# MFS II EVALUATIONS

Joint evaluations of the Dutch Co-Financing System 2011 - 2015

*Civil Society contribution*
*towards achieving*
*the Millennium Development Goals*

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# Country report

# INDONESIA

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July 2015

**SGE** **Stichting Gezamenlijke Evaluaties**

Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research
WOTRO Science for Global Development

PREFACE

This report is one of a series of evaluation reports, consisting of ten reports in total, reflecting the results of the jointly-organised MFS II evaluation:
- eight country reports (India, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Uganda, Indonesia, DR Congo, Liberia, Pakistan);
- a synthesis report (covering the eight country studies); and
- a report with the results of the international lobbying and advocacy programmes.

This series of reports assessed the 2011-2015 contribution of the Dutch Co-Financing System (MFS II) towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals, strengthening international civil society, setting the international agenda and changing decision-makers' policy and practice, with the ultimate goal of reducing structural poverty. On July 2nd, 2015, the reports were approved by the independent steering committee (see below), which concluded that they meet the quality standards of validity, reliability and usefulness set by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

MFS II has been the 2011-2015 grant framework for Co-Financing Agencies (CFAs). A total of 20 alliances of Dutch CFAs were awarded € 1.9 billion in MFS II grants by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. CFAs receiving MFS II funding work through partnerships with Southern partner organisations supporting a wide range of development activities in over 70 countries and at the global policy level.

The MFS II framework required each alliance to carry out independent external evaluations of the effective use of the available funding. These evaluations had to meet quality standards in terms of validity, reliability and usefulness. The evaluations had to focus on four categories of priority result areas, as defined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and comprise baseline assessments serving as a basis for measuring subsequent progress.

Out of the 20 alliances receiving MFS II funding, 19 decided to have their MFS II-funded activities evaluated jointly. These 19 alliances formed the *Stichting Gezamenlijke Evaluaties (SGE)*[1], which acted on their behalf in relation to the joint MFS II evaluation. The SGE was assisted by an 'Internal Reference Group', consisting of seven evaluation experts of the participating CFAs.

The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO/WOTRO) managed the evaluation and selected ten research teams to carry out the joint MFS II evaluation: eight teams responsible for carrying out studies at country level, one team responsible for the synthesis of these country studies, and one team responsible for the study of international lobbying and advocacy. Each study comprises a baseline assessment (2012) and a final assessment (2014). Research teams were required to analyse the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of development interventions funded by MFS II. An independent steering committee was appointed to verify whether the studies met with the required quality standards. In its appraisal, the steering committee drew on assessments by two separate advisory committees.

[1] *Stichting Gezamenlijke Evaluaties can be translated as Joint Evaluation Trust.*

The evaluation has been implemented independently. The influence of the CFAs was limited to giving feedback on the first draft reports, in particular to correct inaccuracies. The contents and presentation of information in this report, including annexes and attachments, are therefore entirely the responsibility of the research team and/or NWO/WOTRO.
However, as SGE we are responsible for adding this preface, the list with parties involved and a table of contents, in the cases that the report is a compilation of several reports.
In addition we would like to note that when reference is made to individual case studies, this should be seen as illustrative examples, rather than as representative of a CFA's entire partner portfolio.

The Dutch CFAs participating in this unique joint evaluation are pleased that the evaluation process has been successfully completed, and thank all the parties involved for their contribution (see the next pages for all the parties involved). We hope that the enormous richness of the report will serve not only accountability but also learning.

Bart Romijn
Chair of the 'Stichting Gezamenlijke Evaluaties'

c/o Partos
Ellermanstraat 18B
1114 AK Amsterdam
www.partos.nl
info@partos.nl

## Participants MFSII Evaluation

*The SGE[1] alliances (and their lead organisations)*

Freedom from fear (PAX)
United Entrepreneurship Coalition (Spark)
Impact Alliance (Oxfam Novib)
Communities of Change (Cordaid)
WASH Alliance (Simavi)
People Unlimited 4.1 (Hivos)
Dutch Consortium for Rehabilitation (ZOA)
SRHR Alliance (Rutgers)
ICCO Alliance (ICCO)
Connect4Change (IICD)
Connect Now (War Child)
Woord en Daad & Red een Kind Alliance (Woord en Daad)
Together4Change (International Child Support)
Child Rights Alliance (PLAN Netherlands)
Ecosystem Alliance (IUCN)
Partners for Resilience (Nederlandse Rode Kruis)
Press Freedom 2.0 (Free Press Unlimited)
Fair Green and Global (Both ENDS)
Kind en Ontwikkeling (Terre des Hommes)

*The SGE Board*

Bart Romijn (Partos/chair)
Ben Witjes (Hivos)
Harry Derksen (New World Campus)
Jan Lock (Woord en Daad)
Dianda Veldman (Rutgers)
Lucia Helsloot (Partos)
Marouschka Booy (independent consultant)
Mirjam Locadia (Partos, until 09/2014)
Alexander Kohnstamm (Partos/chair, until 10/2013)

*The SGE Internal Reference Group*

Yvonne Es (Oxfam Novib)
Rens Rutten (Cordaid)
Karel Chambille (Hivos)
Peter Das (ZOA)
Ruth van Zorge (Rutgers)
Dieneke de Groot (ICCO)
Wouter Rijneveld (independent)

[1] Stichting Gezamenlijke Evaluaties

*NWO/WOTRO, the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research*

Dr. Martijn Wienia
Dr. Gerrie Tuitert
Sabine Zinsmeister
Dr. Henk Molenaar (until 11/2014)
Dr. Barbara Plavcak (until 09/2013)

*Steering Committee*

Prof. Wiebe Bijker (chair), Maastricht University, the Netherlands
Dr. Gavin Andersson, Seriti Institute, South Africa
Prof. Anita Hardon, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Prof. John Rand, University of Copenhagen, Denmark
Ms. Mallika R. Samaranayake, independent consultant, Sri Lanka
Dr. Zenda Ofir, independent consultant, South Africa (until 10/2012)

*Advisory Committee for the Country Level and Synthesis studies*

Prof. James Copestake (chair), University of Bath, Department of Social and Policy Sciences, UK
Prof. Arnab Acharya, OP Jindal Global University, School of Government and Public Policy, India & London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, UK
Prof. Bagele Chilisa, University of Botswana, Botswana
Prof. Christopher Cramer, University of London, Department of Development Studies, UK
Dr. Nathalie Holvoet, University of Antwerp, Institute of Development Policy and Management, Belgium
Dr. Janice Jiggins, Independent consultant & guest researcher Wageningen University & Research Centre, Communication Science, the Netherlands
Dr. Stefan Leiderer, Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), Department of Bilateral and Multilateral Development Cooperation, Germany
Prof. Desmond McNeill, University of Oslo, Centre for Development and the Environment, Norway
Dr. Howard White, International Initiative for Impact Evaluation 3ie, USA
Mr. Burt Perrin, Independent consultant, France – participated in first two calls
Dr. Jim Rugh, UK – participated in first two calls
Prof. Tom Schwandt, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA – participated in first two calls

*Synthesis team*

Prof. Dr. J.W. Gunning
Prof. Dr. J. van der Gaag
Gerton Rongen

*Principal Investigators/Evaluators (per country)*

India: Prof. dr. B.W. Lensink, University of Groningen, The Netherlands
Liberia: Prof. dr. ir. E.H. Bulte, University of Wageningen & Research Centre, The Netherlands
Indonesia: Prof. M.P. Pradhan, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Pakistan: J.P. Tranchant, Institute of Development Studies, UK
DRC/Uganda: Prof. dr. ir. E.H. Bulte, University of Wageningen & Research Centre, The Netherlands
Bangladesh: Dr. J. Devine, University of Bath, UK
Ethiopia: Prof. dr. B.W. Lensink, University of Groningen, The Netherlands

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# Narrative country report on Indonesia

## MFS II Joint Evaluations

## FINAL REPORT

**9 April 2015**









# Contact information


### *Amsterdam Institute for International Development (AIID)*

Trinity building C, 3rd floor, Rm XT-3.17
Pietersbergweg 17
1105 BM Amsterdam
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)20 5661596
F +31 (0)20 5665997
www.aiid.org

### *Centre for Development Innovation (CDI), Wageningen University and Research Centre*

Postbus 88
6700 AB Wageningen
The Netherlands
T + 31 (0)317 48 68 00
E info.cdi@wur.nl
www.wageningenUR.nl/cdi

### *SurveyMeter*

Jl. Jenengan Raya No.109
Maguwoharjo, Depok, Sleman,
Yogyakarta 55282
Indonesia
T +62 (0) 274 4477464
F +62 (0) 274 4477004
www.surveymeter.org

# List of contributors

## *MDG component*

**AIID**

Menno Pradhan (Principal Investigator)
Melinda Vigh (Research Coordinator)
Marije Groot Bruinderink (Project Manager)
Iris van Rossum (Junior Researcher)
Lene Böhnke (Junior Researcher)
Kimberley Wallaart (Qualitative Researcher)
Stavros Malamas (Research Assistant)
Emilie Berkhout (Research Assistant)

**SurveyMeter**

Ni Wayan Suriasatini (Research Coordinator)
Bondan Sikoki (Survey Expert)
Mardiana Br Ginting (Project Manager)
Muhammad Mulia (Qualitative Researcher)
Kamti Ningsih (Qualitative Researcher and Field Coordinator)
Setyo Pujiastuti (Qualitative Researcher)

## *Capacity development component*

**CDI**

Cecile Kusters (Overall 5C coordinator Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia)

**SurveyMeter**

Bekti Dwi Andari (5C Coordinator in Indonesia In-Country Team)
Novina Suprobo (Evaluator in Indonesia In-Country Team)
Widya Priyahita (Evaluator in Indonesia In-Country Team)
Rumenta R. Sihombing (Evaluator in Indonesia In-Country Team)
Seto W. Rokhmatulloh (Evaluator in Indonesia In-Country Team)
Ita Rosita (Evaluator in Indonesia In-Country Team)

**Other**

Martijn Wieriks, SEPAM Consultants Indonesia (5C coordinator Indonesia)

## *Civil society component*

**CDI**

Dieuwke Klaver

**Other**

Hester Smidt

**SurveyMeter**

Kharisma Nugroho
Kharisma Prasetyo
Ciptaningrat Larastiti
Sopril Amir
Sutikno

## Acknowledgement

We are grateful to all the people that have contributed to this report. We particularly would like to thank the staff and the leaders of all Southern Partner Organisations that assisted us in collecting information about the projects and the organisation itself for the baseline. We also thank the Co-Funding Agencies and the representatives of the Dutch Consortia for making available background documentation.

In addition, we would like to give credit to Paula Bilinsky for her contribution in the development of the Capacity Development evaluation tool and training of the Indonesian researchers in the baseline phase. At the baseline period, Débora de Oliveira Martins, Marente Vlekke and other research assistants at AIID have also contributed to the report. We are also grateful for the staff at Survey Meter for implementing the baseline surveys. Finally, we would like to thank Erwin Bulte of Wageningen University and Robert Lensink of Rijksuniversiteit Groningen for collaborating in setting up the evaluation designs.

We hope that this baseline report will provide useful insights and that it is a good basis for making final conclusions about the MFS II funding to Southern Partner Organisations.

# Executive summary

## 1. Introduction

The Netherlands has a long tradition of public support for civil bi-lateral development cooperation, going back to the 1960s. The Co-Financing System (*Medefinancieringsstelsel*, or 'MFS') is its most recent expression. MFS II is the 2011-2015 grant frameworks for Co-Financing Agencies (CFAs), which is directed at achieving a sustainable reduction in poverty. A total of 20 consortia of Dutch CFAs have been awarded €1.9 billion for the period 2011-2015 in MFS II grants by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). The overall aim of the MFS is to contribute to structural poverty reduction in the south by supporting Dutch private non-governmental organisations that share this aim. These Dutch CFAs usually collaborate with local Southern partner organisations (SPOs) that are based in the south.

The overall purpose of the joint MFS II evaluations at the country level is to account for results of MFS II-funded or –co-funded development interventions implemented by Dutch CFAs and/or their Southern partners and to contribute to the improvement of future development interventions. The specific aims of the evaluations of development interventions at country level are threefold: (1) to assess the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of development interventions funded by MFS II; (2) to develop and apply innovative methodologies for the evaluations of development interventions; and (3) to provide justified recommendations that enable Dutch CFAs and/or their Southern partners to draw lessons for future development interventions.

To this end, the country evaluations comprised a baseline assessment in 2012 and a follow-up assessment in 2014, and were arranged according to three categories of priority result areas as defined by MoFA:

- Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) & themes;
- Capacity development of Southern partner organisations (SPO);
- Efforts to strengthen civil society.

The MFS II evaluation in Indonesia was carried out in the framework of a collaboration of the Amsterdam Institute for International Development (AIID), Centre for Development Innovation (CDI) in Wageningen, and Survey Meter in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. AIID was responsible for the overall management of the evaluation and the design and evaluation of the MDG component; CDI led the designing and evaluation of the capacity development and civil society strengthening components; while Survey Meter oversaw and implemented the data collection.

This narrative report provides an overview of the findings of the evaluation components in Indonesia for the 12 projects selected for the MDG evaluation at the final beneficiary level; 12 SPOs evaluated on capacity development; and 10 SPOs assessed with respect to civil society strengthening. The SPOs for the MDG and capacity development components were pre-selected by NWO-WOTRO, while they were sampled by the evaluation team for the civil society component. In the sample, 5 SPOs were included in both the MDG and capacity development components and 2 SPOs were common in the MDG and civil society components. However, the report does not address the synergies between the different

components as in practice the sampled beneficiaries of SPOs in the MDG evaluation are only minimally affected by the changes in the SPOs' capacity and links to civil society between 2012 and 2014 because they benefitted from the SPOs activities mostly prior to these changes were realised (i.e. before the baseline period). Nonetheless, available data was shared between the evaluation teams responsible for the different components for these SPOs.

In the following sections, the main findings for the three evaluation components are summarized starting with the MDG component, capacity development component and, finally, the civil society component.

## 2. Achievement of Millennium Development Goals and Themes

### 2.1. Introduction

The MDG component of the MFS II evaluation addresses five pre-determined evaluation questions:

1. What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period?
2. To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. What is the relevance of these changes?
4. Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient?
5. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

These questions are assessed for the 12 selected projects working on different MDGs and themes. Among the projects, 7 of them (partially) aim at poverty alleviation[1] (MDG 1), and 6 (partially) work on sustainable living environment, forests and biodiversity[2] (MDG 7 a and b). These two topics cover 9 of the 12 selected projects in Indonesia, while the remaining 3 projects are related to the MDGs on gender[3] (MDG 3) and health[4] (MDGs 4, 5 and 6).

We discuss the evaluation findings for these projects according to their final objectives or topics, which do not always coincide with the MDG categories. The following sections present our findings for the following topics:

1. Projects on reforestation: WIIP
2. Projects on poverty alleviation: FIELD, SC GREEN, KSP-QT, SC LED-NTT/FSPP and partially WIIP
3. Projects on empowering indigenous communities: Pt.PPMA, NTFP-EP, YRBI and HuMa
4. Projects on sexual education: YPI
5. Projects assisting victims of gender based violence (GBV): LRC-KJHAM and Rifka Annisa

[1] The following SPOs (projects) are evaluated under MDG 1: FIELD, SC GREEN, KSP-QT, SC LED-NTT and partially WIIP. SPOs Pt.PPMA and NTFP-EP are also partially related to MDG 1, however, these projects were not evaluated with respect to their impacts on poverty alleviation.

[2] The following SPOs (projects) are evaluated under MDG 7ab: WIIP, Pt.PPMA, NTFP-EP, and partially YRBI and HuMa. In addition, FIELD is also partially works on the MDG on sustainable living environment.

[3] The following SPOs (projects) are evaluated under MGD 3: LRC-KJHAM, Rifka Annisa and YPI.

[4] Only Rifka Annisa is selected to be evaluated on the MDG on health.

Before we outline the evaluation methodology and delve into discussing the results, it is important to point out that all of the projects started already before the baseline period of the MFS II evaluation. 3 of 12 contracts already stopped at end 2012 (KSP-QT, LRC-KJHAM and Rifka Annisa). Another 3 contracts were extended (FIELD and SC GREEN) or a new project has been set up serving the same beneficiaries (SC LED-NTT/FSPP). The contract period for the remaining 6 projects was better aligned with the project activities. Nonetheless, except for one project (SC GREEN), in all sampled projects the project beneficiaries have been reached already before the baseline survey. This had important implications for the evaluation methodology and the results of the evaluation.

Finally, it is important to mention that some projects contained multiple sub-projects (NTFP-EP, HuMa, SC LED-NTT). In these cases, we have selected only one of these sub-projects. Therefore, the results of the evaluation are not necessarily generalizable over the whole project.

## 2.2. Methodological approach

### *Change in outcomes between 2012 and 2014*

The evaluation of the selected MDG projects was based on the project logic or result chain of the evaluated projects.[5] For each project, we identified specific evaluation questions and (intermediate) outcome indicators that were linked to the outputs and outcomes of the interventions (see Annex B). This approach, on the one hand, guided us in measuring outcome indicators were the project is mostly likely to have an effect, and on the other hand, it can help us determine whether the changes in outcomes can be attributed to the evaluated intervention following the logic of the result chain. We only collected information on relevant and measureable outcome indicators,[6] which we tried to link to uniform indicators if possible. We report on the changes in these outcome indicators for the surveyed beneficiaries between 2012 and 2014.

### *Attribution of changes to MFS II interventions*

The WOTRO call puts particular emphasis on impact evaluation. Impact evaluation compares the situation as it was realized with the projects to the hypothetical situation of no intervention (counterfactual). This allows one to isolate the contribution of the Dutch MFS II on the outcomes to be studied. Wherever possible, we aimed to use a comparison group in the evaluation design to estimate the counterfactual. In this case, we used the difference-in-difference methodology[7] to estimate the impact of the intervention.

[5] The *result chain* links the project activities to outputs achieved through these activities, and outcomes realised through the outputs. Whereas project outputs can be affected by the project implementers to a large extent, the materialisation of outcomes depends mostly on external factors from the perspective of the project implementers, such as the decisions of local governments, weather conditions or market prices.

[6] Hence, we did not collect information on the uniform indicators that were irrelevant for the project or not measureable using the surveys.

[7] This method compares the changes in outcomes between a treatment and comparison group over the period of time when the intervention takes place.

Unfortunately, all of the sampled projects were already on-going at the time of the baseline survey. Therefore, the difference-in-difference estimate does not capture impacts that were realised before the baseline. In order to assess the early effect of the projects (before the baseline), we compared the baseline outcomes between the treatment and comparison households controlling for household characteristics like age, gender and education of the household head, household size and other observable characteristics that were independent of the intervention.

For four of these projects (partially) related to poverty alleviation, it was possible to use difference-in-difference methodology complemented with cross-sectional analysis at the baseline to evaluate the impact of the project activities both during the evaluation period and before the baseline ('early treatment effect'). For two projects with planned comparison groups, we only used cross-sectional analysis due to unexpected circumstances related to the project implementation.

For the remaining six projects which focused on natural resource management (4 projects), good governance (2 projects) and counselling of victims of GBV (2 projects), we relied on before-after comparison complemented with qualitative data collection to find out the causal channels that have led to the changes in outcomes, including the intervention supported by MFS.[8]

In addition, for one project on reforestation, we also conducted an ecological survey of the forest condition and biodiversity both at the baseline and endline.

All data collected are based on self-reporting of the respondents, except for the ecological survey.

### *Relevance of changes*

To investigate the relevance of the observed changes, we assessed the size of the impact and whether the project addressed an important issue for the beneficiaries. In addition, we compare project impacts to existing literature.

### *Efficiency*

We planned to address this evaluation question through a cost-benefit analysis for each project and compare the results to similar projects. In order to obtain information regarding project costs, we focused on the SPOs as the primary source of information because we assumed the SPOs to be the most knowledgeable about the costs of activities. However, for some projects costs did not include all the costs related to delivering the intervention to the beneficiaries, while some project had different funding sources and several different project activities, which made it difficult to calculate project costs.

In addition, for some projects the cost information was only available in Indonesian rupiahs (IDR). For these projects, we used average annual exchange rates[9] to calculate the amounts in euros, while for the other projects the reported cost information in euros was used. The information on total project costs

[8] The resulting qualitative reports are included as annexes to the project reports.

[9] The annual average exchange rates used are 12,264 IDR/EUR in 2011, 12,087 IDR/EUR in 2012, 13,923 IDR/EUR in 2013 and 16,040 IDR/EUR in 2014. Source: http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/.

(in euros) does not take into account the inflation rate. Therefore, we used International dollars[10] adjusted for inflation (2011 prices) and purchasing power parity when calculating the unit costs of projects. This ensures that the costs are comparable across countries and time, and allows us to easily calculate the overall costs per beneficiary over multiple years at constant prices.

The main difficulty appeared in identifying the unit for which to calculate the unit costs: we only managed to do so for 5 projects (WIIP, FIELD, SC GREEN, SC LED-NTT and YPI). For these projects, we compare the projects' unit costs to the costs of similar interventions based on the findings of the Synthesis team.

### *Limitations*

A number of methodological issues made these evaluation challenging. First of all, at the time of the baseline, most projects had already started. All but one project had received MFS funding for over a year by the time of the baseline. In some cases, the MFS funding dried up during the evaluation period. Four projects ended their contracts with the CFA shortly after the baseline.

We focused the evaluation on the impact of local organizations supported by the SPO under MFS on ultimate beneficiaries, irrespective of whether these organizations were still receiving funds support from the SPO. The rationale behind this decision is that the support provided by the SPO was often in the form of capacity building or rotating funds, the benefits of these investments should be long lasting.

The fact that some SPOs did not directly engage with ultimate beneficiaries, but rather supported local organizations in doing so more effectively, was also unexpected. In our opinion, some of these projects could have been classified as capacity building or civil society evaluations. This explains our reliance on similar methodologies as used in these evaluations.

Finally, we often encountered that the available sample size was small as a result limited scope of the intervention that could be traced back to MFS, or because the project had regionally based objectives, such as forestry management. This also resulted in greater reliance on qualitative methods and process tracing.

## 2.3. Changes in outcomes and attribution (evaluation questions 1, 2 and 5)

We discuss the findings under 5 themes: reforestation, poverty alleviation, empowering indigenous communities, sexual education and gender based violence.

### *Reforestation*

The climate risk reduction project (WIIP) provided 7 communities in Flores (East Indonesia) with (conditional) grants and training to restore mangrove forests, reduce disaster risks and engage in

[10] The following exchange rates were used based on PPP conversion factor using the World Development Indicators: 3,606.57 IDR/Int$ in 2011, 3,636.38 IDR/Int$ in 2012, 3,682.25 IDR/Int$ in 2013 and 4,530.90 IDR/Int$ in 2014. Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#

sustainable livelihood activities. The project also aimed to raise awareness on the importance of mangrove forests for protection against tsunamis. Project participants received compensation for reforestation (grant) and a loan for sustainable livelihood activities, which was converted to a grant if 80 percent of the agreed number of trees were alive after 3 years. Community groups were formed to take charge of the management of the project.

We found that the project was successfully implemented. Over half of the surveyed villagers participated in mangrove planting, 119 hectares of additional forest was attributed to the project and the planting resulted in additional income for villagers. Hazard-prone areas were identified and awareness raising campaigns were conducted in 6 of 7 project villages; while alert teams were set up in every project village; and village regulations on natural resource extraction and land use now take into account natural hazards. Except for reforestation, the project's effects on the direct beneficiaries are muted due to improvements occurring also in the comparison areas.

### *Poverty alleviation*

The poverty alleviation projects assisted farmers to breed seeds that are less reliant on fertilizers and pesticides and improve access to markets (FIELD), promoted organic farming practices and certification (SC LED-NTT/FSPP), provided business development services to groups of female entrepreneurs, usually working in the textile sector (SC GREEN) and provided capacity building and seed funding to savings and credit cooperatives to improve the financial and social performance (KSP-QT).

All projects were implemented according to plan except of SC GREEN, which changed course midway from supporting local organizations to providing training directly to female entrepreneurs. The result was that few project activities were implemented over the evaluation period with a handful of beneficiaries. For the farming projects, around 40 percent of the sampled farmers in the treatment groups participated in any of the trainings provided by the project. For the seed capital project, the only activity which directly affected beneficiaries and could be traced back to MFS was trainings on financial literacy, which were attended by about 25 percent of the sampled treatment group.

Poverty impacts, if any, were only found at baseline. The sampled treatment groups for FIELD, SC LED-NTT/FSPP, and the 2 cooperatives supported under the Seed Capital project of KSP-QT had, respectively, about 40 and 20 percent higher consumption and the same level of income as the comparison group at baseline controlling for observed characteristics. The difference in difference results, providing an estimate of the gain over the evaluation period, show no positive impacts on poverty anywhere. For SC LED-NTT/FSPP, the results even point to a fall in incomes of about 30 percent as a result of the project, caused by regional unfavorable conditions for cashews which were a more important source of income for farmers in the treatment group.

### *Empowering indigenous communities*

Four projects supported communities to improve their awareness and management of natural resources and reduce conflicts over natural resources, in particular forest land. Pt.PPMA implemented a participatory forestry mapping project in Papua, while NTFP-EP in Kalimantan. In both cases, communities did not have formal claims on community forest land, which resulted in lack of forest

management and conflicts over forest land with other communities or palm oil companies (Kalimantan). YBRI, operating in North Sumatra, and HuMa, shared these objectives but had a greater focus on strengthening local institutions that could manage forests and potential conflicts.

At the community level, almost all projects were implemented as planned. The exception is the Pt.PPMA project, where almost no project activities were realized during the contract period (2012-2014) and the contract was terminated.[11] Generally, forestry mapping activities were finalized rather quickly but legalizing the maps took a very long time because of boundary disputes with other villages and a slow response rate of local Government. HuMa also provided training on access to justice for the potential threat of natural resource extraction. The projects' activities mostly involved the local leaders in the community, and women were rarely involved.

We find very little evidence of impact in all four quantitative surveys. Most villages already had regulations on the use of forest, and we find no evidence of those being more effectively applied at endline. We observe small positive improvements in the attitude of villagers towards forest land. There is no increase in the sense of control villagers feel with regards to land. On the positive side, qualitative work indicated an increased support to traditional institutions over the past years, in part as result of the project. There is also evidence from the qualitative work that the participatory mapping had managed to resolve or prevent potential conflicts over land.

### *Sexual education*

The DAKU and Dance for Life (D4L) programmes of YPI aim to increase the capacity of young people to make safe and informed sexual and reproductive health decisions, and are implemented at high schools in Jakarta as extracurricular programmes. DAKU is a computer-based Comprehensive Sexual Education (CSE) programme covering issues like HIV prevention, sexual abuse and other risky behaviour issues like drug prevention. D4L on the other hand is an international programme. It employs dance, music and performing acts and focuses mainly on HIV/AIDS issues.

We find positive effect of the DAKU program in combination with the D4L program on knowledge and attitudes, while we do not find effects for the Dance for Life program alone. This is most likely due to the stronger focus of the DAKU programme, while in the D4L program dance was prioritized over the educational objectives.

### *Assistance to victims of GBV*

Both the Legal Resources Centre for Gender Justice and Human Rights (LRC-KJHAM) and Rifka Annisa are NGOs providing services to female and child victims of violence in the form of psychological counselling and legal aid services. Both NGOs have been providing these services for a long time and MFS support was used to fund part of this ongoing work.

Regarding the beneficiaries, we observed that several beneficiaries visited the service centres only once, particularly in the case of Rifka Annisa. Most respondents who visited the organisations multiple times have turned to the organisations for help in a litigation procedure (legal aid). This is also true for Rifka

[11] This is due to the sudden decease of Pt.PPMA's director in 2011, which led to an organisational crisis.

Annisa. The number of women who experienced either physical, psychological or sexual violence (or a combination of those) in the past 12 months (LRC-KJHAM) or 3 months (Rifka Annisa) decreased for both projects while indicators of psychological health improved somewhat. The women from both projects show satisfaction in the sense that they feel more emotional stable and less stressed due to the services. However, only a small part of the changes can be attributed to the projects. Respondents' family and friends played the most important role in overcoming the burden of domestic abuse, albeit respondents still found it difficult to cope with emotional problems at the endline.

## 2.4. Relevance of changes

### *Reforestation*

Tsunamis have proven to be devastating and the area is tsunami prone. In that sense the WIIP project addresses an important issue for beneficiaries. Regarding the reforestation efforts of WIIP, the survival rate of seedlings was 66% of the total planted trees and 83% of the agreed planting (with replanting) at the end of 2013. Comparing these results to existing studies, we find that the bio-rights approach of WIIP to use residents living close to mangroves to maintain the plants is well-designed. The resulting survival rates are also in the upper range of reforestation projects.

### *Poverty alleviation*

We find very little evidence that the projects improved the livelihoods of the beneficiary households. The developments in household wealth among the beneficiary households are usually matched by improvements in the comparison groups. In the case of the SC LED-NTT project, we even found that due to better diversification of income sources, the comparison households could better cope with a bad cashew nut harvest in the area. Data from the agriculture oriented projects (FIELD and SC LED-NTT) show that households move from investing into farming tools to rather investing in new non-farm businesses, which may be a sign of more diversification of household income.

Access to financial services in the form of saving and borrowing are important tools for better aligning household income and expenditure, and facilitating investments into businesses or farming tools. Many rural households face constraints in accessing formal financial services. The cooperatives participating in the KSP-QT project offer financial services from poor (KSP-QT and KSU-GTGS) to middle income (KSU-GTGS) rural households that are designed to match the needs of their membership. In this respect, the KSP-QT project addresses a relevant issue for the beneficiaries. However, our finding suggest that after the repayment of loans, many households decide to stop saving and leave the cooperative. Hence, the project savings and credit cooperatives serve only a temporary purpose for some households.

We observe similar findings also for the FIELD and SC GREEN projects: some cooperative members have also quit by the endline survey; and in the SC GREEN project, a large share of the 50 participants of the first introductory training on *kanzashi* did not adopt the new skills in their livelihood activities. In addition, all SC GREEN project participants already had a livelihood activity prior to the project that they kept as their main activity also after the project.

Regarding the project beneficiaries, for the SC GREEN and FIELD projects, they were richer than the average Indonesian household in terms of asset ownership, while the beneficiaries of the LED-NTT and KSP-QT cooperative are poorer than the average. Hence, the projects are more needed for these households who live in more remote areas.

### *Empowering indigenous communities*

We do not observe a significant change in the outcome variables. However, the issues addressed by the 4 projects (Pt.PPMA, NTFP-EP, YRBI and HuMa) are very important for the communities: the prospect of recognition of the indigenous communities' sovereignty over the natural resources located in their territory by the local government. Nonetheless, at the individual level respondents are most concerned by more urgent matters like education, health care, access to clean water and the road conditions/access of the village. Almost none of the respondents thought that 'exploitation of natural resources' was an urgent issue. This may indicate a lack of understanding about the likely causes for water scarcity (i.e. environmental destruction due to mining activities and conversion of lands to plantations), or a reluctance to admit to it due to financial interests in the mining activities.

### *Sexual education*

In general, SRHR information addresses an important issue for the targeted beneficiaries. To assess the actual satisfaction of the beneficiaries with the project, students were asked about the effect of the programmes on their life. Mostly an increase of knowledge in certain areas like reproductive health, HIV/AIDS and safe behaviour were mentioned. Some students also mentioned positive changes in their behaviour and attitude towards others, i.e. being more careful and understanding.

### *Assistance to victims of GBV*

A first indication that LRC-KJHAM indeed addresses an important issue for the beneficiaries is that 85% of the respondents visited LRC-KJHAM more than once. Given that respondents visit the SPOs voluntarily, their continued use of Rifka Annisa's and LRC-KJHAM's services signals the value to the respondents. Also, most women agree that the support group activities were or would be very helpful for them. However, most women cannot participate in the support group (only 5 of 20 women were a member of the support group all through the evaluation period) due to the distance to the meeting and the time of the meeting (during working hours).

In addition, the existence of organisations that provide free counselling and legal aid services to victims of SGBV is essential for creating a society that is free of SGBV. They not only provide services but stand as proof for the rights of women, children and other marginalised groups. The more these organisations are known, for example through media coverage or through information from friends, police and health care providers, the more likely it is that abused women will break their silence and seek help to improve their situation either through mediation or divorce.

## 2.5. Efficiency

As discussed above, unit costs were calculated for 5 of the projects (WIIP, FIELD, SC GREEN, SC LED-NTT and YPI). Based on the benchmarks costs identified by the Synthesis team, none of these projects are cost effective, i.e. they operate with higher costs than similar projects. However, it has to be kept in mind that most of the projects are relatively small and in case of the WIIP and LED-NTT/FSPP projects also quite intensive, which contribute to higher costs.

Looking at the benefits of the projects, we also found that costs were higher than the observed benefits in terms of livelihood improvements (no significant effects were found) for the 4 projects working on poverty alleviation. In addition, not all project results can be measured by livelihood improvements. A good example would be increased skills in handcrafts or sustainable farming practices. The only positive cost-benefit estimate was found in terms of the estimated benefits of mangroves and the costs of the WIIP project, both of which were quite high. For the sexual education programme of YPI, no cost-benefit analysis was done.

## 2.6. Overall conclusions

First, project impacts in the uniform indicators were often minimal, if any, because (1) often the project did not explicitly target the uniform indicators; (2) the project interventions were not substantial enough or reached a small fraction of the intended beneficiaries; (3) projects were not successful in reaching their final objectives in terms of outcomes at the final beneficiary level. In addition, the difficulties mentioned in the first bullet made it difficult to draw strong conclusions regarding impact.

Second, looking at the interventions themselves, we mostly found professional and committed local NGOs and CSOs implementing the projects, which is reflected in the high scores on the design and implementation of the projects (Table 6). Projects were often funded from multiple sources. The interventions which could be traced back to MFS sometimes turned out to be very small (for example, for Rifka Annisa). Many projects did not spend the whole budget (for example, NTFP-EP, FIELD and SC LED-NTT), and the project period was also often extended (for example, NTFP-EP and FIELD). Most projects were implemented according to plans except for a few: in the case of the Pt.PPMA project the contract was stopped due to non-performance, and the implementation of the GREEN project of SC was adjusted. However, especially the project aimed empowering indigenous communities using participatory mapping methods (Pt.PPMA, NTPF-EP, YRBI and HuMa/Wallacea) struggled to deliver the planned outcomes due to the limited timeframe for the projects. In the latter case, a long term commitment from the CFAs is important to be able to deliver the desired project outcomes.

Third, we observe that most projects involve a capacity development component (for example, NTFP-EP and HuMa), and some of them even have capacity development of NGOs and CSOs as their primary objective (for example, SC GREEN and KSP-QT). Others provide trainings to community groups or households (for example, WIIP, FIELD and SC LED-NTT/FSPP). In fact, all selected projects focus on one of the following: providing trainings, participatory workshops, counselling and legal aid, SRHR education and linking producers to markets. Regarding the trainings, we often found that their effectiveness could

be increased.[12] Only one project actually disbursed performance-based compensation for project activities (tree planting) to the beneficiaries (WIIP), and another one provided capital for borrowing (KSP-QT). Most projects were designed to have sustainable effects after the project period.

Fourth, for most SPOs, we observe a long working relation between the SPO and CFA. For example, the FIELD and LED-NTT/FSPP projects ran for about 10 years. Hence, the good performance of the SPOs in terms of designing and implementing the projects could be a result of careful partner selection of the CFAs. On the other hand, during the evaluation period some of these working relations have (temporarily) ended due to changing strategies of the CFAs (YRBI, FIELD, KSP-QT).

Fifth, we observe that while some projects worked closely with the beneficiaries (for example, WIIP, YRBI, SC LED-NTT/FSPP), other SPOs were operating at a larger distance from the beneficiaries and more oriented towards civil society and policy influencing and worked with local partner organisations (for example, HuMa, NTFP-EP, FIELD and YPI).[13] Overall, we observe that projects that interacted more intensively with beneficiaries were also more effective (for example, WIIP and YRBI). However, these projects also had the highest costs. Unfortunately, based on the available data, we are not able to assess the efficiency of the two approaches.

Sixth, regarding the relevance of the projects to beneficiaries, most projects addressed relevant issues for the beneficiaries. This is particularly the case for projects on sexual education, services for victims of domestic violence and coastal reforestation. The mapping and natural resource awareness raising projects address important community concerns and are supported by the communities, however, they are not deemed as urgent issues despite the long-term implications of natural resource extraction and the loss of cultural resources. Hence, these projects have an essential role in protecting ecological and cultural resources for future generations. Among the sampled project areas, the projects on poverty alleviation seem to be the least relevant relatively speaking, especially, as only one of the 4 projects is implemented in an underdeveloped area of Indonesia (SC LED-NTT/FSPP).

Overall, we find that the selected project were well-designed and implemented by committed SPOs, albeit the evaluation found limited quantitative impacts of the interventions during the evaluation period and we often found the interventions to be not cost-effective compared to benchmarks provided by the Synthesis team. The latter result may be explained by the small scale of the implemented projects.

Finally, we do not recommend the replication of this evaluation design in the future. However, we encourage carefully designed impact evaluation of development projects that reach a sizeable group of beneficiaries and offer measureable outcome indicators at the final beneficiary level. For small scale projects with outcomes that are difficult to quantify, we recommend the use of more qualitative evaluation methods like process evaluation or process tracing. Regarding the size of the project, it is important to consider whether the outcomes and primary sampling units are at the household or the community level, and the complexity of the project.[14] Most importantly, for all future evaluations we

[12] For example, more effort should be taken by YPI to train teachers on how to effectively deliver the material of the DAKU programme.

[13] Or teachers in the case of YPI.

[14] For projects that involve many different treatments/activities, the beneficiaries should be stratified or separated by the different combination of treatment 'packages'. Evaluating complex projects requires a larger sample size

strongly recommend the development of the evaluation design in cooperation with the SPOs prior to the start of the interventions in order to allow for a true baseline measurement (and possibly the randomisation of beneficiaries) before the project is rolled out.

# 3. Capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations

## 3.1. Methodological approach

The overall evaluation approach for evaluating capacity development of the SPOs is a participatory, theory-based approach using theories of change, impact pathways and process tracing[15,16], in a before-after comparison. Mainly qualitative methods have been used as organisational capacity is characterised by complexity and uncertainty.

The overall evaluation design is centred around the four evaluation questions:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described in more detail in Annex F.

The first (changes in organisational capacity) and the fourth evaluation question are addressed together through:

**Changes in the 5C indicators since the baseline:** standard indicators have been agreed upon for each of the five capabilities of the five capabilities framework (see Annex G) and changes between the baseline, and the endline situation have been described. For data collection, a mix of data collection methods were used, including self-assessments by SPO staff; interviews with SPO staff and externals; document review; observation. For data analysis, the Nvivo software program for qualitative data analysis has been used. Final descriptions per indicator and per capability with corresponding scores have been provided. The scores were developed by the evaluation team, after thorough analysis and description of the situation during endline and how this changes since the baseline. These scores are based on mainly proportional differences. Whilst the information provided by staff may have provided socially desirable answers, the information provided has been cross-checked using different sources of information

due to this stratification. One option to reduce the sample size would be to only evaluate some of the project activities, as was also done for some of the selected MFS II projects.

[15] In Stern et al, 2012: Evaluation and IE in particular, is an opportunity to test a programme's theory through the links in the causal chain. In terms of method, this tendency is close to 'process tracing' (George and McKeown, 1985, Collier 2011), defined by Aminzade (1993) as: 'theoretically explicit narratives that carefully trace and compare the sequences of events constituting the process…'. These causal chains are represented graphically as causal maps or neural networks.

[16] Stern et all (2012) say there are 'three main designs that show promise to reinforce existing IE practice when dealing with complex programmes – theory-based; case-based and participatory'.

(different staff groups based on functions; self-assessments in interviews; interviews with CFA and other externals).

**Key organisational capacity changes – 'general causal map':** during the endline workshop a brainstorm has been facilitated to generate the key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO since the baseline, with related underlying causes. For this purpose, a visual as well as a narrative causal map have been described. This general causal map was developed to also get the SPO perspective on what they considered as important capacity development changes since the baseline. For this reason, and since the indicators by themselves could not provide this overall SPO story and perspectives on what they considered important changes, only the SPO perspective has been included. This was an additional activity that wasn't planned for during the baseline. The analysis in terms of organisational capacity changes has however mainly focused on changes in the 5c indicators.

In terms of the attribution question (2 and 4), **'process tracing'** is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to only 5 of 12 SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This was also confirmed during the 5c endline study. Theory-based evaluation can help to understand why a program works or fails to work and they attend to not only what programs do but also to how participants respond[17]. The theory based approach also allows space for the evaluation to reflect the complex nature of the development process, particularly when focusing on changes in organisational capacity. To deal with the attribution question (2), the theory-based approach '(outcome explaining) process tracing' is used.

A detailed explanation of the methodological approach and reflection on this is provided in Annex F.

## 3.2. Changes in partner organisation's capacity and reasons for change (evaluation question 1 and 4)

**Changes in terms of the five core capabilities**

All in all, changes took place in all the five capabilities, for most of the SPOs, and most of these changes were slight improvements. There were a few exceptions. For Institut Dayakologi no change took place in terms of the average for four of the capabilities. For GSS, Yadupa, and Yayasan Kelola no changes took place in two of these average capabilities. The picture for YRBI is very different from the others, since no changes took place in two capabilities, and a slight deterioration took place in two other capabilities. The main reason for this is that the organisation is in a poor financial situation since ICCO has stopped the contract with YRBI and since then, the organisation has been unable to perform its activities. For 6 (50%) of the SPOs (slight) improvements took place in all of the capabilities: ASB, ECPAT, Lembaga Kita, Rifka Annisa, WIIP, and YPI. WIIP has seen most progress, since in all of the capabilities changes of more than 0.5 have taken place. For ASB and ECPAT also did well, since in three capabilities the progress was 0.5 or more. It must be noted that within these capabilities, and related to the specific indicators, mainly improvements but also some deteriorations have taken place. This is very much specific to the organisation. For specific details about each SPO, we refer to the specific 5C reports.

[17] Carol H. Weiss (2007).

**Key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO - general causal map**

On the whole, according to SPOs for which a 'general causal map' was developed based on what they perceived as key organisational capacity changes since the baseline, MFS II funded capacity development interventions were mentioned as playing a role in bringing about these changes, especially in terms of enhancing staff capacity, mainly in terms of (planning), and M&E (5 SPOs): GSS, ID, Rifka Annisa, Yadupa, YPI, whilst for ASB the strategic planning workshop has sparked of many changes, since it resulted in a leadership change and a strategic plan. Internal factors have also been perceived as very important, whilst external factors have also played a role, particularly in the case of WIIP, with the change of vision and mission at WI-HQ.

## 3.3. Attribution of changes in partner organisation's capacity and reasons for change (evaluation question 2 and 4)

On the whole, it can be concluded that for 3 of the 5 SPOs (for which 'process tracing' was carried out), selected key organisational capacity changes can to a large extent be attributed to MFS II funded capacity development interventions: ASB (1 out of 2 changes); YPI (2 out of 3 changes); and YRBI (1 out of 2 changes). Internal factors have also played an important role in many of these changes. These include changes in leadership (PT.PPMA; YPI) and leadership style (ASB); enhancing staff competencies (ASB, ECPAT, YRBI) and other internal changes. For many of the selected organisational capacity changes, internal changes have played an extremely important role: ASB (2 out of 2); ECPAT (1 out of 2); PT.PPMA (2 out of 2); YPI (1 out of 3); YRBI (1 out of 2). It must be noted that some of the important internal changes were very closely related to MFS II funded capacity development interventions such as the change in leadership style and a strategic document at ASB as a result of the Hivos supported strategic planning workshop which sparked off many internal changes. Only in one case external factors have been mentioned: for YRBI the contract with ICCO expired due to a change in ICCO policy, which was the result of the renewal of the MoU between ICCO and the government of Indonesia. For 4 out of the 5 SPOs (all except PT.PPMA), MFS II capacity development interventions have played a role in enhancing staff competencies. The poor funding situation was a negative change, and has been an issue for two of the SPOs (YPI and YRBI). It is interesting to see that YPI experienced the 5C baseline in 2012 as a capacity development intervention that sparked of many changes in the organisation. For PT.PPMA, there have been no capacity development interventions, even though the CFA has asked the SPO many times for a capacity development plan. For more details please see the separate 5C reports for the SPOs.

## 3.4. Reflections

We recommend for future capacity development evaluations to be more utilisation focused, engaging stakeholders in a learning process so that they can also take up the lessons learned in order to further improve upon their organisations. Now, the evaluation was too much accountability driven. Furthermore, it is important that sufficient time is taken into account for the evaluation process in order to provide useful insights for all involved. The time period of two years was too short to see remarkable changes in terms of capacity development.

Organisational capacity contains many different aspects that are constantly changing. Therefore, it is important to see these as part of a whole rather than separate issues, unlike it had to be done for this evaluation in terms of standard indicators. The different aspects relate to each other and need to be seen more from a whole systems perspective. Furthermore, organisational capacity is complex, methodologies for evaluation need to be tuned to the specific situation of each organisation.

Overall, process tracing has proven to be a useful exercise that provided a lot of insight into how changes in terms of capacity development have taken place. Many SPOs and CFAs valued this insightful learning process and indicated that they would work with the results to further improve the organisational capacity of the SPO. Furthermore, in case of staff turnover, this may have seriously affected institutional memory, which is an important factor, next to the difficulty of recall when describing a chain of events, in qualitative information.

None of the CFAs and SPOs had a clear and explicit Theory of Change for the organisational capacity development of the SPO and this made it difficult to compare and test this theory of change with the final narrative after the process tracing. For future purposes, we recommend that SPO and CFA do a proper analysis of the organisational capacities that the SPO needs to further enhance and make this explicit in the theory of change for the organisational capacity strengthening of the SPO. This would also strengthen theory-based evaluation.

# 4. Efforts to strengthen Civil Society

## 4.1. Introduction

The Civil Society evaluation component of the MFS II evaluation addresses four pre-determined evaluation questions:

1. What are the changes in civil society in the 2012–2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?
2. To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. What is the relevance of these changes?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

To address these evaluation questions, the evaluators were asked to select a sample for the Civil Society evaluation component, unlike for the MDG and Capacity Development evaluation components. A sampling procedure was set up by the evaluators that resulted in the evaluation of five SPOs that address issues related to MDG 7, and five others that work on governance issues. These two themes were selected because most SPOs in Indonesia that receive MFS II funding work on these topics. Within MDG 7, we randomly sampled three SPOs supported by Hivos that are creating cooperatives to improve market access and engage in policy influencing, and two SPOs that address natural resource governance and sustainable livelihoods of forest dependent people supported by IUCN-NL. Within the governance theme; two Hivos' supported organisations are creating space for alternative artist expressions; two

organisations supported by Hivos and Free Press Unlimited that use social and conventional media to engage citizens and youth in online discussions and if necessary in citizen action, and; one organisation supported by Hivos that addresses human rights violations through evidence based advocacy.

### 4.2. Methodology

The evaluation questions aimed at identifying changes occurred in line with the CIVICUS dimensions in the 2012 – 2014 period, the extent to which these changes are to be attributed to the Indonesian SPOs and to MFS II, the relevance of these changes and factors explaining the changes.

*Change* in civil society was documented in relation to the interventions of the SPO, as perceived by the SPO, and expressed in documents, a workshop and follow-up interviews with the SPO, and interviews with external resources persons. To assess whether these changes can be *attributed* to the interventions of the SPO, a theory based methodology was used for five of the ten SPOs while for the others a less extensive contribution analysis was done. The selection of the five SPOs was based upon an estimation of the MFS II budget for that NGO that is related to CIVICUS dimensions, ensuring that both SPOs working on MDG 7 and on governance were amongst the selected as well as a variety of Dutch partners were included. The *relevance question* was assessed through interviews with the SPO and its Dutch partner and context information. Relevance was assessed against the Theory of Change constructed with the SPO during the baseline assessment in 2012, the context in which the SPO is operating and the civil society policies of the Dutch MFS II alliance. The *explaining factors question* assessed organisational factors of the SPO, its external context and the relation between the Dutch and the Indonesian NGO that explained the civil society changes achieved or not. No additional information was collected for this question.

### 4.3. Changes in civil society in relation to SPO interventions

***Governance theme***

*Common Room (CRI) and RUANGRUPA* have contributed to the emergence of new expressions of contemporary arts resulting in an increased exposure of people to alternative expressions of arts. KBR temporarily offered the space for children and teenagers to exchange about issues of their concern, but its Teen Voice radio programme discontinued when KBR failed to mainstream the programme into other networks. CRI has created the space for sharing grassroots information amongst bloggers, community radios and other citizen journalists to voice the day-to-day issues of citizens but failed to mobilise these voices for collaborative action. ELSAM has further positioned itself in the human rights sector as a resource centre on human right atrocities and has used this information for evidence-based advocacy together with its network of both national and local SPOs-CSOs. Its work has resulted in compensations for those affected by natural resource conflicts.

***MDG 7***

The most significant contributions of FIELD, KWLM and LPPSLH in the past two years consist of the expansion of the number of cooperative structures and/or the improvement of their organisational performance. Members improved their bargaining position vis-à-vis middlemen because the cooperatives either help them access premium markets (KWLM and LPPSLH) or provide them access to

credits (FIELD). Cooperative members (and members of FIELD's farmer field schools) have strengthened their personal network and as representatives they have developed relations with local government officials. Whereas FIELD involves small scale farmers in lobby activities with national coalitions, LPPSLH better positioned itself in networks that promote organic farming and food sovereignty. FIELD's most important success since 2012 has been the amendment of the 1992 Crop Production and Protection Act. However, no changes were observed with regards to farmers being able to legalise the intellectual property rights they have when they breed new seed varieties.

WARSI's community based forest management groups increasingly are being endorsed by the authorities, enabling them to manage their village forests for the next 35 years. CBFM groups have started to share experiences, increasingly engage with local governments and are about to form an umbrella organisation. Other SPOs have started replicating the creation of those groups in other districts. Concerns raised are the representativeness of those CBFM groups and how to overcome financial burdens attached to the village forests. WARSI successfully lobbied in Jambi province to create one-stop-shop services to accelerate the implementation of the CBFM scheme. At the same time the government designated 500,000 hectares of forests to be managed by CBFM groups. In West Sumatra the CBFM scheme has been mainstreamed into the provincial forest policy. Together with the other partners of the Ecosystem Alliance WARSI managed to simplify the procedures to obtain a village forest licence in 2014.

***Impact upon the civil society arena, household level, public sector, and private sector***

Overlooking all the changes, most of these occurred in the civil society arena through the creation of community based organisations, cooperatives and the like, followed by changes at household level. Indicators that relate to these two categories already had high scores during the baseline. Changes in the relation with the public sector and in particular influencing policies and practices was less frequently occurring, and impact upon the private sector was negligible. In fact, baseline scores for these two categories were lower than those for civil society and household. Apart from one exception, all changes that occurred since the baseline are minor changes scored with a 1.

## 4.4. Attribution/contribution

***Governance theme***

Out of seven changes, one of the outcomes *cannot* be explained by the SPO: this is CRI's claim that it contributed to the Ministry of Health granting more beneficiaries access to the health insurance scheme through the online platform. Its online platform did not exert public pressure upon the Ministry of Health to change its regulations.

Multiple factors explain the second outcome of CRI; increased participation on the online platform. Each of these factors separately, including CRI's contribution to the increased participation to the platform, forms a *sufficient but not necessary* explanation for the observed change.

RUANGRUPA's and KBR68H' interventions *sufficiently and necessarily* explain their noted changes. RUANGRUPA created the necessary infrastructure and demand for contemporary visual art in Jakarta. Its reputation and role were key in achieving this outcome. KBR68H's interventions also explain the engagement of teenagers and children in the Teen Voice Program. The most valid explanation for the

increased quality of participation of the target group in Teen Voice since the baseline is the shift towards a web-based platform for Teen Voice, in combination with the use of radio and television broadcasts.

Three outcomes are the result of a *causal package*, in which the SPO played a substantial role. ELSAM has an enormous network in which its particular role is to mobilise local information that it uses to draft position papers used by the network for lobby and advocacy. This causal package explained two lobby outcomes. Common Room's innovation to combine traditional Sundanese instruments with heavy metal music and its collaboration with a popular band explain the revival of Sundanese traditions and the integration of heavy metal groups in society.

***MDG 7ab***

With regards to MDG 7ab, nine changes achieved were explained, of which six were assessed with in-depth process tracing; those of LPPSLH, WARSI and NTFP-EP.

Three changes can be explained by a *causal package* of actors and factors that cannot be disentangled and in which the SPO showed to be indispensable. This was the case with FIELD's work in the coalition to push the government for a review of the 1992 Crop Production and Protection Act; WARSI's work to obtain the endorsement of CBFG which required also the support of local authorities at district, provincial and national level, and; WARSI, other SPOs and the provincial government to mainstream CBFM in the West Sumatra forest policies.

The realisation of four other outcomes can be 'attributed' to the SPOs, with local government playing a constructive role. FIELD's, KWLM's and LPPSLH's interventions were a *sufficient and necessary* cause for the creation of cooperatives, and districts provided the enabling environment to do so. The same applies for the second outcome achieved by LPPSLH which consists of the bargaining position of small holders being improved vis-à-vis middlemen because it provided these small holders with alternative and promising value chains through the cooperative.

NTFP-EP's support to the Crafts network and its business unit to market NTFP products is one of the explaining actors for the increased incomes of 17 women weaving baskets. NTFP-EP provides a *sufficient but not necessary* explanation, because other buyers more often buy these products.

NTFP-EP's claim that communities are able to claim their rights to manage natural resources and land in four villages in the first place was only partially true. NTFP-EP's support in mapping the resources and previous work done by other SPOs to organise communities in groups both are a *necessary but not sufficient* cause to explain the outcome; more lobby efforts are needed to integrate the participatory maps into the spatial plans of the district.

**The role of MFS II in the contribution/attribution**

In total, 10 of 16 outcomes were realised with only MFS II funding. MFS II funding was not at all effective with one outcome (CRI), whereas five outcomes materialised during the MFS II period whilst interventions were made during MFS I. Three of these five outcomes where co-funded by other donor organisations.

**Achievement of planned objectives**

When analysing the effectiveness of the SPOs in terms of the achievement of planned objectives, we observe that seven out of the ten are quite effective, having realised 60 % of all their objectives entirely or partially. We also observe, however, that five of the ten SPOs provided insufficient data to assess progress being made against one or several objectives.

**Conclusion**

The overall effectiveness of MFS II with regards to Civil Society is estimated between 60 and 80 percent, based upon the process-tracing exercise and the analysis of the achievement of planned objectives.

### 4.5. Relevance

Most changes explained and other changes in civil society are relevant in the light of the Theory of Change constructed in 2012 during the baseline. All changes are relevant with regards to the context in which they were realised. With few exceptions, changes in civil society are generally speaking relevant in relation to the MFS II policies.

### 4.6. Explaining factors

Most SPOs avail of the *capabilities* to introduce change in civil society. However, Common Room's high staff turnover, decline in staff members and the gap between its ambitions and realisations make this organisation one of the weakest.

CRI, having faced high staff turnover rates (but is growing) and still repositioning itself in society, may also have influenced its outcomes related to the online platform.

Based upon the progress reports made available by the SPOs, we observe that the monitoring systems in place do not allow drawing lessons at outcome level in terms of what works, what does not work and why. Reporting mostly takes place at activity and output level but not at outcome level. Important issues to look at from a civil society perspective are, for instance, the performance of organisations created, a more systematic gathering of information on client satisfaction or impact at household level and governments becoming accountable to citizens.

External factors that provide a conducive environment for the SPOs are Indonesia's connection to the internet; contemporary arts becoming the latest trends; anti-corruption being on the agenda of the government; regulations in favour for community based forest management and the creation of cooperatives, and; growing demands for certified timber and crystal sugar.

Not so conducive factors are the broadcasting law that creates unfair advantages to large media conglomerates and risks to decrease the diversity of expression (CRI and KBR); free expression on the internet (ELSAM and KBR); unfavourable markets for NTFP-EP products in Indonesia because middle class consumers do not buy these products (NTFP-EP), and; NTFP-EP missing the political commitments of district governments for the management of natural resources by communities themselves rather than giving these as concessions to agribusiness and extractive industries.

Relations between the Co-Funding Agencies and the SPOs were overall constructive and supportive.

### 4.7. Design of the interventions

In addition to the mandatory evaluation questions, the synthesis committee added a question about the 'replicability' of the interventions. The evaluation team looked at the extent to which the design could lead to the same outcomes when implemented by a different organisation or in another context, as well as assessing if the design was suitable for a project mode and short term interventions or required a long term and socially embedded process. We categorised the intervention models into those that are replicable, those that are not replicable because they do not fit into a project mode of development and those that need to be redesigned.

Interventions *that are replicable* but with adaptations are those of Combine Resources Institution, KBR68H, FIELD, KWLM, LPPSLH and WARSI:

1. The intervention model of Combine Resource Institution requires more capacity building activities that learn citizen journalists, members of the online platform to jointly exercise pressure upon local and national governments either through social media or by direct engagement.
2. The more or less fixed project format of Free Press Unlimited will become stronger if a more in-depth assessment is made that explores the relations between civic engagement and media usage

among youth, factoring in specific age groups, types of media used, and identifying information gaps.

3. FIELD's impact at household level can improve if more attention is being paid to improve the market access for organic products of the cooperative members and those participating in the Farmers' Field Schools.
4. KWLM's cooperative model is already being replicated by others, but would gain in household impact if less privileged categories in society, including women can become member and if KWLM's shortage of financial liquidity is being addressed.
5. Also LPPSLH's cooperatives for palm sugar farmers is replicable, but more attention is required with regards to gender dimensions at household level and the traceability of products, in particular when organic products are being marketed.
6. WARSI's design and success depends to a large extent to favourable political contexts and to the presence of third-party assistance to support CBFM groups to deal with bureaucracies. The SPO however needs to rethink its strategies to improve the livelihoods of forest dependant people.

Interventions that are *not replicable* because they do not fit into a 'project mode of development' are those of ELSAM and RUANGRUPA:

1. ELSAM's intervention design does not fit into a 'project mode' of development, because its outcomes are partially the result of 20 years of consistent attention on human rights issues, the reputation it has acquired, its huge network with other human rights organisations and its capacity to engage with decision makers within the government and national parliament. RUANGRUPA's outcomes are to be considered as emerging features in an urban context that cannot be planned as an intervention. Therefore its strategy is not replicable in other contexts.
2. Interventions that *need to be redesigned* are Common Room and NTFP-EP.
3. There is a considerable gap in Common Room's Theory of Change to influence the Bandung creative industries and its economy and their realisations in the 2012 – 2014 period. The most important reason for this is to be attributed to its weak organisational capacity, but also strategic thinking is required to harmonise its interventions with its vision and mission.
4. Also NTFP-EP needs to rethink the relations between the interventions it undertakes and the outcomes to be achieved. This is in particular the case for its policy influencing work at district level and strategies to increase the share of household incomes generated by the marketing of NTFP products in the total incomes, as well as strategies to rethink the sharing of benefits in the value chains created.

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| 5C | 5 Capabilities |
| AIID | Amsterdam Institute for International Development |
| ASB | Aliansi Sumut Bersatu (United Alliance of Northern Sumatra) |
| AusAID | Australian Agency for International Development |
| BCI | Basic Capabilities Index |
| BNPB | National Disaster Management Agency |
| BPJS | Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial (Social Security Administration) |
| CBFM | Community-Based Forest Management |
| CCA | Climate Change Adaption |
| CIFOR | Center for International Forestry Research |
| CD | Capacity Development |
| CDI | Wageningen UR Centre for Development Innovation |
| CFA | Co-Financing Agency |
| CR | Common Room |
| CRI | Combine Resource Institution |
| CSE | Comprehensive Sexual Education |
| CSEC | Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children |
| CSO | Civil Society Organisation |
| CSR | Corporate Social Responsibility |
| D4L | Dance4Life |
| DAKU | Dunia Remaja Seru (Lively Youth World) |
| DAP | Dewan Adat Papua (Papua Customary Council) |
| DRC | Disaster Research Centre |
| DRR | Disaster Risk Reduction |
| EA | Ecosystem Alliance |
| ECPAT | 'End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography, and Trafficking of Children for Sexual Purposes'; National Coalition for the Elimination of Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children |
| EED | Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst |
| ELSAM | Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy |
| EMR | Ecosystem Management and Restoration |
| ETC | Edward Taylor Coombs |
| FFS | Farmer Field School |
| FIELD | Farmer Initiatives for Ecological Livelihoods and Democracy |
| FSC | Forest Stewardship Council |
| FSPP | Flores Speciality Products Promotion |
| GBV | Gender-Based Violence |
| GG | Good Governance |
| GIS | Geographic Information System |
| GNI | Gross National Income |

| | |
|---|---|
| GoI | Government of Indonesia |
| GREEN | Garment for Economic Empowerment |
| GSS | Good Shepherd Sisters |
| HDI | Human Development Index |
| HR(M) | Human Resources (Management) |
| HuMa | The Association for Community and Ecologic-Based Law Reform |
| HQ | Head Quarters |
| ICCO | Interchurch Organisation for Development Cooperation |
| ICT | Information and Communication Technology |
| ID | Institut Dayakologi |
| IFACS | Indonesia Forest and Climate Support |
| IOB | Policy and Operations Evaluation Department *(Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie)* |
| IOM | International Organisation for Migration |
| IPM | Integrated Pest Management |
| IPPHTI | Indonesian Integrated Pest Management Farmers Association |
| IUCN | International Union for the Conservation of Nature |
| JRKI | Indonesian Community Radio Network |
| KBR | Kantor Berita Radio |
| KKI | Komunitas Konservasi Indonesia |
| Komnas HAM | Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia |
| KSI | Knowledge Sector Initiative |
| KSM-QTha | Koperasi Sekunder Mentari Qaryah Thayyibah (Secondary Cooperative) |
| KSP-MDM | Koprasi Simpan Pinjam Mentari Dana Mandiri |
| KWLM | Koperasi Wana Lestari Menoreh |
| KSP-QT | Koperasi Simpan Pinjam - Qaryah Thayyibah |
| KSU-GTGS | Koperasi Serba Usaha-Gardu Tani Gedong Songo |
| LED-NTT | Local Economic Development in Nusa Tenggara Timur |
| LMIC | Low and Middle Income Countries |
| LPSK | Witnesses and Victims Protection Agency's |
| LPPSLH | Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengembangan Sumberdaya dan Lingkungan Hidup |
| LRC-KJHAM | Legal Resources Centre for Gender Justice and Human Rights |
| MDG | Millennium Development Goal |
| MDG 1 | Millennium Development Goal on Poverty, and Private sector and agriculture |
| MDG 3 | Millennium Development Goal on Gender |
| MDG 4,5,6 | Millennium Development Goals on Health |
| MDG 7a,b | Millennium Development Goal on Safeguards for a sustainable living environment & forests and biodiversity |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MFS | Co-Financing System (*Medefinancieringsstelsel)* |
| MIS | Management Information System |
| MM | Mensen met een Missie MoFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs |

| | |
|---|---|
| MoH | Ministry of Health |
| MoU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| NA | Not Applicable |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| NTFP | Non-Timber Forest Products |
| NTFP-EP | Non-Timber Forest Products – Exchange Programme |
| NWO-WOTRO | Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research – Science for Global Development |
| OD | Organisational Development |
| PGS | Participatory Guarantee System |
| PKS | Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Justice and Prosperity Party) |
| PME | Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation |
| PMY | Putri Maria dan Yosef |
| Pt. PPMA | Association for Study and Empowerment of Papuan Indigenous People *(Perkumpulan Terbatas untuk Pengkajian dan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Adat Papua)* |
| RGS | Religious of Good Shepherd |
| SC | SwissContact |
| SERF | Social and Economic Rights Fulfilment |
| SLIM | Sustainable Livelihood Initiatives and Models |
| SK | Suara Kommunitas |
| SKN | Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands |
| SOP | Standard Operational Procedures |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |
| SRHR | Sexual Reproductive Health and Rights |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| ToR | Terms of Reference |
| YPI | Yayasan Pelita Ilmu |
| YRBI | Yayasan Rumpun Bambu Indonesia |
| WIIP | Wetlands International Indonesia Programme |
| WPF | World Population Foundation |
| WUR | Wageningen University and Research centre |
| YADUPA | Yayasan anak Dusun Papua |
| YKPHM-Irja | Yayasan Kerjasama Pendidikan Hukum Kritis Irian Jaya |

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Terms of Reference for the MFS II Evaluation

The Netherlands has a long tradition of public support for civil bi-lateral development cooperation, going back to the 1960s. The Co-Financing System (*Medefinancieringsstelsel*, or 'MFS') is its most recent expression. MFS II is the 2011-2015 grant frameworks for Co-Financing Agencies (CFAs), which is directed at achieving a sustainable reduction in poverty. A total of 20 consortia of Dutch CFAs have been awarded €1.9 billion for the period 2011-2015 in MFS II grants by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). The overall aim of the MFS is to contribute to structural poverty reduction in the south by supporting Dutch private non-governmental organisations that share this aim. These Dutch CFA usually collaborate with local Southern partner organisations (SPOs) that are based in the south.

The MFS II framework stipulates that each consortium is required to carry out independent external evaluations to be able to make valid, evaluative statements about the effective use of the available funding. On behalf of Dutch consortia receiving MFS II funding, NWO-WOTRO has issued calls for proposals, on a country by country level basis. This report is part of the joint MFS II evaluations of development interventions for Indonesia.

The overall purpose of the joint MFS II evaluations at the country level is to account for results of MFS II-funded or –co-funded development interventions implemented by Dutch CFAs and/or their Southern partners and to contribute to the improvement of future development interventions.

The specific aims of the evaluations of development interventions at country level are threefold: (1) to assess the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of development interventions funded by MFS II; (2) to develop and apply innovative methodologies for the evaluations of development interventions; and (3) to provide justified recommendations that enable Dutch CFAs and/or their Southern partners to draw lessons for future development interventions.

To this end, the country evaluations comprised a baseline assessment in 2012 and a follow-up assessment in 2014, and were arranged according to three categories of priority result areas as defined by MoFA:

- Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) & themes;
- Capacity development of Southern partner organisations (SPO);
- Efforts to strengthen civil society.

For each priority result areas, pre-determined research questions are specified. For the priority result areas related to MDGs and themes these are:

- What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period?
- To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?

- What is the relevance of these changes?
- Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient?
- What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The research questions for the priority result areas related to capacity development of Southern partner organisation are:

- What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012–2014 period?
- To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
- Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
- What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The research questions for the priority result areas related to civil society are:

- What are the changes in civil society in the 2012–2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?
- To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
- What is the relevance of these changes?
- Were the development interventions of the MFS II consortia efficient?
- What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

These research questions were addressed in the 2012-2014 period. This country narrative report summarizes the main findings of the evaluation activities in Indonesia.

## 1.2. The Evaluation Team and Organisation of the Evaluation

The core of the project team was centered around a collaboration of the Amsterdam Institute for International Development (AIID), Centre for Development Innovation (CDI) in Wageningen, and Survey Meter in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. AIID was responsible for the overall management of the evaluation and the design and evaluation of the MDG component; CDI led the designing and evaluation of the capacity development and civil society strengthening components; while Survey Meter oversaw and implemented the data collection. The team was part of a consortium that included Wageningen University and Groningen University, which took primary responsibility for other country studies. The aim was to harmonize of approaches and tools across country studies that were carried out by the consortium.

The gravity of the research was in Indonesia. Two scientific coordinators, one from Survey Meter and one from AIID, spent most of their time together in Indonesia to prepare and implement the various studies. In addition, qualified senior and junior local researchers were contracted for the development of the MDG survey design and the implementation of the capacity development and civil society evaluations. All local researchers have relevant experience in the topic areas. Two research coordinators based in Indonesia were also contracted for the implementation and preliminary analysis of the capacity development and civil society studies.

Following field work, the analysis of the collected MDG data has been carried out by AIID with the lead of the scientific coordinator for the MDG component in Amsterdam.

The data for the capacity development and civil society studies were collected in Indonesian. Therefore, the local researchers have done the preliminary data analysis and report writing in English with the lead of the local research coordinators. These served as inputs for the final reports, which were jointly written by CDI and the Indonesian research coordinators.

## 1.3. Organisation of the narrative report

This narrative report provides an overview of the findings of the evaluation components in Indonesia. Chapter 2 presents the description, findings and conclusions drawn from the evaluation of the 12 projects selected for the MDG component; Chapter 3 continues with discussing the evaluation findings for the 12 SPOs selected for the capacity development component; while Chapter 4 summarizes the evaluation findings for the 10 SPOs selected for the civil society strengthening component.

It is important to note that, there are 5 SPOs that overlap between the MDG and capacity development sample and 2 SPOs that are common in the MDG and civil society components. However, the report does not address the synergies between the different components as in practice the sampled beneficiaries of SPOs in the MDG evaluation are only minimally affected by the changes in the SPOs' capacity and links to civil society between 2012 and 2014 because they benefitted from the SPOs activities mostly prior to these changes were realised (i.e. before the baseline period). Nonetheless, available data was shared between the evaluation teams responsible for the different components for these SPOs.

A number of annexes provide additional information about the evaluation at the end of the report. For the MDG component, Annex A summarizes key details of the evaluated projects, Annex B shows stylized result chains for the projects, Annex C summarizes all outcome indicators measured for the projects, while Annex D displays changes in selected outcome indicators for the beneficiary population and Annex E reports the regression results regarding the attribution of these changes to the projects.

For the Capacity Development component, Annex F discusses the methodological approach, while Annex G provides background information on the five core capabilities framework (5C) and Annex H gives an overview of the elements of these five capabilities.

For the Civil Society component, Annex I discusses CIVICUS and the Civil Society Index, Annex J provides the details of the methodological approach of the evaluation, while Annex K discusses the changes in the civil society context between 2010 and 2014, and Annex L elaborates on policy changes in Indonesia between 2011 and 2014.

# 2. Achievement of MDGs and Themes

## 2.1. Sample for the MDG evaluation

The sample of projects were pre-selected for the MDG component. The evaluation sample resulted from a stratified random sampling among projects that satisfied the following eligibility conditions:

- The project could be categorised in at least one of the MDGs and themes;
- The project budget exceeded EUR 50,000;
- The project contract was in effect on 1 January 2012.

Based on these conditions, 12 projects were selected for the MDGs and themes evaluation in Indonesia. In case the projects were active in multiple MDGs and/or themes, one of these has been randomly selected for the purpose of the evaluation. Further, in the original sample, one project has been terminated prior to 2012 (E5. KSP-ASD). To replace this project, a new project (E5. SC GREEN) has been randomly drawn by the Synthesis team based on the above criteria. The final sample for the MDGs and themes evaluation is presented in Table 1.

In addition, Figure 1 shows the location of the projects, Figure 2 graphs the contracting periods of the projects (see also Table 14 in Annex A), while Figure 3 shows the actual implementation period of the evaluated project components along with the timing of the evaluation activities.

A number of observations can be made based on these tables. First, regarding the topics of the projects (Table 1), 7 of the 12 projects (partially) aim at poverty alleviation[18] (MDG 1), and 6 (partially) work on sustainable living environment, forests and biodiversity[19] (MDG 7 a and b). These two topics cover 9 of the 12 selected projects in Indonesia, while the remaining 3 projects are related to the MDGs on gender[20] (MDG 3) and health[21] (MDGs 4, 5 and 6).

Second, regarding the location of the selected projects (Figure 1), 6 of the 12 projects work in West or Central Java: half of the projects work on gender related issues (counselling for victims of gender based violence – LRC-KJHAM, Rifka Annisa - or sexual education – YPI) and the other half are aimed at improving the livelihood of households (through saving and credit cooperatives – FIELD, KSP-QT –, and trainings on handicrafts – SC GREEN – and sustainable agricultural practices – FIELD). Two other projects that we evaluate on poverty alleviation are located in East Nusa Tenggara province: one focuses on organic certification and sustainable farming practices (SC LED-NTT), while the other combines economic incentives (sustainable livelihood) with reforestation as an effort at coastal disaster risk reduction (WIIP). The remaining four projects (Pt.PPMA, NTFP-EP, YRBI and HuMa) are spread out in remote areas over

[18] The following SPOs (projects) are evaluated under MDG 1: FIELD, SC GREEN, KSP-QT, SC LED-NTT and partially WIIP. SPOs Pt.PPMA and NTFP-EP are also partially related to MDG 1, however, these projects were not evaluated with respect to their impacts on poverty alleviation.

[19] The following SPOs (projects) are evaluated under MDG 7ab: WIIP, Pt.PPMA, NTFP-EP, and partially YRBI and HuMa. In addition, FIELD is also partially works on the MDG on sustainable living environment.

[20] The following SPOs (projects) are evaluated under MGD 3: LRC-KJHAM , Rifka Annisa and YPI.

[21] Only Rifka Annisa is selected to be evaluated on the MDG on health.

four islands (Sumatra, Kalimantan/Borneo, Sulawesi/Celebes and Papua): they are all aimed at empowering indigenous communities' in their rights to their land and in their decisions on natural resource use. In addition, in all four projects the evaluated project activities rely on participatory mapping methods.[22]

Third, regarding the contract periods of the projects (Figure 2), all projects started already before the baseline period of the MFS II evaluation. However, 3 of 12 contracts already stopped at end 2012 (KSP-QT, LRC-KJHAM and Rifka Annisa). Another 3 contracts were extended (FIELD and SC GREEN) or a new project has been set up serving the same beneficiaries (SC LED-NTT). The contract period for the remaining 6 projects was better aligned with the project activities. Nonetheless, Figure 3 shows that except for one project (SC GREEN), in all sampled projects the project beneficiaries have been reached already before the baseline survey. This had important implications for the evaluation methodology and the results of the evaluation. We return to this issue when discussing the projects.

Fourth, the project budget differs among the projects (Table 1), ranging from the minimum amount of EUR 50,000 to EUR 1,000,000. In addition, for one project (YPI) we found that the project budget was less than the eligibility criteria. The differences in budgets could be due to the size of the population served or the type of activities implemented. Therefore, we postpone the discussion of the project costs to the discussion of similar projects in detail.

Finally, the above discussion already hinted at possible groupings of the projects for the discussion of the evaluation findings. One option would be to discuss the projects based on the MDG categories. However, we decided for a more pragmatic approach based on the final objectives of the projects. For some projects these topics coincide with the selected MDG categories, while in some other cases we split or merged the MDG categories. The following sections present our findings for the following topics:

6. Projects on reforestation: WIIP
7. Projects on poverty alleviation: FIELD, SC GREEN, KSP-QT, SC LED-NTT and partially WIIP
8. Projects on empowering indigenous communities: Pt.PPMA, NTFP-EP, YRBI and HuMa
9. Projects on sexual education: YPI
10. Projects assisting victims of gender based violence: LRC-KJHAM and Rifka Annisa

For these topics, we introduce the context in Indonesia, provide an overview of the planned and actual implementation of the projects, discuss the evaluation design and present our findings for the evaluation questions. We conclude the sections with the main findings and our recommendations. All tables related to the evaluation design and findings are presented in Annexes at the end of the report. These can be consulted for further information about the results. Namely, Annex A contains project information about the contracting period, costs, number of beneficiaries and (if applicable) the project costs per beneficiary for the projects; Annex B presents stylized result chains for the projects to provide further insight into project logic; Annex C shows the outcome indicators used for the evaluation; Annex D reports the changes in selected outcome indicators; and Annex E displays the results regarding the attribution of the projects to the observed changes.


[22] For NTFP-EP and HuMa we only evaluated part of their project activities. At other locations, these projects did not necessarily use participatory mapping but their objectives were similar.

**Table 1: Selected projects for the MDGs and themes evaluation**

| Project | Partner | Consortium | Selected MDG/theme | Other MDGs/themes[a] | Total budget[b] (EUR) | % funded by MFS II |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| E1. Climate-Proof Disaster Risk Reduction | Wetlands International – Indonesia Programme (WIIP) | Partners for Resilience | MDGs 7ab | MDG 1 | 1,001,000 | 100% |
| E2.Empowerment of Papua Customary People for Sustainable Natural Resources Management | Association for Study and Empowerment of Papuan Indigenous People (Pt.PPMA) | Ecosystem Alliance | MDGs 7ab | MDG 1 | 130,328 | 100% |
| E3. Up-Scaling Sustainable , Community-Based Forest Livelihoods in Kalimantan | Non-Timber Forest Product Exchange Programme (NTFP-EP) | Ecosystem Alliance | MDGs 7ab | MDG 1 and Good Governance | 135,217 | 100% |
| E4. Local Economic Development and Promotion of Local Seed System to Indonesian National Policy | Farmer Initiatives for Ecological Livelihoods and Democracy (FIELD) | People Unlimited 4.1 | MDG 1 | MDGs 7ab | 182,975 | 62.2% |
| E5. Implementation of Garment for Economic Empowerment (GREEN) | SwissContact - Regional Office SE Asia (SC) | People Unlimited 4.1 | MDG 1 | (MDG 3) | 141,263 | 76% |
| E6. Seed Capital Programme for Koperasi Mentari Qaryah Thayyibah | Koperasi Simpan Pinjam – Qaryah Thayyibah (KSP-QT) | People Unlimited 4.1 | MDG 1 | | 201,370 | 95.1% |
| E7. Strengthening Marginalized Women's Access and Control to Legal Resources and Human Rights in Central Java 2010-2012 | Legal Resources Centre for Gender Justice and Human Rights (LRC-KJHAM) | People Unlimited 4.1 | MDG 3 | | 95,000 | 100% |
| E8. Empowerment of Mukim and Gampong Capacity in Spatial Management Phase II | Yayasan Rumpun Bambu Indonesia (YRBI) | ICCO Alliance | Good Governance | (MDGs 7ab) | 315,130 | 60.3% |
| E9. The Security of Strengthening Communities Rights and Justice | The Association for Community and Ecologic-Based Law Reform (HuMa) | ICCO Alliance | Good Governance | MDGs 7ab | 615,142 | 29.3% |
| E10. Local Economic Development in Nusa Tenggara Timur (LED-NTT) | SwissContact - Regional Office SE Asia (SC) | Communities of Change | MDG 1 | | 897,794 | 34.0% |
| E11. Rifka Annisa project | Rifka Annisa | SRHR Alliance | MDGs 4 5 6 | MDG 3 | 52,290 | 100% |
| E12. YPI project | Yayasan Pelita Ilmu (YPI) | SRHR Alliance | MDG 3 | MDGs 4 5 6 | 42,864 | 100% |


Source: NWO Joint MFS II Evaluations Country-Specific Information Indonesia.
Notes: [a] MDGs in brackets are based on the judgment of the evaluation team; [b] Total budget in current (2012) contract including funding from other sources based on information in the baseline period. For SC LED-NTT, the total budget does not include the amount for the 2013-2014 period under a new project.

**Figure 1: Location of the MDG projects**





Notes: The map indicates the name of the SPO/project, name of the district (D) and province (P), and the actual number of villages where the project works in the given district (V).

Figure 2: Contracting periods of MDG projects (actual)




Source: MFS II Joint Evaluation Indonesia Endline reports on MDG projects.

Figure 3: Evaluation and project periods of MDG projects




Other evaluation activities:

E2. Pt. PPMA: Project director interview, E7. LRC-KJHAM: Midline quantitative study, E11. Rifka Annisa: Client survey

Source: MFS II Joint Evaluation Indonesia Endline reports on MDG projects.

## 2.1. Methodological approach

Before turning to the evaluation findings, this section discusses the methodological approach used for the evaluation in general. First, the selection of outcome indicators is described, which is followed by the discussion of attribution analysis and the sample sizes. In turn, the approaches used to assess the relevance of changes and the efficiency of the projects is discussed. Further specificities of the evaluation methodology are discussed per topic in sections 2.2 through 2.6.

### 2.1.1. Outcome indicators

The evaluation of the selected MDG projects was based on the project logic or result chain of the evaluated projects.[23] For each project, we identified specific evaluation questions and (intermediate) outcome indicators that were linked to the outputs and outcomes of the interventions (see Annex B). This approach, on the one hand, guided us in measuring outcome indicators were the project is mostly likely to have an effect, and on the other hand, it can help us determine whether the changes in outcomes can be attributed to the evaluated intervention as discussed later in section 2.1.2.

The outcome indicators identified through the result chain were not always aligned with the uniform indicators selected by the Synthesis team at the baseline period for each MDGs and Themes. As much as uniform indicators are useful for the overall assessment of the projects per MDGs and Themes, in practice, measuring uniform indicators that are not directly related to the objectives and result chain of the evaluated projects would have led to misleading results regarding the effectiveness of the projects, and would have increased the costs of data collection if they were added to the specific indicators that we deemed relevant. However, in some cases when uniform indicators seemed relevant, it was also not possible to obtain appropriate data and link it to the intervention. For example, projects on counselling and legal aid for victims of gender-based violence (LRC-KJHAM and Rifka Annisa) will not affect the 'enrolment rates in post-primary education for girls' (a uniform indicator for MDG 3 on gender), and even though they are aimed at reducing the exposure of their clients to repeated instances of violence it would be almost impossible to obtain data on the 'incidents of gender-based violence per 100 adult women' (another uniform indicator for MDG 3) for the general population.[24]

Hence, we only collected information on relevant and measureable outcome indicators,[25] which we tried to link to uniform indicators if possible. Annex C lists the outcome indicators used in each project per topic. In Annex D, the change in the beneficiary population is reported for selected outcome indicators, again by topic.[26] These will be discussed in sections 2.2 through 2.6.

[23] The *result chain* links the project activities to outputs achieved through these activities, and outcomes realised through the outputs. Whereas project outputs can be affected by the project implementers to a large extent, the materialisation of outcomes depends mostly on external factors from the perspective of the project implementers, such as the decisions of local governments, weather conditions or market prices.

[24] We collected information about the exposure to GBV only for the survey respondents.

[25] Hence, we did not collect information on the uniform indicators that were irrelevant for the project or not measureable using the surveys.

[26] The project reports also report on the changes in outcome indicators for the comparison groups (if applicable).

### 2.1.2. Attribution analysis

The WOTRO call puts particular emphasis on impact evaluation. Impact evaluation compares the situation as it was realized with the projects to the hypothetical situation of no intervention (counterfactual). This allows one to isolate the contribution of the Dutch MFS II on the outcomes to be studied. Wherever possible, we aimed to use a comparison group in the evaluation design to estimate the counterfactual. In this case, we used the difference-in-difference methodology[27] to estimate the impact of the intervention (WIIP, FIELD, KSP-QT and SC LED-NTT). This method compares the changes in outcomes between a treatment and comparison group over the period of time when the intervention takes place. Normally, the baseline is taken before the start of the intervention. Then, the impact is estimated by subtracting the endline difference in outcome from the baseline difference in outcomes.

Unfortunately, all of the sampled projects were already on-going at the time of the baseline survey. Therefore, the difference-in-difference estimate does not capture impacts that were realised before the baseline. In order to assess the early effect of the projects (before the baseline), we compared the baseline outcomes between the treatment and comparison households controlling for household characteristics like age, gender and education of the household head, household size and other observable characteristics that showed a different distribution between the treatment and comparison households and were independent of the intervention. In fact, we had to use such cross-sectional regression approach to evaluate two projects that we planned to evaluate using difference-in-difference methodology: in one case, this was due to the limited project activities during the evaluation period (YPI), and in the other case, we only observed the outcomes for project beneficiaries at the endline (SC GREEN).

In the remaining half of the projects, we deemed the sampling of comparison groups impractical because either the project outcomes were defined at the community level with only handful of participating villages (Pt.PPMA, NTFP-EP) or no comparable sampling units (villages or people) could be identified (Pt.PPMA, NTFP-EP, YRBI, HuMa, LRC-KJHAM and Rifka Annisa). For instance, the project that supported local NGOs in participatory mapping of 4 villages for the protection of eco-cultural sites (NTFP-EP) is basically one case study with 4 observations. It would not have been possible to isolate the impact through statistical methods like difference in differences. In addition, in this case as well as in many other projects, the beneficiaries themselves had decided to participate in the project. This self-selection further complicates the identification of a valid comparison group. For example, not all villages are willing to participate in a participatory mapping project due to conflicts of interests as we also observed in the project in Papua (Pt.PPMA).[28] Therefore, in such cases, we relied on before-after comparisons of outcomes among the project beneficiaries, which were complemented with qualitative data collection to find out the causal channels that have led to the changes in outcomes, including the intervention supported by MFS.[29]

[27] In our proposal we had listed our order of preference for evaluation methods, starting from a randomized experiment, which provides the most creditable method. However, as all projects had already started at the time of the baseline this approach was not feasible.

[28] In this case, a planned beneficiary village (Ampas) decided to withdraw from the project due to the conflicting interests of immediate high returns of illegal logging and the long-term sustainable income from eco-forestry.

[29] The resulting qualitative reports are included as annexes to the project reports.

In addition, for all projects, working through the result chain helped us determine whether the changes in outcomes can be attributed to the evaluated intervention. For example, in a project that aims to improve the livelihood of households through trainings on good farming practices (partially SC LED-NTT and FIELD), the output of the project would be that households participated in these trainings, started using the farming practices learned, which led to an increase in their productivity and resulted in increased incomes. Following this link is important, as the productivity and income of households could also change due to other factors such as weather conditions, which could be thought of as an alternative pathway. However, the analysis focuses on assessing whether the pathway proposed by the projects (see Annex B for these result chains) can explain the observed changes and not on finding out what alternative pathways lay behind the changes.

Table 2 summarises the methods used in the evaluation of the 12 MDG projects. In the case of 6 projects it was possible to find valid comparison groups (WIIP, FIELD, SC GREEN, KSP-QT, SC LED-NTT and YPI), and for two additional projects we found comparison groups due to differences in the evaluation design and the project implementation (Pt.PPMA, NTFP-EP). As mentioned above, for four of these projects (partially) related to poverty alleviation (WIIP, FIELD, KSP-QT and SC LED-NTT), it was possible to use difference-in-difference methodology complemented with cross-sectional analysis at the baseline to evaluate the impact of the project activities both during the evaluation period and before the baseline ('early treatment effect'). For the remaining two projects with planned comparison groups, we only used cross-sectional analysis as explained above (SC GREEN, YPI).

**Table 2: Methods and comparison groups used**

| Project ID | SPO name / Project name | Comparison group | Diff-in-Diff method | Cross sectional analysis | Before/after comparison | Qualitative surveys |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **E1** | WIIP | X | X | X[b] | | |
| **E2** | Pt.PPMA | X[a] | | | X | X |
| **E3** | NTFP-EP | X[a] | | | X | X |
| **E4** | FIELD | X | X | X[b] | | |
| **E5** | SC GREEN | X | | X[a] | | X |
| **E6** | KSP-QT | X | X | X[b] | | |
| **E7** | LRC-KJHAM | | | | X | X |
| **E8** | YRBI | | | | X | X |
| **E9** | HuMa | | | | X | X |
| **E10** | SC LED-NTT | X | X | X[b] | | |
| **E11** | Rifka Annisa | | | | X | X |
| **E12** | YPI | X | | X[a] | | X |

Source: MFS II Joint Evaluation Indonesia Baseline reports on MDG projects.
Notes:
a. Due to different project implementation compared to evaluation design.
b. Early treatment effect is estimated.

For the remaining six projects which focused on natural resource management (Pt.PPMA, NTFP-EP, YRBI and HuMa), good governance (YRBI, HuMa) and counselling of victims of GBV (LRC-KJHAM, Rifka Annisa), we relied on before-after comparison complemented with qualitative data collection to assess the impact of the intervention. Qualitative data was collected for the SC GREEN and YPI projects as well. In-depth interviews and focus group discussions were usually conducted with beneficiaries that did not participate in the quantitative surveys (Pt.PPMA, NTFP-EP, LRC-KJHAM, YRBI and HuMa), and additional in-depth interviews were conducted with other project stakeholders such as project facilitators or local government officials (Pt.PPMA, NTFP-EP, LRC-KJHAM, YRBI and HuMa). However, in order to assess the impact of sexual education (YPI) and of counselling for victims of GBV (LRC-KJHAM, Rifka Annisa), we also conducted in-depth interviews with the respondents of the quantitative surveys. In the latter case, alternative pathways were also explored.

In addition, for the project on reforestation (WIIP), we also conducted an ecological survey of the forest condition and biodiversity both at the baseline and endline. These measurements were carried out by forest surveyors at the same GPS coordinates at baseline and endline, which were then linked to a recent satellite image of the area (Google earth). Based on the information from these two sources a quantitative model was built, which can be used to extrapolate the indicators of forest condition over the total project area.

All data collected are based on self-reporting of the respondents, except for the ecological survey.

### 2.1.3. Sample size

For all projects we used structured interviews with individual respondents at the household and for some projects also community level (WIIP, Pt.PPMA, NTFP-EP, YRBI and HuMa). Table 3 summarises the number of villages visited and the number of household interviews conducted for each of the 12 MDG projects. These data are based on the actual classification of the data used.[30]

The projects on mangrove reforestation using bio-rights approach (WIIP), saving and credit services (KSP-Q) and sexual education in high schools (YPI) had the largest sample sizes with around 300 respondents in total. In general, projects that were evaluated under MDG 1 had the largest sample sizes (FIELD, SC GREEN, KSP-QT, SC LED-NTT and partially WIIP) between 100 and 320. For these projects it was also always possible to find comparison groups and use the diff-in-diff methodology for evaluation, except for SC GREEN. On the other hand, FIELD, KSP-QT and SC LED-NTT are also the projects that have been going on for the longest time prior to the baseline.

The projects on assisting victims of GBV had the smallest sample size at around 20 respondents, while the projects on indigenous empowerment had a sample size between 40 and 160.

Comparing these figures to the actual number of beneficiaries (Table 4) puts the sample sizes into perspective. For most projects we sampled a substantial share of the project beneficiaries, especially in terms of location: we sampled all project villages for 2 projects (WIIP, Pt.PPMA), around half of the villages for the two agricultural projects (FIELD, SC LED-NTT), and a selection of project locations for 3

[30] For some projects, the assignment status of villages (schools) and/or households had to be adjusted based on project information (Pt.PPMA, NTFP-EP, FIELD, SC GREEN and YPI).

projects on indigenous land rights and natural resource management (NTFP-EP, YRBI and HuMa). For the sexual education project (YPI), we also sampled almost all known participating high schools known to us at the time of the baseline.[31] Regarding the beneficiaries, for some project we interviewed a substantial share: 77% for LRC-KJHAM, about 50% for WIIP and 20% for FIELD. For other projects this share was lower, while in other cases the project was aimed at the community level and not household level (Pt.PPMA, NTFP-EP, YRBI and HuMa). Further, for one of the gender projects (Rikfa Annisa), the number of survey respondents was limited by the SPO.

Finally, it is important to mention that some projects contained multiple sub-projects (NTFP-EP, HuMa and SC LED-NTT). In these cases, we have selected only one of these sub-projects. Therefore, the results of the evaluation are not necessarily generalizable over the whole project, especially in the case of HuMa where we have selected one of approximately 60 small interventions.

**Table 3: Sample size for structured surveys**

| Project ID | SPO name / Project name | Nr. of treatment villages | Nr. comparison villages | Nr. treatment HHs | | Nr. comparison HHs | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Base | Panel | Base | Panel |
| E1 | WIIP | 7* | 7* | 215[a] | 202[a] | 105 | 99 |
| E2 | Pt.PPMA | 2* | 2* | 40 | 35 | 40 | 27 |
| E3 | NTFP-EP | 4* | 2* | 80 | 71 | 40 | 34 |
| E4 | FIELD | 7 | 4 | 165[a] | 144[a] | 60 | 56 |
| E5 | SC GREEN | 2 | 2[1] | 50 | 1[2] | 50 | 99 |
| E6 | KSP-QT | 8 | 5 | 206 | 203 | 90 | 87 |
| E7 | LRC-KJHAM[3] | n.a. | n.a. | 20 | 20 | 0 | 0 |
| E8 | YRBI | 6* | 0 | 120 | 112 | 0 | 0 |
| E9 | HuMa | 3* | 0 | 40 | 33 | 0 | 0 |
| E10 | SC LED-NTT | 6 | 4 | 89 | 85 | 60 | 53 |
| E11 | Rifka Annisa[3] | n.a. | n.a. | 18[4] | 18 | 0 | 0 |
| E12 | YPI[5] | 9[6] | 5 | 180[a] | 180[a] | 100 | 99 |

Source: MFS II Joint Evaluation Indonesia Baseline reports on MDG projects.
Notes:
n.a. not applicable
* Community survey was done in villages.
[a] Including treatment and spillover households.
[1] Same villages as for treatment.
[2] Only 1 respondent of the potential treatment group actually participated in the project. 5 additional respondents were surveyed at the endline.
[3] Respondents instead of households.
[4] Actual sample size for female respondents. Planned sample size was 60 females and 20 males.
[5] Units are schools and students.
[6] 10 treatment schools were interviewed but one treatment school (sample of 20 students) was excluded from the analysis.

[31] This list turned out to be not accurate at the endline.

**Table 4: Number of project beneficiaries**

| Project ID | SPO name / Project name | Number of project locations | Unit of direct beneficiaries | Number of direct beneficiaries (actual) | Unit of indirect beneficiaries | Number of indirect beneficiaries (actual) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| E1 | WIIP | 7 villages | HHs | 185 | People | 19,653 |
| E2 | Pt.PPMA | 2 villages | People | n.k. | n.k. | |
| E3 | NTFP-EP (Sintang sub-project) | 4 villages | People<br>Land (Ha) | n.k.<br>275 | People | 1,018 |
| E4 | FIELD<br>- cooperative<br>- seed breeding | <br>6 villages<br>15 villages | <br>Farming HHs<br>Farming HHs | <br>456<br>45 | <br>n.a.<br>Farming HHs | <br><br>874 |
| E5 | SC GREEN | 4 villages | People | 125 | n.a. | |
| E6 | KSP-QT | n.a. | Members | 13,372 | n.a. | |
| E7 | LRC-KJHAM[1] | n.a. | Clients | 114 | People | 1,174 |
| E8 | YRBI | 13 mukims[2] | People | n.k. | n.k. | |
| E9 | HuMa | 7 provinces | People (PHR)[3] | 1,416 | n.k. | |
| E10 | SC LED-NTT[4] (cashew sub-project) | 9 villages | Farming HHs | 1,541 | n.a. | |
| E11 | Rifka Annisa[1] (2012) | n.a. | Clients | 270 | n.a. | |
| E12 | YPI[1] (2012)<br>- DAKU<br>- D4L | <br>12 schools<br>30 schools | <br>Students<br>Students | <br>315<br>2,930 | <br>People<br>n.a. | <br>407 |

Source: MFS II Joint Evaluation Indonesia Endline reports on MDG projects.
Notes: HH (household), n.a. (not applicable), n.k. (not known)
[1] Per year.
[2] *Mukim* is a traditional institution in Aceh encompassing around 3-12 *gampongs* or villages.
[3] PHR stands for people participating in community law facilitator (PHR) trainings.
[4] Numbers are only for the cashew sector. In total 4500 planned and 4633 realized beneficiaries (hh) in 3 sectors.

### 2.1.4. Relevance of changes


To investigate the relevance of the observed changes, we assessed the size of the impact and whether the project addressed an important issue for the beneficiaries. For some projects, we also reported on the satisfaction and self-reported impact of beneficiaries (LRC-KJHAM, Rifka Annisa and YPI), and the representativeness of the sample (Rifka Annisa and YPI). In addition, we compare project impacts to existing literature.

### 2.1.5. Efficiency

Assessing the evaluation question 'Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient?' proved to be the most challenging part of the MDG component of the evaluation. We initially planned to address this evaluation question through a cost-benefit analysis for each project and compare the results to similar projects, which relies on the calculation of unit costs and benefits per the same unit. We aimed to calculate the project costs that can be linked to the evaluated project activities reaching the beneficiaries. In addition to the direct project costs, these include project management costs both at the CFA and the SPO.

However, already calculating the project costs proved to be challenging due to different funding sources and several different project activities (that did not reach the sampled beneficiaries). To highlight these difficulties, Figure 4 visualizes the flow of MFS II and other funds to the beneficiaries with arrows showing the direction of expenditure flows.

**Figure 4: Budget flow from MFS II to SPOs**




In order to obtain information regarding project costs, we focused on the SPOs as the primary source of information because we assumed the SPOs to be the most knowledgeable about the costs of activities. We conducted a budget survey with each SPO regarding the project costs, activities and beneficiaries between 2013 and 2014. This information was then complemented with the financial reports of the SPOs for the years between 2010 and 2014, and also verified by the CFAs. However, these costs sometimes do not include all the costs related to delivering the intervention to the beneficiaries. For example, in the case of the YPI project, the costs of schools in implementing the DAKU and D4L sexual educational programmes are not taken into account.

Regarding the calculation of total project costs in euros (EUR), we found out that many SPOs only reported their costs only in Indonesian rupiahs (IDR), for example NTFP-EP, YRBI, FIELD, KSP-QT and others. This was particularly the case for projects with CFAs operating in Indonesia, such as Hivos and ICCO. In these cases, we used the annual average exchange rate to calculate the amounts in euros. This is an important consideration given that there has been a 33% change in the IDR/EUR exchange rate

between 2012 and 2014.[32] When available, the reported cost information in euros was used. The information on total project costs (in euros) does not take into account the inflation rate. Therefore, we used International dollars[33] adjusted for inflation (2011 prices) and purchasing power parity when calculating the unit costs of projects. This ensures that the costs are comparable across countries and time. This is especially useful for projects that have worked with beneficiaries for a longer time period (for example, the projects of WIIP, FIELD and SC LED-NTT), as it allows us to easily calculate the overall costs per beneficiary at constant prices.

Cost per beneficiaries or other unit costs were calculated based on the reported project costs in IDR. For projects with multiple sub-projects such as the projects of NTFP-EP, SC LED-NTT, FIELD and HuMa, we calculated the direct project costs for the evaluated sub-project. The project management costs were accounted for this sub-project proportionally to the share of its direct costs from all direct costs.

The main difficulty appeared in identifying the unit for which to calculate the unit costs: we only managed to do so for 5 projects (WIIP, FIELD, SC GREEN, SC LED-NTT and YPI). In the other cases, we could not identify the unit of beneficiaries either because the project output has not been finalized (Pt.PPMA, HuMa, YRBI, NTFP-EP); because we had difficulty identifying the main output unit (communities, people or land; in all of the above mentioned); or because the intervention was about service delivery which we deemed unsuitable for the calculation of unit costs (Rifka Annisa, LRC-KJHAM and KSP-QT).

Finally, for the 5 projects where we provide information on project costs, we often struggled to compare these costs to the benefits (impacts) of the projects as these manifested themselves in multiple indicators. Instead, we compare the projects' unit costs to the costs of similar interventions based on the findings of the Synthesis team.

Table 5 reports the available information regarding the project costs. These figures will be discussed later in the report per topic.

In general, we find that evaluating the efficiency of the projects was beyond the reach of the evaluation team due to the complex nature of the interventions and because of the limitations posed by not closely working with the SPOs in designing and executing the evaluation due to limited resources.

[32] The annual average exchange rates used are 12,264 IDR/EUR in 2011, 12,087 IDR/EUR in 2012, 13,923 IDR/EUR in 2013 and 16,040 IDR/EUR in 2014. Source: http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/.

[33] The following exchange rates were used based on PPP conversion factor using the World Development Indicators: 3,606.57 IDR/Int$ in 2011, 3,636.38 IDR/Int$ in 2012, 3,682.25 IDR/Int$ in 2013 and 4,530.90 IDR/Int$ in 2014. Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#

**Table 5: Project costs**

| Project ID | SPO name / Project name | Total cost of project (EUR) | Percentage of MFS II budget used | Percentage funded by MFS II | Unit of beneficiary | Total cost per beneficiary (Int$) | Cost of beneficiary per year (Int$) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| E1 | WIIP | 929,491[1] | 92.9% | 100% | Direct beneficiary HHs | 1604.19[2] | 534.73 |
| E2 | Pt.PPMA | 96,512 | 41% | 100% | N.A. | | |
| E3 | NTFP-EP | 78,791 | 61% | 100% | N.A. | | |
| E4 | FIELD | 103,015 | 92% | 60% | Cooperative member | 60.45 | 20.15 |
| E5 | SC GREEN | 116,412 | 82% | 86% | Female craftswomen | 562.80[3] | 562.80[3] |
| E6 | KSP-QT | 156,514 | 79% | 95%[a] | N.A. | | |
| E7 | LRC-KJHAM | 92,670 | 97% | 100% | N.A. | | |
| E8 | YRBI | 235,539 | 47%[4] | 73% | N.A. | | |
| E9 | HuMa | 173,327 | 96% | 29.3% | N.A. | | |
| E10 | SC LED-NTT | 847,748 | 94% | 36% | Cashew Farming HHs | 762.43 | 190.61 |
| E11 | Rifka Annisa[5] | 11,897 | 91% | 2.3% | N.A. | | |
| E12 | YPI[5]<br>- DAKU<br>- D4L | <br>19,144.45<br>14,691.08 | <br>100%[6]<br>0%[7] | <br>100%<br>N.K. | Students<br>- DAKU<br>- D4L | <br>202.02[5]<br>16.67[5] | <br>202.02[5]<br>16.67[5] |

Source: MFS II Joint Evaluation Indonesia Endline reports on MDG projects.

Notes:

N.A. = not applicable. Not possible to determine the cost per beneficiary for this project.

N.K. = not known.

1. For 2011 till 2014. For 2014, the total costs are based on the approved budget from 1 December 2013 – 30 November 2014 minus the actual costs in 2013.
2. Indirect and direct cost per direct beneficiary households between 2011-2013. Additional costs were incurred in the project after the evaluation period.
3. Only for 2013.
4. In total, 65% of ICCO's budget has been spent and 47% of the total budget including activities funded by the communities.
5. Only for 2012.
6. The total costs of the project are actually higher than the budget, but that is financed with unspent parts of the budget from previous periods.
7. Funded by MFS II but not through the selected project.

a. % funded by MFS II is based on the budget and not the actual costs.

### 2.1.6. Reporting structure

The results of all five evaluation questions will be discussed by project groups. The last evaluation question on explanations is integrated into the discussion of the preceding questions on change, attribution, relevance and efficiency.

## 2.2. Projects on reforestation

### 2.2.1. Country context

Earthquakes, floods, volcanic eruptions, drought, landslides and tsunamis are natural hazards that occur in Indonesia almost every day, causing a large number of casualties every year. This situation is particularly true for the relatively poor province of Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT), where the Wetlands International Indonesia Programme (WIIP) project operates. The tsunami event in 1992 has created a traumatic experience where thousands of islanders have lost their lives and some more thousands have lost their shelter and livelihood. However, communities that live in the surroundings of relatively dense mangrove forests have been spared from substantial damage. This is an indication that mangroves have a vital function in the protection from heavy waves of tsunamis. Through disaster risk management measures, such as mangrove reforestation, it is possible to reduce the environmental risk and economic burden of natural hazards on society. As a results, the Government of Indonesia (GoI) has declared its determination to fight the risks from natural hazards by introducing pro-active measures (e.g. early warning systems, mangrove forestation) to enhance the resilience of society. This development increases the effectiveness of rehabilitation efforts that cooperate with local governments. In fact, the district governments at the WIIP project locations (Ende and Sikka districts in NTT) passed regulations that put a moratorium on destroying mangrove forests with the aim to protect the remaining mangrove forests in the district.

The restoration and rehabilitation of wetlands provides not only protection of the vital environment and its resources but also a source of livelihood for locals if managed sustainably. Mangrove forests are rich in crab and fish, the fruit of certain types is edible, but also honey can be harvested. In addition, the timber is a valuable building and construction material. Hence, mangrove forests contribute to the resilience of local communities both by mitigating the effects of natural disasters and by providing sustainable livelihoods.

### 2.2.2. Description of projects

The Climate-Proof Risk Reduction project of WIIP aims to sustain and restore wetlands, their resources and biodiversity through research, information exchange and conservation activities.

In January 2012, WIIP selected 7 project villages in Flores based on a rapid project site assessment and integrated ecosystem mapping. After the socialisation of the project at the village level, community groups responsible for the implementation of the planting and sustainable livelihood activities were formed in each village. In total, the community groups contain 185 members of which 71 (38%) are women.

The bio-rights approach of WIIP encourages community groups (with 20-30 members) to restore coastal ecosystems through awareness raising on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), Climate Change Adaption (CCA) and Ecosystem Management and Restoration (EMR) and signing a contract with community members to commit to reforestation of community areas in exchange for a substantial conditional grant. If after 3 years more than 80% of the agreed number of plants are alive (a dead plant is defined as having no green live leaves – although in reality, some are still able to grow subject to the proper treatment)

and/or community groups participated on the related policy initiatives (such as development of village regulation, development of village contingency plan, and establishment of village level disaster response team), the communities can keep the grant. Otherwise it has to be repaid in proportion with the survival rate of trees. However, enrichment and new planting are possible during the 3 year period.

The result chain for this project can be found in Figure 23 in Annex B. It focusses on the project components that have a direct impact on the surveyed beneficiary population.

### 2.2.3. Evaluation design

The evaluation focused on the impact of the WIIP project in the bio-right community group members (direct beneficiaries) and other community members (indirect beneficiaries) in the 7 treatment villages in Flores. All seven villages that participated in the bio-rights project in Flores were included in the sample. These villages were selected by WIIP based on ecosystem, disaster and climate risk mapping of the area and the strong commitment of the village on environmental actions. Seven comparison villages were selected based on disaster risk mapping and geographical location information. We sampled two treatment and one comparison groups for the household survey: (i) Households directly involved in the bio-rights project: these households are involved in planting the seedlings for which they receive a (conditional) grant from WIIP (112 in total), (ii) Other households living in the project villages who benefit from spillover effects (103 in total); and (iii) Households from comparison villages (105 in total). Hence, the treatment group was separated into the 'bio-rights' households and the 'spillover' households.[34] For all these villages we collected two types of data: quantitative (household, community and bio-rights community group leader surveys) and ecological.

Using the data, we wanted to answer questions like: How did the number of households applying sustainable forest management change (i.e. participating in reforestation efforts)? How did the communities' and households' disaster risk preparedness change? Table 15 and Table 16 in Annex C give an overview of the outcome indicators on reforestation that were measured.

We analyse the effects of the WIIP programme on beneficiaries using regression analysis. The primary analysis uses difference-in-difference methodology: we compare the changes in outcome indicators between the treatment groups (bio-right and spillover groups) and the comparison group. However, because the WIIP project started already before the baseline survey, we also analyse the early results of the project using cross-sectional analysis on the baseline data. The total impact of the WIIP project is the sum of the early effects (at the baseline) and the effects found between the baseline and endline survey period (at the endline).

### 2.2.4. Implementation of projects

The implementation of the WIIP project was according to plan. All planned project activities have been implemented in a timely manner so far. In fact, the project has enjoyed substantial support in the project area, and communities have exceeded their commitment in planting mangroves.

[34] Note that the so-called 'spillover' households also benefit from the village wide project activities, therefore they are not only benefiting from spillover effects.

Table 4 in section 2.1.3 shows the number of project beneficiaries per project. As mentioned already, the number of direct beneficiaries is as proposed: 185 households.[35] The number of indirect beneficiaries is calculated to be 19,653 people, the population of the 7 villages. The overall costs of the project as well as the costs per beneficiary can be found in Table 5 in Annex A. This table gives a summary of the collected information and the estimates of the costs per year. While the overall costs amount to 929,491 EUR, the costs per direct beneficiary households over the entire period were calculated to be 1,604 Int$ (2011 prices).[36]

### 2.2.5. Changes in selected outcome indicators and attribution to MFS II

Table 20, Table 21 and Table 23 in Annex D give the changes of the (selected) outcome indicators between baseline and endline, both at household and community level, while Table 34 and Table 37 in Annex E shows the attribution of these changes to the WIIP project at the household level. First, the changes and then the regression results (attribution) are discussed below for the outcome indicator categories.

#### *Reforestation indicators*

**Changes in outcomes between 2012 and 2014**

At the community level, Table 21 shows no change in the number of villages with efforts at forest protection: both at baseline and endline 4 of 6 project villages had efforts at mangrove forest protection and 3 of 7 villages had efforts at non-mangrove forest protection. This is in line with the fact that the project already started before the baseline.

At the household level, Table 20 shows that, as expected, almost all households in the bio-rights group (around 97%) participated in reforestation, both at baseline and endline. In the spillover group only 35% of the households at baseline and 54% at endline participated in reforestation. The survey also asked respondents who participated in reforestation to estimate the total number of seedlings planted. In the bio-rights group, we observe a sharp increase in this indicator from 398 seedlings per household to 1677 at endline. In the spillover group, this number increased from only 66 to 270 seedlings per households.

**Attribution of changes to MFS II interventions (project effects)**

Table 34 shows that the WIIP project had a strong effect on the percentage of households involved in reforestation efforts (54 percentage point at the baseline), and the number of seedlings planted by the bio rights group: 1,187 of the planted seedlings per household can be attributed to the project (controlling for household characteristics). We also find a positive (245 seedlings/household) effect on the number of seedlings planted by the spillover group. However, this later effect is not statistically significant from zero.

[35] Including the 9 members of the community group in Banten Bay, the total number of bio-right community members (direct beneficiary households) is 194, as indicated in the Yearly reports of WIIP.

[36] International dollars at 2011 prices25 are used for the cost per unit calculation because it takes both purchasing power parity and inflation into account that would not be the case if we reported the unit costs in euros. Hence, using Int$, the costs can easily be compared across time and countries.

### *Forest management indicators (community level)*

In terms of managing the forest, we observe a positive trend in treatment communities. Over the course of the evaluation period, there has been a clear increase in the number of treatment villages that adopted forest management structures for mangrove forests (from 4 to 6 villages) but also for non-mangrove forests (from 3 to 6 villages). Also the number of villages with regulations on natural resources has increased clearly in the treatment area. For mangrove forests, this number increased from 2 to 4 villages, for non-mangrove forests the increase is even bigger (from 1 to 5 villages).

### *Condition of forest indicators (community level)*

On a scale from one to six, the condition the mangrove forests remain constant at around 4.1 in treatment villages. In addition, the ecological survey of mangroves shows that the mangrove forests were in a health condition at the time of the endline survey (August 2014). However, the number of (young) trees has decreased substantially during the evaluation period independently of the project.[37] Note that these figures refer to forests that already existed before the WIIP project started.

### *Indicators on the knowledge and awareness of mangroves*

**Changes in outcomes between 2012 and 2014**

We find no clear patterns here that could indicate that the project increased knowledge. A test showing 4 cards with forests, of which two depicted a mangrove forest, did not show any change between baseline and endline. Another variable, whether households could give a correct description of mangrove forests, was similar between bio-rights and spillover: in both groups around 97% of the households gave corrects descriptions at endline. To test awareness of benefits, households were asked to name benefits of the mangrove forests. Here we see a significant but small increase in the number of benefits in both bio-rights (from 1.3 to 1.8) and spillover groups (from 0.7 to 1.5).

**Attribution of changes to MFS II interventions (project effects)**

Regarding the knowledge and awareness of mangroves, we find that the WIIP project contributed to the correct recognition of the mangroves: respondents in both the bio-rights and spillover groups were more likely (10 and 16 percentage points, respectively) to correctly recognise mangroves at the endline (controlling for household characteristics). Somewhat surprisingly, this effect is larger than we would have expected based on the changes reported for this indicator.

In addition, participants in the bio rights group mentioned on average 0.3 more benefits at baseline than the comparison group (controlling for background characteristics) but this effect disappears by the endline as comparison households also become more aware of the benefits of mangroves.

[37] We observe the same pattern in both treatment and comparison villages.

### *Disaster risk preparedness action indicators*

**Changes in outcomes between 2012 and 2014**

The mangrove forests provide protection against natural disasters, particularly tsunamis. The project aimed to increase disaster preparedness in other ways. To assess whether households are better prepared, we counted the number of disaster preparedness measures they took. There are 4 information related preparedness measures (which focus on whether households know how to act in case of a disaster), 7 personal preparation measures (which focus on whether households have taken measures to protect their family and personal assets) and 3 community volunteering measures (which measure whether households have participated in any community led efforts). We find generally low levels of preparedness, with a small positive trend in terms of information preparedness (on average an additional 0.4-0.5 measures). The levels and trends are comparable for bio-rights and spillover groups. The number of community volunteering measures was higher in bio-rights communities (2.6 against 2.4 in the spillover group) and further increased in this group by 0.3 additional measures on average.

**Attribution of changes to MFS II interventions (project effects)**

Regarding disaster risk preparedness, we find that the WIIP project positively impacted the number of personal preparation and community volunteering measures taken by the bio-rights group (by 0.5 and 0.4, respectively) at the baseline. No further effects at the household level are found as a result of the project activities during the evaluation period, despite the fact that the project achieved results at the community level.[38]

### *Income and livelihood indicators*

**Changes in outcomes between 2012 and 2014**

The project could influence household income and consumption in two ways. First, the (conditional) grant distributed to the households participating in reforestation could result in an income effect. In addition, the project included several livelihood activities on livestock farming, and also related to sustainable use of mangroves, such as shrimp and honey farming. These also could have changed incomes.

Table 20 shows that almost all households obtain at least some income/benefit either from the forest[39] (10-20% at baseline and 20-22% at endline), livestock raising (56-62% at baseline and 57-66% at endline) or fishing (82-92% at baseline and 74-84% at endline). Per capita incomes/benefits per months from these sources have increased in real terms over the evaluation period for forestry and fishing but these changes are not significant. In addition, the income from forestry is marginal on average (7.2-18.9 thousand rupiahs).

[38] Village disaster risk assessment including identification of hazard-prone areas and awareness raising campaigns was carried out in 6 out of 7 project villages, alert teams were set up in every project village, and village regulations on natural resource extraction and land use now take into account natural hazards.

[39] Income from selling of wood, honey and fruits picked in the forest is included under income from forests. We used median prices reported by the households to calculate the value of these products.

In general, the per capita real food and non-food expenditure changed little over the evaluation period. We find some small improvements in asset ownership and housing facilities, and the changes in the self-assessed happiness and current wealth status are also in line with the other wealth indicators (Table 23).

**Attribution of changes to MFS II interventions (project effects)**

The WIIP project did not affect household income from forestry, livestock and fishing (Table 34). The early project results show a small effect on food consumption (10% higher food consumption) due to the disbursements of grants just before the baseline survey, but not on the other livelihood indicators. At the endline, we do not find any livelihood effect of the WIIP project (Table 37).

### 2.2.6. Relevance of changes

The size of the impact in terms of seedlings planted is substantial. Adding up the early impacts and the impacts achieved over the project period, the bio-rights group members in treatment villages report almost 1,700 seedlings planted per household. Otherwise, the project has had little impact at the household level. The few impacts that are recorded are only found for the bio-rights group, which is a small group. Tsunamis have proven to be devastating and the area is tsunami prone. In that sense the project addresses an important issue for beneficiaries. However, we find very few impacts on the general population in terms of preparing themselves for an eventual disaster. This could indicate the project does not reach the population. It could also indicate that disaster risk management is not on the top list of priorities of villagers.

Regarding the reforestation efforts of WIIP, the survival rate of seedlings was 66% of the total planted trees and 83% of the agreed planting (with replanting) at the end of 2013. Comparing these results to existing studies, we find that reported survival rates vary considerably ranging from 17% to 90% (IFRC, 2011; Primavera and Esteban, 2008). The literature shows that the projects with the highest survival rates have in common that there is regular maintenance by residents who live right next to the plantations and have co-management with local governments. Low survival rates are usually the result of a lack of technical knowledge. Survival rates on mangrove reforestation projects in Vietnam (1994-2010) averaged around 60% after receiving technical training (IFRC, 2011). Hence, the bio-rights approach of WIIP to use residents living close to mangroves to maintain the plants is well-designed. The resulting survival rates are also in the upper range of reforestation projects.

### 2.2.7. Efficiency

Table 5 in section 2.1.5 gives an overview of the costs per project, which are estimated at 1,604 Int$ (2011 prices) per direct beneficiary household or 1,266 Int$ per hectare over the entire project period. The benefits of the project are in two areas: the benefits from the additional (mangrove) forests and benefits from livelihood activities. Because the attribution analysis did not show any significant income effects of the project, here we focus on the benefits provided by the additional forests (136.26 hectares, of which 119.6 hectares is attributable to the WIIP project). We compare the project costs (1,266 Int$ per ha) to the benefits provided by the mangrove forests, which Brander et al. (2012) estimated around USD 748-1,353 ha/year in Indonesia. We conclude that the project is cost effective because the benefits from mangroves exceed the costs of the project. However, comparing the unit

costs of reforestation to other projects (399-939 Int$/ha, Primavera and Esteban, 2008), we observe that the WIIP project is on the expensive side.

### 2.2.8. Conclusion

The analysis indicates that the project was rather successful in achieving its objectives. The benefits are in the area of mangrove forest that was realized, and in disaster risk preparedness measures at the community level. The program had less of an effect on the disaster preparedness and awareness of the general population in the project communities. We find very small effects in these areas, limited to the bio-rights groups that directly participated in the project. In addition, despite that the reforestation resulted in additional income for villagers, we do not find evidence that the disbursed project funds and the trainings on sustainable livelihood activities resulted in a lasting livelihood impact on the villagers.

## 2.3. Projects on poverty alleviation

### 2.3.1. Country context

Despite an average of 6 percent annual economic growth in the past decade, Indonesia's most recent (March 2014) poverty statistics[40] estimate that 11 percent of the population still live under the poverty line, while this figure was 13.3 percent in 2010. In 2014, the poverty rate in Central Java is above national average at 13.6 percent. In West Java the situation is better than the national average with 9.2 percent poverty rate in the population. Meanwhile, in Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia, the poverty rate is 4.1 percent. However, one of the poorest provinces of Indonesia is the archipelago of Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) province, of which Flores is one of the islands, with a poverty rate of 19.6 percent.

Indonesia is characterised by small farming households. The average landholdings are around 0.8 hectare per farming households to the 2003[41] agricultural census. According to Kuswara et al. (2009), over the past decades the farmers have become dependent on agricultural companies for agricultural inputs like fertilisers, pesticides and seeds. The government is also encouraging the use of chemical inputs to increase productivity as also indicated above. However, Kuswara et al. notes, many of the existing commercial seeds are not suitable to the local conditions and farmers' needs. In addition, the reliance on industrial inputs has resulted in the loss of farmers' knowledge about plant breeding and high genetic erosion of agro-diversity. PEDIGREA (Participatory Enhancement of Diversity of Genetic Resources in Asia) programme started in 2002 to reverse this situation.

In NTT and other areas in Indonesia, many small-holder farmers produce cash crops like coconut, cashew nut or cocoa. In East Flores, cashew nut is one of the main cash crops, and around 80% of the farmers grow cashews. Most of these cashew farmers deliver the unprocessed cashew nuts to traders that export it to Java. From there the cashews are shipped to countries like India and Vietnam for further processing. The processed cashews are then sold to Western markets. However, cashew nut farming is seasonal activity, providing a stream of income only for 3-6 months per year. Farmers, who

[40] Source: http://www.bps.go.id/tab_sub/view.php?kat=1&tabel=1&daftar=1&id_subyek=23&notab=1. Accessed on 2015-02-20.
[41] World Bank (2006) "Making the new Indonesian work for the poor", Figure 2.1

are not able to save enough during this period, often have to rely on borrowing at high interest rates to overcome the lean periods. Therefore, it is greatly beneficial for the farming households if they can increase their share of profits in the cashew value chain, for example by getting involved in cashew nut processing or in the organic cashew market. By responding to the increasing demand for organic foods in developed countries,[42] farmers following organic farming practices can obtain a premium price, increasing their profits. For example, in a public consultation, FairTrade proposed a 15% premium for organic cashew nut, which was widely accepted by the consulted stakeholders[43].

As in many other places, in Indonesia poverty rates are also higher in rural (13.8 percent) compared to urban (8.2 percent) areas. Many of the poor live in rural areas with limited access to financial institutions despite the fact that Indonesia has quite an advanced banking and financial system. In more remote areas, communities have to rely on informal money lenders, if they need to borrow money to cover their living costs. Most affected are uneducated people who have illiquid assets (in the form of land) but whose land tenure is not registered. Therefore, they are not able to apply for credit at the banks even when banks are present in the villages. In the absence of formal financial institutions, informal arrangements in saving and credit groups provide a way for people to commit to accumulate savings that they can use when it is their turn to receive the payments. This mechanism is useful for small scale savings and expenditures. However, formal institutions are needed to help smooth consumption and income patterns of farming or seasonal employment, and to borrow larger amounts.

Turning from farming households to non-farm businesses, we find that Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises[44] represent the largest part of the Indonesian business community, and contributed 55.6% to the total national GDP in 2011.[45] Therefore, one of the main cluster strategies in alleviating poverty in Indonesia is the empowerment of micro and small enterprises with the goal to increase the saving and to maintain sustainability of micro and small businesses, for example through the micro finance program *Kredit Usaha Rakyat* and other technical assistance programmes.[46] Especially in the provinces of Central Java and Jakarta, there are large numbers of Small and Medium Enterprises focusing on garment products. The textile and garment apparel industry is a labour intensive industry, and it is expected to remain a major contributor to Indonesia's economy.

[42] Source: Barrett, A.W. Browne, P.J.C. Harris, K. Cadoret, Organic certification and the UK market: organic imports from developing countries, Food Policy, Volume 27, Issue 4, August 2002, Pages 301-318,

[43] Source: http://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user_upload/content/2009/standards/documents/2012-05-14_EN_Consultationfeedbacksynopsis_cashewRCN_final.pdf

[44] The Government of Indonesia defines the following characteristics for MSMEs: Micro industries have net assets up to 50 million Indonesian rupiahs (IDR) or have annual revenue from sales up to 300 million IDR; Small Industries have net assets between 50-500 million IDR or have annual revenues from sales between 300-2,500 million IDR; and Medium industries have net assets between 0.5-10 billion IDR or have annual revenue from sales between 2.5-50 billion IDR. Source: https://crawford.anu.edu.au/acde/ip/pdf/Ipem/2012/20120507-SMERU-Dan-Thomson-Bellefleur.pdf

[45] Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/tab_sub/view.php?kat=2&tabel=1&daftar=1&id_subyek=13&notab=45

[46] Other strategies are social aid and protection with the goal to reduce the expenditure burden of poor families, and people's empowerment with the goal to improve income and prosperity of poor people.

### 2.3.2. Description of projects

As the above overview suggests, the projects selected with a specific aim on poverty alleviation (MDG 1) work in different settings and address different needs of the beneficiary population. Below we shortly summarize the project logic of each of the selected projects.

FIELD has assisted farmers in breeding local seed varieties that are less reliant on fertilisers and pesticides. The Local Economic Development and Promotion of Local Seed System project of FIELD aims at facilitating farmers to get their local varieties certified through community seed registration system once it is approved by the local government. To improve the market position of the farmers, FIELD gave trainings to the farmers' cooperative on how to set up a credit cooperative, which is used to mobilise capital to be able to set up an enterprise necessary to sell the products of the members collectively. The aim is to strengthen the market power of farmers producing local seed varieties. The seed breeding program has already started in 2002 and it works in 15 villages in Indramayu district of West Java province. FIELD selected 6 participating villages for the project on cooperatives based on the criteria that the villages having developed local seed varieties; farmers are dependent on income from agriculture; farmer group is well-organised; and the farmers in group have high commitment during seed breeding. In 2012, these cooperatives had 161 members in total, which has increased to 456 by 2014 (Table 4). The result chain for this project can be found in Figure 26 in Annex B.

The GREEN project of SwissContact has the final objective to improve the livelihoods of female micro-entrepreneurs in selected project areas. In the project, SwissContact provides technical assistance for two Hivos partner organisations: PPSW in Jakarta and ASSPUK in Central Java province. Both of these organisations are a network of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) focusing on the empowerment of female entrepreneurs. The project involves the development of these organisations into business development services provider centres. The capacity building is implemented using the garment industry as the theme of the project. The first step in becoming a BDS provider is to identify stakeholders and jointly develop and implement a joint vision for growth. That is followed by implementing promotional measures related to purchasing, production and marketing with groups of entrepreneurs. These are located in four regions: in Surakarta region the focus of the project is on batik making and the beneficiaries are members of JARPUK; in Sukohardjo region the focus is also on batik making and beneficiaries are members of Yayasan Krida Paramita; in Semarang region (Pringapus sub-district) the focus is on doormat/rug making and the beneficiaries are members of the Melati cooperative. The project activities in the above regions are supported by ASSPUK. Finally, in Jakarta region (Tambora sub-district) the focus is on laundry ventures specialised in jeans attire and the beneficiaries are SMSEs that are members of PPSW. In total, 125 craftswomen at the four project locations benefitted from the trainings organised by SC GREEN (Table 4). The result chain for this project can be found in Figure 27 in Annex B.

The Seed Capital project of KSP-QT has the objective to improve the financial and social performance of three primary saving and credit cooperatives: KSP-QT, KSP-MDM and KSU-GTGS, so that they become self-sufficient. The cooperatives operate in Central Java province and have the same mission to provide financial services to the small-scale farmers and entrepreneurs to open their opportunities to improve livelihood by developing small-trading, livestock farming and home industries. The project supported the

establishment of a secondary cooperative, KSM-QTha, that serves as an umbrella organisation for the primary cooperatives by providing guarantee for inter-lending among the cooperatives. Half of the project budget was given to KSM-QTha as seed money used to lend to the cooperatives that need more funding to provide loans to their members. The other half was used to conduct capacity building trainings for the cooperatives' staff from clerical to managerial level. The focus of the training for the field staff was on basic knowledge about cooperative, financial planning for family (financial literacy), and simple business plan. The field staff is in touch with the clients on a daily/weekly basis, as their main task is to collect the daily/weekly savings from members of the cooperatives. All prospective cooperative members participate in an hour-long individual or group training/discussion on family finances, which is followed up by a daily/weekly collection service of the members' savings as part of a continuous education. By saving in the cooperatives, members become eligible to borrow from the cooperatives. At the end of 2012, the three cooperatives had 13,372 members jointly (Table 4). The result chain for this project can be found in Figure 28 in Annex B.

Last, the LED-NTT and FSPP project of SwissContact on local economic development in Nusa Tenggara Timur focused on promoting organic farming practices, supporting the implementation of national and international organic certification for the project villages and supporting the development of local processing. The main objective of the project was to increase income and create jobs by improving the competitiveness of farmers and processing enterprises. The LED-NTT project worked with cacao, cashew and seaweed farmers, while the FSPP project only continued project activities in the cashew sector and started new activities in the wild honey sector. The evaluation focused on the cashew sector, where the project worked with 1,541 cashew farming households in 2012 (Table 4). The result chain for this project can be found in Figure 32 in Annex B.

### 2.3.3. Evaluation design

For all four projects, the evaluation focused on a subsample of the project beneficiaries and locations. Specifically, for the SC GREEN project survey data was only collected for the beneficiaries at the Melati cooperative (Pringapus sub-district); for the Seed capital project of KSP-QT, we sampled from the members of the KSP-QT and KSU-GTGS cooperatives in 5 and 3 villages, respectively; while for the SC LED-NTT and FSPP projects, the evaluation focused on the cashew sector exclusively, collecting data in 6 of 9 project villages. Finally, for FIELD's project, we sampled survey respondents from 8 of 19 project farming groups involved in rice breeding and from 4 of 6 savings and credit cooperatives (in the same villages) established with the assistance of the project.

For all four projects, we interviewed both beneficiary and comparison households[47] in order to allow us to use difference-in-difference methodology in estimating the projects' impacts (attribution). For the FIELD project, we also sampled households living in project villages but not directly benefitting from the project in order to measure potential spillover effects (similarly to the WIIP project). For the sample

[47] Comparison villages were usually selected by matching population and agricultural characteristics of potential comparison villages to the treatment villages. Households were then randomly selected from a farming group similar to the beneficiary households in the case of FIELD and SC LED-NTT, and randomly selected in the case of KSP-QT. In SC GREEN, the potential treatment and comparison households came from the same two villages, had the same livelihood activity but were not member of the project cooperative.

sizes see Table 3 in section 2.1.3. In addition to structured household surveys, for the FIELD project we also collected data using farming group and cooperative surveys, and farming group surveys were also used for the SC LED-NTT project.

Using the collected data, we want to answer the evaluation question related to poverty alleviation (MDG 1): How did the livelihood of households change during the evaluation period? In addition, in each case we also analyse whether the intermediate results in the project logic have been realised.[48] Hence, for all projects there are common outcome indicators (in accordance with the uniform indicators of the synthesis team), while a number of specific outcome indicators were also identified based on the result chain of each project. Table 16 in Annex C gives an overview of the indicators used for each projects.

For the selected outcome indicators, we analyse the effects of the projects on the beneficiary households using regression analysis. For three projects (FIELD, KSP-QT and SC LED-NTT), the primary analysis uses difference-in-difference methodology: we compare the changes in outcome indicators between the treatment groups and the comparison group. However, because the all these projects have already started before the baseline survey (see Figure 2), we also analyse the early results of the project using cross-sectional analysis on the baseline data. Then, the total impact of the projects can be estimated as the sum of the early effects (at the baseline) and the effects found between the baseline and endline survey period (at the endline).

In the MDG evaluation, the SC GREEN project is an exception because the project activity actually started only after the baseline survey. However, unfortunately, the project participants were not yet identified at the time of the baseline survey, and at the endline survey we found out that only 1 of 50 potential beneficiary respondents from the baseline sample participated in the training organised by the project (there were 14 participants in total). Therefore, at the endline, we interviewed 5 additional beneficiaries. As a result of this situation, we had to adjust our initial plan to use difference-in-difference methodology, to working with a cross-sectional regression, like we used for the other projects in estimating the early effects of the projects.

### 2.3.4. Implementation of projects

As discussed before, all four projects had been already running for some time before the evaluation period. The FIELD project already started almost a decade ago, while the SC LED-NTT project started actively working with the project villages at least since 2010. The KSP-QT project also already started in 2009, and some of the sampled beneficiaries became member of the savings and credit cooperatives already in 2010.

This fact, however, only lead to some complication for the evaluation design, but did not influence the implementation of the projects. Indeed, all projects, except for the SC GREEN project, were implemented mostly according to the plans. However, for some of the farming groups sampled as beneficiaries of the FIELD project we found no evidence that they have received any assistance from FIELD in terms of seed breeding, good farming practices and management trainings. Therefore, we moved the households sampled from these farming groups to the comparison group.

[48] For a complete set of specific evaluation questions and outcome indicators, please consult the individual reports.

In the case of SC GREEN, the project period proved to be too short to change the mind-set of the project's two NGOs (ASPPUK and PPSW) to the business world according to SwissContact. As a consequence, half-way through the project, the stakeholders decided to change the strategy of the project: SwissContact shifted the focus directly to the female entrepreneurs, and looked for a market opportunity to link them to a buyer. As a result, three women groups received trainings on batik and *kanzashi* techniques between February-July 2013. Hence, instead of being cases studies, the trainings for direct beneficiaries became core activities of the project.[49] In addition, changes in the SwissContact staff and differences in perspectives between SwissContact and the project NGOs lead to delays in the project implementation.[50]

Regarding the project beneficiaries, it is important to keep in mind that in all projects the beneficiaries were selected based on characteristics such as having an organised farming group and being interested in the project for the FIELD and SC LED-NTT projects. The criteria for the FIELD project were discussed above. FIELD usually works with one farming group (out of several) per village because spreading out the project locations in Indramayu district is useful in the multiple location testing of the newly bred seed varieties. On the other hand, the SC LED-NTT project works with the whole village because organic certification is organised at the village level. Therefore, SwissContact selected the 9 project villages with the additional criteria that the main income source in the village was from cashew nuts, and that there was already a village level farming group with a group leader. In addition, due to the orientation of the organic certified products at the premium markets, having the highest quality cashew nuts (taste and size) and not using chemical inputs were also essential criteria of being involved in the project. Self-selection into the projects played also an important role in the KSP-QT and SC GREEN projects. In the case of KSP-QT and KSU-GTGS, members voluntarily decided to join the savings and credit cooperatives. We also observed that some of the characteristics of the members were different from the population average, for example members were on average higher educated. In the case of the SC GREEN project, the training participants also voluntarily decided to participate in the project. However, in the latter case the beneficiaries and comparison group were quite similar.

Looking at whether the sampled beneficiaries actually participated in similar activities as the ones organised by the projects,[51] we found moderate participation rates among the beneficiaries: less than 40% of the treatment households in both the SC LED-NTT and the FIELD projects reported to have participated in any trainings on good (sustainable) farming practices in the two (three) years preceding the surveys. Also, less than 40% of the KSP-QT members and less than 10% of KSU-GTGS members remembered to have participated in any family finance meetings despite this being an integral part of the services of the cooperatives. In addition, we observed that during the evaluation period some households quit their farming groups (38 percentage points in the SC LED-NTT project and 8 percentage points in the FIELD project) or their savings and credit cooperatives (14 percentage points in the FIELD project, 32 percentage points for KSP-QT members and 27 percentage points for KSU-GTGS members).

[49] The trainings were organised by SwissContact instead of the NGOs (ASPPUK and PPSW) that were to become business development service providers.

[50] A qualitative study of the implementation and benefits of the SC GREEN project can be found in Annex VI of the project report.

[51] We asked about participation in different types of trainings relevant for the project, in order to also be able to measure participation of similar activities in the comparison group.

### 2.3.5. Changes in selected outcome indicators and attribution to MFS II

The evaluation findings for the selected outcome indicators are discussed by group below. For each group, first, the change in the indicators during the evaluation period is discussed based on the tables reported from Table 22 to Table 28 in Annex D. Then, we elaborate to what extent the changes can be linked to the interventions based on the regression tables reported from Table 35 to Table 41 in Annex E.

#### *Indicators on the use of financial instrument*

**Changes in outcomes between 2012 and 2014**

These indicators were measured for the FIELD and KSP-QT projects. For the FIELD project, we do not see any significant change in the use of financial instruments or the percentage of households involved in a financial institution. This suggests a stable membership during baseline and endline. However, we observe a sharp reduction in the use of financial instruments that are directly related to the intervention of the members of KSP-QT (34 percentage points in savings) and KSU-GTGS (12 percentage points in savings). This is due to the fact that they were members at baseline with a high use of services. Also, we observe a positive trend in the use of financial products which are not directly related to savings and credit cooperatives. KSP-QT (KSU-GTGS) members increased their use of savings accounts in regular banks from 14 (33) percent at baseline to 29 (37) percent at endline.

**Attribution of changes to MFS II interventions (project effects)**

Conditional on observed characteristics, savings and cooperative members were about 70 percent point more likely to be involved in a financial institution, and about 87 percent points more likely to have savings in a savings and credit cooperative. Notable is the drop for the latter for KSP-QT from baseline to endline (in comparison with the comparison group). For KSU-GTGS, the effect is much less and insignificant from zero. The reverse occurred for the households holding savings in a bank. This indicates that KSP-QT members tend to make use of the regular financial system after they have paid back their loan, while KSU-GTGS members continue to use the financial services of the cooperative.

#### *Financial knowledge indicators*

**Changes in outcomes between 2012 and 2014**

This indicator has only been measured for the KSP-QT project. While there has been a large increase in financial planning (by around 40 percentage points) for both cooperatives, we find no substantial change in financial numeracy.

**Attribution of changes to MFS II interventions (project effects)**

According to the difference-in-difference results, the increase in financial plans is still large but no significant effect can be found for either group. Only for KSU-GTGS members, we find that the increase in financial numeracy skills is slightly significant. The effects are not significantly different between the two types of cooperatives.

### *Income and livelihood indicators*

**Project differences**

Comparing wealth levels between the people in the projects we find clear differences at the baseline (Table 23 and Table 24). Monthly per capita non-food consumption is only around 70,000 Rp. (less than 6 EUR) on average among the beneficiaries of the SC LED-NTT project compared to 250,000 (525,000) Rp. among the KSP-QT (KSU-GTGS) members and 370,000 Rp. among the beneficiaries of the FIELD project. The difference is driven by the more remote location of the SC LED-NTT project (Flores, NTT) compared to the FIELD and KSP-QT projects (West and Central Java, respectively), as we also find a lower level of non-food consumption (170,000 Rp.) among the beneficiaries of the WIIP project, which is working on a different (less remote) part of Flores. The asset index[52] confirms the finding that the beneficiaries of the WIIP and SC LED-NTT projects are less wealthy than those of the FIELD, SC GREEN and KSP-QT projects. In particular, the negatives values (-1.0 and -1.3, baseline) of the indices for the projects in Flores (WIIP, SC LED-NTT) show that these households were at least one standard deviation poorer compared to the average Indonesian household in 2012. KSP-QT members were also slightly poorer than average (-0.2, baseline), while KSU-GTGS members were somewhat richer (0.3, baseline) and the beneficiaries of the FIELD and SC GREEN projects were more than half a standard deviations richer than the average Indonesian household (0.6, baseline).

However, people in Flores (WIIP, SC LED-NTT) seem to be slightly happier (2.1-2.3) than in the Central and West Java (2.0 for FIELD, SC GREEN and KSP-QT). However, in terms of subjective wealth status they are aware that they are poorer by about 0.5 points (on a scale from 1 to 6).

**Changes in outcomes between 2012 and 2014**

Looking at the changes in the indicators, we observe an overall modest increase in wealth throughout the projects, and also in the comparison groups. Changes in household income are very small between baseline and endline for the FIELD project. However, in the SC LED-NTT project, we actually observe a reduction of income due to the decrease in overall cashew nut harvest. We also observe the same pattern of harvest reduction in the comparison group.

**Attribution of changes to MFS II interventions (project effects)**

Based on the results in Table 36 and Table 37, no significant project effects are found on the livelihood of households between the baseline and endline periods for any of the projects. Significant improvements (attributable to the project) are only found for the housing facilities index and overall happiness of the FIELD farming group households, and the per capita monthly income for the KSU-GTGS members. However, the latter is not supported by improvements in other wealth indicators.

For the FIELD and KSP-QT projects we observe some early project results (controlling for household characteristics), which in the case of the KSP-QT project are often counterbalanced by negative effects for the difference-in-difference estimates. This suggests that in the case of KSP-QT and KSU-GTGS the initial improvements could be part of a loan cycle: savings and credit cooperative member households

[52] The asset index is normalized to have zero value for the average Indonesian household in 2012 based on the DHS survey. In addition, the variance of the index was also normalized to 1. Hence, negative (positive) values of the index show lower (higher) than average wealth status compared to the Indonesian average.

developed earlier, while the comparison households caught up with the cooperative members during the evaluation period due to general developments in Indonesia.

### *Yield and volume of traded goods indicators*

**Changes in outcomes between 2012 and 2014**

In Table 25, we observe different developments in the yield of the selected crops between the FIELD (rice) and SC LED-NTT (cashew nuts) projects: while the yield of rice per hectare increased (from 5.6 to 6.7 t/ha), the yield of cashew nuts decreased (by more than 100 kg/ha and almost 2 kg/tree). These yields are largely influenced by weather and pests, and we observe a similar pattern for the comparison group.

The volume of the traded goods in the FIELD project did not change significantly, but since the project had been in the field for many years already, this is not surprising. However, for the SC LED-NTT project, in line with the findings for the cashew nut yield, we also observe a decline in the amount of cashew nuts sold. Hence, the decrease is driven by supply rather than demand factors.

**Attribution of changes to MFS II interventions (project effects)**

For the FIELD project, we found a positive early project effect on the yield of rice for the farming group members (but a negative effect on the cooperative members). However, no additional effects are found between the baseline and endline periods. The project also did not have a significant effect on the volume of rice marketed.

For the SC LED-NTT project, between the baseline and endline, the yield of cashew nuts in the project villages decreased, which is captured by the negative albeit insignificant coefficient estimate of the intervention. Nonetheless, the overall effect of the project on the cashew nut yields appears to be substantial and significant (42% higher per tree and 46% higher per hectare compared to the comparison group at baseline). The regression results on the volume of cashew nuts sold do not support the hypothesis that the project contributes to increasing the amount of cashews sold. However, as a result of the SC LED-NTT project, households marketed 38 percentage point more of their products at (inter)national markets.

### *Food security and vulnerability indicators*

**Changes in outcomes between 2012 and 2014**

Even though the households' wealth has moderately increased, they seem to feel more often that they cannot cover their living costs. The percentage of households that felt they could not cover their living costs in the past 12 months increased by 20 percentage points for the beneficiaries of the WIIP project, by 6 percentage points for the SC LED-NTT project and by almost 20 percentage points for the FIELD project, see Table 26 and Table 27. This change could signal that households' expectations have increased.

On the other hand, we observe that the emergency savings of both KSP-QT and KSU-GTGS members have increased.

**Attribution of changes to MFS II interventions (project effects)**

Possibly due to the increased savings of the households, the KSP-QT project had a positive impact on the percentage of households with emergency savings covering the living costs for at least one month.

No other effects of the projects were found on the food security of households (Table 39 and Table 40).

### *Indicators on organic farming practices*

**Changes in outcomes between 2012 and 2014**

For the FIELD project, there has been no change in the indicators on organic farming practices (Table 28). On the other hand, in the SC LED-NTT project, the use of organic pesticides/insecticides and fertilizers increased between baseline and endline (by around 25 and 18 percentage points, respectively).

**Attribution of changes to MFS II interventions (project effects)**

Interestingly, the regression results convey different project effects regarding the use of organic practices (Table 41): both projects (FIELD, SC LED-NTT) had a significant early treatment effect on the project farming group members (42 and 18 percentage point higher use of organic fertilizers, respectively). However, between the baseline and endline, these effects were tempered by negative difference-in-difference effects due to the increased use of organic farming practices in the comparison group. The overall effect is still positive in the case of FIELD but it is nullified for in the case of the SC LED-NTT project. The latter result may be, however, somewhat misleading as the effects in the comparison areas could also be partly driven by indirect effects of the SC LED-NTT project as the project also works with the local extension service network.[53]

#### 2.3.6. Relevance of changes

Unfortunately, we find very little evidence that the projects improved the livelihoods of the beneficiary households. The developments in household wealth among the beneficiary households are usually matched by improvements in the comparison groups. In the case of the SC LED-NTT project, we even found that due to better diversification of income sources, the comparison households could better cope with a bad cashew nut harvest in the area. Data from the agriculture oriented projects (FIELD, SC LED-NTT) show that households move from investing into farming tools to rather investing in new non-farm businesses (Table 23 and Table 24), which may be a sign of more diversification of household income.

Access to financial services in the form of saving and borrowing are important tools for better aligning household income and expenditure, and facilitating investments into businesses or farming tools. Many rural households face constraints in accessing formal financial services. The cooperatives participating in the KSP-QT project offer financial services from poor (KSP-QT and KSU-GTGS) to middle income (KSU-GTGS) rural households that are designed to match the needs of their membership. In this respect, the KSP-QT project addresses a relevant issue for the beneficiaries. However, our finding suggest that after

[53] District Education Centre (BPK) or Agricultural Extension Centre (BPP).

the repayment of loans, many households decide to stop saving and leave the cooperative. Hence, the project savings and credit cooperatives serve only a temporary purpose for some households.

We observe similar findings also for the FIELD and SC GREEN projects: some cooperative members have also quit by the endline survey; and in the SC GREEN project, a large share of the 50 participants of the first introductory training on *kanzashi* did not adopt the new skills in their livelihood activities. In addition, all SC GREEN project participants already had a livelihood activity prior to the project that they kept as their main activity also after the project.

Regarding the project beneficiaries, in the case of the SC GREEN and FIELD projects they were richer than the average Indonesian household in terms of asset ownership, while the beneficiaries of the SC LED-NTT and KSP-QT cooperative are poorer than the average. Hence, the projects are more needed for these households who live in more remote areas.

Finally, we compare these results to other evaluation studies. Regarding the FIELD project, the literature shows that seed breeding projects can improve poverty status, at least in the short run. Reported impacts on net income range from 25% to almost 200% (Beye and Margiotta, 2008; Poudel et al., 2003; Singh et al., 2013). However, the sustainability of the impact is a problem. In the FIELD project seed breeding has started already prior to the MFS II period, hence we cannot report on short run impacts but we observe that during the evaluation period the number of seed breeders declined by 26 percentage points, which may indicate sustainability problems.[54]

Related to the SC GREEN project, early evidence is found that vocational trainings and entrepreneurship trainings can also improve someone's poverty status in the developing world. Though, the impact varies with the components and the length of the trainings (Attanasio et al., 2011; Card et al., 2011; Glaub & Frese, 2011; Hirshleifer et al., 2014; Maitra & Mani, 2012; McKenzie, 2012; Patel, 2014). However, these trainings were mostly more intensive (up to 6 months) than that of the SC GREEN project.

Turning to micro-finance such as the credit cooperatives of the KSP-QT and FIELD projects, the existing evidence suggests that most micro-finance projects do not improve the livelihood of household in terms of savings and income, even if it increases sales or employment rates (IPA, 2015; Khandker et al., 1998; Takahashi et al., 2010; Yang and Stanly, 2012). Concerning financial literacy, no evidence is found for a substantial effect of financial literacy training on financial knowledge or saving behaviour (Cole et al., 2011; Eskes, 2011). Hence, the limited impact found in the MFS II projects is in line with existing literature.

With respect to the fourth method of alleviating poverty in the MDG studies, organic farming projects (SC LED-NTT/FSPP, FIELD), the literature shows that organic certification projects have a positive impact on the yield, prices and revenue of farming households if the projects are coupled with trainings on best organic farming practices and the projects target farmers that have not used agro-chemical inputs prior to the project (Agro Eco/Grolink, 2008; Beuchelt and Zeller, 2011; Bolwig et al., 2009; Leijdens, 2007).[55] The one reported increase in yields equals almost 100% increase per cashew tree in Tanzania (Leijdens, 2007). Reported price increases range from 8% in Nicaragua (coffee; Beuchelt and Zeller, 2011) to 200%

[54] The establishment of credit cooperatives was meant to ensure the sustainability of enterprising seed breeding initiatives in the communities.

[55] However, organic farming yields are usually lower compared to yields obtained using agro-chemical inputs.

per kilo in Tanzania (cashew nut, Agro Eco/Grolink, 2008). Reported increases in revenue range from 10% to 20% in Tanzania (cashew nut, Leijdens, 2007) to 75% in Uganda (coffee; Bolwig et al., 2009). However, there are no indications that these effects translate into higher income, especially compared to conventional farming methods using agro-chemical inputs (Beuchelt and Zeller, 2011). In the case of the SC LED-NTT/FSPP projects we observe a higher yield in the treatment communities but we are not able to assess whether this is due to the project or to soil conditions.

### 2.3.7. Efficiency

The four projects on MDG 1 worked with varying budgets (Table 5 in section 2.1.5) and numbers of direct beneficiaries (Table 4 in section 2.1.3). The SC LED-NTT and FSPP projects had the largest project costs (1,040,028 EUR[56] of which 22% or 229,220 EUR was spent on the cashew sector), while FIELD had the smallest (103,015 EUR). However, the type, intensity and number of direct beneficiaries of the project activities were also very different: while the SC LED-NTT project served up to 1,841 farming households and regularly visited the project locations, the FIELD project worked less intensely with direct beneficiaries (161 cooperative members) and focused more on policy advocacy for the community seed registry system.

In the case of KSP-QT, the project did not fund direct project activities with beneficiaries (around 13,000 members); the project costs (156,514 EUR) rather funded the cooperatives' capacity development in terms of financial knowledge, technology and seed money for borrowing. Hence, for this project it is not possible to calculate unit costs.

Most of the project costs of the SC GREEN project also covered the consultancy of SwissContact to project stakeholders. Only 17% of the total project costs (116,412 EUR) were used for providing trainings to direct beneficiaries (125 craftswomen).

Hence, when calculating the unit costs of the projects, we calculated these over the project costs directly attributable to the evaluated project activity. We found that the unit costs were 562.8 Int$ (2011 prices) per training participant for the SC GREEN project for a 2-4 day training; in total 762.43 Int$ per cashew nut farming household for the SC LED-NTT/FSPP projects for the period of 2010-2013; and in total 60.45 Int$ per cooperative member for the FIELD project.

Based on the benchmarks costs identified by the Synthesis team, none of these projects are cost effective, i.e. they operate with higher costs than similar projects. However, it has to be kept in mind that most of the projects are relatively small and in case of the SC LED-NTT/FSPP projects also quite intensive, which contribute to higher costs.

Looking at the benefits of the projects, we also find that costs are higher than the observed benefits in terms of livelihood improvements. In the case of the SC LED-NTT/FSPP project, a regional poor cashew nut harvest contributed to these findings.[57] In addition, not all project results can be measured by livelihood improvements. A good example would be increased skills in handcrafts or sustainable farming practices.

[56] For the LED-NTT (2010-2012) and FSPP (2013-2014) projects together.

[57] Project households were less likely to diversify their income sources into other (non-farm) activities, therefore they were more affected by regional conditions resulting in a poor harvest.

### 2.3.8. Conclusion

All evaluated projects (FIELD, SC GREEN, KSP-QT, SC LED-NTT and WIIP) provided trainings as one of the strategies to improve the skills and welfare of their beneficiaries. In addition, improving access to market was another common strategy used by the projects (FIELD, SC GREEN, KSP-QT and SC LED-NTT): the SC LED-NTT and SC GREEN projects of SwissContact (through different CFAs) also assisted the beneficiaries in marketing their products, while FIELD worked on enabling seed breeding farmers to legally market their products, and KSP-QT (and FIELD to some extent) provided access to financing.

The WIIP project was the only project that directly created new 'jobs' (in reforestation) and provided monetary compensation for households working on the project.

In addition, all of the projects aimed at developing the capacity of partner organisations (ASPPUK and PPSW for SC GREEN and KSP-QT, KSU-GTGS and KSP-MDM for the KSP-QT project), farming groups and cooperatives (FIELD, SC LED-NTT) or the village apparatus (WIIP – not related to poverty alleviation).

Finally, during the evaluation period we observe a general shift from agriculture towards off-farm businesses as a source of diversification of income sources. Projects focusing on agricultural production (SC LED-NTT/FSPP and FIELD) may slow down this adaptation and diversification, which is a necessary development as harvests can be volatile due to environmental conditions. In addition, the last bad harvest in the case of SC LED-NTT/FSPP may explain why households are less keen on exerting extra effort into organic farming practices.

## 2.4. Projects on empowering indigenous communities

### 2.4.1. Country context

Community empowerment programmes for indigenous communities are very important in a country like Indonesia where an estimated 48 million indigenous people still depend on the forest for their livelihood, but where mining, logging and oil palm industry are destroying more than 1 million hectares of rainforest territory each year[58] (Telapak & Gekko Studio 2011). Most often participatory mapping methods are used to agree and map the boundaries of the community, but also to document important ecological, cultural and economic sites within the village.

Even though, in recent years, laws and policies have been implemented (both on federal and local level) by the government to facilitate the indigenous people's access to their lands and resources, in reality it turns out that the implementation of these new policies is problematic, as it is very difficult for the indigenous people to effectively prove their claims to ancestral lands on their own. As a result, central government and outside companies are still able to keep extorting their natural resources.

The general aim of participatory mapping projects is to help indigenous communities to make a map that depicts the boundaries of –and important cultural and natural landmarks and areas within- their community lands, and to help them use the map as a tool to claim the legal rights to their ancestral

[58] Making Indonesia the fastest forest clearing nation in the world since 2012, and also the world's third largest emitter of carbon dioxide emissions, behind China and the United States (Telapak & Gekko Studio 2011).

lands and manage their forests and resources in a sustainable way. Thereby preventing further environmental damage and saving indigenous cultures from extinction.

These projects are very relevant to the project locations we have evaluated, because almost all of the communities are heavily reliant on the forest and its resources for their livelihoods, economy, and culture. All locations cope with their own specific problems: In Jayapura-District in Papua (location of the Pt.PPMA project) the forests are being exploited by timber companies, as well as outside communities that steal valuable natural resources such as birds of paradise, black orchids, and wood from their forests. In Sintang in Kalimantan (location of the NTFP-EP evaluation) conversion of forest land into oil palm plantation has already led to water scarcity and a decrease in forest animals and plants, some of which are used for their traditional weaving crafts. Their remaining forest lands are also under serious threat of being converted to oil palm plantations, as they are located in the APL[59] area of giant oil palm companies. Likewise, the residents of Rampi, Sulawesi (location of the HuMa evaluation), worry about the potential damaging effects of gold mining activities on their still relatively healthy eco-systems, and fear government's plans to convert their community forest into protected forest. Also in Aceh in Sumatera (location of the YRBI project), new natural resource exploitation projects that are taking place without their consent in some areas. In light of these activities, it is increasingly important to settle existing boundary disputes between *Gampongs* and *Mukims.* The communities are also experiencing an increasing water scarcity, and a decline in important forest products, such as honey and timber, as a result of plantation building and the ongoing illegal logging activities (often supported by the local apparatus) in their industrial forests.

### 2.4.2. Description of projects

The main goal of the participatory mapping activities differs per project. Whereas the Pt.PPMA and NTFP-EP projects are mainly trying to secure the livelihood of the communities, YRBI and HuMa are mostly focused on strengthening indigenous political organisations and institutions. By extension, not all participatory mapping projects are evaluated on the same Millennium Development Goals and Themes. On the one hand, the evaluation of Pt.PPMA and NTFP-EP projects is mostly focused on the MDG on 'living environment, forests and biodiversity' (MDG 7a and 7b), and partially on the MDG on 'poverty alleviation' (MDG 1). In addition, the NFTP-EP project is also partially evaluated on the theme of 'good governance and civil society building'. On the other hand, the YRBI and HuMa projects are mainly evaluated on the theme of 'good governance and civil society building', and partially on the Millennium Development Goal on 'sustainable living environments, forests and biodiversity'.

The two main activities that were conducted by the Association for Study and Empowerment of Papuan Indigenous People (Pt.PPMA) in Jayapura-District in Jayapura-District are participatory mapping and eco-forestry. The purpose of these activities was to enhance the communities' ability to properly and sustainably manage their forests. The result chain for this project can be found in Figure 24 in Annex B.

The main activities of NTFP-EP in Sintang in Kalimantan were participatory mapping and training. The objectives of the project were to develop and improve the community's livelihood by making sure that

[59] APL means *Area Peruntukan Lain*, or 'area for other allocation'. Land with an APL indication is government owned land that is allocated for non-forestry business.

they are empowered and organised to manage and benefit from their eco-systems and to claim their rights on the utilization of natural resources (in particular the raw materials used to produce woven cloth and natural dye), and to provide alternative sources of livelihood for the community to improve their income and welfare. The result chain for this project can be found in Figure 25 in Annex B.

YRBI carried out participatory mapping activities as well as trainings, workshops, and discussions on participatory mapping and the strengthening of traditional institutions in Aceh in Sumatra. The final objectives were to strengthen traditional institutions, and letting them regain the rights and authority they once held in Aceh's society in terms of conflict management and the management of natural resources, as well as to increase people's awareness and capacity to manage and control natural resources and sources of water, and to ensure a fair and just management and distribution of natural resources in an ecological and social way. The result chain for this project can be found in Figure 30 in Annex B.

HuMa/Wallacea's main activities in Rampi in Sulawesi, were participatory mapping and organising 'PHR' (community law facilitation) trainings in the form of village discussions for the general community, and special workshops for village leaders about natural resource management and preservation. Their aim is to train communities to manage and maintain their forests, and to fight for their rights over their lands. HuMa's final objective is to influence law and policy with regard to indigenous land rights, by building a social movement that pushes for law reform based on social and ecological justice. The result chain for this project can be found in Figure 31 in Annex B.

### 2.4.3. Evaluation design

For the evaluation of all four projects on the empowerment of indigenous communities, we sampled from project communities. In the case of the Pt.PPMA we sampled all project villages, while for the NTFP-EP and HuMa projects we first selected one of the project areas, and then sampled all project villages in that project component (4 villages for NTFP-EP) or just a subsample (3 of 6 villages for HuMa). YRBI also implements its programme in multiple locations, from which we selected 2 *Mukims* (traditional institution consisting of a group of villages) and sampled 3 of 8 villages in each.

Hence, the evaluation relies on a before-after comparison design.[60] We interviewed community leaders in each sampled village, and 20[61] randomly chosen villagers[62] knowledgeable about village affairs. In order to validate the data from the quantitative surveys and to deepen our understanding of the project context and results, we collected additional qualitative information at the project locations in the form of in-depth interviews with project stakeholders and community leaders, and using focus group discussions with men and women participating in project activities. The findings of the qualitative studies are included as annexes in the project reports.

[60] For Pt.PPMA and NTFP-EP we actually also ended up collecting data on non-project villages due to misunderstandings regarding the project locations (Pt.PPMA,NTFP-EP) and changes in the project implementation (Pt.PPMA). However, due to the small sample size (2-4 villages per treatment group) we are not able to use these locations as true comparison areas.

[61] Due to the small size of the villages in Rampi sub-district (HuMa), in 2 of the villages we only interviewed 10 respondents. Hence, the total sample size for this project was only 40.

[62] We tried to interview a gender-balanced sample.

Both the quantitative and qualitative surveys focused on the evaluation questions like: How did the management structure of community forest areas change? How did the attitude and awareness of the people towards natural resources change? Are there local wisdom documentations about natural resource management produced? Table 17 in Annex C give an overview of the outcome indicators measured for the participatory mapping projects both related to MDG 7 and Good governance.

### 2.4.4. Implementation of projects

At the community level, almost all projects were implemented as planned. The exception is the Pt.PPMA project, where almost no project activities were realized during the contract period (2012-2014) due to the sudden decease of Pt.PPMA's director in 2011, which led to an organisational crisis. This has led the CFA (IUCN) to terminate the project one year earlier than planned (in April 2014).[63]

In general, the implementation of the projects crucially depends on the cooperation of the SPOs with the communities due to the participatory nature of the projects. It usually takes years to complete the mapping of village boundaries due to the necessity to discuss and resolve boundary disputes with other villages and land owners, as we observed in the case of the YRBI project that has been working with the surveyed locations since 2009/2010. NTFP-EP and HuMa only started working with the surveyed project locations in 2012, however, already before the baseline survey. In the case of the NTFP-EP project, the boundary mapping has been finalized rather quickly (March-September 2012). However, lobbying at the local government for the approval of the maps proved to be a challenge due to political dynamics (the frequent turnover of persons in charge of in the local government).

Instead of working closely with communities, HuMa is specialized in providing trainings on community law facilitation to CBOs and NGOs that are confronted with a potential threat of natural resource extraction. Therefore, HuMa's activities are usually short at one location and spread out over many locations over time. The evaluation focuses on the evaluation of HuMa's assistance in Rampi, where HuMa assisted a local NGO (Wallacea) in mapping the village boundaries and other sites and conducting trainings/meetings on community law facilitation to strengthen the indigenous communities' claims to their natural resources. However, the activities in Rampi were not finalized after HuMa's training, and Wallacea continued the project activities from other funds.

Regarding the implementation of the project activities in the communities, our data show that the projects' activities mostly involve the local leaders in the community, and women are rarely involved (due to the heavy work of mapping). For example, less than 30% of the surveyed villagers participated in YRBI's participatory mapping activities.

### 2.4.5. Changes in selected outcome indicators and attribution to MFS II

Looking at the changes in the outcome indicators of the household and community surveys between the baseline and endline (from Table 29 to Table 31 in Annex D), not many significant changes can be found that indicate that the projects have been successful. However, this does not necessarily mean that the

[63] The evaluation of the Pt.PPMA project, therefore, focuses mostly on the impact of Pt.PPMA's project activities in the previous contract period (2009-2010).

projects entirely failed their purpose, or that their beneficiaries did not benefit at all from the projects. Because all the 4 participatory mapping projects had to be evaluated on the same outcome indicators, it was not possible to make the outcome indicators specific enough to encompass all the different objectives of the specific projects. Also, none of the maps that were made during the different projects have yet been legally recognized by the (local) government and therefore cannot yet be used at their full potential. Furthermore, it may take quite some time before changes in natural resource management, land ownership, etc. lead to results that are actually felt and noticed by the larger society. It is, therefore, very possible that not all of the impacts were already measurable at the time of the endline study, and that (more) project impacts will manifest themselves in the future.

In order to bridge part of this gap, information from the qualitative study is used to show how the projects were received by the beneficiaries, and what specific benefits (that are not captured in the quantitative study) the people felt from – and attributed to – the project, or expected to feel from the project in the future. With regard to the outcome indicators, the results from the qualitative study sometimes contradict the results from the quantitative study. However, due to time restrictions it is not possible to further investigate these issues.

Below, the general project results from both the quantitative and qualitative study are discussed per outcome indicator group.

### *Management of natural resources indicators*

Only 1 out of 5 villages[64] that did not yet undertake efforts to protect their forest at the time of the baseline study had started to do this by the time of the endline study. No increase in forest size was found for any of the villages. On the contrary, 4 out of 6 forests were reported to have decreased in size.

At the time of the baseline, regulations about the use and protection of the community forests were already present in 10 out of 14 project villages. This number increased to 12 villages at the endline study (with 1 additional village in Aceh (YRBI) and 1 in Jayapura-district (Pt.PPMA)) according to the community survey. However, at the endline study less respondents (from Jayapura-district (Pt.PPMA), Sintang (NTFP-EP), and Rampi (HuMa) reported that there were regulations than at the baseline study.

With regard to those regulations being communicated to all villagers (including women and children), there was an increase of 1 village in Aceh (YRBI), but a decrease of 2 villages in Sintang (NTFP-EP) compared to the baseline study.

A slight increase in satisfaction with the regulations was only seen among the household respondents of Sintang (NTFP-EP). The respondents of the rest of the projects showed a slight decrease in satisfaction.

The results from the qualitative study more or less mirror those of the quantitative study, as both measure no real significant improvement on forest preservation and natural resource management at the moment of the endline study. However, results from the qualitative study showed that some mapping projects did cause some promising developments that could lead to actual positive impacts on sustainable resource management in the future. For example, in Jayapura-District (Pt.PPMA)

[64] This outcome indicator was only applicable for Pt.PPMA and NTFP-EP, of which the sample size was 6 villages in total. The village that started to undertake efforts to protect their forest was from Sintang (NTFP-EP).

respondents claimed that the map that was created during the project was already being used by the community to make ecologically-responsible landscaping decisions. Additionally, a general workplan for sustainable forest management was created by Pt.PPMA. They also helped the community found the KSU Lwagubin Srem joint venture business cooperative for sustainable timber production' and another cooperative that manages the results of the cacao production in Jayapura-district (NTFP-EP). However, both cooperatives have not been running for the past 2 years, and as such no real result have yet been achieved. In Aceh (YRBI) respondents stated that the project had helped the Mukim governments to restore some of the traditional institutions responsible for natural resource management (the Panglima Glie and Keujreun Blang). However, due to a lack of government support these institutions weren't yet able to operate at their full potential, and as such real results were not yet noticeable in the *Mukims*.

### *Attitude towards forests/plantations indicators*

Compared to the baseline study, a slight increase in dependency on the forest was visible from the household survey, for all but one project location (Mukim Siem in Aceh (YRBI)).

The results from the community endline survey indicate that the attitude of the people of Sintang (NTFP-EP) and Jayapura-District (Pt.PPMA) towards sustainable forest use had grown slightly (for Jayapura-District) and significantly (for Sintang) more positive over the course of the projects. However, the respondents of the household surveys of Sintang and Jayapura-District reported no change in attitude. Results from the qualitative study in Sintang (NTFP-EP) confirmed that the project has actually made people more aware of their dependency on their forests, plants, and animals, and the danger of conversion of forest lands.

In the household surveys of Aceh (YRBI) and Rampi (HuMa) a very slight increase in positive attitude was visible in the quantitative study. This increase was not found in the results of the qualitative study in Aceh (YBRI), where respondents from one of the project locations had actually grown more apathetic towards their forests' sustainability, possibly (partly) due to the fact that they had grown less dependent on their forests over the course of the project. In Rampi (HuMA) both the local leaders and the community members interviewed for the qualitative study were already very much aware of the importance of their natural resources and willing to fight to protect them before the start of the project[65] and continued to do so over the course of the project. However, at the same time, a contradictory increase in gold mining activities was visible in one of the project villages, supported by the local apparatus[66] and also local residents of Rampi who were making money from the mining activities.

### *People involved in traditional crafts*

Since the baseline study, the number of household respondents involved in traditional crafts has significantly decreased. In Sintang (NTFP-EP) the number nearly halved. In Jayapura-District (Pt.PPMA)

[65] e.g. by organising meetings to discuss gold mining activities, actively preventing mining companies from entering their territory, making regulations against gold mining, and visiting local gold mine factories to complain about the environmental damage they are causing and even threatening them with a law suit.

[66] For example: the customary leader of one of the project villages (Onondowa) currently holds a high position in a gold mining business.

there were none left at all. This was also reflected in the qualitative study where respondents reported to have trouble finding the necessary resources.

### *Sense of control of villagers*

We find little evidence that the projects increased the sense of control of villagers in terms of their lives and over land. We observe some improvements in the indicators in Aceh (YRBI) and Rampi (HuMa), but these are only significant in one of the project locations in Aceh. On the other hand, in Sintang (NTFP-EP) and Papua (Pt.PPMA) the indicators deteriorated or stayed the same during the evaluation period (not significant). The data is suggestive of a weak association between the intensity of the projects and the effectiveness of the projects in increasing the security and sense of control of the villagers.

### *Access to information on (local) governance, satisfaction with local governance and the role of traditional institutions*

For the projects in Aceh (YRBI) and Rampi (HuMa) -that were focused on the strengthening of traditional institutions- no significant improvements were found with regard to the household respondents' attitudes towards traditional laws and culture, their satisfaction with local government, and their access to information on local governance. The respondents of the household surveys even reported slightly more corruption and the respondents of Mukim Siem in Aceh (YRBI) had grown slightly less satisfied with the local government. Also, In Mukim Lamteuba (YRBI) the respondents were less satisfied with the local governance's information provision than at the time of the baseline.

Contradictory to these results, the qualitative study shows evidence that the communities of Aceh (YRBI) have grown more and more supportive of the Mukim institution over the past years. It is also important to note that results from the qualitative study show that, with the help of the project, the Mukim institution has increased its role in society over the past 2 years. For example in conflict resolution, education, the preservation of traditional culture, and reviving the traditional institutions for natural resource management.

Likewise, all 4 projects succeeded in enthusing the local communities to take a (greater) interest in their traditional culture and customs, and making them recognize that the map can play a role in preserving their customs and traditions. For example, in Jayapura-district (Pt.PPMA) Informants claimed that they had become enthusiastic about the historical and cultural places (such as ancestral graves, ancient places for ritual, etc.) they encountered in the forests during pioneering, and the stories the elders of the community told them during the sketching of the map. In Rampi (HuMa), some respondents mentioned that the project activities had made them realize even more how beautiful their traditional culture and traditions were, and how important it was to preserve them.

### *Resolution of land related conflicts*

An important (possible) goal of participatory mapping, which is not directly captured in the uniform outcome indicators is conflict resolution. Some projects have managed to solve, reduce, or prevent border conflicts within the project communities themselves. In Aceh (YRBI), the mapping activities have already helped the communities to solve many internal boundary conflicts, making people feel safer on

their land, especially those living in the border areas between villages. In Rampi (HuMa), respondents said that the mapping of the village boundaries between 2 of the project villages -which was done as part of the project in an amicable way- has prevented a serious conflict over land boundaries that was likely to take place in the future. In Sintang (NTFP-EP), where over the past year village borders had often changed due to the openings and expansions of oil palm plantations, respondents mentioned that the mapping had made them more aware of the size and location of their forest areas, and said they were planning to use the forest borders captured on the map as a reference point to monitor trespasses on their territory.

### 2.4.6. Relevance of changes

Unfortunately, we do not observe a significant change in the outcome variables. However, the issues addressed by the 4 projects (Pt.PPMA, NTFP-EP, YRBI and HuMa) are very important for the communities: the prospect of recognition of the indigenous communities' sovereignty over the natural resources located in their territory by the local government. Nonetheless, at the individual level respondents are most concerned by more urgent matters like education, health care, access to clean water and the road conditions/access of the village. Almost none of the respondents thought that 'exploitation of natural resources' was an urgent issue. This may indicate a lack of understanding about the likely causes for water scarcity (i.e. environmental destruction due to mining activities and conversion of lands to plantations), or a reluctance to admit to it due to financial interests in the mining activities.

Comparing the findings to existing literature, in general, studies have noted the positive impacts of participatory mapping on the community. Participatory mapping is not only recognized as a practical tool (e.g. get legal recognition of land rights or control natural resources); the participatory approach is also noted to have impacted group communication and awareness, cultural identity and empowerment (i.e. it empowers indigenous peoples in land and resource use rights against potential encroachers) (Fox et al., 2003, as cited in Wright et al., 2009; Reyes-Garcia et al. ca. 2012a: 2-3). The literature also reports on negative consequences of participatory mapping, for example on the increased privatization of land, loss of indigenous conceptions of space, the greater exposure of valuable natural resources, and the increased taxation by the state. Increase of conflicts - either within the village, with neighbouring villages, or with other external actors such as companies or governmental authorities - is one of the most frequently reported drawbacks of participatory mapping (Reyes-Garcia *et al*. 2012b). However, this finding might have been subject to selection bias[67]. Using an experimental research design in 32 native Amazonian villages, Reyes-Garcia *et al*. (2012b) showed no statistically significant differences in the measured variables (i.e. number of conflicts, negative opinion, neutral attitude, and negative attitudes towards outsiders) between treatment and comparison villages.

The findings for the 4 MFS II projects are partly comparable to the findings in the literature. All projects raised the awareness of communities on important issues. However, not all projects were able to take

[67] Because the villages participating in participatory mapping projects are generally the ones that are chosen or volunteering to participate in participatory mapping due to the fact that they are expected to experience – or are already experiencing – conflicts over land rights and resources.

the improved awareness to the next level where communities take actions. Sometimes this was due to external conditions, for example when higher levels of governments did not legalise the map, in other projects this was due to the approach of the project itself, for example NTFP-EP, where the project was implemented very fast. Only one of the four projects seemed to have impacted the community as a whole. This was the YRBI project which increased the local traditions and customs by strengthening the local institutions. With respect to the increase in land conflicts, some projects show an increase in land conflicts due to greater awareness and the presence of extractive industry (HuMa/Wallacea project), other show a decrease due to solving existing disputes (YRBI project). The findings are partly in line with the literature, as we expect the increase to be the result of the selection bias.

### 2.4.7. Efficiency

The project costs are displayed in Table 5 in section 2.1.5. We did not calculate the unit costs for the participatory mapping projects (Pt.PPMA, NTFP-EP, YRBI and HuMa) partially because lack of accurate information regarding the costs and beneficiaries of the projects. However, a more important reason is that the projects have usually not yet been finalized (have not yet reached the desired outputs, like finalizing the village map or obtaining legal approval of it). The differences in the project costs can be explained by the number of locations covered and the intensity of the project activities funded by MFS II.

### 2.4.8. Conclusion

Our conclusions based on the evaluation findings for the 4 projects are summarized below.

1. The long-term success of participatory mappings projects depends on their capability to empower the beneficiary communities to independently undertake mapping activities, maintain and update their maps, and develop their own map-use strategies. With this respect, we observe different strategies from the evaluated SPOs: for example, NTFP-EP was more concerned with the outcome of the project (the map) than the process of teaching the community members how to independently produce and use the resulting maps. As a result, even though in most projects community members were made part of the mapping team (conducting GPS data collection), they did not know what to do with the maps or what steps to take to get their land rights recognized, and thought it necessary that the SPO would continue to help them in the future (Pt.PPMA, NTFP-EP). On the other hand, YRBI worked closely with the communities as its mandate included the empowerment and revival of traditional institutions. As a result, YRBI communities were able to productively use the resulting maps even before they have been finalized.[68] If the SPOs are to continue their programs in the future, or implement them elsewhere in the world, we recommend that they improve their activities by more strongly aiming them towards achieving community empowerment, i.e.: increasing residents' knowledge, collective awareness, willingness, and capacity to make smart choices and independently manage their natural and cultural resources, and secure the rights to their lands so that they can protect it against damage and threats by outsiders in the future.

[68] In the YRBI project the maps have not been finalized due to yet unsolved boundary disputes.

2. The general aim of the participatory mapping projects is to create a map of a community's village and lands, and to get that map legitimized by the (local) government, in order to ensure the legitimate rights of the community over their indigenous territory and the natural resources in it. Even though all of the 4 SPOs have map legitimization efforts on their agenda, as of yet, none of them have managed to get the map officially recognized. This is not surprising as the process of legitimization is generally very lengthy and strenuous. Our recommendation is therefore that the SPOs keep investing in the project communities, and persist in their efforts until the mapping process is entirely finished, so that the communities can gain maximum and lasting benefits from the projects.
3. The qualitative work indicates that there is a lack of awareness also from the side of the villagers for the need for forest protections. Logging (Pt.PPMA), killing animals (such as bears, monkeys and squirrels) that damage crops (NTFP-EP) and local mining activities (HuMA/Wallacea) are conducted by villagers and contribute to the decline of fauna in their forest. Participatory forest projects could put even greater emphasis on awareness raising, so that these practices are reduced.

## 2.5. Projects on sexual education

### 2.5.1. Country context

Knowledge of Sexual Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) among Indonesian youth (15-24 years) is low. At the school level, SRHR education is only included as informal subjects in the school curriculum. The subjects are normative in essence, relying on morality and deemed to bear social stigma related to sexuality, gender and HIV/AIDS issues. Teachers feel uncomfortable and may choose not to address some subjects, reducing the quality of the education.

Two opposite trends influence the attitude and social taboo on SRHR services and education: Islamisation versus liberalisation. On the one hand, due to the greater emphasis on religion in Indonesia, including part of the youth population, the social taboo on SRHR issues has grown in recent years. On the other hand, the liberalisation trend causes many young people in urban regions to become more open and liberal with respect to expressing themselves and their sexual activities.

When SRHR knowledge level is low, the perceived risk of sexual activities is low, which may increase risky sexual behaviour[69] that may lead to undesirable outcomes like HIV, unintended pregnancies and illegal abortions (Amnesty International, 2010; Harding, 2008). These trends suggest an increase in risky sexual behaviour among Indonesian youth, which is most probably caused by their little knowledge of SRHR. This underlines the importance of SRHR education in schools. To tackle the stigmatization of SRHR issues and increase the awareness of youth aged 12-18 years about risky sexual behaviour, the NGO Yayasan Pelita Ilmu (YPI) carries out two SRHR programmes: DAKU and Dance4Life (D4L).

[69] Risky sexual behavior is commonly defined as behavior that increases one's risk of contracting sexually transmitted infections and experiencing unintended pregnancies. They include having sex at an early age, having multiple sexual partners, having sex while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and unprotected sexual behaviors (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010).

### 2.5.2. Description of projects

Both programmes, DAKU and D4L, aim at increasing the capacity of young people to make safe and informed SRHR decisions and are implemented at schools as extracurricular programmes. DAKU ('Dunia remajaku seru' or 'Lively Youth World') is a computer-based[70] Comprehensive Sexual Education (CSE) programme with 15 modules covering SRHR knowledge issues like HIV prevention, sexual abuse and other risky behaviour issues like drug prevention. D4L on the other hand is an international programme. It employs dance, music and performing acts and focuses mainly on HIV/AIDS issues.

The result chain of both DAKU and D4L is displayed in Figure 34. As mentioned, the ultimate aim of both programmes is to encourage safe SRHR behaviour. They aim at changing the attitude and social opinion about SRHR issues directly, but also indirectly via a knowledge increase.

The target groups for DAKU are students from 15-19 years old. The target group for D4L is broader than DAKU as it covers students from 12-19 years old.

### 2.5.3. Evaluation design

The evaluation focusses on the following research questions: did DAKU and D4L enable students to make more informed decisions about their Sexual and Reproductive Health (SRH) activities? In particular, how did the knowledge, attitude and behaviour of students change as a result of the DAKU and D4L programmes?

To answer these questions we identified specific outcome indicators. The outcome indicators are split up into three sub-categories: knowledge, attitude, and behaviour. Additionally we look at possible unintended effects by investigating whether the programme altered actual sexual behaviour. Table 18 in Annex C displays the outcome indicators of the main analysis and the scale of these variables. For all outcome variables (Panel A to C) 'the higher, the better' rule applies.

The evaluation focuses on vocational senior high schools. A total of 15 schools were selected for the evaluation. In each senior high school 20 students were randomly selected among first and second grade students[71]. In treatment schools we stratified our sample based on CSE participation: we interviewed 10 participants (treatment group) and 10 non-participants who were expected to indirectly benefit from the programme through social contacts with their participating classmates (spillover group).

In total, almost 300 students in 10 treatment and 4 control schools in Jakarta are followed. In treatment schools both participants and non-participants in the programmes were selected. The programmes are implemented at schools as extracurricular programmes.

To analyse the impact of DAKU and D4L, two surveys have been conducted to collect quantitative data: a computer-based student survey and a school survey for a staff member. In addition, in order to gain more insight into the impact of the programmes, a qualitative study was also conducted: 8 participating

[70] In 2013, also a paper-based version of DAKU has been launched by Rutgers WPF and YPI is one of the implementing organisations of this programme.

[71] Senior high consists of 3 years of schooling. If a student dropped out or graduated between the base- and endline survey, the student was tracked at home to complete the endline survey.

students in DAKU and D4L were individually interviewed on the same topics covered in the quantitative survey.

### 2.5.4. Implementation of projects

Our data shows that in the intervention schools the implementation of the DAKU and D4L programmes had already started before the baseline survey. Also, most students participating in these programmes have indicated their involvement already at the baseline phase. DAKU and D4L reached few additional participants between the baseline and endline surveys in our sample.

This had implications for the evaluation design as well: it was no longer meaningful to evaluate the YPI project using difference-in-difference methodology as originally planned. Instead, we opted for multiple cross-sectional analysis. The actual implementation at the schools differs from the original sampling design. Although we sampled 3 DAKU schools, 4 D4L schools, and 2 DAKU&D4L schools, according to the school survey all schools that implemented DAKU also implemented D4L. Hence, we focus on the actual treatment status based on the school survey. Table 4 shows the number of students benefitting from DAKU (315 high school students) and D4L (2,930 junior and senior high school students) in 2012.

### 2.5.5. Changes in selected outcome indicators and attribution to MFS II

Table 32 in Annex D gives the changes of the (selected) outcome variables between baseline and endline. These are shortly discussed below separately for the 4 sub-categories knowledge, attitude, behaviour and unintended effects. Table 42 in Annex E shows the attribution of each of these changes. This is also discussed below.

#### *Knowledge indicators*

**Changes in outcomes between 2012 and 2014**

On average, knowledge levels are moderate for HIV/AIDS issues (8 out of 17) as well as students' awareness about their rights to receive SRHR information. The latter is slightly higher for the DAKU&D4L students (85%) than for the D4L only students (around 79%). Looking at changes over time within each type of schools, we see that the knowledge level decreased slightly (by 1) for the DAKU&D4L group while awareness about their rights to receive SRHR information increased by almost 4 percentage points. For the D4L the change is exactly the other way around that knowledge increased slightly and awareness decreased.

**Attribution of changes to MFS II interventions (project effects)**

Students from the D4L-only schools have not seen a significant improvement in their SRHR knowledge compared to the comparison school for any knowledge indicator except for their HIV/AIDS knowledge. Due to the more comprehensive nature of DAKU and the fact that students can follow both programmes in DAKU&D4L schools, almost all knowledge and awareness indicators show a significant impact of the intervention for these students and schools.

### *Attitude indicators*

**Changes in outcomes between 2012 and 2014**

On average, about half of the statements on relationships were correctly indicated as good/bad at the time of the baseline (4 out of 8). Most statements on Gender Based Violence (GBV) are agreed upon by students to be an incorrect attitude or behaviour. On average, 55-70% of the students at D4L-only and DAKU&D4L schools agreed that HIV/AIDS patients have the same rights as other persons. The acceptance of homosexuality was significantly lower for both treatment groups at the endline compared to the baseline, namely 7-11 percentage points.

**Attribution of changes to MFS II interventions (project effects)**

For the D4L schools, we did not find any significant impact of D4L on any of the attitude indicators. The effects of the programmes on attitude are larger in schools implementing both DAKU and D4L. Especially rights of HIV/AIDS patients and acceptance of homosexuality are significantly higher.

### *Behaviour indicators*

**Changes in outcomes between 2012 and 2014**

Around 30-40% of the students discussed intimate relationships with their friends. This percentage increased in the DAKU&D4L schools from 39 to 41% while it decreased from 35 to 30% for the D4L-only schools. On average, 15-18% of the students consulted a health centre/clinic for SRHR related matters in the past year at time of the baseline.

**Attribution of changes to MFS II interventions (project effects)**

In the D4L-only schools no effect was found on the two behaviour indicators. We found mixed results for the schools implementing both DAKU and D4L. On school level, discussions on intimate relationships increased significantly.

### *Unintended effects*

**Changes in outcomes between 2012 and 2014**

We observe that in both at the base- and endline, none of the students agreed with the statement 'I believe there is nothing wrong with unmarried boys and girls having sexual intercourse if they love each other'. Hence, the SRHR interventions do not alter the opinion of students about premarital sex.

**Attribution of changes to MFS II interventions (project effects)**

With respect to the unintended effects of the SRHR programmes, the results indicate that more students in treatment schools engaged in sexual activities (e.g. holding hands, kissing and hugging) compared to students in comparison schools controlling for age and gender of the students. This is a controversial finding. It is important to emphasize that this finding in itself does not imply that DAKU and D4L encourage sexual activity. There could be a number of other possible explanations for this finding.

### 2.5.6. Relevance of changes

In general, SRHR information addresses an important issue for the targeted beneficiaries. As one student mentions "*It is better to explain [about sexual activities] rather than hide that from young people, so that they will not try it out*". To assess the actual satisfaction of the beneficiaries with the project, students were asked about the effect of the programmes on their life. Mostly an increase of knowledge in certain areas like reproductive health, HIV/AIDS and safe behaviour were mentioned. Some students also mentioned positive changes in their behaviour and attitude towards others, i.e. being more careful and understanding.

Comparing the findings with existing literature, several meta-analyses have been done to study the impact of school sexual education programs, usually focussing on HIV education. In both the developed and the developing world, the results show that these programmes are an effective way to increase SRHR knowledge and attitude of the youth (Fonner et al., 2014; Michielsen et al., 2010; Paul-Ebhohimhen et al., 2008; Song et al., 2000). Hence, our findings for the DAKU programme are in line with the findings of other studies. As a result of the short education component of D4L, this programme only had an effect on HIV/AIDS knowledge of participating students except when jointly implemented with DAKU.

### 2.5.7. Efficiency

Table 5 in section 2.1.5 gives an overview of the costs per project. Since it is difficult to monetize the benefit of increased SRHR knowledge, instead of directly comparing costs with benefits, we resort to indicating the achievements that we have attained using 1 Int$. This method gives the following results: 1 international $ spent on DAKU has contributed to 0.64% increase in STI knowledge and 0.13% increase in the knowledge of rights to information on SRHR. Spending 1 international $ on implementing both DAKU and D4L results in the combination of 0.19% increase in HIV/AIDS knowledge, 0.49% increase in STI knowledge, 0.27% increase in contraceptive knowledge, 0.08% increase in the knowledge of rights to information on SRHR and 0.16% increase in acknowledging the rights of HIV/AIDS patients to equal treatment.

Kivela et al (2011) report on the unit cost of comprehensive sexual education programmes. In Indonesia, they report that the project costs were 17.06 Int$ per learning hour or 518.00 Int$ per year per student during the pilot phase of the project. These benchmark costs are about double the costs reported for DAKU (202.02 Int$ in 2012). Assuming 30 learning hours for the 15 chapters of DAKU, the costs of DAKU were 6.73 Int$ per learning hour per student. However, this calculation may be misleading as it only accounts for the costs of YPI but not the costs incurred by the schools. Nonetheless, we can conclude that the implementation of DAKU is cost effective in terms of output units. Regarding D4L, if we assume a 2 hour session for each stage of D4L (four in total), D4L operates with a unit cost of 4.17 Int$ per learning hour. This is lower than the unit cost of DAKU. However, D4L addresses a large group of students at the same time, while DAKU works with smaller groups.

### 2.5.8. Conclusion

Our findings are in line with the literature on sexual education programmes in the sense that we also find that the DAKU and D4L programmes were effective in educating students about SRHR knowledge. However, students participating in DAKU and D4L still did not perform very well on the SRHR knowledge test. For example, they only answered on average about 9 of 17 (53%) HIV/AIDS related questions correctly. This is nonetheless better than the score in the comparison schools (38-39%). However, we can conclude that DAKU and D4L could improve on the delivery of the SRHR information to students.

Regarding the delivery of the project material, we have to note that YPI only trains the teachers at the participating schools on teaching the DAKU programme. These teachers at the school are responsible for implementing DAKU for the students. Therefore, based on the data, we believe that more effort should be taken by YPI to train teachers on how to effectively deliver the material of the DAKU programme. With regard to D4L, our data suggest that the programme could also improve on its effectiveness, for example by a longer education component.

## 2.6. Projects assisting victims of GBV

### 2.6.1. Country context

Gender based violence (GBV) is a human rights violation and the social and economic costs are high. The UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (1993) offered the first official definition of the term GBV, defining it as "any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivations of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life."[72] Millennium Development Goal 3 calls for the promotion of gender equality and women's empowerment.[73]

In Indonesia, law no. 23/2004 (the PKDRT law) on the Elimination of Domestic Violence was the first regulation that finally legally entitled female victims of domestic violence to report any violence they experienced at the hands of their husband. In addition, as a result of the implementation of this law, institutions providing services to female and child victims of GBV started to be established. In Central Java Province,[74] the government issued by-law no. 3/2009 to assure better enforcement of the PKDRT law. This by-law governs, among others, the rights of female victims and the obligations of the local government with respect to prevention, protection and reintegration of victims. As a result, local governments are authorized to form integrated services centres (PPTKs) and commissions for the protection of female and child victims of domestic and/or gender based violence. However, despite these efforts, the actual implementation and enforcement of the legislation, especially by local governments, is slow. In Indonesia's multicultural society, GBV is often tolerated and permitted due to patriarchy that manifests in cultural and religious beliefs and practices.

[72] Source: http://www.hhri.org/thematic/gender_based_violence.html.
[73] Source: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/gender.shtml
[74] The location of the project.

Domestic violence is by far the largest reported subcategory of GBV. Hakimi et al. (2001) found that 41% of women from Central Java had suffered physical or sexual violence at least once in their lives, mostly from their husbands. The roots of domestic violence in Indonesia can -at least in part- be found in gender inequality, particularly within marital relations. For example, the husband's culturally-instilled superior position as head and provider[75] has grave implications for women's willingness and ability to report domestic violence and/or file for divorce. In addition, many victims attest that their husbands tell them during fights that "he is not bound by his oath to treat her well or stay faithful, because he hasn't sworn the marital oath directly to her [but to her father]". Even though divorce is common in Indonesia, it is rarely instigated by the wife since she needs the income of her husband to take care of the children (Venning, 2010). Moreover, women that report their husband to the police face the threat of being stigmatized by her family and environment. Nonetheless, the National Commission for Women found that 95% of the divorce cases approved by the Religious High Court in 2011 were due to domestic violence against the wife, of which the most common reported form in Indonesia is psychological abuse.

In general, the lack of autonomy and assertiveness among many Indonesian women, particularly of those who live in rural areas, hinders them to report the case to state apparatuses or bringing the case into public.[76] Women also often experience difficulties in accessing the legal system, for example due to the prohibitive cost and distance. Moreover, domestic violence is often regarded as a private matter, not belonging in the public domain. The taboo and stigma on domestic violence prohibits not only collecting accurate data (Utami, 2013), but more importantly hinders women to become aware of the problem and possible solutions. Therefore, institutions providing services to female and child victims of violence play an important role in raising awareness to these problems and in assisting victims in finding personal solutions to become survivors.

### 2.6.2. Description of projects

Both the Legal Resources Centre for Gender Justice and Human Rights (LRC-KJHAM) and Rifka Annisa are NGOs providing services to female and child victims of violence. In both cases, the evaluation focuses on psychological counselling and legal aid services provided for victims of domestic violence.[77]

LRC-KJHAM is a pro-women's rights legal resource centre, which is committed to strengthening the access of marginalized and poor women victims of gender based violence to legal resources. As such, LRC-KJHAM provides legal aid services to women victims, empowers women victims with education and training, and provides survivor-based support groups to improve their ability to reach victims of GBV. Next to activities with women victims, LRC-KJHAM has community and political activities as well, such as holding campaigns for women rights and promotes legal and policy reform and conducting (documentation) research. The project of Hivos provides funding for activities like continuous victim support (legal aid and strengthening support group); training of paralegals; developing a database of

[75] Within Indonesian law and culture, the husband is always regarded as the head of the household and expected to be the breadwinner. The notion of the husband as the head of household is also stated in the marriage law no. 1, dating from 1974.
76 ACNielsen (2005) finds that only 27% of victims would report domestic violence to the police.
77 Rifka Annisa and KJHAM also provide support to victims of violence related to dating, rape and transgender issues. However, these are a minority of cases. Therefore, we focus on the more common support to victims of domestic violence in this study.

cases of GBV; and policy advocacy activities. The result chain for this project can be found in Figure 29 in Annex B.

On the other hand, Rifka Annisa, meaning "Friends of Women", has a focus on victims of Sexual and Gender Based Violence (such as rape, sexual harassment, domestic violence etc.). The main objective of Rifka Annisa is providing counselling and legal assistances to victims of Sexual and Gender Based Violence. The aim of Rifka Annisa is to empower female survivors and in doing that contribute to the development or creation of a gender-just society. Rifka Annisa works together with other community institutions to help the women and promote a gender-just society. In addition, Rifka Annisa also carries out a programme for male perpetrators of SGBV. The project of Rutgers WPF provides funding for activities such as organising training session on paralegal counselling; providing SRH counselling and legal aid services to female victims of SGBV; providing shelter to female victims of SGBV; providing counselling service for changing behaviour of men perpetrators; and developing monitoring and evaluation tools for quality services for victims and perpetrators of SGBV. The result chain for this project can be found in Figure 33 in Annex B.

LRC-KJHAM and Rifka Annisa use rather different approaches to reduce domestic violence and related stress problems. Rifka Annisa works from the premise that many women will stay with their husband. Their theory of change relies on psychological counselling, which starts by building awareness of the problem with the victim of domestic violence, and moves on to increasing self-confidence to address the problem. LRC-KJHAM is more focused on providing free of charge legal assistance to victims of domestic violence supported by psychological counselling. By facilitating the divorce,[78] the women will be able to distance themselves from their former husbands and be less confronted with domestic violence. Both organisations assist women to file complaints with police in order to obtain external help to reduce the domestic violence, and they also offer support groups for women to discuss their problems with other victims of domestic violence.

Both projects operate in Central Java. LRC-KJHAM is located is Semarang, while Rifka Annisa has its base in Yogyakarta. Both SPOs draw their clients from surrounding communities, including rural areas, who usually present themselves to the offices of the SPOs for help. However, the size of the organisations differs in terms of the number of cases handled: whereas LRC-KJHAM assisted 114 clients (49 cases of domestic violence) in 2012, Rifka Annisa handled 270 cases (200 cases of domestic violence).

### 2.6.3. Evaluation design

This evaluation poses two particular challenges. First, beneficiaries contact the SPO, and are always provided with support. It is thus impossible to form a comparison group of victims of domestic violence that are not supported. The evaluation therefore uses a before-after design, that is, it assesses whether the situation of clients of the SPOs improves, and tries to assess whether this change can be attributed to the project. The second challenge is that the topic of domestic violence is sensitive to discuss, especially, with women who are in distress and worried about revealing that they receive support to their husbands. As a result, we relied more on qualitative studies (with support group members, LRC-KJHAM) and interviews with women when they were somewhat advanced in their contact with the SPOS.

[78] LRC-KJHAM never explicitly suggests divorce as a solution. It is the decision of the clients to file for divorce.

For Rifka Anissa, the initial plan was to interview women who already received support from Rika Annisa. We stratified over four brackets: those who had their first contact with Rifka Annisa 0-3, 3-6, 7-9 and 10-12 months ago. However Rifka Annisa insisted on being present at the interviews and to arrange the interviews. In the end, only 18 out of the sampled 80 women could be interviewed in this way. We interviewed these women twice. It is important to note here that 15 of 18 respondents visited Rifka Annisa already more than 9 month before the baseline survey (up to 15 months) for the first time, while the remaining 3 visited 3-9 months before the baseline.

In addition, we also implemented a short self-administered survey (provided by the counsellor) for first time visitors to Rifka Annisa in order to assess the reasons for contacting the SPO and service satisfaction. The clients were asked to fill out another survey focusing on their psychological health and support received from Rifka Annisa upon their third and sixth visit to Rifka Annisa. This worked rather well. However, most women only came for one visit only. During the six month interval of the study, 51 women filled out the questionnaire on their first visit, 3 returned for a third visit, and none returned for the sixth visit.

For LRC-KJHAM, we sampled 20 of 26 women who visited the SPO between January and July 2012 with a case of domestic violence. These respondents were interviewed three times: in September 2012 , November 2013 and September 2014. In addition, we conducted a qualitative survey with support group members using in-depth interviews in July 2013.

Table 19 in Annex C lists the main outcome indicators we obtained from the structured interviews. The outcome indicators are grouped in five groups: number of women free of domestic violence; physical and psychological health of women; women's empowerment/attitude towards themselves; attitude/empowerment in marriage; and satisfaction and self-reported impact. In Table 19 we only listed the main outcome indicators. For a complete list of the indicators collected we refer the reader to project level reports. The table also indicates which indicators correspond to the uniform outcome indicators identified by the synthesis team. The variables grouped under Attitude/empowerment in marriage relate to the attitude of women and men related to GBV.

### 2.6.4. Implementation of projects

The LRC-KJHAM project was implemented as planned. However, the Rifka Annisa project ended already in December 2012 (instead of 2015) because Rutgers WPF allocated funding from another source to finance the project. Hence, only a small part of the planned MFS II budget has been spent (around 12,000 EUR). However, the project objectives and activities remained the same despite the change in funding source.

Regarding the beneficiaries, we observed that many beneficiaries only visited Rifka Annisa once (self-administered survey). Most respondents who visited the organisations multiple times have turned to the organisations for help in a litigation procedure (legal aid). Surprisingly, this appeared to be the case most often for Rifka Annisa, while for LRC-KJHAM we observed that some survey participants who visited LRC-KJHAM more than once did not start or cancelled the litigation procedure.

In addition, between the baseline and endline surveys, only 7 of 20 women used the services of LRC-KJHAM, and this number is 6 of 18 women for Rifka Annisa. Note, however, that we were more likely to sample respondents who had more interaction with the SPOs.

### 2.6.5. Changes in selected outcome indicators and attribution to MFS II

Table 33 in Annex D gives the changes of the (selected) outcome variables between baseline and endline. The results are presented by group of outcome indicator. First, the change in the indicators is discussed, then we elaborate to what extent the changes can be linked to the interventions.

**Changes in outcomes between 2012 and 2014**

#### *Number of women free of domestic violence*

The number of women who experienced either physical, psychological or sexual violence (or a combination of those) in the past 12 months (LRC-KJHAM) or 3 months (Rifka Annisa) decreased for both projects. For LRC-KJHAM, the number of abused women decreased by 10 (from 15 to 5), while for Rifka Annisa, this number decreased by 4 (from 9 to 4). The data also show that while only 1 Rifka Annisa respondent was physically or sexually abused (in the last 3 months) at the time of the baseline, this number was 10 for LRC-KJHAM (in the past 12 months). This is reflected in the indicator for the average number of types of abuse that the respondents experienced.[79] Both programmes see a decrease in this indicator, but it is only significant for LRC-KJHAM (by 1.15), which is explained by the observation that the absolute value of the variable was much higher at the baseline for LRC-KJHAM (1.45) compared to Rifka Annisa (0.56), while this value did not differ much at the endline (around 0.30-0.40).

The difference in the respondents' exposure to domestic abuse between two SPOs (at the baseline and during the evaluation period) can be explained by the fact that most of the Rifka Annisa respondents were already divorced at the baseline (11 out of 18) and sought help at the SPO over a year ago, while over half of the LRC-KJHAM respondents visited the SPO less than 9 month ago and only 5 of 20 were divorced at the time of the baseline.[80]

#### *Indicators of psychological health*

For the psychological health of the women the psychological distress index is reported on, which consists of the social dysfunction index, the anxiety index and the losing confidence index. Again, only LRC-KJHAM saw a significant decrease (by -2.10), which is a positive development for the women. Also the three components of the psychological distress index significantly decreased (by -0.60-0.80). The Rifka Annisa respondents did experience a significant decrease in the social dysfunction index (by -0.50) but at the endline they were doing somewhat worse in terms of symptoms of social dysfunction (0.61 vs 0.40) and anxiety (2.17 vs. 1.60) compared to the LRC-KJHAM respondents. Most women still struggled to overcome emotional problems in both projects.

[79] These types are physical, psychological and sexual violence.
[80] In addition, the recall period may have also played a role in the reported exposure to domestic abuse.

### *Indicators of women's empowerment/attitude towards themselves*

There are smaller changes seen in these indicators. The only significant effect is found in the self-esteem index for the women of LRC-KJHAM, which shows a positive development (it increased by 0.46). Also, the women do not feel disempowered on average, since the level of all the indices is above 0. However, the negative changes in the self-efficacy index, self-esteem index and support for Rifka Annisa are concerning, although not significant.

### *Indicators of women's attitude/empowerment in marriage*

For both projects, no significant changes were found in the indicators. The rights of wife index decreased for LRC-KJHAM (by -0.45), although not significant. There are still women who can think of good reasons for a husband to hit his wife (around 4/5 women for both projects at endline), but on average, they cannot think of a lot of reasons (0.35-0.61 for both projects at endline). Almost all of the women agree with at least one occasion in which a woman can refuse sex. The women from LRC-KJHAM agree with somewhat more occasions than the women from Rifka Annisa (20 compared to 17 at endline).

### *Satisfaction and self-reported impact*

The women from both projects show satisfaction in the sense that they feel more emotional stable and less stressed due to the services. Their feelings about LRC-KJHAM between the baseline and the endline did not really change, while it did decrease for Rifka Annisa (by 0.22).

**Attribution of changes to MFS II interventions (project effects)**

Most respondents first confessed their marital problems to their friends after they could not endure anymore. Friends motivated and encouraged them to seek help. Support from family also played an important role in the resolution of respondents to divorce their husbands, while children were the most often mentioned reason to stay with and endure their husband.

Friends and relatives were the most important sources to refer respondents to Rifka Annisa and LRC-KJHAM. Rifka Annisa provided psychological counselling to all respondents, and legal advice to most of them. Some respondents also joined the support group. Based on the respondents' testimonies, the respondents who turned to LRC-KJHAM not only received legal assistance but also moral support and counselling from survivors at LRC-KJHAM who have experience with their situations. This contributed to improving the respondents' self-esteem and confidence, especially for women who were members of the support group.

Through assisting in the divorce, LRC-KJHAM and Rifka Annisa directly contributed to breaking the cycle of abuse when the women were ready to make this step.[81] Hence, both SPOs assisted women in carrying out their resolution and informed them about their options and the procedure. Most changes in the outcome indicators (less dependency on husband, less exposure to abuse, better relationship with

[81] Rifka Annisa assisted in 6 out of 12 litigation cases, while LRC-KJHAM assisted in 10 of 15 litigation cases (not all ended in a divorce).

husband and improvements in the psychological well-being and social functioning of respondents) can be attributed to the fact that women divorced and broke free from their abuse husbands. Despite the stigma of divorced women in Indonesian culture, respondents who got divorced felt more relieved and relaxed, and managed to find new friends and companions.

However, the SPOs were not the only (or most important) source of help. Respondents also confided in their close friends and looked to them for moral support. Support and advice from parents and siblings was also an important factor in dealing with their household problems. Some LRC-KJHAM respondents also got engaged in religious activities to ease their mind. Overall, respondents' main motivation to look positively into the future is their children and to be able to provide for them.

Nonetheless, the everyday life of respondents has been governed by work and earning a living to provide for themselves and their children, especially after a divorce. Several respondents achieved successes in obtaining a better job or starting their own business. Family support is also an important factor in the observed improvements. Respondents who have parents and siblings that can help them financially and by looking after the children managed to have a good grip on their lives after the divorce, and to find a better job or finish their studies; while some respondents who have no such support still struggle to make ends meet while staying at home with their young children.

Overall, we find that LRC-KJHAM and Rifka Annisa were an important source of help for escaping the abusive situation, especially for women who cannot lean on support from their family and who have the time to go to the SPOs. Respondents felt that LRC-KJHAM really supported victims of domestic violence. However, it was the close friends and family that send most of the respondents to LRC-KJHAM and provided continuous support for the women through their everyday life.

### 2.6.6. Relevance of changes

We observe more improvement in the women's situation for the LRC-KJHAM project than for Rifka Annisa. On the one hand, we could think that this is due to the fact that respondents have been actively seeking help to resolve their marital problems already for some time before the baseline survey (for example, empowerment). On the other hand, the results often show smaller effects for respondents who have been assisted by Rifka Annisa during the evaluation period, suggesting that it takes longer for respondents to recover (for example, psychological distress).

It is also important to mention that while the results are representative for LRC-KJHAM; in the case of Rifka Annisa, the additional self-administered client survey suggests most women only visit the SPO only once (only 3 of 35 respondents visited Rifka Annisa at least 3 times over a 3-6 month survey period) whereas most of the survey respondents visited multiple times. It is mostly women who seek assistance in litigation who visit Rifka Annisa multiple times as also suggested by our sample.

A first indication that LRC-KJHAM indeed addresses an important issue for the beneficiaries is that 85% of the respondents visited LRC-KJHAM more than once. Given that respondents visit the SPOs voluntarily, their continued use of Rifka Annisa's and LRC-KJHAM's services signals the value to the respondents. Also, most women agree that the support group activities were or would be very helpful for them. However, most women cannot participate in the support group (only 5 of 20 women were a member of the support group all through the evaluation period) due to the distance to the meeting and the time of

the meeting (during working hours). In the case of Rifka Annisa, most respondents were not aware of the existence of the support group but those who were mentioned similar concerns (4 out of 18 women were members of the support group).

From the interviews it became clear that woman do need LRC-KJHAM services when filing for a divorce. They indicate the need to receive help and guidance before and during court since most women do not have any experience at all in this area. In addition, LRC-KJHAM is very valuable for respondents who cannot afford to hire a lawyer to handle their case. LRC-KJHAM offers free of charge services both for counselling and legal assistance until the case is closed.

In addition, the existence of organisations that provide free counselling and legal aid services to victims of SGBV is essential for creating a society that is free of SGBV. They not only provide services but stand as proof for the rights of women, children and other marginalised groups. The more these organisations are known, for example through media coverage or through information from friends, police and health care providers, the more likely it is that abused women will break their silence and seek help to improve their situation either through mediation or divorce.

Finally, comparing our findings to existing literature on the effectiveness of counselling programmes, the literature suggests that counselling and support group activities for battered women can improve a number of skills and characteristics, like self-esteem, assertiveness and coping abilities (Bennett et al., 2004 and Tutty et al., 1993). Hence, counselling and support groups can help to emotionally strengthen survivors, but it is not clear yet whether it actually results in changing the abusive situation. The findings for the LRC-KJHAM project are in line with these findings in the literature, while in the case of Rifka Annisa, we found less positive effects of counselling and support group activities, which could be due to the limited number of respondents engaging in Rifka Annisa's counselling and support group activities during the evaluation period.

### 2.6.7. Efficiency

The project costs are displayed in Table 5 in section 2.1.5. In 2012, the project costs of LRC-KJHAM were 42,527 EUR compared to 11,897 EUR for Rifka Annisa. However, the MFS II project only contributed 2.3% of the total costs of Rifka Annisa.[82]

We did not calculate the unit costs for the LRC-KJHAM and Rifka Annisa projects because the SPOs operate with mostly fixed costs, while the number of clients is external to the organisations. In addition, we believe that the availability of the counselling and legal advice and aid services is valuable in itself. Further, calculating the cost per client would be misleading in case of a large turnover of clients.

### 2.6.8. Conclusion

Despite that we find only small effects of the projects on the wellbeing and empowerment of the abused women, the work of LRC-KJHAM and Rifka Annisa, both as service centres and in policy advocacy, are indispensable in creating a gender just society free of sexual and gender based violence. The

[82] We do not have information about the total costs of LRC-KJHAM.

existence of such organisations may raise the awareness of victims of sexual and gender based violence to step outside of the cycle of abuse.

It was interesting to observe that while both Rifka Annisa and LRC-KJHAM provide similar services, the results were more prominent for LRC-KJHAM both in the quantitative and qualitative data. There could be several explanations for this finding. We explore a few possibilities. Firstly, LRC-KJHAM is a smaller organisation (based on the number of clients served) and it works with survivors who are trained as paralegals. Respondents felt that the knowledge and moral support received from these survivor paralegals provided strength for them in solving their problems at court or in the household. There is also a close connection between LRC-KJHAM and the support group and every client is invited to join the support group. On the other hand, the larger size of Rifka Annisa and its focus on multiple activities (perpetrator counselling, shelter, psychological counselling and legal assistance) has resulted in capacity problems. Finally, the respondents of LRC-KJHAM and Rifka Annisa were different. While almost all of them worked, most of the Rifka Annisa respondents received support from their family both financially and by taking care of their children, this was less often the case for LRC-KJHAM. Also, while only 3 of 18 Rifka Annisa respondents remained with their (abusive) husband at the endline, this number was 6 of 20 for LRC-KJHAM.

We conclude this section with some additional observations and recommendations.

1. The risk of being stigmatized by the community, and the fear of not being able to support themselves and their children, is what usually keeps women from filing for divorce or reporting the abusive behaviour of their husbands to the police. Changing this patriarchal culture requires continuous advocacy of policy change with regard to gender equality.
2. Most of our informants had initially tried to cope with the abuse on their own and had waited a long time before confiding to a friend or relative about the abuse. In the end, none of them had made the step to contact the SPOs on their own but were motivated by a friend, relative, neighbour, acquaintance or public officer. It is, therefore, of utmost importance to conduct active outreach not only to clients but also to communities, the victims' social circle and the relevant public institutions (police, health care, court) through multiple media channels.
3. LRC-KJHAM's strategy to change victims of gender based violence into survivors and active agents that are able to change their own situation as well as those of others is well chosen. By empowering victims and giving them the courage, skills, and will to actively speak up in court and actively commit their own knowledge and experiences to inspire and help other victims, the victims themselves become advocates for the fight against gender based violence. By changing shame and disgrace into power, they are able to gradually change the negative connotations that are traditionally associated with 'divorce' and 'assertiveness' in women, and inspire and encourage other victims to fight for their own rights, and ultimately those of others.
4. Our data shows that victims of domestic violence preferred to file for divorce immediately, without first reporting the abuse and going through the full legal process. This is problematic because any abuse that is reported after the divorce is granted will legally not be sentenced as 'domestic violence', but rather as 'violence against women' for which lighter punishment applies.

The fact that many women still decide to directly file for divorce supports the idea that victims know too little about legal procedures.

5. It is often difficult for divorced women with small children and without additional family support to manage to work and to take care of the children at the same time. One respondent found a solution by starting an online business. However, more women would benefit from trainings on entrepreneurship and economic activities that they can do from home (an example would be the *kanzashi* brooches made by beneficiaries of the SC GREEN project).
6. Many respondents stopped using the services of Rifka Annisa because they did not have the time and the organisation was far away from their home. Given the busy schedule of the respondents and the fact that many of them still struggle to overcome the emotional burden of the experiences of abuse, we encourage the SPOs to develop and extend counselling tools that can be used remotely, such as counselling by phone, message based counselling (SMS or chat) and booklets.

## 2.7. Overall conclusions

First, most projects selected for the evaluation were difficult to properly evaluate because

- Often projects were already underway by the time of the baseline. This made it more difficult to estimate impacts by analysing trends from baseline to endline.
- Projects were small, often reaching only a handful of villages or beneficiaries. This made it difficult to rely on statistical analysis to estimate impacts.
- New beneficiaries were not identified by the time of the baseline. This made it difficult to construct a treatment and comparison to follow over the course of the evaluation.
- Even though the projects were selected under the MDG component, they often focused on building capacity building of organisations and influencing civil society (especially, participatory mapping projects, and disaster risk reduction). In these cases we often relied on a combination of qualitative and quantitative work to understand the impacts.

Second, project impacts in the uniform indicators were often minimal, if any, because (1) often the project did not explicitly target the uniform indicators; (2) the project interventions were not substantial enough or reached a small fraction of the intended beneficiaries; (3) projects were not successful in reaching their final objectives in terms of outcomes at the final beneficiary level. In addition, the difficulties mentioned in the first bullet made it difficult to draw strong conclusions regarding impact.

Third, looking at the interventions themselves, we mostly found professional and committed local NGOs and CSOs implementing the projects, which is reflected in the high scores on the design and implementation of the projects (Table 6). Projects were often funded from multiple sources. The interventions which could be traced back to MFS sometimes turned out to be very small (for example, for Rifka Annisa). Many projects did not spend the whole budget (for example, NTFP-EP, FIELD and SC

LED-NTT), and the project period was also often extended (for example, NTFP-EP and FIELD). Most projects were implemented according to plans except for a few: in the case of the Pt.PPMA project the contract was stopped due to non-performance, and the implementation of the SC GREEN project was adjusted. However, especially the project aimed empowering indigenous communities using participatory mapping methods (Pt.PPMA, NTPF-EP, YRBI and HuMa/Wallacea) struggled to deliver the planned outcomes due to the limited timeframe for the projects. In the latter case, a long term commitment from the CFAs is important to be able to deliver the desired project outcomes.

Fourth, we observe that most projects involve a capacity development component (for example, NTFP-EP and HuMa), and some of them even have capacity development of NGOs and CSOs as their primary objective (for example, SC GREEN and KSP-QT). Others provide trainings to community groups or households (for example, WIIP, FIELD and SC LED-NTT/FSPP). In fact, all selected projects focus on one of the following: providing trainings, participatory workshops, counselling and legal aid, SRHR education and linking producers to markets. Regarding the trainings, we often found that their effectiveness could be increased.[83] Only one project actually disbursed performance-based compensation for project activities (tree planting) to the beneficiaries (WIIP), and another one provided capital for borrowing (KSP-QT). Most projects were designed to have sustainable effects after the project period.

Firth, for most SPOs, we observe a long working relation between the SPO and CFA. For example, the FIELD and SC LED-NTT/FSPP projects ran for about 10 years. Hence, the good performance of the SPOs in terms of designing and implementing the projects could be a result of careful partner selection of the CFAs. On the other hand, during the evaluation period some of these working relations have (temporarily) ended due to changing strategies of the CFAs (YRBI, FIELD, KSP-QT).

Sixth, we observe that while some projects worked closely with the beneficiaries (for example, WIIP, YRBI, SC LED-NTT/FSPP), other SPOs were operating at a larger distance from the beneficiaries and more oriented towards civil society and policy influencing and worked with local partner organisations (for example, HuMa, NTFP-EP, FIELD and YPI).[84] Overall, we observe that projects that interacted more intensively with beneficiaries were also more effective (for example, WIIP and YRBI). However, these projects also had the highest costs. Unfortunately, based on the available data, we are not able to assess the efficiency of the two approaches.

Seventh, regarding the relevance of the projects to beneficiaries, most projects addressed relevant issues for the beneficiaries. This is particularly the case for projects on sexual education, services for victims of domestic violence and coastal reforestation. The mapping and natural resource awareness raising projects address important community concerns and are supported by the communities,

[83] For example, more effort should be taken by YPI to train teachers on how to effectively deliver the material of the DAKU programme.
[84] Or teachers in the case of YPI.

however, they are not deemed as urgent issues despite the long-term implications of natural resource extraction and the loss of cultural resources. Hence, these projects have an essential role in protecting ecological and cultural resources for future generations. Among the sampled project areas, the projects on poverty alleviation seem to be the least relevant relatively speaking, especially, as only one of the 4 projects is implemented in an underdeveloped area of Indonesia (SC LED-NTT/FSPP).

Overall, we find that the selected project were well-designed and implemented by committed SPOs, albeit the evaluation found limited quantitative impacts of the interventions during the evaluation period and we often found the interventions to be not cost-effective compared to benchmarks provided by the Synthesis team. The latter result may be explained by the small scale of the implemented projects.

Finally, we do not recommend the replication of this evaluation design in the future. However, we encourage carefully designed impact evaluation of development projects that reach a sizeable group of beneficiaries and offer measureable outcome indicators at the final beneficiary level. For small scale projects with outcomes that are difficult to quantify, we recommend the use of more qualitative evaluation methods like process evaluation or process tracing. Regarding the size of the project, it is important to consider whether the outcomes and primary sampling units are at the household or the community level, and the complexity of the project.[85] Most importantly, for all future evaluations we strongly recommend the development of the evaluation design in cooperation with the SPOs prior to the start of the interventions in order to allow for a true baseline measurement (and possibly the randomisation of beneficiaries) before the project is rolled out.

[85] For projects that involve many different treatments/activities, the beneficiaries should be stratified or separated by the different combination of treatment 'packages'. Evaluating complex projects requires a larger sample size due to this stratification. One option to reduce the sample size would be to only evaluate some of the project activities, as was also done for some of the selected MFS II projects.

**Table 6: Scoring of MDG projects**

| Statement | Score | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | WIIP | Pt.PPMA | NTFP-EP | FIELD | SC GREEN | KSP-QT | LRC-KJHAM | YRBI | HuMa | SC LED-NTT | Rifka Annisa | YPI |
| 1. The project was well designed | 9 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| 2. The project was implemented as designed | 9 | 1 | 7 | 8 | 6 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 9 |
| 3. The project reached all its objectives | 9 | 3 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 8 | 9 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 7 |
| 4. The observed results are attributable to the project interventions | 7 | 1 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 4 | 8 |
| 5. The observed results are relevant to the project beneficiaries | 9 | 2 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 7 | 10 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 10 | 8 |
| 6. The project was implemented in the most efficient way | 8 | 1 | 7 | 6 | N.A. | N.A. | N.A. | N.A. | N.A. | 5 | N.A. | 8 |

Notes: Scores are on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being “no agreement at all” and 10 being “completely agree with statement”.
N.A. = not applicable

# 3. Capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations

## 3.1. The Evaluation Sample


The pre-selected sample for the capacity development component has been stratified between SPOs with projects selected for the MDG evaluation and SPOs that were not eligible for the MDG study, i.e. SPOs with projects that receive less than EUR 50,000 funding through MFS II and/or with projects that cannot be categorised in any of the MDGs and themes. Following these considerations, a sample of 14 SPOs was pre-selected for Indonesia. However, 2 SPOs (Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) and Kapal Perempuan) were dropped from the initial sample as they did not receive MFSII funding at 1 January 2012. Hence, the sample for the capacity development component has been reduced to 12 SPOs. In the sample, 5 SPOs are selected that are also involved in the MDG study. The list of these SPOs is presented in Table 7.

**Table 7: Selected SPOs for the capacity development evaluation**

| Organisation | Dutch Consortium | Dutch CFA | Selected for MDG |
|---|---|---|---|
| Institute Dayakologi | Communities of Change | CORDAID | no |
| Wetlands International – Indonesia Programme (WIIP) | Partners for Resilience | Red Cross | yes |
| Yayasan Rumpun Bambu Indonesia (YRBI) | ICCO Alliance | ICCO | yes |
| YADUPA (Anak Dusun Papua Foundation) | Ecosystem Alliance | IUCN | no |
| Association for Study and Empowerment of Papuan Indigenous People (Pt.PPMA) | Ecosystem Alliance | IUCN | yes |
| Lembaga Kita | Press Freedom 2.0 | Free Press Unlimited | no |
| Indonesia - MM – ECPAT | Press Freedom 2.0 | Free Press Unlimited | no |
| Good Shepherd Sisters (GSS) | Press Freedom 2.0 | Free Press Unlimited | no |
| Yayasan Kelola | People Unlimited 4.1 | HIVOS | no |
| Aliansi Sumut Bersatu (ASB) | People Unlimited 4.1 | HIVOS | no |
| Rifka Annisa | SRHR Alliance | Rutgers WPF | yes |
| Yayasan Pelita Ilmu (YPI) | SRHR Alliance | Rutgers WPF | yes |

Source: NWO Joint MFS II Evaluations Country-Specific Information Indonesia.

**Figure 5: Location of the SPOs selected for the capacity development evaluation**




Notes: The map indicates the name of the SPO, name of the city (C) and province (P).

## 3.2. Methodological approach

The overall evaluation approach for evaluating capacity development of the SPOs is a participatory, theory-based approach using theories of change, impact pathways and process tracing[86,87], in a before-after comparison. Mainly qualitative methods have been used as organisational capacity is characterised by complexity and uncertainty.

The overall evaluation design is centred around the 4 evaluation questions:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5 Capabilities (5C) study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described in more detail in Annex F.

The first (changes in organisational capacity) and the fourth evaluation question are addressed together through:

**Changes in the 5C indicators since the baseline:** standard indicators have been agreed upon for each of the five capabilities of the five capabilities framework (see Annex G) and changes between the baseline, and the endline situation have been described. For data collection a mix of data collection methods has been used, including self-assessments by SPO staff; interviews with SPO staff and externals; document review; observation. For data analysis, the Nvivo software program for qualitative data analysis has been used. Final descriptions per indicator and per capability with corresponding scores have been provided. The scores were developed by the evaluation team, after thorough analysis and description of the situation during endline and how this changes since the baseline. These scores are based on mainly proportional differences. Whilst the information provided by staff may have provided socially desirable answers, the information provided has been cross-checked using different sources of information (different staff groups based on functions; self-assessments in interviews; interviews with CFA and other externals).

[86] In Stern et al, 2012: Evaluation and IE in particular, is an opportunity to test a programme's theory through the links in the causal chain. In terms of method, this tendency is close to 'process tracing' (George and McKeown, 1985, Collier 2011), defined by Aminzade (1993) as: 'theoretically explicit narratives that carefully trace and compare the sequences of events constituting the process…'. These causal chains are represented graphically as causal maps or neural networks.

[87] Stern et all (2012) say there are 'three main designs that show promise to reinforce existing IE practice when dealing with complex programmes – theory-based; case-based and participatory'.

Key organisational capacity changes – 'general causal m**ap':** during the endline workshop a brainstorm has been facilitated to generate the key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO since the baseline, with related underlying causes. For this purpose, a visual as well as a narrative causal map have been described. This general causal map was developed to also get the SPO perspective on what they considered as important capacity development changes since the baseline. For this reason, and since the indicators by themselves could not provide this overall SPO story and perspectives on what they considered important changes, only the SPO perspective has been included. This was an additional activity that wasn't planned for during the baseline. The analysis in terms of organisational capacity changes has however mainly focused on changes in the 5c indicators.

In terms of the attribution question (2 and 4), **'process tracing'** is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This was also confirmed during the 5c endline study. Theory-based evaluation can help to understand why a program works or fails to work and they attend to not only what a programs do but also to how participants respond[88]. The theory based approach also allows space for the evaluation to reflect the complex nature of the development process, particularly when focusing on changes in organisational capacity. To deal with the attribution question (2), the theory-based approach '(outcome explaining) process tracing' is used.

This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities – the 'capability to act and commit' and the 'capability to adapt and self-renew' –, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

The evaluators have considered the internationally agreed upon evaluation standards as useful guidelines for their work, and ranked in order of importance: 1. Utility, 2. Feasibility, 3. Propriety, 4. Accuracy, 5. Evaluation Accountability. Within the boundaries of the conditions set for this evaluation, the evaluators have as much as possible adhered to these standards, particularly utility, whilst the setup of the evaluation seems to focus more on the accuracy standard.

Organisational capacity is complex and seen as an outcome of an open system. Within a complex system, multiple processes operate simultaneously and by no means in isolation.

[88] Carol H. Weiss (2007).

Interactions between these processes can result in unpredictable and evolving results. According to Stern et all (2012), there are "three main designs that show promise to reinforce existing IE practice when dealing with complex programmes – theory-based; case-based and participatory". In order to understand changes in organisation capacity, it is important to develop a deep understanding of the change process and the dynamics that affect organisational change of organisations. Simple linear input-activities-outputs-outcomes-impact chains do not suffice for complex issue like organisational capacity.

The evaluation is participatory in that SPO staff and stakeholders are engaged in a process of self-reflection, learning and validation of findings. Having interactive workshops with staff is part of this.

The evaluation process is also participatory in terms of design and analysis. The overall methodology, including standard indicators and a Likert scale, has been designed by the CDI, Wageningen University and Research centre (WUR; Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia), in collaboration with ETC Foundation (Uganda) and Disaster Studies (WUR; DRC), covering in total 6 out of 8 countries. For the endline process CDI has also taken a lead in methodological development, especially in terms of process tracing, for all the 8 countries in the MFS II evaluation. CDI is involved in 4 out of the 8 countries for the 5C evaluation. Due to the nature of the evaluation (multiple countries, with multiple institutions carrying out the evaluation), all possible efforts were made to design a standard methodology to be used across countries. This included a set of common indicators (32); and data collection tools for six countries[89]. The 5 capabilities were reformulated in outcome domains and for each outcome domain performance indicators have been developed. See also Annex H. The methodology has been shared with the country based evaluation teams, the country project leaders, the synthesis team, and MFS II organisations for feedback. Detailed guidelines and tools have been developed by CDI for the baseline and endline, and these have been piloted in each of the countries CDI is involved in, in line with training the in-country team. Country based evaluators have had a critical input in reviewing and adapting these detailed guidelines and tools. This enhanced a rigorous data collection process. Rigorous analysis of the qualitative data is done with the assistance of the NVivo software program. The qualitative data analysis software allows for a transparent and systematic analytical process across an international team. During data collection, analysis and sense-making, the overall 5C coordinator (CDI) provided training, coaching and mentoring and carried out quality checks for each of the 4 5C country teams that CDI is involved in (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO reports. A detailed explanation of the methodological approach and a reflection on this is provided in Annex F.

[89] DRC, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia, Uganda

## 3.3. Key findings and conclusions

This chapter includes brief descriptions for each SPO included in this capacity development (5C) evaluation, and provides main findings and conclusions of the evaluation, in relation to the 4 core evaluation questions as described in the previous section.

### 3.3.1. Key information on the Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs)

Please find below a brief description of the key information on the Southern Partner Organisations.

**ASB**

The United Alliance of Northern Sumatra (*Aliansi Sumut Bersatu*-ASB) was initiated in 2006, intentionally at the occasion of the International Women's Day. The creation of the ASB took place in the context of a "come together" of various NGO's, artists, students, activists and others against an *"ultra-conservative-district-level-"*[90] bill against pornography and indecent behavior, the so-called RUU APP. This bill was intended by the PKS (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* or Justice and Prosperity Party) as a way of gaining political popularity among Muslims (90% of Indonesian population) through creating this bill based on PKS' conservative understanding of the Islamic principles. The dialogue between the organisations that stood up against what this bill represented and could bring forth resulted in the declaration of the *Aliansi Sumut Bersatu*. Through peaceful actions, discussions, hearings with the House of Parliament and the collection of signatures ASB was created to stand against RUU APP and all activities, laws, norms and behavior that generate social exclusion. *Aliansi Sumut Bersatu* was officially established in 2008[91]. Initially focused on social pluralism regarding sexual and gender equality issues *Aliansi Sumut Bersatu* (ASB) has broadened its scope of action[92] since 2010. An example of this is ASB's present project: "Civil and Religious Societies' Participation in Promoting Peace and Diversity in North Sumatra". This program, which in the framework of MFS II is co-financed by Hivos, aims at bringing about religious pluralism in North Sumatra. The vision of ASB is '*Aliansi Sumut Bersatu*'s vision is *"the achievement of recognition, protection, fulfilment of and respect toward diversity".*[93] *Aliansi Sumut Bersatu's* strategies are: to offer education in feminism, sexuality and pluralism to the community. In the context explained above, "community" encompasses the cross-religion student activists and other social groups. Furthermore, ASB engages in monitoring the practices of religious intolerance in North Sumatra, advocating on policy and advocacy for groups which became the victim of intolerance and doing research on the practices of pluralism in North Sumatra[94].

[90] Aliansi Sumut Bersatu (2011) Historical Time line
[91] Aliansi Sumut Bersatu (2011) Historical Time line
[92] Aliansi Sumut Bersatu (2011), ASB Proposal Form to Hivos
[93] Concept Paper Program ASB 2013-2015
[94] Aliansi Sumut Bersatu (2011) Historical Time line

**ECPAT**

ECPAT Indonesia is the National Coalition for the elimination of Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children (CSEC).[95] It was founded when a group of professionals organised a National Consultation Meeting on Fighting CSEC in Jakarta in 2000. This National Consultation resulted in the establishment of the National Coalition for the Elimination of CSEC in Indonesia named ECPAT Indonesia. The objective of this coalition is: "*to eliminate child prostitution, child pornography and child trafficking for sexual purposes and to push community members and government to ensure the fulfillment of children's basic rights and protection from sexual exploitation*".[96]In 2005, the National Coalition was acknowledged as an Affiliate Member Group of the ECPAT International Network. ECPAT Indonesia is a network of 24 members, 20 NGOs in Indonesia and 4 individuals who are working in the field of CSEC. These organisations are spread over 11 provinces in Indonesia: Aceh, North Sumatra, Lampung, Kepulauan Riau, Jakarta, West Java, East Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta, West Kalimantan and West Nusa. The network does not cover all areas where child trafficking takes place because in these areas there is no (trustworthy) NGO working on CSEC.[97]

**GSS**

The Good Shepherd Congregation was founded in 1835 in Angers (France) by Zr. Mary Euphrasia Pelletier. It is an international congregation with about 5,000 members and it operates in 73 countries on five continents. The Good Shepherd Sisters in Indonesia are founded in 1927 and are active in 8 different locations in Indonesia: Jakarta, Tangerang, Bogor, Bantul (near Yogyakarta) and Yogyakarta on Java, Marau (Kalimantan near Pontianak), Ruteng (Flores) and Batam (Riau Islands).[98] The vision of Good Shepherd Sisters is to "*make visible the merciful God, the very best friend of each person who is wounded, marginalized, and morally fragile".* [99] Good Shepherd Sisters mission is: "*We are committed to reaching out each person with respect to living values and human dignity. We also bring the spirit of reconciliation be with our selves, other person, nature, and the almighty God."* Their goal is to bring: "*Services to those who are marginalized and broken, especially women and children*." [100]

**Institut Dayakologi (ID)**

Institut Dayakologi engages in the struggle for the right to self-determination and preservation of the Dayak culture. Through empowering the Dayak community with knowledge; advocating for the Dayak cause and enhancing peace in the community the Institut Dayakologi raises awareness in the community about the value and potential of the Dayak culture in contributing

[95] Mensen met een Missie (2012) Beoordelingsmemo incl. kenschets ECPAT Indonesia 2012 – 2013 - Onderzoek, monitoren en rapporteren cases m.b.t. seksuele uitbuiting van kinderen
[96] National Coalition for the Elimination of CSEC (2011) Organisation Profile
[97] ECPAT Indonesia (2011) Antwoorden op goedkeuringsbrief
[98] Oteman, M. (2012) External Evaluation of Good Shepherd Sisters
[99] Good Shepherd Sisters (2011) Project Proposal Anti-Trafficking Phase 2
[100] Good Shepherd Sisters (2011) Project Proposal Anti-Trafficking Phase 2

to humankind; in its own and traditional way of doing so[101]. The vision of ID is *"The Indigenous peoples - the Dayak peoples in particular - are able to determine and manage their social, cultural, economic and political in together in the spirit of love to struggle for their dignity and sovereignty"*[102]. The mission is *"To conduct research and/or advocacy in the spirit of education, independency and solidarity for the revitalization and restitution of the Dayaks' existence".*[103] In order to maximize the role of "encouraging the advocacy and dissemination of Dayak culture as well as encouraging the better recognition of the Dayak culture and indigenous rights at home and abroad", Institut Dayakologi has strategic actions such as building up a multi-level network approach in order to broaden the impact of its actions. Institut Dayakologi expects "that the advocacy of indigenous peoples' cultural revitalization, environment and natural resources management, as well as efforts to build peace and transformation can work more effectively owing to the supports of various parties, at local, national and international level"[104].

**Lembaga Kita**

Lembaga Kita was founded in 2007 by Sister Antonie, the head of the congregation Putri Maria and Yosef (PMY).[105] The organisation resulted from multiple collaborations, initiated by Sister Antonie since 2001, in the field of gender-equality promotion in Indonesia. Lembaga Kita can be best described as a network-organisation that facilitates and coordinates multiple gender-related programs in and around Wonosobo (Java), all under the supervision of PMY[106]. The organisation consists solely of volunteers who do their work in three villages because of their social engagement. Strategy and activities are designed together with the Sisters PMY. They also guide the Lembaga Kita team in the implementation. The vision of Lembaga Kita is: "*To embody gender equality and gender justice collectively".*[107] The mission of Lembaga Kita is: "*protection and empowerment for women and children, mainstream gender in policy and development, social empowerment for women and children*".[108] Lembaga Kita aims to: "*create a safe and caring environment and society for women, to help and empower victims of gender-*

[101] Institute Dayakologi (2012) *"Narrative report to Cordaid. January-December 2012".*
[102] Source: http://dayakology.org/eng/vision.htm accessed 20-02-2013
[103] Source: information provided by Institute Dayakologi in response to reviewing the draft baseline report, d.d. 15-01-2013
[104] Institut Dayakologi (2010) *"Institutional Report January-December 2010: Towards Institut Dayakologi as information centre for Dayak culture".* (p.2)
[105] The Congregation of the Daughters of Mary and Joseph was founded in 1820 and is active in The Netherlands and in Indonesia. The Congregation in Indonesia, *Putri Maria and Yosef* (PMY), is led by Sister Antonie who resides in the Wonosobo community of Sisters. PMY consists in of seven communities and a noviciate, all on Java. The community of Sisters in Wonosobo also leads the Dena-Upakara boarding school for deaf and hearing-impaired children can be found. The community of Sisters in Yogyakarta works at the Helen Keller Institute, an institute for the care and education of deaf-blind children.
*Source*: Website Congregatie Dochters van Maria en Jospeh (2012): http://www.congregatiedmj.nl/organisation (Accessed: 8 November 2012)
[106] Lembaga Kita is under the supervision of PMY as can be observed from the Contract with Mensen met een Missie (2012) which is signed by Sister Antonie on behalf of Lembaga Kita.
[107] Lembaga Kita (2011) Project Proposal 2012
[108] Lembaga Kita (2011) Project Proposal 2012

*based violence, to (economically) empower women and improve cooperation between various parties and networks.*

**PT.PPMA**

PT.PPMA is a non-profit organisation established in 2001. The underpinnings for PT.PPMA originates from 1988 when *Yayasan Kerjasama Pendidikan Hukum Kritis Irian Jaya* (YKPHM-Irja). YKPHM focussed mainly on increasing the knowledge of indigenous communities in Papua on their rights and educate them on sustainable management of ancestral land and natural resources. During a workshop in 1997, funded by Hivos Netherlands, it was recommended that YKPHM should expand their activities such as socio-cultural, political and economic management of environment and natural resources as well as human-rights and gender equality. As a consequence of this expansion a new organisation was initiated: *"Lembaga Pengkajian dan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Adat Irian Jaya (LPPMA-IRJA)"/*"The Institute for Irian Jaya Indigenous People's Study and Empowerment". In 2000, LPPMA-IRJA decided to change their institutional organisation to set an example of democratization and transparency. The ownership of the organisation shifted from the founder of the organisation to the members of the organisation. In 2001, this resulted in the establishment of PT.PPMA.[109] PT.PPMA has a long record of working in the field of sustainable forest management and particularly participatory mapping. The vision of PT.PPMA is: "*Indigenous Community men and women in Papua are able to organise themselves and thus to strengthen themselves and the negotiating position of indigenous communities, and also able to develop independently based on their own resources: natural resources, political, social, cultural and economic resources, aspiring to fairness, clear sovereignty over resources, and a sustainable and improved quality of life, without violence*" [110]. The mission of PT.PPMA is: "*Increase the ability and skills of indigenous communities, so that they can develop themselves based on the potential of their resources: natural, political, social, culture and economic whilst fairly achieving an improved quality of live in sustainable way without violence*."[111]

**Rifka Annisa**

Rifka Annisa, meaning "Friends of Women", was founded in 1993 and is based in Yogyakarta. Rifka Annisa's vision is*: "to realize a gender just society that does not tolerate violence against women through the principles of social justice, consciousness and awareness, independence, integrity and preserve local wisdom."*[112] Rifka Annisa's mission is: "*to organise women in particular and society in general to eliminate violence against women and creating gender equitable society through the empowerment of women victims of violence, including children, elderly, Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals, Transgender and other, and increase public awareness and*

[109] Pt.PPMA (No Year) Kenschets - Profil
[110] Pt.PPMA (2008) Project Proposal 2009-2010
[111] Pt.PPMA (2008) Project Proposal 2009-2010
[112] Rifka Annisa, (No year), Kenschets Rifka Annisa - Profil Lembaga Rifka Annisa

*involvement through education and strengthening critical network."* [113] Rifka Annisa provides services to victims of GBV through (initiation of community-based) crisis centres, counselling to both victims and perpetrators (male groups) legal assistance and women support groups. In addition, Rifka Annisa aims to develop a strong network of health care providers, police and legal aid organisations and to improve the capacity of their partners by providing for example training programs. At the same time Rifka Annisa is strongly advocating against violence and especially violence against women through the media (film production, photo exhibition etc.). They also aim to influence local government to implement gender responsive policies. [114].

**Wetlands International Indonesia (WIIP)**

Wetlands International Indonesia (WIIP) is part of the umbrella organisation Wetlands International (WI). The organisation that later became WI was founded in 1937 under the name of Wildfowl Inquiry. The organisation has been involved in environmental protection since then. WIIP works with communities at village to district level, assessment on community vulnerability and capacity, maintaining of group dynamic and works, trainings, environmental campaign, development of village regulation as well as development of community livelihood and ecosystem restoration (Bio-Rights). Wetlands International Indonesia works with 194 households/ communities in 6 coastal villages and 1 upland village in Flores Island and 1 learning site in Banten Province. During this period, WIIP put many efforts to develop good networking on the integration of Climate Change Adaptation, Disaster Risk Reduction and Ecosystem Restoration and Management. Partnerships have also been built with various relevant stakeholders, including land lords, enabling better environment for the introduction and implementation of the proposed programme. Continued efforts on communication and consultation with relevant local government institutions have resulted into good progress on the development of village regulation and establishment of Village level Disaster Response Team.[115] The vision is that ' Wetlands and water resources are conserved and managed wisely so that the various values and environmental services can provide benefits for biodiversity and human life in a sustainable manner'. The mission is to preserve and maintain wetlands, including resources and biodiversity.

**Yadupa**

In 2000 the Second Papua Peoples' Congress was held, from which, two years later, the Papua Customary Council (Dewan Adat-DAP) came into being. The objective of the DAP council is to peacefully fight the violations of the rights of the Papua indigenous people by emphasising Papua's key assets such as its traditions, culture and natural resources.[116] Initially, DAP's mandate was to struggle for the basic rights of Papua indigenous people and one of the concerns was preservation of culture knowledge to the Papuan youth. It was in this context

[113] Rifka Annisa, (No year), Kenschets Rifka Annisa - Profil Lembaga Rifka Annisa
[114] Rifka Annisa, (No year), Kenschets Rifka Annisa - Profil Lembaga Rifka Annisa
[115] WII (2013). Annual Report January - December
[116] Historical Time line developed by Evaluation Team based on conversations with Yadupa staff (2012)

that Yayasan Anak Dusum (Yadupa) came into existence. It was registered in 2003. Until 2005, Yadupa staff mostly consisted of DAP activists and since 2007 Yadupa received a permanent staff from Papuan youth graduated from University. During the first years of its existence, Yadupa's activites consisted mostly of rallies, marches and protest during which they claimed to protect the right of indigenous people. The period 2005 – 2007 was transitional during which Yadupa began to engage in development programs but still participated in the movement.[117] The vision of Yadupa is 'Realization of Papua Indigenous People who have strong Cultural Identity, Sustainable Environment and to be central actors in development processes.' [118] The mission is that 'YADUPA is one of the Papuan youth organisation that active in strengthening the cultural identity of Papua, economic development and environmental protection.'[119] Yadupa's motto is: The young generation of Papua for Papua's future.

**Yayasan Kelola**

Yayasan Kelola is a *"national arts service organisation"*[120] operating in Indonesia. Out of a population of approximately 240 million inhabitants over 2800 Indonesian cultural organisations are registered[121]. The vision is **"**Kelola aims to celebrate, nurture and promote the creativity of Indonesian artists and arts practitioners working in visual arts, music, dance, theatre and film. Through programs with a focus on educational activities, while engaging in cross-cultural dialogue, Yayasan Kelola aims at promoting cultural diversity"[122]. The mission is "To develop its programs in response to the needs and concerns articulated by the Indonesian visual and performing arts as well as by the film communities. As the needs of the communities shift and change, Kelola's programs change in response. Promoting cultural exchange by facilitating artists and art practitioners' engagement in dialogue, so as to gain and share skills and knowledge is also a focus of Yayasan Kelola. Finally, Yayasan Kelola aims at building networks within Indonesia as well as in the international cultural communities"[123].

**YPI**

Yayasan Pelita Ilmu (YPI), which was established on December 4, 1989, focuses on improving Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) knowledge among the youth (15 – 24 year old) in Indonesia. With this aim YPI fills a much needed gap as SRHR education for youths is not widespread in Indonesia. Yayasan Pelita Ilmu (The Pelita Ilmu). The vision is 'To be a reputable and consistent institution in creating a society that has healthy-life behaviour, is independent

[117] Historical Time line developed by Evaluation Team based on conversations with Yadupa staff (2012)
[118] http://www.yadupa.org/profil/, accessed on Dec. 12, 2014, time : 13.47 pm
[119] Ibid.
[120] HIVOS (2012) "Yayasan Kelola" Available at: http://www.HIVOS.nl/eng/community/partner/10002818 Accessed on: 14.11.2012
[121] Yayasan Kelola (2011) *"Narrative Proposal for Activities of Kelola 2011-2013: Application for funding from HIVOS"*.
[122] Yayasan Kelola (2011) "Narrative Proposal for Activities of Kelola 2011-2013: Application for funding from HIVOS".
[123] Yayasan Kelola (2011) "Narrative Proposal for Activities of Kelola 2011-2013: Application for funding from HIVOS".

and productive as well as providing quality health services.[124] The mission is 'Empowering society to combat HIV and AIDS through education, assisting, outreach, and livelihood based on the principles of participation, partnership, equality, transparency and accountability.'[125]

**YRBI**

In 1995 YRBI was established by 4 founders concerned in empowering indigenous institutions, agriculture and environment[126]. YRBI envisions a community that *"will be able to manage natural resources independently and develop the potential of the region to achieve the prosperous life in a fair way"*[127]. The mission includes: strengthen the management of natural resource and the area; strengthening of civil based economy; strengthening of local values; strengthening of public policy with community justification based; strengthen the solidarity among social community.

### 3.3.2. Changes in partner organisation's capacity and reasons for change (evaluation questions 1 and 4)

This section describes the main findings for the first evaluation question: What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period? And the fourth evaluation question: "What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"

These questions are mainly addressed by reviewing standard indicators that have been developed for each of the five core capabilities, which make up the capacity of an organisation (see also Annex H). Through a mix of methods (self-assessments – SPO staff; interviews with SPO staff and externals; document review; observation), data have been selected on whether and what changes have taken place in these indicators since the baseline in 2012. See also a description of the methodology in Annex F. The main findings and conclusions are described below. In addition to reviewing standard 5C indicators, the evaluation team facilitated a discussion on what the organisation perceived as the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline, and how these changes have come about. Key findings are also explained below.

#### *Changes in terms of the five core capabilities*

Below you can see how each of the SPOs changed since the baseline in terms of their average capability and specific indicators.


**ASB**

Since the baseline, two years ago, ASB has seen most changes in the capability to act and commit (see Figure 6). Better task delegation, clearer job descriptions and strategic planning have helped ASB's leadership in organising staff and program activities better. The capability to adapt and self-renew also slightly improved through the improved application of M&E and the

[124] Evaluation Team (2012) Historical Timeline
[125] Evaluation Team (2012) Historical Timeline
[126] Historical time line developed by Evaluation team (2012)
[127] YRBI (2010) Profil_English version

establishment of a diversity communication forum, through which ASB can easier keep track of developments amongst its beneficiary communities. The capability to deliver on development objectives has improved through more systematic working. Day to day activities have been more aligned to the organisation's strategy and each other. In the capability to relate ASB's improved in its networking capacity. More stakeholders are engaged in the development of policies and strategies, which is a very slight improvement compared to the baseline. New partnerships with academia have strengthened external relations and opened up new opportunities. Finally, ASB has very slightly improved in its capability to achieve coherence. Operational guidelines of ASB have slightly improved with the introduction of standard operating procedures for all divisions.


**Figure 6: Changes in the capability to act and commit (ASB)**




**ECPAT**

Since the baseline, two years ago, ECPAT has seen a slight improvement in the capability to act and commit (see Figure 7). The change in leadership style brought about more open communication between staff and management and more room for feedback. Staff turnover remained high, whilst day to day operations were more in line with the strategic plan and supported by new SOPs. ECPAT has very slightly improved in its capability to adapt and self-renew, which was mainly due a clear M&E protocol being in place for 2014 and onwards. ECPAT staff has also developed its M&E competencies, and is more aware of developments in their environment. A slight improvement occurred in the capability to deliver on development objectives as well: clear operational plans have been developed in the form of an implementation work plan and budget plan to control the execution of activities. Delivering planned outputs has improved as virtually all objectives have been met, particularly in the CSEC case program. The capability to relate improved somewhat as a result of better coordination of with partners and stakeholders. Strong lobby activities ensured strong ties to key government and policy makers. Informal communication amongst the staff is now stronger and helps them connect and discuss programmatic issues. Finally, ECPAT has realised a slight improvement in the capability to achieve coherence through its operational guidelines. In 2013 ECPAT hired a consultant to support them to improve the management system and develop several new sets of standard operating procedures in terms of finance, HR and program procedures.


**Figure 7: Changes in the capability to act and commit (ECPAT)**




**GSS**

Since the baseline, two years ago, GSS has seen a slight improvement in the capability to act and commit (see Figure 8). A greater number of training opportunities have increased staff skill and promoted the sharing of knowledge amongst sisters and volunteers. The capability to adapt and self-renew has slightly improved now that M&E application and understanding has improved. No changes occurred however in terms of the capability to deliver on development objectives. The capability to relate improved very slightly as GSS focused its engagement on its biggest area of influence: the Catholic Church. Overall more engagement with target groups has taken place as well. No change has occurred in the capability to achieve coherence.


**Figure 8: Changes in the capability to act and commit (GSS)**




**Institut Dayakologi (ID)**

Since the baseline, two years ago, Institut Dayakologi has only seen changes in the capability to act and commit (see Figure 9). A slight improvement occurred in this regard. This was particularly through a change in staff turnover as a result of several senior staff members resigning. New, younger staff was attracted to replace these functions, which resulted in overall lower costs of wages, more training opportunities and better communication between staff members and management. No further changes occurred in any of the other four capabilities.


**Figure 9: Changes in the capability to act and commit (ID)**




**Lembaga Kita**

Since the baseline, two years ago, Lembaga Kita has seen a slight improvement in the capability to act and commit (see Figure 10). The organisational structure of the organisation improved with the addition of a new Steering Committee and Organisation Committee and clearer responsibilities between the two. Training opportunities also improved with the addition of training on human trafficking by IOM and training in PME by Mensen met een Missie. The capability to adapt and self-renew has improved slightly in terms of freedom for ideas as well as the system to track the environment as Lembaga Kita has made an extra effort to gather stakeholders in villages to thoroughly assess their situations. In the capability to deliver on development objectives a slight improvement occurred. In terms of delivering on planned outputs for example, Lembaga Kita has started to reap the rewards from their intensive door to door policy to gain trust from local communities in their output planning. The capability to relate improved slightly due to more frequent engagement with beneficiaries, as well as better internal communication through the fusion of field offices which encouraged staff members to talk and share more frequently. The greatest improvements occurred in the capability to achieve coherence. The organisation's focus has broadened to now also include anti-trafficking issues. Since the restructuring of the organisation, job and task descriptions have been specified and made clearer and are now documented, but not yet developed in the standard operating procedures. A very slight improvement also occurred in mutually supportive efforts. Lembaga Kita attempts to go beyond solving the problem on its own. For instance, they don't just warn communities for the dangers of trafficking, but also attempt to remove the reasons why people sometimes fall victim to it. They try to give them good opportunities in life.


**Figure 10: Changes in the capability to act and commit (Lembaga Kita)**



**PT.PPMA**

Since the baseline, two years ago, PT.PPMA has seen some improvement in the capability to act and commit (see Figure 11). Responsive leadership improved slightly after a turbulent change in management of the organisation after the passing of the late director and losing IUCN's funding. The new leader enabled staff to feel free to express their ideas and be included in the development of proposals. This resulted in successfully acquiring short term funding from IFACS and "Partnership" between 2012 and 2014 for eco-forestry and the mapping of indigenous territory, as well as advocacy towards local government. Through new donor funded training, staff skills have improved slightly. A slight improvement took place in PT.PPMA's capability to adapt and self-renew. A slight improvement in M&E competences has been achieved through a training in 2014 by Partnership. The capability to deliver on development objectives has improved slightly. The lack of funding has provided a clear impulse to be cost-effective. Delivering planned outputs has however slightly deteriorated. PT.PPMA was unable to deliver or accomplish the planned outputs of the program funded by IUCN. Lack of responsiveness in reporting to the CFA caused the ending of IUCN funding. PT.PPMA on the other hand was unable to fulfil these reporting requests due to a lack of internal coordination and knowledge to provide the required information. Monitoring efficiency has improved in that the lessons and experiences with IUCN do not want to be repeated. PT.PPMA now emphasises coordination and program management more. The capability to relate has slightly improved. PT.PPMA now has closer connections to the local authorities, and internally, staff can relate easier to the new director. No changes have occurred in terms of the capability to achieve coherence.

**Figure 11: Changes in the capability to act and commit (PT.PPMA)**





**Rifka Annisa**

Since the baseline, two years ago, Rifka Annisa has seen an improvement in the capability to act and commit (see Figure 12). The relation between upper management and staff has improved, with considerable improvements in strategic guidance and responsive leadership as a result. Staff turnover has improved and been reduced as a result of more focus on capacity building activities, which also led to greater staff skills. Employment benefits increased, whilst funding sources improved very slightly with the adoption of business programs to generate income and become less dependent of donors and more self-sufficient. The capability to adapt

and self-renew has improved overall. M&E tools have been developed and consistently applied, although Rifka Annisa still needs to step further building an effective MIS, database and knowledge management system. Rifka Annisa is also more aware of its surroundings through increased public discussions and knowledge sharing. The capability to deliver on development objectives has improved through more efficient operations and timely delivery of planned outputs. The capability to relate has also improved. This was achieved through various new relations to authorities and stakeholders at all levels of government. Engagement with target groups through the application of social media has aided in reaching out to new beneficiaries. In the capability to achieve coherence, operational guidelines have slightly improved as they are laid down in standard operational procedures (SOPs), for example in a finance manual and a method for setting up a referral system to other organisations.

**Figure 12: Changes in the capability to act and commit (Rifka Annisa)**





**WIIP**

Since the baseline, two years ago, WIIP has seen an improvement in the capability to act and commit (see Figure 13). The leader has gained extensive experience, is strong and dedicated, and able to maintain good relationships with other parties. Staff turnover has improved and more staff members now work for WIIP with permanent contracts. Overall, employment benefits have increased and the organisation is now more in line with the Indonesian labour law. Strategic plans at project level have been well developed and implemented. Funding procedures have been improved slightly after 2012. The capacity to adapt and self-renew has improved the most out of all capabilities. Systematic M&E is applied at the project level consistently, and M&E competencies have increased slightly. WIIP is employed by other NGO's to evaluate and monitor other projects in Indonesia. Considerable improvement was made in terms of tracking the organisation's environment: WIIP has increased their networks and is up to date about development in various areas and fields of work. In the capability to deliver on development objectives, a slight improvement took place. Cost-effective resource use has slightly improved, as well as a slight improvement in mechanisms to meet beneficiary needs: WIIP now determine field projects based on thorough assessment of needs and perspectives of local communities and stakeholders. Considerable improvement has occurred in terms of balancing quality and efficiency, as WIIP in some cases used the organisation's own money to cover budget gaps in case of cost-exceeding projects to maintain good quality of results. The

capability to relate has also slightly improved. Stakeholders are more involved in policies and strategies and engagement with government and NGO's has intensified. Internal relations have improved through a policy to communicate more face-to-face, and less through email and telephone calls. The capability to achieve coherence has slightly improved through the adoption of new operational procedures related to finance and HRM. Staff agrees that WIIP has been able to successfully align its vision and mission with that of Wetlands International. Mutually supportive efforts have been considerably improved through the cross-project coordination.


**Figure 13: Changes in the capability to act and commit (WIIP)**




**Yadupa**

Since the baseline, two years ago, Yadupa has seen most improvements in the capability to act and commit (see Figure 14). The organisation has been able to stabilize its staff turnover and maintain some of its talent. Staff has been more involved in the implementation of the strategic plan. Various donors support the organisation now through additional funding sources, which has resulted in more training opportunities for the staff. The capability to adapt and self-renew has improved very slightly. This was mostly due to the development and more systematic use of new M&E formats and financial monitoring practices. M&E competencies improved through several training workshops. No changes were reported on the capability to deliver on development objectives and on the capability to relate. The capability to achieve coherence improved very slightly. This occurred mostly due to the revision of the strategic plan in December 2014, as well as more strict application of day-to-day financial guidelines.


**Figure 14: Changes in the capability to act and commit (Yadupa)**



**Yayasan Kelola**

Since the baseline, two years ago, Yayasan Kelola has seen a slight increase in the capability to act and commit (see Figure 15). The director's leadership is more approachable and attentive, staff skills have improved, and new funding sources have been acquired. In terms of the capability to adapt and self-renew a slight improvement has also occurred as M&E is performed more regularly and systematically. The capability to deliver on development objectives has very slightly improved as a result of more cost-effective use of resources. The capacity to relate has improved slightly as well as the organisation has engaged in more networking activities with prominent organisations and is now starting to get more recognized. No changes have occurred in the capability to achieve coherence compared to 2012.


**Figure 15: Changes in the capability to act and commit (Yayasan Kelola)**




**YPI**

Since the baseline, two years ago, YPI has seen a slight improvement in the capability to act and commit (see Figure 16). The merging of offices has made coordination between staff and management easier. Leadership has become more responsive and open. Better M&E approaches in developing work plans and strategies has aided in terms of articulating strategies. Staff skills improved slightly due to several trainings and YPI's funding procedures have improved slightly through the construction of a self-sustaining business unit that assists in fundraising and ensures financial sustainability of the organisation. The capability to adapt and self-renew improved slightly as well. This occurred mainly through more structured M&E practices in terms of a clear reporting and monitoring system. Staff has become more skilled in data collection and reporting. On the capability to deliver on development objectives, YPI has shown the greatest improvement. The cost-effective use of resources has greatly improved through a variety of new policies. The implementation of operational plans has improved resulting in better delivery of planned outputs, and a monitoring system is in place to ensure that quality and efficiency in activities remains balanced. The capability to relate has slightly improved due to greater engagement with stakeholder groups and beneficiaries, particularly youths and government. The capability to achieve coherence has only resulted in very slight improvements, particularly as in 2013 the organisation's vision, mission and strategies were reviewed and re-evaluated.


**Figure 16: Changes in the capability to act and commit (YPI)**




**YRBI**

Since the baseline, two years ago, YRBI has seen most changes under the capability to act and commit (see Figure 17). Overall a slight deterioration took place as compared to the baseline, although some positive developments were found as well. Changes in the staff composition, including the leadership position, created a positive change in responsive leadership and internal communication, but a negative change in staff turnover, strategic guidance and the articulation of strategies. No new funding sources have been found after the ICCO contract ended which left the organisation unable to act or perform. In terms of the capability to adapt and self-renew, a very slight deterioration took place. This could be attributed largely to the deterioration in terms of critical reflection. Less meetings, and opportunities for feedback from colleagues to management were the main reasons for this. The capability to deliver on development objectives has effectively remained unchanged. This was because although operational plans have become clearer, the efficiency of monitoring has slightly deteriorated. The capability to relate has very slightly improved. YRBI has expanded its network to several new networks and groups, but does not have the resources anymore to continue to engage with its target groups. Internal relations within the organisation have improved. No changes occurred in terms of the capability to achieve coherence since the baseline in 2012.

**Figure 17: Changes in the capability to act and commit (YRBI)**



**Summary**

All in all, changes took place in all the five capabilities, for most of the SPOs, as can also be seen in Table 8, and most of these changes were slight improvements. There were a few exceptions. For Institut Dayakologi no change took place in terms of the average for four of the capabilities. For GSS, Yadupa, and Yayasan Kelola no changes took place in two of these average capabilities. The picture for YRBI is very different from the others, since no changes took place in two capabilities, and a slight deterioration took place in two other capabilities. For 6 (50%) of the SPOs (slight) improvements took place in all of the capabilities: ASB, ECPAT, Lembaga Kita, Rifka Annisa, WIIP, and YPI. WIIP has seen most progress, since in all of the capabilities changes of more than 0.5 have taken place. For ASB and ECPAT also did well, since in three capabilities the progress was 0.5 or more. It must be noted that within these capabilities, and related to the specific indicators, mainly improvements but also some deteriorations have taken place. This is very much specific to the organisation. For specific details about each SPO, we refer to the specific 5C reports.

**Table 8: Changes in terms of average capabilities**

| Changes in terms of average capabilities | ASB | ECPAT | GSS | INSTITUT DAYAKOLOGI | LEMBAGA KITA | PT.PPMA | RIFKA ANNISA | WIIP | YADUPA | YAYASAN KELOLA | YPI | YRBI |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Capability to act and commit | **0.8** | **0.4** | **0.1** | **0.2** | **0.2** | **0.3** | **0.7** | **0.7** | **0.3** | **0.3** | **0.3** | **-0.3** |
| Capability to adapt and self-renew | **0.4** | **0.9** | **0.2** | **0.0** | **0.1** | **0.4** | **0.4** | **0.8** | **0.2** | **0.0** | **0.3** | **-0.2** |
| Capability to deliver on development objectives | **0.6** | **0.4** | **0.0** | **0.0** | **0.1** | **0.2** | **0.3** | **0.6** | **0.0** | **0.1** | **0.5** | **0.0** |
| Capability to relate | **0.5** | **0.5** | **0.2** | **0.0** | **0.3** | **0.3** | **0.3** | **0.6** | **0.0** | **0.1** | **0.3** | **0.1** |
| Capability to achieve coherence | **0.2** | **0.5** | **0.0** | **0.0** | **0.4** | **0.0** | **0.1** | **0.6** | **0.2** | **0.0** | **0.2** | **0.0** |

### *Key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO - general causal map*

For each organisation, a discussion with staff was facilitated, so as to understand what they perceived as the key organisational capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline, and how these changes have come about. It was expected that this would provide a comprehensive story for the SPO on what they perceived as the most important changes as well as providing reasons for change, which were difficult to surface from the 33 standard indicators. It must be noted that this information has not been verified with other sources of information, as has been done with the process tracing as explained in the next paragraph. Below you find the results per SPO.

**ASB**

During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by ASB's staff: the provision of health insurance (BPJS) linked to investments; increased job security, through more permanent staff contracts; improved staff capacity to implement programs. Within two of these organisational capacity changes, changes overlap with the key organisational capacity changes that were selected for process tracing because they were linked to MFS II funded capacity development interventions, namely the capacity to manage the organisation. More details can be found in the relevant section below.

The overall organisational capacity change to be more recognized as an organisation focused on pluralism issues, with its underlying 3 organisational capacity changes mentioned above, can only be partially attributed to MFS II supported capacity development interventions. In particular the MFS II (Hivos) funded strategic planning workshop has played an important role in terms of the change in leadership style and having a strategic planning document. Furthermore, Hivos (MFS II) supported the revision of the financial standard operating procedures (SPOs), which ultimately supported getting more funds for program implementation, more staff, better staff welfare and job security. However, non-MFS II funded interventions such as the TIFA foundation (in this case trainings supported and funded partially by external funders) in the field of finance and communication also played an important role in these changes. It can be said that the MFS II capacity development interventions contributed more to the strategic organisational changes, whilst other interventions provided more change at an operational level.

**ECPAT**

During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by ECPAT's staff: professionalization of the organisation; expansion and sustaining of donors; more effective advocacy; improved staff capacity for CSEC case monitoring. Professionalization of the organisation occurred mainly due to the improvement of ECPAT's financial system and staff management. Both factors can be partially attributed to the development of the secretariat on the one hand, and the development and expansion of program activities on the other. Both these factors can be attributed in part to MFS II funding, whilst funds from the

Bodyshop Indonesia were also applied. Improved program management and implementation capacity also led to the professionalization of the organisation, and could be attributed to a specific MFS II intervention in the form of a capacity scan carried out by Mensen met een Missie in 2012. In addition the hiring of new manpower of the organisation as part of the MFS II funded legal service unit program, has also led to organisational capacity change in the form of improved job descriptions, functioning of the secretariat and ultimately the improved program management and implementation capacity. The expansion and sustaining of donors can be attributed to the fact that donors credited ECPAT's work more frequently, which significantly raised their profile amongst other potential partners and donors. This was enabled by better program implementation, made possible through the strategic planning 2011-2014 as well as the staff's capacity improvements to manage programs, their knowledge on CSEC as well as the lobby and negotiation skills. This was in turn enabled by the program becoming more diverse and larger in scale, which was enabled by Mensen met een Missie's support in developing ECPAT's program. The development of ECPAT's program and secretariat were both due MFS II funding and funding from The Bodyshop Indonesia, although not specific MFS II capacity development interventions. More effective advocacy can be attributed to ECPAT having a better bargaining position in their negotiations with authorities. This came about from the support and recommendations from ECPAT International, the expansion of the national network, as well as more information about the organisation and their activities being distributed. This can be attributed to becoming more recognized by various stakeholders in Indonesia after the program has expanded and became more diverse, largely funded with MFS II funds. However, no MFS II funded capacity development interventions were specifically mentioned under this organisational capacity change. Lastly the improved staff capacity for CSEC monitoring was enabled by an increased ability to conduct written documentation, raising the awareness about CSEC issues, and having a monitoring instrument in place. The former two changes were the result of assisting the reflection process of the law unit service, the latter through a better understanding about monitoring CSEC issues of the program staff. Strengthening the ECPAT monitoring and investigation efforts contributed significantly to this. Both these changes can be attributed to the development of program documentation, as part of the program diversification and expansion funded by MFS II. These are not organisational capacity development interventions, but through staff's experience of being involved in these projects their understanding in conducting investigations, monitoring and reporting on CSEC cases has improved and they have been able to develop a monitoring instrument for CSEC cases. Therefore, their capacity has been built not through specific organisational capacity development interventions but rather through the experience in these 2 projects.

**GSS**

During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by GSS's staff: more effective work performance and improved case handling. GSS has become more visible on the issues of single moms and trafficking largely due to the increased trust from stakeholders (donors, beneficiaries and partners). This can be attributed to more effective work performance, improved case handling and the fact that GSS has a better

position in its network, which has allowed them to reach out to new partners, form new alliances and overall streamline operational processes. More effective work performance resulted from better financial management, better job descriptions and better program directions. These last two developments can be attributed to improved organisational management skills, whilst better program directions resulted from the development of impact indicators as a result of better monitoring and evaluation. Mensen met een Missie supported GSS with a one week training on M&E in 2014, which contributed to this capacity improvement. The underlying improved organisational management skills came from improved staff capacity, which can be attributed to the sharing of knowledge from volunteers to the sisters. This in turn can be attributed to more volunteers being involved in GSS (supported by MFS II capacity training on anti-trafficking), as more RGS communities are collaborating with GSS, and the more active role that GSS plays in its network. Improved case handling was enabled by improved advocacy skills and better technical support from GSS's network. Whilst the former results from the improved staff capacity, the latter is the result from a wider network, which enabled more support, as well as the direct support from three main dioceses. In conclusion, according to the GSS staff present at the endline workshop, MFS II capacity development interventions can be tied to several of the organisational capacity changes as indicated by the SPO, although GSS did not specify exactly how. This was not the purpose of this particular exercise, since GSS was not selected for process tracing.

**Institut Dayakologi (ID)**

During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by Institut Dayakologi's staff: improved secretarial coordination and support, improved staff morale, strengthened role as a networking hub for advocacy on Dayak communities and culture, increased executive team's capacity to develop proposals, improved staff decision-making process, more qualified human resources. According to the SPOs staff, MFS II funded capacity development interventions for program support have contributed to organisational capacity change in several ways, both directly and indirectly. The supported training interventions to increase staff capacity in the competencies to document and spread information to the public has contributed significantly to inspiring the community to think back to the Dayak culture and indigenous customs, that has helped improve program implementation and achievements. On the other hand the continuous support of Cordaid in reconstruction by rebuilding the offices, infrastructure and office structure have helped in improving day to day operations of the secretariat, strengthened the role of Institut Dayakologi as a networking hub and improved staff morale, all leading to improved program implementation and achievements. Although the 5C indicators in the previous section don't show great change for the organisation, the general causal map highlighted that MFS II support has certainly contributed to strengthening the organisational capacity and laying the foundation for increased capacity to mobilize resources for operations and program management of Institut Dayakologi. However, it must be noted that the information provided has not been validated through other sources of information, and therefore the conclusions must be understood in that respect.

**Lembaga Kita**

During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by Lembaga Kita's staff: a more visible organisation through the implementation of the community assistance model; and greater recognition amongst stakeholders through the systematic production of documentation. The organisation becoming more visible with the more accepted community assistance model can be attributed to the increased trust in the organisation. This was enabled by the beneficiaries being more satisfied with better services provided, which was the result of better staff working performance and a quicker response to beneficiaries' concerns. Increased staff working performance can be attributed to the change in the incentive system, better outputs achieved and increased community participation in the programming. Lembaga Kita has become more recognized by stakeholders through the production of documentation as a result of better documentation of data. This initiative can be attributed to the change in organisational management that took place. Various changes were indicated by the SPO that can be linked to one of the MFS II capacity development interventions by Mensen met een Missie: the organisational capacity scan that took place after the external MFS II 5c baseline in 2012. This influenced the change in organisational management, improved its organisational profile and brought about a change in the Community Assistance Model, which are the main underlying reasons for these key changes in the organisation, as perceived by the SPO. The CFA indicated that other capacity development interventions took place, including several trainings, but these could not be directly linked to the mentioned key organisational capacity changes mentioned in the general causal map, and process tracing was not carried out for this SPO since the SPO was not selected for this.

**PT.PPMA**

PT.PPMA was selected for process tracing but since no capacity development interventions were carried out by IUCN since the baseline, it was decided a 'general causal map' would be developed based on input from the SPO staff, but where possible, also with additional references. Therefore this part has been described under process tracing in the section below, even though the procedure for process tracing could not be adequately applied in this particular case.

**Rifka Annisa**

During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by Rifka Annisa's staff: staff being more productive and involved in the organisation's decision-making; greater motivation for staff to get promoted; staff being motivated to improve their facilitation skills; improved quality of monitoring and evaluation and a stronger partnership with local authorities in form of a signed MoU. According to the SPO staff, these changes can partly be attributed to MFS II funded capacity development interventions, in particular in relation to improved monitoring and evaluation in the organisation. This specifically refers to the MFS II funded training on M&E and more particularly the development of M&E tools. The development of these tools was an MFS II funded capacity development intervention by

Rutgers WPF, and can be attributed to the Donor requirement to adopt Results Based Management in program implementation. Furthermore, specific issues that required organisational development, were found in an MFS II funded organisational capacity scan that has led to some changes in the way staff performs. However, this has also been affected by other developments such as a major change in leadership as well as a greater focus on facilitation skills.

**WIIP**

During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by WIIP's staff: Improved staff capacity in their respective roles and fields of work; increased communication on WIIP and wetlands issues; improved collaboration and networking with local and international partners; a healthier and safer financial condition of the organisation; increased organisational management capacity. SPO staff attributed the above mentioned organisational capacity changes partly to MFS II capacity development interventions. WIIP staff experienced these as the most important capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline. Improved staff capacity resulted from joining the "community of practice". This is an international community whose members are organisations with similar focus (global warming-wetlands). This was the result of the change of vision and mission of Wetlands International, which in turn can be attributed to the development of the global agenda for wetlands. Increased communication on WIIP and wetlands issues was attributed by the SPO staff to improving media content and packages as well as strengthening media relations. Both these developments sprung from the need for stronger communication and publication which resulted from a change of vision and mission of Wetlands International. Improved collaboration and networking was attributed by the SPO to joining the joint community of practice, the strengthening of activities of advocating policies and other strategic activities, and more extensive and diverse programs. Whilst the work area expansion was due to the change of vision and mission of Wetlands International, the increased accountability resulted from an orderly financial administration. This was an important conclusion from the OD consultant who was hired after Wetlands International provided coaching and a capacity development workshop through MFS II funding. The improved and healthier financial condition of WIIP occurred through an increasing number of donations, and increased staff capacity to manage responsibilities. The greater number of donations was already explained above. The increased staff capacity to manage responsibilities resulted from increased experience and knowledge sharing. Both of these were enabled by staff placement in project management, and staff being sent to trainings and workshops. Both these were recommended by the organisational capacity scan and HQ workshop on capacity development. The increased organisation management capacity resulted from an increased ability of staff to manage responsibilities, strengthening the existence and recognition of the organisation in front of the government, an increased number of managerial staff, and improved supporting facilities. Strengthening the existence and recognition of the organisation in the eyes of the government was due a revision and addition of Employment SOP as well as an adjustment of employment welfare according to Indonesian labour laws after a series of formalizations in the employment policy and contracts.

Both can be attributed to the recommendations made by the consultant regarding integration of Indonesian laws and regulations as well as recommendations regarding reviewing and revising SOP's. This in turn resulted from the MFS II sponsored Capacity Development (CD) scan in March 2013. In conclusion MFS II interventions have been tied to key organisation capacity changes, as experienced by the SPO, although they were only in part responsible for all changes that have occurred. The redevelopment of the global agenda of Wetlands International has also had profound impact on the organisation's capacity changes, particularly in the field of program quality and focus, as well as networks addressed. The development of a more structured, accountable and transparent organisation that adheres to Indonesian law and has increased its' organisational management capacity can however for a large part be attributed to MFS II, according to SPO staff present at the endline workshop. However, it must be noted that the information provided has not been validated through other sources of information, and therefore the conclusions must be understood in that respect.

**Yadupa**

During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by Yadupa's staff: Increased trust from Donor agencies; Better capacity to manage budget efficiently in order to have organisation saving; Delays in the program and report. Trust from the donor agencies has increased as a result of better organisational performance, improved report writing, and Yadupa being more recognized by its stakeholders. The improved report writing could be attributed largely to MFS II funded capacity development interventions, particularly through the M&E training and the English course. Other changes however, such as organisational performance, financial efficiency and stakeholder recognition, which were all more related to the improved capacity to manage the budget efficiently to increase savings and delays in the program and reporting, were more the result of external and internal developments such as the increase in program activities and staff motivation. Better capacity to manage the budget efficiently in order to lead to saving, was due an increase in financial efficiency of the organisation. This could be attributed to the addition of a branch office, which has reduced the accommodation cost. The office was added as three new kampungs were added as beneficiary communities in the city of Biak, as a result of the new programs that were rolled out. The new programs that started were funded by MFS II, and although they are not MFS II capacity interventions, they did contribute to organisational change in terms of budget efficiency and greater saving. Delays in the program and reports can be attributed to the increasing workload and lack of staff capacity that increased as a result of the increasing scale of Yadupa's programs. This was a result of the new programs that were started. On the other hand reporting was delayed due to the new staff requiring technical assistance to implement the program and carry out reporting tasks. The high staff turnover caused the high influx of new staff, which in turn occurred due to the government of Papua releasing larger number of civil servants from their positions who consequently joined Yadupa due to better employment benefits and using the organisation as a stepping stone to other work. Delays in program and reporting can therefore only be slightly attributed to MFS II supported activities, and cannot be linked to specific MFSII capacity interventions. On the whole, according to SPO staff, these

changes can only partly be attributed to MFS II capacity development interventions, but were also related to other, internal and external factors.

**Yayasan Kelola**

During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by Yayasan Kelola's staff: increase of staff capacity, and becoming an organisation with an international reputation. According to the SPO staff, these key organisational capacity changes can only to a minor extent be attributed to MFS II capacity development interventions. The involvement of Hivos to support Kelola with the arts coalition initiative since 2012 has helped in building connections to government and lobbying and advocating activities, although this was not executed in the form of a specific MFS II capacity development intervention. Also a small role of MFS II continues to exist in trainings and workshops. Hivos has stated that they were able to reduce their fundraising from 30% to 5% in recent years due to the increased fundraising capacity of the organisation. This is difficult to attribute to MFS II interventions without going into more detail through for example process tracing.

**YPI**

During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by YPI's staff: an increase in staff working performance; an improved network maintenance; strengthened organisation independency. According to YPI staff in the endline workshop, all of these are expected to contribute to YPI's improvement in service quality. YPI staff experienced these as the most important capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline. Increased staff working performance resulted from increased frequency of controlling beneficiaries for YPI program improvement; staff having opportunities to attend training; comparative studies and courses; ideas from staff being accepted; response to problems in the field; increased job security. The increased frequency of controlling of beneficiaries was enabled by the greater number of staff proficient in M&E, which was enabled by more training, such as the MFS II capacity intervention for a PME workshop funded by Rutgers WPF. This could be attributed to an overall improvement of the organisations' professionalism due to donor requirements. Staff has had more opportunities to attend trainings and develop due to YPI's leader's willingness to send staff to more training opportunities as well as more funding to do so being available as a result of external funding. This was enabled by incentives from the leaders and the openness between staff and board due to the close internal relationships between management, board and staff. Both these factors can be attributed to the change in leadership style. Ideas from staff were more accepted which can again be attributed to the greater openness between staff and management. Quicker response to problems in the field was enabled by a more responsive organisation, which was made possible by the new leadership style. Appropriate action responses from staff were enabled by more detailed working descriptions, which can be attributed to the change of leadership on the one hand, and by better guidelines in the form of revisions of SOPs and new SOPs on the other. Increased job security was due the implementation of a salary standard and improving employment status to full time contracts.

Both were enabled by utilizing savings from other costs to improve employment benefits. These resources were freed up through simplifying the organisational structure and optimizing the use of resources. This efficiency initiative was enabled by the change in leadership. Improving YPI's network resulted from the use of social media as a communication tool to address stakeholders, and extending networks through other alliances and partners. Both were enabled by the existence of new partners for the YPI program due to good relationships with related organisations as a result of more intense networking activities. The network also extended to new groups through YPI's proactive stance to find network partners and funds. This can be attributed to the urgency imposed on the organisation by the decreasing of donors. Increased independency of YPI was enabled by the founding of a private company to provide services in training, facilitation, health services and accommodation. With this business, new more sustainable funding sources are being attempted. In conclusion, the general key changes causal map only provides limited information about the relation between MFS II interventions with the organisational capacity changes that YPI considered most important since the baseline. During the endline process tracing workshop, YPI did not mention specific MFS II capacity interventions that in their opinion had affected the key changes. However, it must be noted that this workshop was held very early on in the evaluation process and that YPI struggled in developing the initial maps and relating them to capacity development. In the course of their involvement in the endline evaluation process, this has changed, and additional insights were developed. The process tracing maps in section 5.3 provide more detailed information about the relation between MFS II funded capacity interventions and key organisational capacity changes. For a more detailed analysis on this matter, please refer to section 5.3 where process tracing findings are presented which can answer the attribution question with more certainty and validity.

**YRBI**

During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by YRBI's staff: staff capacity on *mukim* and *gampong* sovereignty issues is more recognized; an improved and more extensive network; reduced paid workforce and program funds. Two of these changes were selected for process tracing as they were tied to MFS II funded capacity development interventions, namely the 'poor financial situation of the organisation' (the third change mentioned above), as well as 'YRBI becoming the leading organisation in mukim and gampong sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia' (related to the first change mentioned above). See also the section below. YRBI staff indicated that, according to them, staff capacity is more recognized due to more invitations from the community to share staff knowledge and skills on mukim and gampong issues. The increase of staff capacity can be attributed to internal knowledge sharing and learning from various staff capacity building activities by ICCO through MFS II funded capacity development interventions. This increase of staff capacity has also led to a more prominent recognition of YRBI in these areas. According to YRBI staff, YRBI has become the leading organisation in mukim and gampong sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia. MFS II initiatives allowed YRBI to develop new empowerment programs for the poor and programs focused on participatory mapping of communities. YRBI's network improved and

became more extensive. The latter can be attributed to the optimal use of the organisation's facilities for events and trainings, the initiation of sovereignty institutions, as well as mukim and gampong issues becoming more widespread and therefore attracting greater public attention. No relationship has been indicated with MFS II funded capacity development interventions. Most of the changes are due to the organisation's own initiatives. The reduction in paid work force and program funds was a negative development, due to a poor financial situation that led to the closure of programs, staff leaving the organisation and staff not being paid. This poor financial situation can be partly attributed to a change of ICCO policy following the renewal of the MoU between ICCO and the Indonesian government, in which political areas and topics complicated the continuation of projects in the area. Furthermore, the organisation itself did not develop successful proposals since not many proposals were developed – even though staff had the capacity to write proposals –, and the new leader didn't have adequate fundraising experience. Whilst there was no link indicated with MFS II funded capacity development interventions, the fact that the main funder ICCO (MFS II) withdrew from funding the organisation has had an important effect on the organisation's financial situation. For more information about the poor financial situation please see the section below.

**Summary**

On the whole, according to SPOs for which a 'general causal map' was developed based on what they perceived as key organisational capacity changes since the baseline, MFS II funded capacity development interventions were mentioned as playing a role in bringing about these changes, especially in terms of enhancing staff capacity, mainly in terms of (planning), and M&E (5 SPOs): GSS, ID, Rifka Annisa, Yadupa, YPI, whilst for ASB the strategic planning workshop has sparked of many changes, since it resulted in a leadership change and a strategic plan. Internal factors have also been perceived as very important, whilst external factors have also played a role, particularly in the case of WIIP, with the change of vision and mission at WI.

**Table 9: Key underlying reasons for key identified organisational capacity changes**

| Key underlying reasons for key identified organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **SPOs:** | **ASB** | **ECPAT** | **GSS** | **Institut Dayakologi** | **Lembaga Kita** | **PT.PPMA** | **Rifka Annisa** | **WIIP** | **Yadupa** | **Yayasan Kelola** | **YPI** | **YRBI** |
| **Key organisational capacity changes as identified by SPO and key underlying reasons for change** | the provision of health insurance (BPJS) linked to investments; increased job security, through more permanent staff contracts; improved staff capacity to implement programs. | professionalization of the organisation; expansion and sustaining of donors; more effective advocacy; improved staff capacity for CSEC case monitoring. | more effective work performance and improved case handling | improved secretarial coordination and support, improved staff morale, strengthened role as a networking hub for advocacy on Dayak communities and culture, increased executive team's capacity to develop proposals, improved staff decision-making process, more qualified human resources | a more visible organisation through the implementation of the community assistance model; and greater recognition amongst stakeholders through the systematic production of documentation the organisational capacity scan | See next section | staff being more productive and involved in the organisation's decision-making; greater motivation for staff to get promoted; staff being motivated to improve their facilitation skills; improved quality of monitoring and evaluation and a stronger partnership with local authorities in form of a signed MoU | Improved staff capacity in their respective roles and fields of work; Increased communication on WIIP and wetlands issues; Improved collaboration and networking with local and international partners; A healthier and safer financial condition of the organisation; Increased organisational management capacity; | Increased trust from Donor agencies; Better capacity to manage budget efficiently in order to have organisation saving; Delays in the program and report. | increase of staff capacity; becoming an organisation with an international reputation. | An increase in staff working performance; An improved network maintenance; Strengthened organisation independency | staff capacity on *mukim* and *gampong* sovereignty issues is more recognized; an improved and more extensive network; reduced paid workforce and program funds. |

| Key underlying reasons for key identified organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **SPOs:** | **ASB** | **ECPAT** | **GSS** | **Institut Dayakologi** | **Lembaga Kita** | **PT.PPMA** | **Rifka Annisa** | **WIIP** | **Yadupa** | **Yayasan Kelola** | **YPI** | **YRBI** |
| **MFS II funded capacity development interventions** | strategic planning workshop; support to revision of the financial standard operating procedures | development of the secretariat; development and expansion of program activities; capacity scan; hiring of new staff for the legal service unit program | M&E training | training interventions to increase staff capacity in the competencies to document and spread information to the public; rebuilding the offices, infrastructure and office structure | | See next section | training on M&E; development of M&E tools; organisational capacity scan | organisational capacity scan; HQ workshop on capacity development | M&E training and the English course | Support to arts coalition initiative; trainings and workshops | PME workshop | See next section |

| Key underlying reasons for key identified organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **SPOs:** | **ASB** | **ECPAT** | **GSS** | **Institut Dayakologi** | **Lembaga Kita** | **PT.PPMA** | **Rifka Annisa** | **WIIP** | **Yadupa** | **Yayasan Kelola** | **YPI** | **YRBI** |
| **Internal factors** | leadership style; strategic planning document; revision of the financial standard operating procedures; trainings in the field of finance and communication | Project experience | sharing of knowledge from volunteers to the sisters; wider network | | change in organisational management | See next section | a major change in leadership; a greater focus on facilitation skills | improving media content and packages as well as strengthening media relations; joining the joint community of practice, the strengthening of activities of advocating policies and other strategic activities, and more extensive and diverse programs; staff placement in project management; staff being sent to trainings and workshops.. | addition of a branch office; m increasing scale of Yadupa's programs | | change in leadership style; revisions of SOPs and new SOPs; improved networking; the founding of a private company to provide services in training, facilitation, health services and accommodation | See next section |

| Key underlying reasons for key identified organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **SPOs:** | **ASB** | **ECPAT** | **GSS** | **Institut Dayakologi** | **Lembaga Kita** | **PT.PPMA** | **Rifka Annisa** | **WIIP** | **Yadupa** | **Yayasan Kelola** | **YPI** | **YRBI** |
| **External factors (including other funders)** | TIFA foundation – trainings in the field of finance and communication | development of the secretariat & development and expansion of program activities (Body Shop Indonesia); donors credited ECPAT's work more frequently; more recognized by various stakeholders in Indonesia | | | | See next section | Donor requirement to adopt Results Based Management in program implementation. | change of vision and mission of Wetlands International; development of the global agenda for wetlands; formalizations in the employment policy and contracts. | government of Papua releasing larger number of civil servants from their positions | | donor requirements for professionalism; decreasing of donors | See next section |

### 3.3.3. Attribution of changes in partner organisation's capacity and reasons for change (evaluation questions 2 and 4)

This section describes the main findings and conclusions for the second evaluation question: To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)? And the fourth evaluation question: "What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"

Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process. Furthermore, since 'process tracing' is used for this purpose, and this is a very intensive process, not all capabilities could be focused on. For more information about the methodology, please see Annex F. ASB, ECPAT, PT.PPMA, YPI, YRBI were the five SPOs selected for process tracing. Below the key findings are discussed. But for more detailed information please see the 5C reports for the SPOs.

**ASB**

Two organisational capacity changes were more closely investigated with process tracing: the improved capacity to manage the organisation, and the improved capacity to communicate results on diversity issues. The improved capacity to manage to manage the organisation can be attributed to a large extent to the planned MFS II (Hivos) capacity development intervention of the strategic planning workshop. The intervention was the main underlying reason for the change in leadership style and the development of a strategic plan. Both of these proved very important to bring about changes in the organisation for enhanced capacity to manage the organisation. The improved capacity to communicate results on diversity issues can only be partially attributed to MFS II interventions. Particularly competencies to communicate results about diversity issues have improved as a result of the English course, although other non-MFS II interventions (externally funded through TIFA) have impacted this as well. Despite Hivos' detailed plans to address the issue, ASB has developed a great deal of initiatives on their own to address this issue and improve this particular capacity.

**ECPAT**

The organisational capacity changes that were focused on with process tracing were: Improved program management and implementation capacity; improved skill of ECPAT in the investigation, monitoring and reporting of CSEC cases. According to ECPAT, the improved program management and implementation capacity of ECPAT has resulted in better organisational work performance, increased bargaining power over donors and government and greater recognition of ECPAT as an organisation dealing with CSEC issues. The improved

program management and implementation capacity can be attributed to the improved functioning (operating) of the secretariat, the availability of human resources to conduct programming, and improved operational management. Whilst none of these capacity changes can be directly attributed to MFS II interventions, the hiring of staff that has occurred, as well as the consultant assessments are results of the funding from programs sponsored by Mensen met een Missie (legal unit service implementation, November 2013). On the other hand operational management improved due to an improved administration mechanism as regulated in the organisation's statutes, as well as due greater financial efficiency. This administrative mechanism was altered due to a revision in the organisation's statutes and SOP's, as recommended by the consultant in the March 2013 assessment, as well as the 2012 capacity scan performed by an external consultant hired by MM. Greater financial efficiency could also be attributed to the development of these new SOPs, which regulated stricter financial procedures as well as program and project procedures. More accountable and transparent financial reports allowed for improved financial management as well, which was enabled by the revision of the financial guidelines as recommended by the Indonesian consultant in her assessment. The MFS II funded intervention of hiring another independent consultant to perform a capacity scan in 2012 was part of a greater Mensen met een Missie initiative to scan all their partner organisations in Indonesia. This resulted in a report which laid the foundation for self-inspection of ECPAT, and the series of organisational capacity changes, initiatives and developments that took place.

Improved skill of ECPAT in the investigation, monitoring and reporting of CSEC cases resulted in the successful handling of 10 CSEC victim cases as well as the development of a referral mechanism of CSEC cases for other organisations to use. This skill was improved due to a monitoring instrument for CSEC cases being available, and to program staff having gained better understanding in conducting investigations, monitoring and reporting of CSEC cases in practice. ECPAT's monitoring system can be attributed to the development of program documentation for the justice unit service project. The program was intended to build a model for other organisations to work on similar issues, which was done through the publication of a book and a database on the 10 CSEC cases that were followed and supported. This in turn was enabled by the staff's increased ability to capitalize on learning experiences which can be attributed to the staff's work on the reflection process in the case work to find lessons learned, challenges and develop best practices. This resulted directly from the Legal Unit Service Project supported by MFS II, which was a continuation of the CSEC investigating, Monitoring and Reporting project which took place in 2012.

**PT.PPMA**

PT.PPMA was selected for process tracing but since no capacity development interventions were carried out by IUCN since the baseline, it was decided a 'general causal map' would be developed based on input from the SPO staff, but where possible, also with additional references. Therefore this part has been described under process tracing, even though the procedure for process tracing could not be adequately applied in this particular case. During

the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by PT.PPMA's staff: "funding for IUCN project has been stopped" and "Improved recognition of other NGO's, local government and beneficiaries (indigenous people) that PT.PPMA is a leading organisation on indigenous people empowerment". This latter change was mainly related to the following key organisational capacity changes: increased staff experience and knowledge on advocacy with the government; increased staff knowledge on community forestry resources management and community economic knowledge; and capacity to organise indigenous people. None of these changes can be attributed to MFS II supported capacity development interventions since these haven't taken place since the baseline in 2012. The discontinuation of funding from IUCN resulted largely because of the lack of required reporting, which can be attributed to the death of the former director as it left the organisation without the leadership and support to submit the required project information. On the other hand, the improved recognition that PT.PPMA experienced from government can be largely attributed to changes in leadership and by getting short term funding from other donors including IFACS, Partnership and Local Government. The changes that have come about in the organisation since the baseline are therefore mainly due to internal reasons, even though the reduction of funding from IUCN has had a big impact of the organisation.

**YPI**

In terms of process tracing, three organisational capacity changes have been focused on: more motivated staff at YPI; staff being confident in giving training and in delivering SRHR information to beneficiaries; and improved reporting. On the whole, more motivated staff at YPI, due to improved staff welfare and improved management working mechanisms, where the result of many internal changes brought about by a change in leadership, after understanding organisational gaps which were identified in an internal evaluation that was set up after realising organisational capacity gaps with the external 5C baseline (MFS II) in 2012. Staff being confident in giving training and in delivering SRHR information to beneficiaries, can to a large extent be attributed to the MFS II capacity interventions that were carried out by RutgersWPF since the baseline in 2012. Specifically, these capacity interventions were a SRHR training; the training for youth friendly services; and a workshop on strategic communication, all held in 2013. In addition to that, having new volunteer staff members also played a role in this improved capacity. The key organisational capacity change "improved reporting" can to a large extent be attributed to MFS II funded capacity development interventions, in particular the M&E trainings in 2012 and the writing skills training in 2013, since these are related to enhanced capacity to collect robust data and enhanced capacity to write reports. Furthermore, the organisation has taken steps to improve their meetings after realising the importance of this during the 5C baseline study (MFS II).

**YRBI**

In terms of process tracing the following organisational capacity changes were focused on: 'poor financial situation' and 'Becoming the leading organisation in *mukim* and *gampong*

sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia'. The poor financial situation of YRBI resulted from a lack of obtaining new funds, which in turn resulted from the expiration of the ICCO contract, no follow up on fundraising activities occurred, and rejection of proposals for funding (see 4.3.1) took place, even though the organisation has increased its capacity to provide financial reports based on donor standards. This developed competence cannot be related to any MFS II supported capacity development interventions. The expiration of the YRBI and ICCO contract was due to a change of ICCO policy. In this policy ICCO stated that they couldn't further support activities with "mukim and gampong" issues, as they did not receive permission to work in these areas in Aceh any longer after the renewal of the MoU between ICCO and the Government of Indonesia. No follow up for fundraising occurred, despite increased competencies in resource mobilization as the result of the Resource Mobilization training in 2013 by ICCO. The competencies to raise public funds as generated in the ICCO intervention to mobilise resources training in February 2013, were not utilized for YRBI's own financial situation. Instead YRBI elected to share these training outcomes amongst its beneficiary communities, some of which successfully applied this to raise public funds through cooperation with private parties. No evidence for a relation could be found between the poor financial situation of YRBI and the improved transparency and accountability in financial reporting which resulted from the Financial Management training. Despite the positive outcomes in reaching the CFA's objectives in terms of utilizing the financial software and becoming a more transparent and accountable reporting organisation, these developments did not impact the financial situation of YRBI. Instead the capacity built up in this area is now unused, as YRBI does not have any ICCO programs to carry out anymore.

YRBI has become more visible as a leading organisation in Mukim and Gampong sovereignity issues in Aceh in Indonesia. This was due to YRBI's staff capacity on Gampong and Mukim issues becoming more recognized amongst its stakeholders, due to more invitations from the community to share staff knowledge and skills. Village maps were produced and utilized by the people as a result of the application of the training skills to some of the villages independently. This can be attributed to key organisational capacity changes can to a large extent increased staff ability to develop maps independently, following internal knowledge sharing gained from trainings. The knowledge shared in this case can be contributed to the participatory mapping internship (GIS) that took place in 2014 and was MFS II funded. The 'Making Markets Work for the Poor' Training (MFS II), which took place in the course of 2014 parallel to the endline evaluation, resulted in the successful creation of a economic development project for beneficiary communities on the topic of honey bee exploitation and commercialisation. An increased amount of beneficiary groups has started getting involved in this project, again leading to greater trust amongst beneficiary communities. Encouraging the community to use the results of training as a strategy to raise public and corporate funds resulted from the sharing of training knowledge to beneficiaries. This can be attributed to the gained staff skill to do fundraising from public or corporate CSR funds. This was due the internal knowledge sharing of the MFS II funded resource mobilization training that took place in 2013 as well. On the whole, YRBI has grown into a leading organisation in Mukim and Gampong sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia, and this is mainly due to positive effects at community level of

the projects implemented by staff whose competencies have been enhanced in the MFS II trainings on participatory mapping, 'Making Markets Work for the Poor' and resource mobilisation. On the whole, the changes in the key organisational capacity change can be attributed to a large extent to MFS II supported capacity development interventions.

**Summary**

On the whole it can be concluded that for 3 of the 5 SPOs, selected key organisational capacity changes can to a large extent be attributed to MFS II funded capacity development interventions: ASB (1 out of 2 changes); YPI (2 out of 3 changes); and YRBI (1 out of 2 changes). Internal factors have also played an important role in many of these changes. These include changes in leadership (PT.PPMA; YPI) and leadership style (ASB); enhancing staff competencies (ASB, ECPAT, YRBI) and other internal changes. For many of the selected organisational capacity changes internal changes have played an extremely important role: ASB (2 out of 2); ECPAT (1 out of 2); PT.PPMA (2 out of 2); YPI (1 out of 3); YRBI (1 out of 2). It must be noted that some of the important internal changes were very closely related to MFS II funded capacity development interventions such as the change in leadership style and a strategic document at ASB as a result of the Hivos supported strategic planning workshop which sparked off many internal changes. Only in one case external factors have been mentioned: for YRBI contract with ICCO expired due to a change in ICCO policy, which was the result of the renewal of the MoU between ICCO and the government of Indonesia. For 4 out of the 5 SPOs (all except PT.PPMA), MFS II capacity development interventions have played a role in enhancing staff competencies. The poor funding situation was a negative change, and has been an issue for two of the SPOs (YPI and YRBI). It is interesting to see that YPI experienced the 5C baseline in 2012 as a capacity development intervention that sparked of many changes in the organisation. For PT.PPMA, there have been no capacity development interventions, even though the CFA has asked the SPO many times for a capacity development plan. For more details please see the separate 5C reports for the SPOs.

## 3.4. Reflections

We recommend for future capacity development evaluations to be more utilisation focused, engaging stakeholders in a learning process so that they can also take up the lessons learned in order to further improve upon their organisations. Now, the evaluation was too much accountability driven. Furthermore, it is important that sufficient time is taken into account for the evaluation process in order to provide useful insights for all involved. The time period of two years was too short to see remarkable changes in terms of capacity development.

Organisational capacity contains many different aspects that are constantly changing. Therefore, it is important to see these as part of a whole rather than separate issues, unlike it had to be done for this evaluation in terms of standard indicators. The different aspects relate to each other and need to be seen more from a whole systems perspective. Furthermore,

organisational capacity is complex, methodologies for evaluation need to be tuned to the specific situation of each organisation.

Overall, process tracing has proven to be a useful exercise that provided a lot of insight into how changes in terms of capacity development have taken place. Many SPOs and CFAs valued this insightful learning process and indicated that they would work with the results to further improve the organisational capacity of the SPO. Furthermore, in case of staff turnover, this may have seriously affected institutional memory, which is an important factor, next to the difficulty of recall when describing a chain of events, in qualitative information.

None of the CFAs and SPOs had a clear and explicit theory of change for the organisational capacity development of the SPO and this made it difficult to compare and test this theory of change with the final narrative after the process tracing. For future purposes , we recommend that SPO and CFA do a proper analysis of the organisational capacities that the SPO needs to further enhance and make this explicit in the theory of change for the organisational capacity strengthening of the SPO. This would also strengthen theory-based evaluation.

**Table 10: Attribution of selected, key organisational capacity changes to key underlying factors**

| | Attribution of selected, key organisational capacity changes to key underlying factors<br><br>xxx= can to a large extent be attributed to this factor; xx= can partly be attributed to this factor; x = can to a minor extent be attributed to this factor; - = no link with MFS II funded capacity development intervention | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SPOs: | ASB | | ECPAT | | PT.PPMA | | YPI | | | YRBI | |
| Key organisational capacity changes and key underlying reasons for change | improved capacity to manage the organisation | improved capacity to communicate results on diversity issues. | Improved program management and implementation capacity | Improved skill of ECPAT in the investigation, monitoring and reporting of CSEC cases. | funding for IUCN project has been stopped | increased staff experience and knowledge on advocacy with the government; increased staff knowledge on community forestry resources management and community economic knowledge; and capacity to organise indigenous people. | more motivated staff at YPI | staff being confident in giving training and in delivering SRHR information to beneficiaries | improved reporting. | poor financial situation | Becoming the leading organisation in *mukim* and *gampong* sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia |

| | Attribution of selected, key organisational capacity changes to key underlying factors<br><br>xxx= can to a large extent be attributed to this factor; xx= can partly be attributed to this factor; x = can to a minor extent be attributed to this factor; - = no link with MFS II funded capacity development intervention | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SPOs: | ASB | | ECPAT | | PT.PPMA | | YPI | | | YRBI | |
| MFS II funded capacity development interventions | xxx<br><br>Strategic planning workshop | X<br><br>improved competencies to communicate results about diversity issues - English course | xx<br><br>hiring more staff; consultant assessments; organisational capacity scan; | xx<br><br>program staff having gained better understanding in conducting investigations, monitoring and reporting of CSEC cases in practice by engaging in the Legal Unit Service Project (MFS II) | - | - | xx<br><br>5c baseline (external) | xxx<br><br>SRHR training; the training for youth friendly services; and a workshop on strategic communication | xxx<br><br>M&E trainings; writing skills training. Both enhanced capacity to collect robust data and to write reports; 5c baseline (external) | - | xxx<br><br>participatory mapping internship (GIS); 'Making Markets Work for the Poor' Training |
| Internal factors | xxx<br><br>Change in leadership style; strategic plan development | xxx<br><br>more networking and publicity; writing courses; in-house media analysis training | xx<br><br>Self-inspection; revision in the organisation's statutes and SOP's; improved administrative and financial mechanisms | xxx<br><br>monitoring instrument for CSEC cases developed; sharing lessons learned in the Legal Unit Service Project (MFS II) | XXX<br><br>the death of the former director | XXX<br><br>changes in leadership; getting short term funding from other donors including IFACS, Partnership and Local Government | xxx<br><br>change in leadership; internal evaluation | x<br><br>new volunteer staff members | xx<br><br>Improved meetings | xxx<br><br>No follow up for fundraising, despite increased competencies in resource mobilization (MFS II); | xx<br><br>Internal knowledge sharing; staff using enhanced competencies when working with communities / in their projects |

| | Attribution of selected, key organisational capacity changes to key underlying factors<br><br>xxx= can to a large extent be attributed to this factor; xx= can partly be attributed to this factor; x = can to a minor extent be attributed to this factor; - = no link with MFS II funded capacity development intervention | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SPOs: | ASB | | ECPAT | | PT.PPMA | | YPI | | | YRBI | |
| External factors (including other funders) | | | | | | | | | | expiration of the ICCO contract - change of ICCO policy; the renewal of the MoU between ICCO and the Government of Indonesia | |

# 4. Efforts to Strengthen Civil Society

## 4.1. The Evaluation Sample

Contrary to the MDG and capacity development sample, the ToR did not specify the sample for the civil society evaluation. The selection of these was left for the country teams. As the ToR explicitly emphasised the focus on the relevant MDGs and themes in the selected country for the civil society evaluation, the team first identified the most relevant MDGs and themes in terms of the number of MFS II funded projects classified under the MDGs and themes that have a civil society and/or policy influencing component. The sampling procedure was the following:

1. Identify the 2 most relevant (frequent) MDGs and themes.
2. Randomly sample 7 SPOs per selected MDG/theme, from which the last 2 are reserves. Hence, the sample size is 10 SPOs in total.
3. If SPO is part of the capacity development sample, replace the SPO from the reserve list.

Only those SPOs were eligible for the civil society evaluation that had an on-going contract with a CFA on 1 January 2012 and were directly contracted by the CFA (due to this condition one of the selected SPOs was redrawn by the evaluation team). Based on information obtained from the Synthesis team, the three most frequent MDGs/topics the MFS II sector worked on were the good governance theme with 28 SPOs excluding overlapping projects, and sustainable living environment & biodiversity (MDG 7ab) with 26 SPOs, followed by gender (MDG 3) with also 26 SPOs. In total, 120 civil society organisations in Indonesia have a partnership relation with Dutch NGOs.

The evaluation team decided to focus on the theme good governance and MDG 7ab, as natural resources and biodiversity are especially relevant in the Indonesian context. The list of the sampled SPOs are presented in Table 11. Further information on the sampling of the SPOs for the Civil Society component can be found in section 0 and in Annex J[128].

[128] See the evaluation methodology for the civil society component as described in the annex of the baseline report.


**Table 11: Selected sample for the civil society evaluation**

| Organisation | Dutch Consortium | Theme | Selected for MDG |
|---|---|---|---|
| ELSAM Institute of Policy Research and Advocacy | People Unlimited 4.1 | Good governance | no |
| Yayasan RUANGRUPA | People Unlimited 4.1 | Good governance | no |
| Combine Resource Institution (CRI) | People Unlimited 4.1 | Good governance | no |
| Common Room | People Unlimited 4.1 | Good governance | no |
| Kantor Berita Radio (KBR68H) | Press Freedom 2.0 | Good governance | no |
| Farmer Initiatives for Ecological Livelihoods and Democracy (FIELD) | People Unlimited 4.1 | MDG 7ab | yes |
| Koperasi Wana Lestari Menoreh (KWLM) | People Unlimited 4.1 | MDG 7ab | no |
| Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengembangan Sumberdaya dan Lingkungan Hidup (LPPSLH) | People Unlimited 4.1 | MDG 7ab | no |
| Non-Timber Forest Products – Exchange Programme (NTFP-EP) | Ecosystem Alliance | MDG 7ab | yes |
| WARSI - Komunitas Konservasi Indonesia | Ecosystem Alliance | MDG 7ab | no |

Source: MFS II Joint Evaluations Synthesis team and SPO reports on Civil Society in Indonesia.

In the civil society sample, there are 2 SPOs that overlap with the MDG evaluation. However, there are no studies that are jointly included in the capacity development and civil society sample. This decision was made due to considerations towards the SPOs, as we did not want to overburden them with two evaluations each taking 2-3 days of their resources.

**Figure 18: Location of the SPOs selected for the civil society strengthening evaluation**




Notes: The map indicates the name of the SPO, name of the city (C) and province (P).

## 4.2. Methodology

This civil society evaluation uses the CIVICUS framework and seeks to answer the following questions:

1. What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?
2. To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. What is the relevance of these changes?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The CIVICUS framework that comprises five dimensions (civic engagement, level of organisation, practice of values, perception of impact and contexts influencing agency by civil society in general) has been used to orient the evaluation methodology and is presented in Annex I.

The overall evaluation methodology selected is a participatory, theory-based evaluation through a before and after comparison. This methodology is meant to acknowledge the complexity of change processes related to civil society arenas and processes to influence public and private sector organisations. It is theory-based and participatory in nature and it triangulated methods and information sources to come to robust and reliable findings. The first evaluation question identified *changes in civil society* in the 2012 – 2014 period, with a particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in Indonesia. A scoring tool with 17 indicators was developed during the baseline, resulting in the description and a score (0-3) in 2012. During a workshop with the SPO in 2014, workshop participants received the descriptions of each of the indicators from the baseline report and where asked to describe qualitative changes as well as to give an indication of the importance of the change on a scale of -2 -- +2. Apart from this document analysis and follow-up interviews with the SPO provided additional information.

For the *attribution question,* a theory based methodology was used for five of the ten NGOs and comprising a maximum of two outcomes achieved in the 2012 – 2014 period because of resource constraints. For this in-depth outcome, process tracing method was used. A quick contribution assessment was done for the remaining five NGOs. The selection of the five NGOs included in the in-depth-process tracing was based upon an estimation of the MFS II budget for that NGO that is related to CIVICUS dimensions, ensuring that both NGOs working on MDG 7 and on governance were amongst the selected and a variety of Dutch partners.

For those SPOs included for in-depth process tracing, priority was given towards assessing impact with regards to the creation and performance of new CSOs by the SPOs and with regards to policy influencing The steps to be followed were as follows:

- With the SPO identifying outcomes achieved in the 2012 -2014 period, providing evidence for these outcomes and develop pathways that according to the SPO explain the outcome;
- With external resource persons and written materials, confirm that the outcome was achieved, and develop pathways that according to these persons explain the outcome (with a particular focus on rival pathways);
- Construct a model of change that encompasses all pathways that possibly explain the outcome;

- Identify information needs to confirm or reject each of the pathways and collect relevant information be it through interviews, document search etc.;
- Analyse findings and conclude about the most likely pathway that explains the outcome, the nature of the relation between the pathway and the outcome and the role of the SPO and MFS II in this;

The *relevance question* was assessed through interviews with the Indonesian NGOs and their Dutch partners, as well as through context information and written documents. Relevance was assessed against the Theory of Change constructed with the SPO during the baseline assessment in 2012, the context in which the NGO is operating and the civil society policies of the Dutch MFS II alliance.

The *explaining factors* question assessed organisational factors of the SPO, its external context and the relation between the Dutch and the Indonesian SPO that explained the civil society changes achieved or not. No additional information was collected for this question.

A last additional assessment was made with regards to the *design* of the interventions by the Indonesian partner.

In 2013, a decision was made with the commissioner of the study to exclude an evaluation question related to efficiency because of the resources available.

More information on the methodology can be found in Annex J.

## 4.3. Overview of selected Southern Partner Organisations

### 4.3.1. Overview of sample

In 2012 a sample was taken of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs) that according to their Dutch partners worked on MDG 7 ab, natural resources and the general governance theme. Most SPOs in Indonesia work on those two themes.

In 2014 we have contacted all above mentioned SPOs and we were able to conduct an end line assessment for all, although one of the contracts had already ended in November 2012 (KWLM) and another in December 2012 (KBR 68H).

The following table presents the SPOs and their Dutch partner organisations in the sample.

**Table 12: Sample of SPOs and their Dutch partners in the civil society evaluation**

| SPO | Dutch Partner | Dutch Alliance | MDG/theme | Contract period | Contract amount MFS II |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **ELSAM Institute of Policy Research and Advocacy** | Hivos | People Unlimited 4.1 | Governance | January 2011 - December 2012, extension until March 2013 | € 120,000 |
| | | | | July 2012 –June 2013, no-cost, extension until January 2014 | € 17,450 |
| **Yayasan RUANGRUPA** | Hivos | People Unlimited 4.1 | Governance | December 2010 – December 2013 | € 105,000 |
| **Combine Resource Institution (CRI)** | Hivos | People Unlimited 4.1 | Governance | February 2012 - December 2013, extension until March 2014 | € 76,200 |
| **Common Room (CR)** | Hivos | People Unlimited 4.1 | Governance | May 2012 – December 2013 | € 35,000 |
| **KBR68H** | Free Press Unlimited | Press Freedom 2.0 | Governance | July 2011 - December 2012 | € 279,403 |
| **FIELD** | Hivos | People Unlimited 4.1 | MDG 7ab | February 2011 – February 2013 | € 112,000 |
| **KWLM** | Hivos | People Unlimited 4.1 | MDG 7ab | January 2010 – November 2012 | € 59,558 |
| **LPPSLH** | Hivos | People Unlimited 4.1 | MDG 7ab | April 2011 – March 2013 | € 54,833 |
| | | | | December 2013 – August 2015 | € 67,200 |
| **NTFP-EP** | IUCN | Ecosystem Alliance | MDG 7ab | September 2011 – March 2014, extended till June 2015 | € 135,217 |
| | | | | January 2013 – July 2015 | € 45,950 |
| **KKI-WARSI** | IUCN | Ecosystem Alliance | MDG 7ab | October 2011 – October 2014, extension until April 2015 | € 180,750 |
| | | | | January 2013 – June 2015 | € 42,876 |

### 4.3.2. Background of the SPOs

In this section we briefly present each of the SPOs in the sample for MDG 7ab and the Governance theme.

#### *SPOs in the sample for Governance*

Within the Governance sample we found two organisations working in the field of arts (Common Room and RUANGRUPA), two organisations working with radio networks and social media (CRI and KBR) and one organisation working in the field of Human Rights (ELSAM). This sample is very diverse in nature which might possibly be explained by the fact that all SPOs having a clear relation with one of the MDGs were left out of the population for Governance and leaving all other SPOs in a very diverse category.

*Common Room* (CR) was created in 2006 and it aims to develop a civil society through arts, culture and the use of technology (ICT/media). It wants civil society to be inclusive, and until its move to a less

central location in Bandung it became a place that facilitates dialogue to connect individuals, communities and various organisations with diverse economic, social and political interests. CR was the source for the emergence of a new sub-culture on the music scene that merged traditional Sundanese music with underground metal music. Cooperation with Hivos started in 2009 and ended in December 2013.

Similarly, Yayasan RUANGRUPA was set up by a group of artists in 2000, and has built its credibility as a progressive and a visual arts organisation that is producing critical views on Indonesian urban contemporary issues. The organisation promotes collaborative projects involving artists and other disciplines, such as social science, politics, technology, and media. Collaboration with Hivos started in 2003 and support to RUANGRUPA is continuing through the international Arts Collaboratory initiative. This initiative considers culture to be a potential driver of social innovation and change and views artistic processes as a means to facilitate relations that bring people together to develop new perspectives.

*Kantor Berita Radio 68H* (KBR) began in 1999 and became the first radio news agency acting outside the state after Indonesia's transition to democracy. KBR is part of a limited company and currently serves up to 900 radio stations throughout Indonesia of which 100 are community radio stations, as well as 9 countries in Asia. Free Press Unlimited and KBR implemented the Teen Voice Programme for one and a half year, informing youth and teenagers with news content made by young reporters and engaging them in discussions.

*Combine Resource Institution's* (CRI) vision is to provide communities access to knowledge and resources needed that help them to be better positioned in society and to have stronger accountability relationships with government and private sector. It started in the early 2000 with the creation of community forums, followed by the creation of community radios in 2003 and the incorporation of ICT. In 2008 Suara Komunitas, an interactive online platform was launched to connect hundreds of community radio in Indonesia and to promote citizen journalism and information exchange. Collaboration with Hivos started in 2005 – 2006. The 2012 "act upon information" project wants to make Suara Komunitas a strategic medium in supporting advocacy for the fulfilment of basic rights of citizens. CRI cooperates amongst others with the Indonesian Community Radio Network (JRKI) which it helped create.

*ELSAM* supports the development of a democratic political order since its creation in 1993. The organisation played a significant role in Indonesia's ratification of the International Convention Against Torture and the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1998), the promulgation of the Truth Reconciliation Commission Law which is still under review and the recently revised Law on Witness and Victim Protection (2014). It has a wide network of CSOs within the country that amongst others document human rights atrocities. Cooperation with Hivos, Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst (EED) and Miserior started in 2011 aimed at influencing policies, defending the rights of human rights victims and strengthening the organisational capacity of ELSAM itself. Apart from this large project, Hivos financed another small project on internet governance form a human rights perspective together with ICT Watch.

### *SPOs in the sample for MDG 7ab*

Within the MDG 7ab sample we found two partner organisations working with IUCN under the Ecosystem alliance (NTFP-EP and WARSI) and three partners of Hivos who are improving the livelihoods of small scale producers. We observe that NTFP-EP and WARSI are the two SPOs most relevant for MDG 7ab and that the HIVOS partners are more aligned with interventions for MDG1.

*NTFP-EP Indonesia* was created in 2012 as an independent organisation of a regional network in South and Southeast Asia. It aims to promote forest conservation through the empowerment of forest-based communities and the sustainable management of Non-Timber Forest Products. Its partner organisations work directly with forest communities to meet local demands, while the NTFP-EP platform provides technical support and shares experiences. NTFP-EP has worked with IUCN since 2004 and implements two projects; the first aiming at ensuring market access for NTFP products whilst sustainably exploiting natural resources; the second aiming at showcasing sustainable livelihood models at the national level to attract consumers of NTFP products, which is a collaborative initiative with all Ecosystem Alliance (EA) partners in Indonesia.

*KKI-WARSI* started in 1993 and currently works with twelve regional NGOs based on Sumatra. Its mission is to uphold conservation principles of indigenous communities and encourage the development of a model for conservation area management that leads to community prosperity. Collaboration with IUCN started in 2010. A first contract until October 2014 meant to build the capacities of forest managing groups and to support them in their efforts to secure forest management rights as a strategy to stop concessions being granted to private companies. A second contract brings all EA grantees together under the coordination of WARSI to lobby for smoother licence procedures for village forests managed by communities.

*LPPSLH*, established in 1987, has a vision is to become a professional organisation that contributes to social justice and democratisation. Collaboration with Hivos started in 2008 and continued until March 2013 to support small-scale coconut palm sugar producers with the creation of cooperatives and ensuring a premium market outlet for crystal sugar through LPPSLH's business unit.

*KWLM* is a cooperative of timber producers since 2009 that wants to create a sustainable natural environment that generates profits for community members in a fair manner. KWLM manages three business units which are certified timber (including FSC); herb and spices, vegetables and other agricultural products, and; seedlings. The focus in the 2012-2014 period was on creating further developing a 'sustainable community logging' model, which brings benefits to communities. Products are marketed through a company of which KWLM is a shareholder. Hivos supported the creation of KWLM in the 2010 – 2012 period based upon another successful cooperative model of another Hivos partner.

*FIELD* was established in 2001 and is a creation of former FAO experts in Integrated Pest Management (IPM) and Famer Field Schools (FFS). It aims to create farmer and rural community movements by means of participatory education, action research and network building. FIELD's main partner is the Indonesian IPM Farmers Association (IPPHTI). To address the dependence of farmers on private companies for agricultural inputs and advisory services, FIELD's contract with Hivos is meant to develop; an independently operating farmers' credit cooperation; a learning process for Farmers' Seed Certification;

a Community Seeds System, and; strengthening the farmer's cooperative unit. This is the last contract with Hivos with whom FIELD has collaborated since 2003: IPPHTI is expected to look after the program as of February 2013.

## 4.4. Changes in the civil society context

### 4.4.1. Civil society in a historical perspective

With Indonesia's transition from authoritarian leadership to a democracy in 1998, restrictions on citizen participation, press freedom and association were removed.

As of 2000 Indonesia started a decentralisation process which narrowed the gap between regional governments and citizens but this was accompanied by localised political power struggles, decentralisation of corruption and rent-seeking practices. The 2013 decentralisation law, meant to strengthen local governance at village level is seen by some as a new opportunity for local elites to misuse government funds if not properly monitored. According to the Indonesian Governance Index however, the performance of regional governments (legislative bodies), regional administrations, civil society organisations and private sector organisations in terms of participation, transparency, fairness, accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness has increased in the 2008 – 2012 period, with civil society improving its scores significantly and the administration only seeing a slight improvement.

### 4.4.2. Civil Society according to CIVICUS

As required in the Terms of Reference, the evaluation team looked at changes in Indonesia's context in line with the CIVICUS framework. Where possible, changes were identified between 2010 and 2014. More information regarding the civil society context of Indonesia can be found in Annex K.

With regards to the *socio-political context*, civil society has become an important actor since the transformation in 1998 and the number of civil society organisations comprising associations, NGOs, research institutions, cooperatives and small and medium increased between 2012 and 2013. Amongst these CSOs, also hard-line religious groups and leaders can be found who contest the values of diversity and freedom.

NGO and CSO networks came under scrutiny in 2013 when the Mass/Societal Organisations (Ormas) Law No 17 replaced a law of 1985, reinforcing the control of foundations and association. As a consequence the 2014 Freedom House Index rating for civil liberties in Indonesia declined from Free to Partly Free[129]. The 2013 CIVICUS report interpreted the new law as part of the state's reaction to a perceived threat that environmental, land rights and indigenous activists pose to political and economic interests due to the "shadowy connections that can exist between transnational corporations and politicians" in the agriculture, extractive and construction industries.

The Freedom House's Press Index illustrates that Indonesia's media remained partly free in the 2010-2014 period: the country's press system is vibrant and fast growing digital connectivity is being used as a new space for debate and participation in recent years. Current laws however still curtail openness,

[129] http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2014#.VE4BahbarZk

accessibility, inclusiveness and place limits on its use for expression, issues which are being addressed by a handful of NGOs, like ICT Watch and CRI.

With regards to the *socio-economic context*, Indonesia has recently become a lower-middle income country. Its Human Development Index remained stable in the 2010-2014 period but gender equality still remains a major issue. According to the Social and Economic Rights Fulfilment (SERF) Index, Indonesia's position worsened when compared to the situation in 2010 with regards to the right to food and to work; it improved with regards to the right to education and remained stable with regards to the right to health and shelter.

The Index of Economic Freedom which comprises 4 pillars, rule of law, limited government, regulatory efficiency, and open markets still categorises Indonesia as a "mostly unfree" country.

These macro-level figures illustrate the complexity of the socio-economic context. While the economy has grown, 65 million people remain highly vulnerable to shocks. Disparities in income and geographic areas remain, made more complex by the number of people 'floating' between the poor and middle class'.

With respect to the *socio-cultural context* that provides insights into the level of trust between ordinary people and the extent to which tolerance exists, Indonesia has slightly improved its position on the Global Peace Index. However inequality, socio-economic conditions and rights claims (especially land rights) are still a source of localized incidences of conflict in Indonesia: and the number of resource and identity-based incidences reported in the 2010-2014 period increased.

When assessing the extent to which individuals have the opportunity to reach their full potential Indonesia scores are weak for the freedom of religion and tolerance for immigrants (Social Progress Index).

Indonesian people trust the private sector more than NGOs, government and media according to the Edelman Trust Barometer Survey. Businesspeople are said to be more inclined to tell the truth than their government counterparts and three times more likely to fix problems.[130] Interestingly, the trust in NGOs has declined since 2011 but sharply increased again in 2014. This is attributed to NGOs now being able to 'walk the talk' in accountability and transparency, as well as the emergence of 'corporate NGOs'.[131]

## 4.5. Results

### 4.5.1. Changes in civil society with a particular focus on the selected MDGs or theme

The CIVICUS framework has five dimensions, civic engagement, level of organisation, practice of values, perception of impact and civil society context. During data collection we observed considerable overlap in indicators and also between dimensions. For a more meaningful overview of *changes* that occurred in


[130] Indonesians Trust Businesses More Than Govt, Survey Shows. By Harriet Conron & Nicole Jade Millane on Feb 05, 2014. http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/indonesians-trust-businesses-more-than-govt-survey-shows/& Further Rise in Trust in Indonesia, with Business as the Most Trusted Institution in the Country, Says the 2014 Edelman Trust Barometer, Edelman Indonesia, February 5, 2014 http://www.edelman.id/edelman-indonesia/further-rise-in-trust-in-indonesia-with-business-as-the-most-trusted-institution-in-the-country-says-the-2014-edelman-trust-barometer/

[131] Jakarta Globe (Indonesians Trust Businesses More Than Govt Survey Shows)

the 2012 – 2014 period we here conclude about changes and perceived impacts that occurred in the civil society arena, those at household, the public sector and the private sector level (see Figure 19). These relate in the following way to the CIVICUS dimensions:

- Within the civil society arena all findings regarding civic engagement, level of organisation, practice of values and a number of indicators from the perception of impact dimension are regrouped together.
- Perceived impacts at household level are derived from information mostly found in the civic engagement dimension and that of perception of impact.
- The perceived impacts for the public and the private sector are part of the perception of impact dimension.

**Figure 19: Changes in civil society**




In line with the evaluation question, we draw conclusions for those SPOs in MDG 7ab and those in the governance theme. However we have not found any information suggesting that SPOs and their interventions have mutually reinforced each other to create one civil society arena. Each SPO had and still has its own arena, with possible impacts upon households, public sector and private sector.

### *Changes in civil society – Governance theme*

**Figure 20: Perception of impact upon civil society, households, public and private sector.**

| SPO | Civil Society | Households | Public Sector | Private Sector |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **ELSAM** | 2+1 | 3+0 | 2+1 | 2+1 |
| **RUANGRUPA** | 3+1 | 3+1 | NA+NA | NA+1 |
| **CRI** | 1+1 | 2+1 | 1+0 | 0+0 |
| **CR** | 2+1 | 2+0 | 2+0 | NA+NA |
| **KBR** | 2+1 | 2+0 | 2+0 | 2+0 |

Source: Individual evaluation reports.
Notes: Presentation of the absolute scores in 2012 (0-3) + relative change observed in 2014 (-2;+2)

As already mentioned CR and RUANGRUPA work in the field of arts, CRI and KBR are working with radio stations and social media and ELSAM is working on Human Rights.

**Perceived impact in the civil society arena**

*Common Room's* most significant contribution to civil society consists of its support to a musician group that is at the origins of a new contemporary culture, merging a traditional music instrument in the Sundanese customary community, the karinding, with underground metal music. Most significant impacts of this new sub-culture are a revival of the Sundanese culture; an improvement of the position of underground metal groups often labelled as antisocial and westernised and; the use of spells and mantras and burning incenses, often considered as a violation of Islamic rule, becoming an integral part of karinding group performances. Common Room has promoted this instrument since 2008.

Through the RURU Gallery, Jakarta 32$^{o}$C and the OK.Video festival, *RUANGRUPA* provides platforms for artists and introduces the public to new forms of artistic expression. Since 2012 these festivals have become large enough to become separate divisions under RUANGRUPA; they are partly run by volunteers and increasingly host international artists and receive international recognition. RUANGRUPA's online presence improved since 2012 and it developed new visual and video art forms which increasingly help the organisation to position itself and to earn an income.

The organisation itself became an associate partner for the international Arts Collaboratory initiative, an initiative by Hivos and Stichting Doen to support independent visual arts organisations in Africa, Asia and Latin America and social innovation. In consequence RUANGRUPA expanded both its domestic and international network of artists.

*KBR68H* started with a network of independent radios in the early 2000 and currently reaches out to 900 radio stations across Indonesia and radio stations abroad. KBR also uses television and internet platforms that have become popular mediums in the past four years. Its Teen Voice programme was made by teenage reporters and sought to inspire children and teenagers through compelling news content. Originally a radio show, Teen Voice expanded to television and internet in 2012 and at its height, 53 radio stations relayed televised versions of Teen Voice, reaching some 400,000 viewers and around 770,000 listeners.

After the end of the project, KBR discontinued Teen Voice on radio and television in January 2014, but continued with the online platform but the number of visitors declined. Although KBR aimed to mainstream the Teen Voice programme through the radio of its parent company and its online news portal, this did not materialise in 2013 and 2014, but is currently being addressed. The organisation however remains a reliable and active member of the international Kids News Network of Free Press Unlimited.

The online platform (Suara Kommunitas) of *CRI* that promotes citizen journalism to bring grassroots information into the public space is seen by a number of contributors as a unique feature with content making a difference for local communities. 37 percent of the contributors represent community radios and many other bloggers have joint the platform. Since 2012 the number of contributors increased with 25 percent, contributions increased with 56 percent and web visitors with 7 percent. Despite these positive figures, the platform did not meet CRI's and Hivos' expectations to escalate grassroots issues for further lobby and advocacy towards government officials or the private sector.

Concerns were raised with regards to time spend by community radios to write for the online platform rather than improving their radio services to communities.

CRI intensified its collaboration with the Indonesian Community Radio Network (JRKI) not only to increase the members of its online platform, but also to lobby for the revision of the Broadcasting Law.

*ELSAM's* position in civil society is that of a resource centre that documents human rights atrocities and mobilises voices to influence policies based upon evidence. One of its significant contributions in the past two years has been the development on an online data base where local CSOs and other actors can upload human rights cases they documented. The data base currently contains 14,000 cases that have become publically available.

The organisation is a member of many networks at national level that influence Indonesia's policies and regulations with regards to human rights issues in many sectors, from the forest sector to justice. Together with a number of networks, the SPO intensified its lobby in early 2014 to ensure that a new law regarding Witness and Victim Protection was promulgated in October 2014, just before the new parliament was sworn in. Apart from these ELSAM is a member of the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM).

**Perceived impact at household level**

Perceived impact at household level for Common Room and RUANGRUPA is to be translated into people being exposed to alternative arts expressions during events organised by both organisations. Generally speaking figures have gone up. Apart from this, mostly young upcoming artists possibly generate an income during these events or expose their products. The popularity of the karinding instrument starts to create a market for those rural people who know how to make it.

For CRI and KBR, impact at household level is to be translated in terms of number of online visitors, viewers and listeners. KBR's Teen Voice programme reached 400,000 viewers and around 770,000 young listeners: a survey concluded that children and teenagers learned from the television programs and 88 percent from the radio programs. The programme contributed to confidence building and was unlike other mass media that sometimes exploited them. CRI's online platform's visitors increased with 7 percent since the baseline.

ELSAM, together with other human rights organisations and networks successfully influenced the regulatory framework for the Witness and Victims Protection Agency and that of the National Human Rights Commission for granting statements for victims and their families: Eligibility criteria for reparation and indemnification of human rights victims were enlarged, leading to an increase of human rights victims being serviced from 750 in the last quarter of 2013 to 1,000 persons in the first semester of 2014. ELSAM decided to decrease its direct involvement with human rights victims, implying fewer interventions to directly defend their interests.

**Perceived impact with the public sector**

Apart from receiving occasionally financial support for specific arts activities RUANGRUPA and Common Room are collaborating with public sector officials but not in a very meaningful way. . Common Room provided policy inputs for the Provincial Development Planning Agency and the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy without clear results. RUANGRUPA does not seek engagement with the public sector

but is involved in the Indonesian Arts Coalition that seeks greater government support for artist-run initiatives.

Whereas CRI does not engage with local governments with regards to the community radio network and the online platform, it has a huge market to put in place digital village information systems, meant to improve local governments' service delivery towards their citizens. Together with the Indonesian Community Radio Network, CRI lobbies for a revision of the Broadcasting Law, which has until so far not been a priority for the central government.

For KBR 68H the government is a source and a recipient of information and occasionally a client to disseminate messages. KBR does not engage in policy influencing.

ELSAM positions itself as a 'moderate' human rights defender and in this position occasionally is the chair of multi stakeholder agencies like the Witness and Victims Protection Agency, the National Human Rights Commission. ELSAM is well aligned with the Office of the President, where it tries to advance the decision to put in place a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It participated in a fact finding mission with the Ministry for People's Welfare in response to violent land disputes between communities and plantation companies in Lampung.

As a member of several coalitions, ELSAM successfully lobbied for a revision of the law on Witness and Victim Protection in October 2014, just before the new government was sworn in. As already mentioned the eligibility criteria for indemnification of human rights victims were enlarged as a result of ELSAM and the coalitions it works with. Its position in these coalitions is that of conducting research and drafting position papers that incorporate the concerns of human rights victims.

**Perceived impact with the private sector**

In the arts sector Common Room only engage with a few small local businesses as service delivers for the organisation of events. CRI has similar nearly absent relations with private sector organisations.

For KBR and RUANGRUPA private companies are potential revenue sources: international companies support KBR with their Corporate Social Responsibility funding and buy airtime. RUANGRUPA itself created two business entities to support the promotion of alternative artists and artworks, as well as to stimulate the involvement of artists in shaping public spaces. They are amongst others working with advertising companies who use their contemporary visual arts experiences.

ELSAM has developed a two-pronged approach with regards to agribusiness companies and extractive industries. In the first place the organisation investigates land and natural resource conflicts between these companies and poor and/or land-less farmers. Findings are being submitted to the National Commission on Human Rights, the national police, and the Witnesses and Victims Protection Agency which successfully sparked responses from each of the agencies that sought to protect and provide reparations for those affected. Besides this more confrontational approach, ELSAM has produced a manual for companies on "how to do business without violating human rights".

### *Changes in civil society – MDG 7ab*

**Figure 21: Perception of impact upon civil society, households, public and private sector.**

| SPO | Civil Society | Households | Public Sector | Private Sector |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **FIELD** | 2+1 | 2+1 | 1+1 | 1+0 |
| **KWLM** | 1+1 | 1+1 | 1+0 | 2+0 |
| **LPPSLH** | 2+1 | 2+1 | 1+2 | 1+0 |
| **NTFP-EP** | 2+1 | 2+1 | 1+0 | NA+NA |
| **WARSI** | 2+0 | 2+0 | 2+2 | 2+0 |

Source: Individual evaluation reports.
Notes: Presentation of the absolute scores in 2012 (0-3) + relative change observed in 2014 (-2-;+2)

As already mentioned FIELD, KWLM and LPPSLH are cooperatives or support these to support small scale farmers and timber loggers. NTFP-EP and WARSI defend the interests and rights of forest people and indigenous people by means of community based forest management and income generating activities.

**Perceived impact in the civil society arena**

*FIELD's* most important success since 2012 has been the amendment of the 1992 Crop Production and Protection Act. However the process for the legalisation by local governments of locally developed seed varieties produced by farmers and the cooperatives is very slow although those governments have helped fund multi-location trials for seed breeding.

Since the baseline study *KWLM* cooperative became more mature: staff now knows what they are talking about and members are better informed about KWLM's systems and procedures. The cooperative has expanded its interventions to another sub-district. Because the organisation does not need technical support anymore from other NGOs on how to run a cooperative, its civil society network declined. It kept however a strong relation with a credit union to serve its members. Its cooperative model has been replicated in Lampung Province.

*LPPSLH* has helped the creation of two additional cooperatives and is now operational in three districts, with another district asking for the creation of a fourth cooperative. The cooperatives are functioning according to their bylaws; in at least one cooperative the internal accountability systems was used to replace the management committee. Cooperatives still rely upon LPPSLH for the costs of certification, quality control and for access to international premium markets of crystal sugar. Members have broadened their network, are actively engaging in the cooperatives live and have gained confidence in engaging with local government officials. Both farmers and middlemen have become members and whereas farmers now access a new premium market, middlemen benefit of an improved management of their cash flows. In this respect the cooperatives have been successful in managing the complex relations between middle-men and farmers.

LPPSLH itself expanded its network with other NGOs that also work on small holder agriculture, becoming the chair of a regional coalition that promotes organic farming and works closely with a Food Sovereignty coalition.

With support of IUCN-NL, WARSI supported 19 villages to set-up their community based forest management (CBFM) groups of which nine were officially endorsed by the Ministry of Forestry and the local government for their rights to manage forest areas for the next 35 years since 2012. The endorsed groups have two years to acquire a village forest permit. All these procedures require the assistance of third-parties to navigate the procedures with local authorities. CBFM groups have started to share experiences with each other, increasingly engaging with local governments and are about to form an umbrella organisation. Other NGOs have started the replication of the creation of these groups and ask WARSI's assistance in at least 8 other districts. However some of the CBFM groups are considering returning their permit because they cannot overcome the financial burden of forest management, and concerns exist that some groups only represent the interests of village elites.

*NTFP-EP* and its partners work in 75 villages in Kalimantan, seven more than in 2012. In these villages 37 groups (seven more than in 2012) receive support to process and market NTFP products. These groups are being linked to the Craft Kalimantan network created by NTFP-EP in 2011 to sell their products to the network's business unit Borneo Chic. For rattan products the Indonesian Sustainable Rattan Initiative was launched in March 2012 with the role to ensure market access for rattan products certified under a Participatory Guarantee System developed by NTFP-EP which became operational in 2014.

Both in Malinau and Sintang, NTFP-EP attempts to secure tenure rights and eco-cultural livelihoods of communities by involving them in participatory resource mapping. Communities increasingly face palm oil companies and extractive industries obtaining concession rights. The participatory maps are meant to be endorsed by the districts and integrated in its own spatial plans for both forests and agricultural land. Until sofar this has not yet been successful.

NTFP-EP continues to have the same type of relations with actors in the civil society arena in three distinct typologies, namely relations with: community-based organisations and networks, local NGOs and national NGOs. Whereas the CBOs and local NGOs are the main implementers of the programme at district and village level, NTFP-EP collaborates with national organisations for lobby purposes.

**Perceived impact at household level.**

Based upon visits to two of FIELD's six cooperatives, membership has probably doubled since 2012 (from 160 farmers to 360 farmers) and female membership is reaching 45 % in 2014. Most members are landless farmers of have only small plots. The FFS and cooperatives helped them to become less dependent upon middlemen for seeds and inputs, because they learned how to breed their own seeds and engaged in organic farming. Farmers have regained pride in what they do, but they face difficulties in accessing markets and therefore are still dependent on middlemen. With the amended Crop Production and Protection Act in 2012, farmers' dependency on seed companies like Monsanto has been decreasing, as they no longer had to buy and use mass produced, hybrid seedlings and fertilizers. Farmers have gained more control over their production resource, which contributed to 'farming democratization'.

KWLM cooperative has a waiting list of some 1000 persons and its actual membership increased from 900 in 2012 to 1200 persons in 2014. A major constraint for increased membership is that KWLM has not been able to manage its cash flow, because it prefinances its members when it buys their certified timber for premium markets. KWLM has not been successful in supporting its female members to

identify a market for herbs and spices and does not accept landless people. Due to the premium market, members have improved their bargaining position vis-à-vis middlemen and apply a more systemised form of logging.

LPPSLH started with one cooperative with 46 members and now has three cooperatives with 1750 members, of which 33 percent are women and 75 percent are landless people. Also middlemen have become members. Coconut palm sugar producers have access to a premium market for crystal sugar and therefore become less dependent upon middlemen. Crystal sugar production is a more labour requiring activity that requires the participation of both men and women at household level. It is not known how increased incomes are shared at household level. Advantages for smaller middlemen to join the cooperative consist of a better cash flow management with fewer farmers being indebted with them, when they accept the cooperative arrangements in place.

Although WARSI's approach to secure the management of village forests by CBFM groups as a means to improve forest people's livelihoods is promising, evidence of improvements or alternative livelihood opportunities emerging is lacking. Increased incomes and livelihood assets are insignificant compared to Indonesia's poverty line and monthly inflation rates; access of households to electricity has not yet materialised.

According to *NTFP-EP's* information, 1,440 members (186 members more than in 2012) of the groups that process and market NTFPs now earn each € 137 per year against € 53 per member in 2012 . The 17 female members of a rattan weaver association earned € 182, € 276 and € 290 per person in respectively 2012, 2013 and 2014 . However processing rattan bags is not the first income source of these women, other more important income generating activities at household level consist of off-farm employment and incomes in the rubber sector.

**Perceived impact with the public sector**

*FIELD's* most important success since 2012 has been the amendment of the 1992 Crop Production and Protection Act. However the process for the legalisation by local governments of locally developed seed varieties produced by farmers and the cooperatives is very slow although those governments have helped fund multi-location trials for seed breeding.

Upon request of the local government, *KWLM* has provided training on the process of certifying wood products which has become mandatory for forest companies and other concessionaries. The Forestry Department is also replicating KWLM's GPS-based inventory system to locate, track and record trees and timber. KWLM has helped streamline district certification processes which shortened the bureaucratic processes to legalise the origin of timber.

The successes of *LPPSLH's* three cooperatives improved collaboration with the districts where they are based and other districts gained interest to replicate LPPSLH's cooperative model and consider the organisation an expert in the creation of cooperatives and in consequence ask for its assistance.

The three districts increasingly engage with the cooperatives and provide some financial assistance; however increased reliance upon the local governments may also backfire upon the transparency of financial transactions. Crystal sugar production has raised the awareness of government officials that this product is a potential export market for Indonesia, leading to changes in the land use plans for small-scale district industries in favour of palm sugar in two districts. The three districts also started to

campaign with the private sector for a reduction of chemical fertilizers on other crops as a means to ensure the organic production of crystal sugar.

One of *WARSI's* CBFM groups has been successful in preventing a company to obtain concession rights and three villages rejected plans of their local governments to designate forested areas into and industrial forest plantation area. In Jambi province two districts and the province created CBFM task forces that function as a one-stop-shop service for the expansion of CBFM schemes and developed a five-year road map for CBFM, targeting 500,000 hectares to be managed by communities. In West Sumatra, the provincial government has integrated CBFM schemes in their forestry policy, possibly offering more opportunities for community groups to regain control of forest resources. WARSI's two pronged approach of supporting groups to become CBFM groups making use of existing policies and influencing these policies seems successful. Together with the other partners of the Ecosystem Alliance WARSI managed to simplify the procedures to obtain a village forest licence in 2014.

*NTFP-EP*, through the partner organisations it works with has been trying to influence district policies to include participatory mapping results in the spatial plans. However none of these maps have been actually endorsed by local governments. On one occasion, a participatory map was used by the local government to refuse a request for a concession by a palm oil company and on another occasion it helped to protect a natural dye-producing plant that is used in the production of woven materials and crafts. In many cases though, local governments are in favour of the arrival of palm oil companies or extractive industries.

In collaboration with other NGOs, NTFP-EP succeeded in obtaining positive results of the Malinau district government with regards to the review of a 2012 law on indigenous rights on forests.

At the national level, NTFP-EP still engages with other NGOs for strategic lobby work, leading to advancements in the registration of indigenous lands.

**Perceived impact with the private sector**

*KWLM* regularly supplies timber to six buyers who are in the export business but demands are higher than the organisation can fulfil. Yet KWLM is not yet in the position to negotiate more favourable terms of payments and often has to deal with delayed payments.

*LPPSLH's* own business unit increased its exports from 20 tons/month in 2012 to 90 tons/month in 2014 indicating there is a demand. However LPPSLH's collaboration with private sector organisations decreased since the baseline, although the replication of the creation of cooperatives in other districts is likely to be financed with the corporate social responsibility funds of (para-statal) companies.

*FIELD* does not engage with private sector actors and cooperative members observe there access to markets for organic produce needs to be improved.

*NTFP-EP* does not collaborate with private sector companies and with its programmes tries to prevent companies to take concessions that deprive local people from their natural resources and land through lobby activities targeting districts. Only for the manufacturing of NTFP products it works with its own business unit and other small enterprises.

Also *WARSI's* intention is to stop agribusiness and mining companies to obtain concessions that deprive forest dependent people from their land and natural resources. However the area currently managed by

CBFM groups (54,978 hectares for 25 villages) along one of the watersheds in Jambi province is just a tiny fraction compared to the 853,430 hectares of forest land authorized to 18 corporations. In West Sumatra possibilities for companies to obtain concession rights improved since 2011; WARSI has until so far successfully protected 9 villages from private sector organisations.

### 4.5.2. To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the Southern partners?

#### *Introduction*

This section presents findings with regards to the attribution question. Starting with an outcome achieved, the evaluation team developed a model of change that identifies rival pathways that possibly explain the outcome. Data collection was done to obtain evidence that confirms or rejects each of these pathways. Based upon this assessment, the evaluation team concluded about the most plausible explanations of the outcome after which the role of the SPO and MFS II were being discussed.

The relations between the pathways and the outcomes can differ in nature as is being explained in the following table.

**Table 13: Nature of the relation between parts in the Model of Change**

| Nature of the relation between parts and other parts or outcome |
|---|
| The part is the only causal explanation for the outcome. No other interventions or factors explain it. (necessary and sufficient) |
| The part does not explain the outcome at all: other subcomponents explain the outcomes. |
| The part explains the outcome but other parts explain the outcome as well: there are multiple pathways (sufficient but not necessary) |
| The part is a condition for the outcome but won't make it happen without other factors (necessary but not sufficient) |
| The part is a contributory cause it is part of a 'package' of causal actors and factors that together are sufficient to produce the intended effect. |
| Sources: Mayne, 2012; Stern et al, 2012 |

Not all SPOs underwent the same assessment. During the June 2013 NWO-WOTRO workshop strategies were discussed to fit the amount of evaluation work to be done with the available resources. It was decided to conduct a full in-depth process tracing process for only five SPOs in India, and for a maximum of two outcomes. Those SPOs are ELSAM and CRI for the governance theme and WARSI, NTFP-EP, LPPSLH for MDG 7ab. For the other SPOs a quick assessment was conducted.

#### *Explaining outcomes achieved - governance theme*

In total seven outcomes were explained, of which four with the help of in-depth process tracing.

**RUANGRUPA**

1. We assessed the emergence and demand for contemporary visual and video art in Jakarta. For this we identified two rival pathways, one that consists of RUANGRUPA's intervention and another that comprises other actors intervening independently which was rejected. The outcome is explained by RUANGRUPA who has promoted these arts since 2000. RUANGRUPA's networking capability, the establishment of a separate business unit (RURU Corps) since 2012, and in improved use of online media explain this outcome. Most organisations operating in the same sector in Jakarta do this in collaboration with RUANGRUPA or are not working in Jakarta. Another factor consists of the arts expressions of RUANGRUPA being trendy in Jakarta.

**Common Room**

2. We assessed the Karinding community having become more organised and capable of championing the revival of an interest in a traditional Sundanese instrument and supporting the underground metal scene. Three rival pathways were identified, the first explaining the outcome by the Karinding Attack band alone, the second being the emergence of a contempory subculture, and the third being Common Room as the initiator. The most likely explanation of this outcome is a combination of the three pathways. Common Room's innovation to combine both music genres and the popularity of the personnel of the Karinding Attack band that was the first to explore the possibilities, followed by the emergence of a trend or hype. Common Room facilitated the musical experimentation, assisted artists in music composition, and provided space for trainings and performances.

**Combine Resource Institute**

3. We assessed the increased participation of community radios and others to the online platform that provides information of grassroots interest. We identified three rival pathways, the first consisting of the online platform created by CRI, the second consisting of community radios and others having the capacity to engage in the platform, the third explaining the outcome because increasingly Indonesian people are using social media. The first and the second pathway are a condition for the outcome (necessary but not sufficient), and the second pathway provides a sufficient but not necessary explanation. The community radios receive capacity building support from several actors, one being CRI.
4. We assessed an outcome claimed by CRI that the Ministry of Health validated national health insurance beneficiary data that grant these beneficiaries access to the health insurance scheme. Three pathways were identified, the first explaining the outcome because CRI's online platform and other media created public pressure upon the MoH (rejected), the second being lobby and advocacy efforts (confirmed), and the third being the MoH acting upon its own initiative (rejected). The outcome is to be explained by a combination of different CSOs, public sector actors and parliamentarians. CRI's role was found not to be significant in the achievement of this outcome, because it did not seem to be successful in generating substantial public pressure through the online platform to obtain a response from the Ministry of Health, and its participation in the lobby efforts of one of the CSO coalitions was not confirmed.

**Kantor Berita Radio**

5. The outcome to be explained is the engagement of teenagers and children in the Teen Voice Program. We identified two rival pathways, the first consisting of KBR using social media including an online platform, and the second consisting of KBR using mainstream media like radio and television. A combination of both was necessary to achieve the outcome from July 2011 to 2014.

**ELSAM**

6. The first outcome achieved that we looked at is the revised Law on Witnesses and Victim Protection approved in October 2014. This new law will step up the Witnesses and Victims Protection Agency's (LPSK) efforts to support victims of past human rights abuses. Three rival pathways were identified; ELSAM providing regulatory reviews and a draft of the law to an NGO-CSO coalition (confirmed); human right victims taking the initiative to relate to the same coalition without the support of ELSAM (rejected), and; the Government led Human Rights commission lobbying parliament (rejected). The most important factor that explains the outcome is the collaboration of an NGO-CSO coalition to which ELSAM belongs. Most of the advocacy activities were conducted through this coalition and ELSAM's role was the provision of regulatory reviews and the drafting of the bill.
7. The second outcome that we looked at is ELSAM's network capacity to generate evidence of human rights atrocities as an input for evidence based advocacy. Two pathways were identified, the first being ELSAM supporting CSOs in monitoring and documenting human rights violations (necessary but not sufficient) and the second consisting of other NGOs supporting smaller organisations in doing so (sufficient but not necessary). ELSAM's network became more systematic in the manner in which cased of human rights violations are documented and followed up by lobby and advocacy. ELSAM's role was to provide a digital platform for data uploading and managing a national database system.

### *Explaining outcomes achieved - partners working on MDG 7ab*

With regards to MDG 7ab, nine outcomes achieved were explained, of which six were assessed with in-depth process tracing.

**FIELD**

1. The first outcome assessed was the improved performance of the cooperatives. Two rival pathways were identified, the first consisting of the creation of the cooperatives by FIELD and the second consisting of FIELD's interventions to start Farmer Field Schools. Both pathways are sufficient but not necessary. FIELD contributed to their organisational and financial capacity not only through training and technical assistance on cooperative governance and networking but also through its farmer field school approach that helped to increase farmers' productive capacities and interactive learning. There is insufficient evidence that the cooperatives have increased business opportunities for their members.

2. Since 2012 farmers are free to ensure their access to seeds and other inputs when the 1992 Crop Production and Protection Act was reviewed in their favour. Two pathways were identified. The pathway that most likely explains this outcome is that FIELD, together with a NGO/CSO coalition, developed policy inputs and mobilized farmers' in West Java to provide evidence and testimonies that have resulted in a ruling in their favour. The rival pathway consists of another farmer's sovereignty platform in East Java that rallied already in 2010 to demand the revision. It is likely that local actions were taken by separate members of the coalition and that these joined the national level coalition.

**KWLM**

3. The outcome to be explained is an increase in the number of smallholders being organised to produce certified legal timber and being interested in sustainable community logging. Three pathways were identified; KWLM providing the incentives for small holders (sufficient but not necessary); community members take up sustainable logging out of an environmental concern (necessary but not sufficient); the government supports community forest management (necessary but not sufficient). The outcome is to be explained by KWLM's cooperative model and its organisational performance. There is a waiting list for new members which shows the interest people have in joining the cooperative. Also an enabling environment has been created by the local government and the economic incentives provided by KWLM in terms of decreasing dependence upon middlemen and providing access to a premium market. This combination then helped introduce sustainable forestry practices.

**LPPSLH**

4. For the outcome "small-scale palm sugar producers into three cooperatives that are operational and profitable" the following rival pathways were identified; connecting farmers with premium markets; LPPSLH's approach to organise producers; the government's approach to organise producers and; other actors supporting the cooperatives. The outcome is to be explained by the causal package of the two first pathways. The role of local governments in organising palm sugar producers has been rejected as an alternative explanation, together with the role played by other actors and factors.
5. A second outcome achieved is that those farmers that produce crystal sugar have improved their bargaining position vis-à-vis their middlemen with whom they do business for cast sugar. The outcome is important as it shows that LPPSLH's intervention have had an impact on social mobility, which is a precondition for a healthy civil society. Three rival pathways were identified; LPPSLH's role in the establishment of a new palm sugar value chain including access to premium markets has rivalled the domination of traditional value chains. One former LPPSLH staff has also been successful in creating these alternative value chains with possibly better bargaining position of producers vis-à vis middlemen. The traditional value chain as an explanatory cause was rejected as well as other actors helping to change the relations between middlemen and farmers.

**WARSI**

6. The first outcome that we looked at is "community-based forest management (CBFM) groups in 9 villages have received full endorsement". The most likely explanation consists of the political will of the government being improved along with WARSI's efforts to intensively accompany the communities through the bureaucracy. These two pathways form a causal package. A third pathway of other actors and factors explaining the outcome was rejected.
7. The fact that CBFM is being mainstreamed into West Sumatra Province's forestry policy is to be explained by different actors: The provincial government's willingness to mainstream CBFM into its policies is evidenced in several policies, the formulation of which was co-authored by WAHLI and WARSI, academics and others. WARSI and WALHI hold a strategic position vis-à-vis the local government, which has allowed them to contribute to these new policies. A last factor is that WARSI's reputation was probably influenced by their existing CBFM model and the application of it in two of West Sumatra's districts. These three rival pathways (the government's willingness, WARSI's advocacy efforts and other actors involved in the policy formulation form a causal package.

**NTFP-EP**

8. Seventeen women saw their incomes for the production and marketing of rattan bags increase to € 15, € 23 and € 24 per month per person in respectively 2012, 2013 and 2014. In the same period the share of incomes from rattan products in the total household income increased from 8 percent in 2012 to 12 percent in 2014. Two pathways, a Participatory Guarantee System (PGS) and Cordaid's and Both Ends support the creation of a business unit were identified and tested and both provide a sufficient but not necessary explanation. The most plausible explanation of this increased income consists of several actors buying these bags, in the first place actors not associated with NTFP-EP, followed by Borneo Chic, a business unit created with support from Cordaid and Both Ends until 2011. The Participatory Guarantee System which was for the first time used mid-2014 may have provided some additional value, but not significantly. The system was developed with support from IUCN-NL. Each actor provides a sufficient explanation for the outcome but is not necessary.
9. The ability of forest dependent communities to claim their rights to manage forest resources and land in four villages was reached partially because those maps have not yet been endorsed by the districts, although they helped to secure a natural-dye plant and prevent a palm oil company to obtain a concession right. Of the three pathways identified, the outcome is to be explained by two necessary but not sufficient causes; community groups formed by others and resource mapping by NTFP-EP. The third pathway, lobby work by NTFP-EP based upon the maps, was neither a sufficient nor a necessary cause for the endorsement of the maps.

### 4.5.3. What is the relevance of these changes?

The evaluation team assessed the relevance of changes achieved in the light of a Theory of Change (ToC) constructed during a workshop with each SPO in 2012; in the light of the context in which the SPO is operating and; in the light of the MFS II programme that support the organisation.

### *Relevance of the changes in relation to the Theory of Change of 2012*

The following table shows the extent to which changes in civil society are relevant in relation to the Theory of Change that was constructed in 2012.

**Figure 22: Relevance of outcomes achieved in relation to the ToC constructed in 2012**

| SPO | Relevance in relation to 2012 ToC |
|---|---|
| **ELSAM** | Relevant: Outcomes serve both victims of human rights atrocities and address policy issues. A new relevant issue addressed is internet governance from a human rights perspective. |
| **Yayasan RUANGRUPA** | Relevant: Changes positively affected the existence of public space, networking, and the capacity of society. |
| **Combine Resource Institution (CRI)** | Partially relevant: Online platform was meant to help citizen journalists to escalate grassroots issues to be addressed by governments but this part of the 'act upon information' did not materialise. |
| **Common Room (CR)** | Partially relevant: A healthy society characterized with strong cultural identity and freedom of expression was enhanced, but CR's ability to network, to offer public space for artist expression has declined, and their intention to make the use of media and technology a defining feature of Common Room's work did not happen. |
| **KBR68H** | Relevant: KBR produced quality content with and for children who are an underserved age group, and engaged its network to disseminate content through television and radio up until 2013. |
| **FIELD** | Relevant: FIELD contributed both to creating an enabling policy environment for farmers and organises them to obtain access to, and control over resources. |
| **KWLM** | Relevant: KWLM supports the prosperity and autonomy of forest-dependent communities, by delivery of services, obtains support from the public sector, raises community awareness on sustainable timber and ensures access to premium markets |
| **LPPSLH** | Relevant: LPPSLH developed a sustainable and inclusive business model for palm sugar sector<br>But: LPPSLH did not contribute to capacitate farmers to demand their rights and enhance their participation in the political economy. |
| **KKI-WARSI** | Relevant: Outcomes lead to conserved forest and welfare for communities. Some of WARSI's ToC preconditions such as campaign on community-based forest management, increased value of NTFPs and ecosystem-based economy, and major assumption such as political will from the Ministry of Forestry and political momentum are well reflected from the outcome's contribution analysis. |
| **NTFP-EP** | Partially Relevant: NTFP-EP worked on the integration of NTFPs in value chains and tenure rights.<br>But: It will take a long time before NTFPs will become a viable part of sustainable livelihoods, in particular when they are not the most important income generating activity. NTFP-EP underestimated the importance of lobby and advocacy work to be done at district level to integrate participatory maps into district spatial maps. |

### *Relevance of the changes in relation to the context in which the SPO is operating*

Generally speaking the outcomes achieved by the SPOs are relevant in relation to the context they are working:

- ELSAM's efforts to address human rights violations are still needed and ELSAM also addresses these in new areas such as internet governance.
- RUANGRUPA and Common Room help to provide opportunities for non-market – driven artists and help to create alternative spaces where alternative visions and ideas can flourish.
- KBR provided a platform for teenagers and CRI for citizen journalists to voice their concerns, both groups being underserved by mainstream media.
- FIELD, KWLM and LPPSLH organise small scale farmers and timber producers to integrate new value chains that decrease their dependence upon middlemen, help them to gain confidence

and earn an income. Except for KWLM, these organisations also address policies and practices as a means to create an enabling environment

- WARSI and NTFP-EP outcomes are relevant but yet insufficient to ensure the livelihoods of forest dependent people and to prevent the depletion of scarce forest resources by agribusiness and extractive industries. WARSI's model is more relevant with regards to providing a means for forest communities to claim management rights over village forest areas.

### *Relevance of the changes in relation to the policies of the MFS II alliance and the CFA*

*ELSAM* contributes to Hivos' Rights and Citizenship Programme, which aims to the recognition of human rights and women's rights, good governance and a pluralistic society. ELSAM's outcomes are relevant to Hivos' strategies because the SPO has adopted an alternative, more moderate lobby approach as opposed to more common 'radical' strategies often taken on by human rights activists in Indonesia. Its recent focus on human rights with respect to internet governance also aligns with this policy.

Hivos' support to *RUANGRUPA* and Common Room are part of its Expression and Engagement programme aiming to generate social debate and cultural dialogue. Hivos considers space for socially engaged art and culture to be limited in developing countries and sees this as a means to generate critical reflection, pluralism and diversity. Hivos continued support to RUANGRUPA because created spaces for artists to experiment, while expanding organisationally through the creation of different (business) units. Hivos made RUANGRUPA a member of the Arts Collaboratory initiative which helps the SPO to engage with other organisations around the world. Although Common Room's outcomes are also relevant for Hivos' policy, its declining organisational performance actually hampers its contribution to the policy, being a reason for Hivos to end the partnership in December 2013.

Hivos' support to *CRI* fits within the scope of a vision defined in 2008. In particular, Hivos recognized the important emergence of virtual movements that has gone hand-in-hand with the development of communication technologies. Hivos sees CRI's online platform as a shared interest that gives an opportunity to citizen journalists to express their opinions and provide citizens access to bottom-up information. However the platform has not yet resulted in broad citizen activism.

*KBR's* Teen Voice programme relates to one of the tree objectives of Press Freedom's 2.0 in Indonesia, promoting a free and professional media landscape aimed at children and youth, as well as independent journalism. KBR's biggest challenge was to develop and implement a sound business strategy that would ensure sufficient income to cover production and broadcast costs, which however did not materialize. Despite this, KBR continued to engage with the international Kids News Network of Free Press Unlimited.

The changes achieved by *FIELD*, *LPPSLH* and *KWLM* contribute to Hivos' green entrepreneurship programme which focuses on "enterprising men and women as catalysts for green socio-economic progress". Hivos supports small producers to improve their productivity (not at the expense of biodiversity) and strengthening their representative organisations. Hivos also states in its 2008 Vision Paper on Civil Society Building that "In the economic domain it is civil society's role to counterbalance short-term profit policies, and to struggle for long term production policies which are socially and environmentally sound." KWLM and LPPSLH have provided alternative business models that are

inclusive and biodiverse. FIELD did not address market access for the organic farmers. KWLM did not manage to support women as green entrepreneurs whereas FIELD was successful in doing so. Although LPPSLH's cooperatives have many female members, gender issues in the process of producing crystal palm sugar at household level are not being addressed.

*WARSI* and *NTFP-EP* are part of the Ecosystem Alliance's (EA) programme that aims to "to improve the livelihoods of the poor and create an inclusive economy, through participatory and responsible management of ecosystems". Both SPOs contribute to the Livelihoods & Ecosystems theme, WARSI having achieved more success on the ecosystem part and NTFP-EP on the livelihoods part. EA introduced the programmatic approach as a means to contribute to civil society development and policy influence. This implies that all EA partners in Indonesia work together to reach joint results.

NTFP-EP is the coordinator the partner organisations to produce collective achievements on Sustainable Livelihood Initiatives and Models (SLIMs).

WARSI is the coordinator of the partner organisations to simplify the procedures to obtain a village forest recognition and license. In 2014 a regulation was published by the Ministry for Forests that states that it is not any longer necessary to get a license from the governor.

Another objective of the Ecosystem Alliance, halting the expansion of palm oil and mining concessions was only very partially achieved. This objective is rather ambitious given the stakes and interests of both private sector and local elites to quickly make advantageous deals.

### 4.5.4. Explaining factors

#### *Internal factors*

Internal factors that explain the findings are as follows:

RUANGRUPA and LPPSLH's *capability to act and commit* explains part of the positive findings: the first SPO has a dynamic leadership and created separate divisions that are operating rather independently and involve alumni, and; the second works with highly motivated staff and a belief in the principles of community empowerment.

However high staff turnover and loss of institutional memory with CRI and Common Room; Implementing partners of NTFP-EP are missing the capacity to do lobby and advocacy at local level, and; Common Room's absolute dependency upon its director and only having three staff at the moment also explain the less positive findings on changes in civil society.

Four organisations show to avail of the *capability to relate:* RUANGRUPA's open character with a relaxed and informal atmosphere is attracting alumni who want to contribute to the life of the organisation; KWLM, FIELD, and LPPSLH have been capable of relating rural and less-educated farmers and loggers to private sector actors, and; NTFP-EP's staff has good personal networks that help to relate with local partners.

ELSAM's board becoming more effective, NTFP-EP becoming and independent foundation in May 2012 and LPPSLH's intensive accompaniment of cooperatives which the government is not able to replicate all

are elements that explain their *capability to deliver on development objectives*. WARSI has demonstrated that it is a mature organisation that delivers on outcomes due to its technical, managerial, administrative and financial capacities.

Common Room's move to a less central location in Bandung and NTFP-EP being mainly based in Jakarta whilst activities are being implemented in Kalimantan through sub-contracts with local partners negatively affect the civil society changes. Common Room, KBR and KWLM to a lesser extend having not been able to sustain funding for their activities also explain a lower capability to deliver on development outcomes.

ELSAM's strategy changing from direct support to human rights victims and training local NGOs into a resource centre, as well as; RUANGRUPA's reorientation towards becoming a knowledge producer and developer prove their *capacity to adapt and self-renew.*

On the other side CRI is still struggling with its position in society, its wish to become a resource centre but not knowing what services to deliver and to whom.

For all SPOs in the civil society sample, we observe that the monitoring systems in place do not allow drawing lessons at outcome level in terms of what works and what works not and why. Reporting takes place at activity and output level, but not at outcome level: important issues to look at from a civil society perspective are for instance the performance of organisations created, a more systematic gathering of information on client satisfaction or impact at household level, and the government becoming accountable to its citizens.

There is a gap between Common Room's ambitions and its realisations: currently this is exacerbated because the organisation is deviating from its original visions and missions mentioned in project documents. It has difficulties with its *capability to achieve coherence.*

### *External factors*

Indonesia's connection to the internet; contemporary arts becoming the latest trends; anti-corruption being on the agenda of the government; regulations in favour for community based forest management and the creation of cooperatives, and; growing demands for certified timber and crystal sugar all provide a conducive environment for the interventions of the SPOs.

*Indonesia's access to internet* is booming and in 2013 some 30 % of its population had access to internet, in particular those between 15 and 30 years old. However internet is still an urban phenomenon. RUANGRUPA took this opportunity to disseminate the application of contemporary visual arts which creates an alternative market for artists. CRI is busy with the installation of Village Information Systems (Non MFS II) and uses the internet for its online platform of citizen journalists. For KBR the online platform for the Teen Voice programme further enhanced the engagement of children and teenagers with the radio and television programmes until these were stopped.

Both Common Room and RUANGRUPA experience a positive environment for *contemporary arts* in respectively Bandung and Jakarta. Since these have become the latest trend, competition with mainstream artists and others providing alternative public spaces has increased (Common Room).

RUANGRUPA observes that the increased appreciation for contemporary arts also may discourage more critical and provocative discourses: "navigate between idealism and commodity".

*Anti-corruption* is on the political agenda, including better legislation to protect whistle blowers, which is important for ELSAM, and the increased acknowledgment that corruption impacts upon the protection and management of natural resources and forests, which is relevant for NTFP-EP and WARSI.

These last two organisations also use the opportunities provided by the 2007 and 2008 regulations with regards to *community based forest management and the REDD + schemes* in place, although according to the latest information the new government is about to dissolve the Indonesian agency in charge of the implementation of this scheme[132].

The three organisation that work with *cooperatives all* experience good enabling environments at district level and *growing and stable demands* for certified timber and crystal sugar of coconut palm (FIELD, LPPSLH and KWLM).

Not so conducive factors are; the broadcasting law that creates unfair advantages to large media conglomerates and risks to decrease the diversity of expression (CRI and KBR); free expression on the internet (ELSAM and KBR); the market for NTFP products is very limited and still needs to be created in Indonesia (NTFP-EP); NTFP-EP missing the political commitments of district governments for the management of natural resources by communities themselves rather than giving these as concessions to agribusiness and extractive industries, and; regular mutations of government staff which implies that results of previous lobby activities are not being secured .

### *Relations CFA-SPO*

Generally speaking, the relations between the Co-Funding Agencies and their partner organisations are or were very constructive:

Most often mentioned support by Hivos, consisted of linking the partner organisation to other partners of Hivos (ELSAM, Common Room, KWLM, LPPSLH) and at the international level (RUANGRUPA); help to build the organisational capacities and support to the creation of business units or cooperatives (RUANGRUPA, CRI, Common Room, LPPSLH) and creating relations with the new Agri-Profocus Network in Indonesia (FIELD and LPPSLH).

Hivos' expectations with regards to Common Room were not met despite support given to strengthen the organisational capacity of the organisation.

Specific support provided by Hivos to LPPSLH to mainstream gender in its project also did not materialise.

Also Free Press Unlimited supported KBR by means of a series of trainings to support the Teen Voice project to produce news content for children, which required a different journalistic approach. At the end of the project, KBR became a member of the World Kids Network and Kids News Network aiming to create a platform for cooperation and generate revenues for Teen Voice.

[132] http://news.mongabay.com/2015/0113-bp-redd-indonesia-lbell.html

IUCN's most important contribution, and in particular that of the entire Ecosystem Alliance consisted of bringing all partners together in a programmatic approach: WARSI and partners have successfully lobbied for a simplification of the procedures to obtain a community forest management license and NTFP-EP is busy to prepare a festival on Sustainable Livelihoods Initiatives and Models to lobby the national government for a more conducive policy environment and to attract urban middle-class consumers to buy NTFP products. According to IUCN, its partners see the annual meetings of experience sharing as beneficial.

## 4.6. Discussion

### 4.6.1. Design of the intervention

This section answers a question by the synthesis committee about the 'replicability' of the interventions. The evaluation team interpreted this in terms of innovations or approaches that can be replicated by another organisation or in another context. In addition to this replicability implies a project mode and short term interventions. In this paragraph we have organised the intervention models that are replicable, those that are not replicable because they do not fit into a project mode of development and those that need to be redesigned.

#### *Intervention models that are replicable*

**Combine Resource Institution**

Creating an online platform to relate community radios, bloggers and other community journalists to each other to share news and information for grass root level is replicable and relevant in Indonesia's context. However CRI's experience has learned that more interventions are needed if such platforms become a tool to increase pressure upon governments to improve their services. Citizen journalists, members of the platform need lobby and advocacy capacities to campaign on the internet. The online platform itself may need the capacities to mobilise the platform members to take collective action and relate with those organisations capable of directly engaging with the lobby targets.

**KBR68H**

Free Press Unlimited developed a more or less fixed project format, consisting of an 18 months project after which KBR was supposed to be able to continue on its own. The project design would have become stronger if a more in-depth assessment would have been made of the links between civic participation and media usage among youth, factoring in specific age groups, types of media used, and identifying information gaps. A combination of radio, television and online discussion platforms contributed to the success of Teen Voice program but more social media are worthwhile exploring. The financial sustainability of the program would probably have been ensured when business strategies had been developed right from the start of the project.

**FIELD**

FIELD's interventions have three components: learning and empowerment through farmer field schools (FFS); legalising farmers' seeds both formally and informally and; the creation of cooperatives and businesses. Studies have shown that FFS are less suitable for profit-driven approaches to rural development that include credit cooperatives[133]. While these interventions can be complementary, FIELD's example shows that its increased production through FFS did not yet increase their market access through the cooperatives. These relations in FIELD's project design are rather vague, with the cooperatives acting more as an extension of the FFS rather than a means to access markets.

A successful replication of FIELD's model would in the first place require additional expertise in improving market access for organic produce next to the highly technical seed breeding expertise already available.

**KWLM**

The KWLM cooperative model is already being replicated by others. However, the following issues need to be taken into account to further improve the model: In the first place KWLM's cooperative is rather exclusive in membership and community members find it hard to comply with the entry requirements. KWLM's four intervention areas (socialisation, inventory of timber, nursery development and certification) all ensure that market demands are being met rather than meeting farmers' demand for support in FSC certification and other technical issues. In the second place a solution needs to be found for KWLM to avail of sufficient financial capital to purchase timber from members up front for which buyers pay for fully upon delivery. A four-year period would be sufficient to create such a performing cooperative.

**LPPSLH**

LPPSLH itself has shown that it is capable to replicate the model of creating cooperatives of palm sugar farmers in other districts, as well as a former staff of LPPSLH. Government replication efforts however failed because they do not provide intensive guidance to cooperative members, which unlike the government, LPPSLH does provide. Important conditions that need to be in place are the existence and access to premium markets, a clear organisational direction and ideas, a project duration of some 3 to 4 years and organisational competences needed. Pending issues are the gender dimension, assessing the performance of the value chain and traceability of products, in particular when organic products are being marketed.

**WARSI**

WARSI's model and design is replicable if certain conditions are in place. Despite taskforces being in place in West Sumatra to support the expansion of village forest schemes and the simplification of the procedures to obtain village forest licences in 2014, external third-party assistance will still be required for communities to deal with the bureaucracy. A second condition for success remains the local political context, in favour of village forests or in favour of concession rights for agribusiness and extractives. However a major point of attention in the design of WARSI's intervention is that of effectively increasing

[133] Ibid

impact at household level after community based forest management groups have obtained the necessary licenses to manage the forests.

### *Intervention models that are not replicable but successful*

**ELSAM**

According to a report published in 2010 by AusAID regarding the Indonesian Knowledge Sector, the Government lacks the structure for obtaining reliable internal policy analysis[134]. Experiences have shown that where NGOs are involved in collecting, analysing and disseminating data and information to government officials, they have been challenged to provide solutions based on the knowledge they produce[135]. Given this context, the design of ELSAM's interventions has been suitable to the prevailing conditions. Not only has ELSAM been producing information and data on human rights abuses, it has succeeded in working with the government to seek policy solutions by providing its expertise in producing legislative inputs. A 2013 AusAID follow-up initiative, the Knowledge Sector Initiative (KSI) which now also supports ELSAM produced 'stories of change' on successful interventions of its partners. These interventions are: 1) being able to collect research evidence to inform policy makers; 2) the existence of a need for data and information within the government; 3) organisational reputation; 4) engagement with the parliament; 5) collaboration with network organisations; 6) media engagement, and 7) an understanding of the context.[136] ELSAM's role in amending the Law on Victim and Witness Protection and its broader but related work to document human rights violations shows that these success factors were present in the SPO's design.

Another organisation would not be able to replicate this model in a 'project-mode' or short term intervention. The outcomes are the result of 20 years of consistent attention on human rights issues.

**RUANGRUPA**

The outcomes achieved are to be considered as emerging features in an urban context. They evolve and cannot be planned as an intervention. Therefore, although RUANGRUPA has been successful, its strategy is not necessarily replicable in other context. On the other hand, there are more events emerging in Jakarta that cover visual and video art. But it is difficult to assess whether similar events were inspired by RUANGRUPA. The organisation has brought contemporary art closer to the masses so to speak, making it possible for those without an artistic background to take part in shaping the discourse.

### *Interventions that need to be redesigned*

**Common Room**

The Common Room success story is that of having contributed to a progressive sub-culture amongst youth through the fusion of musical genres and the revival of Sundanese traditions, however this has not yet led to larger influences in the creative industry or economy of Bandung. There is a considerable

[134] Page 8, Overview of the Indonesian Knowledge Sector, Final Report. Petrarca Chawaro Karetji. 30 September 2010, AusAID.
[135] Page 12, Ibid
[136] Working Politically: A Story of Change about the contribution of research evidence to the new Village Law in Indonesia (Revised Version). Australian Aid Knowledge Sector Initiative, April 2014.

gap between Common Room's ToC and what they have been able to realise until so far. More strategic thinking is required, as well as a clear focus in the interventions needed to realise the ToC and the vision and mission of the organisation. Meanwhile, the organisation's performance has weakened.

**NTFP-EP**

NTFP-EP's project design could have benefitted from a concentration of efforts on fewer districts as a strategy to successfully oversee, monitor and assist project implementers and local stakeholders in achieving impact. The design fell short of clearly identifying how interventions as the community level would lead to strategic results for civil society. This is in particular the case with regards to communities claiming their rights on natural resources and lobbying districts governments to endorse natural resources maps for land use with a forest or an agricultural destination. Future interventions would benefit from a plan of action that includes: a context analysis including the identification of favourable district policies; a joint development of NTFP management plans with local government; creating working groups within the local government regarding NTFP management; support them to produce regulations in favour of the participatory management of NTFPs, and; improved value chain analysis meant to make NTFP-based livelihoods more sustainable and which includes market access through Borneo chic.

### 4.6.2. Evaluation methodology

A methodology was design to conduct this evaluation – see Annex J. The methodology in itself provides enough guidance to conduct a Theory Based Evaluation, although the process tracing methodology requires substantial understanding of the different steps to take.

Generally speaking we observe that the CIVICUS framework has never been used for evaluation purposes, and that the period between the baseline and end line study hardly covers two years, whereas the entire MFS II period covers 5 years. Furthermore, we observe that the interventions by the SPOs do not distinguish interventions that relate to Civil Society or Policy influencing from other interventions. This makes it occasionally difficult to obtain a clear focus for the civil society evaluation.

Critical steps in the evaluation methodology are the following:

1 Linking project interventions from the SPO to the CIVICUS framework. The project documents do not provide this information and are based upon the interpretation by the evaluation team in the Netherlands.
2 The extent to which the project documentation enables the Dutch team to understand the in-country realities. If the quality of the reports is weak, then the guidance provided to the in-country evaluation team is weak. Therefore deciding upon the outcomes to be selected for in-depth process tracing was sometimes hampered by incomplete and un-clear project documents.
3 After the workshop with the SPO, the in-country team had to decide upon which outcomes they will focus on for the in-depth process tracing. There was a tendency to selecting positive outcomes achieved.
4 Designing the model of change that explains the outcome achieved, followed by the inventory of rival pathways to explain that outcome has also proven to be a critical and difficult step. In this phase it is critical that the evaluation team works together to brainstorm on alternative pathways. A

major challenge is that in-country teams at this moment of the evaluation have obtained a lot of information from the SPO, and not from other NGOs or resource persons, which possibly might strengthen their bias in favour of attributing change to the SPO.

5 The following step of identifying the information needs to confirm or reject these pathways and to identify the method of collecting the information needed. Also this step has most chances to be successful when the evaluators work together.

6 The usefulness of process tracing for all outcomes that were identified and for which process tracing was used. A preliminary conclusion is that this methodology is in the first place suitable for the assessment of contribution towards policy changes and when many actors and factors are involved. Not all outcomes achieved in the civil society study are of this nature.

Information gathering to assess the relevance of the changes in civil society and the explaining factors generally speaking was not challenging.

Critical conditions for this evaluation methodology are:

1 Project documents and progress reports need to be available in time, and they need to systematically report not only on outputs but also on effects on the changes in peoples livelihoods (civic engagement), and at least the performance of organisations that received support from the SPO. None of the SPOs in the sample have an M&E system in place that measures the organisational capacity of the organisations they support.

2 Some of the SPOs seemingly do not have been subject to external evaluations and therefore often were unable to provide the evidence needed (at outcome -impact level) for the evaluation.

3 The evaluation team needs to have a thorough understanding of the CIVICUS framework and the interpretation of the indicators used for this evaluation.

4 The evaluation team needs to understand how process-tracing works and the in-country evaluation teams need to develop a critical stand towards the interventions of the SPO that enables them to identify rival explanations for the outcomes achieved and to identify the appropriate questions to confirm or reject pathways. Because this is a new methodology, much depends upon the team's previous experiences of theory-based evaluations.

5 The methodology developed and in more generally terms theory-based evaluations are more time-consuming than randomized control trials.

6 The process-tracing methodology requires a continuous process of analysis of information obtained and identification of further information needs to be able to make a plausible contribution claim. This capacity of critical reflection is one of the core capacities needed to successfully conduct a theory-based evaluation like process-tracing.

### *Experiences during end line from in-country teams - Indonesia*

The in-country team experienced difficulties in working on the first evaluation question regarding changes in civil society. The team would have preferred a similar workshop as during the baseline that would recapitulate the essence of the CIVICUS model and the content of each standard indicator developed. Although some members of the in-country team were also involved in the 2012 base line assessment, they and their new colleagues experienced a kind of "CS dimension shock" when these

topics where not addressed during the workshop, where a lot of time was spend to work on the second evaluation question on contribution. A guidance sent later in the year was helpful but came late according to the Indonesian team.

The many appendices prepared for data collection and meant as a step-wide approach for the end line study, sometimes became a burden and a limitation when applied directly in collecting data. Like mentioned for the baseline study the questions sometimes limited the probing for information. In addition, in-country team members had to deal with the "CS dimension shock".

The organisation of the entire MFS II evaluation did provide very little opportunities for SPOs to engage with the evaluation and to feel concerned. For many of the SPOs the evaluation does not provide a strategic value in terms of drawing lessons. This lack of ownership is felt more strongly with those SPOs that already ended their contract with the Dutch MFS II organisation and with those SPOs that due to high staff turn overs were confronted with past tense issues that they did not experience.

Some of the SPOs simply didn't care about the evaluation. This could have been anticipated if there had been a special workshop (for the directors, perhaps, and the CFAs) prior to the endline. Via such workshops, appointments and agreements could have been set, allowing the in-country teams to plan their time and schedule. What ended up happening was that many of the SPOs kept putting off appointments and this also affected the schedule of the team.

Many SPOs are unfamiliar with the CIVICUS framework and the in-country team tried to ease them into it by sending background information and the indicator questions regarding changes in civil society prior to the workshop. This was effective for some SPOs (Common Room, WARSI), but not very effective for LPPSLH, RUANGRUPA, and CRI. The latter three found it too difficult to answer these questions by themselves. Common Room, on the other hand dedicated a special discussion session to discuss the questions internally. The questions were however the same as those dealt with during the baseline and possibly high staff turnovers may also explain this "CS dimension shock".

Fieldwork was sometimes inefficient since the in-country team assumed that each step (workshop, interview, drafting model of change, selecting outcome, finding evidences) would neatly fall into sequence and could be packed tightly within 4 or 5 days with strong commitment from the SPO. This often did not happen.

## 4.7. Conclusion

### 4.7.1. What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period?

#### *Governance theme*

**Perceived impact in the civil society arena**

Common Room and RUANGRUPA have contributed to the emergence of new expressions of contemporary arts; Common Room with regards to the fusion of traditional Sundanese music and culture with underground metal music and RUANGRUPA through several forms of artistic expression, including a new visual and video art form which is expanding and also creating business opportunities.

KBR temporarily offered the space for children and teenagers to be informed and to inform others about issues of their concern, but its Teen Voice programme discontinued when KBR failed to mainstream the programme into other networks.

CRI with its online platform has created the space for sharing grassroots information amongst bloggers, community radios and other citizen journalists to voice the day-to-day issues of citizens. It fails however to mobilise these voices for collaborative action.

ELSAM has further positioned itself in the human rights sector as a resource centre that is capable to mobilise the documentation of cases on human right atrocities and to use this information for evidence-based advocacy together with its network of both national and local NGOs-CSOs.

**Perceived impact at household level.**

Most tangible impacts at household level consist of an increased exposure of people to alternative expressions of arts (Common Room and RUANGRUPA); children having learned from the Teen Voice program; more citizens being exposed to grass root level information through CRI's online platform, and; ELSAM and the coalitions it works with having ensured that more human rights victims have become eligible for indemnification or reparation.

**Perceived impact with the public sector**

Only ELSAM, as a 'moderate' human rights defender and as such occasionally a chair of multi stakeholder agencies like the Witness and Victims Protection Agency, the National Human Rights Commission is engaging with the public sector to change policies and practices.

The other four partner organisations occasionally engage with the public sector to obtain financial support, to provide advice or as service delivers.

**Perceived impact with the private sector**

Only ELSAM has interventions in place to influence agribusiness companies and extractive industries. It investigates land and natural resource conflicts between these companies and poor and/or land-less farmers and submits these finding to the National Commission on Human Rights and other actors, which sometimes provides reparations for those affected. Besides this more confrontational approach, ELSAM has produced a manual for companies on "how to do business without violating human rights".

The other SPOs engage with small local businesses as service deliverers, or have created their own business units (RUANGRUPA). For KBR and RUANGRUPA, the private sector is a potential client who wants to buy airtime.

### *MDG 7ab*

**Perceived impact in the civil society arena**

The most significant contributions of FIELD, KWLM and LPPSLH in the past two years consist of the expansion of the number of cooperative structures and/or the improvement of their organisational performance. Meanwhile more people adhered to the cooperatives. Members improved their

bargaining position vis-à-vis middlemen because the cooperatives either help them access premium markets (KWLM and LPPSLH) or provide them access to credits (FIELD).

Cooperative members (and members of FIELD's farmer field schools) have strengthened their personal network and as representatives they have developed relations with local government officials. Whereas FIELD involves small scale farmers in lobby activities with national coalitions, LPPSLH better positioned itself in networks that promote organic farming and food sovereignty.

WARSI's community based forest management groups increasingly are being endorsed by the authorities, enabling them to manage their village forests for the next 35 years. CBFM groups have started to share experiences, increasingly engage with local governments and are about to form an umbrella organisation. Other NGOs have started replicating the creation of those groups in other districts. Concerns raised are the representativeness of those CBFM groups and how to overcome financial burdens attached to the village forests.

**Perceived impact at household level.**

FIELD's, KWLM and LPPSLH's perceived impact at household level consists of more households adhering to the cooperatives; improved incomes because they produce for premium markets (KWLM and LPPSLH) and because they have access to credits (KWLM and FIELD). FIELD's small scale farmers (45 percent are female farmers) regained their control over seeds and inputs when the Crop Production and Protection Act was amended in 2012. Market access for these farmers and their households however remains an issue of concern.

Whereas FIELD and LPPSLH cooperative members consist of small scale producers, land-less or landowners, KWLM's membership excludes land-less people. LPPSLH and KWLM failed to take into account a gender perspective in their activities.

WARSI's CBFM approach until so far did not generate significant increases in incomes and livelihood assets.

**Perceived impact with the public sector**

FIELD, LPPSLH and their cooperatives, and KWLM have constructive relations with local governments with the creation of cooperatives which is aligned with national policies. All three SPOs are engaged in the replication of their cooperative model with local governments.

Apart from this FIELD's most important success since 2012 has been the amendment of the 1992 Crop Production and Protection Act. This was the result of lobbying as a network, including the members of the cooperatives. However no impact was found with regards to farmers being able to legalise the intellectual property rights they have when they breed new seed varieties.

WARSI successfully lobbied in Jambi province to create one-stop-shop services to accelerate the implementation of the CBFM scheme. At the same time the government designated 500,000 hectares of forests to be managed by CBFM groups. In West Sumatra the CBFM scheme has been mainstreamed into the provincial forest policy. Together with the other partners of the Ecosystem Alliance WARSI managed to simplify the procedures to obtain a village forest licence in 2014.

**Perceived impact with the private sector**

KWLM and LPPSLH do not have impact upon the private sector but engage with buyers to access premium markets and are increasingly successful in doing so. FIELD's farmers have not yet found a market for organic produce.

The most important relations NTFP-EP and WARSI have with private companies consists of stopping them to take concessions for agribusiness or extractive industries, by organising villages in CBFM groups or other village group that seek to secure their rights with district authorities.

### 4.7.2. To what degree are the changes attributable to the Southern partners?

#### *Governance theme*

In total, seven outcomes were explained, of which four with the help of in-depth process tracing.

*One of the outcomes cannot* be explained by the partner SPO: this is CRI's claim that it contributed to the Ministry of Health granting more beneficiaries access to the health insurance scheme through the online platform. Its online platform did not exert public pressure upon the Ministry of Health to change its regulations.

*Multiple actors* explain the second outcome of CRI, increased participation on the online platform. Each of these actors separately, including CRI contributed to the increased participation to the platform and form a *sufficient but not necessary* explanation for the outcome.

RUANGRUPA's and KBR68H' interventions *sufficiently and necessarily* explain their outcomes. RUANGRUPA created the necessary infrastructure and demand for contemporary visual art in Jakarta. Its reputation and role were key in achieving this outcome.

KBR68H's interventions also explain the engagement of teenagers and children in the Teen Voice Program. The most valid explanation for the increased quality of participation of the target group in Teen Voice since the baseline is the shift towards a web-based platform for Teen Voice, in combination with the use of radio and television broadcasts.

Three outcomes are the result of *a causal package*, in which the SPO played a substantial role. ELSAM has an enormous network in which its particular role is to mobilise local information that it uses to draft position papers used by the network for lobby and advocacy. This causal package explained two lobby outcomes.

Common Room's innovation to combine traditional Sundanese instruments with heavy metal music and its collaboration with a popular band explain the revival of Sundanese traditions and the integration of heavy metal groups in society.

#### *MDG 7ab*

With regards to MDG 7ab, nine outcomes achieved were explained, of which six were assessed with in-depth process tracing.

Three outcomes can be explained by a causal package of actors and factors that cannot be disentangled and in which the SPO showed to be indispensable. This was the case with FIELD's work in the coalition to push the government for a review of the 1992 Crop Production and Protection Act; WARSI's work to obtain the endorsement of CBFG which required also the support of local authorities at district, provincial and national level, and; WARSI, other NGOs and the provincial government to mainstream CBFM in the West Sumatra forest policies.

The realisation of four other outcomes can be 'attributed' to the SPO, with local government playing a constructive role. FIELD's, KWLM's and LPPSLH's interventions were a *sufficient and necessary* cause for the creation of cooperatives, and districts provided the enabling environment to do so. The same applies for the second outcome achieved by LPPSLH which consists of the bargaining position of small holders being improved vis-à-vis middlemen markets because it provided these small holders with alternative and promising value chains through the cooperative.

NTFP-EP's support to the Crafts Kalimantan network and its business unit to market NTFP products is one of the explaining actors for the increased incomes of 17 women weaving baskets. MFS II financing for this came in the first place from Cordaid until 2011, and IUCN-NL support to establish a Participatory Guarantee System possibly started to have some effect in 2014. NTFP-EP provides a *sufficient but not necessary* explanation, because other buyers most often buy these products.

NTFP-EP's outcome that communities are able to claim their rights to manage natural resources and land in four villages in the first place was only partially realised. NTFP-EP's support in mapping the resources and previous work done by other NGOs to organise communities in groups both are a *necessary but not sufficient* cause to explain the outcome; more lobby efforts are needed to integrate the participatory maps into the spatial plans of the district.

### 4.7.3. What is the relevance of these changes?

Most outcomes explained and other changes in civil society are relevant in the light of the Theory of Change constructed in 2012 during the baseline. Some outcomes were however partially relevant, such as

- CRI's online platform to prepare citizen journalists to 'act upon information';
- Common Room's ability to network, to offer public space having declined and the organisation not having invested in the use of media and technology;
- LPPSLH not having capacitated farmers to demand their rights and enhance their participation in the political economy.

All outcomes are relevant with regards to the context in which they realised.

The outcomes and changes in civil society are generally speaking relevant in relation to the MFS II policies. However:

- Common Room's declining organisational performance made its contribution not effective
- Gender issues in Hivos' green entrepreneurship programme were insufficiently addressed by KWLM and LPPSLH.

### 4.7.4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

Most SPOs avail of the *capabilities* to introduce change in civil society. However Common Room's high staff turnover, decline in staff members and the gap between its ambitions and realisations make this organisation one of the weakest.

CRI, having faced high staff turnover rates (but is growing) and still repositioning itself in society, may also have influenced its outcomes related to the online platform.

Based upon the progress reports made available by the SPOs we observe that the monitoring systems in place do not allow drawing lessons at outcome level in terms of what works and what works not and why. Reporting mostly takes place at activity and output level, but not at outcome level: important issues to look at from a civil society perspective are for instance the performance of organisations created, a more systematic gathering of information on client satisfaction or impact at household level and governments becoming accountable to citizens. .

External factors that provide a conducive environment for the SPOs are Indonesia's connection to the internet; contemporary arts becoming the latest trends; anti-corruption being on the agenda of the government; regulations in favour for community based forest management and the creation of cooperatives, and; growing demands for certified timber and crystal sugar.

Not so conducive factors are; the broadcasting law that creates unfair advantages to large media conglomerates and risks to decrease the diversity of expression (CRI and KBR); free expression on the internet (ELSAM and KBR); unfavourable markets for NTFP-EP products in Indonesia because middle class consumers do not buy these products (NTFP-EP), and; NTFP-EP missing the political commitments of district governments for the management of natural resources by communities themselves rather than giving these as concessions to agribusiness and extractive industries.

Relations between the Co-Funding Agencies and the SPOs were overall constructive and supportive.

### 4.7.5. Design of the intervention

#### *Intervention models that are replicable*

Interventions that are replicable but with adaptations are those of Combine Resources Institution, KBR68H, FIELD, KWLM, LPPSLH and WARSI.

Interventions that are not replicable because they do not fit into a 'project mode of development' are those of ELSAM and RUANGRUPA.

Interventions that need to be redesigned are Common Room and NTFP-EP.

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# Annex A. Project information for the selected MDG projects

**Table 14: Contracting periods of projects**

| Project ID | SPO name / Project name | Start date of project[a] | Start date MFS II contract[b] | End date MFS II contract[b] | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **E1** | WIIP | 1 March 2011[1] | 1 Oct 2011 | 30 June 2015 | [1] Inception contract. |
| **E2** | Pt.PPMA | 1 March 2009 | 1 May 2012 | 1 April 2014[2] | [2] Project stopped at 1 April 2014. Official end date contract: 1 May 2015. |
| **E3** | NTFP-EP | | 15 Sept-2011 | 31 Dec 2014 | |
| **E4** | FIELD | 1 Nov 2003 | 28 Feb 2011 | 28 Feb 2014[3] | [3] Contract period is extended with one year. |
| **E5** | SC GREEN | | 1 July 2011 | 31 October 2013 | |
| **E6** | KSP-QT | 2007-2009 | 1 Dec 2009 | 31 Dec 2012 | |
| **E7** | LRC-KJHAM | | 1 Oct 2010 | 31 Dec 2012[4] | [4] Follow-up contract: 14 August 2013 - 31 July 2015. |
| **E8** | YRBI | 2008-2010 | 1 Nov 2011 | 31 Oct 2013 | |
| **E9** | HuMa | | 1 April 2011 | 31 Dec 2013 | |
| **E10** | SC LED-NTT | 1 March 2005 | 1 Jan 2010 | 31 Dec 2014[5] | [5] Contract from 1 January 2013 until 31 December 2014 under new name, Flores Speciality Products Promotion (FSPP). |
| **E11** | Rifka Annisa | | 1 Jan 2011 | 31 Dec 2012[6] | [6] Contract terminated end 2012 due to funding from other source. Original end of contract was 31 December 2015. |
| **E12** | YPI | 2010 | 1 April 2011 | 31 Dec 2015 | |

Source: MFS II Joint Evaluation Indonesia Baseline reports on MDG projects.
Notes:
[a] If different from current contract
[b] Current contract between CFA and SPO.

# Annex B. Stylized result chains for the selected MDG projects

Figure 23: Result chain for the WIIP project (E1)




Figure 24: Result chain for the Pt.PPMA project (E2)





Figure 25: Result chain for the Sintang project of NTFP-EP (E3)




Figure 26: Result chain for the FIELD project (E4)




Figure 27: Result chain for the SC GREEN project (E5)





Figure 28: Result chain for the KRP-QT project (E6)





**Figure 29: Result chain for the LRC-KJHAM project (E7)**




Notes:
1. MFS II evaluation focuses on result chain items in bold and capitalized (e.g. psychological counselling).
2. Oval factor is independent of the activities of LRC-KJHAM.

**Figure 30: Result chain for the YRBI project (E8)**




**Figure 31: Result chain for the Rampi project of HuMa (E9)**




Figure 32: Result chain for the SC LED-NTT project (E10)






**Figure 33: Result chain for the Rifka Annisa project (E11)**




Notes:

3. MFS II evaluation focuses on result chain items in bold (e.g. psychological counselling).
4. Activities highlighted in grey do not receive funding from Rutgers WPF (e.g. community outreach).
5. Oval factor is independent of the activities of Rifka Annisa.

**Figure 34: Result chain for the YPI project (E12)**



# Annex C. Outcome indicators for the selected MDG projects

**Table 15: Outcome indicators for reforestation projects (MDG7)**

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Project | Uniform Indicator | Discussed in the report |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | E1. WIIP | MDG7 | |
| **Panel A. Reforestation** | | | X[1] | |
| Number of villages with efforts at forest protection | (0;n) | X | | X |
| Percentage of households participating in reforestation efforts | (0-100%) | X | | X |
| Number of planted seedlings | (0;NM) | X | | X |
| **Panel B. Forest management** | | | | |
| Number of villages with forest management structure in place (Mangrove forests) | (0;n) | X | | X |
| Number of villages with forest management structure in place (Dry-land forests) | (0;n) | X | | X |
| Number of villages with village regulations on natural resources (Mangrove forests) | (0;n) | X | | X |
| Number of villages with village regulations on natural resources (Dry-land forests) | (0;n) | X | | X |
| **Panel C. Condition of forests** | | | | |
| Condition of mangrove forests | (1;6) | X | | X |
| Condition of coastal forests | (1;6) | X | | X |
| Condition of upland forests | (1;6) | X | | X |
| Condition of lake area | (1;6) | X | | X |
| **Panel D. Household's knowledge of mangroves** | | | | |
| Percentage of respondents correctly describing mangroves | (0-100%) | X | | X |
| Percentage of respondents incorrectly recognising mangroves | (0-100%) | X | | |
| Percentage of respondents partially correctly recognising mangroves | (0-100%) | X | | |
| Percentage of respondents correctly recognising mangroves | (0-100%) | X | | X |
| Number of benefits of mangrove forests | (0;5) | X | | X |
| **Panel E. Number of actions taken for disaster risk preparedness** | | | | |
| Information action taken by hh to reduce the risk of disaster | (0-100%) | X | | X |
| Preparation action taken by hh to reduce the risk of disaster | (0-100%) | X | | X |

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Project | Uniform Indicator | Discussed in the report |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | E1. WIIP | MDG7 | |
| Savings action taken by hh to reduce the risk of disaster | (0-100%) | X | | X |
| Volunteering action taken by hh to reduce the risk of disaster | (0-100%) | X | | X |
| Number of information measures taken by any hh member to reduce the risks of disaster | (0;4) | X | | X |
| Number of preparation measures taken by any hh member to reduce the risks of disaster | (0;7) | X | | X |
| Number of volunteer measures taken by any hh member to reduce the risks of disaster | (0;3) | X | | X |
| **Panel F. Income of households from sustainable use of the ecosystem** | | | | |
| Contribution of mangrove forest resources to livelihood | (1;5) | X | | X |
| Respondent has income from either forestry, livestock or fishing | (0-100%) | | | X |
| HH income per HH member out of forestry per month (Rp.) | (0;NM) | X | | X |
| HH income per HH member from livestock per month (Rp.) | (0;NM) | X | | X |
| HH income per HH member out of fish per month (Rp.) | (0;NM) | X | | X |

Notes: NM = no minimum/maximum, n is the number of villages in either the treatment group or the comparison group

1. It is related to the uniform indicator “deforestation” but we could not measure this because of sample size.

**Table 16: Outcome indicators for projects on poverty elimination (MDG1)**

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Project | | | | | Uniform Indicator | Discussed in the report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | E1. WIIP | E4. FIELD | E5. SC GREEN | E6. KSP-QT | E10. SC LED-NTT | MDG1 | |
| A**. Use of financial instruments** | | | | | | | X | |
| Percentage of households that know a place to borrow | (0%; 100%) | | X | X | X | | | X |
| Percentage of households that have borrowed in the past 12 months | (0%; 100%) | | X | X | X | | | X |
| Percentage of households involved in a financial institution | (0%; 100%) | | X | | X | | | X |
| Percentage of households with savings in bank account | (0%; 100%) | | | | X | | | X |
| Percentage of households with savings in savings and credit cooperative | (0%; 100%) | | | | X | | | |
| Percentage of households with savings in savings and credit group | (0%; 100%) | | | | X | | | |
| Percentage of households that have savings in the form of savings in group, cooperative or bank | (0%; 100%) | | X | | | | | |
| **B. Financial knowledge and skill** | | | | | | | X | |
| Percentage of households that keep close eyes on expenditures | (0%; 100%) | | | | X | | | |
| Percentage of households that have financial plan | (0%; 100%) | | | | X | | | X |
| Score on financial numeracy (only for panel respondents) | (0; 4) | | | | X | | | X |
| **C. Household income and livelihood** | | | | | | | X | |
| Household revenue from sale of rice (1000 Rp) | (0; NM) | | X | | | | | X |
| Household revenue from sale of cashew nuts (1000 Rp) | (0;NM) | | | | | X | | X |
| Total income per month (1000 Rp) | (NM; NM) | | X | X | | X | | |

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Project | | | | | Uniform Indicator | Discussed in the report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | E1. WIIP | E4. FIELD | E5. SC GREEN | E6. KSP-QT | E10. SC LED-NTT | MDG1 | |
| Total income per month per capita (1000 Rp) | (NM; NM) | | X | | X | X | | X |
| Food consumption per capita (1000 Rp) | (0; NM) | X | | | X | | | X |
| Non-food consumption per capita (1000 Rp) | (0; NM) | X | X | | X | X | | X |
| Housing facilities index | (NM; NM) | X | X | X | x | X | | X |
| Asset index | (NM; NM) | X | X | X | X | X | | X |
| Percentage of households invested in business | (0%; 100%) | | X | | X | X | | X |
| Percentage of households invested in new farming tools | (0%; 100%) | | X | | X | X | | X |
| Overall happiness | (1; 4) | X | X | X | X | X | | X |
| Current subjective wealth status | (1; 6) | X | X | X | X | X | | X |
| **D. Yield of selected crop** | | | | | | | X | X |
| Yield of rice per hectare | (0; NM) | | X | | | | | X |
| Yield of cashew nuts | | | | | | | | |
| - Per hectare | (0;NM) | | | | | X | | X |
| - Per tree | (0;NM) | | | | | X | | X |
| **E. Volume of traded good (uniform indicator)** | | | | | | | X | |
| Volume of cashew nuts sold (kg) | (0;NM) | | | | | X | | X |
| Volume of rice sold (kg) | (0;NM) | | X | | | | | X |
| Value of Sold Rugs per Month (1000 Rp) | (NM; NM) | | | X | | | | |
| Percentage of households that have small business | (0%; 100%) | | | X | | | | |
| Net profits from Small Business Monthly (1000 Rp) | (NM; NM) | | | X | | | | |

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Project | | | | | Uniform Indicator | Discussed in the report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | E1. WIIP | E4. FIELD | E5. SC GREEN | E6. KSP-QT | E10. SC LED-NTT | MDG1 | |
| **F. Percentage of cashew nuts sold to (inter)national markets (compared to local markets) (uniform indicator)** | | | | | | | X | |
| Using aggregate data in treatment and comparison groups (cumulated over the 2 treatment groups) | (0-100%) | | | | | X | | |
| Household average (based on kg sold to markets) | (0-100%) | | | | | X | | X |
| **G. Food Security and vulnerability** | | | | | | | X | |
| Nr. Of Months Could Not Cover Living Costs | (0; NM) | | X | X | | X | | X |
| Nr. Of Months Could Not Enough To Eat | (0; NM) | | X | X | | X | | X |
| Percentage of households have emergency savings for at least one month | (0%; 100%) | | | X | X | | | X |
| Percentage of households have not enough to eat | (0-100%) | | X | | | X | | X |
| Percentage of household not able to cover their living costs during the last 12 months | (0%; 100%) | X | X | | X | X | | X |
| Current standard of living: daily needs covered (only for panel respondents) | (1; 3) | X | X | X | X | X | | X |
| Current standard of living: food consumption covered (only for panel respondents) | (1; 3) | X | X | X | X | X | | X |
| **H. Households using organic farming practices** | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of households practicing organic farming | | | | | | | | |
| Self-reported | (0-100%) | | X | | | X | | |
| Based on responses to questions (not using any chemical input) | (0-100%) | | X | | | X | | |
| Percentage of households using chemical inputs | | | | | | | | |
| *Using chemical fertilizer* | (0-100%) | | X | | | X | | X |

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Project | | | | | Uniform Indicator | Discussed in the report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | E1. WIIP | E4. FIELD | E5. SC GREEN | E6. KSP-QT | E10. SC LED-NTT | MDG1 | |
| *Using chemical pesticides/insecticides* | (0-100%) | | X | | | X | | X |
| Percentage of households using organic inputs | | | | | | | | |
| *Using organic fertilizers* | (0-100%) | | X | | | X | | X |
| *Using organic pesticides/insecticides* | (0-100%) | | X | | | X | | X |
| Percentage of households have distance larger than 9x9m | (0-100%) | | | | | X | | |
| **I. Meetings at the farming group** | | | | | | | | |
| Average number of meetings of farming group in past 12 months (base)/ 24 months (end) | (NM; NM) | | X | | | | | |
| Number of farming groups which discussed […] in the past 12 months | | | | | | | | |
| - Good farming practices | (0; n) | | X | | | | | |
| - Seed breeding | (0; n) | | X | | | | | |
| - Financial management | (0; n) | | X | | | | | |
| - Savings and loans | (0; n) | | x | | | | | |
| - Processing | (0; n) | | X | | | | | |
| - Marketing | (0; n) | | X | | | | | |
| - Social gathering | (0; n) | | X | | | | | |
| - Other topic | (0; n) | | X | | | | | |
| **J. Savings and credit cooperative indicators** | | | | | | | | |
| Total outstanding loans at the savings and credit cooperatives | (0; NM) | | X | | | | | |
| Number of members | (NM; NM) | | X | | | | | |
| **K. Selling price of traded good** | | | | | | | | |
| Cashew nuts | (0;NM) | | | | | X | | |

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Project | | | | | Uniform Indicator | Discussed in the report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | E1. WIIP | E4. FIELD | E5. SC GREEN | E6. KSP-QT | E10. SC LED-NTT | MDG1 | |
| Rice (average per household) – calculated | (0; NM) | | X | | | | | |
| Rice (average per household) – self-reported | (0; NM) | | X | | | | | |
| **L. Skills, time allocation and profit** | | | | | | | | |
| Nr. of simple patterns | (0; NM) | | | X | | | | |
| Nr. of figurative patterns | (0; NM) | | | X | | | | |
| Nr. of Kanzashi patterns | (0; NM) | | | X | | | | |
| Nr. of hours worked per week | (0; NM) | | | X | | | | |
| Profit per hour (from all activities) | (NM; NM) | | | X | | | | |
| **M. Links To Market** | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of households buying inputs from cooperative/group | (0%; 100%) | | | X | | | | |
| Notes: NM = no minimum/maximum, n is the number of villages in either the treatment group or the comparison group | | | | | | | | |

**Table 17: Outcome indicators for projects on participatory mapping (MDG7,GG)**

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Project | | | | Uniform indicator | | Discussed in the report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | E2. Pt.PPMA | E3. NTFP-EP | E8. YRBI | E9. HuMa | MDG7 | GOOD Governance | |
| **Panel A. Size of forest** | | | | | | **X** | | |
| Change in forest size | (decrease;increase) | X | X | | | | | X |
| **Panel B. Number of villages with efforts at forest protection** | | | | | | | | |
| Number of villages with efforts at reforestation | (0;2) | X | X | | | | | X |
| Index for planning and forest protection | (0;3) | X | X | | | | | |
| Number of villages with protection of endangered species | (0;2) | X | X | | | | | |
| **Panel C. Management of natural resources** | | | | | | | | |
| Existence of regulations about the use and protection of the community forests in the village | (0;n) | X | X | X | X | | | X |
| Percentage of forest area protected | (0-100%) | | X | | | | | |
| Regulated activities in the community forest | (0;n) | | X | | | | | |
| Meetings about community forest use and management in the past 12 months | (0;n) | X | X | | | | | |
| Regulations are communicated by community meetings | (0;n) | X | X | X | X | | | |
| Regulations are communicated to all villagers (including women and children) | (0;n) | X | X | X | X | | | X |
| Regulations are taught at school | (0;n) | X | X | X | X | | | |
| Percentage of respondents who report that there are any rules/regulations about the use of community forests in the village | (0-100%) | X | X | X | X | | | X |
| Satisfaction with regulations | (-2;2) | X | X | X | X | | | X |

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Project | | | | Uniform indicator | | Discussed in the report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | E2. Pt.PPMA | E3. NTFP-EP | E8. YRBI | E9. HuMa | MDG7 | GOOD Governance | |
| **Panel D. Households' attitude towards forests/plantations** | | | | | | | | |
| Dependence on forest resources | (-2;2) | X | X | X | X | | | X |
| Index for positive attitude towards sustainable forest use | (-2;2) | X | X | X | X | | | X |
| Index for positive attitude towards sustainable forest use (community survey) | (-2;2) | X | X | X | X | | | X |
| Index for access to forest resources | (-2;2) | X | X | X | X | | | X |
| Percentage of respondents who think that a palm oil plantation in the village is/can be beneficial for him/her and his/her family | (0-100%) | X | X | | | | | |
| Index for positive attitude towards palm oil plantations | (-2;2) | X | X | | | | | |
| Index for positive attitude towards disputed forest areas with neighbouring villages | (-2;2) | X | | | | | | |
| Attitude towards disputed forest areas with local government/industry | (-2;2) | X | | | | | | |
| Percentage of respondents who think that the activities of the government/industry will be harmful | (0-100%) | | | X | X | | | |
| **Panel E. Sense of control of villages** | | | | | | | | |
| Index for sense of control regarding their own life | (-2;2) | X | X | X | X | | | X |
| Index for sense of control regarding land | (-2;2) | X | X | X | X | | | X |

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Project | | | | Uniform indicator | | Discussed in the report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | E2. Pt.PPMA | E3. NTFP-EP | E8. YRBI | E9. HuMa | MDG7 | GOOD Governance | |
| Index for sense of control regarding preservation of traditional culture | (-2;2) | | | X | X | | | |
| Index for trust in village | (-2;2) | | | X | X | | | |
| **Panel F. Number of people involved in traditional crafts** | (0;-) | X | X | | | X | | X |
| **Panel G. Number of villages where community forests have been approved by government** | (0;n) | | X | | | | | |
| **Panel H. Access to information on (local) governance** | | | | | | | X | |
| Level of agreement with statement: 'I feel well-informed about the decisions made by the village leaders.' | (-2;2) | | | X | X | | | X |
| Percentage respondents who know about the policies of the district government related to agriculture and the use of land | (0-100%) | | | X | X | | | |
| **Panel I. Satisfaction with local governance** | | | | | | | X | |
| Index for satisfaction with local governance at village level | (-2;2) | | | X | X | | | X |
| Percentage of respondents who know the name of the mukim leader (imam mukim) | (0-100%) | | | X | | | | |
| Level of agreement with 'The mukim institution serves the benefit of all people in this village' | (-2;2) | | | X | | | | |
| Importance of the role of imam mukim in the village | (1;5) | | | X | | | | |

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Project | | | | Uniform indicator | | Discussed in the report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | E2. Pt.PPMA | E3. NTFP-EP | E8. YRBI | E9. HuMa | MDG7 | GOOD Governance | |
| Index for satisfaction with local governance at sub-district level | (-2;2) | | | X | X | | | X |
| Corruption at village leadership | (1;3) | | | X | X | | | X |
| Corruption at district government | (1;3) | | | X | X | | | X |
| **Panel J. Role of traditional institutions** | | | | | | | | |
| Index for positive attitude towards traditional laws and culture | (-2;2) | | | X | X | | | X |

**Table 18: Outcome indicators for projects on sexual education (MDG3)**

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Project | Uniform indicator | Discussed in the report |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | E12. YPI | MDG 3 | |
| **Panel A. Knowledge** | | | | |
| Index on HIV/AIDS knowledge | (0;17) | | | X |
| Index on knowledge about counselling | (0;2) | | | X |
| Index on other STI knowledge | (0;3) | | | X |
| Index on contraceptive knowledge | (0;2) | | | X |
| Awareness of rights to SRHR information (%) | (0-100%) | | | X |
| **Panel B. Attitude** | | | | |
| Index on the attitude towards relationships | (0;8) | | | X |
| Index on the attitude towards GBV | (0;5) | | X | X |
| Acceptance of HIV/AIDS rights (%) | (0-100%) | | | X |
| Acceptance of homosexuality (%) | (0-100%) | | | X |
| Acceptance of contraceptive (%) | (0-100%) | | | X |
| Action in case STI is suspected: inform partner (%) | (0-100%) | | | X |
| Action in case STI is suspected: seeing a doctor (%) | (0-100%) | | | X |
| **Panel C. Behaviour** | | | | |
| Discussion intimate relationship (%) | (0-100%) | | | X |
| Consultation of a clinic for SRHR related matters (%) | (0-100%) | | | X |
| **Panel D. Unintended effects** | | | | |
| Acceptance of premarital sex (%) | (0-100%) | | | X |
| Index on sexual activity | (0;8) | | | X |

**Table 19: Outcome indicators for projects on assisting victims of gender based violence (MDG3)**

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Project | | Uniform Indicators | Discussed in the report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | E7. LRC-KJHAM | E11. Rifka Annisa | MDG3 | |
| **Panel A. Number of women free of domestic violence** | | | | | |
| Abused by husband/partner in the past 12 months (LRC-KJHAM) or 3 months (Rifka Annisa) (physical, psychological or sexual) | (0;n) | X | X | | X |
| Number of types of abuse by husband/partner | (0-3) | X | X | | X |
| **Panel B. Physical and mental (psychological) health of women** | | | | | |
| Psychological distress index | (0-12) | X | X | | X |
| *Social dysfunction index* | (0-6) | X | X | | X |
| *Anxiety index* | (0-4) | X | X | | X |
| *Losing confidence index* | (0-2) | X | X | | X |
| Components of physical health | | | X | | |
| **Panel C. Women's empowerment/attitude towards themselves** | | | | | |
| *Self-efficacy index* | (-2;2) | X | X | | X |
| *Self-esteem index* | (-2;2) | X | X | | X |
| *Control index* | (-2;2) | X | X | | X |
| *Support* | (-2;2) | X | X | | X |
| **Panel D. Attitude/empowerment in marriage** | | | | | |
| Rights of wife index | (0-9) | X | X | | X |
| Any good reason for a husband to hit his wife | (0;n) | X | X | X | X |
| Number of good reasons for a husband to hit his wife | (0-6) | X | X | X | X |
| Any occasions a wife can refuse to have sex | (0;n) | X | X | X | X |
| Number of occasions a wife can refuse to have sex | (0-3) | X | X | X | X |
| **Panel E. Satisfaction and self-reported impact** | | | | | |
| Feel more emotionally stable and less stressed due to services of LRC-KJHAM or Rifka Annisa | (-2;2) | X | X | | X |
| Notes: n is the number of women in the sample | | | | | |

# Annex D. Change in outcome indicators for the MDG component

**Table 20: Changes of selected outcome variables for project on reforestation – Household level – WIIP (E1)**

| Outcome indicator | E1. WIIP | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assignment group | Bio-Rights | | | Spillover | | |
| Reporting period | Base | End | P-value | Base | End | P-value |
| **Panel A. Reforestation (uniform indicator)** | | | | | | |
| Percentage of households participating in reforestation efforts | 96.3 (2.7) | 98.1 (1.1) | 0.359 | 35.1 (10.9) | 54.3 (7.1) | 0.173 |
| Number of planted seedlings | 397.7 (54.5) | 1,677.0 (405.8) | 0.016 | 66.7 (32.9) | 267.7 (117.4) | 0.088 |
| **Panel D. Household's knowledge of mangroves** | | | | | | |
| Percentage of respondents correctly describing mangroves | 53.7 (13.6) | 97.7 (2.3) | 0.018 | 58.1 (12.6) | 97.4 (1.9) | 0.023 |
| Percentage of respondents correctly recognizing mangroves | 43.5 (4.9) | 46.6 (5.9) | 0.284 | 36.8 (4.8) | 42.1 (7.6) | 0.172 |
| Number of benefits of mangrove forests | 1.3 (0.2) | 1.8 (0.3) | 0.034 | 0.7 (0.2) | 1.5 (0.3) | 0.017 |
| **Panel E. Number of actions taken for disaster risk preparedness** | | | | | | |
| Information action taken by hh to reduce the risk of disaster (%) | 53.7 (9.3) | 67.6 (5.8) | 0.156 | 54.3 (8.1) | 58.5 (5.6) | 0.592 |
| Preparation action taken by hh to reduce the risk of disaster (%) | 76.9 (6.3) | 85.2 (6.3) | 0.062 | 74.5 (5.4) | 87.2 (6.2) | 0.127 |
| Savings action taken by hh to reduce the risk of disaster (%) | 33.3 (4.7) | 23.1 (3.5) | 0.020 | 26.6 (3.2) | 20.2 (4.2) | 0.154 |
| Volunteering action taken by hh to reduce the risk of disaster (%) | 66.7 (7.7) | 73.1 (5.8) | 0.453 | 57.4 (5.9) | 66.0 (5.1) | 0.443 |
| Number of information measures taken by any hh member to reduce the risks of disaster | 1.2 (0.3) | 1.7 (0.4) | 0.079 | 1.0 (0.2) | 1.4 (0.3) | 0.090 |
| Number of preparation measures taken by any hh member to reduce the risks of disaster | 2.6 (0.4) | 2.5 (0.4) | 0.156 | 2.2 (0.2) | 2.5 (0.4) | 0.438 |

| Outcome indicator | E1. WIIP | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assignment group | Bio-Rights | | | Spillover | | |
| Reporting period | Base | End | P-value | Base | End | P-value |
| Number of volunteer measures taken by any hh member to reduce the risks of disaster | 1.1 (0.2) | 1.4 (0.2) | 0.049 | 0.7 (0.2) | 0.9 (0.1) | 0.495 |
| **Panel F. Income of households from sustainable use of the ecosystem (uniform indicator)** | | | | | | |
| Contribution of mangrove forest resources to livelihood (1-5) | 2.1 (0.3) | 2.3 (0.3) | 0.130 | 1.0 (0.2) | 1.6 (0.3) | 0.066 |
| Respondent has income from either forestry, livestock or fishing (%) | 97.8 (1.0) | 93.2 (1.8) | 0.088 | 97.2 (1.6) | 88.9 (3.0) | 0.176 |
| HH income per HH member out of forestry per month (1000 Rp)[1] | 14.8 (5.7) | 20.4 (6.3) | 0.459 | 20.2 (8.2) | 22.3 (6.1) | 0.702 |
| HH income per HH member from livestock per month (1000 Rp)[1] | 62.0 (7.6) | 57.4 (7.1) | 0.584 | 59.6 (5.4) | 67.0 (3.8) | 0.159 |
| HH income per HH member out of fish per month (1000 Rp)[1] | 82.4 (5.3) | 74.1 (5.8) | 0.386 | 91.5 (3.6) | 76.6 (5.5) | 0.043 |

Source: Household survey E1. WIIP; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.

1. Prices are reported in 2012 real prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%). Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/aboutus.php?inflasi=1

**Table 21: Selected outcome variables for project on reforestation – Community level – WIIP (E1)**

| Outcome indicator | E1. WIIP | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assignment group | Comparison | | Treatment | |
| Reporting period | Base | End | Base | End |
| **Panel A. Reforestation** | | | | |
| Number of villages with efforts of […] in the past 2 years | | | | |
| *Mangrove forest protection* | 2 (6) | 2 (5) | 4 (6) | 4 (6) |
| *Non-mangrove forest protection* | 4 (6) | 3 (7) | 3 (5) | 3 (7) |
| **Panel B. Forest management** | | | | |
| Number of villages with forest management structure in place for […] | | | | |
| *Mangrove* | 5 (6) | 4 (5) | 4 (6) | 6 (6) |
| *Non-mangrove* | 3 (6) | 5 (7) | 3 (5) | 6 (7) |
| Number of village with village regulations on natural resources for […] | | | | |
| *Mangrove* | 3 (6) | 2 (5) | 2 (6) | 4 (6) |
| *Non-mangrove* | 3 (6) | 5 (7) | 1 (5) | 5 (7) |
| **Panel C. Condition of forests** | | | | |
| Condition of […] on a scale from 1 to 6 | | | | |
| *Mangrove forest* | 3 (6) | 3 (5) | 4 (6) | 4 (6) |
| *Coastal forest* | 0 | 4 (5) | 3 (2) | 4 (6) |
| *Upland forest* | 4 (6) | 3 (6) | 3 (4) | 3 (7) |
| *Lake area* | 3 (1) | 4 (1) | 4 (2) | 4 (2) |

Source: Community survey E1. WIIP; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: number of non-missing responses given between parentheses

**Table 22: Change of financial indicators for projects on poverty elimination – FIELD (E4), SC GREEN (E5) and KSP-QT (E6)**

| Outcome indicator | E5. SC GREEN | E4. FIELD | | | E6. KSP-QT | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assignment group | | | | | KSP-QT | | | KSU-GTGS | | |
| Reporting period | End | Base | End | P-value | Base | End | P-value | Base | End | P-value |
| A. **Use of financial instruments** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of households that know a place to borrow | 100.0 (0.0) | 98.9 (1.1) | 100.0 0.0 | 0.374 | 99.1 (1.0) | 100.0 (0.0) | 0.390 | 100.0 (0.0) | 100.0 (0.0) | |
| Percentage of households that have borrowed in the past 12 months | 66.7 (21.1) | 39.4 (9.4) | 38.7 (10.8) | 0.903 | 65.7 (5.8) | 54.2 (4.8) | 0.120 | 61.1 (6.0) | 47.4 (9.3) | 0.041 |
| Percentage of households involved in a financial institution | | 62.8 (9.8) | 60.6 (10.7) | 0.846 | 95.4 (1.5) | 77.8 (4.0) | 0.003 | 92.6 (3.7) | 84.2 (3.5) | 0.074 |
| Percentage of households with savings in bank account | | | | | 13.9 (3.2) | 28.7 (4.4) | 0.020 | 32.6 (9.6) | 36.8 (8.8) | 0.571 |
| **B. Financial knowledge and skill** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of households that have financial plan | | | | | 14.8 (3.6) | 54.6 (4.8) | 0.001 | 11.6 (4.6) | 53.7 (7.6) | 0.002 |
| Score on financial numeracy (only for panel respondents) | | | | | 2.750 (0.090) | 3.056 (0.080) | 0.020 | 3.147 (0.067) | 3.158 (0.080) | 0.899 |

Source: Household survey E4. FIELD, E5. SC GREEN and E6. KSP-QT; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

**Table 23: Change of household livelihood indicators for projects on poverty elimination - WIIP (E1) and SC LED-NTT (E10)**

| Outcome indicator | E1. WIIP | | | | | | E10. SC LED-NTT | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assignment group | Bio-Rights | | | Spillover | | | | | |
| Reporting period | Base | End | P-value | Base | End | P-value | Base | End | P-value |
| **C. Household income and livelihood** | | | | | | | | | |
| Household revenue from sale of cashew nuts (1000 Rp) [1] | | | | | | | 796.89 (103.58) | 471.82 (41.84) | 0.006 |
| Total income per month per capita (1000 Rp) [1] | | | | | | | 317.06 (22.41) | 345.54 (55.01) | 0.465 |
| Food consumption per capita (1000 Rp) [1] | 405.1 (23.8) | 418.4 (66.1) | 0.860 | 372.7 (27.2) | 290.8 (22.5) | 0.001 | | | |
| Non-food consumption per capita (1000 Rp) [1] | 171.6 (30.7) | 175.9 (27.0) | 0.803 | 133.1 (27.8) | 153.6 (30.5) | 0.213 | 68.09 (10.89) | 72.48 (7.73) | 0.725 |
| Housing facilities index | -0.4 (0.1) | -0.3 (0.1) | 0.031 | -0.4 (0.0) | -0.3 (0.1) | 0.019 | -0.3 (0.0) | -0.2 (0.0) | 0.174 |
| Asset index | -1.0 (0.1) | -0.8 (0.1) | 0.119 | -1.1 (0.2) | -1.0 (0.2) | 0.640 | -1.3 (0.1) | -1.1 (0.1) | 0.062 |
| Percentage of households invested in business | | | | | | | 10.1 (2.4) | 23.6 (3.1) | 0.017 |
| Percentage of households invested in new farming tools | | | | | | | 64.0 (6.7) | 37.1 (8.2) | 0.006 |
| Overall happiness | 2.1 (0.1) | 2.1 (0.1) | 0.790 | 2.1 (0.1) | 2.2 (0.1) | 0.024 | 2.3 (0.1) | 2.3 (0.1) | 0.924 |
| Current subjective wealth status | 2.3 (0.2) | 2.6 (0.1) | 0.082 | 2.2 (0.1) | 2.3 (0.1) | 0.459 | 2.3 (0.1) | 2.5 (0.1) | 0.013 |

Source: Household survey E1. WIIP and E10. SC LED-NTT; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

1. Prices are reported in 2012 real prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%). Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/aboutus.php?inflasi=1

**Table 24: Change of household livelihood indicators for projects on poverty elimination - FIELD (E4), SC GREEN (E5) and KSP-QT (E6)**

| Outcome indicator | E4. FIELD | | | E5. SC GREEN | E6. KSP-QT | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assignment group | | | | | KSP-QT | | | KSU-GTGS | | |
| Reporting period | Base | End | P-value | End | Base | End | P-value | Base | End | P-value |
| **C. Household income and livelihood** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Household revenue from sale of rice (1000 Rp) [1] | 6,453.1 (3,031.2) | 6,660.7 (4,267.6) | 0.894 | | | | | | | |
| Household revenue from sale of cashew nuts (1000 Rp) [1] | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total income per month per capita (1000 Rp) [1] | 555.7 (72.7) | 438.3 (86.6) | 0.186 | | 312.5 (84.1) | 477.7 (131.2) | 0.147 | 312.0 (70.7) | 984.7 (319.9) | 0.053 |
| Food consumption per capita (1000 Rp)[1] | | | | | 331.8 (21.3) | 315.5 (23.9) | 0.612 | 375.0 (23.4) | 308.3 (19.7) | 0.043 |
| Non-food consumption per capita (1000 Rp) [1] | 369.4 (104.3) | 340.2 (96.5) | 0.426 | | 249.4 (30.1) | 230.5 (23.4) | 0.629 | 525.5 (96.6) | 351.3 (53.8) | 0.266 |
| Housing facilities index | 0.4 0.0 | 0.4 0.0 | 0.308 | 0.4 (0.1) | -0.161 (0.039) | 0.015 (0.037) | 0.000 | 0.151 (0.074) | 0.228 (0.072) | 0.000 |
| Asset index | 0.6 (0.1) | 0.6 0.0 | 0.985 | 0.6 (0.3) | -0.204 (0.094) | -0.121 (0.085) | 0.286 | 0.282 (0.084) | 0.340 (0.102) | 0.356 |
| Percentage of households invested in business | 14.9 (4.0) | 38.3 (6.6) | 0.031 | | 38.0 (4.9) | 19.4 (3.8) | 0.023 | 48.4 (5.9) | 41.1 (7.1) | 0.227 |
| Percentage of households invested in new farming tools | 54.3 (8.5) | 42.6 (8.4) | 0.380 | | 42.6 (7.6) | 17.6 (3.7) | 0.009 | 29.5 (9.8) | 25.3 (7.6) | 0.336 |
| Overall happiness | 2.0 0.0 | 1.9 0.0 | 0.674 | 2.0 (0.0) | 2.0 (0.0) | 2.0 (0.0) | 0.578 | 2.0 (0.0) | 2.0 (0.0) | 0.284 |
| Current subjective wealth status | 2.8 (0.2) | 3.1 (0.1) | 0.038 | 3.0 (0.4) | 2.8 (0.1) | 2.7 (0.1) | 0.276 | 3.1 (0.1) | 3.1 (0.1) | 0.143 |

Source: Household survey E4. FIELD, E5. SC GREEN and E6. KSP-QT; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

1. Prices are reported in 2012 real prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%). Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/aboutus.php?inflasi=1

**Table 25: Change of indicators on yield and volume sold for traded goods for projects on poverty elimination - FIELD (E4) and SC LED-NTT (E10)**

| Outcome indicator | E4. FIELD | | | E10. SC LED-NTT | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | P-value | Base | End | P-value |
| **D. Yield of selected crop** | | | | | | |
| Yield of rice (ton per hectare) | 5.6<br>(0.1) | 6.7<br>(0.6) | 0.086 | | | |
| Yield of cashew nuts (kg) | | | | | | |
| *Per hectare* | | | | 484.6<br>(65.5) | 368.1<br>(34.9) | 0.290 |
| *Per tree* | | | | 4.5<br>(0.7) | 2.8<br>(0.3) | 0.076 |
| **E. Volume of traded good** | | | | | | |
| Volume of cashew nuts sold (kg) | | | | 736.2<br>(106.9) | 464.4<br>(71.0) | 0.010 |
| Volume of rice sold (kg) | 15,501.8<br>(9,063.4) | 18,609.7<br>(11,944.8) | 0.970 | | | |
| **F. Percentage of cashew nuts sold to (inter)national markets (compared to local markets)** | | | | | | |
| Household average (based on kg sold to markets) | | | | 51.0<br>(21.4) | 50.5<br>(14.6) | 0.953 |

Source: Household survey E4. FIELD and E10. SC LED-NTT; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

**Table 26: Change of food security indicators for projects on poverty elimination - WIIP (E1) and SC LED-NTT (E10)**

| Outcome indicator | E1. WIIP | | | | | | E10. SC LED-NTT | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assignment group | Bio-Rights | | | Spillover | | | | | |
| Reporting period | Base | End | P-value | Base | End | P-value | Base | End | P-value |
| **G. Food Security and vulnerability** | | | | | | | | | |
| Nr. Of Months Could Not Cover Living Costs | | | | | | | 3.6 (0.5) | 3.7 (0.2) | 0.981 |
| Nr. Of Months Could Not Enough To Eat | | | | | | | 2.3 (0.3) | 2.4 (0.2) | 0.765 |
| Percentage of households have emergency savings for at least one month | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of households have not enough to eat | | | | | | | 62.9 (4.9) | 79.8 (3.3) | 0.046 |
| Percentage of household not able to cover their living costs during the last 12 months | 70.4 (3.4) | 90.7 (3.8) | 0.012 | 75.5 (4.2) | 90.4 (3.2) | 0.026 | 89.9 (3.8) | 95.5 (2.2) | 0.609 |
| Current standard of living: daily needs covered (only for panel respondents) | 1.4 (0.1) | 1.6 (0.1) | 0.055 | 1.4 (0.1) | 1.5 (0.1) | 0.545 | 1.4 (0.0) | 1.5 (0.0) | 0.376 |
| Current standard of living: food consumption covered (only for panel respondents) | 1.7 (0.1) | 1.7 (0.1) | 0.781 | 1.6 (0.1) | 1.6 (0.1) | 0.611 | 1.6 (0.0) | 1.7 (0.0) | 0.152 |

Source: Household survey E1. WIIP and E10. SC LED-NTT; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

**Table 27: Change of food security indicators for projects on poverty elimination - FIELD (E4), SC GREEN (E5) and KSP-QT (E6)**

| Outcome indicator | E4. FIELD | | | E5. SC GREEN | E6. KSP-QT | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assignment group | | | | | KSP-QT | | | KSU-GTGS | | |
| Reporting period | Base | End | P-value | End | Base | End | P-value | Base | End | P-value |
| **G. Food Security and vulnerability** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nr. Of Months Could Not Cover Living Costs | 0.6 (0.2) | 1.0 (0.2) | 0.225 | 0.3 (0.2) | | | | | | |
| Nr. Of Months Could Not Enough To Eat | 0.3 (0.2) | 0.3 (0.1) | 0.964 | 0.0 (0.0) | | | | | | |
| Percentage of households have emergency savings for at least one month | | | | | 13.0 (3.7) | 55.6 (4.8) | 0.002 | 33.7 (3.8) | 69.5 (5.7) | 0.004 |
| Percentage of households did not have enough to eat during the last 12 months | 12.8 (8.3) | 9.6 (5.1) | 0.812 | 0.0 (0.0) | | | | | | |
| Percentage of household not able to cover their living costs during the last 12 months | 34.0 (7.8) | 51.1 (9.3) | 0.091 | 33.3 (21.1) | 77.8 (2.6) | 68.5 (4.5) | 0.335 | 61.1 (5.8) | 53.7 (3.9) | 0.239 |
| Current standard of living: daily needs covered (only for panel respondents) | 2.1 (0.1) | 2.0 (0.1) | 0.455 | 2.0 (0.0) | 1.8 (0.1) | 1.8 (0.0) | 0.540 | 2.0 (0.1) | 1.9 (0.1) | 0.929 |
| Current standard of living: food consumption covered (only for panel respondents) | 2.2 (0.1) | 2.2 (0.1) | 0.685 | 2.5 (0.2) | 2.1 (0.1) | 2.0 (0.0) | 0.228 | 2.2 (0.1) | 2.1 (0.1) | 0.696 |

Source: Household survey E4. FIELD, E5. SC GREEN and E6. KSP-QT; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

**Table 28: Change of organic farming practices indicators for projects on poverty elimination - FIELD (E4) and SC LED-NTT (E10)**

| Outcome indicator | E4. FIELD | | | E10. SC LED-NTT | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | P-value | Base | End | P-value |
| **H. Households using organic farming practices** | | | | | | |
| Percentage of households using chemical inputs | | | | | | |
| *Using chemical fertilizer* | 67.7 (5.8) | 81.7 (3.7) | 0.230 | 13.5 (11.0) | 15.7 (11.2) | 0.693 |
| *Using chemical pesticides/insecticides* | 90.3 (4.5) | 93.9 (2.6) | 0.341 | 2.3 (1.4) | 0.0 0.0 | 0.183 |
| Percentage of households using organic inputs | | | | | | |
| *Using organic fertilizers* | 67.7 (4.7) | 61.0 (5.3) | 0.254 | 31.5 (6.2) | 49.4 (10.2) | 0.101 |
| *Using organic pesticides/insecticides* | 28.0 (11.6) | 26.8 (9.0) | 0.762 | 13.5 (3.8) | 38.2 (11.0) | 0.053 |

Source: Household survey E4. FIELD and E10. SC LED-NTT; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

**Table 29: Selected community indicators for projects on participatory mapping - Pt.PPMA (E2), NTFP-EP (E3), YRBI (E8) and HuMa (E9)**

| Outcome indicator | E2. Pt.PPMA | | E3. NTFP-EP | | E8. YRBI | | | | E9. HuMa | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assignment group | | | | | Siem | | Lamteuba | | | |
| Reporting period | Baseline | Endline | Baseline | Endline | Baseline | Endline | Baseline | Endline | Baseline | Endline |
| Sample size | (n=2) | (n=2) | (n=4) | (n=4) | (n=1) | (n=1) | (n=3) | (n=3) | (n=4) | (n=4) |
| **Panel A. Size of forest** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Change in forest size | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Descreased* | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | | | | | | |
| *Stayed the same* | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | |
| *Increased* | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | | | | | | |
| **Panel B. Number of villages with efforts at forest protection** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Number of villages with efforts at reforestation | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | | | | | | |
| **Panel C. Management of natural resources** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Existence of regulations about the use and protection of the community forests in the village are present | 1 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| Regulations are communicated to all villagers (including women and children) | 1 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| **Panel D. Households' attitude towards forests/plantations** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Index for positive attitude towards sustainable forest use (community survey) | 1,5 | 1,75 | 0.875 | 1.625 | | | | | | |
| **Panel F. Number of people involved in traditional crafts** | 16 | 0 | 537 | 274 | | | | | | |

Source: Community survey E2. Pt.PPMA, E3. NTFP-EP, E8. YRBI and E9. HuMa; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

**Table 30: Change in selected outcome indicators for projects on participatory mapping - Pt.PPMA (E2) and NTFP-EP (E3)**

| Outcome indicator | E2. Pt.PPMA | | | E3. NTFP-EP | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reporting period | Baseline | Endline | P-Value | Baseline | Endline | P-Value |
| Sample size | (n=40) | (n=40) | (n=35) | (n=80) | (n=80) | (n=71) |
| **Panel C. Management of natural resources** | | | | | | |
| Percentage of respondents who report that there are any rules/regulations about the use of community forests in the village | 90 (30.40) | 85 (36.20) | 0.878 | 97.5 (15.70) | 92.5 (26.50) | 0.066 |
| Satisfaction with regulations | -0.2 (1.20) | -0.7 (1.40) | 0.515 | -0.2 (1.00) | 0.3 (1.10) | 0.142 |
| **Panel D. Households' attitude towards forests/plantations** | | | | | | |
| Dependence on forest resources | 1.1 (0.70) | 1.5 (0.70) | 0.12 | 0.5 (1.00) | 0.7 (1.10) | 0.349 |
| Index for positive attitude towards sustainable forest use | 0.3 (0.60) | 0.3 (0.70) | 0.908 | 0.7 (0.60) | 0.7 (0.50) | 0.257 |
| Index for access to forest resources | 1 (0.60) | 1.3 (0.60) | 0.085 | | | |
| **Panel E. Sense of control of villages** | | | | | | |
| Index for sense of control regarding their own life | 0.6 (0.70) | 0.4 (0.50) | 0.705 | 1 (0.70) | 0.8 (0.60) | 0.132 |
| Index for sense of control regarding land | 1 (0.60) | 0.9 (0.70) | 0.955 | 1.2 (0.40) | 1.2 (0.60) | 0.93 |

Source: Household survey E2. Pt.PPMA and E3. NTFP-EP; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

**Table 31: Change in selected outcome indicators for projects on participatory mapping - YRBI (E8) and HuMa (E9)**

| Outcome indicator | E8. YRBI | | | | | | E9. HuMa | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assignment group | Siem | | | Lamteuba | | | | | |
| Reporting period | Baseline | Endline | P-Value | Baseline | Endline | P-Value | Baseline | Endline | P-Value |
| Sample size | (n=60) | (n=60) | (n=56) | (n=60) | (n=60) | (n=56) | (n=40) | (n=40) | (n=33) |
| **Panel C. Management of natural resources** | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of respondents who report that there are any rules/regulations about the use of community forests in the village | 13.3 (34.30) | 16.7 37.60) | 0.773 | 88.3 (32.40) | 96.7 (18.10) | 0.633 | 77.5 (42.30) | 65.0 (48.30) | 0.001 |
| Satisfaction with regulations[1] | -0.4 (1.00) | -0.5 (1.00) | 0.226 | -0.2 (1.10) | -0.4 (1.20) | 0.478 | -0.3 (1.10) | -0.1 (1.10) | 0.552 |
| **Panel D. Households' attitude towards forests/plantations** | | | | | | | | | |
| Dependence on forest resources | -0.4 (1.10) | -0.8 (0.90) | 0.686 | 0.8 (1.00) | 0.9 (1.10) | 0.647 | 0.6 (1.20) | 1.1 (0.80) | 0.125 |
| Index for positive attitude towards sustainable forest use | 0.7 (0.50) | 1 (0.50) | 0.006 | 0.8 (0.70) | 0.7 (0.60) | 0.334 | 0.4 (0.40) | 0.5 (0.50) | 0.600 |
| Index for access to forest resources | 0.5 (0.50) | 0.8 (0.50) | 0.274 | 0.8 (0.50) | 1.0 (0.50) | 0.360 | 1.2 (0.60) | 0.9 (0.40) | 0.118 |
| **Panel E. Sense of control of villages** | | | | | | | | | |
| Index for sense of control regarding their own life | 0.8 (0.60) | 1.1 (0.60) | 0.026 | 1.0 (0.50) | 1.2 (0.60) | 0.194 | 1.000 (0.80) | 1.200 (0.60) | 0.513 |
| Index for sense of control regarding land | 0.80 (0.40) | 1 (0.40) | 0.063 | 0.9 (0.40) | 1 (0.40) | 0.326 | 1.200 (0.50) | 1.100 (0.50) | 0.380 |
| **Panel H. Access to information on (local) governance** | | | | | | | | | |
| Level of agreement with statement: 'I feel well-informed about the decisions made by the village leaders.' | 1 (0.90) | 1.1 (0.80) | 0.619 | 1.1 (0.50) | 0.2 (1.10) | 0.031 | 0.8 (0.90) | 0.8 (0.90) | 0.571 |
| **Panel I. Satisfaction with local governance** | | | | | | | | | |
| Index for satisfaction with local governance at village level | -0.2 (0.50) | -0.4 (0.30) | 0.155 | -0.4 (0.20) | -0.4 (0.20) | 0.211 | -0.4 (0.30) | -0.4 (0.20) | 0.739 |
| Index for satisfaction with local governance at sub-district level | 1.5 (1.40) | 1.2 (0.60) | 0.532 | 1.3 (1.50) | 1.1 (0.90) | 0.709 | 1.2 (0.40) | 1 (0.40) | 0.216 |
| Corruption at village leadership | 1.3 (0.60) | 1.4 (0.50) | 0.959 | 1.4 (0.60) | 1.2 (0.50) | 0.182 | 1.2 (0.50) | 1.5 (0.60) | 0.234 |
| Corruption at district government | 2 (0.80) | 2.1 (0.70) | 0.815 | 2.2 (0.70) | 2.2 (0.70) | 0.814 | 1.400 (0.50) | 1.900 (0.50) | 0.085 |
| **Panel J. Role of traditional institutions** | | | | | | | | | |
| Index for positive attitude towards traditional laws and culture | 0.9 (0.70) | 1.1 (0.60) | 0.025 | 1.1 (0.80) | 1 (0.60) | 0.507 | 1.2 (0.50) | 1.2 (0.50) | 0.376 |

Source: Household survey E8. YRBI and E9. HuMa; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

1. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 56, 60, 52, 59, 60 and 56

**Table 32: Change in selected outcome indicators for projects on sexual education – YPI (E12)**

| Student type | D4L-type | | DAKU&D4L | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sample size | [n=60] | | [n=120] | |
| Survey | Base | End | Base | End |
| **Panel A. Knowledge** | | | | |
| Index on HIV/AIDS knowledge (0-17) | 7.84 | 8.12 | 9.47 | 8.55 |
| Index on counselling knowledge (0-2) | 0.20 | 0.26 | 0.34 | 0.41 |
| Index on STI knowledge (0-3) | 0.65 | 0.67 | 1.07 | 1.09 |
| Index on contraceptive knowledge (0-2) | 0.63 | 0.61 | 0.67 | 0.63 |
| Awareness of rights to SRHR information | 79.8% | 76.1% | 85.0% | 88.7% |
| **Panel B. Attitude** | | | | |
| Index on relationship (0-8) | 3.65 | 4.12 | 4.23 | 4.28 |
| Index on attitude towards GBV (0-5) | 3.92 | 4.05 | 4.11 | 4.03 |
| Acceptance of HIV/AIDS rights | 55.2% | 58.3% | 70.0% | 74.2% |
| Acceptance of homosexuality | 17.8% | 6.8% | 21.7% | 12.9% |
| Acceptance of contraceptive | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Action in case STI is suspected: inform partner | 43.8% [n=18] | 28.6% [n=22] | 37.7% [n=58] | 40.1% [n=61] |
| Action in case STI is suspected: seeing a doctor | 71.6% [n=18] | 59.1% [n=22] | 97.1% [n=58] | 92.6% [n=61] |
| **Panel C. Behaviour** | | | | |
| Discussion intimate relationship | 35.4% | 30.1% | 38.9% | 41.0% |
| Consultation of a clinic for SRHR related matters | 18.2% | 21.2% | 15.2% | 20.7% |
| **Panel D. Unintended effects** | | | | |
| Acceptance of premarital sex | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Index on sexual activity (0-8) | 2.73 | 3.11 | 1.71 | 2.20 |

Source: Student base- and endline survey E12. YPI, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

**Table 33: Change in selected outcome indicators of projects assisting victims of gender based violence - LRC-KJHAM (E7) and Rifka Annisa (E11)**

| Change | E7. LRC-KJHAM | | | E11. Rifka Annisa | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Outcome indicator** | Baseline | Endline | Change | Baseline | Endline | Change |
| **Sample size** | 20 | 20 | 20 | 18 | 18 | 18 |
| **Panel A. Number of women free of domestic violence** | | | | | | |
| Abused by husband/partner in the past 12 months (LRC-KJHAM) or 3 months (Rifka Annisa) (physical, psychological or sexual) | 15 | 5 | 10 | 9 | 5 | 4 |
| Number of types of abuse by husband/partner | 1.45 (1.10) | 0.30 (0.57) | -1.15*** (1.27) | 0.56 (0.62) | 0.39 (0.70) | -0.17 (0.51) |
| **Panel B. Physical and mental (psychological) health of women** | | | | | | |
| Psychological distress index | 4.80 (2.35) | 2.70 (1.84) | -2.10*** (2.95) | 3.94 (2.01) | 3.28 (2.32) | -0.67 (2.09) |
| *Social dysfunction index* | 1.10 (1.17) | 0.40 (0.99) | -0.70** (1.22) | 1.11 (1.02) | 0.61 (0.92) | -0.50* (1.10) |
| *Anxiety index* | 2.40 (1.10) | 1.60 (1.10) | -0.80** (1.54) | 2.22 (1.06) | 2.17 (1.47) | -0.06 (1.11) |
| *Losing confidence index* | 1.30 (0.80) | 0.70 (0.80) | -0.60** (1.19) | 0.83 (0.86) | 0.72 (0.75) | -0.11 (0.90) |
| **Panel C. Women's empowerment/attitude towards themselves** | | | | | | |
| Self-efficacy index | 0.65 (0.63) | 0.82 (0.67) | 0.17 (0.69) | 1.00 (0.69) | 0.72 (0.81) | -0.28 (0.69) |
| Self-esteem index | 0.10 (0.45) | 0.56 (0.41) | 0.46*** (0.53) | 0.36 (0.52) | 0.21 (0.44) | -0.15 (0.63) |
| Control index | 0.20 (0.82) | 0.38 (0.81) | 0.17 (1.20) | 0.19 (0.84) | 0.22 (0.79) | 0.03 (1.02) |
| Support | 1.3 (0.47) | 1.2 (0.89) | -0.1 (0.97) | 1.28 (0.96) | 1.17 (0.71) | -0.11 (1.13) |
| **Panel D. Attitude/empowerment in marriage** | | | | | | |
| Rights of wife index | 5.8 (1.79) | 5.35 (1.46) | -0.45 (1.67) | 4.56 (1.62) | 4.78 (1.70) | 0.22 (1.35) |
| Any good reason for a husband to hit his wife | 5 | 4 | | 7 | 5 | |
| Number of good reasons for a husband to hit his wife | 0.5 (1.00) | 0.35 (0.81) | -0.15 (1.14) | 0.5 (0.79) | 0.61 (1.33) | 0.11 (0.83) |
| Any occasions a wife can refuse to have sex | 19 | 20 | | 15 | 17 | |

| Change | E7. LRC-KJHAM | | | E11. Rifka Annisa | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Outcome indicator** | Baseline | Endline | Change | Baseline | Endline | Change |
| **Sample size** | 20 | 20 | 20 | 18 | 18 | 18 |
| Number of occasions a wife can refuse to have sex | 2.25 (0.85) | 2.25 (0.64) | 0 (1.12) | 1.67 (0.84) | 1.89 (0.58) | 0.22 (0.81) |
| **Panel E. Satisfaction and self-reported impact** | | | | | | |
| Feel more emotionally stable and less stressed due to services of LRC-KJHAM or Rifka Annisa | 0.77 (1) (0.60) | 0.75 (0.79) | | 1.00 (0.69) | 0.78 (0.43) | |

Source: Household surveys E7. LRC-KJHAM and E11. Rifka Annisa; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Standard errors are robust and corrected for clustering at the village level.
* p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value <0.01
1. Sample size deviates, the number of observations is 13

# Annex E. Attribution of change for the MDG component

**Table 34: Regression results for projects on reforestation – WIIP (E1)**

| | E1. WIIP | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Assignment group** | **Bio-rights group treatment effect** | | **Spillover group treatment effect** | |
| **Outcome indicator** | Early treatment effect | DD with controls | Early treatment effect | DD with controls |
| **Panel A. Reforestation** | | | | |
| Ever participated in reforestation efforts (%) | 53.5***<br>(11.30) | -10.6<br>(8.90) | -4.2<br>(12.60) | 11<br>(14.50) |
| Number of seedlings planted | 316.3***<br>(73.20) | 1,186.7***<br>(381.00) | -34.4<br>(47.20) | 244.7<br>(157.60) |
| **Panel D. Household's knowledge of mangroves** | | | | |
| Correct description of mangroves (%) | 16.1<br>(15.70) | -15.1<br>(20.60) | 18.1<br>(15.30) | -15.3<br>(20.00) |
| Recognition of mangroves is correct (%) | 2.4<br>(9.30) | 10.5*<br>(5.40) | 1.2<br>(6.20) | 16.6**<br>(6.50) |
| Number of benefits from mangrove forests | 0.3*<br>(0.10) | -0.3<br>(0.20) | 0.1<br>(0.10) | 0.2<br>(0.30) |
| **Panel F. Income of households from sustainable use of the ecosystem** | | | | |
| Contribution of mangrove forest resources to livelihood (1-5) | -0.0*<br>(0.0) | -0.4**<br>(0.20) | -0.0<br>(0.0) | 0.2<br>(0.3) |
| Household income per capita per month (1000 Rp)[1] from […] | | | | |
| *Forestry* | -6.2<br>(8.4) | 6.0<br>(10.6) | -5.7<br>(7.2) | 11.5<br>(13.6) |
| *Livestock* | 3.7<br>(49.5) | 89.8<br>(185.6) | -7.8<br>(27.7) | -134.4<br>(150.6) |
| *Fish* | 33.5<br>(58.0) | 34.8<br>(60.1) | 51.4<br>(62.6) | 21.3<br>(51.9) |

Source: Household survey E1. WIIP; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard errors given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.
1. Prices are reported in 2012 real prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%).

**Table 35: Regression results for financial indicators - FIELD (E4), SC GREEN (E5) and KSP-QT (E6)**

| | E4. FIELD | | | | E5. SC GREEN | | E6. KSP-QT | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Assignment group** | **Farming Group** | | **Saving and Credit Cooperative** | | | | **KSP-QT** | | **KSU-GTGS** | |
| **Outcome indicator** | Base | DDX | Base | DDX | ATET $(\beta)^1$ | ATET $(\beta)^2$ | Base | DDX | Base | DDX |
| **Panel A. Use of financial instruments** | | | | | | | | | | |
| % HHs know a place to borrow money | -2.55 (1.74) | 1.94 (2.33) | -3.29 (2.69) | 3.50 (3.26) | 1.12 (4.44) | 0.17 (4.85) | 6.557** (2.338) | -0.391 (6.384) | 4.932** (1.762) | -2.444 (6.114) |
| % HHs involved in a financial institution | 16.06 (11.04) | -14.37 (10.31) | 15.22 (9.22) | -11.54 (7.16) | | | 72.122*** (4.670) | -17.113** (7.047) | 65.098*** (5.172) | -10.241 (6.846) |
| % HHs have savings in bank account | | | | | | | -8.014 (4.981) | 11.427* (6.021) | 7.075 (9.521) | 10.321 (7.670) |
| % HHs have borrowed in past 12 months | 0.89 (8.21) | -9.98 (10.36) | 5.01 (7.56) | 6.35 (9.28) | 36.64* (21.15) | 20.87 (22.82) | 32.830*** (5.494) | -7.839 (11.482) | 18.726** (7.596) | -20.377 (11.853) |
| **Panel B. Financial knowledge and skill** | | | | | | | | | | |
| % HHs have financial plan | | | | | | | 1.968 (6.063) | 13.087 (15.150) | 3.639 (6.172) | 20.227 (13.751) |
| Score on financial numeracy[1] | | | | | | | 0.054 (0.199) | 0.087 (0.319) | 0.371* (0.196) | -0.424 (0.338) |

Source: Household survey E4. FIELD, E5. SC GREEN, and E6. KSP-QT; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes: Standard errors given in parentheses.

1. Controls included in regressions are the education and age of the respondent and the main income source of the household.
2. Controls included in the regression are the same as under 1. In addition, we also control for the respondent's membership in a saving and credit cooperative, in a saving and credit group and in a handicraft group (separately).

**Table 36: Regression results for household livelihood indicators - FIELD (E4), SC GREEN (E5) and KSP-QT (E6)**

| | E4. FIELD | | | | E5. SC GREEN | | E6. KSP-QT | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Assignment group** | **Farming Group** | | **Savings and Credit Cooperative** | | | | **KSP-QT** | | **KSU-GTGS** | |
| **Outcome indicator** | Base | DDX | Base | DDX | ATET $(\beta)^1$ | ATET $(\beta)^2$ | Base | DDX | Base | DDX |
| **Panel C. Household income and livelihood** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Log Household revenue from sale of rice (1000 Rp) | 0.72** (0.27) | -0.43 (0.28) | 0.45* (0.24) | 0.04 (0.32) | | | | | | |
| Log Household revenue per month from sale of cashew nuts (1000 Rp) | | | | | 410.12 (346.13) | 133.82 (371.10) | | | | |
| Log Total income per month per capita (1000 Rp) | 0.40** (0.19) | 0.01 (0.46) | 0.30* (0.18) | -0.17 (0.41) | | | 0.382* (0.204) | 0.513 (0.300) | 0.325 (0.312) | 1.495*** (0.286) |
| Log Food consumption per capita (1000 Rp) | | | | | | | 0.041 (0.090) | -0.100 (0.130) | 0.205* (0.104) | -0.023 (0.118) |
| Log Non-food consumption per capita (1000 Rp) | 0.25* (0.12) | -0.02 (0.16) | 0.25** (0.11) | -0.22 (0.15) | | | -0.056 (0.104) | 0.171 (0.147) | 0.332* (0.172) | 0.159 (0.157) |
| Housing facilities index | 0.20** (0.08) | 0.20*** (0.05) | 0.02 (0.06) | 0.02 (0.04) | 0.29* (0.16) | 0.24 (0.18) | 0.001 (0.049) | -0.068 (0.076) | 0.262** (0.092) | -0.168** (0.079) |
| Asset index | 0.26** (0.10) | -0.01 (0.10) | 0.05 (0.10) | -0.11 (0.09) | 0.25 (0.26) | 0.28 (0.28) | 0.097 (0.102) | -0.204*** (0.062) | 0.295*** (0.092) | -0.219*** (0.057) |
| Percentage of households invested in business | 8.05* (4.41) | 9.61 (10.76) | 2.36 (3.55) | -20.43* (10.85) | | | 12.299 (7.886) | -11.687 (10.256) | 25.463*** (7.218) | 12.179 (9.478) |
| Percentage of households invested in new farming tools | 15.35** (6.86) | 4.03 (11.79) | 2.18 (6.92) | -4.92 (9.67) | | | -0.650 (9.394) | -0.272 (13.109) | -11.529 (7.951) | 20.076 (13.517) |
| Overall happiness | 0.06 (0.04) | 0.26*** (0.06) | -0.03 (0.04) | -0.05 (0.06) | -0.01 (0.23) | 0.08 (0.24) | -0.075 (0.049) | -0.002 (0.086) | 0.037 (0.076) | 0.009 (0.069) |
| Current subjective wealth status | 0.04 (0.16) | 0.12 (0.19) | -0.04 (0.13) | -0.09 (0.17) | 0.17 (0.38) | -0.07 (0.40) | -0.114 (0.067) | -0.007 (0.202) | 0.095 (0.148) | 0.397* (0.223) |

Source: Household survey E4. FIELD, E5. SC GREEN and E6. KSP-QT; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes: Standard errors given in parentheses.

1. Controls included in regressions are the education and age of the respondent and the main income source of the household.
2. Controls included in the regression are the same as under 1. In addition, we also control for the respondent's membership in a saving and credit cooperative, in a saving and credit group and in a handicraft group (separately).

**Table 37: Regression results for household livelihood indicators - WIIP (E1) and SC LED-NTT (E10)**

| | E1. WIIP | | | | E10. SC LED-NTT | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Assignment group** | **Bio-rights group treatment effect** | | **Spillover group treatment effect** | | | |
| **Outcome indicator** | Base | DDX | Base | DDX | Base | DDX |
| **Panel C. Household income and livelihood** | | | | | | |
| Log Household revenue per month from sale of cashew nuts (1000 Rp) | | | | | 0.7*** | -0.2 |
| | | | | | (0.20) | (0.30) |
| Log Total income per month per capita (1000 Rp) | | | | | -0.2 | -0.3 |
| | | | | | (0.20) | (0.30) |
| Food consumption per capita (1000 Rp) | 0.1* | -0.1 | 0 | 0 | | |
| | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | | |
| Non-food consumption per capita (1000 Rp) | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.00 | 0.10 | 0 | -0.2 |
| | (0.20) | (0.10) | (0.20) | (0.10) | (0.20) | (0.20) |
| Housing facilities index | 0 | 0 | -0.1 | 0.1 | 0 | 0 |
| | (0.10) | 0.00 | (0.10) | (0.10) | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Asset index | 0.10 | -0.10 | 0.00 | -0.20 | -0.2 | 0 |
| | (0.20) | (0.10) | (0.20) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| Percentage of households invested in business | | | | | -5.3 | -12.1 |
| | | | | | (4.80) | (7.20) |
| Percentage of households invested in new farming tools | | | | | 8.4 | 0 |
| | | | | | (6.60) | (14.80) |
| Overall happiness | -0.10 | -0.10 | -0.10 | 0.10 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.20) |
| Current subjective wealth status | 0.30 | 0.00 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.5*** | -0.3 |
| | (0.20) | (0.20) | (0.20) | (0.20) | (0.10) | (0.20) |

Source: Household survey E1. WIIP and E10. SC LED-NTT; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard errors given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

**Table 38: Regression results for indicators on yield and volume of traded good – FIELD (E4) and SC LED-NTT (E10)**

| | E4. FIELD | | | | E10. SC LED-NTT | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Farming Group | | Savings and Credit Cooperative | | | |
| **Outcome indicator** | Base | DDX | Base | DDX | Base | DDX |
| **D. Yield of selected crop** | | | | | | |
| Yield of rice per hectare | 0.60*** (0.12) | -0.15 (0.34) | -0.22** (0.10) | -0.82** (0.36) | | |
| Yield of cashew nuts | | | | | | |
| - Per hectare | | | | | 229.2*** (51.00) | -10.8 (75.40) |
| - Per tree | | | | | 2.1*** (0.50) | -0.7 (0.80) |
| **E. Volume of traded good (uniform indicator)** | | | | | | |
| Volume of cashew nuts sold (kg) | | | | | 88.1 (55.10) | -133.4 (89.40) |
| Volume of rice sold (kg) | 19,501.40 (11,982.49) | -17,391.73 (10,888.58) | 14,322.71 (9,006.86 ) | -9,823.04 (6,867.78 ) | | |
| **F. Percentage of cashew nuts sold to (inter)national markets (compared to local markets) (uniform indicator)** | | | | | | |
| Household average (based on kg sold to markets) | | | | | 38.4*** (10.8) | 5.8 (19.9) |

Source: Household survey E4. FIELD and E10. SC LED-NTT; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard errors given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

**Table 39: Regression results of food security indicators - FIELD (E4), SC GREEN (E5) and KSP-QT (E6)**

| | E4. FIELD | | | | E5. SC GREEN | | E6. KSP-QT | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Assignment group** | **Farming Group** | | **Savings and Credit Cooperative** | | | | **KSP-QT** | | **KSU-GTGS** | |
| **Outcome indicator** | Base | DDX | Base | DDX | ATET $(\theta)^1$ | ATET $(\theta)^2$ | Base | DDX | Base | DDX |
| **G. Food Security and vulnerability** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Nr. Of Months Could Not Cover Living Costs | 0.19 (0.13) | -0.67* (0.35) | -0.10 (0.16) | 0.04 (0.28) | -0.81 (0.64) | -0.74 (0.70) | | | | |
| Nr. Of Months Could Not Enough To Eat | 0.19 (0.13) | -0.76** (0.31) | -0.08 (0.11) | -0.09 (0.20) | 0.11 (0.37) | 0.07 (0.39) | | | | |
| Percentage of households have emergency savings for at least one month | | | | | -1.15 (12.36) | 0.86 (13.21) | -3.799 (5.387) | 10.350 (14.665) | 16.750*** (4.893) | 27.820** (12.594) |
| Percentage of households have not enough to eat | 11.03 (6.71) | -25.64** (9.22) | -6.10 (6.15) | -2.90 (7.59) | | | | | | |
| Percentage of household not able to cover their living costs during the last 12 months | 8.59 (5.98) | -26.22*** (9.26) | -3.86 (7.80) | 0.42 (8.33) | -13.59 (23.35) | -19.18 (25.62) | 8.872* (4.682) | -7.178 (12.907) | -10.331* (5.468) | -15.241 (14.895) |
| Current standard of living: daily needs covered (only for panel respondents) | 0.23*** (0.08) | -0.04 (0.13) | 0.17** (0.08) | -0.01 (0.11) | -0.17 (0.22) | -0.38 (0.23) | -0.015 (0.059) | 0.175 (0.136) | 0.154 (0.090) | 0.332** (0.140) |
| Current standard of living: food consumption covered (only for panel respondents) | 0.22** (0.08) | -0.08 (0.10) | 0.20** (0.09) | 0.00 (0.11) | 0.31 (0.21) | 0.22 (0.23) | 0.003 (0.112) | 0.166 (0.202) | 0.089 (0.120) | 0.203 (0.205) |

Source: Household survey E4. FIELD, E5, SC GREEN, and E6. KSP-QT; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes: Standard errors given in parentheses.

1. Controls included in regressions are the education and age of the respondent and the main income source of the household.
2. Controls included in the regression are the same as under 1. In addition, we also control for the respondent's membership in a saving and credit cooperative, in a saving and credit group and in a handicraft group (separately).

**Table 40: Regression results for food security indicators - WIIP (E1) and SC LED-NTT (E10)**

| | E1. WIIP | | | | E10. SC LED-NTT | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Assignment group** | **Bio-rights group treatment effect** | | **Spillover group treatment effect** | | | |
| **Outcome indicator** | Base | DDX | Base | DDX | Base | DDX |
| **G. Food Security and vulnerability** | | | | | | |
| Nr. Of Months Could Not Cover Living Costs | | | | | 1.6*** (0.40) | -0.2 (0.50) |
| Nr. Of Months Could Not Enough To Eat | | | | | 0.5 (0.30) | -0.4 (0.40) |
| Percentage of households have not enough to eat | | | | | -8.5 (7.40) | -2.7 (9.40) |
| Percentage of household not able to cover their living costs during the last 12 months | 0.00 0.00 | -1.00 (7.30) | -0.0* 0.00 | -5.00 (5.00) | 4.80 (5.00) | -6.00 (8.70) |
| Current standard of living: daily needs covered (only for panel respondents) | 0.10 (0.10) | 0.10 (0.10) | 0.10 (0.10) | 0.00 (0.10) | 0.2*** (0.10) | 0 (0.10) |
| Current standard of living: food consumption covered (only for panel respondents) | 0.10 (0.10) | (0.10) (0.10) | 0.10 (0.10) | 0.00 (0.10) | 0.1 (0.10) | -0.1 (0.10) |

Source: Household survey E1. WIIP and E10. SC LED-NTT; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard errors given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

**Table 41: Regression results for organic farming practices indicators - FIELD (E4) and SC LED-NTT (E10)**

| | E4. FIELD | | | | E10. SC LED-NTT | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Assignment group** | **Farming Group** | | **Savings and Credit Cooperative** | | | |
| **Outcome indicator** | Base | DDX | Base | DDX | Base | DDX |
| **H. Households using organic farming practices** | | | | | | |
| Percentage of households using chemical inputs | | | | | | |
| *Using chemical fertilizer* | -13.86* (8.03) | 8.01 (13.24) | -3.30 (6.33) | 12.10 (10.11) | -0.1 (1.70) | -0.2 (2.60) |
| *Using chemical pesticides/insecticides* | -0.30 (3.75) | -4.39 (5.13) | 4.49 (4.54) | -3.33 (4.22) | -0.6 (1.60) | -3.6* (1.90) |
| Percentage of households using organic inputs | | | | | | |
| *Using organic fertilizers* | 41.63*** (9.80) | -28.55** (13.10) | 4.83 (8.92) | -12.70 (11.22) | 18.3** (6.00) | -11.3 (11.40) |
| *Using organic pesticides/insecticides* | 27.33** (11.00) | -16.74 (11.46) | 2.13 (8.83) | 12.27* (6.66) | -0.3 (7.10) | -12.8 (12.60) |

Source: Household survey E4. FIELD and E10. SC LED-NTT; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard errors given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

**Table 42: Regression results for selected outcome indicators – YPI (E12)**

| Regression model | | Weighted mean comp. group | 1. ITT school level | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Treatment group | | | D4L-only | DAKU & D4L |
| Indicator | Survey | | $\beta_1$ | $\beta_2$ |
| **Panel A. Knowledge** | | | | |
| Index on HIV/AIDS knowledge (0-17) | Base | 6.67 | 0.98<br>(0.74) | 2.83***<br>(0.56) |
| | End | 6.43 | 1.48*<br>(0.86) | 2.11***<br>(0.72) |
| Index on counselling knowledge (0-2) | Base | 0.13 | 0.11<br>(0.12) | 0.26**<br>(0.12) |
| | End | 0.28 | -0.01<br>(0.13) | 0.13<br>(0.12) |
| Index on STI knowledge (0-3) | Base | 0.58 | -0.01<br>(0.19) | 0.41**<br>(0.18) |
| | End | 0.64 | 0.06<br>(0.19) | 0.49**<br>(0.19) |
| Index on contraceptive knowledge (0-2) | Base | 0.37 | 0.19<br>(0.15) | 0.32**<br>(0.12) |
| | End | 0.48 | 0.07<br>(0.15) | 0.16<br>(0.14) |
| Awareness of rights to SRHR information | Base | 0.78 | 0.03<br>(0.07) | 0.10*<br>(0.06) |
| | End | 0.78 | -0.02<br>(0.08) | 0.11*<br>(0.06) |
| **Panel B. Attitude** | | | | |
| Index on attitude towards relationships (0-8) | Base | 3.72 | -0.33<br>(0.36) | 0.29<br>(0.29) |
| | End | 4.09 | -0.26<br>(0.33) | -0.06<br>(0.28) |
| Index on attitude towards GBV (0-5) | Base | 4.12 | -0.23<br>(0.17) | -0.06<br>(0.14) |
| | End | 3.86 | 0.24<br>(0.19) | 0.12<br>(0.14) |
| HIV/AIDS patients should have same right | Base | 0.41 | 0.10<br>(0.09) | 0.28***<br>(0.08) |
| | End | 0.58 | -0.03<br>(0.09) | 0.15**<br>(0.07) |
| Acceptance of homo-sexuality | Base | 0.08 | 0.10<br>(0.06) | 0.12**<br>(0.06) |
| | End | 0.08 | -0.02<br>(0.05) | 0.04<br>(0.05) |
| **Panel C. Behaviour** | | | | |
| Discussion intimate relationship | Base | 0.26 | 0.05<br>(0.09) | 0.13*<br>(0.08) |
| | End | 0.29 | -0.06<br>(0.08) | 0.07<br>(0.07) |
| Consultation of a clinic for SRHR related matters | Base | 0.14 | 0.08<br>(0.07) | 0.04<br>(0.07) |
| | End | 0.26 | -0.07<br>(0.07) | -0.06<br>(0.07) |

| Regression model | | Weighted mean comp. group | 1. ITT school level | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Treatment group | | | D4L-only | DAKU & D4L |
| Indicator | Survey | | $\beta_1$ | $\beta_2$ |
| **Panel D. Unintended effects** | | | | |
| Index on sexual activity (0-8) | Base | 1.35 | 1.33*** (0.42) | 0.46* (0.27) |
| | End | 1.78 | 1.18*** (0.42) | 0.46 (0.30) |

Source: Student base- and endline survey E12. YPI, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard errors given in brackets. Regressions are estimated with age and gender as covariates. For ITT school level (equation (1)), observations are weighted proportional to the inverse of the probability of being included in the sample due to stratification. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the school level. * p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value <0.01.

# Annex F. Methodological Approach and Reflection for Capacity Development

## 1. Introduction

This Annex describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around four key evaluation questions:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

Note: the methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report. At the end of this Annex, a brief methodological reflection is provided.

## 2. Changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 1

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?**

This question was mainly addressed by reviewing changes in 5c indicators, but additionally a 'general causal map' based on the SPO perspective on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline has been developed. Each of these is further explained below. The development of the general causal map is integrated in the steps for the endline workshop, as mentioned below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Annex G. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012.[137] Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1) **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff. This general causal map was developed to also get the SPO perspective on what they considered as important capacity development changes since the baseline. For this reason, and since the indicators by themselves could not provide this overall SPO story and perspectives on what they considered important changes, only the SPO perspective has been included. This was an additional activity that wasn't planned for during the baseline. The analysis in terms of organisational capacity changes has however mainly focused on changes in the 5c indicators.

[137] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

2) **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3) **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4) **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5) **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

The scores were developed by the evaluation team, after thorough analysis and description of the situation during endline and how this changes since the baseline. These scores are based on mainly proportional differences. Whilst the information provided by staff may have provided socially desirable answers, the information provided has been cross-checked using different sources of information (different staff groups based on functions; self-assessments in interviews; interviews with CFA and other externals).

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Below each of these steps is further explained.

*Step 1. Provide the **description of indicators** in the relevant formats – CDI team*

- These formats were to be used when collecting data from SPO staff, CFA, partners, and consultants. For each of these respondents different formats have been developed, based on the list of 5C indicators, similar to the procedure that was used during the baseline assessment. The CDI team needed to add the 2012 baseline description of each indicator. The idea was that each respondent would be requested to review each description per indicator, and indicate whether the current situation is different from the baseline situation, how this situation has changed, and what the reasons for the changes in indicators are. At the end of each format, a more general question is added that addresses how the organisation has changed its capacity since the baseline, and what possible reasons for change exist. Please see below the questions asked for each indicator as well as the more general questions at the end of the list of indicators.

General questions about key changes in the capacity of the SPO

*What do you consider to be the key changes in terms of how the organisation/ SPO has developed its capacity since the baseline (2012)?*

*What do you consider to be the main explanatory reasons (interventions, actors or factors) for these changes?*

**List of questions to be asked for each of the 5C indicators** (The entry point is the the description of each indicator as in the 2012 baseline report):

1. *How has the situation of this indicator changed compared to the situation during the baseline in 2012? Please tick one of the following scores:*
    - -2 = Considerable deterioration
    - -1 = A slight deterioration
    - 0 = No change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012
    - +1 = Slight improvement
    - +2 = Considerable improvement
2. *Please describe what exactly has changed since the baseline in 2012*
3. *What interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation in 2012? Please tick and describe what interventions, actors or factors influenced this indicator, and how. You can tick and describe more than one choice.*
    - Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by **SPO**: ..... .
    - Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **Dutch CFA (MFS II funding)**: .... .
    - Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **other funders**: ..... .
    - **Other** interventions, actors or factors: ..... .
    - Don't know.

*Step 2. **Review** the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team*

Before the in-country team and the CDI team started collecting data in the field, it was important that they reviewed the description for each indicator as described in the baseline reports, and also

added to the endline formats for review by respondents. These descriptions are based on document review, observation, and interviews with SPO staff, CFA staff and external respondents during the baseline. It was important to explain this to respondents before they filled in the formats.

*Step 3.* ***Send the formats*** *adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)*

The CDI team was responsible for collecting data from the CFA:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – CFA perspective.

The in-country team was responsible for collecting data from the SPO and from external respondents (except CFA). The following formats were sent before the fieldwork started:

- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – SPO perspective.
- 5C Endline interview guides for externals: partners; OD consultants.

*Step 4.* ***Collect, upload & code the documents*** *from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team*

The CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team, collected the following documents from SPOs and CFAs:

- Project documents: project proposal, budget, contract (Note that for some SPOs there is a contract for the full MFS II period 2011-2015; for others there is a yearly or 2-yearly contract. All new contracts since the baseline in 2012 will need to be collected);
- Technical and financial progress reports since the baseline in 2012;.
- Mid-term evaluation reports;
- End of project-evaluation reports (by the SPO itself or by external evaluators);
- Contract intake forms (assessments of the SPO by the CFA) or organisational assessment scans made by the CFA that cover the 2011-2014 period;
- Consultant reports on specific inputs provided to the SPO in terms of organisational capacity development;
- Training reports (for the SPO; for alliance partners, including the SPO);
- Organisational scans/ assessments, carried out by the CFA or by the Alliance Assessments;
- Monitoring protocol reports, especially for the 5C study carried out by the MFS II Alliances;
- Annual progress reports of the CFA and of the Alliance in relation to capacity development of the SPOs in the particular country;
- Specific reports that are related to capacity development of SPOs in a particular country.

The following documents (since the baseline in 2012) were requested from SPO:

- Annual progress reports;
- Annual financial reports and audit reports;

- Organisational structure vision and mission since the baseline in 2012;
- Strategic plans;
- Business plans;
- Project/ programme planning documents;
- Annual work plan and budgets;
- Operational manuals;
- Organisational and policy documents: finance, human resource development, etc.;
- Monitoring and evaluation strategy and implementation plans;
- Evaluation reports;
- Staff training reports;
- Organisational capacity reports from development consultants.

The CDI team will coded these documents in NVivo (qualitative data analysis software program) against the 5C indicators.

*Step 5.* ***Prepare and organise the field visit*** *to the SPO – in-country team*

Meanwhile the in-country team prepared and organised the logistics for the field visit to the SPO:

- **General endline workshop** consisted about one day for the self-assessments (about ½ to ¾ of the day) and brainstorm (about 1 to 2 hours) on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline and underlying interventions, factors and actors ('general causal map'), see also explanation below. This was done with the five categories of key staff: managers; project/ programme staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin & HRM staff; field staff. Note: for SPOs involved in process tracing an additional 1 to 1½ day workshop (managers; program/project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff) was necessary. See also step 7;
- **Interviews with SPO staff** (roughly one day);
- **Interviews with external respondents** such as partners and organisational development consultants depending on their proximity to the SPO. These interviews coulc be scheduled after the endline workshop and interviews with SPO staff.

General causal map

During the 5C endline process, a 'general causal map' has been developed, based on key organisational capacity changes and underlying causes for these changes, as perceived by the SPO. The general causal map describes cause-effect relationships, and is described both as a visual as well as a narrative.

As much as possible the same people that were involved in the baseline were also involved in the endline workshop and interviews.

*Step 6.* ***Interview the CFA*** *– CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for sending the sheets/ formats to the CFA and for doing a follow-up interview on the basis of the information provided so as to clarify or deepen the information provided. This relates to:

5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;

5C Endline support to capacity sheet - CFA perspective.

*Step 7.* ***Run the endline workshop*** *with the SPO – in-country team*

This included running the endline workshop, including facilitation of the development of the general causal map, self-assessments, interviews and observations. Particularly for those SPOs that were selected for process tracing all the relevant information needed to be analysed prior to the field visit, so as to develop an initial causal map. Please see Step 6 and also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two).

An endline workshop with the SPO was intended to:

Explain the purpose of the fieldwork;

Carry out in the self-assessments by SPO staff subgroups (unless these have already been filled prior to the field visits) - this may take some 3 hours.

Facilitate a brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012 and underlying interventions, factors and actors.

***Purpose of the fieldwork*****:** to collect data that help to provide information on what changes took place in terms of organisational capacity development of the SPO as well as reasons for these changes. The baseline that was carried out in 2012 was to be used as a point of reference.

***Brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes and influencing factors***: a brainstorm was facilitated on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012. In order to kick start the discussion, staff were reminded of the key findings related to the historical time line carried out in the baseline (vision, mission, strategies, funding, staff). This was then used to generate a discussion on key changes that happened in the organisation since the baseline (on cards). Then cards were selected that were related to organisational capacity changes, and organised. Then a 'general causal map' was developed, based on these key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change as experienced by the SPO staff. This was documented as a visual and narrative. This general causal map was to get the story of the SPO on what they perceived as key organisational capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline, in addition to the specific details provided per indicator.

***Self-assessments*****:** respondents worked in the respective staff function groups: management; programme/ project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin and HRM staff; field staff. Staff were assisted where necessary so that they could really understand what it was they were being asked to do as well as what the descriptions under each indicator meant.

Note: for those SPOs selected for process tracing an additional endline workshop was held to facilitate the development of detailed causal maps for each of the identified organisational change/ outcome areas that fall under the capability to act and commit, and under the capability to adapt and self-renew, and that are likely related to capacity development interventions by the CFA. See also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two). It was up to the in-country team whether

this workshop was held straight after the initial endline workshop or after the workshop and the follow-up interviews. It could also be held as a separate workshop at another time.

*Step 8.* ***Interview SPO staff*** *– in-country team*

After the endline workshop (developing the general causal map and carrying out self-assessments in subgroups), interviews were held with SPO staff (subgroups) to follow up on the information that was provided in the self-assessment sheets, and to interview staff that had not yet provided any information.

*Step 9.* ***Fill-in observation sheets*** *– in-country team*

During the visit at the SPO, the in-country team had to fill in two sheets based on their observation:

5C Endline observation sheet;

5C Endline observable indicators.

*Step 10.* ***Interview externals*** *– in-country team & CDI team*

The in-country team also needed to interview the partners of the SPO as well as organisational capacity development consultants that have provided support to the SPO. The CDI team interviewed the CFA.

*Step 11.* ***Upload and auto-code all the formats*** *collected by in-country team and CDI team – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for uploading and auto-coding (in Nvivo) of the documents that were collected by the in-country team and by the CDI team.

*Step 12. Provide the* ***overview of information*** *per 5C indicator to in-country team – CDI team*

After the analysis in NVivo, the CDI team provided a copy of all the information generated per indicator to the in-country team for initial analysis.

*Step 13.* ***Analyse the data and develop a draft description*** *of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team*

The in-country team provided a draft description of the findings per indicator, based on the information generated per indicator. The information generated under the general questions were linked to the general causal map or detailed process tracing related causal map.

*Step 14.* ***Analyse the data and finalize the description*** *of the findings per indicator, per capability and general – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for checking the analysis by the in-country team with the Nvivo generated data and to make suggestions for improvement and ask questions for clarification to which the in-country team responded. The CDI team then finalised the analysis and provided final

descriptions and scores per indicator and also summarize these per capability and calculated the summary capability scores based on the average of all indicators by capability.

*Step 15.* ***Analyse the information*** *in the general causal map –in-country team & CDI team*

The general causal map based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff present at the workshop, was further detailed by in-country team and CDI team, and based on the notes made during the workshop and where necessary additional follow up with the SPO. The visual and narrative was finalized after feedback by the SPO. During analysis of the general causal map relationships with MFS II support for capacity development and other factors and actors were identified. All the information has been reviewed by the SPO and CFA.

## 3. Attributing changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 2

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: ***To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?***

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process. The box below provides some background information on process tracing.

### Background information on process tracing

The essence of process tracing research is that scholars want to go beyond merely identifying correlations between independent variables (Xs) and outcomes (Ys). Process tracing in social science is commonly defined by its addition to trace causal mechanisms (Bennett, 2008a, 2008b; Checkle, 2008; George & Bennett, 2005). A causal mechanism can be defined as "a complex system which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts" (Glennan, 1996, p. 52). Process tracing involves "attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable" (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 206-207).

Process tracing can be differentiated into three variants within social science: theory testing, theory building, and explaining outcome process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

Theory testing process tracing uses a theory from the existing literature and then tests whether evidence shows that each part of hypothesised causal mechanism is present in a given case, enabling within case inferences about whether the mechanism functioned as expected in the

case and whether the mechanism as a whole was present. No claims can be made however, about whether the mechanism was the only cause of the outcome.

Theory building process tracing seeks to build generalizable theoretical explanations from empirical evidence, inferring that a more general causal mechanism exists from the fact of a particular case.

Finally, explaining outcome process tracing attempts to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific historical case. Here the aim is not to build or test more general theories but to craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case centric than theory oriented.

Explaining outcome process tracing is the most suitable type of process tracing for analysing the causal mechanisms for selected key organisational capacity changes of the SPOs. This type of process tracing can be thought of as a single outcome study defined as seeking the causes of the specific outcome in a single case (Gerring, 2006; in: Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Here the ambition is to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a particular outcome, with sufficiency defined as an explanation that accounts for all of the important aspects of an outcome with no redundant parts being present (Mackie, 1965).

Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research strategy that aims to trace the complex conglomerate of systematic and case specific causal mechanisms that produced the outcome in question. The explanation cannot be detached from the particular case. Explaining outcome process tracing refers to case studies whose primary ambition is to explain particular historical outcomes, although the findings of the case can also speak to other potential cases of the phenomenon. Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research process in which 'theories' are tested to see whether they can provide a minimally sufficient explanation of the outcome. Minimal sufficiency is defined as an explanation that accounts for an outcome, with no redundant parts. In most explaining outcome studies, existing theorisation cannot provide a sufficient explanation, resulting in a second stage in which existing theories are re-conceptualised in light of the evidence gathered in the preceding empirical analysis. The conceptualisation phase in explaining outcome process tracing is therefore an iterative research process, with initial mechanisms re-conceptualised and tested until the result is a theorised mechanism that provides a minimally sufficient explanation of the particular outcome.

Below a description is provided of how SPOs are selected for process tracing, and a description is provided on how this process tracing is to be carried out. Note that this description of process tracing provides not only information on the extent to which the changes in organisational development can be attributed to MFS II (evaluation question 2), but also provides information on other contributing factors and actors (evaluation question 4). Furthermore, it must be noted that the evaluation team has developed an adapted form of 'explaining outcome process tracing', since the data collection and analysis was an iterative process of research so as to establish the most realistic explanation for a particular outcome/ organisational capacity change. Below selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

**Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing**

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for

different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);

Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;

Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;

Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

**ETHIOPIA**

For Ethiopia the capabilities that are mostly targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

**Table 43: The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Ethiopia**

| Capability to: | AMREF | CARE | ECFA | FSCE | HOA-REC | HUNDEE | NVEA | OSRA | TTCA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Relate | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| Achieve coherence | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Source: country baseline report, Ethiopia.

Notes: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE. In fact, six SPOs would be suitable for process tracing. We just selected the first one per CFA following the criteria of not including more than one SPO per CFA for process tracing

**Table 44: SPOs selected for process tracing – Ethiopia**

| Ethiopia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **AMREF** | Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | AMREF NL | Yes |
| **CARE** | Dec 31, 2015 | Partly | Yes | Yes | Yes – slightly | CARE Netherlands | No - not fully matching |
| **ECFA** | Jan 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Child Helpline International | Yes |
| **FSCE** | Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN); Note: no info from Defence for Children – ECPAT Netherlands | Yes |
| **HOA-REC** | Sustainable Energy project (ICCO Alliance): 2014<br>Innovative WASH (WASH Alliance):<br>Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes - slightly | ICCO | No - not fully matching |
| **HUNDEE** | Dec 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO & IICD | Yes |
| **NVEA** | Dec 2015 (both) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Edukans Foundation (under two consortia); Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN) | Suitable but SKN already involved for process tracing FSCE |

| Ethiopia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **OSRA** | C4C Alliance project (farmers marketing): December 2014<br>ICCO Alliance project (zero grazing: 2014 (2nd phase) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO & IICD | Suitable but ICCO & IICD already involved for process tracing - HUNDEE |
| **TTCA** | June 2015 | Partly | Yes | No | Yes | Edukans Foundation | No - not fully matching |

**INDIA**

For India the capability that is mostly targeted by CFAs is the capability to act and commit. The next one in line is the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below in which a higher score means that the specific capability is more intensively targeted.

**Table 45: The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – India**

| Capability to: | BVHA | COUNT | DRISTI | FFID | Jana Vikas | Samarthak Samiti | SMILE | SDS | VTRC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 5 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 4 |
| Relate | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |

Source: country baseline report, India.

Notes: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Below you can see a table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether SPO and the CFA both expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BVHA,

COUNT, FFID, SMILE and VTRC. Except for SMILE (capability to act and commit only), for the other SPOs the focus for process tracing can be on the capability to act and commit and on the capability to adapt and self-renew.

**Table 46: SPOs selected for process tracing – India**

| India – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **BVHA** | 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Simavi | Yes; both capabilities |
| **COUNT** | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Woord en Daad | Yes; both capabilities |
| **DRISTI** | 31-03-2012 | Yes | Yes | No | no | Hivos | No - closed in 2012 |
| **FFID** | 30-09-2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |
| **Jana Vikas** | 2013 | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No - contract is and the by now; not fully matching focus |
| **NEDSF** | | | | | | | No – delayed baseline |
| **RGVN** | | | | | | | No - delayed baseline |
| **Samarthak Samiti (SDS)** | 2013 possibly longer | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Hivos | No - not certain of end date and not fully matching focus |
| **Shivi Development Society (SDS)** | Dec 2013 intention 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No - not fully matching focus |
| **Smile** | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Wilde Ganzen | Yes; first capability only |
| **VTRC** | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Stichting Red een Kind | Yes; both capabilities |

**INDONESIA**

For Indonesia the capabilities that are most frequently targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

**Table 47: The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Indonesia**

| Capability to: | ASB | Daya kologi | ECPAT | GSS | Lem baga Kita | Pt.PPMA | Rifka Annisa | WIIP | Yad upa | Yayasan Kelola | YPI | YRBI |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 4 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 3 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 |
| Relate | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |

Source: country baseline report, Indonesia.

Notes: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

The table below describes when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: ASB, ECPAT, Pt.PPMA, YPI, YRBI.

Table 6

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Indonesia*

| Indonesia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **ASB** | February 2012; extension Feb,1, 2013 – June,30, 2016 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Hivos | Yes |
| **Dayakologi** | 2013; no extension | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No: contract ended early and not matching enough |
| **ECPAT** | August 2013; Extension Dec 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes, a bit | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | Yes |
| **GSS** | 31 December 2012; no extension | Yes | Yes | Yes, a bit | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | No: contract ended early |
| **Lembaga Kita** | 31 December 2012; no extension | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | No - contract ended early |
| **Pt.PPMA** | May 2015 | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | IUCN | Yes, capability to act and commit only |
| **Rifka Annisa** | Dec, 31 2015 | No | Yes | No | Yes | Rutgers WPF | No - no match between expectations CFA and SPO |
| **WIIP** | Dec 2015 | Yes | Not MFS II | Yes | Not MFS II | Red Cross | No - Capacity development interventions are not MFS II financed. Only some overhead is MFS II |

| Indonesia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Yayasan Kelola** | Dec 30, 2013; extension of contract being processed for two years (2014-2015) | Yes | Not really | Yes | Not really | Hivos | No - no specific capacity development interventions planned by Hivos |
| **YPI** | Dec 31, 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Rutgers WPF | Yes |
| **YRBI** | Oct, 30, 2013; YRBI end of contract from 31st Oct 2013 to 31st Dec 2013. Contract extension proposal is being proposed to MFS II, no decision yet. | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |
| **Yadupa** | Under negotiation during baseline; new contract 2013 until now | Yes | Nothing committed | Yes | Nothing committed | IUCN | No, since nothing was committed by CFA |

**LIBERIA**

For Liberia the situation is arbitrary which capabilities are targeted most CFA's. Whilst the capability to act and commit is targeted more often than the other capabilities, this is only so for two of the SPOs. The capability to adapt and self-renew and the capability to relate are almost equally targeted for the five SPOs, be it not intensively. Since the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew are the most targeted capabilities in Ethiopia, India and Indonesia, we choose to focus on these two capabilities for Liberia as well. This would help the synthesis team in the further analysis of these capabilities related to process tracing. See also the table below.

**Table 48: The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Liberia**

| Capability to: | BSC | DEN-L | NAWOCOL | REFOUND | RHRAP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Relate | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Source: country baseline report, Liberia.

Notes: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Also, for two of the five SPOs capability to act and commit is targeted more intensively compared to the other capabilities. Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BSC and RHRAP.

**Table 49: SPOs selected for process tracing – Liberia**

| Liberia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **BSC** | Dec 31, 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | SPARK | Yes |
| **DEN-L** | 2014 | No | No | Unknown | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| **NAWOCOL** | 2014 | Yes | No | No | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| **REFOUND** | At least until 2013 (2015?) | Yes | No | Yes | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| **RHRAP** | At least until 2013 (2014?) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |

**Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study**

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ‘ general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

Some definitions of the terminology used for this MFS II 5c evaluation

Based upon the different interpretations and connotations the use of the term causal mechanism we use the following terminology for the remainder of this paper:

A **detailed causal map** (or **model of change)** = the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change.

A **causal mechanism** = is the combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 176).

**Part** or **cause** = one actor with its attributes carrying out activities/ producing outputs that lead to change in other parts. The final part or cause is the change/ outcome.

**Attributes of the actor** = specificities of the actor that increase his chance to introduce change or not such as its position in its institutional environment.

*Step 1. Identify the **planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

Chapter 4.1 and 4.2 in the baseline report were reviewed. Capacity development interventions as planned by the CFA for the capability to act and commit and for the capability to adapt and self-renew were described and details inserted in the summary format. This provided an overview of the capacity development activities that were originally planned by the CFA for these two capabilities and assisted in focusing on relevant outcomes that are possibly related to the planned interventions.

*Step 2. Identify the **implemented capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

The input from the CFA was reviewed in terms of what capacity development interventions have taken place in the MFS II period. This information was be found in the 'Support to capacity development sheet - endline - CFA perspective' for the SPO, based on details provided by the CFA and further discussed during an interview by the CDI team.

The CFA was asked to describe all the MFS II supported capacity development interventions of the SPO that took place during the period 2011 up to now. The CDI team reviewed this information, not only the interventions but also the observed changes as well as the expected long-term changes, and then linked these interventions to relevant outcomes in one of the capabilities (capability to act and commit; and capability to adapt and self-renew).

*Step 3. Identify **initial changes/ outcome areas** in these two capabilities – by CDI team & in-country team*

The CDI team was responsible for coding documents received from SPO and CFA in NVivo on the following:

5C Indicators: this was to identify the changes that took place between baseline and endline. This information was coded in Nvivo.

Information related to the capacity development interventions implemented by the CFA (with MFS II funding) (see also Step 2) to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. For example, the training on financial management of the SPO staff could be related to any information on financial management of the SPO. This information was coded in Nvivo.

In addition, the response by the CFA to the changes in 5C indicators format, was auto-coded.

The in-country team was responsible for timely collection of information from the SPO (before the fieldwork starts). This set of information dealt with:

MFS II supported capacity development interventions during the MFS II period (2011 until now).

Overview of all trainings provided in relation to a particular outcome areas/organisational capacity change since the baseline.

For each of the identified MFS II supported trainings, training questionnaires have been developed to assess these trainings in terms of the participants, interests, knowledge and skills gained, behaviour change and changes in the organisation (based on Kirkpatrick's model), one format for training participants and one for their managers. These training questionnaires were sent prior to the field visit.

Changes expected by SPO on a long-term basis ('Support to capacity development sheet - endline - SPO perspective').

For the selection of change/ outcome areas the following criteria were important:

The change/ outcome area is in one of the two capabilities selected for process tracing: capability to act and commit or the capability to adapt and self-renew. This was the first criteria to select upon.

There was a likely link between the key organisational capacity change/ outcome area and the MFS II supported capacity development interventions. This also was an important criteria. This would need to be demonstrated through one or more of the following situations:

- In the 2012 theory of change on organisational capacity development of the SPO a link was indicated between the outcome area and MFS II support;
- During the baseline the CFA indicated a link between the planned MFS II support to organisational development and the expected short-term or long-term results in one of the selected capabilities;
- During the endline the CFA indicated a link between the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities;
- During the endline the SPO indicated a link between the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities.

Reviewing the information obtained as described in Step 1, 2, and 3 provided the basis for selecting key organisational capacity change/ outcome areas to focus on for process tracing. These areas were to be formulated as broader outcome areas, such as 'improved financial management', 'improved monitoring and evaluation' or 'improved staff competencies'.

Note: the outcome areas were to be formulated as intermediates changes. For example: an improved monitoring and evaluation system, or enhanced knowledge and skills to educate the target group on climate change. Key outcome areas were also verified - based on document review as well as discussions with the SPO during the endline.

*Step 4. Construct the **detailed, initial causal map** (theoretical model of change) – CDI & in-country team*

A detailed initial causal map was developed by the CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team. This was based on document review, including information provided by the CFA and SPO on MFS II supported capacity development interventions and their immediate and long-term objectives as well as observed changes. Also, the training questionnaires were reviewed before developing the initial causal map. This detailed initial causal map was to be provided by the CDI team with a visual and related narrative with related references. This initial causal map served as a reference point for further reflection with the SPO during the process tracing endline workshop, where relationships needed to be verified or new relationships established so that the second (workshop-based), detailed causal map could be developed, after which further verification was needed to come up with the final, concluding detailed causal map.

It's important to note that organisational change area/ outcome areas could be both positive and negative.

For each of the selected outcomes the team needed to make explicit the theoretical model of change. This meant finding out about the range of different actors, factors, actions, and events etc. that have contributed to a particular outcome in terms of organisational capacity of the SPO.

A model of change of good quality includes:

The causal pathways that relate the intervention to the realised change/ outcome;

Rival explanations for the same change/ outcome;

Assumptions that clarify relations between different components or parts;

Case specific and/or context specific factors or risks that might influence the causal pathway, such as for instance the socio-cultural-economic context, or a natural disaster;

Specific attributes of the actors e.g. CFA and other funders.

A model of change (within the 5C study called a 'detailed causal map') is a complex system which produces intermediate and long-term outcomes by the interaction of other parts. It consists of parts or causes that often consist of one actor with its attributes that is implementing activities leading to change in other parts (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). A helpful way of constructing the model of change is to think in terms of actors carrying out activities that lead to other actors changing their behaviour. The model of change can be explained as a range of activities carried out by different *actors* (including the CFA and SPO under evaluation) that will ultimately lead to an outcome. Besides this, there are also '*structural*' elements, which are to be interpreted as external factors (such as economic conjuncture); and *attributes* of the actor (does the actor have the legitimacy to ask for change or not, what is its position in the sector) that should be looked at (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). In fact Beach and Pedersen, make a fine point about the subjectivity of the actor in a dynamic context. This means, in qualitative methodologies, capturing the changes in the actor, acted upon area or person/organisation, in a non-sequential and non-temporal format. Things which were done recently could have corrected behavioural outcomes of an organisation and at the same ime there could be processes which incrementally pushed for the same change over a period of time. Beach and Pedersen espouse this methodology because it captures change in a dynamic fashion as against the methodology of logical framework. For the MFS II evaluation it was important to make a distinction between those paths in the model of change that are the result of MFS II and rival pathways.

The construction of the model of change started with the identified key organisational capacity change/ outcome, followed by an inventory of all possible subcomponents that possibly have caused the change/ outcome in the MFS II period (2011-up to now, or since the baseline). The figure below presents an imaginary example of a model of change. The different colours indicate the different types of support to capacity development of the SPO by different actors, thereby indicating different pathways of change, leading to the key changes/ outcomes in terms of capacity development (which in this case indicates the ability to adapt and self-renew).




**Figure 35: An imaginary example of a model of change**

*Step 5. Identify **types of evidence** needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams with support from CDI team*

Once the causal mechanism at theoretical level were defined, empirical evidence was collected so as to verify or discard the different parts of this theoretical model of change, confirm or reject whether subcomponents have taken place, and to find evidence that confirm or reject the causal relations between the subcomponents.

A key question that we needed to ask ourselves was, *"What information do we need in order to confirm or reject that one subcomponent leads to another, that X causes Y?"*. The evaluation team needed to agree on what information was needed that provides empirical manifestations for each part of the model of change.

There are four distinguishable types of evidence that are relevant in process tracing analysis: *pattern, sequence, trace, and account*. Please see the box below for descriptions of these types of evidence.

The evaluation team needed to agree on the types of evidence that was needed to verify or discard the manifestation of a particular part of the causal mechanism. Each one or a combination of these different types of evidence could be used to confirm or reject the different parts of the model of change. This is what is meant by robustness of evidence gathering. Since causality as a concept can bend in many ways, our methodology, provides a near scientific model for accepting and rejecting a particular type of evidence, ignoring its face value.

Types of evidence to be used in process tracing

**Pattern evidence** relates to predictions of statistical patterns in the evidence. For example, in testing a mechanism of racial discrimination in a case dealing with employment, statistical patterns of employment would be relevant for testing this part of the mechanism.

**Sequence evidence** deals with the temporal and spatial chronology of events predicted by a hypothesised causal mechanism. For example, a test of the hypothesis could involve expectations of the timing of events where we might predict that if the hypothesis is valid, we should see that the event B took place after event A took place. However, if we found that event B took place before event A took place, the test would suggest that our confidence in the validity of this part of the mechanism should be reduced (disconfirmation/ falsification).

**Trace evidence** is evidence whose mere existence provides proof that a part of a hypothesised mechanism exists. For example, the existence of the minutes of a meeting, if authentic ones, provide strong proof that the meeting took place.

**Account evidence** deals with the content of empirical material, such as meeting minutes that detail what was discussed or an oral account of what took place in the meeting.

*Source*: Beach and Pedersen, 2013

Below you can find a table that provides guidelines on what to look for when identifying types of evidence that can confirm or reject causal relationships between different parts/ subcomponents of the model of change. It also provides one example of a part of a causal pathway and what type of information to look for.

**Table 50: Format for identifying types of evidence for different causal relationships in the model of change (example included)**

| Part of the model of change | Key questions | Type of evidence needed | Source of information |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Describe relationship between the subcomponents of the model of change** | Describe questions you would like to answer a so as to find out whether the components in the relationship took place, when they took place, who was involved, and whether they are related | Describe the information that we need in order to answer these questions. Which type of evidence can we use in order to reject or confirm that subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y?<br>Can we find this information by means of :<br>Pattern evidence;<br>Sequence evidence;<br>Trace evidence;<br>Account evidence? | Describe where you can find this information |
| **Example:**<br>**Training workshops on M&E provided by MFS II funding and other sources of funding** | Example:<br>What type of training workshops on M&E took place?<br>Who was trained?<br>When did the training take place?<br>Who funded the training?<br>Was the funding of training provided before the training took place?<br>How much money was available for the training? | Example:<br>Trace evidence: on types of training delivered, who was trained, when the training took place, budget for the training<br>Sequence evidence on timing of funding and timing of training<br>Content evidence: what the training was about | Example:<br>Training report<br>SPO Progress reports<br>interviews with the CFA and SPO staff<br>Financial reports SPO and CFA |

Please note that for practical reasons, the 5C evaluation team decided that it was easier to integrate the specific questions in the narrative of the initial causal map. These questions would need to be addressed by the in country team during the process tracing workshop so as to discover, verify or discard particular causal mechanisms in the detailed, initial causal map. Different types of evidence was asked for in these questions.

*Step 6. **Collect data** to verify or discard causal mechanisms and develop workshop-based, detailed causal map – in-country team*

Once it was decided by the in-country and CDI evaluation teams what information was to be collected during the interaction with the SPO, data collection took place. The initial causal maps served as a basis for discussions during the endline workshop with a particular focus on process

tracing for the identified organisational capacity changes. But it was considered to be very important to understand from the perspective of the SPO how they understood the identified key organisational capacity change/outcome area has come about. A new detailed, workshop-based causal map was developed that included the information provided by SPO staff as well as based on initial document review as described in the initial detailed causal map. This information was further analysed and verified with other relevant information so as to develop a final causal map, which is described in the next step.

*Step 7. **Assess the quality** of data and **analyse data**, and develop the **final detailed causal map** (model of change) – in-country team and CDI team*

Quality assurance of the data collected and the evidence it provides for rejecting or confirming parts of causal explanations are a major concern for many authors specialised in contribution analysis and process-tracing. Stern et al. (2012), Beach and Pedersen (2013), Lemire, Nielsen and Dybdal (2012), Mayne (2012) and Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) all emphasise the need to make attribution/ contribution claims that are based on pieces of evidence that are rigorous, traceable, and credible. These pieces of evidence should be as explicit as possible in proving that *subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y* and ruling out other explanations. Several tools are proposed to check the nature and the quality of data needed. One option is, Delahais and Toulemonde's Evidence Analysis Database, which we have adapted for our purpose.

Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) propose an Evidence Analysis Database that takes into consideration three criteria:

Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no);

Type of causal mechanism: intended contribution/ other contribution/ condition leading to intended contribution/ intended condition to other contribution/ feedback loop;

Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak.

We have adapted their criteria to our purpose. The in-country team, in collaboration with the CDI team, used the criteria in assessing whether causal relationships in the causal map, were strong enough. This has been more of an iterative process trying to find additional evidence for the established relationships through additional document review or contacting the CFA and SPO as well as getting their feedback on the final detailed causal map that was established. Whilst the form below has not been used exactly in the manner depicted, it has been used indirectly when trying to validate the information in the detailed causal map. After that, the final detailed causal map is established both as a visual as well as a narrative, with related references for the established causal relations.

**Table 51: Example format for the adapted evidence analysis database (example included)**

| Description of causal relation | Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no) | Type of information providing the background to the confirmation or rejection of the causal relation | Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak | Explanation for why the evidence is (rather) strong or (rather) weak, and therefore the causal relation is confirmed/ rejected |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **e.g. Training staff in M&E leads to enhanced M&E knowledge, skills and practice** | e.g. Confirmed | e.g. Training reports confirmed that staff are trained in M&E and that knowledge and skills increased as a result of the training | | |

*Step 8.* ***Analyse and conclude*** *on findings– in-country team and CDI team*

The final detailed causal map was described as a visual and narrative and this was then analysed in terms of the evaluation question two and evaluation question four: *"To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?"* and *"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"* It was analysed to what extent the identified key organisational capacity change can be attributed to MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as to other related factors, interventions and actors.

## 4. Explaining factors – evaluation question 4

This paragraph describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This has been explained in the first section of this Annex. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information was procured for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the process of process tracing as described in the section above.

## 5. Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team.

**Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach:** this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

**Using standard indicators and scores**: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

**General causal map:** whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

**Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question:** this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.

Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:

- Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
- Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors, rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

**Utilisation of the evaluation**

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

Design – mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs and providing a comprehensive story per SPO in terms of its organisational capacity development. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information

(2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication: many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process: The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation. For future evaluation purposes, it is important to keep 'utility' in mind since this is the first and most important evaluation standard. Helping to think through how

evaluation can be useful for primary intended users is crucial. Ensuring a process whereby stakeholders involved are engaged in a learning process can support utility. However, it must be noted that, with qualitative information, respondents may suffer from recall bias if they describe a chain of events. Particularly when attrition is high, learning becomes limited since it is hard to find institutional memory.

For future evaluations it is important to be more utilisation focused next time with engagement of stakeholders in a learning process so that they can also take up the lessons learned for further improve upon their organisations. Now, the evaluation was too much accountability driven. Furthermore, it's important that enough time is taken into account for the evaluation process, to provide useful insights for all involved. The time period of two years was too short to see remarkable change in terms of capacity development. Process tracing has proven to be a useful exercise that provided a lot of insight into how changes in terms of capacity development have taken place. Many SPOs and CFAs valued this insightful learning process and indicated they would work with the results to further improve the organisational capacity of the SPO. Furthermore, in case of staff turnover, this may have seriously affected institutional memory, which is an important factor, next to the difficulty of recall when describing a chain of events, in qualitative information. Organisational capacity contains many different aspects that are constantly changing and it's important to see these as part of a whole rather than a separate issues, which had to be done for this specific evaluation in terms of standard indicators. The different aspects relate to each other, a need to be seen more from a whole systems perspective. Furthermore, organisational capacity is complex, methodologies for evaluation need to be tuned to the specific situation of each organisation. For future purposes it would be useful if SPO and CFA develop a clear theory of change together in terms of organisational capacity strengthening. This would strengthen theory-based evaluation.

# Annex G. Background information on the five core capabilities framework

The 5 capabilities (5C) framework was to be used as a framework for the evaluation of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs) of the MFS II consortia. The 5C framework is based on a five-year research program on 'Capacity, change and performance' that was carried out by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). The research included an extensive review of the literature and sixteen case studies. The 5C framework has also been applied in an IOB evaluation using 26 case studies in 14 countries, and in the baseline carried out per organisation by the MFS II organisations for the purpose of the monitoring protocol.

The 5C framework is structured to understand and analyse (changes in) the capacity of an organisation to deliver (social) value to its constituents. This introduction briefly describes the 5C framework, mainly based on the most recent document on the 5C framework (Keijzer et al., 2011).

The 5C framework sees capacity as an **outcome** of an **open system**. An organisation or collaborative association (for instance a network) is seen as a system interacting with wider society. The most critical practical issue is to ensure that relevant stakeholders share a common way of thinking about capacity and its core constituents or capabilities. Decisive for an organisation's capacity is the context in which the organisation operates. This means that **understanding context issues** is crucial. The use of the 5C framework requires a multi-stakeholder approach because shared values and results orientation are important to facilitate the capacity development process. The 5C framework therefore needs to **accommodate the different visions** of stakeholders and conceive different strategies for raising capacity and improving performance in a given situation.

The 5C framework defines capacity as '**producing social value'** and identifies five core capabilities that together result in that overall capacity. Capacity, capabilities and competences are seen as follows:

**Capacity** is referred to as the overall ability of an organisation or system to create value for others;

**Capabilities** are the collective ability of a group or a system to do something either inside or outside the system. The collective ability involved may be technical, logistical, managerial or generative (i.e. the ability to earn legitimacy, to adapt, to create meaning, etc.);

**Competencies** are the energies, skills and abilities of individuals.

Fundamental to developing capacity are inputs such as human, material and financial resources, technology, and information. To the degree that they are developed and successfully integrated, capabilities contribute to the overall capacity or ability of an organisation or system to create value for others. A single capability is not sufficient to create capacity. All are needed and are strongly interrelated and overlapping. Thus, to achieve its development goals, the 5C framework says that every organisation or system must have **five basic capabilities:**

1. The capability to act and commit;
2. The capability to deliver on development objectives;
3. The capability to adapt and self-renew;
4. The capability to relate (to external stakeholders);
5. The capability to achieve coherence.

In order to have a common framework for evaluation, the five capabilities have been reformulated in outcome domains and for each outcome domain performance indicators have been developed.

There is some overlap between the five core capabilities but together the five capabilities result in a certain level of capacity. Influencing one capability may have an effect on one or more of the other capabilities. In each situation, the level of any of the five capabilities will vary. Each capability can become stronger or weaker over time.

# Annex H. Overview of capabilities, and related outcome domains and performance indicators

| Capabilities | Outcome domains | Performance indicators |
|---|---|---|
| Capability to act and commit | Level of Effective Leadership | 1.1.Responsive leadership: 'Leadership is responsive, inspiring, and sensitive' |
| | | 1.2.Strategic guidance: 'Leaders provide appropriate strategic guidance (strategic leader and operational leader)' |
| | | 1.3.Staff turnover: 'Staff turnover is relatively low' |
| | Level of realistic strategic planning | 1.4.Organisational structure: 'Existence of clear organisational structure reflecting the objectives of the organisation' |
| | | 1.5.Articulated strategies: 'Strategies are articulated and based on good situation analysis and adequate M&E' |
| | Level of translation of strategy into operations | 1.6.Daily operations: 'Day-to-day operations are in line with strategic plans' |
| | Level of Staff Capacity and Motivation | 1.7.Staff skills: 'Staff have necessary skills to do their work' |
| | | 1.8.Training opportunities: 'Appropriate training opportunities are offered to staff' |
| | | 1.9.1.Incentives: 'Appropriate incentives are in place to sustain staff motivation' |
| | Level of Financial Resource Security | 1.9.2.Funding sources: 'Funding from multiple sources covering different time periods' |
| | | 1.9.3.Funding procedures: 'Clear procedures for exploring new funding opportunities' |
| Capability to adapt and self-renew | Level of effective application of M&E | 2.1.M&E application: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess activities, outputs and outcomes' |
| | | 2.2.M&E competencies: 'Individual competencies for performing M&E functions are in place' |
| | Level of strategic use of M&E | 2.3.M&E for future strategies: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess the effects of delivered products and services (outcomes) for future strategies' |
| | Level of openness to strategic learning | 2.4.Critical reflection: 'Management stimulates frequent critical reflection meetings that also deal with learning from mistakes' |
| | | 2.5. Freedom for ideas: 'Staff feel free to come up with ideas for implementation of objectives |
| | Level of context awareness | 2.6.System for tracking environment: 'The organisation has a system for being in touch with general trends and developments in its operating environment' |
| | | 2.7.Stakeholder responsiveness: 'The organisation is open and responsive to their stakeholders and the general public' |
| Capability to deliver on development objectives | Extent to which organisation delivers on planned products and services | 3.1.Clear operational plans: 'Organisation has clear operational plans for carrying out projects which all staff fully understand' |

| Capabilities | Outcome domains | Performance indicators |
|---|---|---|
| | | 3.2.Cost-effective resource use: 'Operations are based on cost-effective use of its resources' |
| | | 3.3.Delivering planned outputs: 'Extent to which planned outputs are delivered' |
| | **Extent to which delivered products and services are relevant for target population in terms of the effect they have** | 3.4.Mechanisms for beneficiary needs: 'The organisation has mechanisms in place to verify that services meet beneficiary needs' |
| | **Level of work efficiency** | 3.5.Monitoring efficiency: 'The organisation monitors its efficiency by linking outputs and related inputs (input-output ratio's)' |
| | | 3.6.Balancing quality-efficiency: 'The organisation aims at balancing efficiency requirements with the quality of its work' |
| **Capability to relate** | **Level of involving external parties in internal policy/strategy development** | 4.1.Stakeholder engagement in policies and strategies: 'The organisation maintains relations/ collaboration/alliances with its stakeholders for the benefit of the organisation' |
| | **Level of engagement of organisation in networks, alliances and collaborative efforts** | 4.2.Engagement in networks: 'Extent to which the organisation has relationships with existing networks/alliances/partnerships' |
| | **Extent to which organisation is actively engaging with target groups** | 4.3.Engagement with target groups: 'The organisation performs frequent visits to their target groups/ beneficiaries in their living environment' |
| | **Level of effective relationships within the organisation** | 4.3.Relationships within organisation: 'Organisational structure and culture facilitates open internal contacts, communication, and decision-making' |
| **Capability to achieve coherence** | **Existence of mechanisms for coherence** | 5.1.Revisiting vision, mission: 'Vision, mission and strategies regularly discussed in the organisation' |
| | | 5.2.Operational guidelines: 'Operational guidelines (technical, admin, HRM) are in place and used and supported by the management' |
| | **Level of coherence of various efforts of organisation** | 5.3.Alignment with vision, mission: 'Projects, strategies and associated operations are in line with the vision and mission of the organisation' |
| | | 5.4.Mutually supportive efforts: 'The portfolio of project (activities) provides opportunities for mutually supportive efforts' |

# Annex I. CIVICUS and Civil Society Index

CIVICUS, the World Alliance for Citizen Participation is an international alliance of members and partners which constitutes an influential network of organisations at the local, national, regional and international levels, and spans the spectrum of civil society. It has worked for nearly two decades to strengthen citizen action and civil society throughout the world. CIVICUS has a vision of a global community of active, engaged citizens committed to the creation of a more just and equitable world. This is based on the belief that the health of societies exists in direct proportion to the degree of balance between the state, the private sector and civil society.

One of the areas that CIVICUS works in is the Civil Society Index (CSI). Since 2000, CIVICUS has measured the state of civil society in 76 countries. In 2008, it considerably changed its CSI.

## 1. Guiding principles for measuring civil society

*Action orientation*: the principal aim of the CSI is to generate information that is of practical use to civil society practitioners and other primary stakeholders. Therefore, its framework had to identify aspects of civil society that can be changed, as well as generate knowledge relevant to action-oriented goals.

*CSI implementation must be participatory by design*: The CSI does not stop at the generation of knowledge alone. Rather, it also actively seeks to link knowledge-generation on civil society, with reflection and action by civil society stakeholders. The CSI has therefore continued to involve its beneficiaries, as well as various other actors, in this particular case, civil society stakeholders, in all stages of the process, from the design and implementation, through to the deliberation and dissemination stages.

This participatory cycle is relevant in that such a mechanism can foster the self-awareness of civil society actors as being part of something larger, namely, civil society itself. As a purely educational gain, it broadens the horizon of CSO representatives through a process of reflecting upon, and engaging with, civil society issues which may go beyond the more narrow foci of their respective organisations. A strong collective self-awareness among civil society actors can also function as an important catalyst for joint advocacy activities to defend civic space when under threat or to advance the common interests of civil society vis-à-vis external forces. These basic civil society issues, on which there is often more commonality than difference among such actors, are at the core of the CSI assessment.

*CSI is change oriented*: The participatory nature that lies at the core of the CSI methodology is an important step in the attempt to link research with action, creating a diffused sense of awareness and ownerships. However, the theory of change that the CSI is based on goes one step further, coupling this participatory principle with the creation of evidence in the form of a comparable and contextually valid assessment of the state of civil society. It is this evidence, once shared and disseminated, that ultimately constitutes a resource for action.

*CSI is putting local partners in the driver's seat*: CSI is to continue being a collaborative effort between a broad range of stakeholders, with most importance placed on the relationship between CIVICUS and its national partners.

## 2. Defining Civil Society

The 2008 CIVICUS redesign team modified the civil society definition as follows:

*The arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market – which is created by individual and collective actions, organisations and institutions to advance shared interests.*

*Arena*: In this definition the arena refers to the importance of civil society's role in creating public spaces where diverse societal values and interests interact (Fowler 1996). CSI uses the term 'arena' to describe the particular realm or space in a society where people come together to debate, discuss, associate and seek to influence broader society. CIVICUS strongly believes that this arena is distinct from other arenas in society, such as the market, state or family.

Civil society is hence defined as a political term, rather than in economic terms that resemble more the 'non-profit sector'.

Besides the spaces created by civil society, CIVICUS defines particular spaces for the family, the state and the market.

*Individual and collective action, organisations and institutions*: Implicit in a political understanding of civil society is the notion of agency; that civil society actors have the ability to influence decisions that affect the lives of ordinary people. The CSI embraces a broad range of actions taken by both individuals and groups. Many of these actions take place within the context of non-coercive organisations or institutions ranging from small informal groups to large professionally run associations.

*Advance shared interests*: The term 'interests' should be interpreted very broadly, encompassing the promotion of values, needs, identities, norms and other aspirations.

They encompass the personal and public, and can be pursued by small informal groups, large membership organisations or formal associations. The emphasis rests however on the element of 'sharing' that interest within the public sphere.

## 3. Civil Society Index- Analytical Framework

The 2008 Civil Society Index distinguishes 5 dimensions of which 4 (civic engagement, level of organisation, practice of values and perception of impact), can be represented in the form of a diamond and the fifth one (external environment) as a circle that influences upon the shape of the diamond.

*Civic Engagement*, or 'active citizenship', is a crucial defining factor of civil society. It is the hub of civil society and therefore is one of the core components of the CSI's definition. Civic engagement describes the formal and informal activities and participation undertaken by individuals to advance shared interests at different levels. Participation within civil society is multi-faceted and encompasses socially-based and politically-based forms of engagement.

*Level of Organisation*. This dimension assesses the organisational development, complexity and sophistication of civil society, by looking at the relationships among the actors within the civil society arena. Key sub dimensions are:

- Internal governance of Civil Society Organisations;

- Support infrastructure, that is about the existence of supporting federations or umbrella bodies;
- Self-regulation, which is about for instance the existence of shared codes of conducts amongst Civil Society Organisations and other existing self-regulatory mechanisms;
- Peer-to-peer communication and cooperation: networking, information sharing and alliance building to assess the extent of linkages and productive relations among civil society actors;
- Human resources, that is about the sustainability and adequacy of human resources available for CSOs in order to achieve their objectives:
  - Financial and technological resources available at CSOs to achieve their objectives;
  - International linkages, such as CSO's membership in international networks and participation in global events.




**Figure 36: Civil Society Index**

*Practice of Values*. This dimension assesses the internal practice of values within the civil society arena. CIVICUS identified some key values that are deemed crucial to gauge not only progressiveness but also the extent to which civil society's practices are coherent with their ideals. These are:

- Democratic decision-making governance: how decisions are made within CSOs and by whom;
- Labour regulations: includes the existence of policies regarding equal opportunities, staff membership in labour unions, training in labour rights for new staff and a publicly available statement on labour standards;
- Code of conduct and transparency: measures whether a code of conduct exists and is available publicly. It also measures whether the CSO's financial information is available to the public.
- Environmental standards: examines the extent to which CSOs adopt policies upholding environmental standards of operation;

- Perception of values within civil society: looks at how CSOs perceive the practice of values, such as non-violence. This includes the existence or absence of forces within civil society that use violence, aggression, hostility, brutality and/or fighting, tolerance, democracy, transparency, trustworthiness and tolerance in the civil society within which they operate.

*Perception of Impact.* This is about the perceived impact of civil society actors on politics and society as a whole as the consequences of collective action. In this, the perception of both civil society actors (internal) as actors outside civil society (outsiders) is taken into account. Specific sub dimensions are

- Responsiveness in terms of civil society's impact on the most important social concerns within the country. "Responsive" types of civil society are effectively taking up and voicing societal concerns.
- Social impact measures civil society's impact on society in general. An essential role of civil society is its contribution to meet pressing societal needs;
- Policy impact: covers civil society's impact on policy in general. It also looks at the impact of CSO activism on selected policy issues;
- Impact on attitudes: includes trust, public spiritedness and tolerance. The sub dimensions reflect a set of universally accepted social and political norms. These are drawn, for example, from sources such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as CIVICUS' own core values. This dimension measures the extent to which these values are practised within civil society, compared to the extent to which they are practised in society at large.

*Context Dimension*: *External Environment*. It is crucial to give consideration to the social, political and economic environments in which it exists, as the environment both directly and indirectly affects civil society. Some features of the environment may enable the growth of civil society. Conversely, other features of the environment hamper the development of civil society. Three elements of the external environment are captured by the CSI:

- Socio-economic context: The Social Watch's basic capabilities index and measures of corruption, inequality and macro-economic health are used portray the socioeconomic context that can have marked consequences for civil society, and perhaps most significantly at the lower levels of social development;
- Socio-political context: This is assessed using five indicators. Three of these are adapted from the Freedom House indices of political and civil rights and freedoms, including political rights and freedoms, personal rights and freedoms within the law and associational and organisational rights and freedoms. Information about CSO experience with the country's legal framework and state effectiveness round out the picture of the socio-political context;
- Socio-cultural context: utilises interpersonal trust, which examines the level of trust hat ordinary people feel for other ordinary people, as a broad measure of the social psychological climate for association and cooperation. Even though everyone experiences relationships of varying trust and distrust with different people, this measure provides a simple indication of the prevalence of a world view that can support and strengthen civil society. Similarly, the extent of tolerance and public spiritedness also offers indication of the context in which civil society unfolds.

# Annex J. Methodology of Civil Society Strengthening

This Annex describes the evaluation methodology that was developed to evaluate the efforts of Dutch NGOs and their Southern Partner Organisations (SPO) to strengthen Civil Society in India, Ethiopia and Indonesia. The first paragraph introduces the terms of reference for the evaluation and the second discusses design issues, including sampling procedures and changes in the terms of reference that occurred between the 2012 and 2014 assessment. The third paragraph presents the methodologies developed to answer each of the evaluation questions.

## 1. Introduction

### 1.8. Terms of reference for the evaluation

The Netherlands has a long tradition of public support for civil bi-lateral development cooperation, going back to the 1960s. The Co-Financing System ('MFS) is its most recent expression. MFS II is the 2011-2015 grant programme which meant to achieve sustainable reduction in poverty. A total of 20 consortia of Dutch Co Financing Agencies have been awarded €1.9 billion in MFS II grants by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).

One component of the MFS II programme addresses the extent to which the Southern Partners of the Dutch Consortia are contributing towards strengthening civil society and this evaluation assesses this contribution for Southern Partner countries in Indonesia, India and Ethiopia. The evaluation comprised a baseline study, carried out in 2012, followed by an end line study in 2014.

The entire MFS II evaluation comprises assessments in eight countries where apart from a civil society component, also assessments towards achieving MDGs and strengthening the capacity of the southern partner organisations by the CFAs. A synthesis team is in place to aggregate findings of all eight countries. This team convened three synthesis team meetings, one in 2012, one in 2013 and one in 2014. All three meetings aimed at harmonising evaluation methodologies for each component across countries. CDI has been playing a leading role in harmonising its Civil Society and Organisational Capacity assessment with the other organisations in charge for those components in the other countries.

This Annex describes the methodology that has been developed for the evaluation of the efforts to strengthen civil society priority result area. We will first explain the purpose and scope of this evaluation and then present the overall evaluation design. We will conclude with describing methodological adaptations, limitations and implications.

### 1.9. Civil Society assessment – purpose and scope

The overall purpose of the joint MFS II evaluations is to account for results of MFS II-funded or –co-funded development interventions implemented by Dutch CFAs and/or their Southern partners and to contribute to the improvement of future development interventions.

The civil society evaluation is organised around 5 key questions:

- What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?

- To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
- What is the relevance of these changes?
- Were the development interventions of the MFS II consortia efficient?
- What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

Furthermore, the evaluation methodology for efforts to strengthen civil society should:

- Describe how a representative sample of Southern partner organisations of the Dutch CFAs in the country will be taken
- Focus on five priority result areas that correspond with dimensions of the Civil Society Index (CSI) developed by CIVICUS (see paragraph 6.4 - Call for proposal). For each of those dimensions the call for proposal formulated key evaluation questions.
- Should compare results with available reference data (i.e. a CSI report or other relevant data from the country in question).

The results of this evaluation are to be used by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Dutch Consortia and their partner organisations. The evaluation methodology has to be participatory in the sense that Dutch Consortia and their partner organisation would be asked to give their own perception on a range of indicators of the adjusted CIVICUS analytical framework in 2012 and in 2014.

# 2. Designing the methodology

## 2.1. Evaluation principles and standards

The overall approach selected is a participatory, theory-based evaluation through a before and after comparison. This paragraph briefly describes these principles and how these have been translated into data collection principles. It also describes how a 'representative sample' of Southern Partner Organisations was selected and how the initial terms of references were adjusted with the consent of the commissioner of the evaluation, given the nature of the evaluation component and the resources available for the evaluation.

### *Recognition of complexity*

The issues at stake and the interventions in civil society and policy influence are complex in nature, meaning that cause and effect relations can sometimes only be understood in retrospect and cannot be repeated. The evaluation methods should therefore focus on recurring patterns of practice, using different perspectives to understand changes and to acknowledge that the evaluation means to draw conclusions about complex adaptive systems (Kurtz and Snowden, 2003)[138].

Changes in the values of the Civil Society Indicators in the 2012-2014 period are then the result of conflict management processes, interactive learning events, new incentives (carrots and sticks) that mobilise or demobilise civil society, rather than the result of a change process that can be predicted from A to Z (a linear or logical framework approach)[139].

[138] C. F. Kurtz, D. J. Snowden, The new dynamics of strategy: Sense-making in a complex and complicated world, in IBM Systems Journal vol 42, no 3, 2003.

[139] Caluwe de, L & Vermaak H. (2003) "Learning to Change. A Guide for Organisation Change Agents" Sage Publications.

### *A theory-based evaluation*

Theory-based evaluation has the advantage of situating the evaluation findings in an analysis that includes both what happened over the life of the project as well as the how and why of what happened (Rogers 2004). It demonstrates its capacity to help understand why a program works or fails to work, going further than knowing only outcomes by trying to systematically enter the black box (Weiss, 2004).

Theory-based evaluations can provide a framework to judge effectiveness in context of high levels of complexity, uncertainty, and changeability when traditional (impact) evaluation methods are not suitable: the use of control groups for the civil society evaluation is problematic since comparable organisations with comparable networks and operating in a similar external environment would be quite difficult to identify and statistical techniques of matching cannot be used because of a small n.

Because SPO's theories of change regarding their efforts to build civil society or to influence policies may alter during the 2012-2014 period, it requires us to develop a deep understanding of the change process and the dynamics that affect civil society and policies. It is important to understand what has led to specific (non-) changes and (un)-expected changes. These external factors and actors, as well as the SPO's agency need to be taken into account for the attribution question. Linear input-activities-outputs-outcomes-impact chains do not suffice for complex issues where change is both the result of SPOs' interventions as those by other actors and/or factors.

Therefore, the most reasonable counterfactual that can be used for this evaluation is that of considering alternative causal explanations of change (White and Philips, 2012). Therefore the SPOs' Theory of Change constructed in 2012 is also related to a Model of Change constructed in 2014 that tries to find the ultimate explanations of what happened in reality, including other actors and factors that might possibly explain the outcomes achieved.

### *Triangulation of methods and sources of information*

For purposes of triangulation to improve the robustness, validity or credibility of the findings of the evaluation we used different types of data collection and analysis methods as well as different sources of information. The CIVICUS analytical framework was adjusted for this evaluation in terms of providing standard impact outcome indicators to be taken into account. Data collection methods used consisted of workshops with the SPO, interviews with key resource persons, focus group discussions, social network analysis (during the baseline), consultation of project documents; MFS II consortia documents and other documents relevant to assess general trends in civil society

### *Participatory evaluation*

The evaluation is participatory in that both baseline and end line started with a workshop with SPO staff, decision makers and where possible board members. The baseline workshop helped SPOs to construct their own theory of change with regards to civil society. . Detailed guidelines and tools have been developed by CDI for both baseline and follow-up, and these have been piloted in each of the countries CDI is involved in. Country based evaluators have had a critical input in reviewing and adapting these detailed guidelines and tools. This enhanced a rigorous data collection process. Additionally, the process of data analysis has been participatory where both CDI and in-country teams took part in the process and cross-check each other's inputs for improved quality. Rigorous analysis of the qualitative data was done with the assistance of the NVivo software program.

### *Using the evaluation standards as a starting point*

As much as possible within the boundaries of this accountability driven evaluation, the evaluation teams tried to respect the following internationally agreed upon standards for program evaluation (Yarbrough et al, 2011). These are, in order of priority: Utility; Feasibility; Propriety; Accuracy; Accountability. However, given the entire set-up of the evaluation, the evaluation team cannot fully ensure the extent to which the evaluation is utile for the SPO and their CFAs; and cannot ensure that the evaluation findings are used in a proper way and not for political reasons;

## 2.2. Sample selection

The terms of reference for this evaluation stipulate that the evaluators draw a sample of southern partner organisations to include in the assessment. Given the fact that the first evaluation questions intends to draw conclusions for the MDGs or the themes (governance or fragile states) for Indonesia a sample was drawn for the two or three most frequent MDGs or themes that the SPOs are working in.

In 2012, the Dutch MFS II consortia were asked to provide information for each SPO regarding the MDG/theme it is working on, if it has an explicit agenda in the area of civil society strengthening and/or policy influence. The database then provided an insight into the most important MDG/themes covered by the partner organisations, how many of these have an explicit agenda regarding civil society strengthening and/or policy influence. The entire population of SPOs in Indonesia was 120, of which those exclusively working on the governance theme (28 SPOs), those working on MDG 7ab (26 SPOs) and on MDG 3 (26 SPOs) where the most frequent ones. With regards to MDG 3 and MDG 7ab the evaluator decided to select MDG 7ab, which is a very specific and relevant MDG for Indonesia.

Five 5 partner organisations were randomly selected for respectively MDG 7 (natural resources) of a population of 26 SPOs and 5 for the governance theme from 28 SPOs[140].

## 2.3. Changes in the original terms of reference

Two major changes have been introduced during this evaluation and accepted by the commissioner of the MFS II evaluation. These changes were agreed upon during the 2013 and the 2014 synthesis team meetings.

The efficiency evaluation question:

During the June 2013 synthesis meeting the following decision was made with regards to measuring how efficient MFS II interventions for organisational capacity and civil society are:

*[...] it was stressed that it is difficult to disentangle budgets for capacity development and civil society strengthening. SPOs usually don't keep track of these activities separately; they are included in general project budgets. Therefore, teams agreed to assess efficiency of CD [capacity development] and CS activities in terms of the outcomes and/or outputs of the MDG projects. This implies no efficiency assessment will be held for those SPOs without a sampled MDG project. Moreover, the*

[140] See the evaluation methodology for the civil society component as described in the annex of the baseline report.

*efficiency assessment of MDG projects needs to take into account CD and CS budgets (in case these are specified separately). Teams will evaluate efficiency in terms of outcomes if possible. If project outcomes are unlikely to be observed already in 2014, efficiency will be judged in terms of outputs or intermediate results (e-mail quotation from Gerton Rongen at February 6, 2014).*

### *Attribution/contribution evaluation question*

During the June 2013 NWO-WOTRO workshop strategies were discussed to fit the amount of evaluation work to be done with the available resources. Therefore,

1. The number of SPOs that will undergo a full-fledged analysis to answer the attribution question, were to be reduced to 50 percent of all SPOs. Therefore the evaluation team used the following selection criteria:

- An estimation of the annual amount of MFS II funding allocated to interventions that have a more or less direct relation with the civil society component. This implies the following steps to be followed for the inventory:
- Covering all MDGs/themes in the original sample
- Covering a variety of Dutch alliances and CFAs

2. The focus of the attribution question will be on two impact outcome areas, those most commonly present in the SPO sample for each country. The evaluation team distinguishes four different impact outcome areas:

- The extent to which the SPO, with MFS II funding, engages more and diverse categories of society in the 2011-2014 period (Civicus dimensions “Civic engagement” and “perception of impact”)
- The extent to which the SPOs supports its intermediate organisations to make a valuable contribution to civil society in the 2011 -2014 period (Civicus dimension “Level of organisation” and “perception of impact”)
- The extent to which the SPO itself engages with other civil society organisations to make a valuable contribution to civil society in the 2011-2014 period (Civicus dimension “level of organisation”)
- The extent to which the SPO contributes to changing public and private sector policies and practices in the 2011-2014 period (Civicus dimension “perception of impact”)

3. The CS dimension ‘Practice of Values’ has been excluded, because this dimension is similar to issues dealt with for the organisational capacity assessment.

The aforementioned analysis drew the following conclusions:

**Table 52: SPOs to be included for full-fledged process tracing analysis.**

| Country | SPO in the in-depth analysis | Strategic CS orientation to include |
|---|---|---|
| **Indonesia** | ELSAM, WARSI, CRI, NTFP-EP, LPPSLH | 1. Strengthening intermediate organisations AND influencing policies and practices<br>2. If only one of the two above mentioned is applicable, then select another appropriate impact outcome area to look at. |
| **India** | NNET, CWM, CECOEDECON, Reds Tumkur, CSA | 1. Enhancing civic engagement AND strengthening intermediate organisations<br>2. If only one of the two above mentioned is applicable then select another appropriate impact outcome area to look at. |
| **Ethiopia** | OSSA, EKHC, CCGG&SO, JeCCDO and ADAA | 1. Strengthening the capacities of intermediate organisations AND SPO's engagement in the wider CS arena<br>2. If only one of the two above mentioned is applicable then select another appropriate impact outcome area to look at. |
| Source: Consultation of project documents available in February 2014 | | |

## 2.4. Answering the evaluation questions

### *Evaluation question 1 - Changes in civil society for the relevant MDGs/topics*

Evaluation question 1: *What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?*

**Indicators and tools used**

In line with the CIVICUS Civil Society Index, a scoring tool was developed in 2012 which comprises 17 indicators. The selection was inspired by those suggested in the terms of reference of the commissioner. Each indicator was, also in line with the CIVICUS index accompanied by an open evaluation question to be used for data collection in 2012 and 2014. In 2012 the scoring tool contained four statements describing the level of achievements of the indicator and scores ranged from 0 to 3 (low score - high score).

A comparison of the scores obtained in 2012 informed the evaluation team that there was a positive bias towards high scores, mostly between 2 and 3. Therefore during the 2014 assessment, it was decided to measure relative changes for each indicator in the 2012 – 2014 period, as well as the reasons for changes or no changes and assigning a score reflecting the change between -2 (considerable deterioration of the indicator value since 2012) and +2 (considerable improvement).

In 2012 and based upon the Theory of Change constructed with the SPO, a set of standard indicators were identified that would ensure a relation between the standard CIVICUS indicators and the interventions of the SPO. However, these indicators were not anymore included in the 2014 assessment because of the resources available and because the methodology fine-tuned for the attribution question in 2013, made measurement of these indicators redundant.

Also in 2012, as a means to measure the 'level of organisation' dimension a social network analysis tool was introduced. However this tool received very little response and was discontinued during the end line study.

**Key questions to be answered for this evaluation question**

In 2012, SPO staff and leaders, as well as outside resource persons were asked to provide answers to 17 questions, one per standard indicator of the scoring tool developed by CDI.

In 2012, the SPO staff and leaders were given the description of each indicator as it was in 2012 and had to answer the following questions:

1. How has the situation of this indicator changed compared to its description of the 2012 situation? Did it deteriorate considerably or did it improve considerably (-2 → +2)
2. What exactly has changed since 2012 for the civil society indicator that you are looking at? Be as specific as possible in your description.
3. What interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the situation in 2012? Please tick and describe what happened and to what change this led. It is possible to tick and describe more than one choice.
    - Intervention by SPO, NOT financed by any of your Dutch partners ……..
    - Intervention SPO, financed by your Dutch partner organisation ……(In case you receive funding from two Dutch partners, please specify which partner is meant here)
    - Other actor NOT the SPO, please specify…….
    - Other factor, NOT actor related, please specify……
    - A combination of actors and factors, INCLUDING the SPO, but NOT with Dutch funding, please specify…
    - A combination of actors and factors, INCLUDING the SPO, but WITH Dutch funding, please specify…
    - Don't know
4. Generally speaking, which two of the five CIVICUS dimensions (civic engagement, level of organisation, practice of values, perception of impact, environment) changed considerably between 2012 – 2014? For each of these changes, please describe:
    - Nature of the change
    - Key interventions, actors and factors (MFS II or non-MFS II related) that explain each change (entirely or partially).

**Sources for data collection**

During the baseline and the end line and for purposes of triangulation, several methods were used to collect data on each (standard) indicator:

- Self-assessment per category of staff within the SPO: where possible, three subgroups were made to assess the scores: field staff/programme staff, executive leadership and representatives of the board,, general assembly, and internal auditing groups if applicable completed with separate interviews;
- Interviews with external resource persons. These consisted of three categories: key actors that are knowledgeable about the MDG/theme the SPO is working on and who know the civil society arena around these topics; civil society organisations that are being affected by the programme through support or CSOs with which the SPO is collaborating on equal footing, and; representatives of public or private sector organisations with which the SPO is interacting

- Consultation and analysis of reports that relate to each of the five CIVICUS dimensions.
- Project documents, financial and narrative progress reports, as well as correspondence between the SPO and the CFA.
- Social network analysis (SNA), which was discontinued in the end line study.

During the follow-up, emphasis was put on interviewing the same staff and external persons who were involved during the baseline for purpose of continuity.

## 2.5. Evaluation question 2 – "Attribution" of changes in civil society to interventions of SPOs.

Evaluation question 2: *To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?*

**Adapting the evaluation question and introduction to the methodology chosen**

In line with the observation of Stern et al. (2012) that the evaluation question, the programme attributes, and the evaluation approaches all provide important elements to conclude on the evaluation design to select, the teams in charge of evaluating the civil society component concluded that given the attributes of the programmes it was impossible to answer the *attribution* question as formulated in the Terms of References of the evaluation and mentioned above. Therefore, the evaluation teams worked towards answering the extent *to which the programme contributed towards realising the outcomes.*

For this endeavour explaining outcome process-tracing[141] was used. The objective of the process tracing methodology for MFS II, in particular for the civil society component is to:

- Identify what interventions, actors and factors explain selected impact outcomes for process tracing.
- Assess how the SPO with MFS II funding contributed to the changes in the selected impact outcomes and how important this contribution is given other actors and factors that possibly influence the attainment of the outcome. Ruling out rival explanations, which are other interventions, actors or factors that are not related to MFS II funding.

**Methodology – getting prepared**

As described before a limited number of SPOs were selected for process tracing and for each country strategic orientations were identified as a means to prevent a bias occurring towards only positive impact outcomes and as a means to support the in-country evaluation teams with the selection of outcomes to focus on a much as was possible, based upon the project documents available at CDI. These documents were used to track realised outputs and outcomes against planned outputs and outcomes. During the workshop (see evaluation question on changes in civil society) and follow-up interviews with the SPO, two impact outcomes were selected for process tracing.

[141] Explaining outcome process tracing attempts to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific historical case. Here the aim is not to build or test more general theories but to craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case centric than theory oriented. The aim of process tracing is not to verify if an intended process of interventions took place as planned in a particular situation, but that it aims at increasing our understanding about what works under what conditions and why (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

**Steps in process tracing**

1. Construct the theoretical model of change – by in-country evaluation team

After the two impact outcomes have been selected and information has been obtained about what has actually been achieved, the in-country evaluation team constructs a visual that shows all pathways that might possibly explain the outcomes. The inventory of those possible pathways is done with the SPO, but also with external resource persons and documents consulted. This culminated in a Model of Change. A MoC of good quality includes: The causal pathways that relate interventions/parts by any actor, including the SPO to the realised impact outcome; assumptions that clarify relations between different parts in the pathway, and; case specific and/or context specific factors or risks that might influence the causal pathway, such as for instance specific attributes of the actor or socio-cultural-economic context. The Models of Change were discussed with the SPO and validated.

2. Identify information needs to confirm or reject causal pathways as well as information sources needed.

This step aims to critically reflect upon what information is needed that helps to confirm one of causal pathways and at that at same time helps to reject the other possible explanations. Reality warns that this type of evidence will hardly be available for complex development efforts. The evaluators were asked to behave as detectives of Crime Scene Investigation, ensuring that the focus of the evaluation was not only on checking if parts/interventions had taken place accordingly, but more specifically on identifying information needs that confirm or reject the relations between the parts/interventions. The key question to be answered was: "What information do we need in order to confirm or reject that one part leads to another part or, that X causes Y?". Four types of evidence were used, where appropriate:[142]

- *Pattern evidence* relates to predictions of statistical patterns in the evidence. This may consist of trends analysis and correlations.
- *Sequence evidence* deals with the temporal and spatial chronology of events predicted by a hypothesised causal mechanism. For example, a test of the hypothesis could involve expectations of the timing of events where we might predict that if the hypothesis is valid, we should see that the event B took place after event A. However, if we found that event B took place before event A, the test would suggest that our confidence in the validity of this part of the mechanism should be reduced (disconfirmation/ falsification).
- *Trace evidence* is evidence whose mere existence provides proof that a part of a hypothesised mechanism exists. For example, the existence of meeting minutes, if authentic, provides strong proof that the meeting took place.
- *Account evidence* deals with the content of empirical material, such as meeting minutes that detail what was discussed or an oral account of what took place in the meeting.

3. Collect information necessary to confirm or reject causal pathways

Based upon the inventory of information needs the evaluation teams make their data collection plan after which data collection takes place.

[142] Beach and Pederson, 2013

4. Analyse the data collected and assessment of their quality.

This step consists of compiling all information collected in favour or against a causal pathway in a table or in a list per pathway. For all information used, the sources of information are mentioned and an assessment of the strength of the evidence takes place, making a distinction between strong, weak and moderate evidence. For this we use the traffic light system: **green letters mean strong evidence**, **red letters mean weak evidence** and **orange letter mean moderate evidence:** The following table provides the format used to assess these issues.

**Table 53: Organisation of information collected per causal pathway and assessing their quality**

| Causal pathway | Information that confirms (parts of) this pathway | | Information that rejects (parts of) this pathway | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Pathway 1**<br>**Part 1.1**<br>**Part 1.2**<br>**Etc** | **Information 1**<br>**Information 2**<br>**Information 3**<br>etc | Source of information<br>Source of information<br>Source of information<br>etc | **Information 1**<br>**Information 2**<br>**Information 3**<br>etc | Source of information<br>Source of information<br>Source of information<br>etc |
| **Pathway 2**<br>**Part 2.1**<br>**Part 2.2**<br>**Etc.** | **Information 1**<br>**Information 2**<br>**Information 3**<br>etc | Source of information<br>Source of information<br>Source of information<br>etc | **Information 1**<br>**Information 2**<br>**Information 3**<br>etc | Source of information<br>Source of information<br>Source of information<br>etc |
| **Pathway 3** | | | | |

5. Assessing the nature of the relations between parts in the model of change

The classification of all information collected is being followed by the identification of the pathways that most likely explain the impact outcome achieved. For this the evaluators assess the nature of the relations between different parts in the MoC. Based upon Mayne (2012) and Stern et al (2012) the following relations between parts in the MoC are mapped and the symbols inserted into the original MoC.

**Table 54: Nature of the relation between parts in the Model of Change**

| Nature of the relation between parts and other parts or outcome | |
|---|---|
| **The part is the only causal explanation for the outcome. No other interventions or factors explain it. (necessary and sufficient)** |  |
| **The part does not explain the outcome at all: other subcomponents explain the outcomes.** |  |
| **The part explains the outcome but other parts explain the outcome as well: there are multiple pathways (sufficient but not necessary)** |  |
| **The part is a condition for the outcome but won't make it happen without other factors (necessary but not sufficient)** |  |
| **The part explains the outcome, but requires the help of other parts to explain the outcome in a sufficient and necessary way (not a sufficient cause, but necessary) → it is part of a causal package** |  |
| Sources: Mayne, 2012; Stern et al, 2012 | |

*6.* Write down the contribution and assess the role of the SPO and MFS II funding

This final step consists of answering the following questions, as a final assessment of the contribution question:

- The first question to be answered is: What explains the impact outcome?
- The second question is: What is the role of the SPO in this explanation?
- The third question, if applicable is: what is the role of MFS II finding in this explanation?

7. Sources for data collection

Information necessary to answer this evaluation question is to be collected from:

- Interviews with resource persons inside and outside the SPO
- Project documents and documentation made available by other informants
- Websites that possibly confirm that an outcome is achieved and that the SPO is associated with this outcome
- Meeting minutes of meetings between officials
- Time lines to trace the historical relations between events
- Policy documents
- etc

## 2.6. Evaluation question 3 – Relevance of the changes

Evaluation question 3: *What is the relevance of these changes?*

The following questions are to be answered in order to assess the relevance of the changes in Civil Society.

- How do the MFS II interventions and civil society outcomes align with the Theory of Change developed during the baseline in 2012? What were reasons for changing or not changing interventions and strategies?
- What is the civil society policy of the Dutch alliance that collaborates with the SPO? And how do the MFS II interventions and civil society outcomes align with the civil society policy of the Dutch alliance that collaborates with the SPO?
- How relevant are the changes achieved in relation to the context in which the SPO is operating?
- What is the further significance of these changes for building a vibrant civil society for the particular MDG/ theme in the particular context?

**Sources for data collection**

For this question the following sources are to be consulted:

- Review of the information collected during interviews with the SPO and outside resource persons
- The 2012 Theory of Change
- Interview with the CFA liaison officer of the SPO;

- Review of reports, i.e: the civil society policy document of the Dutch Alliance that was submitted for MFS II funding, relevant documents describing civil society for the MDG/ theme the SPO is working on in a given context.

### 2.7. Evaluation question 4, previously 5 - Factors explaining the findings

Evaluation question 4: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

To answer this question we look into information available that:

- Highlight changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO
- Highlight changes in the relations between the SPO and the CFA
- Highlight changes in the context in which the SPO is operating and how this might affect positively or negatively its organisational capacity.

**Sources for data collection**

Sources of information to be consulted are:

- Project documents
- Communications between the CFA and the SPO
- Information already collected during the previous evaluation questions.

## 3. Analysis of findings

A qualitative software programme NVivo 10 (2010) was used to assist in organising and making sense of all data collected. Although the software cannot take over the task of qualitative data analysis, it does 1) improve transparency by creating a record of all steps taken, 2) organise the data and allow the evaluator to conduct a systematic analysis, 3) assist in identifying important themes that might otherwise be missed, and 4) reduce the danger of bias due to human cognitive limitations, compared to “intuitive data processing” (Sadler 1981). The qualitative data in the evaluation consisted of transcripts from semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions workshops, field notes from observation, and a range of documents available at the SPO or secondary information used to collect reference data and to obtain a better understanding of the context in which the CS component evolves.

To analyse this diverse collection of data, several analytical strategies are envisioned, specifically content analysis, discourse analysis, and thematic analysis. Although each of these strategies can be understood as a different lens through which to view the data, all will require a carefully developed and executed coding plan.

Data have been coded according to: standard civil society indicator; outcome included for in-depth contribution analysis; relevance, and; explaining factors.

This qualitative analysis will be supported by a limited amount of quantitative data largely arising from the score assigned by the evaluation team to each performance indicator described in the civil society scoring tool. Other quantitative data in this study are drawn information provided in background literature and organisational documents as well as the Social Network Analysis method.

# 4. Limitations to the methodology

## 4.1. General limitations with regards to the MFS II evaluation

**The MFS II programme and CIVICUS**

Although the MFS II programme stated that all proposals need to contribute to civil society strengthening in the South[143], mention was made of the use of the CIVICUS framework for monitoring purposes. The fact that civil society was to be integrated as one of the priority result areas next to that of organisational capacity and MDGs became only clear when the MoFA communicated its mandatory monitoring protocol. In consequence, civil society strengthening in the MFS II programmes submitted to the ministry is mainstreamed into different sub programmes, but not addressed as a separate entity.

This late introduction of the Civil Society component also implies that project documents and progress reports to not make a distinction in MDG or theme components vs those of civil society strengthening, leaving the interpretation of what is a civil society intervention our outcome and what not to the interpretation of the evaluation team.

At the same time the evaluation team observes that SPOs and CFAs have started to incorporate the organisational capacity tool that is being used in the monitoring protocol in their own organisational assessment procedures. None of the SPOs is familiar with the CIVICUS framework and how it fits into their interventions.

**Differences between CIVICUS and MFS II evaluation**

CIVICUS developed a Civil Society Index that distinguishes 5 dimensions and for each of these a set of indicators has been developed. Based upon a variety of data collection methods, a validation team composed of civil society leaders provides the scores for the civil society index.

Major differences between the way the Civil Society Index is been used by CIVICUS and for this MFS II evaluation is the following:

1. CIVICUS defines its unit of analysis is terms of the civil society arena at national and/or subnational level and does not start from individual NGOs. The MFS II evaluation put the SPO in the middle of the civil society arena and then looked at organisations that receive support; organisations with which the SPO is collaborating. The civil society arena boundaries for the MFS II evaluation are the public or private sector organisations that the SPO relates to or whose policies and practices it aims to influence
2. The CIVICUS assessments are conducted by civil society members itself whereas the MFS II evaluation is by nature an external evaluation conducted by external researchers. CIVICUS assumes that its assessments, by organising them as a joint learning exercise, will introduce change that is however not planned. With the MFS II evaluation the focus was on the extent to which the interventions of the SPO impacted upon the civil society indicators.
3. CIVICUS has never used its civil society index as a tool to measure change over a number of years. Each assessment is a stand-alone exercise and no efforts are being made to compare indicators over time or to attribute changes in indicators to a number of organisations or external trends.

[143] Policy Framework Dutch Cofinancing System II 2011 - 2015

**Dimensions and indicator choice**

The CIVICUS dimensions in themselves are partially overlapping; the dimension 'perception of impact' for instance contains elements that relate to 'civic engagement' and to 'level of organisation'. Similar overlap is occurring in the civil society scoring tool developed for this evaluation and which was highly oriented by a list of evaluation questions set by the commissioner of the evaluation.

Apart from the overlap, we observe that some of the standard indicators used for the civil society evaluation were not meaningful for the SPOs under evaluation. This applies for instance for the political engagement indicator "How intense is your (individual staff or organisational) participation in locally-nationally elected bodies and/or sectoral user groups?".

**Measuring change over a two-year period**

The MFS II programme started its implementation in 2011 and it will finish in 2015, whereas its evaluation started mid-2012 and will end in the beginning of 2014. The period between the baseline and the end line measurement hardly covers 2 years in some cases. Civil society building and policy influence are considered the type of interventions that requires up to 10 years to reap significant results, especially when taking into account attitudes and behaviour. Apart from the fact that the baseline was done when MFS II was already operational in the field for some 1,5 years, some SPO interventions were a continuation of programmes designed under the MFS I programme, hence illustrating that the MFS II period is not a clear boundary. Contracts with other SPOs ended already in 2012, and practically coincided with the baseline assessment being conducted at the moment the relationship with the CFA had practically ended.

**Aggregation of findings**

Although working with standard indicators and assigning them scores creates expectations of findings being compared and aggregated at national and international level, this may lend itself to a quick but inaccurate assessment of change. Crude comparison between programs on the basis of findings is problematic, and risks being politically abused. The evaluation team has to guard against these abuses by ensuring the necessary modesty in extrapolating findings and drawing conclusions.

**Linking the civil society component to the other components of the MFS II evaluation**

The Theory of Change in the terms of reference assumes that CFAs are strengthening the organisational capacity of their partners, which is evaluated in the organisational capacity components, which then leads to impact upon MDGs or upon civil society. Because the evaluation methodology designed for both the organisational capacity and the civil society evaluation require considerable time investments of the SPOs, a deliberate choice was made not to include SPOs under the organisational capacity component in that of Civil Society. This may possibly hamper conclusions regarding the assumption of capacitated SPOs being able to impact upon civil society. However, where information is available and where it is relevant, the civil society component will address organisational capacity issues.

No such limitations were made with regards to SPOs in the MDG sample, however, apart from Indonesia; none of the SPOs in the civil society sample is also in that of MDG.

### 4.2. Limitations during baseline with regards to the methodology

A very important principle upon which this evaluation methodology is based is that of triangulation, which implies that different stakeholders and documents are consulted to obtain information about the same indicator from different perspectives. Based upon these multiple perspectives, a final score can be given on the same indicator which is more valid and credible.

For Indonesia this has not always been possible:

- For 7 out of 10 SPOs a Survey Monkey questionnaire was developed to assess the intensity of the interaction between stakeholders in the network. Out of 156 actors that were invited to fill in this 5 minute questionnaire, only 7 actors effectively filled in the questionnaire = 4.5 %. The online Social Network Analysis aims at having both the opinion of the SPO on the intensity of the interaction with another actor, as well as the opinion of the other actor for triangulation. Important reasons for not filling in this form are that actors in the network are not technology savvy, or that they have difficulties in accessing internet. Data obtained by survey monkey were not used in the baseline. Instead the evaluation team did a social network assessment during the baseline workshop with the SPO.
- With regards to filling in offline interview forms or answering questions during interviews a number of civil society actors did not want to score themselves because they do not benefit from the interventions of the MFS II projects. Having the scores of their own organisations will help to assess the wider environment in which the SPO operates and possibly an impact of the SPO on other civil society organisations in 2014.
- With regards to public officials the evaluation team faced difficulties to have their opinions on a certain number of indicators such as perception of impact on policy influencing and relations between public organisations and civil society. Public officials fear that they will be quoted in the assessment, which may have repercussions for their position.

### 4.3. Experiences during end line from in-country teams - Indonesia

The in-country team experienced difficulties in working on the first evaluation question regarding changes in civil society. The team would have preferred a similar workshop as during the baseline that would recapitulate the essence of the CIVICUS model and the content of each standard indicator developed. Although some members of the in-country team were also involved in the 2012 base line assessment, they and their new colleagues experienced a kind of “CS dimension shock” when these topics where not addressed during the workshop, where a lot of time was spend to work on the second evaluation question on contribution. A guidance sent later in the year was helpful but came late according to the Indonesian team.

The many appendices prepared for data collection and meant as a step-wide approach for the end line study, sometimes became a burden and a limitation when applied directly in collecting data. Like mentioned for the baseline study the questions sometimes limited the probing for information. In addition, in-country team members had to deal with the “CS dimension shock”.

The organisation of the entire MFS II evaluation did provide very little opportunities for SPOs to engage with the evaluation and to feel concerned. For many of the SPOs the evaluation does not provide a strategic value in terms of drawing lessons. This lack of ownership is felt more strongly with those SPOs that already ended their contract with the Dutch MFS II organisation and with those SPOs that due to high staff turn overs were confronted with past tense issues that they did not experience.

Some of the SPOs simply didn't care about the evaluation. This could have been anticipated if there had been a special workshop (for the directors, perhaps, and the CFAs) prior to the endline. Via such workshops, appointments and agreements could have been set, allowing the in-country teams to plan their time and schedule. What ended up happening was that many of the SPOs kept putting off appointments and this also affected the schedule of the team.

Many SPOs are unfamiliar with the CIVICUS framework and the in-country team tried to ease them into it by sending background information and the indicator questions regarding changes in civil society prior to the workshop. This was effective for some SPOs (Common Room, WARSI), but not very effective for LPPSLH, RUANGRUPA, and CRI. The latter three found it too difficult to answer these questions by themselves. Common Room, on the other hand dedicated a special discussion session to discuss the questions internally. The questions were however the same as those dealt with during the baseline and possibly high staff turnovers may also explain this " CS dimension shock".

Fieldwork was sometimes inefficient since the in-country team assumed that each step (workshop, interview, drafting model of change, selecting outcome, finding evidences) would neatly fall into sequence and could be packed tightly within 4 or 5 days with strong commitment from the SPO. This often did not happen.

## 4.4. Civil Society Scoring tool - baseline

**Table 55: Civil Society Assessment tool – Standard Indicators**

| Dimension | Outcome domains | | Question | Statements 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | x | What are factors (strengths, weaknesses) that explain the current situation? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Civic engagement | 1 | Needs of marginalised groups | How does your organisation take the needs of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups into account in your planning, actions, activities, and/or strategies? | Are NOT taken into account | Are POORLY taken into account | Are PARTLY taken into account | Are FULLY taken into account | Question not relevant, because ..... | |
| | 2 | Involvement of target groups | What is the level of participation of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups in the analysis, planning and evaluation of your activities? | They are INFORMED about on-going and/or new activities that you will implement | They are CONSULTED by your organisation. You define the problems and provide the solutions. | They CARRY OUT activities and/or form groups upon your request. They provide resources (time, land, labour) in return for your assistance (material and/or immaterial) | They ANALYSE PROBLEMS AND FORMULATE IDEAS together with your organisation and/or take action independently from you. | Question not relevant, because ..... | |
| | 3 | Political engagement | How intense is your (individual staff or organisational) participation in locally-nationally elected bodies and/or sectoral user groups? | No participation | You are occasionally CONSULTED by these bodies | You are a member of these bodies. You attend meetings as a participant | You are a member of these bodies. You are chairing these bodies or sub groups | Question not relevant, because ..... | |
| | | | | | | | | | |

| Dimension | Outcome domains | | Question | Statements 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | x | What are factors (strengths, weaknesses) that explain the current situation? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| organisation level | 5 | Relations with other organisations | In the past 12 months what has been the most intensive interaction you had with other CSOs? | No interaction at all | Networking - Cooperation: Inform each other; roles somewhat defined; all decisions made independently | Coordination - Coalition: ideas and resources shared; roles defined and divided; all have a vote in decision making | Collaboration: organisations belong to one system; mutual trust; consensus on all decisions. | Question not relevant, because ..... | |
| | 5 | Frequency of dialogue with closest CSO | In the past 12 months how many meetings did you have with the CSO that you have most intensive interaction with? | No interaction at all | Less thatn 2 times a year | Between 2 and 3 times a year | More than 4 times a year | Question not relevant, because ..... | |
| | 6 | Defending the interests of marginalised groups: | Which CSO are most effective in defending the interests of your target groups? In the past 12 months, how did you relate to those CSOs? | No interaction at all | Networking - Cooperation: Inform each other; roles somewhat defined; all decisions made independently | Coordination - Coalition: ideas and resources shared; roles defined and divided; all have a vote in decision making | Collaboration: organisations belong to one system; mutual trust; consensus on all decisions. | Question not relevant, because ..... | |
| of | 7 | Composition current financial resource base | How does your organisation finance institutional costs such as workshops of the General Assembly (if applicable); attendans to workshops of other CSOs; costs for organisational growth and/or networking? | Depends on 1 indernational donor | Depends on few financial sources: one fund cover(s) more than 75% of all costs. | Depends on a variety of financial sources; one fund cover(s) more than 50% of all costs. | Depends on a variety of sources of equal importance. Wide network of domestic funds | Question not relevant, because ..... | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| Practice of Values | 8 | Downward accountability | To what extent can mandatory social organs (steering committee, general assembly, internal auditing group) ask your executive leaders to be accountable to them? | (financial) information is made available and decisions are taken openly | They fulfil their formal obligation to explain strategic decisions and actions | They react to requests of social organs to justify/explain actions and decisions made | Social organs use their power to sanction management in case of misconduct or abuse | Question not relevant, because ..... | |

| Dimension | Outcome domains | | Question | Statements 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | x | What are factors (strengths, weaknesses) that explain the current situation? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 9 | Composition of social organs | What % of members of your mandatory social organs belong to the marginalised target groups you are working with/for? | Between 0-10 % of all members of the social organs | Between 11-30 % of all members of the social organs | Between 31-65 % of all members of the social organs | More than 65% of all members of the social organs | Question not relevant, because ..... | |
| | 10 | External financial auditing | How regularly is your organisation audited externally? | Never | Occasionally, upon request of funders | Periodically and regularly, because our external funder asks for it | Periodically and regularly, because it is part of our code of conduct | Question not relevant, because ..... | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| Perception of impact | 11 | Client satisfaction | What are the most important concerns of your target groups? How do your services take into account those important concerns? | Majority of target groups are NOT satisfied | Majority of target groups are POORLY satisfied | Majority of target groups are PARTLY satisfied | Majority of target groups are MOSTLY satisfied | Question not relevant, because ..... | |
| | 12 | Civil society impact. | In the past 12 months, what impact did you have on building a strong civil society? | You have not undertaken any activities of this kind | You have undertaken activities of this kind but there is no discernible impact | You have undertaken activities of this kind but impact is limited | You have undertaken activities and examples of significant success can be detected. | Question not relevant, because ..... | |
| | 13 | Relation with public sector organisations. | In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with public sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' objectives? | No direct interaction | You have been invited by public sector organisations for sharing of information | You have been invited by public sector organisations for regular consultations (but public sector decides) | Formal and regular meetings as a multi-stakeholder task force. | Question not relevant, because ..... | |
| | 14 | Relation with private sector organisations | In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with private sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' perspective? | No direct interaction | You have been invited by private sector organisations for sharing of information | You have been invited by private sector organisations for regular consultations (but public sector decides) | Formal and regular meetings as a multi-stakeholder task force. | Question not relevant, because ..... | |

| Dimension | Outcome domains | | Question | Statements 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | x | What are factors (strengths, weaknesses) that explain the current situation? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 15 | Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations | How successful have you been in influencing public policies and practices in the past 2 years? | No activities developed in this area | Some activities developed but without discernible impact | Many activities developed in this area, but impact until so far has been limited | Many activities developed in this area and examples of success can be detected | Question not relevant, because ..... | |
| | 16 | Influence upon private sector agencies' policies, rules, regulations. | How successful have you been in influencing private sector policies and practices in the past 2 years? | No activities developed in this area | Some activities developed but without discernible impact | Many activities developed in this area, but impact until so far has been limited | Many activities developed in this area and examples of success can be detected | Question not relevant, because ..... | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| **Environmental context** | 17 | Coping strategies | In the past 2 years, how did your organisation cope with these changes in the context that may have been positive or negative consequences for civil society. | No analysis of the space and role of civil society has been done. | You are collecting information of the space and role of civil society but not regularly analysing it. | You are monitoring the space and role of civil society and analysing the consequences of changes in the context for your own activities. Examples are available. | You are involved in joint action to make context more favourable. Examples are available. | Question not relevant, because ..... | |

# Annex K. Changes in the Civil Society Context 2010-2014

## 1. Political context

### 1.1. Brief historical perspective

Indonesia's rise to being the world's third largest democratic nation has been lauded by many world leaders. The county is often considered to be a model Muslim democracy. As the fourth most populous nation with an estimated 250 million people[144], Indonesia has sustained its democratic commitment since transitioning from an authoritarian leadership to a democracy in 1998. The decentralized administration now consists of 34 provinces and 508 districts and municipalities.

Prior to 1998, Indonesia was under strict authoritarian regime. Suharto, known for his so-called New Order (1966-1998) regime, ushered in radical transformations that would place social and political forces under direct state supervision. The defining characteristics of the Suharto era were a focus on economic growth and controlled consensus and political stability devoid of dissent. A series of tumultuous economic and political transitions in the nineties severely diminished the credibility of ageing President Suharto, who was forced to resign amidst mass street protests.

His departure in 1998 laid bare three decades of social inequalities, state-perpetuated abuses against human rights, and a lack of civilian liberties. The regime change opened the way for a period of *Reformasi* started under the presidency of B. J. Habibie (1998-1999) and continued by Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001), Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001–2004), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014). Restrictions on citizen participation, press freedom and association were removed. Democratic reforms and decentralization led to direct elections, portioned authority, devolution of authority to regional authorities, formation of new political parties and ended the military's parliamentary influence. The distinct historical periods of the New Order Regime and *Reformasi* (1998-present) have shaped the emergence of civil society. Defining characteristics are summarized in the table below.

**Table 56: Characteristics that have defined the emergence of civil society in Indonesia**

| Characteristics | New Order, authoritarian period (1966 – 1998) | Reformasi (1998 – present) |
|---|---|---|
| **Political system** | Centralized, authoritarian characterized by unipolarity. Golkar as the dominant political party. | Decentralized, democratic. Fragmentation of power and atomization of patronage relationships. Emergence of numerous political parties. Direct presidential elections since 1999. |
| | In 1999, there were 27 provinces, 306 | Decentralization altered the political and administrative landscape: 34 provinces, 410 |

[144] In 2010 the population was estimated to be around 237 million people (BPS 2010 Population Census). The current figure is an estimate from BKKBN and similar figures are cited in the CIA's World Fact Book and the World Bank.

| Characteristics | New Order, authoritarian period (1966 – 1998) | Reformasi (1998 – present) |
|---|---|---|
| | districts and around 60,000 villages. | districts, 98 municipalities, 6,944 sub-districts and 81,253.[145] |
| **State-citizen interaction** | Benevolent leader, obedient population. Down to the village level, the state permeated society. | Modern political culture marked by diminishing hierarchy between the state and citizens, allowing for citizens to interact more freely. |
| **Citizen representation and voice** | Strict control of speech, expression and association. | Burgeoning of CSOs, pressure groups and NGOs following the political euphoria after Suharto's fall. |
| | CSOs and their networks largely "hiding behind the screen", and operating under state surveillance. A period of growth occurred in 1995-98, as resistance was building. | Indonesian CSOs began to establish new networks internationally. Up until the early 2000s the focus was on state-centrist issues. Later, issues that CSOs were tackling became more diverse, ranging from pluralism, poverty reduction to fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights. |
| **Media** | No free press, censorship and state-control. Suharto had firm grasp over how to use print & broadcast medias to promote political ideologies. | More vibrant media environment, flourishing of media businesses albeit in control of 12 main conglomerates that are mostly profit-driven and often have political ties. |
| | Limited public and CS use and access to internet until mid-90s. | Twitter nation, widespread social media use. |
| | | Growing realization of the importance of media/free press as the fourth pillar of democracy. |
| **Artistic forms of expression** | Art and literary censorship conducted by the state. Art forms were a means to reinforce political order. | Greater freedom of the arts and cultural sectors. Organisations able to hold art events more freely. Freedom of expression a catchphrase amongst individuals and artistic groups, but challenged by more conservative members of society. |
| **Religious expression** | Regime repressed religious groups, especially radical forms. | Emergence of religious groups seeking to restore Islamic values and defend Muslim values. |

With political reforms came greater freedom and space for civic engagement. In the *Reformasi* period, there was a remarkable increase in the number of civil society organisations, many of which were Islamic in character. In 2000, the Central Agency on Statistics (BPS) recorded around 70,000 registered

[145] Latest data (2014) See: http://www.rumahpemilu.org/in/read/3351/Gambaran-Singkat-Pemilihan-Umum-2014-di-Indonesia

organisations, compared to just 10,000 in 1996.[146]New groups sprung up with donors encouraging activists to establish NGOs they could fund. These organisations were eager to distance themselves from state and often took an anti-government stance. Proliferating CSOs and NGOs have taken advantage of decentralization and greater regional autonomy to engage in public affairs. Civil society and government relations have improved, although both sides remain sceptical of the others' intentions.

### 1.2. Recent trends in the political context

Indonesia is considered to be a story of democratic success, but it still struggles to realize the benefits of sustained and equitable economic growth. In the political context, the main challenges lie in governing such geographically vast and decentralized country, applying principles of good governance and the enormous task of reforming the country's bureaucracy.

Although, Indonesia's 'big bang' decentralization initiated at the turn of the century narrowed the gap between local government and citizens, it has also localized political power struggles. While the devolution of authorities relieved tensions between the central government and the regions, it has also created opportunities for corrupt and rent-seeking practices, at the local level. As indicated by Transparency International's corruption index scores, perceived corruption in Indonesia remains high.

**Table 57: Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer survey: Indonesia**

| Year | Corruption perceptions Index Score *(0 perceived as highly corrupt and 100 perceived as clean)* | Rank |
|---|---|---|
| **2011** | 30 | 100/182 |
| **2012** | 32 | 118/174 |
| **2013** | 32 | 114/177 |
| Source: Transparency International | | |

In 2013, decentralization was taken a step further with the approval of the Village Law, intended to address weak governance arrangements and empower rural communities to participate politically. The new law could also lead to village elites distorting power relations and misusing government funding if not properly monitored.

Indonesia is still transitioning politically and many challenges lie ahead. According to the 2012 Indonesia Governance Index's Executive Report, "Indonesia is witnessing a paradox in its democracy. On one hand, a successful opening-up of civil liberty has led to the avalanche of democratic demands across the nation, however on the other hand, democratic institutions' are inadequately respond to those demands." Nonetheless, the Indonesian Governance Index, which focuses on measuring provincial governance, does show a general improvement in the performance of the government (political office) bureaucracy, civil society and economic society based on principles of participation, transparency, fairness, accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness between 2008 and 2012. Civil society scores improved the most significantly, while scores for bureaucracy rose slightly.[147]

[146]http://intranet.law.unimelb.edu.au/staff/events/files/Microsoft%20PowerPoint%20-%20LSM%20dan%20Islam%20di%20Indonesia%20--Melbourne%202010-FINAL.pdf

[147] The IGI uses a scale of 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest). Data is available online through their website.

**Table 58: Indonesia Governance Index: Average provincial scores**

| Arena | 2008 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| **Government** | 4.93 | 5.46 |
| **Bureaucracy** | 5.53 | 5.58 |
| **Civil Society** | 4.85 | 6.33 |
| **Economic Society** | 4.77 | 5.71 |
| Source: http://www.kemitraan.or.id/igi | | |

In the past decade, Indonesians have generally enjoyed a freedom to participate in the political process through a direct-election mechanism. However, in September 2014 lawmakers voted in favour of a bill reviving indirect elections of regional heads. The controversial vote provoked public outcry which saw peaceful protests and the public voicing their discontent through social media. In early October, just before the end of his term, president Yudhoyono issued a regulation in lieu of the law, effectively repealing the law until further judicial review.

The recent 2014 elections which marked the end of Yudhoyono's 10-year term, demonstrated that Indonesian voters are increasingly voting for popular figures irrespective of political party alliances. While practices of corruption, vote-buying and poor voter administration remained in the recent election, the public seems to have matured politically, indicated by the enormous interest in televised debates between the leading candidates. The appeal of the newly sworn in President Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, has come from his hands-on, man-of-the-people approach. As Jokowi begins his five-year term he will need to start addressing a myriad of challenges that include corruption, stagnant economic growth, and human rights concerns, particularly with respect to the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and religious intolerance. If left unaddressed, these challenges could seriously undermine Indonesia's stability and democratic reforms.

## 2. Civil Society context

### 2.1. Socio-political context

Today, there are tens of thousands of civil organisations in the country[148], comprising of religious organisations, unions, mass-based membership organisations, ethnic groups, professional associations, politically affiliated organisations, NGOs, and other community organisations.[149] CSOs in Indonesia work on wide range of themes. Thematic areas recently prominent include democratization and human rights; issue-based campaigns; protecting economic, social and cultural rights; promoting community access to basic services; environmental and natural resources management, and; climate change and disaster risk reduction. In 2012, the Ministry of Home Affairs documented more than 65,000 organisations, of which around 9,000 were officially registered with the Ministry.[150] A year later, the figure increased to more

[148] Under state law, there are two forms of organisation recognized legally: "yayasan" or foundations, and "perkumpulan" or associations. The main difference between foundations and associations is that the latter is member-based and in the way they are governed internally and under law. A large majority of NGOs in Indonesia are private foundations.
[149] NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles and Innovations edited by Lisa Jordan, Peter van Tuijl
[150] Source: http://www.koran-jakarta.com/?112-1000-ormas-perbarui-pendaftaran. This figure is similar to 2010 data provided by Rustam Ibrahim in An ASEAN Community for All: Exploring the Scope for Civil Society Engagement, FES 2011.

than 130 thousand foundations, associations, NGOs, research institutions, and other organisations.[151] It is worth noting that NGOs in Indonesia are also allowed to establish cooperatives or SMEs, of which there are 203,701 with a membership reaching 35.2 million people.[152] Under recently reinstated Law No. 25/1992 concerning cooperatives, the cooperatives' objectives are to improve the welfare of its members and participate in developing the economy.[153] Given these regulations it is possible to expand the definition of civil society to include cooperatives.[154]

The civil society stage has become more diverse; the stage is now "shared with more players, like political parties, religious organisations and universities, all able to speak out and publicize their views in a multitude of media outlets that have sprung up in recent years.[155]" NGOs and civil society in Indonesia are now starting to deal with the dissolve of traditionally-compartmentalized roles and responsibilities as their activities begin to overlap with those of the government and private sector. As one recent report stated, "NGOs that were united against Suharto are now without a common enemy and something to unite them to a common vision.[156]" While the government has come to recognize that "a strong civil society is an important contributor to both launching and sustaining a transition to democratic governance"[157], NGOs and CSO networks continue to be scrutinized and criticized for being vehicles of foreign intervention.

Despite the considerable number of organisations, those operating effectively are likely to be a small proportion.[158] The accountability and transparency of CSOs and NGOs themselves has also come under greater scrutiny. "Donors have started to become impatient with some of their NGO counterparts, who have difficulties accepting that they now have to fulfil much greater demands"[159]. In recent years foreign donor funding has depleted, which has led to more organisations turning to the private sector and government programmes.

Since 1985 the state has regulated member-based, citizen organisations under a Mass Organisations Law making it obligatory for social organisations to register with government. This law was largely ignored in the period of reform following 1998. However, in 2013 the law was replaced by a new controversial Mass/Societal Organisations (*Ormas*) Law No. 17, reinforcing control of foundations and associations. The Law could be used to prohibit or dissolve CSOs. Many NGOs and civil society networks deplored the Law for constricting democratic space and the freedom of civil society. The 2014 Freedom

[151] http://kesbangpol.kemendagri.go.id/index.php/subblog/read/2013/2515/Pemerintah-Ada-Ormas-yang-Diperalat-untuk-Kepentingan-Asing/2330&www.kesbangpolbulukumba.info/berita-sambutan--dirjen-kesbangpol------pada-----pertemuan--sosialisasi-undangundang--nomor-17-tahun-2013-.html

[152] Article entitled: Pemerintahan Jokowi Diminta Terus Beber Koperasi dan UMKM, 20 October 2014, Available at: http://www.depkop.go.id/

[153] A cooperative is defined in Article 3 as: "an economic organisation of the people with a social content (character) having persons or legal cooperative societies as members, farming economic entity as a collective endeavor based upon mutual help" (FAO, A study of cooperative legislation in selected Asian and Pacific countries).

[154] The World Economic Forum has adopted such a definition in 2013. See: The Future Role of Civil Society, available at: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_FutureRoleCivilSociety_Report_2013.pdf

[155] NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles and Innovations, Edited by Lisa Jordan and Peter van Tuijl (2006)

[156] STATT NGO Sector Review 2012

[157] Evolution and Challenges of Civil Society Organisations in Promoting Democratization in Indonesia

[158] Rustam Ibrahim comments on this in FES 2011

[159] Ibid

House Index's ratings for civil liberties in Indonesia declined from Free to Partly Free as a result of the new law[160].

**Table 59: Indonesia's Rank & Score: Freedom House Indices**

| Arena | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Freedom status** | Free | Free | Free | Partially Free |
| **Political rights** | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| **Civil liberties** | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 |
| Source: http://www.freedomhouse.org | | | | |

The 2013 CIVICUS report hinted that the legislation could be part of the state's reaction to a perceived threat that environmental, land rights and indigenous activists pose to political and economic interests due to the "shadowy connections that can exist between transnational corporations and politicians" in the agriculture extractive and construction industries.

The annual Freedom of the Press Index produced by Freedom House illustrates that Indonesia's media remains "partly free". From 2011 to 2012 there was significant numerical improvement from 53 points to 49 with the reduction of restrictions and a greater ability of journalists to cover news more freely. From 2012 to 2014, the country's rating remained steady at 49, with slight changes in global ranking (2012: 97$^{th}$, 2013: 96$^{th}$, 2014: 98$^{th}$).[161]

Overall, the press system in Indonesia is vibrant, with a wide range of news sources and perspectives, further growing with the developments in digital media. "Indonesia's online growth in recent years is recognised as nothing short of phenomenal" (Matt Abud 2012). While the Internet is seen as a new space for debate and participation, current laws still curtail openness, accessibility, inclusiveness and place limits on its use for expression. Only a limited number of organisations like ICT Watch are addressing freedom of expression and online rights. Nonetheless, citizens are using cyber space to set up online communities and organise campaigns. Some recent examples include the commuter movement 'masukbusway.com' aimed to capture and shame traffic violators in Jakarta.

Less progressive sources of rhetoric can be found amongst a number of hardline religious groups and leaders, such as *Front Pembela Islam* (Islamic Defenders Front or FPI), who have links with traditional religious schools (pesantren) and recruit members through these and online networks. Radical groups organise frequent protests to apply pressure on the government and are a threat to diversity and freedom.[162]

## 2.2. Socio-economic context

[160] http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2014#.VE4BahbarZk
[161] Freedom House. Freedom of the Press 2011, Freedom of the Press 2012, Freedom of the Press 2013, Freedom of the Press 2014.
[162] The Limits of Civil Society in Democratic Indonesia: Media Freedom and Religious Intolerance, Kikue Hamayotsu. Journal of Contemporary Asia, March 2013

At a macro-level, Indonesia's socio-economic situation has been improving. The country is a regional and global economic force, and has recently graduated to lower-middle income country (LMIC) status.

**Table 60: Indonesia's Rank & Score: UN Human Development Reports**

| | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **HDI Rank (scale 1 – 187 for all years except 2010 out of 169)** | 108 | 124 | 121 | 108 |
| **HDI Value** | 0.671 | 0.640 | 0.681 | 0.684 |
| **Category** | Medium human development | | | |
| **Life expectancy at birth (years)** | 70.2 | 70.4 | 70.6 | 70.8 |
| **Mean years of schooling (years)** | 7.4 | 7.5 | 7.5 | 7.5 |
| **Expected years of schooling** | 12.5 | 12.7 | 12.7 | 12.7 |
| **GNI per capita (2011 PPP$)** | 7,802 | 8,201 | 8,601 | 8,970 |
| **Gender Inequality Index (value & rank)** | 0.680<br>100<br>(2008 data) | 0.505<br>100 | 0.494<br>106 | 0.500<br>103 |

Source: Human Development Report 2014 & Explanatory Note for Indonesia

In recent years, Indonesia has consistently been ranked in the medium development category of the UN's Human Development Index (HDI) measuring a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. In 2013, the HDI value was 0.684with a rank of 108 out of 187 countries and territories. However, the value falls to 0.553, or 19.2 percent, when taking into account inequality. Indonesia's HDI is above its peers in the medium development category but below the average of 0.703 in East Asia and the Pacific. The Gross National Income (GNI) per capita is steadily rising to US$ 8,970, a remarkable feat considering it was just 2,931 in 1980. Despite improvements, the 2014 report and its explanatory note show that growth is slowing and the country has yet to achieve equitable growth. For example, women only hold 18.6 percent of the seats in parliament, 10 percent fewer women reach secondary education compared to men, and women's labour market participation is 51.3 percent compared to 84.4 percent for men.[163]

The Basic Capabilities Index (BCI) produced by Social Watch offers a picture of the status of key human capabilities of accessing basic services. It utilizes three main indicators: under-five mortality rate, births attended by skilled personnel, and enrolment of children up to the 5th grade. Countries are categorized into five groups accordingly based on their BCI values: 1) Basic: 98 and over; 2) Medium: from 91 to 97; 3) Low: from 81 to 90; 4) Very Low: from 71 to 80, and; 5) Critical: values below 70. Results for Indonesia saw stable or improving scores for child and maternal health, but a regression for education. While no

[163] Human Development Report 2014, 'Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience': Explanatory note on the 2014 Human Development Report composite indices Indonesia

data beyond 2011 is available, other data sources confirm that Indonesia still has high maternal mortality rates but basic education through primary school enrolment is improving.[164]

**Table 61: Indonesia's Rank & Score: Basic Capabilities Index**

| Year | Children reaching 5th grade | Survival up to 5 | Births attended by skilled health personnel | BCI |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **2011** | 87 (low) | 96 (medium) | 73 (very low) | 88 (low) |
| **2010** | 94 (medium) | 96 (medium) | 79 (very low) | 90 (low) |
| **2000** | | | | 86 (low) |
| **1990** | | | | 74 (very low) |
| Source: Social Watch | | | | |

Indonesia does not fare too well on the Social and Economic Rights Fulfilment (SERF) Index. In 2012 Indonesia achieved 67.86 percent of protecting social and economic rights. Although there was an improvement compared to 2011 values, performance worsened when compared to 2010. The country consistently preforms poorly in the areas of right to food and right to work, although it improved in fulfilling rights to education.

**Table 62: Social and Economic Rights Fulfilment (SERF) Index Values: Indonesia**

| Year | SERF Index Value | Right to Food | Right to Heath | Right to Education | Right to Housing | Right to Work |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **2012** | 67.86 | 45.33 | 83.95 | 95.19 | 64.26 | 50.56 |
| **2011** | 65.71 | 45.01 | 85.16 | 93.43 | 63.88 | 41.09 |
| **2010** | 69.29 | 45.75 | 85.95 | 93.82 | 65.88 | 54.72 |
| Source: Social Watch, Core Country SERF Indices 2010, 2011 and 2012 (Note that 2010 data was adjusted in 2013). | | | | | | |

Trends in the country's Economic Freedom Scores produced by The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal are also rather bleak. From 2010 to 2014 the country has been categorized as 'Mostly Unfree', with only a small increase in its score from 55.5 to 58.5.[165]

These macro-level figures illustrate the complexity of the socio-economic context. While the economy has grown, 65 million people remain highly vulnerable to shocks. Disparities in income and geographic areas remain, made more complex by the number of people 'floating' between the poor and middle class'.[166]

## 2.3. Socio-cultural context

[164] See: Social Progress Index 2014 Country Scorecards published by the Social Progress Imperative; and the World Bank's Indonesia Development Policy Review 2014.
[165] http://www.heritage.org/index/
[166] World Bank's Indonesia Development Policy Review 2014

With respect to the socio-cultural context it is of interest to look at global indices that provide some insight into the level of trust between ordinary people and the extent to which tolerance exists. On a whole, Indonesia has been able to maintain peace as indicated in the improvements in scores recorded by the annual Global Peace Index. In 2010, the country scored 1.950 on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being the best score. This has gradually improved to 1.853 in 2014, with a rank of 54 out of 162 countries. Nonetheless, inequality, socio-economic conditions and rights claims (especially land rights) are still a source of localized incidences of conflict in Indonesia. Between 2010 and 2014 there has been a rising incidence of resource and identity-based conflicts as well as vigilantism.[167]





**Figure 37: Indonesia's 2014 Social Progress Index Scorecard illustrating selected elements of the Opportunity component.**

Amongst other components, the Social Progress Index published in 2014 examines whether there is opportunity for individuals to reach their full potential by scoring four different components: personal rights; personal freedom and choice; tolerance and inclusion; and access to advanced education. Indonesia scores low in this regard, at just 43.86 out of 100 and ranking 92nd out of 132 countries. Freedom of religion, tolerance for immigrants and religious intolerance are all considered to be weak (red), while the majority of the components are scored as neutral (yellow).

The Edelman Trust Barometer Survey, which collects annual data from 33,000 respondents in 27 countries has shown that on aggregate, Indonesians' confidence in nongovernmental organisations, government, media and businesses increased by 10 percent in the 2014 trust index. Interestingly, businesses, with 82 percent, are the most trusted of the four sectors compared to 73 percent for NGOs, 53 percent for government and 73 percent of respondents putting their trust in the media. According to survey results, Indonesians believe businesspeople are more inclined to tell the truth than their government counterparts and three times more likely to fix problems.[168]

The trends in levels of trust in NGOs over the past four years are noteworthy. In 2011, the trust level was at 61 percent, decreasing to 53 percent in 2012 and 51 percent in 2013. Reports claimed this was due to a lack of transparency and accountability. Edelman reported that the trust levels in 2013 were the lowest amongst eight Asia Pacific countries surveyed, ascribed to the growth of horizontal, peer-to-

[167] Data from the National Violence Monitoring System: www.snpk-indonesia.com/

[168] Indonesians Trust Businesses More Than Govt, Survey Shows. By Harriet Conron & Nicole Jade Millane on Feb 05, 2014. http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/indonesians-trust-businesses-more-than-govt-survey-shows/& Further Rise in Trust in Indonesia, with Business as the Most Trusted Institution in the Country, Says the 2014 Edelman Trust Barometer, Edelman Indonesia, February 5, 2014 http://www.edelman.id/edelman-indonesia/further-rise-in-trust-in-indonesia-with-business-as-the-most-trusted-institution-in-the-country-says-the-2014-edelman-trust-barometer/


peer networks and a preference for social media.[169] The most recent results released in 2014 show substantial jump to 73 percent in 2014 which is attributed to NGOs now being able to 'walk the talk' in accountability and transparency, as well as the emergence of 'corporate NGOs'.[170]

[169] Guest Post: A Crisis of Trust in Indonesian NGOs? April 29, 2013. by David Brain http://www.edelman.com/post/guest-post-a-crisis-of-trust-in-indonesian-ngos/

[170] Jakarta Globe (Indonesians Trust Businesses More Than Govt Survey Shows)

# Annex L. Major policy changes in Indonesia in the 2011-2014 period

**Figure 38: Timeline of regulatory changes between 2011 & 2014**



# Endline Report on the Achievement of MDGs and Themes:

# Evaluation of the WIIP project

## MFS II Joint Evaluations

## Indonesia

**Sub-report:**
**E1. Climate-Proof Disaster Risk Reduction,**
**Wetlands International Indonesia Programme**

## FINAL REPORT

**9 April 2015**


**Amsterdam Institute for International Development (AIID)**

Trinity building C, 3rd floor, Rm XT-3.17
Pietersbergweg 17
1105 BM Amsterdam
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)20 5661596
F +31 (0)20 5665997
www.aiid.org

**SurveyMeter**

Jl. Jenengan Raya No.109
Maguwoharjo, Depok, Sleman,
Yogyakarta 55282
Indonesia
T +62 (0) 274 4477464
F +62 (0) 274 4477004
www.surveymeter.org

# List of contributors

**AIID**
Menno Pradhan (Principal Investigator)
Melinda Vigh (Research Coordinator)
Marije Groot Bruinderink (Project Manager)
Lene Boehnke (Junior Researcher)
Iris van Rossum (Junior Researcher)
Emilie Berkhout (Research Assistant)

**Survey Meter**
Ni Wayan Suriasatini (Research Coordinator)
Mardiana Br Ginting (Project Manager)
Muhammad Mulia (Qualitative Researcher and Field Coordinator)
Bondan Sikoki (Survey Expert)
Pandu Yudha (Forestry Expert)

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# List of Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| BNPB | National Disaster Management Agency |
| CBO | Community-Based Organisation |
| CCA | Climate Change Adaptation |
| CFA | Co-financing Agency |
| CGL | Community Group Leaders |
| DRA | Disaster Risk Assessment |
| DRR | Disaster Risk Reduction |
| EMR | Ecosystem Management and Restoration |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GoI | Government of Indonesia |
| IDR | Indonesian rupiah |
| IFRC | International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies |
| KKMTN | National Mangrove Working Group |
| MDG | Millennium Development Goal |
| MFS II | Medefinancieringsstelsel (Co-financing System Grant Policy Framework) |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| NTT | Nusa Tenggara Timur |
| OBIT | One Billion Tree Programme |
| PCA | Principal Component Analysis |
| PfR | Partners for Resilience |
| Rp. | Rupiah |
| SEM | Sustainable Ecosystem Management |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |
| TBSD | Disaster Response Team |
| USD | United States Dollars |
| WIIP | Wetlands International Indonesia Programme |

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Context project

Earthquakes, floods, volcanic eruptions, drought, landslides and tsunamis are natural hazards that occur in Indonesia almost every day, causing a large number of casualties every year. In 2011 according to the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB), 1598 natural disasters happened in Indonesia. Among these, hydro-meteorological disasters such as floods, flash floods, drought, landslides, cyclones and tidal waves are the dominant type, constituting 89% of all disasters during the period of 2010-2011. In the same year, 834 people died or were missing due to disasters; while 325,361 people had to be displaced. Regarding material costs, 15 166 houses were heavily damaged, 3,302 houses were damaged and 41,795 houses were slightly damaged.[1] Hence, disasters are a serious and constant threat to people, bringing about heavy economic losses every year, and affecting social and economic activities all over the country.

This situation is particularly true for the relatively poor province of Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT), which Partners for Resilience (PfR) chose as their programme area for the *Medefinancieringsstelsel* (MFS) II. The province is characterised by a dry ecosystem and it is prone to various natural hazards, such as landslides, floods, earthquakes, tsunamis, drought and cyclone. This condition has led to many difficulties for the lives of local communities in the province. The tsunami event in 1992 has created a traumatic experience where thousands of islanders have lost their lives and some more thousands have lost their shelter and livelihood. However, communities that live in the surroundings of relatively dense mangrove forests have been spared from substantial damage. This is an indication that mangroves have a vital function in the protection from heavy waves of tsunamis. The first efforts at mangrove reforestation on the island of Flores were inspired by this traumatic event.

Through disaster risk management measures, such as mangrove reforestation, it is possible to reduce the environmental risk and economic burden of natural hazards on society. Therefore, the Government of Indonesia (GoI) has declared its determination to fight the risks from natural hazards by introducing pro-active measures (e.g. early warning systems) to enhance the resilience of society. It is also realised that local communities have to be involved in the assessment and implementation of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) measures if they are to become resilient.

As the above example indicates, the resilience of coastal communities can be increased by integrating the ecosystem rehabilitation/restoration into the current DRR strategy. National and local governments are supportive of the restoration and rehabilitation efforts, for example through the mainstreaming of tree planting into the programme of the Ministry of Forestry (e.g. One Billion Tree Programme or OBIT), as well as other pro-environment initiatives. This was also supported by the GoI initiative on the establishment of the National Mangrove Working Group (KKMTN) and Forest Land Restoration Partnership Working Group at the national level. At provincial/district level, a Regional Mangrove Working Group was also encouraged to be established in the regions with mangrove areas, including the one in Ende district (Nusa Tenggara Timur province), which has just been established in 2012. Together with Sikka district in Nusa Tenggara Timur, Ende district is the location of the MFS II project areas of Wetlands International – Indonesia Programme (WIIP). In Sikka district, a decree of the head of district has been released on 29 September 2012 that put a moratorium on destroying mangrove forests with the aim to protect the remaining mangrove forests

[1] Source: http://healthmdgs.wordpress.com/2012/01/04/bnpb-1-598-bencana-alam-terjadi-di-tahun-2011/

in the district. In addition to the government's initiative, the enabling environment has also been developed by local communities, where various local communities' initiatives have carried out mangrove restoration programmes, during the consultation stage, prior to the formal implementation of the MFS II in the related villages. Restoration and rehabilitation of wetlands have in the most recent years been more widespread and politically recognised activities in a number of countries including Indonesia.

The restoration and rehabilitation of wetlands provides not only protection of the vital environment and its resources but also a source of livelihood for locals if managed sustainably. Mangrove forests are rich in crab and fish, the fruit of certain types is edible, but also honey can be harvested. In addition, the timber is a valuable building and construction material. Hence, mangrove forests contribute to the resilience of local communities both by mitigating the effects of natural disasters and by providing sustainable livelihoods.

## 1.2. Evaluation objectives

This report evaluates the Climate-Proof Risk Reduction project of Wetlands International Indonesia Programme (WIIP)[2] funded by the Partners for Resilience alliance (PfR). This project has been selected as part of the MFS II evaluation for Indonesia under the Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDG) component[3] under the goals on sustainable living environment, forests and biodiversity (MDG 7a and 7b).[4] In particular, the current evaluation focuses on the following research questions: how many hectares of community land are covered by mangrove and dry-land forests? How did the condition of the forests change? How did the number of households applying sustainable forest management (i.e. participating in reforestation efforts)? How did the attitude and awareness of households change towards natural resources, in particular mangroves? How did the communities' disaster risk preparedness change? How did the attitude and awareness of households change towards natural disasters and disaster reduction technologies? Finally, how did the livelihood of households living from sustainable use of ecosystem change?

We investigate whether the project had a favourable effect on the above mentioned outcomes using difference-in-difference methodology: we compare the changes in the outcome variables between the baseline and endline periods for the project beneficiaries to the changes in outcomes for a comparison group. We survey all WIIP project villages (7 in total) in Flores and an equal number of comparison villages.

In the 14 surveyed villages, we conducted community survey in each village with community leaders, and a total of 320 household surveys. In treatment villages, we stratified the sampling by direct beneficiary households and indirect beneficiary households. For the endline surveys, the same respondents were re-interviewed in 2014 whenever it was possible. The survey respondents were selected randomly from the list of project beneficiaries, and households living close to the coast. In addition, we surveyed the ecological conditions of mangroves in both treatment and comparison villages, and interviewed WIIP staff regarding the implementation and costs of the project.

[2] The project is described in more detail in section 3.

[3] Please note that this project has been also evaluated under the Capacity Development of Southern Partner Organisations component of the MFS II Evaluation.

[4] Based on the project objectives, the WIIP project is also partially classified under the goal on poverty alleviation (MDG 1). Therefore, the evaluation addresses the impacts of the project with respect to both MDGs 7a&b and MDG1.

As specified in the Terms of Reference for this evaluation, the report addresses five evaluation questions to assess the project outcomes:

1) Change: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period?
2) Attribution: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3) Relevance of change: What is the relevance of these changes?
4) Efficiency: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations (SPO) efficient?
5) Explanations: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

## 1.3. Summary of findings

This study evaluates the Climate-Proof Risk Reduction project of WIIP funded by the Partners for Resilience alliance focusing on the project's effects on the direct beneficiaries. The project was implemented in 7 coastal villages in Flores, Eastern Indonesia, a poor area prone to tsunamis. The project provided conditional grants to communities to plant and maintain mangrove forests, and sponsored community based activities to increase sustainable income from forestry and disaster preparedness. Later tranches of the funds were disbursed conditionally on demonstrated progress in mangrove reforestation. The approach well known as *bio-rights* mechanism (see section 3).

We find clear evidence, from monitoring reports, community and household surveys, and ecological surveys conducted by a forestry expert, that the project was successful in mobilizing communities to replant mangrove forests. At the end of the project, 136 hectares of additional forest was realized, 90 percent of which can be attributed to the project. The planting also resulted in additional income for villagers. However, we do not find evidence that the disbursed project funds and the trainings on sustainable livelihood activities resulted in a lasting livelihood impact on the villagers.

At the village level, the project had some impact at disaster risk preparedness: hazard-prone areas were identified and awareness raising campaigns were conducted in 6 of 7 project villages; while alert teams were set up in every project village; and village regulations on natural resource extraction and land use now take into account natural hazards. At the household level, we find some impact on disaster preparedness and awareness for the bio-rights group members (direct project beneficiaries), especially in terms of volunteering, while the project did not have an impact on the disaster preparedness of other households in the villages. However, it has to be noted that the project's effects are muted due to improvements occurring also in the comparison areas.

## 1.4. Structure of report

The rest of this report proceeds as follows: section 2 will describe the relevant literature; section 3 describes the project; section 4 describes the evaluation questions and outcome variables; section 5 the data collection. Section 6 provides the descriptive statistics. Sections 7 till 10 discuss evaluation question 1 till 4 in turn. Section 11 describes the relationship between the Capacity Development and MDG component. The last section discusses the results and concludes.

Further details about the project results are presented in a number of annexes. The project implementation is described in Annex I. Regarding the survey data, the construction of the outcome

indicators and indices is summarized in Annex II, and Annex III presents summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis. Annex IV in turn describes the study locations, and Annex V reports detailed descriptive statistics of the sample; detailed figures on the change in outcome indicators is presented in Annex VI, and on regression results in Annex VII. Annex VIII provides additional information that is used to explain the findings. Finally, the results of the ecological survey are presented in Annex IX.

## 2. Literature overview

Related to the WIIP project, this section provides a short overview on the benefits of mangrove ecosystems and then summarizes the results and best practices of mangrove reforestation projects.

### *Benefits of mangrove ecosystem*

Reforestation of mangroves is acknowledged as an appropriate method for coastal disaster risk reduction. Yanagisawa et al. (2010) found that mangroves substantially decrease the hydrodynamic force of waves by researching the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in Banda Aceh. Using a numerical model, their findings show that a 10 year old mangrove forest in a 500 m wide area can reduce a tsunami's hydrodynamic force by approximately 70% for a 3 meter wave – which could be categorised as level 6 on the scale of Beaufort[5] –, while a 30 year old mangrove forest would survive a 5 m tsunami (level 7 on the Beaufort scale[6]) and absorb 50% of its hydrodynamic force.

Looking at the actual protective effects of mangrove forests, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) evaluated mangrove reforestation projects between 1994 and 2010 in Vietnam aimed at community-based disaster risk reduction, which included awareness raising activities and plantation and disaster preparedness training (IFRC, 2011; IFRC, 2012). The studies compared the impact of typhoons under similar conditions before and after the reforestation and found protective benefits of mangroves in several areas. For example, in 1987 a level 9 typhoon on the Beaufort scale hit the commune Dai Hop, which caused serious damage to a three km-stretch of the sea-dyke that needed to be repaired for 300,000 US dollars. After 835 ha of mangroves were planted, the repaired dyke did not sustain any damage due to protective capacity of the mangrove forests during a comparable storm in 2005 (IFRC, 2012).

Mullan (2014) reviewed existing literature about the effects of mangroves on coastal protection. Comparing villages with and without protection of mangroves during the 1999 super-cyclone (wind speed of around 260 km/h, larger than level 12 on the scale of Beaufort) in Orissa, India, it was found that in absence of all existing mangroves in the area (17,900 hectares), the cyclone would have resulted in an increase from 0.63 to 1.72 deaths per village within 10 km of the coast (Das & Vincent, 2009). In addition, it is estimated with contingent valuation that for households with annual incomes of 490 United States Dollars (USD) damage costs averaged 33 USD per household (6.7%) in a village with mangrove protection, and 154 USD per household (31.4%) in a similar village without mangrove protection (Badola & Hussain, 2005). Hence, we can conclude that the presence of

[5] The lowest level on this scale is 0, which means no wind, while the highest level is 12, indicating a hurricane of 118 km/h or more. Level 6 is a strong breeze between 39 and 49 km/h, which means that using an umbrella becomes difficult (http://www.bom.gov.au/lam/glossary/beaufort.shtml; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beaufort_scale).

[6] A high wind/moderate gale between 50 and 61 km/h, heaping up the sea and bringing whole trees in motion.

mangrove forests reduced the costs of damaged caused by the super-cyclone by almost 25% of the average annual household income in Orissa.

Other studies tried to estimate the value of mangrove forests based on the benefits they provide to local communities. For example, Barbier (2007) estimated the net present value of benefits from mangrove forests per hectare. Using a discount rate between 10% and 15%, he found that the net present value of mangrove forests per hectare for habitat-fishery linkage was 708-987 USD, for storm protection it was 8,966-10,821 USD, for net income from forest products it was 484-584 USD, while it was 1,078-1,220 USD for net economic returns from shrimp farming. These results suggest that net social benefits are highest if mangroves are protected. However, Barbier et al. (2008) conclude that for large areas of mangroves, the storm protection benefits of an additional hectare are minimal by accounting for the nonlinear impact of mangrove area on wave weakening. In that case, conversion of mangroves may be welfare improving.

In addition, using a case study on Panay Island, Philippines, Walton et al. (2006) examined the economic benefits associated with a restored mangrove forest using a socioeconomic survey of fishermen in the area (in 2004). A total of 241 fishermen were surveyed divided into four groups according to their dependence on mangroves as their fishing areas: mangrove only; mangrove and other areas; shoreline; and coastal areas. The mangrove only group offered 0.7% of their estimated annual earnings for the protection of the mangroves, compared with 0.13% and 0.15% offered by the shoreline and coastal groups, respectively. Adding income from tourism, timber sales and fish production up, the total direct economic benefits from the replanted mangroves were estimated to be USD 564-2316 ha/yr, depending on what percentage of the coastal and shoreline catches of mangrove-associated species were attributable to the replanted mangrove (10-80%). This income can equal that of brackish-water aquaculture ponds. In the Philippines, the initial planting costs were estimated at USD 211 per ha (USD 14 per year if depreciated), which is relatively small compared to results. The authors conclude that the additional services of mangroves make them the best of the coastal reforestation options.

Forecasting the overall benefits of mangrove ecosystems, Brander et al. (2012) conducted a meta-analysis assessing the impact of the loss of mangrove forests in Southeast Asia for the period of 2000 to 2050 under a business as usual scenario. 41 studies on mangrove valuation were used reporting 130 monetary values on coastal protection, water quality, fisheries, fuel wood, mangrove area, mangrove abundance, roads, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and population. Based on their model, Indonesia is expected to suffer the highest losses using an estimation of mangrove losses of 38% (1.656 million hectares) for the period 2000-2050, namely 1.728 billion USD per year (95% C.I. of 1.239-2.241 billion).

Hence, all the studies above confirm that mangrove forests are hugely beneficial for coastal communities both in terms of protection and other economic benefits they provide.

### *Effectiveness of reforestation projects and best practices*

A general challenge with mangrove reforestation is to keep the survival rates high. This is very important because, as discussed above, the older the mangrove forest, the more protection it offers (Yanagisawa et al., 2010). The IFRC (2011) also found high losses due to low survival rates at the beginning of the project. This was particularly due to the lack of technical knowledge, because after receiving technical advice from the Vietnam National University, survival rates averaged around 60%.

Evaluating eight mangrove initiatives in the Philippines, Primavera and Esteban (2008) found that survival rates of mangrove forests in the Philippines differ a lot between projects: some have a survival rate as low as 17%, while others have rates approaching 90%. All the evaluated projects were funded from international development assistance channelled through the Philippine national government. Among them, the success stories of mangrove reforestation (with 90% survival rates) were mainly low-budget initiatives, which share two common features: regular maintenance by residents who live right next to the plantations and co-management with local governments. This suggests that community-initiated efforts borne out of a shared need (e.g. for coastal protection) have greater prospect of success than heavily funded and donor-driven international development assistance projects.

At the bottom line, the authors find that lower survival rates are mostly due to the use of incorrect species and unsuitable locations, which shows lack of technical knowledge. The natural colonizers in most replanting sites are small seeds and therefore labour-intensive (*A. marina* and *S. alba*), while government agencies and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) prefer *Rhizophora*, large propagules that are easy to collect and plant. However, these are suited for more sheltered areas. Planting locations have mostly been seaward in the lower intertidal zones down to the subtidal zones which pose little threat of ownership conflicts, but they are not optimal for mangroves. However, the upper to middle intertidal sites that are ideal are occupied by ponds. The challenge for the Philippines was to muster enough political will to make abandoned, underdeveloped and otherwise illegal culture ponds available for mangrove rehabilitation.

The authors state that involving the community is a more sustainable approach to reforestation because participatory approaches empower local communities to contribute more effectively to forest management. Funding seems to be of secondary importance. Hence, the essential requirements are suitable sites, correct species, community involvement and commitment, and grant of tenure.

### *Results of other bio-rights projects*

The WIIP project uses the bio-rights approach [7] developed by Wetlands International for rehabilitation of mangrove forests. Van Eijk and Kumar (2009) describe case studies of similar projects implemented by Wetlands International that used the bio-rights approach, which has mainly been used in Indonesia (the coastal district of Pemalang on Central Java, Kalimantan, the Aceh Durassalam province on Sumatra), but also in Mali, Vietnam, the Philippines and India. It was implemented for the first time in 1998 in Central Java, Indonesia, in cooperation with local NGOs in order to restore biodiversity and the ecological functioning of mangroves, improving the livelihoods for poor coastal communities through developing a sustainable fisheries system. It provided awareness-raising and training activities and created a mangrove belt and re-greened existing fishponds on 50 hectares. Rapid inventories showed that incomes had increased threefold of approximately 200 people and there was a significant decrease in vulnerability to erosion and storm damage. The community has voluntarily replanted more mangroves after the project. Survival rates were well above 76% in 2005. Starting small-scale and allocating sufficient time for project implementation was a key to success.

A project for ecological restoration of tsunami impacted areas coupled with sustainable community development was implemented in the coastal areas in Sumatra, between 2005 and 2008. In total,

[7] The bio-rights approach is described in section 3.1.

1000 ha of mangrove and beach forest was rehabilitated in 70 project sites, supporting sustainable development activities for 5000 people and improving livelihoods of 60,000 people resulting from improved ecosystem conditions. Replanting activities were unsuccessful in a small number of projects as a result of the limited technical capacity of several of the local programme managers. So, a key point in this project is that accomplishing full sustainability of community activities requires an intense and long-term process of capacity building and training.

***Summary***

Overall, it is found that community based mangrove reforestation, using either the bio-rights approach or other more conventional methods, generates direct economic benefits to the locals and reduces the damage from natural disasters. It was found that mangroves substantially decrease the hydrodynamic force of tsunami's and the damage caused by typhoons (Yanagisawa et al., 2010, IFRC, 2012 and Mullan, 2014). By analysing the perceived benefits of mangrove fishers and additional services of mangroves, Walton et al. (2006) concluded that mangroves are the best of coastal reforestation options. However, it is a challenge to keep survival rates high, which is important because older forests give more protection. Starting on a small scale, community commitment and capacity building and training for technical knowledge are key factors to success.

# 3. The project

## 3.1. Project description

Wetland International – Indonesia Programme (WIIP) is part of the umbrella organisation Wetlands International. WIIP aims to sustain and restore wetlands, their resources and biodiversity through research, information exchange and conservation activities.

The Climate-Proof Disaster Risk Reduction project of WIIP started on 1 October 2011 after six months of inception phase (March-September 2011). The implementation period of the project is carried out between 1 October 2011 and 30 June 2015,[8] while the project administration has to be finalized by 31 December 2015.

The project is implemented as part of the 'Climate-Proof Disaster Risk Reduction' programme of the Partners for Resilience (PfR), an alliance consisting of Netherlands Red Cross, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Climate Centre, Cordaid, Wetlands International and CARE Netherlands. In the framework of the PfR programme, the five partner organisations collaborate on the intersection of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) and Ecosystem Management and Restoration (EMR), through three strategic intervention areas: strengthening community resilience, civil society capacity building and policy dialogue at all levels.[9] The project of WIIP closely follows this strategic intervention design: WIIP implements its own bio-rights approach (explained below) aimed at DDR, CCA and EMR in the project locations but also works with other PfR partners (joint capacity building), local NGOs and Community-Based Organisations(CBO) and the local government.

[8] The project period is implemented in 3 phases: the first implementation contract ran between 1 Oct 2011 – 30 November 2013, the second between 1 December 2013 – 30November 2014 and the third between 1 December 2014 – 30 June 2015.

[9] See http://www.careclimatechange.org/adaptation-initiatives/climate-proof-drr, Assessed on 17 December 2014.

The *bio-rights* approach of WIIP encourages community groups (with 20-30 members) to restore coastal ecosystems through awareness raising on DRR, CCA and Sustainable Ecosystem Management (SEM) and signing a contract with community members to commit to reforestation of community areas in exchange for a substantial conditional grant. If after 3 years more than 80% of the agreed number of plants are live (a dead plant is defined as having no green live leaves – although in reality, some are still able to grow subject to the proper treatment) and/or community groups participated on the related policy initiatives (such as development of village regulation, development of village contingency plan, and establishment of village level disaster response team), the communities can keep the grant. Otherwise it has to be repaid in proportion with the survival rate of trees. However, enrichment and new planting are possible during the 3 year period.

To increase the impact of its programme, WIIP is also active in policy dialogues at district and provincial/national level regarding the Green Belt Policy and ecosystem-based DRR, ecosystem assessments in the various PfR sites, climate trend risk mapping; and it provides a large number of trainings on ecosystem and landscape approaches in DRR measures of PfR partners, local field staff and other actors in civil society. As PfR aims at innovating DRR practices through integrating climate and ecosystem smart information and expertise, Linking & Learning is a very important part of the programme. In the context of PfR Indonesia, WIIP engages in a number of Linking & Learning activities including establishment of a so-called PfR Learning Site in Banten Bay and facilitating community exchanges from all PfR partners to its various PfR sites.

The present evaluation focuses solely on the effects of the WIIP project in the project villages in Sikka and Ende districts of Flores. Therefore, in the following we focus exclusively on this aspect of the project implementation.

## 3.2. Project implementation

The implementation of the WIIP project follows the plans discussed in the baseline report. All planned project activities have been implemented in a timely manner so far. In fact, the project has enjoyed substantial support in the project area, and communities have exceeded their commitment in planting mangroves. At the end of 2013, a total of 495,000 seedlings have been planted (including replanting) compared to the agreed minimum of 400,000 seedlings. In total, 66% of all seedlings have survived or 82.7% of the agreed seedling number – 50,000 (WIIP Yearly Report 2013, also see Table 14 in Annex I). This percentage increased to 87% by the end of 2014.[10]

We now turn to the project activities that have been implemented in the project villages. Since, the project started already before the baseline survey (July 2012), we discuss the project activities before and after the baseline survey separately.

In January 2012, WIIP selected 7 project villages in Flores based on a rapid project site assessment and integrated ecosystem mapping conducted in 2011. Six of the project villages (Nangahale, Reroroja, Talibura and Darat Pantai in Sikka district; and Kota Baru and Tou Timur in Ende district) are located at the coast, while one of them (Ndone in Sikka district) is located upland. After the socialisation of the project at the village level, community groups responsible for the implementation of the planting and sustainable livelihood activities were formed in each village. The formation of the bio-right community group has been finalized with 8 new bio-right community

[10] Information for 2014 is based on feedback from WIIP.

groups (2 groups have been formed in Reroroja village) established in the 7 project villages during the period of January and February 2012. In total, the community groups contain 185 members of which 71 (38%) are women.[11]

In March and April 2012, WIIP conducted trainings on ecosystem management and restoration, mangrove planting and administration for the newly formed community groups. Finally, in May 2012 the community groups signed the bio-right contract with WIIP for the period of May 2012-June 2015 (3 years). In the contract the communities commit to planting a minimum of 50,000 seedlings (mainly mangrove but also other species in coastal and upland forest areas) per community group and to providing a livelihood activity plan at community and member level for the use of the grant. In exchange, WIIP provides 50 million rupiahs (4,136.61 EUR in 2012 prices[12]) per community group as a grant for the rehabilitation activities; and the same amount as a conditional grant with the condition that at least 80% of the agreed number of planted seedlings is not dead. Hence, the project grants 100 million rupiahs per community group disbursed in 4 instalments over the project period.

The first instalment (30 million rupiahs or 2,481.96 EUR per community group) was disbursed in June 2012. Hence, the community group members could have received around 1.3 million rupiahs (107.33 EUR), on average, shortly before the baseline period.

In addition, in May and June WIIP conducted various awareness raising activities on DRR/CCA/EMR and livelihood activity trainings at the communities. The livelihood trainings covered a variety of activities like chicken rearing, salt production, water desalination, biogas, organic fertilizer production, honey production and marketing, goat and chicken husbandries and weaving craft. These activities were primarily focused on the community group members, while the awareness raising activities targeted school children and other community members as well.

Turning to activities conducted after the baseline survey of the MFS II evaluation, the awareness raising and livelihood training activities continued in the second half of 2012 and also in 2013. With respect to disaster risk reduction, the focus is on mangrove ecosystem rehabilitation but also other hazards and early warning systems were considered. For example, in Darat Pantai, an observation tower has been built to be used as an early warning facility; and in Talibura, an innovative sediment trapping system has been built using bamboo sticks and later planting mangrove seedlings in trapped sediments to mitigate coastal erosion. Both were constructed by community group members based on plans developed with the assistance of WIIP.

The activities on climate change adaptation were closely linked to alternative livelihood activities. Training on the re-introduction of sorghum as a staple crop was conducted both in 2013 and 2014, with the effect that 2 villages set up a sorghum demonstration plot in 2013, while the other villages followed in 2014. In addition, trainings were conducted on the production of organic fertilizers and sustainable forest honey management. All three of these activities were conducted as a cooperation between WIIP and a local NGO.


[11] Including the 9 members of the community group in Banten Bay, the total number of bio-right community members (direct beneficiary households) is 194, as indicated in the Yearly reports of WIIP.
[12] Using yearly average exchange rate for 2012 at 12,087.20 IDR/EUR.

In March and April 2013, the second bio-rights disbursement handed out 20 million rupiahs (1,436.47 EUR[13]) per community group. A third disbursement was carried out between August 2013 and January 2014. Four community groups received 25 million rupiahs (1,795.59 EUR) and the other four groups only 20 million rupiahs. The conditions for the third disbursement were that (1) at least 80% of the agreed number of seedlings is not dead; (2) the development of village regulation on environment management; and (3) the establishment of village level disaster response team (TBSD). The timing of the disbursement varied among the villages due to differences in fulfilling these conditions. Note that there are still 25-30 million rupiahs to be disbursed per community group after the endline survey of the MFS II evaluation.

Due to the project's success in mangrove rehabilitation and lobbying, several of the project villages secured additional funds for mangrove planting from private sector (e.g. BNI bank) and government institutions (e.g. Ministry of Forestry). As a result, by the end of 2013, a total of 136.26 ha of land had been reforested with over 495,000 seedlings planted.

Further information about the implementation of the bio-rights project in Flores can be found in Annex I. We do not list the many other activities WIIP conducted with PfR partner NGOs and other local organisations.

**Figure 1: Timing of intervention and study**




## 3.3. Result chain

Before turning to the evaluation design, we summarize the bio-rights project of WIIP using a simplified result chain focusing on the project's impacts on the project villages (Figure 2). The activities, outputs and outcomes related to capacity building of CBOs and NGOs, lobbying at government institutions are not included on the figure as mentioned before. We only focus on the project components that have a direct impact on the surveyed beneficiary population. It also has to be noted that the figure does not show other factors influencing the result chain. However, it is important to keep in mind that it is not only the project that can influence the project outcomes.

[13] The yearly average exchange rate for 2013 is used at 13,923.00 IDR/EUR.

**Figure 2: Result chain**





Figure 2 shows that, at the community level, the project combines three inter-related activities to reach its overall project objective: increase the resilience of communities in the face of disaster risks and climate change hazards.

Awareness raising campaigns and trainings on participatory disaster risk assessment (DRA) and reduction (DRR) address potential hazards facing the communities and discuss alternatives to mitigate these hazards: such as coastal reforestation to stop erosion, landslides and lessen the effects of tidal waves; developing alternative livelihoods that can cope with climate change; relying on multiple types of livelihoods to mitigate the effects of catastrophic events like droughts or floods. EMR and the benefits of mangrove ecosystems are also discussed related to disaster risk reduction (protection from tidal waves) and livelihood activities (for example, mangrove honey and shrimps). The campaigns are targeted at youth, the community group members and also other community members.

However, the heart of the project is the bio-rights approach. The established bio-right community groups are responsible for the reforestation efforts and implementation of DRR measures with the assistance of WIIP and its partners (like PMI, another NGO). In return, WIIP organises trainings and financially supports the development of alternative livelihood activities.

Hence, the project contributes to developing the communities' capability to implement DRR measures, and to protect their livelihoods against environmental hazards and to adapt their livelihoods to such hazards. As a result, communities become more resilient to disaster risks and climate change.

### 3.4. Other possible impacts

Through the bio-rights approach and alternative livelihood trainings the project not only increases the resilience of the community (group) members but also affects their livelihood. This is not an explicit objective of the project based on the result chain. However, the bio-right disbursements may have a substantial effect on the livelihood of the group members, which may or may not affect other community members as well (spillover). Therefore, we investigate the project's effect on livelihood and food security as outcome indicators of the project.

## 4. Evaluation questions and outcome variables

### 4.1. Evaluation questions

The call for proposals outlines 5 general evaluation questions. In the baseline report specific evaluations questions were specified. Table 1 shows these five questions and what it implies for this project.

**Table 1: Overview general and specific evaluation questions**

| Number | General evaluation question | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| **1** | Change: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period? | 1. How many hectares of community land are covered by mangrove and dry-land forests?<br>2. How did the condition of the forests change?<br>3. How did the number of households applying sustainable forest management change (i.e. participating in reforestation efforts)?<br>4. How did the attitude and awareness of households change towards natural resources, in particular mangroves?<br>5. How did the communities' disaster risk preparedness change?<br>6. How did the attitude and awareness of households change towards natural disasters and disaster reduction technologies?<br>7. How did the livelihood of households living from sustainable use of ecosystem change? |
| **2** | Attribution: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)? | Are the observed changes above attributable to the intervention? |
| **3** | Relevance of change: What is the relevance of these changes? | • The size of the impact<br>• Does the project address an important issue for the beneficiaries? |
| **4** | Efficiency: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient? | Was the intervention cost effective? |
| **5** | Explanations: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above? | Why did things work out/not work out?<br>The evaluation question is answered throughout the other evaluation questions and in the end discussion. |

The evaluation questions are loosely linked to the result chain discussed in section 3.3 and the project logic. The first three questions mainly relate to the reforestation activity of the bio-rights community groups, while questions 4-6 are related to the awareness raising campaign of the WIIP project. Finally, the last question relates to the trainings and funding for livelihood activities.

## 4.2. Outcome indicators

To answer the first two evaluation questions (change and attribution) we identified specific outcome indicators. The outcome indicators are split up into 8 sub-sections: reforestation, forest management, condition of forests, household's knowledge of mangroves, number of actions taken for disaster risk preparedness, income of households from sustainable use of the ecosystem, household livelihood and food security and vulnerability.

Table 2 displays the outcome indicators of the main analysis and the scale of these variables, while Annex II describes the outcome indicators in more detail and highlights the components per index. The last column of Table 2 indicates which outcome indicators fall under the uniform indicators specified by the Synthesis team for MDG 7ab.

We also wanted to include the size of forests as a measure of the reforestation effort but, unfortunately, most of the communities did not consistently report on the size of the forest area. Therefore, we are not able to quantify the changes in forest size in an indicator based on the household survey. Our estimates of the size and health of the mangrove forest are based on project reports and field work conducted by a forestry expert. From the household survey we use information on the number of seedlings planted, an activity they directly participated in.

**Table 2: Overview outcome indicators**

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Source | Uniform indicator |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Panel A. Reforestation** | | | X[1] |
| Number of villages with efforts at forest protection | (0;n) | Community survey | |
| Percentage of households participating in reforestation efforts | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| Number of planted seedlings | (0;NM) | Household survey | |
| **Panel B. Forest management** | | | |
| Number of villages with forest management structure in place (Mangrove forests/Dry-land forests) | (0;n) | Community survey | |
| Number of villages with village regulations on natural resources (Mangrove forests/Dryland forests) | (0;n) | Community survey | |
| **Panel C. Condition of forests** | | | |
| Condition of mangrove/coastal/upland forests | (1;6) | Community survey | |
| Condition of lake area | (1;6) | Community survey | |
| **Panel D. Household's knowledge of mangroves** | | | |
| Percentage of respondents correctly/incorrectly/partially correctly describing mangroves | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| Number of benefits of mangrove forests | (0;5) | Household survey | |

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Source | Uniform indicator |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Panel E. Number of actions taken for disaster risk preparedness** | | | |
| Information action taken by hh to reduce the risk of disaster | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| Preparation action taken by hh to reduce the risk of disaster | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| Savings action taken by hh to reduce the risk of disaster | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| Volunteering action taken by hh to reduce the risk of disaster | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| Number of information measures taken by any hh member to reduce the risks of disaster | (0;4) | Household survey | |
| Number of preparation measures taken by any hh member to reduce the risks of disaster | (0;7) | Household survey | |
| Number of volunteer measures taken by any hh member to reduce the risks of disaster | (0;3) | Household survey | |
| **Panel F. Income of households from sustainable use of the ecosystem** | | | |
| Contribution of mangrove forest resources to livelihood | (1;5) | Household survey | |
| Respondent has income from either forestry, livestock or fishing | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| HH income per HH member out of forestry per month (Rp.) | (0;NM) | Household survey | |
| HH income per HH member from livestock per month (Rp.) | (0;NM) | Household survey | |
| HH income per HH member out of fish per month (Rp.) | (0;NM) | Household survey | |
| **Panel G. Household livelihood** | (0;NM) | | X |
| Per capita food consumption of households per month | (0;NM) | Household survey | |
| Per capita non-food consumption of households per month | (0;NM) | Household survey | |
| Housing facilities index | (NM;NM) | Household survey | |
| Asset index | (NM;NM) | Household survey | |
| Self-reported well-being (Happiness) | (1;4) | Household survey | |
| Self-reported well-being (current wealth status) | (1;6) | Household survey | |
| **Panel H. Food security and vulnerability** | | | X |
| Percentage of households not able to cover their living costs/have not enough to eat | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| Current status of living: daily needs covered | (1;3) | Household survey | |
| Current status of living: food consumption covered | (1;3) | Household survey | |

Notes:
n is the number of villages in either the treatment group or the comparison group
NM stands for no minimum/maximum
1. It is related to uniform indicator 'speed of deforestation'.

# 5. Data collection

This section describes the survey instruments and the sampling design and outcome in turn.

## 5.1. Survey instruments

We collected three types of data: quantitative, ecological and financial. The following paragraphs list the survey instruments used for each type of data.

### *Quantitative data*

To analyse the impact of the programmes, three surveys have been conducted to collect quantitative data:

- **Household survey:** was designed to collect information about socio-economic condition, households' knowledge and attitudes towards natural resources and disaster risk preparedness, and households' livelihoods.
- **Community survey:** the community survey was administered together with the household surveys both during the baseline and endline period. The head of the community or another local leader was interviewed regarding matters of the community including natural resources and disaster risk preparedness.
- **Community group leader survey:** a short survey was administered to the bio-right community group leaders regarding the activities of the community group.

The baseline data have been collected in July 2012; while the endline data was collected in August 2014.

### *Ecological data*

In order to assess the ecological condition of the rehabilitated and existing mangrove forests, an ecological survey was carried out in the survey villages. The timing of this survey coincided with the baseline and endline quantitative data collection. The results of the survey are presented in Annex IX.

### *Financial data collection*

To collect information about the costs of the WIIP project, we conducted a project cost survey with the programme manager and finance manager on 4 October 2013.

## 5.2. Sampling outcome

The evaluation focuses on the impact of the WIIP project in the bio-right community group members (direct beneficiaries) and other community members (indirect beneficiaries) in the 7 treatment villages in Flores.

The following sub-sections discuss the selection procedure for the survey respondents (sampling design) and the results of its implementation (sampling outcome).

### *Sampling design*

All seven villages that participated in the bio-rights project in Flores were included in the sample. These villages were selected by WIIP based on ecosystem, disaster and climate risk mapping of the area and the strong commitment of the village on environmental actions. Seven comparison villages were selected based on disaster risk mapping and geographical location information with the aim to

sample comparable comparison group. Hence, the sampling of the villages was not random. See Annex IV for more details of the sampled villages.

We sampled two treatment and one comparison groups for the household survey: (i) Households directly involved in the bio-rights project: these households are involved in planting the seedlings for which they receive a (conditional) grant from WIIP, and they also participate in trainings on livelihood activities and DRR/EMR (110 in total);[14] (ii) Other households living in the project villages who benefit from spillover effects (105 in total); and (iii) Households from comparison villages (105 in total from 7 comparison villages). Hence, the treatment group was separated into the 'bio-rights' households and the 'spillover' households.[15]

During the baseline survey, for the treatment group, 15 households[16] per bio-rights group were selected randomly from the list of members, except that the group leader was always included in the sample.[17] For the spillover group, 15 households per treatment village were selected randomly from households living in communities close to the rehabilitation area. For the comparison group, 15 households per comparison village were selected randomly from households living in communities close to the water side or rehabilitation area. Hence, the households in the villages were sampled randomly stratified by treatment type.

At the endline survey, we aimed to re-interview all respondents and households participating in the baseline survey. However, if it was not possible to interview the same household or the household moved out of the village, we replaced the household with a randomly selected household following the sampling design from the baseline survey. As some of the questions in the survey relate to the knowledge or attitude of the respondent, we aimed to interview the same respondent as for the baseline survey. If this was not possible, we interviewed another household member knowledgeable about natural resource management and consumption.

### *Sampling outcome*

Table 3 summarizes the planned and actual number of households interviewed during the baseline and endline period. In both the baseline and endline period the planned number of households have been interviewed (320 in total). Although, there was a slight change in the number of bio-rights and spillover households. This partially due to the fact that some community group members between the establishment of the group (February 2012) and the baseline survey (July 2012) became inactive, while some new members joined the group.

The fifth column of the table (panel households) shows the number of households that were interviewed both for the baseline and endline survey. Among the bio-right group, 108 (96%) of the baseline households were re-interviewed, while this number is 94 (91%) among the spillover group, and 99 (94%) among the comparison households. The households that could not be re-interviewed have moved out of the village (15), were not at home (3) or were unavailable due to another reason (1).

[14] Note that these households have self-selected themselves into the project.

[15] Note that the so-called 'spillover' households also benefit from the village wide project activities, therefore they are not only benefiting from spillover effects.

[16] In Reroroja village there are 2 bio-rights groups. There we have only sampled 10 households from the members per group.

[17] The bio-right groups have between 16 and 33 members, with a total of 185 registered members upon the signing of the bio-right contract.

The last column (panel respondent) shows the number of cases where the same respondent was interviewed both for the baseline and endline survey. Overall, for 75% of the sample the same respondent has been interviewed. This percentage is similar among the assignment groups. The most common reason for a new respondent at the endline survey was that the respondent was not at home (47).[18]

**Table 3: Sampling outcome**

| Assignment group | Planned households | Baseline outcome | Endline outcome | Panel households | Panel respondents |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Bio-rights group** | 110 | 112 | 112 | 108 | 88 |
| **Spillover group** | 105 | 103 | 103 | 94 | 76 |
| **Comparison group** | 105 | 105 | 105 | 99 | 76 |
| **Total** | **320** | **320** | **320** | **301** | **240** |

In the data analysis, unless noted otherwise, we report the data only on the 'panel households' in tables using both rounds of data (change in variables).

# 6. Descriptive statistics

This section summarizes the characteristics of the sampled villages and households by treatment group. In addition, the exposure of villages and households to the WIIP and other project activities is explored. Additional tables are provided in Annex VI.

## 6.1. Village characteristics

Table 18 in Annex V provides an overview of community characteristics of the comparison and treatment villages. While in the comparison villages the size of the population has slightly decreased, the total number of inhabitants in the treatment area has increased from 2,134 to 2,196. The percentage of households with electricity has mostly increased in the comparison villages, while in the treatment villages the increase is only small. Looking at the different types of schools present in the villages, there have not been any significant changes. In both the treatment and comparison area, the number of villages with a junior high school has increased by 1.

Number of villages reporting a coastal forest has increased both in the comparison (5 at endline) and treatment villages (6 at endline). It is not clear whether these were non-existent or just not reported at the baseline. In addition, at the endline all treatment villages and almost all comparison villages reported an upland forest.

The table also reveals that small-scale disasters are common in the survey area (both in treatment and comparison villages). Most cases are flood, forest fires, cyclone and erosion/landslides. Among these, floods are the most prevalent: 10 out of 14 villages reported to be affected by at least 2 flood events during the evaluation period (same number in treatment and comparison groups) (Table 20 in Annex V). This figure is also representative for a longer period: at the baseline, 5 villages reported 10 flood events over the past 10 years (or floods reoccur annually), while 7 villages reported less frequently occurring flood events (Table 19 in Annex V). Forest fires are also prevalent in the survey are: 9 of 14 villages reported at least 2 such events during the evaluation period, and 7 villages

[18] Other reasons were refusal (5), death (4), moved (3) and illness (2).

reported annually occurring forest fires over the past 10 years during the baseline period. However, in contrast to floods, which usually cause substantial damage at the communities (see Annex I), forest fires are less harmful for the livelihood of communities. During the evaluation period, several villages (7) have also been affected by cyclones/typhoons damaging numerous houses.

It is also important to note the WIIP project does not work in an isolated environment: Table 21 (in Annex V) shows that are several other NGOs working in the survey area, especially in the field of education (in 8 villages) and health (6 villages). However, the distribution of these programmes is similar between the treatment and comparison villages.

Further information about the study locations can be found in Annex IV, which provides details about the project locations and activities implemented by WIIP and other NGOs.

## 6.2. Household characteristics

To provide a better insight into the general characteristics of the households in our sample, Table 4 displays the most important socio-economic characteristics including age, gender, education level of the household head, wealth indices, economic activities of the household, and the distance from the household to forests. [19]

The table shows all characteristics for the households in the treatment villages as well as the comparison villages. The treatment group is separated into the 'bio-rights' households that are directly involved in the bio-rights project and the 'spillover' households that live in the project villages and benefit from spillover effects. Characteristics are described at the baseline survey (Base) and the endline survey (End) for all households that have been interviewed in both survey rounds (panel sample). We also report on the significance of the change in the variables (p-value). [20] If the p-value is small (say smaller than 5%), it indicates that the change is significantly different from zero (at 5% significance level). [21]The sample size for all variables is reported in Annex III, and the significance of differences in the characteristics among the treatment (bio-rights and spillover, separately) and comparison groups at the baseline can be assessed in Table 23 in Annex V).

[19]The baseline report already described most of these time invariant characteristics of the sample between different groups (see table 11 of the baseline report). However, results were only displayed for the 'participant in intervention' group.

[20]P-values are calculated using standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level. This means that the standard errors are allowed to have an arbitrary correlation for comparison or treatment respondents in the same village. In other words, we allow respondents in the same village in the same treatment group (comparison or treatment) to be more similar to each other than they are to a different randomly selected respondent in another village from the other treatment group.

[21]For some of the indicators the p-value is missing although the numbers for the base- and endline survey show a change (for example, percentage of female headed households). This is due to the fact that some observations are missing either for the baseline or the endline, while no change is observed for thee households for which we have data for both survey rounds.

**Table 4: Household background characteristics**

| Assignment group | Comparison | | | Bio-rights | | | Spillover | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reporting period | Base | End | p-value | End | Base | p-value | Base | End | p-value |
| Household (HH) size | 5.2 | 5.9 | 0.000 | 5.1 | 5.9 | 0.001 | 5.3 | 6.0 | 0.009 |
| % HHs with female HH head | 7.1 | 7.5 | | 13.0 | 11.7 | | 7.4 | 6.9 | |
| Age of the HH head | 47.3 | 48.4 | 0.000 | 43.9 | 45.7 | 0.000 | 46.8 | 48.7 | 0.000 |
| Highest level of education attended by the household head (%) | | | | | | | | | |
| *No school/Islamic school* | 7.1 | 8.6 | 0.734 | 6.5 | 5.9 | 0.817 | 4.3 | 3.4 | 0.597 |
| *Primary school* | 65.7 | 67.7 | 0.634 | 64.8 | 63.7 | 0.828 | 64.9 | 64.4 | 0.685 |
| *Secondary school* | 25.3 | 21.5 | 0.083 | 25.9 | 28.4 | 0.735 | 24.5 | 28.7 | 0.187 |
| *Higher education* | 2.0 | 2.2 | | 2.8 | 2.0 | 0.360 | 6.4 | 3.4 | 0.180 |
| Main source of income (%) | | | | | | | | | |
| *Crop farming* | 62.6 | 63.6 | 0.806 | 54.6 | 58.3 | 0.417 | 67.0 | 59.6 | 0.262 |
| *Fishing* | 10.1 | 10.1 | 1.000 | 16.7 | 11.1 | 0.097 | 12.8 | 14.9 | 0.462 |
| *Livestock* | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.000 | 3.7 | 1.9 | 0.454 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.000 |
| *Non-farm business* | 11.1 | 16.2 | 0.145 | 11.1 | 12.0 | 0.597 | 6.4 | 6.4 | 1.000 |
| *Salary/wage* | 14.1 | 9.1 | 0.419 | 13.0 | 14.8 | 0.565 | 12.8 | 16.0 | 0.683 |
| *Pension* | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.9 | 0.9 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| *Transfers/remittances* | 1.0 | 0.0 | 0.362 | 0.0 | 0.9 | 0.333 | 0.0 | 2.1 | 0.178 |
| Distance to non-mangrove forest (%) | | | | | | | | | |
| *Less than 500m* | 12.2 | 10.1 | 0.688 | 25.9 | 11.1 | 0.008 | 14.9 | 13.8 | 0.787 |
| *Between 500-1000m* | 13.3 | 13.1 | 1.000 | 12.0 | 13.9 | 0.706 | 11.7 | 7.4 | 0.242 |
| *Between 1-2 km* | 23.5 | 15.2 | 0.245 | 22.2 | 13.0 | 0.034 | 22.3 | 17.0 | 0.404 |
| *Between 2-4 km* | 13.3 | 19.2 | 0.326 | 13.0 | 26.9 | 0.063 | 22.3 | 30.9 | 0.188 |
| *More than 4km* | 22.4 | 30.3 | 0.406 | 9.3 | 24.1 | 0.080 | 7.4 | 20.2 | 0.023 |
| Distance to mangrove forest (%) | | | | | | | | | |
| *Less than 500m* | 24.2 | 24.2 | 1.000 | 42.6 | 46.3 | 0.158 | 30.9 | 33.0 | 0.657 |
| *Between 500-1000m* | 18.2 | 19.2 | 0.914 | 18.5 | 11.1 | 0.277 | 13.8 | 13.8 | 1.000 |
| *Between 1-2 km* | 13.1 | 18.2 | 0.612 | 10.2 | 18.5 | 0.071 | 13.8 | 19.1 | 0.243 |
| *Between 2-4 km* | 10.1 | 12.1 | 0.362 | 13.0 | 8.3 | 0.154 | 22.3 | 18.1 | 0.396 |
| *More than 4km* | 1.0 | 2.0 | 0.362 | 1.9 | 1.9 | | 3.2 | 1.1 | 0.162 |
| Household mentions […] as part of forest contributes to their livelihood (%) | | | | | | | | | |
| *Fire wood* | 83.3 | 64.3 | 0.824 | 58.0 | 63.6 | 0.428 | 69.8 | 65.7 | 0.621 |
| *Building material (wood)* | 27.1 | 23.2 | 1.000 | 18.5 | 26.1 | 0.354 | 32.1 | 32.9 | 0.511 |
| *Fish* | 47.6 | 60.7 | 0.005 | 39.3 | 54.0 | 0.441 | 29.2 | 41.0 | 0.389 |
| *Crab/Prawn* | 14.3 | 50.0 | 0.021 | 32.1 | 49.2 | 0.031 | 8.3 | 15.4 | 0.389 |
| *Honey* | 2.1 | 8.9 | 0.136 | 7.4 | 17.0 | 0.171 | 0.0 | 12.9 | 0.015 |
| *Other food resources* | 29.2 | 30.4 | 0.131 | 39.5 | 51.1 | 0.287 | 45.3 | 40.0 | 1.000 |
| *Other resources* | 29.2 | 33.9 | 0.704 | 43.2 | 38.6 | 0.872 | 32.1 | 44.3 | 0.149 |

Source: Household survey E1; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

Table 4 and Table 23 show that the treatment groups (bio-rights and spillover) and comparison group are similar in terms of household size (5.1-5.3 household members at baseline and 5.8-6.0 at endline), education of the household head (around 65% with primary school education and 4-7% no education at baseline) and main economic activity (55-67% crop farming, 10-16% fishing, 13-14% wage employment and 6-11% non-farm business at the baseline). During the evaluation period, the household size has increased by 0.7 members on average in all groups. However, the changes in the other two characteristics are not significant.

Regarding the age and gender of the household head, we observe that the household heads in the comparison and spillover groups are very similar on average (7% female and 47 years old), while the household heads in the bio-rights group are on average younger (44 years) and more often female (13%). However, these differences are not statistically significant (Table 23 in Annex V). No significant change is observed in the gender of the household heads, while the heads got approximately two years older during the evaluation period.[22]

Table 23 shows that the characteristics of the bio-rights group are (significantly) different from the spillover and comparison groups in terms of their distance to mangrove and non-mangrove forests: at the baseline, the treatment households lived closer to both mangrove (43% less than 500 metres away vs. 24-31%) and non-mangrove (26% less than 500 metres away vs. 12-15%) forests, and despite their closeness, reported to use fire wood from the forests less often (58% vs. 70-83%).

Somewhat surprisingly, the self-reported distance to non-mangrove forests increased overall during the evaluation period, with the change most pronounced for the bio-rights group despite the reforestation efforts. However, we do not observe any significant change regarding the distance to mangrove forests, where most rehabilitation took place.

Households were also asked which parts of mangrove forests and which parts of non-mangrove forests contribute to their livelihood. The last rows of Table 4 show the percentage of households mentioning the different resources as parts contributing to their livelihood, combining both answers for mangrove forests and non-mangrove forests.[23]

Looking at the changes between the baseline and endline surveys, we observe a significant overall increase in the percentage of households reporting that crabs and prawns contribute to their livelihood (from around 14% to 50% in the comparison group, and from 32% to 50% in the bio-rights group). Also more households mention that fish contribute to their livelihood at the endline (7-13 percentage point increase) but the change is only significant in the comparison group.

In addition, more households mention that forest honey contributes to their livelihood at the endline (9-18%) compared to the baseline (0-7%). These percentages are the highest in the bio-rights group, but the change is only significant in the spillover group.

[22] In the comparison group the reported change in the age of household head is one year on average instead of the actual two years between the baseline and endline periods.

[23] The answer categories differ slightly between the base- and endline survey, so that the category 'Other Resources' includes not only all answers which don't fall into the given categories, but also all remaining categories which do not overlap in the two surveys.

## 6.3. Treatment exposure

Before turning to the outcome indicators, it is important to discuss what activities related to the objectives of the WIIP project have taken place in both the treatment and comparison villages. Table 5 summarizes the number villages that reported to have had awareness raising campaigns or trainings related to use/management of natural resources in the two years before the baseline survey and during the evaluation period. The results are reported separately for mangrove and non-mangrove forests.[24]

The table shows that in 3 (2) of 7 project villages awareness raising campaigns related to the protection of mangrove (non-mangrove) forests have been already implemented before the baseline, while in 3 (4) villages during the evaluation period. In total, 4 of 7 project villages reported to have had such campaigns based on interviews with community leaders. However, based on interviews with the bio-rights community leaders, we found that WIIP organised such campaigns in 6 of 7 villages (Annex IV).

Table 5 also shows that awareness raising campaigns were not restricted to the project villages: 2 (2) of 7 comparison villages also reported to have had such activities both prior to the baseline and the endline (in total 3 comparison villages).

**Table 5: Exposure to project - Community**

| Assignment group | Comparison | | Treatment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | Base | End |
| Number of villages with awareness raising campaigns about use and protection of […] in the past two years | | | | |
| *Mangrove forests* | 2 [n=6] | 2 [n=5] | 3 [n=6] | 3 [n=6] |
| *Non-mangrove forests* | 2 [n=6] | 2 [n=7] | 2 [n=5] | 4 [n=7] |
| Number of village with training on […] in the past two years | | | | |
| *Natural resource management of mangrove forests* | 1 [n=6] | 2 [n=5] | 3 [n=6] | 6 [n=6] |
| *Natural resource management of non-mangrove forests* | 0 [n=6] | 0 [n=7] | 1 [n=5] | 2 [n=7] |
| *The sustainable use of natural resources of mangrove forests* | 0 [n=6] | 1 [n=5] | 0 [n=6] | 3 [n=6] |
| *The sustainable use of natural resources of non-mangrove forests* | 0 [n=6] | 0 [n=7] | 0 [n=5] | 2 [n=7] |

Source: Community survey E1; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Sample size given between brackets

Looking at trainings on natural resource management, we find similar figures: 3 (1) treatment communities already had trainings on the management of mangrove (non-mangrove) forests at the baseline, while all 6 coastal project villages had a training on mangrove forest management during the evaluation period, and 2 villages had trainings on the management of non-mangrove forests. Overall, all 7 project villages had natural resource management trainings during the evaluation

[24] Please note that non-mangrove forests include both coastal and upland forests.

period. In addition, 3 (2) project villages indicated that there were also trainings on sustainable use of natural resources during the evaluation period. In the comparison communities, trainings on natural resource management were much less common (1 village at baseline and 2 villages at endline). The trainings in the treatment villages and also in one of the comparison communities were organised by WIIP.

**Table 6: Exposure to Project – Household survey**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assignment group | Comparison | | | Bio-Rights | | | | Spillover | | | |
| Reporting period | Base | End | P(1v2) | Base | P(1v4) | End | P(4v6) | Base | P(1v8) | End | P(8v10) |
| […] meetings/trainings on natural resource protection, use or management in the past 12 months (%) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Knowledge of* | 36.4 | 40.4 | 0.663 | 88.0 | 0.000 | 74.1 | 0.013 | 58.5 | 0.053 | 57.4 | 0.873 |
| *Attended* | 17.2 | 30.3 | 0.101 | 79.6 | 0.000 | 63.4 | 0.009 | 23.4 | 0.488 | 34.0 | 0.169 |
| […] meetings/trainings on sustainable livelihood activities in past 12 months (%) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Knowledge of* | 26.3 | 40.4 | 0.005 | 67.6 | 0.007 | 64.3 | 0.711 | 39.4 | 0.191 | 48.9 | 0.220 |
| *Attended* | 12.1 | 23.2 | 0.043 | 59.3 | 0.000 | 49.1 | 0.203 | 14.9 | 0.735 | 33.0 | 0.014 |

Source: Household survey E1; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
1. P-value for the difference between the comparison group and the bio-rights group at the baseline
2. P-value for the difference between the bio-rights group and the spillover group at the baseline

Turning to the participation of the surveyed households in these trainings, Table 6 shows[25] that a significant difference between the bio-rights and comparison groups existed already at the baseline in terms of having heard of (knowledge) and having attended trainings or meetings on natural resource management/protection (88% vs. 36% and 63% vs. 17%, respectively) and sustainable livelihood activities (68% vs. 26% and 59% vs. 12%). This is due to the fact that the project already started before the baseline survey.

Other households in the treatment villages (spillover) were also more likely to have heard of these trainings or meetings at the baseline but their attendance rates were not significantly higher than in the comparison villages.

Looking at changes in these indicators during the evaluation period, we observe that the percentage of bio-rights group members that heard and attended trainings on natural resource management and sustainable livelihood activities in the 12 months preceding the survey has somewhat decreased, while the percentages have increased in the comparison and spillover groups. However, at the endline still 63% of bio-rights group members compared to 34% of the spillover group and 30% of the comparison group participated in trainings on natural resource management in the past 12 months. These figures are 49%, 33% and 23% for trainings on sustainable livelihood activities.

These findings show that while the bio-rights group members are more likely to participate in trainings related to natural resources, the project does not exclusively target the group members. In

[25] In Table 6 a number of p-values are included to compare the differences between different groups: the significance of difference between the treatment groups (bio-rights and spillover) and the comparison group at the baseline are reported in columns 5 and 9 (respectively), and the significance of change over time is reported for each assignment group in columns 3, 7 and 11.

addition, WIIP is not the only organisation conducting trainings and meetings on natural resource management as the figures for the comparison group indicate.

However, it is important to point out that in addition to the trainings, the bio-rights group members also benefit from grants and conditional grants from the WIIP project in exchange for their active involvement in reforestation (see the project logic on Figure 2, the self-reported amount of disbursements for households in Table 27 in Annex VIII, and the total amounts to the community in Annex IV).

Finally, further information about the project activities per village can be found in Annex I and Annex IV.

## 7. Evaluation question 1: Change in outcomes

This section discusses evaluation question 1: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period? The changes in the outcome indicators for the period measured between the base- and endline survey (2012-2014) are grouped into 8 categories: reforestation, forests management, condition of forests, household's knowledge of mangroves, number of actions taken for disaster risk preparedness, income of households from sustainable use of the ecosystem, household livelihood and food security and vulnerability.

Table 7 displays the results for the outcome indicators at the community level, while Table 8 displays indicators using the respondent surveys. For the tables at the community level, only the baseline and endline values are reported but not the change because of the small sample size (maximum 7 villages per treatment group).

At the respondent level, the changes in the outcome variables are reported as well (for the panel sample). The table structure is similar to Table 4 with the exception that in Table 8 we also report on the standard error[26] of the variables below the mean in parenthesis. The figures reported in the "treatment group" columns use all data collected in treatment villages, where we used sampling weights to correct for stratification. Hence, the results in these columns are representative of the population of the treatment villages. The column "bio-rights" uses data from households that participated in the bio-rights group only. The following subsections discuss the levels and changes in the outcome indicators.

[26] Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level. See footnote 20 on page 24.

**Table 7: Outcome Indicators – Community**

| Assignment group | Comparison | | Treatment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | Base | End |
| **Panel A. Reforestation** | | | | |
| Number of villages with efforts of […] in the past 2 years | | | | |
| *Mangrove forest protection* | 2 (6) | 2 (5) | 4 (6) | 4 (6) |
| *Non-mangrove forest protection* | 4 (6) | 3 (7) | 3 (5) | 3 (7) |
| **Panel B. Forest management** | | | | |
| Number of villages with forest management structure in place for […] | | | | |
| *Mangrove* | 5 (6) | 4 (5) | 4 (6) | 6 (6) |
| *Non-mangrove* | 3 (6) | 5 (7) | 3 (5) | 6 (7) |
| Number of village with village regulations on natural resources for […] | | | | |
| *Mangrove* | 3 (6) | 2 (5) | 2 (6) | 4 (6) |
| *Non-mangrove* | 3 (6) | 5 (7) | 1 (5) | 5 (7) |
| **Panel C. Condition of forests** | | | | |
| Condition of […] on a scale from 1 to 6 | | | | |
| *Mangrove forest* | 2.8 (6) | 2.8 (5) | 4.2 (6) | 4.0 (6) |
| *Coastal forest* | (0) | 3.8 (5) | 3.0 (2) | 3.5 (6) |
| *Upland forest* | 4.3 (6) | 3.3 (6) | 3.3 (4) | 2.9 (7) |
| *Lake area* | 3.0 (1) | 4.0 (1) | 3.5 (2) | 3.5 (2) |

Source: Community survey E1; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Number of non-missing responses given between parentheses

### *Efforts at mangrove reforestation and forest management*

The community survey shows surprisingly small differences in terms of whether communities protect forests, but in terms of managing the forest, we observe a positive trend in treatment communities which is not visible in control communities (see Table 7). The condition of the mangrove forests remained constant, and was somewhat better in the treatment communities. The number of villages with efforts at forest protection, either mangrove or non-mangrove, did not change much in between baseline and endline, in line with the fact that the project already started before baseline. It is surprising that only four out of six community leaders in the treatment villages (one treatment village is located upland) report efforts at mangrove reforestation while this was the focus of the project. This variable could be interpreted as the awareness of community leaders about the project.

In the control group, two communities reported efforts at reforestation. Over the course of the evaluation period, there has been a clear increase in the number of treatment villages that adopted formal management forest management structures and regulations. On average, at the endline around 3 more villages adopted such practices compared to baseline. In the control group, the pattern is not clear, changes are small, and sometimes negative, sometimes positive.

### *Condition of forests*

On a scale from one to six, the condition the mangrove forests remain constant at 2.8 in control villages and around 4.1 in treatment villages.

The ecological survey shows that the mangrove forests were in a healthy condition at the endline survey (unfortunately, no information is available for the baseline). However, the number of (young) trees per hectare has decreased substantially during the evaluation period in both the treatment and comparison villages. Note that the figures on forest density refer to forests that already existed before the WIIP project.

**Table 8: Outcome Variables – Household survey**

| Assignment group | Comparison | | | Treatment | | | Bio-rights | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reporting period | Base | End | p-value | Base | End | p-value | Base | End | p-value |
| **Panel A. Reforestation** | | | | | | | | | |
| Ever participated in reforestation efforts (%) | 36.4 (12.9) | 45.5 (11.2) | 0.357 | 39.2 (10.0) | 56.9 (6.5) | 0.136 | 96.3 (2.7) | 98.1 (1.1) | 0.359 |
| Number of seedlings planted | 64.4 (28.4) | 168.9 (98.8) | 0.348 | 85.5 (31.2) | 333.8 (113.0) | 0.021 | 397.7 (54.5) | 1,677.0 (405.8) | 0.016 |
| **Panel D. Household's knowledge of mangroves** | | | | | | | | | |
| Correct description of mangroves (%) | 44.2 (20.6) | 96.8 (3.1) | 0.057 | 57.9 (11.4) | 97.5 (1.7) | 0.005 | 53.7 (13.6) | 97.7 (2.3) | 0.018 |
| Recognitions of mangroves is […] (%) | | | | | | | | | |
| *Incorrect* | 28.6 (7.8) | 36.5 (5.2) | 0.474 | 47.0 (3.5) | 44.7 (6.6) | 0.670 | 45.9 (5.4) | 44.3 (4.6) | 0.799 |
| *Partially correct* | 35.7 (8.5) | 30.2 (7.4) | 0.201 | 15.9 (3.9) | 13.0 (5.6) | 0.298 | 10.6 (5.5) | 9.1 (3.7) | 0.749 |
| *Correct* | 35.7 (6.4) | 33.3 (8.0) | 0.611 | 37.1 (4.3) | 42.3 (6.9) | 0.122 | 43.5 (4.9) | 46.6 (5.9) | 0.284 |
| Number of benefits from mangrove forests | 0.5 (0.1) | 1.0 (0.2) | 0.014 | 0.7 (0.2) | 1.5 (0.3) | 0.004 | 1.3 (0.2) | 1.8 (0.3) | 0.034 |
| **Panel F. Income of households from sustainable use of the ecosystem** | | | | | | | | | |
| Contribution of mangrove forest resources to livelihood (1-5) | 0.8 (0.2) | 1.3 (0.3) | 0.050 | 1.0 (0.2) | 1.6 (0.3) | 0.036 | 2.1 (0.3) | 2.3 (0.3) | 0.130 |
| Respondent has income from either forestry, livestock or fishing (%) | 93.9 (3.3) | 92.9 (2.7) | 0.689 | 96.8 (1.4) | 93.2 (2.2) | 0.241 | 97.2 (2.0) | 88.9 (4.3) | 0.176 |
| Household has income from […] (%) | | | | | | | | | |
| *Forestry* | 10.1 (4.5) | 20.2 (7.0) | 0.063 | 19.9 (7.5) | 22.1 (5.5) | 0.651 | 14.8 (5.7) | 20.4 (6.3) | 0.459 |

| Assignment group | Comparison | | | Treatment | | | Bio-rights | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reporting period | Base | End | p-value | Base | End | p-value | Base | End | p-value |
| *Livestock* | 55.6 (5.3) | 60.6 (7.3) | 0.525 | 59.7 (4.9) | 66.2 (3.5) | 0.146 | 62.0 (7.6) | 57.4 (7.1) | 0.584 |
| *Fish* | 89.9 (4.3) | 83.8 (4.1) | 0.273 | 91.0 (3.3) | 76.6 (5.0) | 0.016 | 82.4 (5.3) | 74.1 (5.8) | 0.386 |
| Household income per capita per month from […] (1000 Rp) | | | | | | | | | |
| *Forestry*[1] | 6.5 (5.7) | 7.2 (3.0) | 0.905 | 5.3 (2.3) | 18.4 (9.9) | 0.233 | 5.1 (3.3) | 8.3 (3.9) | 0.556 |
| *Livestock*[1] | 48.4 (21.6) | 15.2 (7.8) | 0.208 | 53.0 (18.6) | 22.1 (8.0) | 0.196 | 77.1 (40.7) | 134.7 (93.8) | 0.356 |
| *Fish*[1] | 10.1 (3.0) | 11.1 (4.8) | 0.846 | 37.4 (19.5) | 41.1 (23.1) | 0.664 | 42.7 (27.3) | 54.0 (26.5) | 0.361 |
| Total per capita/month HH income from forestry, livestock and fish (1000 Rp)[1] | 65.0 (28.7) | 33.5 (12.5) | 0.351 | 95.7 (35.4) | 81.7 (31.7) | 0.556 | 124.8 (41.0) | 197.0 (95.9) | 0.286 |
| **Panel G. Household livelihood** | | | | | | | | | |
| Per capita food expenditure per month (1000 Rp)[1] | 336.0 (20.3) | 286.9 (18.2) | 0.080 | 374.8 (24.5) | 298.8 (20.9) | 0.000 | 405.1 (23.8) | 418.4 (66.1) | 0.860 |
| Per capita non-food expenditure per month (1000 Rp)[1] | 133.8 (24.1) | 122.8 (25.9) | 0.612 | 135.7 (25.4) | 155.9 (28.0) | 0.157 | 171.6 (30.7) | 175.9 (27.0) | 0.803 |
| Housing facilities index | -0.4 (0.1) | -0.3 (0.1) | 0.044 | -0.4 (0.0) | -0.3 (0.1) | 0.005 | -0.4 (0.1) | -0.3 (0.1) | 0.031 |
| Asset index | -1.2 (0.2) | -1.0 (0.2) | 0.006 | -1.1 (0.2) | -1.0 (0.1) | 0.508 | -1.0 (0.1) | -0.8 (0.1) | 0.119 |
| Self-reported well-being | | | | | | | | | |
| *Happiness (1-4)* | 2.2 (0.1) | 2.3 (0.1) | 0.152 | 2.1 (0.1) | 2.2 (0.1) | 0.011 | 2.1 (0.1) | 2.1 (0.1) | 0.790 |
| *Current wealth status (1-6)* | 2.0 (0.2) | 2.1 (0.1) | 0.244 | 2.2 (0.1) | 2.4 (0.1) | 0.338 | 2.3 (0.2) | 2.6 (0.1) | 0.082 |
| **Panel H. Food security and vulnerability** | | | | | | | | | |
| Sometimes the income does not quite cover the living costs (%) | 71.7 (3.9) | 88.9 (3.0) | 0.002 | 75.2 (3.8) | 90.4 (2.8) | 0.006 | 70.4 (3.4) | 90.7 (3.8) | 0.012 |
| Current standard of living on a scale from 1 to 3 | | | | | | | | | |
| *Daily needs covered* | 1.4 (0.1) | 1.4 (0.1) | 0.687 | 1.4 (0.1) | 1.5 (0.1) | 0.440 | 1.4 (0.1) | 1.6 (0.1) | 0.055 |
| *Food consumption covered* | 1.5 (0.1) | 1.5 (0.1) | 0.757 | 1.6 (0.1) | 1.6 (0.1) | 0.598 | 1.7 (0.1) | 1.7 (0.1) | 0.781 |
| **Panel E. Number of actions taken for disaster risk preparedness** | | | | | | | | | |
| […] action taken by household to reduce the risk of disaster (%) | | | | | | | | | |
| *Information* | 51.5 (6.7) | 74.7 (3.9) | 0.007 | 54.1 (7.3) | 59.1 (5.1) | 0.480 | 53.7 (9.3) | 67.6 (5.8) | 0.156 |
| *Preparation* | 72.7 (7.7) | 72.7 (5.5) | 1.000 | 74.5 (5.0) | 87.1 (5.6) | 0.077 | 76.9 (6.3) | 85.2 (6.3) | 0.062 |

| Assignment group | Comparison | | | Treatment | | | Bio-rights | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reporting period | Base | End | p-value | Base | End | p-value | Base | End | p-value |
| *Savings* | 21.2 (4.5) | 11.1 (5.7) | 0.149 | 26.9 (2.9) | 20.4 (3.8) | 0.089 | 33.3 (4.7) | 23.1 (3.5) | 0.020 |
| *Volunteering* | 46.5 (5.3) | 56.6 (5.8) | 0.335 | 57.9 (5.3) | 66.2 (4.6) | 0.381 | 66.7 (7.7) | 73.1 (5.8) | 0.453 |
| Number of […] measures taken by any household member to reduce to risk of disaster | | | | | | | | | |
| *Information* | 0.9 (0.2) | 1.3 (0.1) | 0.015 | 1.0 (0.2) | 1.4 (0.2) | 0.038 | 1.2 (0.3) | 1.7 (0.4) | 0.079 |
| *Preparation* | 2.0 (0.3) | 1.9 (0.3) | 0.722 | 2.2 (0.1) | 2.5 (0.3) | 0.413 | 2.6 (0.4) | 2.5 (0.4) | 0.156 |
| *Volunteer* | 0.6 (0.1) | 0.7 (0.1) | 0.162 | 0.8 (0.1) | 1.0 (0.1) | 0.421 | 1.1 (0.2) | 1.4 (0.2) | 0.049 |

Source: Household survey E1; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard errors given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.

1. Prices are reported in 2012 real prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%). Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/aboutus.php?inflasi=1

### *Participation of households in reforestation efforts*

The data from the household survey, reported in Table 8, show that households in both treatment and control communities participated in reforestation, but that the number of seedlings planted was more, and increased more in treatment villages. In treatment communities, the percentage of people that participated in reforestation increased by 17 percentage point, bringing it up to 57%. The increase in this variable is attributable to the spillover group exclusively, as almost all bio-rights group members have reported participation in reforestation in both survey periods. By comparison, in control communities it increased by 9 percent point bring it up to 46%. It is interesting to add that the participation in reforestation in the spillover and comparison groups was similar at baseline (35-36%). Hence, the project villages in general (before the WIIP project) were not more active in reforestation compared to other villages.

The survey also asked respondents who participated in reforestation to estimate the total number of seedlings planted. Here we observe a clear sharp increase in treatment communities, and a moderate increase in control communities. Comparing estimates of the general population, at the endline respondents estimated the number of seedlings planted at 333 per household in treatment group, and 169 in the control group. At baseline the difference between the two groups was small, at a level around 70 trees per household. The bio-rights groups reported a substantially higher increase, from 398 to 1677 at endline.[27]

Looking at other measures of forest protection, Table 27 in Annex VIII shows that almost all households agree that mangroves should be protected. In addition to reforestation, households also reported to protect (mangrove) forest though awareness raising: 64% of bio-rights group and 52% in the other two groups at baseline, when the local government has also passed a district regulation on mangrove protection in Sikka district. By the endline, the percentage of households involved in

[27] Unfortunately, the period in the survey was not well-defined. Therefore, we can only hypothesize that the endline values for the number of seedlings planted also include the ones already planted at the baseline.

awareness raising has decreased to 54% in the bio-rights group and further to 31-40% in the other groups.

In addition, at the endline, 43% of the households in the bio-rights group reported to protect mangroves by participating in committees on natural resource management. Such activity is much less common in the other groups (8-12%).

Interestingly, sustainable use of forest resources is mentioned only by 20% of the bio-rights group at the endline (7% at baseline). However, also in the spillover group 17% mentioned sustainable forest use compared to 0% at the baseline. An increase is also observed in the comparison communities at the endline from 0% to 10%. All these changes are significant.

### *Knowledge and awareness of households regarding mangrove forests*

We find no changes here that could be attributed to the project. The results are in Table 8. We find no clear patterns here that could indicate that the project increased knowledge or awareness.

To test knowledge, households were shown 4 cards with forests, of which two depicted a mangrove forest. Households were asked to identify the mangrove forests. At endline, 33% of households could identify the correct cards in control villages, while 46% in treatment villages. The difference is rather small, and did not change much over time. Another variable, whether households could give a correct description of mangrove forests, however, increased sharply from baseline to endline. This change however occurred equally in treatment and control communities. The sharp increase, to about 100% correct answers, is highly unlikely, given the large number of mistakes with the cards. The fact that the large increase is both in control and treatment villages indicates that it is not related to the project.

To test awareness of benefits, households were asked to name benefits of the mangrove forests. Here we see a small increase in the number of benefits mentioned, by about 0.5-0.8, in both treatment and control villages. The number of benefits respondents mention in treatment villages is about 0.5 higher than in control villages. Table 24 in Annex VI details the type of benefits mentioned by the respondents: firewood and building material (wood) are mentioned the most often, followed by food resources. The percentage of households mentioning the latter one has increased significantly over the evaluation period by 10% in the comparison group and 17-23% in the treatment villages. In the treatment villages the acknowledgement of mangroves in protection has increased to 40% by the endline, while it only increased to 18% in the comparison villages. Interesting to note is that bio-rights group members were already aware of the role of mangroves in protection at the baseline (32%) due to project, while by the endline this knowledge has also spread to other community members (spillover).

In line with the above findings, Table 8 shows that the contribution of mangroves to livelihood has also generally (and significantly) increased over the evaluation period, especially for comparison and spillover groups (by 0.5-0.6 on a scale of 1 to 5). However, the bio-rights group members still report the highest reliance on mangroves at the endline (2.3 vs. 1.3-1.6).

### *Income of households from sustainable use of the ecosystem*

Almost all households obtain at least some income/benefit either from the forest[28] (10-20% at baseline and 20-22% at endline), livestock raising (56-62% at baseline and 57-66% at endline) or fishing (82-92% at baseline and 74-84% at endline). Per capita incomes/benefits per months from these sources have increased in real terms over the evaluation period for forestry and fishing but these changes are not significant. In addition, the income from forestry is marginal on average (7.2-18.9 thousand rupiahs).

Regarding the income from livestock, real incomes have declined for the comparison and spillover groups, while increased for the bio-rights group. But none of these changes are significant.

### *Livelihood of households*

The project could influence household income and consumption in two ways. First, the grant distributed to the communities could result in an income effect. Villagers that work for the project will receive some compensation for it. In addition, the project included several livelihood activities on livestock farming, and also related to sustainable use of mangroves, such as shrimp and honey farming. These also could have changed incomes.

We investigate whether such income effects translated into food and non-food expenditures and into more general assessments of welfare. The data shows that the per capita real[29] food expenditure was the highest both at the baseline (after a bio-rights disbursement) and at the endline in the bio-rights group (418,400 Rp/month vs. about 290,000 Rp/month at the endline), and while in the other groups real food consumption decreased by 15-22%, we do not observe such trend in the bio-rights group. However, the per capita real non-food expenditure changed little over the evaluation period. We also asked households to assess their own welfare. Generally, we find some improvement in asset ownership and housing facilities, both in treatment and comparison villages. Changes in the self-assessed happiness and current wealth status are also in line with the other wealth indicators.

### *Food security and vulnerability*

The most noticeable change in terms of self-assessed welfare is the percentage of households that claims that in the past 12 months, they were not able to cover their living costs and/or had not enough to eat. This increases both in control and treatment villages from around 72 percent to around 90 percent. But we do not see a corresponding change in consumption or self- assessed welfare.[30] When households were asked to place themselves on a scale ranging from 1 (very poor) to 6 (very rich) households in control villages put themselves at 2.1, while households in treatment villages placed themselves at 2.2. This is in line with that consumption is slightly higher in treatment communities. When asked whether their current consumption is sufficient to fulfil daily needs, households puts themselves on average at around 1.6 which is halfway in between “not enough to fulfil daily needs” and “enough to fulfil daily needs”.

[28] Income from selling of wood, honey and fruits picked in the forest is included under income from forests. We used median prices reported by the households to calculate the value of these products.

[29] Income and expenditure at the endline is measured in 2012 prices, correcting for inflation between 2012 and 2014.

[30] We also observe similar increases in the percentage of household not able to cover their living costs in another project in East Flores implemented by SwissContact (E10).

### *Disaster risk preparedness*

The mangrove forests provide protection against natural disasters, particularly tsunamis. The project aimed to increase disaster risk preparedness also in other ways. To assess whether households are better prepared, we asked household whether they have taken a number of disaster preparedness measures.[31] There are 4 information related preparedness measures (which focus on whether households know how to act in case of a disaster), 7 personal preparation measures (which focus on whether households have taken measures to protect their family and personal assets) and 3 community volunteering measures (which measure whether households have participated in any community led efforts).

In general, we find that more households have acquired information about disaster risk measures in both treatment (from 54% to 59-68%) and comparison (from 52%-75%) groups during the evaluation period. Also, the number of information measures taken by households has increased by 0.4-0.5 measures per household on average (to 1.3-1.7 out of 4 at the endline). In particular, at the endline households were more informed about possible hazards affecting their households, warning signals and gathering points/evacuation routes (see Table 24 in Annex VI). We observe this development in both comparison and treatment groups.

In the treatment and spillover groups additional households made preparations to mitigate the impacts of potential disasters (from 75-77% to 85-87%) but the average number of measures taken by the households was only marginally affected (2.5 out of 6 at endline).

At the same time, the percentage of households reporting to have emergency savings for disasters has decreased during the evaluation period in all groups (from 21-31% to 11-23%).

In terms of volunteering, Table 24 shows that bio-rights group members are more active in participating in evacuation drills in the village (60% vs. 22-23% households have reported to do so in the endline) and in participating in alert teams for disasters (48% vs. 12-19% at endline). In both of these measures we observed an approximate 15 percentage point increase in the treatment group, and a 5-11 percentage point increase in the comparison and spillover groups. However, the most common volunteering measure was to provide awareness information in the village: 43% of households in the comparison group and 64-66% in the treatment villages reported to have done so at the endline.

Turning to disaster risk management at the community level, Table 26 in Annex VIII shows that most villages in both treatment and comparison groups had carried out a disaster risk assessment already before the baseline survey (5 and 6 villages out of 7). While this activity was always accompanied by identification of hazard-prone areas in the treatment villages, it was the case of only 3 of 6 villages in the comparison group. Awareness raising campaigns were organised in 3 villages in both treatment and comparison groups prior to the baseline.

During the evaluation period, there were a number of disaster risk reduction measures taken in both treatment and comparison areas. Most of these measures were taken in 4 treatment villages compared to 2 comparison villages.

In addition, potential risks from natural hazards were addressed in regulations on land use and natural resource extraction in 6 treatment villages compared to 2 villages at the baseline. The

[31] For the complete list of disaster preparedness measures see Annex II.

picture is not clear in comparison villages, as the number of villages reporting to have addressed these issues in village regulations has decreased over time.

Hence, overall, we find that disaster risk preparedness increased over time especially in the treatment villages (at the community level). However, at the household level, disaster risk preparedness is generally at a low level, with a small positive trend in terms of information preparedness.

# 8. Evaluation question 2: Attribution of changes

This subsection discusses evaluation question 2: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?

## 8.1. Methodology

We analyse the effects of the WIIP programme on beneficiaries using regression analysis. The primary analysis uses difference-in-difference methodology: we compare the changes in outcome indicators between the treatment groups (bio-right and spillover groups) and the comparison group. We assume that in the absence of the WIIP project, on average, we would observe the same magnitude of changes in the treatment villages as in the comparison group.

However, because the WIIP project started already before the baseline survey (as discussed in section 3.2), we also analyse the early results of the project using cross-sectional analysis on the baseline data. The total impact of the WIIP project is the sum of the early effects (at the baseline) and the effects found between the baseline and endline survey period (at the endline). Note that we expect most changes to happen during and after the study period since the project is a continuous effort with regular discussions with the community and most important outcome indicators require a longer time-span to materialise.

Below we discuss the model used for the regression analysis for the household data. Regarding projects effects at the village level, the relative small size of the project (7 treatment villages) does not allow us to test the differences in village-level outcome variables between treatment and comparison villages. Therefore, these village level outcomes are omitted from the attribution analysis.

### *Treatment effect on the treated*

Regression (1) represents the general model for estimating the treatment effect of the WIIP project.

(1) $$Y_{it} = \alpha_t + \beta Bioright_{it} + \gamma Spillover_{it} + \zeta X_{it} + \eta_i + u_{it},$$

where $Y_{it}$ denotes an outcome variable from the list presented in section 4.2 (dependent variable) for household $i$ at time $t$; $Bioright_{it}$ is a binary variable with value 1 if household $i$ at time $t$ has been member of a bio-right community group and 0 otherwise; and $Spillover_{it}$ is also a binary variable indicating whether household $i$ at time $t$ has been living in a treatment village but not member of a bio-right group (indirect beneficiary).[32]

[32] Note that the spillover group is indirectly affected by the bio-rights monetary transfer to the bio-rights group, but may directly benefit from trainings and workshops on sustainable livelihood activities and disaster risk management.

In general, because the treatment and comparison groups were not randomly selected, there could be differences in the characteristics of the treatment and comparison villages and of the households sampled in these villages. If some of these characteristics also affect the outcome of $Y_{it}$ and we do not control for these characteristics, we could mistakenly interpret the effect of these characteristics on the outcome variable as an effect of the project. Therefore, in (1) we include $X_{it}$, a set of observable control variables that affect the project outcome but they are not affected by the outcome itself (predetermined). In addition, we also include household fixed effects ($\eta_i$) that pick up unobservable time invariant household specific characteristics; and a time varying trend ($\alpha_t$) in the outcome variable. The remaining residuals ($u_{it}$) are clustered at the village level.

Finally, turning to the variables of interest: we are interested in the estimates of $\beta$ and $\gamma$, the coefficient of the treatment effect on the bio-rights group and spillover group, respectively.

### *Early treatment effect on the treated at the baseline*

First, we adapt (1) to estimate the effect of the WIIP project at the baseline:

(2) $$Y_{i1} = \alpha + \beta Bioright_{i1} + \gamma Spillover_{i1} + \zeta Z_{i1} + u_{i1}$$

Note that the control variables in (2) were adjusted. First, it is not possible to estimate the individual fixed effects using only one observation per household; and second, the set of control variables, $Z$, satisfies the additional condition that it represent the situation of households prior to the start of the WIIP project at the beginning of 2012 (not effected by the project). In regression (2), it is important to control for all observable village and household characteristics that differ between treatment and comparison villages.

We use the full baseline sample when estimating the early effect of the WIIP project.

### *Treatment effect on the treated between baseline and endline*

We use difference-in-differences methodology to estimate the treatment effect of the WIIP project between the baseline and the endline survey. We take the first difference of (1):[33]

(3) $$\Delta Y_{i2} = \alpha + \beta Bioright_{i2} + \gamma Spillover_{i2} + \zeta \Delta W_{i2} + \Delta u_{i2}$$

The time-invariant household fixed effect disappears in (3) due to the differencing, along with some of the control variables in $X$ with $\Delta W_{i2}$ containing the change in the remaining control variables. Only variables where the change is significantly different between the treatment and comparison groups are included in W. In addition, we denote the average change of the outcome variable in the comparison group by $\alpha$.

Note that we omitted the change sign (Δ) from the treatment variables $Bioright_{i2}$ and $Spillover_{i2}$. In principle, taking the differences of the binary variables would be zero due to the project already running at the baseline period. However, there were several project activities occurring between the baseline and endline period. These activities are summarized by $Bioright_{i2}$ and their effect on the indirect beneficiaries by $Spillover_{i2}$.

We report the regression results for the treatment effects, $\beta$ and $\gamma$, with and without control variables (W). In addition to household characteristics, we also control for different types of projects implemented by other NGOs in the villages (see Table 19).

[33] Hence, $\Delta Y_{i2} = Y_{i2} - Y_{i1}$ and so forth.

## 8.2. Results

Table 9 reports the regression results for the outcome indicators in the same order as in section 7, and Annex VII contains detailed results for outcome indices.

The first column of the table contains the mean value of the variable in the comparison group at the baseline. This serves as a reference point for assessing the size of the project impact on the variables. The next three columns report on the project's impact on the direct beneficiaries (bio-rights group): column 2 reports the early treatment effect using regression (2) on the baseline data, column 3 reports the difference-in-difference (DD) regression results of regression (3) without the controls, and column 4 shows the regression results including controls. As mentioned above, the overall effect of the project on the direct beneficiaries should be assessed as the sum of the baseline effect (column 2) and the DD effect (column 4).

In the regression using the baseline data (columns 2 and 5), the education of the household head, the household size, and the household's main income source are used to control for differences between the households. In the diff-in-diff regression (columns 4 and 7), the same household level variables are included. In addition, we control for different type of activities (like livelihood, health or education) implemented by NGOs in the villages (see Table 20).

The regression results for the indirect beneficiaries (spillover group) are reported in columns 5-7 in the same order as for the direct beneficiaries in columns 2-4. Again, the overall effect of the WIIP project should be assessed as the sum of the early effects (column 5) and the DD effect (column 7).

The standard error of the coefficient estimates are calculated correcting for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level, and they are reported below the coefficients estimates in brackets (columns 2-7). The significance of the coefficient estimates is denoted by stars next to the coefficient estimates.[34] Note that the sample size for the regressions is not reported but can be inferred from Annex III.

[34]The probability that the coefficient estimates are not significantly different from zero is indicated by stars: * denotes that this probability is smaller than 10%, ** is used if this probability is less than 5% and *** if it is less than 1%. Hence, the more stars indicate a higher probability that the effects are significantly different from zero.

**Table 9: Attribution analysis of outcome indicators (regression results)**

| | | Bio-rights group treatment effect | | | Spillover group treatment effect | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Mean comp. at baseline | Early treatment effect | DD without controls | DD with controls | Early treatment effect | DD without controls | DD with controls |
| **Panel A. Reforestation** | | | | | | | |
| Ever participated in reforestation efforts (%) | 34.3 | 53.9***<br>(11.5) | -8.6<br>(8.6) | -10.6<br>(8.9) | -4.2<br>(12.6) | 11.8<br>(13.7) | 11.0<br>(14.5) |
| Number of seedlings planted | 60.8 | 318.0***<br>(71.5) | 1,162.2***<br>(374.6) | 1,186.7***<br>(381.0) | -34.4<br>(47.2) | 179.7<br>(134.1) | 244.7<br>(157.6) |
| **Panel D. Household's knowledge of mangroves** | | | | | | | |
| Correct description of mangroves (%) | 43.5 | 15.6<br>(15.9) | -14.0<br>(22.9) | -15.1<br>(20.6) | 18.1<br>(15.3) | -16.2<br>(22.4) | -15.3<br>(20.0) |
| Correct recognition of mangroves (%) | 32.4 | 2.7<br>(9.2) | 8.0*<br>(4.6) | 10.5*<br>(5.4) | 1.2<br>(6.2) | 6.4<br>(6.3) | 16.6**<br>(6.5) |
| Number of benefits from mangrove forests | 0.4 | 0.3**<br>(0.1) | -0.2<br>(0.2) | -0.3<br>(0.2) | 0.1<br>(0.1) | 0.2<br>(0.3) | 0.2<br>(0.3) |
| **Panel F. Income of households from sustainable use of the ecosystem** | | | | | | | |
| Contribution of mangrove forest resources to livelihood (1-5) | 0.7 | -0.0*<br>(0.0) | -0.4**<br>(0.1) | -0.4**<br>(0.2) | -0.0<br>(0.0) | 0.2<br>(0.3) | 0.2<br>(0.3) |
| Household income per capita per month (1000 Rp)[1] from […] | | | | | | | |
| *Forestry* | 6.1 | -6.2<br>(8.4) | 1.9<br>(7.9) | 6.0<br>(10.6) | -5.7<br>(7.2) | 11.4<br>(12.9) | 11.5<br>(13.6) |
| *Livestock* | 70.9 | 3.7<br>(49.5) | 96.2<br>(171.8) | 89.8<br>(185.6) | -7.8<br>(27.7) | -83.8<br>(131.8) | -134.4<br>(150.6) |
| *Fish* | 40.0 | 33.5<br>(58.0) | 13.1<br>(31.8) | 34.8<br>(60.1) | 51.4<br>(62.6) | -8.0<br>(42.3) | 21.3<br>(51.9) |
| **Panel G. Household livelihood** | | | | | | | |
| Log of per capita food expenditure per month | 12.5 | 0.1*<br>(0.1) | -0.1<br>(0.1) | -0.1<br>(0.1) | 0.0<br>(0.1) | -0.0<br>(0.1) | -0.0<br>(0.1) |
| Log of per capita non-food expenditure per month | 11.2 | 0.2<br>(0.2) | 0.1<br>(0.1) | 0.1<br>(0.1) | -0.0<br>(0.2) | 0.2<br>(0.1) | 0.1<br>(0.1) |
| Housing facilities index | -0.4 | -0.0<br>(0.1) | -0.0<br>(0.0) | -0.0<br>(0.0) | -0.1<br>(0.1) | 0.1<br>(0.0) | 0.1<br>(0.1) |
| Asset index | -1.2 | 0.1<br>(0.2) | -0.1<br>(0.1) | -0.1<br>(0.1) | 0.0<br>(0.2) | -0.2<br>(0.1) | -0.2<br>(0.1) |
| Self-reported well-being | | | | | | | |

| | | Bio-rights group treatment effect | | | Spillover group treatment effect | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Mean comp. at baseline | Early treatment effect | DD without controls | DD with controls | Early treatment effect | DD without controls | DD with controls |
| *Happiness (1-4)* | 2.2 | -0.1<br>(0.1) | -0.1<br>(0.1) | -0.1<br>(0.1) | -0.1<br>(0.1) | 0.0<br>(0.0) | 0.1<br>(0.1) |
| *Current wealth status (1-6)* | 2.0 | 0.3<br>(0.2) | 0.1<br>(0.2) | 0.0<br>(0.2) | 0.1<br>(0.2) | 0.0<br>(0.2) | 0.1<br>(0.2) |
| **Panel H. Food security and vulnerability** | | | | | | | |
| Sometimes the income does not quite cover the living costs (%) | 72.4 | -0.0<br>(0.0) | 3.4<br>(6.0) | -1.0<br>(7.3) | -0.0*<br>(0.0) | -4.5<br>(5.8) | -5.0<br>(5.0) |
| Current standard of living on a scale from 1 to 3 | | | | | | | |
| *Daily needs covered* | 1.4 | 0.1<br>(0.1) | 0.1<br>(0.1) | 0.1<br>(0.1) | 0.1<br>(0.1) | 0.0<br>(0.1) | 0.0<br>(0.1) |
| *Food consumption covered* | 1.5 | 0.1<br>(0.1) | -0.1<br>(0.1) | -0.1<br>(0.1) | 0.1<br>(0.1) | 0.0<br>(0.1) | -0.0<br>(0.1) |
| **Panel E. Number of actions taken for disaster risk preparedness** | | | | | | | |
| Number of […] measures taken by any household member to reduce to risk of disaster | | | | | | | |
| *Information* | 0.9 | 0.1<br>(0.2) | 0.2<br>(0.3) | 0.3<br>(0.2) | 0.0<br>(0.2) | -0.1<br>(0.2) | 0.1<br>(0.2) |
| *Preparation* | 2.0 | 0.5*<br>(0.3) | -0.1<br>(0.2) | -0.1<br>(0.2) | -0.1<br>(0.3) | 0.4<br>(0.4) | 0.4<br>(0.4) |
| *Volunteer* | 0.6 | 0.4**<br>(0.2) | 0.2<br>(0.1) | 0.1<br>(0.1) | 0.1<br>(0.2) | 0.0<br>(0.2) | -0.0<br>(0.2) |
| Savings action taken by household to reduce the risk of disaster (%) | 21.0 | 6.9<br>(4.7) | -0.3<br>(5.9) | 1.8<br>(6.0) | -0.9<br>(3.7) | 3.7<br>(5.9) | 6.1<br>(6.4) |

Source: Household survey E1; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are given in parentheses.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

1. Prices are reported in 2012 real prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%). Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/aboutus.php?inflasi=1

### *Participation of households in reforestation efforts*

Table 9 shows that, as expected, the WIIP project had a strong effect on the percentage of households involved in reforestation efforts (54 percentage point at the baseline), and the number of seedlings planted by the bio rights group: these households planted 318 more seedlings per household compared to the comparison group at the baseline, and 1,187 more seedlings per household during the evaluation period (controlling for household characteristics). We also find a positive (245 seedlings/household) effect on the number of seedlings planted by the spillover group. However, this later effect is not statistically significant from zero.

The WIIP project's success in reforestation efforts may be linked to the financial incentives provided for the reforestation efforts: Table 27 in Annex VIII shows that almost only households in the

treatment villages received compensation for their reforestation efforts in the form of a grant: 53% of the bio-rights group report such compensation at the endline, in contrast to 13% in the spillover group. Note, however, that we would have expected that all bio-rights households receive compensation for their reforestation efforts, while the allocation of funds to the other villagers (spillover) is an actual spillover effect. Looking at the values of grant received per household (for those households that report to have received any grant), we observe at the endline that the bio-rights group members received on average a total of 1,693,000 Rp (1,497,000 Rp in 2012 prices) grant for planting; and that the amount reported is much lower in the spillover group compared to the bio-rights group, which could be explained by the lower number of seedlings planted by this group. In addition, 29% of the bio-rights households also received conditional grants (48% at baseline), which were mostly likely used for investments into livelihood activities. The amount of conditional grant was 1,963,000 Rp (1,737,000 Rp in 2012 prices) at the endline (and 1,091,000 Rp at the baseline) on average for these households.

### *Knowledge and awareness of households regarding mangrove forests*

Regarding the knowledge and awareness of mangroves, we find that the WIIP project contributed to the correct recognition of the mangroves: respondents in both the bio-rights and spillover groups were more likely (10 and 16 percentage points, respectively) to correctly recognise mangroves at the endline (controlling for household characteristics). Somewhat surprisingly, this effect is larger than we would have expected based on the results of Table 8.

In addition, participants in the bio rights group mentioned on average 0.3 more benefits at baseline than the comparison group (controlling for background characteristics) but this effect disappears by the endline as comparison households also become more aware of the benefits of mangroves.

### *Household income, livelihood and food security*

In Table 8 we observed an increase in the contribution of mangrove forests to households' livelihood in both treatment and comparison groups. The regression results in Table 9 show us that in the bio-rights group households became less dependent on mangroves compared to the comparison households (by 0.4 on a scale of 1 to 5).

The WIIP project did not affect household income from forestry, livestock and fishing. However, as discussed above, it disbursed grants and conditional grants in exchange for the reforestation efforts of the households in the project villages. At the baseline, disbursements have been handed out one month before the survey, while at the endline period, the last disbursement happened 6 months before the survey. Overall, the average grant disbursement at the endline amounted to 3.6 months' worth of food consumption (and 1.87 month at the baseline) in the bio-rights group (which had the highest consumption figures) for those households who received such compensation.[35]

Table 9 indeed shows the results of the early disbursements on food consumption (10% higher food consumption) but not on the other livelihood indicators. At the endline, we do not find any livelihood effect of the WIIP project.

[35] In addition, the total amount of conditional grant received could cover 4.2 months' food consumption costs. However, only 29% of the bio-rights group member households reported to have received any conditional grants.

### *Disaster risk preparedness*

Regarding disaster risk preparedness, we find that the WIIP project positively impacted the number of personal preparation and community volunteering measures taken by the bio-rights group (by 0.5 and 0.4, respectively) at the baseline. No further effects at the household level are found as a result of the project activities during the evaluation period, despite the fact that the project achieved results at the community level (see Table 26 in Annex VIII).

### *Summary*

The regression results confirm that beyond the planting of mangrove seedlings, the project has had little impact at the individual level. Most of the benefits of the project are thus in terms of the improved condition of mangrove forests, and as a result on the protection it will provide to the communities as the seedlings mature to trees.

# 9. Evaluation question 3: Relevance of changes

This subsection will answer evaluation question 3: What is the relevance of these changes? In particular we look at the size of the impact and whether the project addresses an important issue for the beneficiaries.

## 9.1. The size of the impact

The size of the impact in terms of seedlings planted is substantial. Adding up the early impacts and the impacts achieved over the project period, the bio rights group members in treatment villages report over 1400 seedlings planted. Otherwise, the project has had little impact at the household level. The few impacts that are recorded are only found for the bio-rights group, which is a small group. They did take more preparedness measures, volunteering in the community and preparing to protect their own family and assets. But the impact is small. Adding up the impact for personal preparedness (0.5) and community preparedness (0.4) measures, we find that on average, they took no more than one new preparedness measure. No such effects were found for the general population in the treatment villages.

## 9.2. Does the project address an important issue for the beneficiaries?

Tsunamis have proven to be devastating and the area is tsunami prone. In that sense the project addresses an important issue for beneficiaries. We however find very few impacts on the general population in terms of preparing themselves for an eventual disaster. This could indicate the project does not reach the population. It could also indicate that disaster risk management is not on the top list of priorities of villagers.

# 10. Evaluation question 4: Efficiency of project

This subsection will answer evaluation question 4: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient? To answer this question we will describe the cost effectiveness of the programme. First, the calculation of cost per beneficiary is discussed. Second, these costs are compared to the project effects per beneficiary. Finally, the findings on cost effectiveness are compared to achievements of similar projects.

## 10.1. Costs per beneficiary

A first step to estimate the cost effectiveness of the programme is to calculate the project cost per beneficiary. We conducted a structured interview with the programme manager and finance manager[36] on 4 October 2013 using the 'budget survey' as described in section 0. In 2014, we have asked WIIP to provide us with updates on the cost information. In addition, we used the Technical Progress Reports of WIIP to complete the information reported in this section. Hence, the cost figures are based on the actual costs reported by WIIP for years 2011-2013 and on the approved budget for 2014 (except for the bio-rights disbursements).

Table 10 gives a summary of the collected cost information and the estimates of the costs per year per beneficiary for years 2011-2014. The first two columns of the table report the total costs of the project per year in Indonesian rupiahs and euros (using the actual payment amounts). Column 3 provides information on the costs of the project in Flores including the environmental and disaster risk management campaigns and the bio-rights approach and trainings on sustainable livelihood activities. The cost information in these columns includes all project related costs including personnel and administration costs incurred by WIIP. These data were obtained from the financial administrator of WIIP.

The funds disbursed to the bio-rights community groups are summarized in column 4 of the table. There are 194 households participating in these community groups as shown in column 7. Based on these data, we have calculated the bio-rights disbursements per beneficiary household per year in column 7 in Indonesian rupiahs and in column 8 in international dollars (Int$). International dollars at 2011 prices[37] are used for the cost per unit calculation because it takes both purchasing power parity and inflation into account that would not be the case if we reported the unit costs in euros. Hence, using Int$, the costs can easily be compared across time and countries.

The table shows that until the endline survey, the community group members have received 909.55 Int$ (2011) (the sum of the last column), and they were expected to receive another 268.43 Int$ (2011) later in 2014.

[36] The interview was conducted with Yus Noor, programme manager, and Lusiana Nuris, finance manager.

[37] The following exchange rates are used based on PPP conversion factor using the World Development Indicators: 3,606.57 IDR/Int$ in 2011, 3,636.38 IDR/Int$ in 2012, 3,682.25 IDR/Int$ in 2013 and 4,530.90 IDR/Int$ in 2014. Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#

**Table 10: Project costs and beneficiaries**

| Year | Total costs [IDR][1] | Total cost [EUR][1] | Total costs in Flores [IDR][2] | Bio-rights disbursement [IDR][3] | Percentage of costs funded by CFA | Number of direct beneficiary households | Bio-rights disbursement per beneficiary HH per year | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | | [IDR] | [Int$][4,5] |
| **2011** | 1,614,573,194 | 135,180 | 1,533,844,534 | - | 100% | - | - | - |
| **2012** | 3,682,754,268 | 313,720 | 3,498,616,555 | 240,000,000 | 100% | 185 | 1,297,297.30 | 356.76 |
| **2013** | 3,041,386,411 | 254,202 | 2,889,317,090 | 340,000,000 | 100% | 185 | 1,837,837.84 | 499.11 |
| **2014** | 3,631,272,519 | 226,389 | 3,449,708,893 | 45,000,000 | 100% | 185 | 243,243.24 | 53.69 |

Source: Budget survey and Technical Progress Reports of WIIP.
Notes:

1. Total costs for 2014 are estimated based on the approved budget for the contract period 1 December 2013-30 November 2014 minus the actual costs reported for 2013.
2. Estimated as 95% of the total costs. Between 2011 and 2013, 95% of the budget was spent on the activities in Flores.
3. In 2014, an additional 225,000,000 IDR is available for disbursement.
4. In 2014, including the additional available funds, the disbursement per beneficiary household is 268.43 Int$.
5. PPP conversion factor to 2011 international dollars is calculated using the World Development Indicators: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#.

However, calculating the cost per beneficiary amounts is inaccurate if we only take into account the bio-rights disbursements to the direct beneficiaries. The community group members have also benefitted from the sustainable livelihood trainings and the environmental and disaster risk reduction campaigns. These are the project activities from which also affect the indirect beneficiaries. Therefore, we add the addition project costs per indirect beneficiary to the bio-rights disbursement to get a more realistic estimate of the cost of the project per direct beneficiary.

Table 11 shows the result of calculating the total cost per direct beneficiary household per year. We calculate the cost per indirect beneficiary as the ratio between the total project costs for years 2011-2013 excluding the bio-rights disbursements (column 1) and the number of indirect beneficiaries (column 2). The resulting figure is converted to international dollars at 2011 prices (column 3). The costs for 2014 are omitted because we do not have a good indication of the costs incurred before the endline survey.

The cost per indirect beneficiaries is calculated at the individual level, while the costs at the direct beneficiaries are calculated at the household level. Therefore, in column 4 ofTable 11 we estimate the additional costs per direct beneficiary household assuming the average household size used in the Technical Progress Reports of WIIP (827 direct beneficiaries from 194 households)[38]. Finally, the total costs per beneficiary households per year are reported in the last column of the table. The total cost per direct beneficiary household is calculated at 1,604 Int$ (2011) between 2011 and 2013. In 2014, at least an additional 54 Int$ (2011) per direct beneficiary households have been funded by

[38] The total number of direct beneficiaries of the WIIP project is 194 households, with 185 bio-rights group members in the 7 project villages in Sikka and Ende districts in Flores, and 9 bio-rights group members in Banten Bay.

the project. However, using the information in Table 11, we estimate the cost per direct beneficiary household in 2014 to be as much as 474 Int$ (2011) if all available funds are spent.

**Table 11: Project Unit cost per beneficiary household**

| Year | Cost excluding bio-rights in Flores [IDR] | Number of indirect beneficiaries (population) | Cost per indirect beneficiary (person) per year [Int$ 2011][1] | Additional cost per direct HH per year [Int$ 2011][1,2] | Total cost per direct beneficiary HH per year [Int$ 2011][1] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **2011** | 1,533,844,534 | 4,490 | 94.72 | 403.78 | 403.78 |
| **2012** | 3,258,616,555 | 19,653 | 45.60 | 194.37 | 551.13 |
| **2013** | 2,549,317,090 | 19,653 | 35.23 | 150.17 | 649.28 |
| **Total 2011-2013** | **7,341,778,179** | - | **175.54** | **748.33** | **1,604.19** |

Source: Budget survey and Technical Progress Reports of WIIP.
Notes:
1. PPP conversion factor to 2011 international dollars is calculated using the World Development Indicators: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#.
2. The average household size is estimated at 4.2629 (as used by the Technical Progress Report of WIIP).

However, as the main objective of the project is the rehabilitation of forest areas, in Table 12 we report on the unit cost per hectares of reforested areas. Based on information from WIIP, the project directly contributed to the reforestation of 132.89 hectares of land. Taking into account only the bio-rights disbursements that were used as compensation for the rehabilitation (see Table 10 for the amounts), Table 12 shows that the unit costs were 1,266.21 Int$ per hectare of reforested area. Please note, however, that these costs not only benefit the reforested areas but potentially also provide livelihood improvements for the bio-rights group members.

**Table 12: Project Unit cost per hectares of reforested area**

| Year | Unit cost per ha of reforested area [IDR] | Unit cost per ha of reforested area [Int$][1] |
|---|---|---|
| **2011** | - | - |
| **2012** | 1,806,004.97 | 496.65 |
| **2013** | 2,558,507.04 | 694.82 |
| **2014** | 338,625.93 | 74.74 |
| **Total 2011-2014** | 4,703,137.93 | 1,266.21 |

Source: Budget survey and Technical Progress Reports of WIIP.
Notes:
1. PPP conversion factor to 2011 international dollars is calculated using the World Development Indicators.

## 10.2. Cost-benefit

As the next step, the unit costs of the project are compared to the benefits derived from the project.

The benefits of the project are in two areas: benefits from the additional (mangrove) forests and benefits from livelihood activities. Because the attribution analysis did not show any significant income effects of the project, here we focus on the benefits provided by the additional forests.

The benefit is in terms of the additional forest that is planted and is in a healthy state. This forest provides protection. This is difficult to quantify in monetary terms so we estimate this in terms of number of hectares of forest. The project data, as reported in Annex I indicate that 136.26 hectares additional mangrove forest was planted, from which 132.89 hectares are attributable to the project directly.

This overstates the impact of the project, as forests have also been planted through initiatives not related to the project. To assess the net impact of the project, we make use of the data on seedlings planted. In control communities, at endline, we found that on average 169 seedlings were planted (see Table 8). By comparison, in treatment communities this was on average 1,677 at endline. We assume that in the absence of the project the number of seedlings as observed in the control communities would have been planted in treatment communities, that is 10 percent (nr seedlings in control/nr seedlings in treatment *100) of what we observe. Applying this percentage to the amount of hectares of forest, we conclude that 90 percent of the 132.89 hectares, that is 119.6 hectares has been planted as result of the project.

The data from the ecological survey indicate that all sites in the surveyed mangrove forests were in healthy condition at endline. The actual benefit in terms of forest planted is thus 119.6 hectares of healthy forest.

To quantify the benefit from these forests, we turn to the benefits quoted in the literature review in section 2. Predicting the future costs of deforestation, Brander et al. (2012) estimated that the value mangroves in Indonesia are USD 748.19-1,353.26 ha/year using a 95% confidence interval. Also Walton et al. (2006) estimated the total direct economic benefits from the replanted mangroves, and concluded that the total benefits of mangroves constitute USD 564-2316 ha/year.

Based on Brander et al. (2012) and using a discount rate of 15 percent, the net present value of a hectare of mangrove forest is between USD 4,987.92 and 9,021.74 per ha. These benefits are higher

than the unit cost of the project calculated above (Int$ 1,266.21). Hence, the benefit of the project outweighs its costs.

### 10.3. Cost effectiveness

We can conclude that the project is it cost effective because the benefits from mangroves exceed the costs of the project. However, comparing the unit costs of reforestation to other projects, we observe that the WIIP project is on the expensive side. Based on evidence in the Philippines, Primavera and Esteban (2008) estimate the unit costs of mangrove reforestation to be between Int$ 399.00 and Int$ 939.00 per hectare.

## 11. Contribution of Capacity Development and Civil Society

The WIIP project has also been selected for the Capacity Development component of the MFS II Evaluation. Regarding the contribution of the capacity development of Wetlands International Head Quarters and the Partners for Resilience Alliance to WIIP during the implementation of the project, MFS II funding has mainly contributed to increased organisational management capacity and more improved financial administration. These were the results of capacity development workshops and a CD scan in March 2013, both funded by MFS II. However, these improvements do not directly affect the project implementation.

On the other hand, the annual project reports of WIIP testify that the collaboration with PfR partners (funded by MFS II) has benefitted both the implementation of the 'Climate Proof Disaster Risk Reduction' project and the expertise of the project staff in term of the integration of the three PfR working pillars (CCA-DRR-EMR) in their work.

## 12. Conclusion

The WIIP project provided performance-based financing for community members to plant and maintain mangrove forests, and conducted community based activities on sustainable livelihood activities and campaigns on disaster risk awareness and preparedness. The analysis indicates that the project was rather successful in achieving its objectives on reforestation: households in the bio-rights group planted over 1,700 seedlings per households on average, from which more than 1,500 is attributable to the WIIP project. In addition, the project had a small positive effect on the awareness of mangroves in the project villages.

The literature review showed that reforestation of mangroves is acknowledged as an appropriate method for coastal disaster risk reduction. The older the mangrove forest, the more protection it offers to natural disasters. Comparing the findings for the WIIP project in this respect is not possible yet since the project just started and long-term survival rates could not be estimated yet. However, at the short-term the project achieved a survival rate of 66% of the total planted trees and 83% of the agreed planting (with replanting) at the end of 2013. The success WIIP booked in reforestation shows that the project can achieve the impact on coastal disaster risk reduction if the villages manage to keep survival rates high. Due to the bio-rights approach and the increased awareness on the community level we think this is likely to happen.

Regarding disaster preparedness and awareness, the project achieved its objectives at the community level: village disaster risk assessment including identification of hazard-prone areas and awareness raising campaigns was carried out in 6 out of 7 project villages, alert teams were set up in every project village, and village regulations on natural resource extraction and land use now take into account natural hazards. However, at the household level, the project was less effective: we find very small effects on households' disaster preparedness indicators, limited to the bio-rights groups that directly participated in the project.

Our findings show that the WIIP project did not have an impact on the livelihoods of the households. These findings are not in line with the findings in the literature review, where awareness-raising and training activities and reforestation have shown to have a positive impact on the income of households. However, the analysis only investigated incomes from forestry, livestock raising and fishing, and not the diversification and adaptation of incomes to the natural environment. Finally, the MFS synthesis team asked to score each project along a few indicators. Table 13 displays the indicators and the scores we deemed valid for the project.

**Table 13: Overall project scoring**

| Statement | Score | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **1. The project was well designed** | 9 | The project has some clever design features. It makes project disbursement dependent on realized successes in reforestation. It thus provides a direct financial incentive for the community to contribute their labour to the project. This type of outcome based financing is often advocated over direct input based financing which does not provide such incentives. |
| **2. The project was implemented as designed** | 9 | The evidence generated by the survey and project documents indicates that the project has been implemented as planned without delays. Already at baseline, soon after the start of the project, planning was in full swing. |
| **3. The project reached all its objectives** | 9 | The project has been successful in reaching its objectives in terms of reforestation and disaster risk reduction measures at the community level. At the household level, we do not find evidence of effects on livelihood and on disaster risk reduction. However, the project objectives were mostly set at the community level. |
| **4. The observed results are attributable to the project interventions** | 7 | Attributing the estimated impacts to the project comes with some caveats. First, the project already started before the baseline, we can thus not apply a classical difference in difference analysis. However, on the basis of the observed characteristics, we believe that the comparison group was similar to the treatment group. During the evaluation period, we observe improvement both in the comparison and treatment areas, while the improvements are more pronounced in the treatment areas in the intervention areas of the project. |
| **5. The observed results are relevant to the project beneficiaries** | 9 | The project is in a tsunami prone area. Mangrove forests have proven useful to protect villages from tsunamis. |
| **6. The project was implemented in the most efficient way** | 8 | Project costs are high, which is due to the complex nature of the programme. However, through awareness raising and lobbying at the local government the results of the project will be sustainable. |

Notes: Scores are on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being "no agreement at all" and 10 being "completely agree with statement".

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# Annex I.Project implementation

This annex summarizes the implementation of the WIIP project in the project villages in Flores based on project information from the Yearly Reports (2012 and 2013) of the project.

## *Summary*

***Beneficiaries:***

- **2012:**
  - Direct beneficiaries (Bio-rights groups): 194 HH or 827 people
  - Indirect beneficiaries: 19,653 people (80% of population)
- **2013:**
  - Direct beneficiaries (Bio-rights groups): 194 HH or 827 people
  - Indirect beneficiaries: 19,653 people (80% of population)
- **2014:**
  - Direct beneficiaries (Bio-rights groups): 194 HH or 827 people
  - Indirect beneficiaries: 24,566 people (100% of population)
  - Indirect beneficiaries reached through capacity building of partners: 6,737 people

***Total reforested area (2014):***

- Darat Pantai village (+ Ministry of Forestry): 3.3 ha (+ 2.5 ha)
- Talibura village (+Ministry of Forestry): 3.69 ha (+0.62 ha)
- Nangahale village: 4.45 ha
- Reroroja village 1: 3.51 ha
- Reroroja village 2: 15.07 ha
- Done village: 76.02 ha
- Tou Timur village: 9.46 ha
- Kota Baru village (+CSR BNI Bank): 17.39 ha (+0.25 ha)

  **WIIP project: 132.89 ha**

  **Other: 3.37 ha**

  **TOTAL: 136.26 ha**

***Bio-rights contract and disbursements:***

- **Bio-rights contract:**
  - Period: May 2012 – June 2015 (3 years)
  - Conditions: conditional grant is received for successful tree planting/ecosystem management with a minimum of 50,000 planted trees; and plan on livelihood activity – grant has to be used on livelihood activities.
  - Total amount: 800 million Rp (in Flores), or 100 million Rp per group from which 50 million is a conditional loan and 50 million is grant for rehabilitation activities
- **1st disbursement**
  - Conditions:
  - Timing: June 2012
  - Amount: 240 million Rp (in Flores)
- **2nd disbursement:**

  - Conditions:
  - Timing: March-April 2013
  - Amount: 160 million Rp (in Flores)
- **3rd disbursement**
  - Conditions: 1. Fulfilment of rehabilitation works (80% planting growth success – "dead" individual tree is defined as a tree which does not have any single green-life leaf); 2. Development of village regulation; 3.Establishment of village level disaster response team (TBSD)
  - Timing: Aug 2013-Jan 2014 (Nov-Dec 2013: Reroroja (2 groups), Done, Nangahale and Darat Pantai; Febr 2014: Tou Timur, Kota Baru and Talibura). Timing in the second round of villages (Febr 2014) was delayed due to low survival rates of planted trees (Tou Timur, Kota Baru and Talibura).
  - Amount: 175 million Rp (in Flores)

### *Project activities*

***2012:***

- January 2012: Socialization of programme at the village level
- January-February 2012: Establishment of local community groups The following criteria has been used to select members:
  1. member of community group should be the representative of each sub-village;
  2. member of community group is living at the respected village;
  3. gender sensitive;
  4. member of community group required to have strong environment cautious;
  5. prioritized for less-privileged family;
  6. member of community group who has a special need.
- March-April 2012: EMR and mangrove rehabilitation training, and training on bio-rights group administration with all community groups
- May 2012: Bio-rights contract signing with the community groups
- May-December 2012:Various awareness raising campaigns on DRR/CCA/EMR to community groups
- May-December 2012:Trainings on livelihood activities (bio-rights group) like chicken rearing, salt production, water desalination, biogas, organic fertilizer production, honey production and marketing, goat and chicken husbandries and weaving craft. Training on weaving techniques was attended by representatives of all community groups.
- Successful advocacy lead to issuance of Head of District Regulation on Mangrove Protection in Sikka district
- Village specific activities:
  - Building of 300 metres long board walk through mangrove forest in Reroroja village as part of the development of the Mangrove Information Centre
  - Building of watch tower and gathering hut in Darat Pantai village to be used also as early warning facility.

***2013:***

- Livelihood activity trainings (use of bio-gas, livestock husbandry, use of natural colour dyeing for ikat handicraft, honey collection and processing, sorghum farming and post-harvest management; chicken vaccine)
- Awareness campaigns on DRR/CCA/EMR targeted to school children and members of community groups (e.g. celebration of World Wetlands Day and World Food Day)
- Trainings on disaster risk reduction; and climate change adaption (e.g. re-introduction of Sorghum as staple crop, production of organic fertilizers, sustainable agriculture (low external inputs, healthy and balanced environment) and sustainable forest honey management)
- Village specific activities:
    - Mangrove Information Centre facilities have been finalized in Reroroja village with almost 500 m track/board walk on mangrove forest and mangrove library.
    - Observation tower and community centre hut built in Darat Pantai village to be used also as early warning facility.
    - Sediment trapping system built in Talibura village using bamboo sticks to mitigate coastal erosion. Mangrove seedlings will be planted in the trapped sediments.
- Working together with other NGOs at the project sites: with SwissContact on honey in Darat Pantai, with PMI on ecosystem mapping in Talibura and Bangkoor (comparison village)
- Advocacy efforts resulted in private and government support for planting activities for the project communities (BNI Bank support to 2 community groups in Reroroja with 3,000 seedlings; Ministry of Forestry support to Talibura and Darat Pantai with 25,000 seedlings)
- Working with communities on developing village regulations on environmental and coastal management and establishment of Village Disaster Preparedness Team
- Research/fieldwork on best practices of coastal rehabilitation (in Darat Pantai, Talibura and Reroroja villages), like sediment trapping and planting on sandy and rocky substrate (best location, timing of planting, planting hole and mangrove variety)

***2014:***

- Sorghum demonstration sites are established in all project villages

***Overall:***

- Total of more than 495,000 planted trees (coastal and up-hill) by community group members (123% of target), including those carried out in cooperation with government institutions (e.g. Ministry of Forestry) and business sector (e.g. BNI bank)

### *Activities in communities*

***General community group meetings***

All community groups organise regular community group meetings facilitated by WIIP local facilitator. The following topics were discussed:

- finalization of community group's structure
- agreement on group administration and regulation/rule (including incentive and dis-incentive)

- development of general programme planning (tree planting, maintenance, enrichment, monitoring of growth success, training programme)
- development of community as well as individual livelihood programme (honey collection, chicken farming, pig farming, duck farming, goat farming, fisheries, food stall, fuel shop, weaving, saving programme, planting of productive trees, vegetable farming)
- planning on building of community group facilities and infrastructure (watch tower, workshop, group secretariat, fencing around mangrove areas, board walk, library)
- evaluation of programme progress
- report writing
- consultation to related government institution

***Darat Pantai village, Kembang Bakau Community Group***

**Disasters**

- March 2012: Typhoon (12 houses damaged)
- January 2013: Heavy rain and high tide (sea water reached settlement)

**Bio-rights group:** 20 members (12 males, 8 females)

**Planting**

- 2013: Ministry of Forestry support for seedling nursery and provided 14.5 million Rp to community group
- 2013: enrichment planting
- Total reforested area: 3.3 ha (+ 2.5 ha with support from Ministry of Forestry)

**Livelihood activities**

- May 2012: Training on the use of de-salination and biogas machines, honey packing and marketing, and compost making.
- 2012: types of livelihood activities supported by WIIP
    - Honey collection
    - Rice seller
    - Pig husbandry
    - Chicken husbandry
    - Goat husbandry
    - Fisheries
    - Handicraft (ikat weaving)
    - Bread seller
    - Food Kiosk
- 2013: 25x50 metres demonstration sites for sorghum farming

**Disaster risk management and regulations**

- 2012: awareness raising events targeted at young people focused on the role of mangrove to support people life and livelihood
- 2013: Observation tower and community centre hut built in Darat Pantai village to be used also as early warning facility.
- 2013: WIIP facilitated finalization of village regulation on environment management

***Talibura village, Klakat Indah Community Group***

**Bio-rights group:** 20 members (7 males, 13 females)

**Disasters**

- January 2012: Landslides (10 ha land affected)
- January 2013: Heavy rain (planted mangrove seedlings washed away)
- February 2013: Flood (25 houses flooded and plants washed away)
- August 2013: House fires (2 houses destructed)

**Planting**

- 2013: Ministry of Forestry support for seedling nursery and provided 14.5 million Rp to community group
- 2013: community carried out enrichment planting to replace dead seedlings
- Total reforested area: 3.69 ha (+0.62 ha with support from Ministry of Forestry)

**Livelihood activities**

- May 2012: Training on chicken farming focussed on preparation of cage, feeding and vaccination
- May 2012: Training on the use of de-salination and biogas machines, honey packing and marketing, and compost making.
- 2012: types of livelihood activities supported by WIIP
    - Chicken husbandry
    - Pig husbandry
    - Chicken husbandry
    - Fisheries
    - Vegetable seller
    - Provision of weaving, milling and gardening equipment
    - Handicraft
- 2014: demonstration site established for sorghum farming

**Disaster risk management and regulations**

- June 2012: Environmental campaign targeting students was implemented including a presentation about mangrove ecosystem.
- 
- 2013: Sediment trapping system built in Talibura village using bamboo sticks to mitigate coastal erosion (community group did the construction based on building design developed together with WIIP). Mangrove seedlings will be planted in the trapped sediments.
- 2013: Ecosystem mapping with support from PMI
    - Hazard from regular floods has been identified due to heavily degraded uplands/mountainous area by shifting cultivators (using fires) and by illegal loggers
    - Community has been advised to implement two crucial actions to mitigate this hazard: (1) development of an integrated village landscape-catchment regulation which includes upland and lowland (including mangrove rehabilitation) approaches; and (2) to develop contingency plan to deal with regular flood hazard

- 2013: WIIP facilitated finalization of village regulation on local environment and contingency plan

***Nangahale village, Nangahale Lestari Community Group***

**Bio-rights group:** 22 members (6 females, 16 males)

**Disasters**

- February 2012: Typhoon (27 houses damaged)
- January 2013: Heavy rain (one week electricity cut)

**Livelihood activities**

- May 2012: Training on the production of Iodinated salt
- 2012: types of livelihood activities supported by WIIP
    - Duck husbandry
    - Pig husbandry
    - Chicken husbandry
    - Cow husbandry
    - Goat husbandry
    - Fisheries
    - Food Kiosk (fried foods, cake)
- 2014: demonstration site established for sorghum farming

**Planting**

- 2013: enrichment planting to replace dead seedlings
- Total reforested area: 4.45 ha

**Disaster risk management and regulations**

- June 2012: environmental campaign through football competition and beach cleaning and discussion on mangrove tree planting.
- 2013: Reinforcement of current village regulation on coastal management

***Reroroja village, Sabar Subur Community Group***

**Bio-rights group:** 16 members (6 females, 10 males)

**Disasters**

- January 2012: Floods
- February 2012: Drought (300 ha rice field affected)
- March 2012: Typhoon (6 houses damaged)
- April 2012: Floods (35 ha ready to harvest rice fields have been destructed)
- January 2013: Typhoon (15 houses damaged)
- July 2013: High wave

**Disaster risk management and regulations**

- June 2012: Awareness campaign targeted to community members through climate change adaptation film show; and to preliminary school students through various competitions, such as canoe, swimming, drawing and beach cleaning.
- 2013: Reinforcement of current village regulation on coastal management

**Planting**

- 2013: BNI support for planting
- Total reforested area: 15.07 ha

**Livelihood activities**

- June 2012: Training on duck and goat farming focusing on topics including selection of goat, cage building, food making, goat caring, disease control, sterilization, and marketing of products
- 2012: types of livelihood activities supported by WIIP
    - Financial cooperatives
    - Pig husbandry
    - Goat husbandry
    - Fisheries
    - Vegetable cultivation
- 2014: demonstration site established for sorghum farming

***Reroroja Village, Sa'ate Community Group***

**Bio-rights group:** 21 members (15 females and 6 males)

**Disasters**

**Disaster risk management and regulations**

- June 2013: Reinforcement of current village regulation on coastal management

**Planting**

- 2013: BNI support for planting
- 2013: enrichment planting
- Total reforested area: 3.51 ha

**Livelihood activities**

- June 2012: Training on duck and goat farming focusing on topics including selection of goat, cage building, food making, goat caring, disease control, sterilization, and marketing of products
- 2012: types of livelihood activities supported by WIIP
    - Financial cooperatives
    - Duck husbandry
    - Pig husbandry
    - Goat husbandry
    - Chicken husbandry
    - Fisheries

  - Food kiosk
- 2014: demonstration site established for sorghum farming

***Done Village, Tedo Tembu Community Group***

**Bio-rights group:** 33 members (8 females, 25 males)

**Disasters**

- March 2012: Typhoon (4 houses damaged)

**Disaster risk management and regulations**

- 2012: awareness campaign was conducted through film show on climate change and environment destruction and video on traditional rice harvesting ritual. An awareness raising campaign targeting primary school children was conducted jointly with PLAN about various disaster types, DRR and climate change issues.
- 2013: WIIP facilitated finalization of village regulation on water sources' management

**Livelihood activities**

- June 2012: Training on duck and goat farming focusing on topics including selection of goat, cage building, food making, goat caring, disease control, sterilization, and marketing of products
- 2012: types of livelihood activities supported by WIIP
  - Duck husbandry
  - Pig husbandry
  - Chicken husbandry
  - Goat husbandry
- 2014: demonstration site established for sorghum farming

**Planting**

- 2013: enrichment planting
- Total reforested area: 76.02 ha

***Tou Timur Village, Bowu Sare Community Group***

**Bio-rights group:** 33 members (8 females, 25 males)

**Disasters**

- March 2012: Anthrax

**Disaster risk management and regulations**

- 2012: Environmental campaign was conducted through film show and discussion focusing on conservation and protection of environment.

**Livelihood activities**

- May 2012: Training on the use of de-salination and biogas machines, honey packing and marketing, and compost making.

- June 2012: Training on duck and goat farming focusing on topics including selection of goat, cage building, food making, goat caring, disease control, sterilization, and marketing of products
- 2012: types of livelihood activities supported by WIIP
    - Pig husbandry
    - Goat husbandry
    - Fisheries
    - Fruit cultivation
- 2013: training on production of organic fertilizers in cooperation with 'Wahana Tani Mandiri' (local NGO)
- 2013: 25x50 metres demonstration sites for sorghum farming

**Planting**

- 2013: low rate of tree growth success due to natural condition and attack of domestic animals
- 2013: enrichment planting
- Total reforested area: 9.46 ha

***Kota Baru, Ma'e Welu Community Group***

**Bio-rights group:** 20 members (7 females, 13 males)

**Disasters**

- March 2012: Anthrax
- 2013: Anthrax (50 cows and 4 buffalo died)
- July 2013: High wave

**Disaster risk management and regulations**

- June 2012: DRR/CCA/EMR messages were conveyed to local communities through film and music show and community discussion. In addition awareness campaign targeted to school children was carried out.
- 2013: agreement to develop village regulation on coastal zone management (hence, regulation is not yet developed)

**Livelihood activities**

- May 2012: Training on the use of de-salination and biogas machines, honey packing and marketing, and compost making.
- June 2012: Training on duck and goat farming focusing on topics including selection of goat, cage building, food making, goat caring, disease control, sterilization, and marketing of products
- 2012: types of livelihood activities supported by WIIP
    - Financial cooperatives
    - Pig husbandry
    - Chicken husbandry
    - Goat husbandry
    - Dog rearing
    - Fisheries
    - Tailor

- 2014: demonstration site established for sorghum farming

**Planting**

- 2013: low rate of tree growth success due to soil quality (sand and rocky substrate) and big wind and waves.
- 2013: enrichment planting
- 2013: community group received 20 million Rp to help planting 5,000 seedlings in Gemo village in Ende.
- Total reforested area: 17.39 ha (+0.25 ha with support from CSR BNI Bank)

## *Project results*

**Table 14: Planting success of each community group (December 2013)**

| Group Name | # Agreed planting | | | # tree planting (June 13) | # enrich. planting (Dec13) | # tree planting (Dec.13) | % tree planting (Dec13) to Total | # Survived trees (Dec 13) | % Survived trees (to Dec 13) | % Survived trees to total agreed (Dec 13) | Remarks during this reporting period |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1st period (June 13) | 2nd period (post-June 13) | Total | | | | | | | | |
| **Sabar Subur (Reroroja village)** | 30,000 | 20,000 | 50,000 | 52,820 | 0 | 57,820 | 115.64 | 48,167 | 83.31 | 96.3 | *Ceriops tagal, Rhizopora apiculata, Hibiscus tiliaceus,* Banana, Cashew nuts, Mango, Areca nut and Coconut |
| **Sa'ate (Reroroja village)** | 10,000 | 40,000 | 50,000 | 50,930 | 1,500 | 54,702 | 109.40 | 46,654 | 85.29 | 93.3 | Cashew nut, banana, coconut, mangrove trees |
| **Tedu Tembo (Done village)** | 10,000 | 40,000 | 50,000 | 47,301 | 4,641 | 56,349 | 112.70 | 52,364 | 92.93 | 104.7 | At water sources of Watuwa sub-village. *Hibiscus tiliaceus*, Banyan trees and white teak |
| **Bowu Sare (Tou Timur village)** | 10,000 | 40,000 | 50,000 | 41,287 | 200 | 62,012 | 124.02 | 19,404 | 31.29 | 38.8 | *Hibiscus tiliaceus,* Reo, Bawe, Ketapang, Wukak, Coconut, and mangrove trees. Heavy disturbance of free-reared livestock |
| **Mae'Welu (Kota Baru village)** | 10,000 | 40,000 | 50,000 | 72,967 | 6,500 | 90,349 | 180.70 | 34,515 | 38.20 | 69.0 | Planting programme in collaboration with CSR support of government owned Bank. Heavy disturbance of free-reared livestock |
| **Klakat Indah (Talibura village)** | 12,000 | 38,000 | 50,000 | 53,316 | 4,472 | 61,786 | 123.57 | 39,198 | 63.44 | 78.4 | Waru (*Hibiscus tiliaceus*) and Mahagoni (*Swietenia mahagoni).* High floods event |
| **Kembang bakau (Darat Pantai village)** | 12,000 | 38,000 | 50,000 | 53,140 | 5,500 | 62,454 | 124.91 | 46,915 | 75.12 | 93.8 | Propagule of *Rhizopora apiculata, Bruguiera sp., Ceriops decandra.* Total *42,250* mangrove species and10,720 other coastal species. Long drought |
| **Nangahale Lestari (Nangahale village)** | 8,000 | 42,000 | 50,000 | 46,927 | 1,500 | 74,354 | 148.71 | 43,402 | 58.37 | 86.8 | *Rhizopora apiculata, Waru* and *Reo* |
| **Total (#) or Average (%)** | **102,000** | **298,000** | **400,000** | **418,688** | **24,313** | **519,826** | **129.96** | **330,619** | **65.99** | **82.7** | |

Source: WIIP Yearly Report 2013

**Table 15: Success of livelihood activities in each community group (December 2013)**

| Name of Community Group | Livelihood Activities | Status of Progress (December 2013) |
|---|---|---|
| **Kembang Bakau** | 1. Honey collection<br>2. Rice seller<br>3. Pig husbandry<br>4. Chicken husbandry<br>5. Goat husbandry<br>6. Fisheries<br>7. Handicraft (ikat weaving)<br>8. Bread seller<br>9. Food Kiosk | 1. Has been running for 14 months. Link with Swiss Contact for honey marketing. Good progress<br>2. Still running well<br>3. Total 17 pigs<br>4. Total 10 chickens<br>5. Total 15 goats<br>6. Selling boat and fish net, fishing hut. Very good improvement<br>7. Currently having 8 order. Price Rp.75,000 (€ 5) – Rp.500,000 (€ 45)<br>8. Still running<br>9. Food Kiosk. Still running |
| **Nangahale Lestari** | 1. Duck husbandry<br>2. Pig husbandry<br>3. Chicken husbandry<br>4. Cow husbandry<br>5. Goat husbandry<br>6. Fisheries<br>7. Food Kiosk (fried foods, cake) | 1. Total 92 ducks. Very good progress<br>2. Total 26 pigs<br>3. Total 33 Chickens<br>4. Total 4 cows<br>5. Goat husbandry. Still running<br>6. Fisheries. Good progress<br>7. Food Kiosk (fried foods, cake). Well running, profit Rp.200,000 (€ 13)/week |
| **Kalakat Indah** | 1. Chicken husbandry<br>2. Pig husbandry<br>3. Chicken husbandry<br>4. Fisheries<br>5. Vegetable seller<br>6. Provision of weaving, milling and gardening equipment<br>7. Handicraft | 1. Has been running for 13th cycles with very good profit. Bigger competitors. Profits are kept at the group's bank account as collective asset<br>2. Total 35 pigs, excluding some have been sold<br>3. 3 – 6 are still running well<br>7. Has 16 orders |
| **Ma'e Welu** | 1. Financial cooperatives<br>2. Pig husbandry<br>3. Chicken husbandry<br>4. Goat husbnadry<br>5. Dog rearing<br>6. Fisheries<br>7. Tailor | 1. Financial cooperatives: still running well<br>2. Pig husbandry: total 14 pigs<br>3. Chicken husbandry: total 77 chickens<br>4. Goat husbandry: total 23 goats<br>5. Dog rearing: total 4 dogs<br>6. Fisheries. Good earning<br>7. Tailor: good earning |
| **Bowu Sare** | 1. Pig husbandry<br>2. Goat husbandry<br>3. Fisheries<br>4. Fruit cultivation | 1. Pig husbandry: 7 pigs<br>2. Goat husbandry: 15 goats<br>3. Fisheries. total 6 fishing net at Bowu lake<br>4. Fruit seller: ¼ ha of water melon cultivation |
| **Sa'ate** | 1. Financial cooperatives<br>2. Duck husbandry<br>3. Pig husbandry<br>4. Goat husbandry<br>5. Chicken husbandry<br>6. Fisheries<br>7. Food kiosk | 1. Financial cooperatives. Has been running for 5 months, borrowed money Rp.3.6 million (€ 250)<br>2. Duck husbandry: 102 ducks<br>3. Pig husbandry: running well<br>4. Goat husbandry: 16 goats<br>5. Chicken husbandry: running well<br>6. Fisheries: running well<br>7. Food kiosk: running well |
| **Sabar Subur** | 1. Financial cooperatives<br>2. Pig husbandry<br>3. Goat husbandry<br>4. Fisheries<br>5. Vegetable cultivation | 1. Financial cooperatives. Has been running for 1 year, borrowed money Oct – Nov 2013: Rp.3 million (€ 200)<br>2. Pig husbandry. Good progress<br>3. Goat husbandry. Good progress<br>4. Fisheries. Very good earning, ca. Rp.100,000 (€ 7)/day<br>5. Vegetable cultivation. Good progress |
| **Tedo Tembu** | 1. Duck husbandry<br>2. Pig husbandry<br>1. Chicken husbandry<br>3. Goat husbandry | 1. Duck husbandry: 40 ducks<br>2. Pig husbandry. Good progress<br>3. Chicken husbandry: 80 chickens<br>4. Goat husbandry. Partly been sold |
| Source: WIIP Yearly Report 2013 | | |

# Annex II. Overview outcome indicators and indices

This annex provides a detailed description about the used outcome indicators. In addition, it discusses the variables which were used to construct the outcome indicator indices. Please note that some of the indicators are constructed as indices from multiple questions. In the main text of the report, only the indices are reported for such indicators. However, this Annex reports on the outcomes of the components of the indices.

Outcome variables for the project were collected at household and community level. The outcomes are reported for treatment villages and comparison villages for the baseline and the endline surveys. The treatment as well as the control group each consists of 7 villages. For the household data, the sample size can differ between tables because the answer 'don't know' is changed to a missing value or because a respondent could skip a question if he/she had no knowledge about what was asked (answered 'no' to a previous question). This was the case if a respondent answered 'don't know' to a question with a scale, so it did not make sense to incorporate the answer in the scale. However, for questions where we were interested in the percentage of the sample that answered 'yes' to a question, it made sense to change the 'don't know' answers to 'no' so that we could use all data when reporting on the question.

### *Reforestation (uniform indicator)*

This information is collected on a community and household level.

- Number of villages with efforts at forest protection in the past 2 years: Data from the community survey are used for outcomes on effort at forest protection. It was asked whether activities have taken place in the village on efforts at reforestation, and if so when. Using the information on the year of reforestation, we constructed a binary variable indicating whether in the past 2 years (2010, 2011 and 2012 for baseline and 2012, 2013 and 2014 at the endline) there have been efforts at reforestation. This indicator is divided into two separate indicators focused on a) mangrove- and b) non-mangrove forests, where non-mangrove forests cover coastal- and upland forests. The information on forests is received by asking in 4 separate questions, first on mangrove forests, followed by coastal and upland forests, and last by lake areas. If the answer is 'No' for one of the forests, all following forest types are skipped, hence the sample size decreases for these type of indicators as the number of villages with missing values increases.
- Percentage of households that participated in reforestation efforts: Data from the household survey are used here. It was asked whether a household has (ever) been involved in reforestation efforts. If this question was answered with 'yes', the last time the activity occurred was reported. All households answering 'yes', independent of the date they mention, are counted as households that have been involved in reforestation efforts. Again using the information on the year of reforestation, we constructed a binary variable indicating whether in the past 2 years (2010, 2011 and 2012 for baseline and 2012, 2013 and 2014 at the endline) there have been efforts at reforestation.
- Number of planted seedlings: Following the previous question, it was asked how many seedlings have been planted as part of the last reforestation activity.

### *Management structure of forests*

For management structure of forests, data was collected on community level on the existence of a management structure as well as regulations on natural resources. Both indicators are again divided into two separate indicators focused on a) mangrove- and b) non-mangrove forests, where non-mangrove forests cover coastal- and upland forests. The information on forests is received by asking in 4 separate questions, first on mangrove forests, followed by coastal and upland forests, and last by lake areas. If the answer is 'No' for one of the forests, all following forest types are skipped, hence the sample size decreases for these type of indicators as the number of villages with missing values increases. For non-mangrove forests, it is possible that a management structure was in place for both types. These cases are not reported separately.

- Management structure in place: It was asked who is responsible for managing the different types of forests, where 'no management structure' is one of the possible categories. Based on this category, the dummy for this indicator was created.
- Village regulations on natural resources: It was asked whether regulations regarding the use of the different types of forests exist.

### *Condition of forest*

For information about the condition of forests, data was collected on the size of the forest areas, on whether it has increased or decreased since the baseline study and on the condition of the forests. All indicators are divided for mangrove and non-mangrove forests, where non-mangrove forests consist of dry-land (coastal and upland) forests. If villages report not to have a certain type of forest, all following forest types are skipped, hence the sample size decreases for these type of indicators as the number of villages with missing values increases.

- Size of forests: It was asked for the size of the area covered by the 3 different types of forests as well as by lake area (in ha). However, reported sizes were not reliable in baseline nor endline survey. Therefore, we only report on the qualitative measure whether the size has increased, decreased or stayed the same. This question was asked with a 10 year recall period at the baseline and a 2 year recall period at the endline in the community survey.
- Condition of forest: It was asked for the condition of the different types of forests. Answers could be given on a scale of 1 (very poor) to 6 (very good). The data come from the community survey,

### *Respondents' knowledge of mangroves*

Data was collected on the description and recognition of mangroves as well as the benefits of mangroves.

- Recognition of mangroves: The respondent was given a flashcard with 4 pictures of different types of trees to identify mangroves. 2 of the 4 pictures actually showed mangrove trees. The respondent had to identify the correct pictures showing mangroves. Three dummies were created from these answers. One dummy gives the percentage of respondents who exactly identified the two correct pictures. Another dummy gives the percentage of respondents who identified one of the two correct pictures (partially correct) and the third dummy gives the percentage of respondents that did not identify any of the pictures correctly or indicated an incorrect picture (even if they also indicated either or both of the correct pictures as well).

- To further test knowledge, it was asked what the benefits of mangroves are, where up to 5 benefits could be mentioned. Results are presented in dummy variables for each of the categories.

These questions relate to the knowledge of the respondent. Therefore, we only report on the change in these indicators if the (main) respondent was the same during the baseline and the endline surveys.

### *Income of households from sustainable use of the ecosystem (uniform indicator)*

For measuring the income from sustainable use of the ecosystem, the following data from the household survey is used:

- Contribution of mangroves to livelihood: It was asked how much mangrove forests contribute to the respondent's livelihood, answering on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (completely).
- Income from forestry/livestock/fishing:
    - The questionnaire includes a separate subsection on the *income from forestry*. It is asked how much (in different possible measuring units) the household sold of 7 natural resources like wood, honey and bamboo in the past 3 months. The subsequent question asks for the amount of Rp received per unit of the natural resource. From these two measures the total *net* income from 'forestry' is calculated for the past three months. For income per household member per month, this amount is divided by the household size and the number of months (three).
    - The questionnaire includes a separate subsection on the *income from livestock.* If a household raised or owned any livestock, poultry or any other domesticated animal during the past three months, more detailed questions on the type and quantity of livestock were asked. For each livestock raised in the past 3 months, the quantity sold was multiplied with the median price for the corresponding animal in the village, sub-district or district. Which of these median prices were used, was decided by the number of available positive answers. For income per household member per month, this amount is divided by the household size and the number of months (three).
    - The questionnaire includes a separate subsection on the *income from fishing and aquaculture*. It is asked what amount the respondent earned in the past 3 months from fishing. To get the monthly income from fishing per household member, this amount is first divided by three, and then divided by the household size.
    - Based on the three indicators on income from forestry, livestock and fishing, a dummy is created which is 1 if the household has any income from at least one of the areas, and 0 if the household has no income at all from forestry, livestock nor fishing.
- Percentage of household income from forestry/livestock/fishing as a share of total income of household from these natural resources: To receive the share of the three different types of income, first the total income from forestry, livestock and fishing is calculated. Income from farm is excluded since only 1 observation has a positive income. The per capita share of (forestry/livestock/fish) income is then calculated by dividing the three measures by the total income.

### *Number of actions taken for disaster risk preparedness*

Respondents were asked about the efforts that the household has made to prepare for disasters and reduce their impact on the household. In total 15 efforts are described, where for each of them the respondent answers with 'yes' or 'no', depending on whether the actions have been taken. This indicator is further divided into four types of efforts: Information preparation, emergency preparation, saving preparation and participation in community preparations. For each of these four categories, the average number of measures taken is calculated. Additionally to the number of measures taken, we present dummies for all four indices which are 1 if at least one measure was taken, and 0 if no measures of a certain type where taken. The four types are defined as follows:

- Prepared with information:
  - Informed about possible hazards for your family/household
  - Checked whether house is located in disaster-prone area
  - Informed about warning signal
  - Informed about gathering point, route and evacuation point
- Prepared for case of emergency:
  - Prepared emergency food and water supplies
  - Prepared emergency lighting
  - Improved resistance of house
  - Built emergency family bunker
  - Planned what to take along in case of evacuation
  - Discussed actions in case of emergency with whole family
  - Prepared communication instrument and warning sign
- Saving preparation:
  - Made emergency savings
- Participated in community preparations:
  - Participated in evacuation tests/drills in village
  - Participate in alert teams of disaster
  - Volunteered to provide awareness information in village

### *Household livelihood*

For this indicator, data was collected on the per capita consumption and asset holdings of households as well as the self-reported well-being.

- Monthly household expenditure is calculated from a) monthly food consumption and b) monthly non-food consumption (both in 1000 Rp). For the monthly per capita consumption (pce), total household expenditure is divided by the household size.
  - Food consumption: The total food consumption of a household is calculated based on purchases but also on the value of self-produced items that were consumed by the household. First, it was asked about the household's expenses within the past week (including purchases, own production and gifts) for different types of food items like staple foods, vegetables and dried foods. To receive the monthly expenditure, this measure was multiplied with 52 (weeks) and divided by twelve (months). Second, the same procedure was done for the values of self-produced food items which the household consumed in the past week. For the per capita food consumption (pce food), the total value of all consumed food items that were purchased or self-produced is divided by the household size.

- Non-food consumption: The total non-food consumption of a household is calculated from a number of questions on household expenses. To get the monthly non-food consumption per household, yearly expenses are converted into monthly figures. Non-food expenses consist of the following:
  - Expenses on utilities (like water and electricity) and personal as well as recreational goods in the past month. Here two categories that were included in the baseline survey were not included in the endline survey ('arisan' and 'non-food items given to others/other parties outside the household'). Hence, they are not included in the analysis. In addition, the total value of these items consumed by the household that were self-produced or received from another source is also included.
  - Yearly expenses on items like clothing, household supplies, medical costs and taxes. Again, also the yearly value of these items that were consumed but self-produced or received from another source is taken into account.
  - Expenses on schooling for family members (schooling needs, transportation, registrations etc.) were asked separately for members outside and inside the household. Only expenses for family members inside the household are included in the calculation of non-food consumption.

  For the per capita *non-food* consumption we divide non-food consumption per month by household size.
- *Housing facilities index (PCA):* In order, that the housing facilities index in the MFS II projects have a meaningful interpretation, we calculate weights for the index components based on their predictive power for household expenditure. The weights are calculated using a population representative survey for Indonesia using regression analysis. We use the IFLS 2007 survey as a population representative sample. From the IFLS 2007 dataset we use aggregate expenditure data, asset ownership and sampling weights. As the aggregate expenditure variable the data analysis uses the logarithm of the monthly per capita expenditure (*lnpce*). The sampling weight used is the cross-sectional sampling weight adjusted for attrition. This weight should be representative of all households living in the IFLS provinces in Indonesia in 2007. Based on the KR section of the IFLS survey, we construct the housing variables that are the same in IFLS and the MFS II surveys. The variables used from the KR section of the MFS II surveys which are also the found in IFLS are: a. *kr01*, b. *kr02*, c. *kr04*, d. *kr07*, e. *kr10* and h. *kr13*. The corresponding variables in IFLS are: a. *kr03,* b. *kr13*, c. *kr16*, d. *kr20*, e. *kr11* and h. *kr24.* There are more variables which are the same between E6 and IFLS, however we wanted to construct a housing facilities asset variable which can be used by all MFS II surveys, thus the variables mentioned above are selected as they are common in most MFS II surveys. The first step is to recode the variables of MFS II surveys in order to have matching answer categories with the variables of IFLS; the same procedure is also followed for the IFLS variables. In addition, as the variable names are not the same among the two datasets, in the IFLS dataset we renamed the common variables as to have the same name with the MFS II variables. After, the aforementioned preparation the two datasets are combined into one dataset. Furthermore, dummy variables are created based on the answer categories of the chosen common variables. The

reason behind the construction of the categorical dummy variables is to include them in the regression of the logarithm of the monthly per capita expenditure on the housing dummies. Nevertheless, not all of the categorical dummies are used in the regression model. The regression does not include dummy variables whose variation is higher than 97% of the sample or lower than 3% of the sample. Moreover, after we performed the regression the next step was to calculate the fitted values by predicting the expenditure based on housing facilities for both the IFLS and MFS II sample. Finally, the last step was to rescale the predicted variable in order to have a zero mean for the IFLS sample by subtracting the mean of the fitted value from the fitted value itself.

Hence, we will be able to infer the livelihood of our survey participants compared to the Indonesian average in 2007: for example, if the value of the index is 0.10 (-0.10), on average, it implies that the sample is approximately 10% better off (worse off) than the average Indonesian household in 2007 based on the predictive power of housing facilities (like drinking water source) on household expenditure.

- *Asset index (PCA):* The construction of the asset index follows a similar procedure with the creation of the housing index, however in this case instead of the IFLS dataset the DHS 2012 dataset was used, as DHS includes more common asset variables with the MFS II surveys than the IFLS. Moreover, asset variables were chosen from the KR section of the MFS II surveys which are common with DHS variables. From MFS II dataset questions a. kr11 and b. kr12 were chosen while from the DHS dataset questions a. *hv207*, b. *hv208*, c. *hv209*, d. *hv243a*, e.*hv210*, f. *hv211*, g. *hv212*, h. *sh118c*, i. *hv243d* and j. *hv243c* were selected. The next step was to combine the two datasets and perform a factor analysis of the common variables in order to calculate the asset index. In addition, as mentioned above the 3% rule was also applied for the asset index, excluding from the factor analysis variables with small variation. Finally, the predicted asset index was normalized for the DHS sample (mean 0 and variance 1).

- For self-reported well-being is measured by two scales on a) happiness and b) current wealth status. Respondents were asked the following:
  - Taken all things together how would you say things are these days? The question was answered on a 4-point Likert scale from 1 (very happy) to 4 (absolutely not happy)
  - Please imagine a six-step ladder where on the bottom (the first step), stand the poorest people, and on the highest step (the sixth step), stand the richest people. On which step are you today? Here, all 'don't know' answers are replaced with missing values.

  These questions relate to the subjective judgement of the respondent. Therefore, we only report on the change in these indicators if the (main) respondent was the same during the baseline and the endline surveys.

### *Food security and vulnerability*

For this index three measures are taken into account.

- Percentage of households not able to cover their living costs/ have not enough to eat: It was asked whether it happened to the household in the past 12 months that the income did not cover the living costs.
- Current standard of living (daily needs covered): Possible answers were 1 (not enough to fulfil my daily needs), 2 (only enough to fulfil my daily needs), 3 (more than enough to fulfil my daily needs). Again, all that answered 'don't know' where replaced with a missing value.
- Current standard of living (food consumption covered): Possible answers were 1 (not enough to fulfil my daily needs), 2 (only enough to fulfil my daily needs), 3 (more than enough to fulfil my daily needs). Again, all that answered 'don't know' where replaced with a missing value.

# Annex III. Summary statistics of variables

**Table 16: Summary statistics of all the variables used**

| | Baseline | | Endline | | Change (EL-BL) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Sample Size | Mean | Sample Size | Mean | Sample Size | Mean |
| Number of household members | 320 | 5.07 | 320 | 5.82 | 301 | 0.71 |
| Percentage of households that have a female household head | 320 | 10.63 | 302 | 9.27 | 283 | 0.00 |
| Age of the household head | 320 | 45.45 | 302 | 47.42 | 283 | 2.07 |
| Highest level of education attended by the household head (%) | | | | | | |
| *No school/ attended Islamic school* | 320 | 5.63 | 301 | 5.98 | 282 | -0.35 |
| *Primary school* | 320 | 65.00 | 301 | 64.12 | 282 | 1.42 |
| *Secondary school* | 320 | 25.94 | 301 | 27.24 | 282 | 0.35 |
| *Higher education* | 320 | 3.44 | 301 | 2.66 | 282 | -1.42 |
| Number of assets owned | 320 | 1.98 | 320 | 2.31 | 301 | 0.27 |
| Housing facilities index | 320 | -0.39 | 320 | -0.29 | 301 | 0.09 |
| Asset index | 320 | -1.11 | 320 | -0.94 | 301 | 0.15 |
| Main source of income (%) | | | | | | |
| *Crop farming* | 320 | 60.31 | 320 | 60.00 | 301 | -0.66 |
| *Fishing* | 320 | 12.81 | 320 | 11.88 | 301 | -1.33 |
| *Livestock* | 320 | 2.19 | 320 | 1.56 | 301 | -0.66 |
| *Non-farm business* | 320 | 9.69 | 320 | 12.19 | 301 | 1.99 |
| *Salary/wage* | 320 | 13.75 | 320 | 12.81 | 301 | 0.00 |
| *Pension* | 320 | 0.31 | 320 | 0.31 | 301 | 0.00 |
| *Transfers/remittances* | 320 | 0.63 | 320 | 1.25 | 301 | 0.66 |
| Distance to non-mangrove forest (%) | | | | | | |
| *Less than 500m* | 319 | 17.87 | 320 | 11.25 | 300 | -6.33 |
| *Between 500-1000m* | 319 | 11.91 | 320 | 11.88 | 300 | -0.67 |
| *Between 1-2 km* | 319 | 22.26 | 320 | 15.63 | 300 | -8.00 |
| *Between 2-4 km* | 319 | 15.67 | 320 | 24.69 | 300 | 9.67 |
| *More than 4km* | 319 | 13.17 | 320 | 25.31 | 300 | 12.00 |
| Distance to mangrove forest (%) | | | | | | |
| *Less than 500m* | 320 | 32.81 | 320 | 35.63 | 301 | 1.99 |
| *Between 500-1000m* | 320 | 18.44 | 320 | 14.38 | 301 | -2.33 |
| *Between 1-2 km* | 320 | 12.19 | 320 | 19.06 | 301 | 6.31 |
| *Between 2-4 km* | 320 | 14.06 | 320 | 12.19 | 301 | -2.33 |
| *More than 4km* | 320 | 1.88 | 320 | 1.88 | 301 | -0.33 |
| Respondent mentions […] as part of forest contributes to their livelihood (%) | | | | | | |
| *Fire wood* | 190 | 68.95 | 224 | 64.73 | 141 | 1.42 |
| *Building material (wood)* | 190 | 24.74 | 224 | 29.02 | 141 | 4.96 |
| *Fish* | 107 | 39.25 | 137 | 52.55 | 68 | 14.71 |
| *Crab/Prawn* | 107 | 27.10 | 137 | 40.88 | 68 | 23.53 |
| *Honey* | 190 | 3.68 | 224 | 13.84 | 141 | 14.18 |
| *Other food resources* | 190 | 38.42 | 224 | 41.96 | 141 | 9.22 |
| *Other resources* | 190 | 36.84 | 224 | 39.29 | 141 | 2.84 |
| […] meetings/trainings on natural resource protection, use or management in the past 12 months (%) | | | | | | |

| | Baseline | | Endline | | Change (EL-BL) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Sample Size | Mean | Sample Size | Mean | Sample Size | Mean |
| *(1) Knowledge of* | 320 | 60.31 | 320 | 58.13 | 301 | -3.99 |
| *(2) Attended* | 320 | 40.63 | 320 | 43.13 | 301 | 1.99 |
| […] meetings/trainings on sustainable livelihood activities in past 12 months (%) | | | | | | |
| *(3) Knowledge of* | 320 | 44.38 | 320 | 51.56 | 301 | 6.31 |
| *(4) Attended* | 320 | 29.69 | 320 | 35.00 | 301 | 5.32 |
| Ever participated in reforestation efforts (%) | 320 | 55.94 | 320 | 66.25 | 301 | 9.63 |
| Number of seedlings planted | 318 | 175.26 | 300 | 678.45 | 280 | 524.07 |
| Respondent has income from either forestry, livestock or fishing (%) | 320 | 96.25 | 320 | 91.88 | 301 | -4.32 |
| Household income per capita from […] per month (1000 Rp, 2012 prices) | | | | | | |
| *Forestry* | 320 | 93.26 | 320 | 117.50 | 301 | 9.68 |
| *Livestock* | 320 | 5.49 | 320 | 11.07 | 301 | 5.57 |
| *Fish* | 320 | 57.28 | 320 | 70.46 | 301 | -1.47 |
| […] action taken by household to reduce the risk of disaster (%) | | | | | | |
| *Information* | 320 | 52.50 | 320 | 66.56 | 301 | 13.95 |
| *Preparation* | 320 | 74.69 | 320 | 82.19 | 301 | 6.98 |
| *Savings* | 320 | 26.88 | 320 | 18.44 | 301 | -8.97 |
| *Volunteering* | 320 | 57.19 | 320 | 65.94 | 301 | 8.31 |
| Number of […] measures taken by any household member to reduce to risk of disaster | | | | | | |
| *Information* | 311 | 1.04 | 296 | 1.47 | 268 | 0.43 |
| *Preparation* | 319 | 2.28 | 320 | 2.30 | 300 | 0.01 |
| *Volunteer* | 293 | 0.83 | 298 | 1.07 | 258 | 0.21 |
| Any household member […] to reduce the risks of disasters (%) | | | | | | |
| *Informed about possible hazards for your family/household* | 270 | 33.70 | 268 | 45.90 | 214 | 13.08 |
| *Checked whether house is located in disaster-prone area* | 291 | 30.58 | 258 | 35.66 | 221 | 4.52 |
| *Informed about warning signal* | 252 | 23.81 | 231 | 44.59 | 174 | 18.39 |
| *Informed about gathering point, route and evacuation point* | 266 | 31.20 | 225 | 51.56 | 177 | 21.47 |
| *Prepared emergency food and water supplies* | 319 | 31.03 | 319 | 25.08 | 299 | -6.35 |
| *Prepared emergency lighting* | 319 | 45.45 | 319 | 61.13 | 299 | 15.38 |
| *Improved resistance of house* | 319 | 34.80 | 320 | 31.88 | 300 | -4.00 |
| *Built emergency family bunker* | 319 | 1.25 | 320 | 0.31 | 300 | -0.33 |
| *Planned what to take along in case of evacuation* | 317 | 42.90 | 320 | 40.00 | 298 | -4.03 |
| *Discussed actions in case of emergency with whole family* | 318 | 55.66 | 320 | 55.94 | 299 | -1.00 |
| *Made emergency savings* | 319 | 26.96 | 320 | 18.44 | 300 | -9.00 |

| | Baseline | | Endline | | Change (EL-BL) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Sample Size | Mean | Sample Size | Mean | Sample Size | Mean |
| *Prepared communication instrument and warning sign* | 319 | 16.93 | 319 | 16.30 | 300 | 0.00 |
| *Participated in evacuation tests/drills in village* | 251 | 25.50 | 223 | 35.87 | 166 | 12.05 |
| *Participate in alert teams of disaster* | 249 | 14.46 | 233 | 28.33 | 168 | 13.69 |
| *Volunteered to provide awareness information in village* | 292 | 49.32 | 292 | 58.90 | 252 | 6.75 |
| Per capita food expenditure per month (1000 Rp, 2012 prices) | 320 | 368.68 | 320 | 345.57 | 301 | -36.97 |
| Per capita non-food expenditure per month (1000 Rp, 2012 prices) | 319 | 143.84 | 319 | 153.93 | 299 | 4.35 |
| Sometimes theincome does not quite cover the living costs (%) | 320 | 73.13 | 320 | 90.00 | 301 | 17.61 |
| Correct description of mangroves (%) | 254 | 54.33 | 301 | 98.01 | 194 | 45.36 |
| Recognitions of mangroves is […] (%) | | | | | | |
| *Incorrect* | 270 | 41.11 | 301 | 44.19 | 207 | -0.48 |
| *Partially correct* | 270 | 20.00 | 301 | 18.94 | 207 | -4.35 |
| *Correct* | 270 | 38.89 | 301 | 36.88 | 207 | 4.83 |
| Number of benefits from mangrove forests | 320 | 0.77 | 320 | 1.33 | 240 | 0.58 |
| Percentage of respondents who mention […] as a mangrove forest benefit | | | | | | |
| *Food* | 320 | 18.44 | 320 | 35.94 | 240 | 16.67 |
| *Medicine* | 320 | 17.19 | 320 | 9.06 | 240 | -5.83 |
| *Firewood* | 320 | 37.81 | 320 | 35.31 | 240 | 1.67 |
| *Building material (wood)* | 320 | 23.75 | 320 | 18.44 | 240 | -2.08 |
| *Protection* | 320 | 14.06 | 320 | 27.50 | 240 | 14.17 |
| *Eco-biological value* | 320 | 4.38 | 320 | 3.44 | 240 | -2.08 |
| *Other* | 320 | 6.25 | 320 | 15.31 | 240 | 11.67 |
| Contribution of mangrove forest resources to livelihood (1-5) | 318 | 1.19 | 320 | 1.60 | 238 | 0.42 |
| Self-reported well-being: | | | | | | |
| *Happiness (1-4)* | 320 | 2.14 | 320 | 2.19 | 240 | 0.06 |
| *Current wealth status (1-6)* | 319 | 2.13 | 320 | 2.30 | 239 | 0.19 |
| Current standard of living on a scale from 1 to 3 | | | | | | |
| *Daily needs covered* | 320 | 1.39 | 320 | 1.47 | 240 | 0.10 |
| *Food consumption covered* | 320 | 1.63 | 320 | 1.62 | 240 | 0.00 |
| Participated in reforestation effort in past 2 years (%) | 320 | 49.38 | 320 | 59.69 | 301 | 9.63 |
| Household received compensation in form of a grant (%) | 320 | 18.13 | 320 | 25.00 | 301 | 7.31 |
| Average amount grant if any received (1000 Rp, | 58 | 772.43 | 80 | 1,179.62 | 25 | 399.26 |

| | Baseline | | Endline | | Change (EL-BL) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Sample Size | Mean | Sample Size | Mean | Sample Size | Mean |
| 2012 pricees) | | | | | | |
| Household received compensation in form of a conditional grant (%) | 320 | 17.19 | 320 | 11.88 | 301 | -5.65 |
| Average amount conditional grant if any received (1000 Rp, 2012 prices) | 55 | 1,082.18 | 38 | 1,561.78 | 23 | 470.68 |
| Respondents who think mangrove forest should be protected (%) | 181 | 98.90 | 244 | 98.36 | 165 | 0.00 |
| Respondents who think non-mangrove forest should be protected (%) | 215 | 98.14 | 231 | 99.57 | 171 | 1.17 |
| Methods used by respondent to protect the mangrove forest (%) | | | | | | |
| *None* | 179 | 9.50 | 240 | 20.42 | 163 | 4.29 |
| *Sustainable use* | 179 | 3.91 | 240 | 16.25 | 163 | 13.50 |
| *Awareness raising* | 179 | 58.10 | 240 | 42.92 | 163 | -12.88 |
| *Participating in committee for natural resource management* | 179 | 17.32 | 240 | 22.92 | 163 | 9.82 |
| *Reforestation* | 179 | 61.45 | 240 | 63.33 | 163 | 8.59 |
| Methods used by respondent to protect non-mangrove forest (%) | | | | | | |
| *None* | 211 | 13.74 | 230 | 14.35 | 167 | -0.60 |
| *Sustainable use* | 211 | 7.58 | 230 | 21.30 | 167 | 16.17 |
| *Awareness raising* | 211 | 44.08 | 230 | 39.13 | 167 | -4.19 |
| *Participating in committee for natural resource management* | 211 | 13.74 | 230 | 13.91 | 167 | 2.99 |
| *Reforestation* | 211 | 49.76 | 230 | 66.09 | 167 | 16.77 |
| Satisfaction with local regulations in protection natural resources (1-5) | 209 | 3.23 | 265 | 3.42 | 168 | 0.29 |

Source: Household survey E1; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

# Annex IV. Description of survey locations

Table 17 summarizes the villages selected for the survey. The description of the villages follows below. For the treatment villages, the activities of WIIP are discussed based on information from the bio-rights community group leaders (community group leader survey). Regarding the number of seedling planted, information from the community group leaders (CGL) is complemented with information from WIIP (see Table 14). Note, however, that the information from the CGLs is based on information from August 2014, while the information from WIIP is based on project documentation until end 2013. Therefore, differences between the numbers are possible.

In addition, for all villages we indicate the activities of other NGOs.

**Table 17: Sampled villages**

| Name of village | District | Sub-district | Treatment type |
|---|---|---|---|
| **NANGAHALE** | SIKKA | TALIBURA | Treatment |
| **TALIBURA** | SIKKA | TALIBURA | Treatment |
| **DARAT PANTAI** | SIKKA | TALIBURA | Treatment |
| **RERO ROJA** | SIKKA | MAGEPANDA | Treatment |
| **DONE** | SIKKA | MAGEPANDA | Treatment |
| **TOU TIMUR** | ENDE | KOTABARU | Treatment |
| **KOTABARU** | ENDE | KOTABARU | Treatment |
| **BAANG KOOR** | SIKKA | TALIBURA | Comparison |
| **KOLISIA** | SIKKA | MAGEPANDA | Comparison |
| **TIWUSORA** | ENDE | KOTABARU | Comparison |
| **NDONDO** | ENDE | KOTABARU | Comparison |
| **EGON** | SIKKA | WAIGETE | Comparison |
| **WAIRTERANG** | SIKKA | WAIGETE | Comparison |
| **WAILITI** | SIKKA | ALOK BARAT | Comparison |

## *Treatment villages*

### EA 01. DESA NANGAHALE

#### Village characteristics

The village Nangahale is located in the sub-district Talibura (district Sikka Nusa Tenggara Timur), consisting of 4 dusuns (hamlets) namely Namandoi, Likong Gete, Wair Utan, and Nangahale. There are 3,382 people living in Nangahale in 985 households. The village's main roads are paved and there is a regular public transportation system connecting the village with the neighbourhood.

The drinking water comes from a protected well and in the dry seasons there has never been a shortage for drinking water. Electricity became available in 2000 and around 50 percent of the households are already using it. The available educational facilities in the village are elementary, middle and high school, and all can be easily accessed by the public. The available health facilities are Posyandu (integrated health service) and village midwives, the closest Public Health Centre lies outside Nangahale, the closest can be reached in about 3 miles.

The village has 445 hectares available for agriculture/plantation and has 150 hectares of forest. The majority of residents are farmers, growing corn, rice, and cassava with self-owned land. Most agricultural products are only for the personal consumption of the household. In addition to the farm income livestock is hold, mostly pigs, cows, chickens, and ducks. The residents and village officials welcomed the research team.

**WIIP activities**

Wetlands International has organised several activities in this community in the past years. Besides focusing on awareness raising towards natural resource management as well as natural hazards and risk reduction, WIIP also gave workshops and trainings on livelihood activities, financial management and resource management.


Regarding the planted number of seedlings by the community group of Nangahale (*Nangahale Lestari*), CGL reported a total of 80,000 mangrove trees and 20,000 coastal and highland trees. However, based on information from WIIP, only 74,354 mangrove trees have been planted by end 2013. WIIP provided this group with a grant of 69,000,000 Rp for the planting of seedlings, and a conditional grant of in the amount of 25,000,000 Rp in total.

If after three years the survival rate of the planted trees is beyond 75%, the loan from WIIP turns into a grant. Otherwise it has to be paid back in proportion with the survival rate of the trees. On top of the two grants, the community group received a loan of 6.000.000 Rp. from WIIP.

**Activities of other NGOs**

Besides Wetlands International, 'Plan International' and 'Dian Desa' have been active in Nangahale in the past 12 months before the endline survey. The activities implemented comprise activities focusing on education and health.

**Figure 3: Map of project area**



**EA 02. DESA TALIBURA**

**Village characteristics**

The village Talibura is located in sub-district Talibura (district Sikka Nusa Tenggara Timur), consisting of 4 hamlets. The population of the village of reaches 2,417, living in 648 households. The total area of Talibura is about 1,594 ha. The village's main roads are asphalted and accessible for 4 wheel vehicles and there is a regular public transportation system connecting the village with the neighbourhood.

The main source of water comes from a spring, which is connected to the village with a pipe. The pipe was installed with the assistance of Pamsimas in 2000. Since then, there has always been drinking water available (even in the dry season). Electricity was already available in Talibura since 1990 and the percentage of households used the electricity facilities is about 90%. The available educational facilities in the village are elementary and junior high school, all easily accessible by the public. A high school is available within the distance of about 3 km. The available health facilities are health centres, midwives and a Posyandu. In the hamlet there is a police station. The village has a weekly market which has become the economic transaction place for people to meet their daily needs.

The size of agricultural land is about 143,549 $m^2$. In addition, there is about 11,194,153 $m^2$ of arid land. The majority of residents are farmers growing crops like rice, corn, and green beans on self-owned land. Most agricultural products are only for the personal consumption of the household. Besides agriculture, the main source of income comes from livestock, namely cows, pigs, chickens, and goats. Apart from agricultural and livestock the community also sells woven products in the city or on order.

**WIIP activities**

In this community, Wetlands International has been very active in awareness raising towards natural resource management as well as natural hazards and risk reduction. Besides involving community members in the risk assessment for their villages, WIIP also implemented workshops and trainings on livelihood activities, financial management and natural resource management.

Regarding the planted number of seedlings by the community group of Talibura (*Klakat Indah*), CGL reported a total of 50,000 mangrove trees and 10,000 coastal and highland trees. Based on information from WIIP, 50,000 mangrove trees and 11,786 coastal and highland trees have been planted by end 2013. The number of planted seedlings in Talibura is slightly lower than in Nangahale, which might be related to the fact that their community group has not received any grant explicitly for planting seedlings, also not conditional on the survival of trees. However, according to the community leader, a transfer worth 75,000,000 Rp. was given by WIIP for the planting and maintenance.

**Activities of other NGOs**

Besides Wetlands International, only PMI has been active in this community in the past 12 months before the endline survey. The types of activities done by PMI cover disaster risk reduction.

**EA 03. DESA DARAT PANTAI**

**Village characteristics**

The village Darat Pantai is located in sub-district Talibura (district Sikka Nusa Tenggara Timur) and consists of three hamlets. The population of the village equals 1,294 people living in 367 households. The total area of the village contains 23.01 ha. The main roads are paved, but they are still quite dirty. Until now, public transportation to go in and out of the village is not available.

The main source of water used by the people is from a protected well. No problems are present with the availability of water during the dry season. Electricity facilities are currently not available in the village. Most households use a lamp for lightening, some use generators. The only educational facility is elementary education. For a middle school one has to travel over a distance of about 12 km, while for the high school level the closest one is in about 15 km. The available health facilities are available health centres, midwives and a Posyandu.

The village has an area of agricultural land of 300.37 ha and 5000 ha forest area. The majority of the residents are farmers growing crops as rice, maize, and cassava on self-owned land. Most agricultural products are only for personal consumption of the household. Besides agriculture the main source of income is livestock. Other natural resources that are important are nuts and coconut acid.

**WIIP activities**

In this community, Wetlands International has been very active in awareness raising towards natural resource management as well as natural hazards and risk reduction. Besides involving community members in the risk assessment for their villages, WIIP also implemented workshops and trainings on livelihood activities, financial management and natural resource management.

Regarding the planted number of seedlings by the community group of Darat Pantai (*Kembang Bakau*), the CGL reported a total of 75,000 mangrove trees and 8,000 coastal and highland trees. Based on information from WIIP, only 62,454 mangrove tree seedlings and 8,000 coastal and highland tree seedlings have been planted by end 2013. WIIP disbursed an (unconditional) grant for the planting of these seedlings which amounted to 50,000,000 Rp. Conditioned on the survival of the trees within 3 years after the planting, the community group received another grant of 50,000,000 Rp. On top of this, another 17,000,000 Rp. were granted by WIIP for project related works for the monitoring of the process.

**Activities of other NGOs**

Besides Wetlands International no other NGO has been active in this community 12 months prior to the endline survey. Hence, no other activities than those implemented by WIIP were done.

**EA 04 (DESA REROROJA)**

**Village characteristics**

The village Reroroja is located in the sub-district Magepanda (district Sikka) and is divided into three hamlets, but the study area includes only two hamlets. The village has a mangrove forest, reaching about 10 acres. The mangrove has been set up with some private initiatives after 1992, the year the tsunami hit the village. Investment activities continue to this day.

**WIIP activities**

Two community groups have been sampled in Reroroja, Sa'ate and Sabar-Subur. Hence, we discuss both groups separately.

For the first group (Sa'ate), Wetlands International focused on awareness raising towards natural resource management as well as natural hazards and risk reduction, and also gave workshops and trainings on livelihood activities, financial management and resource management. In this group, the CGL reported that they have planted a total of 30,000 mangrove seedlings and 26,500 coastal and highland tree seedlings. Based on information from WIIP, the group has planted 30,000 mangrove tree seedlings and 24,702 coastal and highland tree seedlings by end 2013. The community group received 5,000,000 Rp from WIIP for the planting of the seedlings and another 50,000,000 conditional on the survival of the trees in the first three years. Additionally to the two grants, WIIP disbursed another 15,000,000 Rp for other activities.

For the second group (Sabar-Subur), Wetlands International focused on the awareness raising as well, but also did some risk assessment involving the community members. Furthermore, workshops and training on financial management were organised. According the CGL, this community group also planted 30,000 mangrove seedlings but only 1,000 coastal seedlings. Based on information from WIIP, the group planted 56,820 mangrove tree seedlings and 1,000 coastal tree seedlings by end 2013. WIIP solely disbursed a conditional grant on the survival of the trees, amounting to 70,000,000 Rp.

**Activities of other NGOs**

In Reroroja, a number of other NGOs besides WIIP have been active in this community during the 12 months before the endline survey. 'Plan', 'Caritas' and WTM concentrated on livelihood activities, natural resource management as well as education and health activities.

**EA 05 (DESA DONE)**

**Village characteristics**

In the village Done there is one group present, planting tree species which are quite varied, ranging from cash crops such as cashew trees, and pecan to fruit trees like bananas. The group does not seek mangrove planting, because of the geographical location of their village on a mountain plateau. Planting activities are centred on the springs that are used by communities to meet water needs. According to them, the forest and planted trees sustain the springs even during the dry season.

**WIIP activities**

In this community, Wetlands International has been very active in awareness raising towards natural resource management as well as natural hazards and risk reduction. Besides involving community members in the risk assessment for their villages, WIIP also implemented workshops and trainings on livelihood activities, financial management and natural resource management.

Regarding the planted number of seedlings by the community group of Done (*Tedu Tembo*), the CGL reported that they have planted only 1,000 mangrove seedlings and 3,030 coastal/highland trees. However, based on information from WIIP, 56,349 highland seedlings have been planted by end 2013. Given that the village is not located at the coast, it is reasonable to assume that the CGL has misreported the planted number of seedlings. The community group received an (unconditional) grant amounting to 25,000,000 Rp for the planting of seedlings and another 45,000,000 Rp conditional on the survival of at least 75% of the trees in the first 3 years.

**Activities of other NGOs**

Besides Wetlands International, a number of NGOs have been active in this community during the 12 months before the endline survey. 'Plan', 'Caritas' and 'WPI' implemented micro-credit initiatives, and activities focused on natural resource management, disaster risk reduction, water and sanitation, as well as education and health.

**EA 06. DESA TOU TIMUR**

**WIIP activities**

Wetlands International organised a number of activities in this community, like awareness raising towards natural resource management and natural hazards and risk reduction. Furthermore workshops and training on livelihood activities and natural resource management were implemented.

According to the CGL, the community group (*Bowu Sare*) planted a total of 40,000 mangrove seedlings and 6,000 coastal and highland tree seedlings. Based on the information from WIIP, they planted a total of 56,000 mangrove tree seedlings and 6,000 coastal and highland tree seedlings. For this, the group received an (unconditional) grant of 70,000,000 Rp.

**Activities of other NGOs**

No other NGOs have been active in the past 12 months in this area, hence no other activities were done.

**EA 07. DESA KOTABARU**

**WIIP activities**

Compared to the other communities, Wetlands International implemented relatively little activities in Kota Baru. They mainly focused on workshops and trainings on livelihood activities and natural resource management. However, the CGL reported that the group (*Mae'Welu*) has planted 50,000 mangrove and 30,000 coastal/highland seedlings. Based on information from WIIP, this group planted a total of 90,349 mangrove and coastal tree seedlings by end 2013. WIIP disbursed in total

50,000,000 Rp for the planting of the seedlings, and another (conditional) 50,000,000 Rp in case a minimum of 75% of the trees survive the first 3 years.

**Activities of other NGOs**

No other NGOs have been active in the past 12 months in this area, hence no other activities were done.

## *Comparison villages*

### EA 08. DESA BANGKOOR

**Village characteristics**

The village Bangkoor is located in the sub-district Talibura (district Sikka Nusa Tenggara Timur), consisting of three hamlets. The population of the village equals 2,090 people living in 521 households. The total area of the village contains 11.5 ha. The main roads of the village are from asphalt, but there is no lighting at night. Public transport in and out of the village is available at a frequent level.

The main source of water comes from a protected well and even during the dry season the daily water needs are not impaired. Electricity has been available since 1993 but only 70% of the households are using electric facilities. The only available educational facility is an elementary education. A middle school can be found within the distance of about 1 km, while the closest high school level is 11 km away. The available health facilities are village midwives and a Posyandu. The nearest health centre lies within a distance of 1 km.

The majority of villagers are farmers growing crops as rice, maize, and cassava on self-owned land. Most agricultural products are only for personal consumption of the household. In addition, people also plant fruit-bearing crops such as cashew, cocoa and coconut. The products can be sold. Another source of income is provided by livestock, mostly cows, pigs, chickens, and goats. Some residents also left Bangkoor to work in the domestic industry of bricks and weaving.

**Activities of other NGOs**

In this community 3 NGOs, 'Plan', 'PMI' and 'Bethesda' have been active in the past 12 months, with types of activities focusing on (sustainable) livelihood, disaster risk reduction, education and infrastructure development.

### EA 09. DESA KOLISIA

**Village characteristics**

The village Kolisia is divided into two hamlets. The village is partly located at the coast, but there are also areas in a mountainous environment. Mangroves exist on the edge and around the beach, but there are not that many mangrove trees in the village and not many people are using the mangrove trees.

**Activities of other NGOs**

In this community 4 NGOs, among others 'Plan' and 'USAID' have been active in the past 12 months. They implemented activities focused on livelihood, natural resource management, water and sanitation, education and health, as well as infrastructure development.

**EA 10. DESA TIWUSORA**

**Activities of other NGOs**

In this village only one NGO has been active in the past 12 months, namely 'Swiss Contact'. This NGO focused mainly on sustainable livelihood activities.

**EA 11. DESA NDONDO**

**Activities of other NGOs**

No NGOs have been active in this village in the past 12 months.

**EA 12. DESA EGON**

**Village characteristics**

The village Egon is located in the sub-district Talibura (district Sikka Nusa Tenggara Timur), consisting of three hamlets. The population of Egon equals 4,028, living in 1,039 households. The main roads are paved but no street lighting at night is available. Public transport in and out of the village is available at a frequent level.

The main source of water comes from a spring, which is connected to the village with a pipe. The pipe was installed with the assistance of PNPM. In addition, there is also the water from a well. In the past year there has always been drinking water available (even in the dry season). Electricity became available in Egon since 1999. The available educational facilities are elementary and junior high school while there is a high school within the distance of about 5 km. All educational facilities can be easily accessed by the community. The available health facilities are health centres, Posyandu and village midwives. A postal security force also exists in the village. There is also a weekly market.

The village has an agricultural land area of 29.35 km and 1,370 ha forest. The majority of the residents are farmers who grow coconut, nuts and vegetables on own land. Most agricultural products are sold. In addition to the farm income is livestock are hold, mainly cows, horses, pigs, chickens. The research team received a good welcome in the village.

**Activities of other NGOs**

In this village, 4 NGOs have been active in the past 12 months, among others 'Dian Desa' and 'USAID', focusing on natural resource management as well as education and health related activities.

**EA 13. DESA WAITERANG**

**Village characteristics**

The village Waiterang is located in the sub-district Waigete (district Sikka Nusa Tenggara Timur), consisting of three hamlets. The population of the village equals 1,879 people living in 475

households. The total area of Waiterang is 2,934 ha. The main roads are paved, but no street lighting at night is available. Public transport in and out of the village is available.

The main source of water comes from a water sources and even during the dry season the spring was never impaired. Electricity became available in the village in 1994, but still only 50% of households are using the electrical facilities. The only available educational facility in the village is an elementary school. A middle school is available within a distance of 3 km, while a high school of the village is available in 10 km. The available healthcare facilities are Posyandu and village midwives. A health centre lies within a distance of about 3 km.

The village has an agricultural area of 1,061 ha and 700 ha forest area. The majority of residents are farmers who grow commodity crops like cashew, coconut and corn on one's own land. The harvest of cashew and coconut is most of the times sold, but maize is only used for their own household consumption. In addition to farm income, some people own livestock, such as chickens, goats, cows and pigs.

**Activities of other NGOs**

In this village only one NGO has been active in the past 12 months (Childfund), mostly focusing on education focused activities.

**EA 14 DESA WAILITI**

**Village characteristics**

The village Wailiti is divided into two areas, namely the highlands or mountains, and the beach area. In the coastal areas, there are quite a lot of coastal mangrove trees planted, about 500 m along the beach.

**Activities of other NGOs**

In this village, 'Plan' and 'Wailiti' have been active in the past 12 months, focusing on education and health related activities.

# Annex V. Descriptive statistics

**Table 18: Descriptive Statistics - Community Survey**

| **Assignment group** | **Comparison** | | **Treatment** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | Base | End |
| **Total number of villages (sample size)** | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| Mean population (# of people) | 2,187.9 | 2,113.1 | 2,133.9 | 2,196.4 |
| Households using electricity (%) | 70.0 | 88.6 | 73.3 | 75.7 |
| Number of villages with elementary school | 7 | 6 | 7 | 7 |
| Number of villages with junior high school | 2 | 3 | 3 | 4 |
| Number of villages with secondary high school | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Number of villages with mangrove forest | 6 | 5 | 6 | 6 |
| Number of villages with coastal forest | 0 | 5 | 2 | 6 |
| Number of villages with upland forest | 6 | 6 | 4 | 7 |
| Number of villages with lake area | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| Number of village affected by […] in the paste 10 (baseline) or 2 (endline) years | | | | |
| *Flood* | 6 | 5 | 6 | 5 |
| *Tsunami* | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| *Cyclone* | 3 | 3 | 5 | 4 |
| *Landslide* | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| *Erosion* | 6 | 2 | 4 | 5 |
| *Forest fire* | 4 | 4 | 4 | 6 |
| Source: Community survey E1, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | | | |

**Table 19: Number of disasters in villages at baseline (in past 10 years)**

| | Treatment type | Flood | Tsunami | Cyclone | Landslide | Erosion | Forest Fire |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nangahale | **T** | **1** | 0 | **1** | 0 | 0 | **10** |
| Talibura | **T** | **2** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Darat Pantai | **T** | 0 | 0 | **1** | 0 | 0 | **10** |
| Reroroja | **T** | **10** | 0 | **2** | 0 | 0 | **10** |
| Done | **T** | **10** | 0 | **4** | **13** | 0 | 0 |
| Tou Timur | **T** | **10** | 0 | **1** | 0 | 0 | **10** |
| Kotabaru | **T** | **3** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Baang Koor | **C** | **10** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Kolisia | **C** | **2** | 0 | **2** | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Tiwusora | **C** | **1** | 0 | **1** | **5** | 0 | 0 |
| Ndondo | **C** | **3** | **1** | 0 | 0 | 0 | **2** |
| Egon | **C** | **3** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | **10** |
| Wairterang | **C** | **10** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | **10** |
| Wailiti | **C** | 0 | 0 | **1** | 0 | 0 | **10** |

Source: Community survey E1, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

**Table 20: Number of disasters in villages at endline (in past 2 years)**

| | Treatment type | Flood | Tsunami | Cyclone | Landslide | Erosion | Forest Fire |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nangahale | **T** | 0 | 0 | **1** | 0 | 0 | **2** |
| Talibura | **T** | **2** | 0 | **1** | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Darat Pantai | **T** | 0 | 0 | **1** | 0 | 0 | **2** |
| Reroroja | **T** | **2** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | **2** |
| Done | **T** | **3** | 0 | **1** | **5** | 0 | **3** |
| Tou Timur | **T** | **2** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | **2** |
| Kotabaru | **T** | **2** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | **2** |
| Baang Koor | **C** | **2** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Kolisia | **C** | **2** | 0 | **1** | 0 | 0 | **2** |
| Tiwusora | **C** | 0 | 0 | **2** | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Ndondo | **C** | **2** | 0 | 0 | **2** | 0 | **2** |
| Egon | **C** | **2** | 0 | **1** | **1** | 0 | **2** |
| Wairterang | **C** | **2** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | **1** |
| Wailiti | **C** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Source: Community survey E1, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

**Table 21: Activities implemented by other NGOs than WIIP (during 12 months before endline)**

| | Treatment type | Micro - credit | Sustain-able lively-hood activities | Other lively-hood activities | Natural resource manage-ment | Disaster risk reduction | Land rights | Water and sanitation | Education | Health | Infra-structure development |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nangahale | T | | | | | | | | X | X | |
| Talibura | T | | | | | X | | | | | |
| Darat Pantai | T | | | | | | | | | | |
| Reroroja | T | | | X | X | | | | X | X | |
| Done | T | X | | | X | X | | X | X | X | |
| Tou Timur | T | | | | | | | | | | |
| Kotabaru | T | | | | | | | | | | |
| Baang Koor | C | | X | X | | X | | | X | | X |
| Kolisia | C | | | X | X | | | X | X | X | X |
| Tiwusora | C | | X | | | | | | | | |
| Ndondo | C | | | | | | | | | | |
| Egon | C | | | | X | | | | X | X | |
| Wairterang | C | | | | | | | | X | | |
| Wailiti | C | | | | | | | | X | X | |

Source: Community survey E1, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

**Table 22: Other NGOs that were active in the communities during the 12 months before endline**

| | Plan | Dian Desa | PMI | Charitas | WTM | WPI | Betesda | Plan Sikka | World Bank | USAID | Swiss contact | Yaspem | LSM. Candi FLorasta | Childfund |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nangahale | X | X | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Talibura | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Darat Pantai | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Reroroja | X | | | X | x | | | | | | | | | |
| Done | X | | | x | | X | | | | | | | | |
| Tou Timur | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Kotabaru | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Baang Koor | X | | X | | | | X | | | | | | | |
| Kolisia | | X | | | | | | X | X | X | | | | |
| Tiwusora | | | | | | | | | | | X | | | |
| Ndondo | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Egon | | X | | | | | | | | X | | X | X | |
| Wairterang | | | | | | | | | | | | | | X |
| Wailiti | X | X | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Source: Community survey E1, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

**Table 23: Descriptive Statistics - Household Survey**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assignment group | Comparison | | | Bio-Rights | | | | Spillover | | | |
| Reporting period | Base | End | P(1v2) | Base | P(1v4) | End | P(4v6) | Base | P(1v8) | End | P(8v10) |
| HH size | 5.2 | 5.9 | 0.000 | 5.1 | 0.964 | 5.8 | 0.001 | 5.3 | 0.531 | 6.0 | 0.009 |
| % HHs with female HH head | 7.1 | 7.5 | | 13.0 | 0.410 | 12.1 | | 7.4 | 0.547 | 6.9 | |
| Age of the HH head | 47.3 | 48.4 | 0.000 | 43.9 | 0.163 | 45.5 | 0.000 | 46.8 | 0.970 | 48.7 | 0.000 |
| Highest level of education attended by the household head (%) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *No school/Islamic school* | 7.1 | 8.6 | 0.734 | 6.5 | 0.972 | 5.7 | 0.817 | 4.3 | 0.632 | 3.4 | 0.597 |
| *Primary school* | 65.7 | 67.7 | 0.634 | 64.8 | 0.921 | 65.1 | 0.828 | 64.9 | 0.919 | 64.4 | 0.685 |
| *Secondary school* | 25.3 | 21.5 | 0.083 | 25.9 | 0.977 | 27.4 | 0.735 | 24.5 | 0.831 | 28.7 | 0.187 |
| *Higher education* | 2.0 | 2.2 | | 2.8 | 0.702 | 1.9 | 0.360 | 6.4 | 0.158 | 3.4 | 0.180 |
| Main source of income (%) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Crop farming* | 62.6 | 63.6 | 0.806 | 54.6 | 0.610 | 57.1 | 0.417 | 67.0 | 0.632 | 59.6 | 0.262 |
| *Fishing* | 10.1 | 10.1 | 1.000 | 16.7 | 0.243 | 11.6 | 0.097 | 12.8 | 0.653 | 14.9 | 0.462 |
| *Livestock* | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.000 | 3.7 | 0.550 | 1.8 | 0.454 | 1.1 | 0.598 | 1.1 | 1.000 |
| *Non-farm business* | 11.1 | 16.2 | 0.145 | 11.1 | 0.922 | 11.6 | 0.597 | 6.4 | 0.543 | 6.4 | 1.000 |
| *Salary/wage* | 14.1 | 9.1 | 0.419 | 13.0 | 0.737 | 15.2 | 0.565 | 12.8 | 0.744 | 16.0 | 0.683 |
| *Pension* | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.9 | 0.321 | 0.9 | | 0.0 | | 0.0 | |
| *Transfers/remittances* | 1.0 | 0.0 | 0.362 | 0.0 | 0.318 | 1.8 | 0.333 | 0.0 | 0.318 | 2.1 | 0.178 |
| Distance to non-mangrove forest (%) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Less than 500m* | 12.2 | 10.1 | 0.688 | 25.9 | 0.027 | 10.7 | 0.008 | 14.9 | 0.744 | 13.8 | 0.787 |
| *Between 500-1000m* | 13.3 | 13.1 | 1.000 | 12.0 | 0.924 | 14.3 | 0.706 | 11.7 | 0.867 | 7.4 | 0.242 |
| *Between 1-2 km* | 23.5 | 15.2 | 0.245 | 22.2 | 0.924 | 13.4 | 0.034 | 22.3 | 0.933 | 17.0 | 0.404 |
| *Between 2-4 km* | 13.3 | 19.2 | 0.326 | 13.0 | 0.938 | 25.9 | 0.063 | 22.3 | 0.137 | 30.9 | 0.188 |
| *More than 4km* | 22.4 | 30.3 | 0.406 | 9.3 | 0.123 | 25.0 | 0.080 | 7.4 | 0.081 | 20.2 | 0.023 |
| Distance to mangrove forest (%) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Less than 500m* | 24.2 | 24.2 | 1.000 | 42.6 | 0.171 | 46.4 | 0.158 | 30.9 | 0.688 | 33.0 | 0.657 |
| *Between 500-1000m* | 18.2 | 19.2 | 0.914 | 18.5 | 0.970 | 10.7 | 0.277 | 13.8 | 0.676 | 13.8 | 1.000 |
| *Between 1-2 km* | 13.1 | 18.2 | 0.612 | 10.2 | 0.745 | 18.8 | 0.071 | 13.8 | 0.860 | 19.1 | 0.243 |
| *Between 2-4 km* | 10.1 | 12.1 | 0.362 | 13.0 | 0.674 | 8.0 | 0.154 | 22.3 | 0.316 | 18.1 | 0.396 |
| *More than 4km* | 1.0 | 2.0 | 0.362 | 1.9 | 0.663 | 1.8 | | 3.2 | 0.341 | 1.1 | 0.162 |
| Household mentions […] as part of forest contributes to their livelihood (%) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Fire wood* | 83.3 | 64.3 | 0.824 | 58.0 | 0.090 | 64.8 | 0.428 | 69.8 | 0.397 | 65.7 | 0.621 |
| *Building material (wood)* | 27.1 | 23.2 | 1.000 | 18.5 | 0.362 | 27.5 | 0.354 | 32.1 | 0.811 | 32.9 | 0.511 |
| *Fish* | 47.6 | 60.7 | 0.005 | 39.3 | 0.577 | 54.7 | 0.441 | 29.2 | 0.167 | 41.0 | 0.389 |
| *Crab/Prawn* | 14.3 | 50.0 | 0.021 | 32.1 | 0.574 | 50.0 | 0.031 | 8.3 | 0.187 | 15.4 | 0.389 |
| *Honey* | 2.1 | 8.9 | 0.136 | 7.4 | 0.200 | 17.6 | 0.171 | 0.0 | 0.282 | 12.9 | 0.015 |
| *Other food resources* | 29.2 | 30.4 | 0.131 | 39.5 | 0.345 | 50.5 | 0.287 | 45.3 | 0.164 | 40.0 | 1.000 |
| *Other resources* | 29.2 | 33.9 | 0.704 | 43.2 | 0.303 | 39.6 | 0.872 | 32.1 | 0.948 | 44.3 | 0.149 |

Source: Household survey E1; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

# Annex VI. Evaluation question 1 – tables

**Table 24: Detailed outcome variables - Household Survey**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assignment group | Comparison | | | Bio-rights | | | Spillover | | |
| Reporting period | Base | End | P(1v2) | Base | End | P(4v5) | Base | End | P(7v8) |
| **Panel A. Reforestation** | | | | | | | | | |
| Ever participated in reforestation efforts (%) | 36.4 (12.9) | 45.5 (11.2) | 0.357 | 96.3 (2.7) | 98.1 (1.1) | 0.359 | 35.1 (10.9) | 54.3 (7.1) | 0.173 |
| Number of seedlings planted | 64.4 (28.4) | 168.9 (98.8) | 0.348 | 397.7 (54.5) | 1,677.0 (405.8) | 0.016 | 66.7 (32.9) | 267.7 (117.4) | 0.088 |
| **Panel D. Household's knowledge of mangroves** | | | | | | | | | |
| Correct description of mangroves (%) | 44.2 (20.6) | 96.8 (3.1) | 0.057 | 53.7 (13.6) | 97.7 (2.3) | 0.018 | 58.1 (12.6) | 97.4 (1.9) | 0.023 |
| Recognition of mangroves is […] (%) | | | | | | | | | |
| *Incorrect* | 28.6 (7.8) | 36.5 (5.2) | 0.474 | 45.9 (5.4) | 44.3 (4.6) | 0.799 | 47.1 (3.8) | 44.7 (7.2) | 0.729 |
| *Partially correct* | 35.7 (8.5) | 30.2 (7.4) | 0.201 | 10.6 (5.5) | 9.1 (3.7) | 0.749 | 16.2 (4.4) | 13.2 (6.2) | 0.339 |
| *Correct* | 35.7 (6.4) | 33.3 (8.0) | 0.611 | 43.5 (4.9) | 46.6 (5.9) | 0.284 | 36.8 (4.8) | 42.1 (7.6) | 0.172 |
| Number of benefits from mangrove forests | 0.5 (0.1) | 1.0 (0.2) | 0.014 | 1.3 (0.2) | 1.8 (0.3) | 0.034 | 0.7 (0.2) | 1.5 (0.3) | 0.017 |
| Respondent mentions […] as a benefit of the mangrove forest (%) | | | | | | | | | |
| *Food* | 14.5 (4.8) | 25.0 (10.7) | 0.192 | 30.7 (5.6) | 47.7 (10.0) | 0.041 | 13.2 (4.3) | 35.5 (8.8) | 0.021 |
| *Medicine* | 26.3 (14.5) | 21.1 (13.4) | 0.528 | 9.1 (3.8) | 4.5 (2.3) | 0.329 | 10.5 (7.7) | 2.6 (1.5) | 0.378 |
| *Firewood* | 40.8 (13.4) | 39.5 (12.2) | 0.840 | 35.2 (3.8) | 38.6 (6.7) | 0.545 | 30.3 (7.6) | 32.9 (9.0) | 0.817 |
| *Building material (wood)* | 28.9 (14.0) | 23.7 (13.6) | 0.527 | 13.6 (5.9) | 15.9 (6.3) | 0.763 | 21.1 (7.4) | 17.1 (7.0) | 0.717 |
| *Protection* | 7.9 (4.7) | 18.4 (7.0) | 0.166 | 31.8 (8.6) | 37.5 (12.7) | 0.449 | 9.2 (4.3) | 36.8 (10.8) | 0.021 |
| *Eco-biological value* | 3.9 (2.5) | 2.6 (1.9) | 0.728 | 9.1 (2.3) | 6.8 (2.6) | 0.336 | 3.9 (1.7) | 1.3 (1.3) | 0.155 |
| *Other* | 2.6 (2.5) | 15.8 (6.1) | 0.055 | 12.5 (5.1) | 20.5 (6.3) | 0.010 | 5.3 (2.6) | 19.7 (8.3) | 0.075 |
| **Panel F. Income of households from sustainable use of the ecosystem** | | | | | | | | | |
| Contribution of mangrove forest resources to livelihood (1-5) | 0.8 (0.2) | 1.3 (0.3) | 0.050 | 2.1 (0.3) | 2.3 (0.3) | 0.130 | 1.0 (0.2) | 1.6 (0.3) | 0.066 |
| Respondent has income from either forestry, livestock or fishing (%) | 93.9 (3.3) | 92.9 (2.7) | 0.689 | 97.2 (2.0) | 88.9 (4.3) | 0.176 | 96.8 (1.5) | 93.6 (2.4) | 0.348 |

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assignment group | Comparison | | | Bio-rights | | | Spillover | | |
| Reporting period | Base | End | P(1v2) | Base | End | P(4v5) | Base | End | P(7v8) |
| Household has income from […] (%) | | | | | | | | | |
| *Forestry* | 10.1 (4.5) | 20.2 (7.0) | 0.063 | 14.8 (5.7) | 20.4 (6.3) | 0.459 | 20.2 (8.2) | 22.3 (6.1) | 0.702 |
| *Livestock* | 55.6 (5.3) | 60.6 (7.3) | 0.525 | 62.0 (7.6) | 57.4 (7.1) | 0.584 | 59.6 (5.4) | 67.0 (3.8) | 0.159 |
| *Fish* | 89.9 (4.3) | 83.8 (4.1) | 0.273 | 82.4 (5.3) | 74.1 (5.8) | 0.386 | 91.5 (3.6) | 76.6 (5.5) | 0.043 |
| Household income per capita per month from […] (1000 Rp) | | | | | | | | | |
| *Forestry*[1] | 6.5 (5.7) | 7.2 (3.0) | 0.905 | 5.1 (3.3) | 8.3 (3.9) | 0.556 | 5.5 (2.6) | 18.9 (10.9) | 0.290 |
| *Livestock*[1] | 54.5 (27.4) | 23.3 (10.1) | 0.344 | 57.6 (23.6) | 26.4 (8.0) | 0.257 | 87.2 (42.5) | 146.9 (90.6) | 0.330 |
| *Fish*[1] | 48.4 (21.6) | 15.2 (7.8) | 0.208 | 77.1 (40.7) | 134.7 (93.8) | 0.356 | 51.0 (20.4) | 15.0 (4.6) | 0.193 |
| Total per capita/month HH income from forestry, livestock and fish (1000 Rp)[1] | 65.0 (28.7) | 33.5 (12.5) | 0.351 | 124.8 (41.0) | 197.0 (95.9) | 0.286 | 93.8 (38.9) | 75.0 (34.0) | 0.474 |
| **Panel G. Household livelihood** | | | | | | | | | |
| Per capita food expenditure per month (1000 Rp)[1] | 336.0 (20.3) | 286.9 (18.2) | 0.080 | 405.1 (23.8) | 418.4 (66.1) | 0.860 | 372.7 (27.2) | 290.8 (22.5) | 0.001 |
| Per capita non-food expenditure per month (1000 Rp)[1] | 133.8 (24.1) | 122.8 (25.9) | 0.612 | 171.6 (30.7) | 175.9 (27.0) | 0.803 | 133.1 (27.8) | 153.6 (30.5) | 0.213 |
| Housing facilities index | -0.4 (0.1) | -0.3 (0.1) | 0.044 | -0.4 (0.1) | -0.3 (0.1) | 0.031 | -0.4 (0.0) | -0.3 (0.1) | 0.019 |
| Asset index | -1.2 (0.2) | -1.0 (0.2) | 0.006 | -1.0 (0.1) | -0.8 (0.1) | 0.119 | -1.1 (0.2) | -1.0 (0.2) | 0.640 |
| Self-reported well-being | | | | | | | | | |
| *Happiness (1-4)* | 2.2 (0.1) | 2.3 (0.1) | 0.152 | 2.1 (0.1) | 2.1 (0.1) | 0.790 | 2.1 (0.1) | 2.2 (0.1) | 0.024 |
| *Current wealth status (1-6)* | 2.0 (0.2) | 2.1 (0.1) | 0.244 | 2.3 (0.2) | 2.6 (0.1) | 0.082 | 2.2 (0.1) | 2.3 (0.1) | 0.459 |
| **Panel H. Food security and vulnerability** | | | | | | | | | |
| Sometimes the income does not quite cover the living costs (%) | 71.7 (3.9) | 88.9 (3.0) | 0.002 | 70.4 (3.4) | 90.7 (3.8) | 0.012 | 75.5 (4.2) | 90.4 (3.2) | 0.026 |
| Current standard of living on a scale from 1 to 3 | | | | | | | | | |
| *Daily needs covered* | 1.4 (0.1) | 1.4 (0.1) | 0.687 | 1.4 (0.1) | 1.6 (0.1) | 0.055 | 1.4 (0.1) | 1.5 (0.1) | 0.545 |
| *Food consumption covered* | 1.5 (0.1) | 1.5 (0.1) | 0.757 | 1.7 (0.1) | 1.7 (0.1) | 0.781 | 1.6 (0.1) | 1.6 (0.1) | 0.611 |
| **Panel E. Number of actions taken for disaster risk preparedness** | | | | | | | | | |
| […] action taken by household to reduce the risks of disaster (%) | | | | | | | | | |

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assignment group | Comparison | | | Bio-rights | | | Spillover | | |
| Reporting period | Base | End | P(1v2) | Base | End | P(4v5) | Base | End | P(7v8) |
| *Information* | 51.5 (6.7) | 74.7 (3.9) | 0.007 | 53.7 (9.3) | 67.6 (5.8) | 0.156 | 54.3 (8.1) | 58.5 (5.6) | 0.592 |
| *Preparation* | 72.7 (7.7) | 72.7 (5.5) | 1.000 | 76.9 (6.3) | 85.2 (6.3) | 0.062 | 74.5 (5.4) | 87.2 (6.2) | 0.127 |
| *Savings* | 21.2 (4.5) | 11.1 (5.7) | 0.149 | 33.3 (4.7) | 23.1 (3.5) | 0.020 | 26.6 (3.2) | 20.2 (4.2) | 0.154 |
| *Volunteering* | 46.5 (5.3) | 56.6 (5.8) | 0.335 | 66.7 (7.7) | 73.1 (5.8) | 0.453 | 57.4 (5.9) | 66.0 (5.1) | 0.443 |
| Number of […] measures taken by any household member to reduce the risks of disaster | | | | | | | | | |
| *Information* | 0.9 (0.2) | 1.3 (0.1) | 0.015 | 1.2 (0.3) | 1.7 (0.4) | 0.079 | 1.0 (0.2) | 1.4 (0.3) | 0.090 |
| *Preparation* | 2.0 (0.3) | 1.9 (0.3) | 0.722 | 2.6 (0.4) | 2.5 (0.4) | 0.156 | 2.2 (0.2) | 2.5 (0.4) | 0.438 |
| *Volunteer* | 0.6 (0.1) | 0.7 (0.1) | 0.162 | 1.1 (0.2) | 1.4 (0.2) | 0.049 | 0.7 (0.2) | 0.9 (0.1) | 0.495 |
| Any household member […] to reduce the risks of disasters (%) | | | | | | | | | |
| *Informed about possible hazards for your family/household* | 29.1 (6.6) | 40.5 (3.5) | 0.232 | 40.0 (6.9) | 55.9 (7.2) | 0.070 | 33.8 (4.8) | 39.3 (7.4) | 0.244 |
| *Checked whether house is located in disaster-prone area* | 21.6 (3.9) | 25.0 (6.9) | 0.748 | 35.4 (6.9) | 44.2 (13.7) | 0.364 | 36.0 (3.1) | 37.5 (7.6) | 1.000 |
| *Informed about warning signal* | 27.8 (8.2) | 40.0 (2.8) | 0.251 | 25.3 (9.5) | 52.5 (8.9) | 0.044 | 17.3 (7.4) | 40.0 (10.2) | 0.008 |
| *Informed about gathering point, route and evacuation point* | 25.3 (8.5) | 51.3 (8.6) | 0.002 | 34.1 (10.2) | 56.2 (10.4) | 0.193 | 33.8 (11.5) | 47.7 (8.6) | 0.148 |
| *Prepared emergency food and water supplies* | 28.3 (5.3) | 22.2 (5.4) | 0.336 | 36.1 (5.7) | 22.2 (2.9) | 0.020 | 29.0 (5.1) | 32.3 (6.5) | 0.853 |
| *Prepared emergency lighting* | 44.4 (9.8) | 56.6 (7.8) | 0.030 | 48.1 (10.0) | 63.9 (7.5) | 0.010 | 44.1 (5.5) | 63.4 (7.3) | 0.047 |
| *Improved resistance of house* | 29.3 (4.6) | 25.3 (4.7) | 0.478 | 40.7 (8.0) | 34.3 (4.2) | 0.309 | 37.6 (5.0) | 36.2 (6.5) | 0.894 |
| *Built emergency family bunker* | 0.0 (0.0) | 1.0 (1.0) | 0.352 | 1.9 (1.2) | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.177 | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | |
| *Planned what to take along in case of evacuation* | 35.4 (5.7) | 31.3 (8.5) | 0.676 | 54.2 (4.1) | 41.7 (9.6) | 0.126 | 38.0 (7.1) | 45.7 (10.5) | 0.496 |
| *Discussed actions in case of emergency with whole family* | 45.5 (7.4) | 46.5 (10.1) | 0.931 | 63.9 (7.0) | 59.3 (10.7) | 0.505 | 58.7 (5.7) | 59.6 (10.7) | 0.911 |
| *Made emergency savings* | 21.2 (4.5) | 11.1 (5.7) | 0.149 | 33.3 (4.7) | 23.1 (3.5) | 0.020 | 26.9 (3.2) | 20.2 (4.2) | 0.154 |

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assignment group | Comparison | | | Bio-rights | | | Spillover | | |
| Reporting period | Base | End | P(1v2) | Base | End | P(4v5) | Base | End | P(7v8) |
| *Prepared communication instrument and warning sign* | 17.2 (7.8) | 9.1 (4.4) | 0.401 | 20.4 (7.7) | 27.8 (6.8) | 0.257 | 12.9 (4.7) | 12.8 (3.0) | 1.000 |
| *Participated in evacuation tests/drills in village* | 11.1 (5.6) | 22.5 (11.0) | 0.079 | 44.2 (9.2) | 60.0 (11.8) | 0.277 | 17.4 (6.4) | 22.2 (5.9) | 0.539 |
| *Participate in alert teams of disaster* | 7.7 (3.0) | 13.2 (5.2) | 0.085 | 23.3 (9.2) | 48.2 (9.0) | 0.014 | 11.4 (4.3) | 18.5 (5.8) | 0.340 |
| *Volunteered to provide awareness information in village* | 39.1 (6.5) | 43.0 (7.8) | 0.841 | 58.0 (9.1) | 65.7 (7.2) | 0.323 | 50.0 (8.9) | 63.5 (4.8) | 0.345 |

Source: Household survey E1; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.

1. Prices are reported in 2012 real prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%). Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/aboutus.php?inflasi=1

# Annex VII. Evaluation question 2 – tables

**Table 25: Detailed regression results (attribution)**

| | | Bio-rights group treatment effect | | | Spillover group treatment effect | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Mean comp. at baseline | Early treatment effect | DD without controls | DD with controls | Early treatment effect | DD without controls | DD with controls |
| **Panel D. Household's knowledge of mangroves** | | | | | | | |
| Recognition of mangroves is […] (%) | | | | | | | |
| *Incorrect* | 29.7 | 20.5*** (7.0) | -12.1 (9.6) | -14.2 (9.6) | 19.2*** (5.6) | -11.1 (8.0) | -21.1** (9.1) |
| *Partially correct* | 37.8 | -23.2*** (7.6) | 4.1 (6.9) | 3.7 (7.2) | -20.4*** (5.6) | 4.7 (5.9) | 4.5 (7.3) |
| *Correct* | 32.4 | 2.7 (9.2) | 8.0* (4.6) | 10.5* (5.4) | 1.2 (6.2) | 6.4 (6.3) | 16.6** (6.5) |
| Respondent mentions […] as a benefit of the mangrove forest (%) | | | | | | | |
| *Food* | 14.3 | -0.2 (6.7) | 1.0 (9.8) | 0.8 (10.2) | -6.6 (5.0) | 11.9 (9.7) | 6.2 (10.0) |
| *Medicine* | 29.5 | -6.5 (10.2) | 4.2 (9.9) | 5.1 (9.4) | -13.2 (12.3) | 2.7 (12.3) | 1.4 (12.7) |
| *Firewood* | 41.9 | -4.4 (10.6) | 4.8 (9.8) | 5.5 (9.7) | -7.5 (12.4) | 4.7 (12.5) | 3.5 (13.4) |
| *Building material (wood)* | 31.4 | -5.4 (11.4) | 7.7 (11.8) | 8.4 (11.0) | -3.2 (12.4) | 1.8 (13.1) | 2.8 (14.0) |
| *Protection* | 5.7 | 14.2 (8.3) | -10.7 (8.7) | -11.6 (9.2) | 1.7 (4.4) | 9.0 (10.3) | 10.5 (10.6) |
| *Eco-biological value* | 2.9 | 0.5 (1.9) | 1.0 (3.2) | 0.3 (3.2) | -1.3 (2.4) | -1.0 (2.8) | -1.4 (2.2) |
| *Other* | 2.9 | 4.0 (3.2) | -2.3 (4.7) | -3.3 (5.5) | 0.1 (2.2) | 4.0 (6.2) | 2.2 (6.9) |
| **Panel E. Number of actions taken for disaster risk preparedness** | | | | | | | |
| Any household member […] to reduce the risks of disasters (%) | | | | | | | |
| *Informed about possible hazards for your household* | 28.6 | 5.1 (7.0) | 5.7 (11.3) | 12.6 (11.1) | -2.6 (7.0) | -2.6 (9.5) | 6.1 (10.5) |
| *Checked whether house is located in disaster-prone area* | 22.3 | 7.6 (5.7) | 6.7 (12.5) | 7.2 (13.0) | 11.2*** (3.9) | -4.2 (10.7) | -1.8 (11.0) |
| *Informed about warning signal* | 28.0 | -7.6 (10.1) | 13.5 (11.6) | 16.4 (11.2) | -14.0 (9.0) | 11.5 (9.0) | 14.7 (9.5) |
| *Informed about gathering point, route and evacuation point* | 25.6 | 1.8 (9.4) | -14.2 (10.9) | -13.3 (12.4) | 8.8 (12.9) | -17.1 (11.6) | -8.1 (10.5) |
| *Prepared emergency food and water supplies* | 27.6 | 11.2 (7.8) | -6.8 (6.8) | -9.6 (5.8) | 1.0 (8.0) | 5.7 (11.1) | 6.8 (9.8) |

| | | Bio-rights group treatment effect | | | Spillover group treatment effect | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Mean comp. at baseline | Early treatment effect | DD without controls | DD with controls | Early treatment effect | DD without controls | DD with controls |
| *Prepared emergency lighting* | 46.7 | 2.2<br>(10.9) | 6.5<br>(6.6) | 5.1<br>(7.3) | -9.1<br>(10.5) | 8.3<br>(8.7) | 10.0<br>(10.4) |
| *Improved resistance of house* | 27.6 | 11.7*<br>(5.6) | -4.3<br>(8.4) | -7.6<br>(7.4) | 4.0<br>(6.0) | 4.8<br>(9.3) | 3.7<br>(10.0) |
| *Built emergency family bunker* | 0.0 | 2.9**<br>(1.3) | -3.6**<br>(1.5) | -4.1**<br>(1.6) | 0.6<br>(0.6) | -1.9<br>(1.3) | -2.1<br>(1.3) |
| *Planned what to take along in case of evacuation* | 37.1 | 11.6*<br>(5.9) | -8.8<br>(10.5) | -8.0<br>(10.3) | -3.5<br>(8.0) | 13.7<br>(11.5) | 14.8<br>(12.4) |
| *Discussed actions in case of emergency with whole family* | 44.8 | 15.9<br>(9.4) | -6.4<br>(11.8) | -6.4<br>(12.6) | 9.7<br>(8.8) | 2.1<br>(13.2) | 0.1<br>(13.8) |
| *Made emergency savings* | 21.0 | 6.8<br>(4.7) | -0.3<br>(5.9) | 1.8<br>(6.0) | -0.8<br>(3.7) | 3.6<br>(6.0) | 6.1<br>(6.4) |
| *Prepared communication instrument and warning sign* | 17.1 | -1.0<br>(8.6) | 16.6<br>(9.7) | 19.3**<br>(9.0) | -8.7<br>(7.7) | 7.6<br>(9.5) | 10.5<br>(9.4) |
| *Participated in evacuation tests/drills in village* | 10.7 | 23.9***<br>(8.1) | -0.5<br>(11.8) | -7.1<br>(12.5) | 5.6<br>(8.7) | -12.6<br>(11.4) | -12.2<br>(13.6) |
| *Participate in alert teams of disaster* | 7.4 | 14.0<br>(8.1) | 11.5<br>(7.2) | 8.6<br>(7.3) | 1.0<br>(5.9) | 2.1<br>(9.3) | 0.6<br>(8.8) |
| *Volunteered to provide awareness information in village* | 39.8 | 13.1*<br>(7.5) | 7.0<br>(11.4) | 7.1<br>(12.7) | 3.1<br>(7.7) | 13.3<br>(15.0) | 9.3<br>(13.6) |

Source: Household survey E1; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are given in parentheses.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01

# Annex VIII. Additional explanatory variables

**Table 26: Disaster risk preparedness – Community survey**

| Assignment group | Comparison | | Treatment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Survey period | Base | End | Base | End |
| Sample size | (n=7) | (n=7) | (n=7) | (n=7) |
| Implemented […] measures to reduce risks of disasters in past 5 (baseline) /2 (endline) years | | | | |
| *Village disaster risk assessment* | 6 | 2 | 5 | 4 |
| *Identification of hazard-prone areas* | 3 | 2 | 5 | 3 |
| *Awareness raising campaigns on risk knowledge* | 3 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| *Establishing Forum on Disaster Risk Reduction* | 5 | 3 | 3 | 4 |
| *Development of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) plan* | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| *Creating emergency response plan* | 2 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| *Trainings on disaster preparedness* | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 |
| *Simulation / evacuation training / P3K (First aid)* | 3 | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| *Creation of alert teams* | 3 | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| Land use plans used to decide where /how to build structures in village | 4 | 5 | 3 | 5 |
| Potential risks from natural hazards are addressed in […] | | | | |
| *Socio-economic development programmes* | 1 | 4 | 3 | 6 |
| *Infrastructure development plans* | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 |
| *Social programmes* | 5 | 5 | 3 | 6 |
| *Natural/CRM plans* | 3 | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| *Land use plans* | 4 | 4 | 3 | 7 |
| *Regulations on land use and construction* | 4 | 3 | 1 | 5 |
| *Regulations on natural resource extraction* | 5 | 2 | 2 | 6 |
| Source: Community survey E1, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | | | |

**Table 27: Explanatory Variables - Household Survey**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assignment group | Comparison | | | Bio-rights | | | Spillover | | |
| | Base | End | P(1v2) | Base | End | P(4v5) | Base | End | P(7v8) |
| Ever participated in reforestation efforts (%) | 34.3 | 43.8 | 0.357 | 96.4 | 97.3 | 0.359 | 34.0 | 55.3 | 0.173 |
| Participated in reforestation effort in past 2 years (%) | 21.0 | 39.0 | 0.038 | 95.5 | 92.0 | 0.447 | 28.2 | 45.6 | 0.195 |
| Household received compensation in form of a grant | 4.8 | 7.6 | 0.556 | 45.5 | 52.7 | 0.512 | 1.9 | 12.6 | 0.019 |
| Average amount grant if any received (1000 Rp, 2012 prices) | 1,170 [n=5] | 235 [n=8] | | 758 [n=51] | 1,497 [n=59] | | 150 [n=2] | 319 [n=13] | |
| Household received compensation in form of a conditional grant | 0.0 | 1.9 | 0.184 | 48.2 | 29.5 | 0.033 | 1.0 | 2.9 | 0.353 |
| Average amount conditional grant if any received (1000 Rp, 2012 prices) | 0 | 89 [n=2] | | 1,091 [n=54] | 1,737 [n=33] | | 600 [n=1] | 622 [n=3] | |
| Respondents who think mangrove forest should be protected (%) | 94.3 | 98.5 | 0.321 | 100.0 | 100.0 | | 100.0 | 96.3 | 0.376 |
| Respondents who think non-mangrove forest should be protected (%) | 95.2 | 100.0 | 0.351 | 98.8 | 98.9 | | 100.0 | 100.0 | |
| Methods used by respondent to protect mangrove forests (%) | | | | | | | | | |
| *None* | 27.3 | 46.3 | 0.363 | 0.0 | 2.1 | 0.365 | 15.4 | 20.5 | 0.739 |
| *Sustainable use* | 0.0 | 10.4 | 0.043 | 7.4 | 20.0 | 0.097 | 0.0 | 16.7 | 0.008 |
| *Awareness raising* | 51.5 | 31.3 | 0.540 | 63.8 | 53.7 | 0.398 | 51.9 | 39.7 | 0.351 |
| *Participating in committee for natural resource management* | 3.0 | 7.5 | 0.336 | 29.8 | 43.2 | 0.262 | 3.8 | 11.5 | 0.187 |
| *Reforestation* | 30.3 | 37.3 | 0.404 | 78.7 | 85.3 | 0.274 | 50.0 | 59.0 | 0.383 |
| Methods used by respondent to protect non-mangrove forests (%) | | | | | | | | | |
| *None* | 15.3 | 24.2 | 0.873 | 7.1 | 7.8 | 0.600 | 20.6 | 13.5 | 0.446 |
| *Sustainable use* | 5.1 | 16.7 | 0.278 | 7.1 | 24.4 | 0.017 | 10.3 | 21.6 | 0.520 |
| *Awareness raising* | 30.5 | 34.8 | 0.808 | 51.2 | 42.2 | 0.824 | 47.1 | 39.2 | 0.320 |

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assignment group | Comparison | | | Bio-rights | | | Spillover | | |
| | Base | End | P(1v2) | Base | End | P(4v5) | Base | End | P(7v8) |
| *Participating in committee for natural resource management* | 3.4 | 4.5 | | 25.0 | 22.2 | 0.811 | 8.8 | 12.2 | 0.329 |
| *Reforestation* | 54.2 | 60.6 | 0.184 | 52.4 | 73.3 | 0.199 | 42.6 | 62.2 | 0.273 |
| Satisfaction with local regulations in protection natural resources (1-5) | 3.1 | 3.4 | 0.457 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 0.478 | 3.0 | 3.3 | 0.019 |

Source: Household survey E1; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

# Annex IX. Report on the ecological condition of mangroves

## ECOLOGICAL SURVEY AND MEASUREMENT OF MANGROVE AREA IN ENDE AND SIKKA DISTRICT

## 1. Introduction

Mangrove forests grow in brackish water located around the coastline. It is a meeting area between land and ocean ecosystems. The mangrove area has specific environmental characteristics which are affected by sea water tides. It has a high salinity level with muddy soil condition and low pH level as a result of constantly being washed over by sea water tides.

The existence of mangrove forest ecosystem in Flores has provided a variety of benefits for the communities living around the coast. Some of these benefits are:

- Reduced abrasion caused by sea water tides
- Marine life habitat for growing and breeding
- Act as sea windbreak
- Source of food and medicine

The study of mangrove area in Flores is aimed to assessing the ecological condition of mangrove area as a result of the forest rehabilitation project of Wetlands International Indonesia Programme (WIIP). In this study, 10 indicators are used for determining the ecological characteristic of mangroves in Flores. These indicators are:

1. **Water Depth**
   Mangrove is an area affected by sea water tides. Therefore, it is important to know the water depth occurring in the mangrove area. This indicator can describe about the tidal conditions in mangrove forests.
2. **Mud Depth**
   A specific characteristic of mangroves is the muddy soil condition. Each mangrove type is characterised by different mud depth. Therefore, it is very important to know the level of mud depth in mangrove ecosystem.
3. **Soil Texture**
   The soil texture in mangrove forests indicate the level of erosion that occurred upstream on land. If the soil texture of the mangrove area is dominated by sand, it shows that there are high levels of erosion upstream.
4. **Soil pH**
   The soil pH represents the level of soil acidity. If the soil of mangrove is more acerbic, it indicates that there are more toxins in the mangrove substrate.
5. **Salinity**
   The level of salinity is closely related to the growth of mangrove vegetation. If the salinity is too low or too high, the vegetation of mangrove is not able to grow optimally.
6. **Dissolved Oxygen**
   The quantity of dissolved oxygen in mangrove area determines the type of fauna that can live in the mangrove forests.
7. **Stand Structure**

The pattern of stand structure is described by the number of seedlings, saplings and trees found in the mangrove forest. Therefore, it describes the dynamics of vegetation growth in the mangrove areas.

8. **Flora Distribution**
   The measurement of flora distribution is aimed at finding out the different types of plant species that live in the mangrove area.
9. **Flora Diversity**
   The level of flora diversity is an indirect parameter for assessing the balance of mangrove forest ecosystem. A higher flora diversity means that the condition of the mangrove forest is better.
10. **Fauna Condition**
    The measurement of fauna is aimed at finding out the kinds of fauna that live in the mangrove area.

## 2. Survey sites

Table 28 provides and overview of estimated mangrove areas in Sikka and Ende disticts. These figures were obtained combining data from field survey and satellite images (Google Earth) and others digital maps provided by Ministry of Forestry.
The data shows that there are wide variations of mangrove area in Ende and Sikka District. The table also indicates which villages have been part of WIIP's rehabilitation project (Treatment) and the villages that have been sampled as a comparison group (Control).[39]

**Table 28: Mangrove area estimation in Ende and Sikka District**

| District | Sub District | Village | Project treatment status | Area (ha) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Ende** | Kotabaru | Hangalende/Ndondo | Control | 34.72 |
| **Ende** | **Kotabaru** | **Kotabaru** | **Treatment** | **2844.46** |
| **Ende** | Kotabaru | Loboniki/Tiwosura | Control | 3175.03 |
| **Sikka** | Alok Barat | Wailiti | | 1.24 |
| **Sikka** | Alok Barat | Wolomarang | | 35.63 |
| **Sikka** | Alok Barat | Wuring | | 50.63 |
| **Sikka** | Magepanda | Kolisia | | 408.57 |
| **Sikka** | Magepanda | Kolisia B | | 48.10 |
| **Sikka** | Magepanda | Magepanda | Control | 10.55 |
| **Sikka** | **Magepanda** | **Reroroja** | **Treatment** | **12.93** |
| **Sikka** | Talibura | Bangkoor | Control | 444.42 |
| **Sikka** | Talibura | Darat Gunung | | 130.69 |
| **Sikka** | **Talibura** | **Darat Pantai** | **Treatment** | **245.75** |
| **Sikka** | Talibura | Kringa | | 9.08 |

[39] Please note that not all WIIP villages and comparison villages are included in the table.

| District | Sub District | Village | Project treatment status | Area (ha) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Sikka** | **Talibura** | **Nangahale** | **Treatment** | **0.76** |
| **Sikka** | Talibura | Nebe | | 80.62 |
| **Sikka** | **Talibura** | **Talibura** | **Treatment** | **24.96** |
| **Sikka** | Talibura | Wailamung | | 7.23 |
| **Sikka** | Waigete | Egon | Control | 0.25 |
| **Sikka** | Waigete | Nangetobong | | 21.51 |
| **Sikka** | Waigete | Runut | | 350.60 |
| **Sikka** | Waigete | Waibleler | | 26.59 |
| **Total** | | | | **7964.32** |
| **Total in treatment villages** | | | | **3128.86** |
| Source: Combining result analysis of satellite image and ministry forestry data | | | | |

There are 3 type of sites that were surveyed in this study:

a. **Treatment Site**
   Treatment site is the location of WIIP's mangrove rehabilitation project. However, these sites are already existing mangrove forests, hence not part of the reforestation. It is a panel site meaning that it has been measured both in 2012 and 2014.
b. **Control Site**
   Control site is the location that is used for comparing the result of mangrove rehabilitation activities of the WIIP project. It is a panel site meaning that it has also been measured both in 2012 and 2014
c. **New Site**
   New site is the location of the mangrove rehabilitation efforts of the WIIP project where planting has been carried out between 2012 and 2014. The measurement of this site is done in 2014 only.

The ecological survey and measurement conducted in 2014 measured 41 transects and 123 plots to find out the ecological condition of mangrove area in Ende and Sikka District. The number of transects and plots are summarized in Table 29 by village.

**Table 29: Transects and Plots Distributions in Ende and Sikka District**

| Village | District | Identity of Site | Type of Site | Number of Transects | Number of Plots |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Nangahale** | Sikka | Panel Site | Treatment | 2 | 3 |
| **Talibura** | Sikka | Panel Site | Treatment | 3 | 9 |
| **Darat Pantai** | Sikka | Panel Site | Treatment | 12 | 41 |
| **Reroroja** | Sikka | Panel Site | Treatment | 1 | 4 |
| **Tou Timur** | Ende | Panel Site | Treatment | 1 | 3 |
| **Kotabaru** | Ende | Panel Site | Treatment | 2 | 7 |
| **Baang Koor** | Sikka | Panel Site | Control | 5 | 17 |
| **Kolisia** | Sikka | Panel Site | Control | 4 | 9 |
| **Neotonda (Ndondo)** | Ende | Panel Site | Control | 2 | 6 |
| **Egon (Egon + Waiterang)** | Ende | Panel Site | Control | 2 | 3 |
| **Nangahale** | Sikka | New Site | Treatment | 1 | 6 |
| **Talibura** | Sikka | New Site | Treatment | 1 | 4 |
| **Darat Pantai** | Sikka | New Site | Treatment | 1 | 3 |
| **Reroroja** | Sikka | New Site | Treatment | 1 | 4 |
| **Tou Timur** | Ende | New Site | Treatment | 1 | 1 |
| **Kotabaru** | Ende | New Site | Treatment | 2 | 3 |
| **Total** | | | | **41** | **123** |

Source: Fieldwork measurement

## 3. Site Characteristics

Identification of the site characteristic is aimed at finding out the biophysical condition of mangrove area. These indicators were only measured in 2014. Based on the result of ecological survey and measurement, there are high variations of mangrove site characteristic in Ende and Sikka District. Table 30 reports detailed information on the mangrove site characteristics at the surveyed locations**.**

**Table 30: Mangrove site characteristics of Ende and Sikka District in 2014**

| Village | District | Identity of Site | Type of Site | Water Depth (cm) | Mud Depth (cm) | Soil Texture Fraction (%) | | | Soil Ph | Salinity ( $^{0}/_{00}$ ) | Dissolve Oxygen (ppm) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | Sand | Silt | Clay | | | |
| **Nangahale** | Sikka | Panel Site | Treatment | 0 - 25 | 0 - 10 | 50 | 35 | 15 | 6.2 | 3.38 | 4.36 |
| **Talibura** | Sikka | Panel Site | Treatment | 0 - 32 | 0 -12 | 42 | 42 | 16 | 6 | 3.45 | 4.41 |
| **Darat Pantai** | Sikka | Panel Site | Treatment | 0 - 70 | 0 - 29 | 57 | 32 | 11 | 5.9 | 3.42 | 4.31 |
| **Reroroja** | Sikka | Panel Site | Treatment | 0 - 80 | 0 - 45 | 40 | 37 | 23 | 6 | 3.51 | 4.38 |
| **Tou Timur** | Ende | Panel Site | Treatment | 0 - 11 | 0 - 4 | 46 | 39 | 15 | 6.2 | 3.43 | 3.42 |
| **Kotabaru** | Ende | Panel Site | Treatment | 0 - 12 | 0 - 20 | 49 | 36 | 15 | 6.3 | 3.39 | 4.28 |
| **Baang Koor** | Sikka | Panel Site | Control | 0 - 96 | 0 - 88 | 51 | 26 | 23 | 5.9 | 3.38 | 4.28 |
| **Kolisia** | Sikka | Panel Site | Control | 0 - 46 | 0 - 45 | 43 | 40 | 17 | 6.1 | 3.45 | 4.28 |
| **Neotonda (Ndondo)** | Ende | Panel Site | Control | 0 - 19 | 0 - 36 | 57 | 32 | 11 | 5.9 | 3.56 | 4.28 |
| **Egon (Egon + Waiterang)** | Ende | Panel Site | Control | 0 - 9 | 0 - 12 | 41 | 41 | 18 | 6.2 | 3.63 | 4.33 |
| **Nangahale** | Sikka | New Site | Treatment | 25 - 43 | 4 - 11 | 46 | 30 | 25 | 6.3 | 3.45 | 3.43 |
| **Talibura** | Sikka | New Site | Treatment | 0 - 9 | 0 - 12 | 52 | 24 | 23 | 7 | 3.43 | 3.45 |
| **Darat Pantai** | Sikka | New Site | Treatment | 0 - 6 | 0 - 4 | 51 | 27 | 22 | 6.1 | 3.45 | 3.42 |
| **Reroroja** | Sikka | New Site | Treatment | 0 - 45 | 0 - 45 | 57 | 25 | 18 | 6.1 | 3.44 | 4.29 |
| **Tou Timur** | Ende | New Site | Treatment | 0 - 7 | 0 - 8 | 60 | 20 | 20 | 6.8 | 3.47 | 4.23 |
| **Kotabaru** | Ende | New Site | Treatment | 0 - 11 | 7 - 20 | 43 | 30 | 27 | 6.3 | 3.49 | 4.35 |

Source : Fieldwork measurement

Table 30 shows that there are different water depths in every mangrove area, which may occur because of differences in the heights of sea waves reaching the mangrove areas. In addition, Table 30 also shows variations in mud depth in the mangrove areas. The variation may occur due to differences in waterlogged conditions in the mangrove areas. Based on the proportion of soil texture, the sand fraction dominates in every mangrove area. It indicate the high level of erosion from the upstream.

Seen from the level of soil pH, all mangrove areas in Ende and Sikka District are in a healthy condition because the value of pH is slightly acid to neutral. It indicates that the toxic contents are relatively low. The level of salinity is also optimal (0 – 10 $^{0}/_{00}$) for supporting the growth of mangrove vegetation. In addition, the level of dissolved oxygen in mangrove area also allows marine life habitat such as fish, clams, crabs that need the level of dissolved oxygen to reach 3 – 6 ppm.

## 4. Stand Structure

The stand structure tells us about the dynamics of vegetation growth in the mangroves. This information is used to find out about plant competition and natural selection among the mangrove plants. Identification of the stand structure in this study is done by describing the pattern of vegetation stage. The stages are classified into 3 classes based on differences in the height and diameter of tree plants. The 3 classes are:

a. **Seedling**
   Seedling is the stage of vegetation life form that has a height of less than 1.5 m. It is called a young tree.
b. **Sapling**
   Sapling is the stage of vegetation life form that has a height of more than 1.5 m and a diameter of less than 10 cm. It is called a medium tree (adult tree).
c. **Poles and trees**
   Poles and trees are the stage of vegetation life form that have height more than 1.5 m with diameter more than 10 cm. It is called an old tree.


Figure 4 compares the stand structure in every panel site of mangrove area in Ende and Sikka district in 2012 and 2014. The figure shows a decline of vegetation from seedling to poles and trees for all sites. It indicates that as a result of natural selection and competition among the plants some seedlings died. Some of the seedlings that survive will grow up to become first saplings and then poles and trees. However, if we look further, we can observe a difference in the stand structure pattern and the number of vegetations between 2012 and 2014.

Table 31 shows the detail of the number of vegetations in every site, while Table 32 reports on the change in vegetation between 2012 and 2014. Based on the tables, there are 3 important observations:


- The number of vegetations in 2014 is lower than in 2012. This situation may have happened due to various factors. One of the factors identified by fieldwork observations is the presence of pest and diseases (Figure 5). Figure 4 shows the group means for the panel sites. The figures show that on average samplings are the most affected by the reduction of vegetation.

- Figure 6 also shows that there is a difference between the mean number of vegetation between treatment and control sites: the number of seedlings has not changed a lot in the control areas between 2012 and 2014, whereas it substantially decreased in treatment areas on average (note that this refers to mangroves existing prior to the WIIP project). The number of poles and trees has also dropped more sharply in the treatment areas. The number of saplings has dropped in both locations.
- Nonetheless, the mean number of vegetations remained higher in the treatment sites compared to the control sites.

**Figure 4: Comparison of Stand structure in Panel Site**




(a) Stand structure of Panel Site in 2012




(b) Stand structure of Panel Site in 2014

**Table 31: Comparison of the number of vegetations between 2012 against 2014**

| Village | District | Identity of Site | Type of Site | Number of Vegetation per hectares | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Seedling | | Sapling | | Pole and Trees | |
| | | | | 2012 | 2014 | 2012 | 2014 | 2012 | 2014 |
| **Nangahale** | Sikka | Panel Site | Treatment | 1400 | 1250 | 1300 | 1000 | 100 | 100 |
| **Talibura** | Sikka | Panel Site | Treatment | 4167 | 4167 | 1200 | 711 | 209 | 188 |
| **Darat Pantai** | Sikka | Panel Site | Treatment | 3905 | 3055 | 697 | 513 | 977 | 242 |
| **Reroroja** | Sikka | Panel Site | Treatment | 1600 | 1428 | 1300 | 742 | 350 | 250 |
| **Tou Timur** | Ende | Panel Site | Treatment | 2533 | 1500 | 1467 | 720 | 532 | 300 |
| **Kotabaru** | Ende | Panel Site | Treatment | 3000 | 2500 | 1280 | 800 | 305 | 200 |
| **Baang Koor** | Sikka | Panel Site | Control | 6400 | 4166 | 1713 | 971 | 453 | 285 |
| **Kolisia** | Sikka | Panel Site | Control | 2800 | 1153 | 750 | 453 | 429 | 233 |
| **Neotonda (Ndondo)** | Ende | Panel Site | Control | 1520 | 1250 | 1467 | 600 | 150 | 116 |
| **Egon (Egon + Waiterang)** | Ende | Panel Site | Control | 1200 | 762 | 200 | 143 | 425 | 316 |
| **Nangahale** | Sikka | New Site | Treatment | - | 1916 | - | 0 | - | 0 |
| **Talibura** | Sikka | New Site | Treatment | - | 3062 | - | 100 | - | 100 |
| **Darat Pantai** | Sikka | New Site | Treatment | - | 1083 | - | 0 | - | 0 |
| **Reroroja** | Sikka | New Site | Treatment | - | 1000 | - | 300 | - | 0 |
| **Tou Timur** | Ende | New Site | Treatment | - | 1000 | - | 0 | - | 0 |
| **Kotabaru** | Ende | New Site | Treatment | - | 1250 | - | 250 | - | 0 |

Source: Data analysis

**Figure 5: Condition of mangrove vegetation that invaded by pest and disease**



(a)




(b)

**Table 32: Change in mangrove vegetation from 2012 to 2014**


| Village | District | Identity of Site | Type of Site | Vegetation Died | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Seedling | | Sapling | | Poles and Trees | |
| | | | | N/ha | % | N/ha | % | N/ha | % |
| **Nangahale** | Sikka | Panel Site | Treatment | 150 | 10.71 | 300 | 23.08 | 0 | 0 |
| **Talibura** | Sikka | Panel Site | Treatment | 0 | 0 | 489 | 40.75 | 21 | 10.1 |
| **Darat Pantai** | Sikka | Panel Site | Treatment | 850 | 21.77 | 184 | 26.4 | 735 | 75.23 |
| **Reroroja** | Sikka | Panel Site | Treatment | 172 | 10.75 | 558 | 42.92 | 100 | 28.57 |
| **Tou Timur** | Ende | Panel Site | Treatment | 1033 | 40.78 | 747 | 50.92 | 232 | 43.61 |
| **Kotabaru** | Ende | Panel Site | Treatment | 500 | 16.67 | 480 | 37.5 | 105 | 34.43 |
| **Baang Koor** | Sikka | Panel Site | Control | 2234 | 34.91 | 742 | 43.32 | 168 | 37.1 |
| **Kolisia** | Sikka | Panel Site | Control | 1647 | 58.82 | 297 | 39.6 | 196 | 45.69 |
| **Neotonda (Ndondo)** | Ende | Panel Site | Control | 270 | 17.76 | 867 | 59.1 | 34 | 22.67 |
| **Egon (Egon + Waiterang)** | Ende | Panel Site | Control | 438 | 36.5 | 57 | 28.5 | 109 | 25.65 |

Source: Data analysis

**Figure 6: Comparison of stand structure between treatment and control sites**




(a) Comparison between treatment and control sites in 2012




(b) Comparison between treatment and control sites in 2014

Figure 6 shows that on treatment site, the mean number of vegetations are higher than on control site. It indicates that the mangrove rehabilitation gives a positive impact to the condition of mangrove ecosystem in Ende and Sikka District. But, this result can't be used to describe the age level of mangrove forest in Ende and Sikka District.

## 5. Flora Distribution

Mangrove vegetation species have the special characteristics that they are able to live in waterlogged areas with high salinity and low oxygen conditions. Based on the survey and measurement carried out in the mangrove areas in 2014, 10 vegetation species were identified in Ende and Sikka districts. The detailed information of flora distribution is presented in Table 34 for the Panel Sites and in Table 35 for the New Sites.

Based onTable 34 and Table 35, there are 3 important findings:

1. *Rhizhopora mucronata* has continuous pattern distribution in each mangrove area. It indicates that :
    a. The species has good adaptability to the site conditions found in all surveyed mangrove areas.
    b. It is the most dominant species of mangrove area in Ende and Sikka district.
    c. The species is most often used in rehabilitation programmes.
2. Among the surveyed areas, Darat Pantai has the highest number of species. This indicates that the level of biodiversity is the highest on this site.

**Table 33: Flora distribution of Panel Sites in 2012**

| Species | Distribution in Mangrove Area (Panel Site) | | | | | | | | | | Total Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Bangkoor | Darat Pantai | Kolisia | Nanghale | Reroroja | Talibura | Egon | Tou Timur | Kotabaru | Neotonda | |
| ***Ceriops tagal*** | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | **8** |
| ***Rhizhopora apiculata*** | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | No | **8** |
| ***Rhizhopora mucronata*** | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | **10** |
| ***Avicennia alba*** | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | **3** |
| ***Lumnitzera racemosa*** | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No | **4** |
| ***Excoecaria agailacha*** | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | **1** |
| ***Sonneratia alba*** | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | **5** |
| ***Amyna spp.*** | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | **1** |
| ***Aegiceras cornculatum*** | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | **1** |
| ***Bruguiera gymnorhiza*** | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | **1** |
| ***Aegizera feorogum*** | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | **1** |
| **Total Species** | **6** | **7** | **6** | **4** | **4** | **4** | **4** | **3** | **4** | **1** | |

Source: Data analysis

**Table 34: Flora distribution of Panel Sites in 2014**

| Species | Distribution in Mangrove Area (Panel Site) | | | | | | | | | | Total Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Bangkoor | Darat Pantai | Kolisia | Nanghale | Reroroja | Talibura | Egon | Tou Timur | Kotabaru | Neotonda | |
| ***Ceriops tagal*** | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | **8** |
| ***Rhizhopora apiculata*** | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | No | **8** |
| ***Rhizhopora mucronata*** | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | **10** |
| ***Avicennia alba*** | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | **3** |
| ***Lumnitzera racemosa*** | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No | **4** |
| ***Excoecaria agailacha*** | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | **1** |
| ***Sonneratia alba*** | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | **5** |
| ***Amyna spp.*** | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | **1** |
| ***Aegiceras cornculatum*** | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | **1** |
| ***Bruguiera gymnorhiza*** | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | **1** |
| ***Aegizera feorogum*** | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | **1** |
| **Total Species** | **6** | **7** | **6** | **4** | **4** | **4** | **4** | **3** | **4** | **1** | |

Source: Data analysis

**Table 35: Flora distribution in New Site**

| Species | Distribution in Mangrove Area (New Site) | | | | | | Total Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Nangahale | Darat Pantai | Talibura | Reroroja | Tou Timur | Kotabaru | |
| ***Ceriops tagal*** | No | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | No | No | **3** |
| ***Rhizhopora apiculata*** | **Yes** | **Yes** | No | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **5** |
| ***Rhizhopora mucronata*** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | No | **Yes** | **5** |
| ***Avicennia alba*** | No | No | **Yes** | No | No | No | **1** |
| ***Lumnitzera racemosa*** | No | No | No | No | No | No | **0** |
| ***Excoecaria agailacha*** | No | No | No | No | No | No | **0** |
| ***Sonneratia alba*** | No | No | No | **Yes** | No | No | **1** |
| ***Amynea spp.*** | No | No | No | No | No | No | **0** |
| ***Aegiceras cornculatum*** | No | No | No | No | No | No | **0** |
| ***Bruguiera gymnorhiza*** | No | No | No | No | No | No | **0** |
| ***Aegizera feorogum*** | No | No | No | No | No | No | **0** |
| **Total Species** | **2** | **3** | **3** | **4** | **1** | **2** | |

Source: Data analysis

## 6. Flora Diversity

Flora diversity is a description of species richness and heterogenity in the ecosystem. It can be used as an indicator for the balancedness of the ecosystem. In this study, representation of species richness and heterogenity in mangrove areas is described by the Margalef[40] and Shannon[41] indices. The Margalef and Shannon indices have different functions: the Margalef Index describes the richness of ecosystem, while the Shannon Index represents the heterogenity of ecosystem. Despite their different meaning, there is a high positive correlation between them (r=0.928, see Figure 7). Table 36 presents the results for the flora diversity analysis at every surveyed mangrove area in Ende and Sikka districts.

**Table 36: Margallef and Shannon Indices in Each Mangrove Area**


| Village | District | Identity of Site | Type of Site | Margallef Index | | Shannon Index | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | 2012 | 2014 | 2012 | 2014 |
| **Nangahale** | Sikka | Panel Site | Treatment | 0,958 | 0,958 | 1,213 | 1,213 |
| **Talibura** | Sikka | Panel Site | Treatment | 0,616 | 0,616 | 1,036 | 1,036 |
| **Darat Pantai** | Sikka | Panel Site | Treatment | 1,107 | 1,107 | 1,341 | 1,341 |
| **Reroroja** | Sikka | Panel Site | Treatment | 1,165 | 1,165 | 1,489 | 1,489 |
| **Tou Timur** | Ende | Panel Site | Treatment | 0,506 | 0,506 | 1,023 | 1,023 |
| **Kotabaru** | Ende | Panel Site | Treatment | 0,958 | 0,958 | 0,997 | 0,997 |
| **Baang Koor** | Sikka | Panel Site | Control | 1,260 | 1,260 | 1,448 | 1,448 |
| **Kolisia** | Sikka | Panel Site | Control | 1,408 | 1,408 | 1,569 | 1,569 |
| **Neotonda (Ndondo)** | Ende | Panel Site | Control | 0,275 | 0,275 | 0,515 | 0,515 |
| **Egon (Egon + Waiterang)** | Ende | Panel Site | Control | 0,721 | 0,721 | 0,703 | 0,703 |
| **Nangahale** | Sikka | New Site | | | 0,261 | | 0,685 |
| **Talibura** | Sikka | New Site | | | 0,514 | | 0,793 |
| **Darat Pantai** | Sikka | New Site | | | 0,780 | | 0,859 |
| **Reroroja** | Sikka | New Site | | | 1,001 | | 1,166 |
| **Tou Timur** | Ende | New Site | | | 0 | | 0 |
| **Kotabaru** | Ende | New Site | | | 0,434 | | 0,693 |

Source: Data analysis

[40] The Margalef index is calculated as $IM = \frac{S}{lnN}$, where S is the number of species in the sample and N is the total number of vegetation.

[41] The Shannon index is calculated as $IDS = \frac{S}{N}\ln(S/N)$.


**Figure 7: Correlation Between Margallef and Shannon Index**




The data in Table 36 show that the mangrove area of Kolisia has the highest Margalef and Shannon indices. This indicates that the mangrove ecosystem in Kolisia has the best balance. In addition, the mangrove ecosystem in the new site of Tou Timur has the lowest Margalef and Shannon indices (zero). This indicates that only one species has been planted there.

Figure 8 shows the differences in the mean of value of the indices between the treatment and control (panel) sites in 2014. Interestingly, while the Shannon index of species heterogeneity is higher in the treatment areas, the Margalef index of the richness of the ecosystem is higher in the control sites. This situation could happen because of various factors such as stand dynamics process, human intervention through rehabilitation programmes, etc. However, in this study, the factors causing this difference have not been identified.

**Figure 8: Comparison of mean indices between treatment and control sites**




## 7. Modelling of Mangrove Vegetation

The modelling of mangrove vegetation can be used to predict the land cover in mangrove vegetation and its change. Data presented in Table 28 are based on the results of data analysis using modelling. In this study, regression analysis is used for the modelling of mangrove vegetation using data extracted from satellite information (MSAVI2: vegetation density index) and regressed on field observations (Basal Area: potential size of mangrove are formed based on vegetation growing process). Hence, the regression estimates the causality correlation between MSAVI2 in 2013 and 2014 as independent variables with Basal Area as dependent variable. The result of regression analysis show that the model for predicted basal area based on MSAVI in 2013 and 2014 is **Y = - 5.46 + 11.47 MSAVI2_2013 + 31.73 MSAVI2_2014** with **$R^2$ =0.96**. The detail information of regression analysis are presented in Table 37 and Figure 9.

**Table 37: Result of regression analysis**


| *Regression Statistics* | |
|---|---|
| **Multiple R** | 0.981 |
| **R Square** | 0.963 |
| **Adjusted R Square** | 0.960 |
| **Standard Error** | 1.410 |
| **Observations** | 30 |

| ANOVA | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *df* | *SS* | *MS* | *F* | *Significance F* |
| **Regression** | 2 | 1393.870 | 696.935 | 350.624 | 4.81554E-20 |
| **Residual** | 27 | 53.668 | 1.988 | | |
| **Total** | 29 | 1447.538 | | | |

| | *Coefficients* | *Standard Error* | *t Stat* | *P-value* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Intercept** | -5.461 | 0.610 | -8.955 | 1.43299E-09 |
| **MSAVI2 2013** | 11.475 | 4.140 | 2.772 | 0.009979075 |
| **MSAVI2 2014** | 31.732 | 4.204 | 7.549 | 4.04222E-08 |

Source: data analysis

**Figure 9: Basal area comparison between observed against predicted**



## 8. Fauna Description

The characteristics of mangrove areas are not only determined by flora but also by fauna that live in the mangrove ecosystem. Based on the result of ecological survey and measurement, there are some animals species that can be identified of every mangrove area in Ende and Sikka district. These information is presented in Table 38.

**Table 38: Fauna description of mangrove area in Ende and Sikka District**

| No. | Species Name | Picture | Location Found | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | *Scylla serrata* |  | Neotonda, Reroroja, Nangahale, Bangkoor, Kotabaru, Kolisia | It is a type of crab that has green skin. Usually, it can find in the morning. It lives in a hole on the floor of forest mangrove. |
| 2 | *Periopthalmodon sp.* |  | Neotonda, Nangahale, Kotabaru, Kolisia, Bangkoor, Reroroja | It is a type of fish that has black skin. It also has little size. It lives in the waterlogged in mangrove area. The movement is very active and rapidly. |
| 3 | *Telecopium telescopium* |  | Bangkoor, Darat Pantai, Neotonda, Kolisia | It is a type of mollusca. It lives in colony and has a conical shell. It has black skin. It can find on the floor of forest mangrove in the muddy condition. |
| 4 | *Cassiuda aurisfelis* |  | Bangkoor | It is a type of mollusca. It lives in colony and attached on the trunk of mangrove vegetation. It has a conical shell with green skin. |

| No. | Species Name | Picture | Location Found | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5 | *Argipe sp.* |  | Kotabaru, Reroroja | It is a type of spider and life between the branch |
| 6 | *Dardanus calidus* |  | Reroroja, Talibura, Bangkoor, Darat Pantai, Nangahale | It has asimetris stomach and life in shell. It actives in the morning when the mangrove isn't waterlogged. |
| 7 | *Ceberus sp..* |  | Kolisia, Talibura | It is type of snake. It lives in water and has rapidly movement. It can find in low water depth level. |
| 8 | *Chrysopelea sp.* |  | Talibura | It is type of snake. It lives on branch and has slowly movement. It can find in the morning |
| 9 | *Macaca fascularis* |  | Bangkoor, Tou Timur | It is type of monkey. It has long tail and lives in a small group. It likes hanging in tree |

Source: fieldwork observation

## 9. Conclusion

Based on the result of ecological survey and measurement of mangrove area in Ende and Sikka District, there are some conclusions that can be obtained. They are:


1. Mangrove area in Ende and Sikka district have good condition with high variation of site characteristic.
2. *Rhizophora mucronata* is the most adaptability species with continue distribution of Mangrove area in Ende and Sikka district.
3. The mangrove rehabilitation done giving a positive impact to the condition of mangrove ecosystem in Ende and Sikka District.
4. Despite dominated with young tree (seedling), mangrove area in Ende and Sikka district have good species diversity except Tou Timur.
5. The model to predict basal area is **Y = - 5.46 + 11.47 X1 + 31.73 X2**
6. There are 9 animal species that can be found in mangrove area in Ende and Sikka district.

## 10. Appendix on methodology

**a. Flora survey and measurement**

- The transects are taken from the baseline GPS locations
- For each transect, the sets of circular plots are created
- Each set of circular plots consist 3 plots with same centre and different area.

**Figure 10: Circular plots**





- Each set of plots, consist 3 circular sub plots for life form vegetation measurement, i.e. :
  - Seedling : plant with height < 1.5 m
  - Sapling : plant with height > 1.5 m and diameter < 10 cm
  - Poles and trees : plant with height > 1.5 m and diameter > 10 cm
- Sub plot 4 $m^2$ is for seedling, sub plot 25 $m^2$ is for sapling, and sub plot 100 $m^2$ is for poles and trees.
- In each transect, 3 plots at the end of the mangrove are taken from the baseline GPS locations
- In every plot we will also get the environmental data

**b. Fauna survey**

Fauna survey is done at the same location with flora survey. Nevertheless, the sub plot that used in fauna survey is only sub plot 100 $m^2$. The survey is done by taking a picture of fauna that can be found in the sub plot. It also conducted a qualitative description of the fauna behaviour like physical characteristic, time meeting, location meeting, and habitat condition in mangrove area. The illustration of fauna survey in the field is presented as follows.


**Figure 11: Illustration of fauna survey in the field**



**c. Soil measurement**

- The sub plot 100 $m^2$ is used to soil measurement.
- On each plot, it conducted the measurement of water depth and mud depth by ruler. After that, the soil sample is taken from 5 positions in the sub plot systematically.

**Figure 12: Soil sample**



- Then, soil samples are mixed and put into plastic bag so that it can be brought out of mangrove location (*the waterlogged conditions of mangrove makes the direct measurement in the subplot is impossible*).
- After come out from the mangrove area, the measurement of soil characteristic is done by use soil samples that have been taken. The measurement is conducted based on the subplots code of soil samples.
- Before the measurement is done, soil samples are mixed in water with ratio (5 water : 1 soil)
- The measurement of soil characteristic is done by digital tools such as pH meter, refractometer, and digital soil kit test. The range of value from each indicators are :
  a. Range of pH level

**Table 39: Range of pH level**

| Soil pH | Desciption |
|---|---|
| **< 4.5** | very acid |
| **4.5 - 5.5** | acid |
| **5.6 - 6.5** | slightly acid |
| **6.6 - 7.5** | neutral |
| **7.6 - 8.5** | slightly alkaline |
| **> 8.5** | alkaline |

b. Range of salinity level

**Table 40: Range of salinity level**

| Salinity ($^0/_{00}$) | Desciption |
|---|---|
| **0 - 10** | normal |
| **10 - 30** | saline |
| **> 30** | high salinity |

c. Range of dissolved oxygen level

**Table 41: Range of dissolved oxygen level**

| DO (ppm) | Desciption |
|---|---|
| **< 1** | low |
| **1 - 3** | medium |
| **3 - 6** | high |

- The result of measurement is recorded from each sub plot. Then, make a mean for each village.

## 11. Appendix on survey location

a. Talibura (Panel Site)






b. Darat Pantai (Panel Site)




Mangrove
Mangrove
Mangrove
Mangrove
Mangrove
Mangrove
Mangrove
Mangrove
Mangrove
Mangrove
Mangrove
Mangrove
Mangrove
Mangrove
Image © 2012 DigitalGlobe
Image © 2012 TerraMetrics
714 m
Google earth

c. Reroroja (Panel Site)




d. Kotabaru (Panel Site)







e. Bangkoor (Panel Site)



f. Kolisia (Panel Site)



g. Egon (Panel Site)





h. Neotonda, Nanghale, Tou Timur (Panel Site)



i. Nangahale, Kotabaru, dan Tou Timur (New Site)




j. Talibura




k. Darat Pantai



l. Reroroja (New Site)



## 12. Appendix on flora

a. *Ceriops tagal*







b. *Rhizhopora apiculata*








c. *Rhizhopora mucronata*







d. *Avicennia alba*







e. *Lumnitzera racemosa*







f. *Excoecaria agallocha*







g. *Sonneratia alba*







h. *Aegiceras cornculatum*







i. *Bruguiera gymnorhiza*







j. *Aegiceras feorogum*







## 13. Appendix on mangrove landscape

a. Nangahale (Panel Site)





b. Talibura (Panel Site)





c. Darat Pantai (Panel Site)





d. Reroroja (Panel Site)





e. Tou Timur (Panel Site)





f. Kotabaru (Panel Site)





g. Bangkoor (Panel Site)





h. Kolisia (Panel Site)





i. Neotonda (Panel Site)





j. Egon (Panel Site)





k. Nangahale (New Site)





l. Talibura (New Site)





m. Darat Pantai (New Site)





n. Reroroja (New Site)





o. Tou Timur (New Site)





p. Kotabaru (New Site)





# Endline Report on the Achievement of MDGs and Themes:

# Evaluation of the Sintang project of NTFP-EP

## MFS II Joint Evaluations

## Indonesia

**Sub-report:**

**E3. Up-scaling sustainable, community-based forest livelihoods in Kalimantan,**

**Non-Timber Forest Product Exchange Programme (NTFP-EP)**

## FINAL REPORT

**9 April 2015**


**Amsterdam Institute for International Development (AIID)**

Trinity building C, 3rd floor, Rm XT-3.17
Pietersbergweg 17
1105 BM Amsterdam
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)20 5661596
F +31 (0)20 5665997
www.aiid.org

**SurveyMeter**

Jl. Jenengan Raya No.109
Maguwoharjo, Depok, Sleman,
Yogyakarta 55282
Indonesia
T +62 (0) 274 4477464
F +62 (0) 274 4477004
www.surveymeter.org

# List of contributors

**AIID**

Menno Pradhan (Principal Investigator)

Melinda Vigh (Research Coordinator)

Marije Groot Bruinderink (Project Manager)

Iris van Rossum (Junior Researcher)

Kimberley Wallaart (Qualitative Data Analyst)

Emilie Berkhout (Research Assistant)

**Survey Meter**

Ni Wayan Suriasatini (Research Coordinator)

Mardiana Br Ginting (Project Manager)

Muhammad Mulia (Qualitative Researcher and Field Coordinator)

Bondan Sikoki (Survey Expert)

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## List of Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| AMAN | Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (Alliance of Indigenous Movement in the Archipelago) |
| APL | Forest area for other uses |
| ASL | Agro Sentosa Lestari |
| CFA | Co-financing Agency |
| CBO | Community-Based Organisation |
| CSO | Civil Society Organisation |
| GMU | Grand Mandiri Utama |
| GIS | Geographical Information System |
| GPS | Global Positioning System |
| HCVF | High Conservation Value Forests |
| IDR | Indonesian Rupiahs |
| IUCN | International Union for the Conservation of Nature |
| JKPP | Jaringan Kerja Pemetaan Partisipatif (Indonesian Community Mapping Network) |
| JMHI | Jaringan Madu Hutan Indonesia (Indonesian Forest Honey Network) |
| JMM | Jasa Menenun Mandiri Cooperative |
| MDG | Millennium Development Goal |
| MFS II | Medefinancieringsstelsel (Co-financing System Grant Policy Framework) |
| MoU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| NTFP | Non-Timber Forest Product |
| NTFP-EP | Non-Timber Forest Product Exchange Programme |
| PRA | Participatory Rural Appraisal |
| PRCF | People Resources and Conservation Foundation |
| RRA | Rapid Rural Appraisal |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |
| WALHI | Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (Indonesian Forum for Environment) |
| WPP | Wahana Plantation&Product |
| WWF | World Wildlife Fund |

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Context project

The island of Borneo, or its Indonesian name Kalimantan, used to be famous for its dense tropical rainforest cover and rich variety of plant and animal species. The exploitation of forest resources started in the 1980s and 1990s first in Malaysia, then in Indonesia. By 2005, only about 50% of the island's forests still remained,[1] and between 2000 and 2010, 12% of the forest cover in Borneo has been affected by deforestation.[2] The loss of forest can be mainly attributed to logging, oil palm plantations, agriculture and mining.

Economic development in Kalimantan is dominated by these extractive industries, and it is threatening the livelihood of forest-based local communities and environmental resources. Planned expansion of oil palm is occurring at an unprecedented rate on the island. In West Kalimantan alone, there are plans to convert over 2 million hectares into additional oil palm plantations. This would mean expanding into indigenous territories and in pristine protected areas.[3] In East Kalimantan other than the expansion of oil palm plantations, coal mining has long had a serious negative effect on the ecosystem in the last decade.[4] These activities endanger eco-cultural values, while also bringing about a severe loss in biodiversity. In addition, the destruction of rainforests results in the scarcity of clean water, which in turn affects affect the survival of plants and animals in the forests. Even our informants in the project villages have reported that after forests have been converted to plantations, they suffered from the scarcity of clean water and they observed a reduction in fauna in their forests. Hence, the supposed economic development brought by the plantations is severely counterweighted by the loss of forest resources that constitute an integral part of the livelihood and culture of the indigenous Dayak people.

The forests to be converted are classified as 'forest area for other uses' by the government or APL. However, most of these areas historically belong to indigenous forest people, whose livelihood and culture is based on these forests. Therefore, a first step in conserving the remaining forests starts by securing the tenurial rights of indigenous communities. In addition, the indigenous culture of the people have to be strengthened and preserved in order to manage natural resources in a sustainable manner, and models of sustainable livelihoods have to be promoted based on the traditional culture to provide alternative livelihood sources.

The political environment is favourable: progressive local government officials raise the banner for sustainable livelihoods and eco-cultural conservation initiatives. In Sintang district of West Kalimantan province, the Head of District is known to welcome the protection of the remaining forests in the area. Sintang is also one of the regencies within the Heart of Borneo programme area, and thus focus on its conservation is well deserved. In East Kalimantan, Malinau district has also been declared as a conservation area in 2007, and the Head of District has issued a draft ordinance on indigenous peoples. This opens is a window of opportunity to work on empowering indigenous peoples in the area.

[1] Source: http://www.mongabay.com/borneo.html
[2] Source: http://borneoproject.org/updates/charts-deforestation-in-indonesia-and-malaysia-2000-2010
[3] World Agroforestry, unpublished report
[4] Borneo Research Bulletin, 2009

More recently, in May 2013 the constitutional court in Jakarta ruled that the customary forests of indigenous peoples should no longer be classed as falling in 'State Forest Areas' paving the way for a wider recognition of indigenous peoples' rights all over Indonesia (Forest Peoples Programme 2013). However, in reality, it turns out that the implementation of these new policies is problematic, as it is often difficult for the indigenous people to effectively prove their claims to ancestral lands on their own, and political dynamics (the frequent turnover of persons in charge of in the local government) often hinders the implementation of the policies.

Therefore, indigenous communities need outside help to promote their case. The project of Non-Timber Forest Product Exchange Programme (NTFP-EP) in Kalimantan seeks to empower such forest-based communities to use and manage their forest resources in a sustainable way. The project supports eco-cultural conservation initiatives to protect community forest areas from conversion, and sustainable community-based enterprises to improve the livelihood of indigenous people living from sustainable use of forest resources.

## 1.2. Evaluation objectives

This report evaluates the NTFP-EP project [5] as part of as part of the evaluation of the *Medefinancieringsstelsel* II (MFS II) in Indonesia under the Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDG) component. [6] The project has been selected under the goals on sustainable living environment, forests and biodiversity (MDG 7a and 7b). [7] In particular, the current evaluation focuses on the following research questions: how did the size of sustainably managed forest area change? How did the management structure of community forest areas change? How did the attitude and awareness of households change towards natural resource management? Do the communities feel more empowered to protect and manage their natural resources? Are the landscape models and conservation schemes in Sintang protecting ecological and cultural heritage in the community and restoring ecosystems? Finally, are landscape models recognised by the local government?

We investigate whether the project had a favourable effect on the above mentioned outcomes by looking at the changes in the outcome variables between the baseline and endline periods for the project beneficiaries. Regarding the sample, it has to be noted that originally we intended to survey all treatment villages in Sintang. Due to a misunderstanding about the project in Sintang, we sampled two additional communities in addition to the four actual project communities. These two communities are neighbouring one of the treatment communities. Therefore, they could indirectly benefit from the project (spillover). Hence, these locations cannot be regarded as a comparison group. In addition, the small sample size would not allow statistical analysis between the treatment and any comparison group.

Data was collected in four villages using structured community and household surveys in 2012, and the same respondents were re-interviewed in 2014 whenever it was possible. In order to validate the data from the quantitative surveys and to deepen our understanding of the project context and results, we

[5] The project is described in more detail in section 3.1.

[6] Please note that this project has been also evaluated under the Civil Society Strengthening component of the MFS II Evaluation.

[7] Based on the project objectives, the NTFP-EP project is also partially classified under the goal on poverty alleviation (MDG 1) and the theme of good governance and civil society building. However, the evaluation focuses on the impacts of the project with respect to MDGs 7a&b.

collected additional qualitative information at the project locations in the form of in-depth interviews with project stakeholders and community leaders, and using focus group discussions with men and women participating in project activities. The in-depth interviews were conducted with the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) implementing the project (NTFP-EP, People Resources and Conservation Foundation or PRCF and Jasa Menenun Mandiri Cooperative or JMM) and local leaders who participated in the mapping process and other project activities. We have also interviewed NTFP-EP regarding the costs of the project.

As specified in the Terms of Reference for this evaluation, the report addresses five evaluation questions to assess the project outcomes:

1) Change: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period?
2) Attribution: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3) Relevance of change: What is the relevance of these changes?
4) Efficiency: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient?
5) Explanations: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

## 1.3. Summary of findings

This report evaluates the impact of a forest mapping project in the district of Sintang, Kalimantan, Indonesia. This is one of the four locations that were supported by NTFP-EP (Southern Partner Organisation or SPO) through the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) (Co-Financing Agency or CFA). We focus on this project location as this was the only one in which NTFP-EP was directly involved in the implementation along with local NGOs. In all other project locations, the work was subcontracted fully to local NGOs. The intervention consisted of forest mapping, to reach consensus on forest boundaries among stakeholders, and to seek legal status for these maps. This in turn, it was hoped, would result in more secure community ownership of the forest, and less land grabbing by oil palm companies. At the district level, it was hoped that the project's initiative would set an example of eco-cultural zonation aimed at the preservation of ecological and indigenous cultural values. Through a different funding source, the local NGOs involved in the project also provided training in sustainable forest bases income generation, in the hope it would improve welfare and generate an increased ownership of the natural forest among villagers.

We sampled four villages in which the project was implemented, and two other villages in the same area. The data consist of survey data conducted in October-November 2012 and October 2014, and a qualitative study carried out in April 2014.

The NTFP-EP project carried out participatory mapping activities over the period from March to September 2012. The baseline survey, conducted soon after the mapping activities, indicates widespread participation. 82 percent of the sampled villagers in the treatment villages heard of the mapping activities, and 45 percent participated. The qualitative study confirms that the process was carefully executed, with trained facilitators ensuring widespread participation, even from oil palm companies. The activity resulted in maps detailing the boundaries of community forest land.

Unfortunately, by the time of the endline survey, none of these maps had acquired the desired legal status. NTFP-EP did lobby with the district government, but in spite of several meetings with the district head, the formal legislation has not been forthcoming. The local NGOs remained active in the project villages. In all 4 treatment locations community leaders indicated that natural resource management activities had taken place over the evaluation period.

The community survey indicates that forest management is taken more seriously in treatment communities. While none of the spillover communities report any effort at forest protection, two out of the four treatment communities report there is a village protection and conservation programme active in the community. The villagers' responses on this topic do not give a clear picture. In both treatment and spillover villages, around 90 percent report that there are rules regarding the community forest and that people in the village keep those rules. Around 87 percent of villagers report that logging is regulated in the village. Again, both in treatment and spillover communities, villages show a positive attitude towards the sustainable use of forest land.

The objective of the training activities was to increase the sustainable use of the forest by villagers for income generation. A positive finding in this respect is that there has been a strong reduction (38 percentage points) in the fraction of households which reports to use wood from the forest for their family's livelihood. But it is not clear whether more sustainable uses of the forest were applied. There has been no increase in the use of the forest for natural dye material (a topic of the training), but villagers in treatment communities report an increase (18 percent point) in "other uses". In the spillover communities, the use of wood from the forest stayed the same over the evaluation period, while there was an increase in the use of the forest for food (32 percent point).

Another purpose of the mapping was to increase the security of community forests. While there have been no land conversions over the study period, the survey result indicate that land conflicts are still present. In both treatment and spillover communities, there has been a sharp increase in the fraction of villagers reporting land disputes with neighbouring villages and the business or industry. The rise has been somewhat sharper in spillover communities (around 45 percent point) than in treatment communities (around 25 percent point). The qualitative study indicates that the inter village disputes are usually solved peacefully. The conflicts with oil palm companies are mostly about land which was rented by the oil palm companies on a profit sharing arrangement, and communities feel like they did not get their fair share. In treatment communities, there is a continuous concern that forest can be converted to oil palm plantation among villagers.

Summarizing, this project has been implemented in areas where forest are under threat of conversion into oil palm plantations. NTFP-EP collaborates with NGOs which have long standing working relations with the communities. It seems like this has contributed to the awareness in the community regarding the importance of regulating the forest use, somewhat more sustainable use of the forest by villages, but no increase in security over forest land.

Finally, turning to project costs, by the end of 2014 the project has spent 83 percent of its budget, while the costs of the evaluated project activities in Sintang constituted 19.8 percent of the overall project costs. Unfortunately, we are not able to report on the cost-effectiveness of the project because the output of the project has not been finalized during the evaluation period.

### 1.4. Structure of report

The rest of this report proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the relevant literature; section 3 describes the project; section 4 describes the evaluation questions and outcome variables; section 5 the data collection. Section 6 provides the descriptive statistics. Sections 7 till 10 discuss evaluation question 1) till 4) in turn. Section 11 describes the relationship between the Civil Society Strengthening component to the MDG component. The last section discusses the results and concludes.

Further details about the project results are presented in a number of annexes. The planned project implementation is described in Annex I. Regarding the survey data, the construction of the outcome indicators and indices is summarized in Annex II. Annex III in turn describes the study locations, and Annex IV reports detailed descriptive statistics and explanatory variables of the sample; detailed figures on the change in outcome indicators is presented in Annex V. Finally, the results of the qualitative data collection are presented in Annex VI, and further details about the participatory mapping methods can be found in Annex VII.

## 2. Literature overview

Even though the existence of participatory mapping activities is very important in a country like Indonesia where an estimated 48 million indigenous people still depend on the forest for their livelihood, but where mining, logging and oil palm industry are destroying more than 1 million hectares of rainforest territory each year[8] (Telapak & Gekko Studio 2011), the academic literature on participatory mapping within specific Indonesian context is quite limited. This may, at least in part, have to do with the political sensitivities involved in mapping, that can be especially critical for Indonesian indigenous peoples that have since long had a particularly uneasy relation with government and, until very recently, had to cope with a severe lack of legal protection.

Despite the lack of scientific literature over participatory mapping, there was no lack of participatory mapping projects in Indonesia. In fact, over the past 1.5 decades, communities from nearly every region in Indonesia have been trained in the technical and facilitation skills required to undertake participatory mapping , and by 2009 1.5 million hectares of land had already been mapped by local communities (IFAD 2009: 22). The Indonesian community mapping network (Jaringan Kerja Pemetaan Partisipatif or JKPP), established by the mapping activists in 1996 in Bogor, West Java, has been instrumental in achieving these goals (IFAD 2009: 22). I.e. by forming an alliance with Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara or Alliance of Indigenous Movement in the Archipelago (AMAN) and the Forest Watch Indonesia to advocate for the customary maps to become officially recognized and fed into the "Ancestral Domain Registration Agency" (Badan Registrasi Wilayah Adat): The government's official national database of forest cover. In 2011 AMAN signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional), which officially stated that "indigenous" maps would be integrated into governmental data (Harjati Sanmukri 2013: 123).

[8] Making Indonesia the fastest forest clearing nation in the world since 2012, and also the world's third largest emitter of carbon dioxide emissions, behind China and the United States (Telapak & Gekko Studio 2011).

Scientific evidence on the effectiveness of participatory mapping is also limited in the international context. Therefore, a large part of the remaining of this section discusses what participatory mapping is and how it is implemented in terms tools and methods. Finally, we present a short summary of reported impacts of participatory mapping. For further details on the development and methods of participatory mapping, and considerations about "good practice" the reader is referred to Annex VII.

Participatory mapping is a general term[9] used to define a set of approaches and techniques that combine the tools of modern cartography with participatory methods to create a map of a local community's habitat that represents this community's spatial knowledge (Rainforest Foundation UK 2014). "NGO's, from small local ones to large international ones, often play a crucial role as interlocutors, trainers, advocates and facilitators in these mapping activities" (IFAD 2009: 5).

Participatory mapping is used over the whole world, and the maps that are produced can take on many forms, and can be used to achieve various different purposes. Looking at the available literature and documentation on participatory mapping initiatives the most common aim of participatory mapping appears to be to help marginalized groups, in particular indigenous, pastoralist and forest dwellers, to claim and/or defend their (access to) ancestral lands and its resources, typically by working towards legal recognition of their land rights, using the maps as evidence of their continued residency. The maps can also serve as a tool for community land use planning and natural resource management, and can be used to bring resource-related problems, such as the impacts of logging, mining, and 'land grab' activities, to the attention of governmental authorities and decision makers (Chapin et al. 2005: 620; Di Gessa 2008; Rainforest Foundation UK 2014; Literat 2013: 200; IFAD 2009: 9-12, 39). Some indigenous groups are now using mapping to monitor and defend lands against deforestation, illegal timber extraction, prospecting, and colonization (Teague c. 2010: 10). Other purposes of participatory mapping activities include the strengthening of indigenous political organisation, economic development planning, the documentation of history and customs for culture preservation, education of indigenous youths and/or the general public (Chapin et al. 2005: 620), and support for conflict resolution in territory-related disputes (Di Gessa 2008).

What further distinguishes participatory mapping from traditional cartography and map-making is the process by which the maps are made (IFAD 2009: 4): Community members are involved (preferably) throughout the whole mapping process and recognized as capable research collaborators and experts on their own local surroundings and needs (IFAD 2009: 4; Pathways Through Participation 2010: 1). According to Fox *et al*. (2003, as cited in Wright *et al*. 2009: 261) the reasons for choosing a participatory mapping approach are usually not only practical (i.e. the actual production of the map and using it as evidence for land claims, or as community advocacy tools), but also intrinsic, as the communal aspect of the mapping process can enhance group awareness and cultural identity, facilitate the passing down of historical knowledge through generations, and build trust and communication between people.

[9] The numerous initiatives throughout the world aren't always referred to with the words 'participatory mapping', but can go by many different terms, including: "indigenous mapping" (IFAD 2009: 6) , "…"participatory land use mapping," "participatory resource mapping" (Mbile *et al*. 2003), "community mapping" (Bennagen & Royo 2000, Eghenter 2000, Fox 2002), "community-based mapping" (Flavelle 2002), "ethnocartography" (Chapin & Threlkeld 2001, Gonzalez *et al*. 1995), and "counter-mapping" (Peluso 1995, Kosek 1998, Hodgson & Schroeder 2002)…" (as cited in Chapin *et al*. 2005: 622-623).

Throughout the past decades, mapping has become increasingly popular and prominent (Pathways Through Participation 2010: 13), which "many commentators ascribe to the developments in Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) which emerged in the late 1980s in South Asia and combined insights from agro-ecosystem analysis with Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA)" (Ibid: 2).

Looking at the implementation of mapping projects, they usually loosely follow the following steps:

1. "**Ground preparation**: before the project starts project leaders and indigenous leaders explain the objectives and importance of the mapping work to the community, the technical team is recruited and collaboration with NGO's and government agencies is sought;
2. **First workshop – orientation and training**: Project staff and indigenous leaders explain the objectives and methodology to the surveyors and technical team and data collection tools are developed;
3. **First fieldwork – gathering data and sketch mapping**;
4. **Second workshop – transcription of data onto new maps**;
5. **Second fieldwork** – **verification of collected data by the community**; and
6. **Third workshop** – **correcting and completing final maps**: Surveyors reunite with the cartographers to incorporate information that has been verified in the field and put the draft maps in final form

(Chapin & Threlkeld 2001; IFAD 2009: 30).

Turning to the effectiveness of participatory mapping projects, over the years, many researchers have noted the positive impacts that participatory mapping can have on a community:

> Participation in mapping seems to have encouraged some indigenous communities to demand title to lands (Toledo Maya Cultural Council, 1997; Leake, 2000; Herlihy, 2003; Herlihy and Knapp, 2003), to defend and claim their rights to control natural resources (Smith, 2003; Brown, 2006), and to design conservation and resource management plans that are compatible with local practices (Mohamed and Ventura, 2000; McCall and Minang, 2005; Brown, 2006; Bauer, 2009). Researchers have argued that, in addition to producing maps, when implemented with a stress on participation and with facilitation of discussions within communities, indigenous mapping empowers indigenous peoples in land and resource use rights against potential encroachers (Poole, 2003; Smith, 2003; Brown, 2006; Finley-Brook, 2007) (Reyes-Garcia *et al*. ca. 2012a: 2-3).

In addition to these positive effects, researchers have also observed negative consequences resulting from participatory mapping. For instance, Authors such as Mwangi, Hodgson & Schroeder, Fox, Bryant, and Roth have noted issues such as increased privatization of land, loss of indigenous conceptions of space, greater exposure of valuable natural resources, increased taxation by the state, and increase or intensification of conflicts, either within the village, with neighbouring villages, or with other external actors such as companies or governmental authorities (Reyes-Garcia *et al*. 2012b: 651). Increase of conflicts due to participatory mapping, is one of the most frequently reported drawbacks of participatory mapping. Researchers such as Offen, Peluso, Hale, and Vandergeest have argued that: "Participatory mapping might intensify internal conflicts because it might bring to light overlapping uses of land and resources or erode traditional ways of dealing with internal conflicts…" (Ibid). Furthermore, it has been reasoned by i.a. Peluso and Rundstrom that "…participatory mapping might increase the

number of conflicts with external actors, as the maps produced might challenge the maps made by state and corporate authorities" (Ibid).

Reyes-Garcia *et al*. have attempted to validate the theory that participatory mapping systematically increases the number of conflicts, using an experimental research design whereby 32 native Amazonian villages with and without conflicts with outsiders were randomly assigned to a treatment group (those where a participatory mapping project would be implemented by them) and a control group (those where a participatory mapping project would not (yet) be implemented by them[10]).[11] Contrary to others' previous findings, the results of their research show no statistically significant differences in the measured variables (i.e. number of conflicts, negative opinion, neutral attitude, and negative attitudes towards outsiders) between treatment and control villages (2012b: 656).

Reyes-Garcia *et al*. explain their deviating results by arguing that previous studies, which were based on direct observations rather than a randomized experimental design, might have been subject to selection bias, because the villages participating in participatory mapping projects are generally the ones that are chosen or volunteering to participate in participatory mapping due to the fact that they are expected to experience – or are already experiencing – conflicts over land rights and resources (2012b: 651, 656). Their results support the argument that mapping projects do not bring about conflicts per se, rather "…the process and the results of participatory mapping can help in conflict resolution or contribute to conflict generation or exacerbation depending on the political and socio-economic context in which they are conducted" (Ibid: 657).

# 3. The project

## 3.1. Project description

NTFP-EP is a collaborative network of NGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs) working for the common goal of empowering and increasing the capacity of forest-based communities to make use of and to manage forest resources in a sustainable manner. [12] The motivation behind NTFP-EP can be summarized as: "Do not ask the community not to do the destructive logging if we cannot afford to give them a proper alternative income from the forest which they live within this long..."[13] Usually partner organisations that have a strong connection with the local communities work directly with the forest-dependent communities, while NTFP-EP itself catalyses and supports activities that build up and strengthen the capacity of the partner organisations.

The 'Up-scaling sustainable, community-based forest livelihoods in Kalimantan' project of Non-Timber Forest Products Exchange Programme (NTFP-EP) funded by IUCN of Ecosystem Alliance - and selected

[10] For the sake of fairness, participatory mapping projects were also implemented in the control villages, but only after all research data for the post-intervention study had been collected (Reyes-Garcia *et al.* 2012b: 653).
[11] All these villages were located in Tsimane' territory. The Tsimane' are a native Amazonian society of foragers and farmers in Bolivia.
[12] Source: http://www.ntfp.org/sub.php?gosub=about-bg
[13] Source: http://www.ntfp.or.id/home_eng.html

for the MFS II evaluation – is implemented between 15 September 2011 and 30 June, 2015.[14] It worked with a group of implementing NGOs in four project locations in Kalimantan. The details of the sub-projects at the various locations can be found in Annex I.

The evaluation focuses on one of these areas, where NTFP-EP is directly involved in the project implementation: the promotion of Eco-culture in Sintang. In the first year, the main activity is participatory mapping for the protection of eco-cultural sites (from oil palm expansion) especially for the Jerenang and Enpait trees that are used for natural dyes (of weaving) in 4 priority sites in Sintang district (West Kalimantan province). Then, the maps will serve as an example and guidance for eco-cultural zone planning workshops with the local government. The expected end result is that community forests with high eco-cultural value will be acknowledged by the local government and preserved by the indigenous communities as they recognise the ecological and cultural value of the forests and its contribution to their livelihood through sustainable non-timber forest product (NTFP) production. Using the project sites as examples, NTFP-EP and its partners hope that a network of eco-cultural forest sites (scattered among the converted forest areas) can be established and preserved for future generations.

The project in Sintang is a collaboration of NTFP-EP, JMM[15], PRCF[16] and Kobus Foundation[17]. NTFP-EP provides the know-how on participatory mapping and consultations with the local government regarding eco-cultural zonation, while JMM and PRCF implement the mapping with the communities.

## 3.2. Project implementation

In Sintang, the project started with the selection of the 4 project sites selected for participatory mapping. The sites were chosen based on a number of criteria: the site has a great ecological function (watershed, species biodiversity, source of natural dye and medicines); the site has great cultural function (for example, sacred forest, area where cultural activities will take place); the site is in extreme danger of conversion (classified as APL); the site is located on peat land; the community needs the area to be protected and rejects oil palm plantations; and there is interest from the community to establish an area management unit.

The participatory mapping of the selected forest areas in the 4 project villages were carried out between March and September 2012. First, NTFP-EP trained facilitators of JMM and PRCF in the process of participatory mapping. Some community leaders have also participated in the workshop on how to take coordinates with a Global Positioning System (GPS). After the socialization of the project, the recording

[14] The project was supposed to end on 15 March 2014, but the project period was extended until 30 June, 2015 because the full project budget has not yet been spent (NTFP EP wants to use the remaining funds of about EUR 9.000 for among others the eco-certification trip – based on correspondence with IUCN NL). In addition, the frequent turnover of persons in charge in the local government made the project difficult to achieve.

[15] The name of JMM translates to 'Independent Weaving Services', and as it names says the cooperative works with approximately 400 weavers (women) in Sintang. It acts as a marketing node but it is also committed to quality improvement of the woven cloths, for example through the promotion of natural dye producing tree cultivation.

[16] PRCF is an NGO dedicated to the promotion of conservation, protection and wise use of natural resources through a sustainable social and economic development. It is also committed to developing and facilitating Dayak weaving activities in Sintang.

[17] Kobus Foundation is not directly involved in the participatory mapping activities, as it is a cultural foundation on promoting traditional (especially, weaving) culture. However, it contributes to the consultations on eco-cultural zoning in Sintang.

the coordinates of boundaries and other significant sites (for example, sacred sites and sites of natural dye trees) took place in July and August of 2012. The facilitators of JMM and PRCF were also actively involved in this activity helping the communities to record the coordinates. From the coordinates, digital maps were prepared by JMM and PRCF with the help of NTFP-EP. The maps were completed and ready for submission to the local government in September 2012. The size of the mapped forest is summarized in Table 1: the largest forest areas are found in Ensaid Panjang village. In the other villages, some of the forests have already been converted but the communities want to preserve their remaining forest areas.

**Table 1: Size of the mapped forests**

| Village | Size of mapped forests | Mapped by NGO |
|---|---|---|
| Ensaid Panjang | 202.39 Ha | PRCF |
| Karya Jaya Bakti | 3.08 Ha | JMM |
| Gemba Raya | 32.37 Ha | JMM |
| Empaha Kebiau Raya | 37.58 Ha | JMM |
| Source: interview with project stakeholders | | |


Since the completion of the maps, the main task of the project has been to get the local government on board for the planning and development of the eco-cultural zones. The communities are not involved in this activity as it is at a higher level. Meetings have been conducted at the district level with the government and NGOs related to eco-cultural zonation to seek opportunities of support for the initiative. However, NTFP-EP did not yet succeeded in securing the approval of the government for the mapped community forests until the end of 2014 due to the dynamics of local politics in Sintang. Also, the planned workshop with the government on the landscape model of eco-cultural zones for sustainable livelihood options have not yet been conducted for the same reason.[18] Hence, the project did not achieve its final objective during the project period. Nonetheless, the issue remains important for the implementing NGOs who will further promote this cause.

Turning to the promotion of sustainable livelihood activities in the project areas, the focus of the project is on the promotion of traditional weaving techniques. To this end, the project organised a field visit for the partner organisations to Sumatra to exchange knowledge and learn natural dyeing techniques. However, the project is not directly involved in training activities on sustainable livelihood activities in the communities. Such activities of JMM and PRCF are funded by another project.

Figure 1 summarizes the project periods and the evaluation activities. Further information about the implementation of the project in Sintang can be found in Annex VI containing the qualitative evaluation report of the NTFP-EP project.

[18] At local level, actually there are several activities done by the project, ie.: audience with district head on April 17, 2013. Project also had audiences with several head of offices to report the project activities and to get local government support on policy to protect eco-zonation.

**Figure 1: Timing of the intervention and the evaluation**





## 3.3. Result chain

A schematic representation of the result chain for the NTFP-EP project in Sintang is displayed in Figure 2. The figure is based on the interpretation of the project by the evaluation team. As mentioned before, the ultimate goal of the project is to empower forest-based communities to use and manage their forest resources in a sustainable way. In the project in Sintang this goal is achieved by establishing an example of a landscape level model of ecological and culture-based livelihood and conservation theme, and thus preserving and promoting eco-cultural sustainable livelihoods.

Three types of project activities working at different levels (community, NGOs and CBOs and government) bring forward the desired outcome. Firstly, participatory mapping of community forests results in a map of the threatened forest areas. Communities benefit from this map by having agreed on the boundaries with neighbouring villages and plantation companies. Hence, they may feel already more secure about their claims as it is recognised by their neighbours. In addition, the mapping process raises the community's awareness regarding the cultural and ecological values of their forests by mapping sites of cultural, ecological and economic value.

However, the tenure status of the communities is secured only when the government – who decides on the use of APL land – recognises the community forests. To achieve this outcome, the project needs to lobby at local government. This activity is part of the consultation and workshops with the local government on the landscape model approach, which is inter-linked with the results of the mapping process.

**Figure 2: Stylized result chain**




The motivation behind the landscape model approach is that "the mapping of the eco-cultural area will lead to improved awareness of the importance of the area for ecological and cultural significance. This will lead to discussions with other stakeholders such as companies which may have permits in the area and the government. As companies are required to have high conservation value forests (HCVF) off limits to conversion and ecological destructive activities, the project proposes that companies provide these areas to the communities who are already managing these areas through a signed agreement. In some of these areas, such a verbal agreement already exists. This signed agreement, to be confirmed by the local government, will strengthen the communities' tenure over the area and provide more long term incentive for forest management."[19]

At the margin, the project also involves the capacity building of the partner organisations (PRCF and JMM) in sustainable livelihood activities in the form of a field visit to Sumatra to learn about forest plants that provide natural dyes to be used in weaving. However, the project is not directly involved in sustainable livelihood trainings and workshops for direct beneficiaries (like a group of weavers).

## 3.4. Possible unintended impacts

Possible negative unintended effects of the project are that the discussions surrounding forest management brings out conflicts with other stakeholders which are then resolved in a way that counters the community's interests.

[19] Source: correspondence with NTFP-EP in 2012.

# 4. Evaluation questions and outcome variables

## 4.1. Evaluation questions

The call for proposals outlines 5 general evaluation questions. In the baseline report specific evaluations questions were specified. Table 2 shows these five questions and what it implies for this project.

**Table 2: Overview general and specific evaluation questions**

| Number | General evaluation question | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Change: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period? | A. How did the size of sustainably managed forest area change?<br>B. How did the management structure of community forest areas change?<br>C. How did the attitude and awareness of households change towards natural resource management?<br>D. Do the communities feel more empowered to protect and manage their natural resources?<br>E. Are the landscape models and conservation schemes protecting ecological and cultural heritage in the community?<br>F. Are landscape models recognised by the local government? |
| 2 | Attribution: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)? | Are the observed changes above attributable to the intervention? |
| 3 | Relevance of change: What is the relevance of these changes? | • The size of the impact<br>• Does the project address an important issue for the beneficiaries?<br>• Satisfaction of beneficiaries (self-reported impact) |
| 4 | Efficiency: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient? | Was the intervention cost effective? |
| 5 | Explanations: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above? | Why did things work out/not work out?<br>The evaluation question is answered throughout the other evaluation questions and in the end discussion. |

The evaluation questions are loosely linked to the result chain discussed in section 3.3 and the project logic. Question A and B relate to the sustainable management of forest at the villages, which is expected as a result of the mapping activity. These questions are investigated at the community level. Questions C and D investigate how the mapping has affected the general population of the project areas: do they feel more empowered and secure about their land? Are they more aware of the importance of their natural resources? Question E relates to the efforts to bring culture and sustainable use of forest closer together, mainly through the promotion of weaving using natural dyes. Finally, questions F relates to the project activities related to lobbying and consultations with the government. We investigate these questions though project reports and qualitative interviews with project stakeholders.

## 4.2. Outcome indicators

To answer the first two evaluation questions (change and attribution) we identified specific outcome indicators. The outcome indicators are split up into 6 sub-sections following the sub questions listed from A to F in Table 2. Note that in particular for question E, the outcomes related to cultural heritage, it is likely that the observed changes have also been affected by training activities related to traditional crafts. These trainings are also linked to MSF II funds, but only partly not through the NTFP-EP project under the Ecosystem Alliance (IUCN NL).[20] They formed an integral part of the strategy of NTFP—EP. Therefore, we decided to include these outcomes in the analysis.

Regarding the indicator on the number of people involved in traditional crafts, we expected that the project will work on sustainable livelihood activities. However, as discussed before, the NTFP-EP project does not directly work with individual producers. Therefore, any change in this indicator cannot be attributed to the NTFP-EP project.

Table 3 displays the outcome indicators of the main analysis, the scale of these variables and whether the indicator is a uniform indicator, while Annex II describes the outcome indicators in more detail and highlights the components per index. The uniform indicators are specified by the synthesis team for the goals on sustainable living environment, forests and biodiversity (MDG 7a and 7b). For all outcome variables 'the higher, the better' rule applies.

**Table 3: Overview outcome indicators**

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Source | Uniform indicator |
|---|---|---|---|
| **A. How did the size of sustainably managed forest area change?** | | | X |
| Number of villages that report that their forest size has [increased/stayed the same/ decreased] in the past 2 years] | (decrease;increase) | Community survey | |
| Number of villages with efforts at reforestation | (0;n) | Community survey | |
| Index for planning and forest protection | (0;n) | Community survey | |
| Number of villages with efforts at forest protection (protection of endangered species) | (0;n) | Community survey | |
| **B. How did the management structure of community forest areas change?** | | | |
| Existence of regulations about the use and protection of the community forests in the village | (0;n) | Community survey | |
| Percentage of forest area protected | (0-100%) | Community survey | |
| Regulated activities in the community forest | (0;n) | Community survey | |
| Meetings about community forest use and management in the past 12 months | (0;n) | Community survey | |

[20] Trainings on traditional crafts can be linked to Crafts Kalimantan (CK), which is a network which is facilitated by NTFP-EP Indonesia. The work of this network was funded by Cordaid (out of MFS II funds), through funds managed by Both ENDS. Furthermore, CK staff involved in training activities (for example, harvest protocols for natural dyes in Sintang) is partly funded by the EA – IUCN-NL.

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Source | Uniform indicator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Regulations are communicated by community meetings, signs at the forest, farmer group meetings or a letter | (0;n) | Community survey | |
| Regulations are communicated to all villagers (including women and children) | (0;n) | Community survey | |
| Regulations are taught at school | (0;n) | Community survey | |
| Percentage of respondents who report that there are any rules/regulations about the use of community forests in the village | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| Satisfaction with regulations | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| **C. How did the attitude and awareness of households change towards natural resource management?** | | | |
| Dependence on forest resources | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| Index for positive attitude towards sustainable forest use | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| Index for positive attitude towards sustainable forest use (community survey) | (-2;2) | Community survey | |
| Index for access to forest resources | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| Percentage of respondents who think that an oil palm plantation in the village is/can be beneficial for him/her and his/her family | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| Index for positive attitude towards oil palm plantations | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| **D. Do the communities feel more empowered to protect and manage their natural resources?** | | | |
| Index for sense of control regarding their own life | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| Index for sense of control regarding land | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| **E. Are the landscape models and conservation schemes protecting ecological and cultural heritage in the community?** | | | X |
| Number of people involved in traditional crafts | (0;NM) | Community survey | |
| **F. Are landscape models recognised by the local government?** | | | |
| Number of villages where community forests have been approved by government | (0;n) | Interviews and project documents | |
| Notes: NM = no minimum/maximum, n is the number of villages in either the treatment group or the comparison group | | | |

# 5. Data collection

## 5.1. Survey instruments

We collected three types of data: quantitative, qualitative and financial. The following paragraphs list the survey instruments used for each type of data.

### *Quantitative data*

To analyse the impact of the programmes, two surveys have been conducted to collect quantitative data:

- Respondent survey: A short survey was administered with randomly selected community members regarding attitudes towards natural resources, land related conflicts and the respondents' sense of control.
- Community survey: the community survey was administered together with the household surveys both during the baseline and endline period. The head of the community or another local leader was interviewed regarding matters of the community.

The baseline data have been collected in the end of October and beginning of November in 2012; while the endline data was collected in the half of October 2014.

### *Qualitative data*

To gain more insight into the implementation and the impacts of the NTFP-EP project in Sintang qualitative field work was conducted in April 2014. In-depth interviews were conducted with the implementing NGOs (NTFP-EP, PRCF and JMM) and local leaders. In addition, focus group discussions have been conducted with men and women participating the project activities. The results of this study are summarized in Annex VI.

### *Financial data*

To collect information about the costs of the NTFP-EP project, we conducted a project cost survey with executive director and finance officer of NTFP-EP on 14 March 2014.

## 5.2. Sampling outcome

### *Sampling design*

For the evaluation we surveyed all treatment villages. At the time of setting up the evaluation, we expected that 6 villages will participate in the project. The sampling design has been made with this assumption. In each of the 6 villages, we conducted interviews with community leaders (community survey) and randomly selected community members (household survey).

For the respondent survey, 20 people per village were interviewed. Hence, the total sample size in the 6 villages in 120. The sample size was planned to be stratified by gender, involvement in the project activity and location: 7 respondents are randomly selected among the participants of the mapping activity. The remaining 14 respondents are stratified by gender (7 male and 7 female), and they are randomly sampled from the population of the communities involved in the project.[21]

[21] The reasons for stratification are that we were interested whether females and males benefit equally from the project, and whether the project was able to reach all villagers not only the ones participating in the mapping.

For the endline survey, we planned to re-interview the same respondents as much as possible. However, if some of the baseline respondents could not be interviewed, we replaced them by a randomly selected community member with similar characteristics in terms of gender and age.

### *Sampling outcome*

Due to a misunderstanding of project documents, we sampled 6 villages instead of the actual 4 project villages. Hence, we have two additional villages that could serve as a comparison group. However, these villages are neighbouring one of the project villages, therefore they can be better considered as areas that could indirectly learn and benefit from the project (spillover). Due to the small sample size (number of villages), we are not able to use statistical analysis between the treatment and spillover group.

Table 4 summarizes the sample sizes already taking into account the changes in the treatment status of villages. In both the baseline and endline period the planned number of households have been interviewed (120 in total). The last column of the table (panel sample) shows the number of respondents that were interviewed both for the baseline and endline survey. In the treatment villages, 71 (89%) of the baseline respondents were re-interviewed, while this number is 35 (86%) in the spillover villages.

In the treatment villages, 5 of the baseline respondents have moved out of the village and 2 were away working outside of the village. In the spillover villages, 2 of the baseline respondents were travelling, 2 moved out of the village and 2 were away of the village due to work.

**Table 4: Sampling outcome**

| Assignment group | Villages | Respondents baseline | Respondents endline | Panel sample |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Treatment | 4 | 80 | 80 | 71 |
| Spillover | 2 | 40 | 40 | 34 |
| **Total** | **4** | **80** | **80** | **105** |

Source: Household survey E3, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

In the data analysis, we use data from all respondents when discussing the baseline and endline outcomes separately. However, when reporting on the change in variables or performing statistical tests on the significance of the change, we only use the so called *panel sample*, respondents for we have two rounds of data.

# 6. Descriptive statistics

This section summarizes the main characteristics of the sample using the baseline and endline surveys. In addition, the exposure of villages to mapping and natural resource management activities is discussed.

## 6.1. Community characteristics

All project locations are small remote villages in Sintang district, West Kalimantan Province. The area is a transmigration area, therefore the local indigenous Dayak population is mixed with migrants from Java. The livelihood of people depends on rubber and rice farming. The villages are surrounded by oil palm plantations, where some of the villagers work in their free time. However, all project communities reject oil palm plantations as they realize that such plantations only damage environment and bring no advantages for the people. In fact, in one of the project villages (Karya Jaya Bakti) some forest plots have been converted to oil plantations but the companies failed to deliver their promises of building a school and health centre in the village.

In one of the project villages (Ensaid Panjang village) there still exists a traditional Dayak long house and some of the women are still involved in the tradition craft of weaving. This village also still has a large forest area because the community has rejected oil palm companies.

In the potential spillover locations, people also live from rubber, rice and corn farming. However, in these villages most of the community forests have been already turned to oil palm plantations, and only a small area of the forests still remain.

Further details about the project locations can be found in Annex III and in Annex VI for the 3 project villages where the qualitative field work was conducted.

## 6.2. Interventions in villages

Next, we turn to describing the type of project activities that have taken place during the evaluation period. We are particularly interested in activities related to natural resource management and land mapping.

Table 5 summarizes the number of villages that reported forest mapping activities and natural resource management related trainings and meetings in the past 2 years. As discussed in section 3.2, the mapping activities for the project have been finalized already before the baseline survey (September 2012). Therefore, it is not surprising that while all 4 treatment villages report forest mapping activities prior to the baseline, only 2 of the villages still report such activities after the baseline survey (October 2012). In both villages the mapping activities have been organised by PRCF and JMM in 2012 or 2013. In the spillover villages, while one village reported mapping by PRCF in 2011, no mapping activities took place over the past 2 years.

One treatment village (Ensaid Panjang) takes natural resource management very seriously observing the number of workshops and trainings organised in the village on the issue: workshop on sustainable use of natural resources was organised in 2011 by JMM and in 2014 by KOBUS, while awareness raising campaigns were organised by the village apparatus in 2011, 2012 and 2013. In addition, the village has organised trainings on eco-forestry with Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia or Indonesian Forum for Environment (WALHI), PRCF (endline survey) and other organisations (PLHD and TITAN) in 2012.

Only one other treatment village (Karya Jaya Bakti) received trainings on sustainable use of natural resources organised by JMM in 2013, while one potential spillover village organised an awareness raising campaign in 2013.

**Table 5: Trainings related to natural resource management and mapping**

| Assignment group | Treatment | | Spillover | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sample size | (n=4) | | (n=2) | |
| Survey year | Base | End | Base | End |
| **Natural resource management related trainings and workshops in the last two years:** | | | | |
| *Forest/natural resource mapping* | 4 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| *Awareness raising campaigns about use and protection of natural resources* | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| *Training on natural resource management* | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| *Training on sustainable use of natural resources* | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| *Training on eco-forestry* | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |

Source: Community survey E3, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

In addition to the activities mentioned above, the community leader in Ensaid Panjang village further mentioned that PRCF has assisted the village in planting trees for natural dyeing material and organised meetings on land rights in 2012 and 2013. Other NGO's, such as WWF, TITIAN and SPKS Sintang, were involved in the planting of trees as well and they are excited about the project. Also Karya Jaya Bakti village indicated the PRCF and JMM organised land right workshops in the village in the past 2 years. Overall, in all 4 treatment villages community leaders indicated that PRCF, JMM or KOBUS organised natural resource management activities over the past 2 years in their village. In addition, also one of the potential spillover villages indicated that PRCF conducted activities related to natural resource management and sustainable livelihood in the village (the same village where mapping has been conducted in 2011). No other type of activities where organised by non-governmental organisations in the survey villages over the past 3 years.

Summarizing the above, it emerges that one treatment village (Ensaid Panjang) is very committed to protecting and preserving its natural resources. There are also many activities related to natural resource management organised in this village outside the scope of the NTFP-EP project, albeit implemented by the same local NGOs as this project. Our data shows that PRCF and JMM have been working with the project villages already for a longer time. While the NTFP-EP project focuses on the forest mapping activity, these local NGOs also assist the villages (including one of the potential spillover villages) in other natural resource management related issues. Hence, if we find an improvement in the outcome indicators it will show the impact of all the activities of JMM and PRCF in the villages and not only of the activities of the NTFP-EP project.

## 6.3. Respondent characteristics

To provide a better insight into the characteristics of the respondents, Table 6 displays their socio-economic characteristics including age, gender, the main economic activity of the respondent, and the distance from the household to forests.

The left side of Table 6 shows the characteristics of the respondents in the four treatment villages at the baseline survey (Base), at the endline survey (End), and for respondents that have been interviewed in both survey rounds (panel sample) the difference in their endline and baseline responses (Change). Therefore, the values in the change column can be different from the difference of the variables at the end- and baseline. The significance of the change is also reported (p-value) for the panel sample. The P-value shows the probability that the change in the variable is zero. Hence, if the p-value is small (say smaller than 5%), it indicates that the change is significantly different from zero (at 5% significance level).[22] The same statistics are also reported for the potential spillover group in the right side of the table. We do not compare the results of the treatment and spillover groups with each other.

In Table 6, we do not expect the distribution of characteristics to change between the baseline and endline period except for age: 2 years have gone by between the two survey rounds. This is quite precisely indicated in both treatment groups (1.9 vs. 2.1 years). No other significant changes in the socio-economic characteristics of the households are observed between the baseline and endline period.

However, an interesting developments in the project villages is that a significantly higher share of the respondents report that their household goes to the forest daily (39.2% at the endline vs. 12.5% at the baseline), and some of the respondents report to live closer to the forests at the endline than at the baseline.

**Table 6: General characteristics of the sample**

| **Assignment group** | **Treatment** | | | | **Spillover** | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| **Sample size** | 80 | 80 | 71 | 71 | 40 | 40 | 34 | 34 |
| Gender (% female) | 32.5 | 31.3 | -1.4 | 0.787 | 47.5 | 45 | 0.0 | |
| Age | 36.3 | 38.1 | 1.9** | 0.012 | 32.8 | 35.6 | 2.1* | 0.073 |
| Religion (%) | | | | | | | | |
| *Islamic* | 3.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 62.5 | 65 | 0.0 | |
| *Catholic* | 46.3 | 48.8 | 0.0 | | 12.5 | 10 | 0.0 | |
| *Protestant* | 50.0 | 51.3 | 0.0 | | 25 | 25 | 0.0 | |
| Marital status (%) | | | | | | | | |
| *Currently Married* | 87.5 | 85.0 | -2.8 | 0.206 | 90.0 | 87.5 | -2.9 | 0.518 |
| *Divorced* | 1.3 | 2.5 | 1.4 | 0.39 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| *Widowed* | 1.3 | 2.5 | 1.4 | 0.642 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| *Never Married* | 10.0 | 10.0 | 0.0 | | 10.0 | 12.5 | 2.9 | 0.518 |
| Highest level of education attended by the respondent (%) | | | | | | | | |

[22] In calculating the p-value, we used robust standard errors clustered at the village level.

| Assignment group | Treatment | | | | Spillover | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| **Sample size** | 80 | 80 | 71 | 71 | 40 | 40 | 34 | 34 |
| *Primary education* | 42.5 | 47.5 | 2.8 | 0.161 | 35.0 | 40.0 | 2.9 | 0.481 |
| *Secondary education* | 51.3 | 42.5 | -7.0** | 0.013 | 57.5 | 55.0 | 2.9 | 0.799 |
| *Higher education* | 5.0 | 8.8 | 4.2 | 0.224 | 7.5 | 5.0 | -5.9 | 0.518 |
| Main economic activity (%) | | | | | | | | |
| *Farming* | 73.8 | 66.3 | -8.5 | 0.183 | 45.0 | 42.5 | -5.9 | 0.518 |
| *Fishing* | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 2.5 | 0.0 | -2.9 | 0.518 |
| *Self-employed/family business* | 10.0 | 3.8 | -2.8 | 0.516 | 15.0 | 20.0 | -2.9 | 0.481 |
| *Casual worker in agriculture* | 3.8 | 0.0 | -4.2 | 0.382 | 2.5 | 0.0 | -2.9 | 0.518 |
| *Casual worker not in agriculture* | 1.3 | 2.5 | 1.4 | 0.374 | 7.5 | 5.0 | 0.0 | |
| *Worker in company* | 2.5 | 12.5 | 11.3 | 0.395 | 7.5 | 2.5 | -2.9 | 0.481 |
| *Teacher* | 0.0 | 1.3 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| *Civil servant* | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 2.5 | 2.9 | 0.518 |
| *Unemployed* | 0.0 | 1.3 | 0.0 | | 5.0 | 0.0 | -2.9 | 0.481 |
| *Housewife* | 7.5 | 12.5 | 4.2 | 0.468 | 15.0 | 25.0 | 14.7 | 0.161 |
| *Other* | 1.3 | 0.0 | -1.4 | 0.382 | 0.0 | 2.5 | 2.9 | 0.481 |
| Distance to the closest forest (%) | | | | | | | | |
| *Less than 100 m* | 1.3 | 2.5 | 0.0 | 1.000 | 0.0 | 7.5 | 2.9 | 0.481 |
| *Between 100-500 m* | 3.8 | 10.0 | 7.0 | 0.127 | 5.0 | 12.5 | 8.8 | 0.171 |
| *Between 500-1000 m* | 16.3 | 22.5 | 4.2 | 0.605 | 10.0 | 15.0 | 2.9 | 0.481 |
| *Between 1-2 km* | 31.3 | 38.8 | 7.0** | 0.017 | 20.0 | 30.0 | 14.7 | 0.518 |
| *More than 2 km* | 36.3 | 21.3 | -12.7*** | 0.003 | 22.5 | 25.0 | 0.0 | 1.000 |
| The respondent or another family member goes to the community forest […] (%) | | | | | | | | |
| *Almost every day* | 12.5 | 40.0 | 28.2*** | 0.002 | 20.0 | 37.5 | 17.6 | 0.697 |
| *Every week* | 15.0 | 15.0 | 0.0 | 1.000 | 7.5 | 25.0 | 14.7 | 0.371 |
| *Every month* | 30.0 | 25.0 | -7.0 | 0.272 | 5.0 | 25.0 | 20.6 | 0.289 |
| *Every year* | 32.5 | 15.0 | -16.9** | 0.025 | 25.0 | 2.5 | -23.5 | 0.265 |
| *Less than once a year* | 5.0 | 2.5 | -2.8 | 0.374 | 2.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| *Never been there* | 3.8 | 2.5 | 0.0 | | 5.0 | 10.0 | 5.9 | 0.799 |

Source: Household survey E3; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

# 7. Evaluation question 1: Change in outcomes

This section discusses evaluation question 1: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period? The changes in the outcome indicators for the period measured between the base- and endline survey (2012-2014) are grouped into 6 sub-sections: size of forests and number of villages with efforts at forest protection, management of natural resources, household's attitude towards natural resources, sense of control of villagers, number of people involved in traditional crafts and the number of villages where community forests were approved by the government. Some of the outcome indicators combine multiple variables into one index. The components of these indices are presented in Annex V.

Table 7 displays the results for the outcome indicators at the community level, while Table 8 displays indicators using the respondent surveys. For the tables at the community level, only the baseline and endline values are reported but not the change because of the small sample size (4 and 2 villages per treatment group).

At the respondent level, the changes in the outcome variables are reported as well (for the panel sample). The table structure is similar to the table on respondent characteristics with the exception that in Table 8 we also report on the standard error of the variables below the mean in parenthesis.

**Table 7: Outcome indicators at the community level**

| **Assignment group** | **Treatment** | | **Spillover** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Sample size** | (n=4) | | (n=2) | |
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | Base | End |
| **A. How did the size of sustainably managed forest area change?** | | | | |
| Number of villages that report that their forest size […] in the past two years | | | | |
| *Decreased* | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| *Stayed the same* | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| *Increased* | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Number of villages with efforts at reforestation | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Index for planning and forest protection | 0 | 1.5 | 0 | 0 |
| Number of villages with protection of endangered species | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| **B. How did the management structure of community forest areas change?** | | | | |
| Existence of regulations about the use and protection of the community forests in the village | 4 | 4 | 2 | 1 |
| Percentage of forest area protected | 57 | 100 | 25.9 | 98 |
| Regulated activities in the community forest | | | | |
| *Logging* | 4 | 4 | 2 | 1 |
| *Firewood collection* | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| *Collection of other fruits and plants* | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| *Hunting* | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| *Access to forest* | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |

| **Assignment group** | **Treatment** | | **Spillover** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Sample size** | (n=4) | | (n=2) | |
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | Base | End |
| *Sale of trees* | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| *Conversion of forest into agricultural land* | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Meetings about community forest use and management in the past 12 months | 4 | 4 | 0 | 1 |
| Regulations are communicated to the villagers by […] | | | | |
| *Community meetings* | 4 | 4 | 2 | 1 |
| *Signs at forest* | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| *Farmer group meetings* | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| *Letter* | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Regulations are communicated to all villagers (including women and children) | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Regulations are taught at school | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **C. How did the attitude and awareness of households change towards natural resource management?** | | | | |
| Index for a positive attitude towards sustainable forest use (scale -2 to +2) | 0.875 | 1.625 | 1.25 | 1 |
| **E. Are the landscape models and conservation schemes protecting ecological and cultural heritage in the community?** | | | | |
| Number of people involved in traditional crafts | 537 | 274 | 148 | 55 |
| **F. Are landscape models recognised by the local government?** | | | | |
| Number of villages where community forests have been approved by government | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Source: Community survey E3, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes:

1. For the treatment villages, the size of 2 of the 15 community forest plots is not known in the baseline.
2. When calculating the percentage of forest area protected, the size of 2 of the 13 protected community forest plots is not known in the baseline for the treatment villages.

**Table 8: Change in outcome indicators for the respondents**

| Assignment group | Treatment | | | | Spillover | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| **Sample size** | 80 | 80 | 71 | 71 | 40 | 40 | 34 | 34 |
| **B. How did the management structure of community forest areas change?** | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of respondents who report that there are any rules/regulations about the use of community forests in the village | 97.5 (15.7) | 92.5 (26.5) | -5.6* (28.7) | 0.066 | 70.0 (46.4) | 92.5 (26.7) | 23.5** (60.6) | 0.037 |
| Satisfaction with regulations (scale -2 to +2) | -0.2 (1.0) | 0.3 (1.1) | 0.5 (1.4) | 0.142 | 0.2[1] (1.1) | -0.3 (1.1) | -0.6[2] (1.5) | 0.217 |
| **C. How did the attitude and awareness of households change towards natural resource management?** | | | | | | | | |
| Dependence on forest resources (scale -2 to +2) | 0.5 (1.0) | 0.7 (1.1) | 0.2 (1.2) | 0.349 | -0.5 (0.9) | 0.4 (1.3) | 0.9*** (1.3) | 0.005 |
| Index for positive attitude towards sustainable forest use (scale -2 to +2) | 0.7 (0.6) | 0.7 (0.5) | -0.1 (0.7) | 0.257 | 0.9 (0.5) | 0.9 (0.5) | -0.0 (0.6) | 0.951 |
| Index for access to forest resources (scale -2 to +2) | 1.1 (0.4) | 1.2 (0.4) | 0.0 (0.4) | 0.568 | 0.7 (0.7) | 0.9 (0.5) | 0.3* (0.8) | 0.078 |
| Percentage of respondents who think that an oil palm plantation in the village is/can be beneficial for him/her and his/her family | 36.3 (48.4) | 37.5 (48.7) | 2.8 (53.4) | 0.848 | 40.0 (49.6) | 47.5 (50.6) | 5.9** (42.2) | 0.037 |
| Index for positive attitude towards oil palm plantations (scale -2 to +2) | -0.8 (0.7) | -0.9 (1.0) | -0.1 (1.0) | 0.742 | -0.1 (1.0) | -0.3 (1.0) | -0.1 (0.9) | 0.694 |
| **D. Do the communities feel more empowered to protect and manage their natural resources?** | | | | | | | | |
| Index for sense of control regarding their own life (scale -2 to +2) | 1.0 (0.7) | 0.8 (0.6) | -0.3 (0.9) | 0.132 | 1.0 (0.7) | 0.7 (0.6) | -0.3 (1.0) | 0.339 |
| Index for sense of control regarding land (scale -2 to +2) | 1.2 (0.4) | 1.2 (0.6) | 0.0 (0.6) | 0.934 | 1.0 (0.4) | 1.2 (0.5) | 0.2 (0.6) | 0.596 |

Source: Household survey E3; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

1. Sample size deviates, the number of observations is 39
2. Sample size deviates, the number of observations is 33

### *How did the size of sustainably managed forest area change?*

Regarding the size of forests, unfortunately, most of the communities did not consistently report on the size of the forest area[23] Therefore, we are not able to quantify the changes in forest size in an indicator. Instead, we report on responses from community leaders on whether the community forest size increased, stayed the same, or decreased in the past two years. The results show more favourable trends in the spillover villages than in the treatment villages. Three out of 4 community leaders in the treatment villages report that forest size has decreased while one report that it stayed the same. In spillover communities no such negative reports are observed. These negative reports are confirmed in the qualitative study (conducted only in treatment villages). Respondents reported a "rapid decline in the number of native trees, plants and animals", and that "oil palm plantations cut down many trees and this created a water shortage" (see Annex III).

On the other hand, we see a small improvement in how sustainable the forests are managed. At endline, about 2 out of the 4 treatment villages reported efforts at reforestation, plan forest protection and protect endangered species. The result on forest protection is based on an index constructed from three variables related to whether there is a map on natural resources in the village, a special planning programme and a forest protection and conservation programme. At baseline, none of the treatment villages reported to conduct such planning, at endline (on average) 1.5 village did. In the spillover villages, we observed no change in how sustainable the forests were managed.

### *How did the management structure of community forest areas change?*

The main striking finding for the forest management outcome variable is the large increase protected forest in community leaders report. At endline, both in treatment and spillover communities, almost all of the forest lands are considered protected. This is in line with the findings on sustainable management on forest land, which also improved.

Further, there are no clear trends visible comparing the treatment and spillover groups. In all 4 treatment communities there were community meetings about forest land, both at baseline and endline. In the spillover communities, this only happened in half of the villages at endline. Logging is generally regulated. At the household level, villagers report that there are rules and regulations on the use of forest land. At endline, both in treatment and spillover communities, the large majority of villagers report that there are regulations regarding the use of community forests. For this variable, the increase has been the largest in the spillover communities.

[23] For the treatment villages, the size of two of the 15 community forest plots is not known at the baseline. In addition, the reported total area of community forests and the reported total size of community forest plots differ a lot, which should be the same (559.2 ha and 1366.5 ha respectively at the endline for the treatment villages). Also, one of the treatment villages reports on having no forest at the endline, while it says that it does have community forest plots. Perhaps the people who were interviewed for the evaluation, have not been involved in the participatory mapping in the EA project, or they may have misunderstood the question because in some villages other organisations had done mapping activities.

### *How did the attitude and awareness of households change towards natural resource management?*

Most attitude variables come from question posing statements, and asking respondents to indicate whether they agree or disagree on a -2 to 2 scale. The variables have been scaled so that +2 always refers to an outcome in line with project objectives (except for the index on oil palm plantations).

There are few remarkable changes in attitudes regarding natural resource management over time. Generally households have a somewhat positive attitude regarding the sustainable management of forests. The reports from the community leaders are more positive. They report a substantial increase in treatment villages and a small decrease in spillover villages. At endline, the levels were all rather high in the 1-2 range, on the -2 to 2 scale.

Regarding oil palm plantations, households in treatment communities are generally more critical compared to the households in spillover communities. Both in baseline and endline, around 38 percent of households in treatment communities think that oil palm plantations can be beneficial for their family, and the index towards oil palm plantation is clearly negative. Treatment communities on the other hand are more neutral about oil palm on plantations and at endline, the 48 percent thought oil palm plantations could be beneficial for their family.

### *Do the communities feel more empowered to protect and manage their natural resources?*

Two indices were constructed to assess the sense of control of villagers. The first related to their own life, and the second related to the village lands. For both indices, the indices have values around 1, indicating that households feel like they are in control of their lives, and land. There are no noticeable changes across treatment and spillover groups, not across baseline and endline.

### *Are the landscape models and conservation schemes protecting ecological and cultural heritage in the community?*

Table 7 reports the number of people involved in traditional crafts. While the use of natural dyes is substantially higher in treatment villages compared to spillover villages, both groups saw a decline in this art over the project period. According to community leaders, the number has decreased over the project period, both in treatment and spillover villages. In treatment villages the number of people is substantially higher, 274 people in treatment versus 55 in spillover villages. The villager survey confirms these patterns. Table 15 in Annex IV reports on how the forest contributes to the family's livelihood. The use for natural dye declined in both groups. At endline, in treatment villages 36 percent of households reported to use the forest for this purpose, while in spillover villages 3 percent did so.

There are however some other reports on the use of forest land which could indicate a positive impact of the project. Again referring to Table 15, the use of the forest for getting wood for building and manufacturing has declined by 31 percent in treatment villages, which could be both as a result of the declining size of the forest, or the increased conservation of remaining forest. At the same time, there is a substantial increase in the number of people who report to go the community forest almost every day (18 percentage point, see Table 6). But it is not so clear for what purpose this is. In the use of the forest questions (Table 15), the "other "category increased the most (18 percentage point).

***Are landscape models recognised by the local government?***

None of the forest maps had been recognized by the regional government. Only the four treatment villages have requested the approval of the government for the mapped community forests. Their application is supported by the forest management society supports the application. However, the project has not yet been successful in securing the approval of community forest areas due political dynamics at the sub-district.

It seems like that there is a positive attitude in villages on the sustainable use of community forests. People are aware of rules regarding forest use a

In addition, one of the potential spillover villages has also signalled its intention to preserve its community forests.

# 8. Evaluation question 2: Attribution of changes

This subsection discusses evaluation question 2: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?

## 8.1. Methodology

We use before-after methodology for the evaluation of the NTFP-EP project complemented with a qualitative survey. We have not sampled any comparison villages because the small sample size would not allow statistical analysis of the differences between the treatment and comparison group. Instead, we opted for using mixed methods: complement the quantitative survey with in-depth interviews to understand the driving factors behind the changes in the outcome indicators.

In addition, we rely on the results chain discussed in section 3.3 to validate the impacts of the project on the outcome variables: only if the changes in the outcome variables are accompanied by improvements or accomplishment of the outputs and intermediate results of the project can we attribute changes to the project (necessary but not sufficient condition).

## 8.2. Results

The data indicate that the project has been implemented seriously. Over half of the respondents in treatment villages knew of participatory mapping, and over 40 percent participated. The qualitative study, however, indicates that the maps have not been used much in the villages.[24] Instead, the NGO has focused on getting maps legalized at the local government in order to obtain more land security for community forest. Unfortunately, to date, this strategy has not been successful. Despite the maps, land disputes with neighbouring villages are still common. This possibly could have been avoided if the NGO had given more attention to creating ownership of the maps among villagers. In addition, Table 20 shows that land disputes with businesses has increased during the evaluation period.

[24] One explanation for this could be that, at the community level, there could have already been clear maps and boundaries of the land before the mapping. However, this information is often ignored by oil palm companies and the government. That is the reason why the project is focusing on getting maps legalized by the local government in order to increase land security for communities.

We generally observe a quite high awareness among villagers on the importance of using the forest in a sustainable way. Most of the remaining forest land is considered protected. People are aware of rules regarding the use of the forest. This awareness raising was an objective of the project and seems to have been successful, although the levels did not change much over the evaluation period. Therefore, it can be argued that any impact that the project had on the attitude of villagers regarding natural resources has been already realized prior to the baseline survey. As a consequence, changes (between the baseline and endline period) in the communities' attitude and practice towards natural resource management cannot be attributed to the NTFP-EP project but rather to other activities of JMM and PRCF in the project communities.

Nonetheless, data from the qualitative study indicates that the mapping process has helped the communities to realize how dependent they are on their forest resources – on plants just as well as animals –, and it made them more aware of the importance of preserving their forests. Hence, qualitative data suggests that the project was partially successful in this dimension.

Unfortunately, the project has not been successful in protecting community forests. The treatment villages report decreases in forest land, which is confirmed by qualitative work. Also the reluctance of the district government to legalize the maps indicates the forces behind the expansion of oil palm plantations are still strong.

## 9. Evaluation question 3: Relevance of changes

This subsection will answer evaluation question 3: What is the relevance of these changes? In particular we look at the size of the impact and whether the project addresses an important issue for the beneficiaries.

Unfortunately, we do not observe a significant change in the outcome variables, which is due to the lack of project activities. However, the issue of recognition of indigenous peoples' sovereignty over their community forests addressed by the project are very important for the communities. However, only 15% of the respondents mentioned the conservation of traditional values and culture as one of the most important issues in their village in the endline survey, which is a marginally significant ($p=0.061$) increase compared to 6.3% at the baseline survey. Nonetheless, most respondents are mostly concerned about more urgent matters like education, health care, access to clean water and the road conditions/access of the village (see Annex IV).

The importance of the project can be seen, however, from a different perspective: the 4 project sites were selected as example cases for participatory mapping and eco-cultural zoning. Through the project, NTFP-EP has built the capacity of JMM and PRCF to carry out the participatory mapping activities. Based on information from these NGOs, participatory mapping is now in progress in many more villages in Sintang.

# 10. Evaluation question 4: Efficiency of project

This subsection will answer evaluation question 4: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient? Unfortunately, we are not able to evaluate neither the efficiency nor the effectiveness of the project because the output of the project has not been completely realized.

Nonetheless, we present the available cost information for the NTFP-EP project, and alternative ways of calculating the cost per unit are presented. We also provide benchmark for the unit costs of participatory mapping projects.

## 10.1. Project costs

In order to collect information on the project costs, we conducted a structured interview with the executive director and finance officer[25] of NTFP-EP on 14 March 2014 using the 'budget survey' as described in section 5.1. In addition, we consulted the annual finance and progress reports of NTFP-EP. The cost figures are based on actual expenditure data.

Table 9 summarizes the data on project expenditures for the project period 15 September 2011 – 15 March 2014 by year. Column 1 shows the number of project months per year; the total project costs per year are reported in column 2 in Indonesian rupiahs (IDR) and in column 3 in euros (using a yearly average exchange rate).[26] The total project budget was 1,627,206,000 IDR[27], from which only 61.1% has been spent until end 2013.[28] All project costs have been funded by IUCN.

Column 5 in Table 9 presents the project costs in Sintang as reported by Mr. Irawan, the local project coordinator. These costs include local staff costs (salary of Mr. Irawan), the costs of participatory mapping and consultation with the local government to approve the results the mapping and change the status of the mapped forest areas from agricultural land status to forest land status. The costs of JMM and PRCF related to these activities are included in column 5. However, other activities of PRCF (previous mapping activity) and JMM (savings and credit cooperative) are not accounted for. In addition, institutional costs[29] of the project are also not accounted for in column 5. Overall, the costs of the project in Sintang account for 18.4% of all costs between 2011-2013.

[25] The interview was conducted with Jusupta Tarigan, executive director, and Wiji Rahayu, finance officer. Additionally, we have also received information from the project coordinator of NTFP-EP in Sintang, Mr. Irawan.

[26] Unfortunately, we do not have information about the exchange rate used for the project. Instead we use the annual average exchange rate from http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/. The exchange rates used are 12,264 IDR/EUR in 2011, 12,087 IDR/EUR in 2012 and 13,923 IDR/EUR in 2013.

[27] Source: NTFP-EP Finance report 2013.

[28] The project budget was 135,210 EUR according to the NTFP-EP grant agreement with IUCN in 2011.

[29] Institutional costs are budgeted to be 13% of the total costs of the project.

**Table 9: Overview of project costs**

| Year | Nr. of project months | Total costs [IDR] | Total cost [EUR][1] | Percentage of costs funded by CFA | Project costs in Sintang [IDR] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **2011** | 3.5 | 88,021,903 | 7,177.26 | 100% | 49,418,467 |
| **2012** | 12 | 602,029,385 | 49,807.18 | 100% | 92,621,723 |
| **2013** | 12 | 303,614,154 | 21,806.66 | 100% | 40,602,635 |
| **2014** | 12 | N.K.[2] | N.K. | 100% | 45,139,991 |

Sources: Budget Survey and NTFP-EP Finance report 2013.
Notes:
1. Annual average exchange rate is used. Data is obtained from http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/
2. N.K.= not known

## 10.2. Unit costs of project

Next, we report on the unit cost of the project. The unit of the project could be considered as beneficiary households, villages or hectares of forests mapped. Table 10 reports on all these units in Indonesian rupiahs and in International dollars (Int$). International dollars at 2011 prices[30] are used for the cost per unit calculation because it takes both purchasing power parity and inflation into account that would not be the case if we reported the unit costs in euros. Hence, using Int$, the costs can easily be compared across time and countries.

First, looking at the cost per beneficiary households of the project component in Sintang, the project works in 4 hamlets of 4 villages covering a population of 1,018 people or approximately 275 households.[31] Based on this number, we calculated the cost per beneficiary households per year in column 1 and 2 of Table 10. The last row in the table shows that overall the project costs amount to 218.77 Int$ (2011) per household.

Columns 3 and 4 report on the costs per village accounting for the 4 project villages. The overall costs of the project per village were 15,040.63 Int$ (2011) per village.

Finally, columns 5 and 6 report on the costs per $km^2$. We estimate the size of forests using information from the baseline community survey. According to information obtained from the village leaders, the total forest size in the 4 treatment villages were 8,330 hectares or 83.3 $km^2$. Using this information, the project costs per $km^2$ amount to 722.24 Int$ (2011) for the total project period.

However, it has to be kept in mind when interpreting these data that participatory mapping activities were only conducted in 2012, while in the remaining project period the project activities were focused on lobbying at the district level and funding the salary of the local staff.

[30] The following exchange rates are used based on PPP conversion factor using the World Development Indicators: 3,606.57 IDR/Int$ in 2011, 3,636.38 IDR/Int$ in 2012, 3,682.25 IDR/Int$ in 2013 and 4,530.90 IDR/Int$ in 2014. Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#

[31] The number of households are estimated using the average household size in the project villages, which is 3.7 people per household.

**Table 10: Unit costs of project**

| Year | Costs per beneficiary HH | | Costs per village | | Costs per km$^2$ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | [IDR] | [Int$] | [IDR] | [Int$] | [IDR] | [Int$] |
| **2011** | 179,704 | 49.83 | 12,354,617 | 3,425.59 | 593,259 | 164.49 |
| **2012** | 336,806 | 92.62 | 23,155,431 | 6,367.72 | 1,111,905 | 305.77 |
| **2013** | 147,646 | 40.10 | 10,150,659 | 2,756.65 | 487,427 | 132.37 |
| **2014** | 164,145 | 36.23 | 11,284,998 | 2,490.67 | 541,897 | 119.60 |
| **Total** | **828,301** | **218.77** | **56,945,704** | **15,040.63** | **2,734,488** | **722.24** |

Sources: E3 Budget, Household and Community Surveys and NTFP-EP Finance report 2013.

### 10.3. Cost-benefit

It is possible to calculate the costs per unit. However, given that the produced maps have not yet been approved by the local government, the output of the project is not yet completed in Sintang. Therefore, it is not very informative to report the cost per unit at the current stage of the project. In addition, the benefit of the project is difficult to quantify as discussed in section 8.

### 10.4. Benchmark costs

Regarding costs of participatory mapping projects in general, the Synthesis team found Dongus et al. (2007) which report the detailed costs of a community-based mapping procedure without electronic devices in the field for Tanzania.[32] The mapping activity was aimed at the surveillance of malaria mosquitoes' larval. However, the method of implementing the participatory mapping is similar to the NTFP-EP project. Synthesis team (2014) report that the costs of the mapping were 2,270.00 Int$ (in 2011 prices) per km$^2$.

## 11. Contribution of Capacity Development and Civil Society

The NTFP-EP project has also been selected for the Civil Society Strengthening component of the MFS II Evaluation. The findings in this report are supported by the findings of the civil society evaluation. In addition, the civil society report points a shift in NTFP-EP strategy from direct community interventions to policy advocacy engagement, which means that NTFP-EP is relying more on intermediary organisations to conduct community level work and this strategy is chosen as part of a strategy to strengthen local CSOs. NTFP-EP's project in Sintang is a good example of this new strategy. Nonetheless, the report points out that NTFP-EP and its partners need to work more politically and strategically in order to achieve the desired project results (approval of the produced maps and eco-cultural zones by local government). Finally, the results of the civil society evaluation suggest that NTFP-EP should have included a clear and focused lobby strategy for influencing government policies into the project design rather than assuming that local partner organisations are able to deliver results in this area.

[32] The procedure included the development of sketch maps by the community members, laminated aerial photographs as well as the actual GIS analysis.

# 12. Conclusion

The NTFP-EP project focuses on preserving forests with high eco-cultural value in order to conserve not only the forests but also traditional handicrafts relying on forest resources. One of the strongest features of this project is that it works with local NGOs which have a long term engagement with the communities. The project has been implemented in areas where forests are under threat of conversion into oil palm plantations. The activities are clearly relevant for the communities, and for the environment: the project served as an example as participatory mapping is now in progress in many more villages in Sintang. Hence, it seems that the project has been able to win the support from villagers and local leaders.

The collected data suggest that the project was only partially successful in delivering on its objectives. On the one hand, villagers are more aware of the importance of their natural resources (qualitative study) and sustainable forest management has improved in the project area (community survey). On the other hand, villages are not able to use the produced map (qualitative study) due to the ongoing efforts at legalizing the map by the local government. In both treatment and spillover communities, there has been a sharp increase in the fraction of villagers reporting land disputes with neighbouring villages and the business or industry.

Despite the (small) improvement in sustainable forest management, the project has not been successful in stopping forest conversion. A possible explanation would be that the conversion would have gone faster without the NGOs efforts. Another explanation is that the project has been implemented in areas where forests are under threat of conversion into oil palm plantations. .

The results of the NTFP-EP project are partly in line with the findings in the literature. While the literature shows both increases in awareness and in actual actions in the areas of natural resource- and land management, the NTFP-EP project only shows an increase in awareness and in sustainable forest management but not in the actual use of the map (e.g. formal legislation). Moreover, the support of villagers and local leaders regarding sustainable forest management was not enough to stop forest conversion. The findings with respect to the increase in land disputes are in line with the literature, where projects either show similar levels of or more land conflicts in treatment villages though these are probably due to selection bias just like in the NTFP-EP project.

Finally, the MFS synthesis team asked to score each project along a few indicators. Table 11 displays the indicators and the scores we deemed valid for the project.

**Table 11: Overall project scoring**

| Statement | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| **1. The project was well designed** | 8 | The project worked with local NGOs who have a long working relation with the project villages. The project was designed to develop the capacity of these NGOs. The capacity of villages was developed to a lesser extent. |
| **2. The project was implemented as designed** | 7 | Project activities at the village level were implemented as planned, but lobbying at the local government was not successful. |
| **3. The project reached all its objectives** | 6 | The project did not achieve its final objective due to lack of sustained support from the local government. |
| **4. The observed results are attributable to the project interventions** | 7 | The local NGOs also worked with the project villages using other source of funding. Only mapping activities were financed by the project. |
| **5. The observed results are relevant to the project beneficiaries** | 8 | The project is relevant for the beneficiaries. However, unfortunately not all project results have been achieved. |
| **6. The project was implemented in the most efficient way** | 7 | Working and developing the capacity of local NGOs is efficient as they may be able to replicate the results of the project elsewhere (mapping). However, not all project results have been achieved, and the results of the mapping at village level may not be sustainable due to a lack of knowledge on how to use the maps. |
| Notes: Scores are on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being “no agreement at all” and 10 being “completely agree with statement”. | | |

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
# Annex I. Project description

The final objective of the 'Up-scaling sustainable, community-based forest livelihoods in Kalimantan' project of Non-Timber Forest Products Exchange Programme (NTFP-EP) is to empower forest-based communities to use and manage their forest resources in a sustainable way. In particular, NTFP-EP focuses on sustainable use of non-timber forest products. The project works with local partner organisations in four areas of Kalimantan. Figure 3 shows the project locations. The objectives for the areas are:

- Up-scaling and ecologically "upgrading" community-based forest livelihoods (e.g. forest honey) in Kapuas Hulu and Paser.
- Introducing and testing community-based forest management and tenure schemes and participatory spatial planning towards more inclusive land use planning in Malinau.
- Promoting and better profiling an example of a landscape level model of ecological and culture-based livelihoods and conservation schemes in Sintang.
- Improve the leverage of NTFP producers through better organisation and through the exploration of market mechanisms (certification) in Kutai Barat and Kapuas.

To this end, NTFP-EP catalyses and supports activities that strengthen the capacity of local partner organisations that help communities to defend their rights and protect ecological and cultural sites to be free of extractive/industrial development; and that work on improving the position of local producers in competitive markets of non-timber forest products. However, the project activities are subcontracted to partner organisations.

**Figure 3: Map of project locations**




The project activities and expected outcomes are described below per project area:

### *Project in Kapuas Hulu and Paser*

**Activities**

The following activities are planned to be implemented by partner organisation Indonesia Forest Honey Network (*Jaringan Madu Hutan Indonesia*, JMHI):

- Assessment and training support to two new Kalimantan partners (KABAN, PADI) on honey sustainable harvest and hygienic honey processing.
- Field visits to mentor and monitor the trainees in the implementation of their new skills and knowledge in sustainable honey harvesting.
- Establishment of a pool of sustainable honey harvesting and hygienic honey processing trainers.

**Outputs**

It is expected that these activities will lead to the following outputs:

- Sustainable harvest and management of forest honey.
- The outreach by CSOs toward other communities is promoted.

**Outcomes**

The implemented activities work directly on the empowerment of forest-based communities. In Kapuas Hulu and Paser, the livelihood of households is expected to increase due to sustainable harvest and management of forest honey.

### *Project in Malinau*

**Activities**

The following activities are planned to be implemented by partner organisations LP3M and BEBSiC:

- Participatory community mapping and zoning.
- Learning visit Punan-Penan: sharing community mapping and conflict resolution techniques
- Cross visit to a recognised village forest (*hutan desa*).
- Workshops on village forestry (*hutan desa*) and community forestry (*hutan kemasyarakatan*).
- Workshops with government to overlay community maps with the existing spatial plans.

**Outputs**

It is expected that these activities will lead to the following outputs:

- Target communities are organised and empowered to manage and benefit from ecosystems and claim their rights on the utilisation of natural resources.
- A process of government recognition of Punan land use and livelihood systems (village forestry and community forestry) has started.

**Outcomes**

The workshops on participatory mapping and village/community forestry increase the control of target communities over their lands.

### *Project in Sintang*

**Activities**

The following activities are planned to be implemented by partners PRCF, JMM and KOBUS:

- Landscape models of sustainable livelihood: mapping and zoning orientation, and planning.
- Zoning preparation; village meeting, district level meetings.
- Field visit to Sumatra to learn natural dyeing techniques (cooperation with WARSI).
- Workshops with local government on landscape model approach and sustainable livelihood options.

**Outputs**

It is expected that these activities will lead to the following outputs:

- Target communities are empowered and organised to manage and benefit from ecosystems and claim their rights on the utilisation of natural resources.
- Establishment of ecological and cultural zones which are free of extractive/industrial development initiatives and where sustainable livelihood is promoted.

**Outcomes**

The workshops on participatory mapping and village/community forestry increase the control of target communities over their lands.

### *Project in Kutai Barat and Kapuas*

**Activities**

The following activities are planned to be implemented by partners KpSHK and RMU:

- Workshops for rattan eco-certification processes.
- Field trials to test standards and rattan eco-certification processes.
- Private sector dialogue to introduce the participatory certification process and to invite joint testing and acceptance of the same by private sector (IKEA, etc.).

**Outputs**

It is expected that these activities will lead to the following outputs:

- Establishment of National level rattan organisation of farmers to increase bargaining position with market and government players.
- Establishment of standards and initial market relations for alternative (participatory) certification.

**Outcomes**

The establishment of national level rattan organisation and community-based certification improves the livelihood of rattan farming households.

### *Overall project risks and assumptions*

The project proposal identifies the change of currently supportive political perspectives and agendas as risks faced in the implementation of the project. In addition, the project also relies on the committed engagement of the targeted communities in the project activities. Long negotiations with the communities could delay the project.

# Annex II. Overview outcome indicators and indices

This annex provides a detailed description about the used outcome indicators. In addition, it shows the variables which were used to construct the outcome indicator indices.

Data from the community survey as well as data from the household survey were used. The outcomes are reported for treatment villages and spillover villages for the baseline and the endline surveys. The treatment group consists of 4 villages whereas the comparison group consist of two villages. For the household data, the sample size can differ between tables because the answer 'don't know' is changed to a missing value or because a respondent could skip a question if he/she had no knowledge about what was asked (answered 'no' to a previous question). This was the case if a respondent answered 'don't know' to a question with a scale, so it did not make sense to incorporate the answer in the scale. The missing value due to a skip was kept missing if we only wanted to know the percentage of the respondents that knew about the topic of the question that answered 'yes'. If we were interested in the answers of the total sample, it made sense to change the 'don't know' answers to 'no' because that way the percentage of all the respondents that answered 'yes' could be reported.

The 'change' variable measures the difference between the baseline and endline outcomes is for respondents that were in the baseline as well as the endline. The p-value indicates whether this change is significant.

### *Panel A. How did the size of sustainably managed forest area change?*

For the size of the forest, the following data from the community survey is used:

- Change in forest size: the number of villages is shown that reported that their forest size has decreased, stayed the same or increased in the past two years.

Data from the community survey are used for outcomes on efforts at forest protection.

- Reforestation: it was asked whether activities have taken place in the village on efforts at reforestation. If this question was answered with 'yes', the last time the activity occurred was reported. If the activities had taken place in the last 2 years, they were included in the table.
- Index for planning and forest protection: this index contains three questions about plans and programmes for forest protection. If the answer was 'yes' to at least one of these questions, the village is counted in the table. Missing answers are considered as 'no'.
    - Is there a map/plan about natural resources in your village?
    - Is there a spatial planning programme in your village?
    - Is there a village forest protection and conservation programme in you village?
- Protection of endangered species: after the endangered species of flora and fauna in the village forests were reported, it is reported which villages have any regulations protecting these species.

### *Panel B. How did the management structure of community forest areas change?*

For management of natural resources, data was collected on the existence of a management structure and the level of satisfaction with the management structure.

- Existence: the table shows the number of villages that report to have any customary laws protecting the natural resources of the village.

- Percentage of forest area protected: per community forest plot it was asked whether there are regulations for the plot. If there are regulations for the plot, it is considered protected. This indicator is calculated by adding up the sizes of the protected community forest plots and dividing this by the total size of community forest plots (see Table 7) for the treatment villages and the spillover villages separately. At the baseline, the size of two of the 13 protected community forest plots is not known for the treatment villages, so the indicator should be higher.
- Regulated activities in the community forest: this indicator lists all the regulated activities in the community forest. If a regulated activity was not already listed in the survey, it was listed at 'other'. This is the case for 'sale of trees'. One village of the treatment group reported 'keeping the forest' as other regulated activity. This is reported under regulations for 'logging'. The number of villages is shown for which the activity is regulated in the community forest.

  The following four indicators show the number of villages that confirmed that it is applicable to the village:

- Meetings about community forest use and management in the past 12 months
- Regulations are communicated to the villagers by community meetings, signs at the forest, farmer group meetings or through a letter
- Regulations are communicated to all villagers (including women and children)
- Regulations are taught at school

Household level variables:

- Percentage of respondents who report that there are any rules/regulations about the use of community forests in the village: percentage of respondents in the household survey who know about the existence of rules/regulations about the use of community forests.
- Satisfaction with regulations (scale from -2 to 2): Satisfaction with regulations (scale from -2 to 2): level of agreement with the statement: 'Natural resources are not sufficiently protected by the village regulations' (scale -2 to +2): the respondents in the household survey could answer this question with 'strongly agree' with a weight of -2, 'agree' with a weight of -1, 'neither agree nor disagree' with a weight of 0, 'disagree' with weight 1, 'strongly disagree' with weight 2 or 'don't know'. The weights for agreement are negative and the weights for disagreement are positive, since agreement with the statement shows dissatisfaction with the regulations. The indicator provides the average of the weights for the treatment villages and for the spillover villages.
- Index for trainings on aspects of natural resource management: the number of villages that reported that activities had taken place in forest/natural resource mapping, awareness raising campaigns about use and protection of natural resources, training on natural resource management, training on the sustainable use of natural resources or training on eco-forestry.

### *Panel C. How did the attitude and awareness of households change towards natural resource management?*

The following indicators show the level of agreement with the indicated statement on a scale from -2 to +2, for which 2 is 'strongly agree', 1 is 'agree', 0 is 'neither agree nor disagree', -1 is 'disagree' and -2 is

'strongly disagree'. The average over the respondents is calculated for the treatment villages and the spillover villages. The indices are constructed by taking the average over the level of agreement with the included statements. Sometimes agreement with a statement indicates a negative attitude, while the index shows a positive attitude. Therefore, the scale for these statements were reversed, so that -2 means 'strongly agree' and +2 means 'strongly disagree'. That way those statements can be used in the average. They are indicated by (negative). One indicator reports on a percentage of respondents.

- Dependence on forest resources:
    - My family depends on the forest four our livelihood.
- Index for positive attitude towards sustainable forest use:
    - I take from the forest what my family needs without thinking about others (negative)
    - I think all villagers should use the community forest as they want (negative)
    - We have to use our forests with moderation and respect.
- Index for positive attitude towards sustainable forest use (community survey):
    - In this village, people have a strong sense of preserving the environment.
    - There is a need to raise the environmental awareness of the people in this village.
- Index for access to forest resources:
    - Villager's access to forest resources is fair in my community.
    - I'm satisfied with my family's share of forest resources in this village.
    - Out forests are abundant and luscious.
    - I feel that my access to forest resources is secure in this village.
- Percentage of respondents who think that an oil palm plantation in the village is/can be beneficial for him/her and his/her family
- Index for positive attitude towards oil palm plantations:
    - I'm afraid that our community forest can be converted into oil palm plantation (negative)
    - I'm in favour of oil palm plantations in our village.

We also wanted to report on the attitude towards disputed forest areas with neighbouring villages and the attitude towards disputed forest areas with local government/industry. However, in the baseline there was only one respondent that said that his/her village had any dispute or conflict about the ownership or use of forests with neighbouring villages and only two respondents said that their village had dispute with the industry. Conflicts turn out not to be an issue in this area. Therefore, the sample size is not sufficiently large enough to calculate the outcome indicators for the comparison group at the baseline.

### *Panel D. Do the communities feel more empowered to protect and manage their natural resources?*

The method of construction of the indices is the same as with the indices for households' attitude towards forests/plantations.

- Index for sense of control regarding own life

  - Often I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me (negative)
  - On the whole, I'm able to take charge of my life.
- Index for sense of control regarding land:
  - I think there is nothing we can do to keep our traditional lands against the government/industry (negative)
  - I'm confident that if we, the villagers, act together, we can make things happen for this village.
  - I think that our village has the right to our traditional lands.

### *Panel E. Are the landscape models and conservation schemes protecting ecological and cultural heritage in the community?*

For the number of people involved in traditional crafts, the following data is provided by the community survey:

- Number of people involved in traditional crafts: the number of people involved in weaving and natural dyes, rottan farming, pottery, rottan weaving, other handcrafts, forest honey gathering and traditional medicine were reported. It was also possible to fill in the number of people in other traditional crafts if this was the case. This indicator shows the total number of people involved in traditional crafts for both the early treatment and the comparison group by adding up the number of people involved in the different crafts in the two villages.

# Annex III. Description of the study location

This annex provides a description of the surveyed villages at the time of the baseline survey in 2012.

## *Treatment villages*

**DESA ENSAID PANJANG**

Ensaid Panjang village is located in the sub-district Kelam Permai (district Sintang). This village is located about 60 km away from Sintang and about 40 km from the capital city of the sub-district. This village is a transmigration destination, coming for example from Java. But at the same time a Rumah Betang the (the traditional long house of Dayak ethnicity) is still in place housing 28 families. Its uniqueness has attracted many tourists either local or international to stay in this house to experience and understand the pure custom and tradition of the Dayak. Electricity power is not available yet, but Rumah Betang has one electricity generator that is used for all during the evening.

The main livelihood of villagers is rubber. Aside from growing rubber trees, villagers also grow rice. They now apply more modern methods of farming by cultivating one land instead of cutting down the trees in the forest to open new farm and leave the old ones. They are now aware that their old method of farming is destructing the environment and they forbid it now. Women are still preserving the weaving tradition.

Like the other villages, Ensaid Panjang village has oil palm companies trying to operate in the village. However, villagers insisted that they would preserve their community forest and refused to converse them into oil palm plantation. Participative mapping of the forest have been done before with assistance of PRCF Indonesia. One of the purposes of forest mapping is to protect the plants that people use to colour their woven cloth.

**GEMBA RAYA VILLAGE**

The village Gemba Raya is located in Kelam Permai sub-district (Sintang District). Most of the villagers' houses are laid on the sideways of the main road, which is mainly of good quality. This village is about 42 km away from Sintang, and about 25 km away from the capital city of the sub-district. The majority of the villagers' ethnicity is Dayak. Electricity power has been available in this village for almost 2 years. In addition, the gas station provision is sufficient to support the daily economic activities.

Most villagers are rubber farmers. Almost all households in this village own their own rubber trees. Besides, most households also grow other plants such as rice or corn for their household daily consumption. Although rubber prices are quite high, daily needs' prices are relatively high as well and so saving is low and the wellbeing of the residents is still around average.

Villagers refused the offer from oil palm plantation companies to convert the forests. They were aware that oil palm plantation would only damage environment and bring no advantages for the people. Some participatory mapping has been done in the village in August 2012, assisted by JMM.

**KARYA JAYA BAKTI VILLAGE**

This village is about 60 km away from the capital city of the sub-district. All of the inhabitants are from the Dayak ethnic group. It is very difficult to access this village, particularly in the wet season because the road is then muddy and slippery. The road was built in 2007, since the oil palm companies have been

operating in that area. Before that, people used water transportation through the river to go in or out of the village. Since the area is remote and its location is hilly, electricity power is not available in this area.

The majority of villagers are rubber farmers. Some farmers however use their free time to work in the oil palm plantations. Though, many of them are complaining about the work and the accompanying reward. Other villagers plait plants or bamboos into handicraft in their free time. Some of the handcrafts are sold individually, and some are bought by KOBUS foundation and JMM.

The village has 2 major oil palm companies active in the neighbourhood; PT Grand Mandiri Utama and PT Agro Sentosa Lestari. Both companies' camps and branch offices are located in this village. The land of many people has been traded to be converted into an oil palm plantation with a deal of profit share 7:3 (i.e. the company will receive 70% of the total profit while land owner 30%). At first, companies promised the people to build public facilities for the villagers such as schools, a health centre, and a road. However, they have not fulfilled these promises yet except for part of the road as that was for their own advantage. Furthermore, the promise of sharing profit was unfulfilled either. In addition, several problems have occurred in the village since the operation of oil palm companies. One of the problems concerns water pollution due to the chemical waste coming from the oil palm. Even some of the springs have gone and villagers faced difficulties in attaining water.

Since the oil palm plantations are growing and expanding and people awareness to preserve community forests are increasing as well, they decided to conduct forest mapping. The mapping activity had been conducted only in one dusun and 2 forests have been mapped.

**EMPAKA KEBIAU RAYA VILLAGE**

The village Empaka Kebiau Raya is located in the sub-district Binjai Hulu with the capital city on about 80 km (district Sintang, 15 km away). This village is the result of an extension of the area in 2008. The access to this village is considered hard because the road is clay and it is very slippery during wet season. As the village can be easier reached with the use of its surrounding river Kebiau in the wet season each household has their own boat. However, this river is dried half a year during dry season. As electricity power is not available yet in this village, each household has their own generator or oil lamps for lighting.

Most of the villagers are rubber farmers but also work as freelancers in the oil palm plantations nearby. Besides that, people are growing rice and corn in their farm just to fulfil their household daily needs. In this village, the farming work is done in groups. They have 10 to 20 members per group to cultivate the land by rotation.

Just like the other villages, oil palm plantations are operating in this area. The companies owning the plantations are again PT Grand Mandiri Utama and PT Agro Sentosa Lestari.

### *Potential spillover villages*

**BANING PANJANG VILLAGE**

Baning Panjang village is located in Kelam Permai sub district and has 5 dusuns. This village is located about 50 km away from Sintang and 30 km away from the capital city of the sub-district. This village is one of a transmigration destination area; half of the inhabitants are originally from Java, the other half is local people of Dayak ethnicity. The condition of the main road is very poor, mainly caused by the trucks

passing by which transports palm oil. Electricity power is available. Most villagers are living from rubber farming, which makes a good income. Economic conditions seem more advanced seen the many stores and restaurants, and houses are well build.

Baning Panjang has lost most of the forest areas. Participative mapping on forest has never been conducted. There are 2 major plantations in this village, belonging to PT Grand Mandiri Utama and PT Agro Sentosa Lestari. Since the plantation is located quite far from where the residents live, only few of them are working in oil palm plantations.

**SUNGAI MARAM VILLAGE**

Sungai Maram village is about 65 km away from District Sintang and about 45 km from sub-district Kelam Permai. The village is a transmigration area, with migrants coming from Yogyakarta and East Java. People's dwellings are located in lower grounds, while the plantations are on higher grounds. The village has no electricity power yet, but it is planned for 2013. Most of the people in this village are rubber farmers, but also grow rice, corn and vegetables. Since the village is located nearby oil palm plantations, some of villagers work directly for the oil palm companies or indirectly when opening restaurants.

Community forests in this village have decreased a lot since they have been converted into oil palm plantation owned by PT Grand Mandiri Utama and PT Agro Sentosa Lestari. The only forest they have is shared with people of other villages. There has been no forest mapping conducted before.

# Annex IV. Descriptive statistics and explanatory variables

**Table 12: Most important community issues reported by respondents**

| Assignment group | Treatment | | | | Comparison | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| **Sample size** | 80 | 80 | 71 | | 40 | 40 | 34 | |
| Percentage of respondents reporting that there is an oil palm plantation in the village | 77.5 (42.0) | 73.8 (44.3) | -4.2 (20.3) | 0.213 | 100.0 (0.0) | 100.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | |
| Percentage of respondents reporting that there is any plan of forest conversion into oil palm plantation | 3.8 (19.1) | 22.5 (42.0) | 19.7 (46.7) | 0.209 | 22.5 (42.3) | 45.0 (50.4) | 17.6 (57.6) | 0.238 |
| Percentage of respondents that reports […] to be one of the three most important community issues | | | | | | | | |
| *A. Education/School in village* | 51.3 (50.3) | 38.8 (49.0) | -9.9* (72.0) | 0.083 | 47.5 (50.6) | 37.5 (49.0) | -8.8 (57.0) | 0.666 |
| *B. Healthcare* | 33.8 (47.6) | 37.5 (48.7) | 2.8 (58.5) | 0.667 | 42.5 (50.1) | 37.5 (49.0) | 0.0 (85.3) | 1.000 |
| *C. Access to clean water* | 42.5 (49.7) | 45.0 (50.1) | 4.2 (64.2) | 0.665 | 27.5 (45.2) | 65.0 (48.3) | 38.2 (65.2) | 0.179 |
| *D. Sanitation issues* | 0.0 (0.0) | 2.5 (15.7) | 2.8 (16.7) | 0.171 | 7.5 (26.7) | 0.0 (0.0) | -8.8 (28.8) | 0.238 |
| *E. Road conditions to the village/Access to village* | 77.5 (42.0) | 52.5 (50.3) | -23.9 (54.7) | 0.137 | 72.5 (45.2) | 77.5 (42.3) | 0.0 (65.1) | 1.000 |
| *F. Conservation of traditional values/culture* | 6.3 (24.4) | 16.3 (37.1) | 11.3* (36.1) | 0.061 | 0.0 (0.0) | 5.0 (22.1) | 5.9 (23.9) | 0.518 |
| *G. Natural resource/Environment protection in the village* | 25.0 (43.6) | 17.5 (38.2) | -5.6 (50.4) | 0.512 | 10.0 (30.4) | 5.0 (22.1) | -8.8 (28.8) | 0.171 |
| *H. Forest fires* | 0.0 (0.0) | 1.3 (11.2) | 1.4 (11.9) | 0.374 | 0.0 (0.0) | 2.5 (15.8) | 2.9 (17.1) | 0.518 |
| *I. Industry (mining, road building, etc.)* | 1.3 (11.2) | 0.0 (0.0) | -1.4 (11.9) | 0.390 | 0.0 (0.0) | 2.5 (15.8) | 2.9 (17.1) | 0.518 |
| *J. Pollution* | 0.0 (0.0) | 2.5 (15.7) | 2.8 (16.7) | 0.152 | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | |
| *K. Access to land and natural resources* | 1.3 (11.2) | 2.5 (15.7) | 1.4 (20.7) | 0.374 | 10.0 (30.4) | 2.5 (15.8) | -2.9 (30.0) | 0.518 |
| *L. Resolving disputes with neighbouring villages* | 1.3 (11.2) | 3.8 (19.1) | 1.4 (20.7) | 0.724 | 15.0 (36.2) | 10.0 (30.4) | 0.0 (42.6) | 1.000 |

| Assignment group | Treatment | | | | Comparison | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| **Sample size** | 80 | 80 | 71 | | 40 | 40 | 34 | |
| *M. Livelihood improvement* | 6.3 | 17.5 | 7.0 | 0.167 | 22.5 | 22.5 | 0.0 | 1.000 |
| | (24.4) | (38.2) | (42.5) | | (42.3) | (42.3) | (55.0) | |
| *N. Corruption* | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | |
| *O. Participatory mapping of village* | 7.5 | 6.3 | -1.4 | 0.374 | 2.5 | 0.0 | -2.9 | 0.518 |
| | (26.5) | (24.4) | (26.7) | | (15.8) | (0.0) | (17.1) | |
| *P. Alcohol consumption* | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 2.5 | 0.0 | -2.9 | 0.481 |
| | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | | (15.8) | (0.0) | (17.1) | |
| *Q. Animal keeping/Damage caused by domesticated animals* | 0.0 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 0.419 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| | (0.0) | (11.2) | (11.9) | | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | |
| *R. Exploitation of natural resources* | 0.0 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 0.390 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| | (0.0) | (11.2) | (11.9) | | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | |
| *V. Other* | 45.0 | 50.0 | 2.8 | 0.600 | 37.5 | 25.0 | -14.7 | 0.617 |
| | (50.1) | (50.3) | (56.0) | | (49.0) | (43.9) | (65.7) | |

Source: Household survey E3; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

**Table 13: Knowledge of forests**

| Assignment group | Treatment | | | | Comparison | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| **Sample size** | 80 | 80 | 71 | | 40 | 40 | 34 | |
| Percentage of respondents with access to a community forest in the village | 98.8 (11.2) | 100.0 (0.0) | 1.4 (11.9) | 0.382 | 65.0 (48.3) | 100.0 (0.0) | 35.3 (48.5) | 0.238 |
| Percentage of respondents who have participated in any village meeting in the past 12 months | 71.3 (45.5) | 77.5 (42.0) | 5.6 (53.2) | 0.436 | 70.0 (46.4) | 72.5 (45.2) | 2.9 (38.8) | 0.518 |
| Percentage of respondents who have participated in any village meeting on community land in the past 12 months | 58.8 (49.5) | 68.8 (46.6) | 11.3 (52.2) | 0.405 | 57.5 (50.1) | 65.0 (48.3) | 2.9 (52.1) | 0.518 |

Source: Household survey E3; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

**Table 14: Forest regulations**

| Assignment group | Treatment | | | | Comparison | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| **Sample size** | 80 | 80 | 71 | | 40 | 40 | 34 | |
| Percentage of respondents who report that there are any rules/regulations about the use of the community forests in the village | 97.5 (15.7) | 92.5 (26.5) | -5.6* (28.7) | 0.066 | 70.0 (46.4) | 92.5 (26.7) | 23.5** (60.6) | 0.037 |
| Percentage of respondents who report that […] is regulated in the community forests | | | | | | | | |
| *Logging* | 97.5 (15.7) | 90.0 (30.2) | -8.5* (32.7) | 0.074 | 62.5 (49.0) | 85.0 (36.2) | 26.5 (56.7) | 0.171 |
| *Firewood collection* | 5.0 (21.9) | 1.3 (11.2) | -2.8 (23.7) | 0.597 | 2.5 (15.8) | 0.0 (0.0) | -2.9 (17.1) | 0.518 |
| *Honey collection* | 2.5 (15.7) | 1.3 (11.2) | -1.4 (20.7) | 0.714 | 0.0 (0.0) | 2.5 (15.8) | 0.0 (0.0) | |
| *Collection of other fruits and plants* | 23.8 (42.8) | 2.5 (15.7) | -22.5** (45.3) | 0.014 | 5.0 (22.1) | 12.5 (33.5) | 2.9 (38.8) | 0.791 |
| *Hunting* | 6.3 (24.4) | 7.5 (26.5) | 2.8 (37.7) | 0.596 | 0.0 (0.0) | 2.5 (15.8) | 2.9 (17.1) | 0.481 |
| *Access to forest* | 35.0 (48.0) | 13.8 (34.7) | -21.1 (58.3) | 0.217 | 15.0 (36.2) | 15.0 (36.2) | -2.9 (52.1) | 0.799 |

| Assignment group | Treatment | | | | Comparison | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| **Sample size** | 80 | 80 | 71 | | 40 | 40 | 34 | |
| *Other*[1] | 28.8 | 15.0 | -14.1* | 0.092 | 10.0 | 25.0 | 14.7 | 0.686 |
| | (45.5) | (35.9) | (56.8) | | (30.4) | (43.9) | (50.0) | |
| Percentage of respondents who think most people in the village keep the regulations about the use of community forests[2] | 93.6 | 93.2 | 1.5 | 0.636 | 92.9 | 89.2 | -5.0 | 0.500 |
| | (24.7) | (25.3) | (33.0) | | (26.2) | (31.5) | (51.0) | |
| Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | | | | | |
| *Without regulations people would overuse (exploit) the natural resources* | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.1 | 0.712 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.578 |
| | (0.9) | (1.1) | (1.3) | | (1.1) | (0.9) | (1.3) | |
| *Natural resources are not sufficiently protected by the village regulations* | -0.2 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.142 | 0.4 | -0.3 | -0.8 | 0.324 |
| | (1.0) | (1.1) | (1.4) | | (1.6) | (1.1) | (2.1) | |
| *Villager's access to forest resources is fair in my community* | 1.4 | 1.6 | 0.2 | 0.116 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 0.2 | 0.433 |
| | (0.6) | (0.5) | (0.7) | | (0.8) | (0.5) | (0.8) | |

Source: Household survey E3; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

1. This category contains using the forest for farming, burning the forest, selling forest products, the boundaries of the forest, planting back the forest, sanctions on common fields, theft from the forest and poisoning the river. These were all mentioned by the respondents themselves as regulated.
2. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 78, 74, 65, 28, 37 and 20

**Table 15: Use of forests**

| Assignment group | Treatment | | | | Comparison | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| **Sample size** | 80 | 80 | 71 | | 40 | 40 | 34 | |
| Percentage of respondents that reports […] to contribute to their family's livelihood | | | | | | | | |
| *Fire wood* | 36.3 | 37.5 | -1.4 | 0.926 | 30.0 | 32.5 | -2.9 | 0.799 |
| | (48.4) | (48.7) | (57.3) | | (46.4) | (47.4) | (57.7) | |
| *Wood for building or manufacturing* | 77.5 | 42.5 | -38.0** | 0.041 | 25.0 | 25.0 | 0.0 | 1.000 |
| | (42.0) | (49.7) | (64.1) | | (43.9) | (43.9) | (55.0) | |
| *Hunting* | 10.0 | 21.3 | 11.3 | 0.197 | 2.5 | 10.0 | 8.8 | 0.171 |
| | (30.2) | (41.2) | (46.4) | | (15.8) | (30.4) | (28.8) | |
| *Honey* | 2.5 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 1.000 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| | (15.7) | (21.9) | (23.9) | | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | |
| *Other food resources* | 40.0 | 35.0 | -5.6 | 0.660 | 40.0 | 72.5 | 32.4** | 0.020 |
| | (49.3) | (48.0) | (65.2) | | (49.6) | (45.2) | (53.5) | |
| *Medicinal use* | 21.3 | 20.0 | -2.8 | 0.606 | 7.5 | 7.5 | 0.0 | 1.000 |
| | (41.2) | (40.3) | (53.4) | | (26.7) | (26.7) | (42.6) | |
| *Natural dye material* | 36.3 | 31.3 | -8.5 | 0.534 | 5.0 | 2.5 | -2.9 | 0.481 |
| | (48.4) | (46.6) | (64.9) | | (22.1) | (15.8) | (30.0) | |
| *Other resource* | 27.5 | 47.5 | 18.3** | 0.047 | 22.5 | 35.0 | 5.9 | 0.873 |
| | (44.9) | (50.3) | (61.7) | | (42.3) | (48.3) | (64.9) | |
| Level of agreement with statement: 'My family depends on the forest for our livelihood' […] (scale -2 to +2) | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.2 | 0.349 | -0.5 | 0.4 | 0.9*** | 0.005 |
| | (1.0) | (1.1) | (1.2) | | (0.9) | (1.3) | (1.3) | |

Source: Household survey E3; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

**Table 16: Participatory mapping**

| Assignment group | Treatment | | | | Comparison | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| **Sample size** | 80 | 80 | 71 | | 40 | 40 | 34 | |
| Percentage of respondents who have heard of participatory mapping | 82.5 (38.2) | 61.3 (49.0) | -22.5** (48.4) | 0.035 | 12.5 (33.5) | 27.5 (45.2) | 14.7 (55.8) | 0.371 |
| Percentage of respondents who report that there has been participatory mapping in the village | 77.5 (42.0) | 56.3 (49.9) | -22.5** (51.3) | 0.030 | 2.5 (15.8) | 22.5 (42.3) | 20.6 (41.0) | 0.289 |
| Percentage of respondents who have participated in the participatory mapping in the village | 45.0 (50.1) | 31.3 (46.6) | -12.7* (47.6) | 0.078 | 0.0 (0.0) | 17.5 (38.5) | 14.7 (35.9) | 0.371 |

Source: Household survey E3; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

**Table 17: Attitude towards oil palm plantations**

| Assignment group | Treatment | | | | Comparison | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| **Sample size** | 80 | 80 | 71 | | 40 | 40 | 34 | |
| Percentage of respondents who think oil palm plantation in village is/can be beneficial for respondent(s family) | 36.3 (48.4) | 37.5 (48.7) | 2.8 (53.4) | 0.848 | 40.0 (49.6) | 47.5 (50.6) | 5.9** (42.2) | 0.037 |
| Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | | | | | |
| *I'm afraid that our community forest can be converted into oil palm plantation* | 1.1 (0.7) | 1.2 (0.8) | 0.1 (1.0) | 0.723 | 0.4 (1.1) | 0.6 (1.2) | 0.1 (1.5) | 0.371 |
| *I'm in favour of oil palm plantations in our village* | -0.6 (1.2) | -0.7 (1.4) | -0.1 (1.3) | 0.772 | 0.1 (1.1) | 0.1 (1.1) | -0.1 (1.0) | 0.876 |
| *I'm in favour of converting [PLOT] into an oil palm plantation* | -1.3 (0.7) | -1.0 (0.9) | 0.3 (1.1) | 0.263 | -0.7 (1.0) | -0.1 (1.1) | 0.5 (1.0) | 0.238 |

Source: Household survey E3; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

**Table 18: Attitude towards natural resources**

| Assignment group | Treatment | | | | Comparison | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| **Sample size** | 80 | 80 | 71 | | 40 | 40 | 34 | |
| Percentage of respondents that report […] to be a benefit of forests | | | | | | | | |
| *Food security* | 27.5 (44.9) | 42.5 (49.7) | 14.1 (61.6) | 0.100 | 30.0 (46.4) | 67.5 (47.4) | 35.3* (64.6) | 0.068 |
| *Medicinal use* | 10.0 (30.2) | 16.3 (37.1) | 5.6 (44.4) | 0.254 | 2.5 (15.8) | 5.0 (22.1) | 2.9 (30.0) | 0.799 |
| *Fire wood* | 21.3 (41.2) | 30.0 (46.1) | 7.0 (64.0) | 0.518 | 20.0 (40.5) | 40.0 (49.6) | 14.7* (55.8) | 0.089 |
| *Building or manufacturing material* | 85.0 (35.9) | 67.5 (47.1) | -19.7 (60.0) | 0.307 | 40.0 (49.6) | 47.5 (50.6) | 2.9 (67.4) | 0.481 |
| *Hunting* | 3.8 (19.1) | 11.3 (31.8) | 8.5 (36.8) | 0.213 | 5.0 (22.1) | 12.5 (33.5) | 8.8 (37.9) | 0.171 |
| *Natural dye material* | 22.5 (42.0) | 26.3 (44.3) | 2.8 (53.4) | 0.593 | 0.0 (0.0) | 2.5 (15.8) | 2.9 (17.1) | 0.518 |
| *Protection from natural hazards* | 30.0 (46.1) | 26.3 (44.3) | -2.8 (58.5) | 0.804 | 62.5 (49.0) | 37.5 (49.0) | -20.6* (59.2) | 0.053 |
| *Rottan for handcrafts* | 65.0 (48.0) | 26.3 (44.3) | -33.8* (63.1) | 0.061 | 22.5 (42.3) | 12.5 (33.5) | -14.7* (50.0) | 0.089 |
| *Habitat, sanctuary for wildlife* | 25.0 (43.6) | 8.8 (28.4) | -12.7* (44.5) | 0.066 | 10.0 (30.4) | 12.5 (33.5) | 2.9 (46.0) | 0.518 |
| *Aesthetic value* | 3.8 (19.1) | 5.0 (21.9) | 0.0 (29.3) | 1.000 | 0.0 (0.0) | 12.5 (33.5) | 14.7 (35.9) | 0.316 |
| *Spiritual value* | 3.8 (19.1) | 2.5 (15.7) | -1.4 (26.7) | 0.789 | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | |
| *Other* | 25.0 (43.6) | 40.0 (49.3) | 16.9** (69.7) | 0.015 | 55.0 (50.4) | 52.5 (50.6) | 2.9 (67.4) | 0.909 |
| Level of agreement with statement: 'We have to use our forests with moderation and respect' (scale -2 to +2) | 1.4 (0.5) | 1.6 (0.6) | 0.1 (0.7) | 0.407 | 1.2 (0.6) | 1.5 (0.5) | 0.2 (0.6) | 0.324 |

Source: Household survey E3; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

**Table 19: Knowledge of land boundaries**

| Assignment group | Treatment | | | | Comparison | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| **Sample size** | 80 | 80 | 71 | | 40 | 40 | 34 | |
| Percentage of respondents that know […] of the boundaries of their land | | | | | | | | |
| *All of them* | 63.8 | 71.3 | 7.0 | 0.460 | 70.0 | 80.0 | 8.8 | 0.666 |
| | (48.4) | (45.5) | (48.8) | | (46.4) | (40.5) | (51.4) | |
| *Some of them* | 32.5 | 17.5 | -14.1 | 0.264 | 15.0 | 12.5 | 0.0 | 1.000 |
| | (47.1) | (38.2) | (51.5) | | (36.2) | (33.5) | (49.2) | |
| *None* | 3.8 | 11.3 | 7.0 | 0.277 | 15.0 | 7.5 | -8.8 | 0.238 |
| | (19.1) | (31.8) | (25.8) | | (36.2) | (26.7) | (28.8) | |
| Percentage of respondents who know the boundary of his/her village | 42.5 | 42.5 | 1.4 | 0.789 | 57.5 | 65.0 | 11.8** | 0.037 |
| | (49.7) | (49.7) | (52.1) | | (50.1) | (48.3) | (53.7) | |

Source: Household survey E3; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

**Table 20: Land conflicts**

| Assignment group | Treatment | | | | Comparison | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| **Sample size** | 80 | 80 | 71 | | 40 | 40 | 34 | |
| Percentage of respondents that says that their village has any dispute or conflict about the ownership of use of forests with […] | | | | | | | | |
| *Neighbouring villages* | 22.5 | 45.0 | 23.9 | 0.151 | 2.5 | 42.5 | 41.2 | 0.127 |
| | (42.0) | (50.1) | (59.7) | | (15.8) | (50.1) | (55.7) | |
| *District/Province government* | 1.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| | (11.2) | (0.0) | (0.0) | | (0.0) | (0.0) | (0.0) | |
| *Business/Industry* | 11.3 | 40.0 | 28.2 | 0.125 | 5.0 | 55.0 | 47.1 | 0.116 |
| | (31.8) | (49.3) | (48.4) | | (22.1) | (50.4) | (56.3) | |

Source: Household survey E3; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

# Annex V. Evaluation question 1 – tables

| **Assignment group** | **Treatment** | | | | **Spillover** | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| **Sample size (community survey)** | (n=4) | | | | (n=2) | | | |
| **Sample size (household survey)** | 80 | 80 | 71 | 71 | 40 | 40 | 34 | 34 |
| **Panel A. How did the size of sustainably managed forest area change?** | | | | | | | | |
| Index for planning and forest protection<br>Number of villages that answered 'yes' to […] | | | | | | | | |
| *Is there a map/plan about natural resources in your village?* | 0 | 1.5 | | | 0 | 0 | | |
| *Is there a spatial planning programme in your village?* | 0 | 1 | | | 0 | 0 | | |
| *Is there a village forest protection and conservation programme in your village?* | 0 | 2 | | | 0 | 0 | | |
| **Panel B. How did the management structure of community forest areas change?** | | | | | | | | |
| Index for trainings on aspects of natural resource management<br>Number of villages that had […] in the last two years | | | | | | | | |
| *Forest/natural resource mapping* | 4 | 2 | | | 1 | 1 | | |
| *Awareness raising campaigns about use and protection of natural resources* | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 1 | | |
| *Training on natural resource management* | 0 | 1 | | | 0 | 0 | | |
| *Training on sustainable use of natural resources* | 1 | 2 | | | 0 | 0 | | |
| *Training on eco-forestry* | 1 | 1 | | | 0 | 0 | | |
| **Panel C. How did the attitude and awareness of households change towards natural resource management?** | | | | | | | | |
| Index for positive attitude towards sustainable forest use (household survey)<br>Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | | | | | |
| *I take from the forest what my family needs without thinking about others* | -1.1<br>(0.9) | -0.8<br>(0.9) | 0.3**<br>(1.3) | 0.017 | -1.3<br>(0.6) | -1.0<br>(0.6) | 0.2<br>(0.9) | 0.481 |
| *I think all villagers should use the community forest as they want* | 0.3<br>(1.2) | 0.3<br>(1.1) | 0.1<br>(1.5) | 0.847 | -0.1<br>(1.1) | -0.2<br>(1.0) | 0<br>(1.1) | 0.481 |

| Assignment group | Treatment | | | | Spillover | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| **Sample size (community survey)** | (n=4) | | | | (n=2) | | | |
| **Sample size (household survey)** | 80 | 80 | 71 | 71 | 40 | 40 | 34 | 34 |
| *We have to use our forests with moderation and respect* | 1.4 (0.5) | 1.6 (0.6) | 0.1 (0.7) | 0.407 | 1.2 (0.6) | 1.5 (0.5) | 0.2 (0.6) | 0.324 |
| Index for positive attitude towards sustainable forest use (community survey) Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | | | | | |
| *In this village, people have a strong sense of preserving the environment.* | 0.5 | 1.75 | | | 1 | 1.5 | | |
| *There is a need to raise the environmental awareness of the people in this village.* | 1.25 | 1.5 | | | 1.5 | 0.5 | | |
| *In this village, people have a strong sense of preserving the environment.* | 0.5 | 1.75 | | | 1 | 1.5 | | |
| *There is a need to raise the environmental awareness of the people in this village.* | 1.25 | 1.5 | | | 1.5 | 0.5 | | |
| Index for access to forest resources Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | | | | | |
| *Villager's access to forest resources is fair in my community* | 1.1 (0.6) | 1.1 (0.5) | 0 (0.8) | 0.728 | 0.6 (1.0) | 0.9 (0.6) | 0.3 (1.3) | 0.209 |
| *I'm satisfied with my family's share of forest resources in this village* | 0.9 (0.7) | 0.8 (0.8) | -0.1** (0.9) | 0.017 | 0.5 (1.0) | 0.8 (0.7) | 0.5 (1.3) | 0.280 |
| *Our forests are abundant and luscious* | 1.4 (0.6) | 1.5 (0.5) | 0.1 (0.8) | 0.291 | 1.1 (0.6) | 1.1 (0.7) | 0.1 (0.8) | 0.238 |
| *I feel that my access to forest resources is secure in this village* | 1.1 (0.6) | 1.2 (0.6) | 0.1 (0.8) | 0.601 | 0.6 (0.9) | 0.8 (0.9) | 0.4 (1.2) | 0.211 |
| Index for positive attitude towards oil palm plantations Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | | | | | |
| *I'm afraid that our community forest can be converted into an oil palm plantation* | -1.1 (0.7) | -1.2 (0.8) | -0.1 (1.0) | 0.723 | -0.4 (1.1) | -0.6 (1.2) | -0.1 (1.5) | 0.371 |

| Assignment group | Treatment | | | | Spillover | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| **Sample size (community survey)** | (n=4) | | | | (n=2) | | | |
| **Sample size (household survey)** | 80 | 80 | 71 | 71 | 40 | 40 | 34 | 34 |
| *I'm in favour of oil palm plantations in our village* | -0.6 (1.2) | -0.7 (1.4) | -0.1 (1.3) | 0.772 | 0.1 (1.1) | 0.1 (1.1) | -0.1 (1.0) | 0.876 |
| **Panel D. Do the communities feel more empowered to protect and manage their natural resources?** | | | | | | | | |
| Index for sense of control regarding own life<br>Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | | | | | |
| *Often I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me* | 0.7 (1.1) | 0.2 (1) | -0.6* (1.4) | 0.052 | 0.8 (0.9) | 0.1 (1) | -0.6 (1.3) | 0.209 |
| *On the whole, I'm able to take charge of my life* | 1.4 (0.6) | 1.5 (0.5) | 0.1 (0.8) | 0.608 | 1.2 (0.6) | 1.4 (0.6) | 0.1 (1.0) | 0.518 |
| Index for sense of control regarding land<br>Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | | | | | |
| *I think there is nothing we can do to keep out traditional lands against the government/industry* | 0.8 (0.8) | 0.5 (1.4) | 0.0 (1.5) | 0.910 | 0.4 (1) | 0.6 (1.1) | 0.1 (1.3) | 0.763 |
| *I'm confident that if we the villagers act together, we can make things happen for this village* | 1.4 (0.5) | 1.6 (0.5) | 0.2 (0.7) | 0.407 | 1.3 (0.4) | 1.5 (0.5) | 0.2 (0.7) | 0.518 |
| *I think that out village has the right to our traditional lands* | 1.5 (0.5) | 1.4 (0.5) | -0.1 (0.6) | 0.705 | 1.2 (0.5) | 1.5 (0.5) | 0.2 (0.8) | 0.518 |

Source: Household survey and community survey E3; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia.

Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses for household outcomes. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values for the household outcomes.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

# Annex VI. Qualitative report on the NTFP-EP project

## 1. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. Context of the project

NTFP-EP (Non-Timber Forest Product Exchange Program) is a private organisation operating in South and South East Asia. NTFP-EP has a major concern in the management of non-timber forest products in Sintang Province District in West Kalimantan. The NTFP-EP project in Sintang seeks to organise and empower forest-based communities to claim their rights on the utilization of their forest resources and to manage their forest resources in a sustainable way. The project has been funded by IUCN (Ecosystem Alliance) from 2011 until 2014. The project is of great importance for the communities of Sintang, particularly the Dayak tribes, whose livelihood, economy, culture, and social lives are dependent on the forest. The NTFP-EP project is therefore known as an 'eco-culture project'.

The objectives of this project are; 1) to develop and improve the community's livelihood by making sure that they are empowered and organised to manage and benefit from their eco-systems and to claim their rights on the utilization of natural resources, and 2) to provide alternative sources of livelihood for the community to improve their income and welfare. It is expected that when the community's income from forest products increases, they will become more motivated to preserve their forest and its biodiversity, and defend themselves against land conversion by oil palm and mining companies.

The coordinator of NTFP-EP, named Mr. Irawan, stated that the project is focused on maintaining the raw materials that are used by the communities to produce woven cloth and natural dye, which are part of West-Kalimantan -and particularly Sintang- culture. Also, by protecting the forests, people's access to important cultural, historical and/or religious sites such as the old cemetery of the ancestors and the highest point of the hill can be ensured. Preserving the forests therefore also means preserving the community's local culture and traditions. The planned outcome of the NTFP-EP project is a map of the community's area that contains all the important locations in the village's forests. This map should then serve as guidance for eco-cultural zone planning in Sintang district. In the execution of its programme, NTFP-EP worked closely together with local NGOs JMM[33] and PRCF[34].

[33] JMM stands for *Jasa Menenun Mandiri* or 'Independent Weaving Services'. The cooperative is a point of sales for approximately 400 Dayak women weavers in twelve *kampung* (villages) in and around Sintang. The daily operations of the cooperative are managed by a representative body of the twelve villages. JMM's vision is "Sustainable Culture, Emerging Business, and Prosperous Society". JMM has been cooperating with NTFP-EP since 2011. At the moment of the interview they had 3 running programmes; Quality improvement of woven cloths by focusing on the organisations involved One of the objectives of this programme is to increase *mengkudu* (a small tree which root produces dyes) production; The "Kraft Kalimantan" programme which started 3 years ago has ended on June 2014; and the joint mapping project with NTFP-EP.

[34] The People Resources and Conservation Foundation (PRCF) is a non-profit, non-government, and non-membership organisation. They promote conservation, protection, and wise use of natural resources with sound social and economic development. PRCF is particularly interested in encouraging local communities to take over the management of natural resources available to them, with a view to managing them for sustainable harvest. PRCF's activities in Sintang are focused on Ensaid Panjang village. Since 1999 PRCF has committed itself to developing and facilitating Dayak weaving activities. They have run programmes such as the Dayak weaving programme, weaver quality improvement, and institutional development activities such as building weaving

According to Mr. Irawan, the NTFP-EP eco-culture programme was implemented in 4 villages in Sintang. 3 villages (Ensaid Panjang, Gemba Raya, and Karya Jaya Bakti) are located in Kelam Permai sub-district. The other village (Empaka Kebiau Raya) is located in Binjai Hulu sub-district.

The direct beneficiaries of the project are indigenous and otherwise forest-based NTFP[35] gathering and farming communities who are dependent on the forest and non-timber forest products for their livelihoods. In addition, the local government of Sintang can also be counted among the beneficiaries as they have roles in forest management planning.

## 1.2. Study area

Sintang District is located on the west side of West Kalimantan province and about 395 km away from Pontianak city. The district shares land borders with the Malaysian city Serawak. Sintang District consists of about 32.279 $km^2$ of land, most of which is hilly/mountainous and covered with oil palm plantations. The journey from Pontianak to Sintang is not an easy one as road conditions are very poor. Other facilities in Sintang district are likewise underdeveloped.

In Sintang District, mapping activities were conducted in 4 pilot villages that are members of the JMM cooperative. When the mapping activities turn out to be successful, NTFP-EP and JMM are planning to implement the mapping project in other villages that are JMM cooperative members as well.

> ... we start it bit by bit. We decided to start from the sacred sites, as we know that that's where our ancestors were buried. If we hadn't managed those areas, they would have been ruled by the companies. So, we took 4 out of 40 villages [more or less 40 villages are cooperative members] and if they are successful we will implement it to other villages. The other villages have requested for it too, but now we are focusing on the four villages first. We hope these villages will get the acknowledgement from the local government (Mr. Sugiman, Director of the JMM Cooperative).

Each village consists of multiple hamlets (*dusun*). For our evaluation we decided to focus on 3 the project villages, and one *dusun* per village, namely: Dusun Rentap Selatan of Ensaid Panjang village, Dusun Kelumbik of Karya Jaya Bakti village, and Dusun Ransi Panjang of Gemba Raya village.

## 1.3. Evaluation questions and report structure

Firstly, to provide a more detailed description of the context of the project villages, the following research questions were asked: What do the research communities look like? How are they governed? How do the communities use, manage and monitor their natural resources? What land right conflicts are there in the communities and how are they handled? Secondly, to determine the success of the NTFP-EP programme, the following research questions are discussed: How was the project implemented in the 3 villages? What was the project's impact on the lives of the community members and their ability to manage their natural resources in a sustainable way?

This report will be structured broadly along the lines of these research questions: Chapter 2 contains a description of the research villages. Chapter 3 provides more in-depth information about how the communities manage and monitor their natural resources, and Chapter 4 investigates land right

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cooperatives. Before their cooperation with NTFP-EP, PRCF had already started with the development of community-based forest management and publicly promoting areas to become eco-cultural zones.

[35] NTFP is an abbreviation for non-timber forest product(s).

conflicts, both within and among the communities, and between the communities and outsiders. Turning to NTFP-EP's programme, Chapter 5 discusses the project implementation with a particular focus on the participatory mapping activities. In Chapter 6 we look at the impacts of the NTFP-EP programme on the lives of the community members. In particular changes in their awareness, attitudes and behaviour with regard to natural resource use, forest management, land rights, conflicts, and economic activities. Finally, in Chapter 7 we reflect on the project as a whole. Additionally, chapter 8 and 9 are added as an appendix to provide more background information on how the villages and the lives of the community members are governed, and the position that women and newcomers hold within those communities.

## 1.4. Evaluation methods

In order to evaluate the impact of the NTFP-EP project, qualitative field work has been conducted at the selected project locations in April 2014. In-depth interviews were conducted with a number of carefully chosen informants (listed in Table 21 below). Also, focus group discussions were held with male community members working as either self-employed rubber farmers or working at a rubber plantation, and female community members working in the most common traditional handicraft trade in their community. Almost all of these informants were participants in one or more of the NTFP-EP activities, and therefore knowledgeable about the NTFP-EP programme and other topics that were to be discussed during the interviews.

Unfortunately, not all the informants that we had originally planned to interview in the study design were available in the field. Also, other informants such as the village head of Gemba Raya and the female leader, could not provide significant information to answer all of our questions. The implementation of the focus group discussions proceeded relatively smoothly, with the exception of the focus group discussion with women in Gemba Raya that could not be held because no women could be found that had participated in the NTFP-EP mapping activities.

**Table 21: Type of Informants**

| Type of Informant | Ensaid Panjang | Karya Jaya Bakti | Gemba Raya | Project staff |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **FGD men** | X | X | X | |
| **FGD women** | X | X | | |
| **Village facilitator** | X | | X | |
| **Chief of Tawang Forest** | X | | | |
| **Chief of Dusun** | | X | X | |
| **Community leader** | | X | | |
| **Traditional leader** | | | X | |
| **Female leader** | | | X | |
| **Village head** | | | X | |
| | | | | |
| **JMM** | | | | X |
| **PRCF** | | | | X |
| **NTFP-EP consultant** | | | | X |

## 2. DESCRIPTION OF STUDY LOCATIONS

As mentioned previously, 3 villages were studied for our evaluation; Ensaid Panjang, Karya Jaya Bakti, and Gemba Raya. All of them are located in the same sub-district, Kelam Permai. In this chapter the village characteristics are discussed in more detail.

### 2.1. Ensaid Panjang Village

Ensaid Panjang village consists of three hamlets (*dusun* in Indonesian); Rentap Selatan, Ensaid Baru, and Ensaid Panjang. Together they count a total of 130 households and 522 inhabitants. Male inhabitants are in the majority with a 282: 240 male to female ratio. It takes about 1 hour to get to the village from the main road. The road that enters the village is stony, muddy, and very slippery during the rainy season. Nevertheless, this village is a tourist destination for both domestic and international tourists, as it is famous for holding on to its traditional Dayak culture and customs. People in the village for example still live in *Rumah Betang Panjang;* traditional long houses inhabited by multiple Dayak families at once.

In past years the forest area of Ensaid Panjang has greatly decreased as a result of the emergent oil palm industry, and the village is already surrounded by oil palm plantations. Ensaid Panjang's remaining forest lands are also under serious threat of being converted to plantations, as they are

located in the APL area[36] of two giant companies: PT. Wahana Plantation&Product (WPP) and PT. GMU (Grand Mandiri Utama). APL means *Area Peruntukan Lain*, or 'area for other allocation'. Land with an APL indication is government owned land that is allocated for non-forestry business.

Even though deforestation is already in an advanced stage, the people of Ensaid Panjang remain hopeful and are determined to preserve their remaining forest. The first forest area to be mapped was *Tawang Mersibung*. According to Mr. Cepi, the chairman of the community forest, it was important to map this forest area first because this is where visitors are usually brought first if they come to the village. At the time of the interviews, a total of 3 of Ensaid Panjang's forest areas had been mapped, i.e. *Tawang Mersibung*, *Tawang Semilas*, and *Tawang Sebesai.* Ensaid Panjang village also has a village forest group, led by Mr. Cepi, that helps to protect and preserve the forests.

## 2.2. Karya Jaya Bakti Village

Karya Jaya Bakti village consists of 4 *dusun*; Kelumbik, Beran, Jelawai, and Entalang. There are 892 inhabitants, divided over 224 households. The male to female ratio is 467 : 425.

The village's situation is quite similar to that of Ensaid Panjang village. Karya Jaya Bakti is also surrounded by oil palm plantations and located in an APL zone of the company PT. ASL (Agro Sentosa Lestari). The village is also difficult to access, and from all 3 project villages Karya Jaya Bakti is furthest away from Sintang city. Clean water is difficult to obtain and villagers are taking bad quality water directly from the river to fulfill their daily needs. According to some of our informants the scarcity of clean water occurred after many forests were converted into plantations. At the time of our research, only 2 forest areas could be accessed by the villagers of Dusun Kelumbik, namely *Hutan Selabang* and *Hutan Senibang*.

Just like in Ensaid Panjang village, the people of Karya Jaya Bakti are determined to preserve their remaining forests. Unfortunately, there is no special group to protect and preserve the village's forests.

## 2.3. Gemba Raya Village

Gemba Raya village consists of four *dusun*; Ransi Panjang, Ransi Pendek, Lanjing, and Terumbuk. Gemba Raya village has 243 households and 922 inhabitants of which 480 are male and 442 are female. The village is located at the edge of the main road leading to other districts and can be reached from Sintang city in approximately 1 hour.

What's special about Gemba Raya is that, even though it is located nearby the APL zone of PT GMU (Grand Mandiri Utama), no oil palm plantation companies have yet been able to take forest land from the village due to the ongoing rejections of their presence from the village head and the community. During the interview, the village head of Gemba Raya mentioned that he had been visited by representatives of oil palm companies several times, but that he refused each time, and never gave them permission to enter his village.

Unfortunately, Gemba Raya village has not been able to avoid the negative impacts of the presence of plantations in its neigboring villages. As a result the inhabitants of Gemba Raya are now also suffering from water scarcity and a decreasing number of fauna in their forests.

[36] See also http://regional.kompas.com/read/2013/02/07/02361286/7.Juta.Hektar.APL.Tak.Terlindung

# 3. NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

## 3.1. People's livelihood

Most of the people in the project villages work as farmers on rubber farms or plantations where they incise rubber trees to collect latex, usually between 3 am and 10 am in the morning. This work is often combined with work on the rice fields in the afternoons. Both jobs are done by men and women alike. Rubber and rice farming are the main sources of income for all 3 villages. However, over the past 2 years, crop failure due to a shortage of rain and a decrease in rubber latex prices (from Rp. 20.000 per kilo to only 8.000 per kilo) has caused a decline in income for the communities of both Gemba Raya and Ensaid Panjang. Dusun Kelumbik of Karya Jaya Bakti village was the only *dusun* that experienced a slight increase in income over de past 2 years, as a result of the money they earned from their work at the oil palm plantation.

In order to supplement the family income, a small number of villagers make crafts such as the typical Dayak weavings. Weaving is a women's trade. In Ensaid Panjang it is mostly done by mothers and elderly women who can't work at the rice fields. The men typically make craftworks from bamboo and rattan. In Karya Jaya Bakti village there are also still a few people left who make handicrafts from wood and bamboo carvings, but nowadays this is done merely as a hobby. Weaving-craftworks are still sold. They are made and decorated with the help of natural dyes that are taken from the forest. The raw materials used for dyeing are *Darum*, *Mengkudu*, *Gerbang*, *Empait*, and Rattan.

Lastly, a few villagers still earn their money by catching and selling animals from the forest. Dayak people have a reputation for loving to hunt animals for consumption or sale. However, as animals have become rarer and rarer in the past years, hunting activities have gradually decreased.

## 3.2. Availability and use of natural resources

In the village of *Ensaid Panjang* several species of flora and fauna can still be found both in the forest and in the villagers' farms. Types of flora that are still found in the forest are rattan, *meranti, kelansu, rengas, petir*, *rinsak,* and *kubah*. The types of flora that are planted or cultivated by the community are rubber, rice, coconut, sour fruit, banana, nuts, mango, *potersi*, etc. The raw materials for weaving are no longer found in the forests of Ensaid Panjang, with the exception of *empait*. The types of animals that can still be found in the forest are apes, orang utans, mouse deer, *berok*, wild boars, deer, elks, etc. The animals that are kept at people's houses and farms include chickens, cows, pigs, and dogs.

In the village of Gemba Raya, the only trees or plants that are cultivated by the community are rubber trees and rice. Rubber does not grow in the forest but is only grown in the fields owned by residents. Plants that do still exist in the forests and are important for the community are wooden ring, rattan, *empait, mengkudu, gerbang* and *inkatan*. Some of these plants, such as *mengkudu* and *empait*, are used by the villagers as natural dye for fabrics. Animals that can still be found in the forests are bears, squirrels, and several species of birds. Animals that are commonly kept by the villagers are pigs and chickens.

Even though there are still quite some native trees, plants and animals left in the 3 project villages, all of the communities have experienced a rapid decline in the number of these plants and animals, with some species disappearing all together. According to the residents of Gemba Raya and Ensaid Panjang, the oil palm plantations surrounding their villages have cut down many trees and

created a water shortage, which has caused the extinction of many animals that were previously living in their forests. Other animals that used to be abundant are now rarely seen. One of our informants said that: "The animals do not feel comfortable living in the forests like before".

The decline in the number of animals living in the forests is further exacerbated by the villagers' own habit of immediately killing all animals (such as monkeys, bears, squirrels, etc.) that damage the crops in their farm fields. A lack of awareness about the importance of animal preservation plays an important part in this. In the villages there are no clear rules about the protection and conservation of animals. The customary rules for the preservation of the forest that do exist are usually more related to wood and other plants.

Because the natural materials used for dyeing are also becoming increasingly scarce in the forests due to the failing of the forest ecosystem, the JMM cooperative has decided to run a special programme for the cultivation of *noni* as a natural dye product for fabrics. The programme aims to teach people how to cultivate *noni*, and has set up a cooperative through which the villagers can sell their craftworks[37].

## 3.3. Cultural resources

The people living in the project villages are starting to realize that their traditional customs and culture are slowly fading with the changing times. An informant of Dusun Kelumbik (Karya Jaya Bakti village) for example mentioned that the traditional customs of teeth sharpening, hair cutting rituals, and wearing traditional clothing during ceremonies are no longer being done in current times. Another cultural custom that is disappearing is the craft of weaving and carving. Nowadays it is almost exclusively done by the elderly. In Dusun Kelumbik, there are only 2 women left who still know how to weave. However, the youth of Dusun Kelumbik have made plans to learn to make carvings from the elders.

## 3.4. Rules for natural resource management

Data from our study revealed that there were no formal governmental rules for the management of natural resources present at either the village or regional level. The management of natural resources in the 3 villages is done according to long existing customary rules. Even though the exact customary rules may vary between villages, the content of those rules is very much the same for all three villages. In every village there are, for example, rules about the felling of trees in the forest, for example: Felling of trees in the forest is not allowed without the permission of the chairman and local village officials, and the wood from those felled trees may only be used to fulfil the needs of the community itself (such as for building homes) and cannot be sold to outsiders. People that violate these rules, either indigenous or outsiders, will be penalized according to the customary law. The severity of the penalty will be determined based on the number of trees that have been cut down. According to our informants, all the old customary rules are still conserved and enforced until today.

In Gemba Raya village the customary rules for the management of the forest and its natural resources have recently been documented. The documentation process was carried out by the traditional leaders, village head, and village officials without any help from NTFP-EP, JMM, and PRCF. The chairman of Gemba Raya stated that: "The customary rules have been memorized, they're written, and I've held them and all have been signed in 2014". However, the chairman could not show us any

[37] The cooperative purchases the craftworks from the villagers, and then resells it to third party customers.

evidence for the existence of these documentations. In Ensaid Panjang and Karya Jaya Bakti no customary rules have yet been documented. According to our informants the customary rules are anyhow well-known among the villagers because they are passed on from one generation to the next and enforced by every generation.

Of all 3 villages Ensaid Panjang has the most advanced forest preservation methods. They have the Twang forest group that is in charge of protecting and preserving the forest area from natural resource theft and other irresponsible actions of the people and operates as a civilian defence unit (known as *hansip* in Indonesia). They work closely together with the village security officers in carrying out their duties of arresting and even punishing the people that have entered the forest without having received permission from the forest security personnel. The Tawang forest group was already established in 1986, long before NTFP-EP started its mapping activities, and is thus not a result of the project.

In conclusion: Even though the communities of all 3 villages have increased the intensity in monitoring and managing their forest in response to the threat of land conversion, there have not been any great changes in natural resource management procedures in the past 2 years.

# 4. LAND CONFLICTS

## 4.1. Conflicts within the village

According to almost all our informants there have never been any serious conflicts over land boundaries between *dusun* or community members, both before and after the introduction of the participatory mapping programme of NTFP-EP. The reason for this can on the one hand be found in the strong kinship that exists between the people of the different tribes, and on the other hand in the strong reliance on traditional village institutions and customary laws that provide clear rules and an amicable approach in problem solving. The following statement of the traditional leader of Gemba Raya village illustrates this:

> In the village Gemba Raya there is a conflict almost every year. It is a common thing. Land conflicts occur because of a dispute between the heirs, but customary law is still applied here and things are settled amicably between family members.

## 4.2. Conflicts with outsiders

Even though no serious land-related conflicts have yet occurred between the villagers and outsiders, the potential for conflicts with oil palm companies that exploit forest resources and convert indigenous land into plantations is very much present. Ensaid Panjang and Gemba Raya still have most of their land, but feel the threat of the oil palm plantations that completely surround their territory. According to the villagers of Ensaid Panjang markers have appeared in their forest, without the knowledge and permission of the village apparatus. This has made the villagers extra anxious for the map to be finished and legalized, so they can use it to attain their land rights before they are outpaced by the companies. In Karya Jaya Bakti a lot of forest area has already been sold to an oil palm company, and over the years their lands have gotten smaller and smaller. The little space the villagers now still have left is crammed with their homes and their small remaining private rubber fields and forests.

Karya Jaya Bakti's indigenous land was sold to the company as part of the governmental plasma-core land division model (or 'People Nucleus Company Pattern' / *Pola Perusahaan Inti Rakyat,* abbreviated PIR). This model aims to increase farmers' welfare through oil palm development, by cementing a mutually beneficial partnership between the company (the Nuclues Estate or 'core plantation') and the farmers (the Smallholders or 'plasma members'). The core company serves to develop an economic unit consisting of core plantation and the mill, plasma members' plantation, housing for the plasma members and other public and social facilities.[38] The core company is obliged to buy the agreed upon percentage (in this case 20%) of the oil palm harvest from the farmers, and the farmers are obliged to sell that percentage of their harvest to the core company.

The plasma-core partnership in Karya Jaya Bakti does not run smoothly. The villagers of Dusun Kelumbik feel cheated because the company has received a cheap rental permit from the local government for a 25 year period for only 250.000 dollars, but has not fulfilled its promises to improve community facilities such as education and health care. Moreover, they say the company is fraudulent, because it will never give them a clear indication of the price per kilo when paying the farmers for the share of the harvest that they are obliged to sell to the company. According to the villagers of Karya Jaya Bakti the reason for a potential conflict is thus not so much the fact that land is sold to the companies (they say that the company won't insist if they don't want to sell their land), but rather the broken promises and the fact that people will gain less from the partnership than was initially agreed upon.

# 5. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

## 5.1. Cooperation with local NGOs

The implementation of the programme in the villages was not carried out by NTFP-EP itself, but by the staffs of JMM and PRCF. JMM provided a facilitator for the mapping process in Dusun Kelumbik in Jaya Karya Bakti village and Dusun Ramsi Panjang in Gemba Raya Village. The mapping process in Dusun Rentap Selatan in Ensaid Panjang village was guided by a facilitator from PRCF. The coordination of all the project activities in Sintang was carried out by Mr. Irawan, who was appointed by NTFP-EP itself.

NTFP-EP's project started with the socialization of the local NGOs. During this socialization NTFP-EP also consulted the local NGO's about criteria for the target areas[39]. After it was decided in which villages the project should be carried out, these villages were visited and discussions were held about the details of the mapping activities, when and where to start, which forests to be mapped, and about how to socialize the rest of the community.

Before the facilitators went out into the villages to start the mapping activities, they followed trainings, organised by NTFP-EP. During these trainings NTFP-EP taught the facilitators about the different stages of the participatory mapping process, how to properly socialize the community, how to use GPS technology, how to do map sketching, how to process the data, etc. PRCF facilitator Mr.

[38] Source: SHARP. *Desk Review. Smallholders Model in Selected Communities*, p. 7, viewed on 17-11-2014, http://www.sharp-partnership.org/sharp-programmes/objects/pdfs/smallholder-models-in-indonesia

[39] According to one of the facilitators, Mr. Sagiman, Dusun Kelumbik in Karya Jaya Bakti village was -for example- selected as a project location for the following reasons; 1) Dusun Kelumbik is a *dusun* with assistance from JMM, 2) Dusun Kelumbik is an area with many craftsmen and –women, 3) They attain the raw materials (natural resources) to produce their handicrafts from their forests.

Agustinus for example stated: "I joined a training for 3 days and I learned how to use the GPS in the forest and I also learned about the stages of participatory mapping process as well as the data management". Mr. Sagiman, a facilitator of JMM, said: "Before the mapping, we received a training from Mr. Irawan of NTFP-EP on how to use the GPS and the activities in the field like socialization, drawing the map, and legalization of the map". The GPS training was not only participated by the 3 facilitators, but also by some community representatives, such as Mr. Cepi, the head of the community forest of Ensaid Panjang.

## 5.2. The mapping process

### *5.2.1. Overview of stages*

The stages covered during the participatory mapping process were; socialization, determining the coordinate points, data management, map finalization, and map legalization. The table below summarizes the series of activities that have been conducted in the 3 villages of study.

**Table 22: Participatory Mapping Activities**

| Activity | Ensaid Panjang | Karya Jaya Bakti | Gemba Raya | Implementation Time | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Ensaid Panjang | Karya Jaya Bakti | Gemba Raya |
| **Socialization** | √ | √ | √ | July 2012 | March 2012 | August 2012 |
| **Determining coordinate points** | √ | √ | √ | July 2012 | August 2012 | August 2012 |
| **Data management** | √ | √ | √ | unknown | unknown | unknown |
| **Map completion** | √ | √ | √ | September 2012 | September 2012 | September 2012 |
| **Map legalization** | | | | Not yet | Not yet | Not yet |

### *5.2.2. Socialization*

The first activity of the mapping process that was carried out was the socialization of the communities. According to the facilitator, Mr. Sagiman, the socialization workshop was attended by the village apparatus; the village head, the *dusun* heads, the village secretary and the traditional leader, and the general community members, both men and women. He also mentioned that the women in Karya Jaya Bakti were particularly enthusiastic about participating.

During the socialization workshops the purpose and process of the mapping were explained to the communities. The facilitators also further discussed with the communities what would be the best time for the activities to take place, which areas the communities thought should be mapped, and how the mapping teams should be formed. During the workshops it was decided that for Ensaid Panjang the forests *Mersibyang*, *Semilas*, and *Sebesi* should be mapped. For Karya Jaya Bakti the *Selabang* and *Senibung* forests, and for Gemba Raya only *Perauh* forest, which is quite large and located on the border of a neighbouring village. They also decided on who should become members of the pioneer teams

doing the GPS point collection. Village leaders and representatives as well as both male and female community members were chosen for this task.

After the workshop another important meeting was held with the village leaders and representatives of the neighbouring villages to the forest to be mapped. Ensaid Panjang village, for instance, has *Semilas* forest which lies adjacent to Empaci village of Dedai sub-district. Their meeting was attended by some representatives of Ensaid Panjang village, the NTFP-EP facilitators, and also the village apparatus and community leaders of Empaci village. The point of the meeting was to inform the community of Empaci village about the mapping plan in *Semilas* forest. Fortunately, both villages have a good relationship and no objections were raised to the implementation of the mapping activities in the area. The people of Ensaid Panjang village once even invited the community leaders of Empaci village to witness the mapping activities taking place, although the community leaders weren't able to accept the invitation due to previously made appointments.

Karya Jaya Bakti village also had a similar meeting to discuss the boundaries between two villages to be mapped. Their meeting was attended by the *dusun* head and other officers of Dusun Kelumbik, communities of several different *dusun* that lie directly adjacent to the forests to be mapped, the women group, and even some representatives of the oil palm company. During their meeting, agreements were made about the boundaries between the communities' lands, and the boundaries between the land of the oil palm plantation and the community's forest.

### *5.2.3. Determining the coordinate points*

The activity of determining coordinate points is known as *perintisan* (pioneering). Before the pioneering teams and facilitators went into the forest, the communities held a ritual called *Begelak*. *Begelak* is a traditional Dayak ritual to ask for protection from God when carrying out activities in the forest. This ritual is a common custom for Dayak people, and is performed every time they want to conduct an activity in a new location or a sacred place such as the old cemetery, nearby the big trees, etc. The *begelak* ritual for the pioneering activities took a full day to perform, and after its completion the pioneering teams went into the forest to collect the coordinate points. The activity of taking the coordinate points was a lengthy exercise. The teams needed more than 2 days to complete *Selabang* and *Senibung* forests of Dusun Kelumbik (Karya Jaya Bakti village), and 6 days for the forests of Dusun Ransi Panjang (Gemba Raya village) and the Emparu area.

Good practice for participatory mapping projects entails that after completion of the project the community members are empowered to independently undertake mapping activities without outside help. However, our data shows that not many of our informants have received training on how to use the GPS technology on their own. For example, Mr. Ayub (*dusun* head of Kelumbik), Mr. Ringkai (*tokoh masyarakat* of Karya Jaya Bakti village), and Mr. Thomas Dima (*Ketua Adat* of Gemba Raya village), all said that they hadn't received any training on how to use the GPS technology before participating in the pioneering activity. As part of the pioneering teams they went into the forest only to show the facilitators the land boundaries between private land and forest areas, important landmarks, etc. It was the facilitators themselves that were in charge of determining the coordinate points and recording the data with the help of the GPS device. The informants however mentioned that they thought this task was left to the facilitator for a reason, namely to get more accurate data by minimizing mistakes or missing recorded data due to inexperience of the pioneering team members. Additionally, all of the

participants of the focus group discussions in Gemba Raya village said that there had never been any trainings on the use of GPS technology prior to the mapping activities. However, one participant who happened to have studied forestry at college knew how to use a GPS device and had helped the pioneering team to operate the GPS device. Meanwhile, in the village of Ensaid Panjang, a training on how to use the GPS device was held once, and was attended by some of the community members and the head of the village. In Karya Jaya Bakti village no trainings were held, but luckily a lot of the community members had already gained experience using GPS technology, while working at the oil palm plantation.

It is interesting to note that representatives of the oil palm companies were also involved, albeit indirectly, in the pioneering stage of the mapping process, as can be learned from the following statement from Mr. Ringkai about the mapping activities conducted in Karya Jaya Bakti village:

> Mapping activities was started by socialization activity in the community. And then followed by mapping process using GPS by JMM officers. The mapping process was done in the forest which is surrounded by oil palm plantations owned by companies and we borrowed their vehicle to transport the people. When the map is done, village authority and the company approved it by signing it (Mr. Ringkai, interview April 2014).

### *5.2.4. Data management*

The next activity that was undertaken after the collection of the GPS points, was transferring all the recorded GPS data to the computer. During the pioneering activity, coordinate points were recorded both manually and automatically. Data recorded with the GPS device could be directly uploaded into the computer. Computer programmes suchs as Mapsource and Arcview were used to process the coordinate points and create a map of the communities' forests. The processing of the data is a difficult task, and all the facilitators that were charged with this task, needed help from NTFP-EP in order to complete the map.

Table 23 summarizes the forests' sizes, as measured during the mapping activities.

**Table 23: Forest size as measured during mapping activities**

| Forest Location | Ensaid Panjang | Karya Jaya Bakti | Gemba Raya |
|---|---|---|---|
| ***Selabang*** | | 1.342 Ha | |
| ***Senibung*** | | 1.738 Ha | |
| ***Mersibung*** | 53.983 Ha | | |
| ***Semilas*** | 42.778 Ha | | |
| ***Sebesi*** | 105.628 Ha | | |
| ***Perauh*** | | | 32.373 Ha |
| Source : JMM and PRCF, 2012 | | | |

### *5.2.5. Map finalization and legalisation*

The final stage of the participatory mapping process is to get the authorities to validate and approve the map, and collect the signatures of all the relevant stakeholders, such as the village heads, *dusun* heads, community leaders, traditional leaders, and representatives of NTFP-EP and the JMM cooperative or PCRF.

The communities have managed to get the map signed, and several copies have been made and spread amongst the community representatives and authorities. However, even though the map is finished, efforts still need to be made to legalize the map. Considering some of the mapped forest areas are located in APL zones the maps produced in the 3 villages need a special permit from the Regent in order to receive 'legal status'. Mr. Irawan, the coordinator of the NTFP-EP mapping programme in Sintang, is charged with the responsibility to get the maps recognized by local government:

> In keeping with my job about the eco-cultural development, I try to get permission. I need to be around until every permit needs to undergo the village regulations. The last product is the Permit of the Regent. We have been trying to get it for two years, but we can still see a chance (Mr. Irawan).

The process of acquiring the Regent's Permit has already been running for over two years. In October 2012 NTFP-EP managed to organise a meeting with the Regent of Sintang. As a result of this meeting the Regent issued a letter which stated that the community (and NGOs) needed to be helped, but in the end this did not result in the legalization of the map and the communities' rights over their lands. From then on NTFP-EP has continued to make efforts to gain recognition of the maps, assisted by JMM. In April 2014, for example, JMM had another consultation with Local Government about the issue.

The map legalization process is fully conducted by the facilitators and the NTFP-EP staff. The inhabitants of the project villages have not played any part in this. Our data suggests that, even though both the leaders from the village apparatus and the community members realize the importance of getting their map legalized, they have no idea what steps to undertake to get their land rights recognized. According to some participants of the focus group discussion in Dusun Kelumbik (Karya Jaya Bakti village), there had been a training to teach the villagers how to use the map. However, the chief of Dusun Kelumbik said that the map in his village had not been used after its completion, and also added that he had no clue about what to do next with the map. 3 female participants of the focus group discussions in Ensaid Panjang said that they had never even seen the map.

## 6. IMPACTS OF THE NTFP-EP PROGRAMME

NTFP-EP's main project activity in the villages of study has been participatory mapping. The desired result from this activity is a map of the village forests, which has been legitimized by the relevant authorities so that it can be used to secure the communities' rights over their forests and natural resources, and help them manage their natural resources in a sustainable way. In terms of achieving this goal, NTFP-EP's project has only been partially successful. Within all 3 villages participatory mapping has been carried out, and maps of the forests have been produced. However, the formal process of legitimizing the maps has not yet been completed, since there have been difficulties acquiring the last necessary certificate -the Certificate of *Perdas*/the Regent's Permit- from the government authorities. It

has already been 2 years since the project staff started their attempts to obtain the permit, and until now the process has been long and tortuous without results. This means that the resulting map is not yet legally enforceable, which makes it difficult to determine the full potential of NTFP-EP's mapping programme.

The data from our study suggests that the mapping activities as carried out in the project villages have not yet had a clear and concrete impact on the way the natural resources are managed, nor the communities' ability to generate more income from their forest products. Along this line, the Chairman of Gemba Raya village stated that: "the direct benefits of the maps have not been felt very well by the public".

One of NTFP-EP's other original project objectives was to provide alternative sources of livelihood for the community to improve their income and welfare. The intended strategy was based on the theory that communities would become more motivated to preserve and protect their forests and its biodiversity when their income from forest products would increase. Even though NTFP-EP itself has eventually not undertaken any project activities in this specific direction, and community income has decreased (or at its best only slightly increased) over the last 2 years, our data shows that the project has still succeeded in making the community members more aware about the importance of forest preservation and their rights over the forests. According to our informants, people have just recently come to realize how much they are actually dependent on their forests and the plants and animals, and how important it thus is for them to preserve and protect their forest from conversion.

> The benefit that can be gained in the future for the betterment of our children and grandchildren is that first everybody has the forest and second they are willing to preserve and protect the forest (Male informant from the focus group discussion in Dusun Kelumbik of Karya Jaya Bakti village).

> We don't want what belongs to people to get stolen. Such a thing happened in the past. It was about borders with other villages. Previously we did not yet know how extensive the forest that we have is. Then, after learning how large it is, we want the right to manage it so that it becomes the community forest (Male informant from the focus group discussion in Ensaid Panjang).

> This mapping will benefit the community because it can reduce potential conflicts over land ownership, either between villagers or companies (Mr. Yosef Ismail, village head of Gemba Raya, interview on April 2014).

The people also recognize ways in which the map can already be useful for them. Some informants mentioned that the map, signed by the relevant stakeholders, can help them to prevent conflicts over land, by serving as evidence of the previous agreements about boundaries. According to our informants, over the recent years the village borders have often changed due to the openings and expansions of oil palm plantations. The informants say that, as a result of the mapping activities, they have become more aware about the size and location of the forest area that is used by them, and they realize that the forest borders captured on the map can also serve as a reference point for them to monitor the borders of their land and notice if any unexpected changes occur. The following statement from Mr. Cepi, head of the community forest of Ensaid Panjang, shows that the communities also comprehend that the map can play a part in the protection of their traditional customs and culture:

> Mapping can be described as forest preservation for posterity in the future … In the future, the map is intended to be able to defend their territory. Mapping can also protect, preserve and maintain the existence of Rumah Betang since its materials come from the forest.

The people of Ensaid Panjang, Karya Jaya Bakti and Gemba Raya have expressed their hope that NTFP-EP will do a follow-up project in the villages to help them to legitimize their maps, secure their rights over their forest lands, and increase their earnings by building and strengthening their craft businesses.

## 7. REFLECTION ON THE PROJECT

Based on the findings above, we have formulated two important critical notes as a reflection on this NTFP-EP project:

Firstly, good practice dictates that mapping projects should be dedicated to achieving community empowerment. This means that the focus of the project should lie on teaching the community members how to read, interpret, produce, update, and use their maps, and project instigators should therefore let the community members take as much control and responsibility over the mapping process as possible.[40] Our data however suggests that in the execution of the project, NTFP-EP was more concerned with the outcome of the project (the final map), than with the process of teaching the community members how to independently execute all the stages of a mapping process themselves. Community members were made part of the pioneering team, but only few of them received training on how to use the GPS device, and in the end most of the coordinate point were taken by the facilitators instead of by the community members themselves. Also, none of the community members or village representatives were involved in the management and processing of the GPS data (transference of the GPS points to the map) which was fully done by the facilitators and NTFP-EP staff. Likewise, all attempts to legalize the maps are conducted by NGO staff members, without any community involvement. Our data shows that, as a result, the communities are still largely unable to manage their own maps or develop their own map-use strategies without the help of NTFP-EP, JMM and PRCF. This also means that the villages cannot be used as reference material, or "best practice cases", for the implementation of the project in the other villages in the district, as was the original intention of NTFP-EP.

Secondly, the participation of female community members was quite low compared to that of male community members. The women only took part in the socialization stage. Some women of Ensaid Panjang village and Karya Jaya Bakti village did join the pioneering team into the forest, but only to provide food to the men. According to one of our female informants, Mrs. Rubiyah, the fact that no women in Gemba Raya were involved in the implementation of the project was due to the practical reason that the distance to the forest was too long, and so it was agreed that women should not take part in the implementation of the project.

> I was invited at the socialization. In the first socialization, they advised people about the importance of forests because in it there are plants for natural dye weaving, wood for making a loom and woven rattan

[40] Source: Chapin & Threlkeld 2001: 128; Di Gessa 2008: 15; IFAD 2009: 25.

> as raw material, so that citizens should no longer open fields in the forest. But I didn't come at the implementation stage since I had to walk very far to the forest (Mrs. Rubiyah from Gemba Raya village).

Lastly, the fact that the maps of the 3 villages' forests have not yet been formally approved and acknowledged by the district government with the issue of the Regent's Permit, means that the communities' forests are still not sufficiently protected against theft and land conversion by i.a. oil palm companies. It is therefore of the greatest importance that continuous efforts are put into attaining the acknowledgement of the communities' rights to manage their forests as an eco-culture zone.


# APPENDIX

## 8. VILLAGE GOVERNANCE AND COMMUNITY LIFE

In general, the government structure of the three villages of study is similar to the governance structures of other areas in Indonesia. The village government is headed by a village chief who is assisted by the BPD (the village assembly), a secretary, a chief of village development affairs, a chief of government affairs, a chief of financial affairs, and a chief of public affairs. The main task of the village government is to manage the village government's affairs, development, and community issues. In carrying out governance and development at the *dusun* level, the village head is assisted by the head of *dusun*. The village government is supplemented by traditional leaders that deal with indigenous issues at the village level. There is no overlap in village administration between the three project villages.

Broadly speaking, the village government structure can be described as follows:

**Figure 4 : Village Administration Structure**




One thing that distinguishes the village government structure in the project villages from those of typical Indonesian villages, is that the traditional leaders are chosen by the village head instead of the villagers themselves. According to the village head of Gemba Raya, this is because indigenous and social affairs are also part of the village head's responsibilities, so he needs to find someone with whom he can co-operate, whilst still considering the needs and wishes of the villagers.

The Dayak communities' are governed by customary rules that typically have been valid for many generations. These customary rules for example dictate the proper ways of marriage and

housekeeping, procedures before entering the forest, the ordinances of worship, childbirth, and gardening, etc. Some examples of specific Dayak customary rules are; Holding *Bagelak* rituals before undertaking activities such as mapping in the forest; Incoming guests in a *Betang* house have to enter through a specific door; Men are forbidden to weave like women; Women are forbidden to make the matting for the axes that are used for cutting wood; If there is an empty *Betang* house it may never be dark, the lights must stay on. Village officials usually report problems that are related to social customs to the traditional leaders. To solve these issues, traditional leaders usually use the mechanism of *musyawarah*—'sitting together' to find the solution.

# 9. MARGINAL GROUPS

## 9.1. Women

Women's roles in economic activities are not very different from those of men. Both work on the paddies in the rice fields or on the plantations. Mrs. Rubiyah for example mentioned that: "In agricultural activities the position of men and women is equal. Both go to the farm and do the same job in the processing of rubber". There are however some differences in task division between the 2 genders, which are dictated by customary law. For example, only women can weave and only men can produce wicker. With regard to domestic affairs, the husband is regarded as the household head. However, most informants claimed that the family decision-making is done jointly by husband and wife. The wife is deemed responsible for the management of the household, which entails cleaning, child care, education, and family finances. In community life, women typically take care of food and drinks while men take up work that requires physical strength. During customary events women likewise deal with cooking, cleaning, and traditional dress preparation activities. During community meetings women have the same right to speak up as men do. However, in reality not many women attend these meetings, as it is usually the husband that receives the invitation as head of the household. If the husband is unable to attend, his wife will go in his place. The under-attendance of women during public meetings was also noticeable during the socialization meetings for the mapping project.

## 9.2. Newcomers

There are not many recent newcomers in the communities of Ensaid Panjang, Karya Jaya Bakti and Gemba Raya, but migrants from Java have been living with the native inhabitants for decades. In Karya Jaya Bakti some newcomers are moving into the village to work on the oil palm plantation. Newcomers generally manage to blend into the community. Many of them for example participate in the traditional events held in the *Rumah Betang.* The people in the communities have an open attitude towards newcomers, as is confirmed by the following statement of Mr. Ringkai: "The newcomers in the village can adjust to the prevailing customary rules, and do not bring a potential conflict. The indigenous people in this village are very open to new people".

# Annex VII. Literature review on participatory mapping[41]

## *Introduction*

Even though the existence of participatory mapping activities is very important in a country like Indonesia where an estimated 48 million indigenous people still depend on the forest for their livelihood, but where mining, logging and oil palm industry are destroying more than 1 million hectares of rainforest territory each year[42] (Telapak & Gekko Studio 2011), the academic literature on participatory mapping within specific Indonesian context is quite limited. This may, at least in part, have to do with the political sensitivities involved in mapping, that can be especially critical for Indonesian indigenous peoples that have since long had a particularly uneasy relation with government and, until very recently, had to cope with a severe lack of legal protection. Luckily, a lot of additional information can be found in manuals, project evaluations, working papers, and online blogs, tutorial videos, etc. which are most often published in more recent years by the international organisations that implement the mapping projects in Indonesia. This literature review therefore draws on academic literature on participatory mapping both within and without Indonesian context, as well as other (mostly online) sources that are more specifically focused on mapping projects undertaken in Indonesia or Southeast Asia. It will cover the following topics: What is participatory mapping, what tools and methods are used, history and development of participatory mapping, reported impacts, and considerations about "good practice".

## *What is participatory mapping?*

Participatory mapping is a general term[43] used to define a set of approaches and techniques that combine the tools of modern cartography with participatory methods to create a map of a local community's habitat that represents this community's spatial knowledge (Rainforest Foundation UK 2014). "NGO's, from small local ones to large international ones, often play a crucial role as interlocutors, trainers, advocates and facilitators in these mapping activities" (IFAD 2009: 5).

Participatory mapping is used over the whole world, and the maps that are produced can take on many forms, and can be used to achieve various different purposes. Looking at the available literature and documentation on participatory mapping initiatives the most common aim of participatory mapping appears to be to help marginalized groups, in particular indigenous, pastoralist and forest dwellers, to claim and/or defend their (access to) ancestral lands and its resources, typically by working towards legal recognition of their land rights, using the maps as evidence of their continued residency. The maps can also serve as a tool for community land use planning and natural resource management, and can be used to bring resource-related problems, such as the impacts of logging,

[41] Please note beforehand that part of this text has been taken over into the main text of the report. In addition, this annex is also included as annex in MDG projects E2, E8 and E9.

[42] Making Indonesia the fastest forest clearing nation in the world since 2012, and also the world's third largest emitter of carbon dioxide emissions, behind China and the United States (Telapak & Gekko Studio 2011).

[43] The numerous initiatives throughout the world aren't always referred to with the words 'participatory mapping', but can go by many different terms, including: "indigenous mapping" (IFAD 2009: 6) , "…"participatory land use mapping," "participatory resource mapping" (Mbile *et al*. 2003), "community mapping" (Bennagen & Royo 2000, Eghenter 2000, Fox 2002), "community-based mapping" (Flavelle 2002), "ethnocartography" (Chapin & Threlkeld 2001, Gonzalez *et al*. 1995), and "counter-mapping" (Peluso 1995, Kosek 1998, Hodgson & Schroeder 2002)…" (as cited in Chapin *et al*. 2005: 622-623).

mining, and 'land grab' activities, to the attention of governmental authorities and decision makers (Chapin *et al*. 2005: 620; Di Gessa 2008; Rainforest Foundation UK 2014; Literat 2013: 200; IFAD 2009: 9-12, 39). Some indigenous groups are now using mapping to monitor and defend lands against deforestation, illegal timber extraction, prospecting, and colonization (Teague c. 2010: 10). Other purposes of participatory mapping activities include the strengthening of indigenous political organisation, economic development planning, the documentation of history and customs for culture preservation, education of indigenous youths and/or the general public (Chapin *et al*. 2005: 620), and support for conflict resolution in territory-related disputes (Di Gessa 2008).

Participatory mapping processes in general don't follow usual cartographic conventions. The maps that are produced often represent a socially or culturally distinct understanding of landscape and include information that is excluded from mainstream or official maps. The aim is to create a map that depicts local knowledge about the environment, and represents and serves the agenda of the community (IFAD 2009: 7). Participatory maps can present spatial information at various scales, from detailed information of village layout and infrastructure, to a more general depiction of large areas. Elements that can be included in a map are for instance: territorial land boundaries, land-use occupancy, hunting- fishing- and gathering grounds, the location/distribution of flora and fauna, important landmarks such as rivers, caves, roads, and location of houses, but also information on rainfall patterns, health patterns, wealth distributions, etc. Furthermore, the maps can depict places of social, cultural and/or historical significance, such as ancestral burial grounds, sacred areas, cultural sites and trails, and information on cultural customs, traditions, and mythology (IFAD 2009: 6-7).

What further distinguishes participatory mapping from traditional cartography and map-making is the process by which the maps are made (IFAD 2009: 4): Community members are involved (preferably) throughout the whole mapping process and recognized as capable research collaborators and experts on their own local surroundings and needs (IFAD 2009: 4; Pathways Through Participation 2010: 1). According to Fox *et al*. (2003, as cited in Wright *et al*. 2009: 261) the reasons for choosing a participatory mapping approach are usually not only practical (i.e. the actual production of the map and using it as evidence for land claims, or as community advocacy tools), but also intrinsic, as the communal aspect of the mapping process can enhance group awareness and cultural identity, facilitate the passing down of historical knowledge through generations, and build trust and communication between people.

### *Tools and methods*

Participatory mapping uses a range of tools and methods, of which some of the principles ones are:

**"hands on mapping"**, which is a basic method in which the community draws a map from memory on the ground (also called "ground mapping") or on paper (also called "sketch mapping");

**"Participatory mapping using scale maps and images"**, where local knowledge and information is added to a pre-existing image (such as an aerial or satellite image);

**"Participatory 3-D modelling (P3DM)"**, which is used for hilly or mountainous areas. Layers of elevation are cut out of cardboard in the shape and contours of the landscape and placed on top of each other, after which paint, pins and strings are used to show surface information and to indicate boundaries and conflict areas. Data depicted on such a 3-D model can also be extracted, digitized and incorporated into a Geographical Information System (GIS);

**"GPS based field mapping"**, in which geographical reference points of boundaries, landmarks, etc. are collected and are put on top of a map, often using GIS to store, retrieve and analyse the GPS data;
**"Computer based map making"**, where graphic software (such as Adobe Illustrator) and GIS are used to make geographically accurate maps, and;
**"Multimedia and internet-based mapping"**, which draws on Web 2.0 technology to create interactive, computer based maps that contain links to digital video, pictures, audio and written text (Pathways Through Participation 2010: 4). This increasingly popular method, makes it better possible to document the complexities and the oral and visual aspects of local knowledge (Di Gessa 2008: 6-9; IFAD 2009: 13-19; Rainforest Foundation UK 2011).[44]

The choice of methods to be used in a participatory mapping project is determined by many factors, such as the problems the community is facing and wants to resolve, the available resources (financial, and in terms of staff and equipment), and the community's physical context (is it hilly or plain) (IFAD 2009: 13) as well as its cultural context (norms, values, customs) (Rainforest Foundation UK 2011).

## *History and development*

### *Over the world*

Local people have been drawing maps of their territories to develop a sense of place and identity for centuries (Pathways Through Participation 2010: 2). However, mapping of indigenous lands as a participatory exercise and a means for "securing tenure, managing natural resources, and strengthening cultures", often facilitated by outsiders, is a more recent phenomenon (Chapin *et al*. 2005: 619).

According to Chapin *et al.* the first participatory mapping exercises started in Canada and Alaska in the 1960's (2005: 619). The rest of the world only followed much later, approximately 25-30 years ago, when participatory mapping projects started to rapidly proliferate from Southeast Asia through Central Asia, Africa, Europe, North-, South- and Central America to Australasia (IFAD 2009: 7).

"In the development literature, mapping is identified as having many different sources – from social anthropology to participatory action research and popular education" (Pathways Through Participation 2010: 2). Throughout the years, mapping has become increasingly popular and prominent (Ibid: 13), which "many commentators ascribe to the developments in Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) which emerged in the late 1980s in South Asia and combined insights from agro-ecosystem analysis with Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA)" (Ibid: 2).

"The more technically oriented participatory mapping work began filling the field in the mid- and late 1990s, when computerized mapping technology became more widely available" (Chapin *et al*. 2005: 623). "Those engaged in participatory mapping are increasingly taking advantage of new, digital and web-based Technologies" (Teague c. 2010: 13), which are being developed and improved by large corporations such as Google (Google Maps and Google Earth), ESRI (developers of the principal GIS used

[44] More information on the different methodologies and their advantages, disadvantages, ways of implementation, suitable contexts, etc. can be found in the manuals of IFAD (2009) and Di Gessa (2008). For additional information on participatory 3-D modelling in specific also see Vandergeest (1996), Rubiano *et al.* (1997), Rambaldi & Callosa-Tarr (2000), Flavelle (2002), Hoare *et al.* (2002), De Vera *et al*. (2003), and Rhoades & Moates (2003) (as cited in Chapin *et al.* 2005: 623)

word-wide) and Garmin (producer of GPS hardware and software) especially for this purpose (Teague c. 2010: 13).

### *In Indonesia*

According to Peluso early forms of participatory mapping entered Indonesia in the 1980s via conventional (eco) conservation projects by international organisations such as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), after which Indonesian activists took the opportunity to "… reinterpret this kind of mapping as a sort of resistance and counter-movement to state mapping, which did not consider people's rights but instead was a basis for exploitive development projects under the Suharto regime" (1995: 398-400, as cited in Hartjati Sanmukri 2013: 123).

Over the past 1.5 decade, communities from nearly every region in Indonesia have been trained in the technical and facilitation skills required to undertake participatory mapping, and by 2009 1.5 million hectares of land had already been mapped by local communities (IFAD 2009: 22). The Indonesian community mapping network (Jaringan Kerja Pemetaan Partisipatif or JKPP), established by the mapping activists in 1996 in Bogor, West Java, has been instrumental in achieving these goals (IFAD 2009: 22). I.a. by forming an alliance with AMAN and the Forest Watch Indonesia to advocate for the customary maps to become officially recognized and fed into the "Ancestral Domain Registration Agency" (Badan Registrasi Wilayah Adat): The government's official national database of forest cover. In 2011 AMAN signed an MoU with the National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional), which officially stated that "indigenous" maps would be integrated into governmental data (Hartjati Sanmukri 2013: 123).

On May 16'th 2013 another important milestone for the recognition of indigenous peoples' ancestral land rights was reached, when – in response to a petition of AMAN - the constitutional court in Jakarta ruled that the customary forests of indigenous peoples should no longer be classed as falling in "State Forest Areas"[45] (Forest Peoples Programme 2013), officially giving customary forest its own status and position in the Forestry Law, and - at least in theory - returning the rights over the customary forests (seized by the state through UUK[46]) to its indigenous inhabitants (REDD-Monitor 2013). This development could greatly enhance the success rate of indigenous people's endeavours to lay claims to their lands and thereby protect their sources of livelihood in the future.

## *Reported impacts of participatory mapping*

Over the years, many researchers have noted the positive impacts that participatory mapping can have on a community:

> Participation in mapping seems to have encouraged some indigenous communities to demand title to lands (Toledo Maya Cultural Council, 1997; Leake, 2000; Herlihy, 2003; Herlihy and Knapp, 2003), to defend and claim their rights to control natural resources (Smith, 2003; Brown, 2006), and to design conservation and resource management plans that are compatible with local practices (Mohamed and Ventura, 2000; McCall and Minang, 2005; Brown, 2006; Bauer, 2009). Researchers have argued that, in addition to producing maps, when implemented with a stress on participation and with facilitation of

[45] The petition of AMAN (*Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara*), which was filed with the court some 14 months before the ruling, objected to the way the 1999 Forestry Act treats indigenous peoples' 'customary forests' as providing only weak use-rights within State Forest Areas" (Forest Peoples Programme 2013)

[46] UUK is the abbreviation for Undang-Undang Kehutanan: Act No. 41/1999 on Forestry, saying: "customary forest is STATE FOREST in indigenous territory" (IWGIA 2013). The new ruling has replaced this law.

> discussions within communities, indigenous mapping empowers indigenous peoples in land and resource use rights against potential encroachers (Poole, 2003; Smith, 2003; Brown, 2006; Finley-Brook, 2007) (Reyes-Garcia *et al*. ca. 2012a: 2-3).

In addition to these positive effects, researchers have also observed negative consequences resulting from participatory mapping. For instance, Authors such as Mwangi, Hodgson & Schroeder, Fox, Bryant, and Roth have noted issues such as increased privatization of land, loss of indigenous conceptions of space, greater exposure of valuable natural resources, increased taxation by the state, and increase or intensification of conflicts, either within the village, with neighbouring villages, or with other external actors such as companies or governmental authorities (Reyes-Garcia *et al*. 2012b: 651). Increase of conflicts due to participatory mapping, is one of the most frequently reported drawbacks of participatory mapping. Researchers such as Offen, Peluso, Hale, and Vandergeest have argued that: "Participatory mapping might intensify internal conflicts because it might bring to light overlapping uses of land and resources or erode traditional ways of dealing with internal conflicts…" (Ibid). Furthermore, it has been reasoned by i.a. Peluso and Rundstrom that "…participatory mapping might increase the number of conflicts with external actors, as the maps produced might challenge the maps made by state and corporate authorities" (Ibid).

Reyes-Garcia *et al*. have attempted to validate the theory that participatory mapping systematically increases the number of conflicts, using an experimental research design whereby 32 native Amazonian villages with and without conflicts with outsiders were randomly assigned to a treatment group (those where a participatory mapping project would be implemented by them) and a control group (those where a participatory mapping project would not (yet) be implemented by them[47]).[48] Contrary to others' previous findings, the results of their research show no statistically significant differences in the measured variables (i.e. number of conflicts, negative opinion, neutral attitude, and negative attitudes towards outsiders) between treatment and control villages (2012b: 656).

Reyes-Garcia *et al*. explain their deviating results by arguing that previous studies, which were based on direct observations rather than a randomized experimental design, might have been subject to selection bias, because the villages participating in participatory mapping projects are generally the ones that are chosen or volunteering to participate in participatory mapping due to the fact that they are expected to experience – or are already experiencing – conflicts over land rights and resources (2012b: 651, 656). Their results support the argument that mapping projects do not bring about conflicts per se, rather "…the process and the results of participatory mapping can help in conflict resolution or contribute to conflict generation or exacerbation depending on the political and socio-economic context in which they are conducted" (Ibid: 657).

[47] For the sake of fairness, participatory mapping projects were also implemented in the control villages, but only after all research data for the post-intervention study had been collected (Reyes-Garcia *et al.* 2012b: 653).

[48] All these villages were located in Tsimane' territory. The Tsimane' are a native Amazonian society of foragers and farmers in Bolivia.

## *Good practice*

### *How to organise a mapping process*

Considerations on how to successfully undertake a participatory mapping programme, in part focus on the question of "what constitutes as an ideal way to organise a mapping process". There are many philosophical and technical differences in implementing participatory mapping initiatives, and the fact that they are carried out in many different settings, makes it impossible to distinguish a single definitive blueprint process that proves successful regardless of context (Di Gessa 2008: 2; IFAD 2009: 30). It is, however, generally agreed upon that a structured approach to the mapping process is necessary for it to succeed.

In this regard, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD 2009) identified some broad steps that are typically adopted in the deployment of participatory mapping initiatives, i.e.: Preparing the community for the mapping activity; Determining the purpose(s) of making a map; Collecting information; Creating the map and determining the legend; Analysing and evaluating the information, and; Using and communicating the community's spatial information (IFAD 2009: 32-38). These steps correspond with Chapin & Threlkeld's "ethnocartography model": a coherent and structured methodology that provides a 6 step approach to the process of mapping indigenous lands. According to the IFAD (2009: 32) most mapping projects loosely follow the steps of this approach, which entail: 1. "**ground preparation**: before the project starts project leaders and indigenous leaders explain the objectives and importance of the mapping work to the community, the technical team is recruited and collaboration with NGO's and government agencies is sought; 2. **First workshop – orientation and training**: Project staff and indigenous leaders explain the objectives and methodology to the surveyors and technical team and data collection tools are developed; 3. **First fieldwork – gathering data and sketch mapping**; 4. **Second workshop – transcription of data onto new maps**; 5. **Second fieldwork – verification of collected data by the community**, and; 6. **Third workshop – correcting and completing final maps**: Surveyors reunite with the cartographers to incorporate information that has been verified in the field and put the draft maps in final form (Chapin & Threlkeld 2001; IFAD 2009: 30).

### *Ethical considerations*

In one of his later works, Chapin points out that in the past guidebooks about participatory mapping that have grown out of work in Southeast Asia, have focused mostly on the technical aspects of mapping, avoiding the more politically sensitive aspects and ethical considerations brought along by the mapping.[49] The first manual to actually focus on these matters within Indonesian context was "Mapping people's forests: the role of mapping in planning community-based management of conservation areas in Indonesia" by C. Eghenter in 2000 (Chapin *et al*. 2005: 627). Over the years the focus on ethical considerations about potential negative consequences of mapping and the moral responsibilities of the project instigators towards the communities that partake in the mapping projects has become more pronounced. More and more authors broach these kinds of issues in their articles, books and manuals, even if only in afterthought.

[49] Examples of these "technical" guidebooks on participatory mapping are: Drawing on Local Knowledge: A Community Mapping Training Manual (Momberg *et al*. 1995); Mapping Our Land (Flavelle 2002); and Manual on Participatory 3-Dimensional Modelling (Rambaldi & Callosa-Tarr 2000) (as cited in Chapin *et al*. 2005: 627).

In the literature, a prominent topic with regard to "ethical practice" is that of "empowerment". Projects should be dedicated to achieving community empowerment, meaning that cartographers should focus on teaching the indigenous people how to read, interpret, produce and use maps, and should let them take as much control and responsibility over the mapping process as possible, thereby ensuring that the community will also be able to update their map and develop their own map-use strategies after the project has finished (Chapin & Threlkeld 2001: 128; Di Gessa 2008: 15; IFAD 2009: 25). Good practice, in this regard, also (perversely) means that mappers sometimes have to deliberately disregard or simplify available technologies to make sure the community will be able to access, understand and use them in the future without outside help (Chapin *et al.* 2005: 259; Di Gessa 2008: 5). Ownership rights should also belong to the community itself, enabling them to protect their own interests by deciding for themselves which data they want to publicly disclose, and which (potentially sensitive) data they want to keep private (Chapin & Threlkeld 2001: 134; IFAD 2009: 27-28).

According to i.a. Chapin & Threlkeld (2001) and Teague c. (2010), good practice in participatory mapping exercises also requires a culturally sensitive approach on the part of the international project instigators (NGO's, CBO's, etc.) and staff involved in the mapping process. They should make an effort to view the world from the eyes of the indigenous community, respecting and prioritizing the community's needs, and "carefully considering the challenges inherent in translating indigenous knowledge (which is often based on different epistemologies and conceptions of space and time than their own) into Western Cartesian cartographic formats" (Teague c. 2010: 15). For instance, knowledge about boundaries can easily be misrepresented as indigenous peoples often have a "fluid sense" of their borders, which can be overlapping, incomplete, shifting and/or dependent on seasonal variations (Chapin & Threlkeld 2001: 133)

Another topic that is quite extensively covered in the literature is the project initiators' (perceived) ethical responsibility to ensure that the benefits of the participatory mapping exercise are evenly felt throughout the community. It is deemed important that the map should represent the views and wishes of all the different groups within the community, and consequently many authors highlight the fact that special effort should be put into making sure that the map reflects the perceptions and needs of (potentially) marginalized groups, such as women, the elderly, youth, or immigrants (Chapin & Threlkeld 2001: 127; IFAD 2009: 27-28). Furthermore, it is thought important that members of all groups (and not only the village elite) are encouraged to participate in the actual mapping process, among other things to make sure that pre-existing power structures favouring certain groups' access to land are not reinforced (Teague c. 2010: 14), and to prevent new power imbalances between the people that know how to use the advanced technology, and those who don't (Wright *et al*. 2009: 260). Conversely, authors such as Mei-Po Kwan and Diane Rocheleau, who write from a feminist perspective, note the importance of taking into consideration and addressing the disrupting effect that mapping can have on existing gender relations (Teague c. 2010: 14).

An interesting development is that, over the past years, a special interest seems to be taken in the issue of "who controls GIS and with what power" (Spiegel *et al*. 2012: 345). Authors such as Chapin *et al.* (2005), Di Gessa (2008), Spiegel *et al*. (2012), Teague (c. 2010), and Wright *et al*. (2009) raise concerns on how skill levels needed for the handling of GIS are often gendered and age based (Teague c. 2010: 13), and on how a lack of electricity and internet access in remote communities and the cost of the equipment, causes the knowledge and handling of the GIS technology and/or the processing of the

GPS data to remain outside of the community, in the hands of a small - already privileged - elite of experts, thus enhancing existing power structures (Chapin *et al.* 2005: 629; Di Gessa 2008: 14-15).

Other topics on "good practice" in participatory mapping that are less pronounced but still present in the literature are: The importance of ensuring the long term commitment and support to initiatives of external parties (NGO's, CBO's, universities, development partners, etc.) (IFAD 2009: 25); A good selection of the mapping team. For instance: Chapin & Threlkeld have provided a list of desirable characteristics for facilitators (2001: 127), and lastly; The responsibility to make the local community aware of potential risks of mapping (such as boundary conflicts, risks of documenting sensitive information) before the start of the activities, and to put an effort into mitigating negative impacts that occur in the wake of the process (Di Gessa 2008: 1,3; IFAD 2009: 28-29).

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# Endline Report on the Achievement of MDGs and Themes:

# Evaluation of the FIELD project

## MFS II Joint Evaluations

## Indonesia

**Sub-report:**
**E4. Local Economic Development and Promotion of Local Seed System to Indonesian National Policy,**
**Farmer Initiatives for Ecological Livelihoods and Democracy (FIELD)**

## FINAL REPORT

**9 April 2015**


**Amsterdam Institute for International Development (AIID)**
Trinity building C, 3rd floor, Rm XT-3.17
Pietersbergweg 17
1105 BM Amsterdam
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)20 5661596
F +31 (0)20 5665997
www.aiid.org

**SurveyMeter**
Jl. Jenengan Raya No.109
Maguwoharjo, Depok, Sleman,
Yogyakarta 55282
Indonesia
T +62 (0) 274 4477464
F +62 (0) 274 4477004
www.surveymeter.org

# List of contributors

**AIID**
Menno Pradhan (Principal Investigator)
Melinda Vigh (Research Coordinator)
Marije Groot Bruinderink (Project Manager)
Iris van Rossum (Junior Researcher)
Lene Boehnke (Junior Researcher)
Emilie Berkhout (Research Assistant)

**Survey Meter**
Ni Wayan Suriasatini (Research Coordinator)
Mardiana Br Ginting (Project Manager)
Muhammad Mulia (Qualitative Researcher)
Kamti Ningsih (Field Coordinator)
Bondan Sikoki (Survey Expert)

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
| | |
|---|---|
| AIV | African Indigenous Vegetables |
| CBSS | Community-Based Seed System |
| CFA | Co-financing Agency |
| EA | Ecosystem Alliance |
| EQ | Evaluation Question |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organisation |
| FBSM | Farmer-Based Seed Multiplication |
| FIELD | Farmers' Initiatives for Ecological Livelihoods and Democracy |
| FFS | Farmers' Field School |
| FG | Farming Group |
| F(L)SE | Farmer (Led) Seed Enterprises |
| FPVA | Farmer-Participatory Varietal Selection |
| HH | Household |
| IDR or Rp | Indonesian Rupiah |
| IPM | Integrated Pest Management |
| IPPHTI | Indonesian IPM Farmer Association |
| MDG | Millennium Development Goal |
| MFS II | Medefinancieringsstelsel (Co-financing System Grant Policy Framework) |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| PPB | Participatory Plant Breeding |
| PVS | Participatory Variety Selection |
| PEDIGREA | Participatory Enhancement of Diversity of Genetic Resources in Asia |
| SCC | Saving and Credit Cooperative |
| SLPHT | Sekolah Lapang Pangendalian Hama Terpadu (Field School for Pest Control) |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Project context

Agricultural productivity has stagnated in Indonesia. Despite labour productivity remaining buoyant with the outflow of labour from agriculture, agricultural total factor productivity growth has been negative since the early 1990s, from annual gains of 2.5 percent in 1968-92 to annual contractions of 0.1 percent from 1993 to 2000 (World Bank 2006). This is also true for the rice sector. The figure below, copied from Simatupang and Timmer (2008), shows that since the financial crisis of 1997, rice productivity increases have been around 1.2 percent.

**Figure 1: Annual growth of rice production**




*Source:* Raw data from the Ministry of Agriculture.

Historically, Indonesia has intervened a lot in rice markets. The oil boom around 1973 resulted in a large inflow of resources for the Government, which were used to promote high-yield rice varieties and investments in irrigation systems. An important priority at the time was to reach self-sufficiency in rice production, which was shortly achieved in 1984. The years before that had seen an increase in yields of around 7 percent annually. The economic crisis is probably to blame for the lack of productivity since then. Public resources shrunk, and maintenance in irrigation systems was underfunded. Recently, another important reason is the shift of farmers out of rice into higher yielding crops, especially vegetables, which are demanded in the again rapidly growing cities (World Bank 2006).

Besides investing in rice production, government policies have also intervened in prices. Fertiliser subsidy has been important; over the seven year period from 1984 to 1990 this subsidy alone averaged 9% of the total development budget (OECD 2012). Until 1998, Bulog, the state logistics board had a monopoly in trading rice. With the Financial crisis, policies which are budgetary less costly have been pursued. To keep domestic prices high, supposedly to protect farmers, an import duty on rice of 30

percent was introduced along with the abolishment of the monopoly of Bulog. Import rates have fluctuated since then, and the average nominal protection rate was 17% from 1990 to 2000.

Indonesia is characterised by small farming households. The average landholdings are around 0.8 hectare per farming households to the 2003[1] agricultural census. According to Kuswara et al. (2009), over the past decades the farmers have become dependent on agricultural companies for agricultural inputs like fertilisers, pesticides and seeds. The government is also encouraging the use of chemical inputs to increase productivity as also indicated above. However, Kuswara et al. (2009) notes, many of the existing commercial seeds are not suitable to the local conditions and farmers' needs. In addition, the reliance on industrial inputs has resulted in the loss of farmers' knowledge about plant breeding and high genetic erosion of agro-diversity. PEDIGREA (Participatory Enhancement of Diversity of Genetic Resources in Asia) programme has started in 2003 to change this situation.

Indramayu is a district in West Java with a population of around 1.6 million people. It is a suitable place to grow rice. It has 239,698 hectares of rice fields that together produce 155,755 tons of rice. The average yield per hectare was 7.1 tons in 2013[2]. For comparison, the average yield in Indonesia as whole was 5.1 ton per hectare in the same year[3]. According to the Wikipedia, it "was known as Indonesian no 1 rice supplier in the early 1980s to late 1990s"[4] and it was the main target area for the government's Green Revolution in the 1970s (Kuswara et al, 2009).

FIELD has also chosen to implement PEDIGREA in Indramayu for the aforementioned reasons. The programme includes the Farmer Field School on participatory plant breeding on rice and vegetables, and animal improvement on goats. However, a certification is needed in order for the farmers to have the right to sell their seed varieties at the market. Without certification, farmers have no right to sell the seeds, as it must be through government institutions (BALITPA) or through private companies who pursue the right to sell seeds. The certification of the seed varieties is costly, as it has to be tested on multiple locations. FIELD is working on the development of a community registry and seed system for a participatory alternative for the state certification system. In addition, FIELD works with farming groups (FGs) to develop a joint marketing strategy to strengthen the position of farmers when selling their products.

## 1.2. Evaluation objectives

This report evaluates the 'Local Economic Development and Promotion of Local Seed System to Indonesian National Policy' project [5] of FIELD funded by Hivos as part of as part of the *Medefinancieringsstelsel* (MFS) II evaluation for Indonesia under the Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDG) component. The project works on the goals on poverty alleviation (MDG1) and partially on the goals related to sustainable living environment, forests and biodiversity (MDG 7ab). However, for the focus of the evaluation the project's effectiveness regarding the goals on MDG 1 was selected. In particular, the current evaluation focuses on the following research questions: How many

[1] World Bank (2006) "Making the new Indonesian work for the poor", Figure 2.1
[2] http://indramayukab.bps.go.id/index.php?hal=tabel&id=16
[3] Source: Bureau of statistics http://www.bps.go.id/tnmn_pgn.php?kat=3
[4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indramayu
[5] The project is described in more detail in section 3.

households benefit from the savings and credit cooperatives (set up with the help of the project) as members? What is the amount of total outstanding loans? Do the farmers have better access to finance? Are the farmers able to sell their produce collectively on the market and get a better price for their produce? Most importantly, how did the livelihood of farmers change?[6]

We investigate whether the project had a favourable effect on the above mentioned outcomes using difference-in-difference methodology: we compare the changes in the outcome variables between the baseline and endline periods for the project beneficiaries (seed breeding farming group and credit cooperative members) to the changes in outcomes for a comparison group. In addition, because the project was already running for several years before the baseline with the same beneficiaries, we also estimate the effects of the project prior to the baseline survey by comparing the outcomes of the beneficiaries to the comparison group while controlling for pre-intervention household characteristics.

We surveyed 8 of 19 project farming groups involved in rice breeding and from 4 of 6 savings and credit cooperatives (in the same villages) established with the assistance of the project. In addition, 4 non-project farming groups in villages with cooperatives and 3 farming groups outside of the project area were surveyed in Indramayu. Overall, 225 households, 4 cooperatives and 13 farming groups have been interviewed using structured surveys at the baseline period. All of them have been re-interviewed at the endline except for 5 households, which are excluded from the data analysis. The survey households were selected randomly from the farming groups and cooperatives in the treatment villages. However, seed breeding farmers were given priority in sampling.

As specified in the Terms of Reference for this evaluation, the report addresses five evaluation questions to assess the project outcomes:

1) Change: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period?
2) Attribution: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3) Relevance of change: What is the relevance of these changes?
4) Efficiency: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient?
5) Explanations: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

[6] Two additional questions assessed using project reports are: How many local seed varieties are registered in the community seed registry system, and how many community enterprises were established as a result of the intervention?

## 1.3. Summary of findings

The FIELD project ran between 2003 and 2014. However, the evaluation focuses on the project period between 2011 and 2014. During this period, the project focused on institutionalizing the community seed registry system, setting up credit cooperatives (6 in total) as sources of funding for community enterprises based on business potential in the seed sector, and continued assistance to the project farming groups (15 in total) in terms of seed breeding and sustainable farming practices.

Because most of the project activities at the farming household level (direct beneficiaries) have already been running for a while before the baseline survey, in the evaluation the project impacts prior to and during the evaluation period are assessed using regression analysis.

The results show limited impacts of the credit cooperatives on their members. At the time of the endline survey, the project was only effective in increasing the savings of member households (24 percentage points). However, no effects are found on the welfare and borrowing of households.

Most of the impacts are found through the project farming groups in terms of using organic fertilizers (23 percentage point) and pesticides and insecticides (12 percentage points), the yield of rice (0.6 t/ha or 13 percent) and food security (26 percentage point reduction in transient food insecurity). However, again no impact is found on the livelihood of households. Rather, due to a decrease in the price of rice particularly among the treatment households, their income from rice has decreased during the evaluation period (not significant). Related to this issue, almost all households sell their rice individually, and no collective arrangements existed at the endline.

Finally, in general, the farmers increased the use of both chemical and organic fertilizers. Unfortunately, chemical fertilizer use has also increased among seed breeding households (36 percentage points).

## 1.4. Structure of the report

The rest of this report proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the relevant literature; section 3 describes the project; section 4 describes the evaluation questions and outcome variables; section 5 the data collection. Section 6 provides the descriptive statistics. Sections 7 till 10 discuss evaluation question 1) till 4) in turn. Section 11 describes the relationship between the Capacity Development and Civil Society component to the MDG component. The last section discusses the results and concludes.

Further details about the project results are presented in a number of annexes. The project implementation and the SPO is described in Annex I. The construction of the outcome indicators and indices is summarized in Annex II, while Annex III provides the summary statistics on the data used. Annex IV provides a short description of survey locations. Annex V reports on the characteristics of the surveyed households. In turn, Annex VI and Annex VII contain additional tables on the outcome indicators related to the evaluation questions on the change in outcomes and attribution, respectively. Finally, Annex VIII reports further details explaining the results.

## 2. Literature overview

Despite the popularity (see below for references) of projects on participatory seed breeding and selection and farmer seed enterprises (FSE), little research has been done to assess the impacts of seed breeding projects. Therefore, the focus of this literature review is primarily on the best practices and recommendations for farmer seed enterprises based on evaluated projects. The effectiveness of projects is also reported when such information is available.

Neate and Guei (2010) lay out the key requirements for successful smallholder seed enterprise development based on the experience of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO). These are 1) a conducive policy environment; 2) the existence of sustained demand for quality seed; 3) the availability of improved varieties and source seed from public sector breeding programmes or participatory breeding and on-farm testing programmes; 4) technical support and training in seed production as well as training in marketing and management; 5) access to low interest rate credit for purchasing inputs and equipment; 6) local ownership and profitability of seed enterprises to ensure sustainability; 7) subsidies or other related support and services for establishing seed enterprise infrastructure; 8) linkages between formal and informal sectors and 9) communications strategy, branding and marketing to thrive in a competitive world and to ensure a sustained market.

The above requirements are also acknowledged by Karanja et al. (2011), who described the success achieved in an ongoing pilot project, implemented in Kenya and Tanzania, aimed at validating and promoting farmer-led seed enterprise (FLSE) models for sustainable supply of quality seed of African indigenous vegetables (AIVs). They say that the success of the models is based on the development of technical capacities of seed producers as well as building strategic and functional linkages through public private partnership with institutions/organisations in the value chain. In a Ugandan context, also David (2004) found demand for seed, the availability of superior varieties, collaborative linkages and repeated training on seed production, management and marketing as being crucial for the sustainability of farmer seed enterprises. She draws on experiences of three farmer groups (IBFA, BKTWG and MWG) growing common bean in Uganda between 1994 and 1997 and adds close and regular field supervision to the requirements. Although earnings by the FSEs surpassed income from traditional activities (about US$1700 for IBFA, US$337 for BKTWG and US$272 for MWG), the BKTWG had stopped producing after 6 to 8 years and the other groups' level of production and sales had not increased significantly over the years (based on anecdotal evidence). By assessing the Farmer-Based Seed Multiplication (FBSM) programme in Ethiopia, undertaking Participatory Variety Selection (PVS) and Participatory Plant Breeding (PPB), Alemu (2011) confirms the earlier mentioned requirements by recognizing these as major challenges for the FBSM programme. He also finds that intensive supervision and capacity building made the strategy costly and the programme was dependent on the support of different organisations.

Beye and Margiotta (2008) carried out an impact evaluation of groundnut seed projects (Phase I and Phase II), implemented in Mali, Niger and Nigeria from 2003 to 2007. They found that none of the trained farmers' groups was able to evolve into organised seed enterprise ventures, mainly because of weak linkages between farmers, processors and traders and the lack of information on markets and prices. Seed producer associations expressed a need for linkages to national organisations to be able to

access that information. The projects used Farmer Participatory Varietal Selection (FPVS) and Community-based Seed System (CBSS) and the farmers received training in seed production, marketing and management. Although the projects were successful (the proportion of area planted under modern varieties has increased in and around selected pilot sites by 22% in Nigeria, 12% in Mali and 10% in Niger, with yield gains over local varieties of 31%, 24%, and 43% respectively, and the net income obtained by "adopters" compared to "non-adopters" was 66% higher in Mali, 73% in Niger and 111% in Nigeria), they were not sustainable because of the weak linkages.

Two seed producer group projects in Nepal are evaluated by Poudel et al. (2003) and Witcombe et al. (2010). The first one focuses on quality seed business, saving and credit and the second one focuses on building marketing skills for delivering new seed varieties. The projects were successful. Poudel et al. (2003) found an increase in annual income of 25% 9 years after the establishment and Witcombe et al. (2010) found a seed production increase from 1 t in 2001 to 137 t in 2006. However, both projects were financially very dependent on organisations and investors as well as on guaranteed purchases and marketing linkages established by the organisations. Moreover, they also conclude that the interpretations of technologies of smallholders should be heard at a much earlier design stage for higher adoption rates.

Singh et al. (2013) document the experiences of a farmer-participatory pigeonpea seed production project in two districts in India in 2007 and 2008, aimed at increasing productivity of pigeonpea through expanding the availability of quality seed of improved varieties to farmers. Farmers formed three registered cooperatives for seed production, processing and marketing at local level, in which they also got trained. In addition, two generator-operated mobile seed processing units were procured from project resources. After 10 farmer-participatory varietal selection (FPVS) trials, farmers preferred the long-duration variety NA 1, mostly because of its high yield. Using personal interviews and observation, the authors conclude that FPVS is an effective vehicle to identify farmer-preferred varieties and quickens the process of varietal replacement. Also, working together in the cooperatives enhanced the farmers' bargaining power. Compared to the local variety, NA 1 had a 118.63% higher yield and a 17.14% higher market price in 2008-2009. Despite a 46.03% higher cost of cultivation, net income was 199.59% higher than income from the local variety. It is not known whether the project is sustainable, but the cooperatives were advised to brand their seed produce for better marketing.

Summarizing, it is found that participatory seed breeding and farmer seed enterprises are successful in identifying varieties and the distribution of varieties if farmers are included in the process at an early stage. The projects result in an increase in income, at least in the short run. However, sustainability is a problem. Important constraints are seed enterprise infrastructure, linkages between the formal and informal sector and between farmers, trader and organisations and the dependency on support of organisations.

# 3. The project

## 3.1. Project description

The 'Local Economic Development and Promotion of Local Seed System to Indonesian National Policy' project of Farmer Initiatives for Ecological Livelihoods and Democracy (FIELD) is a long-standing initiative to build the capacity of small-scale farmers to select, grade and breed seeds using local seeds. The project started in partnership with PEDIGREA in 2003. Hivos supports the project since the beginning. The evaluated contract period started 28 February 2011 and ran until 28 February 2014. This is the last project period and the project activities have been designed as an exit strategy from the project areas after 10 years of project activities.

In the project, FIELD assisted farmers in breeding local seed varieties that are less reliant on fertilisers and pesticides. FIELD aims at facilitating farmers to get their local varieties certified through community seed registration system once it is approved by the local government. To improve the market position of the farmers, FIELD gave trainings to the farmers' cooperative on how to set up a credit cooperative, which is used to mobilise capital to be able to set up enterprises necessary to sell the products of the members collectively. The aim is to strengthen the market power of farmers producing local seed varieties.

## 3.2. Project implementation


In the project, 6 farmers' groups have set up a credit cooperative building on the previous project on seed breading in Indramayu. In these savings and credit cooperatives, members build up savings and they use the accumulated capital to provide credit for these members. FIELD selected participating villages for the activities on credit cooperatives based on the criteria that the villages having developed local seed varieties; farmers are dependent on income from agriculture; farmer group is well-organised; and the farmers in group have high commitment during seed breeding.

In addition, FIELD continued working with 15 farming groups on seed breeding and sustainable farming practices. Different farmers focused on different crops; however, the breeding of new rice varieties was done in all villages as Indramayu district is a main rice producing area. Therefore, the evaluation also focuses on rice breeding.

A major result of the project was that the Constitutional Court approved the establishment of community seed registry systems on 13 July 2013. In order to disseminate the results and prospects of this ruling in Indramayu, FIELD conducted audiences with government officials responsible for agriculture, animal husbandry and fisheries, consulted with the faculty of agriculture, and held meetings with farmers and a team of lawyers. In addition, in November 2013, a Field School training was organised with 33 farmer participants (both male and female) in Indramayu (Tenajar village). (FIELD Annual Review 2013)

Figure 2 displays the timing of the project and evaluation activities.

**Figure 2: Timing of intervention**




Further information about the FIELD project as well as a detailed description about the planned project activities is provided in Annex I.

## 3.3. Result chain

A stylized result chain of the FIELD project is displayed in Figure 3. The causal links in the graph are the interpretation of the evaluation team. For simplicity, we have omitted from the figure other factors that affect the project outcomes. Only project elements are indicated that are based on the detailed result chain of the project (see Annex I).

As mentioned before, the ultimate goal of the project is to increase the welfare of ecologically-minded farmers. The result chain indicates that FIELD approaches this objective through farmers' empowerment in providing and buying locally produced farming inputs (seed varieties) that are suited to local ecological conditions. FIELD has been working with local seed breeders in the project area already for a decade. However, the current project period focuses on developing a sustainable system for community-based seed breeding and marketing of seeds.

The project rests on three pillars: (i) the establishment of savings and credit cooperatives using the credit union methodology, which the project supported by socialization and development meetings and trainings on the management of cooperatives; (ii) the development of business plans for developing and marketing new seed varieties; (iii) the establishment and legal approval of community seed registry system. As a result of the three pillars, seed breeding farmers are able to establish business enterprises marketing local seed varieties. Specifically, savings and credit cooperatives provide the capital base, while the seed registry system provides the legal protection for setting up a business based on successful local seed varieties.

However, a fourth project pillar is implicitly assumed in the project, namely, that farmers are able to breed successful local varieties that are tested at multiple locations. FIELD has been working on this aspect of the project in the previous project periods with the assistance of IPPHTI. In fact, the project locations are scattered in Indramayu because this provides an ideal ground for the multiple locations testing.

Overall, as a result of the project outputs, farmers have better access to seed markets and are able to become independent of the large input supplying companies. They can better adapt to local circumstances and they can reduce their input costs. At the end, both the seed breeding farmers marketing local varieties and the farmers producing for consumption are better off, and their welfare is improved.


However, please note that the link to improved welfare is rather weak based on this project logic. Business opportunities will only benefit a handful of seed breeding farmers, while it is questionable to what extent the other farmers will benefit from better access to seed markets. Given that timeframe for developing the seed businesses and for the approval of the community seed system, it is rather unlikely that these benefits have been materialized by the time of the endline evaluation.

### *Other project effects*

Not mentioned in the project logic are the project's efforts to encourage sustainable farming practices. Specifically, during the seed breeding process the use of chemical inputs and irrigation is not allowed. However, the use of these practices may also benefit non-breeder farmers as well. Therefore, in the evaluation, we investigate both the use of organic farming practices and the yield of rice. The latter one could be affected both by the seed varieties cultivated and the farming practices used.

Please note that good farming practices are also encouraged by IPPHTI unrelated to the FIELD project.

**Figure 3: Result chain**



# 4. Evaluation questions and outcome variables

## 4.1. Evaluation questions

The call for proposals outlines 5 general evaluation questions. In the baseline report specific evaluations questions were specified. Table 1 shows these five questions and what it implies for this project.

**Table 1: Overview general and specific evaluation questions**

| Number | General evaluation question | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Change: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period? | • How many households benefit from the savings and credit cooperatives (set up with the help of the project) as members? What is the amount of total outstanding loans?<br>• Do the farmers have better access to finance?<br>• Are the farmers able to sell their produce collectively on the market and get a better price for their produce?<br>• How did the livelihood of farmers change? |
| 2 | Attribution: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)? | Are the observed changes above attributable to the intervention? |
| 3 | Relevance of change: What is the relevance of these changes? | • The size of the impact<br>• Does the project address an important issue for the beneficiaries? |
| 4 | Efficiency: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient? | Was the intervention cost effective? |
| 5 | Explanations: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above? | Why did things work out/not work out?<br>The evaluation question is answered throughout the other evaluation questions and in the end discussion. |

The first two questions relate to the savings and credit cooperatives set up with the assistance of the programme. The third question relates to the projects aim to set up business enterprises and jointly market the harvest of farmers. This is expected to lead to better bargaining position, and hence to better prices. The final question assesses the project's overall objective on the welfare of farmers.

Finally, the project's effect on using sustainable farming practices and the effects on yield (rice) were not included among the evaluation questions. However, these have been assessed at the baseline, and we also investigate these outcomes in the endline report.

## 4.2. Outcome indicators

To answer the first two evaluation questions (change and attribution) we identified specific outcome indicators. The outcome indicators are split up into 7 sub-groups: use of financial instruments; households using organic farming practices; yield of rice; selling price of rice; volume of rice sold; household income and livelihood; and food security and vulnerability. These factors are sequentially linked to the project result chain (see section 3.3) and to the evaluation questions presented in Table 1.

Table 2 displays the outcome indicators of the main analysis, the scale of these variables and whether the indicator is a uniform indicator as specified by the synthesis team for the goals on poverty alleviation (MDG 1). Annex II describes the outcome indicators in more detail.

**Table 2: Overview outcome indicators**

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Source | Uniform indicator |
|---|---|---|---|
| **A. Use of financial instruments** | | | X |
| Percentage of households that know a place to borrow | (0%; 100%) | Household survey | |
| Percentage of households involved in a financial institution | (0%; 100%) | Household survey | |
| Percentage of households that have savings in the form of savings in group, cooperative or bank | (0%; 100%) | Household survey | |
| Percentage of households that have borrowed in the past 12 months | (0%; 100%) | Household survey | |
| Total outstanding loans at the savings and credit cooperatives | (0; NM) | Saving and credit cooperative survey | |
| Number of members in savings and credit cooperatives | (NM; NM) | Saving and credit cooperative survey | |
| **B. Households using organic farming practices** | | | |
| Percentage of households practicing organic farming | | Household survey | |
| - Self-reported | (0-100%) | | |
| - Based on responses to questions (not using any chemical input) | (0-100%) | | |
| Percentage of households using chemical inputs | | Household survey | |
| - Using chemical fertilizer | (0-100%) | | |
| - Using chemical pesticides/insecticides | (0-100%) | | |
| Percentage of households using organic inputs | | Household survey | |
| - Using organic fertilizers | (0-100%) | | |
| - Using organic pesticides/insecticides | (0-100%) | | |
| **C. Yield of rice per ha** | (0; NM) | Household survey | X |
| **D. Selling price of rice** | (0; NM) | Household survey | |
| **E. Volume of rice sold (kg)** | (0; NM) | Household survey | X |

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Source | Uniform indicator |
|---|---|---|---|
| **F. Household income and livelihood** | | | X |
| Household revenue from sale of rice (1000 Rp) | (0;NM) | Household survey | |
| Total income per month (1000 Rp) | (NM; NM) | Household survey | |
| Total income per month per capita (1000 Rp) | (NM; NM) | Household survey | |
| Non-food consumption per capita (1000 Rp) | (0; NM) | Household survey | |
| Housing facilities index | (NM; NM) | Household survey | |
| Asset index | (NM; NM) | Household survey | |
| Percentage of households invested in business | (0%; 100%) | Household survey | |
| Percentage of households invested in new farming tools | (0%; 100%) | Household survey | |
| Overall happiness | (1; 4) | Household survey | |
| Current subjective wealth status | (1; 6) | Household survey | |
| **G. Food Security and vulnerability** | | | X |
| Percentage of households not able to cover their living costs | (0%; 100%) | Household survey | |
| Percentage of households have not enough to eat | (0%; 100%) | Household survey | |
| Nr. Of Months Could Not Cover Living Costs | (0; NM) | Household survey | |
| Nr. Of Months Could Not Enough To Eat | (0; NM) | Household survey | |
| Current standard of living: daily needs covered (only for panel respondents) | (1; 3) | Household survey | |
| Current standard of living: food consumption covered (only for panel respondents) | (1; 3) | Household survey | |
| Notes: NM = no minimum/maximum, n is the number of villages in either the treatment group or the comparison group | | | |

# 5. Data collection

This section describes the survey instruments and the sampling design and outcome in turn.

## 5.1. Survey instruments

We collected two types of data: quantitative and financial. The following paragraphs list the survey instruments used for each type of data.

### *Quantitative data*

To analyse the impact of the programmes, three surveys have been conducted to collect quantitative data:

- Household survey: was designed to collect information about socio-economic characteristics, involvement in financial institutions, farming practices and production focusing on rice, and the households' livelihoods.
- Farming group survey: a short survey was administered to the farming group leaders regarding the functioning and activities of the farming group.
- Cooperative survey: a short survey was administered to the project credit cooperative leaders regarding the functioning and activities of the cooperative.

The baseline data have been collected in October 2012; while the endline data was collected in September 2014.

### *Financial data collection*

To collect information about the costs of the FIELD project, we conducted a project cost survey with the finance manager of FIELD on 16 July 2013. We received additional financial information from Hivos in December 2014.

## 5.2. Sampling outcome

### *Sampling design*

From the 19 project villages participating in participatory breeding in Indramayu district,[7] we have sampled 8 farming groups in 8 villages. The choice of farming groups was stratified by the presence of savings and credit cooperatives in order to be able to utilise treatment intensity during the evaluation. In the sample, we selected 4 (out of 6) villages where there was already a cooperative functioning; and 4 villages where only breeding activity was done. For the comparison group, we have selected 3 comparison villages from sub-districts (one per each) where we sampled villages with saving and credit cooperatives. The comparison villages were selected to be comparable to treatment villages in terms of population and percentage of households living from agriculture based on census data.

[7] According to FIELD Annual Review 2013, only 15 farming groups participated in the project. The information on 19 project villages stems from an interview with the field facilitator of IPPHTI, who implements the project on FIELD's behalf. It is possible that IPPHTI works with additional villages that are not part of the project.

In the villages with a cooperative, we sampled three types of households: (i) households who were member of the project (seed-breeding) farming group (110 in total); (ii) households who were members of the project savings and credit cooperative (53 in total, of which 37 were also members of the project farming group); (iii) other farming households who lived in cooperative project villages but were not members of either the project cooperative or the project farming group but may indirectly benefit from the project (spillover, 54 in total). In the comparison villages we sampled farming households that were members of a randomly chosen farming group (45 in total). All households were randomly sampled within the sampling strata. However, in treatment farming groups we have oversampled seed breeding farmers (33 households in total) due to the focus of the project on these households.

At the endline, we aimed to re-interview all the 225 households, and the same respondents. In case it was not possible, the household was dropped from the final sample.

### *Sampling outcome*

There have been two complications in the sampling for the FIELD project: first, we had no prior information regarding the overlap of the farming group and cooperative membership in the villages. In some of the villages the overlap was perfect, while in other villages cooperative members were not members of a farming group. The numbers in the previous section indicate the sampling outcome with respect to farming group, cooperative and spillover group members.

The second complication we encountered was that data from the surveys and project documents indicate that not all sampled treatment farming groups have actually been part of FIELD's project.[8] As a result, the treatment status of 3 farming groups had to be changed (in 2 cases to spillover as another farming group in the village was served by FIELD,[9] and in one case to comparison farming group[10]). Regarding these changes see Table 11 in Annex IV and Table 19 in Annex VIII regarding the classification of farming groups.

Table 3 shows the sampling outcome taking into account both complications.[11] The number of treatment households was much lower at the baseline than originally planned due to the changes in treatment types (96 vs. 140). Among these treatment households, 71 were members of a project farming group and 53 were members of a project savings and credit cooperative (28 households were members of both).

At the endline, we successfully re-interviewed 220 of 225 households,[12] and in 200 household the same respondents.[13]

[8] This is due to the fact that we did not receive a list of project farming villages from FIELD. Instead, the survey team had to find out this information in the field. See also footnote 7 on page 18.
[9] This was the case for farming groups in enumeration area (EA) 7 and 10.
[10] Actually, IPPHTI was conducting trainings with this farming group (in EA 12) but we did not find indication in the project documents of FIELD that this farming group/village was part of the programme on seed breeding.
[11] Please note that in the baseline report we were not yet aware the second complication and information regarding the first complication was missing. Therefore, statistics in the baseline report are different from those in the endline report due to reclassification of households among treatment types.
[12] The remaining 5 households were not interviewed because they have moved out of their village.
[13] Reasons to interview a different household member were because the respondent was out of town (10), was ill (2), passed away (6) or other reasons (2).

**Table 3: Sampling outcome**

| Assignment group | Planned households | Baseline outcome | Endline outcome | Panel respondents |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Treatment group (FG and/or cooperative member)** | 140 | 96 | 94 | 86 |
| **Spillover group** | 40 | 69 | 67 | 58 |
| **Comparison group** | 45 | 60 | 59 | 56 |
| **Total** | **225** | **225** | **220** | **200** |

# 6. Descriptive statistics

This section summarizes the characteristics of the sample by treatment group. The farming group, cooperative and household characteristics are discussed below, while the village characteristics are described in Annex IV. In addition, the exposure of villages and households to the FIELD project activities is explored.

## 6.1. Credit cooperative characteristics and treatment exposure

The four surveyed credit cooperatives have been established between 2009 and 2011.[14] Their membership has doubled during the evaluation period from 35 members on average at the baseline to 76 members at the endline (Table 12 in Annex V). Hence, based on this data, we estimate the total number of credit cooperative members at 456. Also, the percent of female members increased from 21% to 41%, indicating that more than half of the new members are women.

In two villages the credit cooperative members are also members of (project) farming groups. However, in two villages (Ecosystem Alliances or EAs 8 and 9) about one third of the cooperative members had no membership in farming groups (at the endline). The percentage of seed breeding farmers is as high as 40% in one village, while about 10% in two villages, and no seed breeder members were found in one cooperative.[15]

Table 13 shows that the total outstanding loans at the cooperatives have on average tripled (to 71.3 million Rupiahs). However, only 3 cooperatives reported this information at the endline. Further details of the cooperatives are reported in Table 15.

Regarding the treatment exposure of the cooperatives, Table 14 shows the trainings carried out at the cooperatives by FIELD and other organisations. The data verify that FIELD organised trainings for all four cooperatives on financial management between 2010 and 2012. However, after 2012 only the two largest cooperatives continued to receive support from the project.[16] In both of these cooperatives

[14] The credit cooperative in Jengkok village (EA6) was established in 2009, in Kalensari village (EA9) in 2010, and in the other two villages (Tenajar and Wanguk, EAs 7 and 8) in 2011.

[15] No seed breeder members were found in the credit cooperative in Tenajar (EA 7), where we found also no indication of FIELD working with seed breeders among the sampled farming groups in the farming group survey.

[16] The cooperative in Wanguk (EA 8) had 150 members, while in Jengkok (EA 6) there were 63 cooperative members. The other cooperatives had 50 and 42 members at the endline.

trainings on sustainable farming practices were also organised. However, only one of them (EA 8) reported that FIELD delivered trainings on the marketing of crops.

## 6.2. Farming group characteristics and treatment exposure

In Annex V, Table 16 shows the size and activities of the surveyed farming groups. The table reports the baseline and endline averages for three types of farming groups: comparison (in comparison villages, in total 4), treatment (assisted by FIELD, in total 5) and spillover (other farming groups in FIELD project villages, in total 6).[17] The data show that the average number of members in the farming groups have somewhat decreased over the evaluation period in all farming group types (from 44-65 to 39-55). Further, the percentage of female members is the highest in the project farming groups (26% vs. 3-13% at baseline), and their share has increased during the evaluation period in the project farming groups (to 35%) but not in the other groups.

Seed breeding is practiced in all 5 project farming groups at the endline, while only in 2 of 6 spillover farming groups and in 1 of 4 comparison farming groups (Table 17).[18] On average, 3 farmers per farming group are seriously involved in seed breeding (they have bred varieties in F4 status or higher) in the project villages. These farmers have bred on average 8 new varieties. However, farmers usually only grow 4 varieties in total. In most farming groups, (ordinary) farmers can choose to try to cultivate the local varieties, and in 2 farming groups are the farmers given the seed varieties to grow.

Farming groups often organise saving and credit groups for their members with around one third of the members participating in them (Table 16). However, storing the crops of members and joint marketing is not commonly offered. At the baseline, 2 of 5 treatment farming groups offered joint marketing of crops, but none have done so by the endline.

Table 18 shows that the treatment farming groups have much more regular meetings than the other forming groups (35 vs. 9-12 meeting during the evaluation period). Good farming practices and seed breeding are the most often discussed topics at these meetings, but also social gatherings are organised in the treatment farming groups. Based on the reporting of the farming groups (Table 19), FIELD has organised trainings on sustainable farming practices in 3 of 5 treatment farming groups; on rice breeding in 2 of 5 farming groups; and on financial management in 3 of 5 treatment farming groups. FIELD's activities at these groups also continued during the evaluation period.

Overall, 3 of 5 treatment farming groups were more intensely assisted in sustainable farming practices and seed breeding by FIELD, while 1 of 4 comparison farming groups benefitted from such trainings as well (assisted by IPPHTI).

[17] The sample size is indicated below the means in brackets as not all questions have been answered by all farming groups.

[18] The seed breeding farming group in the comparison group is assisted by IPPHTI, the partner of FIELD. In fact, this farming group/village was sampled as a treatment location. However, we did not find either the village (Segeran Kidul) or the farming group (Tani Mulya) in the FIELD project report.

## 6.3. Household characteristics and treatment exposure

To provide a better insight into the general characteristics of the households in our sample, Table 4 displays the most important socio-economic characteristics including age, gender, education level of the household head, economic activities of the household, and membership of the household in farming groups and seed breeding. The data are reported separately for the comparison, treatment and spillover households. The variables are described at the baseline survey (Base) and the endline survey (End) for all households that have been interviewed in both survey rounds (panel sample). We also report on the significance of the change in the variables (p-value).[19] If the p-value is small (say smaller than 5%), it indicates that the change is significantly different from zero (at 5% significance level). The p-value for the difference between the groups at baseline is reported in Table 20 in Annex V, while the sample size for all variables is reported in Annex III.

The data show that the treatment, spillover and comparison households were fairly similar in terms of household size (3.7-3.9 members), main income source (87-90% crop farming) and gender of the household head (1-2% female) at the time of the baseline survey. However, the household heads of the treatment households were on average younger (45 vs. 51-53 years) and more educated (47% with secondary or higher education vs. 19-28%) compared to both the comparison and spillover groups.

In addition, treatment households were less likely to be a member of a farming group (because not all cooperative members were farming group members) and be a member of a savings and credit cooperative (50% vs. 2-9% in the other groups). However, no significant differences were found in terms of membership in savings and credit groups (6-10%).

During the evaluation period, we observe a declining trend in farming group membership, which is particularly pronounced for the comparison and spillover groups (from 100% to 63-67% vs. 88% to 81% in the treatment group). Hence, at the endline, a higher percentage of households are members of farming groups, despite the fact that the importance of crop income has declined in this group (from 87% to 78%). Membership in other groups/cooperatives has been stable over the evaluation period.

Regarding seed breeding, respondents were asked whether they practice in participatory seed breeding. At the baseline, 52% of the treatment households claimed to be involved in seed breeding compared to 17% and 14% in the comparison and spillover groups, respectively. During the evaluation period, the number of households involved in seed breeding has dropped to 24% in the treatment group (p=0.03) and to 7% and 5% in the comparison and spillover groups.

[19] P-values are calculated using standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level. This means that the standard errors are allowed to have an arbitrary correlation for comparison or treatment respondents in the same village. In other words, we allow respondents in the same village in the same treatment group (comparison or treatment) to be more similar to each other than they are to a different randomly selected respondent in another village from the other treatment group.

**Table 4: General characteristics of the sample**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Assignment group** | **Comparison** | | | **Treatment** | | | **Spillover** | | |
| | **Base** | **End** | **(P1v2)** | **Base** | **End** | **(P4v5)** | **Base** | **End** | **(P7v8)** |
| Average size of household | 3.73 | 4.22 | 0.046 | 3.88 | 4.29 | 0.009 | 3.78 | 4.22 | 0.009 |
| Percentage female hh-head | 1.72 | 1.79 | | 1.06 | 1.09 | | 1.49 | 1.61 | |
| Average age of hh-head | 52.53 | 54.57 | 0.000 | 45.16 | 46.53 | 0.002 | 50.52 | 50.76 | 0.003 |
| Highest level of education attended by the household head (%) | | | | | | | | | |
| *No education* | 17.24 | 12.50 | 0.320 | 9.57 | 4.35 | 0.142 | 7.46 | 16.13 | 0.026 |
| *Primary education* | 63.79 | 73.21 | 0.242 | 43.62 | 48.91 | 0.142 | 64.18 | 51.61 | 0.045 |
| *Secondary education* | 18.97 | 14.29 | 0.188 | 36.17 | 36.96 | 0.599 | 26.87 | 30.65 | 0.343 |
| *Higher education* | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 10.64 | 9.78 | 0.599 | 1.49 | 1.61 | |
| Size of cultivated land (ha) | 0.74 | 0.59 | 0.310 | 0.94 | 1.13 | 0.520 | 0.89 | 0.99 | 0.738 |
| Subjective wealth status five years ago (scale 1-6) | 2.78 | 2.34 | 0.176 | 2.54 | 2.80 | 0.056 | 2.49 | 2.65 | 0.475 |
| Main source of income (%) | | | | | | | | | |
| *Crop farming* | 89.83 | 89.83 | 1.000 | 87.23 | 77.66 | 0.088 | 88.06 | 82.09 | 0.532 |
| *Livestock* | 0.00 | 1.69 | 0.398 | 1.06 | 1.06 | | 0.00 | 0.00 | |
| *Non-farm business* | 5.08 | 1.69 | 0.389 | 6.38 | 8.51 | 0.593 | 5.97 | 2.99 | 0.475 |
| *Salary, wage* | 5.08 | 5.08 | 1.000 | 5.32 | 12.77 | 0.111 | 5.97 | 13.43 | 0.243 |
| *Transfer, remittances* | | 1.69 | | | 0.00 | | | 1.49 | |
| Percentage of households with membership in […] (%) | | | | | | | | | |
| *Farming group* | 100.00 | 62.71 | 0.011 | 88.30 | 80.85 | 0.323 | 100.00 | 67.16 | 0.014 |
| *Farming cooperative* | 0.00 | 5.08 | 0.217 | 7.45 | 5.32 | 0.761 | 1.49 | 5.97 | 0.058 |
| *Saving and credit group* | 10.17 | 8.47 | 0.760 | 9.57 | 8.51 | 0.895 | 5.97 | 11.94 | 0.391 |
| *Saving and credit cooperative* | 1.69 | 0.00 | 0.389 | 50.00 | 36.17 | 0.422 | 8.96 | 4.48 | 0.620 |
| % households participating in participatory plant breeding | 16.95 | 7.41 | 0.396 | 51.61 | 24.39 | 0.030 | 13.64 | 5.00 | 0.094 |

Source: Household survey E4; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia.

Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

Table 5 reports on the project activities known and attended by the households. Many households in the comparison and spillover groups (47% and 60% at endline) and most of the treatment households (84%) have heard of the field farmer school. 66% of the treatment households heard of FIELD compared to 27-28% in the other groups. The knowledge of IPPHTI is similar to that of FIELD, while PEDIGREA is less recognised by the respondents.

Almost 40% of the treatment households reported to have participated in trainings on sustainable farming practices at both the baseline and endline, around 30% did so in the comparison group and 20% of the spillover group (during the evaluation period). At the baseline, 37% of the treatment group and 29% of the comparison group participated in trainings on rice breeding. During the evaluation period this number has dropped to 7% in the comparison group but remained at 29% in the treatment group.

In addition, 17% and 28% of the treatment households reported to have attended trainings on financial management and financial management of credit cooperatives at the baseline. In the other groups such trainings were not conducted.

Hence, the data shows treatment households were more exposed to both trainings on farming practices and on financial management compared to the other groups.

**Table 5: Trainings reported by the households**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Assignment group** | **Comparison** | | | **Treatment** | | | **Spillover** | | |
| | **Base** | **End** | **(P1v2)** | **Base** | **End** | **(P4v5)** | **Base** | **End** | **(P7v8)** |
| Percentage of respondents who heard about […] (%) | | | | | | | | | |
| *The field farmer school* | 45.76 | 47.27 | 0.921 | 80.85 | 83.72 | 0.221 | 50.75 | 59.32 | 0.288 |
| *FIELD* | 23.73 | 27.27 | 0.759 | 65.96 | 66.28 | 0.638 | 23.88 | 28.33 | 0.871 |
| *PEDIGREA* | 3.39 | 10.91 | 0.253 | 46.81 | 44.19 | 0.645 | 11.94 | 3.33 | 0.205 |
| *IPPHTI* | 20.34 | 32.73 | 0.402 | 64.89 | 63.95 | 0.824 | 20.90 | 28.33 | 0.210 |
| Percentage of households which participated in a meeting/training on […] in the past two years (%) | | | | | | | | | |
| *Sustainable farming* | 33.90 | 29.09 | 0.720 | 38.46 | 39.53 | 0.835 | 6.35 | 20.00 | 0.044 |
| *Rise breeding* | 28.81 | 7.27 | 0.071 | 36.56 | 29.07 | 0.519 | 7.58 | 13.33 | 0.310 |
| *Vegetable breeding* | 5.08 | 3.64 | 0.637 | 5.38 | 5.81 | 1.000 | 3.03 | 0.00 | 0.346 |
| *Animal breeding* | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 6.38 | 3.49 | 0.429 | 0.00 | 1.67 | 0.346 |
| *Marketing for crops* | 1.69 | 0.00 | 0.389 | 2.13 | 3.49 | 0.789 | 0.00 | 1.67 | 0.346 |
| *Financial management* | 1.69 | 0.00 | 0.389 | 17.02 | 5.81 | 0.175 | 0.00 | 0.00 | |
| *Financial management of credit cooperative* | 1.69 | 0.00 | 0.389 | 28.72 | 13.95 | 0.081 | 1.52 | 0.00 | 0.346 |

Source: Household survey E4; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia.

Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

# 7. Evaluation question 1: Change in outcomes

This section discusses evaluation question 1: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period? The changes in the outcome indicators for the period measured between the base- and endline survey (2012-2014) are grouped into 7 sub-groups: use of financial instruments; households using organic farming practices; yield of rice; selling price of rice; volume of rice sold; household income and livelihood; and food security and vulnerability.

Table 6 displays the results for all outcome indicators in a similar manner as the household characteristics were presented in Table 4. However, in Table 6, the standard error[20] of the outcome variables is displayed in brackets below the mean. The p-value for the difference between the groups at baseline is reported in Table 21 in Annex VI, while the sample size for all variables is reported in Annex III.

The results of Table 6 are discussed below by outcome indicator group.

### *Use of financial instruments*

Table 6 shows that almost all households can name a place where they can borrow money. The most often mentioned institution is banks: at the baseline, 88% of the households in the comparison group mentioned that they could borrow from banks, compared to 70-72% in the treatment villages (Table 23 in Annex VIII). However, the data suggests that banks have become more widespread in the treatment villages, as at the endline 93-97% of the households were aware of them (p=0.08 in treatment group and p=0.003 in spillover group). On the other hand, only 55% of the treatment households mentioned credit cooperatives as places to borrow at the endline, while this percentage was lower in the other groups (43-44%).

The involvement of households with financial institution was measured by households having savings or loans at a bank, cooperative or savings and credit groups. The data shows that as expected, the treatment households were more likely to have savings and/or loans at the baseline (63% vs. 27% in the comparison group, p=0.01). However, while the use of these financial instruments remained stable in the treatment group, it has somewhat increased in the comparison and spillover groups (not significant). This trend is substantial and significant in the spillover group for savings (from 9% to 39%, p=0.02) and loans (from 15 to 28%, p=0.09), separately. In contrast, 55% of the household had savings and 39% of them loans at the endline.

Looking at the source of loans, Table 23 shows that 27-40% (36-39%) of the households that took a loan in the last 12 months have obtained at least one loan from a bank at the baseline (endline). In addition, 57% (53%) of the treatment households also obtained a loan from a credit cooperative at the baseline (endline), while this form of loan was much less common in the other groups (5% at endline). In the comparison group, 31% of the households also obtained credit from their farming groups.

Regarding the use of loans, agricultural equipment (30-35% at baseline and 32-53% at endline), capital for business (31-50% at baseline and 11-42% at endline) and daily expenses (0-38% at baseline and 32-33% at endline) are the most common reasons to borrow.

[20] Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the location level. See footnote 19 on page 23.

### *Households using organic farming practices*

Households were asked whether they practice organic farming. Based on this self-reported indicator, the percentage of households practicing organic farming has increased from 9% (8%) to 23% (23%) in the treatment (comparison) group. However, households were also asked about the type of inputs they use in farming. Based on this data, we find that almost all households use chemical inputs in farming, mostly pesticides and insecticides (94% of treatment households at endline), but also often fertilizers (82%). The use of chemical fertilizers has significantly increased in the treatment villages: at the baseline, only 68% of the treatment group and 73% of the spillover group used such inputs compared to 92% in the comparison group.

At the baseline, the use of organic fertilizers were substantially higher in the treatment villages, particularly in the treatment group where 68% of the households reported to use organic fertilizers, compared to the comparison villages (20%). During the evaluation period, we observe different trends for this variable: the use of organic fertilizers increased in the comparison areas to 39%, while it dropped to 35%in the spillover group (from 48%), and remained stable in the treatment group (61%). These data show that many households combine organic and chemical inputs in farming, and while farmers in comparison group added organic components, the treatment farmers added chemical inputs to making their soil more fertile.

The use of organic pesticides and insecticides are less common, but 28% (27%) of the treatment farmers used them at the baseline (endline), compared to 7% (20%) in the comparison group. Interestingly, the project did not seem to have a spillover effect in the use of organic pesticides, and the spillover effect on organic fertilizers was also only temporary.

The projects impact on using organic inputs is also supported by data from the farming group survey, which shows that the treatment farming groups were more likely to encourage their members to use organic farming practices, especially by making compost and by fitting seed varieties to soil conditions (Table 25 in Annex VIII).

Regarding rice cultivation, households grow on average 1.4-1.9 varieties of rice (Table 24) and harvest rice on average twice per year (Table 26). The most common sources of the planting seeds are from shops selling farming inputs: 67% of the comparison group, 57% of the spillover group but only 40% of the treatment group obtain their seeds from this source at the endline. Most of the remaining households use seeds from their harvest for planting, especially in the treatment group where the percentage of households retaining their seeds for planting has increased from 34% to 73% (p=0.06). We also observed a substantial increase in the spillover group (from 30% to 63%, p=0.08), and a small increase in the comparison group (from 41% to 47%).[21]

Finally, rice breeding farmers were also asked for the reasons of their participation. The most common reasons were: to learn about the crops and the environment, get a better crop quality and conserve biodiversity; which are in line with the objectives of FIELD.

[21] The percentage of households using their own seeds and buying them from shops was not significantly different among the groups at the baseline.

### *Yield and selling price of rice and volume sold*

Regarding the yield, we observe an increasing trend of the median yields during the evaluation period from 4.8-5.6 to 6.4-6.7 tons per hectare (Table 6). In general, the yields are higher in the treatment villages for both the treatment and spillover groups. However, due to the large variation of the indicator and some outliers, we reported the median value of the yield instead of the mean. Therefore, we are not able to report on the significance of changes over time. For information on the average size of plot planted and amount of rice harvest, see Table 26.

Almost all of the households sold at least part of their rice harvest (Table 30), while only 13-15% (24%) of the households sold other crops in the treatment (comparison) villages at the baseline, and these numbers were 12-18% (34%) at the endline. Most of the harvest of these other crops was sold if they were grown for sale. At the same time, the percentage of rice sold was lower but increased during the evaluation period from 51-60% to 60-70%.

Hence, rice is clearly the most important cash crop for the surveyed households. Looking at the volume of rice sold, Table 6 shows that households in the treatment villages sold on average substantially higher quantities of rice than in the comparison group: 7.0 (5.2) tons/year in the treatment (spillover) group compared to 2.6 tons/year in the comparison group. During the evaluation period, an increasing trend of the volume of rice sold is observed, in line with the increase in yield, however, these changes are not significant.

At the same time, the selling price of rice has decreased by 13% in the treatment (p=0.00), by 4% in the spillover (p=0.63) and by 7% in the comparison group (p=0.55). Hence, the treatment households were the most affected by the generally decreasing price level. We also observe a reduction in group selling of rice during the evaluation period, resulting in almost all rice being individually sold to traders and wholesaler at the endline (see Table 27, Table 28 and Table 29).

### *Household income and livelihood*

Despite the reduction in the price of rice, household income from the sale of rice has generally increased during the evaluation period in real terms (not significant) due to a larger increase in productivity.[22] However, per capita total real income has only increased in the comparison group (11%), while it decreased in the treatment (-21%) and spillover (-18%) groups, which is due to both a decrease in total income in real terms and an increase in the household size. In general, the share of transfers in total income increased during the evaluation period from 10% to above 20% (Table 31).

Other wealth indicators also support the finding that the welfare of comparison households improved more during the evaluation period compared to treatment households. However, despite this development, households in the treatment areas remained better off at the end of the evaluation period in both treatment and spillover groups (42% and 65% higher total income per capita, respectively).

[22] Income and consumption variables at the endline are reported in real terms (2012 prices) adjusted for inflation between 2012 and 2014. The CPI was 4.3% in 2012 and 8.38% in 2013, resulting in a 13.04% increase of consumer prices between the baseline and endline periods.

During the evaluation period, the percentage of households that expanded their business, purchased new equipment or started a new business increased by 23-36 percentage point, and the change is significant in all assignment groups. At the same time, the percentage of households that purchased new farming tools decreased by around 12 percentage points in all groups, indicating a general shift from farming to diversifying into non-farm business activities alongside farming.

### *Food security and vulnerability*

The food security of households has not changed substantially during the evaluation period. Overall, we find that despite the increase in per capita income in the comparison group, the percentage of households reporting to not being able to cover their living costs have increased by 31 percentage points. In the treatment villages (p=0.03), this number increased by around 15 percentage points (not significant). This finding indicates that households' expectations increased over time regarding their standard of living.

**Table 6: Change in outcome indicators between the baseline and endline**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assignment group | Comparison | | | Treatment (T1+T2) | | | Spillover (T2S) | | |
| | Base | End | (P1v2) | Base | End | (P4v5) | Base | End | (P7v8) |
| **A. Use of financial instruments** | | | | | | | | | |
| % HHs know a place to borrow | 98.31 (1.69) | 100.00 (0.00) | 0.389 | 98.94 (1.08) | 100.00 (0.00) | 0.374 | 91.04 (4.70) | 98.51 (1.43) | 0.173 |
| % HHs involved in a financial institution | 27.12 (7.05) | 33.90 (10.12) | 0.659 | 62.77 (9.79) | 60.64 (10.70) | 0.846 | 32.84 (7.19) | 44.78 (5.82) | 0.174 |
| % HHs have savings in savings and credit group, cooperative or bank | 1.69 (1.69) | 18.64 (8.30) | 0.135 | 50.00 (14.67) | 55.32 (12.35) | 0.687 | 8.96 (6.78) | 38.81 (3.08) | 0.022 |
| % HHs have borrowed in the past 12 months | 27.12 (9.99) | 32.20 (6.69) | 0.517 | 39.36 (9.38) | 38.71 (10.82) | 0.903 | 14.93 (4.21) | 28.36 (4.49) | 0.088 |
| **B. Households using organic farming practices** | | | | | | | | | |
| % HHs involved in farming | 100.00 (0.00) | 96.36 (3.70) | 0.399 | 100.00 (0.00) | 97.67 (1.53) | 0.188 | 100.00 (0.00) | 96.67 (1.70) | 0.122 |
| Percentage of households practicing organic farming | | | | | | | | | |
| *Self-reported*[1] | 7.50 (4.59) | 22.58 (11.84) | 0.160 | 9.09 (4.58) | 23.38 (3.85) | 0.026 | 7.14 (2.73) | 11.90 (4.04) | 0.617 |
| *Based on responses to questions (not using any chemical inputs)* | 1.69 (1.72) | 1.82 (1.85) | 1.000 | 3.19 (2.18) | 3.49 (2.38) | | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | |
| Percentage of households using chemical inputs | | | | | | | | | |
| *Chemical fertilizers* | 91.53 (5.20) | 85.19 (7.50) | 0.644 | 67.74 (5.78) | 81.71 (3.68) | 0.230 | 72.73 (6.72) | 88.33 (3.12) | 0.095 |
| *Chemical pesticides/insecticides* | 98.31 (1.72) | 94.44 (2.06) | 0.194 | 90.32 (4.49) | 93.90 (2.62) | 0.341 | 98.48 (1.44) | 100.00 (0.00) | 0.348 |
| Percentage of household using organic inputs | | | | | | | | | |

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Assignment group** | **Comparison** | | | **Treatment (T1+T2)** | | | **Spillover (T2S)** | | |
| | **Base** | **End** | **(P1v2)** | **Base** | **End** | **(P4v5)** | **Base** | **End** | **(P7v8)** |
| *Organic fertilizers* | 20.34 (9.02) | 38.89 (15.49) | 0.332 | 67.74 (4.72) | 60.98 (5.28) | 0.254 | 48.48 (10.52) | 35.00 (5.08) | 0.356 |
| *Organic pesticides/insecticides* | 6.78 (0.11) | 20.37 (8.63) | 0.224 | 27.96 (11.62) | 26.83 (9.04) | 0.762 | 6.06 (4.25) | 3.33 (1.70) | 0.709 |
| **C. Yield of rice per ha** | | | | | | | | | |
| Yield of rice per ha in the past 12 months using median values (harvest/area) | 4.79 (0.00) | 6.41 (0.00) | | 5.57 (0.12) | 6.68 (0.65) | | 5.60 (0.00) | 6.04 (0.00) | |
| **D. Selling price of rice** | | | | | | | | | |
| Price of rice per kg (average of later than harvest and immediately at harvest) in Rupiah during the last harvest[2,3] | 4,007.95 (200.40) | 3,741.17 (181.87) | 0.548 | 4,376.79 (89.87) | 3,824.03 (61.35) | 0.000 | 4,171.06 (165.26) | 4,024.77 (125.59) | 0.630 |
| Price of rice per kg on average in Rupiah for sales during the past 12 months (self-reported)[3] | 4,193.86 (122.99) | 3,830.84 (141.96) | 0.012 | 4,348.86 (105.31) | 3,811.80 (66.23) | 0.001 | 4,226.61 (153.67) | 3,855.35 (123.22) | 0.049 |
| **E. Volume of rice sold (t)** | 2.59 (0.67) | 3.85 (1.39) | 0.224 | 7.04 (1.50) | 7.70 (1.94) | 0.719 | 5.24 (1.23) | 7.29 (1.92) | 0.313 |
| **F. Household income and livelihood** | | | | | | | | | |
| Household revenue from sale of rice (1000 Rp)[3] | 959.18 (252.06) | 1,349.57 (551.97) | 0.341 | 6,453.10 (3,031.17) | 6,660.66 (4,267.58) | 0.894 | 3,433.47 (2,028.63) | 12,348.68 (7,439.51) | 0.196 |
| Total income per month (1000 Rp)[3] | 988.42 (165.96) | 1,117.16 (173.29) | 0.415 | 1,764.37 (173.42) | 1,589.62 (286.74) | 0.447 | 1,896.62 (364.54) | 1,613.89 (386.56) | 0.426 |
| Total per capita income per month (1000 Rp)[3] | 280.04 (40.44) | 309.57 (67.17) | 0.575 | 555.69 (72.70) | 438.31 (86.57) | 0.186 | 620.42 (194.05) | 511.32 (193.06) | 0.171 |
| Per capita household non-food expenditure per month (1000 Rp)[3] | 182.15 (21.99) | 119.63 (8.35) | 0.027 | 369.37 (104.29) | 340.15 (96.49) | 0.426 | 237.88 (52.75) | 309.49 (66.80) | 0.157 |
| Housing facilities index | 0.06 (0.10) | 0.35 (0.08) | 0.010 | 0.35 (0.05) | 0.39 (0.04) | 0.308 | 0.29 (0.04) | 0.39 (0.06) | 0.145 |
| Asset index | 0.22 (0.11) | 0.27 (0.08) | 0.315 | 0.57 (0.11) | 0.57 (0.04) | 0.985 | 0.46 (0.12) | 0.45 (0.10) | 0.850 |
| % HHs invested in business | 1.69 (1.69) | 30.51 (6.37) | 0.030 | 14.89 (4.01) | 38.30 (6.62) | 0.031 | 7.46 (4.07) | 43.28 (9.84) | 0.040 |
| % HHs invested in farming tools | 38.98 (4.40) | 27.12 (5.92) | 0.062 | 54.26 (8.48) | 42.55 (8.44) | 0.380 | 49.25 (10.14) | 37.31 (10.37) | 0.452 |

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assignment group | Comparison | | | Treatment (T1+T2) | | | Spillover (T2S) | | |
| | Base | End | (P1v2) | Base | End | (P4v5) | Base | End | (P7v8) |
| Overall happiness (1-4) | 2.02 (0.03) | 2.14 (0.06) | 0.058 | 1.96 (0.03) | 1.94 (0.04) | 0.674 | 2.06 (0.06) | 2.01 (0.04) | 0.597 |
| Current subjective wealth status (1-6) | 2.90 (0.10) | 2.53 (0.12) | 0.116 | 2.82 (0.18) | 3.06 (0.12) | 0.038 | 2.69 (0.19) | 2.90 (0.12) | 0.445 |
| **J. Food security and vulnerability** | | | | | | | | | |
| % HHs had income sometimes not cover living costs in the past 12 months | 28.81 (5.27) | 60.34 (6.21) | 0.030 | 34.04 (7.82) | 51.06 (9.32) | 0.091 | 31.34 (7.18) | 46.27 (10.17) | 0.351 |
| % HHs not able to satisfy their food consumption needs in the last 12 months | 15.25 (7.34) | 20.69 (6.44) | 0.611 | 12.77 (8.25) | 9.57 (5.09) | 0.812 | 8.96 (7.07) | 13.43 (9.55) | 0.186 |
| Nr. months HHs were not able to cover their living costs | 0.71 (0.19) | 1.71 (0.26) | 0.006 | 0.63 (0.18) | 0.98 (0.19) | 0.225 | 0.66 (0.16) | 1.40 (0.44) | 0.122 |
| Nr. months HHs did not have enough to eat | 0.36 (0.15) | 0.64 (0.13) | 0.265 | 0.26 (0.15) | 0.27 (0.14) | 0.964 | 0.16 (0.13) | 0.40 (0.22) | 0.072 |
| Current standard of living | | | | | | | | | |
| *Daily needs covered (1-3)* | 1.81 (0.05) | 1.73 (0.07) | 0.867 | 2.13 (0.06) | 2.02 (0.13) | 0.455 | 1.96 (0.11) | 1.97 (0.09) | 0.735 |
| *Food consumption covered (1-3)* | 1.92 (0.06) | 1.97 (0.11) | 0.412 | 2.21 (0.09) | 2.16 (0.10) | 0.685 | 2.06 (0.11) | 2.09 (0.11) | 0.879 |

Source: Household survey E4; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia.

Notes: Standard errors given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.

P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

1. Sample size deviates: Base: n= 40, n= 77, n= 42; End: n= 31, n= 77, n= 42
2. Sample size deviates: Base: n= 50, n= 75, n= 51; End: n= 31, n= 58, n= 35
3. Prices are reported in 2012 real prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%). Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/aboutus.php?inflasi=1

# 8. Evaluation question 2: Attribution of changes

This subsection discusses evaluation question 2: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?

## 8.1. Methodology

We analyse the effects of the FIELD project on beneficiaries using regression analysis. The primary analysis uses difference-in-difference methodology: we compare the changes in outcome indicators between the treatment and comparison groups. We assume that in the absence of the FIELD project, on average, we would observe the same magnitude of changes in the treatment villages as in the comparison group.

However, because the FIELD project was running already before the baseline survey (since 2003), we also analyse the results of the project using a cross-sectional regression on the baseline data controlling for household characteristics. The results of these regressions tell us the early effects (at the baseline) of the FIELD project. Therefore, the total impact of the FIELD projects can be calculated as the sum of the early effects (at the baseline) and the effects found between the baseline and endline survey period (diff-in-diff). Hence, the current evaluation also informs us on the sustainability and enhancement of the project achievements.

Below we discuss the model used for the regression analysis in detail.

### *Treat effect on the treated*

Regression (1) represents the general model for estimating the treatment effect of the FIELD project.

(1) $$Y_{it} = \alpha_t + \beta FG_{it} + \gamma Coop_{it} + \delta Spillover_{it} + \zeta X_{it} + \eta_i + e_{it}$$

where $Y_{it}$ denotes an outcome variable from the list presented in section 4.2 (dependent variable) for household $i$ at time $t$; $FG_{it}$ is a binary variable with value 1 if household $i$ at time $t$ has been member of the treatment farming group and 0 otherwise; $Coop$ is a binary variable with value 1 if household $i$ at time $t$ has been member of the treatment credit cooperative and 0 otherwise; and $Spillover_{it}$ is also a binary variable indicating whether household $i$ at time $t$ has been living in a treatment village but not member of either the treatment farming group or the cooperative (indirect beneficiary). Please note that a household could be member of both the farming group and cooperative at the same time.

In general, because the treatment and comparison groups were not randomly selected, there could be differences in the characteristics of the treatment and comparison villages and of the households sampled in these villages. If some of these characteristics also affect the outcome of $Y_{it}$ and we do not control for these characteristics, we could mistakenly interpret the effect of these characteristics on the outcome variable as an effect of the project. Therefore, in (1) we include $X_{it}$, a set of observable control variables that affect the project outcome but they are not affected by the outcome itself (predetermined). In addition, we also include household fixed effects ($\eta_i$) that pick up unobservable time invariant household specific characteristics; and a time varying trend ($\alpha_t$) in the outcome variable. The remaining residuals ($u_{it}$) are clustered at the village level.

Finally, turning to the variables of interest: we are interested in the estimates of $\beta$ and $\gamma$, the coefficient of the treatment effect on the bio-rights group and spillover group, respectively.

### *Early treatment effect on the treated at the baseline*

First, we adapt (1) to estimate the effect of the WIIP project at the baseline:

(2) $$Y_{i1} = \alpha + \beta FG_{i1} + \gamma Coop_{i1} + \delta Spillover_{i1} + \zeta Z_{i1} + u_{i1}$$

Note that the control variables in (2) were adjusted. First, it is not possible to estimate the individual fixed effects using only one observation per household; and second, the set of control variables, $Z$, satisfies the additional condition that it represent the situation of households prior to the start of the FIELD project (not effected by the project). In regression (2), it is important to control for all observable village and household characteristics that differ between treatment and comparison villages.

### *Treatment effect on the treated between baseline and endline*

We use difference-in-differences methodology to estimate the treatment effect of the FIELD project between the baseline and the endline survey. We take the first difference of (1):[23]

(3) $$\Delta Y_{i2} = \alpha + \beta FG_{i2} + \gamma Coop_{i2} + \delta Spillover_{i2} + \zeta \Delta \mathrm{W}_{i2} + \Delta u_{i2}$$

The time-invariant household fixed effect disappears in (3) due to the differencing, along with some of the control variables in $X$ with $\Delta \mathrm{W}_{i2}$ containing the change in the remaining control variables. Only variables where the change is significantly different between the treatment and comparison groups are included in $\mathrm{W}$. In addition, we denote the average change of the outcome variable in the comparison group by $\alpha$.

Note that we omitted the change sign (Δ) from the treatment variables $FG_{i2}$, $Coop_{i2}$ and $Spillover_{i2}$. In principle, taking the differences of the binary variables would be zero due to the project already running at the baseline period. However, there were several project activities occurring between the baseline and endline period. In addition, for some activities that occurred before the baseline it may take longer to affect the outcome variables, such as crop yield and income. These activities are summarized by $FG_{i2}$, $Coop_{i2}$ and their effect on the indirect beneficiaries by $Spillover_{i2}$.

We report the regression results for the treatment effects, $\beta$ and $\gamma$, with and without control variables (W).

### *Treatment effect on seed breeders*

Finally, for the outcome variables on farming practices and rice cultivation, we also estimate the FIELD project's effect on seed breeders, as this group of farmers is the focal point of FIELD's project. Hence, we estimate regression (2) and (3) with an additional term, $Breeder_i FG_{it}$, which as a value of 1 if household $i$ participates in seed breeding and is member of a treatment farming group, and zero otherwise. Regression (3) then becomes:

(4) $$\Delta Y_{i2} = \alpha + \beta FG_{i2} + \gamma Coop_{i2} + \delta Spillover_{i2} + \theta Breeder_i FG_{i2} + \zeta \Delta \mathrm{W}_{i2} + \Delta u_{i2}$$

The results of regression (4) are presented in Annex VII.

[23] Hence, $\Delta Y_{i2} = Y_{i2} - Y_{i1}$ and so forth.

## 8.2. Results

Table 7 reports the regression results for the outcome indicators in the same order as in section 7. The first column of the table contains the mean value of the variable in the comparison group at the baseline. This serves as a reference point for assessing the size of the project impact on the variables. The next three columns report on the project's impact on the project farming group members: column 2 reports the early treatment effect using regression (2) on the baseline data, column 3 reports the difference-in-difference (DD) regression results of regression (3) without the controls, and column 4 shows the regression results including controls. As mentioned above, the overall effect of the project on the direct beneficiaries should be assessed as the sum of the baseline effect (column 2) and the DD effect (column 4).

In the regression using the baseline data (columns 2 and 5), the education and age of the household head, the cultivated land size, the household's main income source, and the subjective wealth status of the household 5 years prior to the baseline are used to control for differences between the households. In the diff-in-diff regression (columns 4 and 7), the change in the same household level variables are included. In addition, we control for the change in household size.

The regression results for the credit cooperative members are reported in columns 5-7 in the same order as for the farming group members in columns 2-4. Again, the overall effect of the FIELD project should be assessed as the sum of the early effects (column 5) and the DD effect (column 7). In addition, the results for the indirect beneficiaries (spillover) are reported in columns 8-10.

The standard error of the coefficient estimates are calculated correcting for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level, and they are reported below the coefficients estimates in brackets (columns 2-10). The significance of the coefficient estimates is denoted by stars next to the coefficient estimates.[24] Note that the sample size for the regressions is not reported but can be inferred from Annex III.

### *Use of financial instruments*

The credit cooperatives set up with the assistance of FIELD are expected to encourage both saving and borrowing among their members. The regression results in Table 7 show that the credit cooperatives indeed had a significant effect on the percentage of households that have savings in a bank, cooperative or farming group before the baseline survey: as a result of the early effect of the project 24 percentage point more households had savings accumulated in these organisations (controlling for household characteristics). However, during the evaluation period, savings have also increased in the comparison villages, and the treatment households' advantage disappeared in this indicator by the endline. Regarding credit, membership in the project credit cooperatives did not make borrowing more likely among the treatment households.

As expected, membership in the project farming groups alone did not result in an increased use of financial services. Also, the cooperatives have not yet reached out to many other households in the

[24]The probability that the coefficient estimates are not significantly different from zero is indicated by stars: * denotes that this probability is smaller than 10%, ** is used if this probability is less than 5% and *** if it is less than 1%. Hence, the more stars indicate a higher probability that the effects are significantly different from zero.

village, hence, the results verify our expectations that no significant treatment effect is found in the spillover group.

### *Households using organic farming practices*

As a result of the trainings on sustainable farming practices at the project farming groups, treatment household who were members of a project farming group were 42 percentage point more likely to use organic fertilizers and 27 percentage point more likely to use organic pesticides and insecticides at the baseline (early treatment effect). During the evaluation period organic fertilizers become more commonly used in other areas, and as a result the project's impact was reduced by 29 percentage point. However, the overall impact of the project on the use of organic inputs is still positive for the farming group members (23 percentage point for organic fertilizers and 12 percentage points for organic pesticides and insecticides).

The regression results also show that in the spillover group, the project had an early effect, but it was not sustainable throughout the evaluation period, as many households stopped using organic inputs. In addition, no significant impact of project credit cooperatives is found on organic farming practices.

Finally, we investigate whether seed breeders are more likely to practice organic farming, which is a requirement for developing new varieties. Table 22 in Annex VII shows that seed breeders were not significantly more likely to use organic farming practices compared to other farmers in the treatment farming groups. In fact, we find that seed breeders are the main adopters of chemical fertilizers during the evaluation period: they are 36 percentage points more likely to use chemical fertilizers at the endline than other treatment farming group members, who did not significantly increase their use of chemical fertilizers (coefficient of -5 percentage points, insignificant). However, seed breeders are less likely to use chemical pesticides and insecticides at the endline (-15 percentage points) compared to other treatment farmers.

### *Yield and selling price of rice and volume sold*

Through the farming groups, the project had a positive effect on the yield of rice: the project farming group members obtained 0.6 ton per hectare or 13% higher yields compared to the comparison households at the baseline. This advantage has not changed over the evaluation period. On the other hand, project cooperative members have on average consistently lower yields than the comparison group. As a result, households who are members of both the cooperative and the farming group lost their advantage in the yield of rice during the evaluation period. Interestingly, the productivity of the spillover group was similar to the treatment farming group members at the baseline, but their productivity has decreased compared to the comparison farmers by the endline.

The interpretation of these findings is not straightforward. Productivity differences could be partially explained by regional differences such as soil quality and local weather conditions as the number of locations in each groups are small,[25] and we observe the same trend for the cooperative and spillover group members who are mostly living in the same villages.[26]

[25] Differences in one village could play a substantially influence the outcome.

[26] The same trend for the cooperative and spillover group members could be explained by location specific trends as households in these two groups mostly living in the same villages.

The regression results for the volume of rice sold are similar to the results on yield, as most households sell the majority of rice harvested. However, the negative trend during the evaluation period for the cooperative members and the spillover group is more muted.

Regarding to the selling price of rice, we do not find any impact of the FIELD project.[27] Given that farmers are more likely to sell their produce individually than collectively at the endline (Table 28 in Annex VIII), this is not unexpected.

We do not find a more pronounced effect of the project on seed breeders regarding these indicators (Table 22).

### *Household income, livelihood and food security*

The FIELD project did not affect households' income and wealth during the evaluation period. However, though the farming groups, it improved the self-reported food security of households: 26 percentage point reduction in the share of households in the project farming groups reported that they could not cover their food needs or living costs at the endline compared to the comparison villages and controlling for household characteristics. These household on average reported almost 0.8 month reduction in the number of months per year when they had not enough to eat.[28] No similar impacts are found for the cooperative member group.

[27] No impact was found using the group average selling prices per village. However, we find a negative effect on prices using the self-reported prices among the cooperative members. However, we deem the latter indicator less reliable.

[28] These results are partially driven by increasing self-reported food security in the comparison areas.

## Table 7: Attribution: regression estimates

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Assignment group** | **Comparison** | **Farming Group** | | | **Saving and credit cooperative** | | | **Spillover** | | |
| | **Mean at baseline** | **Early treatment effect** | **DD without controls** | **DD with controls** | **Early treatment effect** | **DD without controls** | **DD with controls** | **Early treatment effect** | **DD without controls** | **DD with controls** |
| **A. Use of financial instruments** | | | | | | | | | | |
| % HHs know a place to borrow | 98.31 | -2.55<br>(1.74) | 1.64<br>(1.77) | 1.94<br>(2.33) | -3.29<br>(2.69) | 1.27<br>(2.51) | 3.50<br>(3.26) | -9.52*<br>(5.11) | 6.53<br>(5.11) | 10.78<br>(6.50) |
| % HHs involved in a financial institution | 27.12 | 16.06<br>(11.04) | -11.54<br>(12.12) | -14.37<br>(10.31) | 15.22<br>(9.22) | -10.06<br>(7.06) | -11.54<br>(7.16) | -11.34<br>(12.83) | 5.87<br>(11.49) | -0.01<br>(11.61) |
| % HHs have savings in savings and credit group, cooperative or bank | 1.69 | 11.20<br>(14.44) | -5.16<br>(13.29) | -5.41<br>(7.79) | 23.95**<br>(10.47) | -20.63***<br>(7.00) | -19.43***<br>(5.03) | -10.68<br>(14.43) | 11.68<br>(12.25) | 11.08<br>(7.39) |
| % HHs have borrowed in the past 12 months | 27.12 | 0.89<br>(8.21) | -8.51<br>(7.90) | -9.98<br>(10.36) | 5.01<br>(7.56) | 7.39<br>(7.82) | 6.35<br>(9.28) | -23.30***<br>(6.82) | 8.97<br>(8.42) | 6.55<br>(10.12) |
| **B. Households using organic farming practices** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of households practicing organic farming | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Self-reported* | 7.50 | 3.34<br>(4.35) | 7.79<br>(12.16) | 1.69<br>(12.10) | -9.10*<br>(4.42) | 21.60*<br>(11.16) | 17.92<br>(12.05) | 0.65<br>(3.81) | 1.96<br>(12.29) | -2.74<br>(12.96) |
| *Based on responses to questions (not using any chemical inputs)* | 1.69 | 1.51<br>(1.95) | 0.64<br>(1.85) | 0.49<br>(1.90) | -2.99<br>(2.38) | 2.34<br>(1.57) | 2.61<br>(1.66) | -1.96<br>(1.23) | 0.25<br>(1.73) | -0.22<br>(1.52) |
| Percentage of households using chemical inputs | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Chemical fertilizers* | 91.53 | -13.86*<br>(8.03) | 9.66<br>(11.66) | 8.01<br>(13.24) | -3.30<br>(6.33) | 9.91<br>(9.86) | 12.10<br>(10.11) | -9.25<br>(8.40) | 11.99<br>(9.83) | 15.03<br>(10.70) |

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Assignment group** | **Comparison** | **Farming Group** | | | **Saving and credit cooperative** | | | **Spillover** | | |
| | **Mean at baseline** | **Early treatment effect** | **DD without controls** | **DD with controls** | **Early treatment effect** | **DD without controls** | **DD with controls** | **Early treatment effect** | **DD without controls** | **DD with controls** |
| *Chemical pesticides/insecticides* | 98.31 | -0.30<br>(3.75) | -0.60<br>(4.91) | -4.39<br>(5.13) | 4.49<br>(4.54) | -2.35<br>(3.56) | -3.33<br>(4.22) | 4.11<br>(3.49) | 0.43<br>(4.09) | -3.87<br>(4.23) |
| Percentage of household using organic inputs | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Organic fertilizers* | 20.34 | 41.63***<br>(9.80) | -25.14**<br>(10.55) | -28.55**<br>(13.10) | 4.83<br>(8.92) | -12.20<br>(9.76) | -12.70<br>(11.22) | 18.19*<br>(10.40) | -29.15**<br>(13.59) | -34.45**<br>(16.61) |
| *Organic pesticides/insecticides* | 6.78 | 27.33**<br>(11.00) | -15.13<br>(11.37) | -16.74<br>(11.46) | 2.13<br>(8.83) | 14.87*<br>(7.66) | 12.27*<br>(6.66) | -3.52<br>(3.10) | -7.13<br>(7.35) | -6.54<br>(8.19) |
| **C. Yield of rice per ha** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Yield of rice per ha in the past 12 months using median values (harvest/area) | 4.79 | 0.60***<br>(0.12) | -0.31<br>(0.35) | -0.15<br>(0.34) | -0.22**<br>(0.10) | -0.84**<br>(0.38) | -0.82**<br>(0.36) | 0.61***<br>(0.10) | -0.93***<br>(0.23) | -0.79***<br>(0.21) |
| **D. Selling price of rice** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Price of rice per kg (average of later than harvest and immediately at harvest) in Rupiah during the last harvest | 4,007.95 | 89.15<br>(148.67) | -344.83*<br>(168.32) | -203.29<br>(187.54) | 131.22<br>(160.96) | -314.79<br>(254.88) | -316.52<br>(275.16) | 21.95<br>(182.77) | 22.41<br>(264.56) | 38.33<br>(244.29) |
| Price of rice per kg on average in Rupiah for sales during the past 12 months (self-reported) | 4,193.86 | -80.89<br>(117.59) | -41.64<br>(88.41) | 23.11<br>(99.09) | 125.99<br>(120.68) | -266.80***<br>(92.17) | -268.50***<br>(91.39) | 65.47<br>(100.92) | -55.54<br>(106.79) | 34.12<br>(106.28) |
| **E. Volume of rice sold (t)** | 2.59 | 3.91**<br>(1.58) | -2.86*<br>(1.54) | -2.43<br>(1.84) | 2.93**<br>(1.33) | -0.71<br>(1.43) | -0.61<br>(1.43) | 2.02*<br>(1.03) | 1.48<br>(1.87) | 2.15<br>(2.16) |
| **F. Household income and livelihood** | | | | | | | | | | |

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assignment group | Comparison | Farming Group | | | Saving and credit cooperative | | | Spillover | | |
| | Mean at baseline | Early treatment effect | DD without controls | DD with controls | Early treatment effect | DD without controls | DD with controls | Early treatment effect | DD without controls | DD with controls |
| Log of household revenue from sale of rice (1000 Rp) | 6.27 | 0.72** | -0.31 | -0.43 | 0.45* | 0.12 | 0.04 | 0.68** | 0.18 | 0.10 |
| | | (0.27) | (0.27) | (0.28) | (0.24) | (0.27) | (0.32) | (0.30) | (0.39) | (0.45) |
| Household revenue from sale of rice (1000 Rp) | 959.18 | 7,790.35* | -670.79 | -7,379.84* | 4,460.47 | 1,041.64 | -7,091.55* | 4,104.91 | 12,562.43 | 3,561.13 |
| | | (4,005.51) | (8,398.46) | (3,843.27) | (3,108.28) | (6,725.92) | (3,930.96) | (2,798.66) | (7,742.47) | (4,450.38) |
| Log of total income per month | 6.32 | 0.42** | -0.10 | 0.01 | 0.27* | -0.16 | -0.17 | 0.55** | -0.01 | 0.11 |
| | | (0.17) | (0.38) | (0.46) | (0.15) | (0.31) | (0.41) | (0.23) | (0.31) | (0.40) |
| Log of total per capita income per month | 5.06 | 0.40** | -0.07 | 0.01 | 0.30* | -0.16 | -0.17 | 0.60** | -0.04 | 0.10 |
| | | (0.19) | (0.37) | (0.46) | (0.18) | (0.29) | (0.41) | (0.27) | (0.32) | (0.40) |
| Log of per capita non-food expenditure per month | 11.71 | 0.25* | -0.05 | -0.02 | 0.25** | -0.27 | -0.22 | 0.03 | 0.07 | 0.09 |
| | | (0.12) | (0.19) | (0.16) | (0.11) | (0.18) | (0.15) | (0.14) | (0.19) | (0.23) |
| Housing facilities index | 0.06 | 0.20** | -0.18*** | -0.20*** | 0.02 | -0.01 | 0.02 | 0.18** | -0.17** | -0.23*** |
| | | (0.08) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.05) |
| Asset index | 0.22 | 0.26** | -0.07 | -0.01 | 0.05 | -0.14* | -0.11 | 0.07 | -0.01 | 0.01 |
| | | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.11) | (0.07) | (0.11) |
| % HHs invested in business | 1.69 | 8.05* | 3.53 | 9.61 | 2.36 | -12.54 | -20.43* | -3.87 | 16.47 | 21.61 |
| | | (4.41) | (9.50) | (10.76) | (3.55) | (10.37) | (10.85) | (3.39) | (14.19) | (16.57) |
| % HHs invested in farming tools | 38.98 | 15.35** | 0.93 | 4.03 | 2.18 | -0.32 | -4.92 | 2.64 | 8.58 | 21.64 |
| | | (6.86) | (10.87) | (11.79) | (6.92) | (9.91) | (9.67) | (9.07) | (13.13) | (14.54) |
| Overall happiness (1-4) | 2.02 | 0.06 | -0.24*** | -0.26*** | -0.03 | -0.05 | -0.05 | 0.05 | -0.16* | -0.21** |
| | | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.10) |

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assignment group | Comparison | Farming Group | | | Saving and credit cooperative | | | Spillover | | |
| | Mean at baseline | Early treatment effect | DD without controls | DD with controls | Early treatment effect | DD without controls | DD with controls | Early treatment effect | DD without controls | DD with controls |
| Current subjective wealth status (1-6) | 2.90 | 0.04<br>(0.16) | 0.45***<br>(0.15) | 0.12<br>(0.19) | -0.04<br>(0.13) | -0.18<br>(0.15) | -0.09<br>(0.17) | -0.17<br>(0.14) | 0.46**<br>(0.20) | 0.13<br>(0.20) |
| **G. Food Security and vulnerability** | | | | | | | | | | |
| % HHs had income sometimes not cover living costs in the past 12 months | 28.81 | 8.59<br>(5.98) | -26.02***<br>(7.47) | -26.22***<br>(9.26) | -3.86<br>(7.80) | 1.54<br>(8.63) | 0.42<br>(8.33) | 4.05<br>(9.37) | -27.71**<br>(13.41) | -33.05**<br>(16.03) |
| % HHs not able to satisfy their food consumption needs in the last 12 months | 15.25 | 11.03<br>(6.71) | -23.27**<br>(9.84) | -25.64**<br>(9.22) | -6.10<br>(6.15) | -1.20<br>(9.25) | -2.90<br>(7.59) | -5.88<br>(4.96) | -11.53<br>(7.51) | -18.65*<br>(9.49) |
| Nr. months HHs were not able to cover their living costs | 0.71 | 0.19<br>(0.13) | -0.71**<br>(0.30) | -0.67*<br>(0.35) | -0.10<br>(0.16) | 0.08<br>(0.32) | 0.04<br>(0.28) | 0.03<br>(0.18) | -0.61**<br>(0.26) | -0.58<br>(0.39) |
| Nr. months HHs did not have enough to eat | 0.36 | 0.19<br>(0.13) | -0.67**<br>(0.25) | -0.76**<br>(0.31) | -0.08<br>(0.11) | -0.15<br>(0.21) | -0.09<br>(0.20) | -0.13<br>(0.09) | -0.33<br>(0.23) | -0.66*<br>(0.33) |
| Current standard of living | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Daily needs covered (1-3)* | 1.81 | 0.23***<br>(0.08) | 0.00<br>(0.11) | -0.04<br>(0.13) | 0.17**<br>(0.08) | -0.02<br>(0.10) | -0.01<br>(0.11) | 0.12<br>(0.10) | 0.16<br>(0.12) | 0.15<br>(0.14) |
| *Food consumption covered (1-3)* | 1.92 | 0.22**<br>(0.08) | -0.05<br>(0.11) | -0.08<br>(0.10) | 0.20**<br>(0.09) | -0.05<br>(0.10) | 0.00<br>(0.11) | 0.15<br>(0.10) | 0.05<br>(0.12) | 0.01<br>(0.14) |

Source: Household survey E4; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia.

Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are given in parentheses.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

1. Prices are reported in 2012 real prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%). Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/aboutus.php?inflasi=1

# 9. Evaluation question 3: Relevance of changes

This subsection will answer evaluation question 3: What is the relevance of these changes? In particular we look at the size of the impact, and whether the project addresses an important issue for the beneficiaries.

## 9.1. The size of the impact

The project had a minimal impact on the welfare of the beneficiaries, which was the final objective of the project. However, the project was effective in motivating farming households to use organic farming practices in the project villages. This effect remained the most significant for the project farming group members. In addition, the project also had a positive effect on the yield of rice and the food security condition of these households.

For the cooperative members, the only benefits of the project were in terms of having more savings. Hence, most results are driven by activities initiated before the current project period.

## 9.2. Does the project address an important issue for the beneficiaries?

Farmers' participation in seed breeding has declined during the evaluation period from 52% to 24% in the treatment group. However, only a handful of successful local seed varieties are necessary to adapt the varieties used to local conditions. Hence, it is sufficient if only a handful of farmers are engaged in seed breeding per village. In that respect, the number of direct beneficiaries of the project is limited. However, their successes enable all farming households in the region to be able to use better adapted seed varieties. According to the FIELD Annual Review 2013, 9 of the 15 project farming groups were successful in breeding new rice varieties (30 in total). Finally, our data shows that the percentage of households that retain seeds from their harvest for next season's planting has doubled during the evaluation period.

# 10. Evaluation question 4: Efficiency of project

This subsection will answer evaluation question 4: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient? To answer this question we will describe the cost effectiveness of the programme. First, the calculation of cost per beneficiary is discussed. Second, these costs are compared to the project effects per beneficiary. Finally, the findings on cost effectiveness are compared to achievements of similar projects.

## 10.1. Costs per beneficiary

A first step to estimate the cost effectiveness of the programme is to calculate the project cost per beneficiary. To collect this information, we conducted a structured interview with the finance manager of FIELD[29] on 16 July 2013 using the 'budget survey' as described in section 5.1. We have also asked Hivos to provide us with an update on the cost information for 2013 and 2014. The cost figures are

[29] The interview was conducted with Novi Setiabudi, finance manager, and Endang Sutaria, programme staff member.

based on actual expenditure data. In addition, we consulted the Annual Reviews of FIELD to find out the number of beneficiaries.

Table 8 summarizes the available cost information and the number of beneficiaries per year. The total project costs are presented in Indonesian rupiah (IDR) (column 2) and in euros (using average exchange rate over the year, column 3). Based on the rupiah amounts, the project between 2011-2013 has spent approximately 92% of the available budget in euros (or 102% in IDR).[30] In 2014, there were no project costs related to the project activities, only the costs of audit.

The project costs related to activities with the direct beneficiaries, were in total 66,906,850 IDR (or 4,983 EUR[31]) for the development of the credit cooperatives, which is 5% of the total project budget as planned; and 283,308,450 IDR (or 20,871.51 EUR) for the activities related to the smallholder' seed system and certification, which is close to the planned 20% in the overall budget. In addition to these costs, FIELD and the communities also contributed 913,900,000 IDR to the total costs of the project, hence they have spent 107% of the budgeted amount.[32]

We calculate the cost per beneficiary for two groups of beneficiaries: cooperative members and seed breeders. At the beginning of the project, the 6 savings and credit cooperatives established with the assistance of the project had total of 161 members. Based on the endline data, we estimate the total credit cooperative membership at 456. The project works with 15 farming groups, the total number of members and the number of seed breeding farmers is estimated at 897 (874) and 75 (45),[33] respectively, based on baseline (endline) information from the surveyed locations.

Based on these data, we have calculated the direct project costs per cooperative beneficiary household per year in column 6 in Indonesian rupiahs and in column 7 in international dollars (Int$). International dollars at 2011 prices[34] are used for the cost per unit calculation because it takes both purchasing power parity and inflation into account that would not be the case if we reported the unit costs in euros. Hence, using Int$, the costs can easily be compared across time and countries.

The results show that the setting up the credit cooperatives cost 60.45 Int$ per member. However, the unit cost of seed breeding should be calculated per successful seed variety. Unfortunately, we do not have information about the total number of seed varieties bred under the project, therefore, we are not able to calculate the unit cost for this.

[30] The total budget for the project was 1,343,999,999 IDR or 112,000 EUR (using 12,000 IDR/EUR). Source: FIELD Partner Contract with Hivos, signed on 7 April 2011.

[31] Unfortunately, we do not have information about the exchange rate used for the project. Instead we use the annual average exchange rate from http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/. The exchange rates used are 12,264 IDR/EUR in 2011, 12,087 IDR/EUR in 2012 and 13,923 IDR/EUR in 2013.

[32] According to the project budget, FIELD and the participating communities cover an additional 70,975 EUR or 851,700,000 IDR (suing 12,000 IDR/EUR).

[33] According to Hivos, the 52 seed breeders benefited from the FIELD project, in particular the community seed registry system, which is in line with the information from the survey data.

[34] The following exchange rates are used based on PPP conversion factor using the World Development Indicators: 3,606.57 IDR/Int$ in 2011, 3,636.38 IDR/Int$ in 2012, 3,682.25 IDR/Int$ in 2013 and 4,530.90 IDR/Int$ in 2014. Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#

**Table 8: Overview of the costs and number of beneficiaries**

| Year | Total costs [IDR][1,2] | Total cost [EUR, current prices][3] | Cooperative development costs [IDR] | Percentage of costs funded by CFA[1] | Number of cooperative members[4] | Cost per beneficiary per year [IDR] | Cost per beneficiary per year [Int$ 2011][5] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **2011** | 162,668,750 | 13,263.92 | 18,283,800 | 100% | 161 | 113,564 | 31.49 |
| **2012** | 290,848,650 | 24,062.53 | - | 100% | 210 | - | - |
| **2013** | 914,582,600 | 65,688.62 | 48,623,050 | 100% | 456 | 106,629 | 28.96 |

Source: Budget survey and FIELD Annual Reviews.
Notes:
N.K.= not known

1. Only the project costs covered by Hivos are included. FIELD and the communities contributed an additional 913,900,000 IDR during the project period. However, we do not have information about the annual division of these costs. Therefore, they are not included in the table. Accounting for these project costs, Hivos has contributed 60% of the project costs overall (in IDR).
2. Annual average exchange rate is used. Data is obtained from http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/
3. Annual average exchange rate is used. Data is obtained from http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/
4. The number of cooperative members for 2012 is estimated using baseline survey data, while for 2013 and 2014 the endline data is used to estimate the members.

PPP conversion factor to 2011 international dollars is calculated using the World Development Indicators: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#.

## 10.2. Cost-benefit

At the time of the endline survey, the credit cooperatives have not resulted in any impact on the welfare of member households. We also do not yet observe any effect for the community seed registry system. However, both of these activities may take much longer before any benefit can be measured.

## 10.3. Cost effectiveness

Finally, we compare the costs of the FIELD project to other similar projects based on the benchmark cost provided by the Synthesis team. Based on a study on Indian self-help groups, Harper (2002) estimates that the costs for establishing such a self-help group to be within the range of 105-1,242 Int$ per cooperative. Another study by Isern (2007) puts the unit cost of self-help group focused only on lending ranges to 188 Int$ per cooperative.

At the same time, the unit costs of the FIELD project for establishing credit cooperatives were 3,045.72 Int$ per cooperative, which makes the project very expensive.

Unfortunately, we do not have any benchmark costs related to the establishment of a community seed registry system. However, Fahim, et al. (1998) estimates the costs of breeding a new seed variety to range between 12 and 259 Int$ per rice variety depending on the methods used.

## 11. Contribution of Capacity Development and Civil Society

FIELD has also been selected for the Civil Society Strengthening component of the MFS II Evaluation. The findings of this report are in line with those of the civil society evaluation, which found evidence that the establishment of the cooperatives and their increased institutional capacity (for example, financial management) can be attributed to FIELD's interventions. However, the trainings provided by the FFS and later through the cooperatives were also critical to strengthening farmers' productive capacities. At the time of the endline, FIELD had no close relation to the cooperatives anymore.

We are not aware that MFS II funding was used to improve the capacity of FIELD to strengthen civil society, and specifically the project cooperatives and seed breeder groups, between 2012 and 2014.

## 12. Conclusion

Due to the time frame of the project and evaluation, the current evaluation was focused on the sustainability and enhancement of the project achievement. Hence, we estimated the medium to long run effects (2003-2014) for the FIELD project.

The FIELD project was successful in raising the awareness of farmers regarding the importance of using locally adapted seed varieties. At the baseline, as much as 52% of the households in the project farming groups have participated in seed breeding. Farmers' involvement was halved by the endline; however, farmers were still more likely to use organic fertilizers than other farmers. During the evaluation period, other farmers in comparison areas also started using more organic inputs, while at the same time, FIELD's farmers started using more chemical inputs. Unfortunately, this trend among treatment farmers is the strongest for seed breeders who are not supposed to use chemical inputs while breeding new varieties. Hence, while the FIELD project was effective in motivating farming households to use organic farming practices in the project villages, the drop in seed breeding participation and the increase in the use of chemical fertilizers between baseline and endline indicate a decline on the positive effects of the project during this period.

However, the project did not manage to reach its objectives through the credit cooperatives: the welfare of households did not improve compared to comparison households, and only in terms of savings do we observe significant impacts.

The findings - minimal impact on the livelihood of households and the recoil of seed breeding activities and organic farming practices - are compatible with the (limited) findings in the literature on the long run effects of seed breeding projects. Whereas the literature review showed that seed breeding projects can improve poverty status in the short run, it also showed that sustainability of the project activities and its impact is a problem.

Finally, the MFS synthesis team asked to score each project along a few indicators. Table 9 displays the indicators and the scores we deemed valid for the project.

**Table 9: Overall project scoring**

| Statement | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| **1. The project was well designed** | 8 | The participatory seed breeding component was well-designed, and it is based on more widely used model. Access to finance is important in setting up new businesses related to seed breeding. However, savings and credit cooperatives may not be the optimal tools, as it takes long for members to accumulate enough savings to be able to lend for setting up a business, and banks were often already functioning in the project areas. |
| **2. The project was implemented as designed** | 8 | The project was mostly implemented as designed. The project period was extended with one year due to underspending of the budget. |
| **3. The project reached all its objectives** | 7 | All project outputs have been accomplished, but the main objective in terms of the welfare of farmers have not yet been materialized. |
| **4. The observed results are attributable to the project interventions** | 7 | Most results are attributable to the project. |
| **5. The observed results are relevant to the project beneficiaries** | 7 | The project beneficiaries are farmers. Therefore, it is relevant for them to learn about sustainable farming practices, and also to be less dependent on the corporations in buying inputs. |
| **6. The project was implemented in the most efficient way** | 6 | The project costs are on the expensive side. |
| Notes: Scores are on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being “no agreement at all” and 10 being “completely agree with statement”. | | |

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# Annex I. SPO and project description

## *SPO description*

Farmers' Initiatives for Ecological Livelihoods and Democracy (FIELD) was established on June 1st, 2001. FIELD was established by staff members who had previously worked with the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) ASIA, which focused on providing technical assistance for the Integrated Pest Management (IPM) Programme for farmers in Asia between 1998 and 2002.[35] After the FAO projects finished, these staff were working informally to support the small farmers in Indonesia. FIELD aims to develop farmer and rural community movements in order to enhance democracy, justice and a healthy environment. They aim to reach this long-term goal by strengthening farmer and rural community movements by means of participatory education, action research and network building. The focus of FIELD is on providing technical assistance for farmers, utilising vast experience of their staff regarding integrated pest management.

The FIELD Foundation has been part of the creation and application of widely praised approaches such as the Farmer Field School, Farmer-to-Farmer training and Farmer Action Research Facilities. FIELD has also trained 26,000 people, both men and women, as Farmer Trainers who are experienced in facilitating and supporting others farmers in a variety of activities such as Field School, Participatory Planning, Field Studies, Farmer's Media Development, Action Research, and advocacy. At the moment, FIELD is supported by several donors on a project basis such as IIED, CGN, and AFFA.

FIELD began operating in 2002, with a project entitled, —The Participatory Enhancement of Diversity of Genetic Resources (PEDIGREA). The PEDIGREA project was started in Indramayu, West Java. Indramayu was chosen because it is the area that produces the largest share of rice in Indonesia. Indramayu is located in the lowlands, about 160 km to the East of Jakarta. Another consideration in choosing Indramayu was because it was the target area of Government's Green Revolution Programme in 1970. Two main components of the PEDIGREA programme are the FFS and Participatory Market Development (PMD). The FFS focuses on Participatory Plant Breeding (PPB) for rice and vegetable and also on participatory on animal improvement (goats).

Regarding the PPB activities, FIELD has trained 60 farmers as facilitators for farmer breeders, of which 34 deal with rice farmers, while 26 deal with vegetable farmers. Regarding the FFS, as of December 2008, FIELD has seen the graduation of many farmers, including 264 rice farmers and 257 vegetables farmers.

The target population of the FIELD project are small farmers in the District of Indramayu, West Java, and Lampung. As the livelihoods of their target groups are prone to suffering due to natural disasters, FIELD has adopted disaster risk reduction (DRR) perspective in their programme, including projects on providing relief; an example of which is an earthquake response effort in Ciamis, West Java in collaboration with HIVOS.

[35] Interview, Mr Adit, Programme Manager, August 28, 2012; See www.field.org/profil/

**IPPHTI**[36]

IPPHTI is the partner organisation of FIELD in Indramayu, they are active in Indramayu since 1999. It is a national grass root organisation, members are graduates from SLPHT (Sekolah Lapang Pangendalian Hama Terpadu = Field School for Pest Control). SLPHT had a contract with FAO and when FAO left and FIELD was founded they continued the cooperation with FIELD.

IPPHTI works in 138 districts in 11 provinces in Indonesia. Since its establishment in 1998 IPPHTI has organised a farmer-to-farmer movement, strengthened farmer-led research, and conducted advocacy on issues such as farmer rights.

The website of IPPHTI is http://suksesorganik.com/ipphti/.

### *Project description*

The following project description is based on discussion with Mr. Masroni of IPPHTI during our field visit to Sliyeng Lor village. IPPHTI is the implementing partner organisation of FIELD in Indramayu district.

In Indramayu FIELD is active in 24 farmer groups in 19 sub-districts.[37] Rice breeding is in every group, however, some of the farmer groups are also engaged in local vegetable breeding or animal breeding. The animal breeding was first focused on chicken, however, due to the Avian flu focus shifted to goats.

In all farmer groups there are 2-5 breeders and the other members are farmers. The farmer groups usually meet twice a year (3 members per group) before and after harvest to discuss their activities. The reason for spreading out the programme in a large area is that the harvest seasons are different in the villages. This speeds up the breeding process, because seeds can be planted more frequently. The farmer groups in the programmes were selected by IPPHTI based on 1) female role, 2) group activity level and 3) the response from the group to the programme. According to Mr. Masroni, there is no seed breeding in the other villages in Indramayu.

FIELD's programme has 4 components: 1) Breeding, 2) Soil management, 3) Marketing and 4) Credit cooperative. However, IPPHTI has additional focus on sustainable farming practices, which is not in the FIELD programme. They encourage the use of *nimba* leaves against pests, compost making from fermented fruits and the use of rain water (no irrigation) for organic farming. Seed breeders have to use organic practices, but farmers mix chemical and organic methods. Irrigation is not allowed for organic practices because the river coming from the south contains chemical fertiliser components. Exchanging seed types also reduces the probability of pests, because growing many seed varieties reduces the chance of pests.

Farmers grow on average 5-10 different rice varieties but only one type on a single plot. Rice is planted 2-3 times per year. In the dry season vegetables like sponge gourd, bitter gourd, squash, water melon or chilli are grown.

[36] Interview with Mr. Masroni of IPPHTI.

[37] However, based on the FIELD Annual Review 2013, the project was only working with 15 farming groups. It is possible that IPPHTI was working with the remaining villages and farming groups through a different project.

FIELD rents land for multiple location testing of the seed varieties. They are working on developing a community seed system instead of certification, which is very expensive.

### *Project result chain*

The section above described the implementation of the project in the field. Hence, it is more detailed at the farmer level than the overall project objectives of FIELD but misses some key elements of the project. The result chain below describes the planned project outcomes based on the project proposal to Hivos.

**Activities**

In order to achieve the four sub-goals, the following activities are envisaged.

First, the development of credit cooperatives:

- Discussions with farmer group representatives to motivate them to run credit cooperatives and establish a core board (year 1)
- Basic training on cooperative management (year 1)
- Organising meetings with prospective cooperative members to establish the credit union (year 1)
- Monthly meetings to further develop cooperative (year 1,2,3)
- Regular monitoring and internal evaluation activities (year 1,2,3)
- Special training for officers and members of the credit cooperative to develop skills (year 1,2,3)

Second, establishment of business enterprises:

- Conducting feasibility study of business opportunities in village (year 1,2)
- Personal Business Enterprise implementation (year 1, 2,3)
- Establishment of community enterprise (year 3)

Third, seed certification:

- Organising regular community forums
- Facilitating multiple location testing of selected seed varieties
- Facilitating seed certification
- Establishing community registry and seed system

Fourth, exit strategy in Lampung:

- Form a group responsible for strategically planning the institutionalisation of organic agriculture and community seed systems, institutionalizing community seed systems (year 1)

**Outputs**

The sub-projects have the following outputs:

- 5 credit cooperatives established using credit union methodology.
- 3 business enterprises established in 5 villages.
- Seed legalisation:
    - Community registry and seed system established.
    - 300 new farmers participate in the community registry system.
    - 14 farmer line varieties identified and selected.

  - 15 farmer breeders involved.
  - 6 new seed varieties developed by farmers under community registry system.
  - 1 seed variety certified.
- Exit strategy devised.

**Outcomes**

The final objective of the project is to increase the welfare of ecologically-minded farmers. Accordingly, sub-objectives of the current contract are to facilitate the institutionalisation of rural businesses by establishing credit cooperatives; stimulating the 'entrepreneurial spirit' of farmers and the village community by stimulating the development of new business ideas and opportunities; providing legal protection of farmers who engage in plant breeding to ensure legal recognition of their products through certification.

As a result of the project, the rural economy is given a boost through the institutionalisation of rural business and new business initiatives. Small-scale farmers see their livelihoods improved after getting better access to seed market and to formal seed quality system.

**Risks and assumptions**

Finally, the proposal assumes the following setting and conditions for the project:

- Stable macroeconomic situation
- Absence of natural disasters
- Well-functioning Credit Cooperative
- Public knowledge of business opportunities in rural areas
- Communities open to business diversification
- Community and government support
- Seed-breeding farmers are able to pass the certification test
- Farmers understand the principles of the credit union
- Availability of sufficient capital to run the business of credit cooperatives
- Society agreed to establish community seed systems

# Annex II. Overview outcome indicators and indices

This annex provides a detailed description about the used outcome indicators. In addition, it discusses the variables which were used to construct the outcome indicator indices. Please note that some of the indicators are constructed as indices from multiple questions. In the main text of the report, only the indices are reported for such indicators. However, this Annex reports on the outcomes of the components of the indices.

Outcome variables for the project were collected at household, farming group and cooperative level. The outcomes are reported for treatment, spillover and comparison groups for the baseline and the endline surveys. For the household data, the sample size can differ between tables because the answer 'don't know' is changed to a missing value or because a respondent could skip a question if he/she had no knowledge about what was asked (answered 'no' to a previous question). This was the case if a respondent answered 'don't know' to a question with a scale, so it did not make sense to incorporate the answer in the scale. However, for questions where we were interested in the percentage of the sample that answered 'yes' to a question, it made sense to change the 'don't know' answers to 'no' so that we could use all data when reporting on the question.

### *Meetings at the farming group*

- Average number of meetings of farming group in past 12 months (baseline)/ 24 months (endline)
- Number of farming groups which discussed […] in the past 12 months: This indicator is based on a question in the farming group survey asking for the topics that have been discussed in the meetings in the past 12/24 months. Respondents could choose from a number of topics and specify other topics that are not listed. For each of these topics a separate sub-indicator was created which equals 1 if the household mentioned it and 0 if he didn't. Hence, the sub-indicators are the following: Good farming practices, Seed breeding, financial management, savings and loans, processing, marketing, social gathering or 'other' topic.

### *Saving and credit cooperative indicators*

- Total outstanding loans at the savings and credit cooperatives: this indicator is based on the question in the savings and cooperative survey on how big the total amount of outstanding loans is (divided by 1000 Rp).
- Number of members: This includes all members, female and male.

### *Use of financial instruments (uniform indicator)*

- Access
    - Households that know a place to borrow money: In section JK (Use of Financial Services) of the questionnaire it was asked whether the respondent or any other household member know of a place where they can borrow money. The question has 3 answer categories: 'Yes', 'No' and 'Don't know'. In order to generate a binary variable 'Don't know' answers were recoded to missing values.
- Membership

  - Households involved in financial institutions: This indicator is constructed using section JK (Use of Financial Services) of the household questionnaire. The dummy is created by combining answers of 2 different questions; jk06 and jk14. All households that answered to have savings in a bank account or in a savings and credit cooperative are counted as households that are involved in a financial institution. Furthermore, all households which were able to get a loan from: a. private commercial bank b. cooperative c. government/semi-government bank d. agricultural bank/SAPRODI or e. non-bank financial institution are counted as households that are involved in a financial institution.
- Savings
  - Percentage of households with savings in bank account, savings and credit cooperative or savings and credit group: Section JK in the endline survey records each of these three types of savings separately. In order to compare the results to the baseline (where all three saving types are grouped in one category), we created a dummy which equals 1 if a household has at least one of the three saving types.
- Borrowing
  - *Households that have borrowed in the past 12 months*: All information in order to construct the dummy variable was taken from question *jk13* for all households which replied that were successful in securing a loan in the past 12 months. Answer categories `don't know' were replaced by missing values.

### *Households using organic farming practices*

- Percentage of households practicing organic farming (this indicator is measured from self-reported information as well as based on responses to questions on chemical inputs for farming)
  - Self-reported: This variable is measured based on responses to the question whether a household practices organic farming. If answers were 'Partially' we recoded them to 0 ('No').
  - Based on responses to questions (not using chemical inputs): Based on three questions on farming practices, it is assessed whether a household practices organic farming, i.e. does not use chemical inputs. The first question asks about the household's soil management for rice cultivation. If the household does not use any chemical fertilizer, it is classified as organic soil management. The second question asks about how the household protects its rice seeds from insects and diseases. If the household does not use any pesticide or chemical herbicides, it is classified as organic farming. The third question asks whether the household used among others any chemical fertiliser or chemical pesticides for cultivating rice in the past year. If the answer is yes to either of these two questions, the household does not exclusively use organic farming practices. Hence, the answers to the three questions are collected into one indicator which indicates whether the household used any chemical input at all.
- Percentage of households using chemical inputs

  - Percentage of households using chemical fertilizers: This indicator is again based on the first question mentioned above whether the household uses any chemical fertilizer to keep the soil for rice cultivation fertile.
  - Percentage of households using chemical pesticides/insecticides: This indicator is again based on the second question mentioned above whether the household uses any pesticides or chemical herbicides to protect its rice cultivation from insects and diseases.
- Percentage of households using organic inputs
  - Percentage of households using organic fertilizers: This indicator is again based on the first question mentioned above whether the household uses 'manure' or 'composting' to keep the soil for rice cultivation fertile.
  - Percentage of households using organic pesticides/insecticides: This indicator is again based on the second question mentioned above whether the household uses bait to attract insects, plants special plants, do crop rotation, plants resistant crop types or uses organic/herbal pesticides/herbicides to protect its rice cultivation from insects and diseases.

### *Percentage of households involved in farming*

This indicator looks at the share of households that are involved in farming of any type of crops. For the baseline all households answered with 'Yes', at the endline around 3% of the households have not grown any crops for sale.

### *Yield of rice per ha (uniform indicator)*

This indicator is calculated per ha (kg/ha). Section UTB of the household questionnaire asks about harvest and sale of all crops that were grown by a household. We concentrate only on rice for now. The section is divided into information about a. the last harvest period, b. the second last harvest period and c. the one before last harvest period where we mostly focus on the first two. For each period, the questionnaire asks for the area that was planted with rice ($m^2$) and the amount of rice that was harvested. For the area we sum up the values and divide them by 10,000 to get values in ha. For the amount harvested, the unit was not predefined in the questionnaire, hence all values are converted into kg. The kg rice harvested as well as the area used for rice cultivations are each summed up for the last and second last period. If values exist for both periods, the sum is divided by 2, hence we get the average for the two periods. Finally, the yield is calculated by dividing the kg harvested by the area used to cultivate rice. Due to a large variation in the yield outcomes, we used the median per treatment type instead.

### *Selling price of rice (average per household)*

This indicator is calculated using two different methods. The first, a bit more complicated method, calculated the average price of the different periods. The second variable uses the average price of the past 12 months mentioned by the household.

- Calculated price: This indicator is calculated as an average of the price received for selling rice a. immediately after harvest and b. later after harvest (in the last harvest period only). Since we calculate the average price for the two periods, we weigh them by how much was sold in each

of them. Hence, we divide the kg sold in each period by the total kg sold in both periods and multiply this with the price of each period. Since the units for prices are not predefined in the questionnaire, we covert them so they are all in Rupiah per kg. This value is then divided by 2 to receive the average price received for rich immediately after harvest and later after harvest. In the endline the price for each of the two periods (immediately and later after harvest) is further divided into price for collectively selling and selling individually. Hence, we also calculate the average price for these two sale types.

- Self-reported price: This indicator simply represents question on the average price households received for selling rice in the past 12 months.

### *Volume of rice sold (t) (uniform indicator)*

The total volume of rice sold is calculated from the volume sold in the last harvest period, the one before the last harvest period and two before the last harvest period. In each of the three harvest periods we collected information on the volume sold immediately after harvest and later after harvest. As mentioned above, the units were not predefined in the questionnaire so all values are converted into kg before adding them up. To receive the total volume of rice sold for each of the three periods, the volumes sold immediately and later after harvest are added up. Last, the total amounts for the three periods are added up to receive the total volume sold. Last, we divide the volume of rice sold by 1,000 to receive our measure in tons.

### *Household income and livelihood (uniform indicator)*

For this indicator, data was collected on the (per capita) consumption and asset holdings of households as well as the self-reported well-being.

- Household income is calculated from a) household revenue from sale of rice, b) total income per months and c) total income per capita per month (all three in 1000 Rp.).
    - Household revenue from sale of rice per month (1000 Rp): This indicator is calculated by multiplying the self-reported average price for rice (see above) with the total volume of rice sold in the last 3 harvest periods (see previous indicator). To receive the revenue per month in 1000 Rp., this value is divided by 12 (months) and 1,000 (Rp.).
    - Total income per month (1000 Rp): The questionnaire includes separate sub-sections for income generated from: a. Crops, b. Livestock (net profit), c. Non-Farm activities (net profit) and d. Money transfers (net income). The total income variable is created by the sum of income generated by the different income sources mentioned above. In particular, we sum the 'total income per month from livestock per household' (based on self-reported price), the net profit per month from non-farm business per household, the income per month from crop other than rice per household, household revenue per month from sale of rice and the total amount of transfers (includes different types of assistance, i.e. in cash or in-kind) received per month per household.
    - Total per capita income per month (1000 Rp): For the monthly per capita income, total income is divided by the household size.

- Per capita expenditures of households (

- Non-food consumption per capita per month (1000 Rp): The total non-food consumption of a household is calculated from a number of questions on household expenses. To get the monthly non-food consumption per household, yearly expenses are converted into monthly figures. For the per capita *non-food* consumption we divide non-food consumption per month by household size. Non-food expenses consist of the following:
  - Yearly expenses on items like clothing, household supplies, medical costs and taxes. Again, also the yearly value of these items that were consumed but self-produced or received from another source is taken into account.
  - Expenses on schooling for family members (schooling needs, transportation, registrations etc.) were asked separately for members outside and inside the household. Only expenses for family members inside the household are included in the calculation of non-food consumption.

- Asset holdings of households
  - Housing facilities index: In order, that the housing facilities index in the MFS II projects have a meaningful interpretation, we calculate weights for the index components based on their predictive power for household expenditure. The weights are calculated using a population representative survey for Indonesia using regression analysis. We use the IFLS 2007 survey as a population representative sample. From the IFLS 2007 dataset we use aggregate expenditure data, asset ownership and sampling weights. As the aggregate expenditure variable the data analysis uses the logarithm of the monthly per capita expenditure (*lnpce*). The sampling weight used is the cross-sectional sampling weight adjusted for attrition. This weight should be representative of all households living in the IFLS provinces in Indonesia in 2007. Based on the KR section of the IFLS survey, we construct the housing variables that are the same in IFLS and the MFS II surveys. The variables used from the KR section of the MFS II surveys which are also the found in IFLS are: a. *kr01*, b. *kr02*, c. *kr04*, d. *kr07*, e. *kr10* and h. *kr13*. The corresponding variables in IFLS are: a. *kr03,* b. *kr13*, c. *kr16*, d. *kr20*, e. *kr11* and h. *kr24.* There are more variables which are the same between E6 and IFLS, however we wanted to construct a housing facilities asset variable which can be used by all MFS II surveys, thus the variables mentioned above are selected as they are common in most MFS II surveys. The first step is to recode the variables of MFS II surveys in order to have matching answer categories with the variables of IFLS; the same procedure is also followed for the IFLS variables. In addition, as the variable names are not the same among the two datasets, in the IFLS dataset we renamed the common variables as to have the same name with the MFS II variables. After, the aforementioned preparation the two datasets are combined into one dataset. Furthermore, dummy variables are created based on the answer categories of the chosen common variables. The reason behind the construction of the categorical dummy variables is to include them in the regression of the logarithm of the monthly per capita expenditure on the housing dummies. Nevertheless, not all of the categorical dummies are used in the regression model. The regression does not

include dummy variables whose variation is higher than 97% of the sample or lower than 3% of the sample. Moreover, after we performed the regression the next step was to calculate the fitted values by predicting the expenditure based on housing facilities for both the IFLS and MFS II sample. Finally, the last step was to rescale the predicted variable in order to have a zero mean for the IFLS sample by subtracting the mean of the fitted value from the fitted value itself.

Hence, we will be able to infer the livelihood of our survey participants compared to the Indonesian average in 2007: for example, if the value of the index is 0.10 (-0.10), on average, it implies that the sample is approximately 10% better off (worse off) than the average Indonesian household in 2007 based on the predictive power of housing facilities (like drinking water source) on household expenditure.

- Asset index: The construction of the asset index follows a similar procedure with the creation of the housing index, however in this case instead of the IFLS dataset the DHS 2012 dataset was used, as DHS includes more common asset variables with the MFS II surveys than the IFLS. Moreover, asset variables were chosen from the KR section of the MFS II surveys which are common with DHS variables. From MFS II dataset questions a. kr11 and b. kr12 were chosen while from the DHS dataset questions a. *hv207*, b. *hv208*, c. *hv209*, d. *hv243a*, e.*hv210*, f. *hv211*, g. *hv212*, h. *sh118c*, i. *hv243d* and j. *hv243c* were selected. The next step was to combine the two datasets and perform a factor analysis of the common variables in order to calculate the asset index. In addition, as mentioned above the 3% rule was also applied for the asset index, excluding from the factor analysis variables with small variation. Finally, the predicted asset index was normalized for the DHS sample (mean 0 and variance 1).

- Investment into business or farm equipment
  - Percentage of households invested in business: This indicator is based on the question whether a household expanded its family business, purchased new equipment or started a new business in the past 12 months. From this we created a dummy which is 1 if the answer to this question is 'Yes', and 0 if the answer is 'No'.
  - Percentage of households invested in new farming tools: This indicator is based on the question whether a household purchased new farming tools in the past 12 months. From this we again created a dummy which is 1 if the answer to this question is 'Yes', and 0 if the answer is 'No'.

- For self-reported well-being is measured by two scales on a) happiness and b) current wealth status. Respondents were asked the following:
  - Taken all things together how would you say things are these days? The question was answered on a 4-point Likert scale from 1 (very happy) to 4 (absolutely not happy).
  - Please imagine a six-step ladder where on the bottom (the first step), stand the poorest people, and on the highest step (the sixth step), stand the richest people. On which step are you today? Here, all 'don't know' answers are replaced with missing values.

These questions relate to the subjective judgement of the respondent. Therefore, we only report on the change in these indicators if the (main) respondent was the same during the baseline and the endline surveys.

### *Household income and livelihood (uniform indicator)*

For this index four measures are taken into account.

- Percentage of households not able to cover their living costs/ have not enough to eat: It was asked whether it happened to the household in the past 12 months that the income did not cover the living costs.
- Number of months households were not able to cover their living months/have not enough to ear.
- Current standard of living (daily needs covered): Possible answers were 1 (not enough to fulfil my daily needs), 2 (only enough to fulfil my daily needs), 3 (more than enough to fulfil my daily needs). Again, all that answered 'don't know' where replaced with a missing value.
- Current standard of living (food consumption covered): Possible answers were 1 (not enough to fulfil my daily needs), 2 (only enough to fulfil my daily needs), 3 (more than enough to fulfil my daily needs). Again, all that answered 'don't know' where replaced with a missing value.

All of these four indicators above, besides the second one on the number of months, relate again to the subjective judgement of the respondent. Hence, we only report on the change in these indicators if the (main) respondent was the same during the baseline and the endline surveys.

# Annex III. Summary Statistics

**Table 10: Summary Statistics Table**

| | Baseline | | Endline | | Change | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Sample size | Mean | Sample size | Mean | Sample size | Mean |
| Average size of household | 220 | 3.81 | 220 | 4.25 | 220 | 0.44 |
| Percentage female hh-head | 219 | 1.37 | 210 | 1.43 | 209 | 0.00 |
| Average age of hh-head | 219 | 48.75 | 210 | 49.92 | 209 | 1.67 |
| Highest level of education attended by the household head (%) | | | | | | |
| *No education* | 219 | 10.96 | 210 | 10.00 | 209 | -0.48 |
| *Primary education* | 219 | 55.25 | 210 | 56.19 | 209 | 0.96 |
| *Secondary education* | 219 | 28.77 | 210 | 29.05 | 209 | 0.00 |
| *Higher education* | 219 | 5.02 | 210 | 4.76 | 209 | -0.48 |
| Size of cultivated land (ha) | 219 | 8,687.68 | 201 | 9,433.46 | 200 | 284.68 |
| Subjective wealth status five years ago (scale 1-6) | 220 | 2.59 | 217 | 2.63 | 217 | 0.04 |
| Main source of income (%) | | | | | | |
| *Crop farming* | 220 | 88.18 | 220 | 82.27 | 220 | -5.91 |
| *Livestock* | 220 | 0.45 | 220 | 0.91 | 220 | 0.45 |
| *Non-farm business* | 220 | 5.91 | 220 | 5.00 | 220 | -0.91 |
| *Salary, wage* | 220 | 5.45 | 220 | 10.91 | 220 | 5.45 |
| *Transfer, remittances* | 0 | | 220 | 0.91 | 0 | |
| Percentage of households with membership in […] | | | | | | |
| *Farming group* | 220 | 95.00 | 220 | 71.82 | 220 | -23.18 |
| *Farming cooperative* | 220 | 3.64 | 220 | 5.45 | 220 | 1.82 |
| *Saving and credit group* | 220 | 8.64 | 220 | 9.55 | 220 | 0.91 |
| *Saving and credit cooperative* | 220 | 24.55 | 220 | 16.82 | 220 | -7.73 |
| % HHs participate in participatory plant breeding (self-reported) | 218 | 30.73 | 196 | 13.78 | 195 | -16.41 |
| Percentage of households that have heard about […] | | | | | | |
| *The field farmer school* | 220 | 62.27 | 200 | 66.50 | 200 | 3.50 |
| *FIELD* | 220 | 41.82 | 201 | 44.28 | 201 | 1.99 |
| *PEDIGREA* | 220 | 24.55 | 201 | 22.89 | 201 | -1.49 |
| *IPPHTI* | 220 | 39.55 | 201 | 44.78 | 201 | 4.48 |
| Percentage of household that participated in a meeting/training on […] in the past two years | | | | | | |
| Sustainable farming | 213 | 27.70 | 201 | 30.85 | 196 | 1.53 |
| Rice breeding | 218 | 25.69 | 201 | 18.41 | 200 | -7.50 |
| Vegetable breeding | 218 | 4.59 | 201 | 3.48 | 200 | -1.50 |
| Animal breeding | 219 | 2.74 | 201 | 1.99 | 200 | -1.00 |
| Marketing for crops | 219 | 1.37 | 201 | 1.99 | 200 | 0.50 |
| Financial management | 219 | 7.76 | 201 | 2.49 | 200 | -5.50 |

| | Baseline | | Endline | | Change | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Sample size | Mean | Sample size | Mean | Sample size | Mean |
| Financial management of credit cooperative | 219 | 13.24 | 201 | 5.97 | 200 | -7.50 |
| **A. Use of financial instruments** | | | | | | |
| % HHs know a place to borrow | 220 | 96.36 | 219 | 99.54 | 219 | 3.20 |
| % HHs involved in a financial institution | 220 | 44.09 | 220 | 48.64 | 220 | 4.55 |
| % HHs have savings in savings and credit group, cooperative or bank | 220 | 24.55 | 220 | 40.45 | 220 | 15.91 |
| % HHs have borrowed in the past 12 months | 220 | 28.64 | 219 | 33.79 | 219 | 5.02 |
| **B. Households using organic farming practices** | | | | | | |
| % HHs involved in farming | 220 | 100.00 | 201 | 97.01 | 201 | -2.99 |
| Percentage of households practicing organic farming | | | | | | |
| *Self-reported*[1] | 159 | 8.18 | 150 | 20.00 | 120 | 15.83 |
| *Based on responses to questions (not using any chemical inputs)* | 220 | 1.82 | 201 | 1.99 | 201 | 0.00 |
| Percentage of households using chemical inputs | | | | | | |
| *Chemical fertilizers* | 218 | 75.69 | 196 | 84.69 | 195 | 6.67 |
| *Chemical pesticides/insecticides* | 218 | 94.95 | 196 | 95.92 | 195 | 1.54 |
| Percentage of household using organic inputs | | | | | | |
| *Organic fertilizers* | 218 | 49.08 | 196 | 46.94 | 195 | -1.54 |
| *Organic pesticides/insecticides* | 218 | 15.60 | 196 | 17.86 | 195 | 1.54 |
| **C. Yield of rice per ha** | | | | | | |
| Yield of rice per ha in the past 12 months using median values (harvest/area) | 215 | 5.36 | 189 | 6.06 | 187 | 0.70 |
| **D. Selling price of rice** | | | | | | |
| Price of rice per kg (average of later than harvest and immediately at harvest) in Rupiah during the last harvest[2] | 176 | 4,212.39 | 124 | 3,859.98 | 102 | -351.95 |
| Price of rice per kg on average in Rupiah for sales during the past 12 months (self-reported) | 207 | 4,269.57 | 189 | 3,830.30 | 180 | -427.35 |
| **E. Volume of rice sold (t)** | 204 | 5.29 | 187 | 6.51 | 178 | 0.63 |
| **F. Household income and livelihood** | | | | | | |

| | Baseline | | Endline | | Change | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Sample size | Mean | Sample size | Mean | Sample size | Mean |
| Household revenue from sale of rice (1000 Rp) | 204 | 4,081.10 | 186 | 6,918.94 | 177 | 2,515.80 |
| Total income per month (1000 Rp) | 202 | 1,587.31 | 194 | 1,465.62 | 185 | -91.17 |
| Per capita total income per month (1000 Rp) | 202 | 498.42 | 194 | 425.06 | 185 | -73.50 |
| Per capita household non-food expenditure per month (1000 Rp) | 215 | 279.11 | 217 | 271.01 | 212 | -4.45 |
| Housing facilities index | 220 | 0.25 | 220 | 0.38 | 220 | 0.13 |
| Asset index | 220 | 0.44 | 220 | 0.45 | 220 | 0.01 |
| % HHs invested in business | 220 | 9.09 | 220 | 37.73 | 220 | 28.64 |
| % HHs invested in farming tools | 220 | 48.64 | 220 | 36.82 | 220 | -11.82 |
| Overall happiness (1-4) | 220 | 2.00 | 220 | 2.01 | 200 | 0.01 |
| Current subjective wealth status (1-6) | 220 | 2.80 | 219 | 2.87 | 199 | 0.08 |
| **J. Food security and vulnerability** | | | | | | |
| % HHs had income sometimes not cover living costs in the past 12 months | 220 | 31.82 | 219 | 52.05 | 199 | 20.60 |
| % HHs not able to satisfy their food consumption needs in the last 12 months | 220 | 12.27 | 219 | 13.70 | 199 | 2.51 |
| Nr. months HHs were not able to cover their living costs | 220 | 0.66 | 220 | 1.30 | 220 | 0.65 |
| Nr. months HHs did not have enough to eat | 220 | 0.25 | 220 | 0.41 | 220 | 0.15 |
| Current standard of living | | | | | | |
| *Daily needs covered (1-3)* | 220 | 1.99 | 220 | 1.93 | 200 | -0.06 |
| *Food consumption covered (1-3)* | 220 | 2.09 | 220 | 2.09 | 200 | 0.01 |
| **Other indicators** | | | | | | |
| Number of rice varieties planted per hh | 220 | 1.69 | 201 | 1.61 | 201 | -0.12 |
| Seeds purchased from […] (%) | | | | | | |
| *Shop* | 220 | 49.09 | 201 | 52.24 | 201 | 3.98 |
| *Market* | 220 | 1.36 | 201 | 3.48 | 201 | 1.99 |
| *Farmers group* | 220 | 6.36 | 201 | 2.49 | 201 | -3.98 |
| *Farmer/breeder* | 220 | 4.09 | 201 | 3.48 | 201 | 0.00 |
| Seeds received from […] (%) | | | | | | |

| | Baseline | | Endline | | Change | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Sample size | Mean | Sample size | Mean | Sample size | Mean |
| Shop | 220 | 0.45 | 201 | 0.50 | 201 | 0.00 |
| Government | 220 | 10.91 | 201 | 0.50 | 201 | -10.95 |
| Friend/relative | 220 | 5.91 | 201 | 3.48 | 201 | -2.49 |
| Own harvest | 220 | 34.55 | 201 | 63.18 | 201 | 26.87 |
| Farmers group | 220 | 4.09 | 201 | 3.48 | 201 | -0.50 |
| Farmer/breeder | 220 | 0.91 | 201 | 1.49 | 201 | 1.00 |
| Other | 220 | 0.45 | 201 | 0.00 | 201 | -0.50 |
| Reasons to participate in plant breeding | | | | | | |
| *Don't need to spend so much on fertilizers and other inputs* | 67 | 2.99 | 27 | 7.41 | 24 | 4.17 |
| *Use less poison* | 67 | 10.45 | 27 | 0.00 | 24 | -16.67 |
| *Conserve biodiversity* | 67 | 22.39 | 27 | 25.93 | 24 | 0.00 |
| *Adapt crop to land and climate conditions* | 67 | 10.45 | 27 | 11.11 | 24 | -8.33 |
| *Get better crop quality* | 67 | 41.79 | 27 | 29.63 | 24 | -8.33 |
| *Get better price for crop* | 67 | 25.37 | 27 | 7.41 | 24 | -25.00 |
| *Makes me feel proud* | 67 | 5.97 | 27 | 18.52 | 24 | 4.17 |
| *I can control my livelihood* | 67 | 0.00 | 27 | 0.00 | 24 | 0.00 |
| *Learn about the crops and environment* | 67 | 58.21 | 27 | 70.37 | 24 | 20.83 |
| *Other reason* | 67 | 29.85 | 27 | 18.52 | 24 | -29.17 |
| Percentage of households that can name […] to borrow money of they know such a place | | | | | | |
| *Banks* | 220 | 75.45 | 220 | 91.82 | 220 | 16.36 |
| *Cooperative* | 220 | 39.55 | 220 | 48.64 | 220 | 9.09 |
| *Employer* | 220 | 0.45 | 220 | 13.18 | 220 | 12.73 |
| *Farmer group* | 220 | 6.82 | 220 | 7.27 | 220 | 0.45 |
| *Money lender* | 220 | 1.82 | 220 | 9.55 | 220 | 7.73 |
| Type of place the household got a loan in the past 12 months | | | | | | |
| *Banks* | 19 | 100.00 | 28 | 100.00 | 6 | 0.00 |
| *Cooperative* | 63 | 38.10 | 74 | 28.38 | 38 | 2.63 |
| *Employer* | 0 | | 4 | 100.00 | 0 | |
| *Farmer group* | 63 | 17.46 | 74 | 9.46 | 38 | -10.53 |
| *Money lender* | 63 | 0.00 | 74 | 2.70 | 38 | 5.26 |
| Amount of the largest loan received in the past 12 months | 63 | 15,160.32 | 74 | 9,705.41 | 38 | 4,152.63 |
| Purpose of the loan | | | | | | |
| *Birth* | 63 | 1.59 | 74 | 0.00 | 38 | 0.00 |
| *Death* | 63 | 1.59 | 74 | 0.00 | 38 | 0.00 |
| *Medication* | 63 | 7.94 | 74 | 4.05 | 38 | 0.00 |
| *Education* | 63 | 7.94 | 74 | 9.46 | 38 | -2.63 |
| *To buy agricultural equipment* | 63 | 33.33 | 74 | 41.89 | 38 | 7.89 |
| *To buy/repair* | 63 | 3.17 | 74 | 4.05 | 38 | 0.00 |

| | Baseline | | Endline | | Change | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Sample size | Mean | Sample size | Mean | Sample size | Mean |
| *agricultural equipment* | | | | | | |
| *To buy materials for business* | 63 | 9.52 | 74 | 5.41 | 38 | 5.26 |
| *Capital for business* | 63 | 38.10 | 74 | 21.62 | 38 | -28.95 |
| *Daily expenses* | 63 | 17.46 | 74 | 32.43 | 38 | 15.79 |
| *Other* | 63 | 17.46 | 74 | 12.16 | 38 | -2.63 |
| Percentage of households using […] to keep soil fertile if the household cultivates rice | | | | | | |
| *Chemical fertilizer* | 218 | 75.69 | 196 | 84.69 | 195 | 6.67 |
| *Crop rotation* | 218 | 6.88 | 196 | 1.02 | 195 | -6.15 |
| *Manure/compost* | 218 | 40.37 | 196 | 33.16 | 195 | -6.15 |
| Percentage of households using […] to protect rice from insects and diseases | | | | | | |
| *Chemicals* | 218 | 94.50 | 196 | 95.41 | 195 | 1.54 |
| *Planting methods* | 218 | 7.80 | 196 | 5.10 | 195 | -2.56 |
| *Organic/herbal method* | 218 | 9.17 | 196 | 10.20 | 195 | 0.51 |
| Percentage of households practicing crop rotation | 218 | 32.57 | 196 | 25.00 | 195 | -7.18 |
| Percentage of households that select seed varieties to match environmental conditions of their plot (soil and weather) | 219 | 82.65 | 201 | 83.08 | 200 | 0.00 |
| Percentage of households that heard of organic farming | 219 | 72.60 | 197 | 76.14 | 197 | 2.03 |
| Percentage farmers growing rice | 220 | 98.64 | 195 | 97.95 | 195 | -1.54 |
| Number of harvests (rice) | 216 | 1.95 | 190 | 1.91 | 188 | -0.03 |
| Area harvested with rice in the past 12 months (ha) | 216 | 0.81 | 191 | 1.03 | 190 | 0.15 |
| Amount of harvested rice in the past 12 months (kg) | 216 | 8.80 | 189 | 12.82 | 187 | 2.98 |
| Yield of rice in the past 12 months (harvest/area) | 215 | 24.78 | 189 | 31.71 | 187 | 4.81 |
| Percentage of respondents who did sell rice to […] later on after harvest | | | | | | |
| *Trader* | 140 | 10.71 | 90 | 42.22 | 61 | 36.07 |
| *Wholesaler* | 140 | 89.29 | 90 | 57.78 | 61 | -37.70 |
| *Other source* | 140 | 0.71 | 90 | 3.33 | 61 | 1.64 |
| Price of rice per kg if sold immediately in Rupiah | 85 | 4,031.76 | 61 | 4,250.00 | 32 | 476.56 |
| Price of rice per kg if | 139 | 4,381.51 | 91 | 4,482.97 | 59 | 44.24 |

| | Baseline | | Endline | | Change | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Sample size | Mean | Sample size | Mean | Sample size | Mean |
| sold later in Rupiah | | | | | | |
| Livestock income (%) | 202 | 3.06 | 194 | 2.84 | 185 | -0.08 |
| Crop income (%) | 202 | 76.75 | 194 | 64.67 | 185 | -12.66 |
| Farm products income (%) | 202 | 1.06 | 194 | 0.69 | 185 | -0.03 |
| Non-farm business (%) | 202 | 8.98 | 194 | 8.51 | 185 | -0.55 |
| Transfer income (%) | 202 | 10.15 | 194 | 23.30 | 185 | 13.32 |
| Education expenditure (%) | 215 | 19.34 | 217 | 20.40 | 212 | 1.31 |
| Medical expenditure (%) | 215 | 13.84 | 217 | 15.88 | 212 | 1.96 |
| Durables expenditure | 215 | 21.77 | 217 | 19.81 | 212 | -2.42 |
| Ritual ceremonies, charity and gifts (%) | 215 | 29.87 | 217 | 24.15 | 212 | -5.74 |
| Other expenditure (%) | 215 | 15.18 | 217 | 19.76 | 212 | 4.89 |
| Percentage of hh that sold any rice | 220 | 95.00 | 195 | 97.44 | 195 | -0.51 |
| Percentage of hh that sold any other crops | 220 | 25.00 | 195 | 28.72 | 195 | 4.62 |
| Value of other crops sold (1000 Rp, own reported price) if other crops sold | 34 | 312.14 | 37 | 347.20 | 13 | 136.25 |
| Percentage of harvest sold of hh that sold any rice | 220 | 57.22 | 220 | 66.56 | 220 | 9.34 |
| Percentage of harvest sold of hh that sold any other crops | 34 | 85.60 | 37 | 97.98 | 13 | 6.10 |

Source: Household survey E4; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

1. Prices are reported in 2012 real prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%). Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/aboutus.php?inflasi=1

# Annex IV. Description of study locations

Table 11 summarises the surveyed villages. Descriptions of the villages are reported below.

**Table 11: Sampled villages**

| EA | Village name | Sub-district | Original Treatment Type | Final Treatment Types |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | KASMARAN | WIDASARI | Comparison | Comparison |
| 2 | TENAJAR KIDUL | KERTASEMAYA | Comparison | Comparison |
| 3 | RANCAHAN | GABUSWETAN | Comparison | Comparison |
| 6 | JENGKOK | KERTASEMAYA | Coop+Breed+Spill | Coop+Breed+Spill |
| 7 | TENAJAR | KERTASEMAYA | Coop+Breed+Spill | Coop+ Spill |
| 8 | WANGUK | ANJATAN | Coop+Breed+Spill | Coop+Breed+Spill |
| 9 | KALENSARI | WIDASARI | Coop+Breed+Spill | Coop+Breed+Spill |
| 10 | CANGKINGAN | KEDOKAN BUNDER | Breed | Spill |
| 11 | MULYASARI | BANGODUA | Breed | Breed |
| 12 | SEGERAN KIDUL | JUNTINYUAT | Breed | Comparison |
| 13 | CANGKINGAN, BLOK SEDONG | KEDOKAN BUNDER | Breed | Breed |

Breed = FIELD seed breeding activity in farming group, members sampled
Coop = FIELD credit cooperative members sampled
Spill = non-participant households sampled in FIELD treatment village

### *DESA KASMARAN*

In desa Kasmaran farmers plant and harvest paddy only twice a year. In between there are farmers planting other crops or they work in the building sector. In this village there are 3 farming groups: Srigaman 1, Srigaman 2, and Srigaman 3. These three farming groups are formed by the official and get assistance in the growing season. The membership is based on the width of the rice field owned by farmers. Also people from neighbouring villages have become a member of the farming group.

### *DESA TENAJAR KIDUL*

In Desa Tenajar Kidul the majority of the people are farmers and in this one year they only plant rice. Here there are 4 farming groups. The farming group meets 3 times in the growing season. There is a long dry season but farmers can still harvest twice a year, although the result of second season is less than before.

### *DESA RANCAHAN*

Desa Rancahan is divided into 4 blocks, and one of them is Plasa block. Plasa block has the most villagers. The majority of people are farmers, and there are two farming group i.e. Farming group of

Guru Tani and Farming group of Sri Ayu. In the village the distance of among respondent's houses is quite far.

### *DESA WANGUK*

In Desa Wanguk the majority of the people are farmers, but there are also teachers, people selling sembako or daily needs, people selling food vendors, toys, people providing labour at buildings etc. The road condition is not too bad, but not too good as well.

### *DESA KALENSARI*

In general, farmers in desa Kalensari plant and harvest paddy only twice a year due to a lack of water in the third season. In the third season some plant crops, some make bricks, and some other leave for working at other areas when providing labour for building. In desa Kalensari there are 3 (three) active farming groups i.e. 1) Ruwart Remaja 2) Tani kita satu, and 3) Tani kita dua. The first group is founded by the villagers assisted by IPPHTI, while the other two are found by the official of agriculture or by the government.

### *DESA CANGKINGAN BLOK PLAWAD*

In Desa Cangkringan the majority of the people are farmers, but besides they also have work when selling sembako, selling cooked food (vegetables, fried snack, nasi rames etc), working as teachers, having rice mill business, having paddy mill business, or make cakes. In the village the people's houses are close each other. The road to access the village is not very good.

### *DESA MULYASARI*

Again, the majority of the people are farmers, which plant and harvest paddy twice a year due to the lack of water in the third season. In the third season they plant crops. In the village there are two farming groups, 1.Karya bakti, and 2. Mulya bakti. Membership of both farming groups is based on the living place of the farmers.

### *DESA SEGERAN KIDUL*

In Desa Segaran Kidul, there is farming group "TANI MULYA" where farmers besides paddy also plant crops (pumpkin, chilli, cucumber, pare and watermelon). Farmers at Jati Gentong have high spirit to develop the agriculture by doing plant crossing to get an optimal result.

### *DESA CANGKINGAN, BLOK SEDONG*

Again, the majority of the people in this village are farmers. But there are also teachers, people selling sembako and people selling cooked food (nasi rames, fried snacks, vegetables, ketoprak etc). Although there are limited number of public transports and must wait for long time, the road condition is good.

# Annex V. Descriptive statistics

### Table 12: Size of saving and credit cooperatives

| | Base | End |
|---|---|---|
| Total members | 35.5 | 76.3 |
| Percentage of female members | 21.4 | 40.6 |

Source: Savings and credit cooperative survey E4; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia.

### Table 13: Total outstanding loans at saving and credit cooperatives

| | Base | End |
|---|---|---|
| Total outstanding loans at the savings and credit cooperatives (1000 Rp) | 24,000.0 (4.0) | 71,333.3 (3.0) |

Source: Savings and credit cooperative survey E4; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia.
Notes: Sample size is given in parentheses.

1. Prices are reported in 2012 real prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%). Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/aboutus.php?inflasi=1

### Table 14: Trainings in saving and cooperative groups

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EA | Name of savings and credit group | Financial management | | Financial management of credit cooperative | | Marketing of crops | | Sustainable farming practices | |
| | | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End |
| **06** | KOPERASI KREDIT UNION KARYA PEDULI TANI | 2011$^{AF}$<br>2012$^{AF}$ | 2014$^{BFO}$ | 2011$^{AF}$<br>2012$^{AF}$ | 2012$^{BFO}$<br>2013$^{BFO}$<br>2014$^{BFO}$ | | | | 2012$^{ABFO}$<br>2013$^{ABFO}$<br>2014$^{ABFO}$ |
| **07** | KOPERASI TUNAS BARTAJA | 2011$^{F}$ | | 2012$^{F}$ | | | | | |
| **08** | SUMBER ASIH | 2011$^{B}$<br>2012$^{B}$ | 2012$^{BC}$<br>2013$^{BC}$ | 2011$^{B}$<br>2012$^{B}$ | 2012 $^{BO}$<br>2013$^{BO}$ | 2011$^{BF}$<br>2012$^{BF}$ | | 2010$^{BF}$<br>2011$^{BF}$<br>2012$^{BF}$ | |
| **09** | KOPERASI KREDIT UNION RUWART REMAJA | 2010$^{F}$<br>2012$^{F}$ | | | | | | | |

Source: Savings and credit cooperative survey E4, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
For the names of villages see Table 11 in Annex IV.
Notes:
F. Reported to be organised by FIELD
A. Reported to be organised by the farming group
B. Reported to be organised by the cooperative.
O. Reported to be organised by OTHER than FIELD, farming group or cooperative.

**Table 15: Details of savings, loans and other activities of credit cooperatives**

| | Base | End |
|---|---|---|
| Number of saving and credit cooperatives that have […] | | |
| *Fixed periodic savings* | 4.0<br>(4.0) | 4.0<br>(4.0) |
| *Savings after sale of crops* | 1.0<br>(4.0) | 0.0<br>(4.0) |
| *Savings for specific purposes* | 2.0<br>(4.0) | 0.0<br>(4.0) |
| *Voluntary savings* | 4.0<br>(4.0) | 4.0<br>(4.0) |
| Mean fixed savings (Rp per month) | 31,250.0<br>(4.0) | 30,000.0<br>(4.0) |
| Number of SCCs where minimum savings requirement for borrowing | 2.0<br>(4.0) | 1.0<br>(3.0) |
| Mean maximum amount of loan (1000 Rp) | 2,500.0<br>(4.0) | 6,666.7<br>(3.0) |
| Mean interest rate over loans per month (%) | 1.4<br>(2.0) | 1.2<br>(4.0) |
| Number of SCCs where collateral is needed for borrowing | 2.0<br>(4.0) | 2.0<br>(4.0) |
| Other activities in the cooperative: […] | | |
| *Financial management trainings* | 4.0<br>(4.0) | 3.0<br>(4.0) |
| *Storage of crops activities* | 0.0<br>(4.0) | 0.0<br>(4.0) |
| *Buying of inputs to farming* | 1.0<br>(4.0) | 0.0<br>(4.0) |
| *Processing of crops* | 0.0<br>(4.0) | 0.0<br>(4.0) |
| *Joint marketing of crops* | 0.0<br>(4.0) | 0.0<br>(4.0) |
| *Social aid/services* | 0.0<br>(4.0) | 0.0<br>(4.0) |

Source: Savings and credit cooperative survey E4; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia.
Notes: Sample size is given between parentheses

1. Prices are reported in 2012 real prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%). Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/aboutus.php?inflasi=1

**Table 16: Size of farming groups**

| Assignment group | Comparison | | Treatment | | Spillover | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End |
| Number of farming groups (poktan) in the village? | 4.5 (4.0) | 3.8 (4.0) | 3.2 (5.0) | 5.0 (5.0) | 5.3 (6.0) | 7.8 (6.0) |
| Total number of members in the farming group | 43.5 (4.0) | 38.5 (4.0) | 59.8 (5.0) | 54.6 (5.0) | 65.4 (5.0) | 53.3 (6.0) |
| Percentage of female members | 13.1 (4.0) | 11.2 (4.0) | 25.7 (5.0) | 34.7 (5.0) | 3.3 (3.0) | 4.1 (6.0) |
| Percentage of farming group that provide […] | | | | | | |
| Storage for crops | 0.0 (4.0) | 0.0 (4.0) | 20.0 (5.0) | 20.0 (5.0) | 0.0 (6.0) | 33.3 (6.0) |
| Joint marketing of crops | 0.0 (4.0) | 0.0 (4.0) | 40.0 (5.0) | 0.0 (5.0) | 0.0 (6.0) | 0.0 (6.0) |
| Saving and credit group | 25.0 (4.0) | 50.0 (4.0) | 40.0 (5.0) | 40.0 (5.0) | 0.0 (6.0) | 16.7 (6.0) |
| Number of members participating in the saving and credit group | 32.0 (1.0) | 35.0 (2.0) | 36.0 (2.0) | 35.0 (2.0) | (0.0) | 50.0 (1.0) |

Source: Farming group survey E4; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia.
Notes: Sample size is given between parentheses

**Table 17: Seed breeding at the farming groups**

| Assignment group | Comparison | | Treatment | | Spillover | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Survey period | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End |
| Average number of members involved in seed breeding | 15 (1) | 7 (1) | 12 (4) | 13 (5) | 3 (4) | 3 (2) |
| Average number of members who have seed in F2 or above | 15 (1) | 7 (1) | 4 (4) | 3 (5) | 4 (3) | 3 (2) |
| Average number of members who have seed in F4 or above | 15 (1) | 7 (1) | 5 (4) | 3 (5) | 5 (2) | 3 (2) |
| Percentage of non-breeder farms that […] the variety to grow | | | | | | |
| *Are given* | 0 (1) | 0 (1) | 25 (4) | 20 (5) | 25 (4) | 0 (2) |
| *Can choose* | 100 (1) | 0 (1) | 75 (4) | 80 (5) | 75 (4) | 100 (2) |
| *Are both given and can choose* | (0) | 100 (1) | (0) | 0 (5) | (0) | 0 (2) |
| Average number of rice varieties that members in the group have bred (in F4 status or above) | 9 (1) | 10 (1) | 5 (4) | 8 (5) | 7 (2) | 8 (2) |
| Average number of rice varieties that farmers in the farming group grow | 9 (1) | 4 (1) | 4 (4) | 4 (5) | 7 (2) | 2 (2) |

Source: Farming group survey E4; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Sample size in parentheses.

**Table 18: Meetings at the farming groups**

| Assignment group | Comparison | | Treatment | | Spillover | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End |
| Average number of meetings of farming group in past 12 months Base/ 24 months | 3.8 | 8.8 | 25.2 | 34.8 | 5.5 | 11.8 |
| Number of farming group which discussed […] in the past 12 months | | | | | | |
| Good farming practices | 3 (4) | 0 (4) | 4 (5) | 3 (5) | 4 (6) | 2 (6) |
| Seed breeding | 2 (4) | 2 (4) | 4 (5) | 3 (5) | 1 (6) | 0 (6) |
| Financial management | 0 (4) | 0 (4) | 1 (5) | 0 (5) | 0 (6) | 1 (6) |
| Savings and loans | 0 (4) | 2 (4) | 2 (5) | 1 (5) | 0 (6) | 1 (6) |
| Processing | 0 (4) | 1 (4) | 1 (5) | 0 (5) | 1 (6) | 0 (6) |
| Marketing | 0 (4) | 0 (4) | 0 (5) | 0 (5) | 0 (6) | 1 (6) |
| Social gathering | 0 (4) | 2 (4) | 4 (5) | 3 (5) | 0 (6) | 3 (6) |
| Other topic | 4 (4) | 2 (2) | 2 (2) | 3 (3) | 6 (6) | 3 (3) |

Source: Farming group survey E4; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia.
Note: Sample size in parentheses.

**Table 19: Training in farming groups**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | | (4) | | (5) | | (6) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **EA** | Treatment type | Name of farming group | Sustainable farming practices | | Rice breeding | | Financial management | | Financial management of credit cooperative | |
| | | | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End |
| **01** | C | SRI GAMAN 2 | | | | | | | | |
| **02** | C | SRI AGUNG | 2011[B] | 2013[B] | | | | | | |
| **03** | C | GURU TANI | | | | | | | 2012[A] | |
| **06** | T | KARYA PEDULI TANI | 2010[AFI] 2011[AFI] 2012[AFI] | 2012[AFI] 2013[AFI] 2014[AFI] | 2010[A] 2011[A] 2012[A] | 2012[A] 2013[A] 2014[A] | | | | 2012[AB] 2013[AB] 2014[AB] |
| **06** | S | SRI MAJU 5 | | | | | | | 2011[F] | |
| **07** | S | KELOMPOK TANI TEKAD MAKMUR | | | | | | | | |
| **07** | S | BARON TANI JAYA | 2012[A] | | | | | | 2011[A] | 2014[AIB] |
| **08** | S | SUMBER BAHAGIA | 2010[B] 2011[B] | 2012[B] 2013[B] | | | | | | |
| **08** | T | KELOMPOK TANI SUMBER SRI ASIH | 2010[AF] 2012[AF] 2013[AF] | 2012[AF] 2013[AF] 2014[AF] | 2010[AF] 2011[AF] 2012[AF] | 2012[AF] 2013[AF] 2014[AF] | 2010[F] 2011[F] 2012[F] | 2013[A] | 2010[F] 2011[F] 2012[F] | 2013[FB] |
| **09** | S | TANI II | 2010[B] | 2012[B] | | | | | | |
| **09** | T | RUWART REMAJA | 2012[A] | 2014[A] | | | 2010[F] 2011[F] 2012[F] | | 2010[F] 2011[F] 2012[F] | |
| **10** | S | SRI MULYA | | | | | | | | |
| **11** | T | KARYA BAKTI | | | | | | | 2010[B] | |
| **12** | C | TANI MULYA | 2011[I] 2012[I] | 2013[I] 2014[I] | 2011[I] | 2013[I] | | 2013[I] | | |
| **13** | T | SRI MULYA ASRI | 2011[F] | 2013[F] | 2011[F] | 2013[F] | 2012[AF] | | | |

Source: E4 – Farming group survey, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes:
C = comparison farming group
S = spillover farming group
T = treatment farming group

For the names of villages see Table 11 in Annex IV.

A. reported to be organised by farming group/cooperative;
B. reported to be organised by other organisation (not FIELD/IPPHTI);
F. reported to be organised by FIELD/PEDIGREA
I. reported to be organised by IPPHTI;

**Table 20: General characteristics of the sample**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assignment group | Comparison | | | Treatment | | | Spillover | | |
| | Base | End | (P1v2) | Base | (P1v4) | End | (P4v6) | Base | (P1v8) | End | (P8v10) |
| Average size of household | 3.73 | 4.22 | 0.046 | 3.88 | 0.663 | 4.29 | 0.009 | 3.78 | 0.895 | 4.22 | 0.009 |
| Percentage female hh-head | 1.72 | 1.79 | | 1.06 | 0.728 | 1.09 | | 1.49 | 0.915 | 1.61 | |
| Average age of hh-head | 52.53 | 54.57 | 0.000 | 45.16 | 0.002 | 46.53 | 0.002 | 50.52 | 0.463 | 50.76 | 0.003 |
| Highest level of education attended by the household head (%) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *No education* | 17.24 | 12.50 | 0.320 | 9.57 | 0.309 | 4.35 | 0.142 | 7.46 | 0.156 | 16.13 | 0.026 |
| *Primary education* | 63.79 | 73.21 | 0.242 | 43.62 | 0.037 | 48.91 | 0.142 | 64.18 | 0.971 | 51.61 | 0.045 |
| *Secondary education* | 18.97 | 14.29 | 0.188 | 36.17 | 0.013 | 36.96 | 0.599 | 26.87 | 0.365 | 30.65 | 0.343 |
| *Higher education* | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 10.64 | 0.031 | 9.78 | 0.599 | 1.49 | 0.354 | 1.61 | |
| Size of cultivated land (ha) | 0.74 | 0.59 | 0.310 | 0.94 | 0.553 | 1.13 | 0.520 | 0.89 | 0.473 | 0.99 | 0.738 |
| Subjective wealth status five years ago (scale 1-6) | 2.78 | 2.34 | 0.176 | 2.54 | 0.143 | 2.80 | 0.056 | 2.49 | 0.101 | 2.65 | 0.475 |
| Main source of income (%) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Crop farming* | 89.83 | 89.83 | 1.000 | 87.23 | 0.703 | 77.66 | 0.088 | 88.06 | 0.731 | 82.09 | 0.532 |
| *Livestock* | 0.00 | 1.69 | 0.398 | 1.06 | 0.333 | 1.06 | | 0.00 | | 0.00 | |
| *Non-farm business* | 5.08 | 1.69 | 0.389 | 6.38 | 0.805 | 8.51 | 0.593 | 5.97 | 0.872 | 2.99 | 0.475 |
| *Salary, wage* | 5.08 | 5.08 | 1.000 | 5.32 | 0.964 | 12.77 | 0.111 | 5.97 | 0.820 | 13.43 | 0.243 |
| Percentage of households with membership in […] | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Farming group* | 100.00 | 62.71 | 0.011 | 88.30 | 0.034 | 80.85 | 0.323 | 100.00 | | 67.16 | 0.014 |
| *Farming cooperative* | 0.00 | 5.08 | 0.217 | 7.45 | 0.140 | 5.32 | 0.761 | 1.49 | 0.354 | 5.97 | 0.058 |
| *Saving and credit group* | 10.17 | 8.47 | 0.760 | 9.57 | 0.931 | 8.51 | 0.895 | 5.97 | 0.384 | 11.94 | 0.391 |
| *Saving and credit cooperative* | 1.69 | 0.00 | 0.389 | 50.00 | 0.008 | 36.17 | 0.422 | 8.96 | 0.307 | 4.48 | 0.620 |
| % households participate in participatory plant breeding (self-reported) | 16.95 | 7.41 | 0.396 | 51.61 | 0.113 | 24.39 | 0.030 | 13.64 | 0.852 | 5.00 | 0.094 |

Source: Household survey E4; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia.

Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

# Annex VI. Evaluation question 1 – tables

**Table 21: Outcome indicators at baseline and endline (including differences at baseline)**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assignment group | Comparison | | | Treatment | | | | Spillover | | | |
| | Base | End | (P1v2) | Base | (P1v4) | End | (P4v6) | Base | (P1v8) | End | (P8v10) |
| **A. Use of financial instruments** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| % HHs know a place to borrow | 98.31 (1.69) | 100.00 (0.00) | 0.389 | 98.94 (1.08) | 0.742 | 100.00 (0.00) | 0.374 | 91.04 (4.70) | 0.164 | 98.51 (1.43) | 0.173 |
| % HHs involved in a financial institution | 27.12 (7.05) | 33.90 (10.12) | 0.659 | 62.77 (9.79) | 0.012 | 60.64 (10.70) | 0.846 | 32.84 (7.19) | 0.562 | 44.78 (5.82) | 0.174 |
| % HHs have savings in savings and credit group, cooperative or bank | 1.69 (1.69) | 18.64 (8.30) | 0.135 | 50.00 (14.67) | 0.008 | 55.32 (12.35) | 0.687 | 8.96 (6.78) | 0.307 | 38.81 (3.08) | 0.022 |
| % HHs have borrowed in the past 12 months | 27.12 (9.99) | 32.20 (6.69) | 0.517 | 39.36 (9.38) | 0.366 | 38.71 (10.82) | 0.903 | 14.93 (4.21) | 0.260 | 28.36 (4.49) | 0.088 |
| **B. Households using organic farming practices** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of households involved in farming | 100.00 (0.00) | 96.36 (3.70) | 0.399 | 100.00 (0.00) | | 97.67 (1.53) | 0.188 | 100.00 (0.00) | | 96.67 (1.70) | 0.122 |
| Percentage of households practicing organic farming | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Self-reported*[1] | 7.50 (4.59) | 22.58 (11.84) | 0.160 | 9.09 (4.58) | 0.800 | 23.38 (3.85) | 0.026 | 7.14 (2.73) | 0.945 | 11.90 (4.04) | 0.617 |
| *Based on responses to questions (not using any chemical inputs)* | 1.69 (1.72) | 1.82 (1.85) | 1.000 | 3.19 (2.18) | 0.583 | 3.49 (2.38) | | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.317 | 0.00 (0.00) | |
| Percentage of households using chemical inputs | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Chemical fertilizers* | 91.53 (5.20) | 85.19 (7.50) | 0.644 | 67.74 (5.78) | 0.010 | 81.71 (3.68) | 0.230 | 72.73 (6.72) | 0.047 | 88.33 (3.12) | 0.095 |

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Assignment group** | **Comparison** | | | **Treatment** | | | | **Spillover** | | | |
| | **Base** | **End** | **(P1v2)** | **Base** | **(P1v4)** | **End** | **(P4v6)** | **Base** | **(P1v8)** | **End** | **(P8v10)** |
| *Chemical pesticides/insecticides* | 98.31 (1.72) | 94.44 (2.06) | 0.194 | 90.32 (4.49) | 0.118 | 93.90 (2.62) | 0.341 | 98.48 (1.44) | 0.934 | 100.00 (0.00) | 0.348 |
| Percentage of household using organic inputs | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Organic fertilizers* | 20.34 (9.02) | 38.89 (15.49) | 0.332 | 67.74 (4.72) | 0.001 | 60.98 (5.28) | 0.254 | 48.48 (10.52) | 0.063 | 35.00 (5.08) | 0.356 |
| *Organic pesticides/insecticides* | 6.78 (0.11) | 20.37 (8.63) | 0.224 | 27.96 (11.62) | 0.092 | 26.83 (9.04) | 0.762 | 6.06 (4.25) | 0.864 | 3.33 (1.70) | 0.709 |
| **C. Yield of rice per ha** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Yield of rice per ha in the past 12 months using median values (harvest/area) | 4.79 (0.00) | 6.41 (0.00) | | 5.57 (0.12) | 0.000 | 6.68 (0.65) | 0.086 | 5.60 (0.00) | | 6.04 (0.00) | |
| **D. Selling price of rice** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Price of rice per kg (average of later than harvest and immediately at harvest) in Rupiah during the last harvest[2] | 4,007.95 (200.40) | 3,741.17 (181.87) | 0.548 | 4,376.79 (89.87) | 0.103 | 3,824.03 (61.35) | 0.000 | 4,171.06 (165.26) | 0.521 | 4,024.77 (125.59) | 0.630 |
| Price of rice per kg on average in Rupiah for sales during the past 12 months (self-reported) | 4,193.86 (122.99) | 3,830.84 (141.96) | 0.012 | 4,348.86 (105.31) | 0.334 | 3,811.80 (66.23) | 0.001 | 4,226.61 (153.67) | 0.864 | 3,855.35 (123.22) | 0.049 |
| **E. Volume of rice sold (t)** | 2.59 (0.67) | 3.85 (1.39) | 0.224 | 7.04 (1.50) | 0.020 | 7.70 (1.94) | 0.719 | 5.24 (1.23) | 0.081 | 7.29 (1.92) | 0.313 |
| **F. Household income and livelihood** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Household revenue from sale of rice (1000 Rp) | 959.18 (252.06) | 1,349.57 (551.97) | 0.341 | 6,453.10 (3,031.17) | 0.094 | 6,660.66 (4,267.58) | 0.894 | 3,433.47 (2,028.63) | 0.239 | 12,348.68 (7,439.51) | 0.196 |

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Assignment group** | **Comparison** | | | **Treatment** | | | | **Spillover** | | | |
| | **Base** | **End** | **(P1v2)** | **Base** | **(P1v4)** | **End** | **(P4v6)** | **Base** | **(P1v8)** | **End** | **(P8v10)** |
| Total income per month (1000 Rp) | 988.42 (165.96) | 1,117.16 (173.29) | 0.415 | 1,764.37 (173.42) | 0.008 | 1,589.62 (286.74) | 0.447 | 1,896.62 (364.54) | 0.044 | 1,613.89 (386.56) | 0.426 |
| Total per capita income per month (1000 Rp) | 280.04 (40.44) | 309.57 (67.17) | 0.575 | 555.69 (72.70) | 0.007 | 438.31 (86.57) | 0.186 | 620.42 (194.05) | 0.109 | 511.32 (193.06) | 0.171 |
| Per capita household non-food expenditure per month (100 Rp) | 182.15 (21.99) | 119.63 (8.35) | 0.027 | 369.37 (104.29) | 0.102 | 340.15 (96.49) | 0.426 | 237.88 (52.75) | 0.334 | 309.49 (66.80) | 0.157 |
| Housing facilities index | 0.06 (0.10) | 0.35 (0.08) | 0.010 | 0.35 (0.05) | 0.014 | 0.39 (0.04) | 0.308 | 0.29 (0.04) | 0.042 | 0.39 (0.06) | 0.145 |
| Asset index | 0.22 (0.11) | 0.27 (0.08) | 0.315 | 0.57 (0.11) | 0.038 | 0.57 (0.04) | 0.985 | 0.46 (0.12) | 0.162 | 0.45 (0.10) | 0.850 |
| % HHs invested in business | 1.69 (1.69) | 30.51 (6.37) | 0.030 | 14.89 (4.01) | 0.011 | 38.30 (6.62) | 0.031 | 7.46 (4.07) | 0.204 | 43.28 (9.84) | 0.040 |
| % HHs invested in farming tools | 38.98 (4.40) | 27.12 (5.92) | 0.062 | 54.26 (8.48) | 0.129 | 42.55 (8.44) | 0.380 | 49.25 (10.14) | 0.355 | 37.31 (10.37) | 0.452 |
| Overall happiness (1-4) | 2.02 (0.03) | 2.14 (0.06) | 0.058 | 1.96 (0.03) | 0.175 | 1.94 (0.04) | 0.674 | 2.06 (0.06) | 0.515 | 2.01 (0.04) | 0.597 |
| Current subjective wealth status (1-6) | 2.90 (0.10) | 2.53 (0.12) | 0.116 | 2.82 (0.18) | 0.693 | 3.06 (0.12) | 0.038 | 2.69 (0.19) | 0.324 | 2.90 (0.12) | 0.445 |
| **J. Food security and vulnerability** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| % HHs had income sometimes not cover living costs in the past 12 months | 28.81 (5.27) | 60.34 (6.21) | 0.030 | 34.04 (7.82) | 0.574 | 51.06 (9.32) | 0.091 | 31.34 (7.18) | 0.771 | 46.27 (10.17) | 0.351 |
| % HHs not able to satisfy their food consumption needs in the last 12 months | 15.25 (7.34) | 20.69 (6.44) | 0.611 | 12.77 (8.25) | 0.817 | 9.57 (5.09) | 0.812 | 8.96 (7.07) | 0.528 | 13.43 (9.55) | 0.186 |

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Assignment group** | **Comparison** | | | **Treatment** | | | | **Spillover** | | | |
| | **Base** | **End** | **(P1v2)** | **Base** | **(P1v4)** | **End** | **(P4v6)** | **Base** | **(P1v8)** | **End** | **(P8v10)** |
| Nr. months HHs were not able to cover their living costs | 0.71 (0.19) | 1.71 (0.26) | 0.006 | 0.63 (0.18) | 0.741 | 0.98 (0.19) | 0.225 | 0.66 (0.16) | 0.820 | 1.40 (0.44) | 0.122 |
| Nr. months HHs did not have enough to eat | 0.36 (0.15) | 0.64 (0.13) | 0.265 | 0.26 (0.15) | 0.627 | 0.27 (0.14) | 0.964 | 0.16 (0.13) | 0.323 | 0.40 (0.22) | 0.072 |
| Current standard of living | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Daily needs covered (1-3)* | 1.81 (0.05) | 1.73 (0.07) | 0.867 | 2.13 (0.06) | 0.003 | 2.02 (0.13) | 0.455 | 1.96 (0.11) | 0.241 | 1.97 (0.09) | 0.735 |
| *Food consumption covered (1-3)* | 1.92 (0.06) | 1.97 (0.11) | 0.412 | 2.21 (0.09) | 0.020 | 2.16 (0.10) | 0.685 | 2.06 (0.11) | 0.259 | 2.09 (0.11) | 0.879 |

Source: Household survey E4; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia.

Notes: Standard errors given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

1. Sample size deviates: Base: n= 40, n= 77, n= 42; End: n= 31, n= 77, n= 42
2. Sample size deviates: Base: n= 50, n= 75, n= 51; End: n= 31, n= 58, n= 35
3. Prices are reported in 2012 real prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%). Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/aboutus.php?inflasi=1

# Annex VII. Evaluation question 2 – tables

**Table 22: Impact on seed breeders (regression results)**

| Column | (1) | (11) | (12) | (13) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Comparison | Farming group*Breeder | | |
| | Mean at baseline | Early treatment effect | DD without controls | DD with controls |
| **B. Households using organic farming practices** | | | | |
| Percentage of households using chemical inputs | | | | |
| *Chemical fertilizers* | 91.53 | -19.10<br>(15.07) | 37.44**<br>(16.99) | 36.00*<br>(19.18) |
| *Chemical pesticides/insecticides* | 98.31 | 9.14*<br>(4.46) | -14.57***<br>(5.04) | -15.26**<br>(6.02) |
| Percentage of household using organic inputs | | | | |
| *Organic fertilizers* | 20.34 | 5.90<br>(14.24) | 21.45<br>(18.62) | 27.58<br>(17.97) |
| *Organic pesticides/insecticides* | 6.78 | 4.49<br>(15.04) | 2.88<br>(13.58) | 5.94<br>(12.18) |
| **C. Yield of rice per ha** | | | | |
| Yield of rice per ha in the past 12 months using median values (harvest/area) | 4.79 | -0.06<br>(0.06) | -0.03<br>(0.19) | -0.10<br>(0.21) |
| **D. Selling price of rice** | | | | |
| Price of rice per kg (average of later than harvest and immediately at harvest) in Rupiah during the last harvest | 4,007.95 | 32.24<br>(131.60) | 120.00<br>(220.62) | 170.25<br>(241.64) |
| Price of rice per kg on average in Rupiah for sales during the past 12 months (self-reported) | 4,193.86 | -136.12<br>(106.57) | 107.72<br>(107.54) | 105.96<br>(122.89) |
| **E. Volume of rice sold (t)** | 2.59 | -1.36<br>(1.25) | 3.84*<br>(2.10) | 3.63<br>(2.14) |
| **F. Household income and livelihood** | | | | |
| Log of household revenue from sale of rice | 6.27 | -0.10<br>(0.28) | 0.04<br>(0.21) | 0.28<br>(0.25) |
| Household revenue from sale of rice | 959.18 | -249.14<br>(4,687.65) | -6,913.14<br>(8,750.74) | 4,643.11<br>(8,329.62) |

Source: Household survey E4; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are given in parentheses.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

1. Prices are reported in 2012 real prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%). Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/aboutus.php?inflasi=1

**(Table 22 continued)**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Comparison | Farming group | | | Cooperative | | | Spillover | | |
| | Mean at baseline | Early treatment effect | DD without controls | DD with controls | Early treatment effect | DD without controls | DD with controls | Early treatment effect | DD without controls | DD with controls |
| **B. Households using organic farming practices** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of households using chemical inputs | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Chemical fertilizers* | 91.53 | -7.56<br>(6.30) | -3.08<br>(10.00) | -5.28<br>(11.30) | -2.44<br>(5.73) | 7.02<br>(8.85) | 9.17<br>(8.85) | -9.31<br>(8.39) | 11.67<br>(9.72) | 14.04<br>(10.70) |
| *Chemical pesticides/ insecticides* | 98.31 | -3.32<br>(4.46) | 4.36<br>(4.83) | 1.24<br>(5.02) | 4.08<br>(4.32) | -1.23<br>(3.01) | -2.09<br>(3.38) | 4.14<br>(3.52) | 0.55<br>(4.01) | -3.45<br>(4.09) |
| Percentage of household using organic inputs | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Organic fertilizers* | 20.34 | 39.69***<br>(12.07) | -32.44**<br>(13.42) | -38.72**<br>(14.58) | 4.56<br>(8.80) | -13.85<br>(9.99) | -14.94<br>(11.36) | 18.21*<br>(10.40) | -29.33**<br>(13.56) | -35.21**<br>(16.60) |
| *Organic pesticides/ insecticides* | 6.78 | 25.85**<br>(10.56) | -16.11<br>(15.05) | -18.94<br>(14.53) | 1.93<br>(8.68) | 14.64*<br>(8.33) | 11.79<br>(6.98) | -3.50<br>(3.10) | -7.15<br>(7.38) | -6.70<br>(8.23) |
| **C. Yield of rice per ha** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Yield of rice per ha in the past 12 months using median values (harvest/area) | 4.79 | 0.62***<br>(0.12) | -0.30<br>(0.37) | -0.11<br>(0.36) | -0.21**<br>(0.10) | -0.84**<br>(0.38) | -0.82**<br>(0.35) | 0.61***<br>(0.10) | -0.93***<br>(0.23) | -0.79***<br>(0.21) |
| **D. Selling price of rice** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Price of rice per kg (average of later than harvest and immediately at harvest) in Rupiah during the last harvest | 4,007.95 | 80.10<br>(160.72) | -383.91**<br>(185.03) | -259.75<br>(200.72) | 130.26<br>(159.83) | -322.87<br>(254.98) | -330.24<br>(272.70) | 22.20<br>(183.05) | 20.37<br>(265.61) | 29.29<br>(243.42) |

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Comparison | Farming group | | | Cooperative | | | Spillover | | |
| | Mean at baseline | Early treatment effect | DD without controls | DD with controls | Early treatment effect | DD without controls | DD with controls | Early treatment effect | DD without controls | DD with controls |
| Price of rice per kg on average in Rupiah for sales during the past 12 months (self-reported) | 4,193.86 | -34.85<br>(112.22) | -79.79<br>(106.94) | -16.45<br>(117.40) | 131.20<br>(122.69) | -273.84***<br>(90.20) | -275.3***<br>(88.79) | 65.42<br>(101.75) | -56.34<br>(107.23) | 31.08<br>(106.89) |
| **E. Volume of rice sold (t)** | 2.59 | 4.35**<br>(1.84) | -4.19**<br>(1.59) | -3.80*<br>(1.86) | 2.99**<br>(1.42) | -0.96<br>(1.44) | -0.87<br>(1.42) | 2.01*<br>(1.04) | 1.46<br>(1.86) | 2.05<br>(2.12) |
| **F. Household income and livelihood** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Log of household revenue from sale of rice | 6.27 | 0.75**<br>(0.29) | -0.32<br>(0.29) | -0.53*<br>(0.29) | 0.45*<br>(0.25) | 0.12<br>(0.27) | 0.02<br>(0.31) | 0.68**<br>(0.30) | 0.18<br>(0.40) | 0.09<br>(0.44) |
| Household revenue from sale of rice | 959.18 | 7,871.40<br>(5,208.44) | 1,713.31<br>(11,277.38) | -9,097.12<br>(5,893.83) | 4,473.30<br>(3,326.76) | 1,503.90<br>(7,343.90) | -7,396.18*<br>(4,099.61) | 4,104.37<br>(2,804.52) | 12,589.29<br>(7,780.32) | 3,445.68<br>(4,431.55) |

Source: Household survey E4; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are given in parentheses. * p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

1. Prices are reported in 2012 real prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%). Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/aboutus.php?inflasi=1

# Annex VIII. Additional explanatory tables

### Table 23: Details of place to borrow money and household loans

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assignment group | Comparison | | | Treatment (T1+T2) | | | Spillover (T2S) | | |
| | Base | End | (P1v2) | Base | End | (P4v5) | Base | End | (P7v8) |
| Household can name […] to borrow money if they know such a place (%) | | | | | | | | | |
| *Banks* | 88.14 | 83.05 | 0.389 | 70.21 | 96.81 | 0.075 | 71.64 | 92.54 | 0.003 |
| *Cooperative* | 30.51 | 44.07 | 0.497 | 57.45 | 55.32 | 0.844 | 22.39 | 43.28 | 0.275 |
| *Employer* | 0.00 | 10.17 | 0.210 | 1.06 | 18.09 | 0.112 | 0.00 | 8.96 | 0.113 |
| *Farmer group* | 10.17 | 10.17 | 1.000 | 3.19 | 6.38 | 0.543 | 8.96 | 5.97 | 0.708 |
| *Money lender* | 1.69 | 1.69 | | 1.06 | 13.83 | 0.030 | 2.99 | 10.45 | 0.288 |
| % HHs have borrowed in the past 12 months | 27.12 | 32.20 | 0.517 | 39.36 | 38.71 | 0.903 | 14.93 | 28.36 | 0.088 |
| Type of place where the household got a loan in the past 12 months[1] | | | | | | | | | |
| *Banks* | 31.25 | 36.84 | 0.538 | 27.03 | 38.89 | 0.726 | 40.00 | 36.84 | 1.000 |
| *Cooperative* | 6.25 | 5.26 | | 56.76 | 52.78 | 0.497 | 20.00 | 5.26 | 0.296 |
| *Employer* | 0.00 | 5.26 | | 0.00 | 5.56 | 0.413 | 0.00 | 5.26 | |
| *Farmer groups* | 31.25 | 31.58 | 0.824 | 10.81 | 0.00 | 0.170 | 20.00 | 5.26 | 0.397 |
| *Money lender* | 0.00 | 5.26 | 0.188 | 0.00 | 2.78 | 0.431 | 0.00 | 0.00 | |
| Size largest loan in past 12 months (1000 Rp)[1] | 4,356.25 | 2,836.84 | 0.254 | 8,551.35 | 13,955.56 | 0.397 | 56,900.00 | 8,521.05 | 0.172 |
| Purpose of loan largest loan […][1] | | | | | | | | | |
| *Birth* | 6.25 | 0.00 | | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 0.00 | 0.00 | |
| *Death* | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 2.70 | 0.00 | | 0.00 | 0.00 | |
| *Medication* | 6.25 | 0.00 | | 10.81 | 5.56 | | 0.00 | 5.26 | |
| *Education* | 0.00 | 5.26 | | 10.81 | 13.89 | 1.000 | 10.00 | 5.26 | 0.296 |
| *To buy agricultural equipment* | 31.25 | 52.63 | 0.511 | 35.14 | 41.67 | 0.803 | 30.00 | 31.58 | |
| *To buy/repair agricultural equipment* | 0.00 | 5.26 | 0.188 | 5.41 | 2.78 | 0.206 | 0.00 | 5.26 | |
| *To buy materials for business* | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 13.51 | 11.11 | 0.206 | 10.00 | 0.00 | 0.296 |
| *Capital for business* | 31.25 | 21.05 | 0.687 | 37.84 | 11.11 | 0.009 | 50.00 | 42.11 | |
| *Daily expenses* | 37.50 | 31.58 | 1.000 | 13.51 | 33.33 | 0.246 | 0.00 | 31.58 | 0.225 |
| *Other* | 18.75 | 0.00 | 0.424 | 13.51 | 16.67 | 0.737 | 30.00 | 15.79 | 1.000 |

Source: Household survey E4; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia.
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

1. Sample size deviates: Base: n= 16, n= 37, n= 10; End: n= 19, n= 36, n= 19
2. Prices are reported in 2012 real prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%). Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/aboutus.php?inflasi=1

**Table 24: Details of source of seeds and seed breeding**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Assignment group** | **Comparison** | | | **Treatment** | | | **Spillover** | | |
| | **Base** | **End** | **(P1v2)** | **Base** | **End** | **(P4v5)** | **Base** | **End** | **(P7v8)** |
| Nr. of rice varieties planted per hh | 1.63 | 1.38 | 0.136 | 1.83 | 1.88 | 0.877 | 1.55 | 1.43 | 0.067 |
| Seeds purchased from […] (%) | | | | | | | | | |
| *Shop* | 52.54 | 67.27 | 0.232 | 39.36 | 39.53 | 0.910 | 59.70 | 56.67 | 0.626 |
| *Market* | 3.39 | 0.00 | 0.176 | 0.00 | 4.65 | 0.210 | 1.49 | 5.00 | 0.401 |
| *Farmers group* | 3.39 | 7.27 | 0.435 | 7.45 | 1.16 | 0.036 | 7.46 | 0.00 | 0.100 |
| *Farmer/breeder* | 1.69 | 1.82 | 1.000 | 4.26 | 4.65 | 0.598 | 5.97 | 3.33 | 0.698 |
| Seeds received from […] (%) | | | | | | | | | |
| *Shop* | 1.69 | 1.82 | 1.000 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 0.00 | 0.00 | |
| *Government* | 11.86 | 0.00 | 0.149 | 14.89 | 1.16 | 0.158 | 4.48 | 0.00 | 0.207 |
| *Friend/relative* | 16.95 | 3.64 | 0.220 | 2.13 | 4.65 | 0.485 | 1.49 | 1.67 | 1.000 |
| *Own harvest* | 40.68 | 47.27 | 0.805 | 34.04 | 73.26 | 0.055 | 29.85 | 63.33 | 0.075 |
| *Farmers group* | 3.39 | 1.82 | 0.635 | 4.26 | 0.00 | 0.118 | 4.48 | 10.00 | 0.122 |
| *Farmer/breeder* | 0.00 | 1.82 | 0.389 | 1.06 | 2.33 | 0.130 | 1.49 | 0.00 | 0.348 |
| *Other* | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 1.49 | 0.00 | 0.348 |
| % HHs participate in participatory plant breeding | 16.95 | 7.41 | 0.396 | 51.61 | 24.39 | 0.030 | 13.64 | 5.00 | 0.094 |
| Reason to participate in plant breeding […] (%)[1,2] | | | | | | | | | |
| *Don't need to spend so much on fertilizers and other inputs* | 10.00 | 0.00 | | 2.08 | 10.00 | 0.016 | 0.00 | 0.00 | |
| *Use less poison* | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 10.42 | 0.00 | 0.271 | 22.22 | 0.00 | |
| *Conserve biodiversity* | 10.00 | 50.00 | | 20.83 | 15.00 | 0.523 | 44.44 | 66.67 | 1.000 |
| *Adapt crop to land and climate conditions* | 20.00 | 25.00 | | 10.42 | 10.00 | 0.038 | 0.00 | 0.00 | |
| *Get better crop quality* | 90.00 | 25.00 | | 35.42 | 30.00 | 1.000 | 22.22 | 33.33 | 0.374 |
| *Get better price for crop* | 30.00 | 25.00 | | 20.83 | 5.00 | 0.289 | 44.44 | 0.00 | 0.374 |
| *Makes me feel proud* | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 6.25 | 20.00 | 1.000 | 11.11 | 33.33 | 0.374 |
| *I can control my livelihood* | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 0.00 | 0.00 | |
| *Learn about the crops and environment* | 40.00 | 100.00 | | 64.58 | 65.00 | 0.501 | 44.44 | 66.67 | 0.590 |
| *Other reason* | 20.00 | 25.00 | | 31.25 | 20.00 | 0.265 | 33.33 | 0.00 | 0.205 |

Source: Household survey E4; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.
1. Some p-values are missing due to small sample size of clusters.
2. Sample size deviates: Base: n= 10, n= 48, n= 9; End: n= 4, n= 20, n= 3

**Table 25: Organic farming practices at farming groups**

| Assignment group | Comparison | | Treatment | | Spillover | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Survey period | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End |
| Sample size | n=1 | n=2 | n=4 | n=4 | n=2 | n=3 |
| Number of farming groups which encouraged […] in the trainings | | | | | | |
| *Organic farming* | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| *Compost making* | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| *Fitting seed varieties to soil conditions* | 0 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 2 |
| *Rain fed cultivation* | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| *Intercropping* | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| *Using special plants against pets* | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| *Other practices* | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 |

Source: Farming group survey E4; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

**Table 26: Yield of rice per ha**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assignment group | Comparison | | | Treatment | | | Spillover | | |
| | Base | End | (P1v2) | Base | End | (P4v5) | Base | End | (P7v8) |
| Percentage farmers growing rice | 100.00 | 98.11 | 0.384 | 98.94 | 96.43 | 0.371 | 97.01 | 100.00 | |
| Number of harvests (rice) | 1.83 | 1.77 | 0.378 | 2.00 | 1.95 | 0.641 | 2.00 | 1.98 | 0.388 |
| Area harvested with rice in the past 12 months (ha) | 0.63 | 0.51 | 0.173 | 0.94 | 1.35 | 0.338 | 0.81 | 1.06 | 0.274 |
| Amount of harvested rice in the past 12 months (kg) | 5.48 | 3.95 | 0.524 | 10.02 | 12.97 | 0.875 | 10.09 | 20.57 | 0.299 |
| Yield of rice in the past 12 months using median values (harvest/area) | 4.79 | 6.41 | | 5.57 | 6.68 | | 5.60 | 6.04 | |

Source: Household survey E4; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia.
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

**Table 27: Collective and individual marketing of rice (baseline)**

| Assignment group | Comparison | Treatment | Spillover |
|---|---|---|---|
| % HHs sold rice via […] | | | |
| *Individual* | 33.90 | 22.58 | 32.31 |
| *Group* | 33.90 | 59.14 | 50.77 |
| *Both* | 32.20 | 18.28 | 16.92 |
| Source: Household survey E4; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | | |

**Table 28: Collective and individual marketing of rice (endline)**

| Assignment group | Comparison | Treatment | Spillover |
|---|---|---|---|
| % HHs collectively sold rice immediately/later after harvest (last harvest period)[1] | 0.00 | 1.23 | 0.00 |
| Average price for selling […] (immediately or later after harvest during last harvest period) | | | |
| *Collectively*[2] | | 4,700.00 | |
| *Individually*[3] | 4,230.65 | 4,322.41 | 4,552.86 |
| Source: Household survey E4; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia. | | | |

1. Sample size deviates: n= 52, n= 81, n= 58
2. Sample size deviates: n= 1
3. Sample size: n= 32, n= 59, n= 35
4. Prices are reported in 2012 real prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%). Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/aboutus.php?inflasi=1

**Table 29: Marketing of rice**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assignment group | Comparison | | | Treatment | | | Spillover | | |
| | Base | End | (P1v2) | Base | End | (P4v5) | Base | End | (P7v8) |
| Percentage of respondents who did sell rice to […] later on after harvest[1] | | | | | | | | | |
| *Trader* | 36.11 | 61.90 | 0.49 | 3.39 | 26.83 | 0.33 | 0.00 | 50.00 | 0.01 |
| *Wholesaler* | 63.89 | 38.10 | 0.49 | 96.61 | 73.17 | 0.33 | 100.00 | 50.00 | 0.02 |
| *Other source* | 2.78 | 0.00 | 0.27 | 0.00 | 2.44 | | 0.00 | 7.14 | 0.16 |
| Price of rice per kg if sold immediately in Rupiah | 3,862.90 | 4,062.50 | 0.04 | 4,212.86 | 4,230.36 | 0.01 | 3,973.68 | 4,458.82 | 0.26 |
| Price of rice per kg if sold later in Rupiah | 4,287.84 | 4,405.00 | 0.34 | 4,516.03 | 4,406.82 | 0.02 | 4,282.95 | 4,664.81 | 0.59 |

Source: Household survey E4; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia.

Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

1. Sample size: Base: n= 36, n= 59, n= 45; End: n= 21, n= 41, n= 28
2. Prices are reported in 2012 real prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%). Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/aboutus.php?inflasi=1

**Table 30: Share of harvest sold**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Assignment group** | **Comparison** | | | **Treatment** | | | **Spillover** | | |
| | **Base** | **End** | **(P1v2)** | **Base** | **End** | **(P4v5)** | **Base** | **End** | **(P7v8)** |
| Percentage of households that sold any […] | | | | | | | | | |
| *Rice* | 93.22 | 98.11 | 1.000 | 94.68 | 94.05 | 0.614 | 95.52 | 100.00 | 0.352 |
| *Other crops* | 23.73 | 33.96 | 0.659 | 14.89 | 17.86 | 0.746 | 13.43 | 12.07 | 0.781 |
| Household revenue from sale of rice (1000 Rp) | 959.18 | 1,525.56 | 0.268 | 6,453.10 | 7,529.23 | 0.993 | 3,433.47 | 13,958.98 | 0.192 |
| Value of other crops sold (1000 Rp) | 311.74 | 343.75 | 0.232 | 290.77 | 356.77 | 0.588 | 347.50 | 337.82 | |
| Percentage of harvest sold of households that sold any […] | | | | | | | | | |
| *Rice* | 51.35 | 60.36 | 0.261 | 59.13 | 70.21 | 0.018 | 59.73 | 66.92 | 0.425 |
| *Other crops* | 91.60 | 100.00 | 0.242 | 76.95 | 95.02 | 0.018 | 89.89 | 98.57 | |

Source: Household survey E4; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia.

Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

1. Prices are reported in 2012 real prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%). Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/aboutus.php?inflasi=1

**Table 31: Components of household income and livelihood**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assignment group | Comparison | | | Treatment | | | Spillover | | |
| | Base | End | (P1v2) | Base | End | (P4v5) | Base | End | (P7v8) |
| Total income per month (1000 Rp) | 988.42 | 1,262.84 | 0.092 | 1,764.37 | 1,796.91 | 0.888 | 1,896.62 | 1,824.35 | 0.999 |
| […] income (%) | | | | | | | | | |
| *Livestock* | 1.74 | 3.07 | 0.648 | 3.87 | 2.89 | 0.686 | 3.20 | 2.55 | 0.930 |
| *Crop* | 75.60 | 64.51 | 0.060 | 75.99 | 62.47 | 0.047 | 78.74 | 67.74 | 0.103 |
| *Farm products* | 0.61 | 0.35 | 0.686 | 1.23 | 1.32 | 0.952 | 1.23 | 0.15 | 0.652 |
| *Non-farm business* | 11.31 | 6.99 | 0.128 | 8.33 | 10.96 | 0.171 | 7.73 | 6.61 | 0.321 |
| *Transfer* | 10.74 | 25.09 | 0.002 | 10.59 | 22.36 | 0.032 | 9.09 | 22.94 | 0.024 |
| Per capita household expenditure per month (1000 Rp) | 182.15 | 135.23 | 0.093 | 369.37 | 384.51 | 0.453 | 237.88 | 349.85 | 0.075 |
| […] expenditure (%) | | | | | | | | | |
| *Education* | 19.46 | 24.49 | 0.063 | 20.37 | 20.65 | 0.860 | 17.78 | 16.33 | 0.690 |
| *Medical* | 13.48 | 11.97 | 0.462 | 14.11 | 17.59 | 0.096 | 13.78 | 16.98 | 0.205 |
| *Durables* | 21.49 | 19.74 | 0.358 | 21.63 | 18.49 | 0.145 | 22.21 | 21.77 | 0.954 |
| *Ritual ceremonies, charity and gifts* | 36.68 | 26.10 | 0.004 | 26.03 | 23.54 | 0.064 | 29.24 | 23.25 | 0.124 |
| *Other* | 8.89 | 17.70 | 0.002 | 17.86 | 19.73 | 0.455 | 17.00 | 21.67 | 0.435 |

Source: Household survey E4; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia.

Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.

1. Prices are reported in 2012 real prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%). Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/aboutus.php?inflasi=1

# Endline Report on the Achievement of MDGs and Themes:

# Evaluation of the GREEN project

## MFS II Joint Evaluations

## Indonesia

**Sub-report:**
**E5. Implementation of Garment for Economic Empowerment (GREEN), SwissContact**

## FINAL REPORT

**9 April 2015**


**Amsterdam Institute for International Development (AIID)**
Trinity building C, 3rd floor, Rm XT-3.17
Pietersbergweg 17
1105 BM Amsterdam
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)20 5661596
F +31 (0)20 5665997
www.aiid.org

**SurveyMeter**
Jl. Jenengan Raya No.109
Maguwoharjo, Depok, Sleman,
Yogyakarta 55282
Indonesia
T +62 (0) 274 4477464
F +62 (0) 274 4477004
www.surveymeter.org

# List of contributors

**AIID**
Menno Pradhan (Principal Investigator)
Melinda Vigh (Research Coordinator)
Marije Groot Bruinderink (Project Manager)
Iris van Rossum (Junior Researcher)
Stavros Malamas (Junior Researcher)
Emilie Berkhout (Research Assistant)

**Survey Meter**
Ni Wayan Suriasatini (Research Coordinator)
Mardiana Br Ginting (Project Manager)
Muhammad Mulia (Qualitative Researcher)
Kamti Ningsih (Qualitative Researcher and Field Coordinator)
Setyo Pujiastuti (Qualitative Researcher)
Bondan Sikoki (Survey Expert)

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# List of Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| ASPPUK | Women's Association of Small Enterprises (*Asosiasi Pendamping Perempuan Usaha Kecil*) |
| BDS | Business Development Service |
| BI | Bank of Indonesia |
| CFA | Co-financing Agency |
| CSR | Corporate Social Responsibility |
| DKI | Daerah Khusus Ibukota (Province of Indonesia) |
| FGD | Focus Group Discussion |
| GREEN | Garment for Economic Empowerment |
| ILO | International Labour Organisation |
| ITB | Bandung Institute of Technology |
| JARPUK | Small Business Women's Network |
| KWPS | Resource Development Women Group |
| LKP | Financial Institution for Women (*Lembaga Keuangan Perempuan*) |
| MDG | Millennium Development Goal |
| MFS II | Medefinancieringsstelsel (Co-financing System Grant Policy Framework) |
| MSME | Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises |
| MPUK | Small Enterprises Women Partners (ASPPUK Business Unit) |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| PO | Purchase Order |
| PPSW | Association of Women Resource Development Centre |
| SCTV | Surya Citra Television (Television station) |
| SME (UKM) | Small and Medium Enterprises (*Usaha Kecil dan Mikro*) |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |
| TA | Technical Assistance |
| YKP | Yayasan Krida Paramita |

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Project context

Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME)[1] play an important role in Indonesia's economy. MSMEs represent the largest part of the Indonesian business community, and contributed 55.6% to the total national GDP in 2011.[2] Therefore, small businesses provide large number of employment opportunities: absorbed almost 90% from the total employment in the Indonesia's industry in 2008.

Despite their importance, MSMEs still face obstacles in terms of legality, human resources, low productivity, and in particular access to capital.[3] Therefore, one of the main cluster strategies in alleviating poverty in Indonesia is the empowerment of micro and small enterprises (MSE) with the goal to increase the saving and to maintain sustainability of micro and small businesses, for example through the micro finance programme *Kredit Usaha Rakyat* (KUR) and other technical assistance programmes.[4]

Especially the provinces of Central Java and Jakarta have large numbers of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) focusing on garment products. As a labour intensive industry, the sector employed about 3.5 million people directly and indirectly based on data from 2004. The textile and garment apparel industry is expected to remain a major contributor to Indonesia's economy. One of the leading reasons is that Indonesia still has a comparative advantage for labour-intensive industries and the sizable domestic market, given the nation is home to 240 million people.

In addition, Indonesia is still regarded as a high quality producer of basics and high-end fashion, and the Ministry of Trade, National Agency for Export Development (NAFED) included textile as one of ten sectors where Indonesia has comparative advantages, and handicraft was recommended as one of the ten sectors with high growth potential during the 2001-2009 period. Therefore, Indonesian textile and garment industry has become one of the most significant sectors that directly contribute to economic growth. Textile, together with leather goods, contributed up to 14.6% Indonesia export in 2008. Growth in exports of Textiles and Clothing Indonesia sky rocketed in 2010 to reach 21.2% or U.S. $ 11.32 billion.

Despite the economic growth, 31 million people or 13.3% of the population in Indonesia still lived under the poverty line in 2010.[5] The poverty rate in central Java was above national average at 16.6%. Meanwhile, in Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia, the poverty rate was 3.4%.

Hence, addressing the challenges faced by SMEs could help improving the economic conditions of poor female micro-entrepreneurs. Taking the opportunity to achieve this objective, HIVOS and SwissContact

[1] The Government of Indonesia defines the following characteristics for MSMEs: Micro industries have net assets up to 50 million Indonesian rupiahs (IDR) or have annual revenue from sales up to 300 million IDR; Small Industries have net assets between 50-500 million IDR or have annual revenues from sales between 300-2,500 million IDR; and Medium industries have net assets between 0.5-10 billion IDR or have annual revenue from sales between 2.5-50 billion IDR. Source: https://crawford.anu.edu.au/acde/ip/pdf/lpem/2012/20120507-SMERU-Dan-Thomson-Bellefleur.pdf

[2] Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/tab_sub/view.php?kat=2&tabel=1&daftar=1&id_subyek=13&notab=45

[3] Source: Suwargo and Rustam, 2011

[4] Other strategies are social aid and protection with the goal to reduce the expenditure burden of poor families, and people's empowerment with the goal to improve income and prosperity of poor people.

[5] Source: http://www.bps.go.id/tab_sub/view.php?kat=1&tabel=1&daftar=1&id_subyek=23&notab=1

Indonesia launched the project Garment for Economic Empowerment (GREEN) with the aim to reduce poverty by increasing income of women through people's empowerment, and improving the competitiveness of micro-small enterprises. The project was implemented in the provinces of Jakarta and Central Java[6] through workshops on a joint vision on purchasing, production and marketing. The project identified and addressed a key challenge of micro and small entrepreneurs in Indonesia: namely the low quality and outdated product designs coupled with insufficient access to input, output and financial markets.

## 1.2. Evaluation objectives

This report evaluates the GREEN project of Hivos with SwissContact Indonesia[7] as part of as part of the *Medefinancieringsstelsel* (MFS) II evaluation for Indonesia under the Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDG) component. The project has been selected under the goals on poverty alleviation (MDG 1). In particular, the current evaluation focuses on the following research questions: How did the skills of female entrepreneurs in the garment sector change? Are the small-scale enterprises better linked to the market? Do small-scale enterprises have better access to financial services? How did the capacity of ASSPUK and PPSW as business development service providers change?

We investigate whether the project had a favourable effect on the above mentioned outcomes for the project beneficiaries. To measure the project's effects, we intended to use difference-in-difference methodology: comparing the changes in the outcome variables between the baseline and endline periods for the project beneficiaries to the changes in outcomes for a comparison group. Hence, at the baseline period structured interviews have been conducted with a total of 50 possible project beneficiaries and 50 respondents for the comparison group, and the same respondents have been re-interviewed at the endline. However, before the endline survey we learned that only 1 respondent in our sample has benefitted from the project intervention. Therefore, we interviewed 5 additional beneficiaries who did not take part in the baseline survey.[8] As a consequence, the impact on the beneficiaries is assessed using cross-sectional data from the endline. Nonetheless, we report on the changes in outcome variables for the potential beneficiary group.

In addition to the surveys, focus group discussions were conducted with project beneficiaries and in-depth interviews with project stakeholders to deepen our understanding of the project implementation and the project results. The results of this qualitative study are presented in Annex VI. Information about project costs was obtained from SwissContact Indonesia.

As specified in the Terms of Reference for this evaluation, the report addresses five evaluation questions to assess the project outcomes:

1) Change: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period?

[6] More specificly, the project focuses on 4 regencies: sub-district Tambora of West Jakarta Regency, Sukoharjo and Surakarta Regency and the sub-district of Pringapus of Semarang Regency.
[7] The project is described in more detail in section 3.

2) Attribution: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3) Relevance of change: What is the relevance of these changes?
4) Efficiency: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient?
5) Explanations: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

## 1.3. Summary of findings

On the one hand, the project is aimed at building the capacity of two associations for female entrepreneurs (PPSW and ASPPUK) in providing business development services to their members. These organisations are the primary beneficiaries of the project. On the other hand, the project uses case studies of linking entrepreneurs to markets and enhancing their skillset using groups of beneficiary craftswomen, whom we refer to as final beneficiaries. The evaluation focuses on the project's impact on the final beneficiaries (training participants). The evaluation of the GREEN project's effectiveness in capacity building of the primary beneficiaries (organisations) is beyond the scope of this evaluation.

In the qualitative study of the evaluation, we found that the project encountered some challenges during the implementation, which has led to delays and the modification in the implementation strategy due to limitations posed by the contract period. However, this did not directly affect the project implementation at the final beneficiary level.

Despite the obstacles encountered in the quantitative study, we arrived at similar findings from both the qualitative and quantitative studies regarding the project's impacts at the final beneficiary level: (1) the trainings provided relevant skills for the participants, related to their previous livelihood activity; however, (2) only 25% of the participants of the first training on *kanzashi* technique at the Melati cooperative decided to make use of the acquired skills in their livelihood activities as a part-time activity taking up on average 24% of their working time; (3) the success of the project in opening new marketing opportunities for the final beneficiaries remained limited; and (4) the project did not have a significant effect on the profits and earnings of the project participants.

## 1.4. Structure of the report

The rest of this report proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the relevant literature; section 3 describes the project; section 4 describes the evaluation questions and outcome variables; section 5 the data collection. Section 6 provides the descriptive statistics. Sections 7 till 10 discuss evaluation question 1 till 4 in turn. The last section discusses the results and concludes.

Further details about the project results are presented in a number of annexes. The project implementation and the SPO is described in Annex I. Regarding the survey data, the construction of the outcome indicators and indices is summarized in Annex II, while Annex III reports on the summary statistics of for all variables used in the analysis. Annex IV describes the survey locations. Further tables on explaining the project outcomes are presented in Annex V. Finally, the results of the qualitative data collection are presented in Annex VI.

# 2. Literature overview

At the final beneficiary level, the GREEN project provides handicraft trainings in the garment sector for craftswomen and links them to the market. In general, the objectives of the GREEN project can be related to vocational and entrepreneurship trainings. Below we summarize the literature on the effectiveness of such trainings and the types of projects implemented. We note in advance that most of these focus on trainings for youth and unemployed, which are not directly comparable to the GREEN project. Nonetheless, the overview may help readers contextualize the GREEN project in relation to other projects aimed at improving vocational and entrepreneurial skills.

### *Vocational trainings*

Typically, vocational trainings are used as an instrument to improve participants' labour market outcomes and as a consequence decrease a nation's (youth) unemployment (Maitra & Mani, 2012; McKenzie, 2012). There are a number of studies in developed countries on the effectiveness of vocational training on these components (for example, Hebbar, 2006 or Budria, 2009).[9] Results are, however, mixed. While vocational trainings can be effective for the participants in a number of aspects, such as employment, job-related skills and earnings, the effectiveness of training programmes varies with the type of trainings and with trainee characteristics such as pre-education level (Bartlett, 2009; Heckman et al., 1999; Maitra & Mani, 2012). However, in the context of developing countries, the literature on the impact of vocational trainings is scarce (McKenzie, 2012). In general, the existing evidence suggests a positive impact of training on participants' labour market outcomes[10] (for example, Attanasio et al., 2011; Maitra & Mani, 2012), which is more often found in terms of the generated income of the employed than in increasing the probability of employment (for example, Card et al., 2011; Hirshleifer et al., 2014).[11] However, the context (for example, Attanasio et al., 2011 and Card et al., 2011 focus on youth) and duration (on average 6 months of training) of these trainings are not directly comparable to the current study.

There are also some projects that are more similar to the GREEN project in the sense that they focus on the skills of women in designing and producing handicraft products; increase their knowledge on the value chain; link them with markets; provide guidance on how women can work in groups; and develop women into effective business managers and organisational leaders (BWBA, 2012; Mendoza and Palma, 2012; www.dastkar.org). Unfortunately, most of these projects were not (yet) rigorously evaluated. One exception is Maitra & Mani (2012), who investigate the economic and social returns of a subsidized, six month long training programme in stitching and tailoring offered to women between ages 18 and 39 years by two local NGOs in New Delhi, India. Using an experimental framework, they found modest positive results for the trainings in terms of employment (5 percentage points), looking for a job (6 percentage points), hours worked (2 additional hours) and wage earnings (69 percent increase).

[9] Or see Department for Employment and Learning (2003) for an analysis of several different vocational training programmes in Northern Ireland.

[10] In addition, the impact estimates are larger in developing countries than in the United States and Europe (Maitra & Mani, 2012).

[11] Most of these studies use experimental designs to evaluate the effectiveness of the training programmes.

However, the implementation of all these projects is more intensive than in the case of the GREEN project, taking up to 10 months (BWBA, 2012) and most projects address the problems at hand in different ways than the GREEN project. Hence, while the content of the projects are similar to the GREEN project, the implementation differs to such an extent that we cannot use these projects as a benchmark for the GREEN project.

#### *Entrepreneurship trainings*

In general, the literature on entrepreneurship trainings shows a positive effect of entrepreneurship trainings on the entrepreneur's performance (Glaub & Frese, 2011). According to an overview paper of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) on women entrepreneurship training during the last decade in low income countries (Patel, 2014), there are usually five types of women entrepreneurship interventions: "1) access to finance; 2) business development services (BDS), which include business training, business advice or mentoring, technology transfer, business incubation services, business formalization services and strengthening of women's entrepreneurial associations; 3) improving market access for women's firms; 4) creating favorable business enabling environments; and 5) efforts to enhance women's agency and empowerment." (Patel, 2014, p.2). While some projects focus entirely on one component, other projects make combinations; for example micro-credit is often combined with business trainings (for example, World Bank, 2014). The evaluated literature provides little evidence that either business training alone or access to finance alone lead to sustained business growth. Instead, business training combined with follow-up technical assistance or business grants seems to be more effective in supporting the business growth of existing women's microenterprises. In addition, projects that combine business trainings with access to finance may be more effective in supporting women's business start-up. Since combined projects are more costly, they are not necessarily more cost-effective. Hence, the ILO concludes that entrepreneur trainings should address more barriers to women's entrepreneurship beyond limited access to finance and business skills.

However, the body of literature on the effectiveness of these programmes is scarce and tends to be methodologically weak (Glaub & Frese, 2011; Patel, 2014; Robb, 2014). For example, the World Bank states that "much more fine-grained analysis needs to be done, particularly with regard to the validity of Entrepreneurship Education and Training' as an antipoverty intervention as well as its direct connection to improving business performance in terms of enhanced profits and prospects for firm growth" (Robb et al., 2014, p.2).

# 3. The project

## 3.1. Project description

The GREEN project was implemented between 1 July 2011 and 31 August 2013, however, project costs were incurred until October 2013.

The final objective of the GREEN project was to improve the livelihoods of female micro-entrepreneurs in selected project areas. In the project, SwissContact provides technical assistance for two Hivos

partner organisations: PPSW in Jakarta and ASSPUK in Central Java province.[12] Both of these organisations are a network of Non-Governmental Organisations focusing on the empowerment of female entrepreneurs. The project involves the development of these organisations into business development services (BDS) provider centres. The capacity building is implemented using the garment industry as the theme of the project. SwissContact had a successful project in the garment sector before (Cipulir project), which initiated Hivos to start a similar project.

The first step in becoming a BDS provider is to identify stakeholders and jointly develop and implement a joint vision for growth. That is followed by implementing promotional measures related to purchasing, production and marketing.

Prior to the project a feasibility study was implemented by SwissContact, which identified the groups of beneficiaries in four regions: in Surakarta region the focus of the project is on batik making and the beneficiaries are members of JARPUK; in Sukohardjo region the focus is also on batik making and beneficiaries are members of Yayasan Krida Paramita (YKP); in Semarang region (Pringapus sub-district) the focus is on doormat/rug making and the beneficiaries are members of the Melati cooperative. The project activities in the above regions are supported by ASSPUK. Finally, in Jakarta region (Tambora sub-district) the focus is on laundry ventures specialised in jeans attire and the beneficiaries are SMSEs that are members of PPSW.

The evaluation focuses only on one of the regions. We have selected the Semarang region as the location of the evaluation.

## 3.2. Project implementation

The project implementation was not in line with the expectations. The qualitative study presented in Annex VI discusses the actual implementation of the project in detail. Overall, the strategy to build the capacity of PPSW and ASPPUK as BDS providers faced two major challenges:

1. The project period proved to be too short to change the mind-set of the NGOs to the business world according to SwissContact.
2. There has been a change in the SwissContact project staff, which led to delays in the project implementation and some confusion at the NGOs based on the observation of the evaluation team.

As a consequence, half-way through the project, the stakeholders decided to change the strategy of the project: SwissContact shifted the focus directly to the female entrepreneurs, and looked for a market opportunity to link them to a buyer. As a result, three women groups received trainings on batik and *kanzashi* techniques between February-July 2013. Batik craftswomen linked to ASPPUK received trainings on batik as planned. However, for the beneficiaries in Tambora (linked to PPSW) and for the members of the Melati cooperative, *kanzashi* making was identified as a new market opportunity. The average number of participants per training is summarized in Table 1 based on the daily attendance list of the trainings.


[12] See Annex I and Annex VI for a description of ASPPUK and PPSW.

**Table 1: Number of participants in project workshops**

| Workshop | Nr. Beneficiaries | Febr - June 2013 | | July 2013 | | Febr - July 2013 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Nr. training days | Average number of participants per training day | Nr. training days | Average number of participants per training day | Nr. training days | Average number of participants per training day |
| **PPSW** | 30 | 12 | 8.4 | - | - | 12 | 8.4 |
| **ASPPUK** | 50 | 2 | 50 | 2 | 25 | 4 | 37.5 |
| **Melati** | 45 | 2 | 49 | 2 | 14 | 4 | 31.5 |

Source: Attendance sheets of workshops and Progress Report May-October 2013.
Notes: The number of average participants is calculated based on the daily attendance sheets of the trainings. Unfortunately, it was not possible to calculate the total number of participants using this data because the names were not always eligible.

**Figure 1: Timing of project activities and evaluation period**





The timing of the project implementation and the evaluation period is displayed in Figure 1. The figure shows that due to the delays in the project implementation, the trainings with the direct beneficiaries took place after the baseline survey. However, at the time of the baseline survey it was not yet clear what project activities were to take place at the selected evaluation location.

## 3.3. Result chain

The stylized results chain based on planned implementation of the project is displayed in Figure 2 based on the interpretation of the evaluation team. The detailed list of planned activities, outputs and outcomes is included in Annex I.

Despite the changes in the project implementation, we discuss the project logic based on the planned implementation because, in principle, the same project results could be achieved also after the changes. Originally, the capacity building of PPSW and ASPPUK were at the centre of the project with linking beneficiary groups to market as case studies for PPSW and ASPPUK. In the actual implementation, SwissContact looked for markets and buyers for the women's groups and organised the training activities; while in the original planning PPSW and ASPPUK were supposed to take the lead on these activities with assistance from SwissContact. Hence, in reality, only the degree of involvement of PPSW and ASPPUK changed, and as a consequence the degree of their capacity development.

**Figure 2: Result chain**




Turning to the project logic presented in Figure 2, as mentioned before, the final objective of the project is to improve the livelihood of female entrepreneurs. At the level of these project beneficiaries, it is expected that the project, on the one hand, creates new market linkages for them (intermediate outcome in original plan, but output of the actual implementation); and on the other hand, it increases their skills in purchasing (inputs), production and marketing (output). The increased skillset of the female entrepreneurs will in turn lead to increased productivity and profits, while the new market opportunities will increase their revenues. Hence, both of these channels contribute to increased incomes to the female entrepreneurs, which will translate into improved livelihoods.

At the institutional level, before the activities affecting the final beneficiaries can take place, the project needs to develop a strategy for achieving its objectives: in the GREEN project this is called the 'joint

vision for growth', which is developed through workshops with key market players (producers, buyers, banks, etc.) and the organisations representing the producers (PPSW and ASPPUK), and which is facilitated by SwissContact.

According to the planning, only after the 'joint vision' or strategy is developed, can the project work on creating new market linkages with the identified market segments (both for raw material and final products) and the entrepreneurs, and conduct workshops on quality and productivity, which will result in the enhanced skillset of the entrepreneurs.

Through the implementation of these project activities, PPSW and ASPPUK will learn how to replicate these results and their capacity to provide business development services to other groups of entrepreneurs will be increased.

# 4. Evaluation questions and outcome variables

## 4.1. Evaluation questions

The call for proposals outlines 5 general evaluation questions. In the baseline report specific evaluations questions were specified. Table 2 shows these five questions and what it implies for this project.

**Table 2: Overview general and specific evaluation questions**

| Number | General evaluation question | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Change: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period? | 1. How did the skills of female entrepreneurs in the garment sector change?<br>2. Are the small-scale enterprises better linked to the market?<br>3. Do small-scale enterprises have better access to financial services?<br>4. How did the capacity of ASSPUK and PPSW as business development service providers change? |
| 2 | Attribution: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)? | Are the observed changes above attributable to the intervention? |
| 3 | Relevance of change: What is the relevance of these changes? | • The size of the impact<br>• Does the project address an important issue for the beneficiaries? |
| 4 | Efficiency: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient? | Was the intervention cost effective? |
| 5 | Explanations: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above? | Why did things work out/not work out?<br>The evaluation question is answered throughout the other evaluation questions and in the end discussion. |

We investigate the first 3 evaluation questions with both quantitative and qualitative methods, while the last evaluation question is only addressed in the qualitative study. The next section discusses the indicators used in the quantitative evaluation. The results of the qualitative study are reported in Annex VI.

The evaluation questions are linked to elements of the results chain presented in Figure 2: the output on enhanced skills of entrepreneurs, and the outcomes on new products and market linkages including input, output and financial markets.

The outcomes on increased productivity and profits, and on increased livelihood were not included among the evaluation questions in the baseline report. However, the outcome indicators presented in the next section also take these into account.

## 4.2. Outcome indicators

To answer the first two evaluation questions (change and attribution) we identified specific outcome indicators. These indicators are linked to the first 3 evaluation questions in Table 2, but they mostly correspond to the results chain presented in Figure 2. As a result, the outcome indicators are split up into 6 groups: use of financial instruments; household income and livelihood; skills, time allocation and profit; links to market; volume of traded goods; and food security and vulnerability. Most of these also correspond to uniform indicators specified by the Synthesis team.

Table 2 displays all the outcome indicators used and the scale of these variables. Annex II discusses the construction of these indicators in detail.

**Table 3: Overview of outcome indicators**

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) |
|---|---|
| **A. Use of financial instruments** | |
| Percentage of households that know a place to borrow | (0%; 100%) |
| Percentage of households that have borrowed in the past 12 months | (0%; 100%) |
| **B. Household income and livelihood** | |
| Total income per month (1000 Rp) | (NM; NM) |
| Housing facilities index | (NM; NM) |
| Asset index | (NM; NM) |
| Overall happiness | (1; 4) |
| Current subjective wealth status | (1; 6) |
| **C. Skills, time allocation and profit** | |
| Nr. of simple patterns | (0; NM) |
| Nr. of figurative patterns | (0; NM) |
| Nr. of *Kanzashi* patterns | (0; NM) |
| Nr. of hours worked per week | (0; NM) |
| Profit per hour (from all activities) | (NM; NM) |

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) |
|---|---|
| **D. Links To Market** | |
| Percentage of households buying inputs from cooperative/group | (0%; 100%) |
| **E. Volume of traded goods** | |
| Value of Sold Rugs per Month (1000 Rp) | (NM; NM) |
| Percentage of households that have small business | (0%; 100%) |
| Net profits from Small Business Monthly (1000 Rp) | (NM; NM) |
| **F. Food Security and vulnerability** | |
| Nr. Of Months Could Not Cover Living Costs | (0; NM) |
| Nr. Of Months Could Not Enough To Eat | (0; NM) |
| Percentage of households have emergency savings for at least one month | (0%; 100%) |
| Current standard of living: daily needs covered (only for panel respondents) | (1; 3) |
| Current standard of living: food consumption covered (only for panel respondents) | (1; 3) |
| Notes: NM = no minimum/maximum | |

# 5. Data collection

This section describes the survey instruments and the sampling design and outcome.

## 5.1. Survey instruments

We collected three types of data: quantitative, qualitative and financial. The following paragraphs list the survey instruments used for each type of data.

### *Quantitative data*

Structured household surveys were conducted with members of the Melati cooperative and non-member households involved in rug making as livelihood activity. The questionnaire was focused on socio-economic characteristics of the household, the skills of the respondents and their income from different economic activities. The baseline data have been collected in November 2012; while the endline data was collected in August 2014.

### *Qualitative data*

The implementation of the GREEN project and its impact on the beneficiaries has also been evaluated using a qualitative study. Project stakeholders (SwissContact, ASPPUK, PPSW, Melati cooperative and a buyer) were interviewed using in-depth interviews, while participants of the trainings on production (batik and *kanzashi*) were surveyed using focus group discussions. The study took place in September 2013, after all the project activities have been implemented. The results of this study are reported in Annex VI.

### *Financial data*

To collect information about the costs of the GREEN project, we conducted a project cost survey with the project manager and the external consultant responsible for the project implementation on 15 July 2013.

## 5.2. Sampling outcome

The evaluation focuses on the impact of the GREEN project on the direct beneficiaries at the Melati cooperative. At the baseline period, it was not yet clear what activity the GREEN project has or was going to implement with the members of the Melati cooperative. Therefore, we have randomly sampled among the active members of the Melati cooperative and the Anugrah rug making group, and non-member rug makers in the same villages. Before the endline period, we learned about the trainings conducted by the GREEN project and additionally interviewed all project beneficiaries who were members of the cooperative.

The following sub-sections discuss the selection procedure for the survey respondents (sampling design) and the results of its implementation (sampling outcome).

### *Sampling design*

As mentioned above, in the evaluation the members of the Melati cooperative were selected as the beneficiaries of the project. The members of Melati cooperative live in several villages around the cooperative. We selected the two largest villages (in terms of membership) to sample from. From these villages, we randomly sampled 50 cooperative members in total (25 from each). The comparison group was selected from the same two villages: we have randomly sampled them from the doormat/rug makers in these villages who did not join the Melati cooperative. Hence, these non-members could actually be regarded more as indirect beneficiaries of the project, as they could decide to join the cooperative or the project activities or indirectly learn from the project (spillover effects). In addition, doormat/rug making women have self-selected themselves into treatment and comparison groups.

At the endline survey, the same respondents were planned to be re-interviewed. In case the baseline respondent or in her absence the household head or a household member knowledgeable about the rug making activity could not be interviewed (due to refusal, moving out of village or another reason), the household was dropped from the endline survey without replacement.

### *Sampling outcome*

Due to the change in the intervention, the treatment respondents in our sample are not, as was planned, automatically benefit from the GREEN project. Only respondents who participated in the *kanzashi* trainings actually benefit from the project. Melati cooperative provided us with a list of respondents who participated in all *kanzashi* trainings. Only these participants are able to make *kanzashi* according to the management of the Melati cooperative. In addition, the participants of the final training were selected from the 50 participants of the first training who continued making *kanzashi* after the training (see Annex VI).

Table 4 shows the list of participants in the final training sorted by management, non-members, members before baseline, and members after baseline. In total, 14 women participated in the final

training on *kanzashi*, which was conducted in July 2013. According to the Melati cooperative, only one of the 14 women was not actively making *kanzashi* anymore at time of the endline survey. In principle, however, the participants of the trainings could teach other women as well (spillover effects). Note that non-members could also follow the trainings provided by the Melati cooperative.

**Table 4: Number of participants in the final *kanzashi* training**

| Type of participant | Number of participants |
|---|---|
| Management | 2 |
| Non-members | 3 |
| Members before baseline (2012) | 7 |
| Members after baseline (>2012) | 2 |
| **Total** | **14** |
| Source: Administration Melati Cooperative | |

From the 14 women who participated in the final training, and are thus expected to be benefited from the project, we only interviewed 1 respondent at baseline. At the endline, we expanded the sample size to include an additional 5 participants of the final training who were already member at baseline into the sample.[13] The choice to include only those participants in the training was based on methodological reasons; for this group we were able to match endline observations to baseline observations using administrative data from the Melati cooperative regarding bonuses received from the cooperative (only available for members).

Because of the above mentioned change in the project implementation, we present the outcomes of the survey by three groups: 1. Non-members at baseline (2012), the original comparison group; 2. Members of Melati cooperative at baseline (2012), the original treatment group; and 3. Treatment group, the members who participated in all project trainings conducted at Melati cooperative. Table 5 reports the sampling outcome by the three assignment groups. The table shows that all baseline respondents could be re-interviewed at the endline. The total sample size at the endline is 105 respondents including the 5 'treatment' respondents sampled only at the endline.

[13] In additional participant of the final training who was also a member of Melati cooperative already at the baseline could not be interviewed because another member of her household was already interviewed for the baseline survey. The protocol of the sampling did not make it possible to interview more than one household member. In fact, the same person was attempted to be interviewed at the baseline, but was replaced by another respondent because of the same reason.

**Table 5: Sampling outcome**

| Assignment group | Baseline planned | Baseline outcome | Endline outcome | Panel respondents |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Non-member at baseline | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 |
| Member at baseline[1] | 50 | 50 | 49 | 49 |
| Treatment | - | - | 6 | 1 |
| **Total** | **100** | **100** | **105** | **100** |

Source: Household survey E5, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes:
1. One of the respondents in the "member at baseline" group turned out to be a "treatment" respondent. Therefore, this respondent was moved to the "Treatment" row at the endline.

Despite the changes in the planned project beneficiaries, we still report the changes in outcomes for the non-member and the member groups as originally planned to show general trends among the population of potential beneficiaries. However, only the respondents in the third group were expected to benefit directly from the GREEN project. Hence, we discuss the findings for evaluation question 2 regarding the attribution of changes to the GREEN project only for the 6 respondents directly benefitting from the trainings organised by the GREEN project.

# 6. Descriptive statistics

This section summarizes the main characteristics of the three assignment groups using the baseline and endline surveys. Unfortunately, for the actual project beneficiaries (treatment group) we are only able to provide information from the endline survey.

First, the socio-economic characteristics of the sample is summarized, which is followed by discussing the characteristics of the respondents with respect to the rug making activity and their self-reported project exposure measured as participation in hand craft trainings.

## 6.1. Respondent and household characteristics

To provide a better insight into the general characteristics of our sample, Table 6 displays a number of general characteristics of the respondents like gender, age, being a household head and education, while Table 7 describes household characteristics regarding household size, main income source and membership in groups and cooperatives.

The columns of the tables contain a lot of information the different groups and time periods. The first four columns of the table are about the non-member group and the following five columns are about the member group: column 1 and 5 show the mean value of the variables at the baseline for the respective groups, and column 2 and 7 display the mean values at the endline, while column 3 and 8 report on the change between the baseline and endline again for the respective groups. In addition, column 4 and 9 report on the probability that this change is zero (p-value). Hence, for example, if the p-

value is below 0.05 we say that the change in the variable is significantly different from zero at 5% significance level.[14]

Further, column 6 reports whether the baseline value of the member and non-member groups is significantly different from each other indicated by a p-value below 0.05 for 5% significance level.

Only the final column (10) of the table reports on the actual beneficiaries of the project: the endline means are reported for this group which contains only 6 respondents. Statistical comparison of this group to the other groups is omitted because of the small sample size. In general, the sample size of the variables is not reported in the tables but can be inferred from Annex III, which provides the sample size and means of all variables used in the analysis.

Table 6 shows that the average age of the respondents is in their late 30s and early 40s with an average age around 39-41 years depending on the group at the endline. Respondents in the treatment group are almost a year older than the average Melati cooperative member, but on average a bit younger than the comparison group. Overall, there is no significant difference between the ages in the groups.

The respondents are most often not the heads of their household, and the percentage of respondents who indicated to be a household head dropped between the baseline and endline for both group. None of the respondents in the *kanzashi* treatment group are the heads of their households.

Regarding education, most women have at least primary education, with around one third of the respondents in the two membership groups having secondary education, while all *kanzashi* group members have attained a secondary education.

[14] The p-values are calculated using standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the location level. This means that the standard errors are allowed to have an arbitrary correlation for comparison or treatment respondents in the same village. In other words, we allow respondents in the same village in the same treatment group (comparison or treatment) to be more similar to each other than they are to a different randomly selected respondent in another village from the other treatment group.

**Table 6: Respondent characteristics**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Group** | **Non-member at baseline** | | | | **Member at baseline** | | | | | **Treatment** |
| **Period** | **Base** | **End** | **Change** | **P(1v2)** | **Base** | **P(1v5)** | **End** | **Change** | **P(5v7)** | **End** |
| Female (%) | 100.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 | | 100.0 | | 100.0 | 0.0 | | 100.0 |
| Household Head (%) | 16.0 | 10.0 | -6.0 | 0.285 | 18.4 | 0.635 | 8.2 | -10.2 | 0.229 | 0.0 |
| Age | 39.2 | 40.5 | 1.3 | 0.130 | 37.3 | 0.225 | 38.8 | 1.4 | 0.184 | 39.7 |
| Education (%) | | | | | | | | | | |
| *No/Islamic* | 6.0 | 10.0 | 4.0 | 0.285 | 4.1 | 0.686 | 4.1 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| *Primary* | 60.0 | 58.0 | -2.0 | 0.285 | 63.3 | 0.887 | 65.3 | 2.0 | 0.564 | 0.0 |
| *Secondary* | 34.0 | 32.0 | -2.0 | 0.285 | 32.7 | 0.592 | 28.6 | -4.1 | 0.564 | 100.0 |
| *Higher* | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | | 2.0 | 2.0 | 0.564 | 0.0 |

Source: Household survey E5; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

Looking at household characteristics, Table 7 shows that the average household size is around 4 in the two membership groups, while the *kanzashi* group members have a somewhat larger household with on average 5 members.

Regarding the main source of household income, wage income is the most common income source, followed by non-farm business. The importance of wage income increased over the whole sample to 55-67% at the endline. Agriculture is not an important income source among the surveyed households. Therefore, it is not surprising that very few households have membership in farming groups and cooperatives.

Membership in savings and credit cooperatives is only 20% in the non-member group, while 84% among the members and 100% among the *kanzashi* group at the endline. This finding is not surprising given that Melati cooperative functions as a savings and credit cooperative (and not as a hand-craft cooperative based on the answers of the respondents). Similar figures are observed for membership in a hand-craft group, with the Anugrah rug making group dominating the membership for the respondents in the membership group (see Table 9).

**Table 7: Household characteristics**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Group** | **Non-member at baseline** | | | | **Member at baseline** | | | | | **Treatment** |
| **Period** | **Base** | **End** | **Change** | **P(1v2)** | **Base** | **P(1v5)** | **End** | **Change** | **P(5v7)** | **End** |
| Household (HH) size | 3.8 | 4.2 | 0.4 | 0.281 | 4.0 | 0.643 | 4.0 | -0.0 | 0.141 | 5.0 |
| Female HH head (%) | 16.0 | 10.0 | -6.0 | 0.285 | 18.4 | 0.635 | 8.2 | -10.2 | 0.229 | 0.0 |
| Main income source (%) | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Crop Farming* | 20.0 | 22.0 | 2.0 | 0.285 | 12.2 | 0.329 | 8.2 | -4.1 | 0.673 | 0.0 |
| *Non-farm Business* | 34.0 | 14.0 | -20.0 | 0.285 | 24.5 | 0.568 | 32.7 | 8.2 | 0.141 | 33.3 |
| *Wage* | 40.0 | 60.0 | 20.0 | 0.285 | 49.0 | 0.716 | 55.1 | 6.1 | 0.614 | 66.7 |
| Membership in […] (%) | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Farming Group* | 12.0 | 10.0 | -2.0 | 0.630 | 14.3 | 0.871 | 16.3 | 2.0 | 0.564 | 0.0 |
| *Farming Cooperative* | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| *Saving & Credit Group* | 12.0 | 16.0 | 4.0 | 0.305 | 10.2 | 0.805 | 14.3 | 4.1 | 0.420 | 66.7 |
| *Saving & Credit Cooperative* | 4.0 | 24.0 | 20.0 | 0.051 | 81.6 | 0.000 | 83.7 | 2.0 | 0.809 | 100.0 |
| *Hand-crafts and other economic groups* | 0.0 | 24.0 | 24.0 | 0.013 | 71.4 | 0.000 | 83.7 | 12.2 | 0.069 | 83.3 |
| *Hands-crafts cooperative* | 2.0 | 0.0 | -2.0 | 0.630 | 0.0 | 0.479 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |

Source: Household survey E5; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

Finally, Table 8 reports on doormat/rug making: except for one non-member respondent at the endline, all respondents make rugs both at the baseline and endline.[15] Most women already had 8-10 years of experience in rug-making at the time of the baseline (this question was not asked at the endline). On average, the member group was able to make a larger variety of doormats/rugs compared to non-members. While this activity contributed to about three-quarters of the respondent's income at the baseline, this share has dropped to a value close to half of their income at the endline for both groups. Interestingly, at the endline rug-making still contributed to 63% of the income of the *kanzashi* making group. However, the changes in the incomes of the respondents are discussed in section 7 in more detail.

[15] Note we do not have information in Table 7 about whether the 5 new respondents in the *kanzashi* group made rugs at the baseline. However, they were all members of the Melati cooperative already at the baseline, and based on information from Melati cooperative, they were making rugs already at that time.

**Table 8: Rug making Characteristics**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Group** | **Non-member at baseline** | | | | **Member at baseline** | | | | | **Treatment** |
| **Period** | **Base** | **End** | **Change** | **P(1v2)** | **Base** | **P(1v5)** | **End** | **Change** | **P(5v7)** | **End** |
| Rug making as livelihood activity in past 12/24 months | 100.0 | 98.0 | -2.0 | 0.285 | 100.0 | | 100.0 | 0.0 | | 100.0 |
| Years of experience in rug making | 9.8 | | | | 8.0 | | | | | |
| Number Of Rug Patterns Respondent Can Make | 2.2 | 2.5 | 0.3 | 0.560 | 3.4 | 0.035 | 3.0 | -0.5 | 0.352 | 2.7 |
| Share of Rug Making Income of Total Income (%) | 78.0 | 56.8 | -21.2 | 0.006 | 75.7 | 0.950 | 55.2 | -21.3 | 0.028 | 62.9 |

Source: Household survey E5; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

## 6.2. Treatment exposure

Next, in Table 9 we investigate the knowledge and participation of the respondents in the activities of Melati cooperative and the Anugrah rug making group, which are the organisations that gave space for the GREEN project's training on *kanzashi* making.

**Table 9: Knowledge, membership and participation in trainings**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Group** | **Non-member at baseline** | | | | **Member at baseline** | | | | | **Treatment** |
| **Period** | **Base** | **End** | **Change** | **P(1v2)** | **Base** | **P(1v5)** | **End** | **Change** | **P(5v7)** | **End** |
| Heard about Melati Cooperative (%) | 66.0 | 70.0 | 4.0 | 0.622 | 98.0 | 0.054 | 93.9 | -4.1 | 0.420 | 100.0 |
| Heard about Anugrah Rug making group (%) | 38.0 | 64.0 | 26.0 | 0.266 | 83.7 | 0.011 | 91.8 | 8.2 | 0.399 | 83.3 |
| Member of Melati cooperative (%) | 0.0 | 16.0 | 16.0 | 0.285 | 81.6 | 0.000 | 83.7 | 2.0 | 0.809 | 100.0 |
| Member of Anugrah rug making group (%) | 0.0 | 18.0 | 18.0 | 0.161 | 73.5 | 0.000 | 83.7 | 10.2 | 0.016 | 83.3 |
| Buys Input material from Melati Cooperative (%) | 26.0 | 28.6 | 2.0 | 0.757 | 87.8 | 0.001 | 77.6 | -10.2 | 0.551 | 83.3 |
| Participated In Any Training Related To Rug-Making[1] (%) | 0.0 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 0.285 | 42.9 | 0.029 | 57.1 | 14.3 | 0.519 | 100.0 |
| Topics discussed in training | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Design of rugs* | | 66.7 | | | 90.5 | 0.093 | 60.7 | -26.7 | 0.042 | 33.3 |
| *Organisation of Work* | | 0.0 | | | 19.0 | 0.130 | 0.0 | -20.0 | 0.521 | 0.0 |
| *Ergonomic Workplace* | | 0.0 | | | 4.8 | 0.028 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| *Financial Literacy* | | 0.0 | | | 52.4 | 0.093 | 25.0 | -13.3 | 0.521 | 16.7 |
| *Marketing/Promotion* | | 100.0 | | | 61.9 | 0.070 | 14.3 | -40.0 | 0.242 | 0.0 |
| *Motivation* | | 0.0 | | | 71.4 | 0.123 | 3.6 | -66.7 | 0.042 | 0.0 |
| *Built Networking* | | 0.0 | | | 23.8 | 0.037 | 0.0 | -20.0 | 0.166 | 0.0 |
| *Learning making other types of craft* | | 33.3 | | | 23.8 | 0.037 | 28.6 | -13.3 | 0.042 | 33.3 |
| *Kanzashi making* | | 66.7 | | | | | 42.9 | | | 100.0 |
| *Other topics* | | 0.0 | | | 0.0 | | 21.4 | 33.3 | 0.312 | 33.3 |

Source: Household survey E5; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

1. This question was asked with a 12 months recall period at the baseline and a 24 months recall period at the endline.

The table shows that most non-members have heard of Melati cooperative (70% at endline), and that some of the non-members became members of both the cooperative (16%) and rug making group (18%) between the baseline and the endline, while the membership among the membership group is very high in both groups, with all respondents being members of at least one of the two organisations. Further, 29% of the non-member and 78% of the membership group buys raw material for making the doormats/rugs from Melati cooperative.

Regarding trainings, most of the non-member respondents did not receive any trainings related to rug-making or *kanzashi* making, while 57% of the membership group reported to have participated in at least one training on rug-making between the baseline and endline periods. Most of these trainings

were related to the design of the rugs (91% at baseline and 61% at endline in the membership group) and financial literacy (52% and 25%). However, some of the respondents also mentioned trainings focusing on learning to make other crafts (24% and 29%). At the endline survey, *kanzashi* making was explicitly included as a response category, and 43% of the respondents who participated in any trainings indicated this as a topic of the trainings. Hence, in total 14 respondents in the two membership groups[16] and the 6 respondents in the *kanzashi* treatment group participated in trainings on *kanzashi* making, most likely organised by the GREEN project.

# 7. Evaluation question 1: Change in outcomes

This section discusses evaluation question 1: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period? The changes in the outcome indicators for the period measured between the base- and endline survey (2012-2014) are grouped into 6 categories: use of financial instruments; household income and livelihood; skills, time allocation and profit; links to market; volume of traded goods; and food security and vulnerability.

Table 10 displays the results for all outcome indicators. The table is organised similarly to the table on the respondent characteristics (Table 6), except that the significance of the difference between the membership groups at baseline (P(1v5) in Table 6) is not reported. However, below the means of the indicators, the standard error is reported in brackets.

The following paragraphs discuss the levels and changes in the outcome indicators in order.

### *Use of financial instruments*

We have asked households whether they know a place to borrow money and whether they have borrowed in the past 12 months. Table 10 shows that almost all households know a place to borrow money (no change at endline). Borrowing has increased in the non-member group (from 32% to 40%) but decreased in the member group (from 69% to 55%). None of these changes are significant though. The different patterns could be explained by the fact that most of the respondents in the member group are members of a saving and credit cooperative (Melati cooperative). It is possible that some respondents joined the cooperative in order to borrow or, in general, these members have easier access to credit when needed. Table 9 showed that some of the non-member respondents have joined Melati cooperative by the endline. Hence, it is possible that these respondents have taken loans at Melati cooperative. Table 15 in Annex V confirms this claim: the percentage of households in the non-member group that took their loan from a cooperative increased from 25% to 50%, while loans from banks lost from their share (from 56% at baseline to 20% at endline). In general, households at the endline were about twice as likely to borrow from a cooperative as from a bank (Table 15). Finally, borrowing was the most common in the treatment group: two thirds of these households have taken loans in the past 12 months.

[16] The 14 respondents are calculated based on 50x6%x67%= 2 respondents in the non-membership group and 49x57%x43%=12 respondents in the membership group.

### *Household income and livelihood*

The income of the respondents in both membership groups increased in real terms[17] between the baseline and endline on average, albeit the change is not significantly different from zero. However, Table 17 in Annex V shows that the share of income from rug/doormat making has significantly decreased in the composition of the respondents' income: from 78% to 57% in the non-member group, and from 76% to 55% in the member group. At the same time, the share of wage income has increased by 12-15 percentage points on average, and at the endline it constituted almost one third of the respondents' income.

Table 17 also highlights that the composition of income is similar between the membership groups (55-57% from rug making and 31-32% from wage, 4-8% from own business and 6-7% from crop and livestock), but different compared to the treatment group. Women involved in *kanzashi* making make most of their living as handcraft entrepreneurs: rug making (63%) and *kanzashi* making (22%). Only 7% of their income comes from wage income compared to 31-32% for the other groups. This clearly suggests a selectivity effect: women who are not able to get a wage contract prefer to make *kanzashi*. This hypothesis is supported by the finding in Table 16, which shows that wage employment offers the highest profit per hour for the respondents.

However, turning to the values of the respondents' total income (Table 10), we observe that while the average income was lower in the member group compared to non-members at the baseline, at the endline the average income of the member group is higher (not significant). In addition, respondents in the treatment group have the highest income on average. This finding seems to contradict that these respondents pursue activities with lower profitability than the other groups (rug making and *kanzashi* making compared to rug making and wage employment) as discussed above. However, the higher income is a result of more working hours per week (Table 10).

The wealth indicators reported in Table 10 verify that the livelihood of households increased during the evaluation period: both the housing conditions and household assets have significantly increased. These indicators are standardized to zero for the average Indonesian household.[18] Hence, the table shows that at the baseline the sampled households were on average slightly poorer than the average Indonesian household in terms of their asset holdings.[19] In terms of overall happiness and the current subjective wealth status, the respondents place themselves in the middle of the scale. Only the member group reports that their current wealth status has increased over the evaluation period.

Finally, the wealth indicators also verify that households in the treatment group are better off compared to the other groups at the endline. However, we do not have information on these households for the baseline, and we cannot determine whether their situation has improved the most since the baseline or their initial wealth status was already higher at the baseline.

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[17] Monthly income for the respondents is reported in 2012 prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI index for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%).

[18] The asset index is standardized to zero for the average Indonesian household in 2012 based on the DHS 2012 survey. The housing facilities index is standardized to zero for the average Indonesian household based on the IFLS 2007 survey. See Annex II for further details.

[19] The housing facilities index is based on 2007 data. Therefore, it is possible that also for that indicator the respondents' households were below the Indonesian average.

### *Skills, time allocation and profit*

We do not observe substantial changes in the rug making skills of the respondents based on the number of patterns they can make. Overall, the member group can make one complicated pattern more compared to the non-member group. In terms of the number of doormat patterns, the treatment group is more similar to the non-member group. However, the *kanzashi* treatment respondents have learned to make two types of *kanzashi* patterns due to the training.

Regarding the time allocation, there is also no substantial change in the number of hours worked per week: women in the non-member and member groups work on average between 52-56 hours per week. Table 19 in Annex V shows the average number of hours worked per week by activity type, while Table 17 shows the average share of these activities in the time allocation of the respondents. The tables show that while the number of hours spent on rug making has increased, its share in the time allocation of women has decreased. Hence, those women have worked more on rug making who have already worked longer working hours.

The treatment group has the highest number of hours worked per week is at 72 hours per week at the endline. These women spend 66% of their time on rug making, and only 24% on *kanzashi* making. As mentioned before, the higher income for these women is a consequence of the long working hours they make.

Taking into account the working hours of the women, Table 10 also reports on the hourly profit the respondents obtain from all their livelihood activities combined. The hourly profits in 2012 prices have increased by 27% in both the non-member and member groups (not significant). Again, the treatment group reports the highest profit rate. Table 16 shows that the *kanzashi* making women obtain similar profits from rug making (3,640 Rp/hour) and rug making (3,753 Rp/hour). But most women report lower profit rates for rug making (2,150 Rp in the non-member group and 3,001 Rp in the member group) on average at the endline. The highest hourly rates are obtained from wage employment with on average 6,579 Rp per hour (Annex III). However, wage employment appears to be scarce and it accounts for only about one fifth of the time spent working.

### *Links to market*

Most women obtain their inputs for rug/doormat making from the Melati cooperative. This is also true for some of the non-member women (30% at baseline and 46% at endline). These results cannot be related to the GREEN project activities.

### *Volume of traded goods*

The value of the doormats/rugs sold has decreased by 30% in the non-member group, while it increased in the member group by 82%. However, the *kanzashi* treatment craftswomen received the highest revenue from doormats, which follows from their specialization on handcrafts and the amount of time spent on making doormats/rugs.

The table also shows that more of the respondents started up a small business during the evaluation period. However, the contribution of this activity to the incomes of the women is not substantial.

These results are also not related to the GREEN project activities.

### *Food security and vulnerability*

The food security situation of the surveyed households has not changed substantially during the evaluation period. About half of the sampled women encountered periods during the year when they could not cover their living costs, but most households did not encounter situations when they had not enough to eat. Again, the situation for the treatment households is better than for the other groups. These women work hard to improve the livelihood of their households.

**Table 10: Change in outcome indicators**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Group** | **Non-member at baseline** | | | | **Member at baseline** | | | | **Treatment** |
| **Period** | **Base** | **End** | **Change** | **P(1v2)** | **Base** | **End** | **Change** | **P(5v6)** | **End** |
| **A. Use of financial instruments** | | | | | | | | | |
| Know a place to borrow money (%) | 94.0 (1.1) | 98.0 (1.0) | 4.0 (2.1) | 0.305 | 100.0 (0.0) | 100.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | | 100.0 (0.0) |
| Have Borrowed Money In Past 12 Months (%) | 32.0 (0.6) | 40.0 (8.8) | 8.0 (8.2) | 0.506 | 69.4 (11.5) | 55.1 (2.2) | -14.3 (9.3) | 0.368 | 66.7 (21.1) |
| **B. Household income and livelihood** | | | | | | | | | |
| Total Monthly Income (1000Rp, 2012)[1] | 573.3 (102.4) | 634.8 (125.8) | 61.5 (23.5) | 0.232 | 394.7 (98.5) | 724.8 (138.2) | 330.1 (236.7) | 0.396 | 1,121.3 (264.6) |
| Housing facilities index | 0.1 (0.0) | 0.2 (0.0) | 0.1 (0.0) | 0.052 | 0.1 (0.0) | 0.2 (0.0) | 0.1 (0.0) | 0.045 | 0.4 (0.1) |
| Asset index | -0.1 (0.1) | 0.2 (0.1) | 0.3 (0.0) | 0.022 | -0.1 (0.0) | 0.2 (0.0) | 0.3 (0.0) | 0.037 | 0.6 (0.3) |
| Overall Happiness | 2.0 (0.0) | 2.0 (0.1) | -0.0 (0.0) | 0.756 | 2.0 (0.1) | 2.1 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.1) | 0.809 | 2.0 (0.0) |
| Current Subjective Wealth Status | 2.7 (0.1) | 2.7 (0.1) | 0.0 (0.0) | | 2.8 (0.1) | 3.1 (0.0) | 0.3 (0.0) | 0.052 | 3.0 (0.4) |
| **C. Skills, time allocation and profit** | | | | | | | | | |
| Nr. of simple patterns | 1.6 (0.1) | 1.7 (0.1) | 0.2 (0.2) | 0.438 | 1.8 (0.4) | 1.4 (0.6) | -0.5 (0.1) | 0.142 | 1.7 (0.5) |
| Nr. of figurative patterns | 0.6 (0.2) | 0.8 (0.1) | 0.1 (0.2) | 0.732 | 1.6 (0.1) | 1.7 (0.5) | -0.0 (0.5) | 0.938 | 1.0 (0.4) |
| Nr. of *Kanzashi* patterns | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | | 2.0 (0.5) |
| Number of hours worked per week | 55.0 (18.8) | 55.6 (4.6) | -3.6 (20.9) | 0.893 | 52.5 (3.0) | 55.1 (6.4) | 1.4 (4.3) | 0.800 | 72.2 (15.8) |
| Profit per hour overall (from all activities) (Rp, 2012)[1] | 650.1 (45.4) | 976.7 (235.0) | 360.7 (177.3) | 0.291 | 628.1 (68.5) | 1,056.1 (39.5) | 451.7 (34.5) | 0.049 | 1,397.7 (417.6) |
| **D. Links to market** | | | | | | | | | |
| Inputs from cooperative/group (%) | 30.0 (1.6) | 46.0 (10.1) | 16.0 (11.7) | 0.401 | 87.8 (6.8) | 87.8 (1.3) | 0.0 (8.2) | 1.000 | 83.3 (16.7) |
| **E. Volume of traded goods** | | | | | | | | | |

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Group** | **Non-member at baseline** | | | | **Member at baseline** | | | | **Treatment** |
| **Period** | **Base** | **End** | **Change** | **P(1v2)** | **Base** | **End** | **Change** | **P(5v6)** | **End** |
| Value of Sold Rugs per Month (1000Rp, 2012)[1] | 420.4 (115.0) | 261.1 (59.6) | -69.4 (27.5) | 0.240 | 105.6 (12.6) | 170.3 (58.4) | 51.7 (59.2) | 0.543 | 854.8 (495.0) |
| Households that have small business (%) | 6.0 (1.1) | 24.0 (7.5) | 18.0 (8.6) | 0.285 | 18.4 (10.2) | 38.8 (2.6) | 20.4 (12.7) | 0.355 | 66.7 (21.1) |
| Profits from Small Business Monthly (1000Rp, 2012)[1] | 26.9 (31.2) | 30.0 (8.8) | 3.1 (22.4) | 0.911 | 6.5 (5.1) | 128.6 (98.9) | 122.0 (93.8) | 0.417 | 111.9 (111.9) |
| **F. Food Security and vulnerability** | | | | | | | | | |
| HHs could not cover living costs in past 12 months (%) | 40.0 (4.8) | 46.0 (13.9) | 6.0 (9.1) | 0.630 | 61.2 (6.7) | 55.1 (2.2) | -6.1 (8.8) | 0.614 | 33.3 (21.1) |
| Nr. Months Could Not Cover Living Costs | 1.0 (0.0) | 0.8 (0.4) | -0.2 (0.4) | 0.735 | 1.6 (0.2) | 1.1 (0.1) | -0.5 (0.2) | 0.190 | 0.3 (0.2) |
| HHs did not have enough to eat in past 12 months (%) | 8.0 (8.2) | 6.0 (9.1) | -2.0 (1.0) | 0.285 | 20.4 (4.6) | 10.2 (0.2) | -10.2 (4.3) | 0.256 | 0.0 (0.0) |
| Nr. Months did not have enough to eat | 0.1 (0.1) | 0.2 (0.3) | 0.1 (0.2) | 0.785 | 0.4 (0.3) | 0.1 (0.0) | -0.3 (0.3) | 0.480 | 0.0 (0.0) |
| Current Standard Of Living: Daily Needs Covered | 2.1 (0.0) | 2.1 (0.1) | 0.0 (0.1) | 0.860 | 2.0 (0.0) | 2.1 (0.0) | 0.1 (0.0) | 0.324 | 2.0 (0.0) |
| Current Standard Of Living: Food Consumption Covered | 2.2 (0.0) | 2.2 (0.1) | 0.0 (0.1) | 0.756 | 2.2 (0.0) | 2.1 (0.1) | -0.1 (0.0) | 0.324 | 2.5 (0.2) |

Source: Household survey E5; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes: Standard errors given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

1. Prices are reported in 2012 real prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%). Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/aboutus.php?inflasi=1

# 8. Evaluation question 2: Attribution of changes

This subsection discusses evaluation question 2: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?

## 8.1. Methodology

In the baseline report we described that we want to analyse the impact (attribution) of the GREEN project on craftswomen making doormats/rugs using difference-in-differences methodology. However,

at the endline we learned that only one respondent in from the baseline survey has actually followed all the activities organised by the GREEN project at the Melati cooperative.

Therefore, we had to adjust our evaluation methodology: we sampled additional project beneficiaries at the endline. Because no baseline data is available for these beneficiaries, we use cross-sectional regressions using data from the endline survey. Hence, we are not able to use fixed effects to control for observed and unobserved respondent characteristics that are constant over time (as done in a difference-in-difference analysis). Controlling for respondent- and household-specific characteristics is important in a cross-sectional analysis, where differences in the distribution of the characteristics of treatment and comparison groups can drive observed differences in the outcome variables. Therefore, we use observable characteristics of the interviewed women (for example, the age and education) as control variables in the regression analysis.

Using regression analysis, we estimate the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET). The ATET is calculated by comparing the outcome variables of respondents participating in the *kanzashi* trainings organised by the GREEN project (treatment) to respondents who did not participate in the GREEN project. Hence, we estimate the following regression equation using the endline data:

(1) $$y_i = \alpha + \beta GREEN_i + \gamma X_i + u_i,$$

Where $y_i$ denotes the outcome indicator for respondent $i$, $X_i$ represents the group of control variables, $\alpha$ is the mean of the reference group and $u_i$ is the error term. Most importantly, $GREEN_i$ is a binary indicator which has value 1 if the respondent $i$ participated in the trainings organised by GREEN and 0 otherwise; and $\beta$ is the coefficient measuring the treatment effect of the GREEN project on the beneficiaries (ATET).

As mentioned above, due to the use of cross sectional data, controlling for confounders in the regression analysis is important. Confounding variables are selected based on three criteria: (1) the distribution of the variable is significantly different between the comparison and treatment students; and (2) the variable is not influenced by factors influencing the outcome (predetermined);[20] and (3) the outcome indicator is influenced by the variable. Using these criteria, we control for the age and education of the respondents and the main income source of the household in the regressions (Column 2 in Table 11). In addition, in a second set of regressions we also control for the membership of the respondents in saving and credit groups, saving and credit cooperatives and handcraft groups to capture the selectivity of the respondents in participating in the *kanzashi* making activities (Column 3 in Table 11).

## 8.2. Results

The regression results are reported in Table 11 following the same groups of outcome indicators as in the previous section (Table 10). The table reports the coefficient estimates for the treatment effect ($\beta$) for each outcome indicator. The standard error of the estimates is reported in brackets below the coefficient estimates. The significance of the estimates is denoted by stars: one star indicates that the

[20] The second condition is important for the selection of valid control variables because the intervention has started already before the baseline data was collected.

treatment estimate is significant at 10% significance level (p<0.1), two stars indicate a significance level of 5% (p<0.05), and three stars indicate a significance level of 1% (p<0.01).

Below, we discuss the GREEN project's effect on these outcome indicator groups in turn.

### *Use of financial instruments*

The *kanzashi* treatment households were on average more likely to borrow during the past 12 months by 21 percentage points. However, controlling for membership in saving and credit groups (column 3), the difference is not significantly different from zero.

We could imagine that starting up with the *kanzashi* making activity needs initial investments. However, given that the respondents already were making doormats, this investment appears to be small and cannot explain the higher percentage of borrowing in the treatment group. Hence, we conclude that the differences are not driven by the GREEN project.

### *Household income and livelihood*

On average, the *kanzashi* treatment group members obtain 19% higher incomes. However, this impact is not significantly different from zero. Overall, there is no indication that the project has significantly increased the livelihood of the beneficiaries.

### *Skills, time allocation and profit*

Due to the GREEN project, participating craftswomen learned to make brooches using *kanzashi* technique, and they are now able to make two different patterns on average.

The *kanzashi* craftswomen also work 27 hours longer per week than the comparison group (48%) but this result is not significantly different from zero due to the high variation of working hours observed in the comparison group. Unfortunately, we do not have information whether the longer working hours are due to the new livelihood activity promoted by the project, or these women have already worked longer hours in other activities prior to the project.

However, the qualitative data presented in Annex VI indicates that the craftswomen find *kanzashi* making a less demanding activity (that is even possible to make in front of the TV) than rug making. This finding could suggest that the craftswomen spend extra working hours making *kanzashi* compared to before the training.

### *Links to market*

The GREEN project did not contribute to linking the women to input markets because the craftswomen already had a source of raw material from the Melati cooperative. The qualitative study (Annex VI) indicates that the marketing of the *kanzashi* is still challenging, and the craftswomen mostly sell the *kanzashi* brooches through their own network. Melati cooperative also provides a marketing channel through providing space for the *kanzashi* products at exhibitions and markets.

Hence, the GREEN project did not contribute much to linking the craftswomen to market at the Melati cooperative. Based on the qualitative report, GREEN has worked on linking craftswomen to output markets at the other training locations (batik craftswomen in Sukohardjo and *kanzashi* craftswomen at Tambora). However, these attempts were also not fully successful partially due to capacity problems of the craftswomen entrepreneurs.

### *Volume of traded goods*

Unfortunately, we do not have good measures of the project's effect on the volume of traded goods. The outcome indicators reported cannot be linked to the GREEN project.

### *Food security and vulnerability*

Given the limited impact of the project on the livelihood of the craftswomen, it is not very surprising that we do not find any impact of the project on the food security situation of the project participants.

**Table 11: Attribution: regression estimates**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Indicator | Mean comparison group | ATET ($\beta$)[1] | ATET ($\beta$)[2] |
| Survey | Endline | Endline | Endline |
| **A. Use of financial instruments** | | | |
| Know a place to borrow money (%) | 98.00 | 1.12<br>(4.44) | 0.17<br>(4.85) |
| Have Borrowed Money In Past 12 Months (%) | 40.00 | 36.64*<br>(21.15) | 20.87<br>(22.82) |
| **B. Household income and livelihood** | | | |
| Total Monthly Income (1000Rp, 2012)[3] | 634.80 | 362.81<br>(306.20) | 118.38<br>(328.29) |
| Housing facilities index | 0.17 | 0.29*<br>(0.16) | 0.24<br>(0.18) |
| Asset index | 0.19 | 0.25<br>(0.26) | 0.28<br>(0.28) |
| Overall Happiness | 2.02 | -0.01<br>(0.23) | 0.08<br>(0.24) |
| Current Subjective Wealth Status | 2.74 | 0.17<br>(0.38) | -0.07<br>(0.40) |
| **C. Skills, time allocation and profit** | | | |
| Nr. of simple patterns | 1.69 | 0.17<br>(0.59) | 0.32<br>(0.63) |
| Nr. of figurative patterns | 0.83 | -0.62<br>(0.79) | -1.18<br>(0.84) |
| Nr. of *Kanzashi* patterns | 0.00 | 1.96***<br>(0.13) | 1.84***<br>(0.14) |
| Number of hours worked per week | 55.56 | 26.69<br>(18.49) | 26.81<br>(20.20) |
| Profit per hour overall (from all activities) (Rp, 2012)[3] | 976.70 | 129.24<br>(337.50) | -124.53<br>(362.45) |
| **D. Links to market** | | | |
| Inputs from cooperative/group (%) | 46.00 | 13.75<br>(21.73) | -3.34<br>(21.63) |
| **E. Volume of traded goods** | | | |

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Indicator | Mean comparison group | ATET ($\beta$)[1] | ATET ($\beta$)[2] |
| Survey | Endline | Endline | Endline |
| Value of Sold Rugs per Month (1000Rp, 2012)[3] | 261.14 | 723.66*** (204.72) | 855.09*** (224.96) |
| Households that have small business (%) | 24.00 | 30.56 (19.95) | 14.78 (21.54) |
| Profits from Small Business Monthly (1000Rp, 2012)[3] | 30.00 | -15.72 (157.72) | -126.48 (170.35) |
| **F. Food Security and vulnerability** | | | |
| HHs could not cover living costs in past 12 months (%) | 46.00 | -13.59 (23.35) | -19.18 (25.62) |
| Nr. Months Could Not Cover Living Costs | 0.78 | -0.81 (0.64) | -0.74 (0.70) |
| HHs did not have enough to eat in past 12 months (%) | 6.00 | -1.15 (12.36) | 0.86 (13.21) |
| Nr. Months did not have enough to eat | 0.20 | 0.11 (0.37) | 0.07 (0.39) |
| Current Standard Of Living: Daily Needs Covered | 2.10 | -0.17 (0.22) | -0.38 (0.23) |
| Current Standard Of Living: Food Consumption Covered | 2.20 | 0.31 (0.21) | 0.22 (0.23) |

Source: Household survey E5; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard errors given in parentheses. * p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

1. Controls included in regressions are the education and age of the respondent and the main income source of the household.
2. Controls included in the regression are the same as under 1. In addition, we also control for the respondent's membership in a saving and credit cooperative, in a saving and credit group and in a handicraft group (separately).
3. Prices are reported in 2012 real prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%). Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/aboutus.php?inflasi=1

# 9. Evaluation question 3: Relevance of changes

This subsection will answer evaluation question 3: What is the relevance of these changes? In particular, we look at the size of the impact, and whether the project addresses an important issue for the project beneficiaries, whom we defined as the participants of the handcraft trainings organised by the project.

## 9.1. The size of the impact

In the evaluated project area, only 12 of 47 (49 participants – 2 management) participants of the *kanzashi* training at the Melati cooperative continued to produce *kanzashi* as a livelihood activity after

the trainings. In addition, except for one beneficiary, all of them produce *kanzashi* only as a side activity, while still retaining their other economic activities, including their main activity of doormat/rug making.

The results of the focus group discussions with the batik craftswomen participating in the GREEN project indicates that the women have partially adopted the new techniques learned, but it did not have an impact on their earnings.

Hence, the GREEN project only had a minor impact on the livelihood of the craftswomen.

### 9.2. Does the project address an important issue for the beneficiaries?

At the level of the craftswomen, the project increases the skills of the craftswomen in terms of production and product design, which are useful for these female entrepreneurs but not all of them ended up adopting the new skills in their livelihood activities (see above). In addition, all project participants already had a livelihood activity prior to the project that they kept as their main activity also after the project. These data seem to suggest that the project did not address an urgent issue for the beneficiaries.

On the other hand, the project could indirectly address an important issue for the beneficiaries through increasing the capacity of the craftswomen's associations in providing business development services for them in the future.

## 10. Evaluation question 4: Efficiency of project

This subsection will answer evaluation question 4: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient? To answer this question we will describe the cost effectiveness of the programme. First, the calculation of cost per beneficiary is discussed. Second, these costs are compared to the project effects per beneficiary. Finally, the findings on cost effectiveness are compared to achievements of similar projects.

### 10.1. Costs per beneficiary

A first step to estimate the cost effectiveness of the programme is to calculate the project cost per beneficiary. We conducted a structured interview with the project manager and the external consultant responsible for the project implementation[21] on 15 July 2013 using the 'budget survey' as described in section 0. In addition, we used the annual financial reports and progress reports of the project to Hivos to complete the information reported in this section. Hence, the cost figures are based on the actual costs reported by SwissContact.

Table 12 summarizes the collected financial information for years 2011-2013, and reports the estimate of the costs per beneficiary for 2013, when the training activities for direct beneficiaries have taken place.

[21] `The interview was conducted with Aldi Surianingrat, external consultant leading the project implementation (and deputy executive director of SwissContact Indonesia until December 2011), and Dedi P Hutahaean, project manager at SwissContact Indonesia.

The yearly total project costs are calculated based on the detailed expenditure data indicating the financial accounting date of the costs. The financial report provides information for a 12 or 13 months period starting in June/July.[22] The total costs of the project between June 2011 and October 2013 were 1,555,451,773 Indonesian rupiahs (or 116,412 EUR using yearly average exchange rate).[23] This amount is 82% of the approved budget of 141,263 EUR (or 1,695,150,000 IDR).[24,25]

From the total project budget, Hivos funded 1,295,150,000 IDR (or 107,929 EUR) for the costs of SwissContact, or 76% of the budget. The remaining project budget is funded by ASPPUK and Melati cooperative, and these it is used for the expenses of field officers and transportation costs.

Based on the cost information of SwissContact until June 2013, the majority of costs incurred by SwissContact (and funded by Hivos) cover personnel costs (70%) and administration costs (13%). The activity related costs are the costs of meetings with project stakeholders for the capacity building of PPSW and ASPPUK (7%), costs of activities related to product development (4%) and travel related project costs (6%).

Hence, only part of the total costs is directly related to activities attended by direct beneficiaries. These are the product development costs (workshop costs), part of the travel costs and fees for the external consultant giving the trainings (accounted under the capacity building costs). We calculated these costs by selecting the cost items related to the workshops (by date and name of consultant and project manager who gave the trainings). The total workshop related costs amount to 259,058,865 IDR (or 18,606.54 EUR) in 2013 (as reported in column 5 of Table 12). This is 17% of the total project costs. However, the costs incurred by ASPPUK and Melati cooperative are not included in these figures. In addition, the calculated costs include only directly related project costs and exclude the share of personnel (fees of the project manager) and administration costs.

[22] This allocation of costs between the years may be not completely accurate if the fees for staff are accounted in the end of the reporting period for the full reporting period.

[23] Unfortunately, we do not have information about the exchange rate used for the project. Instead we use the annual average exchange rate from http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/. The exchange rates used are 12,264 IDR/EUR in 2011, 12,087 IDR/EUR in 2012 and 13,923 IDR/EUR in 2013.

[24] Source: correspondence with Hivos project officer Miranda Rustam. The exchange rate used is 12,000 IDR/EUR.

[25] The project budget in euros is used to calculate the percentage of budget spent due to the exchange rate fluctuations of the Indonesian rupiahs to euros.

**Table 12: Overview of the costs and number of beneficiaries**

| Year | Number of months[1] | Total costs [IDR] | Total costs [EUR, current prices][2] | Costs of workshops [IDR] | Percentage of costs funded by CFA (through MFS II) | Number of direct beneficiaries | Cost per beneficiary per year [Int$ 2011][3] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **2011** | 7 | 156,089,768 | 12,727 | - | 62% | - | - |
| **2012** | 12 | 291,265,896 | 24,097 | - | 77% | - | - |
| **2013** | 10 | 1,108,096,109 | 79,587 | 259,058,865 | 92% | 125 | 562.8 |
| **Total** | **29** | **1,555,451,773** | **116,412** | **259,058,865** | **86%** | **125** | **562.8** |

Sources: 1st and 2nd Annual Financial Report to Hivos and Progress Report May-October 2013.
Notes:
1. Number of months covered in the financial report.
2. Annual average exchange rate is used. Data is obtained from http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/
3. PPP conversion factor to 2011 international dollars is calculated using the World Development Indicators: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#.

The table also reports on the unit cost of the project. The unit of the project could be considered as the number of participants benefiting from the trainings. Based on project information, there are 125 such beneficiaries (column 7 in Table 12). Table 12 reports on the cost per beneficiary in International dollars (Int$). International dollars at 2011 prices[26] are used for the cost per unit calculation because it takes both purchasing power parity and inflation into account that would not be the case if we reported the unit costs in euros. Hence, using Int$, the costs can easily be compared across time and countries.

Column 8 in Table 12 reports that the costs per direct beneficiary amount to 2,072,471 IDR or 562.8 Int$ per beneficiary. This number is calculated for the workshops on average. In fact, 3 separate workshops have been organised with 3 groups of beneficiaries at 3 different locations. However, the total number of days attended by beneficiaries is similar among the workshops for the reporting period (Febr-June 2013) as can be seen in Table 1 (101 days in Tambora, 100 days in Sukohardjo and 90 days in Ungaran).

## 10.2. Cost-benefit

As the next step, the unit costs of the project are compared to the benefits derived from the GREEN project.

Unfortunately, our measures of the project's benefits are not very precise due to the small size of the female entrepreneurs reached by the project in the selected study area. However, both the qualitative and the available quantitative data suggest that the project was successful in increasing the skillset of the participants. However, this did not significantly impact the livelihood of the beneficiaries. It is

[26] The following exchange rates are used based on PPP conversion factor using the World Development Indicators: 3,606.57 IDR/Int$ in 2011, 3,636.38 IDR/Int$ in 2012, 3,682.25 IDR/Int$ in 2013 and 4,530.90 IDR/Int$ in 2014. Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#

difficult to say whether the present value of the total benefits from the project outweigh the costs of the trainings.

It is even more difficult to infer the monetary value of project's benefits on the female entrepreneurs' associations (ASPPUK and PPSW). This task is beyond the scope of this report.

### 10.3. Cost effectiveness

Unfortunately, we are not able to compare the costs of trainings in the GREEN project to the costs and benefits of similar projects. Based on Lyby (2001) the Synthesis team (2014) report the unit cost of trainings on handicrafts (needlework) to be between 27.66 Int$ per person in the context of providing the trainings in a refugee camp in Tanzania with a low budget.

However, we cannot consider these costs as representative for Indonesia, and for the GREEN project in particular, as the GREEN project comprehensive strategy for increasing the livelihood of entrepreneurs (linking entrepreneurs to markets) is certainly more costly.

## 11. Contribution of Capacity Development and Civil Society

SwissContact was not selected for the evaluation of capacity development of the SPO and civil society strengthening.

## 12. Conclusion

The GREEN project does not serve as an ideal case study for the evaluation of the effectives of projects aimed at poverty alleviation at the final beneficiary (households) level. Firstly, the GREEN project intended to primarily build the capacity of associations providing assistance to female entrepreneurs in terms of their business development assistance. Hence, the main focus of the project was not on the final beneficiaries in the short term.

Secondly, providing business development services means to link a group of entrepreneurs to the market demand and assisting them in obtaining the raw materials, making attractive designs, increasing their skills of production and marketing, etc. This activity is likely to be implemented at a small scale, as the number of planned training participants (25-50) also showed, due to the scale of the organisations.

Third, the timing of the evaluation was also misaligned, as it happened before the actual project participants have been identified.

With these considerations in mind, the quantities evaluation was complemented with a qualitative evaluation. Both surveys support the findings that (1) the trainings provided interesting new skills for the participants (*kanzashi* and batik techniques); (2) the uptake of these trainings in the daily livelihood activities of the participants was low: only 25% of the participants of the first training on *kanzashi* technique at the Melati cooperative decided to make use of the acquired skills in their livelihood activities as a part-time activity, taking up on average 24% of their working time; and (3) the project did not have a significant effect on the profits and earnings of the project participants.

These results cannot be put into perspective since similar projects have not been evaluated in the literature (yet). One possible explanation for the lack of impact of profits and earnings for the GREEN project could be the length of the trainings. Compared to the trainings evaluated in the literature the trainings of the GREEN project were very short.

Moreover, all project beneficiaries already had other livelihood activities. Hence, it is a matter of preference how they allocate their working hours among different activities. Given that *kanzashi*s do not result in a higher profit for the women, the project was unlikely to result in a livelihood impact for the beneficiaries. However, on the positive side, participants of the *kanzashi* trainings have a greater flexibility in pursuing livelihood activities that they like or find convenient.

Finally, the MFS synthesis team asked to score each project along a few indicators. Table 13 displays the indicators and the scores we deemed valid for the project.

**Table 13: Overall project scoring**

| Statement | Score | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **1. The project was well designed** | 8 | The project incorporated an earlier successful project of SwissContact with its objective to build the capacity of longer time HIVOS beneficiary organisation. The idea was based on making the results sustainable and possible to replicate in other areas. |
| **2. The project was implemented as designed** | 6 | There have been some challenges in the implementation: the implementing staff at SwissContact changed, and the progress with ASPPUK and PPSW was slow in carrying out the project, which has led to the adjustment of the implementation. |
| **3. The project reached all its objectives** | 6 | The project reached less direct beneficiaries than planned and had only a limited impact on their livelihoods.<br>In addition, at the level of PPSW and ASPPUK, they have not yet shown their abilities in carrying BDS activities. |
| **4. The observed results are attributable to the project interventions** | 7 | The livelihood of most respondents has increased during the evaluation period independent of the project. |
| **5. The observed results are relevant to the project beneficiaries** | 8 | Based on the take up rate of the beneficiaries, the projects activities were only directly relevant for a fraction of the beneficiaries.<br>However, the techniques learned during the trainings covered relevant skills for the beneficiaries. |
| **6. The project was implemented in the most efficient way** | - | We are not able to compare this project to similar projects. |

Notes: Scores are on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being “no agreement at all” and 10 being “completely agree with statement”.

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# Annex I. SPO and project description

### *Swiss Contact*

SwissContact (SC) is an international development organisation with its head office in Switzerland. SC focuses on the development of small enterprises in developing countries.[27] In the 1960s, SwissContact built up the first vocational training projects in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Later, in the 1980s, it developed the first small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) support concepts, as there was a great need in this domain, especially for graduates from vocational schools. SMEs find it very difficult to get inexpensive operational and investment loans, which is why programmes were developed to help overcome these problems. As regards environmental protection, SwissContact has mainly been involved in developing methods to combat air pollution. SwissContact specialises in project management, focusing now on Vocational Education and Training, SME Promotion, Financial Services and Resource Efficiency. SC has been working in Indonesia for over 30 years. SC has its country office in Jakarta, and a field office in NTT.

### *PPSW*[28]

PPSW is the Indonesian abbreviation of Women's Association for Resource Development Centre, which is a women's Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) assisting and developing women's groups since its establishment in 1986. Currently, more than 14,000 people joined in 457 groups that are distributed over 6-Provinces: DKI Jakarta, Banten, West Java, West Kalimantan, Riau and Aceh. PPSW's main objective is the empowerment of women, especially those in the lowest socio-economic strata of society. Hivos works together with PPSW in improving professionalism of microfinance programmes in Jakarta, West Java and Banten provinces. Besides providing assistance in microfinance, PPSW also provides assistance in economic activities of women groups.

### *ASPPUK*[29]

ASPPUK is the Indonesian abbreviation of Women's Association of Small Enterprises, which is a network of NGOs which work towards the empowerment of women's small micro enterprises. Women groups in each district are usually assisted by a local NGO. Hivos has worked together with ASPPUK in Central Java since the end of 2005.

### *Melati cooperative*[30]

The Melati cooperative is a women's cooperative located in the Prinagpus area. The cooperative was established in 1999 and currently has 600 members. With the assistance of ASSPUK, a local NGO that works in the area, the turnover of this savings and loan cooperative is more than IDR 60 million. 90% of the cooperative members are craftspeople specialised in house appliances such as mats, table cloths and other products based on garment production waste. The Cooperative board has is considering to

[27] See also: http://www.swisscontact.org/english/pages/AR/AR.php?navanchor=2110011
[28] Source: SwissContact-Access project (2011) and Hivos Midterm report.
[29] See above.
[30] See above.

expand its business by increasing the number of members, develop new products, and improve the quality - quantity and the market channel.

### *Project result chain*

Below the GREEN project is described in terms of the planned project activities, outputs and outcomes.

**Activities**

The project consists of three types of activities.

First, development and implementation of a joint vision for growth by stakeholders, which includes the following activities:

- Identifying actors/players in the sector.
- Establishing local forum to provide enterprises with access to information and dialogue.
- Organising workshops on developing a joint vision to improving dialogue among players in the area, and establish and document a road map and strategy.

Second, enhancing skills related to purchasing, production and marketing of micro-enterprises through the following activities:

- Organising field visits to improve market linkages, business productivity and quality and access to business information and facilities.
- Organising training session to improve market linkages, business productivity and quality and access to business information and facilities.
- Organising coaching sessions to improve market linkages, business productivity and quality and access to business information and facilities.
- Providing access to raw material supplies.

Third, capacity building for business support by organising activities which grant the garment sector access to key services. This is supported by the following activities:

- Promoting and improving access to business services related to quality improvement and market access.
- Promoting and improving access to financial services.
- Improving access to public services.

**Outputs**

Based on the abovementioned activities, the project has the following three outputs:

- Joint vision for growth is developed for the garment sector in the selected project areas
- Skills of micro-enterprises are enhanced in the areas of purchasing, production and marketing.
- Capacity of micro-enterprise umbrella organisations (ASSPUK and PPSW) is developed into becoming BDS providers.

**Outcomes**[31]

As a result of abovementioned activities, micro-enterprises in selected areas are more competitive through improved supply, improved market linkage and improved productivity and product quality. As a result:

- Enterprises profit increase by 15% per annum.
- Increase productivity increase by 20%.
- New market linkages established.
- Increase in new products developed.

These will lead to the improvement of livelihoods of the female micro-entrepreneurs, due to increases in incomes and creation of new jobs.

### *Project implementation*

The project implementation is described in detail in Annex VI. For the evaluation, we are interested in the workshops organised for the direct beneficiaries. Therefore, below we only summarize data about these workshops.

The workshop were organised in 3 locations:

- Sukoharjo (ASSPUK):
  - 1st training on batik coloring on t-shirt material for 50 batik women entrepreneurs in Sukoharjo and Bantul. (2 days in May 2013)
  - 2nd training on batik coloring for 25 batik women entrepreneurs who have implemented skills possessed from the first training. (2 days in July 2013)
- Ungaran (Melati cooperative):
  - 1st Training on brooch making using *Kanzashi* techniques for 45 floor mat women entrepreneurs of Melati Cooperatives in Ungaran. (2 days in June)
  - Enhancement training on brooch making using *Kanzashi* techniques for 15 women entrepreneurs of Melati Cooperatives who have produced brooch after participating in the first training. (2 days in July 2013)
- Tambora (PPSW):
  - Training on brooch making using *Kanzashi* techniques for the Sahabat Wanita Cooperatives (12 days in February-May 2013)

[31] SwissContact-Access project (2011).

# Annex II. Overview outcome indicators and indices

This annex provides a detailed description about the used outcome indicators. In addition, it discusses the variables which were used to construct the outcome indicator indices. Please note that some of the indicators are constructed as indices from multiple questions. In the main text of the report, only the indices are reported for such indicators.

Outcome variables for the project were collected at household level. The outcomes are reported for treatment and comparison households for the baseline and the endline surveys. The sample size can differ among outcome variables because the answers 'don't know' and `refused' are changed to a missing value or because a respondent could skip a question if he/she had no knowledge about what was asked (answered 'no' to a previous question). 'Don't know' responses were also changed to missing if the question had a scale of responses (for example from 1-4). However, if we were interested in the percentage of the households that answered 'yes' to a certain question, it made sense to change the 'don't know' answers to 'no'. All binary (dummy) variables were recoded so that 'No' is 0 and 'Yes' is 100[32]. The mean and total sample size of the indicators is reported in Annex III.
The outcome variables are discussed below one by one.

***Access to (micro) credit, financial services (uniform indicator)***

- *Access*
  - *Households that know a place to borrow money*: In section JK (Use of Financial Services) of the questionnaire it was asked whether the respondent or any other household member know of a place where they can borrow money. The question has 3 answer categories: "Yes", "No" and "Don't Know". In order to generate dummy variable "Don't know" answers were recoded to "No".
- *Borrowing*
  - *Households that have borrowed in the past 12 months*: All information in order to construct the dummy variable was taken from question *jk13* for all households which replied that were successful in securing a loan in the past 12 months. Answer categories `don't know' were replaced by "No".

***Income and livelihood (uniform indicator)***

- *Respondent Income*
  - *Total income per month (1000 Rp)*: The questionnaire includes separate sub sections for income generated from: a. Rug-making, b. *Kanzashi* making (only in endline), c. Other Income Sources (Crops & Livestock, Wages, Own business). The total income variable is created by the sum of income generated by the different income sources mentioned above. Among these, total rug-making income is calculated by multiplying the total amount of patterns created (*rm20*) with the amount received for each pattern (*rm21*). The price is the mean price of each pattern for each separate treatment group

[32] 100 is used instead of 1 in order to report the dummy variables in percentages

(1.Member at baseline, 2. Non-member at baseline, 3. Treatment). The questionnaire captures also input costs for each piece of pattern (*rm22*), the sum of whom is subtracted from the value of the rugs sold; hence the total rug-making income is reported as net income. The total *Kanzashi*-making income is created by multiplying the total amount of patterns created (*km20*) with the amount received for each pattern (*km21*). Total crop&livestock income, total wage income and total own-business income derive from section IS (Other income sources and time allocation) of the questionnaire. Total crop&livestock income is calculated by multiplying the household's net profit (*is06*) with the share of the respondent's working hours *(is02/is02+is04)* as we want to capture the income on a respondent level. Moreover, total wage income derives from question *is09* where the respondent is asked to provide the total income from working for a wage. Total income from own business is calculated by multiplying the household's net profit (*is015*) with the share of the respondent's working hours *(is12/is12+is14)* as we want to capture the income on a respondent level. Furthermore, the total income is divided by 3 (months) in order to report in monthly values. Finally, the total income per month is divided by 1000 as to report in 1000 Rupiah.

- *Asset holdings of households*
  - *Housing facilities index:* In order, that the housing facilities index in the MFS II projects have a meaningful interpretation, we calculate weights for the index components based on their predictive power for household expenditure. The weights are calculated using a population representative survey for Indonesia using regression analysis. We use the IFLS 2007 survey as a population representative sample. From the IFLS 2007 dataset we use aggregate expenditure data, asset ownership and sampling weights. As the aggregate expenditure variable the data analysis uses the logarithm of the monthly per capita expenditure (*lnpce*). The sampling weight used is the cross-sectional sampling weight adjusted for attrition. This weight should be representative of all households living in the IFLS provinces in Indonesia in 2007. Based on the KR section of the IFLS survey, we construct the housing variables that are the same in IFLS and the MFS II surveys. The variables used from the KR section of the MFS II surveys which are also the found in IFLS are: a. *kr01*, b. *kr02*, c. *kr04*, d. *kr07*, e. *kr10* and h. *kr13*. The corresponding variables in IFLS are: a. *kr03,* b. *kr13*, c. *kr16*, d. *kr20*, e. *kr11* and h. *kr24.* There are more variables which are the same between E6 and IFLS, however we wanted to construct a housing facilities asset variable which can be used by all MFS II surveys, thus the variables mentioned above are selected as they are common in most MFS II surveys. The first step is to recode the variables of MFS II surveys in order to have matching answer categories with the variables of IFLS; the same procedure is also followed for the IFLS variables. In addition, as the variable names are not the same among the two datasets, in the IFLS dataset we renamed the common variables as to have the same name with the MFS II variables. After, the aforementioned preparation the two datasets are combined into one dataset. Furthermore, dummy variables are created based on the answer categories of the chosen common variables. The reason behind the construction

of the categorical dummy variables is to include them in the regression of the logarithm of the monthly per capita expenditure on the housing dummies. Nevertheless, not all of the categorical dummies are used in the regression model. The regression does not include dummy variables whose variation is higher than 97% of the sample or lower than 3% of the sample. Moreover, after we performed the regression the next step was to calculate the fitted values by predicting the expenditure based on housing facilities for both the IFLS and MFS II sample. Finally, the last step was to rescale the predicted variable in order to have a zero mean for the IFLS sample by subtracting the mean of the fitted value from the fitted value itself.

Hence, we will be able to infer the livelihood of our survey participants compared to the Indonesian average in 2007: for example, if the value of the index is 0.10 (-0.10), on average, it implies that the sample is approximately 10% better off (worse off) than the average Indonesian household in 2007 based on the predictive power of housing facilities (like drinking water source) on household expenditure.

- *Asset index:* The construction of the asset index follows a similar procedure with the creation of the housing index, however in this case instead of the IFLS dataset the DHS 2012 dataset was used, as DHS includes more common asset variables with the MFS II surveys than the IFLS. Moreover, asset variables were chosen from the KR section of the MFS II surveys which are common with DHS variables. From MFS II dataset questions a. kr11 and b. kr12 were chosen while from the DHS dataset questions a. *hv207*, b. *hv208*, c. *hv209*, d. *hv243a*, e.*hv210*, f. *hv211*, g. *hv212*, h. *sh118c*, i. *hv243d* and j. *hv243c* were selected. The next step was to combine the two datasets and perform a factor analysis of the common variables in order to calculate the asset index. In addition, as mentioned above the 3% rule was also applied for the asset index, excluding from the factor analysis variables with small variation. Finally, the predicted asset index was normalized for the DHS sample (mean 0 and variance 1).

- *Self-reported well-being*
  - *Happiness:* This is a scale variable which is reported only for panel respondents. A panel respondent indicates that the questionnaire was answered by the same respondent between baseline and endline. The variable using a Likert scale takes values from 1 (very happy) to 4 (absolutely not happy). All the information used for the construction of the Happiness variable is taken from question *sw03* of section SW. (Subjective wellbeing) of the questionnaire.
  - *Current wealth status:* This is a scale variable which is reported only for panel respondents. A panel respondent indicates that the questionnaire was answered by the same respondent between baseline and endline. The variable takes values from 1 (poorest) to 6 (richest). All the information used for the construction of the Happiness variable is taken from question *sw04* of section SW. (Subjective wellbeing) of the questionnaire.

***Skills, time allocation and profit***

- *Number of patterns (rug)*
    - *Number of simple patterns (round, square, oval) :* All information in order to construct the variable were taken from question *rm19* for all households which gave as an answer categories: 1. Small ordinary round, 2. Small heart motive, 3. Mango motive, 4. Medium ordinary round, 5. Medium heart motive, 7. Big ordinary round, 8. Big heart motive, 13. Small round with semi-motive, 16. Medium round semi motive, 19. Big round with semi motive, 25. Small ordinary square, 28. Big ordinary square, 32. Small ordinary oval, 34. Big ordinary oval.
    - *Number of figurative patterns (turtle, fish, elephant figure) :* All information in order to construct the variable were taken from question *rm19* for all households which gave as an answer categories: 6. Micky motive, 9. Telletubies motive, 10. Jumbo ordinary round, 11. Sitting Panda motive, 12. Cat motive, 14. Walking panda motive, 15. Balem, 17. Chicken motive, 18. Tablecloth motive, 20. Elephant motive, 21. Calligraphy motive, 22. Jumbo round semi-motive, 23. Tortoise motive etc.
- *Number of patterns (Kanzashi):* All information in order to construct the variable was taken from question *km19* by summing together the types of *Kanzashi* patterns which were created for each household.
- *Number of hours worked per week:* The total number of hours worked per week is created by summing questions *rm23, is02, is08, is12, km23,* after they were earlier divided by 13 (weeks) as the questions capture a 3 month period.
- *Profit per hour of work (Rp):* The profit per hour of work is actually 6 different variables 1. Profit per hour of work for all activities, 2. Profit per hour of Rug making, 3. Profit per hour of *Kanzashi* making, 4. Profit per hour of cultivating crops and raising livestock, 5. Profit per hour of working for a wage and 6. Profit per hour of working in small business.

***Links to market***

- *Inputs from cooperative/group:* All information in order to construct the dummy variable was taken from question *rm10* where the respondent was asked where he/she gets the input material; if among the answers given were *A. Bought from cooperative Perempuan Melati* or B*. Bought from rug making group,* then the dummy variable takes the value of 1.

***Volume of traded goods (uniform indicator)***

- *Value of sold rugs per month (1000 Rupiah):* The variable is calculated by multiplying the number of patterns created in the past 3 months (*rm20*) by the mean price of rugs sold[33]. Furthermore, the value of sold rugs is divided by 3 (months) in order to report in monthly values. Finally, the value of sold rugs per month is divided by 1000 as to report in 1000 Rupiah.
- *Percentage of households that have small business:* All the information for the construction of the dummy variable was taken from question *is10* where the respondent was asked to provide

[33] The mean price is the average price of rugs sold by treatment group and rug type.

information whether during the past 3 months, did the respondent work in a family-owned, non-farm business like trade/retailing or been self-employed in a non-farm enterprise.

- *Net profits from small business (1000 Rupiah):* The variable is created by diving the respondent's total income from own business with 1000 as to report in 1000 Rupiah. For the calculation of the respondent's total income from own business the same procedure as mentioned before (total monthly income) is followed.

***Food security and vulnerability***

- *Households that have emergency savings for at least one month:* All information in order to construct the dummy variable was taken from question *kk03* for all households which replied that have set aside emergency or rainy day fuds that would cover their expenses for one month, in case of sickness, job loss, economic downturn or other emergencies. Answer categories `refused' and `don't know' were recoded to zero.
- *Households not able to cover their living costs/ have not enough to eat:* All information in order to construct the dummy variable was taken from question *jk02* where the respondent was asked if sometimes people find that their income does not quite cover their living costs during the last 12 months. Answer category `don't know' was recoded to zero.
- *Current standard of living (daily needs covered):* Scale variable asked to panel respondents taking values 1 (not enough to fulfil my daily needs), 2 (only enough to fulfil my daily needs), 3 (more than enough to fulfil my daily needs). Answers 'don't know' where replaced with a missing value. All the information was taken from question *sw01*.
- *Current standard of living (food consumption):* Scale variable asked to panel respondents taking values 1 (not enough to fulfil my daily needs), 2 (only enough to fulfil my daily needs), 3 (more than enough to fulfil my daily needs). Answers 'don't know' where replaced with a missing value. All the information was taken from question *sw02*.

# Annex III. Summary statistics of variables

**Table 14: Summary statistics**

| Variable | Baseline | | Endline | | Change (Endline-Baseline) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Sample | Mean | Sample | Mean | Sample | Mean |
| **Respondent characteristics** | | | | | | |
| Female (%) | 100 | 100.0 | 105 | 100.0 | 100 | 0.0 |
| Household Head (%) | 100 | 17.0 | 105 | 8.6 | 100 | -8.0 |
| Age | 100 | 38.3 | 105 | 39.6 | 100 | 1.4 |
| Education (%) | | | | | | |
| *No/Islamic* | 100 | 5.0 | 105 | 6.7 | 100 | 2.0 |
| *Primary* | 100 | 61.0 | 105 | 58.1 | 100 | 0.0 |
| *Secondary* | 100 | 34.0 | 105 | 34.3 | 100 | -3.0 |
| *Higher* | 100 | 0.0 | 105 | 1.0 | 100 | 1.0 |
| Subjective well-being 5-years ago | 100 | 2.5 | 100 | 2.4 | 100 | -0.1 |
| **Household characteristics** | | | | | | |
| Household (HH) size | 100 | 3.9 | 105 | 4.2 | 100 | 0.2 |
| Female HH head (%) | 100 | 17.0 | 105 | 8.6 | 100 | -8.0 |
| Main income source (%) | | | | | | |
| *Crop Farming* | 100 | 16.0 | 105 | 14.3 | 100 | -1.0 |
| *Non-farm Business* | 100 | 30.0 | 105 | 23.8 | 100 | -6.0 |
| *Wage* | 100 | 44.0 | 105 | 58.1 | 100 | 13.0 |
| Membership in […] (%) | | | | | | |
| Farming Group | 100 | 13.0 | 105 | 12.4 | 100 | 0.0 |
| Farming Cooperative | 100 | 0.0 | 105 | 0.0 | 100 | 0.0 |
| Saving & Credit Group | 100 | 11.0 | 105 | 18.1 | 100 | 5.0 |
| Saving & Credit Cooperative | 100 | 43.0 | 105 | 56.2 | 100 | 11.0 |
| Hand-crafts and other economic groups | 100 | 36.0 | 105 | 55.2 | 100 | 18.0 |
| Hands-crafts cooperative | 100 | 1.0 | 105 | 0.0 | 100 | -1.0 |
| **Rug making characteristics** | | | | | | |
| Rug making as livelihood activity in past 12/24 months | 100 | 100.0 | 105 | 99.0 | 100 | -1.0 |
| Years of experience in rug making | 99 | 8.9 | 0 | | 0 | |
| Number Of Rug Patterns Respondent Can Make | 100 | 2.8 | 93 | 2.8 | 88 | -0.1 |
| Share of Rug Making Income of Total Income (%) | 96 | 77.1 | 102 | 56.4 | 93 | -22.1 |
| **Treatment exposure** | | | | | | |
| Heard about Melati Cooperative (%) | 100 | 82.0 | 105 | 82.9 | 100 | 0.0 |
| Heard about Anugrah Rug making group (%) | 100 | 61.0 | 105 | 78.1 | 100 | 17.0 |
| Member of Melati cooperative (%) | 100 | 41.0 | 105 | 52.4 | 100 | 9.0 |
| Member of Anugrah rug making group (%) | 100 | 37.0 | 105 | 52.4 | 100 | 14.0 |
| Buys Input material from Melati Cooperative (%) | 100 | 57.0 | 104 | 54.8 | 99 | -4.0 |

| Variable | Baseline | | Endline | | Change (Endline-Baseline) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Sample | Mean | Sample | Mean | Sample | Mean |
| Participated In Any Training Related To Rug-Making (%) | 100 | 22.0 | 105 | 35.2 | 100 | 10.0 |
| Topics discussed in training | | | | | | |
| *Design of Drugs* | 22 | 90.9 | 37 | 56.8 | 16 | -31.3 |
| *Organisation of Work* | 22 | 22.7 | 37 | 0.0 | 16 | -25.0 |
| *Ergonomic Workplace* | 22 | 9.1 | 37 | 0.0 | 16 | -6.3 |
| *Financial Literacy* | 22 | 54.5 | 37 | 21.6 | 16 | -18.8 |
| *Marketing/Promossion* | 22 | 63.6 | 37 | 18.9 | 16 | -43.8 |
| *Motivation* | 22 | 72.7 | 37 | 2.7 | 16 | -68.8 |
| *Built Networking* | 22 | 22.7 | 37 | 0.0 | 16 | -18.8 |
| *Learning making other types of craft* | 22 | 22.7 | 37 | 29.7 | 16 | -6.3 |
| *Kanzashi making* | 0 | | 37 | 54.1 | 0 | |
| *Other topics* | 22 | 0.0 | 37 | 21.6 | 16 | 31.3 |
| **Outcome indicators** | | | | | | |
| Know a place to borrow money (%) | 100 | 97.0 | 105 | 99.0 | 100 | 2.0 |
| Have Borrowed Money In Past 12 Months (%) | 100 | 51.0 | 105 | 48.6 | 100 | -4.0 |
| Total Monthly Income (1000Rp) | 100 | 480.6 | 105 | 704.6 | 100 | 211.2 |
| Housing facilities index | 100 | 0.1 | 105 | 0.2 | 100 | 0.1 |
| Asset index | 100 | -0.1 | 105 | 0.2 | 100 | 0.3 |
| Overall Happiness | 100 | 2.0 | 100 | 2.0 | 100 | 0.0 |
| Current Subjective Wealth Status | 100 | 2.8 | 100 | 2.9 | 100 | 0.1 |
| Nr. of simple patterns | 100 | 1.7 | 100 | 1.7 | 100 | 0.0 |
| Nr. of figurative patterns | 100 | 1.1 | 100 | 1.1 | 100 | 0.0 |
| Nr. of *Kanzashi* patterns | 100 | 0.0 | 105 | 0.1 | 100 | 0.0 |
| Number of hours worked per week | 100 | 70.9 | 105 | 55.9 | 100 | -15.4 |
| Profit per hour overall (from all activities) (Rp) | 92 | 897.9 | 103 | 1,037.0 | 90 | 133.2 |
| Inputs from cooperative/group (%) | 100 | 59.0 | 105 | 67.6 | 100 | 8.0 |
| Value of Sold Rugs per Month (1000Rp) | 90 | 262.2 | 92 | 256.4 | 77 | -7.0 |
| Households have small business (%) | 100 | 13.0 | 105 | 33.3 | 100 | 19.0 |
| Profits from Small Business Monthly (1000 Rp) | 100 | 16.6 | 105 | 80.7 | 100 | 61.4 |
| Nr. Of Months Could Not Cover Living Costs | 100 | 1.3 | 105 | 0.9 | 100 | -0.3 |
| Nr. Of Months Could Not Enough To Eat | 100 | 0.3 | 105 | 0.2 | 100 | -0.1 |
| Current Standard Of Living: Daily Needs Covered | 100 | 2.1 | 100 | 2.1 | 100 | 0.0 |
| Current Standard Of Living: Food Consumption Covered | 100 | 2.2 | 100 | 2.2 | 100 | -0.0 |
| **Source of loan (%)** | | | | | | |
| *Banks* | 51 | 33.3 | 51 | 25.5 | 28 | -7.1 |
| *Cooperative (%)* | 51 | 52.9 | 51 | 56.9 | 28 | 0.0 |
| *Employer (%)* | 51 | 0.0 | 51 | 3.9 | 28 | 7.1 |
| *Money Lender (%)* | 51 | 2.0 | 51 | 0.0 | 28 | -3.6 |
| **Months could not cover living costs (%)** | | | | | | |
| *January* | 100 | 4.0 | 105 | 4.8 | 100 | 1.0 |

| Variable | Baseline | | Endline | | Change (Endline-Baseline) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Sample | Mean | Sample | Mean | Sample | Mean |
| *February* | 100 | 3.0 | 105 | 2.9 | 100 | 0.0 |
| *March* | 100 | 4.0 | 105 | 1.9 | 100 | -2.0 |
| *April* | 100 | 3.0 | 105 | 3.8 | 100 | 1.0 |
| *May* | 100 | 5.0 | 105 | 7.6 | 100 | 3.0 |
| *June* | 100 | 11.0 | 105 | 16.2 | 100 | 6.0 |
| *July* | 100 | 19.0 | 105 | 26.7 | 100 | 8.0 |
| *August* | 100 | 19.0 | 105 | 18.1 | 100 | 0.0 |
| *September* | 100 | 27.0 | 105 | 2.9 | 100 | -24.0 |
| *October* | 100 | 26.0 | 105 | 1.9 | 100 | -24.0 |
| *November* | 100 | 4.0 | 105 | 1.9 | 100 | -2.0 |
| *December* | 100 | 2.0 | 105 | 1.0 | 100 | -1.0 |
| **Months could not have enough to eat (%)** | | | | | | |
| *January* | 100 | 0.0 | 105 | 1.0 | 100 | 1.0 |
| *February* | 100 | 0.0 | 105 | 1.9 | 100 | 2.0 |
| *March* | 100 | 0.0 | 105 | 1.0 | 100 | 1.0 |
| *April* | 100 | 1.0 | 105 | 2.9 | 100 | 2.0 |
| *May* | 100 | 1.0 | 105 | 1.0 | 100 | 0.0 |
| *June* | 100 | 2.0 | 105 | 1.9 | 100 | 0.0 |
| *July* | 100 | 4.0 | 105 | 3.8 | 100 | 0.0 |
| *August* | 100 | 8.0 | 105 | 1.9 | 100 | -6.0 |
| *September* | 100 | 5.0 | 105 | 0.0 | 100 | -5.0 |
| *October* | 100 | 5.0 | 105 | 0.0 | 100 | -5.0 |
| *November* | 100 | 1.0 | 105 | 0.0 | 100 | -1.0 |
| *December* | 100 | 1.0 | 105 | 0.0 | 100 | -1.0 |
| Composition of total income (%) | | | | | | |
| *Income from Rug Making* | 96 | 77.1 | 102 | 56.4 | 93 | -22.1 |
| *Income from Kanzashi making* | 96 | 0.0 | 102 | 1.3 | 93 | 1.0 |
| *Crop&Livestock Income* | 96 | 2.7 | 102 | 6.2 | 93 | 4.0 |
| *Wage Income* | 96 | 17.6 | 102 | 29.6 | 93 | 13.1 |
| *Income from Own Business* | 96 | 2.6 | 102 | 6.5 | 93 | 3.9 |
| Composition of hours worked (%) | | | | | | |
| Rug making | 100 | 68.2 | 103 | 54.2 | 98 | -14.5 |
| Crop&Livestock production | 100 | 10.0 | 103 | 7.7 | 98 | -2.1 |
| Wage employment | 100 | 12.6 | 103 | 22.0 | 98 | 9.8 |
| Own Business | 100 | 9.2 | 103 | 14.8 | 98 | 6.0 |
| *Kanzashi* making | 100 | 0.0 | 103 | 1.4 | 98 | 0.9 |
| Profit per hour (Rp) | | | | | | |
| *Rug Making (Rp)* | 87 | 1,867.1 | 92 | 2,347.9 | 75 | 452.5 |
| *Kanzashi Making (Rp)* | 13 | 0.0 | 5 | 3,319.7 | 1 | 4,098.8 |
| *Crop&Livestock (Rp)* | 30 | 950.8 | 39 | 3,127.7 | 20 | 2,621.1 |
| *Working for Wage (Rp)* | 22 | 3,876.1 | 46 | 5,820.3 | 19 | 2,482.9 |
| *Own Business (Rp)* | 13 | 586.5 | 30 | 2,031.8 | 9 | 1,946.2 |

Source: Household survey E5; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

# Annex IV. Description of survey locations

Wonorejo and Wonoyoso villages are located in Pringapus sub-district, Semarang district. Wonorejo village consists of 5 dusun, namely Lengkong, Sambiroto, Wonorejo, Durenan and Mranak dusun. While Wonoyoso village consists of 6 dusun, they are Dawung, Kawah, Larangan, Rejosari, Sambeng and Wonoasri. These two villages are located at the border of industrial areas where garments and clothing factories are.

The area around the two villages tends to be hilly and most of the land is used for farming. The villages are not too far from the main road which connects Semarang province with Yogyakarta. The access to get this village is relatively easy. We can either drive our own vehicle or take public transportation called Colts (mini bus).

Most people in both villages are working in the farming sector, and are either land owners or farming labourers, or they work in factories around the villages which specialise in handicrafts, furniture, mats, mattresses, clothing, and plastic waste recycling. Since the number of garment and clothing factories is so high in thes areas and material waste is abundant, home industries which make use of the rags are flourishing. One of these home industries is rug making, which is mostly done by women and housewives. Rug making is not costly, it is easy to learn and can be done as a side job.

The rug making industry in these villages began in 1998, when Indonesia faced an economy crisis and many factories in the Pringapus sub-district were closed down and unemployment soared. Therefore, the rug making home industry was greatly welcomed by villagers, particularly the women. Nowadays, the number of rug makers per village is very high, and the designs are becoming more advanced as the makers become more skilled and creative. Also, there are plenty of cooperatives and social organisations which can give advice to these small micro-enterprises if needed.

# Annex V. Additional explanatory variables

### Table 15: Source of loan

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Group** | **Non-member at baseline** | | | | **Member at baseline** | | | | | **Treatment** |
| **Period** | **Base** | **End** | **Change** | **P(1v2)** | **Base** | **P(1v5)** | **End** | **Change** | **P(5v7)** | **End** |
| **Source of loan** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Banks | 56.3 | 20.0 | -11.1 | 0.772 | 23.5 | 0.007 | 29.6 | -5.3 | 0.446 | 25.0 |
| Cooperative | 25.0 | 50.0 | 22.2 | 0.374 | 64.7 | 0.024 | 63.0 | -10.5 | 0.546 | 50.0 |
| Employer | 0.0 | 5.0 | 11.1 | 0.374 | 0.0 | | 3.7 | 5.3 | 0.546 | 0.0 |
| Money Lender | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 2.9 | 0.415 | 0.0 | -5.3 | 0.446 | 0.0 |

Source: Household survey E5; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

### Table 16: Profit per hour per livelihood activity

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Group** | **Non-member at baseline** | | | | **Member at baseline** | | | | **Treatment** |
| **Period** | **Base** | **End** | **Change** | **P(1v2)** | **Base** | **End** | **Change** | **P(5v6)** | **End** |
| Profit per hour Rug Making (Rp) | 1,690.1 (154.6) | 1,901.6 (157.7) | 177.9 (233.4) | 0.537 | 2,041.6 (178.9) | 2,654.8 (236.7) | 652.8 (280.4) | 0.254 | 3,220.8 (1,384.2) |
| Profit per hour *Kanzashi* Making | | | | | | | | | 3,319.7 (673.8) |
| Profit per hour Crop&Livestock | 491.9 (247.4) | 3,733.5 (2,299.6) | 5,309.4 (5,037.2) | 0.345 | 1,352.4 (823.4) | 2,256.8 (723.7) | -67.3 (994.3) | 0.926 | |
| Profit per Hour from Wage | 3,868.9 (721.1) | 6,062.5 (531.1) | 2,541.3 (783.7) | 0.041 | 3,883.3 (281.6) | 5,657.2 (541.8) | 2,417.9 (746.0) | 0.236 | |
| Profit per hour Own Business | 1,991.8 (1,013.0) | 854.0 (426.0) | -62.0 (1,721.6) | 0.977 | 183.2 (140.4) | 1,795.2 (854.2) | 2,520.0 (1,987.5) | 0.177 | |

Source: Household survey E5; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard errors given in parentheses. Standard errors are robust and corrected for clustering at the village level.

**Table 17: Composition of income: share of livelihood activities**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Group** | **Non-member at baseline** | | | | **Member at baseline** | | | | | **Treatment** |
| **Period** | **Base** | **End** | **Change** | **P(1v2)** | **Base** | **P(1v5)** | **End** | **Change** | **P(5v7)** | **End** |
| Rug Making (%) | 78.0 | 56.8 | -21.2 | 0.006 | 75.7 | 0.950 | 55.2 | -21.3 | 0.028 | 62.9 |
| *Kanzashi* making (%) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 22.4 |
| Crop&Livestock (%) | 1.8 | 7.0 | 5.4 | 0.245 | 3.6 | 0.377 | 6.1 | 2.6 | 0.656 | 0.0 |
| Wage Income (%) | 16.6 | 31.7 | 14.6 | 0.133 | 19.1 | 0.917 | 30.5 | 11.8 | 0.019 | 6.5 |
| Own Business (%) | 3.6 | 4.6 | 1.1 | 0.356 | 1.6 | 0.400 | 8.1 | 6.8 | 0.440 | 8.2 |

Source: Household survey E5; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

**Table 18: Composition of hours worked: share of livelihood activities**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Group** | **Non-member at baseline** | | | | **Member at baseline** | | | | | **Treatment** |
| **Period** | **Base** | **End** | **Change** | **P(1v2)** | **Base** | **P(1v5)** | **End** | **Change** | **P(5v7)** | **End** |
| Rug Making (%) | 65.8 | 59.5 | -11.2 | 0.014 | 64.4 | 0.762 | 47.3 | -17.0 | 0.153 | 65.6 |
| Crop&Livestock (%) | 12.2 | 10.0 | -0.1 | 0.942 | 9.0 | 0.287 | 6.2 | -2.8 | 0.281 | 0.0 |
| Wage Income (%) | 15.4 | 21.7 | 7.5 | 0.293 | 13.5 | 0.779 | 24.1 | 9.9 | 0.081 | 8.0 |
| Own Business (%) | 6.6 | 8.8 | 3.9 | 0.331 | 13.1 | 0.272 | 22.4 | 9.9 | 0.257 | 2.3 |
| *Kanzashi* making (%) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 24.1 |

Source: Household survey E5; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

### Table 19: Number of hours per week worked in livelihood activities

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Group** | **Non-member at baseline** | | | | **Member at baseline** | | | | | **Treatment** |
| **Period** | **Base** | **End** | **Change** | **P(1v2)** | **Base** | **P(1v5)** | **End** | **Change** | **P(5v7)** | **End** |
| Rug Making | 24.6 | 31.1 | -0.8 | 0.761 | 19.6 | 0.101 | 21.2 | 0.8 | 0.939 | 43.7 |
| Crop&Livestock | 8.1 | 4.5 | -3.6 | 0.671 | 17.9 | 0.237 | 2.3 | -15.6 | 0.202 | 0.0 |
| Wage Income | 12.8 | 10.3 | -2.5 | 0.741 | 10.9 | 0.806 | 14.0 | 3.1 | 0.366 | 4.8 |
| Own Business | 4.0 | 9.6 | 5.6 | 0.244 | 8.1 | 0.412 | 17.2 | 9.1 | 0.297 | 1.4 |
| *Kanzashi* making | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 22.3 |

Source: Household survey E5; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

### Table 20: Months household was not able to cover living costs

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Group** | **Non-member at baseline** | | | | **Member at baseline** | | | | | **Treatment** |
| **Period** | **Base** | **End** | **Change** | **P(1v2)** | **Base** | **P(1v5)** | **End** | **Change** | **P(5v7)** | **End** |
| January | 2.0 | 4.0 | 2.0 | 0.824 | 6.1 | 0.313 | 6.1 | 0.0 | 1.000 | 0.0 |
| February | 2.0 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 1.000 | 4.1 | 0.688 | 4.1 | 0.0 | 1.000 | 0.0 |
| March | 2.0 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 1.000 | 6.1 | 0.313 | 2.0 | -4.1 | 0.141 | 0.0 |
| April | 2.0 | 4.0 | 2.0 | 0.630 | 4.1 | 0.222 | 4.1 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| May | 2.0 | 8.0 | 6.0 | 0.727 | 8.2 | 0.351 | 8.2 | 0.0 | 1.000 | 0.0 |
| June | 10.0 | 16.0 | 6.0 | 0.630 | 12.2 | 0.791 | 18.4 | 6.1 | 0.324 | 0.0 |
| July | 10.0 | 24.0 | 14.0 | 0.230 | 28.6 | 0.020 | 30.6 | 2.0 | 0.564 | 16.7 |
| August | 14.0 | 16.0 | 2.0 | 0.824 | 22.4 | 0.004 | 22.4 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| September | 24.0 | 2.0 | -22.0 | 0.042 | 28.6 | 0.189 | 4.1 | -24.5 | 0.037 | 0.0 |
| October | 24.0 | 0.0 | -24.0 | 0.117 | 28.6 | 0.603 | 4.1 | -24.5 | 0.141 | 0.0 |
| November | 2.0 | 0.0 | -2.0 | 0.630 | 6.1 | 0.413 | 2.0 | -4.1 | 0.564 | 16.7 |
| December | 2.0 | 0.0 | -2.0 | 0.630 | 2.0 | 0.982 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 1.000 | 0.0 |

Source: Household survey E5; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

**Table 21: Months household did not have enough to eat**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Group** | **Non-member at baseline** | | | | **Member at baseline** | | | | | **Treatment** |
| **Period** | **Base** | **End** | **Change** | **P(1v2)** | **Base** | **P(1v5)** | **End** | **Change** | **P(5v7)** | **End** |
| January | 0.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 0.630 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| February | 0.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 0.630 | 0.0 | | 2.0 | 2.0 | 0.564 | 0.0 |
| March | 0.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 0.630 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 |
| April | 0.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 0.630 | 2.0 | 0.172 | 4.1 | 2.0 | 0.564 | 0.0 |
| May | 0.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 0.630 | 2.0 | 0.425 | 0.0 | -2.0 | 0.564 | 0.0 |
| June | 2.0 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 1.000 | 2.0 | 0.973 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 1.000 | 0.0 |
| July | 2.0 | 4.0 | 2.0 | 0.824 | 6.1 | 0.588 | 4.1 | -2.0 | 0.880 | 0.0 |
| August | 4.0 | 4.0 | 0.0 | | 10.2 | 0.092 | 0.0 | -10.2 | 0.256 | 0.0 |
| September | 4.0 | 0.0 | -4.0 | 0.630 | 6.1 | 0.838 | 0.0 | -6.1 | 0.564 | 0.0 |
| October | 2.0 | 0.0 | -2.0 | 0.630 | 8.2 | 0.395 | 0.0 | -8.2 | 0.399 | 0.0 |
| November | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 2.0 | 0.172 | 0.0 | -2.0 | 0.420 | 0.0 |
| December | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 2.0 | 0.172 | 0.0 | -2.0 | 0.420 | 0.0 |

Source: Household survey E5; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

# Annex VI. Qualitative Report on the GREEN project

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1. Context of the project

Garment and textile industries are the largest contributors to non-oil-and-gas exports in Indonesia. Within the garment industry, Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) generate a large share of total income. Although both the domestic and the export markets in Indonesia are promising for textile products, SMEs continue to have challenges because of their limited capacity at being competitive in these markets. The following reasons can be thought of:

- The procedure: the lack of knowledge in relation to productivity and standard quality
- Producer: the lack of knowledge in relation to design and trend
- The high cost of raw materials
- The limited knowledge in relation to business management and financial records
- The limited access to and information about the market
- The weak organisation and coordination among SMEs and other market participants

Therefore, a programme to improve SME competitiveness is highly needed. The Garment for Economic Empowerment (GREEN) project of HIVOS and SwissContact aimed to address these issues and to improve the competitiveness of SMEs. (Progress Report of GREEN PROJECT, July 2012 to April 2013, SwissContact).

### 1.2. GREEN project

The main purpose of GREEN was to decrease poverty by increasing the income of female entrepreneurs through social empowerment and improving SME competitiveness, with a special attention to women groups of small producers living in rural areas.

SwissContact received a mandate from HIVOS to implement the GREEN project in Central Java Province and Jakarta. The project aimed to improve the capacity of Women Association for Resource Development Centre (PPSW) and Women Companion Association of Small Enterprises (ASSPUK) as Business Development Service (BDS) suppliers for their members. The beneficiaries were patchwork accessories (*kanzashi*) craftswomen in Tambora West Jakarta, patchwork doormat craftswomen in Pringapus, and handwriting batik craftswomen in Polokarto and Sukoharjo. After a feasibility study at these locations, the GREEN project ran between 31 May 2011 and 30 June 2013.

### 1.3. Project activities

The activities of the GREEN project were grouped around 3 strategies:

1. Development and implementation of visions (incorporation of visions) for stakeholders, including the following activities:
    - Identifying actors in this sector
    - Creating a local forum to provide information and dialogue

- Organising workshops on vision development to improve dialogues among actors in the sub district/region and to set and document a road map and a strategy

2. Improving skills in relation to purchasing, producing, and marketing of small businesses through the following activities:

    - Organising field visits to improve market relation, business productivity, as well as quality, information access and facility of doing business.
    - A training session of organising to improve market network, business productivity, as well as quality, information access and facility of doing business.
    - Providing access to raw material supply.

3. Improving capacity to support businesses with the following activities:

    - Promoting and improving access to business services in relation to quality improvement and market access.
    - Promoting and improving access to financial services.
    - Improving access to public services.

Based on the preceding activities, the project had the following expected outputs:

- A joint vision of the stakeholders for the growth of the garment sector in their areas for sustainability
- Improved skills of SMEs in purchasing, producing and marketing through i.a. better bargaining skills which empower the women in both financial and non-financial ways
- Improved capacity of SME Associations (ASSPUK and PPSW) as BDS suppliers through better resource management, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), prices based on social performance and being fair (Progress Report of GREEN PROJECT, July 2012 to April 2013, SwissContact).

### 1.4. Location of the project

The GREEN Project worked with PPSW in Jakarta and ASSPUK in Central Java. Related to PPSW, the beneficiaries of the project were accessories craftswomen in Tambora West Jakarta. In relation to ASSPUK, the beneficiaries were craftswomen of handwritten batik in Polokarto Sukoharjo. In addition, doormat craftswomen (the members of Melati cooperative) in Pringapus were also included in the project.

### 1.5. Objectives of the study

The objective of the GREEN Project Qualitative Study is to know the effects of the organisational capacity improvement of the SME Associations as BDS suppliers and the effects on businesswomen as the beneficiaries. Please note that the in the study only stakeholders and beneficiaries related to the project's activities with ASPPUK were interviewed.

# 2. Methodology

## 2.1. Data collection method

The GREEN Project Qualitative Study was carried using in-depth interviews and focus group discussions (FGD). The in-depth interviews were held with the project management of SwissContact, the management of Melati cooperative, the management of ASPPUK and a trader/buyer.[34] The FGDs were held with patchwork doormat craftswomen (members of Melati cooperative) and with handwriting batik craftswomen. The data collection took place between August and September 2013 (see Table 22).

**Table 22: Schedule of data collection of GREEN study**

| Date | Data Collection Method | Informant | Total number of informants |
|---|---|---|---|
| **29-08-2013** | In-depth interview | SwissContact Indonesia | 2 |
| **02-09-2013** | In-depth interview | Melati Cooperative | 1 |
| **02-09-2013** | Focus Group Discussion | Members of Melati Cooperative | 7 |
| **05-09-2013** | In-depth interview | ASPPUK | 1 |
| **05-09-2013** | Focus Group Discussion | Handwriting Batik Craftswomen in Polokarto | 7 |
| **10-09-2013** | In-depth interview | Buyer | 1 |

During the in-depth interviews, the discussion focused on the following topics: the incorporation of vision, the trainings for purchasing, producing and marketing, the improvement of the institutions as BDS suppliers and the replicability of the project. Topics for the FGDs were focused on the trainings for purchasing, producing and marketing, and the benefits of the project.

## 2.2. The location of the study

The study was conducted at the office of the Melati cooperative in Pringapus and at the office of ASPPUK in Solo, Central Java.

## 2.3. Informants of the study

The selection of the informants was done by the Melati Cooperative and ASPPUK based on the criteria provided by the evaluation team. The criteria for the FGD participants were that the informants had to participate in the training organised by SwissContact on batik and patchwork brooch (*kanzashi*) making, and in addition they had to be members of ASPPUK and Melati cooperative, respectively. All of the participants were women. Information in this report about PPSW and the accessories craftswomen in Tambora West Jakarta is based on information attained from SwissContact.

# 3. General description of project stakeholders

## 3.1. SwissContact Indonesia

SwissContact was asked by HIVOS to implement this project because SwissContact had previous projects related to garments in Jakarta. These projects were quite successful in connecting producers with export companies. After HIVOS visited the Cipulir project of SwissContact, they were interested to replicate the

[34] SwissContact provided a list of two buyers, from which the evaluation team managed to interview only one.

project results in other areas. The GREEN project's idea was that SwissContact could not assist SMEs in Indonesia forever, so improving the capacity of local institutions like ASPPUK and PPSW in the field of entrepreneurship would increase the sustainability of the project.

### 3.2. ASPPUK

The Women's Association of Small Enterprises (ASPPUK) was founded in the beginning of the 1980s by 15 NGOs that had the same concerns regarding the situation of women, such as the lack of attention from the government to SME Businesswomen. ASPPUK focuses on the reinforcement of SME businesswomen as a legal and non-political organisation. ASPPUK assists SMEs in sectors of food production, household crafts (batik, weaving), trade, services and agriculture. ASPPUK has been involved in policy advocacy, in particular by supporting policies related to SMEs. It also had an initiative to strengthen women by advising them to support each other when one felt weak, which was taken up well by the members. ASPPUK also has partner organisations called Small Business Women's Network (JARPUK) at the district level. The management of these JARPUKS is done by the member NGOs. In fact, every NGO has a JARPUK in each district where they operate with 64 JARPUKs in total. These are special units with the purpose to assist female entrepreneurs for example through trainings and workshops, saving and credit groups, regular meetings and advocacy. JARPUK Java has also established a Financial Institution for Women (LKP) in 2011 with a focus on business development. LKP also received exhibition facilities from the government.

ASPPUK is active in Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, West Nusa Tenggara and Sulawesi. ASPPUK Java consists of ASPPUK West Java, ASPPUK Central Java and ASPPUK East Java. The GREEN project works with ASPPUK Central Java. The secretariat of ASPPUK Central Java has 5 staff members. According to the secretariat, the small number of staff members and the lack of funding are obstacles in carrying out their activities.

In order to circumvent the problems caused by insufficient funding, ASPPUK developed a Business Development Centre (BDS) called *Mitra Perempuan Usaha Kecil* (MPUK). It has its own management but its office is located in the same place as that of ASPPUK. ASPPUK had just started MPUK and the only activity conducted so far was to facilitate the market, such as handling the demand for products from Jakarta. However, MPUK has not been able to finance its own activities. If MPUK becomes successful, this could support the sustainability of ASPPUK and provide experience in doing business. This experience is important because the NGOs they accompany had more business capacity than ASPPUK itself.

### 3.3. Batik Craftswomen

Handwritten batik has been one of the surviving clothing products from Central Java since centuries. The sale of handwritten batik is affected by the preferences of patterns and colours in the market, so the entrepreneurs should always know the trends.

Handwritten Batik Craftswomen as an organisation has existed for a long time. Women make the batik/paint the batik, while men do the colouring with a batik cap (copper block stamp). Since the women got their skills from their ancestors, it is without a doubt that they can do this batik painting really well. Although many people regard doing batik painting as easy and an old profession, there are still some youngsters doing batik painting willingly. Women usually do the batik painting individually but

sometimes they work together on orders from large companies. It is possible to work on batik after finishing with the household chores, but patience is essential for the batik painting.

### 3.4. Melati Cooperative

Melati Cooperative and Anugerah doormat making group is led by Bu Roh Prihati and is located in Pringapus. It was established in 2003 and has 600 housewives as members. Due to the 1998 monetary crisis there were many unemployed people in Pringapus. At the same time, there were a lot of garment wastes in the form of textile pieces. Bu Roh Prihati invited the local residents to make doormats of these textile remains to increase their income. Doormat craftswomen were given some series of training to improve the quality of their doormats, as well as to improve the colour combinations and designs, so they could be sold at better prices. Some of these trainings were held by government institutions.

The cooperative purchases all the doormats made by its members, independent of quality, and markets the products. However, members can also sell their products outside of the cooperative. In practice, Melati cooperative and the craftswomen have faced challenges in relation to the marketing of the products. To market the products, the cooperative have used the strategy of direct offering and brochure distributing. In general, the cooperative management uses every opportunity to offer the products, including participating in exhibitions.

### 3.5. PPSW

Women Association for Resource Development Centre (PPSW) is an NGO for women in Indonesia that assists and develops women groups since 1986. There are approximately 18,622 women joining 572 Resource Development Women Groups (KWPS) developed by PPSW in 6 Provinces: DKI) Jakarta, Banten, West Java, West Kalimantan, Riau and Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. PPSW consists of four independent institutions. Those are PPSW Jakarta, PPSE Pasoendan, PPSW Borneo and PPSW Sumatra. Its main purpose is empowering women, especially those who have the lowest socioeconomic status within the society. PPSW focuses on economic, health and education problems by carrying out activities such as giving trainings and workshops. In addition, it also conducts research and gives seminars and workshops to support the activities done together with the poor women.

## 4. Implementation of the GREEN project

The GREEN project was initiated on 31 May 2011 and ended on 30 June 2013. The implementation of the project was divided into two periods: June 2011 – September 2012 (first period) and September 2012 - July 2013 (second period), as seen in Table 23. The activities in the first period were incorporation of vision about BDS with ASPPUK and PPSW, strategy and direction making, inviting partners such as the Indonesian Bank (BI) and the Department of Cooperatives, and advising ASPPUK about their BDS. The activities in the second period were incorporation of vision, and product and marketing trainings to SME businesswomen in Tambora, Pringapus and Solo.

**Table 23: Schedule of incorporation of vision held by SwissContact**

| Time | Place | Participant | Objective | Period |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **July 2011** | Surakarta | ASPPUK, SwissContact | To incorporate vision about the BDS concept | 1 |
| **December 2011** | Jakarta | ASPPUK, PPSW, SwissContact | - To incorporate vision about the BDS concept<br>- To give a description about SME as the market target of BDS<br>- To review the planned services<br>- To improve services<br>- To organise Action Planning Services | 1 |
| **Sept 2012** | Central Java | SwissContact, ASPPUK | Stakeholder Relationship, The role of ASPPUK in the future, Business or Companion Services, model of business. | 2 |
| **October 2012** | Jakarta | ASPPUK, PPSW, SwissContact | To equalize the understanding about GREEN Project, as well as a to have a briefing about the organisation of TA activity planning TA for BDSP" | 2 |

Sources: SwissContact Documents and interview with informants.

## 4.1. First period

### *Inception*

As mentioned before, ASPPUK had already established a BDS called MPUK. ASPPUK realized that it had problems with MPUK, since it usually does not do business. MPUK needs capacity strengthening and consultation to change the paradigm of an NGO being a business commodity. SwissContact understood that ASPPUK was an institution committed to advocacy. A SwissContact facilitator found out that the project, as contracted between HIVOS and ASPPUK, was aimed at increasing businesswomen's income. This is different from the focus on advocacy, since this aim needs business development. For reaching this aim, the BDS needs to be open to the market. This acquires the mind set of ASPPUK to be open. However, ASPPUK said that it wanted to avoid big capital and that prices have to be suited with the cost of production. This requires high prices, while the quality of the production had not been good. Consequently, it was possible that the products could not be sold well. The BDS can strengthen the institution and make it sustainable. As SwissContact stated:

> *"If they do not open their mind sets, they will only be pitied by the donors, they will only get the money. If this happens on and on, the economy cannot be strong. Once the donors*

> *stop giving money, it seems strong from outside, but it is really fragile inside, they have a big billboard but they have no production. It will be futile" (D).*

So, the first thing suggested by SwissContact was to change the mind set of ASPPUK.

### *Vision*

In the first period (before September 2012), a workshop on incorporation of visions was done in Surakarta and Jakarta. According to ASPPUK, there had been two meetings with SwissContact in Surakarta. In the meetings, ASPPUK and some NGOs discussed how to build concepts and how to achieve major goals with BDS. Based on photographic documents and modules by SwissContact, there was a workshop on introduction to BDS and opportunities of BDS, done on 26-27 July 2011, which was facilitated by Ade Swargo Mulyo (Project Manager SwissContact), Miranda Rustam[35] (Project Officer SwissContact) and Noorwahyudi (Founder of Detro Consulting-BDS). While there was a vision difference about BDS before the meeting, it seemed that this meeting had reached a bright spot on the BDS concept to develop. ASPPUK was in line according to SwissContact about the concept of BDS.

ASSPUK stated that there was nearly no communication between SwissContact and ASPPUK for one year. ASPPUK did not know why,[36] as there has been a bright point between two parties about the BDS concept in the meeting. Even though the communication between SwissContact and ASPPUK was interrupted; ASPPUK still continued its ideas since they had already started a BDS. According to its management, this BDS only needed to be finalized.

### *Impact*

Changing the vision of ASPPUK needed longer time than expected, as stated by a SwissContact facilitator:

> *"The process of understanding needs a long time and it is longer than expected. I told HIVOS that we can prepare the BDS in 3 months, but in fact it takes more than 6 months."*

According to the mandate given by HIVOS, SwissContact had to strengthen and advise the companion NGOs, so that they would give their direct assistance to small entrepreneurs for sustainability. Since the project time was limited to 2 years, some attempts were made to find a solution to continue the GREEN project. The solution agreed by ASPPUK was directly strengthening the entrepreneurs in marketing, production and skills instead of advising the NGOs. This method was easier, because it had been applied in other projects.

## 4.2. Second period

### *Vision*

After no communication in a year, the SwissContact team came back to ASPPUK and PPSW in September 2012. This period is called the second period of GREEN. In this period, SwissContact and some members of the management of ASPPUK had two meetings.

[35] Miranda Rustam is Project Officer at Hivos since 2012.

[36] The interruption of the project partially happened due to changes in the staff of SwissContact: both Ade Swargo Mulyo and Miranda Rustam left SwissContact at the end of 2011.

In the first meeting in September 2012, ASPPUK and PPSW were informed about the new plan for business strengthening, which had been stated in the first period. SwissContact expressed its interest in batik and *kanzashi* development. During the meeting, it appeared that there had been miscommunication between SwissContact and ASPPUK. According to the management of ASPPUK, the new SwissContact facilitators did not tell them that ASPPUK got the GREEN Project, as stated by one of the ASPPUK management:

> *"If I am not mistaken SwissContact has been to Klaten, but whether it had something to do with GREEN, we did not know. They never talked about GREEN verbally. They just said we were asked by HIVOS as a business consultant, and they never mentioned GREEN (Y)"*

So ASPPUK misunderstood the concept, with which it agreed before. ASPPUK clarified this to SwissContact. The facilitators did not think that it was an important matter, but it could have a great impact on the implementation of the project itself. The meeting was followed by a field visit to ASPPUK by SwissContact.[37]

In October 2012, SwissContact held a meeting in Jakarta (see Table 24). This meeting aimed at equalizing understandings about the GREEN Project, as well as giving a briefing about the plans for Technical Assistance (TA) to BDS. Participants of the meeting were 4 people from SwissContact, 3 from PPSW and 3 from ASPPUK.

Finally, it was decided that the GREEN project would directly strengthening the 3 groups of female entrepreneurs in marketing, production and skills. In Tambora, the trainings were to focus on *kanzashi*[38] making for members of PPSW, while in Sukoharjo, the trainings were to focus on batik on T-shirts for members of ASSPUK. In addition, for members of the Melati cooperative in Pringapus, trainings on *kanzashi* making were also envisioned.

[37] The evaluation team also interviewed ASPPUK and the facilitator of SwissContact during this field visit at the office of ASPPUK.

[38] *Kanzashi* is an accessory in flower shape, originating from paper origami. Like doormats, it is also made from textile pieces, which could originate from garment waste.

**Table 24: Meeting on Understanding Equalization about GREEN in Jakarta**

| Schedule | Activity |
|---|---|
| **11 Oct 2012** | - A meeting with Mrs. Ade Kartika and Riana (of Alleira Batik)<br>- A visit to Alleira outlet in Senayan City.<br>- A meeting with Mr. Rajendran in Cibinong area, where there was a discussion on the possibility of cooperation plan to supply batik to Jakarta |
| **12 Oct 2012** | An open discussion about the understandings of GREEN Project, roles, positions and responsibilities of the stakeholders as well as determination of the following steps by ASPPUK – Central Java and PPSW – Jakarta |

### *Impact*

ASPPUK stated that it needed a strengthening of its BDS both in management and skills if it wanted to be a business consultant for its members and SwissContact was willing to strengthen the BDS institutionally. ASPPUK understood this and saw it as a big opportunity. The meetings also clarified to ASPPUK that it has to keep strengthening the SMEs after they meet buyers, because they cannot take them for granted. MPUK, the BDS, has its own staff and one of its activities is facilitating the market for its members. Even though the capacity development had not been done yet, ASPPUK hopes that MPUK can support its operational activities in the future. ASPPUK said that SwissContact planned to give training to 15 NGOs in Central Java, but it has not been implemented yet.

The two parties agreed to do a strengthening of the BDS, to strengthen batik craftswomen and to facilitate a market for the products of the members. At this stage, ASPPUK and SwissContact had a lot of communication. Sukoharjo was chosen for the trainings on batik as it is the centre of handwriting batik craftswomen, so it is easy to manage. There was a difference in opinion on the decision of training materials. ASPPUK held its principle that the batik should be produced with natural colouring/dyeing, while SwissContact thought that business had to follow the taste of the market, which required chemical colouring/dyeing. Also, chemical inputs are cheaper and easier to obtain. Although ASPPUK is not an environmental institution, they still have a commitment to the environment. In the end, ASPPUK agreed with the chemical dye.

## 5. Trainings in Sukohardjo

### 5.1. Inception

According to SwissContact, the initial idea was to build a small garment industry in Solo, because there were many big companies, such as Pan Brothers,[39] who were willing to establish a cooperation or employment contracts, lend out sewing machines and give training so that standardized products would be achieved. SwissContact had offered to facilitate ASPPUK to contact the Pan Brothers, but this was not successful because the idea to collaborate with big industry was not accepted by ASPPUK. SwissContact contacted the company, but it did not attend the meeting in September 2011 and there was no continuation.

[39] Pan Brothers is a company in the textile industry, whose main products are clothes.

SwissContact also tried to cooperate with Alleira Batik. It is a batik brand that was founded in 2005. Alleira Batik has its own concept of colouring/dyeing, which made their products shinier than others. SwissContact wanted to discuss about the colouring process, how it is influenced by water content and other things. There had been a discussion with Alleria Batik about possible cooperation and plans to supply batik to Jakarta. However, the cooperation did not go through due to the limited capacity of the target group. SwissContact had to look for another opportunity, which turned out to be trainings on batik design on T-shirts.

## 5.2. Trainings on producing

Training on batik was done twice in Sukoharjo. For incorporating marketing opportunities, SwissContact invited a designer from the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) before the trainings to visit the batik centres in Sukoharjo to assess what could be improved. The initial suggestion from the designer was making bags or accessories, but the samples did not meet the criteria of the buyer. The next idea was to dye/colour T-shirts with a batik cap (copper block stamp). Since the participants of the training have done batik painting generation to generation, they already possessed good skills. Yet, they still used traditional ways. Therefore, SwissContact attempted to increase their increase their income by giving them knowledge about modern techniques.

The training was done twice: 27 – 28 May 2013 and 25-26 July 2013.

### *Trainings on 27-28 May 2013*

The expected results of this training were improved skills in dyeing/colouring, using the batik cap on T-shirts and in designing. It was expected that this would result in an increase in the income of batik craftswomen.

The participants of the training were as many as planned: 50 participants. Most participants were from Sukoharjo, while Bantul and Surakarta craftswomen participated in order to increase the access to the knowledge in the society. The criteria for choosing the participants were being craftswomen of a productive age and being able to draw.

Participants were asked to draw. After making drawings, the best drawer was chosen as the leader of her group. The 50 participants were divided into 10 groups. After drawing on papers, they were asked to draw on T-shirts. Each group expressed their own ideas on the drawings. The participants got trained in how to colour/dye with a batik *cap* using chemical dye.

### *Trainings on 25-26 July 2013*

The expected results of this training were a standardized batik technique and synthetic dyeing/colouring process on T-shirts, a colour catalogue (colour gradation quality) and agreement on the communication process of Purchase Orders (PO) between the buyer and ASPPUK.

There were 25 participants attending the training, in line with what was planned. Those 25 participants were selected from the 50 participants of the first training. The reason of fewer participants in the second training was to make them more focused. Some participants from Surakarta and Bantul also attended this training. The chosen participants were expected to organise when there was a contract/an order.

The speaker of the second training was a buyer candidate from Bandung. If the colour catalogue and the colouring production were in line with the buyer's taste, the participant would get a sub-contract.

### 5.3. Impact

Regarding the first training, participants of the FGD stated that it was interesting but not really suitable for women, as the *cap* tool was too heavy. Therefore, *cap* working was done by men. The benefits from the training were knowledge about making patterns, using the *cap*, and batik dyeing/colouring on T-shirts. FGD participants have not used the *cap* in their business, they still preferred handwritten batik.

After the second training, there has not been any sub-contract with the buyer. However, there were benefits from the second training. The participants now know how to mix the colours with the correct formula so they could produce great colours. In addition, the training participants could make interesting colour combinations, so the products were sold well. However, there was no new market or increased selling price after the training. Still, the chemical batiks sold quicker than before the training because of the better colours and colour combinations. Before the training the products could be sold after a week of the production process, while after the training they were sold in only 3 days after the production process.

The price of naturally coloured batik is higher than the price of chemical batik due to the difference in quality. However, naturally coloured batik has some shortcomings: longer soaking time, repeated process in order to make the colour spread evenly, and strong smell of the soaking. In addition, the chemical inputs are cheaper and easier to obtain than the natural inputs. The batik craftswomen have tried to apply their own natural colouring, but the result was not satisfying. Hence, there should be a breakthrough to reduce the shortcomings of natural colouring, including the raw materials supply of the natural colours. The preceding things have been told to SwissContact, but there was no solution yet.

## 6. Trainings at the Melati cooperative

### 6.1. Inception

SwissContact had two successes in marketing for the Melati Cooperative. First, it linked the cooperative to the Indonesian Bank (BI). BI gave sewing machine assistance, but it is not clear whether this was the result of the activities of SwissContact since the cooperative had been in contact with BI before. Second, SwissContact connected the Melati Cooperative to Surya Citra Television (SCTV). SCTV recorded the activities in the Melati Cooperative because it was interested in SME. This way, the Melati Cooperative became known by the society. SwissContact also tried to contact accessories buyers from Yogyakarta. There had been some communication, but no actions followed yet.

Considering the marketing of *kanzashi*, the Melati Cooperative did not have enough funding to buy all the *kanzashi* from its members, as it did with the doormats. In addition, a place to store the products was not ready yet. As a consequence, the *kanzashi* was marketed individually. Some members sold it at schools, some in working places and some got orders. The cooperative did facilitate its members to join an exhibition of *kanzashi* products as a way of marketing. Also SwissContact helped with the exhibition by providing tools and funding. This was very successful for some, but not so successful for others dependent on the time of the exhibition. The unsold products were put in the cooperative office, so they could be sold when a group was visiting the cooperative.

Some of *kanzashi* craftswomen did a survey to malls to see the latest trend of the accessories, so they could make the products up-to-date. There were always orders of *kanzashi*, so when there were too many orders, they would ask for a help from their sisters/brothers/relatives. The craftswomen trained them themselves.

### 6.2. Trainings on producing

SwissContact facilitated two trainings on accessories making using the *kanzashi* technique for the Melati Cooperative: one on 11-12 June 2013 and one on 22–23 July 2013 in Sambeng village, Pringapus, exactly next to the building of the Melati Cooperative.

#### *Trainings on 11-12 June 2013*

49 of the 50 participants came to the training. The first training was offered to members of the Melati Cooperative and members of the Anugrah Group who were interested in making accessories/brooches. To expand the benefits, some craftswomen who are not member of the Melati Cooperative or the Anugrah Group could join the training. 3 non-members joined.

The participants were introduced to *kanzashi* technique after which the training started. The first training was about making brooches with cotton cloth materials. Participants were divided into 10 groups, each consisting of 5 people. The facilitator supervised by walking around the groups. There was homework given on the first day, which was checked on the second day.

#### *Trainings on 22 – 23 July 2013*

The second training had 13 participants, which were women who had produced *kanzashi* since the first training. This, and the results, were checked with a survey by SwissContact. These participants were interested in knowing more about the *kanzashi* technique.

Lessons in the second training were how to cut clothes and especially satin clothes, how to choose and use good and strong glue, how to use a certain sewing technique and how to choose good clothes to close the back of the brooch. During the training, the women made brooches using satin clothes, so the difficulty level was higher than in the first training. After the first day of training, participants were given homework to make pieces that were going to be checked on the second day. Other things that the women learned to make were headbands, hairpins and rings.

### 6.3. Impact

The benefits of *kanzashi* making were the use of fewer materials and a better selling value than doormats. In addition, the women learned to make more difficult *kanzashi*. Since making *kanzashi* does not require much effort, the women felt lucky to earn money without leaving their home and duty as housewives.

> *"I think this is better. I can take care of my children, and lead them to study. It is only a matter of health. If we are healthy, there will be more results to come(I)"*

From the FGD it was found that all the entrepreneurs that were at the discussion felt optimistic about *kanzashi*. The raw materials were available. The doormat entrepreneurs who had followed the training made *kanzashi* craftworks as their side job. Only one of them made *kanzashi* as her main job, because she was not strong enough to sew with a sewing machine. She was been ill and she had to take care of her parents.

> *"I have done doormats sewing for almost 10 years. I just stopped this year; I just can't make it because I'm often sick. I felt lucky because of this kanzashi training. I felt that this is easier to do, I can do it all the time, and I can sell it easily as well"(Ibu T)"*

The other women kept making doormats since the Melati Cooperative would always buy their produce, giving them a steady income. Since the women make *kanzashi* next to their regular jobs, it increased their income.

Although the training has been finished, SwissContact still visited the entrepreneurs' houses.

> *"It feels great they came to us and they saw our products. I was told that I liked making this model other than models that have been taught to me. I like doing experiments on making other models, and buyers like them anyway", "I got an order of 150 brooches from my cousin"(Ibu T, A)*

# 7. Trainings in Tambora

## 7.1. Inception

In the Mid Term Report of the GREEN Project (July 2011-September 2012) it was stated that the activities done for PPSW in the first period were BDS training in Jakarta, training and facilitating market access in the Tambora sub district and training on crafts making with cloth material for some beneficiaries in the Tambora sub district. At the field visit of SwissContact to Tambora in September 2012 (second period), there were no clear results on the production. The products could not be sold well due to lack of quality. As a solution SwissContact chose an expert in accessories making, a graduate from Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), for finding a special product in the market and a design for that product. For this, they took a look at the beneficiaries in the field and did sewing tests to housewives. They came to an agreement on making *kanzashi* and SwissContact was going to give training in *kanzashi* making.

## 7.2. Trainings on production

According to the activity report about the training and assistance programme for SMEs, trainings were given between 15-19 February, 21-26 February and 26-28 March 2013. Even though SwissContact planned on providing the training to 50 women, the first training was participated by 11 women, the second by 10 women and the third by 9 women. As a reason for this PPSW said that there were many orders from factories for cutting clothes, so most members did not have time. At the training Ibu Meriam (from ITB), Pak Dedi and other staff from PPSW were present. On the first day of the training the women were taught about the theory and practice of making *kanzashi*, after which they were mentored by the facilitator.

According to the activity report, the activities were as follows:

1. On February 15$^{th}$ 2013, the women learned a sewing technique, how to combine colours for big, medium, and small size patterns and how to make *kanzashi* with round petals, sharp petals, and oval petals. They also learned how to add beads, buttons, and stones for accessories and the finishing methods to improve the quality of the product in order to be able to market them.

2. The women learned how to combine products in order to meet the market demand particularly for teenagers and children and how to modify products to make them more interesting, like certain colour patterns.
3. They learned to combine colours based on the materials, how to replicate the sample products and how to explore the ideas to develop the products to meet the market demand.

The women made brooches, hairpins, headbands and hair sticks with *kanzashi* technique.

For the sake of marketing, SwissContact also invited a buyer candidate from Bandung, a lecturer from Universitas Parahiyangan who is also an entrepreneur. Before the products were brought into the free market, SwissContact wanted to bring the products to a controlled market first. Therefore, bringing a candidate buyer was intended so that the participants could gain experience in marketing. He thought that the design, colours and material were not interesting enough. This is mainly due to patchwork mafias that are active in the area of Tambora. They buy the good quality garment waste from the factories, so that the women in the sample could only get low quality raw material. PPSW urged SwissContact to help with the resource and market problems, so a facilitator made a meeting with a buyer from Bu Endang, an online accessories shop, via email. Bu Endang made an order of 1500 accessories per week. The raw material for *kanzashi* was provided by SwissContact, but the craftswomen could only make 70 pieces a week. This was a great lesson for PPSW. It realized that it had to adapt to the market.

The biggest problem faced in the companion programme by PPSW was the lack of access to good quality raw materials. PPSW is expected to assist in finding the materials, but it was not done as planned as stated by a facilitator of SwissContact:

> *"The system used is still PO, as it is hard to find the raw materials. I hope PPSW is able to accompany and find the best solution to the easy access to find the raw materials, but they (PPSW) did not do it well" (D).*

SwissContact also wanted to create a BDS in PPSW. People that have a business mind set were hired, so they were not hired for advocacy reasons. No further information about the impact of the BDS is available.

## 8. Impact on replication of BDS

The time limit had changed the project strategy of GREEN from NGO capacity development to the direct strengthening of the entrepreneurs. This was aimed at giving real experiences to the NGOs on how to give services to the SMEs they would assist, especially in the garment sector. ASPPUK, PPSW and the Melati Cooperative were always involved in the trainings and provided coordination. The strategy change had a positive impact on the implementation of this project, because it could give the NGOs additional experience.

ASPPUK now welcomes the SwissContact plans to give a companion programme as well as institutional capacity development. Although the planned capacity development was in the garment industry, the method could also be applied to companion programmes in other sectors, such as the food sector. One staff member of ASPPUK said:

> *"It is OK, Mas Dedi. It is fine that we get the batik training. Hopefully this batik training can be applied to small entrepreneurs and food products, for me that is not a big deal. If this batik training is successful, we can learn a lot from this. So finally (they chose) batik"(Y).*

From the discussion with ASPPUK it is found that, although ASPPUK has not replicated this project in another place yet, it expects that it can replicate the project in another one of their assisted regions.

# Endline Report on the Achievement of MDGs and Themes:

# Evaluation of the KSP-QT project

## MFS II Joint Evaluations

## Indonesia

**E6. Seed capital programme for Koperasi Mentari Qaryah Thayyibah, Koperasi Simpan Pinjam - Qaryah Thayyibah**

## FINAL REPORT

**9 April 2015**


**Amsterdam Institute for International Development (AIID)**

Trinity building C, 3rd floor, Rm XT-3.17
Pietersbergweg 17
1105 BM Amsterdam
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)20 5661596
F +31 (0)20 5665997
www.aiid.org

**SurveyMeter**

Jl. Jenengan Raya No.109
Maguwoharjo, Depok, Sleman,
Yogyakarta 55282
Indonesia
T +62 (0) 274 4477464
F +62 (0) 274 4477004
www.surveymeter.org

# List of contributors

**AIID**
Menno Pradhan (Principal Investigator)
Melinda Vigh (Research Coordinator)
Marije Groot Bruinderink (Project Manager)
Iris van Rossum (Junior Researcher)
Stavros Malamas (Research Assistant)
Emilie Berkhout (Research Assistant)

**Survey Meter**
Ni Wayan Suriasatini (Research Coordinator)
Bondan Sikoki (Survey Expert)
Mardiana Br Ginting (Project Manager)
Kamti Ningsih (Field Coordinator)

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| | |
|---|---|
| BPR-YBS | Bank Perkreditan Rakyat Yayasan Bina Swadaya |
| BRAC | Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee |
| CFA | Co-financing Agency |
| DD | Difference-in-Difference |
| DDX | Difference-in-Difference including controls |
| HH | Household |
| KSP-QT | Koperasi Simpan Pinjam - Qaryah Thayyibah |
| KSU-GTGS | Koperasi Serba Usaha-Gardu Tani Gedong Songo |
| KSP-MDM | Koprasi Simpan Pinjam Mentari Dana Mandiri |
| LDP | Lembaga Diklat Profesi |
| MDG | Millennium Development Goal |
| MFS II | Medefinancieringsstelsel (Co-financing System Grant Policy Framework) |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| OLS | Ordinary Least Squares |
| PSM | Propensity Score Matching |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |
| USD | United States Dollars |

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Project context

Despite that Indonesia has quite an advanced banking and financial system, financial services do not reach to all parts of the country. In more remote areas, communities have to rely on informal money lenders, which in Indonesian are called "*Rentenir*", if they need to borrow money to cover their living costs. Most affected are uneducated people who have illiquid assets (in the form of land) but whose land tenure is not registered. Therefore, they are not able to apply for credit at the banks even when banks are present in the villages.

In the absence of formal financial institutions, informal arrangements in saving and credit groups provide a way for people to commit to accumulate savings that they can use when it is their turn to receive the payments. This mechanism is useful for small scale savings and expenditures. However, formal institutions are needed to help smooth consumption and income patterns of farming or seasonal employment, and to borrow larger amounts.

The Seed capital project of Hivos works with savings and cooperatives that provide their services to rural communities in Central Java. Most people in these communities still face credit constraints because they are not able to fulfil the requirements of commercial banking and the banks do not provide micro-loans (loan less than IDR 3 million). In addition, in many communities the literacy rate is low, and people have limited collateral when applying for credit. Given the limited access to credit, the project's savings and credit cooperatives encourage low and middle class households to accumulate savings in order to prepare for future larger expenditures. The cooperatives provide loans to members only after members have saved a sufficient amount.

## 1.2. Evaluation objectives

This report evaluates the Seed capital project of Hivos with Koperasi Simpan Pinjam - Qaryah Thayyibah (KSP-QT)[1] as part of as part of the *Medefinancieringsstelsel* (MFS) II evaluation for Indonesia under the Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDG) component. The project has been selected under the goals on poverty alleviation (MDG 1). In particular, the current evaluation focuses on the following research questions: do the members have better access to financing? Do the members manage their financial flows better? Did the livelihood of members improve as a result of better access to financing?

We investigate whether the project had a favourable effect on the above mentioned outcomes using difference-in-difference methodology: we compare the changes in the outcome variables between the baseline and endline periods for the project beneficiaries (cooperative members) to the changes in outcomes for a comparison group. We sampled cooperative members that joined the cooperatives in different years between 2010 and 2012 so that we can investigate the longer term impact of the cooperatives on the member households.

[1] The project is described in more detail in section 3.

The sampled beneficiary households were members of either KSP-QT or Koperasi Serba Usaha-Gardu Tani Gedong Songo (KSU-GTGS) (two of the three project cooperatives), and we estimated the impacts of the cooperatives separately for the two cooperatives using regression analysis. Data was collected for a total of 290 beneficiary and comparison households that were interviewed both at the baseline and endline.[2] Beneficiary households were randomly sampled from the membership list of the cooperatives in selected villages with the largest number of members. Comparison households were randomly sampled in selected comparison villages. Therefore, the treatment group is a representative sample of the cooperative members, while the comparison group is a representative sample of the comparison communities. To adjust for the differences in the characteristics of the treatment and comparison households, we control for different socio-economic characteristics of the households during the data analysis.

As specified in the Terms of Reference for this evaluation, the report addresses five evaluation questions to assess the project outcomes:

1) Change: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period?
2) Attribution: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3) Relevance of change: What is the relevance of these changes?
4) Efficiency: Were the development interventions of the Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs) efficient?
5) Explanations: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

## 1.3. Summary of findings

Firstly, it is important to point out some obstacles in the evaluation: the Seed capital project ended shortly after the baseline survey (31 December 2012). In addition, the project did not directly work with the cooperative members, whom we regard as the beneficiaries in the evaluation. Instead, the project developed the financial and social performance of the project savings and credit cooperatives (KSP-QT, KSU-GTGS and Koprasi Simpan Pinjam Mentari Dana Mandiri or KSP-MDM) through trainings to the cooperatives' staff, funding office infrastructure and providing seed capital for borrowing. The project also introduced the importance of family finance trainings for prospective members. Hence, the evaluation focused on the effectiveness of the cooperatives after the capacity building has taken place. We are not able to separate the effect of the project from the cooperatives themselves. However, many cooperative members could not have been reached without the project. Therefore, we consider all the impacts of the cooperatives to be driven by the Seed capital project.

Overall, we find a substantial positive impact of the project on the use of financial services, which is not surprising given the nature of the project and the sampling design. During the evaluation period, 32 (27) percent of the cooperative member households quit their membership in KSP-QT (KSU-GTGS), and only 56 (71) percent of the households still had savings at the cooperatives down from 90 (82) percent at the

[2] In addition, 6 households were only interviewed at the baseline.

baseline. The results suggest that household often quit the cooperative after the repayment of their loans, hence they only accumulate savings as a requirement for borrowing. Nonetheless, the involvement of household in financial institutions (saving and/or borrowing) in the past 12 months was less affected by changes in cooperative membership: 78 (84) percent of the treatment households were still utilizing the services of financial institutions. This is due to the fact that household quitting KSP-QT changed to saving on a bank account instead of the cooperative (29% at endline from 14% at baseline). Hence, KSP-QT opened these households to the regular financial sector. No similar changes occurred among KSU-GTGS members. In the comparison group, financial involvement (25% at endline) and savings accumulated in a bank account (20% at endline) did not change significantly over the evaluation period.

In addition to savings, more cooperative members have borrowed in the past 12 months. This is particularly true at the baseline, which explains the membership in the cooperatives. However, the percentage of households taking a loan at the endline decreased to 54 (47) percent.

Unfortunately, we do not find clear cut impacts of the cooperatives on financial knowledge and skills (except for the increase in savings) and household livelihood/wealth. However, as a result of the increased savings, more households had emergency savings at the endline, and the current standard of living of households also increased during evaluation period in terms of daily needs covered.

### 1.4. Structure of the report

The rest of this report proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the relevant literature; section 3 describes the project; section 4 describes the evaluation questions and outcome variables; section 5 the data collection. Section 6 provides the descriptive statistics. Sections 7 till 10 discuss evaluation question 1 till 4 in turn. The last section discusses the results and concludes.

Further details about the project results are presented in a number of annexes. The project implementation is described in Annex I. Regarding the survey data, the construction of the outcome indicators and indices is summarized in Annex II, and Annex III presents summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis. Annex IV in turn describes the study locations, and Annex V reports detailed descriptive statistics of the sample. Annex VI reports on additional regression results using an extended specification. Finally, Annex VII provides additional tables that are used to explain the findings.

## 2. Literature overview

In Indonesia, one of the strategies to decrease poverty has been envisioned through the development of microfinance industry. For-profit state-owned and private commercial banks have played a dominant role in this strategy in Indonesia, in contrast to microfinance pioneer countries such as Bangladesh and Bolivia, where Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) play an important role. Major characteristics of Indonesian commercialized microfinance include relatively high interest rates, requirement of collateral and allowing for borrowing a relatively large amount of money (Takahashi et al., 2010).

However, a smaller number of micro-finance organisations in Indonesia operate with the intention of adding social value to their services in addition to good financial performance. Examples of such

organisations are the savings and credit cooperatives of the KSP-QT project: KSP-QT, KSU-GTGS and KSP-MDM. In this section, we investigate whether micro-finance projects improve the livelihood of households: we focus on effects on savings and income. In addition, we summarize the literature on the effectiveness of financial literacy trainings.

### *Effectiveness of micro-credit*

First, looking in Indonesia, Takahashi et al. (2010) research a microfinance programme operated by Bank Perkreditan Rakyat Yayasan Bina Swadaya (BPR-YBS) in the Gresik District of Indonesia. This programme seems suitable for the poor, since it does not require collateral and offers small loans at a competitive interest rate (30% per year). The programme is commercialized, does not rely on government subsidies and applicants must make mandatory savings deposits before borrowing. The authors calculated the average treatment effect of the programme by comparing participants to incoming participants who have not received loans yet (85 pairs through Propensity Score Matching or PSM) over time (Difference-in-Difference or DD), and found that microcredit does significantly contribute to expanding per capita sales from self-employment business and nonfarm business: the sales from self-employment from the treatments group grew with approximately 3 million rupiah more between 2007 and 2008 than the sales from the control group. For the sales from nonfarm business this is even higher, namely 3.3 million rupiah. However, the microfinance programme did not increase either profits or income within a year. This is probably because households cannot find the optimal input mix within a short period of time. By adding a dummy for the initial poor to the analysis, the authors find that the benefit of increasing sales is predominantly captured by wealthier households, the net impact was negative if participants were poor. The authors did not find any significant differences between treatment and control groups in savings, durables or livestock using both Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and PSM-DD estimates.

Yang and Stanly (2012) could not find an income effect either. They conducted a meta-analysis of the income effect from participating in a micro-credit programme of 14 papers. These were selected based on two systematic reviews, namely Duvendack et al. (2011) and Stewart et al. (2012), which claim to have evaluated all relevant research on microfinance in Africa and Asia up to that date. All three articles concluded that existing research contains no evidence that micro-credit programmes have a significant income effect, whether looking at the individual studies or across all studies that meet the criteria set by the systematic reviews.

A recent summary of seven randomized control trials on four continents draws the same conclusion: “microcredit does not have a transformative impact on poverty” (IPA, 2015, p. 1). However, the loans can give low-income households more freedom in choosing between their money making and spending activities.

Khandker et al. (1998) attempted to quantify the village-level impacts of the three most successful micro-credit programmes of Bangladesh: the Grameen Bank (group-lending), the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) (focusing more on human capital building) and Bangladesh Rural Development Board’s RD-12 project (combination of the former). The authors compare participating and non-participating villages (N=1798 households) after the programmes were running for over three years from a cross-section of data. The proportionate increase in per household total production compared to that in non-programme villages is 57% (t=2.242) in BRAC villages, 56% (t=2.046) in

Grameen Bank villages and 48% (t=1.954) in RD-12 villages, accrued largely through the rural non-farm sector. Overall village employment in Grameen Bank villages had increased (6.8%, t=2.387), while it decreased in BRAC villages (-11.2%, t=-3.439) and RD-12 villages (-6.7%, t=-1.954) compared to non-programme villages. The increase of employment in Grameen Bank villages was primarily due to an increase in self-employment in non-farm activities (51.1%, t=2.631). This was large enough to offset the decrease in farm wage employment (-39.4%, t=-2.175). Using OLS with White's correction, the authors estimated that income from all sources per household is 29.4% (t=1.861) higher in Grameen Bank villages and 32.7% (t=2.137) higher in BRAC villages, while RD-12 had no significant impact. It is suggested that, for sustainability, programmes must promote skill development and crop sector growth together with rural non-farm growth, since the programmes support workers who make a living from the rural non-farm sector, which is dependent upon agricultural growth.

### *Effectiveness of financial literacy trainings*

In Indonesia, financial literacy may be one of the most important barriers to access to banking. However, the Indonesian banking system has a wide geographical reach and is designed to serve the needs of low income customers as well. Still, only 41% of the total population and 32% of rural Indonesian households have a savings account in a bank (Cole et al., 2011). In addition, Eskes (2011) notes that since Indonesia got more involved in international trade, the importance of financial transactions increased, and therefore a higher level of financial literacy is desirable among the population.

Research to the effect of financial literacy programmes and financial incentives on the demand for a bank account is conducted by Cole et al. (2011) in Indonesia using randomized evaluation. Half of the sample of 564 unbanked households was offered a 2-hour financial literacy education session on the operation of banks and the benefits of opening a bank savings account. To understand cost sensitivity, they offered unbanked households subsidies ranging from 3-14 USD equivalent amounts if the households opened a savings account. The total score out of 4 questions about borrowing, savings and risk, interest rates and inflation was used as a measure for financial literacy. Of those invited for the financial literacy education, 69% attended the course, indicating that demand for financial education is quite high. Nevertheless, the offered financial literacy programme appeared to have no effect on the likelihood to open a bank account (point estimate of -0.02, s.d. 0.027). When comparing literate and uneducated households, the authors only found a substantial effect of 12.3 percentage points (p-value of 0.07) for uneducated households. A higher incentive increased the probability of opening a bank account, but fewer than 10% actually opened one. Using a follow-up survey in January 2010, the authors did not have sufficient statistical power to detect an overall net effect on savings from the financial literacy programme.

By investigating the effect of the Bantesa programme, a microfinance programme presented by Sintesa, on the financial literacy level of members living in Wakatobi, Indonesia, Eskes (2011) could not find a significant difference in saving behaviour either, nor in financial knowledge. The financial literacy training took one hour per day for around three days, dependent on the learning ability of the group. It covered topics about Sintesa and its procedures, the calculation of the interest rate, the importance of savings, the purpose of credit and bookkeeping. For her analysis, the author used secondary data, a few

depth interviews with borrowers and non-borrowers, key informant interviews and a survey (N=191, of which 135 are members and 56 are non-members).

***Summary***

The reviewed literature suggests that the use of micro-credits does not lead to a significant increase either in income or in savings. The BPR-YBS programme in Indonesia suggests that even if non-farm business sales of households increase, it does not necessarily translate into an income effect. Only one paper studying the effectiveness of Grameen Bank and BRAC in Bangladesh found a positive income effect from non-farm income. However, in the light of the other no-result studies, this positive result seems rather to be an exception.

When assessing the used articles in the meta-analysis and the method of the evaluation of the BPR-YBS programme, possible explanations for the difference in impacts are the date of the evaluation (after one year no significant effects are found), whether the loan was used for productive purposes, the size of the loans (larger loans produce generate larger impacts) and the initial level of income of the borrowers.

Concerning financial literacy, no evidence is found for a substantial effect of financial literacy training on financial knowledge. A substantial and sustainable increase in the probability of opening a bank account due to financial literacy training was only found for households with an initial level of financial literacy below median, but no effect from the training was found on savings.

Hence, this literature review warns us not to be overly optimistic about the effectiveness of the KSP-QT project.

# 3. The project

## 3.1. Project description

The Seed Capital programme of Hivos had the objective to improve the financial and social performance of three primary savings and credit cooperatives: KSP-QT, KSP-MDM and KSU-GTGS (see Annex I for further details). The last contract period for the project started on 1 December 2009 and ended on 31 December 2012.[3] There has not been a follow-up project to this contract. According to Hivos, the performance indicators of the cooperatives are strong enough to get funding from other sources. Through the Seed capital project, Hivos has built the capacity of the organisations so that they become self-sufficient.

## 3.2. Project implementation

The implementation of the project corresponded with the initial plans. The secondary cooperative, KSM-QTha, was formally established on 16 January 2010 and became a legal entity in 2012. Between 2009 and 2011, capacity building trainings have been conducted for the staff from clerical to managerial level by Mr. Irawan of Lembaga Diklat Profesi (LDP). The focus of the training for the field staff was on basic

[3] In the previous contract period between 2007 and 2009 Hivos supported KSP-QT with capacity building programme to improve professionalism and capacity of the staff members; and Koperasi Simpan Pinjam – Mentari Dana Mandiri (*Saving and Credit Cooperative*, KSP-MDM) through a micro-fund project.

knowledge about cooperative, financial planning for family (financial literacy), and simple business plan. The field staff is in touch with the clients on a daily basis, as their main task is to collect the daily/weekly savings from members of the cooperatives. According to Mr. Mukito (Head Manager of KSM-QTha), most of the field staff are not professional applicants therefore they needed to be trained. However, since 2010 the focus of the trainings has shifted to improvement in financial indicators, supporting software maintenance and official toolkits (computer) from the clerical to the management level.

As specified in the work plan, 50% of the budget[4] was given to KSM-QTha (the secondary cooperative) as seed money. It is used to lend to the cooperatives that need more funding to provide loans to their members. The money is retained at KSM-QTha and is still used for this purpose in 2014.


Further information about Seed capital project of KSP-QT is provided in Annex I.

## 3.3. Evaluation objectives

As discussed above, the Seed capital project's objective was to develop the capacity of the savings and credit cooperatives both in terms of their financial and social performance. Hence, the direct beneficiaries of the project are the cooperatives. Nonetheless, in the MFS II evaluation we focus on the cooperative members as the final beneficiaries of the project as the cooperatives serve the benefit of their members.

More importantly, Figure 1 shows that the project and evaluation periods are not well aligned: the project has already almost finished at the time of the baseline survey. Therefore, we are not able to compare the situation with the project to the situation before the project has been implemented. Instead, we focus the evaluation on the impact of the cooperatives on their members after the project. We jointly measure the effect of the availability of the cooperatives' services and the project's effect on improving their service delivery. In particular, the project introduced the family finance trainings to the cooperatives and enabled the cooperatives to increase their service area and better manage their finances.

**Figure 1: Timing of intervention**




[4] The amount of seed capital was 1,215,000,000 IDR or 98,780.49 EUR using exchange rate 12,300 IDR/EUR.

## 3.4. Result chain


In this section, we discuss the hypothesized result chain of the KSP-QT project for the purpose of the MFS II evaluation. The intervention logic of the project only covered the results at the cooperative level. Therefore, the research team has developed a result chain describing the savings and credit cooperatives' effect on their members. Figure 2 presents the result chain.

The figure starts out from one of the objectives of the secondary cooperative (KSM-QTha) regarding their social performance: "improving the welfare of the members and neighbouring communities". This objective is taken as the final outcome at the membership level.

We focus on the two main activities of the saving and credit cooperatives: providing saving and credit services and the trainings on family financing for each new member (financial literacy training). For simplicity, we omitted from the figure that the project's cooperatives are probably not the only micro-finance organisations offering saving and credit services to the population.

The financial literacy training starts with an hour-long individual or group training/discussion, and it is followed up by a daily/weekly collection service of the members' savings as part of a continuous education. However, prospective cooperative members learn about the importance of saving and planning their yearly incomes and expenditures (see Annex I). By saving in the cooperatives, members become eligible to borrow from the cooperatives. Savings also contribute to the emergency savings of the households, and together with access to credit they enable households to invest into their businesses. As a result, households rely more on savings and less on credit for their yearly expenses, and they are better able to plan activities for which they need to take credit.

**Figure 2: Result chain**




# 4. Evaluation questions and outcome variables

## 4.1. Evaluation questions

The call for proposals outlines 5 general evaluation questions. In the baseline report specific evaluations questions were specified. Table 1 shows these five questions and what it implies for this project.

**Table 1: Overview general and specific evaluation questions**

| Number | General evaluation question | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Change: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period? | 1. Do the members have better access to financing?<br>2. Do the members manage their financial flows better?<br>3. Did the livelihood of members improve as a result of better access to financing?<br>4. Did the repayment rate at the 3 cooperatives improve?<br>5. Were the cooperatives successful in reaching more female members? |
| 2 | Attribution: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)? | Are the observed changes above attributable to the intervention? |
| 3 | Relevance of change: What is the relevance of these changes? | • The size of the impact<br>• Does the project address an important issue for the beneficiaries? |
| 4 | Efficiency: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient? | Was the intervention cost effective? |
| 5 | Explanations: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above? | Why did things work out/not work out?<br>The evaluation question is answered throughout the other evaluation questions and in the end discussion. |

For the first question, we investigate the households' use of financial instruments (saving and borrowing); for the second question, we look at the financial skills and knowledge of respondents; while for the third question, we investigate the income, livelihood and food security of households.

Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient information to answer questions 4 and 5. Therefore, we will only focus on the first 3 questions presented in Table 1.

## 4.2. Outcome indicators

To answer the first two evaluation questions (change and attribution) we identified specific outcome indicators. The outcome indicators are split up into 4 groups: use of financial instruments, financial knowledge and skills, household income and livelihood, and food security and vulnerability. Each group represents a uniform indicator specified by the synthesis team for goal on poverty alleviation (MDG 1). For each group, we report on multiple outcome indicators.

Table 2 displays the outcome indicators of the main analysis, the scale of these variables and whether the indicator is a uniform indicator, while Annex II describes the outcome indicators in more detail.

**Table 2: Overview outcome indicators**

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Source | Uniform indicator |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Panel A. Use of financial instruments** | | | X |
| Percentage of households that know a place to borrow | (0%; 100%) | Household survey | |
| Percentage of households involved in a financial institution | (0%; 100%) | Household survey | |
| Percentage of households with savings in bank account | (0%; 100%) | Household survey | |
| Percentage of households with savings in savings and credit cooperative | (0%; 100%) | Household survey | |
| Percentage of households with savings in savings and credit group | (0%; 100%) | Household survey | |
| Percentage of households that have borrowed in the past 12 months | (0%; 100%) | Household survey | |
| **Panel B. Financial knowledge and skill** | | | X |
| Percentage of households that keep close eyes on expenditures | (0%; 100%) | Household survey | |
| Percentage of households that have financial plan | (0%; 100%) | Household survey | |
| Score on financial numeracy (only for panel respondents) | (0; 4) | Household survey | |
| **Panel C. Household income and livelihood** | | | X |
| Total income per month per capita (1000 Rp) | (NM; NM) | Household survey | |
| Food consumption per capita (1000 Rp) | (0; NM) | Household survey | |
| Non-food consumption per capita (1000 Rp) | (0; NM) | Household survey | |
| Housing facilities index | (NM; NM) | Household survey | |
| Asset index | (NM; NM) | Household survey | |
| Percentage of households invested in business | (0%; 100%) | Household survey | |
| Percentage of households invested in new farming tools | (0%; 100%) | Household survey | |
| Overall happiness (only for panel respondents) | (1; 4) | Household survey | |
| Current subjective wealth status (only for panel respondents) | (1; 6) | Household survey | |
| **Panel D. Food security and vulnerability** | | | X |
| Percentage of households that have emergency savings for at least one month | (0%; 100%) | Household survey | |

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Source | Uniform indicator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Percentage of household not able to cover their living costs during the last 12 months | (0%; 100%) | Household survey | |
| Current standard of living: daily needs covered (only for panel respondents) | (1; 3) | Household survey | |
| Current standard of living: food consumption covered (only for panel respondents) | (1; 3) | Household survey | |
| Notes: NM = no minimum/maximum | | | |

# 5. Data collection

This section describes the survey instruments and the sampling design and outcome in turn.

## 5.1. Survey instruments

We collected two types of data: quantitative and financial. The following paragraphs list the survey instruments used for each type of data.

### *Quantitative data*

To analyse the impact of the savings and credit cooperatives, structured household surveys been conducted with cooperative member households and comparison households. The baseline data have been collected in July 2012; while the endline data was collected in August 2014.

### *Financial data collection*

To collect information about the costs of the KSP-QT project, we conducted a project cost survey with director of KSP-QT on 22 July 2013. A follow-up interview has been conducted in June 2014.

## 5.2. Sampling outcome

The evaluation focuses on the impact of the KSP-QT project on direct beneficiaries: members of the savings and credit cooperatives. Therefore, members of KSP-QT cooperative were surveyed in 5 villages and members of KSU-GTGS in 3 villages. In addition, households were surveyed in 5 comparison villages.

The following sub-sections discuss the selection procedure for the survey respondents (sampling design) and the results of its implementation (sampling outcome).

### *Sampling design*

From the three primary cooperatives of the project, we have sampled from two: KSP-QT and KSU-GTGS. We chose these two cooperatives, because these focus on financial literacy education. The cooperatives have thousands of members living in a number of districts. We chose the districts, and within these districts we chose the villages with the largest group of members. We randomly sampled members from these villages stratified by the year of membership. We aimed to sample an equal number of member households from those that joined the cooperatives in 2010, 2011 and 2012.

Comparison villages were chosen in the same district as for the cooperatives, and using administrative data we have attempted to match them in terms of population, size and the percentage of household living from agriculture. Households in the comparison villages were randomly chosen stratified by location.[5] Hence, the comparison group should be a representative sample of the population in these villages. However, the households in the treatment groups are a representative sample of the households that have self-selected themselves into using the services of the cooperatives.

We planned to interview a total of 300 households for the survey in 13 villages. From these 105 households in 5 villages were sampled as members of KSP-QT, and 45 households in 2 comparison villages were chosen as a comparison group for the KSP-QT sample. Another 105 households in 3 villages were sampled from the members of KSU-GTGS, and 45 households in 3 villages were used as control for the KSU-GTGS sample. There is no overlap between the villages were KSP-QT and KSU-GTGS are active. The two subsamples for the cooperatives were also chosen in different districts.

At the endline survey, we aimed to re-interview all respondents and households participating in the baseline survey. However, if it was not possible to interview the same household or the household moved out of the village, we dropped the household from the endline survey (no replacement was made). As some of the questions in the survey relate to the knowledge or attitude of the respondent, we aimed to interview the same respondent as for the baseline survey. If this was not possible, we interviewed another household member knowledgeable about household income and consumption.

### *Sampling outcome*

Table 3 summarizes the planned and actual number of households interviewed during the baseline and endline period. The third column of the table shows that there was discrepancy between the planned and actual sample size at the baseline: the number of respondents in the KSU-GTGS sample is lower than planned. This is due to the low response rate in those villages: 155 households were approached for an interview from which 21 refused to participate and 37 households were not interviewed for other reasons. To compensate the low number of respondents, more households were interviewed for the KSP-QT sample. In total, interviews for 296 are used for the baseline survey because 4 interviews could only partially be completed.

The fourth column of the table (panel households) shows the number of households that were interviewed also at the endline. Overall, 98% of the sample was re-interviewed at the endline, which is a very low attrition rate.

[5] We did not have information about the characteristics of treatment households in advance, and this type of information was also not readily available at the villages. Therefore, we resorted to random sampling at the comparison villages.

**Table 3: Sampling outcome**

| Assignment group | Planned households | Baseline outcome | Panel households | Panel respondents |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| KSP-QT member | 105 | 110 | 108 | 99 |
| KSU-GTGS member | 105 | 96 | 95 | 86 |
| Comparison group | 90 | 90 | 87 | 78 |
| **Total** | **300** | **296** | **290** | **263** |
| Source: Household survey E6, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | | | |

The last column (panel respondent) shows the number of cases where the same respondent was interviewed both for the baseline and endline survey. Overall, for 89% of the baseline sample the same respondent has been interviewed at the endline. This percentage is similar among the assignment groups. The most common reason for a new respondent at the endline survey was that the respondent was not at home (13).[6]

# 6. Descriptive statistics

This section summarizes the main characteristics of the treatment and comparison groups using the baseline and endline surveys. First, the socio-economic characteristics of the sample is summarized, which is followed by discussing the self-reported project exposure of the households focusing on family finance meetings, saving and borrowing at the cooperatives. Characteristics of cooperative members are also discussed.

## 6.1. Household characteristics

To provide a better insight into the general characteristics of our sample, Annex V provides information on a number of general characteristics like household size; age, gender and education of the household head; and the main income of the household. The sample size for the variables is reported in Annex III. In addition, Annex IV provides information about the study locations.

The table in Annex V shows that cooperative member households (both KSP-QT and KSU-GTGS) are on average more educated (26-29% with secondary education compared to 13%) and rely less on remittances as their main income source (1-3% vs 9%). In addition, KSU-GTGS member households on average have younger (44 vs 52 years) and more often male household heads (98% vs 85%), and rely on non-farm business as their primary income source (43 vs 15%). In the data analysis, we control for these characteristics.

However, cooperative member households were on average not better off 5 years ago (before becoming cooperative members) compared to the comparison households based on their subjective wealth status. The average cultivated land size was also not significantly different between the treatment and comparison groups.

[6] Other reasons were illness (7), moved (3), too old (2), refusal (1) and other reasons (1).

The table also shows that, at the endline compared to the baseline, more KSP-QT households reported to have a household head with only primary education, and less with a secondary education. In the KSU-GTGS sample, more households reported crop farming as their main income source at the endline (42% vs 32%), which is a shift from non-farm business as primary income source. In addition, in all groups the average cultivated land size decreased between the baseline and the endline periods. We do not have an explanation for this change. However, we include the land size variables, along with the other variables that significantly changed over time, as controls in the data analysis of the change in outcome variables.

## 6.2. Treatment exposure

In this section, we investigate the exposure of the sampled households to the services of savings and credit cooperatives. We are interested whether households have learned about financial literacy or family finance, who the members are, and whether they are indeed using the services of savings and credit cooperatives for saving and borrowing.

First, Table 4 displays the information about attending meetings on family finances by treatment and comparison groups. The first variable reports whether households have attended such meetings organised by the cooperatives. This question was asked to the respondents when discussing their membership in the cooperatives. Hence, we directly asked whether any household member attended such meetings organised by the savings and credit cooperative in question. The table shows that almost 20% of the KSP-QT member households but only 3% of the KSU-GTGS member households reported to have attended any such meetings before the baseline. This suggests that most households cannot recall the discussion about family finances when they joined the cooperative.

These percentages are higher at the endline (37% and 5%), indicating that KSP-QT targets not only new members for providing information about family finance. Indeed, 21% of the member households indicate that they have received information about family finances from KSP-QT between the baseline and endline surveys despite already being a member of KSP-QT for some time. However, KSU-GTGS is either less active in discussing family finances with its members or the members cannot recall such information anymore. Based on these figures, we can only expect that KSP-QT has an impact on the financial skills of its members.

The second group of variables in Table 4 report the responses of the households when asked about meetings on family finances not in connection with financial institutions. The table shows that a few comparison and KSU-GTGS member households have also received such information from other sources than savings and credit cooperatives. However, some KSP-QT member households do not anymore recall attending meetings on family finances when asked independently of KSP-QT.

**Table 4: Participation in meetings on family finances**

| Assignment group | Comparison | KSP-QT | KSU-GTGS |
|---|---|---|---|
| % HHs ever attended any meeting on family finances organised by cooperative | | | |
| *Before baseline* | 0.0 | 19.6 | 3.2 |
| *Before endline*[1] | 0.0 | 37.4 | 5.4 |
| *Between 2012-2014* | 0.0 | 21.3 | 2.1 |
| % HHs ever attended a meeting on family finances […] | | | |
| *Before baseline* | 1.1 | 15.7 | 5.3 |
| *Before endline*[1] | 3.4 | 24.1 | 7.4 |
| % HHs attended a meeting on family finances between baseline and endline | 2.3 | 7.4 | 1.1 |

Source: Household survey E6, MFS II Indonesia

Notes:

1. Endline values are corrected for consistency with the baseline data. If households reported to ever attend a meeting on family finances at the baseline we assumed that this statement must also be true at the endline.

Next, in Table 5 we investigate information about the project cooperative members. First, the distribution of the sample by the year they joined the cooperative is displayed for the baseline, and also the percentage of households (HH) who reported to have remained members of the cooperatives at the time of endline survey (also by year of membership). The data shows that the members are similarly split among joining the cooperative in 2012, 2011 or 2010 (or earlier), as planned. The percentage of households who joined in 2010 can be calculated by subtracting the values for '2009 or earlier' from the values of '2010 or earlier'. In the case of KSU-GTGS, almost 12% of the sampled members reported to have joined the cooperative in 2009 or earlier.

In the endline columns, we observe that only 68% of the KSP-QT sample still report to be a member of KSP-QT and this percentage is 73% for KSU-GTGS. However, there is no clear pattern that older or newer members are more likely to quit the cooperatives. Having multiple household members as cooperative members is also no guarantee for continued membership: if anything households with multiple members are less likely to remain members by the endline (53% vs 68% for KSP-QT and 66% vs 73% for KSU-GTGS).

Looking at the gender of the members, above 70% of the sampled members are women for KSP-QT and almost 60% for KSU-GTGS, and this ratio is stable over time and represents the focus of the cooperatives on women. Cooperative members are most often either the spouse of the household head (40-58%) or the household head (28-32%), and in some cases their children (8-27%).

The last row in the table shows that, similarly to the information on family finance meetings, KSP-QT members are more likely to attend any meeting organised by the cooperative (39% vs 8% at baseline), and this percentage remains similar also at the endline.[7]

[7] However, note that at the endline we report on a 24-month-period compared to a 12-month-period at the baseline.

**Table 5: Cooperative membership**

| Assignment group | KSP-QT | | KSU-GTGS | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Survey** | Base | End | Base | End |
| Year of membership[1] (%) | | | | |
| *2012* | 34.6 | 25.2 | 26.9 | 20.4 |
| *2011* | 35.5 | 22.4 | 36.6 | 29.0 |
| *2010 or earlier* | 29.9 | 20.6 | 36.6 | 23.7 |
| *2009 or earlier* | 3.7 | 2.8 | 16.1 | 11.8 |
| *Overall* | 100.0 | 68.2 | 100.0 | 73.1 |
| % HHs with more than one member | 17.6 | 9.3 | 25.3 | 16.8 |
| % HHs with both household head and husband/wife as member | 8.3 | 9.8 | 10.5 | 12.0 |
| % female members[2] | 73.2 | 71.7 | 56.3 | 60.0 |
| Relation to household head […][2] (%) | | | | |
| *Head of household* | 32.3 | 32.6 | 27.7 | 30.8 |
| *Spouse of household head* | 54.3 | 57.6 | 39.5 | 50.5 |
| *Children* | 10.2 | 7.6 | 26.9 | 15.4 |
| *Grandchildren* | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| *Father/Mother* | 2.4 | 1.1 | 0.8 | 0.0 |
| *Sister/Brother* | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.0 |
| *Son/Daughter-in-law* | 0.0 | 1.1 | 4.2 | 1.1 |
| % HHs attended any meeting organised by cooperative in past 12 months (baseline) / past 24 months (endline) | 38.9 | 36.1 | 8.4 | 6.3 |

Source: Household survey E6, MFS II Indonesia
Notes:
1. At the endline report the percentage that still report membership in cooperative from those that became member in a given year.
2. Of total members. The sample size is bigger than the number of households since in some households more than one person is a member of the cooperative.

Finally, previewing some of the project outcomes, Table 6 shows information about the borrowing and saving activities of the households in relation to the project cooperatives by the year of membership. The table shows that a large percentage of households had savings at the cooperatives at the baseline (82-90%), while this percentage decreased by the endline to 56-71% partly due to households no longer being members of the cooperatives.

Borrowing was lower at the baseline (27-53%). At the endline, borrowing decreased from 53% to 40% for the KSP-QT sample, while it increased from 27% to 33% at KSU-GTGS. Unfortunately, we do not have in-depth information to explain these trends.

**Table 6: Borrowing money by year of membership in cooperatives**

| Assignment group | KSP-QT | | KSU-GTGS | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Survey | Base | End | Base | End |
| % HHs borrowed from cooperative in the past 12 months | 52.8 | 39.8 | 27.4 | 32.6 |
| % HHs borrowed from cooperative in the past 12 months if joined […] | | | | |
| *2012* | 59.5 | 45.9 | 16.0 | 28.0 |
| *2011* | 50.0 | 28.9 | 23.5 | 32.4 |
| *2010 (or earlier)* | 50.0 | 46.9 | 38.2 | 35.3 |
| *2009 or earlier* | 75.0 | 75.0 | 46.7 | 46.7 |
| % HHs have savings in a savings and credit cooperative | 89.8 | 55.6 | 82.1 | 70.5 |
| % HHs have savings in a savings and credit cooperative if joined […] | | | | |
| *2012* | 86.5 | 62.2 | 84.0 | 76.0 |
| *2011* | 92.1 | 52.6 | 91.2 | 76.5 |
| *2010 (or earlier)* | 90.6 | 50.0 | 70.6 | 61.8 |
| *2009 or earlier* | 100.0 | 75.0 | 60.0 | 60.0 |
| Source: Household survey E6, MFS II Indonesia | | | | |

# 7. Evaluation question 1: Change in outcomes

This section discusses evaluation question 1: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period? The changes in the outcome indicators for the period measured between the base- and endline survey (2012-2014) are grouped into 4 categories: use of financial instruments, financial knowledge and skills, household income and livelihood, and food security and vulnerability.

Table 7 displays the results for the outcome indicators for the surveyed treatment (KSP-QT and KSU-GTGS members) and comparison groups. Columns 1-3 report on the comparison group: the mean at the baseline (1), mean at the endline (2) and the probability (p-value) that the average change in the comparison group between endline and baseline is zero (3). If the p-value is below 0.05, the change in the variable is significant at the 5% significance level. The standard error of the group means at the baseline and endline periods is reported in brackets below the mean.[8]

The following columns report on the outcome variables in the treatment groups: columns 4-6 shows the statistics for the KSP-QT member households, while columns 7-9 contain the results for the members of KSU-GTGS.

[8] Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the location level. This means that the standard errors are allowed to have an arbitrary correlation for comparison or treatment respondents in the same village. In other words, we allow respondents in the same village in the same treatment group (comparison or treatment) to be more similar to each other than they are to a different randomly selected respondent in another village from the other treatment group.

The outcome indicators are reported for the panel sample. For 5 indicators (see Table 2) the significance of change (p-values) is only reported for the panel respondents as these variables represent the knowledge or subjective opinion of the respondent.

The results are discussed by outcome indicator group below.

### *Use of financial instruments*

The starting position of the comparison group versus the treatment groups was quite different: At baseline 22 percent of the comparison group reported to be involved in a financial institution whereas for the treatment groups the percentage was over 90 percent. This is no surprise, the cooperatives are financial institutions as they provide a possibility for lending and savings. The comparison group is drawn from the general population.

We observe a sharp reduction in the use of financial instruments that are directly related to the intervention of the members of KSP-QT and KSU-GTGS. This points to a fluctuations of members in the savings and credit cooperatives. These respondents were sampled because at baseline they were members, and we observe as expected, high use of services. But two years later, the utilization rates dropped considerably. For instance, for KSP-QT, 90 percent of members report to save in a credit cooperative at baseline, but by endline this dropped to 56 percent. For KSU-GTGS it dropped less sharp, from 82 to 71 percent. Respondents in the comparison group did not have savings in savings and credit cooperatives, both at baseline and endline. We also observe a drop in the households involved in a financial institution. The drop is less sharp, as expected, because the question is not limited to savings and credit cooperatives.

We observe a positive trends in the use of financial products which are not directly related to savings and credit cooperatives. KSP-QT (KSU-GTGS) members increased their use of savings accounts in regular banks from 14 (33) percent at baseline to 29 (37) percent at endline. For the comparison group, the trend is also positive, but much less, from 17 to 20 percent.

### *Financial knowledge and skills*

We see no trends in the score on financial numeracy. This score measures whether respondents answered four financial numeracy questions correct. The questions were about division, interest rates and understanding of profit on loans. The scores of the KSP-QT and KSU-GTGS members are only slightly above those of the general population. On average, respondents answered around 3 questions correct.

### *Household income and livelihood*

Panel C reports on household income and livelihood. First of all, we observe a huge discrepancy between incomes and consumption. Incomes are a fraction of the reported consumption figures. We have more faith in the consumption figures. The income figures are unrealistically low, with monthly income of around 312,000 Indonesian rupiahs (Rp) or 25 euros[9] per capita per month at the baseline (KSP-QT and KSU-GTGS). Consumption figures are more realistic with around 581,200 Rp or 48 euros per capita per month including food and non-food consumption (KSP-QT). Income data, especially from those self-employed are notoriously hard to collect. A major reason for the large discrepancy probably

[9] Using the annual average exchange rate for 2012 at 12,087.2 IDR/EUR.

has to do with the recall period. Income data were collected with a recall period of a year, and then scaled to monthly figures, whereas food consumption was collection for the last week, and scaled up to monthly.

We observe, from the consumption data, that cooperative member have similar average consumption levels as the general population. The averages of the asset and housing facilities indices, expressed in standard deviations of observed variations in asset holdings, indicate that KSP-QT have similar asset holdings as the comparison group but the KSU-GTGS members are substantially richer. For all groups, we observe a positive trend in the asset holdings. The subjective wealth status confirms this finding. On a scale from 1 to 6, KSU-GTGS members rate themselves around 3.1, while KSP-QT members rate themselves at similar levels as the comparison group, around 2.7.

Table 7 also reports on whether respondents invested in business or farming tools. The index is based on a question on whether respondents invest to expand their business (or started a new business) or had purchased new farming tools in the past 12 months (see Annex II). We observe that savings and credit cooperative members started and ended with a higher rate of investments. We also observe a downward trend for all groups. It is not clear why this happened, in particular for the comparison group. We do not see any indication of a loss in general welfare for this group.

### *Food security and vulnerability*

Precautionary savings provide a venue to reduce such vulnerability. We observe generally positive trends in the fraction of people reporting to have emergency savings. Members of the savings and credit cooperatives report more positive trends. At endline, 56 (70) percent of KSP-QT (KSU-GTGS) members report such savings. A similar trends is observed for whether people feel that in their income does not cover their living costs in the past 12 months. We observe a negative trend for the members of the savings and credit cooperatives, whereas the value for the general population has remained about the same. For the other subjective welfare questions on whether current standard of living covered daily needs and food consumption needs, we do not observe strong trends. The result suggest that households have been better able to smooth their consumption, avoiding periods of hardship, possibly with the help of precautionary savings.

**Table 7: Change in outcome indicators over time**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Group | Comparison | | | KSP-QT | | | KSU-GTGS | | |
| Stat. | Base | End | P(1v2) | Base | End | P(4v5) | Base | End | P(7v8) |
| **Panel A. Use of financial instruments** | | | | | | | | | |
| % HHs know a place to borrow money | 91.7 (3.0) | 91.9 (2.7) | 0.555 | 99.1 (1.0) | 100.0 (0.0) | 0.390 | 100.0 (0.0) | 100.0 (0.0) | |
| % HHs involved in a financial institution | 21.8 (4.5) | 25.3 (4.5) | 0.340 | 95.4 (1.5) | 77.8 (4.0) | 0.003 | 92.6 (3.7) | 84.2 (3.5) | 0.074 |
| % HHs have savings in bank account | 17.2 (4.1) | 19.5 (4.1) | 0.592 | 13.9 (3.2) | 28.7 (4.4) | 0.020 | 32.6 (9.6) | 36.8 (8.8) | 0.571 |
| % HHs have savings in savings & credit coop. | 0.0 (0.0) | 1.1 (1.2) | 0.375 | 89.8 (3.7) | 55.6 (4.8) | 0.000 | 82.1 (7.6) | 70.5 (4.4) | 0.317 |
| % HHs have savings in savings & credit group | 18.4 (4.2) | 5.7 (2.9) | 0.145 | 45.4 (11.1) | 26.9 (4.3) | 0.153 | 24.2 (10.3) | 9.5 (4.7) | 0.071 |
| % HHs have borrowed in past 12 months | 31.0 (5.1) | 28.6 (5.1) | 1.000 | 65.7 (5.8) | 54.2 (4.8) | 0.120 | 61.1 (6.0) | 47.4 (9.3) | 0.041 |
| **Panel B. Financial knowledge and skill** | | | | | | | | | |
| % HHs keep close eye on expenditures | 36.8 (5.2) | 16.1 (5.1) | 0.016 | 43.5 (3.7) | 26.9 (4.3) | 0.041 | 57.9 (4.3) | 33.7 (6.8) | 0.020 |
| % HHs have financial plan | 11.5 (3.4) | 35.6 (5.2) | 0.016 | 14.8 (3.6) | 54.6 (4.8) | 0.001 | 11.6 (4.6) | 53.7 (7.6) | 0.002 |
| Score on financial numeracy[1] | 2.598 (0.096) | 2.782 (0.124) | 0.418 | 2.750 (0.090) | 3.056 (0.080) | 0.020 | 3.147 (0.067) | 3.158 (0.080) | 0.899 |
| **Panel C. Household income and livelihood** | | | | | | | | | |
| Total income per capita per month (1000 Rp)[2] | 230.1 (27.0) | 195.1 (50.5) | 0.404 | 312.5 (84.1) | 477.7 (131.2) | 0.147 | 312.0 (70.7) | 984.7 (319.9) | 0.053 |
| Food consumption per capita per month (1000 Rp)[2] | 330.3 (28.5) | 303.5 (40.3) | 0.441 | 331.8 (21.3) | 315.5 (23.9) | 0.612 | 375.0 (23.4) | 308.3 (19.7) | 0.043 |

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Group | Comparison | | | KSP-QT | | | KSU-GTGS | | |
| Stat. | Base | End | P(1v2) | Base | End | P(4v5) | Base | End | P(7v8) |
| Non-food consumption per capita per month (1000 Rp)[2] | 302.5 (30.6) | 293.2 (39.1) | 0.884 | 249.4 (30.1) | 230.5 (23.4) | 0.629 | 525.5 (96.6) | 351.3 (53.8) | 0.266 |
| Housing facilities index | -0.192 (0.036) | 0.025 (0.052) | 0.008 | -0.161 (0.039) | 0.015 (0.037) | 0.000 | 0.151 (0.074) | 0.228 (0.072) | 0.000 |
| Asset index | -0.449 (0.092) | -0.191 (0.069) | 0.004 | -0.204 (0.094) | -0.121 (0.085) | 0.286 | 0.282 (0.084) | 0.340 (0.102) | 0.356 |
| % HHs invested in business | 18.4 (4.2) | 11.5 (2.7) | 0.218 | 38.0 (4.9) | 19.4 (3.8) | 0.023 | 48.4 (5.9) | 41.1 (7.1) | 0.227 |
| % HHs invested in farming tools | 34.5 (5.1) | 12.6 (3.2) | 0.019 | 42.6 (7.6) | 17.6 (3.7) | 0.009 | 29.5 (9.8) | 25.3 (7.6) | 0.336 |
| Overall happiness[1] | 2.1 (0.0) | 2.1 (0.0) | 0.785 | 2.0 (0.0) | 2.0 (0.0) | 0.578 | 2.0 (0.0) | 2.0 (0.0) | 0.284 |
| Current subjective wealth status[1] | 2.8 (0.1) | 2.5 (0.1) | 0.127 | 2.8 (0.1) | 2.7 (0.1) | 0.276 | 3.1 (0.1) | 3.1 (0.1) | 0.143 |
| **Panel D. Food security and vulnerability** | | | | | | | | | |
| % HHs have emergency savings for at least one month | 14.9 (3.8) | 36.8 (5.6) | 0.016 | 13.0 (3.7) | 55.6 (4.8) | 0.002 | 33.7 (3.8) | 69.5 (5.7) | 0.004 |
| % HHs have not able to cover their living costs during the last 12 months | 67.8 (5.0) | 66.7 (4.1) | 0.854 | 77.8 (2.6) | 68.5 (4.5) | 0.335 | 61.1 (5.8) | 53.7 (3.9) | 0.239 |
| Current standard of living: daily needs covered[1] | 1.8 (0.1) | 1.6 (0.1) | 0.068 | 1.8 (0.1) | 1.8 (0.0) | 0.540 | 2.0 (0.1) | 1.9 (0.1) | 0.929 |
| Current standard of living: food consumption covered[1] | 2.0 (0.1) | 1.9 (0.0) | 0.114 | 2.1 (0.1) | 2.0 (0.0) | 0.228 | 2.2 (0.1) | 2.1 (0.1) | 0.696 |

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Group | Comparison | | | KSP-QT | | | KSU-GTGS | | |
| Stat. | Base | End | P(1v2) | Base | End | P(4v5) | Base | End | P(7v8) |

Source: Household survey E6, MFS II Indonesia
Notes: Standard errors given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

1. Significance of change (p-value) is reported only for panel respondents.
2. Prices are reported in 2012 real prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%). Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/aboutus.php?inflasi=1

# 8. Evaluation question 2: Attribution of changes

This subsection discusses evaluation question 2: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?

## 8.1. Methodology

We analyse the effects of the Seed capital project on beneficiaries using regression analysis. The primary analysis uses difference-in-difference methodology: we compare the changes in outcome indicators between the treatment groups (KSP-QT and KSU-GTGS members) and the comparison group. We assume that in the absence of the project cooperatives, on average, we would observe the same magnitude of changes in the treatment groups as in the comparison group.

However, because the Seed capital project started already before the baseline survey (as discussed in section 3.3) and we sampled cooperative members that have been members already for a longer time, we also analyse the early results of the project using cross-sectional analysis on the baseline data. Therefore, the total impact of the cooperatives is the sum of the early effects (at the baseline) and the effects found between the baseline and endline survey period (at the endline). Below we discuss the model used for the regression analysis in detail.

### *Treatment effect on the treated*

Regression (1) represents the general model for estimating the treatment effect of the WIIP project.

(1) $$Y_{it} = \alpha_t + \beta QT_{it} + \gamma GTGS_{it} + \zeta X_{it} + \eta_i + u_{it},$$

where $Y_{it}$ denotes an outcome variable from the list presented in section 4.2 (dependent variable) for household $i$ at time $t$; $QT_{it}$ is a binary variable with value 1 if household $i$ at time $t$ has been member of KSP-QT and 0 otherwise; and $GTGS_{it}$ is also a binary variable indicating whether household $i$ at time $t$ has been a member of KSU-GTGS. Please note that the two cooperatives operate in different villages, therefore, it is not possible for one household to be a member of both KSP-QT and KSU-GTGS. We estimate separate treatment effects for the two cooperatives because they offer slightly different financial products tailored to their target group.

In general, because the treatment and comparison groups are representative of different populations,[10] there could be differences in the characteristics of the treatment and comparison villages and of the households sampled in these villages. If some of these characteristics also affect the outcome of $Y_{it}$ and we do not control for these characteristics, we could mistakenly interpret the effect of these characteristics on the outcome variable as an effect of the project. Therefore, in (1) we include $X_{it}$, a set of observable control variables that affect the project outcome but they are not affected by the outcome itself (predetermined). In addition, we also include household fixed effects ($\eta_i$) that pick up unobservable time invariant household specific characteristics; and a time varying trend ($\alpha_t$) in the outcome variable. The remaining residuals ($u_{it}$) are clustered at the village level.

Finally, turning to the variables of interest: we are interested in the estimates of $\beta$ and $\gamma$, the coefficient of the treatment effect of KSP-QT and KSU-GTGS, respectively.

### *Early treatment effect on the treated at the baseline*

First, we adapt (1) to estimate the effect of the WIIP project at the baseline:

(2) $$Y_{i1} = \alpha + \beta QT_{i1} + \gamma GTGS_{i1} + \zeta Z_{i1} + u_{i1}$$

Note that the control variables in (2) were adjusted. First, it is not possible to estimate the individual fixed effects using only one observation per household; and second, the set of control variables, $Z$, satisfies the additional condition that it represent the situation of households prior to the start of the WIIP project at the beginning of 2012 (not effected by the project). In regression (2), it is important to control for all observable village and household characteristics that differ between treatment and comparison villages.

However, we have sampled households who became members of the cooperatives in 2010, 2011 and 2012. Assuming that the longer one is a member of a cooperative the larger the benefits are, it is sensible to include the length of membership in regression (2). Then,

(3) $$Y_{it} = \alpha + \sum_{k=2010}^{2012} \beta_k \, YQT_{it}^k + \sum_{k=2010}^{2012} \gamma_k \, YGTGS_{it}^k + \zeta Z_{it} + u_{it},$$

where $YQT_{it}^k$ and $YGTGS_{it}^k$ are dummy variables denoting the year of becoming a member in the savings and credit cooperative with $YQT_{it}^{2012} = 1$ if household $i$ joined the cooperative in 2012 and $YQT_{it}^{2012} = 0$ otherwise, *etc*. We expect that the longer a household is member of the cooperative the larger the impact, or that $\beta_{2012} < \beta_{2011} < \beta_{2010}$ and $\gamma_{2012} < \gamma_{2011} < \gamma_{2010}$. The results of (3) are presented in Annex VI for both the baseline and the endline surveys.

### *Treatment effect on the treated between baseline and endline*

We use difference-in-differences methodology to estimate the treatment effect of the Seed capital project between the baseline and the endline survey. We take the first difference of (1):[11]

(4) $$\Delta Y_{i2} = \alpha + \beta QT_{i2} + \gamma GTGS_{i2} + \zeta \Delta \mathrm{W}_{i2} + \Delta u_{i2}$$

The time-invariant household fixed effect disappears in (4) due to the differencing, along with some of the control variables in $X$ with $\Delta \mathrm{W}_{i2}$ containing the change in the remaining control variables. Only

[10] The treatment groups are representative of the cooperative members, while the comparison group is representative of the population of the comparison communities.

[11] Hence, $\Delta Y_{i2} = Y_{i2} - Y_{i1}$ and so forth.

variables where the change is significantly different between the treatment and comparison groups are included in W. In addition, we denote the average change of the outcome variable in the comparison group by $\alpha$.

Note that we omitted the change sign (Δ) from the treatment variables $QT_{i2}$ and $GTGS_{i2}$. In principle, taking the differences of the binary variables would be zero due to the households' being a member of the cooperative already at the baseline period. However, assuming that the longer term effect of the project is larger than at the short-term, we may still expect a positive impact from the project on the members. Note that we assume that $QT_{i2} = QT_{i1}$ and $GTGS_{i2} = GTGS_{i1}$ irrespective of the households not using the services of the cooperatives anymore.

We report the regression results for the treatment effects, $\beta$ and $\gamma$, with and without control variables (W). In addition, in Annex VI we also report on the difference-in-difference regression allowing for different effects for the households joining the cooperatives in different years (as in regression (3)).

## 8.2. Results

Table 8 reports the regression results for the outcome indicators in the same order as in section 7, and Annex VI contains the results for regressions separating the impacts by year of membership.

The first column of Table 8 contains the mean value of the variable in the comparison group at the baseline. This serves as a reference point for assessing the size of the project impact on the variables. The next three columns report on the project's impact on KSP-QT members: column 2 report the early treatment effect using regression (2) on the baseline data, column 3 reports the difference-in-difference (DD) regression results of regression (4) without the controls, and column 4 shows the regression results including controls (DDX). The regression results for KSU-GTGS are reported in columns 5-7 in the same order as for the impact of KSP-QT in columns 2-4. As mentioned above, the overall effect of the cooperatives on their members should be assessed as the sum of the baseline effect (column 2 or 5) and the DD effect (column 4 or 7).

In the baseline regression (columns 2 and 5), the age, gender and education of the household head; household size; gender of respondent; relation of respondent to the household head; respondent's risk preference and subjective wealth status 5 years ago; and the household's main income source are used to control for differences between the households. In the diff-in-diff regression (columns 4 and 7), household size, the size of land owned, education of the household head and the main income source of the households are included as control variables.[12]

The standard error of the coefficient estimates are calculated correcting for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the location level, and they are reported below the coefficients estimates in brackets (columns 2-7). The significance of the coefficient estimates is denoted by stars next to the coefficient

[12] Note that the coefficient estimates for KSP-QT and KSU-GTGS are obtained from the same regression estimates, i.e. we used one regression to obtain the results in column 2 and 5.

estimates.[13] Note that the sample size for the regressions is not reported but can be inferred from Annex III.

The impact results mostly are in line with the general trends observed in Table 7.

### *Use of financial instruments*

Panel A, on the use of financial instruments, shows that conditional on observed characteristics, savings and cooperative members were about 70 percent point more likely to be involved in a financial institution, and about 87 percent point more likely to have savings in a savings and credit cooperative. Notable is that for the latter, the drop for KSP-QT the drop from baseline to endline (in comparison with the comparison group) was around 33 percent and highly significant while for KSU-GTGS the effect is much less and insignificant from zero. The reverse occurred for the households holding savings in a bank. This indicates that KSP-QT members tend to make use of the regular financial system after they have paid back their loan, while KSU-GTGS members continue to use the financial services of the cooperative. The results in Annex VI confirm that this result is likely related to the paying back of loans. For KSP-QT members we find that the impact (Diff in diff, table 12) on holding savings in a savings and credit cooperative is about twice as big for those who became members in 2010 as compared to those who recently became members in 2012.

### *Financial knowledge and skill*

We observe small and often insignificant impact on the financial knowledge and skill indicators reported in Panel B. There are no significant effects for KSP-QT members. For KSU-GTGS members, we find some positive effects. Relatively more households report to have a financial plan, and at baseline, financial numeracy skills are higher. A positive effect on having a financial plan is also found for KSP-QT, but for them the effect is not significantly different from the comparison group. The effects are also not significantly different between the two types of cooperatives.

### *Household income and livelihood*

As discussed in the previous section, we focus on consumption rather than income data when discussing the effect on household wealth. We find that correcting for observed characteristics, membership in KSU-GTGS results in a positive impact on per capita consumption of about 20 percent. No such effects are found for KSP-QT. The diff in diff results indicate that over the course of the evaluation period, the differences between the groups did not change much.

To interpret the results on the asset and housing indices, it is good the recall the trends observed in Table 7. Note that members started off with higher values of the asset indices, and improvements were recorded for all groups over the course of the evaluation period. The positive results in the 'base' column for KSU-GTGS indicates that they started off with considerably more assets (correcting for observed characteristics) than the comparison group. This is not the case for KSP-QT for the housing facilities index. For regular assets, the baseline effect of KSP-QT is 0.1 standard deviation but not significant. The results also show that assets of cooperative members grew less than for the comparison

[13] The probability that the coefficient estimates are not significantly different from zero is indicated by stars: * denotes that this probability is smaller than 10%, ** is used if this probability is less than 5% and *** if it is less than 1%. Hence, the more stars indicate a higher probability that the effects are significantly different from zero.

group over the course of the evaluation period. For KSP-QT, the drop is higher than the positive effect found in the baseline results. For KSU-GTGS, the effect is less, indicating that they remained to keep higher assets as compared to the control group. The positive wealth effect for KSU-GTGS is also confirmed by the subjective wealth status question. We find positive and significant impact results for KSU-GTGS in the diff in diff results (of about 0.4 compared to 2.8 for the comparison group at baseline and on a scale from 1 to 6).

### *Food security and vulnerability*

Regarding food security and vulnerability, we find a confirmation of the positive impact of membership of the cooperatives on precautionary savings. The results for having periods in the past 12 months not being able to cover cost of living have clearly decreased. The results indicate that KSP-QT members started off from a more vulnerable position than the general population while the opposite holds for KSU-GTGS members. The more negative trends (less vulnerability) observed in Table 7 also show up in the negative diff in diff results, but the effects are all not significantly different from zero. On the other hand, we find a positive and significant effect on some of the subjective assessments on whether current income is sufficient to meet daily needs. It points to a weak, but positive effect of the project in reducing vulnerability.

### *Discussion of findings*

In this subsection we present some subjective assessments from the researchers, and readers are invited to disagree. We find the finding that the savings and credit cooperatives' services are often temporary and related to having a loan quite revealing. It is no surprise that utilization of loans reduces after having paid them back, but it is surprising that savings follow a similar pattern. One would expect members to keep their savings. It seems as if members only save at the savings and credit cooperative because they are obliged to do so as a condition for the loan. The nice thing on the other hand is that we do observe that KSP-QT opens the door to more participation in the regular financial sector. These members are not so different from the general population when they start, and financial access to bank account increases by about 20 percent as a result of the project.

The lack of effect on financial literacy and knowledge is unfortunate but also understandable. On the one hand, not many members recalled participating in trainings on household finances. On the other hand, the indicators used to assess this evaluation question were potentially not the most relevant for the cooperative members.

**Table 8: Effectiveness of the project (regression results)**

| Columns | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Outcome indicator | Mean comp. (baseline) | KSP-QT treatment effect ($\beta$) | | | KSU-GTGS treatment effect ($\gamma$) | | |
| | | Base | DD | DDX | Base | DD | DDX |
| **Panel A. Use of financial instruments** | | | | | | | |
| % HHs know a place to borrow money | 91.667 | 6.557** (2.338) | -1.475 (3.864) | -0.391 (6.384) | 4.932** (1.762) | -2.410 (3.742) | -2.444 (6.114) |
| % HHs involved in a financial institution | 21.839 | 72.122*** (4.670) | -21.041*** (4.706) | -17.113** (7.047) | 65.098*** (5.172) | -11.869** (4.773) | -10.241 (6.846) |
| % HHs have savings in bank account | 17.241 | -8.014 (4.981) | 12.516** (5.958) | 11.427* (6.021) | 7.075 (9.521) | 1.912 (7.626) | 10.321 (7.670) |
| % HHs have savings in savings & credit coop. | 0.000 | 92.687*** (3.354) | -35.409*** (4.818) | 32.523*** (6.000) | 80.534*** (6.237) | -12.728 (9.846) | -11.613 (8.807) |
| % HHs have savings in savings & credit group | 18.391 | 21.216* (10.289) | -5.875 (13.079) | -1.426 (14.163) | 1.738 (11.294) | -2.093 (9.570) | 6.916 (11.292) |
| % HHs have borrowed in past 12 months | 30.952 | 32.830*** (5.494) | -12.150 (7.549) | -7.839 (11.482) | 18.726** (7.596) | -13.684** (6.173) | -20.377 (11.853) |
| **Panel B. Financial knowledge and skill** | | | | | | | |
| % HHs keep close eye on expenditures | 36.782 | 3.754 (5.501) | 4.023 (8.766) | 11.405 (11.657) | 12.863 (7.875) | -3.521 (9.245) | 9.699 (10.899) |
| % HHs have financial plan | 11.494 | 1.968 (6.063) | 15.677 (9.290) | 13.087 (15.150) | 3.639 (6.172) | 17.967* (9.830) | 20.227 (13.751) |
| Score on financial numeracy[1] | 2.598 | 0.054 (0.199) | 0.099 (0.274) | 0.087 (0.319) | 0.371* (0.196) | -0.165 (0.273) | -0.424 (0.338) |
| **Panel C. Household income and livelihood** | | | | | | | |
| Log total income per capita per month | 4.657 | 0.382* (0.204) | 0.122 (0.172) | 0.513 (0.300) | 0.325 (0.312) | 0.820*** (0.195) | 1.495*** (0.286) |
| Log food consumption per capita per month | 12.529 | 0.041 (0.090) | 0.033 (0.121) | -0.100 (0.130) | 0.205* (0.104) | -0.018 (0.128) | -0.023 (0.118) |
| Log non-food consumption per capita per month | 12.217 | -0.056 (0.104) | 0.165 (0.129) | 0.171 (0.147) | 0.332* (0.172) | -0.047 (0.123) | 0.159 (0.157) |
| Housing facilities index | -0.192 | 0.001 (0.049) | -0.041 (0.059) | -0.068 (0.076) | 0.262** (0.092) | -0.140** (0.057) | -0.168** (0.079) |

| Columns | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Outcome indicator | Mean comp. (baseline) | KSP-QT treatment effect ($\beta$) | | | KSU-GTGS treatment effect ($\gamma$) | | |
| | | **Base** | **DD** | **DDX** | **Base** | **DD** | **DDX** |
| Asset index | -0.449 | 0.097<br>(0.102) | -0.174*<br>(0.089) | -0.204***<br>(0.062) | 0.295***<br>(0.092) | -0.199**<br>(0.080) | -0.219***<br>(0.057) |
| % HHs invested in business | 18.391 | 12.299<br>(7.886) | -11.622<br>(7.588) | -11.687<br>(10.256) | 25.463***<br>(7.218) | -0.472<br>(7.019) | 12.179<br>(9.478) |
| % HHs invested in farming tools | 34.483 | -0.650<br>(9.394) | -3.161<br>(9.326) | -0.272<br>(13.109) | -11.529<br>(7.951) | 17.629**<br>(7.888) | 20.076<br>(13.517) |
| Overall happiness[1] | 2.080 | -0.075<br>(0.049) | -0.017<br>(0.066) | -0.002<br>(0.086) | 0.037<br>(0.076) | -0.045<br>(0.063) | 0.009<br>(0.069) |
| Current subjective wealth status[1] | 2.759 | -0.114<br>(0.067) | 0.181<br>(0.176) | -0.007<br>(0.202) | 0.095<br>(0.148) | 0.398**<br>(0.169) | 0.397*<br>(0.223) |
| **Panel D. Food security and vulnerability** | | | | | | | |
| % HHs have emergency savings for at least one month | 14.943 | -3.799<br>(5.387) | 20.754*<br>(10.142) | 10.350<br>(14.665) | 16.750***<br>(4.893) | 13.950<br>(9.462) | 27.820**<br>(12.594) |
| % HHs have not able to cover their living costs during the last 12 months | 67.816 | 8.872*<br>(4.682) | -8.110<br>(10.197) | -7.178<br>(12.907) | -10.331*<br>(5.468) | -6.219<br>(7.758) | -15.241<br>(14.895) |
| Current standard of living: daily needs covered[1] | 1.802 | -0.015<br>(0.059) | 0.206*<br>(0.102) | 0.175<br>(0.136) | 0.154<br>(0.090) | 0.167<br>(0.136) | 0.332**<br>(0.140) |
| Current standard of living: food consumption covered[1] | 2.047 | 0.003<br>(0.112) | 0.091<br>(0.116) | 0.166<br>(0.202) | 0.089<br>(0.120) | 0.147<br>(0.125) | 0.203<br>(0.205) |

Source: Household survey E6, MFS II Indonesia

Notes: Standard errors given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. * p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

1. Only panel respondents are used in regression.

# 9. Evaluation question 3: Relevance of changes

This subsection will answer evaluation question 3: What is the relevance of these changes? In particular we look at the size of the impact and whether the project addresses an important issue for the beneficiaries (the cooperative members).

## 9.1. The size of the impact

In Table 5, we observe that only 68 (73) percent of the cooperative member households kept their membership at the endline in KSP-QT (KSU-GTGS). Accordingly, we observe a substantial reduction in savings at the cooperatives (from 90 to 56 percent at KSP-QT and from 82 to 71 percent at KSU-GTGS) and financial involvement (from 95 to 78 percent and from 93 to 84 percent), particularly for KSP-QT (Table 7). This suggests that after the repayment of loans, many households decide to stop saving and leave the cooperative. Hence, the project savings and credit cooperatives serve only a temporary purpose for some households.

As a result of the above, the project does not have a sizeable impact on most outcome indicators reported in the previous sections.

## 9.2. Does the project address an important issue for the beneficiaries?

Access to financial services in the form of saving and borrowing are important tools for better aligning household income and expenditure. Many rural households face constraints in accessing formal financial services. The cooperatives participating in the KSP-QT project offer financial services from poor (KSP-QT and KSU-GTGS) to middle income (KSU-GTGS) rural households that are designed to match the needs of their membership. In this respect, the project addresses a relevant issue for the beneficiaries.

# 10. Evaluation question 4: Efficiency of project

This subsection will answer evaluation question 4: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient?

Unfortunately, we are not able to evaluate neither the efficiency nor the effectiveness of the project. Therefore, in this section we put forward our arguments for failing to evaluate the question on efficiency. However, first, the available cost information for the KSP-QT project is discussed below.

## 10.1. Project costs

To collect information on the costs of the project, we conducted a structured interview with the director of KSP-QT[14] on 22 July 2013 using the 'budget survey' as described in section 0. In addition, we use data presented in the baseline report, which provide information about the costs of the project incurred by external consultants to the project (not included in the budget of KSP-QT). The cost figures are based on

[14] The interview was conducted with Mr. Mustamiroh, director of KSP-QT, and Ms. Ita Fitriyani, administrative staff member of KSP-QT.

actual expenditure data from KSP-QT and contracted amounts from Hivos. Differences in the numbers may occur due to the change in exchange rates during the reporting period.

Table 9 summarizes the actual project costs reported by KSP-QT per implementation year: the amounts are displayed in Indonesian rupiah in column 2 and in euros (using the yearly average exchange rate) in column 3. Overall, KSP-QT claimed 79% of the available budget (in Indonesian rupiahs).[15] Looking at the composition of these costs over the total project period, 64% of all costs have been used for seed capital (loans to members), 5% for equipment (computers), 6% for the training of members and staff and 26% for operational costs (staff, office, transport and audit costs).

**Table 9: Overview of the costs and number of beneficiaries at KSP-QT**

| Year | Total costs [IDR] | Total cost [EUR, current prices][1] | Percentage of costs funded by CFA | Number of cooperative members | Cost per beneficiary per year[2] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **2010** | 734,465,125 | 60,626 | 100% | 11,449 | N.A. |
| **2011** | 804,549,775 | 65,603 | 100% | 12,266 | N.A. |
| **2012** | 366,062,050 | 30,285 | 100% | 13,372 | N.A. |

Source: Budget survey and Financial Report of the Seed Capital Programme.
Notes:
1. Annual average exchange rate is used. Data is obtained from http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/
2. N.A.= not applicable

However, the total costs of the seed capital project cover not only the costs of KSP-QT. The total budget of the project[16] is 201,370 EUR, to which Hivos contributes 191,574 EUR (95%). The total amount of 191,574 EUR is divided into 3 contracts: 153,597 EUR for KSP-QT (total contract amount[17] with KSP-QT); 15,756 EUR for the consultant of the project (Mr Irawan of LDP) and 22,222 EUR for the rating agency.

Finally, the total number of members in the 3 project savings and credit cooperatives is reported in the fifth column of Table 9.

## 10.2. Assessment

There are a number of factors that complicate the calculation of cost per beneficiary. The project works on improving the financial and social indicators of the 3 savings and credit cooperatives. Hence, the project is more a capacity development project than working with direct beneficiaries. In addition, current and future members both benefit from improved services, while the project enables the

[15] Note that the available budget for the project was 153,597 EUR. However, the total Indonesian rupiahs available for the project were 2,415,350,000 IDR. Hence, the project has used only 79% of the available funds. Note that if someone were to add up the total euro amount in Table 9, he would get 156,514 EUR, which is more than the budgeted amount mentioned above. However, the discrepancy is due to the exchange rates used for the conversion. Note, further, that inflation is not taken into account in these calculations.
[16] Source: correspondence with Miranda Rustam, Hivos Project Officer for Green Entrepreneurship
[17] Source: Hivos contract letter to KSP-QT

cooperatives to grow more rapidly and reach new members and new project locations. Therefore, it would be difficult to decide what number to use as the number of beneficiaries reached in the cost per beneficiary calculation.

Further, we do not know the exact costs of the consultant, the rating agency and the project costs not covered by Hivos. We are only able to calculate the total project costs of KSP-QT in real value. This amounts to 535,437 international dollars in 2011 prices for the whole 2010-2012 period.[18]

Taking the above concerns into account, providing a meaningful estimate of the cost per beneficiary goes beyond the scope of this evaluation. Therefore, we refrain from going further in answering evaluation question 4 than the information on project costs provided in section 10.1.

## 11. Contribution of Capacity Development and Civil Society

KSP-QT was not selected for the evaluation of capacity development of the SPO and civil society strengthening.

## 12. Conclusion

KSP-QT and KSU-GTGS provide savings and credit services to rural households. The savings and credit cooperatives are designed to help households to align their yearly incomes and expenditures through regular savings (weekly) and credit.

We find that only 68 (73) percent of the cooperative member households kept their membership at the endline in KSP-QT (KSU-GTGS), and only 56 (71) percent of the households still had savings at the cooperatives down from 90 (82) percent at the baseline. The results suggest that household often quit the cooperative after the repayment of their loans, hence they only accumulate savings as a requirement for borrowing.

A significant number of KSP-QT members quitting the cooperative ended up opening and saving in a bank account, which shows that KSP-QT opened the door towards more participation in the regular financial sector. On the other hand, many members remaining at KSP-QT participate in family finance and other meetings of the cooperative that are probably designed to encourage saving behaviour. Hence, overall the project had a positive effect on savings either through savings at the cooperative or at a bank. The members of KSU-GTGS changed their membership less often. This cooperative may also function more as a bank with members participating less often in meetings organised by the cooperative.

Possibly due to the increased savings of the households, the project had a positive impact on the percentage of households with emergency savings covering the living costs for at least one month. In addition, the project also had a positive impact on the current standard of living in terms of the daily needs covered. However, no clear cut results are found in terms of the livelihood and wealth of households and improvements in financial knowledge and skills.

[18] PPP conversion factor to 2011 international dollars is calculated using the World Development Indicators: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#

These findings are compatible with the findings in the literature, except for the findings on savings. Concerning financial literacy literature, no evidence is found for a substantial effect of financial literacy training on financial knowledge or saving behaviour. The existing evidence on micro-finance projects suggests that most micro-finance projects do not improve the livelihood of household in terms of savings and income. While the results of this MFS II evaluation indeed showed no impact on financial knowledge and skills and on income, they showed a positive effect on savings.

Finally, the MFS synthesis team asked to score each project along a few indicators. Table 10 displays the indicators and the scores we deemed valid for the project.

**Table 10: Overall project scoring**

| Statement | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| **1. The project was well designed** | 8 | The project was designed to build the capacity and improve the outreach and social and financial performance of the cooperatives. The focus on financial literacy education as means to improve both financial and social performance is well thought out. |
| **2. The project was implemented as designed** | 9 | We are not aware of deviations in the project implementation. |
| **3. The project reached all its objectives** | 8 | The project objectives were mostly defined in terms of the capacity building of the cooperatives.<br>At the household level, the objective of the project was to improve the welfare of its members, and increase the number of active members. This has been achieved to some extent: food security of households has somewhat increased but some members of KSP-QT have decided to stop their membership in the cooperative. |
| **4. The observed results are attributable to the project interventions** | 7 | The cooperative gives the means for the households to better manage their incomes and expenditures in the form of savings and credit. It is up to the households to decide how they use these possibilities. |
| **5. The observed results are relevant to the project beneficiaries** | 7 | Livelihood and food security improvements are probably the most relevant outcomes of the project. |
| **6. The project was implemented in the most efficient way** | - | We did not assess the efficiency of this project. |
| Notes: Scores are on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being “no agreement at all” and 10 being “completely agree with statement”. | | |

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# Annex I. SPO and project description

### *The savings and credit cooperatives*

The Seed Capital Programme for Koperasi Mentari Qaryah Thayyibah was coordinated by Koperasi Simpan Pinjam - Qaryah Thayyibah (KSP-QT), however, the project involves three primary saving and credit cooperatives: Koprasi Simpan Pinjam Mentari Dana Mandiri (KSP-MDM), Koperasi Serba Usaha-Gardu Tani Gedong Songo (KSU-GTGS) and KSP-QT. In addition, the objective of the project was to establish a secondary cooperative: Koperasi Sekunder Mentari Qaryah Thayyibah (*Secondary Cooperative*, KSM-QTha).

The three primary cooperatives were established by Qaryah Thayyibah Federation of Farmer Association[19] (SPPQT) between 2002 and 2006. They have the same mission to provide financial services to the small-scale farmers and entrepreneurs to open their opportunities to improve livelihood by developing small-trading, livestock farming and home industries. However, the three cooperatives have different target areas and beneficiary groups: the main membership of Koprasi Simpan Pinjam Qaryah Thayyibah (*Saving and Credit Cooperative*, KSP-QT) comes from farmers who cultivate rice and vegetables, therefore the saving and credit activities are based on the rice harvesting time, which is usually every three months. On the other hand, the members of Koprasi Simpan Pinjam Mentari Dana Mandiri (KSP MDM) are mostly small traders in the local markets in Semarang city whose trading activities are daily, therefore their saving and credit activities are also daily. Finally, the members of Koperasi Serba Usaha-Gardu Tani Gedong Songo (*Multipurpose Cooperative,* KSU-GTGS) are more diverse: it includes farmers, traders, and manufacturing and garment industry workers whose saving and credit activities are typically every two weeks. All three cooperatives target women for membership, because in Javanese culture women are responsible for spending money.

In total, the cooperatives have reached 8,700 members with various saving and credit products by 31 August 2009.

### *The Seed capital project[20]*

The project aims to improve the performance of three cooperatives (KSP-QT/KSP-MDM/KSU-GTGS) as financial services providers, which is achieved by the establishment of the secondary cooperative KSM-QTha, and capacity development of both the secondary and primary cooperatives. KSM-QTha will serve as an umbrella organisation for the primary cooperatives which provides guarantee for inter-lending among the cooperatives and promotes the three cooperatives to the community.

The final objective of the project is to improve the social performance of the cooperatives which can be measured by the following indicators:

- Drop-out rate
- Depth of outreach
- Percentage of female clients

[19] SPPQT has been a Hivos partner since 1999 in the Sustainable Productions programme.

[20] This section describes the planned implementation of the Seed capital project. Therefore, it is written in present and future tense.

- Percentage of rural clients

In addition, KSM-QTha has three objectives that go along with improved social performance:

- Be a professional cooperative that is able to provide the best services for its members and the community
- Improve the welfare of the members and neighbouring communities
- Promote the cooperatives in its activities

In the 2009-2012 period, Hivos provides funds for the following activities: 50% of the funds is used as working capital for the cooperatives, and the other 50% is used for capacity building trainings:

- Trainings and workshops to staff members in the four cooperatives to facilitate capacity building to staff members
- Training to staff to enhance system and human resources development

The trainings are aimed to achieve the following results:

- Increased staff productivity and stability (measured by active loan clients per staff, growth indicators, active loan clients, loan portfolio quality, repayment rate, PAR30)
- Improved financial performance (measured by operational and financial self-sufficiency and operating expense ratio)

### *Financial literacy training*

Many cooperative members were in a debt trap at the time of becoming a member, and they have borrowed to be able to pay for a previous debt. To help the communities exit from debt trap, and to improve repayment rates, the Seed Capital programme started with a financial literacy programme. Before the Hivos programme, the cooperatives were not aware of the importance of financial literacy. However, with the help of the Seed Capital programme, all three savings and credit cooperatives started with their own financial literacy training.

At KSP-QT, each new prospective member participates in an hour long financial literacy training, either individually or in a group. This training introduces prospective members to the financial products of KSP-QT, and discusses household finances (financial management):

- Drawing a balance sheet: comparing income flows to expenditures
- Finding ways to save from all income a little bit at a time (for example 1000 rupiahs)
- Planning yearly incomes and expenditure: making a plan to start saving for planned larger expenses in time. It is discussed how much to save per day/week/month in order to accumulate the desired amount on time.
- Learning about the importance of keeping track of expenses

The discussions are held simple so that the people can understand it, and short so that they don't get bored or lose the attention. According to KSP-QT, when prospective members are approached to start saving at KSP-QT, they say that they are poor and don't have money to save. But then together with the KSP-QT staff, they draw a balance table of their yearly incomes and expenditures, work out how much money the family needs, and try to find small amounts of money that can be saved throughout the year.

They discuss which product would suit their needs the best (both in terms of savings and loans). Based on experience of KSP-QT staff, low to middle class have money to save but they were not taught how to save, so they don't know about it. After the training, people usually understand that they can also save. KSP-QT encourages members to save at least 1000 rupiahs per day. The cooperative also organises weekly meetings in the communities, where members can come together and deposit their savings together, which serves as a commitment device. Also in KSU-GTGS, a staff member visits members every week and collects savings.

### *Diverse financial instruments*

As discussed above, the three savings and credit cooperatives have different target groups with different needs. The cooperatives strive to develop financial instruments that match the needs of their members. For example, in KSP-QT there is a saving programme for planning ahead (for example for a wedding, a house or religious festivities). In KSU-GTGS, there is also group lending because there are many farmer groups. However, most loans are individual based.

### *Outreach of cooperatives*

Through the Seed Capital programme, Hivos urged the cooperatives to grow in order to increase their saving base. From less than 9,000 members in total, the cooperatives were expected to reach 15,000 members by 2012. Hivos provided funding to set up business in new locations (training of staff, transportation, IT, etc.).

With Hivos funding the cooperatives' membership increased to 13,372 by the end of 2012. Since the end of the project, the membership only grew to 14,407 by June 2014. As the director of KSP-QT explained "without Hivos it's like walking, with Hivos it's like riding a car – you get there but on foot it takes much longer". So, more members could be reached with the funding of Hivos than would have been possible otherwise.

After joining one of the saving and credit cooperatives, the new members have to start with saving. Only when they have saved a certain amount, are they entitled to borrow. The maximum amount of credit increases every time the members successfully repay a loan. However, members that are inactive for two years in the cooperative lose their membership.

### *Financial performance*

In 2014, the average loan size at KSP-QT is 5 million rupiahs, which marks a tenfold increase compared to 2008. The largest loan granted was 50 million rupiahs. Loans are mostly for 12 months with monthly repayments, while the longest period is 3 years. KSP-QT asks for collateral for loans above 2 million rupiahs, while for smaller amounts the (birth) certificate of the member (or child) has to be deposited. For members with a good track record, sometimes it is not necessary to provide collateral.

The interest rate on the loans is between 1.67-2% per month. This is higher than at the banks but lower than other sources of loans (even other savings and credit cooperatives). The default rate at KSP-QT is 10%, which mostly affects loans below 2 million rupiahs (as these do not have collateral). However, if a member cannot pay, KSP-QT first tries to restructure the loan.

The table below provides information about the financial performance of the 3 cooperatives at the end of 2012 (as part of the reporting obligation for Hivos).

**Table 11: Financial performance at the end of 2012**

| Parameter | Target in 2012 | Revised target in 2012 | Actual in December 2012 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | KSP-QT | KSP-MDM | KSU-GTGS | TOTAL |
| **1. Productivity and Stability Staff**<br>Number of active borrowers per staff member | 300 | 203 | 222 | 205 | 130 | 185 |
| **2. Growth indicators**<br>Number of active borrowers<br>Loan portfolio (USD) | 15,000<br>1,700,000 | 5.500<br>1,021,053 | 1,551<br>222,884 | 2,866<br>953,043 | 519<br>108,925 | 4,936<br>1,284,811 |
| **3. Portfolio quality**<br>PAR30 | 6% | 6% | 6.34% | 4.00% | 7.4% | 6% |
| **4. Membership** | 15,000 | 15,000 | 4,407 | 6,563 | 2,402 | 13,372 |
| **5. Total deposits of members** | | | 1,115,585,835 | 4,098,102,650 | 245,708,162 | 5,183,700,683 |
| Source: KSP-QT Annual report to Hivos 2012 | | | | | | |

# Annex II. Overview outcome indicators and indices

This annex provides a detailed description about the used outcome indicators. In addition, it discusses the variables which were used to construct the outcome indicator indices. Please note that some of the indicators are constructed as indices from multiple questions. In the main text of the report, only the indices are reported for such indicators.

Outcome variables for the project were collected at household level. The outcomes are reported for treatment and comparison households for the baseline and the endline surveys. The sample size can differ among outcome variables because the answers 'don't know' and `refused' are changed to a missing value or because a respondent could skip a question if he/she had no knowledge about what was asked (answered 'no' to a previous question). 'Don't know' responses were also changed to missing if the question had a scale of responses (for example from 1-4). However, if we were interested in the percentage of the households that answered 'yes' to a certain question, it made sense to change the 'don't know' answers to 'no'. All binary (dummy) variables were recoded so that 'No' is 0 and 'Yes' is 100[21]. The mean and total sample size of the indicators is reported in Annex III.

The outcome variables are discussed below one by one.

### *Use of financial instruments*

- *Access*
  - *Households that know a place to borrow money*: In section JK (Use of Financial Services) of the questionnaire it was asked whether the respondent or any other household member know of a place where they can borrow money. The question has 3 answer categories: "Yes", "No" and "Don't Know". In order to generate dummy variable "Don't know" answers were recoded to "No".
- *Membership*
  - *Households involved in financial institutions*: Dummy variable constructed using section JK (Use of Financial Services) of the questionnaire. The dummy is created by combing answers of 2 different questions; *jk05* and *jk17*. All households that answered to have savings in a bank account or in a savings and credit cooperative are counted as households that are involved in a financial institution. Furthermore, all households which were able to get a loan from: a. private commercial bank b. cooperative c. government/semi-government bank d. agricultural bank/SAPRODI and e. non-bank financial institution are counted as households that are involved in a financial institution.
- *Savings*
  - *Households with savings in bank account*: All information in order to construct the dummy variable was taken from question *jk05* for all households which replied that have savings in a bank account.

[21] 100 is used instead of 1 in order to report the dummy variables in percentages

- *Households with savings in savings and credit cooperative*: All information in order to construct the dummy variable was taken from question *jk05* for all households which replied that have savings in savings and credit cooperative.
- *Households with savings in savings and credit group*: All information in order to construct the dummy variable was taken from question *jk05* for all households which replied that have savings in savings and credit cooperative.

- *Borrowing*
  - *Households that have borrowed in the past 12 months*: All information in order to construct the dummy variable was taken from question *jk16* for all households which replied that were successful in securing a loan in the past 12 months. Answer categories `don't know' were replaced by missing values.

### *Financial Knowledge and skills*

- *Skill*
  - *Households that keep close eyes on expenditures*: Dummy variable based on question *kk02* of section KK (Cognitive Skills and Financial Literacy). Question *kk02* has 6 answer categories: 1. I don't keep an eye on expenses at all, 2. I keep my on expenses a bit, 3. Without keeping written records, I keep a fairly close eye on expenses, 7. Refused, 8. Don't Know. All households which choose answers categories 3 or 4 are counted as households which keep close eyes on expenditure.
  - *Households that have a financial plan*: All information in order to construct the dummy variable was taken from question *kk01* for all households which replied that have a plan on how to divide income among spending, saving and paying bills. Answer `don't know' was recoded to zero and category `refused' to missing.
- *Knowledge*
  - *Score on financial numeracy questions*: This is a scale variable which is reported only for panel respondents. A panel respondent indicates that the questionnaire was answered by the same respondent between baseline and endline. The variable is the result of the sum of 4 dummy variables therefore the scale variable takes values between 0-4. The 4 dummy variables used take the value of 1 if the panel respondent replied correctly in 4 questions (*kk06, kk07, kk08 and kk09*) concerning financial numeracy. The correct answers for the aforementioned questions are: 20000, more money than today, 0 and 10200 for each question respectively. Answer `don't know' was recoded to zero and category `refused' to missing.

### *Household Income and livelihood (uniform indicator)*

- *Household Income*
  - *Per capita total income per month (1000 Rp)*: The questionnaire includes separate sub-sections for income generated from: a. Crops, b. Livestock (net profit), c. Non-Farm activities (net profit) and d. Money transfers (net income). The total income variable is created by the sum of income generated by the different income sources mentioned above. Among these, crop income is calculated as the value of crops produced.

Therefore, the total income is reported as gross income and not as net income. Although the questionnaire captures expenditures such as input costs, labour costs, transfers costs etc., the data were considered unreliable as they were showing large fluctuations. Thus the costs were not taken into consideration for the construction of the total income variable. The total crop income is created by multiplying the total amount of harvested crops (*utb03, utb04, utb05*), converted in kg for each crop, with the price sold. The price is the mean price of each crop for each separate village. The total livestock income is created by summing the profits generated by the sale of livestock captured by question *utg07.* The total non-farm income derives from section NT. (Non-farm income) of the questionnaire and specifically from question *nt04* where the respondent is asked to provide information concerning the amount generated by non-farm business during the past 12 months. Total income from money transfers comes from section TF. (Transfer) of the questionnaire and specifically from question *tf02* where the respondent was asked to provide information about the type of assistance and the amount of Rupiah he/she received. Furthermore, the total income is divided by 12 (months) in order to report in monthly values, and in order to obtain the income per capita, the total income per month is divided by the household size. Finally, the total income per month per capita is divided by 1000 as to report in 1000 Rupiah.

- *Per capita consumption of households*
  - *Monthly Food Consumption Per Capita (1000 Rp):* The food consumption variable is created by using data from the section KS. (Consumption) of the questionnaire. The respondent is asked to provide information about the market-purchase expenditures (*ks01*) as well as the approximate value of self-produced consumed food items (*ks02*) which are covering different food categories such as: a. Staple foods, b. Vegetables, c. Dried Foods, d. Meat and Fish, e. Milk/Eggs, f. Spices and g. Beverages. The market-purchased expenditures and the value of self-produced food items are asked for the last week; therefore both are first multiplied by 52 (weeks) in order to create the yearly consumption expenditures and later divided by 12 (months) as to report in monthly values. The food consumption per capita is the sum of the monthly market purchased expenditures and the monthly value of self-produced food items, divided by the household size. The last step is to divide the food consumption per capita variable by 1000 as to report it in 1000 Rupiah.

  - *Monthly Non Food Consumption Per Capita (1000 Rp):* The non-food consumption variable is created by using data from the section KS. (Consumption) of the questionnaire. The respondent is asked to provide the monthly expenditures on a series of non-food items such as: a. Electricity, b. Water, c. Fuel, d. Personal Toiletries, e. Transportation, f. Household Items, g. Recreational and Entertainment, and h. Domestic Services and Servants' wages. The non-food consumption is generated by summing up the aforementioned monthly non-food expenditures and then dividing the sum with the

household size in order to report in per capita level. The last step is to divide the non-food consumption per capita variable by 1000 as to report it in 1000 Rupiah.

- *Asset holdings of households*
  - *Housing facilities index (PCA):* In order, that the housing facilities index in the MFS II projects have a meaningful interpretation, we calculate weights for the index components based on their predictive power for household expenditure. The weights are calculated using a population representative survey for Indonesia using regression analysis. We use the IFLS 2007 survey as a population representative sample. From the IFLS 2007 dataset we use aggregate expenditure data, asset ownership and sampling weights. As the aggregate expenditure variable the data analysis uses the logarithm of the monthly per capita expenditure (*lnpce*). The sampling weight used is the cross-sectional sampling weight adjusted for attrition. This weight should be representative of all households living in the IFLS provinces in Indonesia in 2007. Based on the KR section of the IFLS survey, we construct the housing variables that are the same in IFLS and the MFS II surveys. The variables used from the KR section of the MFS II surveys which are also the found in IFLS are: a. *kr01*, b. *kr02*, c. *kr04*, d. *kr07*, e. *kr10* and h. *kr13*. The corresponding variables in IFLS are: a. *kr03,* b. *kr13*, c. *kr16*, d. *kr20*, e. *kr11* and h. *kr24.* There are more variables which are the same between E6 and IFLS, however we wanted to construct a housing facilities asset variable which can be used by all MFS II surveys, thus the variables mentioned above are selected as they are common in most MFS II surveys. The first step is to recode the variables of MFS II surveys in order to have matching answer categories with the variables of IFLS; the same procedure is also followed for the IFLS variables. In addition, as the variable names are not the same among the two datasets, in the IFLS dataset we renamed the common variables as to have the same name with the MFS II variables. After, the aforementioned preparation the two datasets are combined into one dataset. Furthermore, dummy variables are created based on the answer categories of the chosen common variables. The reason behind the construction of the categorical dummy variables is to include them in the regression of the logarithm of the monthly per capita expenditure on the housing dummies. Nevertheless, not all of the categorical dummies are used in the regression model. The regression does not include dummy variables whose variation is higher than 97% of the sample or lower than 3% of the sample. Moreover, after we performed the regression the next step was to calculate the fitted values by predicting the expenditure based on housing facilities for both the IFLS and MFS II sample. Finally, the last step was to rescale the predicted variable in order to have a zero mean for the IFLS sample by subtracting the mean of the fitted value from the fitted value itself.
    Hence, we will be able to infer the livelihood of our survey participants compared to the Indonesian average in 2007: for example, if the value of the index is 0.10 (-0.10), on average, it implies that the sample is approximately 10% better off (worse off) than the average Indonesian household in 2007 based on the predictive power of housing facilities (like drinking water source) on household expenditure.

- *Asset index (PCA):* The construction of the asset index follows a similar procedure with the creation of the housing index, however in this case instead of the IFLS dataset the DHS 2012 dataset was used, as DHS includes more common asset variables with the MFS II surveys than the IFLS. Moreover, asset variables were chosen from the KR section of the MFS II surveys which are common with DHS variables. From MFS II dataset questions a. kr11 and b. kr12 were chosen while from the DHS dataset questions a. *hv207*, b. *hv208*, c. *hv209*, d. *hv243a*, e.*hv210*, f. *hv211*, g. *hv212*, h. *sh118c*, i. *hv243d* and j. *hv243c* were selected. The next step was to combine the two datasets and perform a factor analysis of the common variables in order to calculate the asset index. In addition, as mentioned above the 3% rule was also applied for the asset index, excluding from the factor analysis variables with small variation. Finally, the predicted asset index was normalized for the DHS sample (mean 0 and variance 1).

- *Investment into business or farm equipment*
  - *Household invested in business:* All information in order to construct the dummy variable was taken from question *jk42* for all households which replied that have expanded their family business by purchasing new equipment or start a new business in the past 12 months.
  - *Household invested in new farming tools:* All information in order to construct the dummy variable was taken from question *jk43* for all households which replied that have purchased new farming tools in the past 12 months.

- *Self-reported well-being*
  - *Happiness:* This is a scale variable which is reported only for panel respondents. A panel respondent indicates that the questionnaire was answered by the same respondent between baseline and endline. The variable using a Likert scale takes values from 1 (very happy) to 4 (absolutely not happy). All the information used for the construction of the Happiness variable is taken from question *sw03* of section SW. (Subjective wellbeing) of the questionnaire.
  - *Current wealth status:* This is a scale variable which is reported only for panel respondents. A panel respondent indicates that the questionnaire was answered by the same respondent between baseline and endline. The variable takes values from 1 (poorest) to 6 (richest). All the information used for the construction of the Happiness variable is taken from question *sw04* of section SW. (Subjective wellbeing) of the questionnaire.

### *Food security and vulnerability*

- *Households that have emergency savings for at least one month:* All information in order to construct the dummy variable was taken from question *kk03* for all households which replied that have set aside emergency or rainy day fuds that would cover their expenses

for one month, in case of sickness, job loss, economic downturn or other emergencies. Answer `don't know' was recoded to zero and category `refused' to missing.

- *Households not able to cover their living costs/ have not enough to eat:* All information in order to construct the dummy variable was taken from question *jk02* where the respondent was asked if sometimes people find that their income does not quite cover their living costs during the last 12 months. Answer category `don't know' was recoded to zero.
- *Current standard of living (daily needs covered):* Scale variable asked to panel respondents taking values 1 (not enough to fulfil my daily needs), 2 (only enough to fulfil my daily needs), 3 (more than enough to fulfil my daily needs). Answers 'don't know' where replaced with a missing value. All the information was taken from question *sw01*.
- *Current standard of living (food consumption):* Scale variable asked to panel respondents taking values 1 (not enough to fulfil my daily needs), 2 (only enough to fulfil my daily needs), 3 (more than enough to fulfil my daily needs). Answers 'don't know' where replaced with a missing value. All the information was taken from question *sw02*.

# Annex III. Summary statistics of variables

**Table 12: Descriptive Statistics**

| Survey period | Baseline | | Endline | | Change (Endline-Baseline) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Statistics** | Sample size | Mean | Sample size | Mean | Sample size | Mean |
| Household size | 290 | 3.80 | 285 | 3.99 | 285 | 0.18 |
| % HHs with Female HH Head | 290 | 9.31 | 290 | 9.31 | 290 | 0.00 |
| Age of HH Head | 290 | 48.30 | 290 | 50.20 | 290 | 1.90 |
| % HHs with religion: Muslim | 290 | 93.45 | 0 | | 0 | |
| % HHs with religion: Protestant | 290 | 93.45 | 0 | | 0 | |
| Size Of Cultivated Land ($m^2$) | 204 | 2,137.99 | 203 | 1,471.20 | 178 | -597.79 |
| Education of HH head (%): | | | | | | |
| *No/Islamic* | 289 | 11.42 | 290 | 10.34 | 289 | -1.04 |
| *Primary* | 289 | 62.63 | 290 | 63.45 | 289 | 0.69 |
| *Secondary* | 289 | 23.18 | 290 | 23.79 | 289 | 0.69 |
| *Higher* | 289 | 2.77 | 290 | 2.41 | 289 | -0.35 |
| Main income source (%): | | | | | | |
| *Crop Farming* | 290 | 45.17 | 290 | 51.38 | 290 | 6.21 |
| *Fishing* | 290 | 0.00 | 290 | 0.00 | 290 | 0.00 |
| *Livestock* | 290 | 0.69 | 290 | 0.69 | 290 | 0.00 |
| *Non-Farm Business* | 290 | 23.45 | 290 | 18.28 | 290 | -5.17 |
| *Wage* | 290 | 26.55 | 290 | 26.55 | 290 | 0.00 |
| *Pension* | 290 | 0.00 | 290 | 0.00 | 290 | 0.00 |
| *Remittances* | 290 | 4.14 | 290 | 3.10 | 290 | -1.03 |
| Subjective wealth status 5 years ago | 289 | 2.49 | 286 | 2.37 | 260 | -0.10 |
| Source: Household survey E6, MFS II Indonesia | | | | | | |

**Table 13: Outcome variables**

| Survey period | Baseline | | Endline | | Change (Endline-Baseline) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Statistics** | Sample size | Mean | Sample size | Mean | Sample size | Mean |
| % HHs know a place to borrow money | 287 | 97.21 | 288 | 97.57 | 285 | 1.05 |
| % HHs involved in a financial institution | 290 | 72.41 | 290 | 64.14 | 290 | -8.28 |
| % HHs have savings in bank account | 290 | 21.03 | 290 | 28.62 | 290 | 7.59 |
| % HHs have savings in savings & credit coop. | 290 | 60.34 | 290 | 44.14 | 290 | -16.21 |
| % HHs have savings in savings & credit group | 290 | 30.34 | 290 | 14.83 | 290 | -15.52 |
| % HHs have borrowed in past 12 months | 287 | 54.01 | 286 | 44.41 | 283 | -9.19 |
| % HHs keep close eye on expenditures | 290 | 46.21 | 290 | 25.86 | 290 | -20.34 |
| % HHs have financial plan | 290 | 12.76 | 290 | 48.62 | 290 | 35.86 |
| Score on financial numeracy[1] | 290 | 2.83 | 290 | 3.01 | 263 | 0.14 |
| Total income per capita per month (1000 Rp)[2] | 290 | 287.63 | 285 | 561.64 | 285 | 277.78 |
| Food consumption per capita per month (1000 Rp)[2] | 290 | 345.50 | 290 | 309.55 | 290 | -35.95 |
| Non-food consumption per capita per month (1000 Rp)[2] | 290 | 355.79 | 290 | 288.92 | 290 | -66.87 |
| Housing facilities index | 290 | -0.07 | 290 | 0.09 | 290 | 0.16 |
| Asset index | 290 | -0.12 | 290 | 0.01 | 290 | 0.13 |
| % HHs invested in business | 290 | 35.52 | 290 | 24.14 | 290 | -11.38 |
| % HHs invested in farming tools | 290 | 35.86 | 290 | 18.62 | 290 | -17.24 |
| Overall happiness[1] | 290 | 2.03 | 290 | 2.00 | 263 | -0.03 |
| Current subjective wealth status[1] | 290 | 2.86 | 288 | 2.76 | 263 | -0.08 |
| % HHs have emergency savings | 290 | 20.34 | 289 | 54.67 | 289 | 34.26 |
| % HHs have not able to cover their living costs during the last 12 months | 290 | 69.31 | 290 | 63.10 | 290 | -6.21 |
| Current standard of living: daily needs covered[1] | 289 | 1.85 | 288 | 1.81 | 262 | -0.02 |
| Current standard of living: food consumption covered[1] | 289 | 2.10 | 288 | 1.99 | 262 | -0.10 |

Source: Household survey E6, MFS II Indonesia
Notes:

1. Indicators reported only for panel respondents.
2. Prices are reported in 2012 real prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%). Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/aboutus.php?inflasi=1

**Table 14: Savings and credit**

| Survey period | Baseline | | Endline | | Change (Endline-Baseline) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Statistics** | Sample size | Mean | Sample size | Mean | Sample size | Mean |
| % HHs know a place to borrow | 287 | 97.21 | 288 | 97.57 | 285 | 1.05 |
| Percentage of households that know […] as a place to borrow | | | | | | |
| *Banks* | 290 | 73.10 | 290 | 79.31 | 290 | 6.21 |
| *Cooperative* | 290 | 70.34 | 290 | 74.14 | 290 | 3.79 |
| *Employer* | 290 | 2.07 | 290 | 11.03 | 290 | 8.97 |
| *Small Farmers Group* | 290 | 4.83 | 290 | 7.59 | 290 | 2.76 |
| *Money Lender* | 290 | 8.62 | 290 | 11.72 | 290 | 3.10 |
| % HHs have a bank account | 290 | 27.59 | 290 | 32.07 | 290 | 4.48 |
| % HHs able to obtain loan from the savings and credit cooperative if wanted | 0 | | 290 | 52.41 | 0 | |
| % HHs borrowed money in past 12 months | 287 | 54.01 | 286 | 44.41 | 283 | -9.19 |
| Purpose of the loan (% of hh's) | | | | | | |
| *Social ceremony* | 290 | 2.76 | 290 | 0.69 | 290 | -2.07 |
| *Medication* | 290 | 2.07 | 290 | 1.03 | 290 | -1.03 |
| *Education* | 290 | 4.14 | 290 | 3.79 | 290 | -0.34 |
| *Home renovation* | 290 | 2.76 | 290 | 3.45 | 290 | 0.69 |
| *To buy house* | 290 | 0.00 | 290 | 0.00 | 290 | 0.00 |
| *Agricultural Inputs* | 290 | 6.21 | 290 | 6.90 | 290 | 0.69 |
| *Daily expenses* | 290 | 12.07 | 290 | 8.28 | 290 | -3.79 |
| *Buy repair vehicle* | 290 | 3.10 | 290 | 2.07 | 290 | -1.03 |
| *Capital for other businesses* | 290 | 8.97 | 290 | 7.59 | 290 | -1.38 |
| *% HHs used land as collateral* | 133 | 14.29 | 104 | 32.69 | 66 | 12.12 |
| Percentage of households that used […] as collateral | | | | | | |
| *Homestead* | 133 | 2.26 | 104 | 0.96 | 66 | 0.00 |
| *Certificate/document* | 133 | 32.33 | 104 | 4.81 | 66 | -31.82 |
| *Livestock* | 133 | 0.75 | 104 | 11.54 | 66 | 12.12 |
| *Other type of collateral* | 133 | 50.38 | 104 | 50.00 | 66 | 7.58 |
| Dum. Difficulty Loan Repayment | 155 | 31.16 | 127 | 39.66 | 95 | 7.15 |
| Percentage of households that have savings in […] | | | | | | |
| *Bank account* | 290 | 21.03 | 290 | 28.62 | 290 | 7.59 |
| *Savings & credit cooperative* | 290 | 60.34 | 290 | 44.14 | 290 | -16.21 |
| *Savings & credit group* | 290 | 30.34 | 290 | 14.83 | 290 | -15.52 |
| *Arisan* | 290 | 73.79 | 290 | 76.21 | 290 | 2.41 |
| *Jewelry, Gold & Precious Metals* | 290 | 36.55 | 290 | 35.17 | 290 | -1.38 |
| *Crops In Storage* | 290 | 44.83 | 290 | 38.62 | 290 | -6.21 |
| *Livestock* | 290 | 47.59 | 290 | 50.69 | 290 | 3.10 |
| *Cash* | 290 | 34.48 | 290 | 17.59 | 290 | -16.90 |
| % HHs participated in family finance meetings | 290 | 7.93 | 290 | 5.17 | 290 | -2.76 |
| % HHs Interested In Participating In Family Finance Meetings | 288 | 71.53 | 281 | 70.82 | 279 | -0.36 |

| Survey period | Baseline | | Endline | | Change (Endline-Baseline) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Statistics** | Sample size | Mean | Sample size | Mean | Sample size | Mean |
| Source: Household survey E6, MFS II Indonesia | | | | | | |

**Table 15: Income components**

| Survey period | Baseline | | Endline | | Change (Endline-Baseline) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Statistics** | Sample size | Mean | Sample size | Mean | Sample size | Mean |
| Total Income Per Month (1000 Rp)[1] | 290 | 1,013.89 | 290 | 2,134.12 | 290 | 1,120.23 |
| Percentage of […] income in total income | | | | | | |
| *Livestock* | 290 | 5.45 | 290 | 7.45 | 290 | 2.00 |
| *Farm products* | 290 | 2.04 | 290 | 1.11 | 290 | -0.92 |
| *Transfer* | 290 | 34.95 | 290 | 28.22 | 290 | -6.73 |
| *Non-farm* | 290 | 25.78 | 290 | 27.52 | 290 | 1.74 |
| *Crop* | 290 | 31.44 | 290 | 31.90 | 290 | 0.47 |

Source: Household survey E6, MFS II Indonesia
Notes:
2. Prices are reported in 2012 real prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%). Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/aboutus.php?inflasi=1

**Table 16: Consumption components**

| Survey period | Baseline | | Endline | | Change (Endline-Baseline) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Statistics** | Sample size | Mean | Sample size | Mean | Sample size | Mean |
| Total Expenditure Per Month (1000 Rp)[1] | 290 | 2,156.16 | 290 | 1,933.42 | 290 | -222.75 |
| Percentage […] expenditure in total expenditure | | | | | | |
| *Food* | 290 | 71.65 | 290 | 72.01 | 290 | 0.36 |
| *Education* | 290 | 6.48 | 290 | 7.62 | 290 | 1.14 |
| *Medical* | 290 | 3.62 | 290 | 3.66 | 290 | 0.04 |
| *Durables* | 290 | 4.90 | 290 | 4.67 | 290 | -0.24 |
| *Other* | 290 | 13.35 | 290 | 12.05 | 290 | -1.30 |

Source: Household survey E6, MFS II Indonesia
Notes:
1. Prices are reported in 2012 real prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%). Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/aboutus.php?inflasi=1

**Table 17: Food security and vulnerability**

| Survey period | Baseline | | Endline | | Change (Endline-Baseline) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Statistics** | Sample size | Mean | Sample size | Mean | Sample size | Mean |
| Nr. Of Months Could Not Cover Living Costs in past 12 months | 0 | | 290 | 1.88 | 0 | |
| % HHs Could Not Cover Living Cost in […] | | | | | | |
| *January* | 0 | | 290 | 10.00 | 0 | |
| *February* | 0 | | 290 | 11.03 | 0 | |
| *March* | 0 | | 290 | 10.00 | 0 | |
| *April* | 0 | | 290 | 11.72 | 0 | |
| *May* | 0 | | 290 | 16.55 | 0 | |
| *June* | 0 | | 290 | 32.07 | 0 | |
| *July* | 0 | | 290 | 43.79 | 0 | |
| *August* | 0 | | 290 | 23.45 | 0 | |
| *September* | 0 | | 290 | 8.28 | 0 | |
| *October* | 0 | | 290 | 5.52 | 0 | |
| *November* | 0 | | 290 | 6.55 | 0 | |
| *December* | 0 | | 290 | 8.62 | 0 | |
| % HHs used […] to make ends meet | | | | | | |
| *Own Savings* | 290 | 12.76 | 290 | 28.62 | 290 | 15.86 |
| *Selling Assets* | 290 | 30.69 | 290 | 47.59 | 290 | 16.90 |
| *Borrow Money* | 290 | 60.00 | 290 | 59.31 | 290 | -0.69 |
| *Depend On Charity* | 290 | 1.38 | 290 | 0.69 | 290 | -0.69 |
| *Ask Family Members* | 290 | 2.41 | 290 | 10.00 | 290 | 7.59 |
| *Nothing To Use* | 290 | 2.76 | 290 | 0.34 | 290 | -2.41 |
| Source: Household survey E6, MFS II Indonesia | | | | | | |

# Annex IV. Description of survey locations

Table 17 summarises the villages that have been surveyed for the evaluation.

**Table 18: Villages in the sample**

| EA | Village name | Sub-district | Treatment type |
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | KOPENG | GETASAN | KSP-QT |
| 002 | TAJUK | GETASAN | KSP-QT |
| 009 | SUNGGINGAN | MIRI | KSP-QT |
| 010 | SOKO | MIRI | KSP-QT |
| 011 | BAGOR | MIRI | KSP-QT |
| 003 | LANJAN | SUMOWONO | KSU-GTGS |
| 004 | JUBELAN | SUMOWONO | KSU-GTGS |
| 005 | SUMOWONO | SUMOWONO | KSU-GTGS |
| 006 | KAWENGEN | UNGARAN BARAT | Comparison |
| 007 | KEJI | UNGARAN BARAT | Comparison |
| 008 | GETASAN | GETASAN | Comparison |
| 013 | CEPOKO | SUMBERLAWANG | Comparison |
| 014 | KACANGAN | SUMBERLAWANG | Comparison |

The description of the villages is given below:

### *Treatment villages of KSP-QT*

**EA. 001 KOPENG**

The village Kopeng is located in the sub-district Getasan (district Semarang). It is located on the slope of a mountain, about 1,450 metre above sea level and a lot of land consists of farming areas. The borders between the dusun (neighbourhoods) are visibly marked by rivers, and one of the dusun is attractive to tourists. About 75 percent of the population is Muslim, the other 25 percent is Christian (with Javanese tradition). Muslims and Christians in live in peace and harmony.

Transportation facilities to get to and to leave Kopeng village is very limited and most of the road condition to get the village is poor although it is covered by asphalt. However, the roads inside the dusun are made of stone and are the result of the villagers' hard work. Health and education facilities are adequate in number and accessible. The majority of villagers have access to electricity from PLN (State Electricity Enterprise). In addition, the communication facilities in Kopeng village are good since they already have both landline (PSTN) and cellulars.

The majority of the people in Kopeng are farmers. Farming crops yielded mostly by villagers are vegetables, such as cabbage, lighter coloured mustard greens, carrots, and cauliflower. However, they usually plant tobacco and corn during dry season. They usually market their crops directly to the

traditional market. The other livelihood of the villagers is cow farming which they use as dairy cattle. The marketing of the fresh milk is managed by the local village unit cooperatives (KUD).

**EA. 002 TAJUK**

The village Tajuk is located in the sub-district Getasan (district Semarang). The village is located high above the sea level and has a pretty cold temperature.

Despite the good condition of the road (asphalt), there is no public transportation to get to Tajuk. The available education facilities are elementary schools and middle schools. Both mosques and churches are present in the village. The communication facilities are still a bit weak as only one telecommunication provider can be received and no internet at all is available.

Most of the villagers in Tajuk work on farming fields, tobacco plantations, and the majority of the residents own cows for dairy. The dairy products are sold to one company (PT) or individually. The traditional culture is one of mutual assistance.

**Ea. 009 SUNGGINGAN**

The village Sunggingan is located in sub-district Miri (district Sragen). The village is located in a lower area and the temperature is quite hot. Yet, clean water is not difficult to find. There is no public transportation available to get to the village.

The available education facilities in the village are PAUD, kindergarten and elementary school. The available worshiping places are mosque and church. The majority of residents are Muslim. The communication facilities are good with respect to telecommunication. However, other facilities, such as an internet café, are unavailable in the village, but an internet café is available downtown (about 3 km away).

The majority of villagers are agricultural farmers. People here have strong tradition in mutual assistance just like in the other villagers. The residents have a high tolerance level, they welcomed the survey team very well and were willing to help the team.

**EA. 010 SOKO**

The village Soko is located in sub-district Miri (district Sragen). The village is located in a lower area and the air temperature is quite high. Soko lies next to the villages Pendem (east side) and Miri village (south-east side). The village is about 24 km away from the city Surakarta. There is no public transportation available from or to get to Soko. The road condition is poor as some of them were from stone.

The available education facility in the village is the elementary school. Soko has a mosque. Most of the villagers are Muslims. The electricity power from PLN is accessible for all the villagers. The communication facilities come from cellulars from different types of providers.

Majority of villagers' livelihood in Soko village are labourer/porter of limestone, construction workers, or agricultural farmers. The villagers' farming land is located far from the village (about 3 km). The have just the rain water as their irrigation method.

**EA. 011 BAGOR**

The village Bagor is located in sub-district Miri (district Sragen). The village is located in a lower area and the air temperature is quite high. The village is located next to the villages Brojol on the south side, Pandem on the east side, Kunti on the west side, and Kedungombo dam on the north side. Bagor is about 27 km away from the city Surakarta. There is no public transportation available to get this village. The road condition to get to the village is quite good as it is covered with asphalt. Yet some roads were damaged.

The available education facilities are elementary school and middle schools. In addition, the village has a health facility. The available worshiping facility is a mosque. The majority is Muslim, but Christians do also live in this village. The electricity power from PLN is accessible to all villagers, and communication facilities have been supported by both landline and telecommunication service providers for cellulars.

The majority of people in Bagor village are agricultural farmers. The main crops of their farming are rice, corn, cassava, peanut, and bananas. However, not all of their crops are sold in the market as some of them were consumed by their own household. The other source of living is working as a construction worker or as a civil servant.

### *Treatment villages of KSU-GTGS*

**EA. 003 LANJAN**

The village Lanjan is located in the sub-district Sumowono sub-district (district Semarang). The village is located in a mountain area and has a pretty cold temperature. This area is a developed rural area and the village is easy to access.

Education facilities available in this village are adequate, as they have PAUD (post ECED), kindergarten, elementary schools, middle schools, and high schools. Both mosques and churches are present in the village. The communication facilities in Lanjan are supported by several telecommunication service providers and all type of telecommunication signals can be received in this village. Internet service is available, as there is an internet cafe.

Most of villagers are farmers, and the rest of the residents are working in non-farming fields (civil servants (PNS), entrepreneurs, construction workers, retailers). People in Lanjan are considered as modern people and they tend to be critical toward strangers who come to them. Some respondents therefore refused to be interviewed and others were suspicious and worried that the collected data will be misused.

**EA. 004 JUBELAN**

The village Jubelan is located in the sub-district Sumowono (district Semaran). The village is located in a mountain area and has a pretty cold temperature. The village is located on the main road and easy accessible by public transportation.

The communication facilities in Lanjan are supported by several telecommunication service providers and all type of telecommunication signals can be received in this village. Internet service is available, as there is an internet cafe.

Jubelan is a heterogeneous community. The villagers come from several ethnicity, economic status, and have different types of livelihood.

**EA. 005 SUMOWONO**

The village Sumowono is located in the sub-district Sumowono (district Semarang). The village Sumowono is the capital city of the sub-district. The village lies on a mountain of about 960 M above sea level and therefore has a cold temperature. The access to get to Sumowono village is very easy. The condition of the road is pretty good as most of them have been covered with asphalt and are accessible for both two-wheel and four-wheel vehicles.

The available education facilities are PAUD (Post ECED), elementary schools, middle schools, and high schools. There are several worshiping places for Muslims and Christians. The communication facilities are good, as the village has both landline and telecommunication services for cellulars. In addition, electricity power from PLN has reached all the households in Sumowono village.

Most of the villagers in Sumowono work as merchants and civil servants. While some other villagers are farmers, who have chrysanthemum as their main agriculture product. Mutual assistance in the community of the village is very strong.

### *Comparison villages*

**EA. 006 KAWENGEN**

The village Kawengen is located in the sub-district Ungaran Barat (district Semarang). Although the village lies in a hilly area, the air temperature is quite hot. Kawengen lies next to Tembalang on the west side, Kebonbatur on the east side, Bulusan on the north side and Kalongan on the south side. Kawengen is about 13 km away from the city Semarang. The condition of the road in the village is mostly good and covered with asphalt, yet on some parts the asphalt has been damaged. However, public transport is not that good, so most of the villagers have their own vehicle.

The only available education facility in the village is an elementary school. The village does have an own mosque. The majority of the villagers are Muslims. Kawengen has telecommunication services from cellulars which is accessible for most of the villagers. Meanwhile, the electricity power from PLN is accessible for all villagers.

The villagers' livelihood comprises of 60% agriculture, 30% self-employed and 10% masonry. However, many of villagers went out of the village to seek a job. The main products of their agriculture are rice, corn, cassava, and peanuts. Most of the agricultural products are used for own consumption or individual selling.

**EA. 007 KEJI**

The village Keji is located in the sub-district Ungaran Barat (district Semarang). Although the village lies in a hilly area, the land is barren and the temperature is hot. In addition, houses located on a higher ground have difficulties to get water. Since the water source is limited, it is not suitable to grow rice and food crops in this village. There is not much public transportation available to get to Keji village.

The available education facilities in Keji are elementary school and Pondok pesantren/Islamic education. There are several worship places available in this village such as mushola (small mosque), mosque, and a

church. But most of the villagers are Muslim, only a few are Christian. The communication facilities are in place, yet other facilities such as a market and an internet café are unavailable, although about 5 km away from the village one can find an internet cafe.

Most of villagers in Keji are farmers, coffee cultivators, and non-agricultural actors such as factory employees and sellers. However, the majority of the villagers belong to the lower class society.

**EA. 008 GETASAN**

The village Getasan is located in the sub-district Getasan (district Semarang). The village lies on a plateau at the valley of a mountain of about 960 M above sea level. This village serves as the capital of the sub-district Getasan. The village Getasan lies between two villages; Wates on the west side and Sumogawe on the east side. Getasan village can be reached for about 15 km from the city of Salatiga and about 55 km from the city Semarang. As the village is located at the side of the main road, and mainly of good quality, to Kopeng, it is easy accessible. Besides, several options of public transportation are available.

The available education facilities are PAUD (Post ECED), kindergarten, elementary schools, middle schools, and high schools. Most of the villagers have access to the electricity power from PLN. A Mosque and church are available in the village. 75% of the residents are Muslim and 25% are Christian. Communication facilities are good as both landline and cellulars services are present. Moreover, Getasan has a market, which is the economic centre of that village.

The majority of the respondents depend for their livelihood on agriculture and animal farming. The main products of agricultural crops are vegetables such as pumpkins, corns, cassava, and tobacco in the dry season. Some products are sold individually at the market place, other to collectors. The main animal farming is dairy cattle to yield the milk. The village is an active community, almost every resident always participate in social activities such as Islamic preach every Friday night, arisan, and mutual assistance to clean village environment.

**EA. 013 CEPOKO**

The village Cepoko is located in the sub-district Sumber Lawang, (district Sragen). The village is located in a lower area and the air temperature is quite high. The village lies next to Jati on the south side and Mojopuro on the south west. Cepoko is about 26 km away from the city Surakarta. Public transportation facilities are not available to get to the centre of Cepoko. Parts of the road are covered with asphalt which is now starting to deteriorate; other parts are covered with cement which was built from the PNPM programme.

There is no education facility in the village. The only available health facility in this village is a village midwife. The majority of Soko villagers are Muslim and they have a mosque. The electricity power from PLN is accessed by all villagers. Several providers provide the telecommunication in the village with the help of cellars.

The majority of villagers are agricultural farmers, a minority are retailers. The main crops are rice, corn, cassava, and peanut. Some of their crops are sold in the market, some are sold to the collector, and some are just consumed.

**EA. 014 KACANGAN**

The village Kacangan is located in sub-district Sumber Lawang (district Sragen). The village is located in a lower area and the air temperature is quite high. Kacangan is located on the northern part of Sumber Lawang and it has a pretty wide area. Public transportation passes the village.

The available education facilities are PAUD (Post ECED), kindergarten, elementary schools, middle schools, and high schools, yet their locations are far from each other. The available worshiping places are a mosque and a church. Most of the villagers are Muslims. Communication services are available in the village, but other facilities such as internet as well as market place are still limited.

Most villagers depend for their livelihood on agricultural. However, many villagers went out of village or even went abroad to find work.

## Annex V. Descriptive statistics

The table below displays the socio-economic characteristics of the treatment (KSP-QT and KSU-GTGS member) and comparison households. The first 3 columns of the table contain information about the comparison group: the group mean at the baseline (1) and the endline (2), and the probability (p-value) that the change between the baseline and endline periods is zero. If the p-value is smaller than 0.05 it means that the change of the variable is significant at the 5% significance level.

Columns 4-7 report on the characteristics of the KSP-QT members and columns 8-11 on the KSU-GTGS members: the group mean at the baseline (4 and 8) and the endline (6 and 10), and the p-value for the change between the baseline and endline (7 and 11). In addition, in columns 5 and 9, we report on the p-value for testing that the mean value is not significantly different between the comparison and the KSP-QT/KSU-GTGS group at the baseline. Variables that have a p-value less than 0.10 are included in the baseline (and endline) regression analysis.

**Table 19: Descriptive statistics**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Group** | **Comparison** | | | **KSP-QT** | | | | **KSU-GTGS** | | | |
| **Statistics** | **Base** | **End** | **P(1v2)** | **Base** | **P(1v4)** | **End** | **P(4v6)** | **Base** | **P(1v8)** | **End** | **P(8v10)** |
| Household size | 3.2 | 3.6 | 0.056 | 3.6 | 0.131 | 3.7 | 0.193 | 4.6 | 0.000 | 4.7 | 0.271 |
| % HHs with Female HH Head | 14.9 | 14.9 | 1.000 | 11.1 | 0.212 | 11.1 | 1.000 | 2.1 | 0.000 | 2.1 | 1.000 |
| Age of HH Head | 52.3 | 53.9 | 0.023 | 48.9 | 0.181 | 51.2 | 0.000 | 43.9 | 0.002 | 45.7 | 0.014 |
| Size Of Cultivated Land ($m^2$) | 1,925.5 | 1,270.4 | 0.032 | 2,298.5 | 0.553 | 1,883.3 | 0.381 | 2,116.6 | 0.657 | 1,105.4 | 0.002 |
| Education of HH head (%): | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *No/Islamic* | 18.6 | 17.2 | 0.679 | 13.0 | 0.260 | 13.0 | 1.000 | 3.2 | 0.005 | 1.1 | 0.419 |
| *Primary* | 66.3 | 65.5 | 0.736 | 55.6 | 0.229 | 61.1 | 0.052 | 67.4 | 0.900 | 64.2 | 0.414 |
| *Secondary* | 12.8 | 14.9 | 0.188 | 28.7 | 0.012 | 24.1 | 0.101 | 26.3 | 0.049 | 31.6 | 0.192 |
| *Higher* | 2.3 | 2.3 | | 2.8 | 0.859 | 1.9 | 0.386 | 3.2 | 0.707 | 3.2 | |
| Main income source (%): | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Crop Farming* | 44.8 | 48.3 | 0.663 | 57.4 | 0.273 | 62.0 | 0.454 | 31.6 | 0.304 | 42.1 | 0.041 |
| *Fishing* | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | | 0.0 | | 0.0 | | 0.0 | |
| *Livestock* | 0.0 | 1.1 | 0.300 | 0.9 | 0.347 | 0.9 | 1.000 | 1.1 | 0.225 | 0.0 | 0.280 |
| *Non-Farm Business* | 14.9 | 13.8 | 0.778 | 13.0 | 0.664 | 9.3 | 0.508 | 43.2 | 0.003 | 32.6 | 0.034 |
| *Wage* | 31.0 | 31.0 | 1.000 | 25.9 | 0.574 | 24.1 | 0.701 | 23.2 | 0.386 | 25.3 | 0.535 |
| *Pension* | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | | 0.0 | | 0.0 | | 0.0 | |
| *Remittances* | 9.2 | 5.7 | 0.227 | 2.8 | 0.026 | 3.7 | 0.364 | 1.1 | 0.003 | 0.0 | 0.382 |
| Subjective wealth status 5 years ago[1] | 2.4 | 2.2 | 0.117 | 2.5 | 0.636 | 2.3 | 0.119 | 2.6 | 0.292 | 2.6 | 0.362 |

Source: Household survey E6, MFS II Indonesia

Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

1. Change in variable is only reported for the panel respondents.

# Annex VI. Evaluation question 2 – regression results by year of membership

The tables in this annex contain the results of regression (3) discussed on page 30. The first column contains the mean of the outcome variable in the comparison group as reference for the size of the cooperatives' effects on the outcome variables. Column 2-4 contain the cross-sectional regression results on the effect of cooperative membership at the baseline by the year of membership: column 2 shows the effects of being a member of the cooperative since 2010, etc. Columns 5-7 show the same statistics using the endline survey. Finally, columns 8-10 show the results for the change between endline and baseline again by the year of membership.

The effects of cooperative membership can be assessed as the sum of the baseline and diff-in-diff estimates or by looking at the results for the endline survey (columns 5-6). Table 19 displays the results for KSP-QT members, while Table 20 reports on the results for KSU-GTGS members. However, the same regression was used to generate the results for KSP-QT and KSU-GTGS per time period (baseline, endline and change).

**Table 20: Regression results by membership year for KSP-QT**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Outcome indicators** | **Mean comp. group** | **KSP-QT Baseline** | | | **KSP-QT Endline** | | | **KSP-QT Diff-in-Diff** | | |
| | | **Base 2010** | **Base 2011** | **Base 2012** | **End 2010** | **End 2011** | **End 2012** | **DDX 2010** | **DDX 2011** | **DDX 2012** |
| **Panel A. Use of financial instruments** | | | | | | | | | | |
| % HHs know a place to borrow money | 91.667 | 6.030** (2.300) | 8.014*** (2.319) | 5.467 (3.239) | 4.489** (2.094) | 5.928** (2.405) | 4.419** (1.928) | -2.103 (6.270) | -1.859 (6.217) | 2.483 (7.404) |
| % HHs involved in a financial institution | 21.839 | 73.315*** (6.686) | 74.910*** (4.584) | 67.671*** (5.935) | 46.740*** (6.129) | 51.222*** (7.425) | 45.593*** (9.042) | -20.653* (10.736) | -20.799** (8.945) | -10.527 (8.650) |
| % HHs have savings in bank account | 17.241 | -0.607 (4.316) | -12.826* (7.244) | -9.486 (6.590) | 17.213* (9.958) | -2.169 (7.120) | 3.759 (6.436) | 16.132 (16.240) | 7.963 (9.776) | 11.894** (4.805) |

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Outcome indicators** | **Mean comp. group** | **KSP-QT Baseline** | | | **KSP-QT Endline** | | | **KSP-QT Diff-in-Diff** | | |
| | | **Base 2010** | **Base 2011** | **Base 2012** | **End 2010** | **End 2011** | **End 2012** | **DDX 2010** | **DDX 2011** | **DDX 2012** |
| % HHs have savings in savings & credit coop. | 0.000 | 95.344*** (4.983) | 94.491*** (2.013) | 87.912*** (5.683) | 49.764*** (6.971) | 53.323*** (3.397) | 58.545*** (6.364) | -44.690*** (10.529) | -36.596*** (6.492) | -19.253* (9.263) |
| % HHs have savings in savings & credit group | 18.391 | 9.456 (9.890) | 20.300 (13.283) | 30.993** (13.561) | 17.907** (7.121) | 4.740 (6.842) | 32.847*** (11.254) | 9.426 (12.896) | -10.247 (20.626) | 0.548 (18.087) |
| % HHs have borrowed in past 12 months | 30.952 | 26.634*** (7.493) | 34.749*** (5.460) | 36.116*** (11.111) | 17.212 (15.852) | 5.906 (10.165) | 33.399*** (9.371) | -2.881 (11.283) | -23.369 (18.809) | 6.009 (11.760) |
| **Panel B. Financial knowledge and skill** | | | | | | | | | | |
| % HHs keep close eye on expenditures | 36.782 | 7.525 (8.952) | -0.081 (8.551) | 5.533 (9.578) | 14.677* (7.854) | 4.565 (8.920) | 5.832 (11.111) | 42.845*** (12.111) | 9.983 (13.604) | -9.177 (14.008) |
| % HHs have financial plan | 11.494 | -2.708 (6.519) | 3.019 (8.879) | 5.356 (9.682) | 7.583 (10.220) | 10.479 (7.339) | 26.530* (12.844) | 16.697 (12.875) | 2.612 (20.141) | 22.270 (24.058) |
| Score on financial numeracy[1] | 2.598 | 0.106 (0.204) | 0.037 (0.240) | 0.024 (0.200) | -0.010 (0.204) | 0.347 (0.228) | 0.201 (0.138) | -0.255 (0.372) | 0.115 (0.329) | 0.254 (0.354) |
| **Panel C. Household income and livelihood** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Log total income per capita per month | 4.657 | 0.485** (0.216) | 0.259 (0.192) | 0.416 (0.280) | 0.598** (0.255) | 0.267 (0.266) | 0.461 (0.353) | 0.717 (0.430) | 0.490 (0.329) | 0.399 (0.369) |
| Log food consumption per capita per month | 12.529 | 0.200** (0.088) | 0.053 (0.092) | -0.089 (0.119) | 0.066 (0.113) | 0.166 (0.103) | 0.035 (0.100) | -0.270* (0.141) | -0.085 (0.109) | 0.007 (0.201) |

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Outcome indicators** | **Mean comp. group** | **KSP-QT Baseline** | | | **KSP-QT Endline** | | | **KSP-QT Diff-in-Diff** | | |
| | | **Base 2010** | **Base 2011** | **Base 2012** | **End 2010** | **End 2011** | **End 2012** | **DDX 2010** | **DDX 2011** | **DDX 2012** |
| Log non-food consumption per capita per month | 12.217 | 0.063<br>(0.116) | -0.051<br>(0.103) | -0.182<br>(0.112) | -0.003<br>(0.122) | 0.122<br>(0.181) | -0.078<br>(0.130) | 0.051<br>(0.182) | 0.223<br>(0.204) | 0.199<br>(0.181) |
| Housing facilities index | -0.192 | 0.080<br>(0.059) | -0.050<br>(0.049) | -0.008<br>(0.065) | 0.047<br>(0.088) | -0.081<br>(0.056) | -0.090*<br>(0.046) | -0.036<br>(0.130) | -0.037<br>(0.111) | -0.126<br>(0.090) |
| Asset index | -0.449 | 0.197**<br>(0.091) | 0.067<br>(0.121) | 0.028<br>(0.138) | 0.189*<br>(0.107) | -0.077<br>(0.194) | -0.231<br>(0.139) | -0.028<br>(0.078) | -0.270**<br>(0.122) | -0.259**<br>(0.110) |
| % HHs invested in business | 18.391 | 11.474<br>(6.989) | 7.041<br>(11.641) | 18.438*<br>(9.554) | 6.171<br>(4.922) | 0.174<br>(5.741) | 10.188<br>(11.353) | -13.987<br>(12.677) | -10.271<br>(14.020) | -11.726<br>(12.647) |
| % HHs invested in farming tools | 34.483 | -8.174<br>(7.872) | 2.768<br>(10.883) | 2.438<br>(11.996) | -4.981<br>(6.092) | -1.527<br>(5.400) | 11.687<br>(10.734) | -0.006<br>(13.433) | -10.256<br>(14.778) | 10.434<br>(12.833) |
| Overall happiness[1] | 2.080 | -0.003<br>(0.089) | -0.172**<br>(0.076) | -0.030<br>(0.076) | -0.117<br>(0.086) | -0.076<br>(0.059) | -0.043<br>(0.074) | -0.057<br>(0.161) | 0.054<br>(0.103) | -0.032<br>(0.141) |
| Current subjective wealth status[1] | 2.759 | -0.247*<br>(0.120) | 0.060<br>(0.072) | -0.209*<br>(0.107) | 0.151<br>(0.147) | 0.224<br>(0.161) | -0.112<br>(0.177) | 0.372<br>(0.325) | -0.096<br>(0.231) | -0.126<br>(0.211) |
| **Panel D. Food security and vulnerability** | | | | | | | | | | |
| % HHs have emergency savings | 14.943 | -5.845<br>(6.565) | -4.638<br>(6.309) | -0.569<br>(8.908) | 7.908<br>(10.970) | 27.222*<br>(15.750) | 12.085<br>(9.028) | 2.801<br>(22.355) | 21.750<br>(14.294) | 2.960<br>(17.738) |

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Outcome indicators** | **Mean comp. group** | **KSP-QT Baseline** | | | **KSP-QT Endline** | | | **KSP-QT Diff-in-Diff** | | |
| | | **Base 2010** | **Base 2011** | **Base 2012** | **End 2010** | **End 2011** | **End 2012** | **DDX 2010** | **DDX 2011** | **DDX 2012** |
| % HHs have not able to cover their living costs during the last 12 months | 67.816 | 1.073<br>(9.745) | 16.011**<br>(7.000) | 6.765<br>(6.355) | -8.958<br>(16.886) | 1.294<br>(8.783) | -0.408<br>(9.668) | -5.684<br>(26.557) | -15.750<br>(13.489) | 1.298<br>(14.942) |
| Current standard of living: daily needs covered[1] | 1.802 | -0.006<br>(0.061) | 0.000<br>(0.107) | -0.042<br>(0.091) | 0.212*<br>(0.121) | 0.184<br>(0.133) | 0.092<br>(0.140) | 0.211<br>(0.163) | 0.136<br>(0.190) | 0.196<br>(0.142) |
| Current standard of living: food consumption covered[1] | 2.047 | 0.069<br>(0.135) | -0.036<br>(0.137) | -0.001<br>(0.133) | 0.075<br>(0.123) | 0.055<br>(0.089) | 0.156*<br>(0.087) | 0.138<br>(0.196) | 0.189<br>(0.247) | 0.157<br>(0.215) |

Source: Household survey E6, MFS II Indonesia
Notes: Standard errors given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.
1. Only panel respondents are used in regression.

**Table 21: Regression results by membership year for KSU-GTGS**

| Outcome indicators | Mean comp. group | KSU-GTGS Baseline | | | KSU-GTGS Endline | | | KSU-GTGS Diff-in-Diff | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Base 2010 | Base 2011 | Base 2012 | End 2010 | End 2011 | End 2012 | DDX 2010 | DDX 2011 | DDX 2012 |
| **Panel A. Use of financial instruments** | | | | | | | | | | |
| % HHs know a place to borrow money | 91.667 | 5.356** (2.033) | 4.881** (1.821) | 3.933** (1.820) | 4.678* (2.647) | 5.297* (2.575) | 5.029 (3.446) | -3.739 (6.337) | -1.802 (5.908) | -0.524 (6.403) |
| % HHs involved in a financial institution | 21.839 | 57.757*** (5.348) | 71.202*** (4.751) | 65.972*** (6.001) | 42.554*** (6.980) | 51.327*** (7.159) | 52.194*** (7.945) | -5.981 (9.040) | -18.685** (8.935) | -6.132 (12.864) |
| % HHs have savings in bank account | 17.241 | 1.376 (9.872) | 8.099 (10.019) | 15.612 (11.290) | 7.641 (13.355) | 13.077 (12.977) | 20.373 (14.177) | 8.383 (8.622) | 17.309* (9.574) | 3.233 (11.668) |
| % HHs have savings in savings & credit coop. | 0.000 | 70.421*** (7.479) | 88.583*** (4.464) | 82.874*** (6.767) | 59.161*** (10.326) | 70.161*** (7.675) | 66.137*** (8.842) | -18.412 (11.342) | -6.571 (12.012) | -3.994 (11.768) |
| % HHs have savings in savings & credit group | 18.391 | -7.723 (11.336) | 10.865 (12.013) | 2.962 (13.113) | -5.770 (5.666) | 6.005 (8.241) | 4.461 (8.060) | 10.583 (13.186) | 6.389 (11.912) | -1.059 (14.836) |
| % HHs have borrowed in past 12 months | 30.952 | 18.577** (8.126) | 23.027** (9.744) | 11.593 (11.771) | -6.992 (8.325) | 10.807 (11.563) | 10.025 (10.663) | -24.746* (14.254) | -26.186 (21.256) | -2.027 (10.610) |
| **Panel B. Financial knowledge and skill** | | | | | | | | | | |
| % HHs keep close eye on expenditures | 36.782 | 20.189** (8.810) | 7.751 (12.617) | 10.326 (13.463) | 6.771 (10.826) | 9.196 (8.194) | 7.974 (14.324) | -3.109 (15.998) | 17.713 (13.208) | 23.508 (23.643) |

| Outcome indicators | Mean comp. group | KSU-GTGS Baseline | | | KSU-GTGS Endline | | | KSU-GTGS Diff-in-Diff | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Base 2010 | Base 2011 | Base 2012 | End 2010 | End 2011 | End 2012 | DDX 2010 | DDX 2011 | DDX 2012 |
| % HHs have financial plan | 11.494 | 8.832<br>(10.704) | 3.399<br>(6.449) | -4.464<br>(6.241) | -0.273<br>(9.981) | 30.031***<br>(7.991) | 12.048<br>(14.612) | 5.208<br>(15.255) | 40.159***<br>(11.906) | 21.455<br>(23.535) |
| Score on financial numeracy[1] | 2.598 | 0.246<br>(0.202) | 0.477**<br>(0.190) | 0.398<br>(0.234) | 0.113<br>(0.143) | 0.187<br>(0.130) | 0.180<br>(0.190) | -0.399<br>(0.379) | -0.458<br>(0.345) | -0.409<br>(0.325) |
| **Panel C. Household income and livelihood** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Log total income per capita per month | 4.657 | 0.156<br>(0.280) | 0.397<br>(0.244) | 0.500<br>(0.497) | 0.888*<br>(0.483) | 1.440***<br>(0.358) | 1.209*<br>(0.694) | 1.405**<br>(0.514) | 1.597***<br>(0.370) | 1.511***<br>(0.280) |
| Log food consumption per capita per month | 12.529 | 0.200<br>(0.120) | 0.274**<br>(0.115) | 0.083<br>(0.150) | 0.167<br>(0.105) | 0.252**<br>(0.092) | 0.250<br>(0.164) | -0.089<br>(0.144) | -0.010<br>(0.134) | 0.110<br>(0.243) |
| Log non-food consumption per capita per month | 12.217 | 0.195<br>(0.183) | 0.286<br>(0.172) | 0.622***<br>(0.189) | 0.019<br>(0.191) | 0.400**<br>(0.178) | 0.057<br>(0.210) | 0.093<br>(0.216) | 0.380<br>(0.294) | -0.040<br>(0.225) |
| Housing facilities index | -0.192 | 0.178**<br>(0.081) | 0.352***<br>(0.075) | 0.257*<br>(0.134) | 0.035<br>(0.086) | 0.168**<br>(0.063) | 0.147<br>(0.092) | -0.114<br>(0.078) | -0.175**<br>(0.079) | -0.277*<br>(0.134) |
| Asset index | -0.449 | 0.100<br>(0.088) | 0.383***<br>(0.127) | 0.467***<br>(0.111) | 0.086<br>(0.120) | 0.289***<br>(0.093) | 0.157<br>(0.140) | -0.138<br>(0.116) | -0.122<br>(0.077) | -0.562***<br>(0.062) |
| % HHs invested in business | 18.391 | 18.960*<br>(9.480) | 32.984***<br>(8.706) | 25.091***<br>(7.874) | 24.140**<br>(9.549) | 22.945**<br>(9.211) | 25.605*<br>(13.358) | 17.456<br>(13.540) | 11.147<br>(14.438) | 2.326<br>(26.028) |
| % HHs invested in farming tools | 34.483 | -8.630<br>(10.275) | -8.456<br>(12.524) | -21.942***<br>(6.019) | 26.051**<br>(9.243) | 4.478<br>(8.347) | 2.689<br>(10.192) | 32.286**<br>(13.645) | 8.350<br>(20.060) | 11.552<br>(13.919) |

| Outcome indicators | Mean comp. group | KSU-GTGS Baseline | | | KSU-GTGS Endline | | | KSU-GTGS Diff-in-Diff | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Base 2010 | Base 2011 | Base 2012 | End 2010 | End 2011 | End 2012 | DDX 2010 | DDX 2011 | DDX 2012 |
| Overall happiness[1] | 2.080 | 0.057<br>(0.104) | -0.027<br>(0.072) | 0.133<br>(0.120) | -0.078<br>(0.093) | -0.104<br>(0.077) | -0.005<br>(0.110) | -0.048<br>(0.079) | -0.013<br>(0.097) | 0.165<br>(0.103) |
| Current subjective wealth status[1] | 2.759 | 0.106<br>(0.137) | -0.020<br>(0.214) | 0.226<br>(0.166) | 0.396***<br>(0.116) | 0.542***<br>(0.110) | 0.306<br>(0.305) | 0.407<br>(0.241) | 0.647**<br>(0.243) | -0.017<br>(0.433) |
| **Panel D. Food security and vulnerability** | | | | | | | | | | |
| % HHs have emergency savings | 14.943 | 21.552***<br>(7.388) | 15.996**<br>(6.512) | 10.535<br>(8.040) | 25.593***<br>(7.092) | 37.553***<br>(7.407) | 22.253<br>(17.335) | 31.537*<br>(16.588) | 33.068**<br>(14.085) | 11.911<br>(26.797) |
| % HHs have not able to cover their living costs during the last 12 months | 67.816 | -9.467<br>(8.724) | -16.197*<br>(8.531) | -3.481<br>(14.000) | -8.859<br>(8.670) | -21.563**<br>(9.003) | -22.682**<br>(10.314) | -14.997<br>(23.935) | -20.378<br>(17.008) | -7.861<br>(18.643) |
| Current standard of living: daily needs covered[1] | 1.802 | 0.089<br>(0.127) | 0.209**<br>(0.088) | 0.161<br>(0.147) | 0.254**<br>(0.121) | 0.341*<br>(0.176) | 0.344*<br>(0.165) | 0.480***<br>(0.153) | 0.322**<br>(0.148) | 0.027<br>(0.233) |
| Current standard of living: food consumption covered[1] | 2.047 | 0.086<br>(0.178) | 0.151<br>(0.091) | -0.003<br>(0.125) | 0.213**<br>(0.089) | 0.374***<br>(0.080) | 0.380***<br>(0.125) | 0.075<br>(0.289) | 0.267<br>(0.222) | 0.385*<br>(0.221) |

Source: Household survey E6, MFS II Indonesia
Notes: Standard errors given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

1. Only panel respondents are used in regression.

## Annex VII. Additional explanatory variables

The tables below contain characteristics of the treatment (KSP-QT and KSU-GTGS member) and comparison households. The first 3 columns of the table contain information about the comparison group: the group mean at the baseline (1) and the endline (2), and the probability (p-value) that the change between the baseline and endline periods is zero. If the p-value is smaller than 0.05 it means that the change of the variable is significant at the 5% significance level.

Columns 4-7 report on the characteristics of the KSP-QT members and columns 8-11 on the KSU-GTGS members: the group mean at the baseline (4 and 8) and the endline (6 and 10), and the p-value for the change between the baseline and endline (7 and 11). In addition, in columns 5 and 9, we report on the p-value for testing that the mean value is not significantly different between the comparison and the KSP-QT/KSU-GTGS group at the baseline.

**Table 22: Savings and credit**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Group** | **Comparison** | | | **KSP-QT** | | | | **KSU-GTGS** | | | |
| **Statistics** | **Base** | **End** | **P(1v2)** | **Base** | **P(1v4)** | **End** | **P(4v6)** | **Base** | **P(1v8)** | **End** | **P(8v10)** |
| % HHs know a place to borrow | 91.7 | 91.9 | 0.555 | 99.1 | 0.023 | 100.0 | 0.390 | 100.0 | 0.010 | 100.0 | |
| Percentage of households that know […] as a place to borrow | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Banks* | 70.1 | 77.0 | 0.248 | 65.7 | 0.627 | 73.1 | 0.384 | 84.2 | 0.051 | 88.4 | 0.300 |
| *Cooperative* | 19.5 | 42.5 | 0.020 | 93.5 | 0.000 | 84.3 | 0.324 | 90.5 | 0.000 | 91.6 | 0.887 |
| *Employer* | 2.3 | 8.0 | 0.163 | 2.8 | 0.851 | 7.4 | 0.320 | 1.1 | 0.523 | 17.9 | 0.013 |
| *Small Farmers Group* | 5.7 | 5.7 | 1.000 | 6.5 | 0.893 | 9.3 | 0.396 | 2.1 | 0.438 | 7.4 | 0.277 |
| *Money Lender* | 11.5 | 10.3 | 0.845 | 6.5 | 0.181 | 7.4 | 0.822 | 8.4 | 0.395 | 17.9 | 0.086 |
| % HHs have a bank account | 24.1 | 23.0 | 0.829 | 24.1 | 0.992 | 32.4 | 0.082 | 34.7 | 0.333 | 40.0 | 0.566 |
| % HHs able to obtain loan from the savings and credit cooperative if wanted | | 54.0 | | | | 46.3 | | | | 57.9 | |
| % HHs borrowed money in past 12 months | 31.0 | 28.6 | 1.000 | 65.7 | 0.000 | 54.2 | 0.120 | 61.1 | 0.000 | 47.4 | 0.041 |
| Purpose of the loan (% of hh's) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Social ceremony* | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 6.5 | 0.033 | 0.9 | 0.034 | 1.1 | 0.225 | 1.1 | 1.000 |
| *Medication* | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.000 | 2.8 | 0.390 | 1.9 | 0.627 | 2.1 | 0.594 | 0.0 | 0.206 |

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Group** | **Comparison** | | | **KSP-QT** | | | | **KSU-GTGS** | | | |
| **Statistics** | **Base** | **End** | **P(1v2)** | **Base** | **P(1v4)** | **End** | **P(4v6)** | **Base** | **P(1v8)** | **End** | **P(8v10)** |
| *Education* | 5.7 | 3.4 | 0.180 | 4.6 | 0.606 | 5.6 | 0.684 | 2.1 | 0.137 | 2.1 | 1.000 |
| *Home renovation* | 1.1 | 0.0 | 0.334 | 2.8 | 0.386 | 4.6 | 0.210 | 4.2 | 0.235 | 5.3 | 0.810 |
| *To buy house* | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | | 0.0 | | 0.0 | | 0.0 | |
| *Agricultural Inputs* | 0.0 | 4.6 | 0.081 | 12.0 | 0.004 | 8.3 | 0.233 | 5.3 | 0.089 | 7.4 | 0.624 |
| *Daily expenses* | 14.9 | 8.0 | 0.035 | 13.9 | 0.775 | 12.0 | 0.777 | 7.4 | 0.052 | 4.2 | 0.396 |
| *Buy repair vehicle* | 1.1 | 0.0 | 0.340 | 0.9 | 0.868 | 2.8 | 0.210 | 7.4 | 0.054 | 3.2 | 0.141 |
| *Capital for other businesses* | 2.3 | 3.4 | 0.728 | 4.6 | 0.471 | 5.6 | 0.815 | 20.0 | 0.007 | 13.7 | 0.200 |
| Percentage of household's that used […] as collateral | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Land* | 8.3 | 17.4 | 0.429 | 13.4 | 0.613 | 35.8 | 0.107 | 19.0 | 0.345 | 39.3 | 1.000 |
| *Homestead* | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 1.5 | 0.248 | 0.0 | | 4.8 | 0.126 | 3.6 | 1.000 |
| *Certificate/document* | 8.3 | 13.0 | 0.727 | 37.3 | 0.012 | 1.9 | 0.006 | 38.1 | 0.019 | 3.6 | 0.372 |
| *Livestock* | 4.2 | 4.3 | 0.377 | 0.0 | 0.266 | 11.3 | 0.170 | 0.0 | 0.270 | 17.9 | 0.040 |
| *Other type of collateral* | 79.2 | 65.2 | 0.429 | 47.8 | 0.033 | 50.9 | 0.262 | 38.1 | 0.001 | 35.7 | 0.273 |
| Dum. Difficulty Loan Repayment | 44.0 | 35.3 | 0.654 | 29.0 | 0.338 | 38.1 | 0.578 | 28.1 | 0.264 | 44.0 | 0.286 |
| Percentage of household's that have savings in […] | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Bank account* | 17.2 | 19.5 | 0.592 | 13.9 | 0.453 | 28.7 | 0.020 | 32.6 | 0.133 | 36.8 | 0.571 |
| *Savings & credit cooperative* | 0.0 | 1.1 | 0.375 | 89.8 | 0.000 | 55.6 | 0.000 | 82.1 | 0.000 | 70.5 | 0.317 |
| *Savings & credit group* | 18.4 | 5.7 | 0.145 | 45.4 | 0.048 | 26.9 | 0.153 | 24.2 | 0.627 | 9.5 | 0.071 |
| *Arisan* | 79.3 | 74.7 | 0.320 | 92.6 | 0.090 | 90.7 | 0.627 | 47.4 | 0.043 | 61.1 | 0.104 |
| *Jewelry, Gold & Precious Metals* | 27.6 | 27.6 | 1.000 | 25.9 | 0.868 | 22.2 | 0.637 | 56.8 | 0.001 | 56.8 | 1.000 |
| *Crops In Storage* | 39.1 | 29.9 | 0.231 | 62.0 | 0.024 | 51.9 | 0.119 | 30.5 | 0.452 | 31.6 | 0.856 |
| *Livestock* | 54.0 | 56.3 | 0.639 | 57.4 | 0.693 | 66.7 | 0.177 | 30.5 | 0.045 | 27.4 | 0.600 |
| *Cash* | 31.0 | 13.8 | 0.117 | 28.7 | 0.782 | 16.7 | 0.062 | 44.2 | 0.269 | 22.1 | 0.054 |
| % HHs participated in family finance meetings | 1.1 | 2.3 | 0.603 | 15.7 | 0.020 | 10.2 | 0.353 | 5.3 | 0.119 | 2.1 | 0.201 |
| % HHs Interested In Participating In Family Finance Meetings | 67.8 | 63.4 | 0.506 | 78.5 | 0.227 | 76.6 | 0.891 | 67.0 | 0.934 | 70.7 | 0.324 |

Source: Household survey E6, MFS II Indonesia
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

**Table 23: Income components**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Group** | **Comparison** | | | **KSP-QT** | | | | **KSU-GTGS** | | | |
| **Statistics** | **Base** | **End** | **P(1v2)** | **Base** | **P(1v4)** | **End** | **P(4v6)** | **Base** | **P(1v8)** | **End** | **P(8v10)** |
| Total Income Per Month (1000 Rp)[1] | 704.8 | 599.0 | 0.389 | 1,035.6 | 0.298 | 1,552.3 | 0.093 | 1,272.3 | 0.069 | 4,201.4 | 0.051 |
| Percentage of […] income in total income | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Livestock* | 9.1 | 12.1 | 0.336 | 6.0 | 0.404 | 6.7 | 0.835 | 1.5 | 0.051 | 4.0 | 0.431 |
| *Farm products* | 2.0 | 2.7 | 0.764 | 3.8 | 0.557 | 0.6 | 0.243 | 0.1 | 0.123 | 0.2 | 0.193 |
| *Transfer* | 48.4 | 37.4 | 0.016 | 35.5 | 0.094 | 31.5 | 0.082 | 22.0 | 0.005 | 16.1 | 0.291 |
| *Non-farm* | 16.9 | 21.9 | 0.203 | 15.5 | 0.720 | 16.3 | 0.806 | 45.6 | 0.007 | 45.4 | 0.974 |
| *Crop* | 23.5 | 21.3 | 0.393 | 39.2 | 0.026 | 41.1 | 0.575 | 29.8 | 0.456 | 31.1 | 0.751 |

Source: Household survey E6, MFS II Indonesia

Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.

1. Prices are reported in 2012 real prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%). Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/aboutus.php?inflasi=1

### Table 24: Consumption components

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Group** | Comparison | | | KSP-QT | | | | KSU-GTGS | | | |
| **Statistics** | Base | End | P(1v2) | Base | P(1v4) | End | P(4v6) | Base | P(1v8) | End | P(8v10) |
| Total Expenditure Per Month (1000 Rp)[1] | 1,786.0 | 1,567.4 | 0.260 | 1,951.1 | 0.610 | 1,765.3 | 0.332 | 2,728.3 | 0.033 | 2,459.8 | 0.531 |
| Percentage of […] expenditure in total expenditure | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Food* | 69.5 | 71.9 | 0.571 | 74.6 | 0.171 | 71.8 | 0.471 | 70.3 | 0.824 | 72.4 | 0.455 |
| *Education* | 7.9 | 8.1 | 0.903 | 5.4 | 0.149 | 6.1 | 0.541 | 6.4 | 0.308 | 8.9 | 0.017 |
| *Medical* | 4.6 | 4.7 | 0.926 | 2.7 | 0.205 | 4.5 | 0.152 | 3.8 | 0.571 | 1.8 | 0.019 |
| *Durables* | 4.8 | 4.1 | 0.727 | 4.8 | 0.992 | 4.7 | 0.934 | 5.1 | 0.840 | 5.2 | 0.934 |
| *Other* | 13.3 | 11.2 | 0.265 | 12.5 | 0.698 | 13.0 | 0.780 | 14.4 | 0.615 | 11.7 | 0.286 |

Source: Household survey E6, MFS II Indonesia

Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.

1. Prices are reported in 2012 real prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%). Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/aboutus.php?inflasi=1

### Table 25: Food security and vulnerability

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Group** | **Comparison** | | | **KSP-QT** | | | | **KSU-GTGS** | | | |
| **Statistics** | **Base** | **End** | **P(1v2)** | **Base** | **P(1v4)** | **End** | **P(4v6)** | **Base** | **P(1v8)** | **End** | **P(8v10)** |
| Nr. Of Months Could Not Cover Living Costs in past 12 months | | 2.5 | | | | 1.9 | | | | 1.3 | |
| % HHs Could Not Cover Living Cost in […] | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *January* | | 13.8 | | | | 8.3 | | | | 8.4 | |
| *February* | | 17.2 | | | | 9.3 | | | | 7.4 | |
| *March* | | 13.8 | | | | 11.1 | | | | 5.3 | |
| *April* | | 16.1 | | | | 12.0 | | | | 7.4 | |
| *May* | | 20.7 | | | | 18.5 | | | | 10.5 | |
| *June* | | 36.8 | | | | 31.5 | | | | 28.4 | |
| *July* | | 52.9 | | | | 43.5 | | | | 35.8 | |

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Group** | **Comparison** | | | **KSP-QT** | | | | **KSU-GTGS** | | | |
| **Statistics** | **Base** | **End** | **P(1v2)** | **Base** | **P(1v4)** | **End** | **P(4v6)** | **Base** | **P(1v8)** | **End** | **P(8v10)** |
| *August* | | 32.2 | | | | 25.0 | | | | 13.7 | |
| *September* | | 11.5 | | | | 9.3 | | | | 4.2 | |
| *October* | | 9.2 | | | | 4.6 | | | | 3.2 | |
| *November* | | 10.3 | | | | 6.5 | | | | 3.2 | |
| *December* | | 12.6 | | | | 7.4 | | | | 6.3 | |
| % HHs used […] to make ends meet | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Own Savings* | 8.0 | 13.8 | 0.178 | 7.4 | 0.869 | 35.2 | 0.003 | 23.2 | 0.001 | 34.7 | 0.065 |
| *Selling Assets* | 37.9 | 50.6 | 0.145 | 36.1 | 0.760 | 56.5 | 0.031 | 17.9 | 0.004 | 34.7 | 0.018 |
| *Borrow Money* | 52.9 | 58.6 | 0.342 | 63.0 | 0.163 | 57.4 | 0.540 | 63.2 | 0.176 | 62.1 | 0.905 |
| *Depend On Charity* | 1.1 | 1.1 | | 1.9 | 0.755 | 0.0 | 0.390 | 1.1 | 0.949 | 1.1 | 1.000 |
| *Ask Family Members* | 2.3 | 11.5 | 0.101 | 2.8 | 0.786 | 13.0 | 0.070 | 2.1 | 0.940 | 5.3 | 0.493 |
| *Nothing To Use* | 4.6 | 1.1 | 0.062 | 3.7 | 0.617 | 0.0 | 0.015 | 0.0 | 0.006 | 0.0 | |
| Nr. Of Months Could Not Cover Living Costs in past 12 months | 8.0 | 11.5 | 0.193 | 10.2 | 0.655 | 10.2 | 1.000 | 14.7 | 0.330 | 12.6 | 0.773 |
| % HHs Could Not Cover Living Cost in […] | 8.0 | 0.0 | 0.022 | 0.9 | 0.024 | 0.0 | 0.386 | 0.0 | 0.010 | 0.0 | |

Source: Household survey E6, MFS II Indonesia

Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.

1. Only panel respondents are used in regression.

# Endline Report on the Achievement of MDGs and Themes:

# Evaluation of the LRC-KJHAM project

## MFS II Joint Evaluations

## Indonesia

**Sub-report:**
**E7. Strengthening Marginalized Women's Access and Control to Legal Resources and Human Rights in Central Java 2010-2012,**
**Legal Resources Centre for Gender Justice and Human Rights (LRC-KJHAM)**

## FINAL REPORT

**9 April 2015**


**Amsterdam Institute for International Development (AIID)**
Trinity building C, 3rd floor, Rm XT-3.17
Pietersbergweg 17
1105 BM Amsterdam
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)20 5661596
F +31 (0)20 5665997
www.aiid.org

**SurveyMeter**
Jl. Jenengan Raya No.109
Maguwoharjo, Depok, Sleman,
Yogyakarta 55282
Indonesia
T +62 (0) 274 4477464
F +62 (0) 274 4477004
www.surveymeter.org

# List of contributors

**AIID**
Menno Pradhan (Principal Investigator)
Melinda Vigh (Research Coordinator)
Marije Groot Bruinderink (Project Manager)
Iris van Rossum (Junior Researcher)
Kimberley Wallaart (Qualitative Data Analyst)
Emilie Berkhout (Research Assistant)

**Survey Meter**
Ni Wayan Suriasatini (Research Coordinator)
Bondan Sikoki (Survey Expert)
Mardiana Br Ginting (Project Manager)
Muhammad Mulia (Qualitative Researcher)
Kamti Ningsih (Qualitative Researcher and Field Coordinator)
Budi Wahyuni (Qualitative Researcher and Expert Advisor on Gender Related Projects)

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## List of Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| BAPPEDA | Badan Perencana Pembangunan Daerah (Regional Body for Planning and Development) |
| CBO | Community-Based Organisation |
| CFA | Co-financing Agency |
| FGD | Focus Group Discussion |
| FPAR | Feminist Participatory Action Research |
| GBV | Gender-Based Violence |
| IDR | Indonesian rupiahs |
| IPV | Intimate Partner Violence |
| ISC | Integrated Service Centre |
| LRC-KJHAM | Legal Resources Centre for Gender Justice and Human Rights |
| MDG | Millennium Development Goal |
| MFS II | Medefinancieringsstelsel (Co-financing System Grant Policy Framework) |
| MoU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| PKDRT | Law on the Elimination of Domestic Violence (no. 23/2004) |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| WRIA | Women Rights Impact Assessment |

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Project context

Gender based violence (GBV) is a human rights violation and the social and economic costs are high. GBV is usually the result of unequal power relationships between men and women in families, communities and nations. GBV can result in "physical, mental, sexual, reproductive health and other health problems" for survivors and/or their children (WHO [1]), constituting a major public health problem. In addition, GBV also "impacts on, and impedes, progress in many areas, including poverty eradication, combating HIV/AIDS, and peace and security" (UN[2]). Several actions to combat GBV have been taken. The UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (1993), the first international human rights instrument to deal exclusively with GBV, offered the first official definition of the term gender based violence, defining it as "any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivations of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life." [3] Millennium Development Goal 3 calls for the promotion of gender equality and women's empowerment.[4]

In Indonesia, law no. 23/2004 (the PKDRT law) on the Elimination of Domestic Violence was the first regulation that finally legally entitled female victims of domestic violence to report any violence they experienced at the hands of their husband. In addition, as a result of the implementation of this law, institutions providing services to female and child victims of GBV started to be established. In Central Java Province,[5] the government issued by-law no. 3/2009 to assure better enforcement of the PKDRT law. This by-law governs, among others, the rights of female victims and the obligations of the local government with respect to prevention, protection and reintegration of victims. As a result, local governments are authorized to form integrated services centres (PPTKs) and commissions for the protection of female and child victims of domestic and/or gender based violence.

However, despite these efforts, the actual implementation and enforcement of the legislation, especially by local governments, is slow. In Indonesia's multicultural society, GBV is often tolerated and permitted due to patriarchy that manifests in cultural and religious beliefs and practices.

Domestic violence is by far the largest reported subcategory of GBV[6], which the PKDRT law defines as 'any act toward somebody in the household, especially women, that results in any psychological, physical and/or sexual suffering, and/or abandonment, including threat, force, or deprivation of liberty

[1] Source: http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs239/en/
[2] Source: http://www.un.org/en/events/endviolenceday/
[3] Source: http://www.hhri.org/thematic/gender_based_violence.html.
[4] Source: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/gender.shtml
[5] The location of the project.
[6] According to the National Commission on Violence against Women (Komnas Perempuan) 119.107 cases of violence against women had been reported in Indonesia in 2011. Almost 97% of the reports (110.468 cases) have been filed as 'domestic violence' cases. From the different types of violence against women in the domestic domain, psychological violence ranked the highest with 103.691 cases, followed by economic violence (3.222 cases), physical violence (2.700 cases), and sexual violence (1.398 cases) (Komnas Perempuan, 2012a & 2012b).

as defined by law, that happened within the domestic sphere' (Article 1). The roots of domestic violence in Indonesia can -at least in part- be found in gender inequality, particularly within marital relations. For example, the husband's culturally-instilled superior position as head and provider[7] has grave implications for women's willingness and ability to report domestic violence and/or file for divorce. Another example involves the marital practice where the father of the bride is taking on the role of his daughter's representative during the wedding ceremony. The husband thus swears the marital oath to the father of the bride, instead of to his bride herself. Many victims attest that, consequently, their husbands tell them during fights that "he is not bound by his oath to treat her well or stay faithful, because he hasn't sworn the marital oath directly to her". Worries about how to support herself and her children after a separation or divorce, can inhibit women from taking action to stop the abuse. Even though divorce is common in Indonesia, it is rarely instigated by the wife since she needs the income of her husband to take care of the children (Venning, 2010). Moreover, women that report their husband to the police face the threat of being stigmatized by her family and environment.

Data on GBV cases is gathered mostly by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) working on violence against women. During the period of 2000 to 2011, there was an increasing trend of the number of female victims in Indonesia. Particularly, between 2009 and 2011, there were more than 100,000 reported cases per year. The National Commission for Women found that 95% of the divorce cases approved by the Religious High Court in 2011 were due to domestic violence against the wife. According to Komnas Perempuan (2012a; 2012b) the most vulnerable age group is 25-40 years. The most common reported form of violence in Indonesia is psychological abuse.

Though, the actual number of GBV cases is expected to be higher than the official data (Komnas Perempuan, 2012a; Komnas Perempuan, 2012b; Hayati, 2011). For example, based on the outcomes of the Violence Against Women Survey 2006, UN Women estimates that nearly 2.09 million women in Indonesia experienced at some point in their life a form of domestic violence (Utami, 2013). In November 2000, the prevalence of domestic violence in Central Java was investigated by Hakimi et al. (2001) in accordance with a questionnaire developed by a WHO Multi-Country Study on Women's Health and Domestic Violence Against Women. They found that 41% of women from Central Java had suffered physical or sexual violence at least once in their lives, mostly from their husbands. In addition, 20% of the women experienced sexual assault from someone other than their husband.

In general, the lack of autonomy and assertiveness among many Indonesian women, particularly of those who live in rural areas, hinders them to report the case to state apparatuses or bringing the case into public.[8] Women also often experience difficulties in accessing the legal system, for example due to the prohibitive cost and distance. Moreover, domestic violence is often regarded as a private matter, not belonging in the public domain. The taboo and stigma on domestic violence prohibits not only collecting accurate data (Utami, 2013), but more importantly hinders women to become aware of the

[7] Within Indonesian law and culture, the husband is always regarded as the head of the household and expected to be the breadwinner. The notion of the husband as the head of household is also stated in the marriage law no. 1, dating from 1974.

[8] ACNielsen (2005) finds that only 27% of victims would report domestic violence to the police.

problem and possible solutions. Therefore, the rising trend of GBV prevalence should be regarded as a positive sign of an increasing number of women having the courage to report their cases, hence breaking the taboo on domestic violence.

Several institutions in Indonesia provide services to female and child victims of violence. In 2011, Komnas Perempuan (2012a; 2012b) recorded a total of 395 of these institutions (both government and non-government initiatives) across 33 provinces in Indonesia, providing for example counsellors, gender-sensitive judges/district attorneys and database officers. LRC-KJHAM is one of the institutions. LRC-KJHAM provides protection services to, and engages in policy advocacy on the protection of victimized women and children. Its aim is to empower victims of domestic and gender based violence to become 'survivors' who are strong and knowledgeable enough to solve their problems.

## 1.2. Evaluation objectives

This report evaluates the LRC-KJHAM project[9] as part of as part of the *Medefinancieringsstelsel* (MFS) II evaluation for Indonesia under the Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDG) component. The project has been selected under the goals on gender (MDG 3). In particular, the current evaluation focuses on the following research questions: how did the empowerment of women survivors change? How did gender awareness among the women survivors change? How did the paralegal training change support groups of women survivors in advocating and assisting women victims?[10]

We investigate whether the project had a favourable effect on the above mentioned outcomes by looking at the changes in the outcome variables between the baseline and endline periods for the project beneficiaries.

Data was collected using structured surveys in September 2012, and the same respondents were re-interviewed twice, in November 2013 and September 2014. The survey respondents were selected from the clients of LRC-KJHAM who have sought help in relation to domestic violence in the first half of 2012. In total 20 women (out of 26 cases) were interviewed. Half of these respondents have visited LRC-KJHAM in 2012 for the first time. In addition to the quantitative information, we have also collected qualitative data about the respondents that helps us in determining the factors contributing to the change in outcome indicators during the evaluation period.

In order to gain further insights into the impacts of LRC-KJHAM, we collected additional qualitative information using in-depth interviews with support group members and other stakeholders, and a focus group discussion (FGD) with paralegals trained by LRC-KJHAM.

As specified in the Terms of Reference for this evaluation, the report addresses five evaluation questions to assess the project outcomes:

1) Change: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period?

[9] The project is described in more detail in section 3.
[10] This last evaluation question is answered using a qualitative study with the support group members.

2) Attribution: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3) Relevance of change: What is the relevance of these changes?
4) Efficiency: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient?
5) Explanations: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

## 1.3. Summary of findings

LRC-KJHAM provides counselling and legal aid services to victims of GBV. For the evaluation, we interviewed 20 out of 26 women who visited LRC-KJHAM between January and July of 2012 and were victims of domestic violence. At the time of the baseline survey, several respondents visited LRC-KJHAM already multiple times, and 5 respondents were already divorced. During the evaluation period, only 7 respondents have still used the services of LRC-KJHAM.

These facts and the lack of control group pose limitations for measuring the effectiveness of the project. We tried to compensate these issues by using both structured and qualitative survey questions during two follow-up interviews with the baseline respondents both in 2013 (midline) and 2014 (endline).

The data show quite some changes in the marital status of the respondents: 4 women got divorced, 2 got separated and 3 got remarried. At the endline, 7 women were divorced, 4 were separated, 7 were married to their (abusive) husband and 2 found new husbands.

We find that most women got free of domestic violence and increased their autonomy either through divorce or separation or because the husband was not as abusive anymore, which translated into an 80% reduction in the number of types of abuse suffered by the respondents and a 38% reduction in the abusive traits of the (ex-) husbands towards their wives if they still communicated. But 5 respondents (25%) were still psychologically abused and one of them also sexually abused by her (ex-) husband. LRC-KJHAM contributed to these changes through the counselling and legal assistance provided for the respondents. Respondents felt that the survivors at LRC-KJHAM were patient and friendly and they really defended domestic violence victims. The knowledge and moral support received from these survivors provided strength for the respondents in solving their problems at court or in the household.

However, the support from family and friends and successes in employment were at least as important for the women to become more courageous and self-confident. In fact, respondents first confided their household problems to their close friends and family (parents and siblings) when they could not take the pressure and abuse anymore after a long period of suppressed insecurity and fear. It was usually these friends and family who advised the respondents to seek help at LRC-KJHAM.

The psychological well-being of respondents improved by 44% during the evaluation period. This change is probably due to the encouragement received from these sources. However, respondents who experienced less abuse also suffered from less distress, and respondents who solved their cases and settled the divorce consistently reported to feel more relaxed and relieved.

We do not observe any significant changes in the empowerment of the respondents, except for a substantial increase in their self-esteem. No changes were found with respect to the attitude towards their rights in marriage.

Finally, the qualitative data with support group members reported in Annex VIII suggests that LRC-KJHAM's strategy to change victims of gender based violence into survivors and active agents that are able to change their own situation as well as those of others is well chosen. By empowering victims and giving them the courage, skills, and will to actively speak up in court and actively commit their own knowledge and experiences to inspire and help other victims, the victims themselves become advocates for the fight against gender based violence. By changing shame and disgrace into power, they are able to gradually change the negative connotations that are traditionally associated with 'divorce' and 'assertiveness' in women, and inspire and encourage other victims to fight for their own rights, and ultimately those of others.

### 1.4. Structure of report

The rest of this report proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the relevant literature; section 3 describes the project; section 4 describes the evaluation questions and outcome variables; section 5 the data collection. Section 6 provides the descriptive statistics. Sections 7 till 10 discuss evaluation question 1) till 4) in turn. The last section discusses the results and concludes.

Further details about the project results are presented in a number of annexes. The SPO is described in Annex I. Regarding the survey data, the construction of the outcome indicators and indices is summarized in Annex II. Annex III in turn reports detailed descriptive statistics of the sample, while detailed figures on the change in outcome indicators are presented in Annex IV and further tables on analysing the attribution of changes is presented in Annex V. Tables on the information about the service satisfaction and types of information sought are reported in Annex VI, while Annex VII contains additional tables on the respondents who were not divorced at the baseline. Finally, the results of the qualitative data collection are presented in Annex VIII.

## 2. Literature overview

In order to better position the LRC-KJHAM project, this section summarizes relevant findings in the literature with respect to combating domestic and intimate partner violence (IPV)[11]. First, we discuss policy level recommendations and risk factors, and then report the results of specific interventions aimed at reducing the incidence of domestic violence and IVP, and/or supporting victims of domestic violence and IPV.

***Policy level recommendations for fighting domestic and intimate partner violence***

The state is an important actor when fighting domestic and intimate partner violence. It can adopt or improve domestic violence legislation to provide a framework to prevent and respond to domestic violence (UN, 2010). For example, it can alter the legal framework (e.g. criminal and civil remedies), start programmes to prevent violence (e.g. reduce alcohol abuse), or provide services for victims (e.g. protection services, legal aid services) (UN Women, 2011).

[11] Both domestic violence and IPV can take place in the domestic environment. However, IPV can also take place outside the domestic domain, for example dating violence. Domestic violence does not necessarily take place between partners like IPV, for example the violence can also be directed to children.

The movement aimed at changing domestic violence legislation have been partly successful. On the one hand, women's organisations' and human rights group's campaigns to reform criminal and civil laws related to domestic violence - often broadening the legal definition of domestic violence[12] - have achieved great progress (Heise, 2011). For example, the number of countries that have specific legal provisions on domestic violence has grown from 89 in 2006 to 125 in 2011.[13] On the other hand, however, implementation of these laws is yet quite insufficient (Heise, 2011).

Studies documenting the impact of reforming laws on changing behaviour in low income countries are scarce (Heise, 2011). However, it is generally recognized that resolving domestic violence through the state system can work, but if, for example, women and men do not regard themselves as equals in society, these laws and regulations lack the right effect (Venning, 2010). Then, implementing domestic violence legislation alone will not eliminate the violence. It is crucial to include provisions in domestic violence legislation to ensure efficient implementation of the domestic violence legislation, for example by training public officials. Moreover, laws on domestic violence should include public awareness raising programmes and education provisions to create an environment of zero tolerance for violence (UN Women, 2011).

### *Risk factors affecting the prevalence of domestic violence*

Efforts aimed at preventing domestic violence are very important, as the ultimate goal of both government and the NGO-sphere is to create a zero-tolerance to domestic violence. It is generally recognized that the roots of violence against women lie in gender inequality and discrimination.[14] The likelihood of a woman experiencing violence in a particular situation depends on a variety of (risk) factors at the individual, relationship, community and society (including the institutional/state) levels, together known as 'ecological model' (Heise, 2011). For example, the current stock of literature provides relatively strong evidence that gender-related norms, exposure to violence during childhood and male alcohol abuse are risk factors of IPV, at least in the developed world. However, the research on risk factors of domestic violence specifically on Indonesian women is scarce (Hayati et al., 2011).

Hayati et al. (2011) investigated the risk factors of rural Javanese women for physical and sexual violence. 765 women were interviewed by female field workers using the WHO Multi-Country study instrument on domestic violence. The lifetime exposure to sexual and physical violence was 22% and respectively 11%. The results displayed that women's risk of physical and sexual violence is related to traditional gender norms. These unequal gender relationships, measured with women's attitudes and norms, show that these relationships are more common among women living in the highlands and those being married to poorly educated men. Hence, the traditional gender roles, especially in marriage, should gain particular attention in preventive interventions in Indonesia.

Besides women's experiences, men's views on domestic violence are important to investigate to gain knowledge on the determinants of domestic violence (Hayati et al., 2014). Hayati et al. (2014) conducted

[12] With respect to the definition of domestic violence in the law, the UN Women (2011) recommends to have a detailed definition in the law which "captures women's experiences of violence in all its manifestations". Furthermore, the UN Women recommends to "domesticate the definitions by outlawing specific cultural manifestations of violence" (p. 17).

[13] Source: http://www.stopvaw.org/united_nations_model_legislation

[14] For example, see http://www.endvawnow.org/en/articles/300-causes-protective-and-risk-factors-.html

six focus group discussions with, in total, 44 local male community leaders in Purworejo, rural Java. Three different positions of masculinity with certain beliefs on the gender order and acceptance of violence within marriage among the sample were identified, ranging from high acceptance of violence (traditionalist), pragmatic acceptance if needed to correct the wife's behaviour (pragmatist), to no acceptance (egalitarian). A very important determinant of the beliefs of all three positions is religion. The study concludes by recommending that religion should be included in every type of preventive intervention for this population.

### *Effectiveness of preventive programmes*

The evidence about the effectiveness of preventive programmes is highly skewed towards high-income countries (especially the United States). Based on the available evidence, Heise (2011) provides us with an overview of the current research-based literature on the effectiveness of preventing IPV interventions in low- and middle income countries for five different varieties of programmes: law and justice system reforms (see above), harmful alcohol use, women's economic empowerment, childhood exposure to violence, gender-related norms and beliefs. The current evidence stock on harmful alcohol use and the economic empowerment was inadequate to draw general conclusions, but results from the other two programme varieties are promising.

Interventions aimed at reducing childhood exposure to violence show that parenting programmes can improve parent-child interactions and reduce harsh punishment, but more research is needed on a number of other programmes, e.g. positive child discipline or gender socialization interventions (Heise, 2011).

With respect to changing gender norms interventions, both small group and larger-scale campaigns seem to be effective to change norms, attitudes and beliefs related to gender. In addition, some studies show a decrease in reported IPV cases. Successful programmes seem to have engaged the community and locally respected leaders, have involved awareness raising and deliberation on values, rights and gender based discrimination, have built on local traditions, songs and values; and have addressed the drawback of non-compliance with social norms. However, many evaluation studies are methodologically weak (Heise, 2011).

One study in particular that does give evidence on the impact of a preventive intervention in a developing world context, is the SASA! Activist Kit for Preventing Violence against Women an HIV in Uganda. The programme seeks to change community attitudes, norms and behaviours that result in gender inequality, violence and increased HIV vulnerability. Community activists interested in issues of violence, power and rights were trained, along with staff from selected institutions, who worked through the Awareness, Support and Action phases. The programme introduced new concepts of power and encouraged an analysis of the imbalance of power through local activism, media and advocacy, communication materials and training. The activities in each community were developed in response to the community's needs. Abramsky et al. (2014) report that after almost 3 years of the programme, social acceptance of a man's use of violence against his partner was significantly lower among women

(adjusted risk ratio[15] 0.54, CI[16] 0.38 to 0.79) and lower among men (0.13, CI 0.01 to 1.15) in intervention communities compared to control communities. Similarly, more people in intervention communities reported attitudes supporting the acceptability of a woman refusing sex, statistically significant for both women (1.28, CI 1.07 to 1.52) and men (1.31, CI 1.00 to 1.70). Past year experience of physical IPV was substantially lower among intervention women compared to control women (0.48, CI 0.16 to 1.39). For sexual IPV, the difference between intervention and control communities was somewhat smaller and statistically non-significant (0.76, CI 0.33 to 1.72). These results should be interpreted as the short-term community-wide effects.

### *Effectiveness of post-violence services*

In addition to interventions aimed at preventing and resolving domestic violence, there are services aimed at the rehabilitation of survivors of violence, like facilitating access to justice or counselling.

One of the most popular responses by the government to fight domestic violence is to set up facilities which offer post-violence services, i.e. women's police stations facilitating access to justice for women (Heise, 2011). The effectiveness of domestic violence agencies in Illinois, U.S., is investigated by Bennett et al. (2004). Though the results are preliminary due to the study limitations (e.g. self-reported data, no control group), in all four programme areas, crisis hotline, counselling, advocacy, and emergency shelter, the outcomes were positive. Victims of domestic violence have gained important information due to their participation in the hotline, counselling and advocacy. Counselling and advocacy participation improved victims' decision-making ability. Furthermore, counselling alone increased the self-efficacy and coping skills of victims.

Studies on the effectiveness of women's police stations in the developing world show mixed results. On the positive side, the policy stations seem to make the domestic violence problem visible and offer women new opportunities to defend their rights. However, the stations do not necessarily contribute to the elimination of violence or guarantee access to justice since stations were not designed to fulfil *all* women's needs like emergency shelter, guidance, support and legal advice (Heise, 2011).

With respect to counselling, the literature suggests that counselling for battered women can improve a number of skills and characteristics, like self-esteem, assertiveness and coping abilities (Bennett et al., 2004). Based on international standards and good practices, the United Nations Women (2011) concludes that it is important for the long-term rehabilitation of survivors that counselling aims to empower them, be provided free of charge and should not be mandatory. Counselling for perpetrators must be mandated as supplementary to the criminal justice sanction (United Nations Women, 2011).

Other post-violence services are support groups. The results of the two available studies on their effectiveness is summarised below. Tutty, Bidgood, and Rothery (1993) evaluated the impact of 12 closed support groups (i.e. not open to new members after the start) on 76 women within a time span of 6 months. Women showed improvements in the areas of self-esteem, sense of belonging, locus of control, traditional attitudes towards marriage and the family, marital functioning and perceived stress.

[15] Adjusted risk ratios generated on the basis of expected number of events from a logistic regression model on individual data with independent variables including age, marital status and EA-level summary baseline measure of outcome indicator (Abramsky et al., 2014, p. 12)

[16] The 95% confidence interval (CI) of the estimates is reported.

Women living with their husbands showed significant decreases in both physical and non-physical and controlling abuse. Thought the results should be interpreted with caution due to the high level of attrition (n=32 at the endline) and the lack of a comparison group.

Constantino et al. (2005) evaluated 24 women in a domestic violence shelter (Western Pennsylvania, U.S.) using a randomized control design. The women were randomly designed to either the control group or the treatment group. Both the control and treatment groups received the standard shelter services provided to all women in the residence: meals, shelter, and necessary transportation. In addition, the treatment group received the social support intervention: once a week a 90-minute meeting led by a trained nurse for eight weeks. The meetings focussed on their social support networks and access to community resources. After the programme the treatment group showed greater improvement in psychological distress symptoms, reported higher feelings of social support, and showed less health care utilization than the control group.

However, the above findings may not be directly translated to Indonesian women due to differences in culture and context. As research in the U.S., U.K. and Australia has shown: "women's perceptions of appropriate and inappropriate responses [by professionals] partly depended on the context of the consultation, their own readiness to address the issue, and the nature of the relationship between the woman and the health care professional."(Feder et al., 2006, p.22).

#### *Summary*

Summarizing, it is found that in order to eliminate domestic violence both legal interventions and interventions to change social norms building on local traditions are important. In the context of Indonesia the traditional role of men and women in marriage deserves particular attention. Evidence on the effectiveness of programmes that aim to prevent domestic and IPV violence is scarce. The SASA! Programme was successful in changing beliefs about violence, but did not find significant results for a decrease in actual violence. For rehabilitation of survivors of domestic violence, counselling can help to emotionally strengthen survivors, but it is not clear whether it actually results in changing the abusive situation. More evidence is needed to pinpoint the key factors driving successful programmes aimed at eliminating domestic violence and the rehabilitation of survivors.

# 3. The project

## 3.1. Project description

The "Strengthening Marginalized Women's Access and Control to Legal Resources and Human Rights in Central Java 2010-2012" project of Legal Resources Centre for Gender Justice and Human Rights (LRC-KJHAM) ran between 1 October 2010 and 31 December 2012.[17,18]

[17] Hivos also provides funding for LRC-KJHAM between 14 August 2013 and 31 July 2015. This follow-up project is targeted at the support group. The objective is that it becomes an independent group that is able to advocate other victims of GBV and to campaign for SRHR. As such, the project focuses on 'woman leadership'. Hivos believes that the potency and capacity of survivors can be strengthened through this women leadership project. However, because this project has no effect on the current evaluation (respondent did not benefit from it prior to the interviews), we do not discuss this follow-up project in further detail.

The ultimate goal of LRC-KJHAM is to empower victims of GBV to become survivors. Accordingly, it aims to strengthen the access and control of women victims of GBV to legal resources and human rights in Central Java. [19]


Hivos provided funding for the following activities of LRC-KJHAM:

- Continuous victim support:
  - Providing legal aid to at least 25 female victims of GBV per year.
  - Strengthening 4 support groups for victims of GBV.
- Capacity building of LRC-KJHAM:
  - Training paralegals to support victims of GBV.
  - Recruiting volunteers for programme management or paralegal activities.
- Conducting research and data analysis on cases of GBV:
  - Developing a database of cases of GBV.
  - Developing guidelines to implement Feminist Participatory Action Research (FPAR) and Women's Rights Impact Assessment.
  - Developing a gender profile on health and GBV for 4 sub-districts of Semarang City.
- Organising policy advocacy activities on women's rights:
  - Publishing 2 women's rights journals.
  - Updating the website of LRC-KJHAM.

Among these activities, the evaluation focuses on the counselling and legal aid services to victims of domestic violence, and on the strengthening of the support groups.

Figure 1 summarizes the project periods and the evaluation activities.

**Figure 1: Timing of intervention**




[18] After 2012 Hivos stopped funding the core activities of LRC-KJHAM because LRC-KJHAM is able to obtain funding from the local government in Semarang, which is supportive of the issue of gender based violence and has a good working relation with LRC-KJHAM on the integrated service centres. In the project between 2013-2015, Hivos provides funding for the support group as an 'exit-strategy' because the local government does not provide funding for the strengthening of survivors.

[19] For further information about LRC-KJHAM see Annex I.

## 3.2. Result chain

The result chain is displayed in Figure 2. It is based on both project documents and the interpretation of the evaluators. It is a rather complex project logic which incorporates both activities and their desired effects at the beneficiary and at the community and policy level.

As a pro-women's rights legal resource centre, LRC-JKHAM commits to strengthen the access of marginalized/poor women victims of gender based violence to legal resources. To this end, LRC-KJHAM provides legal aid services to women victims, holds campaigns for women rights and promotes legal and policy reform, empowers women victims with education and training, and conducts (documentation) research and data analysis on women victims of GBV, and uses the data to support policy advocacy on protecting women's rights. It is also engaged in strengthening survivor-based support groups to improve their ability to reach victims of GBV and engage in policy dialogue with the local parliament and government and help drafting local regulation and policy. The project aims to contribute to the enactment of local regulation on protection of women and children victims, and budget allocation in provincial and city/district levels to support the integrated service centre (ISC, or 'one stop crisis centre'/OSCC) at the district level. The basic idea of an ISC is to provide an integrated service unit to handling women victims of GBV. Included are: psychological counselling, mental and physical treatment and legal aid.

The evaluation focuses on the components of the result chain that are printed in bold and with capital letters. Regarding the activities of LRC-KJHAM, these are psychological counselling; legal advice and assistance; and support group. These activities were used by the respondents during the evaluation period. The hypothesised effects of these activities are discussed below in further detail.


The aim of counselling is to overcome the trauma and to improve the awareness, independency and honour of (female) victims. Support groups can also provide comfort for the women by sharing their experiences and providing support for each other. LRC-KJHAM provides the meeting facilities for the support groups. Regular group meetings discuss topics that are of interest to the respondents and sometimes invite guest speakers. Support group members also take part in demonstrations supporting the cases of other victims or campaigning for policy change.

LRC-KJHAM also provides legal advice for abused women regarding their rights and the procedure of divorce or other legal cases. If they are ready to take legal action (divorce), LRC-KJHAM offers assistance in handling the litigation procedure.

It is important to keep in mind that there are also other factors that affect the empowerment and psychological well-being of the survivors of domestic violence. These could be support from the family and friends of the respondents or new life experiences such as a new job.

Finally, it is of interest of the evaluation how the project beneficiaries get in contact with LRC-KJHAM. The victims contact LRC-JKHAM though three channels: survivor support groups actively approach women victims; victims go to support group and ask for assistance; or victims come directly to the ISC.

**Figure 2: Result chain**




Notes:

1. MFS II evaluation focuses on result chain items in bold and capitalized (e.g. psychological counselling).
2. Oval factor is independent of the activities of LRC-KJHAM.

# 4. Evaluation questions and outcome variables

## 4.1. Evaluation questions

The call for proposals outlines 5 general evaluation questions. In the baseline report specific evaluations questions were specified. Table 1 shows these five questions and what it implies for this project.

**Table 1: Overview general and specific evaluation questions**

| Number | General evaluation question | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Change: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period? | • How did the empowerment of women survivors change?<br>• How did gender awareness among the women survivors change? |
| 2 | Attribution: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)? | Are the observed changes above attributable to the intervention? |
| 3 | Relevance of change: What is the relevance of these changes? | • The size of the impact<br>• Does the project address an important issue for the beneficiaries?<br>• Satisfaction of beneficiaries (self-reported impact) |
| 4 | Efficiency: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient? | Was the intervention cost effective? |
| 5 | Explanations: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above? | Why did things work out/not work out?<br>The evaluation question is answered throughout the other evaluation questions and in the end discussion. |

The baseline report specifies three more evaluation questions than mentioned in Table 1. However, for two of those questions[20] we were not able to answer those questions because they are too general and ambitious. On the other hand, we investigate the other evaluation question using a qualitative study with support group members: how did the paralegal training change support groups of women survivors in advocating and assisting women victims?

[20] Were the research and database provided by SPO accessible and used by various stakeholders (GO and NGO)? How did the enactment of regulation on protection for women victims of GBV change?

## 4.2. Outcome indicators

To answer the first two evaluation questions (change and attribution) we identified specific outcome indicators following the result chain of the project discussed in section 3.2. The outcome indicators are split up into 4 sub-groups: the number of women free of domestic violence; psychological health of women; women's empowerment/attitude towards themselves; and attitude/empowerment in marriage. Since there are many possible and interesting outcome indicators, variables are grouped into indices for the main analysis.

Table 2 displays the outcome indicators of the main analysis, the scale of these variables and whether an indicator is a uniform indicator, while Annex II describes the outcome indicators in more detail and highlights the components per index. These uniform indicators are specified by the syntheses team for the goal of gender equality (MDG 3).

**Table 2: Overview outcome indicators**

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Uniform indicator |
|---|---|---|
| **Panel A. Number of women free of domestic violence** | | |
| Abused by husband/partner in the past 12 months | (0;n) | |
| Number of types of abuse by husband/partner | (0-3) | |
| **Panel B. Psychological health of women** | | |
| Psychological distress index | (0-12) | |
| Social dysfunction index | (0-6) | |
| Anxiety index | (0-4) | |
| Losing confidence index | (0-2) | |
| **Panel C. Women's empowerment (attitude towards themselves)** | | |
| Self-efficacy index | (-2;2) | |
| Self-esteem index | (-2;2) | |
| Control index | (-2;2) | |
| Dependency | (-2;2) | |
| Support | (-2;2) | |
| **Panel D. Empowerment in marriage** | | |
| Rights of wife index | (0-9) | |
| Any good reason for a husband to hit his wife | (0;n) | X |
| Number of good reasons for a husband to hit his wife | (0-6) | X |
| Any occasions a wife can refuse to have sex | (0;n) | X |
| Number of occasions a wife can refuse to have sex | (0-3) | X |
| Note: n is the number of women in the sample | | |

# 5. Data collection

This section describes the survey instruments and the sampling design and outcome.

## 5.1. Survey instruments

We collected three types of data: quantitative, qualitative, and financial data. The following paragraphs list the survey instruments used for each type of data.

### *Quantitative data*

A structured survey was administered with 20 clients of LRC-KJHAM focusing on information related to the domestic abuse and help seeking, psychological well-being and attitude towards rights of wives and themselves. Some qualitative questions were integrated in this survey as well. The baseline data have been collected in September 2012, the midline data in November 2013, and the endline data in September 2014.

### *Qualitative data*

To gain more insight into the impact of the programme, a qualitative analysis was conducted in July 2013. In-depth interviews were conducted with four agencies (LRC-KJHAM, Seruni, Provincial PPT, and PPT city/BAPPERMAS), and with 9 female support group clients of LRC-KJHAM. One FGD was held with 5 female (ex-)clients who have become paralegals for LRC-KJHAM. The results of this study are summarized in Annex VIII.

### *Financial data collection*

To collect information about the costs of the project, we conducted a project cost survey with the head of internal matters, head of operations and the director of LRC-KJHAM on 19 July 2013.

## 5.2. Sampling outcome

### *Sampling design*

The evaluation focuses on the victims of domestic violence. According to our information the litigation procedure for domestic violence takes on average 6 months. Therefore, we selected the respondents from the clients of LRC-KJHAM who have sought help in relation to domestic abuse between January and August 2012. Until August, 26 such cases had been recorded at time of the sample selection. We have aimed at interviewing 20 of these women, giving priority for the newer cases.[21]

The same respondents were planned to be re-interviewed on an annual bases.

### *Sampling outcome*

The sampling design was carried out as planned. We have interviewed 20 out of 26 clients of LRC-KJHAM, who turned to the organisation between January and August 2012. For the timing of the data collection, see section 5.1.

[21] Hence, the selection of the sample is non-random due to the limited number of the beneficiaries.

# 6. Descriptive statistics

This section summarizes the main characteristics of the respondents by focusing first on their interaction with LRC-KJHAM, and then on their socio-economic characteristics. Additional tables are provided in Annex III.

## 6.1. Treatment exposure

Table 3 reports on how often and for what purpose the respondents used the services offered by LRC-KJHAM. Out of the 20 respondents, 11 visited LRC-KJHAM in 2012 for the first time, 6 of them contacted LRC-KJHAM already in 2011, while 3 respondents contacted LRC-KJHAM before 2011 for the first time.

At the baseline, a total of 8 of 20 respondents have explicitly mentioned that they have received psychological counselling, 9 respondents received legal advice and 7 received legal aid. During the evaluation period, in the first year (midline) 4 respondents benefitted from legal advice from which 3 have continued from the baseline. Hence, in total 10 respondents benefitted from the legal advice of LRC-KJHAM. During the same period, also 4 respondents reported to use legal aid services of LRC-KJHAM with 3 respondents continuing from the baseline. However, the overlap between the respondents benefitting from legal aid and legal advice is not complete. In total, 12 of 20 respondents reported to have received either legal advice or legal aid from LRC-KJHAM. However, this number may actually be higher for legal advice, as 4 respondents did not indicate the type of services used, despite 3 of them having visited LRC-KJHAM multiple times (but not having filed for divorce).

As the table shows, 7 respondents used the legal aid or legal advice services of LRC-KJHAM during the first year of the evaluation period and none of them did so after the midline study. Most of the cases were regarding divorce, however, one divorced client asked LRC-KJHAM to assist her in claiming her rights over a property acquired jointly with her ex-husband. Respondents stopped visiting LRC-KJHAM after their case had been settled or they had not yet made up their mind about divorcing their abusive husband.

Out of the 11 respondents that visited LRC-KJHAM in 2012 for the first time, only 3 reported that they visited LRC-KJHAM only once. Among these three, one actually received legal aid from LRC-KJHAM but then also got a lawyer to handle her divorce case; another one attended only one psychological counselling session but decided to remain with her husband; and the third one also decided to stay with her husband. The other respondents returned to LRC-KJHAM multiple times, even though not all of them used the legal aid services of LRC-KJHAM either because they did not file for divorce or they used other sources of help. Most (12 of 20) respondents visited LRC-KJHAM a total of 2-4 times. The 5 respondents who visited more often were all members of the support group as well.

The support group was formed by LRC-KJHAM and consists of the women victims who are both members and organisers of the group's activities. The group organises monthly regular meetings but occasionally also supports the trial of victims by use of demonstrations.[22] 6 of 20 respondents reported to be members of the group at the baseline, and 5 continued to be members up until the endline survey.

[22] For more information about the support group, see the qualitative report based on interviews with support group members in Annex VIII.

However, only 2 respondents at the midline and one of them at the endline reported to regularly attend the support group meetings. From the qualitative data we can see that respondents agreed that support group activities were very helpful for them. Unfortunately, they did not really have the chance to participate since most activities were carried out during working hours. As one respondent remarked *"I'm just an employee and if I skipped work my salary will be reduced. I wish I could join the group and meet the other women victims".* Another respondent also noted that "*I really want to gather and add my experience, but I don't have time. I have to meet my company selling target.*" In addition, the distance to the meeting place (the office of LRC-KJHAM) hindered the participants to join in the activities.

In the following data analysis, in addition to reporting the results for the group of all respondents, we also show the results for the group of respondents who have used the legal aid and legal advice services of LRC-KJHAM during the evaluation period (7 respondents).

**Table 3: Use of LRC-KJHAM services**

| Survey | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Sample size** | 20 | 20 | 20 |
| Year of first visit | | | |
| *2012* | 11 | - | - |
| *2011* | 6 | - | - |
| *Before* | 3 | - | - |
| Services used in past 12 months | | | |
| *Psychological counselling* | 8 | 0 | 0 |
| *Legal advice* | 9 | 4 | 0 |
| *Legal aid* | 7 | 4 | 0 |
| *Support group* | 6 | 5 | 5 |
| Visited since last survey | - | 7 | 0 |
| Total nr. times visited | | | |
| *Once* | - | 3 | - |
| *2-4 times* | - | 12 | - |
| *5-10 times* | - | 1 | - |
| *More than 10 times* | - | 4 | - |

Source: Respondent survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

## 6.2. Respondent characteristics

To provide a better insight into the general characteristics of our sample, Table 4 displays a number of socio-economic characteristics of the respondent and her husband at the baseline. For variables where the sample mean is displayed, the standard deviation of the variable is reported in brackets below the mean (for example, for age or number of children). For categorical indicators, the number of respondents that belong in each category is reported.

**Table 4: General characteristics of the sample**

| Sample | Total sample | Used LRC since baseline |
|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2012 |
| **Sample size** | 20 | 7 |
| **Age** | 37.75 (10.02) | 35.57 (9.52) |
| **Number of children** | 1.78 (0.81) | 1.67 (0.82) |
| **Religion** | | |
| - *Islam* | 17 | 6 |
| - *Catholic* | 2 | 0 |
| - *Protestant* | 1 | 1 |
| **Highest level of education of respondent** | | |
| - *Elementary* | | |
| - *Junior High School* | 1 | 1 |
| - *Senior High School* | 3 | 2 |
| - *University* | 9 | 3 |
| | 7 | 1 |
| **Highest level of education of partner** | | |
| - *Elementary* | 1 | 1 |
| - *Junior High School* | 2 | 0 |
| - *Senior High School* | 12 | 6 |
| - *University* | 5 | 0 |
| **Employment status of respondent** | | |
| - *Unemployed / Housewife* | 4 | 1 |
| - *Work* | 16 | 6 |
| **Employment status of partner** | | |
| - *Unemployed* | 4 | 2 |
| - *Work* | 16 | 5 |
| **Asset index** | 0.76 (0.68) | 0.41 (0.65) |
| **Housing facilities index** | 0.58 (0.16) | 0.50 (0.15) |

Source: Respondent survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations are given in parentheses.

The table shows that the average age of respondent was 38 years. The oldest respondent was 53 years old, while the youngest was 21. Most respondents were between 30-40 years old, hence they were in the productive age group both as mothers and as workers. They had on average 2 children, with 4 respondents with 3 children, 6 respondents with 2 children, 8 respondents with 1 child, and 2 childless respondents. Most of them also worked at the time of the baseline survey, with only 4 of 20 being unemployed or housewives. One respondent stated, *"I work to fulfil our daily needs, including my child's needs".* Several respondents reported as one of the reasons for divorce that their husband has not provided them with money to fulfil their and their children's daily needs. As the table shows, 4 respondents' husbands were unemployed.

Most of the respondents had at least senior high school level of education (16 out of 20) with 7 respondents also having university education. The education level of the partners was similar. Respondents' households are also better off than the average Indonesian household based on the asset and housing facilities indices.[23]

Regarding religion, most 17 respondents were Muslim, 2 were Catholic and 1 Protestant. Interestingly, one of the respondents indicated for the reason to divorce her husband that he had changed his religion. However, religion is unrelated to the treatment received at LRC-KJHAM.

Generally, women who turn to LRC-KJHAM are women who are in a high need of solving their problems. Usually, the economic factor is the main obstacle to deal with domestic violence problems. This is not the case in this sample as almost all women worked. There are three main reasons that seemed to trigger the respondents in turning to LRC-KJHAM: firstly, they felt tired, anger, disgust, and not loving their husband anymore due to his behaviour; secondly, their spouses never provided them for a living; and third, their husband had an affair.

## 6.3. Life events during the evaluation period

Below changes in marital status, housing condition and employment are summarized. Other positive and negative life events will be discussed in section 8 in more detail.

### *Marital status*

In Annex III, Table 13 reports on the changes in the marital status of respondents between the baseline and endline. From the 11 married respondents at the baseline, 3 got divorced and 2 got separated during the evaluation period, while 6 remained married to their husband. From 5 divorced respondents at the baseline, 2 has remarried by the endline, and from 4 separated respondents at the baseline, 2 got divorced and one of these also got married. Hence, in total 9 of 20 respondents changed their marital status during the evaluation period but only 4 got divorced. Two divorced respondents married a new husband who has been treating her better. One of the respondents confessed that "*My current husband is nice and gentle. His face is and body are sturdy but his heart is warm."*

However, one respondent re-married her abusive ex-husband due to the insistence of her daughter and the advice of the Ustad (religious leader) despite her statement *"I actually felt reluctant to get back together because I was still afraid of him".*

### *Housing situation*

Table 15 reports on the housing situation of the respondents. At the baseline, only 5 respondents lived in the same house as their husband, while this number is 8 at the endline including the newly married respondents. Most but not all respondents (14 out of 18) who had children actually lived with their children at the baseline, while this number was 13 at the endline.

[23] The asset and housing facilities indices are standardized at zero (mean) for the average Indonesian household based on the DHS 2012 and IFLS 2007 surveys, respectively. The asset index is also standardized to have 1 standard deviation.

### *Employment*

Table 16 reports on the changes in employment during the evaluation period. The table shows that quite some respondents changed their employment during the evaluation period. Most changes are improvements, for example from factory employees to running their own business. Only one respondent stated that she got a worse job.

In addition, 2 respondents stopped working after re-marrying as their new husbands did not allow them to work. *"I am not allowed to work, but I'm only allowed to help my husband's job", "My husband prohibits me to work. I only have to take care of him and his grandchild."*

One respondent who did not work during the evaluation period stated that "*I have already divorced but I receive allowance from my ex-husband every month, as mentioned during the divorce process. I spend it to fulfil my daily needs and I can still save some for savings."* However, her case is exceptional. She still lives in the same house with her ex-husband and their relationship has improved after the divorce.[24]

## 7. Evaluation question 1: Change in outcomes

This section discusses evaluation question 1: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period? The changes in the outcome indicators for the period measured at the base-, mid- and endline surveys are grouped into four categories: exposure to domestic violence, psychological health, women's empowerment (attitude towards themselves), and empowerment in marriage. All outcome indicators are based on self-reported measurement tools.

Table 5 to Table 9 display the results for all outcome indicators for the total sample (n=20) as well as for the women who used the services of LRC-KJHAM since the baseline (n=7). For the baseline (2012), midline (2013) and endline (2014), either the mean of the outcome indices or the number of respondents in the categories are reported. In the first case, the standard deviation of the indicators is displayed below the means in parentheses. In addition, the changes between the surveys are reported by the changes in means or the change (increase or decrease) in number of respondents in the category. The significance of the change is only tested for the change in means. The standard deviation of the change is displayed below the means in brackets. The significance of the change from zero is denoted by stars, with '*' denoting that the change is significant at 10% significance level, '**' for 5% significance level and '***' for 1% significance level.

The following subsections discuss the levels of and changes in the outcome indicators. More information on how the indicators were constructed can be found in Annex II.

### *Exposure to domestic violence*

Table 5 reports on the respondents' experiences of domestic abuse during the past 12 months by physical, psychological and sexual abuse. The number of respondents who experienced the specified type of abuse during the past 12 months is shown in the table. In addition, the mean of the index indicating the number of types of abuse by the husband or partner is provided, as well as the change in

[24] One of the reason for divorce was that the husband has changed his religion.

this indicator between the indicated periods. Further details regarding the changes in exposure to domestic abuse are reported in Table 17 to Table 19 in Annex IV.

**Table 5: Experiences of domestic abuse**

| Period | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2013-2012 | | 2014-2013 | | 2014-2012 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Increase | Decrease | Increase | Decrease | Increase | Decrease |
| **Total sample** | | | | | | | | | |
| **Sample size** | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | | 20 | | 20 | |
| **Abused by husband/ partner in past 12 months** | | | | | | | | | |
| - *Any abuse* | 15 | 12 | 5 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 10 |
| - *Physical* | 9 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 9 |
| - *Psychological* | 15 | 12 | 5 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 10 |
| - *Sexual* | 5 | 8 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 1 | 5 |
| **Nr. of types of abuse by husband/partner (0-3)** | 1.45 (1.10) | 1.10 (1.07) | 0.30 (0.57) | -0.35 (1.14) | | -0.80*** (0.83) | | -1.15*** (1.27) | |
| **Used LRC-KJHAM since baseline** | | | | | | | | | |
| **Sample size** | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | | 7 | | 7 | |
| **Abused by husband/ partner in past 12 months** | | | | | | | | | |
| - *Any abuse* | 6 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 4 |
| - *Physical* | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| - *Psychological* | 6 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 4 |
| - *Sexual* | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| **Nr. of types of abuse by husband/partner** | 1.43 (0.98) | 1.00 (1.15) | 0.29 (0.49) | -0.43 (0.79) | | -0.71* (0.95) | | -1.14** (1.07) | |

Source: Respondent survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Note: Standard deviations given in parentheses. * p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value <0.01

In 2012 (baseline) 15 out of 20 women reported to have been exposed to at least one form of domestic violence in the past year; 6 out of the 7 women who used LRC-KJHAM since the baseline experienced any form of abuse. The most frequently reported type of violence is psychological (15 of 20). Between 2012 and 2013, as well as between 2013 and 2014, we see a decrease in the number of women that experienced abuse by her husband/partner. Between 2012 and 2013, the improvement was mostly in terms of the reduction in the exposure to physical abuse (2 respondents), while psychological abuse did not subside substantially (12 respondents), and in fact, sexual abuse increased (8 respondents). 7 of 12 married respondents experienced sexual abuse at the midline. Table 18 shows that, during the first year of the evaluation period, 5 respondents' situation has worsened (above the diagonal), 6 respondents' situation improved (below diagonal, left) and 3 respondents' situation changed only slightly (below diagonal, right).

The improvement during the second year of the evaluation (2013-2014) was more pronounced. Remarkably, none of the women experienced physical abuse between 2013 and 2014. However, 5 women from the total sample still experienced psychological abuse during this period. Of them, 2 were still married, while 2 got divorced and 1 got separated between 2013 and 2014. In addition, one of the woman who got divorced during this period reported to be sexually abused between 2013 and 2014. Despite her divorce, she still regularly sleeps over at her ex-husband's house as her children stayed with her husband.

Overall, the exposure to domestic abuse decreased significantly during the evaluation period both in terms of the number of women experiencing abuse and the severity of the abuse. In some cases the improvement is due to divorce. Albeit divorce and separation allows a greater distance from the abusive (ex-) husband, it is not a guarantee for the termination of abuse. In most cases women endure psychological abuse for the sake of their children even after the divorce, especially if children stay in the father's house.

We also observe that women take long to decide on divorcing their husband and it is often triggered by the escalation of abuse. Out of the 6 respondents who were married at the midline and got separated (4) or divorced (2) at the endline, 5 experienced psychological abuse both at the baseline and midline, and 4 experienced sexual abuse at the midline (2 also at baseline). On the other hand, out of 5 respondents who did not get divorced or separated during the evaluation period, 3 experienced psychological abuse and 2 experienced sexual abuse in 2012 and 2013, but only one of them was still abused by her husband in 2014. She confessed that she did not consider divorce saying "*If my husband stays in my house I consider him my husband, but if he stays outside I do not consider him as my husband. It is an effort to calm my mind."*

Reporting on domestic abuse assumes that women are always aware that they are being abused by their husband. However, the first step to break the cycle of domestic abuse is the realisation that one is being abused. Therefore, it is of interest to report on how the respondents were being treated by their husband/partner. Seven abusive traits and four supportive traits are reported in Table 21, where the number of respondents who reported a certain trait about their husband is reported.

In Table 6 the domestic life of the respondents is summarized by the mean number of negative (out of 7) and positive (out of 4) traits.[25] The results in the table indicate that the number of negative traits of their (ex-) husband, such as controlling what the respondent does, significantly decreased during the evaluation period (by -1.5 traits out of 7). Hence, the autonomy of the respondents increased during the evaluation period. However, no significant improvement can be found in the supportive attitude of the (ex-) husband.

[25] Please note that at the endline survey the questions were asked for respondents that keep in touch at least once per month with their (ex)husband, and if the respondent has a new partner the questions refer to the new partner.

**Table 6: Relationship with current/last husband/partner**

| Period | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2012-2013 | 2013-2014 | 2012-2014 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Total sample** | | | | | | |
| **Sample size** | 20 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 16 | 17 |
| Negative (abusive) (0-7) | 3.90 | 3.00 | 2.18 | -0.71 | -0.88 | -1.47** |
| | (1.86) | (2.26) | (2.19) | (2.39) | (2.36) | (2.85) |
| Positive (supportive)(0-4) | 1.65 | 1.53 | 2.06 | -0.35 | 0.63 | 0.12 |
| | (1.53) | (1.77) | (1.64) | (1.90) | (1.71) | (1.58) |
| **Used LRC-KJHAM since baseline** | | | | | | |
| **Sample size** | 7 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 6 |
| Negative (abusive) (0-7) | 4.00 | 3.00 | 1.67 | -0.83 | -1.33 | -2.17 |
| | (2.00) | (2.45) | (1.75) | (2.32) | (3.01) | (3.06) |
| Positive (supportive)(0-4) | 2.14 | 2.17 | 2.33 | -0.33 | 0.17 | -0.17 |
| | (1.77) | (1.83) | (1.86) | (1.97) | (2.04) | (1.47) |

Source: Respondent survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Note: Standard deviations given in parentheses. * p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value <0.01

### *Psychological health*

Table 7 reports on the psychological health of women measured with the psychological distress index based on GHQ-12. The psychological distress index is composed of three sub-indices: social dysfunction, anxiety and lack of confidence in oneself. The more psychological distress a woman had experienced in the past one month, the more components of an index were applicable to a woman, and hence, the higher the value of an index. The outcomes of the components included in the indices are provided in Table 21 and Table 22.

Data indicate that at the baseline (2012), most respondents experienced anxiety (2.4 out of 4) and loss of confidence (1.3 out of 2) but they were mostly able to enjoy their daily (social) activities (1.1 out of 6). On average, respondents regularly experienced 4.8 out of the 12 distress feelings.

During the evaluation period, we observe a significant improvement in the psychological well-being of the respondents in all 3 sub-indicators, with the improvements mainly occurring between the baseline (2012) and midline (2013) periods. We observe the most improvement in terms of confidence (-0.6 out of 2) including respondents not feeling depressed anymore (from 14 to 4); and in terms of anxiety (-0.8 out of 4) as most respondents do not feel under strain (from 13 to 2) and think themselves as worthless (from 11 to 5) anymore (Table 22). In addition, respondents became more able to enjoy their lives (social dysfunction changed by -0.7 out of 6) due to being more able to concentrate on things and feeling happier in general (Table 21).

However, most respondents were still struggling to overcome their emotional problems (16 at endline) due to the lingering effects of the abuse (or continued abuse) by their (ex-) husband. In addition, after a temporary improvement at the baseline, respondents still often lost confidence in themselves at the endline (10 respondents). This could potentially be due to new challenges in life such as providing for themselves and their children.

For the women who still used the services of LRC-KJHAM, no significant improvement in the indices are seen (except for Losing confidence in yourself 2013-2012), but the decreases in the indices are similar to the ones for the total sample. In addition, obtaining a significant difference is more difficult due to the lower sample size.

As discussed above, the exposure to domestic violence decreased most significantly between the midline and the endline (2013-2014). However, psychological distress most significantly decreased between the baseline and the midline (2012-2013). Independent of the abuse experienced at the baseline, we observe a general improvement (by 2.35 out of 12 on average) in the psychological well-being of the respondents between 2012 and 2013. The correlation between the number of types of abuses experienced between 2012 and 2013 and the change in the GHQ-12 index during the same period (2012-2013) is moderate (0.24),[26] while the correlation is quite high with the value of the GHQ-12 at the midline (0.74) and even for the endline (0.52).

These figures suggest that the improvement in psychological well-being between 2012 and 2013 is mostly unrelated to the exposure to domestic abuse. A more plausible explanation would be that respondents reached out to seek help for their problems and the support received from their social network and other organisations have helped them to redeem their self-esteem and confidence. For example, 5 of 16 respondents mentioned that they participate in more religious activities.

However, the respondents' who experienced (sexual) abuse at the midline had a 2.5 (1.5) worse score on GHQ-12 at midline compared respondents who were not abused (were 'only' psychologically abused) at the midline. As sexual abuse at midline had a reasonable prediction for being abused at the endline (correlation of 0.47), the difference also persists at the endline (1.9 and 0.9 respectively). As one respondent who was sexually abused by her husband stated "*During this year I often get headaches, colds, can't work for a long time, tired, and my husband is rude and often yelling.*"

[26] The correlation between the number of types of abuses experienced before the baseline and the change in the GHQ-12 index between 2012 and 2013 is even lower at -0.07.

**Table 7: Self-reported psychological health of women**

| Period | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2013-2012 | 2014-2013 | 2014-2012 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Total sample** | | | | | | |
| **Sample size** | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 |
| Psychological distress index (0-12) | 4.80<br>(2.35) | 2.45<br>(1.88) | 2.70<br>(1.84) | -2.35***<br>(2.64) | 0.25<br>(1.83) | -2.10***<br>(2.95) |
| Social dysfunction index (0-6) | 1.10<br>(1.17) | 0.25<br>(0.72) | 0.40<br>(0.99) | -0.85***<br>(1.04) | 0.15<br>(0.67) | -0.70**<br>(1.22) |
| Anxiety index (0-4) | 2.40<br>(1.10) | 1.65<br>(1.14) | 1.60<br>(1.10) | -0.75**<br>(1.48) | -0.05<br>(1.00) | -0.80**<br>(1.54) |
| Losing confidence in yourself index (0-2) | 1.30<br>(0.80) | 0.55<br>(0.69) | 0.70<br>(0.80) | -0.75***<br>(0.79) | 0.15<br>(0.81) | -0.60**<br>(1.19) |
| **Used LRC-KJHAM since baseline** | | | | | | |
| **Sample size** | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| Psychological distress (0-12) | 4.71<br>(2.43) | 2.71<br>(2.21) | 2.57<br>(2.23) | -2.00<br>(3.51) | -0.14<br>(1.57) | -2.14<br>(2.97) |
| Social dysfunction (0-6) | 1.00<br>(1.15) | 0.57<br>(1.13) | 0.57<br>(1.51) | -0.43<br>(0.79) | 0.00<br>(0.58) | -0.43<br>(0.98) |
| Anxiety (0-4) | 2.43<br>(1.27) | 1.57<br>(1.40) | 1.43<br>(1.40) | -0.86<br>(1.95) | -0.14<br>(0.69) | -1.00<br>(1.63) |
| Losing confidence in yourself (0-2) | 1.29<br>(0.95) | 0.57<br>(0.79) | 0.57<br>(0.79) | -0.71*<br>(0.95) | 0.00<br>(0.82) | -0.71<br>(1.11) |

Source: Respondent survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. * p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value <0.01

### *Women's attitude towards themselves*

Women's empowerment with respect to their self-image is measured by three indices and two indicators between the baseline (2012) and the endline (2014),[27] as shown in Table 8. The indices range from -2 to +2, where -2 indicates a negative outcome and +2 indicates a positive outcome. Hence, the higher the value of the index/indicator, the more empowered the women feel. The impact on the components of the indices is provided in Table 23.

At the baseline, all outcome indicators show a positive value, hence on average women have an average to medium empowerment/self-image. The support index shows the highest level (1.3), indicating that most of the women have someone who listens when they need to talk about their problems. The women still using LRC-KJHAM services show lower levels of empowerment with regard to the control index, higher levels of empowerment with regard to the dependency indicator and similar levels of empowerment with regard to the other indicators.

During the evaluation period, we generally observe a small increase in the indices except for support. However, the only significant improvement is in the self-esteem index (by 0.5) for both the total sample and the women who used the services of LRC-KJHAM. The respondents' self-esteem increased in terms

[27] These indicators were not measured at the midline.

of having more things to feel proud of and being more satisfied with themselves (Table 23). This finding is line with the decrease in anxiety and increase in confidence found for the psychological distress index.

**Table 8: Women's attitudes towards themselves (empowerment)**

| Period | 2012 | 2014 | 2012-2014 |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Total sample** | | | |
| **Sample size** | 20 | 20 | 20 |
| Self-efficacy index (-2 to +2) | 0.65 (0.63) | 0.82 (0.67) | 0.17 (0.69) |
| Self-esteem index (-2 to +2) | 0.10 (0.45) | 0.56 (0.41) | 0.46*** (0.53) |
| Control index (-2 to +2) | 0.20 (0.82) | 0.38 (0.81) | 0.17 (1.20) |
| Dependency (-2 to +2) | 0.20 (1.40) | 0.60 (1.27) | 0.40 (1.54) |
| Support (-2 to +2) | 1.30 (0.47) | 1.20 (0.89) | -0.10 (0.97) |
| **Used LRC-KJHAM since baseline** | | | |
| **Sample size** | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| Self-efficacy index (-2 to +2) | 0.57 (0.61) | 0.50 (0.50) | -0.07 (0.73) |
| Self-esteem index (-2 to +2) | 0.04 (0.55) | 0.54 (0.27) | 0.50** (0.52) |
| Control index (-2 to +2) | -0.36 (0.90) | 0.43 (0.84) | 0.79 (1.22) |
| Dependency (-2 to +2) | 0.57 (1.51) | 0.71 (1.25) | 0.14 (1.57) |
| Support (-2 to +2) | 1.29 (0.49) | 1.43 (0.53) | 0.14 (0.69) |

Source: Respondent survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. * p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

### *Empowerment in marriage*

Table 9 reports the respondents' attitude towards their rights in marriage at the baseline (2012), midline (2013) and endline (2014). The rights of wife index indicates respondents' (assumed) autonomy in the marriage and it is measured by the average number of traits indicating autonomy that the respondents agree with (see Annex II for further details).[28] The table also reports on the number of women who agree with any reason for a husband to hit his wife and the number of women who agree with any occasion for a wife to refuse sex. Table 24 and Table 25 in Annex IV report on the components of the indicators.

[28] The rights of wife index was only measured at the baseline (2012) and endline (2014).

**Table 9: Empowerment in marriage**

| Period | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2013-2012 | | 2014-2012 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Increase | Decrease | Increase | Decrease |
| **Total sample** | | | | | | | |
| **Sample size** | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | | 20 | |
| Rights of wife index (0-9) | 5.80 (1.79) | | 5.35 (1.46) | | | -0.45 (1.67) | |
| *Any good reason for a husband to hit his wife* | 5 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| Nr. of good reasons for a husband to hit his wife (0-6) | 0.50 (1.00) | 0.45 (0.76) | 0.35 (0.81) | -0.05 (1.10) | | -0.15 (1.14) | |
| *Any occasion a wife can refuse to have sex* | 19 | 19 | 20 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Nr. of occasions a wife can refuse to have sex (0-3) | 2.25 (0.85) | 2.05 (0.83) | 2.25 (0.64) | -0.20 (0.95) | | 0.00 (1.12) | |
| **Used LRC-KJHAM since baseline** | | | | | | | |
| **Sample size** | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | | 7 | |
| Rights of wife index (0-9) | 6.00 (1.73) | | 5.14 (0.90) | | | -0.86 (1.35) | |
| *Any good reason for a husband to hit his wife* | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Nr. of good reasons for a husband to hit his wife (0-6) | 0.29 (0.76) | 0.86 (1.07) | 0.14 (0.38) | 0.57 (0.98) | | -0.14 (0.90) | |
| *Any occasion a wife can refuse to have sex* | 7 | 7 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Nr. of occasions a wife can refuse to have sex (0-3) | 2.57 (0.53) | 2.29 (0.76) | 2.14 (0.69) | -0.29 (0.95) | | -0.43 (0.98) | |

Source: Respondent survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. * p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

Almost all women agree with most occasions a wife can refuse to have sex. 15 out of 20 women find that none of the reported reasons are good enough reasons for a husband to hit his wife. The rights of wife index is in the upper halve of total scale of the index, meaning that women regard themselves to have medium levels of autonomy in their marriage. No significant change is found between the years on any of these indicators.

Even though not significant, we see a small decrease in the rights of wife index, indicating that the women feel that they had less rights in their marriage at the endline than at the baseline. These findings can be explained by the changes in the components. There we see a significant decrease in the fraction of women who think that 'a woman should be able to choose her own friends even if her husband disapproves' and in the fraction of women who think that 'woman should be allowed to have a full or part-time job outside the household even if her husband disapproves'. However, there was a significant increase in the fraction of women who disagree that 'it is a wife's obligation to have sex with her husband even if she does not feel like it'. These findings are found for the total sample as well as for the women who used the services of LRC-KJHAM.

***Summary***

Overall, the data show significant positive developments in the outcome indicators: 10 respondents became free of domestic abuse, and the extent of abuse significantly decreased for all except 1 respondent. In addition, the self-esteem and psychological well-being of the respondents had significantly increased during the evaluation period.

However, from all the indicators for empowerment, only the self-esteem index significantly improved. The indicators on women's empowerment in marriage were moderately high but some respondents still believed that a husband is justified to hit his wife if she disobeyed him (4) or neglected the children (2).

# 8. Evaluation question 2: Attribution of changes

This subsection discusses evaluation question 2: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?

## 8.1. Methodology

The evaluation of the LRC-KJHAM project relies on a before-after comparison methodology. This means that we interviewed respondents at certain periods and evaluate how their situation changes over time. Due to the specific nature of the project and ethical reasons, no other method was possible. The difficulty of this approach is that we cannot be sure whether the changes (see evaluation question 1) occurred as a consequence of the project or due to other factors. Therefore, we have to use a Theory of Change (ToC) for the project and investigate whether the changes can be explained by this ToC or by alternative pathways. Qualitative analysis helps to disentangle the pathways.

The ToC or result chain for the LRC-KJHAM project was discussed in detail in section 3.2. Here, we summarize the ToC for the counselling and legal assistance services of LRC-KJHAM. It is hypothesised that providing psychological counselling and legal assistance will empower marginalised women by providing information about their rights. This will enable them to make informed decisions about their household situation (divorce, separation or staying with husband) and change their attitude and behaviour towards themselves and their husband, and, finally, improve their psychological health condition. If needed, the legal assistance provided by LRC-KJHAM enables abused women to take legal action against their abusers (in this case their husband), and break the cycle of abuse (by a divorce). All clients of LRC-KJHAM are also invited to join a support group, where survivors of abuse come together for learning and supporting cases of other abused women. This empowers women to become survivors of gender-based and/or domestic violence.

Hence, the outcome indicators of the project are related to women being free from abuse, female empowerment, psychological well-being (psychological health) and the behaviour of abused women. However, it is important to keep in mind that a number of alternative pathways or ToCs could also lead to improvement in these outcomes. For example,

- Women may have sought help elsewhere. If the client already knew about her right to divorce her husband and got divorced with the help of a lawyer, the change in the outcome indicators is not driven by the services of LRC-KJHAM
- She may have moved out of the house of her husband and she is not interacting with the husband anymore.
- Change in the outcome indicator on psychological well-being and empowerment can be originated in other aspects of the women's life than her relationship to her (last) husband. For example, she may have better living or working conditions; or she might suffer from the loss of a close family member.
- Change in the outcome indicator on psychological well-being and empowerment can be also explained by time. If she is not abused anymore, her psychological condition might improve due to new life experiences.

There are numerous other possible explanations for the change in the outcome indicators. In order to find out what share of the change in the outcome indicators can be attributed to the proposed ToC or LRC-KJHAM's services, at the end of the follow-up interview with the respondents, we allowed for open-ended discussion regarding the factors that influenced their lives since the baseline interview.[29] This self-reported information will be used to provide a qualitative explanation of the factors driving the changes and whether these changes can be attributed to the services received at LRC-KJHAM or to alternative pathways. The following section summarizes our findings.

## 8.2. Results

In section 7, we observed that self-esteem and confidence of the respondents increased during the first year of the evaluation period, and these cannot be explained by the exposure to domestic abuse even though the exposure to domestic violence affects the levels of these indicators. We also observed that the prevalence and intensity of domestic abuse decreased significantly during the evaluation period, particularly during the second year, both for married and divorced or separated respondents. However, whether respondents remained with their husband or left the household (divorced or separated) was largely dependent on whether the situation with the husband improved or got worse.

In this section, we try to identify the factors that contributed to these outcomes. We start by investigating the sources of help seeking (social network, LRC-KJHAM and other organisations), and then discuss other life events. In turn, we look at factors affecting the lives of respondents after the divorce, and the overall changes in their lives. We conclude this section by providing an ex-post Theory of Change based on the findings.

[29] The qualitative discussion focused on the following groups of questions: 1. Do you think you have changed since last interview? How? What are the sources/causes that made you change?; 2. We have discussed a lot of things. What were the most important sources of help for you to overcome the abuse in your marriage? Who helped you the most? And in what way? (These could be psychological, legal, economic, social etc. aspects or just time); 3. ONLY IF DIVORCED: How did your situation change after the divorce? (Emotional, family, social, economic aspects. The developments could both be positive or negative.) Why? Did you change? In what ways?

### *Sources of help seeking*

**Social network**

Respondents most often confessed their abusive household situation to their close friends (18 respondents at baseline, see Table 27 in Annex V). Close friends are considered the best place to share feelings and keep secrets. As stated by one respondent who trusted her colleague to tell about her problems "*I have a close friend whom I can trust, and I feel comfortable to share my marital problem."* Most respondents continued to share their household problems with their friends also after the baseline (13 respondents at midline).

Interestingly, the family of the husband was the second most used place to complain, represented by 14 respondents at the baseline. Subsequently, 11 respondents sought help from their siblings and 10 respondents from their parents. After the midline, respondents continued to rely on the support of their own family (9 respondents on siblings and 8 on parents at midline) but not anymore on the family of the husband (only 5 respondents at baseline). This can be explained by the divorced or separated status of the respondents.

The support from the respondents' family can take different forms: they may support her financially, by taking care of the children or even during the divorce. As one of respondent said *"My brother and parents supported me when I was going to report my husband to the police. They also helped me to prepare the divorce process."* However, respondents most often receive moral support and advices from their family (7 of 16 respondents). Only one respondent mentioned explicitly that her parents are taking care of her children so that she can work.

As mentioned before, 18 respondents have children. But most respondents did not tell their situation to their children because they did not want them to feel sad for their mother and as one respondent stated "*I don't want to burden them and they blame their father.*" Only 6 respondents confided in their children. However, it is great relief for the respondents if their children accept the situation and support their mother.

**Police**

Table 28 reports on the institutions where the respondents reported the abuse of their husband. The table shows that the police station was the first and most preferred place to report and ask for help when respondents experienced violence from their partner. Half of the respondents turned to the police for help before the baseline survey. Seeking help at police means respondents could not tolerate the abuse anymore for their own, as well as their family members' sake. The data shows that only 5 of 10 respondents who experienced physical or sexual abuse reported their husband to the police, and 3 of 10 respondents reporting their husband to the police did not experience any psychological or other types of abuse. As one respondent who reported her husband to the police said "*My husband got married to another woman when his status was still married to me."* Another respondent mentioned that "*I reported him [to the police] because he hit and kicked me that my mouth bled, and my stomach and shoulders hurt*". Hence, respondents turned to the police with very different cases. Nonetheless, from the 10 respondents reporting their case to the police, 6 got divorced from their abusive husband by the

endline. Whether respondents chose to get divorced seemed to be independent of the abuse they have reported in the baseline survey.

At the midline, 3 other respondents requested assistance from the police. These respondents have not yet reported their husbands at the baseline even though all of them experienced continued psychological abuse, and 2 of them experienced sexual and physical abuse as well. By the endline only 1 of them was divorced, while the other two were still married.

At the endline, none of the respondents reported their case to the police as they experienced less abuse during this period.

**Other organisations**

In addition to reporting to the police, 4 respondents reported their case at a hospital or health centre at the baseline, while 5 respondents sought help at community leaders (Table 28). In addition, 6 respondents reported their husband at the court and 3 turned for help at legal institutions. At the midline, 2 respondents turned to legal institutions for help and 3 turned to the community leader.

**Litigation**

Turing to the legal actions taken by the respondents, Table 29 summarizes actions taken by the respondent to resolve the abusive marital situation: reporting to the police, litigation procedure, divorce (this is a subcategory of litigation procedures) and mediation. The table explicitly indicates how many of these cases where assisted by LRC-KJHAM in order to see whether LRC-KJHAM played a useful part in the (legal) processes related to the marital situation of the respondents.

In general, respondents needed assistance to settle their marital issues. They decided to do so because they no longer felt comfortable with their situation and hoped to get through it as soon as possible. However, they thought carefully about divorce before starting the procedure. For example as stated by one respondent *"It is my decision to divorce my husband. My husband confessed that he married [by religion] to his colleague."* Another respondent who decided to divorce her husband said that "*I had a husband but he never gave me any money to fulfil our household needs, even I lost some of my savings. When I have no husband, I feel more secure when I work to earn money for the children."*

Table 29 shows that 4 respondents already started the litigation procedure before the baseline and 3 of them were assisted by LRC-KJHAM. At the midline, 2 of these cases were still on-going and 6 other respondents were involved in a lawsuit regarding divorce. LRC-KJHAM assisted in 7 of the 8 cases, however, 3 respondents also relied on other source of assistance such as a lawyer. At the endline, 2 previous cases were still on-going and 4 respondents started the litigation procedure. LRC-KJHAM was not involved in the on-going cases, and only assisted in 2 of the new cases.

Overall, 15 of 20 respondents were involved in lawsuit regarding divorce until the endline with LRC-KJHAM assisting in 10 of these cases. However, not all of these have been finalized as only 7 respondents had divorced status and 3 remarried at the endline. For example, one case stopped in despair as stated by one respondent "*My lawyer died and he had all of my documents and I don't have*

*their copies. I was so upset and I was too desperate to start my case all over again.*" Another respondent said that "*Because of missing my children, I called off the process of divorce."*

**LRC-KJHAM**

The roles of LRC-KJHAM is very important for the women victims to provide assistance, especially during the litigation process. As discussed above, LRC-KJHAM assisted in 10 of 15 litigation cases but it also provided support to respondents who did not want to divorce. Most respondents visited LRC-KJHAM 2-4 times (12) or more (5), and only 3 respondents visited only once, which shows the usefulness of LRC-KJHAM for the respondents who returned.

However, not all respondents were assisted by LRC-KJHAM in their litigation procedure. 5 women got assisted by other institutions/law firms or choose to file a divorce without any help, and 3 respondents being assisted by LRC-KJHAM also relied on other sources. In general, women who can afford to pay for law firm services usually go to these institutions since these institutions are quicker. As one respondent stated "*I came to LRC-KJHAM and I was welcomed nicely. I was asked to tell my problem, fill my data. After that, I didn't come again because it took my time so long."*

Generally, women who ask for help from LRC-KJHAM really need help so their problem can be solved. Economic factor is seen to be a major obstacle for them as they do not have the money for consultations and representing them in court. They are only able to provide for their and their children's living costs. LRC-KJHAM offers to help them for free until the case is closed. But the women have to be patient due to more interviews to collect information and the limited capacities of LRC-KJHAM. One respondent said that "*We need to be patient if we ask for a help in LRC-KJHAM. Survivor partners [paralegals] are really helpful, so I can be ready solving my problem*." According to the respondents, the staff of LRC-KJHAM is patient and friendly and they really defended domestic violence victims. Participants also got counselling service and they were taught how to make incident chronology, how to prepare a letter for the court, and the steps of the lawsuit. The knowledge and moral support received from the survivors working at LRC-KJHAM provided strength for the respondents in solving their problems at court or in the household. As one respondent said *"The guidance done by KJHAM is only out of the court, I have never been in business with a judge, I am afraid I say the wrong answers"*.

All women were also offered to join one of the support groups of LRC-KJHAM. 5 of 20 respondents remained members of the support group during the evaluation period. They stated that they felt more empowered as they got the courage to stand up for themselves. As one respondent stated "*By meeting up with other members regularly, we can share our experiences. It can make us self-confident and brave. I realize that there are women who have heavier burden compared to mine.*"

However, many respondents said that they found it an obstacle to go to LRC-KJHAM and participating in the support group because LRC-KJHAM is too far for them and they do not have the time to go due to their work. Besides, the activities of the support group are organised during the working hours, which makes it difficult for the women to attend as almost all of them have working duties. For example, one respondent said that "*I really want to gather and add my experience, but I don't have time. I have to meet my company selling target."* Another respondent who remarried said that "*My husband doesn't*

*permit me to join the support group. Actually, I still have a will to come so that I can meet other members."*

### *Other life events*

Table 26 summarizes the type of positive and negative life events that happened to the respondents since the baseline interview. The table shows that many positive and also negative events happened to the respondents during the evaluation period. The most positive changes are related to their jobs, with 7 and 11 respondents reporting positive changes in 2013 and 2014, respectively, while 2 and 3 respondents experienced negative changes in their employment conditions. Nonetheless, several respondents experienced negative economic shocks, especially between 2013 and 2014.

Regarding family life, 9 respondents reported positive changes in 2013, and 10 in 2014. These respondents mentioned that they became more peaceful, had more time to spend with children and grandchildren, and already had a job. They felt psychologically stable and they were able to fulfil their daily needs. As stated by one respondent *"I have become independent and no more counting on my parent in-law to fulfil my daily needs. I have my own kitchen. I also join Support group activities that make me feel calm, have more friends, and more knowledge."*

However, 5 respondents reported negative changes in family life in 2013, and 7 in 2014, such as their husbands were still temperamental and took money from her, parent in-law often intervened in their household affair, and her husband took the children to his parent's house. One respondent regretted to have re-married with her husband who conducted violence. As stated by respondent *"I had no other choice than re-marrying my ex-husband for the sake of the children. He was rude and threatened to hurt the children if we leave him."* Six respondents reported that they have suffered from illness, sadness, accident, even parent's illness and death. As described by one of respondent "*I have been suffered from headache, cold, easily get tired since the past one year. My husband always snaps at me and is always rude to me.*"

In 2014, 6 respondents reported positive changes in their social life such as social activities with their friends. For example, a respondent who got divorced said "*I love my recent job and have many friends."*

4 out of 7 respondents who still visited LRC-KJHAM reported positive changes in economic and family life in 2013. One of the respondents stated that she *"has accepted her condition, more relax in facing problems, more patient, and has more income than her husband."* On the other hand, 3 respondents who are still visiting LRC-KJHAM reported negative life due to illness. 2 respondents reported positive changes in marriage life and 2 reported negative changes.

### *Overall changes*

On the one hand, respondents who remained married reported at the endline that they were trying to accept the household condition and be more patient. Some respondents who separated from their husband felt more relaxed and moved towards divorce, while others were struggling to make ends meet and get detached from the past due to unsettled family conditions. For example, one respondent said that *"As time goes by, I'm able to arrange my life and work to meet my needs and my child's, therefore my husband will not underestimate me as a woman."*

On the other hand, all respondents who got divorced felt more relaxed and patient with their health improving.[30] One respondent said that she was "*trying to be strong and tough for the children*" as she had now the responsibility to provide for her children and herself. Two respondents also quickly found a new husband who has been treating them well, while a few other respondents also found new boyfriends and their social life improved. Hence, most of the divorced respondents have moved on with their lives and become more relaxed and free of abuse.

### *Attribution*

The qualitative data show that the respondents who turned to LRC-KJHAM not only received legal assistance but also moral support and counselling from survivors of LRC-KJHAM who have experience with their situations. This contributed to improving the respondents' self-esteem and confidence, especially for women who were members of the support group.

Through assisting in the divorce, LRC-KJHAM directly contributed to breaking the cycle of abuse when the women were ready to make this step. Hence, LRC-KJHAM assisted women in carrying out their resolution and informed them about their options and the procedure. Despite the stigma of divorced women in Indonesian culture, respondents who got divorced felt more relieved and relaxed, and managed to find new friends and companions.

However, LRC-KJHAM was not the only source of help. Respondents also confided in their close friends and looked to them for moral support. Support and advice from parents and siblings was also an important factor in dealing with their household problems. Some respondents also got engaged in religious activities to ease their mind.

Nonetheless, the everyday life of respondents has been governed by work and earning a living to provide for themselves and their children, especially after a divorce. Several respondents achieved successes in obtaining a better job or starting their own business.

Overall, we find that LRC-KJHAM is an important source of help for escaping the abusive situation, especially for women who cannot lean on support from their family and who have the time to go to LRC-KJHAM. Respondents felt that LRC-KJHAM really supported victims of domestic violence. However, it was the close friends and family that send most of the respondents to LRC-KJHAM and provided continuous support for the women through their everyday life.

## 9. Evaluation question 3: Relevance of changes

This subsection will answer evaluation question 3: What is the relevance of these changes? In particular, we look at the size of the impact, whether the project addresses an important issue for the beneficiaries, and the satisfaction of beneficiaries (self-reported impact).

### 9.1. The size of the impact

The results show that most women got free of domestic violence and increased their autonomy either through divorce or separation or because the husband was not as abusive anymore, which translated

[30] An exception is the case of the respondent who remarried her abusive ex-husband on the request of her child.

into an 80% reduction in the number of types of abuse suffered by the respondents and a 38% reduction in the abusive traits of the (ex-) husbands towards their wives if they still communicated. But 5 respondents (25%) were still psychologically abused and one of them also sexually abused by her (ex-) husband. LRC-KJHAM contributed to these changes through the counselling and legal assistance provided for the respondents. However, the support from family and friends and successes in employment were just as important for the women to become more courageous and self-confident.

The psychological well-being of respondents improved by 44% during the evaluation period. This change is probably due to the encouragement received from these sources. However, respondents who experienced less abuse also suffered from less distress, and respondents who solved their cases and settled the divorce consistently reported to feel more relaxed and relieved.

We do not observe any significant changes in the empowerment of the respondents, except for a substantial increase in their self-esteem. No changes were found with respect to the attitude towards their rights in marriage.

The data show sizable reductions in domestic abuse and psychological distress. However, it is difficult to quantify the attribution of LRC-KJHAM in these changes.

## 9.2. Does the project address an important issue for the beneficiaries?

A first indication that LRC-KJHAM indeed addresses an important issue for the beneficiaries is that 85% of the respondents visited LRC-KJHAM more than once. As one respondent stated "*I visited LRC-KJHAM for about 10 times to have consultation for my divorce and my children's rights."* Also, most women agree that the support group activities were or would be very helpful for them. However, most women cannot participate in the support group (only 5 of 20 women were a member of the support group all through the evaluation period) due to the distance to the meeting and the time of the meeting (during working hours).

From the interviews it became clear that woman do need LRC-KJHAM services when filing for a divorce. They indicate the need to receive help and guidance before and during court since most woman do not have any experience at all in this area.

In addition, LRC-KJHAM is very valuable for respondents who cannot afford to hire a lawyer to handle their case. LRC-KJHAM offers free of charge services both for counselling and legal assistance until the case is closed.

## 9.3. Satisfaction of beneficiaries (self-reported impact)

A first indication to whether or not LRC-KJHAM contributed to the measured changes in a woman's exposure to violence, psychological health and improved self-esteem can found in the answer to the question: did you receive the kind of help you were looking for the first time you visited LRC-KJHAM? (Table 30 in Annex VI). 13 women indicated that this was indeed the case, 5 women indicated this was partly the case and 2 women indicated this was not the case, though 1 of these women did visit LRC-KJHAM more than once. In addition, the number of women visiting LRC-KJHAM decreased over time because many women settled their divorce and needed no more help. The respondents who found the

services of LRC-KJHAM useful, usually visited LRC-KJHAM 2-4 times before their case was finished, while support group members visited more often (Table 3).

To be able to tell more about the impact of LRC-KJHAM's services on the women, the self-reported impact was assessed as well. Regarding empowerment, women were asked how the services received at LRC-KJHAM have changed them on a number of occasions (e.g. 'I became more confident and brave') (see Table 31). The responses are indicated on a scale of -2 'Strongly disagree' to +2 'Strongly Agree'. The information was collected at the midline survey (2013). The results are very positive, which may be due to social norms in responding. Almost all women agree or strongly agree with every statement given, indicating that due to the services of LRC-KJHAM they consider themselves more empowered and are in a better psychological health condition. Especially the members of the support group show high results.

One statement in particular is given in the table below: 'I feel more emotionally stable and less stressed due to services of LRC-KJHAM'. On average, women responded positively to this statement: the average score is close to 0.8, meaning that most women agree, though not strongly agree, with feeling more emotionally stable and less stressed due to LRC-KJHAM. No difference in this score is found between the 2012 and 2013.

**Table 10: Service satisfaction and self-reported impact**

| Sample | Total sample | |
|---|---|---|
| **Sample size** | 13 | 20 |
| **Year** | 2012 | 2013 |
| Feel more emotionally stable and less stressed due to services of LRC-KJHAM (scale from -2 to +2) | 0.77<br>(0.60) | 0.75<br>(0.79) |

Source: Respondent survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses.

Table 32 in Annex VI reports the service satisfaction of the women with the services of LRC-KJHAM by service type (scale of -2 'Not satisfied at all' to 2 'very satisfied'). In general women had a neutral to satisfied opinion on the service quality for all four components (psychological counselling, legal advice, legal aid, support group). Especially the legal aid services score high (1.4). Due to the low sample size at the midline it is difficult to compare the service satisfaction rates between the years.

In conclusion, the women are quite satisfied with the services provided and indicate that these services had a positive effect on their psychological well-being.

## 10. Evaluation question 4: Efficiency of project

This subsection addresses evaluation question 4: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient?

Unfortunately, we are not able to evaluate neither the efficiency nor the effectiveness of the project. Therefore, in this section we put forward our arguments for failing to evaluate the question on efficiency. However, first, the available cost information for the LRC-KJHAM project is discussed below.

## 10.1. Project costs

To collect information on the costs of the project, we conducted a structured interview with the director, head of internal affairs and head of field operations[31] of LRC-KJHAM on 19 July 2013 using the 'budget survey' as described in section 5.1. In addition, we had correspondence with LRC-KJHAM in 2014 to obtain information about the new contract with Hivos. However, the contract of LRC-KJHAM and Hivos for 2013-2015 will not be taken into account in this section because the project activities differ from the evaluated project. The cost figures for the 2010-2012 period in this section are based on actual expenditure data.

Table 11 summarizes the available cost information for the LRC-KJHAM project. The contract period for the evaluated project ran between 1 October 2010 and 31 December 2012. Therefore, for 2010 we have separated the cost information for the contract period (Oct-Dec) and for the previous contract period (Jan-Sept). The total project costs reported by LRC-KJHAM to Hivos are reported in column 3 in the table in Indonesian rupiahs (IDR) and in euros in column 4 (using a yearly average exchange rate). Hivos funded the total project budget. Unfortunately, we do not have information about the share of costs used for providing counselling and legal aid services to victims of GBV, and other activities not evaluated in this report.

The total project costs for the contract period (1 October 2010 - 31 December 2012) were in total 1,127,831,300 IDR or 312,458.50 International dollars at 2011 prices.[32] Hence, 97% of the available project budget has been used.[33]

The total number of beneficiaries for the Hivos project is reported in column 6 of Table 11. These numbers include beneficiaries for all project activities, not only the beneficiaries of counselling and legal aid. In fact, in 2012, among the 1,288 beneficiaries, only 114 beneficiaries have been reached through the handling of cases of violence victims (including litigation), among which 49 cases were related to domestic violence. The majority of beneficiaries have been reached through the campaign against violence against women and the distribution of campaign materials (589 people).

[31] The interview was conducted with Fakthurozi, director of LRC-KJHAM, Helen Intania, head of internal affairs, and Eko Roesanto Fiaryanto, head of field operations.

[32] PPP conversion factor to 2011 international dollars is calculated using the World Development Indicators: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#.

[33] The project budget was 95,000 EUR or 1,168,500,000 IDR (using exchange rate of 12,300 IDR/EUR as in the contract between Hivos and LRC-KJHAM) for the period between 1 October 2010 – 31 December 2012.

**Table 11: Overview of the costs and number of beneficiaries**

| Year | Number of months | Total costs [IDR][1] | Total cost [EUR, current prices][2] | Percentage of costs funded by CFA | Beneficiaries (population) | Cost per beneficiary per year [Int$ 2011][3] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **2010 (Jan-Sept)** | 9 | 433,580,040 | 35,789.88 | 100% | 307 | N.A. |
| **2010 (Oct-Dec)** | 3 | 84,719,800 | 6,993.20 | 100% | 65 | N.A. |
| **2011** | 12 | 521,555,750 | 42,527.38 | 100% | 415 | N.A. |
| **2012** | 12 | 521,555,750 | 43,149.43 | 100% | 1,288 | N.A. |

Sources: Budget Survey 2013 and project documents.
Notes:
1. N.K.= Not known
2. Annual average exchange rate is used. Data is obtained from http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/
3. N.A.= not applicable

## 10.2. Assessment

There are a number of factors that complicate the calculation of cost per beneficiary. Firstly, the majority of costs of LRC-KJHAM related to psychological counselling, legal advice and legal aid to victims of GBV are fixed – at least in the medium term (like staff costs). As a consequence, if in a given period more clients turn for assistance at LRC-KJHAM, the cost per beneficiary decreases. However, as the nature of service provision, the number of clients (to some extent) is an external factor to LRC-KJHAM. In addition, the availability of the counselling and legal advice and aid services is valuable in itself.

Secondly, a high number of beneficiaries may show a large turn-over of clients. Hence, it would be more informative to look at the cost per hour for counselling and legal aid/advice. However, unfortunately, we do not have information on these.[34]

Thirdly, we lack information about the total costs associated with counselling and legal aid services. As discussed above, a large number of beneficiaries have been reached through other activities of LRC-KJHAM. Therefore, it is not sensible to calculate the cost per beneficiary based on the information displayed in Table 11.

Taking the above concerns into account, providing a reliable (and sensible) estimate of the cost per beneficiary for the LRC-KJHAM project goes beyond the scope of this evaluation. Therefore, we refrain from going further in answering evaluation question 4 than the information on project costs provided in section 10.1.

[34] Assuming no idle time, it would be possible to calculate the cost per hour based on the wages to the counsellors and the costs associated with the space used for counselling and communication costs. However, we do not attempt to do such a calculation.

# 11. Contribution of Capacity Development and Civil Society

LRC-KJHAM has not been selected for either the capacity development or civil society strengthening components of the MFS II evaluation.

# 12. Conclusion

LRC-KJHAM provides counselling and legal aid services to victims of GBV. The results show that most women got free of domestic violence and were able to increase their autonomy either through divorce or separation or because the husband was not as abusive anymore. But 5 respondents (25%) were still psychologically abused by their (ex-) husband at the endline. In general, we observed an increase in the self-esteem and confidence of most respondents, while respondents who got divorced reported feelings of relief.

LRC-KJHAM contributed to these changes through the counselling and legal assistance provided for the respondents. Respondents felt that the survivors at LRC-KJHAM were patient and friendly and they really defended domestic violence victims. The knowledge and moral support received from these survivors provided strength for the respondents in solving their problems at court or in the household.

However, the support from family and friends and successes in employment were at least as important for the women to become more courageous and self-confident. In fact, respondents first confided their household problems to their close friends and family (parents and siblings) when they could not take the pressure and abuse anymore after a long period of suppressed insecurity and fear. It was usually these friends and family who advised the respondents to seek help at LRC-KJHAM.

These findings are almost perfectly in line with the findings in the literature, which showed that counselling and support group activities can help to emotionally strengthen survivors and improve a number of skills and characteristics, like self-esteem, assertiveness and coping abilities. The literature is not conclusive on whether counselling and support group activities actually result in changing the abusive situation. Indeed, while we observe a decrease in domestic violence, we also reported that 25% of the women were still psychologically abused by their (ex-) husband at the endline. With respect to women's attitude towards marriage and family, our findings deviate from the literature, which shows improvements in women's traditional attitudes towards marriage and the family, and marital functioning, whereas we found no changes with respect to the attitude towards their rights in marriage.

In addition, the results of the qualitative study with support group members and paralegals reported in Annex VIII provide some concluding remarks:

1. The risk of being stigmatized by the community, and the fear of not being able to support themselves and their children, is what usually keeps women from filing for divorce or reporting the abusive behaviour of their husbands to the police. Changing this patriarchal culture requires continuous advocacy of policy change with regard to gender equality.
2. Most of our informants had initially tried to cope with the abuse on their own and had waited a long time before confiding to a friend or relative about the abuse. In the end, none of them had made the step to contact LRC-KJHAM on their own. Instead, all of them had to be motivated by a

friend, relative, neighbour, acquaintance or public officer before they would seek help. In conducting active outreach to clients, it might thus be useful for LRC-KJHAM to include the victims' social circle and the relevant public institutions in their targeting.

3. LRC-KJHAM's strategy to change victims of gender based violence into survivors and active agents that are able to change their own situation as well as those of others is well chosen. By empowering victims and giving them the courage, skills, and will to actively speak up in court and actively commit their own knowledge and experiences to inspire and help other victims, the victims themselves become advocates for the fight against gender based violence. By changing shame and disgrace into power, they are able to gradually change the negative connotations that are traditionally associated with 'divorce' and 'assertiveness' in women, and inspire and encourage other victims to fight for their own rights, and ultimately those of others.
4. Our data shows that, even though LRC-KJHAM never suggests divorce as a solution, victims of domestic violence preferred to file for divorce immediately, without first reporting the abuse and going through the full legal process. This is problematic because any abuse that is reported after the divorce will legally not be sentenced as 'domestic violence', but rather as 'violence against women' for which lighter punishment applies. The fact that many women still decide to directly file for divorce supports the idea that victims know too little about legal procedures. Much can thus still be gained by training and educating the victims on their rights.
5. The synergy between LRC-KJHAM, victims, and government is the key to successfully handling gender based violence cases. The fact that women's right to protection from gender based violence is now recorded as a law, has given policy makers a discourse, and socialization of gender justice and equality already seems to be occurring at various levels. The presence of PPT Seruni - an integrated service centre at the city level - is proof that the government of Semarang is serious about dealing with gender based violence issues.

Finally, the MFS synthesis team asked to score each project along a few indicators. Table 12 displays the indicators and the scores we deemed valid for the project.

**Table 12: Overall project scoring**

| Statement | Score | Remarks |
|---|---|---|
| **1. The project was well designed** | 9 | The project integrates the counselling and legal aid services to victims of gender-based violence with providing these services by trained paralegal survivors who have a good understanding of the respondent's situation. The support group activities provide encouragement and empower survivors of domestic or other gender-based violence. |
| **2. The project was implemented as designed** | 9 | The project was implemented as designed. |
| **3. The project reached all its objectives** | 9 | Objectives were set as the number of served clients and trained paralegals. LRC-KJHAM assisted all clients that turned her for help. |
| **4. The observed results are attributable to the project interventions** | 4 | Other factors such as family, friends and work play a more important role in the outcomes. However, this is not the shortcoming of LRC-KJHAM's activities but the nature of the service. |
| **5. The observed results are relevant to the project beneficiaries** | 10 | Women want to be free of abuse. |
| **6. The project was implemented in the most efficient way** | N.A. | We did not evaluate efficiency of the project due to reasons mentioned in section 10.2. |

Notes: Scores are on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being "no agreement at all" and 10 being "completely agree with statement".

N.A.=not applicable

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# Annex I. SPO description

LRC-KJHAM was established in Semarang - Central Java in July 1999, first as a task force and from 2002 onwards as an independent NGO. LRC-JKHAM was initiated by activists who wanted to promote gender injustice and equal rights for women in the society. LRC-KJHAM is now known as a woman organisation that consistent in defending the rights of women victims of gender based violence. Dominated by young activists, LRC-KJHAM has been growing as the leading organisation for advocating women victims of violence.

From its inception, LRC-KJHAM gained financial support from various national and international agencies. With three years of partnership between Hivos and LRC-KJHAM through EU funded programme 'Women Access to Justice', this organisation has made significant results on the ground related to services for women victims of violence. LRC-KJHAM was able to facilitate the establishment of four integrated service centre (ISC, or 'one stop crisis centre'/OSCC) for women victims of gender based violence at four sub-districts in Semarang district.

The basic idea of ISC is to provide an integrated service unit to handling women victims of gender based violence. By integration means that the victim gets support for psychological counselling, but also treatment (mental and physical treatments) if needed through referring victim to the relevant institutions (police, hospital etc.); and also legal aid to get legal support and rights.

LRC-KJHAM (supported by HIVOS) commits to the establishment of such a centre in all areas of the province. In developing the centres, LRC-KJHAM collaborated with the local government (district and city levels) to integrate the centre in the local governmental system of handling the issues of gender based violence. LRC-KJHAM also succeeded in advocating the local governments to provide funding to run the ISCs.

Presently, in Semarang city there are 9 sub-districts have ISC, in Kendal District there are 2 sub-districts had established 2 ISCs; while in Grobogan there are 2 ISCs established in 2 sub-districts. However, in Kendal District, Grobogan District, and Semarang city, almost all sub-district have initiated to establish the ISCS (35 centres/units), though the ISCs have not yet operated well, because most of sub-districts government indeed had issued the decree to establish the ISC but they had not yet provided a specific place for delivering the service. Up to now, LRC-KJHAM (supported by HIVOS) commits to the establishment of such a unit in all areas of the province.

As noted above, LRC-KJHAM has a good partnership with the government both at the provincial, district/cities, and sub-district levels. The partnership is indicated through the involvement of LRC-KJHAM in drafting local regulation and policy concerning protection of women and children against violence (for example, Local government regulation no: 3/2009 on protection of women and children against violence).

LRC-KJHAM also commits to support and develop women at the community level through working in partnership with women groups at the outreach communities (Support Group in the Semarang City, Wedoro in Grobogan district, and Pribumi in Kendal district). LRC-KJHAM introduces FPAR and WRIA to these women's group as tools for reviewing government policy. Thus, women are able to participate in monitor and evaluate the government programme and policy.

Finally, LRC-KJHAM has unique characteristics. Not only has the capability to give service (legal assistance) for the victims, this organisation also has capability to provide inputs and give new perspectives to local government in term of gender sensitive regulations and able to give legal advice to legal enforcers. For example: LRC-KJHAM is assisting the legal enforcers (police and attorney) to prepare the indictments against Syekh Puji-a very rich guy who own a famous Moslem boarding school in Semarang, who marry an under-age woman. Local government also has requested LRC-KJHAM to assist the establishment of the ISC for women victims of violence in two other cities. LRC-KJHAM's dream to make this organisation as one of the legal resource centre for women with its feminist approach is right on track. [35]

[35] Source: LRC-KJHAM Organisational Assessment

# Annex II. Overview outcome indicators and indices

This annex provides a detailed description about the used outcome indicators. In addition, it shows the variables which were used to construct the outcome indicator indices.

Outcomes are reported for the total sample (n=20) and for women who had used the services of LRC-KJHAM since the baseline (n=7). Panel A and B provide the outcomes for the baseline (2012), the midline (2013) and the endline (2014) with the changes between midline-baseline, endline-midline and between the endline and the baseline. These changes show the absolute difference in the outcomes. Panel C provides the outcomes only for the baseline and the endline with the change and Panel D provides the outcomes for the baseline, endline and midline and the changes between midline-baseline and endline-baseline. The outcomes for the rights of wife index were only available for the baseline and the endline.

### *Panel A. Exposure to domestic violence*

- Abused by husband/partner in the past 12 months
  - *Any abuse*: reports on the number of women who had experienced either physical, psychological or sexual abuse in the past 12 months
  - *Physical*: reports on the number of women who had experienced psychological abuse in the past 12 months
  - *Psychological*: reports on the number of women who had experienced physical abuse in the past 12 months
  - *Sexual*: reports on the number of women who had experienced sexual abuse in the past 12 months
- Number of types of abuse by husband/partner: shows the mean number of types of abuse (physical, psychological and sexual) by husband/partner per woman

### *Panel B. Psychological health of women*

For these tables, the women had to indicate on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is not at all and 5 is all the time, how often they felt in the ways described in the tables in the past month. If the described feeling was positive, the woman experienced a negative feeling if she indicated 1 or 2. This was made into a dummy, where 1 indicates negative feelings if the woman indicated 1 or 2 and 0 indicates positive feelings if she indicated 3, 4 or 5. This was the other way around if the described feeling was negative. Then the dummy is 0 if the woman indicated 1 or 2 and 1 if she indicated 3, 4 or 5. This means that a higher value of the indicators shows more negative feelings. The questions that described a positive feeling, for which the scale has been reversed to let a higher value indicate a more negative feeling, are indicated below with '(positive)'.

- *Psychological distress index*: mean of the number of components (reported in Table 22) per woman that were applicable to the women. This is on a scale from 0 to 12, since there are 12 components in this index. The more components applicable to a women, the more psychological distress she had experienced. It also is the sum of the social dysfunction index, the anxiety index and the losing confidence in yourself index.
- *Social dysfunction index*: it is the sum of the 6 components reported below the index, which shows the mean of the number of those components per woman that were applicable to the

women. The method described above was applied to the following 6 components, which show the fraction (between 0 and 1) of the women who experienced this feeling:
    - Played a useful part in things (positive)
    - Able to concentrate in everything (positive)
    - Feeling capable of making decisions (positive)
    - Enjoying normal day-to-day activities (positive)
    - Able to face up emotional problems (positive)
    - Feeling reasonably happy in general (positive)
- *Anxiety index*: it is the sum of the 4 components reported below the index, which shows the mean of the number of those components per woman that were applicable to the women. The method described above was applied to the following 4 components, which show the fraction (between 0 and 1) of the women who experienced this feeling:
    - Lost much sleep over worry
    - Felt under strain
    - Could not overcome emotional problems
    - Thought of yourself as a worthless person
- *Losing confidence in yourself index*: it is the sum of the 2 components reported below the index, which shows the mean of the number of those components per woman that were applicable to the women. The method described above was applied to the following 2 components, which show the fraction (between 0 and 1) of the women who experienced this feeling:
    - Felt depressed
    - Losing confidence in yourself

### *Panel C. Women's empowerment (attitude towards themselves)*

The following indices are constructed with statements for which the women reported their level of agreement on a scale from -2 to +2, where -2 means 'strongly disagree', -1 means 'disagree', 0 means 'neither agree nor disagree', 1 means 'agree' and 2 means 'strongly agree'. The indices show the average level of agreement over the included statements. A higher value of the index shows more positive feelings. Sometimes agreement with a statement indicates negative feelings. Therefore, the scale for these statements were reversed, so that -2 means 'strongly agree' and +2 means 'strongly disagree'. That way, those statements can be used in the average. They are indicated by '(negative)'.

- *Self-efficacy index*: the following statements are included:
    - On the whole, I'm able to take charge of my life
    - I make commitments not to think of myself as worthless
- *Self-esteem index:* the following statements are included:
    - I feel I do not have much to be proud of (negative)
    - I take a positive attitude towards myself
    - I wish I could have more respect for myself (negative)
    - On the whole, I am satisfied with myself
- *Control index:* the following statement are included:
    - It is not always wise to plan far ahead because many things are a matter of good or bad fortune (negative)
    - Often I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me (negative)

- *Dependency:* level of agreement on a scale from -2 to +2 with 'my dependence on my partner makes me feel disappointed in myself' (negative)
- *Support:* level of agreement on a scale from -2 to +2 with 'I have someone who listens when I need to talk about my problems'

### *Panel D. Empowerment in marriage*

- *Rights of wife index*: this index is constructed with 9 statements for which the women had to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed. If the statement indicates that the woman has little rights (indicated with '(negative)'), disagreement is given the value 1 and agreement the value 0. This is the other way around if the statement indicates many rights for the woman. The rights of wife index gives the mean number of statements per woman with which the women agreed. So, a higher value of the index indicates that the women think they have more rights. The following statements are included in the index:
    - A good wife obeys her husband even if she disagrees (negative)
    - A woman should be able to choose her own friends even if her husband disapproves
    - Family problems should only be discussed with people in the family (negative)
    - If a man mistreats his wife, others outside of the family should intervene
    - It is important for a man to show his wife who is the boss (negative)
    - A woman should be allowed to have a full or part-time job outside the household even if her husband disapproves
    - A husband has the right to know where his wife is at all times (negative)
    - After finishing her housework, a wife should be allowed to participate in social activities in the community
    - It's a wife's obligation to have sex with her husband even if she doesn't feel like it (negative)
- *Any good reason for a husband to hit his wife*: reports on the number of women who indicated that at least one of the following reasons authorizes the husband to hit his wife:
    - She goes out without telling him
    - She neglects the children
    - She argues with him
    - She burns the food
    - She disobeys him
    - She refuses to have sexual intercourse with him
- *Number of good reasons for a husband to hit his wife*: shows the mean number of the above mentioned reasons that the women agreed with
- *Any occasion a wife can refuse to have sex*: reports on the number of women who indicated that at least one of the following occasions authorizes the wife to refuse to have sex:
    - She feels sick or tired
    - If he slept with another woman
    - She doesn't want to have sex
- *Number of occasions a wife can refuse to have sex:* shows the mean number of the above mentioned occasions that the women agreed with

# Annex III. Descriptive statistics

**Table 13: Marital status of total sample**

| | Marital status<br>Total sample (n=20) | 2014 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Married* | *Separated* | *Divorced* | **Total** |
| 2012 | *Married* | 6 | 2 | 3 | 11 |
| | *Separated* | 1 | 2 | 1 | 4 |
| | *Divorced* | 2 | 0 | 3 | 5 |
| | **Total** | 9 | 4 | 7 | 20 |

**Table 14: Marital status of women that used LRC-KJHAM since baseline**

| | Marital status<br>Used LRC-KJHAM since baseline (n=7) | 2014 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Married* | *Separated* | *Divorced* | **Total** |
| 2012 | *Married* | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 |
| | *Separated* | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| | *Divorced* | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| | **Total** | 5 | 0 | 2 | 7 |

**Table 15: Housing situation**

| **Sample** | **Total sample** | | | **Used LRC-KJHAM since baseline** | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
| **Sample size** | 20 | 20 | 20 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| Has children | 18 | 18 | 18 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| Living arrangement | [n=18] | | | [n=5] | | |
| *- Lives with children* | 10 | 10 | 9 | 0 | 3 | 2 |
| *- Lives with husband* | 1 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| *- Lives with children & husband* | 4 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| *- Lives alone/with parents/relatives* | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| Left home because of husband's behaviour in past 12 months | 11 [n=19] | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 0 |
| Moved since baseline | - | 4 | - | - | 1 | - |

Source: Household survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Sample size given between brackets.

**Table 16: Changes in employment**

| Sample | Total sample | | | Used LRC-KJHAM since baseline | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
| **Sample size** | 20 | 20 | | 7 | 7 | |
| Employed | 16 | 18 | 16 | 6 | 6 | 5 |
| Changed job since last visit | - | 5 | 6 | - | 2 | 4 |
| - *Has better job* | - | 4 | 5 | - | 1 | 3 |
| - *Same type* | - | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 |
| - *Has worse job* | - | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | 1 |

Source: Household survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

# Annex IV. Evaluation question 1 – tables

## *Exposure to domestic violence*

**Table 17: Domestic violence: transition dynamics (2012 and 2014)**

| Types of abuse | | EXPERIENCED … ABUSE 1 YEAR BEFORE ENDLINE | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | No | PS | PH | S | PS&PH | PS&S | PH&S | All | Total |
| | No abuse | **5** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | **5** |
| EXPERIENCED … ABUSE 1 YEAR BEFORE BASELINE | Psychological (PS) | **2** | **2** | 0 | 0 | 0 | **1** | 0 | 0 | **5** |
| | Physical (PH) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Sexual (S) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | PS & PH | **3** | **2** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | **5** |
| | PS & S | **1** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | **1** |
| | PH & S | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | PS & PH & S (All) | **4** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | **4** |
| | Total | **15** | **4** | 0 | 0 | 0 | **1** | 0 | 0 | **20** |

**Table 18: Domestic violence: transition dynamics (2012 and 2013)**

| Types of abuse | | EXPERIENCED … ABUSE 1 YEAR BEFORE MIDLINE | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | No | PS | PH | S | PS&PH | PS&S | PH&S | All | Total |
| | No abuse | **4** | **1** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | **5** |
| EXPERIENCED … ABUSE 1 YEAR BEFORE BASELINE | Psychological (PS) | **2** | **1** | 0 | 0 | 0 | **1** | 0 | **1** | **5** |
| | Physical (PH) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Sexual (S) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | PS & PH | **1** | **2** | 0 | 0 | 0 | **1** | 0 | **1** | **5** |
| | PS & S | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | **1** | 0 | 0 | **1** |
| | PH & S | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | PS & PH & S (All) | **1** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | **3** | 0 | 0 | **4** |
| | Total | **8** | **4** | 0 | 0 | 0 | **6** | 0 | **2** | **20** |

**Table 19: Domestic violence: transition dynamics (2013 and 2014)**

| Types of abuse | | EXPERIENCED … ABUSE 1 YEAR BEFORE ENDLINE | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | No | PS | PH | S | PS&PH | PS&S | PH&S | All | Total |
| EXPERIENCED … ABUSE 1 YEAR BEFORE MIDLINE | No abuse | **8** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | **8** |
| | Psychological (PS) | **3** | **1** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | **4** |
| | Physical (PH) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Sexual (S) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | PS & PH | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | PS & S | **4** | **2** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | **6** |
| | PH & S | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | PS & PH & S (All) | 0 | **1** | 0 | 0 | 0 | **1** | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| | Total | **15** | **4** | 0 | 0 | 0 | **1** | 0 | 0 | **20** |

**Table 20: Relationship with current/last husband/partner**

| Period | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2012-2013 | 2013-2014 | 2012-2014 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total sample | | | | | | |
| Sample size | 20 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 16 | 17 |
| **Negative (abusive) (0-7)** | **3.90 (1.86)** | **3.00 (2.26)** | **2.18 (2.19)** | **-0.71 (2.39)** | **-0.88 (2.36)** | **-1.47** (2.85)** |
| *Tries to keep you from seeing your friends* | 0.75 (0.44) | 0.41 (0.51) | 0.29 (0.47) | -0.29* (0.59) | -0.13 (0.50) | -0.41** (0.71) |
| *Tries to restrict contact with your family of birth* | 0.35 (0.49) | 0.24 (0.44) | 0.06 (0.24) | -0.06 (0.43) | -0.19* (0.40) | -0.24 (0.56) |
| *Insists on knowing where you are at all times* | 0.55 (0.51) | 0.47 (0.51) | 0.29 (0.47) | -0.06 (0.66) | -0.19* (0.40) | -0.24 (0.66) |
| *Ignores you and treats you indifferently* | 0.65 (0.49) | 0.59 (0.51) | 0.41 (0.51) | -0.06 (0.56) | -0.19 (0.54) | -0.18 (0.53) |
| *Gets angry if you speak with another man* | 0.55 (0.51) | 0.35 (0.49) | 0.24 (0.44) | -0.12 (0.49) | -0.13 (0.50) | -0.24 (0.66) |
| *Is often suspicious that you are unfaithful* | 0.60 (0.50) | 0.41 (0.51) | 0.29 (0.47) | -0.12 (0.78) | -0.13 (0.50) | -0.24 (0.75) |
| *Expects you to ask his permission before seeking health care for yourself* | 0.45 (0.51) | 0.53 (0.51) | 0.59 (0.51) | 0.00 (0.79) | 0.06 (0.68) | 0.06 (0.83) |
| **Positive (supportive)(0-4)** | **1.65 (1.53)** | **1.53 (1.77)** | **2.06 (1.64)** | **-0.35 (1.90)** | **0.63 (1.71)** | **0.12 (1.58)** |
| *Pays attention to you* | 0.55 (0.51) | 0.41 (0.51) | 0.53 (0.51) | -0.18 (0.64) | 0.13 (0.62) | -0.12 (0.60) |
| *Takes good care of you and your children* | 0.40 (0.50) | 0.35 (0.49) | 0.41 (0.51) | -0.12 (0.70) | 0.13 (0.62) | -0.06 (0.56) |
| *Supports you when you need it* | 0.35 (0.49) | 0.35 (0.49) | 0.47 (0.51) | -0.06 (0.43) | 0.13 (0.50) | 0.06 (0.56) |

| Period | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2012-2013 | 2013-2014 | 2012-2014 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Trusts you in most situations* | 0.35 (0.49) | 0.41 (0.51) | 0.65 (0.49) | 0.00 (0.61) | 0.25 (0.58) | 0.24** (0.44) |
| **Used LRC-KJHAM since baseline** | | | | | | |
| **Sample size** | 7 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 6 |
| **Negative (abusive) (0-7)** | **4.00 (2.00)** | **3.00 (2.45)** | **1.67 (1.75)** | **-0.83 (2.32)** | **-1.33 (3.01)** | **-2.17 (3.06)** |
| *Tries to keep you from seeing your friends* | 0.86 (0.38) | 0.50 (0.55) | 0.17 (0.41) | -0.33 (0.52) | -0.33 (0.52) | -0.67** (0.52) |
| *Tries to restrict contact with your family of birth* | 0.43 (0.53) | 0.33 (0.52) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.33 (0.52) | -0.33 (0.52) |
| *Insists on knowing where you are at all times* | 0.43 (0.53) | 0.50 (0.55) | 0.17 (0.41) | 0.00 (0.63) | -0.33 (0.52) | -0.33 (0.82) |
| *Ignores you and treats you indifferently* | 0.43 (0.53) | 0.50 (0.55) | 0.33 (0.52) | 0.17 (0.41) | -0.17 (0.41) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| *Gets angry if you speak with another man* | 0.57 (0.53) | 0.33 (0.52) | 0.17 (0.41) | -0.17 (0.41) | -0.17 (0.75) | -0.33 (0.82) |
| *Is often suspicious that you are unfaithful* | 0.71 (0.49) | 0.17 (0.41) | 0.17 (0.41) | -0.50 (0.84) | 0.00 (0.63) | -0.50 (0.84) |
| *Expects you to ask his permission before seeking health care for yourself* | 0.57 (0.53) | 0.67 (0.52) | 0.67 (0.52) | 0.00 (0.89) | 0.00 (0.63) | 0.00 (0.63) |
| **Positive (supportive)(0-4)** | **2.14 (1.77)** | **2.17 (1.83)** | **2.33 (1.86)** | **-0.33 (1.97)** | **0.17 (2.04)** | **-0.17 (1.47)** |
| *Pays attention to you* | 0.71 (0.49) | 0.50 (0.55) | 0.50 (0.55) | -0.33 (0.52) | 0.00 (0.63) | -0.33 (0.52) |
| *Takes good care of you and your children* | 0.43 (0.53) | 0.67 (0.52) | 0.50 (0.55) | 0.17 (0.75) | -0.17 (0.75) | 0.00 (0.63) |
| *Supports you when you need it* | 0.57 (0.53) | 0.50 (0.55) | 0.50 (0.55) | -0.17 (0.41) | 0.00 (0.63) | -0.17 (0.41) |
| *Trusts you in most situations* | 0.43 (0.53) | 0.50 (0.55) | 0.83 (0.41) | 0.00 (0.63) | 0.33 (0.52) | 0.33 (0.52) |

Source: Household survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Note: Standard deviations given in parentheses. * p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value <0.01

## *Psychological health*

**Table 21: Components of the psychological distress indices**

| Period | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2013-2012 | 2014-2013 | 2014-2012 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Total sample** | | | | | | |
| **Sample size** | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 |
| **Psychological distress index (0-12)** | **4.80 (2.35)** | **2.45 (1.88)** | **2.70 (1.84)** | **-2.35*** (2.64)** | **0.25 (1.83)** | **-2.10*** (2.95)** |
| **Social dysfunction index (0-6)** | **1.10 (1.17)** | **0.25 (0.72)** | **0.40 (0.99)** | **-0.85*** (1.04)** | **0.15 (0.67)** | **-0.70** (1.22)** |
| *Have not played a useful part in things* | 0.20 (0.41) | 0.05 (0.22) | 0.15 (0.37) | -0.15 (0.49) | 0.10 (0.45) | -0.05 (0.39) |
| *Not able to concentrate in everything* | 0.25 (0.44) | 0.05 (0.22) | 0.05 (0.22) | -0.20** (0.41) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.20** (0.41) |
| *Not feeling capable of making decisions* | 0.20 (0.41) | 0.05 (0.22) | 0.10 (0.31) | -0.15 (0.49) | 0.05 (0.22) | -0.10 (0.55) |
| *Not enjoying normal day-to-day activities* | 0.05 (0.22) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.05 (0.22) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.05 (0.22) |
| *Not able to face up emotional problems* | 0.10 (0.31) | 0.05 (0.22) | 0.10 (0.31) | -0.05 (0.22) | 0.05 (0.22) | 0.00 (0.32) |
| *Not feeling reasonably happy in general* | 0.30 (0.47) | 0.05 (0.22) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.25** (0.44) | -0.05 (0.22) | -0.30** (0.47) |
| **Anxiety index (0-4)** | **2.40 (1.10)** | **1.65 (1.14)** | **1.60 (1.10)** | **-0.75** (1.48)** | **-0.05 (1.00)** | **-0.80** (1.54)** |
| *Lost much sleep over worry* | 0.45 (0.51) | 0.45 (0.51) | 0.45 (0.51) | 0.00 (0.65) | 0.00 (0.65) | 0.00 (0.73) |
| *Felt under strain* | 0.65 (0.49) | 0.40 (0.50) | 0.10 (0.31) | -0.25* (0.55) | -0.30** (0.47) | -0.55*** (0.51) |
| *Could not overcome emotional problems* | 0.75 (0.44) | 0.65 (0.49) | 0.80 (0.41) | -0.10 (0.72) | 0.15 (0.49) | 0.05 (0.60) |
| *Thought of yourself as worthless person* | 0.55 (0.51) | 0.15 (0.37) | 0.25 (0.44) | -0.40*** (0.50) | 0.10 (0.55) | -0.30* (0.73) |
| **Losing confidence in yourself index (0-2)** | **1.30 (0.80)** | **0.55 (0.69)** | **0.70 (0.80)** | **-0.75*** (0.79)** | **0.15 (0.81)** | **-0.60** (1.19)** |
| *Felt depressed* | 0.70 (0.47) | 0.40 (0.50) | 0.20 (0.41) | -0.30** (0.57) | -0.20 (0.52) | -0.50*** (0.69) |
| *Losing confidence in yourself* | 0.60 (0.50) | 0.15 (0.37) | 0.50 (0.51) | -0.45*** (0.51) | 0.35** (0.59) | -0.10 (0.72) |
| **Used LRC-KJHAM since baseline** | | | | | | |
| **Sample size** | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| **Psychological distress (0-12)** | **4.71 (2.43)** | **2.71 (2.21)** | **2.57 (2.23)** | **-2.00 (3.51)** | **-0.14 (1.57)** | **-2.14 (2.97)** |

| Period | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2013-2012 | 2014-2013 | 2014-2012 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Social dysfunction (0-6)** | **1.00 (1.15)** | **0.57 (1.13)** | **0.57 (1.51)** | **-0.43 (0.79)** | **0.00 (0.58)** | **-0.43 (0.98)** |
| *Have not played a useful part in things* | 0.14 (0.38) | 0.14 (0.38) | 0.14 (0.38) | 0.00 (0.58) | 0.00 (0.58) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| *Not able to concentrate in everything* | 0.29 (0.49) | 0.14 (0.38) | 0.14 (0.38) | -0.14 (0.38) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.14 (0.38) |
| *Not feeling capable of making decisions* | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.14 (0.38) | 0.14 (0.38) | 0.14 (0.38) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.14 (0.38) |
| *Not enjoying normal day-to-day activities* | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| *Not able to face up emotional problems* | 0.14 (0.38) | 0.14 (0.38) | 0.14 (0.38) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| *Not feeling reasonably happy in general* | 0.43 (0.53) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.43* (0.53) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.43* (0.53) |
| **Anxiety (0-4)** | **2.43 (1.27)** | **1.57 (1.40)** | **1.43 (1.40)** | **-0.86 (1.95)** | **-0.14 (0.69)** | **-1.00 (1.63)** |
| *Lost much sleep over worry* | 0.57 (0.53) | 0.43 (0.53) | 0.43 (0.53) | -0.14 (0.69) | 0.00 (0.58) | -0.14 (0.38) |
| *Felt under strain* | 0.57 (0.53) | 0.29 (0.49) | 0.14 (0.38) | -0.29 (0.49) | -0.14 (0.38) | -0.43* (0.53) |
| *Could not overcome emotional problems* | 0.71 (0.49) | 0.57 (0.53) | 0.71 (0.49) | -0.14 (0.69) | 0.14 (0.38) | 0.00 (0.82) |
| *Thought of yourself as worthless person* | 0.57 (0.53) | 0.29 (0.49) | 0.14 (0.38) | -0.29 (0.49) | -0.14 (0.38) | -0.43* (0.53) |
| **Losing confidence in yourself (0-2)** | **1.29 (0.95)** | **0.57 (0.79)** | **0.57 (0.79)** | **-0.71* (0.95)** | **0.00 (0.82)** | **-0.71 (1.11)** |
| *Felt depressed* | 0.71 (0.49) | 0.29 (0.49) | 0.14 (0.38) | -0.43* (0.53) | -0.14 (0.38) | -0.57** (0.53) |
| *Losing confidence in yourself* | 0.57 (0.53) | 0.29 (0.49) | 0.43 (0.53) | -0.29 (0.49) | 0.14 (0.69) | -0.14 (0.69) |

Source: Household survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. * p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value <0.01

**Table 22: Components of psychological distress**

| Sample | Total sample | | | Used LRC-KJHAM since baseline | | | Not divorced at baseline | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
| **Sample size** | 20 | 20 | 20 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| Lost much sleep over worry | 9 | 9 | 9 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 7 | 8 | 7 |
| Not played a useful part in things | 4 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 3 |
| Felt under strain | 13 | 8 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 11 | 6 | 2 |
| Not able to concentrate | 5 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 |
| Not feeling capable of making decisions | 4 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| Not enjoying normal day-to-day activities | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Could not overcome emotional problems | 15 | 13 | 16 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 11 | 8 | 12 |
| Thought of yourself as worthless person | 11 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 8 | 2 | 4 |
| Felt depressed | 14 | 8 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 10 | 6 | 4 |
| Not able to face up emotional problems | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Losing confidence in yourself | 12 | 3 | 10 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 9 | 2 | 8 |
| Not feeling reasonably happy in general | 6 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 1 | 0 |

Source: Household survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

### *Women's attitude towards themselves*

**Table 23: Women's attitudes towards themselves**

| Period | 2012 | 2014 | 2012-2014 |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Total sample** | | | |
| **Sample size** | 20 | 20 | 20 |
| **Self-efficacy index** | **0.65** | **0.82** | **0.17** |
| | **(0.63)** | **(0.67)** | **(0.69)** |
| On the whole, I'm able to take charge of my life | 0.40 | 0.45 | 0.05 |
| | (1.05) | (1.19) | (0.89) |
| I make commitments not to think of myself as worthless | 0.90 | 1.20 | 0.30 |
| | (0.91) | (0.89) | (1.13) |
| **Self-esteem index** | **0.10** | **0.56** | **0.46*** ** |
| | **(0.45)** | **(0.41)** | **(0.53)** |
| I feel I do not have much to be proud of[1] | 0.25 | 1.35 | 1.10*** |
| | (1.25) | (0.59) | (1.21) |
| I take a positive attitude towards myself | 1.25 | 1.25 | 0.00 |
| | (0.44) | (0.55) | (0.56) |
| I wish I could have more respect for myself[1] | -1.30 | -1.20 | 0.10 |
| | (0.73) | (0.70) | (0.85) |
| On the whole, I am satisfied with myself | 0.20 | 0.85 | 0.65** |
| | (1.11) | (0.88) | (1.18) |
| **Control index** | **0.20** | **0.38** | **0.17** |
| | **(0.82)** | **(0.81)** | **(1.20)** |
| It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things are a matter of good or bad fortune[1] | 0.35 | 0.40 | 0.05 |
| | (1.14) | (1.23) | (1.43) |
| Often I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me[1] | 0.05 | 0.35 | 0.30 |
| | (1.10) | (1.04) | (1.63) |
| **Dependency** | **0.20** | **0.60** | **0.40** |
| | **(1.40)** | **(1.27)** | **(1.54)** |
| My dependency on my partner makes me feel disappointed in myself[1] | 0.20 | 0.60 | 0.40 |
| | (1.40) | (1.27) | (1.54) |
| **Support** | **1.30** | **1.20** | **-0.10** |
| | **(0.47)** | **(0.89)** | **(0.97)** |
| I have someone who listens when I need to talk about my problems | 1.30 | 1.20 | -0.10 |
| | (0.47) | (0.89) | (0.97) |
| **Used LRC-KJHAM since baseline** | | | |

| Sample size | 7 | 7 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Self-efficacy index** | **0.57** | **0.50** | **-0.07** |
| | **(0.61)** | **(0.50)** | **(0.73)** |
| On the whole, I'm able to take charge of my life | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| | (1.00) | (1.29) | (1.29) |
| I make commitments not to think of myself as worthless | 1.14 | 1.00 | -0.14 |
| | (0.38) | (1.00) | (0.90) |
| **Self-esteem index** | **0.04** | **0.54** | **0.50**** |
| | **(0.55)** | **(0.27)** | **(0.52)** |
| I feel I do not have much to be proud of[1] | 0.14 | 1.43 | 1.29* |
| | (1.57) | (0.53) | (1.60) |
| I take a positive attitude towards myself | 1.29 | 1.14 | -0.14 |
| | (0.49) | (0.38) | (0.38) |
| I wish I could have more respect for myself[1] | -1.29 | -1.29 | 0.00 |
| | (0.49) | (0.49) | (0.00) |
| On the whole, I am satisfied with myself | 0.00 | 0.86 | 0.86 |
| | (1.00) | (0.90) | (1.21) |
| **Control index** | **-0.36** | **0.43** | **0.79** |
| | **(0.90)** | **(0.84)** | **(1.22)** |
| It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things are a matter of good or bad fortune[1] | -0.14 | 0.57 | 0.71 |
| | (1.46) | (1.13) | (1.25) |
| Often I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me[1] | -0.57 | 0.29 | 0.86 |
| | (1.13) | (1.25) | (1.95) |
| **Dependency** | **0.57** | **0.71** | **0.14** |
| | **(1.51)** | **(1.25)** | **(1.57)** |
| My dependency on my partner makes me feel disappointed in myself[1] | 0.57 | 0.71 | 0.14 |
| | (1.51) | (1.25) | (1.57) |
| **Support** | **1.29** | **1.43** | **0.14** |
| | **(0.49)** | **(0.53)** | **(0.69)** |
| I have someone who listens when I need to talk about my problems | 1.29 | 1.43 | 0.14 |
| | (0.49) | (0.53) | (0.69) |

Source: Household survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. * p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.
1. Since agreement with these statement indicates negative feelings, the scale has been reversed so that higher values indicate disagreement with the statement (positive feelings)

## *Empowerment in marriage*

**Table 24: Components of rights of wife index**

| Period | 2012 | 2014 | 2012-2014 |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Total sample** | | | |
| **Sample size** | 20 | 20 | 20 |
| Fraction of sample that disagrees with […][1] | | | |
| *A good wife obeys her husband even if she disagrees* | 0.70 | 0.55 | -0.15 |
| | (0.47) | (0.51) | (0.49) |
| *Family problems should only be discussed with people in the family* | 0.35 | 0.25 | -0.10 |
| | (0.49) | (0.44) | (0.64) |
| *It is important for a man to show his wife who is the boss* | 0.85 | 0.95 | 0.10 |
| | (0.37) | (0.22) | (0.31) |
| *A husband has the right to know where his wife is at all times* | 0.40 | 0.35 | -0.05 |
| | (0.50) | (0.49) | (0.60) |
| *It's a wife's obligation to have sex with her husband even if she doesn't feel like it* | 0.45 | 0.80 | 0.35*** |
| | (0.51) | (0.41) | (0.49) |
| Fraction of sample that agrees with […] | | | |
| *A woman should be able to choose her own friends even if her husband disapproves* | 0.80 | 0.45 | -0.35*** |
| | (0.41) | (0.51) | (0.49) |
| *If a man mistreats his wife, others outside of the family should intervene* | 0.45 | 0.50 | 0.05 |
| | (0.51) | (0.51) | (0.60) |
| *A woman should be allowed to have a full or part-time job outside the household even if her husband disapproves* | 0.80 | 0.50 | -0.30** |
| | (0.41) | (0.51) | (0.47) |
| *After finishing her housework, a wife should be allowed to participate in social activities in the community* | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.00 |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| **Used LRC-KJHAM since baseline** | | | |
| **Sample size** | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| Fraction of sample that disagrees with […][1] | | | |
| *A good wife obeys her husband even if she disagrees* | 0.57 | 0.29 | -0.29 |
| | (0.53) | (0.49) | (0.49) |
| *Family problems should only be discussed with people in the family* | 0.29 | 0.00 | -0.29 |
| | (0.49) | (0.00) | (0.49) |
| *It is important for a man to show his wife who is the boss* | 0.86 | 1.00 | 0.14 |
| | (0.38) | (0.00) | (0.38) |
| *A husband has the right to know where his wife is at all times* | 0.29 | 0.29 | 0.00 |
| | (0.49) | (0.49) | (0.00) |

| Period | 2012 | 2014 | 2012-2014 |
|---|---|---|---|
| *It's a wife's obligation to have sex with her husband even if she doesn't feel like it* | 0.43<br>(0.53) | 0.71<br>(0.49) | 0.29<br>(0.49) |
| Fraction of sample that agrees with […] | | | |
| *A woman should be able to choose her own friends even if her husband disapproves* | 1.00<br>(0.00) | 0.57<br>(0.53) | -0.43*<br>(0.53) |
| *If a man mistreats his wife, others outside of the family should intervene* | 0.57<br>(0.53) | 0.57<br>(0.53) | 0.00<br>(0.58) |
| *A woman should be allowed to have a full or part-time job outside the household even if her husband disapproves* | 1.00<br>(0.00) | 0.71<br>(0.49) | -0.29<br>(0.49) |
| *After finishing her housework, a wife should be allowed to participate in social activities in the community* | 1.00<br>(0.00) | 1.00<br>(0.00) | 0.00<br>(0.00) |

Source: Household survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. * p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.
1. Agreement with these indicators show that the woman thinks that she has little rights, so the scale for these statements has been reversed so that the outcomes for these statements show the fraction of the women that disagreed. So, a higher value indicates more desirable outcomes.

**Table 25: Reasons for a husband to hit his wife and occasions in which the wife can refuse to have sex**

| Period | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2013-2012 | | 2014-2012 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Increase | Decrease | Increase | Decrease |
| **Total sample** | | | | | | | |
| **Sample size** | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | | 20 | |
| Number of women that see […] as a good reason for a husband to hit his wife | | | | | | | |
| *She goes out without telling him* | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| *She neglects the children* | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| *She argues with him* | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| *She burns the food* | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| *She disobeys him* | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| *She refuses to have sexual intercourse with him* | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Number of women that see […] as an occasion a wife can refuse sex | | | | | | | |
| *She feels sick or tired* | 18 | 19 | 19 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 |
| *If he slept with another woman* | 17 | 16 | 19 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 1 |
| *She doesn't want to have sex* | 10 | 6 | 7 | 2 | 6 | 4 | 7 |
| **Used LRC-KJHAM since baseline** | | | | | | | |
| **Sample size** | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | | 7 | |
| Number of women that see […] as a good reason for a husband to hit his wife | | | | | | | |
| *She goes out without telling him* | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| *She neglects the children* | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| *She argues with him* | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| *She burns the food* | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| *She disobeys him* | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| *She refuses to have sexual intercourse with him* | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Number of women that see […] as an occasion a wife can refuse sex | | | | | | | |
| *She feels sick or tired* | 7 | 7 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| *If he slept with another woman* | 6 | 6 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| *She doesn't want to have sex* | 5 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| Source: Household survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | | | | | | |

# Annex V. Evaluation question 2 – tables

**Table 26: Overview of life events since last visit**

| Sample | Total sample | Total sample | Used LRC-KJHAM since baseline | Used LRC-KJHAM since baseline |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | **2013** | **2014** | **2013** | **2014** |
| **Sample Size** | **20** | **20** | **7** | **7** |
| Economy (Positive) | 6 | 3 | 4 | 0 |
| Economy (Negative) | 4 | 9 | 1 | 5 |
| Job (Positive) | 7 | 11 | 2 | 4 |
| Job (Negative) | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 |
| Death | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Illness | 6 | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| Better health | 5 | 3 | 1 | 0 |
| Marital Status /Relationship (Positive) | 5 | 6 | 2 | 4 |
| Marital Status/Relationship (negative) | 7 | 7 | 2 | 2 |
| Family Life (Positive) | 9 | 10 | 4 | 2 |
| Family Life (Negative) | 5 | 7 | 1 | 2 |
| Social life (Positive) | 1 | 6 | 0 | 1 |
| Social life (Negative) | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Abuse (Negative) | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Source: Household survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | | | |

**Table 27: Reported abuse to social network**

| **Sample** | **Total sample** | | | **Used LRC-KJHAM since baseline** | | | **Not divorced at baseline** | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
| **Sample size** | 20 | 20 | 20 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| Report abuse to […] | | | | | | | | | |
| - *Friends* | 18 | 13 | 2 | 6 | 5 | 0 | 13 | 10 | 2 |
| - *Parents* | 10 | 8 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 8 | 7 | 2 |
| - *Brother/Sister* | 11 | 9 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 0 | 7 | 8 | 2 |
| - *Uncle/aunt* | 9 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 0 |
| - *Family of the husband/partner* | 14 | 5 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 4 | 0 |
| - *Children* | 6 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 2 |
| - *Neighbour* | 8 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 3 |
| - *Other persons* | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Source: Household survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | | | | | | | | |

### Table 28: Reported abuse to institutions

| Sample | Total sample | | | Used LRC-KJHAM since baseline | | | Not divorced at baseline | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
| **Sample size** | 20 | 20 | 20 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| Report abuse to […] | | | | | | | | | |
| - *Police* | 10 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 0 |
| - *Hospital /Health centre* | 4 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| - *Women Crisis Centre* | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| - *Legal Institution* | 3 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| - *Court* | 6 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| - *Shelter* | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| - *Community leader* | 5 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| - *Women Organisation* | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| - *Religious leader* | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |

Source: Household survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

### Table 29: Litigation and police

| Sample | Total sample | | | Used LRC-KJHAM since baseline | | | Not divorced at baseline | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
| **Sample size** | 20 | 20 | 20 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| Reported husband to police in past 12 months | 10 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 6 | 3 | 0 |
| - *LRC-KJHAM assisted in reporting to police* | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Litigation procedure in past 12 months | 4 | 8 | 6 | 0 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 6 | 5 |
| - *LRC-KJHAM assisted in litigation* | 3 | 7 | 2 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 6 | 2 |
| Litigation procedure still on-going | - | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | 0 | - | 1 | 1 |
| Divorce procedure in total (not all finalized) | 5 | 12 | 15 | 1 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 6 | 9 |
| - *LRC-KJHAM assisted in divorce* | 2 | 9 | 10 | 1 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 6 | 7 |
| Mediation with husband | - | 3 | 2 | - | 1 | 1 | - | 3 | 2 |
| - *LRC-KJHAM helped in mediation* | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |

Source: Household survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

# Annex VI. Evaluation question 3 – tables

**Table 30: Reasons for first time visit to LRC-KJHAM and satisfaction (2013)**

| Sample | Total sample | Visited LRC-KJHAM once | Visited LRC-KJHAM more times | Member of support group |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Sample size** | 20 | 3 | 17 | 6 |
| Reason for visiting LRC-KJHAM | | | | |
| *Psychological counselling* | 6 | 2 | 4 | 1 |
| *Counselling on how to repair household/relationship with partner* | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| *Information on women's rights* | 8 | 0 | 7 | 3 |
| *Information on law divorce* | 11 | 0 | 11 | 2 |
| *Assistance to report it to police* | 2 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| *Assistance for legal aid/litigation* | 15 | 1 | 14 | 5 |
| *Look for safer shelter* | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| *Other (ask for help)* | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Receiving help | | | | |
| - *Yes* | 13 | 2 | 11 | 4 |
| - *Partly* | 5 | 0 | 5 | 2 |
| - *No* | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Source: Household survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | | | |

**Table 31: Self-reported impact of services (2013)**

| Sample | Total sample | Visited LRC-KJHAM once | Visited LRC-KJHAM more times | Member of support group |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sample size | 20 | 3 | 17 | 6 |
| Number of women that agree with […] | | | | |
| *I became more comfortable asking for help* | 17 | 2 | 15 | 5 |
| *I became more confident and brave* | 18 | 2 | 16 | 6 |
| *I'm more able to make plans for the future* | 18 | 2 | 16 | 6 |
| *I'm more able to make decisions for myself* | 18 | 3 | 15 | 6 |
| *I feel more independent* | 17 | 3 | 14 | 5 |
| *I'm more able to speak up to my partner* | 13 | 2 | 11 | 3 |
| *I'm more able to control situation when commotion occurs* | 18 | 3 | 15 | 5 |
| *I have more resources to call upon* | 18 | 2 | 16 | 6 |
| *I'm better prepared to keep myself safe* | 16 | 2 | 14 | 6 |
| *I'm more hopeful about my future* | 16 | 2 | 14 | 6 |
| *I'm more able to control my emotions* | 16 | 2 | 14 | 6 |
| *I feel emotionally stable and less depressed* | 17 | 2 | 15 | 6 |
| Source: Household survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | | | |

**Table 32: Services used and satisfaction**

| Variable | Used services of LRC-KJHAM before baseline | Service satisfaction | Used services of LRC-KJHAM since baseline | Service satisfaction |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2012 | 2013 | 2013 |
| **Sample size** | 20 | | 7 | |
| Psychological counselling (-2 to +2) | 8 | 0.63<br>(1.06) | 0 | - |
| Legal advice (-2 to +2) | 9 | 0.78<br>(0.97) | 4 | 0.00<br>(0.00) |
| Legal aid (-2 to +2) | 7 | 1.43<br>(0.53) | 4 | 1.50<br>(1.00) |
| Support group (-2 to +2) | 6 | 0.50<br>(1.05) | 3 | 1.33<br>(1.15) |

Source: Household survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses.

# Annex VII. Survey outcomes by marital status at baseline

## *Respondent characteristics*

**Table 33: General characteristics of the sample (not divorced at baseline)**

| Sample | Total sample | Not divorced at baseline |
|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2012 |
| **Sample size** | 20 | 15 |
| **Age** | 37.75 (10.02) | 37.13 (9.94) |
| **Number of children** | 1.78 (0.81) | 1.69 (0.85) |
| **Religion** | | |
| - *Islam* | 17 | 14 |
| - *Catholic* | 2 | 0 |
| - *Protestant* | 1 | 1 |
| **Highest level of education of respondent** | | |
| - *Elementary* | 1 | 1 |
| - *Junior High School* | 3 | 2 |
| - *Senior High School* | 9 | 7 |
| - *University* | 7 | 5 |
| **Highest level of education of partner** | | |
| - *Elementary* | 1 | 1 |
| - *Junior High School* | 2 | 2 |
| - *Senior High School* | 12 | 8 |
| - *University* | 5 | 4 |
| **Employment status of respondent** | | |
| - *Unemployed / Housewife* | 4 | 4 |
| - *Work* | 16 | 11 |
| **Employment status of partner** | | |
| - *Unemployed* | 4 | 3 |
| - *Work* | 16 | 12 |
| **Asset index** | 0.76 (0.68) | 0.87 (0.65) |
| **Housing facilities index** | 0.58 (0.16) | 0.57 (0.15) |

Source: Household survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations are given in parentheses.

### *Exposure to domestic violence*

**Table 34: Experiences of domestic abuse if not divorced at baseline**

| **Not divorced at baseline** | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2013-2012 | | 2014-2013 | | 2014-2012 | |
| **Sample size** | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | | 15 | | 15 | |
| | | | | Increase | Decrease | Increase | Decrease | Increase | Decrease |
| **Abused by husband/ partner in past 12 months** | | | | | | | | | |
| - *Any abuse* | 12 | 10 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 8 |
| - *Physical* | 6 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 6 |
| - *Psychological* | 12 | 10 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 8 |
| - *Sexual* | 5 | 7 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 1 | 5 |
| **Nr. of types of abuse by husband/partner** | 1.53 (1.13) | 1.27 (1.10) | 0.33 (0.62) | -0.27 (1.22) | | -0.93*** (0.88) | | -1.20*** (1.37) | |

Source: Household survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Note: Standard deviations given in parentheses. * p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value <0.01

## *Psychological health*

**Table 35: Indices of psychological distress if not divorced at baseline**

| Not divorced at baseline | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2013-2012 | 2014-2013 | 2014-2012 |
| **Sample size** | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| **Psychological distress (0-12)** | **5.07 (2.58)** | **2.47 (2.13)** | **2.87 (2.00)** | **-2.60*** (2.90)** | **0.40 (1.92)** | **-2.20** (3.19)** |
| **Social dysfunction (0-6)** | **1.33 (1.23)** | **0.33 (0.82)** | **0.40 (1.06)** | **-1.00*** (1.13)** | **0.07 (0.59)** | **-0.93** (1.28)** |
| *Have not played a useful part in things* | 0.27 (0.46) | 0.07 (0.26) | 0.20 (0.41) | -0.20 (0.56) | 0.13 (0.52) | -0.07 (0.46) |
| *Not able to concentrate in everything* | 0.27 (0.46) | 0.07 (0.26) | 0.07 (0.26) | -0.20* (0.41) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.20* (0.41) |
| *Not feeling capable of making decisions* | 0.20 (0.41) | 0.07 (0.26) | 0.07 (0.26) | -0.13 (0.52) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.13 (0.52) |
| *Not enjoying normal day-to-day activities* | 0.07 (0.26) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.07 (0.26) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.07 (0.26) |
| *Not able to face up emotional problems* | 0.13 (0.35) | 0.07 (0.26) | 0.07 (0.26) | -0.07 (0.26) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.07 (0.26) |
| *Not feeling reasonably happy in general* | 0.40 (0.51) | 0.07 (0.26) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.33** (0.49) | -0.07 (0.26) | -0.40*** (0.51) |
| **Anxiety (0-4)** | **2.47 (1.19)** | **1.60 (1.30)** | **1.67 (1.11)** | **-0.87* (1.64)** | **0.07 (1.03)** | **-0.80* (1.57)** |
| *Lost much sleep over worry* | 0.47 (0.52) | 0.53 (0.52) | 0.47 (0.52) | 0.07 (0.70) | -0.07 (0.59) | 0.00 (0.65) |
| *Felt under strain* | 0.73 (0.46) | 0.40 (0.51) | 0.13 (0.35) | -0.33** (0.49) | -0.27** (0.46) | -0.60*** (0.51) |
| *Could not overcome emotional problems* | 0.73 (0.46) | 0.53 (0.52) | 0.80 (0.41) | -0.20 (0.77) | 0.27** (0.46) | 0.07 (0.70) |
| *Thought of yourself as worthless person* | 0.53 (0.52) | 0.13 (0.35) | 0.27 (0.46) | -0.40*** (0.51) | 0.13 (0.52) | -0.27 (0.70) |
| **Losing confidence in yourself (0-2)** | **1.27 (0.88)** | **0.53 (0.74)** | **0.80 (0.86)** | **-0.73*** (0.88)** | **0.27 (0.80)** | **-0.47 (1.25)** |
| *Felt depressed* | 0.67 (0.49) | 0.40 (0.51) | 0.27 (0.46) | -0.27 (0.59) | -0.13 (0.52) | -0.40* (0.74) |

| Not divorced at baseline | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2013-2012 | 2014-2013 | 2014-2012 |
| **Sample size** | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| *Losing confidence in yourself* | 0.60<br>(0.51) | 0.13<br>(0.35) | 0.53<br>(0.52) | -0.47***<br>(0.52) | 0.40***<br>(0.51) | -0.07<br>(0.70) |

Source: Household survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. * p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value <0.01

### *Women's attitude towards themselves*

**Table 36: Women's empowerment if not divorced at baseline**

| Not divorced at baseline | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2014 | 2012-2014 |
| **Sample size** | 20 | 20 | 20 |
| **Self-efficacy index** | 0.57<br>(0.56) | 0.60<br>(0.60) | 0.03<br>(0.55) |
| **Self-esteem index** | -0.03<br>(0.41) | 0.57<br>(0.45) | 0.60***<br>(0.52) |
| **Control index** | 0.00<br>(0.80) | 0.40<br>(0.91) | 0.40<br>(1.26) |
| **Dependency** | -0.20<br>(1.37) | 0.47<br>(1.13) | 0.67<br>(1.50) |
| **Support** | 1.20<br>(0.41) | 1.07<br>(0.96) | -0.13<br>(0.99) |

Source: Household survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. * p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

**Table 37: Components of indices of women empowerment if not divorced at baseline**

| Not divorced at baseline | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2014 | 2012-2014 |
| **Sample size** | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| **Self-efficacy index** | **0.57** | **0.60** | **0.03** |
| | **(0.56)** | **(0.60)** | **(0.55)** |
| On the whole, I'm able to take charge of my life | 0.20 | 0.13 | -0.07 |
| | (1.01) | (1.19) | (0.88) |
| I make commitments not to think of myself as worthless | 0.93 | 1.07 | 0.13 |
| | (0.59) | (0.96) | (0.74) |
| **Self-esteem index** | **-0.03** | **0.57** | **0.60*** ** |
| | **(0.41)** | **(0.45)** | **(0.52)** |
| I feel I do not have much to be proud of[1] | 0.00 | 1.27 | 1.27*** |
| | (1.20) | (0.59) | (1.28) |
| I take a positive attitude towards myself | 1.20 | 1.13 | -0.07 |
| | (0.41) | (0.52) | (0.46) |
| I wish I could have more respect for myself[1] | -1.40 | -1.13 | 0.27 |
| | (0.51) | (0.74) | (0.80) |
| On the whole, I am satisfied with myself | 0.07 | 1.00 | 0.93*** |
| | (1.10) | (0.76) | (1.16) |
| **Control index** | **0.00** | **0.40** | **0.40** |
| | **(0.80)** | **(0.91)** | **(1.26)** |
| It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things are a matter of good or bad fortune[1] | 0.00 | 0.27 | 0.27 |
| | (1.07) | (1.28) | (1.53) |
| Often I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me[1] | 0.00 | 0.53 | 0.53 |
| | (1.13) | (0.99) | (1.77) |
| **Dependency** | **-0.20** | **0.47** | **0.67** |
| | **(1.37)** | **(1.13)** | **(1.50)** |
| My dependency on my partner makes me feel disappointed in myself[1] | -0.20 | 0.47 | 0.67 |
| | (1.37) | (1.13) | (1.50) |
| **Support** | **1.20** | **1.07** | **-0.13** |
| | **(0.41)** | **(0.96)** | **(0.99)** |
| I have someone who listens when I need to talk about my problems | 1.20 | 1.07 | -0.13 |
| | (0.41) | (0.96) | (0.99) |

Source: Household survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. * p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.
1. Since agreement with these statement indicates negative feelings, the scale has been reversed so that higher values indicate disagreement with the statement (positive feelings)

## *Empowerment in marriage*

**Table 38: Empowerment in marriage if not divorced at baseline**

| **Not divorced at baseline** | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2013-2012 | | 2014-2012 | |
| **Sample size** | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | | 15 | |
| | | | | Increase | Decrease | Increase | Decrease |
| Rights of wife index (0-9) | 5.40 | | 5.00 | | | -0.40 | |
| | (1.72) | | (1.51) | | | (1.68) | |
| *Any good reason for a husband to hit his wife* | 5 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| Nr. of good reasons for a husband to hit his wife (0-6) | 0.67 | 0.60 | 0.47 | -0.07 | | -0.20 | |
| | (1.11) | (0.83) | (0.92) | (1.28) | | (1.32) | |
| *Any occasion a wife can refuse to have sex* | 14 | 14 | 15 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Nr. of occasions a wife can refuse to have sex (0-3) | 2.27 | 2.00 | 2.20 | -0.27 | | -0.07 | |
| | (0.96) | (0.85) | (0.68) | (0.96) | | (1.28) | |

Source: Household survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. * p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

**Table 39: Components of rights of wife index if not divorced at baseline**

| **Not divorced at baseline** | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2014 | 2012-2014 |
| **Sample size** | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| Fraction of sample that disagrees with […][1] | | | |
| *A good wife obeys her husband even if she disagrees* | 0.60 | 0.40 | -0.20 |
| | (0.51) | (0.51) | (0.56) |
| *Family problems should only be discussed with people in the family* | 0.27 | 0.20 | -0.07 |
| | (0.46) | (0.41) | (0.59) |
| *It is important for a man to show his wife who is the boss* | 0.87 | 0.93 | 0.07 |
| | (0.35) | (0.26) | (0.26) |
| *A husband has the right to know where his wife is at all times* | 0.40 | 0.33 | -0.07 |
| | (0.51) | (0.49) | (0.46) |
| *It's a wife's obligation to have sex with her husband even if she doesn't feel like it* | 0.33 | 0.73 | 0.40*** |
| | (0.49) | (0.46) | (0.51) |
| Fraction of sample that agrees with […] | | | |

| Not divorced at baseline | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2014 | 2012-2014 |
| **Sample size** | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| *A woman should be able to choose her own friends even if her husband disapproves* | 0.80<br>(0.41) | 0.47<br>(0.52) | -0.33**<br>(0.49) |
| *If a man mistreats his wife, others outside of the family should intervene* | 0.40<br>(0.51) | 0.53<br>(0.52) | 0.13<br>(0.64) |
| *A woman should be allowed to have a full or part-time job outside the household even if her husband disapproves* | 0.73<br>(0.46) | 0.40<br>(0.51) | -0.33**<br>(0.49) |
| *After finishing her housework, a wife should be allowed to participate in social activities in the community* | 1.00<br>(0.00) | 1.00<br>(0.00) | 0.00<br>(0.00) |

Source: Household survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. * p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.
1. Agreement with these indicators show that the woman thinks that she has little rights, so the scale for these statements has been reversed so that the outcomes for these statements show the fraction of the women that disagreed. So, a higher value indicates more desirable outcomes.

**Table 40: Reasons for a husband to hit his wife and occasions in which the wife can refuse to have sex if not divorced at baseline**

| Not divorced at baseline | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Period | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2013-2012 | | 2014-2012 | |
| Sample size | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | | 15 | |
| | | | | Increase | Decrease | Increase | Decrease |
| Number of women that see […] as a good reason for a husband to hit his wife | | | | | | | |
| *She goes out without telling him* | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| *She neglects the children* | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| *She argues with him* | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| *She burns the food* | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| *She disobeys him* | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| *She refuses to have sexual intercourse with him* | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Number of women that see […] as an occasion a wife can refuse sex | | | | | | | |
| *She feels sick or tired* | 13 | 14 | 14 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 |
| *If he slept with another woman* | 12 | 12 | 14 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 1 |
| *She doesn't want to have sex* | 9 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 5 | 3 | 7 |

Source: Household survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

## *Additional tables*

**Table 41: Relationship with current/last husband/partner if not divorced at baseline**

| Not divorced at baseline | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2012-2013 | 2013-2014 | 2012-2014 |
| **Sample size** | 7 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 6 |
| **Negative (abusive) (0-7)** | **3.80** | **3.43** | **2.43** | **-0.29** | **-1.00** | **-1.29** |
| | **(1.90)** | **(2.28)** | **(2.34)** | **(2.27)** | **(2.51)** | **(3.02)** |
| *Tries to keep you from seeing your friends* | 0.73 | 0.50 | 0.36 | -0.21 | -0.14 | -0.36* |
| | (0.46) | (0.52) | (0.50) | (0.58) | (0.53) | (0.74) |
| *Tries to restrict contact with your family of birth* | 0.40 | 0.29 | 0.07 | -0.07 | -0.21* | -0.29 |
| | (0.51) | (0.47) | (0.27) | (0.47) | (0.43) | (0.61) |
| *Insists on knowing where you are at all times* | 0.47 | 0.57 | 0.36 | 0.07 | -0.21* | -0.14 |
| | (0.52) | (0.51) | (0.50) | (0.62) | (0.43) | (0.66) |
| *Ignores you and treats you indifferently* | 0.67 | 0.64 | 0.43 | 0.00 | -0.21* | -0.21 |
| | (0.49) | (0.50) | (0.51) | (0.39) | (0.43) | (0.58) |
| *Gets angry if you speak with another man* | 0.47 | 0.43 | 0.29 | 0.00 | -0.14 | -0.14 |
| | (0.52) | (0.51) | (0.47) | (0.39) | (0.53) | (0.66) |
| *Is often suspicious that you are unfaithful* | 0.53 | 0.43 | 0.36 | -0.07 | -0.07 | -0.14 |
| | (0.52) | (0.51) | (0.50) | (0.73) | (0.47) | (0.77) |
| *Expects you to ask his permission before seeking health care for yourself* | 0.53 | 0.57 | 0.57 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| | (0.52) | (0.51) | (0.51) | (0.78) | (0.68) | (0.88) |
| **Positive (supportive)(0-4)** | **1.87** | **1.57** | **2.00** | **-0.43** | **0.43** | **0.00** |
| | **(1.46)** | **(1.74)** | **(1.62)** | **(1.40)** | **(1.55)** | **(1.66)** |
| *Pays attention to you* | 0.60 | 0.43 | 0.50 | -0.21 | 0.07 | -0.14 |
| | (0.51) | (0.51) | (0.52) | (0.58) | (0.62) | (0.66) |
| *Takes good care of you and your children* | 0.47 | 0.36 | 0.43 | -0.14 | 0.07 | -0.07 |
| | (0.52) | (0.50) | (0.51) | (0.66) | (0.62) | (0.62) |
| *Supports you when you need it* | 0.40 | 0.36 | 0.43 | -0.07 | 0.07 | 0.00 |
| | (0.51) | (0.50) | (0.51) | (0.27) | (0.47) | (0.55) |
| *Trusts you in most situations* | 0.40 | 0.43 | 0.64 | 0.00 | 0.21 | 0.21* |
| | (0.51) | (0.51) | (0.50) | (0.55) | (0.58) | (0.43) |

Source: Household survey E7; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Note: Standard deviations given in parentheses. * p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value <0.01

# Annex VIII. Qualitative report on the evaluation of LRC-KJHAM's Gender Based Violence programme

## 1. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. Methods of study

As part of the evaluation of the project of LRC-KJHAM we have conducted a qualitative research amongst the direct beneficiaries of the project. Firstly, we have conducted in-depth interviews with 4 agencies; LRC-KJHAM, Seruni, Provincial PPT, and PPT city/BAPPERMAS in order to learn more about the project context and the relationship between LRC-KJHAM and government. Secondly, to find out more about LRC-KJHAM's project activities, its clients, and the ways in which LRC-KJHAM's project has impacted its clients' lives, in depth interviews have been conducted with 9 female clients of LRC-KJHAM. 6 of these clients have been members of the LRC-KJHAM support group for over a year, and the other 3 clients for less than a year. We have also held a focus group discussion with 5 female (ex-)clients who have become paralegals for LRC-KJHAM.

The interviews were carried out in the place that was most practical and convenient for the informant. As a result, most of the interviews were carried out in LRC-KJHAM's headquarters, and some interviews were conducted in respondents' homes (2), in a respondent's workplace (1), in a restaurant (1), and in the Women Empowerment Office (3).

### 1.2. Informant Selection and Characteristics

The selection of the informants was carried out by LRC-KJHAM. The reason for this is that –to protect the clients' privacy- it is LRC-KJHAM's policy that only their counsellors have the right to contact the clients. It was therefore arranged that the LRC-KJHAM personnel invited the clients to partake in the research and informed them about the purpose of the study. After they acquired the client's consent, the LRC-KJHAM personnel provided us with the clients' names and telephone numbers, which we used to contact them and set a time and place for the interview. It should be noted that the informants were selected based on their participation in the support group or their status as paralegal. Their views may therefore not necessarily represent those of the women that chose not to participate in the support group.

From our 14 informants, 7 were between 23-40 years old and 7 between 40-55 years old. 10 women were already divorced, 2 women were in the process of being divorced, 1 woman had an uncertain marital status, and 1 woman was never married but had problems with the father of her children. The educational level of the informants was highly varied, ranging from 4'th grade elementary school to Post Graduate studies. All of the women reported to have jobs, i.e. as sellers, employees of a private company, and entrepreneurs. All of them were mothers of 2-5 children, and held custody over their children. One of the women however reported that her husband had illegally taken her children away from her. All of the informants had been victims of gender based violence (GBV) or domestic violence (KDRT[36]) and had experienced psychological abuse. Some of the women also reported physical

[36]This abbreviation stands for '*Kekerasan Dalam Rumah Tangga*', which is the Indonesian term for domestic violence.

abuse (4), economic abuse (1), or abuse which involved their children (3). Most of the conflicts occurred within their households and 10 out of 14 women reported their husband's cheating as one of the major causes of conflict and ultimately divorce.

## 2. BACKGROUND CONTEXT


### 2.1. Scope of the Gender Based Violence Problem

Over the last few years reports of domestic violence against women have increased. According to the National Commission on Violence against Women (Komnas Perempuan) 119.107 cases of violence against women had been reported in Indonesia in 2011. Most of these reports were filed in Central Java Province (25.628 cases) which is also the working area of LRC-KJHAM, followed by East Java (24.555 cases) and West Java (17.720 cases). Almost 97% of the reports (110.468 cases) have been filed as 'domestic violence' cases. Another 1.405 cases involved violence within dating relationships.

From the different types of violence against women in the domestic domain, psychological violence ranked the highest with 103.691 cases, followed by economic violence (3.222 cases), physical violence (2.700 cases), and sexual violence (1.398 cases). The age of the victims that reported the violence ranged between 13-40 years. According to Komnas Perempuan (2012) the most vulnerable age group among them is 25-40 years.

In Central Java district Komnas Perempuan recorded an additional 268 cases of violence against women in 'the public domain', meaning that the victim and offender didn't have any kinship or marital relationship to each other. In these cases offenders were e.g. employers, neighbours, teachers, colleagues, community figures or complete strangers.

**Figure 3: Number of registered cases of domestic violence by type**




Source: Komnas Perempuan (2012)

### 2.2. Rights and Access to Justice for Female Victims of Gender Based Violence

In 2004 the Indonesian Government implemented law no. 23 (the PKDRT[37] law) on the Elimination of Domestic Violence. However, in 2011 Komnas Perempuan's annual records showed a 13.2% increase in

[37] This abbreviation stands for '*PenghapusanKekerasan Dalam Rumah Tangga'*, which means the elimination of domestic violence.

the rating of domestic violence cases compared to 2003. Even though this increase could well be the result of a positive trend whereby more victims that would previously have kept the violence silence have come to find it easier to report their cases, the numbers still attest to the fact that domestic violence in an ongoing problem within Indonesian society.

The PKDRT law of 2004, was a huge encouragement to female victims of domestic violence who were now for the first time legally entitled to report any violence they experienced at the hands of their husband. As a result of the implementation of this law, institutions providing services to female and child victims of GBV started coming into being. In 2011, Komnas Perempuan recorded a total of 395 of these institutions (both government and non-government initiatives) across 33 provinces in Indonesia, providing for example counsellors, gender-sensitive judges/district attorneys and database officers.

In spite of the efforts taken by these institutions, local government is often still slow to provide protection to victims of gender based violence. This is problematic, because reporting a husband's misconduct or filing for a divorce brings the victim in a vulnerable position. Only in 2009 Central Java Province issued the By-law no. 3/2009 which governs the protection for women and children that become the victim of domestic and/or gender based violence. In its article 4 the rights of female victims are listed as follows:

a. The freedom to give testimony without consequences for her safety, and the right to obtain protection for herself, her family, and her belongings;
b. The right to choose and determine the type of protection and safety support;
c. The right to be free from having to answer sensitive questions;
d. The right to receive updates on her case development and court verdict;
e. The right to receive quick, correct, comfortable and appropriate service;
f. The right to recovery and social reintegration;
g. The right to obtain legal, psychological, religious, economic, and social assistance, and assistance in translation.

In article 5 of the By-law the obligations of the local government are listed as follows:

a. Prevent any violence;
b. Provide protection to victims;
c. Provide recovery service and social reintegration;
d. Encourage and improve community participation;
e. Cooperate with service providers for preventive measures;
f. Protection and recovery of victims.

As a result of this By-law, local governments are authorized to form integrated services centres (PPTKs) and commissions for the protection of female and child victims of domestic and/or gender based violence, which have the following functions:

a. Prepare policy formulation and protection programmes for victims(women and children) of domestic and gender based violence;
b. Resolve disputes between service providers;
c. Develop protection systems for victims of domestic and gender based violence;

d. Observation, supervision and reporting with regard to the protection of domestic and gender based violence victims.

LRC-KJHAM is one of the institutions which provides protection services to, and engages in policy advocacy on the protection of victimized women and children. Its aim is to empower victims of domestic and gender based violence to become 'survivors' who are strong and knowledgeable enough to solve their problems and even help other victims to solve their problems by becoming "paralegals" for LRC-KJHAM, serving at an integrated sub-district service centre (PPTK). Semarang City currently counts 16 of those PPTKs in 16 sub-districts.

## 2.3. Divorce Due to Gender Based Violence: A Difficult Choice for Women

The root of domestic violence in Indonesia can -at least in part-be found in gender inequality, particularly within marital relations. Among certain ethnic groups in Indonesia religious and traditional marriage rites and practices exist that reflect and enforce existing gender inequality by instilling a sense of superiority of the husband over the wife and providing him with the means to justify the assertion of this superiority. An example of such a practice is the payment of a bride price, which the groom has to pay to the bride's family in exchange for their consent to their marriage. By paying the bride price, which is often so high that the groom is barely able to afford it, the groom may feel that his wife has become his property and he can therefore treat her as he pleases, even if this entails abusive behaviour towards her. Another marital practice involves the father of the bride taking on the role of his daughter's representative during the wedding ceremony. The husband thus swears the marital oath to the father of the bride, instead of to his bride herself. Many victims attest that, consequently, their husbands tell them during fights that "he is not bound by his oath to treat her well or stay faithful, because he hasn't sworn the marital oath directly to her".

Within Indonesian law and culture, the husband is always regarded as the head of the household and expected to be the breadwinner. The notion of the husband as the head of household is also stated in the marriage law no. 1, dating from 1974. It is also part of the 'covenant of marriage' which is read by the marriage officer of the office of local religious affairs (*Kantor Urusan Agama*) during Muslim wedding ceremonies. The idea that the husband is the most important person within the household, regardless of his ability, and the wife comes second is therefore continually reinforced within Indonesian society. The husband's culturally-instilled superior position as head and provider has grave implications for women's willingness and ability to report domestic violence and/or file for divorce. Worries about how to support herself and her children after a separation or divorce, can inhibit women from taking action to stop the abuse.

Moreover, women that report their husband to the police face the threat of 'revictimization', which means that a husband will requite his wife's actions by pressing made up charges against her, such as accusations of libel, mistreatment of the husband, etc. It can also happen that an offending husband tries to turn the tables by enticing his wife to attack him, so he can file an actual report against his wife to the police. The National Commission of Women recorded 20 cases of revictimization against women in 2011. 12 of these cases were related to domestic violence.

In most domestic violence cases quite some time passes before the woman comes to realize that her husband's abusive behaviour towards her is not right. Their husbands commonly deny that they have committed violent acts against their wife, and merely view their behaviour as part of the life cycle. Woman often try to find the blame in themselves (for example their lack of household managing skills), and it is usually only after a while that they start to wonder if they can ever achieve happiness this way and start to think about how to proceed with their lives.

Nevertheless, the National Commission for Women found that 95% of the divorce cases approved by the Religious High Court in 2011 were due to domestic violence against the wife. This data shows that women that fall victim to domestic violence can find ways to access justice and free themselves from their abusive husbands. Unfortunately, the data doesn't disclose the type of divorce, which can be either *gugat cerai* (divorce sued by the wife) or *cerai talak* (divorce sued by the husband).

## 3. ACCESS TO HELP

### 3.1. Access of Victims to LRC-KJHAM's Services

LRC-KJHAM experienced a significant increase in client numbers between 2011 and 2013. They recorded 30 cases of gender based violence from January – October 2011 (10 months), 47 cases from November 2011 – October 2012 (12 months), and 44 cases from November 2012 – June 2013 (8 months).

All of the informants sought help from LRC-KJHAM after they were recommended to do so by a friend, a family member, or church mates or by authority figures such as the women empowerment organisation, a government officer, a PA officer, a lawyer, a law lecturer of UNDIP (Diponegoro University), a doctor, or staff members of LBH (*Lembaga Bantuan Hukum*). None of the informants were familiar with LRC-KJHAM before. This data suggests that victims' knowledge on how to access service facilities such as LRC-KJHAM is still limited, but luckily LRC-KJHAM seems to be well known by the relevant institutions.

### 3.2. Psychological Violence and the Female Gender Role as Debilitating Factors to Help Seeking

Even though the abuse our 14 informants experienced took different shapes for each of them, the common denominator among them was that all the women suffered from forms of psychological abuse. In the PKDRT Law psychological abuse is defined as: "Acts that result in fear, loss of confidence, loss of the ability to act, a sense of helplessness, and/or severe psychological suffering on a person" (Chapter 7, 2004).

All of our informants reported to have experienced insecurity and fear. These insecurities would typically manifest themselves as feelings of helplessness and self-blaming. The women mentioned that they would first question themselves and would try to find out what it was that they were doing wrong to provoke this kind of behaviour from their husband. Was it the way they dressed? Their lack of cooking or household skills? The way they managed the finances? Weren't they serving their husband right? If the women were unable to detect the problem, they would typically proceed to assume that their husband behaved this way because he was tired or was dealing with a problem. The women's only initial response was to simply brace themselves for his bad temper.

Examples of a husband's behaviour that left the women feeling insecure and afraid were verbal threats, absent behaviour such not coming home for multiple days without notifying her, unanswered calls, having no phone-connection, not paying attention to her or fully ignoring her, and withholding money from her. One of our informants testified that her husband used to give her money every month, but later decided to give her the money per day as if he didn't trust her with it. Near the end of their marriage he only wanted to give her money when there was an urgent reason for her to spend it. Our informants reported that these types of behaviour made them feel uncomfortable, guilty, and fearful of their husband's temper. It would also make them worry about their husband being unfaithful or even marrying another woman. As a result of these negative thoughts and feelings the informants said they lost concentration and became more sensitive and irritable towards their kids. Also, during the focus group discussion almost all of the informants recognized that the situation had an impact on their menstrual periods. *"Oh, yeah, yeah, it impacts on our irregular menstruation.."* yelled the participants. One of the informants mentioned that she felt that her worries disturbed her prayer.

An inherent problem of psychological violence is that it is difficult to prove. The victims realize this, and therefore psychological violence often stays under-reported. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that patriarchal Javanese culture views woman as calm, gentle and patient in nature. Women are therefore implicitly expected to quietly endure the suffering that life brings them. Women that portray feelings of jealousy, shock, disappointment, and anger towards their husband and thereby fail to subscribe to the cultural notion of the "good wife", risk being stigmatized by their community and being perceived as a disgrace to their family. This often results in the victim being blamed for the situation. Speaking up about your problems to your relatives or friends and reporting the abuse to the authorities therefore requires a lot of courage, and fear of the consequences often prevents women from doing so at an early stage. Instead, they stay silent and hope that their husband's behaviour will change with time. The following statement of one of our informants illustrates this point:

> At first, I didn't mind if my husband was unemployed since I was the one who was working. I tried to be patient and I just hoped things would change that my husband would get a job. But after three years of marriage, I didn't see any changes and I have had two children. And then I started to wonder, how much longer do I have to hold on to this situation? (Informant, 33 years old, university graduate).

### 3.3. Motivation behind Seeking for Help

During the interviews and focus group discussion, the majority of the informants conveyed that a lot of time went by before they decided to report the violence they experienced to the police or to seek other legal aid to solve their issues. All informants said that they had initially "tried to understand the situation" and "tried to hang on and stay patient". Only when the situation worsened, and they were no longer able to carry the burden and couldn't contain their feelings anymore, they decided to tell their friends or relatives. When the informants were asked what eventually motivated them to file for divorce and/or ask for other legal aid, they said that they had just reached a point where "they couldn't take it anymore" and had no other choice than to end the abuse. 3 of the focus group participants, for example, exclaimed: "I can't believe I have gone through this".

The informants described the following situations as turning points that triggered them to finally seek help: Finding out that the husband had cheated on them (4) or finding out that the husband

wanted to marry another woman (5). 1 of the informants said that her husband had even asked for her approval to marry another woman, 2 informants' husbands had filed for divorce themselves, and 1 informant's husband had left her and already had a child with another woman. 2 other informants answered that they finally decided to take action after an incident where their husband badly hurt them physically. 1 of these informants got beat up while she was pregnant with her second child. The other was stabbed in the arm with a knife and was also accused of cheating. Another informant was accused of forging the marriage certificate after she tried to get her husband to acknowledge her child. Lastly, 2 other informants said the situation had become unbearable because the husband refused to provide financial support for her and the children.

It is important to note that none of the informants made the step to report the abuse or to file for divorce on their own. Even though the women generally realized that they didn't deserve the abusive behaviour, all of them needed a push from either a friend, family member, neighbour, acquaintance, or public officer before they would take action. For example: One informant said she only got motivated to overcome her abusive situation when her friend, who found out about her household issues, mocked her for not doing anything about it.

> I felt very bad when my friend told me that she pitied me because my husband did not have a job. She asked me whether or not I knew that all he does every day is just hanging out (Informant, 50 years old, 5 years at LRC-KJHAM).

Another informant, who –together with her children- was repeatedly physically abused by her husband, said she only went to the authorities after her neighbours found out about the abuse and told her to get a physical examination and report her husband to the police.

Female victims of domestic violence generally only take action after having received support from family or friends. One of the reasons is that these women often have trouble to determine if the violence they endure actually qualifies as human right violence or if it's merely a natural part of life that they are unlucky enough to have to experience. They often need others to remind them that seeking help in order to overcome the abusive situation is part of their rights.

# 4. LRC-KJHAM'S SERVICES AND ACTIVITIES: IMPACTS AND SERVICE SATISFACTION

## 4.1. Project Strategy

The main objective of LRC-KJHAM is to strengthen the access of marginalized/poor female victims of gender based violence to legal resources. It attempts to accomplish this objective by providing psychological counselling, legal aid services and support groups in order to empower victims of gender based violence to become 'survivors' that have the ability and willingness to fight for their rights and happiness, and ultimately even become 'agents of change' committed to supporting – and fighting for the rights of- other victims.

At the time of our study, 7 informants had already had their cases settled with the help of LRC-KJHAM, 6 informants were still being helped by LCR-KJHAM on their -as yet unsolved- cases, and 1

informant, who had only recently gotten into contact with LRC-KJHAM, had only joined the support group once and had not yet received any other services by LRC-KJHAM.

Overall, the informants were very satisfied with the help they received from the LRC-KJHAM staff, and reported predominantly positive effects of the services on their lives. In this chapter we will report about the different activities and services that LRC-KJHAM provides to its clients, and the self-reported impacts of those activities and services on the lives of our informants.

## 4.2. Counselling

After our informants sought help from LRC-KJHAM, they first received a psychological counselling session. During this session the informant, who was henceforward called '*mitra*' (meaning: partner), was encouraged to share all the problems she faced with the counsellor.

The success of each counselling session is highly dependent on the skills and ability of the counsellor to make the victim feel comfortable, and to make her talk freely, so that the right way to help the victim can be established. According to our informants, the counsellors of LRC-KJHAM had listened patiently to their stories, had made notes, had tried to help and comfort them, and had made clear that the victims could contact them any time. At least 4 of the informants emphasized that the counselling session had had a positive, comforting, and motivational impact on them:

> After I attended the counselling, I felt free from the burden of this problem for the first time. I have told the counsellor about all of my misery. I felt so far and it made my mind at ease. I became aware about what I should do next in my life, and I realized that I should stop crying since it would not solve my problem (Informant, 38 years old, 2 years at LRC-KJHAM).

The informant remarked that she "felt like she had been lift up from the abyss and someone guided her back to the right path". After the counselling session she regained the courage to live her life the way she wanted it, and to start a new and better life.

One other informant told her counsellor about the physical abuse she endured at the hands of her husband, and about how she resented him so much that she was planning to take revenge. However, as a result of the counselling session she could let go of these thoughts, as she had learnt that her plan was unwise and she could instead get her rights by following the law.

## 4.3. Legal Aid

After the counselling session, the informants were offered legal assistance and guidance, for example throughout divorce trials, custody trials and in reporting violence to the police. The informants mentioned that the LRC-KJHAM staff had, among other things, helped them to prepare the necessary documents for court (4), helped them to write and report their story in a chronological fashion (3), taught them what their rights were (2) and taught them how they should answer questions in court (2). 1 informant said that LRC_KJHAM had contacted her husband's lawyer for her, and 1 other informant mentioned that LRC-KJHAM had paid for a DNA test and helped her use it as evidence in court. 5 informants also explicitly mentioned that LRC-KJHAM had given them "encouragement to face the trial".

The victims that lived in an area with a PPTK (a sub-district integrated service centre) were also referred to a PPTK-paralegal for further assistance. In the most serious cases LRC-KJHAM also

cooperates with attorneys from LBH in Semarang city, in order to further facilitate the victim's access to other relevant service providers such as the police, prosecutors, judiciaries, and sometimes the mass media.

The informants conveyed that they were happy with the legal aid provided by LRC-KJHAM. The fact that LRC-KJHAM provides lawyers that are free of charge is an appealing advantage for many of the victims, who would otherwise not have been able to afford the costs of a trial.

> I have never imagined before that I would have a lawyer by my side. I could never meet a lawyer before because I could not afford one, but now I can meet him every time I want to talk to him about my problem. And all the staffs in KJHAM served me very well (Informant, 34 years old, 2 months at LRC-KJHAM).

Another large advantage of LRC-KJHAM's services mentioned by the informants is the support and genuine care that was shown by the staff. According to the informants, this was not something that could be attained from a private lawyer that one can hire. One of the informants described a bad experience she had had in the past when she hired a lawyer that didn't seem to care about her at all, and even turned out to plot against her with her own husband. The lawyer from LRC-KJHAM however, had stood by her and had fought for her rights from start to the end of her divorce process.

### 4.4. Support Group

Soon after our informants got involved with LRC-KJHAM (mostly right after the first counselling session) they were informed about LRC-KJHAM's support group for victims of gender based violence, and invited to attend it:

> Here they have a support group, if you're interested to join, it's a good one, there are lots of friends for sharing (quote form the counsellors as remembered by informant, 55 years old, 13 years as paralegal).

All of our informants decided to join the support group. Most of them were enthusiastic to join, hoping to learn from others' experiences (2), to share their story and find support from kindred spirits (5), to gain confidence (2), or in order to help others (5). Others hoped to receive useful materials (5), to have an opportunity to witness another victim's court session, or to participate in a demonstration to support policy changes (7). One informant expressed that she was reluctant to join the support group at first, but had changed her mind after she attended a meeting and realized how useful it could be for herself and others.

Initially, LRC-KJHAM's idea to form a support group was born at a time when they suffered a shortage of counsellors and were looking for alternative ways to keep enabling their clients to share their stories with others. LRC-KJHAM's support group later evolved into a self-contained group, which is run by ex-clients of LRC-KJHAM who have experience in organisation-management. The new support group was given the name '*Sekar Taji'*, which means: 'spurred flower' or 'able to defend'. Membership of the support group is voluntary, and attendance of the support group meetings is non-compulsory. Members will receive a text message on their phone, notifying them about an upcoming meeting, and can choose per meeting if they wish to attend or not.

The support group activities do not only consist of meetings where the victims share their stories. The members also actively help each other to solve problems, and sometimes undertake outside activities to fight for GBV victim's rights and policy reform. When we asked our informants how they participated in the support groups, they answered that they -apart from going to the regular meetings- also attended and/or assisted during other victims' trials (3), delivered invitations to trials (2), helped other victims write reports (1), gave advise and encouragement (3), made efforts to socialize the community on gender based violence issues (2), held audiences (1), organised fieldwork (1), and participated in demonstrations to compel a just verdict from the court (3).

Without exception the informants were happy to be members of the support group and all of them reported positive feelings and experiences with regard to their membership of (or encounters with) the support group. The positive impacts reported by the informants can be broadly summarized in 2 categories: feelings of empowerment and feelings of support.

Firstly, informants reported that the support group had empowered them by increasing their skills, knowledge (9) and confidence (4), and by helping them to become more independent (6), stronger (5), and better able to keep up their spirits and persevere in their struggle to change their situation (4).

> I used to weep while revealing the problems to KJHAM. But in the end I could lift my chin up after receiving enlightenment and encouragement from KJHAM. It was my own decision to divorce my husband (Informant, 42 years old, 9 years as paralegal).

> My husband still talks in a loud voice and sometimes gets angry with the children without reason, but I now talk back when he is angry, and I have never done that before I participated in KJHAM (Informant, 38 years old, 2 years at LRC-KJHAM).

> The skill in counselling has increased. I am more confident with myself. I used to face difficulty to speak even about my own problem. But now I have the confidence to answer every question including those from the government officers (Informant, 50 years old, 5 years at LRC-KJHAM).

> My knowledge has become broader. I even convinced the judge to allow me to participate during the trial even though I'm not a lawyer (Informant, 54 years old, 3 years at LRC-KJHAM).

> I can feel it and it has been very helpful. I learned a lot about law, computer, writing chronological stories, and completing documents to the court. We have been encouraged to move on and to be independent (Informant, 35 years old, 5 years at LRC-KJHAM).

Secondly, almost all informants mentioned that they felt comforted by – and drew strength from - hearing the stories of others and/or sharing their own experiences. It made them realize that they weren't alone in their hardship (7) and helped them to get a different perspective on what they had experienced. 4 of the informants reported they felt calmer and were able to smile again.

> At least I can ease the heartache. I can smile and think and realize that I am not alone. Some other women experienced even worse violence than I did (Informant, 38 years old, 2 years at LRC-KJHAM).

> I feel that my problem is not that big compared to those that other victims had. And they have been fighting for their rights for about two years (Informant, 34 years old, 2 months at LRC-KJHAM).

> I was able to adapt myself in the group during meetings, and I could express my sadness and release my feelings so that I became calmer (Informant, 35 years old, 5 years at LRC-KJHAM).

Statements made by the informants suggest that solidarity within the support group is very high, just as the drive to help other victims:

> Other victims can become like me and other women here. I can't leave KJHAM. The solidarity is awesome. We work together. We comfort each other. It's a great experience (Informant, 50 years old, 5 years at LRC-KJHAM).

One informant said that she and other support group members had once participated in a demonstration at a domestic violence trial without even personally knowing the victim. Another informant, who was getting into a taxi after a support group meeting, emphasized that she and other members were still enthusiastic about participating in the support group activities, even though they didn't receive any travel reimbursement anymore because the money from the sponsor had run out.

For some victims the drive to help other victims seemed to stem from a willingness to return the favour LRC-KJHAM had done them:

> I have the chance to learn from the other victim's community, and together we set up a plan of activity based on the need of women victims. Now I have the ability to speak in public. And I'm actively participating in KJHAM activities. That's all I can do to repay what KJHAM has done for me (Informant, 50 years old, 5 years at LRC-KJHAM).

> I was recommended by KJHAM to attend a meeting of the support group, and finally realized that I was not alone. Even I learned that many others have experienced worse. I was moved and I decided to participate in giving support to other victims (Informant, 23 years old, 3 years as paralegal).

Also, the fact that the informants had been victims, but had risen as survivors, and were now even able to help others seemed to instil a sense of proud in them:

> Usually someone will help after they have become capable to help, even though they were a victim, they are still able to help (Informant, 42 years old, 9 years as paralegal).

> I became a daredevil after joined the support group. We have people of various conditions here. Some are experiencing unfinished cases. Well we encourage them to keep on going (Informant, 50 years old, 5 years at LRC-KJHAM).

> I'm glad because I improved my knowledge by helping other women during trials. I'm also able to tell them what to do (Informant, 54 years old, 3 years at LRC-KJHAM).

The only recommendation for improvement for the support group meeting model was about the time at which the meetings were held:

> It's a pity that the meeting is conducted in the morning. The working hours, that's what made me often absent. But I always attend if I don't have any urgent things at work. My life became more valuable by participating in the support group (Informant, 54 years old, 3 years at LRC-KJHAM).

### 4.5. Paralegal Training

LRC-KJHAM also offers members of the support group that have managed to overcome their abusive situation (i.e. survivors) the opportunity to become official paralegals, that support – and fight for the rights of - other victims of gender based violence.

5 of our informants were paralegals. In order to become a paralegal the women were required to follow paralegal-trainings organised by LRC-KJHAM. During the trainings a variety of gender based violence related topics were covered. The women were also taught how to mentor and counsel other victims, how to conduct advocacy, and how the referral system works. After the paralegal-trainings, 3 informants were offered full time jobs at a PPTK (Sub-district Integrated Service Centre), where they are now in charge of non-litigation matters.[38] The other 2 informants offer advice and assistance directly to LRC-KJHAM clients and help to refer them to relevant service providers.

The informants had decided to participate in the paralegal trainings for different reasons: 1 woman wanted to broaden her knowledge and understanding, another said she was uneducated but was curious about the law, another felt moved by her own consciousness to share her experiences with others, and another said she was moved and empowered by LRC-KJHAM to help other victims.

The most inspiring parts of the training according to the informants were: learning about the law (4), learning about the duties of the spouse after divorce (1), learning how to prepare files for court (1), and learning how to assist the victim (1). The informants appeared to take their jobs as paralegals very seriously:

> I always communicate with the other victims, and I'm ready when I'm needed at any time. My hand phone is on for 24 hours a day. I am ready and I act fast (Informant, 55 years old, 13 years as paralegal).

> To be a paralegal means awareness to help other victims based on personal experience and being ready to provide assistance at any time (Informant, 43 years old, 5 years as paralegal).

> My hand phone is always active and ready to assist the victim. Paralegals are willing to work full time (Informant, 41 years old, 2 years as paralegal).

By working hard, they felt that they could truly really make a difference for other victims:

> I am able to be independent thanks to KJHAM. Now I try to make other women realize and assist them until their case is settled and they understand their rights as female victim (Informant, 55 years old, 13 years as paralegal).

> Alumni of KJHAM are shatterproof and strong. We really help women to settle their problems (Informant, 23 years old, 3 years as paralegal).

[38] Semarang city has 16 sub-districts, each of which has its own PPTK. At the beginning of LRC-KJHAM's activities, the paralegals that were trained by LRC-KJHAM were only placed at 4 of the 16 different PPTK's. Over the years the relationship between LRC-KJHAM and local government has strengthened and at the time of the interviews almost all of the 16 PPTKs have employed paralegals that were trained by LRC-KJHAM.

### 4.6. Conclusions about Programme Effectiveness and Client Satisfaction

From the answers given by the informants we can conclude that LRC-KJHAM's effort to change victims of gender based violence into survivors and active agents that are able to change their own situation as well as those of others has been quite successful, at least among our informants. The 5 paralegals we interviewed even conveyed that the paralegals had plans to become an independent organisation, not reliant on LRC-KJHAM.

When the informants were asked if they had any suggestions on how LRC-KJHAM could increase the impact of its activities almost all of them answered that they should just keep going on the way they were. The only advice given was that they should "become even more solid and improve the distribution of the tasks among their staff" (informant, 35 years old, 5 years at LRC-KJHAM) and that they "should add more advocacy resources (Informant, 55 years old, 13 years as paralegal) and lawyers" (all paralegals).

## 5. THE COOPERATION BETWEEN LRC-KJHAM AND GOVERNMENT

*"KJHAM has made many contributions, uncountable on fingers"*

The expression above was made by one of the informants who was interviewed about LRC-KJHAM's role in solving the gender based violence in Semarang and its surroundings. The presence of LRC-KJHAM is felt not only by its direct beneficiaries -the victims of gender based violence- but also by other stakeholders such as the Semarang government and development organisations.

The cooperation between LRC-KJHAM and the local government started when, as a result of legislative changes, local government began to allocate more of its APBD[39]funds to GBV issues, and LRC-KJHAM started to push the local government to provide the necessary services for victims of GBV.

Starting out with the critical idea that gender based violence was first and foremost government responsibility, LRC-KJHAM began to assemble all relevant stakeholders for the united task of preparing PPTKs: integrated service points at sub-district level. The choice to set up PPTKs at the sub-district level was consciously made, as most of the sub-district governments were already equipped with the right support facilities.

LRC-KJHAM has been a main initiator of the founding of the PPTKs. Setting up the PPTKs has not been an easy task and has required a lot of perseverance on the side of LRC-KJHAM's staff. On the one hand they had to forge close relationships with government officials, while on the other hand constantly staying critical and protecting their independent position. LRC-KJHAM realizes that its ability to succeed in advocacy and policy influencing is closely intertwined with the quality of its relationship with local government. LRC-KJHAM is therefore sometimes willing to make concessions and adjust its plans and strategy, if doing so means they can ensure local government's support and achieve practical results. This willingness to compromise is what sets LRC-KJHAM apart from other NGOs dealing with GBV issues, and has made LRC-KJHAM the mouthpiece through which community needs are conveyed to local government.

[39] APBD is an abbreviation of "Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanje Daerah", which is the revenue and expenditure budget.

Also after the foundation of the PPTKs, LRC-KJHAM and local government have kept working in close collaboration, i.a. with regard to staff training, mentoring, and providing assistance to victims. For example, when a victim seeks help at a PPTK, LRC-KJHAM has the responsibility to provide a lawyer that can accompany the victim in trial, since there are no lawyers/attorneys at the PPTKs. LRC-KJHAM also keeps the PPTKs updated on the number of victims that report at LRC-KJHAM, so local government can monitor the scope of GBV in the area. In return, LRC-KJHAM receives part of its funding from local government.

Networking with governmental agencies and authorities will keep being important for LRC-KJHAM, especially for advocacy purposes for cases that are presented in District of Religious Court. LRC-KJHAM's strategy aims to empower the victims of gender based violence to become agents of change that can themselves play a role in making policy change happen.

## 6. LESSONS LEARNED AND DISCUSSION

1. According to data released by Komnas Perempuan, the implementation of the Presidential Instruction (Inpres) on Gender Mainstreaming no. 9 year 2000, and the PKDRT law no. 23 year 2004, have not proven sufficient in abolishing gender based violence in Indonesia. Patriarchal culture and its traditional and religious values, norms and beliefs with regard to womanhood and a woman's role within marriage put women in a subordinate position and generally make them dependent on their spouses, both financially and with regard to their position within the community. By pushing for a divorce women are transgressing cultural norms on how a woman or wife should behave, and risk being stigmatized and marginalized by their community. This, and fear of not being able to support themselves and their children, is what usually keeps women from filing for a divorce or reporting the abusive behaviour of their husbands to the authorities. Changing these patriarchal cultural beliefs and practices is difficult and requires time and serious effort. Continuous advocacy of policy changes with regard to gender equality is therefore of extreme importance.

2. Most of our informants had initially tried to cope with the abuse on their own and had waited a long time before confiding to a friend or relative about the abuse. In the end none of them had made the step to contact LRC-KJHAM on their own. Instead, all of them had to be motivated by a friend, relative, neighbour, acquaintance, or public officer before they would seek help. In conducting active outreach to clients, it might thus be useful for LRC-KJHAM to include the victims' social circle and the relevant public institutions in their targeting.

3. LRC-KJHAM's strategy to change victims of gender based violence into survivors and active agents that are able to change their own situation as well as those of others is well chosen. By empowering victims and giving them the courage, skills, and will to actively speak up in court and actively commit their own knowledge and experiences to inspire and help other victims, the victims themselves become advocates for the fight against gender based violence. By changing shame and disgrace into power, they are able to gradually change the negative connotations that are traditionally associated with 'divorce' and 'assertiveness' in women, and inspire and encourage

other victims to fight for their own rights, and ultimately those of others. This should create a snowball effect through which influence on law and culture will be exponentially exerted.

4. Our data shows that, even though LRC-KJHAM never suggests divorce as a solution, victims of domestic violence preferred to file for divorce immediately, without first reporting the abuse and going through the full legal process. This is problematic because any abuse that is reported after the divorce is granted will legally not be sentenced as 'domestic violence', but rather as 'violence against women' for which lighter punishment applies. The fact that many women still decide to directly file for divorce supports the idea that victims know too little about legal procedures. Much can thus still be gained by training and educating the victims on their rights.

5. The synergy between LRC-KJHAM, victims, and government is the key to successfully handling gender based violence cases. The fact that women's right to protection from gender based violence is now recorded as a law, has given policy makers a discourse, and socialization of gender justice and equality already seems to be occurring at various levels. The presence of PPT Seruni: an integrated service centre at the city level, is proof that the government of Semarang is serious about dealing with gender based violence issues.

# Endline Report on the Achievement of MDGs and Themes:

# Evaluation of the YRBI project

## MFS II Joint Evaluations

## Indonesia

**Sub-report:**

**E8. Empowerment of *Mukim* and *Gampong* Capacity in Spatial Management Phase II,**

**Yayasan Rumpun Bambu Indonesia (YRBI)**

## FINAL REPORT

**9 April 2015**


**Amsterdam Institute for International Development (AIID)**

Trinity building C, 3rd floor, Rm XT-3.17
Pietersbergweg 17
1105 BM Amsterdam
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)20 5661596
F +31 (0)20 5665997
www.aiid.org

**SurveyMeter**

Jl. Jenengan Raya No.109
Maguwoharjo, Depok, Sleman,
Yogyakarta 55282
Indonesia
T +62 (0) 274 4477464
F +62 (0) 274 4477004
www.surveymeter.org

# List of contributors

**AIID**
Menno Pradhan (Principal Investigator)
Melinda Vigh (Research Coordinator)
Marije Groot Bruinderink (Project Manager)
Iris van Rossum (Junior Researcher)
Kimberley Wallaart (Qualitative Data Analyst)
Emilie Berkhout (Research Assistant)

**Survey Meter**
Ni Wayan Suriasatini (Research Coordinator)
Mardiana Br Ginting (Project Manager)
Muhammad Mulia (Qualitative Researcher and Field Coordinator)
Bondan Sikoki (Survey Expert)
Najib Azca (Expert Advisor on Theme Good Governance)

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## List of Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| CFA | Co-financing Agency |
| FGD | Focus Group Discussion |
| IDR | Indonesian Rupiah |
| IFAD | International Fund for Agricultural Development |
| JKPP | Indonesia Community Mapping Network (*Jaringkan Kerja Pemetaan Participatif*) |
| MDG | Millennium Development Goal |
| MFS II | Medefinancieringsstelsel (Co-financing System Grant Policy Framework) |
| MoU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |
| YRBI | Rumpun Bambu Indonesia Foundation (*Yayasan Rumpun Bambu Indonesia*) |

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Project context

Traditional (*adat*) structures and laws have existed in Aceh for hundreds of years. The *Mukim* institution was originally developed for religious reasons: it was too small for a *Gampong* (village) to hold Friday prayer ceremonies, which needs to be participated by at least 40 males. Therefore, some *Gampongs* created a federation of villages consisting of several (3-12) villages or *Gampongs*. In the past, the size of a *Mukim* was about 1,000 people. The leader of the *Mukim* is called *Imam Mukim*, and he played social, cultural and political roles, and sometimes even military roles. The leader of religious affairs in the *Mukim* is called *Imam Masjid.* The mosque in the *Mukim* is usually called *Masjid Jami'* (the great mosque), which was used for holding Friday prayer of Muslims from different *Gampongs* in the *Mukim*.

In the past, *Mukims* played a central role in social and economic activities of Aceh people. Its role included government administrative, customary (*adat*) and law (*hukom*) roles (Syarif 2010: 67). The division of authority between the *Gampong* and *Mukim* (association of *Gampongs*) was that the *Mukim* deals with issues which cannot be resolved at the *Gampong* level, and it was also the authorized reference for religious affairs. The *Mukim* also dealt with external affairs, while the *Gampong* addressed internal affairs.

However, the *Mukim* institution was weakened as a repercussion of modernization and, especially, centralization of power by the New Order regime. Following the implementation of Law number 5/1979 on Village Governance, *Mukims* lost their central role and authority as the law only recognizes the authority of the *Gampong* which is seen as a village, the smallest administration unit of government. Without legal recognition from the administration and the lack of financial resources, the *Mukims* played no significant role in Aceh society during the New Order regime. At the same time, the nature of *Gampong* which characterized with collegial type of leadership (altogether with *Teungku Meunasah* and *Tuha Peut*)[1] shifted to be a centralistic kind of leadership. In short, the head of village became the sole authority at the village level (Syarif 2010: 69-70).

Following the collapse of the New Order Regime in 1998 and in the aftermath of the tsunami disaster in 2004, there have been new streams to revive and to revitalize *adat* structure and laws in Aceh. Both the national and local government provided support to improve the capacity of the *Gampong* to involve in the development process. However, there are still too little efforts and too few resources available to enhance the capacity of the 6,408 *Gampongs* and 755 *Mukims* throughout Aceh. There is also a lack of clear rules of engagement between *adat* structures and the law and government's rules.

The Yayasan Rumpun Bambu Indonesia (YRBI) project aims to enhance the capacities of both *Gampong* and *Mukim* to effectively deal with problems related to land tenure, natural hazards, natural resources and spatial management in Aceh. The project is important, particularly, in the context of post-tsunami and post-conflict of Aceh, where society was quite significantly divided into conflicting groups and its environment was severely devastated due to the disaster. While the problems of post-conflict and post-

[1] *Teungku Meunasah* means leader of the village mosque, and he was in charge of religious affairs in the *Gampong*. *Tuah Peut* stands for representative council, usually elected elderly leaders representing the interest of the villagers. There are *Tuah Peut* both at the *Gampong* and *Mukim* level.

tsunami are particular located in Aceh, the weakness of traditional institutions was widespread throughout the archipelago.

Following massive and intensive rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes, land tenure and environmental problems have become new crucial issues in Aceh. Besides resulting in hundreds of thousands of deaths and colossal destruction in Aceh, the tsunami has also brought about another serious problem: the massive loss of land tenure documents. In some areas it has led to conflicting issues regarding boundaries between the *Gampongs* and *Mukims*. The situation has deteriorated in some areas, particularly when new natural resource exploitation projects took place. In several cases, both the *Gampongs* and the *Mukims* have not been involved in producing the license for natural resource exploitation which at times ended up in conflict between villagers and companies as well as among the villagers.

With these emerging problems in the backdrop, YRBI seeks to empower the traditional *Gampong* and *Mukim* institutions in Aceh to play more important roles in resolving conflict between groups as well as in better managing natural resources for more prosperous and sustainable society.

## 1.2. Evaluation objectives

This report evaluates the Empowerment of *Mukim* and *Gampong* Capacity in Spatial Management Phase II of Yayasan Rumpun Bambu Indonesia (YRBI) funded by ICCO. This project has been selected as part of the MFS II evaluation for Indonesia under the Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDG) component[2] under the MDG theme on good governance and civil society building.[3] In particular, the current evaluation focusses on the following research questions: how did the capacity of *Mukim* and *Gampong* on natural resource management and disasters management change? Are there *Gampong*/*Mukim* regulations produced about natural resource management? Are there local wisdom documentations about natural resource management produced? How did the management structure of community forest areas change? How did the attitude and awareness of the people towards natural resources change?

We investigate whether the project had a favourable effect on the above mentioned outcomes by looking at the changes in the outcome variables between the baseline and endline periods for the project beneficiaries. Data was collected in six communities (two *Mukims*) using structured community and household surveys in 2012, and the same respondents were re-interviewed in 2014 whenever it was possible. In order to validate the data from the quantitative surveys, we collected additional qualitative information at some of the project locations in the form of focus group discussion (FGDs) with project stakeholders and beneficiaries to deepen our understanding of the project context and the project results. The survey respondents were selected randomly in their villages. However, we tried to interview a gender-balanced sample. One out of the three communities per *Mukim* was randomly selected for the FGDs. The FGDs were conducted with members of the representative council of the village (*Tuha Peut Gampong*), *Mukim*, and male, female and youth groups.

[2] The project is described in more detail in section 3.

[3] Please note that this project has been also evaluated under the Capacity Development of Southern Partner Organisations component of the MFS II Evaluation.

As specified in the Terms of Reference for this evaluation, the report addresses five evaluation questions to assess the project outcomes:

1) Change: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period?
2) Attribution: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3) Relevance of change: What is the relevance of these changes?
4) Efficiency: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient?
5) Explanations: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

## 1.3. Summary of findings

The evaluation focuses on two of YRBI's project sites: *Mukims* Siem and Lamteuba. YRBI has been working with villages in *Mukim* Siem since 2010 and with villages in *Mukim* Lamteuba since 2008. Therefore, before the baseline survey, mapping of village boundaries were conducted in many of the surveyed villages by YRBI (Table 14 in Annex III). However, both *Mukims* agreed to enhance the cooperation with YRBI in the follow-up project (2011-2013) in order to the revitalize of traditional *adat* institutions, and continue with the mapping activities.

The final objective of the YRBI project is to assist Gampongs and Mukims in strengthening and revitalizing traditional Mukim institutions, especially with regard to informed and just management of natural resources. To reach this objective, YRBI works closely with the communities and traditional institutions using participatory mapping to identify Mukim and Gampong territory (settle boundary disputes) and natural, cultural and social resources. Both the quantitative and qualitative data show progress in the mapping of boundaries (2 of 6 surveyed villages indicating mapping activities, and 6 of 17 disputes resolved in Mukim Siem) and natural resources (2 of 6 villages indicating mapping of natural resources/rice fields). The qualitative study also indicates that YRBI facilitated the communities throughout the process of participatory mapping. However, more work needs to be done to complete the mapping activities and solve all boundary disputes (within the Mukim and with other Mukims).

In both surveyed Mukims, the traditional institution of Keujruen Blang Mukim responsible for the management of farming land has been established. Some documentation and regulations have already been produced regarding the management of irrigation, planting time, harvest time, giving instruction for farmers, and solving land conflict. However, the qualitative data shows that these institutions are not yet fully functional. This is also supported by the community survey data, which indicates that not all villages are yet aware of YRBI's activities with respect to natural resource management and the Keujruen Blang Mukim, even though all villages are aware of the mapping activities of YRBI (before and during the evaluation period). In addition, a few villages also indicated that YRBI assisted them in reforestation efforts, organised trainings on natural resource management and on the sustainable use of natural resources, and implemented livelihood activities (seed distribution).

Turning to the findings at the villager level, the survey data shows that respondents find the role of *Imam Mukim* important in their village both at the baseline (4.0 and 3.8 out of 5) and at the endline (4.1

and 4.5). During the evaluation period, the attitude towards traditional institutions has increased in both *Mukims* but more so in *Mukim* Siem (from 0.9 to 1.1 on a scale of -2 to 2 compared to from 0.9 to 1.0 in Lamteuba). In Siem, we also observe that the attitude towards sustainable forest use has increased significantly (from 0.7 to 1.0 on a scale of -2 to +2) despite being less dependent on forest resources. The change in this indicator in the forest dependent Lamteuba is also positive but insignificant. In general, the improvement could be driven by the increased awareness that forests play an important role in protecting clean water sources. The data shows that access to clean water is an important community issue due to increasing water scarcity: at the baseline 43.4% of the respondents in Siem and 16.4% in Lamteuba mention this as one three most important issues in their village, while at the endline these percentages have increased to 76.6% in Siem and 40% in Lamteuba.

Finally, we find some indication that mutual trust has increased in the communities, and people feel more secure about their control over their land, preservation of traditional culture and even their own lives. However, these improvements are only significant in Siem.

Overall, we find that the mapping activities have already yielded some positive results, such as the resolution of some of the border conflicts, increased awareness regarding the sustainable use of natural resoures and an increased sense of security and peace within the communities. These developments are more pronounced in *Mukim* Siem.

### 1.4. Structure of the report

The rest of this report proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the relevant literature; section 3 describes the project; section 4 describes the evaluation questions and outcome variables; section 5 the data collection. Section 6 provides the descriptive statistics. Sections 7 till 10 discuss evaluation question 1) till 4) in turn. Section 11 describes the relationship between the Capacity Development and Civil Society component to the MDG component. The last section discusses the results and concludes.

Further details about the project results are presented in a number of annexes. The project implementation and the SPO is described in Annex II. Regarding the survey data, the construction of the outcome indicators and indices is summarized in Annex II, while Annex III provides a description of the study locations; Annex IV in turn reports detailed descriptive statistics of the sample, while detailed figures on the change in outcome indicators is presented in Annex V. Finally, the results of the qualitative data collection are presented in Annex VI, and an extended version of the literature review can be found in Annex VII.

## 2. Literature overview

In relation to the YRBI project, we summarize existing literature on the implementation and effectiveness of participatory mapping projects.

Even though the existence of participatory mapping activities is very important in a country like Indonesia where an estimated 48 million indigenous people still depend on the forest for their livelihood, but where mining, logging and oil palm industry are destroying more than 1 million hectares of

rainforest territory each year[4] (Telapak & Gekko Studio 2011), the academic literature on participatory mapping within specific Indonesian context is quite limited. This may, at least in part, have to do with the political sensitivities involved in mapping, that can be especially critical for Indonesian indigenous peoples that have since long had a particularly uneasy relation with government and, until very recently, had to cope with a severe lack of legal protection.

Despite the lack of scientific literature over participatory mapping, there was no lack of participatory mapping projects in Indonesia. In fact, over the past 1.5 decades, communities from nearly every region in Indonesia have been trained in the technical and facilitation skills required to undertake participatory mapping , and by 2009 1.5 million hectares of land had already been mapped by local communities (IFAD 2009: 22). The Indonesian community mapping network (Jaringan Kerja Pemetaan Partisipatif or JKPP), established by the mapping activists in 1996 in Bogor, West Java, has been instrumental in achieving these goals (IFAD 2009: 22). I.e. by forming an alliance with Aliansi Masyarakat *Adat* Nusantara or Alliance of Indigenous Movement in the Archipelago (AMAN) and the Forest Watch Indonesia to advocate for the customary maps to become officially recognized and fed into the "Ancestral Domain Registration Agency" (Badan Registrasi Wilayah *Adat*): The government's official national database of forest cover. In 2011 AMAN signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional), which officially stated that "indigenous" maps would be integrated into governmental data (Harjati Sanmukri 2013: 123).

Scientific evidence on the effectiveness of participatory mapping is also limited in the international context. Therefore, a large part of the remaining of this section discusses what participatory mapping is and how it is implemented in terms tools and methods. Finally, we present a short summary of reported impacts of participatory mapping. For further details on the development and methods of participatory mapping, and considerations about "good practice" the reader is referred to Annex VI.

Participatory mapping is a general term[5] used to define a set of approaches and techniques that combine the tools of modern cartography with participatory methods to create a map of a local community's habitat that represents this community's spatial knowledge (Rainforest Foundation UK 2014). "NGO's, from small local ones to large international ones, often play a crucial role as interlocutors, trainers, advocates and facilitators in these mapping activities" (IFAD 2009: 5).

Participatory mapping is used over the whole world, and the maps that are produced can take on many forms, and can be used to achieve various different purposes. Looking at the available literature and documentation on participatory mapping initiatives the most common aim of participatory mapping appears to be to help marginalized groups, in particular indigenous, pastoralist and forest dwellers, to claim and/or defend their (access to) ancestral lands and its resources, typically by working towards

[4] Making Indonesia the fastest forest clearing nation in the world since 2012, and also the world's third largest emitter of carbon dioxide emissions, behind China and the United States (Telapak & Gekko Studio 2011).

[5] The numerous initiatives throughout the world aren't always referred to with the words 'participatory mapping', but can go by many different terms, including: "indigenous mapping" (IFAD 2009: 6) , "…"participatory land use mapping," "participatory resource mapping" (Mbile *et al*. 2003), "community mapping" (Bennagen & Royo 2000, Eghenter 2000, Fox 2002), "community-based mapping" (Flavelle 2002), "ethnocartography" (Chapin & Threlkeld 2001, Gonzalez *et al*. 1995), and "counter-mapping" (Peluso 1995, Kosek 1998, Hodgson & Schroeder 2002)…" (as cited in Chapin *et al*. 2005: 622-623).

legal recognition of their land rights, using the maps as evidence of their continued residency. The maps can also serve as a tool for community land use planning and natural resource management, and can be used to bring resource-related problems, such as the impacts of logging, mining, and 'land grab' activities, to the attention of governmental authorities and decision makers (Chapin et al. 2005: 620; Di Gessa 2008; Rainforest Foundation UK 2014; Literat 2013: 200; IFAD 2009: 9-12, 39). Some indigenous groups are now using mapping to monitor and defend lands against deforestation, illegal timber extraction, prospecting, and colonization (Teague c. 2010: 10). Other purposes of participatory mapping activities include the strengthening of indigenous political organisation, economic development planning, the documentation of history and customs for culture preservation, education of indigenous youths and/or the general public (Chapin et al. 2005: 620), and support for conflict resolution in territory-related disputes (Di Gessa 2008).

What further distinguishes participatory mapping from traditional cartography and map-making is the process by which the maps are made (IFAD 2009: 4): Community members are involved (preferably) throughout the whole mapping process and recognized as capable research collaborators and experts on their own local surroundings and needs (IFAD 2009: 4; Pathways Through Participation 2010: 1). According to Fox *et al*. (2003, as cited in Wright *et al*. 2009: 261) the reasons for choosing a participatory mapping approach are usually not only practical (i.e. the actual production of the map and using it as evidence for land claims, or as community advocacy tools), but also intrinsic, as the communal aspect of the mapping process can enhance group awareness and cultural identity, facilitate the passing down of historical knowledge through generations, and build trust and communication between people.

Throughout the past decades, mapping has become increasingly popular and prominent (Pathways Through Participation 2010: 13), which "many commentators ascribe to the developments in Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) which emerged in the late 1980s in South Asia and combined insights from agro-ecosystem analysis with Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA)" (Ibid: 2).

Looking at the implementation of mapping projects, they usually loosely follow the following steps:

1. "**Ground preparation**: before the project starts project leaders and indigenous leaders explain the objectives and importance of the mapping work to the community, the technical team is recruited and collaboration with NGO's and government agencies is sought;
2. **First workshop – orientation and training**: Project staff and indigenous leaders explain the objectives and methodology to the surveyors and technical team and data collection tools are developed;
3. **First fieldwork – gathering data and sketch mapping**;
4. **Second workshop – transcription of data onto new maps**;
5. **Second fieldwork – verification of collected data by the community**; and
6. **Third workshop – correcting and completing final maps**: Surveyors reunite with the cartographers to incorporate information that has been verified in the field and put the draft maps in final form

(Chapin & Threlkeld 2001; IFAD 2009: 30).

Turning to the effectiveness of participatory mapping projects, over the years, many researchers have noted the positive impacts that participatory mapping can have on a community:

> Participation in mapping seems to have encouraged some indigenous communities to demand title to lands (Toledo Maya Cultural Council, 1997; Leake, 2000; Herlihy, 2003; Herlihy and Knapp, 2003), to defend and claim their rights to control natural resources (Smith, 2003; Brown, 2006), and to design conservation and resource management plans that are compatible with local practices (Mohamed and Ventura, 2000; McCall and Minang, 2005; Brown, 2006; Bauer, 2009). Researchers have argued that, in addition to producing maps, when implemented with a stress on participation and with facilitation of discussions within communities, indigenous mapping empowers indigenous peoples in land and resource use rights against potential encroachers (Poole, 2003; Smith, 2003; Brown, 2006; Finley-Brook, 2007) (Reyes-Garcia *et al*. ca. 2012a: 2-3).

In addition to these positive effects, researchers have also observed negative consequences resulting from participatory mapping. For instance, Authors such as Mwangi, Hodgson & Schroeder, Fox, Bryant, and Roth have noted issues such as increased privatization of land, loss of indigenous conceptions of space, greater exposure of valuable natural resources, increased taxation by the state, and increase or intensification of conflicts, either within the village, with neighbouring villages, or with other external actors such as companies or governmental authorities (Reyes-Garcia *et al*. 2012b: 651). Increase of conflicts due to participatory mapping, is one of the most frequently reported drawbacks of participatory mapping. Researchers such as Offen, Peluso, Hale, and Vandergeest have argued that: "Participatory mapping might intensify internal conflicts because it might bring to light overlapping uses of land and resources or erode traditional ways of dealing with internal conflicts…" (Ibid). Furthermore, it has been reasoned by i.a. Peluso and Rundstrom that "…participatory mapping might increase the number of conflicts with external actors, as the maps produced might challenge the maps made by state and corporate authorities" (Ibid).

Reyes-Garcia *et al*. have attempted to validate the theory that participatory mapping systematically increases the number of conflicts, using an experimental research design whereby 32 native Amazonian villages with and without conflicts with outsiders were randomly assigned to a treatment group (those where a participatory mapping project would be implemented by them) and a control group (those where a participatory mapping project would not (yet) be implemented by them[6]).[7] Contrary to others' previous findings, the results of their research show no statistically significant differences in the measured variables (i.e. number of conflicts, negative opinion, neutral attitude, and negative attitudes towards outsiders) between treatment and control villages (2012b: 656).

Reyes-Garcia *et al*. explain their deviating results by arguing that previous studies, which were based on direct observations rather than a randomized experimental design, might have been subject to selection bias, because the villages participating in participatory mapping projects are generally the ones that are chosen or volunteering to participate in participatory mapping due to the fact that they are expected to experience – or are already experiencing – conflicts over land rights and resources (2012b: 651, 656). Their results support the argument that mapping projects do not bring about conflicts per se, rather "…the process and the results of participatory mapping can help in conflict resolution or contribute to

[6] For the sake of fairness, participatory mapping projects were also implemented in the control villages, but only after all research data for the post-intervention study had been collected (Reyes-Garcia *et al.* 2012b: 653).
[7] All these villages were located in Tsimane' territory. The Tsimane' are a native Amazonian society of foragers and farmers in Bolivia.

conflict generation or exacerbation depending on the political and socio-economic context in which they are conducted" (Ibid: 657).

# 3. The project

## 3.1. Project description

The first phase of the YRBI project was implemented between 2008 and 2010. For the current project period (1 November 2011 - 31 October 2013), the project aims at the revitalization of traditional (*adat*) structures and law with the main strategy of strengthening *adat* institutions[8] (called *Mukim* and *Gampong*) and advocacy for the formal recognition of these traditional institutions and structures by both the people and the Indonesian government.[9] The project works with *Mukims* already involved in the previous phase of the project. At these locations, an enhanced programme is implemented in terms of depth and intensity. However, the project also targets new locations that are interested in the revitalization of their traditional institutions.

At the project locations and in its office in Banda Aceh, YRBI conducts consultative workshops; trainings on participatory mapping and community-based spatial planning; regular discussions on the empowerment of traditional institutions and structures; and workshop in traditional institutions, especially for youth. Through raising awareness, YRBI aims to enable communities to make informed decisions in land conflict resolution (between villages and also with local government) and natural resource extraction (by corporations and local people). By doing so, it is expected that the management and distribution of natural resources would be fair and just, both socially and ecologically.

These activities serve YRBI's two final objectives: firstly, the objective to strengthen communities' awareness and capacity to manage and control natural resources and sources of water; and secondly, to ensure a fair and just management and distribution of natural resources in an ecological and social way, in which local communities can participate equally and enjoy its benefit optimally.


Annex I provides further information about both YRBI and the project implementation.

## 3.2. Project implementation

Figure 1 summarizes the project periods and the evaluation activities. In the evaluation, we focus on the activities of YRBI in two *Mukims*: *Mukim* Siem and *Mukim* Lamteuba. In these *Mukims* YRBI has been working on mapping village boundaries since 2010 and 2008, respectively.[10] However, in 2012, the *Mukims* and YRBI agreed to enhance the cooperation in terms of reviving traditional *adat* institutions.[11]

[8] *Gampong* is a community or village, while *Mukim* is a collection of neighboring *Gampong*'s that traditionally used to belong under the same mosque and *adat* regulation.
[9] Source: NWO Joint MFS II evaluations Country-Specific Information Indonesia
[10] Hence, the baseline survey does not provide us with true baseline information.
[11] We decided to focus the evaluation on these *Mukims* due to YRBI's focus at these locations on revitalizing and documenting traditional institutions.

**Figure 1: Timing of project activities and the evaluation**




Below, the project's activities are summarized in Mukims Siem and Lamteuba based on project reports. The activities are grouped around three main themes: area management; custom-based dispute resolution; and institutional strengthening of the *Mukims*. Information regarding meetings, discussions and workshops at other project locations are summarized in Table 11 in Annex I.

### *Mukim Siem*

In 2012, a number of achievements have been made in Siem: a socialization meeting has been held about customary methods for spatial dispute resolution between *Gampongs* and *Mukim.* The result of this discussion has been documented, and the method has been applied in settling boundary issues between *Gampongs* in Siem. The regional government of Aceh Besar recognized the process of boundary dispute resolution in *Mukim* Siem and ensured Siem of its support for giving formal recognition of the resolved boundary disputes.

As a result of the above, community participatory mapping activities in *Mukim* Siem resulted inthe reinforcement of *Gampong* boundaries in Siem, specifically settling the boundary coordinates of *Gampongs* Lambitra and Siem, and the communities of Siem built a common understanding about the meaning of communal areas. As promised, the Government of Aceh Besar recognized the village agreements about the boundaries in the following year.

The community participatory mapping activities have also continued in 2013, with 5 boundary agreements reached between villages in Siem: *Gampong* Lamklat made 3 boundary agreements with *Gampongs* Lamasan, Lamreh and Lieue, while *Gampong* Lambiheu reached 2 boundary agreements with *Gampongs* Lamreh and Siem, all located in *Mukim* Siem. These agreements were also approved by the Government of Aceh Besar. In addition, the regional administration and land use map of *Mukim* Siem has been completed.

In 2013, YRBI also assisted Siem in strengthening the *Mukim*'s natural resource management by introducing management of the *blang* area (rice plantation land) (meeting on 2 March 2013), and

producing local wisdom documentation of the new regulations. The concerning rice fields (*blang* area) have also been mapped using participatory mapping. On November 14 2013, *Mukim* Siem made a site visit to *Mukim* Lamteuba regarding the implementation of the *blang* regulations there.

Finally, in 2013 a community agreement has also been reached to donate 3 hectares of community land for reforestation.

#### *Mukim Lamteuba*

The project report mentions that Lamteuba had a famers' initiative to develop a pilot project planting Jember Coffee in their fields before 2012. However, YRBI's project mostly focused on the establishment and working of the traditional institution of *Keujruen Blang Mukim.*[12] This institution has gained recognition and support as a traditional institution that is authorized to regulate the management of rice fields. In order to strengthen the *Keujruen Blang,* participatory mapping of the *blang* areas (rice fields) have been carried out in 2012 to build a common understanding with the communities regarding the areas belonging in the *blang* area. Between April and July in 2012, the following aspects of the *blang* region were mapped: the area belonging to the *blang* region, the traditional rice field drainage network and social data on customary rice field management areas were compiled.

To further develop the *blang* institution, identification of the rice management system using customary system *meublang* was carried out and the local wisdom about natural resource management has been documented in 2012.


In 2013, a meeting on youth roles in strengthening indigenous institutions was held (27 April), and a site visit to *Mukim* Abdya was organised (19-20 October).

### 3.3. Result chain

A schematic description of the YRBI project's result chain is displayed in Figure 2. As mentioned before, the two final objectives of the project are that communities are aware and capable to manage and control their natural resources including water sources, and that natural resources are managed and distributed in an ecologically and socially fair and just way, in which local communities can participate equally and enjoy its benefit optimally. These to outcomes are interlinked to each other and they are linked to the intermediate outcome to reach this goal is to strengthen and support communities to be able to develop and implement sustainable community-based natural resource management mechanisms according to their needs.

[12] *Keujruen Blang* is a customary leader regarding management of irrigation, planting time, harvest time, giving instruction for farmers, and solving land conflict.

**Figure 2: Result chain**




In order to achieve these outcomes, YRBI carries out trainings, workshops and discussions on the following topics: participatory mapping to identify *Mukim* territory and resources; participatory social mapping of historical institution system; revitalizing and empowerment of traditional institutions (for land tenure and natural resource management) and reforestation, including seed & plant distribution activities.

As a result of the activities related to participatory mapping, communities will be able to settle land disputes and document their local knowledge, and they will have a better awareness of their natural and social resources. As a result they will be able to make informed decisions about their natural resources. In turn, as a result of the activities related to revitalizing traditional institutions, communities will be able to use the information gathered through participatory mapping to establish traditional institutions and make new regulations according to the needs of the community. YRBI focuses on reviving traditional institutions governing land tenure and natural resource management. A good example of this is the establishment of the traditional institution *Keujruen Blang Mukim* in both Lamteuba and Siem

responsible for regulating and managing irrigation, planting time, harvest time, giving instruction for farmers, and solving land conflict.

In addition, YRBI also promotes reforestation and it is also involved in some small-scale seed and plant distribution activities.

All these activities jointly contribute to achieving the final objectives of the project in terms of the wise management and just distribution of natural resources.

Please note that there are a number of factors influencing the outputs and outcomes displayed on the figure. However, to keep the figure as simple as possible, we have omitted these external factors from the figure. The project log-frame[13] of YRBI identifies some of the external factors to the project such as the commitments of the *Mukims* and *Gampongs* to the project's objectives and the commitment of the regional government to involve the communities in policy arrangements.

### 3.4. Possible unintended impacts

Possible negative unintended effects of the project are that the mapping of community borders and discussions about natural resource management brings out conflicts with other stakeholders which are then resolved in a way that counters the community's interests.

## 4. Evaluation questions and outcome variables

### 4.1. Evaluation questions

The call for proposals outlines 5 general evaluation questions. In the baseline report specific evaluations questions were specified. Table 1 shows these five questions and what it implies for this project.

[13] Source: Logframe Proposal YRBI ICCO 2011-2013 and Proposal YRBI ICCO 2010-2013.

**Table 1: Overview general and specific evaluation questions**

| Number | General evaluation question | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| **1** | Change: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period? | • How did the capacity of *Mukim* and *Gampong* on natural resource management and disasters management change?<br>• Are there *Gampong*/*Mukim* regulations produced about natural resource management?<br>• Are there local wisdom documentations about natural resource management produced?<br>• How did the management structure of community forest areas change?<br>• How did the attitude and awareness of the people towards natural resources change? |
| **2** | Attribution: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)? | Are the observed changes above attributable to the intervention? |
| **3** | Relevance of change: What is the relevance of these changes? | • The size of the impact<br>• Does the project address an important issue for the beneficiaries? |
| **4** | Efficiency: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient? | Was the intervention cost effective? |
| **5** | Explanations: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above? | Why did things work out/not work out?<br>The evaluation question is answered throughout the other evaluation questions and in the end discussion. |

Regarding the evaluation questions on the change in outcomes, the table shows the specific evaluation questions we posed at the baseline period. Linking these questions to the result chain (Figure 2), we observe that questions 2-4 relate to outputs of the YRBI projects in terms of wisdom documentation, regulations and management structure of natural resources. These results are measureable at the village level. The last question is aimed at investigating the effects of the project (which is mostly at community level) on the village population.

Finally, the first question, regarding the capacity of *Mukim* and *Gampong* on natural resource management, is only investigated through qualitative data collection, along with the achievements of the other final objectives displayed on Figure 2.

The next section discusses how the evaluation questions are linked to outcome indicators for the quantitative survey at the community and household level.

## 4.2. Outcome indicators

To answer the first two evaluation questions (change and attribution) we identified specific outcome indicators. The outcome indicators are split up into 6 groups: access to information on (local)

governance; satisfaction with local governance; role of traditional institutions; management of natural resources; household's attitude towards forests/plantations; and the sense of control of villagers.

Table 2 displays the outcome indicators of the main analysis, the scale of these variables and whether the indicator is a uniform indicator, while Annex II describes the outcome indicators in more detail and highlights the components per index. Since there are many possible and interesting outcome indicators, some of the variables are grouped into indices for the main analysis, while the results for the individual components are presented in Annex V.

The first two groups are linked to the uniform indicators specified by the synthesis team for the goal on Good Governance (Table 2) and to villagers' attitude towards *Mukim* institutions. The index on villagers' perception of the role of traditional institutions in their community further investigates the latter. The indicators on natural resource management and on household's attitude towards forests/plantations are related to the specific evaluation questions specified in Table 1. Finally, the indices on the sense of control of villagers measure whether the settling of boundary disputes and revitalization of traditional institutions affect the sense of control of villagers. Therefore, these indicators could be linked to the final outcomes of the project.

Finally, please note some of the questions posed in Table 1 are not answered by the outcome indicators listed in Table 2 (questions 1-3). Regarding these questions, we present some results among the explanatory tables. However, the main discussion is left for the qualitative study reported in Annex VI.

**Table 2: Overview outcome indicators**

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Source | Uniform indicator (Good Governance) |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Panel A. Access to information on (local) governance** | | | X |
| Level of agreement with statement: 'I feel well-informed about the decisions made by the village leaders.' | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| Percentage respondents who know about the policies of the district government related to agriculture and the use of land | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| **Panel B. Satisfaction with local governance** | | | X |
| Index for satisfaction with local governance at village level | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| Percentage of respondents who know the name of the *Mukim* leader (imam *Mukim*) | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| Level of agreement with 'The *Mukim* institution serves the benefit of all people in this village' | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| Importance of the role of imam *Mukim* in the village | (1;5) | Household survey | |
| Index for satisfaction with local governance at sub-district level | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| Corruption at village leadership | (1;3) | Household survey | |
| Corruption at district government | (1;3) | Household survey | |
| **Panel C. Role of traditional institutions** | | | |
| Index for positive attitude towards traditional laws and culture | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| **Panel D. Management of natural resources** | | | |
| Existence of regulations about the use and protection of the community forests in the village | (0;n) | Community survey | |
| Regulations are communicated by community meetings or farmer group meetings | (0;n) | Community survey | |
| Regulations are communicated to all villagers (including women and children) | (0;n) | Community survey | |
| Regulations are taught at school | (0;n) | Community survey | |
| Percentage of respondents who report that there are any rules/regulations about the use of community forests in the village | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| Satisfaction with regulations | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| **Panel E. Households' attitude towards forests/plantations** | | | |
| Dependence on forest resources | (-2;2) | Household | |

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Source | Uniform indicator (Good Governance) |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | survey | |
| Index for positive attitude towards sustainable forest use | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| Index for access to forest resources | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| Percentage of respondents who think that the activities of the government/industry will be harmful | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| **Panel F. Sense of control of villages** | | | |
| Index for trust in village | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| Index for sense of control regarding their own life | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| Index for sense of control regarding land | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| Index for sense of control regarding preservation of traditional culture | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| Note: n is the number of villages in the area | | | |

# 5. Data collection

## 5.1. Survey instruments

We collected three types of data: quantitative, qualitative, and financial data. The following paragraphs list the survey instruments used for each type of data.

### *Quantitative data*

To analyse the impact of the programmes, two surveys have been conducted to collect quantitative data:

- Respondent survey: a short survey was administered with randomly selected community members regarding their perceptions on governance, natural resource management, and their sense of control.
- Community survey: the community survey was administered together with the household surveys both during the baseline and endline period. The head of the community or another local leader was interviewed regarding matters of the community.

The baseline data have been collected in November 2012, while the endline data was collected in September 2014

### *Qualitative data*

To gain more insight into the implementation and the impacts of the project qualitative field work was conducted in two communities (one per *Mukim*) in November 2012 and May 2014. In-depth interviews

were conducted with the general facilitator of the YRBI project, the local facilitators and local leaders in the *Mukim* and the *Gampong*; and focus group discussions were carried out with 3 different groups: women that were part of a women's group, men that were part of a farmers' group, and young people (aged 16-24 years) that were part of a youth group. The results of this study are summarized in Annex VI.

### *Financial data collection*

To collect information about the costs of the project, we conducted a project cost survey with YRBI in July 2013.

## 5.2. Sampling outcome

### *Sampling design*

In 2012 YRBI has started to implement its *Mukim* level programme in two *Mukims*: *Mukim* Siem in sub-district Darussalam and *Mukim* Lamteuba in sub-district Seulimeum. Therefore, we have selected these two *Mukims* for the evaluation. The project activity has started in September 2012, while we have collected data in November 2012.

Both *Mukims* have 8 *Gampongs*, hence a total of 16 communities participate in the project. Among these we have selected 3 *Gampongs* per *Mukim*. The 6 communities were selected as a combination of YRBI's recommendation (we have selected 2 out of 3 proposed villages) and variation in population and agricultural and forest areas[14].

In each village, 20 people were interviewed for the villager survey. The respondents were chosen randomly, however, stratified by gender (50-50%). If participatory mapping was done in the village, then randomly selected participants of the mapping activity were also interviewed. For the endline survey, we planned to re-interview the same respondents as much as possible. However, if some of the baseline respondents could not be interviewed, we replaced them by a randomly selected community member with similar characteristics in terms of gender and age. The total sample size for the villager surveys was 120 respondents in both survey rounds.

### *Sampling outcome*

Table 3 summarizes the sampling plan and outcome. In both the baseline and endline period the planned number of households have been interviewed (120 in total). The last column of the table (panel sample) shows the number of respondents that were interviewed both for the baseline and endline survey. In the villages, 112 (93.3%) of the baseline respondents were re-interviewed.

One of the baseline respondents has moved out of the village and three could not be interviewed because they were travelling. For the four other baseline respondents who were not re-interviewed, the reason is unknown.

[14] Based on administrative data from PODES 2008.

**Table 3: Sampling outcome**

| Assignment group | Villages | Respondents baseline | Respondents endline | Panel sample |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lamteuba | 3 | 60 | 60 | 56 |
| Siem | 3 | 60 | 60 | 56 |
| **Total** | **6** | **120** | **120** | **112** |
| Source: Household survey E8, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | | | |

In the data analysis, we use data from all respondents when discussing the baseline and endline outcomes separately. However, when reporting on the change in variables or performing statistical tests on the significance of the change, we only use the so called *panel sample*, respondents for we have two rounds of data.

# 6. Descriptive statistics

This section summarizes the main characteristics of the two communities using the baseline and endline surveys. In addition, the exposure of the study locations to the mapping and traditional institution strengthening activities is discussed. Additional tables are provided in Annex IV.

## 6.1. Community characteristics

The evaluation focuses on two *Mukims* in Aceh Besar: *Mukim* Siem and *Mukim* Lamteuba, where YRBI has been conducting extensive project activities. However, these two *Mukims* have very different characteristics.

*Mukim* Siem is part of the Darussalam sub-district. It is comprised of 8 *Gampongs* (villages) and is located close to the provincial capital resulting in a more heterogeneous, educated, and open-minded society. Even though a fair amount of inhabitants still work in agriculture and husbandry, the majority of them work in the city as government officers or employees or as education workers, and do not rely on the forests for their livelihood (Annex VI).

*Mukim* Lamteuba is located at the foot of Mount Seulawah of Seulimum sub-district. It also consists of 8 *Gampongs*, but unlike Mukin Siem, it is located in a remote area, far away from the hustle and bustle of city life. At its border lies a protected forest and there are many rice fields in the surroundings. For their livelihoods, the inhabitants depend on farming, gardening, and raising livestock. The people of Lamteuba speak Acehnese in daily life as well as in schools. Very few speak the National Indonesian language (Bahasa Indonesia) fluently. People are generally less educated (middle or high school), and they are cautious about foreign researchers as they have been let down by NGOs in the past. What distinguishes *Mukim* Lamteuba from other *Mukims* is that its customs and traditions are still well preserved (Annex VI).

Despite their different characteristics, both *Mukims* are interested in YRBI's project that aimed to map *Gampong* and *Mukim* boundaries; assist the *Mukims* in resolving persisting boundary-disputes between *Gampongs* and *Mukims*; and revitalize traditional institutions responsible for the management of natural resources. The latter one has particular importance for the *Mukims* as they are experiencing an increasing water scarcity, and a decline in important forest products, such as honey and timber, as a result of plantation building and the ongoing illegal logging activities (often supported by the local apparatus) in their industrial forests.

Further details about the project locations can be found in Annex III (description of the project locations) and Annex VI (report about the qualitative study).

## 6.2. Intervention in the communities

Next, we turn to describing the type of project activities that have taken place before and during the evaluation period. We are particularly interested in activities related to land mapping and the strengthening of traditional institutions.

Table 4 summarizes the number of villages that reported participatory mapping and other natural resource management related trainings and meetings in the 2 years preceding the baseline survey (Base) and during the evaluation period (End).

**Table 4: Trainings related to natural resource management and mapping**

| **Assignment group** | **Siem** | | **Lamteuba** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Sample size** | n=3 | n=3 | n=3 | n=3 |
| **Survey year** | Base | End | Base | End |
| **Natural resource management related trainings and workshops in the past two years:** | | | | |
| *Forest/natural resource mapping* | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| *Efforts at reforestation* | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| *Awareness raising campaigns about use and protection of natural resources* | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| *Training on natural resource management* | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| *Training on sustainable use of natural resources* | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Source: Community survey E8, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | | | |

YRBI has been working with villages in *Mukim* Siem since 2010 and with villages in *Mukim* Lamteuba since 2008. Mapping of village boundaries has been conducted in almost all surveyed villages before by YRBI (Table 14 in Annex III). However, both *Mukims* re-joined YRBI's follow up project in 2011-2013 to proceed with the previously unfinished activities.

The table shows that before the baseline period, no trainings related to natural resources have taken place in Siem. *Gampong* Lamklat started efforts at reforestation, however, this was the initiative of the *Mukim* and not YRBI (Table 12 in Annex III). In Lamteuba, *Gampong* Lamteuba Droe reported forest

mapping before the baseline survey assisted by YRBI, while in *Gampong* Blang Tingkeum trainings on natural resource management (co-assisted by YRBI) and reforestation efforts (unrelated to YRBI) have taken place.

A number of mapping, training and reforestation activities have taken place in the surveyed villages during the evaluation period. According to the quantitative study, forest/natural resource mapping activities were carried out in 2 villages in *Mukim* Siem during the evaluation period, and were aimed at mapping the rice fields (*blang* area). In addition, 2 villages in *Mukim* Lamteuba reported that YRBI assisted them (and also other villages in the *Mukim*) in village boundary mapping (Table 14 in Annex III).

Furthermore, the qualitative study indicates that YRBI facilitated the communities throughout the process of participatory mapping, for example by training members of the local mapping teams to use GPS-devices to collect coordinate points. However, both the maps of *Mukim* Siem and *Mukim* Lamteuba have still not been completed. The map of *Mukim* Siem is estimated to be 60-70% finished, as many border points between villages could not yet be resolved. The map of *Mukim* Lamteuba is nearly finished, but still misses some information about the exact borders between *Mukim* Lamteuba and some of its neighboring *Mukims* (Annex VI).

In the qualitative study it was found that, during the evaluation period, YRBI also organised a variety of trainings, workshops, and discussions on the importance of natural resource management and the strengthening of traditional institutions in *Mukim* Siem and *Mukim* Lamteuba. The discussions covered topics such as participatory mapping, setting standards in collaboration with the village community, and the empowerment of indigenous institutions and structures. The trainings and workshops taught community leaders about the revitalization of the *Tuha Peut* (representative council of the *Gampong* or *Mukim*), land rights and indigenous rights, the documentation of customary laws (*reusam)*, and reforestation. Also, field visits were made. YRBI also organised a training and discussion on the strengthening of the traditional institution of *Keujrun Blang*, and appointed a *Keujrun Ciek* in every *Gampong* (Annex VI).

In the endline survey (see Table 4, and Table 13 and Table 14 in Annex III) 3 out of 6 villages reported to have undertaken YRBI activities other than the mapping:[15] in *Gampong* Lamklat (Siem) YRBI assisted the reforestation efforts, while in *Gampong* Lamteuba Droe (Lamteuba) YRBI organised trainings on natural resource management and on the sustainable use of natural resources, and assisted the village in strengthening *Mukim* institutions and producing *blang* regulation. In *Gampong* Blang Tingkeum (Lamteuba), YRBI assisted the community in settling conflicts and protecting water sources (for irrigation). However, the informants in the villages indicated that similar activities have also taken place in other villages of the *Mukim.* In addition, 2 villages in Siem and 1 Lamteuba reported that YRBI also implemented activities related to (sustainable) livelihood activities in their community.

[15] Differences in results between the qualitative and quantitative study may also stem from the fact that the informants from the qualitative study were more likely to be familiar with YRBI, as most of them were selected based on their participation in one or more of the project activities. In addition, in the qualitative study we interviewed *Mukim* representatives, who are knowledgeable about activities in all *Gampongs*, while the quantitative study focused on 3 randomly selected *Gampongs* in the *Mukims*.

During the project period, other organisations were also active in some of the project villages. In *Gampong* Lamreh (Siem), an awareness raising campaign about the use and protection of natural resources was held by the department of agriculture. In *Gampong* Lamteuba Droe the farming group and BNN organised awareness campaigns and reforestation activities, and in Blang Tingkeum village the NGO BNN was reported to have organised efforts at reforestation and trainings on sustainable natural resource use.

Summarizing, the quantitative and qualitative studies both show that YRBI has conducted several activities in the study area during the evaluation period. The activities are in line with those reported in section 3.2 based on the project reports. However, we also observe some differences: in *Mukim* Siem, only the qualitative but not the quantitative data indicate the settling of boundary disputes and the revitalization of the *Keujrun Blang* institution for the management of the rice fields, while some communities indicated YRBI's involvement in livelihood activities which are not included in the project reports for *Mukim* Siem. In *Mukim* Lamteuba, the revitalization of the *Keujrun Blang* institution is only mentioned by one of the surveyed villages. In addition, the villages indicated village boundary mapping activities, which were not discussed in the project reports. These data suggest that the surveyed villages perceive YRBI's contribution mostly in terms of the village mapping, and less in strengthening the traditional *Mukim* institutions.

## 6.3. Comparison of main respondent characteristics

To provide a better insight into the general characteristics of our sample, Table 5 displays a number of the respondents' socio-economic characteristics, including age, gender, religion, and the main economic activity.[16]

Table 5 shows the characteristics of the respondents in the two treatment locations at the baseline survey (Base), at the endline survey (End), and for respondents that have been interviewed in both survey rounds (panel sample) the difference in their endline and baseline responses (Change). Therefore, the values in the change column can be different from the difference of the variables at the end- and baseline. The significance of the change is also reported (p-value) for the panel sample. The p-value shows the probability that the change in the variable is zero. Hence, if the p-value is small (say smaller than 5%), it indicates that the change is significantly different from zero (at 5% significance level).[17]

We did not expect the distribution of characteristics to change between the baseline and endline period except for age: 2 years have gone by between the two survey rounds. However, some other significant changes in the socio-economic characteristics of the households are observed between the baseline and endline period, with regard to the respondents' main economic activity: In *Mukim* Siem a significantly larger percentage of respondents reports to be self-employed/running a family business, working in a company, and working as a teacher. In the meantime, the percentage of casual workers (both within and without the agricultural sector) has declined. This is consistent with information from the qualitative study that suggests that the people of *Mukim* Siem have grown less dependent on their natural

[16] The baseline report already described most of these time invariant characteristics of the sample between different groups (see table 11 of the baseline report).
[17] In calculating the p-value, we used robust standard errors clustered at the village level.

resources for their livelihoods over the past 2 years (Annex VI). Interestingly, the percentage of respondents that report 'higher education' as their highest attended level of education has significantly dropped at the endline study in *Mukim* Siem, which suggests misreporting either at the baseline or at the endline.

**Table 5: General characteristics of the sample**

| Treatment area | Siem | | | | Lamteuba | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reporting period | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| Sample size | 60 | 60 | 56 | | 60 | 60 | 56 | |
| Gender (% female) | 35.0 | 50.0 | 12.5 | 0.357 | 50.0 | 50.0 | 0.0 | |
| Age | 37.4 | 39.6 | 2.4** | 0.023 | 34.3 | 35.8 | 1.5** | 0.031 |
| Religion (%) | | | | | | | | |
| *Islam* | 100.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 | | 100.0 | 98.3 | -1.8 | 0.429 |
| *Confucianism (Konghucu)* | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 0.429 |
| Marital status (%) | | | | | | | | |
| *Currently Married* | 66.7 | 68.3 | 0.0 | 1.000 | 70.0 | 75.0 | 1.8 | 0.429 |
| *Divorced* | 0.0 | 3.3 | 3.6 | 0.409 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| *Widowed* | 3.3 | 0.0 | -1.8 | 0.409 | 0.0 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 0.419 |
| *Never Married* | 30.0 | 28.3 | -1.8 | 0.742 | 30.0 | 23.3 | -3.6 | 0.188 |
| Highest level of education attended by the respondent (%) | | | | | | | | |
| *Primary education* | 16.7 | 20.0 | 3.6 | 0.535 | 23.3 | 18.3 | -7.1 | 0.188 |
| *Secondary education* | 43.3 | 46.7 | 3.6 | 0.630 | 60.0 | 65.0 | 5.4 | 0.226 |
| *Higher education* | 40.0 | 33.3 | -7.1** | 0.044 | 16.7 | 16.7 | 1.8 | 0.429 |
| Main economic activity (%) | | | | | | | | |
| *Farming* | 20.0 | 25.0 | 5.4 | 0.426 | 51.7 | 50.0 | -1.8 | 0.840 |
| *Forest livelihoods* | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 1.7 | 0.0 | |
| *Self-employed/family business* | 10.0 | 16.7 | 7.1** | 0.044 | 10.0 | 5.0 | -3.6 | 0.174 |
| *Casual worker in agriculture* | 11.7 | 0.0 | -8.9 | 0.323 | 3.3 | 1.7 | -1.8 | 0.419 |
| *Casual worker not in agriculture* | 13.3 | 1.7 | -10.7* | 0.069 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 0.0 | 1.000 |
| *Worker in company* | 6.7 | 11.7 | 5.4*** | 0.002 | 1.7 | 0.0 | -1.8 | 0.429 |
| *Teacher, lecturer* | 5.0 | 13.3 | 5.4*** | 0.002 | 8.3 | 8.3 | -1.8 | 0.743 |
| *Civil servant* | 6.7 | 5.0 | -1.8 | 0.439 | 1.7 | 3.3 | 1.8 | 0.743 |
| *Student* | 13.3 | 6.7 | -7.1 | 0.258 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 0.429 |
| *Unemployed* | 1.7 | 0.0 | -1.8 | 0.420 | 0.0 | 6.7 | 7.1 | 0.268 |
| *Housewife* | 11.7 | 16.7 | 3.6 | 0.694 | 15.0 | 15.0 | 0.0 | 1.000 |
| *Too old, sick, or weak to work (at home)* | 0.0 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 0.439 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 0.0 | |
| *Other* | 0.0 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 0.420 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 0.0 | 1.000 |

Source: Household survey E8; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

## 6.4. Treatment exposure of respondents

Looking at the knowledge and participation of respondents in the YRBI project, Table 6 shows that at the endline study, 21.7% of the respondents in *Mukim* Siem, and 30% of the respondents in *Mukim* Lamteuba had participated in at least one of YRBI's participatory mapping activities. In addition, the table also shows that during the evaluation period YRBI has become more known among the survey respondents: 10-16% more respondents have heard of YRBI at the endline compared to the baseline. While 72% of the respondents in *Mukim* Lamteuba were familiar with YRBI at the endline, this figure was only 22% in *Mukim* Siem.[18]

Results from the qualitative study indicate that the participants of these mapping activities, as well as YRBI's trainings, workshops, and discussions were predominantly important community figures, such as the *Mukim* and *Gampong* government officials, and leaders of the youth groups. Because high positions are mostly held by the men in society, there were far less women than men among the project participants. However, some women were involved in the mapping process as part of the mapping team in *Mukim* Siem. YRBI has actively invited women and youth to participate in the mapping process, and has at least succeeded in involving many young people in the mapping process in both *Mukims*. Knowledge gained during the project activities was also reported to be spread throughout the wider community via 'word of mouth' and during meetings at the *meunasah* (Annex VI).

[18] This might be explained by the fact that YRBI tends not to introduce its organisation as they are afraid that the communities would ask for money. This situation is caused by the NGOs pouring money in the region after the tsunami of 2004. Instead, YRBI would approach communities by saying that they would like to help them. In addition, in Siem YRBI is mostly working with the members of the *Mukim* government and village leaders, but not so much with the general population. (Information is based on correspondence with ICCO and YRBI at the baseline reporting phase.)

**Table 6: Participatory development plans**

| Treatment area | Siem | | | | Lamteuba | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| **Sample size** | 60 | 60 | 56 | | 60 | 60 | 56 | |
| % respondents who have heard about participatory mapping (%) | 5.0 (22.0) | 55.0 (50.2) | 50.0*** (50.5) | 0.001 | 26.7 (44.6) | 50.0 (50.4) | 25.0 (58.0) | 0.258 |
| % respondents who report that there has been participatory mapping conducted in the community (%) | 3.3 (18.1) | 50.0 (50.4) | 46.4*** (53.8) | 0.000 | 15.0 (36.0) | 50.0 (50.4) | 35.7 (52.0) | 0.102 |
| % respondents who participated in participatory mapping conducted in the community (%) | 0.0 (0.0) | 21.7 (41.5) | 19.6** (40.1) | 0.012 | 10.0 (30.3) | 30.0 (46.2) | 19.6 (44.4) | 0.101 |
| % respondents who think it is/was useful for their community to conduct participatory mapping if they heard about it (%) | 3.3 (18.1) | 50.0 (50.4) | 46.4*** (53.8) | 0.000 | 15.0 (36.0) | 50.0 (50.4) | 35.7 (52.0) | 0.102 |
| Percentage of respondents that had heard of YRBI (%) | 10.0 (30.3) | 21.7 (41.5) | 10.7* (41.2) | 0.083 | 58.3 (49.7) | 71.7 (45.4) | 16.1 (45.8) | 0.130 |

Source: Household survey E8; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

# 7. Evaluation question 1: Change in outcomes

This section discusses evaluation question 1: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period? The changes in the outcome indicators for the period measured between the base- and endline survey (2012-2014) are grouped into 6 sub-sections: access to information on (local) governance, satisfaction with local governance, role of traditional institutions, management of natural resources, household's attitude towards forests/plantations, and sense of control of villagers. Some of the outcome indicators combine multiple variables into one index. The components of these indices are presented in Annex V, and a set of even more detailed tables can be found in Annex IV.

Table 7 displays the results for the community level outcome indicator 'Management of natural resources'. The table only reports the baseline and endline values of the indicators (and not the change) because of the small sample size for the communities (1 and 3 villages per treatment group).

At the household level, Table 8 displays the results for all outcome indicators including the changes in the outcome variables. The table structure is similar to the table on respondent characteristics with the exception that in Table 8 we also report on the standard deviations of the variables below the mean in parenthesis.

The following subsections discuss the levels and changes in the outcome indicators. Information about the construction of the outcome indicators and indices is summarized in Annex II. Annex IV and Annex V provide more detailed information on the separate outcomes for the indicators in the indices. Annex VI contains a report of the results of the qualitative study.

**Table 7: Outcomes indicators at the community level**

| Variable \ Treatment area | Siem | | Lamteuba | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Survey year | Base | End | Base | End |
| Sample size | (n=1) | | (n=3) | |
| **D. Management of natural resources** | | | | |
| Existence of regulations about the use and protection of the community forests in the village | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| Regulations are communicated to the villagers by […] | | | | |
| *Community meetings* | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| *Posters* | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| *Signs at forest* | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| *Letter* | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Regulations are communicated to all villagers (including women and children) | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| Regulations are taught at school | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |

Source: Community survey E8, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes:
- n=1 for Siem, because two villages in Siem said that they have no community forest at both baseline and endline
- two villages from Lamteuba answered that they do not know whether regulations are taught at school at the endline

**Table 8: Change in outcome indicators for the respondents**

| Treatment area | Siem | | | | Lamteuba | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reporting period | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| Sample size | 60 | 60 | 56 | 56 | 60 | 60 | 56 | 56 |
| **A. Access to information on (local) governance** | | | | | | | | |
| Level of agreement with statement: 'I feel well-informed about the decisions made by the village leaders.' […] (scale -2 to +2) | 1.0 (0.9) | 1.1 (0.8) | 0.1 (1.2) | 0.619 | 1.1 (0.5) | 0.2 (1.1) | -0.9** (1.2) | 0.031 |
| Percentage of respondents that knows about the policies of the district government related to agriculture and the use of land | 21.7 (41.5) | 35.0 (48.1) | 10.7 (52.8) | 0.242 | 30.0 (46.2) | 16.7 (37.6) | -10.7* (45.4) | 0.074 |
| **B. Satisfaction with local governance** | | | | | | | | |
| Index for satisfaction with local governance at village level (scale -2 to +2) | -0.3 (0.2) | -0.4 (0.3) | -0.1* (0.3) | 0.073 | -0.4 (0.2) | -0.4 (0.2) | -0.1 (0.3) | 0.211 |
| Indicators for satisfaction with local governance at *Mukim* level | | | | | | | | |
| *Percentage of respondents that know the name of the Mukim leader (imam Mukim)* | 71.7 (45.4) | 85.0 (36.0) | 14.3* (48.3) | 0.077 | 86.7 (34.3) | 81.7 (39.0) | 0.0 (46.7) | 1.000 |
| *Level of agreement with 'The Mukim institution serves the benefit of all people in this village' (scale -2 to +2)*[1] | 1.0 (0.6) | 1.4 (0.7) | 0.3 (0.8) | 0.235 | 1.1 (0.5) | 1.4 (0.5) | 0.4 (0.7) | 0.267 |
| *Importance of the role of imam Mukim in the village (scale 1 to 5)*[2] | 4.0 (1.0) | 4.1 (0.8) | 0.1 (1.2) | 0.802 | 3.8 (1.1) | 4.5 (0.8) | 0.7 (1.2) | 0.153 |
| Index for satisfaction with local governance at sub-district level[3] | 1.0 (0.5) | 1.1 (0.5) | 0.1 (0.5) | 0.374 | 0.8 (0.6) | 0.9 (0.4) | 0.1 (0.7) | 0.432 |
| Level of corruption at […] on a scale from 1 to 3 | | | | | | | | |
| *Village leadership*[4] | 1.3 (0.6) | 1.4 (0.5) | 0.0 (0.8) | 0.959 | 1.4 (0.6) | 1.2 (0.5) | -0.2 (0.6) | 0.182 |
| *District government*[5] | 2.0 (0.8) | 2.1 (0.7) | -0.0 (0.8) | 0.815 | 2.2 (0.7) | 2.2 (0.7) | -0.0 (0.9) | 0.814 |
| **C. Role of traditional institutions** | | | | | | | | |
| Index for positive attitude towards traditional laws and culture (scale from -2 to 2) | 0.9 (0.7) | 1.1 (0.6) | 0.3** (0.8) | 0.025 | 0.9 (0.5) | 1.0 (0.6) | -0.0 (0.9) | 0.926 |
| **D. Management of natural resources** | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage respondents that knows about regulations for the use of community forests | 13.3 (34.3) | 16.7 (37.6) | 3.6 (42.5) | 0.773 | 88.3 (32.4) | 96.7 (18.1) | 3.6 (26.7) | 0.633 |
| Satisfaction with regulations (scale from -2 to 2)[6] | -0.4 (1.0) | -0.5 (1.0) | -0.1 (1.5) | 0.226 | -0.2 (1.1) | -0.4 (1.2) | -0.3 (1.6) | 0.478 |
| **E. Households' attitude towards forests/plantations**[7] | | | | | | | | |

| Treatment area | Siem | | | | Lamteuba | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reporting period | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| Sample size | 60 | 60 | 56 | 56 | 60 | 60 | 56 | 56 |
| Dependence on forest resources (scale -2 to +2) | -0.4 (1.1) | -0.8 (0.9) | -0.1 (1.0) | 0.686 | 0.8 (1.0) | 0.9 (1.1) | 0.1 (1.1) | 0.647 |
| Index for positive attitude towards sustainable forest use (scale -2 to +2) | 0.7 (0.5) | 1.0 (0.5) | 0.4*** (0.6) | 0.006 | 0.7 (0.6) | 0.8 (0.5) | 0.0 (0.6) | 0.334 |
| Index for access to forest resources (scale -2 to +2) | 0.5 (0.5) | 0.8 (0.5) | 0.3 (0.6) | 0.274 | 0.8 (0.5) | 1.0 (0.5) | 0.2 (0.7) | 0.360 |
| **F. Sense of control of villagers** | | | | | | | | |
| The following indices are on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | | | | | |
| *Index for trust in village* | 1.3 (0.6) | 1.6 (0.5) | 0.3** (0.5) | 0.013 | 1.2 (0.5) | 1.5 (0.5) | 0.3* (0.6) | 0.072 |
| *Index for sense of control regarding own life* | 0.8 (0.6) | 1.1 (0.6) | 0.3** (0.8) | 0.026 | 1.0 (0.5) | 1.2 (0.6) | 0.3 (0.8) | 0.194 |
| *Index for sense of control over land* | 0.8 (0.4) | 1.0 (0.4) | 0.3* (0.6) | 0.063 | 0.9 (0.4) | 1.0 (0.4) | 0.1 (0.4) | 0.326 |
| *Index for sense of control regarding preservation of traditional culture* | 0.2 (0.5) | 0.3 (0.6) | 0.1** (0.8) | 0.048 | 0.4 (0.6) | 0.6 (0.6) | 0.1 (0.7) | 0.506 |

Source: Household survey E8; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

1. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 57, 59, 52, 60, 60 and 56
2. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 59, 60, 55, 52, 60 and 48
3. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 59, 60, 55, 59, 60 and 56
4. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 53, 56, 46, 54, 58 and 49
5. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 30, 44, 23, 34, 37 and 22
6. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 56, 60, 52, 59, 60 and 56
7. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 24, 15, 14, 58, 60 and 54 because only respondents that indicated to have a community forest in or around their village are included

### *Access to information on (local) governance*

During the project period (2012-2014) no significant improvements were found with regard to the respondents' access to information on decisions made by village leaders and their knowledge about district government's policies related to agriculture and the use of land. On the contrary, at the endline a significantly lower number of respondents in *Mukim* Lamteuba reported to feel 'well informed' about local government decision making. However, on average the villagers of Lamteuba still felt moderately happy about their access to information with a score of 0.2 on a scale of -2 to +2 at the endline. The number of respondents of *Mukim* Lamteuba that reported to be knowledgeable about district government policies also dropped significantly, from 30% at the baseline to only 16.7% at the endline. In *Mukim* Siem, this percentage was around 35% at the endline.

This drop in satisfaction with government information provision in *Mukim* Lamteuba could have to do with the change in *Mukim* government leadership that took place in Lamteuba halfway the project

period (2013). The new Imeum *Mukim* (traditional *Mukim* leader) is reported to be "less assertive" than his popular predecessor, and has not yet released any new regulations in his one year reign (Annex VI).

### *Satisfaction with local governance*

In both *Mukim* Siem and *Mukim* Lamteuba, the respondents were rather unsatisfied with the local governance at the village (*Gampong*) level (around -0.4 on a scale of -2 to +2, with a significant drop in satisfaction in *Mukim* Siem between baseline and endline), whereas they were satisfied with the local governance at the sub-district level (around 1.0). Interestingly, the respondents did report higher levels of corruptions at the district government level (around 2.1 on a scale of 1-3) than at the village government level (1.4 for Siem and 1.2 for Lamteuba). No significant changes in this regard were measured between the baseline and the endline study.

Because YRBI's project particularly focuses on strengthening the *Mukim* government, we expected to see an increase in the indicators for satisfaction on the *Mukim* government level. However, apart from an increased number of people that know the name of the *Mukim* leader in *Mukim* Siem (from 71.7% at baseline to 85% at endline) no significant changes were measured. Nevertheless, the respondents in both areas remain of the opinion that the *Mukim* institution serves the benefit of all people in the village (1.4 on a scale of -2 to 2), and keep rating the importance of the role of the Imam *Mukim* in the village around a 4.1 in Siem, and a 4.5 in Lamteuba (on a scale of 1-5). In *Mukim* Lamteuba this last indicator increased (but not significant) with 0.7 point between baseline and endline. These outcomes suggest that the respondents have positive feelings towards the *Mukim* institution and therefore might like to see a strengthening of this institution in their society.

### *Role of traditional institutions*

Because YRBI's project aims to revitalize traditional structures in the project locations, it is important to measure the attitude of the villagers towards traditional institutions, laws and culture. Results from the household endline survey show that the attitudes in both project locations are overall positive (1.1 for Siem and 1.0 for Lamteuba on a scale of -2 to 2). While the attitudes of the respondents in Siem have slightly (but significantly) increased by 0.3 point over the course of the project, the attitudes of the respondents in Lamteuba have more or less stayed the same.

However, the qualitative study shows evidence that both communities have grown more and more supportive of the *Mukim* institution over the past years. It is also important to note that findings from the qualitative study indicate that, with the help of the YRBI project, the *Mukim* institutions have increased their role in society over the past 2 years. Both *Mukim* governments (but that of Siem more so than that of Lamteuba) are playing an increasingly important role in conflict resolution, education, reviving traditional institutions for natural resource management, and the preservation of indigenous culture (Annex VI).

Currently, both *Mukim* governments are undertaking efforts to revive old customs and traditions that have disappeared during the New Order Reign, for example by collecting information from the village elders and by teaching women the old custom of corpse-bathing. The community members that were interviewed for the qualitative study also reported to place a high value on their traditional culture and customs, and claimed to play an active role in their preservation. YRBI's initiative to help the people document their cultural customs, laws, and tradition, was happily received by the communities. Even

though, at the time of the qualitative study, the people were still in the middle of the documentation process, they already expressed their good hope that the documentation could help them educate their children, as well as 'legitimize' their existence in the eyes of outsiders (Annex VI)

### *Management of natural resources*

Results from the community survey (Table 7) show that there have been some improvements in the management of natural resources in *Mukim* Siem. In the village of study regulations about the use and protection of the community forests were now reported to be present. At the time of the baseline study, regulations were not communicated to the villagers[19], but at the time of the endline study community meetings and signs in the forest were now reported to be used for this purpose. Two villages in *Mukim* Lamteuba already had regulations that were being communicated to the villagers at the time of the baseline study. This had not changed over the course of the project.

The improvements in natural resource management in *Mukim* Siem are not seen in the outcomes of the household survey (see Table 19). At the endline, only 16.7% of the respondents reported that there were any rules or regulations for the use of community forests in the village, and this percentage had not significantly increased since the baseline. To compare, in *Mukim* Lamteuba the percentage of villagers that reported to know about such regulations lay much higher, at 96.7% at the endline, which could be explained by the higher importance of forest resources in *Mukim* Lamteuba. However, the satisfaction with the regulations had remained comparably low for both study areas from baseline to endline, with a score of -0.5 for Siem and -0.4 for Lamteuba (on a scale from -2 to +2) at the endline.

The results from the qualitative study more or less mirror those of the household survey, as both measure no real significant improvement on forest preservation and natural resource management at the end of the project period. However, results from the qualitative study show that YRBI's project did cause some promising developments that could lead to actual positive impacts on sustainable resource management in the future: Informants of the qualitative study stated that the project had helped the *Mukim* governments to restore the traditional institutions responsible for natural resource management (the *Panglima Glie* and *Keujreun Blang*). However, due to a lack of government support these institutions were not yet able to operate at their full potential, and as such real results were not yet noticeable in the *Mukims* (Annex VI).

### *A. Households' attitude towards forests/plantations*

As expected, results from the endline survey show that the people of semi-urban *Mukim* Siem -of which only 1 out of 3 villages has a community forest- are still far less dependent on forest resources (-0.8 on a scale of -2 to + 2) than the people of rural *Mukim* Lamteuba (0.9), and over the course of the project *Mukim* Siem's access to forest resources has not changed significantly. However, Siem's respondents' attitude towards sustainable forest use seems to have grown significantly more positive. The index for 'positive attitude towards sustainable forest use' as shown in Table 8 is composed of 3 questions, and Siem shows a significant positive change for 2 of those questions, i.e.: "I take from the forest what my family needs without thinking about others" and "we have to use our forest with moderation and respect" (see Table 23). In *Mukim* Lamteuba, the villagers seem to have retained their generally positive

[19] Or at least not in any of the ways suggested in the questionnaire.

attitude towards sustainable forest use, as no significant changes in attitude between the baseline and endline were measured.

The improved attitude towards sustainable forest use in *Mukim* Siem was not confirmed by the qualitative study. On the contrary, the informants reported that the community members of Siem had actually grown more apathetic towards their forests' sustainability. If this would be true, the cause of this apathy can probably (at least partly) be sought in the fact that the community has grown less dependent on their forests (Annex VI).

### *B. Sense of control of villagers*

The index for 'trust in the village' in Table 8 shows a positive development. In both *Mukims* the amount of trust people have in their community members has significantly increased, resulting in high scores of 1.6 (on a scale from -2 to +2) for *Mukim* Siem and 1.5 for *Mukim* Lamteuba (also see Table 23). In *Mukim* Siem, the respondents' sense of control regarding their own lives had also significantly increased to a score of 1.1, as well as their sense of control over land (to 1.0 at endline). In *Mukim* Lamteuba no significant changes in this regard were measured, but its respondents remained to give high scores on both indices (1.2. for sense of control over own lives and 1.0 for sense of control over land at endline).

As a result of YRBI's project we had expected to see an increase in the communities' sense of control regarding the preservation of their traditional culture. However, only a very small significant increase of 0.1 was measured in *Mukim* Siem. In fact, for both *Mukims* the score for this index (0.3 for Siem and 0.6 for Lamteuba) was much lower than the score for the other 2 indices. This corresponds with the qualitative study that found that the community members worried that their old customs and traditions that were no longer practiced in everyday life would disappear for good when the elders in their communities die (Annex VI).

An explanation for the stagnation in sense of control regarding the preservation of traditional culture over the course of the project could be that YRBI's project has made people even more strongly aware that they might forever lose (parts of) their culture if they won't speedily undertake action, thereby enhancing their worries about the issue. This increased concern could, in its turn, negate the positive effects that the actual undertaking of the activities (such as documentation of traditional customs and the revitalization of *adat* structures) may have on their hope and faith for the future. However, our study has not provided sufficient information to conclusively prove this is the case.

### *Other issues: conflict resolution*

An important goal of the participatory mapping project of YRBI which is not directly captured in the uniform outcome indicators is conflict resolution. In *Mukim* Siem, the Imeum *Mukim* reported that his main reason to join the participatory mapping project was to resolve the boundary disputes between different *Gampongs* (villages) in *Mukim* Siem. With the help of YRBI, *Mukim* Siem has succeeded in determining 6 of the 17 unresolved boundary points between the *Gampongs* during the mapping process, thereby restoring some feeling of safety and peace within the community, especially for the people living in the border areas between villages (Annex VI). This development is reflected in the results of the endline survey where the percentage of respondents that knows the boundaries of his or her village has significantly increased by 30.4 percentage points (Table 21).

# 8. Evaluation question 2: Attribution of changes

This subsection discusses evaluation question 2: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?

## 8.1. Methodology

We use before-after methodology for the evaluation of the YRBI project complemented with a qualitative survey. We have not sampled any comparison villages because the small sample size would not allow statistical analysis of the differences between the treatment and comparison group. Instead, we opted for using mixed methods: complement the quantitative survey with in-depth interviews to understand the driving factors behind the changes in the outcome indicators.

In addition, we rely on the results chain discussed in section 3.3 to validate the impacts of the project on the outcome variables: only if the changes in the outcome variables are accompanied by improvements or accomplishment of the outputs and intermediate results of the project can we attribute changes to the project (necessary but not sufficient condition).

## 8.2. Results

Data from the endline survey indicates that the project has been implemented seriously. 50% of the respondents in both *Mukims* knew that participatory mapping had been conducted in their villages. In *Mukim* Lamteuba 30% of the respondents participated in the mapping activities. In *Mukim* Siem this was 21.7%. During the qualitative study a variety of other YRBI activities related to natural resource management and traditional institution strengthening were reported to have taken place in the villages as well.

The objectives of the mapping project were to eliminate potential conflicts over boundaries, and to have the maps serve as a tool to improve regional planning and natural resource management, as well as to educate future generations.

Findings from the qualitative study indicate that, even though the maps of both *Mukims* are not yet completed, the mapping process has already achieved some positive results for the communities of Siem and Lamteuba. In *Mukim* Siem a number of boundary conflicts between the *Mukim*'s villages were resolved during (and as a result of) the mapping process, restoring a sense of peace in the community and making the people that live in the border areas feel safer on their land. This was also reflected in the results of the endline survey that showed that *Mukim* Siem's villagers' sense of control with regard to land had significantly increased. Several villages have also already found ways to put the map to use. For example, by attaching it to fundraising proposals, by using it as a reference to see which *Gampong* should handle the administration of a land-purchase, and by using it as lecture material.

However, because the maps are unfinished, YRBI has not yet been able to reach its ultimate goal of the mapping project: 'to submit the maps to the local government in order to claim the communities' rights over their indigenous lands and the natural resources in it', thereby leaving the communities' forests vulnerable to land grab attempts and further environmental destruction by government and companies.

At the time of the endline study, forest land was still being converted into plantations and fields, and illegal mining, often supported by the local apparatus, was still taking place in the industrial forests. As a result, water sources keep reducing in number and size, and forest products such as wood and honey keep growing scarcer.

Both the quantitative and qualitative studies indicate that no significant improvements in forest preservation and natural resource management have yet taken place as a result of the project. The combined data also suggests that the project has not managed to significantly increase people's awareness and attitudes regarding the importance of natural resource preservation[20] (not taking away from the fact that the attitudes overall attitudes were still relatively positive). However, the qualitative study indicates that YRBI has succeeded in its goal to help the *Mukim* governments of Siem and Lamteuba to revitalize some of the traditional institutions responsible for natural resource management: the *Panglima Glie* and the *Keujreun Blang Mukim*. Even though these institutions are currently not yet able to operate at their full potential due to conflicting governmental rules and regulations, with the right support they may lead to improvements in natural resource management in the future.

Strengthening traditional institutions, in particular the *Mukim* institution, and enhancing their capacity to effectively deal with conflict management, land tenure, and the management of natural resources was an important focus of the YRBI project. Findings from the qualitative study indicate that the *Mukim* governments have actually increased their role in society over the past 2 years. With the help of YRBI, the *Mukim* governments, and especially that of *Mukim* Siem, have taken on a leading role in conflict resolution attempts during the mapping process, and have increased their attempts to revitalize traditional institutions for natural resource management and to revive and preserve indigenous culture, customs, and laws.

Data from the quantitative study shows that peoples' attitudes towards traditional institutions, laws, and culture were already positive at baseline, and have only slightly increased in *Mukim* Siem and have stayed the same in *Mukim* Lamteuba over the course of the project. Either way, YRBI has managed to enthuse and persuade people to start documenting their customary laws, customs, and traditions, under YRBI's assistance. Even though the wisdom documentation is still in process, the qualitative study suggests that it has given people hope that their culture and traditions will be preserved for the future. Nevertheless, against our expectations, a higher sense of control regarding the preservation of traditional culture was barely found among the respondents of the endline study. A potential explanation for this could however be that YRBI's project has simultaneously increased peoples' awareness about the impending loss of their customs and traditions, thereby increasing their worries, while at the same time given the people hope that their culture can be saved by documentation efforts, etc.

Despite the increased role of the *Mukim* government in the communities, the endline study showed that the satisfaction with the *Mukim* government had only slightly increased in *Mukim* Siem and had stayed the same in *Mukim* Lamteuba. However, satisfaction was already high at the time of the baseline, so no

[20] The studies showed conflicting findings for *Mukim* Siem: the quantitative study found a significant improvement in attitude, and the qualitative study found a significant deterioration. Both studies found no change in attitude for *Mukim* Lamteuba.

large changes were expected to happen. The qualitative study, in its turn, indicated that people have grown more supportive of the *Mukim* institution over the past years, which brings with it a potential for traditional institution to keep growing over the coming years.

A final interesting observation is that, although the YRBI project was more widely known among the respondents of *Mukim* Lamteuba (71.7% against 21.7% in Siem at the endline, see Table 17), overall the project seems to have had a bigger impact on the villagers in *Mukim* Siem than it did in *Mukim* Lamteuba. This is curious because the people of *Mukim* Lamteuba are far more reliant on their forest lands and resources than the people of *Mukim* Siem, so one would think they have higher stakes in achieving positive outcomes of the project. However, when we look at the endline (and baseline) values of the indicators, it becomes clear that indeed most of the indicators in *Mukim* Lamteuba are at least as high as in *Mukim* Siem at the endline (and at the baseline). Nonetheless, in both *Mukims* the local leaders can play a role in further improving the attitude and sense of control of households.

In summary, the YRBI project has only partly fulfilled its objectives, but it has planted seeds that might lead to more improvements in conflict management, land tenure, and natural and cultural resource management in the future.

# 9. Evaluation question 3: Relevance of changes

This subsection will answer evaluation question 3: What is the relevance of these changes? In particular we look at the size of the impact, and whether the project addresses an important issue for the beneficiaries.

## 9.1. The size of the impact

The size of the impact is not easy to determine. On the one hand, the quantitative study indicates that no significant improvements for any of the outcome indicators have taken place in *Mukim* Lamteuba during the evaluation period. In *Mukim* Siem, only small significant improvements were measured with regard to the villagers' sense of control, and their attitudes towards sustainable forest use and traditional laws and culture. On the other hand, the qualitative study disproves that attitudes towards sustainable forest use have improved, but does indicate that some real improvements have been made in terms of conflict resolution, culture preservation, and the strengthening of the traditional *Mukim* institution and its role in society, especially in *Mukim* Siem.

## 9.2. Does the project address an important issue for the beneficiaries?

The survey respondents were asked to indicate the 3 most important issues for their communities. At the baseline, the most common responses were road conditions/access to the village (36.7% in Siem and 33.3% in Lamteuba) and education (30% in Siem and 41.7% in Lamteuba), but also livelihood improvement (48.3% in Siem and 56.7% in Lamteuba) and access to clean water (43.4% in Siem and 16.4% in Lamteuba). Hence, it seems that YRBI's project addressed at least some of the issues that were deemed urgent by the communities (access to clean water).

On the other hand, other issues that are addressed by YRBI's project don't seem to be thought of as very important in the communities. For example, almost none of the respondents reported 'resolving disputes with neighboring villages' or 'the conservation of traditional values/culture' as one of the most important issues.

Interestingly, almost none of the respondents thought that 'exploitation of natural resources' was an urgent issue. At the baseline only 1.7% of the respondents of *Mukim* Siem, and 0% of the respondents of *Mukim* Lamteuba thought that natural resource protection was an important problem (which only slightly increased to 5% and 3.3% at the endline), and only 6.7% of *Mukim* Siem's respondents reported that 'industry (mining, road building, etc.)' was a problem. However, at the endline the respondents' worries about clean water had grown even more (to 76.6% in Siem and 40% in Lamteuba). This may indicate a lack of understanding about the likely causes for water scarcity (i.e. environmental destruction due to mining activities and conversion of lands to plantations), or a reluctance to admit to it due to financial interests in the mining activities.

At the endline the percentage of respondents that reports livelihood improvement as an urgent issue has declined for both *Mukims* to only 16.7% in Siem and to 38.3% in Lamteuba. Even though this could be interpreted as a good sign, this decline is probably not due to any improvements in natural resource management or availability of forest resources, as no indications of improvements in these matters were found during the study.

# 10. Evaluation question 4: Efficiency of project

This subsection addresses evaluation question 4: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient?

Unfortunately, we are not able to evaluate neither the efficiency nor the effectiveness of the project. Therefore, in this section we put forward our arguments for failing to evaluate the question on efficiency. However, first, the available cost information for the YRBI project is discussed below.

## 10.1. Project costs

To collect information on the costs of the project, we conducted a structured interview with YRBI in July 2013 using the 'budget survey' as described in section 5.1. In 2014, we had additional correspondence with YRBI to obtain cost figures for the second half of 2013 and the final project report. Therefore, the cost data are based on actual expenditures.

Table 9 summarizes the available cost information. The last contract of YRBI with ICCO ran from 1 November 2011 until 31 October 2013.[21] Therefore, for 2011, we have reported the project costs of the previous phase (Jan-Oct 2011) and the current contract (Nov-Dec 2011). The total project costs for the reporting period are reported in column 3 of the table in Indonesian rupiahs (IDR) and in euros (using

[21] However, the financial report of YRBI covers 1 November 2012 – 31 December 2013. Therefore, in the table we also assume that costs have occurred during the whole year in 2013.

yearly average exchange rates) in column 4. The total costs cover all project activities of YRBI, hence they are not exclusive to the surveyed locations (*Mukim* Siem and *Mukim* Lamteuba). The total costs for the last contract (2011-2013) have been 1,900,294,443 rupiahs or 147,915 euros.[22] This amount is 53% of the budget of the YRBI project.[23]

Column 5 shows the percentage of these costs that have been funded by ICCO. For the last contract, ICCO covered 73% of all project costs using MFS II funds. The remaining amount has been covered by YRBI. The percentage of budget actually used was 65% from ICCO's share and 36% from YRBI's share of the budget. [24]

Unfortunately, we do not have information about the number of beneficiaries. On the one hand, the direct beneficiaries of the project are the people who participate in the activities conducted by YRBI. According to information from YRBI, the total number of participants was 356 in 2011, 288 in 2012 and 88 in the first half of 2013. However, this information may be misleading on at least two grounds: firstly, a wider population benefits from the results of the activities (the population of villages and *Mukims*); and, secondly, some of the participants may attend multiple activities and may be counted multiple times.

Finally, the last column of Table 9 indicates that we are not able to provide an estimate of the cost per beneficiary of the project. The reasons for this are argued below.

**Table 9: Overview of the costs and number of beneficiaries**

| Year | Number of months | Total costs [IDR] | Total cost [EUR, current prices][1] | Percentage of costs funded by CFA | Beneficiaries[2] (population) | Cost per beneficiary per year [Int$ 2011][3] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **2011 (Jan-Oct)** | 10 | 1,074,620,503 | 87,623.98 | 76% | N.K. | N.A. |
| **2011 (Nov-Dec)** | 2 | 138,496,558 | 11,292.94 | 59% | N.K. | N.A. |
| **2012** | 12 | 924,345,550 | 76,473.09 | 66% | N.K. | N.A. |
| **2013** | 12 | 837,452,335 | 60,148.84 | 85% | N.K. | N.A. |

Sources: Budget Survey 2013 and project documents.
Notes:
1. Annual average exchange rate is used. Data is obtained from http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/
2. N.K.=not known
3. N.A.=not applicable

[22] Unfortunately, we do not have information about the exchange rate used for the project. Instead we use the annual average exchange rate from http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/. The exchange rates used are 12,264 IDR/EUR in 2011, 12,087 IDR/EUR in 2012 and 13,923 IDR/EUR in 2013.
[23] Based on the NWO Joint MFS II evaluations Country-Specific Information Indonesia, the budget of the project was 315,130 EUR, which amounts to 3,560,969,000 IDR using an exchange rate of 11,300 IDR/EUR (the exchange rate used in contract between ICCO and YRBI).
[24] ICCO awarded 190,000 EUR or 2,147,000,000 IDR (using 11,300 IDR/EUR exchange rate) for the project and covered 1,395,808,642 IDR from the actual costs for the contract period.

### 10.2. Assessment

There are a number of factors that make the calculation of cost effectiveness a challenge. Firstly, the project of YRBI is a continuous effort at strengthening the *Mukim* institution and assisting villages and *Mukims* to settle boundary disputes and map the boundary of their land. However, this is a lengthy process: based on the qualitative study of this project, the maps have not yet been finalized during the project period due to remaining boundary disputes that remain to be negotiated. Therefore, there is not yet a final output for this component of the project.[25]

Secondly, we are not able to separate the project costs for the surveyed locations.

Thirdly, we also do not have information about the number of beneficiaries over the complete project area, which would allow us to estimate the amount of costs per beneficiary over the whole project area.

Fourthly, beneficiaries of the project are not only the participants of the workshops who are the local leaders, but in a broader perspective the project benefits the whole community and *Mukim*.

Finally, given that the mapping, reforestation and management of the rice plantation activities all relate to land, it would be sensible to calculate the project costs per hectares of land mapped and/or sustainably managed. However, we also lack the information about the size of the project area.

Taking the above concerns into account, providing a reliable (and meaningful) estimate of the cost per beneficiary goes beyond the scope of this evaluation. Therefore, we refrain from going further in answering evaluation question 4 than the information on project costs provided in section 10.1.

### 10.3. Benchmark costs

Regarding costs of participatory mapping projects in general, the Synthesis team found Dongus et al. (2007) which report the detailed costs of a community-based mapping procedure without electronic devices in the field for Tanzania.[26] The mapping activity was aimed at the surveillance of malaria mosquitoes' larval. However, the method of implementing the participatory mapping is similar to the YRBI project. Synthesis team (2014) report that the costs of the mapping were 2,270.00 Int$ (in 2011 prices) per $km^2$.

## 11. Contribution of Capacity Development and Civil Society

The YRBI project has also been selected for the Capacity Development component of the MFS II Evaluation. Regarding the contribution of the capacity development of ICCO and the ICCO Alliance to YRBI during the implementation of the project, the Capacity Development endline report concludes that ICCO played a key role in the growing recognition of YRBI as a leading organisation in *Mukim* and *Gampong* sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia. During the evaluation period, local communities

[25] Note that the institutional strengthening in *Mukim* Lamteuba, the establishment of the keujruen blang *Mukim* traditional institution (for rice plantation management), can be regarded as an outcome of the project.

[26] The procedure included the development of sketch maps by the community members, laminated aerial photographs as well as the actual GIS analysis.

started to invite YRBI more due to an increased trust in the YRBI and due to *Mukim* and *Gampong* issues becoming mainstream both in local governments and communities. According to the report, communities' trust increased in YRBI as a result of the successful activities (village mapping and honey production) of YRBI that led to the empowerment of the communities. During the trainings, communities also learned how to make their own (social) maps and the resulting maps have been used by the communities.

During the evaluation period, YRBI participated in 3 trainings organised by ICCO: participatory mapping internship (October 2013 – January 2014), 'Making markets work for the poor' (March 2014 – ongoing), resource mobilisation training (February 2013). Possibly, these have not yet contributed to the results found in the MDG report, however, they have certainly developed the capacity of YRBI in carrying out their project activities on *Mukim* and *Gampong* issues.

Unfortunately, since YRBI's contract with ICCO terminated, YRBI has not yet found a new funding source, and therefore, the number of staff and project activities had to be reduced.

## 12. Conclusion

The collected data suggest that YRBI was only partially successful in delivering on its objectives of strengthening traditional institutions and local people's awareness and capacity to resolve land related conflicts and manage and control their natural resources in a sustainable way.

Even though the maps of the project locations could not yet be finished and submitted to the government due to unresolved boundary conflicts, the mapping activities have already yielded some results, such as the resolution of some of the border conflicts and an increased sense of security and peace within the communities. YRBI's mapping activities, as well as their trainings, workshops, discussions, and documentation efforts have helped the *Mukim* institution to take on a bigger role in society, in particular with regard to conflict resolution and the preservation of traditional culture, customs, and laws. No real improvements on natural resource management or the condition of the communities' forest and forest resources have yet occurred, but with the right amount of support from the community and the government, the traditional institutions that were revitalized by the *Mukim* government with the help of YRBI (the *Panglima Glie* and *Keujreun Blang*) could become to play an important role in forest preservation in the future.

YRBI could play an important role in obtaining this support, by proceeding to help *Mukim* Lamteuba and *Mukim* Siem in resolving their remaining boundaries, finishing their maps, and submitting those maps to the government so that they can get their rights over their indigenous lands legitimized, and will be legally able to manage them in their own customary and sustainable way.

The literature review showed that participatory mapping is not only recognized as a practical tool; the participatory approach is also noted to have an intrinsic value, i.e. it can impact group communication and awareness, cultural identity and empowerment. The materialized results of the YRBI project (e.g. resolving some border conflicts, preservation of traditional culture, customs, and laws) are in line with both features mentioned in the literature. Though not all positive features mentioned in the literature

have been realised yet by the YRBI project due to some obstacles in the implementation of the project. However, it is expected that with continuation and finishing of the project these results will be realised (e.g. legalizing the maps, improving natural resource management). The literature also mentioned some possible negative consequences of participatory mapping (e.g. greater exposure of valuable natural resources, increase of conflicts), which are not found for the YRBI project. Finally, the MFS synthesis team asked to score each project along a few indicators. Table 10 displays the indicators and the scores we deemed valid for the project.

**Table 10: Overall project scoring**

| Statement | Score | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| **1. The project was well designed** | 8 | The project addresses the importance of informed and just community management of limited natural resources through participatory workshops on mapping, producing documenting traditional regulations, and producing new regulations. YRBI works closely with the *Mukims* and communities in achieving the project results. Hence, the project is able to transfer knowledge and empower the communities. |
| **2. The project was implemented as designed** | 9 | The data shows that the project was to a large extent implemented as designed. |
| **3. The project reached all its objectives** | 7 | No, not all results have been achieved as yet: some boundary conflicts still need to be solved in both Siem and Lamteuba before the maps can be completed. YRBI has managed to revitalize at least some of the traditional institutions for natural resource management and produced some documentation and regulations, but the documentation is not completed yet and the institutions are not yet working at their full potential, so there is still work left to be done. |
| **4. The observed results are attributable to the project interventions** | 8 | We are not able to attribute the few observed (significant) results of the quantitative study to the project with the data of the qualitative study. However, in the qualitative study some alternative results were found that could be attributed to the project (such as 6 resolved boundary conflicts, increased feeling of peace and security with regard to land, revitalization of traditional institutions for natural resource management, increased role of the *Mukim* institution). |
| **5. The observed results are relevant to the project beneficiaries** | 7 | Access to clean water, sanitation issues, and livelihood improvement are thought to be important, but no results are yet observed there. On the other hand, results in boundary conflict resolution are achieved, but those were not deemed very urgent by the respondents (according to Table 16). |
| **6. The project was implemented in the most efficient way** | NA | |

Notes: Scores are on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being “no agreement at all” and 10 being “completely agree with statement”.
NA = not applicable

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# Annex I. SPO and project description

### *SPO description*

In 1995 YRBI was established by 4 founders concerned with empowering indigenous institutions, agriculture and environment. In 1998, YRBI still had no donors and the organisation consisted of a staff of six people and ten volunteers. As YRBI was dealing with the legal aspects of palm oil extraction, it had to function undercover. The main issues YRBI was engaged with at this point were: democracy and human rights advocacy, identifying conflict origins and (eventually) reducing those, solving local conflicts using traditional wisdom and finally the engagement with issues concerning the sustainable use of natural resources[5].

In 1999 the Programme of Panglima Laut was funded by local fishermen and in 2000 one of YRBI's volunteers were kidnapped by Brimob (Indonesian police force). In 2001 YRBI had its Standard Operational Procedures elaborated and the YRBI's office was moved to Banda Aceh. From 2001 to 2004 YRBI had a staff of 11 people and was funded by DAI-OTI-USAID in its programme on civil society mapping, democracy and human rights.

After the tsunami in Aceh in 2004, YRBI worked mainly on humanitarian and emergency issues overseeing the participatory dimensions (i.e. cash for work). During this period YRBI began to engage with ICCO through JKPP (Jaringkan Kerja Pemetaan Participatif)[27], an NGO based in Bogor. Through JKPP, ICCO provided funding for mapping of areas affected by the tsunami and village planning between 2005-2008.

In 2008, YRBI began to get direct support from ICCO for the project 'Empowerment of *Mukim* and *Gampong* Capacity'. In the project, YRBI has shifted the focus of its activities from the village level (*Gampong*) to the level of the traditional *Mukim* institution, which encompasses a handful of villages.

Since 2009 YRBI is also trying to revive its 'original way' to conduct the programmes based on local support and voluntarism. Yet it's quite difficult since many people have already got accustomed to 'receiving cash' for participating in programmes.

**Vision**

YRBI envisions a community that "will be able to manage natural resources independently and develop the potential of the region to achieve the prosperous life in a fair way."

**Mission**

The mission of YRBI can be summarized as follows:

a. Building up and strengthening capacity of community in managing the areas and natural resources.
b. Strengthening community/civil based economy.

[27] *Jaringkan Kerja Pemetaan Participatif* means Community Mapping Network.

c. Strengthening local community culture and values.
d. Strengthening public policy based on community justification and decision as well.
e. Strengthening community cooperation and solidarity among community members.

### *Project description*

YRBI works on revitalization of traditional structures & law and strengthening traditional institutions (called *Mukim* and *Gampong*) as well as advocacy for recognition of these traditional institutions and structures by both the people and the government. It carries out consultative workshops, trainings on participatory mapping and community-based spatial planning, regular discussions on empowerment of traditional institutions and structures and workshop in traditional institutions, especially for youth. By doing so, it is expected that the management and distribution of natural resources would be fair and just both socially and ecologically.

The project activities in the *Gampongs* and *Mukims* usually begin with Programme Workshop, in which YRBI discusses basic idea of the programme and its realization process. The objective is to make participants of this programme understanding the steps and the channel of the programme in order to get commitment and support from local people. Through this activity, YRBI identifies and asks for commitment from local leader to participate in the programme. In *Mukim* area, process to get commitment from local leaders may take quite long time since some *Gampong* leaders should make an agreement before having commitment at *Mukim* level.

The next activity is conducting Participatory *Mukim* Appraisal. This activity is carried out as early process in doing mapping programme of *Mukim* and the empowerment of *Mukim* institution. The objective is to get accurate and adequate data about the *Mukim*, in order to easily identify the requirement and developing field activities agenda. The next activities include Participatory Mapping of *Mukim* area, Training of *Gampong*/*Mukim* regulations and decision making for *adat* leaders and head of village (Keuchik), Training for Tuha Peut to make Rule of *Gampong*, Training of land tenure and customary right (the *adat* Aceh) for youth.

### *Planned project activities and outputs*

**Activities**[28]

Four types of activities were planned.

First, capacity building of the Mukim and Gampong institutions to manage natural resources and natural disasters. This involves the following activities:

- Organising workshop on YRBI's programme to obtain local input for enhancing engagement of community members in the project (Phase1)
- Participatory investigation and social mapping to identify the historical institutional system, customary law, and social and natural resources; and drafting a Participatory Rural Appraisal Report (Phase1)
- Organise regular meetings (every three months) for Mukim and Gampong (Phase2)
- Organise training on land tenure and customary rights for young people (Phase2)

[28] Source: Logframe Proposal YRBI ICCO 2011-2013 and Proposal YRBI ICCO 2010-2013.

Second, introduction of the Gampong and Mukim regulations on community-based natural resource management. This involves the following activities (Phase2):

- Organising participatory mapping activities to identify Mukim territory and resources.
- Drafting documentation on Mukim and Gampong spatial planning and identify executive teams in communities.
- Organising workshop on revitalising the traditional representative council of tuha peut[29] and its role in Gampong and Mukim governance.
- Organising training for tuha peut to formulate Gampong regulations together with communities.

Third, drafting of documentation on local knowledge of natural resource management, which involves (Phase 2):

- Drafting of documentation on Mukim and Gampong regulations.
- Conducting research on community cattle land system and regulation.
- Publishing Peureude bulletin and info sheet "Suara Mukim" once every three months.
- Organising Assistance programme.

Fourth, decreasing the impact of climate change through the following activities planned (Phase 2):

- Organise field trip to identify rivers and water sources that need to be protected.
- Organise re-forestation, seed and plant distribution activities.

**Outputs**

- Increased capacity of the Mukims and Gampongs in Mukim Aceh Besar, and Aceh Selatan to manage natural resources and natural disasters.
- Gampong and Mukim regulations produced on community-based natural resource management.
- Documentation on local knowledge of natural resource management available.
- Activation of communities in re-forestation activities to decrease the impact of climate change.

[29] *Tuha peut* means representative council. There are such councils both at the *Gampong* and *Mukim* level.

### *Project implementation*

The table below provides an overview of the implementation of the YRBI project through summarizing the regular meetings during the project period. The information is taken from the Final report of YRBI to ICCO (2014).

**Table 11: Project meetings and their results (2012-2013)**

| No. | Thema/ Implementations | Output | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| **1** | Empowerment Indigenous and Mukim Institutions of Indigenous workshop in **Mukim Gunong Biram**<br><br>Sunday/25 November 2012<br><br>Participants:<br>34 persons (Keuchik, Sekgam, Tuha Peut, Ketua Pemuda, Imeum Mukim, Sekretaris Mukim) | There was public commitment to strengthen indigenous Mukim in a Mukim area management<br>Blang potential exploration areas and meublang customs rules<br>Mukim and Village boundary dispute settlement<br>There needs to be joint efforts from all people in Mukim to defend the land for availability of land and to sustainability their economy in the long term.<br>Tuha Peut Mukim Gunong Biram which will be established as much 11 people, with a proportion as follows: 6 people village representatives, 1 person women representative, and 1 person youth representative and 1 person representatives of the community appointed by the Imeum Mukim.<br>There was early multiple data / information regarding the deployment of region and the management rules<br>Decision-making system should be built on the gampong levels and Mukim level with regard to Management of Natural Resources. | Process of formation tuha peut Mukim have been started.<br><br>There was imeum initiative Mukim and gampong leaders to conduct between gampong boundaries in the Mukim area with custom approach. Resolve between gampong boundaries has been completed, there is agreement document in 9 gampong boundary agreement signed by each gampong.<br><br>Duek Pakat Mukim about the cattle rules regulating through Mukim Qanun<br><br>Requiring Mukim signature on the deed of sale / compensation of land in the Mukim |
| **2** | Opportunities and the challenges in Mukim Strengthening National Legal Systems<br><br>• Banda Aceh, January 13, 2013<br><br>• Participants: 40 people (Imeum Mukim Aceh Besar, MDPM Board, NGO Partner) | - MDPM socialized existence to one members of DPR of Representatives Commission IV (Mr. Ali Yakob)<br>- Socialized information about assistance programs for farmers (PUAP programme) whose policies are conducted in House of Representatives Commission IV.<br>- Aceh Besar need protection and monitoring over the bineh pasie region, padang meurabee and blang<br>- Mukim not have the right to territory and resources, only recognition.<br>- Mukim need to inventorying natural resources and owned region<br>- Multi-stakeholder dialogue for strengthening MDPM | - Created an agreement to continue the discussion on January 22, 2013 in an effort to expand the Work Plan MDPM period 2012-2015.<br>- Communication and coordination through Mukim-mukim MDPM-AB with the government of Aceh Besar and House of Representatives is getting better.<br>- Working meeting MDPM-AB Results socialized to relevant parties, in particular Aceh Besar regency.<br>- There is a commitment support of from a member House of Representatives Commission D for agriculture and farms activities in Aceh Besar.<br>- Irrigation development plans in Mukim Lamkabeu resumed. |

| No. | Thema/ Implementations | Output | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| **3** | Reflection Mukim Strengthening Efforts - Gampong in Area Management and Protection of the Right<br><br>• Banda Aceh, February 9, 2013<br>• Participants: 25 persons (Imuem Mukim, keuchik, tuha peut, keujreun blang, youth) | - Results and Achievement YRBI Programs socialized in several areas Mukim in Aceh Besar, Aceh Jaya and Aceh Selatan to the representatives of the community participants.<br>- There is some information on the results and achievements in their respective Mukim - Gampong (Lamteuba, Lampanah, Siem, Lambaro Angan, Tanoh Abee, Gunong Biram and Samahani) and Majlis Duek Pakat Mukim.<br>- Main problems faced by mukim is boundary dispute between gampong-mukim and between sub districts. mukim in a boundary dispute resolution approach does not supported by local government<br>- There are several field activities that need to be processed and resolved, such as Document Finalization of Agreement about the Custom Management Area in Mukim Lamteuba, assistance Border Dispute between the Village in Siem Mukim, Mukim Boundary Arrangement between Siem Mukim with Lambaro Angan, to continue assistance in strengthening the rule of custom meublang Mukim Lamteuba, Completion of Mapping mukim Lambaro Angan, assistance the process of boundaries between mukims (Siem, Lambaro Angan, Silang Cadek, Klieng), mukim assistance Custom leaders in all adjacent areas, to continue assistance for policy advocacy agendas conducted by the Majelis Duek Pakat mukim Aceh Besar.<br>- Efforts to strengthen the capacity of beneficiary's mukims the area management should be continued with the active involvement of all stakeholders. Mukim-Gampong must build self-sufficiency and self-initiatives to strengthens and raise external support to expedite the process of strengthening gampong-mukims.<br>- Efforts are required to raise support of all stakeholders at subdistrict level by creating a subdistrict level coordination meeting (subdistrict-BPM + Mukim-Gampong). | - Appears mukim agreement between adjacent to the settlement boundary between two (Mukim Siem - Mukim Lambaro Angan).<br><br>- There are efforts to scour the boundaries between Mukim Siem and the mukim Lambaro Angan over Glee areas.<br><br>- Several mukim consolidation efforts gampong-mukim in an attempt to strengthen the institutional mukim capacity in an area management based on custom.<br><br>- As many as 70 people Mukim Lamkabeu society took the initiative to open the land in the desert meurabe that has been "deprived" Industrial Plantation Forest much as average 2 ha |

| No. | Thema/ Implementations | Output | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| **4.** | Strengthening Keujrun Blang "Kupi beungeh with keujrun blang"<br><br>**Mukim Siem**; March 2, 2013<br>Participants: 33 people (imuem mukim, keuchik, tuha peut, community leaders, youth) | - Most Economic activity Mukim SIEM community is agricultural in area blang. In the past, management of customary rice by keujreun blang never existed, but in conjunction with the enactment of Law on Village Government (UU.No.5 1979) that remove the presence of indigenous institutions plus a with a implementation of agricultural intensification incessant system that delivers agricultural machinery then quickly meublang customary systems in Mukim Siem began to leave their customary provisions.<br>- Currently through the Law on Governing Aceh and qanun, the existence of customary institutions recognized again. The obstacles are the values, procedures and rules as well as the capacity of their customary stakeholders that need to be collected and improved.<br>- Keujrun Blang Mukim have the full support of society<br>- Blang management of customary conducted by Institutional Keujruen Blang Mukim important to be revived, because it can cross gampong and its settings can boost the local economy as mukim while maintaining the wisdom and values of society siem mukim.<br>- Imuem Mukim, keuchik-keuchik, tuha peut, youth representatives and community leaders in Mukim mukim Siem agreed to build a consolidated return management to implement the provisions of indigenous mukim rice and make efforts to establish institutional keujrun blang mukim. | |
| **5.** | Where is Mukim Manage areas in RTRWA and How to achieve it?<br><br>• Banda Aceh, March 18, 2013<br>• Participants: 22 persons (Imuem Mukim, Board MDPM-AB) | - Management space Mukim was not accommodated in RTRWA<br>- Imuem Mukim judging draft RTRWA not participative.<br>- Drafting team is formed, 7 Imuem Mukim and 2 assistance from YRBI | - Impact of the discussion is the existence of third time a further meeting to discuss and identify available areas in Mukim management and to be used as a reference to the Draft Document RTRWA.<br>- there are several NGOs that support concentrated on the recognition Mukim areas in Mukim management RTRWA<br>- The advent of media support through a press conference and MDPM - AB that to voice Manage Mukim areas<br>- Imuem Mukim identified several of intense to voice areas Manage Mukim as part RTRWA in various Forums are often held views and knowledge by all parties (government and NGO) |

| No. | Thema/ Implementations | Output | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| **6.** | Press Conference "Majlis DuekPakat Mukim Aceh Besar Demands RTRWA Have to admit the Mukim Manage areas".<br>• Banda Aceh, 2 April 2013<br>• Participants: 36 persons (MDPM-AB, Journalists, NGOs). | - Socialization Mukim Manage areas every related party<br>- Provide inputs to the RTRWA Drafting Team through the Media information.<br>- Demanding participation in the preparation RTRWA. | - Disseminates Mukim areas Manage in various media: Print (Local & National) and On-Line.<br>- Voiced the Imuem Mukim Aceh Besar view to RTWA through a press conference.<br>- Providing new insight into RTRWA drafting team.<br>- Mukim position Affirmed and Mukim space management in RTRWA. |
| **7.** | Youth Roles in Strengthening Indigenous<br>• **Mukim Lamteuba** 27 April 2013<br>• Participants: 32 people (youths, imeum Mukim, keuchik, tuha peut, keujreun) | Whole Mukim Lamteuba youths agreed to support efforts to strengthen and indigenous enforcement in Mukim Lamteuba. Important Roles to be performed by the youth is 1) to study and know the indigenous prevailing in the Mukim-gampong region 2) assist in the enforcement of the indigenous rules, 3) actively engage in any strengthening activities indigenous, and 4) maintaining and enforcing the rights of indigenous from disruption from within and from outside the Mukim. | Youth Mukim acting as executor in the field sanction of social against custom violations<br>Youth actively involved in mutual aid irrigation channels cleaning (ie Lueng) |
| **8.** | Dissemination Understanding of Indigenous and Custom for Youth<br>• Banda Aceh, May 8, 2013<br>• Participants = 17 representatives indigenous communities Lamteuba (Imeum Mukim,keujreun chik, youths,community leaders) | - Establishment of Meublang socialization and Supporting Custom Team<br>- Reviewing and Refining the Draft Meublang Custom Document<br>- The importance of maintaining the custom values | - Appeared strong understanding among youths the importance of the role and presence of Custom and Non-Custom in Mukim - gampong<br>- There is a youths concrete support for the role of Keujrun Blang through building the Meublang Dissemination from Custom youth<br>- Meublang Custom socialization team also play a role in identifying and re-identifying the custom value on activities meublang |

| No. | Thema/ Implementations | Output | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| **9.** | Majlis Duek Pakat Mukim Aceh Besar meeting to Respond RTRWK draft Qanun Aceh Besar<br><br>• Banda Aceh, May 13, 2013<br>• Participants; 15 people (imeum Mukim and officials MDPM-AB) | Mukim in Aceh Besar through MDPM-AB agreed that "RTRWK Aceh Besar must admit Mukim Sovereignty". The demands of Mukim points are: 1) RTRWK Aceh Besar shall contain strategies and policies that setting and process the Mukim Adiminstratif Regional Planning, 2) RTRWK Aceh Besar should affirm recognition of the region Manage Mukim on land or in water, 3) Government Aceh Besar must ensure an active role in the process of structuring space Mukim involving Mukim in the District Spatial Planning Coordination activities. The agreement contained in document MDPM-AB Statement to be delivered directly to the DPRK Aceh Besar. | - MDPM-AB Written responses above RTRWK Aceh Besar Raqan had the support of four factions in the DPRK Aceh Besar (PKS / PPP, PAN, Demokrat and Golkar / PKB) which is presented in view end of fraction of the Plenary Session DPRK Aceh Besar on Thursday (23/5 / 2013), while the Aceh Party faction which is actually occupied more than 50% of the seats DPRK Aceh Besar did not give a response to the demands of the mukim. PKS / PPP affirmed "the most fundamental improvement is related to the authority of Mukim are not well accommodated by the by-laws, as well as rural territory boundary problems, Mukim and district that must concrete". PAN faction also requesting structure Mukim administrative region accommodated as part of a hierarchy of regions in Aceh Besar district as a mandate UUPA. Demokrat Party faction asked the Regent of Aceh Besar in response all feedback, suggestions and information which is has been or will be delivered by the District of Aceh Besar stakeholder forums Mukim among others, elements of community leaders, NGOs and other organisations before being put into sheets of Aceh Besar regency<br>- MDPM-AB with Indigenous Aceh Assembly District of Aceh Besar, YRBI, Prodeelat, and Pena, doing Informal Dialogue with Drafting the Spatial Plan of Aceh Besar Technical Team on June 15, 2013 to explain the substance of the statement Mukim above Aceh Besar RTRWK. |
| **10.** | Build a Solidarity and Development in Mukim Institutional Protection of the Right to Manage areas.<br><br>Banda Aceh; July 27, 2013<br><br>Participants: 22 persons (Imuem Mukim, MDPM-AB Official) | - Develop Concept of Sovereignty Mukim.<br>- Meeting Scheduled between Mukim.<br>- Discourse of Mukim Aceh Forum formation. | - There was Draft Mukim Sovereignty initiated with Imuem Mukim and supported by NGO partners through regular discussions Mukim.<br>- - The existence of consolidation among NGO partners to join forces to support Mukim Mukim Sovereignty |
| **11.** | Land Management and the Role of Women in Natural Resources Management and Protection<br><br>• **Mukim Lampanah**; October 12, 2013<br>• Participants: 34 persons (Imuem Mukim, Keuchik, Sekgam, Tuhapeut, Women's Leaders). | - There was new knowledge and understanding of what it means and the important role the region over the economic activities of society for women.<br>- There is a need to implement a special discussion series for women.<br>- The role of women is important in the recipient area management because women do the major impact of the mismanagement of natural resources and regions.<br>- Other interests of women in the management area is equality in the utilization of natural resources in the Mukim and village | - Identified of protection areas strategies by women through "whether and to what questions" on every person who enters economic area managed by them |

| No. | Thema/ Implementations | Output | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| **12.** | Formulating Space Manage Mukim Concept for RTRWA<br><br>• Banda Aceh, October 24, 2013<br><br>• Participants: 20 persons (imeum Mukim, NGO partners) | - There are several entries related clausul management Mukim space into the draft RTRWA document.<br>- Indigenous Territory is a joint management area (communal property) include: rice, glee, uteun, bineh pasie, laot.<br>- Territory management Mukim has not received government recognition, although Mukim itself is part of the government, necessitating further recognition by the government through a concrete document.<br>- either of Article in the region Manage Mukim are: 1). Structure Arrangement and Spatial Pattern of Aceh must attention management area Mukim as the origin of the public rights of Mukim; 2) Setup more about the structure and spatial pattern of Mukim will be arranged by Qanun District | - An open space for dialogue between Imuem Mukim and the Government in particular BAPPEDA Aceh regarding a proposed Imuem Mukim of conference Manage Regional Mukim.<br>- The emergence of either Imuem Mukim in Aceh Besar in the various events held various local and national NGOs to convey the meaning space Mukim governance over the territory. (Imeum Mukim Siem / Secretary Majlis Duek Pakat Mukim Aceh Besar-Asnawi Zainun). |
| Source: Final Report of YRBI to ICCO (2014) | | | |

# Annex II. Overview outcome indicators and indices

This annex provides a detailed description about the used outcome indicators. In addition, it shows the variables which were used to construct the outcome indicator indices for levels of satisfaction, attitudes and sense of control.

Data from the community survey as well as data from the household survey were used. Outcomes are reported per treatment area (Siem and Lamteuba), each consisting of three villages. For the household data, the sample size can differ because the answer 'don't know' is changed to a missing value or because a respondent could skip a question if he/she had no knowledge about what was asked (answered 'no' to a previous question). This was the case if a respondent answered 'don't know' to a question with a scale, so it did not make sense to incorporate the answer in the scale. The missing value due to a skip was kept missing if we only wanted to know the percentage of the respondents that knew about the topic of the question that answered 'yes'. If we were interested in the answers of the total sample, it made sense to change the 'don't know' answers to 'no' because that way the percentage of all the respondents that answered 'yes' could be reported. For the same reason some missing values were changed to 'no'.

The household sample consists of 120 households at the baseline, of which 112 were re-interviewed and 8 were replaced at the endline.

All the indices are created using the same method. Villagers reported their level of agreement with certain statements on a scale from -2 to +2, where -2 means 'strongly disagree', -1 means 'disagree', 0 means 'neither agree nor disagree', 1 means 'agree' and 2 means 'strongly agree'. The indices show the average level of agreement over the included statements. Sometimes agreement with a statement indicates dissatisfaction/a negative attitude, while the index shows satisfaction/a positive attitude. Therefore, the scale for these statements were reversed, so that -2 means 'strongly agree' and +2 means 'strongly disagree'. That way, those statements can be used in the average. They are indicated by (negative).

### *Panel A. Access to information on (local) governance*

In order to assess the level of satisfaction with local governance, it is important to know whether the respondents are well-informed about the governance at the village level and the district level.

- Level of agreement with statement: 'I feel well-informed about the decisions made by the village leaders.' […] (scale -2 to +2): this indicator provides the average of the level of agreement on the same scale as the indices.
- Percentage of respondents that knows about the policies of the district government related to agriculture and the use of land

### *Panel B. Satisfaction with local governance*

Two indices for the level of satisfaction with local governance were constructed for different levels of governance. Also the opinion of the level of corruption of the respondents is reported at these levels. It is expected that more corruption is associated with less satisfaction.

- Index for satisfaction with local governance at village level: the following statements are included in this index.
    - Villagers should be given more room to be involved in village decision making (negative)
    - I trust that village leaders will do what is the best for our community.
    - More effort should be taken by the village leaders to preserve traditional/*adat* culture in this village (negative)
- Satisfaction with local governance at *Mukim* level
    - Percentage of respondents who know the name of the *Mukim* leader (imam *Mukim*): the respondents were asked if they are able to tell the name of their *Mukim* leader. The percentage of the respondents who answered 'yes' is reported here.
    - Level of agreement with 'The *Mukim* institution serves the benefit of all people in this village' (scale -2 to +2): this indicator provides the average of the level of agreement on the same scale as the indices.
    - Importance of the role of imam *Mukim* in the village (scale 1 to 5): the respondents were asked to indicate how important they think the role of imam *Mukim* is in their village of a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is very little and 5 is very much. The average over the respondents is provided for each area.
- Index for satisfaction with local governance at the sub-district level: the following statements are included in this index.
    - I'm confident of the district official's ability to their job.
    - The sub-district officials support this village in preserving traditional culture.
    - The sub-district officials can be trusted to represent our interest in protecting our rights to land.
- Level of corruption: for scale of following indicators is from 1 to 3, with 1 being 'no corruption', 2 being 'some corruption' and 3 being 'a lot of corruption'. These are the answers that the respondents could choose from (apart from 'don't know'). The average over the respondents is shown.
    - In your opinion, how much corruption is there at the […]?
        - Village leadership
        - District government

### *Panel C. Role of traditional institutions*

- Index for a positive attitude towards traditional laws and culture: the following statements are included in this index.
    - Customary laws should be used to govern the way of life in this village.
    - Some people have no respect for customary laws anymore in this village (negative)

### *Panel D. Management of natural resources*

For management of natural resources, data was collected on the existence of management structure and the level of satisfaction with the management structure.

- Existence: for this indicator, outcomes from the community survey were used. In the table it is reported per area how many villages said that they have regulations regarding the use and protections of community forests.
- Dissemination of information: these questions report on how regulations are communicated to the villagers and to what extent. The table shows how many villages per area indicated that the following is applicable to them. The outcomes come from the community survey.
    - How are the regulations communicated to the villagers?
      From the data it was found that the regulations were either communicated through community meetings, posters, and signs at the forest or a letter, as indicated in the table.
    - Are regulations communicated to all villagers (including women and children)?
    - Are regulations taught at school?
- Percentage of respondents that knows about regulations for the use of community forests: this indicator shows the percentage of respondents that answered 'yes' to the question whether there are any rules/regulations about the use of community forests in the village.
- Satisfaction with regulations (scale from -2 to 2): the villagers were asked about their level of agreement with the following statement on the same scale from -2 to 2. Since agreement with the statement shows dissatisfaction with the regulations, the scale was reversed in the same way as with the indices.
    - Natural resources are not sufficiently protected by the village regulations.

### *Panel E. Households' attitude towards forests/plantations*

The sample size deviates from the other panels, because only respondents that indicated that there are community forests in or around their village are included.

- Dependence on forest resources: villagers were asked to what extent they agree with the following statement on the same scale from -2 to 2:
    - My family depends on the forest for our livelihood.
- Index for a positive attitude towards sustainable forest use:
    - I take from the forest what my family needs without thinking about others (negative)
    - I think all villagers should use the community forest as they want (negative)
    - We have to use our forests with moderation and respect.
- Index for access to forest resources:
    - Villager's access to forest resources is fair in my community.
    - I'm satisfied with my family's share of forest resources in this village.
    - Our forests are abundant and luscious.
    - I feel that my access to forest resources is secure in this village.

We also wanted to report on the attitude towards disputed forest areas with local government/industry. However, too few respondents indicated that their village has a dispute or conflict with the government or the industry to be able to calculate the outcome indicators. Conflicts with the government or industry turn out not to be an issue in these areas.

### *Panel F. Sense of control of villagers*

- Index for trust in village:
  - People in my community look out for each other.
  - I feel I can trust my neighbours to look after my house if I am away.
- Index for sense of control regarding own life:
  - I feel that my opinion is taken into account in my community.
  - Often I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me (negative)
  - I feel satisfied with my life.
  - On the whole, I'm able to take charge of my life.
- Index for sense of control regarding land:
  - I think there is nothing we can do to keep our traditional lands against the government/industry (negative)
  - I'm confident that if we the villagers act together, we can make things happen for this village
    I think that our village has the right to our traditional lands.
  - I feel that I have no influence on preserving our forests and nature (negative)
- Index for sense of control regarding traditional institutions:
  - I feel that I can contribute to preserving traditional/*adat* culture in my community.
  - I feel that it is difficult to protect traditional culture nowadays (negative)

# Annex III. Description of study locations

## *Mukim Siem*

### ***Gampong* Lamklat**

*Gampong* Lamklat is located in the sub-district Darussalam (District Aceh Besar) and belongs to Ke*Mukim*an Siem. This village is about 7 km away from the capital city of Aceh Besar and about 1.5 km from the sub-district downtown of Darussalam. Geographically, *Gampong* Lamkat belongs to the rural area as the area has many farming areas. Still, the area can be considered as an advanced area. Most of the villagers work as government officers and some other work as farmers, traders, animal breeders, or labourers. One of the characteristics of Lamkat village is the friendly villagers and welcome new comers warmly of which many are high educated people.

### ***Gampong* Lamreh**

*Gampong* Lamreh is located side by side with *Gampong* Lamklat. The geographic and demographic conditions are quite the same. There is no forest area in Lamreh, and many of the villagers have farming land outside the village. Many of the villagers have a high education level. Those who have high education level have contributed a lot to the development of the village. In short, the development and infrastructure in this city are good.

### ***Gampong* Krueng Kalee**

Krueng Kalee village also belongs to Ke*Mukim*an Siem and the location is close to sub-district Darussalam which is about 1 km away (8 km to the capital city of the province). This village is close to a forest area. Many of the villagers are working in farming areas, plantation, and also government offices. Many farmers in the village also grow secondary crops. Some of them also work as traders, animal breeders, and labourers. Many of the villagers have their own vehicle. Compared to the previous two villages, villagers of Krueng Kalee have a lower education level. Yet the characteristic of villagers is almost the same, they are friendly to guests or new comers.

## *Mukim Lamteuba*

### ***Gampong* Lamteuba Dro**

*Gampong* Lamteuba Dro belongs to Ke*Mukim*an Lamteuba in sub-district Seulimuem. This village is located about 20 km away from the capital city of Seulimuem. This village is located on the valley of Mount Seulawah agam. This area belonged to a conflicted area between GAM and TNI (Aceh Independence Movement and National Armies). Generally, people here have short-tempered characters and they tend to hold grudge. They even do not hesitate to use violence.

Since the village has many rice field areas, most villagers are farmers and some of them are gardening. Most villagers completed middle school or high school. As the quality of human resource of this village is low and the government has never paid any attention to this area, *Gampong* Lamteuba Dro is less developed. Therefore, it took a harder effort to persuade the villagers to participate in this study because they are sick and tired of the promises researchers are giving to the village.

***Gampong* Blang Tingkeum**

*Gampong* Blang Tingkeum is located about 20 km away from sub-district Seulimuem. Public transportation is available and private vehicles can access the village as well. This village lies on the mountain area with a lot of rice fields and seasonal areas. The main livelihood of the villagers is farming. Some of the villagers also work as animal breeders or grow plants in the forest. As many villagers are living in poor economic condition not many of them have high education level and working conditions are hard. The average education level is middle school and high school. The new Keuchik (village head) is quite capable in gathering villagers for social and religious activities which indirectly changed people's hard character into more flexible one. This can be seen from their better attitude in welcoming new comers. They believed that those new comers' will bring good changes for the village in the future.

***Gampong* Lam Apeng**

*Gampong* Lam Apeng is located side by side with *Gampong* Blang Tingkeum and has the same distance to the sub-district Seulimuem as *Gampong* Blang Tingkeum. Just like the other *Gampongs* in *Mukim*an Lamteuba, most of the villagers are farmers. Some of them are also living from forest commodities such as candlenuts and rattan.

The attitudes of the residents are reclusive and they tend to be cold and suspicious to new comers, suspecting that the strangers would make use of them. They have been disappointed many times in the past by promises of researches. Villagers of this *Gampong* are less developed than those of *Gampong* Lamteuba Dro and *Gampong* Blang Tingkeum. *Gampong* Lam Apeng has less inhabitants, but their low educational level and the incapability of the village leader has made the village be under-developed area. In addition, their bleak history of the conflict in the past has influenced the backwardness character of people in this village.

The following tables show per village which NGOs and other organisations implemented activities related to natural resource management and mapping. While Table 12 reports on this for the baseline, Table 13 does the same for the endline.

### *Trainings related to natural resource management and mapping*

**Table 12: Trainings related to natural resource management and mapping per village (baseline)**

| | *Siem* | *Lamteuba* |
|---|---|---|
| **Natural resource management related trainings and workshops in the last two years at baseline:** | | |
| ***Forest/natural resource mapping*** | *-* | ***Lamteuba Droe (YRBI)*** |
| ***Efforts at reforestation*** | ***Lamklat (Imum Mukim)*** | ***Blang Tingkeum (Pengusaha)*** |
| ***Awareness raising campaigns about use and protection of natural resources*** | *-* | *-* |
| ***Training on natural resource management*** | *-* | ***Blang Tingkeum (BNN and YRBI)*** |
| ***Training on sustainable use of natural resources*** | *-* | *-* |

Source: Community survey E8, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: After the name of the village, the active NGO('s) are reported between parentheses

**Table 13: Trainings related to natural resource management and mapping per village (endline)**

| | *Siem* | *Lamteuba* |
|---|---|---|
| **Natural resource management related trainings and workshops in the last two years at endline:** | | |
| ***Forest/natural resource mapping*** | ***Krueng Kalee (YRBI)*** ***Lamklat (YRBI)*** | *-* |
| ***Efforts at reforestation*** | ***Lamklat (YRBI)*** | ***Lamteuba Droe (farmer groups)*** ***Blang Tingkeum (BNN)*** |
| ***Awareness raising campaigns about use and protection of natural resources*** | ***Lamreh (department of agriculture)*** | *-* |
| ***Training on natural resource management*** | *-* | ***Lamteuba Droe (YRBI)*** |
| ***Training on sustainable use of natural resources*** | *-* | ***Lamteuba Droe (YRBI)*** ***Blang Tingkeum (BNN)*** |

Source: Community survey E8, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: After the name of the village, the active NGO('s) are reported between parentheses

### *Activities of YRBI*

**Table 14: Activities of YRBI in survey areas**

| Activity | Siem | Lamteuba |
|---|---|---|
| **Village boundary mapping** | ***Lamreh (2012)*** ***Krueng Kalee (2010)*** ***Lamklat (2012)*** | ***Lamteuba Droe (2011, 2013)*** ***Lamapeng (2009, 2014)*** |
| **Socialization meeting** | ***Lamreh (2010)*** ***Lamklat (2014)*** | - |
| **Environmental awareness raising** | ***Lamklat (2012)*** | ***Lamteuba Droe (2013)*** |
| **Strengthening *Mukim* institutions/*blang* regulation** | - | ***Lamteuba Droe (2013)*** |
| **Protection of water sources** | - | ***Blang Tingkeum (2013)*** |
| **Settlement of disputes** | - | ***Blang Tingkeum (2013)*** |

Source: Community survey E8, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: After the name of the village, the active NGO('s) are reported between parentheses

Differences between Table 13 (Table 12) and Table 14 may arise as the first tables show results to the question whether certain activities had taken place in the village and information is obtained about these activities. On the other hand, Table 14 reports on all the activities that YRBI has undertaken in the villages and *Mukims* as reported by the informants in response to an open-ended question. Informats also indicated that most of the activities undertaken in their villages were also implemented in other villages within the *Mukim*. In addition, some of the informants in *Mukim* Lamteuba indicated that they know that YRBI conducted activities with youth and on indigenous issues in other villages.

Finally, at the endline, we also asked the informants about the NGOs that are active in their village. YRBI was mentioned by 5 of the 6 villages. In addition to the activities already discussed, two villages in *Mukim* Siem and one in Lamteube mentioned that YRBI implemented (sustainable) livelihood activities in their village.[30]

[30] Other NGOs active in the surveyed villages were Anisa Center in Lamklat (Siem) working on livelihood activities and education; Walhi and Lupa Simulasi Bencana in Lamteuba Droe (Lamteuba) assisting the community in natural resource management and disaster risk reduction, respectively. No other NGO was mentioned during the survey.

# Annex IV. Descriptive Statistics

**Table 15: Respondent characteristics II**

| **Treatment area** | **Siem** | | | | **Lamteuba** | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| **Sample size** | 60 | 60 | 56 | | 60 | 60 | 56 | |
| Level of agreement with statement: 'My family depends on the forest for our livelihood' […] (scale -2 to +2)[1] | -0.4 (1.1) | -0.8 (0.9) | -0.1 (1.0) | 0.686 | 0.8 (1.0) | 0.9 (1.1) | 0.1 (1.1) | 0.647 |
| Percentage of respondents who have voted on last district level elections (%) | 96.7 (18.1) | 95.0 (22.0) | -3.6 (18.7) | 0.159 | 95.0 (22.0) | 98.3 (12.9) | 3.6 (26.7) | 0.419 |
| Percentage of respondents who attended any village meeting in past 12 months (%) | 81.7 (39.0) | 88.3 (32.4) | 5.4 (44.4) | 0.209 | 76.7 (42.7) | 75.0 (43.7) | -3.6 (46.6) | 0.530 |
| Percentage of respondents who participated in any discussion in the village meeting in past 12 months (%) | 61.7 (49.0) | 80.0 (40.3) | 17.9 (60.6) | 0.223 | 50.0 (50.4) | 68.3 (46.9) | 17.9 (50.8) | 0.190 |
| Percentage of respondents who participated in any discussion in the village meeting in past 12 months about community land use (%) | 15.0 (36.0) | 6.7 (25.2) | -7.1 (37.5) | 0.258 | 25.0 (43.7) | 30.0 (46.2) | 5.4 (51.9) | 0.577 |

Source: Household survey E8; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

1. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 24, 15, 14, 58, 60 and 54

**Table 16: Most important community issues reported by respondents**

| Treatment area | Siem | | | | Lamteuba | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reporting period | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| Sample size | 60 | 60 | 56 | | 60 | 60 | 56 | |
| Percentage of respondents that say that there is a community forest in the village | 40.0 (49.4) | 25.0 (43.7) | -14.3 (40.1) | 0.296 | 96.7 (18.1) | 100.0 (0.0) | 3.6 (18.7) | 0.419 |
| Percentage of respondents that reported […] to be one of the three most important community issues | | | | | | | | |
| *A. Education/School in village* | 30.0 (46.2) | 40.0 (49.4) | 14.3 (64.5) | 0.449 | 41.7 (49.7) | 46.7 (50.3) | 8.9 (64.0) | 0.429 |
| *B. Healthcare* | 21.7 (41.5) | 8.3 (27.9) | -10.7 (49.3) | 0.242 | 31.7 (46.9) | 31.7 (46.9) | 0.0 (71.4) | 1.000 |
| *C. Access to clean water* | 43.3 (50.0) | 76.7 (42.7) | 30.4 (60.1) | 0.193 | 16.7 (37.6) | 40.0 (49.4) | 19.6 (58.5) | 0.255 |
| *D. Sanitation issues* | 13.3 (34.3) | 36.7 (48.6) | 21.4** (59.4) | 0.044 | 6.7 (25.2) | 16.7 (37.6) | 8.9 (39.4) | 0.440 |
| *E. Road conditions to the village/Access to village* | 36.7 (48.6) | 40.0 (49.4) | 0.0 (73.9) | 1.000 | 33.3 (47.5) | 48.3 (50.4) | 12.5 (66.2) | 0.258 |
| *F. Conservation of traditional values/culture* | 0.0 (0.0) | 1.7 (12.9) | 1.8 (13.4) | 0.409 | 13.3 (34.3) | 10.0 (30.3) | -3.6 (46.6) | 0.730 |
| *G. Natural resource/Environment protection in the village* | 1.7 (12.9) | 5.0 (22.0) | 3.6 (26.7) | 0.643 | 0.0 (0.0) | 3.3 (18.1) | 3.6 (18.7) | 0.419 |
| *H. Forest fires* | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | |
| *I. Industry (mining, road building, etc)* | 3.3 (18.1) | 6.7 (25.2) | 5.4 (29.7) | 0.420 | 1.7 (12.9) | 0.0 (0.0) | -1.8 (13.4) | 0.419 |
| *J. Pollution* | 5.0 (22.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | -5.4 (22.7) | 0.235 | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | |
| *K. Access to land and natural resources* | 3.3 (18.1) | 18.3 (39.0) | 14.3 (40.1) | 0.182 | 0.0 (0.0) | 3.3 (18.1) | 3.6 (18.7) | 0.429 |
| *L. Resolving disputes with neighboring villages* | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | | 1.7 (12.9) | 0.0 (0.0) | -1.8 (13.4) | 0.419 |
| *M. Livelihood improvement* | 48.3 (50.4) | 16.7 (37.6) | -30.4 (57.0) | 0.123 | 56.7 (50.0) | 38.3 (49.0) | -17.9 (76.5) | 0.207 |
| *N. Corruption* | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | |
| *O. Participatory mapping of village* | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | |
| *P. Alcohol consumption* | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | |

| Treatment area | Siem | | | | Lamteuba | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reporting period | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| Sample size | 60 | 60 | 56 | | 60 | 60 | 56 | |
| *Q. Animal keeping/Damage caused by domesticated animals* | 5.0 (22.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | -3.6 (18.7) | 0.203 | 5.0 (22.0) | 6.7 (25.2) | 1.8 (35.6) | 0.808 |
| *R. Exploitation of natural resources* | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | | 0.0 (0.0) | 1.7 (12.9) | 1.8 (13.4) | 0.429 |
| *V. Other* | 55.0 (50.2) | 30.0 (46.2) | -25.0** (61.1) | 0.044 | 43.3 (50.0) | 45.0 (50.2) | 1.8 (72.6) | 0.741 |

Source: Household survey E8; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

**Table 17: Satisfaction with village leadership**

| Treatment area | Siem | | | | Lamteuba | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| **Sample size** | 60 | 60 | 56 | | 60 | 60 | 56 | |
| Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | | | | | |
| *Villagers should be given more room to be involved in village decision making* | 1.2 (0.5) | 1.6 (0.5) | 0.4* (0.6) | 0.072 | 1.2 (0.4) | 1.5 (0.5) | 0.3* (0.6) | 0.092 |
| *I trust that village leaders will do what is the best for our community* | 1.4 (0.7) | 1.7 (0.5) | 0.3 (0.7) | 0.232 | 1.2 (0.5) | 1.5 (0.5) | 0.3** (0.7) | 0.039 |
| *More effort should be taken by the village leaders to preserve traditional/adat culture in this village*[1] | 1.0 (0.6) | 1.3 (0.7) | 0.3 (0.9) | 0.272 | 1.1 (0.5) | 1.4 (0.5) | 0.3 (0.7) | 0.125 |
| Percentage of respondents that trust […] the most as local leader | | | | | | | | |
| *Village leader* | 83.3 (37.6) | 73.3 (44.6) | -8.9 (54.9) | 0.213 | 66.7 (47.5) | 56.7 (50.0) | -12.5 (60.5) | 0.232 |
| *Religious leader* | 8.3 (27.9) | 15.0 (36.0) | 3.6 (42.5) | 0.159 | 16.7 (37.6) | 35.0 (48.1) | 19.6* (55.3) | 0.055 |
| *Council of elders* | 1.7 (12.9) | 10.0 (30.3) | 8.9* (28.8) | 0.052 | 1.7 (12.9) | 3.3 (18.1) | 1.8 (23.3) | 0.419 |
| *Other persons* | 3.3 (18.1) | 0.0 (0.0) | -1.8 (13.4) | 0.409 | 10.0 (30.3) | 1.7 (12.9) | -7.1 (26.0) | 0.174 |

Source: Household survey E8; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.

* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

1. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 59, 60, 55, 60, 60 and 56

### Table 18: Level of corruption

| Treatment area | Siem | | | | Lamteuba | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | **Base** | **End** | **Change** | **p-value** | **Base** | **End** | **Change** | **p-value** |
| **Sample size** | **53** | **56** | **46** | | **54** | **58** | **49** | |
| Percentage of respondents that report […] at village leadership | | | | | | | | |
| *No corruption* | 69.8 (46.3) | 64.3 (48.3) | -6.5 (71.2) | 0.863 | 61.1 (49.2) | 79.3 (40.9) | 16.3 (47.2) | 0.152 |
| *Some corruption* | 26.4 (44.5) | 33.9 (47.8) | 10.9 (67.4) | 0.748 | 33.3 (47.6) | 17.2 (38.1) | -14.3 (50.0) | 0.115 |
| *A lot of corruption* | 3.8 (19.2) | 1.8 (13.4) | -4.3 (20.6) | 0.375 | 5.6 (23.1) | 3.4 (18.4) | -2.0 (32.2) | 0.415 |
| Percentage of respondents that report […] at the district government[1] | | | | | | | | |
| *No corruption* | 33.3 (47.9) | 18.2 (39.0) | -4.3 (47.5) | 0.729 | 14.7 (35.9) | 13.5 (34.7) | 0.0 (30.9) | 1.000 |
| *Some corruption* | 33.3 (47.9) | 54.5 (50.4) | 13.0 (75.7) | 0.410 | 47.1 (50.7) | 51.4 (50.7) | 4.5 (78.5) | 0.747 |
| *A lot of corruption* | 33.3 (47.9) | 27.3 (45.1) | -8.7 (59.6) | 0.464 | 38.2 (49.3) | 35.1 (48.4) | -4.5 (78.5) | 0.752 |
| Percentage of respondents that report […] at the local police[2] | | | | | | | | |
| *No corruption* | 37.9 (49.4) | 24.3 (43.5) | -10.5 (45.9) | 0.262 | 29.2 (46.4) | 15.0 (36.6) | -33.3 (51.6) | 0.374 |
| *Some corruption* | 41.4 (50.1) | 62.2 (49.2) | 21.1 (71.3) | 0.350 | 37.5 (49.5) | 50.0 (51.3) | 33.3 (51.6) | 0.205 |
| *A lot of corruption* | 20.7 (41.2) | 13.5 (34.7) | -10.5 (56.7) | 0.559 | 33.3 (48.2) | 35.0 (48.9) | 0.0 (63.2) | 1.000 |

Source: Household survey E8; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

1. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 30, 44, 23, 34, 37 and 22
2. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 29, 37, 19, 24, 20 and 6

### Table 19: Natural resources and their regulations: villager survey

| Treatment area | Siem | | | | Lamteuba | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | **Base** | **End** | **Change** | **p-value** | **Base** | **End** | **Change** | **p-value** |
| **Sample size** | **60** | **60** | **56** | | **60** | **60** | **56** | |
| Percentage of respondents who report that there are any rules/regulations about the use of the community forests | 13.3 (34.3) | 16.7 (37.6) | 3.6 (42.5) | 0.773 | 88.3 (32.4) | 96.7 (18.1) | 3.6 (26.7) | 0.633 |

| Treatment area | Siem | | | | Lamteuba | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reporting period | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| Sample size | 60 | 60 | 56 | | 60 | 60 | 56 | |
| in the village | | | | | | | | |
| Percentage of respondents that reports that […] is regulated | | | | | | | | |
| *Logging* | 13.3 (34.3) | 16.7 (37.6) | 3.6 (42.5) | 0.773 | 85.0 (36.0) | 95.0 (22.0) | 5.4 (35.3) | 0.579 |
| *Firewood collection* | 1.7 (12.9) | 0.0 (0.0) | -1.8 (13.4) | 0.409 | 6.7 (25.2) | 5.0 (22.0) | -1.8 (30.1) | 0.743 |
| *Honey collection* | 0.0 (0.0) | 1.7 (12.9) | 1.8 (13.4) | 0.409 | 1.7 (12.9) | 5.0 (22.0) | 3.6 (26.7) | 0.188 |
| *Collection of other fruits and plants* | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | | 1.7 (12.9) | 5.0 (22.0) | 3.6 (26.7) | 0.174 |
| *Hunting* | 0.0 (0.0) | 3.3 (18.1) | 3.6 (18.7) | 0.190 | 8.3 (27.9) | 11.7 (32.4) | 0.0 (38.1) | 1.000 |
| *Access to forest* | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | | 1.7 (12.9) | 25.0 (43.7) | 25.0 (47.7) | 0.119 |
| *Other* | 1.7 (12.9) | 3.3 (18.1) | 1.8 (23.3) | 0.740 | 21.7 (41.5) | 8.3 (27.9) | -14.3* (52.0) | 0.054 |
| Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | | | | | |
| *Most people in this village follow the regulations about the use of community forests*[1] | 1.0 (0.9) | 0.9 (1.1) | 0.8 (1.5) | 0.295 | 1.1 (0.6) | 1.0 (0.7) | -0.0 (0.9) | 0.873 |
| *Without regulations people would overuse (exploit) the natural resources*[1] | -1.4 (0.5) | 1.1 (0.9) | 2.3 (1.7) | 0.295 | -0.1 (1.2) | 0.4 (1.1) | 0.5 (1.7) | 0.415 |
| *Natural resources are not sufficiently protected by the village regulations*[2] | 0.4 (1.0) | 0.5 (1.0) | 0.1 (1.5) | 0.226 | 0.2 (1.1) | 0.4 (1.2) | 0.3 (1.6) | 0.478 |
| *Villager's access to forest resources is fair in my community*[3] | 0.7 (0.7) | 0.9 (0.9) | 0.1* (0.8) | 0.090 | 0.5 (0.9) | 0.9 (0.6) | 0.4* (1.0) | 0.070 |
| *We have to use our forests with moderation and respect*[4] | 0.9 (1.0) | 1.5 (0.5) | 0.6* (1.2) | 0.068 | 1.0 (0.9) | 1.3 (0.5) | 0.3 (1.0) | 0.178 |

Source: Household survey E8; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

1. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 8, 10, 4, 53, 58 and 51

| Treatment area | Siem | | | | Lamteuba | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | **Base** | **End** | **Change** | **p-value** | **Base** | **End** | **Change** | **p-value** |
| **Sample size** | **60** | **60** | **56** | | **60** | **60** | **56** | |

2. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 56, 60, 52, 59, 60 and 56
3. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 22, 15, 14, 57, 59 and 52
4. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 24, 15, 14, 58, 60 and 54

**Table 20: Land conflicts: villager survey**

| Treatment area | Siem | | | | Lamteuba | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| **Sample size** | 60 | 60 | 56 | | 60 | 60 | 56 | |
| Percentage of respondents that says that their village has any dispute or conflict about the ownership of use of forests with […] | | | | | | | | |
| *Neighbouring villages* | 36.7 (48.6) | 38.3 (49.0) | 1.8 (55.6) | 0.910 | 63.3 (48.6) | 56.7 (50.0) | -7.1 (56.8) | 0.388 |
| *District/Province government* | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | | 5.0 (22.0) | 8.3 (27.9) | 3.6 (32.8) | 0.634 |
| *Business/Industry* | 3.3 (18.1) | 0.0 (0.0) | -3.6 (18.7) | 0.409 | 5.0 (22.0) | 15.0 (36.0) | 10.7* (31.2) | 0.074 |

Source: Household survey E8; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

**Table 21: Knowledge of village boundaries: villager survey**

| Treatment area | Siem | | | | Lamteuba | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| **Sample size** | 60 | 60 | 56 | | 60 | 60 | 56 | |
| Percentage of respondents that knows the boundary of his/her land | 90.0 (30.3) | 100.0 (0.0) | 10.7 (31.2) | 0.250 | 85.0 (36.0) | 83.3 (37.6) | 0.0 (38.1) | 1.000 |
| Percentage of respondents that knows the boundary of his/her village | 65.0 (48.1) | 95.0 (22.0) | 30.4*** (50.2) | 0.010 | 75.0 (43.7) | 90.0 (30.3) | 10.7 (41.2) | 0.426 |

Source: Household survey E8; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

**Table 22: Disputes with neighbouring villages**

| Treatment area | Siem | | | | Lamteuba | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Reporting period** | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| **Sample size** | 22 | 23 | 11 | | 38 | 34 | 24 | |
| Percentage of respondents that have access to the disputed land | 63.6 (49.2) | 87.0 (34.4) | 18.2 (75.1) | 0.627 | 34.2 (48.1) | 82.4 (38.7) | 45.8** (50.9) | 0.022 |
| Percentage of respondents that report that the livelihood for his/her family is affected by the land dispute | 4.5 (21.3) | 4.3 (20.9) | 9.1 (30.2) | 0.208 | 23.7 (43.1) | 38.2 (49.3) | 25.0 (53.2) | 0.353 |
| Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | | | | | |
| *I think that both villages should be able to use the disputed land* | 0.6 (1.0) | 1.1 (0.8) | 0.3 (0.9) | 0.208 | 0.5 (1.1) | 0.3 (1.1) | 0.0 (1.5) | 1.000 |
| *The land dispute creates tension between the people of the two villages* | 0.1 (1.1) | 0.9 (1.0) | 0.8 (1.3) | 0.131 | -0.2 (1.2) | 0.7 (0.9) | 1.0 (1.6) | 0.186 |

Source: Household survey E8; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

# Annex V. Evaluation question 1 – tables

**Table 23: Indicators in indices**

| Treatment area | Siem | | | | Lamteuba | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reporting period | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| Sample size | 60 | 60 | 56 | | 60 | 60 | 56 | |
| **Panel B. Satisfaction with local governance** | | | | | | | | |
| Index for satisfaction with local governance at village level<br>Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | | | | | |
| *Villagers should be given more room to be involved in village decision making* | 1.2<br>(0.5) | 1.6<br>(0.5) | 0.4*<br>(0.6) | 0.072 | 1.2<br>(0.4) | 1.5<br>(0.5) | 0.3*<br>(0.6) | 0.092 |
| *I trust that village leaders will do what is the best for our community* | 1.4<br>(0.7) | 1.7<br>(0.5) | 0.3<br>(0.7) | 0.232 | 1.2<br>(0.5) | 1.5<br>(0.5) | 0.3**<br>(0.7) | 0.039 |
| *More effort should be taken by the village leaders to preserve traditional/adat culture in this village*[1] | 1.0<br>(0.6) | 1.3<br>(0.7) | 0.3<br>(0.9) | 0.272 | 1.1<br>(0.5) | 1.4<br>(0.5) | 0.3<br>(0.7) | 0.125 |
| Index for satisfaction with local governance at sub-district level<br>Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | | | | | |
| *I'm confident of the district official's ability to their job*[2] | 0.9<br>(0.6) | 0.9<br>(0.8) | 0.1<br>(0.6) | 0.632 | 0.6<br>(0.8) | 0.4<br>(1.0) | -0.3*<br>(0.9) | 0.066 |
| *The sub-district officials support this village in preserving traditional culture*[3] | 1.2<br>(0.6) | 1.3<br>(0.6) | 0.1<br>(0.8) | 0.638 | 1.0<br>(0.9) | 1.3<br>(0.4) | 0.2<br>(1.0) | 0.384 |
| *The sub-district officials can be trusted to represent our interest in protecting our rights to land*[4] | 1.1<br>(0.6) | 1.2<br>(0.7) | 0.1<br>(0.8) | 0.552 | 0.8<br>(0.8) | 1.1<br>(0.5) | 0.3<br>(0.9) | 0.118 |
| **Panel C. Role of traditional institutions** | | | | | | | | |
| Index for a positive attitude towards traditional laws and culture<br>Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | | | | | |
| *Customary laws should be used to govern the way of life in this village* | 1.2<br>(0.5) | 1.6<br>(0.5) | 0.4<br>(0.7) | 0.166 | 1.2<br>(0.4) | 1.5<br>(0.5) | 0.3<br>(0.7) | 0.249 |

| Treatment area | Siem | | | | Lamteuba | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reporting period | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| Sample size | 60 | 60 | 56 | | 60 | 60 | 56 | |
| *Many people have no respect for customary laws anymore in this village*[5] | -0.6 (1.1) | -0.7 (1.0) | -0.2 (1.3) | 0.159 | -0.7 (0.9) | -0.5 (1.0) | 0.3 (1.4) | 0.235 |
| **Panel E. Households' attitude towards forests/plantations** | | | | | | | | |
| Index for a positive attitude towards sustainable forest use<br>Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | | | | | |
| *I take from the forest what my family needs without thinking about others*[6] | -1.0 (0.5) | -1.5 (0.5) | -0.5* (0.5) | 0.090 | -0.8 (0.8) | -0.8 (0.8) | 0.0 (1.0) | 1.000 |
| *I think all villagers should use the community forest as they want*[7] | -0.1 (1.1) | -0.1 (1.2) | 0.0 (1.3) | | -0.4 (1.0) | -0.2 (1.1) | 0.2 (1.4) | 0.436 |
| *We have to use our forests with moderation and respect*[6] | 0.9 (1.0) | 1.5 (0.5) | 0.6* (1.2) | 0.068 | 1.0 (0.9) | 1.3 (0.5) | 0.3 (1.0) | 0.178 |
| Index for access to forest resources<br>Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | | | | | |
| *Villager's access to forest resources is fair in my community*[8] | 1.3 (2.2) | 0.9 (0.9) | 0.1* (0.8) | 0.090 | 0.6 (1.3) | 1.0 (1.1) | 0.4* (1.8) | 0.083 |
| *I'm satisfied with my family's share of forest resources in this village*[9] | 2.5 (4.1) | 0.3 (1.0) | -2.2* (4.1) | 0.090 | 0.6 (0.9) | 0.9 (0.8) | 0.3 (1.2) | 0.332 |
| *Our forests are abundant and luscious*[6] | 0.8 (1.0) | 1.5 (0.5) | 0.6 (1.1) | 0.223 | 1.3 (0.5) | 1.3 (0.5) | -0.0 (0.6) | 0.841 |
| *I feel that my access to forest resources is secure in this village*[6] | 0.7 (0.8) | 0.7 (1.2) | -0.1 (1.3) | 0.839 | 0.9 (0.7) | 1.0 (0.8) | 0.0 (1.2) | 0.955 |
| **Panel F. Sense of control of villages** | | | | | | | | |
| Index for trust in village<br>Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | | | | | |
| *People in my community look out for each other* | 1.3 (0.7) | 1.7 (0.5) | 0.4*** (0.7) | 0.003 | 1.2 (0.4) | 1.6 (0.6) | 0.4** (0.6) | 0.028 |
| *I feel I can trust my neighbours to look after my house if I am away* | 1.3 (0.7) | 1.5 (0.6) | 0.2 (0.6) | 0.121 | 1.2 (0.7) | 1.3 (0.6) | 0.1 (0.8) | 0.344 |

| Treatment area | Siem | | | | Lamteuba | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reporting period | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| Sample size | 60 | 60 | 56 | | 60 | 60 | 56 | |
| Index for sense of control regarding own life<br>Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | | | | | |
| *I feel that my opinion is taken into account in my community*[10] | 0.9<br>(0.7) | 0.9<br>(0.8) | -0.0<br>(1.0) | 0.754 | 1.1<br>(0.4) | 0.9<br>(0.8) | -0.2<br>(0.9) | 0.483 |
| *Often I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me*[11] | 0.4<br>(1.0) | 0.2<br>(1.0) | -0.3*<br>(1.5) | 0.057 | 0.4<br>(1.0) | -0.2<br>(1.0) | -0.6*<br>(1.4) | 0.097 |
| *I feel satisfied with my life* | 0.9<br>(0.8) | 1.1<br>(1.0) | 0.3*<br>(1.0) | 0.060 | 1.1<br>(0.5) | 1.2<br>(0.8) | 0.1<br>(0.9) | 0.564 |
| *On the whole, I'm able to take charge of my life*[12] | 1.0<br>(0.7) | 1.5<br>(0.5) | 0.5**<br>(0.8) | 0.032 | 1.1<br>(0.4) | 1.4<br>(0.5) | 0.3*<br>(0.6) | 0.099 |
| Index for sense of control regarding land<br>Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | | | | | |
| *I think there is nothing we can do to keep our traditional lands against the government/industry*[13] | -0.5<br>(1.1) | -0.7<br>(1.2) | -0.4<br>(1.5) | 0.191 | -0.8<br>(0.7) | -1.0<br>(0.3) | -0.2<br>(0.7) | 0.179 |
| *I'm confident that if we the villagers act together, we can make things happen for this village* | 1.4<br>(0.5) | 1.7<br>(0.5) | 0.3**<br>(0.5) | 0.031 | 1.2<br>(0.4) | 1.3<br>(0.5) | 0.1<br>(0.5) | 0.468 |
| *I think that our village has the right to our traditional lands* | 1.2<br>(0.6) | 1.6<br>(0.5) | 0.5***<br>(0.8) | 0.006 | 1.3<br>(0.5) | 1.4<br>(0.5) | 0.1<br>(0.6) | 0.127 |
| *I feel that I have no influence on preserving our forests and nature*[6] | -0.3<br>(1.0) | -0.5<br>(1.0) | -0.2*<br>(1.3) | 0.090 | -0.5<br>(1.1) | -0.4<br>(1.1) | 0.0<br>(1.4) | 0.888 |
| Index for sense of control regarding traditional institutions<br>Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | | | | | |
| *I feel that I can contribute to preserving traditional/adat culture in my community*[14] | 1.0<br>(0.7) | 1.1<br>(0.6) | 0.2**<br>(0.9) | 0.040 | 1.0<br>(0.6) | 1.1<br>(0.7) | 0.1<br>(0.9) | 0.785 |

| Treatment area | Siem | | | | Lamteuba | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reporting period | Base | End | Change | p-value | Base | End | Change | p-value |
| Sample size | 60 | 60 | 56 | | 60 | 60 | 56 | |
| *I feel that it is difficult to protect traditional culture nowadays* | 0.5 (1.0) | 0.5 (1.1) | 0.1 (1.5) | 0.571 | 0.1 (1.0) | -0.1 (1.1) | -0.2 (1.2) | 0.440 |

Source: Household survey E8; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

Sample size can deviate, because the answer 'don't know' was recoded to missing.

1. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 59, 60, 55, 60, 60 and 56
2. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 54, 60, 50, 51, 56 and 45
3. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 58, 60, 54, 58, 60 and 55
4. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 58, 59, 53, 58, 59 and 54
5. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 60, 60, 56, 58, 60 and 54
6. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 24, 15, 14, 58, 60 and 54 because only respondents that indicated to have a community forest in or around their village are included
7. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 23, 15, 14, 57, 60 and 53 because only respondents that indicated to have a community forest in or around their village are included
8. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 22, 15, 14, 57, 59 and 52 because only respondents that indicated to have a community forest in or around their village are included
9. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 16, 15, 9, 58, 60 and 54 because only respondents that indicated to have a community forest in or around their village are included
10. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 56, 60, 52, 58, 60 and 54
11. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 59, 60, 55, 56, 59 and 52
12. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 60, 60, 56, 58, 60 and 54
13. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 55, 59, 50, 59, 60 and 55
14. Sample size deviates, the number of observations, in order, are 59, 60, 55, 59, 60 and 55

# Annex VI. Qualitative Report on the Evaluation of YRBI

## PARTICIPATORY MAPPING

## 1. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. Context of the project

Traditional (*adat*) structures and laws have existed in Aceh for hundreds of years, and in the past the traditional *Mukim* institution played an important role in the social and economic activities of Aceh's people. As a result of the centralization of power by the New Order regime and its implementation of Law no. 5/1979 on Village Governance, the *Mukims* lost their central role and authority.

After the Indonesian Revolution ended the 30 decades of the New Order reign in 1998, a new State's law (no. 44/1999) was issued that granted Aceh the status of "special autonomy" and allowed them to re-implement their own traditional customs and institutions. This was set forth by law no. 11 (issued in 2006) and law no. 10 (issued in 2008) that formally recognized and thereby further reinforced customary institutions in undertaking conflict resolution and taking more control over the management of their natural resources. However, the prolonged marginalization of the *Mukim* institution has left marks on Aceh's social structure, customs, and society as a whole that are still noticeable today:

1. Feelings of unity and solidarity among members of *Mukim* communities have weakened;
2. People have become less committed to their *Mukim*, and are therefore less willing to voluntarily contribute to –and participate in- community building activities. People now expect some kind of payment in return for a lost day's work;
3. The role of customary rules in society has weakened, especially rules that were previously executed by the *Mukim* institution;
4. *Mukim* and *Gampong* communities have lost power and sovereignty over the natural resources that exist in their surroundings;
5. Horizontal conflicts about boundaries have emerged among different *Gampongs* (villages) that previously felt a common identity as part of the *Mukim* their *Gampongs* all belonged to, but were now forced to redefine themselves at the village-level.[31]

The *Yayasan Rumpun Bambu Indonesia* Foundation (YRBI), located in Banda Aceh Indonesia, aims to enhance the capacities of both the *Gampong* and *Mukim* institution in Aceh to effectively deal with problems related to land tenure, natural hazards, natural resources and spatial management. In order to achieve these goals YRBI implements a variety of activities such as trainings on participatory mapping, workshops and discussions on the empowerment of traditional institutions and structures, assistance in the documentation of customary laws and regulations (*reusam*), the publishing of informative bulletins about natural resource management, and advocacy for the formal recognition of

[31] These examples were taken from the testimony of the *Imeum Mukim* of *Mukim* Siem.

the traditional institutions and structures by both the community members and the Indonesian Government.

The main activity of the YRBI project is the facilitation of participatory mapping activities in the *Mukims*, with the aim of revitalizing the traditional *Mukim* institution, and letting it regain the rights and authority it once held in Aceh's society in terms of conflict management and the management of natural resources. Together with the communities, YRBI plans the mapping activities; partakes in negotiations about boundaries; collects GPS data of the *Gampongs*' and *Mukims*' borders and their forests and lands; and processes the data into maps.

The ultimate goals of the map are to eliminate potential conflicts over boundaries, and to serve as a tool to improve regional planning and natural resource management, as well as to educate future generations. The project is important for Aceh's communities that still struggle with the environmental damage that was caused by the tsunami they suffered in 2004, and the effects of new natural resource exploitation projects that are taking place without their consent in some areas. Furthermore, recent conflict has left Aceh society divided, and the massive loss of land tenure documents due to the tsunami has led to an increased number of boundary-conflicts between *Gampongs* and between *Mukims*.

With its project YRBI aims to work towards the attainment of the Millennium Development Goal 'good governance and civil society building'. To a lesser extent, it is also aimed at 'reducing poverty and hunger', and 'creating a sustainable environment, forests, and biodiversity' (MDGs 1 and 7a and b). This is in line with YRBI's final objectives, which are to strengthen peoples' awareness and capacity to manage and control natural resources and sources of water, and to ensure a fair and just management and distribution of natural resources in an ecological and social way, in which local communities can participate equally and enjoy its benefit optimally.

## 1.2. Study area

Our evaluation focuses on the 2 *Mukims* in Aceh Besar YRBI has implemented its programme in, namely: *Mukim* Siem and *Mukim* Lamteuba.

*Mukim* Siem is part of the Darussalam sub district. It is comprised of 8 *Gampongs* (villages), named Lamreh, Siem, Krueng Kalee, Lambiheu Siem, Lamklat, Lambitra, Lie Eu, and Lampasan. *Mukim* Siem is located close to the provincial capital resulting in a more heterogeneous, educated, and open-minded society. Even though a fair amount of inhabitants still work in agriculture and husbandry, the majority of them work in the city as government officers or employees, or as education workers.

*Mukim* Lamteuba is located at the foot of Mount Seulawah of Seulimum sub-district. It consists of 8 *Gampongs*: Ateuk, Blang Tingkeum, Lam Apeng, Lambada, Lam Pantee, Lamteuba droe, Meurah, and Pulo. *Mukim* Lamteuba is located in a remote area, far away from the hustle and bustle of city life. At its border lies a protected forest and there are many rice fields in the surroundings. For their livelihoods the inhabitants depend on farming, gardening, and raising livestock. The people of Lamteuba speak Acehnese in daily life as well as in schools. Very few speak the National Indonesian language (Bahasa Indonesia) fluently. What distinguishes *Mukim* Lamteuba from other *Mukims* is that its customs and traditions are still well preserved.

### 1.3. Evaluation methods

Our qualitative research in *Mukim* Siem and *Mukim* Lamteuba was conducted in 2 parts. In November 2012 (at the same time as the implementation of the quantitative Baseline Survey) we collected information about the region, the characteristics of the village government and the *Mukim* and *Gampong* institutions, the position and influence of marginalized groups, the ways natural resources were managed, the manner in which conflicts were handled, as well as catching a first glimpse of YRBI's project activities. In May 2014,[32] we collected additional information about the activities that had in the meantime been undertaken by YRBI, as well as the changes that had taken place in the communities in the past 2 years, in particular with regard to the role and influence of traditional institutions (*Mukim* and *Gampong* government) and the way in which they handled conflicts, natural resource management, etc.

To answer to the evaluation questions, focus group discussions were carried out with 3 different groups in each *Mukim*: women that were part of a women's group, men that were part of a farmers' group, and young people (aged 16-24 years) that were part of a youth group.[33]

In addition, in-depth interviews were conducted with the general facilitator of the YRBI project, the local facilitators, the *Imeum Mukims* (heads of *Mukim*), the *Keuciks* (heads of *Gampong*), representatives from the *Tuha Peut Inoeng* (women's council), representatives of the *Tuha Peut Mukim* (representative council of the *Mukim*), the Panglima Glies (the persons responsible for the natural resource management) on both *Mukim* and *Gampong* level, and representatives of the *Keujrun Blang* (traditional institution that regulates the management of rice fields), also both on *Mukim* and *Gampong* level. All of the informants had taken part in one or more of YRBI's activities and were thus knowledgeable about the project.

### 1.4. Evaluation questions and report structure

Firstly, to provide a more detailed description of the context of the project villages, the following research questions were asked: What do the research communities look like? How are they governed? How do the communities use, manage and monitor their natural and cultural resources? What land right conflicts are there in the communities and how are they handled? Secondly, to determine the success of the YRBI programme, the following research questions were discussed: How was the project implemented in the 2 *Mukims*? What was the project's impact on village governance –primarily the role and influence of the traditional institutions (*Mukim* and *Gampong*)-, the lives of the community members and their ability to manage their natural resources in a sustainable way?

[32] Our research activities were initially scheduled for early April 2014, but were delayed by the ongoing legislative elections and the labour-intensive harvest period that succeeded it. By the time we were about to go down in the field, a Mosque-caretaker was murdered in *Mukim* Lamteuba. Because the village government wanted time to investigate the murder case, our research was delayed by 4 more days.

[33] The participants of the focus group discussions were selected i.a. based on the fact that they had taken part in at least 1 of YRBI's project activities. However, YRBI's activities were mostly catered towards community leaders and figures, and thus, not many 'common' women, young people, and farmers had taken part in them. As a result we weren't able to arrange the desired number of 6-8 participants per focus group. Instead the focus groups were attended by an average of 5 informants. Another small obstacle we encountered was that some participants expected to receive money as compensation for participating in the interviews, and were confused and disappointed when they found out we weren't able to give them any.

This report will be structured broadly along the lines of these research questions: Chapter 2 describes how the lives of the villagers are governed and how the roles of the traditional institutions in governing and regulating social life have changed over the past 2 years. Chapter 3 discusses the position of women, youth, and newcomers in the communities and their influence within *Mukim* structure. Chapter 4 provides more in-depth information about how the communities manage and monitor their natural and cultural resources. Topics that are covered in this chapter are livelihood, access and availability of land and resources, land conversion, environmental damage, attitudes towards the preservation of natural resources and traditional culture and customs, and local wisdom documentation. Chapter 5 investigates land right conflicts that have occurred during the project period. Turning to YRBI's programme, Chapter 6 discusses the project implementation with a particular focus on the participatory mapping activities, and addresses the practicalities and limitations of the project implementation. Finally, in Chapter 7 we reflect on the impacts of the YRBI programme on the ability of the *Mukim* and *Gampong* institutions to manage natural and cultural resources in a sustainable way, to solve (land) conflicts, and to govern the lives of the community members.

# 2. VILLAGE GOVERNANCE

## 2.1. Role and influence of traditional institutions

After the decree of Law no. 8 in 2009 on the Duties and Functions of the *Mukim* Government, the *Mukim* government in Aceh began to recover from its collapse and gradually increased its role in governance, community development, natural resource management, and the strengthening of customary law. In *Mukim* Siem, for example, the *Mukim* government started to collect information from the community's elders on cultural customs that had disappeared during the period of the New Order Regime, with the intention to revive those customs in present-day society. In turn, in *Mukim* Lamteuba the *adat blang* (customs of traditional rice field management) have been restored to their previous state, with the exception of some ceremonies that are considered incompatible with the *Shari'a* (Islamic law). For example, the ritual of setting aside a portion of food as an offering to the gods during the *adat blang* festival is considered to be a Hindu custom and will therefore not be practiced again.

The *Imeum Mukims* (the traditional leaders of the *Mukims*) have regained their front role and responsibility in implementing the customary rules and regulations. Every member of the *Mukim*'s society has to obey the customs and traditions, regardless of their age or position, and anyone that violates the rules, for example the rules of *blang* such as going to the field and planting rice on Fridays, are subject to the sanctions that have been determined by the customary law.[34]

In *Mukim* Siem and *Mukim* Lamteuba, the *Mukim* and *Gampong* institutions once again play an important role in conflict settlement within the society. When a dispute or conflict occurs, attempts to settle it are first made at the village level, involving the *Keucik* (the head of the *Gampong*), its staff, and the *Tuha Peut Gampong* (representative council at the *Gampong* level). When the conflict or dispute can't be resolved, it is brought before the *Imeum Mukim* and the *Tuha Peut Mukim* (representative council at the *Mukim* level) who will try to resolve the issue together. When the conflict can't be solved

[34] A common sanction for youth that have violated a *blang* rule is the burning of the equipment they used to work on the field on the prohibited day.

at the *Mukim* level either, it will be brought to the police. Interesting to note is that the police only takes on cases that have already been through the previous stages of dispute settlement. In practice, most of the disputes can be settled at the *Gampong* level.

In the past 2 years the *Mukim* government in *Mukim* Siem has increased its role in the strengthening of traditional institutions. For example by undertaking activities to form a *Keujrun Blang Mukim* (institution for the regulation of the management of rice fields), to empower female traditional leaders, and to resolve boundary disputes between *Gampong* and between *Mukim* aided by YRBI's participatory mapping project. In this last regard, the *Mukim* government has been quite successful, as it has managed to resolve 6 border point disputes in only 2 years, compared to the boundary dispute committee of Aceh Besar district level that only managed to resolve 1 border point in a year's time. The *Mukim* government in Siem has also taken efforts to rebuild a dormitory next to the mosque that in past times was used for religious learning practices into a kindergarten. The kindergarten, as well as the mosque itself, are being managed by the *Mukim* government[35].

The *Mukim* government in *Mukim* Lamteuba has experienced less improvement in influence and capacity over the past 2 years than the *Mukim* government of Siem. This is partly due to the fact that, at the time of the interview, the present *Imeum Mukim* had only held office for about a year. According to a number of our informants the current *Imeum Mukim* is less assertive, especially in terms of conflict resolution and forest preservation, than their previous *Imeum Mukim*, whom they considered a respected community leader. Existing regulations to preserve the forest, including the revitalization of the *Keujrun Blang*, are for example all achievements of the former *Imeum Mukim*'s reign. The former *Imeum Mukim* has also managed to remain influential after his office, making it hard for the new *Imeum Mukim* to fully gain the trust and support of the community.

> *The current one [Imeum Mukim] is less likely to know the ins and outs of Lamteuba. The current one, although young, this is not our condemnation of him, is less assertive. The previous one would be stricter about violation (Informant from the focus group discussion with youth in Lamteuba).*

One area where the *Mukim* government in *Mukim* Lamteuba has managed to increase its role is in primary education. Since 2 years, the *Mukim* government participates in the meetings of the school committee, and plays an active role in the resolution of school conflicts.

## 2.2. Government and community support for traditional institutions

Due to the new governmental decrees that recognize and support the function, role, and authority of traditional institutions, government law is now largely compatible with Acehnese customary laws, leaving room for the traditional *Mukim* and *Gampong* institutions to carry out their customary laws and regulations without too much resistance.

There are, however, several governmental rules that restrict the position of traditional institutions. An example of this is the founding of the Farmer Water User Association (P3A) by the government. The P3A takes care of water and irrigation systems, a role that should be held by the

[35] Both *Mukim* Siem and *Mukim* Lamteuba have 1 mosque, which is managed by *Mukim* government.

*Keujrun Ciek* (leader of the *Keujrun Blang* institution) according to custom. Because they cannot defy government authority, the *Keujrun Cieks* in *Mukim* Siem and *Mukim* Lamteuba have not been able to perform their roles and functions according to *Mukim* custom. Nowadays they serve merely as the extension of P3A, and aren't able to make independent decisions.

Even though the *Mukim* institution enjoys the moral support of the government, financial support in order to improve the performance of the *Mukim* government has largely stayed behind. Even though the *Gampong* government routinely receives funds from the Indonesian State Budget (APBD), this is not the case for the *Mukim* government. Whereas all staff of the *Gampong* government earn 'toil money' of about 300.000 to 1.000.000 rupiah per month according to position, the only member of the *Mukim* government that receives toil money is the *Imeum Mukim* (an amount of about 900.000 rupiah per month).

With the *Mukim* government taking on more and more responsibilities over the past 2 years, the communities' support towards them has grown.

## 3. REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN, YOUTH, AND NEWCOMERS IN TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND ACEH SOCIETY

Women, youth and newcomers are all represented in the *Mukim* structure, and in the past 2 years their roles have increased, especially those of women. However, the actual impact women have on decision-making processes is still limited, as most governance activities are carried out at night when women are not allowed out of their homes. Positions in *Mukim* government can be held by natives and non-natives (newcomers) alike, even though in reality it is mostly natives that fulfill these positions as they are thought to be more aware of the ins and outs of the area as well as the characteristics of the *Mukim*. Within the communities the revival of the *Mukim* government is thought to provide benefits to all members of the society alike, and among them a common desire exists to restore the function of the traditional institutions to their previous state.

### 3.1. Women

In *Mukim* Siem women generally spend most of their time at home, fulfilling their domestic duties while their husbands earn the family's living. They are often still dependent on men and have to ask their husbands' permission for everything they want to do. However, over time roles are gradually changing and it is becoming more common and socially acceptable for a man and woman to assist each other in their respective tasks. With regard to household decision-making men are generally still dominant. For decisions about social event (such as whether the family should participate in a festivity) men are expected to consult their wives before making a decision.

In community life, women have an important role in the implementation of traditional rituals such as marriages, funerals, etc. In the past 2 years, the government of *Mukim* Siem has tried to empower female traditional leaders by organising trainings to teach them to execute the important ritual of 'corpse bathing', a procedure for which almost no woman in the *Mukim* was previously qualified and that was handled by people from outside the *Mukim*. *Mukim* Siem is also one of the *Mukims* that has shown to pay considerable attention to the role of women in decision-making

processes, and has recently even provided women with the opportunity to become a member of the *Tuha Peut* (representative council) at both *Mukim* and *Gampong* level.

The lives of the women in *Mukim* Siem and *Mukim* Lamteuba have changed considerably in the past 5 years. They now have more freedom to move and to spend their leisure time elsewhere then at home. Young women in *Mukim* Siem are also more likely to follow a formal higher education. An undergraduate study is often sufficient to get a job, but nowadays many girls continue school up to post graduate level.

In *Mukim* Siem there are several women's NGOs that work together with YRBI to help to strengthen the position of women in the community. Examples are 'Annisa Center' and 'RPUK' (Women Volunteers for Humanity) that aim to empower women by encouraging them to become involved in traditional governance as well as in social life. One example of the NGOs' successes is the case of a female member of the *Tuha Peut Gampong* (the village council) that got dismissed from her position by the Keuchik (the customary *Gampong*/village leader). The woman urged the Keuchik to ask the staff of one of the NGOs about the importance of the position of women in the governance structure. The Keuchik granted her request and went to discuss the issue with the NGO staff member and as a result decided to revoke the dismissal.

## 3.2. Newcomers

Because *Mukim* Siem is in the proximity of the city and schools, a steady stream of immigrants moves to its villages, increasing from year to year. Most native inhabitants don't consider the immigrants a problem, as long as they make an effort to mingle with the natives in all community activities. In *Gampong* Lambitra in *Mukim* Siem, many immigrants have become staff or even leaders of the traditional government. This can happen because newcomers have often received higher formal education than the local people and are therefore considered capable and knowledgeable by the majority of the community. It is for example not uncommon for newcomers to become members of the *Tuha Peut* as representatives of the intellectuals. There are, however, also some native people that are concerned about this development and would prefer to see the positions filled by local people. Nonetheless, a good example of the increasing openness towards newcomers is that of the Keucik in *Gampong* Siem who is accepted by the villagers despite not being a native:

> *After being here for 10 years people can accept me as the head of the village. 5 years ago, I was already a member of the* Tuha Peut *before becoming* Keucik*. Now the acceptance is better since they don't actually care where people are from. For instance, there are Javanese in Lamklat, there are also Palembangnese and others. So there are newcomers in the governance, both at the* Gampong *and at the* Mukim *level (Keuchik of* Gampong *Siem in* Mukim *Siem).*

Even though *Mukim* Siem and *Mukim* Lamteuba both have a welcoming attitude towards newcomers, in Lamteuba there are some restrictions: Only after a period of at least 2 years at *Mukim* Lamteuba will a newcomer officially be entrusted to carry out any duty. In practice, governance positions are, however, almost always filled by locals, who are thought to be more knowledgeable about

*Mukim* Lamteuba's affairs and problems. Skilled newcomers usually won't get any higher up than a position as manager of public lands.

### 3.3. Youth

In *Mukim* Siem, youth are likened to "a fence that preserves the society's culture". Meaning that, if the young people in the society properly fulfill their role in society, the society will prosper because of it. Youth play a role in the governance structure at both *Gampong* and *Mukim* level, albeit a very small one. In community life, youth engage in activities that require physical fitness, such as putting up tents, and serving dishes and beverages during public ceremonies, thereby carefully following traditional routines. Every *Gampong* has a youth club: a youth organisation that provides a forum for youth to be creative, while at the same time working on the preservation of traditional culture, for example by learning and practicing traditional arts and sports. In terms of decision-making youth are not very influential. When they are present during meetings, they mostly listen to what the older people have to say. The young people that participated in our focus group discussions explained that they felt that they didn't have the authority to give advice or an opinion during a decision-making process, and that it was enough for them to listen to the older people making the decisions.

## 4. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

### 4.1. Natural resource management

#### *People's livelihood*

The majority of the people in *Mukim* Siem work as farmers, most of them on the rice fields. In addition, they raise cattle that is allowed to roam freely on the pastures. Over the last few years the income of the community has increased due to the construction of a government funded irrigation system in several villages in *Mukim* Siem. As a result, people can grow and harvest rice twice a year, making them hopeful about the future. The villages located in the higher areas of *Mukim* Siem don't have access to the irrigation system and can only grow and harvest rice once a year. Meanwhile, people are getting less dependent on forest products for their livelihoods. The community forest in *Mukim* Siem is no longer productive and merely functions as a protection for the springs and the supply of water. The rice farmers are shadowed by concerns about the reduction of agricultural land. It is expected that the rice fields will increasingly become smaller in the coming 5-10 years, as lands get turned into housing areas.

The people in *Mukim* Lamteuba are mostly farmers, gardeners or cattle breeders. Rice is the main agricultural commodity, but the people of *Mukim* Lamteuba also cultivate yellow beans, chili, chocolate, *Jabon*, and Patchouli. People make long days, taking care of their plantations, fields, and gardens. They start working early in the morning and go home only at -or even past- sunset. It is hard for the farmers to earn enough money, and according to several of our informants there are still people that illegally grow marijuana to make ends meet.[36]

[36] *Mukim* Lamteuba is well known for its illegal marijuana farmers. The government has even run programs through the BNN (the '*Badan Narkotica Nasional*' – the 'National Agency for Narcotics) that were aimed at enabling people to switch from planting marijuana to planting other agricultural products. However, according to

> *People in Lamteuba are very much dependent on forests, since we're all farmers. Almost 95% of the people are farmers. Besides being used as the protection of the water for irrigation, forests can also function as farming field and a place for raising cattle (Informants from the focus group discussion with women in Mukim Lamteuba).*

### *Availability and use of land*

The *Mukim* Siem region consists of residential areas, rice fields, plantations, moors, HTI (*Hutan Tanaman Industri*—Industrial Plantation Forest), and also livestock grazing areas. The moors around the settlements are planted with vegetables. In the foothills are the cattle pastures, and at the top of the hill lies an industrial plantation that belongs to the state.

Meanwhile in *Mukim* Lamteuba region, there are residential areas and paddy fields. There is also a community forest at the foot of Mount Seulawah. The community forest is considered public land and anyone in the community is allowed to manage a piece of the land that belongs to his *Gampong*. If someone desires to do so, they only have to notify their *Keucik*, after which the land will be delimited with a fence.[37] *Mukim* Lamteuba also has protected forests, which are still maintained by the local community.

In the past 2 years, forests have been converted into plantations in both *Mukims*. In *Mukim* Lamteuba some additional forest has also been converted into husbandry area. After the tsunami in 2004, large-scale tree felling activities took place in the area of *Mukim* Lamteuba in order to rebuild the houses that were destroyed by the water. The large sudden reduction of the tree population also affected the water availability. Therefore, the *Imeum Mukim* ordered a rule that prohibited people from cutting down trees in the forest. Nowadays a *Mukim* Government policy still exists that ordains that every tree that is cut down should be replaced by 5 new trees that have 'economic value', such as Jabon trees, chocolate trees, or patchouli trees.[38]

> *Even if it is not a protected forest, it is suggested by Mr. Mukim that we should plant five trees after cutting one (Informants from the focus group discussion with women in Mukim Lamteuba).*

Many people see the economic benefits of the conversion of communal forest and lands into fields or plantations, as this enables them to use the land for farming and gardening. However, as pastures are getting narrower, it makes it more difficult for people that raise livestock to keep their animals from wandering down to the neighboring *Mukims*' areas.

Before, farmers in *Mukim* Lamteuba planted crops such as corn and soybeans, but due to Lamteuba's remote location it was difficult to distribute and trade them. Therefore, the farmers converted their fields into *Jabon* plantations, which is easier to grow and has greater market potential.

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our informants these programs have failed, and are now only remembered by the public as "the free programme from the government".

[37] Managing a piece of the community forest's land is optional and not all community members choose to do so as it requires effort, energy, and money.

[38] This rule has existed for over 2 years, and YRBI did not contribute to its issuance.

In *Mukim* Siem, conversion of forest land has been happening for over the last 5 years. Most of the *Mukim*'s plantation areas belong to the state, but people living in *Gampong* Kruen Kale and *Gampong* Siem, both near the industrial forest, also cleared land to turn it into chicken farms and chili plantations. In the community forest is a pond that functions as a water reservoir during the rainy season. Last year, the community has started to construct drains with funding from the APBA[39]. The construction is expected to be finished in a year's time.

With the aim of securing the water availability, a tree planting ceremony was organised by YRBI in August 2013. During the ceremony 6 types of trees were planted around the water reservoir: teak, *sengon*, jackfruit, *jabon*, mahogany, and *tanjung*. However, because the trees were planted during the dry season and the public forest land was rocky and shallow (only 1-2 meters deep) the trees had all died. According to the Panglima Glie (the head of natural resource management) the most suitable type of tree to be planted in this area is the banyan tree, because its roots spread into the surface of the soil. Another tree planting ceremony is now planned for November 2014 during the rainy season.

### *Environmental damage*

Some of our informants stated that no environmental damage had occurred over the past 2 years in their *Mukims*. But in fact, illegal logging was –and is still being- done in the industrial forest of both *Mukim* Siem and *Mukim* Lamteuba, and is often supported by the local apparatus. The logging has led to a reduced size and number of springs, which has impacted almost all inhabitant of the *Mukims*, but most especially the farmers who have had disappointing harvests as a result of the water scarcity. The balding forests also cause distress to people that are looking for trees to use as firewood, or to build a house with. Forest honey, that has long been an important forest product for the people of *Mukim* Lamteuba, is also getting increasingly scarce.

> *There was a time when every one kilometer we walked, we saw wood for household. Now even after passing 5 kilometers, we aren't able to see wood (Informant from the focus group discussion with farmers in Mukim Lamteuba).*

Even though it was part of its original project objectives, YRBI has not organised any trainings or activities on disaster risk management. There has, however, been a disaster simulation in the area, which was organised by the BNPB (The National Board for Disaster Management).

### *Attitudes towards natural resources*

Over the past years, the people of *Mukim* Siem have grown more apathetic towards the preservation of their forests, and less and less people are interested to participate in the management and monitoring of the community's natural resources. At the time of our interviews there were no activities or plans to protect the community's forests, other than the tree planting ceremony and the 'cut 1 tree - replace 5' policy. The disinterest in the forests' sustainability is most likely due to the fact that the people of *Mukim* Siem are no longer dependent on the forests' resources for their livelihoods. Some of our informants mentioned that they didn't feel that the forest had anything to offer them, and according to

[39] APBA is an abbreviation of 'Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Aceh'. Translated: the income and expenditure budget of Aceh.

many the responsibility for the forest should only lie with the *Gampongs* that are located close to the forest.

There are however still some people that worry about the future of the forests and the rapidly declining number of various species of birds that live in them. The *Mukim* government as a traditional institution also concerns itself with the sustainability of the community forest, and plans to manage and safeguard its natural resources in accordance with the customary rules that exist in Aceh. A very important aspect of this is the *Mukim* government's effort to reactivate the traditional institution of the Panglima Glie, which is responsible for natural resource management. At the moment of the interview, the Panglima Glie did not yet operate at its full potential. The power and right to reprimand and give sanctions to perpetrators of the rules of *blang* were still held by the *Keuciks*.

In *Mukim* Lamteuba there were no important changes in people's perceptions and attitudes towards the preservation of their natural resources over the past 2 years. Because the people are still highly dependent on the forests for their livelihoods, and still feel connected to their forests, they continue to be driven to protect them. Perpetrators that are caught doing illegal logging will be arrested, taken to the police, and punished by having their timber mills burned down by the community.

> *The community participated in monitoring the forest. Anytime they see someone that destructs the forest, they will at least tell the Keucik or Mukim (Keujrun Blang of Mukim Lamteuba during an in-depth interview).*

> *People are still able to preserve the natural resources up to now. They can protect themselves from the influence of outsiders. They have laws and rules in regard to the natural resources so outsiders cannot exploit the natural resources in Lamteuba (Informant from the focus group discussion with women in Mukim Lamteuba).*

In spite of these repercussions, illegal logging unfortunately keeps occurring.

## 4.2. Cultural resource management

The indigenous culture and traditional customs in *Mukim* Siem and *Mukim* Lamteuba are still very well preserved, and are considered to be very important by the communities. Traditional wisdom regulates the lives of the people, from their birth to their death. All important life phases, such as birth, marriage, pregnancy, and death are governed by customs that have been passed down from generation to generation. Religious rituals and ceremonies such as the Prophet's birthday are also still carried out in accordance with what has been taught by the ancestors. However, with the demise of the *Mukim* institution during the 3 decades of the New Order Regime some cultural customs and traditions were no longer practiced in daily-life and disappeared over time.

The *Mukim* governments in *Mukim* Siem and *Mukim* Lamteuba play an important role in preserving their culture and in reviving old customs and traditions that are almost lost. For example, by interviewing and collecting information from the elders in the community. The role of the *Mukim* government is growing more and more important by the year. The community members in *Mukim* Siem and *Mukim* Lamteuba also play an active role in preserving their cultural customs and traditions, which

they hold in high regard. Their efforts, such as teaching women in the community the traditional custom of corpse bathing (described in chapter 3), have proven quite successful over time.

### 4.3. Documentation of local customs, traditions, and customary laws

At the initiative of YRBI, the people of *Mukim* Siem and *Mukim* Lamteuba have started the process of documenting their customary laws, customs, and traditions. The people were happy with YRBI's initiative, as they fear that their culture and traditions will disappear when the elders in their communities die. They have a strong urge to preserve their customs and to pass them on to coming generations, and recognize that having their cultural customs, laws and traditions 'recorded on paper' may also help to legitimate their existence in the eyes of outsiders.

The role of YRBI is to assist the *Mukim* governments throughout the whole documentation process: From collecting the information (mainly from the elders in the communities that are knowledgeable about the old customs), to the preparation of the drafts, until the final approval of the documentation.

At the moment of our interviews, the process was on its way but had not yet reached the stage of documentation. Once the documentation will be completed, the rules that are written down (for example rules about conflict resolution) will not be rigidly applied, but its application will be adapted to the particular situation at hand. According to Mr. *Mukim*: "…the common law is flexible, in accordance with the changing times."

For the future, there is a plan to document the *Blang* regulation.

## 5. LAND CONFLICTS

According to our informants, no conflicts with people or companies from outside the community have happened in the past 2 years. However, a serious dispute about land borders recently occurred between *Gampong* Lamklat and *Gampong* Lampasan, both belonging to the same *Mukim*. Both parties claimed to have received legalization from the elders on their inheritance rights over the land, and neither of them was willing to give in. The conflict got amplified by the process of participatory mapping that required the people to determine the exact borders between the *Gampongs*. At the end of 2013 they planned a fight with each other and people from both *Gampongs* stood ready to attack each other with machetes. The conflict could eventually be resolved by inviting and consulting local community leaders that were still respected by both parties. But, as a result the process of mapping was temporarily halted.

Conflicts over land boundaries between neighboring *Gampongs* can be seen as a repercussion from the demise of the *Mukim* structure. In previous times, people shared a common identity as a member of the *Mukim*, and for *Gampongs* that belonged to the same *Mukim* it didn't matter that much where the borders between them lay. Therefore village boundaries were rarely an issue. Nowadays the *Mukim* government once again plays a very important role in resolving such conflicts. For example, settlement procedures and principles are now being documented by them.

> *For instance, between Gampong Lambada and Gampong Kan, there is a pole or a wall or a sign that can be consulted with the elders from both villages. Then people can have discussion*

*and decisions can be taken without any fight (Informant from the focus group discussion with youth in Mukim Lamteuba).*

Other land-related problems that could potentially turn into a conflict in the future are border issues between some other *Gampongs* in *Mukim* Siem, and the fact that a large amount of community land is rented to and managed by people from outside the community in *Mukim* Lamteuba, as a result of which there are now more outsiders working on the land than local people.

# 6. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

## 6.1. Participatory mapping

### *Preparation and socialization*

Participatory mapping at *Mukim* Siem was done at the initiative of the *Imeum Mukim*, who was looking for a way to resolve the inter-village disputes within *Mukim* Siem. The *Imeum Mukim* decided to participate after attending a socialization meeting held by YRBI. At the same time, some other *Mukims* in Aceh that had also never done participatory mapping, also joined the project. *Mukim* Lamteuba had already conducted participatory mapping in 2008, approximately one year prior to YRBI's cooperation with ICCO but decided to join the activities of YRBI as well.

In March 2011 the *Imeum Mukim* of *Mukim* Siem performed the first *Duek Pakat Mukim* meeting[40]. It was attended by the staff of all the 8 *Gampongs* of *Mukim* Siem. The purpose of the event was to establish a mutual agreement that the boundary disputes between the *Gampongs* in *Mukim* Siem would be resolved in an integrated and comprehensive manner. During the meeting the *Imeum Mukim* stressed that the success of the project depended on the community's own efforts, and that they should prepare themselves to put in energy and to make costs. After they had reached an agreement the *Imeum Mukim* requested technical support from YRBI for the collection of the coordinate points in the region that was to be mapped, and the map making.

Next, a second *Duek Pakat Mukim* meeting was held in May 2011, which was again attended by the *Imeum Mukim* and the staff of the 8 *Gampongs*. The purpose of this meeting was to form a mapping team (also called the 'boundary demarcation team'), comprised of young volunteers including adolescent women from the community. The team members were then trained to use GPS-devices to collect coordinate points. This training was supervised by YRBI. During the meeting an additional 'Boundary Dispute Resolution Committee' was formed, made up of village elders (*ureung tuha*) that were knowledgeable about borders. The formation of this boundary dispute resolution committee was stipulated by the *Imeum Mukim* Siem in Decree no. 01/SK/MS/VII/2011.

A third *Duek Pakat Mukim* meeting was held in July 2011 and was attended by the *Imeum Mukim*, the staff of the 8 *Gampongs* and the Boundary Dispute Resolution Committee. During this meeting the concepts and principles of boundary dispute resolution between villages in *Mukim* Siem region were issued and captured in the *Mukim* government's decree no. S02/SK/MS/VIII/2011.

[40] Meaning: '*Mukim* discussion meeting'.

In October 2011, the members of the Boundary Dispute Committee were officially appointed during an inauguration ceremony, with the help of a *peusijuek* ritual[41]. The public inauguration was held in order to introduce the committee to the community, gain social legitimacy, and to encourage the committee members to carry out their new duties. The ceremony was attended by people from all levels of society, the staff of the *Gampong* and *Mukim* governments, as well as the staff of the sub-district government of Darussalam.

### *Determining the coordinate points*

The next phase of the mapping process was the collection of the coordinate points for the map. The mapping team of *Mukim* Siem took coordinates of village boundaries, public facilities, and other important sites in the villages. Meanwhile, *Mukim* Siem invited the *Gampongs*' leaders, elders from the Boundary Dispute Resolution Committee, and other people that were considered knowledgeable about the topic, to indicate where the boundaries of their *Gampongs* lay. After all this information was collected, visits were made to the sites of these borders to confirm there was an agreement about the boundaries between the different villages.

The mapping process proceeded almost the same in *Mukim* Lamteuba. However, in *Mukim* Lamteuba they had no Boundary Dispute Resolution Committee, and therefore the *Keuciks* and *Imeum Mukim* played a particularly important role in the dispute resolution within and between the *Gampongs*. Another difference was the absence of women in the mapping process in *Mukim* Lamteuba. In *Mukim* Siem young men and young women were actively involved in the participatory process, while in *Mukim* Lamteuba only the male youth leaders participated.

### *Map finalization*

At the time of our research, the map of *Mukim* Siem was about 60-70% completed. The reason the map was not yet finished, was the fact that there were still many unresolved boundary points between the *Gampongs*. Of the 17 boundary points across the region of *Mukim* Siem, 1 point was already agreed upon, and 6 points were resolved during the mapping process. For the 6 points that were resolved during the participatory mapping process, papers were signed, and then the boundaries were marked with stakes. The event was witnessed by district and sub-district officials and made into a news item. The remaining 10 boundary points, including the points between *Gampong* Lamklat and *Gampong* Lampasan that led to the conflict described in chapter 5, had proved more problematic and had not yet been resolved.

The mapping process in *Mukim* Lamteuba did not end up in conflict since the border points between the *Gampongs* were already clear before the start of the project. However, the mapping process is not yet completely finished either because there are still some disagreements about the exact borders between *Mukim* Lamteuba and some of its neighboring *Mukims*, such as *Mukim* Lampanah.[42]

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[41] *Peusijuek* rituals are usually held by the community's religious leaders or village elders. The ritual is very common in rural Acehnese communities, and is held to obtain good luck. For example in starting a business, resolving disputes, building a new house, celebrating a graduation, etc. Source: http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peusijuek. Viewed on 27-01-2015.

[42] *Mukim* Lamteuba wants to claim some of the land that is currently owned by *Mukim* Lampanah, which according to their elders belongs to *Mukim* Lamteuba. But *Mukim* Lampanah does not (yet) accept their claim.

The target date for the completion of the map of *Mukim* Siem was set at August of 2014. However, due to the existing problems, this did not prove to be feasible. YRBI has committed to proceed with its customary institution strengthening programme and participatory mapping activities until the maps are finished. How long this will exactly take is difficult to predict.

## 6.2. Trainings and discussions

Besides the facilitation during the participatory mapping process, YRBI also organised trainings, workshops, and discussions on participatory mapping and the strengthening of traditional institutions in *Mukim* Siem and *Mukim* Lamteuba. The activities were carried out in various places, for example at the YRBI office in Banda Aceh, in the *Mukim*'s Mosque, and in the village *meunasah*[43]. The discussions covered topics such as participatory mapping, setting standards in collaboration with the village community, and the empowerment of indigenous institutions and structures. The trainings and workshops taught community leaders about the revitalization of the *Tuha Peut* (representative council of the *Gampong* or *Mukim*), land rights and indigenous rights, the documentation of customary laws (*reusam)*, and reforestation. Also, field visits were made. YRBI also organised a training and discussion on the strengthening of the traditional institution of *Keujrun Blang*, and appointed a *Keujrun Ciek* in every *Gampong*.

The participants of the trainings, workshops, and discussion were predominantly staff members of the *Mukim* and *Gampong* governments, members of the *Tuha Peut*, and representatives from the youth groups. Only a small amount of women participated in the activities, namely the women that were already involved in government activities in *Mukim* Siem.

## 6.3. Reflection on the project activities

### *Reflections on participatory mapping*

Despite the fact that until now not all conflicts over boundaries could be resolved, the mapping process has already achieved some positive results for the communities. Most of the people in *Mukim* Siem and *Mukim* Lamteuba could already feel the benefits of the map, especially people living in the border areas between villages, who said they now felt safer on the land they live on because there is more clarity about the boundaries. Even though the maps are not yet completely finished, several villages have also already taken the maps into use. For example, by attaching it to a proposal to get a donation from PNMP[44], by attaching it in the *musrembang* proposals, and by using it as a reference to see which *Gampong* should handle the administration of, for example, a land-purchase. The map has also been used as lecture material by an undergraduate student from *Mukim* Siem.

[43] The *meunasah* is a traditional religious institution that plays an important part in community activities, e.g. holding community meetings, providing (religious) teachings, decision making, and the performance of marriage ceremonies. Source: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2005/01/19/meunasah039-play-strategic-role-life-acehnese.html# sthash.E9jy8HJX.dpuf. Viewed on 27-01-2015.

[44] PNPM Generasi is an innovative social assistance programme from the Indonesian government designed to address three lagging Millennium Development Goals: Maternal Health, Child Health, and Universal Education. Source: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:23234251~menuPK:141311~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html.

> *The map is very useful. The community or village can know their boundaries, and the children and grandchildren of our descendants will know clearly what is their land or the land inherited from their parents, and not to take land belonging to another person or village. With the mapping, the public will be more careful when opening the land for farming or plantations, lest the land is already owned by someone else (Informants from the focus group discussion with women in Mukim Lamteuba).*

YRBI has committed itself to finishing the mapping project with the final goal of submitting the map to the local government in order to claim the communities' rights over their indigenous land. Thus, when the maps are completed even more positive results may be achieved.

### *Reflections on the trainings, workshops, and discussions*

Even though the communities have attempted to apply the knowledge they gained from the trainings and discussion of YRBI, the results of these attempts are not yet satisfactory. Not yet all people understand the need to strengthen traditional institutions, and the need for property rights and customary land management. As a result *Mukim* Siem and *Mukim* Lamteuba have managed to revive the traditional institutions of the *Keujrun Blang*, and the Panglima Glie but have not yet managed to fully restore their previous function and authority. For example, the *Keujrun Cieks* cannot take care of the water and irrigation systems because conflicting governmental rules and regulations exist that prevent them from executing their tasks. Likewise, the authority to punish perpetrators of the rules of *blang* (for example by handing out fines to people whose livestock have damaged crops), is still held by the village head, even though according to custom this right belongs to the Panglima Glie. In order for the communities' attempts to apply the knowledge from YRBI's trainings and workshops to succeed, involvement and support will be needed from all layers of society.

### *Reflections on the distribution of benefits*

The group that most directly benefitted from YRBI's project were the community members with high positions. The trainings, workshops, and discussions were predominantly attended by *Mukim* and *Gampong* government officials, and other community leaders such as leaders of the youth groups. Because high positions are mostly held by the men in society, there were far less women than men among the direct beneficiaries of the project. However, some women were involved in the mapping process as part of the mapping team in *Mukim* Siem. YRBI has actively invited women and youth to participate in the mapping process, and has at least succeeded in involving many young people in the mapping process in both *Mukims*. Community members that were not involved in the project also benefitted from the project activities because knowledge was often informally transferred from the participants to the rest of the community, for example whilst enjoying a cup of coffee together in a local coffee shop. There were also some government staff members that took the opportunity to inform their community members about what they had learned at one of YRBI's events, during a meeting at the *meunasah.*

## 7. IMPACTS OF THE YRBI PROGRAMME

YRBI has empowered the *Mukim* governments by helping them to restore some of the traditional institutions: the Panglima Glie and the *Keujrun Blang Mukim*, including the appointment of its staff members: the *Keujrun Cieks*. However, these institutions aren't yet able to operate at their full potential. As such, real results with regard to forest preservation and sustainable natural resource management are not yet noticeable in the *Mukims*. Forest land is still being converted into plantations and fields, and illegal mining, often supported by the local apparatus, keeps taking place in the industrial forests. As a result, water sources keep reducing in number and size, and forest products such as wood and honey keep growing scarcer. The project has not (yet) managed to improve the attitudes of the communities towards the importance of the preservation of forests and natural resources. While the attitudes of the people of *Mukim* Lamteuba have pretty much stayed the same, the people of *Mukim* Siem, who are no longer solely reliant on the forest, have grown more apathetic towards their forests' and natural resources' sustainability over the past 2 years.

However, YRBI's project activities have made some other noticeable impacts on society. YRBI's participatory mapping project has helped the *Mukim* government to take control in solving some of the boundary disputes between its *Gampongs* (Siem), thereby restoring some feeling of safety and peace within the community.

Furthermore, YRBI has managed to enthuse and persuade people to start documenting their customary laws, customs, and traditions. Even though the wisdom documentation is still in process, it has given people hope that their culture and traditions will be preserved for the future. With regard to cultural resource management, the role of the *Mukim* government has continued to grow over the years, and has keep doing so during the period of the project.

Lastly, the position of women within Siem's and Lamteuba's society also seems to have improved over the past years. Women enjoy more freedom, and are now able to become members of traditional government. Developments such as these are usually the result of many factors, and cannot be unilaterally attributed to the effects of YRBI's project.[45] However, anecdotal evidence -such as the example of the female leader that got re-assigned as member of the *Tuha Peut* after an NGO staff member educated the *Keucik* about the importance of the presence of women in governance structure- shows that present NGOs can make a difference. In the past 2 years, the government of *Mukim* Siem has also taken an active role in the empowerment of women by skilling them in the traditional art of corpse bathing.

With the *Mukim* government taking on more and more responsibilities over the past 2 years, the communities' support towards them has grown.

[45] And the concurrent existence of multiple NGOs working towards women emancipation in the region make it even more difficult to distinguish the real contribution of YRBI in this regard.

## APPENDIX A: The Profile of Mukim and Gampong

Historically, Aceh has its own mechanism in the implementation of government administration and development based on norms influenced by Islam. In the past there were five main institutions in the kingdom in Aceh, i.e


(1) **Sultan**: ruler / king of Aceh Sultanate
(2) **Panglima Sagoe**: leader of Mukim federation during the reign of Aceh sultanate in Aceh Besar (*Sagoe Nukim*/ *Aceh lhee Sagoe*)
(3) **Ulee Balang**: a royal family member in Aceh community who leads a *Kenegerian* or *Nanggroë,* which is an area at district level of Indonesian current governmental structure. *Ulee balang* is awarded with customary title of *Teuku* for male and *Cut* for female.
(4) **Imeum Mukim**: administration head of *Mukim*, who governs several *Gampongs*
(5) **Keucik**: Head of *Gampong* or village, who governs the village and is master of all administration management in the village.

Hence, traditionally, *Mukim* was considered as one of the most important institutions in Aceh playing a role in both the administration and in the implementation of customary rules and traditions. Under the New Order regime, the *Mukim* institution was weakened as a repercussion of modernization and centralization of power. As a result of Law No. 5/1979 about the Village Administration, the role of *Mukims* was reduced to only represent a customary institution without any role in administration.

After the collapse of the New Order regime in 1998, the Special Autonomy Law of 2001 made it possible for the province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province (NAD) to revitalize traditional *adat* institutions including the role of *Mukims* in governance through the enactment of a series of *Qanuns* or local laws: *Qanun* No. 4/2003 on *Mukim* Administration acknowledged *Mukims* as a government and custom institution. This was later reaffirmed by *Qanun* No. 11/2006 on the Aceh Administration. *Qanun* No. 9/2008 on the Development of Custom Life specified the regulations on the role of the *Mukims* in the completion of legal action or dispute at *Mukim* level.

*Qanun* No. 4/2003 on *Mukim* administration and *Qanun* No. 5/2003 on *Gampong* administration defined *Mukim* as the governmental unit in NAD Province, which consists of several *Gampongs* with certain boundaries and its own property; and holds position directly under the *Camat* (head of subdistrict). At the same time, *Gampong* is defined as governmental unit under *Mukim* and led by a *Keuchik*; and it has the right to conduct its own domestic affairs. Article 3 of *Qanun* No. 4/2003 acknowledges that *Mukims* have duties to govern, to implement development, to develop community and increase the implementation of Syari'at Islam. In order to reinforce the role of *Mukims*, the government of Aceh Besar established the *Qanun* No. 8/2009 on *Mukim* Administration.


**Figure 3: Mukim in hierarchy of government structure**




The *Qanun* on *Mukim* administration explained that *Mukim* is led by an *Imuem Mukim*, who is elected by a *Mukim* meeting and legalized by the Bupati (head of district). According to the *Qanun* of Aceh Besar District No. 8/2009, the structure of governance in the *Mukim* consists of: [46]

- Imuem Mukim
- Secretary of Mukim
- Mukim Deliberation Committee / Majelis Musyawarah Mukim
- The completion of customary in Mukim / Penyelesaian Perselisihan Adat Mukim
- Imeum Chiek

**Figure 4: Mukim's Structure**




[46] Please check the List of terms at the end of this document to see the description and function of this institution.

Figure 4 describes the *Mukim* governance structure of *Mukim* Siem based on information from the *Imeum Mukim* of Siem (Asnawi Zainun). Almost all lines are command lines, except for *Tuha Peut*, which has coordination line. *Tuha Peut* has several roles in community: one of its roles is to maintain community's tradition and culture, habit, and local culture; another one is to supervise the performance of the *Mukim*. The custom institutions mentioned above in the *Mukim* structure are *keujreun blang*[47], *panglima uteun* or *panglima glie*[48], *panglima laot*[49], etc. While others institutions are formed according to the needs in each *Mukim*. For example, *Mukim* Siem has a youth institution and LPTQ[50]. In some mukims, the position of *Imuem Chiek* is at the same level with *Imuem Mukim*, but in general *Imuem Chiek* is under the command line of *Imuem Mukim*.

One aspect of *Mukim* governance that has been revived is its role in dispute resolution. According to the customary law, there are some levels of settlement: if a dispute or problem arises, kinship approach usually comes first to solve the problems; dispute resolution will only extend to the *Keucik* if it has not been solved at the kinship level, in which case he will give advice to finish the problem in peace; if the problem cannot be resolved at this level, it will be brought to *Meunasah*, where the customary law is applied; if it is still not solved, the *Imuem Mukim* will try to find solution, through the customary law. Only after all these stages of problem resolution have proved to be unsuccessful, is the problem reported to the police. In addition to the *Mukim*'s role in dispute resolution, *Mukims* also serve as a mouthpiece between *Gampongs* and the subdistrict.

According to *Qanun* of Aceh Besar No. 8/2009 regarding Mukim Governance Chapter II section 5 article 1, *Mukim* has an authority to supervise the ecological life as well as to manage the natural sources in their area.

Considering the enormities of community's expectation to restore mukim's role in government and custom in people's life in *Mukim* Siem, the community had done many efforts to revitalize it. Land purchase and sale, for instance, requires a signature of the *Imeum Mukim* before the contract is submitted to the sub-district.

Even though the law of *Mukim* existence is powerful, it does not mean that the functions of the *Mukim* can be easily implemented. On the one hand, the long reduced functionality of *Mukims* has resulted in some loss of knowledge. On the other hand, the functioning of *Mukims* is severely affected by the lack of support from the federal government in both moral and material grounds (such as budget, office building, facilities and infrastructure, as well as incentives for *Mukim* activities). As a consequence, despite the revitalization efforts, a decline in *Mukim* fuction can be observed in the society.

[47] Keujreun Blang is the customary leader regarding management of irrigation, planting time, harvest time, giving instruction for farmers, and solving land conflict.

[48] Pawang glie or Pawang Uteun is the head of custom who governs the management of community forest, either the timber or non-timber forest products (honey, rambung sap, bird nests, rattan, resin, etc), meurusa, picking up wasee glee, providing adivise/instruction regarding forest management, and solving conflicts of glee law violation.

[49] Panglima Laot is the customary leader regarding management of fishing, giving instruction for the fishermen, and solving conflict amongst the fishermen.

[50] LPTQ (Al-qur'an Recital foundation/Tilawatil Qur'an) a foundation with interest in encouraging the moslems to study and memorize Al-Quran as well as to practice the messages of Al-quran in the middle of Aceh community.

## APPENDIX B: LIST OF TERMS

**Imeum Mukim**: administration head of Mukim, who governs several Gampongs.

**Keucik**: Head of Gampong, who governs a gampong and master all administration management in Gampong.

**Keujreun Blang**: customary leader regarding management of irrigation, planting time, harvest time, giving instruction for farmers, and solving land conflict.

**LPTQ** (Al-qur'an Recital foundation/Tilawatil Qur'an): a foundation with interest in encouraging the moslems to study and memorize Al-Quran as well as to practice the messages of Al-quran in the middle of Aceh community.

**Meunasah:** a worship place and a place to study and have gatherings for the islamic community, particularly those in rural area of Aceh. Meunasah is derived from arabic (madrasah), which means a place to gather and to attain knowledge as well as a place for the community to have discussion.

**Muspika**: discussion amongst leaders in sub-district which is attended by sub-district head/Camat, commander of *koramil* (Danramil), and head of police sector (Kapolsek).

**Panglima Laot**: customary leader regarding management of fishing, giving instruction for the fishermen, and solving conflict amongst the fishermen.

**Panglima Sagoe**: leader of Mukim federation during the reign of Aceh sultanate in Aceh Besar (Sagoe Mukim/ Aceh lhee Sagoe)

**Pawang Glie** or **Pawang Uteun**: head of custom who governs the management of community forest, either the timber or non-timber forest products (honey, rambung sap, bird nests, rattan, resin, etc), *meurusa*, picking up *wasee glee*, providing adivise/instruction regarding forest management, and solving conflicts of glee law violation.

**Qanun**: local government regulations which governs government administration and community life of Aceh Province.

**Reusam**: customary law/regulation at gampong level which is aplied in Aceh.

**Sultan**: ruler / king of Aceh Sultanate

**Tuha Peut Inoeng:** representative group for women that represents women's aspiration in community.

**Ulee Balang**: a royal family member in Aceh community who leads a Kenegerian or Nanggroë, that is an area at district level of Indonesian current governmental structure. Ulee Balang is awarded with customary title of Teuku for male, while Cut for female.

# Annex VII. Literature review on participatory mapping[51]

## *Introduction*

Even though the existence of participatory mapping activities is very important in a country like Indonesia where an estimated 48 million indigenous people still depend on the forest for their livelihood, but where mining, logging and oil palm industry are destroying more than 1 million hectares of rainforest territory each year[52] (Telapak & Gekko Studio 2011), the academic literature on participatory mapping within specific Indonesian context is quite limited. This may, at least in part, have to do with the political sensitivities involved in mapping, that can be especially critical for Indonesian indigenous peoples that have since long had a particularly uneasy relation with government and, until very recently, had to cope with a severe lack of legal protection. Luckily, a lot of additional information can be found in manuals, project evaluations, working papers, and online blogs, tutorial videos, etc. which are most often published in more recent years by the international organisations that implement the mapping projects in Indonesia. This literature review therefore draws on academic literature on participatory mapping both within and without Indonesian context, as well as other (mostly online) sources that are more specifically focused on mapping projects undertaken in Indonesia or Southeast Asia. It will cover the following topics: What is participatory mapping, what tools and methods are used, history and development of participatory mapping, reported impacts, and considerations about "good practice".

## *What is participatory mapping?*

Participatory mapping is a general term[53] used to define a set of approaches and techniques that combine the tools of modern cartography with participatory methods to create a map of a local community's habitat that represents this community's spatial knowledge (Rainforest Foundation UK 2014). "NGO's, from small local ones to large international ones, often play a crucial role as interlocutors, trainers, advocates and facilitators in these mapping activities" (IFAD 2009: 5).

Participatory mapping is used over the whole world, and the maps that are produced can take on many forms, and can be used to achieve various different purposes. Looking at the available literature and documentation on participatory mapping initiatives the most common aim of participatory mapping appears to be to help marginalized groups, in particular indigenous, pastoralist and forest dwellers, to claim and/or defend their (access to) ancestral lands and its resources, typically by working towards legal recognition of their land rights, using the maps as evidence of their continued residency. The maps can also serve as a tool for community land use planning and natural resource management, and can be used to bring resource-related problems, such as the impacts of logging, mining, and 'land grab' activities, to the attention of governmental authorities and decision makers

[51] Please note beforehand that part of this text has been taken over into the main text of the report. In addition, this annex is also included as annex in MDG projects E2, E3 and E9.

[52] Making Indonesia the fastest forest clearing nation in the world since 2012, and also the world's third largest emitter of carbon dioxide emissions, behind China and the United States (Telapak & Gekko Studio 2011).

[53] The numerous initiatives throughout the world aren't always referred to with the words 'participatory mapping', but can go by many different terms, including: "indigenous mapping" (IFAD 2009: 6) , "…"participatory land use mapping," "participatory resource mapping" (Mbile *et al*. 2003), "community mapping" (Bennagen & Royo 2000, Eghenter 2000, Fox 2002), "community-based mapping" (Flavelle 2002), "ethnocartography" (Chapin & Threlkeld 2001, Gonzalez *et al*. 1995), and "counter-mapping" (Peluso 1995, Kosek 1998, Hodgson & Schroeder 2002)…" (as cited in Chapin *et al*. 2005: 622-623).

(Chapin *et al*. 2005: 620; Di Gessa 2008; Rainforest Foundation UK 2014; Literat 2013: 200; IFAD 2009: 9-12, 39). Some indigenous groups are now using mapping to monitor and defend lands against deforestation, illegal timber extraction, prospecting, and colonization (Teague c. 2010: 10). Other purposes of participatory mapping activities include the strengthening of indigenous political organisation, economic development planning, the documentation of history and customs for culture preservation, education of indigenous youths and/or the general public (Chapin *et al*. 2005: 620), and support for conflict resolution in territory-related disputes (Di Gessa 2008).

Participatory mapping processes in general don't follow usual cartographic conventions. The maps that are produced often represent a socially or culturally distinct understanding of landscape and include information that is excluded from mainstream or official maps. The aim is to create a map that depicts local knowledge about the environment, and represents and serves the agenda of the community (IFAD 2009: 7). Participatory maps can present spatial information at various scales, from detailed information of village layout and infrastructure, to a more general depiction of large areas. Elements that can be included in a map are for instance: territorial land boundaries, land-use occupancy, hunting- fishing- and gathering grounds, the location/distribution of flora and fauna, important landmarks such as rivers, caves, roads, and location of houses, but also information on rainfall patterns, health patterns, wealth distributions, etc. Furthermore, the maps can depict places of social, cultural and/or historical significance, such as ancestral burial grounds, sacred areas, cultural sites and trails, and information on cultural customs, traditions, and mythology (IFAD 2009: 6-7).

What further distinguishes participatory mapping from traditional cartography and map-making is the process by which the maps are made (IFAD 2009: 4): Community members are involved (preferably) throughout the whole mapping process and recognized as capable research collaborators and experts on their own local surroundings and needs (IFAD 2009: 4; Pathways Through Participation 2010: 1). According to Fox *et al*. (2003, as cited in Wright *et al*. 2009: 261) the reasons for choosing a participatory mapping approach are usually not only practical (i.e. the actual production of the map and using it as evidence for land claims, or as community advocacy tools), but also intrinsic, as the communal aspect of the mapping process can enhance group awareness and cultural identity, facilitate the passing down of historical knowledge through generations, and build trust and communication between people.

### *Tools and methods*

Participatory mapping uses a range of tools and methods, of which some of the principles ones are:

**"hands on mapping"**, which is a basic method in which the community draws a map from memory on the ground (also called "ground mapping") or on paper (also called "sketch mapping");

**"Participatory mapping using scale maps and images"**, where local knowledge and information is added to a pre-existing image (such as an aerial or satellite image);

**"Participatory 3-D modelling (P3DM)"**, which is used for hilly or mountainous areas. Layers of elevation are cut out of cardboard in the shape and contours of the landscape and placed on top of each other, after which paint, pins and strings are used to show surface information and to indicate boundaries and conflict areas. Data depicted on such a 3-D model can also be extracted, digitized and incorporated into a Geographical Information System (GIS);

**"GPS based field mapping"**, in which geographical reference points of boundaries, landmarks, etc. are collected and are put on top of a map, often using GIS to store, retrieve and analyse the GPS data;

**"Computer based map making"**, where graphic software (such as Adobe Illustrator) and GIS are used to make geographically accurate maps, and;
**"Multimedia and internet-based mapping"**, which draws on Web 2.0 technology to create interactive, computer based maps that contain links to digital video, pictures, audio and written text (Pathways Through Participation 2010: 4). This increasingly popular method, makes it better possible to document the complexities and the oral and visual aspects of local knowledge (Di Gessa 2008: 6-9; IFAD 2009: 13-19; Rainforest Foundation UK 2011).[54]

The choice of methods to be used in a participatory mapping project is determined by many factors, such as the problems the community is facing and wants to resolve, the available resources (financial, and in terms of staff and equipment), and the community's physical context (is it hilly or plain) (IFAD 2009: 13) as well as its cultural context (norms, values, customs) (Rainforest Foundation UK 2011).

### *History and development*

#### Over the world

Local people have been drawing maps of their territories to develop a sense of place and identity for centuries (Pathways Through Participation 2010: 2). However, mapping of indigenous lands as a participatory exercise and a means for "securing tenure, managing natural resources, and strengthening cultures", often facilitated by outsiders, is a more recent phenomenon (Chapin *et al*. 2005: 619).

According to Chapin *et al.* the first participatory mapping exercises started in Canada and Alaska in the 1960's (2005: 619). The rest of the world only followed much later, approximately 25-30 years ago, when participatory mapping projects started to rapidly proliferate from Southeast Asia through Central Asia, Africa, Europe, North-, South- and Central America to Australasia (IFAD 2009: 7).

"In the development literature, mapping is identified as having many different sources – from social anthropology to participatory action research and popular education" (Pathways Through Participation 2010: 2). Throughout the years, mapping has become increasingly popular and prominent (Ibid: 13), which "many commentators ascribe to the developments in Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) which emerged in the late 1980s in South Asia and combined insights from agro-ecosystem analysis with Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA)" (Ibid: 2).

"The more technically oriented participatory mapping work began filling the field in the mid- and late 1990s, when computerized mapping technology became more widely available" (Chapin *et al*. 2005: 623). "Those engaged in participatory mapping are increasingly taking advantage of new, digital and web-based Technologies" (Teague c. 2010: 13), which are being developed and improved by large corporations such as Google (Google Maps and Google Earth), ESRI (developers of the principal GIS used word-wide) and Garmin (producer of GPS hardware and software) especially for this purpose (Teague c. 2010: 13).

[54] More information on the different methodologies and their advantages, disadvantages, ways of implementation, suitable contexts, etc. can be found in the manuals of IFAD (2009) and Di Gessa (2008). For additional information on participatory 3-D modelling in specific also see Vandergeest (1996), Rubiano *et al.* (1997), Rambaldi & Callosa-Tarr (2000), Flavelle (2002), Hoare *et al.* (2002), De Vera *et al*. (2003), and Rhoades & Moates (2003) (as cited in Chapin *et al.* 2005: 623)

**In Indonesia**

According to Peluso early forms of participatory mapping entered Indonesia in the 1980s via conventional (eco) conservation projects by international organisations such as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), after which Indonesian activists took the opportunity to "… reinterpret this kind of mapping as a sort of resistance and counter-movement to state mapping, which did not consider people's rights but instead was a basis for exploitive development projects under the Suharto regime" (1995: 398-400, as cited in Hartjati Sanmukri 2013: 123).

Over the past 1.5 decade, communities from nearly every region in Indonesia have been trained in the technical and facilitation skills required to undertake participatory mapping, and by 2009 1.5 million hectares of land had already been mapped by local communities (IFAD 2009: 22). The Indonesian community mapping network (Jaringan Kerja Pemetaan Partisipatif or JKPP), established by the mapping activists in 1996 in Bogor, West Java, has been instrumental in achieving these goals (IFAD 2009: 22). I.a. by forming an alliance with AMAN and the Forest Watch Indonesia to advocate for the customary maps to become officially recognized and fed into the "Ancestral Domain Registration Agency" (Badan Registrasi Wilayah Adat): The government's official national database of forest cover. In 2011 AMAN signed an MoU with the National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional), which officially stated that "indigenous" maps would be integrated into governmental data (Hartjati Sanmukri 2013: 123).

On May 16'th 2013 another important milestone for the recognition of indigenous peoples' ancestral land rights was reached, when – in response to a petition of AMAN - the constitutional court in Jakarta ruled that the customary forests of indigenous peoples should no longer be classed as falling in "State Forest Areas"[55] (Forest Peoples Programme 2013), officially giving customary forest its own status and position in the Forestry Law, and - at least in theory - returning the rights over the customary forests (seized by the state through UUK[56]) to its indigenous inhabitants (REDD-Monitor 2013). This development could greatly enhance the success rate of indigenous people's endeavours to lay claims to their lands and thereby protect their sources of livelihood in the future.

### *Reported impacts of participatory mapping*

Over the years, many researchers have noted the positive impacts that participatory mapping can have on a community:

> *Participation in mapping seems to have encouraged some indigenous communities to demand title to lands (Toledo Maya Cultural Council, 1997; Leake, 2000; Herlihy, 2003; Herlihy and Knapp, 2003), to defend and claim their rights to control natural resources (Smith, 2003; Brown, 2006), and to design conservation and resource management plans that are compatible with local practices (Mohamed and Ventura, 2000; McCall and Minang, 2005; Brown, 2006; Bauer, 2009). Researchers have argued that, in addition to producing maps, when implemented with a stress on participation and with facilitation of discussions within communities, indigenous mapping empowers indigenous peoples in land and resource use*

[55] The petition of AMAN (*Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara*), which was filed with the court some 14 months before the ruling, objected to the way the 1999 Forestry Act treats indigenous peoples' 'customary forests' as providing only weak use-rights within State Forest Areas" (Forest Peoples Programme 2013)

[56] UUK is the abbreviation for Undang-Undang Kehutanan: Act No. 41/1999 on Forestry, saying: "customary forest is STATE FOREST in indigenous territory" (IWGIA 2013). The new ruling has replaced this law.

*rights against potential encroachers (Poole, 2003; Smith, 2003; Brown, 2006; Finley-Brook, 2007) (Reyes-Garcia et al. ca. 2012a: 2-3).*

In addition to these positive effects, researchers have also observed negative consequences resulting from participatory mapping. For instance, Authors such as Mwangi, Hodgson & Schroeder, Fox, Bryant, and Roth have noted issues such as increased privatization of land, loss of indigenous conceptions of space, greater exposure of valuable natural resources, increased taxation by the state, and increase or intensification of conflicts, either within the village, with neighbouring villages, or with other external actors such as companies or governmental authorities (Reyes-Garcia *et al*. 2012b: 651). Increase of conflicts due to participatory mapping, is one of the most frequently reported drawbacks of participatory mapping. Researchers such as Offen, Peluso, Hale, and Vandergeest have argued that: "Participatory mapping might intensify internal conflicts because it might bring to light overlapping uses of land and resources or erode traditional ways of dealing with internal conflicts…" (Ibid). Furthermore, it has been reasoned by i.a. Peluso and Rundstrom that "…participatory mapping might increase the number of conflicts with external actors, as the maps produced might challenge the maps made by state and corporate authorities" (Ibid).

Reyes-Garcia *et al*. have attempted to validate the theory that participatory mapping systematically increases the number of conflicts, using an experimental research design whereby 32 native Amazonian villages with and without conflicts with outsiders were randomly assigned to a treatment group (those where a participatory mapping project would be implemented by them) and a control group (those where a participatory mapping project would not (yet) be implemented by them[57]).[58] Contrary to others' previous findings, the results of their research show no statistically significant differences in the measured variables (i.e. number of conflicts, negative opinion, neutral attitude, and negative attitudes towards outsiders) between treatment and control villages (2012b: 656).

Reyes-Garcia *et al*. explain their deviating results by arguing that previous studies, which were based on direct observations rather than a randomized experimental design, might have been subject to selection bias, because the villages participating in participatory mapping projects are generally the ones that are chosen or volunteering to participate in participatory mapping due to the fact that they are expected to experience – or are already experiencing – conflicts over land rights and resources (2012b: 651, 656). Their results support the argument that mapping projects do not bring about conflicts per se, rather "…the process and the results of participatory mapping can help in conflict resolution or contribute to conflict generation or exacerbation depending on the political and socio-economic context in which they are conducted" (Ibid: 657).

[57] For the sake of fairness, participatory mapping projects were also implemented in the control villages, but only after all research data for the post-intervention study had been collected (Reyes-Garcia *et al.* 2012b: 653).

[58] All these villages were located in Tsimane' territory. The Tsimane' are a native Amazonian society of foragers and farmers in Bolivia.

## *Good practice*

### How to organise a mapping process

Considerations on how to successfully undertake a participatory mapping programme, in part focus on the question of "what constitutes as an ideal way to organise a mapping process". There are many philosophical and technical differences in implementing participatory mapping initiatives, and the fact that they are carried out in many different settings, makes it impossible to distinguish a single definitive blueprint process that proves successful regardless of context (Di Gessa 2008: 2; IFAD 2009: 30). It is, however, generally agreed upon that a structured approach to the mapping process is necessary for it to succeed.

In this regard, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD 2009) identified some broad steps that are typically adopted in the deployment of participatory mapping initiatives, i.e.: Preparing the community for the mapping activity; Determining the purpose(s) of making a map; Collecting information; Creating the map and determining the legend; Analysing and evaluating the information, and; Using and communicating the community's spatial information (IFAD 2009: 32-38). These steps correspond with Chapin & Threlkeld's "ethnocartography model": a coherent and structured methodology that provides a 6 step approach to the process of mapping indigenous lands. According to the IFAD (2009: 32) most mapping projects loosely follow the steps of this approach, which entail: 1. "**ground preparation**: before the project starts project leaders and indigenous leaders explain the objectives and importance of the mapping work to the community, the technical team is recruited and collaboration with NGO's and government agencies is sought; 2. **First workshop – orientation and training**: Project staff and indigenous leaders explain the objectives and methodology to the surveyors and technical team and data collection tools are developed; 3. **First fieldwork – gathering data and sketch mapping**; 4. **Second workshop – transcription of data onto new maps**; 5. **Second fieldwork – verification of collected data by the community**, and; 6. **Third workshop – correcting and completing final maps**: Surveyors reunite with the cartographers to incorporate information that has been verified in the field and put the draft maps in final form (Chapin & Threlkeld 2001; IFAD 2009: 30).

### Ethical considerations

In one of his later works, Chapin points out that in the past guidebooks about participatory mapping that have grown out of work in Southeast Asia, have focused mostly on the technical aspects of mapping, avoiding the more politically sensitive aspects and ethical considerations brought along by the mapping.[59] The first manual to actually focus on these matters within Indonesian context was "Mapping people's forests: the role of mapping in planning community-based management of conservation areas in Indonesia" by C. Eghenter in 2000 (Chapin *et al*. 2005: 627). Over the years the focus on ethical considerations about potential negative consequences of mapping and the moral responsibilities of the project instigators towards the communities that partake in the mapping projects has become more pronounced. More and more authors broach these kinds of issues in their articles, books and manuals, even if only in afterthought.

[59] Examples of these "technical" guidebooks on participatory mapping are: Drawing on Local Knowledge: A Community Mapping Training Manual (Momberg *et al*. 1995); Mapping Our Land (Flavelle 2002); and Manual on Participatory 3-Dimensional Modelling (Rambaldi & Callosa-Tarr 2000) (as cited in Chapin *et al*. 2005: 627).

In the literature, a prominent topic with regard to "ethical practice" is that of "empowerment". Projects should be dedicated to achieving community empowerment, meaning that cartographers should focus on teaching the indigenous people how to read, interpret, produce and use maps, and should let them take as much control and responsibility over the mapping process as possible, thereby ensuring that the community will also be able to update their map and develop their own map-use strategies after the project has finished (Chapin & Threlkeld 2001: 128; Di Gessa 2008: 15; IFAD 2009: 25). Good practice, in this regard, also (perversely) means that mappers sometimes have to deliberately disregard or simplify available technologies to make sure the community will be able to access, understand and use them in the future without outside help (Chapin *et al.* 2005: 259; Di Gessa 2008: 5). Ownership rights should also belong to the community itself, enabling them to protect their own interests by deciding for themselves which data they want to publicly disclose, and which (potentially sensitive) data they want to keep private (Chapin & Threlkeld 2001: 134; IFAD 2009: 27-28).

According to i.a. Chapin & Threlkeld (2001) and Teague c. (2010), good practice in participatory mapping exercises also requires a culturally sensitive approach on the part of the international project instigators (NGO's, CBO's, etc.) and staff involved in the mapping process. They should make an effort to view the world from the eyes of the indigenous community, respecting and prioritizing the community's needs, and "carefully considering the challenges inherent in translating indigenous knowledge (which is often based on different epistemologies and conceptions of space and time than their own) into Western Cartesian cartographic formats" (Teague c. 2010: 15). For instance, knowledge about boundaries can easily be misrepresented as indigenous peoples often have a "fluid sense" of their borders, which can be overlapping, incomplete, shifting and/or dependent on seasonal variations (Chapin & Threlkeld 2001: 133)

Another topic that is quite extensively covered in the literature is the project initiators' (perceived) ethical responsibility to ensure that the benefits of the participatory mapping exercise are evenly felt throughout the community. It is deemed important that the map should represent the views and wishes of all the different groups within the community, and consequently many authors highlight the fact that special effort should be put into making sure that the map reflects the perceptions and needs of (potentially) marginalized groups, such as women, the elderly, youth, or immigrants (Chapin & Threlkeld 2001: 127; IFAD 2009: 27-28). Furthermore, it is thought important that members of all groups (and not only the village elite) are encouraged to participate in the actual mapping process, among other things to make sure that pre-existing power structures favouring certain groups' access to land are not reinforced (Teague c. 2010: 14), and to prevent new power imbalances between the people that know how to use the advanced technology, and those who don't (Wright *et al*. 2009: 260). Conversely, authors such as Mei-Po Kwan and Diane Rocheleau, who write from a feminist perspective, note the importance of taking into consideration and addressing the disrupting effect that mapping can have on existing gender relations (Teague c. 2010: 14).

An interesting development is that, over the past years, a special interest seems to be taken in the issue of "who controls GIS and with what power" (Spiegel *et al*. 2012: 345). Authors such as Chapin *et al.* (2005), Di Gessa (2008), Spiegel *et al*. (2012), Teague (c. 2010), and Wright *et al*. (2009) raise concerns on how skill levels needed for the handling of GIS are often gendered and age based (Teague c. 2010: 13), and on how a lack of electricity and internet access in remote communities and the cost of the equipment, causes the knowledge and handling of the GIS technology and/or the processing of the

GPS data to remain outside of the community, in the hands of a small - already privileged - elite of experts, thus enhancing existing power structures (Chapin *et al.* 2005: 629; Di Gessa 2008: 14-15).

Other topics on "good practice" in participatory mapping that are less pronounced but still present in the literature are: The importance of ensuring the long term commitment and support to initiatives of external parties (NGO's, CBO's, universities, development partners, etc.) (IFAD 2009: 25); A good selection of the mapping team. For instance: Chapin & Threlkeld have provided a list of desirable characteristics for facilitators (2001: 127), and lastly; The responsibility to make the local community aware of potential risks of mapping (such as boundary conflicts, risks of documenting sensitive information) before the start of the activities, and to put an effort into mitigating negative impacts that occur in the wake of the process (Di Gessa 2008: 1,3; IFAD 2009: 28-29).

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# Endline Report on the Achievement of MDGs and Themes:

# Evaluation of the Rampi project of HuMa

## MFS II Joint Evaluations

## Indonesia

**Sub-report:**
**E9. The Security of Strengthening Communities Rights and Justice,**
**The Association for Community and Ecologic-Based Law reform (HuMa)**

## FINAL REPORT

**9 April 2015**


**Amsterdam Institute for International Development (AIID)**

Trinity building C, 3rd floor, Rm XT-3.17
Pietersbergweg 17
1105 BM Amsterdam
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)20 5661596
F +31 (0)20 5665997
www.aiid.org

**SurveyMeter**

Jl. Jenengan Raya No.109
Maguwoharjo, Depok, Sleman,
Yogyakarta 55282
Indonesia
T +62 (0) 274 4477464
F +62 (0) 274 4477004
www.surveymeter.org

# List of contributors

**AIID**
Menno Pradhan (Principal Investigator)
Melinda Vigh (Research Coordinator)
Marije Groot Bruinderink (Project Manager)
Iris van Rossum (Junior Researcher)
Kimberley Wallaart (Qualitative Data Analyst)
Emilie Berkhout (Research Assistant)

**Survey Meter**
Ni Wayan Suriasatini (Research Coordinator)
Bondan Sikoki (Survey Expert)
Mardiana Br Ginting (Project Manager)
Muhammad Mulia (Qualitative Researcher and Field Coordinator)
Najib Azca (Expert Advisor on Theme Good Governance)

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## List of Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| AMAN | Alliance of Indigenous Movement in the Archipelago |
| CBO | Community Based Organisation |
| CFA | Co-financing Agency |
| CLRDF | Community Law Resource Development Facilitator |
| FGD | Focus Group Discussion |
| GPS | Global Positioning System |
| HuMa | Association for Community and Ecologic-Based Law Reform |
| IDR | Indonesian rupiahs |
| IFAD | International Fund for Agricultural Development |
| INCLaF | Indonesian Community Law Facilitators |
| Indev | Institutional Development |
| MDG | Millennium Development Goal |
| MFS II | Medefinancieringsstelsel (Co-financing System Grant Policy Framework) |
| MoU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| PHK | Critical Law Training |
| PHR | Community Law Facilitator |
| PRA | Participatory Rural Appraisal |
| RRA | Rapid Rural Appraisal |
| SPHR | School of Community Law Facilitators |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |

# 1. Introduction


## 1.1. Project context

Community empowerment programmes for indigenous communities are very important in a country like Indonesia where an estimated 48 million indigenous people still depend on the forest for their livelihood, but where mining, logging and oil palm industry are destroying more than 1 million hectares of rainforest territory each year (Telapak & Gekko Studio 2011).

According to Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria (KPA, Consortium for Agrarian Reform), as quoted by Mustofa (2012), there were 163 land-right related conflict incidents in Indonesia in 2011. The number increased quite significantly from 106 conflict incidents in 2010. In terms of casualties, there were about 22 farmers/villagers who died in the conflicting issues and areas. The conflict involved more than 69,975 families, with approximately about 472,948 hectares of land. Of the 163 cases, there were 97 plantation cases (60%), 36 forestry cases (22%), and 1 case of coastal area (1%). Looking at the distribution of violent incidents, most agrarian cases took place in East Java (36), North Sumatera (25), Southeast Sulawesi (15), Central Java (12), Jambi (11), Riau (10), South Sumatera (9), Lampung (5), and the rest dispersed in many provinces of Indonesia.

According to Association for Community and Ecologic-Based Law Reform (HuMa), from 110 agrarian cases, it was about 2.7 million hectares of land which became the object of dispute, involving government and corporations as the main players. Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (Alliance of Indigenous Movement in the Archipelago, AMAN) notes that in 2011 there were various kinds of human rights violations towards indigenous people, including criminalization and arresting some of its activists.

**Figure 1: Types of forestry conflicts**




Source: HuMa (2011)

In data compiled by HuMa in 2011, about 46% of forestry conflict has involved indigenous and local communities against outsiders due to many reasons, see Figure 1. In most of the cases, conflict exploded because forest communities' land and territory were grabbed by outsiders without consent or even consultation with communities.

With all these data as the backdrop, it is important to strengthen the security of communities' rights and justice and justice on land and natural resources tenure. As also indicated in Figure 1, the Ministry of Forestry and Perhutani (a state-owned forestry company) are the main parties involved in conflicts along with companies/cooperatives. It is also important to notice that following the changing political system from authoritarian to a (more) democratic one, a new policy of decentralization has also been implemented, which transfers authority from central to local government. Thus, dispute between national and local governments sometimes happens.

Differences of interest may lead to further disputes and conflicts in the future. Nonetheless, a major victory for the rights' of indigenous communities was achieved in May 2013, when the constitutional court in Jakarta ruled that the customary forests of indigenous peoples should no longer be classed as falling in 'State Forest Areas' paving the way for a wider recognition of indigenous peoples' rights all over Indonesia (Forest Peoples Programme 2013). However, in reality, it turns out that the implementation of these new policies is problematic, as it is often difficult for the indigenous people to effectively prove their claims to ancestral lands on their own, and political dynamics (the frequent turnover of persons in charge of in the local government) often hinders the implementation of the policies.

Therefore, indigenous communities are in the need of outside help evermore to promote their cases. HuMa is one of the organisations: through its nationwide network, HuMa seeks to empower communities' rights through holding training on customary law and legal pluralism so that people have legal instrument to defend their rights.

Working together with Wallacea, a local Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) partner based in Palopo, HuMa developed a programme in Rampi sub-district (in South Sulawesi province). Rampi is a buffer ecological zone which contains the sources of clean water for three provinces, namely West Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi and South Sulawesi. Rampi also consists of some indigenous communities which still apply customary law in their daily life: customary law mechanism is used to resolve cases instead of legal process. However, some outsider groups attempted to make use of its rich natural resources by neglecting customary law. Thus, HuMa seeks to empower local people by holding training on customary law and legal pluralism to empower people with a legal instrument for the defending their rights. HuMa also attempts to set up local regulations and promoting deliberative process to avoid harm and conflict to happen as a consequence of development activities. By carrying out empowerment programmes and promoting local capacities on the ground, like participatory mapping, community law facilitators (PHR), and trainings on sustainable natural resource management, it is expected to pave the way to increase pressure on changing local and national natural resource policy toward (more) democracy and (more) respect for human rights.

## 1.2. Evaluation objectives

This report evaluates 'The Security of Strengthening Communities Rights and Justice' project[1] of the Association for Community and Ecologic-Based Law Reform (HuMa) with funding from ICCO as part of the MFS II evaluation for Indonesia under the Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDG) component. The project works on the goals on Good Governance and Civil Society Building and on the Millennium Development Goals on sustainable living environment, forests and biodiversity (MDG 7a and 7b). For the evaluation, the project's achievements in relation to the Good Governance theme were selected. However, objectives related to sustainable living environment are also partially assessed. In particular, the current evaluation focusses on the following research questions: how did the awareness of rights (for natural resources) for the community leaders and the population change? How did the ease of conflict resolution change in the community? Did the community take any measures to strengthen its position in the ownership of natural resources? How did the size of community forests change?

We investigate whether the project had a favourable effect on the above mentioned outcomes by looking at the changes in the outcome variables between the baseline and endline periods for the project beneficiaries.

In the project, HuMa assists many community based organisations (CBOs) and NGOs - threatened by (potential) natural resource conflicts – in community law facilitator (PHR)[2] trainings mostly through 2-3 days long workshops and financial assistance.[3] The current evaluation provides a case study of one such activity in Rampi sub-district (South Sulawesi province) that lasted longer than average with more than a week.[4]

To evaluate the case of Rampi, data was collected in three of seven villages using structured community and household surveys in 2012, and the same respondents were re-interviewed in 2014 whenever it was possible. A total of 40 randomly selected survey respondents were interviewed from the pool of villagers knowledgeable about local governance. These quantitative data are analysed using before-after methodology: comparing outcomes before and after the project implementation. Both the project context and the small sample size (7 villages in total) did not make it feasible to compare the change in outcomes to a comparison group. Instead, in order to validate the findings from the quantitative surveys, we collected additional qualitative information at all of the project locations in the form of focus group discussion (FGDs) with community members and in-depth interviews with local leaders to deepen our understanding of the project context and results.

As specified in the Terms of Reference for this evaluation, the report addresses five evaluation questions to assess the project outcomes:

[1] The project is described in more detail in section 3.
[2] PHR is an abbreviation of *Pendamping Hukum Rakyat,* translated: 'Community law facilitator'.
[3] For the complete list of assisted locations see Annex I.
[4] Based on information from HuMa, the length of this project was planned at approximately one month. However, the HuMa Annual Report 2012 shows that the trainings were conducted within 8 days. The approximated one month period may include additional days for travel and discussions with the project partner, etc.

1) Change: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period?
2) Attribution: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3) Relevance of change: What is the relevance of these changes?
4) Efficiency: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient?
5) Explanations: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

## 1.3. Summary of findings

The ultimate objective of HuMa's project is the expansion of the social movement that supports law reform based on social and ecological justice in order to protect and strengthen the land rights of marginalized communities. HuMa's main strategy to achieve this goal is through training and education of community law and resource development facilitators (PHR) in communities threatened by (potential) conflicts related to natural resources and land tenure.

This evaluation provides a case study for the implementation and results of one such training and workshops in Rampi sub-district (South Sulawesi province), where HuMa with its local partner Wallacea conducted trainings on participatory mapping, indigenous law, natural resources and agrarian conflict in June-July 2012. HuMa participated only in the initial trainings, while Wallacea continued the implementation of the project through other funding. At the time of the endline survey in June 2014, the map of the villages (the main project activity) has not yet been completed. However, the participatory explorations for providing data for the maps and the PHR discussions have already benefitted the villagers.

Rampi sub-district is situated in a remote hilly area that still has abundant natural resources and luscious forests. Life in Rampi is still governed by traditional laws and culture. Villagers have the most trust in the council of elders, while the trust in the village head significantly decreased over the evaluation period. Villagers are also somewhat unsatisfied with the village governance.

During the evaluation period, the quantitative study found little change in the village and villager level outcome indicators used to evaluate the project. In particular, we find mixed results related to natural resource management. On the one hand, villagers' awareness of forest regulations decreased, while on the other hand, new community rules related to sustainable forest resource management regarding emerging mining sites were enacted.

The HuMa/Wallacea project increased the awareness of villagers related to their natural resources as households' dependence to forest resources have increased (not significant) and also became more diverse (for example, medicinal use). The qualitative study also found that the residents of Rampi became more worried about the potential damaging effect of gold mining on Rampi's ecosystem, and their stories showed that they are willing to fight for their forests. The quantitative data verifies that villagers report a high sense of control regarding their lives and their land. In addition, we observe a small increase on the amount of influence they have on their own lives. Nonetheless, pristine rivers and forests are at imminent risk of contamination and (illegal) resource extraction as the immediate

economic benefits from mining and illegal logging may overweight the long-term benefits provided by a healthy eco-system. Therefore, HuMa and Wallacea chose a crucial time to implement their PHR project in Rampi.

### 1.4. Structure of the report

The rest of this report proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the relevant literature; section 3 describes the project; section 4 describes the evaluation questions and outcome variables; section 5 the data collection. Section 6 provides the descriptive statistics. Sections 7 till 10 discuss evaluation question 1) till 4) in turn. The last section discusses the results and concludes.

Further details about the project results are presented in a number of annexes. The project implementation and the SPO is described in Annex I. Regarding the survey data, the construction of the outcome indicators and indices is summarized in Annex II, while Annex III provides a description of the study locations. Annex IV presents detailed descriptive statistics and explanatory variables of the sample; detailed figures on the change in outcome indicators is presented in Annex V. Annex VI in turn provides additional explanatory tables. The results of the qualitative data collection are presented in Annex VII and an extensive version of the literature review on participatory mapping is provided in Annex VIII.

## 2. Literature overview

The central component of HuMa's project is community law facilitator workshops. However, in the case study in Rampi, the main focus is on participatory mapping and participatory informal discussions on PHR related topics. Therefore, the literature overview, below, summarizes existing literature on the implementation and effectiveness of participatory mapping projects.

Even though the existence of participatory mapping activities is very important in a country like Indonesia where an estimated 48 million indigenous people still depend on the forest for their livelihood, but where mining, logging and oil palm industry are destroying more than 1 million hectares of rainforest territory each year[5] (Telapak & Gekko Studio 2011), the academic literature on participatory mapping within specific Indonesian context is quite limited. This may, at least in part, have to do with the political sensitivities involved in mapping, that can be especially critical for Indonesian indigenous peoples that have since long had a particularly uneasy relation with government and, until very recently, had to cope with a severe lack of legal protection.

Despite the lack of scientific literature over participatory mapping, there was no lack of participatory mapping projects in Indonesia. In fact, over the past 1.5 decades, communities from nearly every region in Indonesia have been trained in the technical and facilitation skills required to undertake participatory mapping , and by 2009 1.5 million hectares of land had already been mapped by local communities (IFAD 2009: 22). The Indonesian community mapping network (Jaringan Kerja Pemetaan Partisipatif or JKPP), established by the mapping activists in 1996 in Bogor, West Java, has been instrumental in achieving these goals (IFAD 2009: 22). I.e. by forming an alliance with Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara

[5] Making Indonesia the fastest forest clearing nation in the world since 2012, and also the world's third largest emitter of carbon dioxide emissions, behind China and the United States (Telapak & Gekko Studio 2011).

or Alliance of Indigenous Movement in the Archipelago (AMAN) and the Forest Watch Indonesia to advocate for the customary maps to become officially recognized and fed into the "Ancestral Domain Registration Agency" (Badan Registrasi Wilayah Adat): The government's official national database of forest cover. In 2011 AMAN signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional), which officially stated that "indigenous" maps would be integrated into governmental data (Harjati Sanmukri 2013: 123).

Scientific evidence on the effectiveness of participatory mapping is also limited in the international context. Therefore, a large part of the remaining of this section discusses what participatory mapping is and how it is implemented in terms tools and methods. Finally, we present a short summary of reported impacts of participatory mapping. For further details on the development and methods of participatory mapping, and considerations about "good practice" the reader is referred to Annex VIII.

Participatory mapping is a general term[6] used to define a set of approaches and techniques that combine the tools of modern cartography with participatory methods to create a map of a local community's habitat that represents this community's spatial knowledge (Rainforest Foundation UK 2014). "NGO's, from small local ones to large international ones, often play a crucial role as interlocutors, trainers, advocates and facilitators in these mapping activities" (IFAD 2009: 5).

Participatory mapping is used over the whole world, and the maps that are produced can take on many forms, and can be used to achieve various different purposes. Looking at the available literature and documentation on participatory mapping initiatives the most common aim of participatory mapping appears to be to help marginalized groups, in particular indigenous, pastoralist and forest dwellers, to claim and/or defend their (access to) ancestral lands and its resources, typically by working towards legal recognition of their land rights, using the maps as evidence of their continued residency. The maps can also serve as a tool for community land use planning and natural resource management, and can be used to bring resource-related problems, such as the impacts of logging, mining, and 'land grab' activities, to the attention of governmental authorities and decision makers (Chapin et al. 2005: 620; Di Gessa 2008; Rainforest Foundation UK 2014; Literat 2013: 200; IFAD 2009: 9-12, 39). Some indigenous groups are now using mapping to monitor and defend lands against deforestation, illegal timber extraction, prospecting, and colonization (Teague c. 2010: 10). Other purposes of participatory mapping activities include the strengthening of indigenous political organisation, economic development planning, the documentation of history and customs for culture preservation, education of indigenous youths and/or the general public (Chapin et al. 2005: 620), and support for conflict resolution in territory-related disputes (Di Gessa 2008).

What further distinguishes participatory mapping from traditional cartography and map-making is the process by which the maps are made (IFAD 2009: 4): Community members are involved (preferably) throughout the whole mapping process and recognized as capable research collaborators and experts

[6] The numerous initiatives throughout the world aren't always referred to with the words 'participatory mapping', but can go by many different terms, including: "indigenous mapping" (IFAD 2009: 6) , "…"participatory land use mapping," "participatory resource mapping" (Mbile *et al*. 2003), "community mapping" (Bennagen & Royo 2000, Eghenter 2000, Fox 2002), "community-based mapping" (Flavelle 2002), "ethnocartography" (Chapin & Threlkeld 2001, Gonzalez *et al*. 1995), and "counter-mapping" (Peluso 1995, Kosek 1998, Hodgson & Schroeder 2002)…" (as cited in Chapin *et al*. 2005: 622-623).

on their own local surroundings and needs (IFAD 2009: 4; Pathways Through Participation 2010: 1). According to Fox *et al*. (2003, as cited in Wright *et al*. 2009: 261) the reasons for choosing a participatory mapping approach are usually not only practical (i.e. the actual production of the map and using it as evidence for land claims, or as community advocacy tools), but also intrinsic, as the communal aspect of the mapping process can enhance group awareness and cultural identity, facilitate the passing down of historical knowledge through generations, and build trust and communication between people.

Throughout the past decades, mapping has become increasingly popular and prominent (Pathways Through Participation 2010: 13), which "many commentators ascribe to the developments in Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) which emerged in the late 1980s in South Asia and combined insights from agro-ecosystem analysis with Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA)" (Ibid: 2).

Looking at the implementation of mapping projects, they usually loosely follow the following steps:

1. "**Ground preparation**: before the project starts project leaders and indigenous leaders explain the objectives and importance of the mapping work to the community, the technical team is recruited and collaboration with NGO's and government agencies is sought;
2. **First workshop – orientation and training**: Project staff and indigenous leaders explain the objectives and methodology to the surveyors and technical team and data collection tools are developed;
3. **First fieldwork – gathering data and sketch mapping**;
4. **Second workshop – transcription of data onto new maps**;
5. **Second fieldwork – verification of collected data by the community**; and
6. **Third workshop – correcting and completing final maps**: Surveyors reunite with the cartographers to incorporate information that has been verified in the field and put the draft maps in final form

(Chapin & Threlkeld 2001; IFAD 2009: 30).

Turning to the effectiveness of participatory mapping projects, over the years, many researchers have noted the positive impacts that participatory mapping can have on a community:

> Participation in mapping seems to have encouraged some indigenous communities to demand title to lands (Toledo Maya Cultural Council, 1997; Leake, 2000; Herlihy, 2003; Herlihy and Knapp, 2003), to defend and claim their rights to control natural resources (Smith, 2003; Brown, 2006), and to design conservation and resource management plans that are compatible with local practices (Mohamed and Ventura, 2000; McCall and Minang, 2005; Brown, 2006; Bauer, 2009). Researchers have argued that, in addition to producing maps, when implemented with a stress on participation and with facilitation of discussions within communities, indigenous mapping empowers indigenous peoples in land and resource use rights against potential encroachers (Poole, 2003; Smith, 2003; Brown, 2006; Finley-Brook, 2007) (Reyes-Garcia *et al*. ca. 2012a: 2-3).

In addition to these positive effects, researchers have also observed negative consequences resulting from participatory mapping. For instance, Authors such as Mwangi, Hodgson & Schroeder, Fox, Bryant, and Roth have noted issues such as increased privatization of land, loss of indigenous conceptions of space, greater exposure of valuable natural resources, increased taxation by the state, and increase or intensification of conflicts, either within the village, with neighbouring villages, or with other external

actors such as companies or governmental authorities (Reyes-Garcia *et al*. 2012b: 651). Increase of conflicts due to participatory mapping, is one of the most frequently reported drawbacks of participatory mapping. Researchers such as Offen, Peluso, Hale, and Vandergeest have argued that: "Participatory mapping might intensify internal conflicts because it might bring to light overlapping uses of land and resources or erode traditional ways of dealing with internal conflicts…" (Ibid). Furthermore, it has been reasoned by i.a. Peluso and Rundstrom that "…participatory mapping might increase the number of conflicts with external actors, as the maps produced might challenge the maps made by state and corporate authorities" (Ibid).

Reyes-Garcia *et al*. have attempted to validate the theory that participatory mapping systematically increases the number of conflicts, using an experimental research design whereby 32 native Amazonian villages with and without conflicts with outsiders were randomly assigned to a treatment group (those where a participatory mapping project would be implemented by them) and a control group (those where a participatory mapping project would not (yet) be implemented by them[7]).[8] Contrary to others' previous findings, the results of their research show no statistically significant differences in the measured variables (i.e. number of conflicts, negative opinion, neutral attitude, and negative attitudes towards outsiders) between treatment and control villages (2012b: 656).

Reyes-Garcia *et al*. explain their deviating results by arguing that previous studies, which were based on direct observations rather than a randomized experimental design, might have been subject to selection bias, because the villages participating in participatory mapping projects are generally the ones that are chosen or volunteering to participate in participatory mapping due to the fact that they are expected to experience – or are already experiencing – conflicts over land rights and resources (2012b: 651, 656). Their results support the argument that mapping projects do not bring about conflicts per se, rather "…the process and the results of participatory mapping can help in conflict resolution or contribute to conflict generation or exacerbation depending on the political and socio-economic context in which they are conducted" (Ibid: 657).

# 3. The project

## 3.1. Project description

The "Security of Strengthening Communities Rights and Justice" project of HuMa ran between 1 March 2011 and 31 December 2013.[9] The final project objectives were twofold: first, the project aimed at the expansion of a social movement that supports law reform based on social and ecological justice in order to protect and strengthen the land rights of marginalised communities. To achieve this goal, HuMa works together with local and national level partners. The second goal was to strengthen HuMa itself as a more influential, competent, and independent organisation (institutional development).

[7] For the sake of fairness, participatory mapping projects were also implemented in the control villages, but only after all research data for the post-intervention study had been collected (Reyes-Garcia *et al.* 2012b: 653).
[8] All these villages were located in Tsimane' territory. The Tsimane' are a native Amazonian society of foragers and farmers in Bolivia.
[9] ICCO is also funding a follow-up project with HuMa called "Indonesian Community Law Facilitators (PHR) (INCLaF) Programme" between 1 January 2014 and 31 December 2015.

On the one hand, HuMa's advocacy and legal reform movement heavily relies on the power of community law and resource development facilitators (PHR) on the ground, who carry out legal advocacy at the local level together with HuMa's local partners. Therefore, HuMa established PHR training and education as a main strategy. On the other hand, at the national level, HuMa acts as an intermediary, which links the results of legal reform works conducted by PHR to larger arenas, particularly in supporting resolution of natural resources conflicts through national and regional campaign. (HuMa, 2013)

## 3.2. Project implementation

In the evaluation, we focus on PHR trainings as these are the project activities that most directly reach direct beneficiaries (population of villages).[10] Therefore, only these are discussed in more detail.

HuMa and its partner NGOs provide community law and recourse development facilitator (PHR) trainings to influential people in community (religious leaders, village leaders, artists, lawyers). The aim of the training is to increase knowledge, awareness and capacity in the following topics: constitutional rights, paralegal material, revitalization of people's law (indigenous law, customary law), legal pluralism (the co-existence of state and people's law), gender issues (less patriarchal society), critical legal study, and tools like participatory mapping.

The logic of the PHR trainings is that the trained community members spread the knowledge to the whole community, and possibly also to neighbouring communities through family, friend and ethnic network. Through the increased critical awareness of their rights, communities will make more informed decisions about the use of their land. For example, contracts with corporations who are extracting natural resources. They are able to organise protests against unjust regulations, which HuMa will support through legal assistance and advocacy. The more cases are in process, the higher the probability to change the district and national regulation about land use rights.

In 2011, 19 PHR trainings were conducted with 268 participants (Table 12 in Annex I). The number of trainings was 21 and 19 in 2012 and 2013, respectively, but the number of participants increased to 579 and 569 people (Table 13 and Table 14). Most of these beneficiaries are spread over 7 provinces[11] served by HuMa and its partners.

For the evaluation, we have selected one of the project locations where HuMa conducted PHR trainings in 2012.[12] Trainings in the 7 villages of Rampi sub-district in South Sulawesi province were carried out between end June and beginning of July (Table 13), while the baseline evaluation was conducted in October 2012 (Figure 2). This location was chosen for the project, as the trainings were conducted by a HuMa staff member and a local NGO (Wallacea), and the project activities were expected to last for

[10] Annex I summarizes all project activities, and the location and topics of the PHR trainings.

[11] These provinces are West Java, Central Java, West Sumatra, Central Sulawesi, South Sulawesi, West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan. In 2012, HuMa also conducted trainings in East Nusa Tenggara, which is not included in the ICCO project description. However,


[12] Hence, we are only evaluating one of many activities of HuMa that is funded by ICCO and MFS II. Therefore, the findings of the survey cannot be generalised for the effectiveness of PHR trainings and the impact of HuMa's programme on the beneficiaries.

approximately one month involving 400 participants in 7 villages.[13] The area was threatened by the development of gold mining industry, and other local issues (see section 5.2). HuMa conducted trainings on participatory mapping, indigenous law, natural resources and agrarian conflict. Hence, the activities were an introduction to PHR. We expected that during the evaluation period these activities would be potentially followed up by further PHR trainings.

However, HuMa did not continue its activities in Rampi as no further intervention was deemed necessary (yet). In addition, as discussed in the qualitative report in Annex VII, the maps have not yet been completed in Rampi during the evaluation period despite the commitment of Wallacea, HuMa's partner in Rampi, to complete the project activity. Wallacea indeed continued the activity started with HuMa, however, after finding funding from a different source (Oxfam).

In 2013, HuMa was actually extensively working with Wallacea in South Sulawesi: 8 of 19 PHR trainings were conducted in the area and the director of Wallacea was invited to give key note speeches at several workshops organised by HuMa.

**Figure 2: Timing of intervention**




Annex I provides further information about HuMa, Wallacea and the project. The remaining of this report focuses on the evaluation of the project activities in Rampi. Hence, the effectiveness of the HuMa project is assessed though this case study.

## 3.3. Result chain

The result chain is displayed in Figure 3. As mentioned before, the final objective of the project is the expansion of a social movement that supports law reform based on social and ecological justice in order to protect and strengthen the land rights of marginalized communities.


To achieve this goal, HuMa and its partner NGOs work closely together to identify and quickly react to emerging (potential) natural resource and land tenure threats in communities. At these locations, HuMa

[13] Information from HuMa based on the project plans.

and its local partner provides workshops to local leaders on community law and natural resource management and other tools. The aim is that communities are able to make informed decisions about their natural resources, and are able to organise protests against unjust actions of corporations and the local government. If the community wants to take legal action regarding the occurring natural resource conflict, HuMa and its partners are ready to facilitate the litigation procedure. The more communities take action against unjust legal treatment, the more the social movement on law reform can expand.

In addition to supporting community initiatives, the project is also a continuous effort at improving the capacity of both HuMa and its partners through workshops, research and learning, as the policy situation can bring about new opportunities and challenges through changing local and national laws and emerging cases of conflicts.

**Figure 3: Result chain**




## 3.4. Possible unintended impacts

Possible negative unintended effects of the project are that the mapping of community borders and discussions about natural resource management brings out conflicts with other stakeholders, such as

other communities or corporations, which are then resolved in a way that counters the community's interests.

# 4. Evaluation questions and outcome variables

## 4.1. Evaluation questions

The call for proposals outlines 5 general evaluation questions. In the baseline report specific evaluations questions were specified. Table 1 shows these five questions and what it implies for this project.

**Table 1: Overview general and specific evaluation questions**

| Number | General evaluation question | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Change: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period? | • How did the awareness of rights (for natural resources) for the community leaders and the population change?<br>• How did the ease of conflict resolution change in the community?<br>• Did the community take any measures to strengthen its position in the ownership of natural resources?<br>• How did the size of community forests change? |
| 2 | Attribution: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)? | Are the observed changes above attributable to the intervention? |
| 3 | Relevance of change: What is the relevance of these changes? | • The size of the impact<br>• Does the project address an important issue for the beneficiaries? |
| 4 | Efficiency: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient? | Was the intervention cost effective? |
| 5 | Explanations: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above? | Why did things work out/not work out?<br>The evaluation question is answered throughout the other evaluation questions and in the end discussion. |

The above questions are sequentially linked to the project result chain presented in Figure 3. In addition to the questions at the community level, in the evaluation we are also interested about the project's impacts at the villager level: Did the project's effects trickle down from local leaders to the ordinary villagers? We are particularly interested about villagers' attitudes towards natural resources and how empowered they feel in their communities. Therefore, most of the outcome indicators – presented in the next section - investigate the project's effects at the villager level.

## 4.2. Outcome indicators

To answer the first two evaluation questions (change and attribution) we identified specific outcome indicators. The outcome indicators are split up into 6 groups: access to information on (local) governance; satisfaction with local governance; role of traditional institutions; management of natural resources; household's attitude towards forests/plantations; and the sense of control of villagers. The first two of these categories are linked to the uniform indicators specified by the synthesis team for the goal on Good Governance,[14] while the remaining factors are linked to the evaluation questions presented above. Since there are many possible and interesting outcome indicators, some of the variables are grouped into indices for the main analysis.

Table 2 displays the outcome indicators of the main analysis, the scale of these variables and whether the indicator is a uniform indicator, while Annex II describes the outcome indicators in more detail and highlights the components per index.

**Table 2: Overview outcome indicators**

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Source | Uniform indicator |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Panel A. Access to information on (local) governance** | | | X |
| Level of agreement with statement: 'I feel well-informed about the decisions made by the village leaders.' | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| Percentage respondents that knows about the policies of the district government related to agriculture and the use of land in Rampi | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| **Panel B. Satisfaction with local governance** | | | X |
| Index for satisfaction with local governance at village level | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| Index for satisfaction with local governance at sub-district level | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| Corruption at village leadership | (1;3) | Household survey | |
| Corruption at district government | (1;3) | Household survey | |
| **Panel C. Role of traditional institutions** | | | |
| Index for positive attitude towards traditional laws and culture | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| **Panel D. Management of natural resources** | | | |
| Existence of regulations about the use and protection of the community forests in the village | (no; yes) | Community survey | |

[14] These indicator groups are not necessarily linked to the planned project outcomes.

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Source | Uniform indicator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Regulations are communicated by community meetings or farmer group meetings | (no; yes) | Community survey | |
| Regulations are communicated to all villagers (including women and children) | (no; yes) | Community survey | |
| Regulations are taught at school | (no; yes) | Community survey | |
| Percentage of respondents who report that there are any rules/regulations about the use of community forests in the village | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| Satisfaction with regulations | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| **Panel E. Households' attitude towards forests/plantations** | | | |
| Dependence on forest resources | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| Index for positive attitude towards sustainable forest use | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| Index for access to forest resources | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| Percentage of respondents who think that the activities of the government/industry will be harmful | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| **Panel F. Sense of control of villagers** | | | |
| Index for trust in village | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| Index for sense of control regarding their own life | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| Index for sense of control regarding land | (-2;2) | Household survey | |
| Index for sense of control regarding preservation of traditional culture | (-2;2) | Household survey | |

# 5. Data collection

This section describes the survey instruments and the sampling design and outcome at the school level and student level in turn.

## 5.1. Survey instruments

We collected three types of data: quantitative, qualitative, and financial data. The following paragraphs list the survey instruments used for each type of data.

### *Quantitative data*

To analyse the impact of the programmes, two surveys have been conducted to collect quantitative data:

- Respondent survey: a short survey was administered with randomly selected community members regarding their perceptions on governance, natural resource management, and their sense of control.

- Community survey: the community survey was administered together with the household surveys both during the baseline and endline period. The head of the community or another local leader was interviewed regarding matters of the community.

The baseline data have been collected in October 2012, while the endline data was collected in June 2014.

### *Qualitative data*

To gain more insight into the implementation and the impacts of the project qualitative field work was conducted in all three sampled communities parallel to the quantitative data collection. At the baseline, focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted separately with local leaders who participated in the PHR trainings and those that did not. The topic of these interviews were focused on the governance and natural resource management, land related conflicts and their resolution in the communities. The collected data revealed that the PHR trainings were informally carried out. Hence, most local leaders and villagers participated in the project.

Therefore, at the endline, we followed a different study design: in each village 2 FGDs were held - 1 with men that were part of a farmer group and 1 with women working in the farming trade. All of these informants had taken part in the project activities of Wallacea and HuMa. Furthermore, in each village in-depth interviews were conducted with a number of village representatives: the *Tokey Bola* (customary leader), the village head, the *Topebeloi* (agriculture and forest expert), and the *Pobeloi* (land reclaimer). In Onondowa village the position of *Topebeloi* and *Pobeloi* were occupied by the same person. The results of this study are reported in Annex VII.

### *Financial data collection*

To collect information about the costs of the project, we conducted a project cost survey with the programme officer, programme coordinator, and executive director of HuMa on 21 May 2014.

## 5.2. Sampling outcome

### *Sampling design*

From the 7 villages participating in the Rampi project activity, we have selected 3 villages for the evaluation. The villages were selected based on information from the narrative report[15] on the Rampi activities. During the training, threats and problems were identified, which are related to gold mining, protected forests, forest fires, boundary problems with neighbouring villages and a new airport in the area. In the selection of villages we aimed to cover villages with different issues. Hence, sampling was not random at the village level.

For the structured villager surveys we randomly sampled from villagers knowledgeable about local governance aiming at a gender balanced sample. Regarding the sample size, in one of the villages (Onondowa) 20 villagers were interviewed, while in the other two villages only 10 villagers due to the small size of these villages based on administrative data[16].

[15] Narrative report Rampi (Laporan Kegiatan Rampi), received on 7 September 2012.
[16] Source: PODES 2008 survey.

For the endline survey, we planned to re-interview the same respondents as much as possible. However, if some of the baseline respondents could not be interviewed, we replaced them by a randomly selected community member with similar characteristics in terms of gender and age. The total sample size for the villager surveys was 40 respondents in both survey rounds.

### *Sampling outcome*

Table 3 summarizes the sample sizes. In both the baseline and endline period the planned number of households have been interviewed (40 in total). The last column of the table (panel sample) shows the number of respondents that were interviewed both for the baseline and endline survey. In the villages, 33 (82.5%) of the baseline respondents were re-interviewed.

**Table 3: Sampling outcome**

| Assignment group | Villages | Respondents baseline | Respondents endline | Panel sample |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total | **3** | **40** | **40** | **33** |
| Source: Household survey E9, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | | | |

In the data analysis, we use data from all respondents when discussing the baseline and endline outcomes separately. However, when reporting on the change in variables or performing statistical tests on the significance of the change, we only use the so called *panel sample*, respondents for whom we have two rounds of data.

# 6. Descriptive statistics

This section summarizes the main characteristics of the community using the baseline and endline surveys. In addition, the exposure of the study locations to the mapping and traditional institution strengthening activities is discussed. Additional information about the survey locations can be found in Annex III and Annex VII, and about the villager and village characteristics in Annex IV.

## 6.1. Community characteristics

Our evaluation focuses on three villages in the Rampi sub-district that all deal with different issues related to natural resources, as mentioned in section 5.2. These villages are Rampi, Dodolo and Onondowa. Onondowa is the capital of the Rampi sub-district and is the only village that has educational and health facilities. However, at the endline it does reports these facilities as important community issues (Table 16 in Annex IV). It is also the only village with communication facilities such as mobile network coverage. Residents from Rampi and Dodolo have to go to Onondowa to be able to communicate with the outside world. Even though Onondowa is the capital, Rampi village is one step ahead with regard to electricity. Rampi sub-district is a mountainous area covered with forests, and as such all the villages in the area are difficult to access. Comparing the 3 villages, Onondowa has better accessibility than Rampi and Dodolo, including a new airport.

Even though all the villages cope with different issues, they are similar in their residents' main economic activity, which is farming, and in their dependence on natural resources. Since natural resources, such as gold, are abundant in the sub-district, the potential for conflicts with mining companies and the government is very much present.

Further details about the project locations can be found in Table 15 and Table 16 in Annex IV and in section 2 of Annex VII (qualitative study).

## 6.2. Intervention in the communities

Next, we turn to describing the type of project activities that have taken place before and during the evaluation period.

Table 4 shows per village which NGOs implemented which activities during the past 12 and 24 months at the baseline and endline, respectively. The two main activities of the "Security of Strengthening Communities Rights & Justice Program" are community law facilitation (PHR) training and participatory mapping. The activities on natural resource management and land rights are part of the PHR training.

Before the baseline, only mapping activities took place. These were implemented by YPS and AMAN. AMAN is a network and movement working on the empowerment of indigenous communities in Indonesia that HuMa and Wallacea are part of. Since this information comes from the community survey, it might be possible that Wallacea is not recognized in Dodolo as an NGO separate from AMAN. Indeed, in the qualitative research (Annex VI) it is found that Wallacea implemented the mapping activities. The activities included trainings on how to use Global Positioning System (GPS) devices, collecting the GPS points in the forest and discussing the data. The processing of the GPS data is fully done by Wallacea, but the maps are not finished yet.

During the evaluation period, activities on natural resource management and land rights have been carried out in all three villages. In addition, infrastructure development has been carried out in Rampi, and sustainable livelihood activities were held in Dodolo and Onondowa. Table 4 shows that Wallacea has been working together with AMAN while implementing the activities in Rampi and Onondowa. In Dodolo, only AMAN was reported to be active. As discussed before, the fact that Wallacea is not mentioned in Dodolo, is most likely because Wallacea is not recognized as a separate NGO there. As discussed in the qualitative report (Annex VI), Wallacea has implemented PHR activities in all three villages.

**Table 4: NGOs and their activities in the past 12 months (baseline) / 2 years (endline)**

| Village | Type of activity | Name of NGO | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Survey year | Base | End |
| Rampi | Mapping the territory/area | YBS, AMAN | |
| | Natural resource management | | WALLACEA, AMAN |
| | Land rights | | WALLACEA, AMAN |
| | Infrastructure development | | AMAN |
| Dodolo | Legal mapping | AMAN | |
| | Sustainable livelihood activities | | AMAN |
| | Natural resource management | | AMAN |
| | Land rights | | AMAN |
| Onondowa | Mapping the territory/area | AMAN | |
| | Sustainable livelihood activities | | WALLACEA, AMAN |
| | Natural resource management | | WALLACEA, AMAN |
| | Land rights | | WALLACEA, AMAN |
| Source: Community survey E9, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | | |

The aim of PHR activities is to train influential people in the villages to become 'community law facilitators' that know how to successfully manage and maintain their forests, know how to fight for the rights over their lands, and will pass on their knowledge to their communities.

However, for its implementation in the villages in Rampi sub-district, HuMa and Wallacea has chosen a slightly different strategy whereby they refrained from using the limiting term 'PHR', so that they could adapt a more informal approach, allowing them to not only target the influential people in the villages, but also directly involve the general population in their activities. HuMa and Wallacea for example organised non-formal discussions among small groups of residents that were gathered in the fields, farms, churches, houses, *baruga*, and other public places. In each village various topics were discussed such as farming and agriculture, natural resource management, forest conservation, the destruction of nature, and mapping. In Onondowa, a movie about the environment was shown and people from other villages were also invited to watch it. The participants of these PHR activities varied from group to group, but included farmers, women, youth, as well as local leaders (Annex VI).

## 6.3. Respondent characteristics

To provide a better insight into the general characteristics of our sample, Table 5 displays a number of the respondents' socio-economic characteristics, including age, gender, religion, and the main economic activity. It shows the characteristics of the respondents at the baseline survey (Base), at the endline survey (End), and for respondents that have been interviewed in both survey rounds (panel sample) the

difference in their endline and baseline responses (Change). Therefore, the values in the change column can be different from the difference of the variables at the end- and baseline. The significance of the change is also reported (p-value) for the panel sample. The p-value shows the probability that the change in the variable is zero. Hence, if the p-value is small (say smaller than 5%), it indicates that the change is significantly different from zero (at 5% significance level).[17]

At the baseline, only 20% of the respondents were women despite our intention to interview a gender balanced sample. This outcome is explained by the traditional gender roles in the Rampi society, especially related to issues on governance.

Most of the respondents had a secondary education or higher (70%) and lived from farming (67% at baseline), while almost all respondents were married, and all of them were protestant. We did not expect the distribution of characteristics to change between the baseline and endline period except for age: 2 years have gone by between the two survey rounds. Indeed, the results show that there were no significant changes between the baseline and the endline except for age.

Regarding the participation of villagers in community life, the data shows that most of the respondents attended at least one village meeting over the past 12 months (87.5%) and many of them participated in the discussions there (65% at baseline and 80% at endline, see Table 18 in Annex IV).[18] The three most important community issues for the respondents were education, access to the village and healthcare (Table 17).

[17] In calculating the p-value, we used robust standard errors clustered at the village level.
[18] This is not surprising, as we sampled respondents knowledgeable about governance.

**Table 5: General characteristics of the sample**

| Reporting period | Base | End | Change | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Sample size** | 40 | 40 | 33 | |
| Gender (% female) | 20.0 | 27.5 | 6.1 | 0.484 |
| Age | 43.3 | 44.8 | 1.9** | 0.016 |
| Religion (%) | | | | |
| *Protestant* | 100.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 | |
| Marital status (%) | | | | |
| *Currently Married* | 92.5 | 92.5 | 0.0 | |
| *Widowed* | 0.0 | 2.5 | 0.0 | |
| *Never Married* | 7.5 | 5.0 | 0.0 | |
| Highest level of education attended by the respondent (%) | | | | |
| *Primary education* | 30.0 | 30.0 | -3.0 | 0.484 |
| *Secondary education* | 52.5 | 60.0 | 3.0 | 0.484 |
| *Higher education* | 17.5 | 10.0 | 0.0 | |
| Main economic activity (%) | | | | |
| *Farming* | 67.5 | 75.0 | 0.0 | |
| *Casual worker not in agriculture* | 2.5 | 2.5 | 0.0 | |
| *Worker in company* | 2.5 | 2.5 | 0.0 | |
| *Teacher* | 10.0 | 10.0 | 0.0 | |
| *Civil servant* | 7.5 | 2.5 | -3.0 | 0.280 |
| *Student* | 5.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| *Housewife* | 2.5 | 2.5 | 0.0 | |
| *Too old, sick or weak to work (at home)* | 0.0 | 2.5 | 3.0 | 0.280 |
| *Priest* | 2.5 | 2.5 | 0.0 | |

Source: Household survey E9; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

## 6.4. Treatment exposure

For the treatment exposure, we look at the exposure to participatory mapping and PHR activities.

Looking at the knowledge of respondents about the Wallacea programme, Table 6 shows that the number of respondents who have heard about participatory mapping has significantly increased between the baseline (45%) and endline study (65%). Results from the qualitative study indicate that the participants of these mapping activities were village leaders, village officials, members of the customary board, religious leaders, as well as the community members, including youth. Women were underrepresented during the mapping process. Even though some women joined the socialization workshops, their role mostly stayed limited to providing food for the other participants. No women were made part of the mapping team.

**Table 6: Participatory development plans**

| Reporting period | Base | End | Change | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Sample size** | 40 | 40 | 33 | |
| Percentage of respondents who have heard about participatory mapping (%) | 45.0 (50.4) | 65.0 (48.3) | 21.2* (60.0) | 0.059 |
| Percentage of respondents who think it is/was useful for their community to conduct participatory mapping if they heard about it (%)[1] | 100.0 (0.0) | 100.0 (0.0) | 0.0 (0.0) | |

Source: Household survey E9; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

1. Sample size deviates, the number of observations in the columns, in order, are 18, 26 and 10

With regard to the PHR activities, the respondents' knowledge about these activities seemed to have only slightly (and not significantly) increased from 2.5% to 25% (see Table 7). However, this low percentage is probably caused by the fact that Wallacea chose to refrain from using the term 'PHR' in relation to the discussions and workshops organised by them, as described in paragraph 6.2. During the qualitative study none of the informants recognized the term 'PHR'. However, the informants confirmed the activities had taken place by reciting stories about the discussions and workshops, and their relevance and benefits to the community. The percentage of respondents who heard about HuMa and Wallacea did significantly increase for both NGOs, but at the time of the endline study not more than half of the respondents were aware of them.

**Table 7: Knowledge of the project**

| Reporting period | Base | End | Change | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Sample size** | 40 | 40 | 33 | |
| Percentage respondents who heard about (PHR) (%) | 2.5 (0.9) | 25.0 (43.9) | 21.7 (43.7) | 0.223 |
| Percentage of respondents who heard about HuMa (%) | 2.6 (0.8) | 32.5 (47.4) | 27.8* (46.9) | 0.092 |
| Percentage of respondents who heard about Wallacea (%) | 3.0 (0.0) | 27.5 (45.2) | 27.3* (46.7) | 0.055 |

Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

# 7. Evaluation question 1: Change in outcomes

This section discusses evaluation question 1: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period? The changes in the outcome indicators for the period measured between the base- and endline survey (2012-2014) are grouped into 7 categories: access to information on (local) governance; satisfaction with local governance; role of traditional institutions; management of natural resources; household's attitude towards forests/plantations; the sense of control of villagers, and unintended effects. Some of the outcome indicators combine multiple variables into one index.

Table 8 displays the results for the community level outcome indicator 'Management of natural resources'. The table only reports the baseline and endline values of the indicators (and not the change) because of the small sample size for the community (3 villages).

At the household level, Table 9 displays the results for all outcome indicators including the changes in the outcome variables. The table structure is similar to the table on respondent characteristics with the exception that in Table 9 we also report on the standard deviations of the variables below the mean in parenthesis.

The following subsections discuss the levels and changes in the outcome indicators. Information about the construction of the outcome indicators and indices is summarized in Annex II. The components of these indices are presented in Annex V, and a set of even more detailed tables can be found in Annex VI. Annex VII contains a report of the results of the qualitative study.

**Table 8: Outcome indicators at the community level**

| Assignment group | Rampi | | Dodolo | | Onondowa | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reporting period | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End |
| **Panel D. Management of natural resources** | | | | | | |
| Existence of regulations about the use and protection of the community forests in the village | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** |
| Regulations are communicated to the villagers by […] | | | | | | |
| *Community meetings* | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** |
| *Farmer group meetings* | No | **Yes** | No | **Yes** | No | No |
| Regulations are communicated to all villagers (including women and children) | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** |
| Regulations are taught at school | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| Source: Community survey E9, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | | | | | |

**Table 9: Change in outcome indicators for the respondents**

| Reporting period | Base | End | Change | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sample size | 40 | 40 | 33 | |
| **Panel A. Access to information on (local) governance** | | | | |
| Level of agreement with statement: 'I feel well-informed about the decisions made by the village leaders.' […] (scale -2 to +2) | 0.8<br>(0.9) | 0.8<br>(0.9) | -0.2<br>(0.9) | 0.571 |
| Percentage respondents that knows about the policies of the district government related to agriculture and the use of land in Rampi | 20.0<br>(40.5) | 40.0<br>(49.6) | 18.2<br>(58.4) | 0.136 |
| **Panel B. Satisfaction with local governance** | | | | |
| Index for satisfaction with local governance at village level (scale -2 to +2) | -0.4<br>(0.3) | -0.4<br>(0.2) | 0.0<br>(0.3) | 0.739 |
| Index for satisfactions with local governance at sub-district level (scale -2 to +2) | 1.2<br>(0.4) | 1.0<br>(0.4) | -0.2<br>(0.6) | 0.216 |
| Corruption at village leadership[1] (scale 1 to 3) | 1.2<br>(0.5) | 1.5<br>(0.6) | 0.2<br>(0.5) | 0.234 |
| Corruption at district government[2] (scale 1 to 3) | 1.4<br>(0.5) | 1.9<br>(0.5) | 0.4*<br>(0.5) | 0.085 |
| **Panel C. Role of traditional institutions** | | | | |
| Index for a positive attitude towards traditional laws and culture (scale from -2 to 2) | 1.2<br>(0.5) | 1.2<br>(0.5) | -0.1<br>(0.6) | 0.376 |
| **Panel D. Management of natural resources** | | | | |
| Percentage of respondents that knows about regulations for the use of community forests | 77.5<br>(42.3) | 65.0<br>(48.3) | -27.3***<br>(57.4) | 0.001 |
| Satisfaction with regulations (scale from -2 to 2) | -0.3<br>(1.1) | -0.1<br>(1.1) | 0.2<br>(1.5) | 0.552 |
| **Panel E. Households' attitude towards forests/plantations** | | | | |
| Dependence on forest resources (scale -2 to +2) | 0.6<br>(1.2) | 1.1<br>(0.8) | 0.5<br>(1.5) | 0.125 |
| Index for a positive attitude towards sustainable forest use (scale -2 to +2) | 0.4<br>(0.4) | 0.5<br>(0.5) | -0.1<br>(0.5) | 0.600 |
| Index for access to forest resources (scale -2 to +2) | 1.2<br>(0.6) | 0.9<br>(0.4) | -0.2<br>(0.7) | 0.118 |
| Percentage of respondents who think that the activities of the government/industry, when in conflict with the village, will be harmful[3] | 30.0<br>(48.3) | 85.0<br>(36.6) | 25.0<br>(50.0) | 0.295 |
| **Panel F. Sense of control of villagers** | | | | |
| Index for trust in village | 1.6<br>(0.5) | 1.5<br>(0.5) | -0.0<br>(0.8) | 0.913 |
| Index for sense of control regarding own life | 1.0<br>(0.8) | 1.2<br>(0.6) | 0.2<br>(0.8) | 0.513 |
| Index for sense of control regarding land | 1.2<br>(0.5) | 1.1<br>(0.5) | 0.1<br>(0.7) | 0.380 |
| Index for sense of control regarding preservation of traditional culture | 0.8<br>(0.6) | 0.8<br>(0.6) | 0.1<br>(0.6) | 0.671 |

| Reporting period | Base | End | Change | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sample size | 40 | 40 | 33 | |

Source: Household survey E9; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

1. Sample size deviates, the number of observations in the columns, in order, are 30, 39 and 23
2. Sample size deviates, the number of observations in the columns, in order, are 17, 34 and 11
3. Sample size deviates, the number of observations in the columns, in order, are 10, 20 and 4

### *Access to information on (local) governance*

During the evaluation period (2012-2014) no significant changes were found with regard to the respondents' access to information on decisions made by village leaders and their knowledge about district government's policies related to agriculture and the use of land. The respondents still feel rather well-informed about the decisions made by the village leaders (0.8 on a scale of -2 to +2). However, even though the change is not significant, it does seem that more people know about the district government's policies (40% at the endline versus 20% at the baseline study).

### *Satisfaction with local governance*

The level of satisfaction on the village level as well as on district level has not changed significantly over the course of the project. The respondents are still quite satisfied with the governance at the district level (1.0 on a scale of -2 to +2 at endline), but remain unsatisfied with the governance at the village level (-0.4). Interestingly, the respondents did report higher levels of corruption at the district government level (1.9 on a scale of 1-3) than at the village government level (1.5). The reported level of corruption at the district level had even significantly increased from 1.4 at the baseline to 1.9 at the endline study. This does not necessarily mean that the district government has indeed grown more corrupt over the years, as it could also be a sign that people's awareness about corruption has increased.

Table 20 in Annex IV shows that the local leaders that were interviewed for the community survey had actually grown less satisfied with the district government in Rampi and Dodolo. In both villages the local leaders reported to feel less support from sub-district officials with regard to the preservation of the village's traditional culture and the protection of its land rights (from a score of 2.0 at the baseline to 1.0 and -1.0 at the endline on a scale of -2 to +2). The level of satisfaction in Onondowa was already lower at the baseline and did not change over the course of the project (1.0).

### *Role of traditional institutions*

Results from the endline study show no significant change in the respondents' attitude towards traditional laws and culture. The respondents' attitude remains quite positive with a score of 1.2 (on a scale of -2 to +2). However, it is important to note that the result in Table 9 is the combined average of the 3 villages, and results from the community survey (Table 27) suggest that attitudes have actually changed per village. Dodolo and Onondowa report a decrease in the villagers' respect for customary laws, while Rampi reports an increase in respect.

The qualitative study found that the residents of Rampi sub-district have a rich local culture, and still adhere to a lot of their traditional customs. It also shows that its residents are committed to preserve their culture, customs, and historical/cultural sites in the forest. Rampi has a special women's group that

is concerned with the preservation of Rampi culture, and the customary board has been undertaking efforts to preserve Rampi's cultural customs and traditions by documenting them in the form of written reports, pictures, and videos. Even though HuMa and Wallacea did not play any role in the documentation of Rampi's culture or the founding of the women's group (which already existed before the project was implemented), the qualitative study suggests that the mapping activities did have an effect on the attitudes of the villagers towards the preservation of their traditional culture. Some informants mentioned, for example, that the mapping had made them realize even more how great their traditional culture was and how important it was to preserve it (Annex VII).

According to the qualitative study the customary board is very strong in Rampi sub-district. Not only because the board and the customary law are well respected by the villagers, but also because some village heads often spend time away from the village for long periods of time in which case the leadership role will be entirely fulfilled by the *Tokey Bola* (the customary leader of the village). The study suggests that, overall, our informants seemed to think more highly of the customary leader than the village leader. The results displayed in Table 22 seem to be in line with these findings, and even show a significant and large increase (from only 7.5% to 40% ) in the percentage of respondents that trust the council of elders the most among the local leaders. Meanwhile the number of villagers that trust the village leader the most has dropped drastically with 42.4 percentage point to only 27.5% at the endline study, indicating an increased trust in traditional institutions and customary ways.

### *Management of natural resources*

According to the results of the community survey (Table 8), at the time of the baseline study, regulations about the use and the protections of the community forests were already present in all the three villages and communicated to the villagers by community meetings. By the time of the endline, the regulations were also communicated through farmer group meetings in Rampi and Dodolo, indicating an improvement in the communication.

However, this reported improvement in communication is not seen reflected in the outcomes of the household survey. The percentage of respondents that know about regulations for the use of community forests actually significantly decreased between the baseline and the endline with 27.3 percentage points (p=0.001), indicating a worsening of the communication. This suggests that HuMa/Wallacea's objective to train people in the village to become community law facilitators that actively pass on their knowledge about forest resource management and land rights to their communities, has not (or at least not yet) been realized.

In addition, the respondents were still not satisfied with the regulations at the time of the endline study (-0.1 on a scale of -2 to +2).

The qualitative study shows that the management and use of natural resources in Rampi sub-district heavily rely on the customary laws[19], and that with the emergence of gold mining sites new rules related to sustainable forest resource management (such as the prohibition of the use of chemicals in mining activities) have been –and are in the process of being- made by the customary board. However,

[19] Examples of these customary laws are: 'Residents may not damage others' plants, may not burn their forests and fields, may not use chemical fertilizers when planting rice, and may not cut too many trees' (Annex VI).

according to our informants HuMa and Wallacea did not play a direct role in the establishments of these new rules and we don't have enough evidence to definitively attribute this development to the projects' indirect workings.

### *Households' attitude towards forests/plantations*

Even though peoples' dependency on forest resources on average seems to have grown over the course of the project (however not significantly, and with the community survey indicating that dependency has increased in Dodolo, decreased in Rampi, and stayed the same in Onondowa, see Table 24), while at the same time their satisfaction with their family's share of forest resources has significantly decreased (from 1.6 to 0.9 on a scale of -2 to +2) (see Annex V, index for access to forest resources), no changes in the respondents' attitudes towards sustainable forest use were found in the quantitative study. However, it seems that an increased number of respondents have become aware that the activities of the government/industry will be harmful to their forests (from 30% at baseline to 85% at endline, but the change is not significant). Results in Table 17 suggest the same, as at the baseline survey none of the respondents reported industry to be one of the three most important community issues, versus 30% (p=0.06) of the respondents at the endline survey.

The qualitative study also showed conflicting results. On the one hand the informants claimed that the residents of Rampi are worried about the potential damaging effect gold mining may have on Rampi's ecosystem, and their stories showed that they are willing to fight for their forests. The customary leaders have, for example, with the assistance of AMAN arranged a meeting with the local government to discuss their worries about the pegs that the Department of Forestry has planted on their lands[20], and have visited an existing mining company to complain about environmental damage and even threatened them with legal actions. Recently, they have also refused to let the new Aribama mining company –that already claims to have received a land acquisition licence from the government to run its business in Rampi- into their territory. A testimony from the *Topebeloi* (agriculture and forest expert) of Dodolo shows that this refusal was fuelled by Wallacea's socialization efforts (Annex VII). At the same time, a contradictory increase in gold mining activities -and damage of natural resources- is occurring in Onondowa, facilitated by both the companies and some of the villages' leaders and local residents themselves who make money from the mining activities (Annex VII).

### *Sense of control of villagers*

No significant changes with regard to the villagers' sense of control were found over the course of the project. The respondents still trust fellow villagers (1.5 on a scale of -2 to +2), still have a rather large sense of control regarding their own life as well as regarding their land (1.2 and 1.1 at endline respectively), and remain to feel quite able to preserve their traditional culture (0.8). The only almost significant change is found for the question on the influence of the respondent on the things that

[20] In this meeting the customary leaders told the government that the community was worried about the peg mounting because they feared that the pegs were put there to indicate the borders of what will become protected forest instead of community land. They asked the government to remove the pegs from their lands. However, at the time of the interviews no action had yet been taken by the government to do so (for more detailed information see Annex VI).

happen to them, which indicate that the respondents feel more in charge of their lives (change of -0.9 on a scale of -2 to +2, p=0.06) (Annex V).

Results from the qualitative study indicate that the project had a positive effect on the sense of control of the villagers. According to the informants the residents of Rampi sub-district worry about the potential damaging effects of gold mining, but have good hope that, with the new knowledge they acquired through the mapping activities, they are able to handle any conflicts over land use and land rights that will occur between the community and companies or government (Annex VII).

#### *Unintended effects*

As a result of the mapping activities a disagreement about village boundaries emerged between Onondowa village and Dodolo village. However, according to the *Tokey Bola* of Onondowa this disagreement could be resolved through discussions and mediation by the customary board. Wallacea has taken responsibility by acting as mediator between the customary leaders of the 2 villagers, and by organising discussions with farmers and (re)measuring borders.

## 8. Evaluation question 2: Attribution of changes

This subsection discusses evaluation question 2: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?

### 8.1. Methodology

We use before-after methodology for the evaluation of the Rampi project of HuMa complemented with a qualitative survey. We have not sampled any comparison villages because the small sample size would not allow statistical analysis of the differences between the treatment and comparison group. Instead, we opted for using mixed methods: complement the quantitative survey with in-depth interviews to understand the driving factors behind the changes in the outcome indicators.

In addition, we rely on the results chain discussed in section 3.3 to validate the impacts of the project on the outcome variables: only if the changes in the outcome variables are accompanied by improvements or accomplishment of the outputs and intermediate results of the project can we attribute changes to the project (necessary but not sufficient condition).

### 8.2. Results

For Rampi specifically, the project objective on the community level was to increase the knowledge, awareness, and capacity of the community regarding their rights and natural resources, thereby making the community able to make more informed decisions about the use of their land, and strengthening them to undertake action against unjust regulations.

The ultimate goal of HuMa/Wallacea's participatory mapping activities was to create a map that can serve as a tool for the community to claim the rights over their indigenous lands so that they will be able to sustainably manage their forests according to their customary laws and defend them against

outsiders that want to extort the forests' natural riches. However, HuMa/Wallacea have not yet been able to finish the final area map of Rampi sub-district, and as a result no efforts have yet been done to legitimize the map and to get the government to acknowledge Rampi's indigenous people's rights over their forests. Nevertheless, the mapping process in itself has already proven beneficial to the local communities in other ways. The mapping of the boundaries between the villages has, for example, cleared up some uncertainties about the exact location of the borders between Onondowa and Dodolo village, preventing a potential serious escalation of the conflict in the future. The mapping process has also instilled confidence in the participants that they would be able to handle any future conflicts over land use and land rights between the community and companies or government with the help of the knowledge they acquired through the mapping activities.

Results from both the qualitative and quantitative study indicate that PHR activities have taken place in all 3 surveyed villages. Even though the informants of the qualitative study seemed to be satisfied with the implementation, and claimed that the PHR discussions have strongly benefitted the society by increasing the people's knowledge about the importance of preserving the environment and their traditional culture, the qualitative study also found that due to limited budget and the problematic accessibility of Rampi's villages the PHR activities have not been executed with as much attention and thoroughness as they should have been to reach maximum result. In addition, not all participants seemed to have fully understood the materials that were presented during the workshops and discussions.

Our studies suggest that no real improvements with regard to the management of natural resources have yet taken place in the villages. Results from the community survey that suggest an improvement in the communication of regulations about the use and protection of community forests are contradicted by the outcomes of the household survey that show that the number of respondents that know about these regulations had even significantly decreased over the course of the project. This implies that HuMa/Wallacea's goal to train people in the village to become 'community law facilitators' that actively pass on their knowledge about forest resource management and land rights to their communities, has not (or at least not yet) been realized. Informants' stories did show that over the past years new customary rules with regard to sustainable resource management have been made by the customary board as a response to the threats posed by gold mining activities, but there is no evidence to suggest this happened as a result of the workings of HuMa/Wallacea's project activities.

All things taken together, the project seems to have had at least some effect on the knowledge and awareness of the people with regard to sustainable natural resource use. Results from the quantitative study and testimonies from informants of the qualitative study show that peoples' worries about the potential damaging effects of mining activities and forest conversion have grown over the course of the project. And, even though actions against mining companies were already undertaken by residents before the start of the project, the fact that the *Topebeloi* (agriculture and forest expert) of Dodolo explicitly claimed that the communities' refusal of the Aribama mining company was the result of new awareness and insights that people had gained from Wallacea's socialization which had made them "brave to fight", confirms that the project has also had a direct effect on people's behaviour, and thereby (at least partly) achieved its goal of "strengthening communities to undertake action against unjust regulations". However, at the end of the project period, the impact of the project on people's

attitudes did not (yet) seem to be large enough to make the villagers consistently choose the long term benefits of forest preservation over their short term financial benefits gained from the mining activities, as the villages still tolerated –and sometimes even facilitated- other mining activities in their forests that some local leaders and villagers were gaining money from. The net result is that, over the course of the project, Rampi's natural resources have grown even scarcer as a result of mining activities and polluting waste, as well as the people's own wood cutting activities (for construction of houses, etc.). If this situation continues it will have disastrous consequences for Rampi's eco-system and the local communities' ability to survive (Annex VII).

# 9. Evaluation question 3: Relevance of changes

This subsection will answer evaluation question 3: What is the relevance of these changes? In particular we look at the size of the impact and whether the project addresses an important issue for the beneficiaries.

## 9.1. The size of the impact

The size of the impact is not easy to determine. On the one hand, the quantitative study indicates that no significant improvements for any of the outcome indicators have taken place in the community. Even though some small improvements (though not significant) were measured with regard to increased trust in customary institutions, and people's awareness about the dangers of industry.

On the other hand, the qualitative study does show that the project has had some positive impact on the community members. I.e. on the attitudes of the villagers towards the preservation of their traditional culture and their sense of control over land. The qualitative study also indicates that people have gained new awareness and insights about protecting natural resources during the project, but the fact that they are inconsistent in their behaviour of applying the new knowledge (e.g. actively refusing one mining company but at the same time tolerating another) makes it hard to determine to what extent their attitudes towards sustainable forest use have actually changed.

## 9.2. Does the project address an important issue for the beneficiaries?

When respondents were asked during the baseline survey what the 3 most important issues for their communities were, most of them answered that those where education (87.5%), road conditions/access to the village (77.5%) and healthcare (52.5%), none of which are addressed by the HuMa/Wallacea's project. Table 17 shows that the particular issues that HuMa/Wallacea's project does address were not deemed urgent by the community members at the time of the baseline study, with the exception of livelihood improvement (30%). For example, the issues of natural resource/environment protection in the village, exploitation of natural resources, industry, pollution, and conservation of traditional culture were not mentioned by any of the respondents. Access to clean water (5%) and access to land (2.5%) were also rarely mentioned as most important issues during the baseline survey. However, for the endline survey a slight increase in people that rate these issues among the 3 most important for their community is visible (and a significant increase for the issue of 'industry' from 0 to 30%), which (in the

best case) could mean that the community's awareness about the issues has increased over the course of the project. However, the outcomes of the endline survey show that education, road conditions, and health remain to be the most pressing issues for the community.

We observe similar figures also in the community survey, where community leaders were asked to list the 5 most important community issues. At the baseline none of them indicated natural resource related issues, while at the endline one village indicated natural resource and environment protection and two villages indicated access to land and natural resources as one of the five most important community issues. Of course, the emergence of these issues may be more driven by the emergence of increased mining interests in the area than due to the project. However, the HuMa/Wallacea project's awareness raising activities certainly contributed to the discussions on deciding the future of the communities' natural resources. In that respect, HuMa and Wallacea delivered their trainings and messages at a crucial time.

Hence, this case study shows that due to the network of local NGOs HuMa is able to reach out to the communities when assistance is most needed regarding natural resource management and land tenure conflicts, even though communities may not yet fully be aware of the importance of these issues.

# 10. Evaluation question 4: Efficiency of project

This subsection addresses evaluation question 4: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient?

Unfortunately, we are not able to evaluate neither the efficiency nor the effectiveness of the project. Therefore, in this section we put forward our arguments for failing to evaluate the question on efficiency. However, first, the available cost information for the HuMa's project in Rampi is discussed below.

## 10.1. Project costs

To collect information on the costs of the project, we conducted a structured interview with the executive director, programme coordinator and programme officer[21] of HuMa on 21 May 2014 using the 'budget survey' as described in section 5.1. During the survey, we were mainly interested in information about HuMa's project in Rampi. We have also interviewed the director of Wallacea, about the project costs in Rampi. In addition, ICCO provided us with the financial (2011-2013) and annul project reports (2011-2013) in January 2015.

Table 10 summarizes the available cost information per year. The total project costs funded by ICCO during the reporting period are reported in column 2 of the table in Indonesian rupiahs (IDR) and in euros (using yearly average exchange rates)[22] in column 3. These are in total, 2,211,821,594 IDR or

[21] The interview was conducted with Mr. Andiko, executive director, Ms. Nurul Firmansyah, programme coordinator, and Mr. Bawor, programme officer.

[22] Unfortunately, we do not have information about the exchange rate used for the project. Instead we use the annual average exchange rate from http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/. The exchange rates used are 12,264 IDR/EUR in 2011, 12,087 IDR/EUR in 2012 and 13,923 IDR/EUR in 2013.

173,327 EUR. Unfortunately, we do not have information about the actual project costs covered by other sources. However, the total project budget[23] was 615,142 EUR, to which ICCO contributed 180,003 EUR or 29.3% of the budget,[24,25] which is close to the actual costs (102% calculated in IDR and 96% calculated in EUR).

Column 4 shows that the project costs in Rampi were 47,425,000 IDR in 2012, from which HuMa covered 37,425,000 IDR (or 3,096.25 EUR), [26] while the remaining costs were contributed by the local communities in Rampi.

HuMa has not funded other project activities in Rampi after 2012. However, the participatory mapping was not yet completed. Therefore, the local NGO, Wallacea, has looked for other sources of funding to complete the mapping process in Rampi: Oxfam provided has funding through JKPP for the project after 2012. Unfortunately, we do not have information about the costs of the project for this period.

In total, 98 participants attended the trainings facilitated by HuMa in 5 villages in Rampi. However, the data shows that the project involved more people in the project activities. Their number is unfortunately not known. In addition, the number of participants may be misleading regarding the impacts of the project because a wider population benefits from the results of the activities (the population of villages).

Regarding the total number of workshop participants in elementary law training over the whole project area (8 provinces of Indonesia)[27], HuMa reported 268 participants in 2011, 579 participants in 2012, and 569 participants in 2013. However, these numbers only cover the new recruitments, which is only one activity component of HuMa's programme. The total number of project beneficiaries is unknown. Therefore, we are also not able to provide an estimate of the cost per beneficiary of the project. Further reasons for failing to calculate the unit costs of the project are argued below.

[23] Source: HuMa Recapitulation Budget 2011-2013 (Annex 2: Approved Budget). Signed by HuMa 29 July, 2011.
[24] The exchange rate used for calculating the budget is 12,000 IDR per EUR.
[25] The rest of the budget was funded by the Rainforest Foundation (107,763 EUR, only in 2011), the Ford Foundation (144,704 EUR), HuMa and others (178,588 EUR) and the communities participating in the project (4,083 EUR).
[26] We do not know whether all these costs were covered by ICCO, or they were partially funded by other donors of the project (see footnote 25).
[27] These provinces are West Java, Central Java, West Sumatra, Central Sulawesi, South Sulawesi, East Nusa Tenggara, West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan. East Nusa Tenggara is not included in the ICCO project description, however, HuMa conducted trainings there as well during the project period (2012).

**Table 10: Overview of the costs and number of beneficiaries**

| Year | Total costs [IDR] | Total cost [EUR, current prices][1] | % of costs funded by CFA | Project costs in Rampi [IDR] | Nr. Beneficiaries[2] | Cost per beneficiary per year |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **2011** | 640,860,924 | 52,255.46 | N.K. | N.K. | 0 | N.A. |
| **2012** | 755,291,170 | 62,486.86 | N.K. | 47,425,000 | 98 | N.A. |
| **2013** | 815,669,500 | 58,584.32 | N.K. | N.K. | N.K. | N.A. |
| **Total** | 2,211,821,594 | 173,327 | N.K. | N.K. | N.K. | N.A. |

Source: Budget survey and financial reports of HuMa to ICCO

1. Annual average exchange rate is used. Data is obtained from http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/
2. Number of participants in the workshops in Rampi.
3. N.K.=not known
4. N.A.=not applicable

## 10.2. Assessment

There are two main factors that make the calculation of cost per beneficiary a challenge in Rampi. Firstly, we do not have information about the costs of the project in Rampi since 2012 because all project costs after 2012 have been funded by another NGO. Secondly, the project has not yet been completed: the map is not yet finalized. Hence, we are not able to quantify the costs of the project per output unit (for example, cost of mapping one hectare of land).

Turning to the unit costs of the other project activities, the considerations for the Rampi project apply for these as well. In addition, HuMa has a comprehensive project agenda, simultaneously addressing the grassroots and the policy level issues in furthering the cause of land and natural resource security of indigenous communities. This makes the accounting of project costs complicated. Further, travel costs constitute a substantial part of the project costs as the trainings are given on-site in numerous remote communities every year.

Taking the above concerns into account, providing a reliable (and meaningful) estimate of the cost per beneficiary goes beyond the scope of this evaluation. Therefore, we refrain from going further in answering evaluation question 4 than the information on project costs provided in section 10.1.

# 11. Contribution of Capacity Development and Civil Society

HuMa was not selected for the evaluation of capacity development of the SPO and civil society strengthening.

# 12. Conclusion

The project logic makes the HuMa project better suited for a Civil Society strengthening evaluation than for an MDG evaluation focused at the final beneficiary level. In the evaluation, we relied on a case study in Rampi sub-district (South Sulawesi province) to evaluate the effectiveness of the HuMa project. Given

the small sample size, we are not able to draw strong overall conclusions regarding the HuMa project. Further, because we only evaluated one of many activities of HuMa that is funded by ICCO and MFS II, the findings of the evaluation cannot be generalised for the effectiveness of PHR trainings and the impact of HuMa's programme on the beneficiaries.

It is also important to add that while HuMa assists its partners in conducting PHR trainings to recruit new members for their social movement, most of HuMa's efforts are focused on national level advocacy and capacity development of itself and its partners to be able to quickly respond to emerging opportunities and threats to the social movement on law reform posed by changes in government regulations and new natural resource and land conflicts.

The case study in Rampi shows that HuMa implemented the project in Rampi at a crucial period, when some villages were already affected by the mining industry but before it became an issue for the majority of villages in Rampi. Hence, the project helped the communities make more informed decisions about their natural resources. However, the short term economic benefits from natural resource extraction can be tempting. We can only hope that the surveyed communities (in particular, Onondowa village) carefully considered the short term promised economic benefits from gold mining corporations and long term environmental consequences (such as contamination of the water sources of several sub-districts) of the activities of these mining corporations.

The collected data suggests that HuMa and Wallacea were only partially successful in delivering on their objectives in terms of increasing the communities' critical knowledge and awareness regarding their land rights and natural resources; in terms of increasing the communities' capacity in making informed decisions with regard to land use; and in terms of empowering communities to undertake action against unjust regulations. Even though both the qualitative and quantitative study suggest that peoples' awareness seems to have increased, this awareness was not yet translated into real life results for natural resource- and land management, because financial interests in mining are still in the way of communities consistently changing their behaviour.

In future projects, we recommend that HuMa and Wallacea put more emphasis on overcoming this problem (for example through more focus on behaviour change), as well as make sure that the map is finalized so that when communities are fully willing to actively counter all mining activities and manage their lands in an ecologically sustainable way according to their customary rules, they are able to do so because they are able to exercise their rights over their lands and have the power to fend off any land grabs from companies and government.

Comparing the results to existing literature, the findings of the HuMa project are only partly in line with the findings in the literature, which shows both increases in awareness and in actual actions in the areas of natural resource- and land management, whereas the specific case study of the HuMa project only shows an increase in awareness.

Finally, the MFS synthesis team asked to score each project along a few indicators. Table 11 displays the indicators and the scores we deemed valid for the project.

**Table 11: Overall project scoring**

| Statement | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| **1. The project was well designed** | 8 | The project is well designed in terms of policy advocacy, working with a wide network of partners and constant capacity development of both HuMa and its partners. The widening of the PHR movement is also well designed.<br>Our only concern is that based on our data (also from other project reports) indigenous communities need longer term support than that offered by the PHR trainings. However, HuMa's project logic aims to reach as many threatened groups as quickly as possible. |
| **2. The project was implemented as designed** | 10 | The project was implemented as designed. |
| **3. The project reached all its objectives** | 7 | Based on the available information (one case study), it is difficult to assess whether the project has reached all of its objectives. In terms of outputs, the project has probably reached its objectives. However, at the outcome level, we are uncertain whether the community empowerment using PHR has reached all its objectives. Regarding the law reform, the success of the movement depends on many external factors. During the evaluation period, the movement has achieved some important results. However, the land tenure of indigenous communities is not yet secured. |
| **4. The observed results are attributable to the project interventions** | 7 | HuMa's project is part of a wider movement (including AMAN). Hence, the results are also the achievement of the whole movement. |
| **5. The observed results are relevant to the project beneficiaries** | 7 | Healthcare, access to the village and education seem to be more important concerns of the village population. However, after the project activities and with the realisation of the threat posed by the mining industry, the population's concerns also increased regarding the issues advocated by HuMa. |
| **6. The project was implemented in the most efficient way** | N.A. | |

Notes: Scores are on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being "no agreement at all" and 10 being "completely agree with statement".

N.A.=not applicable

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# Annex I. SPO and project description

### *SPO description*

HuMa is a non-profit non-governmental organisation that focuses on the issue of law reform in the natural resources sector. The concept of law reform proposed by HuMa emphasizes the importance of recognition of indigenous peoples and local communities' rights to natural resources and preservation of the ecology. HuMa believes that indigenous communities and indigenous peoples should be the main actors in law reform processes. It is their vision to build a social movement pushing for law reform which creates a legal system and practices that can deliver justice for marginalized communities and that are supportive of ecological preservation while respecting the values of humanity and social-cultural diversity. It is their mission to:

- Push for the consolidation, capacity development and quantity increase of PHRs or Community Law Resource Development Facilitators through the empowerment of strategic partners.
- Conduct policy advocacy, campaign and various models of legal training to counter the dominant discourse on law reform in land and natural resources sectors.
- Make HuMa a centre of data, information and knowledge development based on empirical realities.
- Strengthen HuMa's institution to become an influential, competent and independent organisation to support social movement and law reform.

HuMa was pioneered by individuals coming from a highly diverse background (activists, academicians and lawyers) who shared similar concerns with regards to legal thinking and practices in the natural resources sector. Indigenous law was very weak during the New Order-Soeharto period. Yet there were increasing numbers of indigenous law related problems in the late and the post New Order era, particularly following the implementation of decentralization policy. In 1997, a number of indigenous communities' movements united to establish Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (Alliance of indigenous communities in Indonesia, AMAN) in 1999. In addition to 'bantuan hokum struktural' (structural approach of legal aid) which they had applied from the 1970s onwards, a new approach was launched as Pendamping Hukum Kritis (PHK, critical law facilitator) which eventually became known as Pendamping Hukum Rakyat (PHR) or community law facilitators (INCLAF). HuMa was established in 2001 as the result of a mutual decision made by 6 PHR to create a national organisation that could provide technical assistance and policy advocacy on indigenous community issues.

**Wallacea**

HuMa implements the project in Rampi sub-district in South Sulawesi province together with Wallacea. Wallacea is non-governmental organisation devoted to the empowerment of indigenous and local communities for the achievement of sovereignty over natural resources. Wallacea is an abbreviation of the Forum for Sustainable Environment Celebes Area. Wallacea was established on June 5, 2000. Its mission is to facilitate self-reliance and independence of indigenous communities and to allocate the natural resources equitably and sustainably while ensuring biodiversity.

- Support and develop the values of traditional wisdom which are environmentally friendly.

- Enhance awareness and public participation in environmental conservation and biodiversity.
- Improve and develop the human and economic resources in a fair and sustainable society in the perspective of "Ecology - Economy" and defend of the community and the environment.
- Organise Campaigns and Advocate Pro-People and the Environment policy.

Together with HuMa, Wallacea focuses more on community strengthening by providing community law education to the people (PHR). HuMa and Wallacea have been cooperating on this subject since 2000. HuMa assists Wallacea by realizing funds to finance activities carried out by the Wallacea, providing training on critical legal education, legal substance, legal drafting, advocacy and campaigning case and by helping the academic community in drafting, compiling chapters, etc.

### *Planned project result chain*

**Activities**

The project's activities can be categorized along two institutions: the Indonesian Community Law Facilitators (INCLaF) and the Institutional Development (InDev).

The following activities are related to the development of legal reform movement and PHR capacity and legal services (INCLaF):

- Organising workshops on formulating and assessing PHR and partners' capacity development strategy.
- Conducting evaluation on process and results of PHR development and PHR position in Indonesia's legal reform movement.
- Organising National Workshop on inter-PHR learning in several areas, stages, and issues.
- Formulating a guide on PHR recruitment.
- Create and launch directory of PHR profile via HuMa's web site.
- Organising Elementary and advanced Critical Law Training (PHK) for new PHR recruitment.
- Plan Cross-facilitation of PHR.
- Facilitating handling of legal cases and natural resources conflicts through court and non-court advocacy.
- Organising periodic press conference and short articles as a response of the development on natural resources conflicts and cases and national/regional regulations.
- Conduct routine reviews of court decisions, natural resources conflicts, and regional regulations concerning natural resources.

Regarding InDev, the following activities are planned:

- Review and renew the data directory of HuMa membership.
- Capacity development of members, board of trustees and implementation body of HuMa.
- Capacity development of partners.

**Outputs**

The above activities lead to the following outputs.

Regarding INCLaF:

- PHR and strategic partners' development strategy is perfected.
- PHR recruitment pattern is conducted systematically.

- The number and scope of PHR is increased and expanded.
- A number of PHR have obtained the required capacities, among them are community facilitation/organisation, lobby and policy advocacy, legislative drafting, policy review, and conflict resolution ability/skills.
- Equipment and supporting materials of development of PHR capacity have been provided and utilized in trainings or advocating activities.
- Advocacy and legal services by PHR concerning the problems of indigenous and local communities are able to push for local and national policy change discourse.
- Strategic collaboration between HuMa and its regional partners is getting more solid.
- HuMa has been able to facilitate a part of its partners' needs, especially in terms of their financial resources and human resource capacity development.
- All of PHR and partners' members have been consolidated in one movement of legal reform.

Regarding InDev:

- HuMa organisation and institutional mechanism strengthened.
- Capacity and capability of members, board of trustees, implementation body, and strategic partner staffs are increasingly acknowledged and become an asset to the sustainability of the independent and professional institution.
- Quality services of HuMa are ready to be offered to the public.

**Outcomes**

The capacity and capability of the implementation staff, members, and partners to support efforts toward social movement expansion and law reform has improved. Consequently, HuMa and its strategic partners are able to respond quickly and accurately to problems faced by communities related to land and natural resources tenure and management.

As a result of the above activities the service area of the PHR managed by partners is expanded, and the service actions provided by PHR are capable of influencing other parties to make a change.

**Risks and assumptions**

The log-frame of the project[28] lists the assumptions made regarding the implementation of the project. These mainly relate to active involvement of PHR in the project and the continued interest of activists and community members to get involved in PHR. In addition, it is also assumed that there will not be any social or political change which is repressive to people's movement.

### *HuMa project activities*

In 2011, the project implemented the following activities:

- Assessment of CLRDFs and Partner's capacity development strategy;
- Workshop on formulating of CLRDFs and partners' capacity development strategy;
- Assessment on CLRDFs position in Indonesia's law reform movement;

[28] Source: Logframe HuMa 2011-2015

- Workshop on formulating a guide on CLRDFS recruitment (curriculum, training grade, qualification of resource person/facilitator/trainer, requirement of participants candidacy, supporting tools);
- Dissemination of CLRDFs profile form sheet;
- CLRDFs data entry and verification.
- Making and launching of directory of CLRDFs profile via HuMa's web site;
- Review on existing modules and assessment of training materials based on CLRDFS's needs;
- Workshop on training module development and CLRDFs capacity development
- Elementary Critical Law Training (PHK) for new CLRDFs recruitment;
- Workshop on model learning and supportive tools development CLRDFs (trainer, facilitator, resource person, module, tools)
- Training of Trainer for PHK Facilitators
- Cross-facilitation of CLRDFs
- Need assessment on supporting materials to support CLRDFs capacity development
- Collection of supporting literatures for CLRDFs in their advocacy activities
- Handling of legal cases and natural resources conflicts through court and non-court advocacy
- Routine reviews of court decisions, natural resources conflicts, and regional regulations concerning natural resources
- Periodic press conference as a response of the development on natural resources conflicts and cases and national/regional regulation
- Periodic sending of short articles and opinions to main mass media concerning natural resources conflicts and development of regulations in the national and regional level
- Fund contribution for CLRDFs consolidation forum at the village, sub-district, district, and provincial level
- Facilitating funding for personnel of implementation body, members, governing board, and staffs of strategic partners that have fulfilled the requirements and conditions
- Facilitating peer-mentoring process between personnel of implementation body, members, governing board, and staffs of strategic partners

In 2012, the project implemented the following activities:

- Workshop on formulating of CLRDFs and partners' capacity development strategy;
- Elementary Critical Law Training (PHK) for new CLRDFs recruitment;
- Workshop on model learning and supportive tools development CLRDFs (trainer, facilitator, resource person, module, tools)
- Cross-facilitation of CLRDFs
- Collection of supporting literatures for CLRDFs in their advocacy activities
- Handling of legal cases and natural resources conflicts through court and non-court advocacy
- Routine reviews of court decisions, natural resources conflicts, and regional regulations concerning natural resources
- Periodic press conference as a response of the development on natural resources conflicts and cases and national/regional regulation

- Fund contribution for CLRDFs consolidation forum at the village, sub-district, district, and provincial level

Finally, in 2013 the following activities were implemented:

- Workshop on the Development of School of Community Law Facilitators (SPHR) at the partners level (South Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, West Kalimantan, West Sumatra, and West Java)
- Consolidation of PHR and Partners for Conflict Resolution and Legal Reform in the Partner's Respective Working Areas
- Translation of Books Used as Learning Materials for PHR and Partners
- Thematic discussions on community rights to natural resources
- Training for Trainers for SPHR Facilitators
- Natural Resources Cases Handling using Litigation and Non-Litigation Method
- Financial and substantive contribution in several trials regarding the case of natural resources
- Regular Study on Court Decisions, Tenurial Conflict and Other Resources, and Regional Policy on Natural Resources Management
- Advocacy on Community Rights Through Market Mechanism

The following PHR or Community Law Resource Development Facilitator (CLRDF) trainings have been implemented during the project period (2011-2013):

**Table 12: HuMa's PHR/CLRDF trainings in 2011**

| Time | Topic of Training | Presented materials by CLRDFs | Participants |
|---|---|---|---|
| **8 - 11 March 2011** | Critical legal thought training and consolidation of high land communities in Palopo South Sulawesi | Module of training on critical legal thought | 22 participants including 2 woman from 5 villages: Battang, Battang Barat, Padang Lambe, Kambo and Latuppa, Palopo City South Sulawesi |
| **13 – 18 March 2011** | Training on participatory mapping and way of indigenous movement in Bowong Langi | ▪ Constitutional rights of citizen<br>▪ Indigenous peoples in national and international law<br>▪ Agrarian law & participatory mapping | 50 participants including some of them are woman from Bowong Langi high land communities (Bone, Gowa, Sinjai) South Sulawesi |
| **13 – 15 April 2011** | Legal training to respond to conflict against cement fabric expansion In Pati Central Java | ▪ Forestry law and forestry problems<br>▪ Mining law and mining problems | 20 participants from Pati's community and supporting alliance |

| Time | Topic of Training | Presented materials by CLRDFs | Participants |
|---|---|---|---|
| **17 – 20 April 2011** | Training and seminar to respond to The Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate (MIFEE) in Merauke Papua | ▪ Constitutional rights of citizen<br>▪ Legal contract<br>▪ Basic rights of citizens under the criminal court and system of criminal justice in Indonesia | 22 orang (2 perempuan) from activists and indigenous communities in Merauke Papua |
| **6 – 8 May 2011** | Training on critical legal thought in Nanggung Municipality, Bogor District Central Java | Module of training on critical legal thought | 30 participants from Nanggung Community |
| **5 - 7 July 2011** | Legal training for farmers along coastal southern of Java | ▪ Coastal marine and small islands Law<br>▪ Mining law | 20 participants from coastal southern of Java |
| **22 – 25 July 2011** | Training on critical legal thought to respond to MIFEE | ▪ Citizen's rights under Indonesian law<br>▪ Introduction to and review on agrarian and forestry law | 19 participants from Malind Community in Merauke |
| **28 – 30 July 2011** | Paralegal training for responding the expansion of plantation in Sorolangun Jambi Province | Trial of module of PIL-NET (a lawyer networking where HuMa has given contribution) | 25 participants from indigenous and local communities |
| **17 – 25 September 2011** | Training on critical legal thought for village leader and NGOs in Merauke Papua | Continuing materials on citizen's rights, agrarian law and forestry law<br>Lay down training materials into some follow up actions, such as having consensus to set up advocacy team at village level, making counter draft of district bill on ulayat land, and plan to review the existing license | 20 participants from the networking HuMa's local partner namely Komali in Merauke |
| **30 November 2011** | Legal training and Seminar on strengthening capacity and community based forest management organised by Walhi jambi | Contribute materials on position of adat law in national law, community organisation and how to manage organisation | 30 participants from community |
| **15 – 19 December 2011** | Writing workshop for CLRDFs in Palopo | Legal analysis and legal reasoning | 10 participants of local CLRDFs in Palopo |
| Source: HuMa Annual Report 2011 submitted to ICCO | | | |

**Table 13: HuMa's PHR/CLRDF trainings in 2012**

| Time | Venue | Total Participants |
|---|---|---|
| **17 - 20 February 2012** | Central Java Agricultural Education – Semarang Public Legal Aid - Huma | 31 participants (4 female participants) |
| **22 – 23 March 2012** | Legal Education and preparation of JR with regard to the Law on Procurement of Land for Public Interest Qbar - HuMa | 18 participants (2 female participants) |
| **29 – 30 March 2012** | Work Shop and Training of improvement of Indigenous People Community Organisation (Kamas) in defending and promoting rights of indigenous people for natural resources in Melawi and Sintang. LBBT – Huma | 34 participants (1 Female participants) |
| **11 – 12 April 2012** | PHK for the people of Malalo Region West Sumatra (Advocacy for preparing the mediation with the Regional Government of West Sumatra and Water Power Plant) | 18 participants (5 female participants) |
| **3 – 5 May 2012** | PHK for Matteko, Bolamorang, Bulu Tana, Teko, Baliti communities and other indigenous people communities | 60 participants (20 female participants) |
| **13 – 16 May 2012** | Education for the Formulation of Village Regulation in Melung Village, Kedung Banteng, Banyumas Regency | 14 participants (1 female participant) |
| **20 – 23 May 2012** | Training of PHR for farmers around forests in Java | 23 participants (3 female participants) |
| **24 – 26 May 2012** | Legal Education for PHR in the issue of Natural Resources Management in East Nusa Tenggara | 55 participants (6 female participants) |
| **26 June 2012** | Participative Mapping Education and legal and natural resources/agrarian conflict discussion - Onondowa Rampi Village – Luwu Utara – South Sulawesi | 26 participants |
| **28 June 2012** | Participative Mapping Education and legal and natural resources/agrarian conflict discussion - Tedeboe Village – Luwu Utara – South Sulawesi | 10 participants |
| **30 June 2012** | Participative Mapping Education and legal and natural resources/agrarian conflict discussion – Sulaku Village - Rampi– Luwu Utara – South Sulawesi | 11 participants |
| **1 July 2012** | Participative Mapping Education and legal and natural resources/agrarian conflict discussion – Ceboni Village - Rampi– Luwu Utara – South Sulawesi | 30 participants |
| **3 July 2012** | Participative Mapping Education and legal and natural resources/agrarian conflict discussion – Bangkok Village - Rampi– Luwu Utara – South Sulawesi | 21 participants |
| **5 – 8 July 2012** | Workshop and Training for Criticizing Legal Opportunities (spatial layout and other policies) in Promoting the Legal Recognition and Protection of Customary Area Law of Indigenous People in Naga Tebidah, Sintang Regency, West Kalimantan | 50 (5 Female participants) |
| **4 – 5 August2012** | Environmental Law Training With Regard to the Construction of Power Plant in Baturaden | 20 participants (1 female participants) |
| **3 – 6 September 2012** | Training of Bantaya Facilitators (HuMa provided facilitators and resource persons as its contribution) | 17 participants (5 female participants) |

| Time | Venue | Total Participants |
|---|---|---|
| **18 – 19 October 2012** | PHK Training for the people of Pasir Buncir, Caringin, Bogor, held by RMI | 32 participants |
| **20 – 24 October 2012** | Critical Law Training on village and village regulations in Palu | 25 participants (3 Female participants) |
| **29 – 30 October 2012** | Critical Law and Formulation of Village Regulation Training for the people (held by the Public Forest Work Group) | 14 participants |
| **23 – 28 November 2012** | Critical Law Training for the indigenous people of Delang District, Lamandau, Central Kalimantan (in cooperation with Ecosoc Inst ) | 18 participants (4 Female participants) |
| **13 – 21 November 2012** | Critical Law Training in Sungai Garung Hamlet, Gunung Sengiang Village, Serawai District, Sintang Regency, West Kalimantan Province. | 52 participants (17 Female participants) |
| | Total | 579 participants (77 female participants) |
| Source: HuMa Annual Report 2012 submitted to ICCO | | |

**Table 14: HuMa's PHR/CLRDF trainings in 2013**

| Date | Agenda | Result | Participants |
|---|---|---|---|
| **9th – 10th of January 2012** | Consolidation of and Training for Farmers on Participatory Mapping in Forest Area in Ngrimpak, Temanggung, Central Java. | A map based on factual measurement conducted by the people of Ngrimpak | 18 persons (16 M/2 F) |
| **21st – 23rd of March 2013** | Community Law Training in Dongi, Magani Village, Nuha Luwu Timur, South Sulawesi | A short-term follow-up plan: formulating policy draft for customary regulation in Karunsie Dongi. | 29 persons (11 Females) |
| **24th – 26th of March 2013** | Community Law Training in Liku Dengen Luwu Utara, South Sulawesi | Short-term Follow-up plan: conduct evaluation and discussion on advocacy planning for land recognition (see meeting on 5th – 6th of April 2013). | 30 Persons (10 females) |
| **28th – 30th of March 2013** | Community Law Training in Compong Sidrap, South Sulawesi | Advanced legal training in Village and District level. | 20 Persons (3 Females) |
| **2nd – 3rd of April 2013** | Tribe-Level Discussion in Dongi, Magani Village, Nuha Luwu Timur, South Sulawesi to discuss customary provisions | Customary provisions to strengthen tribe unity in facing a nickel company that has occupied their customary land. | 30 Persons (15 Females) |
| **5th – 6th of April 2013** | Village-Level Discussion in Liku Dengen Luwu Utara, South Sulawesi. | Steps for Advocacy. | 40 Persons (12 Females) |
| **1st – 3rd of April 2013** | Community Law Training in Barugaya Takalar, South Sulawesi | Involved in the handling of criminalization cases of farmers based on the law | 25 Persons (as recorded on paper), actual participants are more than 30 persons. – 10 Females. |
| **15th of April 2013** | Community Law Training in Mateko, Erelembang Village, Tombolopao, Gowa South Sulawesi | Legal understanding on natural resources and forest, and plan for further advocacy towards establishment of agreement with the company | 20 Persons |
| **18th of April 2013** | Community Law Training in Kampung Loka, Bonto Lojong Village, Ulu Ere Sub-district, Bantaeng South Sulawesi | Legal understanding on natural resources and forest, and plan for HKM recognition and participatory mapping | 20 Persons |

| Date | Agenda | Result | Participants |
|---|---|---|---|
| **26th of April 2013** | Water Festival – Kudus. Capacity Building for Youth in Kudus District regarding Advocacy. | Participants understands the rights of community to natural resources | 50 Persons (20 Females) |
| **3rd – 5th of May 2013** | Advocacy Training for College Student, in Collaboration with LKBH UMS- Solo | Work plan for student involvement in providing legal training and assistance in Surakarta and its surroundings | 30 Persons (15 Females) |
| **29th – 30th of July 2013** | Mapping and Legal Training regarding Tenure and Natural Resources Issues in Nanggung Sub-district | Action Plan: Reject Palm Oil Planting. | 18 Persons |
| **2nd – 5th of September 2013** | Critical Legal Training, in Collaboration with Lanting Borneo of West Kalimantan | Plan for Further Advocacy by Local Partner | 14 Persons (6 Females) |
| **7th – 9th of September 2013** | Legal Training for People in Pesisir Kubu raya – in collaboration with Sampan Pontianak | Plan for Further Advocacy by Local Partner | 65 Persons (25 Females) |
| **5th – 9th of September 2013** | Legal Training for People around the Forest Area – in collaboration with Balang Bantaeng | Plan for Further Advocacy by Local Partner in the form of rejecting land conversion. | 25 Persons |
| **21st – 23rd of November 2013** | Critical Legal Training for Kasepuhan (traditional customary community) in Lebak Banten | Petition to support the Movement of Civil Society to file a Judicial Review (JR) against Law on Prevention and Eradication of Forest Crime (UUP3H) | 56 Persons |
| **26th – 27th of November 2013** | Legal Drafting Training for PHR in Kiara Sari Bogor | Needs on Female PHR Training and plan for Village Planning Formulation | 49 Persons (34 Females) |
| **3rd – 5th of December 2013** | Critical Legal Training for people in Nanggung, West Java | Advanced Advocacy Steps | 30 Persons (30 Males) |
| Source: HuMa Final Report 2013 submitted to ICCO | | | |

# Annex II. Overview outcome indicators and indices

This annex provides a detailed description about the used outcome indicators. In addition, it shows the variables which were used to construct the outcome indicator indices for levels of satisfaction, attitudes and sense of control.

Data from the community survey as well as data from the household survey were used. Outcomes from the community survey are reported per village (Rampi, Dodolo and Onondowa), while outcomes from the household survey are averages for villagers from all three villages. For the household data, the sample size can differ from 40 because the answer 'don't know' is changed to a missing value or because a respondent could skip a question if he/she had no knowledge about what was asked (answered 'no' to a previous question). This was the case if a respondent answered 'don't know' to a question with a scale, so it did not make sense to incorporate the answer in the scale. The missing value due to a skip was kept missing if we only wanted to know the percentage of the respondents that knew about the topic of the question that answered 'yes'. If we were interested in the answers of the total sample, it made sense to change the 'don't know' answers to 'no' because that way the percentage of all the respondents that answered 'yes' could be reported. For the same reason some missing values were changed to 'no'.

All the indices are created using the same method. Villagers reported their level of agreement with certain statements on a scale from -2 to +2, where -2 means 'strongly disagree', -1 means 'disagree', 0 means 'neither agree nor disagree', 1 means 'agree' and 2 means 'strongly agree'. The indices show the average level of agreement over the included statements. Sometimes agreement with a statement indicates dissatisfaction/a negative attitude, while the index shows satisfaction/a positive attitude. Therefore, the scale for these statements were reversed, so that -2 means 'strongly agree' and +2 means 'strongly disagree'. That way, those statements can be used in the average. They are indicated by (negative).

The 'change' variable measures the difference between the baseline and endline outcomes is for respondents that were in the baseline as well as the endline. The p-value indicates whether this change is significant.

### *Access to information on (local) governance*

In order to assess the level of satisfaction with local governance, it is important to know whether the respondents are well-informed about the governance at the village level and the district level.

- Level of agreement with statement: 'I feel well-informed about the decisions made by the village leaders.' […] (scale -2 to +2): this indicator provides the average of the level of agreement on the same scale as the indices.
- Percentage of respondents that knows about the policies of the district government related to agriculture and the use of land in Rampi

### *Satisfaction with local governance*

Two indices for the level of satisfaction with local governance were constructed for different levels of governance. Also the opinion of the level of corruption of the respondents is reported at these levels. It is expected that more corruption is associated with less satisfaction.

- Index for satisfaction with local governance at village level: the following statements are included in this index.
    - Villagers should be given more room to be involved in village decision making (negative)
    - I trust that village leaders will do what is the best for our community.
    - More effort should be taken by the village leaders to preserve traditional/adat culture in this village (negative)
- Index for satisfaction with local governance at the sub-district level: the following statements are included in this index.
    - I'm confident of the district official's ability to their job.
    - The sub-district officials support this village in preserving traditional culture.
    - The sub-district officials can be trusted to represent our interest in protecting our rights to land.
- Level of corruption: for scale of following indicators is from 1 to 3, with 1 being 'no corruption', 2 being 'some corruption' and 3 being 'a lot of corruption'. These are the answers that the respondents could choose from (apart from 'don't know'). The average over the respondents is shown.
    - In your opinion, how much corruption is there at the […]?
        - Village leadership
        - District government

### *Role of traditional institutions*

- Index for a positive attitude towards traditional laws and culture: the following statements are included in this index.
    - Customary laws should be used to govern the way of life in this village.
    - Some people have no respect for customary laws anymore in this village (negative)

### *Management of natural resources*

For management of natural resources, data was collected on the existence of management structure and the level of satisfaction with the management structure.

- Existence: for this indicator, outcomes from the community survey were used. In the table it is reported per village whether there are regulations regarding the use and protections of community forests.
- Dissemination of information: these questions report on how regulations are communicated to the villagers and to what extent. The outcomes come from the community survey.
    - How are the regulations communicated to the villagers?
      From the data it was found that the regulations were either communicated through community meetings or farmer group meetings, as indicated in the table.
    - Are regulations communicated to all villagers (including women and children)?

  - Are regulations taught at school?
- Percentage of respondents that knows about regulations for the use of community forests: this indicator shows the percentage of respondents that answered 'yes' to the question whether there are any rules/regulations about the use of community forests in the village.
- Satisfaction with regulations (scale from -2 to 2): the villagers were asked about their level of agreement with the following statement on the same scale from -2 to 2. Since agreement with the statement shows dissatisfaction with the regulations, the scale was reversed in the same way as with the indices.
  - Natural resources are not sufficiently protected by the village regulations.

### *Households' attitude towards forests/plantations*

- Dependence on forest resources: villagers were asked to what extent they agree with the following statement on the same scale from -2 to 2:
  - My family depends on the forest for our livelihood.
- Index for a positive attitude towards sustainable forest use:
  - I take from the forest what my family needs without thinking about others (negative)
  - I think all villagers should use the community forest as they want (negative)
  - We have to use our forests with moderation and respect.
- Index for access to forest resources:
  - Villager's access to forest resources is fair in my community.
  - I'm satisfied with my family's share of forest resources in this village.
  - Our forests are abundant and luscious.
  - I feel that my access to forest resources is secure in this village.

- Percentage of respondents who think that the activities of the government/industry will be harmful: the respondents were asked whether they think that the activities of the government/industry will be beneficial, harmful, both beneficial and harmful or have no effect. The percentage of the respondents who answered 'harmful' is reported here.

### *Sense of control of villagers*

- Index for trust in village:
  - People in my community look out for each other.
  - I feel I can trust my neighbours to look after my house if I am away.
- Index for sense of control regarding own life:
  - I feel that my opinion is taken into account in my community.
  - Often I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me (negative)
  - I feel satisfied with my life.
  - On the whole, I'm able to take charge of my life.
- Index for sense of control regarding land:
  - I think there is nothing we can do to keep our traditional lands against the government/industry (negative)
  - I'm confident that if we the villagers act together, we can make things happen for this village

I think that our village has the right to our traditional lands.
    - I feel that I have no influence on preserving our forests and nature (negative)
- Index for sense of control regarding traditional institutions:
    - I feel that I can contribute to preserving traditional/adat culture in my community.
    - I feel that it is difficult to protect traditional culture nowadays (negative)

# Annex III. Description of study locations

### *Area Description*

Rampi a sub district located in Regency Luwu Utara and included in the northeast area of Province South Sulawesi, sharing a border with Central Sulawesi. The area width of Rampi is around 1.565,65 Km² (BPS, 2011), where most of it is forest and hill areas. Rampi is not everywhere easy to reach.

Rampi consists of 6 villages, they are: Desa Tedeboe, Desa Rampi, Desa Dodolo, Desa Onondowa, Desa Sulaku, Desa Leboni. Desa Onondowa is the largest village and home base of the local government of the sub-district, while the smallest village is Desa Sulaku. All six villages have the status as very backward villages (BPS, 2012). The villages selected for the evaluation are: Desa Dodolo, Desa Rampi, and Desa Onondowa.

### *Desa Dodolo*

The area of Dodolo village is around 218 $km^2$ (BPS, 2012), where most areas consist of forests and hills. The border of Dodolo at the north is Rampi village, at the south is Onondowa village. Dodolo consists of two hamlets or sub-villages, i.e. Dusun Dodolo and Dusun Kontara.

Dodolo has in total 277 inhabitants (BPS, 2012). Most villagers have completed elementary school. The majority of these villagers work in the agricultural sector, either when cultivating crops (rice) or with cattle. There are small numbers of villagers who hold grocery shops.

Some of the residents have no access to clean water service from the government (PDAM) due to the difficult and insufficient access by road. Electricity is present, but only on certain specified times. There is a church and an elementary school in the village. Health facilities are not well equipped. For media information some villagers have television, but the use of them is limited as it depends on the electricity hours. No telecommunication provider can be accessed in the village due to the remoteness of the area. Though, the majority of the youth in this village have cell phones, which is only used for listening to music.

### *Desa Bangko/Rampi*

This village is an old village. In daily activity, people in sub district Rampi know Desa Rampi as Desa Bangko (Bangau). Geographically the village is at the edge of the mountain. The village has border with several neighbouring villages; in the north with Desa Tedeboe, at the south with Desa Dodolo, at the west with a protected forest under the province Central Sulawesi, and at the east with a protected forest of Regency Luwu Utara. Access to the village takes about 13 hours from the city Masamba, but takes longer if the rain has made the road slippery and muddy. Most villagers are farmers, others have cattle. The majority of the people of this village have an education level of elementary school.

The infrastructure is quite the same for this village as for desa Dodolo; difficult and insufficient road access, no electricity, 1 church, almost no health facilities, no access of any telecommunication providers, and no clean water from PDAM. The village has an elementary school, Kindergarten and PAUD (Post ECED), but when the team was conducting the interviews no learning activity took place.


### *Desa Onondowa*

Desa Onondowa is a village in the area which has good prospect for the future. The border of the village at the north is desa Dodolo, at the south it is desa Sulaku. Geographically the village is at the edge of the mountain. The village can be reached from city Masamba can be reached in only twelve hours. The main road access is through jungle. The total numbers of villagers is 902 living in 223 families. Most villagers are farmers, others have cattle. In addition, some are panning for gold or have become a merchant. The average education level is junior high school.

Part of the villagers hasn't got service from PDAM. It is because the difficult road access. Electricity can be enjoyed in the afternoon and night. There is one church, an elementary school, a junior high school, a senior high school, kindergarten and PAUD (Post ECED) in the village. However, there is no teacher from outside (PNS) teaching in this village, only local workers are (honorary). The available health facilities are Posyandu, Puskesmas, and a (part time) midwife but no doctors have their office in the village. There is an airport close by, but because of some problems it is not running. The media information comes from the television owned by some villagers, but the telecommunication has the same problems as mentioned by the other villages. Again the youth have some cell phones, but can only use it for music.

Further information about the project area can be found in section 2 of Annex VII.

**Figure 4: Map of Rampi sub-district**



# Annex IV. Descriptive statistics

**Table 15: Community characteristics I**

| Variable \ Village | Rampi | | Dodolo | | Onondowa | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Survey year** | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End |
| Number of people living in the village | 284 | 307 | 332 | 315 | 902 | 860 |
| Well established boundaries of the village are present | **Yes** | **Yes** | No | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** |
| Selection method of village head […] (%) | | | | | | |
| *Voting* | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Number of meetings in past 12 months to discuss issues and problems in the village | 4 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| […] groups represented at the meetings | | | | | | |
| *Women* | **Yes** | No | No | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** |
| *Youth* | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** |
| *Elderly* | **Yes** | [n.a.] | **Yes** | [n.a.] | **Yes** | [n.a.] |

Source: Community survey E9, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

**Table 16: Community characteristics II**

| Variable \ Village | Rampi | | Dodolo | | Onondowa | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Survey years** | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End |
| Five most important community issues […] (%) | | | | | | |
| *Education/School in village* | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | No | No | **Yes** |
| *Healthcare* | No | **Yes** | **Yes** | No | No | **Yes** |
| *Road conditions to the village/Access to village* | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | No | **Yes** |
| *Livelihood improvement* | No | **Yes** | **Yes** | No | **Yes** | **Yes** |
| *Participatory mapping of village* | No | No | No | No | **Yes** | No |
| *Access to clean water* | No | No | No | **Yes** | No | No |
| *Sanitation issues* | No | No | No | **Yes** | No | No |
| *Natural resource/Environment protection in the village* | No | **Yes** | No | No | No | No |
| *Access to land and natural resources* | No | No | No | **Yes** | No | **Yes** |
| *Industry (mining, road building, etc.)* | No | No | No | **Yes** | No | No |
| *Other issues*[1] | **Yes** | No | **Yes** | No | No | No |

Source: Community survey E9, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes:
1. These include communication and irrigation of rice field for Rampi and electricity issues for Dodolo
2. At the baseline, Rampi only mentioned 3 community issues and Onondowa only mentioned 2.

**Table 17: Most important community issues reported by respondents**

| Reporting period | Base | End | Change | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Sample size** | 40 | 40 | 33 | |
| Percentage of respondents that reported […] to be one of the three most important community issues | | | | |
| *A. Education/School in village* | 87.5<br>(33.5) | 77.5<br>(42.3) | -9.1<br>(63.1) | 0.280 |
| *B. Healthcare* | 52.5<br>(50.6) | 52.5<br>(50.6) | 6.1<br>(60.9) | 0.654 |
| *C. Access to clean water* | 5.0<br>(22.1) | 17.5<br>(38.5) | 9.1<br>(45.9) | 0.365 |
| *D. Sanitation issues* | 0.0<br>(0.0) | 12.5<br>(33.5) | 12.1<br>(33.1) | 0.280 |
| *E. Road conditions to the village/Access to village* | 77.5<br>(42.3) | 52.5<br>(50.6) | -33.3<br>(64.5) | 0.201 |
| *F. Conservation of traditional values/culture* | 0.0<br>(0.0) | 2.5<br>(15.8) | 3.0<br>(17.4) | 0.280 |
| *G. Natural resource/Environment protection in the village* | 0.0<br>(0.0) | 10.0<br>(30.4) | 12.1<br>(33.1) | 0.341 |
| *H. Forest fires* | 0.0<br>(0.0) | 0.0<br>(0.0) | 0.0<br>(0.0) | |
| *I. Industry (mining, road building, etc.)* | 0.0<br>(0.0) | 30.0<br>(46.4) | 30.3*<br>(46.7) | 0.061 |
| *J. Pollution* | 0.0<br>(0.0) | 2.5<br>(15.8) | 3.0<br>(17.4) | 0.496 |
| *K. Access to land and natural resources* | 2.5<br>(15.8) | 0.0<br>(0.0) | -3.0<br>(17.4) | 0.280 |
| *L. Resolving disputes with neighbouring villages* | 0.0<br>(0.0) | 2.5<br>(15.8) | 3.0<br>(17.4) | 0.496 |
| *M. Livelihood improvement* | 30.0<br>(46.4) | 25.0<br>(43.9) | -9.1<br>(57.9) | 0.527 |
| *N. Corruption* | 0.0<br>(0.0) | 0.0<br>(0.0) | 0.0<br>(0.0) | |
| *O. Participatory mapping of village* | 0.0<br>(0.0) | 2.5<br>(15.8) | 3.0<br>(17.4) | 0.496 |
| *P. Alcohol consumption* | 0.0<br>(0.0) | 0.0<br>(0.0) | 0.0<br>(0.0) | |
| *Q. Animal keeping/Damage caused by domesticated animals* | 7.5<br>(26.7) | 5.0<br>(22.1) | -3.0<br>(17.4) | 0.496 |
| *R. Exploitation of natural resources* | 0.0<br>(0.0) | 2.5<br>(15.8) | 3.0<br>(17.4) | 0.484 |
| *V. Other* | 30.0<br>(46.4) | 10.0<br>(30.4) | -18.2<br>(58.4) | 0.346 |

Source: Household survey E9; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

**Table 18: Household characteristics II**

| Reporting period | Base | End | Change | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sample size | 40 | 40 | 33 | |
| Percentage of respondents who have voted on last district level elections (%) | 97.5<br>(15.8) | 100.0<br>(0.0) | 3.0<br>(17.4) | 0.280 |
| Percentage of respondents who attended any village meeting in past 12 months (%) | 87.5<br>(33.5) | 87.5<br>(33.5) | -3.0<br>(30.5) | 0.496 |
| Percentage of respondents who participated in any discussion in the village meeting in past 12 months (%) | 65.0<br>(48.3) | 80.0<br>(40.5) | 6.1<br>(49.6) | 0.453 |
| Percentage of respondents who participated in any discussion in the village meeting in past 12 months about community land use (%) | 37.5<br>(49.0) | 52.5<br>(50.6) | 12.1<br>(65.0) | 0.136 |

Source: Household survey E9; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

# Annex V. Evaluation question 1 – tables

**Table 19: Change in outcome indicators: details of indices**

| Reporting period | Base | End | Change | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Sample size (household survey)** | 40 | 40 | 33 | |
| **Panel B. Satisfaction with local governance** | | | | |
| Index for satisfaction with local governance at the village level<br>Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | |
| *Villagers should be given more room to be involved in village decision making* | 1.3<br>(0.7) | 1.3<br>(0.5) | -0.2<br>(0.8) | 0.420 |
| *I trust that village leaders will do what is the best for our community* | 1.4<br>(0.5) | 1.2<br>(0.4) | -0.2<br>(0.7) | 0.125 |
| *More effort should be taken by the village leaders to preserve traditional/adat culture in this village* | 1.4<br>(0.5) | 1.2<br>(0.4) | -0.2<br>(0.7) | 0.553 |
| Index for satisfaction with local governance at the sub-district level<br>Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | |
| *I'm confident of the district official's ability to their job* | 0.6<br>(0.9) | 0.7<br>(0.8) | 0.2**<br>(1.1) | 0.018 |
| *The sub-district officials support this village in preserving traditional culture* | 1.5<br>(0.5) | 1.2<br>(0.4) | -0.2<br>(0.6) | 0.125 |
| *The sub-district officials can be trusted to represent our interest in protecting our rights to land* | 1.5<br>(0.5) | 1.0<br>(0.6) | -0.5<br>(0.9) | 0.224 |
| **Panel C. Role of traditional institutions** | | | | |
| Index for positive attitude towards traditional laws and culture<br>Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | |
| *Customary laws should be used to govern the way of life in this village* | 1.5<br>(0.6) | 1.4<br>(0.5) | -0.1<br>(0.7) | 0.348 |
| *Many people have no respect for customary laws anymore in this village* | -0.9<br>(0.7) | -0.9<br>(0.7) | 0.0<br>(0.8) | 0.875 |
| **Panel E. Households' attitude towards forests/plantations** | | | | |
| Index for positive attitude towards sustainable forest use<br>Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | |
| *I take from the forest what my family needs without thinking about others* | -0.9<br>(1.1) | -0.9<br>(0.6) | 0.1<br>(1.0) | 0.542 |
| *I think all villagers should use the community forest as they want* | 1.2<br>(0.8) | 0.8<br>(0.8) | -0.3<br>(0.9) | 0.275 |
| *We have to use our forests with moderation and respect* | 1.6<br>(0.5) | 1.2<br>(0.8) | -0.4<br>(1.1) | 0.180 |
| Index for access to forest resources<br>Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | |
| *Villager's access to forest resources is fair in my community* | 1.1<br>(0.9) | 1.0<br>(0.8) | -0.1<br>(1.1) | 0.726 |
| *I'm satisfied with my family's share of forest resources in this village* | 1.6<br>(1.2) | 0.9<br>(0.6) | -0.6*<br>(1.4) | 0.078 |

| Reporting period | Base | End | Change | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Sample size (household survey)** | 40 | 40 | 33 | |
| *Our forests are abundant and luscious* | 1.6<br>(0.5) | 1.5<br>(0.5) | -0.1<br>(0.7) | 0.348 |
| *I feel that my access to forest resources is secure in this village* | 0.4<br>(1.2) | 0.4<br>(1.0) | 0.2<br>(1.4) | 0.578 |
| **Panel F. Sense of control of villagers** | | | | |
| Index for trust in village<br>Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | |
| *People in my community look out for each other* | 1.7<br>(0.5) | 1.6<br>(0.5) | 0.0<br>(0.7) | 0.747 |
| *I feel I can trust my neighbours to look after my house if I am away* | 1.6<br>(0.6) | 1.4<br>(0.6) | -0.1<br>(0.9) | 0.748 |
| Index for sense of control regarding own life<br>Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | |
| *I feel that my opinion is taken into account in my community* | 1.2<br>(0.9) | 0.9<br>(0.7) | -0.2<br>(1.1) | 0.608 |
| *Often I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me* | 0.5<br>(1.1) | -0.3<br>(1.0) | -0.9*<br>(1.2) | 0.062 |
| *I feel satisfied with my life* | 0.9<br>(1.1) | 1.0<br>(1.0) | -0.0<br>(1.0) | 0.829 |
| *On the whole, I'm able to take charge of my life* | 1.4<br>(0.7) | 1.4<br>(0.6) | -0.1<br>(0.9) | 0.574 |
| Index for sense of control regarding land<br>Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | |
| *I think there is nothing we can do to keep our traditional lands against the government/industry* | -0.7<br>(1.1) | -1.1<br>(0.5) | -0.4<br>(1.3) | 0.126 |
| *I'm confident that if we the villagers act together, we can make things happen for this village* | 1.5<br>(0.6) | 1.5<br>(0.7) | 0.1<br>(0.8) | 0.365 |
| *I think that our village has the right to our traditional lands* | 1.7<br>(0.5) | 1.4<br>(0.7) | -0.1<br>(0.7) | 0.454 |
| *I feel that I have no influence on preserving our forests and nature* | -0.8<br>(0.9) | -0.7<br>(1.0) | 0.2<br>(1.1) | 0.416 |
| Index for sense of control regarding traditional institutions<br>Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | |
| *I feel that I can contribute to preserving traditional/adat culture in my community* | 1.4<br>(0.5) | 1.2<br>(0.4) | -0.2<br>(0.7) | 0.280 |
| *I feel that it is difficult to protect traditional culture nowadays* | -0.2<br>(1.1) | -0.4<br>(1.1) | -0.3<br>(1.1) | 0.482 |

Source: Household survey E9; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia.
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

# Annex VI. Additional explanatory tables

### Table 20: Satisfaction with local government policies: community survey

| Variable \ Village | Rampi | | Dodolo | | Onondowa | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Survey year** | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End |
| Level of agreement with the following statements […] (scale -2 to +2) | | | | | | |
| *The district government respects the local customary laws of this village* | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| *The agriculture and land use policies of the district government respect the right of this village to its land* | 2 | 1 | -1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| *The sub-district officials support this village in preserving traditional culture* | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| *The sub-district officials support this village in protecting its rights for the land* | 2 | 1 | 2 | -1 | 1 | 1 |
| Source: Community survey E9, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | | | | | |

### Table 21: Satisfaction with local government policies: villager survey

| Reporting period | Base | End | Change | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Sample size** | 40 | 40 | 33 | |
| Level of agreement with […] on a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | |
| *I'm confident of the district official's ability to their job* | 0.6 (0.9) | 0.7 (0.8) | 0.2** (1.1) | 0.018 |
| *The agriculture and land-use policies of the district government respect the customary rights of the people in this village*[1] | 1.3 (0.5) | 0.9 (0.5) | -0.3 (0.5) | 0.626 |
| *The sub-district officials support this village in preserving traditional culture* | 1.5 (0.5) | 1.2 (0.4) | -0.2 (0.6) | 0.125 |
| *The sub-district officials can be trusted to represent our interest in protecting our rights to land* | 1.5 (0.5) | 1.0 (0.6) | -0.5 (0.9) | 0.224 |

Source: Household survey E9; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

1. Sample size deviates, the number of observations in the columns, in order, are 8, 16 and 4

**Table 22: Satisfaction with village leadership**

| Reporting period | Base | End | Change | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Sample size** | 40 | 40 | 33 | |
| Villagers should be given more room to be involved in village decision making (scale -2 to +2) | 1.3<br>(0.7) | 1.3<br>(0.5) | -0.2<br>(0.8) | 0.420 |
| I trust that village leaders will do what is the best for our community (scale -2 to +2) | 1.4<br>(0.5) | 1.2<br>(0.4) | -0.2<br>(0.7) | 0.125 |
| More effort should be taken by the village leaders to preserve traditional/adat culture in this village (scale -2 to +2) | 1.4<br>(0.5) | 1.2<br>(0.4) | -0.2<br>(0.7) | 0.553 |
| Percentage of respondents that trust […] the most as local leader | | | | |
| *Village leader* | 72.5<br>(45.2) | 27.5<br>(45.2) | -42.4**<br>(61.4) | 0.029 |
| *Religious leader* | 17.5<br>(38.5) | 32.5<br>(47.4) | 9.1<br>(45.9) | 0.257 |
| *Council of elders* | 7.5<br>(26.7) | 40.0<br>(49.6) | 36.4***<br>(54.9) | 0.005 |
| *Other persons* | 2.5<br>(15.8) | 0.0<br>(0.0) | -3.0<br>(17.4) | 0.496 |

Source: Household survey E9; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

### Table 23: Level of corruption

| Reporting period | Base | End | Change | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Sample size** | 30 | 39 | 23 | |
| Percentage of respondents that report […] at village leadership | | | | |
| *No corruption* | 80.0<br>(40.7) | 61.5<br>(49.3) | -26.1<br>(44.9) | 0.142 |
| *Some corruption* | 16.7<br>(37.9) | 30.8<br>(46.8) | 30.4*<br>(47.0) | 0.094 |
| *A lot of corruption* | 3.3<br>(18.3) | 7.7<br>(27.0) | -4.3<br>(20.9) | 0.331 |
| Percentage of respondents that report […] at the district government[1] | | | | |
| *No corruption* | 64.7<br>(49.3) | 17.6<br>(38.7) | -36.4*<br>(50.5) | 0.085 |
| *Some corruption* | 35.3<br>(49.3) | 70.6<br>(46.2) | 36.4*<br>(50.5) | 0.085 |
| *A lot of corruption* | 0.0<br>(0.0) | 11.8<br>(32.7) | 0.0<br>(0.0) | |

Source: Household survey E9; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

1. Sample size deviates, the number of observations in the columns, in order, are 17, 34 and 11

### Table 24: Forest resources: community survey

| Variable \ Village | Rampi | | Dodolo | | Onondowa | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Survey years | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End |
| Any protected forest area present | No | **Yes** | No | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** |
| Any community forest area present | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** |
| Total area of community forests in the village (ha) | [n.a.] | 2000 | [n.a.] | 2000 | [n.a.] | 500 |
| Level of agreement with statement: '*People of this village depend on the forest for their livelihood*' (scale -2 to +2) | 2 | 1 | -1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Way people of the village depend on the forest for their livelihood […] | | | | | | |
| *Logging* | No | No | No | **Yes** | **Yes** | No |
| *Firewood collection* | **Yes** | No | No | **Yes** | No | **Yes** |
| *Honey collection* | **Yes** | **Yes** | No | No | No | No |
| *Collection of other fruits and plants* | **Yes** | **Yes** | No | No | No | **Yes** |
| *Medicinal use* | No | **Yes** | No | **Yes** | No | **Yes** |
| *Other use* | **Yes** | No | No | No | No | No |

| Variable \ Village | Rampi | | Dodolo | | Onondowa | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Survey years | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End |
| Any meeting about community forest use and management took place in past 12 months | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | No | No |
| Topic addressed in any of the meetings in the past 12 months […] | | | | | | |
| *Illegal use of forest (logging/hunting)* | **Yes** | No | **Yes** | **Yes** | [n.a.] | [n.a.] |
| *Forest management* | **Yes** | No | No | No | [n.a.] | [n.a.] |
| *Forest use* | **Yes** | **Yes** | No | **Yes** | [n.a.] | [n.a.] |
| *Regulations of forest use* | **Yes** | No | **Yes** | **Yes** | [n.a.] | [n.a.] |
| Source: Community survey E9, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | | | | | |

**Table 25: Regulations and management of natural resources: community survey**

| Variable \ Village | Rampi | | Dodolo | | Onondowa | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Survey year | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End |
| Any regulations about the use and the protection of the community forests in the village are present | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** |
| […] is regulated for the community forests | | | | | | |
| *Logging* | No | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** |
| *Firewood collection* | No | No | **Yes** | No | No | No |
| *Access to forest* | No | No | **Yes** | **Yes** | No | **Yes** |
| *Conversion of forest in to agricultural land* | **Yes** | No | No | No | No | No |
| *Collection of other fruits and plants* | No | **Yes** | No | **Yes** | No | No |
| *Hunting* | No | No | No | **Yes** | No | No |
| *Other* | **Yes** | No | No | No | No | No |
| […] is responsible for the management of the community forests | | | | | | |
| *No management structure* | No | No | No | No | **Yes** | No |
| *Head of village* | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | No | **Yes** |
| *Local Leader* | No | **Yes** | No | **Yes** | No | No |
| *Local government (head of sub-district/district)* | No | **Yes** | No | No | No | No |
| *Other person/institution* | **Yes** | No | **Yes** | No | No | No |
| Source: Community survey E9, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | | | | | |

**Table 26: Natural resources and their regulations: villager survey**

| Reporting period | Base | End | Change | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sample size | 40 | 40 | 33 | |
| Percentage of respondents who report that there are any rules/regulations about the use of the community forests in the village (%) | 77.5<br>(42.3) | 65.0<br>(48.3) | -27.3***<br>(57.4) | 0.001 |
| Percentage of respondents that report that […] is regulated | | | | |
| *Logging* | 75.0<br>(43.9) | 62.5<br>(49.0) | -24.2**<br>(56.1) | 0.020 |
| *Firewood collection* | 10.0<br>(30.4) | 5.0<br>(22.1) | -6.1<br>(34.8) | 0.603 |
| *Honey collection* | 0.0<br>(0.0) | 5.0<br>(22.1) | 3.0<br>(17.4) | 0.280 |
| *Collection of other fruits and plants* | 2.5<br>(15.8) | 10.0<br>(30.4) | 3.0<br>(30.5) | 0.280 |
| *Hunting* | 10.0<br>(30.4) | 7.5<br>(26.7) | -9.1<br>(29.2) | 0.280 |
| *Access to forest* | 22.5<br>(42.3) | 10.0<br>(30.4) | -18.2<br>(58.4) | 0.402 |
| *Other* | 17.5<br>(38.5) | 15.0<br>(36.2) | -12.1<br>(54.5) | 0.280 |
| Level of agreement with […] at a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | |
| *Most people in this village follow the regulations about the use of community forests*[1] | 1.8<br>(0.6) | 1.2<br>(0.5) | -0.5**<br>(0.7) | 0.036 |
| *Without regulations people would overuse (exploit) the natural resources*[2] | 0.5<br>(1.1) | 0.2<br>(1.1) | -0.3<br>(1.4) | 0.255 |
| *Natural resources are not sufficiently protected by the village regulations* | 0.3<br>(1.1) | 0.1<br>(1.1) | -0.2<br>(1.5) | 0.552 |
| *Villager's access to forest resources is fair in my community* | 1.1<br>(0.9) | 1.0<br>(0.8) | -0.1<br>(1.1) | 0.726 |
| *We have to use our forests with moderation and respect* | 1.6<br>(0.5) | 1.2<br>(0.8) | -0.4<br>(1.1) | 0.180 |

Source: Household survey E9; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

1. Sample size deviates, the number of observations in the columns, in order, are 31, 26 and 17
2. Sample size deviates, the number of observations in the columns, in order, are 31, 26 and 17

### Table 27: Role of traditional institutions: community survey

| Variable \ Village | Rampi | | Dodolo | | Onondowa | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Survey year** | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End |
| Level of agreement with the following statements […] (scale -2 to +2) | | | | | | |
| *People's lives are governed by customary laws in this village* | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| *Some people have no respect for customary laws anymore in this village* | 1 | -1 | -2 | -1 | -1 | 1 |
| *Any violation of customary law is punishable accordingly in this village* | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| Village solves […]with customary law (opposed to report to police) | | | | | | |
| *Theft* | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** |
| *Fighting, beating* | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** |
| *Illegal logging/hunting* | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | No |
| *Slander* | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** |
| *Rape* | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** | **Yes** |

Source: Community survey E9, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

### Table 28: Role of traditional institutions: villager survey

| Reporting period | Base | End | Change | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Sample size** | 40 | 40 | 33 | |
| Level of agreement with […] at a scale from -2 to +2 | | | | |
| *Customary laws should be used to govern the way of life in this village* | 1.5 (0.6) | 1.4 (0.5) | -0.1 (0.7) | 0.348 |
| *Customary laws benefit some people more than others in this village* | 0.0 (1.5) | -0.8 (1.0) | -0.4 (2.0) | 0.329 |
| *Many people have no respect for customary laws anymore in this village* | -0.9 (0.7) | -0.9 (0.7) | 0.0 (0.8) | 0.875 |
| *I feel that it is difficult to protect traditional culture nowadays* | -0.2 (1.1) | -0.4 (1.1) | -0.3 (1.1) | 0.482 |

Source: Household survey E9; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

### Table 29: Land conflicts: community survey

| Variable \ Village | Rampi | | Dodolo | | Onondowa | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Survey year** | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End |
| If the village had any conflict/dispute regarding the use and protection of community forests in the past 12 months | No | **Yes** | No | **Yes** | No | No |
| Number of villages with any dispute/conflict about the land use or ownership with […] | | | | | | |
| *Neighbouring villages* | No | **Yes** | No | No | No | No |
| *District/Province government* | No | **Yes** | No | No | No | **Yes** |
| *Business/Industry* | No | No | No | **Yes** | No | **Yes** |
| Source: Community survey E9, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | | | | | |

### Table 30: Land conflicts: villager survey

| Reporting period | Base | End | Change | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Sample size** | 40 | 40 | 33 | |
| Percentage of respondents that says that their village has any dispute or conflict about the ownership of use of forests with […] | | | | |
| *Neighbouring villages* | 32.5 (47.4) | 32.5 (47.4) | 3.0 (30.5) | 0.710 |
| *District/Province government* | 20.0 (40.5) | 12.5 (33.5) | -9.1 (57.9) | 0.710 |
| *Business/Industry* | 10.0 (30.4) | 42.5 (50.1) | 36.4** (48.9) | 0.044 |
| Source: Household survey E9; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia<br>Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.<br>* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01. | | | | |

### Table 31: Knowledge of village boundaries: villager survey

| Reporting period | Base | End | Change | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Sample size** | 40 | 40 | 33 | |
| Percentage of respondents that know the boundary of his/her land (%) | 87.5 (33.5) | 92.5 (26.7) | 0.0 (35.4) | |
| Percentage of respondents that know the boundary of his/her village (%) | 75.0 (43.9) | 82.5 (38.5) | 6.1 (55.6) | 0.724 |
| Source: Household survey E9; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia<br>Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.<br>* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01. | | | | |

### Table 32: Disputes with neighbouring villages

| Reporting period | Base | End | Change | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Sample size** | 13 | 13 | 9 | |
| Percentage of respondents that have access to the disputed land (%)[1] | 83.3<br>(38.9) | 61.5<br>(50.6) | -12.5<br>(35.4) | 0.295 |
| Percentage of respondents that report that the livelihood for his/her family is affected by the land dispute (%) | 15.4<br>(37.6) | 23.1<br>(43.9) | -11.1<br>(33.3) | 0.266 |
| I think that both villages should be able to use the disputed land (scale -2 to +2) | 0.2<br>(1.2) | -0.3<br>(0.9) | -0.2<br>(1.3) | 0.266 |
| The land dispute creates tension between the people of the two villages (scale -2 to +2) | -0.6<br>(1.0) | 0.2<br>(1.1) | 0.6<br>(1.9) | 0.446 |

Source: Household survey E9; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

1. Sample size deviates, the number of observations in the columns, in order, are 12, 13 and 8

### Table 33: Disputes with industry or government

| Reporting period | Base | End | Change | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Sample size** | **10** | **20** | **4** | |
| Percentage of respondents that says that the dispute/conflict is about […] | | | | |
| *Converting land into plantation* | 10.0<br>(31.6) | 0.0<br>(0.0) | -25.0<br>(50.0) | 0.626 |
| *Mining* | 10.0<br>(31.6) | 95.0<br>(22.4) | 75.0<br>(50.0) | 0.105 |
| *Environmental damage (e.g. pollution, logging)* | 0.0<br>(0.0) | 15.0<br>(36.6) | 25.0<br>(50.0) | 0.626 |
| *Protected forest areas (e.g. not allowed to use for livelihood activities)* | 10.0<br>(31.6) | 30.0<br>(47.0) | 25.0<br>(95.7) | 0.295 |
| *Land used for airport* | 70.0<br>(48.3) | 0.0<br>(0.0) | -50.0<br>(57.7) | 0.295 |
| *Other reasons* | 20.0<br>(42.2) | 0.0<br>(0.0) | -50.0<br>(57.7) | 0.295 |
| Percentage of respondents that have access to the disputed land (%) | 40.0<br>(51.6) | 85.0<br>(36.6) | 25.0<br>(50.0) | 0.295 |
| Percentage of respondents who report that the livelihood of the family is affected by the land dispute (%) | 50.0<br>(52.7) | 40.0<br>(50.3) | 0.0<br>(81.6) | |
| Percentage of respondents that think that the activities of the government/industry will be […] to them and their family | | | | |
| *Beneficial* | 40.0<br>(51.6) | 10.0<br>(30.8) | -25.0<br>(50.0) | 0.295 |
| *Harmful* | 30.0<br>(48.3) | 85.0<br>(36.6) | 25.0<br>(50.0) | 0.295 |

| Reporting period | Base | End | Change | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Sample size** | **10** | **20** | **4** | |
| *Both beneficial and harmful* | 30.0<br>(48.3) | 0.0<br>(0.0) | -25.0<br>(50.0) | 0.295 |
| *No effect* | 0.0<br>(0.0) | 5.0<br>(22.4) | 25.0<br>(50.0) | 0.295 |
| Percentage of respondents who report that there are any efforts in the village to resolve the conflict over the disputed area (%) | 90.0<br>(31.6) | 95.0<br>(22.4) | 0.0<br>(0.0) | |
| Percentage of respondents that report […] as an effort to resolve the conflict[1] | | | | |
| *Negotiation with company* | 0.0<br>(0.0) | 73.7<br>(45.2) | 50.0<br>(57.7) | 0.295 |
| *Negotiation with government* | 66.7<br>(50.0) | 21.1<br>(41.9) | -50.0<br>(57.7) | 0.295 |
| *Collective petition* | 0.0<br>(0.0) | 5.3<br>(22.9) | 0.0<br>(0.0) | |
| *Peaceful protests* | 44.4<br>(52.7) | 15.8<br>(37.5) | -50.0<br>(57.7) | 0.295 |
| *Protest using force/violence* | 11.1<br>(33.3) | 5.3<br>(22.9) | 25.0<br>(50.0) | 0.295 |
| Percentage of respondents who are involved in the efforts (%)[2] | 66.7<br>(50.0) | 57.9<br>(50.7) | 25.0<br>(50.0) | 0.626 |

Source: Household survey E9; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values. P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

1. Sample size deviates, the number of observations in the columns, in order, are 9, 19 and 4
2. Sample size deviates, the number of observations in the columns, in order, are 9, 19 and 4

# Annex VII. Qualitative Report on the HuMa project in Rampi

## 1. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. Context of the project

Rampi sub-district is an isolated area in South Sulawesi province, surrounded by hills and mountains. It has luscious and abundant forests which are vibrant with many different types of flora and fauna. Rampi's inhabitants are highly dependent on the forests' natural resources for their livelihoods, as nearly all of them are rice farmers, hunters, or collectors of honey and palm water. Rampi sub-district is also an important ecological buffer zone that contains the sources of clean water for three provinces: West Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, and South Sulawesi. In Rampi society traditional culture is still well preserved. Its inhabitants still actively practice their old traditions and live by their customary laws.

Rampi's remote location and difficult access have long protected its forests and communities against the threats of modern development and industrialization. However, over the recent years more and more companies are discovering Rampi's bountiful forests and are trying to gain access into the territory to undertake (gold) mining activities.

As a result of the increasing mining activities and their polluting waste some natural resources are already growing scarcer and some water sources are affected. Any further damage of Rampi's forest could have disastrous consequences for its eco-system, as well as the indigenous peoples' ability to survive. This is not only the case for Rampi sub-district itself, but also for the surrounding regions that depend on Rampi sub-district for their water supply. The situation in Rampi sub-district is pressing, as its habitants are constantly on the verge of conflict with mining companies that want to take over their forests, as well as the government that has plans to develop and expand mining activities in the area. The recent opening of the Masamba Rampi airport may also worsen the situation as it provides wider opportunities for investors to enter Rampi territory.

HuMa, the Association for Community and Ecologic-Based Law Reform, is an organisation that seeks to empower indigenous communities to defend and strengthen their rights to land and its natural resources. Together with Wallacea[29], a local NGO that aims to achieve indigenous peoples' sovereignty over their natural resources, HuMa implemented workshops in the framework of the "Security of Strengthening Communities Rights & Justice Program" in all 7 villages of Rampi sub-district: Sulaku, Leboni, Onondowa, Dodolo, Rampi, Mohale, and Tedeboe.

The programme has 2 main activities. The first is community law facilitation (PHR[30]) training, which is provided to influential people within communities, such as community leaders, religious leaders, lawyers, etc. The training covers different topics including constitutional rights, revitalization of indigenous/customary law, gender issues, critical legal study, and legal pluralism, and aims to increase people's knowledge and awareness about their land rights, and their ability to make informed decisions about the use of their lands and natural resources. The idea behind the PHR trainings is to train people to become 'community law facilitators' that will pass on their knowledge throughout the rest of their communities. The second activity is participatory mapping, which should result in a map that shows the

[29] Wallacea is an abbreviation of *Wahana Lestari Lingkungan Celebes Area,* translated: 'Forum for the Sustainable Environment of South Sulawesi'.

[30] PHR is an abbreviation of *Pendamping Hukum Rakyat,* translated: 'Community law facilitator'.

borders of the communities' villages and forests and the location of their natural resources and important natural and cultural landmarks, and can be used as a tool to prove and secure indigenous land rights.

The final objective of the HuMa programme is to influence law and policy with regard to indigenous land rights, by building a social movement that pushes for law reform based on social and ecological justice. The idea is to make the indigenous communities the main actors in the law reform process. Both the participatory mapping and the PHR activities form an integral part of this approach.

### 1.2. Evaluation questions and report structure

Firstly, to provide a more detailed description of the context of the project villages, the following research questions were asked: What do the research communities look like? How are they governed? How do the communities use, manage and monitor their natural and cultural resources? What land right conflicts are there in the communities and how are they handled? Secondly, to determine the success of HuMa's programme, the following research questions are discussed: How was the project implemented in the 3 villages? What was the project's impact on the lives of the community members and their ability to manage their natural resources in a sustainable way?

This report will be structured broadly along the lines of these research questions: Chapter 2 contains a description of the research villages. Chapter 3 provides more in-depth information about how the communities manage and monitor their natural and cultural resources, and Chapter 4 investigates land right conflicts, both within and among the communities, and between the communities and outsiders. Turning to HuMa's programme, Chapter 5 discusses the project implementation. Finally, in Chapter 6 we reflect on the practicalities and limitations of the project implementation and the project's impacts on the lives of the community members. Additionally, chapter 7 and 8 are added as an appendix to provide more background information on how the villages and the lives of the community members are governed, and the position that women hold within those communities.

### 1.3. Evaluation methods

For our qualitative evaluation we have chosen to study 3 of the 7 project villages in Rampi sub-district: Rampi, Dodolo, and Onondowa. In each village 2 focus group discussions were held; 1 with men that were part of a farmer group and 1 with women working in the farming trade. All of these informants had taken part in HuMa's project activities. Furthermore, in each village in-depth interviews were held with a number of village representatives: the *Tokey Bola* (customary leader), the village head, the *Topebeloi* (agriculture and forest expert), and the *Pobeloi* (land reclaimer). In Onondowa village the position of *Topebeloi* and *Pobeloi* were occupied by the same person.

## 2. DESCRIPTION OF STUDY LOCATIONS

Rampi sub-district lies within the Luwu Utara District, and can be reached from the District's capital Masamba, which is 95 km away, on motorcycle (*ojek*) or by airplane. A plane ride only takes 20 minutes, but tickets are difficult to get and have to be booked at least one week before departure. There is one alternative road to Rampi which leads from Palopo to Poso. It takes one day to drive from Palopo to Bada. The remaining 37 km through mountains, forests, and footpaths to Rampi have to be travelled by motorcycle, which costs around Rp. 500.000 per person. A map of Rampi sub-district can be found in

Annex III.

## 2.1. Onondowa village

Onondowa is the capital of Rampi sub-district. This village shares borders with Mount Onondowa in the north, Dodolo in the west, Onondowa Forest in the south, and Sulaku in the east. The government office of Rampi sub-district is only 1 km away from the village. Ondonowa village is approximately 40 Ha wide, and has a population of +/- 860 people belonging to 248 families. They have an additional +/- 50 Ha of agricultural land, and a forest area of +/- 150 Ha. There is a church in Onondowa, and most of the residents are Christians.

Residents of Onondowa mostly work as farmers in the field and plantations, while some others work as gold miners. Some residents also work as motorcycle drivers. Residents of Onondowa rely on the forest for the fulfilment of their daily needs. Onondowa's forest still harbours plenty of natural resources, such as hazelnut, coffee, cocoa, eaglewood, wood rosin, and rattan. Just like the other villages in Rampi sub-district, Onondowa village uses spring water and distributes it to the houses through pipes.

Unlike the other villages Onondowa had good communication facilities. There is signal service within 100 meters from the sub-district office and a callers quota of 20 callers. Residents have had mobile phones since 2007. Before, they only used them to play music, but now they can also be used as a means of communication.

Most residents of Onondowa have graduated Elementary, Junior, and High School, and a few have finished studies at the University. Onondowa village has educational facilities, including a Kindergarten, an Elementary School, a Junior School, and a High School. These facilities are attended by many students that are motivated to come to school and study diligently, despite the fact that they are taught by temporary teachers. Onondowa also has health facilities and staff in the village, such a *POLINDES (Poliklinik Desa),* and midwives. However, these facilities are of minimal quality. Because it is so difficult to find medical staff and teachers from outside the area that want to work in Rampi's remote villages, the residents of Rampi-district hope that the government will hire local people to become medical staff and teachers and appoint them as civil servants.

The electricity facilities in Onondowa are not working properly since their Microhydro Electricity system has recently been struck by lightning, causing a black out. At the moment the residents of Onondowa are using generators for lighting.

The road into the village is slippery and of poor quality but can still be travelled by vehicles. Onondowa also has an airport, which serves the Massamba-Rampi and Rampi-Palu routes. The residents of Rampi sub-district expected that the construction of this airport would lead to easy access from Rampi to Masamba and Palu, but in reality it is very hard for the average villager to get a flight ticket, as the airline staff gives priority to rich residents such as gold mine owners and officials.

## 2.2. Dodolo village

Dodolo village is located in the centre of Rampi sub-district. It shares land borders with Onondowa in the south, Rampi village in the north, Morawa Forest in the east, and Rampi Forest in the west. Dodolo village covers an area of approximately +/- 30 Ha inhabited land, +/- 30 Ha of agricultural land/fields, and +/- 2000 Ha of forest. The population of Dodolo village counts around 315 people, belonging to 75 families.

Most residents of Dodolo are farmers. Some of them are also working in the plantations, and some others work as gold miners or motorcycle drivers that transport daily supplies from Bada to Rampi. The average adult inhabitant of Dodolo village has graduated from Elementary, Junior, and High School. Some of the villagers have a University degree.

Residents of Dodolo village strongly rely on the forest as their source of livelihood. For now, there are plenty of natural resources in the village, such as coffee, cocoa, and hazelnut. Dodolo's residents take water from the natural springs, which is delivered to their houses through pipes. The water is used to bath, wash, and cook. The quality of the water is good, but can become turbid after heavy rains and floods. Some residents still wash their laundry in the rivers, but the custom board has recently advised the villagers not to use the water from the river as it is contaminated by gold mining waste from Onondowa. Dodolo village has the facilities to generate Microhydro Electricity from spring water. The cables have been installed to the houses, but due to money laundering by the staff, the system has not been working properly and electricity has not been distributed as it should. Up till now the villagers have been using candles to light up their houses in the evenings. Some of them use batteries or generators to power lamps and other electronic devices.

Road access into the village is poor and the only way to enter the village is by motorcycle or by foot. Due to bad signal service there are no good communication facilities in the village. Some of the residents have got mobile phones, but they mainly use them to play music. When they want to use the mobile phones for communication, they need to travel to Onondowa.

There is only one Elementary School in Dodolo. The school is accessible for all village residents but only a few students attend this school as there are no permanent teachers employed. Dodolo, like all other villages in Rampi-District, has a hard time finding and employing permanent teachers because of its remote location and lack of facilities. The teachers that were mandated to teach in Dodolo decided to live in Masamba (the district's capital) instead and only come to Dodola once a month.

Dodolo doesn't have any health facilities. They have no health centres (*Puskesmas-Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat*) and no midwife. Sick residents have to be brought to the city for treatment and medication. They are prioritized to use airplanes, but will still have to make the one hour trip from Dodolo to the airport in Onondowa.

### 2.3. Rampi village

Rampi village is located about 9 kilometres north of Dodolo village. Rampi shares borders with Onondowa in the north, Tedeboe in the south, Bangko forest in the east, and Seko sub-district in the west. There are 307 people from 67 families living in Rampi. Rampi village covers a total of +/- 272 Ha, including +/- 45 Ha of agriculture land and +/- 200 Ha of forest.

Like the residents of Dodolo, most of Rampi village's residents are farmers and/or work on plantations and in gold mines. Some of them own fishing ponds that they use for business or private consumption. Rampi has a substantial amount of land which is suitable to plant rice on.

Most residents of Rampi have graduated Elementary, Junior, and Senior High School, and some have graduated University. There is one Elementary School and one Kindergarten in this village, but students rarely attend these facilities because the permanent teachers are absent most of the time. If the students are taught at all, this is mostly by temporary teachers. If students want to attend Junior and Senior High School (*SMP* and *SMA*) they have to travel to the sub-district capital on foot, just like the

students from Dodolo village. There is one church in Rampi village. Most of the residents are Christians. On Sundays, residents of Rampi join a mass prayer, children at 7 a.m. and adults at 9 a.m. At noon, residents gather in groups in the houses of the indigenous leaders to pray and to discuss their problems and village issues. There are no health care facilities in Rampi village, because the medical staff doesn't want to live in Rampi because of its remote location.

The road that accesses the village is slippery and damaged, but can with great effort be traversed by motorcycles and other vehicles. There is no mobile phone service in Rampi village. To use their mobile phones the villagers have to travel to Onondowa.

Rampi village is one step ahead of the other villages with regard to electricity facilities. Their Microhydro Electricity system is running, so the residents of Rampi don't have to rely on generators, which they now only use in case of power failures.

# 3. MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

## 3.1. Natural resources

Situated on a plateau and surrounded by green hills, Rampi sub-district has abundant natural resources such as forests, water, gold, rice, corn, eagle wood, wood rosin, rattan, honey, dwarf buffalo (*anoa)*, various types of birds, livestock (cows, horses, pigs), and many other forest animals. Some residents of Rampi sub-district still use cows to plough the field and horses to transport goods. The land in Rampi is used as a place for living, fields, plantations, fishing ponds, and livestock farming. The fields are planted with rice, corn, yam, etc. Some of the forest land has been converted to coffee-, hazelnut-, and cocoa plantations. The main water source for Rampi residents is the rivers. This water is also used for irrigation. Nowadays, clean water is being distributed to houses and some villages have Microhydro Electricity Systems (*Pembangkit Listrik Tenaga Mikrohydro-PLTMH*).

However, nowadays, it is getting more and more difficult to find natural resources such as rattan and wood in the forests of Rampi. Not only have they become scarcer, but villagers also have to travel further to find them. This is partly due to an increased usage by the residents themselves, who use these natural resources to build houses, etc. Livestock raising is still done in the conventional way, which means that the animals are free to roam around the villages. This is problematic because the animals leave dirt throughout the villages, and sometimes wander through the farmer fields and damage the crops.

## 3.2. Livelihood activities based on natural resources

Most of the residents of Rampi sub-district are farmers. They start working in the field or plantation in the early morning and finish in the afternoon. The way of farming has recently changed due to an increased need of space for agricultural practices. Before, farmers used to regularly change location and leave fields lie fallow. Now, farmers choose one place as their field and continue to plant coffee, cocoa, or hazelnut throughout the year. The lands that lay fallow before have now been planted with yam, corn, and other plants, or are used as fishing ponds. Rampi's residents want to improve the way they manage their natural resources, but a lack of funds, technology, knowledge, and skilled people makes it difficult for them to develop their farms and other businesses. Poor road access and transportation facilities worsen the condition, as products cannot easily be exported outside the region.

### 3.3. Natural resource management

The management and use of natural resources in Rampi sub-district still heavily relies on the customary laws. Examples of these customary laws are: 'Residents may not damage others' plants, may not burn their forests and fields, may not use chemical fertilizers when planting rice, and may not cut too many trees'. Since the emergence of gold mining sites in Onondowa, parts of the forests have been converted into mines. In response the customary board has made new rules related to gold mining activities, one of which is the prohibition of the use of chemicals in mining activities.[31]

The village government has also shown its support of these rules by publishing a government rule that appoints mining as a form of Native Village Income (*Penghasilan Asli Desa*: PAD). One of the sources of income is the fines that are charged to people that violate the forest regulations and laws. The management of PAD is done by the customary board. They are the ones that decide on the penalties for perpetrators, which is usually a fine in the form of money or livestock. If livestock is paid as a penalty, it is distributed among the residents of the village and a party will be held as a symbol of peace making between the two parties involved in the conflict.

> There will be a fine paid to the custom board if one party burns out a forest. Each of the violation has its own fine. For example: one will have to pay Rp. 1.500.000 for doing bomb fishing in the river (Focus group discussion with men in Onondowa).

Even though new regulation have been made, the residents of Rampi are still worried about the potential damaging effect gold mining may have on Rampi's ecosystem. When our informants were asked how they thought their forests and villages would look like within 5 years times, they mentioned that they feared that the wall of the Tomonongka river and other rivers, some agricultural lands (for example Kompe and Timo Oni in Onondowa village), some animal species, and the conditions of the road would (further) deteriorate as a result of illegal gold mining activities. On the other hand, the people had good hope for the future of their rice fields and some parts of the forests where they said a lot of trees were seen to be growing.

## 4. MANAGEMENT OF CULTURAL RESOURCES

### 4.1. Cultural resources

The residents of Rampi-district have a rich local culture, and still adhere to a lot of their traditional customs such as rituals for planting and harvesting crops (for example a welcoming ceremony for rice, praying in the field and feasting after harvest), traditional dances, playing music on their traditional instruments, and making traditional clothing from 'wooden leather' which can be found in the forests. Rampi's forests also harbour various sites that are of cultural and historical importance, such as the old villages, the old fields, sites that display ancestral sculptures, and Kalibamba Mountain which is the place of human creation according to Rampi mythology.

[31] According to our informants HuMa and Wallacea did not play any role in the making of these rules.

### 4.2. Cultural resource management

Rampi sub-district manages its cultural resources by continuing to follow its customs and traditions. Nowadays, Rampi has a special women's group that is concerned with the preservation of Rampi culture. It does so by taking care of issues regarding customary activities, marriage customs, and women's rights, by making traditional clothing made of wood crust, and by participating in culture exhibitions to promote Rampi culture.

> Residents are very committed to preserve their cultural customs such as the traditional wedding ceremony, so the next generation will not forget the traditions and culture. There are groups of women who try to preserve the culture by showing traditional costumes in an exhibition (Focus group discussion with women in Onondowa).

Another important thing to notice is the effort made by the customary board to preserve Rampi's cultural customs and traditions by documenting them in the form of written reports, pictures, and videos. The events and activities that are undertaken by the customary board, have also received the approval and support of the village- and district government within the last 2 years.

Even though HuMa and Wallacea did not play any role in the documentation of Rampi's culture or the founding of the women's group (which already existed before the project was implemented), their mapping activities did have an effect on the attitudes of the villagers towards the preservation of their traditional culture. Some informants, for example, said that the mapping had made them realize even more how great their traditional culture was and how important it was to preserve it.

## 5. CONFLICTS

### 5.1. Conflicts within and between villages

According to our informants, including the village heads of Dodolo and Rampi village, there have never been any serious issues with regard to land rights within the villages. However, a conflict about village boundaries has occurred between Onondowa village and Dodolo village. According to the *Tokey Bola* of Onondowa this conflict was solved through discussions and mediation by the customary board. Wallacea also played a part in solving this conflict by organising discussions with farmers, (re)measuring borders, and acting as mediator between the customary leaders of the 2 villages.

The fact that serious conflicts between villagers and neighbouring villages in Rampi only rarely happen can be explained by the fact that all residents in Rampi have their own land and know the boundaries of their land. Secondly, the escalation of conflicts is prevented by the existence of – and strong adherence to - customary laws about land management, such as the rule that people are not allowed to sell their land to 'outsiders' (people who are not Rampi residents). According to the *Tokey Bola* (customary leader) of Dodolo village, land conflict settlement is now better handled than in the past. While before only the customary leaders were involved in conflict settlement, nowadays conflicts about land rights are solved by the customary board and the village government together, often also involving the religious leaders. Usually, the 2 conflicting parties are made to sit down together and discuss their issues under mediation of the customary board.

## 5.2. Conflicts with outsiders

Even though no serious land-related conflicts have yet occurred between Rampi's villagers and outsiders, the potential for conflicts with mining companies and the government is very much present. According to some of our informants the community is worried about the process of peg mounting on the lands owned by residents that is being done by the Department of Forestry. The process is already taking up to 5 years, and the government officials have still not given any explanation about why it is being done. Meanwhile, the villagers continue to work on the land, but live in fear that the pegs are put there to indicate the borders of what will become protected forest instead of community land. In an attempt to subvert the problem, the customary board received assistance from AMAN[32] to organise a meeting with the government. In this meeting the customary leaders told the government that the community was unhappy about the peg mounting and asked them to remove the pegs from their lands. However, no action has yet been taken by the government to do so.

Another conflict that might potentially happen in the future is with the Aribama mining company that is planning to run its business in Rampi. The company claims it has received a land acquisition license from the government, and is therefore allowed to use residents' land for their business activities. However, the residents of Rampi refuse to let the company in, as the following statement of the *Topebeloi* (agriculture and forest expert) of Dodolo shows:

> To counter the effort of indigenous land grabbing, we agreed not to give the company a chance. We are now brave to fight. A long time ago, residents were afraid to violate the border, but because the capacity of the community has now improved, they are motivated to fight for their rights over their land.

When we asked the *Topebeloi* if he could clarify his statement about the capacity of the community being improved, he said that he meant that "…the community members had gained new awareness and insights about protecting their natural resources, as a result of Wallacea's socialization about village boundaries, forest conversion, and environmental damages".

Recently, an Australian mining company has also tried to set foot in Rampi. The community's attitudes towards this company have been different than those towards the Aribama company because the Australian mining company has promised to undertake their mining activities with eco-friendly machinery and without the use of chemicals, and has pledged to invest in community development. The customary boards of all villages in Rampi sub-district have already agreed to let the company operate in Rampi, except for the customary board of Onondowa village, who are still contemplating the pros and cons for the society. Because the company would be located in Onondowa the final right to decide lies with the customary board of Onondowa.

Rampi sub-district is no stranger to land conflicts with mining companies. For example, in the past another land right conflict occurred when a mining company attempted to seize mining spots in

[32] Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (AMAN) translated as Indigenous Peoples Alliance of Archipelago is an independent social organisation comprised of Indigenous communities from various parts of the Indonesia Archipelago. AMAN is a forum for the struggle of Indigenous Peoples in matters relating to upholding the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in politics, social, economic, cultural and natural resources through just and sustainable ways (source: http://ccmin.aippnet.org/index.php/aman-indonesia, viewed 02-12-2014).

Onondowa territory.

The people of Rampi have shown that they are willing to fight for their natural resources, and have already taken actions against mining companies. For example: members of the customary board together with some community members have visited the leaders of a mining company to warn them about the threats of mining waste contaminating the river water the residents use for their daily needs and the maintenance of their livestock. They also threatened the company leaders that, if they wouldn't change their ways, the villagers would sue them and ask the government to withdraw the company's license to mine in the area. In the past years the customary board has also often held discussions about how to deal with the gold mining issues, and has taken steps in developing new customary regulations related to mining activities.

According to our informants the residents of Rampi sub-district have a positive outlook on the future and believe that, with the new knowledge they acquired through the mapping activities, they are able to handle any conflicts over land use and land rights that will occur between the community and companies or government.

# 6. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

## 6.1. Participatory mapping

As discussed earlier, the HuMa/Wallacea project has two main activities: participatory mapping and PHR trainings. In this paragraph the implementation of the participatory mapping activities will be discussed. The different stages of the participatory mapping process in the 3 villages of study are described below.

Wallacea started off the mapping project by holding a socialization workshop in each of the villages to explain the details of the project, and discuss with the communities how, when, and where the mapping activities could best be implemented. The socialization workshops were joined by village leaders, village officials, members of the customary board, religious leaders, as well as the community members. Youth and women were present during the workshop, but the role of the women was mostly limited to providing food.

After the socialization workshops, the village apparatus (village leaders and officials, religious leaders, and members of the customary board) and community members (men and youth) decided together on who among themselves should become the members of the pioneering teams: the people that would collect the GPS points in the forest. No women were chosen as members of the pioneering teams.

> I do not know what the training was like as I was not involved in the training. Only selected men joined it. Those were representatives of youth, the custom board, as well as village officials (Female focus group participant from Onondowa).

The people that were assigned to the pioneering team then received training on how to use GPS devices to take coordinate points in the field. This training was facilitated by Wallacea, and was done in one day.

After the training the pioneering teams (2 teams for Rampi, 1 for Onondowa, and 1 for Dodolo) and the facilitators from Wallacea went into the forests to collect the coordinate points. The full process

of the GPS data collection took them approximately one week. The activity involved measuring the boundaries between villages, sub-districts, and provinces. The pioneering teams also made notes of the important natural and cultural landmarks and sites in those areas, such as sculptures, old villages, old fields, and mountains.

When the pioneering teams were finished with their field activities, they brought their data back to the villages, and organised a discussion with the village leaders, customary leaders, religious leaders, and the community members. The objective of this discussion was to check the validity and accuracy of the data that was found in the field. All participants of the discussion could ask questions and had the right to make corrections. After an agreement about the data was reached, it was handed in for the final stage: the making of the map.

The processing of the GPS data - transferring all the data to the computer and making it into a map - is complicated work. Therefore, the task was fully being done by Wallacea staff, and no community leaders or community members were involved during this stage.

The ultimate aim of the mapping project is to create a 3D map which depicts the whole of Rampi sub-district area with all its borders and important sites, and then submit the map to local government in order to get the communities' rights over their lands officially recognized. However, at the moment of our study the map was not yet completely finished, though a simplified version of the map was already on display in the village office in Onondowa.

## 6.2. PHR activities

Wallacea also organised PHR activities in villages in Rampi. Generally, the aim of PHR activities is to train influential people in the villages to become 'community law facilitators' that know how to successfully manage and maintain their forests, know how to fight for the rights over their lands, and will pass on their knowledge to their communities.

However, for its implementation in the villages in Rampi sub-district, Wallacea has chosen a slightly different strategy whereby they not only targeted the influential people in the villages, but also directly involved the general population in their activities. Wallacea for example organised non-formal discussions among small groups of residents that were gathered in the fields, farms, churches, houses, *baruga*, and other public places. In each village various topics were discussed such as farming and agriculture, natural resources management, forest conservation, the destruction of nature, and mapping. In Onondowa, a movie about the environment was shown and people from other villages were also invited to watch it. The participants of these PHR activities varied from group to group, but included farmers, women, youth, as well as local leaders. According to our informants, these discussions have strongly benefitted the society by increasing the people's knowledge about the importance of preserving the environment.

Apart from organising these community discussions, Wallacea also invited some local leaders (from the village government, customary council, and church) to attend workshops about environmental damage and the preservation of natural resources. These trainings coincided with the socialization stage of the participatory mapping. Some of the customary leaders we interviewed said they had also attended a seminar on 'indigenous maintaining' at the time of the socialization workshop, and had tried to pass the knowledge they obtained during this seminar on to their community members.

Wallacea chose to refrain from using the limiting term 'PHR' in relation to the discussions and workshops organised by them, so that they could adapt a more informal approach for the project activities' implementation. As a result, none of our informants recognized the term 'PHR' when we asked them about it. However, the informants confirmed the activities had taken place by reciting stories about the discussions and workshops, and their relevance and benefits to the community.

# 7. Reflections on the project's implementation and its impacts on the lives of the community members

## 7.1. Reflection on the participatory mapping activities

Our first consideration about the project is that (at the time of our research) the process of participatory mapping was not yet finished, as no final map had yet been published and therefore no efforts had yet been done to legitimize the map and to get the government to acknowledge Rampi's indigenous people's rights over their forests. The slow pace of the project seems to be caused by at least 2 obstacles: the limited number of skilled community members, and the remote location of the villages which makes it difficult and expensive for HuMa's and Wallacea's staff to visit the communities. In the original HuMa project planning only one visit from Wallacea to Rampi had been budgeted. However, since 2012, Wallacea has visited Rampi 3 times together with AMAN. Sainal Abidin, the executive director of Wallacea, mentioned that Wallacea feels a moral responsibility to finish the mapping project in Rampi, because the government is planning to develop and expand mining activities in the area which will be disastrous for the sustainability of Rampi's forests and its riches. Wallacea has therefore tried to search for additional sources of funding, which they eventually found through one of Sainal Abidin's friends who worked for JKPP (*Jaringan Kerja Pemetaan Partisipatif* or 'the Participatory Network'). The funding is coming from Oxfam, but is distributed to Wallacea's mapping project through JPKK. Even though Wallacea has been able to continue their project activities, they have not yet been able to deliver many results. Because the final area map of Rampi sub-district is not yet finished, we cannot determine if it will contain all the relevant and detailed information (for example about the location of borders, houses, rivers, caves and roads, flora and fauna distribution, rainfall patterns, wealth distributions, etc.) the communities need to manage their resources and convince the government of their rights to the lands. However, Rampi's forests are under immediate threat from land grab attempts and the damaging effects of existing mining companies, and it is therefore of immense importance that Wallacea finishes the map as soon as possible.

Our second consideration about the mapping process is that it has not sufficiently empowered the local communities to undertake the mapping activities on their own. Firstly, the mapping team mainly consisted of village leaders and members of the customary council, and as a result only a few local residents (mostly youth) learned how to undertake map sketching and how to use GPS technology to take coordinate points in the forests. Secondly, nobody from the villages, not even the village leaders, received training on how to process the GPS data and make it into a map. This means that the communities are still dependent on outside parties, such as Wallacea, to be able to undertake a complete mapping exercise and produce, update and maintain their maps.

Furthermore, it seems that the female residents have benefitted less from the mapping

activities compared to the male residents. Women were only included in the socialization stage of the mapping process, and even then were often too busy with providing food to the other participants to actively partake in the discussions. No women took part in the pioneering activities. However, some informants mentioned that participating in the project activities had made them more knowledgeable about gender issues and women emancipation.

Even though the map has not yet been finished, it has already proven beneficial to the local communities. The mapping of the boundaries between the villages has for example cleared up some uncertainties about the exact location of the borders between Onondowa and Dodolo village. The exact location of the borders could now be established amicably, but could otherwise have led to a serious conflict in the future. However, only when the map is fully completed will the local communities be able to use the map to prevent or win land right conflict with outsiders such as mining companies or the government. The map could then serve as a tool for the communities to claim their rights over their ancestral lands and their ways of managing those lands according to Rampi's customary rules.

## 7.2. Reflection on the PHR activities

Our data shows that HuMa/Wallacea have combined their PHR activities with the implementation of the mapping process. The reason for this is that HuMa/Wallacea only had a limited budget to spend on staff trips to and from Rampi, which are expensive and arduous due to Rampi's remote location. Nevertheless, the fact remains that HuMa/Wallacea have not executed their PHR activities with as much attention and as thoroughly as they should have to reach maximum results. Our data shows that the participants not always fully understood the materials that were presented during the workshops and discussions. By putting greater effort and more time in the implementation of the discussions and workshops and by covering a larger variety of topics, Wallacea should be able to instil in Rampi's residents a deeper understanding of the issues and solutions at hand.

For now, it is difficult to determine to what extent the PHR discussions and workshops in Rampi have had an effect on people's awareness and behaviour with regard to land conversion and sustainable natural resource management. On the one hand, our informants clearly stated that the project had given people new awareness and insights about the value and worth of their forests, as well as their traditional culture, and making them realize how important it was to protect and preserve their natural resources and cultural customs. Some of the respondents also mentioned that they felt confident that, with the knowledge they acquired through the mapping activities, they would be able to handle any future conflicts over land use and land rights between the community and companies or government. Furthermore, the village apparatus' concern about the negative effect of the gold mining activities is shown by the fact that the customary board often held discussions about the issue, and has taken steps in developing new regulations with regard to gold mining. There is also a visible willingness among Rampi's communities to fight for their forests, as can for example be seen from the visit representatives of the villages made to leaders of one of the mining companies operating in their district to complain about the damage done to their environment and threaten the company leaders with a law suit, as well as the villagers' persistent refusal to let the new Aribama mining company enter their territory.

On the other hand, at the same time, a contradictory increase in gold mining activities -and damage of natural resources- is occurring in Onondowa. This increase is facilitated by both the companies and the local residents themselves. The residents' reason for allowing the mining companies

to keep operating has much to do with the fact that many residents make money from the mining activities. Conflicts over who should be allowed to work on the mining sites have even occurred between Rampi's residents and people from outside Rampi that had especially come to Rampi to work on the mining sites. The fact that these newcomers brought along their own values and customs – sometimes incompatible with Rampi's culture and customary rules-, thereby affecting the social life of Rampi, also played a part in the emergence of these conflicts. In addition, some influential people in Rampi administration keep setting a bad example for the community members by being involved in the mining industry themselves. Among them is the *Tokey Bola* of Onondowa who currently holds a high position in a gold mining business. When confronted, these village officials say that the mining activities they are supporting don't make use of destructive machinery, and that they did not realize 'their' type of mining activities could cause damage to Rampi's nature, even though these activities are forbidden by the customary law they themselves exert.

In short, Rampi's communities do not yet seem to consistently apply the knowledge they were taught during the socialization stage of the mapping and the PHR discussions and workshops. The extent to which the project has managed to improve people's awareness and behaviour towards sustainable natural resource management can thus not be unilaterally measured.

## 7.3. Final considerations


If HuMa and/or Wallacea were to continue the programme or implement it elsewhere in the world, we think it would be of paramount importance that they would improve its activities by more strongly aiming them towards achieving community empowerment, i.e.: increasing residents' knowledge, collective awareness, willingness, and capacity to make smart choices and independently manage their natural and cultural resources, and secure the rights to their lands so that they can protect it against damage and threats by outsiders in the future. Active participation of the community members is key in these endeavours, and for the project to be effective Wallacea should facilitate and push the community members to be actively involved in all the stages of the project, as well as putting a stronger focus on proper and effective knowledge transfer to the communities.

# APPENDIX

## 8. GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE OF RAMPI


The structure of the government in Rampi sub-district's village is similar to that of other villages in Indonesia. Rampi is led by the village head, who is assisted by the village secretary, as well as four 'heads of village affairs' (development, administration, finance, and general issues). There is also a Board of Village Representatives (*Badan Perwakilan Desa-BPD*), assigned to represent and fight for residents' rights and wishes. Rampi is an integral part of Luwuk Utara District and South Sulawesi Province, so they abide to the same law. Below the structure of village government in Rampi is displayed.

**Figure 5: The structure of the village government**




In the villages in Rampi the village government doesn't exist on its own. There is also a customary board that helps the village government take care of social problems and regulates affairs relating to custom, community life, and village development. Its structure can be described as follows:

**Figure 6: The structure of the customary board**




As can be seen in the figure above, the customary board counts 11 positions:

- *Tokey Tongko* : Customary leader of Rampi sub-district / all Rampi villages
- *Tokey Bola* : Customary leader of a village
- *Kabilaha* : Judge
- *Barorai* : Security guard
- *Kadulakoh* : General
- *Topekoalo* : Spokesman
- *Tobrolia* : Customary doctor
- *Toponoroo* : Customary singer
- *Pantuah* : Customary treasurer
- *Topobeloi* : Head of farmer groups / Agriculture and forest expert
- *Tomoko* : Farming expert

The *Tokey Tongko* is the highest leader of Rampi's indigenous society, and operates at the same level as the sub-district government head. The *Tokey Tongko* is the head of 7 *Tokey Bola*, the indigenous leaders of the 7 villages of Rampi sub-district. Both the *Tokey Tongko* and the *Tokey Bola* play important roles in maintaining and preserving Rampi's culture and customs, its norms and values, the social order, the sovereignty of the society, and the spirituality of Rampi's residents.

The customary board rules society according to Rampi's customary laws that have been applied in the villages throughout many generations, as well as new rules that can be made by the customary board if the necessity arises. The customary rules have been written down for documentation, independently from the HuMa/Wallacea project.

The customary law applies to all residents of Rampi, regardless age, social- and economic status, religion, and position, and all residents are obedient to the rules. To illustrate this, one of our informants told us a story about a *Tokey Tongko* (the highest customary leader within Rampi sub-district) that got

into a fight with a miner. The *Tokey Tongko* was called before the customary board, was declared guilty, and was charged with the fine of one cow which he had to give to the miner as compensation.

The village government supports the customary board's implementation of the customary law in the villages, and overall the village government and customary board work closely together in regulating village affairs. This can, for example, be seen reflected in the villages' security management:

> There is only one police officer in this village, and there are only two soldiers here. It is the customary board that's solving all the problems that occur in this village (Focus group discussion for men in Onondowa).

The role of the customary board is very strong in Rampi sub-district. Not only because the board and the customary law are well respected by the villagers, but also because some heads of villages often spend time away from the village for long periods of time in which case the leadership role will be entirely fulfilled by the *Tokey Bola* (the customary leader of the village). Overall our informants seemed to think more highly of the customary leader than the village leader, as can be seen from the statement of one of the male focus group participants in Dodolo:

> The role of the village government is quite a lot, but they do not do their jobs well. On the other hand, the role of Tokey Bola is really good. He really pays attention to the society. Meanwhile, the village government does not really affect the society. The condition of our village is its reflection.

The village government and customary board often also collaborate with the church in regulating society's life, especially with regard to village empowerment. This collective leadership between the 3 different parties gives Rampi sub-district a special and unique character compared to other sub-districts in Luwu Utara District and Indonesia.

## 9. THE POSITION OF WOMEN IN RAMPI SOCIETY

Most of the women in Rampi sub-district are housewives. Their main tasks are cooking, cleaning, providing clean water to the household, taking care of their children and husband and reminding them to pray. Men are regarded as the head of the household and are expected to provide for their families, even though in reality women often also contribute to the family income.

Within community life women are bound by some restrictions dictated by customary law. Women can't, for example, become *ojek* drivers and can't pick up wood. They are also prohibited to go to the forest in the evenings, and are not allowed to visit other houses if there is only one man inside. Furthermore, women have to adhere to customary dress-regulations, as illustrated by the statement of one of the male focus group participants in Dodoma:

> Women are not allowed to wear trousers when they go to the church, but they can wear them when doing chores.

With regard to village politics and decision making, women have the freedom to participate in any activity or programme that is available in the village, and have the right to speak during discussions.

However, in reality their role usually only consists of catering food. Women in Rampi do have their own organisations: women groups that are for example active in government programmes such as PNPM (National Programme to Empower the Community).

Over the past few years, women's role in community life and village politics has increased. Some women have, for example, become religious leaders. It is also getting more and more common that women with leadership skills nominate themselves for leadership positions, such as that of village head. Some informants mentioned that the HuMa project has increased their knowledge about gender issues and women emancipation, but the discourse about women as leaders had already started to change before the start of the project, at least partly due to people's increased exposure to other cultures and ideas via electronic media (such as television). It is therefore hard to determine how much the project has really contributed to this change in the people's mentality.

For now, no women are yet assigned to the customary board, but women are often involved in the process of problem solving. When there is an issue, such as an extra-marital love affair between villagers, a conflict over land ownership, or even disagreements between members of the customary board itself, women are asked to discuss the problem and to help decide who's to blame and what a suitable punishment is. The role of women as mediators was confirmed by some of the male participant of the focus group discussion in Dodolo, who stated that: "Women play important roles. They are mediators of conflict".

Women also play a role in the management of natural resources. They are, for example, involved in the regulation of water in the fields and the use of manure for fertilizing crops. They also have a role in instilling awareness and concern for the preservation of natural resources in their husbands and children.

# Annex VIII. Literature review on participatory mapping[33]

## *Introduction*

Even though the existence of participatory mapping activities is very important in a country like Indonesia where an estimated 48 million indigenous people still depend on the forest for their livelihood, but where mining, logging and oil palm industry are destroying more than 1 million hectares of rainforest territory each year[34] (Telapak & Gekko Studio 2011), the academic literature on participatory mapping within specific Indonesian context is quite limited. This may, at least in part, have to do with the political sensitivities involved in mapping, that can be especially critical for Indonesian indigenous peoples that have since long had a particularly uneasy relation with government and, until very recently, had to cope with a severe lack of legal protection. Luckily, a lot of additional information can be found in manuals, project evaluations, working papers, and online blogs, tutorial videos, etc. which are most often published in more recent years by the international organisations that implement the mapping projects in Indonesia. This literature review therefore draws on academic literature on participatory mapping both within and without Indonesian context, as well as other (mostly online) sources that are more specifically focused on mapping projects undertaken in Indonesia or Southeast Asia. It will cover the following topics: What is participatory mapping, what tools and methods are used, history and development of participatory mapping, reported impacts, and considerations about "good practice".

## *What is participatory mapping?*

Participatory mapping is a general term[35] used to define a set of approaches and techniques that combine the tools of modern cartography with participatory methods to create a map of a local community's habitat that represents this community's spatial knowledge (Rainforest Foundation UK 2014). "NGO's, from small local ones to large international ones, often play a crucial role as interlocutors, trainers, advocates and facilitators in these mapping activities" (IFAD 2009: 5).

Participatory mapping is used over the whole world, and the maps that are produced can take on many forms, and can be used to achieve various different purposes. Looking at the available literature and documentation on participatory mapping initiatives the most common aim of participatory mapping appears to be to help marginalized groups, in particular indigenous, pastoralist and forest dwellers, to claim and/or defend their (access to) ancestral lands and its resources, typically by working towards legal recognition of their land rights, using the maps as evidence of their continued residency. The maps can also serve as a tool for community land use planning and natural resource management, and can be used to bring resource-related problems, such as the impacts of logging, mining, and 'land grab' activities, to the attention of governmental authorities and decision makers

[33] Please note beforehand that part of this text has been taken over into the main text of the report. In addition, this annex is also included as annex in MDG projects E2, E3 and E8.

[34] Making Indonesia the fastest forest clearing nation in the world since 2012, and also the world's third largest emitter of carbon dioxide emissions, behind China and the United States (Telapak & Gekko Studio 2011).

[35] The numerous initiatives throughout the world aren't always referred to with the words 'participatory mapping', but can go by many different terms, including: "indigenous mapping" (IFAD 2009: 6) , "…"participatory land use mapping," "participatory resource mapping" (Mbile *et al*. 2003), "community mapping" (Bennagen & Royo 2000, Eghenter 2000, Fox 2002), "community-based mapping" (Flavelle 2002), "ethnocartography" (Chapin & Threlkeld 2001, Gonzalez *et al*. 1995), and "counter-mapping" (Peluso 1995, Kosek 1998, Hodgson & Schroeder 2002)…" (as cited in Chapin *et al*. 2005: 622-623).

(Chapin *et al*. 2005: 620; Di Gessa 2008; Rainforest Foundation UK 2014; Literat 2013: 200; IFAD 2009: 9-12, 39). Some indigenous groups are now using mapping to monitor and defend lands against deforestation, illegal timber extraction, prospecting, and colonization (Teague c. 2010: 10). Other purposes of participatory mapping activities include the strengthening of indigenous political organisation, economic development planning, the documentation of history and customs for culture preservation, education of indigenous youths and/or the general public (Chapin *et al*. 2005: 620), and support for conflict resolution in territory-related disputes (Di Gessa 2008).

Participatory mapping processes in general don't follow usual cartographic conventions. The maps that are produced often represent a socially or culturally distinct understanding of landscape and include information that is excluded from mainstream or official maps. The aim is to create a map that depicts local knowledge about the environment, and represents and serves the agenda of the community (IFAD 2009: 7). Participatory maps can present spatial information at various scales, from detailed information of village layout and infrastructure, to a more general depiction of large areas. Elements that can be included in a map are for instance: territorial land boundaries, land-use occupancy, hunting- fishing- and gathering grounds, the location/distribution of flora and fauna, important landmarks such as rivers, caves, roads, and location of houses, but also information on rainfall patterns, health patterns, wealth distributions, etc. Furthermore, the maps can depict places of social, cultural and/or historical significance, such as ancestral burial grounds, sacred areas, cultural sites and trails, and information on cultural customs, traditions, and mythology (IFAD 2009: 6-7).

What further distinguishes participatory mapping from traditional cartography and map-making is the process by which the maps are made (IFAD 2009: 4): Community members are involved (preferably) throughout the whole mapping process and recognized as capable research collaborators and experts on their own local surroundings and needs (IFAD 2009: 4; Pathways Through Participation 2010: 1). According to Fox *et al*. (2003, as cited in Wright *et al*. 2009: 261) the reasons for choosing a participatory mapping approach are usually not only practical (i.e. the actual production of the map and using it as evidence for land claims, or as community advocacy tools), but also intrinsic, as the communal aspect of the mapping process can enhance group awareness and cultural identity, facilitate the passing down of historical knowledge through generations, and build trust and communication between people.

### *Tools and methods*

Participatory mapping uses a range of tools and methods, of which some of the principles ones are:

**"hands on mapping"**, which is a basic method in which the community draws a map from memory on the ground (also called "ground mapping") or on paper (also called "sketch mapping");

**"Participatory mapping using scale maps and images"**, where local knowledge and information is added to a pre-existing image (such as an aerial or satellite image);

**"Participatory 3-D modelling (P3DM)"**, which is used for hilly or mountainous areas. Layers of elevation are cut out of cardboard in the shape and contours of the landscape and placed on top of each other, after which paint, pins and strings are used to show surface information and to indicate boundaries and conflict areas. Data depicted on such a 3-D model can also be extracted, digitized and incorporated into a Geographical Information System (GIS);

**"GPS based field mapping"**, in which geographical reference points of boundaries, landmarks, etc. are collected and are put on top of a map, often using GIS to store, retrieve and analyse the GPS data;

**"Computer based map making"**, where graphic software (such as Adobe Illustrator) and GIS are used to make geographically accurate maps, and;
**"Multimedia and internet-based mapping"**, which draws on Web 2.0 technology to create interactive, computer based maps that contain links to digital video, pictures, audio and written text (Pathways Through Participation 2010: 4). This increasingly popular method, makes it better possible to document the complexities and the oral and visual aspects of local knowledge (Di Gessa 2008: 6-9; IFAD 2009: 13-19; Rainforest Foundation UK 2011).[36]

The choice of methods to be used in a participatory mapping project is determined by many factors, such as the problems the community is facing and wants to resolve, the available resources (financial, and in terms of staff and equipment), and the community's physical context (is it hilly or plain) (IFAD 2009: 13) as well as its cultural context (norms, values, customs) (Rainforest Foundation UK 2011).

### *History and development*

#### Over the world

Local people have been drawing maps of their territories to develop a sense of place and identity for centuries (Pathways Through Participation 2010: 2). However, mapping of indigenous lands as a participatory exercise and a means for "securing tenure, managing natural resources, and strengthening cultures", often facilitated by outsiders, is a more recent phenomenon (Chapin *et al*. 2005: 619).

According to Chapin *et al.* the first participatory mapping exercises started in Canada and Alaska in the 1960's (2005: 619). The rest of the world only followed much later, approximately 25-30 years ago, when participatory mapping projects started to rapidly proliferate from Southeast Asia through Central Asia, Africa, Europe, North-, South- and Central America to Australasia (IFAD 2009: 7).

"In the development literature, mapping is identified as having many different sources – from social anthropology to participatory action research and popular education" (Pathways Through Participation 2010: 2). Throughout the years, mapping has become increasingly popular and prominent (Ibid: 13), which "many commentators ascribe to the developments in Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) which emerged in the late 1980s in South Asia and combined insights from agro-ecosystem analysis with Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA)" (Ibid: 2).

"The more technically oriented participatory mapping work began filling the field in the mid- and late 1990s, when computerized mapping technology became more widely available" (Chapin *et al*. 2005: 623). "Those engaged in participatory mapping are increasingly taking advantage of new, digital and web-based Technologies" (Teague c. 2010: 13), which are being developed and improved by large corporations such as Google (Google Maps and Google Earth), ESRI (developers of the principal GIS used word-wide) and Garmin (producer of GPS hardware and software) especially for this purpose (Teague c. 2010: 13).

[36] More information on the different methodologies and their advantages, disadvantages, ways of implementation, suitable contexts, etc. can be found in the manuals of IFAD (2009) and Di Gessa (2008). For additional information on participatory 3-D modelling in specific also see Vandergeest (1996), Rubiano *et al.* (1997), Rambaldi & Callosa-Tarr (2000), Flavelle (2002), Hoare *et al.* (2002), De Vera *et al*. (2003), and Rhoades & Moates (2003) (as cited in Chapin *et al.* 2005: 623)

### In Indonesia

According to Peluso early forms of participatory mapping entered Indonesia in the 1980s via conventional (eco) conservation projects by international organisations such as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), after which Indonesian activists took the opportunity to "… reinterpret this kind of mapping as a sort of resistance and counter-movement to state mapping, which did not consider people's rights but instead was a basis for exploitive development projects under the Suharto regime" (1995: 398-400, as cited in Hartjati Sanmukri 2013: 123).

Over the past 1.5 decade, communities from nearly every region in Indonesia have been trained in the technical and facilitation skills required to undertake participatory mapping, and by 2009 1.5 million hectares of land had already been mapped by local communities (IFAD 2009: 22). The Indonesian community mapping network (Jaringan Kerja Pemetaan Partisipatif or JKPP), established by the mapping activists in 1996 in Bogor, West Java, has been instrumental in achieving these goals (IFAD 2009: 22). I.a. by forming an alliance with AMAN and the Forest Watch Indonesia to advocate for the customary maps to become officially recognized and fed into the "Ancestral Domain Registration Agency" (Badan Registrasi Wilayah Adat): The government's official national database of forest cover. In 2011 AMAN signed an MoU with the National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional), which officially stated that "indigenous" maps would be integrated into governmental data (Hartjati Sanmukri 2013: 123).

On May 16'th 2013 another important milestone for the recognition of indigenous peoples' ancestral land rights was reached, when – in response to a petition of AMAN - the constitutional court in Jakarta ruled that the customary forests of indigenous peoples should no longer be classed as falling in "State Forest Areas"[37] (Forest Peoples Programme 2013), officially giving customary forest its own status and position in the Forestry Law, and - at least in theory - returning the rights over the customary forests (seized by the state through UUK[38]) to its indigenous inhabitants (REDD-Monitor 2013). This development could greatly enhance the success rate of indigenous people's endeavours to lay claims to their lands and thereby protect their sources of livelihood in the future.

#### *Reported impacts of participatory mapping*

Over the years, many researchers have noted the positive impacts that participatory mapping can have on a community:

> *Participation in mapping seems to have encouraged some indigenous communities to demand title to lands (Toledo Maya Cultural Council, 1997; Leake, 2000; Herlihy, 2003; Herlihy and Knapp, 2003), to defend and claim their rights to control natural resources (Smith, 2003; Brown, 2006), and to design conservation and resource management plans that are compatible with local practices (Mohamed and Ventura, 2000; McCall and Minang, 2005; Brown, 2006; Bauer, 2009). Researchers have argued that, in addition to producing maps, when implemented with a stress on participation and with facilitation of discussions within communities, indigenous mapping empowers indigenous peoples in land and resource use*

[37] The petition of AMAN (*Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara*), which was filed with the court some 14 months before the ruling, objected to the way the 1999 Forestry Act treats indigenous peoples' 'customary forests' as providing only weak use-rights within State Forest Areas" (Forest Peoples Programme 2013)

[38] UUK is the abbreviation for Undang-Undang Kehutanan: Act No. 41/1999 on Forestry, saying: "customary forest is STATE FOREST in indigenous territory" (IWGIA 2013). The new ruling has replaced this law.

*rights against potential encroachers (Poole, 2003; Smith, 2003; Brown, 2006; Finley-Brook, 2007) (Reyes-Garcia et al. ca. 2012a: 2-3).*

In addition to these positive effects, researchers have also observed negative consequences resulting from participatory mapping. For instance, Authors such as Mwangi, Hodgson & Schroeder, Fox, Bryant, and Roth have noted issues such as increased privatization of land, loss of indigenous conceptions of space, greater exposure of valuable natural resources, increased taxation by the state, and increase or intensification of conflicts, either within the village, with neighbouring villages, or with other external actors such as companies or governmental authorities (Reyes-Garcia *et al*. 2012b: 651). Increase of conflicts due to participatory mapping, is one of the most frequently reported drawbacks of participatory mapping. Researchers such as Offen, Peluso, Hale, and Vandergeest have argued that: "Participatory mapping might intensify internal conflicts because it might bring to light overlapping uses of land and resources or erode traditional ways of dealing with internal conflicts…" (Ibid). Furthermore, it has been reasoned by i.a. Peluso and Rundstrom that "…participatory mapping might increase the number of conflicts with external actors, as the maps produced might challenge the maps made by state and corporate authorities" (Ibid).

Reyes-Garcia *et al*. have attempted to validate the theory that participatory mapping systematically increases the number of conflicts, using an experimental research design whereby 32 native Amazonian villages with and without conflicts with outsiders were randomly assigned to a treatment group (those where a participatory mapping project would be implemented by them) and a control group (those where a participatory mapping project would not (yet) be implemented by them[39]).[40] Contrary to others' previous findings, the results of their research show no statistically significant differences in the measured variables (i.e. number of conflicts, negative opinion, neutral attitude, and negative attitudes towards outsiders) between treatment and control villages (2012b: 656).

Reyes-Garcia *et al*. explain their deviating results by arguing that previous studies, which were based on direct observations rather than a randomized experimental design, might have been subject to selection bias, because the villages participating in participatory mapping projects are generally the ones that are chosen or volunteering to participate in participatory mapping due to the fact that they are expected to experience – or are already experiencing – conflicts over land rights and resources (2012b: 651, 656). Their results support the argument that mapping projects do not bring about conflicts per se, rather "…the process and the results of participatory mapping can help in conflict resolution or contribute to conflict generation or exacerbation depending on the political and socio-economic context in which they are conducted" (Ibid: 657).

[39] For the sake of fairness, participatory mapping projects were also implemented in the control villages, but only after all research data for the post-intervention study had been collected (Reyes-Garcia *et al.* 2012b: 653).

[40] All these villages were located in Tsimane' territory. The Tsimane' are a native Amazonian society of foragers and farmers in Bolivia.

*Good practice*

### How to organise a mapping process

Considerations on how to successfully undertake a participatory mapping programme, in part focus on the question of "what constitutes as an ideal way to organise a mapping process". There are many philosophical and technical differences in implementing participatory mapping initiatives, and the fact that they are carried out in many different settings, makes it impossible to distinguish a single definitive blueprint process that proves successful regardless of context (Di Gessa 2008: 2; IFAD 2009: 30). It is, however, generally agreed upon that a structured approach to the mapping process is necessary for it to succeed.

In this regard, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD 2009) identified some broad steps that are typically adopted in the deployment of participatory mapping initiatives, i.e.: Preparing the community for the mapping activity; Determining the purpose(s) of making a map; Collecting information; Creating the map and determining the legend; Analysing and evaluating the information, and; Using and communicating the community's spatial information (IFAD 2009: 32-38). These steps correspond with Chapin & Threlkeld's "ethnocartography model": a coherent and structured methodology that provides a 6 step approach to the process of mapping indigenous lands. According to the IFAD (2009: 32) most mapping projects loosely follow the steps of this approach, which entail: 1. "**ground preparation**: before the project starts project leaders and indigenous leaders explain the objectives and importance of the mapping work to the community, the technical team is recruited and collaboration with NGO's and government agencies is sought; 2. **First workshop – orientation and training**: Project staff and indigenous leaders explain the objectives and methodology to the surveyors and technical team and data collection tools are developed; 3. **First fieldwork – gathering data and sketch mapping**; 4. **Second workshop – transcription of data onto new maps**; 5. **Second fieldwork – verification of collected data by the community**, and; 6. **Third workshop – correcting and completing final maps**: Surveyors reunite with the cartographers to incorporate information that has been verified in the field and put the draft maps in final form (Chapin & Threlkeld 2001; IFAD 2009: 30).

### Ethical considerations

In one of his later works, Chapin points out that in the past guidebooks about participatory mapping that have grown out of work in Southeast Asia, have focused mostly on the technical aspects of mapping, avoiding the more politically sensitive aspects and ethical considerations brought along by the mapping.[41] The first manual to actually focus on these matters within Indonesian context was "Mapping people's forests: the role of mapping in planning community-based management of conservation areas in Indonesia" by C. Eghenter in 2000 (Chapin *et al*. 2005: 627). Over the years the focus on ethical considerations about potential negative consequences of mapping and the moral responsibilities of the project instigators towards the communities that partake in the mapping projects has become more pronounced. More and more authors broach these kinds of issues in their articles, books and manuals, even if only in afterthought.

[41] Examples of these "technical" guidebooks on participatory mapping are: Drawing on Local Knowledge: A Community Mapping Training Manual (Momberg *et al*. 1995); Mapping Our Land (Flavelle 2002); and Manual on Participatory 3-Dimensional Modelling (Rambaldi & Callosa-Tarr 2000) (as cited in Chapin *et al*. 2005: 627).

In the literature, a prominent topic with regard to "ethical practice" is that of "empowerment". Projects should be dedicated to achieving community empowerment, meaning that cartographers should focus on teaching the indigenous people how to read, interpret, produce and use maps, and should let them take as much control and responsibility over the mapping process as possible, thereby ensuring that the community will also be able to update their map and develop their own map-use strategies after the project has finished (Chapin & Threlkeld 2001: 128; Di Gessa 2008: 15; IFAD 2009: 25). Good practice, in this regard, also (perversely) means that mappers sometimes have to deliberately disregard or simplify available technologies to make sure the community will be able to access, understand and use them in the future without outside help (Chapin *et al.* 2005: 259; Di Gessa 2008: 5). Ownership rights should also belong to the community itself, enabling them to protect their own interests by deciding for themselves which data they want to publicly disclose, and which (potentially sensitive) data they want to keep private (Chapin & Threlkeld 2001: 134; IFAD 2009: 27-28).

According to i.a. Chapin & Threlkeld (2001) and Teague c. (2010), good practice in participatory mapping exercises also requires a culturally sensitive approach on the part of the international project instigators (NGO's, CBO's, etc.) and staff involved in the mapping process. They should make an effort to view the world from the eyes of the indigenous community, respecting and prioritizing the community's needs, and "carefully considering the challenges inherent in translating indigenous knowledge (which is often based on different epistemologies and conceptions of space and time than their own) into Western Cartesian cartographic formats" (Teague c. 2010: 15). For instance, knowledge about boundaries can easily be misrepresented as indigenous peoples often have a "fluid sense" of their borders, which can be overlapping, incomplete, shifting and/or dependent on seasonal variations (Chapin & Threlkeld 2001: 133)

Another topic that is quite extensively covered in the literature is the project initiators' (perceived) ethical responsibility to ensure that the benefits of the participatory mapping exercise are evenly felt throughout the community. It is deemed important that the map should represent the views and wishes of all the different groups within the community, and consequently many authors highlight the fact that special effort should be put into making sure that the map reflects the perceptions and needs of (potentially) marginalized groups, such as women, the elderly, youth, or immigrants (Chapin & Threlkeld 2001: 127; IFAD 2009: 27-28). Furthermore, it is thought important that members of all groups (and not only the village elite) are encouraged to participate in the actual mapping process, among other things to make sure that pre-existing power structures favouring certain groups' access to land are not reinforced (Teague c. 2010: 14), and to prevent new power imbalances between the people that know how to use the advanced technology, and those who don't (Wright *et al*. 2009: 260). Conversely, authors such as Mei-Po Kwan and Diane Rocheleau, who write from a feminist perspective, note the importance of taking into consideration and addressing the disrupting effect that mapping can have on existing gender relations (Teague c. 2010: 14).

An interesting development is that, over the past years, a special interest seems to be taken in the issue of "who controls GIS and with what power" (Spiegel *et al*. 2012: 345). Authors such as Chapin *et al.* (2005), Di Gessa (2008), Spiegel *et al*. (2012), Teague (c. 2010), and Wright *et al*. (2009) raise concerns on how skill levels needed for the handling of GIS are often gendered and age based (Teague c. 2010: 13), and on how a lack of electricity and internet access in remote communities and the cost of the equipment, causes the knowledge and handling of the GIS technology and/or the processing of the

GPS data to remain outside of the community, in the hands of a small - already privileged - elite of experts, thus enhancing existing power structures (Chapin *et al.* 2005: 629; Di Gessa 2008: 14-15).

Other topics on "good practice" in participatory mapping that are less pronounced but still present in the literature are: The importance of ensuring the long term commitment and support to initiatives of external parties (NGO's, CBO's, universities, development partners, etc.) (IFAD 2009: 25); A good selection of the mapping team. For instance: Chapin & Threlkeld have provided a list of desirable characteristics for facilitators (2001: 127), and lastly; The responsibility to make the local community aware of potential risks of mapping (such as boundary conflicts, risks of documenting sensitive information) before the start of the activities, and to put an effort into mitigating negative impacts that occur in the wake of the process (Di Gessa 2008: 1,3; IFAD 2009: 28-29).

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# Endline Report on the Achievement of MDGs and Themes:

# Evaluation of the LED-NTT project

## MFS II Joint Evaluations

## Indonesia

**Sub-report:**
**E10. Local Economic Development in Nusa Tenggara Timur (2010-2012) and Flores Specialty Products Promotion (2013-2014), SwissContact**

## FINAL REPORT

**9 April 2015**


**Amsterdam Institute for International Development (AIID)**
Trinity building C, 3rd floor, Rm XT-3.17
Pietersbergweg 17
1105 BM Amsterdam
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)20 5661596
F +31 (0)20 5665997
www.aiid.org

**SurveyMeter**
Jl. Jenengan Raya No.109
Maguwoharjo, Depok, Sleman,
Yogyakarta 55282
Indonesia
T +62 (0) 274 4477464
F +62 (0) 274 4477004
www.surveymeter.org

# List of contributors

**AIID**
Menno Pradhan (Principal Investigator)
Melinda Vigh (Research Coordinator)
Marije Groot Bruinderink (Project Manager)
Lene Böhnke (Junior Researcher)
Iris van Rossum (Junior Researcher)
Emilie Berkhout (Research Assistant)

**Survey Meter**
Ni Wayan Suriasatini (Research Coordinator)
Mardiana Br Ginting (Project Manager)
Muhammad Mulia (Qualitative Researcher and Field Coordinator)
Bondan Sikoki (Survey Expert)

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## List of Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| BPK | District Education Centre |
| BPP | Balai Penyuluhan Pertanian (Agricultural Extension Centre) |
| CHF | Swiss francs |
| CFA | Co-financing Agency |
| DD | Difference-in-Difference |
| EPOPA | Export Promotion of Organic Products from Africa |
| FSPP | Flores Specialty Products Promotion |
| GFP | Good Farming Practices |
| HH | Household |
| ICS | Internal Control System |
| IDR | Indonesian Rupiahs |
| LED-NTT | Local Economic Development in Nusa Tenggara Timur |
| MDG | Millennium Development Goal |
| MFS II | Medefinancieringsstelsel (Co-financing System Grant Policy Framework) |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| NTT | Nusa Tenggara Timur (Province of Indonesia) |
| Sida | Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency |
| SMEs | Small and Medium-sized Enterprises |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Project context

The archipelago of Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) province, of which the Flores is one of the islands, is one of the poorest provinces of Indonesia. Indonesia's most recent (March 2014) poverty statistics[1] estimate that 20% of the population in NTT province lives in poverty, while the national percentage is 11%. Many of the poor are small-holder farmers producing cash crops like coconut, cashew nut or cocoa. Therefore, they are not only vulnerable to local weather conditions but also to international market prices, and they depend on the trading conditions offered by local traders.

In East Flores, cashew nut is one of the main cash crops, and around 80% of the farmers grow cashews. Most of these cashew farmers deliver the unprocessed cashew nuts to traders that export it to Java. From there the cashews are shipped to countries like India and Vietnam for further processing. The processed cashews are then sold to Western markets.

Cashew nut farming is seasonal activity, providing a stream of income only for 3-6 months per year. Farmers, who are not able to save enough during this period, often have to rely on borrowing at high interest rates to overcome the lean periods. Therefore, it is greatly beneficial for the farming households if they can increase their share of profits in the cashew value chain, for example by getting involved in cashew nut processing or in the organic cashew market. By responding to the increasing demand for organic foods in developed countries,[2] farmers following organic farming practices can obtain a premium price, increasing their profits. For example, in a public consultation, FairTrade proposed a 15% premium for organic cashew nut, which was widely accepted by the consulted stakeholders[3].

Entering the organic food market requires high quality products and that farmers have not used chemical farming inputs for a sustained period. Both of these conditions are satisfied for the cashew sector in East Flores.

SwissContact also realized the potential for producing high quality organic cashews in East Flores, which became part of their Local Economic Development in NTT (LED-NTT) project starting in 2004 [4] The project focused on promoting organic farming practices, supporting the implementation of national and international organic certification for the project villages and supporting the development of local processing. The main objective of the project was to increase income and create jobs by improving the competitiveness of farmers and processing enterprises. The project started out as a local economic development project in the first phase (2005-2009). However, in the second phase (2010-2012), value chain development became the focus of the project aimed at the development of alternative market channels. In addition, in the cashew sector, the project stared cooperating with the local government at

[1] Source: http://www.bps.go.id/tab_sub/view.php?kat=1&tabel=1&daftar=1&id_subyek=23&notab=1. Accessed on 2015-01-07.
[2] Source: Barrett, A.W. Browne, P.J.C. Harris, K. Cadoret, Organic certification and the UK market: organic imports from developing countries, Food Policy, Volume 27, Issue 4, August 2002, Pages 301-318,
[3] Source: http://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user_upload/content/2009/standards/documents/2012-05-14_EN_Consultationfeedbacksynopsis_cashewRCN_final.pdf
[4] For more information about SwissContact and the LED-NTT project, see Annex I.

the district (East Flores) and sub-district level. As a result, organic farming practices have become part of the government's extension services for cashew, and the government has also contributed financially to the certification process of cashew.

In addition to cashews, the LED-NTT project (2004-2012) focused also on the cocoa and seaweed sector in different parts of NTT. After the end of the project, Cordaid continued funding the cashew nut sector activities through the Flores Specialty Products Promotion (FSPP) project which was running in 2013-2014. The project activities in the seaweed sector have been phased out, and the cocoa sector is funded by another donor after 2012. Hence, the *Medefinancieringsstelsel* (MFS) II evaluation focuses on the cashew nut sector activities for the 2010-2014 period.

## 1.2. Evaluation objectives

This report evaluates the cashew nut sector activities of the LED-NTT (2010-2012) and FSPP (2013-2014) projects of SwissContact[5] funded by Cordaid as part of as part of the MFS II evaluation for Indonesia under the Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDG) component. The project has been selected under the goals on poverty alleviation (MDG 1). In particular, the current evaluation focuses on the following research questions: Have the trainings on good farming practices lead to sustained increased productivity? Did the livelihood of farmers increase? Has certification of cashew nuts led to increased prices and revenues for the farmer? How did the share of cashew nuts sold at regional/national markets change? How did the farmers access to finance and use of financial services change?

We investigate whether the project had a favourable effect on the above mentioned outcomes using difference-in-difference methodology: we compare the changes in the outcome variables between the baseline and endline periods for the project beneficiaries to the changes in outcomes for a comparison group. In addition, because the project was already running for several years before the baseline with the same beneficiaries, we also estimate the effects of the project prior to the baseline survey by comparing the outcomes of the beneficiaries to the comparison group while controlling for pre-intervention household characteristics. We surveyed 6 out of 9 project villages and 4 comparison villages in East Flores.

In the 10 surveyed villages, we conducted a total of 150 household surveys. For the endline surveys, the same respondents were re-interviewed in 2014 whenever it was possible. The survey households were selected randomly from the project cashew farming groups in the treatment villages, and from cashew farmers who were members of randomly selected farming groups in the comparison villages. In addition, we interviewed the project farming groups in the sampled project villages both at the baseline and at the endline. We have also interviewed SwissContact to obtain information about the project implementation and project costs.

As specified in the Terms of Reference for this evaluation, the report addresses five evaluation questions to assess the project outcomes:

[5] The project is described in more detail in section 3.

1) Change: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period?
2) Attribution: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3) Relevance of change: What is the relevance of these changes?
4) Efficiency: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient?
5) Explanations: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

## 1.3. Summary of findings

The LED-NTT project of SwissContact ran between 2010 and 2012. This project was followed up by the FSPP project between 2013 and 2014. The projects focused on different sectors. However, both of them included a focus on the cashew sector in East Flores that is the focus of this evaluation report. Both project had the objective to increase the profits of cashew farmers through four channels: increasing productivity, obtaining premium prices on organic certified cashews, obtaining higher price for processed products and linking farming groups to national and international buyers.

The fact that the project already started years before the baseline period of this evaluation and it worked with the same nine project villages all through the project period complicated the impact analysis. To be able to assess the early effects of the project before the baseline and the impacts during the evaluation period, we use both pooled regressions with location fixed effects and difference-in-difference regressions. The total effect of the two projects is the sum of the early effect and the effect found during the evaluation period, or it can also be inferred from the pooled regression coefficient.

In the data analysis, we found that the as the result of the projects treatment households conducted about 50 percent of their cashew trade at (inter)national markets (both at baseline and endline), and they increased the share of processed cashew nuts (with brown or white skin) in the total volume of cashew sold to 24% (at the endline). These developments contributed to increasing the average selling price of cashews by 22% compared to the comparison group at the endline but the result is not significant.

Regarding the promotion of sustainable farming practices, less than 50% of the treatment households practiced sustainable farming practices at the endline compared to around 30% at baseline. However, the comparison group was quickly catching up in the use of sustainable farming practices during the evaluation period.

Unfortunately, the yield, production and revenue of cashew nuts have decreased during the evaluation period in both groups but treatment households suffered more. The total household income still increased on average but comparison households were better at diversifying their incomes and as a result their income increased more. This development contrasts the baseline findings of around 100% higher revenues from cashews than the comparison group at the baseline, and highlights the importance of income diversification as cashew production is seasonal and volatile.

### 1.4. Structure of report

The rest of this report proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the relevant literature; section 3 describes the project; section 4 describes the evaluation questions and outcome variables; section 5 the data collection. Section 6 provides the descriptive statistics. Sections 7 till 10 discuss evaluation question 1 till 4 in turn. The last section discusses the results and concludes.

Further details about the project results are presented in a number of annexes. Information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO), the project and its implementation is provided in Annex I. Regarding the survey data, the construction of the outcome indicators and indices is summarized in Annex II, and Annex III presents summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis. Annex IV in turn describes the study locations, and Annex V reports detailed descriptive statistics of the sample. Finally, Annex VI provides additional information that is used to explain the findings.

## 2. Literature overview

The demand for organic products has been continuously growing over the last decade driven. According to Mheen-Sluijer and Innocenti (2011) the turnover of the global organic markets grew from some 20 billion USD in 2000 to 54.9 billion USD in 2009. The Research Institute of Organic Agriculture found that the European organic market grew by approximately 6% to a value of almost 23 billion EUR in 2012.[6] As a response, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and farming groups are increasingly adopting organic farming practices world-wide. Organic farming is an interesting option for farmers in developing countries because it combines low external inputs, environmental conservation and a premium price through labelling (Mheen-Sluijer and Innocenti, 2011). However, the socio-economic benefits of organic farming is debated as organic farming practices are more labour intensive and provide lower yields compared to using chemical inputs. In a comprehensive meta-analysis, Seufert et al. (2012) indeed found that organic yields are typically lower than conventional yields. However, they added that the difference is system and site specific: it ranged from 5% lower organic yields for rain-fed legumes and perennials on weak-acidic to weak-alkaline soils; 13% lower yields when best organic practices are used; to 34% lower yields when the conventional and organic systems are most comparable.

In the case of cashew nuts, the yield difference is likely to be small as cashew trees are usually grown on (sandy) soils that are generally unsuitable for other fruit trees.[7] In addition, when the yield difference is calculated based on the yield before introducing organic farming practices, organic farming can actually increases yields if the farmers used 'organic by default' farming practices, implying no agro-chemicals but also no organic best practices.

Leijdens (2007) reported the effects of an organic cashew nut certification project in Mkuranga, Tanzania. The project was implemented between September 2002 and January 2006 as part of the project Export Promotion of Organic Products from Africa (EPOPA), which is financed by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). The project was linked to the exporting company

[6] Source: http://www.fibl.org/en/media/media-archive/media-archive14/media-release14/article/european-organic-market-continued-to-grow-in-2012.html
[7] Source: http://www.nda.agric.za/docs/Infopaks/cashew.htm

Premier Cashew Industries Ltd., and EPOPA supported the project by setting up the field organisation and the internal control system, training the farmers, and providing technical assistance in production, certification and marketing.

Due to the high prices of pesticides in Tanzania, farmers did not use agro-chemical inputs for years before the certification (Forss & Lundstrom, 2004). Cashew fields were also old and fairly neglected, trees had not been pruned for years. The project's field officers had been teaching pruning, mulching, stamping and how to apply manure, for which one demonstration farm in each of the three villages was established. The farmers all started to improve their cashew-trees, increasing yields in the following years. Additionally, some farmers invested in new land and processing equipment (Agro Eco/Grolink, 2008). This, together with the increase in productivity as a response to the increased demand, resulted in a production of almost twice as much on the same trees, from 5.2 to 10.1 kg per tree. It should be mentioned that the exporter provided sulphur to control the Powdery Mildew Disease.[8]

The farmers received an organic premium on their sales of raw nuts between 10% and 20% (Leijdens, 2007). At the same time, the price increased by over 200% from around 300 TSH (0.27 USD) per kilo to 700 TSH (0.62 USD) per kilo (Agro Eco/Grolink, 2008). Consequently, the income of the farmers has increased significantly, also when higher production costs were taken into account (Leijdens, 2007).[9] Unfortunately, no data is available for comparison households to control for the positive development on the international cashew market. Therefore, it is not possible to estimate the impact of the project on incomes. Among the interviewed project participants, 54% of the farmers reported that organic farming had improved their lives. Forss and Lundstrom (2004) noted that the sustainability of the project depended on the development of the world market and on government interference in the cashew trade in Tanzania. They concluded that as long as farming and trade are profitable, the impacts of the project would be sustainable.

Evidence for the sustainability of organic farming projects can be found in another EPOPA project in the cacao production in Tanzania, which ended before 2000. Incomes of the farmers kept increasing and the exporter did not need support anymore. It was too early to analyse the impact of the second phase, but Forss and Lundstrom (2004) stated that the use of demand and market mechanisms as driving forces in combination with local certification would indicate a sustainable impact at village level.

Bolwig, Gibbon and Jones (2009) assessed the revenue effects of certified organic coffee contract farming for smallholders coupled with trainings on organic agricultural farming methods in Uganda. They analysed Kawacom[10] Ltd.'s Sipi organic coffee contract farming scheme, which was also part of the EPOPA. Hence, the implementation was similar to the cashew project in Tanzania. The non-use of synthetic inputs was a condition for qualifying for organic certification. Certification in 2000 and 2001 was paid by Kawacom and conducted using a group system, based on an internal control system. Locally recruited company field officers performed annual or semi-annual farm inspections. They were trained in organic farming methods, ran demonstration farms and conducted occasional training. Kawacom

[8] Part of the results could also be driven by weather conditions as no comparison group is available to control for such effects.

[9] In the first two years of the project, the farmers earned an additional income of 603 USD per farmer compared to a total income per farmer of 2,198 USD (Leijdens, 2007).

[10] Kawacom is the largest organic coffee exporter from Uganda.

bought all the coffee that the organic farmers offer during the main buying season, paying an organic premium of unspecified size if the coffee is 'of suitable quality'. Surpluses were sold as conventional coffee. By analysing survey data on participants in the contract farming scheme as well as data on a control group of non-organic coffee smallholders in the same area, Bolwig et al. (2009) found an increase in net coffee revenue of around 75%, which is equivalent to 12.5% of mean household revenue. This is explained by the price premiums and higher yields per tree, which are contributed by the authors to the organic production system. After the EPOPA support stopped, Kawacom kept training field officers and running demonstration plots (Tulip, 2005).

Beuchelt and Zeller (2011) conducted a quantitative analysis of an organic certification project without emphasis on adoption of best organic farming practices. The analysed the effects of organic certified coffee cooperatives on income and poverty in Nicaragua. The cooperatives had to be certified for 5 years and have an internal control system. In addition, the certified farmers sell over 85% of their produce in certified market channels. By applying random sampling techniques, complemented by over a hundred qualitative in-depth interviews, the authors found a negative effect on the net coffee incomes for the whole organic certified coffee area as well as on per capita incomes, even though organic coffee farmers in Nicaragua received 8% higher prices in comparison to conventional farmers. Due to the higher prices and the high yield, organic certified farmers had significantly higher revenues. Nonetheless, neither input costs nor production costs were significantly lower for the certified farmers, while labour costs were likely to rise. The authors find that over a period of 10 years, organic certified farmers became relatively poorer.

The reported EPOPA projects all showed positive effects of organic farming on both yield and revenues, while the organic coffee project in Nicaragua showed a negative effect on the livelihood of the organic coffee farmers. The success of the EPOPA projects may be explained by the fact that the projects' farmers used 'organic by default' farming practices prior to the project. Hence, their productivity was below the levels using conventional farming. The training and adoption of best organic farming practices have resulted in increased yields under these circumstances.

However, organic farming practices are labour intensive, and adoption rates of best practices may be dependent on the farming households' willingness to increase their labour inputs. Agro Eco/Grolink (2008) reported that most smallholder farmers have complained about the heavy work load resulting from the organic farming practices. In addition, Mheen-Sluijer and Innocenti (2011) notes that smallholder farmers often have multiple, including off-farm sources of income and do not always have sufficient labour for agriculture. Hence, the profitability of organic farming also depends on the availability of cheap labour.

Overall, we can conclude that organic certification projects have a positive impact on the yield and revenue of farming households if the projects are coupled with trainings on best organic farming practices and the projects target farmers that have not used agro-chemical inputs prior to the project. For example, in Tanzania the EPOPA project increased the yield of cashew nuts from 5.2 kg to 10.1 kg per tree.

However, the high costs of organic certification have to be supported either by the exporter (under contract farming) or other funding agencies at the start of the project. Barrett et al (2001) recommend

that farmers form a producer group or cooperative to share costs. However, they note that there is a risk that the whole cooperative will lose its organic certification if one farmer fails the inspection. As a solution, they suggest that internal control and record keeping are needed.

# 3. The project

## 3.1. Project description

The Local Economic Development in Nusa Tenggara Timur (LED-NTT) project of SwissContact has started in 2004. Cordaid provides funding for the project since 2005. Since then, three phases of the project have been implemented. The last phase, which ran between 1 January 2010 and 31 December 2012, was selected for the MDG component of the MFS II evaluation in Indonesia. The LED-NTT focused on three sectors: cashew nut, cocoa and seaweed. As a follow-up on the project in the cashew sector and a new component on wild honey, the Flores Specialty Products Promotion (FSPP) project of SwissContact and Cordaid ran between 1 January 2013 and 31 December 2014.[11]

Due to the continuity in the cashew sector activities, we decided to focus the evaluation only on the cashew nut sector, and evaluate the joint effect of the LED-NTT and FSPP projects on participating cashew nut farmers. As a consequence, the remainder of this report addresses only the cashew nut sector activities of LED-NTT and FSPP.

LED-NTT chose cashew nuts as one of the focus crops because the quality of cashew nuts is very good in East Flores and many farmers do not use chemical inputs as they are costly. The project expected that by labelling cashew nuts as organic can increase the selling price by approximately 30%.


The objectives of LED-NTT were to increase the profit of cashew nut farmers by (1) increasing productivity (yield of cashew nuts) by providing trainings on sustainable farming, (2) increasing selling prices of products by organising national and international organic certification, (3) increasing the profit share of local communities from the value chain of cashew nuts by setting-up local processing units of cashew nuts (creates jobs for locals and allows for higher selling price through value added), and (4) linking farmers to organic and non-organic markets. This last objective is supported by establishing cooperatives for contracting buyers and linking the buyers to the farmers. These objectives remained the same also in the FSPP project.

## 3.2. Project implementation

Figure 1 shows the timing of the LED-NTT and FSPP projects and the evaluation periods.

[11] The cocoa activities continued with funding from other donors, while the seaweed activities were phased out in the last LED-NTT project.

**Figure 1: Timing of the intervention and evaluation periods**




At the start of the project, SwissContact selected the project sites for the cashew nut activities based on the following criteria:

- Only districts with the best quality of cashew nuts, tested on size and the taste, were eligible.
- Only communities where the main income source is from cashew nuts qualified (SwissContact conducted a livelihood study to determine whether this is the case).
- Farmers had to organise themselves into a village level (*gapoktan*) farming group as certification is based on the village level.
- Only when a credible group leader is present within the farmer group, the community becomes eligible for the certification assessment

The implementation of the project was done at the village level in a total of nine villages/farming groups. Farmers in villages with organic certification have to sell their cashew harvest through the farming group in order to get the premium price. However, the members are also allowed to sell outside of the farming group. As usual practice, only the best quality cashews are sold as organic at the national and international market. The rest are sold at local markets. To apply for certification, the farming groups had to set up an internal control system (ICS) for the quality control of the cashews labelled as organic. In addition, a saving fund has been set up to save from sales for the costs of certification. However, only four of the nine farming groups/villages participated in certification by 2012.

LED-NTT implemented the following activities between 2010 and 2012:

- Identifying measures for productivity increase
- Training facilitators in Good Farming Practices
- Coaching facilitators in conducting training
- Facilitating potential investors
- Supporting organic certification
- Identifying provider and coaching delivery of services related to quality assurance and access to markets

In addition, FSPP planned to conduct the following activities between 2013 and 2014:

- Facilitating production, processing and marketing of organic cashew

- Facilitating technical services and marketing services
- Facilitating service delivery through farmer cooperatives

FSPP focused on the strategies on access to market through support on financial access and increase of quality and quantity of processed cashew products, as these were identified as the bottleneck issues of the LED-NTT project. Efforts have been made to organise organic certification for processing units as well, in order to be able to sell processed cashews at the organic market.

Annex I provides further information about the outputs of the LED-NTT project.

## 3.3. Result chain

The overall objective of the LED-NTT and FSPP projects is to increase the income of farming households. Figure 2 displays a schematic project logic to reach this objective from the perspective of the beneficiary farming households.[12]

On the left side of the figure, the main project activities are displayed: training on sustainable or good farming practices (GFP), facilitating certification and assisting in setting-up processing units. These project components influence the decision nodes of the farming households:

- **Farming practices**: what type of inputs and farming practices to use for the cultivation of cashews? The project trains and encourages farmers to use more labour intensive but low input sustainable farming practices, which include sustainable soil management through weeding, *rorak* making (drainage channels supported by composting and water catchment in a hole); distancing between cashew trees and pruning to select productive branches; the use of organic pesticides and herbicides; and the abandonment of chemical inputs.
- **Market**: farmers have to decide how much of their harvest to sell at the local, national and international markets (given the demand at each market). In general, only the best quality products are sold at the national/international markets, while second grade cashews are sold to the local market. The project facilitates the establishment of linkages between the farming groups and national or international buyers both for certified and non-certified cashews in different processing stages.
- **Processing stage**: farmers have to decide whether they want to sell the cashews in shell and let the buyer process it, or they want to benefit from higher prices by selling processed cashews. The project assists the establishment of local processing units.


The decisions of the farmers affect their production (yield and quality) and the selling price of cashews (depending on the market sold), which will finally affect the livelihood of the farmers. While the LED-NTT project focused a lot of attention on the use of sustainable farming practices and setting up an ICS, FSPP focused more on the marketing of the cashews.

It is important to note that organic certification is implemented at the village level, and it requires the commitment of the community to follow the quality control regulations. Therefore, it is a collective decision of the cashew farmers in the village. In addition, certification is only worthwhile if the products

[12] The results chain in Figure 2 is the interpretation of the evaluation team.

can be sold to buyers who are willing to pay for the additional value of certification. Linking the villages to such buyers was a continuous activity of both the LED-NTT and FSPP projects.

**Figure 2: Result chain**




Finally, as the figure indicates, there are also numerous other factors that affect the decisions of the farmers and the final outcomes of both production and marketing. To mention the most important ones: the weather conditions and diseases can hugely influence cashew production; the international cashew market drives the prices for cashew; and local government policies and extension workers can encourage farmers to use chemical farming inputs.[13]

# 4. Evaluation questions and outcome variables

## 4.1. Evaluation questions

The call for proposals outlines 5 general evaluation questions. In the baseline report specific evaluations questions were specified. Table 1 shows these five questions and what it implies for this project.

[13] To control for the effects of such outside factors (from the perspective of the project), it is important to use a comparison group when evaluating the impacts of project like the LED-NTT or FSPP.

**Table 1: Overview general and specific evaluation questions**

| Number | General evaluation question | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Change: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period? | • Have the trainings on good farming practices lead to sustained increased productivity?<br>• Did the livelihood of farmers increase?<br>• Has certification of cashew nuts led to increased prices and revenues for the farmer?<br>• How did the share of cashew nuts sold at regional/national markets change?<br>• How did the farmers access to finance and use of financial services change? |
| 2 | Attribution: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)? | Are the observed changes above attributable to the intervention? |
| 3 | Relevance of change: What is the relevance of these changes? | • The size of the impact<br>• Does the project address an important issue for the beneficiaries? |
| 4 | Efficiency: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient? | Was the intervention cost effective? |
| 5 | Explanations: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above? | Why did things work out/not work out?<br>The evaluation question is answered throughout the other evaluation questions and in the end discussion. |

The first 4 questions directly link to the project logic presented in Figure 2, while the last question refers to a general activity of the LED-NTT project: facilitating access to credit. This is not included in Figure 2 as it is not indicated as one of the outputs of the project.

In addition, 2 questions have been proposed in the baseline report that cannot be answered using the data collected as they relate to higher level outcomes. These are: Did the programme improve the business environment for the farmers? Did the programme contribute to creating new jobs in the cashew nut or related sectors?

## 4.2. Outcome indicators

To answer the first two evaluation questions (change and attribution) we identified specific outcome indicators split up into 7 groups: households using organic farming practices; yield of cashew nuts; volume of cashew nuts sold; percentage of cashew nuts sold to (inter)national markets; selling price of cashew nuts; household income and livelihood; and food security and vulnerability. These outcome variables are closely linked to the evaluation questions presented in the previous section, and also to the uniform indicators identified by the Synthesis team.

Table 2 displays the outcome indicators of the main analysis, the scale of these variables and whether the indicator is a uniform indicator, while Annex II provides a detailed explanation of the content and

construction of the indicators. The uniform indicators are specified by the synthesis team for the goal on poverty alleviation (MDG 1).

**Table 2: Overview outcome indicators**

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Source | Uniform indicator |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Panel A. Households using organic farming practices** | | | |
| Percentage of households practicing organic farming | | | |
| - Self-reported | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| - Based on responses to questions (not using any chemical input) | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| Percentage of households using chemical inputs | | | |
| - Using chemical fertilizer | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| - Using chemical pesticides/insecticides | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| Percentage of households using organic inputs | | | |
| - Using organic fertilizers | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| - Using organic pesticides/insecticides | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| Percentage of households have distance larger than 9x9m | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| **Panel B. Yield of cashew nuts** | | | X |
| Yield per hectare | (0;NM) | Household survey | |
| Yield per tree | (0;NM) | Household survey | |
| **Panel C. Volume of cashew nuts sold (kg)** | (0;NM) | Household survey | X |
| **Panel D. Percentage of cashew nuts sold to (inter)national markets (compared to local markets)** | | | X |
| Using aggregate data in treatment and comparison groups (cumulated over the 2 treatment groups) | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| Household average (based on kg sold to markets) | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| **Panel E. Selling price of cashew nuts** | (0;NM) | Household survey | |
| **Panel F. Household income and livelihood** | | | X |
| Household income | | | |
| - Household revenue from sale of cashew nuts (1000 Rp) | (0;NM) | Household survey | |
| - Total income per month (1000 Rp) | (0;NM) | Household survey | |
| - Total income per capita per month (1000 Rp) | (0;NM) | Household survey | |
| Per capita expenditures of households | | | |
| - Non-food consumption per capita per month | (0;NM) | Household survey | |
| Asset holdings of households | | | |
| - Predicted expenditure based on housing facilities using IFLS (compatible with all MFS) | (NM;NM) | Household survey | |
| - Asset index using weights from DHS | (NM;NM) | Household survey | |

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Source | Uniform indicator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Investment into business or farm equipment | | | |
| - Percentage of household invested in business | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| - Percentage of household invested in new farming tools | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| Self-reported well-being | | | |
| - Happiness | (1;4) | Household survey | |
| - Current wealth status | (1;6) | Household survey | |
| **Panel G. Food security and vulnerability (uniform indicator)** | | | X |
| Percentage of households not able to cover their living costs | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| Percentage of households have not enough to eat | (0-100%) | Household survey | |
| Number of months households not able to cover their living costs | (0;12) | Household survey | |
| Number of months households have not enough to eat | (0;12) | Household survey | |
| Current standard of living: daily needs covered | (1;3) | Household survey | |
| Current standard of living: food consumption covered | (1;3) | Household survey | |
| Notes: NM stands for no minimum/maximum | | | |

# 5. Data collection

This section describes the survey instruments and the sampling design and outcome in turn.

## 5.1. Survey instruments

We collected two types of data: quantitative and financial. The following paragraphs list the survey instruments used for each type of data.

### *Quantitative data*

To analyse the impact of the programmes, two surveys have been conducted to collect quantitative data:

- Household survey: was designed to collect information about socio-economic characteristics, involvement in financial institutions, farming practices and production focusing on cashews, and the households' livelihoods.
- Farming group survey: a short survey was administered to the project farming group leaders regarding the activities of the farming group.

The baseline data have been collected from mid-September to the beginning of October in 2012; while the endline data was collected in the first two weeks of September 2014.

### *Financial data collection*

To collect information about the costs of the LED-NTT and FSPP projects, we conducted a project cost survey with the field coordinator of LED-NTT and the project manager of FSPP on 9 September 2013. The cost data has been verified with Cordaid in November 2014.

## 5.2. Sampling outcome

The evaluation focuses on the impact of the LED-NTT and FSPP projects on the beneficiary cashew nut farmers in 6 out of 9 project villages.

The following sub-sections discuss the selection procedure for the survey respondents (sampling design) and the results of its implementation (sampling outcome).

### *Sampling design*

At the time of the baseline survey, the treatment intensity differed among the 9 project villages: some have already obtained certification at the baseline (4), some were planning to obtain it (2), while the rest of the villages were not yet ready for certification. Also, some but not all project villages had a processing unit in the village. We stratified the sampling of villages by certification status: we randomly sampled 3 villages with certification, 2 that planned certification and 1 village that did not plan on certification. Please note that the selection of the project location is based on self-selection: only committed and well-organised villages participate in the project.

Comparison villages were selected based on information from SwissContact field officers: we selected 4 villages out of 10 listed villages. We have chosen one village in the same sub-district as some of the treatment villages; one village was chosen from the largest cashew producing sub-district in the area; and 2 villages had international certification in the past but the local NGO left the area and the intervention stopped.

In the 10 sampled villages, we interviewed 15 randomly selected households that were members of a selected farming group and produced cashew nuts. In the treatment villages we sampled from the project farming groups focusing only on cashew, while in the comparison villages the farming groups were often focusing on several crops.

At the endline survey, we aimed to re-interview all respondents and households participating in the baseline survey. However, if it was not possible to interview the same household or the household moved out of the village, we replaced the household with a randomly selected household following the sampling design from the baseline survey. As some of the questions in the survey relate to the subjective perception of the respondent, we aimed to interview the same respondent as for the baseline survey. If this was not possible, we interviewed another household member knowledgeable about household income and farming practices.

### *Sampling outcome*

Table 3 reports on the sampling outcome. The sampling at the baseline almost followed the sampling plan. However, one interviewed treatment household had to be discarded as they reported not to have produced any crops during the past 12 months (column 2). At the endline, we interviewed the same number of households as at the baseline (column 3). However, 4 treatment (4%) and 7 comparison (12%)

households were replaced. Replacement in the treatment villages occurred most often because the household moved out of the village (3) or the household was not at home at the time of the field work (1). In the comparison villages, the reasons were that the household moved out of the village (5), the household could not be found (1) or the household head died (1). Column 4 of Table 3 shows the households that have been interviewed in both survey rounds (panel households). The data on the households is used when assessing the change in the outcome variables between the baseline and endline (evaluation question 1 and the difference-in-difference estimators for equation question 2).

We also aimed to interview the same respondent at the endline as at the baseline. In the treatment villages this happened in 82% of the cases, while in the comparison villages only in 68% of the cases (column 5). Replacement of the respondent most often happened due to the baseline respondent not being at home (75% of all cases). The sample of panel respondents is used in the analysis for some of the outcome variables that depend on the subjective valuation of the respondent, like the subjective well-being of the household.

**Table 3: Sampling outcome**

| Assignment group | Planned | Baseline | Endline | Panel HHs | Panel respondent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Treatment | 90 | 89 | 89 | 85 | 73 |
| Comparison | 60 | 60 | 60 | 53 | 41 |
| **Total** | **150** | **149** | **149** | **138** | **114** |
| Source: Household survey E10; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | | | | |

# 6. Descriptive statistics

This section summarizes the characteristics of the sample by treatment group. The household characteristics are discussed below, while the village characteristics are described in Annex IV. In addition, the exposure of villages and households to the LED-NTT and FSPP projects activities is explored.

## 6.1. Household characteristics

To provide a better insight into the general characteristics of the households in our sample, Table 4 displays the most important socio-economic characteristics including age, gender, education level of the household head, economic activities of the household, and membership of the household in farming groups. The data are reported separately for the comparison and treatment villages. The variables are described at the baseline survey (Base) and the endline survey (End) for all households that have been interviewed in both survey rounds (panel sample). We also report on the significance of the change in the variables (p-value)[14]: column 3 (and 7) compares the characteristics of the comparison (and treatment) groups over time, while column 5 compares the characteristics of the treatment and

[14] P-values are calculated using standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level. This means that the standard errors are allowed to have an arbitrary correlation for comparison or treatment respondents in the same village. In other words, we allow respondents in the same village in the same treatment group (comparison or treatment) to be more similar to each other than they are to a different randomly selected respondent in another village from the other treatment group.

comparison groups at the baseline. If the p-value is small (say smaller than 5%), it indicates that the change is significantly different from zero (at 5% significance level). The sample size for all variables is reported in Annex III.

The data show that the treatment and comparison households are fairly similar in terms of household size (4.7 vs 4.6 members), gender of the household head (10.1% vs 11.7% female), age of the household head (45.7 vs 43.7 years) and religion (100% catholic).

However, the household heads in the comparison groups are somewhat more educated (6% vs 0% with no education, and 23% vs 37% with secondary education). In addition, less of the comparison group's households report to have crop farming as the main income source (93% vs 85%), however, this difference is not significant. These households earn the most of their living from salary/wage or non-farm business. Further, the treatment households cultivate a somewhat larger size of land (2.1 vs 1.9 hectares) but the difference is again not significant.

The most important difference between the treatment and comparison households is their membership in farming groups. While almost all households have a membership in a farming group, at the baseline it was more often a cashew specialised farming group (*poktan*) (100% vs 38%) or a cashew farming group at the village level (*gapoktan*) (69% vs 13%) in the treatment group compared to the comparison group. Most farmers in the comparison group were members of a general farming group not specialized on cashew (0% vs 57%). However, by the endline the membership of treatment households in specialized cashew farming groups have dropped: only 55% of them still had membership in small cashew farming groups (*poktan*) and 46% had membership in a village level cashew farming group. At the same time, the membership in general farming groups in the treatment villages have increased: 38% of households were members of such a farming group. The same pattern, although more muted, can be also found among the comparison villages: membership in general farming groups increased at the expanse of cashew farming groups between 2012 and 2014.

Finally, membership in a savings and credit group is also higher in the treatment villages (40% vs 18% at baseline), and membership has increased in both types of villages between the baseline and endline (61% vs 40% at endline).

**Table 4: General characteristics of the sample**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Assignment group** | **Comparison** | | | **Treatment** | | | |
| **Survey period** | Base | End | (P1v2) | Base | (P1v4) | End | (P4v6) |
| Average size of household | 4.6 | 4.6 | 0.304 | 4.7 | 0.530 | 4.7 | 0.758 |
| Percentage female hh-head | 11.7 | 8.3 | 0.384 | 10.1 | 0.747 | 10.1 | |
| Average age of hh-head | 43.7 | 45.4 | 0.014 | 45.7 | 0.144 | 47.5 | 0.020 |
| Education level of household head (%) | | | | | | | |
| *No education* | 0.0 | 1.7 | 0.384 | 5.6 | 0.144 | 4.5 | 0.611 |
| *Primary education* | 63.3 | 61.7 | 0.607 | 71.9 | 0.371 | 69.7 | 0.334 |
| *Secondary education* | 36.7 | 36.7 | 0.837 | 22.5 | 0.091 | 25.8 | 0.104 |
| Religion of household head (%) | | | | | | | |
| *Catholic* | 100.0 | | | 100.0 | | | |
| Main source of income (%) | | | | | | | |
| *Crop farming* | 85.0 | 78.3 | 0.439 | 93.3 | 0.203 | 91.0 | 0.743 |
| *Fishing* | 1.7 | 6.7 | 0.200 | 0.0 | 0.303 | 0.0 | |
| *Livestock* | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | | 1.1 | 0.364 |
| *Non-farm business* | 5.0 | 3.3 | 0.643 | 0.0 | 0.121 | 4.5 | 0.109 |
| *Salary / wage* | 8.3 | 10.0 | 0.824 | 5.6 | 0.733 | 1.1 | 0.021 |
| *Pension* | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 1.1 | 0.326 | 1.1 | |
| *Transfer, remittances* | 0.0 | 1.7 | 0.384 | 0.0 | | 1.1 | |
| Percentage of households with membership in […] | | | | | | | |
| *Cashew farming group* | 38.3 | 20.0 | 0.620 | 100.0 | 0.021 | 61.8 | 0.053 |
| *Other farming group* | 56.7 | 75.0 | 0.642 | 0.0 | 0.039 | 43.8 | 0.026 |
| *Cashew cooperative* | 0.0 | 1.7 | | 0.0 | | 4.5 | 0.235 |
| *Other cooperative* | 0.0 | 3.3 | 0.414 | 2.2 | 0.140 | 7.9 | 0.385 |
| *Saving and credit group* | 18.3 | 40.0 | 0.207 | 40.4 | 0.036 | 60.7 | 0.062 |
| *Saving and credit cooperative* | 45.0 | 43.3 | 0.717 | 41.6 | 0.828 | 33.7 | 0.161 |
| Type of place households can name to borrow money (%) | | | | | | | |
| *Banks* | 43.3 | 51.7 | 0.670 | 57.3 | 0.325 | 60.7 | 0.787 |
| *Cooperative* | 70.0 | 71.7 | 0.657 | 75.3 | 0.690 | 78.7 | 0.497 |
| *Farmer group* | 10.0 | 31.7 | 0.046 | 33.7 | 0.087 | 32.6 | 1.000 |
| *Money Lender* | 0.0 | 10.0 | 0.097 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | |
| Subjective well-being 5 years ago | 1.6 | 1.9 | 0.165 | 1.8 | 0.257 | 2.0 | 0.169 |
| Total cultivated land per hh (ha) | 1.9 | 1.9 | 0.580 | 2.1 | 0.767 | 1.9 | 0.612 |

Source: Household survey E10; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

## 6.2. Treatment exposure

### *Treatment exposure in treatment villages*

In the farming group survey in the project villages we have asked a number of questions related to activities related to the LED-NTT and FSPP projects. The result of these questions is summarized in Table 5 and in Table 16 and Table 17 in Annex VI reported for the baseline (Base) and endline (End) periods.

**Table 5: Services of treatment farming groups supported by the project**

| Survey period | Base | End |
|---|---|---|
| **Sample size** | n=6 | n=6 |
| Number of farming groups that […] | | |
| *Had last meeting/training on GFP in 2012 Base/2013 End* | 4 | 4 |
| *Has an Internal Control System (ICS)* | 6 | 5 |
| *Has national organic certification (Biocet)* | 1 | 5 |
| *In 2012* | 2 | 4[1] |
| *In 2013* | - | 3 |
| *In 2014* | - | 1 |
| *Has international organic certification (IMO)* | 2 | 4 |
| *In 2012* | 3 | 3 |
| *In 2013* | - | 1 |
| *In 2014* | - | 1 |
| *Has a processing unit* | 2 | 5 |
| *Is involved in the marketing of cashew nuts* | 3 | 6 |

Source: Farming group survey E10; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes:

1. Two additional farming groups indicated at the endline to have had national certification in 2012. However, the validity of this information is questionable.

The data shows that at the time of the baseline 4 of the 6 farming groups had the last training on good farming practices in 2012, while the remaining 2 villages had it in previous years. At the endline, also 4 farming groups reported to have had the last training in 2013, while one organised the last training in 2014 and another in 2012. The groups reported that the trainings were mostly organised by SwissContact (4 at baseline and 5 at endline) or by the district education centre or agricultural extension centre (4) (Table 17).

Table 5 also indicates that almost all farming groups have an internal control system that is used for quality control for certification or gathering data for applying for certification. One farming group has given up on managing an internal control system.

Turning to certification, Table 5 shows that 3 farming groups reported to have had international organic certification in 2012 (IMO)[15], while only one of the villages reported to have it in 2013 and 2014 (not the same villages). However, 3 villages reported to have national certification (Biocet) in 2013, and only 1 in 2014.[16] The 3 villages with international certification in 2012 and national certification in 2013 are the

[15] International certification (IMO) is awarded for 3 years. The villages had to reapply in 2012.

[16] National certification (Biocet) is valid for 1 year, and it has to be reapplied each year.

same. Table 19 indicates that SwissContact has (co-)financed the costs of certification for all farming groups.

The number of farming groups with a processing unit has increased between the baseline and endline from 2 to 5, while the number of farming groups involved in the marketing of cashews has also increased from 3 to 6. Most farming groups also provided storage for cashews at the endline (5) (Table 16). These are the largest improvements among the treatment indicators.

Unfortunately, we do not have information about comparison farming groups.

### *Treatment exposure of households*

Turning to the household data, we are able to report on the participation of both treatment and comparison households in project related activities. Table 6 and Table 18 in Annex VI show that, in general, not too many households reported to participate in trainings on good farming practices at the baseline (33% and 10%), while the percentage of participating households have somewhat increased by the endline despite the shorter recall period (3 vs 2 years) to 39% and 20% in the treatment and comparison groups, respectively. Hence, more treatment than comparison households participated in such trainings in prior to both survey rounds. Nonetheless, the treatment exposure to trainings on good farming practices is not universal among the treatment households. It is possible that some households do not recall to have attended such trainings or do not consider a discussion about farming practices a training. However, this is true for both treatment and comparison villages.

In addition, due to the extension service workers adopting the good farming practices advocated by SwissContact, it is quite possible that the comparison households indirectly also benefitted from the projects of SwissContact.

However, only the treatment households benefitted from organic certification. While only 27% of the households reported to participate in organic certification (at the national level), at the endline 58% of the households reported to have patriated in some type of organic certification. Based on the data from the farming groups, 3 of 6 farming groups had international certification in 2013, which implies a response rate of 50% at the household level if all households participated, while we observe that 56% of the treatment households reported to have international organic certification at the endline. However, this discrepancy could be due to the one village that had national certification at the endline (17% of the sample): only 2% reported to have only national organic certification, while 12% reported to have both international and national certification.

The final verdict regarding certification is whether household actually report to sell their cashews at the national and international markets, which we will investigate among other outcome variables in the next section.

**Table 6: Household participation in organic certification**

| Assignment group | Comparison | | Treatment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Survey period** | Base | End | Base | End |
| Percentage of households that participated in good farming practices training in the past 3 years (baseline) / 2 years (endline) | 10.0 | 20.0 | 32.6 | 39.3 |
| Percentage of households that have […] certification | | | | |
| *No* | 100.0 | 98.3 | 73.3 | 41.6 |
| *National* | 0.0 | 1.7 | 26.7 | 2.2 |
| *International* | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 43.8 |
| *Both* | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 12.4 |
| Source: Household survey E10; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | | | |

# 7. Evaluation question 1: Change in outcomes

This section discusses evaluation question 1: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period? The changes in the outcome indicators for the period measured between the base- and endline survey (2012-2014) are 7 groups: households using organic farming practices; yield of cashew nuts; volume of cashew nuts sold; percentage of cashew nuts sold to (inter)national markets; selling price of cashew nuts; household income and livelihood; and food security and vulnerability.

Table 7 displays the results for all outcome indicators in a similar manner as the household characteristics were presented in Table 4. However, Table 7 only reports on the significance of changes within group between the baseline and endline (p-values). Comparison of the changes between the treatment and comparison groups is left for the attribution section (evaluation question 2). In Table 7, the standard error[17] of the outcome variables is displayed in brackets below the mean. The sample size for the outcome variables can be inferred from Annex III.

The results of Table 7 are discussed below by outcome indicator group.

### *Use of organic farming practices*

Households were asked directly whether they were practicing organic farming. At the baseline, almost all households reported to do so in both treatment groups. At the endline, the percentage of households that reported to practice organic farming has dropped sharply in the comparison group (from 92% to 30%) and also in the treatment group (from 88% to 62%). However, this decrease hints more at the popularity of the expression 'organic farming' in 2012 than the actual practice itself because when asking about the type of farming practices used in detail, we observed that 95% of comparison households and 76% of the treatment households did not use chemical inputs to farming at the endline, hence qualifying for organic farming.

[17] Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the location level. See footnote 14 on page 21.

The data show that 16% of the sampled treatment households use chemical fertilizers at the endline, compared to the 8% reported by the treatment farming groups in Table 20. This could be an issue for the farming groups that have organic certification. Therefore, Table 20 also reports separately on the three farming groups that have organic certification: these farming groups report that no households use chemical inputs for soil management or against insects and diseases. However, according to Table 21, which contains the self-reported farming practices of the households, 9% of the households report to use chemical fertilizers. No change is found in this value between the baseline and endline.

Organic farming does not imply the absence of chemicals in farming but also the use of sustainable farming practices that were also promoted by the LED-NTT project. Table 7 shows that the use of organic practices have significantly increased over the evaluation period: among the treatment households 49% are using organic soil management practices (16% use manure, 19% *rorak*[18] and 29% use other methods including compost, see Table 21) and 38% use organic methods against insects and diseases, mostly fumigation/smoking (34%, see Table 21).

Surprisingly, less of the households in the organic certified farming groups use organic farming practices (Table 21). Especially the use of *rorak* for soil management has reduced in this group between the baseline and endline from 23% to 5%, while the farming group survey indicates that the use of *rorak* has increased from 33% to 92%. Hence, the data from the households contradicts the data from farming group leaders for the certified farming groups.

The use of organic practices has increased the most in the comparison villages: at the endline 30% used organic soil management practices (12% used *rorak*, 3% manure and 20% other methods including compost) and 42% used organic methods (fumigation/smoking) against insects and diseases. This last percentage is higher than in the treatment groups.

Overall, the data on the comparison villages show that SwissContact was successful in mainstreaming organic farming methods into the extension services and trainings held by other field workers (for example through peer education) on farming practices.

However, this finding has also a drawback from the perspective of the evaluation: since the changes in organic farming methods are the largest in the comparison group, it makes it difficult to identify the projects' effects on cashew nut yield.

### *Yield of cashew*

As farmers switch from letting cashews grow naturally to using sustainable soil and pest management, it is expected that their yield should increase. However, Table 7 shows that the both the yield per hectare and per tree has generally decreased between the baseline and endline periods.[19] However, yields are still higher in the treatment group compared to the comparison group. The reduction in yields is likely to

[18] *Rorak* involves the making of drainage channels supported by composting and water catchment in a hole.

[19] For 47% of the comparison households and 62% of the treatment households we calculated a reduction in the cashew nut yield per tree (not reported).

driven by other factors (like weather conditions) than the project. In the treatment group, the average yield per tree has dropped from 4.51 kg to 2.8 kg.[20]

Table 22 and Table 23 investigate some potential factors affecting the yield of cashews. Table 23 shows that the percentage of cashew trees in full production did not change significantly: 52-67% of the cashew trees are in full production, while this percentage it at the higher end in the treatment group. The table also highlights that the stock of cashew trees have a worse age structure in the treatment villages, meaning that there are more trees that are too old for production (20% vs 15% at endline), and less young trees (14% vs 32%). Between baseline and endline, we also observe a small reduction in the number of cashew trees used for production in both the treatment and control groups (not significant).

Table 22 investigates the variables used to calculate the cashew nut yield per hectare: cashew harvest and the cultivated land size. Cashew harvest in the past 12 months has decreased on average by 25% in the comparison group and by 43% in the treatment group. There has been a reduction also in the land used to cultivate cashews but this is only 13% in the comparison group and 20% in the treatment group on average. Only households in villages with organic certification have increased the land used for cashew production, however, their production suffered the largest loss at 49% on average.

### *Volume of cashew nuts sold*

Due to the substantial drop in cashew harvest in the past 12 months, also the volume of cashew nuts sold has significantly diminished in both the comparison and treatment villages. The households sold most of the harvested cashews.

### *Percentage of cashew nuts sold to (inter)national markets*

There has been no change in the percentage of cashews sold at national or international markets compared to the local market: about 50% of the cashew nuts are sold to national or international market in the treatment villages, while almost all cashew nuts are sold at the local market in the comparison villages.

In addition, Table 8 disaggregates the percentage sold to (inter)national markets by the processing stage of the cashew nuts. At the endline, almost all processed (brown or white skin) and almost half of the unprocessed (in shell) cashew nuts were sold at (inter)national markets in the treatment villages. Table 24 further investigates at which markets households sold cashews both in terms of processing stage and locality of the market. Focusing on treatment households, we observe that only 18% of the household sold any cashews with brown skin and 14% sold with white skin. Hence, the benefit selling processed cashew nuts are only limited to less than 20% of the treatment households.

Table 25 shows that most treatment households either sell all their cashews at the (inter)national market or they sell all it at the local market.[21] There are very few households that sell to both markets. Looking at the data from the farming groups, Table 26 shows that while at the baseline farming groups were still selling cashew nuts to the local market (especially in shell), by the endline farming groups were

[20] For reference, the yield per trees has increased from 5.2 kg/tree to 10.1 kg/tree in a similar project in Tanzania (Agro Eco/Grolink, 2008).

[21] Please note the inconsistency between selling at the national and international markets based on the household and farming group data. It is most likely that household made a mistake when specifying whether they sold at international or national markets.

mostly specialized on marketing the cashew nuts at the (inter)national market. In addition, the share of processed cashews has increased in the volume of cashews marketed by the farming groups: from 1% to 20% for cashew nuts with brown skin and from 0.2% to 3.6% for cashew nuts with white skin.

### *Selling price of cashew nuts*

The average selling price of cashew nuts (averaged over markets and processing stage) has increased in both treatment (16%) and comparison groups (10%) in real terms. [22] However, the change is not significant due to the large variation of reported selling prices by the households. For more detailed information on average cashew nut prices the reader is referred to Table 27 and Table 28, which contain the disaggregated price data for cashew nuts sold in different processing stage and at different markets from the project farming groups and all surveyed households, respectively.

Overall, the increase in the average selling price of cashews is driven both by households selling a larger share of cashews as processed products, and by a general increase in prices of cashew nuts.

### *Household income and livelihood*

Revenues from cashew nut production have decreased in real terms by 41% (p=0.01) in the treatment group and 21% (p=0.14) in the comparison group, as the increase in prices could not compensate the significant reduction the amount of cashews harvested.

Nonetheless, the total household income per capita has increased by 70% in real terms in the comparison group (p=0.05) and by 9% in the treatment group (p=0.47). Hence, especially in the comparison group the reduction in cashew revenues was compensated by an increase in income from non-farm businesses (14.4 percentage point increase in the share of total income) and from livestock (8 percentage point increase).

In the treatment villages, the reliance on cashew nuts remained high: 53.2% in the share of total income compared to 36% in the comparison group. Households in treatment villages compensated the reduction in cashew income through and increase in income from transfers (7 percentage point increase in the share of total income) and from non-farm businesses (6 percentage point increase). However, not only cashew revenues but the contribution of other crops to the household income has decreased.

Hence, the increase in total household income per capita cannot be attributed to the LED-NTT and FSPP projects as it did not arise through increases in cashew nut income.

The increase in total household income (per capita) is verified by increases is non-food expenditure,[23] the asset indices and the subjective valuation of the current wealth status (for panel respondents only). However, only the last one of these increased significantly over the evaluation period.

Finally, looking at the investments made by households, a shift is visible: a smaller percentage of households invested into new farming tools (37% and 30% at endline) and a larger percentage invested into business (24% and 27% at endline). These figures suggest that non-farm business opportunities are more profitable than crop farming.

[22] Income and consumption variables at the endline are reported in real terms (2012 prices) adjusted for inflation between 2012 and 2014. The CPI was 4.3% in 2012 and 8.38% in 2013, resulting in a 13.04% increase of consumer prices between the baseline and endline periods.

[23] For details about the components of non-food expenditure see Table 30.

### *Food security and vulnerability*

Despite the increase in per capita household income, the percentage of households reporting that they were not able to cover their living cost and they had not enough to eat at least in one month during the last 12 months has increased in both treatment groups. In fact, almost 80% of the households in both groups report to have had an episode when they did not have enough to eat. This suggests that households still rely on seasonal income, and mechanisms to save household income for later consumption are not well developed.

**Table 7: Outcome indicators**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Assignment group** | **Comparison** | | | **Treatment** | | |
| **Survey period** | Base | End | (P1v2) | Base | End | (P4v5) |
| **Panel A. Households using organic farming practices** | | | | | | |
| Percentage of households practicing organic farming | | | | | | |
| *Households practicing organic farming (self-reported)* | 91.67 (4.19) | 30.00 (21.34) | 0.11 | 87.64 (9.88) | 61.798 (16.927) | 0.112 |
| *Households practicing organic farming (not using any chemical inputs)* | 98.33 (1.67) | 95.00 (1.67) | 0.20 | 84.27 (12.10) | 77.528 (11.926) | 0.306 |
| Percentage of households using chemical inputs | | | | | | |
| *Households using chemical fertilizer for soil management* | 1.67 (1.67) | 3.33 (1.92) | 0.41 | 13.48 (10.97) | 15.730 (11.188) | 0.693 |
| *Households using chemical methods to protect from insects and diseases* | 0.00 (0.00) | 1.67 (1.67) | 0.38 | 2.25 (1.41) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.183 |
| Percentage of households using organic inputs | | | | | | |
| *Households using organic fertilizer for soil management* | 3.33 (3.33) | 30.00 (11.06) | 0.03 | 31.46 (6.15) | 49.438 (10.241) | 0.101 |
| *Households using organic methods to protect from insects and diseases* | 3.33 (3.33) | 41.67 (8.77) | 0.01 | 13.48 (3.84) | 38.202 (11.001) | 0.053 |
| Percentage of households have distance larger than 9x9 m | 96.67 (1.92) | 96.67 (3.33) | 1.00 | 91.01 (4.81) | 91.011 (5.117) | 1.000 |
| **Panel B. Yield of cashew nuts (uniform indicator)** | | | | | | |
| Yield of cashew nuts per hectare (kg) | 361.55 (46.34) | 319.86 (33.16) | 0.46 | 484.60 (65.49) | 368.098 (34.875) | 0.290 |
| Yield of cashew nuts per tree (kg) | 3.06 (0.50) | 2.42 (0.03) | 0.24 | 4.51 (0.73) | 2.847 (0.283) | 0.076 |
| **Panel C. Volume of cashew nuts sold (uniform indicator)** | | | | | | |
| Amount of cashew nuts sold (kg) | 412.36 (57.21) | 341.63 (63.17) | 0.08 | 736.15 (106.91) | 464.438 (71.008) | 0.010 |
| **Panel D. Percentage of cashew nuts sold to (inter)national markets (compared to local markets) (uniform indicator) (household data)** | | | | | | |
| Percentage of cashew nuts sold to (inter)national markets - Household average | 3.33 (3.33) | 0.09 (0.09) | 0.38 | 51.02 (21.40) | 50.455 (14.587) | 0.953 |

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Assignment group** | **Comparison** | | | **Treatment** | | |
| **Survey period** | Base | End | (P1v2) | Base | End | (P4v5) |
| **Panel E. Selling price of cashew nuts** | | | | | | |
| Selling price (weighted) of cashew nuts (average per household)[1] | 9,200.78 (312.05) | 10,154.54 (997.69) | 0.299 | 11,505.87 (991.58) | 13,367.03 (1,752.54) | 0.094 |
| **Panel F. Household income and livelihood (uniform indicator)** | | | | | | |
| Household income | | | | | | |
| *Household revenue per month from sale of cashew nut (1000 Rupiah)[1]* | 357.89 (68.27) | 280.18 (53.61) | 0.140 | 796.89 (103.58) | 471.82 (41.84) | 0.006 |
| *Total income/revenue per month per household (1000 Rupiah)[1]* | 717.01 (75.33) | 1,095.13 (122.02) | 0.092 | 1,351.47 (95.65) | 1,349.97 (246.05) | 0.886 |
| *Total income/revenue per capita per month (1000 Rupiah)[1]* | 166.10 (19.38) | 283.10 (46.52) | 0.054 | 317.06 (22.41) | 345.54 (55.01) | 0.465 |
| Per capita expenditures of households | | | | | | |
| *Hh non-food expenditure per month per capita (1000 Rupiah)[1]* | 60.81 (8.46) | 81.99 (22.12) | 0.551 | 68.09 (10.89) | 72.48 (7.73) | 0.725 |
| Asset holds of households | | | | | | |
| *Housing facilities index* | -0.38 (0.02) | -0.33 (0.05) | 0.38 | -0.28 (0.03) | -0.230 (0.031) | 0.174 |
| *Asset index* | -1.38 (0.06) | -1.15 (0.17) | 0.34 | -1.26 (0.08) | -1.112 (0.115) | 0.062 |
| Investment into business or farm equipment | | | | | | |
| *Percentage of households that invested in business* | 3.33 (1.92) | 26.67 (6.09) | 0.02 | 10.11 (2.40) | 23.596 (3.078) | 0.017 |
| *Percentage of households that invested in new farming tools* | 56.67 (10.36) | 30.00 (6.94) | 0.19 | 64.04 (6.67) | 37.079 (8.211) | 0.006 |
| Self-reported well-being | | | | | | |
| *Happiness* | 2.37 (0.08) | 2.35 (0.07) | 0.87 | 2.26 (0.05) | 2.258 (0.106) | 0.924 |
| *Current wealth status* | 1.70 (0.11) | 2.28 (0.07) | 0.03 | 2.28 (0.10) | 2.494 (0.145) | 0.013 |
| **Panel G. Food security and vulnerability (uniform indicator)** | | | | | | |
| Percentage of hh's not able to cover their living costs | 81.67 (3.19) | 91.67 (3.19) | 0.34 | 89.89 (3.82) | 95.506 (2.227) | 0.609 |
| Percentage of hh's that have not enough to eat | 61.67 (1.67) | 78.33 (4.19) | 0.09 | 62.92 (4.92) | 79.775 (3.308) | 0.046 |
| Number of months hh not able to cover their living costs | 3.47 (0.28) | 3.40 (0.32) | 0.18 | 3.62 (0.48) | 3.663 (0.184) | 0.981 |
| Number of months hh have not enough to eat | 2.42 (0.20) | 2.62 (0.29) | 0.13 | 2.34 (0.32) | 2.449 (0.174) | 0.765 |

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Assignment group** | **Comparison** | | | **Treatment** | | |
| **Survey period** | Base | End | (P1v2) | Base | End | (P4v5) |
| Current standard of living: daily needs covered | 1.27 (0.07) | 1.37 (0.10) | 0.08 | 1.44 (0.04) | 1.483 (0.041) | 0.376 |
| Current standard of living: food consumption covered | 1.50 (0.09) | 1.67 (0.05) | 0.22 | 1.64 (0.02) | 1.730 (0.047) | 0.152 |

Source: Household survey E10; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard errors given in parentheses. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.

1. Prices are reported in 2012 real prices. Prices at the endline are deflated by the CPI for 2012 at 4.3% and for 2013 at 8.38% (total of 13.04%). Source: http://www.bps.go.id/eng/aboutus.php?inflasi=1

**Table 8: Percentage of cashew nuts sold to (inter)national markets (compared to local markets)**

| Assignment group | Comparison | | Treatment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Survey period** | Base | End | Base | End |
| Percentage of cashew […] going to (inter)national markets – aggregate of households | | | | |
| *In shell* | 5.13 | 0.00 | 38.80 | 45.78 |
| *With brown skin* | 0.00 | 62.96 | 100 | 97.30 |
| *With white skin* | 0.00 | 0.00 | 41.28 | 96.87 |

Source: Household survey E10; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

# 8. Evaluation question 2: Attribution of changes

This subsection discusses evaluation question 2: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?

## 8.1. Methodology

We analyse the effects of the LED-NTT and FSPP projects on beneficiaries using regression analysis. The primary analysis uses difference-in-difference methodology: we compare the changes in outcome indicators between the treatment and comparison groups. We assume that in the absence of the LED-NTT and FSPP projects, on average, we would observe the same magnitude of changes in the treatment villages as in the comparison group.

However, because the LED-NTT project was running already before the baseline survey (since 2010), we also analyse the results of the project using a pooled regression combining the baseline and endline data without taking first differences. In effect, this analysis compares the outcomes of the treatment and comparison group at a point in time. The results tell us the early effects (at the baseline) of the LED-NTT project and also the total effects of the LED-NTT and FSPP projects (at the endline).

The total impact of the LED-NTT and FSPP projects can also be calculated as the sum of the early effects (at the baseline) and the effects found between the baseline and endline survey period (diff-in-diff). The two calculations of the total project impact should yield similar results. If the estimated total impacts are significantly different, it suggests that the results of the pooled estimator are invalid.

Below we discuss the model used for the regression analysis in detail.

### *Treatment effect on the treated*

As discussed in section 3.3, the project has three components: trainings on good farming practices, organic certification and processing units. These components affect the outcomes to a different extent depending on the outcome variables. Therefore, it would be reasonable to assume the following regression equation for outcome variable $Y$:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_t + \beta GFP_{it} + \gamma Cert_{it} + \delta Proc_{it} + \zeta X_{it} + \eta_i + e_{it} \quad (1)$$

Where $GFP_{it}$ signifies if household $i$ is a member of a farming group that received trainings on good farming practices at time $t$;[24] $Cert_{it}$ shows whether household $i$'s farming group has been certified to produce organic cashew nuts at time $t$; and $Proc_{it}$ indicates whether the same farming group (village) had a processing unit at time $t$.

In general, because the treatment and comparison groups were not randomly selected, there could be differences in the characteristics of the treatment and comparison villages and of the households sampled in these villages. If some of these characteristics also affect the outcome of $Y_{it}$ and we do not control for these characteristics, we could mistakenly interpret the effect of these characteristics on the outcome variable as an effect of the project. Therefore, in (1) we include $X_{it}$, a set of observable control variables that affect the project outcome but they are not affected by the outcome itself (predetermined). In addition, we also include household fixed effects ($\eta_i$) that pick up unobservable time invariant household specific characteristics; and a time varying trend ($\alpha_t$) in the outcome variable. The remaining residuals ($u_{it}$) are clustered at the village level.

However, due to the limited number of observations (of farming groups) per intervention type, we are not able to report on the project components separately for most outcome variables. Instead, we only report on the overall impact of the intervention. Hence, instead of regressing the outcome variable on the components of the intervention, we will only use an indicator whether the household is a member of a project farming group ($Treat$). This way we can estimate the mean effect of the programme on the participating farming groups and households.

In addition, since the project has already started before the baseline at the farming groups and there have been continued project activities since the baseline, we split the intervention coefficient into before baseline ($TreatBefore_{it} = 1$ in both rounds if the household is member of a project farming group, and 0 otherwise) and after baseline ($TreatAfter_{it} = 1$ at the endline survey if the household is member of a project farming group, and 0 otherwise). Therefore, $TreatAfter$ only contains the additional improvement after the baseline. The resulting regression equation is:

$$\mathrm{Y_{it}} = \alpha_t + \theta_1 \mathrm{TreatBefore_{it}} + \theta_2 \mathrm{TreatAfter_{it}} + \zeta \mathrm{X_{it}} + \eta_i + \mathrm{e_{it}} \quad (2)$$

[24] Regarding the time index $t$, $t = 1$ for the baseline period and $t = 2$ for the endline period.

We are interested in the estimates of $\theta_1$ and $\theta_2$, the coefficient of the treatment effects before and after the baseline, respectively.

### *Treatment effect on the treated between baseline and endline*

We use difference-in-differences methodology to estimate the treatment effect of the LED-NTT and FSPP projects between the baseline and the endline survey. We take the first difference of (2):[25]

$$\Delta Y_{i2} = \alpha + \theta_2 \text{TreatAfter}_{i2} + \zeta \Delta W_{i2} + \Delta u_{i2} \quad (3)$$

The time-invariant household fixed effect disappears in (3) due to the differencing, along with some of the control variables in $X$ with $\Delta W_{i2}$ containing the change in the remaining control variables. Only variables where the change is significantly different between the treatment and comparison groups are included in W. In addition, we denote the average change of the outcome variable in the comparison group by $\alpha$.

Note that the early treatment variable, $TreatBefore$, has been omitted from (3) as its value did not change between the baseline and endline periods. In addition, we omitted the change sign (Δ) from $\text{TreatAfter}_{i2}$ as its value at the baseline was zero, and hence, the change in this treatment variable is equal to its value at the endline. We report the regression results for the treatment effect, $\theta_2$, with and without control variables (W). Note that only the panel sample is used for this regression.

### *Treatment effect on the treated before and after the baseline*

In order to estimate the treatment effect of the LED-NTT project before the baseline survey, we combine or pool the baseline and endline data,[26] and estimate the following pooled regression:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_t + \theta_1 \text{TreatBefore}_{it} + \theta_2 \text{TreatAfter}_{it} + \zeta X_{it} + \mu_{f(i)} + u_{it} \quad (4)$$

where the household fixed effect ($\eta_i$) is replaced by a farming group fixed effect ($\mu_{f(i)}$) in the pooled regression. This model assumes that there are no unobserved household-specific effects that correlate with the treatment. Given that the intervention is at the farming group level, self-selection of individuals is less of a problem. Only the overall organisation of the farming group and the quality of the cashew nuts played a role in the placement of the intervention, which can be controlled by farming group fixed effects.

Regarding the control variables, $X_{it}$ includes household characteristics that are significantly different between the treatment and comparison households either at the baseline or the endline period. We use observations on all sampled households for estimating regression (4).

Most importantly, the coefficient of $TreatAfter$ in regression (4) not only shows the impact of the interventions after the baseline (as in regression (3)) but, in fact, it combines the treatment effect both before and after the baseline survey. Hence, it estimates the total treatment effect on the treated.[27]

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[25] Hence, $\Delta Y_{i2} = Y_{i2} - Y_{i1}$ and so forth.

[26] In principle, we could also just have estimated the early project results using a cross-sectional analysis of the baseline data. However, combining the baseline and endline data may improve the precision of the estimates.

[27] If the total impact estimated by $\theta_2$ in regression (4) significantly differs from the total impact estimated by the sum of $\theta_1$ from (4) and $\theta_2$ from (3), it signals that unobserved household characteristics are also an important determinants of the outcome variables. Hence, the results from (4) are biased.

## 8.2. Results

Table 9 reports the regression results for the outcome indicators in the same order as in section 7. The first column of the table contains the mean value of the variable in the comparison group at the baseline. This serves as a reference point for assessing the size of the project impact on the variables. The next two columns report on the pooled regression results of regression (4): column 2 reports on the treatment effect before the baseline, while column 3 reports on the total treatment effect until the endline. Next, column 4 reports the difference-in-difference (DD) regression results of regression (3) without the controls, and column 5 shows the regression results including controls. As mentioned above, the overall effect of the project on the beneficiaries should be assessed as the sum of the baseline effect (column 2) and the DD effect (column 5), which can be compared to the total effect calculated in using the pooled regression (column 3). If the two results are significantly different, it suggests that the results of regression (4) in columns 2 and 3 are biased.

In the pooled regression (columns 2 and 3), the education, age and gender of the household head, the household size, the size and slope of land owned and cultivated, the gender of the main respondent, and the subjective well-being 5 years ago are used to control for differences between the households. In addition, village fixed effects are also included as indicated in regression (4). In the diff-in-diff regression (column 5), the same household level variables are included.

The standard error of the coefficient estimates are calculated correcting for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level, and they are reported below the coefficients estimates in brackets (columns 2-5). The significance of the coefficient estimates is denoted by stars next to the coefficient estimates.[28] As before, the sample size for the regressions is not reported but can be inferred from Annex III.

The regression results are discussed by outcome variable groups.

### *Use of organic farming practices*

The regression results show that the LED-NTT and FSPP projects did not significantly affect the farming practices used by the households between the baseline and endline periods except for a small reduction in using chemicals to protect from insects and diseases (significant at 10%). No positive impact is observed on using organic soil management and protection methods against insects and diseases as the comparison group was also catching up in terms of organic farming practices between the baseline and endline.

However, if the improvements in the comparison villages are due to spillover effects of the LED-NTT project as argued above, the increase in organic farming practices in both the treatment and comparison groups can be at least partially attributed to the projects. Unfortunately, we are not able to quantify what percentage of the effect can be attributed to LED-NTT.

[28] The probability that the coefficient estimates are not significantly different from zero is indicated by stars: * denotes that this probability is smaller than 10%, ** is used if this probability is less than 5% and *** if it is less than 1%. Hence, the more stars indicate a higher probability that the effects are significantly different from zero.

### *Yield of cashew*

Between the baseline and endline the yield of cashew nuts in the project villages decreased, which is captured by the negative albeit insignificant coefficient estimate of the intervention. Nonetheless, the overall effect of the project on the cashew nut yields appears to be substantial and significant (42% higher per tree and 46% higher per hectare compared to the comparison group at baseline).

However, given the selection procedure of the LED-NTT project for the project sites, it is possible that at least some part of this effect is due to unobserved site characteristics (like soil quality). This view is supported by the fact that treatment households did not use more intensive sustainable farming practices compared to the comparison households at the endline.

### *Volume of cashew nuts sold*

The regression results do not support the hypothesis that the project contributes to increasing the amount of cashews sold.

### *Percentage of cashew nuts sold to (inter)national markets*

The results show that the LED-NTT and FSPP projects were successful in linking the project farming groups to (inter)national markets. The total effect of the projects was a 38.4 percentage point increase in the percent of cashew nuts marketed at (inter)national markets.

### *Selling price of cashew nuts*

Due to the LED-NTT and FSPP projects, the average selling price of cashew nuts increased in the treatment group. The overall effect is 28% higher prices compared to the prices reported by the comparison group at the baseline (or 22% at endline). As discussed before, both the processing stage of cashew nuts and the locality of market contributed to this outcome. Both of these factors are influenced by the project. However, the estimated project impact is very imprecise, and it cannot be excluded that the project did not have any beneficial effect on the selling price of cashew nuts.

### *Household income and livelihood*

Before the baseline period, the project had a positive impact on households' revenue from cashews (exp(0.7)-1=101% increase compared to the comparison group). However, during the evaluation period the project had a negative (exp(-0.2)-1=-18%) but insignificant effect. The overall effect of the project is insignificant (exp(0.3)-1=35%).

However, the impact of the project on the total household income per capita is negative both during the evaluation period (exp(-0.3)-1=-26%) and overall (exp(-0.6)-1=-45%). This is due to the fact that the comparison households were able to improve their livelihood with activities other than cashew nut cultivation, while the treatment households lost out on focusing on cashews and suffering a bad harvest.

Due to the project, treatment households invested less into their own business and relatively more into farming tools than the comparison households.

Finally, despite being poorer in terms of total income and expenditure, at the baseline treatment households judged their current wealth status to be higher than in the comparison group by 29%. However, during the evaluation period the subjective wealth status of treatment households grew less than in the comparison group.

Hence, overall, the LED-NTT and FSPP projects did not contribute to improving the livelihoods of the treatment households. Treatment households may have been better off by focusing on a different livelihood activity.

### *Food security and vulnerability*

The regression results on the food security indicators are mixed, and do not yield conclusive findings on the effect of the project on the food security and vulnerability of households.

**Table 9: Regression on outcome variables (attribution)**

| | | Treatment effect (pooled) | | Treatment effect (diff-in-diff) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Mean comp. at baseline | (PoBef) | (PoAf) | (DDwo) | (DDw) |
| **Panel A. Households using organic farming practices** | | | | | |
| Percentage of households practicing organic farming | | | | | |
| *Households practicing organic farming (self-reported)* | 91.7 | -7.5<br>(15.4) | 30.1**<br>(12.5) | 35.7<br>(27.6) | 39.8<br>(23.2) |
| *Households practicing organic farming (not using any chemical inputs)* | 98.3 | -7.9<br>(4.5) | -11.8***<br>(2.5) | -2.1<br>(5.4) | -3.4<br>(4.6) |
| Percentage of households using chemical inputs | | | | | |
| *Households using chemical fertilizer for soil management* | 1.7 | -0.1<br>(1.7) | 0.6<br>(2.4) | -0.7<br>(3.3) | -0.2<br>(2.6) |
| *Households using chemical methods to protect from insects and diseases* | 0.0 | -0.6<br>(1.6) | -4.7***<br>(1.2) | -4.2*<br>(2.2) | -3.6*<br>(1.9) |
| Percentage of households using organic inputs | | | | | |
| *Households using organic fertilizer for soil management* | 3.3 | 18.3**<br>(6.0) | 10.4<br>(8.8) | -11.4<br>(11.6) | -11.3<br>(11.4) |
| *Households using organic methods to protect from insects and diseases* | 3.3 | -0.3<br>(7.1) | -12.6<br>(8.8) | -13.7<br>(11.7) | -12.8<br>(12.6) |
| Percentage of households have distance larger than 9x9 m | 96.7 | -6.2<br>(3.7) | -6.6***<br>(1.5) | 0.0<br>(4.2) | 0.0<br>(4.2) |
| **Panel B. Yield of cashew nuts (uniform indicator)** | | | | | |
| Yield of cashew nuts per hectare (kg) | 361.6 | 229.2***<br>(51.0) | 165.9**<br>(64.6) | -37.4<br>(108.0) | -10.8<br>(75.4) |
| Yield of cashew nuts per tree (kg) | 3.1 | 2.1***<br>(0.5) | 1.3**<br>(0.5) | -0.9<br>(0.9) | -0.7<br>(0.8) |
| **Panel C. Volume of cashew nuts sold (uniform indicator)** | | | | | |
| Amount of cashew nuts sold (kg) | 412.4 | 88.1<br>(55.1) | -78.2<br>(78.8) | -159.3*<br>(83.4) | -133.4<br>(89.4) |
| **Panel D. Percentage of cashew nuts sold to (inter)national markets (compared to local markets) (uniform indicator) (household data)** | | | | | |
| Percentage of cashew nuts sold to (inter)national markets - Household average | 3.3 | 33.8***<br>(9.7) | 38.4***<br>(10.8) | 5.1<br>(19.0) | 5.8<br>(19.9) |
| **Panel E. Selling price of cashew nuts** | | | | | |
| Selling price (weighted) of cashew nuts (average per household) | 9,193.5 | 869.3<br>(1,776.2) | 2,467.5<br>(1,560.4) | 1,659.7<br>(1,884.0) | 1,466.8<br>(1,461.2) |
| **Panel F. Household income and livelihood (uniform indicator)** | | | | | |
| Household income | | | | | |
| *Log Household revenue per month from sale of cashew nuts* | 5.2 | 0.7***<br>(0.2) | 0.3<br>(0.2) | -0.3<br>(0.3) | -0.2<br>(0.3) |

| | | Treatment effect (pooled) | | Treatment effect (diff-in-diff) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Mean comp. at baseline | (PoBef) | (PoAf) | (DDwo) | (DDw) |
| *Log Total income/revenue per month per household* | -0.9 | -0.2<br>(0.2) | -0.5***<br>(0.1) | -0.4*<br>(0.2) | -0.3<br>(0.3) |
| *Log Total income/revenue per capita per month* | 4.5 | -0.2<br>(0.2) | -0.6***<br>(0.1) | -0.5*<br>(0.2) | -0.3<br>(0.3) |
| Per capita expenditures of households | | | | | |
| Log *per capita hh non-food expenditure per month* | 10.6 | -0.0<br>(0.2) | -0.2*<br>(0.1) | -0.2<br>(0.3) | -0.2<br>(0.2) |
| Asset holds of households | | | | | |
| *Housing facilities index* | -0.4 | 0.0<br>(0.0) | 0.0<br>(0.0) | 0.0<br>(0.0) | 0.0<br>(0.0) |
| *Asset index* | -1.4 | -0.2<br>(0.1) | -0.2<br>(0.1) | 0.0<br>(0.1) | 0.0<br>(0.1) |
| Investment into business or farm equipment | | | | | |
| *Percentage of households that invested in business* | 3.3 | -5.3<br>(4.8) | -14.9**<br>(4.7) | -12.3*<br>(6.6) | -12.1<br>(7.2) |
| *Percentage of households that invested in new farming tools* | 56.7 | 8.4<br>(6.6) | 8.9<br>(9.3) | -6.8<br>(13.8) | 0.0<br>(14.8) |
| Self-reported well-being | | | | | |
| *Happiness* | 2.4 | -0.0<br>(0.1) | 0.1<br>(0.1) | -0.0<br>(0.1) | 0.0<br>(0.2) |
| *Current wealth status* | 1.7 | 0.5***<br>(0.1) | 0.2<br>(0.1) | -0.3**<br>(0.1) | -0.3<br>(0.2) |
| **Panel G. Food security and vulnerability (uniform indicator)** | | | | | |
| Percentage of hh's not able to cover their living costs | 81.7 | 4.8<br>(5.0) | -0.6<br>(6.0) | -3.6<br>(9.1) | -6.0<br>(8.7) |
| Percentage of hh's that have not enough to eat | 61.7 | -8.5<br>(7.4) | -6.4<br>(7.2) | 2.6<br>(6.8) | -2.7<br>(9.4) |
| Number of months hh not able to cover their living costs | 3.5 | 1.6***<br>(0.4) | 1.6***<br>(0.3) | -0.2<br>(0.5) | -0.2<br>(0.5) |
| Number of months hh have not enough to eat | 2.4 | 0.5<br>(0.3) | 0.4*<br>(0.2) | -0.3<br>(0.4) | -0.4<br>(0.4) |
| Current standard of living: daily needs covered | 1.3 | 0.2***<br>(0.1) | 0.1*<br>(0.1) | -0.0<br>(0.1) | -0.0<br>(0.1) |
| Current standard of living: food consumption covered | 1.5 | 0.1<br>(0.1) | 0.0<br>(0.1) | -0.1<br>(0.1) | -0.1<br>(0.1) |

Source: Household survey E10; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are given in parentheses.
* p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

# 9. Evaluation question 3: Relevance of changes

This subsection will answer evaluation question 3: What is the relevance of these changes? In particular we look at the size of the impact and whether the project addresses an important issue for the beneficiaries.

## 9.1. The size of the impact

The LED-NTT and FSPP projects had a positively impact on the share of cashew nuts sold at (inter)national markets, the revenue from cashew sales and the selling price of cashew nuts compared to the comparison group. However, it failed to increase the total income of the project beneficiaries during the evaluation period. In fact, households in treatment villages are worse of compared to the comparison group that manage to better diversify its income sources and increase its income through investing more into non-farm business and livestock.

Hence, the achieved positive results of the project are counterweighted by the unfortunate reduction in cashew harvests, which led to the relative decrease of household income in the treatment group. The findings highlight the importance of income diversification of the project beneficiaries, as cashew nut cultivation not only provides seasonal income but it also appears to be a risky income source subject to weather and other factors outside the control of the households. In that respect, it is not a surprise that households are not willing to exert the extra effort to fully adopt the sustainable farming practices promoted by the project.

## 9.2. Does the project address an important issue for the beneficiaries?

The project addresses an in important issue for the beneficiaries: their livelihood. Given that most household in the project area are cashew farmers that produce good quality cashews without using chemical inputs, the project's focus on organic certification and (inter)national marketing of cashew nuts is well chosen.

However, the project focuses on a seasonal and risky livelihood activity as can be seen from the findings of this evaluation, which may not be the optimal strategy for the economic development of the treatment households.

As we observed in Table 4, the membership of treatment households decreased over the evaluation period in cashew focused farming groups in favour of more general farming groups. This suggests that farmers have realized that they have to diversify also in their crop production and not focus solely on cashews. Recalling the findings of Table 24 and Table 25, the projects of SwissContact are certainly beneficial for the treatment households that engage in processing of cashews (18-32%) and selling at the (inter)national market (53%). However, other farmers are better off by pursuing other livelihood activities.

# 10. Evaluation question 4: Efficiency of project

This subsection will answer evaluation question 4: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient? To answer this question we will describe the cost effectiveness of the programme. First, the calculation of cost per beneficiary is discussed. Second, these costs are compared to the project effects per beneficiary. Finally, the findings on cost effectiveness are compared to achievements of similar projects.

## 10.1. Costs per beneficiary

A first step to estimate the cost effectiveness of the programme is to calculate the project cost per beneficiary. We conducted a structured interview with the field coordinator[29] of LED-NTT and the project manager of FSPP at SwissContact on 9 September 2013 using the 'budget survey' as described in section 5.1. In addition, we consulted relevant reports of the LED-NTT such as their financial statements and annual narrative reports. [30]

The cost data is based on the actual costs made by LED-NTT. However, a number of currency exchanges had to be calculated for the project as SwissContact Indonesia reported costs in Indonesian Rupiahs (IDR) and Swiss francs (CHF), while the audit reports were usually in CHF and EUR. We tried to consistently use the IDR and EUR amounts whenever possible. However, project management costs and fees at SwissContact headquarters in Switzerland had to be converted to IDR in order to report the total projects in IDR.[31]

The total costs of the LED-NTT project amount to 9,543,375,490 IDR or 847,748 EUR[32,33] for the 2010-2012 period covering the four sectors of the project (cashew nut, cocoa, seaweed and enabling environment) and overall project management. This is 94% of the overall project budget of 897,794 EUR.

[29] The interview was conducted with Hanna Keraf, Programme Manager of FSPP, Etih Suryatin, Field Coordinator of LED-NTT, and Elvy Setheono, Head of Operations of Swisscontact Indonesia until end 2013.

[30] For the costs we relied on the LED NTT Cordaid (Total Expenditure-Profit Loss) reports for years 2010, 2011 and 2012, and the annual audit reports for years 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013. Information about the beneficiaries is obtained from half-yearly project reports between 2010-2012, Progress Report 2013 and Wildhoney Baseline Report.

[31] The project costs for 2012 differ between the profit/loss statements obtained from SwissContact Indonesia, the financial statement sent by SwissContact Switzerland to Cordaid, and the annual audited financial report. Data reported in the tables are based on the financial statement specifying costs in EUR and CHF.

[32] Using implicit exchange rates based on the financial reports, we arrive at the following IDR/EUR exchange rates: 10,490 IDR/EUR in 2010, 11,916 IDR/EUR in 2011, 11,899 IDR/EUR in 2012 and 14,106 IDR/EUR in 2012. Note, however, that costs have been recorded in IDR and CHF at the time of occurrence. Therefore, there is no fixed exchange rate for the costs. The exchange rates reported above are average exchange rates calculated based on the annual total project costs.

[33] Prices in IDR and EUR are reported in nominal values. No adjustment for inflation has been made. Hence, adding the costs over the years is technically incorrect. To overcome this problem when calculating the costs per beneficiaries, we converted the annual costs to International dollars (Int$) in 2011 prices. Hence, values reported in Int$ are real values adjusted for purchasing power parity.

Cordaid funded 36% of the actual costs (305,000 EUR) of the LED-NTT project.[34] Overall, 52% of the costs cover direct project costs (18% for cashew nut sector, 13% for cocoa sector, 12% for seaweed sector and 9% for enabling environment), and the remaining 48% are the costs of project management (24% local project management, 16% project management at SwissContact headquarters and 8% overhead).

Based on the financial statement for 2010, Cordaid covered 100% of the direct costs in the cashew sector, 75% in the cashew sector, 9% of the seaweed sector and 74% of the project activities on enabling environment. In addition, Cordaid funded 6% of the local project management costs and 32% of the project management costs at SwissContact headquarters and project management fees (overhead costs). The overall contribution of Cordaid to the LED-NTT project was 39% in 2010. Unfortunately, we do not have information about the cost items covered by Cordaid in 2011 and 2012.

Turning to the FSPP project, the total cost for the 2013-2014 period was planned at 379,365 EUR with 73% contribution from Cordaid. In 2013, the total costs of the FSPP project were 2,035,315,560 IDR or 144,289.76 EUR funded 100% by Cordaid.[35] In the first half of 2014, the project costs amounted to 47,990 EUR financed fully by Cordaid.[36] Hence, 49% of the planned budget was still available for the second half of 2014. In 2013, 29% of the overall costs were used for the cashew sector component, 21% were used for the honey sector, 41% were the costs of project management, and the remaining 9% were the project management fee (overhead). Unfortunately, the actual costs of activities in 2014 were not yet available at the time of writing this report.

Table 10 summarizes the overall costs of the LED-NTT and FSPP projects in Indonesian rupiahs (column 1) and in euros (column 2) per year. The percentage of total costs covered by Cordaid (Co-financing Agency or CFA) through MFS II funding is shown in column 3 also per year.

The remaining columns of Table 10 contain information regarding the calculation of annual project costs per beneficiary household. Column 4 reports on the percentage of project costs attributed to the cashew sector (direct and indirect costs) in Indonesian rupiahs. The indirect costs of overall project management are split among the sub-projects according to their share from all direct costs.[37]

We report on the cashew nut project costs in Indonesian rupiahs because we want to calculate the annual cost per beneficiary household (HH) in Indonesian rupiahs and International dollars (Int$). International dollars at 2011 prices[38] are used for the final values of the cost per beneficiary household

[34] According to SwissContact Budget to LED-NTT Contract, the total budget of the LED-NTT project for the period 2010-2012 was 897,794 EUR, of which Cordaid financed 305,250 EUR.

[35] Cordaid have transferred 151,434 EUR to SwissContact. However, due to changes in the exchange rate over the year, only 144,289.76 EUR (95% of funds) have been used. The project closed the year with a net asset balance of 100,774,836 IDR according to the project's audit report.

[36] Information for 2014 received from Cordaid.

[37] The share of indirect costs attributed to the cashew nut sub-project is 29.2% in 2010, 28.1% in 2011, 42.4% in 2012 and 57.6% in 2013.

[38] The following exchange rates are used based on PPP conversion factor using the World Development Indicators: 3,469.52 IDR/Int$ in 2010, 3606.57 IDR/Int$ in 2011, 3,636.38 IDR/Int$ in 2012, 3,682.25 IDR/Int$ in 2013 and 4,530.90 IDR/Int$ in 2014. Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#

calculation because it takes both purchasing power parity and inflation into account. Hence, the final result can easily be compared across time and countries.

Turning to the direct beneficiaries, column 5 shows the number of farm households directly benefiting from the cashew nut intervention as reported in the progress reports of the project. Column 6 reports the cost per farming household per year in IDR and column 8 reports the same value in constant price international dollars (Int$ 2011).

The table shows that the number of beneficiaries is rather stable over the years, indicating that the same households have benefitted from the project over the three year project period. As discussed in section 3, the intervention is a continued capacity development of the cashew nut farmers and processors. Therefore, in order to obtain a realistic picture of the overall costs per beneficiary, we need to sum the costs per beneficiary per year for the 2010-2014 period. The total costs are 589.45 Int$ per farming household for the 2010-2012 LED-NTT period, and 172.98 Int$ for 2013 in the FSPP period. Hence, for the period of 2010-2013, the total costs per cashew farming household were 762.43 Int$.

**Table 10: Overview of the costs and number of beneficiaries**

| Period | Total costs [IDR] | Total costs [EUR][1] | Percentage of costs funded by CFA [MFS II] | Cashew costs[2] [IDR] | Number of direct beneficiaries [Farm HHs] | Cost per farm HH per year [IDR] | Cost per farm HH per year [Int$ 2011][3] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ***LED-NTT*** | | | | | | | |
| 2010 | 4,078,335,415 | 388,765 | 39%[4] | 722,595,697 | 1,519 | 879,354 | 253.45 |
| 2011 | 2,519,823,913 | 211,464 | 38% | 224,672,204 | 1,519 | 408,566 | 113.28 |
| 2012 | 2,945,216,162 | 247,519 | 30% | 432,012,904 | 1,541 | 809,907 | 222.72 |
| ***FSPP*** | | | | | | | |
| 2013 | 2,035,315,560 | 144,290 | 100% | 1,172,636,458 | 1,841 | 636,956 | 172.98 |
| 2014[5] | N.K.[6] | 47,990 | 100% | N.K. | 2,163[8] | N.K. | N.K. |

Source: Budget Survey 2013; LED-NTT financial statements and annual narrative reports for the years 2010-2013.
Notes:

1. EUR amounts are included as reported in the annual audit reports as the amount transferred by Cordaid to SwissContact. No adjustment has been made for inflation.
2. Direct costs include the direct costs of the cashew nut sub-project and indirect costs of overall management. The share of the cashew nut sub-project from all direct project costs (for 4 sub-projects) is used to calculate the share of the cashew nut sub-project from the total indirect costs.
3. PPP conversion factor to 2011 international dollars is calculated using the World Development Indicators: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#
4. Costs in 2010 are funded by MFS I.
5. Costs are included only from 1 January 2014 until 30 June 2014 (6 months).
6. N.K. = not known
7. Planned number of beneficiaries.

The financial report assigns sector costs to categories of production/productivity, organic certification, market channel, processing unit/product development, coordination and staff, and monitoring and

evaluation. Table 11 reports on the cost per beneficiary household for specific project activities in International dollars (2011). The staff costs are not included in the table, only direct project activity costs. In addition, costs contributed by the beneficiaries or the local government are not taken into account. This especially applies for the organic certification, where the local government also contributes. The establishment of processing units is also partly driven by private initiatives that complement the project.

**Table 11: Contribution of project activities to cost per beneficiary household (2010-2013) in Int$ (2011)**

| Year | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Productivity (GFP)** | 17.08 | 4.25 | 6.34 | 22.79 | **50.46** |
| **Organic certification** | 9.18 | 11.65 | - | 18.11 | **38.93** |
| **Product development, market channel and processing units** | 15.72 | 7.32 | 43.23 | 29.62 | **95.89** |
| Source: LED-NTT financial statements and annual narrative reports for the years 2010-2013. | | | | | |

Table 11 shows that the costs of production/productivity contribute 7% of the total cost per beneficiary, while this percentage is 5% for organic certification and 13% for market channel and processing unit/product development.

## 10.2. Cost-benefit

On the one hand, the total costs of the LED-NTT and FSPP project were estimated at 762.43 Int$ per cashew farming household. However, only considering only the direct project costs on the three project components: productivity increase, organic certification and marketing, the cost of direct project activities was only 185.28 Int$ (2011).

On the other hand, it is difficult to quantify the benefit of the project. The final outcome of the project is the increase in households' livelihood, which may be best quantified by increases in total household income. However, the regression results in Table 9 indicate that while the project had a positive impact on revenue from cashew production, it had a negative overall impact on the total household income.

The results may be driven by unfortunate weather or other circumstances, and in another year or over the long run we might have found a positive overall benefit for the project in terms of household income.

However, judging the project based on the findings during the evaluation period, we have to conclude that the net benefit of the project is negative accounting for the project costs.

## 10.3. Cost effectiveness

Comparing the costs of the LED-NTT and FSPP projects to the costs of other similar projects, Barett et al (2002) report that the costs of organic cashew nut certification were 1,037 Int$ per farming group (100 farmers) per year, or 10.37 Int$ per farmer per year. Considering only the costs of certification, these costs are similar to the ones found for the projects of SwissContact (9.18-18.11 Int$ per farmer).

Quizon et al (2001) report on the costs of trainings on organic farming practices per farming group using the farmer field school approach, which are 37.30-49.20 Int$ per farming group, which are considerably

lower than the costs of the productivity component of the LED-NTT project (4.25-22.79 Int$ per farmer per year).

Summarizing, already the direct costs of trainings on organic farming practices are higher than the benchmark suggested by the Synthesis team (Quizon et al, 2001), while most of the SwissContact unit project costs (762.43 Int$ per farmer) cover indirect project costs like project management. Hence, compared to the benchmark costs sited above, the projects of SwissContact are not cost effective.

# 11. Contribution of Capacity Development and Civil Society

SwissContact was not selected for the evaluation of capacity development of the SPO and civil society strengthening.

# 12. Conclusion

SwissContact's LED-NTT and FSPP projects aimed to increase the profit of cashew nut farmers through four channels: increasing productivity, obtaining premium prices on organic certified cashews, obtaining higher price for processed products and linking farming groups to national and international buyers. Below we discuss to what extent the projects were successful in delivering the desired outcomes in terms of the four project components for the sampled beneficiary households.

Firstly, we consider the productivity channel: almost all treatment farming groups indicated that SwissContact has conducted meetings or trainings at the farming group on good farming practices, while only 33% of the treatment households at the baseline and 39% at the endline recalled to have participated at such meetings. However, this does not in itself imply that households are not using sustainable farming practices. Indeed, during the evaluation period the percentage of households using sustainable soil management methods increased from 31% to 49%, and for insect and disease protection methods it increased from 13% to 38%. However, at the same time households in comparison villages also caught up on using sustainable farming practices. This could be an indirect effect of LED-NTT. Unfortunately, households in organic certified villages showed the lowest use of organic farming practices at the endline, while some of them even admitted to using chemical fertilisers (9%). Turning to cashew yields, we find that the cashew yields are significantly higher among the project beneficiaries compared to the control group. However, during the evaluation period the advantage has decreased. In general, cashew yields have dropped from 2011/2012 to 2013/2014 by 24-37% in the treatment and 11-21% in the comparison group.

Secondly, half of the sampled project farming groups had organic certification. As a result of organic certification and linking farming groups to (inter)national markets, around 50% of the cashews sold have been marketed on (inter)national markets. Table 27 and Table 28 show that cashews were generally sold more expensive at (inter)national markets.

Thirdly, almost all project farming groups had a processing unit at the endline. Table 24 shows that the share of processed cashew nuts sold increased to 24% in the treatment group at the endline. As processed cashews are sold at a higher price, the SwissContact projects have contributed to the increase

in cashew selling price. In fact, the project contributed to a 22% increase in the overall average cashew nut selling prices but the impact is not significant due to the large variation of reported selling prices. Hence, the LED-NTT and FSPP project were the most successful in linking farmers to the (inter)national market (including certification) and setting up processing units.

Turning to the profits and income of farmers, we found that despite the positive impact on prices, the projects were not able to increase the revenues of project beneficiaries from 2011/2012 to 2013/2014 even when controlling for the reduction in revenues in the comparison villages. However, at the baseline (2011/2012), treatment households had twice as high revenues from cashews compared to the comparison households. Unfortunately, treatment households were not able to adapt to the poor harvest of the 2013/2014 period as total household income of the treatment households decreased in relative terms during the evaluation period.

The data show signs that households started moving away from cashew nut production, diversifying their income sources, which could be a result of the unfavourable cashew cultivation conditions in the 2013/2014 period. We observe that the membership of treatment households in cashew farming groups has decreased by 38%, while membership in general farming groups increased by 44%. In addition, households stared investing more in off-farm businesses at the expenses of new farming tools. This is a necessary development as cashew harvest can be volatile due to environmental conditions. However, the last bad harvest may explain why households are less keen on exerting extra effort into organic farming practices.

The above findings are partly compatible with the findings in the literature. The literature shows that organic certification projects can have a positive impact on the yield, prices and revenue of farming households. However, there are no indications that these effects translate into higher income. The LED-NTT project indeed increased price (the reported increase in price for the LED-NTT project falls into the range of reported price increases in the literature[39]) and indeed, though unfortunate, has no effect on total household income. However, where the literature shows positive effects on yield and revenue as well, the LED-NTT project was not able to increase the yield of cashew nuts or the revenues of project beneficiaries during the evaluation period due to regional unfavourable conditions for cashew nut cultivation. Nonetheless, we observed higher yields and revenues of beneficiary households at the baseline compared to comparison location.

Finally, the MFS synthesis team asked to score each project along a few indicators. Table 12 displays the indicators and the scores we deemed valid for the project.

[39] Though, the reported increases in yield, price and revenue vary widely between studies.

**Table 12: Overall project scoring**

| Statement | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| **1. The project was well designed** | 8 | The project aimed to improve the livelihood of farmers by increasing the value added of the commodity already produced by the farmers. In addition, it cooperated with the local government and farmer peer educators on promoting sustainable farming practices. |
| **2. The project was implemented as designed** | 9 | We are not aware of deviations in the project implementation. |
| **3. The project reached all its objectives** | 7 | While most project objectives have been reached, the project was not successful in increasing the revenue from cashews and total household income of beneficiary households during the evaluation period.<br>A positive effect of the project is that also farmers in the comparison villages started using some of the sustainable farming practices promoted by SwissContact. |
| **4. The observed results are attributable to the project interventions** | 6 | The score is both positive and negative.<br>Positive: the unsuccessfulness of the project in term of household income during the evaluation period is driven by factors outside of the control of SwissContact of the farmers (like whether).<br>Negative: The positive effects on yield cannot be explained by the use of sustainable farming practices. Therefore, it is possible that they are due to the selection effect of the project (site characteristics). |
| **5. The observed results are relevant to the project beneficiaries** | 6 | Given the negative outcome on income, the beneficiaries may be better off by diversifying their income sources to other livelihood activities. |
| **6. The project was implemented in the most efficient way** | 5 | Comparing the project costs to other projects, the SwissContact projects seem to be on the expensive side partially due to the high project management costs. |
| Notes: Scores are on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being “no agreement at all” and 10 being “completely agree with statement”. | | |

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Project documents of SwissContact:

- FSPP Financial Report to Cordaid 1st Semester 2013
- LED-NTT Financial Report to Cordaid 2010
- LED-NTT Financial Report to Cordaid 2011
- LED-NTT Financial Report to Cordaid 2012

# Annex I. SPO and project description

### *SwissContact*

SwissContact is an international development organisation with its head office in Switzerland. SwissContact focuses on the development of small enterprises in developing countries. In the 1960s, SwissContact built up the first vocational training projects in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Later, in the 1980s, it developed the first small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) support concepts, as there was a great need in this domain, especially for graduates from vocational schools. SMEs find it very difficult to get inexpensive operational and investment loans, which is why programmes were developed to help overcome these problems. As regards environmental protection, SwissContact has mainly been involved in developing methods to combat air pollution. SwissContact specialises in project management, focusing now on Vocational Education and Training, SME Promotion, Financial Services and Resource Efficiency. SwissContact has been working in Indonesia for over 30 years. SwissContact has its country office in Jakarta, and a field office in NTT. As of 2007, SwissContact has two offices on the island of Flores and a permanent staff of 5 people. [40]

### *Project description: LED-NTT (2004-2012)*

The Local Economic Development in Nusa Tenggara Timur (LED NTT) project is one of the projects supported by Cordaid and SwissContact. There are two phases of the LED NTT programme: the first phase is in 2004-2008, and the second phase is 2009-2012. In the first phase, Cordaid and SwissContact support LED NTT by providing an integrated approach for economic development, particularly in rural areas in Eastern parts of Indonesia. Focus of the activity in the first phase was improving and enabling environment by promoting green or organic production among farmers in rural areas, linking the product of cashew, cocoa, and seaweed to the market, and promoting the access of information and access to finance for farmers of cashew, cocoa, and seaweed.

Based on the internal assessment of the project in 2008, it is concluded that it would be more efficient for the project to focus on the selected activities which sound feasible. Therefore, LED NTT project move to the second phase, 2009-2012. There are three selected sectors that get funded, including: cashew production in East Flores, cocoa production in district of Ende, and seaweed production in Alor.

Focusing on Farmers who produce cashew nut in East Flores, the projects' aim are: (i) strengthening farmers by organising farmers work in groups to apply for organic cashew certification; (ii) improving farmers' productivity through training; (iii) linking farmers to market for selling organic cashew nuts. Organic cashew able to gain premium price; being labelled as organic the cashew value added improve approximately 30%. (iv) cashew nut sector is expected able to create job approximately 130 employees, mainly in the processing unit. The majority of the workers are female.

Cocoa is the second sector to be focused by LED NTT in the second phase. Like the cashew, cocoa is already planted by the local farmers in Ende. Cocoa production started in 2007. However, due to vulnerable for disease, cocoa production decreased significantly in the subsequent year, 2008. The key intervention of the project in cocoa production involving: (i) strengthening farmers groups by forming

[40] See also: http://www.swisscontact.org/english/pages/AR/AR.php?navanchor=2110011

farmers into 21 groups, with approximately 432 members. Within these groups, farmers could sharing their experience how to maintain good quality of cocoa seed instead of bad impact of the diseases. (ii) Through the training for Good Farming Practices (GFP) cocoa farmers are expected gaining productivity. They plant good seeds which are available in the local nursery, and applying organic fertilizer. Using demonstration in 3 different plots, it is reported that organic fertilizer could improving cocoa production almost 300%. In collaboration with PT MARS, the cocoa from farmers in Ende can be improved by guaranteeing its dry level.

The third sector of the LED NTT second phase project is seaweed production. Seaweed production is started in 2006 as parts of earth quake recovery project. In 2007, only 600 farmers engage in seaweed production, however the number double into 1282 farmers by the year 2009. Like in other sectors, forming farmers into groups, assigning training how to produce seaweed could increase the number of farmers involved in the seaweed sector. SwissContact has phased out its activities in the seaweed sector in 2010.

### *Achievements of LED-NTT in the cashew nut sector (2010-2012)*

Based on the progress reports of the LED-NTT project between 2010 and 2012, this subsection describes the planned project outputs and their accomplishments.

***Output targets***

*Organisational strengthening*

1.1 As from 2012 the Cashew Coordinating body acts as driver for future sector development.

*Productivity*

1.2 In 2012 at least 2 productivity enhancement measures applied by 1100 producers.

*Value added*

1.3 In 2012, 5 cashew farmers groups continuously obtained organic certification for 3 consecutive years.

1.4 In 2012, at least 70% of certified organic cashew shell sold through the organic channel.

1.5 At least 3 service providers provide services related to access to finance, access to markets and quality improvement until end of 2010 for cashews and until 2012 for palm/coconut sugar

***Achievements in 1st semester of 2010***

*Organisational strengthening (50% achieved)*

- Balai Penyuluhan Pertanian – BPP able to act as Cashew Coordinating Body – CCB for capacity building, increasing productivity and strengthening farmer groups.

- Several inter-group meetings resulted in strategy and planning for certification process 2010, they discussed budget for preparation certification cost, strategy for GFP training, strategy for selling cashew market.

- Almost all farmer groups are very active in conducting working groups on applying GFP (sanitation) facilitated by field facilitator in each villages.

*Increasing productivity (50% achieved)*

- 12 package role out training on on-farm GFP (Conservation and Sanitation, Pruning, pest and disease, and fertilizer) and on off-farm (post harvesting), facilitated by CCB with 24 field facilitator (7 field extension government employees and 17 farmers). Attended by 234 HH of which 155 HH very actively apply GFP.

- 9 Demo plots as media for learning have been introducing part of GFP treatment.

*Value added (60% achieved)*

- 3 farmer groups conducted preparation for organic certification process for certification 2010

- 4 Service Providers provided service relate to access to market, access to finance, and quality improvement

- 22 HH have additional income from processing 190 kg cashew equivalent to IDR 16.150.000 or IDR 241.818 per HH per month

- 5 organic channel linkages: PT. PMA, PT. Big Tree Farm Bali, PT. Aliet Green, Manik Organic Shop (producer Chocolate "Monggo"), Carrefour. One of buyer (PT. Alit green) have been promoting "Flores Branding"

***Achievements in 2nd semester of 2010***

*Organisational strengthening (70% achieved)*

- Balai Penyuluhan Pertanian – BPP act as Cashew Coordinating Body – CCB for very active conduct capacity building on increasing productivity and strengthening farmer groups through formalize farmer group organisation become cooperative, coordinates working groups on applying GFP (sanitation) facilitated by field facilitator in each villages.

- Several inter-group meetings resulted in strategy and planning for certification process 2010, they discussed budget for preparation certification cost, strategy for GFP training, strategy for selling cashew market.

*Increasing productivity (60% achieved)*

- Coordinated by CCB of 24 field facilitator (7 field extension government employees and 17 farmers) were conducted technical assistance to 857 farmers trained on farm GFP and on off-farm (post harvesting). Of 221 HH very actively apply full GFP (Conservation and Sanitation, Pruning, pest and disease, and fertilizer).

- 6 of 9 demo plots as media for learning maintained and showing positive impact on increasing productivity

*Value Added (65% achieved)*

- 5 farmer groups participate in organic certification process for certification 2010.

- Only 7% of 260 ton sold to organic cashew channel this year (decrease 18% in 2008). Of 15 ton will processed during first semester 2011 in level processing unit.

- 27 HH have increase additional income of 28% from processing 3.436 kg cashew become brown skin quality equivalent to IDR 194.416.000 or IDR 1.524.000 per HH per 2 month.

- 4 organic channel linkages: PT. Big Tree Farm Bali, PT. Aliet Green (producer Chocolate "Monggo"), Carrefour and Olam ltd. "Flores Branding" have been promoted.

- 1 potential investor for Processing unit and 1 market channel identify and facilitated business linkages.

***Achievements in 1st semester of 2011***

*Organisational strengthening (75% achieved)*

- Balai Penyuluhan Pertanian – BPP acts as Cashew Coordinating Body. Continuation of capacity building on increasing productivity and strengthening farmer groups through formalizing farmer group organisation to become cooperatives. Coordination of working groups on applying GFP (sanitation) facilitated by field facilitator in each villages.

- Several inter-group meetings resulted in strategy for selling cashew market and increasing productivity.

*Increasing productivity (70% achieved)*

- Cashew: 12 of 24 field facilitators (field extension government employees and lead farmers) have now good capacity and knowledge on GFP and become trainers. Coordinated by CCB, training to 460 farmers was conducted and technical assistance was provided to 1519 farmers on-farm GFP and off-farm (post harvesting) practice.

- The total number of farmers increased 32% or 693 HH (398 direct and 30 indirect) compared to data first second semester 2010. They are applying full GFP (Conservation and Sanitation, Pruning, pest and disease, and fertilizer). 50 farmers apply and integrated cocoa system with cattle.

- 14 demo plots as media for learning maintained are showing positive impact on increasing productivity.

*Value Added (65% achieved)*

- 5 farmer groups participate in organic certification process for certification 2011.

- 2 HH of 51 HH have increase additional income of 28% from processing. 180 kg cashew become brown skin quality for BTF Bali and white kernel for local market, equivalent to IDR 10.980.000 or margin IDR 1.098.000 per HH per 2 month.

- 6 identified, 4 organic and 2 conventional market channels have been identified: PT. Big Tree Farm Bali, PT. Aliet Green), Carrefour, UD Nusa Permai, Comextra and Eka Prima

- 1 potential investor for Processing identified and facilitated business linkages with existing processing unit.

***Achievements 2nd semester of 2011***

*Organisational strengthening (75% achieved)*

- Balai Penyuluhan Pertanian – BPP acts as Cashew Coordinating Body. Continuation of capacity building on increasing productivity & disseminate the lesson learn.

- 1 group formalized as cooperative, offer the business services such as buying and selling organic cashew, received micro-credit IDR 110 Mio for working capital and successfully create income IDR 5.600.000,- .
- Several inter-group implemented for selling brown skin cashew to market and increasing productivity.

*Increasing productivity (70% achieved)*

- 25 field facilitators (field extension government employees and lead farmers, 3 women) active provided technical assistance to 1519 farmer on-farm GFP and off-farm (post harvesting) practice.
- 408 farmers are applying full GFP (Conservation and Sanitation, Pruning, pest and disease, and fertilizer). 50 farmers apply and integrated cocoa system with cattle.
- 14 demo plots as media for learning maintained.

*Value Added (65% achieved)*

- 4 farmer groups participate in international and national organic certification process for certification 2011.
- 128 HH have increase additional income of 42% from processing. 4.880 kg cashew become brown skin quality for BTF Bali and UD Nusa Permai, equivalent to IDR 333.500.000 or income IDR 2.605.469 per HH per 4 month.
- 6 identified, 2 organic market channels have been signed contract: PT. Big Tree Farm Bali, PT. Aliet Green, Carrefour, UD Nusa Permai, and Javara
- 1 potential market channel a Service Provider identified

### *Achievements in 1st semester of 2012*

*Organisational strengthening (80% achieved)*

- Cashew Coordinating Body was successful promote their services, the results are: 1) the cashew module on GFP and Processing include as a curriculum and 2 facilitator became a teacher in SMK Teluk Hading. 2) Local government and other NGO have plan to on job training in village on processing unit and training on ICS implementation
- 2 cooperative offers the business services such as buying and selling organic and conventional cashew, 1 cooperative in Lewobele village received micro-credit IDR 686 Mio for working capital from government programme and successfully create income IDR 5.035.325 from buying selling cashew and as micro finance services.

*Increasing productivity (85% achieved)*

- 27 field facilitators are active provided technical assistance to 1519 farmer on-farm GFP and off-farm (post harvesting) practice. Of 395 farmers trained during this period.
- 489 farmers or 32% from total beneficiaries (increased 20% compare data 2011 of 208 farmers) are applying full GFP accept re-planting (Conservation and Sanitation, Pruning, pest and disease, and fertilizer).
- Of 14 from 15 demo plot shows positive result: growing more flowers and healthy

*Value Added (75% achieved)*

- 4 farmer groups received international and national organic certificate with prediction harvest of 271.426 tons, 2 new villages identified. 140 household processing units certified.
- 1 pilot local processing unit for white kernel in village level is still under construction.
- 7 identified: Carrefour, PT. Larise, BTF Bali, Berry Beach and PT. Indo Agroforestry, PT. PMA and UD Nusa Permai. The total demand of 470 tons, of 58% processed in Flores

***Achievements in 2nd semester of 2012***

*Organisational strengthening*

- Cashew Coordinating Body was active provides technical assistance to farmer group on processing, productivity and dissemination base practices to other farmers. Lobbying to local government for rehabilitation.
- 1 cooperative have created profit reaching US$ 5'600, increased of 1112% profit compared data 2012 semester- 2 of US$ 503 from buying selling organic cashew and as micro finance services.

*Increasing productivity*

- 28 field facilitators are active provided technical assistance to 1541 farmer on-farm GFP and off-farm (post harvesting) practice. Almost 603 farmers applying full GFP accept re-planting (Conservation and Sanitation, Pruning, pest and disease, and fertilizer), of 56 trained during this period.
- Of 9 from 15 demo plot shows positive result: increased productivity until 79% compared base line data 2008.

*Value Added*

- 624 Farmer HH from 6 farmer groups participates in international and national organic certification process for certification 2012.
- 1 pilot organic local processing unit for white kernel in village level tested, of 1980,5 kg sold to national market – PT. Indo Agroforestry with price US$ 12 per-kg FOB Village. During 3 month (October – December) were successfully created income of US$ 2.065
- 8 buyer identified, of 4 buyers (PT. PMA, BTF Bali, PT. Indo Agroforestry and JAVARA) were providing contract and purchases order for harvest 2012.
- JAVARA was committing to make a long-term relation with the farmer groups, developing financing scheme for working capital, product development and access to national and international market.

***Achievement of outputs***

Achieved:

*Organisational strengthening*

Output 1.1: Done

*Increasing productivity*

Output 1.2: Almost all farmers applying GAP, of 603 applying full GFP (Achievement 55% from phase target of 1100 measured)

*Value added*

Output 1.3: Achievement 70%Output 1.4: In 2012 Achievement only 22% lower than achievement in 2009 of 47%.
Output 1.5: Achievement 50%
Not achieved:
*Organisational strengthening*
Output 1.1: Currently, The CCB only focused for productivity. Only 1 cashew cooperative established and only focused for buying and selling cashew in shell and brown skin.
*Value added*

Output 1.3: only 3 farmers groups received certificate since 2005 and 2007. 1 groups certified since 2011 and 1 group have join in 2012.
Output 1.4: 1 company PMA withdraw from Flores and close their processing unit. Other issues such as lack of working capital and capacity of the processing unit.
Output 1.5: only 1 legalized and only 1 buyer provider down payment

# Annex II. Overview outcome indicators and indices

This annex provides a detailed description about the used outcome indicators. In addition, it discusses the variables which were used to construct the outcome indicator indices. Please note that some of the indicators are constructed as indices from multiple questions. In the main text of the report, only the indices are reported for such indicators. However, this Annex reports on the outcomes of the components of the indices.

Outcome variables for the project were collected at household and farming group level. The outcomes are reported for treatment villages and comparison villages for the baseline and the endline surveys. The treatment and control group consist in total of 6 farming groups. For the household data, the sample size can differ between tables because the answer 'don't know' is changed to a missing value or because a respondent could skip a question if he/she had no knowledge about what was asked (answered 'no' to a previous question). This was the case if a respondent answered 'don't know' to a question with a scale, so it did not make sense to incorporate the answer in the scale. However, for questions where we were interested in the percentage of the sample that answered 'yes' to a question, it made sense to change the 'don't know' answers to 'no' so that we could use all data when reporting on the question.

### *Households using organic farming practices*

- Percentage of households practicing organic farming (this indicator is measured from self-reported information as well as based on responses to questions on chemical inputs for farming)
    - Self-reported: This variable is measured based on responses to the question whether a household practices organic farming. We assume that if the answer is 'Don't know', this household does not practice organic farming, hence answers are recoded with 0.
    - Based on responses to questions (not using chemical inputs): Based on three questions on farming practices, it is assessed whether a household practices organic farming, i.e. does not use chemical inputs. The first question asks about the household's soil management for cashew trees. If the household does not use any chemical fertilizer, it is classified as organic soil management. The second question asks about how the household protects its cashew trees from insects and diseases. If the household does not use any pesticide or chemical herbicides, it is classified as organic farming. The third question asks whether the household used among others any chemical fertiliser or chemical pesticides for growing cashews in the past year. If the answer is yes to either of these two questions, the household does not exclusively use organic farming practices. Hence, the answers to the three questions are collected into one indicator which indicates whether the household used any chemical input at all.
- Percentage of households using chemical inputs
    - Percentage of households using chemical fertilizers: This indicator is again based on the first question mentioned above whether the household uses any chemical fertilizer to keep the soil for cashew nuts fertile.

  - Percentage of households using chemical pesticides/insecticides: This indicator is again based on the second question mentioned above whether the household uses any pesticides or chemical herbicides to protect its cashew trees from insects and diseases.
- Percentage of households using organic inputs
  - Percentage of households using organic fertilizers: This indicator is again based on the first question mentioned above whether the household uses 'manure' or 'rorak (composting and water catchment in hole)' to keep the soil for cashew nuts fertile.
  - Percentage of households using organic pesticides/insecticides: This indicator is again based on the second question mentioned above whether the household uses bait to attract insects, plants special plants (eg. Nimba tree) or uses organic/herbal pesticides/herbicides to protect its cashew trees from insects and diseases.
- Percentage of households that have distancing larger than 9x9 m: This indicator gives information about the distance between the cashew trees which the household grows. This dummy is 1 if the distance is larger or equal to nine square meters.

### *Yield of cashew nuts (uniform indicator)*

This indicator is measured by a) the yield per hectare and b) the yield per tree.

- Yield per hectare: This indicator looks at the total amount of cashew nuts in shell harvested in the past year. Since the questionnaire asks for the harvest in four different time periods (of each 3 months) separately, these values need to be added up to get the total amount of cashew nuts harvested. To receive the yield per hectare, this amount is divided by the area used for growing cashew nuts (in ha) per household.
- Yield per tree: Here the same amount of cashew nuts harvested is used. However, now we divide this amount by the total number of cashew trees cultivated by the household. For the total number of cashew trees, we add up the number of trees per household that are a) too young to produce (i.e. still no or few fruits), b) in full production (i.e. all branches bear fruit) and c) no longer in full production (i.e. production is less than 60% of full production).

### *Volume of cashew nuts sold (kg) uniform indicator*

This value represents the total amount of cashew nuts sold on local, national and international markets. It does not distinguish between the processing stages but rather includes all cashew nuts sold in shell, brown skinned cashew nuts and white skinned cashew nuts. The household questionnaire asks all information on the production of cashew nuts for four different time periods of each 3 months. It is important to know that all amounts for these four periods are generally added up to receive the yearly measure. Furthermore the questionnaire asks the information for cashew nuts sold in the three processing stages separately. For each processing stage, it further differentiates between non-certified cashew nuts (local markets), national certified cashew nuts and international certified cashew nuts. To receive the total amount of all cashew nuts on all markets, first the amounts for all three markets are added up, before then adding up these amounts for all cashew nut types.

### *Percentage of cashew nuts sold to (inter)national markets (compared to local markets) (uniform indicator)*

This indicator is measured in two different ways, aggregated in the treatment and comparison group, as well as the household average based on the kg sold to the markets. We report on the percentage going to national and international markets together.

- Using aggregate data: First, we calculate the total amount (per household) of cashew nuts sold either on national or international markets. This is done separately for every processing stage (cashew nuts in shell, brown skinned cashew nuts and white skinned cashew nuts). Second, we aggregate the total amount sold to (inter)national markets for the Treatment and the Control group. This is again done separately for all three processing stages. In total, this leaves us with six different amounts, three for each treatment group (one for each processing stage). For the percentage of cashew nuts going to (inter)national markets compared to local markets, we divide each of the six values by the total amount sold of the particular processing stage in either the treatment or control group and multiply each of them with 100. We end up with three percentages for the treatment group, and three percentages for the control group.
- Household average: For this indicator the total amount of cashew nuts in all processing stages (in shell, brown skinned and white skinned) sold to national and international markets is calculated. To receive the percentage sold to (inter)national markets compared to local markets, this total amount is then divided by the total amount of cashew nuts to sold to all markets (including local) and multiplied with 100.

### *Selling price of cashew nuts (average per household)*

This indicator gives the price of cashew nuts weighted by the quantity sold. Since there are three different types of markets (local, national and international) and three processing stages of cashew nuts (in shell, brown skinned and white skinned), we have in total 9 prices for 9 markets. By multiplying each price (per kg) with the quantity sold in the corresponding market, we receive the value sold for each of the 9 markets. Next we sum up all 9 values to get the total value of cashew nuts (of all processing stages) sold per household (on all markets). Dividing by the total quantity sold (on all markets) we finally receive the weighted price of cashew nuts as an average per household

### *Household income and livelihood (uniform indicator)*

For this indicator, data was collected on the (per capita) consumption and asset holdings of households as well as the self-reported well-being.

- Household income is calculated from a) household revenue from sale of cashew nuts, b) total income per months and c) total income per capita per month (all three in 1000 Rp.).
    - Household revenue from sale of cashew nuts (1000 Rp): This indicator is measured from the amount of cashew nuts sold (kg) multiplied by the price received per kilo (in Rp.). The volume of sold cashew nuts as well as the price is recorded separately for three types of cashew nuts (in shell, brown skinned and white skinned). These types represent the different stages of production, where white skinned cashew nuts represent the final stage. Additionally, for every type of cashew nut, we further differentiate between nuts sold on local markets (non-certified), sold on national markets (national certified) and

sold on international markets (international certified). Hence, this gives 3 markets and 3 production stages. Furthermore, these amounts and prices are recorded for three different time periods throughout the year (each 3 months). We simply add these 4 periods up to receive the yearly figures. For the total revenue per household, first the revenues per market and cashew type are calculated. Second, the total revenue for every production stage is calculated, leaving us with 3 revenues. Finally, these values are summed up to receive the total for all three cashew nut types (shell, brown and white skinned). For the monthly revenue in 1000 Rp., total revenue is divided by 12 and by 1000.

- Total income per month (1000 Rp): The questionnaire includes separate sub-sections for income generated from: a. Crops, b. Livestock (net profit), c. Non-Farm activities (net profit) and d. Money transfers (net income). The total income variable is created by the sum of income generated by the different income sources mentioned above. In particular, we sum the 'total income per month from livestock per household' (based on self-reported price), the net profit per month from non-farm business per household, the income per month from crop other than cashew nuts per household, household revenue per month from sale of cashew nuts and the total amount of transfers (includes different types of assistance, i.e. in cash or in-kind) received per month per household.
- Total per capita income per month (1000 Rp): For the monthly per capita income, total income is divided by the household size.

- Per capita expenditures of households (
  - Non-food consumption per capita per month (1000 Rp): The total non-food consumption of a household is calculated from a number of questions on household expenses. To get the monthly non-food consumption per household, yearly expenses are converted into monthly figures. For the per capita *non-food* consumption we divide non-food consumption per month by household size. Non-food expenses consist of the following:
    - Yearly expenses on items like clothing, household supplies, medical costs and taxes. Again, also the yearly value of these items that were consumed but self-produced or received from another source is taken into account.
    - Expenses on schooling for family members (schooling needs, transportation, registrations etc.) were asked separately for members outside and inside the household. Only expenses for family members inside the household are included in the calculation of non-food consumption.

- Asset holdings of households
  - Housing facilities index: In order, that the housing facilities index in the MFS II projects have a meaningful interpretation, we calculate weights for the index components based on their predictive power for household expenditure. The weights are calculated using a population representative survey for Indonesia using regression analysis. We use the IFLS 2007 survey as a population representative sample. From the IFLS 2007 dataset we

use aggregate expenditure data, asset ownership and sampling weights. As the aggregate expenditure variable the data analysis uses the logarithm of the monthly per capita expenditure (*lnpce*). The sampling weight used is the cross-sectional sampling weight adjusted for attrition. This weight should be representative of all households living in the IFLS provinces in Indonesia in 2007. Based on the KR section of the IFLS survey, we construct the housing variables that are the same in IFLS and the MFS II surveys. The variables used from the KR section of the MFS II surveys which are also the found in IFLS are: a. *kr01*, b. *kr02*, c. *kr04*, d. *kr07*, e. *kr10* and h. *kr13*. The corresponding variables in IFLS are: a. *kr03,* b. *kr13*, c. *kr16*, d. *kr20*, e. *kr11* and h. *kr24.* There are more variables which are the same between E6 and IFLS, however we wanted to construct a housing facilities asset variable which can be used by all MFS II surveys, thus the variables mentioned above are selected as they are common in most MFS II surveys. The first step is to recode the variables of MFS II surveys in order to have matching answer categories with the variables of IFLS; the same procedure is also followed for the IFLS variables. In addition, as the variable names are not the same among the two datasets, in the IFLS dataset we renamed the common variables as to have the same name with the MFS II variables. After, the aforementioned preparation the two datasets are combined into one dataset. Furthermore, dummy variables are created based on the answer categories of the chosen common variables. The reason behind the construction of the categorical dummy variables is to include them in the regression of the logarithm of the monthly per capita expenditure on the housing dummies. Nevertheless, not all of the categorical dummies are used in the regression model. The regression does not include dummy variables whose variation is higher than 97% of the sample or lower than 3% of the sample. Moreover, after we performed the regression the next step was to calculate the fitted values by predicting the expenditure based on housing facilities for both the IFLS and MFS II sample. Finally, the last step was to rescale the predicted variable in order to have a zero mean for the IFLS sample by subtracting the mean of the fitted value from the fitted value itself.

Hence, we will be able to infer the livelihood of our survey participants compared to the Indonesian average in 2007: for example, if the value of the index is 0.10 (-0.10), on average, it implies that the sample is approximately 10% better off (worse off) than the average Indonesian household in 2007 based on the predictive power of housing facilities (like drinking water source) on household expenditure.

- Asset index: The construction of the asset index follows a similar procedure with the creation of the housing index, however in this case instead of the IFLS dataset the DHS 2012 dataset was used, as DHS includes more common asset variables with the MFS II surveys than the IFLS. Moreover, asset variables were chosen from the KR section of the MFS II surveys which are common with DHS variables. From MFS II dataset questions a. kr11 and b. kr12 were chosen while from the DHS dataset questions a. *hv207*, b. *hv208*, c. *hv209*, d. *hv243a*, e.*hv210*, f. *hv211*, g. *hv212*, h. *sh118c*, i. *hv243d* and j. *hv243c* were selected. The next step was to combine the two datasets and perform a factor analysis of the common variables in order to calculate the asset index. In addition, as mentioned

above the 3% rule was also applied for the asset index, excluding from the factor analysis variables with small variation. Finally, the predicted asset index was normalized for the DHS sample (mean 0 and variance 1).

- Investment into business or farm equipment
    - Percentage of households invested in business: This indicator is based on the question whether a household expanded its family business, purchased new equipment or started a new business in the past 12 months. From this we created a dummy which is 1 if the answer to this question is 'Yes', and 0 if the answer is 'No'.
    - Percentage of households invested in new farming tools: This indicator is based on the question whether a household purchased new farming tools in the past 12 months. From this we again created a dummy which is 1 if the answer to this question is 'Yes', and 0 if the answer is 'No'.

- For self-reported well-being is measured by two scales on a) happiness and b) current wealth status. Respondents were asked the following:
    - Taken all things together how would you say things are these days? The question was answered on a 4-point Likert scale from 1 (very happy) to 4 (absolutely not happy).
    - Please imagine a six-step ladder where on the bottom (the first step), stand the poorest people, and on the highest step (the sixth step), stand the richest people. On which step are you today? Here, all 'don't know' answers are replaced with missing values.

  These questions relate to the subjective judgement of the respondent. Therefore, we only report on the change in these indicators if the (main) respondent was the same during the baseline and the endline surveys.

### *Household income and livelihood (uniform indicator)*

For this index four measures are taken into account.

- Percentage of households not able to cover their living costs/ have not enough to eat: It was asked whether it happened to the household in the past 12 months that the income did not cover the living costs.
- Number of months households were not able to cover their living months/have not enough to ear.
- Current standard of living (daily needs covered): Possible answers were 1 (not enough to fulfil my daily needs), 2 (only enough to fulfil my daily needs), 3 (more than enough to fulfil my daily needs). Again, all that answered 'don't know' where replaced with a missing value.
- Current standard of living (food consumption covered): Possible answers were 1 (not enough to fulfil my daily needs), 2 (only enough to fulfil my daily needs), 3 (more than enough to fulfil my daily needs). Again, all that answered 'don't know' where replaced with a missing value.

All of these four indicators above, besides the second one on the number of months, relate again to the subjective judgement of the respondent. Hence, we only report on the change in these indicators if the (main) respondent was the same during the baseline and the endline surveys.

# Annex III. Summary statistics of variables

**Table 13: Summary Statistics**

| Survey period | Baseline | | Endline | | Change (EL-BL) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Sample Size | Mean | Sample Size | Mean | Sample Size | Mean |
| Average size of household | 149 | 4.68 | 149 | 4.67 | 138 | -0.09 |
| Percentage female hh-head | 149 | 10.74 | 149 | 9.40 | 138 | -0.72 |
| Average age of hh-head | 149 | 44.88 | 149 | 46.64 | 138 | 1.86 |
| Education level of hh-head (%) | | | | | | |
| *No education* | 149 | 3.36 | 149 | 3.36 | 138 | 0.00 |
| *Primary education* | 149 | 68.46 | 149 | 66.44 | 138 | -4.35 |
| *Secondary education* | 149 | 28.19 | 149 | 30.20 | 138 | 4.35 |
| Religion of hh-head (%) | | | | | | |
| *Catholic* | 149 | 100.00 | 0 | | 0 | |
| Main source of income (%) | | | | | | |
| *Crop farming* | 149 | 89.93 | 149 | 85.91 | 138 | -3.62 |
| *Fishing* | 149 | 0.67 | 149 | 2.68 | 138 | 2.17 |
| *Livestock* | 149 | 0.00 | 149 | 0.67 | 138 | 0.72 |
| *Non-farm business* | 149 | 2.01 | 149 | 4.03 | 138 | 2.17 |
| *Salary / wage* | 149 | 6.71 | 149 | 4.70 | 138 | -2.17 |
| *Pension* | 149 | 0.67 | 149 | 0.67 | 138 | 0.00 |
| *Transfer, remittances* | 149 | 0.00 | 149 | 1.34 | 138 | 0.72 |
| Percentage of hh's with membership in […] | | | | | | |
| *Cashew farming group* | 149 | 75.17 | 149 | 44.97 | 138 | -27.54 |
| *Other farming group* | 149 | 22.82 | 149 | 56.38 | 138 | 31.16 |
| *Cashew farming group: POKTAN* | 149 | 75.17 | 149 | 40.94 | 138 | -31.88 |
| *Cashew farming group: GAPOKTAN* | 149 | 46.31 | 149 | 29.53 | 138 | -13.77 |
| *Other farming group: POKTAN* | 149 | 22.82 | 149 | 51.01 | 138 | 25.36 |
| *Other farming group: GAPOKTAN* | 149 | 0.00 | 149 | 16.11 | 138 | 15.94 |
| *Cashew farming cooperative* | 149 | 0.00 | 149 | 3.36 | 138 | 2.90 |
| *Other farming cooperative* | 149 | 1.34 | 149 | 6.04 | 138 | 5.07 |
| *Saving and credit group* | 149 | 31.54 | 149 | 52.35 | 138 | 19.57 |
| *Saving and credit cooperative* | 149 | 42.95 | 149 | 37.58 | 138 | -5.80 |
| Type of place hh can name to borrow money (% of hh's) | | | | | | |
| *Banks* | 149 | 51.68 | 149 | 57.05 | 138 | 5.07 |
| *Private commercial bank* | 149 | 18.12 | 149 | 17.45 | 138 | -0.72 |
| *Cooperative* | 149 | 73.15 | 149 | 75.84 | 138 | 0.72 |
| *Government/ semi-government* | 149 | 38.93 | 149 | 51.01 | 138 | 10.87 |
| *Agricultural bank/SAPRODI* | 149 | 0.67 | 149 | 0.00 | 138 | 0.00 |
| *Employer* | 149 | 0.00 | 149 | 2.01 | 138 | 2.17 |
| *Landlord* | 149 | 0.00 | 149 | 0.67 | 138 | 0.72 |
| *Store Owner* | 149 | 19.46 | 149 | 6.71 | 138 | -12.32 |
| *Non-government organisation* | 149 | 0.00 | 149 | 0.67 | 138 | 0.72 |
| *Neighbourhood association* | 149 | 0.00 | 149 | 0.67 | 138 | 0.72 |
| *Arisan* | 149 | 12.75 | 149 | 12.75 | 138 | -2.17 |

| Survey period | Baseline | | Endline | | Change (EL-BL) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Sample Size | Mean | Sample Size | Mean | Sample Size | Mean |
| *Small farmers group (kelom)* | 149 | 24.16 | 149 | 32.21 | 138 | 7.25 |
| *Money lender* | 149 | 0.00 | 149 | 4.03 | 138 | 4.35 |
| *Office* | 149 | 0.00 | 149 | 0.67 | 138 | 0.72 |
| *Pawnshop* | 149 | 2.68 | 149 | 6.04 | 138 | 3.62 |
| *Non-bank financial institution* | 149 | 8.05 | 149 | 7.38 | 138 | -0.72 |
| *Other* | 149 | 4.03 | 149 | 42.28 | 138 | 40.58 |
| *Don't know* | 149 | 0.00 | 149 | 0.00 | 138 | 0.00 |
| Subjective well-being five years ago | 149 | 1.72 | 149 | 1.92 | 138 | 0.22 |
| Area of the plot cultivated, owned or controlled by any of the hh members (m^2) | 149 | 2.01 | 147 | 1.91 | 136 | -0.10 |
| Any of the hh members participated in a meeting or training on good farming practices in the past 2 years (%) | 149 | 23.49 | 149 | 31.54 | 138 | 9.42 |
| Percentage of households that have […] certification | | | | | | |
| *None* | 46 | 0.91 | 149 | 0.64 | 41 | -0.12 |
| *National* | 46 | 0.09 | 149 | 0.02 | 41 | -0.10 |
| *International* | 46 | 0.00 | 149 | 0.26 | 41 | 0.15 |
| *Both* | 46 | 0.00 | 149 | 0.07 | 41 | 0.07 |
| **Panel A. Households using organic farming practices** | | | | | | |
| Percentage of households practicing organic farming | | | | | | |
| *Self-reported* | 149 | 89.26 | 149 | 48.99 | 138 | -38.41 |
| *Households practicing organic farming (not using chemical inputs)* | 149 | 89.93 | 149 | 84.56 | 138 | -5.07 |
| Percentage of households using chemical inputs | | | | | | |
| *Households using chemical fertilizer for soil management* | 149 | 8.72 | 149 | 10.74 | 138 | 1.45 |
| *Households using chemical methods to protect from insects and diseases* | 149 | 1.34 | 149 | 0.67 | 138 | -0.72 |
| Percentage of households using organic inputs | | | | | | |
| *Households using organic fertilizer for soil management* | 149 | 20.13 | 149 | 41.61 | 138 | 23.19 |
| *Households using organic methods to protect from insects and diseases* | 149 | 9.40 | 149 | 39.60 | 138 | 31.16 |
| Percentage of households have distance larger than 9x9 m | 149 | 93.29 | 149 | 93.29 | 138 | 0.00 |
| **Panel B. Yield of cashew nuts (uniform indicator)** | | | | | | |
| Yield of cashew nuts per hectare (kg) | 143 | 433.83 | 138 | 348.87 | 123 | -86.37 |
| Yield of cashew nuts per tree (kg) | 147 | 3.93 | 142 | 2.68 | 130 | -1.41 |
| **Panel C. Volume of cashew nuts sold (uniform indicator)** | | | | | | |
| Amount of cashew nuts sold (kg) | 143 | 602.56 | 146 | 416.49 | 131 | -225.85 |
| **Panel D. Percentage of cashew nuts sold to (inter)national markets (compared to local markets) (uniform indicator) (household data)** | | | | | | |
| Percentage of cashew nuts sold to (inter)national markets - Household average | 148 | 31.69 | 146 | 30.79 | 135 | -0.74 |
| **Panel E. Selling price of cashew nuts** | | | | | | |
| Selling price (weighted) of cashew nuts | 148 | 10,664.74 | 146 | 13,795.10 | 135 | 3,161.67 |

| Survey period | Baseline | | Endline | | Change (EL-BL) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Sample Size | Mean | Sample Size | Mean | Sample Size | Mean |
| (average per household) | | | | | | |
| **Panel F. Household income and livelihood (uniform indicator)** | | | | | | |
| Household revenue per month from sale of cashew nut (1000 Rupiah) | 147 | 615.69 | 146 | 542.79 | 134 | -75.88 |
| Total income/revenue per month per household (1000 Rupiah) | 148 | 1,091.32 | 146 | 1,422.14 | 134 | 384.69 |
| Total income/revenue per capita per month (1000 Rupiah) | 148 | 255.76 | 146 | 362.91 | 134 | 131.33 |
| Percentage of […] cashew nuts sold to international markets (not aggregated) | | | | | | |
| *Shell* | 148 | 31.76 | 143 | 29.30 | 132 | -0.84 |
| *Brown skin* | 14 | 92.86 | 18 | 83.33 | 5 | 0.00 |
| *White skin* | 14 | 35.71 | 14 | 71.43 | 6 | 33.33 |
| Hh non-food expenditure per month per capita (1000 Rupiah) | 146 | 65,150.81 | 149 | 86,260.92 | 135 | 18,922.20 |
| Housing facilities index | 149 | -0.32 | 149 | -0.27 | 138 | 0.05 |
| Asset index | 149 | -1.31 | 149 | -1.13 | 138 | 0.15 |
| Investment into business or farm equipment | | | | | | |
| *Percentage of households that invested in business* | 149 | 7.38 | 149 | 24.83 | 138 | 18.84 |
| *Percentage of households that invested in new farming tools* | 149 | 61.07 | 149 | 34.23 | 138 | -26.81 |
| Self-reported well-being | | | | | | |
| *Happiness* | 149 | 2.30 | 149 | 2.30 | 114 | 0.00 |
| *Current wealth status* | 149 | 2.05 | 149 | 2.41 | 114 | 0.39 |
| **Panel G. Food security and vulnerability (uniform indicator)** | | | | | | |
| Percentage of hh's not able to cover their living costs | 149 | 86.58 | 149 | 93.96 | 114 | 6.14 |
| Percentage of hh's have not enough to eat | 149 | 62.42 | 149 | 79.19 | 114 | 15.79 |
| Number of months hh not able to cover their living costs | 149 | 3.56 | 149 | 3.56 | 138 | 0.05 |
| Number of months hh have not enough to eat | 149 | 2.37 | 149 | 2.52 | 138 | 0.20 |
| Current standard of living: daily needs covered | 149 | 1.37 | 149 | 1.44 | 114 | 0.11 |
| Current standard of living: food consumption covered | 149 | 1.58 | 149 | 1.70 | 114 | 0.14 |
| Percentage of hh that followed training on GFP in […] | | | | | | |
| *2010* | 149 | 10.74 | 149 | 0.00 | 138 | -11.59 |
| *2011* | 149 | 8.05 | 149 | 0.00 | 138 | -8.70 |
| *2012* | 149 | 10.74 | 149 | 6.04 | 138 | -4.35 |
| *2013* | 149 | 0.00 | 149 | 22.82 | 138 | 23.91 |
| *2014* | 149 | 0.00 | 149 | 4.70 | 138 | 5.07 |
| Percentage of households that participated in good farming practices training in the past 3 years (baseline) / 2 years (endline) | 149 | 23.49 | 149 | 31.54 | 138 | 9.42 |
| […] organised meetings/trainings (% of total trainings) | | | | | | |

| Survey period | Baseline | | Endline | | Change (EL-BL) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Sample Size | Mean | Sample Size | Mean | Sample Size | Mean |
| *Farming group* | 35 | 5.71 | 47 | 27.66 | 25 | 28.00 |
| *Farming cooperative* | 35 | 2.86 | 47 | 0.00 | 25 | -4.00 |
| *District Education Centre (BPK)* | 35 | 11.43 | 47 | 29.79 | 25 | 24.00 |
| *Swiss Contact* | 35 | 48.57 | 47 | 51.06 | 25 | 0.00 |
| *Field worker* | 35 | 20.00 | 47 | 17.02 | 25 | -4.00 |
| *Other person/organisation* | 13 | 100.00 | 18 | 100.00 | 5 | 0.00 |
| […] used by hh to keep soil fertile (%) if hh cultivates trees/plants | | | | | | |
| *Chemical fertilizer* | 149 | 7.38 | 149 | 10.07 | 138 | 2.90 |
| *Manure* | 149 | 8.72 | 149 | 10.74 | 138 | 1.45 |
| *Rorak* | 149 | 7.38 | 149 | 16.11 | 138 | 9.42 |
| *none* | 149 | 72.48 | 149 | 55.03 | 138 | -18.12 |
| *Other (including compost)* | 149 | 6.71 | 149 | 25.50 | 138 | 20.29 |
| […] used by hh to protect trees/plants from insects and diseases (%) | | | | | | |
| *Chemicals* | 149 | 1.34 | 149 | 0.67 | 138 | -0.72 |
| *Using bait to attract insects* | 149 | 0.00 | 149 | 0.00 | 138 | 0.00 |
| *Planting special plants* | 149 | 0.00 | 149 | 3.36 | 138 | 3.62 |
| *Organic/herbal pesticide/herbicide* | 149 | 1.34 | 149 | 0.67 | 138 | -0.72 |
| *None* | 149 | 89.26 | 149 | 59.73 | 138 | -30.43 |
| *Fumigation/smoking* | 149 | 8.05 | 149 | 36.91 | 138 | 29.71 |
| Use of any chemical inputs (%) | 149 | 9.40 | 149 | 14.09 | 138 | 4.35 |
| Distance between cashew trees | | | | | | |
| *Below 5m^2* | 149 | 3.36 | 149 | 3.36 | 138 | 0.00 |
| *5 to 9 m^2* | 149 | 3.36 | 149 | 3.36 | 138 | 0.00 |
| Percentage of hh's that harvested any cashew nuts during the past 12 months | 149 | 99.33 | 149 | 97.99 | 138 | -0.72 |
| Amount of harvested cashew nuts in past 12 months if cashew nuts are harvested (kg) | 148 | 733.74 | 146 | 451.89 | 135 | -295.24 |
| Size of land used by hh to cultivate cashew (m^2) | 45 | 1.62 | 146 | 1.51 | 40 | -0.24 |
| Cultivated land for […] per hh (ha) | | | | | | |
| *Seasonal crops* | 40 | 0.63 | 42 | 0.60 | 11 | 0.06 |
| *Perennial crops* | 136 | 1.79 | 128 | 1.63 | 107 | -0.28 |
| *Mixed crops* | 35 | 0.90 | 56 | 0.84 | 10 | -0.15 |
| Average number of cashew trees cultivated per hh | 145 | 228.77 | 144 | 197.45 | 132 | -32.79 |
| Percentage of trees in full production | 149 | 59.41 | 147 | 62.34 | 136 | 1.50 |
| Percentage of trees too young to produce | 149 | 21.47 | 147 | 20.93 | 136 | -0.22 |
| Percentage of trees too old to produce (less than 60% of full production) | 149 | 19.12 | 146 | 18.21 | 135 | -0.51 |
| Number of cashew trees planted in the past 5 years | 148 | 54.48 | 149 | 14.88 | 137 | -37.45 |
| Percentage of hh used sidegrafting to regenerate cashew trees in the past | 149 | 0.67 | 149 | 0.00 | 138 | -0.72 |
| Percentage of hh cut out cashew trees to allow new branches to grow from | 149 | 53.02 | 149 | 51.68 | 138 | -2.90 |

| Survey period | Baseline | | Endline | | Change (EL-BL) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Sample Size | Mean | Sample Size | Mean | Sample Size | Mean |
| Percentage of hh that sold any cashew nuts in shell | 148 | 100.00 | 146 | 97.95 | 135 | -2.22 |
| Total cashew nuts in shell production per hh (kg) | 148 | 688.11 | 143 | 410.87 | 132 | -285.66 |
| Percentage of kg sold in SHELL in […] market | | | | | | |
| *Local* | 148 | 68.24 | 143 | 70.70 | 132 | 0.84 |
| *National* | 148 | 31.76 | 143 | 0.00 | 132 | -32.58 |
| *International* | 148 | 0.00 | 143 | 29.30 | 132 | 31.74 |
| Value of cashew nuts in shell sold (1000 Rupiah, own reported price) | 148 | 6,708.33 | 143 | 4,378.11 | 132 | -2,363.02 |
| Percentage of hh that sold any brown skinned cashew nuts | 149 | 9.40 | 149 | 12.08 | 138 | 2.17 |
| Total brown skinned cashew nuts production per hh (kg) | 14 | 117.86 | 18 | 61.00 | 5 | -65.40 |
| Percentage of kg sold in BROWN SKIN in […] market | | | | | | |
| *Local* | 14 | 7.14 | 18 | 16.67 | 5 | 0.00 |
| *National* | 14 | 85.71 | 18 | 5.56 | 5 | -100.00 |
| *International* | 14 | 7.14 | 18 | 77.78 | 5 | 100.00 |
| Value of brown skinned cashew nuts sold (1000 Rupiah, own reported price) | 14 | 7,350.71 | 18 | 4,245.28 | 5 | -4,032.00 |
| Percentage of hh that sold any white skinned cashew nuts | 149 | 9.40 | 149 | 9.40 | 138 | 0.00 |
| Total white skinned cashew nuts production per hh (kg) | 14 | 42.50 | 14 | 68.29 | 6 | 71.33 |
| Percentage of kg sold in WHITE SKIN in […] market | | | | | | |
| *Local* | 14 | 64.29 | 14 | 28.57 | 6 | -33.33 |
| *National* | 14 | 35.71 | 14 | 0.00 | 6 | -33.33 |
| *International* | 14 | 0.00 | 14 | 71.43 | 6 | 66.67 |
| Value of white skinned cashew nuts sold (1000 Rupiah, own reported price) | 14 | 3,363.57 | 14 | 17,748.92 | 6 | 9,522.50 |
| Percentage of hh that sold any cashew nuts in [...] market | | | | | | |
| *Local* | 149 | 68.46 | 149 | 69.13 | 138 | 0.72 |
| *National* | 149 | 31.54 | 149 | 0.67 | 138 | -33.33 |
| *International* | 149 | 0.67 | 149 | 31.54 | 138 | 33.33 |
| Price/kg for […] cashew nuts in shell | | | | | | |
| *Non-certified (T)* | 101 | 9,109.08 | 103 | 10,403.32 | 75 | 1,056.11 |
| *National-certified (SN)* | 47 | 9,917.02 | 0 | | 0 | |
| *International-certified (SI)* | 0 | | 44 | 11,460.61 | 0 | |
| Price/kg for […] brown skin cashew nuts | | | | | | |
| *Non-certified (T)* | 1 | 50,000.00 | 3 | 66,666.67 | 0 | |
| *National-certified (SN)* | 12 | 58,750.00 | 1 | 70,000.00 | 0 | |
| *International-certified (SI)* | 1 | 50,000.00 | 14 | 67,035.71 | 0 | |
| Price/kg for […] white skin cashew nuts | | | | | | |
| *Non-certified (T)* | 9 | 85,555.56 | 4 | 75,000.00 | 2 | 15,000.00 |
| *National-certified (SN)* | 5 | 65,000.00 | 0 | | 0 | |
| *International-certified (SI)* | 0 | | 9 | 92,500.00 | 0 | |

| Survey period | Baseline | | Endline | | Change (EL-BL) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Sample Size | Mean | Sample Size | Mean | Sample Size | Mean |
| […] income per month (%) | | | | | | |
| *Livestock* | 148 | 2.16 | 146 | 7.81 | 134 | 5.80 |
| *Transfer* | 148 | 15.64 | 146 | 21.38 | 134 | 5.24 |
| *Net profit non-farm business* | 148 | 10.80 | 146 | 20.25 | 134 | 9.20 |
| *Cashew nut* | 146 | 65.41 | 143 | 46.45 | 130 | -18.93 |
| *Crop income* | 148 | 6.87 | 146 | 5.07 | 134 | -2.18 |
| Value of crop harvest last 12 months excluding cashews (1000 Rp) | 61 | 2,235.46 | 59 | 1,620.21 | 31 | -483.71 |
| Percentage of harvest sold last 12 months excluding cashews (%) | 61 | 91.85 | 59 | 73.05 | 32 | -18.63 |
| Share of […] expenditure from total non-food expenditure (%) | | | | | | |
| *Education* | 146 | 27.73 | 149 | 27.34 | 135 | -1.00 |
| *Medical* | 146 | 13.25 | 149 | 13.76 | 135 | 0.45 |
| *Durables* | 146 | 21.03 | 149 | 23.34 | 135 | 3.70 |
| *Ritual ceremonies, charity and gifts* | 146 | 31.63 | 149 | 21.79 | 135 | -10.44 |
| *Other* | 146 | 6.36 | 149 | 13.77 | 135 | 7.29 |
| Percentage of hh that were not able to cover their living costs in […] | | | | | | |
| *January* | 149 | 60.40 | 149 | 66.44 | 138 | 5.80 |
| *February* | 149 | 75.84 | 149 | 78.52 | 138 | 2.17 |
| *March* | 149 | 67.11 | 149 | 65.77 | 138 | 0.00 |
| *April* | 149 | 50.34 | 149 | 47.65 | 138 | 0.00 |
| *May* | 149 | 38.26 | 149 | 34.23 | 138 | -2.90 |
| *June* | 149 | 26.85 | 149 | 25.50 | 138 | -0.72 |
| *July* | 149 | 8.72 | 149 | 15.44 | 138 | 7.25 |
| *August* | 149 | 3.36 | 149 | 3.36 | 138 | 0.00 |
| *September* | 149 | 2.01 | 149 | 2.01 | 138 | 0.00 |
| *October* | 149 | 2.01 | 149 | 1.34 | 138 | -0.72 |
| *November* | 149 | 6.04 | 149 | 2.01 | 138 | -3.62 |
| *December* | 149 | 14.77 | 149 | 13.42 | 138 | -2.17 |
| Percentage of hh that did not have enough to eat in […] | | | | | | |
| *January* | 149 | 38.93 | 149 | 53.69 | 138 | 15.22 |
| *February* | 149 | 53.02 | 149 | 65.10 | 138 | 10.87 |
| *March* | 149 | 47.65 | 149 | 46.31 | 138 | -0.72 |
| *April* | 149 | 36.24 | 149 | 26.85 | 138 | -7.97 |
| *May* | 149 | 25.50 | 149 | 24.16 | 138 | 0.72 |
| *June* | 149 | 17.45 | 149 | 14.77 | 138 | -1.45 |
| *July* | 149 | 3.36 | 149 | 6.04 | 138 | 2.90 |
| *August* | 149 | 1.34 | 149 | 0.67 | 138 | -0.72 |
| *September* | 149 | 1.34 | 149 | 0.00 | 138 | -1.45 |
| *October* | 149 | 1.34 | 149 | 0.67 | 138 | -0.72 |
| *November* | 149 | 2.68 | 149 | 2.01 | 138 | 0.00 |
| *December* | 149 | 8.05 | 149 | 11.41 | 138 | 3.62 |

Source: Household survey E10; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

# Annex IV. Description of survey locations

Table 14 summarizes the surveyed villages. The description of the villages is given below.

**Table 14: Sampled villages**

| Village | Subdistrict | Type | Certification in 2012-2013 | Processing unit 2014 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Lewobele** | Lewolema | Treatment | Yes | Yes |
| **Sinarhading** | Lewolema | Treatment | | |
| **Balukhering** | Lewolema | Treatment | | Yes |
| **Painapang** | Lewolema | Treatment | | Yes |
| **Serinuho** | Titihena | Treatment | Yes | Yes |
| **Duli Jaya** | Titihena | Treatment | Yes | Yes |
| **Adabang** | Titihena | Comparison | | |
| **Sinamalaka** | Tanjung Bunga | Comparison | | |
| **Lewomada** | Talibura | Comparison | | |
| **Wailamung** | Talibura | Comparison | | |

### *Treatment villages*

**DESA PAINAPANG**

Painapang is located in Kecamatan Lewolema Kabupaten Flores Timur. This village is divided into areas split by a hill. The distance between the main village Painapang and dusun Welo is quite far, which is about 20 km if taking forest route. But forest route is impossible to access at night and we have to take another route through Larantuka city which is about 40 km away to travel. With this distance issue, Dusun Welo people have proposed themselves to be a village. Village area is hilly and the asphalt of the roads is severely damaged, yet the access to this road is quite easy. While the electricity power is available 24 hours in this village, yet many times they have blackout.

Most villagers' livelihood is cashew nuts farmers. Yet some villagers are producer of coconuts and cocoa. The cashew nuts products have been managed well by the farmer group in this village (Gapoktan). They sell the cashew nuts in shell to this Gapoktan and there are working unit who will do the skinning in order to produce white cashew nuts and ready to market. This working unit of Gapoktan has a tool to preserve the white cashew nuts to last longer. Gapoktan's white cashew nuts have been distributed to many areas throughout Indonesia with average price ranged from Rp65.000 to Rp 95.000, depending on the quality. Villagers do not made use of the cashew fruit. Meanwhile, the other farming products produced in this village are dried cocoa or copra, and cocoa. The price of copra is around Rp 2.500 – Rp 3.500 per kilo. People are also growing other farming products mentioned above, but they are grown to fulfil villagers' daily needs.

**DESA BALUK HERING**

Baluk Hering village belongs to Kecamatan Lewolema Kabupaten Flores Timur. The location is about 25 km away from Larantuka. Most of the area consists of hills but some part of it lies on the seashore. The road to access this village is damaged severely. Electricity power is available for 12 hours which is at 6 pm to 6 am.

Most of Desa Baluk Hering's villagers are cashew nuts farmers. Cashew nuts plantation in this village is considered the biggest one through Flores Timur. The trees are grown in the hilly areas of this village, while the sloped areas are used as people's dwelling. But some of villagers built houses at the top of the mountain lies in this village and no transportation mean can reach them. There is no other way than walking to get there and it would take one or two hours. Although the number of cashew nuts production in this village is the biggest in Flores Timur, there is no proper product processing system in order to produce good quality cashew nuts available in this village that farmers could not get the optimum income from cashew nuts selling. The farmers sell the nuts in their shell to the collectors who come to their village every day. Therefore, farmers could not improve their household economic condition with cashew nuts. Some villagers earn their living from selling copra. Meanwhile, those living on the shore are fishing to earn a living.

**DESA SINAR HADING**

Sinar Hading village is located in Kecamatan Lewolema Kabupaten Flores Timur. It is about 15 km from Kabupaten Flores Timur, Larantuka. All of village's areas consist of hills on the border of the sea. The access to this village from Larantuka is pretty easy with relatively good road condition. Electricity power is available for 24 hours but clean water is difficult to attain since they only have a small spring water source that is insufficient for all villagers. Therefore, people have to get water which is derived from wells nearby the shore to fulfil their daily needs for water.

The majority of the people in Sinar Hading are cashew nut farmers. The plantation is not only located on the hilly areas but it is also at the top of the mountain. A system to produce high quality products is not available in this village and they simply sell cashew nuts in their shell. However, an experiment on cashew to be processed into syrup has been conducted in this village. Since the syrup is still in testing process, it is not marketed yet. Like any other villages, copra is produced in this village. As the location is nearby the sea, some people were cultivating seaweed. However, the price of seaweed nowadays is not too good that many of them have abandoned it.

**DESA LEWOBELE**

Desa Lewobele belongs to Kecamatan Lewolema Kabupaten Flores Timur. The distance between village and Larantuka is about 30 km. Half of this village is located on the hill and the other half is on the shore. The road to access this village is poor because the asphalt is damaged. However, electricity is working 24 hours and water availability in this village is abundant because it comes from the flowing spring of the mountain and directly distributed to villagers' houses with pipes.

Just like the other villages in this district, the majority of villagers' livelihood is cashew nut farmers. In 2011, Gapoktan of this village started to process cashew nuts by skinning the shells. However, they found difficulty in marketing these white cashew nuts and faced problem in storing them that they no longer sell cashew nuts to Gapoktan since 2012. Some people are producing copra as their livelihood and some other are raising animals such as pigs, goats, and chicken. In addition, there are some industries in this village that producing fermented palm wine (tuak).

**DESA SERINUHO**

Serinuho is located in Kecamatan Lewolema Kabupaten Flores Timur. This village is 40 km away from Larantuka. Community's dwelling is located in lower ground, while plantation is on the hills. The access to get this village is actually easy, only the condition of the asphalt road is severely damaged. There is no electricity power in this village. People have their own generator or oil lamp. Clean water is difficult to attain because spring water debit is small that is insufficient for the whole villagers.

Most of the villagers are cashew nuts farmers. They sell the nuts with the shells and the cashew fruit is given to the pigs or just thrown away in the yard. Coconut trees are available along the shore area and people pick the fruits to be processed into copra. Those who own farming land usually grow rice, corn, and bananas just to fulfil their daily needs.

**DESA DULI JAYA**

Desa Duli Jaya is a new village as a result of extension village of Serinuho village in 2010. The distance between Serinuho and Duli Jaya villages is only 3 km away. The village area is similar to Serinuho village. Community dwelling is located on the lower ground while plantation is on the higher ground. Although the asphalt on the road is damaged, the access to get this village is considered easy. They have no electricity power but each household has their own generator or oil lamp.

Most of villagers' livelihood is cashew nut farmers. And those who possess coconut plantation are copra producer. Cashew nut farmers sell their nuts in shell and no further process of the cashew. They just throw away the cashew or give them to their livestock. Just like farmers in other villages, they grow rice or vegetables in their farm just to fulfil their daily needs.

### *Comparison villages*

**SINAMALAKA VILLAGE**

Sinamalaka village is located in Kecamatan Tanjung Bunga, Kabupaten Flores Timur. This village is located about 50 km away from Larantuka, kabupaten Flores Timur. It is about 35 km away from Gewayantana airport. The access to get this village is pretty easy; the only problem is the poor condition of the road as the asphalt is severely damaged. Only the road which is heading to the Tanjung Bunga sub-district is in good condition. This village lies on lower ground and it is not too far from the sea. Electricity power in this village is available already, yet it works only at 6 pm to 6 am.

The majority of villager's livelihood is farmers. They grow cashew nuts, coconut, cocoa and other farming products for their own daily consumption. They usually harvest cashew nuts on August through January depends on the condition of the trees. In good condition, the trees can yield plenty of nuts and longer harvest time. Otherwise, cashew trees can only be harvested during September through December. Cashew nuts farmers usually sell cashew nuts with the shell, though few of them sell without the shell (white nuts). The price of cashew nuts in shell is around Rp 9.000-Rp 13.000. Meanwhile, the cashew fruit is given away to the pigs or just thrown away. They do nothing to make use of the cashew fruit. Other than cashew nuts, villagers are growing coconut and dried them to make copra. And some industries buy coconuts from villagers to produce coconut oil. One bottle of coconut oil small size cost Rp 25.000. They have distributed coconut oil to other provinces, even to Surabaya.

**DESA ADABANG**

Adabang village is the furthest village of Laruntaka. It is located about 60 km away from Kabupaten Flores Timur, Larantuka. To get Larantuka we need to go through the damaged asphalt road. Most of villagers of Adabang usually access Maumere city, the capital of Kabupeten Sikka which has good road condition although the distance is further. This village lies on the border of kabupaten Flores Timur and Kabupaten Sikka. Community dwelling lies on the lower ground while plantation is on the higher ground. There is no electricity power in this city and people generally have generator or oil lamp for lighting.

The majority of people in Adabang village are cashew nut farmers. Just like the other products in other villages, cashew nuts are not well processed. They merely sell the nuts with the shell to the collectors who have already given them money in advance. This system is called ijon system. Other than cashew nuts, people in this village also produce copra from their coconut plantation. Meanwhile, fishermen of this village are able to market their fishing product to other villages.

**DESA LEWOMADA**

Lewomada is located in Kecamatan Talibura Kabupaten Sikka. This village is about 80 km away from Maumere capital city of Kabupaten Sikka. Lewobele village lies on the border of Kabupaten Flores Timur (Desa Adabang). The access to get this village is from Kecamatan Talibura for about 20 km. The condition of the asphalt is very poor; even some spot is almost cut off due to the abrasion of the sea. Repair has never been conducted and government never paid attention to it. Some part of Lewomada village lies on the hills and some other part lies on the shore. Since electricity is not available in this village, people have their own generator and oil lamp.

The main livelihood of the villagers is cashew nut farmers. Almost each household has their own cashew nut trees on their back yard. But some of them grow cashew nuts on the hills. They sell the nuts with their shells and no further process is conducted. The other income source of the villagers is making copra and also fishing for those dwelling around the shore.

**DESA WAILAMUN**

Wailamun village used to be called Wailamung. It changed into Wailamun since 2012. This village is located about 10 km away from Kecamatan Talibura. The distance between village and sub-district is actually not too far, but the condition of the road is very poor. Community's dwelling is mostly located on the hilly areas, while plantation is on the mountain. Electricity power is not available yet in this village that people use their own generator and oil lamp for lighting. Even some of them have solar energy. Electricity from PLN s planned to reach this village in 2013 and the poles have been installed since 2012.

The majority livelihood in Wailamun is cashew nuts farmers. They sell their harvest to the collectors along with their shells. Other than cashew nuts, people have coconut plantation which is to produce copra. Cows ranch house is available is this village.

# Annex V. Descriptive statistics

**Table 15: General characteristics of the sample – Detailed**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Assignment group** | **Comparison** | | | **Treatment** | | | |
| **Survey period** | Base | End | (P1v2) | Base | (P1v4) | End | (P4v6) |
| Average size of household | 4.6 | 4.6 | 0.304 | 4.7 | 0.530 | 4.7 | 0.758 |
| Percentage female hh-head | 11.7 | 8.3 | 0.384 | 10.1 | 0.747 | 10.1 | |
| Average age of hh-head | 43.7 | 45.4 | 0.014 | 45.7 | 0.144 | 47.5 | 0.020 |
| Education level of hh-head (%) | | | | | | | |
| *No education* | 0.0 | 1.7 | 0.384 | 5.6 | 0.144 | 4.5 | 0.611 |
| *Primary education* | 63.3 | 61.7 | 0.607 | 71.9 | 0.371 | 69.7 | 0.334 |
| *Secondary education* | 36.7 | 36.7 | 0.837 | 22.5 | 0.091 | 25.8 | 0.104 |
| Religion (%) | | | | | | | |
| Catholic | 100.0 | | | 100.0 | | | |
| Main source of income (%) | | | | | | | |
| *Crop farming* | 85.0 | 78.3 | 0.439 | 93.3 | 0.203 | 91.0 | 0.743 |
| *Fishing* | 1.7 | 6.7 | 0.200 | 0.0 | 0.303 | 0.0 | |
| *Livestock* | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | | 1.1 | 0.364 |
| *Non-farm business* | 5.0 | 3.3 | 0.643 | 0.0 | 0.121 | 4.5 | 0.109 |
| *Salary / wage* | 8.3 | 10.0 | 0.824 | 5.6 | 0.733 | 1.1 | 0.021 |
| *Pension* | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 1.1 | 0.326 | 1.1 | |
| *Transfer, remittances* | 0.0 | 1.7 | 0.384 | 0.0 | | 1.1 | |
| Percentage of hh's with membership in […] | | | | | | | |
| *Cashew farming group: POKTAN* | 38.3 | 20.0 | 0.620 | 100.0 | 0.021 | 55.1 | 0.055 |
| *Cashew farming group: GAPOKTAN* | 13.3 | 5.0 | 0.723 | 68.5 | 0.011 | 46.1 | 0.309 |
| *Other farming group: POKTAN* | 56.7 | 70.0 | 0.771 | 0.0 | 0.039 | 38.2 | 0.026 |
| *Other farming group: GAPOKTAN* | 0.0 | 13.3 | 0.087 | 0.0 | | 18.0 | 0.087 |
| *Cashew farming cooperative* | 0.0 | 1.7 | | 0.0 | | 4.5 | 0.235 |
| *Other farming cooperative* | 0.0 | 3.3 | 0.414 | 2.2 | 0.140 | 7.9 | 0.385 |
| *Saving and credit group* | 18.3 | 40.0 | 0.207 | 40.4 | 0.036 | 60.7 | 0.062 |
| *Saving and credit cooperative* | 45.0 | 43.3 | 0.717 | 41.6 | 0.828 | 33.7 | 0.161 |
| Type of place hh can name to borrow money (% of hh's) | | | | | | | |
| *Private commercial bank* | 18.3 | 16.7 | 0.812 | 18.0 | 0.973 | 18.0 | 0.909 |
| *Cooperative* | 70.0 | 71.7 | 0.657 | 75.3 | 0.690 | 78.7 | 0.497 |
| *Government/ semi-government bank* | 30.0 | 43.3 | 0.316 | 44.9 | 0.151 | 56.2 | 0.399 |
| *Agricultural bank/SAPRODI* | 1.7 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 0.303 | 0.0 | |
| *Employer* | 0.0 | 5.0 | 0.200 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | |
| *Landlord* | 0.0 | 1.7 | 0.384 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | |
| *Store Owner* | 31.7 | 10.0 | 0.111 | 11.2 | 0.198 | 4.5 | 0.343 |
| *Non-government organisation* | 0.0 | 1.7 | 0.414 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | |
| *Neighbourhood association* | 0.0 | 1.7 | 0.414 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | |
| *Arisan* | 13.3 | 20.0 | 0.755 | 12.4 | 0.896 | 7.9 | 0.382 |
| *Small farmers group (kelompok petani kecil)* | 10.0 | 31.7 | 0.046 | 33.7 | 0.087 | 32.6 | 1.000 |

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Assignment group** | **Comparison** | | | **Treatment** | | | |
| **Survey period** | Base | End | (P1v2) | Base | (P1v4) | End | (P4v6) |
| Money lender | 0.0 | 10.0 | 0.097 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | |
| Office | 0.0 | 1.7 | 0.384 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | |
| Pawnshop | 5.0 | 15.0 | 0.309 | 1.1 | 0.245 | 0.0 | 0.358 |
| Non-bank financial institution | 3.3 | 3.3 | 1.000 | 11.2 | 0.083 | 10.1 | 0.889 |
| Other | 0.0 | 48.3 | 0.019 | 6.7 | 0.044 | 38.2 | 0.037 |
| Don't know | 0.0 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | | 0.0 | |
| Subjective well-being 5 years ago | 1.6 | 1.9 | 0.165 | 1.8 | 0.257 | 2.0 | 0.169 |
| Total cultivated land per hh (ha) | 1.9 | 1.9 | 0.580 | 2.1 | 0.767 | 1.9 | 0.612 |

Source: Household survey E10; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level are used to calculate p-values.
P-values are not defined for variables where there was no change.

# Annex VI. Additional explanatory tables

## *Treatment exposure*

**Table 16: Other project related services of treatment farming groups**

| | Base | End |
|---|---|---|
| Sample size | (n=6) | (n=6) |
| Number of farming groups that […] | | |
| *Provides storage for cashew nuts for its members* | 2 | 5 |
| *Keeps records of cashew nuts sales of members* | 5 | 5 |
| *Has a saving fund* | 4 | 4 |
| *Is a cooperative* | 1 | 0 |
| Source: Farming group survey E10; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | |

**Table 17: Trainings on good farming practices: treatment farming group data**

| | Base | End |
|---|---|---|
| Sample size | (n=6) | (n=6) |
| Number of farming groups that had a meeting/training for the farming group members about GFP in past 2 years | 6 | 6 |
| Last meeting/training was in […] | | |
| *2010* | 1 | 0 |
| *2011* | 1 | 0 |
| *2012* | 4 | 1 |
| *2013* | 0 | 4 |
| *2014* | 0 | 1 |
| The meeting/training was organised by […] | | |
| *Farming group or cooperative* | 2 | 2 |
| *District Education Centre (BPK) or Agricultural Extension Centre (BPP)* | 4 | 4 |
| *Swiss Contact* | 4 | 5 |
| *Other person/organisation* | 3 | 3 |
| Source: Farming group survey E10; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | |

**Table 18: Trainings on good farming practices: household data**

| Assignment group | Comparison | | Treatment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Survey period** | Base | End | Base | End |
| Percentage of hh that followed training on good farming practices in […] | | | | |
| *2010* | 1.7 | 0.0 | 16.9 | 0.0 |
| *2011* | 3.3 | 0.0 | 11.2 | 0.0 |
| *2012* | 5.0 | 3.3 | 14.6 | 7.9 |
| *2013* | 0.0 | 16.7 | 0.0 | 27.0 |
| *2014* | 0.0 | 1.7 | 0.0 | 6.7 |
| Percentage hh following any trainings between 2010-2012 Base / 2012-2014 End | 10.0 | 20.0 | 32.6 | 39.3 |
| […] organised meetings/trainings (% of total trainings) | | | | |
| *Farming group* | 16.7 | 41.7 | 3.4 | 22.9 |
| *Farming cooperative* | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.4 | 0.0 |
| *District Education Centre (BPK)* | 16.7 | 33.3 | 10.3 | 28.6 |
| *Swiss Contact* | 16.7 | 8.3 | 55.2 | 65.7 |
| *Field worker* | 50.0 | 16.7 | 13.8 | 17.1 |
| *Other person/organisation* | | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Source: Household survey E10; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia. | | | | |

**Table 19: Financing of certificates**

| | Base | End |
|---|---|---|
| Sample size | (n=6) | (n=6) |
| Number of villages with […] as source of (co-)financing | | |
| *Government* | 3 | 1 |
| *Farming group* | 1 | 0 |
| *Swiss contact* | 3 | 5 |
| Source: Farming group survey E10; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | |

### *Households using organic farming practices*

**Table 20: Good farming practices in treatment farming groups**

| | All villages | | Only villages with certification | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Survey period** | Base | End | Base | End |
| Percentage of farming group members using/practicing […] | | | | |
| *Weeding* | 75.0 | 100.0 | 75.0 | 100.0 |
| *Pruning* | 70.8 | 91.7 | 75.0 | 100.0 |
| *Chemical fertilizer* | 20.8 | 8.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| *Rorak making (composting and water catchment in hole)* | 25.0 | 62.5 | 33.3 | 91.7 |
| *Drainage system* | 4.2 | 16.7 | 8.3 | 0.0 |
| *Chemical pesticide/herbicide* | 16.7 | 8.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| *Organic/herbal pesticide/herbicide* | 25.0 | 45.8 | 0.0 | 66.7 |
| *Intercropping of cashew* | 50.0 | 58.3 | 50.0 | 100.0 |
| Source: Farming group survey E10; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | | | |

**Table 21: Cashew nut farming practices by households**

| | All villages | | | | Villages with certification | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Assignment group** | Comparison | | Treatment | | Treatment | |
| **Survey period** | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End |
| […] used by hh to keep soil fertile (%) if hh cultivates trees/plants | | | | | | |
| *Chemical fertilizer* | 0.0 | 1.7 | 12.4 | 15.7 | 9.1 | 9.1 |
| *Manure* | 1.7 | 3.3 | 13.5 | 15.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| *Rorak* | 0.0 | 11.7 | 12.4 | 19.1 | 22.7 | 4.5 |
| *None* | 95.0 | 68.3 | 57.3 | 46.1 | 68.2 | 70.5 |
| *Other (including compost)* | 3.3 | 20.0 | 9.0 | 29.2 | 4.5 | 27.3 |
| […] used by hh to protect trees/plants from insects and diseases | | | | | | |
| *Chemicals* | 0.0 | 1.7 | 2.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| *Using bait to attract insects* | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| *Planting special plants* | 0.0 | 1.7 | 0.0 | 4.5 | 0.0 | 4.5 |
| *Organic/herbal pesticide/herbicide* | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.2 | 1.1 | 2.3 | 0.0 |
| *None* | 96.7 | 56.7 | 84.3 | 61.8 | 88.6 | 72.7 |
| *Fumigation/smoking* | 3.3 | 41.7 | 11.2 | 33.7 | 9.1 | 22.7 |
| Use of any chemical inputs (%) | 1.7 | 1.7 | 14.6 | 22.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Distance between cashew trees | | | | | | |
| *Below 5m^2* | 0.0 | 1.7 | 5.6 | 4.5 | 11.4 | 6.8 |
| *5 to 9 m^2* | 3.3 | 1.7 | 3.4 | 4.5 | 6.8 | 9.1 |
| *Equal or more than 9 m^2* | 96.7 | 96.7 | 91.0 | 91.0 | 81.8 | 84.1 |
| Source: Household survey E10; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia<br>Notes: Sample size deviates in last two columns: n=44 | | | | | | |

### *Yield of cashew nuts*

**Table 22: Yield of cashew nuts**

| | All villages | | | | Villages with certificates | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Assignment group** | Comparison | | Treatment | | Treatment | |
| **Survey period** | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End |
| Percentage of hh's that harvested any cashew nuts during the past 12 months | 100.0 (60.0) | 95.0 (60.0) | 98.9 (89.0) | 100.0 (89.0) | 97.7 (44.0) | 100.0 (44.0) |
| Amount of harvested cashew nuts in past 12 months if cashew nuts are harvested (kg) | 473.9 (60.0) | 353.3 (57.0) | 910.9 (88.0) | 515.0 (89.0) | 784.6 (43.0) | 401.6 (44.0) |
| Cultivated land for cashew nuts per hh (ha) | 1.5 (31.0) | 1.3 (60.0) | 2.0 (14.0) | 1.6 (86.0) | 1.1 (4.0) | 1.3 (44.0) |
| Total cultivated land per hh (ha) | 1.9 (60.0) | 1.9 (60.0) | 2.1 (89.0) | 1.9 (87.0) | 1.5 (44.0) | 1.6 (44.0) |
| Cultivated land for […] per hh (ha) | | | | | | |
| *Seasonal crops* | 0.5 (27.0) | 0.7 (19.0) | 0.9 (13.0) | 0.5 (23.0) | (0.0) | 0.4 (15.0) |
| *Perennial crops* | 1.6 (56.0) | 1.8 (45.0) | 1.9 (80.0) | 1.6 (83.0) | 1.5 (40.0) | 1.3 (41.0) |
| *Mixed crops* | 0.8 (14.0) | 0.8 (24.0) | 1.0 (21.0) | 0.9 (32.0) | 0.8 (11.0) | 0.7 (14.0) |

Source: Household survey E10; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Sample size is given in parentheses.

**Table 23: Cashew trees**

| | All villages | | | | Villages with certificate | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Assignment group** | Comparison | | Treatment | | Treatment | |
| **Survey period** | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End |
| Average number of cashew trees cultivated per hh | 180.4 (59.0) | 154.0 (58.0) | 261.9 (86.0) | 226.7 (86.0) | 237.0 (43.0) | 204.5 (44.0) |
| Percentages of cashew trees per hh in full production (%) | 51.5 (60.0) | 54.9 (59.0) | 64.8 (89.0) | 67.3 (88.0) | 66.9 (44.0) | 66.2 (44.0) |
| Percentage of cashew trees per hh too young for production (%) | 32.4 (60.0) | 31.5 (59.0) | 14.1 (89.0) | 13.8 (88.0) | 12.8 (44.0) | 13.3 (44.0) |
| Percentage of cashew trees per hh too old for production (%) | 16.1 (60.0) | 15.3 (59.0) | 21.1 (89.0) | 20.2 (87.0) | 20.3 (44.0) | 20.5 (44.0) |
| Average cashew trees planted in past 5 years Base/ 2 years End | 63.0 (60.0) | 27.6 (60.0) | 48.7 (88.0) | 6.3 (89.0) | 27.8 (43.0) | 8.1 (44.0) |
| Percentage hh's that used side grafting to regenerate cashew trees in past 5 years (base)/ 2 years (end) | 0.0 (60.0) | 0.0 (60.0) | 1.1 (89.0) | 0.0 (89.0) | 0.0 (44.0) | 0.0 (44.0) |
| Percentage hh's that cut out cashew trees to allow new branches to grow from the trunk in past 5 years (base)/ 2 years (end) | 35.0 (60.0) | 41.7 (60.0) | 65.2 (89.0) | 58.4 (89.0) | 56.8 (44.0) | 65.9 (44.0) |

Source: Household survey E10; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Too old for production is defined as a production of less than 60 per cent of full production.
Sample size is given in parentheses.

### *Volume of cashew nuts*

**Table 24: Volume of cashews sold**

| | Cashew nuts in shell | | | | Brown skinned cashew nuts | | | | White skinned cashew nuts | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Assignment group** | Comparison | | Treatment | | Comparison | | Treatment | | Comparison | | Treatment | |
| **Survey period** | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End |
| Percentage of hh that sold any [...] | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 96.6 | 1.7 | 3.3 | 14.6 | 18.0 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 13.5 | 13.5 |
| Total [...] production per hh (kg) | 467.0 | 337.1 | 838.8 | 459.8 | 7.0 | 67.5 | 126.4 | 60.2 | 25.0 | 62.5 | 45.4 | 69.3 |
| Percentage of kg sold in [...] in LOCAL market | 96.7 | 100.0 | 48.9 | 51.3 | 100.0 | 50.0 | 0.0 | 12.5 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 58.3 | 16.7 |
| Percentage of kg sold in [...] in NATIONAL market | 3.3 | 0.0 | 51.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 50.0 | 92.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 41.7 | 0.0 |
| Percentage of kg sold in [...] in INTERNATIONAL market | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 48.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 7.7 | 87.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 83.3 |
| Value of [...] sold (1000 Rupiah, own reported price) if [...] sold | 4,468.3 | 3,330.6 | 8,235.6 | 5,072.4 | 350.0 | 4,725.0 | 7,889.2 | 4,185.3 | 1,897.5 | 5,187.5 | 3,607.9 | 19,842.5 |

Source: Household survey E10; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

**Table 25: Percentage of households that sold any cashew nuts in local and (inter)national markets**

| Assignment group | Comparison | | Treatment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Survey period** | Base | End | Base | End |
| Percentage of hh that sold any cashew nuts in […] market | | | | |
| *Local* | 96.7 | 95.0 | 49.4 | 51.7 |
| *National* | 3.3 | 1.7 | 50.6 | 0.0 |
| *International* | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.1 | 52.8 |
| Source: Household survey E10; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia. | | | | |

**Table 26: Percentage of cashew nuts sold to (inter)national market: treatment farming group data**

| | Total production | | Sold in shell | | Sold with brown skin | | Sold with white skin | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Survey period** | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End |
| Cashews sold (kg) | 259,858.0 | 93,517.0 | 256,300.0 | 71,011.0 | 2,968.0 | 19,112.0 | 590.0 | 3,394.0 |
| Percentage of cashew nuts production going to […] markets | | | | | | | | |
| *Local* | 71.6 | 0.5 | 72.4 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 100.0 | 5.9 |
| *National* | 27.0 | 13.9 | 26.8 | 12.4 | 48.4 | 5.1 | 0.0 | 94.1 |
| *International* | 1.4 | 85.7 | 0.8 | 87.3 | 51.6 | 94.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Source: Farming group survey E10; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | | | | | | | |

### *Selling price of cashew nuts*

**Table 27: Price of cashew nuts: treatment farming group data**

| | Sold in shell | | Sold with brown skin | | Sold with white skin | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Survey period** | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End |
| Price of cashew nuts going to […] markets | | | | | | |
| *Local* | 9,250.0 (2) | 13,000.0 (1) | (0) | 60,000.0 (1) | 80,000.0 (1) | 80,000.0 (1) |
| *National* | 14,125.0 (2) | 13,666.7 (3) | 65,000.0 (1) | 72,500.0 (2) | (0) | 101,666.7 (3) |
| *International* | 13,500.0 (1) | 12,500.0 (1) | 67,500.0 (2) | 67,500.0 (2) | (0) | (0) |

Source: Farming group survey E10; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Sample size is given in parentheses.

**Table 28: Price of cashew nuts: household data (overview)**

| | Sold in shell | | Sold with brown skin | | Sold with white skin | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Survey period** | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End |
| Price of cashew nuts going to […] markets | | | | | | |
| *Local* | 9,109.1 (101) | 10,403.3 (103) | 50,000.0 (1) | 66,666.7 (3) | 85,555.6 (9) | 75,000.0 (4) |
| *National* | 9,917.0 (47) | (0) | 58,750.0 (12) | 70,000.0 (1) | 65,000.0 (5) | (0) |
| *International* | (0) | 11,460.6 (44) | 50,000.0 (1) | 67,035.7 (14) | (0) | 92,500.0 (9) |

Source: Household survey E10; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Sample size is given in parentheses.

## *Household income and livelihood*

**Table 29: Household income**

| Assignment group | Comparison | | Treatment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Survey period** | Base | End | Base | End |
| Total income per month (1000 Rp) | 738.0 | 1,228.1 | 1,325.6 | 1,553.7 |
| Percentage of income from […] | | | | |
| *Livestock* | 3.1 | 11.1 | 1.5 | 5.6 |
| *Transfer* | 21.5 | 25.4 | 11.8 | 18.6 |
| *Net profit non-farm business* | 8.9 | 23.3 | 12.1 | 18.2 |
| *Cashew nut* | 60.1 | 36.0 | 69.0 | 53.2 |
| *Crop* | 6.4 | 6.0 | 7.2 | 4.4 |
| Value of crop harvest last 12 months excluding cashews (1000 Rp) | 2,281.6 | 1,692.4 | 2,214.6 | 1,577.3 |
| Percentage of harvest sold last 12 months excluding cashews (%) | 100.0 | 81.9 | 87.9 | 67.8 |

Source: Household survey E10; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
1. Only from crops that were also sold during the past 12 months.
2. Sample size deviates: BASE: comp (19) and treat (42); END: comp (22) and treat (37).
3. Sample size deviates: BASE: comp (20) and treat (41); END: comp (22) and treat (37).

**Table 30: Household expenditure**

| Assignment group | Comparison | | Treatment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Survey period** | Base | End | Base | End |
| Share of […] expenditure from total non-food expenditure (%) | | | | |
| *Education* | 26.5 | 23.9 | 28.6 | 29.7 |
| *Medical* | 16.1 | 13.5 | 11.3 | 13.9 |
| *Durables* | 22.7 | 23.3 | 19.9 | 23.4 |
| *Ritual ceremonies, charity and gifts* | 29.9 | 22.0 | 32.8 | 21.6 |
| *Other* | 4.7 | 17.3 | 7.5 | 11.4 |

Source: Household survey E10; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia.

**Table 31: Food security**

| | Not able to cover living costs in past 12 months | | | | Not able to eat enough in past 12 months | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Assignment group** | Comparison | | Treatment | | Comparison | | Treatment | |
| **Survey period** | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End |
| Percentage hh that were [...] in JANUARY | 61.7 | 70.0 | 59.6 | 64.0 | 43.3 | 60.0 | 36.0 | 49.4 |
| Percentage hh that were [...] in FEBRUARY | 70.0 | 78.3 | 79.8 | 78.7 | 53.3 | 66.7 | 52.8 | 64.0 |
| Percentage hh that were [...] in MARCH | 60.0 | 58.3 | 71.9 | 70.8 | 46.7 | 45.0 | 48.3 | 47.2 |
| Percentage hh that were [...] in APRIL | 45.0 | 48.3 | 53.9 | 47.2 | 36.7 | 26.7 | 36.0 | 27.0 |
| Percentage hh that were [...] in MAY | 41.7 | 30.0 | 36.0 | 37.1 | 28.3 | 25.0 | 23.6 | 23.6 |
| Percentage hh that were [...] in JUNE | 31.7 | 18.3 | 23.6 | 30.3 | 16.7 | 11.7 | 18.0 | 16.9 |
| Percentage hh that were [...] in JULY | 11.7 | 16.7 | 6.7 | 14.6 | 1.7 | 6.7 | 4.5 | 5.6 |
| Percentage hh that were [...] in AUGUST | 5.0 | 3.3 | 2.2 | 3.4 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.1 | 0.0 |
| Percentage hh that were [...] in SEPTEMBER | 1.7 | 1.7 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 1.7 | 0.0 | 1.1 | 0.0 |
| Percentage hh that were [...] in OCTOBER | 1.7 | 1.7 | 2.2 | 1.1 | 0.0 | 1.7 | 2.2 | 0.0 |
| Percentage hh that were [...] in NOVEMBER | 3.3 | 3.3 | 7.9 | 1.1 | 1.7 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 1.1 |
| Percentage hh that were [...] in DECEMBER | 13.3 | 10.0 | 15.7 | 15.7 | 10.0 | 13.3 | 6.7 | 10.1 |

Source: Household survey E10; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia.

# Endline Report on the Achievement of MDGs and Themes:

# Evaluation of the Rifka Annisa project

## MFS II Joint Evaluations

## Indonesia

**Sub-report:**
**E11. Rifka Annisa project,**
**Rifka Annisa**

## FINAL REPORT

**9 April 2015**


**Amsterdam Institute for International Development (AIID)**
Trinity building C, 3rd floor, Rm XT-3.17
Pietersbergweg 17
1105 BM Amsterdam
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)20 5661596
F +31 (0)20 5665997
www.aiid.org

**SurveyMeter**
Jl. Jenengan Raya No.109
Maguwoharjo, Depok, Sleman,
Yogyakarta 55282
Indonesia
T +62 (0) 274 4477464
F +62 (0) 274 4477004
www.surveymeter.org

# List of contributors

**AIID**
Menno Pradhan (Principal Investigator)
Melinda Vigh (Research Coordinator)
Marije Groot Bruinderink (Project Manager)
Iris van Rossum (Junior Researcher)
Emilie Berkhout (Research Assistant)

**Survey Meter**
Ni Wayan Suriasatini (Research Coordinator)
Bondan Sikoki (Survey Expert)
Mardiana Br Ginting (Project Manager)
Muhammad Mulia (Qualitative Researcher)
Kamti Ningsih (Qualitative Researcher and Field Coordinator)
Budi Wahyuni (Qualitative Researcher)

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## List of Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| CFA | Co-financing Agency |
| GBV | Gender based violence |
| IPV | Intimate Partner Violence |
| MDG | Millennium Development Goal |
| MFS II | Medefinancieringsstelsel (Co-financing System Grant Policy Framework) |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| PKDRT | Law on the Elimination of Domestic Violence (no. 23/2004) |
| RA | Rifka Annisa |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |
| SRH | Sexual and Reproductive Health |
| SRHR | Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| UFBR | Unite for Body Rights |

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Project context

Gender based violence (GBV) is a human rights violation and the social and economic costs are high. GBV is usually the result of unequal power relationships between men and women in families, communities and nations. GBV can result in "physical, mental, sexual, reproductive health and other health problems" for survivors and/or their children (WHO [1]), constituting a major public health problem. In addition, GBV also "impacts on, and impedes, progress in many areas, including poverty eradication, combating HIV/AIDS, and peace and security" (UN[2]). Several actions to combat GBV have been taken. The UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (1993), the first international human rights instrument to deal exclusively with gender-based violence (GBV), offered the first official definition of the term gender based violence (GBV), defining it as "any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivations of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.[3] Millennium Development Goal 3 calls for the promotion of gender equality and women's empowerment.[4]

In Indonesia, law no. 23/2004 (the PKDRT law) on the Elimination of Domestic Violence was the first regulation that finally legally entitled female victims of domestic violence to report any violence they experienced at the hands of their husband. In addition, as a result of the implementation of this law, institutions providing services to female and child victims of GBV started to be established. In Central Java Province,[5] the government issued by-law no. 3/2009 to assure better enforcement of the PKDRT law. This by-law governs, among others, the rights of female victims and the obligations of the local government with respect to prevention, protection and reintegration of victims. As a result, local governments are authorized to form integrated services centres (PPTKs) and commissions for the protection of female and child victims of domestic and/or gender based violence.

However, despite these efforts, the actual implementation and enforcement of the legislation, especially by local governments, is slow. In Indonesia's multicultural society, GBV is often tolerated and permitted due to patriarchy that manifests in cultural and religious beliefs and practices.

Domestic violence is by far the largest reported subcategory of GBV[6], which the PKDRT law defines as 'any act toward somebody in the household, especially women, that results in any psychological,

[1] Source: http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs239/en/
[2] Source: http://www.un.org/en/events/endviolenceday/
[3] Source: http://www.hhri.org/thematic/gender_based_violence.html.
[4] Source: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/gender.shtml
[5] The location of the project.
[6] According to the National Commission on Violence against Women (Komnas Perempuan) 119.107 cases of violence against women had been reported in Indonesia in 2011. Almost 97% of the reports (110.468 cases) have been filed as 'domestic violence' cases. From the different types of violence against women in the domestic domain, psychological violence ranked the highest with 103.691 cases, followed by economic violence (3.222 cases), physical violence (2.700 cases), and sexual violence (1.398 cases) (Komnas Perempuan, 2012a & 2012b).

physical and/or sexual suffering, and/or abandonment, including threat, force, or deprivation of liberty as defined by law, that happened within the domestic sphere' (Article 1). The roots of domestic violence in Indonesia can -at least in part- be found in gender inequality, particularly within marital relations. For example, the husband's culturally-instilled superior position as head and provider [7] has grave implications for women's willingness and ability to report domestic violence and/or file for divorce. Another example involves the marital practice where the father of the bride is taking on the role of his daughter's representative during the wedding ceremony. The husband thus swears the marital oath to the father of the bride, instead of to his bride herself. Many victims attest that, consequently, their husbands tell them during fights that "he is not bound by his oath to treat her well or stay faithful, because he hasn't sworn the marital oath directly to her". Worries about how to support herself and her children after a separation or divorce, can inhibit women from taking action to stop the abuse. Thought divorce is common in Indonesia, it is rarely instigated by the wife since she needs the income of her husband to take care of the children (Venning, 2010). Moreover, women that report their husband to the police face the threat of being stigmatized by her family and environment.

Data on GBV cases is gathered mostly by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) working on violence against women. During the period of 2000 to 2011, there was an increasing trend of the number of female victims in Indonesia. Particularly, between 2009 and 2011, there were more than 100,000 reported cases per year. The National Commission for Women found that 95% of the divorce cases approved by the Religious High Court in 2011 were due to domestic violence against the wife. According to Komnas Perempuan (2012a; 2012b) the most vulnerable age group is 25-40 years. The most common reported form of violence in Indonesia is psychological violence.

Though, the actual number of GBV cases is expected to be higher than the official data (Komnas Perempuan, 2012a; Komnas Perempuan, 2012b; Hayati, 2011). For example, based on the outcomes of the Violence Against Women Survey 2006, UN Women estimates that nearly 2.09 million women in Indonesia experienced at some point in their life a form of domestic violence (Utami, 2013). In November 2000, the prevalence of domestic violence in Central Java was investigated by Hakimi et al. (2001) in accordance with a questionnaire developed by a WHO Multi-Country Study on Women's Health and Domestic Violence Against Women. They found that 41% of women from Central Java had suffered physical or sexual violence at least once in their lives, mostly from their husbands. In addition, 20% of the women experienced sexual assault from someone other than their husband.

In general, the lack of autonomy and assertiveness among many Indonesian women, particularly of those who live in rural areas, hinders them to report the case to state apparatuses or bringing the case into public.[8] Women also often experience difficulties in accessing the legal system, for example due to the prohibitive cost and distance. Moreover, domestic violence is often regarded as a private matter, not belonging in the public domain. The taboo and stigma on domestic violence prohibits not only

[7] Within Indonesian law and culture, the husband is always regarded as the head of the household and expected to be the breadwinner. The notion of the husband as the head of household is also stated in the marriage law no. 1, dating from 1974.

[8] ACNielsen (2005) finds that only 27% of victims would report domestic violence to the police.

collecting accurate data (Utami, 2013), but more importantly hinders women to become aware of the problem and possible solutions. Therefore, the rising trend of GBV prevalence should be regarded as a positive sign of an increasing number of women having the courage to report their cases, hence breaking the taboo on domestic violence.

Several institutions in Indonesia provide services to female and child victims of violence. In 2011, Komnas Perempuan (2012a; 2012b) recorded a total of 395 of these institutions (both government and non-government initiatives) across 33 provinces in Indonesia, providing for example counsellors, gender-sensitive judges/district attorneys and database officers. Rifka Annisa is one of the institutions. Rifka Annisa provides counselling and legal assistance to victims of Sexual and Gender Based Violence. The aim of Rifka Annisa is to empower female survivors and in doing that contribute to the development or creation of a gender-just society.

## 1.2. Evaluation objectives

This report evaluates the Rifka Annisa project[9] as part of as part of the *Medefinancieringsstelsel* (MFS) II evaluation for Indonesia under the Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDG) component.[10] The project has been selected under the goals on gender (MDG 3) and health (MDG 4, 5, 6). In particular, the current evaluation focuses on the following research questions: how did the programme change the mental (and physical) health conditions of women victims? Did the programme empower women victims of GBV?

We investigate whether the project had a favourable effect on the above mentioned outcomes by looking at the changes in the outcome variables between the baseline and endline periods for the project beneficiaries.

Data was collected using structured surveys from October to the beginning of December 2012. Survey respondents were selected from the client base of Rifka Annisa. In total 18 women (out of the 168 counselled female victims of GBV visiting Rifka Annisa between July 2011 and June 2012) were interviewed. These respondents were re-interviewed in April 2014 in order to assess the change in outcome variables. The attribution of these changes is addressed using qualitative information regarding the life events of the respondents during the evaluation period.

In addition, a self-administered client survey was designed to obtain additional information regarding the effectiveness of Rifka Annisa's services on the beneficiaries. This client survey was carried out between September 2013 and February 2014 with 51 participants.

As specified in the Terms of Reference for this evaluation, the report addresses five evaluation questions to assess the project outcomes:

1) Change: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period?

[9] The project is described in more detail in section 3.

[10] Please note that this project has been also evaluated under the Capacity Development of Partner Organisations component of the MFS II Evaluation.

2) Attribution: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3) Relevance of change: What is the relevance of these changes?
4) Efficiency: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient?
5) Explanations: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

## 1.3. Summary of findings

Rifka Annisa provides counselling and legal aid services to victims of SGBV. For the evaluation, we interviewed 18 women who used the counselling, legal aid and support group services of Rifka Annisa and were victims of domestic violence. At the time of the baseline survey, most of the respondents have already visited Rifka Annisa multiple times, with their first visit more than 6 months before the baseline except for one respondent. In addition, many (11) respondents were already divorced at the time of the survey. As a consequence, only 6 respondents have still visited Rifka Annisa during the evaluation period.

These facts pose limitations for measuring the effectiveness of the project. However, we were restricted in the sampling by the Rifka Annisa's policy that only allowed us access to their clients if a counsellor of Rifka Annisa contacts the client and she is also present during parts of the interview.

For the endline survey, the same respondents were re-interviewed in April 2014. By that time, only 3 respondents were still married to their husband, and two divorced women had remarried. The data show that most women had taken a positive attitude towards their future due to their ambition to provide a better future for their children.[11] Almost all respondents were employed (17), and many of them found a better job. Often they were supported by their family morally and financially and by taking care of the children. Women who had no such support were struggling to make ends meet as they had to take care of the children and work at the same time.

In addition, friends provided emotional support and encouragement to take action to break free of the cycle of abuse. Often they have also referred the respondents to Rifka Annisa. At Rifka Annisa, all respondents received counselling, 11 of them received legal advice, and 6 of them were assisted in the litigation procedure. However, some respondents turned for help elsewhere (3) or handled their case on their own (4). The respondents indicate that Rifka Annisa was the most helpful in the litigation procedure that helped them settle their issues with their husband (divorce). They were in general satisfied with all the help received from Rifka Annisa.

Turning to the findings for the outcome indicators, we observe little change during the evaluation period. The most notable changes are observed as less dependency on husband, less exposure to abuse, better relationship with husband and improvements in the psychological well-being and social functioning of respondents. But there are signs that the physical health of the respondents got somewhat worse. Respondents were also still struggling to cope with the emotional burden of the past experiences, and their new responsibilities as the breadwinner.

[11] All respondents had at least one child.

### 1.4. Structure of report

The rest of this report proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the relevant literature; section 3 describes the project; section 4 describes the evaluation questions and outcome variables; section 5 the data collection. Section 6 provides the descriptive statistics. Sections 7 till 10 discuss evaluation question 1) till 4) in turn. Section 11 describes the relationship between the Capacity Development and Civil Society component to the MDG component. The last section discusses the results and concludes.

Further details about the project results are presented in a number of annexes. The project implementation and the SPO is described in Annex I. Regarding the survey data, the construction of the outcome indicators and indices is summarized in Annex II, while Annex III till Annex V present detailed figures on the change in outcome indicators for evaluation questions 1 till 3. Annex VI provides the survey outcomes by marital status and finally, the results of the Rifka Annisa client survey are presented in

Annex VII.

## 2. Literature overview

In order to better position the Rifka Annisa project, this section summarizes relevant findings in the literature with respect to combating domestic and intimate partner violence (IPV)[12]. First, we discuss policy level recommendations and risk factors, and then report the results of specific interventions aimed at reducing the incidence of domestic violence and IPV, and/or supporting victims of domestic violence and IPV.

#### *Policy level recommendations for fighting domestic and intimate partner violence*

The state is an important actor when fighting domestic and intimate partner violence. It can adopt or improve domestic violence legislation to provide a framework to prevent and respond to domestic violence (UN, 2010). For example, it can alter the legal framework (e.g. criminal and civil remedies), start programmes to prevent violence (e.g. reduce alcohol abuse), or provide services for victims (e.g. protection services, legal aid services) (UN Women, 2011).

The movement aimed at changing domestic violence legislation have been partly successful. On the one hand, women's organisations' and human rights group's campaigns to reform criminal and civil laws related to domestic violence - often broadening the legal definition of domestic violence[13] - have achieved great progress (Heise, 2011). For example, the number of countries that have specific legal

[12] Both domestic violence and IPV can take place in the domestic environment. However, IPV can also take place outside the domestic domain, for example dating violence. Domestic violence does not necessarily take place between partners like IPV, for example the violence can also be directed to children.

[13] With respect to the definition of domestic violence in the law, the UN Women (2011) recommends to have a detailed definition in the law which "captures women's experiences of violence in all its manifestations". Furthermore, the UN Women recommends to "domesticate the definitions by outlawing specific cultural manifestations of violence" (p. 17).

provisions on domestic violence has grown from 89 in 2006 to 125 in 2011.[14] On the other hand, however, implementation of these laws is yet quite insufficient (Heise, 2011).

Studies documenting the impact of reforming laws on changing behaviour in low income countries are scarce (Heise, 2011). However, it is generally recognized that resolving domestic violence through the state system can work, but if, for example, women and men do not regard themselves as equals in society, these laws and regulations lack the right effect (Venning, 2010). Then, implementing domestic violence legislation alone will not eliminate the violence. It is crucial to include provisions in domestic violence legislation to ensure efficient implementation of the domestic violence legislation, for example by training public officials. Moreover, laws on domestic violence should include public awareness raising programmes and education provisions to create an environment of zero tolerance for violence (UN Women, 2011).

### *Risk factors affecting the prevalence of domestic violence*

Efforts aimed at preventing domestic violence are very important, as the ultimate goal of both government and the NGO-sphere is to create a zero-tolerance to domestic violence. It is generally recognized that the roots of violence against women lie in gender inequality and discrimination.[15] The likelihood of a woman experiencing violence in a particular situation depends on a variety of (risk) factors at the individual, relationship, community and society (including the institutional/state) levels, together known as 'ecological model' (Heise, 2011). For example, the current stock of literature provides relatively strong evidence that gender-related norms, exposure to violence during childhood and male alcohol abuse are risk factors of IPV, at least in the developed world. However, the research on risk factors of domestic violence specifically on Indonesian women is scarce (Hayati et al., 2011).

Hayati et al. (2011) investigated the risk factors of rural Javanese women for physical and sexual violence. 765 women were interviewed by female field workers using the WHO Multi-Country study instrument on domestic violence. The lifetime exposure to sexual and physical violence was 22% and respectively 11%. The results displayed that women's risk of physical and sexual violence is related to traditional gender norms. These unequal gender relationships, measured with women's attitudes and norms, show that these relationships are more common among women living in the highlands and those being married to poorly educated men. Hence, the traditional gender roles, especially in marriage, should gain particular attention in preventive interventions in Indonesia.

Besides women's experiences, men's views on domestic violence are important to investigate to gain knowledge on the determinants of domestic violence (Hayati et al., 2014). Hayati et al. (2014) conducted six focus group discussions with, in total, 44 local male community leaders in Purworejo, rural Java. Three different positions of masculinity with certain beliefs on the gender order and acceptance of violence within marriage among the sample were identified, ranging from high acceptance of violence (traditionalist), pragmatic acceptance if needed to correct the wife's behaviour (pragmatist), to no acceptance (egalitarian). A very important determinant of the beliefs of all three positions is religion. The study concludes by recommending that religion should be included in every type of preventive intervention for this population.

[14] Source: http://www.stopvaw.org/united_nations_model_legislation

[15] For example, see http://www.endvawnow.org/en/articles/300-causes-protective-and-risk-factors-.html

### *Effectiveness of preventive programmes*

The evidence about the effectiveness of preventive programmes is highly skewed towards high-income countries (especially the United States). Based on the available evidence, Heise (2011) provide us with an overview of the current research-based literature on the effectiveness of preventing IPV interventions in low- and middle income countries for five different varieties of programmes: law and justice system reforms (see above), harmful alcohol use, women's economic empowerment, childhood exposure to violence, gender-related norms and beliefs. The current evidence stock on harmful alcohol use and the economic empowerment was inadequate to draw general conclusions, but results from the other two programme varieties are promising.

Interventions aimed at reducing childhood exposure to violence show that parenting programmes can improve parent-child interactions and reduce harsh punishment, but more research is needed on a number of other programmes, e.g. positive child discipline or gender socialization interventions (Heise, 2011).

With respect to changing gender norms interventions, both small group and larger-scale campaigns seem to be effective to change norms, attitudes and beliefs related to gender. In addition, some studies show a decrease in reported IPV cases. Successful programmes seem to have engaged the community and locally respected leaders, have involved awareness raising and deliberation on values, rights and gender based discrimination, have built on local traditions, songs and values; and have addressed the drawback of non-compliance with social norms. However, many evaluation studies are methodologically weak (Heise, 2011).

One study in particular that does give evidence on the impact of a preventive intervention in a developing world context, is the SASA! Activist Kit for Preventing Violence against Women an HIV in Uganda. The programme seeks to change community attitudes, norms and behaviours that result in gender inequality, violence and increased HIV vulnerability. Community activists interested in issues of violence, power and rights were trained, along with staff from selected institutions, who worked through the Awareness, Support and Action phases. The programme introduced new concepts of power and encouraged an analysis of the imbalance of power through local activism, media and advocacy, communication materials and training. The activities in each community were developed in response to the community's needs. Abramsky et al. (2014) report that after almost 3 years of the programme, social acceptance of a man's use of violence against his partner was significantly lower among women (adjusted risk ratio[16] 0.54, CI[17] 0.38 to 0.79) and lower among men (0.13, CI 0.01 to 1.15) in intervention communities compared to control communities. Similarly, more people in intervention communities reported attitudes supporting the acceptability of a woman refusing sex, statistically significant for both women (1.28, CI 1.07 to 1.52) and men (1.31, CI 1.00 to 1.70). Past year experience of physical intimate partner violence (IPV) was substantially lower among intervention women compared to control women (0.48, CI 0.16 to 1.39). For sexual IPV, the difference between intervention and control communities was

[16] Adjusted risk ratios generated on the basis of expected number of events from a logistic regression model on individual data with independent variables including age, marital status and EA-level summary baseline measure of outcome indicator (Abramsky et al., 2014, p. 12)

[17] The 95% confidence interval (CI) of the estimates is reported.

somewhat smaller and statistically non-significant (0.76, CI 0.33 to 1.72). These results should be interpreted as the short-term community-wide effects.

### *Effectiveness of post-violence services*

In addition to interventions aimed at preventing and resolving domestic violence, there are services aimed at the rehabilitation of survivors of violence, like facilitating access to justice or counselling.

One of the most popular responses by the government to fight domestic violence is to set up facilities which offer post-violence services, i.e. women's police stations facilitating access to justice for women (Heise, 2011). The effectiveness of domestic violence agencies in Illinois, U.S., is investigated by Bennett et al. (2004). Though the results are preliminary due to the study limitations (e.g. self-reported data, no control group), in all four programme areas, crisis hotline, counselling, advocacy, and emergency shelter, the outcomes were positive. Victims of domestic violence have gained important information due to their participation in the hotline, counselling and advocacy. Counselling and advocacy participation improved victims' decision-making ability. Furthermore, counselling alone increased the self-efficacy and coping skills of victims.

Studies on the effectiveness of women's police stations in the developing world show mixed results. On the positive side, the policy stations seem to make the domestic violence problem visible and offer women new opportunities to defend their rights. However, the stations do not necessarily contribute to the elimination of violence or guarantee access to justice since stations were not designed to fulfil *all* women's needs like emergency shelter, guidance, support and legal advice (Heise, 2011).

With respect to counselling, the literature suggests that counselling for battered women can improve a number of skills and characteristics, like self-esteem, assertiveness and coping abilities (Bennett et al., 2004). Based on international standards and good practices, the United Nations Women (2011) concludes that it is important for the long-term rehabilitation of survivors that counselling aims to empower them, be provided free of charge and should not be mandatory. Counselling for perpetrators must be mandated as supplementary to the criminal justice sanction (United Nations Women, 2011).

Other post-violence services are support groups. The results of the two available studies on their effectiveness is summarised below. Tutty, Bidgood, and Rothery (1993) evaluated the impact of 12 closed support groups (i.e. not open to new members after the start) on 76 women within a time span of 6 months. Women showed improvements in the areas of self-esteem, sense of belonging, locus of control, traditional attitudes towards marriage and the family, marital functioning and perceived stress. Women living with their husbands showed significant decreases in both physical and non-physical and controlling abuse. Thought the results should be interpreted with caution due to the high level of attrition (n=32 at the endline) and the lack of a comparison group.

Constantino et al. (2005) evaluated 24 women in a domestic violence shelter (Western Pennsylvania, U.S.) using a randomized control design. The women were randomly designed to either the control group or the treatment group. Both the control and treatment groups received the standard shelter services provided to all women in the residence: meals, shelter, and necessary transportation. In addition, the treatment group received the social support intervention: once a week a 90-minute meeting led by a trained nurse for eight weeks. The meetings focussed on their social support networks and access to community resources. After the programme the treatment group showed greater

improvement in psychological distress symptoms, reported higher feelings of social support, and showed less health care utilization than the control group.

However, the above findings may not be directly translated to Indonesian women due to differences in culture and context. As research in the U.S., U.K. and Australia has shown: "women's perceptions of appropriate and inappropriate responses [by professionals] partly depended on the context of the consultation, their own readiness to address the issue, and the nature of the relationship between the woman and the health care professional."(Feder et al., 2006, p.22).

***Summary***

Summarizing, it is found that in order to eliminate domestic violence both legal interventions and interventions to change social norms building on local traditions are important. In the context of Indonesia the traditional role of men and women in marriage deserves particular attention. Evidence on the effectiveness of programmes that aim to prevent domestic and IPV violence is scarce. The SASA! Programme was successful in changing beliefs about violence, but did not find significant results for a decrease in actual violence. For rehabilitation of survivors of domestic violence, counselling can help to emotionally strengthen survivors, but it is not clear whether it actually results in changing the abusive situation. More evidence is needed to pinpoint the key factors driving successful programmes aimed at eliminating domestic violence and the rehabilitation of survivors.

# 3. The project

## 3.1. Project description

Rutgers WPF provides funds for pre-specified activities of Rifka Annisa, an NGO providing free counselling and legal aid services to victims of Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) in Yogyakarta and its surroundings (Central Java province). However, Rifka Annisa is also involved in several other activities that help achieve its mission to organise women and community in eliminating violence against women, to create a gender-just society through the empowerment of violence survivor, and to increase community's awareness and participation through critical education and strengthening network. Accordingly, the final objective of the project is to reduce SGBV.

The funding from Rutgers WPF is directed towards the following activities:

- Organising training session on paralegal counselling.
- Providing Sexual and Reproductive Health (SRH) counselling and legal aid services to female victims of SGBV.
- Providing shelter to female victims of SGBV.
- Providing counselling service for changing behaviour of men perpetrators
- Promoting national networking of the New Men Alliance
- Developing M&E tools for quality services for victims and perpetrators of SGBV.
- Organising case conferences.
- Organising activities to link partner organisations to relevant networks.


- Developing and implementing advocacy strategy and advocacy work plans on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) for partner organisations.
- Arranging contact moments between alliance members and policy makers at the national level.

## 3.2. Project implementation

The contract for the Rifka Annisa project started 1 January 2011 and was planned to run until the end of 2015. However, the MFS II funding of Rifka Annisa stopped at the end of 2012, due to an additional funding possibility from the MenCare+ and UFBR (Unite for Body Rights) programme[18] of Rutgers WPF. Hence, starting 2013, the project was moved under a different funding framework but the content of the project was not affected. However, Rifka Annisa still benefits from MFS II funding through the capacity building activities of Aliansi Satu Visi.[19]

These changes did not affect the evaluation, which focused on the counselling and legal assistances provided to victims of domestic violence, as this group is the most represented among the clients of Rifka Annisa. In 2012, among the 270 cases handled by Rifka Annisa, 200 were cases of domestic violence. Figure 1 summarizes the project periods and the evaluation activities.

**Figure 1: Timing of intervention**




## 3.3. Result chain

The result chain of the project is shown in Figure 2. It is based on both project documents and the interpretation of the evaluators. It is a rather complex project logic which incorporates both activities and their desired effects at the beneficiary and at the community and policy level.

[18] Both MenCare+ and UFBR are funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.
[19] The counselling activities are funded by UFBR which is not funded by MFS II. However, the capacity building activities also contribute to the quality of counselling.

The evaluation focuses on the components of the result chain that are printed in bold and with capital letters. Regarding the activities of Rifka Annisa, these are psychological counselling; legal advice, aid and assistance; and support group. These activities were used by the respondents during the evaluation period. The hypothesised effects of these activities are discussed below in further detail, while we leave the interpretation of the other components to the readers as the evaluation does not directly address these.


The aim of counselling is to overcome the trauma and to improve the awareness, independency, and honour of (female) victims. However, it usually takes time to empower the victims of domestic violence to break free of the cycle of abuse and become survivors. First, victims have to become aware that they are being abused, which is followed by becoming aware that they are able to change their situation and becoming open for outside help. As a result, women are able to make a decision either to divorce their husband or learn to control the household situation. Based information from Rifka Annisa, counselling for women who decide to stay with their husband takes about 1 year on average. However, also in case of a divorce, women need counselling to overcome the emotional burden of the abuse. Support groups can also provide comfort for the women by sharing their experiences and providing support for each other.

Rifka Annisa also provides legal advice for abused women regarding their rights and the procedure of divorce or other legal cases. If they are ready to take legal action (divorce), Rifka Annisa offers assistance in handling the litigation procedure.

It is important to keep in mind that there are also other factors that affect the empowerment and psychological well-being of the survivors of domestic violence. These could be support from the family and friends of the respondents or new life experiences such as a new job.

Finally, it is of interest of the evaluation how the project beneficiaries got in contact with Rifka Annisa. Most clients voluntarily visit Rifka Annisa. They have heard about Rifka Annisa through friends, family or media, for example Rifka Annisa hosts a weekly TV-show in Yogyakarta and is frequently present on the radio. Rifka Annisa works with outreach communities where they make themselves more actively known and organise discussion groups. Within these outreach communities, Rifka Annisa is informed about victims of SGBV. Rifka Annisa could be notified by a representative from the neighbourhood or a Health Centre in their network. In such a case, Rifka Annisa could decide to do a home-visit. Victims of SGBV can thus be referred to Rifka Annisa; Rifka Annisa collaborates for example with a special unit in the police department, hospitals, health centres, clinics, etc. Victims can also reach Rifka Annisa through email and telephone.

**Figure 2: Result chain**




Notes:

1. MFS II evaluation focuses on result chain items in bold (e.g. psychological counselling).
2. Activities highlighted in grey do not receive funding from Rutgers WPF (e.g. community outreach).
3. Oval factor is independent of the activities of Rifka Annisa.

# 4. Evaluation questions and outcome variables

## 4.1. Evaluation questions

The call for proposals outlines 5 general evaluation questions. In the baseline report specific evaluation questions were specified. Table 1 shows these five questions and what it implies for this project.

**Table 1: Overview general and specific evaluation questions**

| Number | General evaluation question | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Change: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period? | • How did the programme change the mental (and physical) health conditions of women victims?<br>• Did the programme empower women victims of GBV? |
| 2 | Attribution: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)? | Are the observed changes above attributable to the intervention? |
| 3 | Relevance of change: What is the relevance of these changes? | • The size of the impact<br>• Representativeness of the sample<br>• Does the project address an important issue for the beneficiaries?<br>• Satisfaction of beneficiaries (self-reported impact) |
| 4 | Efficiency: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient? | Was the intervention cost effective? |
| 5 | Explanations: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above? | Why did things work out/not work out?<br>The evaluation question is answered throughout the other evaluation questions and in the end discussion. |

In addition, the baseline report identified one other evaluation questions: did the programme lead to a change in the behaviour and empowerment of men's perpetrators? However, this question proved to be too ambitious.[20]

## 4.2. Outcome indicators

To answer the first two evaluation questions (change and attribution) we identified specific outcome indicators following the result chain of the project discussed in section 3.3. The outcome indicators are split up into 4 sub-groups: women's empowerment/attitude towards themselves; attitude/empowerment in marriage; number of women free of domestic violence; and (psychological) health of women. Since there are many possible and interesting outcome indicators, variables are grouped into indices for the main analysis.

[20] At time of the baseline, we were only able to interview three males regarding these issues.

Table 2 displays the outcome indicators of the main analysis, the scale of these variables and whether the indicator is a uniform indicator, while Annex II describes the outcome indicators in more detail and highlights the components per index. The uniform indicators are specified by the synthesis team for the goal on health (MDG 4, 5 and 6) and gender equality (MDG 3). However, none of the uniform indicators on health were related to the project outcomes. Therefore, these have not been measured.

**Table 2: Overview outcome indicators**

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Uniform indicator |
|---|---|---|
| **Panel A. Women's empowerment/attitude towards themselves** | | |
| Locus of Control/Happiness Index | | |
| *Self-efficacy index* | (-2;2) | |
| *Self-esteem index* | (-2;2) | |
| *Control index* | (-2;2) | |
| *Dependency* | (-2;2) | |
| *Support* | (-2;2) | |
| Survivor Coping Index | (1-5) | |
| *Support* | (1-5) | |
| *Self-efficacy* | (1-5) | |
| *Decision making* | (1-5) | |
| *Control* | (1-5) | |
| *Coping skills* | (1-5) | |
| **Panel B. Attitude/empowerment in marriage** | | |
| Rights of wife index | (0-9) | |
| Any good reason for a husband to hit his wife | (0;n) | MDG 3 |
| Number of good reasons for a husband to hit his wife | (0-6) | MDG 3 |
| Any occasions a wife can refuse to have sex | (0;n) | MDG 3 |
| Number of occasions a wife can refuse to have sex | (0-3) | MDG 3 |
| **Panel C. Number of women free of domestic violence** | | |
| Abused by husband/partner in the past 3 months | (0;n) | |
| Number of types of abuse by husband/partner | (0-3) | |
| Nr. of negative traits | (0-6) | |
| Nr. of positive traits | (0-4) | |
| **Panel D. Physical and mental (psychological) health of women** | | |
| Psychological distress index | (0-12) | |
| *Social dysfunction index* | (0-6) | |
| *Anxiety index* | (0-4) | |
| *Losing confidence index* | (0-2) | |

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Uniform indicator |
|---|---|---|
| *Components of physical health* | | |
| *Often had headaches* | (0;n) | |
| *Poor appetite* | (0;n) | |
| *Easily frightened* | (0;n) | |
| *Hands were shaking* | (0;n) | |
| *Felt nervous, tense or worried* | (0;n) | |
| *Cried more than usual* | (0;n) | |
| *Felt tired all the time* | (0;n) | |
| *Had uncomfortable feelings in stomach* | (0;n) | |
| Notes: n is the number of women in the sample | | |

# 5. Data collection

This section describes the survey instruments and the sampling design and outcome in turn.

## 5.1. Survey instruments

We collected two types of data: quantitative and financial data. The following paragraphs list the survey instruments used for each type of data.

### *Quantitative data*

To analyse the impact of the programmes, two surveys have been conducted to collect quantitative data:

- Respondent survey: data was collected using a structured survey for clients of Rifka Annisa. The baseline data have been collected at October-December 2012; the endline data in April 2014.

Client survey: a short self-administered survey with clients of Rifka Annisa was carried out after their first counselling session, which was followed up by an extended survey after the third counselling session during the period September 2013 – February 2014. The result of this survey is reported in

- Annex VII.

### *Financial data collection*

To collect information about the costs of the project, we conducted a project cost survey with the programme manager and financial coordinator of Rifka Annisa on 10 December 2013.

## 5.2. Sampling outcome

### *Sampling design*

The evaluation strategy was based on interviews with clients of Rifka Annisa. To evaluate the impact of counselling on victims of domestic violence and perpetrators, we distinguished several sub-treatment

groups based on the starting date of counselling and whether their husband was involved in the men's programme. Table 3 summaries the planned sample size for the treatment types.

**Table 3: Planned sample size by treatment group**

| Possible treatment exposure (bin) | Female victims (1) | Men's programme: wife (2) | Men's programme: males (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0-3 months | 10 | 5 | 5 |
| 3-6 months | 10 | 5 | 5 |
| 6-9 months | 10 | 5 | 5 |
| 9-12 months | 10 | 5 | 5 |
| **Total** | **40** | **20** | **20** |

In the first group (1), victims of domestic violence are sampled whose (last) husband is not involved in counselling. The total desired sample size for this group is 40 respondents stratified by the starting date of counselling irrespective of current counselling status. In the second group (2), victims of domestic violence are interviewed whose husband also follows the men's programme at Rifka Annisa. The total desired sample size for this group is 20, stratified by the date of their husband's first visit at Rifka Annisa. Finally, the third group (3) contains the men who are following the men's programme, and whose wife is sampled in group (2).

### *Sampling outcome*

The final baseline sample substantially deviated from the sampling strategy described above. At the baseline, from the 168 counselled female victims of SGBV visiting Rifka Annisa between July 2011 and June 2012 for the first time, only 18 victims could be interviewed; and from 18 male clients only 3 were available for interview. All interviews had to be arranged by Rifka Annisa and conducted at the facilities of Rifka Annisa to protect their clients. This constrained the number of respondents we were able to reach because respondents had to invest time and energy for travel to participate in the survey.[21]

Due to the low sample size in the male survey, we decided to only focus on the evaluation of female victims in the follow-up survey at endline period. All 18 female respondents were successfully re-interviewed in April 2014, while the male respondents were excluded from the evaluation. Note that due to the small sample size, the results reported should not be taken as precise estimates.

In addition, to gain more insights into the impact of Rifka Annisa on the female clients, we developed a new client-based survey. All women with cases of domestic abuse who turned to Rifka Annisa between September 2013 and February 2014 were invited to take part in a self-administered short survey after their first counselling session and an extended self-administered survey after the third and sixth visit to Rifka Annisa. During the survey period, 51 women filled out the first survey, and only 3 of them returned for a third visit and filled out the second survey. Due to the rather low latter outcome, it is not possible

[21] Hence, the selection of the sample is non-random due to the limited number of the beneficiaries. Therefore, the results of the study cannot be generalised.

to evaluate the change in women's empowerment, psychological health and self-reported impact of Rifka Annisa's services. The results of the survey are nonetheless summarized in

Annex VII focusing on the profiling of Rifka Annisa's clients by the type of assistance they seek (legal or psychological).

The following sections focus on the outcomes of the 18 female survey respondents who were interviewed in 2012 and 2014.

# 6. Descriptive statistics

This section summarizes the main characteristics of the respondents focusing first on their interaction with Rifka Annisa, and then on their socio-economic characteristics.

## 6.1. Treatment exposure

Table 4 reports on how often and for what purpose the respondents used the services offered by Rifka Annisa. The table shows that most respondents visited Rifka Annisa more than 9 months ago for the first time (8 of 11 respondents). Hence, the respondents at the time of the baseline were not anymore in a situation where they need acute help. All 18 respondents reported that they have received (psychological) counselling before the baseline survey, and 11 of them received legal advice. Three respondents reported that Rifka Annisa directly assisted them in litigation before the baseline. Almost all (15) respondents visited Rifka Annisa more than once.[22]

We assume that the more often respondents used the services of Rifka Annisa, the more they benefitted from them. Before the baseline survey, respondents visited Rifka Annisa 3.7 times on average with 3 respondents visiting Rifka Annisa only once.[23]

During the evaluation period, 6 respondents had contact with Rifka Annisa: 2 were only visiting support group sessions, 4 received counselling, from which 3 also received legal advice, and 2 out of these 3 received legal aid and were member of the support group as well.[24] However, none of them used counselling or legal assistance anymore at the time of the endline survey. At the endline, 4 respondents were members of the support group compared to only 2 at the baseline (3 members joined and one left). Among the 4 support group members 2 visited only 1-3 times, but 2 visited over 10 times, while the other 2 respondents visited 1-2 times.

We are specifically interested in these respondents who have used the services of Rifka Annisa during the evaluation period because we assume that due to directly being exposed to the services of Rifka Annisa, the changes in the life of these respondents are the most influenced by the services of Rifka

[22] For the representativeness of this sample, see section 9.2.

[23] 8 respondents visited Rifka Annisa 2-3 times, 5 of them 4-5 times, 1 respondent 8 times and 1 respondent 16 times (member of support group).

[24] Different respondents reported to have received legal aid before and after baseline. Hence, Rifka Annisa provided direct assistance in a total of 5 litigation cases in the sample.

Annisa during the evaluation period. Therefore, we also report the changes in the outcome indicators separately for this group.[25]

**Table 4: Number and type of visits to Rifka Annisa**

| Survey<br>Sample size | 2012<br>(n=18) | 2014<br>(n=18) |
|---|---|---|
| Time ago first visit[1] | | |
| *0-3 months (Bin 1)* | 0 | - |
| *3-6 months (Bin 2)* | 1 | - |
| *6-9 months (Bin 3)* | 2 | - |
| *9-12 months ago (Bin 4)* | 3 | - |
| *12-15 months ago* | 4 | - |
| *More than 15 months ago* | 1 | - |
| Services used | | |
| *Counselling* | 18 | 4 |
| *Legal advice* | 11 | 3 |
| *Legal aid for civil law litigation* | 3 | 2 |
| *Legal aid for criminal law litigation* | 0 | 0 |
| *Men's programme* | 1 | 0 |
| *Support group (membership)* | 2 | 4 |
| *Shelter* | 1 | 0 |
| Visited Rifka Annisa more than once | 15 | 15 |
| Used counselling services of Rifka Annisa since baseline | - | 6 |
| Still uses services | 5 | 0 |
| Number of sessions (including support group) | 3.7 | 6.0 |

Source: E11 surveys, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: 1. Sample size deviates: n=11

Finally, it is interesting to observe the reasons respondents stopped using the services of Rifka Annisa. For the 5 cases where Rifka Annisa assisted in litigation, the most common reason to stop was that the case (divorce) was finalized. Only one respondent returned for additional counselling sessions, and finally stopped because of lack of time and distance to Rifka Annisa. Among the other 13 cases, 3 looked for help elsewhere (e.g. lawyer), 2 said that the counsellor was not always available, 4 said that the case/problem was finished and 2 that the situation improved. In addition, 4 respondents had no time for counselling and 2 complained about the distance to Rifka Annisa.

[25] Note that respondents who only used the support group during the evaluation period are not included this group.

## 6.2. Respondent characteristics

To provide a better insight into the general characteristics of our sample, Table 5 displays a number of socio-economic characteristics of the respondent and her husband at the baseline. For variables where the sample mean is displayed, the standard deviation of the variable is reported in parentheses below the mean (for example, for age or number of children). For categorical indicators, the number of respondents that belong in each category is reported.

The table shows that the average age of respondent is 35 years. The youngest respondent is 25, while the oldest is 53. This shows that most of respondents belong to productive age, both productive as worker and as mother. Most respondents have more than one children and in school age. Almost all respondents are Muslim.

Looking at the education level, both respondents and their husband have senior high school and bachelor degrees, and the education level between the spouses is similar. Respondents' households are also better off than the average Indonesian household based on the asset and housing facilities indices.[26] In terms of the asset index, they were almost one standard deviation wealthier than an average Indonesian household in 2012.

The table also shows that most respondents are working in order to have their own income (13 respondents at baseline and 17 at endline, Table 28 in Annex IV). As stated by one of the respondents "*women who got married should never stop working, just in case if anything bad happens they can handle it on their own"*. This is proved by the fact that most respondents work and are able to fulfil their and their children's needs, even though it is only enough to fulfil their basic needs. As stated by one respondent *"I work for the children and I can also do good things for my parents and I also asked my parents to take care of my children while I am working."* Respondents conveyed that employed women can be more independent and they can take care of themselves in case they have to leave their husband. Another respondent agreed "*Working is a must for women, if our husband is cheating on us and they did not provide us allowance we can still move on and take care of the children*".

[26] The asset and housing facilities indices are standardized at zero (mean) for the average Indonesian household based on the DHS 2012 and IFLS 2007 surveys, respectively. The asset index is also standardized to have 1 standard deviation.

**Table 5: General characteristics of the sample**

| Sample | Total sample | Used Rifka Annisa since baseline |
|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2012 |
| **Sample size** | 18 | 6 |
| Age | 35.06 (7.94) | 38.00 (7.10) |
| Number of children | 1.78 (0.73) | 2.33 (0.52) |
| Marital status (Nr. of respondents) | | |
| *Currently married* | 6 | 2 |
| *Divorced* | 11 | 3 |
| *Separated* | 1 | 1 |
| Religion (Nr. of respondents) | | |
| *Islam* | 17 | 6 |
| *Protestant* | 1 | 0 |
| Highest level of education of respondent (Nr. of respondents) | | |
| *No/Islamic education* | 0 | 0 |
| *Primary education* | 0 | 0 |
| *Secondary education* | 8 | 3 |
| *Higher education* | 10 | 3 |
| Highest level of education of partner (Nr. of respondents) | | |
| *No/Islamic education* | 0 | 0 |
| *Primary education* | 1 | 1 |
| *Secondary education* | 8 | 2 |
| *Higher education* | 9 | 3 |
| Employment status of respondent (Nr. of respondents) | | |
| *Unemployed / Housewife* | 1 | 0 |
| *Work* | 17 | 6 |
| Employment status of (ex-)partner (Nr. of respondents) | | |
| *Unemployed* | 0 | 0 |
| *Work* | 18 | 6 |
| Women has own income (Nr. of respondents) | 13 | 5 |
| Asset index | 0.91 (0.65) | 0.84 (0.94) |
| Housing facilities index | 0.39 (0.37) | 0.47 (0.21) |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses

At the time of the baseline, 11 respondents were already divorced and only 6 of them were still married. We assume that a divorce can solve marital problems. Hence, for respondents that were already divorced at the time of the baseline survey, their marital problems have been solved already. These women were at a different stage of their life at the time of the baseline compared to women who were

in the process or preparing for divorce or who did not want to divorce. We expect to find an impact on the last group of women since Rifka Annisa helped these women with their divorce and/or with solving their marital disputes.

For women who were already divorced at the baseline, changes in their lives after the baseline can still be attributed to the services of Rifka Annisa in some cases. For example, if they are a member of the support group. Moreover, it takes time to heal and adjust your personal habits. The effect of the counselling sessions can have a short term impact when learning how to cope with the marital disputes, but can also have a long term impact on the women. Even after a divorce and when not attending Rifka Annisa anymore, respondents can still improve on their wellbeing due to the lessons learned in the counselling sessions with Rifka Annisa.

Hence, Rifka Annisa's services could affect both women who were already divorced at baseline and those who were not. Since we expect the impact to be different, we are interested in both subsamples. The results on the outcome indicators for the two subgroups are reported in Annex VI.

# 7. Evaluation question 1: Change in outcomes

This section discusses evaluation question 1: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period? The changes in the outcome indicators for the period measured between the base- and endline survey (2012-2014) are grouped into 4 categories: women's empowerment/attitude towards themselves; attitude/empowerment in marriage; number of women free of domestic violence; and (psychological) health of women. Annex II describes the contents and construction of the indices and Annex III reports the results for the components of outcome indices.

Table 6 to Table 12 display the results for these outcome indicators. In the tables, we report the results for the total sample and the subsample of respondents who have used the services of Rifka Annisa since the baseline separately. For both groups, the tables show the baseline (2012) and endline (2014) values and the change (2014-2012) in the outcome indicators. The standard deviation of the indicators is displayed below the means in parentheses. The significance of the change from zero is denoted by stars, with '*' denoting that the change is significant at 10% significance level, '**' for 5% significance level and '***' for 1% significance level.

The following subsections discuss the levels and changes in the outcome indicators.

### *Women's empowerment/attitude towards themselves*

Women's empowerment with respect to their self-image is measured by three indices and two indicators between the baseline and the endline, as shown in Table 6. The indices range from -2 to +2, where -2 indicates a negative outcome and +2 indicates a positive outcome. Hence, the higher the value of the index/indicator, the more empowered the women feel. The impact on the components of the indices is provided in Annex III.

The table shows that women feel significantly less dependent on their husbands at the endline (change of 0.88 on a scale of -2 to +2), which is especially true for women who used Rifka Annisa's services during the evaluation period (change of 1.60).

However, we do not observe any significant changes in the respondent's self-efficacy, self-esteem, control (or influence on life) and having support. In general the self-efficacy and support indicators were reported at a quite high level at the baseline but have deteriorated somewhat by the time of the endline. This could be the result of new challenges in the lives of the women, for example the increased burden to provide for themselves and their children. In addition, some of the respondents are also faced with negative judgement in their communities due to their divorced status.

**Table 6: Women's attitudes towards themselves (empowerment)**

| Sample | Total sample | | | Used Rifka Annisa since baseline | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Period | 2012 | 2014 | 2014-2012 | 2012 | 2014 | 2014-2012 |
| Sample size | 18 | 18 | 18 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| **Self-efficacy** | 1.00<br>(0.69) | 0.72<br>(0.81) | -0.28<br>(0.69) | 1.00<br>(0.63) | 0.75<br>(0.88) | -0.25<br>(0.76) |
| **Self-esteem** | 0.36<br>(0.52) | 0.21<br>(0.44) | -0.15<br>(0.63) | 0.29<br>(0.53) | 0.21<br>(0.56) | -0.08<br>(0.74) |
| **Control** | 0.19<br>(0.84) | 0.22<br>(0.79) | 0.03<br>(1.02) | 0.42<br>(0.38) | -0.17<br>(0.75) | -0.58<br>(0.74) |
| **Dependency** | -0.22<br>(1.35) | 0.53<br>(1.07)<br>[n=17] | 0.88**<br>(1.54)<br>[n=17] | -0.83<br>(1.60) | 0.20<br>(1.10)<br>[n=5] | 1.60*<br>(1.34)<br>[n=5] |
| **Support** | 1.28<br>(0.96) | 1.17<br>(0.71) | -0.11<br>(1.13) | 1.50<br>(0.55) | 0.83<br>(0.98) | -0.67<br>(1.21) |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Response range is from -2 to +2. Higher values indicate more desirable outcomes.
Standard deviations given in parentheses. * p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value <0.01

Table 7 reports the Survivor Coping Index and the sub-components based on Bennett et al (2004). The scaling of each indicator is from 1 to 5, with 5 indicating the best possible outcome. This indicator was only asked at the endline, however, the client survey also asked first time visitors to Rifka Annisa the same questions. The outcomes of the respondents are similar for this reference group (after first time counselling session, n=51), indicating that respondents were neither doing too good nor too bad in terms of confidence in their coping abilities.

**Table 7: Survivor Coping Index**

| Sample | Total sample | Used Rifka Annisa since baseline |
|---|---|---|
| Period | 2014 | 2014 |
| Sample size | 18 | 6 |
| Survivor Coping Index (1-5) | 3.49 (0.54) | 3.48 (0.46) |
| Support (1-5) | 3.17 (0.95) | 3.08 (1.07) |
| Self-efficacy (1-5) | 3.61 (1.04) | 3.67 (1.03) |
| Decision making (1-5) | 3.39 (0.78) | 3.17 (0.41) |
| Control (1-5) | 3.72 (0.89) | 3.83 (0.98) |
| Coping skills (1-5) | 3.63 (0.61) | 3.67 (0.47) |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses

### *Attitude/empowerment in marriage*

Table 8 reports on respondents' attitude towards their rights in marriage. The rights if wife index indicates respondents' (assumed) autonomy in the marriage and it is measured by the average number of traits indicating autonomy that the respondents agree with (see Annex II for further details). The table also reports on the number of women who agree with any reason for a husband to hit his wife and the number of women who agree with any occasion for a wife to refuse sex. Annex III reports on the components of the indicators.

Overall, women feel quite some autonomy towards matters participating in social matters after their housework is done (100%) and not obeying their husbands when they disagree with him (72%). However, only 61% of them thought that a wife has the right to work (part-time) without the approval of her husband. In addition, more than 80% of them thought that the husband has the right to know where his wife is at all times, and that family problems should be discussed only within the family (Table 20 in Annex III). The last finding is interesting since all women have reported their case to Rifka Annisa and often confessed their marital problems to their friends.

The overall score of 4.8 at the endline indicates that women believe that they have some autonomy but they still report patriarchal values, which sometimes may be only normative as the case of discussing family issues with outsiders shows. However, we do not observe much change in this indicator during the evaluation period.

Respondents confessed that it is justified for women to refuse to obey their husband, like refusing to have sex, as long as they have acceptable reasons. A Muslim respondent mentioned that "*disobedience toward husband is forbidden in religion.*" However, most women agree that women are allowed to refuse to have sex either when they have (17 at endline) or have no reason at all (only 1 respondent).

Most respondents also agree that a husband never has the right to hit his wife. However, despite having experienced domestic abuse, 7 women at the baseline still believed that a husband is justified to physically abuse his wife if she neglected her children. However, at the endline the number of respondents who agreed with this statement has decreased by 2.

Hence, we observe some increased empowerment of at least two of the respondents with respect to their rights as wives.

**Table 8: Empowerment in marriage**

| **Sample** | **Total sample** | | | | **Used Rifka Annisa since baseline** | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2014 | 2014-2012 | | 2012 | 2014 | 2014-2012 | |
| **Sample size** | 18 | 18 | 18 | | 6 | 6 | 6 | |
| Rights of wife index (0-9)[1] | 4.56 (1.62) | 4.78 (1.70) | 0.22 (1.35) | | 4.50 (1.76) | 4.67 (2.16) | 0.17 (1.60) | |
| Any good reason for a husband to hit his wife | | | Increased | Decreased | | | Increased | Decreased |
| | 7 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| Nr. of good reasons for a husband to hit his wife (0-6) | 0.50 (0.79) | 0.61 (1.33) | 0.11 (0.83) | | 0.83 (1.17) | 1.33 (2.16) | 0.50 (1.22) | |
| Any occasion a wife can refuse to have sex | | | Increased | Decreased | | | Increased | Decreased |
| | 15 | 17 | 2 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 0 |
| Nr. of occasions a wife can refuse to have sex (0-3) | 1.67 (0.84) | 1.89 (0.58) | 0.22 (0.81) | | 1.50 (0.84) | 1.67 (0.82) | 0.17 (0.41) | |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses.
* p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value <0.01
1. The higher value indicate more rights.

### *Number of women free of abuse/domestic violence*

Being free of domestic violence means that the respondents have experienced violence in the past but they are not being abused anymore. Of course, the psychological impact of the abuse may affect the respondents longer.

The hypothesis in the Theory of Change is that legal assistance and the psychological counselling empower the clients of Rifka Annisa to take action towards breaking the cycle of violence. This can happen through legal action/divorce, but also women who are aware of their rights may be less likely to be submissive to abuse. Therefore, we expect that due to the services of Rifka Annisa the exposure of

respondents to abuse will decrease. However, there are also other reasons that result in a reduction in the number of respondents reporting experiences of abuse. A qualitative analysis of the interviews is needed to disentangle the determinants of change.

Table 9 reports the exposure of respondents to GBV for the 3 or 12 months period prior to the baseline (2012) and prior to the endline (2014) surveys. GBV is categorised into domestic violence and abuse by others. Domestic violence is further categorised into psychological, physical and sexual abuse. Abuse by others is categorised into physical and sexual abuse.[27] Since there are women who experience more than one type of abuse, the mean number of types of abuse by the husband or partner is provided in the table together with the change in this indicator between the indicated periods.

The results in Table 9 show that, at baseline, half of the 18 respondents were still experiencing psychological (9) and sexual (1) violence from their (ex-)husband/partner within the past 3 months. This number is quite high given that 12 respondents at the endline were already divorced or separated, and they have started counselling at Rifka Annisa more than 6 months ago in almost all cases (17). At some point in their married life, 15 respondents experienced some type of domestic abuse, from which psychological abuse was experienced by 14 respondents, physical abuse by 12 and sexual abuse by 10, while 8 respondents were subjected to all three forms of abuses at one point in their married life (Table 22 in Annex III). These unforgettable and bitter experiences of physical and sexual violence prior to the baseline 'forced' women to seek help and protection, as one of the respondents confessed *"I'm trying not to tell anyone about his abusive behaviour, but it's too painful to hold* by myself".

During the evaluation period, 12 respondents reported to have experienced some form of domestic abuse. All of these respondents confessed that they were psychologically abused, but 5 of them were also physically and 2 of them sexually abused (Table 22). Based on this table, 4 women became free of domestic violence; while an additional 5 women became free of physical or sexual abuse but not of psychological abuse. Unfortunately, the situation did not improve for 4 women and actually deteriorated for 2 women who experienced multiple types of abuse during the evaluation period.

At the time of the endline study, the situation seemed somewhat better: while 5 respondents were still experiencing psychological abuse, and two of them also reported sexual abuse during the past 3 months, 13 of the 18 respondents were free of domestic violence compared to only 9 at the baseline.

Regarding the forms of psychological abuse, they can take the form of word, SMS or public embarrassment. For example, one of the respondents mentioned that her husband *"sent me SMS regarding properties in the house*", and she also added that her husband "*forced me to have sexual intercourse but I always refuse by saying that I'm tired*".

[27] Please note that if the respondent has a new partner at the endline, the domestic violence indicators are reported for the new partner. In this case, abuse by the ex-husband should be reported in the abuse by others section of the table. In the discussion of the tables on abuse by others, it should be indicated who were the perpetrators of the abuse.

**Table 9: Exposure to abuse**

| Sample | Total sample | | | | Used Rifka Annisa since baseline | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Period | 2012 | 2014 | 2014-2012 | | 2012 | 2014 | 2014-2012 | |
| Sample size | 18 | 18 | 18 | | 6 | 6 | 6 | |
| Abused by husband/ partner in past 3 months | | | Increased | Decreased | | | Increased | Decreased |
| - *Any abuse* | 9 | 5 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| - *Psychological* | 9 | 5 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| - *Physical* | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| - *Sexual* | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Nr. of types of abuse by husband/partner in past 3 months | 0.56 (0.62) | 0.39 (0.70) | -0.17 (0.51) | | 0.50 (0.55) | 0.17 (0.41) | -0.33 (0.52) | |
| Abused by others before baseline (2012) or in past 12 months (2014) | | | Increased | Decreased | | | Increased | Decreased |
| - *Any abuse* | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| - *Physical abuse* | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| - *Sexual abuse* | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Nr. of types of abuse by others before baseline (2012) or in past 12 months (2014) | 0.17 (0.51) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.17 (0.51) | | 0.50 (0.84) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.50 (0.84) | |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. * p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value <0.01

Reporting on domestic abuse assumes that women are always aware that they are being abused by their husband. However, the first step to break the cycle of domestic abuse is the realisation that one is being abused. Therefore, it is of interest to report on how the respondents were being treated by their husband/partner. Six abusive traits[28] and four supportive traits are reported in Table 23, where the number of respondents who reported a certain trait about their husband is reported.

In Table 10 the domestic life of the respondents is summarized by the mean number of negative (out of 6) and positive (out of 4) traits.[29] The results in the table indicate that the number of negative traits of their (ex-)husband, such as ignoring and distrusting, significantly decreased during the evaluation period (by -2.3 traits out of 7). This is the result of the divorce, as it increases the autonomy of the respondents.

[28] The last negative question was taken out of the indicator.
[29] Please note that at the endline survey the questions were asked for respondents that keep in touch at least once per month with their (ex)husband, and if the respondent has a new partner the questions refer to the new partner.

Some of the respondents confessed an improvement in their relation to their (formerly) abusive (ex)husband after the divorce (3) or in the marriage (1). For a positive example, he pays attention showing that he still cares about the respondent, as one respondent confessed: *"my husband buy me a new car, he still give money for monthly necessities, accompany my children to the doctor, and never angry with me."* However, overall, we only observe a small insignificant increase in the number of positive traits (ex)husbands show towards the respondents.

**Table 10: Relationship with current/last husband/partner**

| Sample | Total sample | | | Used Rifka Annisa since baseline | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Period | 2012 | 2014 | 2014-2012 | 2012 | 2014 | 2014-2012 |
| Sample size | 18 | 9 | 9 | 6 | 3 | 3 |
| Nr. of negative traits (0-7) | 3.94 | 1.88 | -2.25*** | 4.17 | 2.50 | -2.50 |
| | (2.04) | (2.10) | (1.67) | (1.94) | (2.12) | (0.71) |
| | | [n=8] | [n=8] | | [n=2] | [n=2] |
| Nr. of positive traits (0-4) | 1.17 | 1.67 | 0.33 | 1.33 | 1.33 | -1.00 |
| | (1.25) | (1.73) | (2.00) | (1.75) | (2.31) | (1.73) |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses.
* p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value <0.01

### *Psychological and physical health of women*

Table 11 reports on the psychological health of women measured with the psychological distress index based on the GHQ-12. The psychological distress index is composed of three sub-indices: social dysfunction, anxiety and lack of confidence in oneself. The more psychological distress a woman had experienced in the past one month, the more components of an index were applicable to a woman, and hence, the higher the value of an index. The outcomes of the components included in the indices are provided in Table 24.

The data show that most respondents experience anxiety (2.2 out of 4) and loss of confidence (0.72 out of 2) and that these problems have not improved much during the evaluation period. In particular, at the endline 14 respondents still indicate that they have trouble overcoming emotional problems, which is likely to be a lingering effect of the abuse endured. One of the respondents described that "*sometimes I can't hold back my feelings, my husband accused me of cheating on him."* Another respondent confessed that she sometimes cries when she remembers her husband's terrible treatment of her. As a woman, she tried to be strong although she has suffered a lot. She sometimes hides her feelings and even forgives her husband. As stated by one of respondent *"I felt sorry for my children's father (ex-husband)".*

In addition, 11 reported that they feel constantly under strain and 9 lost much sleep over worry during the past month despite reporting feeling relieved after the divorce procedure is over. However, respondents are now the sole responsible for providing for themselves and their (young) children, which certainly increases their burden. One of the respondents confessed that *"my children are still young and I can't leave them, so I stopped working"*, hence this respondent struggles to provide for her family.

At the same time, we also observe some improvement in these indices. The number of respondents who felt depressed and did not feel reasonably happy in general reduced by 4 from 10 and 7 at the baseline, respectively.

However, respondents are generally able to enjoy their life and carry out their daily activities without significant obstacles (social dysfunction 0.6 out of 6 at endline), and we also observe a significant improvement (-0.5) in the social dysfunction indicator during the evaluation period, which is mainly explained by the decrease in the index for women who were divorced at the baseline (Table 44 in Annex VI).

All respondents confessed that they 'played a useful part in things,' as they have an important role in many aspects of life, such as taking care of the children, working to provide for the children and taking care of household chores. As stated by one of the respondents who wanted her children to be successful persons "*I have to work so that I can provide them with high level of education*". Most respondents confessed that their children are the main motivation for them to look positively into the future, as one respondents stated "*I would not be overshadowed by the past anymore, I want to take care of the children in order they have a bright future.*"

**Table 11: Indices of psychological distress**

| Sample | Total sample | | | Used Rifka Annisa since baseline | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Period | 2012 | 2014 | 2014-2012 | 2012 | 2014 | 2014-2012 |
| Sample size | 18 | 18 | 18 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| Psychological distress (0-12) | 3.94 | 3.28 | -0.67 | 3.67 | 3.67 | 0.00 |
| | (2.01) | (2.32) | (2.09) | (1.97) | (2.58) | (1.67) |
| *Social dysfunction (0-6)* | 1.11 | 0.61 | -0.50* | 0.83 | 0.67 | -0.17 |
| | (1.02) | (0.92) | (1.10) | (0.75) | (0.82) | (0.75) |
| *Anxiety (0-4)* | 2.22 | 2.17 | -0.06 | 2.33 | 2.33 | 0.00 |
| | (1.06) | (1.47) | (1.11) | (1.03) | (1.51) | (0.89) |
| *Loss of confidence (0-2)* | 0.83 | 0.72 | -0.11 | 0.83 | 1.00 | 0.17 |
| | (0.86) | (0.75) | (0.90) | (0.98) | (0.89) | (0.75) |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses.
* p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value <0.01

Compared to the small improvements observed in the indices on psychological distress, the physical symptoms reported in Table 12 seem to suggest that the respondents' health is not all that well. However, not all physical symptoms may be related to the distress caused by (past) experiences marital abuse. For example, tiredness may arise from working long hours, and 'uncomfortable feelings in the stomach' may be due to the menstrual cycle.

Nonetheless, 7 (8) women suffered from feeling nervous, tense and worried. In addition, the number of women who cried more than usual and who have bad appetite has increased for 3 respondents (from 2 and 4 before the baseline, respectively, to 5 and 7 at the endline). Most of these negative developments (2 out of 3) are observed among women who have used the services of Rifka Annisa after the baseline,

indicating that they are freshly divorced and are still struggling with the after-effects of the divorce, which may have put additional pressures on them as breadwinners.

**Table 12: Components of physical health**

| Sample | Total sample | | Used Rifka Annisa since baseline | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Period | 2012 | 2014 | 2012 | 2014 |
| Sample size | 18 | 18 | 6 | 6 |
| Often had headaches | 11 | 11 | 4 | 4 |
| Poor appetite | 4 | 7 | 2 | 4 |
| Easily frightened | 6 | 5 | 3 | 2 |
| Hands were shaking | 4 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| Felt nervous, tense or worried | 7 | 8 | 3 | 3 |
| Cried more than usual | 2 | 5 | 1 | 3 |
| Felt tired all the time | 10 | 10 | 4 | 4 |
| Had uncomfortable feelings in stomach | 12 | 12 | 2 | 4 |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

# 8. Evaluation question 2: Attribution of changes

This subsection discusses evaluation question 2: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?

## 8.1. Methodology

The evaluation of the Rifka Annisa project relies on a before-after comparison methodology. This means that we interviewed respondents at certain periods and evaluate how their situation changes over time. The difficulty of this approach is that we cannot be sure whether these changes occurred as a consequence of the project or due to other factors. Therefore, we have to use a Theory of Change (ToC) for the project and investigate whether the changes can be explained by this ToC or by alternative pathways. Qualitative analysis helps to disentangle the pathways.

The ToC or result chain for the Rifka Annisa project was discussed in detail in section 3.3. Here, we summarize the ToC for the counselling and legal assistance services of Rifka Annisa. It is hypothesised that providing psychological counselling and legal assistance will empower marginalised women by providing information about their rights. This will improve their psychological health condition and enables them to change their behaviour. In addition, it might enable abused women to take legal action against their abusers (in this case their husband), and break the cycle of abuse (by a divorce). All clients of Rifka Annisa are also invited to join a support group, where survivors of abuse come together for

learning and supporting cases of other abused women. This empowers women to become survivors of gender-based and/or domestic violence.

Hence, the outcome indicators of the project are related to women being free from abuse, female empowerment, psychological well-being (psychological health) and the behaviour of abused women. However, it is important to keep in mind that a number of alternative pathways or ToCs could also lead to improvement in these outcomes. For example,

- Women may have sought help elsewhere. If the client already knew about her right to divorce her husband and got divorced with a help of a lawyer, the change in the outcome indicators is not driven by the services of Rifka Annisa
- She may have moved out of the house of her husband and she is not interacting with the husband anymore.
- Change in the outcome indicator on psychological well-being and empowerment can be originated in other aspects of the women's life than her relationship to her (last) husband. For example, she may have better living or working conditions; or she might suffer from the loss of a close family member.
- Change in the outcome indicator on psychological well-being and empowerment can also be explained by time. If she is not abused anymore, her psychological condition might improve due to new life experiences.

There are numerous other possible explanations for the change in the outcome indicators. In order to find out what share of the change in the outcome indicators can be attributed to the proposed ToC or Rifka Annisa's services, at the end of the follow-up interview with the respondents, we allowed for open-ended discussion regarding the factors that influenced their lives since the baseline interview.[30] The following section summarizes our findings.

## 8.2. Results

In order to address the attribution of changes to different factors, we first discuss the most important changes in the lives of the respondents categorised by marital status, children and employment, which constitute the majority of the most important life events. Then we turn to discussing the sources of help respondents turned to during their difficult times. These are categorized by social network and governmental and non-governmental institution. We also discuss Rifka Annisa's role separately. In turn, we look at factors affecting the lives of respondents after the divorce, and the overall changes in their lives. We conclude this section by providing an ex-post Theory of Change based on the findings.

[30] The qualitative discussion focused on the following groups of questions: 1. Do you think you have changed since last interview? How? What are the sources/causes that made you change?; 2. We have discussed a lot of things. What were the most important sources of help for you to overcome the abuse in your marriage? Who helped you the most? And in what way? (These could be psychological, legal, economic, social etc. aspects or just time); 3. ONLY IF DIVORCED: How did your situation change after the divorce? (Emotional, family, social, economic aspects. The developments could both be positive or negative.) Why? Did you change? In what ways?

### *Life events*

Every couple and individual experiences ups and downs in their relationships and changes in their life. As expressed by one respondent *"life is like a roller coaster, today we may be on the bottom and tomorrow may be on the top of the wheel."* Table 25 in Annex IV summarizes these ups and downs in life events that happened to the respondents since the baseline interview. The table shows that most of the changes in the lives of respondents are centred around family life and children (11 positive, 2 negative), employment (10 positive, 3 negative) and their (marital) relationships (6 positive, 5 negative). While most changes in family life and employment are positive, the picture is less clear for marital relationships.

The positive reported changes are for example better relationships with ex-husband/ex-husband's (4) and children have accepted the condition (2). However, for most respondents, first their job improved, which enabled respondents to fulfil their own daily needs, as well as to develop their businesses (2). Meanwhile, the negative changes experienced by respondents were in the sickness suffered by respondents and the family (5). The negative changes level is high on the relationship between respondent and husband which cannot be fixed and also in process of divorce.

The negative as well as positive changes that respondents had were influenced by several factors. Respondents who have experienced domestic violence were trying to get out of the abusive situation. They were brave to make decisions in their life, including to divorce. They just hoped to have positive changes in their life after becoming free from abuse.

In the following these life events are discussed in more detail.

#### Marital status

Therefore, in Table 26 we take a closer look at the changes in marital status. Two women who used the services of Rifka Annisa after the baseline got divorced during the evaluation period, while 2 other women got remarried. One of respondent described her new husband as *"my current husband is more patient, understanding, and love my two children"*, meanwhile the other respondent confessed that "*I got married because there was a man who wanted to help my economic condition*."

At the endline, only 3 women were still married to their (formerly) abusive husbands, while one women became a widow.

#### Children

Table 27 reports on the housing situation of the women. At the baseline, all women lived with their children, and 3 women lived also with her husband. At the endline, one women was living away from her children, while 4 women lived with both her children and husband.

Children can be one of the agents of change on the lifestyle and social structure. As described by one of respondent *"I have to fight for my children although I have to work hard",* another respondent stated that *"I want to be with my children until they can finally live on their own."* Children can be great companions, as described by respondent "*I live with my children and they can cheer me up whenever I*

*feel sad*". Respondents who are still living in the house with their husband and children indicate that they are trying to maintain their marital status and trying to fix the relationship.

However, some respondents expressed that their children have suffered from the husband's abusive behaviour towards the respondents (3), as one respondent described that her two children are imitating the abusive behaviour of their father: they like to scream and snap, and even dare to hit.

**Employment**

Table 25 reports 10 positive and 3 negative changes in job. Table 28 shows that of the 17 respondents who were employed at the baseline, 6 (33% of total sample) changed their jobs. Most women got a better position, with only one woman reporting a worse employment condition. Half of the women who changed their jobs (3) are among respondents who returned to Rifka Annisa during the evaluation period, which indicates that there has been more change in the lives of these respondents with 50% of them changing their job, and one respondent ending in a worse job.

As described by one respondent who experienced a positive change in her occupation "*the online business is running smoothly and I have many customers. Now I have my own activity and it is fun and I gain a lot of profit*." The situation is different for respondents who still have to take care of their children themselves, which has a negative impact on their jobs. As stated by one respondent "*Since the father has gone, the children had no one to take care of them, the first child has started the kindergarten and they need to be monitored, we can't leave them as we like."*

### *Sources of help*

**Social network**

Many respondents have more a stable emotional condition thanks to the help of their friends and family (Table 29). Respondents realized that they need friends to count on in order to overcome their marital problems (15). Friends became a useful source of help because many respondents found that they feel comfortable the most when talking about their bad experiences. They can keep the respondent's secret well and they can reveal whatever the respondent feels concerning the domestic violence she is experiencing. One respondent expressed that "*friends can entertain and give advice when I'm sad and confused*". Friends are seen as the first place to ask for help when hard times hit.

Another source of help is family, like parents and siblings. They can provide not only a shoulder to cry on but also financial assistance (6) and help in taking care of the children (6) in order to get through the hard times.

The support and motivation they received from family and friends encouraged respondents as well as empowered them to attain their freedom.

**Governmental and non-governmental organisations**

Table 30 reports on the organisations where the respondents sought help regarding the abuse they experienced. The police is the first organisation to report if respondents experience physical abuse or threats from her husband or partner. 6 respondents reported her husband to the police before the

baseline survey and 3 of them sought help at a hospital or health centre. A respondent said that *"my husband threats that he will hurt me, so I run to the police station to seek for help. I filed a report and then they summoned my husband. He received conditional sentence"*. Another respondent stated *"he accused me for having an affair and forced me to admit it, but I never did that. I went to file a report in a police station where he works"*.

Apart from that, community leaders rank the second (5 women reported her situation there before the baseline). Community leaders such as the Neighbourhood Association (*RT*) and Community Association (*RW*) have an essential role in the community. But they can only act as a mediator if marital dispute occurs.

During the evaluation period, we observe a decrease in the number of respondents reporting to officials such as police, community leaders, hospitals and religious leaders, which indicates that most respondents' situation improved during the evaluation period, while at least one respondent's condition worsened.

**Rifka Annisa**

Table 31 and Table 32 show that Rifka Annisa provided assistance during the trial in the court for divorce in 6 cases, from which 4 were finalized during the evaluation period. Rifka Annisa helped respondents in the preparation for the court trial (for example, in gathering the necessary documents). However, none of the respondents received assistance from Rifka Annisa in their mediation process with their spouse despite 8 of them having been involved in mediation.

In total, 13 women have been involved in litigation, from which 4 of them handled the case without additional support, 6 received assistance from Rifka Annisa and 3 of them received help from other organisations. Hence, most respondents who sought assistance for litigation actually used the help of Rifka Annisa and only 33% turned to other sources of help.

Interestingly, Rifka Annisa's support is most often mentioned in relation to assistance in the divorce process, and very few respondents explicitly mention the importance of the counselling sessions. One exception is the respondent, who reported that even though the divorce is finished she still wanted to continue with the counselling. In fact, she has also joined the support group during the evaluation period and visited regularly along with one other respondent.

Two other respondents dropped out of the support group due to time and distance considerations, even though they found the sharing of experiences helpful. However, one respondent left the support group because remembering her past only makes her cry and she is not able to forget. The other respondents (13) did not know about the support group.

### *Changes after divorce*

After the divorce, many respondents feel "*relieve", "no more pressure", "less psychological burden*". Although they are no longer burdened with psychological stress, they have to face another burden which is to fulfil their daily needs for the children. Besides that, they have to face the negative view in the community of being divorced.

Each era has its own culture and value which are influenced by characteristics of the origin community. Their culture and values often differ from other communities. Javanese patriarchal culture, for instance, views women without a husband negatively. They tend to have a negative attitude toward divorced women, who have a lower social status compared to divorced men. Some of the respondents expressed that they were negatively judged by community members, which translated into a psychological burden and resulted in insecurity in their life. As described by one respondent *"My neighbour often averts his/her face when I greets him/her. Once, I did that when my male friend sent me home".* Other divorced respondents think and act positively in their community, as described by another respondent *"I stay away from those who dislike me, I have to be careful with the men who approach me, I only work for my children."*

However, despite prejudices towards divorced women in the community, divorced women are able to find a new partner or husband as shown by the example of the two respondents who have remarried shortly after their divorce from their first husband.

Nonetheless, after the divorce, working becomes the norm for women to support their children. Respondents hardly received financial support from their husband/partner or ex-husband/partner. One respondent said "*He never give me spending money.*" No financial support and divorce do not make them give up. Respondents are working hard to provide for their children. Hence, the advice of one respondent is indeed to the point: "*women who got married should never stop working, just in case if anything bad happens they can handle it on their own."*

### *Overall changes*

In general, respondents needed some time to finally decide to get out of the abusive behaviour of their husband. This decision was often supported by friends and family. During the evaluation period, divorced respondents started to move on and start a new life. They got their spirit back and they are optimistic that their lives will change for the better not only in terms of their economic condition but also for their children's future.

Children are the most important factor for respondents to move on and get out of the abusive behaviour. As described by one of respondent "*I won't give up and be drowning in the past, because I have to take care of my children for their better future".* Another respondent described *"I can't regret everything, because all of them can be a valuable lesson for my life".*

Working has become the main activity for respondents because it is important to support the children in order to have better future. They would take any job in order to be able to fulfil their daily needs. As stated by one of respondent *"My child started to attend a school and I can't leave my child to work outside, so I'm running online business in order to help me earn money to give allowance money to my child. I also received help from my brother".*

### *Attribution*

Most respondents first confessed their marital problems to their friends after they could not endure anymore. Friends motivated and encouraged them to seek help. Support from family also played an important role in the resolution of respondents to divorce their husbands.

Friends and relatives were the most important sources to refer respondents to Rifka Annisa. Rifka Annisa provided psychological counselling to all respondents, and legal advice to most of them. From the 12 women who decided to divorce their husband, Rifka Annisa supported half in the litigation procedure. In fact, this is the most often mentioned impact of Rifka Annisa on the lives of the respondents. It is difficult to assess to what extent Rifka Annisa played a role in empowering respondents and taking the decision for the divorce.

Based on the respondents' testimonies, most changes in the outcome indicators (less dependency on husband, less exposure to abuse, better relationship with husband and improvements in the psychological well-being and social functioning of respondents) can be attributed to the fact that women divorced and broke free from their abuse husbands.

In addition, the data show that respondents' main motivation to look positively into the future is their children and to be able to provide for them. Most respondents confess that after the divorce they feel relieved, their mind is more at ease and they look positively towards the future due to their children.

Family support is also an important factor in realizing these changes. Respondents who have parents and siblings that can help them financially and by looking after the children managed to have a good grip on their lives after the divorce, and to find a better job or finish their studies; while some respondents who have no such support still struggle to make ends meet while staying at home with their young children.

However, all women are working hard to provide for their children, which also had an impact on their physical health. But women are also still struggling to manage their emotions especially related to the traumatic experiences in their marriage. In this respect, respondents found consolation in their friends and family, while some of them joined the support group of Rifka Annisa.

# 9. Evaluation question 3: Relevance of changes

This subsection will answer evaluation question 3: What is the relevance of these changes? In particular we look at the size of the impact, the representativeness of the sample, if the project addresses an important issue for the beneficiaries, and the satisfaction and self-reported impact of beneficiaries.

## 9.1. The size of the impact

We observe limited changes in the outcome variables. On the one hand, we could think that this is due to the fact that respondents have been actively seeking help to resolve their marital problems already for some time before the baseline survey (for example, empowerment). On the other hand, the results often show smaller effects for respondents who have been assisted by Rifka Annisa during the evaluation period, suggesting that it takes longer for respondents to recover (for example, psychological distress).

## 9.2. Representativeness of the sample

In the client survey, we find that only 3 of 35 clients with cases of domestic abuse who filled out the survey after the first counselling session between September and November 2013 have visited Rifka Annisa at least three times in a period covering more than three months (from September 2013 to February 2014). This suggests that the respondents analysed in this report are not necessarily representative of the clients of Rifka Annisa, as most respondents have visited Rifka Annisa multiple times. However, regarding the type of assistance respondents look for, the sample seems to be representative of Rifka Annisa's clients (compare Table 33 in Annex V and Table 46 in

Annex VII).

## 9.3. Does the project address an important issue for the beneficiaries?

The services of Rifka Annisa address a pressing problem of the beneficiaries, namely how to improve their marital situation when they cannot endure the abuse of their husband anymore. Respondents visit Rifka Annisa voluntarily, hence, their continued use of Rifka Annisa's services signals the value to the respondents (see section 6.1).

However, as section 1.1 regarding the project context and the literature overview in section 2 indicates, the existence of organisations that provide free counselling and legal aid services to victims of SGBV is essential for creating a society that is free of SGBV. They not only provide services but stand as proof for the rights of women, children and other marginalised groups. The more these organisations are known, for example through media coverage or through information from friends, police and health care providers, the more likely it is that abused women will break their silence and seek help to improve their situation either through mediation or divorce.

Of course, not only NGOs but also governmental organisations provide free services for victims of SGBV. However, the quality of services is often lower in governmental institutions due to lack of funding and counsellors are also more likely to advice women to be patient and go back to their husband, rather than providing counselling and support for abused women.

## 9.4. Satisfaction and self-reported impact of beneficiaries

An important indicator of the success of the services of Rifka Annisa is the satisfaction of clients. The valuation of the respondents is reported for the total sample, respondents who have visited Rifka Annisa only once, and those that have used the services of Rifka Annisa after the first visit (visited more than once) and the respondents who are members of the support group. These subcategories are selective since it is the respondent's decision whether to use the services of Rifka Annisa or not. It is expected that respondents who benefit more from the services would use them more extensively.

### *Reasons to seek help at Rifka Annisa*

The reasons for visiting Rifka Annisa for the first time are reported in Table 33 in Annex V. This information was gathered at the endline (2014). Respondents were also asked if they have received the kind of help they were looking for.

All respondents came to Rifka Annisa due to their marital problems. As described by one respondent "*I asked for help to Rifka Annisa because I couldn't take it anymore. I was so broken-hearted and I always come to Rifka Annisa whenever I feel down.*" Most respondents (16) were looking for psychological counselling. A respondent confessed that "*I feel calmer after I spill out all the feelings I have inside.*" However, most of them also sought legal assistance (11) during the divorce procedure, and one respondent wanted to claim rights over the property acquired jointly with her ex-husband. However, not all respondents finally used the assistance offered by Rifka Annisa. For example, one respondent noted that "*I visited Rifka Annisa only once, and my parents got the attorney for me.*" Nonetheless, most respondents (12) who visited Rifka Annisa generally received assistance as expected and have visited Rifka Annisa multiple times, while others were only partially satisfied with the assistance received.

### *Self-reported impact*

All respondents were asked how the services received at Rifka Annisa have changed them. The responses were given on a scale of 1 'Strongly disagree', 2 'Disagree', 3 'Undecided', 4 'Agree' and 5 'Strongly agree'. The number of respondents who answered 4 or 5 for the questions is reported in Table 35 and Table 36 in Annex V. Note that the information was collected at the endline (2014). The results are overly positive, and may represent the general change in the respondents' attitude rather than factors attributable to Rifka Annisa.

The satisfaction of the respondents with Rifka Annisa's services is reported in Table 13. The response categories range from 1 'not satisfied at all' to 5 'very satisfied'. The mean of the responses minus 3 is reported in the table along with the standard deviation. Due to the rescaling, dissatisfaction will have a negative sign and satisfaction will have a positive sign.

Respondents in general were satisfied with the services of Rifka Annisa. They were the most satisfied with the legal aid services and the support group at the baseline. Respondents who used the services of Rifka Annisa during the evaluation period were also positive but to a lesser extent.

**Table 13: Rifka Annisa services used and service satisfaction**

| Variable | Used services of Rifka Annisa before baseline | Service satisfaction | Used services of Rifka Annisa since baseline | Service satisfaction |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2012 | 2014 | 2014 |
| **Sample size** | 18 | - | 6 | - |
| Psychological counselling | 18 | 0.83<br>(0.86) | 4 | 0.75<br>(0.50) |
| Legal advice, information and/or consultation | 11 | 0.82<br>(0.87) | 3 | 1.00<br>(0.00) |
| Legal aid for civil law litigation | 3 | 1.67<br>(0.58) | 2 | 1.00<br>(0.00) |
| Support group | 2 | 1.50<br>(0.71) | 4 | 0.75<br>(0.50) |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Response range is from -2 to +2.

Finally, respondents were asked whether the services of Rifka Annisa made them feel more emotionally stable and less stressed. Respondents also generally agreed with this statement. However, less so at the endline, which is probably because other factors played a larger role in their lives.

**Table 14: Rifka Annisa services used and service satisfaction**

| Variable | Total sample | |
|---|---|---|
| Period | 2012 | 2014 |
| Sample size | 18 | 18 |
| Feel more emotionally stable and less stressed due to services of Rifka Annisa (scale from -2 to +2) | 1.00 (0.69) | 0.78 (0.43) |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses.

# 10. Evaluation question 4: Efficiency of project

This subsection addresses evaluation question 4: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organisations efficient?

Unfortunately, we are not able to evaluate neither the efficiency nor the effectiveness of the project. Therefore, in this section we put forward our arguments for failing to evaluate the question on efficiency. However, first, the available cost information for the Rifka Annisa project is discussed below.

## 10.1. Project costs

To collect information on the costs of the project, we conducted a structured interview with the programme manager and the financial coordinator[31] of Rifka Annisa on 10 December 2013 using the 'budget survey' as described in section 5.1. In addition, we consulted the 2011 and 2012 expenditure report of Rifka Annisa to Rutgers WPF. Hence, the cost figures are based on actual expenditure data.

As discussed in section 3, the project was terminated at the end of 2012 before the planned end date of the project because Rutgers WPF had decided to allocate funding from a different source for the project (but leaving the project objectives unchanged). This was possible because Rutgers WPF signs yearly contracts with its partners despite agreeing to a multi-annual commitment with the SPOs. Every year the projects are evaluated and new objectives are set for the following year.

Table 15 summarizes the costs of the Rifka Annisa project for 2011 and 2012. We have included information on 2011 for two reasons: firstly, funding in 2011 was already from MFS II funds; and secondly, the project costs can be compared between 2011 and 2012 to see whether the costs in 2012 were typical.

The second column of Table 15 reports the total expenditure of Rifka Annisa covered by all funding sources for the indicated year. The third column presents the funding from Rutgers WPF, for the given

[31] The interview was conducted with Rina Eko Widarsih, programme manager, and Siti Amaroh, financial coordinator.

period, in Indonesian rupiahs and the forth in euros. In turn, the fifth column shows the share of funding from the MFS II project to the total expenditure of Rifka Annisa. The sixth column reports on the number of beneficiaries in the given period. However, in the seventh column the cost per beneficiary is not reported, as it is not sensible to calculate this indicator using the available data as will be argued in the next section.

The table shows that less than 5% of the total expenditures of Rifka Annisa is funded by Rutgers WPF (MFS II).

**Table 15: Overview of the costs and number of beneficiaries**

| Year | Total costs of SPO [IDR][1] | Total costs funded by CFA [IDR] | Total costs funded by CFA [EUR, current prices][2] | Percentage of costs funded by CFA (through MFS II) | Number of beneficiaries[3] | Cost per beneficiary per year [Int$ 2011][4] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 3,706,776,254 | 162,599,985 | 13,258.32 | 4.4% | 347 | N.A. |
| 2012 | 6,389,176,000 | 143,800,000 | 11,896.88 | 2.3% | 270 | N.A. |

Sources: Expenditure report of Rifka Annisa to Rutgers WPF (if not stated otherwise).
Notes:
1. Source: Budget Survey 2013.
2. Annual average exchange rate is used. Data is obtained from http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/
3. Source: Annual Report of Rifka Annisa.
4. N.A. = not applicable

In addition, Table 16 investigates the composition of the project budget funded by Rutgers WPF. We observe that in 2011 33% of the Rutgers WPF budget was allocated to cover costs of counselling services (excluding an additional 9.2% spent on shelter facilities), and an additional 10.8% was allocated towards the development of counselling tools and paralegal training. Hence, a substantial part of the budget was allocated to covering the costs of counselling and improving the quality of counselling services, while the remaining funds were used for covering staff and office costs.

Compared to 2011, the structure of the Rutgers WPF budget changed in 2012: the funds allocated to covering the costs of counselling decreased to 15%, however, the amount dedicated to improving the quality of counselling services (database of cases, formulation of counselling manual and tools for quality services) increased to 44%. Hence, the focus of the project has shifted from supporting the costs of counselling to capacity building of Rifka Annisa in order to improve service quality.

**Table 16: Share of counselling and paralegal training in the project budget**

| Year | Provision for counselling of SGBV victims and perpetrators | | Counselling tool development for victims and perpetrators of SGBV | | Paralegal training [IDR] | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Int$ (2011)[1] | %[2] | Int$ (2011)[1] | %[2] | Int$ (2011)[1] | %[2] |
| 2011 | 14,873.09 | 33.0% | 3,382.72 | 7.5% | 1,508.36 | 3.3% |
| 2012 | 5,926.23 | 15.0% | 17,393.69 | 44.0% | - | 0.0% |

Source: Expenditure report of Rifka Annisa to Rutgers WPF

Notes:

1. PPP conversion factor to 2011 international dollars is calculated using the World Development Indicators: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#
2. Percent of total expenditure funded by Rutgers WPF.

However, we are unable to relate these expenditure components to the overall budget of Rifka Annisa because we lack information on the expenditure structure of the total expenditures of Rifka Annisa. Therefore, we also do not know the share of Rutgers WPF funding in the overall expenditures on these project items.

## 10.2. Assessment

There are a number of factors that complicate the calculation of cost per beneficiary. Firstly, the majority of costs of Rifka Annisa related to counselling of victims and perpetrators of SGBV are fixed – at least in the medium term (like staff costs). As a consequence, if in a given period more clients turn for support to Rifka Annisa, the cost per beneficiary decreases. However, as the nature of service provision, the number of clients (to some extent) is an external factor to Rifka Annisa. In addition, the availability of the counselling service is valuable in itself.

Secondly, a high number of beneficiaries may show a large turn-over of clients. In fact, the results of the Before-After survey showed us that the majority of the clients did not return to Rifka Annisa within the 6 months of the survey period. Hence, it would be more informative to look at the cost per counselling hour. However, unfortunately, we do not have information about the number of counselling hours at Rifka Annisa in a given year.[32]

Thirdly, we lack information about the total costs associated with counselling. We can only calculate the counselling cost per beneficiary funded by Rutgers WPF, which amounts to 42.86 Int$ in 2011 and 21.95 Int$ in 2012 at 2011 prices (taking only the provision for counselling services into account and excluding general office costs). However, this may not be the total amount spent on counselling.

[32] Assuming no idle time, it would be possible to calculate the cost per hour based on the wages to the counsellors and the costs associated with the space used for counselling and communication costs. However, we do not attempt to do such a calculation.

Fourthly, expenditure spent on improving the quality of counselling services is a capacity building of Rifka Annisa, from which future clients benefit. Therefore, it is difficult to take this item into account when calculating the costs per beneficiary.

Taking the above concerns into account, providing a reliable (and sensible) estimate of the cost per beneficiary for the Rifka Annisa project goes beyond the scope of this evaluation. Therefore, we refrain from going further in answering evaluation question 4 than the information on project costs provided in section 10.1.

## 11. Contribution of Capacity Development and Civil Society

The Rifka Annisa project has also been selected for the Capacity Development component of the MFS II Evaluation. Regarding the contribution of the capacity development of Rutgers WPF and One Vision Alliance to Rifka Annisa during the implementation of the project, MFS II funding was used to develop monitoring and evaluation tools of Rifka Annisa in 2012. As reported in the capacity development endline report, this contributed to a small improvement in Rifka Annisa's capacity to adapt and self-renew. During the evaluation period, several other factors contributed to improving Rifka Annisa's capability to act and commit and other capabilities. The most important internal factors are a more responsive leadership and greater motivation and skills of staff, while an important external factor is the stronger partnership with local authorities.

However, these developments did not affect the MDG evaluation, as the surveyed project beneficiaries have mostly used the services of Rifka Annisa prior to the evaluation period. In addition, during the before-after client surveys (Sept 2013 – February 2014) we found that the monitoring and evaluation tools of Rifka Annisa were not yet always working sufficiently.[33]

## 12. Conclusion

Rifka Annisa provides counselling and legal aid services to victims of SGBV. Despite finding limited measureable impact for the project, the lives of the respondents have improved as they feel free and relieved from their abusive husband after the divorce. Only three of the respondents try to normalize their lives with their husband.

Many respondents find support in their family and friends. However, their main motivation to remain positive is due to the fact that they want to provide a bright future for the children. Respondents with small children and without additional family support to take care of the children find it hard to manage to work and take care of the children at the same time. One respondent found a solution by starting an online business. However, more women would benefit from trainings on entrepreneurship and economic activities that they can do from home (an example would be the *kanzashi* brooches made by beneficiaries of the GREEN project (E5 in this evaluation)).

In addition, when asking respondents why they stopped visiting Rifka Annisa, many respondents indicated that they did not have the time and Rifka Annisa was far away from their home. There was

[33] Counsellors often forgot to administer the survey with the clients.

only one respondent that wanted to attend counselling after the divorced was finalized. Many respondents (13) were also not aware of the support group. Given the busy schedule of the respondents and the fact that many of them still struggle to overcome the emotional burden of the experiences of abuse, we encourage Rifka Annisa to develop and extend counselling tools that can be used remotely, such as counselling by phone, message based counselling (SMS or chat) and booklets.

The reviewed literature showed that counselling and support group activities can help to emotionally strengthen survivors and improve a number of skills and characteristics, like self-esteem, assertiveness and coping abilities. As opposed to the literature, most of the observed impact for Rifka Annisa was attributed to a woman's divorce instead of Rifka Annisa's counselling or support group activities. However, the reported findings for Rifka Annisa are difficult to compare with the findings in the literature review since these are based on women who joined the activities, while in our study only 6 out of 18 respondents had contact with Rifka Annisa during the study period and only 4 women joined the support group activities. In addition, the literature is not conclusive on whether counselling and support group activities actually result in changing the abusive situation; for Rifka Annisa we observe a decrease in exposure to abuse, but again this impact is attributed mostly to divorce.

Finally, the MFS synthesis team asked to score each project along a few indicators. Table 17 displays the indicators and the scores we deemed valid for the project.

**Table 17: Overall project scoring**

| Statement | Score | Remarks |
|---|---|---|
| **1. The project was well designed** | 8 | Rifka Annisa has a complex and well-designed strategy to achieve its objectives. The funding from the CFA provides continuous support to implement activities of the SPO. |
| **2. The project was implemented as designed** | 8 | The project budget was used for the pre-specified activities. |
| **3. The project reached all its objectives** | 8 | Objectives were set as the number of served clients. These outcomes depend on the demand for services. Rifka Annisa assisted all clients that turned her for help. |
| **4. The observed results are attributable to the project interventions** | 4 | Other factors such as family, friends and work play a more important role in the outcomes. However, this is not the shortcoming of Rifka Annisa's activities but the nature of the service. |
| **5. The observed results are relevant to the project beneficiaries** | 10 | Women want to be free of abuse. |
| **6. The project was implemented in the most efficient way** | N.A. | We did not evaluate efficiency of the project due to reasons mentioned in section 10.2. |

Notes: Scores are on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being "no agreement at all" and 10 being "completely agree with statement".

N.A.=not applicable

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Documents of Rifka Annisa:

- Annual Report 2011
- Annual Report 2012
- Expenditure Report to Rutgers WPF 2011
- Expenditure Report to Rutgers WPF 2012

# Annex I. SPO and project description

Rifka Annisa, meaning "Friends of Women", was founded in 1993 and is based in Yogyakarta. Rifka Annisa was initiated by Suwarni Angesti Rahayu, Sri Kusyuniati, Latifah Iskandar, Desti Murdijana and Sitoresmi Prabuningrat. Initially Rifka Annisa operated solely as a crisis and counselling centre. [34] In 1995, Rifka Annisa started to broaden her activities and increasing their influence in the community by for example writing for a column in a local newspaper. Rifka Annisa also developed the unique perspective that man should be included in their programmes, which was very uncommon practice at that time in Indonesia. In 1997, to decrease the gap between government institution and NGOs working in the field of SGBV, Rifka Annisa started to collaborate with regional police (women's and children protection division) and hospitals (victim services). The collaboration aimed to detect earlier and provide adequate services on different levels (medical care, legal aid and counselling). In the same year, Rifka Annisa developed a family approach for their counselling services whereby the husband and possibly the children are included in the counselling sessions. In the following years, Rifka Annisa continued to develop their network with community and governmental organisations which leads to the implementation of an integrated service mechanism for female victims of SGBV by the local government in the Yogyakarta region in 2005. Because of their effective programmes and community influence it becomes easier for Rifka Annisa to attract funds and thus the organisation and their activities can expand.

**Vision:**
The vision of Rifka Annisa is "to realise a gender just society that does not tolerate violence against women through the principles of social justice, consciousness and awareness, independence, integrity and preserve local wisdom."

**Mission:**
The mission of Rifka Annisa is "to organise women in particular and society in general to eliminate violence against women and creating gender equitable society through the empowerment of women victims of violence, including children, elderly, Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals, Transgender and other, and increase public awareness and involvement through education and strengthening critical network."

**Strategies:**
Rifka Annisa provides services to victims of GBV through (initiation of community-based) crisis centres, counselling to both victims and perpetrators (male groups) legal assistance and women support groups. In addition, Rifka Annisa aims to develop a strong network of health care providers, police and legal aid organisations and to improve the capacity of their partners by providing for example training programmes. At the same time Rifka Annisa is strongly advocating against violence and especially violence against women through the media (film production, photo exhibition etc.). They also aim to influence local government to implement gender responsive policies. [35]

[34] Rifka Annisa, (No year), Kenschets Rifka Annisa - Profil Lembaga Rifka Annisa
[35] Rifka Annisa, (No year), Kenschets Rifka Annisa - Profil Lembaga Rifka Annisa

# Annex II. Overview outcome indicators and indices

This annex provides a detailed description about the used outcome indicators. In addition, it shows the variables which were used to construct the outcome indicator indices.

Outcomes are reported for the total sample (n=18), for women who had used the services of Rifka Annisa since the baseline (n=6) and for women who were not divorced at the baseline (n=7). Panel A, B, C and D provide the outcomes for the baseline (2012) and the endline (2014) with the changes between the endline and the baseline. These changes show the absolute difference in the outcomes. The outcomes for the rights of wife index were only available for the baseline and the endline.

### *Women's empowerment (attitude towards themselves)*

The following indices are constructed with statements for which the women reported their level of agreement on a scale from -2 to +2, where -2 means 'strongly disagree', -1 means 'disagree', 0 means 'neither agree nor disagree', 1 means 'agree' and 2 means 'strongly agree'. The indices show the average level of agreement over the included statements. A higher value of the index shows more positive feelings. Sometimes agreement with a statement indicates negative feelings. Therefore, the scale for these statements were reversed, so that -2 means 'strongly agree' and +2 means 'strongly disagree'. That way, those statements can be used in the average. They are indicated by '(negative)'.

- *Self-efficacy index*: the following statements are included:
  - On the whole, I'm able to take charge of my life
  - I make commitments not to think of myself as worthless
- *Self-esteem index:* the following statements are included:
  - I feel I do not have much to be proud of (negative)
  - I take a positive attitude towards myself
  - I wish I could have more respect for myself (negative)
  - On the whole, I am satisfied with myself
- *Control index:* the following statement are included:
  - It is not always wise to plan far ahead because many things are a matter of good or bad fortune (negative)
  - Often I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me (negative)
- *Dependency:* level of agreement on a scale from -2 to +2 with 'my dependence on my partner makes me feel disappointed in myself' (negative)
- *Support:* level of agreement on a scale from -2 to +2 with 'I have someone who listens when I need to talk about my problems'

In addition, the Survivor Coping Index based on Bennett et al (2004) was measured at the endline. It consists of 8 questions that can be divided into sub-components:

- *Support*
  - I have someone I can turn to for helpful advice about my problem
  - I have someone who would help me in critical situation
- *Self-efficacy*
  - I trust my ability to solve difficult problems

- *Decision making*
    - I am confident about the decisions that I make
- *Control*
    - I feel like I'm in control of my own life
- *Coping skills*
    - I have ways to help myself when I feel troubled
    - I know the abuse was not my fault
    - I am able to talk about my thoughts and feelings about the assault/abuse

All the questions are phrased in a positive way, and the scoring goes from 1 'Never' to 5 'Always'. The responses to the questions should be added up and divided by 8. Then, the score for the Survivor Coping Index is in the range of (1-5).[36] The indicators and indices for the sub-components the average of the questions in reported for each group.[37] Hence, the scaling is from 1 to 5 in each case. The reporting format is the same as for the indices of psychological distress.

### *Empowerment in marriage*

- *Rights of wife index*: this index is constructed with 9 statements for which the women had to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed. If the statement indicates that the woman has little rights (indicated with '(negative)'), disagreement is given the value 1 and agreement the value 0. This is the other way around if the statement indicates many rights for the woman. The rights of wife index gives the mean number of statements per woman with which the women agreed. So, a higher value of the index indicates that the women think they have more rights. The following statements are included in the index:
    - A good wife obeys her husband even if she disagrees (negative)
    - A woman should be able to choose her own friends even if her husband disapproves
    - Family problems should only be discussed with people in the family (negative)
    - If a man mistreats his wife, others outside of the family should intervene
    - It is important for a man to show his wife who is the boss (negative)
    - A woman should be allowed to have a full or part-time job outside the household even if her husband disapproves
    - A husband has the right to know where his wife is at all times (negative)
    - After finishing her housework, a wife should be allowed to participate in social activities in the community
    - It's a wife's obligation to have sex with her husband even if she doesn't feel like it (negative)
- *Any good reason for a husband to hit his wife*: reports on the number of women who indicated that at least one of the following reasons authorizes the husband to hit his wife:
    - She goes out without telling him
    - She neglects the children
    - She argues with him
    - She burns the food

[36] In the USA Bennett et al (2004) finds a mean of 3.89 with standard deviation 0.75.
[37] The index for Support is divided by 2 and the index for Coping skills is divided by 3.

  - She disobeys him
  - She refuses to have sexual intercourse with him
- *Number of good reasons for a husband to hit his wife*: shows the mean number of the above mentioned reasons that the women agreed with
- *Any occasion a wife can refuse to have sex*: reports on the number of women who indicated that at least one of the following occasions authorizes the wife to refuse to have sex:
  - She feels sick or tired
  - If he slept with another woman
  - She doesn't want to have sex
- *Number of occasions a wife can refuse to have sex:* shows the mean number of the above mentioned occasions that the women agreed with.

### *Number of women free of domestic violence*

- Abused by husband/partner in the past 12 months
  - *Any abuse*: reports on the number of women who had experienced either physical, psychological or sexual abuse in the past 12 months
  - *Physical*: reports on the number of women who had experienced psychological abuse in the past 12 months
  - *Psychological*: reports on the number of women who had experienced physical abuse in the past 12 months
  - *Sexual*: reports on the number of women who had experienced sexual abuse in the past 12 months
- Number of types of abuse by husband/partner: shows the mean number of types of abuse (physical, psychological and sexual) by husband/partner per woman

### *Psychological health of women*

For these tables, the women had to indicate on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is not at all and 5 is all the time, how often they felt in the ways described in the tables in the past month. If the described feeling was positive, the woman experienced a negative feeling if she indicated 1 or 2. This was made into a dummy, where 1 indicates negative feelings if the woman indicated 1 or 2 and 0 indicates positive feelings if she indicated 3, 4 or 5. This was the other way around if the described feeling was negative. Then the dummy is 0 if the woman indicated 1 or 2 and 1 if she indicated 3, 4 or 5. This means that a higher value of the indicators shows more negative feelings. The questions that described a positive feeling, for which the scale has been reversed to let a higher value indicate a more negative feeling, are indicated below with '(positive)'.

- *Psychological distress index*: mean of the number of components per woman that were applicable to the women. This is on a scale from 0 to 12, since there are 12 components in this index. The more components applicable to a women, the more psychological distress she had experienced. It also is the sum of the social dysfunction index, the anxiety index and the losing confidence in yourself index.
- *Social dysfunction index*: it is the sum of the 6 components reported below the index, which shows the mean of the number of those components per woman that were applicable to the women. The method described above was applied to the following 6 components, which show the fraction (between 0 and 1) of the women who experienced this feeling:

  - Played a useful part in things (positive)
  - Able to concentrate in everything (positive)
  - Feeling capable of making decisions (positive)
  - Enjoying normal day-to-day activities (positive)
  - Able to face up emotional problems (positive)
  - Feeling reasonably happy in general (positive)
- *Anxiety index*: it is the sum of the 4 components reported below the index, which shows the mean of the number of those components per woman that were applicable to the women. The method described above was applied to the following 4 components, which show the fraction (between 0 and 1) of the women who experienced this feeling:
  - Lost much sleep over worry
  - Felt under strain
  - Could not overcome emotional problems
  - Thought of yourself as a worthless person
- *Losing confidence in yourself index*: it is the sum of the 2 components reported below the index, which shows the mean of the number of those components per woman that were applicable to the women. The method described above was applied to the following 2 components, which show the fraction (between 0 and 1) of the women who experienced this feeling:
  - Felt depressed
  - Losing confidence in yourself

# Annex III. Evaluation question 1 – tables

### *Women's empowerment/attitude towards themselves*

**Table 18: Components of the women's empowerment indices**

| Sample | Total sample | | Used Rifka Annisa since baseline | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Period | 2012 | 2014 | 2012 | 2014 |
| Sample size | 18 | 18 | 6 | 6 |
| *It is not always wise to plan far ahead because many things are a matter of good or bad fortune* | -0.83 | -0.67 | -1.17 | -0.33 |
| *On the whole, I'm able to take charge of my life* | 0.39 | 0.33 | 0.17 | 0.5 |
| *My dependence on my partner makes me feel disappointed in myself* | 0.22 | -0.53 [n=17] | 0.83 | -0.2 [n=5] |
| *I feel I do not have much to be proud of* | -1 | -0.67 | -0.83 | -0.33 |
| *I have someone who listens when I need to talk about my problems* | 1.28 | 1.17 | 1.5 | 0.83 |
| *I take a positive attitude towards myself* | 1.39 | 1.17 | 1.33 | 1.33 |
| *I wish I could have more respect for myself* | 1.67 | 1.22 | 1.67 | 1.17 |
| *I make commitments not to think of myself as worthless* | 1.61 | 1.11 | 1.83 | 1 |
| *Often I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me* | 0.44 | 0.22 | 0.33 | 0.67 |
| *On the whole, I am satisfied with myself* | 0.72 | 0.22 | 0.67 | 0.33 |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: response range is from -2 to +2.

**Table 19: Components of the Survivor Coping Index**

| | Total sample | Used Rifka Annisa since baseline |
|---|---|---|
| *How often were the following statements true for you in the past one month?* (scale from 1 to 5) | Mean | Mean |
| a. I have someone I can turn to for helpful advice about my problem | 3.2 | 3.3 |
| b. I have someone who would help me in a critical situation. | 3.2 | 2.8 |
| c. I trust my ability to solve difficult problems | 3.6 | 3.7 |
| d. I am confident about the decisions that I make | 3.4 | 3.2 |
| e. I feel like I'm in control of my own life | 3.7 | 3.8 |
| f. I have ways to help myself when I feel troubled | 3.6 | 3.3 |
| g. I know the abuse was not my fault | 3.5 | 3.5 |
| h. I am able to talk about my thoughts and feelings about the assault/abuse | 3.8 | 4.2 |
| **Support** (average a and b) | 3.2 | 3.1 |
| **Coping** (average f, g and h) | 3.6 | 3.7 |
| **Survivor Coping Index** (average a to h) | 3.5 | 3.5 |
| Sample | 18.0 | 6.0 |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

### *Attitude/empowerment in marriage*

**Table 20: Components of the rights of wife index**

| Group | Total Sample | | | Used Rifka Annisa since baseline | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Period | 2012 | 2014 | 2014-2012 | 2012 | 2014 | 2014-2012 |
| Fraction of sample that disagrees with […] | | | | | | |
| *A good wife obeys her husband even if she disagrees* | 0.67 (0.49) | 0.72 (0.46) | 0.06 (0.64) | 0.67 (0.52) | 0.50 (0.55) | -0.17 (0.98) |
| *A husband has the right to know where his wife is at all times* | 0.11 (0.32) | 0.17 (0.38) | 0.06 (0.42) | 0.50 (0.55) | 0.33 (0.52) | -0.17 (0.75) |
| *Family problems should only be discussed with people in the family* | 0.06 (0.24) | 0.11 (0.32) | 0.06 (0.24) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.17 (0.41) | 0.17 (0.41) |
| *It's a wife's obligation to have sex with her husband even if she doesn't feel like it* | 0.50 (0.51) | 0.56 (0.51) | 0.06 (0.64) | 0.50 (0.55) | 0.17 (0.41) | -0.33 (0.52) |
| *It is important for a man to show his wife who is the boss* | 0.94 (0.24) | 0.89 (0.32) | -0.06 (0.24) | 0.83 (0.41) | 0.83 (0.41) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Fraction of sample that agrees with […] | | | | | | |
| *A woman should be allowed to have a full or part-time job outside the household even if her husband disapproves* | 0.56 (0.51) | 0.61 (0.50) | 0.06 (0.42) | 0.50 (0.55) | 0.67 (0.52) | 0.17 (0.41) |
| *A woman should be able to choose her own friends even if her husband disapproves* | 0.44 (0.51) | 0.44 (0.51) | 0.00 (0.59) | 0.17 (0.41) | 0.33 (0.52) | 0.17 (0.41) |
| *If a man mistreats his wife, others outside of the family should intervene* | 0.28 (0.46) | 0.28 (0.46) | 0.00 (0.49) | 1.00 (0.00) | 1.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| *After finishing her housework, a wife should be allowed to participate in social activities in the community* | 1.00 (0.00) | 1.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.33 (0.52) | 0.67 (0.52) | 0.33 (0.82) |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. * p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01.

**Table 21: Reasons for hitting wife and occasions for refusing sex**

| | Total sample | | | | Used Rifka Annisa since baseline | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2012 | 2014 | Increase | Decrease | 2012 | 2014 | Increase | Decrease |
| Number of women that see […] as a good reason for a husband to hit his wife | | | | | | | | |
| She goes out without telling him | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| She neglects the children | 7 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 1 |
| She argues with him | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| She burns the food | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| She disobeys him | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| She refuses to have sexual intercourse with him | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Number of women that see […] as an occasion in which a wife can refuse sex | | | | | | | | |
| She feels sick or tired | 15 | 16 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 0 |
| If he slept with another woman | 14 | 17 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 0 |
| She doesn't want to have sex | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia<br>Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Standard errors are robust and corrected for clustering at the village level. * p-value<0.10; ** p-value<0.05; ***p-value <0.01. | | | | | | | | |

## *Number of women free of abuse/domestic violence*

**Table 22: Domestic violence: transition dynamics I (2012 and 2014)**

| Types of abuse | | EXPERIENCED … ABUSE SINCE BASELINE | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | No | PS | PH | S | PS&PH | PS&S | PH&S | All | **Total** |
| EVER EXPERIENCED … ABUSE BEFORE BASELINE | No abuse (No) | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| | Psychological (PS) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| | Physical (PH) | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| | Sexual (S) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | PS & PH | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| | PS & S | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| | PH & S | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | PS & PH & S (All) | 3 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 8 |
| | **Total** | 6 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 18 |

**Table 23: Components of relationship with current/last husband**

| Sample | Total sample | | | | Used Rifka Annisa since baseline | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Period | 2012 | 2014 | Decreased | Increased | 2012 | 2014 | Decreased | Increased |
| Sample size | 18 | 10 | 10 | | 6 | 3 | 3 | |
| Negative (abusive) | | | | | | | | |
| *Tries to keep you from seeing your friends* | 10 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| *Tries to restrict contact with your family of birth* | 7 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| *Insists on knowing where you are at all times* | 11 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| *Ignores you and treats you indifferently* | 13 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| *Gets angry if you speak with another man* | 9 | 3 [n=9] | 3 [n=9] | 0 [n=9] | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| *Is often suspicious that you are unfaithful* | 12 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| *Expects you to ask his permission before seeking health care for yourself* | 9 | 3 [n=9] | 2 [n=9] | 1 [n=9] | 3 | 0 [n=2] | 1 [n=2] | 0 [n=2] |
| Positive (supportive) | | | | | | | | |
| *Pays attention to you* | 5 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| *Takes good care of you and your children* | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| *Supports you when you need it* | 6 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| *Trusts you in most situations* | 6 | 5 [n=9] | 3 [n=9] | 0 [n=9] | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

## *Physical and psychological health indicators*

**Table 24: Components of psychological distress**

| Sample | | Total sample | | Used Rifka Annisa since baseline | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Period | | 2012 | 2014 | 2012 | 2014 |
| Sample size | | 18 | 18 | 6 | 6 |
| a. | Lost much sleep over worry | 10 | 9 | 3 | 3 |
| b. | Not played a useful part in things | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| c. | Felt under strain | 10 | 11 | 2 | 4 |
| d. | Not able to concentrate | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| e. | Not feeling capable of making decisions | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| f. | Not enjoying normal day-to-day activities | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| g. | Could not overcome emotional problems | 15 | 14 | 6 | 5 |
| h. | Thought of yourself as worthless person | 5 | 5 | 3 | 2 |
| i. | Felt depressed | 10 | 6 | 3 | 3 |
| j. | Not able to face up emotional problems | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| k. | Losing confidence in yourself | 5 | 7 | 2 | 3 |
| l. | Not feeling reasonable happy in general | 7 | 3 | 0 | 1 |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Statements b, d, e, f, h and l are modified to negative statements from their original positive phrasing during the interviews.

# Annex IV. Evaluation question 2 – tables on alternative pathways

**Table 25: Overview of life events since baseline**

| Sample | Total sample | Used Rifka Annisa since baseline |
|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2014 | 2014 |
| **Sample size** | 18 | 6 |
| Economy (Positive) | 5 | 1 |
| Economy (Negative) | 3 | 2 |
| Job (Positive) | 10 | 2 |
| Job (Negative) | 3 | 1 |
| Death | 1 | 1 |
| Illness | 5 | 3 |
| Better health | 0 | 0 |
| Marital Status /Relationship (Positive) | 6 | 2 |
| Marital Status/Relationship (negative) | 5 | 2 |
| Family Life (Positive) | 11 | 4 |
| Family Life (Negative) | 2 | 0 |
| Social life (Positive) | 2 | 1 |
| Social life(Negative) | 0 | 0 |
| Abuse (Negative) | 0 | 0 |
| Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | |

**Table 26: Marital status**

| Sample | Total sample | | Used Rifka Annisa since baseline | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2014 | 2012 | 2014 |
| **Sample size** | 18 | 18 | 6 | 6 |
| Marital status | | | | |
| - *Married* | 6 | 5 | 2 | 0 |
| - *Divorced* | 11 | 11 | 3 | 5 |
| - *Separated* | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| - *Has a new partner* | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| - *Widowed* | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | | | |

### Table 27: Housing situation

| Sample | Total sample | | Used Rifka Annisa since baseline | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2014 | 2012 | 2014 |
| **Sample size** | 18 | 18 | 6 | 6 |
| Has children | 18 | 18 | 6 | 6 |
| Living arrangement | | | | |
| Lives with children | 15 | 13 | 6 | 6 |
| Lives with husband | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Lives with husband & children | 3 | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| Live without husband & children (alone/with parents/relatives) | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Left home because of husband's behaviour in past 12 months | 7 | 2 [n=4] | 2 | 0 [n=4] |
| Moved since baseline | - | 4 | - | 1 |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

### Table 28: Changes in employment

| Sample | Total sample | | Used Rifka Annisa since baseline | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2014 | 2012 | 2014 |
| **Sample size** | 18 | 18 | 6 | 6 |
| Employed | 17 | 17 | 6 | 5 |
| Changed job since baseline | - | 6 | - | 3 |
| - *Has better job* | - | 5 | - | 2 |
| - *Same type of job* | - | 0 | - | 0 |
| - *Has worse job* | - | 1 | - | 1 |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

### Table 29: Reported abuse to social network

| Sample | Total sample | | Used Rifka Annisa since baseline | | Not divorced at baseline | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2014 | 2012 | 2014 | 2012 | 2014 |
| **Sample size** | 18 | 18 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 7 |
| Ever reported abuse to … | | | | | | |
| - *Friends* | 14 | 15 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 |
| - *Parents* | 11 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 3 |
| - *Brother/Sister* | 11 | 8 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 4 |
| - *Uncle/aunt* | 3 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| - *Family of the husband/partner* | 9 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 6 | 2 |
| - *Children* | 3 | 6 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| - *Neighbour* | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

### Table 30: Reported abuse to institutions

| Sample | Total sample | | Used Rifka Annisa since baseline | | Not divorced at baseline | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2014 | 2012 | 2014 | 2012 | 2014 |
| **Sample size** | 18 | 18 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 7 |
| Ever reported abuse to … | | | | | | |
| - *Police* | 6 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| - *Hospital /Health centre* | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| - *Women Crisis Centre* | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| - *Legal Institution* | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| - *Court* | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| - *Shelter* | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| - *Community leader* | 5 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| - *Women Organisation* | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| - *Religious leader* | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| - *Other persons* | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

### Table 31: Litigation and police

| Sample | Total sample | | Used Rifka Annisa since baseline | | Not divorced at baseline | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2014 | 2012 | 2014 | 2012 | 2014 |
| **Sample size** | 18 | 18 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 7 |
| Reported husband to police | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| - *Rifka Annisa assisted in reporting to police* | - | 0 | - | 0 | - | 0 |
| Litigation procedure on-going | - | 1 | - | 0 | - | 1 |
| - *Rifka Annisa assisted in litigation* | - | 6 [n=13] | - | 4 [n=6] | - | 1 [n=4] |
| Divorce | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| - *Rifka Annisa assisted in divorce* | - | 6 [n=12] | - | 4 [n=5] | - | 1 [n=3] |
| Mediation with husband | - | 8 | - | 3 | - | 6 |
| - *Rifka Annisa helped in mediation* | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

### Table 32: Other sources of assistance since baseline (2014)

| Sample | Reported to police | Legal procedure | Divorce |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2014 | 2014 | 2014 |
| **Sample size** | 1 | 13 | 12 |
| Received assistance from […] | | | |
| *No one* | 1 | 4 | 4 |
| *Rifka Annisa* | 0 | 6 | 6 |
| *Legal advice centre* | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| *Women's crisis centre* | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| *Women's organisation* | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| *Lawyer* | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| *Local apparatus* | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| *Other institution/person* | 0 | 2 | 1 |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

# Annex V. Evaluation question 3 – tables on self-reported impact

**Table 33: Reasons for first time visit to Rifka Annisa and satisfaction (2014)**

| Sample | Total sample | Visited Rifka Annisa once | Visited Rifka Annisa more times | Member of support group |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Sample size** | 18 | 2 | 16 | 4 |
| Reasons to contact Rifka Annisa | | | | |
| *Psychological counselling* | 16 | 2 | 14 | 4 |
| *Counselling on how to repair household/relationship with spouse* | 4 | 1 | 3 | 0 |
| *Information about divorce rights* | 4 | 0 | 4 | 1 |
| *Information about divorce law* | 5 | 0 | 5 | 1 |
| *Help with reporting case to the police* | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| *Help with court case/legal process* | 11 | 0 | 11 | 4 |
| *Look for safe place to stay* | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Received this kind of help | | | | |
| - *Yes* | 12 | 0 | 12 | 4 |
| - *Partially* | 6 | 2 | 4 | 0 |
| - *No* | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Husband knows about visit to Rifka Annisa | 2 [n=6] | 0 [n=0] | 2 [n=6] | 1 [n=4] |
| Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | | | |

**Table 34: Change since last interview in relationship with current/last husband/partner (2014)**

| Sample | Total sample | Visited Rifka Annisa once | Visited Rifka Annisa more times | Member of support group |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Sample size** | 18 | 2 | 16 | 4 |
| Relationship with husband/partner […] | | | | |
| - *Did not change* | 5 | 0 | 5 | 2 |
| - *Improved* | 5 | 1 | 4 | 0 |
| - *Worsened* | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| - *Don't talk/see anymore* | 6 | 1 | 5 | 2 |
| Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | | | |

**Table 35: Self-reported impact of services (2014)**

| Sample | Total sample | Visited Rifka Annisa once | Visited Rifka Annisa more times | Member of support group |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Sample size** | 18 | 2 | 16 | 4 |
| Number of respondents that agree with […] | | | | |
| *I became more comfortable asking for help* | 17 | 2 | 15 | 3 |
| *I became more confident and brave* | 16 | 2 | 14 | 3 |
| *I'm more able to make plans for the future* | 13 | 1 | 12 | 2 |
| *I'm more able to make decisions for myself* | 13 | 2 | 11 | 2 |
| *I feel more independent* | 16 | 2 | 14 | 3 |
| *I'm more able to speak up to my partner* | 9 | 1 | 8 | 3 |
| *I'm more able to control situation when commotion occurs* | 11 | 1 | 10 | 1 |
| *I have more resources to call upon* | 17 | 2 | 15 | 4 |
| *I'm better prepared to keep myself safe* | 17 | 2 | 15 | 4 |
| *I'm more hopeful about my future* | 17 | 2 | 15 | 3 |
| *I'm more able to control partner's temper* | 6 | 1 | 5 | 0 |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

**Table 36: Self-reported impact of counselling services (2014)**

| Sample | Total sample | Visited Rifka Annisa once | Visited Rifka Annisa more times | Member of support group |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Sample size** | 18 | 2 | 16 | 4 |
| Number of respondents that agree with […] | | | | |
| *With my counsellor(s), I was an active participant in setting goals* | 14 | 1 | 13 | 4 |
| *I have made progress towards my goals* | 15 | 1 | 14 | 4 |
| *Counsellor(s) helped me develop the skills I needed to be able to meet my goals* | 7 | 0 | 7 | 2 |
| *Counselling has given me new ways of looking at abuse* | 15 | 2 | 13 | 3 |
| *I have a better understanding about the effects that abuse has had on my life* | 15 | 1 | 14 | 4 |
| *I have a better understanding of the choices and resources available to me* | 15 | 1 | 14 | 3 |
| *Counsellor(s) listened respectfully and took me seriously* | 17 | 2 | 15 | 4 |
| *Counsellor(s) understood the impact the abuse had on me* | 18 | 2 | 16 | 4 |
| *Counsellor(s) let me know I am not alone* | 18 | 2 | 16 | 4 |
| *Counsellor(s) helped me develop a safety plan* | 8 | 1 | 7 | 2 |
| *Counsellor(s) explained that domestic violence is not only a personal problem, but also a social problem* | 12 | 2 | 10 | 2 |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

# Annex VI. Survey outcomes by marital status at baseline

## *Respondent characteristics*

**Table 37: General characteristics of the sample by marital status at baseline**

| Sample | Total sample | Not divorced at baseline | Divorced at baseline |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2012 | 2012 |
| **Sample size** | 18 | 7 | 11 |
| Age | 35.06 (7.94) | 39.43 (8.34) | 32.27 (6.60) |
| Number of children | 1.78 (0.73) | 1.86 (0.90) | 1.73 (0.65) |
| Religion | | | |
| *Islam* | 17 | 7 | 10 |
| *Protestant* | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Highest level of education of respondent | | | |
| *No/Islamic education* | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| *Primary education* | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| *Secondary education* | 8 | 3 | 5 |
| *Higher education* | 10 | 4 | 6 |
| Highest level of education of partner | | | |
| *No/Islamic education* | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| *Primary education* | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| *Secondary education* | 8 | 3 | 5 |
| *Higher education* | 9 | 3 | 6 |
| Employment status of respondent | | | |
| *Unemployed / Housewife* | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| *Work* | 17 | 6 | 11 |
| Employment status of (ex-)partner | | | |
| *Unemployed* | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| *Work* | 18 | 7 | 11 |
| Women has own income | 13 | 7 | 6 |
| Housing facilities index | 0.39 (0.37) | 0.51 (0.25) | 0.32 (0.42) |
| Asset index | 0.91 (0.65) | 1.04 (0.81) | 0.83 (0.56) |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses

### *Women's empowerment/attitude towards themselves*

**Table 38: Women's attitudes towards themselves (empowerment) by marital status**

| Sample | Not divorced at baseline | | | Divorced at baseline | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Period | 2012 | 2014 | 2014-2012 | 2012 | 2014 | 2014-2012 |
| Sample size | 7 | 7 | 7 | 11 | 11 | 11 |
| Self-efficacy | 1.21 | 0.79 | -0.43 | 0.86 | 0.68 | -0.18 |
| | (0.49) | (0.64) | (0.67) | (0.78) | (0.93) | (0.72) |
| Self-esteem | 0.50 | 0.18 | -0.32 | 0.27 | 0.23 | -0.05 |
| | (0.52) | (0.37) | (0.76) | (0.52) | (0.49) | (0.55) |
| Control | 0.50 | 0.14 | -0.36 | 0.00 | 0.27 | 0.27 |
| | (0.41) | (0.69) | (0.56) | (1.00) | (0.88) | (1.19) |
| Dependency | -0.43 | 0.14 | 0.57 | -0.09 | 0.80 | 1.10* |
| | (1.13) | (1.07) | (1.13) | (1.51) | (1.03) | (1.79) |
| | | | | | [n=10] | [n=10] |
| Support | 1.71 | 1.29 | -0.43* | 1.00 | 1.09 | 0.09 |
| | (0.49) | (0.49) | (0.53) | (1.10) | (0.83) | (1.38) |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Response range is from -2 to +2. Higher values indicate more desirable outcomes.
Standard deviations given in parentheses. * p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value <0.01

**Table 18: Components of the women's empowerment indices by marital status**

| Sample | Not divorced at baseline | | Divorced at baseline | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Period | 2012 | 2014 | 2012 | 2014 |
| Sample size | 7 | 7 | 11 | 11 |
| *It is not always wise to plan far ahead because many things are a matter of good or bad fortune* | -1.29 | -0.71 | -0.55 | -0.64 |
| *On the whole, I'm able to take charge of my life* | 0.71 | 0.43 | 0.18 | 0.27 |
| *My dependence on my partner makes me feel disappointed in myself* | 0.43 | -0.14 | 0.09 | -0.80 [n=10] |
| *I feel I do not have much to be proud of* | -1.29 | -0.43 | -0.82 | -0.82 |
| *I have someone who listens when I need to talk about my problems* | 1.71 | 1.29 | 1 | 1.09 |
| *I take a positive attitude towards myself* | 1.43 | 1.14 | 1.36 | 1.18 |
| *I wish I could have more respect for myself* | 1.86 | 1.29 | 1.55 | 1.18 |
| *I make commitments not to think of myself as worthless* | 1.71 | 1.14 | 1.55 | 1.09 |
| *Often I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me* | 0.29 | 0.43 | 0.55 | 0.09 |
| *On the whole, I am satisfied with myself* | 1.14 | 0.43 | 0.45 | 0.09 |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: response range is from -2 to +2.

**Table 39: Survivor Coping Index by marital status at endline**

| Sample | Not divorced at baseline | Divorced at baseline |
|---|---|---|
| Period | 2014 | 2014 |
| Sample size | 7 | 11 |
| Survivor Coping Index (1-5) | 3.55<br>(0.76) | 3.45<br>(0.40) |
| Support (1-5) | 3.43<br>(0.61) | 3.00<br>(1.12) |
| Self-efficacy (1-5) | 3.43<br>(1.13) | 3.73<br>(1.01) |
| Decision making (1-5) | 3.29<br>(0.95) | 3.45<br>(0.69) |
| Control (1-5) | 3.86<br>(1.07) | 3.64<br>(0.81) |
| Coping skills (1-5) | 3.67<br>(0.77) | 3.61<br>(0.53) |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses.

## *Attitude/empowerment in marriage*

**Table 40: Empowerment in marriage by marital status**

| Sample | Not divorced at baseline | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Period | 2012 | 2014 | 2014-2012 | |
| Sample size | 7 | 7 | 7 | |
| Rights of wife index (0-9)[1] | 5.71<br>(1.70) | 5.71<br>(1.80) | 0.00<br>(0.58) | |
| Any good reason for a husband to hit his wife | | | Increased | Decreased |
| | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Nr. of good reasons for a husband to hit his wife (0-6) | 0.57<br>(1.13) | 0.86<br>(1.86) | 0.29<br>(0.95) | |
| Any occasion a wife can refuse to have sex | | | Increased | Decreased |
| | 7 | 7 | 0 | 0 |
| Nr. of occasions a wife can refuse to have sex (0-3) | 2.00<br>(0.58) | 2.00<br>(0.00) | 0.00<br>(0.58) | |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses.
* p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value <0.01
1. The higher value indicate more rights.

### *Number of women free of abuse/domestic violence*

**Table 41: Exposure to abuse (not divorced at baseline)**

| Sample | Not divorced at baseline | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2014 | 2014-2012 | |
| **Sample size** | 7 | 7 | 7 | |
| Abused by husband/ partner in past 3 months | | | Increased | Decreased |
| - *Any abuse* | 6 | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| - *Psychological* | 6 | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| - *Physical* | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| - *Sexual* | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| Nr. of types of abuse by husband/partner in past 3 months | 1.00 (0.58) | 0.71 (0.95) | -0.29 (0.76) | |
| Abused by others in past 12 months | | | Increased | Decreased |
| - *Any abuse* | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| - *Physical abuse* | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| - *Sexual abuse* | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Nr. of types of abuse by others | 0.43 (0.79) | 0.00 (0.00) | -0.43 (0.79) | |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses.
* p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value <0.01

**Table 42: Relationship with current/last husband/partner (not divorced at baseline)**

| Sample | Not divorced at baseline | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2014 | 2014-2012 |
| **Sample size** | 7 | 4 | 4 |
| Nr. of negative traits (0-6) | 4.71 (1.98) | 2.75 (2.75) | -2.00 (2.16) |
| Nr. of positive traits (0-4) | 1.00 (1.53) | 1.75 (2.06) | 0.50 (1.73) |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses.
* p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value <0.01

**Table 43: Components of relationship with current/last husband (not divorced at baseline)**

| Sample | Not divorced at baseline | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Period | 2012 | 2014 | Improved | Deteriorated |
| Sample size | 7 | 5 | | 4 |
| Negative (abusive) | | | | |
| *Tries to keep you from seeing your friends* | 5 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| *Tries to restrict contact with your family of birth* | 5 | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| *Insists on knowing where you are at all times* | 6 | 2 | 3 | 0 |
| *Ignores you and treats you indifferently* | 3 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| *Gets angry if you speak with another man* | 4 | 3 | 1 | 0 |
| *Is often suspicious that you are unfaithful* | 5 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| *Expects you to ask his permission before seeking health care for yourself* | 5 | 2 [n=4] | 0 [n=4] | 0 [n=4] |
| Positive (supportive) | | | | |
| *Pays attention to you* | 1 | 3 | 2 | 0 |
| *Takes good care of you and your children* | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| *Supports you when you need it* | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| *Trusts you in most situations* | 2 | 2 [n=4] | 1 [n=4] | 0 [n=4] |
| Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | | | |

## *Psychological and physical health of women*

**Table 44: Indices of psychological distress by marital status**

| Sample | Not divorced at baseline | | | Divorced at baseline | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Period | 2012 | 2014 | 2014-2012 | 2012 | 2014 | 2014-2012 |
| Sample size | 7 | 7 | 7 | 11 | 11 | 11 |
| Psychological distress (0-12) | 4.00 | 3.57 | -0.43 | 3.91 | 3.09 | -0.82 |
| | (1.73) | (2.76) | (1.40) | (2.26) | (2.12) | (2.48) |
| *Social dysfunction (0-6)* | 1.14 | 1.00 | -0.14 | 1.09 | 0.36 | -0.73* |
| | (0.90) | (1.15) | (0.69) | (1.14) | (0.67) | (1.27) |
| *Anxiety (0-4)* | 2.43 | 2.43 | 0.00 | 2.09 | 2.00 | -0.09 |
| | (0.98) | (1.72) | (1.15) | (1.14) | (1.34) | (1.14) |
| *Loss of confidence (0-2)* | 0.71 | 0.57 | -0.14 | 0.91 | 0.82 | -0.09 |
| | (0.76) | (0.79) | (0.69) | (0.94) | (0.75) | (1.04) |
| Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia<br>Notes: Standard deviations given in parentheses.<br>* p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value <0.01 | | | | | | |

**Table 24: Components of psychological distress by marital status**

| Sample | Not divorced at baseline | | Divorced at baseline | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2014 | 2012 | 2014 |
| Sample size | 7 | 7 | 11 | 11 |
| a. Lost much sleep over worry | 4 | 4 | 6 | 5 |
| b. Not played a useful part in things | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| c. Felt under strain | 3 | 4 | 7 | 7 |
| d. Not able to concentrate | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| e. Not feeling capable of making decisions | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| f. Not enjoying normal day-to-day activities | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 |
| g. Could not overcome emotional problems | 7 | 6 | 8 | 8 |
| h. Thought of yourself as worthless person | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| i. Felt depressed | 4 | 2 | 6 | 4 |
| j. Not able to face up emotional problems | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| k. Losing confidence in yourself | 1 | 2 | 4 | 5 |
| l. Not feeling reasonable happy in general | 2 | 2 | 5 | 1 |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Statements b, d, e, f, h and l are modified to negative statements from their original positive phrasing during the interviews.

**Table 45: Components of physical health by marital status**

| Sample | Not divorced at baseline | | Divorced at baseline | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Period** | 2012 | 2014 | 2012 | 2014 |
| **Sample size** | 7 | 7 | 11 | 11 |
| Often had headaches | 5 | 6 | 6 | 5 |
| Poor appetite | 2 | 3 | 2 | 4 |
| Easily frightened | 2 | 2 | 4 | 3 |
| Hands were shaking | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Felt nervous, tense or worried | 2 | 3 | 5 | 5 |
| Cried more than usual | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| Felt tired all the time | 3 | 4 | 7 | 6 |
| Had uncomfortable feelings in stomach | 5 | 5 | 7 | 7 |

Source: Household survey E11; MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

# Annex VII. Report on the results of the Rifka Annisa client survey

## 1. Introduction

This study is a cooperation between Survey Meter/AIID (Amsterdam Institute for International Development) and Rifka Annisa (RA). Survey Meter and AIID are contracted by NWO-WOTRO (Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research – WOTRO Science for Global Development) to carry out external evaluation of selected organisations that receive MFS II funding. Rifka Annisa benefits from MFS II through its funding from Rutgers WPF (Aliansi Satu Visi). NOW-WOTRO selected Rifka Annisa to be part of the MFS II evaluation at two levels: evaluation of the impact on direct beneficiaries and evaluation of the capacity development of Rifka Annisa by Rutgers WPF.

Rifka Annisa has a focus on victims of Sexual and Gender Based Violence (such as rape, sexual harassment, domestic violence etc.). The organisation is based in Yogyakarta; the area of Yogyakarta is also their target area for the programme. The main objective of Rifka Annisa is providing counselling and legal assistance to victims of Sexual and Gender Based Violence. The aim of counselling is to overcome the trauma and to improve the awareness, independency, and honour of (female) victims.

The motivation for this study was to assess the impact of Rifka Annisa on its clients. Given that the original evaluation design could not be implemented as intended, AIID wanted to develop another survey instrument that could better assess the effectiveness of the services of Rifka Annisa in terms of psychological well-being, coping skills, and empowerment of Rifka Annisa clients. Hence, a new client-based survey was developed that could be self-administered by the clients after their first and third visits to RA. However, due to the small number of clients who returned to Rifka Annisa for a third session, the analysis of the data has been adjusted. Instead of focusing on impacts, we analyse differences in outcomes for women who had different reasons for contacting Rifka Annisa. In addition, self-reported impacts are described.

## 2. Methodology

The client survey focused on women who turned to Rifka Annisa because of domestic abuse. Hence, from the sample we excluded women who were victims of dating violence and rape. Of all the women that visited Rifka Annisa during the time of the study, 90 percent was a victim of domestic violence and only 7 percent was a victim of dating violence. The remaining 3 percent were a rape case and a case of child molestation.

There were two surveys: one for when the women visit Rifka Annisa for the first time (before survey), and one for when they visit for the third time (after survey). Clients visiting Rifka Annisa between September 2013 and March 2014 were asked to participate in the survey. The before survey was kept short, because talking about the abuse might have been too hard for them since it was their first visit to RA. We also wanted to keep the amount of time spend on the questionnaire short. The surveys focused on the following impact areas:

1. Coping/empowerment of victims/survivors
2. Psychological health of victims/survivors

3. Behaviour change from victim to survivor
4. Satisfaction with the services of Rifka Annisa

The coping/empowerment of victims/survivors is measured by the Survivor Coping Index proposed by Bennett et al (2004) and the mental health of victims/survivors is measured by a shortened version of the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ). The method for measuring behaviour change was designed together with RA. Based on ten questions, it is assessed in which stages of behaviour change the women are, which are denial, contemplation, preparation for action, action and maintenance.

In addition to these questions, the after survey also included and extended section on psychological well-being, service satisfaction and background information about the respondents including the type of abuse experienced.

Although the surveys were self-administered, a counsellor could help the respondents with filling out the survey. Still, this was the case for only 12 percent of the respondents. For the satisfaction with the services of Rifka Annisa it is important to get the honest opinion of the respondents, so these questions were filled out by the respondents in private.

Both surveys focused on the situation of the respondent during the past month in terms of general health and their attitude towards themselves. Because the women already benefitted from the services of Rifka Annisa after their third visit, it is expected to see an impact in the outcomes from the after survey.

We show the outcomes for the total sample of women who did before survey and for returning women who did both the before and the after survey.

When assessing the results, it should be taken into account that the women might tend to report the middle or neutral outcomes for reasons such as social norms.

## 2.1. Sampling outcome

In total, 51 women were interviewed right after their first visit. Not all women who came to Rifka Annisa were interviewed after their first visit. At the point where 76 target women had visited RA, only 46 had been interviewed. The main reason for this is the counsellor's negligence (in 6 cases), but clients also refused (3 cases) or had no time (3 cases) or their psychological condition did not allow for it (in 2 cases). However, most of the reasons are unknown (in 16 cases).

Unfortunately, of the women who were interviewed after their first visit, only 3 came back for the third time. This is unexpected, since 50 of the 51 women said that they wished to continue making use of the service of Rifka Annisa. Of the three returning women, one only went for psychological counselling, while the other two received information about the divorce law and help with a court case or legal process. When receiving help with a legal process or court case, legal documents have to be prepared, which takes time. So, coming back to Rifka Annisa a couple of times seems reasonable in that case. However, other women who received legal help only came for one visit. Also psychological counselling would be most effective when repeated several times. To find out why most women did not return to RA, they were called. Of the 30[38] women called in April 2014, 9 women answered the question and one woman refused to talk. The rest could not be contacted because the mobile phone number did not work

[38] We had no contact information for the other women

or no one answered the phone. Of the 9 women, two women were pregnant, but did call with their counsellor a couple of times, two were busy with work, one with school and one with a baby and three answered that they were planning on going in the near future. It seems that most of the women are too busy to come to RA, but whether they gave honest answers is always doubtful. In addition, these women remained with their husbands.

## 3. Characteristics of respondents

The average age of the women is 34 (n=45) and almost all of them attended at least high school (including secondary schools 95.6%). 20 percent has a college degree and 28.9 percent are university graduates (n=45). This information is obtained from RA.

From the surveys we found that the main motives of the women to go to Rifka Annisa were receiving information about the divorce law (56.9%) and psychological counselling (47.1%) (see Table 46). Other motives were receiving counselling on how to improve household conditions/relationship with spouses (35.3%), information about rights (27.5%) and help with a court case/legal process (25.5%).

In order to profile the sample, we split it to see the outcomes separately for women who only came for counselling, women who only came for legal help and for women who came for a combination of those. This grouping is based on the findings in Table 46, where high percentages are seen for counselling and receiving information about rights or the divorce law. The 'only counselling' group consists of 17 women who came for psychological counselling, counselling on how to improve household conditions/relationship with spouse or a combination of those. 15 women who came for information about rights or the divorce law, for help with reporting a case to the police or with a court case/legal process or a combination of these reasons are included in the 'only legal help' group. The other 19 women who came for a combination of counselling and legal help are reported on in the 'mixed' group. We expect the situation of the 'only counselling' group to be better than the situations of the other groups, since they do not have the intention to divorce.

**Table 46: Purpose of visit**

| | **Sample**<br>Purpose of visit | **Total**<br>% Agree | **Returning**<br>% Agree |
|---|---|---|---|
| A | Psychological counselling | 47.1 | 33.3 |
| B | Counselling on how to improve household conditions/relationship with spouse | 35.3 | 0.0 |
| C | Male counselling | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| D | Information about rights | 27.5 | 0.0 |
| E | Information about divorce law | 56.9 | 66.7 |
| F | Help with reporting case to the police | 7.8 | 0.0 |
| G | Help with court case/legal process | 25.5 | 33.3 |
| H | Need a safe place to stay | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| i | Other | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | Sample size<br>Source: Rifka Annisa client survey | 51.0 | 3.0 |

Unfortunately, we do not what type of abuse (psychological, physical, economical and/or sexual) the women experienced, since this was only asked in the after survey. Information provided by Rifka Annisa does describe the type of abuse for nine women. None of them indicated that they had experienced sexual violence, while most of them had experienced psychological violence (8 out of 9).Only two had experienced physical violence and six had experienced economical abuse. However, these numbers are not generalizable.

It is interesting to look at the sources of referral to Rifka Annisa for the separate subsamples, which are shown in Table 47. We clearly see that most of the women heard from Rifka Annisa through the people around them or through the media. Only women who were looking for legal help alone or in combination with counselling heard from Rifka Annisa through public or private court, which could be expected. Another interesting finding is that none of the women heard from Rifka Annisa through religious leaders or religion affair offices.

**Table 47: Sources of referral to Rifka Annisa**

| Percentage of women referred to Rifka Annisa by […] | Only counselling | Only legal help | Mixed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Friends/neighbours | 41.2 | 40.0 | 63.2 |
| Family/relatives | 17.6 | 20.0 | 21.1 |
| Support group in community (PKK, posyandu, Dasawisma, religious activity, etc.) | 5.9 | 0.0 | 5.3 |
| Community leaders (village head/neighbourhood head (RT)) | 5.9 | 0.0 | 15.8 |
| Police/army | 5.9 | 6.7 | 0.0 |
| Health care officer | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.3 |
| Media (radio, TV, website, internet) | 23.5 | 33.3 | 15.8 |
| Rifka Annisa (Rifka Annisa visited the respondent) | 5.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Religious leader | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Public court/private court | 0.0 | 13.3 | 5.3 |
| BP4/KUA (religion affair office) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Rifka Annisa's brochures/newsletter | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.3 |
| Other | 5.9 | 13.3 | 5.3 |
| Sample | 17.0 | 15.0 | 19.0 |

Source: Rifka Annisa client survey

## 4. Results

This chapter describes the results for the Survivor Coping Index, general health, behaviour change and self-reported impacts. For these, outcomes are reported for the women who filled out the before survey, which is the total sample, and for the three returning respondents who filled out both the before and the after survey. Due to the small sample size, we are not able to report on the significance of change for the latter group. Additionally, the outcomes are shown in a separate table for the subsamples according to their reasons for visiting Rifka Annisa for the first time.

## 4.1. Survivor Coping Index

The Survivor Coping Index is proposed by Bennett et al (2004) and consists of 8 questions that can be divided into sub-components: support, self-efficacy, decision making, control and coping skills. The Survivor Coping Index is shown in Table 48 together with the questions and sub-components. Questions a and b form the sub-component assessing the support around the respondent. Self-efficacy or the woman's believe in her own ability to complete tasks and reach goals is captured with question c. Question d is meant to assess the belief of the respondent in her decision making ability and question e represents the sub-component of control, meaning to assess the feeling of control the respondent has over her own life. The last three questions are taken together in the coping skills sub-component, assessing the coping skills of the respondent with respect to the domestic violence. All the questions together then form the Survivor Coping Index.

The respondents were asked if they never, rarely, sometimes, often or always feel in the described way. The mean and the percentage of the (sub)sample that at least often feels in that way[39] are reported. Calculating the mean, never is seen as 1 and always as 5. The percentage that at least often feel in the described way is the percentage of the (sub)sample that answered often or always. Since the statements are phrased in a positive way, a higher mean or percentage indicates better outcomes. For the indices, the percentage that at least often feels in the described way shows the percentage of women for whom the average of the statements was 4 or higher.

[39] This percentage is group reported because the average could be misleading if some women do better while others do worse.

**Table 48: Question 1 Survivor coping index**

| *Sample (survey)* | Total (before survey) | | Returning (before survey) | | Returning (after survey) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *How often were the following statements true for you in the past one month?* | Mean (1-5) | % at least often feels that way | Mean (1-5) | % at least often feels that way | Mean (1-5) | % at least often feels that way |
| a. I have someone I can turn to for helpful advice about my problem | 3.1 | 39.2 | 4.0 | 66.7 | 4.0 | 66.7 |
| b. I have someone who would help me in a critical situation. | 3.0 | 35.3 | 4.0 | 66.7 | 4.0 | 66.7 |
| c. I trust my ability to solve difficult problems | 3.2 | 35.3 | 3.7 | 33.3 | 3.7 | 33.3 |
| d. I am confident about the decisions that I make | 3.8 | 64.7 | 3.7 | 33.3 | 4.0 | 66.7 |
| e. I feel like I'm in control of my own life | 3.7 | 62.7 | 3.7 | 33.3 | 3.3 | 66.7 |
| f. I have ways to help myself when I feel troubled | 3.2 | 33.3 | 3.7 | 33.3 | 3.7 | 33.3 |
| g. I know the abuse was not my fault | 3.5 | 46.0 | 4.3 | 100.0 | 4.3 | 100.0 |
| h. I am able to talk about my thoughts and feelings about the assault/abuse | 3.7 | 56.0 | 3.0 | 33.3 | 4.0 | 66.7 |
| **Support** (average of a, b) | 3.0 | 33.3 | 4.0 | 66.7 | 4.0 | 66.7 |
| **Coping skill** (average of f, g, h) | 3.5 | 33.3 | 3.7 | 33.3 | 4.0 | 66.7 |
| **Survivor coping index** (average of a-h) | 3.4 | 21.6 | 3.8 | 33.3 | 3.9 | 33.3 |
| Sample size | **51.0** | | **3.0** | | **3.0** | |
| Source: Rifka Annisa client survey | | | | | | |

The means of the indices for the returning group (between 3.8 and 4), in both the before survey and the after survey, are higher than that the means of the total sample (between 3 and 3.5). We see increases in feeling confident about decisions and in being able to talk about thoughts and feelings about the assault/abuse, resulting in increases in the coping skill (from 3.7 to 4.0) and in the survivor coping index (from 3.8 to 3.9). While at the after survey there was one more woman who at least often felt that she was in control of her life, the mean decreased from 3.7 to 3.3. This is due to one woman indicating that she never feels in control of her own life, which is the only negative development we see.

Table 49 presents the same outcome indicators for the subsamples according to their reason for visiting. Column 5, 8 and 9 report on p-values to indicate the significance of differences in means between the groups. The columns that are compared are shown between brackets.

**Table 49: Question 1 Survivor coping index (split sample)**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Only counselling | | Only legal help | | | Mixed | | | |
| *How often were the following statements true for you in the past one month?* | Mean (1-5) | % at least often feels that way | Mean (1-5) | % at least often feels that way | P(1;3) | Mean (1-5) | % at least often feels that way | P(1;6) | P(3;6) |
| a. I have someone I can turn to for helpful advice about my problem | 3.4 | 41.2 | 2.8 | 26.7 | 0.118 | 3.1 | 47.4 | 0.461 | 0.447 |
| b. I have someone who would help me in a critical situation. | 3.2 | 29.4 | 2.8 | 40.0 | 0.381 | 2.9 | 36.8 | 0.538 | 0.756 |
| c. I trust my ability to solve difficult problems | 3.1 | 29.4 | 3.1 | 33.3 | 0.965 | 3.4 | 42.1 | 0.483 | 0.548 |
| d. I am confident about the decisions that I make | 3.3 | 41.2 | 4.1 | 73.3 | 0.027 | 4.1 | 78.9 | 0.026 | 0.829 |
| e. I feel like I'm in control of my own life | 3.3 | 58.8 | 4.2 | 73.3 | 0.013 | 3.6 | 57.9 | 0.487 | 0.131 |
| f. I have ways to help myself when I feel troubled | 3.1 | 29.4 | 3.6 | 46.7 | 0.128 | 3.1 | 26.3 | 0.897 | 0.217 |
| g. I know the abuse was not my fault | 3.0 | 29.4 | 3.6 | 42.9 | 0.206 | 3.8 | 63.2 | 0.038 | 0.533 |
| h. I am able to talk about my thoughts and feelings about the assault/abuse | 3.4 | 47.1 | 3.6 | 42.9 | 0.471 | 4.0 | 73.7 | 0.126 | 0.397 |
| **Support** (average of a, b) | 3.3 | 35.3 | 2.8 | 26.7 | 0.206 | 3.0 | 36.8 | 0.479 | 0.591 |
| **Coping skill** (average of f, g, h) | 3.1 | 17.6 | 3.6 | 33.3 | 0.093 | 3.6 | 47.4 | 0.126 | 0.929 |
| **Survivor coping index** (average of a-h) | 3.2 | 11.8 | 3.4 | 13.3 | 0.261 | 3.5 | 36.8 | 0.260 | 0.782 |
| Sample size | 17.0 | | 15.0 | | 32 | 19.0 | | 36 | 34 |

Source: Rifka Annisa client survey

When comparing the groups in order to profile the sample we do see differences. The 'only counselling' group feels significantly less confident about decisions compared to the other groups ($p<0.05$) and they know that the abuse was not their fault significantly fewer times than the mixed group. In addition, the 'only legal' group feels significantly more in control of their own lives, reflecting the consideration of divorce. There is an almost significant difference in the means of the coping skill index between the 'only counselling' group and the 'only legal' group. Women who want information and help with a divorce indicate that they cannot handle their relationship anymore, suggesting low coping skills. That those women have a higher coping skill index than women that come for counselling seems counterintuitive.

When looking at the separate indicators in the coping skill index, we see that this difference is mainly driven by knowing that the abuse was not their fault.

Although not significant, women who come for legal help feel less like they have someone they can turn to for helpful advice about their problem, which might be because they want legal advice. People around them are not likely to know about. This also causes the low support index for women who only come for legal help.

## 4.2. General Health

Table 50 shows a shortened version of the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ), which usually consists of 12 components. This method was chosen because some sensitive questions could make the respondent emotional and we wanted to keep the survey as short as possible. The full GHQ is asked in the second survey, but as mentioned before, only three women came for a third visit. The five statements asked were previously validated to have high predictive power for the original survey measuring psychological well-being of respondents. For these five statements, the respondents could answer that they never (1), rarely (2), sometimes (3), often (4) or always (5) feel like that. This way of measuring the GHQ is different from the original, but because we wanted to compare the indicators over time, this method seemed to be more compatible. For each statement, the mean is reported and the percentage of women who answered one of the most desirable 2 or 3 answers. Since losing sleep over excessive worry, feeling constantly under strain and feeling unhappy and depressed are phrased in a negative way, the top 2 responses for these are never and rarely and the top 3 also includes sometimes. Because being able to enjoy normal day to day activities and feeling reasonably happy are phrased positively, the top 2 responses for those are often and always, and the top 3 includes sometimes. For the returning group only the percentage of women that answered one of the three best responses. This is done because almost none of those 3 women answered the top 2 responses. For both the percentage outcomes as the mean, after reversing the scale for negatively phrased statements, a higher value indicates a more desirable outcome. The GHQ-5 index shows the mean number of questions (a to e) that the women answered with the top 2 or 3 responses. This could be between 0 and 5 statements. Also here, a higher outcome is more desirable.

**Table 50: Question 2 General health**

| Sample (survey) | | Total (before survey) | | Returning (before survey) | | Returning (after survey) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *How often have you felt in the following ways in the past one month?* | Mean (1-5) | % Good health outcome (top 2) | % Good health outcome (top 3) | Mean (1-5) | % Good health outcome (top 3) | Mean (1-5) | % Good health outcome (top 3) |
| **a.** Lost much sleep over excessive worry | 2.5 | 7.8 | 43.1 | 2.3 | 33.3 | 3.3 | 66.7 |
| **b.** Felt constantly under strain | 2.1 | 7.8 | 29.4 | 1.7 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 66.7 |
| **c.** Been able to enjoy your normal day to day activities | 3.3 | 32.0 | 76.0 | 3.0 | 100.0 | 4.0 | 100.0 |
| **d.** Been feeling unhappy and depressed | 2.2 | 3.9 | 29.4 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 3.3 | 66.7 |
| **e.** Been feeling reasonably happy, all things considered | 2.6 | 7.8 | 56.9 | 2.7 | 66.7 | 3.0 | 100.0 |
| | | Mean (top 2) | Mean (top 3) | | Mean (top 3) | | Mean (top 3) |
| **GHQ-5 index** (scale 0-5) | | 0.6 | 2.3 | | 2.0 | | 4.0 |
| Sample size | | 51.0 | | | 3.0 | | |
| Source: Rifka Annisa client survey | | | | | | | |

It is seen that few women gave the top 2 responses. The women only indicate that they have been able to enjoy their normal day to day activities (32 percent answered 'often' or 'always'). For this indicator, the mean was also the highest one (3.3, while it was 2.6 or lower for the other indicators). On average, the women answered half of the statements with the top 3 responses (GHP-5 index is 2.3).

When comparing the before and after survey outcomes of the returning group we see that all indicators improved.

Table 51 reports on the same outcome indicators for the three subsamples for the top 2 responses and Table 52 does this for the top 3 responses. The p-values are reported in the same way as in Table 49.

**Table 51: Question 2 General health (split sample; top 2 responses)**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Only counselling** | | **Only legal help** | | | **Mixed** | | | |
| *How often have you felt in the following ways in the past one month?* | Mean (1-5) | % Good health outcome (top 2) | Mean (1-5) | % Good health outcome (top 2) | P(1;3) | Mean (1-5) | % Good health outcome (top 2) | P(1;6) | P(3;6) |
| **a**. Lost much sleep over excessive worry | 2.6 | 5.9 | 2.4 | 13.3 | 0.620 | 2.4 | 5.3 | 0.590 | 0.953 |
| **b**. Felt constantly under strain | 2.2 | 5.9 | 2.2 | 6.7 | 0.940 | 2.0 | 10.5 | 0.613 | 0.557 |
| **c**. Been able to enjoy your normal day to day activities | 3.7 | 52.9 | 2.8 | 14.3 | 0.025 | 3.2 | 26.3 | 0.173 | 0.226 |
| **d**. Been feeling unhappy and depressed | 2.4 | 5.9 | 2.2 | 6.7 | 0.495 | 1.9 | 0.0 | 0.051 | 0.296 |
| **e**. Been feeling reasonably happy, all things considered | 2.7 | 11.8 | 2.5 | 0.0 | 0.406 | 2.6 | 10.5 | 0.667 | 0.671 |
| | | Mean (top 2) | | Mean (top 2) | | | Mean (top 2) | | |
| **GHQ_5 index** (scale 0-5) | | 0.8 | | 0.4 | 0.226 | | 0.5 | 0.344 | 0.678 |
| Sample | | 17 | | 15 | 32 | | 19 | 36 | 34 |

Source: Rifka Annisa client survey

The only significant difference found between the groups is in being able to enjoy normal day to day activities ($p<0.05$). A significant larger percentage of the women that only came for counselling said to be able to enjoy their normal day to day activities compared to the women that only came for legal help. Considering the top 3 responses in Table 52, it can be seen that the 'only counselling' group has highest percentages of women answering the top 3 responses in all five statements. They also had the highest means. Especially the mean of being able to enjoy normal day to day activities is higher for the 'only counselling' group, however, this difference is not significant anymore. These women having the highest GHQ-5 index could explain why the women only came for counselling and not for legal help with a divorce. In Table 52, the difference in the GHQ-5 index between the 'only counselling' group and the 'only legal' group even comes close to significance ($p<0.1$).

Overall, the women were feeling unhappy, depressed and constantly under strain.

**Table 52: Question 2 General health (split sample; top 3 responses)**

| Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Only counselling** | | **Only legal help** | | | **Mixed** | | | |
| *How often have you felt in the following ways in the past one month?* | Mean (1-5) | % Good health outcome (top 3) | Mean (1-5) | % Good health outcome (top 3) | P(1;3) | Mean (1-5) | % Good health outcome (top 3) | P(1;6) | P(3;6) |
| **a**. Lost much sleep over excessive worry | 2.6 | 58.8 | 2.4 | 26.7 | 0.620 | 2.4 | 42.1 | 0.590 | 0.953 |
| **b**. Felt constantly under strain | 2.2 | 41.2 | 2.2 | 26.7 | 0.940 | 2.0 | 21.1 | 0.613 | 0.557 |
| **c**. Been able to enjoy your normal day to day activities | 3.7 | 82.4 | 2.8 | 64.3 | 0.025 | 3.2 | 78.9 | 0.173 | 0.226 |
| **d**. Been feeling unhappy and depressed | 2.4 | 47.1 | 2.2 | 20.0 | 0.495 | 1.9 | 21.1 | 0.051 | 0.296 |
| **e**. Been feeling reasonably happy, all things considered | 2.7 | 58.8 | 2.5 | 53.3 | 0.406 | 2.6 | 57.9 | 0.667 | 0.671 |
| | | Mean (top 3) | | Mean (top 3) | | | Mean (top 3) | | |
| **GHQ_5 index** (scale 0-5) | | 2.9 | | 1.9 | 0.081 | | 2.2 | 0.201 | 0.502 |
| Sample | | 17 | | 15 | 32 | | 19 | 36 | 34 |

Source: Rifka Annisa client survey

## 4.3. Behaviour change

In order to assess the level in the stages of behaviour change from victim to survivor, Table 53 shows questions asked for determining this for the total sample as well as for the women who did the second survey. (Dis)agreement with the statements determine in what stage the woman is. It is indicated in the table which statements indicate what stage. There are five stage of behavioural change. The first stage is denial, where the woman denies that she is being abused and/or she blames herself. The second stage is contemplation. In this stage, the woman knows that she is being abused, but she is not yet aware that she could control the situation. She feels like she cannot change her marriage and chooses to endure as a good wife. The third stage is preparation for action. The woman admits that she can play a role in changing her husband's behaviour and is open for help from outside. Fourth is the action stage, in which the woman is actively working on changing her situation by telling her husband how she feels and how he should behave. The last stage is maintenance. The woman is a survivor. She is out of the cycle of abuse and wants to help other women who are abused.[40] The percentages of women in the stages are provided in the table.

Since the women could choose from 'agree', 'disagree' and 'don't know', 'does not disagree' also includes women who answered 'don't know'.

[40] However, these stages do not necessarily follow one-another. The stages could rather be thought of as a cycle, where some event can trigger a relapse into a lower stage.

**Table 53: Question 3 Stages of behaviour change**

| | Sample (survey) | Total (before survey) | Returning (before survey) | Returning (after survey) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Do you agree or disagree that the following statements were true for you in the past one month? | % agree | % agree | % agree |
| a. | My husband and I argue but he is not abusing me. | 46.9 | 66.7 | 33.3 |
| b. | My husband is hurting me because I am not a good wife. | 8.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| c. | My husband is hurting me sometimes but I have to endure as a good wife. | 27.1 | 33.3 | 0.0 |
| d. | There is nothing to change in my marriage. | 18.4 | 0.0 | 66.7 |
| e. | I can play a role in changing my husband's behaviour. | 6.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| f. | I'm open for help in mediation between me and my husband. | 60.4 | 0.0 | 33.3 |
| g. | I tell my husband how he makes me feel. | 78.0 | 66.7 | 66.7 |
| h. | I'm able to tell my husband how he should behave. | 56.0 | 33.3 | 66.7 |
| i. | I want to be involved in activities that help other women who are abused. | 90.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| j. | I can prevent my husband from hurting me. | 34.7 | 33.3 | 33.3 |
| | **STAGES OF BEHAVIOUR** | % in stage | % in stage | % in stage |
| | **Stage 1: Denial** (does not disagree a and/or b) | 57.1 | 66.7 | 66.7 |
| | **Stage 2: Contemplation** (does not disagree c and d, disagrees a and b) | 4.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | **Stage 3: Preparation for action** (agrees e and f) | 6.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | **Stage 4: Action** (agrees g and h) | 52.0 | 33.3 | 66.7 |
| | **Stage 5: Maintenance** (agrees i and j) | 28.6 | 33.3 | 33.3 |
| | Sample size<br>Source: Rifka Annisa client survey | 49.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 |

These outcomes show some interesting findings.

An outstanding finding from these tables is that more than half of the sample is in the denial stage, since these women came to Rifka Annisa for help regarding the abuse by their husband. Also in the returning group, 2 out of 3 women are in the denial stage both at the before survey and the after survey. These are the two women that did not come for counselling, but for legal help.

When looking at the preparation stage, almost none of the women are in there. However, when looking at the indicators that determine being in the preparation stage, we see that 60.4 percent of the women are open for help in mediation between her and her husband, even though only 6 percent thinks that

they can play a role in changing their husband's behaviour. Of the women who returned to RA, only one woman was open for mediation at the after survey. Surprisingly, the woman that only came for psychological counselling is not open for mediation with her husband, not even after three counselling sessions.

The maintenance stage includes 28.6 percent of the women, but when looking at determinants of being in this stage we see that a much higher percentage wants to be involved in activities that help other women who are abused (90 percent). While only 34.7 percent thinks that they can prevent their husband from hurting them, there are women who think that they cannot prevent the abuse in their own situation but they are willing to help others.

52 percent of the total sample was in the action stage. However, 39 percent of these women were in the denial stage as well. This overlap in stages is unexpected. When comparing the results from the before survey with the after survey, we see positive as well as negative developments. Therefore, no general conclusion can be made here.

Table 54 reports on the same outcomes for the subsamples, again showing the p-values for differences between the groups with the compared columns between brackets. It is interesting to see that 71.4 percent of the women who came for legal help think that their husband is not abusing them. Also, none of them think that they can change their husband's behaviour and only 7.7 percent thinks that they can prevent their husband from hurting them (significantly lower than the other groups, $p<0.05$), even though quite a large percentage (35.7 percent) says that they can tell their husband how he should behave. This might indicate that the women tried to change the husband's behaviour, but that it did not work. These findings explain why these women want a divorce.

In addition, compared to both other groups, an almost significant ($p<0.1$) lower percentage of the women who came for legal help told her husband how he made her feel. This was also the case for the maintenance stage, which is mainly caused by these women thinking that they are not able to prevent their husbands from hurting them.
As expected, women who came for counselling are significantly more open for mediation between her and her husband ($p<0.05$), since 71 percent of these women came for counselling on how to improve household conditions/relationship with spouse. Although not significant, the group also has the lowest percentage of women who think that there is nothing to change in their marriage.

For looking at relations between outcomes, we regressed the stages of behaviour on the coping index and the coping index and its subcategories on the general health index using Ordinary Least Squares, controlling for the reasons to visit. However, no significant relations were found, so we will not report on this further.

**Table 54: Question 3 Stages of behaviour change (split sample)**

| | Column | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | **Only counselling** | **Only legal help** | | **Mixed** | | |
| | Do you agree or disagree that the following statements were true for you in the past one month? | % agree | % agree | P(1;2) | % agree | P(1;4) | P(2;4) |
| a. | My husband and I argue but he is not abusing me. | 43.8 | 71.4 | 0.136 | 31.6 | 0.473 | 0.023 |
| b. | My husband is hurting me because I am not a good wife. | 12.5 | 7.1 | 0.640 | 5.3 | 0.461 | 0.830 |
| c. | My husband is hurting me sometimes but I have to endure as a good wife. | 25.0 | 38.5 | 0.454 | 21.1 | 0.789 | 0.297 |
| d. | There is nothing to change in my marriage. | 6.3 | 21.4 | 0.237 | 26.3 | 0.124 | 0.755 |
| e. | I can play a role in changing my husband's behaviour. | 11.8 | 0.0 | 0.197 | 5.3 | 0.495 | 0.399 |
| f. | I'm open for help in mediation between me and my husband. | 94.1 | 28.6 | 0.000 | 52.9 | 0.005 | 0.183 |
| g. | I tell my husband how he makes me feel. | 88.2 | 57.1 | 0.051 | 84.2 | 0.736 | 0.089 |
| h. | I'm able to tell my husband how he should behave. | 47.1 | 42.9 | 0.822 | 73.7 | 0.108 | 0.077 |
| i. | I want to be involved in activities that help other women who are abused. | 82.4 | 92.9 | 0.402 | 94.7 | 0.250 | 0.830 |
| j. | I can prevent my husband from hurting me. | 47.1 | 7.7 | 0.019 | 42.1 | 0.773 | 0.034 |
| Stages of behaviour | | % in stage | % in stage | P(1;2) | % in stage | P(1;4) | P(2;4) |
| **Stage 1: Denial** (does not disagree a and/or b) | | 50.0 | 78.6 | 0.113 | 47.4 | 0.881 | 0.074 |
| **Stage 2: Contemplation** (does not disagree c and d, disagrees a and b) | | 6.3 | 0.0 | 0.377 | 5.3 | 0.904 | 0.417 |
| **Stage 3: Preparation for action** (agrees e and f) | | 11.8 | 0.0 | 0.197 | 5.9 | 0.559 | 0.373 |
| **Stage 4: Action** (agrees g and h) | | 47.1 | 35.7 | 0.540 | 68.4 | 0.205 | 0.065 |
| **Stage 5: Maintenance** (agrees i and j) | | 35.3 | 7.7 | 0.081 | 36.8 | 0.926 | 0.065 |
| Sample | | 16.0 | 14.0 | 30 | 19.0 | 35 | 33 |

Source: Rifka Annisa client survey
Notes: Because some women answered 'don't know', the sample size deviates. The number of observations are 16, 14, 30, 19, 35 and 33 instead of 17, 15, 32, 19, 36 and 34.

## 4.4. Self-reported impact

In the before survey, 50% of the women indicated that they were somewhat satisfied and the other 50% was very satisfied. In addition, 61 percentage says that they had somewhat more information about their available choices and 29 percent said that they now had a lot more information. 8 percent indicated that they had received a little information or they did not know the answer to the question. The question whether the counselling at Rifka Annisa had answered their questions was answered 'all of them' in 73 percent of the cases and 'some of them' in 25 percent of the cases. The answers to these questions were missing for one of the respondents. Concluding from this we can say that the women were satisfied with the services from RA, but there is room for improvements.

Table 55 shows the self-reported impacts by the women who returned to RA. The respondents had to indicate whether they strongly disagreed, disagreed, undecided, agreed or strongly agreed with the statements described in the table. The outcomes show the mean on a scale from -2 to +2, where -2 indicates strong disagreement and +2 indicates strong agreement.

The outcomes only show positive impacts. However, it should be noted that, due to social norms, the women tend to give positive answers.

**Table 55: Question 6 Self-reported impact**

| Because of the counselling and other services […] (scale from -2 to +2) | Returning (after survey) |
|---|---|
| a. I became more comfortable asking for help | 1.7 |
| b. I became more confident and brave | 1.3 |
| c. I'm more able to make plans for the future | 1.7 |
| d. I'm more able to make decisions for myself | 1.3 |
| e. I feel more independent | 1.3 |
| f. I'm more able to speak up to my partner | 1.3 |
| g. I'm more able to control situations when commotion occurs | 1.0 |
| h. I have more resources to call upon | 1.0 |
| i. I'm better prepared to keep myself safe | 1.7 |
| j. I'm more hopeful about my future | 1.7 |
| k. I'm more able to control my emotions | 1.0 |
| Sample<br>Source: Rifka Annisa client survey | 3 |

## 5. Conclusion

Overall, we cannot say much about the impact of the visits to Rifka Annisa on the women due to a small sample of women who returned to RA. Still, most findings suggest positive developments among the women, which they also indicate when self-reporting on the impact of the programme.

Profiling the women according to their reason for visiting, we saw that women who only came for counselling are the least confident about their decisions. However, they were the most able to enjoy their normal day to day activities. In addition, they had the highest GHQ index, explaining why they did not want a divorce.

A surprising finding is that almost half of the women deny that they are being abused, while they came to Rifka Annisa for help regarding the abuse by their husband. This denial was especially high among the women who only came for legal help. Also, almost none of the women who came for legal help think that they can prevent their husband from hurting them and they felt more in control over their lives compared to the group that only came for counselling. These findings are explanatory for the fact that these women are considering a divorce, since getting a divorce is a crucial decision.

Nevertheless, almost all of the women want to be involved in activities that help other women that are abused.

# Endline Report on the Achievement of MDGs and Themes:

# Evaluation of the YPI project

## MFS II Joint Evaluations

## Indonesia

**Sub-report:**

**E12. Yayasan Pelita Ilmu project**

## FINAL REPORT

**9 April 2015**


**Amsterdam Institute for International Development (AIID)**

Trinity building C, 3rd floor, Rm XT-3.17
Pietersbergweg 17
1105 BM Amsterdam
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)20 5661596
F +31 (0)20 5665997
www.aiid.org

**SurveyMeter**

Jl. Jenengan Raya No.109
Maguwoharjo, Depok, Sleman,
Yogyakarta 55282
Indonesia
T +62 (0) 274 4477464
F +62 (0) 274 4477004
www.surveymeter.org

# List of contributors

**AIID**

Menno Pradhan (Principal Investigator)

Melinda Vigh (Research Coordinator)

Marije Groot Bruinderink (Project Manager)

Iris van Rossum (Junior Researcher)

Kimberley Wallaart (Qualitative Data Analyst)

Emilie Berkhout (Research Assistant)

**Survey Meter**

Ni Wayan Suriasatini (Research Coordinator)

Mardiana Br Ginting (Project Manager)

Sukamtiningsih (Qualitative Researcher and Field Coordinator)

Budi Wahyuni (Expert on Gender issues)

Bondan Sikoki (Survey Expert)

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## List of Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| ATET | Average Treatment Effect of the Treated |
| BKKBN | National Family Planning and Population Board |
| BPS | Badan Pusat Statistik (Central Bureau of Statistics of Indonesia) |
| CFA | Co-financing Agency |
| CSE | Comprehensive Sexuality Education |
| D4L | Dance4Life |
| DAKU | Dunia Remaja Seru (Lively Youth World) |
| DHS | Demographic and Health Survey |
| GBV | Gender-Based Violence |
| IDR | Indonesian Rupiah |
| ITT | Intention to Treat |
| KAP | Knowledge, attitude, and practices |
| KIT | Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen (Royal Tropical Institute) |
| MDG | Millennium Development Goal |
| MFS II | Medefinancieringsstelsel (Co-financing System Grant Policy Framework) |
| MoH | Ministry of Health |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| PLHIV | People Living with HIV-AIDS |
| RHS | Right-Hand Side |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |
| SRH | Sexual and Reproductive Health |
| SRHR | Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights |
| STI | Sexually Transmitted Infection |
| UFBR | UNITE For BODY RIGTHS Programme |
| VCT | Voluntary Counselling and Testing |
| WSWM | World Starts With Me |
| YPI | Yayasan Pelita Ilmu |

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Project context

Knowledge of Sexual Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) among Indonesian youth (15-24 years) is low. For example, only 7.5 percent of never-married women (3.1% for men) know where to obtain HIV counselling and testing services (IYARHS, 2012). At the school level, SRHR education is only included as informal subjects in the school curriculum. The subjects are normative in essence, relying on morality and deemed to bear social stigma related to sexuality, gender and HIV/AIDS issues. Teachers feel uncomfortable and may choose not to address some subjects, reducing the quality of the education.

Two opposite trends influence the attitude and social taboo on SRHR services and education: Islamisation versus liberalisation. On the one hand, due to the greater emphasis on religion in Indonesia, including part of the youth population, the social taboo on SRHR issues has grown in recent years. Public discussions on policies regarding SRHR education have been restricted for a long time. Moreover, state and religious leaders are unsupportive and stigma-laden towards SRHR services and education (Utomo & McDonald, 2008). For example, the Population and Family Development Law (No.52/2009) and the Health Law (No.36/2009) define that access to sexual and reproductive health services may only be given to legally married couples (Amnesty International, 2010, p.23). The Ministry of Education of Indonesia does offer a detailed description of sexuality education in its policy framework and it has specific education sector policies on HIV and health. However, the impact of these policies may be limited at the schools due to conservative socio-cultural norms with respect to sexuality. (Iyer et al., 2014). On the other hand, the liberalisation trend causes many young people in urban regions to become more open and liberal with respect to expressing themselves and their sexual activities. Especially the exposure of the youth to the internet and other Western media contributes to the change in attitude and behaviour towards sex and sexuality (Utomo & McDonald, 2008).

When SRHR knowledge level is low, the perceived risk of sexual activities is low, which may increase risky sexual behaviour[1] that may lead to undesirable outcomes like HIV, unintended pregnancies and illegal abortions (Amnesty International, 2010; Harding, 2008). Though, the figures about actual sexual behaviour are low among unmarried youth (15-24 years) [8.3% of the male and 0.9% of the female youth admit to have had sexual intercourse (IYARHS, 2012)[2]], an increasing number of unmarried youth is believed to have engaged in sexual activities. This is evidenced by, for example, the increasing number of sexually transmitted infections (STIs), HIV/AIDS cases, pregnancies and abortions among unmarried adolescents in Indonesia (Harding, 2008; Mepham, 2001). Moreover, while other countries in the region made progress in addressing the HIV/AIDS epidemic, the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in Indonesia went up (UNDP, 2011).

[1] Risky sexual behaviour is commonly defined as behaviour that increases one's risk of contracting sexually transmitted infections and experiencing unintended pregnancies. They include having sex at an early age, having multiple sexual partners, having sex while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and unprotected sexual behaviours (Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010).

[2] These figures might be unreliable due to the high taboo on sexual intercourse, especially before marriage.

These trends suggest an increase in risky sexual behaviour among Indonesian youth, which is most probably caused by their little knowledge of SRHR. This underlines the importance of SRHR education in schools. To tackle the stigmatization of SRHR issues and increase the awareness of youth aged 12-18 years about risky sexual behaviour, the Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) Yayasan Pelita Ilmu (YPI) carries out two SRHR programmes: DAKU and Dance4Life (D4L). Both programmes aim to increase the capacity of young people to make safe and informed SRHR decisions and are implemented at schools as extracurricular programmes. DAKU ('Dunia remajaku seru' or 'Lively Youth World') is a computer-based [3] Comprehensive Sexual Education (CSE) programme with 15 modules covering SRHR knowledge issues like HIV prevention, sexual abuse and other risky behaviour issues like drug prevention. The target groups are students from 15-19 years old. D4L on the other hand is an international programme. It employs dance, music and performing acts and focuses mainly on HIV/AIDS issues. The target group for D4L is broader than DAKU as it covers students from 12-19 years old.

## 1.2. Evaluation objectives

This report evaluates the two projects as part of the *Medefinancieringsstelsel* (MFS) II evaluation for Indonesia.[4] Both projects have been selected under Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 3. In particular, the current evaluation focusses on the following research questions: did DAKU and D4L enable students to make more informed decisions about their Sexual and Reproductive Health (SRH) activities? In particular, how did the knowledge, attitude and behaviour of students change as a result of the DAKU and D4L programmes?

We investigate for both programmes whether they enabled students to make more informed decisions. Since D4L mainly focused on HIV/AIDS related issues, the hypothesized improvement for students attending D4L in knowledge, attitude and behaviour concerns mainly HIV/AIDS issues.

The evaluation is set up as a panel data set evaluation that follows almost 300 students aged 14-19 years in 10 treatment and 4 control schools in Jakarta. In treatment schools both participants and non-participants in the programmes were selected. We collected quantitative data for these students using a self-assisted computer-based survey. Also, a school survey was administered together with the second data collection round. In addition, qualitative data was collected from 8 participating students after the programme implementation; and we interviewed YPI regarding the activities and costs of the YPI project to gain insight into costs of the programmes.

Five evaluation questions are answered to measure programme impact.

1) Change: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period?
2) Attribution: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?

[3] In 2013, also a paper-based version of DAKU has been launched by Rutgers WPF and YPI is one of the implementing organisations of this programme.
[4] It follows the baseline report of this evaluation.

3) Relevance of change: What is the relevance of these changes?
4) Efficiency: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organizations (SPO) efficient?
5) Explanations: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

## 1.3. Summary of findings

Our data shows that in the intervention schools the implementation of the DAKU and D4L programmes had already started before the baseline survey. Also, most students participating in these programmes have indicated their involvement already at the baseline phase. DAKU and D4L reached few additional participants between the baseline and endline surveys in our sample. This had implications for the evaluation design as well: it was no longer meaningful to evaluate the YPI project using difference-in-difference methodology as originally planned. Instead, we opted for multiple cross-sectional analysis.

The results of our study show that both DAKU and D4L were able to affect knowledge and attitudes of the participating students. The results are strongest for students who participated in DAKU and for students who participated in both DAKU and D4L. They show a significant increase in their knowledge about HIV/AIDS, STIs, and contraceptive methods, as well as more awareness of their rights to information about SRHR. The students who participated only in D4L showed an increase in their HIV/AIDS knowledge, but – as expected – not in any of the other topics such as STIs and pregnancy prevention. Due to the D4L programme, students showed a more accepting attitude towards people living with HIV/AIDs and homosexuality. Unfortunately, we did not find any spillover effects of the programmes, which is an important aspect of especially the D4L programme. We also did not find a change in student's opinion about premarital sex.

## 1.4. Structure of report

The rest of this report proceeds as follows; section 2 will describe the relevant literature; section 3 describes the project; section 4 describes the evaluation questions and outcome variables; section 5 the data collection. Section 6 provides the descriptive statistics. Sections 7 till 10 discuss evaluation question 1 till 4 in turn. Section 11 describes the relationship between the Capacity Development and Civil Society component to the MDG component. The last section discusses the results and concludes.

Further details about the project results are presented in a number of annexes. A summary of the project context based on the qualitative survey results is presented in Annex I, while the full report on the qualitative study can be found in Annex X. Annex II provides further information about YPI and the project. Regarding the survey data, the construction of the outcome indicators and indices is summarized in Annex III and Annex IV discusses data cleaning issues. Annex V in turn discusses whether project participants have different characteristics than non-participants, and Annex VI reports detailed descriptive statistics and explanatory variables of the sample. Detailed figures on the change in outcome indicators are presented in Annex VII, and detailed regression outcomes in Annex VIII. Finally, the representativeness of the sample is discussed in Annex IX.

## 2. Literature overview

In order to better position the SRHR education programmes of YPI, this section summarizes relevant findings on the effectiveness of SRHR education programmes conducted in the past. Special attention is placed on other DAKU and D4L evaluations.

It is important to note that most studies on SRHR focus on Sub-Saharan Africa and Western countries. Iyer et al. (2014) investigate the barriers to HIV and sexuality education in Asia and identifies four key inter-related factors hampering high-quality school-based HIV and sexuality education: cultural and contextual factors (such as religion), policy factors (the absence of supporting enabling environment), resource constraints and school-level factors (such as lack of teacher training on HIV and sexuality education).

Song et al. (2000) conducted a meta-analysis, including 67 studies, on the effects of school sexuality education programmes on the sexual knowledge of adolescents in the U.S.[5], and found that 97% of the weighted effect sizes reported in the studies were positive, indicating positive impact of the evaluated programmes. They also investigated six subcomponents of sexual knowledge: general sexuality, pregnancy, family life, HIV/AIDS, contraception and sexual transmitted infections (STIs); and found that the effect size in subcomponents was significantly positive. Therefore, the authors conclude that sexuality education programmes in the U.S. positively affect overall SRHR knowledge.

Michielsen et al. (2010) conducted a meta-analysis consisting of 31 studies (28 interventions) on the effectiveness of HIV prevention programmes, such as sexual education and condom promotion activities for youths (between 10 and 25 years old) in Sub-Saharan Africa).[6] The interventions greatly differ in intensity, ranging from reading a book for an hour to a 3-year sexual health education programme (median duration: 1 year). The majority of the included interventions were conducted in a school setting. In general, the treatment groups showed a significant improvement in knowledge and attitudes, but the authors did not find a significant impact on risky sexual behaviour, except for condom use[7], or on sexual activity. These conclusions are confirmed by Paul-Ebhohimhen et al. (2008), who conducted a systematic review of sexual education in Sub-Saharan Africa. The authors included 12 articles, of which 10 overlap with the meta-analysis of Michielsen et al. (2010). Michielsen et al. (2010) ascribe the limited impact to the poor implementation of the interventions due to, for example, resource constraints and disorganization in schools or the reluctance of

[5] The selection of studies was based on six criteria: 1) the study must have been a quantitative analysis of empirical data; 2) the study must have been conducted in a school setting; 3) the study must have been conducted in the United States; 4) the study must have been conducted during the years 1900 to 1997; 5) the sample must have included adolescents between grades five and twelve; 6) statistical data required to estimate weighted effect sizes must have been reported or available.

[6] Criteria for the selection of studies are: 1) the study must include a control group; 2) the study must have been published between January 1990 and December 2008; 3) the study must focus on the general population of young people (10-25 years) in Sub-Saharan Africa; 4) the study must report an evaluation of behavioural interventions aimed at preventing HIV transmission by reducing sexual risk taking. In total, 11 interventions used a randomized design, 5 had a pre-post design to control for exposure level and 12 used a parallel-group design comparing intervention groups with control groups.

[7] The increase in the use of condoms at last sex was found among males. Condom use at last sex was 1.46 times higher for males in the intervention group than in the control group.

teachers and health professionals to discuss the use of condoms with youths. In addition, the authors suggest that the lack of impact on behaviour could be due to the focus on HIV/AIDS prevention thereby forgetting other important issues like STIs and contraception.

Fonner et al. (2014) conducted a systematic review to study the impact of school-based sex education on HIV-related risk behaviours (age 9 to 38) in low- and middle income countries. Interventions ranged from 2 or 3 hours in total to spanning multiple years and involving community-based components. A wide range of study designs were eligible for inclusion in the meta-analysis[8], leading to a total of 69 studies. However, only 6.3% of the eligible studies were implemented in South Asia. Over the whole sample, Fonner et al (2014) find that HIV knowledge of youth that participated in any intervention significantly increased compared to youth who did not participate. Also self-efficacy related to HIV prevention (e.g., confidence in refusing sex or confidence in using condoms during sex) was significantly higher for those who participated. The studies that reported on condom use (3 out of 12) found a significant increase for the intervention groups compared to the comparison groups. Regarding behaviour, participants reported a 34% reduction in sexual activity compared to comparison groups. The authors conclude that school-based sex education is an effective intervention for generating HIV-related knowledge and decreasing sexual risk behaviours.

Rijsdijk et al. (2011) conducted an impact evaluation of the Ugandan SRHR programme: the World Starts With Me (WSWM), on which DAKU is based. Besides a few differences (see Annex II), the programmes have the same aims, methodology and message. The results of the intervention on safe sexual knowledge, attitude, and behaviour were mixed. On the one hand, positive significant impact was found for a number of outcomes, like detecting wrong beliefs on how to prevent pregnancy, intention to use a condom in the future, and intention to delay sexual intercourse. On the other hand, the comparison group significantly increased their knowledge scores relating to identifying misconceptions related to HIV compared to the treatment group. No impact of the intervention was found for schools which implemented only half of the programme. However, schools which indicated to have followed the programme only partially, adapting the material to their environment, revealed a slightly higher impact of the programme compared to schools which followed the implementation manual strictly. Overall, the authors conclude that the effectiveness of the programme could be improved by paying more attention to the context in which the programme is implemented.

The Indonesian DAKU programme has been evaluated by Rutgers WPF herself, the Dutch partner organisation of YPI. A quasi-experimental design with pre- and post-tests in both intervention (treatment) and control schools was employed in this study[9]. In total 2044 students from DAKU schools and 2214 students from control schools (79 schools) in grade 10 and 11 were asked to fill in

[8] Inclusion criteria: provided estimate of effect size and its variance, pre-post or multi-arm results comparing before-after or control group, presented outcome of interest comparable to other studies and presented data in individuals.

[9] The study also included a process evaluation, concluding that the DAKU module was perceived very useful and attractive to the students. In addition, teachers were interviewed to measure their opinion about SRHR issues. The evaluation after the involvement of the teachers as facilitators, several attitudes became more accepted. However, found that most teachers still pushed their personal attitude on the students.

an anonymous questionnaire. The ratio of women-men was about 3-1; the rate of attrition was about 13-21%. Due to the anonymous nature of the questionnaire it could not be evaluated if the attrition was systematic or not. However, the reasons for not filling in the questionnaire seemed to be random (e.g. sick at home, move to other schools). The study did not find any results on the behaviour of students with respect to sexual intercourse, other sexual activities, condom use or the intended delay in sexual intercourse. However, results were found for SRHR knowledge in a number of occasions (e.g. HIV transmission, STI transmission, knowledge on behaviour leading to pregnancy). Though, it must be mentioned that the myths around sexual intercourse were still high after the intervention. In addition, a positive result was found on the attitude towards the right for sexual intercourse. The effect of the intervention on the risk perception and self-efficacy related to sexual intercourse was mixed (Rutgers WPF, 2011).

Another evaluation carried out by Rutgers WPF is the evaluation of the UNITE For BODY RIGTHS Programme (UFBR) in Indonesia. So far only a baseline report has been written. The UFBR aims at "improving sexual reproductive rights in developing countries among women, men, adolescents and marginalized groups regardless of their cultural and religious background, age, gender and sexual orientation through its local partners" (p. 1). In Indonesia several NGOs, including YPI, joint forces to work on this aim: ONE VISION ALLIANCE. To obtain the aim the alliance wants to design several interventions. A quantitative evaluation among 983 students (485 junior high school students aged 12-14 years; 498 senior high school students aged 15-18 years) from 17 high schools (8 junior high schools and 9 senior high schools) was conducted to help designing the interventions. The students are located in 4 provinces and asked to fill in a KAP (Knowledge, Attitude and Practice) survey. Among others, the results displayed that about 3% of the female and 9% of the male senior high school students acknowledge to have had sexual intercourse. Most students have heard about HIV. However knowledge concerning HIV transmission and prevention is low; and pre-marital sex and homosexuality is not acceptable for almost all students (BASELINE REPORT FOR THE UNITE for BODY RIGHTS PROGRAMME IN INDONESIA, n.d.).

The Royal Tropical Institute (KIT) conducted an assessment about D4L in Uganda and Russia to evaluate the effect of the programme on the lives of young people and their community. As far as interviewed participants, the results show that in Uganda all participants reported that D4L had a positive effect on their lives, especially with respect to HIV knowledge and related discriminating and stigmatizing behaviour. In Russia most participants reported a positive effect as well, not only in terms of gained knowledge, but also in terms of self-confidence, tolerance, HIV/SRHR stigmatization and taboos, and in their actual sexual and reproductive behaviour (van der Kwaak & 't Hooft, 2012).

In sum, these evaluations show that SRHR programmes are partially effective. School-based sex education programmes significantly changes SRHR knowledge and attitude, but it only has a minor, if any, effect on sexual behavioural intention and activity. 2 out of the 5 meta-analyses conclude that SRHR interventions significantly change actual sexual behaviour of the youth.

# 3. The project

## 3.1. Project description

Yayasan Pelita Ilmu (YPI) provides SRHR education and services focusing on HIV prevention, voluntary counselling and testing (VCT), health services, and support for PLHIV (people living with HIV-AIDS) in Southern Jakarta. As the ultimate mission YPI wants to develop an independent, productive and healthy community and access to youth-friendly health services. Through two education programmes, DAKU and Dance4Life (D4L), YPI aims to increase the capacity of young people to make safe and informed decisions related to SRHR. In particular, as a result of the sexual education programmes, it is expected that young people increase their demand for SRH services, and they become more empowered to demand good quality services that cater their needs.

DAKU is a national programme, targeting senior high school students (15-19 years). D4L on the other hand is a global SRHR education programme, targeting high school students aged 12-19 years. Both programmes are implemented at schools as an extracurricular programme. DAKU is a computer-based programme consisting of 15 modules covering various aspects, such as HIV prevention, sexuality, and sexual abuse. Albeit comprehensive in nature, DAKU can only reach about 30 students per class due to its reliance of the computer lab. However, in 2013 a paper-based version of DAKU has been started in order to reach more students at schools and offer more flexibility in the form of delivering the lessons.

D4L is a social activity and for reaching her aims it employs dance, music, and performing arts. D4L consists of four stages: inspire, educate, activate, and celebrate (at World AIDS day). The programme applies dance and music as its approach to motivate students to learn about SRHR and share their knowledge with their environment. The educative part of the D4L curriculum consists of a 2.5 hour session on HIV/AIDS issues.

## 3.2. Project implementation

The implementation of DAKU and D4L differ in the schools: while D4L is implemented by YPI, the DAKU modules are facilitated by school teachers trained by YPI. In addition, the education component of D4L is implemented in only one session (about two hours), while DAKU covers 15 sessions if implemented fully.

In 2011 and 2012, YPI worked with 33 and 24 teachers, respectively, on the computer-based DAKU programme. In 2012, 14 teachers (from 9 schools) were trained on DAKU, while in 2011 there were no trainings. In 2013, 19 teachers (from 12 schools) were trained on the paper-based DAKU, while in total 22 teachers where involved in teaching DAKU (on the computer or on paper).

The schools participating in both sexual education programmes are selected annually as a result of consultations between YPI and the schools. YPI has a mandate to engage new schools into the D4L programme every year. However, some schools also drop out from the programmes, for example, due to busy student schedule or lack of interest from the school principal.

Often the schools implementing DAKU and D4L overlap. This can be explained by the fact that it may be easier to engage those schools in the D4L programme that already participated in DAKU (or vice versa) because, in general, these schools have a more open attitude towards sexual education. In

addition, it is easy to imagine, how DAKU could fit in the Educate module of D4L,[10] hence extending this component into a comprehensive sexual education curriculum.


It is also important to note that while the evaluation focuses on the computer-based DAKU and D4L, YPI's mandate for the MFS II period has been to implement the paper-based DAKU and take part in rolling out a comprehensive sexual education programme for junior high school students called SETARA. However, due to delays in the development of these tools, it was not possible for the evaluation to identify and sample students who later took part in these new programmes.

Further information about YPI, DAKU, and D4L as well as a detailed description about the realized activities is provided in Annex II.

## 3.3. Result chain

The result chain of both DAKU and D4L is displayed in Figure 1. As mentioned, the ultimate aim of both programmes is to encourage safe SRHR behaviour. The sexual behaviour of a person depends on several factors; among them are SRHR knowledge, SRHR attitude, SRH behaviour intention, social influence, and other factors like age and gender. As the figure shows, both DAKU and D4L direct aims are to increase the SRHR knowledge and change the attitude towards and the social opinion on SRHR [D4L: HIV/AIDS] issues. Both programmes aim at changing the attitude and social opinion about SRHR issues directly, but also indirectly via a knowledge increase.

**Figure 1: Result chain**




[10] This aspect of combining DAKU and D4L at the same schools has been pointed out by Rutgers WPF. This may work well for the paper-based DAKU.

### 3.4. Possible unintended impacts

Some people, like religious leaders or policy makers, might argue that talking about SRHR increase sexual activity or increased acceptance of premarital sex among the youth. Therefore, it must be explicitly mentioned that both programmes do *not* want to encourage any (premarital) sexual activity. The programmes aim at increasing *safe* SRH behaviour. Safe SRH behaviour includes delayed (intentional) sexual intercourse. We do not expect that the programmes altered the actual sexual behaviour of students. However, seen the general concern in Indonesia about SRHR education (see introduction) it is important to investigate this issue. The outcome variables are grouped under the 'unintended effects', since the programmes do not intent to change these outcomes.

## 4. Evaluation questions and outcome variables

### 4.1. Evaluation questions

The call for proposals outlines 5 general evaluation questions. Table 1 shows these five questions and what it implies for this project.

**Table 1: Overview general and specific evaluation questions**

| Number | General evaluation question | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Change: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period? | How did the knowledge, attitude and behaviour of students change? |
| 2 | Attribution: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)? | Did the CSE programmes (DAKU and D4L) enable students to make more informed decisions about their sexual activities? In particular, how did the knowledge, attitude and behaviour of students change as a result of the CSE programmes? |
| 3 | Relevance of change: What is the relevance of these changes? | • The size of the impact<br>  • Did the D4L project activate students to inform others about SRHR in their school and/or community?<br>• Representativeness of the sample<br>• Does the project address an important issue for the beneficiaries?<br>• Satisfaction of beneficiaries (self-reported impact) |
| 4 | Efficiency: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organizations efficient? | Was the intervention cost effective? |
| 5 | Explanations: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above? | Why did things work out/not work out?<br>The evaluation question is answered throughout the other evaluation questions and in the end discussion. |

## 4.2. Outcome indicators

To answer the first two evaluation questions (change and attribution) we identified specific outcome indicators. The outcome indicators are split up into three sub-categories: knowledge, attitude, and behaviour. These three factors are sequentially linked (see section 3.3). In addition, we also include the unintended effects variables as identified above (see section 3.4). Since there are many possible and interesting outcome indicators, variables are grouped into indices for the main analysis.

Table 2 displays the outcome indicators of the main analysis, the scale of these variables and whether the indicator is a uniform indicator[11], while Annex III describes the outcome indicators in more detail and highlights the components per index. For all outcome variables (Panel A to C) 'the higher, the better' rule applies.

[11] The uniform outcome indicators as laid out by the synthesis team for MDG 3 could only be collected on one of the uniform indicators: attitude towards gender based violence by women and men (Index on the attitude towards GBV).

**Table 2: Overview outcome indicators**

| Outcome indicator | Scale (minimum; maximum) | Uniform indicator |
|---|---|---|
| **Panel A. Knowledge** | | |
| Index on HIV/AIDS knowledge | (0;17) | |
| Index on knowledge about counselling | (0;2) | |
| Index on other STI knowledge | (0;3) | |
| Index on contraceptive knowledge | (0;2) | |
| Awareness of rights to SRHR information (%) | (0-100%) | |
| **Panel B. Attitude** | | |
| Index on the attitude towards relationships | (0;8) | |
| Index on the attitude towards GBV | (0;5) | X |
| Acceptance of HIV/AIDS rights (%) | (0-100%) | |
| Acceptance of homosexuality (%) | (0-100%) | |
| Acceptance of contraceptive (%) | (0-100%) | |
| Action in case STI is suspected: inform partner (%) | (0-100%) | |
| Action in case STI is suspected: seeing a doctor (%) | (0-100%) | |
| **Panel C. Behaviour** | | |
| Discussion intimate relationship (%) | (0-100%) | |
| Consultation of a clinic for SRHR related matters (%) | (0-100%) | |
| **Panel D. Unintended effects** | | |
| Acceptance of premarital sex (%) | (0-100%) | |
| Index on sexual activity | (0;8) | |

# 5. Data collection

This section describes the survey instruments and the sampling design and outcome at the school level and student level in turn.

## 5.1. Survey instruments

We collected four types of data: quantitative, qualitative, financial, and secondary data. The following paragraphs list the survey instruments used for each type of data.

### *Quantitative data*

To analyse the impact of the programmes, two surveys have been conducted to collect quantitative data:

- Student survey: data was collected using a self-assisted computer-based survey for students, which allowed students to privately answer sensitive questions. We tried to formulate questions to minimize normative responses. The questionnaire had a multiple choice layout, which provides room for leading questions and random guessing. The baseline data have been collected at the end of October and the beginning of November 2012; the endline data in May or September 2013 assisted by the same student.
- School survey: a school survey was administered together with the student endline survey. A responsible staff member of the school was asked about a number of school related items (number of students per grade, participation in sexual reproductive programmes).

### *Qualitative data*

To gain more insight into the impact of the programmes a qualitative analysis was conducted. Eight participating students in DAKU and D4L were individually interviewed on the same topics covered in the quantitative survey. The eight students were selected out of the students from our sample who indicated to have or have had a boy- or girlfriend. The results of this study are summarized in Annex X.

### *Financial data collection*

To collect information about the costs of the project on the targeted beneficiaries (senior high school students participating in SRHR education), we conducted a project cost survey with the project manager, financial manager, and two programme officers of YPI.

### *Secondary data*

Besides our own surveys, we also used other data sources in this report. We have used the young adult subsample of the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) to compare our sample characteristics with the general youth population characteristics (see Annex IX). Next, we used the annual reports of YPI to collect project information.

## 5.2. Sampling outcome at the school level

### *Sampling design*

The evaluation focuses on vocational senior high schools. Based on our information at the baseline period, [12] 12 senior high schools implemented either DAKU or D4L in 2012, and 10 of these have been sampled for the evaluation. In addition to the treatment schools, we randomly selected 3 public vocational senior high schools and 2 private Muslim vocational senior high schools in the same area to form the comparison group. Hence, a total of 15 schools were selected for the evaluation. Note that randomized assignment of schools into treatment was not possible as schools participate based on agreement with YPI.

[12] YPI provided us with a list of schools.

### *Sampling outcome*


For the final sample we dropped one treatment school because the programme was implemented with junior instead of senior high school students. Four out of the remaining nine treatment schools had a different treatment status than expected in the baseline report. Based on the YPI listings, we sampled 3 DAKU schools, 4 D4L schools, and 2 DAKU&D4L schools. However, according to the information of the school survey all schools implementing DAKU also implemented D4L. One sampled D4L school did implement DAKU as well. Therefore we focus on the actual treatment status (based on the outcomes of the school survey) in this report: the sample contains five comparison schools, three schools which implemented only D4L, and six schools which implemented both DAKU and D4L.[13]

The school survey also revealed all schools started the intervention already before the first study. In addition, some of the schools participated in the programmes before the 2012-2013 school year, and did not continue their implementation during the evaluation period (3). Hence, the first survey cannot be taken as a true baseline survey. Figure 2 displays the timing issues graphically. The horizontal lines/arrows show the period of implementation of the programmes at each school, while the vertical columns indicate the timing of the surveys. Note that in two schools the endline survey had to be postponed to September due to request of the schools.

The section 8.1 discusses the implications of this finding for the methodology in detail. More information about the data cleaning is given in Annex IV.

[13] 2 out of the 5 comparison schools report to have implemented another CSE programme during the past school year. Unfortunately we do not have information about the participation of the student in our sample in the programmes. It appeared that not many students at the school level participated. Hence, we disregard this issue, based on the expectation that these were fairly small interventions. If anything, our results will be an underestimate of the DKU & D4L programme impact.

**Figure 2: Timing of the intervention and student surveys**




Source: School survey E12, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia.

## 5.3. Sampling outcome at the student level

### *Sampling design*

In each senior high school 20 students were randomly selected among first and second grade students[14], stratified by gender. We obtained the list of participation students from the schools, who were responsible for the selection of students into the programmes. Based on the list, in treatment schools we stratified our sample based on CSE participation: we interviewed 10 participants (treatment group) and 10 non-participants who were expected to indirectly benefit from the programme through social contacts with their participating classmates (spillover group).

### *Sampling outcome*

All students, except for one, were interviewed in both rounds of data collection.[15] Hence, the attrition rate is very low. In the analysis we use data on the 279 students interviewed in both evaluation rounds. They are divided almost equally over the three treatment groups: comparison, treatment and spillover.

[14] Senior high consists of 3 years of schooling. If a student dropped out or graduated between the base- and endline survey, the student was tracked at home to complete the endline survey.
[15] Due to personal reasons the school did not allow us to track this student at home.

The stratification in treatment schools was based on their participation in DAKU or D4L. However, at the endline it appeared that the actual treatment status of students (based on self-reported participation) often differed from the listings provided by the schools. In order to give a better estimate of the impact of the programme, we use the treatment status as indicated by the students at the endline survey to distinguish between different types student.[16]

**Table 3: Recognition and participation in the programme by school treatment status**

| Column number | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| School | | Comp | D4L-only | DAKU & D4L |
| Participant status | Survey year | Comp | All | All |
| Variable name \ Sample size | | [n=99] | [n=60] | [n=120] |
| Percentage of students who have heard of DAKU (%) | base | 2.8% | 9.1% | 58.3% |
| | end | 5.6% | 18.4% | 75.1% |
| Percentage of students who have heard of D4L (%) | base | 7.6% | 63.0% | 84.6% |
| | end | 14.8% | 82.2% | 86.9% |
| Percentage of students who ever participated in DAKU, never in D4L (%) | base | 0.0% | 0.0% | 11.0% |
| | end | 0.0% | 0.0% | 12.8% |
| Percentage of students who ever participated in D4L, never in DAKU (%) | base | 0.0% | 39.8% | 26.9% |
| | end | 0.0% | 46.6% | 17.3% |
| Percentage of students who ever participated in DAKU and D4L (%) | base | 0.0% | 0.0% | 28.7% |
| | end | 0.0% | 0.0% | 43.8% |

Source: Student base- and endline survey E12, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia.
Notes:
- The treatment status of schools is displayed as actual treatment.
- Observations are weighted proportional to the inverse of the probability of being included in the sample due to stratification.

Table 3 shows the participation rates of students at the school level. The responses of the students are weighted proportionally to the inverse of the probability of the students being included in the sample.[17] Therefore, the results in the table are representative at the school level and the percentages display the average percentage of students who have heard of DAKU at the school level.

[16] Some errors and/or typos appeared in this self-reported treatment status. First, 8 (baseline: 2) students reported to have participated in DAKU, while they are attending a comparison school or a school which only implemented D4L. 2 students (baseline: 1) of the comparison schools report to have participated in D4L. We have set those participation rates to zero for those observations. Secondly, 6 students indicated to have participated in DAKU at the baseline, but reported not to have participated at the endline. For D4L these are 15 students. This is in itself a rather important outcome. Apparently 3.3% of the students attending a treatment school forgot that they participated in DAKU; even 7.8% for D4L. We have not corrected those participation rates at the endline survey. Hence, these students appear in the spillover group in the analysis.

[17] The weights are normalised such that each school has an equal weight in the sample.

**Table 4: Recognition and participation in the programme by assigned participation**

| Column number | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| School | | D4L-only | | DAKU & D4L | |
| Participant status | Survey year | Ass. Treat | Spillover | Ass. Treat | Spillover |
| Variable name \ Sample size | | [n=30] | [n=30] | [n=70] | [n=50] |
| Percentage of students who have heard of DAKU (%) | base | 6.7% | 10.0% | 57.1% | 52.0% |
| | end | 23.3% | 20.0% | 75.7% | 62.0% |
| Percentage of students who have heard of D4L (%) | base | 90.0% | 53.3% | 87.1% | 72.0% |
| | end | 86.7% | 80.0% | 90.0% | 74.0% |
| Percentage of students who ever participated in DAKU, never in D4L (%) | base | 0.0% | 0.0% | 10.0% | 12.0% |
| | end | 0.0% | 0.0% | 11.4% | 14.0% |
| Percentage of students who ever participated in D4L, never in DAKU (%) | base | 73.3% | 26.7% | 25.7% | 14.0% |
| | end | 66.7% | 43.3% | 17.1% | 14.0% |
| Percentage of students who ever participated in DAKU and D4L (%) | base | 0.0% | 0.0% | 37.1% | 8.0% |
| | end | 0.0% | 0.0% | 51.4% | 16.0% |

Source: Student base- and endline survey E12, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia.
Notes:
- The treatment status of schools is displayed as actual treatment.
- Observations are weighted proportional to the inverse of the probability of being included in the sample due to stratification.

Investigating the differences between intended and actual treatment status of the students, Table 4 reports the self-reported participation rates of students in the assigned treatment and spillover groups. In addition to participation, the table also shows the percentage of students who have heard about DAKU and D4L.

The results show that only a small fraction of students in the comparison schools have heard of DAKU and D4L (Table 3). In both D4L-only and DAKU&D4L schools, most students already participated in DAKU and/or D4L at the baseline. Though at the endline, more students participated in both programmes. The increase in participants of both DAKU&D4L at the endline stems from an increase in participants in DAKU. Table 4 shows that in the treatment group in D4L-only schools the percentage of students participating in D4L dropped at the endline compared to the baseline from 73.3% to 66.7%. This drop could be due to several reasons: the student misreported their participation status in either baseline or endline, or the students forgot at the endline that they participated in the programme. Note that especially in the D4L-only schools, a significant number of students from the listed spillover group participated in the programme.

## 6. Descriptive statistics

This section summarizes the main differences between the comparison and treatment schools (D4L only and D4L&DAKU) using baseline data (except if mentioned otherwise). The tables are provided in

Annex VI. All figures in the tables are representative at the school level. In tables using the student survey, the group means (in columns 2, 3 and 5) and significance levels (p-values) have been calculated using sampling weights to correct for stratification by gender and assigned treatment status. The p-values (in columns 4 and 6) indicate significant differences between the particular treatment and comparison school. There is a significant difference between treatment and comparison schools when the p-vale us is below 0.05, meaning that the probability that the means in the two groups are equal is less than 5%. In the calculation of the P-values we corrected for clustering at the school level.[18]

## 6.1. Number of students per school

Looking at the number of students in (grades 1-3) per school among the treatment groups (Table 15 in Annex VI), we observe that the treatment schools are on average somewhat larger than the comparison schools (551 students in D4L and 571 in DAKU&D4L vs. 521 in comparison schools). The percentage of girls is higher in all school types in average: 70% in the treatment schools and 62-64% in the treatment schools. Due to the low sample size (n=13) no statistical inferences on these differences can be drawn.

## 6.2. General student characteristics at baseline

To provide a better insight into the general characteristics of our sample, Table 5 displays age, gender, grade, religion, number of siblings, final grade last school year, and the education level of the father respectively mother. 'Final grades last school year' and the 'education level of both parents' are included as proxies for school quality. [19]

[18] This means that the standard errors are allowed to have an arbitrary correlation for students within the same school. In other words, we allow students in the same school to be more similar to each other than they are to a different randomly selected student in another school.

[19] The baseline report already described most of these time invariant characteristics of the sample between different groups (see table 12 of the baseline report). However, results were displayed by gender and by assigned treatment status of the student. The results displayed here will use the actual treatment status of the student as this will be the division used in the impact analysis.

**Table 5: General characteristics of the sample at baseline**

| School type | Comparison | D4L-only | P-value C. vs. D4L | DAKU&D4L | P-value C. vs. DAKU&D4L |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Sample size** | n=99 | n=60 | | n=120 | |
| Age | 15.9 | 16.8 | 0.000 | 16.6 | 0.000 |
| Gender (% female) | 38.3% | 31.2% | 0.377 | 57.0% | 0.011 |
| Grade (%) | | | | | |
| First grade | 60.6% | 15.7% | 0.000 | 14.1% | 0.000 |
| Second grade | 39.4% | 84.3% | 0.000 | 60.5% | 0.002 |
| Third grade | 0.0% | 0.0% | . | 25.4% | 0.000 |
| Religion: Islam (%) | 100.0% | 100.% | . | 100% | . |
| Number of siblings | 2.3 | 2.9 | 0.116 | 2.2 | 0.732 |
| Final/UN grade last school year | | | | | |
| *Mathematics* | 7.1 | 6.5 | 0.058 | 7.8 | 0.006 |
| *Indonesian* | 7.3 | 7.7 | 0.029 | 7.7 | 0.016 |
| *English* | 7.2 | 7.3 | 0.655 | 7.4 | 0.310 |
| Education level of father (%) | | | | | |
| *No education* | 1.3% | 0.0% | 0.318 | 0.0% | 0.318 |
| *Primary education* | 24.3% | 25.8% | 0.852 | 16.4% | 0.225 |
| *Secondary education* | 35.1% | 29.8% | 0.544 | 32.4% | 0.725 |
| *Vocational school* | 34.0% | 41.4% | 0.422 | 40.3% | 0.395 |
| *University or collage* | 5.4% | 3.0% | 0.487 | 10.8% | 0.197 |
| Education level of mother (%) | | | | | |
| *No education* | 0.0% | 0.0% | . | 0.7% | 0.320 |
| *Primary education* | 27.8% | 26.7% | 0.893 | 22.5% | 0.435 |
| *Secondary education* | 38.6% | 37.6% | 0.912 | 39.3% | 0.929 |
| *Vocational school* | 26.6% | 31.2% | 0.591 | 22.6% | 0.537 |
| *University or college* | 7.1% | 4.6% | 0.562 | 15.0% | 0.116 |

Source: Student baseline survey E12, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes:
- Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the school level.
- Observations are weighted proportional to the inverse of the probability of being included in the sample due to stratification.

The results show that students in both of the treatment schools are significantly older than students in the comparison group. This is due for two reasons: 1) in comparison schools we sampled only first and second graders, while in the treatment schools students from the third grade were sampled as well; 2) in the comparison group most students in the sample attend grade 1, while in treatment

schools most students attend grade 2.[20] Since age[21] is an important determinant of SRHR knowledge, attitude and behaviour, we include age as a covariate when we estimate the impact of the intervention.

The number of females in the comparison and D4L-only schools is comparable, about 31-38% of the sample is female. In DAKU&D4L schools 57% of the students are female, significantly more than in the comparison group. This is due to the fact that in some schools more females than males participated in the programme. As with age, gender can be an important determinant for the outcome variables. Hence, gender is included as a covariate as well when we estimate the impact of the intervention.

Apart from age and gender no statistical significances between the treatment groups are found for any of the reported time invariant characteristics. This indicates that the school quality, proxied by 'final grades last school year' and the 'education level of both parents', is comparable between the schools.

## 6.3. Students out of school activities and exposure to media

The students were asked what their preferred place and separately activity is after school time (endline survey). In addition, questions were asked about their level of exposure to Western media to get an insight into the exposure level of Western influences to these students. Table 17 in Annex VI displays the results.

Most students prefer to be at home when they are free, with visiting friends on the second place. With respect to activities, students prefer to play on the computer, surf the internet, watch TV, listen to music/radio and chat with friends.[22] Almost all students go out to a discotheque occasionally. Some statistical significant differences between treatment types (comparison, D4L and DAKU&D4L) are found, but those are only small in nature.

With respect to the exposure to Western media, television appears to be the most common media source used in the past 6 months. Almost all students listen frequently or occasionally to religious broadcasting. Indonesian popular music and films are slightly more popular than Western popular music and films. Overall, the exposure level to Western influences seems moderate. Again, some significant differences between treatment types are present, but no overall significant differences between groups are found.

[20] Hence, without the third graders in the sample, students in both treatment groups are still significantly older than students in the comparison group (results not displayed).

[21] Grade is an important determinant as well if students receive information about SRHR issues in a particular grade or if students are influenced by their (younger/older) classmates' knowledge, attitude or behaviour. Since grade and age are highly correlated and age is endogenous to other factors influencing the outcome variables, age instead of grade is used as a covariate.

[22] Feedback from Rutgers WPF verifies this finding. Their Operational Research, currently conducted under UFBR's ASK programme, found that home computer is the first option for young people to access knowledge, affirming the importance of parents in strengthening the CSE impacts on their children. In addition, Rutgers WPF noted that this finding is a good example of the importance of the Enabling Environment in UFBR: in order to facilitate the CSE learning, parents need to be involved in the programme. This was also discussed during the process of Outcomes Measurement (OM) Survey for UFBR in 2013.

## 6.4. Relationship and sexual behaviour of students

An important descriptive statistics for the current study is the relationship and sexual behaviour of students (see Table 18 in Annex VI). As it appears, 76-90% of the sampled students ever had a boy- or girlfriend at time of the baseline survey. No significant differences are found between the treatment types.

Despite the high number of students who engaged in a relationship, the rate of sexual activities of students is low: none of the girls reported to ever have had sex, while 2.5-2.7% of the boys in treatment schools and none of the boys in the comparison schools have done so (as reported in the baseline report).[23] Due to the taboo on sexual intercourse before marriage (see introduction) the figures might be underreported.

## 6.5. Information on SRHR at the schools

Table 19 in Annex VI summarizes SRHR related topics that have been discussed in class (for example in biology class) at the schools over the past school year. According to the school management of the 5 schools implementing DAKU (school survey), a range of topics (including SRHR issues, puberty, drugs, etc.) were covered during the classes. As expected, only a subset of those topics was covered in the D4L programme. This subset varies by school, but in all schools D4L covered 'HIV/AIDS' and 'other STIs' issues. 3 treatment and 2 comparison schools indicated to have discussed 'HIV/AIDS', 'other STIs', 'SRHR', and 'drugs and narcotics' issues in another SRHR education programme than DAKU or D4L. Apart from SRHR programmes, only 1 treatment school discussed the human sexual reproduction system in biology class. Hence, in the schools, most information about SRHR issues can only be learned in the framework of specific SRHR programmes implemented at the school.

## 6.6. Correlates of programme participation

As mentioned earlier, we use self-reported actual participation in the DAKU and D4L programmes. It appears that students could decide themselves whether they wanted to participate in the programmes. Therefore, it is important that in the analysis we control for observable student characteristics that is different between participants and non-participants. Annex V investigates which (if any) observable characteristics are correlated with student participation. We find that the gender of the student (being a female) and preferences to go to a concert/cinema are positively correlated to involvement into the programmes; preferences to play sports is negatively correlated with selection into the programme. The last correlation may be partially explained by the fact that both playing sports and attending DAKU or D4L are both extracurricular activities, and the students may not have time to participate in both.

The next sections describe per evaluation question the methodology and the results of the analysis.

[23] For more information on sexual activity of the students see Table 22 reporting on unintended effects of the project in Annex VII.

# 7. Evaluation question 1: Change in outcomes

This section discusses evaluation question 1: What are the changes under each MDG or theme at community/household level during the 2012–2014 period? The changes in the outcome indicators for the period measured between the base- and endline survey (2012-2013 school year) are reported below grouped into four categories: knowledge, attitude, behaviour, and unintended effects.

Table 6 displays the results per school type[24] for all outcome indicators. The indicators are calculated to be representative at the school level. Hence, in treatment schools they include both programme participants and non-participant students expected to indirectly benefit from the programme. Results separately for programme participants and the spillover group[25] are presented in Annex VII.[26] The following subsections discuss the levels and changes in the outcome indicators grouped by indicators for knowledge, attitude, behaviour and unintended effects.

## 7.1. Knowledge indicators

Panel A in Table 6 shows that, on average, knowledge levels are moderate for HIV/AIDS issues (6.7-9.5 out of 17) and also for students awareness about their rights to receive SRHR information (78-85%) and low for the awareness of counselling services (0.1-0.3 out of 2), STI (0.6-1.1 out of 3) and contraceptive knowledge (0.4-0.7 out of 2) at time of the baseline. Looking at changes over time within each type of schools (we are **not yet** comparing treatment with control), we see that knowledge levels at time of base- and endline are comparable for both treatment and control schools. Three exceptions stand out: 1) the students in the comparison schools more than doubled their knowledge about counselling; 2) the comparison schools increased their knowledge on contraceptive knowledge with 30%; and 3) the DAKU&D4L group experienced a 'loss' in their knowledge level on HIV/AIDS issues of almost 1 point. Hence, contrary to the expectations, on average the students in the DAKU&D4L group answered 1 HIV/AIDS related question more incorrect at the endline than at the baseline.

[24] For the school types we use the actual intervention status as self-reported by schools.
[25] We use the self-reported participation of students to define the participant and spillover groups.
[26] Table 23 in Annex VII also shows the number of students that improved or deteriorated on the outcome indicators.

**Table 6: Change in outcome indicators over time**

| Student type | Comp. | | D4L-type | | DAKU&D4L | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sample size | [n=99] | | [n=60] | | [n=120] | |
| Survey | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End |
| **Panel A. Knowledge** | | | | | | |
| Index on HIV/AIDS knowledge (0-17) | 6.67 | 6.43 | 7.84 | 8.12 | 9.47 | 8.55 |
| Index on counselling knowledge (0-2) | 0.13 | 0.28 | 0.20 | 0.26 | 0.34 | 0.41 |
| Index on STI knowledge (0-3) | 0.58 | 0.64 | 0.65 | 0.67 | 1.07 | 1.09 |
| Index on contraceptive knowledge (0-2) | 0.37 | 0.48 | 0.63 | 0.61 | 0.67 | 0.63 |
| Awareness of rights to SRHR information | 77.9% | 78.2% | 79.8% | 76.1% | 85.0% | 88.7% |
| **Panel B. Attitude** | | | | | | |
| Index on relationship (0-8) | 3.72 | 4.09 | 3.65 | 4.12 | 4.23 | 4.28 |
| Index on attitude towards GBV (0-5) | 4.12 | 3.86 | 3.92 | 4.05 | 4.11 | 4.03 |
| Acceptance of HIV/AIDS rights | 41.0% | 58.1% | 55.2% | 58.3% | 70.0% | 74.2% |
| Acceptance of homosexuality | 7.7% | 7.5% | 17.8% | 6.8% | 21.7% | 12.9% |
| Acceptance of contraceptive | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Action in case STI is suspected: inform partner | 32.6% [n=33] | 40.2% [n=37] | 43.8% [n=18] | 28.6% [n=22] | 37.7% [n=58] | 40.1% [n=61] |
| Action in case STI is suspected: seeing a doctor | 86.9% [n=33] | 90.4% [n=37] | 71.6% [n=18] | 59.1% [n=22] | 97.1% [n=58] | 92.6% [n=61] |
| **Panel C. Behaviour** | | | | | | |
| Discussion intimate relationship | 25.6% | 29.2% | 35.4% | 30.1% | 38.9% | 41.0% |
| Consultation of a clinic for SRHR related matters | 13.7% | 25.6% | 18.2% | 21.2% | 15.2% | 20.7% |
| **Panel D. Unintended effects** | | | | | | |
| Acceptance of premarital sex | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Index on sexual activity (0-8) | 1.35 | 1.78 | 2.73 | 3.11 | 1.71 | 2.20 |

Source: Student base- and endline survey E12, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes:
- If the sample size deviates, the sample size is displayed in brackets.
- Observations are weighted proportional to the inverse of the probability of being included in the sample due to stratification.

## 7.2. Attitude indicators

Panel B of Table 6 indicates that, on average, about half of the statements (3.7-4.2 out of 8) on relationships were correctly indicated as good/bad at the time of the baseline. The scores on attitude towards Gender Based Violence (GBV) are closer to the desired outcome: on average 3.9-4.1 out of 5 statements are agreed upon by students to be an incorrect attitude or behaviour. On average, 41-70% of the students agreed that HIV/AIDS patients have the same rights as other persons. For all mentioned indicators, the scores are comparable between the base- and endline in ally treatment types. The acceptance of homosexuality was significantly lower for both treatment groups (6.8-12.9%) at the endline compared to the baseline.

At both baseline and endline, *none* of the students agreed with the statement 'I think that unmarried boys and girls should use a contraceptive to prevent pregnancy if they have sex with each other.' Therefore, it was not possible to include this variable in our analysis. The low outcome could be due to two reasons:

- The attitude towards premarital sexual intercourse (see unintended effects) is in general negative (see below)
- Inadequate knowledge about the need to use contraceptive methods to prevent pregnancy

About 29-44% of the students would inform their partner in case they suspect to have a STI; 72-97% would visit a doctor at time of the baseline. However, only a low number of students were asked to answer this question (students needed to know what a STI is). Due to the low sample size for these variables we drop these variables from later analysis.

## 7.3. Behaviour indicators

Panel C of Table 6 shows that 26-39% of the students discussed intimate relationships with their friends at time of the baseline. The percentages of the endline survey display similar levels. On average, 14-18% of the students consulted a health centre/clinic for SRHR related matters in the past year at time of the baseline. At the endline more students indicated to have visited a clinic, but this change can be due to age solely. The older a student becomes, the more likely s/he will or has engaged in sexual activities and the higher the 'need' to visit a clinic.

## 7.4. Unintended effects

Looking at Panel D Table 6, we observe that in both at the base- and endline, none of the students agreed with the statement 'I believe there is nothing wrong with unmarried boys and girls having sexual intercourse if they love each other'.[27] Hence, the SRHR interventions do not alter the opinion of students about premarital sex. Since there is no variation in the indicator between the groups, the indicator is dropped in later analysis.

[27] Feedback from Rutgers WPF indicates that the Outcome Measurement Survey in 2013 and also IYARHS (2012) found that the percentage of young people who have had extramarital sex is very small. Rutgers WPF notes that part of the reason could be that the survey was conducted in schools, and among students who mostly live with parents, allowing same values and norms transferred from parents. The situation might be different with out-of-school young people or in community-based research.

With respect to the sexual activity level, on average students indicate to have engaged in 1.4-2.7 out of the 8 listed activities, meaning that the average student has not embraced and caressed (index=2) and kissed (index=3) yet. At the time of the endline survey, this indicator has increased by 0.4-0.5 on average, indicating that more students have engaged in these activities. For a detailed description on the percentage of students engaged in intimate partner activities, see Table 22 in Annex VII.

In general, students from the treatment schools indicated to have engaged in more sexual activities at both base- and endline compared to the comparison group. Though, one should be reminded of the fact that students in the comparison group were significantly younger than students in the treatment groups. Any statistical interference about the impact of the programmes on sexual activity can only be made when the analysis controls for age differences.

With respect to sexual intercourse (see Table 22 in Annex VII), only 3 students indicate to have engaged in sexual intercourse with a boy-/girlfriend; 6 students report to have had sexual intercourse with someone who was not their boy-/girlfriend (either a friend or housemate).[28]

### 7.5. Discussion

We do not observe a lot of changes for the treatment groups between the base- and endline surveys. Therefore, we also do not expect a large impact of the programmes between the baseline and endline periods. However, given that both DAKU and D4L were already running for some time during the baseline survey and treatment after the baseline was limited (see Figure 2), we expect that most of the project impact has already taken place already before the baseline (for example, increase in knowledge). Therefore, it makes little sense to follow the planned evaluation methodology using difference-in-differences analysis. Instead, we compare the outcome indicators between the comparison and treatment groups separately for both base- and endline surveys (cross-sectional analysis). We hypothesise that the programme effect will be higher at the endline survey due to additional project activities between the baseline and endline periods.

## 8. Evaluation question 2: Attribution of changes

This subsection discusses evaluation question 2: To what degree are these changes at target group level attributable to the development interventions of Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?

[28] Of the students who indicated to have had sexual intercourse with their boy/girlfriend (n=3 at endline), 2 students say that they used a form of contraception to prevent pregnancy but not always, the other student answered never to use such a method (not in table). From the students who indicated to have had sex with another person (n=6), 2 students indicate to have always used a contraception method, 2 answered never, the other 2 respondents refused to answer (not in table). Though the sample sizes are very low, the numbers are worrisome. Our questions about the use of certain contraception methods suffer from the same low sample size issue, except for the result that 8.2% of the respondents indicate to have ever used abstinence as a contraception method. Interesting as well is the low percentage (34.8%) of students who agree with the following statement: 'Before two people start having sex with each other, they should test for their HIV/AIDS and other STI status if at least one of them had a sexual relationship before'.

## 8.1. Methodology

In the baseline report we described that we want to analyse the impact (attribution) of the YPI project on senior high school students using difference-in-differences methodology. Due to the timing of the survey with respect to the intervention (see Figure 2), we do not expect to be able to identify the impact of the DAKU and D4L programmes between base- and endline (as discussed in the previous section).[29] Therefore, we opt for taking a different approach for measuring the programme effects: we use cross-sectional regressions using data from the base- and endline surveys. Hence, we are not able to use fixed effects to control for observed and unobserved student characteristics that are constant over time (as done in a difference-in-difference analysis). Controlling for student-specific characteristics is important in a cross-sectional analysis, where differences in the distribution of the characteristics of treatment and comparison groups can drive observed differences in the outcome variables. Therefore, we use observable student characteristics (for example, the age of the students at baseline) as control variables in the regression analysis.

Using regression analysis, we first estimate the overall treatment effect on the schools or the Intention to Treat (ITT) effect at the school level. This measure combines the effect of DAKU and D4L on the programme participants (direct effect) and non-participants (indirect effect). To separate the two effects, we also estimate the Average Treatment Effect of the Treated (ATET) at the student level. The ATET is calculated by comparing the outcome variables of students in the comparison schools to the two treatment groups: (1) the students who participated in DAKU and/or D4L (direct effect), and (2) the students in the treatment schools who did not participated in DAKU and D4L (indirect/spillover effect). Note that in both regressions the actual treatment status of both schools and students is used instead of the assigned treatment (see section 5.3).

Regarding the regression outcomes at the baseline and endline, given that not all schools had already finished DAKU and D4L before the baseline survey, we expect that the treatment effect using the endline data will be larger compared to the treatment effect found for the baseline data.

### *Intention to Treat (ITT) at the school level*

Equation (1) estimates the ITT of the intervention at the school level. In other words, equation (1) estimates the impact of the programme for an average student in a treatment school, regardless of the participation of the student in D4L and/or DAKU. Hence, equation (1) estimates the average effect of DAKU and D4L at the school level for a selected outcome variable.

$$(1) \qquad y_{ij}^{t} = \beta_0^t + \beta_1^t D4L_j + \beta_2^t DAKUD4L_j + \boldsymbol{\gamma}^t \boldsymbol{X}_{ij}^t + \varepsilon_{ij}^t,$$

where $t$ indicates either baseline or endline, $i$ is the individual, $j$ is the school, and $\varepsilon_{ij}$ is the error term clustered at the school level. $y_{ij}$ is the outcome variables as discussed in section 4.2. $D4L_j = 1$ if a school implemented the D4L programme, 0 otherwise. $DAKU_D4L_j = 1$ if a school implemented both the DAKU and the D4L programme. $\boldsymbol{X}_{ij}$ is the vector of control variables.

[29] We don't know for sure if the parallel trend assumption holds, meaning that we cannot assume that the 'trend' in the outcome variables between the baseline and the endline are the same for both treatment and comparison groups since the trend in outcome variables were already affected by the programmes at time of the baseline.

In the regression, $\beta_1$ measures the intention to treat effect for D4L and $\beta_2$ for jointly implementing DAKU and D4L. In order to obtain results that are representative at the school level, the coefficients are calculated using weighted least squares method to correct for the effects of stratification. The sampling weights are proportional to the inverse of the probability that the respondents are included in the sample as a result of the stratification procedure at the school level (on gender and assigned treatment status). The sampling weights are normalised so that each school has an equal weight in the sample.

As mentioned above, due to the use of cross sectional data, controlling for confounders in the regression analysis is important. Confounding variables are selected based on three criteria: (1) the distribution of the variable is significantly different between the comparison and treatment students; and (2) the variable is not influenced by factors influencing the outcome (predetermined);[30] and (3) the outcome indicator is influenced by the variable. Using these criteria, we control for age[31] and gender in the regressions. We expect that the outcome indicators differ by age and gender of the student, since both are considered to be important determinants of SRHR issues in the literature. For example, the older someone is, the more likely someone has or is engaged in sexual activities. Also, it is generally assumed that men have a more liberal attitude towards casual sex.

### *Average Treatment Effect on the Treated at the student level*

Equation (2) estimates the ATET on the student level. In other words, equation (2) estimates the effect of the programmes by comparing the outcomes between the three groups – comparison, participants, spillover – using the self-reported participation of students in DAKU and D4L.

(2) $$y_{ij}^t = \alpha_0^t + \alpha_1^t D4L_j * D4L_{spillover_{ij}} + \alpha_2^t D4L_j * D4L_{student_{ij}} + \alpha_3^t DAKUD4L_j * DAKUD4L_{spillover_{ij}} + \alpha_4^t DAKUD4L_j * D4L_{student_{ij}} + \alpha_5^t DAKUD4L_j * DAKU_{student_{ij}} + \alpha_6^t DAKUD4L_j * DAKUD4L_{student_{ij}} + \boldsymbol{\gamma}^t \boldsymbol{X}_{ij}^t + \varepsilon_{ij}^t$$

The sub- and superscripts, abbreviations and X-vector are as in equation (1). In addition to equation (1) the actual treatment status of the students are added on the right-hand side (RHS). $D4L_{spillover_{ij}} = 1$ if a student did attend a D4L treatment school but did not participate in the programme. $DAKUD4L_{spillover_{ij}} = 1$ if a student did attend a DAKU & D4L treatment school but did not participate in any of the programmes. $D4L_{student_{ij}} = 1$ if a student reported at the endline survey to have ever participated in the D4L programme, but not in the DAKU programme. $DAKU_{student_{ij}} = 1$ if a student reported at the endline survey to have ever participated in the DAKU programme, but not in the D4L programme. $DAKUD4L_{student_{ij}} = 1$ if a student reported at the endline survey to have ever participated in both the DAKU and D4L programmes.

[30] The second condition is important for the selection of valid control variables because the intervention has started already before the baseline data was collected.

[31] The distribution of both age and grade is significantly different between the treatment and comparison group. However, these two variables are highly correlated. We chose to use age over grade as control since age is exogenous, while grade is endogenous (depends on age, skill levels, motivation at school, etc.), meaning that both grade and the outcome are influenced by the same unobserved factors (like motivation and skills).

Note that we do not use weights in equation (2) since equation (2) is not meant to provide a representative outcome at the school level, but instead it measures the impact of actual participation and spillover effects of the programme.[32]

## 8.2. Results

Again results are displayed by the three categories: knowledge, attitude and behaviour. As before, unintended effects indicators form the fourth category. Results of both regressions (1) and (2) for both the base- and endline data are displayed in Table 7, and the findings for the two rounds are jointly discussed below the table. Annex VIII displays the results for both regressions of each separate component of the indices for the endline survey. Note that for all regressions the sample size equals 279, the total balanced sample size[33].

[32] We do not use weights in equation (2) because of the discrepancy between the assigned and actual treatment status. If we did use the weight in equation (2) the students who were not supposed to participate but actually report to have participated would have a larger weight in determining the coefficients for participation than the students who were supposed to and actually did participate. This is due to the fact that the weight of participants is smaller; i.e. we sampled to have a 50-50 division between the spillover and participant group but the actual division in schools is in favour of the spillover group.

[33] The sample size by treatment status is as follows: D4L-only n=60; DAKU & D4L: n=120; D4L spill.: n=27; D4L part.: n=33; DAKU & D4L spill.: n=42; DAKU part.: n=15; D4L part.: n=19; DAKU & D4L part.: n=44.

**Table 7: Attribution: regression estimates**

| Regression model | | Weighted mean comp. group | 1. ITT school level | | | 2. ATET student level | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Treatment group | | | D4L-only | DAKU & D4L | D4L spill. | D4L part. | DAKU & D4L spill. | DAKU part. | D4L part. | DAKU & D4L part. |
| Indicator | Survey | | $\beta_1$ | $\beta_2$ | $\alpha_1$ | $\alpha_2$ | $\alpha_3$ | $\alpha_4$ | $\alpha_5$ | $\alpha_6$ |
| **Panel A. Knowledge** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Index on HIV/AIDS knowledge (0-17) | Base | 6.67 | 0.98 (0.74) | 2.83*** (0.56) | 1.45 (1.38) | 0.76 (0.84) | 0.92 (1.34) | 1.69 (1.78) | 2.29** (0.92) | 3.45** (1.22) |
| | End | 6.43 | 1.48* (0.86) | 2.11*** (0.72) | 1.56 (0.95) | 2.46*** (0.57) | 0.98 (1.36) | 1.37 (0.87) | 1.69 (1.50) | 2.74*** (0.79) |
| Index on counselling knowledge (0-2) | Base | 0.13 | 0.11 (0.12) | 0.26** (0.12) | 0.20 (0.14) | -0.01 (0.07) | 0.16 (0.14) | 0.31 (0.20) | 0.06 (0.12) | 0.40*** (0.12) |
| | End | 0.28 | -0.01 (0.13) | 0.13 (0.12) | -0.05 (0.11) | -0.05 (0.11) | -0.06 (0.10) | -0.03 (0.16) | 0.18 (0.16) | 0.16 (0.14) |
| Index on STI knowledge (0-3) | Base | 0.58 | -0.01 (0.19) | 0.41** (0.18) | 0.26 (0.18) | -0.46** (0.21) | 0.27 (0.20) | 0.62** (0.22) | 0.01 (0.29) | 0.55 (0.31) |
| | End | 0.64 | 0.06 (0.19) | 0.49** (0.19) | 0.14 (0.26) | -0.14 (0.21) | 0.03 (0.17) | 0.83*** (0.25) | 0.40* (0.19) | 0.68** (0.27) |
| Index on contraceptive knowledge (0-2) | Base | 0.37 | 0.19 (0.15) | 0.32** (0.12) | 0.08 (0.12) | 0.24 (0.14) | 0.10 (0.10) | 0.33** (0.11) | 0.20 (0.12) | 0.45*** (0.11) |
| | End | 0.48 | 0.07 (0.15) | 0.16 (0.14) | 0.02 (0.09) | 0.20* (0.10) | -0.06 (0.12) | -0.04 (0.15) | 0.21 (0.22) | 0.28** (0.10) |
| Awareness of rights to SRHR information | Base | 0.78 | 0.03 (0.07) | 0.10* (0.06) | 0.08 (0.05) | -0.01 (0.12) | 0.08 (0.09) | 0.21*** (0.06) | 0.09 (0.08) | 0.14 (0.09) |
| | End | 0.78 | -0.02 (0.08) | 0.11* (0.06) | 0.03 (0.04) | -0.00 (0.06) | 0.02 (0.09) | 0.21*** (0.03) | 0.11* (0.06) | 0.14*** (0.04) |
| **Panel B. Attitude** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Index on attitude towards relationships (0-8) | Base | 3.72 | -0.33 (0.36) | 0.29 (0.29) | -0.34 (0.38) | -0.47 (0.51) | -0.49 (0.36) | -0.27 (0.59) | 0.53 (0.39) | 0.79 (0.49) |
| | End | 4.09 | -0.26 (0.33) | -0.06 (0.28) | 0.01 (0.33) | -0.12 (0.20) | -0.53 (0.55) | -0.53 (0.32) | 0.48 (0.61) | 0.31 (0.48) |
| Index on attitude towards GBV (0-5) | Base | 4.12 | -0.23 (0.17) | -0.06 (0.14) | -0.10 (0.16) | -0.14 (0.13) | -0.19 (0.19) | 0.08 (0.20) | -0.05 (0.15) | 0.09 (0.11) |
| | End | 3.86 | 0.24 (0.19) | 0.12 (0.14) | 0.28 (0.37) | 0.24* (0.14) | -0.00 (0.22) | 0.14 (0.14) | -0.12 (0.31) | 0.30** (0.10) |
| HIV/AIDS patients should have same right | Base | 0.41 | 0.10 (0.09) | 0.28*** (0.08) | 0.12 (0.08) | 0.08 (0.08) | 0.06 (0.13) | 0.41*** (0.10) | 0.27*** (0.09) | 0.31** (0.12) |
| | End | 0.58 | -0.03 (0.09) | 0.15** (0.07) | -0.08 (0.08) | 0.12 (0.07) | -0.08 (0.15) | 0.09 (0.16) | 0.31*** (0.08) | 0.20** (0.09) |
| Acceptance of homo-sexuality | Base | 0.08 | 0.10 (0.06) | 0.12** (0.06) | 0.15*** (0.04) | -0.02 (0.06) | 0.14 (0.11) | 0.22* (0.12) | 0.06 (0.07) | 0.14*** (0.04) |
| | End | 0.08 | -0.02 (0.05) | 0.04 (0.05) | 0.01 (0.05) | -0.02 (0.04) | 0.04 (0.10) | -0.02 (0.10) | 0.13* (0.07) | 0.03 (0.05) |
| **Panel C. Behaviour** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Discussion intimate relationship | Base | 0.26 | 0.05 (0.09) | 0.13* (0.08) | 0.19 (0.13) | -0.10 (0.11) | 0.14** (0.06) | 0.01 (0.08) | 0.21 (0.12) | 0.11 (0.07) |
| | End | 0.29 | -0.06 (0.08) | 0.07 (0.07) | 0.07 (0.13) | -0.02 (0.10) | 0.04 (0.08) | 0.10 (0.14) | 0.23** (0.08) | 0.19 (0.11) |

| Regression model | | Weighted mean comp. group | 1. ITT school level | | | 2. ATET student level | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Treatment group | | | D4L-only | DAKU & D4L | D4L spill. | D4L part. | DAKU & D4L spill. | DAKU part. | D4L part. | DAKU & D4L part. |
| Indicator | Survey | | $\beta_1$ | $\beta_2$ | $\alpha_1$ | $\alpha_2$ | $\alpha_3$ | $\alpha_4$ | $\alpha_5$ | $\alpha_6$ |
| Consultation of a clinic for SRHR related matters | Base | 0.14 | 0.08 | 0.04 | -0.03 | 0.05 | -0.12** | 0.20* | -0.09 | 0.05 |
| | | | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.10) | (0.06) | (0.10) |
| | End | 0.26 | -0.07 | -0.06 | -0.09 | -0.04 | -0.07 | 0.18* | -0.08 | 0.03 |
| | | | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.10) | (0.08) | (0.07) |
| **Panel D. Unintended effects** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Index on sexual activity (0-8) | Base | 1.35 | 1.33*** | 0.46* | 1.14*** | 0.92*** | 0.40 | -0.13 | 1.11*** | 0.81** |
| | | | (0.42) | (0.27) | (0.23) | (0.23) | (0.55) | (0.50) | (0.34) | (0.34) |
| | End | 1.78 | 1.18*** | 0.46 | 1.03*** | 0.88*** | 0.63 | 0.24 | 1.10** | 0.82** |
| | | | (0.42) | (0.30) | (0.22) | (0.26) | (0.46) | (0.35) | (0.39) | (0.32) |

Source: Student base- and endline survey E12, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes: Standard errors given in brackets. Regressions are estimated with age and gender as covariates. For ITT school level (equation (1)), observations are weighted proportional to the inverse of the probability of being included in the sample due to stratification. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the school level. * p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value <0.01.

## 8.3. Knowledge

This subsection discusses the results for the knowledge indicators as reported in Panel A of Table 7. At the school level (ITT), students from the D4L-only schools have not seen a significant improvement in their SRHR knowledge compared to the comparison school for any knowledge indicator except for their HIV/AIDS knowledge. At the endline students of the D4L-only schools score almost 1.5 points (or 23%) higher than the comparison students (c.p.). At the student level (ATET), participants of D4L show a 2.5 point higher score (or 38%) in their HIV/AIDS knowledge compared to comparison students. We do not find any significant effect for the spillover group. The D4L participants show a higher score in their contraceptive knowledge at the endline of 0.2 points (42%), but show a lower score in their STI knowledge score of 0.46 (79%) compared to the students in the comparison schools. Note that the educate component of D4L is relatively short (2 hours) and it focuses exclusively on HIV/AIDS. Therefore, we do not expect to find any impact of D4L on other indicators than HIV/AIDS knowledge and attitude.

Due to the more comprehensive nature of DAKU and the fact that students can follow both programmes in DAKU&D4L schools, we expect the results on students SRHR knowledge to be bigger for these students and schools. Indeed, almost all knowledge indicators show a significant impact of the intervention. At the school level, HIV/AIDS knowledge scores are 42% at baseline (32% at endline) higher compared to the comparison group; STI knowledge scores are 71% (77%) higher. Looking at the student level, it becomes clear that the impact of the intervention mainly stems from DAKU-only and DAKU&D4L participants: DAKU-only participants know significantly more about STIs and contraceptive methods, and are more aware of their right to be informed about SRHR issues compared to the students in the comparison schools. Participants in both DAKU and D4L show the most impact of the programmes on their knowledge scores, especially on the scores on HIV/AIDS and contraceptive knowledge. As with participants in D4L-only schools, D4L-only participants know significantly more about HIV/AIDS (34% at the baseline) but we do not find a significant impact on other aspects of SRHR knowledge for this group (as expected). Note that students participating only

in D4L did not learn about other SRHR related issues from their classmates participating in DAKU (and potentially also in D4L). Hence, neither D4L nor DAKU succeeded in activating students to inform their peers about SRHR issues.

## 8.4. Attitude

Panel B of Table 7 shows the results on attitude indicators. For the D4L schools, we did not find any significant impact of D4L on any of the attitude indicators.

The effects of the programmes on attitude are larger in schools implementing both DAKU and D4L. At the school level, students in DAKU&D4L schools score significantly higher on both the statement 'HIV/AIDS patients should have the same rights' (26-68%) and 'In my opinion, being attracted to someone of the same sex is ok' (150% at baseline) than the students in the comparison schools. Even so the acceptance of homosexuality is only 20% in the DAKU&D4L schools at the baseline and only 12% at the endline. At the student level, it is participants in either or both programmes who score higher than comparison students. However, the effects are larger at the baseline than at the endline. An explanation for the low rate of acceptance of homosexuality could be that YPI focuses its efforts more on HIV/AIDS with a medical approach (as the founders of YPI are medical doctors), while discussions about gender have received less attention during the programmes.[34]

Regarding the students' attitude towards GBV, we find a significant coefficient at the endline for the participants of both DAKU and D4L. However, this finding is driven by a reduction in the score of the comparison school students rather than by an increase in the score of the programme participants. Hence, we cannot talk about an effect of the programme in this case.

No spillover effects for any of the attitude indicators were found.[35]

## 8.5. Behaviour

With respect to the behaviour indicators reported in Panel C of Table 7, in the D4L only schools, neither school nor participant effect of D4L was found on the two behaviour indicators. We found mixed results for the schools implementing both DAKU and D4L. On the one hand, significant positive effects of the programme are found for DAKU-only participants for 'consultation of a clinic for SRHR related matters'. For D4L-only participants a significant positive effect is found on the statement 'with some of my friends we talk about intimate relationships and sex'. At time of the baseline, spillover students score higher for the discussion indicator, but significantly lower for the consultation indicator compared to comparison students. No impact on behaviour is found for students participating in both programmes.

## 8.6. Attribution of effects

In addition to the regression results, we can utilize the result chain of the project to assess whether the observed effects in SRHR knowledge, attitude and behaviour can be attributed to the YPI project.

[34] This explanation was offered by Rutgers WPF.

[35] Note that for a spillover effect to take place the impact of the programme on the participants also has to be significant because it is argued that the impact of the programme reached the 'spillover' group through the programme participants.

In essence, the output of the project is that the participants of DAKU and D4L are trained on different types of SRHR related issues, for example HIV/AIDS has been discussed at the school. Then the outcomes are that, for example, the students are more knowledgeable about HIV/AIDS. The outcomes of the project were already discussed above.

Turning to the outputs, we measured the exposure to SRHR topics in the endline survey: students were asked whether they have learned anything about a number of SRHR related topics in school related activities during the past school year.[36] In principal, students could have learned about these topics for example in biology class or via another SRHR programme as well. But due to the DAKU and D4L programmes we expect that participants of the programmes indicate higher percentages with the relevant topics.

Table 20 in Annex VI shows the results: students from DAKU and D4L schools indicate to have learned more about each listed topic during the past school year than comparison schools, differences being significant for half of the topics.

However, in schools implementing on D4L, students report significantly higher percentages compared to the comparison group for only 2 out of the 12 topics ('feel part of a group of young people' and 'dance and party for a good cause'). What is surprising is that the percentage of students that indicate to have learned about HIV/AIDS related issues is not significantly different from the comparison group ('know more about (your) sexual and reproductive health and HIV/AIDS issues'; 'how to discuss sensitive issues such as sexuality and HIV/AIDS' and 'not stigmatize/ discriminate people living with HIV/AIDS'). This finding is also in line with data from the qualitative survey, where students indicated to recall little about the 'educate' component that lasted for only about 2 hours. Students mostly remembered D4L for its dancing activities.

In schools implementing both DAKU and D4L, the percentage of students indicating to have learned about HIV/AIDS and sexuality issues (the 3 questions mentioned above) is significantly higher for all three questions compared to the comparison group. In addition, significantly more students in these schools indicated to have learned about topics related to social activities ('feel part of a group of young people' and 'dance and party for a good cause') and learning about rights related to SRHR.

Hence, these findings support the claim that changes in the outcome variables can be attributed to DAKU and D4L in the schools participating in both programmes, but the findings are less favourable for the D4L only schools.

## 8.7. Unintended effects

With respect to the unintended effects of the SRHR programmes, the results indicate that more students in treatment schools engaged in sexual activities (e.g. holding hands, kissing and hugging) compared to students in comparison schools controlling for age and gender of the students. In D4L-only schools, students engaged on average in a one level higher order activity, meaning that while the comparison group was on average at the 'holding hands' and 'embrace and cares level, students in D4L-schools were at the 'embrace and cares and 'kiss' level. In DAKU&D4L schools, the spillover

[36] Given that we look at self-reported indicators, maybe it is better to think about these indicators as intermediate outcomes.

and DAKU-only students were similar in terms of the average level of sexual activity they have experienced. In the same schools, students who participated either only in D4L or both in DAKU and D4L, again experienced a one level higher order of sexual activities than the comparison group (just like the D4L participants in the D4L-only schools).

This is a controversial finding. It is important to emphasize that this finding in itself does not imply that DAKU and D4L encourage sexual activity. There could be a number of other possible explanations for this finding. These are:

- **Selection-effect at school level:** DAKU and D4L are implemented in more liberal schools. The fact that the school leadership is willing to implement DAKU and D4L may be a sign of that. However, we also observe that both public and Muslim private schools are participating in the programmes
- **Selection effect at student level:** Students who have more experience in intimate partner relationships are more interested to participate in DAKU and/or D4L (self-selection), and/or they are more likely to recall that they have participated in these programmes because the content of the programme is more relevant for them.
- **Effect on openness:** Students participating in DAKU and/or D4L are more willing to admit their sexual behaviour as discussing sexual activities become less of a taboo for these students.
- **Nonlinear age effects:** As mentioned before, the students in the comparison schools are on average almost a year younger than the students in the treatment schools. In the regression analysis, we control for age using a linear trend. However, it is possible that around the age of 16-17 years students start to engage in intimate partner activities at a higher order than a linear trend would predict. Hence, the differences between the treatment and control schools may be driven by a non-linear boom in sexual activity around the age of 16-17 years.

Given our data, unfortunately, we are not able to distinguish to what extent these factors drive our findings on the self-reported sexual activity of the students.

## 8.8. Discussion

Our findings are in line with the literature on sexual education programmes (see section 2); we also find that the DAKU and D4L programmes were effective in educating students about SRHR knowledge. Similar to the literature, students participating in DAKU and D4L still did not perform very well on the SRHR knowledge test. For example, in our sample they only answered on average about 9 of 17 (53%) HIV/AIDS related questions correctly. This is nonetheless better than the score in the comparison schools (38-39%). However, we can conclude that DAKU and D4L could improve on the delivery of the SRHR information to students.

Regarding the delivery of the project material, we have to note that YPI only trains the teachers at the participating schools on teaching the DAKU programme. These teachers at the school are responsible for implementing DAKU for the students. Therefore, based on the data, we believe that more effort should be taken by YPI to train teachers on how to effectively deliver the material of the

DAKU programme.[37] With regard to D4L, our data suggest that this programme could also improve on its effectiveness, for example by a longer education component.

# 9. Evaluation question 3: Relevance of changes

This subsection will answer evaluation question 3: What is the relevance of these changes? In particular we look at the size of the impact, the representativeness of the sample, if the project addresses an important issue for the beneficiaries, and the satisfaction of beneficiaries (self-reported impact).

## 9.1. The size of the impact

As expected, the size of the impact is bigger for the DAKU-only and DAKU&D4L participants than for D4L-only participants. No substantial spillover effects are found. In relative terms, the size of the impact on the knowledge level is moderate to high, especially on HIV/AIDS (increase 34 to 52% compared to the comparison group) and STI knowledge (increase of 63 to 130% compared to the comparison group). With respect to attitude, the size of the impact is marginal for students in D4L-only schools, but more substantial for participants of any of the programmes in DAKU&D4L schools. No clear effect of the programmes was found on behavioural indicators. Though the size of the impact (in percentage improvement compared to the comparison group) is substantial for about half of the knowledge and attitude indicators, there is room left for improvements in students SRHR knowledge and attitude; the overall scores at the endline are not yet close to reaching their ceiling score of 100% score as discussed above.

Related to the issue on the magnitude of the project impact, is the question whether the project activates students to inform others about SRHR in their school and/or community. Actively passing on the D4L information and core messages is a particular aspect of the D4L project. For this reason, some specific questions about the activation of students were asked to the participants of DAKU and D4L. Of course, no data from comparison schools could be selected since the questions are programme specific. In particular, the following outcome indicators are used:

- Percentage of students who like to share with other that they are involved in DAKU and/or D4L
- Percentage of students that do tell others that they are involved in DAKU or D4L
- Percentage of students that see themselves as an agent of change (D4L term)

The results are displayed in Table 8.

[37] Rutgers WPF confirmed this finding stating that, especially, additional training on value clarification is very much needed. Before DAKU is implemented teachers have to attend several trainings to increase their skills in: (1) computer using, (2) SRHR knowledge; (3) mastering DAKU module incl. micro teaching. However, as indicated by some teachers during a workshop on CSE, there were not enough rooms for value clarification exercises, especially on gender and sexual orientation, SGBV, and right-based approach. Please note, however, that DAKU is no longer supported under MFS II due to the introduction of the new programme SETARA.

**Table 8: Dissemination of programme participation and messages**

| School type | D4L-only | | DAKU&D4L | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Student type** | D4L | DAKU | D4L | DAKU&D4L |
| **Sample size** | [n=25] | [n=14] | [n=16] | [n=43] |
| Percentage of students who like to share with other that they are participating in DAKU and/or D4L | 60.0% | 71.4% | 62.5% | 86.1% |
| Percentage of students that do tell others that they are involved in DAKU or D4L | 1.9% | 1.4% | 2.3% | 1.3% |
| Percentage of students that see themselves as an agent of change | 28.0% | 14.3% | 31.3% | 32.6% |

Source: Student endline survey E12, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

The results show that at least one third of the participants would like to share their participation in the programme with other students. Though, only around 2% indeed tell other people about their involvement, probably due to the high social taboo on SRHR related issues. D4L has the specific aim to make students 'agents of change', meaning that students believe they can contribute in changing the world around them. About 24-33% of the participants in D4L indicate that they see themselves as agents of change.

## 9.2. Representativeness of sample

The results of the current study give us useful information about youth aged 14-19 years old in the targeted areas in which YPI is working; i.e. urban areas in Indonesia with high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates.

We compared some of our statistics to the general statistics of Indonesian youth to see how close we are to a representative sample (see Table 25 in Annex IX). The DHS 2007 and 2012 surveys[38] included a young adult sexual and reproductive health survey (IYARHS). We compared the data for the appropriate age group from these surveys to our baseline sample data and concluded the following:

- The knowledge level about HIV/AIDS for students who have answered these questions seems to be a bit lower in our sample. Looking at the IYARHS 2012 sample only, knowledge levels are more similar, especially to our treatment sample.
- The attitude about virginity before marriage is the same in both samples.
- Cigarette, alcohol and drugs use is comparable for our and the IYARHS 2012 sample.
- Slightly more respondents (around 10%) in our sample ever had a boy-/girlfriend than in the IYARHS 2012 sample. The percentage of respondents who currently have a boy-/girlfriend is the same for both samples.
- Sexual activity (held hands, kissed lips, touched/aroused) is lower in our sample than in the IYARHS 2007 sample (around 10%). The percentage of respondents who ever

[38] Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) are nationally-representative household surveys conducted in various countries that collect data in the areas of population, health, and nutrition.

had actual intercourse is comparable between the IYARHS 2012 sample and our sample.

- A smaller fraction of the respondents in our sample have heard about different contraception methods than the respondents of IYARHS 2007. Only looking at knowledge of the diaphragm as well as emergency contraception, our sample is more informed.
- The respondents in our sample are only slightly less aware that a condom can prevent pregnancy and STI transmission than in the IYARHS 2012 sample.

Hence, our sample is representative when it comes to premarital attitude, relationship behaviour, knowledge about condoms as well as experience with drugs/alcohol. Looking at HIV/AIDS knowledge levels, activities with the boy/girlfriend, as well as awareness about different contraception methods, students in our sample display lower rates.

## 9.3. Does the project address an important issue for the beneficiaries?

According to Rutgers WPF, the project addresses an important issue for high school students who are the beneficiaries of the programmes. We have also argued throughout the report the importance of SRHR information for the targeted beneficiary group in order to prevent risky sexual behaviour among them.

Students also agree that the project addresses an important issue for them. For example, at the endline survey, almost 80 per cent of the students, including the comparison group, indicate that they want to learn more about 'How to protect yourself from HIV/AIDS and other STIs' and 'How to know if you have HIV/AIDS or other STIs'. In the qualitative study all students indicated that 'HIV/AIDS issues are an important issue for youths when specifically asked about this issue. As one student mentions "It is better to explain [about sexual activities] rather than hide that from young people, so that they will not try it out".

## 9.4. Satisfaction of beneficiaries (self-reported impact)

To assess the satisfaction of the beneficiaries with the project, we asked the students to indicate to what extent DAKU and/or D4L had an effect on their live. We tried to measure this in two different ways.

First, we asked them to mention 3 aspects of the programme that affected their lives. From the respondents that answered this question (n=109), a large amount reported that the project increased their knowledge about reproductive health (28.5%) and their awareness of HIV/AIDS (16.5%), in particular on how to prevent infection (4.5%). Some respondents mentioned an increased knowledge about how to protect yourself in a relationship (i.e. how to practice 'safe dating' and how to distinguish between good and bad relationships) (6.5%), how to live healthier lives (7.5%) and a better awareness of what the general concerns of their peer group are (5.5%). Moreover, some respondents reported that the project had made them adopt a more positive attitude towards life in general (9%) and towards themselves (4.5%). It had also taught them to have more respect and tolerance for others (5.5%), in particular for people with HIV (2%) and women (1%).

With respect to behaviour, some respondents indicated that the project(s) had caused them to be more careful when in a relationship (5.5%), to avoid sexual actions before marriage (5.5%) and to self-reflect about negative actions undertaken in the past (1%). 4.5% of the respondents mentioned that the programme caused them to help others by sharing information with them. Only 3 respondents (3%) reported that the project had had a negative effect on their lives: 1 of those respondents said that he/she had become "scared of sex" due to the programme, and the other 2 said that the programme had "destroyed their lives". One last respondent reported that the project had had no effect on his/her life at all.

Second, we asked the students to indicate on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is no effect, how big the impact of the programme was on their life. Note that the sample size is quite low, due to many 'don't knows' of the students. For those students who did know what to answer, the reported effect averages between 2.8 and 3.4. No clear distinction between the programmes is found.

**Table 9: Self-reported impact of the programme**

| **School type** | **D4L-only** | | **DAKU&D4L** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Student type** | D4L | DAKU | D4L | DAKU&D4L |
| **Sample size** | [n=14] | [n=10] | n=7] | [n=34] |
| Effect programme on live students | 2.9 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.3 |

Source: Student endline survey E12, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

# 10. Evaluation question 4: Efficiency of project

This subsection will answer evaluation question 4: Were the development interventions of the Southern partner organizations efficient? To answer this question we will describe the cost effectiveness of the programme. First, the calculation of cost per beneficiary is discussed. Second, these costs are compared to the project effects per beneficiary. Finally, the obtained unit costs are compared to costs of similar projects (benchmark).

## 10.1. Costs per beneficiary

A first step to estimate the cost effectiveness of the programme is to calculate the project cost per beneficiary. To collect this information, we conducted a structured interview with the project manager and programme officers of YPI on 13 March 2014 using the 'budget survey' as described in section 5.1 In addition, we consulted relevant reports of YPI: Annual report (2010; 2011; 2012); Project financial statements (2011); Semi-annual expenditures report (2012; 2013). Hence, the cost figures are based on actual expenditure data. A follow-up interview with YPI was conducted on 26 June 2014.

Regarding the source of funding for the evaluated programmes implemented by YPI (DAKU and D4L), we learned that both programmes are funded by MFS II. However, D4L is not funded by Rutgers WPF

but Dance4Life, another SRHR Alliance member.[39] Regarding DAKU, Rutgers WPF has funded DAKU between 2007-2011 prior to the evaluation. The funding for DAKU has officially stopped by 2012, however, unspent budget from previous periods have been used to fund DAKU activities in 2012 and even 2013.

Table 10 gives a summary of the collected information and the estimates of the costs per month per beneficiary for the years: 2011, 2012 and 2013. Information on 2014 was not yet available at the time of the interview.

Note that despite the fact that D4L is not funded by the YPI project of Rutgers WPF, the cost per beneficiary is calculated for DAKU and D4L separately because D4L was implemented in all sampled treatment schools.[40]

The table reports the total costs spent on the DAKU/D4L project during the given period in Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) (column 1) and euros[41] (column 2), the percentage funded by the Co-Financing Agency or CFA (Rutgers WPF) under an MFS II contract (column 3) and the number of students participating in DAKU/D4L (beneficiaries) during the given period (column 4). The cost data are obtained from financial reporting of YPI to Rutgers WPF and include all costs of YPI related to the project, but not the cost of the CFA. Data on the number of beneficiaries is obtained from the output indicator form as reported to Rutgers WPF. Only direct beneficiaries (participants of DAKU/D4L) are included in the count. Indirect beneficiaries reached through the direct beneficiaries (spillover), social media and DAKU exhibition (campaign) are not reported. Hence, not all project costs can be linked to the students directly benefiting from the programme. However, we do not separate these costs. Also additional costs at the school are not taken into account.

[39] The funding for D4L runs through Rutgers WPF, however, the source of funding is Dance4Life. This has led to the confusion regarding the content of the YPI project.
[40] The evaluators were not aware at the time of the baseline period that D4L was not funded by Rutgers WPF.
[41] Unfortunately, we do not have information about the exchange rate used for the project. Instead we use the annual average exchange rate from http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/. The exchange rates used are 12,264 IDR/EUR in 2011, 12,087 IDR/EUR in 2012 and 13,923 IDR/EUR in 2013.

**Table 10: Overview of the costs and number of beneficiaries**

| Year | Total costs [IDR] | Total cost [EUR][1] | Percentage of costs funded by CFA | Number of beneficiaries (students) | Cost per beneficiary per year [IDR] | Cost per beneficiary per year [Int$ 2011][2] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **DAKU** | | | | | | |
| 2011 | 112,333,163 | 9,159.59 | 100% | 291 | 386,025 | 107.03 |
| 2012 | 231,402,836 | 19,144.45 | 100% | 315 | 734,612 | 202.02 |
| 2013 | 155,294,453 | 11,153.81 | 100% | 135 | 1,150,329 | 312.40 |
| **D4L** | | | | | | |
| 2011 | 127,420,000 | 10,389.76 | 0% | 3,064 | 41,586 | 11.53 |
| 2012 | 177,574,000 | 14,691.08 | 0% | 2,930 | 60,605 | 16.67 |
| 2013 | 124,295,980 | 8,927.38 | 0% | 2,041 | 60,900 | 16.54 |

Sources: Budget Survey 2013 and project documents.

Notes:

1. Annual average exchange rate is used. Data is obtained from http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates/
2. PPP conversion factor to 2011 international dollars is calculated using the World Development Indicators: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#.

As mentioned in section 3.2, in the participating schools, DAKU is implemented by school teachers and not directly by YPI. Teachers received compensation from YPI per DAKU module (50,000-75,000 IDR/module).[42,43] This is included in the project costs.

Every year, different students participate in both DAKU and D4L. Therefore, the value of cost per beneficiary can be calculated on a yearly basis, dividing the total costs per year with the total number of student participants. This is reported in the column 5 of Table 10 in IDR, while in the last column the value in international dollars (Int$) is displayed. International dollars at 2011 prices[44] are used for the cost per unit calculation because it takes both purchasing power parity and inflation into account that would not be the case if we reported the unit costs in euros. Hence, using Int$, the costs can easily be compared across time and countries.

We calculate that the cost of DAKU was 202.02 Int$/student in 2012 (the year of the baseline survey), while it was 107.03 Int$ in 2011 and 312.40 Int$ in 2013.

The higher DAKU project costs in 2012 and 2013 are partially due to the training activity for teachers that did not take place in 2011. However, it has to be noted that trained teachers will be able to teach DAKU for multiple years if the school decides to continue implementing DAKU. However, out

[42] In total, there are 15 modules of DAKU.

[43] Since the funding for DAKU has stopped, the schools have to implement DAKU on their own account and on a voluntary basis in the future.

[44] The following exchange rates are used based on PPP conversion factor using the World Development Indicators: 3,606.57 IDR/Int$ in 2011, 3,636.38 IDR/Int$ in 2012, 3,682.25 IDR/Int$ in 2013 and 4,530.90 IDR/Int$ in 2014. Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#

of 26 schools trained on the computer-based DAKU between 2007 and 2012, only 3 schools were still implementing DAKU in 2014 (these schools are also part of our sample).

Despite its shortcomings, for the cost-benefit analysis we will use the cost per beneficiary reported for 2012 for both DAKU (202.02 Int$) and D4L (16.67 Int$).

## 10.2. Cost-benefit

As the next step, the unit costs of the project are compared to the benefits derived from the project. Given that it is difficult to monetize the benefit of increased SRHR knowledge, instead of directly comparing costs with benefits, we resort to indicating the achievements that we have attained using 1 Int$.

The results are displayed in Table 11 separately for DAKU (for students participating only in DAKU), DAKU and D4L and D4L only. Only significant effects are reported using the endline data (medium term effects) as reported in Table 7.

**Table 11: Benefits of DAKU and D4L per 1 international dollar at 2011 prices (percentage increase in outcomes)**

| CSE programme | DAKU only | | Combination of DAKU and D4L | | D4L only (in schools with only D4L) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| % increase in outcome indicator | Overall | Per Int$ (2011) | Overall | Per Int$ (2011) | Overall | Per Int$ (2011) |
| HIV/AIDS knowledge | - | - | 42.6% | 0.19% | 38.3% | 2.30% |
| STI knowledge | 129.7% | 0.64% | 106.3% | 0.49% | - | - |
| Contraceptive knowledge | - | - | 58.3% | 0.27% | - | - |
| SRHR information right knowledge | 26.9% | 0.13% | 17.9% | 0.08% | - | - |
| Acknowledgement of rights of HIV/AIDS patients | - | - | 34.5% | 0.16% | - | - |

Sources: Budget Survey 2013 and the student endline survey E12, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

The results in the table should be understood cumulatively: 1 international $ spent on DAKU has contributed to 0.64% increase in STI knowledge and 0.13% increase in the knowledge of rights to information on SRHR. Spending 1 international $ on implementing both DAKU and D4L results in the combination of 0.19% increase in HIV/AIDS knowledge, 0.49% increase in STI knowledge, 0.27% increase in contraceptive knowledge, 0.08% increase in the knowledge of rights to information on SRHR and 0.16% increase in acknowledging the rights of HIV/AIDS patients to equal treatment.

## 10.3. Cost effectiveness

Unfortunately, we are not able to compare the cost-benefit of the YPI project to the outcomes of other youth sexual education programmes. However, based on Kivela et al (2011) the Synthesis team (2014) report the unit cost of comprehensive sexual education programmes to be between 1.33-17.06 Int$ per learning hour in the context of six different countries. For Indonesia, they report that the project costs were 17.06 Int$ per learning hour or 518.00 Int$ per year per student during the pilot phase of the project.

These benchmark costs are about double the costs reported for DAKU (202.02 Int$ in 2012). Assuming 30 learning hours for the 15 chapters of DAKU, the costs of DAKU were 6.73 Int$ per learning hour per student. However, this calculation may be misleading as it only accounts for the costs of YPI but not the costs incurred by the schools. Nonetheless, we can conclude that the implementation of DAKU is cost effective in terms of output units. No information is available for the efficiency of the DAKU project based on the realized results/outcomes.

Regarding D4L, if we assume a 2 hour session for each stage of D4L (four in total), D4L operates with a unit cost of 4.17 Int$ per learning hour. This is lower than the unit cost of DAKU. However, D4L addresses a large group of students at the same time, while DAKU works with smaller groups.

## 11. Contribution of Capacity Development and Civil Society

The YPI project has also been selected for the Capacity Development component of the MFS II Evaluation. Regarding the contribution of the capacity development of Rutgers WPF to YPI during the implementation, capacity development report identified three main organisational capacity changes that have been further analysed. These are a more motivated staff at YPI; the increased confidence of staff in giving trainings and in delivering SRHR information to beneficiaries; and improved reporting. The last two of these changes can be attributed to MFS II capacity development interventions of Rutgers WPF: SRHR training; training for youth friendly services; and a workshop on strategic communication, all held in 2013.

Unfortunately, the sampled beneficiaries have not benefitted from YPI's improved information delivery regarding SRHR information because they received the project interventions already in 2012. Hence, we are not able to reflect on the increased capabilities of YPI with respect to the MDG evaluation.

## 12. Conclusion

The YPI projects aims to educate junior and senior high school students about HIV/AIDS, and to increase the capacity of youth to make safe and informed decisions about their sexual and reproductive health and avoid risky sexual behaviour. Especially in countries like Indonesia where the social taboo and stigma on sexuality and HIV/AIDS issues is high, comprehensive SRHR education is important. YPI has implemented two SRH programmes in senior high schools in Jakarta. Both programmes are implemented as extracurricular programmes. The first programme is Dance4Life (D4L) and mainly aims at improving knowledge and attitude concerning HIV/AIDS issues. The other programme is DAKU, a computer-based programme covering a wide range of topics concerning youth aged 15-19 years old. In this report we tested for both programmes whether they enabled students to make more informed decisions. Quantitative panel data was collected for 279 students aged 14-19 years in 14 treatment and control schools in Jakarta.

The data shows only small changes in SRHR knowledge, attitude, and behaviour between the baseline and the endline survey. This is due to the fact that the SRHR programmes in most school were already (partly) implemented before the baseline survey. Our research methodology was

adapted to cope with this fact. In general, SRHR knowledge levels among students in the sample are low to moderate. The attitude of students towards healthy relationships, GBV, and people living with HIV/AIDS is moderate to good. The attitude towards homosexuality is unfavourable. None of the students are in favour of premarital sex. Regarding actual sexual activities, the average student report to have at most hold hands, embrace and caress, and/or kissed with their boy/girlfriends. Only 9 out of the 279 students in the sample indicate to have had sexual intercourse. Even though only a low percentage of students have engaged in sexual intercourse, the figures about student's contraceptive knowledge and intended sexual behaviour are worrisome. Moreover, the availability of SRHR services in Indonesia for non-married individuals or couples is low. Hence, the students in our sample are prone to show risky sexual behaviour (when the time comes). This study shows the high need for SRHR education programmes.

We have estimated the Intention to Treat (ITT) at the school and the Average Treatment Effect of the Treated (ATET) at the student level using repeated cross-sectional data analysis. Results for the ITT were weighted in order to make the results representative at the school level. Trends in the outcome variables in three groups: comparison, participants and non-participants were compared separately for base- and endline values. In general, the increases in SRHR knowledge, attitude, and safe sexual behaviour due to the SRHR programmes were highest for participants in DAKU or in both DAKU&D4L. D4L students showed increases in their HIV/AIDS knowledge due to the programme. Students in DAKU and DAKU&D4L show a significant impact of the intervention on SRHR knowledge for HIV/AIDS, STI, contraceptive and SRHR information rights related issues. No spillover effect of the programme on non-participants knowledge was found. The programme had a positive impact on attitude towards HIV/AIDS patients' rights and on homosexuality for participants of any programme. The SRHR interventions have not altered the opinion of students about premarital sex.

The literature review showed that in both the developed and the developing world school sexual education programs have shown to be an effective way to increase SRHR knowledge and attitude of the youth and only have limited impact on sexual activity and behaviour (intention). Hence, the findings for the YPI projects are perfectly in line with the literature.

In relative terms, the size of the impact (in percentages improvements attributable to the programme) is substantial for about half of the knowledge and attitude indicators. However, there is room left for improvements in students SRHR knowledge and attitude; the overall scores at the endline are not yet close to reaching their ceiling score of 100% score. The literature review showed that interventions similar to the YPI project report the same problem.

The ultimate goal of the whole MFS programme is to contribute to improvements on the MDG indicators. Both DAKU and D4L were selected under MDG 3: promote gender equality and empower women. The improvement on this goal was measured with the use of one uniform indicator (as set by the MFS synthesis team): index on attitudes towards GBV. D4L-participants and DAKU&D4L participants in DAKU&D4L schools showed an improvement on this indicator of about 6.2 to 7.8% due to the programmes they attended, implying that they are less accepting of GBV. While this is not a large improvement, we have to note that both programmes were not specifically designed to promote gender equality and empower women and only marginally include this issue in their

curriculum. Hence, we would not like to make any general conclusions about both programmes based on their improvements on MDG 3.

Finally, the MFS synthesis team asked to score each project along a few indicators. Table 12 displays the indicators and the scores we deemed valid for the DAKU programme, while the explanations are given below:

- **1. Design:** The YPI project has organically evolved since the launch of the DAKU programme in 2007. The project is designed in a sustainable manner: YPI transfers the know-how of implementing a comprehensive sexual education curriculum to the school teachers. Each school can decide on the timing and conditions of the implementation of DAKU in the following school years, which can result in the schools continuously implementing DAKU, recycling parts of DAKU in other curriculums or dropping the programme altogether. Therefore, there is a selection effect for the schools: only schools with progressive directors and teachers will participate in the programme. Given the social taboo and stigma on sexuality and HIV/AIDS in Indonesia, the YPI programme provides an important platform for educators open for engaging in sexuality and HIV/AIDS education and providing them with a state-of-art interactive curriculum for comprehensive sexual education. However, the role of YPI is not clear in providing feedback from the field to improve the curriculum of DAKU. Overall, we give a *grade of 8 for the design* of the YPI project due to the tackling of an important and difficult issue with a well-designed programme but note that there could be more emphasis put on the retaining of the schools in the DAKU programme for a longer period. (In addition, there has been development of new teaching materials at Rutgers WPF, which means that the 'old' computer-based DAKU is replaced by the paper-based DAKU (2013); and DAKU is replaced by SETARA, a paper-based educational tool like DAKU for junior high school students (end 2014).)
- **2. Implementation:** According to available information, the project was implemented as planned. In most years YPI has even underspent the available budget. Therefore, a grade of 9 is given.
- **3. Reaching objectives:** Unfortunately, the project has not been able to reach all of its objectives. Notably, very few students have told others about what they have learned. On the other hand, a total of 3,416 people have visited the exhibitions that presented the social activity work of the DAKU students in 2012 and 2013. For this aspect of the project we deem a grade of 7.
- **4. Attribution:** The MFS II evaluation period falls into a period of change: Rutgers WPF stopped funding for the computer-based DAKU, and Rutgers WPF was developing the paper-based DAKU in 2012 that was launched in 2013, and SETARA a paper-based educational tool like DAKU for junior high school students have been in development since 2012 and is launched in 2014. We observe that only half of the DAKU schools in our sample have received training in 2012, while the rest was already trained in 2009. Therefore, MFS II funding between 2012 and 2014 does not directly fund the impacts on the students in our sample. However, our findings can be generalized to the MFS II funding in 2012 for DAKU. We find that a large part of the changes can be attributable to the projects. Therefore, we give a grade of 8.

- **5. Relevance:** The project is relevant for the beneficiaries. However, unfortunately not all project results have been achieved. Therefore, we give a grade of 8.
- **6. Efficiency:** Compared to other projects in Indonesia, the project cost are lower for the YPI project. The project is also designed in a sustainable way. However, the retention rate of schools in the project could be improved. Therefore, we deem a grade of 8.

**Table 12: Overall project scoring**

| Statement | Score |
|---|---|
| **1. The project was well designed** | 8 |
| **2. The project was implemented as designed** | 9 |
| **3. The project reached all its objectives** | 7 |
| **4. The observed results are attributable to the project interventions** | 8 |
| **5. The observed results are relevant to the project beneficiaries** | 8 |
| **6. The project was implemented in the most efficient way** | 8 |
| Notes: Scores are on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being "no agreement at all" and 10 being "completely agree with statement". | |

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# Annex I: Project context: results of the qualitative study

Near the end of the implementation period of the DAKU programme and Dance4Life programme a qualitative study was held with 8 students that participated in these programme(s), in order to learn more about the students' knowledge, attitudes and behaviour regarding reproductive health. A short description of the project context is given below:

As a result of the emergence of a more liberal, modern dating culture among contemporary Indonesian youth, traditional religious norms dictating that 'sex before marriage is forbidden' and 'dating is not allowed' have over recent years been renegotiated. The current norm: 'Dating is allowed, as long as the couple is not alone in a quiet place', is flexibly interpreted by the adolescents, in attempts to justify their own behaviour (by stretching the norm to mean 'as long as no intercourse is involved') or judge the behaviour of their peers, which is usually done more harshly, based on stricter traditional interpretations.

Informants reported that having sex before marriage is common among their peers, but that they themselves would never do this. However, all of them admitted to having undertaken some intimate acts with their partners ranging from holding hands to French kissing and touching. According to the male informants, boys were the ones to initiate sexual activities. Interestingly, most of the female informants argued that girls could just as well initiate, or conversely, refuse sexual acts according to their will. Even though this may possibly not correspond with what happens in reality, it at least hints at a more empowered attitude of female adolescents with regards to the recognition of their sexual rights and ability to decide within their relationships.

According to our informants the most pressing sexuality issues experienced by adolescents are unwanted pregnancies outside of marriage and HIV infection. Almost all of the informants agreed that it is important for them and their peers to receive information about safe relationships, condoms and other contraceptives, and HIV/AIDS issues.

At the time they were interviewed most informants were aware that HIV/AIDS is a deadly virus/disease that is incurable, and knew about the ways in which the HIV virus is transmitted and how transmission can be prevented. The informants also seemed to know the purpose of using a condom – to protect against pregnancy and HIV infection - fairly well. Nevertheless, most of them had never actually seen a condom and did not know how to use it correctly. A point of concern are the myths, false beliefs and negative attitudes regarding condom use and safe sex in general, which still persist among the informants and could act as impediments to young peoples' willingness or ability to refrain themselves from risky sexual behaviour.

Even though some ambiguity could be detected in the responses of the informants, they generally displayed a positive attitude towards HIV/AIDS infected people, expressing their support and stating that they think it is important not to alienate them. They are also aware that people with HIV/AIDS have the same rights and should be treated in the same way as healthy people. Attitudes towards homosexuals were far less positive, with some of the respondents expressing strong negative feelings and others having a reserved attitude at best, saying that, even though they would not ignore gay people, they would still keep their distance.

# Annex II: SPO and project description

### *YPI*

Pelita Ilmu Foundation[45] (YPI) is a non-governmental, non-profit organization established on 4 December 1989 in Jakarta by two medical doctors. YPI provides SRHR education and services focusing on HIV prevention, voluntary counselling and testing (VCT), health services, and support for PLHIV (people live with HIV-AIDS). As the ultimate mission, YPI wants to develop an independent, productive and healthy community and access to health services by focussing its services on treatment and prevention, testing and counselling, and supporting PLHIV. The primary focus group of YPI are young people, women and marginalized groups (PLHIV, street children). YPI has established 7 base camps in the provinces of Jakarta, West Java and Banten. YPI collaborates with NGOs in areas across Indonesia and with international partners. Presently, YPI is supported by 30 staff members and 142 (trained) volunteers.

In general, YPI has four programmes: HIV/AIDS Prevention Programme (including DAKU and D4L), Counselling Programme, HIV Testing and Health services, Community Support Programme for People Living with HIV-AIDS, and Communication and Development Programme. Issues reached by the different programmes are for example preventing the HIV transmission in the community, preventing unsafe abortion, preventing under-age drug involvement, provide basic treatment in relation to HIV/AIDS, drugs or reproductive health, providing a home (shelter) for people with HIV, and of course education programmes like DAKU and D4L. Figure 2 summarizes the time frame of the project.

### *DAKU*

As described in the main text, DAKU is a school based SRH Education programme, targeting senior high school students. Most schools need one semester to complete the 15 topics (like SRH, HIV prevention, sexual abuse) of the DAKU module, which means a commitment to follow the programme for 2 hours a week. Due to the need of a computer only a few students are able to participate in the programme.

However, early 2012 Rutgers WPF carried out a pilot with a printed version of the DAKU programme in two schools. This version allows DAKU to reach far more students per school and it can be implemented in a more flexible way, for example by moving the discussion out of the computer lab to the school garden. Until now, DAKU has been an extracurricular subject, but efforts are made to accept the module as an intracurricular subject (one such effort is the introduction of the paper-based version).

It has to be noted that YPI and other implementing NGOs only provide training for the teachers at the schools. The implementation of DAKU is left for the schools: it is up to the school to incorporate DAKU into their extracurricular schedule, leaving the actual implementation of DAKU far from identical among the schools. YPI meets with the implementing teachers every semester to discuss issues and exchange ideas related to DAKU.

[45] Source: YPI Semi Annual Report Jan-June 2012

Between 2007 and 2013, YPI has trained 26 schools on the computer-based DAKU and 12 schools on the paper-based DAKU. In principle, YPI trains teachers once and they can implement DAKU multiple times in the following years. However, only a few of these schools are still implementing the programme. According to YPI, schools often drop out of the programme due to no space for DAKU in the curriculum; due to the arrival of a new, more conservative principal at the school; or due to the DAKU teacher leaving the school.

Returning to the DAKU trainings, in February 2012, YPI trained 9 schools (14 teachers) on the computer-based DAKU, while in May 2013 12 schools (19 teachers) were trained on the new paper-based version of DAKU. In both cases the trainings lasted for 4 days, focusing on SRHR training and DAKU training. Unfortunately, due to budget concerns, the training did not explicitly address computer skills and facilitation skills.[46]

So what topics are covered by DAKU? The DAKU programme has been made specifically for the Indonesia context. The programme is based upon the comprehensive school-based sexuality education programme from Uganda: 'The world starts with me' (WSWM). The WSWM is targeted to secondary school students (age 12-19) in Uganda and is a voluntary extra-curricular computer-based programme, though the programme could also be done without a computer. It has been adapted to Indonesian circumstances with the use of Intervention Mapping. Some adjustments to the WSWM programme were made, but in the end most of the content stayed the same. One adjustment is worth mentioning: the 'condom demonstration' was not adopted, but replaced with a referral to another organization which provides condom demonstrations. In addition, the message was added that sexual activities preferably take place within the marriage (Leerlooijer et. al, 2011).

DAKU covers 15 modules in total:

1. The World Starts With Me
2. Emotional ups and downs
3. Is your body changing too?
4. Friends and other relationships
5. Boys and Girls, Men and Women
6. Fight for your rights
7. Sexuality and love
8. Pregnancy: 4 Girls and 4 Boys
9. Protect yourself: STIs & HIV/AIDS
10. HIV/AIDS: U have a role 2 play 2
11. Young people and drug abuse
12. Love shouldn't hurt
13. Your future, dreams and plans
14. My top peer book
15. Exhibition

[46] Please note that these trainings were conducted from remaining funds from the previous contract between Rutgers WPF and YPI.

### *D*4L

While the DAKU programme has been made specifically for the Indonesia context, D4L is an international and more or less universal programme. Like DAKU, D4L is an extracurricular programme as well. However, here the implementation takes about a year, and D4L is suitable for younger students (from age of 10) as well. Therefore, in addition to senior high schools, junior high schools also participate in D4L. The programme consists of four stages are in sequence:

- Inspire: facilitators motivate students to learn about SHR.
- Educate: with the help of dance and music D4L educates the participants about SHR.
- Activate: in this stage students are asked to create attractive and creative activities to motivate or educate other students or raise money to spread for D4L.
- Celebrate: in December students celebrate World AIDS day together with other students from more than 30 countries with mainly dancing and music.

Despite the lengthy implementation of the project, the actual activities cover much less time. In particular, the education component of D4L takes only about one 2 hour session in total.

YPI is one of the three NGOs implementing D4L in Jakarta since 2010.[47] In the case of D4L, it is the trainers of YPI (YPI volunteers) who conduct the 'inspire' component of the programme, and also conduct the 2 hour education session on HIV/AIDS related issues. However, the 'activate' and 'celebrate' components are implemented by the school teachers. Often more schools celebrate World AIDS day together.

YPI has implemented D4L in 11 schools in 2010, in 19 (11 old and 8 new) schools in 2011, in 30 (19 old and 11 new) schools in 2012, and 19 (13 old and 9 new) schools in 2013. To select schools for D4L, at the beginning of every school year, YPI discusses with the schools whether they are interested in implementing D4L. Some schools drop out because the teachers or the principal is not any more interested in implementing D4L. In this case, students of such schools can still follow D4L activities through social media.

### *Activities: realized versus expected*

The MFS II project has three objectives. Firstly, it aims to increase the quality in the delivery of Comprehensive Sexuality Education (CSE). Secondly, it aims to increase the utilization and quality of comprehensive SRH services. Thirdly, it aims at education the youth about SRHR. YPI aims at reaching its goals by means of funding and implementing certain activities. Yearly plans are made to reach these goals. With those activities YPI wanted to improve SRHR education programmes, increase the knowledge of existing CSE teachers, train new educators, have 3,000 young people participated in CSE programmes, and have reached another 3,000 people by SRHR awareness raising activities. The following activities were set for 2011:

- Rewriting the SRHR education programme to improve quality.
- Organising training session for 20 new educators and 20 educators to improve their knowledge on how to teach CSE.

[47] The other two NGOs are PKBI and PMI.

- Organising CSE sessions for students in selected schools.
- Organising training session to health service providers to improve their knowledge on SRH.
- Involving community members and leaders in organising SRHR awareness activities and.
- Organising awareness raising activities at the community level.
- Organising activities to link partner organisations to relevant networks.
- Drafting and implementing advocacy strategy and advocacy work plans on SRHR for partner organisations.
- Organising activities to have alliance members get in touch with policy makers at the national level.

### *Outputs*

The following targets were set for 2011:

- Improved SRHR education programme on quality standards of CSE.
- 20 new educators trained to deliver CSE, and 20 educators with improved knowledge to deliver CSE.
- 3000 young people, women and men have participated in CSE.
- Service providers trained to deliver SRH services.
- 3000 people reached by SRHR awareness raising activities.

### *Outcomes*

Firstly, the CSE programme implemented by the trained educators increases the capacity of young people to make safe and informed decisions related to their SRH. Secondly, the trainings for the service providers will improve their standards for youth friendly services, which will increase the satisfaction of young people with the SRHR services. Further, engaging community members in SRHR activities will increase the acceptance of SRHR at the community level. Finally, the networking and lobbying activities of YPI and other alliance members will contribute improved SRHR policies and legislation.

# Annex III. Overview outcome indicators indices

This Annex provides a detailed description about the used outcome indicators. In addition, it shows the variables which were used to construct the knowledge and attitude outcome indicator indices.

### *Knowledge*

As the baseline report lays out, misconceptions about sexual and reproductive health are widespread among the students (for example, almost all students think that AIDS is a disease that you get if you have sex with a lot of people).

For knowledge 4 indexes were created. The index is constructed by giving every right answer to a particular question a score of 1, every wrong or 'don't know' answer scores 0. For every index it is thus the case that the higher the score, the better the knowledge level of the student. In particular, the following indexes are used:

- **Index on HIV/AIDS knowledge (scale 0-17):** containing 17 questions about what HIV is, questions about the ways to conceive HIV, and questions about the ABC-method.:
  - Know what HIV is: students were asked via a multiple choice question what HIV is. Five answers were possible of which only one was right.
  - Know what AIDS is: students were asked via a multiple choice question what AIDS is. Five answers were possible of which only one was right.
  - Belief about possibility of getting cured from HIV/AIDS: students were asked if it is possible to get cured from HIV/AIDS.
  - Belief about possibility for healthy looking person to have HIV/AIDS: students were asked if it is possible for a healthy-looking person to have the HIV/AIDS virus.
  - Misconceptions about HIV/AIDS: students were asked to indicate for 6 cases whether it is possible to transmit HIV/AIDS or if a certain action reduces the chance of contracting the HIV virus. Each of the cases should be answered negatively to be correct. For every right answer the student received one point. The following misconceptions were used:
    - People get the HIV/AIDS virus by sharing food with a person who has HIV/AIDS
    - People get the HIV/AIDS virus by hugging and kissing on the cheeks with a person who has HIV/AIDS
    - People get the HIV/AIDS virus from mosquito bites
    - People get the HIV/AIDS virus because of witchcraft or other supernatural means
    - The chance of contracting the virus causing HIV/AIDS is reduced by not touching public toilets
    - The chance of contracting the virus causing HIV/AIDS is reduced by avoiding sick looking people
  - Knowledge about ways to contract HIV: the same structure for the questions is used as with the misconceptions, though here the correct answer is to indicate that with this method it is indeed possible to transmit HIV or increase the chance of

contracting the virus. For every right answer the student received one point. The following statements were used:
    - People get the HIV/AIDS virus by sharing razors or tooth brushes with a person who has HIV/AIDS
    - People get the HIV/AIDS virus by having oral sex with a person who has HIV/AIDS
    - The virus that causes HIV/AIDS can be transmitted from a mother to a child
  - Knowledge about ABC-method (abstinence, being mutually faithful, always using a condom). For every right answer the student received one point.
  - Knowledge about condoms protecting HIV/AIDS. This variable shows the percentage of students who have heard that the condom can safely prevent HIV/AIDS and other STIs.
- **Index on knowledge about counselling (scale 0-2):** this index tests if students know about counselling and if yes, were to go to for a consultation.
  - Knowledge about HIV/AIDS test preceding counselling. Students were asked if they 'know about voluntary HIV test preceded by counselling'.
  - Knowledge about a place where to get consultation and HIV/AIDS testing. Students were asked if they 'know where you can get consultation and HIV/AIDS testing'.
- **Index on other STI knowledge (scale 0-3):** containing 3 questions about what an STI is, and questions about the ways to conceive an STI.
  - Percentage of students heard of sexually transmitted infections: student were asked whether they ever heard of sexually transmitted infections other than HIV/AIDS.
  - Knowledge about causes and non-causes of STI: students were asked to indicate for 2 cases whether it is possible to transmit a STI. The first question concerns a misconception (hugging or petting), the second question indeed increases the risk (oral sex). For every right answer the student received one point.
- **Index on contraceptive knowledge (scale 0-2):**
  - Knowledge about condoms protecting pregnancy. Students were asked to indicate if a condom can safely prevent pregnancy.
  - Percentage of students that think to be able to obtain contraceptive methods for themselves.
- **Awareness of rights to SRHR information**: students were asked if they know 'that young people have the right to get information about reproductive health (including dating, sexual behaviour, sexually transmitted diseases, HIV/AIDS, pregnancy and contraception)'. If they indicate to know this, the answer is recoded as 1; 0 otherwise.

### *Attitude*

Next, we collected data on a certain number of variables concerning beliefs, attitudes, self-efficacy and intentions of students about sexual activities and relationships Except for the first and the last two outcome indicators, the following possible answers were allowed to choice from: 'agree', 'disagree', 'not sure', 'don't want to answer', and 'don't know'. The desirable answer was coded to 1, all other options were coded as 0. After each statement the desirable answer is given in brackets. In particular; the following outcome indicators will be used:

- **Index on the attitude towards relationships (scale 0-8)**: Students were given 8 situations and asked if that characterize a good or bad relationship between a men and women.
    - A partner agrees to have sexual intercourse when he/she actually does not want to [bad]
    - Both partners use methods to prevent STIs or unwanted pregnancy [good]
    - Two people have sex in exchange for gifts [bad]
    - A girl calls her boyfriend not manly enough when he does not want to have sex with her [bad]
    - When one partner does not feel ready to have sex yet, the other one waits [good]
    - A boy tells his girlfriend he will not love her anymore if she does not want to have sex [bad]
    - Two people have sex because everybody else is doing it [bad]
    - Two partners agree not to have sex with anybody else when they are in a relationship together [good]
- **Index on the attitude towards GBV (scale 0-5)**: 5 statements about Gender Based Violence (GBV) were asked.
    - I think that sometimes a boy has to force a girl to have sex if he loves her [disagree]
    - In my opinion, it is sometimes justifiable for a boy to hit his girlfriend [disagree]
    - I think that if someone refuses to have sex, it is acceptable to use some force/pressure [disagree]
    - I believe that if someone wants to have sex, his/her partner has the right to refuse [agree]
    - I think only the man should be held responsible if he rapes a woman who wears sexy clothing [agree]
- **Acceptance of HIV/AIDS rights**: the level of agreement with the statement 'A person with HIV/AIDS should have the same rights as anybody else' [agree]
- **Acceptance of homosexuality**: the level of agreement with the statement 'In my opinion, being attracted to someone of the same sex is ok' [agree]
- **Acceptance of contraceptive**: the level of agreement with: 'I think that unmarried boys and girls should use a contraceptive to prevent pregnancy if they have sex with each other.' [agree]
- **Action in case STI is suspected: inform partner**: the percentage of students who indicates to tell their partner in case s/he suspects to have a STI. It is hypothesized that the students of the treatment group more often tell their partner about this issue than the students of the comparison group, although this issue is not addressed in particular in both programmes.
- **Action in case STI is suspected: seeing a doctor**: the percentage of students which indicates to see a doctor in case s/he suspects to have a STI. It is hypothesized that the students of the treatment group would see a doctor more often than students of the comparison group, although this issue is not addressed in particular in both programmes.

In addition, we asked students on their intention to use a condom when they have sex in the future. However, no normative assumption about a right or wrong answer can be made without further knowledge. For example, if both partners have sex for the first time or both partners got tested,

using a condom is not necessary to protect for STIs. Hence, this variable could not be used as an outcome indicator.

### *Behaviour*

While it is estimated that many young people in Indonesia are sexually active (Leerlooijer et al., 2011), the issue is highly taboo. Even in anonymous questionnaires like ours, almost all students indicate not to have gone beyond *kissing* (see baseline report). Therefore, indicators like 'percentage of students using a form of contraception to avoid pregnancy' have a too low sample size to be used as an outcome indicator. Though, two outcome indicators can be used:

- **Discussion intimate relationship**: one of the aspects of the D4L programme is to encourage students to actively pass on the information. Therefore, a positive impact of the intervention on the level of agreement with the following statement is expected for D4L participants: 'With some of my friends we talk about intimate relationships and sex'.
- **Consultation of a clinic**: Students were asked how often they have visited a health centre (Puskesmas) or clinic for reproductive health problems, contraception, pregnancy, abortion or sexually transmitted diseases in the past year. It is hypothesized that the students of the treatment group visit more often a clinic than students of the comparison group, although this issue is not addressed in particular in both programmes. The variable is recoded as a dummy variable, equalling one if the student visited once or more a clinic. 'Don't want to answer' and 'don't know' answers are recoded to zero.

### *Unintended effects*

As explained in the result chain, we do not expect to see any impact of the programmes on the rate of sexual activity. However, some people might argue that talking about sexual behaviour stimulates the actual activity of students. Therefore, it is important to investigate whether or not the programme had this unintended side effect. Hence, the following two unintended effects variables will be included in the analysis:

- **Acceptance of premarital sex**: the level of agreement with: 'I believe there is nothing wrong with unmarried boys and girls having sexual intercourse if they love each other.'
- **Index on sexual activity (scale 0-8)**: the index for sexual activity is constructed using the percentage of students who ever engaged in one of the following activities with an (ex-)boy- or girlfriend: hold hands, embrace and cares, kiss, French kiss, grope, petting, mutual masturbation and/or oral sex, and sexual intercourse. If a respondent report to have done petting, it is assumed it also engaged in the activities listed before petting. If a respond never had a boy- or girlfriend, it was assumed the student did not engage in any sexual activity. If there were still missing values after this procedure, these were set to zero.

# Annex IV. Data cleaning

Our questionnaire allowed respondents to answer 'don't know' and 'don't want to answer' with some particular questions. In general, we took the conservative approach to recode those answers to no. This approach allowed us to comparing the baseline data with the endline data. If we followed a different approach or the number of responses with 'don't know' and/or 'don't want to answer' was high, we commented on this issue in the main text. For the same reason, also all missing values have been recoded as zero's (the undesirable answer).

Having both the baseline and an endline data made it possible to check the consistency of variables like gender. Two gender inconsistencies were present: one at baseline and one at endline. The inconsistencies were solved by checking the real gender of the respondents in the sampling file.

In addition, some ambiguities with respect to the grade a student attended at the baseline data were solved. For most schools, students were interviewed at the beginning and at the end of the school year. Hence, unless they dropped out of school, students should report the same grade at both base- and endline. The two schools where data have been collected at the beginning of the next year allows such a comparison as well; students should be either in the same grade as in the baseline (repeater) or should be one grade higher. In case of inconsistencies (6 cases), the baseline was taken as the right grade.

Next, some inconsistencies with respect to age were solved. In case of inconsistencies, for example if a student reported to be younger at the endline than at the baseline, the baseline age was taken as the appropriate age. In total, 6 students reported inconsistent date of births.

All other variables were checked on inconsistencies and outliers, and if possible also on differences between base- and endline data. Table 13 details the issues we encountered. The first column of the table indicates the variable number from the questionnaire, followed by the variable description, the number and type of inconsistencies, and finally the actions taken to solve the issues.

**Table 13: Data cleaning**

| Variable name | Subject variable | Number of inconsistencies | Solution |
|---|---|---|---|
| RC05;<br>RC09;<br>RC10 | Final grade;<br>Educ. father;<br>Educ. mother | Missing values at baseline, but at endline response was given:<br>Mathematics: 24<br>Indonesian: 31<br>English: 33<br>Educ. father: 19<br>Educ. mother: 12 | Take baseline data as starting point. Impute endline date in missing baseline data.<br>NB: baseline data is imputed in endline data when endline data is missing. |
| RC05;<br>RC09;<br>RC10 | Final grade;<br>Educ. father;<br>Educ. mother | After imputation (see row above), differences between base- and endline data are:<br>Mathematics: 63<br>Indonesian: 62<br>English: 55<br>Educ. father: 52<br>Educ. mother: 61 | Take baseline data as starting point. Impute baseline data in endline data. |

| Variable name | Subject variable | Number of inconsistencies | Solution |
|---|---|---|---|
| RC08 | Number of siblings | More than 10 siblings at baseline: 2<br><br>Number at baseline can't be lower at the endline: 27 | Take baseline data as starting point.<br>Impute endline data in baseline data.<br>Impute baseline data in endline data. |
| TL01 | Ever had a boyfriend | Yes at baseline, no at endline: 8 | Take endline data as starting point.<br>After TL01 there is a skip in the questionnaire if one answers no; yes at base- and no and endline makes these variables impossible to compare. If we fill out no for TL07 TL08, TL16.at the endline, no inconsistencies appear.<br>Replace yes at baseline with no for TL01. |
| TL16 | Engagement in sexual activities | Hold hands: 38<br>Embrace: 31<br>Kiss: 35<br>French kiss: 22<br>Grope: 12<br>Petting: 8<br>Masturbation/ oral sex: 6<br>Intercourse: 0 | Take baseline data as starting point.<br>We assume that no one answers 'yes' unless this is really the case.<br>Replace no at endline with yes.<br>Recalculate sexual behaviour index at endline.<br>NB: These inconsistencies appear in the raw data set to a larger extent. |
| KN23 | Use of contraceptive methods | Abstinence: 18<br>Pill: 2<br>IUD: 0<br>Injection: 3<br>Diaphragm/pessary: 0<br>Foam/gel/cream: 0<br>Condom: 2<br>Female condom: 2<br>Norplant/implant: 1<br>Herbal medicine: 2<br>Non penetrative sex: 2<br>Periodic abstinence: 2<br>Sex during girl's period: 1<br>Sex standing up: 0<br>Genital washing after intercourse: 1<br>Withdrawal: 0<br>Emergency contraception: 2 | Take baseline data as starting point.<br>Replace no at endline with yes. |

# Annex V. Correlates of programme participation

**Table 14: Correlates of participation in programme**

| | DAKU and/or D4L school | |
|---|---|---|
| **Variable** | Coeff. | Standard error |
| **Sample size** | [n=170] | |
| Age | 0.06 | [0.05] |
| Gender | 0.26*** | [0.08] |
| Education level of father | | |
| *Secondary education* | 0.12 | [0.12] |
| *Vocational school* | 0.10 | [0.12] |
| *University or collage* | -0.02 | [0.17] |
| Watch Western films | 0.17 | [0.14] |
| Ever had a boy-/girlfriend | 0.00 | [0.00] |
| Currently have a boy-/girlfriend | -0.01 | [0.08] |
| Preference place to hang out at […] when they free | | |
| *At home* | -0.28 | [0.12] |
| *Visiting friends* | 0.04 | [0.10] |
| *At a café* | -0.07 | [0.11] |
| *At a shopping mall* | -0.05 | [0.10] |
| *At places of worship (mosque)* | 0.06 | [0.09] |
| *At sport events* | 0.22 | [0.15] |
| Preference activity […] when free | | |
| *Reading books/newspaper/magazine* | 0.04 | [0.08] |
| *Watch TV* | -0.06 | [0.12] |
| *Listen to music/radio* | 0.15 | [0.11] |
| *Participate in religious activities* | 0.09 | [0.10] |
| *Chat with friends* | -0.14 | [0.10] |
| *Do sports* | -0.21* | [0.11] |
| *Play an instrument* | -0.11 | [0.13] |
| *Go to concert/cinema* | 0.20* | [0.11] |
| *Go to a discotheque* | -0.28 | [0.24] |

Source: Student survey E12, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

# Annex VI. Descriptive statistics

**Table 15: Number of students per school**

| School type | Comparison | D4L-only | DAKU&D4L |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Sample size** | [n=4] | [n=3] | [n=6] |
| Average number of students (grade 1-3) | 521 | 551 | 571 |
| *Female* | 362 | 339 | 365 |
| *Male* | 159 | 212 | 206 |
| Source: School survey E12, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia | | | |

**Table 16: Students out of school activities**

| School type | Comparison | D4L-only | P-value C. vs. D4L | DAKU&D4L | P-value C. vs. DAKU&D4L |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sample size | [n=99] | [n=60] | | [n=120] | |
| Percentage of students who prefer to hang out at […] when they are free | [n=97] | [n=60] | | [n=120] | |
| *At home* | 93.3% | 93.1% | 0.975 | 93.3% | 0.997 |
| *Visiting friends* | 38.9% | 53.6% | 0.106 | 60.7% | 0.004 |
| *At a café* | 13.1% | 21.4% | 0.262 | 26.7% | 0.024 |
| *At a shopping mall* | 16.4% | 14.4% | 0.742 | 27.2% | 0.083 |
| *At places of worship (mosque)* | 28.9% | 38.0% | 0.308 | 41.0% | 0.104 |
| *At sport events* | 11.9% | 20.3% | 0.247 | 13.7% | 0.737 |
| *School related activity (music, dance, sports)* | 20.7% | 20.2% | 0.951 | 18.7% | 0.751 |
| *Other activities* | 10.3% | 7.2% | 0.563 | 4.1% | 0.131 |
| Percentage of students who prefer doing […] when they are free | [n=98] | [n=60] | | [n=117] | |
| *Read a book/newspaper/magazine* | 39.6% | 42.8% | 0.716 | 45.7% | 0.429 |
| *Play on computer or internet* | 71.0% | 55.3% | 0.086 | 60.1% | 0.148 |
| *Watch TV* | 86.6% | 88.0% | 0.819 | 78.6% | 0.156 |

| School type | Comparison | D4L-only | P-value C. vs. D4L | DAKU&D4L | P-value C. vs. DAKU&D4L |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sample size | [n=99] | [n=60] | | [n=120] | |
| *Listen to music/radio* | 77.9% | 71.4% | 0.435 | 85.8% | 0.172 |
| *Participate in religious activities* | 15.2% | 21.3% | 0.412 | 25.9% | 0.092 |
| *Do activities with study group* | 18.0% | 11.2% | 0.292 | 18.5% | 0.937 |
| *Chat with friends* | 67.8% | 59.8% | 0.351 | 71.4% | 0.597 |
| *Do sports* | 35.5% | 34.9% | 0.943 | 32.9% | 0.726 |
| *Play an instrument* | 19.1% | 21.9% | 0.723 | 10.5% | 0.132 |
| *Go to concert/cinema* | 24.7% | 14.5% | 0.140 | 30.7% | 0.393 |
| *Go to a discotheque* | 0.0% | 0.0% | . | 2.4% | 0.030 |
| *Other activities* | 0.9% | 5.5% | 0.243 | 1.3% | 0.781 |
| Percentage of students that say to go […] to the discotheque | | | | | |
| *Frequently* | 0.0% | 3.2% | 0.313 | 0.0% | . |
| *Occasionally* | 1.9% | 6.1% | 0.272 | 10.1% | 0.021 |
| *Never* | 98.1% | 90.8% | 0.129 | 89.9% | 0.021 |

Source: Student baseline survey E12, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes: Observations are weighted proportional to the inverse of the probability of being included in the sample due to stratification. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the school level.

**Table 17: Students exposure to western media**

| School type | | Comparison | D4L-only | P-value C. vs. D4L | DAKU&D4L | P-value C. vs. DAKU&D4L |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sample size | | [n=99] | [n=60] | | [n=120] | |
| Percentage of students who use […] in the past 6 months | | | | | | |
| *Newspaper* | Every day | 4.6% | 5.6% | 0.817 | 1.8% | 0.246 |
| | Several times per week | 8.9% | 0.7% | 0.012 | 13.8% | 0.302 |
| | Occasionally | 61.5% | 47.6% | 0.126 | 48.1% | 0.082 |
| | Never | 25.1% | 46.2% | 0.017 | 36.3% | 0.114 |
| *Magazine* | Every day | 2.9% | 0.0% | 0.091 | 0.0% | 0.090 |

| School type | | Comparison | D4L-only | P-value C. vs. D4L | DAKU&D4L | P-value C. vs. DAKU&D4L |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sample size | | [n=99] | [n=60] | | [n=120] | |
| | Several times per week | 3.7% | 8.5% | 0.262 | 17.5% | 0.005 |
| | Occasionally | 60.6% | 42.0% | 0.042 | 57.7% | 0.703 |
| | Never | 32.8% | 49.5% | 0.062 | 24.8% | 0.242 |
| *Television* | Every day | 79.3% | 82.5% | 0.639 | 68.4% | 0.096 |
| | Several times per week | 8.4% | 4.6% | 0.335 | 11.0% | 0.595 |
| | Occasionally | 10.3% | 6.7% | 0.464 | 15.5% | 0.309 |
| | Never | 2.0% | 6.2% | 0.280 | 5.2% | 0.161 |
| *Radio* | Every day | 10.0% | 4.3% | 0.202 | 10.7% | 0.865 |
| | Several times per week | 14.4% | 18.8% | 0.520 | 9.1% | 0.267 |
| | Occasionally | 47.1% | 34.2% | 0.143 | 55.6% | 0.273 |
| | Never | 28.5% | 42.7% | 0.094 | 24.7% | 0.562 |
| *Internet* | Every day | 39.3% | 13.2% | 0.000 | 50.2% | 0.142 |
| | Several times per week | 28.8% | 34.8% | 0.473 | 30.8% | 0.775 |
| | Occasionally | 27.0% | 42.8% | 0.076 | 15.0% | 0.050 |
| | Never | 4.9% | 9.2% | 0.394 | 4.1% | 0.769 |
| Percentage of students who watch or listen to […] | | | | | | |
| *Religious broadcasting* | Frequently | 20.5% | 19.7% | 0.919 | 30.8% | 0.134 |
| | Occasionally | 76.6% | 65.8% | 0.207 | 63.8% | 0.071 |
| | Never | 2.9% | 14.5% | 0.054 | 5.4% | 0.350 |
| *Indonesian popular music* | Frequently | 41.9% | 39.6% | 0.793 | 37.6% | 0.574 |
| | Occasionally | 55.4% | 51.4% | 0.663 | 53.9% | 0.851 |
| | Never | 2.7% | 9.1% | 0.199 | 8.4% | 0.058 |
| *Western popular music* | Frequently | 35.7% | 29.1% | 0.449 | 38.0% | 0.757 |
| | Occasionally | 54.5% | 54.5% | 0.992 | 49.0% | 0.478 |
| | Never | 9.8% | 16.4% | 0.300 | 13.0% | 0.500 |
| *Indonesian film* | Frequently | 38.7% | 46.1% | 0.415 | 31.5% | 0.325 |

| School type | | Comparison | D4L-only | P-value C. vs. D4L | DAKU&D4L | P-value C. vs. DAKU&D4L |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sample size | | [n=99] | [n=60] | | [n=120] | |
| | Occasionally | 58.7% | 49.5% | 0.309 | 63.6% | 0.515 |
| | Never | 2.5% | 4.4% | 0.586 | 4.9% | 0.341 |
| *Western film* | Frequently | 24.0% | 21.9% | 0.795 | 14.5% | 0.127 |
| | Occasionally | 66.1% | 64.8% | 0.884 | 74.7% | 0.212 |
| | Never | 10.0% | 13.4% | 0.560 | 10.8% | 0.840 |

Source: Student baseline survey E12, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes: Observations are weighted proportional to the inverse of the probability of being included in the sample due to stratification. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the school level.

**Table 18: Relationship behaviour of students**

| School type | Survey year | Comparison | D4L-only | P-value C. vs. D4L | DAKU&D4L | P-value C. vs. DAKU&D4L |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Sample size** | | [n=99] | [n=60] | | [n=120] | |
| Percentage of students who ever had a boy- or girlfriend | Base | 75.9% | 87.0% | 0.374 | 89.6% | 0.209 |
| | End | 85.3% | 90.1% | 0.374 | 91.3% | 0.209 |

Source: Student baseline survey E12, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes: Observations are weighted proportional to the inverse of the probability of being included in the sample due to stratification. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the school level.

**Table 19: SRHR topics discussed in class (school level)**

| Outcome variable | Topics covered in D4L | | Topics covered in DAKU | Topics covered in other SRH programmes | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **School type** | D4L-only | DAKU&D4L | DAKU&D4L | Comparison | D4L-only | DAKU&D4L |
| **Sample size** | [n=3] | [n=5][1] | [n=5][1] | [n=2] | [n=2] | [n=1] |
| Number of schools which covered […] | | | | | | |
| *HIV/AIDS* | 3 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| *Other STIs* | 3 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 1 |

| Outcome variable | Topics covered in D4L | | Topics covered in DAKU | Topics covered in other SRH programmes | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **School type** | D4L-only | DAKU&D4L | DAKU&D4L | Comparison | D4L-only | DAKU&D4L |
| **Sample size** | [n=3] | [n=5][1] | [n=5][1] | [n=2] | [n=2] | [n=1] |
| *Condom use* | 2 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| *Rights of young people and human rights* | 2 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| *Sexual and reproductive health rights* | 3 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| *Puberty* | 3 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| *Emotional Ups and Downs* | 3 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| *Friendships and relationships* | 3 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| *Pregnancy, family planning and contraception* | 3 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| *Future plans and dreams* | 2 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| *Communication and decision making* | 3 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| *Managing stress in daily life* | 2 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| *Drugs and narcotics* | 3 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 1 |
| *Tolerance and homosexuality* | 2 | 3 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Source: School survey E12, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia
Notes:
1. Data from one school is missing.

**Table 20: Learning about DAKU and D4L related topics in class (student level)**

| School type | Comparison | D4L-only | P-value C. vs. D4L | DAKU&D4L | P-value C. vs. DAKU&D4L |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sample size | [n=99] | [n=60] | | [n=120] | |
| Percentage of students which indicated to have learned about […] during school related activities in the last school year (%) | | | | | |
| *How to discuss sensitive issues such as sexuality and HIV/AIDS* | 31.7% | 37.2% | 0.528 | 46.9% | 0.041 |
| *How to stand up for your yourself in difficult situations in your life* | 58.4% | 58.0% | 0.965 | 67.8% | 0.191 |
| *To know more about (your) sexual and reproductive health and HIV/AIDS issues* | 49.2% | 53.3% | 0.652 | 70.5% | 0.003 |
| *To know more about your rights related to sexual and reproductive health* | 39.7% | 47.6% | 0.392 | 68.8% | 0.000 |
| *To become and feel part of a group of young people* | 42.9% | 60.4% | 0.049 | 61.8% | 0.010 |
| *To not stigmatize/discriminate people living with HIV/AIDS* | 40.8% | 46.4% | 0.541 | 66.1% | 0.000 |
| *To have a better feeling of yourself as a person* | 78.9% | 78.4% | 0.942 | 80.4% | 0.797 |
| *To treat everyone the same irrespective of colour, race, gender, religion* | 85.5% | 85.0% | 0.927 | 87.4% | 0.686 |
| *To dance and party for a good cause* | 46.4% | 70.6% | 0.006 | 71.0% | 0.001 |
| *To organize activities and/or raise funds for a good cause* | 44.1% | 40.3% | 0.669 | 51.1% | 0.340 |
| *How to use the internet to find information* | 87.7% | 85.8% | 0.767 | 90.9% | 0.458 |
| *How to use computer programmes* | 84.6% | 79.4% | 0.471 | 90.0% | 0.258 |

Source: Student endline survey E12, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes: Observations are weighted proportional to the inverse of the probability of being included in the sample due to stratification. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the school level.

# Annex VII. Evaluation question 1 - tables

**Table 21: Evaluation question 1: change in outcome indicators by student participation**

| School type | D4L-only | | | | DAKU&D4L | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Student type | Spillover | | D4L participant | | Spillover | | DAKU participant | | D4L participant | | DAKU & D4L participant | |
| Sample size | [n=27] | | [n=33] | | [n=42] | | [n=15] | | [n=19] | | [n=44] | |
| Survey | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End |
| **Panel A. Knowledge** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Index on HIV/AIDs knowledge (0-17) | 8.22 | 7.45 | 7.42 | 8.89 | 8.08 | 7.78 | 8.54 | 6.93 | 9.68 | 9.47 | 10.49 | 9.12 |
| Index on counselling knowledge (0-2) | 0.36 | 0.26 | 0.01 | 0.27 | 0.20 | 0.24 | 0.45 | 0.26 | 0.08 | 0.70 | 0.48 | 0.44 |
| Index on STI knowledge (0-3) | 0.94 | 0.89 | 0.33 | 0.41 | 1.11 | 0.83 | 1.43 | 1.25 | 0.66 | 0.88 | 1.10 | 1.28 |
| Index on contraceptive knowledge (0-2) | 0.63 | 0.58 | 0.64 | 0.65 | 0.49 | 0.48 | 0.42 | 0.16 | 0.62 | 0.76 | 0.87 | 0.80 |
| Awareness of rights to SRHR information | 89.7% | 79.4% | 68.4% | 72.4% | 84.6% | 81.9% | 98.4% | 100.0% | 84.4% | 81.9% | 81.7% | 92.0% |
| **Panel B. Attitude** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Index on relationship (0-8) | 3.55 | 4.11 | 3.76 | 4.13 | 3.19 | 3.59 | 3.73 | 3.45 | 4.73 | 5.16 | 4.79 | 4.59 |
| Index on attitude towards GBV (0-5) | 3.92 | 3.95 | 3.91 | 4.15 | 3.85 | 3.84 | 4.33 | 3.90 | 4.08 | 3.71 | 4.22 | 4.29 |
| Acceptance of HIV/AIDS rights | 59.3% | 51.5% | 50.5% | 66.1% | 54.8% | 57.3% | 78.8% | 71.0% | 74.0% | 89.8% | 74.9% | 79.1% |
| Acceptance of homosexuality | 21.7% | 9.5% | 13.4% | 3.8% | 16.5% | 14.0% | 42.1% | 5.4% | 12.6% | 24.6% | 22.5% | 9.8% |

| **School type** | **D4L-only** | | | | | | **DAKU&D4L** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Student type** | Spillover | | D4L participant | | Spillover | | DAKU participant | | D4L participant | | DAKU & D4L participant | |
| **Sample size** | [n=27] | | [n=33] | | [n=42] | | [n=15] | | [n=19] | | [n=44] | |
| **Survey** | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End |
| Acceptance of contraceptive | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Action in case STI is suspected: inform partner | 41.1% | 42.7% | 51.7% | 0.0% | 38.5% | 21.2% | 39.2% | 7.6% | 38.1% | 63.1% | 36.3% | 53.5% |
| Action in case STI is suspected: seeing a doctor | 62.2% | 54.2% | 100.0% | 68.9% | 91.4% | 71.2% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 92.8% | 98.9% | 100.0% |
| **Panel C. Behaviour** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Discussion intimate relationship | 51.4% | 35.8% | 17.1% | 23.6% | 46.1% | 36.7% | 16.6% | 33.8% | 51.9% | 40.8% | 36.1% | 45.7% |
| Consultation of a clinic for SRHR related matters | 13.6% | 20.0% | 23.5% | 22.7% | 2.4% | 14.4% | 28.0% | 39.4% | 4.2% | 14.4% | 23.4% | 21.3% |
| **Panel D. Unintended effects** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Acceptance of premarital sex | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Index on sexual activity (0-8) | 3.19 | 3.58 | 2.21 | 2.57 | 1.63 | 2.25 | 0.68 | 1.40 | 1.85 | 2.19 | 2.01 | 2.41 |

Source: Student base- and endline survey E12, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes: If the sample size deviates, the correct sample size is displayed in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the school level.

**Table 22: Unintended effects: sexual activity**

| **School type** | **D4L-only** | | | | | | **DAKU&D4L** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Student type** | Spillover | | D4L participant | | Spillover | | DAKU participant | | D4L participant | | DAKU & D4L participant | |
| **Sample size** | [n=32] | | [n=28] | | [n=42] | | [n=15] | | [n=19] | | [n=44] | |
| **Survey** | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End | Base | End |
| Percentage of students who ever engaged in […] with (ex) boy-/girlfriend | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Hold hands* | 76.6% | 86.9% | 83.6% | 90.4% | 59.2% | 71.4% | 51.2% | 83.2% | 94.4% | 94.4% | 85.4% | 89.5% |
| *Embrace and caress* | 58.6% | 66.0% | 47.0% | 55.2% | 29.7% | 41.0% | 11.0% | 31.6% | 46.3% | 52.3% | 45.1% | 62.2% |
| *Kiss* | 48.3% | 53.4% | 46.3% | 55.2% | 21.2% | 32.8% | 2.0% | 16.6% | 27.0% | 40.0% | 33.2% | 41.9% |
| *French kiss* | 43.9% | 49.6% | 25.3% | 31.3% | 17.1% | 28.7% | 2.0% | 3.6% | 10.7% | 13.1% | 18.3% | 18.7% |
| *Grope* | 38.8% | 44.5% | 14.2% | 15.7% | 9.9% | 18.3% | 2.0% | 3.6% | 6.5% | 8.9% | 12.8% | 12.8% |
| *Petting* | 23.6% | 28.8% | 4.4% | 4.4% | 9.9% | 12.2% | 0.0% | 1.6% | 0.0% | 3.6% | 4.9% | 9.6% |
| *Mutual masturbation and/or oral sex* | 23.6% | 23.6% | 0.0% | 4.4% | 8.0% | 10.3% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 3.6% | 1.6% | 6.3% |
| *Sexual intercourse* | 5.1% | 5.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 8.0% | 10.3% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 3.6% | 0.0% | 0.0% |

Source: Student base- and endline survey E12, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes: If the sample size deviates, the correct sample size is displayed in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the school level.

**Table 23: Increase and decrease in knowledge, attitude and behaviour**

| | Balanced sample size | Average value of […] at baseline (non-weighted) | Percentage of sample that increase on the outcome indicator | | | Percentage of sample that decrease on the outcome indicator | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Comparison | Participated in DAKU and/or D4L | Spillover | Comparison | Participated in DAKU and/or D4L | Spillover |
| **PANEL A. KNOWLEDGE** | | | | | | | | |
| Index on HIV/AIDs knowledge (0-17) | 279 | 7.90 | 39.4% | 42.3% | 37.9% | 42.4% | 39.6% | 47.8% |
| Index on counselling knowledge (0-2) | 279 | 0.18 | 14.1% | 17.1% | 11.6% | 1.0% | 10.8% | 8.7% |
| Index on STI knowledge (0-3) | 279 | 0.78 | 22.2% | 27.9% | 23.2% | 18.2% | 16.2% | 36.2% |
| Index on contraceptive knowledge (0-2) | 279 | 0.51 | 19.2% | 17.1% | 17.4% | 10.1% | 18.0% | 21.7% |
| Knowledge on SRHR information rights | 279 | 81.0% | 10.1% | 10.8% | 4.4% | 8.1% | 4.5% | 7.3% |
| **PANEL B. ATTITUDE** | | | | | | | | |
| Index on attitude towards relationships (0-8) | 279 | 3.89 | 39.4% | 42.3% | 53.6% | 30.3% | 35.1% | 23.2% |
| Index on attitude towards GBV (0-5) | 279 | 4.10 | 28.3% | 31.5% | 34.8% | 48.5% | 27.9% | 36.2% |
| Acceptance of HIV/AIDS rights | 279 | 53.4% | 21.2% | 17.1% | 13.0% | 6.1% | 6.3% | 13.0% |

| | Balanced sample size | Average value of […] at baseline (non-weighted) | Percentage of sample that increase on the outcome indicator | | | Percentage of sample that decrease on the outcome indicator | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Comparison | Participated in DAKU and/or D4L | Spillover | Comparison | Participated in DAKU and/or D4L | Spillover |
| Acceptance of homosexuality | 279 | 16.8% | 6.1% | 5.4% | 1.5% | 7.1% | 14.4% | 14.5% |
| Acceptance of contraceptive | 279 | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Action in case STI is suspected: inform partner | 109 | 36.7% | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Action in case STI is suspected: seeing a doctor | 109 | 88.1% | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| **PANEL C. BEHAVIOUR** | | | | | | | | |
| Discussion intimate relationship | 279 | 32.3% | 11.1% | 19.8% | 10.1% | 9.1% | 9.0% | 18.8% |
| Consultation of a clinic | 279 | 13.6% | 16.2% | 12.6% | 14.5% | 7.1% | 7.2% | 2.9% |
| **PANEL D. UNINTENDED EFFECTS** | | | | | | | | |
| Acceptance of premarital sex | 279 | 0.0% | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Index on sexual activity (0-8) | 279 | 1.77 | 30.3% | 28.8% | 29.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |

Source: Student survey E12, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes: Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the school level.

# Annex VIII. Evaluation question 2 - tables

**Table 24: Evaluation question 2: attribution per indicator component**

| **Regression model** | | Weighted | 1. ITT school level | | | | 2. ATET student level | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Treatment group** | | mean comp. group | D4L-only | DAKU & D4L | D4L spill. | D4L part. | DAKU & D4L spill. | DAKU part. | D4L part. | DAKU & D4L part. |
| **Indicator** | Survey | | $\beta_1$ | $\beta_2$ | $\alpha_1$ | $\alpha_2$ | $\alpha_3$ | $\alpha_4$ | $\alpha_5$ | $\alpha_6$ |
| PANEL A. KNOWLEDGE | | | | | | | | | | |
| *A1. Index on HIV/AIDS knowledge* | | | | | | | | | | |
| Know what HIV is | Base | 0.50 | -0.04 | 0.17** | 0.04 | -0.10 | 0.13 | -0.02 | 0.14 | 0.07 |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.19) | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.19) | (0.17) | (0.15) |
| | End | 0.55 | 0.11 | 0.13* | 0.08 | 0.22*** | 0.09 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.06 |
| | | | (0.10) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.05) | (0.09) | (0.16) | (0.15) | (0.05) |
| Know what AIDS is | Base | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.00 | 0.02 | -0.00 | -0.00 | -0.00 |
| | | | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.02) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| | End | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.01* | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.07* | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| | | | (0.04) | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.00) | (0.03) | (0.00) | (0.01) |
| [No] Possibility to get cured from HIV/AIDS | Base | 0.28 | 0.02 | 0.07 | -0.01 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.25 | 0.15 | 0.12 |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.20) | (0.09) | (0.14) |
| | End | 0.27 | 0.14 | 0.07 | 0.14* | 0.07 | 0.13 | 0.01 | 0.17** | 0.06 |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.08) | (0.11) |
| Possibility of healthy looking person to have HIV/AIDS | Base | 0.51 | 0.17* | 0.27*** | 0.19 | 0.15 | 0.21 | 0.04 | 0.31* | 0.24* |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.07) | (0.12) | (0.09) | (0.14) | (0.17) | (0.15) | (0.13) |
| | End | 0.58 | -0.01 | 0.15* | 0.09 | 0.05 | 0.10 | -0.05 | 0.21 | 0.21*** |
| | | | (0.10) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.12) | (0.08) | (0.15) | (0.06) |
| Misconceptions about HIV/AIDS | | | | | | | | | | |
| People [can't] get the HIV/AIDS virus by sharing food with a person who has | Base | 0.18 | 0.25*** | 0.46*** | 0.31 | 0.26*** | 0.25* | 0.55** | 0.32*** | 0.51*** |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.18) | (0.07) | (0.12) | (0.21) | (0.08) | (0.12) |

| **Regression model** | | Weighted mean comp. group | 1. ITT school level | | | | 2. ATET student level | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Treatment group** | | | D4L-only | DAKU & D4L | D4L spill. | D4L part. | DAKU & D4L spill. | DAKU part. | D4L part. | DAKU & D4L part. |
| **Indicator** | Survey | | $\beta_1$ | $\beta_2$ | $\alpha_1$ | $\alpha_2$ | $\alpha_3$ | $\alpha_4$ | $\alpha_5$ | $\alpha_6$ |
| HIV/AIDS | End | 0.26 | 0.18** | 0.33*** | 0.14 | 0.31*** | 0.21 | 0.20* | 0.36* | 0.34** |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.07) | (0.15) | (0.10) | (0.17) | (0.13) |
| People [can't] get the HIV/AIDS virus by hugging and kissing on the cheeks with a person who has HIV/AIDS | Base | 0.25 | 0.20** | 0.31*** | 0.27** | 0.21* | 0.16 | 0.25 | 0.15 | 0.33** |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.12) | (0.10) | (0.12) | (0.14) | (0.13) | (0.13) |
| | End | 0.32 | 0.11 | 0.26*** | 0.00 | 0.33** | 0.17 | 0.25* | 0.19 | 0.25** |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.11) | (0.14) | (0.13) | (0.14) | (0.11) | (0.11) |
| People [can't] get the HIV/AIDS virus from mosquito bites | Base | 0.33 | 0.06 | 0.18** | 0.14 | -0.03 | 0.03 | 0.17 | 0.18* | 0.27** |
| | | | (0.10) | (0.08) | (0.12) | (0.07) | (0.11) | (0.13) | (0.10) | (0.12) |
| | End | 0.31 | 0.15 | 0.21** | 0.16 | 0.28** | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.18 | 0.30*** |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.13) | (0.05) |
| People [can't] get the HIV/AIDS virus because of witchcraft or other supernatural means | Base | 0.53 | -0.05 | 0.13* | 0.01 | -0.07 | -0.08 | 0.24 | 0.23* | 0.20* |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.13) | (0.09) | (0.11) | (0.15) | (0.11) | (0.10) |
| | End | 0.53 | -0.00 | 0.14* | 0.03 | 0.11 | 0.13 | 0.20** | 0.04 | 0.15 |
| | | | (0.10) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.14) | (0.08) | (0.11) | (0.10) |
| The chance of contracting the virus causing HIV/AIDS is [not] reduced by not touching public toilets | Base | 0.43 | 0.02 | 0.22*** | 0.15 | 0.02 | 0.16 | 0.17 | 0.20 | 0.27** |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.11) | (0.08) | (0.12) | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.12) |
| | End | 0.37 | 0.20** | 0.11 | 0.30*** | 0.17 | 0.05 | -0.11 | 0.15 | 0.21** |
| | | | (0.10) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.11) | (0.15) | (0.10) |
| The chance of contracting the virus causing HIV/AIDS is [not] reduced by avoiding sick looking people | Base | 0.47 | 0.10 | 0.22*** | 0.02 | 0.16* | 0.08 | -0.02 | 0.07 | 0.29*** |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.13) | (0.08) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.15) | (0.08) |
| | End | 0.45 | 0.07 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.12 | 0.15 |
| | | | (0.10) | (0.08) | (0.14) | (0.12) | (0.16) | (0.17) | (0.15) | (0.11) |
| Contraction methods HIV/AIDS | | | | | | | | | | |

| **Regression model** | | Weighted mean comp. group | 1. ITT school level | | | | 2. ATET student level | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Treatment group** | | | D4L-only | DAKU & D4L | D4L spill. | D4L part. | DAKU & D4L spill. | DAKU part. | D4L part. | DAKU & D4L part. |
| **Indicator** | Survey | | $\beta_1$ | $\beta_2$ | $\alpha_1$ | $\alpha_2$ | $\alpha_3$ | $\alpha_4$ | $\alpha_5$ | $\alpha_6$ |
| People get the HIV/AIDS virus by sharing razors or tooth brushes with a person who has HIV/AIDS | Base | 0.40 | 0.00 | 0.09 | -0.06 | -0.02 | 0.02 | -0.16 | 0.21 | 0.04 |
| | | | (0.10) | (0.08) | (0.17) | (0.12) | (0.10) | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.15) |
| | End | 0.45 | -0.08 | -0.04 | -0.05 | -0.06 | -0.02 | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.04 |
| | | | (0.10) | (0.08) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.06) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.08) |
| People get the HIV/AIDS virus by having oral sex with a person who has HIV/AIDS | Base | 0.79 | -0.04 | 0.02 | -0.03 | -0.11 | -0.01 | -0.05 | 0.07 | 0.01 |
| | | | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.17) | (0.14) | (0.09) |
| | End | 0.63 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.02 | 0.13* | -0.01 | 0.10* |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.12) | (0.09) | (0.07) | (0.11) | (0.06) |
| The virus that causes HIV/AIDS can be transmitted from a mother to a child | Base | 0.63 | 0.14* | 0.18*** | 0.13 | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.13 | 0.18** |
| | | | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.11) | (0.09) | (0.11) | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.07) |
| | End | 0.61 | 0.07 | 0.12 | 0.07 | 0.14** | 0.03 | 0.14* | 0.04 | 0.14* |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.10) | (0.05) | (0.12) | (0.08) | (0.15) | (0.07) |
| Knowledge about ABC-method | | | | | | | | | | |
| Abstinence reduces change HIV/AIDS virus transmission | Base | 0.44 | 0.11 | 0.07 | 0.14 | 0.11 | -0.04 | 0.04 | -0.02 | 0.20* |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.10) | (0.13) | (0.09) | (0.12) | (0.17) | (0.10) |
| | End | 0.38 | 0.09 | 0.02 | 0.05 | 0.19 | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.07 |
| | | | (0.10) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.11) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.14) | (0.09) |
| Always using a condom reduces change HIV/AIDS virus transmission | Base | 0.37 | -0.02 | 0.13* | 0.04 | -0.05 | -0.11 | -0.03 | 0.09 | 0.22** |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.13) | (0.07) | (0.10) | (0.15) | (0.17) | (0.10) |
| | End | 0.26 | 0.21** | 0.14* | 0.24** | 0.24*** | 0.02 | 0.06 | 0.07 | 0.20** |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.10) | (0.08) |
| Being mutually faithful reduces change HIV/AIDS virus transmission | Base | 0.37 | -0.01 | 0.18** | -0.01 | 0.05 | -0.08 | -0.00 | 0.11 | 0.33*** |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.10) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) |

| **Regression model** | | Weighted mean comp. group | 1. ITT school level | | | | 2. ATET student level | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Treatment group** | | | D4L-only | DAKU & D4L | D4L spill. | D4L part. | DAKU & D4L spill. | DAKU part. | D4L part. | DAKU & D4L part. |
| **Indicator** | Survey | | $\beta_1$ | $\beta_2$ | $\alpha_1$ | $\alpha_2$ | $\alpha_3$ | $\alpha_4$ | $\alpha_5$ | $\alpha_6$ |
| | End | 0.34 | 0.01 | 0.13 | -0.01 | 0.03 | -0.14 | -0.04 | 0.09 | 0.23** |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.11) | (0.09) | (0.08) |
| Knowledge about condoms protecting HIV/AIDS | Base | 0.19 | 0.06 | 0.14* | 0.12 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.16 | -0.04 | 0.17* |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.12) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.13) | (0.09) | (0.08) |
| | End | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13* | 0.09 | 0.15** | 0.00 | 0.30*** | -0.04 | 0.20*** |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.05) |
| *A2. Index on knowledge about counselling* | | | | | | | | | | |
| HIV/AIDS test knowledge proceeding counselling | Base | 0.06 | 0.07 | 0.15** | 0.11 | 0.01 | 0.11 | 0.18 | 0.08 | 0.21*** |
| | | | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.05) | (0.09) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.07) |
| | End | 0.16 | 0.02 | 0.06 | -0.00 | -0.01 | -0.02 | -0.03 | 0.10 | 0.08 |
| | | | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.11) | (0.08) |
| HIV/AIDS consultation place knowledge | base | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.11* | 0.09 | -0.01 | 0.05 | 0.13 | -0.02 | 0.19*** |
| | | | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.03) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.03) | (0.05) |
| | end | 0.12 | -0.03 | 0.07 | -0.05 | -0.04 | -0.04 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0.07 |
| | | | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| *A3. Index on other STI knowledge* | | | | | | | | | | |
| Heard of other STI | Base | 0.31 | 0.01 | 0.15* | 0.16 | -0.24** | 0.15 | 0.30** | -0.04 | 0.12 |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.12) |
| | End | 0.35 | 0.05 | 0.16* | 0.10 | -0.07 | 0.02 | 0.37*** | 0.16 | 0.17 |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.14) | (0.16) | (0.07) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| Hugging or petting [does not] increases chance transmission STI | base | 0.04 | 0.08 | 0.16*** | 0.09 | 0.02 | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.11* | 0.30** |
| | | | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.10) |

| **Regression model** | | Weighted mean comp. group | 1. ITT school level | | | | 2. ATET student level | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Treatment group** | | | D4L-only | DAKU & D4L | D4L spill. | D4L part. | DAKU & D4L spill. | DAKU part. | D4L part. | DAKU & D4L part. |
| **Indicator** | Survey | | $\beta_1$ | $\beta_2$ | $\alpha_1$ | $\alpha_2$ | $\alpha_3$ | $\alpha_4$ | $\alpha_5$ | $\alpha_6$ |
| | end | 0.07 | 0.03 | 0.19*** | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.07 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.29** |
| | | | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.07) | (0.12) | (0.07) | (0.12) |
| Oral sex increases chance transmission STI | Base | 0.23 | -0.10 | 0.10 | 0.01 | -0.24** | 0.05 | 0.24* | -0.06 | 0.13 |
| | | | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.10) | (0.08) | (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.12) |
| | End | 0.22 | -0.02 | 0.14* | 0.03 | -0.10* | -0.06 | 0.35** | 0.12 | 0.22** |
| | | | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.11) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.14) | (0.10) | (0.09) |
| *A4. Index on contraceptive knowledge* | | | | | | | | | | |
| Condoms protect pregnancy | Base | 0.19 | 0.15 | 0.14* | 0.13* | 0.15** | 0.01 | 0.13 | -0.02 | 0.23*** |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.07) |
| | End | 0.20 | 0.11 | 0.06 | 0.02 | 0.22*** | -0.03 | 0.01 | -0.06 | 0.16*** |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.05) | (0.09) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.05) |
| Able to obtain contraceptive methods | Base | 0.17 | 0.04 | 0.18** | -0.05 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.20*** | 0.22* | 0.22*** |
| | | | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.08) | (0.05) | (0.10) | (0.06) |
| | End | 0.28 | -0.04 | 0.10 | 0.00 | -0.03 | -0.04 | -0.05 | 0.27* | 0.11 |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.11) | (0.15) | (0.07) |
| PANEL B. ATTITUDE | | | | | | | | | | |
| *B1. Index on the attitude towards relationships* | | | | | | | | | | |
| A partner [does not] agree(s) to have sexual intercourse when he/she actually does not want to. | Base | 0.68 | -0.06 | 0.09 | -0.06 | -0.03 | -0.00 | -0.04 | 0.20*** | 0.16** |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.07) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.13) | (0.05) | (0.06) |
| | End | 0.80 | -0.14* | -0.11 | -0.09 | -0.08 | -0.20** | -0.03 | -0.11 | -0.06 |
| | | | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.14) | (0.08) |
| Two people [do not] have sex in exchange for gifts | Base | 0.58 | 0.00 | 0.10 | 0.06 | -0.04 | 0.12 | 0.06 | 0.12 | 0.07 |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.09) |

| Regression model | | Weighted mean comp. group | 1. ITT school level | | | | 2. ATET student level | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Treatment group | | | D4L-only | DAKU & D4L | D4L spill. | D4L part. | DAKU & D4L spill. | DAKU part. | D4L part. | DAKU & D4L part. |
| Indicator | Survey | | $\beta_1$ | $\beta_2$ | $\alpha_1$ | $\alpha_2$ | $\alpha_3$ | $\alpha_4$ | $\alpha_5$ | $\alpha_6$ |
| | End | 0.65 | -0.03 | -0.11 | 0.02 | -0.02 | -0.06 | -0.22** | -0.00 | -0.16 |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.09) |
| A girl calls her boyfriend (not) manly (enough) when he does not want to have sex with her | Base | 0.51 | -0.12 | -0.02 | -0.09 | -0.10 | -0.14 | 0.05 | 0.19* | 0.14* |
| | | | (0.10) | (0.08) | (0.21) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.15) | (0.10) | (0.08) |
| | End | 0.48 | 0.06 | 0.12 | 0.09 | -0.08 | 0.03 | -0.04 | 0.08 | 0.27** |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.16) | (0.07) | (0.11) | (0.15) | (0.18) | (0.10) |
| A boy tells his girlfriend he will not [stop to] love her anymore if she does not want to have sex | Base | 0.66 | -0.10 | -0.04 | -0.19** | -0.06 | -0.17* | -0.13 | -0.10 | 0.07 |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.15) | (0.08) | (0.15) | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| | End | 0.75 | -0.05 | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.05 | -0.10 | -0.01 | 0.10 | 0.10 |
| | | | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.09) |
| Two people [do not] have sex because everybody else is doing it | Base | 0.61 | 0.02 | 0.05 | 0.04 | -0.08 | -0.04 | -0.08 | -0.01 | 0.07 |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.11) | (0.12) | (0.08) | (0.10) | (0.12) | (0.11) |
| | End | 0.70 | 0.00 | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.07 | -0.08 | -0.17 | 0.06 | 0.08 |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.11) | (0.13) | (0.07) | (0.08) |
| Both partners use methods to prevent STIs or unwanted pregnancy | Base | 0.24 | 0.01 | 0.04 | 0.09 | -0.03 | -0.06 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.15* |
| | | | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.10) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.08) |
| | End | 0.24 | 0.00 | -0.02 | 0.09 | 0.05 | -0.05 | -0.05 | 0.10 | 0.02 |
| | | | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.11) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.16) | (0.10) |
| When one partner does not feel ready to have sex yet, the other one waits | Base | 0.45 | -0.11 | 0.08 | -0.20** | -0.14 | -0.17** | -0.14* | 0.09 | 0.13 |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.13) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.13) | (0.10) |
| | End | 0.47 | -0.11 | 0.07 | -0.15 | -0.02 | -0.10 | -0.08 | 0.20* | 0.03 |
| | | | (0.10) | (0.08) | (0.12) | (0.07) | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.08) |

| **Regression model** | | Weighted mean comp. group | 1. ITT school level | | | | 2. ATET student level | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Treatment group** | | | D4L-only | DAKU & D4L | D4L spill. | D4L part. | DAKU & D4L spill. | DAKU part. | D4L part. | DAKU & D4L part. |
| **Indicator** | Survey | | $\beta_1$ | $\beta_2$ | $\alpha_1$ | $\alpha_2$ | $\alpha_3$ | $\alpha_4$ | $\alpha_5$ | $\alpha_6$ |
| Two partners agree not to have sex with anybody else when they are in a relationship together | Base | 0.00 | 0.03 | -0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.01 | -0.02 | -0.02 | 0.01 |
| | | | (0.03) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) |
| | End | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.07 | 0.05 | 0.02 |
| | | | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.03) |
| *B2. Index on the attitude towards GBV* | | | | | | | | | | |
| I think that (sometimes) a boy [never] has to force a girl to have sex if he loves her. | Base | 0.94 | -0.04 | 0.03 | -0.04* | -0.00 | -0.03 | 0.06** | 0.07*** | 0.00 |
| | | | (0.05) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| | End | 0.95 | -0.01 | -0.00 | 0.00 | 0.02 | -0.05 | 0.02 | -0.02 | -0.03 |
| | | | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.07) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.06) | (0.03) |
| In my opinion, it is (sometimes) [never] justifiable for a boy to hit his girlfriend | Base | 0.94 | -0.12** | -0.02 | -0.08 | -0.10** | -0.05 | 0.05 | -0.07 | -0.01 |
| | | | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.07) | (0.04) | (0.06) | (0.05) |
| | End | 0.91 | -0.05 | 0.01 | -0.05 | -0.08* | -0.04 | 0.02 | 0.02 | -0.01 |
| | | | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.05) |
| I think that if someone refuses to have sex, it is [not] acceptable to use some force/pressure | Base | 0.86 | -0.07 | -0.03 | -0.05 | -0.01 | -0.04 | 0.01 | 0.08 | -0.04 |
| | | | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.04) |
| | End | 0.78 | 0.02 | 0.07 | -0.03 | 0.09** | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.02 | 0.14*** |
| | | | (0.07) | (0.05) | (0.12) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.03) |
| I think only the man should be held responsible if he rapes a woman who wears sexy clothing | Base | 0.57 | 0.05 | -0.06 | 0.08 | -0.02 | -0.07 | -0.11 | -0.10 | 0.04 |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.10) | (0.17) | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| | End | 0.43 | 0.31*** | 0.07 | 0.28** | 0.26*** | 0.05 | -0.04 | 0.04 | 0.15 |
| | | | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.12) | (0.07) | (0.10) | (0.14) | (0.12) | (0.11) |
| I believe that if someone wants to have sex, his/her partner has the right to | Base | 0.82 | -0.06 | 0.01 | -0.01 | 0.00 | -0.00 | 0.06 | -0.02 | 0.09 |
| | | | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.07) |

| **Regression model** | | Weighted mean comp. group | 1. ITT school level | | | | 2. ATET student level | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Treatment group** | | | D4L-only | DAKU & D4L | D4L spill. | D4L part. | DAKU & D4L spill. | DAKU part. | D4L part. | DAKU & D4L part. |
| **Indicator** | Survey | | $\beta_1$ | $\beta_2$ | $\alpha_1$ | $\alpha_2$ | $\alpha_3$ | $\alpha_4$ | $\alpha_5$ | $\alpha_6$ |
| refuse | End | 0.78 | -0.03 | -0.03 | 0.08 | -0.04 | 0.01 | 0.09 | -0.17 | 0.05 |
| | | | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.10) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.13) | (0.11) |

Source: Student baseline survey E12, MFS II Evaluation Indonesia

Notes: Standard errors given in brackets. Regressions are estimated with age and gender as covariates. For ITT school level (equation (1)), observations are weighted proportional to the inverse of the probability of being included in the sample due to stratification. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the school level.

* p-value<0.10, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value <0.01.

# Annex IX. Representativeness of the sample

**Table 25: Comparison of IYARHS 2007 and 2012 data (ages 15-17) with E12 sample data**

| Study | E12 - baseline | | | | IYARHS 2007 (age 15-17) | | IYARHS 2012 (age 15-17) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| School (if applicable) | Comparison | | Treatment | | | | | |
| Gender | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | **Male** | **Female** |
| Sample size | 44 | 47 | 70 | 103 | 147 | 133 | **148** | **142** |
| Age | 15.6 | 15.5 | 16.2 | 16.0 | 15.8 | 15.9 | 16.0 | 15.9 |
| Religion | | | | | | | | |
| *Islam* | 97.7% | 100.0% | 98.6% | 99.0% | 87.1% | 86.5% | | |
| *Protestant* | 2.3% | 0.0% | 1.4% | 1.0% | 6.1% | 6.8% | | |
| *Catholic* | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 2.0% | 2.3% | | |
| Age respondent would like to get married | 25.1 [n=19] | 24.0 [n=16] | 25.5 [n=24] | 23.8 [n=34] | 25.7 [n=124] | 24.0 [n=93] | 25.3 [n=135] | 24.3 [n=124] |
| Number of children if you can chose | 2.3 [n=22] | 2.2 [n=21] | 2.4 [n=28] | 2.6 [n=39] | 0.75 [n=124] | 0.8 [n=116] | 2.3 [n=147] | 2.3 [n=130] |
| Ever had boy/girlfriend | 81.8% | 83.0% | 92.9% | 88.3% | 78.2% | 78.1% | 70.4% [n=81] | 66.7% [n=78] |
| Currently have a boy/girlfriend | 45.5% | 40.4% | 47.1% | 48.5% | 36.1% | 48.1% | 45.3% | 45.1% |
| Activities with boy/girlfriend (note: E12 has more options to choose from) | | | | | [n=115] | [n=104] | [n=124] | [n=116] |
| *Held hands* | 88.6% [n=35] | 70.3% [n=37] | 81.3% [n=64] | 83.0% [n=88] | 93.4% | 93.3% | 93.5% | 84.5% |
| *Kissed lips* | 25.0% [n=32] | 27.0% [n=37] | 37.3% [n=59] | 35.8% [n=81] | 47.8% | 42.3% | 41.9% | 29.3% |
| *Touched / Aroused (petting)* | 2.9% [n=34] | 0.0% [n=37] | 9.8% [n=61] | 1.2% [n=86] | 13.9% | 0.1% | 19.4% | 5.2% |
| Percentage students which ever had sexual intercourse | 0.0% [n=35] | 0.0% [n=38] | 3.2% [n=63] | 0.0% [n=90] | 0.7% [n=146] | 1.5% | 2.7% | 0.0% |
| Women should maintain virginity before marriage (agree) | 97.5% [n=40] | 100.0% [n=42] | 96.8% [n=63] | 98.0% [n=101] | 98.0% | 100.0% | 98.0% [n=148] | 100.0% [n=141] |
| Contraception methods 'ever heard of' (for preventing pregnancy) | | | | | | | | |
| *Pill* | 43.2% | 51.1% | 54.3% | 43.7% | 55.8% | 97.7% | 82.3% [n=147] | 88.7% [n=142] |
| *IUD* | 9.1% | 8.5% | 11.4% | 17.5% | 29.9% | 69.2% | 17.7% [n=147] | 59.2% [n=142] |
| *Injectables* | 40.9% | 44.7% | 45.7% | 41.7% | 47.6% | 94.7% | 53.4% | 85.9% |
| *Implants* | 18.2% | 21.3% | 20.0% | 19.4% | 14.4% | 53.4% | 10.1% | 40.8% |
| *Condom* | 81.8% | 87.2% | 80.0% | 78.6% | 93.9% | 96.2% | 93.9% | 83.1% |
| *Intravaginal/Diaphragm* | 20.5% | 19.1% | 21.4% | 25.2% | 3.4% | 15.0% | 5.4% | 9.9% |
| *Rhythm or periodic abstinence* | 11.4% | 14.9% | 22.9% | 18.4% | 12.2% | 25.8% | 14.2% | 32.4% |
| *Withdrawal* | 15.9% | 4.3% | 18.6% | 12.6% | 46.3% | 42.9% | 16.9% | 13.4% |
| *Emergency contraception* | 15.9% | 12.8% | 20.0% | 19.4% | 8.2% | 12.8% | 8.8% | 7.7% |
| *Other methods* | | | | | 2.7% | 0.0% | 0.7% [n=148] | 2.8% [n=141] |

| Study | E12 - baseline | | | | IYARHS 2007 (age 15-17) | | IYARHS 2012 (age 15-17) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| School (if applicable) | Comparison | | Treatment | | | | | |
| Gender | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | **Male** | **Female** |
| Sample size | 44 | 47 | 70 | 103 | 147 | 133 | **148** | **142** |
| Can women become pregnant by having one sexual intercourse? | 96.4% [n=28] | 87.2% [n=39] | 98.3% [n=60] | 94.0% [n=83] | 77.3% [n=128] | 60.5% [n=114] | 71.4% [n=147] | 54.2% [n=142] |
| Statements: [E12: Can [condom] safely prevent pregnancy / HIV/AIDS and other STIs? | | | | | | | | |
| *Condoms can be used to prevent pregnancy* | 55.6% [n=18] | 42.9% [n=14] | 83.3% [n=36] | 45.7% [n=35] | 97.9% [n=143] | 88.0% [n=125] | 79.7% [n=143] | 68.3% [n=142] |
| *A condom can protect against getting HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases* | 60.0% [n=15] | 47.1% [n=17] | 73.5% [n=34] | 47.1% [n=34] | 95.7% [n=140] | 87.8% [n=123] | 56.6% [n=143] | 54.2% [n=142] |
| Ever heard of (an illness called) (HIV/)AIDS | 81.8% | 93.6% | 90.0% | 96.1% | 94.6% | 98.5% | 98.0% | 98.6% |
| % of correct answers: Can you get the HIV/AIDS virus from […]? | | | | | | | | |
| | [n=36] | [n=44] | [n=63] | [n=99] | [n=139] | [n=131] | [n=144] | [n=140] |
| *Mosquito bites* | 38.9% | 38.6% | 44.4% | 53.5% | 67.6% | 62.6% | 54.2% | 52.9% |
| *Sharing food* | 27.8% | 15.9% | 60.3% | 47.5% | 67.6% | 58.0% | 39.6% | 47.1% |
| *Because of witchcraft or other supernatural means* | 66.7% | 52.3% | 77.8% | 58.6% | 82.7% | 90.1% | 80.6% | 82.1% |
| % of correct answers: Can people reduce their chance of getting the HIV/AIDS virus by […]? | | | | | | | | |
| Using a condom every time they/you have sex | 47.2% | 29.5% | 60.3% | 30.3% | 67.6% | 70.2% | 66.9% [n=145] | 45.7% [n=140] |
| Not having sexual intercourse at all | 63.9% | 36.4% | 57.1% | 46.5% | 50.4% | 74.0% | | |
| Possible for a healthy-looking person to have the AIDS virus[1] (% of correct answers) | 52.8% | 65.9% | 76.2% | 79.8% | 89.9% | 96.2% | 79.2% [n=144] | 79.3% [n=140] |
| Can the virus that causes HIV/AIDS be transmitted from a mother to a child (% of correct answers) | 63.9% | 79.5% | 88.9% | 83.8% | 80.6% | 85.5% | | |
| Do you know about voluntary HIV test preceded by counselling? | 9.1% | 2.1% | 12.9% | 13.6% | 5.8% | 6.9% | 6.9% [n=145] | 20.7% [n=140] |
| Apart from HIV/AIDS, have you heard other infections that can be transmitted through sexual contact? | 27.3% | 40.4% | 45.7% | 35.0% | 32.7% | 27.1% | 19.6% | 38.7% |
| Ever smoked a cigarette | 56.1% | 8.5% | 72.5% | 13.0% | 65.3% | 15.0% | 72.3% | 15.6% |

| Study | E12 - baseline | | | | IYARHS 2007 (age 15-17) | | IYARHS 2012 (age 15-17) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| School (if applicable) | Comparison | | Treatment | | | | | |
| Gender | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | **Male** | **Female** |
| Sample size | 44 | 47 | 70 | 103 | 147 | 133 | **148** | **142** |
| | [n=41] | [n=47] | [n=69] | [n=100] | | | [n=148] | [n=141] |
| Age smoked a cigarette | 13.2 [n=22] | 11.8 [n=4] | 12.8 [n=49] | 14.2 [n=13] | 13.6 [n=96] | 13.7 [n=20] | 13.4 [n=107] | 13.5 [n=22] |
| Ever drank alcohol | 4.9% [n=41] | 0.0% [n=47] | 30.0% [n=70] | 2.0% [n=101] | 23.8% | 0.06% | 27.0% | 4.9% |
| Age drank alcohol | 15.0 [n=1] | . | 14.5 [n=21] | 14.0 [n=2] | 14.7 [n=35] | 14.0 [n=7] | 14.8 [n=40] | 14.0 [n=7] |
| Ever used drugs | 0.0% [n=42] | 2.1% [n=47] | 5.7% [n=70] | 0.0% [n=103] | 0.05% | 0.0% | 5.4% | 0.0% |

Notes:
- Our questionnaire is a self-reported interview, IYARHS is not self-reported.
- If the sample size deviates, the correct sample size is displayed in brackets.
1. We are aware of the fact that this should be HIV virus. However, we stick to the formulation of the questionnaires.

# Annex X. Qualitative report on the evaluation of DAKU and Dance4Life

**REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH EDUCATION AND**

**HIV AND AIDS PREVENTION THROUGH EDUCATION, MUSIC, AND DANCE FOR TEENAGERS**

**"Start dancing stop aids"**[48]

## 1. BACKGROUND

In response to the increase in unplanned teen pregnancies and HIV transmission rates resulting from risky sexual behaviour among Indonesian teenagers nowadays, the DAKU and D4L programmes have been brought to Indonesian high schools.

## 2. EVALUATION METHOD

To evaluate the DAKU and Dance4Life programmes we have conducted in-depth interviews with 8 informants that have been involved in one or both of the programmes. In order to discern the impact of the programme on behavioural changes, only informants who had a girlfriend/boyfriend were considered. The informants – 4 boys and 4 girls from 4 different vocational high schools - were randomly selected among the eligible respondents satisfying both criteria mentioned above. All of the selected informants turned out to be D4L participants. Only one of the informants (female) had also participated in the DAKU programme.

At the time the interviews were conducted, the male informants were 15, 18, 16 and 17 years old and were in a relationship with girls of 15, 17, 17 and 16 years old. The length of their relationships was 3 months, 6 months, 5 months and 1 year. The female informants were 16, 17, 17 and 17 years old and were in a relationship with slightly older boys of 20, 18, 21 and 19 years old. Their relationships already lasted 8 months, 8 months, 2 years and 2 years.

Seven of the interviews were conducted inside the schools. Six of which during school hours, and one (with a male informant) outside school hours. The remaining interview with a female informant who was currently doing an internship programme was conducted outside of school. All interviews were undertaken in easy and relaxed settings in an attempt to get open and honest answers from all the informants. To break shyness, jokes and teases were sometimes made. The teachers in all the 4 schools were very supportive and provided private rooms for the interviews to take place.

[48] Module dance 4 Life

# 3. FINDINGS ON THE FIELD

## 3.1. Project implementation

### *DAKU*

DAKU is a computer-based comprehensive sexual education programme that focuses on teaching high school students about various aspects of reproductive health, such as HIV prevention, sexuality and sexual abuse. The information transfer was carried out at school computer labs, usually in 2 one-to-two-hour sessions in which only around 30 students participated per school, which in the surveyed school turned out to be only girls. The process of recruitment was not publically announced. Instead, in the surveyed school participants were appointed by the counselling teacher.

After being taught about reproductive health with the use of the computer, students were allowed to ask questions about the material to the DAKU counsellor. However, the DAKU counsellor did not go into detail about what healthy reproduction exactly entails and focused only on male and female reproductive health in general. The highlight of the materials presented was about male and female organs, focusing in particular on menstruation and sperm.[49]

### *Dance4Life*

Meanwhile, the D4L programme has the purpose of preventing HIV and AIDS through the medium of dance activities. Unlike the DAKU programme, which only involved a limited number of students, the D4L programme could be joined by anyone, girls and boys alike, who was willing to participate.
**The D4L Programme is** divided into 4 stages known as the **4 Stages of *School4life,*** which are:

- ***Inspire: Heart Connection Tour*****,** aimed at motivating teenagers to have active roles in preventing the spread of HIV infection.
- ***Educate: Skill4life*****,** a series of interactive workshops with several themes; self-development, basic knowledge on gender-based violence, reproductive health and sexuality including HIV and AIDS, negotiation skills, public speaking, debating, leadership, and entrepreneurship.
- ***Activate: Act4life*****,** students are encouraged to communicate with and inform their peers, family members and neighbours about HIV and AIDS and undertake activities such as becoming volunteers who care about AIDS, fund raising, advocating, or making other efforts to prevent the spread of HIV both at school and in the community.
- ***Celebrate*****,** to celebrate their achievements reached in the previous three stages and to inspire and gain support from the rest of the word, the students dance together with other students from over the whole world on World Aids Day. This celebration moment is intended to strengthen the commitment of the teenagers as 'agents of change' and to connect them with teenagers from other countries where the Dance4Life programme is also applied.

[49] It should be noted here that this description is based on the reflections of only 1 informant.

The students could decide for themselves if they wanted to join all the 4 stages or just one or some of them. All 8 informants indicated that they had participated in the lectures about HIV/AIDS (the *educate stage*) and the dance (the *celebrate stage*). On the other hand, none of them mentioned that they had undertaken any activities outside of the classroom (the *activate stage*).

Most informants said that they still remembered how the different stages were implemented in the D4L Programme. For the *educate stage* for instance, they described how they received information from an LCD screen and students were asked to answer questions on the question sheets provided. They also described how they had the chance to ask questions. Unfortunately, 2 of the informants felt that the presentation of information was too fast and that they did not get enough opportunities to ask questions, as illustrated in their following remarks:

> The information was presented in the class for about 3 hours. They explained about HIV/AIDS very quick. And then they gave us question sheets to answer. We were given a chance to ask any question. Next was dancing performance which is accompanied by music.

> We were shy (to ask), because most of my friends replied all at once that they had already known about it. After that, there was no more chance to ask and we were asked to answer the question sheets.

### *DAKU vs. Dance4Life – weak and strong points*

The DAKU and D4L programmes have a similar goal in encouraging students to make healthy lifestyle choices and behave responsibly with regard to their relationships and sexuality. Among other things, by teaching them how to have safe relationships and to prevent themselves from undertaking risky sexual behaviour. However, the programmes differ in the fact that the DAKU programme was designed to promote healthy reproduction, while the D4L programme was more specifically designed to prevent the spread of HIV and AIDS.

Unlike in the D4L programme, there is neither game nor performance involved in the DAKU programme. One of the informants that participated in both the DAKU and the D4L programme stated that the DAKU programme felt "less dynamic" than the D4L programme, because it was conducted in the computer lab and had their own teacher acting as the instructor. She also felt that the limited number of students participating in the programme hindered them from expressing themselves. On the other hand, this same informant observed that the DAKU programme contained a broader scope of information as the emphasis of the D4L programme seemed to be more on the dance performance than on the transfer of information. When asked, only 2 of the 8 informants were able to recite the slogans from D4L. One of the informants that could not remember any of the slogans said that this was due to the fact that "they were all in English".[50]

[50] Rutgers WPF noted that while it is true that all slogans in D4L are in English, most of the campaign materials of D4L are actually in Indonesian.

Some suggestions for improvement for the D4L programme that were given by the other informants were; to hold the meetings in a tent instead of in the hot open air; to create more opportunities to ask questions; to modernize the dance; and for the facilitators to be better prepared. Overall, the informants were positive about the D4L programme, especially about the dance.

## 3.2. Project impacts

### *Knowledge about HIV/AIDS*

All informants reported that, as a result of the programme(s), they have become more knowledgeable and aware of HIV and AIDS, particularly about the ways in which the HIV virus is transmitted and how transmission can be prevented. Most informants were aware that HIV/AIDS is a deadly virus/disease that is incurable. Six of the informants explicitly mentioned that the programme had taught them to adopt a more "careful" attitude whilst in a relationship.

Interestingly however, when the informants were asked if they would want their partners to get tested for HIV/AIDS, all of them said "no". One informant answered that she did not think it's necessary because she "would not necessarily get infected" if her partner did carry the virus.[51] For 4 of the other informants the reason was that they trusted their partner to be healthy and/or tell them if they might not be. This faith in a partner's honesty, combined with a partner's potential reluctance to admitting to having had pre-marital sex stemming from the taboos that surround this topic, might have serious consequences for teen HIV transmission and may deserve extra attention in the future.

### *Sexual behaviour and knowledge about contraception*

Most of the informants said that by participating in the D4L and DAKU programme(s) they have become more aware of their own sexual behaviour. After some probing, 5 of the informants admitted to having undertaken sexual acts with their (ex-)partners limited to kissing and touching. None of these informants considered this risky behaviour. However, one male informant confessed that he had once touched his ex-girlfriend's body and felt embarrassed with it. With his current girlfriend he had done nothing but hanging out after school as they were only dating for 5 months.

With regard to reproductive health, most of the informants seemed unable to explain its meaning in a comprehensive way. Only some of the informants had heard the term STI (sexually transmitted infection) before. They were also unfamiliar with the term contraception, although all of them had heard about the condom. Additionally, some of the informants knew about family planning pills or injections. One informant said that she once watched TV and learned that an artist used an instrument applied in her abdomen in order to prevent unwanted pregnancy. Yet, the informant did not exactly know what it was at first and had only recently learned that this instrument was called an IUD or a spiral.

[51] Rutgers WPF noted that while young girls started to understand about their SRH rights, they still need to be more empowered to protect themselves and not letting intimate feeling mislead their behaviour.

### *Attitudes towards HIV infected people*

In general, all the informants displayed a positive attitude towards HIV/AIDS infected people. They expressed their support for people with HIV/AIDS and stated that they think it is important not to alienate them. They are also aware that people with HIV/AIDS have the same rights and should be treated in the same way as healthy people. However, one informant still confessed that he would think twice about continuing his relationship with his infected friends out of fear to get infected too. Likewise, 2 other informants mentioned that, even though they would have dinner with HIV infected friends, they would not share the dishes with them.

### *Attitudes towards homosexuals*

Because the topic of homosexuality was not extensively covered in the D4L programme, the effects of the programme on the attitudes of the students are difficult to determine. In general, the informants seemed to be more familiar with transsexuals, which they sometimes encounter on the streets in their neighbourhoods, than with homosexuals. However, one of the informants said that she knew about lesbians as she had a couple living in her community.

Where 3 of the informants said that "gay is also human" – a slogan they learned from the D4L programme according to one of the male informants – the other informants seemed to have a reserved attitude towards homosexuality at best. Some of the informants said that they had no problem with gay people as long as they did not cause any trouble with the community, such as the transgenders that sometimes "chase male students in the streets". Generally, these informants confessed that they would not avoid gay people, but would still keep a bit of distance, for example out of fear that the gay person would try to pursue and seduce them (2 male informants) or because it felt uncomfortable (1 female student). A few of the informants expressed stronger negative feelings towards gay people. One of them expressed his opinion that gay people must not receive equal treatment from society because they have sinned and homosexuality is clearly forbidden by religion. Another informant gave the following reason for avoiding gay people: "Gay is homo, it is disgusting just by watching them."

### *Sharing the message*

Almost all of the informants agreed that it is important for them and their peers to receive information about safe relationships (7 out of 8 informants), condoms and other contraceptives (7 out of 8 informants), and HIV/AIDS issues (8 out of 8 informants). Furthermore, all of them felt that they have a responsibility to share the knowledge they received from the D4L programme with their friends. Almost all informants reported that they have tried to spread the message of DAKU and D4L to their friends or their family at least once, particularly right after the presentation or after the dancing practice. However, the informants reported that their friends and/or family reacted ignorantly towards the HIV&AIDS issues they tried to raise with them, which left the informants feeling upset and disappointed. They mentioned feeling especially uncomfortable discussing the issues with adults. As a result of these demoralizing experiences the informants have not tried to further promote the information to their communities.

### 3.3. Youth Sexuality: norms versus Reality

Generally, the informants believed religion to be the most dominant factor in protecting the sexual health of young people. Informants reported to have received a lot of information about safe relationships and safe dating in religion class. One of the informants gave the following example "when we are dating we are not allowed to be alone in a quiet place." Another informant mentioned that he had learned that "all what we have done (with his girlfriend) before marriage is a sin, our religion forbid those things." In general, all the informants agreed that "teenagers are not allowed to have sex before getting married."

The lessons they receive from religion class provide teenagers with a strong grip to prevent themselves from slipping into norm violation. norms around sexual behaviour, mostly stemming from religious teaching, are further being established by parents and society in general, where teenagers are perpetually being exposed to normative messages about youth sexuality, teaching them that it is wrong to have sexual intercourse before marriage and date in quiet places. Additionally, the value placed on female virginity is reinforced by messages that teach girls in particular to "be careful and take good care of themselves".

Even though the religious rule that "a young couple is not allowed to date" has long been deeply rooted in Indonesian society and culture, "dating" has nowadays become a trend in modern Indonesian youth culture. Reflecting this situation, 4 informants mentioned that dating has become more common, and that society has become more open and permissive of dating. One of these informants gave an example of parking attendants putting a blind eye to young people dating in dark parking lots. Three of the informants stated that it is "very difficult to find a virgin boy or girl anymore" and 2 informants mentioned an increase in teen pregnancies. However, all informants expressed that, even though they are dating, they feel it is wrong to have sex before marriage and are quick to mention that they themselves would never do that.

In the process of mitigating the clash between, on the one side, the traditional norms that forbid young people to date, and on the other side, the actual reality of modern young people dating and experiencing with pre-marital sexuality, we see a situation in which religious teaching about dating is adapted to modern culture, resulting in the emergence of a new dating norm, namely: "Dating is allowed as long as the couple is not alone in a quiet place".

Another case that exemplifies the adaptation process of religious teaching to modern youth culture is veil wearing behaviour among female youths: 2 of our informants wore a veil at the time they were interviewed. From their statements, it was clear that both of them were aware that wearing a veil is obligatory for every female Muslim. One of the informants indeed gave a normative explanation for her daily practice of veil wearing. Interestingly, the other female informant considered it optional to wear the veil and said that she sometimes took off her veil to make herself feel more comfortable. Researchers, such as Zaky (2006), have indicated the existence of a 'pragmatic veil wearing culture'

among female Muslim youth, where female adolescents, for example, only wear veils when they are at school and take them off afterwards. Along the same lines our own female informant expressed the following statement:

> I only wear a veil at school. I even wear short pants when I hang out. Since I like wearing short pants I'm breaking up with my fourth boyfriend. I don't want his mother to reprimand me because I wear it, so I'd better dump him first before she scorns me. Anyway, I'm an easily fed up type of girl when it comes to dating. My longest relationship lasted 2 years (A., 17 years old).

According to our informants, many teenagers nowadays refuse to obey the rule to "never date in a quiet place", behaviour which can lead to risky sexual behaviour. Even though all of our informants said that they never have or take the opportunity to "spend some intimate time together", a few of them confessed to already having undertaken some intimate acts, the furthest being hand holding (4 informants), kissing on the cheek (2 informants), kissing (1 informant) and hugging and French kissing (1 informant). Some informants mentioned kissing on the motorbike while waiting for the traffic light. Others did it at home when no one was around. None of the informants confessed to having experienced petting, oral sex, or sexual intercourse.

Even though it would seem that by undertaking this kind of behaviour the informants have violated the norm, none of the informants felt that they did something wrong. In an attempt to condone their behaviour the informants seem to have shifted their idea of what they consider the normative boundary from "no dating in quiet places" to "as long as no sexual intercourse is involved". In contrast, when informants were asked about other people's dating behaviour they were inclined to judge them more harshly and based on the traditional dating norm. For example, when one of the female informants (n.) was asked to give her opinion about female students who accidentally got pregnant without being married, she argued that "it is their own fault, because they chose a quiet place to have a date." Likewise, informants S. and A. argued that "this happens because they don't have strong enough faith and it is their parents to blame."

This and previous examples make clear that sexual norms have a dynamic nature and that what is considered as acceptable sexual behaviour among youth is, to some extent, open for negotiation. It seems that young people who decide to start dating have a relative amount of autonomy to interpret and shape the norms for acceptable sexual behaviour to better fit their situation and needs. The following quote illustrates this flexible attitude:

> ...religious teaching received at this school is more than that of public school. However, the application depends on each individual (n., 18 years old).

### 3.4. Gender Roles and Decision Making in Dating Relationships

When asked about the role of boys and the role of girls in dating and relationships the informants gave various kinds of responses.

From the responses of both female and male informants we can gather that it is usually the girls who choose and initiate the non-sexual dating activities such as "hanging out" after school, going to the movies, having a meal together or going to the bookstore. The female informants seem confident in their role to decide on these activities as is shown by the following remarks made by informant P.: "Girls are usually right when choosing it", and informant n.: "Boys tend to follow what the girls want".

With regard to initiating sexual activities, 3 of the male informants and only 1 of the female informants say they think that it will usually be the boy who takes the lead, confirming the traditional gender roles of the sexually dominant male and the submissive female.

> ...for non-sexual actions it is usually girls who take the initiative, but when it comes to kissing or other sexual actions they tend to wait since they are shy, or refuse it when they did not want it (A., male informant, 17 years old).

> …it can be both sexes, but in reality it is the boy who usually takes that initiative (male informant).

However, the other 3 female informants say that "both sexes can initiate sexual activities". From their responses it becomes clear that they have come to realize that girls have equal rights to boys when it comes to deciding about sexual activities, and that they have adopted a more assertive attitude, or at least a more positive expectation of their ability to decide, even though these expectations may not necessarily live up to reality. The following remark, made by female informant A., illustrates this assertive attitude: "Well, it doesn't matter if the girl asks to have a kiss. It is already their habit that girls have more initiatives than the boys". Additionally, many of the informants indicated that they are assertive enough to refuse kissing or touching if they do not want to. Herein, the habit of girls deciding on the dating place and activities, might give girls an advantage in either indirectly preventing sexual acts from happening or, conversely, initiating sexual acts by choosing or not-choosing to date in "private places".

While discussing gender roles with regard to dating and relationships, the male informants also touched upon the issue of taking financial responsibility when dating. Many male informants mentioned that they feel they have to pay for the meals when they are on a date because society expects this of them, and say that it would even be inappropriate for a girl to pay the bill. The male informants are thus subscribing to traditional gender roles, according to which the man has the responsibility to fulfil the household needs.

## 3.5. Sexuality Issues among Adolescents

### *Important Sexuality Issues*

According to our informants the most pressing sexuality issues experienced by adolescents are unwanted pregnancies outside of marriage and HIV/AIDS or other STIs. Their concern for unwanted pregnancies was especially high, based on the fact that this could cause a "domino effect" in which the pregnant girl had to leave school, and as a result would encounter all sorts of family problems. One of the informants that went to a religious private vocational high school had personally experienced that 2 of her friends were forced to leave the school due to unwanted pregnancy.

The high concern about unwanted pregnancies actually seems to have incited several informants to remember little messages from the DAKU and D4L programme that were addressing this issue. One female informant said that the most striking message from the *education stage* of the D4L programme was: '*Be careful to a girl because you'll leave marks on her*'. According to her, this message meant that a pregnancy will leave visible traces in the body of a woman, but the body of a man who makes a girl pregnant will still look the same. The other message which she still remembered from the programme was a positive message about family relationships. Another male informant mostly remembered the message '*do not disappoint your parents because of an unwanted pregnancy'*.

The informants' concerns about HIV/AIDS transmission were a little less pronounced than those of unwanted pregnancy, but still all informants thought that this was an important issue for young people nowadays. In general, the informants could tell how the HIV virus was transmitted and how to treat a person who was infected by HIV/AIDS. However, the informants seemed unworried if their partners could be infected and most of them said that they would not ask their partners to get tested for HIV.

### *Myths and Attitudes with Regard to Safe Sex*

It is important to note that the DAKU and D4L programmes have been able to convey principal messages to the students about their 2 main concerns: how to prevent unwanted pregnancies and how to prevent HIV transmission. However, many untrue beliefs and myths around sexuality still exist.

An example of such a myth, asserted and believed by one of our male informants, is that you can determine if a woman has had sex before by the way she walks. If she is no longer a virgin she'll tend to walk straddling with her feet somewhat opened. Other myths, mentioned by one of the female informants, are that sperm can be used as a facial mask to smooth the skin, and that "drinking sperm will make you ageless". She got these ideas from a friend, who heard it from a friend who read this on the internet. Young people's believe in myths like these is problematic as it can discourage them from using condoms when having sex, and/or in other ways prevent them from behaving in a safe and healthy way when it comes to reproduction.

The issue is further complicated by young people's negative attitudes towards condoms. The informants seemed to know the purpose of using a condom – to protect against pregnancy and

HIV/AIDS infection - fairly well. Nevertheless, most of them had never actually seen a condom and did not know how to use it correctly. They explained that they had only read information about the condom as part of the DAKU and D4L programmes, and were only shown a picture of it. One of the male informants told that he had once seen a condom which was still in its package and was unopened. Another male informant confessed that he had seen and touched a condom, brought by one of his friends to show and make a balloon.

When asked what they thought about using condoms, a couple of the informants expressed negative feelings. Some female informants, for example, were of the opinion that it is better not to use a condom when having sexual intercourse. The reason being that the man will then be able to have sex with a woman without taking the responsibility of marrying her.

> Condom only make a man does not take responsibility for his behaviour. Because if the women is not pregnant, the man can escape from his responsibility (P., 17 years old).

Along the same lines, another informant said that "if the risk is not visible, the adolescent can keep doing their sexual behaviour". Lastly, one of the male informants stated that he "...would never touch a real condom, and would keep that away until he was married", possibly associating the condom with sinful behaviour.

From all this, we can conclude that the principal message of the programmes about the function of the condom has been understood by the students, but also that, unfortunately, this has not necessarily resulted in a positive attitude towards condom use. It is therefore important that the projects make an effort to improve adolescents' attitude and address existing false beliefs and myths about condoms and safe sex in their future proceedings. A lot of homework thus still exists for DAKU and D4L.

## 4. CONCLUSION

1. The DAKU and D4L programme have the same aim: encouraging adolescents to make responsible choices with regard to their sexual behaviour. The D4L programme specifically focuses on HIV/AIDS prevention, while the DAKU programme takes a broader approach and focuses on reproductive health in general. D4L has the playful element of dance incorporated in its programme, which coincidentally is the part that the students that participated in the programme remembered most. The DAKU programme is less dynamic than the D4L programme, but covers more topics and contains more information.

   Weak points of the programmes' implementation, according to the informants, are that DAKU had the students' own teacher (who lacked the skill to properly do this) act as counsellor and the fact that they didn't feel that they could express themselves freely as a result of the limited amount of participants. Weak points in the implementation of the D4L programme are that students

considered the material to go too fast, and that they felt there was not enough opportunity for them to ask questions.

2. The DAKU and/or D4L programmes are shown to have some positive impacts on the participants' knowledge about HIV/AIDS and other reproductive health issues. However, it is only the basic knowledge and ideas of the programmes that the informants seem to have remembered. Nevertheless, their attitudes towards people infected with HIV have grown more positive. On the other hand, their attitudes towards homosexuals are not yet fully positive and supportive. This could have something to do with their lack of education on the topic of sexual orientation.

   Even though there is some indication to assume that the projects have had an effect on the sexual behaviour of the informants - mainly the low level of reported sexual behaviour among our informants compared to the norm - it is very difficult to determine if these changes can actually be ascribed to the projects. However, as mentioned above, we have two informants' statements saying that they remember two important messages of the DAKU and D4L programmes about self-protection and not having sex on the basis of respecting your partner and following your parents' advice.

   The programmes have also, partly, succeeded in their aim to move the informants to try and share the information they learned with friends and close family, which all of the informants did. Unfortunately they were met with 'ignorant' and reluctant reactions and therefore stopped trying to spread the message altogether.

3. Traditional norms regarding relationships and sexuality, stemming from religion, prohibit dating and sexual activity before marriage. Schools play a big role in adolescents' socialization into these norms and values. However, traditional norms are now being challenged as a result of the modern dating culture that has emerged among Indonesian youth, which has resulted in a new norm: "dating is allowed, as long as the couple is not alone in a quiet place". Our informants' remarks show that they have room to flexibly interpret this norm and negotiate its meaning, in an attempt to justify their own actions (e.g. "taking the norm to mean: "as long as no sexual actions are performed") or judge the actions of others, which is usually done more harshly and based on a more traditional interpretation of the norm.

4. While girls usually seem to take the initiative for non-sexual dating activities, the male informants say boys are the ones to initiate sexual acts. However, most of the female informants say that girls and boys can equally take the initiative. Likewise, these informants claim they are assertive enough to refuse kissing or touching if they don't want too. It is unclear if this is actually the case in reality, but at the least, these statements attest to a more empowered attitude of the female informants with regards to the recognition of their sexual rights and their ability to decide within their relationships.

5. The two main sexuality issues that our informants are concerned about are unwanted pregnancies and HIV/AIDS. These issues are extensively addressed by the DAKU and D4L programmes. However, our data shows that, even though the informants have remembered and understood the key basic messages of the programme, false beliefs (obtained from friends and the internet) and negative attitudes regarding the practice of safe sex still persist among the informants. Because these could act as impediments to young peoples' willingness or ability to refrain themselves from risky sexual behaviour, it is important that the projects make an attempt to addressed these issues in their future proceedings.

## 5. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Following the research findings described above, we have formulated 2 important points of discussion about the potential development and improvement of the DAKU and D4L programmes. Firstly, we discuss opportunities for increasing project sustainability by adopting a 'peer educator' model into the project design. Secondly, we'll discuss the idea of reconsidering the project design to adopt a religious approach, and reformulate key messages from a religious perspective, in order to increase its effectiveness. The two discussions together form a note of recommendation for the future.

### 5.1. Programme Sustainability: Peer Educator Strategy

YPI has been successfully carrying out programmes focusing on HIV/AIDS and reproduction issues for a long time, and it is therefore likely that they will manage to keep implementing DAKU and D4L in the future. However, some critical notes for the two programmes exist: On the one side the overdone focus on dance in the Dance4Life programme, and on the other side the rigidity of the computer laboratory setting and choice of exclusively female participants of DAKU. As is shown by our research findings, these issues have the potential to prevent the intended adolescent KAP strengthening[52] from reaching its full potential.

To improve the sustainability of the projects, YPI could consider adopting a 'peer educator model' into its programme design. 'Peer education synergy programmes' have proven effective in several other similar settings and could therefore also be promising for YPI. Peer education in the context of the DAKU and D4L programmes would involve students informing and educating other students with the aim of changing their awareness and behaviour. The idea behind this strategy is that adolescents are more likely to accept information from their peers than they would from others.

To implement this peer educator strategy, YPI could make use of existing youth forums and youth organizations, such as student councils, PMR[53], and PRAMUKA[54], and have them continue the

[52] This abbreviation stands for: Knowledge, attitude and practices strengthening.
[53] This abbreviation stands for: Palang Merah Indonesia, which is the Indonesian "Red Cross" catering to youth.
[54] The Indonesian scouting organization.

discussion about the topics covered in the DAKU and Dance4Life programmes after the programmes have ended. This with the hopes that a prolonged exposure to the programmes' messages will help to ensure more profound changes in the attitudes and behaviour of the students.

To safeguard the sustainability of this method, it is advisable that a capable staff member of the school, such as the counselling teacher, supervises the youth forum. It is important that the person that is appointed understands the dynamics of adolescent life, has good rapport with the students, and has an open attitude towards the issues raised in the programmes.

## 5.2. Rethinking the Programmes' Design: Approach Sexuality and Gender Issues through Positive Religious Interpretation

Youth's attitude towards sexuality is a contestation space. On the one hand, religious norms and values strongly influence adolescents' attitudes towards sexuality. On the other hand, adolescents obtain – sometimes faulty – sex-related information through various media and friends. The core task of the DAKU and D4L programmes should be to examine the effects of these information flows on youth's attitudes towards sexuality, and to counter existing misconceptions and harmful ideas acquired from these sources by spreading knowledge based on scientific and medical facts. To succeed in doing this, the programmes' messages need to be communicated in a strong and effective way. If the messages are not clear and strong the students will be reluctant to adopt them, or will not remember them at all and will fall back on their old knowledge, as is shown in our research findings.

Because religion is a dominant factor in adolescents' lives, and religious norms and values strongly influence their ideas and attitudes, we recommend that the DAKU and D4L programmes adopt this approach and try to bring their messages more from a religious perspective in order to increase their uptake and acceptance. Responsibility for this not only lies with YPI, but also with the programme designer in Indonesia, who we recommend should hold a workshop to incorporate this new approach into the programme's design.

# Endline report – Indonesia, Aliansi Sumut Bersatu
# MFS II country evaluations

Capacity of Southern Partner Organisations (5C) component

Cecile Kusters[1]
Martijn Wieriks[2]
Bekti Dwi Andari[3]
Novina Suprobo[3]
Widya Priyahita[3]
Rumenta R. Sihombing[3]
Seto W. Rokhmatulloh[3]
Ita Rosita[3]

1 Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR
2 SEPAM Consultants Indonesia
3 SurveyMeter

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen, February 2015

Report CDI-15-042

Kusters, C., Wieriks, M., Dwi Andari, B., Suprobo, N., Priyahita, W., Sihombing, R.R., Rokhmatulloh, S.W., Rosita, I., 2015. *Endline report – Indonesia, ASB. MFS II country evaluations; Capacity of Southern Partner Organisations (5C) component.* Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University & Research centre. Report CDI-15-042. Wageningen.

This report presents the findings of the endline of the evaluation of the organisational capacity component of the MFS II country evaluations. The focus of this report is Indonesia, ASB. The format is based on the requirements by the synthesis team and NWO/WOTRO. The endline was carried out in 2014. The baseline was carried out in 2012.

Key words: 5C (five core capabilities); attribution; baseline; causal map; change; CFA (Co-financing Organisation) endline; organisational capacity development; SPO (Southern Partner Organisation).



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Report CDI-15-042 |

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# Acknowledgements

We are grateful to all the people that have contributed to this report. We particularly would like to thank the Southern Partner Organisation Aliansi Sumut Bersatu (ASB), and the Co-Financing Agency HIVOS for their endless patience and support during this challenging task of collecting the endline data. We hope that this endline report will provide useful insights to ASB, HIVOS, the synthesis team, IOB and NWO/Wotro.

The Indonesia 5C evaluation team

# List of abbreviations and acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| 5 C | Capacity development model which focuses on 5 core capabilities |
| ASB | Aliansi Sumut Bersatu |
| Causal map | Map with cause-effect relationships. See also 'detailed causal map'. |
| Causal mechanisms | The combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome |
| CDI | Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre |
| CFA | Co-Financing Agency |
| CFO | Co-Financing Organisation |
| CS | Civil Society |
| Detailed causal map | Also 'model of change'. the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change. In the 5C evaluation identified key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms) are traced through process tracing (for attribution question). |
| General causal map | Causal map with key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms), based on SPO perception. |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MFS | Dutch co-financing system |
| MIS | Management Information System |
| MoFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| OD | Organisational Development |
| PME | Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation |
| PRA | Priority Result Area |
| Process tracing | Theory-based approach to trace causal mechanisms |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |
| SSI | Semi-structured Interview |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| Wageningen UR | Wageningen University & Research centre |

# 1 Introduction & summary

## 1.1 Purpose and outline of the report

The Netherlands has a long tradition of public support for civil bi-lateral development cooperation, going back to the 1960s. The Co-Financing System (*Medefinancieringsstelsel*, or 'MFS') is its most recent expression. MFS II is the 2011-2015 grant framework for Co-Financing Agencies (CFAs), which is directed at achieving a sustainable reduction in poverty. A total of 20 consortia of Dutch CFAs have been awarded €1.9 billion in MFS II grants by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).

The overall aim of MFS II is to help strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. CFAs receiving MFS II funding work through strategic partnerships with Southern Partner Organisations.

The MFS II framework stipulates that each consortium is required to carry out independent external evaluations to be able to make valid, evaluative statements about the effective use of the available funding. On behalf of Dutch consortia receiving MFS II funding, NWO-WOTRO has issued three calls for proposals. Call deals with joint MFS II evaluations of development interventions at country level. Evaluations must comprise a baseline assessment in 2012 and a follow-up assessment in 2014 and should be arranged according to three categories of priority result areas as defined by MoFA:

Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) & themes;

Capacity development of Southern partner organisations (SPO) (5 c study);

Efforts to strengthen civil society.

This report focuses on the assessment of capacity development of southern partner organisations. This evaluation of the organisational capacity development of the SPOs is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The purpose of this report is to provide endline information on one of the SPOs involved in the evaluation: ASB in Indonesia. The baseline report is described in a separate document.

Chapter 2 describes general information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO). Here you can find general information about the SPO, the context in which the SPO operates, contracting details and background to the SPO. In chapter 3 a brief overview of the methodological approach is described. You can find a more detailed description of the methodological approach in appendix 1.Chapter 4 describes the results of the 5c endline study. It provides an overview of capacity development interventions of the SPO that have been supported by MFS II. It also describes what changes in organisational capacity have taken place since the baseline and why (evaluation question is 1 and 4). This is described as a summary of the indicators per capability as well as a general causal map that provides an overview of the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline, as experienced by the SPO. The complete overview of descriptions per indicator, and how these have changed since the baseline is described in appendix 3. The complete visual and narrative for the key organisational capacity changes that have taken place since the baseline according to the SPO staff present at the endline workshop is presented in appendix 4.

For those SPOs involved in process tracing a summary description of the causal maps for the identified organisational capacity changes in the two selected capabilities (capability to act and commit; capability to adapt and self-renew) is provided (evaluation questions 2 and 4). These causal maps

describe the identified key organisational capacity changes that are possibly related to MFS II interventions in these two capabilities, and how these changes have come about. More detailed information can be found in appendix 5.

Chapter 5 presents a discussion on the findings and methodology and a conclusion on the different evaluation questions.

The overall methodology for the endline study of capacity of southern partner organisations is coordinated between the 8 countries: Bangladesh (Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath; INTRAC); DRC (Disaster Studies, Wageningen UR); Ethiopia (CDI, Wageningen UR); India (CDI, Wageningen UR: Indonesia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Liberia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Pakistan (IDS; MetaMeta); (Uganda (ETC). Specific methodological variations to the approach carried out per country where CDI is involved are also described in this document.

This report is sent to the Co-Financing Agency (CFA) and the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO) for correcting factual errors and for final validation of the report.

## 1.2 Brief summary of analysis and findings

Since the baseline, two years ago, ASB has seen most changes in the capability to act and commit. Better task delegation, clearer job descriptions and strategic planning have helped ASB's leadership in organizing staff and program activities better. The capability to adapt and self renew also slightly improved through the improved application of M&E and the establishment of a diversity communication forum, through which ASB can easier keep track of developments amongst its beneficiary communities. The capability to deliver on development objectives has improved through more systematic working. Day to day activities have been more aligned to the organization's strategy and each other. In the capability to relate ASB improved in its networking capacity. More stakeholders are engaged in the development of policies and strategies, which is a very slight improvement compared to the baseline. New partnerships with academia have strengthened external relations and opened up new opportunities. Finally, ASB has very slightly improved in its capability to achieve coherence. Operational guidelines of ASB have slightly improved with the introduction of standard operating procedures for all divisions.

The evaluators considered it important to also note down the SPO's story in terms of changes in the organisation since the baseline, and this would also provide more information about reasons for change, which were difficult to get for the individual indicators. Also for some issues there may not have been relevant indicators available in the list of core indicators provided by the evaluation team. During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by ASB's staff: the provision of health insurance (BPJS) linked to investments; increased job security, through more permanent staff contracts; improved staff capacity to implement programs.

Within two of these organisational capacity changes, changes overlap with the key organisational capacity changes that were selected for process tracing because they were linked to MFS II funded capacity development interventions, namely the capacity to manage the organization. More details can be found in the relevant section below.

The overall organizational capacity change to be more recognized as an organizationfocussed on pluralism issues, with its underlying 3 organisational capacity changes mentioned above, can only be partially attributed to MFS II supported capacity development interventions. In particular the MFS II (HIVOS) funded strategic planning workshop has played an important role in terms of the change in leadership style and having a strategic planning document. Furthermore, HIVOS (MFS II) supported the revision of the financial standard operating procedures (SPOs), which ultimately supported getting more funds for program implementation, more staff, better staff welfare and job security. However, non-MFS II funded interventions such as the TIFA foundation(in this case trainings supported and funded partially by external funders) in the field of finance and communication also played an important role in these changes. It can be said that the MFS II capacity development interventions contributed more to the strategic organizational changes, whilst other interventions provided more change at an operational level.

Two organizational capacity changes were more closely investigated with process tracing: the improved capacity to manage the organization, and the improved capacity to communicate results on diversity issues. The improved capacity to manage to manage the organization can be attributed to a large extent to the planned MFS II (HIVOS) capacity development intervention of the strategic planning workshop. The intervention was the main underlying reason for the change in leadership style and the development of a strategic plan. Both of these proved very important to bring about changes in the organisation for enhanced capacity to map to manage the organisation. The improved capacity to communicate results on diversity issues can only be partially attributed to MFS II interventions. Particularly competencies to communicate results about diversity issues have improved as a result of the English course, although other non-MFS II interventions (externally funded through TIFA) have impacted this as well. Despite HIVOS' detailed plans to address the issue, ASB has developed a great deal of initiatives on their own to address this issue and improve this particular capacity.

# 2 General Information about the SPO – Aliansi Sumut Bersatu

## 2.1 General information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO)

| | |
|---|---|
| **Country** | Indonesia |
| **Consortium** | People Unlimited 4.1 |
| **Responsible Dutch NGO** | HIVOS |
| **Project (if applicable)** | Civil and Religious Societies' Participation in Promoting Peace and Diversity in North Sumatra |
| **Southern partner organisation** | Aliansi Sumut Bersatu |

The project/partner is part of the sample for the following evaluation component(s):

| | |
|---|---|
| **Achievement of MDGs and themes** | |
| **Capacity development of Southern partner organisations** | X |
| **Efforts to strengthen civil society** | |

## 2.2 The socio-economic, cultural and political context in which the partner operates

**The socio-economic, cultural and political context in which the partner operates**
Initially focused on social pluralism regarding sexual and gender equality issues *Aliansi Sumut Bersatu* (ASB) has broadened its scope of action[1] since 2010, including freedom of religion. An example of this is ASB's present project: "Civil and Religious Societies' Participation in Promoting Peace and Diversity in North Sumatra". This program, which in the framework of MFSII is co-financed by HIVOS, aims at bringing about religious pluralism in North Sumatra. But what does pluralism mean and why does Indonesia need religious pluralism?

Religious pluralism means more than the coexistence or mere tolerance for diverse religious beliefs. Rather, pluralism means an *"energetic engagement with diversity"* as well as *"the active seeking of understanding across lines of difference".* [2]As such, pluralism means that different religious groups do not merely accept and tolerate each other's existence but understand, acknowledge and respect the validity of others' religious beliefs as they do with their own. In the context of Indonesia, which consists mostly of Muslim citizens, this very idea poses a considerable challenge for groups like ASB who intend to create a more pluralistic social landscape. This challenge is formed mainly due to monotheistic believers like Muslims and Christians who tend to have their own doctrines as the only possible truth. Furthermore, there are a myriad of different interpretations of Islam and Christianity among Indonesians as well as other religious currents, what does not make pluralism any easier to be reached. Besides facing the challenge of bringing monotheistic citizens to an understanding and comprehensive approach towards different beliefs, in its recent project ASB also needs to cope strategically with the Western political connotation that "pluralism" receives among certain groups in Indonesia[3].

[1] Aliansi Sumut Bersatu (2011), ASB Proposal Form to HIVOS
[2] *Eck, L. D. (2011) Harvard Pluralism Project*, http://pluralism.org/pages/pluralism/what_is_pluralism, Accessed on 08.11.2012
[3] HIVOS (2012) *"Promoting Pluralism in Indonesia"* article viewed in http://www.hivos.net/Knowledge-Program2/Themes/Promoting-Pluralism/Topics/Promoting-Pluralism-in-Indonesia, accessed on 08.11.2012

As pointed out by Robert Hefner (2001:4-6)[4], Indonesia is one of the countries in Southeast Asia where, since its independence after World War II, deep-rooted religious and ethnic divisions have been strikingly damaging for the society[5]. Attacks in churches by Muslims as well as Bible-inspired local regulations in Papua[6] (and the tensions these events brought up) are but a few examples of this religious impasse and how it damages the Indonesian society. In the past year 39 cases of interreligious tensions were registered and it has been concluded that (in comparison with last year) violence due to religious differences has doubled. Nevertheless, the Indonesian government has played down the case[7]. Moreover, religious segregation amounts to *"lack of common social will"*[8], what reflects civil society weakness and undermines democracy.

The results of the media monitoring in 2012, ASB found some news of freedom violation of religion and belief that mass media highlighted a lot the issues that are[9] :

1. Rejection of religious activity that is Congress Confucianism in Emerald Garden on June 22 to 26, 2012. These discriminatory actions are repeatedly reported by several Mainstream Newspapers.
2. Issues and destruction of Houses of Worship and threats
3. Throughout the year 2012, the United North Sumatra Alliance also advocated sealing of 17 houses of worship in Singkil and 14 houses of worship in Banda Aceh.

These data indicate a violation of religious freedom tends to spread and massive. This is a problem that is equally harmful damage the harmony of society within the framework of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia.

## 2.3 Contracting details

When did cooperation with this partner start: 1st July 2009.

What is the MFS II contracting period: 5th of January 2013 until 4th of December 2015

Did cooperation with this partner end: Not applicable

If yes, when did it finish: Not applicable

What is the reason for ending the cooperation with this partner: Not applicable

Is there expected cooperation with this partner after 31st of December 2015: Yes.

## 2.4 Background to the Southern Partner Organisation

**History**

North Sumatera is an area that is often used as the symbols of diversity in indonesia. As the largest province on the island of Sumatra based on statistical data; the inhabitants of north sumatera are 12.985.075 individuals. From the religious aspect of north inhabitant of Sumatra consisting of Islam ( 65,45 % ) , Protestant ( 26,62 % ) , Catholic ( 4,78 % ) , Buddhist ( 2,82 % ) , official Hindu ( % ) , and an adherent of other faiths 0,14 % .[10]

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[4] Hefner, R. ed., (2001), *The Politics of Multiculturalism: Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia,* University of Hawaii Press.

[5] Azra, A. and Hudson, W., (2008) *"Islam Beyond Conflict: Indonesian Islam and Western Political Theory",* Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hamphshire, England. 2008. p. 114

[6] Azra, A. and Hudson, W., (2008) *"Islam Beyond Conflict: Indonesian Islam and Western Political Theory",* Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hamphshire, England. 2008. p. 114

[7] HIVOS (2012) *"Indonesian Government Must take Action Against Religious Violence",* article viewed in http://www.hivos.net/HIVOS-Knowledge-Program/Themes/Promoting-Pluralism/News/Indonesian-government-must-take-action-against-religious-violence, accessed on 08.11.2012

[8] Aliansi Sumut Bersatu (2011), Proposal Form to HIVOS

[9] Concept Paper Program ASB 2013-2015

[10] Ibid.

There are 27.841 houses of worship in North Sumatera, consisting of 15.752 mosques, 9.777 protestant churches, 1.855 Catholic churches, 194 puras, 128 Viharas, and 135 Klentengs. Based on inhabitant percentage of ethnic are Melayu ( 5,86 % ), Karo ( 5,09 % ), Batak ( 25,62 % ), Mandailing ( 11,27 % ), Nias 6,36 % ), Simalungun ( 1.04 % ), and Pakpak ( 0,73 % ). And also ethnic immigrants is Java ( 33,4 % ), Minang ( 2.66 % ), Chinese ( 2.71 % ), Aceh ( 0,97 % ), and the combine of other ethnic 3,29 %.[11]

Those data very often become material used by the government of Indonesia, especially in North Sumatra to describe diversity in North Sumatra so that North Sumatra often declared as a barometer of tolerance in Indonesia. But in reality people in North Sumatra often faced with the reality of intolerance.[12]

The United Alliance of Northern Sumatra (*Aliansi Sumut Bersatu*-ASB) was initiated in 2006, intentionally at the occasion of the International Women's Day. The creation of the ASB took place in the context of a "come together" of various NGO's, artists, students, activists and others against an *"ultra-conservative-district-level-"*[13]bill against pornography and indecent behaviour, the so-called RUU APP. This bill was intended by the PKS (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* or Justice and Prosperity Party) as a way of gaining political popularity among Muslims (90% of Indonesian population) through creating this bill based on PKS' conservative understanding of the Islamic principles. The dialogue between the organizations that stood up against what this bill represented and could bring forth resulted in the declaration of the *Aliansi Sumut Bersatu*. Through peaceful actions, discussions, hearings with the House of Parliament and the collection of signatures ASB was created to stand against RUU APP and all activities, laws, norms and behaviour that generate social exclusion. *Aliansi Sumut Bersatu* was officially established in 2008[14].

**Vision**

Aliansi Sumut Bersatu's vision is "the achievement of recognition, protection, fulfilment of and respect toward diversity".[15]

**Mission**

Aliansi Sumut Bersatu's mission are[16] :

1. Implement the diversity education
2. Conduct efforts in the protection of intolerance victims of violence
3. Conduct advocacy for realizing policies that respect diversity and favor of the marginalized groups and minorities
4. Conduct studies and research to the diversity issues
5. Build and encourage civil society organizations to be involved in the recognition, protection, fulfillment and respect for diversity.

**Strategies**

*Aliansi Sumut Bersatu's* strategies are: to offer education in feminism, sexuality and pluralism to the community. In the context explained above, "community" encompasses the cross-religion student activists and other social groups. Furthermore, ASB engages in monitoring the practices of religious intolerance in North Sumatra, advocating on policy and advocacy for groups which became the victim of intolerance and doing research on the practices of pluralism in North Sumatra[17].

[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Aliansi Sumut Bersatu (2011) Historical Time line
[14] Aliansi Sumut Bersatu (2011) Historical Time line
[15] Concept Paper Program ASB 2013-2015
[16] Concept Paper Program ASB 2013-2015
[17] Aliansi Sumut Bersatu (2011) Historical Time line

# 3 Methodological approach and reflection

## 3.1 Overall methodological approach and reflection

This chapter describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

Note: this methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report A detailed overview of the approach is described in appendix 1.

The first (changes in organisational capacity) and the fourth evaluation question are addressed together through:

- **Changes in the 5C indicators since the baseline:** standard indicators have been agreed upon for each of the five capabilities of the five capabilities framework (see appendix 2) and changes between the baseline, and the endline situation have been described. For data collection a mix of data collection methods has been used, including self-assessments by SPO staff; interviews with SPO staff and externals; document review; observation. For data analysis, the Nvivo software program for qualitative data analysis has been used. Final descriptions per indicator and per capability with corresponding scores have been provided.
- **Key organisational capacity changes – 'general causal map':** during the endline workshop a brainstorm has been facilitated to generate the key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO since the baseline, with related underlying causes. For this purpose, a visual as well as a narrative causal map have been described.

In terms of the attribution question (2 and 4), **'process tracing'** is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to

focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

## 3.2 Assessing changes in organisational capacity and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?** And the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This is explained below. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

The evaluators considered it important to also note down a consolidated SPO story and this would also provide more information about what the SPO considered to be important in terms of organisational capacity changes since the baseline and how they perceived these key changes to have come about. Whilst this information has not been validated with sources other than SPO staff, it was considered important to understand how the SPOs has perceived changes in the organisation since the baseline.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information is provided for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the next session on the evaluation question on attribution, as described below and in the appendix 1.

How information was collected and analysed for addressing evaluation question 1 and 4, in terms of description of changes in indicators per capability as well as in terms of the general causal map, based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff, is further described below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012[18].

[18] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1. **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2. **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3. **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4. **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5. **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Please see appendix 1 for a description of the detailed process and steps.

## 3.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity - evaluation question 2 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: **To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?** and the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Below, the selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

### 3.3.1 Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

For the detailed results of this selection, in the four countries that CDI is involved in, please see appendix 1. The following SPOs were selected for process tracing:

- Ethiopia: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE (4/9)
- India: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE, VTRC (5/10)
- Indonesia: ASB, ECPAT, PtPPMA, YPI, YRBI (5/12)
- Liberia: BSC, RHRAP (2/5).

### 3.3.2 Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ' general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop

have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained. More information can be found in Appendix 1.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

### 3.3.3 Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team. These can also be found in appendix 1.

**Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach:** this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

**Using standard indicators and scores**: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

**General causal map:** whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

**Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question:** this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified

organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

**Utilisation of the evaluation**

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

**Design:** mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

**Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication:** many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

**5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process:** The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

# 4 Results

## 4.1 MFS II supported capacity development interventions

Below an overview of the different MFS II supported capacity development interventions of ASB that have taken place since 2011 are described. The information is based on the information provided by HIVOS.

Table 1
*Information about MFS II supported capacity development interventions since baseline*

| Title of the MFS II supported capacity development intervention | Objectives | Activities | Timing and duration | Budget |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strategic planning workshop to develop work plans 2012/2013-2015 | N/a | Reviewed and revised the SOP of work division and on finance | October 2011 | 700 Euro |
| English course | n/a | Intensive coaching and training on English skills to focus on both writing proposals and project reports to encourage skills that would affect both the capability to act and commit as well as the capability to adapt and self-renew | 2013-2015 (ongoing) | 700 Euro |


Source: 5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_CFA perspective_Indonesia_ASB

## 4.2 Changes in capacity development and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

Below you can find a description of the changes in each of the five core capabilities. This information is based on the analysis of the information per each of the indicators. This detailed information for each of the indicators describes the current situation, and how and why it has changed since the baseline. See also annex 3.

### 4.2.1 Changes in the five core capabilities

**Capability to act and commit**





Overall, the capability to act and commit considerably improved since the leader of ASB has changed his leadership style from a one man show to a leader who delegates work well. This change occurred after the strategic planning workshop (sponsored by HIVOS) returned a lot of feedback to the organization's leadership. Ever since, delegation of tasks has increased, job descriptions have become clearer, more feedback on staff performance has been given and the overall gap between leadership and staff has decreased. With improved strategic guidance and better articulated strategies also the daily activities are now more in line with the strategies.

More opportunities now exist for the staff to take their own responsibilities and staff experiences more independently in their work, particularly amongst senior staff, and this has improved staff to be motivated in their work. Staff turnover has not changed, even though some staff left, the other staff joined in the organization, other people with appropriate skills for the job have been hired. The skill gap between senior staff and leadership has diminished, which has allowed the director to lead with general strategic directions and technical guidelines as opposed to hands-on control.

After ASB has acquired new donor funds (TIFA) in 2013, new and more staff training opportunities become available. Particularly on the field of media monitoring, advocacy, investigative journalistic and writing skills and general analytical thinking and data analysis with further training is required. Similar training has been conducted in 2011, however some new staffs hired in 2013, has not been participated in these type of training yet.

Score: From 3.0 to 3.8 (improvement)


**Capability to adapt and self-renew**




ASB has continued to apply the same M&E approach for the last two years. More frequent meetings in the form of staff meetings and the annual evaluation & planning meetings have enabled ASB to capture more input and optimize M&E. ASB continuously compares the work plans with the results and output of activities. Furthermore staff indicated that stakeholder opinions are now included more frequently in M&E activities. Through regular meetings and annuals reviews a systematic evaluation method is in place which allows for all staff members to provide their input on current projects and general organizational developments. Although the system is in place M&E is still performed by individual staff members, and not a dedicated M&E function. The director continuously plays an important role in this. In terms of the internal culture of critical reflection and sharing of ideas, the atmosphere in ASB is considered to be more open and communication is stimulated. Beneficiaries are able to approach the organization more easily and in general ASB has become more responsive to stakeholders . Overall this capability has improved slightly, mainly due to the greater frequency in meeting and greater role of staff input. Being involved in networks and having students do research at ASB helps them to keep track of what is happening in the environment.

Score: From 3.1 to 3.6 (slight improvement)


**Capability to deliver on development objectives**



The capability to deliver on development objectives has slightly improved mainly due to the fact that ASB has more clear operational plans and gives opportunity to the staff to align their activities to their organization's strategic level. Even though ASB has acquired more donor funds, they are more creative in terms of using their resources cost effectively. This care is displayed for instance in how staff is now more carefully selected for attending external or internal events, and also through coordinating events with universities to reduce operational costs for venues. The saved costs are in turn utilized to fund programs which are not directly supported by donors. There is no formal system in place to assess beneficiary needs, but through the established FKK (Diversity and Communication Forum), beneficiary and stakeholder needs could be checked and balanced. Although there is no formal system to compare inputs with outputs but they have regular meetings to help them assessing the work progress as a part of work efficiency assessment.

Score: From 3.3 to 3.9 (slight improvement)


**Capability to relate**




The capability to relate has slightly improved mainly due to having an extended network on local, national and even in the international level. ASB has also established new partnerships with universities which resulted in the establishment of a support system for the handling of legal cases. Collaboration with universities and being involved in the FKK network has also improved relationships with beneficiaries. In relation to the improved supporting system for handling cases, ASB's bargaining position in the networks has increased, which has led to opportunities for new collaborations and funding. Internally, relationships have improved due to having a director who often invites the staff to have dinner and watching movies after hours.

Score: From 3.6 to 4.1 (slight improvement)

**Capability to achieve coherence**




Even though there is no formal discussion about vision and mission, ASB still operate based on the same vision and mission. However, with the help of HIVOS, the strategic planning process has taken place, which is also helped develop implementation plans in line with the strategies. Generally, program, strategies and activities are in line with the vision and mission of the organization. Project activities are still complimentary as in the baseline such as program from HIVOS for case handling while program from TIFA for counseling training. Counseling training completed the case handling activities as when handling some cases, it is needed skill to be a good listener or a good counselor.

Score : From 3.5 to 3.6 (very minor improvement)

### 4.2.2 General changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO

The evaluation team carried out an endline assessment at *Aliansi Sumut Bersatu (ASB*) from 16 July 2014 to 18 July 2014. During this workshop, the team made a recap of key features of the organisation in the baseline in September 2012 (such as vision, mission, strategies, clients, partnerships). This was the basis for discussing changes that had happened to the organisation since the baseline. The three main changes that happened in the organisation since the baseline, as identified by the staff during the endline workshop were:

1. Being more recognized as an organization working on pluralism issues [1].
2. The provision of health insurance (BPJS) linked to investments [2].
3. Increased job security, with through more permanent staff contracts [3]
4. The first is the most important change in the organization. Each of these changes and how these have come about is explained more in detail below. Numbers in the narrative correspond to numbers in the visual.
5. Both these latter changes were achieved through better staff welfare [8]


More recognized as an organization focussed on pluralism issues [1]
Provision of Health insurance (BPJS) linked to investments [2]
Increased job security (more staff has permanent contracts) [3]
Improved staff capacity to implement programs [4]
Increased trust from stakeholders [5]
Staff is more confident in implementing program activities [6]
More opportunity to participate in training/capacity building [7]
Staff capacity is better recognized by the Board [13]
Greater staff autonomy [17]
Increased opportunities and ability of staff to manage programs [21]
More work delegated to senior and junior staff [24]
Better staff welfare [8]
Addition of 3 staff members (advocacy, monitoring, finance) [9]
Better office infrastructure [10]
Increase in program activities [11]
Organization is widely acknowledged [12]
The addition of funds from TIFA [14]
Improved diversity of funding [19]
Increased confidence of donors and stakeholders [22]
Increased capacity and confidence to propose to donors [25]
Clearer programatic guidance to propose for funding [30]
Strategic planning paper created [34]
More frequent internal meetings to discuss issues [18]
Increased awareness among staff for operational performance [29]
Change in leadership style [33]
Financial statements more transparent and accountable through website [26]
Better operational financial management [31]
Improved acceptance amongst stakeholders [15]
Improved quality service delivery [27]
Lower cost handling case and inceased efficiency [32]
Support in handling cases stronger [35]
Increased cooperation with religious and faith based leaders for case handling [36]
Increased awareness to introduce pluralism issues to the public [37]
Dissemination to the public through seminars, workshops etc. [16]
Increased documentation and publication of work on diversification and pluralism issues [20]
Increased cooperation with academics and journalists for publications [23]
Increased capacity to communicate results [28]
Strategic planning funded by HIVOS in 2013 [38]
BITRA Indonesia financial management training in 2011 [39]
Review and revise standard operating procedures on finance in 2013 [40]
Writing course by KIPAS in 2012 [41]
Investigative journalistic writing by YAKOMA in 2011 [42]

**Being more recognized as an organization focusing on pluralism issues [1].**
According to ASB staff present at the end line workshop, the main change that has taken place in the organization since the baseline in 2012 is being more recognized as an organization working on pluralism issues [1]. ASB has become the benchmark for both private and public organizations working in the field of pluralism in North Sumatra. In general it can be concluded that the strategic planning session organized by HIVOS in October 2013 has played an important underlying factor in realizing the abovementioned key change in the organization.

The greater recognition of ASB in terms of pluralism issues was the result of:

1. Improved staff capacity to implement programs [4]
2. Increased trust from stakeholders [5]

Each of these factors is explained below:

First of all improved staff capacity to implement programs came about from five developments, each of which are listed here. First, staff became more confident in implementing program activities [6]. Second, better staff welfare resulted in a more productive and motivated workforce [8]. Third, three new staff members were added to the organization in the fields of advocacy, monitoring and finance that did not yet exist before the baseline in 2012 [9]. Fourth, better office infrastructure allowed staff to work more efficiently [10]. Staff used to work with limited office support facilities, but with the addition of voice recorders, laptops, projectors and a stable internet connection, communication was greatly enhanced. Finally, fifth, an overall increase in program activities increased the speed at which staff learned about program implementation [11]. Each of these areas is further explained below.

Greater confidence amongst staff in implementing their program activities [6] came largely about from a greater number of opportunities for staff to participate in training and capacity building activities [7]. These opportunities were created by the board, who soon came to recognize the (importance of) staff capacity [13] because staff operated with greater autonomy on the one hand [17] whilst communicating results in more frequent internal meetings to discuss issues on the other [18].

Staff was enabled with greater autonomy through more opportunities to manage programs independently [21]. This was the direct result of more and more work being delegated from management to senior and junior staff [24], one of the key decisions that came about in the change in leadership style that occurred [33]

The increase in meeting frequently [18] came about from an overall increase in awareness amongst staff for the need of operational performance [29]. This was carefully communicated by the new leadership in place [33]. The change in leadership style was an important change as a result of the strategic planning session funded by HIVOS in 2013 [38].

The other four factors that affected improved staff capacity (better welfare) [8], new staff additions [9], better office infrastructure [10], and more program activities [11]) all resulted from the addition of funds enabled by acquiring the TIFA foundation as a new sponsor [14]. This was enabled shifting the policy of single funders to achieve greater diversity of funding sources [19]. ASB was able to shift towards this new paradigm—from single funders to the greater variety of funding sources-- through increased confidence of donors and stakeholders [22], which in turn occurred as a result of three factors:

1. An increased capacity and confidence amongst staff to develop proposals and present these to donors [25] therefore getting in touch with more potential funding candidates;
2. More transparent financial statements and accountable reporting through the website [26];
3. Improved quality of service delivery [27].

The first of these factors resulted from increased awareness amongst the staff regarding operational performance [29]. Simply put, with greater awareness the overall sense for the need to proactively engage with stakeholders came about amongst staff. In addition to this, a clearer programmatic guidance to propose for funding [30] significantly increased both capacity and confidence of staff to propose to donors. The guidance resulted from a strategic planning paper [34] written as a result from the HIVOS funded strategic planning workshop in 2013 [38].

The second factor, greater transparency in financial statements and accounting resulted from an overall improvement in operational financial management [31]. This improvement can be attributed to the BITRA financial management training which was performed in 2011 on the one hand [39], and the review and revision of standard operating procedures on finance sponsored by HIVOS in 2013 on the other [40].

The third factor, improved quality of service delivery resulted from the lower cost to handle case work and an increase in overall efficiency in doing so [32]. The greater support from stakeholders and partner organizations [35] through increased cooperation with religious and faith based leaders [36] was the main reason for this. Overall, this support came about through the increased awareness in partner networks about ASB's ambition to introduce pluralism issues to the public [37], which in turn was identified in the strategic planning workshop in 2013 [38].

Prior to 2012, the network of the organization was limited only to certain religious leaders among which were Protestant and *Parmalim* (local religion) religious leaders. From 2012 onwards, ASB expanded their network to universities *(Universitas Sumatera Utara, Universitas Negeri Medan),* journalists, local NGOs, and religious leaders from other religions such as *Matakin* (local religion), Hindhuism, Bahai, Konghucu, and Advent Protestant. ASB also started working with religious-based organizations such as *Majelis Kelenteng Konghucu Indonesia (MKKI), Majelis Budhayana Indonesia (MBI)* and *Persatuan Hindu Darma Indonesia).*

All of the above has explained how ASB's improved staff capacity to implement programs has come about [4]. But there is a second factor which has influenced the key change of ASB being recognized as an organization focusing on pluralism issues: the increased trust from stakeholders in ASB [5]. This came about from a wide public acknowledgement of ASB, and what they are doing [12]. On the one hand this occurred through an improved acceptance of ASB by its stakeholders through ASB's improved quality of service delivery [27]. On the other hand, the public itself became more and more aware of ASB and their objectives through the various seminars, workshops and other events organized by the organization [16]. ASB staff members got more and more public interest to attend such events through the increased documentation and publication of their work [20]. This practice was enabled by cooperating with various academics and journalists on publications [23], but largely founded on the increased capacity of the staff members to communicate results [28]. The latter greatly benefited from a writing course sponsored by KIPAS in 2012 [41], and a workshop on investigative journalistic writing sponsored by YAKOMA PGI in 2011 [42].

Since 2013, ASB has maintained an agreement with the local university by providing a scholarship program to college students to write their thesis on pluralism issues. In addition to that, academic publishing and public publishing with the help of university experts has increased. The ties to the academic and media networks have significantly increased the organization's visibility to become the leading organization for pluralism issues.

## 4.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity development - evaluation question 2 and 4

Note: for each country about 50% of the SPOs has been chosen to be involved in process tracing, which is the main approach chosen to address evaluation question 2. For more information please also see chapter 3 on methodological approach. For each of these SPOs the focus has been on the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew, since these were the most commonly addressed capabilities when planning MFS II supported capacity development interventions for the SPO.

For each of the MFS II supported capacity development interventions -under these two capabilities- an outcome area has been identified, describing a particular change in terms of organisational capacity of the SPO. Process tracing has been carried out for each outcome area. The following outcome areas have been identified under the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. Also the MFS II capacity development interventions that could possibly be linked to these outcome areas are described in the table below.

Table 2

*Information on selected capabilities, outcome areas and MFS II supported capacity development interventions since the baseline*

| Capability | Outcome area | MFS II supported capacity development intervention(2) |
|---|---|---|
| Capability to act and commit | Improved capacity to manage the organization | Strategic planning workshop to develop work plans 2012/2013-2015 |
| Capability to adapt and self-renew | Improved capacity to communicate results on diversity issues | English course |

The next sections will describe the results of process tracing for each of the outcome areas, and will describe to what extent these outcome areas have taken place as a result of MFS II supported capacity development interventions and/or other related factors and actors.

All key organisational capacity changes that were identified during the general map exercise happen to coincide with the outcome areas selected for process tracing. Each of these three areas is described more in detail below, and a full description of these changes and how they have come about is provided in Appendix 5. In the descriptions the numbers refer to the visual which includes all organisational capacity changes and can be found below.

### 4.3.1 Improved capacity to manage the organization

In the capability to act and commit the following outcome area has been identified, based on document review and discussions with SPO and CFA: 'improved capacity to manage the organization'.

In the capability to adapt and self-renew the following outcome area has been identified, based on document review and discussions with SPO and CFA: 'improved staff capacity to communicate results on diversity issues'


- Below you will find a description of the 'improved capacity to manage the organization' and how this has come about. According to staff present at the (process tracing) endline Process Tracing Minutes Meeting the improved capacity to manage the organization is mainly due to: Improved senior staff capacity [2] (Annex L, M, R, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting)Better planning, organized and documented work [3] (Annex, D, E, L, M)

Both of these factors are further described explained below. The numbers in the visual correspond with the numbers in the narrative.

**Improved senior staff capacity [1]**

First of all, the improved ability to manage the organization came about from an improvement in senior staff's capacity. This was validated by both internal and external stakeholders [1] (Annex D, E, L, M, and Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting). The greater capacity of senior staff resulted from greater opportunity for senior staff to manage the program [4] (Annex A, D, L, M, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting). This in turn came about from an ability to work more independently without having to wait for leadership instructions [5] (Annex A, D, L, M, R, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting). The statement was echoed by senior program staff during the end line Process Tracing Minutes Meeting. The Director said that currently they have more opportunity to work independently including making decisions. Further, more staff has been better recognized by the partners of the organization, not only by the Director.

Causal map ASB –
C1.1 Improved ability to manage the organization




Staff members indicated during the end line Process Tracing Minutes Meeting (Annex D, E, M, L, P, and Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting) that the greater independence in their work resulted from two occurrences: sharing knowledge by leadership with senior staff, and by senior staff with junior staff [7] on the one hand, and clearer job descriptions on the other. The two paragraphs below describe each occurrence.

First of, a of knowledge took place by leadership with staff members [7] (Annex A, L, M, R, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting). This was enabled by the willingness of the organization to expand and improve their organization [20] (Annex A, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting) and more frequent meetings at the organizational level [17] (Annex A, D, L, M, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting). In the baseline, the regular meetings between staff and the Director were conducted monthly, while in the end line, they stated that they have had bi-weekly meetings in addition to monthly meetings.

Both these factors resulted from a change in leadership style[22] (Annex D, E, L, R, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting). Some staff said that previously the Director tended to be "one man show" and did not really provide great autonomy to staff. However, based on the Director's opinion, the narrowed autonomy he provided to staff was by intention. The Director wanted to do stepwise delegation due to the great competency gap among leader, senior and junior staff. The leadership style was significantly changed as a result of the strategic planning supported by HIVOS in 2011 [24] One of the agenda points in the strategic planning Process Tracing Minutes Meeting was to reflect and evaluate the leadership style of the current Director as proposed by the Board of the organization. The Board has advised to the Director to give greater autonomy to the staff (Annex A, B, L, R, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting).

The second development that enabled senior staff to do their work with more indepence was the development of clearer job descriptions for the staff in general [6] (Annex A, D, E, L, M, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting). Previously in ASB, there was a lot of overlap among staff responsibilities [6] (Annex E,M,L,P, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting). One staff member could work on more than one task. The need for a clearer description of work responsibilities for staff members therefore came about for three different reasons. Firstly, staff realized that a better job and task division was required and they realized this during their regular staff meetings [8]. Secondly, there was a new Department for advocacy [10] (Annex A, D, E, L, M, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting).Thirdly, three new staff members were recruited utilizing the newly acquired TIFA budget [11] (Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting).

These last two factors were derived from the new funding obtained from TIFA in 2013. The success to obtain funding from TIFA came about from the result of strategic planning that was used as a tool to propose new funding [13] (Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting, last revision of proposal to TIFA for period of Jan-Dec 2014.doc).

**Better planning, organized and documented work [3]**

The improved capacity to manage the organization was not only due to improved senior staff capacity, but also to better planning, organized and documented work [3] (Annex, D, E, L, M). . Staff stated that this occurred primarily based on the now regular (monthly) development of monthly work plans [12] (Annex L, M, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting), but was also due to having half yearly and annual 'evaluations' [25] (Annex L, M, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting), which specifically supported the documentation of the work being implemented. This monthly meetings, and improved evaluation came about from the having more systematic and well developed annual work plans [14] (Annex E, D, R, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting, program schedule 2013-2014 to HIVOS.doc), which in turn were enabled by a much greater focus on strategic directions and key issues in diversity, pluralism and minorities in North Sumatra [16] (Annex A, B, E, D, R, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting). This more specific focus was formulated in a program, as explained in the strategic proposal 2013-2015. This was based on the logical framework that was developed for HIVOS in 2011 [23](Final log frame revisi.doc), as result of the Strategic Planning Process Tracing Minutes Meeting in 2011, which was focused on developing a work plans until 2015 [24] (Annex A, B, L, R, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting).

### 4.3.2 Improved capacity to communicate results on diversity issues

- ASB is an institution that was founded in 2006 and was officially established in 2009 as association. Initially focused on social pluralism regarding sexual and gender equality issues *Aliansi Sumut Bersatu* (ASB) has broadened its scope of action[19] since 2010. An example of this is ASB's present project: "Civil and Religious Societies' Participation in Promoting Peace and Diversity in North Sumatra". This program, which in the framework of MFSII is co-financed by HIVOS, aims at bringing about religious pluralism in North Sumatra. The end line focused on the following key organizational capacity change or key outcome in the capability to adapt and self-renew: improved capacity to communicate results on diversity issues [4] (Annex A, D, E, L, M). This came out of document

[19] Aliansi Sumut Bersatu (2011), ASB Proposal Form to HIVOS


review as well as discussion with staff present at the end line workshop (Annex A, B).Improved capacity to communicate is expected to and already affects communication of results, through the following means :

- Dissemination through a road show to five ASB area namely Siantar, Aceh Singkil, Binjai, Langkat, and Medan. These areas were targeted to disseminate the result of ASB regular reporting on pluralism and diversity and discussed what possible action can be done to response the report. These five areas have issued a policy of intolerance and discriminatory [1] (Process Tracing Minutes Meeting.)
- Procurement media campaigns such as: brochures, stickers, calendars and pocket books[2] (Annex D, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting, program schedule 2013-2015 sent to HIVOS.
- Book Distribution Results of Monitoring Results Report [4]. They did the monitoring of diversity issues and collected the monitoring results in the form of books. As part of ASB's advocacy strategy, ASB disseminated diversity information by distributing the monitoring result books. Process Tracing Minutes Meeting)

Staff's capacity to communicate results in diversity issues has improved because of the following four reasons:

- A wider network of stakeholders and partner [5] (Annex A,D,E,M,R, Process Tracing minutes of meeting)
- Improved competencies to communicate issues about diversity [6] (Annex A, L, R, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting)
- Documentation of practices respecting diversity in North Sumatra [7] (Annex A, L, M, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting, program schedule 2013-2015 sent to HIVOS)
- Documenting policies and discrimination [8] (Annex M, L, P, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting, program schedule 2013-2015 sent to HIVOS)

Each of these factors and their underlying logic is explained below.



**Wider network of stakeholders and partners [5]**
*Aliansi Sumut Bersatu* (ASB) has an extensive network including various communities, media, and religious groups. In 2012, ASB expanded their network to academia with various religions such as *Konghucu, Islam, Hindu, Budha, Bahai, Ahmadiyah, Parmalin and Advent*. Previously, these stakeholders have not been part of ASB. In other words, ASB has wider network of stakeholders and partners [5] (Annex A, D, E, M, R, )

This improved network was realized through increased cooperation with academia [9] (Annex L, M, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting) on the one hand, and case collaboration with partners on the other [10] (Annex D, L, M, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting).

Increasing the network with academia was also part of ASB's strategy to improve the institutions' efficiency.To strengthen commitment to pluralism, ASB has expanded networking to local, national and international partner organizations.

- At the local level these organizations included: Fitria, Human Rights Study Center, Medan University, and Sumatra Utara University (Annex E, M, P, and Process Tracing Minutes Meeting).
- At the national level these included: Setara Institute, Wahid Institute, ILRC (Indonesian Legal Resource Center), SEJUK, Asean Moslem Action Network (AMAN), PGI (Persekutuan Gereja Indonesia – Indonesian Church Community), and YAKOMA (Annex A, D, E, M, P.
- At the international level these included: Amnesty International and CSW (Christian Solidarity Worldwide) (Annex E, M, L, and Process Tracing Minutes Meeting).

Agreements were made in order to establish relationships with universities [14] (Annex D, L, M,R).The relationship was in the form of providing venues to conduct workshops and or seminars related to pluralism issues. One of the program staff said that another reason of the intensified relationships with academia was the provision of scholarships by the organization for university students whose thesis was about pluralism issues [13](Annex L, M, L, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting) which was used as a strategy to disseminate pluralism issues at the university level.

With respect to handling cases, ASB was supported by some networking and partners. Case collaboration has been affected to the escalation of ASB network and partners – i.e, ASB has stronger collaborative work with the National Commission on Violence Against Women (*Komnas Perempuan*) in Jakarta when they handle the cases [10] (Annex D, L, M, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting).

Case collaboration, scholarship initiative, and agreement with university have been influenced by a greater emphasis networking and publicity [16] (Annex B, D). ASB has a strong commitment regarding pluralism issues.

**Improved competencies to communicate issues about diversity [6]**
The fact that staff have improved their competencies to convey diversity issues [6](Annex A, L, R, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting), is the second factor that influenced the improved capacity to communicate results on diversity issues [4] (Annex A, D, E, L, M, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). This improvement can be attributed to three factors. The first factor was an English course funded by MFS II [17] (Annex A, B C) after the partner organization realized that communication needed to be improved. The second factor affecting the improved communication competency was the writing course conducted by KIPAS in 2012. KIPAS has been ASB's partner since 2009. KIPAS has the same concern as ASB – advocacy strategy through journalism [18] (Annex B, D). The third and last contributing factor was a journalism investigative and writing training which was held by YAKOMA PGI in 2011[19] (Annex B).

**Documentation practices respecting diversity in North Sumatra [7]**
The third factor relating to the improved capacity to communicate results on diversity issues was improved documentation practices regarding diversity in North Sumatra [7] (Annex A, L, M, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting, program schedule 2013-2015 sent to HIVOS). Similarly to the improved competencies to communicate issues about diversity [6] (Annex A, L, R, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting) as described in the previous section, this was the result of the writing course [18] (Annex B, D) and the investigative journalistic writing training [19] (Annex B, Interview questionnaire staff). ASB

creates annual reports on media monitoring and documenting cases of intolerance in Aceh and North Sumatra (doc: meeting minutes). The data is used as a reference for media and community and society to reveal the diversity of pluralism in Indonesia.

**Documenting policies and discrimination [8]**

The final factor contributing to the improved capacity to communicate results on diversity issues includes the documenting of policies [8] (Annex B, D).This in turn was affected by two factors. On the one hand documentation of media monitoring results[11] (Annex E, L, W, program schedule 2013-2015 sent to HIVOS) on the other hand social media monitoring of policies and discrimination against minority religious group[12](Annex L, M, P, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting, program schedule 2013-2015 sent to HIVOS). ASB has staff that is responsible for monitoring intolerance cases through media and social media (Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). Starting from 2011, the ASB published a book as a result of the monitoring of the media and social media monitoring, and HIVOS supported this publication (Annex E, L, W, program schedule 2013-2015 sent to HIVOS).

Both the documentation of media monitoring results as well as actively monitoring social media for policies came forward from a workshop to analyze media monitoring results funded by HIVOS in 2013[15] (Annex A,B). This workshop on analyzing media monitoring results came about from the first similar workshop came which was conducted in 2011. This 2011 workshop also funded by HIVOS [20] (Annex A, B).

# 5 Discussion and conclusion

## 5.1 Methodological issues

**General: Applied to all or most SPOs**
With regard to the methodology, Indonesia has made some data collection adjustment based on the context. The first adjustment was related to the type of instrument used. To assess the organizational capacity, the study has provided self-assessment, observation and interview sheets. These all were used during the baseline with all SPOs. During the end line the team used self-assessment, interview and observation sheets. However the evaluator applied interview sheets as self-assessment—where participants were asked to fill these sheets by themselves. For the participants who did not attend the workshop, the interviews were done separately using the interview sheet and the results from the interview were included in the subgroup interview sheet that was already filled by the staff member. Were combined into the relevant sub categories in the interview sheet. Interview sheets were also applied for interviews with the CFAs, partners and consultants.

The baseline study showed that having two similar instruments (self assessments, and interview sheets) did not have any effect in relation to obtaining adequate and quality data.

Another adjustment to the methodology was the language. The team has translated all instruments in to Bahasa Indonesia to be able better understood by the SPO's. This also applied to the initial findings (translated back into Indonesia) for three SPOs that are YRBI, ASB and PT.PPMA.


To have some clarification post visit to all SPOs, the evaluator used email and phone interviews.

**Aliansi Sumut Bersatu (ASB)**
The interview sheet was sent prior to the workshop and filled by most of the respondents. The participants involved in this end line process were 1 management, 2 coordinator programs, 1 finance and administration, 4 field staffs, 1 partner and 1 consultant. The organization was selected for process tracing and had the chance to be visited twice by the evaluators. In relation to process tracing, six staffs filled the training questionnaire related to MFS II funded training events since the baseline in 2012. For the process-tracing workshop, the evaluator has provided initial draft causal maps for the evaluator as guidance. These initial draft causal maps were developed, based on document review. The first map on the capability to act and commit was not shown during the workshop and the participants developed the map based on their own understanding led by the evaluator (bottom up process). Due to limited time and workshop participants being tired, the initial draft causal map for the capability to adapt and self-renew was used as the basis for discussions with the workshop participants. After the had seen the map, the evaluator asked for their verification, clarification and allowed them to modify the map where necessary. It is not clear whether the initial causal map that was developed directed the workshop participants into a particular thinking. But all the issues have been checked and verified.

## 5.2 Changes in organisational capacity development

This section aims to provide an answer to the first and fourth evaluation questions:

1. *What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?*
4. *What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?*




Whilst changes took place in all of the five core capabilities, the improvements were only minor. Below the changes in each of the capabilities are further explained, by referring to the specific indicators that changed.

Over the last two years most improvements took place in the indicators under the capability to act and commit. A slight improvement occurred in the responsiveness of leadership. The current leadership is considered to have improved in task delegation in the absence of leadership, greater clarity in staff's job descriptions, staff regeneration, and feedback to staff performance as a post-monitoring mechanism. An improvement occurred in terms of strategic guidance in the organization as well. The Director is now focusing on more strategic tasks to the level of responding to organizational issues instead of internal staff conflicts. He is able to provide strategic direction to the staff whilst allowing them to solve implementation problems on their own. An improvement also occurred in the organisational structure. This occurred particularly due to the increased clarity in tasks and responsibilities for staff members. A slight improvement happened in the articulation of strategies. ASB has increasingly utilized strategic planning in their approach to communicate and frame their work activities and plans. Daily operations improved slightly due to staff members placing their work plans on the writing board for everyone to see and refer to on a day to day basis. Staff skills have improved due to the delegation of work tasks and sharing of information to subordinates. This has empowered subordinate staff throughout the organization. Training opportunities have improved due to the availability of new funding sources from for example TIFA. In addition the ASB director now plays an important role in deciding who will participate in which training, giving a fairer chance to all staff members. Incentives have slightly improved. Even though nothing changed in terms of remuneration, the increased freedom to manage work independently and the addition of flexible working hours, added to overall staff motivation and stimulated creativity on the job. Funding resources improved as well. With assistance from HIVOS, ASB's strategic plan has become a reference to seek new funding opportunities. This mechanism has allowed ASB to act more strategically on proposals, initiatives and directions instead of the former responsive attitude.

In the capability to adapt and self-renew ASB also slightly improved on various indicators. In terms of M&E application a slight improvement occurred as more frequent meetings in the form of staff meetings and the annual evaluation & planning meetings have enabled ASB to capture more input and optimize M&E. M&E competencies also slightly improved as the role of M&E person is now fulfilled by another person next to the director. Critical reflection within ASB improved slightly as the director encourages staff to attend informal meetings in order to discuss their concerns. A slight improvement was also found relating to the freedom of ideas, staff stated that their director has readjusted his expectations to the staff's work to be more in line with the challenges faced in the field. The system for tracking the environment has been slightly improved as ASB established the FKK (a Diversity Communication Forum) as part of their networking support. Within this forum they encourage members of their network to assist them by extending their case monitoring in the field. Finally there was a slight improvement in the stakeholder responsiveness: since the baseline, ASB has actively expanded their network of partner organizations and beneficiaries. Feedback from the network and beneficiaries are taken into account during program planning and the development of strategic plans.

In terms of the capability to deliver on development objectives, an improvement has taken place with the development of ASB's strategic plan, which has positively affected the operational plans that were already in place. Day to day and operational activities now align better with the organizational strategy. Similarly a slight improvement took place on cost-effective resource use as ASB has become creative through their concern in spending funds. ASB also adjusted their operational strategy and organizational decisions to reflect this. Delivering planned outputs has slightly improved for the organization. ASB delivers planned outputs in a timely manner, even with its limited resources through the involvement of volunteers and their network. The mechanism for beneficiary needs has slightly improved too, as the strategy to establish the FKK (Diversity and Communication Forum) has been proven to be a successful mechanism to meet beneficiary needs. Monitoring efficiency has slightly improved as ASB always evaluates the progress of each project biweekly and monthly and utilizes the feedback to evaluate work efficiency. In terms of balancing efficiency requirements with the quality of work, a slight improvement occurred as all work plans are aligned to each other and used to examine the quality of achievements versus implementation time.

In the capability to relate ABS improved in its networking capacity. More stakeholders are engaged in the development of policies and strategies, which is a very slight improvement compared to the baseline. Engagement in networks has improved, as new partnerships but also academia are approached. Target groups have been engaged more through the Diversity Communication Forum. Finally, relations within the organisation have slightly improved as relationships are considered more open and equal, since the director has delegated more tasks and roles and responsibilities are more clear.

Finally, SDS has very slightly improved in its capability to achieve coherence. Operational guidelines of ASB have slightly improved with the introduction of standard operating procedures for all divisions.

**General organisational capacity changes related to MFS II Interventions**

The evaluators considered it important to also note down the SPO's story in terms of changes in the organisation since the baseline, and this would also provide more information about reasons for change, which were difficult to get for the individual indicators. Also for some issues there may not have been relevant indicators available in the list of core indicators provide by the evaluation team. Please note that this information is based only on the information provided by ASB staff during the endline workshop, but no validation of this information has been done like with the process tracing causal maps. For details in relation to attribution, we refer to the next section (5.3).

During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by ASB staff, these have been captured in the general causal map in 4.2.2: the provision of health insurance (BPJS) linked to investments; increased job security, through more permanent staff contracts; improved staff capacity to implement programs. All of these are expected to contribute to ASB being more recognised as an organisation to focus on pluralism issues. ASB staff experienced these as the most important capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline.

First, both the provision of Health insurance (BPJS) linked to investments, and the increased job security through permanent contracts, can be attributed to better staff welfare through an addition of funds from the TIFA funding. TIFA funds could be acquired through a more diverse funding focus after donors and stakeholders gained confidence in the organisation to invest. This confidence could be attributed to the increased capacity to propose to donors, more transparent and accountable statements and improved quality of service delivery. Greater capacity to propose for funding can be attributed to clearer programmatic guidance, based on a strategic planning paper being created after the MFS II funded strategic planning workshop in 2013. Clearer programmatic guidance also occurred through increased awareness on operational performance as instructed by the leader through his new leadership style. This shift in style also occurred after the strategic planning workshop was concluded.

Increased financial statement transparency and accountability on the other hand, was enabled by better operational financial management. This can be attributed to the BITRA Indonesia financial management training in 2011 (non-MFS II) but also to the review and revision of standard operating procedures (SPOs) on finance in 2013, which was MFS II funded.

The improved quality of service was the result from lower cost in handling cases and increased efficiency. This can be attributed to greater support in handling cases through increased cooperation with religious and faith based leaders. This was enabled by increased awareness on the topic of pluralism issues amongst the public, which was one of the recommendations and key actions defined in the HIVOS sponsored strategic planning workshop in 2013.

Improved staff capacity to implement programs occurred through the addition of new staff members, an increase in program activities and staff being more confident in implementing those activities. New staff, improved office infrastructure and more activities could all be attributed to the addition of TIFA funds. The acquisition of those funds follows the same line of changes as described above, and are tied to the MFS II funded strategic planning workshop in 2013, as well as the review and revision of SOP's in 2013, although also to the BITRA Indonesia financial management training in 2011.

The increase in confidence to implement program activities occurred through more opportunities to participate in trainings and capacity building activities, after the board started to recognize the value of staff capacity. This in turn was enabled by greater staff autonomy and more frequent internal meetings, in which staff got the chance to prove said capacity to their leadership. More autonomy can be attributed to an increase in opportunities to manage the program after more delegation from the top down into the organization took place. This was the direct result of the change in leadership style, which occurred per recommendation in the MFS II funded strategic planning workshop in 2013. The increase in meeting frequency also can be attributed to this leadership style as that increased awareness of staff on operational performance, which was carefully communicated to all staff.

Finally, the greater recognition of ASB as an organization focussing on pluralism issues also came about through increased trust from stakeholders. This was in part enabled by the increase in program activities as described earlier, but on the other hand through the organization being more widely acknowledged. The latter change occurred in part through more communication initiatives which were partially related to two other non-MFS II developments: a writing course by KIPAS in 2012, and an investigative journalistic writing course by YAKOMA PGI in 2011.

In conclusion, the overarching organizational capacity change area of ASB being more recognized as an organization focussed on pluralism issues can be only partially attributed to MFS II supported capacity development interventions. The MFS II funded strategic planning workshop and financial SOP review and revision contributed to a large extent to organizational changes related to staff capacity and welfare. However, non-MFS II funded interventions in the field of finance and communication also played an important role in these changes. It can be said that the MFS II interventions contributed more to the strategic organizational changes, whilst other interventions provided more change at an operational level. This was not the purpose of this particular exercise. It must be noted that the information provided has not been validated through other sources of information, and therefore the conclusions must be understood in that respect. More detailed information can be found in the next section where selected organisational capacity changes have been thoroughly investigated through process tracing.

## 5.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity development to MFS II

This section aims to provide an answer to the second and fourth evaluation questions:

2. *To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?*
4. *What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?*

To address the question of attribution it was agreed that for all the countries in the 5C study, the focus would be on the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew, with a focus on MFS II supported organisational capacity development interventions that were possibly related to these capabilities. 'Process tracing' was used to get more detailed information about the changes in these capabilities that were possibly related to the specific MFS II capacity development interventions. The organisational capacity changes that were focused on were:

- Improved capacity to manage the organization
- Improved capacity to communicate results on diversity issues

The first organisational capacity change falls under the capability to act and commit (in relation to the part on improved staff's capacity) and the capability to adapt and self-renew (in relation to the part on planning and M&E). The second organisational capacity change falls under the capability to adapt and self-renew. The organisational capacity change areas that were chosen are based on document review as well as discussions with the SPO and CFA. Each of these organisational capacity changes is further discussed below.

*The following issues are discussed for the MFS II funded activities that are related to the above-mentioned organisational capacity changes:*

a. Design: the extent to which the MFS II supported capacity development intervention was well-designed. (Key criteria: relevance to the SPO; SMART objectives)
b. Implementation: the extent to which the MFS II supported capacity development was implemented as designed (key criteria: design, according to plans during the baseline);
c. Reaching objectives: the extent to which the MFS II capacity development intervention reached all its objectives (key criteria: immediate and long-term objectives, as formulated during the baseline);
d. The extent to which the observed results are attributable to the identified MFS II supported capacity development intervention (reference made to detailed causal map, based on 'process tracing').

Please note that whilst (d) addresses the evaluation question related to attribution (evaluation question 2), the other three issues (a, b and c) have been added by the synthesis team as additional reporting requirements. This was done when fieldwork for the endline process had already started and is also not the focus on this 5c evaluation. With the minimum information available the evaluation team tried to address these first 3 questions.

**Improved capacity to manage the organization**

The following MFS II capacity development intervention supported by HIVOS is linked to the key organisational capacity, change "improved capacity to manage the organization":

**1. Strategic planning workshop to develop work plans 2012/2013-2015**

*Strategic planning workshop to develop work plans 2012/2013-2015 – October 2011*

**Design**

This capacity development intervention was not explicitly planned during the baseline, and took place in October 2011. HIVOS assisted in the formulation of work plans, since ASB struggled in finding the right focus of work. Both HIVOS and ASB have confirmed the CFA intervention in both the self-assessments and interviews.

The immediate objective of the workshop was to create focused work areas and related work plans for 2013 to 2015. In addition, more strategic organizational questions were discussed, such as the "fit" of leadership style of the acting director.

The capacity development intervention was initiated by the management of ASB after good experiences in self-reflection during the MFS II baseline evaluation and the need for more focussed work plans and activities. The exercise therefore proved very relevant to the organisation as it was meant to outline activities and directions for the coming years that up until that point did not yet exist. Nonetheless it quickly became apparent that input and assistance from HIVOS was required to sharpen the organization's objectives, vision and mission.

Due to the spontaneity of the intervention, expected effects were not formulated in a SMART way (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound).

**Implementation**

Based on the information that is available to the evaluation team, the implementation of the capacity development intervention occurred as designed during a one day workshop. In this workshop, the vision, mission and strategy were for established for the period of 2013, with the agreement of revising these items once every three years. The only major difference was the involvement of HIVOS in the process. Originally the workshop was intended to be an ASB exclusive activity. The HIVOS coordinator who participated in the workshop stated that all of the staff members attended and participated in the workshop.

**Reaching objectives**

Not having objectives that were defined as SMART objectives makes it difficult to assess whether they have been successfully accomplished. The immediate objective to create focused work areas was met through the production of clear work plans for 2013 to 2015 as well as the foundations laid for a logframe exercise from HIVOS. With respect to long term objectives, the workshop resulted in a change in leadership style of the director which led him to allow greater autonomy of his staff members. Finally the workshop set a precedent for a continuing series of strategic planning sessions from 2013, in which operational and strategic plans are reassessed periodically.

**Attribution of observed results to MFS II capacity development interventions**

Overall, the improved capacity to manage the organization was due to improved senior staff's capacity as well as better planning and organized, documented work. Both these capacity changes can be attributed to the MFS II intervention of the strategic planning workshop as an underlying reason for changes in terms of managing the organisation.

The improved senior staff's capacity was due to the opportunity and ability of staff to manage the programs they were involved in, which can be attributed to the fact that senior staff has become more independent in their jobs. Other than before the baseline, senior staff did not require to await instructions from the director before carrying on with their work. This development was enabled by the director sharing more knowledge with senior staff, and senior staff doing the same with their juniors. Having more information ready at hand enabled all staff members make better decisions independently. On the other hand clearer job descriptions amongst the staff in general made it clearer for staff members to carry out their work without having to first get permissions or answers from their superiors. Clearer job descriptions were developed due to an increase in staff awareness to have a better division of labour and task division, the development of a new advocacy department which allowed more effective splitting of work, as well as the recruiting of three new staff members under the newly acquired TIFA budget.

The new process of superiors sharing knowledge with the subordinates, as well as the increased staff awareness for better job and task division can be attributed to more frequent regular meetings that were organized at the organisational level. In addition to monthly staff meetings, bi-weekly meetings were added between staff members and ASB's director, which allowed for more frequent discussions of issues and solutions. Both the greater frequency of meetings as well as the sharing of information and knowledge to superiors resulted from a greater willingness of the organization to expand and improve itself. This could be attributed directly to the change in leadership style, which became less strict and more open to initiative and autonomy of the staff members. The change in leadership style in turn was the direct result of the strategic planning workshop in October 2011, in which after much discussion, the Board of ASB advised the director to alter his leadership style.

The newly acquired TIFA budget obtained in 2013 was the result of strategic planning used as a tool to propose for new funding. In practice, this meant that in the proposal, submitted in 2013 to TIFA, ASB's vision, mission and specific goals were presented with the 2011 strategic plan as foundation. Similarly specific activities and outputs related to these goals were presented, resulting in a well-rounded proposal for the period of January to December 2014. Writing this proposal was possible due

to the greater capacity and confidence of staff to develop and submit proposals for new funding sources. This capacity growth can be attributed to the development of the strategic proposal 2013-2015 developed as a concept paper early 2013. The development of this concept paper was made possible due to the ground work laid out in the development of the logical framework (LogFrame) for HIVOS in 2011. This logframe development was one of the actions defined for the work plans during the strategic planning workshop in 2011.

Finally, the improved capacity to manage the organization also came about from better planning and more organized and documented work. This could be attributed to the development of frequent (monthly) work plans as well as half-yearly evaluations. Both of these procedures were enabled by the more systematic annual work plan developed in 2013 as a result of a greater focus on key issues in diversity, pluralism and minorities in North Sumatra in an effort to develop more focussed strategic directions. The development of these directions can be attributed to the developed program based on the strategic planning which came about from the logframe exercise for HIVOS.

In conclusion the above series of developments displays how the improved capacity to manage to manage the organization can be attributed to a large extent to the planned MFS II capacity development intervention, as the main underlying reason for a change in leadership style and the strategic plan, which both proved very important to bring about changes in the organisation for enhanced capacity to map to manage the organisation.

***Improved capacity to communicate results on diversity issues***

The following MFS II capacity development interventions supported by HIVOS are linked to the key organisational capacity change "Improved capacity to communicate results on diversity issues" (please also see section 4.3):

1. English course

*English course (2013-ongoing)*

**Design**

These capacity development interventions were planned for during the baseline and were, according to HIVOS, one the most important aspects for ASB to develop. HIVOS intended for intensive coaching and training on english skills to focus on both writing proposals and project reports to encourage skills that would affect both the capability to act and commit as well as the capability to adapt and self-renew. According to the CFA, for a small and young organization like ASB with a limited number of staff members these trainings were expected to have a big impact on the organization and highly relevant. ASB itself benefits from the English course as it allows them to contact new potential fundraisers and connections.

It was not specified in what form the course would be given, or whether it would occur as a single training.

More specifically, HIVOS expected immediate effects of the training to allow ASB to be able to develop project proposals and revise their standard operating procedures. Additionally they expected that as a result of a more structured way of working through writing – ASB would adhere stricter to the strategic plan, and not work as impulsively as they did prior to the baseline evaluation in 2012.

In the long term, HIVOS expected that ASB would actually get support from other Donors than HIVOS as well as a result of successfully developing proposals. This should lead to more stability in the implementation of ASB's programs and activities.

This intervention was planned for during the baseline workshop and specified in the Theory of Change and thereby relevant to the organisation.

The expected effects were not formulated in a SMART way (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound). Then again, the evaluation team did not ask the CFA for SMART objectives specifically during the baseline, but rather asked about the expected or observed immediate and long term effects of the interventions.

**Implementation**
The English course was implemented in 2013 as an ongoing activity until 2015 for all staff members of ASB to attend. Other than only focussing on writing skills, teaching the English language was also included on this intervention. In the implementation ASB was also assisted by other initiatives on behalf of ASB themselves. KIPAS, a partner organization helped in organizing a separate writing workshop. No further details are known to the evaluation team regarding the specific design or setup of the intervention.

**Reaching objectives**
Since the objectives haven't been formulated as SMART objectives, it is difficult to assess to what extent these objectives have been reached. Additionally, the course is still ongoing and therefore only partially implemented which makes evaluation of long term objectives difficult. However, as can be seen in section 4.3.1, the capacity and confidence to write reports have increased which is in line with the immediate expected effect as formulated by HIVOS in the baseline evaluation. Similarly, ASB was able to secure additional funding from TIFA through the development of its own proposal based on strategic planning. This aligns to the long-term expected effect that HIVOS formulated earlier. Whether or not this will lead to a more sustainable and independent ASB is however as of yet inconclusive.

**Attribution of observed results to MFS II capacity development interventions**
ASB has improved its' capacity to communicate results on diversity issues over the last years. This development can be attributed to four distinct factors, namely: a wider network of stakeholders and partners; improved competencies to communicate issues about diversity; better documentation practices respecting diversity issues; and overall better documentation on policies and discrimination.

Out of these four factors only one attributes to an MFS II capacity development intervention. Each factor will be described in detail below.

First, the wide network of stakeholders and partners was due to increased cooperation with academia, as well as case collaboration with partners. The cooperation with academia resulted from the ASB scholarship initiative on the one hand and the establishment of university agreements on the other. Both of these could be attributed to a greater emphasis on networking and publicity by ASB.

Secondly, improved competencies to communicate issues about diversity could be attributed directly to the English course provided to all the staff members by HIVOS from 2013 to 2015. KIPAS, ASB's partner organization aided in a writing course as well provided in 2012. The competence to communicate can therefore be attributed in part to MFS II sponsored interventions.

Thirdly, documentation practices respecting diversity in North Sumatra were realized in 2013. These practices can be attributed to the writing course provided by KIPAS in 2012, as well as an investigative journalistic and writing course conducted by YAKOMA in 2011 on ASB's own initiative.

Finally the documenting of policies and discrimination was due document media monitoring results conducted in 2013 as well as a social media monitoring initiative of policy discriminating against minority religious groups in the same year. Both these were enabled by a series of workshops organized by ASB between 2013 and 2014 to analyse media monitoring results as a result of an in-house media analysis training organized by ASB themselves in 2011.

In conclusion, the improved capacity to communicate results on diversity issues can only be partially attributed to MFS II interventions. Particularly competencies to communicate results about diversity issues have improved as a result of the English course, although other non-MFS II interventions have impacted this as well. Despite HIVOS detailed plans to address the issue, ASB has developed a great deal of initiatives on their own to address this issue and improve this particular capacity.

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**Specific research documentation and resources CFA/SPO:**

Annex A_5c endline_assessment sheet_Dutch co-financing organisations_Indonesia_ASB_HIVOS.doc

Annex B_5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_CFA perspective_INDONESIA_ASB_HIVOS (2).doc

Budget sesuai MoU.doc

Concept Paper Program ASB 2013 - 2015.doc

FINAL LOGFRAME REVISI UNTUK HIVOS untuk dikirim.doc

Final revisi budget ASB 2013-2015 untuk dikirim ke HIVOS Tahun 2013-2014.pdf

Final revisi budget ASB 2013-2015 untuk dikirim ke HIVOS Thn 2014-2015.pdf
Final revisi budget ASB 2013-2015 untuk dikirim ke HIVOS Thn 2015-2016.pdf
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Jadwal Program 2013-2015 untuk dikirim ke HIVOS.xls
Notulensi Pelatihan Advokasi.docx
Revisi Akhir Proposal untuk TIFA.doc
Revisi Tabel_Kerangka_Waktu TIFA Sheet1.pdf
Revisi Tabel_Kerangka_Waktu TIFA.xls
TOR Pelatihan Pluralisme.docx
Tor Renstra-1.pdf
Undangan Renstra-NGO.pdf
Annex A_ASB.doc
Annex R_5c endline_observable indicators at SPO_Indoneisa_ASB
BAHASA-Annex C-endline_support to capacity development sheet_SPO perspective_Indonesia_ASB.doc
BAHASA-Annex D_5c endline interview guide_partners_selected indicators_Indonesia_ASB.doc
BAHASA-Annex E_5c endline interview guide_OD consultants_selected indicators_Indonesia_ASB.docx
BAHASA-Annex L_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_management_selected indicators_Indonesia_ASB.doc
BAHASA-Annex M_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_program staff_selected indicators_Indonesia_ASB.docx
BAHASA-Annex P_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_field staff_selected indicators_Indonesia_ASB.doc
BAHASA-Annex Q_c endline observation sheet_Indonesia_ASB.doc
BAHASA-Notulensi Workshop_Indonesia_ASB.docx
BAHASA-Training Interview_Konferensi SPBAT KBB_ASB.doc
BAHASA-Training Interview_Pelatihan Advokasi_ASB.doc
BAHASA-Training interview_Pelatihan Konseling_ASB.doc
BAHASA-Training Interview_Pelatihan Pluralisme_ASB.doc
BAHASA-Training Interview_sbg manajemen melihat staffnya yg mengikuti pelatihan_ASB.doc
BAHASA-Training Interview_sebagai peserta pelatihan_Membangun Sinergitas untuk RUU KUB_ASB.doc
ASB _C3.1_Narrative_19112014
ASB_All Maps_30102014.vsd
Key of Changes_ASB_Medan_translation.vsd
Key of Changes_ASB_Medan.vsd
Map of Causal MapC3.1 Capability to monitor and communicate_ASB_19102014 (ita rosita's conflicted copy 2014-11-19).vsd
Narrative of Genral Key Changes_ASB

# List of Respondents

### People Present at the Workshops

| Date: | 16-18 July 2014 | Organisation: Aliansi Sumut Bersatu 9ASB) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **NAME** | **ROLE IN THE ORGANISATION** | **DURATION OF SERVICE** | **PHONE** | **E-MAIL** |
| *Management* | | | | |
| VeryantoSitohang | Director | | 0812.6593.680 | Tohang_very@yahoo.com |
| *Program/ Project staff* | | | | |
| Redina | Education | 8 years | 0811.6080.45 | Verius_redina@hotmail.com |
| Ferry Wira P | Monitoring and advocacy | 8 years | 0813.9692.8252 | |
| Dessy Hutajulu | Monitoring | 1 year | 0853.6004.3451 | dessyhutajulu@yahoo.co.id |
| Johnson Samosir | Advocacy staff | 1 year | 0812.6045.8584 | Jhonsaut@yahoo.co.id |
| Eldevia Endora T | Monitoring | 1 year | 0812.6936.9417 | Tariganeldevia@yahoo.co.id |
| *Finance / administration* | | | | |
| HeriSyahputra | Finance | | 0852.7571.0523 | Herisaputra913@yahoo.com |
| *Field staff* | | | | |
| | | | | |
| *Others* | | | | |
| | | | | |

### List of People Interviewed

| Date: | 16-18 July 2014 | Organisation: AliansiSumutBersatu | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **NAME** | **ROLE IN THE ORGANISATION** | **DURATION OF SERVICE** | **PHONE** | **E-MAIL** |
| *Management* | | | | |
| VeryantoSitohang | Director | 8 years | 0812.6593.680 | Tohang_very@yahoo.com |
| *Program/ Project staff* | | | | |
| Redina | Education | 8 years | 0811.6080.45 | Verius_redina@hotmail.com |
| Ferry Wira P | Monitoring and advocacy | 8 years | 0813.9692.8252 | |
| DessyHutajulu | Monitoring | 1 year | 0853.6004.3451 | dessyhutajulu@yahoo.co.id |
| Johnson Samosir | Advocacy staff | 1 year | 0812.6045.8584 | Jhonsaut@yahoo.co.id |
| Eldevia Endora T | Monitoring | 1 year | 0812.6936.9417 | Tariganeldevia@yahoo.co.id |
| *Finance / administration* | | | | |
| HeriSyahputra | Finance | | 0852.7571.0523 | Herisaputra913@yahoo.com |
| *Field staff staff* | | | | |
| Christina | Advocacy and publication (website) | 1 year | 0823-7009-1056 | - |
| *Others* | | | | |
| Anto | Executive Director Kipas Institution | 5 year | - | - |
| Sarma | Independent Consultant for monitoring book publication and strategic planning | 8 year | - | - |

# Appendix 1 Methodological approach & reflection

## Introduction

This appendix describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around four key evaluation questions:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

Note: the methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report. At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

## Changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 1

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?**

This question was mainly addressed by reviewing changes in 5c indicators, but additionally a 'general causal map' based on the SPO perspective on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline has been developed. Each of these is further explained below. The development of the general causal map is integrated in the steps for the endline workshop, as mentioned below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012.[20] Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1. **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2. **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3. **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4. **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5. **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

[20] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Below each of these steps is further explained.

*Step 1. Provide the **description of indicators** in the relevant formats – CDI team*

- These formats were to be used when collecting data from SPO staff, CFA, partners, and consultants. For each of these respondents different formats have been developed, based on the list of 5C indicators, similar to the procedure that was used during the baseline assessment. The CDI team needed to add the 2012 baseline description of each indicator. The idea was that each respondent would be requested to review each description per indicator, and indicate whether the current situation is different from the baseline situation, how this situation has changed, and what the reasons for the changes in indicators are. At the end of each format, a more general question is added that addresses how the organisation has changed its capacity since the baseline, and what possible reasons for change exist. Please see below the questions asked for each indicator as well as the more general questions at the end of the list of indicators.

General questions about key changes in the capacity of the SPO

*What do you consider to be the key changes in terms of how the organisation/ SPO has developed its capacity since the baseline (2012)?*

*What do you consider to be the main explanatory reasons (interventions, actors or factors) for these changes?*

**List of questions to be asked for each of the 5C indicators** (The entry point is the the description of each indicator as in the 2012 baseline report):

1. *How has the situation of this indicator changed compared to the situation during the baseline in 2012? Please tick one of the following scores:*
   - -2 = Considerable deterioration
   - -1 = A slight deterioration
   - 0 = No change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012
   - +1 = Slight improvement
   - +2 = Considerable improvement
2. *Please describe what exactly has changed since the baseline in 2012*

3. *What interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation in 2012? Please tick and describe what interventions, actors or factors influenced this indicator, and how. You can tick and describe more than one choice.*
   - Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by **SPO**: ..... .
   - Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **Dutch CFA (MFS II funding)**: .... .
   - Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **other funders**: ..... .
   - **Other** interventions, actors or factors: ..... .
   - Don't know.

*Step 2. **Review** the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team*

Before the in-country team and the CDI team started collecting data in the field, it was important that they reviewed the description for each indicator as described in the baseline reports, and also added to the endline formats for review by respondents. These descriptions are based on document review, observation, interviews with SPO staff, CFA staff and external respondents during the baseline. It was important to explain this to respondents before they filled in the formats.

*Step 3. **Send the formats** adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)*

The CDI team was responsible for collecting data from the CFA:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – CFA perspective.

The in-country team was responsible for collecting data from the SPO and from external respondents (except CFA). The following formats were sent before the fieldwork started:

- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – SPO perspective.
- 5C Endline interview guides for externals: partners; OD consultants.

*Step 4. **Collect, upload & code the documents** from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team*

The CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team, collected the following documents from SPOs and CFAs:

- Project documents: project proposal, budget, contract (Note that for some SPOs there is a contract for the full MFS II period 2011-2015; for others there is a yearly or 2-yearly contract. All new contracts since the baseline in 2012 will need to be collected);
- Technical and financial progress reports since the baseline in 2012;.
- Mid-term evaluation reports;
- End of project-evaluation reports (by the SPO itself or by external evaluators);
- Contract intake forms (assessments of the SPO by the CFA) or organisational assessment scans made by the CFA that cover the 2011-2014 period;
- Consultant reports on specific inputs provided to the SPO in terms of organisational capacity development;
- Training reports (for the SPO; for alliance partners, including the SPO);
- Organisational scans/ assessments, carried out by the CFA or by the Alliance Assessments;
- Monitoring protocol reports, especially for the 5C study carried out by the MFS II Alliances;
- Annual progress reports of the CFA and of the Alliance in relation to capacity development of the SPOs in the particular country;
- Specific reports that are related to capacity development of SPOs in a particular country.

The following documents (since the baseline in 2012) were requested from SPO:

- Annual progress reports;
- Annual financial reports and audit reports;
- Organisational structure vision and mission since the baseline in 2012;
- Strategic plans;

- Business plans;
- Project/ programme planning documents;
- Annual work plan and budgets;
- Operational manuals;
- Organisational and policy documents: finance, human resource development, etc.;
- Monitoring and evaluation strategy and implementation plans;
- Evaluation reports;
- Staff training reports;
- Organisational capacity reports from development consultants.

The CDI team will coded these documents in NVivo (qualitative data analysis software program) against the 5C indicators.

*Step 5.* ***Prepare and organise the field visit*** *to the SPO – in-country team*

Meanwhile the in-country team prepared and organised the logistics for the field visit to the SPO:

- **General endline workshop** consisted about one day for the self-assessments (about ½ to ¾ of the day) and brainstorm (about 1 to 2 hours) on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline and underlying interventions, factors and actors ('general causal map'), see also explanation below. This was done with the five categories of key staff: managers; project/ programme staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin & HRM staff; field staff. Note: for SPOs involved in process tracing an additional 1 to 1½ day workshop (managers; program/project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff) was necessary. See also step 7;
- **Interviews with SPO staff** (roughly one day);
- **Interviews with external respondents** such as partners and organisational development consultants depending on their proximity to the SPO. These interviews coulc be scheduled after the endline workshop and interviews with SPO staff.

General causal map

During the 5C endline process, a 'general causal map' has been developed, based on key organisational capacity changes and underlying causes for these changes, as perceived by the SPO. The general causal map describes cause-effect relationships, and is described both as a visual as well as a narrative.

As much as possible the same people that were involved in the baseline were also involved in the endline workshop and interviews.

*Step 6.* ***Interview the CFA*** *– CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for sending the sheets/ formats to the CFA and for doing a follow-up interview on the basis of the information provided so as to clarify or deepen the information provided. This relates to:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet - CFA perspective.

*Step 7.* ***Run the endline workshop*** *with the SPO – in-country team*

This included running the endline workshop, including facilitation of the development of the general causal map, self-assessments, interviews and observations. Particularly for those SPOs that were selected for process tracing all the relevant information needed to be analysed prior to the field visit, so as to develop an initial causal map. Please see Step 6 and also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two).

An endline workshop with the SPO was intended to:

- Explain the purpose of the fieldwork;
- Carry out in the self-assessments by SPO staff subgroups (unless these have already been filled prior to the field visits) - this may take some 3 hours.
- Facilitate a brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012 and underlying interventions, factors and actors.

***Purpose of the fieldwork*:** to collect data that help to provide information on what changes took place in terms of organisational capacity development of the SPO as well as reasons for these changes. The baseline that was carried out in 2012 was to be used as a point of reference.

***Brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes and influencing factors***: a brainstorm was facilitated on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012. In order to kick start the discussion, staff were reminded of the key findings related to the historical time line carried out in the baseline (vision, mission, strategies, funding, staff). This was then used to generate a discussion on key changes that happened in the organisation since the baseline (on cards). Then cards were selected that were related to organisational capacity changes, and organised. Then a 'general causal map' was developed, based on these key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change as experienced by the SPO staff. This was documented as a visual and narrative.This general causal map was to get the story of the SPO on what they perceived as key organisational capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline, in addition to the specific details provided per indicator.

***Self-assessments*:** respondents worked in the respective staff function groups: management; programme/ project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin and HRM staff; field staff. Staff were assisted where necessary so that they could really understand what it was they were being asked to do as well as what the descriptions under each indicator meant.

Note: for those SPOs selected for process tracing an additional endline workshop was held to facilitate the development of detailed causal maps for each of the identified organisational change/ outcome areas that fall under the capability to act and commit, and under the capability to adapt and self-renew, and that are likely related to capacity development interventions by the CFA. See also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two). It was up to the in-country team whether this workshop was held straight after the initial endline workshop or after the workshop and the follow-up interviews. It could also be held as a separate workshop at another time.

*Step 8.* ***Interview SPO staff*** *– in-country team*

After the endline workshop (developing the general causal map and carrying out self-assessments in subgroups), interviews were held with SPO staff (subgroups) to follow up on the information that was provided in the self-assessment sheets, and to interview staff that had not yet provided any information.

*Step 9.* ***Fill-in observation sheets*** *– in-country team*

During the visit at the SPO, the in-country team had to fill in two sheets based on their observation:

- 5C Endline observation sheet;
- 5C Endline observable indicators.

*Step 10.* ***Interview externals*** *– in-country team & CDI team*

The in-country team also needed to interview the partners of the SPO as well as organisational capacity development consultants that have provided support to the SPO. The CDI team interviewed the CFA.

*Step 11.* ***Upload and auto-code all the formats*** *collected by in-country team and CDI team – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for uploading and auto-coding (in Nvivo) of the documents that were collected by the in-country team and by the CDI team.

*Step 12. Provide the **overview of information** per 5C indicator to in-country team – CDI team*

After the analysis in NVivo, the CDI team provided a copy of all the information generated per indicator to the in-country team for initial analysis.

*Step 13. **Analyse the data and develop a draft description** of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team*

The in-country team provided a draft description of the findings per indicator, based on the information generated per indicator. The information generated under the general questions were linked to the general causal map or detailed process tracing related causal map.

*Step 14. **Analyse the data and finalize the description** of the findings per indicator, per capability and general – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for checking the analysis by the in-country team with the Nvivo generated data and to make suggestions for improvement and ask questions for clarification to which the in-country team responded. The CDI team then finalised the analysis and provided final descriptions and scores per indicator and also summarize these per capability and calculated the summary capability scores based on the average of all indicators by capability.

*Step 15. **Analyse the information** in the general causal map –in-country team & CDI team*

The general causal map based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff present at the workshop, was further detailed by in-country team and CDI team, and based on the notes made during the workshop and where necessary additional follow up with the SPO. The visual and narrative was finalized after feedback by the SPO. During analysis of the general causal map relationships with MFS II support for capacity development and other factors and actors were identified. All the information has been reviewed by the SPO and CFA.

## Attributing changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 2

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: ***To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?***

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process. The box below provides some background information on process tracing.

Background information on process tracing

The essence of process tracing research is that scholars want to go beyond merely identifying correlations between independent variables (Xs) and outcomes (Ys). Process tracing in social science is commonly defined by its addition to trace causal mechanisms (Bennett, 2008a, 2008b; Checkle, 2008; George & Bennett, 2005). A causal mechanism can be defined as "a complex system which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts" (Glennan, 1996, p. 52). Process tracing involves "attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable" (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 206-207).

Process tracing can be differentiated into three variants within social science: theory testing, theory building, and explaining outcome process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

- Theory testing process tracing uses a theory from the existing literature and then tests whether evidence shows that each part of hypothesised causal mechanism is present in a given case, enabling within case inferences about whether the mechanism functioned as expected in the case and whether the mechanism as a whole was present. No claims can be made however, about whether the mechanism was the only cause of the outcome.
- Theory building process tracing seeks to build generalizable theoretical explanations from empirical evidence, inferring that a more general causal mechanism exists from the fact of a particular case.
- Finally, explaining outcome process tracing attempts to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific historical case. Here the aim is not to build or test more general theories but to craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case centric than theory oriented.

Explaining outcome process tracing is the most suitable type of process tracing for analysing the causal mechanisms for selected key organisational capacity changes of the SPOs. This type of process tracing can be thought of as a single outcome study defined as seeking the causes of the specific outcome in a single case (Gerring, 2006; in: Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Here the ambition is to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a particular outcome, with sufficiency defined as an explanation that accounts for all of the important aspects of an outcome with no redundant parts being present (Mackie, 1965).

Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research strategy that aims to trace the complex conglomerate of systematic and case specific causal mechanisms that produced the outcome in question. The explanation cannot be detached from the particular case. Explaining outcome process tracing refers to case studies whose primary ambition is to explain particular historical outcomes, although the findings of the case can also speak to other potential cases of the phenomenon. Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research process in which 'theories' are tested to see whether they can provide a minimally sufficient explanation of the outcome. Minimal sufficiency is defined as an explanation that accounts for an outcome, with no redundant parts. In most explaining outcome studies, existing theorisation cannot provide a sufficient explanation, resulting in a second stage in which existing theories are re-conceptualised in light of the evidence gathered in the preceding empirical analysis. The conceptualisation phase in explaining outcome process tracing is therefore an iterative research process, with initial mechanisms re-conceptualised and tested until the result is a theorised mechanism that provides a minimally sufficient explanation of the particular outcome.

Below a description is provided of how SPOs are selected for process tracing, and a description is provided on how this process tracing is to be carried out. Note that this description of process tracing provides not only information on the extent to which the changes in organisational development can be attributed to MFS II (evaluation question 2), but also provides information on other contributing factors and actors (evaluation question 4). Furthermore, it must be noted that the evaluation team has developed an adapted form of 'explaining outcome process tracing', since the data collection and analysis was an iterative process of research so as to establish the most realistic explanation for a particular outcome/ organisational capacity change. Below selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

**Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing**

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the

purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

**ETHIOPIA**

For Ethiopia the capabilities that are mostly targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 1

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Ethiopia*

| Capability to: | AMREF | CARE | ECFA | FSCE | HOA-REC | HUNDEE | NVEA | OSRA | TTCA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Relate | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| Achieve coherence | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Ethiopia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE. In fact, six SPOs would be suitable for process tracing. We just selected the first one per CFA following the criteria of not including more than one SPO per CFA for process tracing

Table 2

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Ethiopia*

| Ethiopia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AMREF | Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | AMREF NL | Yes |
| CARE | Dec 31, 2015 | Partly | Yes | Yes | Yes – slightly | CARE Netherlands | No - not fully matching |
| ECFA | Jan 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Child Helpline International | Yes |
| FSCE | Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN); Note: no info from Defence for Children – ECPAT Netherlands | Yes |
| HOA-REC | Sustainable Energy project (ICCO Alliance): 2014<br>Innovative WASH (WASH Alliance): Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes - slightly | ICCO | No - not fully matching |
| HUNDEE | Dec 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO & IICD | Yes |
| NVEA | Dec 2015 (both) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Edukans Foundation (under two consortia); Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN) | Suitable but SKN already involved for process tracing FSCE |
| OSRA | C4C Alliance project (farmers marketing): December 2014<br>ICCO Alliance project (zero grazing: 2014 (2nd phase) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO & IICD | Suitable but ICCO & IICD already involved for process tracing - HUNDEE |
| TTCA | June 2015 | Partly | Yes | No | Yes | Edukans Foundation | No - not fully matching |

**INDIA**

For India the capability that is mostly targeted by CFAs is the capability to act and commit. The next one in line is the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below in which a higher score means that the specific capability is more intensively targeted.

Table 3

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – India*[21]

| Capability to: | BVHA | COUNT | DRISTI | FFID | Jana Vikas | Samarthak Samiti | SMILE | SDS | VTRC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 5 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 4 |
| Relate | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, India.

Below you can see a table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether SPO and the CFA both expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE and VTRC. Except for SMILE (capability to act and commit only), for the other SPOs the focus for process tracing can be on the capability to act and commit and on the capability to adapt and self-renew.

Table 4

*SPOs selected for process tracing – India*

| India – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BVHA | 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Simavi | Yes; both capabilities |
| COUNT | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Woord en Daad | Yes; both capabilities |
| DRISTI | 31-03-2012 | Yes | Yes | No | no | Hivos | No - closed in 2012 |
| FFID | 30-09-2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |

[21] RGVN, NEDSF and Women's Rights Forum (WRF) could not be reached timely during the baseline due to security reasons. WRF could not be reached at all. Therefore these SPOs are not included in Table 1.

| India – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jana Vikas | 2013 | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No - contract is and the by now; not fully matching focus |
| NEDSF | | | | | | | No – delayed baseline |
| RGVN | | | | | | | No - delayed baseline |
| Samarthak Samiti (SDS) | 2013 possibly longer | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Hivos | No - not certain of end date and not fully matching focus |
| Shivi Development Society (SDS) | Dec 2013 intention 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No - not fully matching focus |
| Smile | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Wilde Ganzen | Yes; first capability only |
| VTRC | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Stichting Red een Kind | Yes; both capabilities |

**INDONESIA**

For Indonesia the capabilities that are most frequently targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 5

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Indonesia*

| Capability to: | ASB | Daya kologi | ECPAT | GSS | Lem baga Kita | PT. PPMA | Rifka Annisa | WIIP | Yad upa | Yayasan Kelola | YPI | YRBI |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 4 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 3 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 |
| Relate | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, Indonesia.

The table below describes when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: ASB, ECPAT, PT.PPMA, YPI, YRBI.

Table 6

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Indonesia*

| Indonesia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ASB | February 2012; extension Feb,1, 2013 – June,30, 2016 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Hivos | Yes |
| Dayakologi | 2013; no extension | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No: contract ended early and not matching enough |
| ECPAT | August 2013; Extension Dec 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes, a bit | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | Yes |
| GSS | 31 December 2012; no extension | Yes | Yes | Yes, a bit | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | No: contract ended early |
| Lembaga Kita | 31 December 2012; no extension | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | No - contract ended early |
| PT.PPMA | May 2015 | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | IUCN | Yes, capability to act and commit only |
| Rifka Annisa | Dec, 31 2015 | No | Yes | No | Yes | Rutgers WPF | No - no match between expectations CFA and SPO |
| WIIP | Dec 2015 | Yes | Not MFS II | Yes | Not MFS II | Red Cross | No - Capacity development interventions are not MFS II financed. Only some overhead is MFS II |

| Indonesia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yayasan Kelola | Dec 30, 2013; extension of contract being processed for two years (2014-2015) | Yes | Not really | Yes | Not really | Hivos | No - no specific capacity development interventions planned by Hivos |
| YPI | Dec 31, 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Rutgers WPF | Yes |
| YRBI | Oct, 30, 2013; YRBI end of contract from 31st Oct 2013 to 31st Dec 2013. Contract extension proposal is being proposed to MFS II, no decision yet. | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |
| Yadupa | Under negotiation during baseline; new contract 2013 until now | Yes | Nothing committed | Yes | Nothing committed | IUCN | No, since nothing was committed by CFA |

**LIBERIA**

For Liberia the situation is arbitrary which capabilities are targeted most CFA's. Whilst the capability to act and commit is targeted more often than the other capabilities, this is only so for two of the SPOs. The capability to adapt and self-renew and the capability to relate are almost equally targeted for the five SPOs, be it not intensively. Since the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew are the most targeted capabilities in Ethiopia, India and Indonesia, we choose to focus on these two capabilities for Liberia as well. This would help the synthesis team in the further analysis of these capabilities related to process tracing. See also the table below.

Table 7

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Liberia*

| Capability to: | BSC | DEN-L | NAWOCOL | REFOUND | RHRAP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Relate | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, Liberia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Also, for two of the five SPOs capability to act and commit is targeted more intensively compared to the other capabilities. Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BSC and RHRAP.

Table 8

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Liberia*

| Liberia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BSC | Dec 31, 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | SPARK | Yes |
| DEN-L | 2014 | No | No | Unknown | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| NAWOCOL | 2014 | Yes | No | No | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| REFOUND | At least until 2013 (2015?) | Yes | No | Yes | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| RHRAP | At least until 2013 (2014?) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |

**Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study**

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ' general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

Some definitions of the terminology used for this MFS II 5c evaluation

Based upon the different interpretations and connotations the use of the term causal mechanism we use the following terminology for the remainder of this paper:

- A **detailed causal map** (or **model of change)** = the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change.
- A **causal mechanism** = is the combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 176).
- **Part** or **cause** = one actor with its attributes carrying out activities/ producing outputs that lead to change in other parts. The final part or cause is the change/ outcome.
- **Attributes of the actor** = specificities of the actor that increase his chance to introduce change or not such as its position in its institutional environment.

*Step 1. Identify the **planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

Chapter 4.1 and 4.2 in the baseline report were reviewed. Capacity development interventions as planned by the CFA for the capability to act and commit and for the capability to adapt and self-renew were described and details inserted in the summary format. This provided an overview of the capacity development activities that were originally planned by the CFA for these two capabilities and assisted in focusing on relevant outcomes that are possibly related to the planned interventions.

*Step 2. Identify the **implemented capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

The input from the CFA was reviewed in terms of what capacity development interventions have taken place in the MFS II period. This information was be found in the 'Support to capacity development sheet - endline - CFA perspective' for the SPO, based on details provided by the CFA and further discussed during an interview by the CDI team.

The CFA was asked to describe all the MFS II supported capacity development interventions of the SPO that took place during the period 2011 up to now. The CDI team reviewed this information, not only the interventions but also the observed changes as well as the expected long-term changes, and then linked these interventions to relevant outcomes in one of the capabilities (capability to act and commit; and capability to adapt and self-renew).

*Step 3. Identify **initial changes/ outcome areas** in these two capabilities – by CDI team & in-country team*

The CDI team was responsible for **coding** documents received from SPO and CFA in NVivo on the following:

- **5C Indicators**: this was to identify the changes that took place between baseline and endline. This information was coded in Nvivo.
- Information related to the **capacity development interventions implemented by the CFA** (with MFS II funding) (see also Step 2) to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. For example, the training on financial management of the SPO staff could be related to any information on financial management of the SPO. This information was coded in Nvivo.

In addition, the response by the CFA to the changes in 5C indicators format, was auto-coded.

The in-country team was responsible for timely collection of information from the SPO (before the fieldwork starts). This set of information dealt with:

- MFS II supported capacity development interventions during the MFS II period (2011 until now).
- Overview of all trainings provided in relation to a particular outcome areas/organisational capacity change since the baseline.
- For each of the identified MFS II supported trainings, training questionnaires have been developed to assess these trainings in terms of the participants, interests, knowledge and skills gained, behaviour change and changes in the organisation (based on Kirkpatrick's model), one format for training participants and one for their managers. These training questionnaires were sent prior to the field visit.
- Changes expected by SPO on a long-term basis ('Support to capacity development sheet - endline - SPO perspective').

For the selection of change/ outcome areas the following criteria were important:

- The change/ outcome area is in one of the two capabilities selected for process tracing: capability to act and commit or the capability to adapt and self-renew. This was the first criteria to select upon.
- There was a likely link between the key organisational capacity change/ outcome area and the MFS II supported capacity development interventions. This also was an important criteria. This would need to be demonstrated through one or more of the following situations:
  - In the 2012 **theory of change** on organisational capacity development of the SPO a link was indicated between the outcome area and MFS II support;
  - During the baseline the CFA indicated a link between **the planned MFS II support** to organisational development and the expected short-term or long-term results in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the **CFA** indicated a link between **the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions** and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the **SPO** indicated a link between **the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions** and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities.

Reviewing the information obtained as described in Step 1, 2, and 3 provided the basis for selecting key organisational capacity change/ outcome areas to focus on for process tracing. These areas were to be formulated as broader outcome areas, such as 'improved financial management', 'improved monitoring and evaluation' or 'improved staff competencies'.

Note: the outcome areas were to be formulated as intermediates changes. For example: an improved monitoring and evaluation system, or enhanced knowledge and skills to educate the target group on climate change. Key outcome areas were also verified - based on document review as well as discussions with the SPO during the endline.

*Step 4. Construct the **detailed, initial causal map** (theoretical model of change) – CDI & in-country team*

A detailed initial causal map was developed by the CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team. This was based on document review, including information provided by the CFA and SPO on MFS II supported capacity development interventions and their immediate and long-term objectives as well as observed changes. Also, the training questionnaires were reviewed before developing the initial causal map. This detailed initial causal map was to be provided by the CDI team with a visual and related narrative with related references. This initial causal map served as a reference point for further reflection with the SPO during the process tracing endline workshop, where relationships needed to be verified or new relationships established so that the second (workshop-based), detailed causal map could be developed, after which further verification was needed to come up with the final, concluding detailed causal map.

It's important to note that organisational change area/ outcome areas could be both positive and negative.

For each of the selected outcomes the team needed to make explicit the theoretical model of change. This meant finding out about the range of different actors, factors, actions, and events etc. that have contributed to a particular outcome in terms of organisational capacity of the SPO.

A model of change of good quality includes:

- The causal pathways that relate the intervention to the realised change/ outcome;
- Rival explanations for the same change/ outcome;
- Assumptions that clarify relations between different components or parts;
- Case specific and/or context specific factors or risks that might influence the causal pathway, such as for instance the socio-cultural-economic context, or a natural disaster;
- Specific attributes of the actors e.g. CFA and other funders.

A model of change (within the 5C study called a 'detailed causal map') is a complex system which produces intermediate and long-term outcomes by the interaction of other parts. It consists of parts or causes that often consist of one actor with its attributes that is implementing activities leading to change in other parts (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). A helpful way of constructing the model of change is to think in terms of actors carrying out activities that lead to other actors changing their behaviour. The model of change can be explained as a range of activities carried out by different *actors* (including the CFA and SPO under evaluation) that will ultimately lead to an outcome. Besides this, there are also '*structural*' elements, which are to be interpreted as external factors (such as economic conjuncture); and *attributes* of the actor (does the actor have the legitimacy to ask for change or not, what is its position in the sector) that should be looked at (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). In fact Beach and Pedersen, make a fine point about the subjectivity of the actor in a dynamic context. This means, in qualitative methodologies, capturing the changes in the actor, acted upon area or person/organisation, in a non sequential and non temporal format. Things which were done recently could have corrected behavioural outcomes of an organisation and at the same ime there could be processes which incrementally pushed for the same change over a period of time. Beach and Pedersen espouse this methodology because it captures change in a dynamic fashion as against the methodology of logical framework. For the MFS II evaluation it was important to make a distinction between those paths in the model of change that are the result of MFS II and rival pathways.
The construction of the model of change started with the identified key organisational capacity change/ outcome, followed by an inventory of all possible subcomponents that possibly have caused the change/ outcome in the MFS II period (2011-up to now, or since the baseline). The figure below presents an imaginary example of a model of change. The different colours indicate the different types of support to capacity development of the SPO by different actors, thereby indicating different pathways of change, leading to the key changes/ outcomes in terms of capacity development (which in this case indicates the ability to adapt and self-renew).





***Figure 1*** *An imaginary example of a model of change*

*Step 5. Identify* ***types of evidence*** *needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams with support from CDI team*

Once the causal mechanism at theoretical level were defined, empirical evidence was collected so as to verify or discard the different parts of this theoretical model of change, confirm or reject whether subcomponents have taken place, and to find evidence that confirm or reject the causal relations between the subcomponents.

A key question that we needed to ask ourselves was, *"What information do we need in order to confirm or reject that one subcomponent leads to another, that X causes Y?"*. The evaluation team needed to agree on what information was needed that provides empirical manifestations for each part of the model of change.

There are four distinguishable types of evidence that are relevant in process tracing analysis: *pattern, sequence, trace, and account*. Please see the box below for descriptions of these types of evidence.

The evaluation team needed to agree on the types of evidence that was needed to verify or discard the manifestation of a particular part of the causal mechanism. Each one or a combination of these different types of evidence could be used to confirm or reject the different parts of the model of change. This is what is meant by robustness of evidence gathering. Since causality as a concept can bend in many ways, our methodology, provides a near scientific model for accepting and rejecting a particular type of evidence, ignoring its face value.

Types of evidence to be used in process tracing

- **Pattern evidence** relates to predictions of statistical patterns in the evidence. For example, in testing a mechanism of racial discrimination in a case dealing with employment, statistical patterns of employment would be relevant for testing this part of the mechanism.
- **Sequence evidence** deals with the temporal and spatial chronology of events predicted by a hypothesised causal mechanism. For example, a test of the hypothesis could involve expectations of the timing of events where we might predict that if the hypothesis is valid, we should see that the event B took place after event A took place. However, if we found that event B took place before event A took place, the test would suggest that our confidence in the validity of this part of the mechanism should be reduced (disconfirmation/ falsification).
- **Trace evidence** is evidence whose mere existence provides proof that a part of a hypothesised mechanism exists. For example, the existence of the minutes of a meeting, if authentic ones, provide strong proof that the meeting took place.
- **Account evidence** deals with the content of empirical material, such as meeting minutes that detail what was discussed or an oral account of what took place in the meeting.

*Source*: Beach and Pedersen, 2013

Below you can find a table that provides guidelines on what to look for when identifying types of evidence that can confirm or reject causal relationships between different parts/ subcomponents of the model of change. It also provides one example of a part of a causal pathway and what type of information to look for.

Table 9

*Format for identifying types of evidence for different causal relationships in the model of change (example included)*

| Part of the model of change | Key questions | Type of evidence needed | Source of information |
|---|---|---|---|
| Describe relationship between the subcomponents of the model of change | Describe questions you would like to answer a so as to find out whether the components in the relationship took place, when they took place, who was involved, and whether they are related | Describe the information that we need in order to answer these questions.<br>Which type of evidence can we use in order to reject or confirm that subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y?<br>Can we find this information by means of :<br>Pattern evidence;<br>Sequence evidence;<br>Trace evidence;<br>Account evidence? | Describe where you can find this information |
| Example:<br>Training workshops on M&E provided by MFS II funding and other sources of funding | Example:<br>What type of training workshops on M&E took place?<br>Who was trained?<br>When did the training take place?<br>Who funded the training?<br>Was the funding of training provided before the training took place?<br>How much money was available for the training? | Example:<br>Trace evidence: on types of training delivered, who was trained, when the training took place, budget for the training<br><br>Sequence evidence on timing of funding and timing of training<br><br>Content evidence: what the training was about | Example:<br>Training report<br>SPO Progress reports<br>interviews with the CFA and SPO staff<br>Financial reports SPO and CFA |

Please note that for practical reasons, the 5C evaluation team decided that it was easier to integrate the specific questions in the narrative of the initial causal map. These questions would need to be addressed by the in country team during the process tracing workshop so as to discover, verify or

discard particular causal mechanisms in the detailed, initial causal map. Different types of evidence was asked for in these questions.

*Step 6.* ***Collect data*** *to verify or discard causal mechanisms and develop workshop-based, detailed causal map – in-country team*

Once it was decided by the in-country and CDI evaluation teams what information was to be collected during the interaction with the SPO, data collection took place. The initial causal maps served as a basis for discussions during the endline workshop with a particular focus on process tracing for the identified organisational capacity changes. But it was considered to be very important to understand from the perspective of the SPO how they understood the identified key organisational capacity change/outcome area has come about. A new detailed, workshop-based causal map was developed that included the information provided by SPO staff as well as based on initial document review as described in the initial detailed causal map. This information was further analysed and verified with other relevant information so as to develop a final causal map, which is described in the next step.

*Step 7.* ***Assess the quality*** *of data and* ***analyse data****, and develop the* ***final detailed causal map*** *(model of change) – in-country team and CDI team*

Quality assurance of the data collected and the evidence it provides for rejecting or confirming parts of causal explanations are a major concern for many authors specialised in contribution analysis and process-tracing. Stern et al. (2012), Beach and Pedersen (2013), Lemire, Nielsen and Dybdal (2012), Mayne (2012) and Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) all emphasise the need to make attribution/ contribution claims that are based on pieces of evidence that are rigorous, traceable, and credible. These pieces of evidence should be as explicit as possible in proving that *subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y* and ruling out other explanations. Several tools are proposed to check the nature and the quality of data needed. One option is, Delahais and Toulemonde's Evidence Analysis Database, which we have adapted for our purpose.

Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) propose an Evidence Analysis Database that takes into consideration three criteria:

- Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no);
- Type of causal mechanism: intended contribution/ other contribution/ condition leading to intended contribution/ intended condition to other contribution/ feedback loop;
- Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak.

We have adapted their criteria to our purpose. The in-country team, in collaboration with the CDI team, used the criteria in assessing whether causal relationships in the causal map, were strong enough. This has been more of an iterative process trying to find additional evidence for the established relationships through additional document review or contacting the CFA and SPO as well as getting their feedback on the final detailed causal map that was established. Whilst the form below has not been used exactly in the manner depicted, it has been used indirectly when trying to validate the information in the detailed causal map. After that, the final detailed causal map is established both as a visual as well as a narrative, with related references for the established causal relations.

| *Example format for the adapted evidence analysis database (example included)* **Description of causal relation** | **Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no)** | **Type of information providing the background to the confirmation or rejection of the causal relation** | **Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak** | **Explanation for why the evidence is (rather) strong or (rather) weak, and therefore the causal relation is confirmed/ rejected** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| e.g. Training staff in M&E leads to enhanced M&E knowledge, skills and practice | e.g. Confirmed | e.g. Training reports confirmed that staff are trained in M&E and that knowledge and skills increased as a result of the training | | |

*Step 8.* ***Analyse and conclude*** *on findings– in-country team and CDI team*

The final detailed causal map was described as a visual and narrative and this was then analysed in terms of the evaluation question two and evaluation question four: *"To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?"* and *"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"* It was analysed to what extent the identified key organisational capacity change can be attributed to MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as to other related factors, interventions and actors.

## Explaining factors – evaluation question 4

This paragraph describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This has been explained in the first section of this appendix. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information was procured for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the process of process tracing as described in the section above.

## Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team.

**Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach:** this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

**Using standard indicators and scores**: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes

comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

**General causal map:** whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

**Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question:** this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

**Utilisation of the evaluation**

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

**Design** – mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

**Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication:** many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

**5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process:** The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment

and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

# Appendix 2 Background information on the five core capabilities framework

The 5 capabilities (5C) framework was to be used as a framework for the evaluation of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs) of the MFS II consortia. The 5C framework is based on a five-year research program on 'Capacity, change and performance' that was carried out by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). The research included an extensive review of the literature and sixteen case studies. The 5C framework has also been applied in an IOB evaluation using 26 case studies in 14 countries, and in the baseline carried out per organisation by the MFS II organisations for the purpose of the monitoring protocol.

The 5C framework is structured to understand and analyse (changes in) the capacity of an organization to deliver (social) value to its constituents. This introduction briefly describes the 5C framework, mainly based on the most recent document on the 5C framework (Keijzer et al., 2011).

The 5C framework sees capacity as an **outcome** of an **open system**. An organisation or collaborative association (for instance a network) is seen as a system interacting with wider society. The most critical practical issue is to ensure that relevant stakeholders share a common way of thinking about capacity and its core constituents or capabilities. Decisive for an organisation's capacity is the context in which the organisation operates. This means that **understanding context issues** is crucial. The use of the 5C framework requires a multi-stakeholder approach because shared values and results orientation are important to facilitate the capacity development process. The 5C framework therefore needs to **accommodate the different visions** of stakeholders and conceive different strategies for raising capacity and improving performance in a given situation.

The 5C framework defines capacity as '**producing social value'** and identifies five core capabilities that together result in that overall capacity. Capacity, capabilities and competences are seen as follows:

**Capacity** is referred to as the overall ability of an organisation or system to create value for others;

**Capabilities** are the collective ability of a group or a system to do something either inside or outside the system. The collective ability involved may be technical, logistical, managerial or generative (i.e. the ability to earn legitimacy, to adapt, to create meaning, etc.);

**Competencies** are the energies, skills and abilities of individuals.

Fundamental to developing capacity are inputs such as human, material and financial resources, technology, and information. To the degree that they are developed and successfully integrated, capabilities contribute to the overall capacity or ability of an organisation or system to create value for others. A single capability is not sufficient to create capacity. All are needed and are strongly interrelated and overlapping. Thus, to achieve its development goals, the 5C framework says that every organisation or system must have **five basic capabilities:**

- The capability to act and commit;
- The capability to deliver on development objectives;
- The capability to adapt and self-renew;
- The capability to relate (to external stakeholders);
- The capability to achieve coherence.

In order to have a common framework for evaluation, the five capabilities have been reformulated in outcome domains and for each outcome domain performance indicators have been developed. A detailed overview of capabilities with outcome domains and indicators is attached in Appendix 3.

There is some overlap between the five core capabilities but together the five capabilities result in a certain level of capacity. Influencing one capability may have an effect on one or more of the other

capabilities. In each situation, the level of any of the five capabilities will vary. Each capability can become stronger or weaker over time.

# Appendix 3 Changes in organisational capacity of the SPO - 5C indicators

Below you will find a description for each of the indicators under each of the capabilities, what the situation is as assessed during the endline, how this has changed since the baseline and what are the reasons for change.

**Description of Endline Indicators_Aliansi Sumut Bersatu (ASB)**

**Capability to Act and to Commit**

1.1 Responsive leadership: 'Leadership is responsive, inspiring, and sensitive'

*How would you describe your leadership? Leadership within the organisation (operational, strategic). If there is a larger body then you may also want to refer to leadership at a higher level but not located at the local organisation?)*

The leadership practiced in ASB has enhanced along with their organizational development. The ASB leadership is still practicing what they have done since the baseline although some areas have developed. The current leadership is considered to have improved in task delegation in the absence of leadership, greater clarity in staffs job descriptions, staff regeneration, and feedback to staff performance as a post-monitoring mechanism. The Director ensures that the staffs have more opportunities and access to capacity building both internally and externally. Task delegation by the director has been especially appreciated by the board, which can now focus on future programs, strategic planning and mitigating emerging issues. The staff's independency in performing their work has improved even in the absence of their leader. Nonetheless, the need for standard operating procedures (SOPs), regeneration at staff level and the need for additional board members are frequently mentioned during the interviews. Furthermore, the urge of ensuring that staff participates in capacity building is demanded to the Director.

Score: From 4 to 4.5 (slight improvement)

1.2. Strategic guidance: 'Leaders provide appropriate strategic guidance (strategic leader and operational leader)'

*This is about the extent to which the leader(s) provide strategic directions*

There has been mission a shift in focus and role of leadership since the baseline. The staff considered these positive changes, and mentioned that leadership has significantly improved. The Director is now focusing on more strategic tasks to the level of responding to organizational issues instead of internal staff conflicts. Instead of responding to staff obstacles in implementing their work, the Director is able to provide strategic direction to the staff whilst allowing them to solve implementation problems on their own. This has allowed for staff to develop their own problem solving capacity and independence. Due to this, the Board has gained more trust in the director and reduced the number of interventions throughout the year. Nevertheless, the board remains involved in the annual review and utilizes it as a place to provide their strategic view and feedback to the program.

Score: From 3 to 4 (improvement)

1.3. Staff turnover: 'Staff turnover is relatively low'

*This is about staff turnover.*

The staff turnover rate is still as low as during the baseline. There are only four project staff members who completed their project of which three of them are continuing their studies whilst the other one moved to other organisation. The acquisition of an additional funding source from TIFA has allowed for the addition of four new staff members in ASB. The new staff recruitment was also based on specific requirements imposed by TIFA who expected staff with a background in Law. ASB currently has eight staff members of whom six are full time and two are part time employed.

Score: From 4 to 4 (no change)

1.4 Organisational structure: 'Existence of clear organisational structure reflecting the objectives of the organisation'

*This is about leadership within the organisation (operational, strategic). If there is a larger body then you may also want to refer to leadership at a higher level but not located at the local organisation.*

ASB has extended their organizational structure. Currently eight staffs has fulfilled the need of human resource. Meanwhile, the clarity in tasks and responsibilities for the individual staff members and divisions has increased, particularly as an effect of increased use of strategic planning for guidance.

Score: From 3 to 4 (improvement)

1.5.Articulated strategies: 'Strategies are articulated and based on good situation analysis and adequate M&E'

*Observable indicator: strategies are well articulated. Situation analysis and monitoring and evaluation are used to inform strategies.*

There has only been a slight change in this indicator compared to the baseline situation.ASB has increasingly utilized strategic planning as the approach to communicate and discuss work plans. At the same time, HIVOS still assists ASB in sharpening their strategic directions and plays an important role in using strategic planning as a form of capacity building for ASB.

Score: From 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

1.6 Daily operations: 'Day to day operations are in line with strategic plans'

*This is about the extent to which day-to-day operations are aligned with strategic plans.*

ASB has continued to use their strategic plan from 2011. With support from HIVOS, ASB has started to develop and use strategic planning and annual work plans to deliver their activities. In practice, staff members have placed the work plan in writing on the writing board so that everybody can see and refer to it on a day to day basis. This has allowed ASB staff to reflect and understand what is happening in the program, assess implementation challenges, and to discuss partnerships and networking issues they may encounter.

Score: From 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

1.7. Staff skills: 'Staff have necessary skills to do their work'

*This is about whether staff have the skills necessary to do their work and what skills they might they need.*

Overall, senior staff capacity and work performance has increased since the baseline. Their ability to manage and delegate work to junior level staff has had great impact on program implementation. On top of that, an additional funding source from HIVOS has brought further opportunities for capacity building for the staff. Through increased networking and advocacy, staffs have also created external capacity building opportunities for themselves. Director and senior staff have collaborated to facilitate a media analysis in-house training for junior staff in 2011. The media analysis training has led them to distribute result of diversity issue monitoring in a form of book annually.

Nonetheless it was found that additional capacity building is required in particular for the new staff hired in 2013 who had not participated in the training in 2011. The additional training identified in

particular for newly hired staff are media monitoring and advocacy, investigative journalistic and writing skills, general analytical skills and data analysis.

Score: From 2.5 to 3.5 (considerable improvement)

1.8. Training opportunities: 'Appropriate training opportunities are offered to staff'

*This is about whether staff at the SPO are offered appropriate training opportunities*

The new funding sources from HIVOS and TIFA have opened up more training opportunities for ASB in the last two years. HIVOS and TIFA have provided technical training for ASB staffs in order to improve their technical skills in delivering program activities. In addition to that, the ASB director now plays an important role in deciding who will participate in which training. This change has brought about a positive response from the staff who consider and appreciate this change as a fair mechanism. Staff members now consider themselves as having the same opportunities for training and development as their colleagues. Despite this positive development however staff has indicated that there is still room for development. Some staff members indicated they would prefer to see a standardized way of sharing training lessons and experienced amongst colleagues.

Score: From 3 to 4 (improvement)

1.9.1. Incentives: 'Appropriate incentives are in place to sustain staff motivation'

*This is about what makes people want to work here. Incentives could be financial, freedom at work, training opportunities, etc.*

According to staff, the most appreciated incentive that ASB offers is its' family-like working environment. Staff admitted working in ASB feels like being part of a family. They also experienced equality in the working place. Even though nothing changed in terms of remuneration, the increased freedom to manage work independently and the addition of flexible working hours, added to overall staff motivation and stimulated creativity on the job.

core: From 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

1.9.2. Funding sources: 'Funding from multiple sources covering different time periods'

*This is about how diversified the SPOs funding sources are over time, and how the level of funding is changing over time.*

ASB has significant improvement to seek and secure their funding. A change in organizational strategy by developing strategic planning has attracted many new donors to fund their activities. For the last two years ASB has received more variety and continuous funding from HIVOS and TIFA (2013-2014), *Pelayanan Komunikasi Masyarakat* /Community Communication Services (YAKOMA PGI) (2013-2014), *Suara Kita*/Our Voice (2010-2014), and *Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja Indonesia Pusat (PGI Pusat)*/Church World Service (CWS) (2013-2014). Funding from CWS was the result of improved organizational networking capacity in ASB which in turn was recommended by PGI.

Score: From 2 to 3.5 (considerable improvement)

1.9.3. Funding procedures: 'Clear procedures for exploring new funding opportunities'

*This is about whether there are clear procedures for getting new funding and staff are aware of these procedures.*

With assistance from HIVOS, ASB's strategic plan has become a reference to seek new funding opportunities. During each call for proposal, the organization's strategic direction and program focus was discussed at the hand of this document. This assisted ASB in determining whether a proposal or new funding call was in line with their strategic directions, and if it should be accepted or not.

This mechanism has allowed ASB to act more strategically on proposals, initiatives and directions instead of the former responsive attitude. Finally, ASB has also opened themselves up for more information about funding opportunities by increasing their networking and communication activities.

Score: From 2 to 3 (improvement)

**Summary of Capability to Act and to Commit**

Overall, the capability to act and commit considerably improved since the leader of ASB has changed his leadership style from a one man show to a leader who delegates work well. This change occurred after the strategic planning workshop (sponsored by HIVOS) returned a lot of feedback to the organization's leadership. Ever since, delegation of tasks has increased, job descriptions have become clearer, more feedback on staff performance has been given and the overall gap between leadership and staff has decreased. With improved strategic guidance and better articulated strategies also the daily activities are now more in line with the strategies.

More opportunities now exist for the staff to take their own responsibilities and staff experiences more independently in their work, particularly amongst senior staff, and this has improved staff to be motivated in their work. Staff turnover has not changed, even though some staff left, the other staff joined in the organization, other people with appropriate skills for the job have been hired. The skill gap between senior staff and leadership has diminished, which has allowed the director to lead with general strategic directions and technical guidelines as opposed to hands-on control.

After ASB has acquired new donor funds (TIFA) in 2013, new and more staff training opportunities become available. Particularly on the field of media monitoring, advocacy, investigative journalistic and writing skills and general analytical thinking and data analysis with further training is required. Similar training has been conducted in 2011, however some new staffs hired in 2013, has not been participated in these type of training yet.

Score: From 3.0 to 3.8 (improvement)

**Capability to Adapt and to Self Renew**

2.1. M&E application: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess activities, outputs and outcomes'

*This is about what the monitoring and evaluation of the SPO looks at, what type of information they get at and at what level (individual, project, organisational).*

ASB is still applying the same M&E approach it used for the last two years. The monthly meetings that were used to do this have now also been used as an activity planning point, which opens up the possibility to directly apply lessons learned. More frequent meetings in the form of staff meetings and the annual evaluation & planning meetings have enabled ASB to capture more input and optimize M&E. ASB continuously compares the work plans with the results and output of activities. Furthermore staff indicated that stakeholder opinions are now included more frequently in M&E activities. ASB has been applied program monitoring through monthly, semester, and annual program report. There appeared to be some improvement in the M&E process in terms of the systematic recording of results in their program. For the accountability at the end of a program, ASB report the financial audit result to a public accountant.

Score : From 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

2.2. M&E competencies: 'Individual competencies for performing M&E functions are in place'

*This is about whether the SPO has a trained M&E person; whether other staff have basic understanding of M&E; and whether they know what information to collect, how to process the information, how to make use of the information so as to improve activities etc.*

Since the baseline, the responsibility of M&E functions still remains with the director. There is no dedicated person to perform M&E in the organization. Staff indicated that in the last two years at least

two staff members took on this role. One of these included the director, who frequently acts as M&E person due to his M&E experience.

Score : From 2 to 2.5 (slight improvement)

2.3. M&E for future strategies: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess the effects of delivered products and services (outcomes) for future strategies'

*This is about what type of information is used by the SPO to make decisions; whether the information comes from the monitoring and evaluation; and whether M&E info influences strategic planning.*

Description of the endline situation:

ASB's practice to apply M&E for strategic purposes remains the same as during the baseline. Notwithstanding, ASB have no particular M&E staff but ASB has been applied program monitoring through monthly, semester, and annual program report. The evaluation results are used as references for decision making. The annual program evaluation is also used for compiling the strategic planning for the next year. For example, previously monitoring process was done by the staff, but now the media monitoring process involves the beneficiaries. Another example is ASB worked only for case handling but now they also begin to plan the advocacy in the government level.

Score: From 3 to 3 ( no change)

2.4. Critical reflection: 'Management stimulates frequent critical reflection meetings that also deal with learning from mistakes'

*This is about whether staff talk formally about what is happening in their programmes; and, if so, how regular these meetings are; and whether staff are comfortable raising issues that are problematic.*

Staff has indicated that there is sufficient space to discuss problems or issues. Staffs communicates both informally and formally about what is happening in their programs. Moreover, the director encourages staff to attend informal meetings in order to discuss their concerns. Formally, staffs holds biweekly meetings per project on the one hand, and monthly meetings for all staff on the other.

Score: From 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

2.5. Freedom for ideas: 'Staff feel free to come up with ideas for implementation of objectives'

*This is about whether staff feel that ideas they bring for implementation of the programme are welcomed and used.*

The ASB director plays an important role in creating a supportive environment for staff to share their ideas. Improving upon the common practices applied since the baseline, staff stated that their director has readjusted his expectations to the staff's work to be more in line with the challenges faced in the field. Staff also indicated that they felt that their office environment is now more open and accessible to beneficiaries.

Score: From 4 to 4.5 (slight improvement)

2.6. System for tracking environment: 'The organisation has a system for being in touch with general trends and developments in its operating environment'

*This is about whether the SPO knows what is happening in its environment and whether it will affect the organisation.*

ASB uses its network to keep track of its environment. They encourage students at universities to be involved in their programs by providing final year student research opportunities to students who want to graduate on issues relevant to ASB's work. This helps them in staying in touch with state of the art academic developments relating to their work. Furthermore, ASB established the FKK (a Diversity Communication Forum) as part of their networking support. Within this forum they encourage members of their network to assist them by extending their case monitoring in the field.

Score: From 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

2.7. Stakeholder responsiveness: 'The organisation is open and responsive to their stakeholders and the general public'

*This is about what mechanisms the SPO has to get input from its stakeholders, and what they do with that input.*

Stakeholders and beneficiaries are actively involved in ASB's strategic planning development. Since the baseline, ASB has actively expanded their network of partner organizations and beneficiaries. Feedback from the network and beneficiaries are taken into account during program planning and the development of strategic plans. The FKK (Diversity Communication Forum) aids in reaching out to beneficiaries.

Score: From 4 to 4.5 (slight improvement)

**Summary of Capability to Adapt and To Self Renew**

ASB has continued to apply the same M&E approach for the last two years. More frequent meetings in the form of staff meetings and the annual evaluation & planning meetings have enabled ASB to capture more input and optimize M&E. ASB continuously compares the work plans with the results and output of activities. Furthermore staff indicated that stakeholder opinions are now included more frequently in M&E activities. Through regular meetings and annuals reviews a systematic evaluation method is in place which allows for all staff members to provide their input on current projects and general organizational developments. Although the system is in place M&E is still performed by individual staff members, and not a dedicated M&E function. The director continuously plays an important role in this. In terms of the internal culture of critical reflection and sharing of ideas, the atmosphere in ASB is considered to be more open and communication is stimulated. Beneficiaries are able to approach the organization more easily and in general ASB has become more responsive to stakeholders . Overall this capability has improved slightly, mainly due to the greater frequency in meeting and greater role of staff input. Being involved in networks and having students do research at ASB helps them to keep track of what is happening in the environment.

Score: From 3.1 to 3.6 (slight improvement)

**Capability to Deliver Development Objective**

3.1. Clear operational plans: 'Organisation has clear operational plans for carrying out projects which all staff fully understand'

*This is about whether each project has an operational work plan and budget, and whether staff use it in their day-to-day operations.*

The development of ASB's strategic plan has positively affected the operational plans that were already in place. Day to day and operational activities now align better with the organizational strategy. Staff members now have clear guidelines on how to develop their operational plans to the annual work plan. At staff level, the annual work plan has been printed and placed at the board where they used it as reminder between themselves. Additionally, ASB has tried to develop the simple M&E framework to reflect the result chains.

Score: From 3 to 4  improvement)

3.2. Cost-effective resource use: 'Operations are based on cost-effective use of its resources'

*This is about whether the SPO has the resources to do the work, and whether resources are used cost-effectively.*

ASB is still applying their strategy in using their own resources to preserve and avoid unnecessary cost. As noted in the baseline evaluation, ASB has become creative through their concern in spending

funds. ASB also adjusted their operational strategy and organizational decisions to reflect this. In terms of operational strategies, they chose the lowest price and utilized their own property (such as motorbike) in an effort to save on operational costs. ASB will only have to pay the maintenance and gas for the cost incurred for program implementation. ASB also saves costs which are in turn utilized to fund programs which are not directly supported by donors. On the other hand, ASB now carefully selects which staff to be assigned for external or internal events such as seminars or workshops. In addition to that, the cooperation with universities also reduced operational cost due to the use of university locations for venues.

Score: From 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

3.3. Delivering planned outputs: 'Extent to which planned outputs are delivered'

*This is about whether the SPO is able to carry out the operational plans.*

There is a slight improvement in this indicator. ASB delivers planned outputs in a timely manner, even with its limited resources. They are able to carry out their operational plans by involving volunteers and their network. Besides that, ASB has received increased support, not only from their network, but also from getting additional funds from TIFA which enabled more flexibility in implementing their programs. Previously ASB had to get funds before implementing

Score: From 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

3.4. Mechanisms for beneficiary needs: 'The organisation has mechanisms in place to verify that services meet beneficiary needs'

*This is about how the SPO knows that their services are meeting beneficiary needs*

The strategy to establish the FKK (Diversity and Communication Forum) has been proven to be a successful mechanism to meet beneficiary needs. It channels the two way communication between ASB, stakeholders, and beneficiaries to check and balance their support to the community. The forum has also proven to be a good response to the baseline assessment, as it significantly changed their approach in how to work with beneficiaries.

Score: From 4 to 4.5 (slight improvement)

3.5. Monitoring efficiency: 'The organisation monitors its efficiency by linking outputs and related inputs (input-output ratio's)'

*This is about how the SPO knows they are efficient or not in their work.*

ASB always evaluate the progress of each project biweekly and monthly. Beside, the input from stakeholders becomes one of the tools to evaluate their work efficiency. There is no particular monitoring to examine the relation between output (result) and input (fund and time)

Score: From 3 to 3.5 (Slight improvement)

3.6. Balancing quality-efficiency: 'The organisation aims at balancing efficiency requirements with the quality of its work'

*This is about how the SPO ensures quality work with the resources available*

ASB ensures their working quality by examine the achievement of the biweekly work plan and examine their project timeline. Biweekly work plan is derived from monthly work plan while the monthly work plan is derived from the annual work plan. Each project has progress implementation evaluation in biweekly meeting. We can see from the project timeline that there are some works have not conducted yet; such as dissemination through road show for regency and municipality that establishes intolerance and discriminative policies. This work should be done in the first semester of 2014 but has not conducted yet.

Score: From 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

**Summary of Capability to Deliver Development Objective**

The ccapability to deliver on development objectives has slightly improved mainly due to the fact that ASB has more clear operational plans and gives opportunity to the staff to align their activities to their organization's strategic level. Even though ASB has acquired more donor funds, they are more creative in terms of using their resources cost effectively. This care is displayed for instance in how staff is now more carefully selected for attending external or internal events, and also through coordinating events with universities to reduce operational costs for venues. The saved costs are in turn utilized to fund programs which are not directly supported by donors. There is no formal system in place to assess beneficiary needs, but through the established FKK (Diversity and Communication Forum), beneficiary and stakeholder needs could be checked and balanced. Although there is no formal system to compare inputs with outputs but they have regular meetings to help them assessing the work progress as a part of work efficiency assessment.

Score: From 3.3 to 3.9 (slight improvement)

**Capability to Relate**

4.1. Stakeholder engagement in policies and strategies: 'The organisation maintains relations/ collaboration/alliances with its stakeholders for the benefit of the organisation'

*This is about whether the SPO engages external groups in developing their policies and strategies, and how.*

ASB still uses the same method in engaging the beneficiaries and stakeholders to sharpen their strategies. ASB engages external groups in developing their policies and strategies. For the evaluation & planning meeting and strategic planning meeting, ASB invites more various stakeholders, beneficiaries and partners to participate in discussions about the programs. The stakeholders that ASB is involved with are local partners, national organizations and international NGOs, and also specific target groups. Their input influences next years' work plan

Score: From 4 to 4.25 (very slight improvement)

4.2. Engagement in networks: 'Extent to which the organisation has relationships with existing networks/alliances/partnerships'

*This is about what networks/alliances/partnerships the SPO engages with and why; with they are local or international; and what they do together, and how do they do it.*

ASB has intensified its networks locally, nationally and internationally with respect to baseline situation two years ago. ASB has expanded their network with stakeholders such as KIPAS, HKTP (Violence Against wWmen) networks, KBB, ILRC (Indonesia Legal Resource Center), Wahid Institute, AMAN, ILRC, Sejuk (*Serikat Jurnalis Untuk Perdamaian*), YIPC (Young Interfaith Pluralism Community), and media network such as Tribun Medan, Sindo, and Radio Suara Berkah Sidikalang. ASB has also established new partnerships with universities such as USU, UNIMED and IMKRIS. As a result of that, over the last two years ASB has established a support system to promote pluralism and diversity issues among the university students, which has strengthened ASB in their bargaining position within the others network such as university, religious institution, and improve access to the organizations within the network. In addition to that, ASB engagement gained more funding from national networks.

Score: From 4 to 4.75 (improvement)

4.3. Engagement with target groups: 'The organisation performs frequent visits to their target groups/ beneficiaries in their living environment'

*This is about how and when the SPO meets with target groups.*

The establishment of the FKK (Diversity Communication Forum) has strengthened ASB's approach in engaging target groups. FKK has assisted to intensify the communication with target groups and

increase their level of trust. In addition to that, ASB has facilitated the relationship between the victims to become closer.

Score: From 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

4.4. Relationships within organisation: 'Organisational structure and culture facilitates open internal contacts, communication, and decision-making'

*How do staff at the SPO communicate internally? Are people free to talk to whomever they need to talk to? When and at what forum? What are the internal mechanisms for sharing information and building relationships?*

The organizational culture has improved slightly since the baseline. Relationships are considered more open and equal, since director has delegated more tasks and roles and responsibilities are more clear . The staff is free to talk to whomever they want to talk to. Previously, most of the decisions were taken by the director, but currently decisions are made in cooperation with staff members. This occurred for instance in determining the theme for a live talk show on radio.

Score: From 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

**Summary Capability to Relate**

The capability to relate has slightly improved mainly due to having an extended networks on local, national and even in the international level. ASB has also established new partnerships with universities which resulted in the establishment of a support system for the handling of legal cases. Collaboration with universities and being involved in the FKK network has also improved relationships with beneficiaries. In relation to the improved supporting system for handling cases, ASB's bargaining position in the networks has increased, which has led to opportunities for new collaborations and funding. Internally, relationships have improved due to having a director who often invites the staff to have dinner and watching movies after hours.

Score: From 3.6 to 4.1 (slight improvement)

**Capability to Achieve Coherence**

5.1. Revisiting vision, mission: 'Vision, mission and strategies regularly discussed in the organisation'

*This is about whether there is a vision, mission and strategies; how often staff discuss/revise vision, mission and strategies; and who is involved in this.*

The vision and mission of ASB have not changed since the baseline but with the support of HIVOS, ASB has focus more on the pluralism and religion diversity issues and the strategic planning has improved in the organisation over the last two years.

Score : From 4 to 4 (no change)

5.2. Operational guidelines: 'Operational guidelines (technical, admin, HRM) are in place and used and supported by the management'

*This is about whether there are operational guidelines, which operational guidelines exist; and how they are used.*

In February 2014, ASB started to discuss the idea of developing standard operating procedures for all divisions. The discussion was held during the general staff meeting which was attended by all of the board and director. The result in this meeting was only a guideline to develop those SOPs, but, it is uncertain if, when and how the idea will be further developed.

Score: From 2 to 2.5 (slight improvement)

5.3. Alignment with vision, mission: 'Projects, strategies and associated operations are in line with the vision and mission of the organisation'

*This is about whether the operations and strategies are line with the vision/mission of the SPO.*

ASB still operates based on the same vision and mission. They also implement their activities in accordance with their core mandate which aligns program, strategies and implementation on the field. This process has been strengthened with the support from HIVOS to develop a strategic plan and annual work plan.

Score: From 4 to 4 (no change)

5.4. Mutually supportive efforts: 'The portfolio of project (activities) provides opportunities for mutually supportive efforts'

*This is about whether the efforts in one project complement/support efforts in other projects.*

ASB project activities still have the same support to other activities or program implementation and provided opportunity for mutual supportive efforts, for example case handling is supported by the counselling training for staff and beneficiaries (in pluralism victim) therefore the staff can understand the beneficiaries' feeling and know how to respond them.

Score: From 4 to 4 (no change)

**Summary Capability to Achieve Coherence**

Even though there is no formal discussion about vision and mission, ASB still operate based on the same vision and mission. However, with the help of HIVOS , the strategic planning process has taken place, which is also helped develop implementation plans in line with the strategies. Generally, program, strategies and activities are in line with the vision and mission of the organization. Project activities are still complimentary as in the baseline such as program from HIVOS for case handling while program from TIFA for counseling training. Counseling training completed the case handling activities as when handling some cases, it is needed skill to be a good listener or a good counselor.

Score : From 3.5 to 3.6 (very minor improvement)

# Appendix 4 Results - key changes in organisational capacity - general causal map

**Aliansi Sumut Bersatu (ASB) General Causal Map**



**Narrative of Aliansi Sumut Bersatu (ASB) General Causal Map**

The evaluation team carried out an endline assessment at Aliansi Sumut Bersatu (ASB) from 16 July 2014 to 18 July 2014. During this workshop, the team made a recap of key features of the organisation in the baseline in September 2012 (such as vision, mission, strategies, clients, partnerships). This was the basis for discussing changes that had happened to the organisation since the baseline. The three main changes that happened in the organisation since the baseline, as identified by the staff during the endline workshop were:

1. Being more recognized as an organization working on pluralism issues [1].
2. The provision of health insurance (BPJS) linked to investments [2].
3. Increased job security, with through more permanent staff contracts [3]

The first is the most important change in the organization. Each of these changes and how these have come about is explained more in detail below. Numbers in the narrative correspond to numbers in the visual.

4. Both these latter changes were achieved through better staff welfare [8]

**Being more recognized as an organization focusing on pluralism issues [1].**

According to ASB staff present at the end line workshop, the main change that has taken place in the organization since the baseline in 2012 is being more recognized as an organization working on pluralism issues [1]. ASB has become the benchmark for both private and public organizations working in the field of pluralism in North Sumatra. In general it can be concluded that the strategic planning session organized by HIVOS in October 2013 has played an important underlying factor in realizing the abovementioned key change in the organization.

The greater recognition of ASB in terms of pluralism issues was the result of:

1. Improved staff capacity to implement programs [4]
2. Increased trust from stakeholders [5]

Each of these factors is explained below:

First of all improved staff capacity to implement programs came about from five developments, each of which are listed here. First, staff became more confident in implementing program activities [6]. Second, better staff welfare resulted in a more productive and motivated workforce [8]. Third, three new staff members were added to the organization in the fields of advocacy, monitoring and finance that did not yet exist before the baseline in 2012 [9]. Fourth, better office infrastructure allowed staff to work more efficiently [10]. Staff used to work with limited office support facilities, but with the addition of voice recorders, laptops, projectors and a stable internet connection, communication was greatly enhanced. Finally, fifth, an overall increase in program activities increased the speed at which staff learned about program implementation [11]. Each of these areas is further explained below.

Greater confidence amongst staff in implementing their program activities [6] came largely about from a greater number of opportunities for staff to participate in training and capacity building activities [7]. These opportunities were created by the board, who soon came to recognize the (importance of) staff capacity [13] because staff operated with greater autonomy on the one hand [17] whilst communicating results in more frequent internal meetings to discuss issues on the other [18].

Staff was enabled with greater autonomy through more opportunities to manage programs independently [21]. This was the direct result of more and more work being delegated from management to senior and junior staff [24], one of the key decisions that came about in the change in leadership style that occurred [33]

The increase in meeting frequently [18] came about from an overall increase in awareness amongst staff for the need of operational performance [29]. This was carefully communicated by the new leadership in place [33]. The change in leadership style was an important change as a result of the strategic planning session funded by HIVOS in 2013 [38].

The other four factors that affected improved staff capacity (better welfare) [8], new staff additions [9], better office infrastructure [10], and more program activities [11]) all resulted from the addition of funds enabled by acquiring the TIFA foundation as a new sponsor [14]. This was enabled shifting

the policy of single funders to achieve greater diversity of funding sources [19]. ASB was able to shift towards this new paradigm—from single funders to the greater variety of funding sources-- through increased confidence of donors and stakeholders [22], which in turn occurred as a result of three factors:

1. An increased capacity and confidence amongst staff to develop proposals and present these to donors [25] therefore getting in touch with more potential funding candidates;
2. More transparent financial statements and accountable reporting through the website [26];
3. Improved quality of service delivery [27].

The first of these factors resulted from increased awareness amongst the staff regarding operational performance [29]. Simply put, with greater awareness the overall sense for the need to proactively engage with stakeholders came about amongst staff. In addition to this, a clearer programmatic guidance to propose for funding [30] significantly increased both capacity and confidence of staff to propose to donors. The guidance resulted from a strategic planning paper [34] written as a result from the HIVOS funded strategic planning workshop in 2013 [38].

The second factor, greater transparency in financial statements and accounting resulted from an overall improvement in operational financial management [31]. This improvement can be attributed to the BITRA financial management training which was performed in 2011 on the one hand [39], and the review and revision of standard operating procedures on finance sponsored by HIVOS in 2013 on the other [40].

The third factor, improved quality of service delivery resulted from the lower cost to handle case work and an increase in overall efficiency in doing so [32]. The greater support from stakeholders and partner organizations [35] through increased cooperation with religious and faith based leaders [36] was the main reason for this. Overall, this support came about through the increased awareness in partner networks about ASB's ambition to introduce pluralism issues to the public [37], which in turn was identified in the strategic planning workshop in 2013 [38].

Prior to 2012, the network of the organization was limited only to certain religious leaders among which were Protestant and *Parmalim* (local religion) religious leaders. From 2012 onwards, ASB expanded their network to universities *(Universitas Sumatera Utara),* journalists, local NGOs, and religious leaders from other religions such as *Matakin* (local religion), Hindhuism, Bahai, Konghucu, and Advent Protestant. ASB also started working with religious-based organizations such as *Majelis Kelenteng Konghucu Indonesia (MKKI), Majelis Budhayana Indonesia (MBI)* and *Persatuan Hindhu Darma Indonesia).*

All of the above has explained how ASB's improved staff capacity to implement programs has come about [4]. But there is a second factor which has influenced the key change of ASB being recognized as an organization focusing on pluralism issues: the increased trust from stakeholders in ASB [5]. This came about from a wide public acknowledgement of ASB, and what they are doing [12]. On the one hand this occurred through an improved acceptance of ASB by its stakeholders through ASB's improved quality of service delivery [27]. On the other hand, the public itself became more and more aware of ASB and their objectives through the various seminars, workshops and other events organized by the organization [16]. ASB staff members got more and more public interest to attend such events through the increased documentation and publication of their work [20]. This practice was enabled by cooperating with various academics and journalists on publications [23], but largely founded on the increased capacity of the staff members to communicate results [28]. The latter greatly benefited from a writing course sponsored by KIPAS in 2012 [41], and a workshop on investigative journalistic writing sponsored by YAKOMA PGI in 2011 [42].


Since 2013, ASB has maintained an agreement with the local university by providing a scholarship program to college students to write their thesis on pluralism issues. In addition to that, academic publishing and public publishing with the help of university experts has increased. The ties to the academic and media networks have significantly increased the organization's visibility to become the leading organization for pluralism issues.

# Appendix 5 Results - attribution of changes in organisational capacity - detailed causal maps

**Aliansi Sumut Bersatu**

**Narrative Key Outcome C.1.1 Capacity to manage organisation**

Causal map ASB –
C1.1 Improved ability to manage the organization



Note: for each country about 50% of the SPOs has been chosen to be involved in process tracing, which is the main approach chosen to address evaluation question 2. For more information please also see chapter 3 on methodological approach. For each of these SPOs the focus has been on the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew, since these were the most commonly addressed capabilities when planning MFS II supported capacity development interventions for the SPO.

For each of the MFS II supported capacity development interventions -under these two capabilities- an outcome area has been identified, describing a particular change in terms of organizational capacity of the SPO. Process tracing has been carried out for each outcome area. The following outcome areas have been identified under the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew.

In the capability to act and commit the following outcome area has been identified, based on document review and discussions with SPO and CFA: 'improved capacity to manage the organization'.

In the capability to adapt and self-renew the following outcome area has been identified, based on document review and discussions with SPO and CFA: 'improved staff capacity to communicate results on diversity issues'

- Below you will find a description of the 'improved capacity to manage the organization' and how this has come about. According to staff present at the (process tracing) endline Process Tracing Minutes Meeting the improved capacity to manage the organization is mainly due to: Improved senior staff capacity [2] (Annex L, M, R, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting)Better planning, organized and documented work [3] (Annex, D, E, L, M)

Both of these factors are further described explained below. The numbers in the visual correspond with the numbers in the narrative.

**Improved senior staff capacity [1]**
First of all the improved ability to manage the organization came about from an improvement in senior staff's capacity. This was validated by both internal and external stakeholders [1] (Annex D, E, L, M, and Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting). The greater capacity of senior staff resulted from greater opportunity for senior staff to manage the program [4] (Annex A, D, L, M, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting). This in turn came about from an ability to work more independently without having to wait for leadershipinstructions [5] (Annex A, D, L, M, R, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting). The statement was echoed by senior program staff during the end line Process Tracing Minutes Meeting. The Director said that currently they have more opportunity to work independently including making decisions. Further, more staff has been better recognized by the partners of the organization, not only by the Director.

Staff members indicated during the end line Process Tracing Minutes Meeting (Annex D, E, M, L, P, and Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting) that the greater independence in their work resulted from two occurrences: sharing knowledge by leadership with senior staff, and by senior staff with junior staff [7] on the one hand, and clearer job descriptions on the other. The two paragraphs below describe each occurrence.

First of, a of knowledge took place by leadership with staff members [7] (Annex A, L, M, R, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting). This was enabled by the willingness of the organization to expand and improve their organization [20] (Annex A, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting) and more frequent meetings at the organizational level [17] (Annex A, D, L, M, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting). In the baseline, the regular meetings between staff and the Director were conducted monthly, while in the end line, they stated that they have had bi-weekly meetings in addition to monthly meetings.

Both these factors resulted from a change in leadership style[22] (Annex D, E, L, R, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting). Some staff said that previously the Director tended to be "one man show" and did not really provide great autonomy to staff. However, based on the Director's opinion, the narrowed autonomy he provided to staff was by intention. The Director wanted to do stepwise delegation due to the great competency gap among leader, senior and junior staff. The leadership style was significantly changed as a result of the strategic planning supported by HIVOS in

2011 [24] One of the agenda points in the strategic planning Process Tracing Minutes Meeting was to reflect and evaluate the leadership style of the current Director as proposed by the Board of the organization. The Board has advised to the Director to give greater autonomy to the staff (Annex A, B, L, R, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting).

The second development that enabled senior staff to do their work with more indepence was the development of clearer job descriptions for the staff in general [6] (Annex A, D, E, L, M, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting). Previously in ASB, there was a lot of overlap among staff responsibilities [6] (Annex E,M,L,P, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting). One staff member could work on more than one task. The need for a clearer description of work responsibilities for staff members therefore came about for three different reasons. Firstly, staff realized that a better job and task division was required and they realized this during their regular staff meetings [8]. Secondly, there was a new Department for advocacy [10] (Annex A, D, E, L, M, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting).Thirdly, three new staff members were recruited utilizing the newly acquired TIFA budget [11] (Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting).


These last two factors were derived from the new funding obtained from TIFA in 2013. The success to obtain funding from TIFA came about from the result of strategic planning that was used as a tool to propose new funding [13] (Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting, last revision of proposal to TIFA for period of Jan-Dec 2014.doc).

**Better planning, organized and documented work [3]**

The improved capacity to manage the organization was not only due to improved senior staff capacity, but also to better planning, organized and documented work [3] (Annex, D, E, L, M). . Staff stated that this occurred primarily based on the now regular (monthly) development of monthly work plans [12] (Annex L, M, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting), but was also due to having half yearly and annual 'evaluations' [25] (Annex L, M, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting), which specifically supported the documentation of the work being implemented. This monthly meetings, and improved evaluation came about from the having more systematic and well developed annual work plans [14] (Annex E, D, R, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting, program schedule 2013-2014 to HIVOS.doc), which in turn were enabled by a much greater focus on strategic directions and key issues in diversity, pluralism and minorities in North Sumatra [16] (Annex A, B, E, D, R, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting). This more specific focus was formulated in a program, as explained in the strategic proposal 2013-2015. This was based on the logical framework that was developed for HIVOS in 2011 [23](Final log frame revisi.doc), as result of the Strategic Planning Process Tracing Minutes Meeting in 2011, which was focused on developing a work plans until 2015 [24] (Annex A, B, L, R, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting minutes meeting).

**Aliansi Sumut Bersatu**

**Narrative of Key Outcome 3 : Improved capacity to communicate results on diversity issue**



**Aliansi Sumut Bersatu**

**Narrative of Key Outcome 3 : Improved capacity to communicate results on diversity issue**

- ASB is an institution that was founded in 2006 and was officially established in 2009 as association. Initially focused on social pluralism regarding sexual and gender equality issues *Aliansi Sumut Bersatu* (ASB) has broadened its scope of action[22] since 2010. An example of this is ASB's present project: "Civil and Religious Societies' Participation in Promoting Peace and Diversity in North Sumatra". This program, which in the framework of MFSII is co-financed by HIVOS, aims at bringing about religious pluralism in North Sumatra. The end line focused on the following key organizational capacity change or key outcome in the capability to adapt and self-renew: improved capacity to communicate results on diversity issues [4] (Annex A, D, E, L, M). This came out of document review as well as discussion with staff present at the end line workshop (Annex A, B).Improved capacity to communicate is expected to and already affects communication of results, through the following means :
- Dissemination through a road show to five ASB area namely Siantar, Aceh Singkil, Binjai, Langkat, and Medan. These areas were targeted to disseminate the result of ASB regular reporting on pluralism and diversity and discussed what possible action can be done to response the report. These five areas have issued a policy of intolerance and discriminatory [1] (Process Tracing Minutes Meeting.)
- Procurement media campaigns such as: brochures, stickers, calendars and pocket books[2] (Annex D, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting, program schedule 2013-2015 sent to HIVOS.
- Book Distribution Results of Monitoring Results Report [4]. They did the monitoring of diversity issues and collected the monitoring results in the form of books. As part of ASB's advocacy strategy, ASB disseminated diversity information by distributing the monitoring result books. Process Tracing Minutes Meeting)

Staff's capacity to communicate results in diversity issues has improved because of the following four reasons:

- A wider network of stakeholders and partner [5] (Annex A,D,E,M,R, Process Tracing minutes of meeting)
- Improved competencies to communicate issues about diversity [6] (Annex A, L, R, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting)
- Documentation of practices respecting diversity in North Sumatra [7] (Annex A, L, M, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting, program schedule 2013-2015 sent to HIVOS)
- Documenting policies and discrimination [8] (Annex M, L, P, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting, program schedule 2013-2015 sent to HIVOS)

Each of these factors and their underlying logic is explained below.

**Wider network of stakeholders and partners [5]**
*Aliansi Sumut Bersatu* (ASB) has an extensive network including various communities, media, and religious groups. In 2012, ASB expanded their network to academia with various religions such as *Konghucu, Islam, Hindu, Budha, Bahai, Ahmadiyah, Parmalin and Advent*. Previously, these stakeholders have not been part of ASB. In other words, ASB has wider network of stakeholders and partners [5] (Annex A, D, E, M, R, )

This improved network was realized through increased cooperation with academia [9] (Annex L, M, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting) on the one hand, and case collaboration with partners on the other [10] (Annex D, L, M, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting).

Increasing the network with academia was also part of ASB's strategy to improve the institutions' efficiency.To strengthen commitment to pluralism, ASB has expanded networking to local, national and international partner organizations.

[22] Aliansi Sumut Bersatu (2011), ASB Proposal Form to HIVOS

- At the local level these organizations included: Fitria, Human Rights Study Center, Medan University, and Sumatra Utara University (Annex E, M, P, and Process Tracing Minutes Meeting).
- At the national level these included: Setara Institute, Wahid Institute, ILRC (Indonesian Legal Resource Center), SEJUK, Asean Moslem Action Network (AMAN), PGI (Persekutuan Gereja Indonesia – Indonesian Church Community), and YAKOMA (Annex A, D, E, M, P.
- At the international level these included: Amnesty International and CSW (Christian Solidarity Worldwide) (Annex E, M, L, and Process Tracing Minutes Meeting).

Agreements were made in order to establish relationships with universities [14] (Annex D, L, M,R).The relationship was in the form of providing venues to conduct workshops and or seminars related to pluralism issues. One of the program staff said that another reason of the intensified relationships with academia was the provision of scholarships by the organization for university students whose thesis was about pluralism issues [13](Annex L, M, L, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting) which was used as a strategy to disseminate pluralism issues at the university level.

With respect to handling cases, ASB was supported by some networking and partners. Case collaboration has been affected to the escalation of ASB network and partners – i.e, ASB has stronger collaborative work with the National Commission on Violence Against Women (*Komnas Perempuan*) in Jakarta when they handle the cases [10] (Annex D, L, M, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting).

Case collaboration, scholarship initiative, and agreement with university have been influenced by a greater emphasis networking and publicity [16] (Annex B, D). ASB has a strong commitment regarding pluralism issues.

**Improved competencies to communicate issues about diversity [6]**

The fact that staff have improved their competencies to convey diversity issues [6](Annex A, L, R, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting), is the second factor that influenced the improved capacity to communicate results on diversity issues [4] (Annex A, D, E, L, M, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). This improvement can be attributed to three factors. The first factor was an English course funded by MFS II [17] (Annex A, B C) after the partner organization realized that communication needed to be improved. The second factor affecting the improved communication competency was the writing courseconducted by KIPAS in 2012. KIPAS has been ASB's partner since 2009. KIPAS has the same concern as ASB – advocacy strategy through journalism [18] (Annex B, D). The third and last contributing factor was a journalism investigative and writing training which was held by YAKOMA PGI in 2011[19] (Annex B).

**Documentation practices respecting diversity in North Sumatra [7]**

The third factor relating to the improved capacity to communicate results on diversity issues was improved documentation practices regarding diversity in North Sumatra [7] (Annex A, L, M, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting, program schedule 2013-2015 sent to HIVOS). Similarly to the improved competencies to communicate issues about diversity [6] (Annex A, L, R, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting) as described in the previous section, this was the result of the writing course [18] (Annex B, D) andthe investigative journalistic writingtraining [19] (Annex B, Interview questionnaire staff). ASB creates annual reports on media monitoring and documenting cases of intolerance in Aceh and North Sumatra (doc: meeting minutes). The data is used as a reference for media and community and society to reveal the diversity of pluralism in Indonesia.

**Documenting policies and discrimination [8]**

The final factor contributing to the improved capacity to communicate results on diversity issues includes the documenting of policies [8] (Annex B, D).This in turnwas affected by two factors. On the one hand documentation of media monitoring results[11] (Annex E, L, W, program schedule 2013-2015 sent to HIVOS) on the other hand social media monitoring of policies and discrimination against minority religious group[12](Annex L, M, P, Process Tracing Minutes Meeting, program schedule 2013-2015 sent to HIVOS). ASB has staff that is responsible for monitoring intolerance cases through media and social media (Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). Starting from 2011, the ASB published a book as

a result of the monitoring of the media and social media monitoring, and HIVOS supported this publication (Annex E, L,W,program schedule 2013-2015 sent to HIVOS).

Both the documentation of media monitoring results as well as actively monitoring social media for policies came forward from a workshop to analyze media monitoring results funded by HIVOS in 2013[15] (Annex A,B). This workshop on analyzing media monitoring results came about from the first similar workshop came  which was conducted in 2011. This 2011 workshop also funded by HIVOS [20] (Annex A, B).

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen UR
P.O. Box 88
6700 AB Wageningen
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)317 48 68 00
www.wageningenUR.nl/cdi

Report CDI-15-042

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# Endline report – Indonesia, ECPAT MFS II country evaluations

Capacity of Southern Partner Organisations (5C) component

Cecile Kusters[1]
Martijn Wieriks[2]
Bekti Dwi Andari[3]
Novina Suprobo[3]
Widya Priyahita[3]
Rumenta R. Sihombing[3]
Seto W. Rokhmatulloh[3]
Ita Rosita[3]

1 Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR
2 SEPAM Consultants Indonesia
3 SurveyMeter

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen, February 2015

Report CDI-15-041

Kusters, C., Wieriks, M., Dwi Andari, B., Suprobo, N., Priyahita, W., Sihombing, R.R., Rokhmatulloh, S.W., Rosita, I., 2015. *Endline report – Indonesia, ECPAT. MFS II country evaluations; Capacity of Southern Partner Organisations (5C) component.* Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University & Research centre. Report CDI-15-041. Wageningen.

This report presents the findings of the endline of the evaluation of the organisational capacity component of the MFS II country evaluations. The focus of this report is Indonesia, ECPAT. The format is based on the requirements by the synthesis team and NWO/WOTRO. The endline was carried out in 2014. The baseline was carried out in 2012.

Keywords: 5C (five core capabilities); attribution; baseline; causal map; change; CFA (Co-financing Organisation) endline; organisational capacity development; SPO (Southern Partner Organisation).

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# Acknowledgements

We are grateful to all the people that have contributed to this report. We particularly would like to thank the Southern Partner Organisation ECPAT and the Co-Financing Agency Mensen met een Missie for their endless patience and support during this challenging task of collecting the endline data. We hope that this endline report will provide useful insights to ECPAT, Mensen met een Missie, the synthesis team, IOB and NWO/Wotro.

The Indonesia 5C evaluation team

# List of abbreviations and acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| 5 C | Capacity development model which focuses on 5 core capabilities |
| Causal map | Map with cause-effect relationships. See also 'detailed causal map'. |
| Causal mechanisms | The combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome |
| CDI | Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University & Research centre |
| CFAs | Co-Financing Agencies |
| CFO | Co-Financing Organisation |
| CS | Civil Society |
| CSEC | Commercial and Sexual Exploitation of Children |
| Detailed causal map | Also 'model of change'. the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change. In the 5C evaluation identified key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms) are traced through process tracing (for attribution question). |
| ECPAT | 'End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography, and Trafficking of Children for Sexual Purposes'; National Coalition for the Elimination of Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children |
| General causal map | Causal map with key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms), based on SPO perception. |
| IOM | International Organization for Migration |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MFS | Dutch co-financing system |
| MIS | Management Information System |
| MM | Mensen met een Missie |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| OD | Organisational Development |
| PRA | Priority Result Area |
| PME | Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation |
| Process tracing | Theory-based approach to trace causal mechanisms |
| RCT | Randomized Control Trials |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |
| SSI | Semi-structured Interview |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| Wageningen UR | Wageningen University & Research centre |

# 1 Introduction & summary

## 1.1 Purpose and outline of the report

The Netherlands has a long tradition of public support for civil bi-lateral development cooperation, going back to the 1960s. The Co-Financing System (*Medefinancieringsstelsel*, or 'MFS') is its most recent expression. MFS II is the 2011-2015 grant framework for Co-Financing Agencies (CFAs), which is directed at achieving a sustainable reduction in poverty. A total of 20 consortia of Dutch CFAs have been awarded €1.9 billion in MFS II grants by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).

The overall aim of MFS II is to help strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. CFAs receiving MFS II funding work through strategic partnerships with Southern Partner Organisations.

The MFS II framework stipulates that each consortium is required to carry out independent external evaluations to be able to make valid, evaluative statements about the effective use of the available funding. On behalf of Dutch consortia receiving MFS II funding, NWO-WOTRO has issued three calls for proposals. Call deals with joint MFS II evaluations of development interventions at country level. Evaluations must comprise a baseline assessment in 2012 and a follow-up assessment in 2014 and should be arranged according to three categories of priority result areas as defined by MoFA:

Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) & themes;

Capacity development of Southern partner organisations (SPO) (5 c study);

Efforts to strengthen civil society.

This report focuses on the assessment of capacity development of southern partner organisations. This evaluation of the organisational capacity development of the SPOs is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The purpose of this report is to provide endline information on one of the SPOs involved in the evaluation: ECPAT in Indonesia. The baseline report is described in a separate document.

Chapter 2 describes general information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO). Here you can find general information about the SPO, the context in which the SPO operates, contracting details and background to the SPO. In chapter 3 a brief overview of the methodological approach is described. You can find a more detailed description of the methodological approach in appendix 1.Chapter 4 describes the results of the 5c endline study. It provides an overview of capacity development interventions of the SPO that have been supported by MFS II. It also describes what changes in organisational capacity have taken place since the baseline and why (evaluation question is 1 and 4). This is described as a summary of the indicators per capability as well as a general causal map that provides an overview of the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline, as experienced by the SPO. The complete overview of descriptions per indicator, and how these have changed since the baseline is described in appendix 3. The complete visual and narrative for the key organisational capacity changes that have taken place since the baseline according to the SPO staff present at the endline workshop is presented in appendix 4.

For those SPOs involved in process tracing a summary description of the causal maps for the identified organisational capacity changes in the two selected capabilities (capability to act and commit; capability to adapt and self-renew) is provided (evaluation questions 2 and 4). These causal maps

describe the identified key organisational capacity changes that are possibly related to MFS II interventions in these two capabilities, and how these changes have come about. More detailed information can be found in appendix 5.

Chapter 5 presents a discussion on the findings and methodology and a conclusion on the different evaluation questions.

The overall methodology for the endline study of capacity of southern partner organisations is coordinated between the 8 countries: Bangladesh (Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath; INTRAC); DRC (Disaster Studies, Wageningen UR); Ethiopia (CDI, Wageningen UR); India (CDI, Wageningen UR: Indonesia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Liberia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Pakistan (IDS; MetaMeta); (Uganda (ETC). Specific methodological variations to the approach carried out per country where CDI is involved are also described in this document.

This report is sent to the Co-Financing Agency (CFA) and the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO) for correcting factual errors and for final validation of the report.

## 1.2 Brief summary of analysis and findings

Since the baseline, two years ago, ECPAT has seen a slight improvement in the capability to act and commit. The change in leadership style brought about more open communication between staff and management and more room for feedback. Staff turnover remained high, whilst day to day operations were more in line with the strategic plan and supported by new SOPs. ECPAT has very slightly improved in its capability to adapt and self-renew, which was mainly due a clear M&E protocol being in place for 2014 and onwards. ECPAT staff has also developed it's M&E competencies, and is more aware of developments in their environment. A slight improvement occurred in the capability to deliver on development objectives as well: clear operational plans have been developed in the form of an implementation work plan and budget plan to control the execution of activities. Delivering planned outputs has improved as virtually all objectives have been met, particularly in the CSEC case program. The capability to relate improved somewhat as a result of better coordination of with partners and stakeholders. Strong lobby activities ensured strong ties to key government and policy makers. Informal communication amongst the staff is now stronger and helps them connect and discuss programmatic issues. Finally, ECPAT has realised a slight improvement in the capability to achieve coherence through its operational guidelines. In 2013 ECPAT hired a consultant to support them to improve the management system and develop several new sets of standard operating procedures in terms of finance, HR and program procedures.

The evaluators considered it important to also note down the SPO's story in terms of changes in the organisation since the baseline, and this would also provide more information about reasons for change, which were difficult to get for the individual indicators. Also for some issues there may not have been relevant indicators available in the list of core indicators provided by the evaluation team. During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by ECPAT's staff: professionalization of the organization; expansion and sustaining of donors; more effective advocacy; improved staff capacity for CSEC case monitoring.

Professionalization of the organization occurred mainly due to the improvement of ECPAT's financial system and staff management. Both factors can be partially attributed to the development of the secretariat on the one hand, and the development and expansion of program activities on the other. Both these factors can be attributed in part to MFS II funding, whilst funds from the Bodyshop Indonesia were also applied. Improved program management and implementation capacity also led to the professionalization of the organization, and could be attributed to a specific MFS II intervention in the form of a capacity scan carried out by Mensen met een Missie in 2012. In addition the hiring of new manpower of the organization as part of the MFS II funded legal service unit program, has also led to organizational capacity change in the form of improved job descriptions, functioning of the secretariat and ultimately the improved program management and implementation capacity.

The expansion and sustaining of donors can be attributed to the fact that donors credited ECPAT's work more frequently, which significantly raised their profile amongst other potential partners and donors. This was enabled by better program implementation, made possible through the strategic

planning 2011-2014 as well as the staff's capacity improvements to manage programs, their knowledge on CSEC as well as the lobby and negotiation skills. This was in turn enabled by the program becoming more diverse and larger in scale, which was enabled by Mensen met een Missie's support in developing ECPAT's program. The development of ECPAT's program and secretariat were both due MFS II funding and funding from The Bodyshop Indonesia, although not specific MFS II capacity development interventions.

More effective advocacy can be attributed to ECPAT having a better bargaining position in their negotiations with authorities. This came about from the support and recommendations from ECPAT International, the expansion of the national network, as well as more information about the organization and their activities being distributed. This can be attributed to becoming more recognized by various stakeholders in Indonesia after the program has expanded and became more diverse, largely funded with MFS II funds. However, no MFS II funded capacity development interventions were specifically mentioned under this organisational capacity change.

Lastly the improved staff capacity for CSEC monitoring was enabled by an increased ability to conduct written documentation, raising the awareness about CSEC issues, and having a monitoring instrument in place. The former two changes were the result of assisting the reflection process of the law unit service, the latter through a better understanding about monitoring CSEC issues of the program staff. Strengthening the ECPAT monitoring and investigation efforts contributed significantly to this. Both these changes can be attributed to the development of program documentation, as part of the program diversification and expansion funded by MFS II. These are not organisational capacity development interventions, but through staff's experience of being involved in these projects their understanding in conducting investigations, monitoring and reporting on CSEC cases has improved and they have been able to develop a monitoring instrument for CSEC cases. Therefore, their capacity has been built not through specific organisational capacity development interventions but rather through the experience in these 2 projects.

During the process tracing workshop a closer look was taken at detailed information concerning the organizational development changes that have occurred. This was done in order to get a better answer to the second and fourth evaluation questions dealing with the attribution of changes to specific development interventions and their underlying factors. The organizational capacity changes that were focussed on were:

- Improved program management and implementation capacity;
- Improved skill of ECPAT in the investigation, monitoring and reporting of CSEC cases.

According to ECPAT, the improved program management and implementation capacity of ECPAT has resulted in better organizational work performance, increased bargaining power over donors and government and greater recognition of ECPAT as an organization dealing with CSEC issues. The improved program management and implementation capacity can be attributed to the improved functioning (operating) of the secretariat, the availability of human resources to conduct programming, and improved operational management. Whilst none of these capacity changes can be directly attributed to MFS II interventions, the hiring of staff that has occurred, as well as the consultant assessments are results of the funding from programs sponsored by Mensen met een Missie (legal unit service implementation, November 2013).

On the other hand operational management improved due to an improved administration mechanism as regulated in the organization's statutes, as well as due greater financial efficiency. This administrative mechanism was altered due to a revision in the organization's statutes and SOP's, as recommended by the consultant in the March 2013 assessment, as well as the 2012 capacity scan performed by an external consultant hired by MM. Greater financial efficiency could also be attributed to the development of these new SOPs, which regulated stricter financial procedures as well as program and project procedures. More accountable and transparent financial reports allowed for improved financial management as well, which was enabled by the revision of the financial guidelines as recommended by the Indonesian consultant in her assessment. The MFS II funded intervention of hiring another independent consultant to perform a capacity scan in 2012 was part of a greater Mensen met een Missie initiative to scan all their partner organizations in Indonesia. This resulted in a report which laid the foundation for self-inspection of ECPAT, and the series of organizational capacity changes, initiatives and developments that took place.

Improved skill of ECPAT in the investigation, monitoring and reporting of CSEC cases resulted in the successful handling of 10 CSEC victim cases as well as the development of a referral mechanism of CSEC cases for other organizations to use. This skill was improved due to a monitoring instrument for CSEC cases being available, and to program staff having gained better understanding in conducting investigations, monitoring and reporting of CSEC cases in practice. ECPAT's monitoring system can be attributed to the development of program documentation for the justice unit service project. The program was intended to build a model for other organizations to work on similar issues, which was done through the publication of a book and a database on the 10 CSEC cases that were followed and supported. This in turn was enabled by the staff's increased ability to capitalize on learning experiences which can be attributed to the staff's work on the reflection process in the case work to find lessons learned, challenges and develop best practices. This resulted directly from the Legal Unit Service Project supported by MFS II, which was a continuation of the CSEC investigating, Monitoring and Reporting project which took place in 2012.

In conclusion the key organizational capacity of improved skill of ECPAT on CSEC monitoring, investigation and monitoring of CSEC cases can be fully attributed to both MFS II funded intervention programs. These are not organisational capacity development interventions, but through staff's experience of being involved in these projects their understanding in conducting investigations, monitoring and reporting on CSEC cases has improved and they have been able to develop a monitoring instrument for CSEC cases. Therefore, their capacity has been built not through specific organisational capacity development interventions but rather through the experience in these 2 projects.

# 2 General Information about the SPO – Name SPO

## 2.1 General information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO)

| | |
|---|---|
| **Country** | Indonesia |
| **Consortium** | Press Freedom 2.0 |
| **Responsible Dutch NGO** | Mensen met een Missie |
| **Project (if applicable)** | Developing investigation, monitoring and reporting mechanisms for CSEC cases |
| **Southern partner organisation** | ECPAT |

The project/partner is part of the sample for the following evaluation component(s):

| | |
|---|---|
| **Achievement of MDGs and themes** | |
| **Capacity development of Southern partner organisations** | X |
| **Efforts to strengthen civil society** | |

## 2.2 The socio-economic, cultural and political context in which the partner operates

**The socio-economic, cultural and political context in which the partner operates**
Human trafficking is the third biggest crime in the world and believed to produce by the quintillion dollars annually. Related to the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children (CSEC), the fact remains that nearly 80 percent of trafficking in all over the world is for the purpose of sexual exploitation, and an estimated 1.2 million children are trafficked globally for the purpose of sexual exploitation and other purposes each year.

Indonesia is known for being a transition country where mostly women and children are the victims of human trafficking. ECPAT's activities concentrate on trafficking of children and have a strong focus on preventing the sexual exploitation of children. As these activities take place in secret, data on sexual exploitation and trafficking of children is limited. Nevertheless, some research has been done and a few statistics are available. It estimated that, every year, around 100.000 Indonesian women and children are being trafficked, about 30% is below 18 years old. Trafficking of women and girls occurs within and across the borders of Indonesia. The International Organization for Migration (2010) studied and published some figures of the 3,735 cases that were assisted by IOM during the period March 2005 and March 2010. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimated that more than 80 per cent of victims they assisted were cross-border cases, the rest involved internal trafficking. About half worked in domestic servitude outside of Indonesia and 16 per cent was forced into prostitution within Indonesia. Approximately 30 per cent of victims experienced sexual abuse and/or rape.

Most trafficking victims originate from Java, West Kalimantan, Lampung, North Sumatra, Banten, South Sulawesi, West Nusa Tenggara, East Nusa Tenggara and North Sulawesi. Common trafficking destinations are Malaysia, Singapore, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other part of the Middle - East. IOM (2010) reports that especially women and girls trafficked to Malaysia and Japan end-up sex industry. IOM (2010) explains that initially victims are labour migrants employed as domestic workers but are later on sold and forced into prostitution. This displays one of the major problems with labour migration in Indonesia: labour agencies and brokers are not providing transparent information and people are often misled. IOM (2010) states that illegal but also legal recruitment agencies are

misleading women and girls about what type and duration of their employment abroad as well as their salary. Debt bondage is a common problem and used as a means for exploitation.

Also internal trafficking is occurring in Indonesia. IOM (2010) cited two reports that indicate increasing figures on internal trafficking of women and children for sexual exploitation. More particularly, there seems to be a rise in the number of young rural women who are exploited as sex workers in urban areas.

During the past years the Government of Indonesia has developed multiple policies to combat human trafficking. For example, the Government adopted Law no. 21 on the "Eradication of Criminal Act of Trafficking in Persons" in 2007. In 2008 the Ministry for Women's Empowerment provided anti-trafficking outreach education in 33 provinces. And in 2009 they legalized the "National Plan of Action on the Eradication of Trafficking in Persons and Sexual Exploitation of Children 2009 – 2014". In 2011, the Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection launched a program, "Protecting and Empowering Victims of Indonesia (EMPOWER), aimed at improving the capacity of state as well as non-state organizations working in the field of trafficking in West-Java, West Kalimantan and West Nusa Tenggara. Activities within this program are: policy support; training of law enforcement officials, service providers and health workers; equipment grants, coordination meetings and research; victim assistance and community awareness on safe migration and the risks of trafficking; and capacity building for high-risk communities to better prevent human trafficking at the community level. The Indonesian Government also follows international conventions with respect to Human Trafficking and Child Labour such as ILO Conventions 182 on the "Worst Form of Child Labour" in 2000 and the "Protocol to Prevent Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime" in 2009. However enforcement of these laws and convention by the Government of Indonesia can be improved.

As a part of a global network, ECPAT Indonesia is involved in the implementation of various initiatives on key issues at both national and regional level. The involvement of the national coalition is to be followed by the members at provincial level on behalf of the national initiatives. Our commitment is strengthen national actions in the efforts to prevent and eliminate CSEC within the country by building collaboration with crossed-sectoral key stakeholders include civil society actors and broader child rights organizations, academics, professionals, government bodies, private sectors, international agencies and many more. Our presence is to ensure the state community and the government to take serious action addressing this severe crime.

## 2.3 Contracting details

When did cooperation with this partner start: 1st July 2009.

What is the MFS II contracting period: 1-1-2014 to 31-12-2014

Did cooperation with this partner end: Not applicable

If yes, when did it finish: Not applicable

What is the reason for ending the cooperation with this partner: Not applicable

Is there expected cooperation with this partner after 31st of December 2015: Yes.

## 2.4 Background to the Southern Partner Organisation

**History**

ECPAT Indonesia is the National Coalition for the elimination of Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children (CSEC).[1] It was founded when a group of professionals organized a National Consultation Meeting on Fighting CSEC in Jakarta in 2000. This National Consultation resulted in the establishment of the National Coalition for the Elimination of CSEC in Indonesia named ECPAT Indonesia. The objective of this coalition is: "*to eliminate child prostitution, child pornography and child trafficking for sexual purposes and to push community members and government to ensure the fulfillment of children's basic rights and protection from sexual exploitation*".[2]In 2005, the National Coalition was acknowledged as an Affiliate Member Group of the ECPAT International Network.

ECPAT International was founded in 1990 to end child prostitution in relation to travelling in Asia. ECPAT's original name End Child Prostitution in Asian Tourism was changed in 1996 to End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography and the Trafficking of Children for Sexual Purposes, reflecting the organization's geographic expansion and broader mandate. There are now 81 groups in 75 countries in the ECPAT network. The International Secretariat is based in Bangkok, Thailand.[3]

ECPAT Indonesia is a network of 24 members, 20 NGOs in Indonesia and 4 individuals who are working in the field of CSEC. These organizations are spread over 11 provinces in Indonesia: Aceh, North Sumatra, Lampung, Kepulauan Riau, Jakarta, West Java, East Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta, West Kalimantan and West Nusa. The network does not cover all areas where child trafficking takes place because in these areas there is no (trustworthy) NGO working on CSEC.[4]

For more details on the history of ECPAT please see appendix A for the historical time line that was developed during the baseline workshop.

**Vision**

The mission of ECPAT Indonesia since 2000 is the following: *Every child in Indonesia is free and protected from any forms of commercial sexual exploitation and the fulfillment of fundamental rights of the children is guaranteed by the whole elements of the society and government*.[5]

**Mission**

The mission of ECPAT Indonesia from 2000 until 2012 is: Working together for the elimination of child sex trafficking, child prostitution, child pornography, child sex tourism and child marriage and encouraging the state community and the government to ensure the fulfillment of the rights and the protection of the children from all forms of commercial sexual exploitation in Indonesia.[6]

Since 2012 ECPAT Indonesia specifies its mission towards three different target groups, being members, society and government[7]:

- Mission towards members: to build strong commitment and cooperation, adequate capacity and broader network in every effort to combating CSEC [8].
- Mission towards society: to build and raise awareness cares critical value and participation of society at large, children, and young people to work together in combating CSEC[9].
- Mission towards government: to encourage the government to commit and make tangible efforts[10].

[1] Mensen met een Missie (2012) Beoordelingsmemo incl. kenschets ECPAT Indonesia 2012 – 2013 - Onderzoek, monitoren en rapporteren cases m.b.t. seksuele uitbuiting van kinderen
[2] National Coalition for the Elimination of CSEC (2011) Organization Profile
[3] ECPAT International (2012) Website: http://www.ecpat.net/ei/Ecpat_vision.asp
[4] ECPAT Indonesia (2011) Antwoorden op goedkeuringsbrief
[5] Historical Timeline developed by Evaluation Team (2012)
[6] Historical Timeline developed by Evaluation Team (2012)
[7] Historical Timeline developed by Evaluation Team (2012)
[8] Historical Timeline developed by Evaluation Team (2012)
[9] Historical Timeline developed by Evaluation Team (2012)
[10] Historical Timeline developed by Evaluation Team (2012)

**Strategies**

Strategic program of ECPAT Indonesia[11] are trough advocacy, prevention, protection, strengthening the capacity of staff and strengthening Networking and Communications.

**Strategic Direction of 2014-2016[12] :**

1. **To strengthen the provision of legal aid, rehabilitation and psychosocial services for sexually exploited children.**

*Strategy:*

- Cooperating with various law enforcement institutions at national level in Indonesia
- Building the capacity of civil society organizations to enable them to directly provide legal aid for sexually exploited children
- Developing a model for working with sexually exploited children comprehensively
- Building the capacity of local partners to enable them to provide rehabilitation and psychosocial services

*Main Activities:*

- Cooperating with the Supreme Court, Attorney General's Office, the Indonesian Police Headquarters and Indonesian Advocates Association
- Providing direct legal aid or referral services
- Holding various trainings, education and information sharing with partner organizations
- Providing psychosocial and rehabilitation training for sexually exploited children to strengthen them internally and externally

2. **To advocate for policy making and harmonize national laws related to sexual exploitation of children with the Convention on the Rights of the Child**

*Strategy**:***

- Raising the status of the Convention on the Rights of the Child from presidential decree to law
- Encouraging the revision of Law on Child Protection and
- other laws, including local regulations, related to sexual exploitation of children
- Ensuring budget allocation for sexually exploited children in the national and local budgets
- Developing a model for a sustainable advocacy work at provincial and national levels

*Main Activity:*

- Actively participating in efforts to raise the ratification status of the
- CRC from presidential decree to law through public studies and reviews
- Proactively and constructively participating in the formulation of the National Plan of Action for the Elimination of CSEC and in monitoring its implementation

3. **To raise public awareness of the elimination of demands for sexual exploitation of children**

*Strategy*:

- Developing a guide and instrument for the prevention of sexual exploitation of children at sex buyer level
- Building a strategic partnership with a number of tourism and recreation industries to promote the prevention of sexual exploitation of children
- Developing IT-based and conventional strategies to raise public awereness of the issue
- Building IT-based and conventional capacity for child protection
- Improving young people participation in CSEC elimination

*Main activity:*

- Developing a guide and instrument for the prevention of sexual exploitation of children at sex buyer level
- Establishing cooperation with a number of tourism and recreation industries in promoting the prevention of sexual exploitation of children at sex buyer level
- Developing IT-based and conventional strategies to raise public awareness of the issue

[11] http://ecpatindonesia.org/tentang-kami, accessed 18/12/2014
[12] Strategic Directions Ecpat Indonesia 2014-2016

- Building IT-based and conventional capacity for child protection

**4. To encourage the development of a mechanism that is integrated with human rights to improve the implementation of the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography**

*Strategy*:

- Advocating government to immediately implement the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography
- Advocating for policy changes through the writing of an alternative
- report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, especially for cluster 8, by civil society organizations

*Main Activity:*

- Encouraging government to immediately implement the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography
- Writing an alternative report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, especially for cluster 8, by civil society organizations

# 3 Methodological approach and reflection

## 3.1 Overall methodological approach and reflection

This chapter describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

Note: this methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report A detailed overview of the approach is described in appendix 1.

The first (changes in organisational capacity) and the fourth evaluation question are addressed together through:

- **Changes in the 5C indicators since the baseline:** standard indicators have been agreed upon for each of the five capabilities of the five capabilities framework (see appendix 2) and changes between the baseline, and the endline situation have been described. For data collection a mix of data collection methods has been used, including self-assessments by SPO staff; interviews with SPO staff and externals; document review; observation. For data analysis, the Nvivo software program for qualitative data analysis has been used. Final descriptions per indicator and per capability with corresponding scores have been provided.
- **Key organisational capacity changes – 'general causal map':** during the endline workshop a brainstorm has been facilitated to generate the key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO since the baseline, with related underlying causes. For this purpose, a visual as well as a narrative causal map have been described.

In terms of the attribution question (2 and 4), **'process tracing'** is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to

focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

## 3.2 Assessing changes in organisational capacity and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?** And the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This is explained below. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

The evaluators considered it important to also note down a consolidated SPO story and this would also provide more information about what the SPO considered to be important in terms of organisational capacity changes since the baseline and how they perceived these key changes to have come about. Whilst this information has not been validated with sources other than SPO staff, it was considered important to understand how the SPOs has perceived changes in the organisation since the baseline.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information is provided for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the next session on the evaluation question on attribution, as described below and in the appendix 1.

How information was collected and analysed for addressing evaluation question 1 and 4, in terms of description of changes in indicators per capability as well as in terms of the general causal map, based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff, is further described below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012[13].

[13] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1. **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2. **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3. **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4. **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5. **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Please see appendix 1 for a description of the detailed process and steps.

## 3.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity - evaluation question 2 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: **To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?** and the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Below, the selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

### 3.3.1 Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

For the detailed results of this selection, in the four countries that CDI is involved in, please see appendix 1. The following SPOs were selected for process tracing:

- Ethiopia: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE (4/9)
- India: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE, VTRC (5/10)
- Indonesia: ASB, ECPAT, PtPPMA, YPI, YRBI (5/12)
- Liberia: BSC, RHRAP (2/5).

### 3.3.2 Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ' general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop

have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained. More information can be found in Appendix 1.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

### 3.3.3 Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team. These can also be found in appendix 1.

**Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach:** this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

**Using standard indicators and scores**: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

**General causal map:** whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

**Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question:** this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified

organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

**Utilisation of the evaluation**

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

**Design:** mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

**Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication:** many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

**5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process:** The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

# 4 Results

## 4.1 MFS II supported capacity development interventions

Below an overview of the different MFS II supported capacity development interventions of ECPAT that have taken place since 2011 are described. The information is based on the information provided by Mensen met een Missie.

Table 1
*Information about MFS II supported capacity development interventions since baseline*

| Title of the MFS II supported capacity development intervention | Objectives | Activities | Timing and duration | Budget |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MM Capacity Scan by Independent consultant in 2012 | Evaluate the organization's capacity development needs and highlight opportunities for growth | Capacity scan, evaluation report and recommendations for follow-up. Basis for collective as well as individual capacity building trajectories. | July-August 2012 | 2000 Euro |
| Training on law enforcement | Increasing knowledge on the processes of law enforcement | 3 day training and exchanging knowledge | 5-8 Februari 2012 | 6320 Euro |
| Project Cycle Management training | Increase knowledge on project cycle management | One week training on PCM | Late 2014 | 18000 Euro (for all partners in MFSII program – not exclusively ECPAT) |


Source: 5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_CFA perspective_Indonesia_ECPAT

## 4.2 Changes in capacity development and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

Below you can find a description of the changes in each of the five core capabilities. This information is based on the analysis of the information per each of the indicators. This detailed information for each of the indicators describes the current situation, and how and why it has changed since the baseline. See also annex 3.

### 4.2.1 Changes in the five core capabilities

**Capability to act and commit**





After the program manager resigned, the responsibility was taken over by the director who then fulfilled a dual role as both director and program manager, and leadership has been more active, hands-on, inspiring, and engaging since then. This has helped to bridge the large capacity gap between the director and staff, although a gap still remains. Staff has been involved in developing plans and strategic guidance by the director has improved which led to the board to reduce their strategic input. The strategic plan has been developed for the period of 2013-2016, and together with having standard operating procedures in place; this guided the day-to-day implementation of activities. Staff are motivated to work for ECPAT in relation to its work and is due to increased funding staff remuneration has improved which has also contributed to improved staff incentives. This improved funding situation is due to having a strategic plan which attracted more funders.

In terms of staff knowledge and skills, there have been some slight improvements in terms of capacity to implement the program due to the staff's professional skill on legal service, but much of the learning relates to internal sharing and learning on-the-job. In terms of the organizational structure, ECPAT has broadened the organization structure due to new program which obviously needs extra staff. ECPAT recruited some new staff to fill in the position to implement program, but overall there has been a high staff turnover with two people leaving the organisation since 2012 and 8 people joining the organisation and having an increase in staff members from 4 in 2012 to 10 in 2014.

Score: from 3.3 to 3.7 (slightly improved)

**Capability to adapt and self-renew**





M&E in ECPAT has improved mainly in relation to donor requirements and donor support for strengthening M&E capacity. An overall monitoring and evaluation system is lacking in the organisation, although on the whole, monitoring and evaluation has become more systematic. The monitoring and evaluation refers to ME in Pelhuk implementation; the monitoring, investigating, and reporting of CSEC Cases. However, the director also applied day to day web based monitoring. He would provide feedback on the reports written by staff. Monitoring and evaluation is mainly focus on activities and outputs, but not outcomes and impact. Overall ECPAT currently has strong capacity in M&E in 'the form of its leader, but less so in it's' staff members. The skill gap is bridged through close assistance of the leader in day to day activities and hands-on training.

The staff has practiced monitoring in their regular visits or activities and the results are discussed at monthly meeting. They also have simple monitoring tools in place such as child protection cases handling monitoring. The director implemented web based monitoring to ensure the day to day operations and provided feedback on the assignment or work that has been in progress or completed. One of the staff members has good research skills and this assists in scanning the environment for relevant issues.

The organization's internal culture has been described as open and positive, allowing for feedback and input from all levels of staff. Although the role of ECPAT as coalition network manager has diminished, the external connections to stakeholders and beneficiaries has increased over the last two years in the form of the establishment of a new service division on the one hand, and stronger cooperation with government and public agencies as a result of their newly acquired status to function as the official ECPAT Indonesia organization.

Score: from 3.2 to 4.1 (improvement)


**Capability to deliver on development objectives**




Based on the strategic plan and the new standard operating procedures, there are clear work plans and budgets in place. The organization aims to work as cost effectively as possible and efficiency is being measured by having an external finance expert help in the organization and by reviewing progress with plans and budgets regularly. However, there is no clear mechanism in place to balance efficiency with quality of the work. ECPAT verifies whether the organization meets the needs of the beneficiary by direct observation, as well as close collaboration with other organizations. From the coalition manager's point of view, ECPAT Indonesia failed to deliver the expected results, but this did not affect the program and development objectives of ECPAT themselves.

Score: From 3.3 to 3.7 (slight improvement)

**Capability to relate**





ECPAT is very strong in lobbying and has an extensive network with the government and other key players in ECPAT's policy making, planning and implementation. Overall, ECPAT is a reliable, strong partner in the field of combating CSEC, especially through advocacy, lobby and publishing, and remains widely considered as the expert institute on CSEC issues. On the other hand the function of

ECPAT Indonesia as CSEC coalition manager has deteriorated after the leadership change due to a shift in organizational priorities. Coalition members now publicly voice their concern and wonder what added value ECPAT still provides to the coalition as a whole. There was a change in terms of relating to the beneficiaries of ECPAT due to the implementation of *Pelhuk* program. The nature of direct service has made ECPAT possible to engage closely with the dynamic of the beneficiaries. Internally, relationships have improved due to improved leadership and more regular meetings.

Score: from 3.1 to 3.6 (slight improvement)

**Capability to achieve coherence**




ECPAT has consistently adjusted strategic plan and program area with its vision and mission. It was stated clearly in the new strategic program 2014-12016. The new strategic program area has been discussed with the boards member and reflected ECPAT International strategic directions.

The vision, mission and strategies are still yearly review with the support from other stakeholders, especially coalition members. And they program activities are line with the vision and mission of ECPAT, and also mutually supportive.  Since the baseline in 2012, several new standard operating procedures have been put in place with the help of an external consultant. This has supported programme implementation.

Score: from 3.5 to 4 (slightly improvement)

### 4.2.2 General changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO


The evaluation team carried out an end line assessment at ECPAT from 23th to 25th June 2014. During the end line workshop, the team made a recap of key features of the organisation in the baseline in 2012 (such as vision, mission, strategies, clients, partnerships). This was the basis for discussing changes that had happened to the organisation since the baseline.

According to ECPAT staff present at the end line workshop, the key change in ECPAT since the baseline in 2012 was the development of ECPAT into a leading organization on CSEC issues with good management, independent, transparent, accountable, and supportive to its member.

There are four developments that have led to this change:

1. Professionalization of the organization [5]
2. Expansion and sustaining of donors [2]
3. More effective advocacy [3]
4. Improved staff capacity for CSEC case monitoring [4]

Each of these factors will be explained below. The numbers in the narrative correspond to the numbers in the visual.


ECPAT gains stronger image as organization who is committed to CECS Issue [38]
Trust—status acknowledged by donor [28]
Higher bargaining position to get donor funding [17]
Effort to upgrade KONASPESKA status from affiliation to national group of ECPAT International [47]
Requirements of ECPAT International in order to change the status of the organization into a national group [48]
Status changed from affiliation into national group. (March 2012). Koalisi has been officially permitted to use the name of Ecpat Indonesia and the logo [43]
ECPAT management revitalization as national secretariat [39]
Work target fulfilled [29]
More clear Work distribution [30]
Financial information is more accountable and easier to access [31]
Financial Coordination and communication with donor is easier [32]
ECPAT financial system and staff management improved [18]
ECPAT is becoming a more professional organization [5]
Better program implementation [19]
Strategic planning dari 2011- 2014
Information dissemination expanded [20]
Support and recommendation of ECPAT Int to Ecpat Indonesia [21]
National networking expanded [22]
Donor put credits on ECPAT's work [6]
Donor Expanded and sustained [2]
Funding from MM [49]
Funding from Bodyshop [50]
Program development [44]
Secretariat development [45]
Program became more diverse and larger in scale [40]
Staff capacity to manage program improved, knowledge on CSEC inproved, loby and negotiation skill improved [33]
ECPAT gain extensive networking (more recognized by society, law enforcer, NGO, legal officer, Court) [34]
Have a better bargaining position over government and law enforcement officer [7]
More effective advocacy [3]
Staff have a better ability to conduct written documentation [8]
Assist the reflection process of Law unit service by finding lesson learned, challenges, and best practices [23]
program documentation development, especially justice service unit program, from internal orientation to external orientation (as a model for other organization work in the same issue), from technical format to substantive format (from report to a book format) [27]
Strengthen ECPAT monitoring and investigation in CSEC issue [24]
Program staff have a better understanding in conducting CSEC cases monitoring [14]
ECPAT developed consultation and referral mechanism of CSEC cases as model for other organization [12]
Raising awareness to change stakeholder paradigm about CSEC in order to manage CSEC cases effectively [9]
ECPAT have a monitoring instrument of CSEC cases [10]
Improved staff capacity of CSEC case monitoring (Outcome C3) [4]
Better as a leading organization (known as the only representative of ECPAT international on CSEC issues) [1]
Manager program resigned 2013 [51]
Organization condition was unbalanced, missing one important person in running the program [46]
ECPAT function as a coalition hub networking was stagnant [41]
Double tasking by coordinator national [42]
Fundraising function improved [35]
ME function worked [36]
Legal document management :NPWP, certificate from lawyers, Bank account, SOP [37]
Develop organization independent SOP [25]
Legal Status changed from Konaspeska became ecpat – registered at notary [26]
Legal registered of ECPAT as a organization work for CSEC from ministry of law and human rights (2014) [16]
The development of division SOP, more detailed SOP compared to general organization SOP [15]
Stronger organization legal status in national level [13]
Able to propose funding to donor [11]

**Professionalization of the organization [5]**
According to ECPAT staff present at the end line workshop, the organization of ECPAT professionalized over the last two years. Two factors contributed to this.

First, ECPAT's financial system and staff management improved [18]. This occurred due to the successful accomplishing of work targets [29], a better distribution of work activities [30], financial information being more accountable and easier to access [31] and financial coordination and communication with the donor being easier [32]. Each of these developments resulted from the overall revitalization of the ECPAT as the national secretariat [39], through the addition of new personnel, an independent financial mechanism (without ties to the previous PKPA arrangement), and moving in to a new office space. This spurt in development was enabled on the one hand by now being able to handle the name and logo of ECPAT Indonesia [43] by adhering to the strict requirements of ECPAT International and efforts to upgrade the status of *Konaspeska-Koalisi Nasional Penghapusan Eksploitasi Seksual Komersial Anak/*National Coalition on the Elimination of Child Sexual Commercial Exploitation-embrio of ECPAT from affiliate to National group of ECPAT International [48]. On the other hand through the development of the secretariat [45] through funding from two separate sources (The Body Shop [49] and Mensen met een Missie [50]).

Secondly, fundraising efforts finally got rewarded as the system in place started to perform [35] after significant efforts by the national coordinator in a double role, as a director of ECPAT and took over the role of the resigned project manager [42]. The drive for the national coordinator to take on the double role came about from the organization's need for additional key personnel [46] as the program manager resigned in 2013 [51].

**Expansion and sustaining of donors [2]**
The acquisition of new donors and sustaining current donors was greatly supported by the fact that donors started affiliating themselves more with ECPAT's work [6]. They explicitly gave their credits on activities carried out by ECPAT Indonesia, which significantly raised their profile amongst other potential donors in the network. The willingness of donors to do so resulted from the overall higher quality of program implementation [19] that has occurred over the last two years as set out in the strategic planning 2011-2014 [52]. Overall, this quality improvement can be attributed to the improved staff's capacity to manage their programs and their increased CSEC related knowledge as well as lobbying and negotiation skills [33]. The latter was largely a learning effect resulting from a more diverse and larger program and related work activities [40]. Examples of the diversification and expansion of activities include the Justice support service, direct CSEC services in terms of rehabilitation, reintegration and consultation, monitoring and investigating of CSEC cases and the engagement in international activities for instance through the youth partnership project. The expansion in terms of all these program activities was driven by systematic program development [44] enabled by funds from Mensen met een Missie (MM) [49] and The Body Shop [50].

The second factor which has led to expansion and sustaining of donors was the ability to (successfully) propose for funding [11]. In doing so, ECPAT expanded its funding sources to for example Child fund in 2013. This ability came about from two factors. First, the development of clear standard operating procedures (SOPs) for each division[15], based on SPO for the organization as a whole and independent from other organizations [25], allowed for clear guidelines on how to formulate proposals. Secondly, the organizations legal status at the national level became much stronger [13] which made ECPAT Indonesia a more attractive partner for funding. The improvement of legal status was initiated through registering ECPAT with the ministry of law and human rights in 2014 [16]. This was made possible after the official affiliation with ECPAT international was made official in Indonesian law through registration at a notary [26].Both the development of ECPATs own SOP and the registration as a formal and legally accepted institution were made possible by the creation and management of the right set of official documentation [37]. This included the organizations *NPWP* (tax registration number), a certificate from lawyers and a bank account. The preparation of all this legal work was done by the national coordinator in his double role [42], who next to this important role in fundraising [35], also oversaw the function of monitoring and evaluation [36].

**More effective advocacy [3]**
Advocacy efforts by ECPAT increased greatly over the last two years largely due to an improvement in the bargaining position of ECPAT over government and law enforcement authorities [7]. This bargaining position got strengthened for three particular reasons: (a) greater access and dissemination of information [20]; (b) The close involvement of ECPAT International with direct support and advice of ECPAT International [21] and; (c) the expansion of the national network [22]. Each of these factors in turn was developed through the higher quality of connections to key stakeholders in society, NGOs legal and law enforcement authorities as well as the local courts [34]. Access and contacts to these key stakeholders was once again possible through the larger and more diverse program activities that were now carried out [40].

**Improved staff capacity to of CSEC case monitoring [4]**
ECPAT's staff was able to increase its capacity regarding CSEC case monitoring through three specific factors: (a) an increased ability to write documentation on case work [8]; (b) ability to engage stakeholder in the reflection process in order to change stakeholders' paradigm about CSEC [9] and; (c) staff now being able to utilize the ECPAT monitoring instrument for CSEC cases [10]. The first two of these three factors were enabled by increased reflection on working processes within the law service unit by looking at lessons learned, challenges and best practices [23]. The last of the three factors, the utilization of the monitoring instrument, was enabled by the formulation of a clear referral mechanism for CSEC cases as a model for other organizations [12]. This model was developed as a result of the increased understanding of program staff on how to conduct CSEC case monitoring [14] which was enabled by strengthened ECPAT's monitoring and investigation in CSEC issues gained through the implementation of the program [24]. All these previous factors were enabled by a greater effort in program documentation and reporting [27]. ECPAT expanded its reporting from mere technical formats to more substantive forms such as reports or even books for publication. The greater effort required to write these documents formed a clear learning process for all staff involved. This effort once again sprung from the diversification and overall increase of program activities [40].

## 4.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity development - evaluation question 2 and 4

Note: for each country about 50% of the SPOs has been chosen to be involved in process tracing, which is the main approach chosen to address evaluation question 2. For more information please also see chapter 3 on methodological approach. For each of these SPOs the focus has been on the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew, since these were the most commonly addressed capabilities when planning MFS II supported capacity development interventions for the SPO.

For each of the MFS II supported capacity development interventions -under these two capabilities- an outcome area has been identified, describing a particular change in terms of organisational capacity of the SPO. Process tracing has been carried out for each outcome area. In the capability to act and commit the following outcome area has been identified, based on document review and discussions with SPO and CFA: 'improved program management and implementation capacity'. However, this organisational change area was not limited to this capability but also covered other capabilities. This indicates the importance of the interconnectedness of the 5 core capabilities.

In the capability to adapt and self-renew the following outcome area has been identified, based on document review and discussions with SPO and CFA: 'improved skill of ECPAT in the investigation, monitoring and reporting of CSEC'


Table 2

*Information on selected capabilities, outcome areas and MFS II supported capacity development interventions since the baseline*

| Capability | Outcome area | MFS II supported capacity development intervention(2) |
|---|---|---|
| Capability to act and commit | Improved program management and implementation capacity | MM Capacity Scan by Independent consultant in 2012 |
| Capability to adapt and self-renew | Improved skill of ECPAT in the investigation, monitoring and reporting of CSEC cases | n/a |

The next sections will describe the results of process tracing for each of the outcome areas, and will describe to what extent these outcome areas have taken place as a result of MFS II supported capacity development interventions and/or other related factors and actors.

### 4.3.1 Improved program management and implementation capacity




ECPAT International has officially recognized ECPAT Indonesia as part of its organization and network. One of the requirements from ECPAT International was that ECPAT Indonesia carries out programs and activities independently. The organization was forced to take on more responsibilities and to formulate and carry out their own programs to maintain the new status and secure funding. For this purpose, there was a need to strengthen the program management of ECPAT. This is expected to improve program management and implementation capacity [5] (source: *(annex L, annex A, Process*

*tracing minutes meeting)* and herewith overall work performance. This is expected to lead to increased bargaining power with donors *[1] (annex, A, annex D, process tracing minutes meeting)*; increased bargaining power with over government on CSEC advocacy [2] *(annex P, process tracing minutes meeting)*; and being more recognized as an organization on CSEC *issues [3] (annex P, process tracing minutes meeting).*

ECPAT achievement to be an organization with improved program management & implementation capacity was the result of *[6] (source: annex O, annex A, and process tracing minutes meeting)* Improved functioning of the secretariat [7]; more human resources for implementation [16]; and improved operational management [6]. Each of these areas is further discussed below.

**The functioning of the secretariat improved** due to having an improved job description and job distribution between administration and finance [10] *(source: annex o and process tracing minutes meeting).* This was the result of ECPAT starting to separate the financial function and administration function [15] *(source: annex O, annex L)*. There was a clear job distribution and description between finance and administration which has contributed to strengthen administration and made administration function well[15] *(annex O and annex L)* . The other reason for improved functioning of the secretariat is having more human resources available to conduct programming: a secretary, a programme coordinator and a programme assistant [19] (source: annex O, annex P).


The second reason for improved program management and implementation capacity was **the improved Operational management of the organization** [6] (source: annex O, A; workshop minutes meeting) which was the result of improved administration mechanisms [8] (source: annex L; process tracing meeting minutes) and improved financial efficiency [9] (source: annex L; process tracing meeting minutes). In relation to administrative mechanisms [8], all the organizational documents and organization used to follow PKPA mechanisms and management. But as a new organization, ECPAT needed to have their own organizational management mechanism [8]. According to some staff, the organizational development was not funded by MM, however. ECPAT also put some of the budget from MM on the process of organizational development.

The administrative mechanisms have improved due to using the revised organisation statues [12] (source: annex L; process tracing meeting minutes). This was the result of having a revised organization statute document (ART) for the secretariat and Anggaran Dasar (basic regulations of an organization) for ECPAT members [17] *(source: process tracing minutes meeting) .* The Indonesian organisational development consultant [20] (source: annex C&P) assisted in this revision in March 2013. It is unclear who funded this consultant: MM or the Body Shop Indonesia. On the other hand, MM funded their own capacity scan in 2012 performed by another external consultant [21].

The other reason for improved operational management [6] (source: annex O&A; process tracing meeting minutes) was the improved financial efficiency [9] (source: annex L; process tracing meeting minutes) The Financial matters were efficiently applied because there was an improvement on the financial management (11) (source: annex L&P, process tracing meeting minutes). The improved Financial management existed as a result of the development of new SOPs for divisions, such as finance SOP, program SOP, and project SOP) [13] *(source: annex C, annex P)*, and the assistance of the organisational development consultant [20], as well as recommendations made by the MM funded external consultant who did the capacity scan in 2012 [21]. One of the staff said that finance SOP has made them easier to conduct procurement.

Furthermore, financial management improved due to having more accountable and transparent financial reports [14] (source: annex L; process tracing meeting minutes). These financial reports have improved due to the newly developed SOPs [13] (source: annex C&P) and through revised financial guidelines on reporting [18] (source*: process tracing minutes meeting)*. Again here the support of the Indonesian organisational development consultant has helped [20], as well as the MM capacity scan performed in 2012 [21].

### 4.3.2 Improved skill of ECPAT in the investigation, monitoring and reporting of CSEC cases




During 2012-2014, there was an improvement on the ECPAT staff's skill in the investigation, monitoring, and reporting of CSEC cases [3] (Annex L, M, R; Workshop Minutes Meeting). This improvement has helped ECPAT in achieving their target. They succeeded to handle 10 cases as a result of staffs' better understanding and skills during conducting investigation and monitoring of CSEC cases [1] (Annex P, R; Workshop Minutes Meeting). Besides that, it also encouraged ECPAT to generate a model of referral mechanism for CSEC cases for other organization [2] (Annex R; Workshop Minutes Meeting). The referral mechanism for CSEC cases model provided steps, guidance, also strategy to manage CSEC cases. It was expected that other organization can learn, adopt, and adjust the model of CSEC cases handling.

The improved skill of ECPAT staff in investigating, monitoring and reporting of CSEC cases [3], can be attributed on the one hand to the fact that ECPAT now has a monitoring instrument in place for CSEC cases [4] (Annex C, L, R; Workshop Minutes Meeting). The other reason is that program staff gained better understanding in how to, investigate, monitor, and report on CSEC cases [5] (Annex C, L, P, R; Workshop Minutes Meeting). Each of these two reasons is explained in more detail below.

**ECPAT as a monitoring system for CSEC cases [4]**

ECPAT now has a monitoring instrument for CSEC cases [4] (Annex C, L, R; Workshop Minutes Meeting). This is the result of the development of program documentation for the justice unit service [6] (Annex C, L, M, R; Workshop Minutes Meeting). This program was intended to build a model for other organizations to work on the same issues. The form of that documentation is a book containing the details of how ECPAT handled 10 CSEC cases. The book also became a reporting mechanism for cases of CSEC and is available nationally through a database system. This reporting mechanism has changed in terms of being more externally oriented than only internally oriented. This means that ECPAT shared the lesson learned of the CSEC cases handling and provided models for other organization working in CSEC issues Furthermore, the format has changed from being more administrative reporting to being described in the form of a book.

The development of the program documentation was enabled by the fact that ECPAT staff now has a better ability to develop program documentation as the staff were now better able to capitalise on their learning during the justice service project implementation [7] (Annex C, L, P, R; Workshop Minutes Meeting). This learning process occurred amongst staff following an increased focus on the process of reflection on work and challenges, developing lessons learned and best practices. [8] (Annex O, R; Workshop Minutes Meetings). This shift in critical reflection can be attributed to requirements established in the fund received for the development of the legal unit service project [10] (Annex C, L, R, Workshop Minutes).

**Increased staff skill in investigating, monitoring and reporting on CSEC cases [5]**

Program staff now has a better understanding of how to investigate, monitor and report on CSEC cases [5] (Annex C, L, P, R; Workshop Minutes Meeting). This was due to two reasons. Firstly,there was an increased ability of staff to capitalize on project learning [7] [6] (Annex C, L, P, R; Workshop Minutes Meeting), as already disclosed above. Secondly, staff have had the opportunity to handle a greater number of CSEC cases [9] (Annex C, L, M, P, R; Workshop Minutes Meeting; Project Proposal). This is demonstrated by the fact that the staff succeed to reach the target to handle at least 10 cases during the implementation of the project.

The foundation of the positive organizational developments with respect to this key outcome is a series of activities and processes of two projects. First, the fund for the Legal Service Unit Project – commenced in November 2012 [10] (Annex C, L, R; Workshop Minutes Meeting). The Legal Unit Service Project implementation was a new direct service for CSEC cases handling, and this is funded by MM. This project is actually a continuation of the Investigating, Monitoring, and Reporting CSEC Project [11] (Annex C, L, R; Workshop Minutes Meeting, Annual Report 2012), - which was concluded in September 2012. The initiative to develop a model of handling CSEC cases has started during the implementation of that project. So that it has resulted in the development of guideline of CSEC handling cases for the member of ECPAT [2].

# 5 Discussion and conclusion

## 5.1 Methodological issues

**General: Applied to all or most SPOs**

With regard to the methodology, Indonesia has made some data collection adjustment based on the context. The first adjustment was related to the type of instrument used. To assess the organizational capacity, the study has provided self-assessment, observation and interview sheets. These all were used during the baseline with all SPOs. During the end line the team used self-assessment, interview and observation sheets. However the evaluator applied interview sheets as self-assessment—where participants were asked to fill these sheets by themselves. For the participants who did not attend the workshop, the interviews were done separately using the interview sheet and the results from the interview were included in the subgroup interview sheet that was already filled by the staff member. Were combined into the relevant sub categories in the interview sheet. Interview sheets were also applied for interviews with the CFAs, partners and consultants.

The baseline study showed that having two similar instruments (self assessments, and interview sheets) did not have any effect in relation to obtaining adequate and quality data.

To have some clarification post visit to all SPOs, the evaluator used email and phone interviews.

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Prior to the endline workshop, the interview sheets were sent to the SPO. Although it was instructed to be filled in within group, the SPO worked on the interview sheet individually. However, the SPO was able to send back the filled interview sheets prior to the endline workshop. All staff, mostly newly recruited and a representation from management, admin/HR, program, and field staff attended the endline workshop. However, the key persons, - the finance manager and the program manager of Legal service Division- were not available during the process tracing workshop. Therefore, the team conducted phone interviews and email communication with these key persons after the workshop to gain more information and to confirm information from the endline workshopThere was no person with specific M&E role, but this function was attached to the coordinators and director's role. The evaluation team was able to interview 1 partner and 1 consultant of organization capacity development.

The general causal map was developed, which included key organizational capacity changes as from the perspective of the SPO. As ECPAT was one of the selected SPOs for process tracing, a pre workshop activity was conducted to analyze the secondary data and draw initial causal maps for the selected capabilities, and this was used during the endline workshop. The initial process tracing causal map that has been developed prior to the endline workshop, needed to be adjusted based on the new information from the staff involved in the endline workshop. In relation to this process tracing, only 1 staff who attended MFS II funded training is still in the organisation, the others have left. This is a program manager from the legal service division and this person filled the training questionnaire on the Proposal Development, Monitoring and Evaluation training that was held in 2014 and MFS II funded.


Although the endline workshop had been planned carefully, some key persons were absent during the endline process due to personal reasons. Most staff that attended the workshop were new to the organisation and they did not have a complete picture of the initial condition of the organization. In the process tracing workshop, only the director attended as senior staff, and provided most of the information. As a result of the process, the evaluation team needed to verify all the information with key staff of ECPAT such as, the admin staff/secretary, finance manager, and program manager so as to develop the final causal map of ECPAT after the workshop. Another concern about ECPAT was in the analysis process; ECPAT has two different functions as a secretary of the consortium and as organization. As the focus was not clear in the beginning, the workshop and process tracing did not differentiate ECPAT's two functions. As a result, the causal map development put the two functions as

outcome of the organizational capacity changes. However, after reviewing this, it was decided that the analysis should focus on the role of ECPAT as organization not as a consortium. The causal map was adapted accordingly.

## 5.2 Changes in organisational capacity development

This section aims to provide an answer to the first and fourth evaluation questions:

1. *What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?*
4. *What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?*




Whilst changes took place in all of the five core capabilities, over the last two years most improvements for ECPAT took place in the indicators under the capability to adapt and self-renew. Below the changes in each of the capabilities are further explained, by referring to the specific indicators that changed.

The capability to act and commit improved slightly for ECPAT in the last two years. Responsive leadership improved slightly as the overall leadership style within ECPAT has changed from a 'one man show' to a more accommodating and inspiring style. Particularly the supportive style, open communication, as well as the increased clarity in the descriptions of roles and responsibilities was much appreciated. Strategic guidance also improved slightly: a monthly meeting is now organized as to regularly meet staff, discuss issues and evaluate performance which involves all staff members. Staff turnover deteriorated, and overall turnover has remained high, with experienced staff members resigning to seek out better job offers, whilst new inexperienced staff take over and must be hired with the addition of new program activities. Organisational structure improved as with the new direct service program of Pelhuk (Pelayanan Hukum_Legal Service Unit), the organogram has reflected strongly the objectives of the organization to commit more in addressing the CSEC issues. In terms of daily operations, a slight improvement has occurred: ECPAT has implemented its operations in accordance to the strategic plan, which has attracted additional funding for research projects, internships and direct legal services. Strategies have been more articulated due to this strategic plan for 2014-2016 as well, as current strategic planning was formulized based on the consultation with ECPAT's board members and aligned with ECPAT International's strategic directions for the East Asia Region. Daily operations have improved slightly with the introduction of several new standard operating procedures SOPs related to this strategic plan. Overall staff skills improved slightly too, this occurred mainly due to the increase of ECPAT's internal spending on training and development. Incentives for staff members have improved slightly due to a raise in staff benefits and remuneration. New funding sources were found in forms of DH and Child Fund as well as local campaign funds from the Ministry of Education and Culture. Funding procedures have improved as the involvement of staff members has increased in proposal development.

In the capability to adapt and self-renew ECPAT also improved slightly in various indicators. In the application of M&E, ECPAT now has a clear M&E protocol in place for 2014 and onwards as a result of stricter donor requirements on the generation of monitoring and evaluation data. M&E competences increased as well due to the active involvement of the Director to teach and assist his staff members in conducting M&E. The application of these results for future strategies has resulted in an improvement of this indicator. ECPAT also actively gathered data on CSEC cases which were bundled and teaching materials have been developed for new employees, partners and other interest groups. Overall critical reflection improved slightly with as more meetings were created for staff to express themselves. For the same reason, the freedom for staff to express their ideas slightly improved. ECPAT's system to track their environment has improved too. The director actively performs situational analysis and collects details on issues related to the organization and its' activities. He also seeks information through coalition members and from the media. The responsiveness of stakeholders has improved after ECPAT adopted the name ECPAT Indonesia. This change in status associated to the name ("brand") have allowed networking activities to expand.

In terms of the capability to deliver on development objectives, there has been a slight improvement overall. Clear operational plans have been developed in the form of an implementation work plan and budget plan to control the execution of activities. Furthermore clear standard operating procedures have been developed to guide operational work. Delivering planned outputs has improved as virtually all objectives have been met, particularly in the CSEC case program. Beneficiaries have enjoyed ECPAT's improved mechanism to ensure their needs are being met. Close cooperation with beneficiaries at all stages of project execution ensures their continuous involvement, albeit an intensive effort to maintain.

In the capability to relate ECPAT slightly improved its stakeholder engagement by coordinating their work more with government parties, for instance the Pelhuk Program. Similarly other stakeholders such as local enforcement authorities are closely integrated in the handling of case work. ECPAT's engagement in its network is strong through lobbying activities amongst key government and policy making figures. Despite this overall improvement, some coalition members have voiced their concern whether ECPAT can still maintain its role as leader of the coalition given its current priorities. Target groups continue to be engaged through direct services to beneficiaries, and ECPAT expanded these groups to youth clubs and schools to raise awareness to prevent CSEC. Overall relationships within the organisation have improved slightly. Informal communication amongst the staff is now stronger and helps them connect and discuss programmatic issues.

Finally, ECPAT has realised a slight improvement in the capability to achieve coherence through its operational guidelines. In 2013 ECPAT hired a consultant to support them to improve the management system and develop several new sets of standard operating procedures in terms of finance, HR and program procedures.

**General organisational capacity changes related to MFS II Interventions**

The evaluators considered it important to also note down the SPO's story in terms of changes in the organisation since the baseline, and this would also provide more information about reasons for change, which were difficult to get for the individual indicators. Also for some issues there may not have been relevant indicators available in the list of core indicators provide by the evaluation team. Please note that this information is based only on the information provided by ECPAT staff during the endline workshop, but no validation of this information has been done like with the process tracing causal maps. For details in relation to attribution, we refer to the next section (5.3).

During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by ECPAT staff, these have been captured in the general causal map in 4.2.2: professionalization of the organization; expansion and sustaining of donors; more effective advocacy; improved staff capacity for CSEC case monitoring. All of these changes are expected to contribute to ECPAT being better as a leading organization (known as the only representative of ECPAT international on CSEC issues). ECPAT staff experienced these as the most important capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline.

According to SPO staff present at the endline workshop, professionalization of the organization can be attributed to the improvement of ECPAT's financial system and staff management, this occurred through the achieving of work targets, clearer work distribution, more accountable and accessible

financial information and financial coordination and communication with the donor having become easier. Each of these factors in turn were enabled by ECPAT's management revitalization as a national secretariat. This can be attributed to the status change into ECPAT Indonesia on the one hand, and a more diverse and larger scale program on the other. The status change occurred after serious effort was undertaken on ECPAT Indonesia's behalf, and by meeting the requirements of ECPAT International. On the other hand the more diverse programs resulted from the expansion and development of the programs as well as the secretariat. Both of these changes occurred with help of capacity development interventions funded by MFS II by Mensen met een Missie, but were also enabled by some additional funding from the Bodyshop Indonesia.

The expansion and sustaining of donors can be attributed to the fact that donors credited ECPAT's work more frequently, which significantly raised their profile amongst other potential partners and donors. This was enabled by better program implementation, made possible through the strategic planning 2011-2014 as well as the staff's capacity improvements to manage programs, their knowledge on CSEC as well as the lobby and negotiation skills. This was in turn enabled by the program becoming more diverse and larger in scale, which was enabled by Mensen met een Missie's support in developing ECPAT's. On the other hand, a better bargaining position of ECPAT due to a better trust status by the donor allowed it to make it easier to expand and sustain donor support. This trust increase can be attributed to ECPAT's stronger image as an organization who is committed to the CSEC issues, which was enabled by the name and status change of the organization. The last capacity change that can be attributed to the sustaining and expansion of ECPAT's donors is the ability to develop proposals for funding. This was enabled by the development of standard operating procedureson the one hand, and a stronger legal status at the national level on the other hand. Both can be attributed to the management of legal documents to formalize the organization as a legitimate entity under Indonesian law.

More effective advocacy can be attributed to ECPAT having a better bargaining position in their negotiations with authorities. This came about from the support and recommendations from ECPAT International, the expansion of the national network, as well as more information about the organization and their activities being distributed. This can be attributed to becoming more recognized by various stakeholders in Indonesia after the program has expanded and became more diverse, largely funded with MFS II funds.

Lastly the improved staff capacity for CSEC monitoring was enabled by an increased ability to conduct written documentation, raising the awareness about CSEC issues, and having a monitoring instrument in place. The former two changes were the result of assisting the reflection process of the law unit service, the latter through a better understanding about monitoring CSEC issues of the program staff. Strengthening the ECPAT monitoring and investigation efforts contributed significantly to this. Both these changes can be attributed to the development of program documentation, as part of the program diversification and expansion funded by MFS II. The strengthening of ECPAT's monitoring and investigation was enabled by the improvement of the fundraising function, which can be attributed to the double tasking set for the national coordinator who filled in on one of the missing organizational roles after the manager resigned in 2013.

In conclusion, the general organizational capacity changes that were identified as importance by SPO staff during the endline workshop can be partly related to MFS II funded capacity development interventions, particularly in terms of staff capacity for CSEC case monitoring, effective advocacy and professionalization of the organization in terms of better work distribution, more accountable financial information, better program implementation, more detailed SOPs and a better legal foundation of the organization according to the Indonesian law. Funding from other sources (e.g. the Bodyshop) have also enabled some of these changes. Fundraising capacities on the other hand were more the result of internal developments, namely the resignation of the program manager, and the effect of the name change and status associated with the adoption of the ECPAT name. This was not the purpose of this particular exercise. It must be noted that the information provided has not been validated through other sources of information, and therefore the conclusions must be understood in that respect. More detailed information can be found in the next section where selected organisational capacity changes have been thoroughly investigated through process tracing.

## 5.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity development to MFS II

This section aims to provide an answer to the second and fourth evaluation questions:

2. *To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?*
4. *What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?*

To address the question of attribution it was agreed that for all the countries in the 5C study, the focus would be on the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew, with a focus on MFS II supported organisational capacity development interventions that were possibly related to these capabilities. 'Process tracing' was used to get more detailed information about the changes in these capabilities that were possibly related to the specific MFS II capacity development interventions. The organisational capacity changes that were focused on were:

- Improved program management and implementation capacity
- Improved skill of ECPAT in the investigation, monitoring and reporting of CSEC cases

The first organisational capacity change falls under the capability to act and commit. The second falls under the capability to adapt and self-renew. The organisational capacity change areas that were chosen are based on document review as well as discussions with the SPO and CFA. Each of these organisational capacity changes is further discussed below.

*The following issues are discussed for the MFS II funded activities that are related to the above mentioned organisational capacity changes:*

a. Design: the extent to which the MFS II supported capacity development intervention was well-designed. (Key criteria: relevance to the SPO; SMART objectives)
b. Implementation: the extent to which the MFS II supported capacity development was implemented as designed (key criteria: design, according to plans during the baseline);
c. Reaching objectives: the extent to which the MFS II capacity development intervention reached all its objectives (key criteria: immediate and long-term objectives, as formulated during the baseline);
d. The extent to which the observed results are attributable to the identified MFS II supported capacity development intervention (reference made to detailed causal map, based on 'process tracing').

Please note that whilst (d) addresses the evaluation question related to attribution (evaluation question 2), the other three issues (a, b and c) have been added by the synthesis team as additional reporting requirements. This was done when fieldwork for the endline process had already started.

**Improved program management and implementation capacity**

The following MFS II capacity development interventions supported by Mensen met een Missie (MM) were linked to the key organisational capacity change "Improved program management and implementation capacity":

1. MM Capacity Scan by Independent consultant in 2012

In addition to this capacity intervention, human resources were hired through the Mensen met een Missie sponsored projects. The hiring of these people can not be seen as a capacity development intervention, but did contribute to capacity changes in the organization. More on this will be elaborated whilst answering the attribution question.

*MM Capacity scan by independent consultant in 2012*

**Design**
This intervention was planned for all partner organizations of Mensen met een Missie during the baseline in 2012, although the details still had to be specified.

The short term objective of this intervention was that the document would serve as input for all SPO's for reflection. The long term expectation was that based on this document and this self-reflection, decisions would be made in terms of capacity strengthening.

The relevancy for both Mensen met een Missie and ECPAT are clear; as the capacity scan was to act as an evaluation moment for the organization and highlight opportunities for growth. The objectives were not formulated in a SMART way.

**Implementation**
This intervention was planned for during the baseline in 2012, and took place later that year in July-August 2012. As far as the evaluation team knows, it was implemented as designed, however, details about the specific design cannot be provided, since this wasn't the focus of the evaluation.

**Reaching objectives**
Not having objectives formulated makes it difficult to assess this issue. Despite that, the MM funded capacity scan was communicated to the SPO and served as a basis for new capacity development interventions. Amongst others, an additional initiative to hire an Indonesian consultant for an organizational management scan was taken, which resulted in a series of organizational changes related to organizational development.

**Attribution of observed results to MFS II capacity development interventions**
According to ECPAT, the improved program management and implementation capacity of ECPAT has resulted in better organizational work performance, increased bargaining power over donors and government and greater recognition of ECPAT as an organization dealing with CSEC issues. The improved program management and implementation capacity can be attributed to the improved functioning (operating) of the secretariat, the availability of human resources to conduct programming, and improved operational management. Whilst none of these capacity changes can be directly attributed to MFS II interventions, the hiring of staff that has occurred, as well as the consultant assessments are results of the funding from programs sponsored by Mensen met een Missie. How these have contributed to organizational capacity change will be explained in detail below.

The improved functioning and operating of the secretariat was due to improved job descriptions and job distributions between financial and administrative tasks. This in turn could be attributed to the new recruitment of three project staff members; a secretary, program coordinator and program assistant. These new functions were possible due to the recruitment of staff to implement the legal unit service, a program funded by Mensen met een Missie in November 2012. Similarly, the availability of human resources to conduct programming of staff was enabled by the hiring of new staff in light of the MM funded legal unit service project. Although these are not interventions specifically, the hiring of human resources and manpower to work on the MFS II sponsored program for a Legal Unit Service, has contributed a lot to the organizational changes described above.

On the other hand operational management improved due to an improved administration mechanism as regulated in the organization's statutes, as well as due greater financial efficiency. This administrative mechanism was altered due to a revision in the organization's statutes and SOP's, as recommended by the consultant in the March 2013 assessment, as well as the 2012 capacity scan performed by an external consultant hired by MM. Greater financial efficiency could also be attributed to the development of these new SOPs, which regulated stricter financial procedures as well as program and project procedures. More accountable and transparent financial reports allowed for improved financial management as well, which was enabled by the revision of the financial guidelines as recommended by the Indonesian consultant in her assessment. The MFS II funded intervention of hiring another independent consultant to perform a capacity scan in 2012 was part of a greater

Mensen met een Missie initiative to scan all their partner organizations in Indonesia. This resulted in a report which laid the foundation for self-inspection of ECPAT, and the series of organizational capacity changes, initiatives and developments that took place.

In conclusion, the improved program management and implementation capacity observed in ECPAT since the baseline can be attributed to the MFS II funded intervention supported by Mensen met een Missie, in particular the capacity scan performed in July-August 2012. In addition the hiring of new manpower of the organization as part of the MFS II funded legal service unit program, has also lead to organizational ccapacity change in form of improved job descriptions, functioning of the secretariat and ultimately the improved program management and implementation capacity

**Improved skill of ECPAT in the investigation, monitoring and reporting of CSEC cases**
No specific MFS II capacity development interventions supported by Mensen met een Missie (MM) were implemented since the baseline in relation to "Improved skill of ECPAT in the investigation, monitoring and reporting of CSEC" (please also see section 4.3). Instead, the execution of the MFS II funded programs for a legal unit service as well as its preceding program on Investigating, Monitoring and Reporting of CSEC cases, has led to organizational learning which has brought about organizational capacity changes. This will be explained in more detail below

**Attribution of observed results to MFS II capacity development interventions**
Improved skill of ECPAT in the investigation, monitoring and reporting of CSEC cases resulted in the successful handling of 10 CSEC victim cases as well as the development of a referral mechanism of CSEC cases for other organizations to use. This skill was improved due to a monitoring instrument for CSEC cases being available, and to program staff having gained better understanding in conducting investigations, monitoring and reporting of CSEC cases in practice.

ECPAT's monitoring system can be attributed to the development of program documentation for the justice unit service project. The program was intended to build a model for other organizations to work on similar issues which was done through the publication of a book and a database on the 10 CSEC cases that were followed and supported. This in turn was enabled by the staff's increased ability to capitalize on learning experiences which can be attributed to the staff's work on the reflection process in the case work to find lessons learned, challenges and develop best practices. This resulted directly from the Legal Unit Service Project supported by MFS II, which was a continuation of the CSEC investigating, Monitoring and Reporting project which took place in 2012.

On the other hand, better staff understanding on how to conduct investigations as well as monitor and report on CSEC cases was the direct cause of staff being able to handle several CSEC cases, as well as studying these cases closely. This too was enabled by the Legal Unit Service Project.

In conclusion the key organizational capacity of improved skill of ECPAT on CSEC monitoring, investigation and monitoring of CSEC cases can be fully attributed to both MFS II funded intervention programs. These are not organisational capacity development interventions, but through staff's experience of being involved in these projects their understanding in conducting investigations, monitoring and reporting on CSEC cases has improved and they have been able to develop a monitoring instrument for CSEC cases. Therefore, their capacity has been built not through specific organisational capacity development interventions but rather through the experience in these 2 projects.

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Annex 2 - B 5C endline ECPAT - evaluation report complete PRIVATE.pdf
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BAHASA-Annex Q_5c endline observation sheet_Indonesia_Ecpat.doc
BAHASA-Annex M_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_program staff_selected indicators_Indonesia_ECPAT.doc
BAHASA-Annex D_5c endline interview guide_partners_selected indicators_Indonesia_ECPAT.doc
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Annex C_5CBAHASA- endline_support to capacity development sheet_SPO perspective_INDONESIA_ECPAT-1.doc
BAHASA-Annex L_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_management_selected indicators_Indonesia_Ecpat-Deasy.doc
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General Key Changes_ECPAT_22102014.docx
Map of General Key Changes ECPAT_22102014.vsd

# List of Respondents

### People Present at the Workshops

| Date: | 23 Juni 2014 | Organisation: ECPAT Indonesia | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **NAME** | **ROLE IN THE ORGANISATION** | **DURATION OF SERVICE** | **PHONE** | **E-MAIL** |
| *Management* | | | | |
| Ahmad Sofian | National Coordinator | 14 years | 0812 6064 126 | sofianpkpa@yahoo.com |
| Desmarinta | Admin/Finance | 4 year | 0813-1865-2015 | desmarinta@yahoo.com |
| *Program/ Project staff* | | | | |
| Erna | Manajer Divisi pelayanan hukum | 2 years | 0821 1385 0972 | ermelinasingereta@yahoo.com |
| *Admin/ HR/Finance staff* | | | | |
| Fitria Noviana | Secretary and HR | 2 years | (081213672543) | |
| Oviani Fathul Jannah | Receptionist | 7 Month | (085710004423) | |
| Yulitasari | Finance assistance | | | |
| Field staff staff | | | | |
| Rio Hendra | Staf Pelhuk | 2 years | | |
| Abdurrachman Wisnu Mahardi | Program Officer Children & Youth | 1 years | | |
| Rebana Adawiyah | Media Officer & Interpreter | 1 years | | |
| *Others* | | | | |

### List of People Inteviewed

| Date: | 24 Juni 2014 | Organisation: | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **NAME** | **ROLE IN THE ORGANISATION** | **DURATION OF SERVICE** | **PHONE** | **E-MAIL** |
| *Management* | | | | |
| Ahmad Sofian | National Coordinator | 14 years | 0812 6064 126 | sofianpkpa@yahoo.com |
| Desmarinta | Admin/Finance | 4 year | 0813-1865-2015 | desmarinta@yahoo.com |
| | | | | |
| Program/ Project staff | | | | |
| Erna | Manajer Divisi pelayanan hukum | 2 years | | |
| *Admin/ HR/Finance staff* | | | | |
| Fitria Noviana | Secretary and HR | 2 years | (081213672543) | |
| Oviani Fathul Jannah | Receptionist | 7 Month | (085710004423) | |
| Yulitasari | Finance assistance | | | |
| Field staff staff | | | | |
| Rio Hendra | Staf Pelhuk | 2 years | | |
| Abdurrachman Wisnu Mahardi | Program Officer Children & Youth | 1 years | | |
| Rebana Adawiyah | Media Officer & Interpreter | 1 years | | |
| *Others* | | | | |

# Appendix 1 Methodological approach & reflection

## Introduction

This appendix describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around four key evaluation questions:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

Note: the methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report. At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

## Changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 1

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?**

This question was mainly addressed by reviewing changes in 5c indicators, but additionally a 'general causal map' based on the SPO perspective on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline has been developed. Each of these is further explained below. The development of the general causal map is integrated in the steps for the endline workshop, as mentioned below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012.[14] Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1. **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2. **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3. **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4. **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5. **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

[14] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Below each of these steps is further explained.

*Step 1. Provide the **description of indicators** in the relevant formats – CDI team*

- These formats were to be used when collecting data from SPO staff, CFA, partners, and consultants. For each of these respondents different formats have been developed, based on the list of 5C indicators, similar to the procedure that was used during the baseline assessment. The CDI team needed to add the 2012 baseline description of each indicator. The idea was that each respondent would be requested to review each description per indicator, and indicate whether the current situation is different from the baseline situation, how this situation has changed, and what the reasons for the changes in indicators are. At the end of each format, a more general question is added that addresses how the organisation has changed its capacity since the baseline, and what possible reasons for change exist. Please see below the questions asked for each indicator as well as the more general questions at the end of the list of indicators.

General questions about key changes in the capacity of the SPO

*What do you consider to be the key changes in terms of how the organisation/ SPO has developed its capacity since the baseline (2012)?*

*What do you consider to be the main explanatory reasons (interventions, actors or factors) for these changes?*

**List of questions to be asked for each of the 5C indicators** (The entry point is the the description of each indicator as in the 2012 baseline report):

1. *How has the situation of this indicator changed compared to the situation during the baseline in 2012? Please tick one of the following scores:*
   - -2 = Considerable deterioration
   - -1 = A slight deterioration
   - 0 = No change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012
   - +1 = Slight improvement
   - +2 = Considerable improvement
2. *Please describe what exactly has changed since the baseline in 2012*

3. *What interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation in 2012? Please tick and describe what interventions, actors or factors influenced this indicator, and how. You can tick and describe more than one choice.*
   - Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by **SPO**: ..... .
   - Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **Dutch CFA (MFS II funding)**: .... .
   - Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **other funders**: ..... .
   - **Other** interventions, actors or factors: ..... .
   - Don't know.

*Step 2. **Review** the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team*

Before the in-country team and the CDI team started collecting data in the field, it was important that they reviewed the description for each indicator as described in the baseline reports, and also added to the endline formats for review by respondents. These descriptions are based on document review, observation, interviews with SPO staff, CFA staff and external respondents during the baseline. It was important to explain this to respondents before they filled in the formats.

*Step 3. **Send the formats** adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)*

The CDI team was responsible for collecting data from the CFA:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – CFA perspective.

The in-country team was responsible for collecting data from the SPO and from external respondents (except CFA). The following formats were sent before the fieldwork started:

- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – SPO perspective.
- 5C Endline interview guides for externals: partners; OD consultants.

*Step 4. **Collect, upload & code the documents** from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team*

The CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team, collected the following documents from SPOs and CFAs:

- Project documents: project proposal, budget, contract (Note that for some SPOs there is a contract for the full MFS II period 2011-2015; for others there is a yearly or 2-yearly contract. All new contracts since the baseline in 2012 will need to be collected);
- Technical and financial progress reports since the baseline in 2012;.
- Mid-term evaluation reports;
- End of project-evaluation reports (by the SPO itself or by external evaluators);
- Contract intake forms (assessments of the SPO by the CFA) or organisational assessment scans made by the CFA that cover the 2011-2014 period;
- Consultant reports on specific inputs provided to the SPO in terms of organisational capacity development;
- Training reports (for the SPO; for alliance partners, including the SPO);
- Organisational scans/ assessments, carried out by the CFA or by the Alliance Assessments;
- Monitoring protocol reports, especially for the 5C study carried out by the MFS II Alliances;
- Annual progress reports of the CFA and of the Alliance in relation to capacity development of the SPOs in the particular country;
- Specific reports that are related to capacity development of SPOs in a particular country.

The following documents (since the baseline in 2012) were requested from SPO:

- Annual progress reports;
- Annual financial reports and audit reports;
- Organisational structure vision and mission since the baseline in 2012;
- Strategic plans;

- Business plans;
- Project/ programme planning documents;
- Annual work plan and budgets;
- Operational manuals;
- Organisational and policy documents: finance, human resource development, etc.;
- Monitoring and evaluation strategy and implementation plans;
- Evaluation reports;
- Staff training reports;
- Organisational capacity reports from development consultants.

The CDI team will coded these documents in NVivo (qualitative data analysis software program) against the 5C indicators.

*Step 5.* ***Prepare and organise the field visit*** *to the SPO – in-country team*

Meanwhile the in-country team prepared and organised the logistics for the field visit to the SPO:

- **General endline workshop** consisted about one day for the self-assessments (about ½ to ¾ of the day) and brainstorm (about 1 to 2 hours) on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline and underlying interventions, factors and actors ('general causal map'), see also explanation below. This was done with the five categories of key staff: managers; project/ programme staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin & HRM staff; field staff. Note: for SPOs involved in process tracing an additional 1 to 1½ day workshop (managers; program/project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff) was necessary. See also step 7;
- **Interviews with SPO staff** (roughly one day);
- **Interviews with external respondents** such as partners and organisational development consultants depending on their proximity to the SPO. These interviews coulc be scheduled after the endline workshop and interviews with SPO staff.

General causal map

During the 5C endline process, a 'general causal map' has been developed, based on key organisational capacity changes and underlying causes for these changes, as perceived by the SPO. The general causal map describes cause-effect relationships, and is described both as a visual as well as a narrative.

As much as possible the same people that were involved in the baseline were also involved in the endline workshop and interviews.

*Step 6.* ***Interview the CFA*** *– CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for sending the sheets/ formats to the CFA and for doing a follow-up interview on the basis of the information provided so as to clarify or deepen the information provided. This relates to:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet - CFA perspective.

*Step 7.* ***Run the endline workshop*** *with the SPO – in-country team*

This included running the endline workshop, including facilitation of the development of the general causal map, self-assessments, interviews and observations. Particularly for those SPOs that were selected for process tracing all the relevant information needed to be analysed prior to the field visit, so as to develop an initial causal map. Please see Step 6 and also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two).

An endline workshop with the SPO was intended to:

- Explain the purpose of the fieldwork;
- Carry out in the self-assessments by SPO staff subgroups (unless these have already been filled prior to the field visits) - this may take some 3 hours.
- Facilitate a brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012 and underlying interventions, factors and actors.

***Purpose of the fieldwork*:** to collect data that help to provide information on what changes took place in terms of organisational capacity development of the SPO as well as reasons for these changes. The baseline that was carried out in 2012 was to be used as a point of reference.

***Brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes and influencing factors***: a brainstorm was facilitated on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012. In order to kick start the discussion, staff were reminded of the key findings related to the historical time line carried out in the baseline (vision, mission, strategies, funding, staff). This was then used to generate a discussion on key changes that happened in the organisation since the baseline (on cards). Then cards were selected that were related to organisational capacity changes, and organised. Then a 'general causal map' was developed, based on these key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change as experienced by the SPO staff. This was documented as a visual and narrative.This general causal map was to get the story of the SPO on what they perceived as key organisational capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline, in addition to the specific details provided per indicator.

***Self-assessments*:** respondents worked in the respective staff function groups: management; programme/ project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin and HRM staff; field staff. Staff were assisted where necessary so that they could really understand what it was they were being asked to do as well as what the descriptions under each indicator meant.

Note: for those SPOs selected for process tracing an additional endline workshop was held to facilitate the development of detailed causal maps for each of the identified organisational change/ outcome areas that fall under the capability to act and commit, and under the capability to adapt and self-renew, and that are likely related to capacity development interventions by the CFA. See also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two). It was up to the in-country team whether this workshop was held straight after the initial endline workshop or after the workshop and the follow-up interviews. It could also be held as a separate workshop at another time.

*Step 8.* ***Interview SPO staff*** *– in-country team*

After the endline workshop (developing the general causal map and carrying out self-assessments in subgroups), interviews were held with SPO staff (subgroups) to follow up on the information that was provided in the self-assessment sheets, and to interview staff that had not yet provided any information.

*Step 9.* ***Fill-in observation sheets*** *– in-country team*

During the visit at the SPO, the in-country team had to fill in two sheets based on their observation:

- 5C Endline observation sheet;
- 5C Endline observable indicators.

*Step 10.* ***Interview externals*** *– in-country team & CDI team*

The in-country team also needed to interview the partners of the SPO as well as organisational capacity development consultants that have provided support to the SPO. The CDI team interviewed the CFA.

*Step 11.* ***Upload and auto-code all the formats*** *collected by in-country team and CDI team – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for uploading and auto-coding (in Nvivo) of the documents that were collected by the in-country team and by the CDI team.

*Step 12. Provide the **overview of information** per 5C indicator to in-country team – CDI team*

After the analysis in NVivo, the CDI team provided a copy of all the information generated per indicator to the in-country team for initial analysis.

*Step 13. **Analyse the data and develop a draft description** of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team*

The in-country team provided a draft description of the findings per indicator, based on the information generated per indicator. The information generated under the general questions were linked to the general causal map or detailed process tracing related causal map.

*Step 14. **Analyse the data and finalize the description** of the findings per indicator, per capability and general – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for checking the analysis by the in-country team with the Nvivo generated data and to make suggestions for improvement and ask questions for clarification to which the in-country team responded. The CDI team then finalised the analysis and provided final descriptions and scores per indicator and also summarize these per capability and calculated the summary capability scores based on the average of all indicators by capability.

*Step 15. **Analyse the information** in the general causal map –in-country team & CDI team*

The general causal map based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff present at the workshop, was further detailed by in-country team and CDI team, and based on the notes made during the workshop and where necessary additional follow up with the SPO. The visual and narrative was finalized after feedback by the SPO. During analysis of the general causal map relationships with MFS II support for capacity development and other factors and actors were identified. All the information has been reviewed by the SPO and CFA.

## Attributing changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 2

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: ***To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?***

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process. The box below provides some background information on process tracing.

Background information on process tracing

The essence of process tracing research is that scholars want to go beyond merely identifying correlations between independent variables (Xs) and outcomes (Ys). Process tracing in social science is commonly defined by its addition to trace causal mechanisms (Bennett, 2008a, 2008b; Checkle, 2008; George & Bennett, 2005). A causal mechanism can be defined as "a complex system which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts" (Glennan, 1996, p. 52). Process tracing involves "attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable" (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 206-207).

Process tracing can be differentiated into three variants within social science: theory testing, theory building, and explaining outcome process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

- Theory testing process tracing uses a theory from the existing literature and then tests whether evidence shows that each part of hypothesised causal mechanism is present in a given case, enabling within case inferences about whether the mechanism functioned as expected in the case and whether the mechanism as a whole was present. No claims can be made however, about whether the mechanism was the only cause of the outcome.
- Theory building process tracing seeks to build generalizable theoretical explanations from empirical evidence, inferring that a more general causal mechanism exists from the fact of a particular case.
- Finally, explaining outcome process tracing attempts to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific historical case. Here the aim is not to build or test more general theories but to craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case centric than theory oriented.

Explaining outcome process tracing is the most suitable type of process tracing for analysing the causal mechanisms for selected key organisational capacity changes of the SPOs. This type of process tracing can be thought of as a single outcome study defined as seeking the causes of the specific outcome in a single case (Gerring, 2006; in: Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Here the ambition is to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a particular outcome, with sufficiency defined as an explanation that accounts for all of the important aspects of an outcome with no redundant parts being present (Mackie, 1965).

Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research strategy that aims to trace the complex conglomerate of systematic and case specific causal mechanisms that produced the outcome in question. The explanation cannot be detached from the particular case. Explaining outcome process tracing refers to case studies whose primary ambition is to explain particular historical outcomes, although the findings of the case can also speak to other potential cases of the phenomenon. Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research process in which 'theories' are tested to see whether they can provide a minimally sufficient explanation of the outcome. Minimal sufficiency is defined as an explanation that accounts for an outcome, with no redundant parts. In most explaining outcome studies, existing theorisation cannot provide a sufficient explanation, resulting in a second stage in which existing theories are re-conceptualised in light of the evidence gathered in the preceding empirical analysis. The conceptualisation phase in explaining outcome process tracing is therefore an iterative research process, with initial mechanisms re-conceptualised and tested until the result is a theorised mechanism that provides a minimally sufficient explanation of the particular outcome.

Below a description is provided of how SPOs are selected for process tracing, and a description is provided on how this process tracing is to be carried out. Note that this description of process tracing provides not only information on the extent to which the changes in organisational development can be attributed to MFS II (evaluation question 2), but also provides information on other contributing factors and actors (evaluation question 4). Furthermore, it must be noted that the evaluation team has developed an adapted form of 'explaining outcome process tracing', since the data collection and analysis was an iterative process of research so as to establish the most realistic explanation for a particular outcome/ organisational capacity change. Below selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

**Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing**

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on

17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

**ETHIOPIA**

For Ethiopia the capabilities that are mostly targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 1

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Ethiopia*

| Capability to: | AMREF | CARE | ECFA | FSCE | HOA-REC | HUNDEE | NVEA | OSRA | TTCA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Relate | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| Achieve coherence | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Ethiopia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE. In fact, six SPOs would be suitable for process tracing. We just selected the first one per CFA following the criteria of not including more than one SPO per CFA for process tracing

Table 2

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Ethiopia*

| Ethiopia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AMREF | Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | AMREF NL | Yes |
| CARE | Dec 31, 2015 | Partly | Yes | Yes | Yes – slightly | CARE Netherlands | No - not fully matching |
| ECFA | Jan 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Child Helpline International | Yes |
| FSCE | Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN); Note: no info from Defence for Children – ECPAT Netherlands | Yes |
| HOA-REC | Sustainable Energy project (ICCO Alliance): 2014<br>Innovative WASH (WASH Alliance): Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes - slightly | ICCO | No - not fully matching |
| HUNDEE | Dec 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO & IICD | Yes |
| NVEA | Dec 2015 (both) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Edukans Foundation (under two consortia); Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN) | Suitable but SKN already involved for process tracing FSCE |
| OSRA | C4C Alliance project (farmers marketing): December 2014<br>ICCO Alliance project (zero grazing: 2014 (2nd phase) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO & IICD | Suitable but ICCO & IICD already involved for process tracing - HUNDEE |
| TTCA | June 2015 | Partly | Yes | No | Yes | Edukans Foundation | No - not fully matching |

**INDIA**

For India the capability that is mostly targeted by CFAs is the capability to act and commit. The next one in line is the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below in which a higher score means that the specific capability is more intensively targeted.

Table 3

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – India*[15]

| Capability to: | BVHA | COUNT | DRISTI | FFID | Jana Vikas | Samarthak Samiti | SMILE | SDS | VTRC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 5 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 4 |
| Relate | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, India.

Below you can see a table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether SPO and the CFA both expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE and VTRC. Except for SMILE (capability to act and commit only), for the other SPOs the focus for process tracing can be on the capability to act and commit and on the capability to adapt and self-renew.

Table 4

*SPOs selected for process tracing – India*

| India – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BVHA | 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Simavi | Yes; both capabilities |
| COUNT | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Woord en Daad | Yes; both capabilities |
| DRISTI | 31-03-2012 | Yes | Yes | No | no | Hivos | No - closed in 2012 |
| FFID | 30-09-2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |

15 RGVN, NEDSF and Women's Rights Forum (WRF) could not be reached timely during the baseline due to security reasons. WRF could not be reached at all. Therefore these SPOs are not included in Table 1.

| India – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jana Vikas | 2013 | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No - contract is and the by now; not fully matching focus |
| NEDSF | | | | | | | No – delayed baseline |
| RGVN | | | | | | | No - delayed baseline |
| Samarthak Samiti (SDS) | 2013 possibly longer | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Hivos | No - not certain of end date and not fully matching focus |
| Shivi Development Society (SDS) | Dec 2013 intention 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No - not fully matching focus |
| Smile | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Wilde Ganzen | Yes; first capability only |
| VTRC | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Stichting Red een Kind | Yes; both capabilities |

**INDONESIA**

For Indonesia the capabilities that are most frequently targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 5

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Indonesia*

| Capability to: | ASB | Daya kologi | ECPAT | GSS | Lem baga Kita | PT. PPMA | Rifka Annisa | WIIP | Yad upa | Yayasan Kelola | YPI | YRBI |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 4 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 3 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 |
| Relate | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, Indonesia.

The table below describes when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: ASB, ECPAT, PT.PPMA, YPI, YRBI.

Table 6

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Indonesia*

| Indonesia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ASB | February 2012; extension Feb,1, 2013 – June,30, 2016 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Hivos | Yes |
| Dayakologi | 2013; no extension | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No: contract ended early and not matching enough |
| ECPAT | August 2013; Extension Dec 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes, a bit | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | Yes |
| GSS | 31 December 2012; no extension | Yes | Yes | Yes, a bit | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | No: contract ended early |
| Lembaga Kita | 31 December 2012; no extension | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | No - contract ended early |
| PT.PPMA | May 2015 | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | IUCN | Yes, capability to act and commit only |
| Rifka Annisa | Dec, 31 2015 | No | Yes | No | Yes | Rutgers WPF | No - no match between expectations CFA and SPO |
| WIIP | Dec 2015 | Yes | Not MFS II | Yes | Not MFS II | Red Cross | No - Capacity development interventions are not MFS II financed. Only some overhead is MFS II |

| Indonesia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yayasan Kelola | Dec 30, 2013; extension of contract being processed for two years (2014-2015) | Yes | Not really | Yes | Not really | Hivos | No - no specific capacity development interventions planned by Hivos |
| YPI | Dec 31, 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Rutgers WPF | Yes |
| YRBI | Oct, 30, 2013; YRBI end of contract from 31st Oct 2013 to 31st Dec 2013. Contract extension proposal is being proposed to MFS II, no decision yet. | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |
| Yadupa | Under negotiation during baseline; new contract 2013 until now | Yes | Nothing committed | Yes | Nothing committed | IUCN | No, since nothing was committed by CFA |

**LIBERIA**

For Liberia the situation is arbitrary which capabilities are targeted most CFA's. Whilst the capability to act and commit is targeted more often than the other capabilities, this is only so for two of the SPOs. The capability to adapt and self-renew and the capability to relate are almost equally targeted for the five SPOs, be it not intensively. Since the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew are the most targeted capabilities in Ethiopia, India and Indonesia, we choose to focus on these two capabilities for Liberia as well. This would help the synthesis team in the further analysis of these capabilities related to process tracing. See also the table below.

Table 7

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Liberia*

| Capability to: | BSC | DEN-L | NAWOCOL | REFOUND | RHRAP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Relate | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, Liberia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Also, for two of the five SPOs capability to act and commit is targeted more intensively compared to the other capabilities. Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BSC and RHRAP.

Table 8

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Liberia*

| Liberia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BSC | Dec 31, 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | SPARK | Yes |
| DEN-L | 2014 | No | No | Unknown | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| NAWOCOL | 2014 | Yes | No | No | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| REFOUND | At least until 2013 (2015?) | Yes | No | Yes | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| RHRAP | At least until 2013 (2014?) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |

**Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study**

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ' general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

Some definitions of the terminology used for this MFS II 5c evaluation

Based upon the different interpretations and connotations the use of the term causal mechanism we use the following terminology for the remainder of this paper:

- A **detailed causal map** (or **model of change)** = the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change.
- A **causal mechanism** = is the combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 176).
- **Part** or **cause** = one actor with its attributes carrying out activities/ producing outputs that lead to change in other parts. The final part or cause is the change/ outcome.
- **Attributes of the actor** = specificities of the actor that increase his chance to introduce change or not such as its position in its institutional environment.

*Step 1. Identify the **planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

Chapter 4.1 and 4.2 in the baseline report were reviewed. Capacity development interventions as planned by the CFA for the capability to act and commit and for the capability to adapt and self-renew were described and details inserted in the summary format. This provided an overview of the capacity development activities that were originally planned by the CFA for these two capabilities and assisted in focusing on relevant outcomes that are possibly related to the planned interventions.

*Step 2. Identify the **implemented capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

The input from the CFA was reviewed in terms of what capacity development interventions have taken place in the MFS II period. This information was be found in the 'Support to capacity development sheet - endline - CFA perspective' for the SPO, based on details provided by the CFA and further discussed during an interview by the CDI team.

The CFA was asked to describe all the MFS II supported capacity development interventions of the SPO that took place during the period 2011 up to now. The CDI team reviewed this information, not only the interventions but also the observed changes as well as the expected long-term changes, and

then linked these interventions to relevant outcomes in one of the capabilities (capability to act and commit; and capability to adapt and self-renew).

*Step 3. Identify **initial changes/ outcome areas** in these two capabilities – by CDI team & in-country team*

The CDI team was responsible for **coding** documents received from SPO and CFA in NVivo on the following:

- **5C Indicators**: this was to identify the changes that took place between baseline and endline. This information was coded in Nvivo.
- Information related to the **capacity development interventions implemented by the CFA** (with MFS II funding) (see also Step 2) to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. For example, the training on financial management of the SPO staff could be related to any information on financial management of the SPO. This information was coded in Nvivo.

In addition, the response by the CFA to the changes in 5C indicators format, was auto-coded.

The in-country team was responsible for timely collection of information from the SPO (before the fieldwork starts). This set of information dealt with:

- MFS II supported capacity development interventions during the MFS II period (2011 until now).
- Overview of all trainings provided in relation to a particular outcome areas/organisational capacity change since the baseline.
- For each of the identified MFS II supported trainings, training questionnaires have been developed to assess these trainings in terms of the participants, interests, knowledge and skills gained, behaviour change and changes in the organisation (based on Kirkpatrick's model), one format for training participants and one for their managers. These training questionnaires were sent prior to the field visit.
- Changes expected by SPO on a long-term basis ('Support to capacity development sheet - endline - SPO perspective').

For the selection of change/ outcome areas the following criteria were important:

- The change/ outcome area is in one of the two capabilities selected for process tracing: capability to act and commit or the capability to adapt and self-renew. This was the first criteria to select upon.
- There was a likely link between the key organisational capacity change/ outcome area and the MFS II supported capacity development interventions. This also was an important criteria. This would need to be demonstrated through one or more of the following situations:
  - In the 2012 **theory of change** on organisational capacity development of the SPO a link was indicated between the outcome area and MFS II support;
  - During the baseline the CFA indicated a link between **the planned MFS II support** to organisational development and the expected short-term or long-term results in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the **CFA** indicated a link between **the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions** and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the **SPO** indicated a link between **the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions** and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities.

Reviewing the information obtained as described in Step 1, 2, and 3 provided the basis for selecting key organisational capacity change/ outcome areas to focus on for process tracing. These areas were to be formulated as broader outcome areas, such as 'improved financial management', 'improved monitoring and evaluation' or 'improved staff competencies'.

Note: the outcome areas were to be formulated as intermediates changes. For example: an improved monitoring and evaluation system, or enhanced knowledge and skills to educate the target group on

climate change. Key outcome areas were also verified - based on document review as well as discussions with the SPO during the endline.

*Step 4. Construct the **detailed, initial causal map** (theoretical model of change) – CDI & in-country team*

A detailed initial causal map was developed by the CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team. This was based on document review, including information provided by the CFA and SPO on MFS II supported capacity development interventions and their immediate and long-term objectives as well as observed changes. Also, the training questionnaires were reviewed before developing the initial causal map. This detailed initial causal map was to be provided by the CDI team with a visual and related narrative with related references. This initial causal map served as a reference point for further reflection with the SPO during the process tracing endline workshop, where relationships needed to be verified or new relationships established so that the second (workshop-based), detailed causal map could be developed, after which further verification was needed to come up with the final, concluding detailed causal map.

It's important to note that organisational change area/ outcome areas could be both positive and negative.

For each of the selected outcomes the team needed to make explicit the theoretical model of change. This meant finding out about the range of different actors, factors, actions, and events etc. that have contributed to a particular outcome in terms of organisational capacity of the SPO.

A model of change of good quality includes:

- The causal pathways that relate the intervention to the realised change/ outcome;
- Rival explanations for the same change/ outcome;
- Assumptions that clarify relations between different components or parts;
- Case specific and/or context specific factors or risks that might influence the causal pathway, such as for instance the socio-cultural-economic context, or a natural disaster;
- Specific attributes of the actors e.g. CFA and other funders.

A model of change (within the 5C study called a 'detailed causal map') is a complex system which produces intermediate and long-term outcomes by the interaction of other parts. It consists of parts or causes that often consist of one actor with its attributes that is implementing activities leading to change in other parts (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). A helpful way of constructing the model of change is to think in terms of actors carrying out activities that lead to other actors changing their behaviour. The model of change can be explained as a range of activities carried out by different *actors* (including the CFA and SPO under evaluation) that will ultimately lead to an outcome. Besides this, there are also '*structural*' elements, which are to be interpreted as external factors (such as economic conjuncture); and *attributes* of the actor (does the actor have the legitimacy to ask for change or not, what is its position in the sector) that should be looked at (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). In fact Beach and Pedersen, make a fine point about the subjectivity of the actor in a dynamic context. This means, in qualitative methodologies, capturing the changes in the actor, acted upon area or person/organisation, in a non sequential and non temporal format. Things which were done recently could have corrected behavioural outcomes of an organisation and at the same ime there could be processes which incrementally pushed for the same change over a period of time. Beach and Pedersen espouse this methodology because it captures change in a dynamic fashion as against the methodology of logical framework. For the MFS II evaluation it was important to make a distinction between those paths in the model of change that are the result of MFS II and rival pathways.
The construction of the model of change started with the identified key organisational capacity change/ outcome, followed by an inventory of all possible subcomponents that possibly have caused the change/ outcome in the MFS II period (2011-up to now, or since the baseline). The figure below presents an imaginary example of a model of change. The different colours indicate the different types of support to capacity development of the SPO by different actors, thereby indicating different pathways of change, leading to the key changes/ outcomes in terms of capacity development (which in this case indicates the ability to adapt and self-renew).





***Figure 1*** *An imaginary example of a model of change*

*Step 5. Identify* ***types of evidence*** *needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams with support from CDI team*

Once the causal mechanism at theoretical level were defined, empirical evidence was collected so as to verify or discard the different parts of this theoretical model of change, confirm or reject whether subcomponents have taken place, and to find evidence that confirm or reject the causal relations between the subcomponents.

A key question that we needed to ask ourselves was, *"What information do we need in order to confirm or reject that one subcomponent leads to another, that X causes Y?"*. The evaluation team needed to agree on what information was needed that provides empirical manifestations for each part of the model of change.

There are four distinguishable types of evidence that are relevant in process tracing analysis: *pattern, sequence, trace, and account*. Please see the box below for descriptions of these types of evidence.

The evaluation team needed to agree on the types of evidence that was needed to verify or discard the manifestation of a particular part of the causal mechanism. Each one or a combination of these different types of evidence could be used to confirm or reject the different parts of the model of change. This is what is meant by robustness of evidence gathering. Since causality as a concept can bend in many ways, our methodology, provides a near scientific model for accepting and rejecting a particular type of evidence, ignoring its face value.

Types of evidence to be used in process tracing

- **Pattern evidence** relates to predictions of statistical patterns in the evidence. For example, in testing a mechanism of racial discrimination in a case dealing with employment, statistical patterns of employment would be relevant for testing this part of the mechanism.
- **Sequence evidence** deals with the temporal and spatial chronology of events predicted by a hypothesised causal mechanism. For example, a test of the hypothesis could involve expectations of the timing of events where we might predict that if the hypothesis is valid, we should see that the event B took place after event A took place. However, if we found that event B took place before event A took place, the test would suggest that our confidence in the validity of this part of the mechanism should be reduced (disconfirmation/ falsification).
- **Trace evidence** is evidence whose mere existence provides proof that a part of a hypothesised mechanism exists. For example, the existence of the minutes of a meeting, if authentic ones, provide strong proof that the meeting took place.
- **Account evidence** deals with the content of empirical material, such as meeting minutes that detail what was discussed or an oral account of what took place in the meeting.

*Source*: Beach and Pedersen, 2013

Below you can find a table that provides guidelines on what to look for when identifying types of evidence that can confirm or reject causal relationships between different parts/ subcomponents of the model of change. It also provides one example of a part of a causal pathway and what type of information to look for.

Table 9

*Format for identifying types of evidence for different causal relationships in the model of change (example included)*

| Part of the model of change | Key questions | Type of evidence needed | Source of information |
|---|---|---|---|
| Describe relationship between the subcomponents of the model of change | Describe questions you would like to answer a so as to find out whether the components in the relationship took place, when they took place, who was involved, and whether they are related | Describe the information that we need in order to answer these questions.<br>Which type of evidence can we use in order to reject or confirm that subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y?<br>Can we find this information by means of :<br>Pattern evidence;<br>Sequence evidence;<br>Trace evidence;<br>Account evidence? | Describe where you can find this information |
| Example:<br>Training workshops on M&E provided by MFS II funding and other sources of funding | Example:<br>What type of training workshops on M&E took place?<br>Who was trained?<br>When did the training take place?<br>Who funded the training?<br>Was the funding of training provided before the training took place?<br>How much money was available for the training? | Example:<br>Trace evidence: on types of training delivered, who was trained, when the training took place, budget for the training<br><br>Sequence evidence on timing of funding and timing of training<br><br>Content evidence: what the training was about | Example:<br>Training report<br>SPO Progress reports<br>interviews with the CFA and SPO staff<br>Financial reports SPO and CFA |

Please note that for practical reasons, the 5C evaluation team decided that it was easier to integrate the specific questions in the narrative of the initial causal map. These questions would need to be addressed by the in country team during the process tracing workshop so as to discover, verify or

discard particular causal mechanisms in the detailed, initial causal map. Different types of evidence was asked for in these questions.

*Step 6. **Collect data** to verify or discard causal mechanisms and develop workshop-based, detailed causal map – in-country team*

Once it was decided by the in-country and CDI evaluation teams what information was to be collected during the interaction with the SPO, data collection took place. The initial causal maps served as a basis for discussions during the endline workshop with a particular focus on process tracing for the identified organisational capacity changes. But it was considered to be very important to understand from the perspective of the SPO how they understood the identified key organisational capacity change/outcome area has come about. A new detailed, workshop-based causal map was developed that included the information provided by SPO staff as well as based on initial document review as described in the initial detailed causal map. This information was further analysed and verified with other relevant information so as to develop a final causal map, which is described in the next step.

*Step 7. **Assess the quality** of data and **analyse data**, and develop the **final detailed causal map** (model of change) – in-country team and CDI team*

Quality assurance of the data collected and the evidence it provides for rejecting or confirming parts of causal explanations are a major concern for many authors specialised in contribution analysis and process-tracing. Stern et al. (2012), Beach and Pedersen (2013), Lemire, Nielsen and Dybdal (2012), Mayne (2012) and Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) all emphasise the need to make attribution/ contribution claims that are based on pieces of evidence that are rigorous, traceable, and credible. These pieces of evidence should be as explicit as possible in proving that *subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y* and ruling out other explanations. Several tools are proposed to check the nature and the quality of data needed. One option is, Delahais and Toulemonde's Evidence Analysis Database, which we have adapted for our purpose.

Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) propose an Evidence Analysis Database that takes into consideration three criteria:

- Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no);
- Type of causal mechanism: intended contribution/ other contribution/ condition leading to intended contribution/ intended condition to other contribution/ feedback loop;
- Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak.

We have adapted their criteria to our purpose. The in-country team, in collaboration with the CDI team, used the criteria in assessing whether causal relationships in the causal map, were strong enough. This has been more of an iterative process trying to find additional evidence for the established relationships through additional document review or contacting the CFA and SPO as well as getting their feedback on the final detailed causal map that was established. Whilst the form below has not been used exactly in the manner depicted, it has been used indirectly when trying to validate the information in the detailed causal map. After that, the final detailed causal map is established both as a visual as well as a narrative, with related references for the established causal relations.

| *Example format for the adapted evidence analysis database (example included)* **Description of causal relation** | **Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no)** | **Type of information providing the background to the confirmation or rejection of the causal relation** | **Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak** | **Explanation for why the evidence is (rather) strong or (rather) weak, and therefore the causal relation is confirmed/ rejected** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| e.g. Training staff in M&E leads to enhanced M&E knowledge, skills and practice | e.g. Confirmed | e.g. Training reports confirmed that staff are trained in M&E and that knowledge and skills increased as a result of the training | | |

*Step 8.* ***Analyse and conclude*** *on findings– in-country team and CDI team*

The final detailed causal map was described as a visual and narrative and this was then analysed in terms of the evaluation question two and evaluation question four: *"To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?"* and *"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"* It was analysed to what extent the identified key organisational capacity change can be attributed to MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as to other related factors, interventions and actors.

## Explaining factors – evaluation question 4

This paragraph describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This has been explained in the first section of this appendix. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information was procured for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the process of process tracing as described in the section above.

Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team.

**Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach:** this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

**Using standard indicators and scores**: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes

comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

**General causal map:** whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

**Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question:** this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

**Utilisation of the evaluation**

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

**Design** – mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

**Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication:** many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

**5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process:** The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and

SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

# Appendix 2 Background information on the five core capabilities framework

The 5 capabilities (5C) framework was to be used as a framework for the evaluation of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs) of the MFS II consortia. The 5C framework is based on a five-year research program on 'Capacity, change and performance' that was carried out by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). The research included an extensive review of the literature and sixteen case studies. The 5C framework has also been applied in an IOB evaluation using 26 case studies in 14 countries, and in the baseline carried out per organisation by the MFS II organisations for the purpose of the monitoring protocol.

The 5C framework is structured to understand and analyse (changes in) the capacity of an organization to deliver (social) value to its constituents. This introduction briefly describes the 5C framework, mainly based on the most recent document on the 5C framework (Keijzer et al., 2011).

The 5C framework sees capacity as an **outcome** of an **open system**. An organisation or collaborative association (for instance a network) is seen as a system interacting with wider society. The most critical practical issue is to ensure that relevant stakeholders share a common way of thinking about capacity and its core constituents or capabilities. Decisive for an organisation's capacity is the context in which the organisation operates. This means that **understanding context issues** is crucial. The use of the 5C framework requires a multi-stakeholder approach because shared values and results orientation are important to facilitate the capacity development process. The 5C framework therefore needs to **accommodate the different visions** of stakeholders and conceive different strategies for raising capacity and improving performance in a given situation.

The 5C framework defines capacity as '**producing social value'** and identifies five core capabilities that together result in that overall capacity. Capacity, capabilities and competences are seen as follows:

**Capacity** is referred to as the overall ability of an organisation or system to create value for others;

**Capabilities** are the collective ability of a group or a system to do something either inside or outside the system. The collective ability involved may be technical, logistical, managerial or generative (i.e. the ability to earn legitimacy, to adapt, to create meaning, etc.);

**Competencies** are the energies, skills and abilities of individuals.

Fundamental to developing capacity are inputs such as human, material and financial resources, technology, and information. To the degree that they are developed and successfully integrated, capabilities contribute to the overall capacity or ability of an organisation or system to create value for others. A single capability is not sufficient to create capacity. All are needed and are strongly interrelated and overlapping. Thus, to achieve its development goals, the 5C framework says that every organisation or system must have **five basic capabilities:**

- The capability to act and commit;
- The capability to deliver on development objectives;
- The capability to adapt and self-renew;
- The capability to relate (to external stakeholders);
- The capability to achieve coherence.

In order to have a common framework for evaluation, the five capabilities have been reformulated in outcome domains and for each outcome domain performance indicators have been developed. A detailed overview of capabilities with outcome domains and indicators is attached in Appendix 3.

There is some overlap between the five core capabilities but together the five capabilities result in a certain level of capacity. Influencing one capability may have an effect on one or more of the other capabilities. In each situation, the level of any of the five capabilities will vary. Each capability can become stronger or weaker over time.

# Appendix 3 Changes in organisational capacity of the SPO - 5C indicators

Below you will find a description for each of the indicators under each of the capabilities, what the situation is as assessed during the endline, how this has changed since the baseline and what are the reasons for change.

**Description of Endline Indicators ECPAT Indonesia**

**Capability to Act and to Commit**

1.1. Responsive leadership: 'Leadership is responsive, inspiring, and sensitive'

*This is about leadership within the organization (operational, strategic). If there is a larger body then you may also want to refer to leadership at a higher level but not located at the local organization.*

Since the baseline ECPAT went through a series of changes in terms of leadership. After the program manager resigned, the responsibility was taken over by the director who then fulfilled a dual role as both director and program manager. The absence of a dedicated program manager influenced ECPAT's work both as an organization and as a coordinator of the coalition of organizations work on CSEC issues. Upon taking over the dual leadership role, a large gap of capacity existed between leaders and working staff. To address this, the new leader became more involved in day to day administrative and program activities. This hand on approach was paired with close coaching which enabled staff to develop their own responsibilities. Staff acknowledged that the overall leadership style within ECPAT has changed from a 'one man show' to a more accommodating and inspiring style. Particularly the supportive style, open communication, as well as the increased clarity in the descriptions of roles and responsibilities was much appreciated. Even though, some of the staff mentioned that there is a possibility that his leadership style will lead to a 'single fighter image' of the organization, the organization is stronger under his leadership. Staff has stressed that their involvement in decision making and planning has led to better decisions and stated further that they perceive his leadership as effective, inspiring and action-oriented.

The second role that ECPAT fulfills is that as the national secretariat of the coalition. Within this role, ECPAT's leadership was not considered very strong. Board members were unable to meet frequently due to a lack of financial support, which severely undermined the influence of ECPAT as a coalition leader. After the resignation of the former program manager and leadership change, ECPAT focused its' activities inwards in order to develop and strengthen their internal capacity. As the internal organization grew stronger, so did the capabilities of the coalition's secretariat. However, due to the minimal contact and interaction of the coalition, coalition members have grown uneasy and have started to question ECPAT's leadership and role as acting secretariat for the coalition.

Score: From 4 to 4.5 (slightly improvement)

1.2. Strategic guidance: 'Leaders provide appropriate strategic guidance (strategic leader and operational leader)'

*This is about the extent to which the leader(s) provide strategic directions*

Since 2013, ECPAT leadership has been applying a new approach towards handling relationships to staff members with respect to strategic and operational aspects. A monthly meeting is now organized as to regularly meet staff, discuss issues and evaluate performance. On an annual basis a general meeting is organized in which future programming and general organizational development issues are discussed openly. Staff experienced many benefits in relation to this strategy of constructive guidance. For example, all staff members are involved in the new proposal development process.

Staff considers this as personal development on how to develop proposals, but also appreciate the opportunity to give input and offer their own ideas. Both program staff and non-program staff are included on these meetings, to also offer those staff members not directly involved in field work the opportunity to develop program related skills. On the other hand, the board members have reduced their involvement in these operational meetings as a result of their increased confidence in the capacity of the organization's leadership and guidance.

Whereas internal strategic guidance improved, the guidance offered to the coalition and to coalition partners decreased in intensity. Members of the coalition indicated that they thought of ECPAT as having their own agenda instead of fulfilling their role and responsibilities as a national secretariat. Coordination between coalition members has proven weak, which is in sharp contrast to the way the coalition was managed under previous leadership. The former program manager actively built communication and coordination amongst other members of the coalition. But as the current leader holds two responsibilities at once (as both a director of national secretariat and coordinator of national network), he prioritizes the development and strengthening of the internal ECPAT organization.

Score: From 3.5 to 4 (slightly improvement)

1.3. Staff turnover: 'Staff turnover is relatively low'

*This is about staff turnover.*

ECPAT has increased the number of staff as a result of additional funding. The new funding sources included MM The Body Shop, which have been supporting the organization for the last two years. ECPAT has 10 (ten) staff members in total, with three of them as non-exempt (permanent) staff and the rest of them as contractual/project based staff. Only two staff members resigned in this period with as reason getting a better offer from another organization. Compared to 2012, ECPAT has increased the number of staff from 4 in 2012 to 10 in 2014. Some staff left in 2012 whilst 8 joined the organization in 2012 and 2013. The organogram in 2012 and in 2014 had showed clearly the different number of the staff due to addition of new programs.

Score: From 3.5 to 2.5 (deterioration)

1.4 Organisational structure: 'Existence of clear organisational structure reflecting the objectives of the organisation'

*Observable indicator: Staff have copy of org. structure and understand this*

The current organizational structure of ECPAT has accommodated the need of staff to carry out the program implementation. With a total of ten staff, clearly separated function and roles of finance and administration, and the new direct service program of Pelhuk (*Pelayanan Hukum*_Legal Service Unit), the organogram has reflected strongly the objectives of the organization to commit more in addressing the CSEC issues. In the baseline, ECPAT had 4 staff that focused more to work on advocating the CSEC issues with coalition members, whilst in the end line; ECPAT had opportunity to carry out direct service to CSEC victims

Score: From 3 to 4 : (considerable improvement)

1.5 Articulated strategies: 'Strategies are articulated and based on good situation analysis and adequate M&E'

*Observable indicator: strategies are well articulated. Situation analysis and monitoring and evaluation are used to inform strategies.*

A strategic plan 2014-2016 has been developed which has attracted additional funding for research projects, internships and direct legal services. This success is also contributed by donor intervention to develop ECPAT institutional capacity in strategic planning. The current strategic planning was formulized based on the consultation with ECPAT's board members and aligned with ECPAT international's strategic directions for East Asia Region. The strategic directions were developed based

on the recommendation from the ECPAT's evaluation, the organization capacity assessment done by consultant, and consultation with ECPAT International.

Score: From 3.5 to4 (slightly improvement)

1.6. Daily operations: 'Day-to-day operations are in line with strategic plans'

*This is about the extent to which day-to-day operations are aligned with strategic plans.*

ECPAT has implemented its operations in according to the strategic plan. In addition to that, the strategic plan developed has proven attracted additional funding for research projects, internships and direct legal services. This success is also contributed by donor intervention to develop ECPAT institutional capacity in strategic planning. The development of the several SOPs which were the reflection of the strategic planning has played as important guidelines to ensure the day to day operations are in line with strategic plans. ECPAT's activities in conducting the program have reflected the strategic plans.

Score: From 4 to 4.5 (slightly improvement)

1.7. Staff skills: 'Staff have necessary skills to do their work'

*This is about whether staff have the skills necessary to do their work and what skills they might need.*

The budget allocation for personal development has helped to improve the technical capacity of ECPAT staff. Despite these efforts the need for further technical capacity development is apparent in the organization. Staff members are now actively involved in program implementation and generating lessons learned to boost their experience and skills. Management and staff are open to external capacity building opportunities whenever they arise. To implement direct legal service program funded by MM, ECPAT recruited experienced staff to ensure the implementation and reflection process of monitoring, investigation, and reporting CSEC cases. The staff has provided her skill to develop the steps by steps legal process (SOP) in documentation to the organization.

Score: From 3 to 3.5 (slightly improved)

1.8. Training opportunities: 'Appropriate training opportunities are offered to staff'

*is about whether staffs at the SPO are offered appropriate training opportunities*

Various training opportunities are available and encouraged for staff members. Most of them are offered through external channels through ECPAT's network and coalition. Due to limited budget allocation to training, ECPAT actively seeks out alternative training opportunities at lower cost. These include participation in seminars, talkshows, public discussions as well as invitation to act as presenters and moderators in related events. For the last two years ECPAT has internally trained their finance staff in support management. The objective to train all other staff in this field remains, but will not be able to be realized until after this MFS II evaluation has been completed. MM provided training opportunity to develop project proposal in May 2014, one staff joined the training, however, further follow up has not yet taken after the training. Other trainings funded by MM was for staff who have left the organisation in 2012 and 2013.

Score: From 2 to 2.5 (slightly improved)

1.9.1. Incentives: 'Appropriate incentives are in place to sustain staff motivation'

*This is about what makes people want to work here. Incentives could be financial, freedom at work, training opportunities, etc.*

With respects to incentives, ECPAT's situation has remained stable since the baseline evaluation. At several times during the interviews, staff members indicated that their primary reasons for working with ECPAT are non-monetary, but instead driven by a passion for the work and beneficiaries. Their

achievements with the organization lead to respect from colleagues and partners in their network and coalition which in turn resulted in a lot of motivation to keep organizational performance high.

The acquisition of new funding sources allowed for management to raise staff benefits and remuneration.

Score: From 3 to 3.5 (slightly improved)

1.9.2. Funding sources: 'Funding from multiple sources covering different time periods'

*This is about how diversified the SPOs funding sources are over time, and how the level of funding is changing over time.*

Overall ECPAT was able to increase their funding sources since the baseline. Additional funding was secured for research projects from TDH and ChildFund. Direct support service and campaign funds were acquired from the Indonesian Ministry of Education and Culture (KEMENDIKBUD). Program support was received from ECPAT International, ECPAT Netherlands and MM-N.

Despite the acquisition of new sources, staff members indicated that funding competition on the issue of child protection is increasing. In future it may therefore become more difficult to secure steady funding growth.

Score: From 3.5 to 4 (slightly improved)

1.9.3. Funding procedures: 'Clear procedures for exploring new funding opportunities'

*This is about whether there are clear procedures for getting new funding and staff are aware of these procedures.*

The existence of strategic planning for the years 2013 to 2016 has facilitated resource mobilization, particularly to regulate and identify funding opportunities. The involvement of all staff including their leader has strengthened the strategic plan and, as acknowledged by all staff, functions as the guideline to find more funding sources. The role of the board in fundraising has diminished however. The director of ECPAT acted as the only upper management person to deal with fundraising.

Score: From 3 to 3.5 (slightly improved)

**Summary Capability to Act and to Commit**

After the program manager resigned, the responsibility was taken over by the director who then fulfilled a dual role as both director and program manager, and leadership has been more active, hands-on, inspiring, and engaging since then. This has helped to bridge the large capacity gap between the director and staff, although a gap still remains. Staff has been involved in developing plans and strategic guidance by the director has improved which led to the board to reduce their strategic input. The strategic plan has been developed for the period of 2013-2016, and together with having standard operating procedures in place; this guided the day-to-day implementation of activities. Staff are motivated to work for ECPAT in relation to its work and is due to increased funding staff remuneration has improved which has also contributed to improved staff incentives. This improved funding situation is due to having a strategic plan which attracted more funders.

In terms of staff knowledge and skills, there have been some slight improvements in terms of capacity to implement the program due to the staff's professional skill on legal service, but much of the learning relates to internal sharing and learning on-the-job. In terms of the organizational structure, ECPAT has broadened the organization structure due to new program which obviously needs extra staff. ECPAT recruited some new staff to fill in the position to implement program, but overall there has been a high staff turnover with two people leaving the organisation since 2012 and 8 people joining the organisation and having an increase in staff members from 4 in 2012 to 10 in 2014.

Score: from 3.3 to 3.7 (slightly improved)

**Capability to Adapt and Self Renew**

2.1. M&E application: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess activities, outputs and outcomes'

*This is about what the monitoring and evaluation of the SPO looks at, what type of information they get at and at what level (individual, project, organizational).*

At ECPAT M&E is perceived as a donor driven mechanism. Despite adequate M&E mechanisms being in place, and it function quite well at the strategic level. Donor interventions , such as MM through Direct Legal Service Unit funding  and the body shop have assisted ECPAT in strengthening overall M&E capacity. For example, strict funding requirements from The Body Shop have imposed the generation of monitoring and evaluation data for every meeting they have together. ECPAT now has a clear M&E protocol in place for 2014 and onward, although there is no dedicated person who handles the portfolio. The director takes up a role in monitoring and evaluation. For example, he has implemented web based monitoring to ensure the day to day operations are being implemented and to provide feedback on the assignment or work that has been in progress or completed.

For their latest direct service project, PELHUK- *Pelayanan Hukum,* direct legal unit service required an intensive case monitoring and documentation system of all the steps taken. The procedures to do so provide a clear guide for stakeholders and coalition members to carry out M&E and program activities on CSEC.

Score: From 3 to 4 (considerable improvement)

2.2. M&E competencies: 'Individual competencies for performing M&E functions are in place'

*This is about whether the SPO has a trained M&E person; whether other staff have basic understanding of M&E; and whether they know what information to collect, how to process the information, how to make use of the information so as to improve activities etc.*

The current ECPAT leader has a strong capacity and experience in M&E. In order to assist staff members in developing these skills of their own four major developments took place. First, the director directly assisted staff members in the implementation of their activities and allowed them to practice M&E in the field. Secondly, simple monitoring tools such as child protection cases handling monitoring were put in place and applied. Thirdly, a yearly program review was conducted to evaluate overall program implementation with the whole organization. Finally, staff was trained in project cycle management for 5 days in May 2014 as supported by the MM.

Struggling to document CSEC case monitoring, ECPAT published a book on the compilation of all case management that took place between 2012 and 2014. Documenting over 10 CSES cases in the form of a book has greatly supported staff members in learning to apply M&E.

Score: From 3 to 4 (considerable improvement)

2.3. M&E for future strategies: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess the effects of delivered products and services (outcomes) for future strategies'

*This is about what type of information is used by the SPO to make decisions; whether the information comes from the monitoring and evaluation; and whether M&E info influences strategic planning.*

ECAPT did not have specific person in ME; however the latest direct service project, PELHUK required an intensive cases monitoring and documented all the steps and experienced in conducting cases monitoring in a book. The documentation process has provided opportunity for the staff to assess the effect of the program delivery as it captured the details on the planning and outcome even impact of the program. The book provided a resources and a guide for the stakeholders and members of coalition specifically to carry out program on CSEC.

Struggling to document the CSEC cases monitoring; ECPAT developed a book on the compilation of all CSEC cases management within 2012-2014. The experience of documenting 10 CSEC cases monitoring in a book has already supported staff learning process in conducting ME.

Score: From 3 to 4 (considerable improvement)

2.4. Critical reflection: 'Management stimulates frequent critical reflection meetings that also deal with learning from mistakes'

*This is about whether staffs talk formally about what is happening in their programs; and, if so, how regular these meetings are; and whether staffs are comfortable raising issues that are problematic.*

The regular monthly meetings conducted for the last two years has facilitated discussion related to the program, achievements and problems amongst the staff. The leader role has stimulated the discussion in the meetings to be more open and comfortable whilst discussing implementation problems. The director implemented web based monitoring to ensure the day to day operations are being implemented and to provide feedback on the assignment or work that has been in progress or completed. Next to being a strong control mechanism of the work of staff members, the daily web based monitoring system encouraged staff members to be more critical about their own work, communication and scheduling.

Score: From 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

2.5. Freedom for ideas: 'Staff feel free to come up with ideas for implementation of objectives

*This is about whether staff feel that ideas they bring for implementation of the program are welcomed and used.*

Staff indicated that ECPAT offers an open office environment where it is possible to freely discuss ideas and provide input. This is also possible during the internal meetings that occur on a monthly basis, which can be characterized as less formal. The current leader plays an important role in managing the meetings to be a safe environment to share knowledge, discuss ideas and receive constructive feedback.

Score: From 4 to 4.5 (slight improvement)

2.6. System for tracking environment: 'The organisation has a system for being in touch with general trends and developments in its operating environment'

*This is about whether the SPO knows what is happening in its environment and whether it will affect the organization.*

ECPAT benefits from the skills of one particular staff member-, the director, who has a strong research background. He performs situational analysis and collects details on issues related to the organization and its' activities. He also seeks information through coalition members and from the media. Apart from this individual's efforts, ECPAT has made it a habit to use their networks to gather information about their surroundings.

Score: From 3 to 4 (improvement)

2.7. Stakeholder responsiveness: 'The organization is open and responsive to their stakeholders and general public'

*This is about what mechanisms the SPO has to get input from its stakeholders, and what they do with that input.*

The most noticeable response that ECPAT has received from its stakeholders and the general public has come about from its formal acknowledgement as ECPAT Indonesia. The change in status has become an important factor for ECPAT to expand its networking activities. ECPAT is now involved in several projects with government authorities, law enforcers and other organizations. Furthermore a new division was established whose responsibility has become to provide direct service to beneficiaries.

Score: From 3 to 4 (improvement)

**Summary Capability to Adapt and to Self Renew**

M&E in ECPAT has improved mainly in relation to donor requirements and donor support for strengthening M&E capacity. An overall monitoring and evaluation system is lacking in the organisation, although on the whole, monitoring and evaluation has become more systematic. The monitoring and evaluation refers to ME in Pelhuk implementation; the monitoring, investigating, and reporting of CSEC Cases. However, the director also applied day to day web based monitoring. He would provide feedback on the reports written by staff. Monitoring and evaluation is mainly focus on activities and outputs, but not outcomes and impact. Overall ECPAT currently has strong capacity in M&E in 'the form of its leader, but less so in it's' staff members. The skill gap is bridged through close assistance of the leader in day to day activities and hands-on training.

The staff has practiced monitoring in their regular visits or activities and the results are discussed at monthly meeting. They also have simple monitoring tools in place such as child protection cases handling monitoring. The director implemented web based monitoring to ensure the day to day operations and provided feedback on the assignment or work that has been in progress or completed. One of the staff members has good research skills and this assists in scanning the environment for relevant issues.

The organization's internal culture has been described as open and positive, allowing for feedback and input from all levels of staff. Although the role of ECPAT as coalition network manager has diminished, the external connections to stakeholders and beneficiaries has increased over the last two years in the form of the establishment of a new service division on the one hand, and stronger cooperation with government and public agencies as a result of their newly acquired status to function as the official ECPAT Indonesia organization.

Score: from 3.2 to 4.1 (improvement)

**Capability to Deliver Development Objectives**

3.1. Clear operational plans: 'Organisation has clear operational plans for carrying out projects which all staff fully understand'

*This is about whether each project has an operational work plan and budget, and whether staffs use it in their day-to-day operations.*

Guided by the strategic plan, ECPAT developed an implementation work plan and budget plan to control the execution of activities. In addition to that, ECPAT has hired a consultant to develop standard operating procedures (SOPs) to guide operational work to become better and more transparent. The activities and budget are always reviewed in monthly meetings to ensure their compliance and progress against the plan.

Score: From 4 to 5 (considerable improvement)

3.2. Cost-effective resource use: 'Operations are based on cost-effective use of its resources'

*This is about whether the SPO has the resources to do the work, and whether resources are used cost-effectively.*

ECPAT has external support in financial expertise to monitor the organization financially. They are continuously working within the network to support their activities and reduce cost. Additionally, more care is taken in who should travel in response to field activities in order to cut down on travelling expenses.

Score: From 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

3.3. Delivering planned outputs: 'Extent to which planned outputs are delivered'

*This is about whether the SPO is able to carry out the operational plans.*

In the FGD it was mentioned that ECPAT research project was finished as expected. Staff reported that not all output in the *Pelhuk* program was delivered in a timely manner. ECPAT succeeded in handling 10 CSEC cases and sent to court, however, as some cases needed extra time to conclude, ECPAT need more time to finish developing a book about how to monitor, investigate, and report CSEC cases. In sum, the achievements made were (1) capacity and expertise of ECPAT Indonesia increased in investigating, monitoring and reporting of cases of CSEC, (2) ECPAT Indonesia and the Indonesian National Police (POLRI) have agreed to cooperate in the handling of cases of CSEC and (3) reporting mechanism for cases of CSEC is available nationally through database system.

The MOU with the police was still in the process of lobbying due to the rotation within police authorities. Most of the unfinished program was caused by external factors which were very difficult to handle by ECPAT. Some of the unfinished output was carried away to the next phase of funding.

However, staff indicated that ECPAT submitted activity report to ECPAT Netherland on time to fulfill the requirement of being a member of ECPAT International. The punctuality to submit report on time to ECPAT International was a strict requirement as in influenced the ECPAT Indonesia status as a member of ECPAT International. ECPAT Indonesia gained the first rank in the report submission punctuality from ECPAT Netherland.

Compared to the baseline, ECPAT gained slightly improvement on the output delivery due to the finishing some projects in a timely manner.

Score: From 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

3.4. Mechanisms for beneficiary needs: 'The organisation has mechanisms in place to verify that services meet beneficiary needs'

*This is about how the SPO knows that their services are meeting beneficiary needs*

The *Pelhuk* program has implemented direct observation to check whether ECPAT has met beneficiary needs. The regular monitoring, investigating, and reporting mechanism on the cases using monitoring form has enabled ECPAT to ensure that the program has met the needs of the beneficiaries (victim of CSEC). Some of the cases took longer time to conclude to meet the beneficiary's expectation. As the CSEC cases are individual cases, the solution of each cases was very contextual, based on the needs of the beneficiaries. The regular monitoring has assisted ECPAT to ensure the proper intervention needed by beneficiaries. Nonetheless this method proved quite intensive and challenging to apply in practice, leading to mixed results. The Apart from direct contact with beneficiaries, ECPAT worked closely together with other organizations to check on trending issues in the field of CSEC and how the organization could contribute to solving these.

From the perspective of the coalition members however, ECPAT was considered weak in meeting the needs of the coalition. In fact, a specific call for a mechanism to ensure meeting the needs of coalition beneficiaries was mentioned by some partner organizations The mechanism of close monitoring, investigating, and reporting CSEC cases was not yet applied in the baseline. Regardless the challenge in the implementation, the Pelhuk program implementation has made ECPAT possible to verify that service meet beneficiaries need.

Score: From 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

3.5. Monitoring efficiency: 'The organisation monitors its efficiency by linking outputs and related inputs (input-output ratio's)'

*This is about how the SPO knows they are efficient or not in their work.*

The mechanism of monitoring program efficiency in the end-line applied the same mechanism as in the baseline. Both staff accounts and documentation shows that linking outputs to inputs takes place. ECPAT has demonstrated that they efficiently use their budget by considering lower cost alternatives in the implementation of activities. The regular monitoring, investigating, and reporting of CSEC cases

has encouraged ECPAT to apply efficiency by linking output and input more often and reported in the staff monthly meeting.

Score: From 3 to 3 (no change)

3.6. Balancing quality-efficiency: 'The organisation aims at balancing efficiency requirements with the quality of its work'

*This is about how the SPO ensures quality work with the resources available*

ECPAT still ensures quality of their work by looking at the achievements of the project through monthly, quarterly, and annual meetings. They aim to find out the results of their work and look at the changes that occur in the target group., and the possibility to conduct the program more efficient and keep the quality of its work.Every activity in the program implementation applied budget wiseand pursue a quality of the work.

Score: From 3 to 3 (no change)

**Summary Capability to deliver on development objectives**
Based on the strategic plan and the new standard operating procedures, there are clear work plans and budgets in place. The organization aims to work as cost effectively as possible and efficiency is being measured by having an external finance expert help in the organization and by reviewing progress with plans and budgets regularly. However, there is no clear mechanism in place to balance efficiency with quality of the work. ECPAT verifies whether the organization meets the needs of the beneficiary by direct observation, as well as close collaboration with other organizations. From the coalition manager's point of view, ECPAT Indonesia failed to deliver the expected results, but this did not affect the program and development objectives of ECPAT themselves.

Score: From 3.3 to 3.7 (slight improvement)

**Capability to relate**

4.1. Stakeholder engagement in policies and strategies: 'The organisation maintains relations/ collaboration/alliances with its stakeholders for the benefit of the organisation'

*This is about whether the SPO engages external groups in developing their policies and strategies, and how.*

ECPAT has actively involved stakeholders, particularly government, in annual evaluation or review. The government parties provide their input to program planning as well as feedback to government for their program improvement. The *Pelhuk* Program implementation has broadened ECPAT's networking, especially in building cooperation with other parties such as legal aid and NGOs in handling the cases of children and cooperation in handling of the special case with law enforcer, Police Headquarter , METRO JAYA Police, South Jakarta Police, East Jakarta Resort Police, Bogor Police, Tangerang Police, Singaraja Denpasar police, south Sumatra Police, Tegal Police, Bogor Attorney, south of Jakarta district Attorney, Attorney State of Singaraja, Palembang District Attorney , South Jakarta District Court , Singaraja District Court, Bogor District Court, and Palembang District Court.

Score: From 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

4.2. Engagement in networks: 'Extent to which the organisation has relationships with existing networks/alliances/partnerships'.

*This is about what networks/alliances/partnerships the SPO engages with and why; with they are local or international; and what they do together, and how do they do it.*

ECPAT is very strong in lobbying and has an extensive network with the government and other key players in policy making and implementation, especially after it' newly acquired formal recognition by ECPAT International Overall, ECPAT is a reliable, strong partner in the field of combating CSEC,

especially through advocacy, lobby and publishing. Current networking capability has increased when ECPAT played at international level. On the other hand, there are some concerned voices relating to the role of ECPAT as coalition manager. Some coalition members have indicated that they consider that there is no added value of ECPAT for the coalition.

Score: From 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

4.3. Engagement with target groups: 'The organisation performs frequent visits to their target groups/ beneficiaries in their living environment'

*This is about how and when the SPO meets with target groups.*

ECPAT provides direct service to beneficiaries, such as closely assisting and provide referral consultation service, advocating and lobbying to law enforcers, as well as government. ECPAT also worked directly in youth clubs and schools to raise awareness to prevent CSEC. In the baseline, the work of ECPAT was still limited to connect stakeholders and duty bearer in child protection issue as well as linking referral systems. However, in the last two years, the role as a hub was weaker than previous because no professional individual was available to maintain the networking.

Score: From 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

4.4. Relationships within organisation: 'Organisational structure and culture facilitates open internal contacts, communication, and decision-making'

*How does staff at the SPO communicate internally? Are people free to talk to whomever they need to talk to? When and at what forum? What are the internal mechanisms for sharing information and building relationships?*

ECPAT has not established a new internal mechanism since baseline. They intensified the use of current and available means of communication through monthly meetings. The significant change shows in informal relationships amongst the staff when the leadership changed. Informal communication within the staff is now stronger and it helps them to connect and discuss more programmatic issues with their leader and amongst themselves.

Score: From 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

**Summary Capability to relate**

ECPAT is very strong in lobbying and has an extensive network with the government and other key players in ECPAT's policy making, planning and implementation. Overall, ECPAT is a reliable, strong partner in the field of combating CSEC, especially through advocacy, lobby and publishing, and remains widely considered as the expert institute on CSEC issues. On the other hand the function of ECPAT Indonesia as CSEC coalition manager has deteriorated after the leadership change due to a shift in organizational priorities. Coalition members now publicly voice their concern and wonder what added value ECPAT still provides to the coalition as a whole. There was a change in terms of relating to the beneficiaries of ECPAT due to the implementation of *Pelhuk* program. The nature of direct service has made ECPAT possible to engage closely with the dynamic of the beneficiaries. Internally, relationships have improved due to improved leadership and more regular meetings.

Score: from 3.1 to 3.6 (slight improvement)

**Capability to Achieve Coherence**

5.1. Revisiting vision, mission: 'Vision, mission and strategies regularly discussed in the organisation'

*This is about whether there is a vision, mission and strategies; how often staff discuss/revise vision, mission and strategies; and who is involved in this.*

ECPAT Indonesia has revised its vision and mission in 2012, but no further revisions have taken place since. The revision affected the current policies in ECPAT. The Board members, the National

Coordinator and the Program Manager were involved in this process. The Board members of ECPAT are mostly the leaders of the coalition members. ECPAT discusses the vision, mission and strategies at least once per year with the coalition members. They consult the coalition members and based on this consultation a program strategy for the next three years is formulated. They subsequently convey the vision, mission and strategy to the staff, so that the staff can understand and implement them in their daily operations. This process has been continued up until now.

Score: From 4 to 4 (no change)

5.2. Operational guidelines: 'Operational guidelines (technical, admin, HRM) are in place and used and supported by the management'

*This is about whether there are operational guidelines, which operational guidelines exist; and how they are used.*

In 2013, ECPAT hired a consultant to support them to improve the management system. The activity has resulted in the development of several standard operating procedures (SOPs), such as: financial SOP, HR SOP, and Program SOP. All the SOPs have been used as a guideline in conducting day to day operations and program implementation.

Score: From 2 to 4 (significant improvement)

5.3. Alignment with vision, mission: 'Projects, strategies and associated operations are in line with the vision and mission of the organisation'

*This is about whether the operations and strategies are line with the vision/mission of the SPO.*

ECPAT has launched new strategic programs for 2014-2016. The strategic programs were formulized based on consultation with respective members and board and aligned with ECPAT International's strategic directions for East Asia Region. All programs are in line with the vision and mission of ECPAT. They have been working on children's issues consistently. ECPAT is coherent in their vision and mission and their goals and activities. Their work on policy influencing, trainings and protocols is all connected to their primary mission. This alignment is done with relative ease due to their specific focus. Last year a new program paired with a new legal unit service was launched to address youth projects for CSEC, which again aligns clearly with the organizations overall vision and mission.

Score: From 4 to 4 (no change)

5.4. Mutually supportive efforts: 'The portfolio of project (activities) provides opportunities for mutually supportive efforts'

*This is about whether the efforts in one project complement/support efforts in other projects.*

ECPAT's work has supported the youth roles in advocacy and legal aid which provides several opportunities for mutually supportive efforts. Nonetheless the degree to which mutually supportive efforts take place remains the same to those two years ago. The close relations of programs and divisions have made it very easy for staff members from different programs to cooperate and support each other mutually. For instance, the newly establish legal services unit not only supports CSEC case handling of youths, but also provides opportunities for other stakeholders such as law enforcement agencies and government to strengthen, learn and cooperate on case work. A second example is the advocacy program, a citizen advocacy project of a group of young social advocates supported by the European Union to strengthen youth participation in the elimination of trafficking.

Score: From 4 to 4 (no change)

**Summary Capability to Achieve Coherence**

ECPAT has consistently adjusted strategic plan and program area with its vision and mission. It was stated clearly in the new strategic program 2014-12016. The new strategic program area has been discussed with the boards member and reflected ECPAT International strategic directions.

The vision, mission and strategies are still yearly review with the support from other stakeholders, especially coalition members. And they program activities are line with the vision and mission of ECPAT, and also mutually supportive.  Since the baseline in 2012, several new standard operating procedures have been put in place with the help of an external consultant. This has supported programme implementation.

Score: from 3.5 to 4 (slightly improvement)

# Appendix 4 Results - key changes in organisational capacity - general causal map

**Narrative of ECPAT Indonesia General Causal Map**

The evaluation team carried out an end line assessment at ECPAT from 23th to 25th June 2014. During the end line workshop, the team made a recap of key features of the organisation in the baseline in 2012 (such as vision, mission, strategies, clients, partnerships). This was the basis for discussing changes that had happened to the organisation since the baseline.


According to ECPAT staff present at the end line workshop, the key change in ECPAT since the baseline in 2012 was the development of ECPAT into a leading organization on CSEC issues with good management, independent, transparent, accountable, and supportive to its member.

There are four developments that have led to this change:

1. Professionalization of the organization [5]
2. Expansion and sustaining of donors [2]
3. More effective advocacy [3]
4. Improved staff capacity for CSEC case monitoring [4]

Each of these factors will be explained below. The numbers in the narrative correspond to the numbers in the visual.

# *ECPAT Indonesia General Causal Map*



**Professionalization of the organization [5]**
According to ECPAT staff present at the end line workshop, the organization of ECPAT professionalized over the last two years. Two factors contributed to this.

First, ECPAT's financial system and staff management improved [18]. This occurred due to the successful accomplishing of work targets [29], a better distribution of work activities [30], financial information being more accountable and easier to access [31] and financial coordination and communication with the donor being easier [32]. Each of these developments resulted from the overall revitalization of the ECPAT as the national secretariat [39], through the addition of new personnel, an independent financial mechanism (without ties to the previous PKPA arrangement), and moving in to a new office space. This spurt in development was enabled on the one hand by now being able to handle the name and logo of ECPAT Indonesia [43] by adhering to the strict requirements of ECPAT International and efforts to upgrade the status of Konaspeska-Koalisi Nasional Penghapusan Eksploitasi Seksual Komersial Anak/National Coalition on the Elimination of Child Sexual Commercial Exploitation-embrio of ECPAT from affiliate to National group of ECPAT International [48]. On the other hand through the development of the secretariat [45] through funding from two separate sources (The Body Shop [49] and Mensen met eenMissie [50]).

Secondly, fundraising efforts finally got rewarded as the system in place started to perform [35] after significant efforts by the national coordinator in a double role, as a director of ECPAT and took over the role of the resigned project manager [42]. The drive for the national coordinator to take on the double role came about from the organization's need for additional key personnel [46] as the program manager resigned in 2013 [51].

**Expansion and sustaining of donors [2]**
The acquisition of new donors and sustaining current donors was greatly supported by the fact that donors started affiliating themselves more with ECPAT's work [6]. They explicitly gave their credits on activities carried out by ECPAT Indonesia, which significantly raised their profile amongst other potential donors in the network. The willingness of donors to do so resulted from the overall higher quality of program implementation [19] that has occurred over the last two years as set out in the strategic planning 2011-2014 [52]. Overall, this quality improvement can be attributed to the improved staff's capacity to manage their programs and their increased CSEC related knowledge as well as lobbying and negotiation skills [33]. The latter was largely a learning effect resulting from a more diverse and larger program and related work activities [40]. Examples of the diversification and expansion of activities include the Justice support service, direct CSEC services in terms of rehabilitation, reintegration and consultation, monitoring and investigating of CSEC cases and the engagement in international activities for instance through the youth partnership project. The expansion in terms of all these program activities was driven by systematic program development [44] enabled by funds from Mensen met een Missie (MM) [49] and The Body Shop [50].


The second factor which has led to expansion and sustaining of donors was the ability to (successfully) propose for funding [11]. In doing so, ECPAT expanded its funding sources to for example Child fund in 2013. This ability came about from two factors. First, the development of clear standard operating procedures (SOPs) for each division[15], based on SPO for the organization as a whole and independent from other organizations [25], allowed for clear guidelines on how to formulate proposals. Secondly, the organizations legal status at the national level became much stronger [13] which made ECPAT Indonesia a more attractive partner for funding. The improvement of legal status was initiated through registering ECPAT with the ministry of law and human rights in 2014 [16]. This was made possible after the official affiliation with ECPAT international was made official in Indonesian law through registration at a notary [26].Both the development of ECPATs own SOP and the registration as a formal and legally accepted institution were made possible by the creation and management of the right set of official documentation [37]. This included the organizations NPWP (tax registration number), a certificate from lawyers and a bank account. The preparation of all this legal work was done by the national coordinator in his double role [42], who next to this important role in fundraising [35], also oversaw the function of monitoring and evaluation [36].

**More effective advocacy [3]**
Advocacy efforts by ECPAT increased greatly over the last two years largely due to an improvement in the bargaining position of ECPAT over government and law enforcement authorities [7]. This bargaining position got strengthened for three particular reasons: (a) greater access and dissemination of information [20]; (b) The close involvement of ECPAT International with direct support and advice of ECPAT International [21] and; (c) the expansion of the national network [22]. Each of these factors in turn was developed through the higher quality of connections to key stakeholders in society, NGOs legal and law enforcement authorities as well as the local courts [34]. Access and contacts to these key stakeholders was once again possible through the larger and more diverse program activities that were now carried out [40].

**Improved staff capacity to of CSEC case monitoring [4]**
ECPAT's staff was able to increase its capacity regarding CSEC case monitoring through three specific factors: (a) an increased ability to write documentation on case work [8]; (b) ability to engage stakeholder in the reflection process in order to change stakeholders' paradigm about CSEC [9] and; (c) staff now being able to utilize the ECPAT monitoring instrument for CSEC cases [10]. The first two of these three factors were enabled by increased reflection on working processes within the law service unit by looking at lessons learned, challenges and best practices [23]. The last of the three factors, the utilization of the monitoring instrument, was enabled by the formulation of a clear referral mechanism for CSEC cases as a model for other organizations [12]. This model was developed as a result of the increased understanding of program staff on how to conduct CSEC case monitoring [14] which was enabled by strengthened ECPAT's monitoring and investigation in CSEC issues gained through the implementation of the program [24]. All these previous factors were enabled by a greater effort in program documentation and reporting [27]. ECPAT expanded its reporting from mere technical formats to more substantive forms such as reports or even books for publication. The greater effort required to write these documents formed a clear learning process for all staff involved. This effort once again sprung from the diversification and overall increase of program activities [40].

# Appendix 5 Results - attribution of changes in organisational capacity - detailed causal maps

**Narrative Key Outcome C.1.2.: Improved program management and implementation capacity**



Note: for each country about 50% of the SPOs has been chosen to be involved in process tracing, which is the main approach chosen to address evaluation question 2. For more information please also see chapter 3 on methodological approach. For each of these SPOs the focus has been on the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew, since these were the most commonly addressed capabilities when planning MFS II supported capacity development interventions for the SPO.

For each of the MFS II supported capacity development interventions -under these two capabilities- an outcome area has been identified, describing a particular change in terms of organisational capacity of the SPO. Process tracing has been carried out for each outcome area.

In the capability to act and commit the following outcome area has been identified, based on document review and discussions with SPO and CFA: 'improved program and implementation capacity'. However, this organisational change area was not limited to this capability but also covered other capabilities. This indicates the importance of the interconnectedness of the 5 core capabilities.

In the capability to adapt and self-renew the following outcome area has been identified, based on document review and discussions with SPO and CFA: 'improved staff capacity to communicate results on diversity issues'

Below you will find a description of the 'improved program and implementation capacity and how this has come about.

ECPAT International has officially recognized ECPAT Indonesia as part of its organization and network. One of the requirements from ECPAT International was that ECPAT Indonesia carries out programs and activities independently. The organization was forced to take on more responsibilities and to formulate and carry out their own programs to maintain the new status and secure funding. For this purpose, there was a need to strengthen the program management of ECPAT. This is expected to improve program management and implementation capacity [5] (source: *(annex L, annex A, Process tracing minutes meeting)* and herewith overall work performance. This is expected to lead to increased bargaining power with donors *[1] (annex, A, annex D, process tracing minutes meeting)*; increased bargaining power with over government on CSEC advocacy [2] *(annex P, process tracing minutes meeting)*; and being more recognized as an organization on CSEC *issues [3] (annex P, process tracing minutes meeting).*

ECPAT achievement to be an organization with improved program management & implementation capacity was the result of *[6] (source: annex O, annex A, and process tracing minutes meeting)* Improved functioning of the secretariat [7]; more human resources for implementation [16]; and improved operational management [6]. Each of these areas is further discussed below.

**The functioning of the secretariat improved** due to having an improved job description and job distribution between administration and finance [10] *(source: annex o and process tracing minutes meeting).* This was the result of ECPAT starting to separate the financial function and administration function [15] *(source: annex O, annex L)*. There was a clear job distribution and description between finance and administration which has contributed to strengthen administration and made administration function well[15] *(annex O and annex L)* . The other reason for improved functioning of the secretariat is having more human resources available to conduct programming: a secretary, a programme coordinator and a programme assistant [19] (source: annex O, annex P).

The second reason for improved program management and implementation capacity was **the improved Operational management of the organization** [6] (source: annex O, A; workshop minutes meeting) which was the result of improved administration mechanisms [8] (source: annex L; process tracing meeting minutes) and improved financial efficiency [9] (source: annex L; process tracing meeting minutes). In relation to administrative mechanisms [8], all the organizational documents and organization used to follow PKPA mechanisms and management. But as a new organization, ECPAT needed to have their own organizational management mechanism [8]. According to some staff, the organizational development was not funded by MM, however. ECPAT also put some of the budget from MM on the process of organizational development.


The administrative mechanisms have improved due to using the revised organisation statues [12] (source: annex L; process tracing meeting minutes). This was the result of having a revised organization statute document (ART) for the secretariat and Anggaran Dasar (basic regulations of an

organization) for ECPAT members [17] *(source: process tracing minutes meeting) .* The Indonesian organisational development consultant [20] (source: annex C&P) assisted in this revision in March 2013. It is unclear who funded this consultant: MM or the Body Shop Indonesia. On the other hand, MM funded their own capacity scan in 2012 performed by another external consultant [21].

The other reason for improved operational management [6] (source: annex O&A; process tracing meeting minutes) was the improved financial efficiency [9] (source: annex L; process tracing meeting minutes) The Financial matters were efficiently applied because there was an improvement on the financial management (11) (source: annex L&P, process tracing meeting minutes). The improved Financial management existed as a result of the development of new SOPs for divisions, such as finance SOP, program SOP, and project SOP) [13] *(source: annex C, annex P)*, and the assistance of the organisational development consultant [20], as well as recommendations made by the MM funded external consultant who did the capacity scan in 2012 [21]. One of the staff said that finance SOP has made them easier to conduct procurement.

Furthermore, financial management improved due to having more accountable and transparent financial reports [14] (source: annex L; process tracing meeting minutes). These financial reports have improved due to the newly developed SOPs [13] (source: annex C&P) and through revised financial guidelines on reporting [18] (source*: process tracing minutes meeting)*. Again here the support of the Indonesian organisational development consultant has helped [20], as well as the MM capacity scan performed in 2012 [21].

**Narrative of Causal Map C3 : Improved Skill on ECPAT in the investigation, monitoring and reporting of CSEC cases**




Note: for each country about 50% of the SPOs has been chosen to be involved in process tracing, which is the main approach chosen to address evaluation question 2. For more information please also see chapter 3 on methodological approach. For each of these SPOs the focus has been on the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew, since these were the most commonly addressed capabilities when planning MFS II supported capacity development interventions for the SPO.

For each of the MFS II supported capacity development interventions -under these two capabilities- an outcome area has been identified, describing a particular change in terms of organisational capacity of

the SPO. Process tracing has been carried out for each outcome area. In the capability to act and commit the following outcome area has been identified, based on document review and discussions with SPO and CFA: 'recognised as a leading organisation on CSEC issues'.

In the capability to adapt and self-renew the following outcome area has been identified, based on document review and discussions with SPO and CFA: 'improved skill of ECPAT in the investigation, monitoring and reporting on CSEC cases'

Below you will find a description of the 'improved skill of ECPAT in the investigation, monitoring and reporting on CSEC cases' and how this has come about. The numbers in the visual correspond with the numbers in the narrative.

During 2012-2014, there was an improvement on the ECPAT staff's skill in the investigation, monitoring, and reporting of CSEC cases [3] (Annex L, M, R; Workshop Minutes Meeting). This improvement has helped ECPAT in achieving their target. They succeeded to handle 10 cases as a result of staffs' better understanding and skills during conducting investigation and monitoring of CSEC cases [1] (Annex P, R; Workshop Minutes Meeting). Besides that, it also encouraged ECPAT to generate a model of referral mechanism for CSEC cases for other organization [2] (Annex R; Workshop Minutes Meeting). The referral mechanism for CSEC cases model provided steps, guidance, also strategy to manage CSEC cases. It was expected that other organization can learn, adopt, and adjust the model of CSEC cases handling.

The improved skill of ECPAT staff in investigating, monitoring and reporting of CSEC cases [3], can be attributed on the one hand to the fact that ECPAT now has a monitoring instrument in place for CSEC cases [4] (Annex C, L, R; Workshop Minutes Meeting). The other reason is that program staff gained better understanding in how to, investigate, monitor, and report on CSEC cases [5] (Annex C, L, P, R; Workshop Minutes Meeting). Each of these two reasons is explained in more detail below.

**ECPAT as a monitoring system for CSEC cases [4]**

ECPAT now has a monitoring instrument for CSEC cases [4] (Annex C, L, R; Workshop Minutes Meeting). This is the result of the development of program documentation for the justice unit service [6] (Annex C, L, M, R; Workshop Minutes Meeting). This program was intended to build a model for other organizations to work on the same issues. The form of that documentation is a book containing the details of how ECPAT handled 10 CSEC cases. The book also became a reporting mechanism for cases of CSEC and is available nationally through a database system. This reporting mechanism has changed in terms of being more externally oriented than only internally oriented. This means that ECPAT shared the lesson learned of the CSEC cases handling and provided models for other organization working in CSEC issues Furthermore, the format has changed from being more administrative reporting to being described in the form of a book.

The development of the program documentation was enabled by the fact that ECPAT staff now has a better ability to develop program documentation as the staff were now better able to capitalise on their learning during the justice service project implementation [7] (Annex C, L, P, R; Workshop Minutes Meeting). This learning process occurred amongst staff following an increased focus on the process of reflection on work and challenges, developing lessons learned and best practices. [8] (Annex O, R; Workshop Minutes Meetings). This shift in critical reflection can be attributed to requirements established in the fund received for the development of the legal unit service project [10] (Annex C, L, R, Workshop Minutes).

**Increased staff skill in investigating, monitoring and reporting on CSEC cases [5]**
Program staff now has a better understanding of how to investigate, monitor and report on CSEC cases [5] (Annex C, L, P, R; Workshop Minutes Meeting). This was due to two reasons. Firstly,there was an increased ability of staff to capitalize on project learning [7] [6] (Annex C, L, P, R; Workshop Minutes Meeting), as already disclosed above. Secondly, staff have had the opportunity to handle a greater number of CSEC cases [9] (Annex C, L, M, P, R; Workshop Minutes Meeting; Project Proposal). This is demonstrated by the fact that the staff succeed to reach the target to handle at least 10 cases during the implementation of the project.

The foundation of the positive organizational developments with respect to this key outcome is a series of activities and processes of two projects. First, the fund for the Legal Service Unit Project – commenced in November 2012 [10] (Annex C, L, R; Workshop Minutes Meeting). The Legal Unit Service Project implementation was a new direct service for CSEC cases handling, and this is funded by MM. This project is actually a continuation of the Investigating, Monitoring, and Reporting CSEC Project [11] (Annex C, L, R; Workshop Minutes Meeting, Annual Report 2012), - which was concluded in September 2012. The initiative to develop a model of handling CSEC cases has started during the implementation of that project. So that it has resulted in the development of guideline of CSEC handling cases for the member of ECPAT [2].

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen UR
P.O. Box 88
6700 AB Wageningen
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)317 48 68 00
www.wageningenUR.nl/cdi

Report CDI-15-041

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# Endline report – Indonesia, Good Shepherd Sisters
# MFS II country evaluations

Capacity of Southern Partner Organisations (5C) component


Cecile Kusters[1]
Martijn Wieriks[2]
Bekti Dwi Andari[3]
Novina Suprobo[3]
Widya Priyahita[3]
Rumenta R. Sihombing[3]
Seto W. Rokhmatulloh[3]
Ita Rosita[3]

1 Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR
2 SEPAM Consultants Indonesia
3 SurveyMeter



Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen, February 2015

Report CDI-15-036

Kusters, C., Wieriks, M., Dwi Andari, B., Suprobo, N., Priyahita, W., Sihombing, R.R., Rokhmatulloh, S.W., Rosita, I., 2015. *Endline report – Indonesia, GSS. MFS II country evaluations; Capacity of Southern Partner Organisations (5C) component.* Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University & Research centre. Report CDI-15-036 Wageningen.

This report presents the findings of the endline of the evaluation of the organisational capacity component of the MFS II country evaluations. The focus of this report is Indonesia, GSS. The format is based on the requirements by the synthesis team and NWO/WOTRO. The endline was carried out in 2014. The baseline was carried out in 2012.

Key words: 5C (five core capabilities); attribution; baseline; causal map; change; CFA (Co-financing Organisation) endline; organisational capacity development; SPO (Southern Partner Organisation).



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Report CDI-15-036|

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# Acknowledgements

We are grateful to all the people that have contributed to this report. We particularly would like to thank the Southern Partner Organisation GSS and the Co-Financing Agency Mensen met een Missie for their endless patience and support during this challenging task of collecting the endline data. We hope that this endline report will provide useful insights to GSS, Mensen met een Missie, the synthesis team, IOB and NWO/Wotro.

The Indonesia 5C evaluation team

# List of abbreviations and acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| 5 C | Capacity development model which focuses on 5 core capabilities |
| Causal map | Map with cause-effect relationships. See also 'detailed causal map'. |
| Causal mechanisms | The combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome |
| CDI | Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University & Research centre |
| CFA | Co-Financing Agency |
| CFO | Co-Financing Organisation |
| CS | Civil Society |
| Detailed causal map | Also 'model of change'. the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change. In the 5C evaluation identified key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms) are traced through process tracing (for attribution question). |
| General causal map | Causal map with key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms), based on SPO perception. |
| GSS | Good Shepherd Sisters |
| GSSWC | Good Shepherd Services for Woman and Children |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MFS | Dutch co-financing system |
| MIS | Management Information System |
| MM | Mensen met een Missie |
| MoFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| OD | Organisational Development |
| PME | Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation |
| PRA | Priority Result Area |
| Process tracing | Theory-based approach to trace causal mechanisms |
| RCT | Randomized Control Trials |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |
| SSI | Semi-structured Interview |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| Wageningen UR | Wageningen University & Research centre |

# 1 Introduction & summary

## 1.1 Purpose and outline of the report

The Netherlands has a long tradition of public support for civil bi-lateral development cooperation, going back to the 1960s. The Co-Financing System (*Medefinancieringsstelsel*, or 'MFS') is its most recent expression. MFS II is the 2011-2015 grant framework for Co-Financing Agencies (CFAs), which is directed at achieving a sustainable reduction in poverty. A total of 20 consortia of Dutch CFAs have been awarded €1.9 billion in MFS II grants by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).

The overall aim of MFS II is to help strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. CFAs receiving MFS II funding work through strategic partnerships with Southern Partner Organisations.

The MFS II framework stipulates that each consortium is required to carry out independent external evaluations to be able to make valid, evaluative statements about the effective use of the available funding. On behalf of Dutch consortia receiving MFS II funding, NWO-WOTRO has issued three calls for proposals. Call deals with joint MFS II evaluations of development interventions at country level. Evaluations must comprise a baseline assessment in 2012 and a follow-up assessment in 2014 and should be arranged according to three categories of priority result areas as defined by MoFA:

Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) & themes;

Capacity development of Southern partner organisations (SPO) (5 c study);

Efforts to strengthen civil society.

This report focuses on the assessment of capacity development of southern partner organisations. This evaluation of the organisational capacity development of the SPOs is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The purpose of this report is to provide endline information on one of the SPOs involved in the evaluation: ECPAT in Indonesia. The baseline report is described in a separate document.

Chapter 2 describes general information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO). Here you can find general information about the SPO, the context in which the SPO operates, contracting details and background to the SPO. In chapter 3 a brief overview of the methodological approach is described. You can find a more detailed description of the methodological approach in appendix 1.Chapter 4 describes the results of the 5c endline study. It provides an overview of capacity development interventions of the SPO that have been supported by MFS II. It also describes what changes in organisational capacity have taken place since the baseline and why (evaluation question is 1 and 4). This is described as a summary of the indicators per capability as well as a general causal map that provides an overview of the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline, as experienced by the SPO. The complete overview of descriptions per indicator, and how these have changed since the baseline is described in appendix 3. The complete visual and narrative for the key organisational capacity changes that have taken place since the baseline according to the SPO staff present at the endline workshop is presented in appendix 4.

For those SPOs involved in process tracing a summary description of the causal maps for the identified organisational capacity changes in the two selected capabilities (capability to act and commit; capability to adapt and self-renew) is provided (evaluation questions 2 and 4). These causal maps

describe the identified key organisational capacity changes that are possibly related to MFS II interventions in these two capabilities, and how these changes have come about. More detailed information can be found in appendix 5.

Chapter 5 presents a discussion on the findings and methodology and a conclusion on the different evaluation questions.

The overall methodology for the endline study of capacity of southern partner organisations is coordinated between the 8 countries: Bangladesh (Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath; INTRAC); DRC (Disaster Studies, Wageningen UR); Ethiopia (CDI, Wageningen UR); India (CDI, Wageningen UR: Indonesia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Liberia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Pakistan (IDS; MetaMeta); (Uganda (ETC). Specific methodological variations to the approach carried out per country where CDI is involved are also described in this document.

This report is sent to the Co-Financing Agency (CFA) and the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO) for correcting factual errors and for final validation of the report.

## 1.2 Brief summary of analysis and findings

Since the baseline, two years ago, GSS has seen a slight improvement in the capability to act and commit. A greater number of training opportunities have increased staff skill and promoted the sharing of knowledge amongst sisters and volunteers. The capability to adapt and self-renew has slightly improved now that M&E application and understanding has improved. No changes occurred however in terms of the capability to deliver on development objectives. The capability to relate improved very slightly as GSS focussed its engagement on its biggest area of influence: the Catholic Church. Overall more engagement with target groups has taken place as well. No change has occurred in the capability to achieve coherence.

The evaluators considered it important to also note down the SPO's story in terms of changes in the organisation since the baseline, and this would also provide more information about reasons for change, which were difficult to get for the individual indicators. Also for some issues there may not have been relevant indicators available in the list of core indicators provided by the evaluation team. During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by GSS's staff: more effective work performance and improved case handling.

GSS has become more visible on the issues of single moms and trafficking largely due to the increased trust from stakeholders (donors, beneficiaries and partners). This can be attributed to more effective work performance, improved case handling and the fact that GSS has a better position in its network, which has allowed them to reach out to new partners, form new alliances and overall streamline operational processes.

More effective work performance resulted from better financial management, better job descriptions and better program directions. These last two developments can be attributed to improved organizational management skills, whilst better program directions resulted from the development of impact indicators as a result of better monitoring and evaluation. Mensen met een Missie supported GSS with a one week training on M&E in 2014, which contributed to this capacity improvement. The underlying improved organizational management skills came from improved staff capacity, which can be attributed to the sharing of knowledge from volunteers to the sisters. This in turn can be attributed to more volunteers being involved in GSS (supported by MFS II capacity training on anti-trafficking), as more RGS communities are collaborating with GSS, and the more active role that GSS plays in its network.

Improved case handling was enabled by improved advocacy skills and better technical support from GSS's network. Whilst the former results from the improved staff capacity, the latter is the result from a wider network, which enabled more support, as well as the direct support from three main dioceses.

In conclusion, according to the GSS staff present at the endline workshop, MFS II capacity development interventions can be tied to several of the organizational capacity changes as indicated by the SPO, although GSS did not specify exactly how. This was not the purpose of this particular exercise, since GSS was not selected for process tracing. It must be noted that the information

provided has not been validated through other sources of information, and therefore the conclusions must be understood in that respect.

# 2 General Information about the SPO – Good Shepherd Sisters

## 2.1 General information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO)

| | |
|---|---|
| **Country** | Indonesia |
| **Consortium** | Press Freedom 2.0 |
| **Responsible Dutch NGO** | Mensen met een Missie |
| **Project (if applicable)** | Prevention of human trafficking, crisis center and advocacy for victims |
| **Southern partner organisation** | Good Shepher Sisters |

The project/partner is part of the sample for the following evaluation component(s):

| | |
|---|---|
| **Achievement of MDGs and themes** | |
| **Capacity development of Southern partner organisations** | X |
| **Efforts to strengthen civil society** | |

## 2.2 The socio-economic, cultural and political context in which the partner operates

**The socio-economic, cultural and political context in which the partner operates**
Indonesia is known for being a transition country where mostly women and children are the victims of human trafficking. It is estimated that, every year, around 100.000 Indonesian women and children fall into the hands of traffickers, about 30% is below 18 years old. [1] More specifically, is estimated that each week 300 migrants, who have been abused or held imprisoned by the government, return from Malaysia and other countries to the harbor in Jakarta.

Good Shepherd Sisters works on preventing human trafficking by providing information through community and religious networks and by building community involvement as a means to decrease the incidence of human trafficking in the long-run.

Through community and religious networks GSS wants to disseminate information about complexity of this issue so that this knowledge should be published and subsequently in long term GSS wants to decrease human trafficking through community involvement by building sustainable way to prevent human trafficking.[2]

Religious network has strengthened GSS in dedicating themselves for women and children, since trafficking and single mom become an issue to be taken seriously by policy makers in Diocese of Ruteng , Jakarta , and Semarang . Both issues have been included in Catholic church's policy in those three dioceses. [3]

[1] Press Freedom 2.0 (2011) Beoordelingsmemo incl. kenschets ECPAT Indonesia – Onderzoek, monitoren en rapporteren van cases mbt seksuele uitbuiting van kinderen
[2] Good Shepherd Sisters (2014). Final Report.
[3] Annex Q . Observation Sheet (2014).

There are some local issues that trigger GSSWC policy becomes part of the diocesan policy that

- The vision of GSS WC is in line with "Arah Dasar Keuskupan Agung Semarang, Jakarta, and Ruteng"
- Consistency of GSSWC program since 2008
- Issue of trafficking becomes urgent local agenda that urged the church that takes religiois part for social issue.
- Issue of trafficking becomes global agenda urged the religious women. Declaration of 2008 was attended by 49 congregations, and GSS is one of the most active .
- Issue a single mom began to be accepted as a reality that must be addressed by the people to the diocese as a policy maker for many cases of single mom and trafficking .
- The implications of the inclusion of both these issues into the structure of diocese are:
- Cooperation with the diocese make GSSWC more easily obtain resources
- Part of funding for single mom was obtained from diocese.
- Stakeholders has changed paradigm of single mom
- Cooperation with the diocese enabled GSSWC in expanding network.

The 4 things mentioned above enabled anti- trafficking services and single mom is growing and become sustainable.[4]

At the same time Good Shepherd Sisters offers support and protection to victims by their crisis centers. The main target groups of Good Shepherd Sisters are women and children from rural areas and the poorer suburbs of urban and industrial areas. [5]

The project that receives MFSII funding through Press Freedom 2.0 is part of "Good Shepherd Services for women & children is active in three regions that are most affected by human trafficking: a) Ruteng (Flores), a poor and remote area where labor migration is common, thereby making the region prone to being a sending and transit area for human trafficking[6]; b) Batam (Riau Islands), is situated close to Singapore and as a result a hotspot for (forced) prostitution[7]; c) Jakarta. Good Shepherd Sisters employs the following activities in the three regions supported by the MFSII Project[8] :

1. **Jakarta**: Good Shepherd Sisters mostly focuses on advocacy, providing services to victims of trafficking and human development programs for the poor and single mothers. The activities include:
   - Anti-trafficking center (outreaching, sheltering, data gathering, disseminating issue, networking).
   - Single Mother Services (advocacy through research, strengthening individual and community, parenting programs, scholarship for children, vocational training).
   - Women empowerment program (income generating, training on gender).
   - Family and Youth Program (family counseling).

   Reunification (They pursued reunification of their client with their family members by calling them and inviting them to their shelter to meet and to accept their clients in whatever condition is).[9]
2. **Ruteng (Flores)**: the center in Flores is involved in rural community development and advocacy. The focus is on providing economic support and education opportunities especially to the family of migrant workers. The activities include:
   - Women Empowerment Program (Micro credit, monthly meeting, training on gender)
   - Scholarship for rural children.
   - Anti-trafficking Center (outreaching, sheltering, data gathering, disseminating data, networking). It also includes raising awareness through socialization to schools and parochial. In Ruteng they also give assistance to victims by providing a safe house, repatriation and

[4] Bahasa Indonesia_Notulensi_GSS (2014).
[5] Press Freedom 2.0 (2011) Beoordelingsmemo incl. kenschets Good Shepherd Sisters - Preventie vrouwenhandel en advocacy voor de slachtoffers
[6] Oteman, M. (2012) External Evaluation of Good Shepherd Sisters
[7] Oteman, M. (2012) External Evaluation of Good Shepherd Sisters
[8] Good Shepherd Sisters (2011) Project Proposal Anti-Trafficking Phase 2
[9] Good Shepherd Sisters (2014). Final Report.

reunification. Furthermore, there is health assistance for ex foreign workers who have returned home, and they work together with the government to provide HIV/AIDS tests.

3. **Batam**: main activities are around the crisis centre, it serves as a temporary shelter for women and girls in crisis situation. The activities include:
   - Community anti-trafficking program (teenage folk theatre, outreaching, data gathering, networking).
   - Crisis Center (sheltering).
   - Reunification

Capacity building for teachers of Good Shepherd Sister's teachers who taught in slum area. This activity is conducted to make teachers aware of trafficking and capable to facilitate discussion on human trafficking with parents of their students.

## 2.3 Contracting details

When did cooperation with this partner start: 1st July 2009.

What is the MFS II contracting period: 5-1-2013 to 4-1-2014

Did cooperation with this partner end: No

If yes, when did it finish: Not applicable

What is the reason for ending the cooperation with this partner: Not applicable

Is there expected cooperation with this partner after 31st of December 2015: Yes.

## 2.4 Background to the Southern Partner Organisation

**History**

The Good Shepherd Congregation was founded in 1835 in Angers (France) by Zr. Mary Euphrasia Pelletier. It is an international congregation with about 5,000 members and it operates in 73 countries on five continents. The Good Shepherd Sisters in Indonesia are founded in 1927 and are active in 8 different locations in Indonesia: Jakarta, Tangerang, Bogor, Bantul (near Yogyakarta) and Yogyakarta on Java, Marau (Kalimantan near Pontianak), Ruteng (Flores) and Batam (Riau Islands).[10]

For the detailed description of the history of the organization please see appendix A, where the historical time line of GSS is described as developed during the baseline workshop.

**Vision**

The vision of Good Shepherd Sisters is to"make visible the merciful God, the very best friend of each person who is wounded, marginalized, and morally fragile". [11]

**Mission**

Good Shepherd Sisters mission is: *"We are committed to reaching out each person with respect to living values and human dignity. We also bring the spirit of reconciliation be with our selves, other person, nature, and the almighty God."* Their goal is to bring: *"Services to those who are marginalized and broken, especially women and children."*[12]

[10] Oteman, M. (2012) External Evaluation of Good Shepherd Sisters
[11] Good Shepherd Sisters (2011) Project Proposal Anti-Trafficking Phase 2
[12] Good Shepherd Sisters (2011) Project Proposal Anti-Trafficking Phase 2

**Strategies**

For this project Good Shepherd Sisters formulated the following overall objective: *"Our purpose is to provide potential human trafficking victims information through various sources before they are trapped to migrate to other areas for anticipation of better future. Through community and religious networks we want to disseminate information about complexity of this issue so that this knowledge should be public and subsequently in long term we want to decrease human trafficking through community involvement by building sustainable way to prevent human trafficking."*[13]

The activities of Good Shepherd Sisters are dedicated to one of the following goals[14]:

To prevent people in sender area to be victim of trafficking
To provide direct services for victims of trafficking
To promote the importance of respecting human dignity that has been neglected by people in globalized world.

**Unit of analysis**

The unit of analysis is decided as GSS but the field work has been carried out at GSSWC, which is part of GSS Indonesia. GSS Indonesia is working in 9 Communities in 8 districts, while GSSWC is only working in 3 Communities in 3 districts. GSSWC received funds directly from MM not through GSS Indonesia, but is not a separate legal entity. The focus of this baseline has been on GSSWC.

[13] Good Shepherd Sisters (2011) Project Proposal Anti-Trafficking Phase 2
[14] Good Shepherd Sisters (2011) Project Proposal Anti-Trafficking Phase 2

# 3 Methodological approach and reflection

## 3.1 Overall methodological approach and reflection

This chapter describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

Note: this methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report A detailed overview of the approach is described in appendix 1.

The first (changes in organisational capacity) and the fourth evaluation question are addressed together through:

- **Changes in the 5C indicators since the baseline:** standard indicators have been agreed upon for each of the five capabilities of the five capabilities framework (see appendix 2) and changes between the baseline, and the endline situation have been described. For data collection a mix of data collection methods has been used, including self-assessments by SPO staff; interviews with SPO staff and externals; document review; observation. For data analysis, the Nvivo software program for qualitative data analysis has been used. Final descriptions per indicator and per capability with corresponding scores have been provided.
- **Key organisational capacity changes – 'general causal map':** during the endline workshop a brainstorm has been facilitated to generate the key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO since the baseline, with related underlying causes. For this purpose, a visual as well as a narrative causal map have been described.

In terms of the attribution question (2 and 4), **'process tracing'** is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to

focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

## 3.2 Assessing changes in organisational capacity and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?** And the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This is explained below. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

The evaluators considered it important to also note down a consolidated SPO story and this would also provide more information about what the SPO considered to be important in terms of organisational capacity changes since the baseline and how they perceived these key changes to have come about. Whilst this information has not been validated with sources other than SPO staff, it was considered important to understand how the SPOs has perceived changes in the organisation since the baseline.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information is provided for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the next session on the evaluation question on attribution, as described below and in the appendix 1.

How information was collected and analysed for addressing evaluation question 1 and 4, in terms of description of changes in indicators per capability as well as in terms of the general causal map, based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff, is further described below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012[15].

[15] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1. **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2. **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3. **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4. **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5. **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Please see appendix 1 for a description of the detailed process and steps.

## 3.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity - evaluation question 2 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: **To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?** and the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Below, the selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

### 3.3.1 Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

For the detailed results of this selection, in the four countries that CDI is involved in, please see appendix 1. The following SPOs were selected for process tracing:

- Ethiopia: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE (4/9)
- India: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE, VTRC (5/10)
- Indonesia: ASB, ECPAT, PtPPMA, YPI, YRBI (5/12)
- Liberia: BSC, RHRAP (2/5).

### 3.3.2 Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ' general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop

have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained. More information can be found in Appendix 1.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

### 3.3.3 Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team. These can also be found in appendix 1.

**Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach:** this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

**Using standard indicators and scores**: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

**General causal map:** whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

**Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question:** this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified

organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

**Utilisation of the evaluation**

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

**Design:** mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

**Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication:** many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

**5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process:** The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

# 4 Results

## 4.1 MFS II supported capacity development interventions

Below an overview of the different MFS II supported capacity development interventions of ECPAT that have taken place since 2011 are described. The information is based on the information provided by Mensen met een Missie.

Table 1
*Information about MFS II supported capacity development interventions since baseline*

| Title of the MFS II supported capacity development intervention | Objectives | Activities | Timing and duration | Budget |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MM Capacity Scan by Independent consultant in 2012 | Evaluate the organization's capacity development needs and highlight opportunities for growth | Capacity scan, evaluation report and recommendations for follow-up. Basis for collective as well as individual capacity building trajectories. | July-August 2012 | 2000 Euro |
| Capacity building on Anti-trafficking | Highlight Anti-trafficking mission of GSS in light of the organization | Discussion and workshop | August 2012 | 700 Euro |
| Training on law enforcement | Increasing knowledge on the processes of law enforcement | 3 day training and exchanging knowledge | 5-8 Februari 2012 | 6320 Euro |
| Project Cycle Management training | Increase knowledge on project cycle management | One week training on PCM | Late 2014 | 18000 Euro (for all partners in MFSII program – not exclusively ECPAT) |


Source: 5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_CFA perspective_Indonesia_ECPAT

## 4.2 Changes in capacity development and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

Below you can find a description of the changes in each of the five core capabilities. This information is based on the analysis of the information per each of the indicators. This detailed information for each of the indicators describes the current situation, and how and why it has changed since the baseline. See also annex 3.

### 4.2.1 Changes in the five core capabilities

**Capability to act and commit**





**Summary Capability to act and commit**

Mostly GSSWC is still in the same situation as it was during the baseline evaluation. The organization has a capable and dedicated team of staff and project leaders, although there is still a requirement to further enhance staff skills, particularly in the area of anti-trafficking. However, training has been provided in terms of community empowerment, working with victims of violence, networking, anti-trafficking training for religious leaders, finance management, and law in handling trafficking that funded mostly by MM, with a small number of training contributed independently by a consultant that came from the volunteer organisation. The staff is very motivated to do the work, mainly because of acting from their faith, even though financial benefits are minimal. However, they work under difficult conditions and a high workload. The leadership model in GSSWC is not hierarchical and there is no single person making the decisions, but decision-making can be inefficient and unclear. There have been no changes to the organizational structure of GSSWC and donors often don't understand the difference between GSS Indonesia Province and GSSWC as in the baseline. The GSS Indonesia Province has developed the strategic plan and this is adopted by the GSSWC. They discuss the vision, program, ideas, and strategies together with the project implementing persons, and day-to-day activities are based on the vision and mission of the organisation, but a strategic plan developed independently by GSSWC is lacking. It mostly refers to the GSS Indonesia Province strategic plan. However, the strategic plan for GSSWC is being developed for the period 2014-2020. GSS is still mainly depending on Mensen met een Missie (MM) for financial support, and generally they are lacking procedures to secure funding.

Score: From 2.8 to 2.9 (very slight improvement)

**Capability to adapt and self-renew**





There is still no comprehensive monitoring and evaluation system in place and the monitoring and evaluation is mainly focused on activities and outputs and mostly at the project level. This is a small organization taking on a tremendous and controversial topic in a sometimes hostile atmosphere. The issue taken care by the organization (trafficking, unwanted pregnancy or single mother) are uncommon issues discussed inside the church and to some extent might not conform to the church values. Learning and adaptation about this process and what works best is a reflective and iterative process, which the organization is well aware of. This learning is not always evaluated and / or planned systematically but it is recognized and receives sufficient follow-up. The main improvement in regard to this capability is that there is now a person responsible for monitoring and evaluation, and the position is embedded to the roles of program manager. This person requests bimonthly reports from the different regions and there is a special monitoring and evaluation meeting once or twice a year. However, monitoring and evaluation mainly remains in the hands of this monitoring and evaluation officer and there is a need to enhance the capacity and responsibility of the regions in monitoring and evaluation. At GSS the different communities of sisters have a meeting every 2 weeks. For GSSWC the internal contacts are planned more informally. During these meetings work related issues are discussed. For now only one M&E person (the program manager) member tries to contact the project every month to follow the M&E developments.

In general, GSS is a very participative organization and all feedback from staff and others is welcome and is taken seriously. The leaders are very open to input, and let people know what they have done with it. The strength of the GSSWC is their network with all relevant local stakeholders, which includes beneficiaries but also locations and connections such as hospitals, law enforcement agencies, local government, airport customs, ports, and shelters. GSS works closely together with the diocese and this has resulted in a good work atmosphere and mutual strengthening, which also supports the organisation in tracking the environment. There is no systematic assessment of services in place for future strategies, since the organisation mainly focuses on monitoring of activities and outputs at the project level, not outcomes and impact. .

Score: from 2.9 to 3.1 (very slight improvement)

**Capability to deliver on development objectives**





The endline showed the same quality as the baseline. The GSSWC continues to work according to operational plans, but their activities cannot always be planned. For example when confronted with a victim of abuse, they have to adapt to the situation and environment at hand. The number of victims cannot be predicted beforehand. They have guidelines on how to work with vulnerable people. It may not have been formalized into protocols, but they all know what to do. Furthermore, each project has an operational work plan and budget that is used for day to day operations. Often however, there is not enough funding and they must choose which activities can be implemented or look for help from other people. Staff compensation in terms of salary remains low. Office facilities are limited which forces staff members to bring their own equipment, like computer or vehicles, but they can get reimbursement for transportation costs. In this way organizational costs are kept low and the staff therefore feels that they work cost-effectively. Moreover, the implementation of program activities are supported by many volunteers. GSS continuous to deliver outputs on time and presents the results in reports managed by the program managers. The organization makes a point of staying lean and adaptive, and may alter plans, outputs and activities if they feel that this is in the beneficiaries' best interest.

Close communication and involvement of the beneficiaries remains key to GSSWC's working approach that has remained unchanged over the last two years. Beneficiaries are included in the formulation and design of programs, but also in the assessment of their impact through active discussions. They also gather information on delivered services for beneficiaries need through surveys in which questionnaires are disseminated through the parish church. Similar to M&E there is no formal system that allows GSSWC to monitor its efficiency. GSSWC adopts a very flexible way of managing programs and can change directions during their implementation. This makes monitoring of efficiency difficult.

Score: From 3.2 to 3.2 (no change)


**Capability to relate**




The network of the GSSWC can be considered selective with a strong focus on Catholic partners like dioceses, parishioners, bishops, members of different church commissions and congregations, and local volunteers. However, they do not engage external groups in developing GSSWC policies and strategies however. GSS realizes that they need to invest more in external partners on the level of developing their own policies and strategies The GSSWC works together with institutions that are relevant to their beneficiaries. Their network is well established, extending all over Indonesia. The sisters make regular visits to their target groups. There is a monthly meeting of the single mother community in Jakarta, the sisters visit victims of trafficking in Bambu Apus every week, and they have daily interaction in their own shelters. There is an open atmosphere and everyone is free to speak their mind. This can be done informally and if necessary over the phone, but there are also more formal opportunities to do so in the form of regular meetings.

Score: From 3.4 to 3.6 (very slight improvement)

**Capability to achieve coherence**



The end line showed the same quality as the baseline. GSSWC is part of an GSS Indonesia Province which falls under an international congegration. The vision and mission are decided at the international level, and are then specified according to the situation in Indonesia. The program manager and coordinator discuss the vision and mission every year before starting to plan for a new program, and the projects are in line with the vision and mission and also contextualized. In one place it is rescue, in another it is prevention. So the strategies depend on location, context and how the project coordinators form the link among them. Efforts in one project complement and support efforts in other projects  for example the program on economic empowerment supports the program aimed at single mothers, which in turn supports the anti-trafficking program. In terms of having operational guidelines, GSSWC as a number of guidelines in place, for example on how to work with vulnerable groups. However, guidelines will be different between the three regions because of their different situation, and they will not cover all activities.

Score: From 2.9 to 2.9 (no change)

### 4.2.2 General changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO

During the end line workshop at GSS, a discussion was held around what staff perceived as the key changes in in the organization since the baseline. This then led to a discussion on what were the key organizational capacity changes and why these changes have taken place according to staff present at the end line workshop. The discussion resulted in a 'general causal map' which is described below. The general causal map provides a comprehensive picture of organizational capacity changes that took place since the baseline, based on the perspective of GSS staff present at the end line workshop.

Since the baseline in 2012, several key organisational capacity changes have occurred within GSS. First of all, the organization shifted its' focus more towards the issues of single mothers and trafficking.Globally, there has been a movement within the churches to have emphasise these issues more. The movement is mostly driven by female religious leaders. GSS has also been known as the organisation that consistenly workson these issues.


With this new focusthe organization has become more visible in dealing with the issues of single moms and trafficking [1]. According to GSS staff present at the endline workshop, increased trust of stakeholders and beneficiaries in GSS to deal with these issues [2], has led to an increase in sponsored activities but also the spread of GSS's reputation in these issues.

The increase in stakeholder trust came about from three main developments:

1. First of all GSS's better positioning in the network [16] has allowed them to reach out to new partners, form new alliances and overall streamline operational processes.
2. Secondly, an increase in effective work performance [3].
3. Thirdly improved case handling and quality of work [4] played an important role in partners and beneficiaries development of faith in the organization.

The increase in effective work performance [3] can be related to a greater focus on specifying the work at hand. This was achieved by providing better job descriptions [5] on the one hand, and offer better overal program directions [7] on the other. The former was the direct result of a general improvement in organizational management skills and attitude [12], whilst the latter resulted from the development of clear indicators [10] which came about from improved monitoring and evaluation (M&E) practices [11]. These M&E practices were also part of overall improved organizational management skills.

These skills themselves were developed alongside a general improvement in staff capacity [13]. Staff and volunteers of GSS now have better advocacy, counseling and facilitation,and organisational management skills (financial, ME and human resources). Improved staff capacity [13] came about from an increasing degree of sharing knowledge between staff members, particularly from the field volunteers to the sisters responsible for running the programs. Narrowing the knowledge gap between field and program staff was a good starting point to specify and focus program activities to become more practice oriented.


Organization is becoming more visible on the issues of single moms and trafficking [1]
Increased trust from stakeholders (donors, beneficiaries, partners) [2]
Effective work performance [3]
Improved case handling [4]
Better job descriptions [5]
Better Financial Management [6]
Better program directions [7]
Improved advocacy skills [8]
Better technical suppport from the networks [9]
Impact indicators developed [10]
Better M&E [11]
Improved organizational management skills [12]
Improved staff capacity [13]
Sharing knowledge from volunteers to sisters [14]
Wider network [15]
GSS has a better position in its network [16]
More volunteers involved in the organization [17]
More RGS communities working collaboratively with GSS [18]
Support from 3 main dioceses is strengthened [19]

The need to share knowledgefrom volunteers to the sisters resulted from three developments. Firstly, GSS has a better position in its network. By involving Catholic Church especially diocese, enabled GSS has a better position in networking. The diocese has its power and it encouraged more Religious of Good Shepherd (RGS) communities to join and to involve GSS in serving people to decrease number of trafficking. RGS is one of congregation (Roman Catholic Religious Institute). It is abbreviated from Religious of Good Shepherd. When the human resource was proper in quality and quantity, it enabled knowledge sharing from volunteers to sisters. [14]. Secondly, an overal increase of volunteers in the organization and work activities occurred, which is made easier to share knowledge and information between volunteers and sisters. Thirdly, more RGS communities now work together with GSS, which calls for increased coordination and communication, and thus also sharing of information and knowledge.

The third and final big factor influencing the increased trust of shareholders in GSS came about from their ability to handle cases better [4]. For instance GSS has succesfully supported the establishment of Perdes (Village Regulation) in Ruteng to prevent traficking. This improvement resulted from an overall improvement in the organizations advocacy skills [8], which came along with the overall increase in staff capacity [13] and knowledge exchange with partner organizations and volunteers [14]. The second big reason why cases were handled better was that over the last two years the techical support from within GSS networks have greatly increased. This has enabled GSS to tap the expertise and in–depth knowledge of partners in the network if required.

The latter came about from more intensive networking which resulted in a wider overal network [15] on the one hand, but also the internal strengthening of GSS through the combination of efforts among three dioceses (church administrations) in Jakarta, Semarang and Ruteng [19].

On the whole, improved staff capacity as well as improved networking have been the main underlying reasons, leading to changes that led to improved trust from stakeholders, which has helped the organisation to become more visible the issues of single mothers and trafficking.

# 5 Discussion and conclusion

## 5.1 Methodological issues

**General: Applied to all or most SPOs**

With regard to the methodology, Indonesia has made some data collection adjustment based on the context. The first adjustment was related to the type of instrument used. To assess the organizational capacity, the study has provided self-assessment, observation and interview sheets. These all were used during the baseline with all SPOs. During the end line the team used self-assessment, interview and observation sheets. However the evaluator applied interview sheets as self-assessment—where participants were asked to fill these sheets by themselves. For the participants who did not attend the workshop, the interviews were done separately using the interview sheet and the results from the interview were included in the subgroup interview sheet that was already filled by the staff member. Were combined into the relevant sub categories in the interview sheet. Interview sheets were also applied for interviews with the CFAs, partners and consultants.

The baseline study showed that having two similar instruments (self assessments, and interview sheets) did not have any effect in relation to obtaining adequate and quality data.

To have some clarification post visit to all SPOs, the evaluator used email and phone interviews.


**Good Shepher's Sister (GSS)**

Only three people who have strong knowledge of GSS and its relation with MM funding attended the endline workshop, they are the Coordinator of GSSWC, Program Manager Tangerang District and Field Staff of Tangerang District. These three people are the only people at headquarters to organise all the activities. The interview with one partner, a leader of the Diocese in Ruteng District, was not conducted was difficult to contact. The other partner, a key person who was actively involved in the program in Tangerang District was contacted to attend the endline workshop but she cancelled the attendance due to her other commitments. She was interviewed by email and the evaluator got her response. An interview with the organizational development consultant of the organization (financial consultant) was also conducted. In the GSS, there is no particular staff assigned for monitoring and evaluation, therefore no interview for this position was conducted. However, the information related to M&E was obtained from the Program Manager who has basic research and monitoring experience. The evaluator sent out all the interview sheets to all three working areas and, two out of three self-assessment sheets that were sent to Tangerang District were returned back before the field visit, but no response was obtained for two others districts.

## 5.2 Changes in organisational capacity development

This section aims to provide an answer to the first and fourth evaluation questions:

1. *What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?*
4. *What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?*




Overall the changes in relation to the five capabilities have remained small. Out of the five, the capability to adapt and self renew has shown the greatest change. Below the changes in each of the capabilities are further explained, by referring to the specific indicators that changed.

The capability to act and commit improved slightly. Staff skills have improved slightly due to knowledge sharing between sisters and volunteers and a small increase in the number of training topics provided. Training opportunities improved as more were now available compared to 2012. These included training sessions on community empowerment, working with victims of violence, networking, anti-trafficking training for religious leaders, finance management, and law in handling trafficking.

As mentioned before, in the capability to adapt and self-renew, improvements could be seen. M&E application has improved slightly now that the organisation has a better understanding about the application and need of M&E than it did in 2012. Similarly, M&E competencies improved with the appointment of a program manager with a solid understanding of M&E.

No changes have occurred in terms of the capability to deliver development objectives.

The capability to relate improved very slightly in terms of its networking capacity. A slight improvement has occurred in the engagement in networks as the organisation has chosen to invest in its biggest area of influence: the Catholic Church. Currently GSS builds a relation with strategic institutions in implementing their work such as IOM to handle trafficking victims. A very slight improvement occurred in the engagement with target groups as well: In Batam the sisters have started with a "walk-in'' centre for working women in the prostitution areas of Batam. In this way they spend time with the women to provide counselling and teach practical skills such as computer usage, sewing, cooking and beauty classes.

No change has occurred in the capability to achieve coherence.

**General organisational capacity changes related to MFS II Interventions**

The evaluators considered it important to also note down the SPO's story in terms of changes in the organisation since the baseline, and this would also provide more information about reasons for change, which were difficult to get for the individual indicators. Also for some issues there may not have been relevant indicators available in the list of core indicators provide by the evaluation team. Please note that this information is based only on the information provided by GSS staff during the endline workshop, but no validation of this information has been done like with the process tracing causal maps. For details in relation to attribution, we refer to the next section (5.3).

During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by GSS staff, these have been captured in the general causal map in 4.2.2: more effective work performance and

improved case handling. This was expected to contribute to GSS becoming more visible on the issues of single moms and trafficking. GSS staff experienced this as the most important capacity change in the organisation since the baseline.

GSS has become more visible on the issues of single moms and trafficking largely due to the increased trust from stakeholders (donors, beneficiaries and partners). This can be attributed to more effective work performance, improved case handling and the fact that GSS has a better position in its network, which has allowed them to reach out to new partners, form new alliances and overall streamline operational processes.

More effective work performance resulted from better financial management, better job descriptions and better program directions. These last two developments can be attributed to improved organizational management skills, whilst better program directions resulted from the development of impact indicators as a result of better monitoring and evaluation. Mensen met een Missie supported GSS with a one week training on M&E in 2014, which contributed to this capacity improvement. The underlying improved organizational management skills came from improved staff capacity, which can be attributed to the sharing of knowledge from volunteers to the sisters. This in turn can be attributed to more volunteers being involved in GSS (supported by MFS II capacity training on anti-trafficking), as more RGS communities are collaborating with GSS, and the more active role that GSS plays in its network.

Improved case handling was enabled by improved advocacy skills and better technical support from GSS's network. Whilst the former results from the improved staff capacity, the latter is the result from a wider network which enabled more support, as well as the direct support from three main dioceses.

In conclusion, according to the GSS staff present at the endline workshop, MFS II capacity development interventions can be tied to several of the organizational capacity changes as indicated by the SPO, although GSS did not specify exactly how. This was not the purpose of this particular exercise, since GSS was not selected for process tracing. It must be noted that the information provided has not been validated through other sources of information, and therefore the conclusions must be understood in that respect.

# References and Resources


**Overall evaluation methodology**

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**Research documentation and resources received from CFA/SPO:**

1. Project proposal 2012.doc
2. Budget 2012.pdf
2. Budget 2012.xlsx
3. Beoordelingsmemo 2012.doc
4. Revised budget 2012.doc
5. Letter of approval 2012.doc

6a. Final report 2012.doc

6b. Foto Documentation trafficking project 2012.pdf
7. Evaluation MEMO MM 2012.doc
MM Final Report single mother 2012.doc
MM Final Report-anti trafficking 2012.doc
1. Proposal 2013.doc
2. 2012.10.01 Evaluation Good Shepherd Sisters.docx
3. Beoordelingsmemo 2013.docx
4. Contract 2013.pdf
5. Answers to questions 2013.docx
6. Revised budget 2013.doc
7. Work visit notes.pdf
8a. Sanne - MM staff at RGS for capacity building.pdf
8b. Sanne - Job description.doc
8c. Eefje - MM staff at RGS for capacity building.pdf
8d. Eefje - Job description.docx
Annex 1 - B 5C endline GSS.pdf
Annex 2 - B 5C endline GSS (final report 2011).doc
Annex 3 - B 5C endline GSS - evaluation report complete PRIVATE.pdf
Annex 4 - B 5C endline GSS - Indonesia full report.pdf
Annex 5 - B 5C endline GSS - JPAI training.docx
Annex 6 - MM Final Report-anti trafficking 2012.docx
Annex 7 - B 5C endline ECPAT - PCM training proposal.docx
Annex 8 - MM Final Report-anti trafficking 2013.pdf
MM Final Report single mother 2013.pdf
MM Final Report-anti trafficking 2013.pdf
Annex A 5c endline Indonesia GSS Mensen met een Missie_DEF.doc
Annex B_5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_CFA perspective_Indonesia_GSS_MensenmeteenMissie_DEF.doc
Annex R_5c endline_observable indicators at SPO_Indoneisa_GSS.docx
BAHAS-Annex Q_5c endline observation sheet_Indonesia_GSS.doc
BAHASA- Annex  endline interview guide_subgroup_parnert_Kristi Poewandari_Indonesia_GSS.docx
BAHASA-Annex C-endline_support to capacity development sheet_SPO perspective_Indonesia_GSS.doc
BAHASA-Annex E_5c endline interview guide_OD consultants_selected indicators_Indonesia_GSS.docx
BAHASA-Annex L_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_management_selected indicators_Indonesia_GSS.doc
BAHASA-Annex M_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_program staff_selected indicators_Indonesia_GSS.doc
BAHASA-Annex P_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_field staff_selected indicators_Indonesia_GSS.doc
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# List of Respondents

### People Present at the Workshops

**Date:** **30 June – 1 July 2014** **Organisation: Good Shepherd Sisters**

| NAME | ROLE IN THE ORGANISATION | DURATION OF SERVICE | PHONE | E-MAIL |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Management** | | | | |
| SusterCaeciliaSupriyati, RGS | Coordinator of GSSWC | 12 years | 0813-8016-305 | cecil_rgs@yahoo.com |
| **Program/ Project staff** | | | | |
| Imakulata Kurniasanti | Program Manager | 5 years | 0858-8185-6478 | gsswc.id@gmail.com |
| **Field staff staff** | | | | |
| Sister Tasiana Emi, RGS | Field staff | 5 years | 0813-8313-3419 | siana_rgs@yahoo.com |

### List of People Interviewed

**Date:** **30 June – 1 July 2014** **Organisation: Good Shepherd Sisters**

| NAME | ROLE IN THE ORGANISATION | DURATION OF SERVICE | PHONE | E-MAIL |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Management** | | | | |
| SusterCaeciliaSupriyati, RGS | Coordinator of GSSWC | 12 years | 0813-8016-305 | cecil_rgs@yahoo.com |
| **Program/ Project staff** | | | | |
| ImakulataKurniasanti | Program Manager | 5 years | 0858-8185-6478 | gsswc.id@gmail.com |
| **Field staff staff** | | | | |
| Sister Tasiana Emi, RGS | Field staff | 3 years | 0813-8313-3419 | siana_rgs@yahoo.com |
| **Others** | | | | |
| Ambar | Consultant | 2 years | | |

# Appendix 1 Methodological approach & reflection

## Introduction

This appendix describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around four key evaluation questions:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

Note: the methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report. At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

## Changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 1

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?**

This question was mainly addressed by reviewing changes in 5c indicators, but additionally a 'general causal map' based on the SPO perspective on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline has been developed. Each of these is further explained below. The development of the general causal map is integrated in the steps for the endline workshop, as mentioned below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012.[16] Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1. **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2. **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3. **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4. **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5. **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

[16] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Below each of these steps is further explained.

*Step 1. Provide the **description of indicators** in the relevant formats – CDI team*

- These formats were to be used when collecting data from SPO staff, CFA, partners, and consultants. For each of these respondents different formats have been developed, based on the list of 5C indicators, similar to the procedure that was used during the baseline assessment. The CDI team needed to add the 2012 baseline description of each indicator. The idea was that each respondent would be requested to review each description per indicator, and indicate whether the current situation is different from the baseline situation, how this situation has changed, and what the reasons for the changes in indicators are. At the end of each format, a more general question is added that addresses how the organisation has changed its capacity since the baseline, and what possible reasons for change exist. Please see below the questions asked for each indicator as well as the more general questions at the end of the list of indicators.

General questions about key changes in the capacity of the SPO

*What do you consider to be the key changes in terms of how the organisation/ SPO has developed its capacity since the baseline (2012)?*

*What do you consider to be the main explanatory reasons (interventions, actors or factors) for these changes?*

**List of questions to be asked for each of the 5C indicators** (The entry point is the the description of each indicator as in the 2012 baseline report):

1. *How has the situation of this indicator changed compared to the situation during the baseline in 2012? Please tick one of the following scores:*
   - -2 = Considerable deterioration
   - -1 = A slight deterioration
   - 0 = No change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012
   - +1 = Slight improvement
   - +2 = Considerable improvement
2. *Please describe what exactly has changed since the baseline in 2012*

3. *What interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation in 2012? Please tick and describe what interventions, actors or factors influenced this indicator, and how. You can tick and describe more than one choice.*
   - Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by **SPO**: ..... .
   - Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **Dutch CFA (MFS II funding)**: .... .
   - Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **other funders**: ..... .
   - **Other** interventions, actors or factors: ..... .
   - Don't know.

*Step 2. **Review** the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team*

Before the in-country team and the CDI team started collecting data in the field, it was important that they reviewed the description for each indicator as described in the baseline reports, and also added to the endline formats for review by respondents. These descriptions are based on document review, observation, interviews with SPO staff, CFA staff and external respondents during the baseline. It was important to explain this to respondents before they filled in the formats.

*Step 3. **Send the formats** adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)*

The CDI team was responsible for collecting data from the CFA:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – CFA perspective.

The in-country team was responsible for collecting data from the SPO and from external respondents (except CFA). The following formats were sent before the fieldwork started:

- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – SPO perspective.
- 5C Endline interview guides for externals: partners; OD consultants.

*Step 4. **Collect, upload & code the documents** from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team*

The CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team, collected the following documents from SPOs and CFAs:

- Project documents: project proposal, budget, contract (Note that for some SPOs there is a contract for the full MFS II period 2011-2015; for others there is a yearly or 2-yearly contract. All new contracts since the baseline in 2012 will need to be collected);
- Technical and financial progress reports since the baseline in 2012;.
- Mid-term evaluation reports;
- End of project-evaluation reports (by the SPO itself or by external evaluators);
- Contract intake forms (assessments of the SPO by the CFA) or organisational assessment scans made by the CFA that cover the 2011-2014 period;
- Consultant reports on specific inputs provided to the SPO in terms of organisational capacity development;
- Training reports (for the SPO; for alliance partners, including the SPO);
- Organisational scans/ assessments, carried out by the CFA or by the Alliance Assessments;
- Monitoring protocol reports, especially for the 5C study carried out by the MFS II Alliances;
- Annual progress reports of the CFA and of the Alliance in relation to capacity development of the SPOs in the particular country;
- Specific reports that are related to capacity development of SPOs in a particular country.

The following documents (since the baseline in 2012) were requested from SPO:

- Annual progress reports;
- Annual financial reports and audit reports;
- Organisational structure vision and mission since the baseline in 2012;
- Strategic plans;

- Business plans;
- Project/ programme planning documents;
- Annual work plan and budgets;
- Operational manuals;
- Organisational and policy documents: finance, human resource development, etc.;
- Monitoring and evaluation strategy and implementation plans;
- Evaluation reports;
- Staff training reports;
- Organisational capacity reports from development consultants.

The CDI team will coded these documents in NVivo (qualitative data analysis software program) against the 5C indicators.

*Step 5.* ***Prepare and organise the field visit*** *to the SPO – in-country team*

Meanwhile the in-country team prepared and organised the logistics for the field visit to the SPO:

- **General endline workshop** consisted about one day for the self-assessments (about ½ to ¾ of the day) and brainstorm (about 1 to 2 hours) on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline and underlying interventions, factors and actors ('general causal map'), see also explanation below. This was done with the five categories of key staff: managers; project/ programme staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin & HRM staff; field staff. Note: for SPOs involved in process tracing an additional 1 to 1½ day workshop (managers; program/project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff) was necessary. See also step 7;
- **Interviews with SPO staff** (roughly one day);
- **Interviews with external respondents** such as partners and organisational development consultants depending on their proximity to the SPO. These interviews coulc be scheduled after the endline workshop and interviews with SPO staff.

General causal map

During the 5C endline process, a 'general causal map' has been developed, based on key organisational capacity changes and underlying causes for these changes, as perceived by the SPO. The general causal map describes cause-effect relationships, and is described both as a visual as well as a narrative.

As much as possible the same people that were involved in the baseline were also involved in the endline workshop and interviews.

*Step 6.* ***Interview the CFA*** *– CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for sending the sheets/ formats to the CFA and for doing a follow-up interview on the basis of the information provided so as to clarify or deepen the information provided. This relates to:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet - CFA perspective.

*Step 7.* ***Run the endline workshop*** *with the SPO – in-country team*

This included running the endline workshop, including facilitation of the development of the general causal map, self-assessments, interviews and observations. Particularly for those SPOs that were selected for process tracing all the relevant information needed to be analysed prior to the field visit, so as to develop an initial causal map. Please see Step 6 and also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two).

An endline workshop with the SPO was intended to:

- Explain the purpose of the fieldwork;
- Carry out in the self-assessments by SPO staff subgroups (unless these have already been filled prior to the field visits) - this may take some 3 hours.
- Facilitate a brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012 and underlying interventions, factors and actors.

***Purpose of the fieldwork*:** to collect data that help to provide information on what changes took place in terms of organisational capacity development of the SPO as well as reasons for these changes. The baseline that was carried out in 2012 was to be used as a point of reference.

***Brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes and influencing factors***: a brainstorm was facilitated on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012. In order to kick start the discussion, staff were reminded of the key findings related to the historical time line carried out in the baseline (vision, mission, strategies, funding, staff). This was then used to generate a discussion on key changes that happened in the organisation since the baseline (on cards). Then cards were selected that were related to organisational capacity changes, and organised. Then a 'general causal map' was developed, based on these key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change as experienced by the SPO staff. This was documented as a visual and narrative.This general causal map was to get the story of the SPO on what they perceived as key organisational capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline, in addition to the specific details provided per indicator.

***Self-assessments*:** respondents worked in the respective staff function groups: management; programme/ project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin and HRM staff; field staff. Staff were assisted where necessary so that they could really understand what it was they were being asked to do as well as what the descriptions under each indicator meant.

Note: for those SPOs selected for process tracing an additional endline workshop was held to facilitate the development of detailed causal maps for each of the identified organisational change/ outcome areas that fall under the capability to act and commit, and under the capability to adapt and self-renew, and that are likely related to capacity development interventions by the CFA. See also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two). It was up to the in-country team whether this workshop was held straight after the initial endline workshop or after the workshop and the follow-up interviews. It could also be held as a separate workshop at another time.

*Step 8.* ***Interview SPO staff*** *– in-country team*

After the endline workshop (developing the general causal map and carrying out self-assessments in subgroups), interviews were held with SPO staff (subgroups) to follow up on the information that was provided in the self-assessment sheets, and to interview staff that had not yet provided any information.

*Step 9.* ***Fill-in observation sheets*** *– in-country team*

During the visit at the SPO, the in-country team had to fill in two sheets based on their observation:

- 5C Endline observation sheet;
- 5C Endline observable indicators.

*Step 10.* ***Interview externals*** *– in-country team & CDI team*

The in-country team also needed to interview the partners of the SPO as well as organisational capacity development consultants that have provided support to the SPO. The CDI team interviewed the CFA.

*Step 11.* ***Upload and auto-code all the formats*** *collected by in-country team and CDI team – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for uploading and auto-coding (in Nvivo) of the documents that were collected by the in-country team and by the CDI team.

*Step 12. Provide the **overview of information** per 5C indicator to in-country team – CDI team*

After the analysis in NVivo, the CDI team provided a copy of all the information generated per indicator to the in-country team for initial analysis.

*Step 13. **Analyse the data and develop a draft description** of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team*

The in-country team provided a draft description of the findings per indicator, based on the information generated per indicator. The information generated under the general questions were linked to the general causal map or detailed process tracing related causal map.

*Step 14. **Analyse the data and finalize the description** of the findings per indicator, per capability and general – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for checking the analysis by the in-country team with the Nvivo generated data and to make suggestions for improvement and ask questions for clarification to which the in-country team responded. The CDI team then finalised the analysis and provided final descriptions and scores per indicator and also summarize these per capability and calculated the summary capability scores based on the average of all indicators by capability.

*Step 15. **Analyse the information** in the general causal map –in-country team & CDI team*

The general causal map based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff present at the workshop, was further detailed by in-country team and CDI team, and based on the notes made during the workshop and where necessary additional follow up with the SPO. The visual and narrative was finalized after feedback by the SPO. During analysis of the general causal map relationships with MFS II support for capacity development and other factors and actors were identified. All the information has been reviewed by the SPO and CFA.

## Attributing changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 2

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: ***To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?***

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process. The box below provides some background information on process tracing.

Background information on process tracing

The essence of process tracing research is that scholars want to go beyond merely identifying correlations between independent variables (Xs) and outcomes (Ys). Process tracing in social science is commonly defined by its addition to trace causal mechanisms (Bennett, 2008a, 2008b; Checkle, 2008; George & Bennett, 2005). A causal mechanism can be defined as "a complex system which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts" (Glennan, 1996, p. 52). Process tracing involves "attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable" (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 206-207).

Process tracing can be differentiated into three variants within social science: theory testing, theory building, and explaining outcome process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

- Theory testing process tracing uses a theory from the existing literature and then tests whether evidence shows that each part of hypothesised causal mechanism is present in a given case, enabling within case inferences about whether the mechanism functioned as expected in the case and whether the mechanism as a whole was present. No claims can be made however, about whether the mechanism was the only cause of the outcome.
- Theory building process tracing seeks to build generalizable theoretical explanations from empirical evidence, inferring that a more general causal mechanism exists from the fact of a particular case.
- Finally, explaining outcome process tracing attempts to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific historical case. Here the aim is not to build or test more general theories but to craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case centric than theory oriented.

Explaining outcome process tracing is the most suitable type of process tracing for analysing the causal mechanisms for selected key organisational capacity changes of the SPOs. This type of process tracing can be thought of as a single outcome study defined as seeking the causes of the specific outcome in a single case (Gerring, 2006; in: Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Here the ambition is to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a particular outcome, with sufficiency defined as an explanation that accounts for all of the important aspects of an outcome with no redundant parts being present (Mackie, 1965).

Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research strategy that aims to trace the complex conglomerate of systematic and case specific causal mechanisms that produced the outcome in question. The explanation cannot be detached from the particular case. Explaining outcome process tracing refers to case studies whose primary ambition is to explain particular historical outcomes, although the findings of the case can also speak to other potential cases of the phenomenon. Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research process in which 'theories' are tested to see whether they can provide a minimally sufficient explanation of the outcome. Minimal sufficiency is defined as an explanation that accounts for an outcome, with no redundant parts. In most explaining outcome studies, existing theorisation cannot provide a sufficient explanation, resulting in a second stage in which existing theories are re-conceptualised in light of the evidence gathered in the preceding empirical analysis. The conceptualisation phase in explaining outcome process tracing is therefore an iterative research process, with initial mechanisms re-conceptualised and tested until the result is a theorised mechanism that provides a minimally sufficient explanation of the particular outcome.

Below a description is provided of how SPOs are selected for process tracing, and a description is provided on how this process tracing is to be carried out. Note that this description of process tracing provides not only information on the extent to which the changes in organisational development can be attributed to MFS II (evaluation question 2), but also provides information on other contributing factors and actors (evaluation question 4). Furthermore, it must be noted that the evaluation team has developed an adapted form of 'explaining outcome process tracing', since the data collection and analysis was an iterative process of research so as to establish the most realistic explanation for a particular outcome/ organisational capacity change. Below selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

**Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing**

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the

purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

**ETHIOPIA**

For Ethiopia the capabilities that are mostly targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 1

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Ethiopia*

| Capability to: | AMREF | CARE | ECFA | FSCE | HOA-REC | HUNDEE | NVEA | OSRA | TTCA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Relate | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| Achieve coherence | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Ethiopia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE. In fact, six SPOs would be suitable for process tracing. We just selected the first one per CFA following the criteria of not including more than one SPO per CFA for process tracing

Table 2

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Ethiopia*

| Ethiopia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AMREF | Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | AMREF NL | Yes |
| CARE | Dec 31, 2015 | Partly | Yes | Yes | Yes – slightly | CARE Netherlands | No - not fully matching |
| ECFA | Jan 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Child Helpline International | Yes |
| FSCE | Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN); Note: no info from Defence for Children – ECPAT Netherlands | Yes |
| HOA-REC | Sustainable Energy project (ICCO Alliance): 2014<br>Innovative WASH (WASH Alliance): Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes - slightly | ICCO | No - not fully matching |
| HUNDEE | Dec 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO & IICD | Yes |
| NVEA | Dec 2015 (both) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Edukans Foundation (under two consortia); Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN) | Suitable but SKN already involved for process tracing FSCE |
| OSRA | C4C Alliance project (farmers marketing): December 2014<br>ICCO Alliance project (zero grazing: 2014 (2nd phase) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO & IICD | Suitable but ICCO & IICD already involved for process tracing - HUNDEE |
| TTCA | June 2015 | Partly | Yes | No | Yes | Edukans Foundation | No - not fully matching |

**INDIA**

For India the capability that is mostly targeted by CFAs is the capability to act and commit. The next one in line is the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below in which a higher score means that the specific capability is more intensively targeted.

Table 3

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – India*[17]

| Capability to: | BVHA | COUNT | DRISTI | FFID | Jana Vikas | Samarthak Samiti | SMILE | SDS | VTRC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 5 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 4 |
| Relate | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, India.

Below you can see a table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether SPO and the CFA both expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE and VTRC. Except for SMILE (capability to act and commit only), for the other SPOs the focus for process tracing can be on the capability to act and commit and on the capability to adapt and self-renew.

Table 4

*SPOs selected for process tracing – India*

| India – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BVHA | 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Simavi | Yes; both capabilities |
| COUNT | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Woord en Daad | Yes; both capabilities |
| DRISTI | 31-03-2012 | Yes | Yes | No | no | Hivos | No - closed in 2012 |
| FFID | 30-09-2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |

[17] RGVN, NEDSF and Women's Rights Forum (WRF) could not be reached timely during the baseline due to security reasons. WRF could not be reached at all. Therefore these SPOs are not included in Table 1.

| India – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jana Vikas | 2013 | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No - contract is and the by now; not fully matching focus |
| NEDSF | | | | | | | No – delayed baseline |
| RGVN | | | | | | | No - delayed baseline |
| Samarthak Samiti (SDS) | 2013 possibly longer | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Hivos | No - not certain of end date and not fully matching focus |
| Shivi Development Society (SDS) | Dec 2013 intention 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No - not fully matching focus |
| Smile | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Wilde Ganzen | Yes; first capability only |
| VTRC | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Stichting Red een Kind | Yes; both capabilities |

**INDONESIA**

For Indonesia the capabilities that are most frequently targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 5

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Indonesia*

| Capability to: | ASB | Daya kologi | ECPAT | GSS | Lem baga Kita | PT. PPMA | Rifka Annisa | WIIP | Yad upa | Yayasan Kelola | YPI | YRBI |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 4 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 3 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 |
| Relate | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, Indonesia.

The table below describes when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: ASB, ECPAT, PT.PPMA, YPI, YRBI.

Table 6

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Indonesia*

| Indonesia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ASB | February 2012; extension Feb,1, 2013 – June,30, 2016 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Hivos | Yes |
| Dayakologi | 2013; no extension | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No: contract ended early and not matching enough |
| ECPAT | August 2013; Extension Dec 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes, a bit | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | Yes |
| GSS | 31 December 2012; no extension | Yes | Yes | Yes, a bit | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | No: contract ended early |
| Lembaga Kita | 31 December 2012; no extension | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | No - contract ended early |
| PT.PPMA | May 2015 | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | IUCN | Yes, capability to act and commit only |
| Rifka Annisa | Dec, 31 2015 | No | Yes | No | Yes | Rutgers WPF | No - no match between expectations CFA and SPO |
| WIIP | Dec 2015 | Yes | Not MFS II | Yes | Not MFS II | Red Cross | No - Capacity development interventions are not MFS II financed. Only some overhead is MFS II |

| Indonesia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yayasan Kelola | Dec 30, 2013; extension of contract being processed for two years (2014-2015) | Yes | Not really | Yes | Not really | Hivos | No - no specific capacity development interventions planned by Hivos |
| YPI | Dec 31, 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Rutgers WPF | Yes |
| YRBI | Oct, 30, 2013; YRBI end of contract from 31st Oct 2013 to 31st Dec 2013. Contract extension proposal is being proposed to MFS II, no decision yet. | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |
| Yadupa | Under negotiation during baseline; new contract 2013 until now | Yes | Nothing committed | Yes | Nothing committed | IUCN | No, since nothing was committed by CFA |

**LIBERIA**

For Liberia the situation is arbitrary which capabilities are targeted most CFA's. Whilst the capability to act and commit is targeted more often than the other capabilities, this is only so for two of the SPOs. The capability to adapt and self-renew and the capability to relate are almost equally targeted for the five SPOs, be it not intensively. Since the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew are the most targeted capabilities in Ethiopia, India and Indonesia, we choose to focus on these two capabilities for Liberia as well. This would help the synthesis team in the further analysis of these capabilities related to process tracing. See also the table below.

Table 7

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Liberia*

| Capability to: | BSC | DEN-L | NAWOCOL | REFOUND | RHRAP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Relate | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, Liberia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Also, for two of the five SPOs capability to act and commit is targeted more intensively compared to the other capabilities. Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BSC and RHRAP.

Table 8

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Liberia*

| Liberia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BSC | Dec 31, 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | SPARK | Yes |
| DEN-L | 2014 | No | No | Unknown | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| NAWOCOL | 2014 | Yes | No | No | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| REFOUND | At least until 2013 (2015?) | Yes | No | Yes | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| RHRAP | At least until 2013 (2014?) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |

**Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study**

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ' general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

4.

Some definitions of the terminology used for this MFS II 5c evaluation

Based upon the different interpretations and connotations the use of the term causal mechanism we use the following terminology for the remainder of this paper:

- A **detailed causal map** (or **model of change)** = the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change.
- A **causal mechanism** = is the combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 176).
- **Part** or **cause** = one actor with its attributes carrying out activities/ producing outputs that lead to change in other parts. The final part or cause is the change/ outcome.
- **Attributes of the actor** = specificities of the actor that increase his chance to introduce change or not such as its position in its institutional environment.

*Step 1. Identify the **planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

Chapter 4.1 and 4.2 in the baseline report were reviewed. Capacity development interventions as planned by the CFA for the capability to act and commit and for the capability to adapt and self-renew were described and details inserted in the summary format. This provided an overview of the capacity development activities that were originally planned by the CFA for these two capabilities and assisted in focusing on relevant outcomes that are possibly related to the planned interventions.

*Step 2. Identify the **implemented capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

The input from the CFA was reviewed in terms of what capacity development interventions have taken place in the MFS II period. This information was be found in the 'Support to capacity development sheet - endline - CFA perspective' for the SPO, based on details provided by the CFA and further discussed during an interview by the CDI team.

The CFA was asked to describe all the MFS II supported capacity development interventions of the SPO that took place during the period 2011 up to now. The CDI team reviewed this information, not only the interventions but also the observed changes as well as the expected long-term changes, and

then linked these interventions to relevant outcomes in one of the capabilities (capability to act and commit; and capability to adapt and self-renew).

*Step 3. Identify **initial changes/ outcome areas** in these two capabilities – by CDI team & in-country team*

The CDI team was responsible for **coding** documents received from SPO and CFA in NVivo on the following:

- **5C Indicators**: this was to identify the changes that took place between baseline and endline. This information was coded in Nvivo.
- Information related to the **capacity development interventions implemented by the CFA** (with MFS II funding) (see also Step 2) to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. For example, the training on financial management of the SPO staff could be related to any information on financial management of the SPO. This information was coded in Nvivo.

In addition, the response by the CFA to the changes in 5C indicators format, was auto-coded.

The in-country team was responsible for timely collection of information from the SPO (before the fieldwork starts). This set of information dealt with:

- MFS II supported capacity development interventions during the MFS II period (2011 until now).
- Overview of all trainings provided in relation to a particular outcome areas/organisational capacity change since the baseline.
- For each of the identified MFS II supported trainings, training questionnaires have been developed to assess these trainings in terms of the participants, interests, knowledge and skills gained, behaviour change and changes in the organisation (based on Kirkpatrick's model), one format for training participants and one for their managers. These training questionnaires were sent prior to the field visit.
- Changes expected by SPO on a long-term basis ('Support to capacity development sheet - endline - SPO perspective').

For the selection of change/ outcome areas the following criteria were important:

- The change/ outcome area is in one of the two capabilities selected for process tracing: capability to act and commit or the capability to adapt and self-renew. This was the first criteria to select upon.
- There was a likely link between the key organisational capacity change/ outcome area and the MFS II supported capacity development interventions. This also was an important criteria. This would need to be demonstrated through one or more of the following situations:
  - In the 2012 **theory of change** on organisational capacity development of the SPO a link was indicated between the outcome area and MFS II support;
  - During the baseline the CFA indicated a link between **the planned MFS II support** to organisational development and the expected short-term or long-term results in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the **CFA** indicated a link between **the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions** and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the **SPO** indicated a link between **the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions** and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities.

Reviewing the information obtained as described in Step 1, 2, and 3 provided the basis for selecting key organisational capacity change/ outcome areas to focus on for process tracing. These areas were to be formulated as broader outcome areas, such as 'improved financial management', 'improved monitoring and evaluation' or 'improved staff competencies'.

Note: the outcome areas were to be formulated as intermediates changes. For example: an improved monitoring and evaluation system, or enhanced knowledge and skills to educate the target group on

climate change. Key outcome areas were also verified - based on document review as well as discussions with the SPO during the endline.

*Step 4. Construct the **detailed, initial causal map** (theoretical model of change) – CDI & in-country team*

A detailed initial causal map was developed by the CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team. This was based on document review, including information provided by the CFA and SPO on MFS II supported capacity development interventions and their immediate and long-term objectives as well as observed changes. Also, the training questionnaires were reviewed before developing the initial causal map. This detailed initial causal map was to be provided by the CDI team with a visual and related narrative with related references. This initial causal map served as a reference point for further reflection with the SPO during the process tracing endline workshop, where relationships needed to be verified or new relationships established so that the second (workshop-based), detailed causal map could be developed, after which further verification was needed to come up with the final, concluding detailed causal map.

It's important to note that organisational change area/ outcome areas could be both positive and negative.

For each of the selected outcomes the team needed to make explicit the theoretical model of change. This meant finding out about the range of different actors, factors, actions, and events etc. that have contributed to a particular outcome in terms of organisational capacity of the SPO.

A model of change of good quality includes:

- The causal pathways that relate the intervention to the realised change/ outcome;
- Rival explanations for the same change/ outcome;
- Assumptions that clarify relations between different components or parts;
- Case specific and/or context specific factors or risks that might influence the causal pathway, such as for instance the socio-cultural-economic context, or a natural disaster;
- Specific attributes of the actors e.g. CFA and other funders.

A model of change (within the 5C study called a 'detailed causal map') is a complex system which produces intermediate and long-term outcomes by the interaction of other parts. It consists of parts or causes that often consist of one actor with its attributes that is implementing activities leading to change in other parts (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). A helpful way of constructing the model of change is to think in terms of actors carrying out activities that lead to other actors changing their behaviour. The model of change can be explained as a range of activities carried out by different *actors* (including the CFA and SPO under evaluation) that will ultimately lead to an outcome. Besides this, there are also '*structural*' elements, which are to be interpreted as external factors (such as economic conjuncture); and *attributes* of the actor (does the actor have the legitimacy to ask for change or not, what is its position in the sector) that should be looked at (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). In fact Beach and Pedersen, make a fine point about the subjectivity of the actor in a dynamic context. This means, in qualitative methodologies, capturing the changes in the actor, acted upon area or person/organisation, in a non sequential and non temporal format. Things which were done recently could have corrected behavioural outcomes of an organisation and at the same ime there could be processes which incrementally pushed for the same change over a period of time. Beach and Pedersen espouse this methodology because it captures change in a dynamic fashion as against the methodology of logical framework. For the MFS II evaluation it was important to make a distinction between those paths in the model of change that are the result of MFS II and rival pathways.
The construction of the model of change started with the identified key organisational capacity change/ outcome, followed by an inventory of all possible subcomponents that possibly have caused the change/ outcome in the MFS II period (2011-up to now, or since the baseline). The figure below presents an imaginary example of a model of change. The different colours indicate the different types of support to capacity development of the SPO by different actors, thereby indicating different pathways of change, leading to the key changes/ outcomes in terms of capacity development (which in this case indicates the ability to adapt and self-renew).





***Figure 1*** *An imaginary example of a model of change*

*Step 5. Identify* ***types of evidence*** *needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams with support from CDI team*

Once the causal mechanism at theoretical level were defined, empirical evidence was collected so as to verify or discard the different parts of this theoretical model of change, confirm or reject whether subcomponents have taken place, and to find evidence that confirm or reject the causal relations between the subcomponents.

A key question that we needed to ask ourselves was, *"What information do we need in order to confirm or reject that one subcomponent leads to another, that X causes Y?"*. The evaluation team needed to agree on what information was needed that provides empirical manifestations for each part of the model of change.

There are four distinguishable types of evidence that are relevant in process tracing analysis: *pattern, sequence, trace, and account*. Please see the box below for descriptions of these types of evidence.

The evaluation team needed to agree on the types of evidence that was needed to verify or discard the manifestation of a particular part of the causal mechanism. Each one or a combination of these different types of evidence could be used to confirm or reject the different parts of the model of change. This is what is meant by robustness of evidence gathering. Since causality as a concept can bend in many ways, our methodology, provides a near scientific model for accepting and rejecting a particular type of evidence, ignoring its face value.

Types of evidence to be used in process tracing

- **Pattern evidence** relates to predictions of statistical patterns in the evidence. For example, in testing a mechanism of racial discrimination in a case dealing with employment, statistical patterns of employment would be relevant for testing this part of the mechanism.
- **Sequence evidence** deals with the temporal and spatial chronology of events predicted by a hypothesised causal mechanism. For example, a test of the hypothesis could involve expectations of the timing of events where we might predict that if the hypothesis is valid, we should see that the event B took place after event A took place. However, if we found that event B took place before event A took place, the test would suggest that our confidence in the validity of this part of the mechanism should be reduced (disconfirmation/ falsification).
- **Trace evidence** is evidence whose mere existence provides proof that a part of a hypothesised mechanism exists. For example, the existence of the minutes of a meeting, if authentic ones, provide strong proof that the meeting took place.
- **Account evidence** deals with the content of empirical material, such as meeting minutes that detail what was discussed or an oral account of what took place in the meeting.

*Source*: Beach and Pedersen, 2013

Below you can find a table that provides guidelines on what to look for when identifying types of evidence that can confirm or reject causal relationships between different parts/ subcomponents of the model of change. It also provides one example of a part of a causal pathway and what type of information to look for.

Table 9

*Format for identifying types of evidence for different causal relationships in the model of change (example included)*

| Part of the model of change | Key questions | Type of evidence needed | Source of information |
|---|---|---|---|
| Describe relationship between the subcomponents of the model of change | Describe questions you would like to answer a so as to find out whether the components in the relationship took place, when they took place, who was involved, and whether they are related | Describe the information that we need in order to answer these questions.<br>Which type of evidence can we use in order to reject or confirm that subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y?<br>Can we find this information by means of :<br>Pattern evidence;<br>Sequence evidence;<br>Trace evidence;<br>Account evidence? | Describe where you can find this information |
| Example:<br>Training workshops on M&E provided by MFS II funding and other sources of funding | Example:<br>What type of training workshops on M&E took place?<br>Who was trained?<br>When did the training take place?<br>Who funded the training?<br>Was the funding of training provided before the training took place?<br>How much money was available for the training? | Example:<br>Trace evidence: on types of training delivered, who was trained, when the training took place, budget for the training<br><br>Sequence evidence on timing of funding and timing of training<br><br>Content evidence: what the training was about | Example:<br>Training report<br>SPO Progress reports<br>interviews with the CFA and SPO staff<br>Financial reports SPO and CFA |

Please note that for practical reasons, the 5C evaluation team decided that it was easier to integrate the specific questions in the narrative of the initial causal map. These questions would need to be addressed by the in country team during the process tracing workshop so as to discover, verify or

discard particular causal mechanisms in the detailed, initial causal map. Different types of evidence was asked for in these questions.

*Step 6. **Collect data** to verify or discard causal mechanisms and develop workshop-based, detailed causal map – in-country team*

Once it was decided by the in-country and CDI evaluation teams what information was to be collected during the interaction with the SPO, data collection took place. The initial causal maps served as a basis for discussions during the endline workshop with a particular focus on process tracing for the identified organisational capacity changes. But it was considered to be very important to understand from the perspective of the SPO how they understood the identified key organisational capacity change/outcome area has come about. A new detailed, workshop-based causal map was developed that included the information provided by SPO staff as well as based on initial document review as described in the initial detailed causal map. This information was further analysed and verified with other relevant information so as to develop a final causal map, which is described in the next step.

*Step 7. **Assess the quality** of data and **analyse data**, and develop the **final detailed causal map** (model of change) – in-country team and CDI team*

Quality assurance of the data collected and the evidence it provides for rejecting or confirming parts of causal explanations are a major concern for many authors specialised in contribution analysis and process-tracing. Stern et al. (2012), Beach and Pedersen (2013), Lemire, Nielsen and Dybdal (2012), Mayne (2012) and Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) all emphasise the need to make attribution/ contribution claims that are based on pieces of evidence that are rigorous, traceable, and credible. These pieces of evidence should be as explicit as possible in proving that *subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y* and ruling out other explanations. Several tools are proposed to check the nature and the quality of data needed. One option is, Delahais and Toulemonde's Evidence Analysis Database, which we have adapted for our purpose.

Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) propose an Evidence Analysis Database that takes into consideration three criteria:

- Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no);
- Type of causal mechanism: intended contribution/ other contribution/ condition leading to intended contribution/ intended condition to other contribution/ feedback loop;
- Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak.

We have adapted their criteria to our purpose. The in-country team, in collaboration with the CDI team, used the criteria in assessing whether causal relationships in the causal map, were strong enough. This has been more of an iterative process trying to find additional evidence for the established relationships through additional document review or contacting the CFA and SPO as well as getting their feedback on the final detailed causal map that was established. Whilst the form below has not been used exactly in the manner depicted, it has been used indirectly when trying to validate the information in the detailed causal map. After that, the final detailed causal map is established both as a visual as well as a narrative, with related references for the established causal relations.

| *Example format for the adapted evidence analysis database (example included)* **Description of causal relation** | **Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no)** | **Type of information providing the background to the confirmation or rejection of the causal relation** | **Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak** | **Explanation for why the evidence is (rather) strong or (rather) weak, and therefore the causal relation is confirmed/ rejected** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| e.g. Training staff in M&E leads to enhanced M&E knowledge, skills and practice | e.g. Confirmed | e.g. Training reports confirmed that staff are trained in M&E and that knowledge and skills increased as a result of the training | | |

*Step 8.* ***Analyse and conclude*** *on findings– in-country team and CDI team*

The final detailed causal map was described as a visual and narrative and this was then analysed in terms of the evaluation question two and evaluation question four: *"To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?"* and *"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"* It was analysed to what extent the identified key organisational capacity change can be attributed to MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as to other related factors, interventions and actors.

## Explaining factors – evaluation question 4

This paragraph describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This has been explained in the first section of this appendix. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information was procured for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the process of process tracing as described in the section above.

## Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team.

**Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach:** this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

**Using standard indicators and scores**: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes

comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

**General causal map:** whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

**Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question:** this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

**Utilisation of the evaluation**

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

**Design** – mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

**Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication:** many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

**5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process:** The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment

and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

# Appendix 2 Background information on the five core capabilities framework

The 5 capabilities (5C) framework was to be used as a framework for the evaluation of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs) of the MFS II consortia. The 5C framework is based on a five-year research program on 'Capacity, change and performance' that was carried out by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). The research included an extensive review of the literature and sixteen case studies. The 5C framework has also been applied in an IOB evaluation using 26 case studies in 14 countries, and in the baseline carried out per organisation by the MFS II organisations for the purpose of the monitoring protocol.

The 5C framework is structured to understand and analyse (changes in) the capacity of an organization to deliver (social) value to its constituents. This introduction briefly describes the 5C framework, mainly based on the most recent document on the 5C framework (Keijzer et al., 2011).

The 5C framework sees capacity as an **outcome** of an **open system**. An organisation or collaborative association (for instance a network) is seen as a system interacting with wider society. The most critical practical issue is to ensure that relevant stakeholders share a common way of thinking about capacity and its core constituents or capabilities. Decisive for an organisation's capacity is the context in which the organisation operates. This means that **understanding context issues** is crucial. The use of the 5C framework requires a multi-stakeholder approach because shared values and results orientation are important to facilitate the capacity development process. The 5C framework therefore needs to **accommodate the different visions** of stakeholders and conceive different strategies for raising capacity and improving performance in a given situation.

The 5C framework defines capacity as '**producing social value'** and identifies five core capabilities that together result in that overall capacity. Capacity, capabilities and competences are seen as follows:

**Capacity** is referred to as the overall ability of an organisation or system to create value for others;

**Capabilities** are the collective ability of a group or a system to do something either inside or outside the system. The collective ability involved may be technical, logistical, managerial or generative (i.e. the ability to earn legitimacy, to adapt, to create meaning, etc.);

**Competencies** are the energies, skills and abilities of individuals.

Fundamental to developing capacity are inputs such as human, material and financial resources, technology, and information. To the degree that they are developed and successfully integrated, capabilities contribute to the overall capacity or ability of an organisation or system to create value for others. A single capability is not sufficient to create capacity. All are needed and are strongly interrelated and overlapping. Thus, to achieve its development goals, the 5C framework says that every organisation or system must have **five basic capabilities:**

The capability to act and commit;
The capability to deliver on development objectives;
The capability to adapt and self-renew;
The capability to relate (to external stakeholders);
The capability to achieve coherence.

In order to have a common framework for evaluation, the five capabilities have been reformulated in outcome domains and for each outcome domain performance indicators have been developed. A detailed overview of capabilities with outcome domains and indicators is attached in Appendix 3.

There is some overlap between the five core capabilities but together the five capabilities result in a certain level of capacity. Influencing one capability may have an effect on one or more of the other capabilities. In each situation, the level of any of the five capabilities will vary. Each capability can become stronger or weaker over time.

# Appendix 3 Changes in organisational capacity of the SPO - 5C indicators

Below you will find a description for each of the indicators under each of the capabilities, what the situation is as assessed during the endline, how this has changed since the baseline and what are the reasons for change.

**Description of Endline Indicators ECPAT Indonesia**

**Capability to Act and to Commit**

**1.1. Responsive leadership: 'Leadership is responsive, inspiring, and sensitive'**
*This is about leadership within the organization (operational, strategic). If there is a larger body then you may also want to refer to leadership at a higher level but not located at the local organization.*

The endline shows the same quality as the baseline with regard to responsive leadership. The leadership model in Good Shepherd Services for Women and Children (GSSWC), which falls under Good Shepherd Sisters (GSS) Indonesia Province, is not hierarchical and there is no single person who makes all decisions. Rather, many decisions are based on dialogue. GSSWC is an institution founded by the Good Shepherd Sisters of Indonesia province and operated by the Good Shepherd Sisters and lay partners.
The sisters do not just give instructions to the staff; they lead by example and encourage staff to understand the values of spirituality. The staff is given a lot of freedom to decide for themselves what to do. As pointed out by several people, the weakness of this system is inefficiency in decision making. It takes a long time to make a decision, and sometimes the decision is not clear. Some staff members expressed a feeling of having to face problems alone.

At the beginning of March 2014 GSS Indonesia Province has started a new chapter with a clearer view on mission, vision and spirituality. They have asked several lay partners to join in this new step. GSS Indonesia Province tries to work on the basis of people own initiative, especially for the sisters to take their own responsibility if they need change(s). By involving the lay partners more actively they hope to increase the communication between the different parties involved. A new GSS provincial sister has been chosen for 6 years starting June 2014. The Province Leader has ordinary authority over the province and is its official representative under the congregational leader. Her role is one of spiritual and apostolic leadership, service and love. The province leader's term of office is six years. She has also served as a member of the Justice and Peace Team in the Province of Indonesia. This sister is aware of some of the problems at the level of communication and decision-making. The organization hopes that she can make a positive change to make sure all partners both sisters as lay-partners are involved in the GSSWC work.

Score: From 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

**1.2. Strategic guidance: 'Leaders provide appropriate strategic guidance (strategic leader and operational leader)'**
*This is about the extent to which the leader(s) provide strategic directions*

There were no changes on this indicator. The sisters are well informed about what their beneficiaries want, and how to achieve these goals. They discuss the vision, program, ideas, and strategies together with the project implementing staff. Program staff has sufficient freedom to be creative, which is why the sisters are not giving detailed strategic coaching but they discuss what programs need to be implemented in the next years. This situation creates a real work basis. Routine activities and procedures are not formalized or written but the project staff shows good understanding of the activities. There is a provincial level strategic plan which functions as "umbrella" in the program implementation. The strategic plan was developed by the GSS Indonesia province and followed by GSSWC in all branches. The core team directs the program officers in the field related to the activity

content to be in line within the "umbrella". Currently the situation is still the same. GSSWC has a work plan that they follow but there is space and opportunity to be flexible. The sisters and staff work at grassroots level and really focus on the day to day needs for their target groups. GSSWC trust their staff and give them space to work within the GSS framework.

Score: From 3 to 3 (no change)

**1.3. Staff turnover: 'Staff turnover is relatively low'**
*This is about staff turnover.*

No change has occurred in terms of staff turnover since 2012. Most of the staffs are still volunteers, although more volunteers have offered their services to the organization through friend-to-friend recommendations. GSS is still facing the same problem regarding financial insecurities. For example many of the teachers at the schools of GSS are not sure it they will be paid by the end of the month. GSS struggles to provide sufficient financial security for the staff members. Because both staff and lay partners feel a lot of motivation and satisfaction for the work of GSS they decide to stay committed. GSS is currently trying to add new people to the teams. Most of them are volunteers so they don't receive any financial support.

Score: 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

**1.4 Organisational structure 'Existence of clear organization structure reflecting the objectives of the organization"**
*Observable indicator: Staffs have copy of org. structure and understand this*

There have been no changes to the organizational structure of GSS Indonesia Province and GSSWC and donors often do not understand the difference between GSS and GSSWC as in the baseline. Current management of GSSWC consists of nine core persons including a provincial leader. The GSSWC has a program manager who has the role mainly to create programmes to increase options for women at risk of trafficking.

Score: 2 to 2 (no change)

**1.5 Articulated Strategies. Strategies are articulated and based on good situation analysis and adequate M&E**
*Observable indicator: strategies are well articulated. Situation analysis and monitoring and evaluation are used to inform strategies.*

There is no change in the achievement against this indicator since the baseline. Learning and adaptation about the process and what works best, is a reflective and iterative process which the organization is well aware of. The GSSWC thinks about their experiences in projects and the consequences for their work. It may not be formally written down, but experiences in one year do have an effect on their work the next year. There still is a learning cycle. This learning is not planned systematically in formal M&E, but it occurs informally based on discussions and impacts on beneficiaries. The importance is recognized and evaluations receive sufficient follow-up. There is an overall strategic plan which functions as "umbrella" in the program implementation.

Score: 2.5 to 2.5 (no change)

**1.6. Daily operations: 'Day-to-day operations are in line with strategic plans'**
*This is about the extent to which day-to-day operations are aligned with strategic plans.*

The GSSWC strategic plan refers to the GSS Indonesia Province strategic plan. At this point the GSS sisters are focusing on designing a strategic plan (as part of the new chapter 2014-2020) to guide the current way of working and activities with the vision and mission of GSS. The vision and mission of GSS are reflected in the work/activities. As a result, many activities that have been planned are actually realized, despite of low funding and staffing. The organization has stated that it prefers to make plans every year rather than applying for a 2-year or 3-year budget with MM. The reason for this is the shifting local context and the personal insecurity if the staff members will be appointed in the same locations for more years.

Score: From 2.5 to 2.5 (no change )

**1.7. Staff skills: 'Staff have necessary skills to do their work'**
*This is about whether staff have the skills necessary to do their work and what skills they might need.*

There is a slightly improvement in this indicator. All people that were consulted from outside the organization consider the GSSWC to be capable and dedicated. There is knowledge shared between volunteers and sisters. The implication of these knowledge sharing are:

a. improved capacity in facilitating beneficiaries with social and psychological skills to be more confident and brave to take a decision and there is a reintegration process;
b. improved managerial capacity including integrating the aspect of monitoring and evaluation in reporting form, for example the financial reports, and better in financial management;
c. improved advocacy capacity so that the stakeholders have the same understanding about the single mom and trafficking issues. One of the results is there is a village regulation about anti-trafficking (in Ruteng) stating that every person in a village who wants to make a birth certificate documentation should use baptismal certificate.

Furthermore, training has been provided on the following topics: community empowerment, working with victims of violence, networking, anti-trafficking training for religious leaders, finance management, and law in handling trafficking.
However, another stakeholder said that currently some of the GSS sisters are lacking basic knowledge on the subject of for example human trafficking or victim care. It will be necessary to make an assessment of the current level of education and skills regarding the work that is being done. Not all staff members are placed in the right position to do their work to their full potential. It will benefit the overall work of GSSWC if an investment can be made in necessary skills on both anti-trafficking training and generic skills for daily activities. Due to the dedicated atmosphere at GSSWC the staff manages to fulfill their work and work together to combine their strengths.

Score: From 3 to 3.5 (Slight improvement)

**1.8. Training opportunities: 'Appropriate training opportunities are offered to staff'**
*This is about whether staffs at the SPO are offered appropriate training opportunities*

More opportunities for staff training were available since 2012. These included training sessions on community empowerment, working with victims of violence, networking, anti-trafficking training for religious leaders, finance management, and law in handling trafficking. Most of the training was funded by MM while some trained by a consultant from a volunteer organisation i.e. in financial training.

However, sometimes GSS is not able to join these meetings due to the high work pressure and busy day to day schedules while working with the complex target group. GSS feels that it will be needed to carry out a needs assessment within the GSS team (sisters and staff) to see which training opportunities are suitable and necessary.

Score: From 3 to 3.5 (Improvement)

**1.9.1. Incentives: 'Appropriate incentives are in place to sustain staff motivation'**
*This is about what makes people want to work here. Incentives could be financial, freedom at work, training opportunities, etc.*

The endline showed the same quality as the baseline with respect to this indicator. Many of the staff members still express their dedication and motivation as a strong motivator to continue their work for GSS. The main motivation mentioned by the staff comes from the effect they have on beneficiaries and the satisfaction obtained from acting on their faith. Their work is their spiritual calling, and their service to the community makes the staff grateful and happy even though they do not get paid or have a high workload.

The sisters of GSS spend a lot of time with the staff and pay a lot of attention to their personal situation either at home or work. Own initiatives by staff are encouraged by GSS; the positive outcome of activities is a strong motivating factor for the staff members/ lay partners. Some of the staff also mentioned that they enjoy the variety in the work and working together as a team with the

sisters.  Also they have a lot of freedom at work, and they are involved in many different tasks and learn from the experience.

Score: From 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

**1.9.2. Funding sources: 'Funding from multiple sources covering different time periods'**
*This is about how diversified the SPOs funding sources are over time, and how the level of funding is changing over time.*

For the donor institution, GSSWC is still mainly depending on Mensen met een Missie (MM) for financial support. Besides that, GSSWC ensures that the issues they work on are included in the agenda of the diocese (church administrative unit) to ensure future funding for their work. At the local level, GSSWC supports the sisters to access funds from local level such as the Ministry of Social and Health Services. GSS receives some donations from well-wishers from the local society and there are more people who believe and support them, not just in terms of financial resources, but also by providing for example free electricity. Nonetheless, GSSWC is not really looking ahead to see how to increase the possibilities to secure funding in the long term, and they have indicated that they prefer a shorter term (annual) basis for contracts to stay flexible.

Score: From 2 to 2 (no change)

**1.9.3. Funding procedures: 'Clear procedures for exploring new funding opportunities'**
*This is about whether there are clear procedures for getting new funding and staff are aware of these procedures.*

No changes have occurred in funding procedures for the organization. GSSWC is aware of the risks and the current situation regarding exploring new funding opportunities. There is no consistent program aimed at generating income. Small requests for funding are made to the Archdiocese, but the sisters are not accustomed to approaching big donors and cooperating with them. GSSWC really needs to start focusing on networking and establishing written funding procedures. Perhaps a training on this issue could provide them with the necessary skills. What also hinders them is that the distinction between the GSS and the GSSWC is not understood by donors. The GSSWC does not have a legal standing of its own. They do however need funds to continue their program in Batam, Ruteng and Tangerang and to develop new activities. GSSWC still manages their projects with the support of MM and the help of the Archdiocese. Especially for Batam GSSWC are facing a lot of challenges regarding funding since the local community does not contribute due to religious issues on the island.

Score: From 2 to 2 (No change)

**Summary Capability to act and commit**
Mostly GSSWC is still in the same situation as it was during the baseline evaluation. The organization has a capable and dedicated team of staff and project leaders, although there is still a requirement to further enhance staff skills, particularly in the area of anti-trafficking. However, training has been provided in terms of community empowerment, working with victims of violence, networking, anti-trafficking training for religious leaders, finance management, and law in handling trafficking that funded mostly by MM, with a small number of training contributed independently by a consultant that came from the volunteer organisation. The staff is very motivated to do the work, mainly because of acting from their faith, even though financial benefits are minimal. However, they work under difficult conditions and a high workload. The leadership model in GSSWC is not hierarchical and there is no single person making the decisions, but decision-making can be inefficient and unclear. There have been no changes to the organizational structure of GSSWC and donors often don't understand the difference between GSS Indonesia Province  and GSSWC as in the baseline. The GSS Indonesia Province has developed the strategic plan and this is adopted by the GSSWC. They discuss the vision, program, ideas, and strategies together with the project implementing persons, and day-to-day activities are based on the vision and mission of the organisation, but a strategic plan developed independently by GSSWC is lacking. It mostly refers to the GSS Indonesia Province strategic plan. However, the strategic plan for GSSWC is being developed for the period 2014-2020. GSS is still mainly depending on Mensen met een Missie (MM) for financial support, and generally they are lacking procedures to secure funding.

Score: From 2.8 to 2.9 (very slight improvement)

**Capability to adapt and self-renew**

**2.1. M&E application: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess activities, outputs and outcomes'**
*This is about what the monitoring and evaluation of the SPO looks at, what type of information they get at and at what level (individual, project, organizational).*

GSSWC now has a better understanding about the application and need of M&E than it did in 2012. There are no staff members that are trained in M&E, but there is one program manager that has worked in research and therefore has a basic understanding of monitoring and evaluation. Other staff members do not have any knowledge on this matter.
In general, GSSWC is a very participative organization and all feedback from staff and others is welcome and taken seriously. Currently one person is responsible for all M&E. This staff member requests bi-monthly reports from all regions. At this point GSSWC is having monitoring and evaluation meetings once or twice a year. There is better communication between the different regions and projects. The only issue is that the sisters really depend on the person in charge for all the M&E, to prepare the reports and do the follow-up. It would be better if the sisters from each region give their input on a more regular basis and not only if asked by the staff member. There are regular formal meetings to talk about the programs. Decisions are made collectively though discussion. At GSSWC the different communities of sisters have a meeting every 2 weeks. For GSSWC the internal contacts are planned more informally. During these meetings work related issues are discussed. For now only one M&E staff member tries to contact the project every month to follow the M&E developments. Overall, the organization monitoring and evaluation still focused activity and output at the project level.
On the whole, there is still no comprehensive monitoring and evaluation system in place and the monitoring and evaluation is mainly focused on activities and outputs.

Score: From 2.5 to 3 (Slight improvement)

**2.2. M&E competencies: 'Individual competencies for performing M&E functions are in place'**
*This is about whether the SPO has a trained M&E person; whether other staff have basic understanding of M&E; and whether they know what information to collect, how to process the information, how to make use of the information so as to improve activities etc.*

There is still no dedicated M&E staff member in place, but there is one program manager that has worked in research and therefore has a basic understanding of monitoring and evaluation. Other staff members do not have any knowledge on this matter. The program manager requests reports every two months from all regions in Indonesia. This is input for special M&E meeting once or twice a year. There is still a lot of room for improvement of M&E capacity amongst the other staff members however, as currently everybody relies on a single person to collect, analyse and follow up on results gathered through the M&E process. The plan for the future is that one person is responsible for all M&E.

Score: From 1.5 to 2.5 (improvement)

**2.3. M&E for future strategies: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess the effects of delivered products and services (outcomes) for future strategies'**
*This is about what type of information is used by the SPO to make decisions; whether the information comes from the monitoring and evaluation; and whether M&E info influences strategic planning.*

Whereas during the baseline there was no systematic assessment of services in place for future strategies, currently, the monitoring results are communicated to be followed up in the program activities through the program manager that takes roles as an M&E person in the organization. The information is mostly on the activity and output at the project level, not yet to the outcome and impact. However, follow up is slow as only a single person is tasked with the M&E activities in GSSWC.

Score: Score 2.5 to 2.5 (no change)

**2.4. Critical reflection: 'Management stimulates frequent critical reflection meetings that also deal with learning from mistakes'**
*This is about whether staffs talk formally about what is happening in their programs; and, if so, how regular these meetings are; and whether staffs are comfortable raising issues that are problematic.*

The endline showed the same quality as the baseline with respect to this indicator. Both formal and informal communication between staff members occurs regarding program activities. It is unclear whether there is a specific schedule or frequency to meetings for feedback. Overall however, the GSSWC remains a participative organization and all feedback from staff and others is welcome. For example, they request their clients in shelters to evaluate their services and also request all participants, facilitators, staff and volunteers to evaluate the programs. It is not clear to what extent the meetings are really critically reflective in nature and also informs future strategies.

Score: From 3 to 3 (no change)

**2.5. Freedom for ideas: 'Staff feel free to come up with ideas for implementation of objectives**
*This is about whether staffs feel that ideas they bring for implementation of the program are welcomed and used.*

There is no change regarding this indicator. The atmosphere is still open. All staff members agree that they are welcome to give their ideas, that they are stimulated to do so, and that they all can have a say about solutions. The leaders are very open to input, and let people know what they have done with it.

Score: From 4 to 4 (no change)

**2.6. System for tracking environment: 'The organization has a system for being in touch with general trends and developments in its operating environment'**
*This is about whether the SPO knows what is happening in its environment and whether it will affect the organization.*

GSSWC is still in the same situation with the last baseline. GSSWC's network remains to be one of their prime assets. Their network is well established, also with people who support their work in kind like priests. The GSSWC are part of a network extending all over Indonesia, including schools and hospitals, where victims can be found. All sister congregations are involved in this network. Additionally, there is the mailing list of GSS International, JPIC that gives information on the Asia-Pacific region, a church-owned website that informs about the situation in Indonesia, and at the diocese level there are monthly newsletters. GSSWC has really been investing in the contact with the diocese.

They are working closely together and use the different networks to strengthen their contacts. GSSWC does realize that they need to invest in their network to stay up to date with trends and developments in their working area i.e. by actively strengthening the communication within the networks by sharing GSSWC publications and being actively involved in the discussions.

Score: From 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)
**2.7. Stakeholder responsiveness: 'The organization is open and responsive to their stakeholders and the general public'**
*This is about what mechanisms the SPO has to get input from its stakeholders, and what they **do** with that input.*

GSSWC has been investing a lot working contacts on different levels. However, even though they are open to all outside parties, the focus lies on their network within the church. GSSWC works closely together with the diocese and other churches based organization and this has resulted in a good work atmosphere and mutual strengthening. Through this way they hope to strengthen their influence within the church structures.
There is no clear vision on how to respond to stakeholders, and although there is more stakeholder trust in what GSSWC has done. Additionally, they hold regular meetings with beneficiaries, for example target group meetings or focus group discussions. The reason for holding the regular meetings is to build the trust and enhance the beneficiaries skill as a single mother. The beneficiaries give information about their own personal and social situation, and are also involved in decisions regarding themselves in the crisis center.

Score: From 3.5 to 3.5 ( no change)

**Summary capability to adapt and self-renew**
There is still no comprehensive monitoring and evaluation system in place and the monitoring and evaluation is mainly focused on activities and outputs and mostly at the project level. This is a small organization taking on a tremendous and controversial topic in a sometimes hostile atmosphere. The issue taken care by the organization (trafficking, unwanted pregnancy or single mother) are uncommon issues discussed inside the church and to some extent might not conform to the church values. Learning and adaptation about this process and what works best is a reflective and iterative process, which the organization is well aware of. This learning is not always evaluated and / or planned systematically but it is recognized and receives sufficient follow-up. The main improvement in regard to this capability is that there is now a person responsible for monitoring and evaluation, and the position is embedded to the roles of program manager. This person requests bimonthly reports from the different regions and there is a special monitoring and evaluation meeting once or twice a year. However, monitoring and evaluation mainly remains in the hands of this monitoring and evaluation officer and there is a need to enhance the capacity and responsibility of the regions in monitoring and evaluation. At GSS the different communities of sisters have a meeting every 2 weeks. For GSSWC the internal contacts are planned more informally. During these meetings work related issues are discussed. For now only one M&E person (the program manager) member tries to contact the project every month to follow the M&E developments.
In general, GSS is a very participative organization and all feedback from staff and others is welcome and is taken seriously. The leaders are very open to input, and let people know what they have done with it. The strength of the GSSWC is their network with all relevant local stakeholders, which includes beneficiaries but also locations and connections such as hospitals, law enforcement agencies, local government, airport customs, ports, and shelters. GSS works closely together with the diocese and this has resulted in a good work atmosphere and mutual strengthening, which also supports the organisation in tracking the environment. There is no systematic assessment of services in place for future strategies, since the organisation mainly focuses on monitoring of activities and outputs at the project level, not outcomes and impact. .

Score: from 2.9 to 3.1 (very slight improvement)

**Capability to deliver on development objectives**

**3.1. Clear operational plans: 'Organization has clear operational plans for carrying out projects which all staff fully understand'**
*This is about whether each project has an operational work plan and budget, and whether staff use it in their day-to-day operations.*

The endline showed the same quality as the baseline. The GSSWC continues to work according to operational plans, but their activities cannot always be planned. For example when confronted with a victim of abuse, they have to adapt to the situation and environment at hand. The number of victims cannot be predicted beforehand They have guidelines on how to work with vulnerable people. It may not have been formalized into protocols, but they all know what to do. Furthermore, each project has an operational work plan and budget that is used for day to day operations. Often however, there is not enough funding and they must choose which activities can be implemented or look for help from other people.

Score: From 3 to 3 (no change)

**3.2. Cost-effective resource use: 'Operations are based on cost-effective use of its resources'**
*This is about whether the SPO has the resources to do the work, and whether resources are used cost-effectively.*

There is no change in the achievement against this indicator. Staff compensation in terms of salary remains low. Office facilities are limited which forces staff members to bring their own equipment, like computer or vehicles, but they can get reimbursement for transportation costs. In this way organizational costs are kept low and the staff therefore feels that they work cost-effectively. Moreover, the implementation of program activities are supported by many volunteers. The great deal of uncertainty in the work ahead requires the organization to be lean and adaptive, also with its resources.

Score: From 4 to 4 (no change)

**3.3. Delivering planned outputs: 'Extent to which planned outputs are delivered'**
*This is about whether the SPO is able to carry out the operational plans.*

The endline showed the same quality as the baseline. GSSWC continuous to deliver outputs on time and presents the results in reports. The main changes that affect to the current report development is that the sisters is now more cooperative to provide the report than before, however the content mostly not much developed. Program manager is the person who develop the report. The organization makes a point of staying lean and adaptive, and may alter plans, outputs and activities if they feel that this is in the beneficiaries' best interest.

Score: From 4 to 4 (no change)

**3.4. Mechanisms for beneficiary needs: 'The organization has mechanisms in place to verify that services meet beneficiary needs'**
*This is about how the SPO knows that their services are meeting beneficiary needs*

Close communication and involvement of the beneficiaries remains key to GSS's working approach. This approach has remained unchanged over the last two years. Beneficiaries are included in the formulation and design of programs, but also in the assessment of their impact through active discussions. Impact here means on how's GSSWC intervention has affected changes in the beneficiary's life. They also gather information on delivered services to beneficiaries through surveys in which questionnaires are disseminated through the parish church. This work method that GSS is using is highly appreciated by the clients. Through this way they make the contact very personal and really address the needs of the clients.

Score: From 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

**3.5. Monitoring efficiency: 'The organization monitors its efficiency by linking outputs and related inputs (input-output ratio's)'**
*This is about how the SPO knows they are efficient or not in their work.*

There were not many changes on this indicator. Similar to M&E there is no formal system that allows GSSWC to monitor its efficiency. GSS adopts a very flexible way of managing programs and can change directions during their implementation. This makes monitoring of efficiency difficult. GSS has started documenting the number of clients/target group members through which they can follow the increasing number of clients that are consulting GSS.

Score: From 2 to 2 ( no change)

**3.6. Balancing quality-efficiency: 'The organization aims at balancing efficiency requirements with the quality of its work'**
*This is about how the SPO ensures quality work with the resources available*

The endline showed the same quality as the baseline. The GSSWC tries to make the most of their limited resources and believes in the quality of their work. This is informally evaluated by comparing outputs against the work plan, and getting feedback from beneficiaries and other stakeholders.

Score: From 3 to 3 (no change)

**Summary of Capability to deliver on development objectives**
The endline showed the same quality as the baseline. The GSSWC continues to work according to operational plans, but their activities cannot always be planned. For example when confronted with a victim of abuse, they have to adapt to the situation and environment at hand. The number of victims cannot be predicted beforehand. They have guidelines on how to work with vulnerable people. It may not have been formalized into protocols, but they all know what to do. Furthermore, each project has an operational work plan and budget that is used for day to day operations. Often however, there is not enough funding and they must choose which activities can be implemented or look for help from other people. Staff compensation in terms of salary remains low. Office facilities are limited which forces staff members to bring their own equipment, like computer or vehicles, but they can get

reimbursement for transportation costs. In this way organizational costs are kept low and the staff therefore feels that they work cost-effectively. Moreover, the implementation of program activities are supported by many volunteers. GSS continuous to deliver outputs on time and presents the results in reports managed by the program managers. The organization makes a point of staying lean and adaptive, and may alter plans, outputs and activities if they feel that this is in the beneficiaries' best interest.
Close communication and involvement of the beneficiaries remains key to GSSWC's working approach that has remained unchanged over the last two years. Beneficiaries are included in the formulation and design of programs, but also in the assessment of their impact through active discussions. They also gather information on delivered services for beneficiaries need through surveys in which questionnaires are disseminated through the parish church. Similar to M&E there is no formal system that allows GSSWC to monitor its efficiency. GSSWC adopts a very flexible way of managing programs and can change directions during their implementation. This makes monitoring of efficiency difficult.

Score: From 3.2 to 3.2 (no change)

**Capability to relate**

**4.1. Stakeholder engagement in policies and strategies: 'The organization maintains relations/ collaboration/alliances with its stakeholders for the benefit of the organization'**
*This is about whether the SPO engages external groups in developing their policies and strategies, and how.*

No changes have occurred in terms of stakeholder engagement in policies and strategies since 2012. The network of the GSSWC can be considered selective with a strong focus on Catholic partners like dioceses, parishioners, bishops, members of different church commissions and congregations, and local volunteers. It is however also considered sufficient and it contributes to the strength and legitimacy of the organization and its capacity to reach desired goals. They do not engage external groups in developing GSSWC policies and strategies however. GSSWC realizes that they need to invest more in external partners on the level of developing their own policies and strategies but past experiences have not been good. Good potential partners are hard to find due to religious conflict(s) hidden agenda's or financial issues.

Score: From 3 to 3 (no change)

**4.2. Engagement in networks: 'Extent to which the organization has relationships with existing networks/alliances/partnerships'**
*This is about what networks/alliances/partnerships the SPO engages with and why; with they are local or international; and what they do together, and how do they do it.*

The GSSWC works together with institutions that are relevant to their beneficiaries. Their network is well established, extending over the whole of Indonesia. For their programs they work together with dioceses, parishioners, archbishops, family life commission, migrant commission, religious networks, NGO networks, government networks, orphanages, health care providers, and the Good Shepherd justice and peace partnership networks.

GSS has experienced that their impact and area of influence is the biggest within the Catholic Church. Therefore they have chosen to really invest in this area. GSS still has many contacts with other relevant organizations. They consult each other in case of special cases/situations. GSS is well respected within the anti-human trafficking network in for example Jakarta. Currently GSSWC builds a relation with strategic institutions in implementing their work such as IOM to handle trafficking victims.

Score: From 3 to 3.5 (Slight improvement)

**4.3. Engagement with target groups: 'The organization performs frequent visits to their target groups/ beneficiaries in their living environment'**
*This is about how and when the SPO meets with target groups.*

The sisters continue to make regular visits to their target groups. There is a monthly meeting of the single mother community in Jakarta, the sisters visit victims of trafficking in Bambu Apus every week, and they have daily interaction in their own shelters.

In Batam the sisters have started with a "walk-in'' centre for working women in the prostitution areas of Batam. Through this way they spend time with the women to provide counseling and teach practical skills such as computer usage, sewing, cooking and beauty classes.

Score: From 4 to 4.25 (very slight improvement)

**4.4. Relationships within organization: 'Organizational structure and culture facilitates open internal contacts, communication, and decision-making'**
*How does staff at the SPO communicate internally? Are people free to talk to whomever they need to talk to? When and at what forum? What are the internal mechanisms for sharing information and building relationships?*

There is no change in the achievement against this indicator. There is still an open atmosphere and everyone is free to speak their mind. This can be done informally and if necessary over the telephone, but also there are regular formal meetings to talk about the programs. Decisions are made collectively though discussion.

At GSS the different communities of sisters have a meeting every 2 weeks. For GSSWC the internal contacts are planned more informally. During these meetings work related issues are discussed. Staff has indicated that it would be good for GSS to have the different locations (Batam, Ruteng and Tangerang communicate more. For now only one staff member tries to contact the project every month to follow the M&E developments.

Score: From 3.5 to 3.5 (No change)

**Summary of Capability to relate**
The network of the GSSWC can be considered selective with a strong focus on Catholic partners like dioceses, parishioners, bishops, members of different church commissions and congregations, and local volunteers. However, they do not engage external groups in developing GSSWC policies and strategies however. GSS realizes that they need to invest more in external partners on the level of developing their own policies and strategies The GSSWC works together with institutions that are relevant to their beneficiaries. Their network is well established, extending all over Indonesia. The sisters make regular visits to their target groups. There is a monthly meeting of the single mother community in Jakarta, the sisters visit victims of trafficking in Bambu Apus every week, and they have daily interaction in their own shelters. There is an open atmosphere and everyone is free to speak their mind. This can be done informally and if necessary over the phone, but there are also more formal opportunities to do so in the form of regular meetings.
Score: From 3.4 to 3.6 (very slight improvement)

**Capability to achieve coherence**

**5.1. Revisiting vision, mission: 'Vision, mission and strategies regularly discussed in the organization'**
*This is about whether there is a vision, mission and strategies; how often staff discuss/revise vision, mission and strategies; and who is involved in this.*

The endline has shown the same quality as the baseline. GSSWC is part of an GSS Indonesia Province which falls under an international congegration. The vision and mission are decided at the international level, and are then specified according to the situation in Indonesia. The sisters look at the international focus and local issues, and have chosen a particular focus on the victims of trafficking and single mothers, keeping in mind their local capacity. The coordinator and the manager of the program discuss the vision and mission every year before starting to develop a new program.

Score: From 2.5 to 2.5 (no change)

**5.2. Operational guidelines: 'Operational guidelines (technical, admin, HRM) are in place and used and supported by the management'**
*This is about whether there are operational guidelines, which operational guidelines exist; and how they are used.*

There is no change in the achievement against this indicator. The GSSWC has guidelines for example on how to work with vulnerable groups. However, guidelines will be different between the three

regions because of their different situation, and they will not cover all activities. So there is freedom in carrying out activities, and the development of guidelines for activities is something they do together. These are not created top down.

Score: From 2 to 2 (no change)

**5.3. Alignment with vision, mission: 'Projects, strategies and associated operations are in line with the vision and mission of the organization'**
*This is about whether the operations and strategies are line with the vision/mission of the SPO.*

The endline showed the same quality as the baseline. The program manager and coordinator discuss the vision and mission every year before starting to plan for a new program. As a result, all staff members indicate that their operations are in line with the vision and mission of the Good Shepherd Sisters. Currently GSSWC choose their partners having the same vision and mission with GSS.

Score: From 3 to 3 (no change)

**5.4. Mutually supportive efforts: 'The portfolio of project (activities) provides opportunities for mutually supportive efforts'**
*This is about whether the efforts in one project complement/support efforts in other projects.*

There is no change in the achievement against this indicator. Efforts in one project complement and support efforts in other projects. For example the program on economic empowerment supports the program aimed at single mothers, which in turn supports the anti-trafficking program. The projects are local and tuned to the specific conditions. In one place it is rescue, in another place it is prevention. So the strategies depend on the location and context and how the coordinators form the link among them. They can observe the relevance of what happens in one place for another location. It may also be the case that the different projects support one another in a financial sense.


Score: From 4 to 4 (no change)

**Summary Capability to achieve coherence**
The end line showed the same quality as the baseline. GSSWC is part of an GSS Indonesia Province which falls under an international congegration. The vision and mission are decided at the international level, and are then specified according to the situation in Indonesia. The program manager and coordinator discuss the vision and mission every year before starting to plan for a new program, and the projects are in line with the vision and mission and also contextualized. In one place it is rescue, in another it is prevention. So the strategies depend on location, context and how the project coordinators form the link among them. Efforts in one project complement and support efforts in other projects for example the program on economic empowerment supports the program aimed at single mothers, which in turn supports the anti-trafficking program. In terms of having operational guidelines, GSSWC as a number of guidelines in place, for example on how to work with vulnerable groups. However, guidelines will be different between the three regions because of their different situation, and they will not cover all activities.

Score: From 2.9 to 2.9 (no change)

# Appendix 4 Results - key changes in organisational capacity - general causal map

**GSS General Causal Map**


Organization is becoming more visible on the issues of single moms and trafficking [1]
Increased trust from stakeholders (donors, beneficiaries, partners) [2]
Effective work performance [3]
Improved case handling [4]
Better job descriptions [5]
Better Financial Management [6]
Better program directions [7]
Improved advocacy skills [8]
Better technical suppport from the networks [9]
Impact indicators developed [10]
Better M&E [11]
Improved organizational management skills [12]
Improved staff capacity [13]
Sharing knowledge from volunteers to sisters [14]
Wider network [15]
GSS has a better position in its network [16]
More volunteers involved in the organization [17]
More RGS communities working collaboratively with GSS [18]
Support from 3 main dioceses is strengthened [19]

**Narrative of Good Shepherd Sisters General Causal Map :**

During the end line workshop at GSS, a discussion was held around what staff perceived as the key changes in in the organization since the baseline. This then led to a discussion on what were the key organizational capacity changes and why these changes have taken place according to staff present at the end line workshop. The discussion resulted in a 'general causal map' which is described below. The general causal map provides a comprehensive picture of organizational capacity changes that took place since the baseline, based on the perspective of GSS staff present at the end line workshop.

Since the baseline in 2012, several key organisational capacity changes have occurred within GSS. First of all, the organization shifted its' focus more towards the issues of single mothers and trafficking.Globally, there has been a movement within the churches to have emphasise these issues more. The movement is mostly driven by female religious leaders. GSS has also been known as the organisation that consistenly workson these issues.

With this new focusthe organization has become more visible in dealing with the issues of single moms and trafficking [1]. According to GSS staff present at the endline workshop, increased trust of stakeholders and beneficiaries in GSS to deal with these issues [2], has led to an increase in sponsored activities but also the spread of GSS's reputation in these issues.

The increase in stakeholder trust came about from three main developments:

1. First of all GSS's better positioning in the network [16] has allowed them to reach out to new partners, form new alliances and overall streamline operational processes.
2. Secondly, an increase in effective work performance [3].
3. Thirdly improved case handling and quality of work [4] played an important role in partners and beneficiaries development of faith in the organization.

The increase in effective work performance [3] can be related to a greater focus on specifying the work at hand. This was achieved by providing better job descriptions [5] on the one hand, and offer better overal program directions [7] on the other. The former was the direct result of a general improvement in organizational management skills and attitude [12], whilst the latter resulted from the development of clear indicators [10] which came about from improved monitoring and evaluation (M&E) practices [11]. These M&E practices were also part of overall improved organizational management skills.

These skills themselves were developed alongside a general improvement in staff capacity [13]. Staff and volunteers of GSS now have better advocacy, counseling and facilitation,and organisational management skills (financial, ME and human resources). Improved staff capacity [13] came about from an increasing degree of sharing knowledge between staff members, particularly from the field volunteers to the sisters responsible for running the programs. Narrowing the knowledge gap between field and program staff was a good starting point to specify and focus program activities to become more practice oriented.

The need to share knowledgefrom volunteers to the sisters resulted from three developments. Firstly, GSS has a better position in its network. By involving Catholic Church especially diocese, enabled GSS has a better position in networking. The diocese has its power and it encouraged more Religious of Good Shepherd (RGS) communities to join and to involve GSS in serving people to decrease number of trafficking. RGS is one of congregation (Roman Catholic Religious Institute). It is abbreviated from Religious of Good Shepherd. When the human resource was proper in quality and quantity, it enabled knowledge sharing from volunteers to sisters. [14]. Secondly, an overal increase of volunteers in the organization and work activities occurred, which is made easier to share knowledge and information between volunteers and sisters. Thirdly, more RGS communities now work together with GSS, which calls for increased coordination and communication, and thus also sharing of information and knowledge.

The third and final big factor influencing the increased trust of shareholders in GSS came about from their ability to handle cases better [4]. For instance GSS has succesfully supported the establishment of Perdes (Village Regulation) in Ruteng to prevent traficking. This improvement resulted from an overall improvement in the organizations advocacy skills [8], which came along with the overall increase in staff capacity [13] and knowledge exchange with partner organizations and volunteers [14]. The second big reason why cases were handled better was that over the last two years the techical support from within GSS networks have greatly increased. This has enabled GSS to tap the expertise and in–depth knowledge of partners in the network if required.

The latter came about from more intensive networking which resulted in a wider overal network [15] on the one hand, but also the internal strengthening of GSS through the combination of efforts among three dioceses (church administrations) in Jakarta, Semarang and Ruteng [19].

On the whole, improved staff capacity as well as improved networking have been the main underlying reasons, leading to changes that led to improved trust from stakeholders, which has helped the organisation to become more visible the issues of single mothers and trafficking.

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen UR
P.O. Box 88
6700 AB Wageningen
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)317 48 68 00
www.wageningenUR.nl/cdi

Report CDI-15-036

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# Endline report – Indonesia, Institut Dayakologi
# MFS II country evaluations

Capacity of Southern Partner Organisations (5C) component


Cecile Kusters[1]
Martijn Wieriks[2]
Bekti Dwi Andari[3]
Novina Suprobo[3]
Widya Priyahita[3]
Rumenta R. Sihombing[3]
Seto W. Rokhmatulloh[3]
Ita Rosita[3]

1 Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR
2 SEPAM Consultants Indonesia
3 SurveyMeter



Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen, February 2015

Report CDI-15-043

Kusters, C., Wieriks, M., Dwi Andari, B., Suprobo, N., Priyahita, W., Sihombing, R.R., Rokhmatulloh, S.W., Rosita, I., 2015. *Endline report – Indonesia, Institut Dayakologi. MFS II country evaluations; Capacity of Southern Partner Organisations (5C) component.* Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University & Research centre. Report CDI-15-043. Wageningen.

This report presents the findings of the endline of the evaluation of the organisational capacity component of the MFS II country evaluations. The focus of this report is Indonesia, Institut Dayakologi. The format is based on the requirements by the synthesis team and NWO/WOTRO. The endline was carried out in 2014. The baseline was carried out in 2012.

Key words: 5C (five core capabilities); attribution; baseline; causal map; change; CFA (Co-financing Organisation) endline; organisational capacity development; SPO (Southern Partner Organisation).



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Report CDI-15-043|

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# Acknowledgements

We are grateful to all the people that have contributed to this report. We particularly would like to thank the Southern Partner Organisation Institut Dayakologi and the Co-Financing Agency ICCO for their endless patience and support during this challenging task of collecting the endline data. We hope that this endline report will provide useful insights to Institut Dayakologi, ICCO, the synthesis team, IOB and NWO/Wotro.

The Indonesia 5C evaluation team

# List of abbreviations and acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| 5 C | Capacity development model which focuses on 5 core capabilities |
| Causal map | Map with cause-effect relationships. See also 'detailed causal map'. |
| Causal mechanisms | The combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome |
| CDI | Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University & Research centre |
| CFA | Co-Financing Agency |
| CFO | Co-Financing Organisation |
| CS | Civil Society |
| Detailed causal map | Also 'model of change'. the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change. In the 5C evaluation identified key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms) are traced through process tracing (for attribution question). |
| General causal map | Causal map with key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms), based on SPO perception. |
| ID | Institut Dayakologi |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MFS | Dutch co-financing system |
| MIS | Management Information System |
| MoFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| OD | Organisational Development |
| PME | Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation |
| PRA | Priority Result Area |
| Process tracing | Theory-based approach to trace causal mechanisms |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |
| SSI | Semi-structured Interview |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| Wageningen UR | Wageningen University & Research centre |

# 1 Introduction & summary

## 1.1 Purpose and outline of the report

The Netherlands has a long tradition of public support for civil bi-lateral development cooperation, going back to the 1960s. The Co-Financing System (*Medefinancieringsstelsel*, or 'MFS') is its most recent expression. MFS II is the 2011-2015 grant framework for Co-Financing Agencies (CFAs), which is directed at achieving a sustainable reduction in poverty. A total of 20 consortia of Dutch CFAs have been awarded €1.9 billion in MFS II grants by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).

The overall aim of MFS II is to help strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. CFAs receiving MFS II funding work through strategic partnerships with Southern Partner Organisations.

The MFS II framework stipulates that each consortium is required to carry out independent external evaluations to be able to make valid, evaluative statements about the effective use of the available funding. On behalf of Dutch consortia receiving MFS II funding, NWO-WOTRO has issued three calls for proposals. Call deals with joint MFS II evaluations of development interventions at country level. Evaluations must comprise a baseline assessment in 2012 and a follow-up assessment in 2014 and should be arranged according to three categories of priority result areas as defined by MoFA:

Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) & themes;

Capacity development of Southern partner organisations (SPO) (5 c study);

Efforts to strengthen civil society.

This report focuses on the assessment of capacity development of southern partner organisations. This evaluation of the organisational capacity development of the SPOs is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The purpose of this report is to provide endline information on one of the SPOs involved in the evaluation: ECPAT in Indonesia. The baseline report is described in a separate document.

Chapter 2 describes general information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO). Here you can find general information about the SPO, the context in which the SPO operates, contracting details and background to the SPO. In chapter 3 a brief overview of the methodological approach is described. You can find a more detailed description of the methodological approach in appendix 1.Chapter 4 describes the results of the 5c endline study. It provides an overview of capacity development interventions of the SPO that have been supported by MFS II. It also describes what changes in organisational capacity have taken place since the baseline and why (evaluation question is 1 and 4). This is described as a summary of the indicators per capability as well as a general causal map that provides an overview of the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline, as experienced by the SPO. The complete overview of descriptions per indicator, and how these have changed since the baseline is described in appendix 3. The complete visual and narrative for the key organisational capacity changes that have taken place since the baseline according to the SPO staff present at the endline workshop is presented in appendix 4.

For those SPOs involved in process tracing a summary description of the causal maps for the identified organisational capacity changes in the two selected capabilities (capability to act and commit; capability to adapt and self-renew) is provided (evaluation questions 2 and 4). These causal maps describe the identified key organisational capacity changes that are possibly related to MFS II

interventions in these two capabilities, and how these changes have come about. More detailed information can be found in appendix 5.

Chapter 5 presents a discussion on the findings and methodology and a conclusion on the different evaluation questions.

The overall methodology for the endline study of capacity of southern partner organisations is coordinated between the 8 countries: Bangladesh (Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath; INTRAC); DRC (Disaster Studies, Wageningen UR); Ethiopia (CDI, Wageningen UR); India (CDI, Wageningen UR: Indonesia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Liberia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Pakistan (IDS; MetaMeta); (Uganda (ETC). Specific methodological variations to the approach carried out per country where CDI is involved are also described in this document.

This report is sent to the Co-Financing Agency (CFA) and the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO) for correcting factual errors and for final validation of the report.

## 1.2 Brief summary of analysis and findings

Since the baseline, two years ago, Institut Dayakologi has only seen changes in the capability to act and commit. A slight improvement occurred in this regard. This was particularly through a change in staff turnover as a result of several senior staff members resigning. New, younger staff was attracted to replace these functions, which resulted in overall lower costs of wages, more training opportunities and better communication between staff members and management. No further changes occurred in any of the other four capabilities.

The evaluators considered it important to also note down the SPO's story in terms of changes in the organisation since the baseline, and this would also provide more information about reasons for change, which were difficult to get for the individual indicators. Also for some issues there may not have been relevant indicators available in the list of core indicators provided by the evaluation team. During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by Institut Dayakologi's staff: improved secretarial coordination and support, improved staff morale, strengthened role as a networking hub for advocacy on Dayak communities and culture, increased executive team's capacity to develop proposals, improved staff decision-making process, more qualified human resources.

According to the SPOs staff, MFS II funded capacity development interventions for program support have contributed to organizational capacity change in several ways, both directly and indirectly. The supported training interventions to increase staff capacity in the skills and capacity to document and spread information to the public has contributed significantly to inspiring the community to think back to the Dayak culture and indigenous customs, that has helped improve program implementation and achievements. On the other hand the continuous support of Cordaid in reconstruction by rebuilding the offices, infrastructure and office structure have helped in improving day to day operations of the secretariat, strengthened the role of Institut Dayakologi as a networking hub and improved staff morale, all leading to improved program implementation and achievements. Although the 5C indicators in the previous section don't show great change for the organization, the general causal map highlighted that MFS II support has certainly contributed to strengthening the organizational capacity and laying the foundation for increased capacity to mobilize resources for operations and program management of Institut Dayakologi. However, it must be noted that the information provided has not been validated through other sources of information, and therefore the conclusions must be understood in that respect.

# 2 General Information about the SPO – Name SPO

## 2.1 General information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO)

| | |
|---|---|
| **Country** | Indonesia |
| **Consortium** | Communities of Change |
| **Responsible Dutch NGO** | Cordaid |
| **Project (if applicable)** | Information Centre of Dayak Culture |
| **Southern partner organisation** | Institut Dayakologi |

The project/partner is part of the sample for the following evaluation component(s):

| | |
|---|---|
| **Achievement of MDGs and themes** | |
| **Capacity development of Southern partner organisations** | X |
| **Efforts to strengthen civil society** | |

## 2.2 The socio-economic, cultural and political context in which the partner operates

**The socio-economic, cultural and political context in which the partner operates**

The main feature outlining the context in which Institut Dayakologi operates is a historical struggle between traditional Indigenous' norms and values (in this case is the Dayak) and the modern ideas of what a society should look like. The Dayak people are originally from Borneo and live from farming and herding[1]. Very little has changed in the Dayak farming techniques throughout the years and it is not exceptional to find groups still living in the so-called longhouses (houses where about a hundred people live together- separated in apartments for each family)[2]. The Dayak have their own system of beliefs and ideas about how humans should live in harmony with each other and with nature. On the basis of these ideas the Dayak have been struggling to protect their peculiar way of living in face of fast urban and technological developments that have been taking place in Indonesia that increasingly demand Dayak territory for its further expansion.

The principles on which the Dayak base their lifestyle have been put in contrast with principles typical of modern societies. These principles are:

- "Sustainability (biodiversity) versus productivity (monoculture)
- Collective (cooperation) versus individuality (competition)
- Natural (organic) versus engineered (inorganic)
- Spirituality (rituality) versus rationality (scientific)
- Process (effectiveness) versus result (efficiency)
- Subsistence (domesticity) versus commerciality (market)

[1] Compost, A.(2012)*"Borneo People",* WWF- Available at: http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/where_we_work/borneo_forests/about_borneo_forests/people/ Accessed on 13.11.2012

[2] Compost, A.(2012)*"Borneo People",* WWF- Available at: http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/where_we_work/borneo_forests/about_borneo_forests/people/ Accessed on 13.11.2012

- Customary law (locality) versus state law (global)"[3]

John Bamba, the executive director of Institut Dayakologi, stresses that "failure to achieve these ideals is believed to result in barau (Jalai Dayak): a situation when nature fails to function normally and thus results in chaos. Barau is a result of Adat* transgression—a broken relationship with nature. "Poverty" for the Dayak is linked directly with failure to exercise the Adat that governs the way in which the people should live"[4]. As it is the case with other Indigenous peoples around the world, the Dayak people struggle for the right to self-determination. That is, to decide based on their own norms and values how to live their lives in their community, how to use their land and how to cultivate their animals.

The challenges in setting forth this struggle derive mainly from power differences. This means that although the Dayak are covered by the United Nation's Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007)[5], corporate and governmental actors still invade Dayak areas, resulting in the sometimes forceful expulsion of the areas' inhabitants. These factors increase the pressure on and the difficulties for the Dayak to maintain and continue the communal, natural and traditional identity and life-style they have cultivated throughout their existence. Furthermore, urban and technological developments do not reach the Dayak in an inclusive way; rather, these groups grow marginalized in relation to the rest of the country[6]. A curious fact is that, despite the destruction of indigenous religions by European Christians, it has often been Christian missionaries (Roman Catholic) who have struggled to preserve the Dayak culture and religion[7].

Institut Dayakologi engages in the struggle for the right to self-determination and preservation of the Dayak culture. Through empowering the Dayak community with knowledge; advocating for the Dayak cause and enhancing peace in the community the Institut Dayakologi raises awareness in the community about the value and potential of the Dayak culture in contributing to humankind; in its own and indigenous way of doing so[8].

The program activities of Institut Dayakologi for year 2010-2013 formulated based on the above objectives that are to be achieved in the next 3 years are as follows[9]:

1. Activities of Documentation, Research, Studies and Publication Programme
2. Activities of Collaboration and Advocacy Programme
3. Activities of Recovery and Reconstruction Programme
4. Activities of Institutional Empowerment Programme

* Adat: set of local and traditional laws.

## 2.3 Contracting details

When did cooperation with this partner start: For more than 15 years Cordaid has been cooperating with Institut Dayakologi

What is the MFS II contracting period: 2010-2015

Did cooperation with this partner end: Not applicable

If yes, when did it finish: Not applicable

[3] UNICEF (2012), *"State of the World's Indigenous People",* Chapter 1. Available at: http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/SOWIP_chapter1.pdf Accessed on 14.11.2012

[4] Bamba, J. 2003. *"Seven fortunes and seven calamities – Cultural poverty from an indigenous perspective"* in Indigenous Affairs, Indigenous Poverty: An issue of Rights and Needs, No.1/2003: 26-35. Copenhagen: IWGIA. Available online at http://www.iwgia.org Accessed on 14.11.2012

[5] IWGIA (2012) *"Who are the Indigenous Peoples?"* Available at: http://www.iwgia.org/culture-and-identity/identification-of-indigenous-peoples Accessed on 14.11.2012

[6] IWGIA (2012) *"Who are the Indigenous Peoples?"* Available at: http://www.iwgia.org/culture-and-identity/identification-of-indigenous-peoples Accessed on 14.11.2012

[7] Vinson and Joanne Sutlive, Gen. Eds., *The Encyclopaedia of Iban Studies:Iban History, Society, and Culture Volume II (H-N)*, (Kuching: The Tun Jugah Foundation, 2001), 697

[8] Institute Dayakologi (2012) *"Narrative report to Cordaid. January-December 2012".*

[9] Annual Progress Report 2013 :Toward Institut Dayakologi As The Information Center for Dayak Culture , January-December 2013

What is the reason for ending the cooperation with this partner: Not applicable

Is there expected cooperation with this partner after 31st of December 2015: No.

## 2.4 Background to the Southern Partner Organisation

Based on the fact that the Dayak culture has been vanishing over time due to unequal and invasive urban and technological developments, the founders of what later came to be called Institut Dayakologi aim at preserving and promoting the Dayak culture among its members. Through raising awareness of the richness and importance of the Dayak traditions, ways of thinking and lifestyle, the Institut Dayakologi envisions the Dayak as a people with the right of self-determination about the meaning of progress and well-being as well as the kinds of developments it should avoid or bring forth for the Dayak community members.

In 1981 in Pontianak, Dayak intellectuals (mostly teachers) established the Fundation Yayasan Karya Sosial Pancur Kasih (YPSPK) where formal education for raising awareness of the Dayak culture was the first service offered to the Dayak community[10]. As YKPSK grew in size and scope, it expanded its services to other areas, now also empowering the Dayak in social, economic and political matters[11]. In 1987 the Pancur Kasih Credit Union was established by YKSPK in Pontianak, and in 1991 a rural bank was established in Sungah Pinyuh (50 km from Pontianak). This Community Credit Bank was created for the purpose of generating a small-scale credit for the communities in the rural areas. At the end of the 1990's the Institute of Dayakologi Research and Development was established, which has been known as the Institut Dayakologi since 1998[12].

In 2007 a fire accident in Institut Dayakologi's office destroyed almost 90% of the documentation collected since the establishment of the organization. After a short break for recovery of the damage; Institut Dayakologi continued its operations.

Year 2013, precisely five years have passed since Institut Dayakologi has had to resume its operation with new condition following the fire disaster in 2007. This five years' period can be divided into 2 important and noteworthy stages, they are recovery from 2007 to 2009, which was marked by the recovery of institutional non-physical infrastructures (programmes, strategic planning and so forth) and reconstruction from 2012 to 2013 that was marked by the procurement of supporting infrastructure in the form of the Office Building and Jurung of Institut Dayakologi.[13] With this new beginning, the organization saw the need of redefining the organization's focus and strategy[14].

For more details on the history of Institut Dayakologi please see appendix A for the historical time line that was developed during the baseline workshop.

**Vision**

*"The Indigenous peoples - the Dayak peoples in particular - are able to determine and manage their social, cultural, economic and political in together in the spirit of love to struggle for their dignity and sovereignty"[15].*

**Mission**

*"To conduct research and/or advocacy in the spirit of education, independency and solidarity for the revitalization and restitution of the Dayaks' existence".[16]*

[10] UNICEF (2012), *"State of the World's Indigenous People",* Chapter 1. Available at: http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/SOWIP_chapter1.pdf Accessed on 14.11.2012

[11] Institute Dayakologi, (2012) *"History".* Available at: http://dayakology.org/eng/vision.htm Accessed on 14.11.2012

[12] Institute Dayakologi, (2012) *"History".* Available at: http://dayakology.org/eng/vision.htm Accessed on 14.11.2012

[13] Annual Progress Report 2013 :Toward Institut Dayakologi As The Information Center for Dayak Culture , January-December 2013

[14] Historical time line developed by Evaluation team, (2012)

[15] Source: http://dayakology.org/eng/vision.htm accessed 20-02-2013

[16] Source: information provided by Institute Dayakologi in response to reviewing the draft baseline report, d.d. 15-01-2013

**Strategies**

In order to maximize the role of "encouraging the advocacy and dissemination of Dayak culture as well as encouraging the better recognition of the Dayak culture and indigenous rights at home and abroad", Institut Dayakologi has strategic actions such as building up a multi-level network approach in order to broaden the impact of its actions. Institut Dayakologi expects "that the advocacy of indigenous peoples' cultural revitalization, environment and natural resources management, as well as efforts to build peace and transformation can work more effectively owing to the supports of various parties, at local, national and international level"[17].

Based on the Strategic Planning resulted from the Workshop held on 23 – 25 March 2009, and from the reflection of Institut Dayakologi's performance held on 9 August 2009 by Institut Dayakologi, activities for the period of 2010 – 2013 in an integrative Institutional Programme have been formulated aiming to achieve the following Goals and Objectives[18]:

**1. Goals**

1.1. Realization of Institut Dayakalolgy as the Information Centre for Dayak culture that is accessible to public and is beneficial to the advocacy of indigenous Dayak peoples.

1.2. Increased participation of indigenous peoples and other oppressed communities in struggling for their rights, justice, pluralism, gender equality and anti-violence through facilitation, community organizing, media as well as local, national and international networks.

1.3. Conducting recovery by means of managing the remaining data in the form of audio cassettes, and photos saved from the fire, as well as re-collecting data still available from external parties; recovery of Pancur Dangeri Cooperative and Mitra Kasih Printing House; and realization of reconstruction of Institut Dayakologi's office in order to support the performance of Institut Dayakologi's role as the Information Centre and Advocacy of Dayak culture.

1.4. Increased accountabilities and capabilities of Institut Dayakologi in managing available institutional resources in sustainable ways in order to improve infrastructure, welfare and capacities of its activists to be able to implement the institution's programs.

**2. Objectives**

2.1. Objectives of Documentation, Research, Studies, Publication Programme

Objective 1: Documentation

By May 2013, Institut Dayakologi shall have re-documented Dayak oral traditions and music from all districts in West Kalimantan, with the priority of 11 sub-ethnic groups in Ketapang, Sintang, Kapuas Hulu and Melawi Districts based on pre-survey for better quality and management than those before the fire.

Objective 2: Research and Studies

By May 2013, Institut Dayakologi shall have had 10 research/study findings related to social, cultural, environmental, economic and political issues that bring impacts to the indigenous Dayak communities in West Kalimantan.

Objective 3: Publication

By May 2013, Institut Dayakologi shall have produced 29 titles of books, 2 journals, and published the works of Institut Dayakologi through local media, exhibition, and Institut Dayakologi's website, so that they become sources of reference about Dayak culture that are accountable for and accessible to local, national and international public.

[17] Institut Dayakologi (2010) *"Institutional Report January-December 2010: Towards Institut Dayakologi as information centre for Dayak culture".* (p.2)

[18] Annual Progress Report 2013 :Toward Institut Dayakologi As The Information Center for Dayak Culture , January-December 2013

2.2. Objectives of Advocacy and Collaboration Programme

Objective 1: Communities Empowerment and Advocacy
By the end of May 2013, Institut Dayakologi shall have facilitated 9 activities of Community Empowerment programme in order to become empowered and professional communities through Communities Organizing, natural resources management, advocacy and empowerment of the Alliance of Indigenous Peoples of Jalai Sekayuq-Kendawangan (AMA JK) in Jelai Hulu, Marau, Tumbang Titi, Manis Mata, Air Upas, Tayap subdistricts, in Ketapang District.

Objective 2: Peace Building and Transformation

By the end of May 2013, Institut Dayakologi shall have facilitated multicultural partnership through 4 times of peace education in Central Kalimantan and East Kalimantan, 5 times of training on natural resources conflict resolution in West Kalimantan and the teaching of Multicultural Local Culture at 14 Junior High Schools (SMP), 20 campaign activities and peace culture promotion, facilitation on 6 multicultural productive-business groups in order to maintain peace and transformation in West Kalimantan.
Objective 3: Local Culture Teaching

By the end of May 2013, Institut Dayakologi shall have facilitated the teaching of Local Culture at 20 Primary Schools (SD) and Junior High Schools (SMP) in West Kalimantan to pass Dayak culture tradition to the younger generation.

2.3. Objectives of Recovery and Reconstruction Programme

Objective 1: Recovery
By the end of May 2013, Institut Dayakologi shall have conducted recovery actions through management of remaining data saved from the fire in the form of 2,000 audio cassettes, 7,000 photos, re-collection of data from external parties, as well as the recovery of Pancur Dangeri Cooperative and Mitra Kasih Printing House to reach their cash flow liquidity of 10-20%.

Objective 2: Reconstruction
By the end of December 2011, Institut Dayakologi shall have had a new office in Pontianak, West Kalimantan, in order to support the role of Institut Dayakologi as the Information Centre and Advocacy of Dayak Culture.

2.4. Objectives of Institutional, Financial and Secretariat Development Programme

Objective 1: Financial Management
By the end of May 2013, Institut Dayakologi, shall have applied standard financial management, collected funds needed for the implementation of its programs, obtained more alternative income sources, and conducted financial audit, in order to manage its financial resources more professionally, effectively and efficiently.

Objective 2: Institutional and Activists Empowerment
By the end of May 2013, Institut Dayakologi shall have facilitated the improvement of its activists' capacities through various policies in supports for studies, training, short courses, creating new cadres, and refreshing.

Objective 3: Secretariat
Secretariat of Institut Dayakologi shall have been managed professionally (efficient, secured, proactive, quick-to-respond, effective) in order to be able to provide effective and friendly services as well as to be able to manage ID's database based on its standards.

# 3 Methodological approach and reflection

## 3.1 Overall methodological approach

This chapter describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

5. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
6. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
7. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
8. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

Note: this methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report A detailed overview of the approach is described in appendix 1.

The first (changes in organisational capacity) and the fourth evaluation question are addressed together through:

- **Changes in the 5C indicators since the baseline:** standard indicators have been agreed upon for each of the five capabilities of the five capabilities framework (see appendix 2) and changes between the baseline, and the endline situation have been described. For data collection a mix of data collection methods has been used, including self-assessments by SPO staff; interviews with SPO staff and externals; document review; observation. For data analysis, the Nvivo software program for qualitative data analysis has been used. Final descriptions per indicator and per capability with corresponding scores have been provided.
- **Key organisational capacity changes – 'general causal map':** during the endline workshop a brainstorm has been facilitated to generate the key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO since the baseline, with related underlying causes. For this purpose, a visual as well as a narrative causal map have been described.

In terms of the attribution question (2 and 4), **'process tracing'** is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to

focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

## 3.2 Assessing changes in organisational capacity and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?** And the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This is explained below. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

The evaluators considered it important to also note down a consolidated SPO story and this would also provide more information about what the SPO considered to be important in terms of organisational capacity changes since the baseline and how they perceived these key changes to have come about. Whilst this information has not been validated with sources other than SPO staff, it was considered important to understand how the SPOs has perceived changes in the organisation since the baseline.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information is provided for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the next session on the evaluation question on attribution, as described below and in the appendix 1.

How information was collected and analysed for addressing evaluation question 1 and 4, in terms of description of changes in indicators per capability as well as in terms of the general causal map, based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff, is further described below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012[19].

[19] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1) **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2) **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3) **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4) **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5) **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Please see appendix 1 for a description of the detailed process and steps.

## 3.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity - evaluation question 2 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question*: **To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia* (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?** and the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Below, the selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

### 3.3.1 Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.
For the detailed results of this selection, in the four countries that CDI is involved in, please see appendix 1. The following SPOs were selected for process tracing:
Ethiopia: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE (4/9)
India: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE, VTRC (5/10)
Indonesia: ASB, ECPAT, PtPPMA, YPI, YRBI (5/12)
Liberia: BSC, RHRAP (2/5).

### 3.3.2 Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ' general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained. More information can be found in Appendix 1.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

### 3.3.3 Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team. These can also be found in appendix 1.

**Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach:** this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

**Using standard indicators and scores**: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

**General causal map:** whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

**Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question:** this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II

supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:

- Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
- Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

**Utilisation of the evaluation**

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

**Design** – mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

**Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication:** many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

**5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process:** The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

# 4 Results

## 4.1 MFS II supported capacity development interventions

Below an overview of the different MFS II supported capacity development interventions of Institut Dayakologi that have taken place since 2011 are described. The information is based on the information provided by ICCO.

Table 1
*Information about MFS II supported capacity development interventions since baseline*

| Title of the MFS II supported capacity development intervention | Objectives | Activities | Timing and duration | Budget |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rebuilding of Office and Jurung meeting facility | Rebuild the office space for ID after the fire | Rebuilding the office environment and providing a special meeting room | 2012-2014 | 100,000 Euro |
| Documentary film making training | Training on how to make documentary films for the public | Scenario and manuscript writing, manual walkthrough | 2013 | 1785 Euro |
| IT Training, database and website | Development of a Dayak cultural database and source | IT Consultant designation, database development, SOP and procedure development | 2012 | 26000 Euro |


Source: 5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_SPO perspective_Indonesia_Institut Dayakologi

## 4.2 Changes in capacity development and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

Below you can find a description of the changes in each of the five core capabilities. This information is based on the analysis of the information per each of the indicators. This detailed information for each of the indicators describes the current situation, and how and why it has changed since the baseline. See also annex 3.

### 4.2.1 Changes in the five core capabilities

**Capability to act and commit**





In terms of strategic guidance to resist slight change since the baseline. The director has become the chairman of another organization (GPPK) and the treasurer of yet another (CUG). Now the division Manager has the authority to make decisions as long as it is within the scope of the program. Meetings in the division depend on the initiative of the management team and Division Managers but are routinely held each month and this is where strategic and operational guidelines are provided. The management team provided mentoring and guidance to division managers. Strategic plans are well articulated and based on monitoring and evaluation, although there is no systematic monitoring and evaluation in place. The changing on the day to day leadership on management team has opened a wide opportunity of discussion between management team, division managers, and program managers, on the program implementation. As the communication and capacity gap was minimum and staff became more free to express ideas. The discussion became a means of collecting facts, analysing the condition, and deciding strategies for a better implementation. The organization also runs a research and studies program, an advocacy and collaboration program, and an empowerment of resource program. M&E is done both internally and externally and the result was used to analyse program implementation and formulate better pogram implementation strategy. M&E has become one of the approaches in the preparation of strategic planning. There is no particular tool to do this process. Meetings for annual planning and review are used to deliver the next strategic plan.

Staff turnover is still high , since some experienced staff left the organisation by the end of 2012. But there is also been some new staff. This left the organisation with a gap in terms of available knowledge and skills but the money that came available by staff leaving has been used to train other staff. There have been plenty of opportunities for skills upgrading both in the organisation through sharing meetings as well as by attending capacity building events mostly finded by MSF II especially in house trainings within the organisation. Generally, the staff of *Institut Dayakologi* are loyal, dedicated and committed but still lack general skills i.e. language skills. Motivation to work for the organisation mainly comes from staff's dedication to contribute to the Dayak culture, although some staff have left the organisation due to better financial gains elsewhere. Staff in this organization are included in a social security system, provided allowance for family and children, health insurance, accommodation and transportation. A pension program for staff is under development and hopefully can be implemented before the end of 2014 The organization still has a complicated but firm organization structure, and also has clear procedures to develop the strategic planning which is included target communities. It has relative stability in financial resources and there are procedures and plans to obtain additional income and to become less dependent of donors, which is described in a ten year organization financial plan.

Score: from 3.1 to 3.6 (slight improvement)


**Capability to adapt and self-renew**




There is still no comprehensive and functional monitoring and evaluation system in place, but the organization receives feedback from other organizations and beneficiaries and evaluates the impact of the implemented programs as part of program implementation. ID has setup a M&E Division as one of its main programs starting 2015. This program will be managed by a Division Manager and put in the management structure of the organization. Furthermore, regular meetings are held to discuss progress program implementation and annual planning and review meeting is held to look back and plan ahead for the next year. There is no specific and dedicated trained staff to do M&E. Monitoring and evaluation is mainly focused on project and not organisational level and on activities and outputs and impact. The organisation also has published lots of publication that provided a deep analysis on the indigenous people culture. The book is a reflection of how the intervention bring changes on people's life. There are many ways for staff to deliver their ideas and critiques both informally and formally. Currently with the fast growth of social media, the staff are also able to deliver their ideas through digital media. The organisation tracks what is happening in the environment, mainly by engaging with the communities but also with the media.

Score: from 3.1 to 3.1 (no change)


**Capability to deliver on development objectives**



Programs are implemented based on work plans and detailed operational budgets in the Program Implementation Planning (RPK) which includes activities, output, result, resources (assest) , and budget. All staff has a responsibility to develop RPK and APK. Beside the RPK, there is also Program Implementation Analysis (APK) which supports the analysis of program implementation. RPK and APK are used by the staff as a reference for daily operational activities. *Institut Dayakologi* has an approach for project implementation which requires developing the work plan and budget arrangement first and analyze it afterwards. This way, the staff can work efficiently and the resources are used appropriately. It also helps them to compare the input, the output and the impact. There is still deviation from the planning because of the external factors although the organization always finishes their program completely. In order to fulfill the needs of the beneficiaries, the organization held discussions and workshops before the programs are implemented. Sometimes, the staff stays with the beneficiaries to ensure optimal delivery. Since staff engages frequently with beneficiaries, this assists in assessing whether the services meet their needs.

Score: from 3.6 to 3.6 (no change)


**Capability to relate**




The organization has an extensive network and develops good relationships from village level to international level. Stakeholders are invited to provide suggestions to aid in the development of the strategic planning and asked to work together with the organization in the implementation of projects. There is frequent contact between staff members and beneficiaries through frequent visits or even by phone if distance or resources do not allow frequent visits. Sometimes staff members stay with the beneficiaries There are many ways to get staff feedback or involvement in the decision making process through routine meetings, informal communication and a suggestion box.

Score: from 4.1 to 4.1 (no change)

**Capability to achieve coherence**




The vision and mission of the *Institut Dayakologi* are reviewed every three years. Strategic planning directly becomes work planning, which enables projects to generally be in line with the vision and mission. The projects are also related to and supporte each other, therefore, mutually supportive. There is an agreed SOP to support the work of the staff covering HRM and finance which is developed together with the staff and these are effectively applied, but this hasn't changed since the baseline in 2012 .

Score: 3.9 to 3.9 (no change)

### 4.2.2 General changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO

Institute Dayakologi (ID) is an advocacy organization which works for the preservation of the cultural preservation of the Dayak. One of the main activities of ID was to conduct advocacy of the natural and indigenous environment which is increasingly threatened by the expansion of plantation companies. In addition, ID takes a leading role in creating awareness in the community on pluralism through local subjects at schools. It targeted junior high school level students and was intended to bring awareness to children that they are part of a multi-cultural society.

1. The evaluation team carried out an end line assessment at Institut Dayakologi from 20 to 23 August 2014. During this workshop, the team made a recap of key features of the organisation in the baseline in 2012 (such as vision, mission, strategies, clients, partnerships). This was the basis for discussing changes that had happened to the organisation since the baseline. The three main changes that happened in the organisation since the baseline, as identified by the staff during the end line workshop were:improved secretarial coordination and support [20]
2. improved staff morale [1]
3. strengthened role as a networking hub for advocacy on Dayak communities and culture [7]
4. increased executive team's capacity to develop proposals [8]
5. improved staff decision-making process [28]
6. more qualified human resources [16]

According to staff present at the end line workshop, these organizational capacity changes are expected to contribute to the development of Institut Dayakologi as a leading organization in indigenous culture preservation.


Apart from the fourth issue, all of these issues have contributed to improved programme implementation and achievements [5] which have helped the organization to be better recognized as a leading organization on the Dayak culture in terms of information and advocacy work [4]. This increased recognition as well as the increased executive team's capacity to develop proposals is

helping the organization in the capacity to mobilize resources for operations and program management [2].

One example of improved programme implementation could be seen in inspiring the community to think about the culture, customs and indigenous communities of the Dayak [9]. On the one hand this was done through the publication of a documentary film published by Institut Dayakologi [11], in an attempt to broaden public information [14]. On the other hand community awareness was addressed by pointing out the need to preserve the Dayak culture and the challenges that indigenous communities face on a daily basis through Ruai TV broadcasting. Based on the FGD with staff, Ruai TV had a role to publish or broadcast documenter films/movies produced by Institut Dayakologi.[15]. Both these initiatives were enabled by the increased staff capacity to create documentary films [18] , which are further explained below.

Another example includes the high quality advocacy work [10] that has been done by Institut Dayakologi. Next to specific new work initiatives, the quality of advocacy work went up significantly as well [10] due to more qualified staff and human resources available to the organization [16]. This is further explained below.

Each of the five key organizational changes are further explained below. The numbers in the narrative correspond with the numbers in the visual.


Old office was destroyed because of Fire [43]
There was a need For better workspace [42]
New office building funded by partner [40]
New office building as a work space in 2013 [37]
Improved Workspace [34]
Communication is easier because parallel phone between office space is available [22]
Staff has focused more in conducting their role and responsibility ( in working) [23]
More formalized communication structure through organizational division separation [24]
Improved coordination and support through secretariat [20]
The new building reflected Dayakalogi's identity as a center of Dayak Culture. [25]
Dayakologi center is more accessible and visible [12]
Improved staff morale [1]
Jurung (new meeting room) is available as a meeting point between organizations/stakeholders [26]
Strengthened role as a networking hub focused on advocacy on Dayak communities and culture [7]
There is an additional income from Jurung (meeting room) Rental [27]
New office facilities bring increase operational costs [21]
Budget revised to cover office operational expenses [17]
Executive team challenged to develop proposals to fill budget gap [13]
Increased executive team's capacity to develop proposals [8]
Director assumes position as head of GPPK coalition [44]
Delegation of more authority to daily operational team [38]
More discussion opportunities with division manager and program manager [35]
Improved Staff Decision Making Process [28]
Improved program implementation and achievement [5]
More organizations recognize Dayakologi as a leading organization in Dayak culture information and advocacy [4]
Increased capacity to mobilize resources for operations and program management [2]
Some senior staff members resigned [45]
Staff restructuring and rehiring to accommodate knowledge gap [41]
Delayed program activities [39]
Increased need for staff capacity building [36]
Training of documentary video making [29]
Increased staff capacity to create documentary film [18]
More qualified human resources [16]
Broaden public information [14]
Inspire community to take action based on the documentary film [11]
Inspiring the community to think back of "culture", custom, and indigenous [9]
Training on criminal investigation of money laundering in forestry [30]
Increase community awareness to preserve Dayak culture and indigenous challenges through Ruai TV broadcasting [15]
High quality advocacy work [10]
Visual documentation training [31]
Staff knowledge and technical skill improved [19]
Etno linguistic training [32]
IT Training to operate nd web maintenance ) [33]

**Improved secretarial coordination and support [20]**
Daily tasks and program implementation work were more effectively executed [5] by having better coordination and support from the organization's secretariat [20]. Program activities could now be carried out with more coordination, focus and in a timely manner. The secretariat now possesses good communication infrastructure, such as multiple phone connections [22], stronger work discipline and focus in carrying out their duties [23] and most importantly, a more formalized communication structure which was brought about by the physical restructuring of the department into separate divisions [24]. The underlying cause for this overall professionalization of the secretariat was the improved workspace [34] which was upgraded as part of the new office building in 2013 [37]. Funds for this rebuilding was provided for 35% by partner donor agencies, and the remainder was paid for with Institut Dayakologi's sustainability fund [40].The new office building was a necessity [42] after the old building got destroyed in a fire in 9 August 2007[43], but also a welcome change after working for years in an inadequate and improvised environment. It greatly impacted staff morale and the professionalization of the organization as a whole.

**Improved staff morale [1]**
According to staff present at the end line workshop, staff morale overall was greatly impacted by the accessibility and visibility of the newly constructed Institut Dayakologi building [12]. More people came to visit this building to learn and look for references about Dayak Culture, which enthused and engaged the organization's staff. The new building-itself became more visible through their designs, which incorporate and display both the Dayak Culture's and the organization's identity [25]. This major overhaul of office space was part of a greater initiative to improve office space [34], which will be explained as a separate change factor in more detail further below. Improved staff morale is expected to lead to improved programme implementation [16].

**Strengthened role as a networking hub for advocacy on Dayak communities and culture [7]**
Institut Dayakologi strengthened its role as a hub in the network that focuses on the advocacy for Dayak communities and culture [7]. Partners and stakeholders supported Institut Dayakologi role as such due to their provision of meeting space in their new office as meeting point for thenetwork [26]. The meeting room, or better known traditionally as a "Jurung", was created as part of the new office environment, and meant to be used both for internal use as well as external use by renting out the space publicly. The Jurung is a true replication of a traditional Dayak meeting space, and provides an important role in the Dayak culture.

**Increased executive team's capacity to develop proposals [8]**
The executive team's capacity to develop proposals [8] has been increased after the executive team was challenged to increase their competencies and find additional funding for the organization in order to be able and fill the new budget gap [13]. Institut Dayakologi's budget had to be revised [17] after it came under strain as a result of the higher operational expenses brought in from usage of the new office facilities [21]. Although some of these expenses could be covered by income from renting out the "Jurung" meeting room [27], new funds were required to balance the organization's budget after the workspace improvements had been realized [34].

**Improved staff decision-making process [28]**
The organization has improved its decision making process [28]. The junior Staffs were given more opportunities to discuss matters with the division manager and program manager [35], who in turn utilized this input into their management decisions. These opportunities were created through the delegation of more authority to the daily operational team [38]. Prior to this it was mostly the Director who dealt with such issues and management decisions, but as he assumed position as head of the GPPK coalition [44], the director was forced to put down some of his day to day Institut Dayakologi activities and delegate them to his subordinates.

**More qualified human resources [16]**
Institut Dayakologi now has more qualified human resources [16] . Due to having increased capacity for staff to create documentary films [18], after following a training session on the subject of documentary video making [29]. Staff capacity also increased due to improved technical knowledge and skills of staff [19]. This was due to a series of trainings. On the knowledge side, staff was trained for instance on Etno linguistic skills, which enabled them to understand and communicate with Dayak communities at a higher level [32]. On the technical skill side, staff went through training on criminal investigations of money laundering in forestry [30], visual documentation [31] and IT training to operate IT but also maintain for example the website [33]. All the trainings provided by Institut Dayakologi were part of the organization addressing the need for further staff capacity building [36]. This became evident after program activities became more and more delayed after a large restructuring operation of human resources [41]. Staff was relocated, newly hired and repositioned to accommodate the knowledge gap [41] that was left behind after several senior staff members resigned [45] from the organization in the observed period in the end of 2012.

1. Improved program implementation and meeting the set objectives [5]
The strategy of program implementation was broadened through the use of visual documentation of indigenous custom through movies or videos. This was enabled by inspiring community (not only beneficiaries) to think about the culture, customs and indigenous communities of the Dayak [9]. On the one hand this was done through the publication of a documentary film published by Institut

Dayakologi [11], in an attempt to broaden public information [14]. On the other hand community awareness was addressed by pointing out the need to preserve the Dayak culture and the challenges that indigenous communities face on a daily basis through Ruai TV broadcasting (15]. Both these initiatives were enabled by the increased staff capacity to create documentary films [18] after following a training session on the subject of documentary video making [29].

2. High quality advocacy work [10]

Next to specific new work initiatives the quality of advocacy work went up significantly as well [10] due to more qualified staff and human resources available to the organization [16].Both staff knowledge as well as technical skills improved [19]

**Better recognition of Institut Dayakologi as a Dayak Culture information center [2]**

Institut Dayakologi has become known as the leading organization with respect to Dayak Culture information [2] amongst both the public as well as public and private institutions. The prime reason for this was the fact that more organizations have experienced and observed Institut Dayakologi efforts in advocacy for the natural and indigenous environments which are increasingly threatened by the expansion of plantation companies and the Dayak culture in general. The reasons for this recognition have already been explained in the sections above.

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# 5 Discussion and conclusion

## 5.1 Methodological issues

**General: Applied to all or most SPOs**

With regard to the methodology, Indonesia has made some data collection adjustment based on the context. The first adjustment was related to the type of instrument used. To assess the organizational capacity, the study has provided self-assessment, observation and interview sheets. These all were used during the baseline with all SPOs. During the end line the team used self-assessment, interview and observation sheets. However the evaluator applied interview sheets as self-assessment—where participants were asked to fill these sheets by themselves. For the participants who did not attend the workshop, the interviews were done separately using the interview sheet and the results from the interview were included in the subgroup interview sheet that was already filled by the staff member. Were combined into the relevant sub categories in the interview sheet. Interview sheets were also applied for interviews with the CFAs, partners and consultants.

The baseline study showed that having two similar instruments (self assessments, and interview sheets) did not have any effect in relation to obtaining adequate and quality data.

To have some clarification post visit to all SPOs, the evaluator used email and phone interviews.


**Institut Dayakologi**

In preparation for the endline workshop, the evaluation team sent the interview sheets in advance to Institut Dayakologi and had an opportunity to have the filled sheets prior to workshop. When reading the interview sheet, it was clear that staff had different understanding in answering the questions. The information gained from the interview was confirmed during the workshop in Institut Dayakologi through group interview. All staff attended the workshop, and represented group categorization such as management, program, field staff, and admin/HR. Specific M&E was not available and attached to certain function and role in the organization. Team also had opportunity to interview 2 partners of Institut Dayakologi, unfortunately consultant was not available. he workshop was started by discussion on the general causal map, which includes the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline, as perceived by the SPO. Since there has been a high staff turnover between baseline and end line, most of the staff respondents were different from the staff respondents during the baseline. Like during the baseline, a large number of staff (23 during the endline), attended the endline workshop. This made it difficult for all staff to be able to express their views, but this has been solved by organizing in-depth interviews using the same interview sheets.

## 5.2 Changes in organisational capacity development

This section aims to provide an answer to the first and fourth evaluation questions:

1. *What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?*
4. *What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?*




Whilst changes took place in all of the five core capabilities, overall very little has changed for Institut Dayakologi over the last two years. Below the changes in each of the capabilities are further explained, by referring to the specific indicators that changed. All changes took place in the indicators under the capability to act and commit.

There was a slight improvement in the indicator on staff turnover. After a series of resignations of senior staff, Institut Dayakologi was able to recruit new staff early 2013 for data base management, research, administration and cleaning services. Even though a skill and knowledge gap occurred, the reduction of senior staff freed up financial resources that could be applied to the new staff's development and training. In terms of articulated strategies, a slight improvement occurred as well: a change in day to day leadership narrowed the communication and capacity gap and allowed more staff to become involved in program management and implementation decisions. Additionally, staff members were given the opportunity to speak more freely and express ideas. Staff skills improved as well due to tighter screening of new employees and more in-house training opportunities for new staff. These training opportunities resulted from a greater training budget now that more senior staff has left the organisation.

No further changes occurred in any of the other four capabilities.

**General organisational capacity changes related to MFS II Interventions**

The evaluators considered it important to also note down the SPO's story in terms of changes in the organisation since the baseline, and this would also provide more information about reasons for change, which were difficult to get for the individual indicators. Also for some issues there may not have been relevant indicators available in the list of core indicators provide by the evaluation team. Please note that this information is based only on the information provided by Institut Dayakologi staff during the endline workshop, but no validation of this information has been done like with the process tracing causal maps. For details in relation to attribution, we refer to the next section (5.3).

During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by Institut Dayakologi's staff, these have been captured in the general causal map in 4.2.2: improved secretarial coordination and support, improved staff morale, strengthened role as a networking hub for advocacy on Dayak communities and culture, increased executive team's capacity to develop proposals, improved staff decision-making process, more qualified human resources. All of these are expected to contribute to Institut Dayakologi having increased capacity to mobilize resources for operations and program management. Institut Dayakologi staff experienced these as the most important capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline.

The improved secretarial coordination and support, improved staff morale, strengthened role as a networking hub for advocacy on Dayak communities and culture, increased executive team's capacity to develop proposals, and improved staff decision-making process, were all said to lead to improved program implementation and achievements. Each of these capacity changes is detailed below.

Improved coordination and support through the secretariat can be attributed to improved communication in the new office through parallel phone lines, staff focussing more on carrying out their roles and responsibilities as well as having a more formalized communication structure. Each of these developments can be attributed to the improved workspace, which was build and funded by Cordaid with MFS II funding. The requirement to rebuild the office space originated from the fire that destroyed the previous office back in August 2007, and required major investments and support to rebuild the organization.

Improved staff morale can be attributed to the Institut Dayakologi center now being more accessible and visible, as a result of the new building, incorporating and reflecting the organizations identity as a center of Dayak Culture better. This was a fundamental goal of the improved workspace, which can be related to MFS II funding as explained above.

The strengthened role as a networking hub of Institut Dayakologi was strongly enabled by the creation of a *Jurung* (traditional meeting room) in the new offices, which acted as a central meeting point for organizations, partners and stakeholders. This too was the direct result of the MFS II intervention to support the rebuilding of the office.

The increased executive team's capacity to develop proposals resulted from the challenge to fill the budget gap that occurred due to the change in operational expenses imposed by the new building and it's facilities. This change occurred through greater costs resulting from the greater costs to run the facility. Although some of the costs could be diminished through additional income from renting out meeting room facilities, the net effect was still negative. Through this the improved workspace also contributed to the organization adapting and developing capacities to support change.

The improved staff decision making process can be attributed to the greater amount of discussion opportunities with the division manager and program manager of staff. This was enabled by more delegation of authority to the daily operational team, which was attributed to the Director assuming the position as head of the GPPK coalition. This change can therefore not be attributed to MFS II.

The last factor that resulted indirectly to the improved program implementation and achievement of Institut Dayakologi was the inspiring of the community to think back of the cultural and indigenous customs. This inspiration could be attributed to the call for action from the documentary film, and the high quality advocacy work that the organization undertook. The former resulted from the initiative to broaden public information, whilst the latter came about the increase in community awareness through Ruai TV which broadcasted Institut Dayakologi material. Both initiatives were enabled by more qualified human resources as a key organizational capacity change.

The increase in Institut Dayakologi's staff capacity resulted specifically from training in video and documentary making on the one hand, and increased staff knowledge and technical skills on the other. Staff knowledge and skill came about from a series of trainings which were all MFS II supported, and focused on both skills such as visual documentation, linguistic training and IT training as well as more substantial matter relating to the criminal investigation of money laundering in forestry. All MFS II funded capacity development interventions resulted from an increased need for staff capacity building. This could be attributed to delayed program activities, after staff had to be rehired and restructured to fill the knowledge and capacity gap that occurred after some of the senior staff members resigned.

In conclusion, MFS II funded initiatives for program support have contributed to organizational capacity change in several ways, both directly and indirectly. The supported training interventions to increase staff capacity in the skills and capacity to document and spread information to the public has contributed significantly to inspiring the community to think back to the Dayak culture and indigenous customs, that has helped improve program implementation and achievements. On the other hand the continuous support of Cordaid in reconstruction by rebuilding the offices, infrastructure and office structure have helped in improving day to day operations of the secretariat, strengthened the role of Institut Dayakologi as a networking hub and improved staff morale, all leading to improved program implementation and achievements. Although the 5C indicators in the previous section don't show great change for the organization, the general causal map described above highlights that MFS II support has certainly contributed to strengthening the organizational capacity and laying the foundation for increased capacity to mobilize resources for operations and program management of Institut Dayakologi. However, it must be noted that the information provided has not been validated through other sources of information, and therefore the conclusions must be understood in that respect.

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**Overall evaluation methodology**


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Annual Financial Report & Audit 2011-2103.xls

Annual Progress report 2013.docx

Annual Progress report 2011.doc

Annual Progress report 2012.docx

Consultan report for Financial ID.doc

Evaluation report MFSII Indonesia Baseline.pdf

Financial Plan ID 2011-2013.xls

Monitoring & Evaluation-Implementation plans.docx

Notes from auditor to the financial statement 2013,2012,2011.doc

Organisational Structure Vision & Mission.docx

program planning document 2011-2013 copy.xls

Program Planning document 2011-2013.xls

Project Workplan document 2011-2013.xls

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Annex_C_Capacity Organization_Indonesia_Dayakologi.doc

BAHASA-Annex D_5c endline interview guide_partners_selected indicators_Indonesia dayakologi _Adrianus.doc

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BAHASA-Annex O_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_admin and HRM staff_selected indicators_Indonesia_Dayakologi1.doc

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General Key Changes Dayakologi_Final.vsd

General Key Changes Dayakologi.docx

# List of Respondents

**List of Respondents**

**People Present at the Workshops**

| **Date: 20-22 August 2014** | | **Organisation: Institute of Dayakologi** | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **ROLE IN THE ORGANISATION** | **DURATION OF SERVICE** | **PHONE** | **E-MAIL** |
| **Management** | | | | |
| John Bamba | Director Executive | 13 years | 0813 45 353536 | jbamba@dayakology.org |
| Johanna AnpoliniDiid | FinancialManager | 19 year | 0813 52 255637 | johanna@dayakology.org |
| P.Yusnono | Manager of Human Resources | 6 year | 0812 57 09430 | yusnono@yahoo.com |
| Maria Paskalia | Office manager | | 081345485878 | mariapaskalia25@gmail.com |
| K. Kusnadi | Publication and Documentation | | 085252134215 | Kusnadi.isim77@gmail.com |
| Ajin Vinsentius | Manager of Empowerment Resources | 5 year | 0812 5610950 | ajinvinsentius@kalimantanreview.com |
| Krissusandi | Manager of Advocacy & Collaboration | 8 year | 0852 85 933290 | krissusandi@kalimantanreview.com |
| Benyamin Efraim | Manager of Documentation & Publications | 5 year | 0813 45 276789 | ben.efraim@yahoo.co.id |
| **Program/ Project staff** | | | | |
| Julianto | Division of Advocacy and Collaboration in Peace Building and Transformation Program | | 08125745446 | jul_makmur@hotmail.com |
| Vitalis Andi | Manager of Advocacy and Collaboration Division | 11 year | 0813 52 016553 | anditebuar@yahoo.co.id |
| Peternus | Chief of Marketing Kalimantan Review magazine | | 085252502244 | petrnusaheroy@yahoo.co.id |
| Giring | Chief Editor Kalimantan Review (Organisation sustainability Division) | | 081345090498 | Giring.giring.giring@gmail.com |
| Rony | Publication and Documentation Manager | | 081345312983 | Bidebinua_kr@yahoo.com |
| **Admin/ HR/Finance staff** | | | | |
| Sunarti | Accountant | 17 year | 0813 52 432375 | sunarti@dayakology.org |
| Sufi'i | Administration and secretary | 17 year | 085391972930 | supii@dayakology.org |
| Songkon | Administration | | 085650901803 | songkon33@gmail.com |
| Hendata | Cashier | | 085245205512 | Hendata.nata@yahoo.co.id |

| Field staff staff | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Marsiana Oktavia | KR editorial staff | | 081345010887 | |
| Cica P. | Field Staf | 1 year | 085252516711 | |
| Yohanes Iswadi | Di divisi kemandirian | 6 years | 085245347124 | iswadi@gmail.com |
| Yusita Hastaningsih | KR administration | 3 tahun | 085345255124 | Ucakr2014@gmail.com |
| Ptr. Darmono | Field Staf | 7 years | 082157964149 | Darmononul16@yahoo.co.id |
| Regina | Advocacy and collaboration division and in secretariat | | 085345918553 | Regina03.jalai@gmail.com |
| Erniliana | Field Staff | 10 month | 085822271941 | darapanarigas@gmail.com |
| Dwi Susilo H. | Graphis and architec | 4 years | 08157980282 | Susilo.jalai@gmail.com |
| **Others** | | | | |

**List of People Interviewed**

| **Date:20-22 August 2014** | | **Organisation: Institute Dayakologi** | | |
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| **Management** | | | | |
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| Maria Paskalia | Office manager | | 081345485878 | mariapaskalia25@gmail.com |
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| Ajin Vinsentius | Manager of Empowerment Resources | 5 year | 0812 5610950 | ajinvinsentius@kalimantanreview.com |
| Krissusandi | Manager of Advocacy & Collaboration | 8 year | 0852 85 933290 | krissusandi@kalimantanreview.com |
| Benyamin Efraim | Manager of Documentation & Publications | 5 year | 0813 45 276789 | ben.efraim@yahoo.co.id |
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| Vitalis Andi | Manager of Advocacy and Collaboration Division | 11 year | 0813 52 016553 | anditebuar@yahoo.co.id |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Peternus | Chief of Marketing Kalimantan Review magazine | | 085252502244 | petrnusaheroy@yahoo.co.id |
| Giring | Chief Editor Kalimantan Review (Organisation sustainability Division) | | 081345090498 | Giring.giring.giring@gmail.com |
| Rony | Publication and Documentation Manager | | 081345312983 | Bidebinua_kr@yahoo.com |
| **Admin/ HR/Finance staff** | | | | |
| Sunarti | Accountant | 17 year | 0813 52 432375 | sunarti@dayakology.org |
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| Songkon | Administration | | 085650901803 | songkon33@gmail.com |
| Hendata | Cashier | | 085245205512 | Hendata.nata@yahoo.co.id |
| Yusita Hastaningsih | KR administration | 3 tahun | 085345255124 | Ucakr2014@gmail.com |
| Marsiana Oktavia | KR editorial staff | | 081345010887 | |
| Ratna | Front office and documentation | 3 years | | |
| **Field staff staff** | | | | |
| Marsiana Oktavia | KR editorial staff | | 081345010887 | |
| Cica P. | Field Staf | 1 year | 085252516711 | |
| Yohanes Iswadi | Field Staf | 6 years | 085245347124 | iswadi@gmail.com |
| Yusita Hastaningsih | KR administration | 3 tahun | 085345255124 | Ucakr2014@gmail.com |
| Ptr. Darmono | Field Staff | 7 years | 082157964149 | Darmononul16@yahoo.co.id |
| Regina | Advocacy and collaboration division staff and in secretariat | | 085345918553 | Regina03.jalai@gmail.com |
| Erniliana | Field Staff | 10 month | 085822271941 | darapanarigas@gmail.com |
| Dwi Susilo H. | Graphis and architec | 4 years | 08157980282 | Susilo.jalai@gmail.com |
| **Others** | | | | |
| Adrianus, Ssi. | Principal of Santo Fransiscus Asisi Junior High School-Pontianak (Partner) | 14 years | 08125659172 | |
| Antonius PriyaniWidjaya | Director of Walhi (Partner) | 4 years | 0811574476 | walhi@ptk.centrin.net.id |
| | | | | |

# Appendix 1 Methodological approach & reflection

## 1. Introduction

This appendix describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around four key evaluation questions:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

Note: the methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report. At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

## 2. Changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 1

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?**

This question was mainly addressed by reviewing changes in 5c indicators, but additionally a 'general causal map' based on the SPO perspective on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline

has been developed. Each of these is further explained below. The development of the general causal map is integrated in the steps for the endline workshop, as mentioned below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012.[20] Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1) **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2) **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3) **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4) **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5) **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

[20] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Below each of these steps is further explained.

*Step 1. Provide the **description of indicators** in the relevant formats – CDI team*

- These formats were to be used when collecting data from SPO staff, CFA, partners, and consultants. For each of these respondents different formats have been developed, based on the list of 5C indicators, similar to the procedure that was used during the baseline assessment. The CDI team needed to add the 2012 baseline description of each indicator. The idea was that each respondent would be requested to review each description per indicator, and indicate whether the current situation is different from the baseline situation, how this situation has changed, and what the reasons for the changes in indicators are. At the end of each format, a more general question is added that addresses how the organisation has changed its capacity since the baseline, and what possible reasons for change exist. Please see below the questions asked for each indicator as well as the more general questions at the end of the list of indicators.

General questions about key changes in the capacity of the SPO

*What do you consider to be the key changes in terms of how the organisation/ SPO has developed its capacity since the baseline (2012)?*

*What do you consider to be the main explanatory reasons (interventions, actors or factors) for these changes?*

**List of questions to be asked for each of the 5C indicators** (The entry point is the the description of each indicator as in the 2012 baseline report):

1. *How has the situation of this indicator changed compared to the situation during the baseline in 2012? Please tick one of the following scores:*
   - -2 = Considerable deterioration
   - -1 = A slight deterioration
   - 0 = No change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012
   - +1 = Slight improvement
   - +2 = Considerable improvement
2. *Please describe what exactly has changed since the baseline in 2012*
3. *What interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation in 2012? Please tick and describe what interventions, actors or factors influenced this indicator, and how. You can tick and describe more than one choice.*

- Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by **SPO**: ..... .
- Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **Dutch CFA (MFS II funding)**: .... .
- Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **other funders**: ..... .
- **Other** interventions, actors or factors: ..... .
- Don't know.

*Step 2. **Review** the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team*

Before the in-country team and the CDI team started collecting data in the field, it was important that they reviewed the description for each indicator as described in the baseline reports, and also added to the endline formats for review by respondents. These descriptions are based on document review, observation, interviews with SPO staff, CFA staff and external respondents during the baseline. It was important to explain this to respondents before they filled in the formats.

*Step 3. **Send the formats** adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)*

The CDI team was responsible for collecting data from the CFA:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – CFA perspective.

The in-country team was responsible for collecting data from the SPO and from external respondents (except CFA). The following formats were sent before the fieldwork started:

- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – SPO perspective.
- 5C Endline interview guides for externals: partners; OD consultants.

*Step 4. **Collect, upload & code the documents** from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team*

The CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team, collected the following documents from SPOs and CFAs:

- Project documents: project proposal, budget, contract (Note that for some SPOs there is a contract for the full MFS II period 2011-2015; for others there is a yearly or 2-yearly contract. All new contracts since the baseline in 2012 will need to be collected);
- Technical and financial progress reports since the baseline in 2012;.
- Mid-term evaluation reports;
- End of project-evaluation reports (by the SPO itself or by external evaluators);
- Contract intake forms (assessments of the SPO by the CFA) or organisational assessment scans made by the CFA that cover the 2011-2014 period;
- Consultant reports on specific inputs provided to the SPO in terms of organisational capacity development;
- Training reports (for the SPO; for alliance partners, including the SPO);
- Organisational scans/ assessments, carried out by the CFA or by the Alliance Assessments;
- Monitoring protocol reports, especially for the 5C study carried out by the MFS II Alliances;
- Annual progress reports of the CFA and of the Alliance in relation to capacity development of the SPOs in the particular country;
- Specific reports that are related to capacity development of SPOs in a particular country.

The following documents (since the baseline in 2012) were requested from SPO:

- Annual progress reports;
- Annual financial reports and audit reports;
- Organisational structure vision and mission since the baseline in 2012;
- Strategic plans;
- Business plans;
- Project/ programme planning documents;
- Annual work plan and budgets;
- Operational manuals;

- Organisational and policy documents: finance, human resource development, etc.;
- Monitoring and evaluation strategy and implementation plans;
- Evaluation reports;
- Staff training reports;
- Organisational capacity reports from development consultants.

The CDI team will coded these documents in NVivo (qualitative data analysis software program) against the 5C indicators.

*Step 5.* ***Prepare and organise the field visit*** *to the SPO – in-country team*

Meanwhile the in-country team prepared and organised the logistics for the field visit to the SPO:

- **General endline workshop** consisted about one day for the self-assessments (about ½ to ¾ of the day) and brainstorm (about 1 to 2 hours) on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline and underlying interventions, factors and actors ('general causal map'), see also explanation below. This was done with the five categories of key staff: managers; project/ programme staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin & HRM staff; field staff. Note: for SPOs involved in process tracing an additional 1 to 1½ day workshop (managers; program/project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff) was necessary. See also step 7;
- **Interviews with SPO staff** (roughly one day);
- **Interviews with external respondents** such as partners and organisational development consultants depending on their proximity to the SPO. These interviews coulc be scheduled after the endline workshop and interviews with SPO staff.

General causal map

During the 5C endline process, a 'general causal map' has been developed, based on key organisational capacity changes and underlying causes for these changes, as perceived by the SPO. The general causal map describes cause-effect relationships, and is described both as a visual as well as a narrative.

As much as possible the same people that were involved in the baseline were also involved in the endline workshop and interviews.

*Step 6.* ***Interview the CFA*** *– CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for sending the sheets/ formats to the CFA and for doing a follow-up interview on the basis of the information provided so as to clarify or deepen the information provided. This relates to:

5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
5C Endline support to capacity sheet - CFA perspective.

*Step 7.* ***Run the endline workshop*** *with the SPO – in-country team*

This included running the endline workshop, including facilitation of the development of the general causal map, self-assessments, interviews and observations. Particularly for those SPOs that were selected for process tracing all the relevant information needed to be analysed prior to the field visit, so as to develop an initial causal map. Please see Step 6 and also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two).

An endline workshop with the SPO was intended to:

Explain the purpose of the fieldwork;
Carry out in the self-assessments by SPO staff subgroups (unless these have already been filled prior to the field visits) - this may take some 3 hours.

Facilitate a brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012 and underlying interventions, factors and actors.

***Purpose of the fieldwork*:** to collect data that help to provide information on what changes took place in terms of organisational capacity development of the SPO as well as reasons for these changes. The baseline that was carried out in 2012 was to be used as a point of reference.

***Brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes and influencing factors***: a brainstorm was facilitated on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012. In order to kick start the discussion, staff were reminded of the key findings related to the historical time line carried out in the baseline (vision, mission, strategies, funding, staff). This was then used to generate a discussion on key changes that happened in the organisation since the baseline (on cards). Then cards were selected that were related to organisational capacity changes, and organised. Then a 'general causal map' was developed, based on these key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change as experienced by the SPO staff. This was documented as a visual and narrative.This general causal map was to get the story of the SPO on what they perceived as key organisational capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline, in addition to the specific details provided per indicator.

***Self-assessments*:** respondents worked in the respective staff function groups: management; programme/ project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin and HRM staff; field staff. Staff were assisted where necessary so that they could really understand what it was they were being asked to do as well as what the descriptions under each indicator meant.

Note: for those SPOs selected for process tracing an additional endline workshop was held to facilitate the development of detailed causal maps for each of the identified organisational change/ outcome areas that fall under the capability to act and commit, and under the capability to adapt and self-renew, and that are likely related to capacity development interventions by the CFA. See also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two). It was up to the in-country team whether this workshop was held straight after the initial endline workshop or after the workshop and the follow-up interviews. It could also be held as a separate workshop at another time.

*Step 8.* ***Interview SPO staff*** *– in-country team*

After the endline workshop (developing the general causal map and carrying out self-assessments in subgroups), interviews were held with SPO staff (subgroups) to follow up on the information that was provided in the self-assessment sheets, and to interview staff that had not yet provided any information.

*Step 9.* ***Fill-in observation sheets*** *– in-country team*

During the visit at the SPO, the in-country team had to fill in two sheets based on their observation:

5C Endline observation sheet;
5C Endline observable indicators.

*Step 10.* ***Interview externals*** *– in-country team & CDI team*

The in-country team also needed to interview the partners of the SPO as well as organisational capacity development consultants that have provided support to the SPO. The CDI team interviewed the CFA.

*Step 11.* ***Upload and auto-code all the formats*** *collected by in-country team and CDI team – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for uploading and auto-coding (in Nvivo) of the documents that were collected by the in-country team and by the CDI team.

*Step 12. Provide the **overview of information** per 5C indicator to in-country team – CDI team*

After the analysis in NVivo, the CDI team provided a copy of all the information generated per indicator to the in-country team for initial analysis.

*Step 13. **Analyse the data and develop a draft description** of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team*

The in-country team provided a draft description of the findings per indicator, based on the information generated per indicator. The information generated under the general questions were linked to the general causal map or detailed process tracing related causal map.

*Step 14. **Analyse the data and finalize the description** of the findings per indicator, per capability and general – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for checking the analysis by the in-country team with the Nvivo generated data and to make suggestions for improvement and ask questions for clarification to which the in-country team responded. The CDI team then finalised the analysis and provided final descriptions and scores per indicator and also summarize these per capability and calculated the summary capability scores based on the average of all indicators by capability.

*Step 15. **Analyse the information** in the general causal map –in-country team & CDI team*

The general causal map based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff present at the workshop, was further detailed by in-country team and CDI team, and based on the notes made during the workshop and where necessary additional follow up with the SPO. The visual and narrative was finalized after feedback by the SPO. During analysis of the general causal map relationships with MFS II support for capacity development and other factors and actors were identified. All the information has been reviewed by the SPO and CFA.

# 3. Attributing changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 2

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: ***To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?***

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process. The box below provides some background information on process tracing.

## Background information on process tracing

The essence of process tracing research is that scholars want to go beyond merely identifying correlations between independent variables (Xs) and outcomes (Ys). Process tracing in social science is commonly defined by its addition to trace causal mechanisms (Bennett, 2008a, 2008b; Checkle, 2008; George & Bennett, 2005). A causal mechanism can be defined as "a complex system which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts" (Glennan, 1996, p. 52). Process tracing involves "attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable" (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 206-207).

Process tracing can be differentiated into three variants within social science: theory testing, theory building, and explaining outcome process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

> Theory testing process tracing uses a theory from the existing literature and then tests whether evidence shows that each part of hypothesised causal mechanism is present in a given case, enabling within case inferences about whether the mechanism functioned as expected in the case and whether the mechanism as a whole was present. No claims can be made however, about whether the mechanism was the only cause of the outcome.
> Theory building process tracing seeks to build generalizable theoretical explanations from empirical evidence, inferring that a more general causal mechanism exists from the fact of a particular case.
> Finally, explaining outcome process tracing attempts to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific historical case. Here the aim is not to build or test more general theories but to craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case centric than theory oriented.

Explaining outcome process tracing is the most suitable type of process tracing for analysing the causal mechanisms for selected key organisational capacity changes of the SPOs. This type of process tracing can be thought of as a single outcome study defined as seeking the causes of the specific outcome in a single case (Gerring, 2006; in: Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Here the ambition is to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a particular outcome, with sufficiency defined as an explanation that accounts for all of the important aspects of an outcome with no redundant parts being present (Mackie, 1965).

Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research strategy that aims to trace the complex conglomerate of systematic and case specific causal mechanisms that produced the outcome in question. The explanation cannot be detached from the particular case. Explaining outcome process tracing refers to case studies whose primary ambition is to explain particular historical outcomes, although the findings of the case can also speak to other potential cases of the phenomenon. Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research process in which 'theories' are tested to see whether they can provide a minimally sufficient explanation of the outcome. Minimal sufficiency is defined as an explanation that accounts for an outcome, with no redundant parts. In most explaining outcome studies, existing theorisation cannot provide a sufficient explanation, resulting in a second stage in which existing theories are re-conceptualised in light of the evidence gathered in the preceding empirical analysis. The conceptualisation phase in explaining outcome process tracing is therefore an iterative research process, with initial mechanisms re-conceptualised and tested until the result is a theorised mechanism that provides a minimally sufficient explanation of the particular outcome.

Below a description is provided of how SPOs are selected for process tracing, and a description is provided on how this process tracing is to be carried out. Note that this description of process tracing provides not only information on the extent to which the changes in organisational development can be attributed to MFS II (evaluation question 2), but also provides information on other contributing factors and actors (evaluation question 4). Furthermore, it must be noted that the evaluation team has developed an adapted form of 'explaining outcome process tracing', since the data collection and analysis was an iterative process of research so as to establish the most realistic explanation for a particular outcome/ organisational capacity change. Below selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

**Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing**

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

**ETHIOPIA**

For Ethiopia the capabilities that are mostly targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 1

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Ethiopia*

| Capability to: | AMREF | CARE | ECFA | FSCE | HOA-REC | HUNDEE | NVEA | OSRA | TTCA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Relate | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| Achieve coherence | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Ethiopia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE. In fact, six SPOs would be suitable for process tracing. We just selected the first one per CFA following the criteria of not including more than one SPO per CFA for process tracing

Table 2

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Ethiopia*

| Ethiopia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AMREF | Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | AMREF NL | Yes |
| CARE | Dec 31, 2015 | Partly | Yes | Yes | Yes – slightly | CARE Netherlands | No - not fully matching |
| ECFA | Jan 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Child Helpline International | Yes |
| FSCE | Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN); Note: no info from Defence for Children – ECPAT Netherlands | Yes |
| HOA-REC | Sustainable Energy project (ICCO Alliance): 2014 Innovative WASH (WASH Alliance): Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes - slightly | ICCO | No - not fully matching |
| HUNDEE | Dec 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO & IICD | Yes |
| NVEA | Dec 2015 (both) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Edukans Foundation (under two consortia); Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN) | Suitable but SKN already involved for process tracing FSCE |
| OSRA | C4C Alliance project (farmers marketing): December 2014 ICCO Alliance project (zero grazing: 2014 (2nd phase) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO & IICD | Suitable but ICCO & IICD already involved for process tracing - HUNDEE |
| TTCA | June 2015 | Partly | Yes | No | Yes | Edukans Foundation | No - not fully matching |

**INDIA**

For India the capability that is mostly targeted by CFAs is the capability to act and commit. The next one in line is the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below in which a higher score means that the specific capability is more intensively targeted.

Table 3

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – India*[21]

| Capability to: | BVHA | COUNT | DRISTI | FFID | Jana Vikas | Samarthak Samiti | SMILE | SDS | VTRC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 5 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 4 |
| Relate | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, India.

Below you can see a table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether SPO and the CFA both expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE and VTRC. Except for SMILE (capability to act and commit only), for the other SPOs the focus for process tracing can be on the capability to act and commit and on the capability to adapt and self-renew.

Table 4

*SPOs selected for process tracing – India*

| India – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BVHA | 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Simavi | Yes; both capabilities |
| COUNT | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Woord en Daad | Yes; both capabilities |
| DRISTI | 31-03-2012 | Yes | Yes | No | no | Hivos | No - closed in 2012 |
| FFID | 30-09-2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |

[21] RGVN, NEDSF and Women's Rights Forum (WRF) could not be reached timely during the baseline due to security reasons. WRF could not be reached at all. Therefore these SPOs are not included in Table 1.

| India – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jana Vikas | 2013 | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No - contract is and the by now; not fully matching focus |
| NEDSF | | | | | | | No – delayed baseline |
| RGVN | | | | | | | No - delayed baseline |
| Samarthak Samiti (SDS) | 2013 possibly longer | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Hivos | No - not certain of end date and not fully matching focus |
| Shivi Development Society (SDS) | Dec 2013 intention 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No - not fully matching focus |
| Smile | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Wilde Ganzen | Yes; first capability only |
| VTRC | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Stichting Red een Kind | Yes; both capabilities |

**INDONESIA**

For Indonesia the capabilities that are most frequently targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 5

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Indonesia*

| Capability to: | ASB | Daya kologi | ECPAT | GSS | Lem baga Kita | Pt. PPMA | Rifka Annisa | WIIP | Yad upa | Yayasan Kelola | YPI | YRBI |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 4 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 3 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 |
| Relate | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, Indonesia.

The table below describes when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: ASB, ECPAT, Pt.PPMA, YPI, YRBI.

Table 6

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Indonesia*

| Indonesia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ASB | February 2012; extension Feb,1, 2013 – June,30, 2016 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Hivos | Yes |
| Dayakologi | 2013; no extension | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No: contract ended early and not matching enough |
| ECPAT | August 2013; Extension Dec 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes, a bit | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | Yes |
| GSS | 31 December 2012; no extension | Yes | Yes | Yes, a bit | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | No: contract ended early |
| Lembaga Kita | 31 December 2012; no extension | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | No - contract ended early |
| Pt.PPMA | May 2015 | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | IUCN | Yes, capability to act and commit only |
| Rifka Annisa | Dec, 31 2015 | No | Yes | No | Yes | Rutgers WPF | No - no match between expectations CFA and SPO |
| WIIP | Dec 2015 | Yes | Not MFS II | Yes | Not MFS II | Red Cross | No - Capacity development interventions are not MFS II financed. Only some overhead is MFS II |

| Indonesia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yayasan Kelola | Dec 30, 2013; extension of contract being processed for two years (2014-2015) | Yes | Not really | Yes | Not really | Hivos | No - no specific capacity development interventions planned by Hivos |
| YPI | Dec 31, 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Rutgers WPF | Yes |
| YRBI | Oct, 30, 2013; YRBI end of contract from 31st Oct 2013 to 31st Dec 2013. Contract extension proposal is being proposed to MFS II, no decision yet. | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |
| Yadupa | Under negotiation during baseline; new contract 2013 until now | Yes | Nothing committed | Yes | Nothing committed | IUCN | No, since nothing was committed by CFA |

**LIBERIA**

For Liberia the situation is arbitrary which capabilities are targeted most CFA's. Whilst the capability to act and commit is targeted more often than the other capabilities, this is only so for two of the SPOs. The capability to adapt and self-renew and the capability to relate are almost equally targeted for the five SPOs, be it not intensively. Since the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew are the most targeted capabilities in Ethiopia, India and Indonesia, we choose to focus on these two capabilities for Liberia as well. This would help the synthesis team in the further analysis of these capabilities related to process tracing. See also the table below.

Table 7

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Liberia*

| Capability to: | BSC | DEN-L | NAWOCOL | REFOUND | RHRAP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Relate | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, Liberia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Also, for two of the five SPOs capability to act and commit is targeted more intensively compared to the other capabilities. Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BSC and RHRAP.

Table 8

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Liberia*

| Liberia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BSC | Dec 31, 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | SPARK | Yes |
| DEN-L | 2014 | No | No | Unknown | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| NAWOCOL | 2014 | Yes | No | No | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| REFOUND | At least until 2013 (2015?) | Yes | No | Yes | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| RHRAP | At least until 2013 (2014?) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |

**Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study**

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ' general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

Some definitions of the terminology used for this MFS II 5c evaluation

Based upon the different interpretations and connotations the use of the term causal mechanism we use the following terminology for the remainder of this paper:

A **detailed causal map** (or **model of change)** = the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change.
A **causal mechanism** = is the combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 176).
**Part** or **cause** = one actor with its attributes carrying out activities/ producing outputs that lead to change in other parts. The final part or cause is the change/ outcome.
**Attributes of the actor** = specificities of the actor that increase his chance to introduce change or not such as its position in its institutional environment.

*Step 1. Identify the **planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

Chapter 4.1 and 4.2 in the baseline report were reviewed. Capacity development interventions as planned by the CFA for the capability to act and commit and for the capability to adapt and self-renew were described and details inserted in the summary format. This provided an overview of the capacity development activities that were originally planned by the CFA for these two capabilities and assisted in focusing on relevant outcomes that are possibly related to the planned interventions.

*Step 2. Identify the **implemented capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

The input from the CFA was reviewed in terms of what capacity development interventions have taken place in the MFS II period. This information was be found in the 'Support to capacity development sheet - endline - CFA perspective' for the SPO, based on details provided by the CFA and further discussed during an interview by the CDI team.

The CFA was asked to describe all the MFS II supported capacity development interventions of the SPO that took place during the period 2011 up to now. The CDI team reviewed this information, not only the interventions but also the observed changes as well as the expected long-term changes, and

then linked these interventions to relevant outcomes in one of the capabilities (capability to act and commit; and capability to adapt and self-renew).

*Step 3. Identify **initial changes/ outcome areas** in these two capabilities – by CDI team & in-country team*

The CDI team was responsible for **coding** documents received from SPO and CFA in NVivo on the following:

**5C Indicators:** this was to identify the changes that took place between baseline and endline. This information was coded in Nvivo.
Information related to the **capacity development interventions implemented by the CFA** (with MFS II funding) (see also Step 2) to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. For example, the training on financial management of the SPO staff could be related to any information on financial management of the SPO. This information was coded in Nvivo.
In addition, the response by the CFA to the changes in 5C indicators format, was auto-coded.

The in-country team was responsible for timely collection of information from the SPO (before the fieldwork starts). This set of information dealt with:

MFS II supported capacity development interventions during the MFS II period (2011 until now). Overview of all trainings provided in relation to a particular outcome areas/organisational capacity change since the baseline.
For each of the identified MFS II supported trainings, training questionnaires have been developed to assess these trainings in terms of the participants, interests, knowledge and skills gained, behaviour change and changes in the organisation (based on Kirkpatrick's model), one format for training participants and one for their managers. These training questionnaires were sent prior to the field visit.
Changes expected by SPO on a long-term basis ('Support to capacity development sheet - endline - SPO perspective').

For the selection of change/ outcome areas the following criteria were important:

The change/ outcome area is in one of the two capabilities selected for process tracing: capability to act and commit or the capability to adapt and self-renew. This was the first criteria to select upon. There was a likely link between the key organisational capacity change/ outcome area and the MFS II supported capacity development interventions. This also was an important criteria. This would need to be demonstrated through one or more of the following situations:

- In the 2012 **theory of change** on organisational capacity development of the SPO a link was indicated between the outcome area and MFS II support;
- During the baseline the CFA indicated a link between **the planned MFS II support** to organisational development and the expected short-term or long-term results in one of the selected capabilities;
- During the endline the CFA indicated a link between **the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions** and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities;
- During the endline the SPO indicated a link between **the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions** and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities.

Reviewing the information obtained as described in Step 1, 2, and 3 provided the basis for selecting key organisational capacity change/ outcome areas to focus on for process tracing. These areas were to be formulated as broader outcome areas, such as 'improved financial management', 'improved monitoring and evaluation' or 'improved staff competencies'.

Note: the outcome areas were to be formulated as intermediates changes. For example: an improved monitoring and evaluation system, or enhanced knowledge and skills to educate the target group on

climate change. Key outcome areas were also verified - based on document review as well as discussions with the SPO during the endline.

*Step 4. Construct the **detailed, initial causal map** (theoretical model of change) – CDI & in-country team*

A detailed initial causal map was developed by the CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team. This was based on document review, including information provided by the CFA and SPO on MFS II supported capacity development interventions and their immediate and long-term objectives as well as observed changes. Also, the training questionnaires were reviewed before developing the initial causal map. This detailed initial causal map was to be provided by the CDI team with a visual and related narrative with related references. This initial causal map served as a reference point for further reflection with the SPO during the process tracing endline workshop, where relationships needed to be verified or new relationships established so that the second (workshop-based), detailed causal map could be developed, after which further verification was needed to come up with the final, concluding detailed causal map.

It's important to note that organisational change area/ outcome areas could be both positive and negative.

For each of the selected outcomes the team needed to make explicit the theoretical model of change. This meant finding out about the range of different actors, factors, actions, and events etc. that have contributed to a particular outcome in terms of organisational capacity of the SPO.

A model of change of good quality includes:

The causal pathways that relate the intervention to the realised change/ outcome;
Rival explanations for the same change/ outcome;
Assumptions that clarify relations between different components or parts;
Case specific and/or context specific factors or risks that might influence the causal pathway, such as for instance the socio-cultural-economic context, or a natural disaster;
Specific attributes of the actors e.g. CFA and other funders.

A model of change (within the 5C study called a 'detailed causal map') is a complex system which produces intermediate and long-term outcomes by the interaction of other parts. It consists of parts or causes that often consist of one actor with its attributes that is implementing activities leading to change in other parts (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). A helpful way of constructing the model of change is to think in terms of actors carrying out activities that lead to other actors changing their behaviour. The model of change can be explained as a range of activities carried out by different *actors* (including the CFA and SPO under evaluation) that will ultimately lead to an outcome. Besides this, there are also '*structural*' elements, which are to be interpreted as external factors (such as economic conjuncture); and *attributes* of the actor (does the actor have the legitimacy to ask for change or not, what is its position in the sector) that should be looked at (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). In fact Beach and Pedersen, make a fine point about the subjectivity of the actor in a dynamic context. This means, in qualitative methodologies, capturing the changes in the actor, acted upon area or person/organisation, in a non sequential and non temporal format. Things which were done recently could have corrected behavioural outcomes of an organisation and at the same ime there could be processes which incrementally pushed for the same change over a period of time. Beach and Pedersen espouse this methodology because it captures change in a dynamic fashion as against the methodology of logical framework. For the MFS II evaluation it was important to make a distinction between those paths in the model of change that are the result of MFS II and rival pathways.
The construction of the model of change started with the identified key organisational capacity change/ outcome, followed by an inventory of all possible subcomponents that possibly have caused the change/ outcome in the MFS II period (2011-up to now, or since the baseline). The figure below presents an imaginary example of a model of change. The different colours indicate the different types of support to capacity development of the SPO by different actors, thereby indicating different pathways of change, leading to the key changes/ outcomes in terms of capacity development (which in this case indicates the ability to adapt and self-renew).





***Figure 1*** *An imaginary example of a model of change*

*Step 5. Identify **types of evidence** needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams with support from CDI team*

Once the causal mechanism at theoretical level were defined, empirical evidence was collected so as to verify or discard the different parts of this theoretical model of change, confirm or reject whether subcomponents have taken place, and to find evidence that confirm or reject the causal relations between the subcomponents.

A key question that we needed to ask ourselves was, *"What information do we need in order to confirm or reject that one subcomponent leads to another, that X causes Y?"*. The evaluation team needed to agree on what information was needed that provides empirical manifestations for each part of the model of change.

There are four distinguishable types of evidence that are relevant in process tracing analysis: *pattern, sequence, trace, and account*. Please see the box below for descriptions of these types of evidence.

The evaluation team needed to agree on the types of evidence that was needed to verify or discard the manifestation of a particular part of the causal mechanism. Each one or a combination of these different types of evidence could be used to confirm or reject the different parts of the model of change. This is what is meant by robustness of evidence gathering. Since causality as a concept can bend in many ways, our methodology, provides a near scientific model for accepting and rejecting a particular type of evidence, ignoring its face value.

Types of evidence to be used in process tracing

**Pattern evidence** relates to predictions of statistical patterns in the evidence. For example, in testing a mechanism of racial discrimination in a case dealing with employment, statistical patterns of employment would be relevant for testing this part of the mechanism.
**Sequence evidence** deals with the temporal and spatial chronology of events predicted by a hypothesised causal mechanism. For example, a test of the hypothesis could involve expectations of the timing of events where we might predict that if the hypothesis is valid, we should see that the event B took place after event A took place. However, if we found that event B took place before event A took place, the test would suggest that our confidence in the validity of this part of the mechanism should be reduced (disconfirmation/ falsification).
**Trace evidence** is evidence whose mere existence provides proof that a part of a hypothesised mechanism exists. For example, the existence of the minutes of a meeting, if authentic ones, provide strong proof that the meeting took place.
**Account evidence** deals with the content of empirical material, such as meeting minutes that detail what was discussed or an oral account of what took place in the meeting.
*Source*: Beach and Pedersen, 2013

Below you can find a table that provides guidelines on what to look for when identifying types of evidence that can confirm or reject causal relationships between different parts/ subcomponents of the model of change. It also provides one example of a part of a causal pathway and what type of information to look for.

Table 9

*Format for identifying types of evidence for different causal relationships in the model of change (example included)*

| Part of the model of change | Key questions | Type of evidence needed | Source of information |
|---|---|---|---|
| Describe relationship between the subcomponents of the model of change | Describe questions you would like to answer a so as to find out whether the components in the relationship took place, when they took place, who was involved, and whether they are related | Describe the information that we need in order to answer these questions.<br>Which type of evidence can we use in order to reject or confirm that subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y?<br>Can we find this information by means of :<br>Pattern evidence;<br>Sequence evidence;<br>Trace evidence;<br>Account evidence? | Describe where you can find this information |
| Example:<br>Training workshops on M&E provided by MFS II funding and other sources of funding | Example:<br>What type of training workshops on M&E took place?<br>Who was trained?<br>When did the training take place?<br>Who funded the training?<br>Was the funding of training provided before the training took place?<br>How much money was available for the training? | Example:<br>Trace evidence: on types of training delivered, who was trained, when the training took place, budget for the training<br><br>Sequence evidence on timing of funding and timing of training<br><br>Content evidence: what the training was about | Example:<br>Training report<br>SPO Progress reports<br>interviews with the CFA and SPO staff<br>Financial reports SPO and CFA |

Please note that for practical reasons, the 5C evaluation team decided that it was easier to integrate the specific questions in the narrative of the initial causal map. These questions would need to be addressed by the in country team during the process tracing workshop so as to discover, verify or discard particular causal mechanisms in the detailed, initial causal map. Different types of evidence was asked for in these questions.

*Step 6. **Collect data** to verify or discard causal mechanisms and develop workshop-based, detailed causal map – in-country team*

Once it was decided by the in-country and CDI evaluation teams what information was to be collected during the interaction with the SPO, data collection took place. The initial causal maps served as a basis for discussions during the endline workshop with a particular focus on process tracing for the identified organisational capacity changes. But it was considered to be very important to understand from the perspective of the SPO how they understood the identified key organisational capacity change/outcome area has come about. A new detailed, workshop-based causal map was developed that included the information provided by SPO staff as well as based on initial document review as described in the initial detailed causal map. This information was further analysed and verified with other relevant information so as to develop a final causal map, which is described in the next step.

*Step 7. **Assess the quality** of data and **analyse data**, and develop the **final detailed causal map** (model of change) – in-country team and CDI team*

Quality assurance of the data collected and the evidence it provides for rejecting or confirming parts of causal explanations are a major concern for many authors specialised in contribution analysis and process-tracing. Stern et al. (2012), Beach and Pedersen (2013), Lemire, Nielsen and Dybdal (2012), Mayne (2012) and Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) all emphasise the need to make attribution/ contribution claims that are based on pieces of evidence that are rigorous, traceable, and credible.

These pieces of evidence should be as explicit as possible in proving that *subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y* and ruling out other explanations. Several tools are proposed to check the nature and the quality of data needed. One option is, Delahais and Toulemonde's Evidence Analysis Database, which we have adapted for our purpose.

Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) propose an Evidence Analysis Database that takes into consideration three criteria:

Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no);
Type of causal mechanism: intended contribution/ other contribution/ condition leading to intended contribution/ intended condition to other contribution/ feedback loop;
Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak.

We have adapted their criteria to our purpose. The in-country team, in collaboration with the CDI team, used the criteria in assessing whether causal relationships in the causal map, were strong enough. This has been more of an iterative process trying to find additional evidence for the established relationships through additional document review or contacting the CFA and SPO as well as getting their feedback on the final detailed causal map that was established. Whilst the form below has not been used exactly in the manner depicted, it has been used indirectly when trying to validate the information in the detailed causal map. After that, the final detailed causal map is established both as a visual as well as a narrative, with related references for the established causal relations.

| ***Example format for the adapted evidence analysis database (example included)*** **Description of causal relation** | **Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no)** | **Type of information providing the background to the confirmation or rejection of the causal relation** | **Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak** | **Explanation for why the evidence is (rather) strong or (rather) weak, and therefore the causal relation is confirmed/ rejected** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| e.g. Training staff in M&E leads to enhanced M&E knowledge, skills and practice | e.g. Confirmed | e.g. Training reports confirmed that staff are trained in M&E and that knowledge and skills increased as a result of the training | | |

*Step 8.* ***Analyse and conclude*** *on findings– in-country team and CDI team*

The final detailed causal map was described as a visual and narrative and this was then analysed in terms of the evaluation question two and evaluation question four: *"To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?"* and *"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"* It was analysed to what extent the identified key organisational capacity change can be attributed to MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as to other related factors, interventions and actors.

# 4. Explaining factors – evaluation question 4

This paragraph describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this.

This has been explained in the first section of this appendix. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information was procured for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the process of process tracing as described in the section above.

# 5. Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team.

**Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach:** this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

**Using standard indicators and scores**: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

**General causal map:** whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

**Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question:** this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.

Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:

Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.

Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

**Utilisation of the evaluation**

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

Design – mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on

design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication: many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process: The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

# Appendix 2 Background information on the five core capabilities framework

The 5 capabilities (5C) framework was to be used as a framework for the evaluation of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs) of the MFS II consortia. The 5C framework is based on a five-year research program on 'Capacity, change and performance' that was carried out by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). The research included an extensive review of the literature and sixteen case studies. The 5C framework has also been applied in an IOB evaluation using 26 case studies in 14 countries, and in the baseline carried out per organisation by the MFS II organisations for the purpose of the monitoring protocol.

The 5C framework is structured to understand and analyse (changes in) the capacity of an organization to deliver (social) value to its constituents. This introduction briefly describes the 5C framework, mainly based on the most recent document on the 5C framework (Keijzer et al., 2011).

The 5C framework sees capacity as an **outcome** of an **open system**. An organisation or collaborative association (for instance a network) is seen as a system interacting with wider society. The most critical practical issue is to ensure that relevant stakeholders share a common way of thinking about capacity and its core constituents or capabilities. Decisive for an organisation's capacity is the context in which the organisation operates. This means that **understanding context issues** is crucial. The use of the 5C framework requires a multi-stakeholder approach because shared values and results orientation are important to facilitate the capacity development process. The 5C framework therefore needs to **accommodate the different visions** of stakeholders and conceive different strategies for raising capacity and improving performance in a given situation.

The 5C framework defines capacity as '**producing social value'** and identifies five core capabilities that together result in that overall capacity. Capacity, capabilities and competences are seen as follows:

**Capacity** is referred to as the overall ability of an organisation or system to create value for others;

**Capabilities** are the collective ability of a group or a system to do something either inside or outside the system. The collective ability involved may be technical, logistical, managerial or generative (i.e. the ability to earn legitimacy, to adapt, to create meaning, etc.);

**Competencies** are the energies, skills and abilities of individuals.

Fundamental to developing capacity are inputs such as human, material and financial resources, technology, and information. To the degree that they are developed and successfully integrated, capabilities contribute to the overall capacity or ability of an organisation or system to create value for others. A single capability is not sufficient to create capacity. All are needed and are strongly interrelated and overlapping. Thus, to achieve its development goals, the 5C framework says that every organisation or system must have **five basic capabilities:**

The capability to act and commit;
The capability to deliver on development objectives;
The capability to adapt and self-renew;
The capability to relate (to external stakeholders);
The capability to achieve coherence.

In order to have a common framework for evaluation, the five capabilities have been reformulated in outcome domains and for each outcome domain performance indicators have been developed. A detailed overview of capabilities with outcome domains and indicators is attached in Appendix 3.

There is some overlap between the five core capabilities but together the five capabilities result in a certain level of capacity. Influencing one capability may have an effect on one or more of the other capabilities. In each situation, the level of any of the five capabilities will vary. Each capability can become stronger or weaker over time.

# Appendix 3 Changes in organisational capacity of the SPO - 5C indicators

Below you will find a description for each of the indicators under each of the capabilities, what the situation is as assessed during the endline, how this has changed since the baseline and what are the reasons for change.

**Description of Endline Indicators Institut Dayakologi**

**Capability to act and commit**

1.1. Responsive leadership: 'Leadership is responsive, inspiring, and sensitive'

*This is about leadership within the organization (operational, strategic). If there is a larger body then you may also want to refer to leadership at a higher level but not located at the local organization.*

The active leader has remained the same for quite a long period of involvement in the organization. He is an inspiration and a leader for his staff with appropriate knowledge and capacity, charismatic and democratic leadership. He was involved in the establishment of the organization and devoted to the cultural issue of *Dayak* although it is not considered a "sexy" issue according to one of the staff. He is able to continue the organization's existence and keep the staff's spirit ignited.

The problems in the organization are resolved in discussions, as well as participatory decision making. Generally, the Institut Dayakologi has the organization elements with structure, set and principles for decision making at any level. The leader provide drafts of decisions for strategic decision making related to important issues and external & supporting networks before meeting with the staff for critique and suggestions. This is the way the staff learns to understand the problems and to find a way out of them.

At this moment, the director of Institut Dayakologi was also in charge as a chairman of GPPK "Gerakan Pemberdayaan Pancur Kasih", a coalition of several NGOs in which Institut Dayakologi becomes one of its members. He gave more authority to the Institut Dayakologi daily management team (dewan pengurus), - consisting of 4 senior staff-, to run the organization and providing supervision to the program division and implementation. The management team provided supervision and day to day mentoring to the staff in implementing the program, especially the division manager. Each of of them has responsibility to provide guidance and supervision to each division. They conducted regular discussion on program implementation and supported the division to overcome challenges. Starting 30 January 2015, the director has resigned from his position as the executive director of ID for personal reasons, and was replaced by the former Division Manager of Research and Studies.

Score: 4 to 4 (no change)

1.2. Strategic guidance: 'Leaders provide appropriate strategic guidance (strategic leader and operational leader)'

*This is about the extent to which the leader(s) provide strategic directions*

There is a slight change in the decision making mechanism due to the leader becoming the chairman of another organization (GPPK) and the treasurer of yet another (CUG). At this moment, the director of Institut Dayakologi was also in charge as a chairman of GPPK "Gerakan Pemnerdayaan Pancur Kasih", a coalition of several NGOs in which Institut Dayakologi becomes the member. He gave more

authority to the Institut Dayakologi daily management team (dewan pengurus), - consisting of 4 senior staff-, to run the organization and providing supervision to the program division and implementation. The management team provided supervision and day to day mentoring to the staff in implementing the program, especially the division manager. Each of of them has responsibility to provide guidance and supervision to each division. They conducted regular discussion on program implementation and supported the division to overcome challenges.

The all division Managers have the authority to make decisions as long as it is within the scope of the program. Meetings in the division depend on the initiative of the Division Manager but are routinely held each month. Random meetings are held sometimes in informal situations. The Division Manager and Team Leader are for certain activities able to coordinate and provide strategic orientation for the involved activists therefore the activities run smoothly within the planning. The division Manager is coached and controlled by the management team in daily activities due to the external activities of the leader. Sometimes the Board also goes to the field.

There was an improvement of the regeneration that management team substituted the role of the director to decide technical things. Institute Dayakologi (ID) staff used to be very dependent on the leadership of the director, but now they learned how to manage programs, involving in the implementation supervision, even to develop proposal. The director provided more opportunity and authority for the management team to work and decide on the day to day progress in the organization.

Score: 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

1.3. Staff turnover: 'Staff turnover is relatively low'

*This is about staff turnover.*

By the end of 2011 and 2012, five senior staff (division manager) and one executive staff resigned from the organization due to getting higher salary offers and better opportunity to improve capacity from other organizations. Early 2013, the organization recruited new staff for data base management, research, administration and cleaning services.

When some of the senior staff resigned, there was some turbulence within the organization due to the skill gap. The organization had to train new staff in order to meet the requirements of running the activities in *Institut Dayakologi*. But on the other hand, there was a financial benefit for the organisation since the budget for senior staff salary could now be used for the new staffs' development and training.

Score: 1.5 to 2 (slight improvement)

1.4 Organisational structure: 'Existence of clear organisational structure reflecting the objectives of the organisation'

The organizational structure has not changed since the baseline and still consists of:

Members of Meeting; Executive Chairman of the Association, consisting of the chairman, secretary and member; Board of Financial Audit, consisting of chairman, secretary and member; Board of Management, consisting of chairman, vice chairman, secretary, treasurer, and member; Executive Body.

Standard operational procedures are also present to support the organizational structure. These explain decision-making and operational mechanisms, authorities, job-descriptions, and the responsibility of each of the components within the board of managers, board of executives and the activists as well as guidelines for accountability and reporting of activities.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

1.5 Articulated strategies: 'Strategies are articulated and based on good situation analysis and adequate M&E'

The change in the day to day leadership in the management team has opened a wide opportunity of discussions between the management team, division managers, and program managers, on the program implementation. Also the communication and capacity gap was minimum and staff became more free to express ideas. The discussion became a means of collecting facts, analysing the condition, and deciding strategies for better implementation. The organization also runs a research and studies program, an advocacy and collaboration program, and an empowerment of resource program. M&E is done both internally and externally and the result was used to analyse program implementation and formulate better pogram implementation strategy.

M&E has become one of the approaches in the preparation of strategic planning. There is no particular tool to do this process. Meetings for annual planning and review are used to deliver the next strategic plan.

Score: 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

1.6. Daily operations: 'Day-to-day operations are in line with strategic plans'

*This is about the extent to which day-to-day operations are aligned with strategic plans.*

The daily operatios run in line with the strategic plan. The core Program activities are described in the annual program plan and this plan was specifically conducted through the Program Implementation Plan (RPK) and Program Implementation Evaluation (APK). RPK was the operational plan of the program implementation and evaluated or monitored through APK. The program implementation plan was intended to provide guideline on the activities, while program implementation evaluation provided opportunity to reflect on the program implementation plan.  The RPK and APK were developed in an annual management workshop within the organization but according to some staff, the implementation is not always consistent as in the planning due to control weaknesses at managerial level.

Score: 4 to 4 ( no change)

1.7. Staff skills: 'Staff have necessary skills to do their work'

*This is about whether staff have the skills necessary to do their work and what skills they might need.*

The organization has a tight selection on new staff recruitment , which is based on their skill and education background. Similarly, staff is placed within the organization based oncapacity and background.

There is also an improvement related to staffs' skill in understanding and analyzing the situation in the field, and their abilities to understand the cultural issues which the organization deals with. Most of the staff stated that they need capacity building and language (English) training.

ID conducted and joined lots of training, especially in house trainings to improve staff capacity. The resignation of some senior staffs had encouraged ID to build the capacity of the current staff, such as proposal development training attended by all staff ID, documentary film production attended by 19 staff ID and 6 GPPK staff, and database and website training attended by all management staff. MSF II funded the trainings and 1 collaboration was with another donor.

Score: 2.5 to 3.5 (improvement)

1.8. Training opportunities: 'Appropriate training opportunities are offered to staff'

*This is about whether staff at the SPO are offered appropriate training opportunities*

Since the baseline in 2012 , the organization held in-house training sessions to share the knowledge and experiences among the staff. The in-house trainings consisted of a proposal preparation training, production of documentary films training, and data base and website training. Basically, the organization has given the opportunity to attend any training related to skill improvement for all the staff without differentiations between senior and junior levels. However, due to the organization's last experience in terms of having some senior staff with high skills resigning, tight selection and requirements are now applied in sending staff to follow training outside the organization. Currently it is mainly staff at managerial level who are sent for training outside the organization, they are required to write a written report of the training and there is a routine in sharing their learning through monthly meetings.

Score: 3 to 3.5 (improvement)

1.9.1. Incentives: 'Appropriate incentives are in place to sustain staff motivation'

*This is about what makes people want to work here. Incentives could be financial, freedom at work, training opportunities, etc.*

Nothing has changed in terms of incentives for staff members in the last two years. The staff continues to work for the organization not just for the work but to be part of an opportunity to strengthen the *Dayak* culture.

Staff in this organization is included in a social security system, provided allowance for family and children, health insurance, accommodation and transportation. A pension program for staff is under development and hopefully can be implemented before the end of 2014. ID arranges the staff's pension plan through Credit Union. ID adds 10% to each salary of the staff every month for pension plan which is managed through Credit Union. This portion of salary is used to pay back the loan at the CU that each staff borrows. The loan is used as saving at the Credit Union with 15% interest p.a. for their pension purpose.

Another incentive is the opportunity to attend trainings, in house or outside the organization as the organization fully supports staff capacity building.

Score: 3 to 3 (no change)

1.9.2. Funding sources: 'Funding from multiple sources covering different time periods'

*This is about how diversified the SPOs funding sources are over time, and how the level of funding is changing over time.*

Generally, the organization now has a stable income, although some donors already reduced or even stopped their support. Income comes from donors, especially foreign donors, but also from donations, fundraising, and investments. The fluctuating income is compensated during the program implementation or by raising additional income through program activities themselves.

The management realises that the organization has to build autonomy and independence in its position regarding income, and develop a particular division to focus on this issue. Financial plans are projecting that by 2019, the organization should have more internal revenue sources than external, decreasing the dependency on donor organizations. Another income source is from *GCU* and *GPPK* for the development of *Kalimantan Review*, whether from compulsory contribution of the members or from the advertisements in the *Kalimantan Review*.

Score: 3 to 3 (no change)

1.9.3. Funding procedures: 'Clear procedures for exploring new funding opportunities'

*This is about whether there are clear procedures for getting new funding and staff are aware of these procedures.*

No change has occurred with respect to funding procedures at *Institut Dayakologi* over the last two years. The organization has a good financial strategy which is described in the ten year organization financial plan (2010-2019).

However to sustain the organization income, ID improved the mechanism of organization fundraising and proposal development by conducting training on proposal development. The training of proposal development was attended by all staff, forming a team of proposal development , collecting information on partners who worked at the similar issue. ID also made an effort to strengthen the organization fundraising by recruiting 1 staff to work on the outlet of ID. The outlet of ID provided public with more ID publication such as publication of research on indigenous people , in the form of books, bulletin, and newspaper. It also collected the artwork of indigenous people and help them sell their product. New Jurung also provided new opportunity to generate income from organization asset.

Score: 4 to 4 (no change)

**Summary Capability to act and commit**

In terms of strategic guidance to resist slight change since the baseline. The director has become the chairman of another organization (GPPK) and the treasurer of yet another (CUG). Now the division Manager has the authority to make decisions as long as it is within the scope of the program. Meetings in the division depend on the initiative of the management team and Division Managers but are routinely held each month and this is where strategic and operational guidelines are provided. The management team provided mentoring and guidance to division managers. Strategic plans are well articulated and based on monitoring and evaluation, although there is no systematic monitoring and evaluation in place. The changing on the day to day leadership on management team has opened a wide opportunity of discussion between management team, division managers, and program managers, on the program implementation. As the communication and capacity gap was minimum and staff became more free to express ideas. The discussion became a means of collecting facts, analysing the condition, and deciding strategies for a better implementation. The organization also runs a research and studies program, an advocacy and collaboration program, and an empowerment of resource program. M&E is done both internally and externally and the result was used to analyse program implementation and formulate better pogram implementation strategy. M&E has become one of the approaches in the preparation of strategic planning. There is no particular tool to do this process. Meetings for annual planning and review are used to deliver the next strategic plan.

Staff turnover is still high , since some experienced staff left the organisation by the end of 2012. But there is also been some new staff. This left the organisation with a gap in terms of available knowledge and skills but the money that came available by staff leaving has been used to train other staff. There have been plenty of opportunities for skills upgrading both in the organisation through sharing meetings as well as by attending capacity building events mostly finded by MSF II especially in house trainings within the organisation. FGenerally, the staff of *Institut Dayakologi* are loyal, dedicated and committed but still lack general skills i.e. language skills. Motivation to work for the organisation mainly comes from staff's dedication to contribute to the Dayak culture, although some staff have left the organisation due to better financial gains elsewhere. Staff in this organization are included in a social security system, provided allowance for family and children, health insurance, accommodation and transportation. A pension program for staff is under development and hopefully can be implemented before the end of 2014 The organization still has a complicated but firm organization structure, and also has clear procedures to develop the strategic planning which is included target communities. It has relative stability in financial resources and there are procedures and plans to obtain additional income and to become less dependent of donors, which is described in a ten year organization financial plan.

Score: from 3.1 to 3.6 (slight improvement)

**Capability to adapt and self-renew**

2.1. M&E application: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess activities, outputs and outcomes'

*This is about what the monitoring and evaluation of the SPO looks at, what type of information they get at and at what level (individual, project, organizational).*

Compared to the baseline there is still no comprehensive and functional M&E system in place and there are no written documents or formal procedures for M&E. M&E is just centered on discussions between staff and coordinators. M&E is applied at the project level, not yet the organizational level. M&E is done in the form of discussions based on projects, together with stakeholders sharing experiences, renewing reports, and providing suggestions. The monthly meeting which is attended by all staff is also used as the evaluation forum discussing achievements, problems, and solutions. An annual evaluation and planning meeting is also held to evaluate all the implemented programs within a year and to arrange next year's programs. Staff members are slowly learning about M&E, identifying obstacles and constraints and reducing the risk of failure by finding solutions.

Score: 3 to 3 (no change)

2.2. M&E competencies: 'Individual competencies for performing M&E functions are in place'

*This is about whether the SPO has a trained M&E person; whether other staff have basic understanding of M&E; and whether they know what information to collect, how to process the information, how to make use of the information so as to improve activities etc.*

Compared to the baseline, there is still no particularly trained staff to implement M&E although they do understand the importance of M&E. Staff gathers information on the implementation of their programs, resources and the needs of targeted community. Division Manager and program managers provide monthly, quarterly, six-monthly and annual reports.

Some staff members have been requested to do M&E in the internal organization of GPPK.

Score: 2 to 2 (no change)

2.3. M&E for future strategies: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess the effects of delivered products and services (outcomes) for future strategies'

*This is about what type of information is used by the SPO to make decisions; whether the information comes from the monitoring and evaluation; and whether M&E info influences strategic planning.*

No change has occurred in this indicator compared to the baseline. Generally, management decisions are based on program implementation reports however, the findings are not always recorded and neither is feedback from the beneficiaries. The reported problems are analyzed to find the solutions which are then recommended as the basis for decision-making. Through this process, M&E has become one of the approaches in the preparation of strategic planning. There is no particular tool to do this process. Meetings for annual planning and review are used to deliver the next strategic plan.

Score: 3 to 3 (no change)

2.4. Critical reflection: 'Management stimulates frequent critical reflection meetings that also deal with learning from mistakes'

*This is about whether staff talk formally about what is happening in their programs; and, if so, how regular these meetings are; and whether staff are comfortable raising issues that are problematic.*

Critical reflection is done in executive meetings, program meetings, and monthly meetings in the form of "debates". The monthly meeting is held to discuss any concerns related to programs or non-programs openly. There is an informal mechanism within the staff and management to discuss those concerns for example during lunch time.

The suggestion box is changed into a digital forum through social media and short message service, which staff members can use as a tool to convey feedback to management. Despite offering this mechanism in an electronic format now, there is no difference compared to two years ago.

Monitoring and evaluation on programme implementation of respective divisions are carried out on a montly, quarterly, semester and annual basis as well as per activity. The instruments used to monitor the programme implementation are Activity Implementation Plan (RPK), Activity Implementation Analysis (APK), monthly reports that are submitted by staff to programme manager, Quarterly reports that are submitted by programme manager to Division Manager, Semester reports that are submitted by Division Manager to Director. In addition, monitoring and evaluation are also held during monthly meetings, executive meetings and programme's year-end evaluation and monitoring.

Monitoring and evaluation aimed at ensuring that programmes implemented in compliance with work plans that have been previously formulated and providing feedback for perfection and improvement of programmes taking into account today's development ongoing in the facilitated communities.
Monitoring on budget is carried out every day, once in 4 months, semester and year. The aims of monitoring are not only to ensure that every activity is implemented on time, on target and on budget but also to provide input and recommendation for the next activities.
Daily monitoring is carried out every working day at the secretariat of Institut Dayakologi in Pontianak, whereas the monitoring on the implementation of Grasshopper IV programme in Tanjung, Jelai Hulu, Ketapang District is carried out once in 4 months (quarterly) by conducting a direct visit to the field to see whether the budget is used appropriately for the programme implementation in the field.
The aim of evaluation is to evaluate the progress and outcomes of the programme implementation as well as to identify constraints sustained. The aspects that are evaluated, among which are the time of activity implementation, the compliance of preparation of activity with the work plan, the compliance of activity implementation with time table, human and financial resources, costs, how the activity is carried out, goals and what instruments are used as well as all the notes and receipts as source of evidence for the activity implementation. All these aspects are evaluated as to see whether they comply with the Work plan, Activity Implementation Plan, Activity Implementation Plan and Budget Form.
Score: 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

2.5. Freedom for ideas: 'Staff feel free to come up with ideas for implementation of objectives

*This is about whether staff feel that ideas they bring for implementation of the program are welcomed and used.*

There is no change regarding sharing ideas among the staff. They feel that the organization is always open for any comments and ideas through formal meetings or personal communication. For example, if the finance staff needs an external financial consultant to develop organizational financial software, the organization will find an appropriate consultant to develop this idea. The new ideas, including technical suggestions for program implementation are accommodated as long as they are in line with the vision and mission of the organization.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

2.6. System for tracking environment: 'The organization has a system for being in touch with general trends and developments in its operating environment'

*This is about whether the SPO knows what is happening in its environment and whether it will affect the organization.*

There has been no change in the way that Institut Dayakologi tracks its environment. *Institut Dayakologi* as a leading NGO on the Dayak culture in West Borneo finds that it has to follow general trends and developments in its environment, particularly developments with good impact for the organization. It is easy to find information about the changes and trends as it has coaching programs with activists being involved in the community's everyday life. Another method to obtain information is by conducting a forum for external reflection with participants from universities, church representatives and local community members.

Since 2012, the organization has held an annual celebration for its anniversary with particular events such as book/documentary film/journal launching to attract public attention.

Score: 4 to 4 (no change)

2.7. Stakeholder responsiveness: 'The organization is open and responsive to their stakeholders and the general public'

*This is about what mechanisms the SPO has to get input from its stakeholders, and what they do with that input.*

No changes have taken place with regards to stakeholder responsiveness. *Institut Dayakologi* invites all stakeholders and other organizations in an evaluation meeting to evaluate the implemented programs and to obtain suggestions for next programs. There is also a general evaluation session which involves stakeholders and beneficiaries to obtain criticisms and suggestions for the next implemented programs.

Score: 3 to 3 (no change)

**Summary of capability to adapt and self-renew**

There is still not comprehensive and functional monitoring and evaluation system in place , but the organization receives feedback from other organizations and beneficiaries and evaluates the impact of the implemented programs as part of program implementation. ID has setup a M&E Division as one of its main programs starting 2015. This program will be managed by a Division Manager and put in the management structure of the organization. Furthermore, regular meetings are held to discuss progress program implementation and annual planning and review meeting is held to look back and plan ahead for the next year. There is no specific and dedicated trained staff to do M&E. Monitoring and evaluation is mainly focused on project and not organisational level and on activities and outputs and impact. The organisation also has published lots of publication that provided a deep analysis on the indigenous people culture. The book is a reflection of how the intervention bring changes on people's life.There are many ways for staff to deliver their ideas and critiques both informally and formally. Currently with the fast growth of social media, the staff are also able to deliver their ideas through digital media. The organisation tracks what is happening in the environment, mainly by engaging with the communities but also with the media.

Score: from 3.1 to 3.1 (no change)

**Capability to deliver on development objectives**

3.1. Clear operational plans: 'Organization has clear operational plans for carrying out projects which all staff fully understand'

*This is about whether each project has an operational work plan and budget, and whether staff use it in their day-to-day operations.*

Programs are implemented based on work plans and detailed operational budgets in the Program Implementation Planning (RPK) which includes activities, output, result, resources (asset), and budget. Beside the RPK, there is also Program Implementation Analysis (APK) which analyzes program implementation. RPK and APK are used by the staff as a reference for daily operational activities. However, various staff members have raised concerns related to the effectiveness of RPK due to lack of staff to implement all the programs, and an alternative, simpler way of planning may be more applicable and effective.

Score: 4 to 4 (no change)

3.2. Cost-effective resource use: 'Operations are based on cost-effective use of its resources'

*This is about whether the SPO has the resources to do the work, and whether resources are used cost-effectively.*

Cost effective resource use is promoted through the budget arrangement . Budget is the first process to be prepared to ensure that the organization has the resources needed and make a cost effective activitivy plan. The staff needs to propose the budget before the program starts and they need to submit reports and receipts to be verified by the finance department. This mechanism gives a significant impact in budget saving and the staff can work efficiently before the budget is allocated without considering the needs or real demand in the field. This mechanism has remained unchanged since 2012, relating in no change with respect to this indicator.

Score: 4 to 4 (no change)

3.3. Delivering planned outputs: 'Extent to which planned outputs are delivered'

*This is about whether the SPO is able to carry out the operational plans.*

There is no change related to operational planning and program implementation. *Institut Dayakologi* implemented the program based on the planning. Acivities to implement the program was conducted to achive the objective of the program. on the planning made by all the staff. Generally, operational planning runs smoothly as long as the planning is well and carefully prepared. Any deviation that occurred was caused by external factors or other situational conditions in the field. Most staff members have high commitment regarding  program implementation which enables them to run their planning well. Overall outputs have been delivered according to the plans consistently.

Score: from 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

3.4. Mechanisms for beneficiary needs: 'The organization has mechanisms in place to verify that services meet beneficiary needs'

*This is about how the SPO knows that their services are meeting beneficiary needs*

There is no change in the way the organization fulfills the needs of the beneficiaries. The organization holds a workshop and discussions at the start of a program to assess the newest condition in the community. Community involvement is the key for this organization in implementing the programs as well as doing monitoring and evaluation. During program implementation, the team will allocate time

to stay together with the beneficiaries. This engagement with the communities supports assessing whether the services meet beneficiary needs.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

3.5. Monitoring efficiency: 'The organization monitors its efficiency by linking outputs and related inputs (input-output ratio's)'

*This is about how the SPO knows they are efficient or not in their work.*

There is no change related to the monitoring efficiency. The organization reviews Program Implementation Planning (RPK) and undertakes Program Implementation Analysis (APK). This is the most effective way to find out the relation between the input and output of the implemented program, and to find out the achievement of target percentage. Staff performance is evaluated by each program manager biweekly and by division manager monthly.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

3.6. Balancing quality-efficiency: 'The organization aims at balancing efficiency requirements with the quality of its work'

*This is about how the SPO ensures quality work with the resources available*

Quality and efficiency are balanced by comparing the used resources and the impact of an implemented program, and this has been performed consistently over the last two years. No significant changes have therefore been found with respect to this indicator.. Program quality or activity can be seen from the positive feedback from the beneficiaries, local government, and other stakeholders. The needs of the beneficiaries and the demand in the field are high whilst the available resources are limited. Staff has to be creative in way to keep the result optimal.

Score: 3 to 3 (no change)

**Summary of Capability to deliver on development objectives**

Programs are implemented based on work plans and detailed operational budgets in the Program Implementation Planning (RPK) which includes activities, output, result, resources (assest) , and budget. All staff has a responsibility to develop RPK and APK. Beside the RPK, there is also Program Implementation Analysis (APK) which supports the analysis of program implementation. RPK and APK are used by the staff as a reference for daily operational activities. *Institut Dayakologi* has an approach for project implementation which requires developing the work plan and budget arrangement first and analyze it afterwards. This way, the staff can work efficiently and the resources are used appropriately. It also helps them to compare the input, the output and the impact. There is still deviation from the planning because of the external factors although the organization always finishes their program completely. In order to fulfill the needs of the beneficiaries, the organization held discussions and workshops before the programs are implemented. Sometimes, the staff stays with the beneficiaries to ensure optimal delivery. Since staff engages frequently with beneficiaries, this assists in assessing whether the services meet their needs.

Score: from 3.6 to 3.6 (no change)

**Capability to relate**

4.1. Stakeholder engagement in policies and strategies: 'The organization maintains relations/ collaboration/alliances with its stakeholders for the benefit of the organization'

*This is about whether the SPO engages external groups in developing their policies and strategies, and how.*

*Institut Dayakologi* is a part of an extensive network, GPPK or Gerakan Pemberdayaan Pancur Kasih (Pancur Kasih Empowerment Movement), in Borneo. The organization has developed various activities to exchange experience within the network from the village level up to the international level. It also develops good relationships with some external communities to develop its policy and strategy through strategic planning and review meetings for and these meetings are open for feedback and suggestions by anybody.

Score: 4 to 4 (no change)

4.2. Engagement in networks: 'Extent to which the organization has relationships with existing networks/alliances/partnerships'

*This is about what networks/alliances/partnerships the SPO engages with and why; with they are local or international; and what they do together, and how do they do it.*

Institut Dayakologi has maintained its engagement level in it's networks. The internal relation within *Institut Dayakologi* has remained strong as well as the relations with other strategic networks whether local, national or at the international level. External relations have been developed since the program was implemented. The network consists of the Credit Union (CU), Catholic Church (diocese), the regency (Education Department, animal husbandry, fishery, and National Land Agency, libraries, etc.), the local village government (in the beneficiaries' areas), traditional organization, partner organization, and international NGO i.e. Cordaid.

The organization participates in other organizations' programs and vice versa, or implements a joint program such as lobbying at the national level and amongst government. The relationship with government was better as government has put more trust on ID's work. The stakeholders trust was shown from the use of books published by ID as their reference, including being used by school as a textbook. ID also developed stronger relationship with Media, such as Ruai TV.

The new "Jurung" also contributed to strengthen ID networking as it opened for any organization activities.

Score: 4.5 to 4.5 (no change)

4.3. Engagement with target groups: 'The organization performs frequent visits to their target groups/ beneficiaries in their living environment'

*This is about how and when the SPO meets with target groups.*

*Institut Dayakologi* has continued its processes related to the engagement with its target groups. It visits the targeted communities frequently, which has become an important part of program implementation. The amount of visits depends on the program, for example in the division for Collaboration and Advocacy the staff had to stay with the beneficiaries. In another program, the organization communicates with the targeted community by visiting their homes, or holding seminars or meetings. The amount of visits depends on the needs of the community but because of the distance and cost, not all the communities have been visited with the same frequency. In that case, the staff communicate with the community representative via telephone.

Score: 4 to 4 (no change)

4.4. Relationships within organization: 'Organizational structure and culture facilitates open internal contacts, communication, and decision-making'

*How does staff at the SPO communicate internally? Are people free to talk to whomever they need to talk to? When and at what forum? What are the internal mechanisms for sharing information and building relationships?*

Relationships within the organization have remained strong and well. Communication and decision making is still done through routine meetings: monthly, executive, managerial, annual evaluation and annual program. The organization also uses a mailing list to communicate with the staff/activists. An annual performance review by the executive director has also become a forum to communicate in which the director closely communicates with the staff whilst the staff can share any problems related to their performance.

The other way is through suggestions via short message service and social media. Previously the organization provided a suggestion box to obtain the staff's ideas, feedback, and suggestions. The daily communication is open through direct communication or electronic media (email, SMS, or phone call).

Sejauh ini seperti itu, ketika pembicaraannya sampai ke tingkat direktur mengenai masslah pribadi, itu harus dilakukan. Tetapi sebelumnya terlebih dahulu di bicarakan di tingkat pengurus, baru kalau tidak diselesaikan di tingkat pengurus, baru ke tingkat direktur, disitu keputusannya, dan itu harus dilakukan. Kalau mailing list di beberapa tahun ini tidak jalan. Dan saat ini di lakukan di grup bbm untuk share-share pekerjaan walaupun belum mencakup semua staf karena tidak semua menggunakan bbm.
Score: 4 to 4 (no change)

**Summary of Capability to relate**

The organization has an extensive network and develops good relationships from village level to international level. Stakeholders are invited to provide suggestions to aid in the development of the strategic planning and asked to work together with the organization in the implementation of projects. There is frequent contact between staff members and beneficiaries through frequent visits or even by phone if distance or resources do not allow frequent visits. Sometimes staff members stay with the beneficiaries There are many ways to get staff feedback or involvement in the decision making process through routine meetings, informal communication and a suggestion box.

Score: from 4.1 to 4.1 (no change)

**Capability to achieve coherence**

5.1. Revisiting vision, mission: 'Vision, mission and strategies regularly discussed in the organization'

*This is about whether there is a vision, mission and strategies; how often staff discuss/revise vision, mission and strategies; and who is involved in this.*

No changes have occurred regarding the revisiting of Institut Dayakologi vision and mission. The vision and mission are reviewed formally in the meeting for strategic planning which is held every three years. Stakeholders are involved in the discussion with the founders, management, executives, and staff. The discussion about the vision and mission is not always producing changes but can be a reflection of the current social situation (consider vision and mission in any program).

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

5.2. Operational guidelines: 'Operational guidelines (technical, admin, HRM) are in place and used and supported by the management'

*This is about whether there are operational guidelines, which operational guidelines exist; and how they are used.*

Operational guidelines have stayed the same over the last two years, and continue to be effectively applied to day to day work. The organization has clear rules to direct the performance of the staff. There is a twenty page document regarding Standard Operational Procedures (SOP) which has been revised many times -. The newest version is from the year of 2007 regarding technical operation guidelines, administration and HRM. Th was a new SOP of building maintenance. The SOP refered to the new building of ID that just finished its construction in 2013. The SOP is used and supported by the management. There is also a description of the jobs and the documentation process as well as financial procedures. Before using the SOP, the description of the jobs is discussed and the staff members are asked to provide feedback.

Score: 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

5.3. Alignment with vision, mission: 'Projects, strategies and associated operations are in line with the vision and mission of the organization'

*This is about whether the operations and strategies are line with the vision/mission of the SPO.*

No changes have occurred since 2012 with regards to the alignment with vision and mission. Project and strategy are still in line with work programs of the organization, the objective and the activities are taken directly from the vision and mission. ID staff has internalized the vision and mission of the organization. The work has reflected the vision and mission of the organization.

Score: 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

5.4. Mutually supportive efforts: 'The portfolio of project (activities) provides opportunities for mutually supportive efforts'

*This is about whether the efforts in one project complement/support efforts in other projects.*

Dayakologi's efforts remain greatly mutually supportive. All the running projects are designed to relate to each other, for example the documentation of *Dayak* culture has given an impact towards the awareness amongst the community regarding the importance of maintaining their culture. The publication has suppoted the work of ID direct intervention with community. One of the issue was a conservation of indigenous territory which has to face with private company expansion. The publication hads influenced the community in such a way they have a good knowledge and understanding to defend indigenous territory. This common issue was an example of how reserach division support the publication division and , adcocacy division to solve the environmental problems followed by an increase in income. All the programs support each other in such a way.

Score: 4.5 to 4.5 (no change)

**Summary Capability to achieve coherence**

The vision and mission of the *Institut Dayakologi* are reviewed every three years. Strategic planning directly becomes work planning, which enables projects to generally be in line with the vision and mission. The projects are also related to and supporte each other, therefore, mutually supportive. There is an agreed SOP to support the work of the staff covering HRM and finance which is developed together with the staff and these are effectively applied, but this hasn't changed since the baseline in 2012 .

Score: 3.9 to 3.9 (no change)

# Appendix 4 Results - key changes in organisational capacity - general causal map

**Narrative of Genral Causal Map of Institut Dayakologi**

Institute Dayakologi (ID) is an advocacy organization which works for the preservation of the cultural preservation of the Dayak. One of the main activities of ID was to conduct advocacy of the natural and indigenous environment which is increasingly threatened by the expansion of plantation companies. In addition, ID takes a leading role in creating awareness in the community on pluralism through local subjects at schools. It targeted junior high school level students and was intended to bring awareness to children that they are part of a multi-cultural society.

1. The evaluation team carried out an end line assessment at Institut Dayakologi from 20 to 23 August 2014. During this workshop, the team made a recap of key features of the organisation in the baseline in 2012 (such as vision, mission, strategies, clients, partnerships). This was the basis for discussing changes that had happened to the organisation since the baseline. The three main changes that happened in the organisation since the baseline, as identified by the staff during the end line workshop were:improved secretarial coordination and support [20]
2. improved staff morale [1]
3. strengthened role as a networking hub for advocacy on Dayak communities and culture [7]
4. increased executive team's capacity to develop proposals [8]
5. improved staff decision-making process [28]
6. more qualified human resources [16]

According to staff present at the end line workshop, these organizational capacity changes are expected to contribute to the development of Dayakologi as a leading organization in indigenous culture preservation.


Apart from the fourth issue, all of these issues have contributed to improved programme implementation and achievements [5] which have helped the organization to be better recognized as a leading organization on the Dayak culture in terms of information and advocacy work [4]. This increased recognition as well as the increased executive team's capacity to develop proposals is helping the organization in the capacity to mobilize resources for operations and program management [2].

One example of improved programme implementation could be seen in inspiring the community to think about the culture, customs and indigenous communities of the Dayak [9]. On the one hand this was done through the publication of a documentary film published by Institut Dayakologi [11], in an attempt to broaden public information [14]. On the other hand community awareness was addressed by pointing out the need to preserve the Dayak culture and the challenges that indigenous communities face on a daily basis through Ruai TV broadcasting. Based on the FGD with staff, Ruai TV had a role to publish or broadcast documenter films/movies produced by Institut Dayakologi.[15]. Both these initiatives were enabled by the increased staff capacity to create documentary films [18] , which are further explained below.

Another example includes the high quality advocacy work [10] that has been done by Institut Dayakologi. Next to specific new work initiatives, the quality of advocacy work went up significantly as well [10] due to more qualified staff and human resources available to the organization [16]. This is further explained below.

Each of the five key organizational changes are further explained below. The numbers in the narrative correspond with the numbers in the visual.

## General Causal Map of Institut Dayakologi



**Improved secretarial coordination and support [20]**

Daily tasks and program implementation work were more effectively executed [5] by having better coordination and support from the organization's secretariat [20]. Program activities could now be carried out with more coordination, focus and in a timely manner. The secretariat now possesses good communication infrastructure, such as multiple phone connections [22], stronger work discipline and focus in carrying out their duties [23] and most importantly, a more formalized communication structure which was brought about by the physical restructuring of the department into separate divisions [24]. The underlying cause for this overall professionalization of the secretariat was the improved workspace [34] which was upgraded as part of the new office building in 2013 [37]. Funds for this rebuilding was provided for 35% by partner donor agencies, and the remainder was paid for with Institut Dayakologi's sustainability fund [40].The new office building was a necessity [42] after the old building got destroyed in a fire in 9 August 2007[43], but also a welcome change after working for years in an inadequate and improvised environment. It greatly impacted staff morale and the professionalization of the organization as a whole.

**Improved staff morale [1]**

According to staff present at the end line workshop, staff morale overall was greatly impacted by the accessibility and visibility of the newly constructed Institut Dayakologi building [12]. More people came to visit this building to learn and look for references about Dayak Culture, which enthused and engaged the organization's staff. The new building-itself became more visible through their designs, which incorporate and display both the Dayak Culture's and the organization's identity [25]. This major overhaul of office space was part of a greater initiative to improve office space [34], which will be explained as a separate change factor in more detail further below. Improved staff morale is expected to lead to improved programme implementation [16].

**Strengthened role as a networking hub for advocacy on Dayak communities and culture [7]**

Dayakologi strengthened its role as a hub in the network that focuses on the advocacy for Dayak communities and culture [7]. Partners and stakeholders supported Institut Dayakologi's role as such due to their provision of meeting space in their new office as meeting point for thenetwork [26]. The meeting room, or better known traditionally as a "Jurung", was created as part of the new office environment, and meant to be used both for internal use as well as external use by renting out the space publicly. The Jurung is a true replication of a traditional Dayak meeting space, and provides an important role in the Dayak culture.

**Increased executive team's capacity to develop proposals [8]**

The executive team's capacity to develop proposals [8] has been increased after the executive team was challenged to increase their competencies and find additional funding for the organization in order to be able and fill the new budget gap [13]. Institut Dayakologi's budget had to be revised [17] after it came under strain as a result of the higher operational expenses brought in from usage of the new office facilities [21]. Although some of these expenses could be covered by income from renting out the "Jurung" meeting room [27], new funds were required to balance the organization's budget after the workspace improvements had been realized [34].

**Improved staff decision-making process [28]**

The organization has improved its decision making process [28]. The junior Staffs were given more opportunities to discuss matters with the division manager and program manager [35], who in turn utilized this input into their management decisions. These opportunities were created through the delegation of more authority to the daily operational team [38]. Prior to this it was mostly the Director who dealt with such issues and management decisions, but as he assumed position as head of the GPPK coalition [44], the director was forced to put down some of his day to day Institut Institut Dayakologi activities and delegate them to his subordinates.

**More qualified human resources [16]**

Institut Dayakologi now has more qualified human resources [16] . Due to having increased capacity for staff to create documentary films [18], after following a training session on the subject of documentary video making [29]. Staff capacity also increased due to improved technical knowledge and skills of staff [19]. This was due to a series of trainings. On the knowledge side, staff was trained for instance on Etno linguistic skills, which enabled them to understand and communicate with Dayak communities at a higher level [32]. On the technical skill side, staff went through training on criminal investigations of money laundering in forestry [30], visual documentation [31] and IT training to operate IT but also maintain for example the website [33]. All the trainings provided by Institut Dayakologi were part of the organization addressing the need for further staff capacity building [36]. This became evident after program activities became more and more delayed after a large restructuring operation of human resources [41]. Staff was relocated, newly hired and repositioned to accommodate the knowledge gap [41] that was left behind after several senior staff members resigned [45] from the organization in the observed period in the end of 2012.

1. Improved program implementation and meeting the set objectives [5]
    a. The strategy of program implementation was broadened through the use of visual documentation of indigenous custom through movies or videos. This was enabled by inspiring community (not only beneficiaries) to think about the culture, customs and indigenous communities of the Dayak [9]. On the one hand this was done through the publication of a documentary film published by Institut Dayakologi [11], in an attempt to broaden public information [14]. On the other hand community awareness was addressed by pointing out the need to preserve the Dayak culture and the challenges that indigenous communities face on a daily basis through Ruai TV broadcasting (15]. Both these initiatives were enabled by the increased staff capacity to create documentary films [18] after following a training session on the subject of documentary video making [29].
2. High quality advocacy work [10]
    a. Next to specific new work initiatives the quality of advocacy work went up significantly as well [10] due to more qualified staff and human resources available to the organization [16].Both staff knowledge as well as technical skills improved [19]

**Better recognition of Dayakologi as a Dayak Culture information center [2]**

Institut Dayakologi has become known as the leading organization with respect to Dayak Culture information [2] amongst both the public as well as public and private institutions. The prime reason for this was the fact that more organizations have experienced and observed Institut Dayakolog'si efforts in advocacy for the natural and indigenous environments which are increasingly threatened by the expansion of plantation companies and the Dayak culture in general. The reasons for this recognition have already been explained in the sections above.

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen UR
P.O. Box 88
6700 AB Wageningen
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)317 48 68 00
www.wageningenUR.nl/cdi

Report CDI-15-043

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# Endline report – Indonesia, Lembaga Kita
# MFS II country evaluations

Capacity of Southern Partner Organisations (5C) component


Cecile Kusters[1]
Martijn Wieriks[2]
Bekti Dwi Andari[3]
Novina Suprobo[3]
Widya Priyahita[3]
Rumenta R. Sihombing[3]
Seto W. Rokhmatulloh[3]
Ita Rosita[3]

1 Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR
2 SEPAM Consultants Indonesia
3 SurveyMeter



Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen, February 2015

Report CDI-15-044

Kusters, C., Wieriks, M., Dwi Andari, B., Suprobo, N., Priyahita, W., Sihombing, R.R., Rokhmatulloh, S.W., Rosita, I., 2015. *Endline report – Indonesia, Lembaga Kita. MFS II country evaluations; Capacity of Southern Partner Organisations (5C) component.* Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University & Research centre. Report CDI-15-044. Wageningen.

This report presents the findings of the endline of the evaluation of the organisational capacity component of the MFS II country evaluations. The focus of this report is Indonesia, Lembaga Kita. The format is based on the requirements by the synthesis team and NWO/WOTRO. The endline was carried out in 2014. The baseline was carried out in 2012.

Key words: 5C (five core capabilities); attribution; baseline; causal map; change; CFA (Co-financing Organisation) endline; organisational capacity development; SPO (Southern Partner Organisation).



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Report CDI-15-044 |

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# Acknowledgements

We are grateful to all the people that have contributed to this report. We particularly would like to thank the Southern Partner Organisation Lembaga Kita and the Co-Financing Agency Mensen met een Missie for their endless patience and support during this challenging task of collecting the endline data. We hope that this endline report will provide useful insights to Lembaga Kita, Mensen met een Missie, the synthesis team, IOB and NWO/Wotro.

The Indonesia 5C evaluation team

# List of abbreviations and acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| 5 C | Capacity development model which focuses on 5 core capabilities |
| Causal map | Map with cause-effect relationships. See also 'detailed causal map'. |
| Causal mechanisms | The combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome |
| CDI | Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre |
| CFA | Co-Financing Agency |
| CFO | Co-Financing Organisation |
| CS | Civil Society |
| Detailed causal map | Also 'model of change'. the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change. In the 5C evaluation identified key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms) are traced through process tracing (for attribution question). |
| General causal map | Causal map with key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms), based on SPO perception. |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MFS | Dutch co-financing system |
| MIS | Management Information System |
| MM | Mensen met een Missie |
| MoFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| OD | Organisational Development |
| PME | Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation |
| PRA | Priority Result Area |
| Process tracing | Theory-based approach to trace causal mechanisms |
| RCT | Randomized Control Trials |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |
| SSI | Semi-structured Interview |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| Wageningen UR | Wageningen University & Research centre |

# 1 Introduction & summary

## 1.1 Purpose and outline of the report

The Netherlands has a long tradition of public support for civil bi-lateral development cooperation, going back to the 1960s. The Co-Financing System (*Medefinancieringsstelsel*, or 'MFS') is its most recent expression. MFS II is the 2011-2015 grant framework for Co-Financing Agencies (CFAs), which is directed at achieving a sustainable reduction in poverty. A total of 20 consortia of Dutch CFAs have been awarded €1.9 billion in MFS II grants by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).

The overall aim of MFS II is to help strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. CFAs receiving MFS II funding work through strategic partnerships with Southern Partner Organisations.

The MFS II framework stipulates that each consortium is required to carry out independent external evaluations to be able to make valid, evaluative statements about the effective use of the available funding. On behalf of Dutch consortia receiving MFS II funding, NWO-WOTRO has issued three calls for proposals. Call deals with joint MFS II evaluations of development interventions at country level. Evaluations must comprise a baseline assessment in 2012 and a follow-up assessment in 2014 and should be arranged according to three categories of priority result areas as defined by MoFA:

Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) & themes;

Capacity development of Southern partner organisations (SPO) (5 c study);

Efforts to strengthen civil society.

This report focuses on the assessment of capacity development of southern partner organisations. This evaluation of the organisational capacity development of the SPOs is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The purpose of this report is to provide endline information on one of the SPOs involved in the evaluation: Lembaga Kita in Indonesia. The baseline report is described in a separate document.

Chapter 2 describes general information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO). Here you can find general information about the SPO, the context in which the SPO operates, contracting details and background to the SPO. In chapter 3 a brief overview of the methodological approach is described. You can find a more detailed description of the methodological approach in appendix 1.Chapter 4 describes the results of the 5c endline study. It provides an overview of capacity development interventions of the SPO that have been supported by MFS II. It also describes what changes in organisational capacity have taken place since the baseline and why (evaluation question is 1 and 4). This is described as a summary of the indicators per capability as well as a general causal map that provides an overview of the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline, as experienced by the SPO. The complete overview of descriptions per indicator, and how these have changed since the baseline is described in appendix 3. The complete visual and narrative for the key organisational capacity changes that have taken place since the baseline according to the SPO staff present at the endline workshop is presented in appendix 4.

For those SPOs involved in process tracing a summary description of the causal maps for the identified organisational capacity changes in the two selected capabilities (capability to act and commit; capability to adapt and self-renew) is provided (evaluation questions 2 and 4). These causal maps

describe the identified key organisational capacity changes that are possibly related to MFS II interventions in these two capabilities, and how these changes have come about. More detailed information can be found in appendix 5.

Chapter 5 presents a discussion on the findings and methodology and a conclusion on the different evaluation questions.

The overall methodology for the endline study of capacity of southern partner organisations is coordinated between the 8 countries: Bangladesh (Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath; INTRAC); DRC (Disaster Studies, Wageningen UR); Ethiopia (CDI, Wageningen UR); India (CDI, Wageningen UR: Indonesia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Liberia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Pakistan (IDS; MetaMeta); (Uganda (ETC). Specific methodological variations to the approach carried out per country where CDI is involved are also described in this document.

This report is sent to the Co-Financing Agency (CFA) and the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO) for correcting factual errors and for final validation of the report.

## 1.2 Brief summary of analysis and findings

Since the baseline, two years ago, Lembaga Kita has seen a slight improvement in the capability to act and commit. The organizational structure of the organization improved with the addition of a new Steering Committee (SC) and Organization Committee (OC) and clearer responsibilities between the two. Training opportunities also improved with the addition of training on human trafficking by IOM and training in PME by Mensen met een Missie. The capability to adapt and self renew has improved slightly in terms of freedom for ideas as well as the system to track the environment as Lembaga Kita has made an extra effort to gather stakeholders in villages to thoroughly assess their situations. In the capability to deliver on development objectives a slight improvement occurred. In terms of delivering on planned outputs for example, Lembaga Kita has started to reap the rewards from their intensive door to door policy to gain trust from local communities in their output planning. The capability to relate improved slightly due to more frequent engagement with beneficiaries, as well as better internal communication through the fusion of field offices which encouraged staff members to talk and share more frequently. The greatest improvements occurred in the capability to achieve coherence. The organization's focus has broadened to now also include anti-trafficking issues. Since the restructuring of the organization, job and task descriptions have been specified and made clearer and are now documented, but not yet developed in the standard operating procedures. A very slight improvement also occurred in mutually supportive efforts. Lembaga Kita attempts to go beyond solving the problem on its own. For instance, they don't just warn communities for the dangers of trafficking, but also attempt to remove the reasons why people sometimes fall victim to it. They try to give them good opportunities in life.

The evaluators considered it important to also note down the SPO's story in terms of changes in the organisation since the baseline, and this would also provide more information about reasons for change, which were difficult to get for the individual indicators. Also for some issues there may not have been relevant indicators available in the list of core indicators provide by the evaluation team. During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by Lembaga Kita's staff: a more visible organization through the implementation of the community assistance model; and greater recognition amongst stakeholders through the systematic production of documentation. The organization becoming more visible with the more accepted community assistance model can be attributed to the increased trust in the organization. This was enabled by the beneficiaries being more satisfied with better services provided, which was the result of better staff working performance and a quicker response to beneficiaries' concerns. Increased staff working performance can be attributed to the change in the incentive system, better outputs achieved and increased community participation in the programming. Lembaga Kita has become more recognized by stakeholders through the production of documentation as a result of better documentation of data. This initiative can be attributed to the change in organizational management that took place.

Various changes were indicated by the SPO that can be linked to one of the MFS II capacity development interventions by Mensen met een Missie: the organizational capacity scan that took place after the external MFS II 5c baseline in 2012. This influence the change in organisational

management, improved it's organisational profile and brought about a change in the Community Assistance Model, which are the main underlying reasons for these key changes in the organisation, as perceived by the SPO. The CFA indicated that other capacity development interventions took place, including several trainings, but these could not be directly linked to the mentioned key organizational capacity changes mentioned in the general causal map, and process tracing was not carried out for this SPO since the SPO was not selected for this.

# 2 General Information about the SPO – Lembaga Kita

## 2.1 General information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO)

| | |
|---|---|
| **Country** | Indonesia |
| **Consortium** | Press Freedom 2.0 |
| **Responsible Dutch NGO** | Mensen met een Missie |
| **Project (if applicable)** | Empowerment and protection of women around gender-related violence (2012-2013) |
| **Southern partner organisation** | Lembaga Kita |

The project/partner is part of the sample for the following evaluation component(s):

| | |
|---|---|
| **Achievement of MDGs and themes** | |
| **Capacity development of Southern partner organisations** | X |
| **Efforts to strengthen civil society** | |

## 2.2 The socio-economic, cultural and political context in which the partner operates

**The socio-economic, cultural and political context in which the partner operates**
Lembaga Kita works in the field of gender equality. The project funded by MFS II focuses on prevention and support of victims of Gender-Based Violence (GBV). The project is situated in a poor and rural district in Central-Java: Wonosobo, where people mainly live from agricultural and forest products.[1] As in many areas in Indonesia where income-generating activities are very limited, people see labour-migration as the only option to earn a decent living for themselves and their families. Especially females, who often work as domestic laborers, face multiple problems when they return from their overseas jobs. It is not uncommon that these women have been confronted with GBV during their migration and returning home after such an experience is viewed as a failure. Lembaga Kita aims to improve the situation of women in the Wonosobo disctrict. [2]
Related to Social-economic condition in Kumejing , especially in dusun Kiringan, people has understood gender equality that are applied in daily life and this is proven by cooperation among women and men. The establishment of PRA cooperation (Participatory Rural Approach) makes economic capital family and decreases economic harassment in family.

In Sitiung, Wonosobo, a large number of people look for livelihood as a rubbish collector, asongan sellers (a walking seller with only few things sold), and labors. About 25 head of family have a special community in which they protect each other as what they can afford. The daily outcome only could meet the need of very simple meal. Their children get education at free school which is managed by educational valunteers. With the lack of economy, it is very easy to meet harassment toward women both economy, psychological, physic.

The victims of gender-based violence often happen to mothers and children. This takes place because of patriarchy culture. To build gender responsive mindset must be done in all components government, society, and family from all ages. Building gender responsive mindset on children can be done by some ways for example, through organization in their school. This is a very effective way to

1 K. Nomura (2008) The politics of participation in Forest Management: A Case from Democratizing Indonesia, Journal of Environment Development, June 2008, vol. 17, no.2, p 166 -191
2 Mensen met een Missie (2010) 2010 – 2011 Beoordelingsmemo

give understanding about health and its application as well as analysis of effect from unfair gender treatment.[3]

It is estimated that every year 700.000 registered Indonesian migrant workers seek employment oversees.[4] The majority of the Indonesian migrant-labourers go to South-East and East Asia and the Middle East, in particular in Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Taiwan Province of China, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.[5] The International Migration Organization (IOM) on Labour Migration from Indonesia (2010) states that the migration of Indonesian labourers is a driving force behind the Indonesian economy and development of Indonesian human resources; the 4.3 million Indonesians who work abroad send between USD 6 – 8.2 billion back home in the form of remittances.[6] The number of unregistered migrant is expected to be 2 – 4 times higher and 75% of the migrant-labourers are females who are mostly working in the domestic services sector.[7] Although a driving force, migrant workers, especially female domestic workers susceptible to exploitation as well as physical and psychological abuse including violence, (sexual) harassment and intimidation at different stages of the migration process (IOM, 2010). Main problems faced by Indonesian labourers are a) labour problems: wages below agreed rates, unpaid wages, passport and other document retained by their employers, excessive work hours, insufficient food and/or rest, restrictions of access to information and communication and inhumane working conditions; b) problems related to violence: sexual abuse, rape, torture and murder.[8] The perpetrators of these practices are mostly brokers, recruitment agents, employers and officials.

The Indonesian Government has taken steps to reduce the problems faced by the migrant workers. For example recruitment agencies are now required to register all Indonesian workers at the Indonesian embassy or consulates when they arrive. The embassy registers the address of the migrant worker's employer and holds a copy of their contract which makes it easier to locate the worker and undertake action when exploitation or abuse is reported.[9] However, enforcement of these new regulations is not yet up to standards.

## 2.3 Contracting details

When did cooperation with this partner start: 01-01-2012

What is the MFS II contracting period: 1-1-2012 to 31-12-2012 (but extended program activities through amendment)

Did cooperation with this partner end: Not applicable

If yes, when did it finish: Not applicable

What is the reason for ending the cooperation with this partner: Not applicable

Is there expected cooperation with this partner after 31st of December 2015: Yes.

[3] Project Proposal, 2012
[4] Website: International Labour Oganisation, Accessed at 9 November 2012: http://www.ilo.org/jakarta/areasofwork/labour-migration/lang--en/index.htm
[5] International Organization for Migration, (2010), Labour Migration from Indonesia, An overview of Indonesian Migration to selected Destinations in Asia and the Middle East, IOM Indonesia, Jakarta
[6] Website: International Labour Oganisation, Accessed at 9 November 2012: http://www.ilo.org/jakarta/areasofwork/labour-migration/lang--en/index.htm
[7] Website: International Labour Oganisation, Accessed at 9 November 2012: http://www.ilo.org/jakarta/areasofwork/labour-migration/lang--en/index.htm
[8] International Organization for Migration, (2010), Labour Migration from Indonesia, An overview of Indonesian Migration to selected Destinations in Asia and the Middle East, IOM Indonesia, Jakarta
[9] International Organization for Migration, (2010), Labour Migration from Indonesia, An overview of Indonesian Migration to selected Destinations in Asia and the Middle East, IOM Indonesia, Jakarta

## 2.4 Background to the Southern Partner Organisation

**History**

Lembaga Kita was founded in 2007 by Sister Antonie, the head of the congregation Putri Maria and Yosef (PMY).[10] The organization resulted from multiple collaborations, initiated by Sister Antonie since 2001, in the field of gender-equality promotion in Indonesia.

Lembaga Kita can be best described as a network-organization that facilitates and coordinates multiple gender-related programs in and around Wonosobo (Java), all under the supervision of PMY[11]. One of the NGOs in the network of Lembaga Kita is Srikandi Women's Cooperative, which was also founded by Sister Antonie. This is an organization that focuses on income generating activities to female ex-migrant workers who returned to Wonosobo.[12] A key-partner in the network of Lembaga Kita, and very relevant to this MFS II Evaluation, is Association of Wonosobo Women Struggle (Per3W). The project that is currently funded by MFSII through Press Freedom 2.0 is a continuation of a program of Association of Wonosobo Women Struggle (Per3W) that started in 2010. The program of 2010 focussed on strengthening the capacity of Per3W and its network with other NGOs; increase awareness on Gender equality and gender-based violence (GBV); and improving the economic situation of families in Wonosobo. [13] Lembaga Kita took over the project of Per3W in 2011 and takes on a coordinating role, while Per3W focussed on carrying out the project in Kumejing village.[14] The program now focuses on prevention and supporting victims of GBV.

The organisation consists solely of volunteers who do their work in three villages because of their social engagement. Strategy and activities are designed together with the Sisters PMY. They also guide the Lembaga Kita team in the implementation.

A team of volunteers is very sympathetic but certainly also has its drawbacks. Because of this setup one of the realities was that a project meant for 1 year, took 2,5 years to be fully implemented. Their relation is such though that they communicate about this openly and MM adjusts to this situation easily.

This voluntary setup is also a very positive signal though. It means the team is doing their work because their heart tells them to, not because of any external financial incentive. The team relates very well with the target group and knows very well what the issues and needs are because they are so embedded.

Being a group of volunteers is mostly a limitation in terms of time and organisational procedures (the paperwork), not in terms of quality. They have relevant knowledge and expertise to do the work. The coordinator, works at the government, which also provides Lembaga Kita with interesting contacts with relevant stakeholders.[15]

[10] The Congregation of the Daughters of Mary and Joseph was founded in 1820 and is active in The Netherlands and in Indonesia. The Congregation in Indonesia, *Putri Maria and Yosef* (PMY), is led by Sister Antonie who resides in the Wonosobo community of Sisters. PMY consists in of seven communities and a noviciate, all on Java. The community of Sisters in Wonosobo also leads the Dena-Upakara boarding school for deaf and hearing-impaired children can be found. The community of Sisters in Yogyakarta works at the Helen Keller Institute, an institute for the care and education of deaf-blind children. *Source*: Website Congregatie Dochters van Maria en Jospeh (2012): http://www.congregatiedmj.nl/organization (Accessed: 8 November 2012)

[11] Lembaga Kita is under the supervision of PMY as can be observed from the Contract with Mensen met een Missie (2012) which is signed by Sister Antonie on behalf of Lembaga Kita.

[12] Historical timeline developed by Indonesian Evaluation Team (2012)

[13] Mensen met een Missie (2010) 2010 – 2011 Beoordelingsmemo

[14] Marieke Oteman (2012) External Evaluation Lembaga Kita

[15] Anne B, MFS II endline Evaluation, 2014

**Vision**
The vision of Lembaga Kita is: "*To embody gender equality and gender justice collectively".*[16]

**Mission**
The mission of Lembaga Kita is: "*protection and empowerment for women and children, mainstream gender in policy and development, social empowerment for women and children*". [17]

**Strategies**
Lembaga Kita aims to: "*create a safe and caring environment and society for women, to help and empower victims of gender-based violence, to (economically) empower women and improve cooperation between various parties and networks.*
The main activity of Lembaga Kita is: *"social empowerment and advocacy for women and children's issues, focusing on GBV'.*

The target group of Lembaga Kita consists of: "*women and children, especially the ones at risk for GBV, poor women and ex-migrants."* [18]

The current project focuses on increasing awareness on gender-based violence (GBV) among communities in Central-Java.[19] The project entails two sub-projects:

a. Improving the network of women with the objective to protect women from gender-based violence. This sub-project intends to work on prevention as well as supporting victims of GBV. [20] The network focuses on improving the network of NGSOs working in the field of GBV. The network will serve mainly as a referral system for shelter, medical care and other support victims of GBV. [21] To reduce the susceptibility to GBV, Lembaga Kita will develop income-generating activities as well as micro-finance opportunities for women in Central - Java. The rational is that economic empowerment of women reduces their vulnerability of falling into a situation of GBV. [22] Lembaga Kita and its partners developed income-generating activities with women's groups in three villages: Kemejing Village, Tempuran Village and Purwojiwo Village. The programs in these villages are developed through 'participatory rural appraisal' method; a method where the villagers (women in this case) participate in the development and implementation of the program. [23]

b. Educating teenagers on sexual health and raising awareness on GBV. This sub-project intends to educate children in schools and appoint a counselor at these schools who can provide guidance to the children. Lembaga Kita plans to develop visual media to spread their message on GBV and sexual health. [24] Lembaga Kita already runs a program in a local high school in Wonosobo where they give courses about under aged marriage and trafficking.[25]

[16] Lembaga Kita (2011) Project Proposal 2012
[17] Lembaga Kita (2011) Project Proposal 2012
[18] Lembaga Kita (2011) Project Proposal 2012
[19] Note that this project is fully depending on funding of Mensen met een Missie. (Mensen met een Missie, (2011), Beoordelingsmemo incl. kenschets 2012)
[20] Mensen met een Missie, (2011), Beoordelingsmemo incl. kenschets 2012
[21] Marieke Oteman (2012) External Evaluation Lembaga Kita
[22] Mensen met een Missie, (2011), Beoordelingsmemo incl. kenschets 2012
[23] Marieke Oteman (2012) External Evaluation Lembaga Kita
[24] Mensen met een Missie, (2011), Beoordelingsmemo incl. kenschets 2012
[25] Marieke Oteman (2012) External Evaluation Lembaga Kita

# 3 Methodological approach and reflection

## 3.1 Overall methodological approach

This chapter describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

Note: this methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report A detailed overview of the approach is described in appendix 1.

The first (changes in organisational capacity) and the fourth evaluation question are addressed together through:

- **Changes in the 5C indicators since the baseline:** standard indicators have been agreed upon for each of the five capabilities of the five capabilities framework (see appendix 2) and changes between the baseline, and the endline situation have been described. For data collection a mix of data collection methods has been used, including self-assessments by SPO staff; interviews with SPO staff and externals; document review; observation. For data analysis, the Nvivo software program for qualitative data analysis has been used. Final descriptions per indicator and per capability with corresponding scores have been provided.
- **Key organisational capacity changes – 'general causal map':** during the endline workshop a brainstorm has been facilitated to generate the key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO since the baseline, with related underlying causes. For this purpose, a visual as well as a narrative causal map have been described.

In terms of the attribution question (2 and 4), **'process tracing'** is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to

focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

## 3.2 Assessing changes in organisational capacity and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?** And the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This is explained below. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

The evaluators considered it important to also note down a consolidated SPO story and this would also provide more information about what the SPO considered to be important in terms of organisational capacity changes since the baseline and how they perceived these key changes to have come about. Whilst this information has not been validated with sources other than SPO staff, it was considered important to understand how the SPOs has perceived changes in the organisation since the baseline.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information is provided for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the next session on the evaluation question on attribution, as described below and in the appendix 1.

How information was collected and analysed for addressing evaluation question 1 and 4, in terms of description of changes in indicators per capability as well as in terms of the general causal map, based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff, is further described below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012[26].

[26] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1. **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2. **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3. **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4. **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5. **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Please see appendix 1 for a description of the detailed process and steps.

## 3.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity - evaluation question 2 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: ***To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?*** and the fourth evaluation question: ***"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"***

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Below, the selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

### 3.3.1 Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

For the detailed results of this selection, in the four countries that CDI is involved in, please see appendix 1. The following SPOs were selected for process tracing:

Ethiopia: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE (4/9)

India: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE, VTRC (5/10)

Indonesia: ASB, ECPAT, PtPPMA, YPI, YRBI (5/12)

Liberia: BSC, RHRAP (2/5).

### 3.3.2 Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ' general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained. More information can be found in Appendix 1.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

### 3.3.3 Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team. These can also be found in appendix 1.

**Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach:** this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

**Using standard indicators and scores**: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

**General causal map:** whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have

come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

**Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question:** this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

**Utilisation of the evaluation**

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

Design – mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team

has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication: many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process: The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

# 4 Results

## 4.1 MFS II supported capacity development interventions

Below an overview of the different MFS II supported capacity development interventions of Lembaga Kita that have taken place since 2011 are described. The information is based on the information provided by Mensen met een Missie.

Table 1
*Information about MFS II supported capacity development interventions since baseline*

| Title of the MFS II supported capacity development intervention | Objectives | Activities | Timing and duration | Budget |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MM Capacity Scan by Independent consultant in 2012 | Evaluate the organization's capacity development needs and highlight opportunities for growth | Capacity scan, evaluation report and recommendations for follow-up. Basis for collective as well as individual capacity building trajectories. | July-August 2012 | 2000 Euro |
| Training on law enforcement | Increasing knowledge on the processes of law enforcement | 3 day training and exchanging knowledge | 5-8 Februari 2012 | 6320 Euro (for all partners in network) |
| Project Cycle Management training | Increase knowledge on project cycle management | One week training on PCM | Late 2014 | 18000 Euro (for all partners in MFSII program – not exclusively Lembaga Kita) |


Source: 5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_CFA perspective_Indonesia_Lembaga Kita

## 4.2 Changes in capacity development and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

Below you can find a description of the changes in each of the five core capabilities. This information is based on the analysis of the information per each of the indicators. This detailed information for each of the indicators describes the current situation, and how and why it has changed since the baseline. See also annex 3.

### 4.2.1 Changes in the five core capabilities


**Capability to act and commit**




The leadership within the organization changed from Sister Antonie to Sister Patricia, and Ms. Maria Susiawati, the chairperson. Sister Patricia is the new provincial in Wonosobo therefore; she automatically takes the leadership in the organization. With the addition of two committees (Steering committee and Organization committee) overseeing the activities of the organization, a change in focus and visibility were enabled. Strategic guidance is developed together through cooperative meetings with staff, and not solely by the leaders. Both leaders (strategic and operational) are involved in the development of strategic guidance. In the last four years the organization had a relatively steady number of staff members. They started with four persons and two volunteers joined as field staff. Staff is dedicated, motivated and very knowledgeable in their field. Each of the staff members has a particular expertise that has contributed to the work of the organization. Currently, there are two trainings that have been organized since the baseline; training in human trafficking by IOM and the other training in PME in 2014 by MM. Staffs are motivated to work for Lembaga Kita mainly due to their passion to the work and sharing the values of the organization. Lembaga Kita does not have a solid donor base. To date Mensen met eenMissie is the only donor. There are no clear procedures for exploring new funding opportunities.

Score: From 2.5 to 2.7 (very slight improvement)


**Capability to adapt and self-renew**




There is no formal M&E system in place. The organization looks only at the project level in terms of monitoring and evaluation of activities. In some proposals, it is mentioned that they have a regular meetings to discuss the progress of the project and how it will be improved together with the beneficiaries. Staff and volunteers of Lembaga Kita have the competences to conduct monitoring and evaluation in a very basic manner. M&E is conducted through focus group discussions with the beneficiaries as well as direct informal discussions with the village leaders. Staff indicates that M&E findings are used for future strategies, but there is no M&E system in place and the strategic plan is missing. Evidence in the form of documentation to support these claims could not be found. Lembaga Kita has several meetings on a monthly and annual basis. In these meetings, staff, volunteers and beneficiaries are gathered to discuss relevant issues. Since Lembaga Kita has an office, now the project staff and the sisters live more closely to each other and this assists in having frequent meetings. They are able to express their ideas, feelings and concerns openly. Lembaga Kita has very close connections with their target groups and this also makes them aware of what is happening in their surroundings and project areas, although a systematic way of tracking their environment is still missing.

Score: From 2.6 to 2.6 (no change)


**Capability to deliver on development objectives**



The operational plans are based on the project proposal as funded by Mensen met een Missie. There is a budget and operational plan available that covers the basic necessities to run the program. The organization is realistic in their budgets and ensures that staff understands the costs involved, and hereby aims to use resources cost-effectively..This is further contributed to by the fact that they work locally and also with local people as to keep operational expenses low. Monitoring and evaluation remains subject to improvement, particularly to setting up a more systematic way to do so and as such there is no system in place to measure efficiency by relating inputs to outputs. Currently the organization mainly looks at budget expenditure and compares this with what was planned. The organization balances quality with efficiency by keeping costs low whilst delivering quality work through field monitoring, and engaging competent staff and volunteers, and by having good interpersonal relationships and personal commitment to the work. Whilst planned activities seem to be implemented long-term effects take time.

Score: From 3.3 to 3.4 (very slight improvement)


**Capability to relate**




Lembaga Kita is a small organization and is part of a network extending over the whole of Indonesia, including for example schools and hospitals where victims can be found. All Indonesian sister congregations are involved in this network. Lembaga Kita has sufficient capacity to relate to their stakeholders. It is not complicated at all for the organization to establish contact, because each member is also a member of another organization in the Lembaga Kita network. At the international level, all organizations in the Mensen met eenMissie network come together twice a year for discussions, trainings, etc. However, the organization does not have any formal way to engage external groups in developing their policies and strategies. The organization works closely together with the community, and has changed its stance from low profile to a more moderate and visible profile within the communities the organization serves. This has led to increased trust amongst beneficiaries. Their strength is their grassroots involvement in the organization now works closely with the communities. Internal relations have improved through the establishment of a new office building in which staff can now regularly meet and freely communicate.

Score: from 3.4 to 3.7 (very slight improvement)

**Capability to achieve coherence**





There is a very slight improvement in this capability. The organization has a mission and vision developed collectively with the staff in 2007. There is no detailed information on how the vision and mission were developed.Within the last two years, the organization's focus has broadened and does not only focus on violence based on gender but now also includes anti-trafficking. This change is based on MFS II baseline 2012 results. There are no operational guidelines available in the organization in term of Human Resources, Administration and Finances, although job and work descriptions have been specified and made clearer. The management relies on guidance provided by the donors. There is a large coherence between goals, aims, activities and available resources, although there is no strategic plan in place and activities are based on the project proposal funded by MM. They don't do different projects but do their work in different villages. In what they do there is a logical consistency aimed at the prevention of trafficking, and their greater engagement within communities to raise the organization's profile has forced staff members to integrate with community activities that are not necessarily directly related to project or program activities.

Score: From 2.5 to 2.9 (slight improvement )

### 4.2.2 General changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO

During the end line workshop at Lembaga Kita, a discussion was held around what staff perceived as the key changes in in the organization since the baseline in 2012. This then led to a discussion on what were the key organizational capacity changes and why these changes have taken place according to staff present at the end line workshop. The discussion resulted in a 'general causal map' which is described below. The general causal map provides a comprehensive picture of organizational capacity changes that took place since the baseline, based on the perspective of SPO staff present at the end line workshop. The numbers in the narrative correspond with the numbers in the visual.

Two key organisational capacity changes have occurred at Lembaga Kita since the baseline:
1. A more visible organization through the implementation of the community assistance model [1].
2. Greater recognition amongst stakeholders through the systematic production of documentation [2].


MFS II Baseline Result [20]
Organisation profile change—from low into moderate profile [19]
Change in organizational management [17]
Change in the Incentive system for staff [13]
Change in the organisation structure (with SC and OC) [14]
Recruited 2 new staffs [12]
Shared workload [10]
Output is better achieved [8]
Staff better work performance [5]
Beneficiaries are more satisfiedby better services [4]
Increased trust to the organisation [3]
Organization is more visible with the more accepted community assistance model [1]
Better data documentation [15]
More recognized by stakeholders through the documentation production [2]
Needs to be closer to community as the field activity is intensified [11]
Establishment of new field offices [9]
Speedy response to beneficiaries concerns [6]
Change in the Community Assistance Model [18]
Trustworthy from beneficiaries/community [16]
Increased community participation in the programming [7]

**A more visible organization through the implementation of the community assistance model [1].**

First of all. Lembaga Kita is now more visible with a more accepted community assistance model that has been put in to place since 2013 [1]. The community assistance model allowed staff to place themselves as so called partners in the communities they were serving, and provided a way to be closer to beneficiaries whilst performing informal activities. This greatly increased trust by the community in Lembaga Kita [3].

The overall increase in trust came about from an overal increase in satisfaction about Lembaga Kita's services to the beneficiaries [4] on the one hand, as well a greater sense of ownership and participation within program activities by the communities and beneficiaries [7].

Beneficiaries were overall more satisifed due to an overall increase in staff working performance [5] as well as the speed with which the organization responded to beneficiary concerns and requests [6]. Both factors will be explained below in more detail.

First, the increase in work performance can be explained by the organization achieving better outputs [8] through staff increasingly sharing their workload with each other and cooperating [10]. This in turn was enabled by the recruitment of two new staff members [12], and an overall change in organization structure [14], which was the result of a broader change in organizational management [17].

Prior to the baseline in 2012, most of the volunteers in Lembaga Kita were government officers *(Pegawai Negeri Sipil)* who had very limited time for field implementation. After that, the organization recruited two more staff. Apart from the staff additions, revisions in the organizational structure included the splitting into Steering Committee (SC) and Operational Committee (OC). The intention of this action was to achieve better coordination and communication, faster field response, and clearer job distribution. In the same year, the organization added one more target village to a total of three supported villages right now.

**Greater recognition amongst stakeholders through the systematic production of documentation [2].**

Secondly, the overal speed with which staff members responded to beneficiary requests increased by a change in the incentive system for staff [13], as well as the establishment of new field offices [9], which addressed the need to have staff members to be closer to the community in the field during their work activities [11]. Changes to the incentive system [13] included payment of transportation to staff on a monthly basis, and ultimately into a stand-alone transportation fund. This allowed staff to travel more freely and quicker to beneficiaries and stakeholders in the field.

Both the need to be closer to the community whilst carrying out activities as well as the overall changes in organizational management sprung from Lembaga Kita's objective to change their organizational profile from low to more moderate and public [19], which was one of the conclusions drawn by Lembaga Kita based on the results from the MFSII organisational capacity development (5c) baseline assessment that was carried out in 2012 [20].

The second factor which greatly impacted the increased trust in the organization was the increase of community participation in the programming of activities and the activities themselves [7]. Communities and other beneficiaries more readily accepted to participate due to an increase in trust in the organisation [16] resulting from the changes made in the community assistance model. Previously, they were more focused on program delivery and still had less attention to community engagement. As a result, community seen Lembaga Kita as "donor" instead of empowering community. After the baseline, they changed the strategy to more strengthened the community enggagement by having more interaction with community. Current approcah has resulted in the more positive image of the organisation to community[18]. The reason to set up this model was also a conclusion drawn by Lembaga Kita on the basis of theMFS II organisational capacity development (5c) baseline results in 2012 [20].

Finally, stakeholders indicated that Lembaga Kita has paid considerable attention to the practice of documentation of data and activities [2]. This development was already recognized during the baseline MFS II 5c evaluation, but was significantly improved over the last two years [15] as part of the changes and professionalization in organizational management [17] or example a documentary film

was made about sustainable waste management. The documentary has been used as learning material for local communities and beneficiaries.

# 5 Discussion and conclusion

## 5.1 Methodological issues

**General: Applied to all or most SPOs**

With regard to the methodology, Indonesia has made some data collection adjustment based on the context. The first adjustment was related to the type of instrument used. To assess the organizational capacity, the study has provided self-assessment, observation and interview sheets. These all were used during the baseline with all SPOs. During the end line the team used self-assessment, interview and observation sheets. However the evaluator applied interview sheets as self-assessment—where participants were asked to fill these sheets by themselves. For the participants who did not attend the workshop, the interviews were done separately using the interview sheet and the results from the interview were included in the subgroup interview sheet that was already filled by the staff member. Were combined into the relevant sub categories in the interview sheet. Interview sheets were also applied for interviews with the CFAs, partners and consultants.

The baseline study showed that having two similar instruments (self assessments, and interview sheets) did not have any effect in relation to obtaining adequate and quality data.

To have some clarification post visit to all SPOs, the evaluator used email and phone interviews.


**Lembaga Kita**

The staff involved in the endline process were 2 management, 1 coordinator program, 1 finance and administration, 1 field staff. The interview sheet was sent prior to the workshop, however only one was returned. The rest of the interview sheets were filled in by staff during the endline field visit. The endline workshop started with completing the self-assessment sheets, and this was followed by the development of the general causal map which looked at organisational capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline, and as perceived by the SPO. The discussion was organized in the evening due to staff availability. The interview views with partners, consultants and M&E staff were not conducted. The SPO indicated that they do not have any long-term partner and consultant, which intensively and formally works with them. The organization only set up an ad hoc partnership such as when they organized seminars or workshops, but there is no partnership on a long-term basis, where partners also get to know the SPO very well. Furthermore, the organization' role is mostly to facilitate the targeted area to get the particular experts as a resource person. There was also no interview with M&E staff as this function is non-existing in the organization. One of the significant people who attended the baseline-the Coordinator of Lembaga Kita, could not be involved during the end line workshop as she was in the Netherlands during the time of the field visits. However, the information collected was still adequate, as her role was replaced by the present Program Manager during the data collection.

## 5.2 Changes in organisational capacity development

This section aims to provide an answer to the first and fourth evaluation questions:

1. *What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?*
4. *What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?*




Whilst changes took place in all of the five core capabilities, the most improvements to place in Lembaga Kita's (LK) capability to achieve coherence. Below the changes in each of the capabilities are further explained, by referring to the specific indicators that changed.

Over the last two years a slight improvement took place in the capability to act and commit. The organizational structure of the organization improved with the addition of a new Steering Committee (SC) and Organization Committee (OC). The steering committee focuses on the management of Lembaga Kita and the Organization Committee is more focused on program implementation. Training opportunities also improved with the addition of training on human trafficking by IOM and training in PME by Mensen met een Missie.

The capability to adapt and self renew has improved slightly in terms of freedom for ideas. Critical feedback can be shared comfortably without fear, whilst keeping conversations light and positive. The system to track the environment improved very slightly as Lembaga Kita has made an extra effort to gather stakeholders in villages to thoroughly assess their situations.

In the capability to deliver on development objectives a slight improvement occurred. In terms of delivering on planned outputs for example, Lembaga Kita has started to reap the rewards from their intensive door to door policy to gain trust from local communities in their output planning.

The capability to relate has improved slightly as well. A very slight improvement was found in terms of engagement with target groups due to an increase in frequency in meeting beneficiaries of up to sometimes 2-3 times a week. An improvement also took place in the relationships within the organization. With moving to a new office, staff members feel more at ease and feel encouraged to talk openly, share and provide feedback whenever needed.

Lastly the greatest improvements occurred in the capability to achieve coherence. With respect to revisiting the vision and mission, Lembaga Kita 's focus has broadened. The organisation does not only focus on violence based on gender but now also includes anti-trafficking. This shift in focus was brought about from results during the baseline workshop where they realized that they have a choice on what issues are of their concern. Also, operational guidelines have improved slightly due to an increasing awareness of the organization to have better technical and operational guidelines. Since the restructuring of the organization, job and task descriptions have been specified and made clearer and are now documented, but not yet developed in the standard operating procedures. A very slight improvement also occurred in mutually supportive efforts. Lembaga Kita attempts to go beyond solving the problem on its own. For instance, they don't just warn communities for the dangers of

trafficking, but also attempt to remove the reasons why people sometimes fall victim to it. They try to give them good opportunities in life.

**General organisational capacity changes related to MFS II Interventions**

The evaluators considered it important to also note down the SPO's story in terms of changes in the organisation since the baseline, and this would also provide more information about reasons for change, which were difficult to get for the individual indicators. Also for some issues there may not have been relevant indicators available in the list of core indicators provide by the evaluation team. Please note that this information is based only on the information provided by Lembaga Kita's staff during the endline workshop, but no validation of this information has been done like with the process tracing causal maps. For details in relation to attribution, we refer to the next section (5.3).

During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by Lembaga Kita staff, these have been captured in the general causal map in 4.2.2: a more visible organization through the implementation of the community assistance model; and greater recognition amongst stakeholders through the systematic production of documentation. Lembaga Kita staff experienced these as the most important capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline.

The organization becoming more visible with the more accepted community assistance model can be attributed to the increased trust in the organization. This was enabled by the beneficiaries being more satisfied with better services provided, which was the result of better staff working performance and a quicker response to beneficiaries' concerns.

Increased staff working performance can be attributed to the change in the incentive system, better outputs achieved and increased community participation in the programming. The incentive system for staff was changed as a result of a change in organizational management. Better outputs achieved resulted from sharing the workload amongst staff members, which was enabled by recruiting two new staff members. This was possible through the change in the incentive system on the one hand and the change in organisation structure on the other. According to SPO staff, both factors can be attributed to the change in organizational management, which resulted from a shift in strategy for the organization to change from a low into a moderate profile, which was one of the conclusions drawn from the MFS II sponsored capacity scan that Mensen met een Missie carried out after the external MFS II baseline took place. The third factor that SPO staff mentioned as contributing to better staff working performance is the increased community participation in programming, which resulted from an increase in trust amongst beneficiaries and the community in Lembaga Kita. This can be attributed to the change in the community assistance model, in which Lembaga Kita changed from a more donor centric role to an involved and interactive organization. This too can be partly attributed to the MFS II sponsored capacity scan that Mensen met een Missie carried out after the external MFS II baseline took place.

Lembaga Kita has become more recognized by stakeholders through the production of documentation as a result of better documentation of data. This initiative can be attributed to the change in organizational management that took place.

In conclusion, various changes were indicated by the SPO that can be linked to one of the MFS II capacity development interventions by MM , namely the organizational capacity scan that took place after the external MFS II baseline in 2012. The CFA has also indicated that other capacity development interventions took place, including several trainings. However, these were not mentioned and included in the general key changes causal map by the SPO due to a lack of specification of this causal map, since this was on the purpose of this assessment. Lembaga Kita has not been selected for process tracing, which would have provided more detailed information. It must be noted that the information provided has not been validated through other sources of information, and therefore the conclusions must be understood in that respect.

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**Overall evaluation methodology**

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Woolcock, Michael. 2009. *Toward a plurality of methods in project evaluation: a contextualised approach to understanding impact trajectories and efficacy, Journal of Development Effectiveness*, 1:1, 1-14.

**Research documentation and resources received from CFA/SPO:**

1. Project Proposal 2012.docx

2. Budget Proposal 2012.xls

3. Beoordelingsmemo 2012.doc

4. Reflections on proposal 2012 by MM.docx

5a. Answers to questions.doc

5b. Answers to questions.doc

6a. Contract - Lembaga Kita agreement 1 PDF.pdf

6b. Contract - Lembaga Kita agreement 2 PDF.pdf

6c. Contract - Lembaga Kita agreement 3 PDF.pdf

6d. Contract - Lembaga Kita agreement 4 PDF.pdf

6e. Contract - Lembaga Kita agreement 5 PDF.pdf

7. Extension of project period (until june 2014).msg

8. 2012.10.01 Evaluation report incl. capacity scan.pdf

Annex 1 - B 5C endline LG.pdf

Annex 2 - B 5C endline LG - evaluation report complete PRIVATE.pdf

Annex 3 - B 5C endline LG - Indonesia full report.pdf

Annex 4 - B 5C endline LG - JPAI training.docx

Annex 5 - B 5C endline LG - PCM training proposal.docx

Annex A_5c endline_Indonesia_Lembaga Kita_Mensen met een Missie_DEF.docx

Annex B_5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_CFA perspective_Indonesia_Lembaga Kita_Mensen met een Missie_DEF.docx

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CatpenG_HO_Pra.pptx

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materi Buruh Migran-Perempuan.doc

Prinsip-prinsip PRA.ppt

Informasi Kualitatif_TD.docx

Jadual dan Outline PRA_Altf_2.doc

Jadual dan Outline PRA.doc

Jadual dan Outline TOT.doc

KEPENDUDUKAN DESA TEMPURAN DHUWUR.doc

Kerangka Pra Desa Ramah BMP.doc

Kerangka TOTPRA_TD.docx

pedoman PRA_TD.doc

POTENSI DESA.doc

report survei.docx

SIKLUS Program TD_KITA.docx

ToC Revisi.docx

Annex R_5c endline_observable indicators at SPO_Indoneisa_Lembaga Kita.docx

BAHASA-Annex L_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_management_selected indicators_Indonesia_Lembaga Kita.doc

BAHASA-Annex M_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_program staff_selected indicators_Indonesia_Lembaga Kita.rtf

BAHASA-Annex Q_5c endline observation sheet_Indonesia_Lembaga Kita.doc

BAHASA-Notulensi Workshop_Indonesia_Lembaga Kita.docx

# List of Respondents

**People Present at the Workshops**

| **Date:** | **5-6 September 2014** | **Organisation: Lembaga Kita** | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **NAME** | **ROLE IN THE ORGANISATION** | **DURATION OF SERVICE** | **PHONE** | **E-MAIL** |
| **Management** | | | | |
| Maria Susiawati | Coordinator | 7 years | 081327030888 | mariasusiawati@yahoo.com |
| Fransiska Dwi Wijayanto | Secretary | 2 years | 081327008322 | fransiska-pmy@hotmail.com |
| **Program/ Project staff** | | | | |
| Rumiyati | Program Coordinator | 6 years | 087834072183 | Rayap12@yahoo.com |
| **Admin/ HR/Finance staff** | | | | |
| Eka Munfarida Irfiyani | Administration and Finance | | | |
| **Field staff staff** | | | | |
| Rini Wulandari | Field Staff | | | |

**List of People Inteviewed**

| **Date:** | **5-6 September 2014** | **Organisation: Lembaga Kita** | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **NAME** | **ROLE IN THE ORGANISATION** | **DURATION OF SERVICE** | **PHONE** | **E-MAIL** |
| **Management** | | | | |
| Maria Susiawati | Program Coordinator | 7 years | 081327030888 | mariasusiawati@yahoo.com |
| Sr. Fransiska Dwi Wijayanto | Secretary | 2 years | 081327008322 | fransiska-pmy@hotmail.com |
| **Program/ Project staff** | | | | |
| Rumiyati | Program Coordinator | 6 years | 087834072183 | Rayap12@yahoo.com |
| **Admin/ HR/Finance staff** | | | | |
| Eka Munfarida Irfiyani | Administration and Finance | | | |
| **Field staff staff** | | | | |
| RiniWulandari | Field Staff | | | |

# Appendix 1 Methodological approach & reflection

## 1. Introduction

This appendix describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around four key evaluation questions:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

Note: the methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report. At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

## 2. Changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 1

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?**

This question was mainly addressed by reviewing changes in 5c indicators, but additionally a 'general causal map' based on the SPO perspective on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline

has been developed. Each of these is further explained below. The development of the general causal map is integrated in the steps for the endline workshop, as mentioned below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012.27 Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1. **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2. **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3. **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4. **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5. **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

[27] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Below each of these steps is further explained.

*Step 1. Provide the **description of indicators** in the relevant formats – CDI team*

- These formats were to be used when collecting data from SPO staff, CFA, partners, and consultants. For each of these respondents different formats have been developed, based on the list of 5C indicators, similar to the procedure that was used during the baseline assessment. The CDI team needed to add the 2012 baseline description of each indicator. The idea was that each respondent would be requested to review each description per indicator, and indicate whether the current situation is different from the baseline situation, how this situation has changed, and what the reasons for the changes in indicators are. At the end of each format, a more general question is added that addresses how the organisation has changed its capacity since the baseline, and what possible reasons for change exist. Please see below the questions asked for each indicator as well as the more general questions at the end of the list of indicators.

General questions about key changes in the capacity of the SPO

*What do you consider to be the key changes in terms of how the organisation/ SPO has developed its capacity since the baseline (2012)?*

*What do you consider to be the main explanatory reasons (interventions, actors or factors) for these changes?*

**List of questions to be asked for each of the 5C indicators** (The entry point is the the description of each indicator as in the 2012 baseline report):

*1. How has the situation of this indicator changed compared to the situation during the baseline in 2012? Please tick one of the following scores:*

- -2 = Considerable deterioration
- -1 = A slight deterioration
- 0 = No change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012
- +1 = Slight improvement
- +2 = Considerable improvement

*2. Please describe what exactly has changed since the baseline in 2012*

*3. What interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation in 2012? Please tick and describe what interventions, actors or factors influenced this indicator, and how. You can tick and describe more than one choice.*

- Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by **SPO**: ..... .
- Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **Dutch CFA (MFS II funding)**: .... .
- Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **other funders**: ..... .
- **Other** interventions, actors or factors: ..... .
- Don't know.

*Step 2. **Review** the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team*

Before the in-country team and the CDI team started collecting data in the field, it was important that they reviewed the description for each indicator as described in the baseline reports, and also added to the endline formats for review by respondents. These descriptions are based on document review, observation, interviews with SPO staff, CFA staff and external respondents during the baseline. It was important to explain this to respondents before they filled in the formats.

*Step 3. **Send the formats** adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)*

The CDI team was responsible for collecting data from the CFA:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – CFA perspective.

The in-country team was responsible for collecting data from the SPO and from external respondents (except CFA). The following formats were sent before the fieldwork started:

- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – SPO perspective.
- 5C Endline interview guides for externals: partners; OD consultants.

*Step 4. **Collect, upload & code the documents** from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team*

The CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team, collected the following documents from SPOs and CFAs:

- Project documents: project proposal, budget, contract (Note that for some SPOs there is a contract for the full MFS II period 2011-2015; for others there is a yearly or 2-yearly contract. All new contracts since the baseline in 2012 will need to be collected);
- Technical and financial progress reports since the baseline in 2012;.
- Mid-term evaluation reports;
- End of project-evaluation reports (by the SPO itself or by external evaluators);
- Contract intake forms (assessments of the SPO by the CFA) or organisational assessment scans made by the CFA that cover the 2011-2014 period;
- Consultant reports on specific inputs provided to the SPO in terms of organisational capacity development;
- Training reports (for the SPO; for alliance partners, including the SPO);
- Organisational scans/ assessments, carried out by the CFA or by the Alliance Assessments;
- Monitoring protocol reports, especially for the 5C study carried out by the MFS II Alliances;
- Annual progress reports of the CFA and of the Alliance in relation to capacity development of the SPOs in the particular country;
- Specific reports that are related to capacity development of SPOs in a particular country.

The following documents (since the baseline in 2012) were requested from SPO:

- Annual progress reports;
- Annual financial reports and audit reports;
- Organisational structure vision and mission since the baseline in 2012;
- Strategic plans;
- Business plans;
- Project/ programme planning documents;
- Annual work plan and budgets;
- Operational manuals;
- Organisational and policy documents: finance, human resource development, etc.;
- Monitoring and evaluation strategy and implementation plans;
- Evaluation reports;
- Staff training reports;
- Organisational capacity reports from development consultants.

The CDI team will coded these documents in NVivo (qualitative data analysis software program) against the 5C indicators.

*Step 5.* ***Prepare and organise the field visit*** *to the SPO – in-country team*

Meanwhile the in-country team prepared and organised the logistics for the field visit to the SPO:

- **General endline workshop** consisted about one day for the self-assessments (about ½ to ¾ of the day) and brainstorm (about 1 to 2 hours) on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline and underlying interventions, factors and actors ('general causal map'), see also explanation below. This was done with the five categories of key staff: managers; project/ programme staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin & HRM staff; field staff. Note: for SPOs involved in process tracing an additional 1 to 1½ day workshop (managers; program/project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff) was necessary. See also step 7;
- **Interviews with SPO staff** (roughly one day);
- **Interviews with external respondents** such as partners and organisational development consultants depending on their proximity to the SPO. These interviews coulc be scheduled after the endline workshop and interviews with SPO staff.

General causal map

During the 5C endline process, a 'general causal map' has been developed, based on key organisational capacity changes and underlying causes for these changes, as perceived by the SPO. The general causal map describes cause-effect relationships, and is described both as a visual as well as a narrative.

As much as possible the same people that were involved in the baseline were also involved in the endline workshop and interviews.

*Step 6.* ***Interview the CFA*** *– CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for sending the sheets/ formats to the CFA and for doing a follow-up interview on the basis of the information provided so as to clarify or deepen the information provided. This relates to:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet - CFA perspective.

*Step 7.* ***Run the endline workshop*** *with the SPO – in-country team*

This included running the endline workshop, including facilitation of the development of the general causal map, self-assessments, interviews and observations. Particularly for those SPOs that were selected for process tracing all the relevant information needed to be analysed prior to the field visit, so as to develop an initial causal map. Please see Step 6 and also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two).

An endline workshop with the SPO was intended to:

- Explain the purpose of the fieldwork;
- Carry out in the self-assessments by SPO staff subgroups (unless these have already been filled prior to the field visits) - this may take some 3 hours.
- Facilitate a brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012 and underlying interventions, factors and actors.

**Purpose of the fieldwork:** to collect data that help to provide information on what changes took place in terms of organisational capacity development of the SPO as well as reasons for these changes. The baseline that was carried out in 2012 was to be used as a point of reference.

**Brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes and influencing factors:** a brainstorm was facilitated on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012. In order to kick start the discussion, staff were reminded of the key findings related to the historical time line carried out in the baseline (vision, mission, strategies, funding, staff). This was then used to generate a discussion on key changes that happened in the organisation since the baseline (on cards). Then cards were selected that were related to organisational capacity changes, and organised. Then a 'general causal map' was developed, based on these key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change as experienced by the SPO staff. This was documented as a visual and narrative.This general causal map was to get the story of the SPO on what they perceived as key organisational capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline, in addition to the specific details provided per indicator.

**Self-assessments:** respondents worked in the respective staff function groups: management; programme/ project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin and HRM staff; field staff. Staff were assisted where necessary so that they could really understand what it was they were being asked to do as well as what the descriptions under each indicator meant.

Note: for those SPOs selected for process tracing an additional endline workshop was held to facilitate the development of detailed causal maps for each of the identified organisational change/ outcome areas that fall under the capability to act and commit, and under the capability to adapt and self-renew, and that are likely related to capacity development interventions by the CFA. See also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two). It was up to the in-country team whether this workshop was held straight after the initial endline workshop or after the workshop and the follow-up interviews. It could also be held as a separate workshop at another time.

*Step 8.* ***Interview SPO staff*** *– in-country team*

After the endline workshop (developing the general causal map and carrying out self-assessments in subgroups), interviews were held with SPO staff (subgroups) to follow up on the information that was provided in the self-assessment sheets, and to interview staff that had not yet provided any information.

*Step 9.* ***Fill-in observation sheets*** *– in-country team*

During the visit at the SPO, the in-country team had to fill in two sheets based on their observation:

- 5C Endline observation sheet;
- 5C Endline observable indicators.

*Step 10.* ***Interview externals*** *– in-country team & CDI team*

The in-country team also needed to interview the partners of the SPO as well as organisational capacity development consultants that have provided support to the SPO. The CDI team interviewed the CFA.

*Step 11.* ***Upload and auto-code all the formats*** *collected by in-country team and CDI team – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for uploading and auto-coding (in Nvivo) of the documents that were collected by the in-country team and by the CDI team.

*Step 12. Provide the* ***overview of information*** *per 5C indicator to in-country team – CDI team*

After the analysis in NVivo, the CDI team provided a copy of all the information generated per indicator to the in-country team for initial analysis.

*Step 13.* ***Analyse the data and develop a draft description*** *of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team*

The in-country team provided a draft description of the findings per indicator, based on the information generated per indicator. The information generated under the general questions were linked to the general causal map or detailed process tracing related causal map.

*Step 14.* ***Analyse the data and finalize the description*** *of the findings per indicator, per capability and general – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for checking the analysis by the in-country team with the Nvivo generated data and to make suggestions for improvement and ask questions for clarification to which the in-country team responded. The CDI team then finalised the analysis and provided final descriptions and scores per indicator and also summarize these per capability and calculated the summary capability scores based on the average of all indicators by capability.

*Step 15.* ***Analyse the information*** *in the general causal map –in-country team & CDI team*

The general causal map based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff present at the workshop, was further detailed by in-country team and CDI team, and based on the notes made during the workshop and where necessary additional follow up with the SPO. The visual and narrative was finalized after feedback by the SPO. During analysis of the general causal map relationships with MFS II support for capacity development and other factors and actors were identified. All the information has been reviewed by the SPO and CFA.

# 3. Attributing changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 2

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: ***To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?***

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew,

and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process. The box below provides some background information on process tracing.

### Background information on process tracing

The essence of process tracing research is that scholars want to go beyond merely identifying correlations between independent variables (Xs) and outcomes (Ys). Process tracing in social science is commonly defined by its addition to trace causal mechanisms (Bennett, 2008a, 2008b; Checkle, 2008; George & Bennett, 2005). A causal mechanism can be defined as "a complex system which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts" (Glennan, 1996, p. 52). Process tracing involves "attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable" (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 206-207).

Process tracing can be differentiated into three variants within social science: theory testing, theory building, and explaining outcome process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

- Theory testing process tracing uses a theory from the existing literature and then tests whether evidence shows that each part of hypothesised causal mechanism is present in a given case, enabling within case inferences about whether the mechanism functioned as expected in the case and whether the mechanism as a whole was present. No claims can be made however, about whether the mechanism was the only cause of the outcome.
- Theory building process tracing seeks to build generalizable theoretical explanations from empirical evidence, inferring that a more general causal mechanism exists from the fact of a particular case.
- Finally, explaining outcome process tracing attempts to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific historical case. Here the aim is not to build or test more general theories but to craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case centric than theory oriented.

Explaining outcome process tracing is the most suitable type of process tracing for analysing the causal mechanisms for selected key organisational capacity changes of the SPOs. This type of process tracing can be thought of as a single outcome study defined as seeking the causes of the specific outcome in a single case (Gerring, 2006; in: Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Here the ambition is to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a particular outcome, with sufficiency defined as an explanation that accounts for all of the important aspects of an outcome with no redundant parts being present (Mackie, 1965).

Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research strategy that aims to trace the complex conglomerate of systematic and case specific causal mechanisms that produced the outcome in question. The explanation cannot be detached from the particular case. Explaining outcome process tracing refers to case studies whose primary ambition is to explain particular historical outcomes, although the findings of the case can also speak to other potential cases of the phenomenon. Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research process in which 'theories' are tested to see whether they can provide a minimally sufficient explanation of the outcome. Minimal sufficiency is defined as an explanation that accounts for an outcome, with no redundant parts. In most explaining outcome studies, existing theorisation cannot provide a sufficient explanation, resulting in a second stage in which existing theories are re-conceptualised in light of the evidence gathered in the preceding empirical analysis. The conceptualisation phase in explaining outcome process tracing is therefore an iterative research process, with initial mechanisms re-conceptualised and tested until the result is a theorised mechanism that provides a minimally sufficient explanation of the particular outcome.

Below a description is provided of how SPOs are selected for process tracing, and a description is provided on how this process tracing is to be carried out. Note that this description of process tracing provides not only information on the extent to which the changes in organisational development can be attributed to MFS II (evaluation question 2), but also provides information on other contributing factors and actors (evaluation question 4). Furthermore, it must be noted that the evaluation team has developed an adapted form of 'explaining outcome process tracing', since the data collection and analysis was an iterative process of research so as to establish the most realistic explanation for a

particular outcome/ organisational capacity change. Below selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

**Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing**

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

**ETHIOPIA**

For Ethiopia the capabilities that are mostly targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 1

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Ethiopia*

| Capability to: | AMREF | CARE | ECFA | FSCE | HOA-REC | HUNDEE | NVEA | OSRA | TTCA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Relate | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| Achieve coherence | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Ethiopia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE. In fact, six SPOs would be suitable for process tracing. We just selected the first one per CFA following the criteria of not including more than one SPO per CFA for process tracing

Table 2

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Ethiopia*

| Ethiopia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AMREF | Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | AMREF NL | Yes |
| CARE | Dec 31, 2015 | Partly | Yes | Yes | Yes – slightly | CARE Netherlands | No - not fully matching |
| ECFA | Jan 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Child Helpline International | Yes |
| FSCE | Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN); Note: no info from Defence for Children – ECPAT Netherlands | Yes |
| HOA-REC | Sustainable Energy project (ICCO Alliance): 2014 Innovative WASH (WASH Alliance): Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes - slightly | ICCO | No - not fully matching |
| HUNDEE | Dec 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO & IICD | Yes |
| NVEA | Dec 2015 (both) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Edukans Foundation (under two consortia); Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN) | Suitable but SKN already involved for process tracing FSCE |
| OSRA | C4C Alliance project (farmers marketing): December 2014 ICCO Alliance project (zero grazing: 2014 (2nd phase) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO & IICD | Suitable but ICCO & IICD already involved for process tracing - HUNDEE |
| TTCA | June 2015 | Partly | Yes | No | Yes | Edukans Foundation | No - not fully matching |

**INDIA**

For India the capability that is mostly targeted by CFAs is the capability to act and commit. The next one in line is the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below in which a higher score means that the specific capability is more intensively targeted.

Table 3

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – India*[28]

| Capability to: | BVHA | COUNT | DRISTI | FFID | Jana Vikas | Samarthak Samiti | SMILE | SDS | VTRC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 5 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 4 |
| Relate | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, India.

Below you can see a table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether SPO and the CFA both expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE and VTRC. Except for SMILE (capability to act and commit only), for the other SPOs the focus for process tracing can be on the capability to act and commit and on the capability to adapt and self-renew.

Table 4

*SPOs selected for process tracing – India*

| India – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BVHA | 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Simavi | Yes; both capabilities |
| COUNT | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Woord en Daad | Yes; both capabilities |
| DRISTI | 31-03-2012 | Yes | Yes | No | no | Hivos | No - closed in 2012 |
| FFID | 30-09-2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |

[28] RGVN, NEDSF and Women's Rights Forum (WRF) could not be reached timely during the baseline due to security reasons. WRF could not be reached at all. Therefore these SPOs are not included in Table 1.

| India – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jana Vikas | 2013 | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No - contract is and the by now; not fully matching focus |
| NEDSF | | | | | | | No – delayed baseline |
| RGVN | | | | | | | No - delayed baseline |
| Samarthak Samiti (SDS) | 2013 possibly longer | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Hivos | No - not certain of end date and not fully matching focus |
| Shivi Development Society (SDS) | Dec 2013 intention 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No - not fully matching focus |
| Smile | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Wilde Ganzen | Yes; first capability only |
| VTRC | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Stichting Red een Kind | Yes; both capabilities |

**INDONESIA**

For Indonesia the capabilities that are most frequently targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 5

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Indonesia*

| Capability to: | ASB | Daya kologi | ECPAT | GSS | Lem baga Kita | PT. PPMA | Rifka Annisa | WIIP | Yad upa | Yayasan Kelola | YPI | YRBI |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 4 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 3 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 |
| Relate | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, Indonesia.

The table below describes when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (MFS II funding). Based on the above-

mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: ASB, ECPAT, PT.PPMA, YPI, YRBI.

Table 6
*SPOs selected for process tracing – Indonesia*

| Indonesia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ASB | February 2012; extension Feb,1, 2013 – June,30, 2016 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Hivos | Yes |
| Dayakologi | 2013; no extension | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No: contract ended early and not matching enough |
| ECPAT | August 2013; Extension Dec 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes, a bit | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | Yes |
| GSS | 31 December 2012; no extension | Yes | Yes | Yes, a bit | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | No: contract ended early |
| Lembaga Kita | 31 December 2012; no extension | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | No - contract ended early |
| PT.PPMA | May 2015 | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | IUCN | Yes, capability to act and commit only |
| Rifka Annisa | Dec, 31 2015 | No | Yes | No | Yes | Rutgers WPF | No - no match between expectations CFA and SPO |
| WIIP | Dec 2015 | Yes | Not MFS II | Yes | Not MFS II | Red Cross | No - Capacity development interventions are not MFS II financed. Only some overhead is MFS II |

| Indonesia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yayasan Kelola | Dec 30, 2013; extension of contract being processed for two years (2014-2015) | Yes | Not really | Yes | Not really | Hivos | No - no specific capacity development interventions planned by Hivos |
| YPI | Dec 31, 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Rutgers WPF | Yes |
| YRBI | Oct, 30, 2013; YRBI end of contract from 31st Oct 2013 to 31st Dec 2013. Contract extension proposal is being proposed to MFS II, no decision yet. | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |
| Yadupa | Under negotiation during baseline; new contract 2013 until now | Yes | Nothing committed | Yes | Nothing committed | IUCN | No, since nothing was committed by CFA |

**LIBERIA**

For Liberia the situation is arbitrary which capabilities are targeted most CFA's. Whilst the capability to act and commit is targeted more often than the other capabilities, this is only so for two of the SPOs. The capability to adapt and self-renew and the capability to relate are almost equally targeted for the five SPOs, be it not intensively. Since the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew are the most targeted capabilities in Ethiopia, India and Indonesia, we choose to focus on these two capabilities for Liberia as well. This would help the synthesis team in the further analysis of these capabilities related to process tracing. See also the table below.

Table 7

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Liberia*

| Capability to: | BSC | DEN-L | NAWOCOL | REFOUND | RHRAP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Relate | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, Liberia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Also, for two of the five SPOs capability to act and commit is targeted more intensively compared to the other capabilities. Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BSC and RHRAP.

Table 8

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Liberia*

| Liberia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BSC | Dec 31, 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | SPARK | Yes |
| DEN-L | 2014 | No | No | Unknown | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| NAWOCOL | 2014 | Yes | No | No | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| REFOUND | At least until 2013 (2015?) | Yes | No | Yes | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| RHRAP | At least until 2013 (2014?) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |

**Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study**

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ' general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

Some definitions of the terminology used for this MFS II 5c evaluation

Based upon the different interpretations and connotations the use of the term causal mechanism we use the following terminology for the remainder of this paper:

- A **detailed causal map** (or **model of change)** = the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change.
- A **causal mechanism** = is the combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 176).
- **Part** or **cause** = one actor with its attributes carrying out activities/ producing outputs that lead to change in other parts. The final part or cause is the change/ outcome.
- **Attributes of the actor** = specificities of the actor that increase his chance to introduce change or not such as its position in its institutional environment.

*Step 1. Identify the **planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

Chapter 4.1 and 4.2 in the baseline report were reviewed. Capacity development interventions as planned by the CFA for the capability to act and commit and for the capability to adapt and self-renew were described and details inserted in the summary format. This provided an overview of the capacity development activities that were originally planned by the CFA for these two capabilities and assisted in focusing on relevant outcomes that are possibly related to the planned interventions.

*Step 2. Identify the **implemented capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

The input from the CFA was reviewed in terms of what capacity development interventions have taken place in the MFS II period. This information was be found in the 'Support to capacity development sheet - endline - CFA perspective' for the SPO, based on details provided by the CFA and further discussed during an interview by the CDI team.

The CFA was asked to describe all the MFS II supported capacity development interventions of the SPO that took place during the period 2011 up to now. The CDI team reviewed this information, not only the interventions but also the observed changes as well as the expected long-term changes, and then linked these interventions to relevant outcomes in one of the capabilities (capability to act and commit; and capability to adapt and self-renew).

*Step 3. Identify **initial changes/ outcome areas** in these two capabilities – by CDI team & in-country team*

The CDI team was responsible for coding documents received from SPO and CFA in NVivo on the following:

- 5C Indicators: this was to identify the changes that took place between baseline and endline. This information was coded in Nvivo.
- Information related to the capacity development interventions implemented by the CFA (with MFS II funding) (see also Step 2) to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. For example, the training on financial management of the SPO staff could be related to any information on financial management of the SPO. This information was coded in Nvivo.

In addition, the response by the CFA to the changes in 5C indicators format, was auto-coded.

The in-country team was responsible for timely collection of information from the SPO (before the fieldwork starts). This set of information dealt with:

- MFS II supported capacity development interventions during the MFS II period (2011 until now).
- Overview of all trainings provided in relation to a particular outcome areas/organisational capacity change since the baseline.
- For each of the identified MFS II supported trainings, training questionnaires have been developed to assess these trainings in terms of the participants, interests, knowledge and skills gained, behaviour change and changes in the organisation (based on Kirkpatrick's model), one format for training participants and one for their managers. These training questionnaires were sent prior to the field visit.
- Changes expected by SPO on a long-term basis ('Support to capacity development sheet - endline - SPO perspective').

For the selection of change/ outcome areas the following criteria were important:

- The change/ outcome area is in one of the two capabilities selected for process tracing: capability to act and commit or the capability to adapt and self-renew. This was the first criteria to select upon.
- There was a likely link between the key organisational capacity change/ outcome area and the MFS II supported capacity development interventions. This also was an important criteria. This would need to be demonstrated through one or more of the following situations:
  - In the 2012 theory of change on organisational capacity development of the SPO a link was indicated between the outcome area and MFS II support;
  - During the baseline the CFA indicated a link between the planned MFS II support to organisational development and the expected short-term or long-term results in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the CFA indicated a link between the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the SPO indicated a link between the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities.

Reviewing the information obtained as described in Step 1, 2, and 3 provided the basis for selecting key organisational capacity change/ outcome areas to focus on for process tracing. These areas were to be formulated as broader outcome areas, such as 'improved financial management', 'improved monitoring and evaluation' or 'improved staff competencies'.

Note: the outcome areas were to be formulated as intermediates changes. For example: an improved monitoring and evaluation system, or enhanced knowledge and skills to educate the target group on climate change. Key outcome areas were also verified - based on document review as well as discussions with the SPO during the endline.

*Step 4. Construct the **detailed, initial causal map** (theoretical model of change) – CDI & in-country team*

A detailed initial causal map was developed by the CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team. This was based on document review, including information provided by the CFA and SPO on MFS II supported capacity development interventions and their immediate and long-term objectives as well as observed changes. Also, the training questionnaires were reviewed before developing the initial causal map. This detailed initial causal map was to be provided by the CDI team with a visual and related narrative with related references. This initial causal map served as a reference point for further reflection with the SPO during the process tracing endline workshop, where relationships needed to be verified or new relationships established so that the second (workshop-based), detailed causal map could be developed, after which further verification was needed to come up with the final, concluding detailed causal map.

It's important to note that organisational change area/ outcome areas could be both positive and negative.

For each of the selected outcomes the team needed to make explicit the theoretical model of change. This meant finding out about the range of different actors, factors, actions, and events etc. that have contributed to a particular outcome in terms of organisational capacity of the SPO.

A model of change of good quality includes:

- The causal pathways that relate the intervention to the realised change/ outcome;
- Rival explanations for the same change/ outcome;
- Assumptions that clarify relations between different components or parts;
- Case specific and/or context specific factors or risks that might influence the causal pathway, such as for instance the socio-cultural-economic context, or a natural disaster;
- Specific attributes of the actors e.g. CFA and other funders.

A model of change (within the 5C study called a 'detailed causal map') is a complex system which produces intermediate and long-term outcomes by the interaction of other parts. It consists of parts or causes that often consist of one actor with its attributes that is implementing activities leading to change in other parts (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). A helpful way of constructing the model of change is to think in terms of actors carrying out activities that lead to other actors changing their behaviour. The model of change can be explained as a range of activities carried out by different *actors* (including the CFA and SPO under evaluation) that will ultimately lead to an outcome. Besides this, there are also '*structural*' elements, which are to be interpreted as external factors (such as economic conjuncture); and *attributes* of the actor (does the actor have the legitimacy to ask for change or not, what is its position in the sector) that should be looked at (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). In fact Beach and Pedersen, make a fine point about the subjectivity of the actor in a dynamic context. This means, in qualitative methodologies, capturing the changes in the actor, acted upon area or person/organisation, in a non sequential and non temporal format. Things which were done recently could have corrected behavioural outcomes of an organisation and at the same ime there could be processes which incrementally pushed for the same change over a period of time. Beach and Pedersen espouse this methodology because it captures change in a dynamic fashion as against the methodology of logical framework. For the MFS II evaluation it was important to make a distinction between those paths in the model of change that are the result of MFS II and rival pathways.

The construction of the model of change started with the identified key organisational capacity change/ outcome, followed by an inventory of all possible subcomponents that possibly have caused the change/ outcome in the MFS II period (2011-up to now, or since the baseline). The figure below presents an imaginary example of a model of change. The different colours indicate the different types of support to capacity development of the SPO by different actors, thereby indicating different pathways of change, leading to the key changes/ outcomes in terms of capacity development (which in this case indicates the ability to adapt and self-renew).





***Figure 1*** *An imaginary example of a model of change*

*Step 5. Identify **types of evidence** needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams with support from CDI team*

Once the causal mechanism at theoretical level were defined, empirical evidence was collected so as to verify or discard the different parts of this theoretical model of change, confirm or reject whether subcomponents have taken place, and to find evidence that confirm or reject the causal relations between the subcomponents.

A key question that we needed to ask ourselves was, "What information do we need in order to confirm or reject that one subcomponent leads to another, that X causes Y?". The evaluation team needed to agree on what information was needed that provides empirical manifestations for each part of the model of change.

There are four distinguishable types of evidence that are relevant in process tracing analysis: pattern, sequence, trace, and account. Please see the box below for descriptions of these types of evidence.

The evaluation team needed to agree on the types of evidence that was needed to verify or discard the manifestation of a particular part of the causal mechanism. Each one or a combination of these different types of evidence could be used to confirm or reject the different parts of the model of change. This is what is meant by robustness of evidence gathering. Since causality as a concept can bend in many ways, our methodology, provides a near scientific model for accepting and rejecting a particular type of evidence, ignoring its face value.

Types of evidence to be used in process tracing

- **Pattern evidence** relates to predictions of statistical patterns in the evidence. For example, in testing a mechanism of racial discrimination in a case dealing with employment, statistical patterns of employment would be relevant for testing this part of the mechanism.
- **Sequence evidence** deals with the temporal and spatial chronology of events predicted by a hypothesised causal mechanism. For example, a test of the hypothesis could involve expectations of the timing of events where we might predict that if the hypothesis is valid, we should see that the event B took place after event A took place. However, if we found that event B took place before event A took place, the test would suggest that our confidence in the validity of this part of the mechanism should be reduced (disconfirmation/ falsification).
- **Trace evidence** is evidence whose mere existence provides proof that a part of a hypothesised mechanism exists. For example, the existence of the minutes of a meeting, if authentic ones, provide strong proof that the meeting took place.
- **Account evidence** deals with the content of empirical material, such as meeting minutes that detail what was discussed or an oral account of what took place in the meeting.

*Source*: Beach and Pedersen, 2013

Below you can find a table that provides guidelines on what to look for when identifying types of evidence that can confirm or reject causal relationships between different parts/ subcomponents of the model of change. It also provides one example of a part of a causal pathway and what type of information to look for.

Table 9

*Format for identifying types of evidence for different causal relationships in the model of change (example included)*

| Part of the model of change | Key questions | Type of evidence needed | Source of information |
|---|---|---|---|
| Describe relationship between the subcomponents of the model of change | Describe questions you would like to answer a so as to find out whether the components in the relationship took place, when they took place, who was involved, and whether they are related | Describe the information that we need in order to answer these questions.<br>Which type of evidence can we use in order to reject or confirm that subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y?<br>Can we find this information by means of :<br>Pattern evidence;<br>Sequence evidence;<br>Trace evidence;<br>Account evidence? | Describe where you can find this information |
| Example:<br>Training workshops on M&E provided by MFS II funding and other sources of funding | Example:<br>What type of training workshops on M&E took place?<br>Who was trained?<br>When did the training take place?<br>Who funded the training?<br>Was the funding of training provided before the training took place?<br>How much money was available for the training? | Example:<br>Trace evidence: on types of training delivered, who was trained, when the training took place, budget for the training<br><br>Sequence evidence on timing of funding and timing of training<br><br>Content evidence: what the training was about | Example:<br>Training report<br>SPO Progress reports<br>interviews with the CFA and SPO staff<br>Financial reports SPO and CFA |

Please note that for practical reasons, the 5C evaluation team decided that it was easier to integrate the specific questions in the narrative of the initial causal map. These questions would need to be addressed by the in country team during the process tracing workshop so as to discover, verify or discard particular causal mechanisms in the detailed, initial causal map. Different types of evidence was asked for in these questions.

*Step 6. **Collect data** to verify or discard causal mechanisms and develop workshop-based, detailed causal map – in-country team*

Once it was decided by the in-country and CDI evaluation teams what information was to be collected during the interaction with the SPO, data collection took place. The initial causal maps served as a basis for discussions during the endline workshop with a particular focus on process tracing for the identified organisational capacity changes. But it was considered to be very important to understand from the perspective of the SPO how they understood the identified key organisational capacity change/outcome area has come about. A new detailed, workshop-based causal map was developed that included the information provided by SPO staff as well as based on initial document review as described in the initial detailed causal map. This information was further analysed and verified with other relevant information so as to develop a final causal map, which is described in the next step.

*Step 7. **Assess the quality** of data and **analyse data**, and develop the **final detailed causal map** (model of change) – in-country team and CDI team*

Quality assurance of the data collected and the evidence it provides for rejecting or confirming parts of causal explanations are a major concern for many authors specialised in contribution analysis and process-tracing. Stern et al. (2012), Beach and Pedersen (2013), Lemire, Nielsen and Dybdal (2012), Mayne (2012) and Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) all emphasise the need to make attribution/ contribution claims that are based on pieces of evidence that are rigorous, traceable, and credible. These pieces of evidence should be as explicit as possible in proving that *subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y* and ruling out other explanations. Several tools are proposed to check the nature and the quality of data needed. One option is, Delahais and Toulemonde's Evidence Analysis Database, which we have adapted for our purpose.

Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) propose an Evidence Analysis Database that takes into consideration three criteria:

- Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no);
- Type of causal mechanism: intended contribution/ other contribution/ condition leading to intended contribution/ intended condition to other contribution/ feedback loop;
- Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak.

We have adapted their criteria to our purpose. The in-country team, in collaboration with the CDI team, used the criteria in assessing whether causal relationships in the causal map, were strong enough. This has been more of an iterative process trying to find additional evidence for the established relationships through additional document review or contacting the CFA and SPO as well as getting their feedback on the final detailed causal map that was established. Whilst the form below has not been used exactly in the manner depicted, it has been used indirectly when trying to validate the information in the detailed causal map. After that, the final detailed causal map is established both as a visual as well as a narrative, with related references for the established causal relations.

| *Example format for the adapted evidence analysis database (example included)* **Description of causal relation** | **Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no)** | **Type of information providing the background to the confirmation or rejection of the causal relation** | **Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak** | **Explanation for why the evidence is (rather) strong or (rather) weak, and therefore the causal relation is confirmed/ rejected** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| e.g. Training staff in M&E leads to enhanced M&E knowledge, skills and practice | e.g. Confirmed | e.g. Training reports confirmed that staff are trained in M&E and that knowledge and skills increased as a result of the training | | |

*Step 8.* ***Analyse and conclude*** *on findings– in-country team and CDI team*

The final detailed causal map was described as a visual and narrative and this was then analysed in terms of the evaluation question two and evaluation question four: *"To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?"* and *"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"* It was analysed to what extent the identified key organisational capacity change can be attributed to MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as to other related factors, interventions and actors.

# 4. Explaining factors – evaluation question 4

This paragraph describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This has been explained in the first section of this appendix. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information was procured for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the process of process tracing as described in the section above.

# 5. Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team.

**Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach:** this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has

provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

**Using standard indicators and scores**: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

**General causal map:** whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

**Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question:** this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is

crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

**Utilisation of the evaluation**

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

Design – mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication: many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process: The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or

not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

# Appendix 2 Background information on the five core capabilities framework

The 5 capabilities (5C) framework was to be used as a framework for the evaluation of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs) of the MFS II consortia. The 5C framework is based on a five-year research program on 'Capacity, change and performance' that was carried out by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). The research included an extensive review of the literature and sixteen case studies. The 5C framework has also been applied in an IOB evaluation using 26 case studies in 14 countries, and in the baseline carried out per organisation by the MFS II organisations for the purpose of the monitoring protocol.

The 5C framework is structured to understand and analyse (changes in) the capacity of an organization to deliver (social) value to its constituents. This introduction briefly describes the 5C framework, mainly based on the most recent document on the 5C framework (Keijzer et al., 2011).

The 5C framework sees capacity as an **outcome** of an **open system**. An organisation or collaborative association (for instance a network) is seen as a system interacting with wider society. The most critical practical issue is to ensure that relevant stakeholders share a common way of thinking about capacity and its core constituents or capabilities. Decisive for an organisation's capacity is the context in which the organisation operates. This means that **understanding context issues** is crucial. The use of the 5C framework requires a multi-stakeholder approach because shared values and results orientation are important to facilitate the capacity development process. The 5C framework therefore needs to **accommodate the different visions** of stakeholders and conceive different strategies for raising capacity and improving performance in a given situation.

The 5C framework defines capacity as '**producing social value'** and identifies five core capabilities that together result in that overall capacity. Capacity, capabilities and competences are seen as follows:

**Capacity** is referred to as the overall ability of an organisation or system to create value for others;

**Capabilities** are the collective ability of a group or a system to do something either inside or outside the system. The collective ability involved may be technical, logistical, managerial or generative (i.e. the ability to earn legitimacy, to adapt, to create meaning, etc.);

**Competencies** are the energies, skills and abilities of individuals.

Fundamental to developing capacity are inputs such as human, material and financial resources, technology, and information. To the degree that they are developed and successfully integrated, capabilities contribute to the overall capacity or ability of an organisation or system to create value for others. A single capability is not sufficient to create capacity. All are needed and are strongly interrelated and overlapping. Thus, to achieve its development goals, the 5C framework says that every organisation or system must have **five basic capabilities:**

- The capability to act and commit;
- The capability to deliver on development objectives;
- The capability to adapt and self-renew;
- The capability to relate (to external stakeholders);
- The capability to achieve coherence.

In order to have a common framework for evaluation, the five capabilities have been reformulated in outcome domains and for each outcome domain performance indicators have been developed. A detailed overview of capabilities with outcome domains and indicators is attached in Appendix 3.

There is some overlap between the five core capabilities but together the five capabilities result in a certain level of capacity. Influencing one capability may have an effect on one or more of the other capabilities. In each situation, the level of any of the five capabilities will vary. Each capability can become stronger or weaker over time.

# Appendix 3 Changes in organisational capacity of the SPO - 5C indicators

Below you will find a description for each of the indicators under each of the capabilities, what the situation is as assessed during the endline, how this has changed since the baseline and what are the reasons for change.

**Description of Endline Indicators Lembaga Kita**

**Capability to act and commit**

1.1. Responsive leadership: 'Leadership is responsive, inspiring, and sensitive'

*This is about leadership within the organization (operational, strategic). If there is a larger body then you may also want to refer to leadership at a higher level but not located at the local organization.*

Leadership of Lembaga Kita has remained largely unchanged since the baseline in 2012. The same sisters remain in charge. Within the congregation Sr. Fransiska has now been appointed as one of the program officers for Lembaga Kita. She works very well together with the Lembaga Kita team. The newly established steering committee serves as the decision making body for day to day work as well as long term strategies. The leadership Maria and Sr. Patricia have a good working relation and this also has positive effects on the team. Despite the formation of a new steering team, leadership responsiveness remains the same.

Score: From 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

1.2. Strategic guidance: 'Leaders provide appropriate strategic guidance (strategic leader and operational leader)'

*This is about the extent to which the leader(s) provide strategic directions*

Lembaga Kita is still in the same situation as it was during the baseline evaluation. Strategic guidance is developed together through meetings, not solely by the leaders. Both leaders (strategic and operational) are involved in the development of strategic guidance together with the other staff members. At the level of beneficiaries, strategic and technical guidance remains to be provided by the relevant field staff. Lembaga Kita has a new organizational structure which consists of a Steering Committee (SC) and Organization Committee (OC). The SC focuses on the management of Lembaga Kita and the OC is more focused on program implementation. The additions of these new organizational entities have allowed the organization to pivot their priorities and goals. For instance, Lembaga Kita has made a conscious effort to become more visible in public by adopting a more moderate stance and profile. Additionally, their focus on operations has shifted from an exclusive focus on violence based on gender, to include more anti-trafficking related work. Both these shifts were prepared and facilitated by the new committees in place.

Score: From 3 to 3 (no change)

1.3. Staff turnover: 'Staff turnover is relatively low'

*This is about staff turnover.*

Lembaga Kita's situation with regards to staff turnover remains unchanged compared to the baseline. The organization had a relatively steady number of staff members. There is a higher turnover in volunteers and partner staff, as their involvement depends on the requirements in the on-going programs. Lembaga Kita remains very selective in recruiting new members, expecting that they are loyal and dedicated. Not all interested applicants and volunteers are accepted. Currently two volunteers have become staff members due to the need of the organization.

Score: From 3 to 3 (no change)

1.4 .Organisational structure 'Existence of clear organization structure reflecting the objectives of the organization"

*Observable indicator: Staffs have copy of org. structure and understand this*

Lembaga Kita has a new organizational structure which consists of a Steering Committee (SC) and Organization Committee (OC). The SC focuses on the management of Lembaga Kita and the OC is more focused on program implementation. Both institutions understand their place and function in the organization and act accordingly.

Score: From 3 to 4 (improvement)

1.5 Articulated Strategies. Strategies are articulated and based on good situation analysis and adequate M&E

*Observable indicator: strategies are well articulated. Situation analysis and monitoring and evaluation are used to inform strategies.*

The end line showed the same quality of this indicator as compared to the baseline. Lembaga Kita still does not have clear documentation of their strategic planning, although there are well defined mechanisms and assessment systems in place and applied in the formulation and implementation of projects. Although the basis for the development of strategies, monitoring and evaluation are there, none of it is articulated, specified or documented. Lembaga Kita does not have a written vision, mission or strategy on paper. They use the baseline as a strategic plan and reference for the organization. They have worked this out in a Theory of Change and this serves as their strategic guideline. They've been through a process of discussions about the strategy. First they wanted to fix the organizational structure, then evaluate their programs in the past and then develop a strategic plan. However, relevant the staff members and leadership do talk about the future direction of the organization with regards to staffing, resource mobilization and their programmatic area.

Score: From 2.5 to 2.5 (no change)

1.6. Daily operations: 'Day-to-day operations are in line with strategic plans'

*This is about the extent to which day-to-day operations are aligned with strategic plans.*

Lembaga Kita is still in the same situation as it was during the baseline evaluation. Lembaga Kita does not have any documentation of their strategic planning for 5 years but has an annual planning. However, when relevant they do talk about the future direction of the organization with regards to staffing, resource mobilization and their programmatic area. The day to day operations are based on the approved work plan for the project. They are able to work in accordance with this work plan but a strategic plan is missing. Most activities are in line with it, with some minor adjustments made based on the context. For example, the time to deliver the result can be delayed.

Score: From 2 to 2 (No change)

1.7. Staff skills: 'Staff have necessary skills to do their work'

*This is about whether staff have the skills necessary to do their work and what skills they might need.*

Staff remains dedicated, motivated and very knowledgeable in their field. Each of the staff members has a particular expertise that has contributed to the work of the organization. The staff interviews show that they are confident to perform their tasks. There is still no system in place for staff training, which reinforces the need to pay close attention for learning opportunities outside of the organization. The staff is aware that , they need capacity building to improve their skills, for example project management skills, paralegal training to assist victims of trafficking, and skills on anti-trafficking.Since the baseline in 2012, they have been trained in human traffickingfunded by IOM, and PME training funded by Mensen met een Missie (MFS II).

The coordinator has good leadership skills, the finance officer and field staff are also skilled but they still feel the need for one English speaking staff member. Also they observe many issues and cases related to women's rights and they help case by case, but feel that they should document these observations, but they do not know how and exactly for what purpose.

Score: From 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

1.8. Training opportunities: 'Appropriate training opportunities are offered to staff'

*This is about whether staffs at the SPO are offered appropriate training opportunities*

Partially due to the observations in the baseline for the need of additional training opportunities and the need for capacity building, this indicator has improved over the last two years. Training on human trafficking by IOM and training in PME by Mensen met eenMissie has been organized. Since some staff work on a voluntary basis and also work with other organizations (such as in the government, Women's Network etc) opportunities for training may arise in those organizations.

Score: From 1 to 2 (improvement)

1.9.1. Incentives: 'Appropriate incentives are in place to sustain staff motivation'

*This is about what makes people want to work here. Incentives could be financial, freedom at work, training opportunities, etc.*

There is no change in the achievement against this indicator. Staffs are still motivated to work for Lembaga Kita mainly due to their passion to the work and sharing the values of the organization. The other reason is the flexibility at work, as the organization does not apply office hours and has no physical office, which allows people to work for other organizations. Staff works mainly on a voluntary basis. For the volunteers, the benefits lie in "learning by doing" during project implementation. There are no financial incentives for volunteers. From July 2014 onwards, 4 of the staff members will get some financial compensation. Until now, they worked because of the social engagement (heart and spirit). The activity related costs have been reimbursed.

Score: From 3 to 3 (no change)

1.9.2. Funding sources: 'Funding from multiple sources covering different time periods'

*This is about how diversified the SPOs funding sources are over time, and how the level of funding is changing over time.*

Lembaga Kita is still in the same situation with the last baseline. Lembaga Kita does not have a solid donor base. To date Mensen met eenMissie is the only donor. They are aware that in the future they should consider fundraising with other organizations but still, there is no effort to look for other resources.

Score: From 2 to 2 (no change)

1.9.3.Funding procedures: 'Clear procedures for exploring new funding opportunities'

*This is about whether there are clear procedures for getting new funding and staff are aware of these procedures.*

Lembaga Kita is still in the same situation with the last baseline. There are no clear procedures for exploring new funding opportunities. The only funding they have is from Mensen met eenMissie. Previously Sr. Antonie, now Sr. Patricia, is the main person who deals with donors, including preparing the paper works, while other staff members have less understanding about it.

Score: From 1 to 1 (no change)

**Summary Capability to act and commit**

The leadership within the organization changed from Sister Antonie to Sister Patricia, and Ms. Maria Susiawati, the chairperson. Sister Patricia is the new provincial in Wonosobo therefore; she automatically takes the leadership in the organization. With the addition of two committees (Steering committee and Organization committee) overseeing the activities of the organization, a change in focus and visibility were enabled. Strategic guidance is developed together through cooperative meetings with staff, and not solely by the leaders. Both leaders (strategic and operational) are involved in the development of strategic guidance. In the last four years the organization had a relatively steady number of staff members. They started with four persons and two volunteers joined as field staff. Staff is dedicated, motivated and very knowledgeable in their field. Each of the staff members has a particular expertise that has contributed to the work of the organization. Currently, there are two trainings that have been organized since the baseline; training in human trafficking by IOM and the other training in PME in 2014 by MM. Staffs are motivated to work for Lembaga Kita

mainly due to their passion to the work and sharing the values of the organization. Lembaga Kita does not have a solid donor base. To date Mensen met eenMissie is the only donor. There are no clear procedures for exploring new funding opportunities.

Score: From 2.5 to 2.7 (very slight improvement)

**Capability to adapt and self-renew**

2.1. M&E application: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess activities, outputs and outcomes'

*This is about what the monitoring and evaluation of the SPO looks at, what type of information they get at and at what level (individual, project, organizational).*

M&E application in Lembaga Kita has remained the same since the baseline evaluation. Practices are not documented, which makes it very difficult to evaluate the impact of specific activities and other data collection that took place. The organization applies some evaluation at the project level, but most of this done non-systematically and without recording of results and practices. Staff has indicated that it is aware of the need for an M&E system and has followed PME training in May 2014. The results of this training and intentions to develop a proper system could not yet be seen at the date of publishing of this report.

Score: From 2 to 2 (no change)

2.2. M&E competencies: 'Individual competencies for performing M&E functions are in place'

*This is about whether the SPO has a trained M&E person; whether other staff have basic understanding of M&E; and whether they know what information to collect, how to process the information, how to make use of the information so as to improve activities etc.*

Staff and volunteers of Lembaga Kita continue to have the capability to conduct monitoring and evaluation in a very basic manner. M&E is conducted through focus group discussions with the beneficiaries as well as direct informal discussions with the village leaders. Staffs are equipped with skills and knowledge on the Participatory Rural Appraisal prior to the implementation of the program but some stated that they still need capacity building related to the M&E skill.

Score: From 2 to 2 (no change)

2.3. M&E for future strategies: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess the effects of delivered products and services (outcomes) for future strategies'

*This is about what type of information is used by the SPO to make decisions; whether the information comes from the monitoring and evaluation; and whether M&E info influences strategic planning.*

Due to the lack of development of new M&E systems and processes, nothing has changed with respect to the application of outcomes to adapt future strategies. Staff indicates that M&E findings are used for future strategies, but there is no M&E system in place and the strategic plan is missing so in fact it is not possible to do this effectively. There is a clear intention to develop an M&E system in the near future, but no concrete steps have been taken to achieve this as of yet.

Score: From 2 to 2 (no change)

2.4. Critical reflection: 'Management stimulates frequent critical reflection meetings that also deal with learning from mistakes'

*This is about whether staffs talk formally about what is happening in their programs; and, if so, how regular these meetings are; and whether staffs are comfortable raising issues that are problematic.*

Lembaga Kita has continued to hold meetings on a monthly and annual basis.. Now that the project staff and the sisters live more closely to each other, such meetings can be organized more frequently. Critical and strategic reflection was emphasized more, due to the outcomes of the baseline study. As the strategic plan and an M&E system are still missing, critical reflection is not done systematically nor strategically.

Score: From 2 to 2 (no change)

2.5. Freedom for ideas: 'Staff feels free to come up with ideas for implementation of objectives

*This is about whether staffs feel that ideas they bring for implementation of the program are welcomed and used.*

Staff members are continued to be welcomed to come up with ideas, as well as to collectively set up agreements on which ideas are to be implemented in the field. They are able to express their ideas, feelings and concerns openly. This situation was also observed during the workshop for the baseline, where all staff equally expressed their ideas without any domination from both leaders. Ms. Rumi and Sr. Fransiska can both share critical feedback while keeping conversation light and positive. They both expressed that they feel totally free to express this throughout the organization. Creative ideas are very welcome and communication in Lembaga Kita is considered very strong.

Score: From 4 to 4.5 (slight improvement)

2.6. System for tracking environment: 'The organization has a system for being in touch with general trends and developments in its operating environment'

*This is about whether the SPO knows what is happening in its environment and whether it will affect the organization.*

A strong asset of Lembaga Kita continues to be its use of Participatory Rural Appraisal as a mechanism to design the projects in the villages. With this, the local context is reflected in the planning of the organization. Lembaga Kita has very close connections with their target groups and this also makes them aware of what is happening in their environment. Lembaga Kita has made an extra effort to gather stakeholders in a village (both from formal structures as well as from informal structures) and thoroughly analyses the situation. In other villages they organized meetings with the direct target group  with strongly using informal information sessions i.e going door to door and meeting people face to face in addition to community meeting. Despite these very practical and hands-on methods, there is still no formal system in place to follow trends and developments.

Score: From 3 to 3.25 (very slight improvement)

2.7. Stakeholder responsiveness: 'The organization is open and responsive to their stakeholders and the general public'

*This is about what mechanisms the SPO has to get input from its stakeholders, and what they do with that input.*

Lembaga Kita remains focused and tuned in to the needs of their beneficiaries. They act on the needs they observe in the villages where they work. They are well connected and offer solutions. To get input from other stakeholders they rely on the networks that staff members already have, and do so through informal conversations rather than a structured way of data collection. Lembaga Kita has developed a process and method which allows participation from community, program beneficiaries and also partner institutions, starting from the program design, implementation, monitoring and reporting. It remains unclear whether this process has been implemented due to the lack of supporting documentation. They have informal conversations with local authorities to tune activities. They also communicate the needs of their target group to the government. Lembaga Kita has very close connections with their target groups and this also makes them aware of what is happening in their environment.

Score: From 3 to 3 (no change)

**Capability to adapt and self-renew**

There is no formal M&E system in place. The organization looks only at the project level in terms of monitoring and evaluation of activities. In some proposals, it is mentioned that they have a regular meetings to discuss the progress of the project and how it will be improved together with the beneficiaries. Staff and volunteers of Lembaga Kita have the competences to conduct monitoring and evaluation in a very basic manner. M&E is conducted through focus group discussions with the beneficiaries as well as direct informal discussions with the village leaders. Staff indicates that M&E findings are used for future strategies, but there is no M&E system in place and the strategic plan is missing. Evidence in the form of documentation to support these claims could not be found. Lembaga

Kita has several meetings on a monthly and annual basis. In these meetings, staff, volunteers and beneficiaries are gathered to discuss relevant issues. Since Lembaga Kita has an office, now the project staff and the sisters live more closely to each other and this assists in having frequent meetings. They are able to express their ideas, feelings and concerns openly. Lembaga Kita has very close connections with their target groups and this also makes them aware of what is happening in their surroundings and project areas, although a systematic way of tracking their environment is still missing.

Score: From 2.6 to 2.6 (no change)

**Capability to deliver on development objectives**

3.1.Clear operational plans: 'Organization has clear operational plans for carrying out projects which all staff fully understand'

*This is about whether each project has an operational work plan and budget, and whether staff use it in their day-to-day operations.*

As Mensen met een Missie remains the sole donor of Lembaga Kita, he operational plans are still based on the project proposal, and have not changed over the last two years. There is a budget and operational plan available that covers the basic necessities to run the program. The operational plan is reported annually to the donor. Currently, strategies are developed during staff meetings and changes are discussed with everyone to ensure that everybody clearly understands their relation to operational activities

Score: From 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

3.2. Cost-effective resource use: 'Operations are based on cost-effective use of its resources'

*This is about whether the SPO has the resources to do the work, and whether resources are used cost-effectively.*

Lembaga Kita remains cost-effective in the use of their resources. Budgets are realistic and well understood by staff and leadership. They work locally and also with local people so they do not have high expenses. They allocate most of the funds to the program, using local standard cost while other expenses are covered individually/collectively. Between 2012 and 2013, they did not use the budget but the program has been implemented well nonetheless. It is dues to higher community involvement than before so that some program implementation does not need any financial cost as it is covered by community voluntarily.  Currently, there are some changes in staffs' composition; some volunteers have become permanent staff members who have increased operational costs, but overall their cost is still warranted through more effective output of the staff members in their new roles.

Score: From 4.5 to 4.5 (no change)

3.3. Delivering planned outputs: 'Extent to which planned outputs are delivered'

*This is about whether the SPO is able to carry out the operational plans.*

Lembaga Kita continues to deliver results, although it struggles with their documentation, monitoring and evaluation. Late transfer of funds delays the process of implementation. Planning is not done well, although planned activities are said to be implemented. To really contribute to sustainable changes takes a long time. To gain trust in the communities is a long process. They go door to door and bring food, but no money. This does not always necessarily open the doors, and developing trusts takes time. Now however, these investments have paid up and the relationship with the target villages is very good. Lembaga Kita gain stronger trust and participation from community.

Score: From 3.5 to 4 (improvement)

3.4. Mechanisms for beneficiary needs: 'The organization has mechanisms in place to verify that services meet beneficiary needs'

This is about how the SPO knows that their services are meeting beneficiary needs

The end line showed the same quality as the baseline. Lembaga Kita's strength remains their presence at the grass roots level and working very close together with the beneficiaries. Lembaga Kita undertakes participatory rural appraisal and this is the basis for their planning. To ensure the feedback from the community, they organize monitoring. They carry out monitoring through interviews with the

village facilitator or discussions with the beneficiaries directly. They also have strong relationships with the village leaders who directly inform them on the progress of the project. However, apart from the PRA there is no systematic M&E in place although there is an intention to begin to arrange such a system.

Score: From 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

3.5. Monitoring efficiency: 'The organization monitors its efficiency by linking outputs and related inputs (input-output ratio's)'

*This is about how the SPO knows they are efficient or not in their work.*

The organization conducts M&E at a very basic and undocumented level. They mainly look at budget expenditure and compare this with what is planned. A formal system to link outputs to inputs is still missing.

Score: From 2 to 2 (no change)

3.6. Balancing quality-efficiency: 'The organization aims at balancing efficiency requirements with the quality of its work'

*This is about how the SPO ensures quality work with the resources available*

The organization has continued the quality of their work through the monitoring of the situation in the field, and by engaging competent staff and volunteers. Another significant factor that enhances the quality of their work is the interpersonal relationships and personal commitment to the work.

Score: From 3 to 3 (no change)

**Summary of Capability to deliver on development objectives**
The operational plans are based on the project proposal as funded by Mensen met eenMissie. There is a budget and operational plan available that covers the basic necessities to run the program. The organization is realistic in their budgets and ensures that staff understands the costs involved, and hereby aims to use resources cost-effectively..This is further contributed to by the fact that they work locally and also with local people as to keep operational expenses low. Monitoring and evaluation remains subject to improvement, particularly to setting up a more systematic way to do so and as such there is no system in place to measure efficiency by relating inputs to outputs. Currently the organization mainly looks at budget expenditure and compares this with what was planned. The organization balances quality with efficiency by keeping costs low whilst delivering quality work through field monitoring, and engaging competent staff and volunteers, and by having good interpersonal relationships and personal commitment to the work. Whilst planned activities seem to be implemented long-term effects take time.

Score: From 3.3 to 3.4 (very slight improvement)

**Capability to relate**
4.1. Stakeholder engagement in policies and strategies: 'The organization maintains relations/ collaboration/alliances with its stakeholders for the benefit of the organization'

*This is about whether the SPO engages external groups in developing their policies and strategies, and how.*

The end line showed the same quality as the baseline. In their project location their network currently consists of village leaders, the labor department, the forest/environment office, other NGOs. Lembaga Kita is part of a network extending over the whole of Indonesia, including for example schools and hospitals where victims can be found. All Indonesian sister congregations are involved in this network. Lembaga Kita has sufficient capacity to relate to their stakeholders. The network is only local and not very large, but helps the organization in reaching its goals. The legitimacy of the objectives of the organization is very high, but the organization itself is not widely known to the public (although this is increasing). The organization forms a very good bridge between different religions and successfully strives to alleviate poverty and create economic opportunities. There is a large involvement of local volunteers and friends. The organization does not have any formal way to engage external groups in developing their policies and strategies.

Score: From 3 to 3 (no change)

4.2. Engagement in networks: 'Extent to which the organization has relationships with existing networks/alliances/partnerships'

*This is about what networks/alliances/partnerships the SPO engages with and why; with they are local or international; and what they do together, and how do they do it.*

There is no change in the achievement against this indicator. Engagements in networks remain the same at both the local and international level. At the local level cooperation with NGOs working on similar issues remains strong. Locally, they are linked to five prominent women's organizations which are the Women's Organization Association (GOW), The Association of Women's Struggle Wonosobo (Per3W), Indonesian Migrant Workers Association (SBMI) and Srikandi Women's Cooperative. More networks and alliances with other CSOs had been established, such as with SPPTQ Salatiga, Percik, Persepsi, Upipa, Wonosobo Youth Center (WYC).There is no schedule for meetings with network partners. They have a meeting if there are specific issues that need to be discussed. It is not complicated at all for Lembaga Kita to establish contact, because each member is also a member of another organization in the LK network. At the international level, all organizations in the Mensen met eenMissie network come together twice a year for discussions, trainings, etc.

Score: From 3 to 3 (no change)

4.3. Engagement with target groups: 'The organization performs frequent visits to their target groups/ beneficiaries in their living environment'

*This is about how and when the SPO meets with target groups.*

There is a slightly improvement in this indicator. The organization works more closely together with the community. Their strength is their grassroots involvement. Meeting with the target groups are held more regularly. Previously the Village Facilitator visited the community, but currently field staff visited the community. They visit the target group more frequently; sometimes up to 2-3 times in a week. Beneficiaries are still strongly participating in the participatory rural appraisal that is used for planning activities. Over the past two years the organizations has shifted from a low profile position to a more moderate and visible profile through the implementation of the community assistance model. In this model staff members place themselves as partners within communities and perform both formal program related activities as well as informal and more ad-hoc activities to encourage trust among the beneficiaries.

Score: From 4.5 to 4.75 (very slight improvement)

4.4. Relationships within organization: 'Organizational structure and culture facilitates open internal contacts, communication, and decision-making'

*How does staff at the SPO communicate internally? Are people free to talk to whomever they need to talk to? When and at what forum? What are the internal mechanisms for sharing information and building relationships?*

There is an improvement in this indicator. Lembaga Kita has an office now. Since they have an office, communication within the organization has significantly improved and intensified. The staff members can talk openly and provide input and feedback to each other at any time.

Score: From 3 to 4 (improvement)

**Summary of Capability to relate**
Lembaga Kita is a small organization and is part of a network extending over the whole of Indonesia, including for example schools and hospitals where victims can be found. All Indonesian sister congregations are involved in this network. Lembaga Kita has sufficient capacity to relate to their stakeholders. It is not complicated at all for the organization to establish contact, because each member is also a member of another organization in the Lembaga Kita network. At the international level, all organizations in the Mensen met eenMissie network come together twice a year for discussions, trainings, etc. However, the organization does not have any formal way to engage external groups in developing their policies and strategies. The organization works closely together with the community, and has changed its stance from low profile to a more moderate and visible profile within the communities the organization serves. This has led to increased trust amongst beneficiaries. Their strength is their grassroots involvement in the organization now works closely with

the communities. Internal relations have improved through the establishment of a new office building in which staff can now regularly meet and freely communicate.

Score: from 3.4 to 3.7 (very slight improvement)

**Capability to achieve coherence**

5.1. Revisiting vision, mission: 'Vision, mission and strategies regularly discussed in the organization'

*This is about whether there is a vision, mission and strategies; how often staff discuss/revise vision, mission and strategies; and who is involved in this.*

There is an improvement in the achievement against this indicator. The organization has a mission and vision developed collectively with the staff in 2007. There is no detailed information on how the vision and mission were developed. Prior to 2007, the organization did not have a clear vision and mission. These were developed as a result of donor requirements. Within the last two years, the organization's focus has broadened and does not only focus on violence based on gender but now also includes anti-trafficking. This shift in focus was brought about from results during the baseline workshop where they realized that they have a choice on what issues are of their concern.

Score: From 2 to 3 (improvement)

5.2. Operational guidelines: 'Operational guidelines (technical, admin, HRM) are in place and used and supported by the management'

*This is about whether there are operational guidelines, which operational guidelines exist; and how they are used.*

Operational guidelines in terms of Human Resources, Administration and Finances are still missing at Lembaga Kita. Management continues to rely on guidance provided by the donors, such as for the financial report. There is an increasing awareness of the organization to have better technical and operational guidelines. However, since the restructuring of the organization, job and task descriptions have been specified and made clearer an documented, but not yet developed in the SOP, which results in a slight improvement of this indicator as compared to the baseline.

Score: From 1 to 1.5 (slight improvement)

5.3. Alignment with vision, mission: 'Projects, strategies and associated operations are in line with the vision and mission of the organization'

*This is about whether the operations and strategies are line with the vision/mission of the SPO.*

The endline showed the same quality as the baseline. There is a large coherence between goals, aims, activities and available resources. However the strategic plan is missing. Because of the small size of the organization, procedures are not always formalized and remain undocumented which makes tracking very difficult.

Score: From 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

5.4. Mutually supportive efforts: 'The portfolio of project (activities) provides opportunities for mutually supportive efforts'

*This is about whether the efforts in one project complement/support efforts in other projects.*

They don't do different projects but do their work in different villages. In what they do there is a logical consistency aimed at the prevention of trafficking. They go beyond just warning people, but also try to take away the reasons why people sometimes fall victim to it. They try to give them good opportunities in life. Furthermore, the choice of the organization to become more visible in the communities they serve made staff members engage in informal activities to support their formal work and goals to increase trust amongst beneficiaries.

Score: From 3.5 to 3.75 (very slight improvement)

**Summary Capability to achieve coherence**


There is a very slight improvement in this capability. The organization has a mission and vision developed collectively with the staff in 2007. There is no detailed information on how the vision and mission were developed.Within the last two years, the organization's focus has broadened and does not only focus on violence based on gender but now also includes anti-trafficking. This change is based

on MFS II baseline 2012 results. There are no operational guidelines available in the organization in term of Human Resources, Administration and Finances, although job and work descriptions have been specified and made clearer. The management relies on guidance provided by the donors. There is a large coherence between goals, aims, activities and available resources, although there is no strategic plan in place and activities are based on the project proposal funded by MM. They don't do different projects but do their work in different villages. In what they do there is a logical consistency aimed at the prevention of trafficking, and their greater engagement within communities to raise the organization's profile has forced staff members to integrate with community activities that are not necessarily directly related to project or program activities.

Score: From 2.5 to 2.9 (slight improvement )

# Appendix 4 Results - key changes in organisational capacity - general causal map

**General Causal Map Lembaga Kita**




During the end line workshop at Lembaga Kita, a discussion was held around what staff perceived as the key changes in in the organization since the baseline in 2012. This then led to a discussion on what were the key organizational capacity changes and why these changes have taken place according to staff present at the end line workshop. The discussion resulted in a 'general causal map' which is described below. The general causal map provides a comprehensive picture of organizational capacity changes that took place since the baseline, based on the perspective of SPO staff present at the end line workshop. The numbers in the narrative correspond with the numbers in the visual.

Two key organisational capacity changes have occurred at Lembaga Kita since the baseline:

3. A more visible organization through the implementation of the community assistance model [1].
4. Greater recognition amongst stakeholders through the systematic production of documentation [2].

**A more visible organization through the implementation of the community assistance model [1].**

First of all. Lembaga Kita is now more visible with a more accepted community assistance model that has been put in to place since 2013 [1]. The community assistance model allowed staff to place themselves as so called partners in the communities they were serving, and provided a way to be closer to beneficiaries whilst performing informal activities. This greatly increased trust by the community in Lembaga Kita [3].

The overall increase in trust came about from an overal increase in satisfaction about Lembaga Kita's services to the beneficiaries [4] on the one hand, as well a greater sense of ownership and participation within program activities by the communities and beneficiaries [7].

Beneficiaries were overall more satisifed due to an overall increase in staff working performance [5] as well as the speed with which the organization responded to beneficiary concerns and requests [6]. Both factors will be explained below in more detail.

First, the increase in work performance can be explained by the organization achieving better outputs [8] through staff increasingly sharing their workload with each other and cooperating [10]. This in turn was enabled by the recruitment of two new staff members [12], and an overall change in organization structure [14], which was the result of a broader change in organizational management [17].

Prior to the baseline in 2012, most of the volunteers in Lembaga Kita were government officers *(Pegawai Negeri Sipil)* who had very limited time for field implementation. After that, the organization recruited two more staff. Apart from the staff additions, revisions in the organizational structure included the splitting into Steering Committee (SC) and Operational Committee (OC). The intention of this action was to achieve better coordination and communication, faster field response, and clearer job distribution. In the same year, the organization added one more target village to a total of three supported villages right now.

**Greater recognition amongst stakeholders through the systematic production of documentation [2].**

Secondly, the overal speed with which staff members responded to beneficiary requests increased by a change in the incentive system for staff [13], as well as the establishment of new field offices [9], which addressed the need to have staff members to be closer to the community in the field during their work activities [11]. Changes to the incentive system [13] included payment of transportation to staff on a monthly basis, and ultimately into a stand-alone transportation fund. This allowed staff to travel more freely and quicker to beneficiaries and stakeholders in the field.

Both the need to be closer to the community whilst carrying out activities as well as the overall changes in organizational management sprung from Lembaga Kita's objective to change their organizational profile from low to more moderate and public [19], which was one of the conclusions drawn by Lembaga Kita based on the results from the MFSII organisational capacity development (5c) baseline assessment that was carried out in 2012 [20].

The second factor which greatly impacted the increased trust in the organization was the increase of community participation in the programming of activities and the activities themselves [7]. Communities and other beneficiaries more readily accepted to participate due to an increase in trust in the organisation [16] resulting from the changes made in the community assistance model. Previously, they were more focused on program delivery and still had less attention to community engagement. As a result, community seen Lembaga Kita as "donor" instead of empowering community. After the baseline, they changed the strategy to more strengthened the community enggagement by having more interaction with community. Current approcah has resulted in the more positive image of the organisation to community[18]. The reason to set up this model was also a conclusion drawn by Lembaga Kita on the basis of theMFS II organisational capacity development (5c) baseline results in 2012 [20].

Finally, stakeholders indicated that Lembaga Kita has paid considerable attention to the practice of documentation of data and activities [2]. This development was already recognized during the baseline MFS II 5c evaluation, but was significantly improved over the last two years [15] as part of the changes and professionalization in organizational management [17] or example a documentary film was made about sustainable waste management. The documentary has been used as learning material for local communities and beneficiaries.

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen UR
P.O. Box 88
6700 AB Wageningen
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)317 48 68 00
www.wageningenUR.nl/cdi

Report CDI-15-044

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# Endline report – Indonesia, Rifka Annisa
# MFS II country evaluations

Capacity of Southern Partner Organisations (5C) component

Cecile Kusters[1]
Martijn Wieriks[2]
Bekti Dwi Andari[3]
Novina Suprobo[3]
Widya Priyahita[3]
Rumenta R. Sihombing[3]
Seto W. Rokhmatulloh[3]
Ita Rosita[3]

1 Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR
2 SEPAM Consultants Indonesia
3 SurveyMeter

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen, February 2015

Report CDI-15-046

Kusters, C., Wieriks, M., Dwi Andari, B., Suprobo, N., Priyahita, W., Sihombing, R.R., Rokhmatulloh, S.W., Rosita, I., 2015. *Endline report – Indonesia, Rifka Annisa. MFS II country evaluations; Capacity of Southern Partner Organisations (5C) component.* Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University & Research centre. Report CDI-15-046. Wageningen.

This report presents the findings of the endline of the evaluation of the organisational capacity component of the MFS II country evaluations. The focus of this report is Indonesia, Rifka Annisa. The format is based on the requirements by the synthesis team and NWO/WOTRO. The endline was carried out in 2014. The baseline was carried out in 2012.

Key words: 5C (five core capabilities); attribution; baseline; causal map; change; CFA (Co-financing Organisation) endline; organisational capacity development; SPO (Southern Partner Organisation).

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Report CDI-15-046 |

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# Acknowledgements

We are grateful to all the people that have contributed to this report. We particularly would like to thank the Southern Partner Organisation Rifka Annisa and the Co-Financing Agency Rutgers WPF for their endless patience and support during this challenging task of collecting the endline data. We hope that this endline report will provide useful insights to Rifka Annisa, Rutgers WPF, the synthesis team, IOB and NWO/Wotro.

The Indonesia 5C evaluation team

# List of abbreviations and acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| 5 C | Capacity development model which focuses on 5 core capabilities |
| Causal map | Map with cause-effect relationships. See also 'detailed causal map'. |
| Causal mechanisms | The combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome |
| CDI | Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University & Research centre |
| CFA | Co-Financing Agency |
| CFO | Co-Financing Organisation |
| CS | Civil Society |
| Detailed causal map | Also 'model of change'. the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change. In the 5C evaluation identified key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms) are traced through process tracing (for attribution question). |
| GBV | Gender Based Violence |
| General causal map | Causal map with key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms), based on SPO perception. |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MFS | Dutch co-financing system |
| MIS | Management Information System |
| MoFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| OD | Organisational Development |
| PME | Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation |
| PRA | Priority Result Area |
| Process tracing | Theory-based approach to trace causal mechanisms |
| RA | Rifka Annisa |
| SOP | Standard Operating Procedure |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |
| SRHR | Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights |
| SSI | Semi-structured Interview |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| ToT | Trainers of Trainers |
| Wageningen UR | Wageningen University & Research centre |

# 1 Introduction & summary

## 1.1 Purpose and outline of the report

The Netherlands has a long tradition of public support for civil bi-lateral development cooperation, going back to the 1960s. The Co-Financing System (*Medefinancieringsstelsel*, or 'MFS') is its most recent expression. MFS II is the 2011-2015 grant framework for Co-Financing Agencies (CFAs), which is directed at achieving a sustainable reduction in poverty. A total of 20 consortia of Dutch CFAs have been awarded €1.9 billion in MFS II grants by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).

The overall aim of MFS II is to help strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. CFAs receiving MFS II funding work through strategic partnerships with Southern Partner Organisations.

The MFS II framework stipulates that each consortium is required to carry out independent external evaluations to be able to make valid, evaluative statements about the effective use of the available funding. On behalf of Dutch consortia receiving MFS II funding, NWO-WOTRO has issued three calls for proposals. Call deals with joint MFS II evaluations of development interventions at country level. Evaluations must comprise a baseline assessment in 2012 and a follow-up assessment in 2014 and should be arranged according to three categories of priority result areas as defined by MoFA:

Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) & themes;

Capacity development of Southern partner organisations (SPO) (5 c study);

Efforts to strengthen civil society.

This report focuses on the assessment of capacity development of southern partner organisations. This evaluation of the organisational capacity development of the SPOs is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The purpose of this report is to provide endline information on one of the SPOs involved in the evaluation: Rifka Annisa in Indonesia. The baseline report is described in a separate document.

Chapter 2 describes general information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO). Here you can find general information about the SPO, the context in which the SPO operates, contracting details and background to the SPO. In chapter 3 a brief overview of the methodological approach is described. You can find a more detailed description of the methodological approach in appendix 1.Chapter 4 describes the results of the 5c endline study. It provides an overview of capacity development interventions of the SPO that have been supported by MFS II. It also describes what changes in organisational capacity have taken place since the baseline and why (evaluation question is 1 and 4). This is described as a summary of the indicators per capability as well as a general causal map that provides an overview of the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline, as experienced by the SPO. The complete overview of descriptions per indicator, and how these have changed since the baseline is described in appendix 3. The complete visual and narrative for the key organisational capacity changes that have taken place since the baseline according to the SPO staff present at the endline workshop is presented in appendix 4.

For those SPOs involved in process tracing a summary description of the causal maps for the identified organisational capacity changes in the two selected capabilities (capability to act and commit; capability to adapt and self-renew) is provided (evaluation questions 2 and 4). These causal maps

describe the identified key organisational capacity changes that are possibly related to MFS II interventions in these two capabilities, and how these changes have come about. More detailed information can be found in appendix 5.

Chapter 5 presents a discussion on the findings and methodology and a conclusion on the different evaluation questions.

The overall methodology for the endline study of capacity of southern partner organisations is coordinated between the 8 countries: Bangladesh (Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath; INTRAC); DRC (Disaster Studies, Wageningen UR); Ethiopia (CDI, Wageningen UR); India (CDI, Wageningen UR: Indonesia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Liberia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Pakistan (IDS; MetaMeta); (Uganda (ETC). Specific methodological variations to the approach carried out per country where CDI is involved are also described in this document.

This report is sent to the Co-Financing Agency (CFA) and the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO) for correcting factual errors and for final validation of the report.

## 1.2 Brief summary of analysis and findings

Since the baseline, two years ago, Rifka Annisa has seen an improvement in the capability to act and commit. The relation between upper management and staff has improved, with considerable improvements in strategic guidance and responsive leadership as a result. Staff turnover has improved and been reduced as a result of more focus on capacity building activities, which also led to greater staff skills. Employment benefits increased, whilst funding sources improved very slightly with the adoption of business programs to generate income and become less dependent of donors and more self-sufficient. The capability to adapt and self renew has improved overall. M&E tools have been developed and consistently applied, although Rifka Annisa still needs to step further building an effective MIS, database and knowledge management system. Rifka Annisa is also more aware of its surroundings through increased public discussions and knowledge sharing. The capability to deliver on development objectives has improved through more efficient operations and timely delivery of planned outputs. The capability to relate has also improved. This was achieved through various new relations to authorities and stakeholders at all levels of government. Engagement with target groups through the application of social media has aided in reaching out to new beneficiaries. In the capability to achieve coherence, operational guidelines have slightly improved as they are laid down in standard operational procedures (SOPs), for example in a finance manual and a method for setting up a referral system to other organizations.

The evaluators considered it important to also note down the SPO's story in terms of changes in the organisation since the baseline, and this would also provide more information about reasons for change, which were difficult to get for the individual indicators. Also for some issues there may not have been relevant indicators available in the list of core indicators provided by the evaluation team. During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by Rifka Annisa's staff: staff being more productive and involved in the organization's decision-making; greater motivation for staff to get promoted; staff being motivated to improve their facilitation skills; improved quality of monitoring and evaluation and a stronger partnership with local authorities in form of a signed MoU.

According to the SPO staff, these changes can partly be attributed to MFS II funded capacity development interventions, in particular in relation to improved monitoring and evaluation in the organization. This specifically refers to the MFS II funded capacity development intervention training on M&E and more particularly the development of M&E tools. The development of these tools was an MFS II funded capacity development intervention by Rutgers WPF, and can be attributed to the Donor requirement to adopt Results Based Management in program implementation. Furthermore, specific issues that required organizational development, were found in an MFS II funded organizational capacity scan that has led to some changes in the way staff performs. However, this has also been affected by other developments such as a major change in leadership as well as a greater focus on facilitation skills.

# 2 General Information about the SPO – Rifka Annisa

## 2.1 General information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO)

| | |
|---|---|
| **Country** | Indonesia |
| **Consortium** | SRHR Alliance |
| **Responsible Dutch NGO** | Rutgers WPF |
| **Southern partner organisation** | Rifka Annisa |

The project/partner is part of the sample for the following evaluation component(s):

| | |
|---|---|
| **Achievement of MDGs and themes** | X |
| **Capacity development of Southern partner organisations** | X |
| **Efforts to strengthen civil society** | |

## 2.2 The socio-economic, cultural and political context in which the partner operates

**The socio-economic, cultural and political context in which the partner operates**
Gender-Based-Violence (GBV) is a crucial issue in the context of developing gender justice society in Indonesia. In Indonesia's multicultural society, gender based violence is tolerated and permitted across cultures and regions due to patriarchy that manifests in cultural and religious beliefs and practices. Prior to 2000, there was inadequate statistical data available that indicated GBV prevalence in Indonesia, because GBV is regarded as a personal and domestic issue. In addition, there was a lack of government's concern with regard to this issue. The data on GBV cases is gathered by non-governmental-organizations (NGOs) working on violence against women. For example, Rifka Annisa and LRC-KJHAM[1] documented GBV cases since 1994 based on reports from various resources (clients, newspapers, hotline service etc) (Hidayat et.al. 2009). National Commission on Violence against Women (*Komnas Perempuan*) initiated annual report and documentation on GBV since 2000[2].

During the period of 2000 to 2011, there was an increasing trend of the number of female victims. Particularly, between 2009-2011, there were more than 100.000 reported cases per year. The real number of GBV cases is expected to be higher than the official data (Komnas Perempuan, 2012, Hayati et.al. 2011). As the trends of GBV, in fact do not disclose the real conditions of GBV-practices in the society. Lack of autonomy and assertiveness among Indonesian women, particularly, those who live in rural areas, hinders then to report the case to state apparatuses or bringing the case into public. Moreover, since communities regard GBV as a personal issue, revealing the case often leads to stigmatizing the female victims as a disgrace to the family. However, the trend of GBV prevalence could also be regarded as a positive sign of an increasing number of women having the courage to report their cases.

[1] Both NGOs are selected for the MFSII Indonesia MDG Evaluation
[2] Indonesian government established the National Commission on Violence against Women through releseased Presidential Decree No. 181/1998.

According to Komnas Perempuan's annual record on GBV, in 2011, there were 119.107 female victims of GBV. The 2011's rating was 13.2% higher compared to the data of 2010[3]. A ranking of the study provinces has been made and the following provinces show the highest rates of GBV: Central Java (25.628 women victim), East Java (24.555 women), West Java (17.720), DKI Jakarta (11.286), and North Sumatra (8277). The number of female victims in Yogyakarta, target area of Rifka Annisa, was 4154. West Papua and Riau Islands were not included in the study as there were no reports of GBV in these areas. This does not necessarily mean that no GBV took place in these areas, more likely is that no one reported a case to official institutions.

In Indonesia, GBV is classified into three (3) categories. The categorization is based on the domain where the GBV takes place: domestic/family domain (including violence against wife, violence against children, dating violence), community/public domain (including sexual violence or harassment in the work place, sexual violence and harassment in public transportation etc), and state domain (discrimination and sexual harassment in public services, sexual violence in prison). Based on those categories, in 2011, domestic violence ranked as the highest compared to other types of violence. The ranking is based on the percentage of female victims of domestic violence i.e. 95.61% out of the total of GBV cases (Komnas Perempuan, 2012:11). The percentage of female victims of GBV in community/public domain was 4.35%, and the rest took place in the state domain. This trend is apparent is all Indonesian provinces (Komnas perempuan, 2012:14). The record of Komnas Perempuan confirmed by the report documented by Rifka Annisa and LRC-KJHAM (Hayati et.al. 2011; Hidayat et.al., 2009, LRC-KJHAM, 2012).

The ranges of types of violence in domestic domain are psychological violence (most common), economic violence, physical violence, and sexual violence. While in the community domain, the types of violence include sexual violence (most common), physical violence, psychological violence, trafficking (the number is significant in Central Java) and rape. With regard to the characteristics of female victims of GBV, the majority is aged between 25-40 years, and tends to be spouses (non working spouses), students, and workers (Komnas Perempuan, 2012). There is also indication that the number of female victims of GBV with a higher educational background is increasing (Hayati et.al. 2011; LRC-KJHAM, 2012). The perpetrators are usually relatives or others with whom she has a close relationship (Hidayat et.al, 2009).

**Impacts of Gender Based Violence: multi-faceted and multi-dimensional**

The impacts of GBV are multi-faceted and multi-dimensional. First, victims need to deal with the physical and psychological impact of their experiences. Victims of GBV typically experience organ dysfunction, metabolism disorder and injuries as well as psychological traumas and subsequently fear, stress, strain, lost of confidence, and mental disturbance. Second, the (financial) costs of openly admitting to be a victim and/or pursuing legal steps, are very high. Case studies show that married women end-up in a difficult financial situations because the ex-husband usually rejects to financially provide for the living cost of their children and his former spouse. Students and employed women, in particular when pursuing a legal procedure, are often faced with the fact that they cannot continue their study or lose their job, thereby losing their perspectives for a good future. The state has no funds available to help these women in their financial setback when trying to overcome the situation. GBV also influences the social position of female victims. They are labeled and stigmatized as the cause of the GBV (for example because they are not loyal to the husband, they dress improperly etc.), thereby victimizing them again.[4]

**Policy and Regulation in Tackling GBV**

The Indonesian Government implemented legislation with respect to Gender Equality with the ratification of CEDAW in the Law no. 7/1984 and the Presidential Instruction No. 9/2000 concerning Gender Mainstreaming. All legal products related to gender in Indonesia refers to those policies including the Law no. 23/2004 about Elimination of Domestic Violence. Following the Law on Elimination of Domestic Violence there are the Law No.21/2007 concerning anti human trafficking,

[3] Komnas perempuan compiled the record from its local partners(299 organizations), religious courts, and owmen and child service unit in police departmen and other institutions (Komnas Perempuan, 2012:9).

[4] Komnas perempuan, 2011; Rifka Annisa, 2011, Hidayat et.al., 2009

Indonesian Police Regulation No. 3/2008 about service unit for women and children in district/city police office, Ministerial Regulation No.1/2010 about budget allocation in the national and local government for shelter or crisis centre for women and children victim of GBV, and Ministry of Women Empowerment Regulation No. 1/2010 on Minimum service standard for GBV's victims service centre.

At the regional level, there are also some local government regulations regarding GBV (such as Gubernatorial Decree No. 6/2004 issued in North Sumatra province). The above regulations are also supported by services provided by both (different levels of) state and NGOs. According to Komnas Perempuan's fact sheet, in 2011, there are 395 institutions (organized by both government and non government) that provide services to female and child victims of GBV across 33 provinces in Indonesia (Komnas Perempuan, 2012).

To conclude, the government provided integrated and comprehensive regulations with respect to GBV. However, there is still a gap between the regulation and the implementation due to low level of law enforcement by the state apparatuses. In addition, the lack of gender perspectives among legal personnel should be improved as well.

## 2.3 Contracting details

When did cooperation with this partner start: 2003.

What is the MFS II contracting period: 1-4-2011 to 31-12-2015

Did cooperation with this partner end: No

If yes, when did it finish: Not applicable

What is the reason for ending the cooperation with this partner: Not applicable

Is there expected cooperation with this partner after 31st of December 2015: Yes.

## 2.4 Background to the Southern Partner Organisation

**History**
Rifka Annisa, meaning "Friends of Women", was founded in 1993 and is based in Yogyakarta. Rifka Annisa was initiated by Suwarni Angesti Rahayu, Sri Kusyuniati, Latifah Iskandar, Desti Murdijana and Sitoresmi Prabuningrat. Initially Rifka Annisa operated solely as a crisis and councelling center centre.[5] In 1995 Rifka Annisa started to broaden her activities and increasing their influence in the community by for example writing for a column in a local newspaper. Rifka Annisa also developed the unique perspective that man should be included in their programs, which was very uncommon practice at that time in Indonesia. In 1997, to decrease the gap between government institutions and NGOs working in the field of GBV, Rifka Annisa started to collaborate with regional police (women's and children protection division) and hospitals (victim services). The collaboration aimed to earlier detect and provide adequate services on different levels (medical care, legal aid and counseling). In the same year, Rifka Annisa developed a family approach for their domestic violence - counseling services whereby the husband and possibly the children are included in the counseling sessions. In the following years Rifka Annisa continued to develop their network with community and governmental organizations which leads to the implementation of an integrated service mechanism for female victims of GBV by the local government in the Yogyakarta region in 2005. Because of their effective programs and community influence it becomes easier for Rifka Annisa to attract funds and thus the organization and their activities can expand.

In 2013, Rifka Annisa worked with some priority issues, namely :
1.Involving men in eliminating violence against women , justice and gender equality;

[5] Rifka Annisa, (No year), Kenschets Rifka Annisa - Profil Lembaga Rifka Annisa

2. Integration UUPKDRT (domestic violence law) and Child Protection Law in the system of religious courts.
3. Trafficking and sexual violence

To optimize the program and achieving goals of all issues, Rifka Annisa has been supported by some agencies, namely :

- Rutgers WPF : Men Care + Engaging men in 4 Country Inisiatif dan Men Making Difference in Stopping Violence Againt Women
- UNTF : Establishing integrated response for survivor of Violence through Integration Domestic Violence Eradication Act into Syariah Law in Indonesia
- OXFAM : Strengthening Alliancebof New Men (LLB) Movement for Justice and Gender equality and Eliminate Violence Againt Women
- Up lift International : Gender Responsif Budgeting foe Women Health
- Awo International : Baseline untuk persiapan program "School-Based Prevention towards Trafficking and Sexual Violence against Children in the Regency of Gunung Kidul Yogyakarta October 2013 – December 2014"
- UN WOMEN : Qualitatif Household survey on Violence Againt Women and Masculinities in three areas in Indonesia ( Jakarta, Rural Java, and Papua)

Some programs run, have wedge issues mutually reinforcing each other . This is very important in order to accelerate the achievement of the program , build synergy among the issues and stakeholders in the various regions in Indonesia .[6]

Rifka Annisa has been very serious in improving their staff's capacity as wellas in delivering service for their clients. Activities have been conducted during 2012 and it showed their commitment and dedication. Capacity development which has been supported by MFS II as well as the changes, are as follows :

1. Counseling for women as victims of violence.
2. The provision of safe shelters.
3. Support Group service for the victims of violence.
4. Counseling service for male perpetrators.
5. Case conference
6. Capacity building on trauma healing for counselor
7. Monitoring tools for clients empowerment
8. Couples counseling
9. Community capacity building. It is aimed at increasing knowledge of the community in relation to violence against women and mechanisms of prevention and treatment .[7]

Since 2012 Rifka Annisa has documented five main significant changes as follows :

1. Change of leadership : improved leadership quality
2. Change of Remuneration system and staff's evaluation mechanism :Improved HR system and mechanism
3. Change of ME quality: the use of baseline in the program and developing new ME tools
4. Change of staff's capacity: facilitation skill has improved
5. Change of Organization's networking quality and quantity : MOU [8]

**Vision**

Rifka Annisa's vision is*: "to realize a gender just society that does not tolerate violence against women through the principles of social justice, consciousness and awareness, independence, integrity and preserve local wisdom."*[9]

[6] Annual Report Mencare. 2013
[7] Annex C, MFS II endline Evaluation, 2014.
[8] General Key Changes (Rifka Annisa), 2014.

**Mission**

Rifka Annisa's mission is: "*to organize women in particular and society in general to eliminate violence against women and creating gender equitable society through the empowerment of women victims of violence, including children, elderly, Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals, Transgender and other, and increase public awareness and involvement through education and strengthening critical network.*"[10]

**Strategies**

Rifka Annisa provides services to victims of GBV through (initiation of community-based) crisis centres, counselling to both victims and perpetrators (male groups) legal assistance and women support groups. In addition, Rifka Annisa aims to develop a strong network of health care providers, police and legal aid organizations and to improve the capacity of their partners by providing for example training programs. At the same time Rifka Annisa is strongly advocating against violence and especially violence against women through the media (film production, photo exhibition etc.). They also aim to influence local government to implement gender responsive policies. [11].

[9] Rifka Annisa, (No year), Kenschets Rifka Annisa - Profil Lembaga Rifka Annisa
[10] Rifka Annisa, (No year), Kenschets Rifka Annisa - Profil Lembaga Rifka Annisa
[11] Rifka Annisa, (No year), Kenschets Rifka Annisa - Profil Lembaga Rifka Annisa

# 3 Methodological approach and reflection

## 3.1 Overall methodological approach

This chapter describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

Note: this methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report A detailed overview of the approach is described in appendix 1.

The first (changes in organisational capacity) and the fourth evaluation question are addressed together through:

- **Changes in the 5C indicators since the baseline:** standard indicators have been agreed upon for each of the five capabilities of the five capabilities framework (see appendix 2) and changes between the baseline, and the endline situation have been described. For data collection a mix of data collection methods has been used, including self-assessments by SPO staff; interviews with SPO staff and externals; document review; observation. For data analysis, the Nvivo software program for qualitative data analysis has been used. Final descriptions per indicator and per capability with corresponding scores have been provided.
- **Key organisational capacity changes – 'general causal map':** during the endline workshop a brainstorm has been facilitated to generate the key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO since the baseline, with related underlying causes. For this purpose, a visual as well as a narrative causal map have been described.

In terms of the attribution question (2 and 4), **'process tracing'** is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to

focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

## 3.2 Assessing changes in organisational capacity and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?** And the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This is explained below. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

The evaluators considered it important to also note down a consolidated SPO story and this would also provide more information about what the SPO considered to be important in terms of organisational capacity changes since the baseline and how they perceived these key changes to have come about. Whilst this information has not been validated with sources other than SPO staff, it was considered important to understand how the SPOs has perceived changes in the organisation since the baseline.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information is provided for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the next session on the evaluation question on attribution, as described below and in the appendix 1.

How information was collected and analysed for addressing evaluation question 1 and 4, in terms of description of changes in indicators per capability as well as in terms of the general causal map, based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff, is further described below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and

indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012[12].

Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1) **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2) **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3) **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4) **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5) **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team

[12] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Please see appendix 1 for a description of the detailed process and steps.

## 3.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity - evaluation question 2 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question*: **To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia*** **(i.e. measuring effectiveness)?** and the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Below, the selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

### 3.3.1 Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

For the detailed results of this selection, in the four countries that CDI is involved in, please see appendix 1. The following SPOs were selected for process tracing:

Ethiopia: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE (4/9)

India: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE, VTRC (5/10)

Indonesia: ASB, ECPAT, PtPPMA, YPI, YRBI (5/12)

Liberia: BSC, RHRAP (2/5).

### 3.3.2 Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ' general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained. More information can be found in Appendix 1.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

### 3.3.3 Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team. These can also be found in appendix 1.

**Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach:** this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

**Using standard indicators and scores**: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

**General causal map:** whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

**Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question:** this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

**Utilisation of the evaluation**

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

**Design** – mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the

most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

**Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication:** many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

**5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process:** The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

# 4 Results

## 4.1 MFS II supported capacity development interventions

Below an overview of the different MFS II supported capacity development interventions of Rifka Annisa that have taken place since 2011 are described. The information is based on the information provided by Rutgers WPF.

Table 1
*Information about MFS II supported capacity development interventions since baseline*

| Title of the MFS II supported capacity development intervention | Objectives | Activities | Timing and duration | Budget |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Capacity Development training on M&E | The development of more structural approach towards M&E | Tool development | 2012 | IDR 3.600.000 |


Source: 5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_SPO perspective_Indonesia_Rifka Annisa

## 4.2 Changes in capacity development and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

Below you can find a description of the changes in each of the five core capabilities. This information is based on the analysis of the information per each of the indicators. This detailed information for each of the indicators describes the current situation, and how and why it has changed since the baseline. See also annex 3.

### 4.2.1 Changes in the five core capabilities

**Capability to act and commit**




Rifka Annisa experienced changes in the leadership, both at the board level and executive level (director). The change in leadership brought a positive atmosphere to the organization dynamic of Rifka Annisa. The management of the last two years has been very active in providing operational planning directives. Annual (work) planning includes a detailed budget plan to ensure that operational activities are financed in accordance with the strategic plan. Rifka Annisa still needs to improve their Strategic Planning and complete the plan with comprehensive external risk (threats) assessment and categorize the threats into low, medium and high risks, plus possible ways to overcome those threats. The organization also needs to regularly analyse the effectivity of budget spent (Budget vs. Actual Analysis), and this duty is part of the Board's responsibility.

Rifka Annisa gained a lot of benefit from the more active participation of the board, the director, and the managers in strategic guidance and decision making mechanisms. Strategies are now based on the vision and mission, in combination with baseline recommendations and findings, as well as input from stakeholders and staff on impacts on the target group. Almost all staff had the ability to do their day to day tasks and responsibilities. Rifka Annisa had also mandated the staff to master the knowledge of gender issue. This gained through induction and continuous capacity building within the organization. The capacity building through training has also supported Rifka Annisa's staff to conduct their role and responsibility better. English training for staff was intended to improve communication and wrting skill of the staff when they have to deal with Donors. Other thematic training such as, monitoring and evaluation training, the training on LGBT issues, feminism training, and men's care training was provided for all staff, starting from the office boy, security, and managerial level. The trainings have resulted in the improvement of staff capacity to accomplish the responsibilities, such as monitoring and evaluation capacity, facilitation skill, negotiation skill, proposal development skill, program planning skill, etc.

There is a standard mechanism for financial incentives for staff and also standard evaluation mechanism to be included in the payroll system. There is also an improvement regarding the reward and punishment system since April 2014. Remuneration now considers staff education background and work performance. Rifka Annisa is involved with many donor organizations and local governments and as such have a diversity of funders.  A clear funding procedure was still not in place, however, staff indicated that they have more opportunities in developing proposals to get funding from donors.

Score: from 2.9 to 3.6 (slight improvement)

**Capability to adapt and self-renew**




In the last two years M&E tools have been developed by the program division, and the information obtained has been used to improve and enrich existing programs. The evidence and results based M&E approach that is required by the donor encourages the staff to create programs in which information can be tracked and obtained up until the activity level.

Previously, it was director and manager who conducted evaluation, but now Rifka annisa applied a participatory evaluation. Every division evaluated other division. The evaluation was conducted within division and reported to the manager. In addition to that, the monitoring and evaluation training provided by donors have contributed to the increased staff capacity to conduct internal monitoring and evaluation.

M&E tools have been developed and applied at the activity level. A slight change has occurred There has been no new mechanism for the staff on reflection meetings during the last two years. There was a formal and informal meetings, such as organization meetings, managers meetings, annual staff meeting, evaluation and planning meeting to report the program development, its challenges, and its problems. The CFA has stated that although the M&E system is in place, Rifka Annisa needs to step further in order to build and effective MIS, data-base and knowledge management due to its leading position amongst similar organizations in Indonesia. A mechanism for sharing not only data, but also lessons learned to strategic stakeholders should be developed.


Rifka Annisa provided open and free opportunities for the staff to express their ideas on Wednesday and Friday. There was no gap between staff and the managerial levels.
Rifka Annisa has more extensive networking during the last two years. The networking has been expanded in village up to national level.

The program implementation was based on the input and feedback from the networkings, as well as based on the evidence from the stakeholders, iclusding the beneficiaries. Rifka Annisa conducted interview to beneficiaries about the impact of the program to beneficiaries' life.

There is no formal M&E system in place, although M&E tools have been developed and are utilized at the activity level in order to meet donor requirements. There is a detailed annual work plan and financial plan, and they have to report on activities and expenditures. There is no organizational level M&E aimed at measuring impact. There is however attention for outcomes and impact at the project level which is incorporated into reports. There is no dedicated person in place for M&E. There are conflicting statements onwhat M&E entails and how it is used. Discussions can be held at monthly staff meetings, at the managers' meetings, at the annual evaluation meeting and the annual members' meeting. The gap between managerial level, and staff has reduced and they are now more informal discussions with staff members. Rifka Annisa staff engages in network activities with various organizations, invites experts to share information, follows the media, maintains contacts through discussions and email, and shares this information internally. Rifka Annisa works closely together with its beneficiaries in order to best serve their needs. They are also open to their feedback and input.

Score: from 2.8 to 3.2 (slight improvement)

**Capability to deliver on development objectives**




The development of the work plan was more rigid and there has been an annual activities planning funded by donor and by organization. Every program now has a clear work plan, budget, and target for each activity which is implemented by the staff. The work plan and budget plan are understood by the staff. Rifka Annisa also developed voluntarily system or mechanism to implement the program, having a low cost resource by opening internship. Rifka Annisa also built partnership with private sectors and media to get low cost price when conducting the program. Under the MFS II program Rifka had opened internship opportunities for other members of Aliansi Satu Visi (ASV), providing excellent chances to learn about management and SGBV case handling. Vice versa, RA had also sent its staff to Ardhanary Institute to learn more about Lesbian Bisexual and Transgender (LBT) issues. Based on this experience RA realized the need to improve SRH services for their clients, developing better referral networks with other members of ASV particularly in Yogyakarta (PKBI DIY and currently CD Bethesda) in order to provide more comprehensive services for SGBV survivors. Related to this need and situation, RA need to invest more in capacity building for staff as well as clients' data management. Furthermore the CFA stated that Rifka Annisa should focus in developing itself as a center of excellence in SGBV areas, as well as work with Theory of Change and using Result-based Management approaches in order to improve operations.

The organization has resources which are used effectively and efficiently. However, Rifka annisa has also made an effort to deliver the output in a timely manner by conducting more assistance to junior staff and supervision, conducting staff capacity building, and involving external consultant such as editor, translator, and writer,  Rifka Annisa had a mechanism to measure the quality of the service. The organization developed tools, such as tools to measure clients's resilience, pre test and post test of a training, etc. to measure whether their service has met beneficiaries's expectation.

Score: from 2.7 to 3.0 (very slight improvement)

**Capability to relate**





The organization expanded its network and develops good relationships from local level to national level. During the ast two years, they al also built relationship with schools, with Ministry of Religious Affair (religious Affair Office), BPPM (women and community empowerment board), Supreme Court, and some of the government institution, not only in national and provincial level, but also government in sub district and village level. The organization has done a lot in involving communities in their various activities, including to prevent violence against women. However, the CFA has stated that further development of the network and collaboration with private sectors is encouraged.

The organisation works together with stakeholders in building community based crisis centers and in shared activities like lobby and advocacy. Rifka frequently engages in campaigns and outreach activities. They do home visits and surveys, or invite clients for workshops and meetings and hereby

engage with the clients frequently. There are formal and informal meetings to discuss issues and exchange information and this is now also supported by the use of social media.

Score: from 3.5 to 3.8 (very slight improvement)

**Capability to achieve coherence**




The vision and mission of the organization are reviewed in the three-year general assembly meeting and the annual members' meeting, and all staff were involved in the annual strategic planning meeting. Operational guidelines are now laid down in standard operational procedures (SOP), now that manual of RCT and Rifka WCC have been combined. Almost all of the staff members hold the opinion that the programs are in line with the vision and mission and the long term strategic plan. Programs are connected with each other through their efforts to eliminate violence against women, as outlined in the vision and mission, and hereby complimentary in nature.

Score: from 3.5 to 3.6 (very slight improvement)


### 4.2.2 General changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO

The evaluation team carried out an end line assessment at Rifka Annisa from 25th March to 27th March 2014. During this end line workshop, the team made a recap of key features of the organisation in the baseline in September 2012 (such as vision, mission, strategies, clients, partnerships). This was the basis for discussing changes that had happened to the organisation since the baseline. The main changes that happened in the organisation since the baseline, as identified by the staff during the end line workshop were:

1. Staff being more productive and involved in the organization's decision-making [3]
2. Greater motivation for staff to get promoted [9]
3. Staff being motivated to improve their facilitation skills [4]
4. Improved quality of monitoring and evaluation [2]
5. A stronger partnership with local authorities in form of a signed MoU [5].

All of these organisational capacity changes are expected to lead to strengthening the performance of the organisation [1].

1. Strengthening of the organization's work performance capacity [1];
Each of these changes in the organisation, and related organisational capacity changes and other factors are further explained below. The numbers in the narrative correspond to the numbers in the visual.





According to staff present at the end line workshop, **staff became more productive and involved in the organization's decision making** [3] since the baseline in 2012. This was enabled by an increase in collective decision making meetings where both regular staff and volunteers attended [6], a more active and engaged board of directors to deal with internal issues [7], and more staff members being promoted [8]. Each of these factors came about from an overall change in leadership in 2012 where both the acting director as well as the individual board members was replaced with new candidates [16].

The other organisation capacity change is that **staff became more motivated to get promoted** [9], which was due to a change in the HR policy and remuneration system. In this new system staff was evaluated differently, and compensated more fairly according to the tasks and responsibilities they possessed [12]. Prior to this, the salary difference between junior and senior level staff was almost negligible, providing little incentive for junior staff to opt for promotion. This change in the remuneration system was implemented following one of the recommendations from the organizational development consultant who Rifka Annisa hired in 2013 [17].

Another organisational capacity change that happened since the baseline was that staff became more **motivated to contribute to and develop facilitation sessions** [4]. Being an organization who focuses on capacity building, Rifka Annisa has a lot of scheduled time dedicated to training local communities, other organizations and internal staff. So whilst the need for facilitation skills was high, staff often considered the task of facilitation secondary to their other program activities. However, there was a change in the organisation in terms of realising the importance of increased facilitation skills [18] and this finally staff being more motivated to engage in facilitation [4]. There were three reasons for this change in motivation to facilitate. First of all the there was a new HRD system which now also included facilitation skills and volunteering as evaluation criteria[10].This was the result of an overall change in the staff's evaluation mechanism and remuneration system [12]. Secondly, there were now more opportunities for staff to take turns in facilitation sessions [13], which helped the staff in being able to actively contribute to facilitation [4]. This was a direct result of realizing the need to improve facilitation skill [18]. Thirdly, the new HRD regulation set a higher standard of being a facilitator [11] which encouraged staff to improve their facilitation skill.

A significant change in terms of an **improvement of the quality of monitoring and evaluation** in Rifka Annisa took place [2]. As mentioned before, this came about from a much more structural approach towards M&E in the form of specific tools such as program planning, log frame tracking and analysis, work plans and the development and monitoring of specific indicators [14]. These tools were developed [15] following strict donor requirements to adopt a result-based management approach in the implementation of the organization's programs [19].

Lastly, **the partnership with local authorities was significantly strengthened** after signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with sub-district government officials and the police [5]. This came about from an active effort to increase the networking quality and quantity of Rifka Annisa [20]. Results of this could be clearly seen in the contribution of Rifka Annissa to the LGBT – Lesbian, Gay, Bi-sexual, and Transgender) program where several organizations were drawn together to commit to the cross cutting issues of disability, LGBT and sexual abuse.

# 5 Discussion and conclusion

## 5.1 Methodological issues

**General: Applied to all or most SPOs**

With regard to the methodology, Indonesia has made some data collection adjustment based on the context. The first adjustment was related to the type of instrument used. To assess the organizational capacity, the study has provided self-assessment, observation and interview sheets. These all were used during the baseline with all SPOs. During the end line the team used self-assessment, interview and observation sheets. However the evaluator applied interview sheets as self-assessment—where participants were asked to fill these sheets by themselves. For the participants who did not attend the workshop, the interviews were done separately using the interview sheet and the results from the interview were included in the subgroup interview sheet that was already filled by the staff member. Were combined into the relevant sub categories in the interview sheet. Interview sheets were also applied for interviews with the CFAs, partners and consultants.

The baseline study showed that having two similar instruments (self assessments, and interview sheets) did not have any effect in relation to obtaining adequate and quality data.
To have some clarification post visit to all SPOs, the evaluator used email and phone interviews.

**Rifka Annisa**

The MSF II evaluation team carried out endline workshop in Rifka Annisa in the end of March 2014, before the initial training for the evaluation team of MSF II endline conducted in Yogyakarta. As the first workshop of the endline process, the workshop in Rifka was considered as an effort to generate lessons learned of the data collection process in SPOs. The process followed strictly the methodological guidelines, and started with sending the self-assessment sheets to the SPO, a day before the workshop so that these could be filled beforehand . It was expected that the SPO has finished answering the self-assessment sheets on the endline workshop day and gained deeper understanding on the topics/theme of the end-line workshop. However, it turned out to be more appropriate to discuss and fill in the self-assessment sheets with the guidance of the evaluator in answering the questions related to the indicators.

The endline workshop started with general explanation of the end line process to participants, and the session continued with group self-assessment according to the functional groups of the organization (management, program staff, field staff, finance and admin staff). Since there was no specific person appointed as M&E, this function was represented by other staff who conducted an M&E role. . The SPO preferred to fill in the indicators during the workshop rather than prior to workshop as expected. Most of the groups needed to be assisted closely during the process, and be assisted in understanding the meaning of the questions related to the indicators in the self-assessment sheets. As more time was needed to finish the self-assessment sheet, the process moved to group interviews, and it was agreed to submit the filled self-assessment sheets on a particular date. Participants said that group interview sessions were much more effective as they could understand the questions easily and thereby provide answers. The interview sessions provided lot of information about organizational capacity. The general causal map discussion on the next day provided more information on the organizational capacity changes based on the 5 capabilities framework . It was later known that discussions did not need to strictly find out the changes for each of the 5 capabilities directly and had to draw the causal map between changes. The process of general causal map in Rifka Annisa was an analysis process after the workshop and concluded after all field notes were written and analyzed. - To complete the analysis, the


evaluation team interviewed the government partner from government and thecapacity development consultant.

However, it needs to be highlighted that the self-assessment sheet was quite challenging for the organization to fill in. It took a couple of days for the SPO to work with the group and have the paper filled in.

## 5.2 Changes in organisational capacity development

This section aims to provide an answer to the first and fourth evaluation questions:

1. *What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?*
4. *What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?*




Changes on all five capabilities for Rifka Annisa, but mostly so under the capability to act and commit. Below the changes in each of the capabilities are further explained, by referring to the specific indicators that changed.

Over the last two years most improvements took place in the capability to act and commit. Responsive leadership improved as a change in leadership brought a positive atmosphere to the organization dynamic of Rifka Annisa. Strategic guidance improved considerably, due to a more active and involved upper management. The board is involved in more decisions on the ground and the director is more active in providing strategic directions, even upon a staff members request. Staff turnover has slightly improved. For the last two years the turnover was relatively lower than previous years, as Rifka Annisa made an effort to maintain the remaining staff by providing capacity building through training. Articulated strategies improved slightly as Rifka Annisa made an effort to have a baseline in every program in order to have a more systematic mechanism for evaluation during the endline. Daily operations improved as the management of the last two years has been very active in providing operational planning directives. Annual (work) planning includes a detailed budget plan to ensure that operational activities are financed in accordance with the strategic plan. Staff skills also improved due to greater attention to skills and training as well as facilitator selection. In turn, training opportunities increased in terms of English training for all staff, thematic training such as monitoring and evaluation training, the training on LGBT issues, feminism training, and men’s care training. Incentives for staff have improved as well. The organization now provides free accommodation, a basic salary and allowance, as well as loans through salary deduction. Funding sources have improved very slightly, and Rifka currently has business programs in place aimed at generating income for the organization in order

to become less dependent on donors and more self-sufficient. For example, they now actively run the business division by renting out the guesthouse.

The capability to adapt and self renew has improved overall. First, the application of M&E has improved. In the last two years the program division has developed M&E tools, and the information obtained has been used to improve and enrich existing programs. M&E competencies slightly improved as well. The development and implementation of M&E tools indicates that understanding about M&E has improved. M&E for future strategies has improved through the increased attention to outcomes and impacts at the project level. In terms of the organizations system for tracking the environment, a slight improvement was found through the increase in networking activities. More attention is now paid on this aspect through the organization of public discussions and by sharing knowledge regarding the newest issues which has influenced the organization's perspective.

The capability to deliver on development objectives has improved. In terms of clear operational plans the development of the work plan was more rigid and there has been an annual activities planning funded by donor and by the organization. Cost effective resources use has been slightly improved due to the application of an efficient cost activity, such as combining two activities at once to reduce transportation cost. Delivering planned outputs has also only slightly improved. Rifka Annisa has made an effort to deliver the outputs in a timely manner by conducting more assistance to junior staff and providing supervision, conducting staff capacity building, and involving external consultants such as editor, translator, and writer. The mechanism for beneficiary needs has improved slightly through a mechanism to measure whether services meet beneficiary needs. In this approach tools are developed which allow measuring of client resilience. The balance in quality and efficiency has slightly improved as Rifka Annisa has combined staff evaluations with job descriptions.

The capability to relate has improved slightly in terms of engagement in networks. During the last two years, staff indicated that Rifka Annisa has extended its' networking. Rifka Annisa did not only work with hospitals, police, court, but also built relationships with the Ministry of Religious Affairs (religious Affair Office), BPPM (women and community empowerment board), Supreme Court, and some of the government institutions, not only in national and provincial level, but also government in sub district and village level. Engagement with target groups has also very slightly improved through engaging in direct interaction with beneficiaries through campaigns and outreach activities, but also new social media such as WhatsApp Messenger and Twitter. Relationships within the organization have slightly improved in that the organization has committed to a good working atmosphere in which staff can share ideas freely.

In the capability to achieve coherence, operational guidelines have slightly improved as they are laid down in standard operational procedures (SOPs), for example in a finance manual and a method for setting up a referral system to other organizations.

**General organisational capacity changes related to MFS II Interventions**

The evaluators considered it important to also note down the SPO's story in terms of changes in the organisation since the baseline, and this would also provide more information about reasons for change, which were difficult to get for the individual indicators. Also for some issues there may not have been relevant indicators available in the list of core indicators provide by the evaluation team. Please note that this information is based only on the information provided by Rifka Annisa staff during the endline workshop, but no validation of this information has been done like with the process tracing causal maps. For details in relation to attribution, we refer to the next section (5.3).

During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by Rifka Annisa staff, these have been captured in the general causal map in 4.2.2: staff being more productive and involved in the organization's decision-making; greater motivation for staff to get promoted; staff being motivated to improve their facilitation skills; improved quality of monitoring and evaluation and a stronger partnership with local authorities in form of a signed MoU. All of these are expected to contribute to strengthening of the organization's work performance capacity. Rifka Annisa staff experienced these as the most important capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline.

Staff is more productive and involved with organizational decision making as a result of collective decision making occurring more frequently, a more active and engaged board to organisational matters, and more staff being promoted. Each of these changes can be attributed to the change in leadership that occurred in 2012, where both the acting director as well as the individual board members were replaced with new candidates.

Greater motivation for staff to get promoted occurred due to greater benefits being offered. This can be attributed to a change in the remuneration system and the staff evaluation mechanism on the one hand, and to the increased number of opportunities to take turn in the facilitation sessions on the other. The former can bet attributed to a recommendation from the hired organizational development consultant on HR issues which was an MFS II sponsored capacity development intervention. The latter can be attributed to the organization realizing the importance to improve the staff's facilitation skills.

Similarly, staff being motivated to improve their facilitation skills resulted from a new HRD system in place that now is also applied to facilitator selection. This can be attributed to the change in the staff remuneration/evaluation system on the one hand, and the increased number of opportunities to take turn in facilitation sessions on the other, as described above.

Improved quality of monitoring and evaluation can be attributed to the baseline having encouraged the development of program planning, logframes, work plans and indicators. This resulted from an improved quality in monitoring and evaluation through development of M&E tools. The development of M&E tools was an MFS II funded capacity development intervention by Rutgers WPF, and can be attributed to the Donor requirement to adopt Results Based Management in program implementation.

Finally, the MoU with local authorities has strengthened the partnership to achieve a common goal, which can be directly attributed to the change of the organization's networking quality and quantity in that Rifka Annisa invested in relations to local authorities. Results of this could be clearly seen in the contribution of Rifka Annissa to the LGBT – Lesbian, Gay, Bi-sexual, and Transgender) program where several organizations were drawn together to commit to the cross cutting issues of disability, LGBT and sexual abuse.

In conclusion in relation to MFS II funded capacity development interventions, this can be mainly related to improved monitoring and evaluation in the organization, and specifically refer to the training on M&E and more particularly the development of M&E tools. Furthermore, specific organization development points were found in an organizational capacity scan that has led to some changes in the way staff performs. However, this has also been affected by other developments such as a major change in leadership as well as a greater focus on facilitation skills. Strengthening organization work performance in general can therefore be partially related to MFS II supported capacity development interventions, according to staff present at the endline workshop. However, it must be noted that the information provided has not been validated through other sources of information, and therefore the conclusions must be understood in that respect.

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**Overall evaluation methodology**


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LAPORAN Jan-Dec - WPF.docx

Laporan Tahun 2011.docx

Laporan Tahun 2012 (WPF).docx

Planning 5C fieldwork Indonesian.docx

Report OCA 2013 - FINAL English.docx

Annual report format MenCare 2013-1 (Autosaved).doc

budget mfs2.xls

Financial Report Sexual Diversity.xls

Laporan Tahun 2012 (WPF)-MSF II.doc

MOU WPF.pdf

WPF MFS 2.rar

Annex C_5CBAHASA- endline_support to capacity development sheet_SPO perspective_Indonesia_Rifka Annisa.doc

Annex G_5c endline self-assessment sheet_programme staff_Indonesia_Rifka Annisa.docx

Annex P_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_field staff_Indonesia_Rifka Annisa.docx

BAHASA-Annex G_5c endline self-assessment sheet_programme staff_Indonesiaa_Rifka Annisa.doc

BAHASA-Annex H_5c endline self-assessment sheet_ManE staff_Indonesia_Rifka Annisa.doc

BAHASA-Annex I_5c endline self-assessment sheet_admin HRM staff_Indonesia_Rifka annisa.doc

BAHASA-Annex L_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_management_Indonesia_Rifka Annisa.doc

# List of Respondents

**List of Respondents**

**People Present at the Workshops**

| **Date:** | **23 Juni 2014** | **Organisation: Rifka Annisa Indonesia** | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **NAME** | **ROLE IN THE ORGANISATION** | **DURATION OF SERVICE** | **PHONE** | **E-MAIL** |
| **Management** | | | | |
| Suharti Muklas | Director | | | Yu_harti@yahoo.com |
| Rina Widiastuti | Manager Advocacy and Service | | | |
| Siti Amarah | Manager Finance | | | |
| Any Sundari | Manager Public Relation | | 081 228 314 817 | neysundari2010@gmail.com |
| **Program/ Project staff** | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| **Admin/ HR/Finance staff** | | | | |
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| **Field staff staff** | | | | |
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| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| **Others** | | | | |
| | | | | |

**List of People Inteviewed**

| **Date:** | 24 Juni 2014 | **Organisation:** | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **NAME** | **ROLE IN THE ORGANISATION** | **DURATION OF SERVICE** | **PHONE** | **E-MAIL** |
| **Management** | | | | |
| Suharti Muklas | Director | | | Yu_harti@yahoo.com |
| Rina Widiastuti | Manager Advocacy and Service | | | |
| Siti Amarah | Manager Finance | | | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Any Sundari | Manager Public Relation | | 081 228 314 817 | neysundari2010@gmail.com |
| **Program/ Project staff** | | | | |
| Nurmawati | Advocacy and Service Officer | | | - |
| Asih Nuryanti | Advocacy and Service Officer | | | |
| Arfianto OA | Client Assistance Officer | | | |
| Deffrentia One | PR and Media Officer | | | |
| M Tantowi | Advocay and Service Officer | | | |
| Fitri Indra H | Research and Development Officer | | | |
| **Admin/ HR/Finance staff** | | | | |
| Alfi Sulistyawati | Finance Officer | | | - |
| Sri Wahyuni | Finance Officer | | | |
| Nurina Wardana | HRM | | | |
| Hendi S | Admin Officer | | | |
| **Field staff staff** | | | | |
| Niken Anggrek Wulan | Field Staff | | | |
| Budi Wulandari | Field Staff | | | |
| Ani Nurfaida | Field Staff | | | |
| Ratna Dwi Astuti | Field Staff | | | |
| Ali Rosidin | Field Staff | | | |
| Abdul Rohim | Field Staff | | | |
| Nusriyati | Field Staff | | | |
| **Others** | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |

# Appendix 1 Methodological approach & reflection

## 1. Introduction

This appendix describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around four key evaluation questions:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

Note: the methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report. At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

# 2. Changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 1

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?**

This question was mainly addressed by reviewing changes in 5c indicators, but additionally a 'general causal map' based on the SPO perspective on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline has been developed. Each of these is further explained below. The development of the general causal map is integrated in the steps for the endline workshop, as mentioned below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012.[13] Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1) **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2) **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3) **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or

[13] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;

4) **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5) **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Below each of these steps is further explained.

*Step 1. Provide the **description of indicators** in the relevant formats – CDI team*

- These formats were to be used when collecting data from SPO staff, CFA, partners, and consultants. For each of these respondents different formats have been developed, based on the list of 5C indicators, similar to the procedure that was used during the baseline assessment. The CDI team needed to add the 2012 baseline description of each indicator. The idea was that each respondent would be requested to review each description per indicator, and indicate whether the current situation is different from the baseline situation, how this situation has changed, and what the reasons for the changes in indicators are. At the end of each format, a more general question is added that addresses how the organisation has changed its capacity since the baseline, and what possible reasons for change exist. Please see below the questions asked for each indicator as well as the more general questions at the end of the list of indicators.

General questions about key changes in the capacity of the SPO

*What do you consider to be the key changes in terms of how the organisation/ SPO has developed its capacity since the baseline (2012)?*

*What do you consider to be the main explanatory reasons (interventions, actors or factors) for these changes?*

**List of questions to be asked for each of the 5C indicators** (The entry point is the the description of each indicator as in the 2012 baseline report):

1. *How has the situation of this indicator changed compared to the situation during the baseline in 2012? Please tick one of the following scores:*
   - -2 = Considerable deterioration
   - -1 = A slight deterioration
   - 0 = No change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012
   - +1 = Slight improvement
   - +2 = Considerable improvement
2. *Please describe what exactly has changed since the baseline in 2012*
3. *What interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation in 2012? Please tick and describe what interventions, actors or factors influenced this indicator, and how. You can tick and describe more than one choice.*
   - Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by **SPO**: ..... .
   - Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **Dutch CFA (MFS II funding)**: .... .
   - Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **other funders**: ..... .
   - **Other** interventions, actors or factors: ..... .
   - Don't know.

*Step 2. **Review** the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team*

Before the in-country team and the CDI team started collecting data in the field, it was important that they reviewed the description for each indicator as described in the baseline reports, and also added to the endline formats for review by respondents. These descriptions are based on document review, observation, interviews with SPO staff, CFA staff and external respondents during the baseline. It was important to explain this to respondents before they filled in the formats.

*Step 3. **Send the formats** adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)*

The CDI team was responsible for collecting data from the CFA:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – CFA perspective.

The in-country team was responsible for collecting data from the SPO and from external respondents (except CFA). The following formats were sent before the fieldwork started:

- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – SPO perspective.
- 5C Endline interview guides for externals: partners; OD consultants.

*Step 4.* ***Collect, upload & code the documents*** *from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team*

The CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team, collected the following documents from SPOs and CFAs:

- Project documents: project proposal, budget, contract (Note that for some SPOs there is a contract for the full MFS II period 2011-2015; for others there is a yearly or 2-yearly contract. All new contracts since the baseline in 2012 will need to be collected);
- Technical and financial progress reports since the baseline in 2012;.
- Mid-term evaluation reports;
- End of project-evaluation reports (by the SPO itself or by external evaluators);
- Contract intake forms (assessments of the SPO by the CFA) or organisational assessment scans made by the CFA that cover the 2011-2014 period;
- Consultant reports on specific inputs provided to the SPO in terms of organisational capacity development;
- Training reports (for the SPO; for alliance partners, including the SPO);
- Organisational scans/ assessments, carried out by the CFA or by the Alliance Assessments;
- Monitoring protocol reports, especially for the 5C study carried out by the MFS II Alliances;
- Annual progress reports of the CFA and of the Alliance in relation to capacity development of the SPOs in the particular country;
- Specific reports that are related to capacity development of SPOs in a particular country.

The following documents (since the baseline in 2012) were requested from SPO:

- Annual progress reports;
- Annual financial reports and audit reports;
- Organisational structure vision and mission since the baseline in 2012;
- Strategic plans;
- Business plans;
- Project/ programme planning documents;
- Annual work plan and budgets;
- Operational manuals;
- Organisational and policy documents: finance, human resource development, etc.;
- Monitoring and evaluation strategy and implementation plans;
- Evaluation reports;
- Staff training reports;
- Organisational capacity reports from development consultants.

The CDI team will coded these documents in NVivo (qualitative data analysis software program) against the 5C indicators.

*Step 5.* ***Prepare and organise the field visit*** *to the SPO – in-country team*

Meanwhile the in-country team prepared and organised the logistics for the field visit to the SPO:

- **General endline workshop** consisted about one day for the self-assessments (about ½ to ¾ of the day) and brainstorm (about 1 to 2 hours) on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline and underlying interventions, factors and actors ('general causal map'), see also explanation below. This was done with the five categories of key staff: managers; project/ programme staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin & HRM staff; field staff. Note: for SPOs involved in process tracing an additional 1 to 1½ day workshop (managers; program/project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff) was necessary. See also step 7;
- **Interviews with SPO staff** (roughly one day);

- **Interviews with external respondents** such as partners and organisational development consultants depending on their proximity to the SPO. These interviews coulc be scheduled after the endline workshop and interviews with SPO staff.

General causal map

During the 5C endline process, a 'general causal map' has been developed, based on key organisational capacity changes and underlying causes for these changes, as perceived by the SPO. The general causal map describes cause-effect relationships, and is described both as a visual as well as a narrative.

As much as possible the same people that were involved in the baseline were also involved in the endline workshop and interviews.

*Step 6.* ***Interview the CFA*** *– CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for sending the sheets/ formats to the CFA and for doing a follow-up interview on the basis of the information provided so as to clarify or deepen the information provided. This relates to:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet - CFA perspective.

*Step 7.* ***Run the endline workshop*** *with the SPO – in-country team*

This included running the endline workshop, including facilitation of the development of the general causal map, self-assessments, interviews and observations. Particularly for those SPOs that were selected for process tracing all the relevant information needed to be analysed prior to the field visit, so as to develop an initial causal map. Please see Step 6 and also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two).

An endline workshop with the SPO was intended to:

- Explain the purpose of the fieldwork;
- Carry out in the self-assessments by SPO staff subgroups (unless these have already been filled prior to the field visits) - this may take some 3 hours.
- Facilitate a brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012 and underlying interventions, factors and actors.

***Purpose of the fieldwork*****:** to collect data that help to provide information on what changes took place in terms of organisational capacity development of the SPO as well as reasons for these changes. The baseline that was carried out in 2012 was to be used as a point of reference.

***Brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes and influencing factors***: a brainstorm was facilitated on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012. In order to kick start the discussion, staff were reminded of the key findings related to the historical time line carried out in the baseline (vision, mission, strategies, funding, staff). This was then used to generate a discussion on key changes that happened in the organisation since the baseline (on cards). Then cards were selected that were related to organisational capacity changes, and organised. Then a 'general causal map' was developed, based on these key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change as experienced by the SPO staff. This was documented as a visual and narrative.This general causal map was to get the story of the SPO on what they perceived as key organisational capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline, in addition to the specific details provided per indicator.

***Self-assessments*:** respondents worked in the respective staff function groups: management; programme/ project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin and HRM staff; field staff. Staff were assisted where necessary so that they could really understand what it was they were being asked to do as well as what the descriptions under each indicator meant.

Note: for those SPOs selected for process tracing an additional endline workshop was held to facilitate the development of detailed causal maps for each of the identified organisational change/ outcome areas that fall under the capability to act and commit, and under the capability to adapt and self-renew, and that are likely related to capacity development interventions by the CFA. See also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two). It was up to the in-country team whether this workshop was held straight after the initial endline workshop or after the workshop and the follow-up interviews. It could also be held as a separate workshop at another time.

*Step 8. **Interview SPO staff** – in-country team*

After the endline workshop (developing the general causal map and carrying out self-assessments in subgroups), interviews were held with SPO staff (subgroups) to follow up on the information that was provided in the self-assessment sheets, and to interview staff that had not yet provided any information.

*Step 9. **Fill-in observation sheets** – in-country team*

During the visit at the SPO, the in-country team had to fill in two sheets based on their observation:

- 5C Endline observation sheet;
- 5C Endline observable indicators.

*Step 10. **Interview externals** – in-country team & CDI team*

The in-country team also needed to interview the partners of the SPO as well as organisational capacity development consultants that have provided support to the SPO. The CDI team interviewed the CFA.

*Step 11. **Upload and auto-code all the formats** collected by in-country team and CDI team – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for uploading and auto-coding (in Nvivo) of the documents that were collected by the in-country team and by the CDI team.

*Step 12. Provide the **overview of information** per 5C indicator to in-country team – CDI team*

After the analysis in NVivo, the CDI team provided a copy of all the information generated per indicator to the in-country team for initial analysis.

*Step 13. **Analyse the data and develop a draft description** of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team*

The in-country team provided a draft description of the findings per indicator, based on the information generated per indicator. The information generated under the general questions were linked to the general causal map or detailed process tracing related causal map.

*Step 14. **Analyse the data and finalize the description** of the findings per indicator, per capability and general – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for checking the analysis by the in-country team with the Nvivo generated data and to make suggestions for improvement and ask questions for clarification to which the in-country team responded. The CDI team then finalised the analysis and provided final descriptions and scores per indicator and also summarize these per capability and calculated the summary capability scores based on the average of all indicators by capability.

*Step 15.* ***Analyse the information*** *in the general causal map –in-country team & CDI team*

The general causal map based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff present at the workshop, was further detailed by in-country team and CDI team, and based on the notes made during the workshop and where necessary additional follow up with the SPO. The visual and narrative was finalized after feedback by the SPO. During analysis of the general causal map relationships with MFS II support for capacity development and other factors and actors were identified. All the information has been reviewed by the SPO and CFA.

# 3. Attributing changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 2

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: ***To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?***

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process. The box below provides some background information on process tracing.

## Background information on process tracing

The essence of process tracing research is that scholars want to go beyond merely identifying correlations between independent variables (Xs) and outcomes (Ys). Process tracing in social science is commonly defined by its addition to trace causal mechanisms (Bennett, 2008a, 2008b; Checkle, 2008; George & Bennett, 2005). A causal mechanism can be defined as "a complex system which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts" (Glennan, 1996, p. 52). Process tracing involves "attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable" (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 206-207).

Process tracing can be differentiated into three variants within social science: theory testing, theory building, and explaining outcome process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

- Theory testing process tracing uses a theory from the existing literature and then tests whether evidence shows that each part of hypothesised causal mechanism is present in a given case, enabling within case inferences about whether the mechanism functioned as expected in the case and whether the mechanism as a whole was present. No claims can be made however, about whether the mechanism was the only cause of the outcome.
- Theory building process tracing seeks to build generalizable theoretical explanations from empirical evidence, inferring that a more general causal mechanism exists from the fact of a particular case.
- Finally, explaining outcome process tracing attempts to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific historical case. Here the aim is not to build or test more general theories but to craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case centric than theory oriented.

Explaining outcome process tracing is the most suitable type of process tracing for analysing the causal mechanisms for selected key organisational capacity changes of the SPOs. This type of process tracing can be thought of as a single outcome study defined as seeking the causes of the specific outcome in a single case (Gerring, 2006; in: Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Here the ambition is to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a particular outcome, with sufficiency defined as an explanation that accounts for all of the important aspects of an outcome with no redundant parts being present (Mackie, 1965).

Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research strategy that aims to trace the complex conglomerate of systematic and case specific causal mechanisms that produced the outcome in question. The explanation cannot be detached from the particular case. Explaining outcome process tracing refers to case studies whose primary ambition is to explain particular historical outcomes, although the findings of the case can also speak to other potential cases of the phenomenon. Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research process in which 'theories' are tested to see whether they can provide a minimally sufficient explanation of the outcome. Minimal sufficiency is defined as an explanation that accounts for an outcome, with no redundant parts. In most explaining outcome studies, existing theorisation cannot provide a sufficient explanation, resulting in a second stage in which existing theories are re-conceptualised in light of the evidence gathered in the preceding empirical analysis. The conceptualisation phase in explaining outcome process tracing is therefore an iterative research process, with initial mechanisms re-conceptualised and tested until the result is a theorised mechanism that provides a minimally sufficient explanation of the particular outcome.

Below a description is provided of how SPOs are selected for process tracing, and a description is provided on how this process tracing is to be carried out. Note that this description of process tracing provides not only information on the extent to which the changes in organisational development can be attributed to MFS II (evaluation question 2), but also provides information on other contributing factors and actors (evaluation question 4). Furthermore, it must be noted that the evaluation team has developed an adapted form of 'explaining outcome process tracing', since the data collection and analysis was an iterative process of research so as to establish the most realistic explanation for a particular outcome/ organisational capacity change. Below selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

**Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing**

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

**ETHIOPIA**

For Ethiopia the capabilities that are mostly targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 1

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Ethiopia*

| Capability to: | AMREF | CARE | ECFA | FSCE | HOA-REC | HUNDEE | NVEA | OSRA | TTCA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Relate | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| Achieve coherence | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Ethiopia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE. In fact, six SPOs would be suitable for process tracing. We just selected the first one per CFA following the criteria of not including more than one SPO per CFA for process tracing

Table 2

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Ethiopia*

| Ethiopia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AMREF | Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | AMREF NL | Yes |
| CARE | Dec 31, 2015 | Partly | Yes | Yes | Yes – slightly | CARE Netherlands | No - not fully matching |
| ECFA | Jan 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Child Helpline International | Yes |
| FSCE | Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN); Note: no info from Defence for Children – ECPAT Netherlands | Yes |
| HOA-REC | Sustainable Energy project (ICCO Alliance): 2014 Innovative WASH (WASH Alliance): Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes - slightly | ICCO | No - not fully matching |
| HUNDEE | Dec 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO & IICD | Yes |
| NVEA | Dec 2015 (both) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Edukans Foundation (under two consortia); Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN) | Suitable but SKN already involved for process tracing FSCE |
| OSRA | C4C Alliance project (farmers marketing): December 2014 ICCO Alliance project (zero grazing: 2014 (2nd phase) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO & IICD | Suitable but ICCO & IICD already involved for process tracing - HUNDEE |
| TTCA | June 2015 | Partly | Yes | No | Yes | Edukans Foundation | No - not fully matching |

**INDIA**

For India the capability that is mostly targeted by CFAs is the capability to act and commit. The next one in line is the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below in which a higher score means that the specific capability is more intensively targeted.

Table 3

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – India*[14]

| Capability to: | BVHA | COUNT | DRISTI | FFID | Jana Vikas | Samarthak Samiti | SMILE | SDS | VTRC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 5 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 4 |
| Relate | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, India.

Below you can see a table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether SPO and the CFA both expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE and VTRC. Except for SMILE (capability to act and commit only), for the other SPOs the focus for process tracing can be on the capability to act and commit and on the capability to adapt and self-renew.

Table 4

*SPOs selected for process tracing – India*

| India – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BVHA | 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Simavi | Yes; both capabilities |
| COUNT | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Woord en Daad | Yes; both capabilities |
| DRISTI | 31-03-2012 | Yes | Yes | No | no | Hivos | No - closed in 2012 |
| FFID | 30-09-2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |

[14] RGVN, NEDSF and Women's Rights Forum (WRF) could not be reached timely during the baseline due to security reasons. WRF could not be reached at all. Therefore these SPOs are not included in Table 1.

| India – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jana Vikas | 2013 | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No - contract is and the by now; not fully matching focus |
| NEDSF | | | | | | | No – delayed baseline |
| RGVN | | | | | | | No - delayed baseline |
| Samarthak Samiti (SDS) | 2013 possibly longer | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Hivos | No - not certain of end date and not fully matching focus |
| Shivi Development Society (SDS) | Dec 2013 intention 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No - not fully matching focus |
| Smile | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Wilde Ganzen | Yes; first capability only |
| VTRC | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Stichting Red een Kind | Yes; both capabilities |

**INDONESIA**

For Indonesia the capabilities that are most frequently targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 5

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Indonesia*

| Capability to: | ASB | Daya kologi | ECPAT | GSS | Lem baga Kita | Pt. PPMA | Rifka Annisa | WIIP | Yad upa | Yayasan Kelola | YPI | YRBI |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 4 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 3 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 |
| Relate | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, Indonesia.

The table below describes when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: ASB, ECPAT, Pt.PPMA, YPI, YRBI.

Table 6

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Indonesia*

| Indonesia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ASB | February 2012; extension Feb,1, 2013 – June,30, 2016 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Hivos | Yes |
| Dayakologi | 2013; no extension | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No: contract ended early and not matching enough |
| ECPAT | August 2013; Extension Dec 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes, a bit | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | Yes |
| GSS | 31 December 2012; no extension | Yes | Yes | Yes, a bit | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | No: contract ended early |
| Lembaga Kita | 31 December 2012; no extension | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | No - contract ended early |
| Pt.PPMA | May 2015 | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | IUCN | Yes, capability to act and commit only |
| Rifka Annisa | Dec, 31 2015 | No | Yes | No | Yes | Rutgers WPF | No - no match between expectations CFA and SPO |
| WIIP | Dec 2015 | Yes | Not MFS II | Yes | Not MFS II | Red Cross | No - Capacity development interventions are not MFS II financed. Only some overhead is MFS II |

| Indonesia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yayasan Kelola | Dec 30, 2013; extension of contract being processed for two years (2014-2015) | Yes | Not really | Yes | Not really | Hivos | No - no specific capacity development interventions planned by Hivos |
| YPI | Dec 31, 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Rutgers WPF | Yes |
| YRBI | Oct, 30, 2013; YRBI end of contract from 31st Oct 2013 to 31st Dec 2013. Contract extension proposal is being proposed to MFS II, no decision yet. | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |
| Yadupa | Under negotiation during baseline; new contract 2013 until now | Yes | Nothing committed | Yes | Nothing committed | IUCN | No, since nothing was committed by CFA |

**LIBERIA**

For Liberia the situation is arbitrary which capabilities are targeted most CFA's. Whilst the capability to act and commit is targeted more often than the other capabilities, this is only so for two of the SPOs. The capability to adapt and self-renew and the capability to relate are almost equally targeted for the five SPOs, be it not intensively. Since the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew are the most targeted capabilities in Ethiopia, India and Indonesia, we choose to focus on these two capabilities for Liberia as well. This would help the synthesis team in the further analysis of these capabilities related to process tracing. See also the table below.

Table 7

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Liberia*

| Capability to: | BSC | DEN-L | NAWOCOL | REFOUND | RHRAP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Relate | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, Liberia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Also, for two of the five SPOs capability to act and commit is targeted more intensively compared to the other capabilities. Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BSC and RHRAP.

Table 8

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Liberia*

| Liberia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BSC | Dec 31, 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | SPARK | Yes |
| DEN-L | 2014 | No | No | Unknown | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| NAWOCOL | 2014 | Yes | No | No | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| REFOUND | At least until 2013 (2015?) | Yes | No | Yes | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| RHRAP | At least until 2013 (2014?) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |

**Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study**

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ' general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the

field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

5.

Some definitions of the terminology used for this MFS II 5c evaluation

Based upon the different interpretations and connotations the use of the term causal mechanism we use the following terminology for the remainder of this paper:

- A **detailed causal map** (or **model of change)** = the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change.
- A **causal mechanism** = is the combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 176).
- **Part** or **cause** = one actor with its attributes carrying out activities/ producing outputs that lead to change in other parts. The final part or cause is the change/ outcome.
- **Attributes of the actor** = specificities of the actor that increase his chance to introduce change or not such as its position in its institutional environment.

*Step 1. Identify the **planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

Chapter 4.1 and 4.2 in the baseline report were reviewed. Capacity development interventions as planned by the CFA for the capability to act and commit and for the capability to adapt and self-renew were described and details inserted in the summary format. This provided an overview of the capacity development activities that were originally planned by the CFA for these two capabilities and assisted in focusing on relevant outcomes that are possibly related to the planned interventions.

*Step 2. Identify the **implemented capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

The input from the CFA was reviewed in terms of what capacity development interventions have taken place in the MFS II period. This information was be found in the 'Support to capacity development sheet - endline - CFA perspective' for the SPO, based on details provided by the CFA and further discussed during an interview by the CDI team.

The CFA was asked to describe all the MFS II supported capacity development interventions of the SPO that took place during the period 2011 up to now. The CDI team reviewed this information, not only the interventions but also the observed changes as well as the expected long-term changes, and then linked these interventions to relevant outcomes in one of the capabilities (capability to act and commit; and capability to adapt and self-renew).

*Step 3. Identify **initial changes/ outcome areas** in these two capabilities – by CDI team & in-country team*

The CDI team was responsible for coding documents received from SPO and CFA in NVivo on the following:

- 5C Indicators: this was to identify the changes that took place between baseline and endline. This information was coded in Nvivo.
- Information related to the capacity development interventions implemented by the CFA (with MFS II funding) (see also Step 2) to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. For example, the training on financial management of the SPO staff could be related to any information on financial management of the SPO. This information was coded in Nvivo.

In addition, the response by the CFA to the changes in 5C indicators format, was auto-coded.

The in-country team was responsible for timely collection of information from the SPO (before the fieldwork starts). This set of information dealt with:

- MFS II supported capacity development interventions during the MFS II period (2011 until now).
- Overview of all trainings provided in relation to a particular outcome areas/organisational capacity change since the baseline.
- For each of the identified MFS II supported trainings, training questionnaires have been developed to assess these trainings in terms of the participants, interests, knowledge and skills gained, behaviour change and changes in the organisation (based on Kirkpatrick's model), one format for training participants and one for their managers. These training questionnaires were sent prior to the field visit.
- Changes expected by SPO on a long-term basis ('Support to capacity development sheet - endline - SPO perspective').

For the selection of change/ outcome areas the following criteria were important:

- The change/ outcome area is in one of the two capabilities selected for process tracing: capability to act and commit or the capability to adapt and self-renew. This was the first criteria to select upon.
- There was a likely link between the key organisational capacity change/ outcome area and the MFS II supported capacity development interventions. This also was an important criteria. This would need to be demonstrated through one or more of the following situations:
  - In the 2012 theory of change on organisational capacity development of the SPO a link was indicated between the outcome area and MFS II support;
  - During the baseline the CFA indicated a link between the planned MFS II support to organisational development and the expected short-term or long-term results in one of the selected capabilities;

- During the endline the CFA indicated a link between the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities;
- During the endline the SPO indicated a link between the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities.

Reviewing the information obtained as described in Step 1, 2, and 3 provided the basis for selecting key organisational capacity change/ outcome areas to focus on for process tracing. These areas were to be formulated as broader outcome areas, such as 'improved financial management', 'improved monitoring and evaluation' or 'improved staff competencies'.

Note: the outcome areas were to be formulated as intermediates changes. For example: an improved monitoring and evaluation system, or enhanced knowledge and skills to educate the target group on climate change. Key outcome areas were also verified - based on document review as well as discussions with the SPO during the endline.

*Step 4. Construct the **detailed, initial causal map** (theoretical model of change) – CDI & in-country team*

A detailed initial causal map was developed by the CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team. This was based on document review, including information provided by the CFA and SPO on MFS II supported capacity development interventions and their immediate and long-term objectives as well as observed changes. Also, the training questionnaires were reviewed before developing the initial causal map. This detailed initial causal map was to be provided by the CDI team with a visual and related narrative with related references. This initial causal map served as a reference point for further reflection with the SPO during the process tracing endline workshop, where relationships needed to be verified or new relationships established so that the second (workshop-based), detailed causal map could be developed, after which further verification was needed to come up with the final, concluding detailed causal map.

It's important to note that organisational change area/ outcome areas could be both positive and negative.

For each of the selected outcomes the team needed to make explicit the theoretical model of change. This meant finding out about the range of different actors, factors, actions, and events etc. that have contributed to a particular outcome in terms of organisational capacity of the SPO.

A model of change of good quality includes:

- The causal pathways that relate the intervention to the realised change/ outcome;
- Rival explanations for the same change/ outcome;
- Assumptions that clarify relations between different components or parts;
- Case specific and/or context specific factors or risks that might influence the causal pathway, such as for instance the socio-cultural-economic context, or a natural disaster;
- Specific attributes of the actors e.g. CFA and other funders.

A model of change (within the 5C study called a 'detailed causal map') is a complex system which produces intermediate and long-term outcomes by the interaction of other parts. It consists of parts or causes that often consist of one actor with its attributes that is implementing activities leading to change in other parts (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). A helpful way of constructing the model of change is to think in terms of actors carrying out activities that lead to other actors changing their behaviour. The model of change can be explained as a range of activities carried out by different *actors* (including the CFA and SPO under evaluation) that will ultimately lead to an outcome. Besides this, there are also '*structural*'

elements, which are to be interpreted as external factors (such as economic conjuncture); and *attributes* of the actor (does the actor have the legitimacy to ask for change or not, what is its position in the sector) that should be looked at (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). In fact Beach and Pedersen, make a fine point about the subjectivity of the actor in a dynamic context. This means, in qualitative methodologies, capturing the changes in the actor, acted upon area or person/organisation, in a non sequential and non temporal format. Things which were done recently could have corrected behavioural outcomes of an organisation and at the same ime there could be processes which incrementally pushed for the same change over a period of time. Beach and Pedersen espouse this methodology because it captures change in a dynamic fashion as against the methodology of logical framework. For the MFS II evaluation it was important to make a distinction between those paths in the model of change that are the result of MFS II and rival pathways.

The construction of the model of change started with the identified key organisational capacity change/ outcome, followed by an inventory of all possible subcomponents that possibly have caused the change/ outcome in the MFS II period (2011-up to now, or since the baseline). The figure below presents an imaginary example of a model of change. The different colours indicate the different types of support to capacity development of the SPO by different actors, thereby indicating different pathways of change, leading to the key changes/ outcomes in terms of capacity development (which in this case indicates the ability to adapt and self-renew).





***Figure 1*** *An imaginary example of a model of change*

*Step 5. Identify **types of evidence** needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams with support from CDI team*

Once the causal mechanism at theoretical level were defined, empirical evidence was collected so as to verify or discard the different parts of this theoretical model of change, confirm or reject whether subcomponents have taken place, and to find evidence that confirm or reject the causal relations between the subcomponents.

A key question that we needed to ask ourselves was, *"What information do we need in order to confirm or reject that one subcomponent leads to another, that X causes Y?"*. The evaluation team needed to agree on what information was needed that provides empirical manifestations for each part of the model of change.

There are four distinguishable types of evidence that are relevant in process tracing analysis: *pattern, sequence, trace, and account*. Please see the box below for descriptions of these types of evidence.

The evaluation team needed to agree on the types of evidence that was needed to verify or discard the manifestation of a particular part of the causal mechanism. Each one or a combination of these different types of evidence could be used to confirm or reject the different parts of the model of change. This is what is meant by robustness of evidence gathering. Since causality as a concept can bend in many ways, our methodology, provides a near scientific model for accepting and rejecting a particular type of evidence, ignoring its face value.

Types of evidence to be used in process tracing

- **Pattern evidence** relates to predictions of statistical patterns in the evidence. For example, in testing a mechanism of racial discrimination in a case dealing with employment, statistical patterns of employment would be relevant for testing this part of the mechanism.
- **Sequence evidence** deals with the temporal and spatial chronology of events predicted by a hypothesised causal mechanism. For example, a test of the hypothesis could involve expectations of the timing of events where we might predict that if the hypothesis is valid, we should see that the event B took place after event A took place. However, if we found that event B took place before event A took place, the test would suggest that our confidence in the validity of this part of the mechanism should be reduced (disconfirmation/ falsification).
- **Trace evidence** is evidence whose mere existence provides proof that a part of a hypothesised mechanism exists. For example, the existence of the minutes of a meeting, if authentic ones, provide strong proof that the meeting took place.
- **Account evidence** deals with the content of empirical material, such as meeting minutes that detail what was discussed or an oral account of what took place in the meeting.

*Source*: Beach and Pedersen, 2013

Below you can find a table that provides guidelines on what to look for when identifying types of evidence that can confirm or reject causal relationships between different parts/ subcomponents of the model of change. It also provides one example of a part of a causal pathway and what type of information to look for.

Table 9

*Format for identifying types of evidence for different causal relationships in the model of change (example included)*

| Part of the model of change | Key questions | Type of evidence needed | Source of information |
|---|---|---|---|
| Describe relationship between the subcomponents of the model of change | Describe questions you would like to answer a so as to find out whether the components in the relationship took place, when they took place, who was involved, and whether they are related | Describe the information that we need in order to answer these questions. Which type of evidence can we use in order to reject or confirm that subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y? Can we find this information by means of : Pattern evidence; Sequence evidence; Trace evidence; Account evidence? | Describe where you can find this information |
| Example: Training workshops on M&E provided by MFS II funding and other sources of funding | Example: What type of training workshops on M&E took place? Who was trained? When did the training take place? Who funded the training? Was the funding of training provided before the training took place? How much money was available for the training? | Example: Trace evidence: on types of training delivered, who was trained, when the training took place, budget for the training<br><br>Sequence evidence on timing of funding and timing of training<br><br>Content evidence: what the training was about | Example: Training report SPO Progress reports interviews with the CFA and SPO staff Financial reports SPO and CFA |

Please note that for practical reasons, the 5C evaluation team decided that it was easier to integrate the specific questions in the narrative of the initial causal map. These questions would need to be addressed by the in country team during the process tracing workshop so as to discover, verify or discard particular causal mechanisms in the detailed, initial causal map. Different types of evidence was asked for in these questions.

*Step 6. **Collect data** to verify or discard causal mechanisms and develop workshop-based, detailed causal map – in-country team*

Once it was decided by the in-country and CDI evaluation teams what information was to be collected during the interaction with the SPO, data collection took place. The initial causal maps served as a basis for discussions during the endline workshop with a particular focus on process tracing for the identified organisational capacity changes. But it was considered to be very important to understand from the perspective of the SPO how they understood the identified key organisational capacity change/outcome area has come about. A new detailed, workshop-based causal map was developed that included the information provided by SPO staff as well as based on initial document review as described in the initial detailed causal map. This information was further analysed and verified with other relevant information so as to develop a final causal map, which is described in the next step.

*Step 7. **Assess the quality** of data and **analyse data**, and develop the **final detailed causal map** (model of change) – in-country team and CDI team*

Quality assurance of the data collected and the evidence it provides for rejecting or confirming parts of causal explanations are a major concern for many authors specialised in contribution analysis and process-tracing. Stern et al. (2012), Beach and Pedersen (2013), Lemire, Nielsen and Dybdal (2012),

Mayne (2012) and Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) all emphasise the need to make attribution/ contribution claims that are based on pieces of evidence that are rigorous, traceable, and credible. These pieces of evidence should be as explicit as possible in proving that *subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y* and ruling out other explanations. Several tools are proposed to check the nature and the quality of data needed. One option is, Delahais and Toulemonde's Evidence Analysis Database, which we have adapted for our purpose.

Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) propose an Evidence Analysis Database that takes into consideration three criteria:

- Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no);
- Type of causal mechanism: intended contribution/ other contribution/ condition leading to intended contribution/ intended condition to other contribution/ feedback loop;
- Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak.

We have adapted their criteria to our purpose. The in-country team, in collaboration with the CDI team, used the criteria in assessing whether causal relationships in the causal map, were strong enough. This has been more of an iterative process trying to find additional evidence for the established relationships through additional document review or contacting the CFA and SPO as well as getting their feedback on the final detailed causal map that was established. Whilst the form below has not been used exactly in the manner depicted, it has been used indirectly when trying to validate the information in the detailed causal map. After that, the final detailed causal map is established both as a visual as well as a narrative, with related references for the established causal relations.

| ***Example format for the adapted evidence analysis database (example included)*** **Description of causal relation** | **Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no)** | **Type of information providing the background to the confirmation or rejection of the causal relation** | **Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak** | **Explanation for why the evidence is (rather) strong or (rather) weak, and therefore the causal relation is confirmed/ rejected** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| e.g. Training staff in M&E leads to enhanced M&E knowledge, skills and practice | e.g. Confirmed | e.g. Training reports confirmed that staff are trained in M&E and that knowledge and skills increased as a result of the training | | |

*Step 8.* ***Analyse and conclude*** *on findings– in-country team and CDI team*

The final detailed causal map was described as a visual and narrative and this was then analysed in terms of the evaluation question two and evaluation question four: *"To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?"* and *"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"* It was analysed to what extent the identified key organisational capacity change can be attributed to MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as to other related factors, interventions and actors.

# 4. Explaining factors – evaluation question 4

This paragraph describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This has been explained in the first section of this appendix. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information was procured for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the process of process tracing as described in the section above.

# 5. Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team.

**Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach:** this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

**Using standard indicators and scores**: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

**General causal map:** whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

**Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question:** this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that

they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

**Utilisation of the evaluation**

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

**Design** – mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all

the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

**Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication:** many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

**5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process:** The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

# Appendix 2 Background information on the five core capabilities framework

The 5 capabilities (5C) framework was to be used as a framework for the evaluation of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs) of the MFS II consortia. The 5C framework is based on a five-year research program on 'Capacity, change and performance' that was carried out by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). The research included an extensive review of the literature and sixteen case studies. The 5C framework has also been applied in an IOB evaluation using 26 case studies in 14 countries, and in the baseline carried out per organisation by the MFS II organisations for the purpose of the monitoring protocol.

The 5C framework is structured to understand and analyse (changes in) the capacity of an organization to deliver (social) value to its constituents. This introduction briefly describes the 5C framework, mainly based on the most recent document on the 5C framework (Keijzer et al., 2011).

The 5C framework sees capacity as an **outcome** of an **open system**. An organisation or collaborative association (for instance a network) is seen as a system interacting with wider society. The most critical practical issue is to ensure that relevant stakeholders share a common way of thinking about capacity and its core constituents or capabilities. Decisive for an organisation's capacity is the context in which the organisation operates. This means that **understanding context issues** is crucial. The use of the 5C framework requires a multi-stakeholder approach because shared values and results orientation are important to facilitate the capacity development process. The 5C framework therefore needs to **accommodate the different visions** of stakeholders and conceive different strategies for raising capacity and improving performance in a given situation.

The 5C framework defines capacity as '**producing social value'** and identifies five core capabilities that together result in that overall capacity. Capacity, capabilities and competences are seen as follows:

**Capacity** is referred to as the overall ability of an organisation or system to create value for others;

**Capabilities** are the collective ability of a group or a system to do something either inside or outside the system. The collective ability involved may be technical, logistical, managerial or generative (i.e. the ability to earn legitimacy, to adapt, to create meaning, etc.);

**Competencies** are the energies, skills and abilities of individuals.

Fundamental to developing capacity are inputs such as human, material and financial resources, technology, and information. To the degree that they are developed and successfully integrated, capabilities contribute to the overall capacity or ability of an organisation or system to create value for others. A single capability is not sufficient to create capacity. All are needed and are strongly interrelated and overlapping. Thus, to achieve its development goals, the 5C framework says that every organisation or system must have **five basic capabilities:**

- The capability to act and commit;
- The capability to deliver on development objectives;
- The capability to adapt and self-renew;
- The capability to relate (to external stakeholders);
- The capability to achieve coherence.

In order to have a common framework for evaluation, the five capabilities have been reformulated in outcome domains and for each outcome domain performance indicators have been developed. A detailed overview of capabilities with outcome domains and indicators is attached in Appendix 3.

There is some overlap between the five core capabilities but together the five capabilities result in a certain level of capacity. Influencing one capability may have an effect on one or more of the other capabilities. In each situation, the level of any of the five capabilities will vary. Each capability can become stronger or weaker over time.

# Appendix 3 Changes in organisational capacity of the SPO - 5C indicators

Below you will find a description for each of the indicators under each of the capabilities, what the situation is as assessed during the endline, how this has changed since the baseline and what are the reasons for change.

**Endline Description of Indicators Rifka Annisa**

**Capability to act and commit**

1.1. Responsive leadership: 'Leadership is responsive, inspiring, and sensitive'
*This is about leadership within the organization (operational, strategic). If there is a larger body then you may also want to refer to leadership at a higher level but not located at the local organization.*

Rifka Annisa experienced changes in the leadership, both at the board level and executive level (director). The change in leadership brought a positive atmosphere to the organization dynamic of Rifka Annisa. The communication between board and the management was very active; they made use of every opportunity to discuss organizational development issues. The current board members were actively providing support to the organization. The new directors also provided more opportunities for the staff to participate in decision making processes, including discussions on proposal development. The leadership of Rifka Annisa continues to practice participatory decision-making, and everyone can give their opinion as well as develop themselves within the organization. There is good cooperation and effective coordination between staff and manager. The relation between staff and leaders can be described as a good familial relationship which also plays an important role in program implementation.

Score: 2.5 to 3.5 (improvement)

1.2. Strategic guidance: 'Leaders provide appropriate strategic guidance (strategic leader and operational leader)'
*This is about the extent to which the leader(s) provide strategic directions*

Rifka Annisa gained a lot of benefit from the more active participation of the board, the director, and the managers in strategic guidance and decision making mechanisms. Board members joined in the meetings of management to discuss SOP, budgeting, and strategic planning. Issues, problems, and progress were well communicated. In these meetings, board members provided advisory support and strategic guidance about program implementation and development. The board has intensive meetings every one or two months with the directors and managers to discuss the work plan and budget. . Staff is free to choose which program activities they prioritize and want to work on first.

The organization has begun to conduct program evaluation for staff performance through staff appraisal regarding staff and manager's performance. The leader is more active in providing strategic direction which is not only provided during the monthly meetings, but also every time the staff requests it. This affects how programs are executed.

More action is undertaken to increase the influence of beneficiaries and the organization has opened itself up for new issues such as LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender), without compromising the focus on existing issues.

Score: 2 to 3.5 (considerable improvement)

1.3. Staff turnover: 'Staff turnover is relatively low'
*This is about staff turnover.*

After experiencing a high staff turnover in 2012, Rifka Annisa tried to find a solution. However, this was postponed and added as an issue to be discussed in the upcoming revision of the strategic planning which is planned in the end of 2014. The staff turnover, especially the senior ones, left a lesson learned for Rifka Annisa to find mechanism to prevent the turn over. Most of the senior staff who resigned has received capacity building as benefit of being Rifka Annisa's staff, such as scholarship and overseas training. The situation left a gap between remaining senior staff and the junior ones. More capacity building was needed to fill in the capacity gap. Another focus point was to find ways to improve human resource management. For the last two years the tur over was relatively lower than previous years, as Rifka Annisa made an effort to maintain the remaining staff by providing capacity building trough training.

Score: 3 to 3.25 (slight improvement)

1.4 . Organisational structure 'Existence of clear organization structure reflecting the objectives of the organization"
*Observable indicator: Staff have copy of org. structure and understand this*

Nothing has changed in Rifka Annissa in terms of organizational structure. The functions for director and some of the board members have been taken over by new individuals.
Rifka Annisa continues to work from within existing institutions, for example by setting up a women's desk inside hospitals and community centers. This allows them to develop an integrated management system for women and children victims of violence by involving the various organizations. It also helps to build the community's capacity to deal with violence issues. During the baseline it was reported that Rifka Annisa has too many layers, which can lead to miscommunication, this remains to be a potential problem.

Score: From 3 to 3 (no change)

1.5 Articulated Strategies. Strategies are articulated and based on good situation analysis and adequate M&E
*Observable indicator: strategies are well articulated. Situation analysis and monitoring and evaluation are used to inform strategies.*

The baseline of the men's care program funded by MSF II gave an insight to adopt the same M&E mechanism for all of Rifka Annisa's programs. Rifka Annisa made an effort to adopt baseline in every program in order to have a more systemized mechanism on the endline. It helped them to conduct regular monitoring and evaluate the program. However, there is still no formal M&E person at the organizational level, although staff members collect information on an individual case basis. Strategies are now based on the vision and mission, in combination with baseline recommendations and findings, as well as input from stakeholders and staff on impacts on the target group.

Score: From 2.5 to 3 (slight improvement)

1.6. Daily operations: 'Day-to-day operations are in line with strategic plans'
*This is about the extent to which day-to-day operations are aligned with strategic plans.*

The management of the last two years has been very active in providing operational planning directives. Annual (work) planning includes a detailed budget plan to ensure that operational activities are financed in accordance with the strategic plan.
Daily operations in general are considered to be in line with strategic plans, but sometimes there are deviations as a result of engagement in unplanned activities or the absence of guidance from the leaders. Most of the work plans in the observed period have been successfully achieved. Particularly the media division has scored well in terms of alignment with the strategic plan.The staff is committed to

finish their projects on time and within budget, but when an activity is not donor-funded this may not always work well. So unplanned and delayed activities have resulted in some deviations from strategic plans.

Score: 3 to 4 (improvement)

1.7. Staff skills: 'Staff have necessary skills to do their work'
*This is about whether staff have the skills necessary to do their work and what skills they might need.*

Almost all staff had the ability to do their day to day tasks and responsibilities. Rifka Annisa had also mandated the staff to master the knowledge of gender issue. This gained through induction and continuous capacity building within the organization.

- The recruitment mechanism in Rifka Annisa has been strengthened in the last two years. The Human resource manager has carefully selected. This was done due to finding a proffesoinal who was able to assist Rifka Annisa in developing human resource department.
- The new human resource manager and the consultant developed a recruitment standard which strictly requiring a certain professional capacity to fill in the certain posts. For example, every staff of Rifka Annisa should have writing capacity as the basic skill. Rifka Annisa considered writing skill as the basic skill of knowledge management. Another strict requirement in the staff selection process was that the person must show great interest on the gender issue, women issues, and children issues. This mechanism has been enabled Rifka to recruit staff who has capacity needed by the program.
- The capacity building through training has also supporte Rifta Annisa's staff to conduct their role and responsibility better. English training for staff was intended to improve communication and wrting skill of the staff when they have to deal with Donors. Other thematic training such as, monitoring and evaluation training, the training on LGBT issues, feminism training, and men's care training was provided for all staff, starting from the office boy, security, and managerial level.
- The trainings have resulted in the improvement of staff capacity to accomplish the responsibilities, such as monitoring and evaluation capacity, facilitation skill, negotiation skill, proposal development skill, program planning skill, etc.
- Currently Rifka Annisa applied a very strict facilitator selection. The process of the facilitator used to conduct without rigid selection criteria, but now, Rifka Annisa used an assessment and mechanism to determine feasibility of being a facilitator. A staff had to go through certain assessment to be a facilitator, meaning that not all staff hold a "license" to be a facilitator. This mechanism has encouraged staff to improve their facilitation capacity and conduct their job more professionally.
- Rifka Annisa also applied a new mechanism to build staff's capacity by mainstreaming all values in each program to be shared to all staff. The new mechanism was intended to keep all staff with the shared values or capacity to conduct a program. The mastery of an issue or a program used to be attached to the staff of a certain program, but now, it was expected that Rifta Annisa shared the same value or capacity in conducting the program. Rifka Annisa built a sharing process mechanism through regular meeting between managers and staff. a very celar example of this mechanism was LGBT program fubded by MSF II. The capacity building of LGBT in which all staf of Rifka annisa involved in the training. Staff indicated that they applied the LGB perspectives in all program of Rifka Annisa.

Score: 3 to 4 (improvement)

1.8. Training opportunities: 'Appropriate training opportunities are offered to staff'
*This is about whether staff at the SPO are offered appropriate training opportunities*

Rifka Annisa provided more training opportunities for staff in the last two years, some of which are provided directly by Rifka Annisa (in house training), donors or network partners..
During the last two years, Rifka Annisa provided various training to all staff, such as: English training for all staff, thematic training such as; monitoring and evaluation training, the training on LGBT issues, feminism training, and men's care training. The training was provided for all staff, starting from the office boy, security, and managerial level. Staff also enthusiastically joined the training provided by donors such as, children trafficking training, certified mediator training, client monitoring tools development, and human resource management analysis training. MSF II funding also provided staff

capacity building through trainings on LGBT mainstreaming, counseling training, internship in Ardhanary Institute, monitoring and evaluation training, Men's care training, youth advocacy training, and communication and advocacy training. While from other institution, Rifka Annisa also joined child protection policy training and human resource within CSO training. The last two training was provided by VSO.Managers shared any training opportunities to the staff and the mechanism of training opportunity were managed by Human resource division.
Rifka Annisa has prioritized the focus of capacity building on specific issues where there are more challenges and competition with other organisations. Overall, compared to the baseline, more training has been attended by staff members. Additionally, where in the baseline evaluation staff and management indicated that sharing knowledge was insufficient, the organization has now implemented a sharing mechanism for staff every Friday.

Score:3 to 4 (improvement)

1.9.1. Incentives: 'Appropriate incentives are in place to sustain staff motivation'
*This is about what makes people want to work here. Incentives could be financial, freedom at work, training opportunities, etc.*

The staff indicated that incentives was not only about salary, but also opportunity for capacity building, and knowledge. They considered training as one of the incentives working in Rifka Annisa. The organization now provides free accommodation, a basic salary and allowance, as well as loans through salary deduction. There is a standard mechanism for financial incentives for staff and also a standard evaluation mechanism to be included in the payroll system. There was an improvement regarding the reward and punishment system in April of 2014. Remuneration now considers staff's education, background and work performance.

Score: 3 to 4 (improvement)

1.9.2. Funding sources: 'Funding from multiple sources covering different time periods'
*This is about how diversified the SPOs funding sources are over time, and how the level of funding is changing over time.*

Rifka Annisa remained involved with many donor organizations and local governments and as such have a diversity of funders, such UNTF, Rutgers WPF, Oxfam, TDH Netherland, AWO. They are a well-known as a leading organization on women issues. As a result they have sufficient funding from various donors, although this does not cover all of their expenses and programs. What can be improved according to some staff members is independent fundraising. Rifka currently has business programs in place aimed at generating income for the organization in order to become less dependent on donors and more self-sufficient. For example, they now actively run the business division by renting out the guesthouse.

Score: 4 to 4.25 (very slight improvement)

1.9.3. Funding procedures: 'Clear procedures for exploring new funding opportunities'
*This is about whether there are clear procedures for getting new funding and staff are aware of these procedures.*

Compared to baseline, Rifka Annisa now encouraged all program staff to write and develop proposals. It used to be managers who had responsibility to write proposals. A number of staff members indicated not being aware of any procedures on developing proposals. Staff involeved in the proposal development was limited from the certain division to develop the current program. For example, all staff in the media division was involved in the program development to AWO International.

Score: 3 to 3 (no change)

**Summary Capability to act and commit**
Rifka Annisa experienced changes in the leadership, both at the board level and executive level (director). The change in leadership brought a positive atmosphere to the organization dynamic of Rifka Annisa. The management of the last two years has been very active in providing operational planning

directives. Annual (work) planning includes a detailed budget plan to ensure that operational activities are financed in accordance with the strategic plan. Rifka Annisa still needs to improve their Strategic Planning and complete the plan with comprehensive external risk (threats) assessment and categorize the threats into low, medium and high risks, plus possible ways to overcome those threats. The organization also needs to regularly analyse the effectivity of budget spent (Budget vs. Actual Analysis), and this duty is part of the Board's responsibility.

Rifka Annisa gained a lot of benefit from the more active participation of the board, the director, and the managers in strategic guidance and decision making mechanisms. Strategies are now based on the vision and mission, in combination with baseline recommendations and findings, as well as input from stakeholders and staff on impacts on the target group. Almost all staff had the ability to do their day to day tasks and responsibilities. Rifka Annisa had also mandated the staff to master the knowledge of gender issue. This gained through induction and continuous capacity building within the organization. The capacity building through training has also supporte Rifka Annisa's staff to conduct their role and responsibility better. English training for staff was intended to improve communication and wrting skill of the staff when they have to deal with Donors. Other thematic training such as, monitoring and evaluation training, the training on LGBT issues, feminism training, and men's care training was provided for all staff, starting from the office boy, security, and managerial level. The trainings have resulted in the improvement of staff capacity to accomplish the responsibilities, such as monitoring and evaluation capacity, facilitation skill, negotiation skill, proposal development skill, program planning skill, etc.

There is a standard mechanism for financial incentives for staff and also standard evaluation mechanism to be included in the payroll system. There is also an improvement regarding the reward and punishment system since April 2014. Remuneration now considers staff education background and work performance. Rifka Annisa is involved with many donor organizations and local governments and as such have a diversity of funders.  A clear funding procedure was still not in place, however, staff indicated that they have more opportunities in developing proposals to get funding from donors.

Score: from 2.9 to 3.6 (slight improvement)

**Capability to adapt and self-renew**
2.1. M&E application: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess activities, outputs and outcomes'
*This is about what the monitoring and evaluation of the SPO looks at, what type of information they get at and at what level (individual, project, organizational).*

In the last two years M&E tools have been developed by the program division, and the information obtained has been used to improve and enrich existing programs. The evidence and results based M&E approach that is required by the donor encourages the staff to create programs in which information can be tracked and obtained up until the activity level. This can be considered an improvement since the baseline situation two years ago where no formal M&E system nor mechanism was in place. Rifka annisa started to adopt baseline for all the programs, not only programs funded by MSF II. They became more aware of the need to conduct carefull monitoring and evaluation mechanism.

Score: 2 to 3 (improvement)

2.2. M&E competencies: 'Individual competencies for performing M&E functions are in place'
*This is about whether the SPO has a trained M&E person; whether other staff have basic understanding of M&E; and whether they know what information to collect, how to process the information, how to make use of the information so as to improve activities etc.*

This indicator has slightly improved. The development and implementation of M&E tools indicates that understanding about M&E has improved. Although there is still no dedicated staff member in place tasked with this particular role, the basis for M&E to fulfill the donor's requirements is now in place. Previously, it was director and manager who conducted evaluation, but now Rifka annisa applied a participatory evaluation. Every division evaluated other division. The evaluation was conducted within division and reported to the manager. In addition to that, the monitoring and evaluation training

provided by donors have contributed to the increased staff capacity to conduct internal monitoring and evaluation. The training has assisted staff to see the impact of a program. Indicators achievement was reflected in the field report. The currentt weakness in monev was the documentation system, data was not documented well so that the knowledge management was hard to do.

Score: 2.5 to 3 (slight improvement)

2.3. M&E for future strategies: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess the effects of delivered products and services (outcomes) for future strategies'
*This is about what type of information is used by the SPO to make decisions; whether the information comes from the monitoring and evaluation; and whether M&E info influences strategic planning.*

Although there is no organizational level M&E aimed at measuring final impact. There is however attention for outcomes and impact at the project level which is incorporated into reports.M&E tools have been developed and applied at the activity level. A slight change has occurred in the M&E practice for particular programs because it has to be actively synchronized with the objectives, indicators, and field findings. Field activities are used to identify the outputs and to measure whether the goal has been achieved or not. The result of the monev in every project was always used as a reference to develop new program, including development of program planning.
Score: 2 to 3 (improvement)

2.4. Critical reflection: 'Management stimulates frequent critical reflection meetings that also deal with learning from mistakes'
*This is about whether staff talk formally about what is happening in their programs; and, if so, how regular these meetings are; and whether staff are comfortable raising issues that are problematic.*

There has been no new mechanism for the staff on reflection meetings during the last two years. There was a formal and informal meetings, such as organization meetings, managers meetings, annual staff meeting, evaluation and planning meeting  to report the program development, its challenges, and its problems. The change was not so significant, becaue no new mechanism take place, however, HRD was now involved in the informal communication. Rifka Annisa took benefit of the new technology as a means of communication such as whats App. The communication mechanism was more clear than previous.

Score: 3 to 3 (no change)

2.5. Freedom for ideas: 'Staff feel free to come up with ideas for implementation of objectives
*This is about whether staff feel that ideas they bring for implementation of the program are welcomed and used.*

Rifka Annisa provided open and free opportunities for the staff to express their ideas on Wednesday and Friday. There was no gap between staff and the managerial levels. A number of staff members indicate that ideas are not often put into practice, but others contradict this and mention that when an idea is relevant it will be implemented.The new director gives more opportunity for more staff by asking them to attend capacity building or training. This attitude may change this indicator in the future, but for now no change could be found.

Score: 3 to 3 (no change)

2.6. System for tracking environment: 'The organization has a system for being in touch with general trends and developments in its operating environment'
*This is about whether the SPO knows what is happening in its environment and whether it will affect the organization.*

Rifka Annisa has more extensive networking during the last two years. The networking has been expanded in village up to national level., and also more networking in certain themes such as women migrant, women and election, and widowers.

More attention is now paid on this aspect through the organization of public discussions and by sharing knowledge regarding the newest issues which has influenced the organization's perspective.

Score: 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

2.7. Stakeholder responsiveness: 'The organization is open and responsive to their stakeholders and the general public'
*This is about what mechanisms the SPO has to get input from its stakeholders, and what they do with that input.*

Rifka Annisa worked very closly with the networking. Maintaining networking was the priority of the organization. The program implementation was based on the input and feedback from the networkings, as well as based on the evidence from the stakeholders, iclusding the beneficiaries. Rifka Annisa conducted interview to beneficiaries about the impact of the program to beneficiaries' life. Rifka Annisa works closely together with its beneficiaries in order to best serve their needs. They are also open to their feedback and input, as well as from other network partners, even though there is no standardized or systematic way for doing so. The organization is service-oriented and focused on beneficiary needs. The baseline has contributed the organization to determine strategy of meeting the beneficiaries needs.

Score: 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

**Summary of capability to adapt and self-renew**
In the last two years M&E tools have been developed by the program division, and the information obtained has been used to improve and enrich existing programs. The evidence and results based M&E approach that is required by the donor encourages the staff to create programs in which information can be tracked and obtained up until the activity level. The CFA has stated that although the M&E system is in place, Rifka Annisa needs to step further in order to build and effective MIS, data-base and knowledge management due to its leading position amongst similar organizations in Indonesia. A mechanism for sharing not only data, but also lessons learned to strategic stakeholders should be developed.

Previusly, it was director and manager who conducted evaluation, but now Rifka annisa applied a participatory evaluation. Every division evaluated other division. The evaluation was conducted within division and reported to the manager. In addition to that, the monitoring and evaluation training provided by donors have contributed to the increased staff capacity to conduct internal monitoring and evaluation.

M&E tools have been developed and applied at the activity level. A slight change has occurred There has been no new mechanism for the staff on reflection meetings during the last two years. There was a formal and informal meetings, such as organization meetings, managers meetings, annual staff meeting, evaluation and planning meeting to report the program development, its challenges, and its problems. Rifka Annisa provided open and free opportunities for the staff to express their ideas on Wednesday and Friday. There was no gap between staff and the managerial levels.
Rifka Annisa has more extensive networking during the last two years. The networking has been expanded in village up to national level.

The program implementation was based on the input and feedback from the networkings, as well as based on the evidence from the stakeholders, iclusding the beneficiaries. Rifka Annisa conducted interview to beneficiaries about the impact of the program to beneficiaries' life.

There is no formal M&E system in place, although M&E tools have been developed and are utilized at the activity level in order to meet donor requirements. There is a detailed annual work plan and financial plan, and they have to report on activities and expenditures. There is no organizational level M&E aimed at measuring impact. There is however attention for outcomes and impact at the project level which is incorporated into reports. There is no dedicated person in place for M&E. There are conflicting statements onwhat M&E entails and how it is used. Discussions can be held at monthly staff meetings, at the managers' meetings, at the annual evaluation meeting and the annual members' meeting. The gap between managerial level, and staff has reduced and they are now more informal discussions with staff members. Rifka Annisa staff engages in network activities with various organizations, invites experts to

share information, follows the media, maintains contacts through discussions and email, and shares this information internally. Rifka Annisa works closely together with its beneficiaries in order to best serve their needs. They are also open to their feedback and input.

Score: from 2.8 to 3.2 (slight improvement)

**Capability to deliver on development objectives**
3.1. Clear operational plans: 'Organization has clear operational plans for carrying out projects which all staff fully understand'
*This is about whether each project has an operational work plan and budget, and whether staff use it in their day-to-day operations.*

During the last two years, the development of the workplan was more rigid and there has been an annual activities planning funded by donor and by organization. Each donor-funded project has a budget and work plan that is used in day to day operations. Every program now has a clear work plan, budget, and target for each activity which is implemented by the staff. The work plan and budget plan are understood by the staff.

Score: 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

3.2. Cost-effective resource use: 'Operations are based on cost-effective use of its resources'
*This is about whether the SPO has the resources to do the work, and whether resources are used cost-effectively.*

Rifka Annisa applied an efficient cost activity, such as combining two activities at once to reduce transpotation cost. Rifka Annisa also developed voluntarily system or mechanism to implement the program, having a low cost resource by opening internship. Rifka Annisa also built partnership with private sectors and media to get low cost price when conducting the program. The overall opinion of the staff is that the resources are used as effectively and efficiently as possible, and they sometimes even put in their own money. The organization has resources which are used effectively and efficiently. The management suggests through clear policy to each staff to skimp for the continuity of the organizational budget. There is a slight improvement in terms of having developed a voluntary program through internship and more partnership with media to get a low-cost program.

Score: 3 to 3.25 (very slight improvement)

3.3. Delivering planned outputs: 'Extent to which planned outputs are delivered'
*This is about whether the SPO is able to carry out the operational plans.*

The condition did not change much, although now some activities were delivered as planned. Staff members mentioned that there are too many activities and too few staff, whereas others mention that operational plans are carried out due to sufficient organizational resources and commitment. External factors suct as late funding disbursement contributed to the delay program implementation. However, Rifka Annisa has also made an effort to deliver the output in a timely manner by conducting more assistance to junior staff and sypervision, conducting staff capacity building, and involving external consultants such as editor, translator, and writer.

Score: 2.5 to 3 (slight improvement)

3.4. Mechanisms for beneficiary needs: 'The organization has mechanisms in place to verify that services meet beneficiary needs'
*This is about how the SPO knows that their services are meeting beneficiary needs*

Rifka Annisa had a mechanism in place to measure whether services meet beneficiary needs. The organization developed tools, such as tools to measure clients's resilience, pre test and post test of a training, etc to measure whether their service has met beneficiaries's expectation. The counseling service has an exit interview which was developed to measure client satisfaction. Testimony was collected to measure the quality of service in the community. The community assistance division

conducted annual evaluation to get feedback from the beneficiaries. The RTC (research and training center) division also provided evaluation forms to stakeholders. The media division measures the response from the public on the public campaigns done by Rifka Annisa. Rifka Annisa continues to engage in community outreach activities and field visits. When they have handled a case, they do an exit interview with the beneficiary to assess the effectiveness and success of the service, and ask for critsicism and suggestions.In cooperation with RTC, the organization provides the M&E form for the client. Previously, their baseline used secondary data but now the information is gathered through arranged primary data. Program design follows the consultancy plan with beneficiaries, baseline and assessment.

Score: 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

3.5. Monitoring efficiency: 'The organization monitors its efficiency by linking outputs and related inputs (input-output ratio's)'
*This is about how the SPO knows they are efficient or not in their work.*

This indicator did not change since the baseline. There has been no specific mechanism to measure the effectivity of input and output. Progress and expenditures continue to be discussed in monthly meetings, and this is seen by the staff as their approach to ensuring that they work efficiently. Results achieved, client feedback and time spent are elements used to evaluate efficiency.

Score: 2 to 2 (no change)

3.6. Balancing quality-efficiency: 'The organization aims at balancing efficiency requirements with the quality of its work'
*This is about how the SPO ensures quality work with the resources available*

Rifka Annisa have conducted staff evaluation based on the job description of each staff to see the work effectivity of the staff. Rifka Annisa has evaluated the human resource management and remuneration system, but there no specific tools available to measure the staff quality and efficiency.
In other case, Rifka Annisa compared the workplan and the achievement based on the indicators from the workplan. The different from the baseline was that all staff was involved in providing evaluation to other staff.

Score: 2 to 2.25 (very slight improvement)

**Summary of Capability to deliver on development objectives**
The development of the work plan was more rigid and there has been an annual activities planning funded by donor and by organization. Every program now has a clear work plan, budget, and target for each activity which is implemented by the staff. The work plan and budget plan are understood by the staff. Rifka Annisa also developed voluntarily system or mechanism to implement the program, having a low cost resource by opening internship. Rifka Annisa also built partnership with private sectors and media to get low cost price when conducting the program. Under the MFS II program Rifka had opened internship opportunities for other members of Aliansi Satu Visi (ASV), providing excellent chances to learn about management and SGBV case handling. Vice versa, RA had also sent its staff to Ardhanary Institute to learn more about Lesbian Bisexual and Transgender (LBT) issues. Based on this experience RA realized the need to improve SRH services for their clients, developing better referral networks with other members of ASV particularly in Yogyakarta (PKBI DIY and currently CD Bethesda) in order to provide more comprehensive services for SGBV survivors. Related to this need and situation, RA need to invest more in capacity building for staff as well as clients' data management. Furthermore the CFA stated that Rifka Annisa should focus in developing itself as a center of excellence in SGBV areas, as well as work with Theory of Change and using Result-based Management approaches in order to improve operations.

The organization has resources which are used effectively and efficiently. However, Rifka annisa has also made an effort to delivere the output in atimely manner by conducting more assistance to junior staff and sypervision, conducting staff capacity building, and involving expetrnal consultant such as editor, translator, and writer,  Rifka Annisa had a mechanism to measure the quality of the service. The

organization developed tools, such as tools to measure clients's resilience, pre test and post test of a training, etc to measure whether their service has met beneficiaries's expectation.

Score: from 2.7 to 3.0 (very slight improvement)

**Capability to relate**
4.1. Stakeholder engagement in policies and strategies: 'The organization maintains relations/ collaboration/alliances with its stakeholders for the benefit of the organization'
*This is about whether the SPO engages external groups in developing their policies and strategies, and how.*

Rifka Annisa continued to work with external groups (stakeholders) to get and collect input to develop organization strategy and policy by conducting consultative meeting with related party. For example, Rifka annisa invited the stakeholders, especially the government of Kulonprogo and Gunugkidul, in a meeting to gain feedback on the program implementation strategy and the development of recommnedation to government. The donors, including MSF II, also supported Rifka Annisa to conduct the consultative meeting with stakeholder.Rifka Annisa also maintained good communication with religious court and justice and seek clarity on certain issues form religious view.

Score: 3 to 3 (no change)
4.2. Engagement in networks: 'Extent to which the organization has relationships with existing networks/alliances/partnerships'
*This is about what networks/alliances/partnerships the SPO engages with and why; with they are local or international; and what they do together, and how do they do it.*

During the ast two years, staff indicated that Rifka Annisa has extended the networking, Rifka Annisa did not only work with hospitals, police, court, but also built relationship with Ministry of Religious Affair (religious Affair Office), BPPM (women and community empowerment board), Supreme Court, dan some of the government institution, not only in national and provincial level, but also government in sub district and village level.

In adition to that, Rifka Annisa built networking with schools, media, not only in Yogyakarta but also in other provinces, such as Nusa Tenggara Timur and Nusa tenggara Barat. Donors through the program implementation has made networking extension possible.

Score: 4 to 4.5 (very slight improvement)

4.3. Engagement with target groups: 'The organization performs frequent visits to their target groups/ beneficiaries in their living environment'
*This is about how and when the SPO meets with target groups.*

Rifka Annisa continues to frequently engage in campaigns and outreach activities as part of the strategy and organization culture. They do home visits and surveys, or invite clients for workshops and meetings. They also directly interact with beneficiaries in the community-based crisis centers and clinics.
The growth of technology through social media also helps the organization meet with the beneficiaries, for example through WhatsApp messenger or Twitter.

Score: 4 to 4.25 (very slight improvement)

4.4. Relationships within organization: 'Organizational structure and culture facilitates open internal contacts, communication, and decision-making'
*How does staff at the SPO communicate internally? Are people free to talk to whomever they need to talk to? When and at what forum? What are the internal mechanisms for sharing information and building relationships?*

The organization has committed to provide good atmosphere for the staff to share ideas freely. Rifka Annisa built spaces as a meeting point for the staff where they can have activities together. There are formal and informal meetings to discuss issues and exchange information. For example the monthly staff

meetings and shared lunches. However, due to their busy time schedules field workers rarely meet, and communicate via SMS, phone, email and social media (What's App, Facebook, Twitter groups). Everyone is free to discuss what they want, but some psychological barriers do exist. There has been an increase in internal bonding sthrough events uch as out bound, outing, annual holiday, social gathering, and even karaoke.

Score: 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

**Summary of Capability to relate**

The organization expanded its network and develops good relationships from local level to national level. During the ast two years, they al also built relationship with schools, with Ministry of Religious Affair (religious Affair Office), BPPM (women and community empowerment board), Supreme Court, and some of the government institution, not only in national and provincial level, but also government in sub district and village level. The organization has done a lot in involving communities in their various activities, including to prevent violence against women. However, the CFA has stated that further development of the network and collaboration with private sectors is encouraged.

Rifka frequently engages in campaigns and outreach activities. They do home visits and surveys, or invite clients for workshops and meetings and hereby engage with the clients frequently. There are formal and informal meetings to discuss issues and exchange information and this is now also supported by the use of social media.

Score: from 3.5 to 3.8 (very slight improvement)

**Capability to achieve coherence**
5.1. Revisiting vision, mission: 'Vision, mission and strategies regularly discussed in the organization'
*This is about whether there is a vision, mission and strategies; how often staff discuss/revise vision, mission and strategies; and who is involved in this.*
No change has occurred with respect to the vision and mission. Rifka Annisa had a mechanism to re discussed the vision, mission, and strategy in an annuall staff meeting, and three year cycle in a general assembly meeting. The program implementation strategy was discussed as needed. All staff is involved in the vision and mission meeetings in order for the staff to understand them.

Score: 3.5 to to 3.5 (no change)

5.2. Operational guidelines: 'Operational guidelines (technical, admin, HRM) are in place and used and supported by the management'
*This is about whether there are operational guidelines, which operational guidelines exist; and how they are used.*

In the last two years the manual of the Research Training Center (RTC; a training center within Rifka Annisa for capacity building) and Rifka Women Crisis Center (RCC; service to the beneficiaries) have been combined. Operational guidelines are laid down in standard operational procedures (SOP), for example in a finance manual and a method for setting up a referral system to other organizations. The SOPs do not cover each organizational aspect though, and some need updating too.

Score: 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

5.3. Alignment with vision, mission: 'Projects, strategies and associated operations are in line with the vision and mission of the organization'
*This is about whether the operations and strategies are line with the vision/mission of the SPO.*
The staff members mentioned that programs were all well in line with vision, mission, and strategic planning. Program planning and proposal development sessions always considered vision, mission, and strategic planning as a basic value of the program implementation. Some think that there is a lack of focus however, partly as a result of running too many projects.

Score: 4 to 4 (no change)

5.4. Mutually supportive efforts: 'The portfolio of project (activities) provides opportunities for mutually supportive efforts'
*This is about whether the efforts in one project complement/support efforts in other projects.*

Programs continued to be connected with each other. The connected program has assisted staff to implement day to day activities easily as they did not need to repeat the same activities. At this moment, Rifka Annisa made an effort to implement the program in certain areas in order to be able to integrate some programs. They conducted integrative planning as many programs are interrelated with other programs.  to c staff indicated that projects are now more mutually supportive and aligned based on the vision and mission.

Score: 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

**Summary Capability to achieve coherence**
The vision and mission of the organization are reviewed in the three-year general assembly meeting and the annual members' meeting, and all staff were involved in the annual strategic planning meeting. Operational guidelines are now laid down in standard operational procedures (SOP), now that manual of RCT and Rifka WCC have been combined. Almost all of the staff members hold the opinion that the programs are in line with the vision and mission and the long term strategic plan. Programs are connected with each other through their efforts to eliminate violence against women, as outlined in the vision and mission, and hereby complimentary in nature.

Score: from 3.5 to 3.6 (very slight improvement)

# Appendix 4 Results - key changes in organisational capacity - general causal map

**Narrative of Rifka Annisa Indonesia General Causal Map**

The evaluation team carried out an end line assessment at Rifka Annisa from 25th March to 27th March 2014. During this end line workshop, the team made a recap of key features of the organisation in the baseline in September 2012 (such as vision, mission, strategies, clients, partnerships). This was the basis for discussing changes that had happened to the organisation since the baseline. The main changes that happened in the organisation since the baseline, as identified by the staff during the end line workshop were:


1. Staff being more productive and involved in the organization's decision-making [3]
2. Greater motivation for staff to get promoted [9]
3. Staff being motivated to improve their facilitation skills [4]
4. Improved quality of monitoring and evaluation [2]
5. A stronger partnership with local authorities in form of a signed MoU [5].

All of these organisational capacity changes are expected to lead to strengthening the performance of the organisation [1].

1. Strengthening of the organization's work performance capacity [1];

Each of these changes in the organisation, and related organisational capacity changes and other factors are further explained below. The numbers in the narrative correspond to the numbers in the visual.

## Rifka Annisa General Causal Map




DRAFT

According to staff present at the end line workshop, **staff became more productive and involved in the organization's decision making** [3] since the baseline in 2012. This was enabled by an increase in collective decision making meetings where both regular staff and volunteers attended [6], a more active and engaged board of directors to deal with internal issues [7], and more staff members being promoted [8]. Each of these factors came about from an overall change in leadership in 2012 where both the acting director as well as the individual board members was replaced with new candidates [16].

The other organisation capacity change is that **staff became more motivated to get promoted** [9], which was due to a change in the HR policy and remuneration system. In this new system staff was evaluated differently, and compensated more fairly according to the tasks and responsibilities they possessed [12]. Prior to this, the salary difference between junior and senior level staff was almost negligible, providing little incentive for junior staff to opt for promotion. This change in the remuneration system was implemented following one of the recommendations from the organizational development consultant who Rifka Annisa hired in 2013 [17].

Another organisational capacity change that happened since the baseline was that staff became more **motivated to contribute to and develop facilitation sessions** [4]. Being an organization who focuses on capacity building, Rifka Annisa has a lot of scheduled time dedicated to training local communities, other organizations and internal staff. So whilst the need for facilitation skills was high, staff often considered the task of facilitation secondary to their other program activities. However, there was a change in the organisation in terms of realising the importance of increased facilitation skills [18] and this finally staff being more motivated to engage in facilitation [4]. There were three reasons for this change in motivation to facilitate. First of all the there was a new HRD system which now also included facilitation skills and volunteering as evaluation criteria[10].This was the result of an overall change in the staff's evaluation mechanism and remuneration system [12]. Secondly, there were now more opportunities for staff to take turns in facilitation sessions [13], which helped the staff in being able to actively contribute to facilitation [4]. This was a direct result of realizing the need to improve facilitation skill [18]. Thirdly, the new HRD regulation set a higher standard of being a facilitator [11] which encouraged staff to improve their facilitation skill.

A significant change in terms of an **improvement of the quality of monitoring and evaluation** in Rifka Annisa took place [2]. As mentioned before, this came about from a much more structural approach towards M&E in the form of specific tools such as program planning, log frame tracking and analysis, work plans and the development and monitoring of specific indicators [14]. These tools were developed [15] following strict donor requirements to adopt a result-based management approach in the implementation of the organization's programs [19].

Lastly, **the partnership with local authorities was significantly strengthened** after signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with sub-district government officials and the police [5]. This came about from an active effort to increase the networking quality and quantity of Rifka Annisa [20]. Results of this could be clearly seen in the contribution of Rifka Annissa to the LGBT – Lesbian, Gay, Bi-sexual, and Transgender) program where several organizations were drawn together to commit to the cross cutting issues of disability, LGBT and sexual abuse..

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen UR
P.O. Box 88
6700 AB Wageningen
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)317 48 68 00
www.wageningenUR.nl/cdi

Report CDI-15-046

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# Endline report – Indonesia, Wetlands International Indonesia
# MFS II country evaluations

Capacity of Southern Partner Organisations (5C) component

Cecile Kusters[1]
Martijn Wieriks[2]
Bekti Dwi Andari[3]
Novina Suprobo[3]
Widya Priyahita[3]
Rumenta R. Sihombing[3]
Seto W. Rokhmatulloh[3]
Ita Rosita[3]

1 Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR
2 SEPAM Consultants Indonesia
3 SurveyMeter

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen, February 2015



Report CDI-15-047









Kusters, C., Wieriks, M., Dwi Andari, B., Suprobo, N., Priyahita, W., Sihombing, R.R., Rokhmatulloh, S.W., Rosita, I., 2015. *Endline report – Indonesia, WII. MFS II country evaluations; Capacity of Southern Partner Organisations (5C) component.* Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University & Research centre. Report CDI-15-047. Wageningen.

This report presents the findings of the endline of the evaluation of the organisational capacity component of the MFS II country evaluations. The focus of this report is Indonesia, WII. The format is based on the requirements by the synthesis team and NWO/WOTRO. The endline was carried out in 2014. The baseline was carried out in 2012.

Key words: 5C (five core capabilities); attribution; baseline; causal map; change; CFA (Co-financing Organisation) endline; organisational capacity development; SPO (Southern Partner Organisation).

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Report CDI-15-047|

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# Acknowledgements

We are grateful to all the people that have contributed to this report. We particularly would like to thank the Southern Partner Organisation WII and the Co-Financing Agency Red Cross for their endless patience and support during this challenging task of collecting the endline data. We hope that this endline report will provide useful insights to WII, Red Cross, the synthesis team, IOB and NWO/Wotro.

The Indonesia 5C evaluation team

# List of abbreviations and acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| 5 C | Capacity development model which focuses on 5 core capabilities |
| AWB | Asian Wetlands Bureau |
| Causal map | Map with cause-effect relationships. See also 'detailed causal map'. |
| Causal mechanisms | The combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome |
| CBO | Community Based Organisation |
| CCA | Climate Change Adaptation |
| CDI | Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University & Research centre |
| CDI | Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre |
| CFA | Co-Financing Agency |
| CFO | Co-Financing Organisation |
| CS | Civil Society |
| Detailed causal map | Also 'model of change'. the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change. In the 5C evaluation identified key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms) are traced through process tracing (for attribution question). |
| DRR | Disaster Risk Reduction |
| EMR | Ecosystem Management and Restoration |
| General causal map | Causal map with key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms), based on SPO perception. |
| IWRB | International Waterfowl & Wetlands Research Bureau |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MFS | Dutch co-financing system |
| MIS | Management Information System |
| MoFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| MoU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| OD | Organisational Development |
| PME | Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation |
| Process tracing | Theory-based approach to trace causal mechanisms |
| RCT | Randomized Control Trials |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |
| SSI | Semi-structured Interview |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| UNFCCC | United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change |
| Wageningen UR | Wageningen University & Research centre |
| WASH | WAter, Sanitation and Hygiene |
| WII | Wetlands International – Indonesia |

# 1 Introduction & summary

## 1.1 Purpose and outline of the report

The Netherlands has a long tradition of public support for civil bi-lateral development cooperation, going back to the 1960s. The Co-Financing System (*Medefinancieringsstelsel*, or 'MFS') is its most recent expression. MFS II is the 2011-2015 grant framework for Co-Financing Agencies (CFAs), which is directed at achieving a sustainable reduction in poverty. A total of 20 consortia of Dutch CFAs have been awarded €1.9 billion in MFS II grants by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).

The overall aim of MFS II is to help strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. CFAs receiving MFS II funding work through strategic partnerships with Southern Partner Organisations.

The MFS II framework stipulates that each consortium is required to carry out independent external evaluations to be able to make valid, evaluative statements about the effective use of the available funding. On behalf of Dutch consortia receiving MFS II funding, NWO-WOTRO has issued three calls for proposals. Call deals with joint MFS II evaluations of development interventions at country level. Evaluations must comprise a baseline assessment in 2012 and a follow-up assessment in 2014 and should be arranged according to three categories of priority result areas as defined by MoFA:

Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) & themes;

Capacity development of Southern partner organisations (SPO) (5 c study);

Efforts to strengthen civil society.

This report focuses on the assessment of capacity development of southern partner organisations. This evaluation of the organisational capacity development of the SPOs is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The purpose of this report is to provide endline information on one of the SPOs involved in the evaluation: WII in Indonesia. The baseline report is described in a separate document.

Chapter 2 describes general information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO). Here you can find general information about the SPO, the context in which the SPO operates, contracting details and background to the SPO. In chapter 3 a brief overview of the methodological approach is described. You can find a more detailed description of the methodological approach in appendix 1.Chapter 4 describes the results of the 5c endline study. It provides an overview of capacity development interventions of the SPO that have been supported by MFS II. It also describes what changes in organisational capacity have taken place since the baseline and why (evaluation question is 1 and 4). This is described as a summary of the indicators per capability as well as a general causal map that provides an overview of the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline, as experienced by the SPO. The complete overview of descriptions per indicator, and how these have changed since the baseline is described in appendix 3. The complete visual and narrative for the key organisational capacity changes that have taken place since the baseline according to the SPO staff present at the endline workshop is presented in appendix 4.

For those SPOs involved in process tracing a summary description of the causal maps for the identified organisational capacity changes in the two selected capabilities (capability to act and commit; capability to adapt and self-renew) is provided (evaluation questions 2 and 4). These causal maps describe the identified key organisational capacity changes that are possibly related to MFS II

interventions in these two capabilities, and how these changes have come about. More detailed information can be found in appendix 5.

Chapter 5 presents a discussion on the findings and methodology and a conclusion on the different evaluation questions.

The overall methodology for the endline study of capacity of southern partner organisations is coordinated between the 8 countries: Bangladesh (Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath; INTRAC); DRC (Disaster Studies, Wageningen UR); Ethiopia (CDI, Wageningen UR); India (CDI, Wageningen UR: Indonesia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Liberia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Pakistan (IDS; MetaMeta); (Uganda (ETC). Specific methodological variations to the approach carried out per country where CDI is involved are also described in this document.

This report is sent to the Co-Financing Agency (CFA) and the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO) for correcting factual errors and for final validation of the report.

## 1.2 Brief summary of analysis and findings

Since the baseline, two years ago, Wetlands International Indonesia (WII) has seen an improvement in the capability to act and commit. The leader has gained extensive experience, is strong and dedicated, and able to maintain good relationships with other parties. Staff turnover has improved and more staff members now work for WII with permanent contracts. Overall, employment benefits have increased and the organization is now more in line with the Indonesian labour law. Strategic plans at project level have been well developed and implemented. Funding procedures have been improved slightly after 2012. The capacity to adapt and self-renew has improved the most out of all capabilities. Systematic M&E is applied at the project level consistently, and M&E competencies have increased slightly. WII is employed by other NGO's to evaluate and monitor other projects in Indonesia. Considerable improvement was made in terms of tracking the organization's environment: WII has increased their networks and is up to date about development in various areas and fields of work. In the capability to deliver on development objectives, a slight improvement took place. Cost-effective resource use has slightly improved, as well as a slight improvement in mechanisms to meet beneficiary needs: WII now determine field projects based on thorough assessment of needs and perspectives of local communities and stakeholders. Considerable improvement has occurred in terms of balancing quality and efficiency, as WII in some cases used the organization's own money to cover budget gaps in case of cost-exceeding projects to maintain good quality of results. The capability to relate has also slightly improved. Stakeholders are more involved in policies and strategies and engagement with government and NGO's has intensified. Internal relations have improved through a policy to communicate more face-to-face, and less through email and telephone calls. The capability to achieve coherence has slightly improved through the adoption of new operational procedures related to finance and HRM. Staff agrees that WII has been able to successfully align it's vision and mission with that of Wetlands International. Mutually supportive efforts have been considerably improved through the cross-project coordination.

The evaluators considered it important to also note down the SPO's story in terms of changes in the organisation since the baseline, and this would also provide more information about reasons for change, which were difficult to get for the individual indicators. Also for some issues there may not have been relevant indicators available in the list of core indicators provided by the evaluation team. During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by WII's staff:

1. Improved staff capacity in their respective roles and fields of work
2. Increased communication on WII and wetlands issues
3. Improved collaboration and networking with local and international partners
4. A healthier and safer financial condition of the organization
5. Increased organizational management capacity

SPO staff attributed the above mentioned organizational capacity changes partly to MFS II capacity development interventions. WII staff experienced these as the most important capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline.

Improved staff capacity resulted from joining the "community of practice". This is an international community whose members are organizations with similar focus (global warming-wetlands). This was the result of the change of vision and mission of Wetlands International, which in turn can be attributed to the development of the global agenda for wetlands.

Increased communication on WII and wetlands issues was attributed by the SPO staff, to improving media content and packages as well as strengthening media relations. Both these developments sprung from the need for stronger communication and publication which resulted from a change of vision and mission of Wetlands International.

Improved collaboration and networking was attributed by the SPO to joining the joint community of practice, the strengthening of activities of advocating policies and other strategic activities, and more extensive and diverse programs. Whilst the work area expansion was due to the change of vision and mission of Wetlands International, the increased accountability resulted from an orderly financial administration. This was an important conclusion from the OD consultant who was hired after Wetlands International provided coaching and a capacity development workshop through MFS II funding.

The improved and healthier financial condition of WII occurred through an increasing number of donations, and increased staff capacity to manage responsibilities. The greater number of donations was already explained above. The increased staff capacity to manage responsibilities resulted from increased experience and knowledge sharing. Both of these were enabled by staff placement in project management, and staff being sent to trainings and workshops. Both these were recommended by the organizational capacity scan and HQ workshop on capacity development.

The increased organization management capacity resulted from an increased ability of staff to manage responsibilities, strengthening the existence and recognition of the organization in front of the government, an increased number of managerial staff, and improved supporting facilities. Strengthening the existence and recognition of the organization in the eyes of the government was due a revision and addition of Employment SOP as well as an adjustment of employment welfare according to Indonesian labor laws after a series of formalizations in the employment policy and contracts. Both can be attributed to the recommendations made by the consultant regarding integration of Indonesian laws and regulations as well as recommendations regarding reviewing and revising SOP's. This in turn resulted from the MFS II sponsored CD scan in March 2013.

In conclusion MFS II interventions have been tied to key organization capacity changes, as experienced by the SPO, although they were only in part responsible for all changes that have occurred. The redevelopment of the global agenda of Wetlands International has also had profound impact on the organization's capacity changes, particularly in the field of program quality and focus, as well as networks addressed. The development of a more structured, accountable and transparent organization that adheres to Indonesian law and has increased its' organizational management capacity can however for a large part be attributed to MFS II, according to SPO staff present at the endline workshop. However, it must be noted that the information provided has not been validated through other sources of information, and therefore the conclusions must be understood in that respect.

# 2 General Information about the SPO – Name SPO

## 2.1 General information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO)

| | |
|---|---|
| **Country** | Indonesia |
| **Consortium** | Partners for Resilience |
| **Responsible Dutch NGO** | Red Cross |
| **Project (if applicable)** | Indonesia Programme |
| **Southern partner organisation** | Wetlands International – Indonesia Programma (WII) |

The project/partner is part of the sample for the following evaluation component(s):

| | |
|---|---|
| **Achievement of MDGs and themes** | X |
| **Capacity development of Southern partner organisations** | X |
| **Efforts to strengthen civil society** | |

## 2.2 The socio-economic, cultural and political context in which the partner operates

**The socio-economic, cultural and political context in which the partner operates**
Earthquakes, floods, volcanic eruptions, drought, landslides and tsunamis are natural hazards that occur in Indonesia almost every day, causing a large number of casualties every year. In 2011 according to the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB), 1598 natural disasters happened in Indonesia. Hydro-meteorological disasters such as floods, flash floods, drought, landslides, cyclones and tidal waves are the dominant type of disaster in Indonesia, and constituted 89% of all disasters in 2010-2011. In the same year 834 people died or were missing due to disasters; while 325,361 people had to be displaced. Regarding material costs, 15 166 houses were heavily damaged, 3302 houses were damaged and 41,795 houses were slightly damaged.[1]

The above numbers show that disasters are a serious and constant threat to people, bringing about heavy economic losses every year, and affecting social and economic activities all over the country. Most natural disasters have one thing in common: they usually occur suddenly and unexpectedly. In order to mitigate the risk from such disasters, state institutions, civil society organizations and specialized institutions have carried out many activities from assessing disaster risks to mitigation measures. However, the risks are still increasing, damages are greater and an ever increasing number of especially poor people are exposed to natural hazards.

This situation is particularly true for the province of Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT), which Partners for Resilience chose as their program area for MFS II. The province is characterized by dry ecosystem and it is prone to various natural hazards, such as landslides, floods, earthquakes, tsunamis, drought and cyclone. This condition has led to many difficulties for the lives of local communities in the province. The tsunami event in 1994 has created a traumatic experience where thousands of islanders have lost their lives and some more thousands have lost their shelter and livelihood. However, communities that live in the surroundings of relatively dense mangrove forests have been spared from substantial damage. This is an indication that mangroves have a vital function in the protection from heavy waves

[1] Source: http://healthmdgs.wordpress.com/2012/01/04/bnpb-1-598-bencana-alam-terjadi-di-tahun-2011/

of tsunamis. The first efforts at mangrove reforestation on the island of Flores were inspired by this traumatic event.

Disaster risk management reduces the environmental risk and economic burden of natural hazards on society. Therefore, the Government of Indonesia has declared its determination to fight the risks from natural hazards by introducing pro-active measures (e.g. early warning systems) to enhance the resilience of society. It is also realized that local communities have to be involved in the assessment and implementation of disaster risk reduction measures if they become resilient.

As the above example indicates, the resilience of coastal communities can be increased by integrating the ecosystem rehabilitation/restoration into the current disaster risk reduction strategy. National and local governments are supportive of the restoration and rehabilitation efforts, for example through the mainstreaming of tree planting into the program of the Ministry of Forestry, as well as other pro-environment initiatives. This was also supported by the GoI initiative on the establishment of the National Mangrove Working Group and Forest Land Restoration Partnership Working Group at the national level. At provincial/district level, a Regional Mangrove Working Group was also encouraged to be established in the regions with mangrove areas, including the one in Ende district (Nusa Tenggara Timur), which has just been established in 2012. Together with Sikka district in Nusa Tenggara Timur, Ende district is the location of the MFS II project areas of WI-IP. In Sikka district, a decree of the head of district has been released on 29 September 2012 that put a moratorium on destroying mangrove forests with the aim to protect the remaining mangrove forests in the district. In addition to the government's initiative, the enabling environment has also been developed by local communities, where various local communities' initiatives have carried out mangrove restoration programs, during the consultation stage, prior to the formal implementation of the MFS II in the related villages. Restoration and rehabilitation of wetlands have in the most recent years been more widespread and politically recognized activities in a number of countries including Indonesia.

The restoration and rehabilitation of wetlands provides not only protection of the vital environment and its resources but also a source of livelihood for locals if managed sustainably. Mangrove forests are rich in crab and fish, the fruit of certain types is edible, but also honey can be harvested. In addition, the timber is a valuable building and construction material. Hence, providing sustainable livelihoods mangrove forests contributes to the resilience of local communities.

Mangroves are a crossroad where oceans, freshwater, and land realms meet. They are among the most productive and complex ecosystems on the planet, growing under environmental conditions that would just kill ordinary plants very quickly. In general, mangroves have specialized root structures (breathing roots or pneumatophores) as a result from their physical adaptation to oxygen-poor or anaerobic sediments/soils.

Degradation and loss of mangroves has caused coastal abrasion, sea water intrusion, flood, loss of settlements due to storm, loss of natural fishing areas, and opportunities to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. The above conditions are generally caused by:

- Over-harvesting of wood from mangrove forests.
- Conversion to aquaculture.
- Unsustainable urban and agricultural development.
- Neglected deforested mangrove areas.

Indonesia has large coastal zones which are rich with various coastal vegetations such as mangrove forests (the country, in fact, has the largest mangrove forests in the world with an area of 3,2 million hectares). Unfortunately, since the mid-1980s, a large part of Indonesia's coastal zones has been severely damaged due to conversion to aquacultures and other purposes.

To reverse the functions, values and environmental services of mangrove forests and other coastal ecosystems, there is a need to restore and to implement sustainable coastal zone management. One of them is through the silvo fishery concept, which combines the replanting of mangroves near and inside shrimp and fishponds.[2]

[2] Wetlands Indonesia. http://indonesia.wetlands.org/Infolahanbasah/SpesiesMangrove/tabid/2835/language/en-GB/Default.aspx

Finally, it is also important to mention that wetlands are one of the world's most important environmental assets.[3] They are a highly complex and fragile kind of ecosystem, which contains a great variety of plants and animals, and plays an essential role in the history of human development.[4] Wetlands can be found across the whole world and make up for 10% of all fresh water on the planet.[5] This ecosystem is the only one dealt with under an exclusive global environmental treaty, the Ramsar Convention. This treaty has been signed in 1971, in Ramsar (Iran). Under this treaty, wetlands are defined as "areas of marsh, fen, peatland or water, whether natural or artificial, permanent or temporary, with water that is static or flowing, fresh, brackish or salt, including areas of marine water the depth of which at low tide does not exceed six meters". Although not being of regulative nature or enforcing punishment by non-compliance, the Treaty signed by 163 countries formed the "framework for national action and international cooperation".[6]

Wetlands International – Indonesia Program (WIPP) works on peatland as their focus but for MFS II funded project they work on mangrove.

## 2.3 Contracting details

When did cooperation with this partner start: 2010.

What is the MFS II contracting period: 1-1-2011 to 31-12-2015

Did cooperation with this partner end: No

If yes, when did it finish: Not applicable

What is the reason for ending the cooperation with this partner: Not applicable

Is there expected cooperation with this partner after 31st of December 2015: Yes.

## 2.4 Background to the Southern Partner Organisation

**History**

WII is part of the umbrella organization WI. The organization that later became WI was founded in 1937 under the name of Wildfowl Inquiry. The organization has been involved in environmental protection since then. Initially, the organization was a part of the British Section of the International Committee of Bird Preservation. In 1954, besides expanding its scope of action to also include the protection of wetland areas, the organization had its name changed to International Waterfowl & Wetlands Research Bureau (IWRB). Under this name the organization was based in the United Kingdom at first, then in France and later in the United Kingdom once again. The IWRB work in Indonesia started in the beginning of the 1980's. At that time all members were volunteers and the activities were mainly scientific[7]. In 1987 the organization changed its name to Asian Wetlands Bureau (AWB) and it signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Indonesian Ministry of Forestry for having 'wetlands' as its specific issue [8]. Since the end of the 1980's, other organizations around the world have started working together with the AWB in an effort to protect wetland areas across the globe. In the 1990's, as a result of this worldwide collaboration, one global organization was

[3] Wetlands International (2012). "Wetlands for water and life: What are wetlands?", Available at: http://www.wetlands.org/Whatarewetlands/tabid/202/Default.aspx, Accessed on 13.11.2012

[4] See above.

[5] Wetlands International (2012). "Social and Economic issues of global peatlands". Presented during the International Peat Congress, Stockholm, Sweden (3-8 June, 2012). Available at: http://indonesia.wetlands.org/Publikasi/tabid/2824/mod/1570/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/3364/Default.Aspx, Accessed on 13.11.08

[6] Mitra et. al (2005) "An appraisal of global wetland area and its organic carbon stock" (p. 25). Available at: http://tejas.serc.iisc.ernet.in/~currsci/jan102006/25.pdf, Accessed on 13.11.08

[7] Historical Timeline Developed by Evaluation Team (2012)

[8] Historical Timeline Developed by Evaluation Team (2012)

established under the name Wetlands International. In 1996 Wetlands International established its headquarters in the Netherlands[9].

As a change from the Global Agenda, WI changed their logo, vision and mission: Over the entire agreement of global offices, WI changed global visibility. The impact was, that strategic changes, has been extended to the field of resilience. In 2013, WII replaced the logo that has been used since 1996. It did so, since they began to focus on their concern to social and humanitarian issues as an integral part of environmental activities . [10]

WII works with communities at village to district level, assessment on community vulnerability and capacity, maintaining of group dynamic and works, trainings, environmental campaign, development of village regulation as well as development of community livelihood and ecosystem restoration (Bio-Rights). Wetlands International Indonesia works with 194 households/ communities in 6 coastal villages and 1 upland village in Flores Island and 1 learning site in Banten Province.

During this period, WII put many efforts to develop good networking on the integration of Climate Change Adaptation, Disaster Risk Reduction and Ecosystem Restoration and Management. Partnerships have also been built with various relevant stakeholders, including land lords, enabling better environment for the introduction and implementation of the proposed programme. Continued efforts on communication and consultation with relevant local government institutions have resulted into good progress on the development of village regulation and establishment of Village level Disaster Response Team.[11]

**Mission :**
To preserve and maintain wetlands , including resources and biodiversity

**Vision :**
Wetlands and water resources are conserved and managed wisely so that the various values and environmental services can provide benefits for biodiversity and human life in a sustainable manner

**Global Strategies :**
**1. Build up and disseminate wetlands information :**
a. Developing various outreach materials , such as posters , print off , and comics
b . Publishing news on wetland conservation ( WKLB )
c .Developing electronic materials , such as movies , slide kits and broadcast media .
d . Organizing and facilitating meetings and related training .
e .Developing a data base of important wetlands in Indonesia.

**2. Introducing the role of wetlands in sustainable development:**
a. Study and research on wetlands that have not been generally known , for example, studies and providing information on peat and carbon content.
b .Facilitating strategic management of wetland ecosystems at national and regional level , such as the National Strategy for Management of Wetlands , National Strategy for Management of Peatlands , and the ASEAN Peatland Management.
c .Facilitating the integration and harmonization of wetland ecosystems in the General Spatial Plan at the district level .

**3. Integrating wetlands into water resources management**
a. facilitating the development of alternative livelihoods for communities around the protected area of wetlands or other important wetlands.
b .facilitating the preparation of management plans for protected area wetlands or other important wetlands

[9] Wetlands International (2012), "History". Available at: http://www.wetlands.org/Aboutus/Ourorganization/History/tabid/64/Default.aspx, Accessed on 13.11.2012
[10] Annex D, MFS II Endline Evaluation, 2014.
[11] WII (2013). Annual Report January - December

**4. Wetland biodiversity conservation and ecological networks**

a. The development of a variety identification guidelines , studies , and surveys for some kind of important wetlands.

b .facilitating various network related to various of important wetland species , especially migrant species.

c .integrating restorationactivities and rehabilitation of wetlands that had been or was damaged.

# 3 Methodological approach

## 3.1 Overall methodological approach

This chapter describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

Note: this methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report A detailed overview of the approach is described in appendix 1.

The first (changes in organisational capacity) and the fourth evaluation question are addressed together through:

- Changes in the 5C indicators since the baseline: standard indicators have been agreed upon for each of the five capabilities of the five capabilities framework (see appendix 2) and changes between the baseline, and the endline situation have been described. For data collection a mix of data collection methods has been used, including self-assessments by SPO staff; interviews with SPO staff and externals; document review; observation. For data analysis, the Nvivo software program for qualitative data analysis has been used. Final descriptions per indicator and per capability with corresponding scores have been provided.
- Key organisational capacity changes – 'general causal map': during the endline workshop a brainstorm has been facilitated to generate the key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO since the baseline, with related underlying causes. For this purpose, a visual as well as a narrative causal map have been described.

In terms of the attribution question (2 and 4), **'process tracing'** is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

## 3.2 Assessing changes in organisational capacity and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?** And the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This is explained below. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

The evaluators considered it important to also note down a consolidated SPO story and this would also provide more information about what the SPO considered to be important in terms of organisational capacity changes since the baseline and how they perceived these key changes to have come about. Whilst this information has not been validated with sources other than SPO staff, it was considered important to understand how the SPOs has perceived changes in the organisation since the baseline.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information is provided for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the next session on the evaluation question on attribution, as described below and in the appendix 1.

How information was collected and analysed for addressing evaluation question 1 and 4, in terms of description of changes in indicators per capability as well as in terms of the general causal map, based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff, is further described below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012[12].

Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See

[12] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1) **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2) **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3) **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4) **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5) **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Please see appendix 1 for a description of the detailed process and steps.

## 3.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity - evaluation question 2 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)? and the fourth evaluation question: "What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Below, the selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

### 3.3.1 Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);

- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;

Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

For the detailed results of this selection, in the four countries that CDI is involved in, please see appendix 1. The following SPOs were selected for process tracing:

- Ethiopia: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE (4/9)
- India: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE, VTRC (5/10)
- Indonesia: ASB, ECPAT, PtPPMA, YPI, YRBI (5/12)
- Liberia: BSC, RHRAP (2/5).

### 3.3.2 Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ' general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in

time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained. More information can be found in Appendix 1.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

### 3.3.3 Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team. These can also be found in appendix 1.

**Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach:** this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

**Using standard indicators and scores**: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

**General causal map:** whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

**Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question:** this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified

organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

**Utilisation of the evaluation**

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

**Design** – mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to

generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

**Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication:** many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

**5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process:** The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

# 4 Results

## 4.1 MFS II supported capacity development interventions

Below an overview of the different MFS II supported capacity development interventions of WII that have taken place since 2011 are described. The information is based on the information provided by Red Cross.

Table 1
*Information about MFS II supported capacity development interventions since baseline*

| Title of the MFS II supported capacity development intervention | Objectives | Activities | Timing and duration | Budget |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Capacity Development Scan and Workshop | Workshop was meant to set priorities for capacity development during the (remaining) MFS perioed | Workshop, scan and plan capacity development directions | March 2013 | 4000 Euro |


Source: 5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_CFA perspective_Indonesia_WII

## 4.2 Changes in capacity development and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

Below you can find a description of the changes in each of the five core capabilities. This information is based on the analysis of the information per each of the indicators. This detailed information for each of the indicators describes the current situation, and how and why it has changed since the baseline. See also annex 3.

### 4.2.1 Changes in the five core capabilities

**Capability to act and commit**




The leader has extensive experience, is strong and dedicated, and is able to maintain good relationships with other parties, both within as well as outside the organization. There are three leaders at the managerial level: the Program Director, the Programme Manager, and the Finance Manager. The Program Director, in collaboration with the Programme Manager, provides good strategic guidelines for the implementation of projects (i.e. through work plans), through which staff performance can be maximized. Currently, communication between leadership and staff has intensified and management and communication responsibilities have been delegated to the project staff. Currently, the strategic plan is still under development. There are more strategic consolidations in proposal development with the Head Quarter. The running projects are in line with the main goal and targets set by the global office.


In terms of staff turnover, one senior person who was with the organization for a long time has left the organization since the baseline but a HR consultant has been hired. Having the HR consultant is led to changes in the staff's working contracts, that affect staff motivation: key personnel is now working as permanent staff; salary and benefits are reviewed and adjusted; and the internal human resources policy is in line with the Indonesian labor law. A good working environment, opportunities for training and internal motivation have also contributed to staff being highly motivated to work with WII, but on the whole there is not much change since the baseline.

WII has technical and academically skilled staff with appropriate educational background and general skills (English language, administration, projects, multitasking). There are opportunities to attend formal and informal training – informal training occurs when staffs exchange knowledge during joined projects with other organization and university; whilst there is also formal ad hoc training.

Some projects are close to end in 2015 which will affect the organization finance. However, there are some strategic efforts in the Head Quarter, supported with the good reputation in program implementation, and the organization expects to get some funding in the next years. In term of funding procedures there is no much change since the baseline. The organization still has no clear funding procedures. However it does not affect the ability of WII to get new funds.

Score: from 3.4 to 4.2 (slight improvement)

**Capability to adapt and self-renew**





Overall the M&E is conducted in organizational that is done by the Management and project level which is done by Program Manager. In addition that internal M&E also supported by independent consultant and Project Manager of Wetlands International. In term of process all the staff are involved an interactive discussion and encouraged for self reflection. The staffs have more freedom to express their ideas equally in many organizational forum including in policy making process. In addition, there is more room for the staff and management to communicate, mainly dealing with project implementation.

Regarding system for tracking environment, WII has a considerable improvement. During this period (2012-2014), WII highly put any possible efforts to develop good networking on the integration of Climate Change Adaptation, Disaster Risk Reduction and Ecosystem Restoration and Management. Partnerships have also been built with various relevant stakeholders, including land lords, enabling better environment for the introduction and implementation of the proposed program. Continued efforts on communication and consultation with relevant local government institutions have resulted into good progress on the development of village regulation and establishment of Village level Disaster Response Team.

WII is well respected by its partners, which is proven by the increased efforts to be involved in a number of local, national and international initiatives. Before, during, and after project implementations, the organization always communicates intensively and extensively with their stakeholders to ensure their relevance with stake holders' need.

Score: from 3.0 to 3.8 (improvement)


**Capability to deliver on development objectives**




WII has a systematic way of delivering results through clear plans, log frames, outlines, agreements and continuous re-examination. Projects run based on operational work plans and budgets. WII has a strong and good reputation in providing satisfying results in accordance to the agreement with funders and partners. Particularly the clear project plans and skilled staff play an important role in this. By having field staff to stay in the project locations, the organization ensures that there is involvement and active ownership within the community, which assists WII in ensuring that project activities meet the needs of the communities. Although there is no formal system to measure efficiency and quality, WII is able to deliver high quality results within the given budget or even with additional budget from the organization were needed. WII is known with donors for delivering high-quality results and using resources cost effectively.

Score: from 3.4 to 4 (slight improvement)

**Capability to relate**





WII closely considers the needs of their stakeholders, including different ministries, NGOs and communities in the development of policy. WII has been involved in the activities initiated by the different ministries, and is part of the different national and local networks. WII developed cooperation

with other organizations (government and non-government) which have the same concerns: forest mapping, carbon sequestration, conservation and restoration of wetlands and other environmental issues. WII works directly with the communities by establishing community based organization and by having project staff that live in the project areas so that issues are well known to the project staff, and can be acted upon.

Score: from 3.6 to 4.2 (slight improvement)

**Capability to achieve coherence**




WII operates in a playing field of many competing interests and needs which makes coherence a challenging task. For example, vision and mission have been changed at the international level which has profound impact on the work activities in Indonesia, since the strategies need to be contextualized to the Indonesian context. Staff is not actively involved in the revision of the International vision and mission. In other term, overall staff members agree however that program implementation is in line with the set vision and mission also there is a better and more productive relationship between the various projects.

Score: from 3 to 3.6 (slight improvement)


### 4.2.2 General changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO

The evaluation team carried out an end line assessment at Wetlands International Indonesia (WII) from 2 to 3 July 2014. During this workshop, the team made a recap of key features of the organisation in the baseline in September 2012 (such as vision, mission, strategies, clients, partnerships). This was the basis for discussing changes that had happened to the organisation since the baseline. The main changes that happened in the organisation since the baseline, as identified by the staff during the end line workshop were:

1. Improved staff capacity in their respective roles and fields of work [1]
2. Increased communication on WII and wetlands issues [10]
3. Improved collaboration and networking with local and international partners [2]
4. A healthier and safer financial condition of the organization[4]
5. Increased organizational management capacity [9]

These changes have helped the organization to improve the quality of the programs [8] and thereby contributed to reaching the organization's vision and targets [6]. According to WIP staff, they expect that this contributes to WII to become a leading organization and a role model for organizations dealing with wetlands and climate change issues in Indonesia.

Each of the five organizational capacity changes is further described below. The numbers in the narrative correspond to the numbers in the visual.


Wetlands is leading and knowledge resource network for organizations dealing with its issues in Indonesia [3]
Achievement of the organization's vision and targets [6]
The bargaining position of the organization in advocating policies is higher [7]
Increased program quality [8]
Improved staff capacity in their respective roles and fields of work[11]
Increased communication on WIIP and wetlands issues [10]
Improved collaboration and networking with local and international partners [2]
A healthier and safer financial condition of the organization [4]
Increased organisational management capacity [9]
More extensive and diverse programs (ex: Community Resilience, greening economy) [14]
Improving media content and publication (website, magazine, Socmed) [20]
Strengthening media relation [21]
Strengthening the activities of "Advocating" policies and other strategic issues (Mangrove - emission management) - one map policy [22]
Increasing number of donors and volume of donations [23]
Increased opportunities to submit financial proposals to more various donor [24]
Increased staff capacity to manage responsibilities [15]
Strengthening the existence and position of the organization in the eyes of the government [13]
Increased number of managerial staff [18]
Improved supporting facilities : office, car, new warehouse, parking lot, sewing room, etc. [19]
Improved accountability of the organizational funds [25]
Adjustment of employment welfare according to the increasing minimum wage policy [5]
Joining "Community of Practice" [26]
The need for stronger communication and publication [27]
Organization strategy approach to increase profile to high profile ("show off") to improve bargaining position [28]
Development of field level program to strategic level program [29]
Expansion of issue coverage and work area [30]
Orderly financial administration [39]
Increased experience [31]
Knowledge sharing [32]
Revision and addition of Employment SOP [16]
Formulation of a more thorough organization SOP, which is more in-depth in general based on the policy for employment which pushes for a short amount in the employment contract [17]
Change of vision and mission of Wetlands International [33]
Providing recommendations, assistance, and monitoring the the organization's condition of funds [34]
Staff placement in project management [35]
Staff delegation for trainings, workshops, seminars and other events held by external parties [36]
Providing recommendations, assistance, and monitoring to adapt to the regulations with employment [37]
Providing recommendations, assistance, and monitoring for the SOP, the SOP for the organization and a more detailed SOP for employment [38]
Development of the global wetlands agenda [40]
Consultant recommendations [39]
COO & consultant: HRD & Financial [41]
There is aspiration from the staff for organization development [42]
Increased need for resources for program activities and staff [43]
HQ provides coaching for WIIP [44]
MSF II - Base line survey (PANTAS) [45]

**Improved staff capacity in their respective roles and fields of work [1]**
Staff present at the end line workshop indicated that staff capacities in the respective roles and fields of work have improved since the baseline in 2012. They indicated that this is mainly the result of joining the "community of practice"[26]. This is an international community developed by Wetlands International whose members are individuals with similar focus (wetlands – climate change issues). Their activities include: face to face meetings and regular webinars; huddle (joint data sharing mechanism), the access and maintenance of a virtual library. Through their involvement in this community, WII greatly benefited in both the development of individual staff competences. Joining the "community of practice" initiative was the result of the change of vision and mission of wetlands international [33], which in turn was influenced by the global development agenda for wetlands [41].

**Improved communication about WII and wetlands issues [10]**
More and higher quality news items about WII's activities was spread by distributing improved media content and packages through social media [20] and stronger ties with traditional media relations [21]. Better information could be provided through the cooperation in the "community of practice" initiative [26], but was driven by the need for stronger communication and publication [27]. Similarly, the strengthening of relations to traditional media was the result of this need [27]. The need for stronger communication was the direct result of the change of vision and mission at Wetlands International [33]. This change entitled to become more high-profile and visible in media, as well making the issues of wetlands more related to human needs.

The bargaining position of Wetlands International Indonesia increased due to an increase of spreading news about Wetlands International Indonesia and the issues dealt with [10] and expanding the network of stakeholders that the organization deals with [11] to include government, local communities, the private sector, civil society and the scientific community.

**Increased collaboration in networking with local and international partners [2]**
Since the baseline in 2012 WII has expanded its network and collaborating with a wide range of partners, both locally as well as internationally. This includes government, local communities, the private sector, civil society, the scientific community and organizations similar to WII internationally.

The expansion of WII's stakeholder network resulted from joining the international community of practice [26], better ties to the media [21], an overall strengthening of "advocating" policies related to not just wetlands [22] and having more extensive and diverse programs [14]. The overall strengthening of 'advocating' policies [22] related to not just wetlands, but also related areas like disasters, peat and emission management [22]. One of the WII contribution is the development of Indonesia's one map policy led by Indonesia's Geo-spatial Information Agency (BIG). One map policy is an integrated policy on the map production and utilization in Indonesia which covers all wetlands maps, including peat and mangroves. This in turn was enabled by the organizations approach to move its strategy and image from low profile to high profile ("show off") [28] and the development of field level activities to more strategic level program activities [29]. Both developments fit in with the new vision and mission of Wetlands International [33].

WII formulated more extensive and diverse programs [14]. These included for instance community resilience programs or green economy development initiatives. With this a greater amount of new stakeholders was reached. The move to these broader program initiatives was on the one hand related to the expansion of the issue coverage and work area [29] as projected in the new vision and mission of the organization [33], but also driven by an increasing number of donors and volume of donations, that resulted from increased opportunities to submit proposals to a wide range of donors [24], which was related to covering more issues and a wider work area [24]. This was in line with the new vision and mission of Wetlands International [33]. WII submitted more proposals to donors because WII has improved the accountability of the funds [25], which greatly increased confidence amongst potential donors for successful application of their funds. This improved accountability was due to having a more orderly financial administration in place [30]. Overall the greater accountability came about from an orderly financial administration of the organization's activities [30], as could be seen in the improved financial reports. This was largely due to the close monitoring of the organization's activities and funds, and the recommendations and assistance given by the Chief of Organization Officer (COO) of Wetland International (WI) Head Quarter (HQ) with an independent financial and HR consultant as recommended by WI HQ[41]. This was the result of getting coaching from headquarters [44]. After

findings from the MFS II baseline in 2012 financial issues became clear [45]. Furthermore, WII staff wanted the organization to develop [42] which supported the organization to improve upon their financial administration.

**A healthier and safer financial condition of the organization [4]**
WII has become a healthier and safer organization in financial terms [4]. This was largely enabled by the increasing number and amount of donations [23], which is explained above. It is also related to increased staff capacity to manage responsibilities [15]. This is further explained below.

**Increased organizational management capacity [9]**
Finally, WII staff indicated that there was an overall increase in organizational management capacity [9]. Four factors affected this increase:

1. Increased staff capacity to manage responsibilities [15]
2. Strengthening the existence and recognition of the organization in the eyes of the government [13]
3. An increase in the number of managerial staff [18]
4. Improved supporting facilities [19]

First, overall staff capacity to manage their activities and responsibilities [15] increased as a result of greater experience [31] and through knowledge sharing amongst colleagues [32]. Both were enabled by better staff placement in project management [35]. Moreover, staff management capacity increased due to additional training and capacity development events for staff members [36]. The consultant that was hired by WII as follow up of the MFS II baseline for the Alliance, provided recommendations to enhance staff management capacity [39].

The other reason for increased organizational management capacity [9] was that WII's recognition and image was strengthened in the eyes of the government [13]. This was due to the revision and addition of employment standard operating procedures (SOPs) to conform better to Indonesian law and regulations [16]. The drafting of these SOPs was the immediate result of a proactive stance to comply and adapt to Indonesian law and regulation in terms of human resources management and benefits [37]. All of these decisions were based on recommendations [37] made by an external consultant in the period between 2012 and 2014 [39] in an effort to evaluate organizational development of finances and human resources development [41] based on coaching and recommendations from Wetlands International HQ [44] after having reviewed the 5C baseline evaluation results by MFS II in 2012 [45].

Strengthening the recognition and image in the eyes of the government was also due to adjustment of the employment welfare according to the Indonesian employment policy [5]. As mentioned earlier, WII made a proactive case to comply and adjust to the employment welfare laws and regulations of Indonesia. This adjustment was sustained and successfully implemented [5] through the formulation of organization specific standard operating procedures [17] and based on specific recommendations [38] for having a more specific SPO for employment. This was suggested by the consultant is hired to improve management capacity, including finance, administration, human resources and other SPO related to its [39].

Thirdly, the number of managerial staff increased, providing additional resources and capacity for the management of the organization [18], due to an increasing need for resources for program activities and its' staff [43].

Fourthly, improved supporting facilities in the form of a new warehouse, parking lot, survey tools and supporting office materials [18] enabled an environment to manage operations in a more professional and efficient manner. This too, was based on a greater need for resources that matched the new ambitions and program activities of WII.

# 5 Discussion and conclusion

## 5.1 Methodological issues

**General: Applied to all or most SPOs**

With regard to the methodology, Indonesia has made some data collection adjustment based on the context. The first adjustment was related to the type of instrument used. To assess the organizational capacity, the study has provided self-assessment, observation and interview sheets. These all were used during the baseline with all SPOs. During the end line the team used self-assessment, interview and observation sheets. However the evaluator applied interview sheets as self-assessment—where participants were asked to fill these sheets by themselves. For the participants who did not attend the workshop, the interviews were done separately using the interview sheet and the results from the interview were included in the subgroup interview sheet that was already filled by the staff member. Were combined into the relevant sub categories in the interview sheet. Interview sheets were also applied for interviews with the CFAs, partners and consultants.

The baseline study showed that having two similar instruments (self assessments, and interview sheets) did not have any effect in relation to obtaining adequate and quality data.

To have some clarification post visit to all SPOs, the evaluator used email and phone interviews.


**WII**

The evaluator sent out all the interview sheets and most of them (six out of seven) were returned back before the field visit. WII did not have any M&E staff in place and so this particular interview sheet was not filled. The field visit started with the development of the general causal map, based on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012. There were 10 staff members who participated in the workshops, they were: 3 management staff (director, program manager, and finance manager), 3 program staff, 2 admin and HRM staff, and 2 field staff. Reviewing the historical timeline from 2012-2014 helped to initiate this process. Overall there was not much adjustment of the endline methodological guidelines. Furthermore, generally the same staff who participated in the baseline, also participated in the endline process.

## 5.2 Changes in organisational capacity development

This section aims to provide an answer to the first and fourth evaluation questions:

1. *What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?*
4. *What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?*




Whilst changes took place in all of the five core capabilities, the greatest improvements have taken place in the capability to adapt and self renew. Below the changes in each of the capabilities are further explained, by referring to the specific indicators that changed.

Over the last two years an improvement took place the capability to act and commit. Responsive leadership has improved. The leader has extensive experience, is strong and dedicated, and is able to maintain good relationships with other parties. Strategic guidance has also improved as the leader provides good strategic guidelines related to the implementation of projects (i.e. work plan). Staff turnover has improved as well: key staff members that were hired as contractual staff has now been hired to work as permanent staff. Salary and benefits have been reviewed and adjusted; besides that, the human resources policy is now more in line with the Indonesian labour law. WII' organisational structure has improved as well due to an additional staff member at the country program level. Articulation of strategies has improved considerably since 2012. At the project level, decisions on future activities are based on a situational analysis (e.g. rapid ecosystem assessments). The strategic plans at project level have been well developed and implemented. Daily operations have slightly improved, since the running projects are now in line with the main goal and targets set by the global office. Staff skills have improved slightly; at present the staff's capacity to deal with strategic issues has improved due to the more complex activities and projects, which the organization has taken on board in order to survive. Training opportunities have slightly improved. Informal training occurs when staff exchange knowledge during joint projects with other organizations and universities. Formal training occurs more ad hoc. A slight improvement in the sources for funding has occurred. Some projects are close to end in 2015, which will affect the organization's finance. This is however being anticipated in Head Quarters where some strategic efforts are currently being formulated. Combined with the good reputation of the organization in program implementation, WII is expected to get sufficient funding in the next years. This is also supported by the wider scope of work as described in the organization's visibility change (logo, vision and mission) at the global level. Funding procedures have improved slightly after 2012 as there is now an initiative to have strategic consolidation from Wetland International to create umbrella programs that enable its members to access funds.

The capability to adapt and self-renew has improved the most compared to the other 4 capabilities. At the project level, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is done systematically and on time. All WII projects have a log frame which has been agreed upon with the funders. Similarly, M&E competencies improved slightly: M&E at the project level runs smoothly but at the organizational level there is still room for improvement. In some cases, WII is employed by other International NGOs (i.e. Oxfam, Novib, IUCN NL) to evaluate and monitor their projects in Indonesia. M&E for future strategies has improved slightly; M&E at the outcome level is now done by the consultant hired by the funder, for example during the midterm review. Compared to 2012, the learning process in terms of critical reflection has been better developed and accommodated at the project level. The freedom for ideas has improved as staff now experience more freedom to express their ideas at the project level. In terms of a system for tracking the environment, WII has a considerable improvement. During this period (2012-2014), WII put its efforts in developing good networks in the areas of Climate Change Adaptation, Disaster Risk Reduction and Ecosystem Restoration and Management. In terms of

stakeholder responsiveness, WII is well respected by its partners, which is proven by the increased efforts to be involved in a number of local, national and international initiatives.

In the capability to deliver on development objectives, an overall slight improvement has taken place. In terms of clear operational plans, WII remains well known for having good performance in implementing and conducting the log frame at the project level which is acknowledged by both partners and donors. Cost-effective resource use has been slightly improved. WII works with a time writing system, and staff frequently works on more than one project at once to optimize their work schedules. In terms of mechanisms to meet beneficiary needs, a slight improvement has taken place as field projects are now determined based on thorough assessment of the needs and perspectives of local communities and stakeholders. In terms of balancing quality and efficiency, WII has shown considerable improvement: in a number of cases where the financial needs exceeded the proposal, the organization would disregard efficiency and use the organization's own money to cover the budget gap and maintain the quality of the result.

The capability to relate has slightly improved. First, stakeholder engagement is more involved in policies and strategies. The Ministry of Forestry, National Working Group on Mangrove, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Marine and Fishery, National Council of Climate Change, National Disaster Management Agency, Community Disaster Management Indonesia, have been some of the parties that WII has engaged with since the baseline. In terms of engaging networks, WII has slightly improved 2012. There has been an increase in invitations from parties in WII's network to become partners with WII and more cooperation initiatives have been launched. The engagement with target groups has improved as well. Local communities and the other stakeholders are still always involved in implementation in the field. Relationships within the organization have slightly improved. There has been an emphasis on face to face communication and limiting information sharing through email and phone calls.

Finally the capability to achieve coherence has slightly improved as well. In terms of operational guidelines new operational procedures related to finance and HRM have been adopted by the management since the baseline. A slight improvement also took place in the alignment with vision and mission: staff agrees that the vision and mission of WII have been successfully aligned with Wetlands International after a global change in recent years. Mutually supportive efforts have been considerably improved through the cross-project coordination.

**General organisational capacity changes related to MFS II Interventions**

The evaluators considered it important to also note down the SPO's story in terms of changes in the organisation since the baseline, and this would also provide more information about reasons for change, which were difficult to get for the individual indicators. Also for some issues there may not have been relevant indicators available in the list of core indicators provide by the evaluation team. Please note that this information is based only on the information provided by WII staff during the endline workshop, but no validation of this information has been done like with the process tracing causal maps. For details in relation to attribution, we refer to the next section (5.3).

During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by WII staff, these have been captured in the general causal map in 4.2.2:

1. Improved staff capacity in their respective roles and fields of work
2. Increased communication on WII and wetlands issues
3. Improved collaboration and networking with local and international partners
4. A healthier and safer financial condition of the organization
5. Increased organizational management capacity

All of these are expected to contribute to WII becoming a leading organization and a role model for organizations dealing with global warming and wetlands issues in the Indonesia. WII staff experienced these as the most important capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline.

Improved staff capacity resulted from joining the "community of practice". This is an international community whose members are organizations with similar focus (global warming-wetlands). This was

the result of the change of vision and mission of Wetlands International, which in turn can be attributed to the development of the global agenda for wetlands.

Increased communication on WII and wetlands issues was attributed by the SPO staff, to improving media content and packages as well as strengthening media relations. Both these developments sprung from the need for stronger communication and publication which resulted from a change of vision and mission of Wetlands International.

Improved collaboration and networking was attributed by the SPO to joining the joint community of practice, the strengthening of activities of advocating policies and other strategic activities (disaster, peat, emissions management) as part of a "one map policy" to include other subsectors, and more extensive and diverse programs. The strengthening of advocating activities was enabled by the shift in organizational approach from "low profile" to "high profile" as well as the development of field based programs to more strategic level programs. Both these shifts were the result of the change of vision and mission of Wetlands International, which occurred after the development of the global wetlands agenda. More extensive and diverse programs were the result of an increasing number of donors and the volume of donations, which in turn resulted from increased opportunities to submit financial proposals to various donors. This can be attributed to an expansion of issue coverage and work area on the one hand, and improved accountability of the organizational funds on the other. Whilst the work area expansion was once again due to the change of vision and mission of Wetlands International, the increased accountability resulted from an orderly financial administration. This was an important conclusion from the OD consultant who was hired after Wetlands International provided coaching and a capacity development workshop through MFS II funding.

The improved financial condition of WII occurred through an increasing number of donations, and increased staff capacity to manage responsibilities. The greater number of donations was already explained above. The increased staff capacity to manage responsibilities resulted from increased experience and knowledge sharing. Both of these were enabled by staff placement in project management, and staff being sent to trainings and workshops. Both these were recommended by the organizational capacity scan and HQ workshop on capacity development.

Finally, the increased organization management capacity resulted from an increased ability of staff to manage responsibilities, strengthening the existence and recognition of the organization in front of the government, an increased number of managerial staff, and improved supporting facilities. The latter two changes resulted from an increased need for resources for program activities and staff. Increased staff capacity to manage responsibilities was already explained in the previous paragraph. Strengthening the existence and recognition of the organization in the eyes of the government was due a revision and addition of Employment SOP as well as an adjustment of employment welfare according to Indonesian labor laws after a series of formalizations in the employment policy and contracts. Both can be attributed to the recommendations made by the consultant regarding integration of Indonesian laws and regulations as well as recommendations regarding reviewing and revising SOP's. This in turn resulted from the MFS II sponsored CD scan in March 2013.

In conclusion MFS II interventions have been tied to key organization capacity changes, as experienced by the SPO, although they were only in part responsible for all changes that have occurred. The redevelopment of the global agenda of Wetlands International has also had profound impact on the organization's capacity changes, particularly in the field of program quality and focus, as well as networks addressed. The development of a more structured, accountable and transparent organization that adheres to Indonesian law and has increased its' organizational management capacity can however for a large part be attributed to MFS II, according to SPO staff present at the endline workshop. However, it must be noted that the information provided has not been validated through other sources of information, and therefore the conclusions must be understood in that respect.

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20140430 PfR Annual Report 2013.pdf
Annex A_5c endline_assessment sheet_Dutch co-financing organisations_Indonesia_WII_RedCross.docx
Annex B_5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_CFA perspective_Indonesia_WII_RedCross.docx
Annual Plan Indonesia 2014_ver 8_13 December 2013_FINAL response YRN to comments MJV.pdf
Annual Report 2012_final_no track change.doc
Annual Report January 1 - December 31 2013_ver 2.docx
Capacity Development Plan_March 2013_ver 2, update July 2013, yn.docx
Capacity development WI-ID 130307.ppt
Contract Amendment- PfR 1231-012 Indonesia (1).doc
Contract Amendment- PfR 1231-012 Indonesia.doc
Contract Annex 1 3 & 4 initials JR scan.pdf
Contract Annex 2 ToR initials JR scan.pdf
Contract Budget WII budget July - sept 2013 INN final.xls
Contract Indonesia Budget and workplan Oct - Nov 2013_ver3_11 October 2013.xls
Contract PfR 2014 signature JR scan.pdf
Contract Work plan WII July - sept 2013 INN final.xls
draaiboek PfR internal strategizing meeting September 2013 draft agenda.doc
Final Agenda SMT meeting October 2013.docx
Global Work Conference September 2013 version 8 sept 13.docx
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Lesson learnt and success stories_WI_2011.doc
MFSII Indonesia Baseline_5C_Wetlands_2012-12-17_YRN Comments.pdf
Midterm Revie IND Presentation.final.pptx
Midterm Review - overview and main findings final.docx
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OD Assessment visit to Wetlands International in Indonesia 28 April - 6 May 2012_Josje 120508.docx
OD Assessment WI Indonesia findings HR Fin_HR part updated per 12 june 2012.doc
Organization Structure of PfR.doc
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Profile WII (2012-Sept 2013)_Indonesian.pdf
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Research proposal Learning from and about PfR Sep 2013 zb.pdf
ToC WII based on WI workshop.docx
ToC WII_Jan 2013_workshop version.docx
ToC WII_Jan 2013.docx
ToC_Indonesia_Wetlands International_Aug 16.2012_A4.docx
Annual Plan Indonesia 2014_ver 8_13 December 2013_FINAL response YRN to comments MJV.pdf
Annual Report January 1 - December 31 2013_ver 2.docx
Data_keuangan_Lusiana.xls
WII Planning report 2014.doc
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E01_Wetlands.xls
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20140430 PfR Annual Report 2013.pdf
Annual Plan Indonesia 2014_ver 8_13 December 2013_FINAL.pdf
Annual Report 2012_final_no track change.doc
Annual Report January 1 - December 31 2013_ver 2.docx
Benefit Scheme_Indonesian.pdf
Capacity Development Plan_March 2013_ver 2, update July 2013, yn.docx
Capacity development WI-ID 130307.ppt
Contract Budget WII budget July - sept 2013 INN final.xls
Contract Indonesia Budget and workplan Oct - Nov 2013_ver3.xls
Contract Work plan WII July - sept 2013 INN final.xls
draaiboek PfR internal strategizing meeting September 2013 draft agenda.doc

Final Agenda SMT meeting October 2013.docx
Financial Statement 2012.pdf
Global Work Conference September 2013 version 8 sept 13.docx
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Lesson learnt and success stories_WI_2011.doc
Midterm Revie IND Presentation.final.pptx
Midterm Review - overview and main findings final.docx
Midterm Review Report Indonesia_comments WII.docx
Organization Structure of PfR.doc
Partners for Resilience WI Strategy.pdf
Profile WII (2012-Sept 2013)_Indonesian.pdf
Report WII at AMCDRR .doc
Research proposal Learning from and about PfR Sep 2013 zb.pdf
Safety and Security at Works_English.doc
Standard Operational Cost_Indonesian.pdf
WII Planning report 2014.doc
WII Yearly Report 2011.doc
WII Yearly Report 2012.doc
Annex Q_ WII.doc
Annex R_5c endline_observable indicators at SPO_Indonesia_Wetlands.docx
BAHASA-Annex L_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_management (yus).doc
BAHASA-Annex L_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_management_Indonesia_Wetland_Lusi.doc
BAHASA-Annex M_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_program staf (reza).doc
BAHASA-Annex M_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_program staff (iwan).doc
BAHASA-Annex M_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_program staff (triana).doc
BAHASA-Annex M_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_program staff_Indonesia_Wetlands.doc
BAHASA-Annex O_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_admin and HRM staff (hidayat).doc
BAHASA-Annex O_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_admin and HRM staff_anggita.doc
BAHASA-Annex P_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_field staff (ragil).doc
BAHASA-Annex P_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_field staff (telly).doc

# List of Respondents

**List of Respondents**

**People Present at the Workshops**

| **Date:** | **2-3 July 2014** | **Organisation: Wetlands International-Indonesia** | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **NAME** | **ROLE IN THE ORGANISATION** | **DURATION OF SERVICE** | **PHONE** | **E-MAIL** |
| **Management** | | | | |
| Yus Rusila Noor | Programme Manager | 27 years | 08128289379 | Yus.noor@gmail.com |
| Lusiana Nuris Siyadah | Finance Manager | 10 years | 08121101279 | lusiananurissiyadah@yahoo.com |
| **Program/ Project staff** | | | | |
| Reza | Program Staff | | | |
| Iwan Tri Cahyo Wibisono | Forestry and Rehabilitation Specialist | 12 years | 0818101398 | wibisono_yoyok@wetlands.or.id |
| Triana | Publication Officer | 12 years | 02518633629 | maintenance@wetlands.or.id |
| Telly Kurniasari | Project Koordinator | 10 years | 0818101328 | - |
| **Admin/ HR/Finance staff** | | | | |
| Hidayat Sunarsyah | Maintenance Officer | 27 years | | |
| Anggita Kalistaningsih | Sekretarisdan Admin | 7 years | 0217272293 | admin@wetlands.or.id |
| **Field staff staff** | | | | |
| Yoyok | Field staff | | | |
| Vidi | Field staff | | | |
| Ragil Satriyo Gumilang | Forestry specialist | 4 years | | |
| **Others** | | | | |
| | | | | |

**List of People Inteviewed**

| **Date:** | **25-28 June 2012** | **Organisation: Lembaga Kita** | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **NAME** | **ROLE IN THE ORGANISATION** | **DURATION OF SERVICE** | **PHONE** | **E-MAIL** |
| **Management** | | | | |
| Yus Rusila Noor | Programme Manager | 27 years | | |
| Lusiana Nuris Siyadah | Finance Manager | 10 years | 0812110 1279 | lusiananurissiyadah@yahoo.com |
| **Program/ Project staff** | | | | |
| Reza | Program Staff | | | _ |
| Iwan Tri CahyoWibisono | Spesialiskehutanandanrehabilitasi | 12 years | 0818101398 | wibisono_yoyok@wetlands.or.id |
| Triana | Publication Staff | 23 years | 025 8633629 | maintenance@wetlands.or.id |
| Telly Kurniasari | Project Koordinator | 10 years | 0818101328 | |
| **Admin/ HR/Finance staff** | | | | |
| Hidayat Sunarsyah | Maintenance Officer | 27 years | | _ |
| Anggita Kalistaningsih | Sekretarisdan Admin | 12 years | 0217272293 | admin@wetlands.or.id |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Field staff staff** | | | | |
| Yoyok | Field staff | | | |
| Vidi | Field staff | | | |
| Ragil Satriyo Gumilang | Forestry specialist | | | |
| **Others** | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |

# Appendix 1 Methodological approach & reflection

## Introduction

This appendix describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around four key evaluation questions:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

Note: the methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report. At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

## Changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 1

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?**

This question was mainly addressed by reviewing changes in 5c indicators, but additionally a 'general causal map' based on the SPO perspective on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline has been developed. Each of these is further explained below. The development of the general causal map is integrated in the steps for the endline workshop, as mentioned below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012.[13] Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1. **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2. **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3. **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4. **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5. **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

[13] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Below each of these steps is further explained.

*Step 1. Provide the **description of indicators** in the relevant formats – CDI team*

These formats were to be used when collecting data from SPO staff, CFA, partners, and consultants. For each of these respondents different formats have been developed, based on the list of 5C indicators, similar to the procedure that was used during the baseline assessment. The CDI team needed to add the 2012 baseline description of each indicator. The idea was that each respondent would be requested to review each description per indicator, and indicate whether the current situation is different from the baseline situation, how this situation has changed, and what the reasons for the changes in indicators are. At the end of each format, a more general question is added that addresses how the organisation has changed its capacity since the baseline, and what possible reasons for change exist. Please see below the questions asked for each indicator as well as the more general questions at the end of the list of indicators.

General questions about key changes in the capacity of the SPO

*What do you consider to be the key changes in terms of how the organisation/ SPO has developed its capacity since the baseline (2012)?*

*What do you consider to be the main explanatory reasons (interventions, actors or factors) for these changes?*

**List of questions to be asked for each of the 5C indicators** (The entry point is the the description of each indicator as in the 2012 baseline report):

1. *How has the situation of this indicator changed compared to the situation during the baseline in 2012? Please tick one of the following scores:*
   - -2 = Considerable deterioration
   - -1 = A slight deterioration
   - 0 = No change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012
   - +1 = Slight improvement

- +2 = Considerable improvement

2. *Please describe what exactly has changed since the baseline in 2012*
3. *What interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation in 2012? Please tick and describe what interventions, actors or factors influenced this indicator, and how. You can tick and describe more than one choice.*
   - Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by **SPO**: ..... .
   - Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **Dutch CFA (MFS II funding)**: .... .
   - Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **other funders**: ..... .
   - **Other** interventions, actors or factors: ..... .
   - Don't know.

*Step 2. **Review** the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team*

Before the in-country team and the CDI team started collecting data in the field, it was important that they reviewed the description for each indicator as described in the baseline reports, and also added to the endline formats for review by respondents. These descriptions are based on document review, observation, interviews with SPO staff, CFA staff and external respondents during the baseline. It was important to explain this to respondents before they filled in the formats.

*Step 3. **Send the formats** adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)*

The CDI team was responsible for collecting data from the CFA:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – CFA perspective.

The in-country team was responsible for collecting data from the SPO and from external respondents (except CFA). The following formats were sent before the fieldwork started:

- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – SPO perspective.
- 5C Endline interview guides for externals: partners; OD consultants.

*Step 4. **Collect, upload & code the documents** from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team*

The CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team, collected the following documents from SPOs and CFAs:

- Project documents: project proposal, budget, contract (Note that for some SPOs there is a contract for the full MFS II period 2011-2015; for others there is a yearly or 2-yearly contract. All new contracts since the baseline in 2012 will need to be collected);
- Technical and financial progress reports since the baseline in 2012;.
- Mid-term evaluation reports;
- End of project-evaluation reports (by the SPO itself or by external evaluators);
- Contract intake forms (assessments of the SPO by the CFA) or organisational assessment scans made by the CFA that cover the 2011-2014 period;
- Consultant reports on specific inputs provided to the SPO in terms of organisational capacity development;
- Training reports (for the SPO; for alliance partners, including the SPO);
- Organisational scans/ assessments, carried out by the CFA or by the Alliance Assessments;
- Monitoring protocol reports, especially for the 5C study carried out by the MFS II Alliances;
- Annual progress reports of the CFA and of the Alliance in relation to capacity development of the SPOs in the particular country;
- Specific reports that are related to capacity development of SPOs in a particular country.

The following documents (since the baseline in 2012) were requested from SPO:

- Annual progress reports;
- Annual financial reports and audit reports;

- Organisational structure vision and mission since the baseline in 2012;
- Strategic plans;
- Business plans;
- Project/ programme planning documents;
- Annual work plan and budgets;
- Operational manuals;
- Organisational and policy documents: finance, human resource development, etc.;
- Monitoring and evaluation strategy and implementation plans;
- Evaluation reports;
- Staff training reports;
- Organisational capacity reports from development consultants.

The CDI team will coded these documents in NVivo (qualitative data analysis software program) against the 5C indicators.

*Step 5.* ***Prepare and organise the field visit*** *to the SPO – in-country team*

Meanwhile the in-country team prepared and organised the logistics for the field visit to the SPO:

- **General endline workshop** consisted about one day for the self-assessments (about ½ to ¾ of the day) and brainstorm (about 1 to 2 hours) on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline and underlying interventions, factors and actors ('general causal map'), see also explanation below. This was done with the five categories of key staff: managers; project/ programme staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin & HRM staff; field staff. Note: for SPOs involved in process tracing an additional 1 to 1½ day workshop (managers; program/project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff) was necessary. See also step 7;
- **Interviews with SPO staff** (roughly one day);
- **Interviews with external respondents** such as partners and organisational development consultants depending on their proximity to the SPO. These interviews coulc be scheduled after the endline workshop and interviews with SPO staff.

General causal map

During the 5C endline process, a 'general causal map' has been developed, based on key organisational capacity changes and underlying causes for these changes, as perceived by the SPO. The general causal map describes cause-effect relationships, and is described both as a visual as well as a narrative.

As much as possible the same people that were involved in the baseline were also involved in the endline workshop and interviews.

*Step 6.* ***Interview the CFA*** *– CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for sending the sheets/ formats to the CFA and for doing a follow-up interview on the basis of the information provided so as to clarify or deepen the information provided. This relates to:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet - CFA perspective.

*Step 7.* ***Run the endline workshop*** *with the SPO – in-country team*

This included running the endline workshop, including facilitation of the development of the general causal map, self-assessments, interviews and observations. Particularly for those SPOs that were selected for process tracing all the relevant information needed to be analysed prior to the field visit,

so as to develop an initial causal map. Please see Step 6 and also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two).

An endline workshop with the SPO was intended to:

- Explain the purpose of the fieldwork;
- Carry out in the self-assessments by SPO staff subgroups (unless these have already been filled prior to the field visits) - this may take some 3 hours.
- Facilitate a brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012 and underlying interventions, factors and actors.

***Purpose of the fieldwork*:** to collect data that help to provide information on what changes took place in terms of organisational capacity development of the SPO as well as reasons for these changes. The baseline that was carried out in 2012 was to be used as a point of reference.

***Brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes and influencing factors***: a brainstorm was facilitated on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012. In order to kick start the discussion, staff were reminded of the key findings related to the historical time line carried out in the baseline (vision, mission, strategies, funding, staff). This was then used to generate a discussion on key changes that happened in the organisation since the baseline (on cards). Then cards were selected that were related to organisational capacity changes, and organised. Then a 'general causal map' was developed, based on these key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change as experienced by the SPO staff. This was documented as a visual and narrative.This general causal map was to get the story of the SPO on what they perceived as key organisational capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline, in addition to the specific details provided per indicator.

***Self-assessments*:** respondents worked in the respective staff function groups: management; programme/ project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin and HRM staff; field staff. Staff were assisted where necessary so that they could really understand what it was they were being asked to do as well as what the descriptions under each indicator meant.

Note: for those SPOs selected for process tracing an additional endline workshop was held to facilitate the development of detailed causal maps for each of the identified organisational change/ outcome areas that fall under the capability to act and commit, and under the capability to adapt and self-renew, and that are likely related to capacity development interventions by the CFA. See also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two). It was up to the in-country team whether this workshop was held straight after the initial endline workshop or after the workshop and the follow-up interviews. It could also be held as a separate workshop at another time.

*Step 8.* ***Interview SPO staff*** *– in-country team*

After the endline workshop (developing the general causal map and carrying out self-assessments in subgroups), interviews were held with SPO staff (subgroups) to follow up on the information that was provided in the self-assessment sheets, and to interview staff that had not yet provided any information.

*Step 9.* ***Fill-in observation sheets*** *– in-country team*

During the visit at the SPO, the in-country team had to fill in two sheets based on their observation:

- 5C Endline observation sheet;
- 5C Endline observable indicators.

*Step 10.* ***Interview externals*** *– in-country team & CDI team*

The in-country team also needed to interview the partners of the SPO as well as organisational capacity development consultants that have provided support to the SPO. The CDI team interviewed the CFA.

*Step 11.* ***Upload and auto-code all the formats*** *collected by in-country team and CDI team – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for uploading and auto-coding (in Nvivo) of the documents that were collected by the in-country team and by the CDI team.

*Step 12. Provide the* ***overview of information*** *per 5C indicator to in-country team – CDI team*

After the analysis in NVivo, the CDI team provided a copy of all the information generated per indicator to the in-country team for initial analysis.

*Step 13.* ***Analyse the data and develop a draft description*** *of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team*

The in-country team provided a draft description of the findings per indicator, based on the information generated per indicator. The information generated under the general questions were linked to the general causal map or detailed process tracing related causal map.

*Step 14.* ***Analyse the data and finalize the description*** *of the findings per indicator, per capability and general – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for checking the analysis by the in-country team with the Nvivo generated data and to make suggestions for improvement and ask questions for clarification to which the in-country team responded. The CDI team then finalised the analysis and provided final descriptions and scores per indicator and also summarize these per capability and calculated the summary capability scores based on the average of all indicators by capability.

*Step 15.* ***Analyse the information*** *in the general causal map –in-country team & CDI team*

The general causal map based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff present at the workshop, was further detailed by in-country team and CDI team, and based on the notes made during the workshop and where necessary additional follow up with the SPO. The visual and narrative was finalized after feedback by the SPO. During analysis of the general causal map relationships with MFS II support for capacity development and other factors and actors were identified. All the information has been reviewed by the SPO and CFA.

## Attributing changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 2

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: ***To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?***

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process. The box below provides some background information on process tracing.

Background information on process tracing

The essence of process tracing research is that scholars want to go beyond merely identifying correlations between independent variables (Xs) and outcomes (Ys). Process tracing in social science is commonly defined by its addition to trace causal mechanisms (Bennett, 2008a, 2008b; Checkle, 2008; George & Bennett, 2005). A causal mechanism can be defined as "a complex system which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts" (Glennan, 1996, p. 52). Process tracing involves "attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable" (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 206-207).

Process tracing can be differentiated into three variants within social science: theory testing, theory building, and explaining outcome process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

- Theory testing process tracing uses a theory from the existing literature and then tests whether evidence shows that each part of hypothesised causal mechanism is present in a given case, enabling within case inferences about whether the mechanism functioned as expected in the case and whether the mechanism as a whole was present. No claims can be made however, about whether the mechanism was the only cause of the outcome.
- Theory building process tracing seeks to build generalizable theoretical explanations from empirical evidence, inferring that a more general causal mechanism exists from the fact of a particular case.
- Finally, explaining outcome process tracing attempts to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific historical case. Here the aim is not to build or test more general theories but to craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case centric than theory oriented.

Explaining outcome process tracing is the most suitable type of process tracing for analysing the causal mechanisms for selected key organisational capacity changes of the SPOs. This type of process tracing can be thought of as a single outcome study defined as seeking the causes of the specific outcome in a single case (Gerring, 2006; in: Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Here the ambition is to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a particular outcome, with sufficiency defined as an explanation that accounts for all of the important aspects of an outcome with no redundant parts being present (Mackie, 1965).

Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research strategy that aims to trace the complex conglomerate of systematic and case specific causal mechanisms that produced the outcome in question. The explanation cannot be detached from the particular case. Explaining outcome process tracing refers to case studies whose primary ambition is to explain particular historical outcomes, although the findings of the case can also speak to other potential cases of the phenomenon. Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research process in which 'theories' are tested to see whether they can provide a minimally sufficient explanation of the outcome. Minimal sufficiency is defined as an explanation that accounts for an outcome, with no redundant parts. In most explaining outcome studies, existing theorisation cannot provide a sufficient explanation, resulting in a second stage in which existing theories are re-conceptualised in light of the evidence gathered in the preceding empirical analysis. The conceptualisation phase in explaining outcome process tracing is therefore an iterative research process, with initial mechanisms re-conceptualised and tested until the result is a theorised mechanism that provides a minimally sufficient explanation of the particular outcome.

Below a description is provided of how SPOs are selected for process tracing, and a description is provided on how this process tracing is to be carried out. Note that this description of process tracing provides not only information on the extent to which the changes in organisational development can be attributed to MFS II (evaluation question 2), but also provides information on other contributing factors and actors (evaluation question 4). Furthermore, it must be noted that the evaluation team has developed an adapted form of 'explaining outcome process tracing', since the data collection and analysis was an iterative process of research so as to establish the most realistic explanation for a particular outcome/ organisational capacity change. Below selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

**Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing**

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on

17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

**ETHIOPIA**

For Ethiopia the capabilities that are mostly targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 1

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Ethiopia*

| Capability to: | AMREF | CARE | ECFA | FSCE | HOA-REC | HUNDEE | NVEA | OSRA | TTCA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Relate | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| Achieve coherence | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Ethiopia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE. In fact, six SPOs would be suitable for process tracing. We just selected the first one per CFA following the criteria of not including more than one SPO per CFA for process tracing

Table 2

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Ethiopia*

| Ethiopia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AMREF | Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | AMREF NL | Yes |
| CARE | Dec 31, 2015 | Partly | Yes | Yes | Yes – slightly | CARE Netherlands | No - not fully matching |
| ECFA | Jan 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Child Helpline International | Yes |
| FSCE | Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN); Note: no info from Defence for Children – ECPAT Netherlands | Yes |
| HOA-REC | Sustainable Energy project (ICCO Alliance): 2014 Innovative WASH (WASH Alliance): Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes - slightly | ICCO | No - not fully matching |
| HUNDEE | Dec 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO & IICD | Yes |
| NVEA | Dec 2015 (both) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Edukans Foundation (under two consortia); Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN) | Suitable but SKN already involved for process tracing FSCE |
| OSRA | C4C Alliance project (farmers marketing): December 2014 ICCO Alliance project (zero grazing: 2014 (2nd phase) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO & IICD | Suitable but ICCO & IICD already involved for process tracing - HUNDEE |
| TTCA | June 2015 | Partly | Yes | No | Yes | Edukans Foundation | No - not fully matching |

**INDIA**

For India the capability that is mostly targeted by CFAs is the capability to act and commit. The next one in line is the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below in which a higher score means that the specific capability is more intensively targeted.

Table 3

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – India*[14]

| Capability to: | BVHA | COUNT | DRISTI | FFID | Jana Vikas | Samarthak Samiti | SMILE | SDS | VTRC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 5 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 4 |
| Relate | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, India.

Below you can see a table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether SPO and the CFA both expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE and VTRC. Except for SMILE (capability to act and commit only), for the other SPOs the focus for process tracing can be on the capability to act and commit and on the capability to adapt and self-renew.

Table 4

*SPOs selected for process tracing – India*

| India – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BVHA | 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Simavi | Yes; both capabilities |
| COUNT | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Woord en Daad | Yes; both capabilities |
| DRISTI | 31-03-2012 | Yes | Yes | No | no | Hivos | No - closed in 2012 |
| FFID | 30-09-2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |

14 RGVN, NEDSF and Women's Rights Forum (WRF) could not be reached timely during the baseline due to security reasons. WRF could not be reached at all. Therefore these SPOs are not included in Table 1.

| India – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jana Vikas | 2013 | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No - contract is and the by now; not fully matching focus |
| NEDSF | | | | | | | No – delayed baseline |
| RGVN | | | | | | | No - delayed baseline |
| Samarthak Samiti (SDS) | 2013 possibly longer | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Hivos | No - not certain of end date and not fully matching focus |
| Shivi Development Society (SDS) | Dec 2013 intention 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No - not fully matching focus |
| Smile | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Wilde Ganzen | Yes; first capability only |
| VTRC | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Stichting Red een Kind | Yes; both capabilities |

**INDONESIA**

For Indonesia the capabilities that are most frequently targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 5

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Indonesia*

| Capability to: | ASB | Daya kologi | ECPAT | GSS | Lem baga Kita | PT. PPMA | Rifka Annisa | WIIP | Yad upa | Yayasan Kelola | YPI | YRBI |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 4 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 3 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 |
| Relate | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, Indonesia.

The table below describes when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: ASB, ECPAT, PT.PPMA, YPI, YRBI.

Table 6

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Indonesia*

| Indonesia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ASB | February 2012; extension Feb,1, 2013 – June,30, 2016 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Hivos | Yes |
| Dayakologi | 2013; no extension | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No: contract ended early and not matching enough |
| ECPAT | August 2013; Extension Dec 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes, a bit | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | Yes |
| GSS | 31 December 2012; no extension | Yes | Yes | Yes, a bit | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | No: contract ended early |
| Lembaga Kita | 31 December 2012; no extension | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | No - contract ended early |
| PT.PPMA | May 2015 | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | IUCN | Yes, capability to act and commit only |
| Rifka Annisa | Dec, 31 2015 | No | Yes | No | Yes | Rutgers WPF | No - no match between expectations CFA and SPO |
| WIIP | Dec 2015 | Yes | Not MFS II | Yes | Not MFS II | Red Cross | No - Capacity development interventions are not MFS II financed. Only some overhead is MFS II |

| Indonesia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yayasan Kelola | Dec 30, 2013; extension of contract being processed for two years (2014-2015) | Yes | Not really | Yes | Not really | Hivos | No - no specific capacity development interventions planned by Hivos |
| YPI | Dec 31, 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Rutgers WPF | Yes |
| YRBI | Oct, 30, 2013; YRBI end of contract from 31st Oct 2013 to 31st Dec 2013. Contract extension proposal is being proposed to MFS II, no decision yet. | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |
| Yadupa | Under negotiation during baseline; new contract 2013 until now | Yes | Nothing committed | Yes | Nothing committed | IUCN | No, since nothing was committed by CFA |

**LIBERIA**

For Liberia the situation is arbitrary which capabilities are targeted most CFA's. Whilst the capability to act and commit is targeted more often than the other capabilities, this is only so for two of the SPOs. The capability to adapt and self-renew and the capability to relate are almost equally targeted for the five SPOs, be it not intensively. Since the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew are the most targeted capabilities in Ethiopia, India and Indonesia, we choose to focus on these two capabilities for Liberia as well. This would help the synthesis team in the further analysis of these capabilities related to process tracing. See also the table below.

Table 7

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Liberia*

| Capability to: | BSC | DEN-L | NAWOCOL | REFOUND | RHRAP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Relate | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, Liberia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Also, for two of the five SPOs capability to act and commit is targeted more intensively compared to the other capabilities. Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BSC and RHRAP.

Table 8

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Liberia*

| Liberia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BSC | Dec 31, 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | SPARK | Yes |
| DEN-L | 2014 | No | No | Unknown | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| NAWOCOL | 2014 | Yes | No | No | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| REFOUND | At least until 2013 (2015?) | Yes | No | Yes | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| RHRAP | At least until 2013 (2014?) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |

**Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study**

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ' general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

Some definitions of the terminology used for this MFS II 5c evaluation

Based upon the different interpretations and connotations the use of the term causal mechanism we use the following terminology for the remainder of this paper:

- A **detailed causal map** (or **model of change)** = the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change.
- A **causal mechanism** = is the combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 176).
- **Part** or **cause** = one actor with its attributes carrying out activities/ producing outputs that lead to change in other parts. The final part or cause is the change/ outcome.
- **Attributes of the actor** = specificities of the actor that increase his chance to introduce change or not such as its position in its institutional environment.

*Step 1. Identify the **planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

Chapter 4.1 and 4.2 in the baseline report were reviewed. Capacity development interventions as planned by the CFA for the capability to act and commit and for the capability to adapt and self-renew were described and details inserted in the summary format. This provided an overview of the capacity development activities that were originally planned by the CFA for these two capabilities and assisted in focusing on relevant outcomes that are possibly related to the planned interventions.

*Step 2. Identify the **implemented capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

The input from the CFA was reviewed in terms of what capacity development interventions have taken place in the MFS II period. This information was be found in the 'Support to capacity development sheet - endline - CFA perspective' for the SPO, based on details provided by the CFA and further discussed during an interview by the CDI team.

The CFA was asked to describe all the MFS II supported capacity development interventions of the SPO that took place during the period 2011 up to now. The CDI team reviewed this information, not only the interventions but also the observed changes as well as the expected long-term changes, and

then linked these interventions to relevant outcomes in one of the capabilities (capability to act and commit; and capability to adapt and self-renew).

*Step 3. Identify **initial changes/ outcome areas** in these two capabilities – by CDI team & in-country team*

The CDI team was responsible for coding documents received from SPO and CFA in NVivo on the following:

- 5C Indicators: this was to identify the changes that took place between baseline and endline. This information was coded in Nvivo.
- Information related to the capacity development interventions implemented by the CFA (with MFS II funding) (see also Step 2) to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. For example, the training on financial management of the SPO staff could be related to any information on financial management of the SPO. This information was coded in Nvivo.

In addition, the response by the CFA to the changes in 5C indicators format, was auto-coded.

The in-country team was responsible for timely collection of information from the SPO (before the fieldwork starts). This set of information dealt with:

- MFS II supported capacity development interventions during the MFS II period (2011 until now).
- Overview of all trainings provided in relation to a particular outcome areas/organisational capacity change since the baseline.
- For each of the identified MFS II supported trainings, training questionnaires have been developed to assess these trainings in terms of the participants, interests, knowledge and skills gained, behaviour change and changes in the organisation (based on Kirkpatrick's model), one format for training participants and one for their managers. These training questionnaires were sent prior to the field visit.
- Changes expected by SPO on a long-term basis ('Support to capacity development sheet - endline - SPO perspective').

For the selection of change/ outcome areas the following criteria were important:

- The change/ outcome area is in one of the two capabilities selected for process tracing: capability to act and commit or the capability to adapt and self-renew. This was the first criteria to select upon.
- There was a likely link between the key organisational capacity change/ outcome area and the MFS II supported capacity development interventions. This also was an important criteria. This would need to be demonstrated through one or more of the following situations:
  - In the 2012 theory of change on organisational capacity development of the SPO a link was indicated between the outcome area and MFS II support;
  - During the baseline the CFA indicated a link between the planned MFS II support to organisational development and the expected short-term or long-term results in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the CFA indicated a link between the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the SPO indicated a link between the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities.

Reviewing the information obtained as described in Step 1, 2, and 3 provided the basis for selecting key organisational capacity change/ outcome areas to focus on for process tracing. These areas were to be formulated as broader outcome areas, such as 'improved financial management', 'improved monitoring and evaluation' or 'improved staff competencies'.

Note: the outcome areas were to be formulated as intermediates changes. For example: an improved monitoring and evaluation system, or enhanced knowledge and skills to educate the target group on

climate change. Key outcome areas were also verified - based on document review as well as discussions with the SPO during the endline.

*Step 4. Construct the **detailed, initial causal map** (theoretical model of change) – CDI & in-country team*

A detailed initial causal map was developed by the CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team. This was based on document review, including information provided by the CFA and SPO on MFS II supported capacity development interventions and their immediate and long-term objectives as well as observed changes. Also, the training questionnaires were reviewed before developing the initial causal map. This detailed initial causal map was to be provided by the CDI team with a visual and related narrative with related references. This initial causal map served as a reference point for further reflection with the SPO during the process tracing endline workshop, where relationships needed to be verified or new relationships established so that the second (workshop-based), detailed causal map could be developed, after which further verification was needed to come up with the final, concluding detailed causal map.

It's important to note that organisational change area/ outcome areas could be both positive and negative.

For each of the selected outcomes the team needed to make explicit the theoretical model of change. This meant finding out about the range of different actors, factors, actions, and events etc. that have contributed to a particular outcome in terms of organisational capacity of the SPO.

A model of change of good quality includes:

- The causal pathways that relate the intervention to the realised change/ outcome;
- Rival explanations for the same change/ outcome;
- Assumptions that clarify relations between different components or parts;
- Case specific and/or context specific factors or risks that might influence the causal pathway, such as for instance the socio-cultural-economic context, or a natural disaster;
- Specific attributes of the actors e.g. CFA and other funders.

A model of change (within the 5C study called a 'detailed causal map') is a complex system which produces intermediate and long-term outcomes by the interaction of other parts. It consists of parts or causes that often consist of one actor with its attributes that is implementing activities leading to change in other parts (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). A helpful way of constructing the model of change is to think in terms of actors carrying out activities that lead to other actors changing their behaviour. The model of change can be explained as a range of activities carried out by different *actors* (including the CFA and SPO under evaluation) that will ultimately lead to an outcome. Besides this, there are also '*structural*' elements, which are to be interpreted as external factors (such as economic conjuncture); and *attributes* of the actor (does the actor have the legitimacy to ask for change or not, what is its position in the sector) that should be looked at (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). In fact Beach and Pedersen, make a fine point about the subjectivity of the actor in a dynamic context. This means, in qualitative methodologies, capturing the changes in the actor, acted upon area or person/organisation, in a non sequential and non temporal format. Things which were done recently could have corrected behavioural outcomes of an organisation and at the same ime there could be processes which incrementally pushed for the same change over a period of time. Beach and Pedersen espouse this methodology because it captures change in a dynamic fashion as against the methodology of logical framework. For the MFS II evaluation it was important to make a distinction between those paths in the model of change that are the result of MFS II and rival pathways.
The construction of the model of change started with the identified key organisational capacity change/ outcome, followed by an inventory of all possible subcomponents that possibly have caused the change/ outcome in the MFS II period (2011-up to now, or since the baseline). The figure below presents an imaginary example of a model of change. The different colours indicate the different types of support to capacity development of the SPO by different actors, thereby indicating different pathways of change, leading to the key changes/ outcomes in terms of capacity development (which in this case indicates the ability to adapt and self-renew).





***Figure 1*** *An imaginary example of a model of change*

*Step 5. Identify **types of evidence** needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams with support from CDI team*

Once the causal mechanism at theoretical level were defined, empirical evidence was collected so as to verify or discard the different parts of this theoretical model of change, confirm or reject whether subcomponents have taken place, and to find evidence that confirm or reject the causal relations between the subcomponents.

A key question that we needed to ask ourselves was, *"What information do we need in order to confirm or reject that one subcomponent leads to another, that X causes Y?"*. The evaluation team needed to agree on what information was needed that provides empirical manifestations for each part of the model of change.

There are four distinguishable types of evidence that are relevant in process tracing analysis: *pattern, sequence, trace, and account*. Please see the box below for descriptions of these types of evidence.

The evaluation team needed to agree on the types of evidence that was needed to verify or discard the manifestation of a particular part of the causal mechanism. Each one or a combination of these different types of evidence could be used to confirm or reject the different parts of the model of change. This is what is meant by robustness of evidence gathering. Since causality as a concept can bend in many ways, our methodology, provides a near scientific model for accepting and rejecting a particular type of evidence, ignoring its face value.

Types of evidence to be used in process tracing

- **Pattern evidence** relates to predictions of statistical patterns in the evidence. For example, in testing a mechanism of racial discrimination in a case dealing with employment, statistical patterns of employment would be relevant for testing this part of the mechanism.
- **Sequence evidence** deals with the temporal and spatial chronology of events predicted by a hypothesised causal mechanism. For example, a test of the hypothesis could involve expectations of the timing of events where we might predict that if the hypothesis is valid, we should see that the event B took place after event A took place. However, if we found that event B took place before event A took place, the test would suggest that our confidence in the validity of this part of the mechanism should be reduced (disconfirmation/ falsification).
- **Trace evidence** is evidence whose mere existence provides proof that a part of a hypothesised mechanism exists. For example, the existence of the minutes of a meeting, if authentic ones, provide strong proof that the meeting took place.
- **Account evidence** deals with the content of empirical material, such as meeting minutes that detail what was discussed or an oral account of what took place in the meeting.

*Source*: Beach and Pedersen, 2013

Below you can find a table that provides guidelines on what to look for when identifying types of evidence that can confirm or reject causal relationships between different parts/ subcomponents of the model of change. It also provides one example of a part of a causal pathway and what type of information to look for.

Table 9

*Format for identifying types of evidence for different causal relationships in the model of change (example included)*

| Part of the model of change | Key questions | Type of evidence needed | Source of information |
|---|---|---|---|
| Describe relationship between the subcomponents of the model of change | Describe questions you would like to answer a so as to find out whether the components in the relationship took place, when they took place, who was involved, and whether they are related | Describe the information that we need in order to answer these questions.<br>Which type of evidence can we use in order to reject or confirm that subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y?<br>Can we find this information by means of :<br>Pattern evidence;<br>Sequence evidence;<br>Trace evidence;<br>Account evidence? | Describe where you can find this information |
| Example:<br>Training workshops on M&E provided by MFS II funding and other sources of funding | Example:<br>What type of training workshops on M&E took place?<br>Who was trained?<br>When did the training take place?<br>Who funded the training?<br>Was the funding of training provided before the training took place?<br>How much money was available for the training? | Example:<br>Trace evidence: on types of training delivered, who was trained, when the training took place, budget for the training<br><br>Sequence evidence on timing of funding and timing of training<br><br>Content evidence: what the training was about | Example:<br>Training report<br>SPO Progress reports<br>interviews with the CFA and SPO staff<br>Financial reports SPO and CFA |

Please note that for practical reasons, the 5C evaluation team decided that it was easier to integrate the specific questions in the narrative of the initial causal map. These questions would need to be addressed by the in country team during the process tracing workshop so as to discover, verify or

discard particular causal mechanisms in the detailed, initial causal map. Different types of evidence was asked for in these questions.

*Step 6. **Collect data** to verify or discard causal mechanisms and develop workshop-based, detailed causal map – in-country team*

Once it was decided by the in-country and CDI evaluation teams what information was to be collected during the interaction with the SPO, data collection took place. The initial causal maps served as a basis for discussions during the endline workshop with a particular focus on process tracing for the identified organisational capacity changes. But it was considered to be very important to understand from the perspective of the SPO how they understood the identified key organisational capacity change/outcome area has come about. A new detailed, workshop-based causal map was developed that included the information provided by SPO staff as well as based on initial document review as described in the initial detailed causal map. This information was further analysed and verified with other relevant information so as to develop a final causal map, which is described in the next step.

*Step 7. **Assess the quality** of data and **analyse data**, and develop the **final detailed causal map** (model of change) – in-country team and CDI team*

Quality assurance of the data collected and the evidence it provides for rejecting or confirming parts of causal explanations are a major concern for many authors specialised in contribution analysis and process-tracing. Stern et al. (2012), Beach and Pedersen (2013), Lemire, Nielsen and Dybdal (2012), Mayne (2012) and Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) all emphasise the need to make attribution/ contribution claims that are based on pieces of evidence that are rigorous, traceable, and credible. These pieces of evidence should be as explicit as possible in proving that *subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y* and ruling out other explanations. Several tools are proposed to check the nature and the quality of data needed. One option is, Delahais and Toulemonde's Evidence Analysis Database, which we have adapted for our purpose.

Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) propose an Evidence Analysis Database that takes into consideration three criteria:

- Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no);
- Type of causal mechanism: intended contribution/ other contribution/ condition leading to intended contribution/ intended condition to other contribution/ feedback loop;
- Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak.

We have adapted their criteria to our purpose. The in-country team, in collaboration with the CDI team, used the criteria in assessing whether causal relationships in the causal map, were strong enough. This has been more of an iterative process trying to find additional evidence for the established relationships through additional document review or contacting the CFA and SPO as well as getting their feedback on the final detailed causal map that was established. Whilst the form below has not been used exactly in the manner depicted, it has been used indirectly when trying to validate the information in the detailed causal map. After that, the final detailed causal map is established both as a visual as well as a narrative, with related references for the established causal relations.

| *Example format for the adapted evidence analysis database (example included)* **Description of causal relation** | **Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no)** | **Type of information providing the background to the confirmation or rejection of the causal relation** | **Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak** | **Explanation for why the evidence is (rather) strong or (rather) weak, and therefore the causal relation is confirmed/ rejected** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| e.g. Training staff in M&E leads to enhanced M&E knowledge, skills and practice | e.g. Confirmed | e.g. Training reports confirmed that staff are trained in M&E and that knowledge and skills increased as a result of the training | | |

*Step 8.* ***Analyse and conclude*** *on findings– in-country team and CDI team*

The final detailed causal map was described as a visual and narrative and this was then analysed in terms of the evaluation question two and evaluation question four: *"To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?"* and *"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"* It was analysed to what extent the identified key organisational capacity change can be attributed to MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as to other related factors, interventions and actors.

## Explaining factors – evaluation question 4

This paragraph describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This has been explained in the first section of this appendix. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information was procured for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the process of process tracing as described in the section above.

## Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team.

**Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach:** this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has

provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

**Using standard indicators and scores**: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

**General causal map:** whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

**Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question:** this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is

crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

**Utilisation of the evaluation**

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

**Design –** mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

**Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication:** many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

**5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process:** The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture

details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

# Appendix 2 Background information on the five core capabilities framework

The 5 capabilities (5C) framework was to be used as a framework for the evaluation of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs) of the MFS II consortia. The 5C framework is based on a five-year research program on 'Capacity, change and performance' that was carried out by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). The research included an extensive review of the literature and sixteen case studies. The 5C framework has also been applied in an IOB evaluation using 26 case studies in 14 countries, and in the baseline carried out per organisation by the MFS II organisations for the purpose of the monitoring protocol.

The 5C framework is structured to understand and analyse (changes in) the capacity of an organization to deliver (social) value to its constituents. This introduction briefly describes the 5C framework, mainly based on the most recent document on the 5C framework (Keijzer et al., 2011).

The 5C framework sees capacity as an **outcome** of an **open system**. An organisation or collaborative association (for instance a network) is seen as a system interacting with wider society. The most critical practical issue is to ensure that relevant stakeholders share a common way of thinking about capacity and its core constituents or capabilities. Decisive for an organisation's capacity is the context in which the organisation operates. This means that **understanding context issues** is crucial. The use of the 5C framework requires a multi-stakeholder approach because shared values and results orientation are important to facilitate the capacity development process. The 5C framework therefore needs to **accommodate the different visions** of stakeholders and conceive different strategies for raising capacity and improving performance in a given situation.

The 5C framework defines capacity as '**producing social value'** and identifies five core capabilities that together result in that overall capacity. Capacity, capabilities and competences are seen as follows:

**Capacity** is referred to as the overall ability of an organisation or system to create value for others;

**Capabilities** are the collective ability of a group or a system to do something either inside or outside the system. The collective ability involved may be technical, logistical, managerial or generative (i.e. the ability to earn legitimacy, to adapt, to create meaning, etc.);

**Competencies** are the energies, skills and abilities of individuals.

Fundamental to developing capacity are inputs such as human, material and financial resources, technology, and information. To the degree that they are developed and successfully integrated, capabilities contribute to the overall capacity or ability of an organisation or system to create value for others. A single capability is not sufficient to create capacity. All are needed and are strongly interrelated and overlapping. Thus, to achieve its development goals, the 5C framework says that every organisation or system must have **five basic capabilities:**

- The capability to act and commit;
- The capability to deliver on development objectives;
- The capability to adapt and self-renew;
- The capability to relate (to external stakeholders);
- The capability to achieve coherence.

In order to have a common framework for evaluation, the five capabilities have been reformulated in outcome domains and for each outcome domain performance indicators have been developed. A detailed overview of capabilities with outcome domains and indicators is attached in Appendix 3.

There is some overlap between the five core capabilities but together the five capabilities result in a certain level of capacity. Influencing one capability may have an effect on one or more of the other capabilities. In each situation, the level of any of the five capabilities will vary. Each capability can become stronger or weaker over time.

# Appendix 3 Changes in organisational capacity of the SPO - 5C indicators

Below you will find a description for each of the indicators under each of the capabilities, what the situation is as assessed during the endline, how this has changed since the baseline and what are the reasons for change.

**Description of Endline Indicators WII**

1.1. Responsive leadership: 'Leadership is responsive, inspiring, and sensitive'
*This is about leadership within the organization (operational, strategic). If there is a larger body then you may also want to refer to leadership at a higher level but not located at the local organization.*

The leader has extensive experience, is strong and dedicated, and is able to maintain good relationships with other parties. There are currently three leaders at the managerial level. The management is now more inclusive and pays more attention to the needs of organizational development compared to the baseline situation in 2012. Most of the staff stated that the delegation of tasks and leadership roles amongst the managers are distributed more evenly, and not fulfilled by the Program Director alone. Program Managers are responsible for the technical reports, while the budget is managed by the Finance Manager in cooperation with the Project Coordinator. Project staffs are also encouraged to improve their capacity dealing with the projects. This situation affects the information distribution and decision making process. In addition, the leaders have positive concerns towards the staff and vice versa. Staffs has also gained trust in their leaders. Nonetheless, leadership is considered strong and hierarchical

WII holds a strategic position in influencing the wetland policy in Indonesia as the organization became the active member of National Committee of Wetland Ecosystem Management, the secretary of National Mangrove Working Group, member of Regional Mangrove Working Group in Sikka and Serang (Banten), and the only NGO member of One Map Policy (apart from Government Agencies) led by National Geospatial Agency (BIG)

Score: from 3.5 to 4.5 (improvement)

1.2.Strategic guidance: 'Leaders provide appropriate strategic guidance (strategic leader and operational leader)'
*This is about the extent to which the leader(s) provide strategic directions*

The leader provides good strategic guidelines related to the implementation of projects (i.e. work plan), which staff considered extremely helpful in getting the best out of their work activities. Staff has indicated that communication with leadership has become easier since the baseline in 2012, partially due to the more active use of organization's communication facilities (e.g. office server) and informal discussions. Besides that, the leader has disaggregated meetings into three levels in order to make it more effective. The multi layers meeting were initiated also to accommodate the Program Director's limited time and workload. Therefore, he is not necessary to attend all meetings. The meetings are as follows; *Firstly,* between the Program Director and the management. *Secondly,* between the management and the project coordinator/project manager, and thirdly between project coordinator/project manager and project staff.

In addition, the Program Director understands the importance of capacity building for staffs, particularly field staffs which most of them are junior. There are considerable gap of capacity between senior and junior staff. Therefore to increase their capacity the Program Director provides greater

autonomy for staff to work independently i.e working independently for project. To help them, the Program Director along with the program manager and finance manager developed detailed operational guidelines for the project coordinator/project manager that has improved staff skill to manage project significantly

Score: from 3 to 4 (improvement)

1.3.Staff turnover: 'Staff turnover is relatively low'
*This is about staff turnover.*

A senior staff member who already worked for WII for years left the organization for further education in 2013. The organization hired a HR independent consultant which resulted in general changes to staff's work contracts. Key staff members that was hired as contractual staff have now been hired to work as permanent staff. Salary and benefits have been reviewed and adjusted; beside that the human resources policy is now more in line with the Indonesian labor law. These changes have had positive effects for the staffs' working motivation within the organization. Staff has indicated that they hope that this will lead to positively support the organization's long term strategic planning. Staff placement and roles are now based on their expertise through which they can contribute optimally to the organization.

The organization considers its internal relationships as a strong familial bond and atmosphere as most of the staffs have been working for the organization for more than 10 years. Most of staffs have also a very good sense of belonging to the organization. That's why staff turnover is very low. A very few permanent staffs left just for education reason.

Score: from 3.5 to 4.5 (improvement)

1.4 .Organisational structure 'Existence of clear organization structure reflecting the objectives of the organization"

The organizational structure of WII did not change much. There was only one addition of personnel at the Country Programme level. This increased the total number of responsible people in the organization to three: the Programme Program Director, Programme Manager, and Finance Manager. They are also linked to the staff at Wetlands International global headquarters in the Netherlands. Global objectives and strategies are implemented through partnership agreements with the country offices, and these are ultimately implemented in the field through cooperation with local government, local NGOs and community-based organizations.

The organizational structure at the project management level reflects the activities that are undertaken by WII. In terms of field office management, the office set-up which has been realized at the end of 2011 remains solid and working properly. A total of five full-time project personnel have been settled in the Maumere Office and one other staff member in the Serang (Banten) office for Partners for Resilience Project (PfR), all supported by the management team in the Bogor Office. They have successfully managed and implemented the project components as planned.

During this period (2011-2014), WII highly put any possible efforts to develop good networking on the integration of Climate Change Adaptation, Disaster Risk Reduction and Ecosystem Restoration and Management. Partnerships have also been built with various relevant stakeholders, including land lords, enabling better environment for the introduction and implementation of the proposed programme. In addition, WII attempt to bring their partners in to a more globally integrated working atmosphere. The strategy is bringing their partners to be a part of *Partners for Resilience (PfR).* Wetlands International has worked closely with Red Cross, Cordaid, Red Cross Climate Centre and CARE to implement a range of activities in Asia, Latin America and Africa to increase people's resilience against (climate related) disasters via ecosystem restoration and management. They named the alliance by PfR.

Score: from 4 to 5 (improvement)

1.5 Articulated Strategies. Strategies are articulated and based on good situation analysis and adequate M&E

Development of the Wetland International global agenda has forced WII to adapt themselves and to incorporate strategic planning. WII was assisted by the capacity assessment under the MFS II programme in the context of Partners for Resilience (PfR). However, findings from regular M&E are still insufficiently adopted into the strategic planning.

At the project level, decisions on future activities are based on a situational analysis (e.g. rapid ecosystem assessments) disregard the fact that the WII strategic plan 2013 has not fully aligned with the global agenda yet. However, the strategic plans at projects level have been well developed and implemented. Nonetheless, there is a basic strategy set out in the Strategic Plan and grouped around 5 themes. All WII projects reflect the 5 strategies: Sustainable livelihoods, Biodiversity, Water, Climate, Greening the Economy).

Score: From 2.5 to 4 (considerable improvement)

1.6.Daily operations: 'Day-to-day operations are in line with strategic plans'
*This is about the extent to which day-to-day operations are aligned with strategic plans.*

There has not been any significant change from the baseline situation in 2012. Currently, the strategic plan is still in the process of being adapted from the global strategic plan to the national situation. The running projects are in line with the main goal and targets set by the global office. Some staff members are familiar with the existing strategic plan while some are not, particularly if it does not directly relate to their activities and responsibilities. Only the technical staff and some supporting staff members are familiar with the strategic plan due to their involvement in its implementation. Daily activities are set based on the monthly and daily plans to ensure that all targets are achieved.

Score:  from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

1.7.Staff skills: 'Staff have necessary skills to do their work'
*This is about whether staff have the skills necessary to do their work and what skills they might need.*

Wetlands International Indonesia (WII) has technical and academically skilled staffs with appropriate educational background and general skills (English language, administration, project management). Most of the technical staff has a background in environmental education. At present the staff's capacity to deal with strategic issues has improved due to the more complex activities and projects which the organization has taken on in order to survive. Wetlands International Indonesia was previously the leading organization in Indonesia concerning wetlands but now other organizations are emerging within the sector who addresses similar issues. The competition with these organizations has proven to be a key factor for staff to be willing to increase their capacity and stay competitive in the market place.

The Program Director has delegated the authority to communicate about particular issues in the media to some of the technical and junior staff whom he deemed skillful enough to do so.

Score:  from 4 to 4.5 (slight improvement)

1.8.Training opportunities: 'Appropriate training opportunities are offered to staff'
*This is about whether staffs at the SPO are offered appropriate training opportunities*

There are many opportunities to attend formal and informal training. Informal training occurs when staff exchanges knowledge during joint projects with other organizations and knowledge institutions. Formal training occurs more ad hoc. Nevertheless, the organization has no budget for sending staff members for training. Staff therefore has to fund the training they attend by themselves or looking for scholarship. WII only sends staff to attend training related to program development for the organization. On the other hand, WII has also sent staff for further education abroad through

scholarship. There are some staff members with Master of Science degrees and one staff member is studying for a PhD in Australia with support from the organization. The management facilitated in seeking the scholarship for staffs with highly potential capacity by establishing cooperation with some universities abroad. The most minimal support given is providing institutional recommendation letter for the staff. Beside that in some cases where long trainings opportunities are available, the staff chooses not to participate because their attendance is required for their respective programs.

Score: from 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

1.9.1.Incentives: 'Appropriate incentives are in place to sustain staff motivation'
*This is about what makes people want to work here. Incentives could be financial, freedom at work, training opportunities, etc.*

So far there has not been much change in the incentives given to WII staff. Currently, there is an adjustment related to salary and allowance in line with the addition of workload and inflation. Some temporary/project staff has stated that they receive sufficient remuneration. Overall staff motivation to work for WII missions is high. The inclusion of health allowance for field staff who works in risky environments adds to this motivation. Another incentive appreciated by the staff is the fact that WII offers the freedom to work in a warm office environment whilst having the opportunity to travel around Indonesia or abroad. Career and training opportunities are offered to particular staff members.

The organization hired a HR consultant which resulted in general changes to staff's work contracts. Contractual project staff members that positively appraised by the management have now been hired to work as permanent staff. Salary and benefits have been reviewed and adjusted, and the human resources policy is now more in line with the Indonesian labor law. These changes have had positive effects for the staffs' working motivation within the organization. Staff has indicated that they hope that this will lead to positively support the organization's long term strategic planning. Staff placement and roles are now based on their expertise through which they can contribute optimally to the organization. Furthermore, the organization considers its internal relationships as a strong familial bond and atmosphere as most of the staffs have been working for the organization for years.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

1.9.2.Funding sources: 'Funding from multiple sources covering different time periods'
*This is about how diversified the SPOs funding sources are over time, and how the level of funding is changing over time.*

In the last decade, WII was able to increase the variety of funding. This included sources from the government, private sectors, and international foundations. These are including the Netherlands, CIDA/Canada, World Bank and international foundations such as IUCN, Oxfam, WWF, AccioNatura, and the Rockfeller Brother Funds. These funding sources have significantly stabilized the budget of the organization. Most of them are used for particular projects. WII has a good reputation with respect to budget management which makes it relatively easy for them to find funding. However, as a part of Wetland International (which is listed in Indonesia as an international NGO), WII is not allowed to get funding from within Indonesia which is narrowing the potential funding resource. Most staffs said that it will prevent conflict of interest and maintain independency.

Some projects are close to end in 2015 which will affect the organization's finance. This is however being anticipated in Head Quarters where some strategic efforts are currently being formulated. Combined with the good reputation of the organization in program implementation, WII is expected to get sufficient funding in the next years. This is also supported by the wider scope of work as described in the organization's visibility change (logo, vision and mission) at the global level.

Score: from 4 to 4.5 (slight improvement)

1.9.3.Funding procedures: 'Clear procedures for exploring new funding opportunities'

*This is about whether there are clear procedures for getting new funding and staff are aware of these procedures.*

Overall there are no clear procedures for exploring new funding opportunities. However, after 2012 there is initiative to have strategic consolidation from Wetland International to have umbrella programs that enable its members to access funds.

In addition, staffs has the opportunity to create proposals and to approach potential funders, it also comes the other way around where the funders approach the organization because of its good reputation. Although it seems that WII easy to get new funds, however staffs indicated that the clear funding procedure is required.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (Slight Improvement)

**Summary Capability to act and commit**
The leader has extensive experience, is strong and dedicated, and is able to maintain good relationships with other parties, both within as well as outside the organization. There are three leaders at the managerial level: the Program Director, the Programme Manager, and the Finance Manager. The Program Director, in collaboration with the Programme Manager, provides good strategic guidelines for the implementation of projects (i.e. through work plans), through which staff performance can be maximized. Currently, communication between leadership and staff has intensified and management and communication responsibilities have been delegated to the project staff. Currently, the strategic plan is still under development. There are more strategic consolidations in proposal development with the Head Quarter. The running projects are in line with the main goal and targets set by the global office.

In terms of staff turnover, one senior person who was with the organization for a long time has left the organization since the baseline but a HR consultant has been hired. Having the HR consultant is led to changes in the staff's working contracts, that affect staff motivation: key personnel is now working as permanent staff; salary and benefits are reviewed and adjusted; and the internal human resources policy is in line with the Indonesian labor law. A good working environment, opportunities for training and internal motivation have also contributed to staff being highly motivated to work with WII, but on the whole there is not much change since the baseline.

WII has technical and academically skilled staff with appropriate educational background and general skills (English language, administration, projects, multitasking). There are opportunities to attend formal and informal training – informal training occurs when staffs exchange knowledge during joined projects with other organization and university; whilst there is also formal ad hoc training.

Some projects are close to end in 2015 which will affect the organization finance. However, there are some strategic efforts in the Head Quarter, supported with the good reputation in program implementation, and the organization expects to get some funding in the next years. In term of funding procedures there is no much change since the baseline. The organization still has no clear funding procedures. However it does not affect the ability of WII to get new funds.

Score: from 3.4 to 4.2 (slight improvement)

**Capability to adapt and self-renew**
2.1. M&E application: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess activities, outputs and outcomes'
*This is about what the monitoring and evaluation of the SPO looks at, what type of information they get at and at what level (individual, project, organizational).*

At the project level, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is done systematically and on time. All WII projects have a log frame which has been agreed upon with the funders. The result of the log frame analysis is monitored and evaluated in a midterm evaluation by a consultant hired by the funder. So far, M&E is done well at the project level, as well as at the organization level. Even though they realize the importance of M&E for reasons of transparency, efficiency, cost effectiveness, and learning and

improvement. There are still need to have a more comprehensive M&E system that incorporates organizational performance and carries out M&E more systematically.

Score: from 3 to 4 (improvement)

2.2. M&E competencies: 'Individual competencies for performing M&E functions are in place'
*This is about whether the SPO has a trained M&E person; whether other staff have basic understanding of M&E; and whether they know what information to collect, how to process the information, how to make use of the information so as to improve activities etc.*

Up to now, the M&E is conducted in organizational and project level. In the organizational level M&E is conducted to measure the output of the implementation of finance, administration and services. It is done by the management (Program Director, Program Manager, and Finance Manager and they sometimes assisted by other staff based on their expertise). While, in the project level, the M&E measures the output and outcomes and done by Program Manager.

In addition to the internal M&E, the organization has hired the independent consultant to conduct the M&E for both organizational and project level annually. It measures the output, outcome and impact of the both domains. The similar M&E has also conducted by Project Manager of Wetlands International.

There is no staff particularly trained on M&E. Nonetheless, some staff members do understand the basics of M&E. There is still a need to increase the staff capacity in this area. M&E at the project level runs smoothly but at the organizational level there is still room for improvement. In some cases, WII is employed by other International NGOs (i.e. Oxfam, Novib, IUCN NL) to evaluate and monitor their projects in Indonesia. In particular cases, WII staff is employed to perform M&E duties abroad, for example in Thailand.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

2.3.M&E for future strategies: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess the effects of delivered products and services (outcomes) for future strategies'
*This is about what type of information is used by the SPO to make decisions; whether the information comes from the monitoring and evaluation; and whether M&E info influences strategic planning.*

The organization staff is actively involved in the M&E process of the implemented projects but has not been able to apply it at the organizational level within particular structure and schedule. M&E at the outcome level is done by the consultant hired by the funder, for example during the midterm review. Output and impact measurement at organizational level is still missing.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

2.4. Critical reflection: 'Management stimulates frequent critical reflection meetings that also deal with learning from mistakes'
*This is about whether staffs talk formally about what is happening in their programs; and, if so, how regular these meetings are; and whether staffs are comfortable raising issues that are problematic.*

Compared to 2012, the learning process is better developed and accommodated at the project level. Staff is fully involved in the meetings during which critical reports towards the current project status and also proposals for further improvements are discussed. These opportunities are used appropriately by the staff and have impact on the implementation of projects.

Score: from 3 to 4 (improvement)

2.5. Freedom for ideas: 'Staff feel free to come up with ideas for implementation of objectives
*This is about whether staff feel that ideas they bring for implementation of the program are welcomed and used.*

The staffs have more freedom to express their ideas in the project level. There is more room for the staff and management to communicate, mainly dealing with project implementation. Though in the organization level, there is no formal forum to share the ideas. Another factor is the seniority which is not applied to those three managerial staffs. In other words, staff has more equal opportunity to share and express their ideas. Generally the working atmosphere within the organization is good.

Score: from 3 to 4 (improvement)
2.6. System for tracking environment: 'The organization has a system for being in touch with general trends and developments in its operating environment'
*This is about whether the SPO knows what is happening in its environment and whether it will affect the organization.*

In terms of system for tracking environment, WII has a considerable improvement. During this period (2012-2014), WII highly put any possible efforts to develop good networking on the integration of Climate Change Adaptation, Disaster Risk Reduction and Ecosystem Restoration and Management. Partnerships have also been built with various relevant stakeholders, including land lords, enabling better environment for the introduction and implementation of the proposed programme. Continued efforts on communication and consultation with relevant local government institutions have resulted into good progress on the development of village regulation and establishment of Village level Disaster Response Team.

The specific achievement were: 1) The Bio-Rights approach has been fully implemented to all Community Group in 8 villages of Ende and Sikka, and Serang, Banten; 2) The early success of Bio-Rights approach has been more visible, both restoration and livelihood activities; 3) Better atmosphere for integration of the three PfR working pillars (CCA-DRR-EMR) on Wetlands International works as well as more coordinated communication among Partners with local government. As previously described PfR is an Alliance to increase people's resilience against (climate related) disasters via ecosystem restoration and management; 3) The successful advocacy efforts on Sikka District regulation on mangrove protection has been shared during various national and international meetings; 4) Additional supports for community group from local government and private sector through CSR programme; 5) Introduction of Climate Change Adaptation scenarios at community level (including re-introduction of Sorghum as staple for communities in NTT and provision of clean water facility in Banten); 6) Better working and planning coordination and alignment with all Partners; 7) Early result on the development of village regulation and establishment of Village Disaster Preparedness Team.

Score: from 3 to 4 (improvement)

2.7.Stakeholder responsiveness: 'The organization is open and responsive to their stakeholders and the general public'
*This is about what mechanisms the SPO has to get input from its stakeholders, and what they do with that input.*

WII is well respected by its partners, which is proven by the increased efforts to be involved in a number of local, national and international initiatives. Before beginning projects, they begin with quick assessments on the ecosystem, the beneficiaries, and the local leaders in the planned activities through dialogs with local communities and governments. They participate in dialogues with the multi-sectoral government regarding planning, which allows them to exchange information and provide feedback. Their operation in Indonesia is established in a Memorandum of Understanding with Ministry of Forestry. However, means to reach out to the community remain limited.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

**Summary of Capability to adapt and self-renew**
Overall the M&E is conducted in organizational that is done by the Management and project level which is done by Program Manager. In addition that internal M&E also supported by independent consultant and Project Manager of Wetlands International. In term of process all the staff are involved

an interactive discussion and encouraged for self reflection. The staffs have more freedom to express their ideas equally in many organizational forum including in policy making process. In addition, there is more room for the staff and management to communicate, mainly dealing with project implementation.

Regarding system for tracking environment, WII has a considerable improvement. During this period (2012-2014), WII highly put any possible efforts to develop good networking on the integration of Climate Change Adaptation, Disaster Risk Reduction and Ecosystem Restoration and Management. Partnerships have also been built with various relevant stakeholders, including land lords, enabling better environment for the introduction and implementation of the proposed program. Continued efforts on communication and consultation with relevant local government institutions have resulted into good progress on the development of village regulation and establishment of Village level Disaster Response Team.

WII is well respected by its partners, which is proven by the increased efforts to be involved in a number of local, national and international initiatives. Before, during, and after project implementations, the organization always communicates intensively and extensively with their stakeholders to ensure their relevance with stake holders' need.

Score: from 3.0 to 3.8 (improvement)

**Capability to deliver on development objectives**

3.1.Clear operational plans: 'Organization has clear operational plans for carrying out projects which all staff fully understand'

*This is about whether each project has an operational work plan and budget, and whether staffs use it in their day-to-day operations.*

There are still clear plans, including log frames, outline, agreement, and examination. Projects run based on operational work plans and budgets. Operational plans are used as guidelines to implement the daily activities together with M&E schedule and report writing. Operational planning at the project level functions as the reference to maximize outputs. Log frames for each project have been arranged and implemented at the Bogor office and in the field. WII is well known for having good performance in implementing and conducting the log frame at the project level which is acknowledged by both partners and donors.

Score: from 4 to 4.5 (slight improvement)

3.2.Cost-effective resource use: 'Operations are based on cost-effective use of its resources'

*This is about whether the SPO has the resources to do the work, and whether resources are used cost-effectively.*

WII is aware of the needs to work effectively using the resources related to the budget. An effective and efficient working habit in making the best of time and staff capacity is WII's strengths. They have a time writing system, and staff frequently works on more than one project at once to optimize their work schedules. Some staff members indicated that they have worked effectively and efficiently, whereas some other staff members stated that the lack of strategic management leads to an inefficient "*fire fighting"* approach – program manager will take over the works when crisis happen such as the project has not reach the target while the deadline is already approaching, having to attend to ad-hoc issues.

Score: from 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

3.3. Delivering planned outputs: 'Extent to which planned outputs are delivered'

*This is about whether the SPO is able to carry out the operational plans.*

WII has a strong and good reputation in providing satisfying results in accordance to the agreement with funders and partners. Particularly the clear project plans and skilled staffs are appreciated in this

regard. If any changes in the external environment arise that may impact the project result, the organization will discuss a change in the plan and the time with the donors. So far there have not been any complaints made to WII dealing with these agreements.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

3.4. Mechanisms for beneficiary needs: 'The organization has mechanisms in place to verify that services meet beneficiary needs'
*This is about how the SPO knows that their services are meeting beneficiary needs*

Field projects are determined based on thorough assessment of the needs and perspectives of local communities and stakeholders. The organization's approach ensures that there is involvement and active ownership within the community. WII has an internal policy to require the field staff to stay at the project location so they can work efficiently and integrate the ideas within the community. Through structured monitoring and evaluation practices, WII verified that the community and stakeholders' needs is fulfilled trough the intensive participatory meeting between WII and stakeholders that conducted regularly before, during and after project implemented.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

3.5. Monitoring efficiency: 'The organization monitors its efficiency by linking outputs and related inputs (input-output ratio's)'
*This is about how the SPO knows they are efficient or not in their work.*

There is not much change but the efficiency is more strictly applied since 2012. WII is able to develop budgets based on the high quality results which enable them to stay within the confines of the allocated budget. WII is also able to prevent idle time by counting of the operational cost and arrange payroll. One of the strategies is to employ people in several projects at one time. Payroll is done by monthly fixed salary mechanism instead of by project mechanism. Besides that, the organization's planning system supports efficient work. Efficiency is monitored by the project coordinator/project manager or by a consultant hired by the funder. It is not clear whether the measurement of efficiency is conducted by specifically linking the related outputs and inputs.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

3.6. Balancing quality-efficiency: 'The organization aims at balancing efficiency requirements with the quality of its work'
*This is about how the SPO ensures quality work with the resources available*

This organization still considers quality as the highest priority when implementing their projects. In a number of small cases where the financial needs exceeded the proposal, the organization would disregard efficiency and use the organization's overhead money to cover the budget gap and maintain the quality of the result. Formally, there is no system to measure the quality and efficiency of the result but WII has so far continued to satisfy the donors' expectations so that they have very good reputation. More than that, WII then become one of the role model organization for others organization on Wetland International link.

Score: from 3 to 4.5 (considerable improvement)

**Summary of Capability to deliver on development objectives**
WII has a systematic way of delivering results through clear plans, log frames, outlines, agreements and continuous re-examination. Projects run based on operational work plans and budgets. WII has a strong and good reputation in providing satisfying results in accordance to the agreement with funders and partners. Particularly the clear project plans and skilled staff play an important role in this. By having field staff to stay in the project locations, the organization ensures that there is involvement and active ownership within the community, which assists WII in ensuring that project activities meet the needs of the communities. Although there is no formal system to measure efficiency and quality,

WII is able to deliver high quality results within the given budget or even with additional budget from the organization were needed. WII is known with donors for delivering high-quality results and using resources cost effectively.

Score: from 3.4 to 4 (slight improvement)

**Capability to relate**

4.1.Stakeholder engagement in policies and strategies: 'The organization maintains relations/ collaboration/alliances with its stakeholders for the benefit of the organization'
*This is about whether the SPO engages external groups in developing their policies and strategies, and how.*

After 2012, WII has been more involved in a number of activities initiated by the government and other institutions. The involvement of stakeholders occurs in the collaboration with the government institutions. The Ministry of Forestry, National Mangrove Working Group, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Marine and Fishery, National Planning Agency, National Council of Climate Change, National Disaster Management Agency, Community Disaster Management Indonesia, have been some of the parties that WII has engaged with since the baseline. WII closely considers the needs of their stakeholders, including different ministries, NGOs and communities involved in the development of policy (as for example was the case in Aceh after the tsunami). Besides that, as previously explained that WII has greater networking also at global level.

Wetlands International has worked closely with Red Cross, Cordaid, Red Cross Climate Centre and CARE to implement a range of activities in Asia, Latin America and Africa to increase people's resilience against (climate related) disasters via ecosystem restoration and management. They named the Alliance by PfR (Partners for Resilience) which was WII joined in. That networking has given a big influence in developing WII's policies and strategies. WII want to always update their policies and strategies not only in line with the needs on the field but also with the PfR's trend.

Score: from 3.5 to 4.5 (improvement)

4.2. Engagement in networks: 'Extent to which the organization has relationships with existing networks/alliances/partnerships'
*This is about what networks/alliances/partnerships the SPO engages with and why; with they are local or international; and what they do together, and how do they do it.*

In general, the condition has slightly improved from 2012. There has been an increase in invitations from parties in WII's network to become partners with WII. The organization has focused on developing their network and cooperation with other organizations (government and non-government) with similar areas of work, including: forest mapping, carbon sequestration, conservation and restoration of wetlands and other environmental issues. Nearly all projects are implemented through cooperation with other organizations. WII supports the establishment of community based organizations and invests in their capacity development.

WII is an active member of the National Committee of Wetlands Ecosystem Management (chaired by the Directorate General of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation (PHKA), the Ministry of Forestry). Through their membership, WII aids in the improvement of Strategic Planning and Action for National Wetlands. Furthermore, WII acts as the secretary of the National Mangrove Working Group which provides input and directions in arranging coastal (particularly mangrove) areas. WII also actively helps the Ministry of Internal Affairs and other ministries in the establishment of National Stratgies and Action Plan for Peatlands Management and distributes the documents into all regencies with peat lands. WII is also a member of the Regional Mangrove Working Group in Sikka (NTT) and Serang (Banten). In addition, Wetlands International Indonesia is also the chair of National Secretariat on Partnership on Migratory Bird Management. The operation in Indonesia is established through a Memorandum of Understanding with Ministry of Forestry.

Score: from 4 to 4.5 (slight improvement)

4.3.Engagement with target groups: 'The organization performs frequent visits to their target groups/ beneficiaries in their living environment'
*This is about how and when the SPO meets with target groups.*

Generally, there is still a good relationship between WII and local communities similar to the baseline situation. Local communities and the other stakeholders are still always involved in the arrangement and initiative implementation in the field. WII works directly with the communities by establishing community based organizations. The intensity and effectiveness of the communication has increased due to the increasing number of facilitators that stay with the community to obtain high involvement from the targeted community. WII also has monthly visits to the field in order to monitor the targeted communities. Generally, the organization is focused on long term projects in one area, not in a particular village or community.

Score: from 4 to 4.5 (slight improvement)

4.4.Relationships within organization: 'Organizational structure and culture facilitates open internal contacts, communication, and decision-making'
*How does staff at the SPO communicate internally? Are people free to talk to whomever they need to talk to? When and at what forum? What are the internal mechanisms for sharing information and building relationships?*

The communication with the field staff still runs well which greatly supports the success of the programs. Field staff is sometimes invited to attend meetings at the head office of WII in Bogor. Conversely, management staffs sometimes also visit project locations to meet with field staff. At the program or organization level, there is an exchange of limited information via e-mail or phone calls. Remote field project locations sometimes do not allow connecting through these means.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

**Summary of Capability to relate**
WII closely considers the needs of their stakeholders, including different ministries, NGOs and communities in the development of policy. WII has been involved in the activities initiated by the different ministries, and is part of the different national and local networks. WII developed cooperation with other organizations (government and non-government) which have the same concerns: forest mapping, carbon sequestration, conservation and restoration of wetlands and other environmental issues. WII works directly with the communities by establishing community based organization and by having project staff that live in the project areas so that issues are well known to the project staff, and can be acted upon.

Score: from 3.6 to 4.2 (slight improvement)

**Capability to achieve coherence**
5.1.Revisiting vision, mission: 'Vision, mission and strategies regularly discussed in the organization'
*This is about whether there is a vision, mission and strategies; how often staff discuss/revise vision, mission and strategies; and who is involved in this.*

In 2013, Wetlands International changed the organizational vision. The vision and mission are described at global level through the representatives in all offices once every five years. In addition to this, annual meetings are held to discuss and determine priority strategies. However, the strategies are not always well adapted into specific strategies for Indonesia. The improvement of strategic planning is still under development. Staff members are informed about the vision and mission but not actively involved in their development. The change in the global vision has stimulated the staff to adapt to a new way to working based on this new vision.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

5.2. Operational guidelines: 'Operational guidelines (technical, admin, HRM) are in place and used and supported by the management'
*This is about whether there are operational guidelines, which operational guidelines exist; and how they are used.*

There is a slight improvement in the availability of operational guidelines at the organizational level. There are some new operational procedures related to finance and HRM which have been adopted by the management since the baseline. However, not all the staff members agree to those particular procedures. WII has had financial guidelines and HRM since 1987 which have been renewed last October (2014) and are still under development.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

5.3.Alignment with vision, mission: 'Projects, strategies and associated operations are in line with the vision and mission of the organization'
*This is about whether the operations and strategies are line with the vision/mission of the SPO.*

Staff agrees that program implementations are in line with the vision and mission of WII, which is the same as the vision and mission of WI. This positive condition is still sustained to this day. It can be reached because of WII very strict to refer their vision, mission, strategies, and log frame when they developed programs and activities.

Score: from 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

5.4.Mutually supportive efforts: 'The portfolio of project (activities) provides opportunities for mutually supportive efforts'
*This is about whether the efforts in one project complement/support efforts in other projects.*


There is a better and more productive relationship between the various projects. This is an improvement. This can be achieved due to cross-project coordination is getting better. Sharing knowledge is not only done through meetings, but also through a variety of media, especially the Internet: organization server, email, dropbox, etc. It makes coordination easier and cheaper (efficient). In addition, there are also cross-cutting stakeholders between the various projects. It is good because it can mutually support each other.

Score: from 2.5 to 3.5 (considerable improvement)

**Summary of Capability to achieve coherence**
WII operates in a playing field of many competing interests and needs which makes coherence a challenging task. For example, vision and mission have been changed at the international level which has profound impact on the work activities in Indonesia, since the strategies need to be contextualized to the Indonesian context. Staff is not actively involved in the revision of the International vision and mission. In other term, overall staff members agree however that program implementation is in line with the set vision and mission also there is a better and more productive relationship between the various projects.

Score: from 3 to 3.6 (slight improvement)

# Appendix 4 Results - key changes in organisational capacity - general causal map



**Narrative of Wetlands International Indonesia Program Causal Map**

The evaluation team carried out an end line assessment at Wetlands International Indonesia (WII) from 2 to 3 July 2014. During this workshop, the team made a recap of key features of the organisation in the baseline in September 2012 (such as vision, mission, strategies, clients, partnerships). This was the basis for discussing changes that had happened to the organisation since the baseline. The main changes that happened in the organisation since the baseline, as identified by the staff during the end line workshop were:

1. Improved staff capacity in their respective roles and fields of work [1]
2. Increased communication on WII and wetlands issues [10]
3. Improved collaboration and networking with local and international partners [2]
4. A healthier and safer financial condition of the organization[4]
5. Increased organizational management capacity [9]

These changes have helped the organization to improve the quality of the programs [8] and thereby contributed to reaching the organization's vision and targets [6]. According to WIP staff, they expect that this contributes to WII to become a leading organization and a role model for organizations dealing with wetlands and climate change issues in Indonesia.

Each of the five organizational capacity changes is further described below. The numbers in the narrative correspond to the numbers in the visual.

**Improved staff capacity in their respective roles and fields of work [1]**

Staff present at the end line workshop indicated that staff capacities in the respective roles and fields of work have improved since the baseline in 2012. They indicated that this is mainly the result of joining the "community of practice"[26]. This is an international community developed by Wetlands International whose members are individuals with similar focus (wetlands – climate change issues). Their activities include: face to face meetings and regular webinars; huddle (joint data sharing mechanism), the access and maintenance of a virtual library. Through their involvement in this community, WII greatly benefited in both the development of individual staff competences. Joining the "community of practice" initiative was the result of the change of vision and mission of wetlands international [33], which in turn was influenced by the global development agenda for wetlands [41].

**Improved communication about WII and wetlands issues [10]**

More and higher quality news items about WII's activities was spread by distributing improved media content and packages through social media [20] and stronger ties with traditional media relations [21]. Better information could be provided through the cooperation in the "community of practice" initiative [26], but was driven by the need for stronger communication and publication [27]. Similarly, the strengthening of relations to traditional media was the result of this need [27]. The need for stronger communication was the direct result of the change of vision and mission at Wetlands International [33]. This change entitled to become more high-profile and visible in media, as well making the issues of wetlands more related to human needs.

The bargaining position of Wetlands International Indonesia increased due to an increase of spreading news about Wetlands International Indonesia and the issues dealt with [10] and expanding the network of stakeholders that the organization deals with [11] to include government, local communities, the private sector, civil society and the scientific community.

**Increased collaboration in networking with local and international partners [2]**

Since the baseline in 2012 WII has expanded its network and collaborating with a wide range of partners, both locally as well as internationally. This includes government, local communities, the private sector, civil society, the scientific community and organizations similar to WII internationally.

The expansion of WII's stakeholder network resulted from joining the international community of practice [26], better ties to the media [21], an overall strengthening of "advocating" policies related to not just wetlands [22] and having more extensive and diverse programs [14]. The overall strengthening of 'advocating' policies [22] related to not just wetlands, but also related areas like disasters, peat and emission management [22]. One of the WII contribution is the development of Indonesia's one map policy led by Indonesia's Geo-spatial Information Agency (BIG). One map policy is an integrated policy on the map production and utilization in Indonesia which covers all wetlands maps, including peat and mangroves. This in turn was enabled by the organizations approach to move its strategy and image from low profile to high profile ("show off") [28] and the development of field level activities to more strategic level program activities [29]. Both developments fit in with the new vision and mission of Wetlands International [33].

WII formulated more extensive and diverse programs [14]. These included for instance community resilience programs or green economy development initiatives. With this a greater amount of new stakeholders was reached. The move to these broader program initiatives was on the one hand related to the expansion of the issue coverage and work area [29] as projected in the new vision and mission of the organization [33], but also driven by an increasing number of donors and volume of donations, that resulted from increased opportunities to submit proposals to a wide range of donors [24], which was related to covering more issues and a wider work area [24]. This was in line with the new vision and mission of Wetlands International [33]. WII submitted more proposals to donors because WII has improved the accountability of the funds [25], which greatly increased confidence amongst potential donors for successful application of their funds. This improved accountability was due to having a more orderly financial administration in place [30]. Overall the greater accountability came about from an orderly financial administration of the organization's activities [30], as could be seen in the improved financial reports. This was largely due to the close monitoring of the organization's activities and funds, and the recommendations and assistance given by the Chief of Organization Officer (COO) of Wetland International (WI) Head Quarter (HQ) with an independent financial and HR consultant as recommended by WI HQ[41]. This was the result of getting coaching from headquarters [44]. After findings from the MFS II baseline in 2012 financial issues became clear [45]. Furthermore, WII staff wanted the organization to develop [42] which supported the organization to improve upon their financial administration.

**A healthier and safer financial condition of the organization [4]**

WII has become a healthier and safer organization in financial terms [4]. This was largely enabled by the increasing number and amount of donations [23], which is explained above. It is also related to increased staff capacity to manage responsibilities [15]. This is further explained below.

**Increased organizational management capacity [9]**

Finally, WII staff indicated that there was an overall increase in organizational management capacity [9]. Four factors affected this increase:

1. Increased staff capacity to manage responsibilities [15]
2. Strengthening the existence and recognition of the organization in the eyes of the government [13]
3. An increase in the number of managerial staff [18]
4. Improved supporting facilities [19]

First, overall staff capacity to manage their activities and responsibilities [15] increased as a result of greater experience [31] and through knowledge sharing amongst colleagues [32]. Both were enabled by better staff placement in project management [35]. Moreover, staff management capacity

increased due to additional training and capacity development events for staff members [36]. The consultant that was hired by WII as follow up of the MFS II baseline for the Alliance, provided recommendations to enhance staff management capacity [39].

The other reason for increased organizational management capacity [9] was that WII's recognition and image was strengthened in the eyes of the government [13]. This was due to the revision and addition of employment standard operating procedures (SOPs) to conform better to Indonesian law and regulations [16]. The drafting of these SOPs was the immediate result of a proactive stance to comply and adapt to Indonesian law and regulation in terms of human resources management and benefits [37]. All of these decisions were based on recommendations [37] made by an external consultant in the period between 2012 and 2014 [39] in an effort to evaluate organizational development of finances and human resources development [41] based on coaching and recommendations from Wetlands International HQ [44] after having reviewed the 5C baseline evaluation results by MFS II in 2012 [45].

Strengthening the recognition and image in the eyes of the government was also due to adjustment of the employment welfare according to the Indonesian employment policy [5]. As mentioned earlier, WII made a proactive case to comply and adjust to the employment welfare laws and regulations of Indonesia. This adjustment was sustained and successfully implemented [5] through the formulation of organization specific standard operating procedures [17] and based on specific recommendations [38] for having a more specific SPO for employment. This was suggested by the consultant is hired to improve management capacity, including finance, administration, human resources and other SPO related to its [39].

Thirdly, the number of managerial staff increased, providing additional resources and capacity for the management of the organization [18], due to an increasing need for resources for program activities and its' staff [43].

Fourthly, improved supporting facilities in the form of a new warehouse, parking lot, survey tools and supporting office materials [18] enabled an environment to manage operations in a more professional and efficient manner. This too, was based on a greater need for resources that matched the new ambitions and program activities of WII.

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen UR
P.O. Box 88
6700 AB Wageningen
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)317 48 68 00
www.wageningenUR.nl/cdi

Report CDI-15-047

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# Endline report – Indonesia, Yayasan Kelola
# MFS II country evaluations

Capacity of Southern Partner Organisations (5C) component

Cecile Kusters[1]
Martijn Wieriks[2]
Bekti Dwi Andari[3]
Novina Suprobo[3]
Widya Priyahita[3]
Rumenta R. Sihombing[3]
Seto W. Rokhmatulloh[3]
Ita Rosita[3]

1 Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR
2 SEPAM Consultants Indonesia
3 SurveyMeter

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen, February 2015

Report CDI-15-049

Kusters, C., Wieriks, M., Dwi Andari, B., Suprobo, N., Priyahita, W., Sihombing, R.R., Rokhmatulloh, S.W., Rosita, I., 2015. *Endline report – Indonesia, Yayasan Kelola. MFS II country evaluations; Capacity of Southern Partner Organisations (5C) component.* Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University & Research centre. Report CDI-15-049. Wageningen.

This report presents the findings of the endline of the evaluation of the organisational capacity component of the MFS II country evaluations. The focus of this report is Indonesia, Yayasan Kelola. The format is based on the requirements by the synthesis team and NWO/WOTRO. The endline was carried out in 2014. The baseline was carried out in 2012.

Key words: 5C (five core capabilities); attribution; baseline; causal map; change; CFA (Co-financing Organisation) endline; organisational capacity development; SPO (Southern Partner Organisation).



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# Acknowledgements

We are grateful to all the people that have contributed to this report. We particularly would like to thank the Southern Partner Organisation Yayasan Kelola and the Co-Financing Agency Hivos for their endless patience and support during this challenging task of collecting the endline data. We hope that this endline report will provide useful insights to Yayasan Kelola, Hivos, the synthesis team, IOB and NWO/Wotro.

The Indonesia 5C evaluation team

# List of abbreviations and acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| 5 C | Capacity development model which focuses on 5 core capabilities |
| Causal map | Map with cause-effect relationships. See also 'detailed causal map'. |
| Causal mechanisms | The combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome |
| CDI | Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University & Research centre |
| CFA | Co-Financing Agency |
| CFO | Co-Financing Organisation |
| CS | Civil Society |
| Detailed causal map | Also 'model of change'. the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change. In the 5C evaluation identified key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms) are traced through process tracing (for attribution question). |
| General causal map | Causal map with key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms), based on SPO perception. |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MFS | Dutch co-financing system |
| MIS | Management Information System |
| MoFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| OD | Organisational Development |
| PME | Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation |
| PRA | Priority Result Area |
| Process tracing | Theory-based approach to trace causal mechanisms |
| RCT | Randomized Control Trials |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |
| SSI | Semi-structured Interview |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| Wageningen UR | Wageningen University & Research centre |

# 1 Introduction & summary

## 1.1 Purpose and outline of the report

The Netherlands has a long tradition of public support for civil bi-lateral development cooperation, going back to the 1960s. The Co-Financing System (*Medefinancieringsstelsel*, or 'MFS') is its most recent expression. MFS II is the 2011-2015 grant framework for Co-Financing Agencies (CFAs), which is directed at achieving a sustainable reduction in poverty. A total of 20 consortia of Dutch CFAs have been awarded €1.9 billion in MFS II grants by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).

The overall aim of MFS II is to help strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. CFAs receiving MFS II funding work through strategic partnerships with Southern Partner Organisations.

The MFS II framework stipulates that each consortium is required to carry out independent external evaluations to be able to make valid, evaluative statements about the effective use of the available funding. On behalf of Dutch consortia receiving MFS II funding, NWO-WOTRO has issued three calls for proposals. Call deals with joint MFS II evaluations of development interventions at country level. Evaluations must comprise a baseline assessment in 2012 and a follow-up assessment in 2014 and should be arranged according to three categories of priority result areas as defined by MoFA:

Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) & themes;

Capacity development of Southern partner organisations (SPO) (5 c study);

Efforts to strengthen civil society.

This report focuses on the assessment of capacity development of southern partner organisations. This evaluation of the organisational capacity development of the SPOs is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The purpose of this report is to provide endline information on one of the SPOs involved in the evaluation: Yayasan Kelola in Indonesia. The baseline report is described in a separate document.

Chapter 2 describes general information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO). Here you can find general information about the SPO, the context in which the SPO operates, contracting details and background to the SPO. In chapter 3 a brief overview of the methodological approach is described. You can find a more detailed description of the methodological approach in appendix 1.Chapter 4 describes the results of the 5c endline study. It provides an overview of capacity development interventions of the SPO that have been supported by MFS II. It also describes what changes in organisational capacity have taken place since the baseline and why (evaluation question is 1 and 4). This is described as a summary of the indicators per capability as well as a general causal map that provides an overview of the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline, as experienced by the SPO. The complete overview of descriptions per indicator, and how these have changed since the baseline is described in appendix 3. The complete visual and narrative for the key organisational capacity changes that have taken place since the baseline according to the SPO staff present at the endline workshop is presented in appendix 4.

For those SPOs involved in process tracing a summary description of the causal maps for the identified organisational capacity changes in the two selected capabilities (capability to act and commit; capability to adapt and self-renew) is provided (evaluation questions 2 and 4). These causal maps

describe the identified key organisational capacity changes that are possibly related to MFS II interventions in these two capabilities, and how these changes have come about. More detailed information can be found in appendix 5.

Chapter 5 presents a discussion on the findings and methodology and a conclusion on the different evaluation questions.

The overall methodology for the endline study of capacity of southern partner organisations is coordinated between the 8 countries: Bangladesh (Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath; INTRAC); DRC (Disaster Studies, Wageningen UR); Ethiopia (CDI, Wageningen UR); India (CDI, Wageningen UR: Indonesia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Liberia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Pakistan (IDS; MetaMeta); (Uganda (ETC). Specific methodological variations to the approach carried out per country where CDI is involved are also described in this document.

This report is sent to the Co-Financing Agency (CFA) and the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO) for correcting factual errors and for final validation of the report.

## 1.2 Brief summary of analysis and findings

Since the baseline, two years ago, Yayasan Kelola has seen a slight increase in the capability to act and commit. The director's leadership is more approachable and attentive, staff skills have improved, and new funding sources have been acquired. In terms of the capability to adapt and self renew a slight improvement has also occurred as M&E is performed more regularly and systematically. The capability to deliver on development objectives has very slightly improved as a result of more cost-effective use of resources. The capacity to relate has improved slightly as well as the organization has engaged in more networking activities with prominent organizations and is now starting to get more recognized. No changes have occurred in the capability to achieve coherence compared to 2012.

The evaluators considered it important to also note down the SPO's story in terms of changes in the organisation since the baseline, and this would also provide more information about reasons for change, which were difficult to get for the individual indicators. Also for some issues there may not have been relevant indicators available in the list of core indicators provide by the evaluation team. During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by Yayasan Kelola's staff: increase of staff capacity, and becoming an organization with an international reputation. According to the SPO staff, these key organisational capacity changes can only to a minor extent be attributed toMFS II capacity development interventions.  The involvement of Hivos to support Kelola with the arts coalition initiative since 2012 has helped in building connections to government and lobbying and advocating activities, although this was not executed in the form of a specific MFS II capacity development intervention. Also a small role of MFS II continues to exist in trainings and workshops. Hivos has stated that they were able to reduce their fundraising from 30% to 5% in recent years due to the increased fundraising capacity of the organization. This is difficult to attribute to MFS II interventions without going into more detail through for example process tracing.

# 2 General Information about the SPO – Yayasan Kelola

## 2.1 General information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO)

| | |
|---|---|
| **Country** | Indonesia |
| **Consortium** | People Unlimited 4.1 |
| **Responsible Dutch NGO** | HIVOS |
| **Project (if applicable)** | 1. Empowering Women Artists;<br>2. Arts Grants;<br>3. National Internships;<br>4. Discussion Series<br>5. Theatre for Development and Education |
| **Southern partner organisation** | Yayasan Kelola |

The project/partner is part of the sample for the following evaluation component(s):

| | |
|---|---|
| **Achievement of MDGs and themes** | |
| **Capacity development of Southern partner organisations** | X |
| **Efforts to strengthen civil society** | |

## 2.2 The socio-economic, cultural and political context in which the partner operates

**The socio-economic, cultural and political context in which the partner operates**

Yayasan Kelola is a *"national arts service organization"*[1] operating in Indonesia. Out of a population of approximately 240 million inhabitants over 2800 Indonesian cultural organizations are registered[2]. Still a legacy of the Soeharto era, Indonesia has laws and regulations (normally implying high fees and charges) which limit and weaken the activities of art and cultural organizations[3]. On the other hand, more recent laws also made the development of arts in Indonesia more difficult, for instance the Anti-Pornography bill passed in 2009 by the Muslim party[4]. Public and financial support for arts and cultural enterprises remains rather limited and sporadic. This is mainly due to the fact that there are no incentives from the government for private organizations to invest in arts and culture. Nor is there a system for using some of the tax money for investing in arts and cultural objectives[5]. Moreover, the small public funding available for artists is rather inaccessible since it is *"channelled through a complex, slow and uncooperative bureaucracy"*[6].

Kelola Foundation encourages and facilitates arts. The focus is taken not without the reason, which is in Indonesia many artists only restrict the meaning on the performance or creation of the artwork. But it is less concern on the management. It is how the performance must be managed in such a way, by including the arrangement of financial report done properly so that this is the role of Kelola Foundation to stimulate the progress and increase vitality of arts in Indonesia by providing the access to the

[1] HIVOS (2012) "Yayasan Kelola" Available at: http://www.HIVOS.nl/eng/community/partner/10002818 Accessed on: 14.11.2012
[2] Yayasan Kelola (2011) *"Narrative Proposal for Activities of Kelola 2011-2013: Application for funding from HIVOS"*.
[3] Yayasan Kelola (2011) *"Narrative Proposal for Activities of Kelola 2011-2013: Application for funding from HIVOS"*.
[4] Yayasan Kelola (2011) *"Narrative Proposal for Activities of Kelola 2011-2013: Application for funding from HIVOS"*.
[5] Yayasan Kelola (2011) *"Narrative Proposal for Activities of Kelola 2011-2013: Application for funding from HIVOS"*.
[6] Yayasan Kelola (2011) *"Narrative Proposal for Activities of Kelola 2011-2013: Application for funding from HIVOS"*.

learning and knowledge, access to the information and fund. Due to the focus is in management, Kelola Foundation is the organization of arts which never produce artworks, does not perform the art activities itself. [7]

Kelola's programs range from workshops on management of cultural organizations and festivals to lighting, stage design, business partnership as well as offering learning opportunities through National Internships and International Residencies. The Art Grants offer monetary assistance to individual artists and ensembles. Through its website, Kelola opens access to information for and about the arts communities.[8]

Since Yayasan Kelola's current project implies five different programs, it is worth it describing the particular contexts relevant to each program. The program called *"Empowering Women Artists, Giving Voice to Women Artists"* consists of *"developing untapped potential of women artists by supporting their work and facilitating access to knowledge and networks"*[9]. Generally, this program aims at providing a platform for female artists where relevant topics can be discussed and translated into action. Developing female artists in a leadership position (like film directors and choreographers) is the main focus of this program[10]. One of the biggest challenges faced by the people involved in this program is that of social norms that dictate gender differences. For example, figures from the Kelola's Art Grant program revealed that only 25% of the recipients of the grant were female[11], which reflects how women are under-represented in leading positions in arts. In order to tackle this inequality the Empowering Women Artists program must be carried out over a long term (9 years), what poses another challenge since raising funds for such long periods is a challenge in itself.

The program "*Performing Arts Grants: Stimulating Innovation and Appreciation of different forms"* relates to a core activity of Yayasan Kelola and already exists for eleven years[12]. The relevance of this program in the artistic context in Indonesia, besides stimulating competition in the sector, is the fact that this is the only current grant program carried out in transparency and fair selection processes[13]. The main challenge faced in Indonesia in relation to this program is the fact that, despite having a long tradition in performing arts, the public and financial support for such activities has experienced a downturn in the past decade[14]. In this context, Yayasan Kelola aims at raising awareness both about the importance of Indonesian performing arts and about the need for regular funding in the artistic sector.

"*National Internships: Developing Human Resources for the Art Sector*" is the third program currently being carried out. As in the above programs, the main limiting challenge is the lack of funding. The National Internships have been elaborated as a solution for the lack of a common platform for Indonesian artists[15]. The program aims at bringing art students, performers, art and cultural organizations together, so that knowledge and inspiration can be shared and improved. Also, with this program Yayasan Kelola aims at preparing young Indonesian artists for a work life. The first Internship took place in 2000 and 12% of the total applicants have had the chance to participate[16]. The small amount of participants does not reflect a lack of will from Yayasan Kelola to place more candidates. Rather, the limited amount of participants is a result of Yayasan Kelola's limited resources.
The "*Series of One Day workshop: Building Skills and Knowledge*" is aimed at improving actors' communication and management skills, so as to ensure that the coming generations of artists can be as autonomous as possible[17]. Also in this case, limited resources form a barrier to the broadening and improvement of the program.

[7] FGD MFS II Workshop, Kelola Office 26-27 June 2014
[8] Change in the Organizational Capacity of Kelola Foundation in 2012-2014
[9] Yayasan Kelola (2011) *"Narrative Proposal for Activities of Kelola 2011-2013: Application for funding from HIVOS"*.
[10] Yayasan Kelola (2011) *"Narrative Proposal for Activities of Kelola 2011-2013: Application for funding from HIVOS"*.
[11] Yayasan Kelola (2011) *"Narrative Proposal for Activities of Kelola 2011-2013: Application for funding from HIVOS"*.
[12] Yayasan Kelola (2011) *"Narrative Proposal for Activities of Kelola 2011-2013: Application for funding from HIVOS"*.
[13] Yayasan Kelola (2011) *"Narrative Proposal for Activities of Kelola 2011-2013: Application for funding from HIVOS"*.
[14] Yayasan Kelola (2011) *"Narrative Proposal for Activities of Kelola 2011-2013: Application for funding from HIVOS"*.
[15] Yayasan Kelola (2011) *"Narrative Proposal for Activities of Kelola 2011-2013: Application for funding from HIVOS"*.
[16] Yayasan Kelola (2011) "Narrative Proposal for Activities of Kelola 2011-2013: Application for funding from HIVOS".
[17] Yayasan Kelola (2011) "Narrative Proposal for Activities of Kelola 2011-2013: Application for funding from HIVOS".

Also, there is the Theatre for Development and Education (TDE), which started as a pilot project in 2010. TDE is a program which uses theatre as a method to discuss social issues. Its methods are based on those of Augusto Boal's Theater Forum. Boal believes that theatre can find alternatives and solutions to the ongoing problems of society by involving individual people and communities directly. Recently, a large program implemented by the Kelola Foundation concerns PNPM Support Facility (PSF) for Creative Community program using the method of created empowerment process by using the cultural expression in voicing their aspiration through the theater of empowerment and participative video to empower the marginalized community and increase their participation. The program is the grant of creative community and a process of creative empowerment. The project is divided into 2 phases. The first phase will end in September, working in 3 locations, Landak in West Kalimantan, Bone in South Sulawesi, and North Lombok in NTB. The second phase between October-December 2015 we will work in 50 locations in 8 Provinces.[18]

All programs still continue until now. And all Kelola programs are open and competitive. The program is announced to the wide community and whoever fulfilling the requirement can apply. The applicants are then selected by the independent team which consists of the experts of art, and the selected applicants are announced through Kelola's website.[19]

## 2.3 Contracting details

When did cooperation with this partner start: 2003

What is the MFS II contracting period: 31-12-2010 to 30-12-2013

Did cooperation with this partner end: Not applicable

If yes, when did it finish: Not applicable

What is the reason for ending the cooperation with this partner: Not applicable

Is there expected cooperation with this partner after 31st of December 2015: Yes.

[18] Annex M, Interview with Meuthia Susanti (Assistant Project Manager), MFS II Endline, 2014.
[19] Kelola Foundation Activities Report 2013

## 2.4 Background to the Southern Partner Organisation

**History**

Yayasan Kelola was established in 1999 in Solo (Indonesia)[20]. In collaboration with Indonesia's leading management school, Lembaga Manajemen PPM, it offered art modules for art organizations. To enhance and promote the vitality of Indonesian arts, Kelola works directly with Indonesian arts practitioners, across nationwide communities, in response to the needs by providing access to learning opportunities, funding, and information. Kelola also promotes cultural exchange by facilitating artists and art practitioners to engage in dialogue, gain and share skills and knowledge, as well as to build networks within Indonesia and with the international cultural communities.[21]

In 2004 Yayasan Kelola moved to Jakarta and kept on expanding the scope of its interventions. Nowadays Yayasan Kelola has five running programs and has reached more than 15000 people through it, direct and indirectly. Yayasan Kelola has sent 37 arts practitioners in residency programs to the USA and Australia and has supplied 90 arts practitioners with internships in 14 established institutions in Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Jambi and Lampung. Finally, Yayasan Kelola has more than 1,000 arts practitioners in workshops and international conferences in 26 provinces[22]. Yayasan Kelola has regularly received support from HIVOS, the Ford Foundation and the Asian Cultural Council. Yet these organizations form only a fraction of the impressive network this organization has built up throughout the years of its existence[23].

Led by Director whose capacity has been well-recognized both in National and International level, the working pattern from Kelola Foundation is not similar to the other art organizations, but more similar to the formal agency instead, in which the staffs working with the artists receiving the grant, have the duty to maintain the order of management from all the artists.[24]

Kelola Foundation is the initiator of the artists gathering which then born the Indonesian Art Coalition (KSI) in 2010. There are 60 members, both personal and agencies throughout Indonesia. This coalition is the part of the learning due to the absence of association for the artists. The goal in the future is in order that the artists can be the legal entity. Thus with the existence of Indonesian Art Coalition, it is as the effort to the information access regarding the policy especially the art in Indonesia, and has the advocacy function for the art in Indonesia. [25]

Kelola programs drafted in response to the need and the problems uncovered by the visual arts, dance, Indonesian music and theatre society. If the need of art and cultural society shifts and turns, the Kelola program will also about to change.[26]

Please see appendix A for more details in the historical time line that was developed during the baseline workshop.

**Vision**

**"**Kelola aims to celebrate, nurture and promote the creativity of Indonesian artists and arts practitioners working in visual arts, music, dance, theatre and film. Through programs with a focus on educational activities, while engaging in cross-cultural dialogue, Yayasan Kelola aims at promoting cultural diversity"[27].

**Mission**

"To develop its programs in response to the needs and concerns articulated by the Indonesian visual and performing arts as well as by the film communities. As the needs of the communities shift and change, Kelola's programs change in response. Promoting cultural exchange by facilitating artists and

[20] Historical time line developed by Evaluation team (2012
[21] Change in the Organizational Capacity of Kelola Foundation in 2012-2014
[22] HIVOS (2012) "Yayasan Kelola" Available at: http://www.HIVOS.nl/eng/community/partner/10002818 Accessed on: 14.11.2012
[23] HIVOS (2012) "Yayasan Kelola" Available at: http://www.HIVOS.nl/eng/community/partner/10002818 Accessed on: 14.11.2012
[24] Annex D, MFS II Endline Interview with Egbert, 2014
[25] MFS II Endline, FGD Key of change Kelola, 2014
[26] Kelola Foundation Activities Report 2013
[27] Yayasan Kelola (2011) "Narrative Proposal for Activities of Kelola 2011-2013: Application for funding from HIVOS".

art practitioners' engagement in dialogue, so as to gain and share skills and knowledge is also a focus of Yayasan Kelola. Finally, Yayasan Kelola aims at building networks within Indonesia as well as in the international cultural communities"[28].

**Strategies**

Yayasan Kelola's strategies vary per program. Nevertheless, there are a few features based on Kelola's guiding principles, which outline all strategies carried out by Yayasan Kelola. Yayasan Kelola's guiding principles are: respect for diversity, fairness and accountability. The features that outline the specific program strategies are:

- a work ethic is based on impartiality, clarity and transparency.
- clear organizational objectives and structure,
- a focused program delivery system and
- financial accountability.

[28] Yayasan Kelola (2011) "Narrative Proposal for Activities of Kelola 2011-2013: Application for funding from HIVOS".

# 3 Methodological approach and reflection

## 3.1 Overall methodological approach and reflection

This chapter describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

Note: this methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report A detailed overview of the approach is described in appendix 1.

The first (changes in organisational capacity) and the fourth evaluation question are addressed together through:

- **Changes in the 5C indicators since the baseline:** standard indicators have been agreed upon for each of the five capabilities of the five capabilities framework (see appendix 2) and changes between the baseline, and the endline situation have been described. For data collection a mix of data collection methods has been used, including self-assessments by SPO staff; interviews with SPO staff and externals; document review; observation. For data analysis, the Nvivo software program for qualitative data analysis has been used. Final descriptions per indicator and per capability with corresponding scores have been provided.
- **Key organisational capacity changes – 'general causal map':** during the endline workshop a brainstorm has been facilitated to generate the key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO since the baseline, with related underlying causes. For this purpose, a visual as well as a narrative causal map have been described.

In terms of the attribution question (2 and 4), **'process tracing'** is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected

capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

## 3.2 Assessing changes in organisational capacity and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?** And the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This is explained below. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

The evaluators considered it important to also note down a consolidated SPO story and this would also provide more information about what the SPO considered to be important in terms of organisational capacity changes since the baseline and how they perceived these key changes to have come about. Whilst this information has not been validated with sources other than SPO staff, it was considered important to understand how the SPOs has perceived changes in the organisation since the baseline.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information is provided for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the next session on the evaluation question on attribution, as described below and in the appendix 1.

How information was collected and analysed for addressing evaluation question 1 and 4, in terms of description of changes in indicators per capability as well as in terms of the general causal map, based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff, is further described below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and

indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012[29].

Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1. **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2. **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3. **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4. **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5. **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

[29] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Please see appendix 1 for a description of the detailed process and steps.

## 3.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity - evaluation question 2 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question*: **To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia*** **(i.e. measuring effectiveness)?** and the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Below, the selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

### 3.3.1 Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

For the detailed results of this selection, in the four countries that CDI is involved in, please see appendix 1. The following SPOs were selected for process tracing:

- Ethiopia: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE (4/9)
- India: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE, VTRC (5/10)
- Indonesia: ASB, ECPAT, PtPPMA, YPI, YRBI (5/12)
- Liberia: BSC, RHRAP (2/5).

### 3.3.2 Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ' general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained. More information can be found in Appendix 1.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

### 3.3.3 Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team. These can also be found in appendix 1.

**Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach:** this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in

the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

**Using standard indicators and scores**: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

**General causal map:** whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

**Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question:** this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a

result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

**Utilisation of the evaluation**

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

**Design** – mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

**Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication:** many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

**5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process:** The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

# 4 Results

## 4.1 MFS II supported capacity development interventions

Below an overview of the different MFS II supported capacity development interventions of Yayasan Kelola that have taken place since 2011 are described. The information is based on the information provided by HIVOS.

Table 1
*Information about MFS II supported capacity development interventions since baseline*

| Title of the MFS II supported capacity development intervention | Objectives | Activities | Timing and duration | Budget |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Empowering Women artists | Support Women artists in Indonesia | Artistic and gender assistance, leadership training and production support | 2011-2013 | IDR 315,300,000 |
| Organizational support | Support the organization in various ways | 6-8 managers supported and given internships in local/foreign cultural institutions. Funding support for national media coverage. Fundraising efforts supported | 2011-2013 | IDR 433,000,000 (for all organizational support activities) |
| Series of workshops | Improve performance art related knowledge | Workshops | 2011-2013 Annually | IDR 23,000,000 |


Source: 5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_CFA perspective_Indonesia_Yayasan Kelola – Exchange rate: 1 Euro = IDR 12,200

## 4.2 Changes in capacity development and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

Below you can find a description of the changes in each of the five core capabilities. This information is based on the analysis of the information per each of the indicators. This detailed information for each of the indicators describes the current situation, and how and why it has changed since the baseline. See also annex 3.

### 4.2.1 Changes in the five core capabilities

**Capability to act and commit**





Kelola has a limited number of staff and only a few separate divisions, making it an effective and efficient organization.The Director has been a great asset for the foundation as she can encourage her staffs to improve their skills and go beyond their limit. She is well connected to the target groups and also the funders which has positive impact on the organization. Compared to the baseline the director is now more approachable and attentive, especially for those who feel uncomfortable to talk to her directly. She has been able to attract additional funding, from FirstState Investment, and consequently new staff have been recruited. These include two staff members with finance and procurement expertise and two staff members with foreign language skills. These have improved the overall level of knowledge and skills in the organisation, but with the new project, there are also new competences that need to be addressed and training opportunities are more limited having more staff are not enough funds available. However, Kelola also offers them a number of incentives in the form of larger network exposure and great experiences. Even though new staff has been recruited the organisational structure hasn't changed. New staff with specific expertise is expected to provide more advantages in the long run especially in acquiring more funds for the organization. Whilst the strategic plan continues to be the basis for guiding staff in their work, the staff themselves receive clear guidance to achieve their goals through bi-weekly meetings and SOPs. Program activities all derive from the vision and mission, and the design and implementation are always based on the results of the evaluations. Kelola's evaluation mechanism itself is clear and structured. Since the funding is limited, their main programs are their priority and the scale of the projects depends on the funds.

Note: As it is quite difficult to find a replacement for the Director who is approaching the time for her retirement, Kelola may be on the edge of a managerial crisis that needs to be taken care of as soon as possible for the long run.

Score: 3.2 to 3.4 (very slight improvement)


**Capability to adapt and self-renew**




YAYASAN KELOLA still needs to make efforts to improve its M&E system especially with regards to the education and appointment of individual staff members dedicated to this area, but also to have a more strategically oriented, monitoring and evaluation that helps in making strategic decisions. YAYASAN KELOLA continues to have regular evaluations and discussions with their beneficiaries and stakeholders (media, artists, public, etc). The outcomes of these sessions are used to develop future strategies. The system enables them to meet the beneficiaries' needs and to measure the effectiveness of their programThere is no significant change in terms of internal culture or critical reflection and sharing of ideas. The staff still feels free to share their ideas and offer feedback. The cooperation with stakeholders has proven to have great impact on the operational and strategic decision-making. YAYASAN KELOLA is responsive to the changes in their environment, including the needs of stakeholders and the networks. The good relationship they have with stakeholders and networks help them to be aware of what is happening in their environment. Overall there is no significant change compared to the baseline in 2012.

Score: 3.3 to 3.3 (no change)


**Capability to deliver on development objectives**



YAYASAN KELOLA has clear operational plans in place. YAYASAN KELOLA has been working under budget constraints for a long time forcing the organization to focus on using resources efficiently and focussing on what's important. All the staff is aware of the limited funds received and attempt to use their resources optimally. It has good system to respond to the need of the beneficiaries and meet the funders' qualifications. Although there is no formal system yet for its monitoring and evaluation to assess the beneficiary needs, efficiency and quality of their work, they show efforts to use minimal resources as best as they can. Outputs have generally still been implemented according to plan.

Score 3.4 to 3.5 (very minor improvement)


**Capability to relate**




The capability to relate has hardly improved mainly due to having a Director who is very active and well connected with the organization's network. As the result of good networking, YAYASAN KELOLA is getting more acknowledged both nationally as well as internationally. YAYASAN KELOLA continues to work closely with the target groups through dialogue, performances, information sharing, skills improvement, and networking. Internal relationships facilitate open communication, both formally and informally. Yayasan Kelola also actively work with the Koalisi Seni in particular to advocate the government policy collectively to run PP No 93 /2010.

Score: 3.9 to 4.0 (very minor improvement)

**Capability to achieve coherence**




Overall this organization has a good understanding on how to achieve coherence. They have a vision and mission which is reviewed every two years, and adjusted to the national needs and global trends. Nonetheless, changes have not been made since 2008 because the organization's vision and mission are still considered relevant and applicable. Each of the programs Kelola develops is derived from the vision and mission and even though Kelola makes innovations, they are all within the field of "arts and cultural development" framework of the organization's vision. Because all the programs are in line with their vision and mission, all of the programs support and complement each other. Furthermore staff members and partners are encouraged to share and conduct cross-program learning, as to apply lessons learned across all programs. YAYASAN KELOLA is a well-established organisation and since long as has adequate Standard Operating Procedures in place which are utilized by new staff members to start their work.


Score: 3.2 to 3.2 (no change)

### 4.2.2 General changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO

The evaluation team carried out an endline assessment at Yayasan Kelola from 26 to 27 June 2014. During this workshop, the team made a recap of key features of the organization in the baseline in September 2012 (such as vision, mission, strategies, clients, partnerships). This was the basis for discussing changes that had happened to the organization since the baseline. The two main changes that happened in the organization since the baseline in 2012, as identified by the staff during the endline workshop were:

1. Increase of staff capacity [1]
2. Becoming an organization with an international reputation [2]

Each of these organizational capacity changes is elaborated in detail below.


Involved in promoting the founding of PP 93 year 2010 which mandates the role of corporations in the development of arts and culture [40]
Encouraged corporations tto allocate some budget for the development of arts and culture [18]
Received new funding resources from corporations [14]
Formation of procurement structure [28]
Better financial management [19]
Improved efficiency [15]
Increased saved fund [9]
More adequate financial source [3]
New KK project (sequel to 2013) [41]
Involvement of experts in finance and procurement [34]
Better utilization of financial software [30]
Better financial recording mechanism [20]
Financial reports are easier to create [10]
Financial reports can be routinely accounted for [7]
Preserve the donor's trust [11]
Success to obtain fund from donors
Sharing of knowledge from expert seniors to the staff [21]
On the job experience [22]
Opportunity to enter and interact in the arts network [23]
Open opportunity to participate in trainings/workshops [24]
Increase of staff capacity [1]
Good recruitment mechanism [42]
Passionate staffs [35]
Clear salary mechanism [43]
Better orgnaizational system: Increase in the quality of the SOP (More detailed and complete) [44]
Routine internal Reflection [29]
Increase in organizational capacity [16]
Becomes an organization with an international reputation [2]
Stronger capacity in conducting advocacy (For example: skills to track public budgets) [31]
Stronger network for arts [32]
Stronger relation with the government [33]
Improvement in conducting the advocating function [26]
Collectively involved in policy advocacy [47]
Involved as the motor which moves the coalition of arts since 2012 [36]
Continuous and improved project implementation [17]
More well known by the public [12]
Improved image of the organization in Indonesia [8]
Stronger and Wider Networking with Stakeholders [5]
Capacity building for stakeholders: workshop, training, Internship opportunities [48]
Providing grants [49]
Assistance and mentoring [50]
Development of arts and culture database [51]
Socialization and communication [52]
Society empowerment (Theater Empowerment) [53]
Involvement of expert artists in program development [37]
Increasing and strengthening the activities and the roles of facilitators [38]
Improved Lesson Learned Program [39]
Improvement in conducting the function of arts and culture development facilitation [27]
More publications of kelola activities through mass media [54]
Many viewers access the Kelola website [55]
Holding a workshop in the utilization of social media [56]
Utilization of social media [57]
Strengthening relations through media [58]
Strong media communication [13]

**Increase of staff capacity [1]**

According to staff present at the endline workshop, overall staff capacity within Yayasan Kelola has increased [1] which has also influenced the increase in the organizational capacity [16].

The following underlying factors can be related to this development. *First,* sharing of knowledge from senior staff to junior staff took place [21]. *Secondly,* staff gained significant experience on the project [22] therefore staff learned through the opportunity to enter and interact with members of the arts network [23] that Yayasan Kelola is involved in. *Thirdly,* the benefit of staff close relation with the art networks makes them get invitation to participate in trainings and workshops held by other organizations within Yayasan Kelola network [24].

The staffs that have very good passion [35] on art see these opportunities for them to increase their capacities therefore Yayasan Kelola does not need to develop their staffs through internal capacity building. The passion in staff was in turn one of the qualities looked for during the recruitment of staff [42]. This is the cause why all staffs' passion on arts has supported their capacities both for the job and for their own developments.

**Becoming an organization with an international reputation [2]**

According to staff, Yayasan Kelola has significantly raised its profile and international reputation through various activities and developments. These developments have resulted in the director of the organization receiving an international award from Fullbright, USA.

The *first* factor that affected the organizational reputation was obtaining more adequate financial sources therefore the organization can operate continuously [3]. There are at least three folds influenced the first factor.

1. New funding resources were for instance obtained from corporations [14] as an effect of the establishment of PP 93 year 2010 which mandates the role of corporation in the form of art and culture [40]. This regulation effectively encourages corporations to allocate some budget for art and culture [18]. It was not solely a public effort to bring about the formulation of this policy however, as a collective effort to be involved in policy advocacy was a clear target for Yayasan Kelola to be achieved in the years prior [47].
2. Increase saved fund [9] as the result of improved financial efficiency [15] as an effect of better financial management [19]. It is caused by formation of procurement structure [28], and better utilization of financial software [30].
3. Yayasan Kelola has good ability in fund management resulted in the ability to fund some projects which has no donors. The fund from donors is used efficiently for a project, and the remained fund will be used as cross subsidy for other projects. The efficiency in fund use is the factor contributes to adequate financial sources. Whilst the frequent and accountable financial reports supports the organization to gain international reputation
4. Succeed in obtaining fund from international donors because of the trust from the donors [11]. The organization can preserve the trust due to the following:
    a. Routine and accountable financial reports. The financial reports are easier to create [10] after the implementation of a better financial recording mechanism [20]. The implementation of this mechanism was enabled by better utilization of the financial software [30] after the involvement experts in finance and procurement [34] through the new establishment of *Komunitas Kreatif* (Creative Community) project in 2013 [35].
    b. Increase in organizational capacity (will be elaborated in other paragraph) [16]
    c. Continuous and improved project implementation [17]

The *second* factor is the increase in organizational capacity [16], as is explained further below in this narrative. There are fourfold influenced the second factor:

1. Internal reflection [29] in monthly, quarterly, semester, annual organizational meetings, and also in project meetings based on the needs.
2. Increase staff capacity [1].
3. Better organizational system – complete standard operating procedures (SOPs) [44], including payroll mechanism - staffs' salaries increase based on Cost of Living Adjustment mechanism [43].
4. Continuous and improved project implementation (16), as elaborated below:
    a. There is an improvement in conducting the advocating function of the organization [26]. The advocating function of the organization improved through stronger capacity in advocacy such as the skill to keep track of public budgets [31]. But also through a stronger network in the

arts sector [32] as well as stronger relations with the government and authorities [33]. Both these factors were enabled by Kelola's role as the driving actor in the coalition of arts since 2012 [36]. This role was obtained after taking a leading position in the collective policy advocacy initiative [47].

b. There is an improvement in conducting the facilitation of arts and cultural development on the other hand [27], was improved through an improved lesson program [39] and the involvement of experts and artists themselves in the program's development [37]. Another factor that played an important role in improved facilitation was through strengthening and increasing the activities of facilitators themselves [38]. Six developments enabled this:
   - Capacity building for stakeholders through workshops, trainings, internships and other opportunities in which facilitators were directly applied [48].
   - Providing grants to fund their development [49]
   - Direct assistance and mentoring [50]
   - Development of an arts and culture database accessible to facilitators to enable learning and knowledge sharing [51]
   - Socialization and communication amongst facilitators [52]
   - Society empowerment through art activities [53].

The *third* factor affecting Yayasan Kelola's reputation was the stronger and wider networking efforts that the organization undertook. Not only were networking activities intensified, they were also applied to a broader range of organizations in a variety of fields of work [5].The improved image of Yayasan Kelola in Indonesia played a significant role in reaching out to these parties and broadening the network as a whole [8]. The greater image of the organization in turn came about from being better known amongst the public [10] through successful project implementation [13], but also through strong communication with the media [30]. Communication with the media was a carefully devised strategy consisting of a range of activities namely:

1. More publications and articles relating to Kelola's activities in mass media [50]. The number of publications regarding EWA in the media up to December 2013 are 81 articles (including news on the performances of the grantees, and also profiles on Kelola), and 61 publications for *Hibah Seni*.

2. An increase in online content leading to a greater audience on the organization's website [51]. Due to improvements in the content of the website, the number of visitors of Kelola's website up to December 2013 increased more than 20% with the total visitors : 160,457 117,606 and total clicks : 2,324,644 1,824,977.

3. The organization of a workshop through the utilization of social media [52]

4. Utilization of social media [53]. Since 2013, the Kelola newsletter was improved by sending several news in one email with attractive photos. The appearance of the newsletter with attractive visuals and layout caused a 25% increase in newsletter subscribers from 3,600 to 4,532. In addition, Kelola has 5000 friends on Facebook and 1697 followers on Twitter.

5. Approaching media as one of the organization stakeholders [54]. In 2013, Kelola succeeded in collaborating with five medias: Dewi, Femina, The Jakarta Globe, Suara Pembaruan and www.beritasatu.com. Through these collaborations, three performances of the Kelola grantees in Jakarta (Theater Performance "Mada" by Bambang Prihadie; Dance Performance "*Ruang Waktu*"by Nabilla Rasul; and Dance Performance "This Cycle We're In" by Andara F. Moeis) received support in the form of print ad, and publication before and after the performances in printed and online media. If counted, the value of Kelola's collaboration with the five media partners above are a total of IDR 480.300.00,- .

# 5 Discussion and conclusion

## 5.1 Methodological issues

**General: Applied to all or most SPOs**

With regard to the methodology, Indonesia has made some data collection adjustment based on the context. The first adjustment was related to the type of instrument used. To assess the organizational capacity, the study has provided self-assessment, observation and interview sheets. These all were used during the baseline with all SPOs. During the end line the team used self-assessment, interview and observation sheets. However the evaluator applied interview sheets as self-assessment—where participants were asked to fill these sheets by themselves. For the participants who did not attend the workshop, the interviews were done separately using the interview sheet and the results from the interview were included in the subgroup interview sheet that was already filled by the staff member. Were combined into the relevant sub categories in the interview sheet. Interview sheets were also applied for interviews with the CFAs, partners and consultants.

The baseline study showed that having two similar instruments (self assessments, and interview sheets) did not have any effect in relation to obtaining adequate and quality data.

To have some clarification post visit to all SPOs, the evaluator used email and phone interviews.

**Yayasan Kelola**

The endline workshop in Kelola started with the brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012 and factors influencing these changes, which resulted in the general causal map for the organisation. The discussion on this general causal map, was initiated by discussing the *historical time* line (from the baseline in 2012), and how this has changed over the years: critical changes in the organization, development of vision, mission and strategies; target groups; numbers and functions of staff; total budget and funders; important influencing factors and actors. This resulted in a broad range of organisational capacity changes.


In-depth interviews were held with SPO staff to follow up the information that was provided on the self-assessment sheets and also to further explore issues discussed during the workshop. There were six staff members who participated in the workshop: 2 management staffs, 3 program staffs and 1 administration and HRM staffs. The evaluator did not conduct interview with M&E staff because Kelola did not have specific M&E staff. However, the M&E issue was discussed with other staff, specifically with the management, who has taken over the M&E role.

There were no differences in the baseline and endline respondents because Kelola Foundation staff turnover was very low. The external partner respondents were selected together by the evaluator and Kelola Foundation. They were a member of Koalisi Seni as a partner; a cultural specialist involved in one of the project as a consultant; and an art curator who had received a grant from Kelola as a beneficiary. The consultant and beneficiary were not located in Jakarta (Kelola's office), so the interview with them was conducted at different time.

## 5.2 Changes in organisational capacity development

This section aims to provide an answer to the first and fourth evaluation questions:

1. *What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?*
4. *What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?*




Below the changes in each of the capabilities are further explained, by referring to the specific indicators that changed.

Over the last two years most improvements took place in the indicators under the capability to act and commit for Yayasan Kelola. A slight improvement occurred in the responsiveness of leadership. After an effort to cover the gap between senior and junior staff with management, the director is now more approachable and attentive, especially for those who feel uncomfortable to talk to her directly. This enabled all the staff to give input and feedback comfortably. In terms of articulation of strategies a slight improvement took place through even greater integration of program activities in relation to strategic objectives and vision and mission. Staff skills improved slightly through the hiring of newly skilled staff, but also through the continuous learning of staff members in the issues related to local artists as well as report writing. Incentives have slightly improved at the organization by offering exposure to a large professional network which allows for significant personal growth of the staff members. Funding sources have slightly improved as well, true the long term cooperation with First State Investment which started in 2012.

The capability to adapt and self-renew has only very slightly improved compared to the baseline situation in 2012. The application of M&E for instance is still done informally, although now more regularly. Every program activity is reviewed by a third party to ensure the objectivity of the analysis, but further analysis and implementation is needed for M&E to be truly useful for the organization.

The capability to deliver on development objectives has demonstrated a very minor improvement. A slight improvement has occurred in the cost-effective use of resources of Yayasan Kelola. Since every staff member now understands the difficulty of obtaining funds and managing them, they are even more motivated to be precise in their estimations as well as utilizing their resources as effectively as possible.

The capacity to relate has a very minor improvement resulting from Yayasan Kelola's engagement in networks. The organization has engaged in more networking activities with prominent organizations is now starting to get more recognized.

No change has occurred in the capability to achieve coherence compared to 2012.

**General organisational capacity changes related to MFS II Interventions**

The evaluators considered it important to also note down the SPO's story in terms of changes in the organisation since the baseline, and this would also provide more information about reasons for change, which were difficult to get for the individual indicators. Also for some issues there may not have been relevant indicators available in the list of core indicators provide by the evaluation team. Please note that this information is based only on the information provided by the SPO staff during the endline workshop, but no validation of this information has been done like with the process tracing causal maps. For details in relation to attribution, we refer to the next section (5.3).

During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by Yayasan Kelola staff, these have been captured in the general causal map in 4.2.2:

1. Increase of staff capacity
2. Becoming an organization with an international reputation

Yayasan Kelola staff experienced these as the most important capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline.

An increase in staff capacity was due to sharing of knowledge from expert seniors to the staff; on the job experience; the opportunity to enter and interact in the arts network; and opening the opportunity to participate in trainings and workshops. Each of these was enabled by passionate staff, which can be attributed to the good recruitment mechanism of Yayasan Kelola.

Becoming and organization with an international reputation was due an increase in organizational capacity, more adequate financial sources and a stronger and wider network with stakeholders. Increased organizational capacity was due on the job experience, a clear salary mechanism, better organizational systems through higher quality SOPs, routine internal reflection and continuous and improved project implementation. The latter was due improvements in advocating and improvements in arts and culture development facilitation. Improvements in advocating can be attributed to stronger capacity in advocacy skills, a stronger network for arts, as well as better relations with the government. This in turn was enabled by Yayasan Kelola acting as the engine which drove the coalition of arts since 2012 and the organization being collectively involved in policy advocacy. This was a Hivos sponsored MFS II activity, but could not be identified as a specific capacity development intervention. The improved function of arts and culture development facilitation resulted from involvement of expert artists in program development, improved lessons learned program, and increasing and strengthening the activities and roles of facilitators. This was due to a variety of interventions namely; capacity building for stakeholders, workshops, training and internship opportunities (partially funded by MFS II), providing grants, assistance and mentoring, development of arts and culture database, Socialization and communication as well as society empowerment.

More adequate financial sources were enabled by new funding from corporations, increased saving funds, as well as additional donor funding. Corporations were encouraged to allocate budget for the development of arts and culture due to Yayasan Kelola being involved in promoting the government regulation PP93 which encouraged corporations to do so. Increased savings were made possible by improved efficiency in operations due to better financial management. This was enabled by the formation of a procurement structure. The successful acquisition of new donor funds were enabled by preserving donor trust, accountable financial reports as a result of a simplified mechanism to do financial recording. This was enabled by the utilization of financial software after the involvement of finance experts as part of the KK project in 2013.

The stronger and wider network of stakeholders that Yayasan Kelola that was developed since the baseline was due an improved image of the organization in Indonesia. This can be attributed to it being better known by the public, as well as the strong media communication that took place. Public awareness increased as a result of continuous and improved project implementation, as was already explained above. The strong media communication can be attributed to more publications of Kelola activities through mass media, an increase in website traffic, holding a workshop in the utilization of social media, utilizing social media and strengthening media relations.

In conclusion, and based only on the information provided by the SPO staff during the endline workshop, only a small part of MFS II capacity development interventions can be related to the key organizational capacity changes that have taken place. The involvement of Hivos to support Kelola with the arts coalition initiative since 2012 has helped in building connections to government and lobbying and advocating activities, although this was not executed in form of a specific MFS II capacity development intervention. Also a small role of MFS II continues to exist in trainings and workshops.It must be noted that the information provided has not been verified through other sources of information. However Hivos has stated themselves that they were able to reduce their fundraising from 30% to 5% in recent years due to the increased fundraising capacity of the organization. This is difficult to attribute to MFS II interventions without going into more detail through for example process tracing.

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1002502-contract-Kelola.doc
contract intake form-Kelola.rtf
coverletter.doc
Kenschets Page 1.doc
Kenschets Page 2.doc
partners capacity assessment-Kelola.rtf

Grant  Hivos 2011-2012 dan Rencana Realokasi.ods
Pengalihan dana 2012 ke 2013.pdf
1002502 budget status 2011.xls
1002502 Budget status 2011.xlsx
1002502 budget status 2012.xls
1002502- Audit Review FY11.xls
1002502- Audit Review FY12.xls
1002502-Audit Assm Y2011.doc
1002502-Audit Assm Y2012.doc
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data kliping peraih EWA 2011.doc
data kliping peraih HS 2011.doc
Feedback laporan 2011 dari Kelola.pdf
feedback laporan 2011.doc
Laporan Kegiatan Kelola Tahun 2011.pdf
Laporan Tahunan Hivos 2012 Final.pdf
Report assessed-2011.doc
report-assessed-2011-osiris-final.xls
Assessment sheet_Dutch co-financing organisations_Indonesia_Yayasan Kelola-12102012.doc
Assessment sheet_Dutch co-financing organisations_Indonesia_Yayasan Kelola.doc
pertanyaan evaluasi-1.pdf
pertanyaan evaluasi.pdf
Support to capacity development by MFS II and others_Indonesia_Yayasan Kelola-12102012.doc
Support to capacity development by MFS II and others_Indonesia_Yayasan Kelola.doc
1002502-Budget Assessment-Kelola.doc
FINAL DETAILED BUDGET REQUEST TO HIVOS 2011-2013-Kelola.xls
Final Proposal to HIVOS 2011-2013 - Kelola.doc
Workplan Kelola 2012.pdf
Annex A_5c endline_assessment sheet_Dutch co-financing organisations_indonesia_yayasan kelola_hivos.docx
Annex B_5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_CFA perspective_indonesia_yayasan kelola_hivos.docx
Kelola_2013_AnnualReviewAssessment.xls
Alur Kerja HS.docx
Alur Kerja MN.doc
Artikel Langitberita.com Ruang. Waktu..doc
ontosoroh 7.jpg
perjalanan dunia tengah tribun timur.pdf
Kelola's Statement of Activities and Fund  Balances 2013.pdf
ANGGRA~1.JPG
Bambang Prihadi, Sutradara - Hibah Seni.jpg
Citra Pratiwi, Koreografer - EWA.jpg
Danardono, Koreografer - Hibah Seni.JPG
DWIWIN~1.JPG
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Ibed Suryana Yuga, Sutradara - Hibah Seni.JPG
Nabilla Rasul, Koreografer - Hibah Seni.JPG
Rapat Evaluasi EWA.JPG
Susandra Jaya, Komposer - Hibah Seni.JPG
TONYAS~1.JPG
Laporan Naratif FSII.pdf
Kelola's Statement of Activities and Fund  Balances 2013.pdf
Laporan Naratif  Kegiatan Kelola  2013.pdf
Laporan Naratif  Kegiatan Kelola  2013.pdf
Annex Q_5c endline observation sheet_country_name SPO.doc
Annex R_5c endline_observable indicators at SPO_Indonesia_Yayasan Kelola.docx
BAHASA-Annex D_5c endline interview guide_mitra_egbert_koalisi seni.doc

BAHASA-Annex D_5c endline interview guide_mitra_selected indicators_Alia.fix.doc
BAHASA-Annex L_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_management.doc
BAHASA-Annex O -5c endline interview guide_admin and HRM staff_ Windi Wulandari.doc
Form Annex M - 5c endline interview guide_subgroup_program staff_Viranti Dara.doc
Form Annex M -5c endline interview guide_subgroup_program staff_ Meuthia Susanti -rev.doc
Form Annex M -5c endline interview guide_subgrup_program staff_ Endah Pertiwi.doc

# List of Respondents

**List of Respondents**

**People Present at the Workshops**

| **Date:** | **26-27 June 2014** | | **Organisation: YayasanKelola** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **NAME** | **ROLE IN THE ORGANISATION** | **DURATION OF SERVICE** | **PHONE** | **E-MAIL** |
| **Management** | | | | |
| Amna Kesuma | Direktur | | | amna@indo.net.id |
| Linda Hoemar Abidin | Ketua Pengurus | 15 years | 08161884288 | lhabidin@gmail.com |
| **Program/ Project staff** | | | | |
| Viranti Dara Anggari | Koordinator Program | 1 year | | |
| Endah Pertiwi | Staff Program | 2 years | | |
| Meuthia Susanti | Asisten Project Manager | 10 years | | |
| | | | | |
| **Admin/ HR/Finance staff** | | | | |
| Windi Wulandari | Finance Administration | 4 years | 081387119231 | |
| | | | | |
| **Field staff staff** | | | | |
| | | | | |
| **Others** | | | | |
| | | | | |

**List of People Inteviewed**

| **Date:** | **25-28 June 2012** | | **Organisation: Lembaga Kita** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **NAME** | **ROLE IN THE ORGANISATION** | **DURATION OF SERVICE** | **PHONE** | **E-MAIL** |
| **Management** | | | | |
| Amna Kesuma | Direktur | | | amna@indo.net.id |
| Linda HoemarAbidin | Ketua Pengurus | 15 years | 08161884288 | lhabidin@gmail.com |
| **Program/ Project staff** | | | | |
| Viranti Dara Anggari | Koordinator Program | 1 year | | _ |
| Meuthia Susanti | Asisten Project Manager | 10 years | | |
| Endah Pertiwi | Staff Program | 2 years | | |
| **Admin/ HR/Finance staff** | | | | |
| WindiWulandari | Finance Administration | 4 years | 081387119231 | _ |
| Sri Asih | Finance Accounting | 1 year | | |
| **Field staff staff** | | | | |
| | | | | |
| **Others** | | | | |
| Egbert Willems Wits | Partner | 2 years | 081388302679 | |

# Appendix 1 Methodological approach & reflection

## Introduction

This appendix describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around four key evaluation questions:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

Note: the methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report. At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

## Changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 1

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?**

This question was mainly addressed by reviewing changes in 5c indicators, but additionally a 'general causal map' based on the SPO perspective on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline has been developed. Each of these is further explained below. The development of the general causal map is integrated in the steps for the endline workshop, as mentioned below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012.[30] Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1. **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2. **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3. **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4. **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5. **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

[30] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Below each of these steps is further explained.

*Step 1. Provide the **description of indicators** in the relevant formats – CDI team*

- These formats were to be used when collecting data from SPO staff, CFA, partners, and consultants. For each of these respondents different formats have been developed, based on the list of 5C indicators, similar to the procedure that was used during the baseline assessment. The CDI team needed to add the 2012 baseline description of each indicator. The idea was that each respondent would be requested to review each description per indicator, and indicate whether the current situation is different from the baseline situation, how this situation has changed, and what the reasons for the changes in indicators are. At the end of each format, a more general question is added that addresses how the organisation has changed its capacity since the baseline, and what possible reasons for change exist. Please see below the questions asked for each indicator as well as the more general questions at the end of the list of indicators.

General questions about key changes in the capacity of the SPO

*What do you consider to be the key changes in terms of how the organisation/ SPO has developed its capacity since the baseline (2012)?*

*What do you consider to be the main explanatory reasons (interventions, actors or factors) for these changes?*

**List of questions to be asked for each of the 5C indicators** (The entry point is the the description of each indicator as in the 2012 baseline report):

1. *How has the situation of this indicator changed compared to the situation during the baseline in 2012? Please tick one of the following scores:*
   - -2 = Considerable deterioration
   - -1 = A slight deterioration
   - 0 = No change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012
   - +1 = Slight improvement
   - +2 = Considerable improvement
2. *Please describe what exactly has changed since the baseline in 2012*

3. *What interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation in 2012? Please tick and describe what interventions, actors or factors influenced this indicator, and how. You can tick and describe more than one choice.*
   - Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by **SPO**: ..... .
   - Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **Dutch CFA (MFS II funding)**: .... .
   - Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **other funders**: ..... .
   - **Other** interventions, actors or factors: ..... .
   - Don't know.

*Step 2. **Review** the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team*

Before the in-country team and the CDI team started collecting data in the field, it was important that they reviewed the description for each indicator as described in the baseline reports, and also added to the endline formats for review by respondents. These descriptions are based on document review, observation, interviews with SPO staff, CFA staff and external respondents during the baseline. It was important to explain this to respondents before they filled in the formats.

*Step 3. **Send the formats** adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)*

The CDI team was responsible for collecting data from the CFA:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – CFA perspective.

The in-country team was responsible for collecting data from the SPO and from external respondents (except CFA). The following formats were sent before the fieldwork started:

- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – SPO perspective.
- 5C Endline interview guides for externals: partners; OD consultants.

*Step 4. **Collect, upload & code the documents** from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team*

The CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team, collected the following documents from SPOs and CFAs:

- Project documents: project proposal, budget, contract (Note that for some SPOs there is a contract for the full MFS II period 2011-2015; for others there is a yearly or 2-yearly contract. All new contracts since the baseline in 2012 will need to be collected);
- Technical and financial progress reports since the baseline in 2012;.
- Mid-term evaluation reports;
- End of project-evaluation reports (by the SPO itself or by external evaluators);
- Contract intake forms (assessments of the SPO by the CFA) or organisational assessment scans made by the CFA that cover the 2011-2014 period;
- Consultant reports on specific inputs provided to the SPO in terms of organisational capacity development;
- Training reports (for the SPO; for alliance partners, including the SPO);
- Organisational scans/ assessments, carried out by the CFA or by the Alliance Assessments;
- Monitoring protocol reports, especially for the 5C study carried out by the MFS II Alliances;
- Annual progress reports of the CFA and of the Alliance in relation to capacity development of the SPOs in the particular country;
- Specific reports that are related to capacity development of SPOs in a particular country.

The following documents (since the baseline in 2012) were requested from SPO:

- Annual progress reports;
- Annual financial reports and audit reports;
- Organisational structure vision and mission since the baseline in 2012;
- Strategic plans;

- Business plans;
- Project/ programme planning documents;
- Annual work plan and budgets;
- Operational manuals;
- Organisational and policy documents: finance, human resource development, etc.;
- Monitoring and evaluation strategy and implementation plans;
- Evaluation reports;
- Staff training reports;
- Organisational capacity reports from development consultants.

The CDI team will coded these documents in NVivo (qualitative data analysis software program) against the 5C indicators.

*Step 5.* ***Prepare and organise the field visit*** *to the SPO – in-country team*

Meanwhile the in-country team prepared and organised the logistics for the field visit to the SPO:

- **General endline workshop** consisted about one day for the self-assessments (about ½ to ¾ of the day) and brainstorm (about 1 to 2 hours) on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline and underlying interventions, factors and actors ('general causal map'), see also explanation below. This was done with the five categories of key staff: managers; project/ programme staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin & HRM staff; field staff. Note: for SPOs involved in process tracing an additional 1 to 1½ day workshop (managers; program/project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff) was necessary. See also step 7;
- **Interviews with SPO staff** (roughly one day);
- **Interviews with external respondents** such as partners and organisational development consultants depending on their proximity to the SPO. These interviews coulc be scheduled after the endline workshop and interviews with SPO staff.

General causal map

During the 5C endline process, a 'general causal map' has been developed, based on key organisational capacity changes and underlying causes for these changes, as perceived by the SPO. The general causal map describes cause-effect relationships, and is described both as a visual as well as a narrative.

As much as possible the same people that were involved in the baseline were also involved in the endline workshop and interviews.

*Step 6.* ***Interview the CFA*** *– CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for sending the sheets/ formats to the CFA and for doing a follow-up interview on the basis of the information provided so as to clarify or deepen the information provided. This relates to:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet - CFA perspective.

*Step 7.* ***Run the endline workshop*** *with the SPO – in-country team*

This included running the endline workshop, including facilitation of the development of the general causal map, self-assessments, interviews and observations. Particularly for those SPOs that were selected for process tracing all the relevant information needed to be analysed prior to the field visit, so as to develop an initial causal map. Please see Step 6 and also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two).

An endline workshop with the SPO was intended to:

- Explain the purpose of the fieldwork;
- Carry out in the self-assessments by SPO staff subgroups (unless these have already been filled prior to the field visits) - this may take some 3 hours.
- Facilitate a brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012 and underlying interventions, factors and actors.

***Purpose of the fieldwork*:** to collect data that help to provide information on what changes took place in terms of organisational capacity development of the SPO as well as reasons for these changes. The baseline that was carried out in 2012 was to be used as a point of reference.

***Brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes and influencing factors***: a brainstorm was facilitated on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012. In order to kick start the discussion, staff were reminded of the key findings related to the historical time line carried out in the baseline (vision, mission, strategies, funding, staff). This was then used to generate a discussion on key changes that happened in the organisation since the baseline (on cards). Then cards were selected that were related to organisational capacity changes, and organised. Then a 'general causal map' was developed, based on these key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change as experienced by the SPO staff. This was documented as a visual and narrative.This general causal map was to get the story of the SPO on what they perceived as key organisational capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline, in addition to the specific details provided per indicator.

***Self-assessments*:** respondents worked in the respective staff function groups: management; programme/ project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin and HRM staff; field staff. Staff were assisted where necessary so that they could really understand what it was they were being asked to do as well as what the descriptions under each indicator meant.

Note: for those SPOs selected for process tracing an additional endline workshop was held to facilitate the development of detailed causal maps for each of the identified organisational change/ outcome areas that fall under the capability to act and commit, and under the capability to adapt and self-renew, and that are likely related to capacity development interventions by the CFA. See also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two). It was up to the in-country team whether this workshop was held straight after the initial endline workshop or after the workshop and the follow-up interviews. It could also be held as a separate workshop at another time.

*Step 8.* ***Interview SPO staff*** *– in-country team*

After the endline workshop (developing the general causal map and carrying out self-assessments in subgroups), interviews were held with SPO staff (subgroups) to follow up on the information that was provided in the self-assessment sheets, and to interview staff that had not yet provided any information.

*Step 9.* ***Fill-in observation sheets*** *– in-country team*

During the visit at the SPO, the in-country team had to fill in two sheets based on their observation:

- 5C Endline observation sheet;
- 5C Endline observable indicators.

*Step 10.* ***Interview externals*** *– in-country team & CDI team*

The in-country team also needed to interview the partners of the SPO as well as organisational capacity development consultants that have provided support to the SPO. The CDI team interviewed the CFA.

*Step 11.* ***Upload and auto-code all the formats*** *collected by in-country team and CDI team – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for uploading and auto-coding (in Nvivo) of the documents that were collected by the in-country team and by the CDI team.

*Step 12. Provide the **overview of information** per 5C indicator to in-country team – CDI team*

After the analysis in NVivo, the CDI team provided a copy of all the information generated per indicator to the in-country team for initial analysis.

*Step 13. **Analyse the data and develop a draft description** of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team*

The in-country team provided a draft description of the findings per indicator, based on the information generated per indicator. The information generated under the general questions were linked to the general causal map or detailed process tracing related causal map.

*Step 14. **Analyse the data and finalize the description** of the findings per indicator, per capability and general – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for checking the analysis by the in-country team with the Nvivo generated data and to make suggestions for improvement and ask questions for clarification to which the in-country team responded. The CDI team then finalised the analysis and provided final descriptions and scores per indicator and also summarize these per capability and calculated the summary capability scores based on the average of all indicators by capability.

*Step 15. **Analyse the information** in the general causal map –in-country team & CDI team*

The general causal map based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff present at the workshop, was further detailed by in-country team and CDI team, and based on the notes made during the workshop and where necessary additional follow up with the SPO. The visual and narrative was finalized after feedback by the SPO. During analysis of the general causal map relationships with MFS II support for capacity development and other factors and actors were identified. All the information has been reviewed by the SPO and CFA.

## Attributing changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 2

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: ***To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?***

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process. The box below provides some background information on process tracing.

Background information on process tracing

The essence of process tracing research is that scholars want to go beyond merely identifying correlations between independent variables (Xs) and outcomes (Ys). Process tracing in social science is commonly defined by its addition to trace causal mechanisms (Bennett, 2008a, 2008b; Checkle, 2008; George & Bennett, 2005). A causal mechanism can be defined as "a complex system which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts" (Glennan, 1996, p. 52). Process tracing involves "attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable" (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 206-207).

Process tracing can be differentiated into three variants within social science: theory testing, theory building, and explaining outcome process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

- Theory testing process tracing uses a theory from the existing literature and then tests whether evidence shows that each part of hypothesised causal mechanism is present in a given case, enabling within case inferences about whether the mechanism functioned as expected in the case and whether the mechanism as a whole was present. No claims can be made however, about whether the mechanism was the only cause of the outcome.
- Theory building process tracing seeks to build generalizable theoretical explanations from empirical evidence, inferring that a more general causal mechanism exists from the fact of a particular case.
- Finally, explaining outcome process tracing attempts to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific historical case. Here the aim is not to build or test more general theories but to craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case centric than theory oriented.

Explaining outcome process tracing is the most suitable type of process tracing for analysing the causal mechanisms for selected key organisational capacity changes of the SPOs. This type of process tracing can be thought of as a single outcome study defined as seeking the causes of the specific outcome in a single case (Gerring, 2006; in: Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Here the ambition is to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a particular outcome, with sufficiency defined as an explanation that accounts for all of the important aspects of an outcome with no redundant parts being present (Mackie, 1965).

Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research strategy that aims to trace the complex conglomerate of systematic and case specific causal mechanisms that produced the outcome in question. The explanation cannot be detached from the particular case. Explaining outcome process tracing refers to case studies whose primary ambition is to explain particular historical outcomes, although the findings of the case can also speak to other potential cases of the phenomenon. Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research process in which 'theories' are tested to see whether they can provide a minimally sufficient explanation of the outcome. Minimal sufficiency is defined as an explanation that accounts for an outcome, with no redundant parts. In most explaining outcome studies, existing theorisation cannot provide a sufficient explanation, resulting in a second stage in which existing theories are re-conceptualised in light of the evidence gathered in the preceding empirical analysis. The conceptualisation phase in explaining outcome process tracing is therefore an iterative research process, with initial mechanisms re-conceptualised and tested until the result is a theorised mechanism that provides a minimally sufficient explanation of the particular outcome.

Below a description is provided of how SPOs are selected for process tracing, and a description is provided on how this process tracing is to be carried out. Note that this description of process tracing provides not only information on the extent to which the changes in organisational development can be attributed to MFS II (evaluation question 2), but also provides information on other contributing factors and actors (evaluation question 4). Furthermore, it must be noted that the evaluation team has developed an adapted form of 'explaining outcome process tracing', since the data collection and analysis was an iterative process of research so as to establish the most realistic explanation for a particular outcome/ organisational capacity change. Below selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

**Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing**

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on

17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

**ETHIOPIA**

For Ethiopia the capabilities that are mostly targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 1

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Ethiopia*

| Capability to: | AMREF | CARE | ECFA | FSCE | HOA-REC | HUNDEE | NVEA | OSRA | TTCA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Relate | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| Achieve coherence | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Ethiopia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE. In fact, six SPOs would be suitable for process tracing. We just selected the first one per CFA following the criteria of not including more than one SPO per CFA for process tracing

Table 2

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Ethiopia*

| Ethiopia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AMREF | Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | AMREF NL | Yes |
| CARE | Dec 31, 2015 | Partly | Yes | Yes | Yes – slightly | CARE Netherlands | No - not fully matching |
| ECFA | Jan 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Child Helpline International | Yes |
| FSCE | Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN); Note: no info from Defence for Children – ECPAT Netherlands | Yes |
| HOA-REC | Sustainable Energy project (ICCO Alliance): 2014<br>Innovative WASH (WASH Alliance): Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes - slightly | ICCO | No - not fully matching |
| HUNDEE | Dec 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO & IICD | Yes |
| NVEA | Dec 2015 (both) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Edukans Foundation (under two consortia); Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN) | Suitable but SKN already involved for process tracing FSCE |
| OSRA | C4C Alliance project (farmers marketing): December 2014<br>ICCO Alliance project (zero grazing: 2014 (2nd phase) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO & IICD | Suitable but ICCO & IICD already involved for process tracing - HUNDEE |
| TTCA | June 2015 | Partly | Yes | No | Yes | Edukans Foundation | No - not fully matching |

**INDIA**

For India the capability that is mostly targeted by CFAs is the capability to act and commit. The next one in line is the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below in which a higher score means that the specific capability is more intensively targeted.

Table 3

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – India*[31]

| Capability to: | BVHA | COUNT | DRISTI | FFID | Jana Vikas | Samarthak Samiti | SMILE | SDS | VTRC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 5 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 4 |
| Relate | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, India.

Below you can see a table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether SPO and the CFA both expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE and VTRC. Except for SMILE (capability to act and commit only), for the other SPOs the focus for process tracing can be on the capability to act and commit and on the capability to adapt and self-renew.

Table 4

*SPOs selected for process tracing – India*

| India – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BVHA | 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Simavi | Yes; both capabilities |
| COUNT | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Woord en Daad | Yes; both capabilities |
| DRISTI | 31-03-2012 | Yes | Yes | No | no | Hivos | No - closed in 2012 |
| FFID | 30-09-2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |

[31] RGVN, NEDSF and Women's Rights Forum (WRF) could not be reached timely during the baseline due to security reasons. WRF could not be reached at all. Therefore these SPOs are not included in Table 1.

| India – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jana Vikas | 2013 | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No - contract is and the by now; not fully matching focus |
| NEDSF | | | | | | | No – delayed baseline |
| RGVN | | | | | | | No - delayed baseline |
| Samarthak Samiti (SDS) | 2013 possibly longer | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Hivos | No - not certain of end date and not fully matching focus |
| Shivi Development Society (SDS) | Dec 2013 intention 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No - not fully matching focus |
| Smile | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Wilde Ganzen | Yes; first capability only |
| VTRC | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Stichting Red een Kind | Yes; both capabilities |

**INDONESIA**

For Indonesia the capabilities that are most frequently targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 5

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Indonesia*

| Capability to: | ASB | Daya kologi | ECPAT | GSS | Lem baga Kita | Pt. PPMA | Rifka Annisa | WIIP | Yad upa | Yayasan Kelola | YPI | YRBI |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 4 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 3 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 |
| Relate | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, Indonesia.

The table below describes when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: ASB, ECPAT, Pt.PPMA, YPI, YRBI.

Table 6

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Indonesia*

| Indonesia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ASB | February 2012; extension Feb,1, 2013 – June,30, 2016 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Hivos | Yes |
| Dayakologi | 2013; no extension | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No: contract ended early and not matching enough |
| ECPAT | August 2013; Extension Dec 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes, a bit | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | Yes |
| GSS | 31 December 2012; no extension | Yes | Yes | Yes, a bit | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | No: contract ended early |
| Lembaga Kita | 31 December 2012; no extension | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | No - contract ended early |
| Pt.PPMA | May 2015 | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | IUCN | Yes, capability to act and commit only |
| Rifka Annisa | Dec, 31 2015 | No | Yes | No | Yes | Rutgers WPF | No - no match between expectations CFA and SPO |
| WIIP | Dec 2015 | Yes | Not MFS II | Yes | Not MFS II | Red Cross | No - Capacity development interventions are not MFS II financed. Only some overhead is MFS II |

| Indonesia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yayasan Kelola | Dec 30, 2013; extension of contract being processed for two years (2014-2015) | Yes | Not really | Yes | Not really | Hivos | No - no specific capacity development interventions planned by Hivos |
| YPI | Dec 31, 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Rutgers WPF | Yes |
| YRBI | Oct, 30, 2013; YRBI end of contract from 31st Oct 2013 to 31st Dec 2013. Contract extension proposal is being proposed to MFS II, no decision yet. | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |
| Yadupa | Under negotiation during baseline; new contract 2013 until now | Yes | Nothing committed | Yes | Nothing committed | IUCN | No, since nothing was committed by CFA |

**LIBERIA**

For Liberia the situation is arbitrary which capabilities are targeted most CFA's. Whilst the capability to act and commit is targeted more often than the other capabilities, this is only so for two of the SPOs. The capability to adapt and self-renew and the capability to relate are almost equally targeted for the five SPOs, be it not intensively. Since the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew are the most targeted capabilities in Ethiopia, India and Indonesia, we choose to focus on these two capabilities for Liberia as well. This would help the synthesis team in the further analysis of these capabilities related to process tracing. See also the table below.

Table 7

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Liberia*

| Capability to: | BSC | DEN-L | NAWOCOL | REFOUND | RHRAP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Relate | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, Liberia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Also, for two of the five SPOs capability to act and commit is targeted more intensively compared to the other capabilities. Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BSC and RHRAP.

Table 8

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Liberia*

| Liberia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BSC | Dec 31, 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | SPARK | Yes |
| DEN-L | 2014 | No | No | Unknown | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| NAWOCOL | 2014 | Yes | No | No | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| REFOUND | At least until 2013 (2015?) | Yes | No | Yes | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| RHRAP | At least until 2013 (2014?) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |

**Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study**

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ' general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

Some definitions of the terminology used for this MFS II 5c evaluation

Based upon the different interpretations and connotations the use of the term causal mechanism we use the following terminology for the remainder of this paper:

- A **detailed causal map** (or **model of change)** = the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change.
- A **causal mechanism** = is the combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 176).
- **Part** or **cause** = one actor with its attributes carrying out activities/ producing outputs that lead to change in other parts. The final part or cause is the change/ outcome.
- **Attributes of the actor** = specificities of the actor that increase his chance to introduce change or not such as its position in its institutional environment.

*Step 1. Identify the **planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

Chapter 4.1 and 4.2 in the baseline report were reviewed. Capacity development interventions as planned by the CFA for the capability to act and commit and for the capability to adapt and self-renew were described and details inserted in the summary format. This provided an overview of the capacity development activities that were originally planned by the CFA for these two capabilities and assisted in focusing on relevant outcomes that are possibly related to the planned interventions.

*Step 2. Identify the **implemented capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

The input from the CFA was reviewed in terms of what capacity development interventions have taken place in the MFS II period. This information was be found in the 'Support to capacity development sheet - endline - CFA perspective' for the SPO, based on details provided by the CFA and further discussed during an interview by the CDI team.

The CFA was asked to describe all the MFS II supported capacity development interventions of the SPO that took place during the period 2011 up to now. The CDI team reviewed this information, not only the interventions but also the observed changes as well as the expected long-term changes, and

then linked these interventions to relevant outcomes in one of the capabilities (capability to act and commit; and capability to adapt and self-renew).

*Step 3. Identify **initial changes/ outcome areas** in these two capabilities – by CDI team & in-country team*

The CDI team was responsible for **coding** documents received from SPO and CFA in NVivo on the following:

- **5C Indicators**: this was to identify the changes that took place between baseline and endline. This information was coded in Nvivo.
- Information related to the **capacity development interventions implemented by the CFA** (with MFS II funding) (see also Step 2) to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. For example, the training on financial management of the SPO staff could be related to any information on financial management of the SPO. This information was coded in Nvivo.

In addition, the response by the CFA to the changes in 5C indicators format, was auto-coded.

The in-country team was responsible for timely collection of information from the SPO (before the fieldwork starts). This set of information dealt with:

- MFS II supported capacity development interventions during the MFS II period (2011 until now).
- Overview of all trainings provided in relation to a particular outcome areas/organisational capacity change since the baseline.
- For each of the identified MFS II supported trainings, training questionnaires have been developed to assess these trainings in terms of the participants, interests, knowledge and skills gained, behaviour change and changes in the organisation (based on Kirkpatrick's model), one format for training participants and one for their managers. These training questionnaires were sent prior to the field visit.
- Changes expected by SPO on a long-term basis ('Support to capacity development sheet - endline - SPO perspective').

For the selection of change/ outcome areas the following criteria were important:

- The change/ outcome area is in one of the two capabilities selected for process tracing: capability to act and commit or the capability to adapt and self-renew. This was the first criteria to select upon.
- There was a likely link between the key organisational capacity change/ outcome area and the MFS II supported capacity development interventions. This also was an important criteria. This would need to be demonstrated through one or more of the following situations:
  - In the 2012 **theory of change** on organisational capacity development of the SPO a link was indicated between the outcome area and MFS II support;
  - During the baseline the CFA indicated a link between **the planned MFS II support** to organisational development and the expected short-term or long-term results in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the **CFA** indicated a link between **the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions** and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the **SPO** indicated a link between **the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions** and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities.

Reviewing the information obtained as described in Step 1, 2, and 3 provided the basis for selecting key organisational capacity change/ outcome areas to focus on for process tracing. These areas were to be formulated as broader outcome areas, such as 'improved financial management', 'improved monitoring and evaluation' or 'improved staff competencies'.

Note: the outcome areas were to be formulated as intermediates changes. For example: an improved monitoring and evaluation system, or enhanced knowledge and skills to educate the target group on

climate change. Key outcome areas were also verified - based on document review as well as discussions with the SPO during the endline.

*Step 4. Construct the **detailed, initial causal map** (theoretical model of change) – CDI & in-country team*

A detailed initial causal map was developed by the CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team. This was based on document review, including information provided by the CFA and SPO on MFS II supported capacity development interventions and their immediate and long-term objectives as well as observed changes. Also, the training questionnaires were reviewed before developing the initial causal map. This detailed initial causal map was to be provided by the CDI team with a visual and related narrative with related references. This initial causal map served as a reference point for further reflection with the SPO during the process tracing endline workshop, where relationships needed to be verified or new relationships established so that the second (workshop-based), detailed causal map could be developed, after which further verification was needed to come up with the final, concluding detailed causal map.

It's important to note that organisational change area/ outcome areas could be both positive and negative.

For each of the selected outcomes the team needed to make explicit the theoretical model of change. This meant finding out about the range of different actors, factors, actions, and events etc. that have contributed to a particular outcome in terms of organisational capacity of the SPO.

A model of change of good quality includes:

- The causal pathways that relate the intervention to the realised change/ outcome;
- Rival explanations for the same change/ outcome;
- Assumptions that clarify relations between different components or parts;
- Case specific and/or context specific factors or risks that might influence the causal pathway, such as for instance the socio-cultural-economic context, or a natural disaster;
- Specific attributes of the actors e.g. CFA and other funders.

A model of change (within the 5C study called a 'detailed causal map') is a complex system which produces intermediate and long-term outcomes by the interaction of other parts. It consists of parts or causes that often consist of one actor with its attributes that is implementing activities leading to change in other parts (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). A helpful way of constructing the model of change is to think in terms of actors carrying out activities that lead to other actors changing their behaviour. The model of change can be explained as a range of activities carried out by different *actors* (including the CFA and SPO under evaluation) that will ultimately lead to an outcome. Besides this, there are also '*structural*' elements, which are to be interpreted as external factors (such as economic conjuncture); and *attributes* of the actor (does the actor have the legitimacy to ask for change or not, what is its position in the sector) that should be looked at (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). In fact Beach and Pedersen, make a fine point about the subjectivity of the actor in a dynamic context. This means, in qualitative methodologies, capturing the changes in the actor, acted upon area or person/organisation, in a non sequential and non temporal format. Things which were done recently could have corrected behavioural outcomes of an organisation and at the same ime there could be processes which incrementally pushed for the same change over a period of time. Beach and Pedersen espouse this methodology because it captures change in a dynamic fashion as against the methodology of logical framework. For the MFS II evaluation it was important to make a distinction between those paths in the model of change that are the result of MFS II and rival pathways.
The construction of the model of change started with the identified key organisational capacity change/ outcome, followed by an inventory of all possible subcomponents that possibly have caused the change/ outcome in the MFS II period (2011-up to now, or since the baseline). The figure below presents an imaginary example of a model of change. The different colours indicate the different types of support to capacity development of the SPO by different actors, thereby indicating different pathways of change, leading to the key changes/ outcomes in terms of capacity development (which in this case indicates the ability to adapt and self-renew).





***Figure 1*** *An imaginary example of a model of change*

*Step 5. Identify* ***types of evidence*** *needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams with support from CDI team*

Once the causal mechanism at theoretical level were defined, empirical evidence was collected so as to verify or discard the different parts of this theoretical model of change, confirm or reject whether subcomponents have taken place, and to find evidence that confirm or reject the causal relations between the subcomponents.

A key question that we needed to ask ourselves was, *"What information do we need in order to confirm or reject that one subcomponent leads to another, that X causes Y?"*. The evaluation team needed to agree on what information was needed that provides empirical manifestations for each part of the model of change.

There are four distinguishable types of evidence that are relevant in process tracing analysis: *pattern, sequence, trace, and account*. Please see the box below for descriptions of these types of evidence.

The evaluation team needed to agree on the types of evidence that was needed to verify or discard the manifestation of a particular part of the causal mechanism. Each one or a combination of these different types of evidence could be used to confirm or reject the different parts of the model of change. This is what is meant by robustness of evidence gathering. Since causality as a concept can bend in many ways, our methodology, provides a near scientific model for accepting and rejecting a particular type of evidence, ignoring its face value.

Types of evidence to be used in process tracing

- **Pattern evidence** relates to predictions of statistical patterns in the evidence. For example, in testing a mechanism of racial discrimination in a case dealing with employment, statistical patterns of employment would be relevant for testing this part of the mechanism.
- **Sequence evidence** deals with the temporal and spatial chronology of events predicted by a hypothesised causal mechanism. For example, a test of the hypothesis could involve expectations of the timing of events where we might predict that if the hypothesis is valid, we should see that the event B took place after event A took place. However, if we found that event B took place before event A took place, the test would suggest that our confidence in the validity of this part of the mechanism should be reduced (disconfirmation/ falsification).
- **Trace evidence** is evidence whose mere existence provides proof that a part of a hypothesised mechanism exists. For example, the existence of the minutes of a meeting, if authentic ones, provide strong proof that the meeting took place.
- **Account evidence** deals with the content of empirical material, such as meeting minutes that detail what was discussed or an oral account of what took place in the meeting.

*Source*: Beach and Pedersen, 2013

Below you can find a table that provides guidelines on what to look for when identifying types of evidence that can confirm or reject causal relationships between different parts/ subcomponents of the model of change. It also provides one example of a part of a causal pathway and what type of information to look for.

Table 9

*Format for identifying types of evidence for different causal relationships in the model of change (example included)*

| Part of the model of change | Key questions | Type of evidence needed | Source of information |
|---|---|---|---|
| Describe relationship between the subcomponents of the model of change | Describe questions you would like to answer a so as to find out whether the components in the relationship took place, when they took place, who was involved, and whether they are related | Describe the information that we need in order to answer these questions.<br>Which type of evidence can we use in order to reject or confirm that subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y?<br>Can we find this information by means of :<br>Pattern evidence;<br>Sequence evidence;<br>Trace evidence;<br>Account evidence? | Describe where you can find this information |
| Example:<br>Training workshops on M&E provided by MFS II funding and other sources of funding | Example:<br>What type of training workshops on M&E took place?<br>Who was trained?<br>When did the training take place?<br>Who funded the training?<br>Was the funding of training provided before the training took place?<br>How much money was available for the training? | Example:<br>Trace evidence: on types of training delivered, who was trained, when the training took place, budget for the training<br><br>Sequence evidence on timing of funding and timing of training<br><br>Content evidence: what the training was about | Example:<br>Training report<br>SPO Progress reports<br>interviews with the CFA and SPO staff<br>Financial reports SPO and CFA |

Please note that for practical reasons, the 5C evaluation team decided that it was easier to integrate the specific questions in the narrative of the initial causal map. These questions would need to be addressed by the in country team during the process tracing workshop so as to discover, verify or

discard particular causal mechanisms in the detailed, initial causal map. Different types of evidence was asked for in these questions.

*Step 6. **Collect data** to verify or discard causal mechanisms and develop workshop-based, detailed causal map – in-country team*

Once it was decided by the in-country and CDI evaluation teams what information was to be collected during the interaction with the SPO, data collection took place. The initial causal maps served as a basis for discussions during the endline workshop with a particular focus on process tracing for the identified organisational capacity changes. But it was considered to be very important to understand from the perspective of the SPO how they understood the identified key organisational capacity change/outcome area has come about. A new detailed, workshop-based causal map was developed that included the information provided by SPO staff as well as based on initial document review as described in the initial detailed causal map. This information was further analysed and verified with other relevant information so as to develop a final causal map, which is described in the next step.

*Step 7. **Assess the quality** of data and **analyse data**, and develop the **final detailed causal map** (model of change) – in-country team and CDI team*

Quality assurance of the data collected and the evidence it provides for rejecting or confirming parts of causal explanations are a major concern for many authors specialised in contribution analysis and process-tracing. Stern et al. (2012), Beach and Pedersen (2013), Lemire, Nielsen and Dybdal (2012), Mayne (2012) and Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) all emphasise the need to make attribution/ contribution claims that are based on pieces of evidence that are rigorous, traceable, and credible. These pieces of evidence should be as explicit as possible in proving that *subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y* and ruling out other explanations. Several tools are proposed to check the nature and the quality of data needed. One option is, Delahais and Toulemonde's Evidence Analysis Database, which we have adapted for our purpose.

Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) propose an Evidence Analysis Database that takes into consideration three criteria:

- Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no);
- Type of causal mechanism: intended contribution/ other contribution/ condition leading to intended contribution/ intended condition to other contribution/ feedback loop;
- Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak.

We have adapted their criteria to our purpose. The in-country team, in collaboration with the CDI team, used the criteria in assessing whether causal relationships in the causal map, were strong enough. This has been more of an iterative process trying to find additional evidence for the established relationships through additional document review or contacting the CFA and SPO as well as getting their feedback on the final detailed causal map that was established. Whilst the form below has not been used exactly in the manner depicted, it has been used indirectly when trying to validate the information in the detailed causal map. After that, the final detailed causal map is established both as a visual as well as a narrative, with related references for the established causal relations.

| *Example format for the adapted evidence analysis database (example included)* **Description of causal relation** | **Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no)** | **Type of information providing the background to the confirmation or rejection of the causal relation** | **Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak** | **Explanation for why the evidence is (rather) strong or (rather) weak, and therefore the causal relation is confirmed/ rejected** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| e.g. Training staff in M&E leads to enhanced M&E knowledge, skills and practice | e.g. Confirmed | e.g. Training reports confirmed that staff are trained in M&E and that knowledge and skills increased as a result of the training | | |

*Step 8.* ***Analyse and conclude*** *on findings– in-country team and CDI team*

The final detailed causal map was described as a visual and narrative and this was then analysed in terms of the evaluation question two and evaluation question four: *"To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?"* and *"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"* It was analysed to what extent the identified key organisational capacity change can be attributed to MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as to other related factors, interventions and actors.

## Explaining factors – evaluation question 4

This paragraph describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This has been explained in the first section of this appendix. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information was procured for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the process of process tracing as described in the section above.

## Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team.

**Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach:** this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has

provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

**Using standard indicators and scores**: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

**General causal map:** whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

**Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question:** this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is

crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

**Utilisation of the evaluation**

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

Design – mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

**Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication:** many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

**5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process:** The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process

tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

# Appendix 2 Background information on the five core capabilities framework

The 5 capabilities (5C) framework was to be used as a framework for the evaluation of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs) of the MFS II consortia. The 5C framework is based on a five-year research program on 'Capacity, change and performance' that was carried out by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). The research included an extensive review of the literature and sixteen case studies. The 5C framework has also been applied in an IOB evaluation using 26 case studies in 14 countries, and in the baseline carried out per organisation by the MFS II organisations for the purpose of the monitoring protocol.

The 5C framework is structured to understand and analyse (changes in) the capacity of an organization to deliver (social) value to its constituents. This introduction briefly describes the 5C framework, mainly based on the most recent document on the 5C framework (Keijzer et al., 2011).

The 5C framework sees capacity as an **outcome** of an **open system**. An organisation or collaborative association (for instance a network) is seen as a system interacting with wider society. The most critical practical issue is to ensure that relevant stakeholders share a common way of thinking about capacity and its core constituents or capabilities. Decisive for an organisation's capacity is the context in which the organisation operates. This means that **understanding context issues** is crucial. The use of the 5C framework requires a multi-stakeholder approach because shared values and results orientation are important to facilitate the capacity development process. The 5C framework therefore needs to **accommodate the different visions** of stakeholders and conceive different strategies for raising capacity and improving performance in a given situation.

The 5C framework defines capacity as '**producing social value'** and identifies five core capabilities that together result in that overall capacity. Capacity, capabilities and competences are seen as follows:

**Capacity** is referred to as the overall ability of an organisation or system to create value for others;

**Capabilities** are the collective ability of a group or a system to do something either inside or outside the system. The collective ability involved may be technical, logistical, managerial or generative (i.e. the ability to earn legitimacy, to adapt, to create meaning, etc.);

**Competencies** are the energies, skills and abilities of individuals.

Fundamental to developing capacity are inputs such as human, material and financial resources, technology, and information. To the degree that they are developed and successfully integrated, capabilities contribute to the overall capacity or ability of an organisation or system to create value for others. A single capability is not sufficient to create capacity. All are needed and are strongly interrelated and overlapping. Thus, to achieve its development goals, the 5C framework says that every organisation or system must have **five basic capabilities:**

- The capability to act and commit;
- The capability to deliver on development objectives;
- The capability to adapt and self-renew;
- The capability to relate (to external stakeholders);
- The capability to achieve coherence.

In order to have a common framework for evaluation, the five capabilities have been reformulated in outcome domains and for each outcome domain performance indicators have been developed. A detailed overview of capabilities with outcome domains and indicators is attached in Appendix 3.

There is some overlap between the five core capabilities but together the five capabilities result in a certain level of capacity. Influencing one capability may have an effect on one or more of the other capabilities. In each situation, the level of any of the five capabilities will vary. Each capability can become stronger or weaker over time.

# Appendix 3 Changes in organisational capacity of the SPO - 5C indicators

Below you will find a description for each of the indicators under each of the capabilities, what the situation is as assessed during the endline, how this has changed since the baseline and what are the reasons for change.

**Description of Endline Indicators Yayasan Kelola**

**Capability to act and commit**

1.1. Responsive leadership: 'Leadership is responsive, inspiring, and sensitive'

*This is about leadership within the organisation (operational, strategic). If there is a larger body then you may also want to refer to leadership at a higher level but not located at the local organisation.*

The Director of Yayasan Kelola is an experienced professional with good managerial skills and vision. Since she is quite senior, there is sometimes a gap the junior staff, although the gap is basically in terms of content (vision, mission, the future and infrastructure of Indonesian arts & culture). In regard to this problem already recognized in the baseline, the second in command has increased efforts to cover the gap between senior and junior staff and the Director. The director is now more approachable and attentive, especially for those who feel uncomfortable to talk to her directly. This enabled all the staff to give input and feedback comfortably.

The Director has also performed intensive weekly meetings to reduce the gap with junior staff and to assist the staff to improve themselves by delegating tasks as budgeting and joining workshops or discussions. She is highly respected and considered as a very important and valuable person for the organization.

Score: from 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

1.2. Strategic guidance: 'Leaders provide appropriate strategic guidance (strategic leader and operational leader)'

*This is about the extent to which the leader(s) provide strategic directions*

The strategic plan continuous to be the guidance for the activities within the YAYASAN KELOLA. Vision and mission remain clear and the Director has supervised all work performance. Staff has received clear guidance to achieve their goals through bi-weekly meetings and standard operating procedures (SOPs) (consists of all procedures in the organization). Although the implementation might be differed based on the personal style of individual staff members, the guidelines have been standardized.

As for the project teams, the meetings are held once a month as some of the staff members are located in different cities such as Jakarta and Yogyakarta. There is also standard guidance for the team to run the project i.e. *Manual Operasional Proyek or* MOP/Project Operational Manual or POM, which is one of the donor requirements.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

1.3. Staff turnover: 'Staff turnover is relatively low'

*This is about staff turnover.*

Several changes have occurred in terms of staff turnover. Whereas in the baseline YAYASAN KELOLA was struggling with limited funding, the addition of new programs and funds have helped change this situation. Two new staff members have been recruited between 2012-2013 to fill vacant positions in the program. The positions opened up after former staff members were transferred to other new projects. Ten new staff openings were created due to the new projects. To date three staff members have left the organization, two of them left of family reasons and one for accepting a higher paying job elsewhere  Hiring occurs by project demand. But on the whole turnover in permanent staff is still low, whilst there is a high turnover in temporary staff since these are project based and externally funded.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

1.4. Organisational structure: 'Existence of clear organisational structure reflecting the objectives of the organisation'

Yayasan Kelola is a small foundation that runs programs aimed at the Indonesian arts. It has a limited number of staff and only a few separate divisions, making it an effective and efficient organization. In 2013, Kelola gradually employed 5 new staff members (project based staff) for their Komunitas Kreatif (KK) project, making a total of 12 staff members (10 women and 2 men). Despite this growth, Kelola did not undergo a significant change in the organizational formation and structure, such as the board, executive officer and auditor. The organization continues to work effectively towards its objectives.

The loyalty of Kelola's staff is high. Having a good recruitment mechanism directly controlled by the director contributes to selecting loyal staff. Passion has always been the main qualification requested. The activities at Kelola are not just considered as work, but also personal development,  dedication and engagement for the development of arts in  Indonesia.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

1.5. Articulated strategies: 'Strategies are articulated and based on good situation analysis and adequate M&E'

*Observable indicator: strategies are well articulated. Situation analysis and monitoring and evaluation are used to inform strategies.*

All the programs are derived from the vision, mission and strategic plan. In addition, program design and implementation are always based on the results of the evaluations conducted with stakeholders. In the annual evaluation Kelola used to invite external expert such as art experts. Kelola has a clear and structured evaluation mechanism. Kelola hires a public accountant for their finance. Kelola always asks for suggestions from their stakeholders, such as involving art experts, to increase the quality of their programs. Internally, Kelola conducts regular meetings every month, three months, and year for purposes of evaluation and strategic and operational decision-making. Evaluations are also supported by supervision from their Donor in term of input to program content, admin and finance. The demands for written reports force Kelola to conduct routine and systematic reflections. This is what has been improving Kelola's working performance.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

1.6. Daily operations: 'Day-to-day operations are in line with strategic plans'

*This is about the extent to which day-to-day operations are aligned with strategic plans.*

The strategic plan continues to be the guidance for the activities within the YAYASAN KELOLA. YAYASAN KELOLA has been working under budget constraints for a long time forcing the organization to focus on using resources efficiently and focussing on what's important. Program objectives as lined out in the work plans and strategic plans are key to this approach. Little to no deviation from these plans occurs.

To date the routine programs still run even though new funds have been acquired.

Score: from 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

1.7. Staff skills: 'Staff have necessary skills to do their work'

*This is about whether staffs have the skills necessary to do their work and what skills they might they need.*

The organization has recruited four new program staff members of which 2 with finance and procurement expertise and two with foreign language skills. The finance officer has done excellent bookkeeping and used IT optimally for financial record purposes. The ability to correspond in English has been improved with the arrival of new staffs.

Over the years staff has improved their skills in issues related to local artists and making reports.

The organization has accepted new funding from First State Investments Indonesia and the World Bank for new projects with a bigger scale than Kelola's previous programs. Therefore, new staff members with specific qualifications are needed.

Score: from 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

1.8. Training opportunities: 'Appropriate training opportunities are offered to staff'

*This is about whether staffs at the SPO are offered appropriate training opportunities*

So far the Kelola Foundation has organized several trainings for their target groups. The staff is allowed to join these trainings as well to enhance their knowledge. Other training has been provided by sponsors and funders. Unfortunately, limited funds and the increased number of staff members make it difficult to send staff to join more training.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

1.9.1. Incentives: 'Appropriate incentives are in place to sustain staff motivation'

*This is about what makes people want to work here. Incentives could be financial, freedom at work, training opportunities, etc.*

One of the staff incentives that Kelola has offered is in the form of exposure to a large professional network and through offering great working experience. Some of the staff members have significantly grown in terms of skill and experience due to the exposure to this network, and as a result now receive salaries to compensate accordingly. Further incentives stated by staff members were the flexibility and freedom in working in a comfortable work environment.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

1.9.2. Funding sources: 'Funding from multiple sources covering different time periods'

*This is about how diversified the SPOs funding sources are over time, and how the level of funding is changing over time.*

It remains a difficult task in Indonesia to get funding for art and culture. However, Kelola is actively involved in fund raising, though mostly in small amounts or for short period projects. Over the past two years there has been an increase in funding received and in the number of donors. First State Investment started showing interest in YAYASAN KELOLA in 2012, and has developed a long-term cooperation with the organization. And also with the World Bank for new projects with a bigger scale than Kelola's previous programs.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

1.9.3. Funding procedures: 'Clear procedures for exploring new funding opportunities'

*This is about whether there are clear procedures for getting new funding and staff are aware of these procedures.*

There is no change in fund raising procedures. The Director and Board of Directors continue to play the most important role in acquiring funding, with a limited role for subordinate staff members. Nonetheless, any ideas related to new funding opportunities are accepted and considered.

Score: from 2.5 to 2.5 (no change)

**Summary Capability to act and commit**

Kelola has a limited number of staff and only a few separate divisions, making it an effective and efficient organization.The Director has been a great asset for the foundation as she can encourage her staffs to improve their skills and go beyond their limit. She is well connected to the target groups and also the funders which has positive impact on the organization. Compared to the baseline the director is now more approachable and attentive, especially for those who feel uncomfortable to talk to her directly. She has been able to attract additional funding, from FirstState Investment, and consequently new staff have been recruited. These include two staff members with finance and procurement expertise and two staff members with foreign language skills. These have improved the overall level of knowledge and skills in the organisation, but with the new project, there are also new competences that need to be addressed and training opportunities are more limited having more staff are not enough funds available. However, Kelola also offers them a number of incentives in the form of larger network exposure and great experiences. Even though new staff has been recruited the organisational structure hasn't changed. New staff with specific expertise is expected to provide more advantages in the long run especially in acquiring more funds for the organization. Whilst the strategic plan continues to be the basis for guiding staff in their work, the staff themselves receive clear guidance to achieve their goals through bi-weekly meetings and SOPs. Program activities all derive from the vision and mission, and the design and implementation are always based on the results of the evaluations. Kelola's evaluation mechanism itself is clear and structured. Since the funding is limited, their main programs are their priority and the scale of the projects depends on the funds.

Note: As it is quite difficult to find a replacement for the Director who is approaching the time for her retirement, Kelola may be on the edge of a managerial crisis that needs to be taken care of as soon as possible for the long run.

Score: 3.2 to 3.4 (very slight improvement)

**Capability to adapt and self-renew**

2.1. M&E application: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess activities, outputs and outcomes'

*This is about what the monitoring and evaluation of the SPO looks at, what type of information they get at and at what level (individual, project, organisational).*

M&E is done informally although regularly, much as was already done during the baseline two years ago. YAYASAN KELOLA is however learning to improve its M&E capacity, by focussing on project evaluations together with their beneficiaries as part of their project management cycle. Every program activity is reviewed by a third party to ensure the objectivity of the analysis. There is also a supervision session every two months with the Empowerment Woman Artist (EWA) association. Every project is completed with M&E, either qualitative or quantitative. YAYASAN KELOLA continues to have regular evaluations and discussions with their beneficiaries and stakeholders (media, artists, public, etc). The outcomes of these sessions are used to develop future strategies. The system enables them to meet the beneficiaries' needs and to measure the effectiveness of their program. However, further analysis and implementation of M&E is needed

Score: from 3.5 to 3.75 ( very slight improvement)

2.2. M&E competencies: 'Individual competencies for performing M&E functions are in place'

*This is about whether the SPO has a trained M&E person; whether other staff have basic understanding of M&E; and whether they know what information to collect, how to process the information, how to make use of the information so as to improve activities etc.*

Kelola still needs to improve staff competency in relation to M&E. There is still no particularly dedicated or trained staff on the subject. All staff are involved in evaluation, in the form of a collective process. Every year an external Auditor evaluates all the projects since the audits are important to get more funds.

Score: from 2.5 to 2.5 (no change)

2.3. M&E for future strategies: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess the effects of delivered products and services (outcomes) for future strategies'

*This is about what type of information is used by the SPO to make decisions; whether the information comes from the monitoring and evaluation; and whether M&E info influences strategic planning.*

Due to the lack of a clear M&E procedure and system, its application and relation to future strategies remains limited. M&E is mostly done through end of project evaluations, but lessons learned are applied mostly at the operational level, not the strategic level. End of project findings in the form of reports are shared with stakeholders and beneficiaries for feedback. YAYASAN KELOLA continues to have regular evaluations and discussions with their beneficiaries and stakeholders (media, artists, public, etc). The outcomes of these sessions are used to develop future strategies. The system enables them to meet the beneficiaries' needs and to measure the effectiveness of their programThis allows some degree of feedback and trend monitoring that is helpful in deciding on future strategies, but it is not yet systematic

Score:  from 3 to 3 (no change)

2.4. Critical reflection: 'Management stimulates frequent critical reflection meetings that also deal with learning from mistakes'

*This is about whether staffs talk formally about what is happening in their programmes; and, if so, how regular these meetings are; and whether staffs are comfortable raising issues that are problematic.*

YAYASAN KELOLA continues to hold bi-weekly meetings where the staff can critically reflect upon what they have achieved and discuss issues and their solutions. In depth analysis of results, feedback and other issues remain open for improvement.

Score: from 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

2.5. Freedom for ideas: 'Staff feel free to come up with ideas for implementation of objectives

*This is about whether staffs feel that ideas they bring for implementation of the programme are welcomed a*

Staff is comfortable to share ideas and give suggestions during meetings. Suggestions and feedback are often considered and addressed by management. An example of this was one of the suggestions by staff to share more supporting materials between office and field staff, as better coordination affects the organization as a whole. This was addressed and encouraged, which has resulted in a simpler implementation and reporting process. Overall the freedom to express ideas has remained unchanged.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

2.6. System for tracking environment: 'The organisation has a system for being in touch with general trends and developments in its operating environment'

*This is about whether the SPO knows what is happening in its environment and whether it will affect the organisation.*

YAYASAN KELOLA continuous to monitor media and utilize their network to keep in touch with general trends in the are of performing arts and their other program activities. Nothing has changed in this regard over the last two years.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

2.7. Stakeholder responsiveness: 'The organisation is open and responsive to their stakeholders and the general public'

*This is about what mechanisms the SPO has to get input from its stakeholders, and what they do with that input.*

Close stakeholder involvement and interaction allows YAYASAN KELOLA to continuously adapt programs to their needs. Particularly in regards to providing funding for admin and finance staff training. Regular contact through discussions with local government, organizations and the public continue to be held, as well as the steady progression of expanding the network by meeting new stakeholders. Practices have remained unchanged over the last two years in this regard.

Score: from 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

**Summary capability to adapt and self-renew**

YAYASAN KELOLA still needs to make efforts to improve its M&E system especially with regards to the education and appointment of individual staff members dedicated to this area, but also to have a more strategically oriented, monitoring and evaluation that helps in making strategic decisions. YAYASAN KELOLA continues to have regular evaluations and discussions with their beneficiaries and stakeholders (media, artists, public, etc). The outcomes of these sessions are used to develop future strategies. The system enables them to meet the beneficiaries' needs and to measure the effectiveness of their programThere is no significant change in terms of internal culture or critical reflection and sharing of ideas. The staff still feels free to share their ideas and offer feedback. The cooperation with stakeholders has proven to have great impact on the operational and strategic decision-making. YAYASAN KELOLA is responsive to the changes in their environment, including the needs of stakeholders and the networks. The good relationship they have with stakeholders and networks help them to be aware of what is happening in their environment. Overall there is no significant change compared to the baseline in 2012.

Score: 3.3 to 3.3 (no change)

**Capability to deliver on development objectives**

3.1. Clear operational plans: 'Organisation has clear operational plans for carrying out projects which all staff fully understand'

*This is about whether each project has an operational work plan and budget, and whether staffs use it in their day-to-day operations.*

All team members are responsible for their work plan and budget. Every division proposes a work plan completed with budget needed. Furthermore, they have to manage the fund under the supervision of their direct supervisor and the finance team. Therefore, whenever a change of plan occurs, appropriate decisions can be taken faster. The individual responsibility of staff over work plans and their budgets, encourages understanding and effective use of them.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

3.2. Cost-effective resource use: 'Operations are based on cost-effective use of its resources'

*This is about whether the SPO has the resources to do the work, and whether resources are used cost-effectively.*

YAYASAN KELOLA has been working under budget constraints for a long time forcing the organization to focus on using resources efficiently and focussing on what's important. The individual responsibility of staff over work plans and their budgets, encourages understanding and effective use of them. The work plans are still made with realistic expectations and the scope of most projects remains in line with the funds provided. Since every staff member now understands the difficulty of obtaining funds and managing them, they are motivated to be even more precise in their estimations as well utilizing their resources as effectively as possible. This sense of awareness has improved compared to the baseline situation two years ago, resulting in a minor improvement with respect to this indicator.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

3.3. Delivering planned outputs: 'Extent to which planned outputs are delivered'

*This is about whether the SPO is able to carry out the operational plans.*

No changes have occurred with respect to this indicator. Overall YAYASAN KELOLA remains able to deliver on planned outputs, although some delays take place at times due to problems in the field. YAYASAN KELOLA closely coordinates their plans with the donors which improves their overall quality and balances expectations. Systematic planning according to a clear set of indicators provided by the donor, allow for realistic goal setting and delivery in practice.,

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

3.4. Mechanisms for beneficiary needs: 'The organisation has mechanisms in place to verify that services meet beneficiary needs'

*This is about how the SPO knows that their services are meeting beneficiary needs*

YAYASAN KELOLA continues to have regular evaluations and discussions with their beneficiaries and stakeholders (media, artists, public, etc). The outcomes of these sessions are used to develop future strategies. For instance as the result of inputs received, YAYASAN KELOLA has been responsive to the need of a special program for women: theater for empowering. The system enables them to meet the beneficiaries' needs and to measure the effectiveness of their program. Government is also included in stakeholder consultation sessions.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

3.5. Monitoring efficiency: 'The organisation monitors its efficiency by linking outputs and related inputs (input-output ratio's)'

*This is about how the SPO knows they are efficient or not in their work.*

Monitoring efficiency has remained unchanged. Outcomes and targets are tested to the objectives in the work plans, but no further analysis is done in terms of what this means for efficiency. Donors remain closely involved in the formulation of targets and work plans, ensuring a quality check for realistic expectations.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

3.6. Balancing quality-efficiency: 'The organisation aims at balancing efficiency requirements with the quality of its work'

*This is about how the SPO ensures quality work with the resources available*

No change has occurred in this indicator. YAYASAN KELOLA has been working under budget constraints for a long time forcing the organization to focus on using resources efficiently and focussing on what's important. Limited funding encourages the organization and its staff to operate efficiently, this can create quality concerns. Nonetheless the stringent preparation in work plans and goal setting in cooperation with the donor allow for setting up minimum quality targets. Kelola always asks for suggestions from their stakeholders, such as involving art experts, to increase the quality of their programs. Through these mechanisms both efficiency and quality are to some degree ensured, however a conscious balancing decision is not made.

Score: from 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

**Summary of capability to deliver on development objectives**

YAYASAN KELOLA has clear operational plans in place. YAYASAN KELOLA has been working under budget constraints for a long time forcing the organization to focus on using resources efficiently and focussing on what's important. All the staff is aware of the limited funds received and attempt to use their resources optimally. It has good system to respond to the need of the beneficiaries and meet the funders' qualifications. Although there is no formal system yet for its monitoring and evaluation to assess the beneficiary needs, efficiency and quality of their work, they show efforts to use minimal resources as best as they can. Outputs have generally still been implemented according to plan.

Score 3.4 to 3.5 (very minor improvement)

**Capability to relate**

4.1. Stakeholder engagement in policies and strategies: 'The organisation maintains relations/ collaboration/alliances with its stakeholders for the benefit of the organisation'

*This is about whether the SPO engages external groups in developing their policies and strategies, and how.*

The Director is actively interacting with stakeholders and beneficiaries to analyze their needs to fit the program. Furthermore, YAYASAN KELOLA has initiated and is actively involved in the Coalition of Indonesian Art (Koalisi Kesenian Indonesia) in particular to advocate the government policy collectively to run PP No 93 /2010.

Score: from 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

4.2. Engagement in networks: 'Extent to which the organisation has relationships with existing networks/alliances/partnerships'

*This is about what networks/alliances/partnerships the SPO engages with and why; with they are local or international; and what they do together, and how do they do it.*

YAYASAN KELOLA has cooperated with many organizations, both domestically and internationally, such as with KSI, Centre Culturel Français, Goethe Institute, Asian Cultural Council and Centre for Civic Education from US. The network meets every 2 months to share information, make programs, and offer apprenticeships.

As a result of good networking, YAYASAN KELOLA is getting more acknowledged. Last year the Director has been invited to three different countries (Czechoslovakia, South Korea and Hong Kong) as a speaker and Indonesian representative. She also received an award for Art Management from Rockefeller, NY.

Some testimonials from local and international NGOs prove that YAYASAN KELOLA has great credibility.

Score: from 4 to 4.5 (slight improvement)

4.3. Engagement with target groups: 'The organisation performs frequent visits to their target groups/ beneficiaries in their living environment'

*This is about how and when the SPO meets with target groups.*

YAYASAN KELOLA continues to work closely with the target groups through dialogue, performances, information sharing, skills improvement, and networking. The organization is always open to any email or contact made. With limited funds, the organization tries its best to assist the target group optimally through regular meetings and end of project evaluations. No significant changes have occurred with respect to this indicator since the baseline evaluation in 2012.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

4.4. Relationships within organisation: 'Organisational structure and culture facilitates open internal contacts, communication, and decision-making'

*How do staffs at the SPO communicate internally? Are people free to talk to whomever they need to talk to? When and at what forum? What are the internal mechanisms for sharing information and building relationships?*

Generally the relation within the organization is good and comfortable. Staff is free to share their ideas informally at the lunch table as well as formally in bi-weekly meetings. YAYASAN KELOLA has recruited capable staff to close the gap between the senior and junior staff members. Although this addition of staff members to bridge the gap has been effective in mitigating potential problems, it has not contributed to a significant change in terms of organizational structure and culture.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

**Summary capability to relate**

The capability to relate has hardly improved mainly due to having a Director who is very active and well connected with the organization's network. As the result of good networking, YAYASAN KELOLA is getting more acknowledged both nationally as well as internationally. YAYASAN KELOLA continues to work closely with the target groups through dialogue, performances, information sharing, skills improvement, and networking. Internal relationships facilitate open communication, both formally and informally. Yayasan Kelola also actively work with the Koalisi Seni in particular to advocate the government policy collectively to run PP No 93 /2010.

Score: 3.9 to 4.0 (very minor improvement)

**Capability to achieve coherence**

5.1.Revisiting vision, mission: 'Vision, mission and strategies regularly discussed in the organisation'

*This is about whether there is a vision, mission and strategies; how often staff discuss/revise vision, mission and strategies; and who is involved in this.*

YAYASAN KELOLA has a clear and unique scope of work which are well formulated in the organization's vision and mission. Both vision and mission are regularly reviewed and if needed, adjusted to national needs or global trends. All of the staff members are familiar with the vision and mission because they are involved in designing programs which are in line with that vision. The vision and mission are reviewed every two years. However, changes have not been made since 2008 because they are still considered relevant and applicable.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change )

5.2.Operational guidelines: 'Operational guidelines (technical, admin, HRM) are in place and used and supported by the management'

*This is about whether there are operational guidelines, which operational guidelines exist; and how they are used.*

YAYASAN KELOLA is a well-established organization and adequate Standard Operating Procedures have been in place for a long time. New staff members have indicated to find this extremely helpful in getting started in their new positions. YAYASAN KELOLA has maintained its level of professionalism since the baseline. Overall no significant change has occurred with respect to the operational guidelines of the organization.

Score: from 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

5.3.Alignment with vision, mission: 'Projects, strategies and associated operations are in line with the vision and mission of the organisation'

*This is about whether the operations and strategies are line with the vision/mission of the SPO.*

No change has occurred in the last two years related to this indicator. YAYASAN KELOLA continues to be very selective in designing programs. Each one is derived from their vision and mission, ensuring that they are well aligned with the organization's purpose and strategy. In the last two years, YAYASAN KELOLA has expanded their stakeholder network and scope of work. The organization works in advocating arts and cultural policies in Indonesia. In addition, Kelola also has a new program called Komunitas Kreatif which is a form of empowerment through the arts. It is all within the framework of "arts and cultural development in Indonesia" as the organization's vision.

Score: 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

5.4.Mutually supportive efforts: 'The portfolio of project (activities) provides opportunities for mutually supportive efforts'

*This is about whether the efforts in one project complement/support efforts in other projects.*

No change has occurred since the baseline evaluation in 2012. Because all the programs are in line with the organization's vision and mission, all of the programs support and complement each other. Kelola gives special attention so that generation of art and culture in Indonesia continues to live and to be competitive in the international world. This is done by providing opportunities of learning, funding and information. Kelola also realizes cultural exchange with the cooperation between artists for dialogue, sharing skills and knowledge, and building working networks with national and international arts and cultural communities. The programs are *Magang Nusantara, Hibah Seni, Komunitas Kreatif, Pemberdayaan Seniman Perempuan* and *Hibah Cipta Perempuan*. Close relations with partners and work amongst colleagues ensures that cross-program learning occurs which allows the application of lessons learned amongst all programs

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)


**Overall description of the capability to achieve coherence**

Overall this organization has a good understanding on how to achieve coherence. They have a vision and mission which is reviewed every two years, and adjusted to the national needs and global trends. Nonetheless, changes have not been made since 2008 because the organization's vision and mission are still considered relevant and applicable. Each of the programs Kelola develops is derived from the vision and mission and even though Kelola makes innovations, they are all within the field of "arts and cultural development" framework of the organization's vision. Because all the programs are in line with their vision and mission, all of the programs support and complement each other. Furthermore staff members and partners are encouraged to share and conduct cross-program learning, as to apply lessons learned across all programs. YAYASAN KELOLA is a well-established organisation and since long as has adequate Standard Operating Procedures in place which are utilized by new staff members to start their work.

Score: 3.2 to 3.2 (no change)

# Appendix 4 Results - key changes in organisational capacity - general causal map

**Yayasan Kelola General Causal Map**



**Narrative of Yayasan Kelola General Causal Map**

The evaluation team carried out an endline assessment at Yayasan Kelola from 26 to 27 June 2014. During this workshop, the team made a recap of key features of the organization in the baseline in September 2012 (such as vision, mission, strategies, clients, partnerships). This was the basis for discussing changes that had happened to the organization since the baseline. The two main changes that happened in the organization since the baseline in 2012, as identified by the staff during the endline workshop were:

1. Increase of staff capacity [1]
2. Becoming an organization with an international reputation [2]

Each of these organizational capacity changes is elaborated in detail below.

**Increase of staff capacity [1]**

According to staff present at the endline workshop, overall staff capacity within Yayasan Kelola has increased [1] which has also influenced the increase in the organizational capacity [16].

The following underlying factors can be related to this development. *First,* sharing of knowledge from senior staff to junior staff took place [21]. *Secondly,* staff gained significant experience on the project [22] therefore staff learned through the opportunity to enter and interact with members of the arts network [23] that Yayasan Kelola is involved in. *Thirdly,* the benefit of staff close relation with the art networks makes them get invitation to participate in trainings and workshops held by other organizations within Yayasan Kelola network [24].

The staffs that have very good passion [35] on art see these opportunities for them to increase their capacities therefore Yayasan Kelola does not need to develop their staffs through internal capacity building. The passion in staff was in turn one of the qualities looked for during the recruitment of staff [42]. This is the cause why all staffs' passion on arts has supported their capacities both for the job and for their own developments.

**Becoming an organization with an international reputation [2]**

According to staff, Yayasan Kelola has significantly raised its profile and international reputation through various activities and developments. These developments have resulted in the director of the organization receiving an international award from Fullbright, USA.

The *first* factor that affected the organizational reputation was obtaining more adequate financial sources therefore the organization can operate continuously [3]. There are at least three folds influenced the first factor.

1. New funding resources were for instance obtained from corporations [14] as an effect of the establishment of PP 93 year 2010 which mandates the role of corporation in the form of art and culture [40]. This regulation effectively encourages corporations to allocate some budget for art and culture [18]. It was not solely a public effort to bring about the formulation of this policy however, as a collective effort to be involved in policy advocacy was a clear target for Yayasan Kelola to be achieved in the years prior [47].
2. Increase saved fund [9] as the result of improved financial efficiency [15] as an effect of better financial management [19]. It is caused by formation of procurement structure [28], and better utilization of financial software [30].
3. Yayasan Kelola has good ability in fund management resulted in the ability to fund some projects which has no donors. The fund from donors is used efficiently for a project, and the remained fund will be used as cross subsidy for other projects. The efficiency in fund use is the factor contributes to adequate financial sources. Whilst the frequent and accountable financial reports supports the organization to gain international reputation
4. Succeed in obtaining fund from international donors because of the trust from the donors [11]. The organization can preserve the trust due to the following:
    a. Routine and accountable financial reports. The financial reports are easier to create [10] after the implementation of a better financial recording mechanism [20]. The implementation of this mechanism was enabled by better utilization of the financial software [30] after the involvement experts in finance and procurement [34] through the new establishment of *Komunitas Kreatif* (Creative Community) project in 2013 [35].
    b. Increase in organizational capacity (will be elaborated in other paragraph) [16]

c. Continuous and improved project implementation [17]

The *second* factor is the increase in organizational capacity [16], as is explained further below in this narrative. There are fourfold influenced the second factor:

1. Internal reflection [29] in monthly, quarterly, semester, annual organizational meetings, and also in project meetings based on the needs.
2. Increase staff capacity [1].
3. Better organizational system – complete standard operating procedures (SOPs) [44], including payroll mechanism - staffs' salaries increase based on Cost of Living Adjustment mechanism [43].
4. Continuous and improved project implementation (16), as elaborated below:

    a. There is an improvement in conducting the advocating function of the organization [26]. The advocating function of the organization improved through stronger capacity in advocacy such as the skill to keep track of public budgets [31]. But also through a stronger network in the arts sector [32] as well as stronger relations with the government and authorities [33]. Both these factors were enabled by Kelola's role as the driving actor in the coalition of arts since 2012 [36]. This role was obtained after taking a leading position in the collective policy advocacy initiative [47].

    b. There is an improvement in conducting the facilitation of arts and cultural development on the other hand [27], was improved through an improved lesson program [39] and the involvement of experts and artists themselves in the program's development [37]. Another factor that played an important role in improved facilitation was through strengthening and increasing the activities of facilitators themselves [38]. Six developments enabled this:

        - Capacity building for stakeholders through workshops, trainings, internships and other opportunities in which facilitators were directly applied [48].
        - Providing grants to fund their development [49]
        - Direct assistance and mentoring [50]
        - Development of an arts and culture database accessible to facilitators to enable learning and knowledge sharing [51]
        - Socialization and communication amongst facilitators [52]
        - Society empowerment through art activities [53].

The *third* factor affecting Yayasan Kelola's reputation was the stronger and wider networking efforts that the organization undertook. Not only were networking activities intensified, they were also applied to a broader range of organizations in a variety of fields of work [5].The improved image of Yayasan Kelola in Indonesia played a significant role in reaching out to these parties and broadening the network as a whole [8]. The greater image of the organization in turn came about from being better known amongst the public [10] through successful project implementation [13], but also through strong communication with the media [30]. Communication with the media was a carefully devised strategy consisting of a range of activities namely:

1. More publications and articles relating to Kelola's activities in mass media [50]. The number of publications regarding EWA in the media up to December 2013 are 81 articles (including news on the performances of the grantees, and also profiles on Kelola), and 61 publications for *Hibah Seni*.
2. An increase in online content leading to a greater audience on the organization's website [51]. Due to improvements in the content of the website, the number of visitors of Kelola's website up to December 2013 increased more than 20% with the total visitors : 160,457 117,606 and total clicks : 2,324,644 1,824,977.
3. The organization of a workshop through the utilization of social media [52]
4. Utilization of social media [53]. Since 2013, the Kelola newsletter was improved by sending several news in one email with attractive photos. The appearance of the newsletter with attractive visuals and layout caused a 25% increase in newsletter subscribers from 3,600 to 4,532. In addition, Kelola has 5000 friends on Facebook and 1697 followers on Twitter.

Approaching media as one of the organization stakeholders [54]. In 2013, Kelola succeeded in collaborating with five medias: Dewi, Femina, The Jakarta Globe, Suara Pembaruan and www.beritasatu.com. Through these collaborations, three performances of the Kelola grantees in Jakarta (Theater Performance "Mada" by Bambang Prihadie; Dance Performance "*Ruang Waktu*"by Nabilla Rasul; and Dance Performance "This Cycle We're In" by Andara F. Moeis) received support in the form of print ad, and publication before and after the performances in printed and online media. If

counted, the value of Kelola's collaboration with the five media partners above are a total of IDR 480.300.00,- .

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen UR
P.O. Box 88
6700 AB Wageningen
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)317 48 68 00
www.wageningenUR.nl/cdi

Report CDI-15-049

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# Endline report – Indonesia, YPI
# MFS II country evaluations

Capacity of Southern Partner Organisations (5C) component


Cecile Kusters[1]
Martijn Wieriks[2]
Bekti Dwi Andari[3]
Novina Suprobo[3]
Widya Priyahita[3]
Rumenta R. Sihombing[3]
Seto W. Rokhmatulloh[3]
Ita Rosita[3]

1 Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR
2 SEPAM Consultants Indonesia
3 SurveyMeter



Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen, February 2015

Report CDI-15-050

Kusters, C., Wieriks, M., Dwi Andari, B., Suprobo, N., Priyahita, W., Sihombing, R.R., Rokhmatulloh, S.W., Rosita, I., 2015. *Endline report – Indonesia, YPI. MFS II country evaluations; Capacity of Southern Partner Organisations (5C) component.* Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University & Research centre. Report CDI-15-050. Wageningen.

This report presents the findings of the endline of the evaluation of the organisational capacity component of the MFS II country evaluations. The focus of this report is Indonesia, YPI. The format is based on the requirements by the synthesis team and NWO/WOTRO. The endline was carried out in 2014. The baseline was carried out in 2012.

Key words: 5C (five core capabilities); attribution; baseline; causal map; change; CFA (Co-financing Organisation) endline; organisational capacity development; SPO (Southern Partner Organisation).



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Report CDI-15-050 |

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# Acknowledgements

We are grateful to all the people that have contributed to this report. We particularly would like to thank the Southern Partner Organisation YPI and the Co-Financing Agency RutgersWPF for their endless patience and support during this challenging task of collecting the endline data. We hope that this endline report will provide useful insights to YPI, RutgersWPF, the synthesis team, IOB and NWO/Wotro.

The Indonesia 5C evaluation team

# List of abbreviations and acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| 5 C | Capacity development model which focuses on 5 core capabilities |
| Causal map | Map with cause-effect relationships. See also 'detailed causal map'. |
| Causal mechanisms | The combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome |
| CDI | Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University & Research centre |
| CDI | Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre |
| CFA | Co-Financing Agency |
| CFAs | Co-Financing Agencies |
| CFO | Co-Financing Organisation |
| CS | Civil Society |
| Detailed causal map | Also 'model of change'. the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change. In the 5C evaluation identified key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms) are traced through process tracing (for attribution question). |
| General causal map | Causal map with key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms), based on SPO perception. |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MFS | Dutch co-financing system |
| MIS | Management Information System |
| MoFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| OCA | Organisational Capacity Assessment |
| OD | Organisational Development |
| PME | Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation |
| PRA | Priority Result Area |
| Process tracing | Theory-based approach to trace causal mechanisms |
| RCT | Randomized Control Trials |
| SOP | Standard Operation Procedures |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |
| SRHR | Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights |
| SSI | Semi-structured Interview |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| Wageningen UR | Wageningen University & Research centre |
| YPI | Yayasan Pelita Ilmu |

# 1 Introduction & summary

## 1.1 Purpose and outline of the report

The Netherlands has a long tradition of public support for civil bi-lateral development cooperation, going back to the 1960s. The Co-Financing System (*Medefinancieringsstelsel*, or 'MFS') is its most recent expression. MFS II is the 2011-2015 grant framework for Co-Financing Agencies (CFAs), which is directed at achieving a sustainable reduction in poverty. A total of 20 consortia of Dutch CFAs have been awarded €1.9 billion in MFS II grants by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).

The overall aim of MFS II is to help strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. CFAs receiving MFS II funding work through strategic partnerships with Southern Partner Organisations.

The MFS II framework stipulates that each consortium is required to carry out independent external evaluations to be able to make valid, evaluative statements about the effective use of the available funding. On behalf of Dutch consortia receiving MFS II funding, NWO-WOTRO has issued three calls for proposals. Call deals with joint MFS II evaluations of development interventions at country level. Evaluations must comprise a baseline assessment in 2012 and a follow-up assessment in 2014 and should be arranged according to three categories of priority result areas as defined by MoFA:

Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) & themes;

Capacity development of Southern partner organisations (SPO) (5 c study);

Efforts to strengthen civil society.

This report focuses on the assessment of capacity development of southern partner organisations. This evaluation of the organisational capacity development of the SPOs is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The purpose of this report is to provide endline information on one of the SPOs involved in the evaluation: YPI in Indonesia. The baseline report is described in a separate document.

Chapter 2 describes general information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO). Here you can find general information about the SPO, the context in which the SPO operates, contracting details and background to the SPO. In chapter 3 a brief overview of the methodological approach is described. You can find a more detailed description of the methodological approach in appendix 1.Chapter 4 describes the results of the 5c endline study. It provides an overview of capacity development interventions of the SPO that have been supported by MFS II. It also describes what changes in organisational capacity have taken place since the baseline and why (evaluation question is 1 and 4). This is described as a summary of the indicators per capability as well as a general causal map that provides an overview of the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline, as experienced by the SPO. The complete overview of descriptions per indicator, and how these have changed since the baseline is described in appendix 3. The complete visual and narrative for the key organisational capacity changes that have taken place since the baseline according to the SPO staff present at the endline workshop is presented in appendix 4.

For those SPOs involved in process tracing a summary description of the causal maps for the identified organisational capacity changes in the two selected capabilities (capability to act and commit; capability to adapt and self-renew) is provided (evaluation questions 2 and 4). These causal maps

describe the identified key organisational capacity changes that are possibly related to MFS II interventions in these two capabilities, and how these changes have come about. More detailed information can be found in appendix 5.

Chapter 5 presents a discussion on the findings and methodology and a conclusion on the different evaluation questions.

The overall methodology for the endline study of capacity of southern partner organisations is coordinated between the 8 countries: Bangladesh (Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath; INTRAC); DRC (Disaster Studies, Wageningen UR); Ethiopia (CDI, Wageningen UR); India (CDI, Wageningen UR: Indonesia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Liberia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Pakistan (IDS; MetaMeta); (Uganda (ETC). Specific methodological variations to the approach carried out per country where CDI is involved are also described in this document.

This report is sent to the Co-Financing Agency (CFA) and the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO) for correcting factual errors and for final validation of the report.

## 1.2 Brief summary of analysis and findings

Since the baseline, two years ago, YPI has seen a slight improvement in the capability to act and commit. The merging of offices has made coordination between staff and management easier. Leadership has become more responsive and open. Better M&E approaches in developing work plans and strategies has aided in terms of articulating strategies. Staff skills improved slightly due to several trainings and YPI's funding procedures have improved slightly through the construction of a self-sustaining business unit that assists in fundraising and ensures financial sustainability of the organization. The capability to adapt and self renew improved slightly as well. This occurred mainly through more structured M&E practices in terms of a clear reporting and monitoring system. Staff has become more skilled in data collection and reporting. On the capability to deliver on development objectives, YPI has shown the greatest improvement. The cost-effective use of resources has greatly improved through a variety of new policies. The implementation of operational plans has improved resulting in better delivery of planned outputs, and a monitoring system is in place to ensure that quality and efficiency in activities remains balanced. The capability to relate has slightly improved due to greater engagement with stakeholder groups and beneficiaries, particularly youths and government. The capability to achieve coherence has only resulted in very slight improvements, particularly as in 2013 the organization's vision, mission and strategies were reviewed and re-evaluated.
The evaluators considered it important to also note down the SPO's story in terms of changes in the organisation since the baseline, and this would also provide more information about reasons for change, which were difficult to get for the individual indicators. Also for some issues there may not have been relevant indicators available in the list of core indicators provided by the evaluation team. During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by YPI's staff:

1. An increase in staff working performance
2. An improved network maintenance
3. Strengthened organization independency

According to YPI staff in the endline workshop, all of these are expected to contribute to YPI's improvement in service quality. YPI staff experienced these as the most important capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline.

Increased staff working performance resulted from increased frequency of controlling beneficiaries for YPI program improvement; staff having opportunities to attend training; comparative studies and courses; ideas from staff being accepted; response to problems in the field; increased job security. The increased frequency of controlling of beneficiaries was enabled by the greater number of staff proficient in M&E, which was enabled by more training, such as the MFS II capacity intervention for a

PME workshop funded by Rutgers WPF. This could be attributed to an overall improvement of the organizations' professionalism due to donor requirements. Staff has had more opportunities to attend trainings and develop due to YPI's leaders willingness to send staff to more training opportunities as well as more funding to do so being available as a result of external funding. This was enabled by incentives from the leaders and the openness between staff and board due to the close internal relationships between management, board and staff. Both these factors can be attributed to the change in leadership style. Ideas from staff were more accepted which can again be attributed to the greater openness between staff and management. Quicker response to problems in the field was enabled by a more responsive organization, which was made possible by the new leadership style. Appropriate action responses from staff were enabled by more detailed working descriptions, which can be attributed to the change of leadership on the one hand, and by better guidelines in the form of revisions of SOPs and new SOPs on the other.

Increased job security was due the implementation of a salary standard and improving employment status to full time contracts. Both were enabled by utilizing savings from other costs to improve employment benefits. These resources were freed up through simplifying the organizational structure and optimizing the use of resources. This efficiency initiative was enabled by the change in leadership.

Improving YPI's network resulted from the use of social media as a communication tool to address stakeholders, and extending networks through other alliances and partners. Both were enabled by the existence of new partners for the YPI program due to good relationships with related organizations as a result of more intense networking activities. The network also extended to new groups through YPI's proactive stance to find network partners and funds. This can be attributed to the urgency imposed on the organization by the decreasing of donors.

Increased independency of YPI was enabled by the founding of a private company to provide services in training, facilitation, health services and accommodation. With this business, new more sustainable funding sources are being attempted.

In conclusion, the general key changes causal map only provides limited information about the relation between MFS II interventions with the organizational capacity changes that YPI considered most important since the baseline. During the endline process tracing workshop, YPI did not mention specific MFS II capacity interventions that in their opinion had affected the key changes. However, it must be noted that this workshop was held very early on in the evaluation process and that YPI struggled in developing the initial maps and relating them to capacity development. In the course of their involvement in the endline evaluation process, this has changed, and additional insights were developed. The process tracing maps in section 5.3 provide more detailed information about the relation between MFS II funded capacity interventions and key organizational capacity changes. For a more detailed analysis on this matter, please refer to section 5.3 where process tracing findings are presented which can answer the attribution question with more certainty and validity.

In terms of process tracing (attribution question), three organisational capacity changes have been focused on: more motivated staff at YPI; staff being confident in giving training and in delivering SRHR information to beneficiaries; and improved reporting. On the whole, more motivated staff at YPI, due to improved staff welfare and improved management working mechanisms, where the result of many internal changes brought about by a change in leadership, after understanding organisational gaps which were identified in an internal evaluation that was set up after realising organisational capacity gaps with the external 5C baseline (MFS II) in 2012. Staff being confident in giving training and in delivering SRHR information to beneficiaries, can to a large extent be attributed to the MFS II capacity interventions that were carried out by RutgersWPF since the baseline in 2012. Specifically, these capacity interventions were a SRHR training; the training for youth friendly services; and a workshop on strategic communication, all held in 2013. In addition to that, having new volunteer staff members also played a role in this improved capacity. The key organisational capacity change "improved reporting" can to a large extent be attributed to MFS II funded capacity development interventions, in particular the M&E trainings in 2012 and the writing skills training in 2013, since these are related to

enhanced capacity to collect robust data and enhanced capacity to write reports. Furthermore, the organisation has taken steps to improve their meetings after realising the importance of this during the 5C baseline study (MFS II).

# 2 General Information about the SPO – YPI

## 2.1 General information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO)

| | |
|---|---|
| **Country** | Indonesia |
| **Consortium** | SRHR Alliance |
| **Responsible Dutch NGO** | Rutgers WPF |
| **Project (if applicable)** | Youth Sexual Reproductive Health Education Program (2001-2012)<br>HIV/AIDS Education through D4L in Indonesia (2010-2012) |
| **Southern partner organisation** | Yayasan Pelita Ilmu (YPI) |

The project/partner is part of the sample for the following evaluation component(s):

| | |
|---|---|
| **Achievement of MDGs and themes** | X |
| **Capacity development of Southern partner organisations** | X |
| **Efforts to strengthen civil society** | |

## 2.2 The socio-economic, cultural and political context in which the partner operates

**The socio-economic, cultural and political context in which the partner operates**

Yayasan Pelita Ilmu (YPI) focuses on improving Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) knowledge among the youth (15 – 24 year old) in Indonesia. With this aim YPI fills a much needed gap as SRHR education for youths is not widespread in Indonesia. The lack of widespread SRHR education is illustrated by figures of the Basic Health Research who revealed that only 25.1% of young people have ever received SRHR education.[1] Boys and girls aged 10-14 years received the least SRHR education (13.7%) and youths living in urban areas received more SRHR education that those living in rural areas (32.2% compared to 17.3%).[2] The Indonesian Young Adult Reproductive Health Survey (IYARHS) (2007) also investigated SRHR-educational programs within schools among their study population. 59% of the females and 50% of the males reported to have received information in Junior High School about their reproductive system. However, fewer respondents reported to receive information on family planning methods, sexual transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS. Respectively 16.5% and 13% of the females and males in the age of 15-24 years old reported to be educated on family planning methods in Junior High school; percentages for education on sexual transmitted diseases are respectively 16.4% and 16%; and for HIV/AIDS education percentages are respectively 32% and 26%. In addition, the IYARHS (2007) investigated to what extent 15-24 year old males and females discussed sexual and reproductive health issues. IYARHS (2007) shows that 15% of the females and 29% of the males never discussed sexual and reproductive health issues with anyone. The males and females, who did discuss such matters, did this with mainly their peers, respectively 58% and 71%. About 40% of the females and 37% of the males discussed sexual and reproductive health matters with their teacher; unfortunately it is not clear if such a discussion took place during the curriculum or in private conversations between teacher and students. [3]

[1] Riskedas, 2010
[2] Riskedas, 2010
[3] Indonesian Young Adult Reproductive Health Survey (IYARHS), (2007)

Low levels of SRHR education might result in low levels of SRHR knowledge. However, the figures for Indonesia show a mixed picture as on the one hand knowledge on fertility is low while most 15-24 year old male and females have heard of (modern) family planning methods. For example, when looking at pregnancy risk perceptions, the figures show that only about 50% of males and females in the age of 15 – 24 years old know that one-time-sexual intercourse can lead to a pregnancy, thereby indicating a lack of knowledge, while 96% of females and 93% of males have heard about modern contraception methods which is a very positive signal of SRHR knowledge.[4] The National Family Planning and Population Board (BKKBN) conducted a survey in 2010, part of which focused on SRHR knowledge. They found that only 32.3% of male and 29% of female respondents know about the existence of a fertile period. In addition, they measured relatively low levels of HIV/AIDS as only 57.5% of the population indicated to have heard of HIV/AIDS. HIV/AIDs knowledge among youths appears to be higher. IYARHS (2007) presents higher figures on HIV/AIDS knowledge; they state that 77% of male and 80% of female respondents have heard about HIV/AIDS. However, they also show that only about 54 -55% knows how to prevent HIV/AIDS. Riskesdas (2010) also studied HIV/AIDS knowledge among youths, and focused especially on HIV transmission. The study shows that, 71% of the study population knows that HIV transmission can occur through unsafe sex, 68.4% mentioned transmission through virus-contaminated needle sharing, and 61% knows transmission can occur through unprotected blood transfusion. However, only 50.2 % of the study population knows how to prevent HIV. [5] Moreover, UNICEF (2010) presents much lower figures on HIV/AIDS comprehensive HIV/AIDS knowledge: 15% of the males between 15-24 years old and 10% of females in that same category have comprehensive HIV/AIDS knowledge[6].[7] When looking at adolescents 15-19 years old these figures drop considerable, UNICEF (2010) reports that 2% of the males and 6% of the females have comprehensive HIV/AIDS knowledge. [8] IYARHS (2007) also investigated the knowledge on other Sexual Transmitted Infections (STIs) and its symptoms. They report that 71% of the females and 62% of the males could not name a STI other than HIV/AIDS. [9] Between 8-9% of the women could mentions symptoms of STIs for men and/or women; 13-15% of the male respondents could mention symptoms for men, but only 30-5% of the males knew about STI symptoms for women.[10]

Low levels of SRHR knowledge might result in low levels of perceived risk and subsequently into risky sexual behavior. The data available for Indonesia on risky sexual behavior of youths in inconclusive, one of the reason is that sex before marriage is unacceptable and surveys are susceptible to socially desirable answers. However, some data exists on sexual behavior of youths in Indonesia exists. For example, the outcomes of a survey on Young People Sexual behavior in Jakarta and nearby areas (*Jabodetabek*), conducted by BKKBN in 2010, reported that 51 % of them had sexual intercourse. The IYARHS (2007) reported lower levels of sexual intercourse. Among their unmarried study population between 15 -24 year old, 1.3% of the females and 6.4% of the males indicated that they ever had sex. It is highly likely that this figure is underreported and social acceptable answers were given. Especially, because this concerns the unmarried population and the general believe is that one should not have sexual intercourse before marriage. Although the following percentages are based on relatively low levels of respondents, the figures are indicative for risky sexual behavior. From the women who ever had sex, 21% indicated that they were forced by their partner. [11] Date-raping is a much debated topic in Indonesia, as figures are yearly increasing. According to Annual Report from National Women Commission (2012), dating violence reached 1,405 cases in 2011, increasing from earlier year 2010 with 1,299 cases. When talking about consensual sex, only 8 % of female and 21% of male sexually active respondents said that they used a condom during their first sexual intercourse.

[4] Indonesian Young Adult Reproductive Health Survey (IYARHS), (2007)
[5] Riskedas, 2010
[6] Comprehensive age knowledge: a) correctly identifying the two major ways of preventing the sexual transmission of HIV (using condoms and limiting sex to one faithful, uninfected partner),b) rejecting the two most common local misconceptions about HIV transmission, c) who know that a healthy-looking person can have HIV.
[7] UNICEF - at a glance Indonesia; Source: http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/indonesia_statistics.html
[8] UNICEF - at a glance Indonesia; Source: http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/indonesia_statistics.html
[9] Indonesian Young Adult Reproductive Health Survey (IYARHS), (2007)
[10] Indonesian Young Adult Reproductive Health Survey (IYARHS), (2007)
[11] Indonesian Young Adult Reproductive Health Survey (IYARHS), (2007)

A higher rate of condom use was reported for their last sexual intercourse: 10 % of female and 18 % of male respondent reported to have used a condom during last sexual intercourse. [12]
Unintended pregnancy is a direct result of unsafe sexual behavior and has large consequences in Indonesia. When a pregnancy outside marriage occurs, women will be confronted with stigmatization and social discrimination, for example, she might not be able to continue a normal education. [13] The Guttmacher Institute (2008) reports an estimation of unintended pregnancies: about 17% of all live births in Indonesia are resulting from a mistimed or unwanted pregnancy. Unintended pregnancies often result in abortions, which is illegal in Indonesia (except when the pregnancy is a result of rape, it is necessary for medical reasons or a severely impaired infant is expected). Although illegal in most cases, the rate of abortions in Indonesia is among the highest in the region. It was estimated that 2 million abortions occurred in 2000, which means about 37 abortions per 1000 women of reproductive age (15-49), compared to the regional average of 29 abortions per 1000 women, this figure for Indonesia is high.[14] The Guttmacher Institute (2008) mentions that about half of the women, who are seeking for abortion, most probably go to traditional birth attendants, traditional healers or masseurs to terminate the pregnancy. It is unknown how many women induce an abortion themselves. [15] Such abortion practices are considered unsafe and are often leading to all sorts of complications. The WHO estimated that in the South-East Asian Countries with strong restrictive abortion regulation, 16% of maternal mortality is caused by unsafe abortions. [16] Unfortunately, there are no large scale – country wide studies on unintended pregnancies and abortions in Indonesia. Hence it is not possible to report how many females in the age of 15-24 experience unintended pregnancy and resort in unsafe abortions. Another consequence of unsafe sexual behaviour is the contraction of HIV/AIDs and STIs. A report from Ministry of Health in Indonesia of June, 2012 indicated that the population aged 15-29 year population are most vulnerable of contracting HIV.

When looking at the rate of youth access to public health service, we see that only 10 % of youth have ever heard about public health services delivered to young people.[17] Another survey conducted for designing National Mid Term Development Planning (RPJMN) in 2010 showed that only 28 % of young people ever heard about Information and Counselling Centre For Youth (PIK-Remaja) served by BKKBN.[18]

The attitude of the state and religious leaders towards SRHR issues for young people is considered to be unsupportive as well as stigma-*laden*. For example, the Chief of Indonesian Parliament stated that "*sexy*" clothes of women are the cause of rape. He also rejected a proposal for including Sexual Education in school curriculum, by arguing that there is a social taboo on sexuality.[19] Some eminent Indonesian religious leaders, such as NU and Muhammadiyah, objected against an idea of *Harm Reduction* by the MoH that included giving condoms to sexual active youth. They refused the idea because they belied it would interpreted as if promiscuity (*zina*) was permitted, which is highly forbidden in religious teachings.

In line with the attitude of leaders, Indonesia also has many policies that hinder young people to get comprehensive SRHR services and even put them into risky situation. Regarding to the latest mentioned situation, Indonesia is still imposing Marriage Act (no 1/1974) that allow 16 years teen to get married. Unsupportive policies toward SRHR are [1] Family Welfare and Population Development Law (no 52/2009) which limits SRHR comprehensive services only for married couples, [2] Health Law

[12] Indonesian Young Adult Reproductive Health Survey (IYARHS), (2007)
[13] School rules are based on the local ordonances imposed by local Education and Religious Affair.
[14] Guttmacher Institute (2008) Abortion in Indonesia, In Brief, 2008 Series, no. 2., Source: http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2008/10/15/IB_Abortion_Indonesia.pdf
[15] Guttmacher Institute (2008) Abortion in Indonesia, In Brief, 2008 Series, no. 2., Source: http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2008/10/15/IB_Abortion_Indonesia.pdf
[16] Guttmacher Institute (2008) Abortion in Indonesia, In Brief, 2008 Series, no. 2., Source: http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2008/10/15/IB_Abortion_Indonesia.pdf
[17] An exit survey by IPPA Youth Clinic by KPAN, 2011
[18] Pusat Penelitian dan Pengembangan Keluarga Berencana, *Survei Indikator Kinerja Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional (RPJMN) Program Kependudukan dan KB Nasional*, Jakarta, Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional, 2010.
[19] http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/10/18/minister-rejects-proposal-sex-education.html

(no 36/2008) which limits safe abortion for 6 weeks and only for medical reason, rape and suspected impaired infant. [3] Social Welfare Law (no 11/2009) uses stigmatizing terms, like "socially impaired groups" to name Sex Workers, transgender and gays.

In 2005, facilitated by UNFPA, a national policy on SRHR was signed by 4 related ministries (Social, Health, Education, and BKKBN).This policy aims to target SRHR for youth through two programs. First, BKKBN's developed a program, called PIK-R, that targets counselling centres or. In 2010, the PIK-R has reached 9,195 centres, consisting of 7,455 centres in tumbuh (growth) phases, 1,337 centres in tegak (steady) phase, and 403 centres in tegar (firm) phase.[20] Secondly, MoH developed program, called PKPR (Youth Friendly Health Service Centres) that ensures that a Public Health Centre is based in each sub-district. In December 2008, it was reported that 26 provinces were having 1611 centres, and 2,256 health-centre attendants have been trained accordingly. However, both programs are of school curriculum. Recently, the Ministry of Education and Culture allows SRHR education in school. SRHR education will not be offered through a separate course, but will be increasingly included in other courses, such as Science (IPA), Biology, Physical Health and Sport Subjects (Penjaskes), Social Sciences (IPS) and Religious themes. [21]

Utomo and McDonald et al. (2008) concluded that the SRHR courses have been delivered in first grade of Elementary School until 12 grade of High School. Unfortunately, the courses are still normative in essence, relying on morality and deemed to bear social stigma related to sexuality, gender and HIV/AIDS issues. In addition, the Biology subject is delivered in strictly scientific way and lacks social and cultural aspect of SRHR.

## 2.1 Contracting details

When did cooperation with this partner start: 2000.

What is the MFS II contracting period: 1-4-2011 to 31-12-2015

Did cooperation with this partner end: No

If yes, when did it finish: Not applicable

What is the reason for ending the cooperation with this partner: Not applicable

Is there expected cooperation with this partner after 31st of December 2015: Yes.

[20] BKKBN, *Data Potensi Wilayah Program KB Nasional 2010*, Jakarta : Direktorat Pelaporan dan Statistik, 2011.

[21] PSS PKBI DIY, *Analisis Kurikulum Pendidikan Kesehatan Reproduksi dan Seksual di SMA*, 2007. Cf. Utomo, McDonald, Hull, "Meningkatkan Pendidikan Kesehatan Reproduksi dalam Kurikulum Nasional Indonesia", *Gender and Reproductive Health Study Policy Brief,* No. 2, 2011

## 2.2 Background to the Southern Partner Organisation

**History**

Yayasan Pelita Ilmu (The Pelita Ilmu) was established on December 4, 1989. YPI was initiated by Dr. Zubairi after attending an international training on immunology in the mid-1980s. Together with his wife Sri Wahyuningsing, a public health expert, and his friend at FKUI/RSCM Dr. Samsuridjal, who had organizational skills to establish a NGO in the field of prevention of HIV transmission, they founded YPI. The name Pelita Ilmu arose spontaneously as in the early days, the activities carried out were located in schools, so as to be "light" for high school students to gain "knowledge" about healthy living as well as be responsible to prevent themselves from HIV infection. YPI was the first organization in Indonesia, working on the issue of HIV/AIDS. In the first two years, YPI received no core funding by donor organizations but searched for funding for every activity it undertook.[22]

Partnership between Yayasan Pelita Ilmu (YPI) and Rutgers WPF started in 2000 through a program of campaigning SRHR through peer educators. YPI initially visited mainly Senior High Schools near YPI office. YPI trained both students and teachers on the issues of SRHR and HIV prevention, and motivated them to be peer educators. Meanwhile, the teachers were also trained to support the campaign program in the schools. Since 2005, YPI has introduced a school based program for SRH education called DAKU (Dunia Remaja Seru- the lively Youth world). Collaboration between YPI and WPF continued through implementing Dance4life program, another SRHR education for youth, started in 2010.

The current project is a follow-up on implementing the Dance4Life program. It now also includes DAKU. YPI implements the DAKU and dance4life programs in a total of 14 schools in South and Central Jakarta in the 2012-2013 school year. Among these schools are 3 junior high schools participating in the dance4life program, and the remaining 11 are at senior high level: 6 in dance4life, 3 in DAKU and 2 in both DAKU and dance4life.

YPI obtained the funds from several donors , one the donors is MFS II . Most of intervention is used for increasing beneficiaries' capacity rather than organizational capacity. Nevertheless, YPI thought that improving skills for staffs is very important.
Besides running program and conducted training for teachers and students, this institution also provided opportunity for staffs to attend the training. The trainings for staffs are : journalistic , documentation, finance, and SRHR (Sexual Reproductive Health and Rights) training from PKBI (Perkumpulan Keluarga Berencana Indonesia)-an association for Family Planning in Indonesia.[23]

YPI sees that staffs' skill has been improved through training. Staffs have more responsibility in handling youth group ,being more skillful in report writing, being more skillful in giving technical assistance for youth in creating website, flyers, and leaflet and crating documenter film.[24]

**Vision**

To be a reputable and consistent institution in creating a society that has healthy-life behaviour, is independent and productive as well as providing quality health services.[25]

**Mission**

Empowering society to combat HIV and AIDS through education, assisting, outreach, and livelihood based on the principles of participation, partnership, equality, transparency and accountability.[26]

[22] Evaluation Team (2012) Historical Timeline
[23] Annex D, MFS II Endline Evaluation, 2014.
[24] Workshop minutes meeting, MFS II Endline Evaluation, 2014.
[25] Evaluation Team (2012) Historical Timeline
[26] Evaluation Team (2012) Historical Timeline

**Strategies**

- Providing Information and Data,
- Expanding the continuum of SRHR education,
- Increasing knowledge and access on ARV ,
- Increasing earned income of women with HIV-AIDS,
- Strengthening Services for Children with HIV-AIDS,
- Developing the Management for Supporting PWAs,
- Strengthening the Organization Management,
- Mobilizing Funding Resources and Earned Income, and Developing Monitoring and Evaluation System.[27]

YPI has 4 major programs:

1. HIV / AIDS and SRHR Prevention Program
2. This program aims to prevent HIV transmission in the community, especially those who are at risk of contracting HIV from both work and behaviors such as medical providers, injectable drug users, sex workers, migrant workers candidates, youth, street children and others. In addition to HIV / AIDS program also aims at preventing unwanted pregnancies among adolescents, unsafe abortion, drug abuse, child involvement in drugs, and prevention of HIV transmission from mother to fetus / baby.
3. Counseling Program, HIV Testing and Health Services
   This program aims to provide quality services for those who require consultation, testing, and basic treatment for HIV / AIDS, drugs, and reproductive health. Most of them who benefited from this program, were referrals from other prevention programs and NGOs.
4. Community Support Program for People with HIV.
   This program is specifically carried out to foster public and government support for people living with HIV / AIDS (PLHIV) and their families. YPI currently own a shelter for people living with HIV until their family / community welcome them back or during treatment in Jakarta, as well as a model in addressing HIV / AIDS problems in family.
5. Communication and Development Program
   This program was developed not only to address reproductive health problems, drug abuse and HIV / AIDS, but also designed to meet the needs of local communities and future YPI development. The program includes life-skills training, publication of books and magazines, education / schools and free courses for public, and development of training center and business unit facilities.[28]

[27] Evaluation Team (2012) Historical Timeline
[28] YPI_Bianual Report, 2013.

# 3 Methodological approach and reflection

## 3.1 Overall methodological approach and reflection

This chapter describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

Note: this methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report A detailed overview of the approach is described in appendix 1.

The first (changes in organisational capacity) and the fourth evaluation question are addressed together through:

- **Changes in the 5C indicators since the baseline:** standard indicators have been agreed upon for each of the five capabilities of the five capabilities framework (see appendix 2) and changes between the baseline, and the endline situation have been described. For data collection a mix of data collection methods has been used, including self-assessments by SPO staff; interviews with SPO staff and externals; document review; observation. For data analysis, the Nvivo software program for qualitative data analysis has been used. Final descriptions per indicator and per capability with corresponding scores have been provided.
- **Key organisational capacity changes – 'general causal map':** during the endline workshop a brainstorm has been facilitated to generate the key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO since the baseline, with related underlying causes. For this purpose, a visual as well as a narrative causal map have been described.

In terms of the attribution question (2 and 4), **'process tracing'** is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to

focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

## 3.2 Assessing changes in organisational capacity and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?** And the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This is explained below. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

The evaluators considered it important to also note down a consolidated SPO story and this would also provide more information about what the SPO considered to be important in terms of organisational capacity changes since the baseline and how they perceived these key changes to have come about. Whilst this information has not been validated with sources other than SPO staff, it was considered important to understand how the SPOs has perceived changes in the organisation since the baseline.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information is provided for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the next session on the evaluation question on attribution, as described below and in the appendix 1.

How information was collected and analysed for addressing evaluation question 1 and 4, in terms of description of changes in indicators per capability as well as in terms of the general causal map, based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff, is further described below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012[29].

[29] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1. **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2. **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3. **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4. **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5. **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Please see appendix 1 for a description of the detailed process and steps.

## 3.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity - evaluation question 2 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question*: **To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia* (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?** and the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Below, the selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

### 3.3.1 Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.
For the detailed results of this selection, in the four countries that CDI is involved in, please see appendix 1. The following SPOs were selected for process tracing:

- Ethiopia: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE (4/9)
- India: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE, VTRC (5/10)
- Indonesia: ASB, ECPAT, PtPPMA, YPI, YRBI (5/12)
- Liberia: BSC, RHRAP (2/5).

### 3.3.2 Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ' general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in

time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained. More information can be found in Appendix 1.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

### 3.3.3 Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team. These can also be found in appendix 1.

**Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach:** this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

**Using standard indicators and scores**: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

**General causal map:** whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

**Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question:** this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during

the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

**Utilisation of the evaluation**

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

**Design** – mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

**Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication:** many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

**5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process:** The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

# 4 Results

## 4.1 MFS II supported capacity development interventions

Below an overview of the different MFS II supported capacity development interventions of YPI that have taken place since 2011 are described. The information is based on the information provided by Rutgers WPF.

Table 1
*Information about MFS II supported capacity development interventions since baseline*

| Title of the MFS II supported capacity development intervention | Objectives | Activities | Timing and duration | Budget |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Workshop Strategic Communication | To promote effective communication towards clients utilizing a broad range of communication tools | Workshop | September 2013 | n/a – partially funded by MenCare and ASK |
| Workshop on writing skills | Improve reporting skills | 9 sessions, weekly | April-June 2013 | n/a |
| Training for youth friendly services | To promote new means of communication with modern youth | Targeted training on communications. Social Media utilization was emphasised | November 2013 | n/a |
| PME Workshop | Develop project monitoring and evaluation skills | 3 day workshop<br>Reflective workshop | July 2013<br>7-11 January 2014 | n/a |
| SRHR Module development + training of trainers | Evaluate module implementation. Learn from other partners. Learn about context of SRHR education | Present work, discuss current development of SRHR module implementation and challenges in Indonesia | 8-10 october 2013 | n/a |


Source: 5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_CFA perspective_Indonesia_YPI

## 4.2 Changes in capacity development and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

Below you can find a description of the changes in each of the five core capabilities. This information is based on the analysis of the information per each of the indicators. This detailed information for each of the indicators describes the current situation, and how and why it has changed since the baseline. See also annex 3.

### 4.2.1 Changes in the five core capabilities


**Capability to act and commit**




The leadership of YPI has improved slightly in terms of their responsiveness and openness to organizational and programmatic issues. The areas of leadership improvements are program and strategic management, communication and partnership. The strategic guidance has become more specific and consistent with program strategic plans. Furthermore, strategic guidance has improved in terms of improved coordination by merging 3 offices to 2, by making decisions more promptly and firmly and by stimulating creative and inspiring program design. The Programme's strategies are now more based on monitoring and evaluation. Operations are based on the organizational strategies and by having a small budget it is possible to also keep running the activities even when funding is delayed. The structure of the organization hasn't changed since the baseline. There is no staff turnover during 2012-2014. However, staff is motivated by having more benefits compared to the baseline. The staff skills improved through training as well as informal sharing in weekly meetings on SRHR, data collection and reporting, and strategic communication Whilst diversity of funding sources hasn't really changed, YPI has developed a business unit named PT. Pelita Niaga Mandiri to assist in fundraising and ensure financial sustainability for the organization. The CFA has recommended that YPI further improve their strategic planning, external risk assessments and Budged vs. Actual (BvA) analysis.

Score: From 3.4 to 3.7 (very slight improvement)


**Capability to adapt and self-renew**




Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is now more structured, particularly in relation to having a reporting system and a monitoring visit mechanism in place. However, monitoring and evaluation is still focused on activities and outputs rather than outcomes and impact. However, improved networking and relationships with partners as well as having a monitoring visit mechanism in place can inform YPI on trends and developments in the operational environment. Staff competencies have improved in terms of data collection and reporting, but there are still no dedicated M&E person in place, and staff have to combine these tasks with their program implementation tasks. Having more regular meetings have helped the organization to reflect on progress and adjust plans. Staffs are still able to share their ideas freely and this is even improved since merging three buildings into two. The CFA has also recommended that YPI further improve their M&E system and knowledge management, as well as improve their analytical skill to improve their reports and other documents.

Score: From 3.1 to 3.4 (slight improvement)


**Capability to deliver on development objectives**



All projects still have a work plan and budget which is used in day-to-day operations. Resources are now used more cost effectively by having less staff with more programme implementation responsibilities, by merging three offices into two offices, and by reducing printing costs and stationary costs. Implementation has improved due to improved staff capacity, and by having operational, financial plans in place, but the lack of analytical skills in implementation. Beneficiaries are now more involved in programme planning and by having the way discussions on their needs. The basis for monitoring efficiency lies in the work plans and budgets that exist for all projects. A comparison is made between expenditures and achievements, and this is discussed in the team coordination meeting. Moreover since the baseline and the united the three offices become two offices, the board of trustees is more involved in the progress implementation evaluation. However, there is no specific monitoring of the relation between the level of output (results) and the level of input (time and money spent). YPI needs to further improve their HR policy and carefully design training and capacity building for staff according to the CFA in order to manage the vast growing number of people with HIV/AIDS in Indonesia. Additionally annual planning needs further improvement, and stronger relationships with strategic stakeholders must be built.

Score: From 3.2 to 3.7 (slight improvement)


**Capability to relate**




YPI still collaborates with many stakeholders and target groups for learning and support, and to some extent for developing its policies. This is both at the international and national level. There are additionally close contacts with beneficiaries, which they even visit in their homes in remote areas. They have improved upon engaging with youth by having three-yearly meetings and performing school visits and youth meetings in the community. Within the organization communication is well developed and open and this has been further stimulated by a change in leadership, which stimulates openness as well as having 3 to 2 offices which has improved internal conclusion and coordination. There are regular staff meetings but communication can also occur using SMS, email or even Facebook. A mechanism for public accountability does not yet exist and can greatly benefit the organization. Stakeholders should be more involved in program planning and in sharing lessons-learned.

Score: From 3.7 to 4.1 (slight improvement)

**Capability to achieve coherence**





The vision, mission and strategies were discussed in 2013. In terms of operational guidelines, these are in place in terms of HRM and finance and there has been a decree on the status of staff employment since the baseline. Since that the job descriptions is more clearly. Projects, strategies and activities are still in line with the vision and mission of the organisation and to project activities are still mutually supportive. Operational planning and clear job descriptions are still areas that require further improvement as mentioned by the CFA.

Score: From 2.9 to 3.1 (very slight improvement)

### 4.2.2 General changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO

The evaluation team carried out an end line assessment at YPI. During the end line workshop, the team made a recap of key features of the organisation in the baseline in 2012 (such as vision, mission, strategies, clients, partnerships). This was the basis for discussing changes that had happened to the organisation since the baseline.


Improved service quality [1]
Increased staff working performance [2]
Improving network [3]
Strenghtened organization independency [4]
Increased Job security [5]
Optimizing social media as communication forum among stakeholders [6]
The founding of ltd (companies) to provide services in : training facilitation, health services, accomodation (homestay)services [7]
The existence of salary standard [8]
Improving employment status (no more contract employment) [9]
Extending networks (initiating cooperation with new actor, e.g : MGBK, Aliansi Satu Visi) [10]
Increased the frequent of controlling from beneficiaries for YPI program improvement [11]
Staff has opportunities to attend training, comparative study, and course [12]
Ideas from staff are accepted [13]
Response to problem in the field. E.g : basic needs for ODHA [14]
Appropriate action for offences because of a clear working description [15]
Efficiency result is used to improve employment's welfare [16]
YPI is proactive to find network and fund [17]
The number of staff increased (transfering skills from money project to another staff [18]
Leaders has more initiative to send staff for capacity building and availability of external fundings [19]
The existence or new partner for YPI Program [20]
Donor decrease [21]
Staff capacity increased through training [23]
The openess between staff and board [24]
Simplified the organizational structure ; Optimizing resources [25]
Build a good relationship with related organization [26]
organization profesionalism improvement requirements to maintain credibility [27]
Incentive from leaders [28]
Close relationship between staff executive board, and founder [29]
More Responsive [30]
Working description is more detail (job distribution : internal and external YPI) [31]
Efficiency [32]
To make job easier from leader to staff and YPI relation [33]
The need of guideline for organization [34]
Donor requirements [35]
Change of Leadership style [36]
Development of SOPs [37]
Strenghtened networking [38]

The key change in YPI's organizational capacity since the baseline is an improvement in service quality [1]. Three underlying factors caused this improvement:

1. An increase in staff working performance [2]
2. An improved network maintenance s [3]
3. Strengthened organization independency [4]

Each of these factors is explained in detail below.

First of all, the staff's working performance increased for six different reasons:

1. Increased frequency of controlling beneficiaries for YPI program improvement [11]
   a. YPI beneficiaries were frequented and monitored more intensely which lead to overall program improvement. This was enabled by a greater number of staff members with Monitoring and Evaluations skills from other projects [18]. Staff capacity in general increased through training, which enabled the sharing of Monitoring and evaluation skills [23] and application across other programs. The increased focus on developing staff skills came from a greater need to professionalize all aspects in the organization to maintain credibility in the field [27] and to adhere to donor requirements [35].
2. Staff has opportunities to attend training, comparative studies and courses [12]
   a. Generally staffs that do not have enough skills will be trained or given opportunity to attend seminars/course locally and abroad. The availability of external funding and also leaders initiative to send staff to attend trainings, course was the primary reason for staff to to attend training and courses [19].The leader is selective however in choosing who can follow courses, only those people that are willing and able are chosenIncreased staff motivation in turn came about from increased incentives from the leadership [28] and more openness between staff and board/management [24]. The latter was a logical consequence from the close relationship between the staff's executive board and the founder of the organization [29] which developed soon after the change in leadership style [36].
3. Ideas from staff are accepted [13]
   a. Similarly to the previous line of developments, ideas from staff became more accepted and encouraged due to the openness between staff and board [24].
4. Response to problems in the field [14]
   a. The organization was able to respond to more problems and issues in the field by generally becoming more flexible and responsive [30]. This can largely be attributed to the change of leadership style which caused a much flatter organizational structure [36]
5. Appropriate action for offences because of a clear working description [15]
   a. Much like the previous factor, staff members were not only able to respond faster to problems, but also able to act more effectively by taking appropriate action for offences [15]. This came about from clearer and more detailed job descriptions of work activities[31] on the one hand, and a simplified organizational structure on the other. The revision of job descriptions was performed to make jobs easier and responsibilities clearer [33] and generally provide more guidelines for the organization's work [34]. The development of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's) lay at the foundation of all these formalization and specification actions [37]. The simplication of the organizational structure on the other hand happened for efficiency reasons [32], which went hand in hand with the change of leadership style [36].
6. Increased job security [5]
   a. Increased job security also played an important role in the increased staff working performance, which greatly impacted staff morale [5]. Since the baseline MFS2 5C evaluation, a salary standard was introduced [8] as well as an improvement in employment status (no more contract work) [9]. Both developments could be realized from cost-saving resulting from the simplification of the organizational structure [25].

The second factor that resulted in improved service quality of YPI was the improvement of YPI's network [3]. This resulted from an optimized use of social media as a communication platform for stakeholders [6] on the one hand, and due to expanding networks to other actors and beneficiaries [10] on the other. More actors could now be served more effectively. Both these developments came about from contacting and including the new partners in the YPI programs [20], which in turn

developed through the active networking and building of relationships with related organizations [26]. The latter resulted from the conscious decision of YPI to strengthen their networking activities.

The third and final factor affected YPI's improved service quality is the strengthened organization's independence from other organizations and stakeholders [4]. YPI achieved this by founding limited independent corporate entities to provide services such as training, facilitation, health services and accommodation. For example, YPI have done various fundraising activities such as giving trainings, organizing music events, acting as facilitator and developing a clinic. For example, one of YPIs field offices has already established a self-sustained training center successfully. The income generated from this initiative covers the operational expenses of the camp itself. This has not been practiced for the whole organization yet.However some plan has been initiated to make it in a larger scale [7]. The former was achieved by YPI's proactive stance in finding new funds and partners in their network [17] after a decrease in donor support became evident soon after the baseline [21]

## 4.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity development - evaluation question 2 and 4

Note: for each country about 50% of the SPOs has been chosen to be involved in process tracing, which is the main approach chosen to address evaluation question 2. For more information please also see chapter 3 on methodological approach. For each of these SPOs the focus has been on the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew, since these were the most commonly addressed capabilities when planning MFS II supported capacity development interventions for the SPO.

For each of the MFS II supported capacity development interventions -under these two capabilities- an outcome area has been identified, describing a particular change in terms of organisational capacity of the SPO. Process tracing has been carried out for each outcome area. In the capability to act and commit the following two outcome areas have been identified, based on document review and discussions with SPO and CFA: 'more motivated staff' and 'more recognized capacity to deliver SRHR training'.

In the capability to adapt and self-renew the following outcome area has been identified, based on document review and discussions with SPO and CFA: 'improved reporting'.


Table 2

*Information on selected capabilities, outcome areas and MFS II supported capacity development interventions since the baseline*

| Capability | Outcome area | MFS II supported capacity development intervention(2) |
|---|---|---|
| Capability to act and commit | More motivated staff | No related capacity development intervention found |
| Capability to act and commit | More recognized capacity to deliver SRHR training | 1. SRHR training in October 2013<br>2. Training for Youth friendly services in November 2013<br>3. Workshop on strategic communication in September 2013 |
| Capability to adapt and self-renew | Improved reporting | 1. M&E training workshop in 2013-2014<br>2. Writing skills training in 2013 |

The next sections will describe the results of process tracing for each of the outcome areas, and will describe to what extent these outcome areas have taken place as a result of MFS II supported capacity development interventions and/or other related factors and actors.

### 4.3.1 More motivated staff




During the endline workshop at YPI, a discussion was held around what staff perceived as the key changes in in the organisation since the baseline. This then led to a discussion on what were the key organisational capacity changes and why these changes have taken place according to staff present at the endline workshop. The discussion resulted in a 'general causal map' which is described below. The general causal map provides a comprehensive picture of organisational capacity changes that took place since the baseline, based on the perspective of SPO staff present at the endline workshop. Numbers in the narrative correspond to the numbers in the visual.

The identified organisational change under the capability to act and commit was ''more motivated staff [2] (Annex D, J, N), which is expected to contribute to increased work performance of staff to manage program activities [1] (Annex G, I, L, N, Q, workshop minutes meeting). The main underlying reason for this change is the MFS II organisational capacity development (5c) baseline process [21] (Annex L, R, workshop minutes meeting) which has inspired staffs, management and board management to improve some organizational aspects (Annex J), in particular, leadership [18] (Annex G, I, L, P, R, workshop minutes meeting) for example more responsive, decisive and open feedback. Staff has become more motivated due to improved staff welfare [3] (Annex I, L) and a better management working mechanism [4] (Annex I, J, L). Below you can find an explanation of how these changes have come about.

There were four main reasons for **improved staff welfare** [3] (Annex I, L): provision of BJS linked to investment [8] (Annex I, L); better staff remuneration [9] (Annex I, L); increased/improved job security [5] (Annex J, N); and operational efficiency [6] (Annex L, N, P).

Provision of BJS and insurance was linked to investment [8] (Annex I, L) which led to improved staff welfare by ensuring their insurance of health [3].

There has been better staff remuneration which was increased since December 2013 [9] (Annex I, L). The management acknowledged that the YPI remuneration is relatively low compared to other local organizations, but it is substituted by the provision of BPJS[30] and insurance linked to the investment [8] (Annex I,L). The investment insurance scheme is given to the staff with at least two-year service period. This improved staff remuneration is the result the leader's response to employee concerns, which were raised by staff [14] (Annex L). Staff would not have been able to raise such concerns without the new leader's ability to allow for such feedback [15] (Annex G, I, J, L, R). The main reason for this was that there was a change of leadership style. Previously the leader (the Director) was less responsive to staff concerns, and now the Director has better understanding to staff concerns [18] (Annex G, I, L, P, R, workshop minutes meeting).

The third reason for improved staff welfare was improved job security [5] (Annex J, I, L, N). Staff perceived increased job security [5] (Annex J, I, L, N) due to a change from fixed term contracts to permanent staff employment [10] (Annex I, J, P). This too was one of the changes brought about by the change of leadership [18] (Annex G, I, L, P, R, workshop minutes meeting).

The fourth reason for improved staff welfare was improved operational efficiency [6] (Annex L, N, P). This was related to a reduction in the number of offices [13] (Annex L, I, R, Q, workshop minutes meeting), which had to happen to reduce operational costs [16] (Annex J, N). These reductions came straight from the process of internal evaluation [20] (Annex L, R, minutes endline workshop). In the internal evaluation there was discussion related to how to make the organization more efficient by reducing the number of offices (from 3 to 2) and using the saved money to increase staff welfare.

The second reason for improved staff motivation was having a **better management working mechanism** [4] (Annex I, J, L). This came about as a result of the active sharing of progress on activities and program evaluation results [7] (Annex J, training questionnaire_staff, training questionnaire_program manager, training questionnaire_secretary of executive board), which resulted from an increased staff habit to communicate and coordinate more intensively [11] (Annex G, I, J, L, N, R, Q). This habit resulted somewhat automatically from the fact that there was a reduction in the number of offices [13] (Annex L, I, R, Q workshop minutes meeting) allowing staff to communicate more easily. The reduction in the number of offices also affected to the operational efficiency [6] (Annex L,N,P) that led to better management working mechanism [4] (Annex L,I). Having fewer offices, reduced operational cost has enabled the management to manage the working mechanism better. In addition to this, the quality of meetings and relationships between staff management and the board also increased [17] (Annex I, L, Q, R). The latter resulted from an increased awareness to communicate more closely [19] (Annex Q), which was one of the results from the process of baseline workshop process conducted by MFS II in 2012 [21] (Annex L, R, workshop minutes meeting).

During the 5C baseline workshop in 2012 [21] (Annex L, R, workshop minutes meeting), the development of the *historical timeline* and the *theory of change*, made staff become more aware of

[30] BJPS is the Administrator for the Social Security System


the importance of having more intensive meeting amongst themselves, with management and with the executive board (source: CFA; additional sheet). The intensified meetings have increased staff's common understanding on the organization's current situation. It is also used as an internal forum for evaluation and at the same time as a means to strengthen the team work [20] (Annex L, R, workshop minutes meeting). YPI staff also said that they used to conduct regular meetings once in three months, but during the 5c baseline assessment, they became more aware of the importance of having more regular meetings. Intensive feedback and input through the internal evaluation has resulted to the change of leader's attitude. The leader is becoming more responsive, decisive and open to feedback [18] (Annex G, I, L, P, R, workshop minutes meeting).

The more intensive meetings also included an increased intensity of the board to have intensive interaction with staff [17] (Annex, I, L, Q, R). Through this, the board has better understanding on the updates of the organization. Before the baseline in 2012, meetings amongst management were not intensive and this was realized during the 5c baseline assessment in 2012 [19] (Annex L, R, workshop minutes meeting).

On the whole, the baseline 5c assessment in 2012 has had quite a big impact on the organisation in terms of a changed leadership style and ultimately motivated staff.

### 4.3.2 More recognized capacity to deliver SRHR training

Below you will find a description of the 'More recognized capacity to deliver SRHR training' and how this has come about.




YPI has been recognized and acknowledged by its peers in providing trainings on SRHR in addition to being already considered as an HIV-AIDS expert in Indonesia [1] (Annex A, B, C). The many invitations that YPI has received in which the organization was requested to act as a facilitator, resource person or consultant in various forums at the local, regional as well as national level, serves as proof for this. YPI's staff has become more confident in giving trainings and delivering SRHR information to beneficiaries [2] (Annex A,X) as a result of knowledge sharing to other organizations through internships [3] (Annex C,X), as well as knowledge sharing to other organizations involved in the alliance [4] (Annex A,X).

On the one hand knowledge was shared through the internship positions that YPI had created [3] (Annex C,X). In order to develop the issues of SRHR and HIV-AIDS amongst the youths, YPI initiated a *youth forum* within DKI Jakarta. The idea was to bring about one forum that comes from, was run by, and made for, youths who were working with these two issues as a basis. YPI performed the role of initiator and facilitator. This forum was the place where YPI staffs' learning process was disseminated to the members of the youth forum.

On the other hand, knowledge was shared through organizations involved in the alliance [4] (Annex X). YPI is involved in as a member, official or initiator in several alliances related to SRHR issues. Among the most important ones is the Independent Youth Alliance (ARI). Each alliance possesses communication mechanism both in the form of direct meetings and electronic media (social media). In general, these alliances were established as a place for various organizations in sharing their problems, insights, knowledge, information and agenda-setting. It is from and through these alliance forums that YPI's staff improved their capacity on SRHR training and communication. They often share what they have learnt from the forums they participated in, as well as being asked to join as committee members or facilitators of activities initiated by the alliance.

The sharing of knowledge and participation in these forums was enabled by the improved capacity as SRHR experts of the organization. During 2013, YPI increasingly participated in SRHR initiatives and venues next to practicing their existing expertise on HIV-AIDS, improving the capacity of the organizations SRHR expertise [5] (Annex A, X). This was enabled by the improved competencies to train and communicate with target groups on SRHR issues [6] (Annex A, B) on the one hand, but also through the addition of new staff members and volunteers who were increasingly involved in the SRHR programs and contributed to the capacity growth of the organization in the field of SRHR [10] (Annex A, X).

Improved competencies to train and communicate with target groups on SRHR issues can be attributed to three MFS II funded capacity interventions. In each training there was an unwritten agreement obliging them to share what they have learnt to others internally (Annex X).

**SRHR Training [7] (Annex A, B, X**

This training was held by RutgersWPF, on October 2013. YPI received an invitation for 3 participants. Who all attended. In the training emphasis was put on holistic understanding on everything related to SRHR. All partners who had implemented SRHR modules presented and shared their work which enabled them to learn from each other.

**Training for Youth Friendly Services [8] (Annex A,B,X)**


This training was held by PKBI in Cibubur on November 2013, and funded by MFS II and the ASK program. One YPI staff member attended the training, who was an active volunteer in YPI, and also a youth forum member. Targeted training to promote new means of communication to modern youth was given. The use of social media was emphasized.

**Workshop on Strategic Communication [9] (Annex A,B,X)**

This training was held in Bogor on September 2013 by One Vision Alliance. On YPI staff member attended the training. The training was focused on the development of a communication strategy, and how to strengthen the organization's standpoint to give communication more impact.

### 4.3.3 Improved reporting

The key organizational change in the capability to adapt and self renew was initially identified as 'improved monitoring and evaluation' but during the process was refined to 'improved reporting' since the focus was more on this part of monitoring and evaluation [2] (Annex A; training questionnaire_staff; training questionnaire program manager; training questionnaire secretary of the executive board; workshop minutes meeting); CFA Document). The improved reports help to develop work plans [1] (Annex P; training questionaire_staff; training questionaire_program manager; training questionnaire secretary of executive board).



Improved reporting has been influenced by three factors: getting more varied reports (report with more form of data such as more visual or pictures and photography) [3] (Annex C; workshop minutes meeting; training questionnaire secretary of executive board), an improved capacity to write reports [6] (Annex B; Annex M; training questionnaire program manager; training questionnaire staff; training questionnaire secretary of executive board) and getting more robust data for report writing [4] (Observation interview CFA; Annex G; Annex N; Annex I; Annex P; Annex R). Reports are getting more varied because they have lots of data and know how to present the data in their reports also the reporting format has become more complicated [3] (Annex A; C; workshop minutes meeting; training questionnaire secretary of executive board; workshop minutes of meeting).

Staff have improved their capacity to write reports [6] (Annex B; Annex M; training questionnaire program manager; training questionnaire staff, training questionnaire secretary of executive board; workshop minutes meeting), on the one hand because of the M&E training in 2012 [18] (Annex C; Annex B; training questionnaire program manager, training questionnaire staff), which came as a requirement by the CFA [21] (Annex D; Annex J). The second reason for improved reporting capacity was the sharing among staff of results of the writing skills training. One of the participants at workshop in YPI while facilitating sheet of perspective SPO said that they shared the training experience and knowledge to other colleagues) [10] (Training questionnaire_3 staffs). One of the managers indicated during an interview that staff who is responsible for the teenagers group, has better understanding in report writing (Annex C). One of the training participants admitted that before the training, she needed more guidance from the leader in report writing, while after the training she feels more independent and needs less guidance from the leader (training questionnaire program manager). The writing skills training itself was supported by RWPF in 2013 [19] (Annex C; Annex B; training questionnaire management; training questionnaire program manager), and led to better understanding of how to write a good reports [19] (Annex C; Annex B; training questionnaire management; training questionnaire program manager). Ultimately it was the requirement from the CFA for improved reporting which created the necessity to have the trainings on M&E and writing skills [21] (Annex D; Annex J).

The third reason for improved reporting [2] (training questionnaire staff; training questionnaire program manager; training questionnaire secretary of the executive board); CFA Document) is that more robust data are being supplied as material for the reports [4] (observation interview CFA; training questionnaire management; Annex G; Annex N; ; Annex R; workshop minutes of meeting). There are two reasons for getting more robust data: on the one hand more accountable data is being collected [5] (Annex J; Training questionnaire staff) and on the other hand meetings have improved [7] (Annex L; Annex P, Annex O, Annex R).

**More accountable data is being collected** [5] (Annex J; training questionnaire staff) by staff due to an increase in the competences to conduct interviews in the field, such as beneficiaries and teachers [9] (Annex M; Training questionnaire _staff), The competencies to has come as a result of improved awareness on the importance of validated data [14] (Annex M, Training questionnaire staff), not only by staff forward attended a training on monitoring and evaluation, but also staff who learned this from the people trained [8] (Annex M; training questionnaire program manager; training questionnaire program staff). This is mainly due to a training by RWPF on monitoring and evaluation, which was conducted in 2011 [18] (Annex C; Annex B; training questionnaire program manager; training questionnaire staff), and which was attended by the project officer, the program manager and the secretary of the executive board.

Other staff, who did not join the training also increased their awareness on the importance of data validation, since M&E training participants shared their training experience in organizational meetings [8] (Annex M; training questionnaire program manager; training questionnaire program staff). The need to share became clear to staff attending the training as their awareness of the importance of validated data collection increased [14] (Annex M, training questionnaire staff). Staff has begun to discuss with their colleagues about data collected in monthly discussions. The requirement from the CFA for improved reporting created the necessity to have the trainings on M&E and writing skills [21] (Annex D; Annex J).

**The second reason for having more robust data is that meetings have been improved** [7] (Annex L; Annex N; Annex P; Annex O; Annex R) for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the staff meetings are more intensive and regular, as stated by staff and executive board during the interview [11] (Annex D; Annex J; Annex L, Annex P; Annex R). YPI staff also said that they used to conduct regular meetings once in three months, but during the 5c baseline, they realized the importance of having more regular meetings [20] (CFA, Annex M, Annex R) and are now conducting monthly meetings as a result of baseline survey [11] (Annex D; Annex L; Annex L, Annex P).

Secondly, the executive board visits the YPI office more regularly [12] (Annex J; Annex L;). It is stated by the founder, that they initiate the meeting (Annex L). This statement is supported by one of the management, that the executive board is asking to conduct meetings to get information about the progress of activities (Annex L; Informal discussion with management) and is supported by admin staff [12] (Annex L) and by field staff (Annex J).

Thirdly, more staff are involved in regular meetings [13] (Annex L; Annex P; Annex N). In the last two years, YPI reduced the staff, which means that YPI doesn't have project staff anymore (Annex J; Annex L). Staff in YPI are permanent staff, who have rights and obligations based on YPI regulations. The smaller number of YPI staff, makes them being more involved in regular meetings.

During the 5C baseline workshop, and in particular the discussions on the historical time line and the theory of change, and during discussions with management [20] (Annex L, Annex R; Workshop minutes meeting), staff became aware of the importance of having intensive meetings among staff, management and the executive board [17] (Annex L, Annex R)

# 5 Discussion and conclusion

## 5.1 Methodological issues

**General: Applied to all or most SPOs**

With regard to the methodology, Indonesia has made some data collection adjustment based on the context. The first adjustment was related to the type of instrument used. To assess the organizational capacity, the study has provided self-assessment, observation and interview sheets. These all were used during the baseline with all SPOs. During the end line the team used self-assessment, interview and observation sheets. However the evaluator applied interview sheets as self-assessment—where participants were asked to fill these sheets by themselves. For the participants who did not attend the workshop, the interviews were done separately using the interview sheet and the results from the interview were included in the subgroup interview sheet that was already filled by the staff member. Were combined into the relevant sub categories in the interview sheet. Interview sheets were also applied for interviews with the CFAs, partners and consultants.

The baseline study showed that having two similar instruments (self assessments, and interview sheets) did not have any effect in relation to obtaining adequate and quality data.

To have some clarification post visit to all SPOs, the evaluator used email and phone interviews.

**Yayasan Pelita Ilmu (YPI)**

Yayasan Pelita Ilmu was the first organizations visited during the data collection for the pilot. It was selected for process tracing, however the visit could only be conducted once. In relation to process tracing, seven staffs filled the training questionnaire related to MFS II funded training events since the baseline in 2012. It was filled in two ways, by calling and emailing them during the Surveymeter training workshop with CDI in Yogyakarta last April 2014. Some other training questionnaires were filled during the second field visit in June 2014. The seven staffs filled the training questionnaire on various different trainings; two staff on the PME training (in 2012), one staff on the PME training (in 2013), one staff on the Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights training (in 2014), and three staffs on the communication training (in 2014).


The self-assessment was conducted directly during the endline visit. The evaluator did not send the self-assessment sheet prior to the visit. However not all participants were able to complete the sheets at that time and it was followed up on by email for completion. The participants involved in the study were 2 management, 2 coordinators/program manager, 1 administration, 4 field staffs, 1 M&E program, and 1 partner.

When developing the general causal map of key organisational capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline, as experienced by the SPO, instead of identifying the key changes generally, the evaluator guided the team to have it one by one per capability. Therefore there were five different independent maps developed which were later combined into one general causal map and verified with the SPO during the feedback process. The documents for desk review collected from the organization were very limited due to low response from the organization on this particular aspect; most of the documents gathered were received from the CFAs.

## 5.2 Changes in organisational capacity development

This section aims to provide an answer to the first and fourth evaluation questions:

1. *What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?*
4. *What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?*




Whilst changes took place in all of the five core capabilities, the greatest improvement took place in the capability to deliver on development objectives. Below the changes in each of the capabilities are further explained, by referring to the specific indicators that changed.

Over the last two years the capability to act and commit improved slightly. Leadership responsiveness has improved in terms of the board of executives demonstrating more openness to organizational and programme issues. Strategic guidance has slightly improved in terms of improved coordination by merging 3 offices in to 2, by making decisions more promptly and firmly, and by stimulating creative inspiring program design. In terms of articulating strategies, YPI improved slightly by utilizing results from new M&E approaches in developing work plans and strategies. Daily operations also improved very slightly due to allocating a small amount of budget to keep operations going, even when donor funding is pending. Staff skills improved slightly. YPI has responded to baseline findings on weaknesses in their staff' skills, by facilitating capacity building activities to address these weaknesses. In terms of incentives, YPI has been able to add secondary employment benefits in terms of annual bonuses, family support benefits and family excursions. YPI's funding procedures have also slightly improved through the construction of a self-sustaining business unit that assists in fundraising and ensure financial sustainability of the organization.

YPI's capability to adapt and self renew has improved slightly. The application of M&E is now more structured, particularly in relation to having a reporting system and a monitoring visit mechanism in place. M&E competencies have improved slightly too: Staff skills have improved in terms of data collection and reporting to for example the partners at provincial level. In terms of critical reflection, the organization's frequency of meetings has gone up in response to a need for more coordination amongst staff. This has resulted in a minor improvement on this particular indicator. Equally, the freedom for ideas has very slightly improved in that management is opening up to the idea to discuss ideas about program implementation with staff members. The system used to track the environment has been very slightly improved through more active networking of YPI in greater AIDS networks as well as utilizing social media more. YPI's best practice to involve partners and stakeholders in their program planning as a foundation to build long lasting relationships proves beneficial in terms of stakeholders responsiveness.

The capability to deliver on development objectives has shown the greatest improvement for YPI. In terms of clear operational plans, a very slight improvement has occurred as a result of YPI staff now being more aware of budget and funding sources and procedures. This resulted from open discussions with the Director. Cost-effective use of resources has greatly improved for YPI through a variety of policies. Amongst others, the merging of two offices, reduction of operational printing costs and fewer investments in computer hardware have greatly saved costs for the organization. In terms of delivering planned outputs, YPI has continued to improve its capacity to implement operational plans. YPI now highlights the importance of the relationship between work plan and financial plans prior to implementation to its staff members, which proves insightful for most. A slight improvement has occurred in terms of the mechanism for beneficiary needs through the introduction of two-way discussions. In balancing quality and efficiency, YPI has developed particularly the quality side of work through more structured work plans and program units. A monitoring system is in place to ensure that quality and efficiency remain balanced.

The capability to relate has slightly improved. Stakeholder engagement has slightly improved as a result of new collaborations with Aliansi Satu Visi, KPAN, KPAP DKI Jakarta and the Ministry of Social Affairs. Engagement with target groups has slightly improved as well, particularly through the organization of gatherings called OBRAS (lunch discussions) with particular guest speakers. Internal relationships have slightly improved due to more openness from management.

Finally, the capability to achieve coherence has only resulted in very slight improvements. In 2013 YPI facilitated a meeting to discuss and re-evaluate the organizations vision, mission and strategies. A slight improvement in terms of operational guidelines occurred since the baseline as board and management members now more frequently get involved in discussions about operational issues.

During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by YPI's staff: more motivated staff and improved reporting. This paragraph has already shown some changes that are related to these issues. How the MFS II funding was linked to the two identified key organisational capacity changes will be further explained in section 5.3.

**General organisational capacity changes related to MFS II Interventions**

The evaluators considered it important to also note down the SPO's story in terms of changes in the organisation since the baseline, and this would also provide more information about reasons for change, which were difficult to get for the individual indicators. Also for some issues there may not have been relevant indicators available in the list of core indicators provide by the evaluation team. Please note that this information is based only on the information provided by YRBI staff during the endline workshop, but no validation of this information has been done like with the process tracing causal maps. For details in relation to attribution, we refer to the next section (5.3).

During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by YPI staff, these have been captured in the general causal map in 4.2.2:

1. An increase in staff working performance
2. An improved network maintenance
3. Strengthened organization independency

All of these are expected to contribute to YPI's improvement in service quality. YPI staff experienced these as the most important capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline.

Increased staff working performance resulted from increased frequency of controlling beneficiaries for YPI program improvement; staff having opportunities to attend training; comparative studies and courses; ideas from staff being accepted; response to problems in the field; increased job security. The increased frequency of controlling of beneficiaries was enabled by the greater number of staff proficient in M&E, which was enabled by more training, such as the PME workshop funded by RutgersWPF. This could be attributed to an overall improvement of the organizations' professionalism due to donor requirements. Staff has had more opportunities to attend trainings and develop due to YPI's leaders willingness to send staff to more training opportunities as well as more funding to do so being available as a result of external funding. This was enabled by incentives from the leaders and the openness between staff and board due to the close internal relationships between management, board and staff. Both these factors can be attributed to the change in leadership style. Ideas from staff were more accepted which can again be attributed to the greater openness between staff and management. Quicker response to problems in the field was enabled by a more responsive organization, which was made possible by the new leadership style. Appropriate action responses from staff were enabled by more detailed working descriptions, which can be attributed to the change of leadership on the one hand, and by better guidelines in the form of revisions of SOPs and new SOPs on the other.

Increased job security was due the implementation of a salary standard and improving employment status to full time contracts. Both were enabled by utilizing savings from other costs to improve employment benefits. These resources were freed up through simplifying the organizational structure and optimizing the use of resources. This efficiency initiative was enabled by the change in leadership.

Improving YPI's network resulted from the use of social media as a communication tool to address stakeholders, and extending networks through other alliances and partners. Both were enabled by the existence of new partners for the YPI program due to good relationships with related organizations as a result of more intense networking activities. The network also extended to new groups through YPI's proactive stance to find network partners and funds. This can be attributed to the urgency imposed on the organization by the decreasing of donors.

Increased independency of YPI was enabled by the founding of a private company to provide services in training, facilitation, health services and accommodation. With this business, new more sustainable funding sources are being attempted.

In conclusion, the general key changes causal map only provides limited information about the relation between MFS II interventions with the organizational capacity changes that YPI considered most important since the baseline. During the endline process tracing workshop, YPI did not mention specific MFS II capacity interventions that in their opinion had affected the key changes. However, it must be noted that this workshop was held very early on in the evaluation process and that YPI struggled in developing the initial maps and relating them to capacity development. In the course of their involvement in the endline evaluation process, this has changed, and additional insights were developed. The process tracing maps in section 5.3 provide more detailed information about the relation between MFS II funded capacity interventions and key organizational capacity changes. For a more detailed analysis on this matter, please refer to section 5.3 where process tracing findings are presented which can answer the attribution question with more certainty and validity.

## 5.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity development to MFS II

This section aims to provide an answer to the second and fourth evaluation questions:

2. *To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?*
4. *What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?*

To address the question of attribution it was agreed that for all the countries in the 5C study, the focus would be on the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew, with a focus on MFS II supported organisational capacity development interventions that were possibly related to these capabilities. 'Process tracing' was used to get more detailed information about the changes in these capabilities that were possibly related to the specific MFS II capacity development interventions. The organisational capacity changes that were focused on were:

- More motivated staff
- More recognized capacity to deliver SRHR training
- Improved reporting

The first two organisational capacity changes fall under the capability to act and commit. The third organisational capacity change falls under the capability to adapt and self-renew. The organisational capacity change areas that were chosen are based on document review as well as discussions with the SPO and CFA. Each of these organisational capacity changes is further discussed below.

**The following issues are discussed for the MFS II funded activities that are related to the above mentioned organisational capacity changes:**

a. Design: the extent to which the MFS II supported capacity development intervention was well-designed. (Key criteria: relevance to the SPO; SMART objectives)
b. Implementation: the extent to which the MFS II supported capacity development was implemented as designed (key criteria: design, according to plans during the baseline);
c. Reaching objectives: the extent to which the MFS II capacity development intervention reached all its objectives (key criteria: immediate and long-term objectives, as formulated during the baseline);

d. the extent to which the observed results are attributable to the identified MFS II supported capacity development intervention (reference made to detailed causal map, based on 'process tracing').

**Please note that whilst (d) addresses the evaluation question related to attribution (evaluation question 2), the other three issues (a, b and c) have been added by the synthesis team as additional reporting requirements.** This was done when fieldwork for the endline process had already started and is also not the focus on this 5c evaluation. With the minimum information available the evaluation team tried to address these first 3 questions.

**More motivated staff**
Based on document review as well as interviews with CFA and SPO, more motivated staff was identified as a key organizational capacity change. However no specific MFS II funded capacity development interventions could be related to this organizational capacity change. Instead the change was mostly attributed to the external MFS II 5C baseline workshop process performed in 2012. Although was not designed as a MFS II funded organizational capacity intervention, it was experienced as an important capacity development intervention that triggered changes in terms of having more motivated staff. T

The questions regarding design, implementation, and reaching objectives are not applicable since this intervention wasn't planned and designed as a capacity development intervention funded by the CFA (MFS II). The attribution question will be answered however, in order to highlight how the baseline process invoked changes in organizational capacity at YPI, in particular in relation to having more motivated staff.

**Attribution of observed results to MFS II capacity development interventions**
YPI's more motivated staff occurred due to improved staff welfare and a better management working mechanism. Although neither of these factors relates to MFS II capacity development interventions, the MFS II baseline workshop process in 2012 triggered several changes in terms of organizational development that will be highlighted below (see also 4.3.1).

Staff welfare was improved after a series of changes in HR policies and operational efficiency which made work more enjoyable and effective. Since December 2013, better staff remuneration, new insurance benefits and improved job security through offering now permanent employment contracts are examples of implementations that occurred after a change of the leadership occurred in late 2012. This change in leadership style occurred after the organisation had performed a thorough internal evaluation. The director saw the value of changing his leadership style into a more responsive manner and open to his staff. He encouraged staff to express their ideas freely and raise concerns, which opened the door for discussion about remuneration and employment benefits.

In addition the new leadership style reduced operational costs and merged some of the YPI office, making communication and coordination of work much easier and greatly increasing operational efficiency. This too enabled improved staff welfare.

Finally the baseline evaluation workshop in 2012 forced staff and management to interact frequently, exchange ideas and thoughts and have more intensive meetings as this would result in more insight in to day to day activities, problems and opportunities. Meetings now also included more participants, including board members. This has led to better understanding amongst the board about what is occurring in the field.

On the whole, more motivated staff at YPI, due to improved staff welfare and improved management working mechanisms , where the result of many internal changes brought about by a change in leadership, after understanding organisational gaps which were identified in an internal evaluation that was set up after realising organisational capacity gaps with the external 5C baseline (MFS II) in 2012.

***More recognized capacity to deliver SRHR training***

The following MFS II capacity development interventions supported by Rutgers WPF are linked to the key organisational capacity change "More recognized capacity to deliver SRHR training" (please also see section 4.3):

1. SRHR training in October 2013

2. Training for Youth friendly services in November 2013
3. Workshop on strategic communication in September 2013

*SRHR training – 8-10 October 2013*

**Design**

This intervention was planned during the baseline, although no specific time was specified. The initiative was planned for YPI and other partners organizations of RutgersWPF, and intended to strengthen YPI's capacity to act and commit. Purposes of the workshop included: to evaluate the modules implementation and formulate various strategies for scaling up. And to learn from other partners about the hindrances in implementing sexuality modules in schools and best practices. Finally attendees were encouraged to learn about the context of SRHR education in Indonesia from a historical and social perspective.

The training was relevant for YPI as it relates closely to YPI's current expertise in HIV-AIDS issues. In the immediate term, RutgersWPF expected YPI to reach beneficiaries and advocate their needs to policy makers. In the long term, they expected YPI to enable program beneficiaries with improved knowledge and understanding of SRHR and ready to advocate their rights.

The expected effects and objectives were not formulated in a SMART way (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound). Then again, the evaluation team did not ask the CFA for SMART objectives specifically during the baseline, but rather asked about the expected or observed immediate and long term effects of the interventions.

**Implementation**

The SRHR training workshop was done between 8-10 October 2013 and attended by three YPI staff members. YPI presented their work at schools and juvenile institutions on SRHR education. In the workshop, all RutgersWPF partners that had implemented SRHR modules met and discussed the most current development of the modules implementation in different provinces in Indonesia.

**Reaching objectives**

Since the objectives haven't been formulated as SMART objectives, it is difficult to assess to what extent these objectives have been reached. However, RutgersWPF indicated that YPI picked up on the material quickly, and expected that in the long term, a solid SRHR education program would be implemented by YPI. Therefore both objectives appeared to have been met, although the long-term objective still has not been reached, but is on the right track. The CFA did indicate that competencies to train and communicate with target groups on SRHR issues had improved.

*Training for Youth friendly services – November 2013*

**Design**

This intervention was planned by the CFA during the baseline. The training was relevant for YPI as it was in line with the organization's objective to reach out to more youth in schools and local communities.

The immediate expected effect as stated by RutgersWPF in the baseline was that YPI would have a better perspective on SRHR services for youth. The long term objective was for YPI to have improved understanding of how to develop friendly services for their youth clients. None of the expected effects were formulated in a very SMART way (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound). Then again, the evaluation team did not ask the CFA for SMART objectives.

**Implementation**

The training was held by PKBI in Cibubur on November 2013 and was funded by MFS II as well as the ASK program. One YPI member attended the training, who was also an active volunteer in YPI, and a permanent member of the youth forum. To the knowledge of the evaluation team, the session was carried out as planned.

**Reaching objectives**

Since the objectives were not formulated in a SMART way, it is difficult to assess to what extent they have been reached.

The CFA has stated that YPI has remained the expert on HIV-AIDS issues in Indonesa amongst all its partners. With the implementation of several youth related initiatives, such as the foundation of a youth forum and visits to schools, a stronger focus on youth services has been achieved. This aligns

with the short term expectation of the CFA. In regards to the long term objective, no evidence could be found that more friendly services for youth clients were achieved, but then this objective was not formulated in a very SMART way, and is difficult to measure without more specific SMART criteria. The CFA did indicate that competencies related to train and communicate with target groups had improved.

*Workshop on strategic communication – September 2013*

**Design**

This intervention was not planned during the baseline, and therefore no expected outcomes were formulated for the short and long term. The training itself concerned mostly the effective communication towards clients utilizing a broad range of communication tools, including social media. The training is therefore very relevant to YPI as it relates to the focus and objective to relate to new target beneficiaries, particularly youth.

**Implementation**

The workshop took place in Bogor in September 2013 and was aimed at RutgersWPF partners in the One Vision Alliance, and partially funded by ASK and MenCare. According to the CFA, YPI was included as their communication did not appear as structured as it could be. Additionally, the CFA intended to increase YPI's capacity in formulating more creative, innovative and popular messages to their target groups, particularly through the application of social media. One YPI staff member attended the training.

**Reaching objectives**

Since no (SMART) objectives have been formulated for this intervention, it is not possible to specifically say whether objectives were reached. The CFA has stated that following the workshop, they immediately observed a higher number of visits to health providers. The also stated that following the workshop they hoped that YPI would see a long term improvement in effective communication of HIV-AIDS and SRHR campaigns in different media channels. The CFA did indicate that competencies related to train and communicate with target groups had improved.

**Attribution of observed results to MFS II capacity development interventions**

YPI was recognized as an organization with the capacity to deliver SRHR training in addition to being an HIV-AIDS expert. This was due the greater confidence in giving trainings and delivering SRHR information to beneficiaries since the baseline. This increased capacity can be attributed to three specific MFS II funded capacity interventions which brought about a series of organizational capacity changes (see also 4.3.1).

Greater confidence in giving trainings and delivering SRHR information to beneficiaries was due an increase in knowledge sharing to other organizations through an internship program on the one hand and through knowledge sharing to other organizations involved in the alliance on the other. Both these knowledge sharing opportunities were possible as a result of improved capacity of the organization as an SRHR expert. This resulted from improved competencies to train and communicates with target groups on SRHR issues on the one hand, but also due to the addition of new volunteer staff actively involved in for instance the youth programs.

The improved competencies can to a large extent be attributed to the three MFS II funded capacity interventions in the form of SRHR training, training for youth friendly services and the workshop on strategic communication, all of which took place in 2013.

On the whole, staff being confident in giving training and in delivering SRHR information to beneficiaries, can to a large extent be attributed to the MFS II capacity interventions that were carried out by RutgersWPF since the baseline in 2012. Specifically, these capacity interventions were a SRHR training; the training for youth friendly services; and a workshop on strategic communication, all held in 2013. In addition to that, having new volunteer staff members also played a role in this improved capacity.  on SRHR;training competency and ability to communicate effectively about the issue with target beneficiaries.

***Improved reporting***

The following MFS II capacity development interventions supported by Rutgers WPF are linked to the key organisational capacity change "Improved reporting" (please also see section 4.3):

1. M&E training workshop in 2013-2014

*M&E training workshop – July 2013 and January 2014*

**Design**

This intervention was planned during the baseline as ' M&E training' with the following immediate objective "Partners are able to use monitoring tools to report their progress" and the following long term objective "Partners have improved understanding of how to utilize M&E tools and analyse findings". .

In the baseline workshop M&E was established in the theory of change as an important issue, which makes it relevant to the organisation

The expected effects and objectives were not formulated in a SMART way (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound). Then again, the evaluation team did not ask the CFA for SMART objectives specifically during the baseline, but rather asked about the expected or observed immediate and long term effects of the interventions.

**Implementation**

The M&E training workshop was organized in two sessions. The first session was a three day workshop in July 2013 with the focus on an outcome measurement (OM) survey. In this workshop together with partners, Rutgers WPF discussed the purpose of conducting the OM survey, adjusted the methods (questionnaires etc), and developed work plans. Measuring Outcomes was a new approach introduced by the donor, to allow partners to see their achievements and whether they are on track or not.

The second session took place between 7-11 January 2014. The session discussed thoroughly all result areas under the MFS II project. Included in the workshop was the evaluation of the process, approach, strategy, strengths and weaknesses of the project implementation.

In both sessions, one staff member from YPI has attended.

**Reaching objectives**

Since the objectives haven't been formulated as SMART objectives, it is difficult to assess to what extent these objectives have been reached. However, RutgersWPF indicated that an immediate change observed was that M&E approaches became more structured, a positive development which met their immediate objective of YPI being able to use monitoring tools to report their progress. With respect to the long term objective, which entailed the improved understanding of how to utilize M&E tools and analyse findings, it was found that more M&E understanding was shared amongst colleagues and the tools were used in practice. Both objectives have been met, although it is difficult to be specific in this regard without more SMART objectives.

*Writing skills training – April to June 2013*

**Design**

This intervention was not specifically planned by the CFA during the baseline, although it was observed in the baseline (and prior) that YPI's reporting skills were poor. With the writing workshop, Rutgers WPF intended to improve that need in the immediate future. For the long term, the CFA expected that the workshop would also improve analytical skills of the attendees.

The need for improved reporting skills were recognized by both the CFA and SPO, as well as a strict requirement from the Donor. The intervention was therefore very relevant for YPI.

None of the expected effects were formulated in a SMART way (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound). Then again, the evaluation team did not ask the CFA for SMART objectives.

**Implementation**

This training consisted of 9 sessions, weekly, with 2 mentors, between April – June 2013. Partners from DKI Jakarta were invited to join the sessions held in the current Rutgers WPF Indonesia office in South Jakarta. The sessions were attended by one staff member from YPI who described the trainings as useful, relevant and effective.

This intervention was not planned for by the CFA during the baseline and details about the specific design cannot be provided, since this wasn't the focus of the evaluation. Therefore, no further judgement can be made on whether this intervention was implemented as designed.

**Reaching objectives**
Since the objectives were not formulated in a SMART way, it is difficult to assess to what extent they have been reached.

The CFA has stated that reporting has improved, although not yet for all off YPI staff members. The CFA has not been able to assess whether the long-term objective has been reached as well, particularly in regard as to whether individuals have increased their analytical skills, which is difficult to measure without moreSMART criteria.

**Attribution of observed results to MFS II capacity development interventions**
Improved reporting occurred due to supplying a variety of reports, increased capacity to write such reports, and supplying robust data as report material (see 4.3.2). Each of these developments can be attributed to MFS II interventions, as is described in detail below.

Supplying a variety of reports occurs as more accountable data is collected and because staff has increased its capacity to report better. More accountable data can be attributed to the sharing of results of the M&E training sessions which took place in 2013 and the increased ability to interview beneficiaries. Sharing of training experiences and validated data in general has been a key lesson of the M&E training workshop in 2013, whilst better interviews can be attributed to the improved staff skill to collect data. This too was a key component of the M&E training workshop. The workshop was funded by MFS II.

Furthermore staff's capacity to write reports has been brought about through sharing of the results of the writing skill training to other colleagues, as well as better understanding to write a good report of the staff member who attended the writing skill training sessions in 2013. Increased capacity to write reports can therefore be fully attributed to the writing skills training, which was 100% funded as an MFS II intervention by Rutgers WPF.

Lastly, supplying robust data as report material resulted from the availability of more accountable data on the one hand, as discussed above. On the other hand improved meetings (in which staff had begun to discuss data collected with their colleagues) contributed to more robust data as well. Improved meetings occurred due to more intensive regular staff meetings, more board meetings, and more staff involved in the general meetings. This new meeting culture resulted from the staff and management becoming aware of the importance of having such meetings and making them more intensive and interactive to encourage dialogue and sharing of ideas and concerns. This awareness was created by the process of the 5C baseline survey which occurred in 2012, and was also an MFS II supported intervention, albeit not intended and directly sponsored by the CFA as a capacity development intervention.

In conclusion, the key organisational capacity change "improved reporting" can be to a large extent attributed to MFS II funded capacity development interventions, in particular the M&E trainings in 2012 and the writing skills training in 2013, since these are related to enhanced capacity to collect robust data and enhanced capacity to write reports. Furthermore, the organisation has taken steps to improve their meetings after realising the importance of this during the 5C baseline study (MFS II).

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01-LAPORAN PKO-OCA-YPI JAKARTA -2013-final-bahan.docx

02-LAMPIRAN 1-TABEL ANALISIS DATA-PKO-OCA-YPI JAKARTA -2013- LAP -DRAFT.xlsx

Annex B_5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_CFA perspective_Indonesia_YPI_Rutgers WPF -- new input.docx

Special Evaluation Endline 2014. docx.docx

YPI - Biannual 2013 Final E2 - 5Aug13.docx

Annex A_5c endline_assessment sheet_Dutch co-financing organisations_Indonesia_YPI_Rutgers WPF

Annex B_5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_CFA perspective_Indonesia_YPI_Rutgers WPF

Observations interview CFA [raw notes]- Rutgers WPF

Report OCA 2013 - FINAL English.docx

RutgersWPF _AR2012_ENG.pdf

Annex ... 5c endline_questionnaire_PM&E Workshop_participant perspective_Indonesia_YPI_Elok Nastitit.doc

Annex ... 5c endline_questionnaire_Report Writing Workshop_participant perspective_Indonesia_YPI_interview_Wasiyati.doc

Annex C_5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_SPO perspective_Indonesia_YPI_English (1)

Annex R_5c endline_observable indicators at SPO_Indonesia_YPI

BAHASA-Annex C_5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_SPO perspective_Indonesia_YPI

BAHASA-Annex D_5c endline interview guide_partners_Indonesia_YPI.docx

BAHASA-Annex G_5c endline self assessment_subgroup_program staff_Indonesia_YPI.doc

BAHASA-Annex I_5c endline self-assessment_Admin HRM staff_Indonesia_YPI.doc

BAHASA-Annex J_5c endline self-assessement sheet_field staff_Indonesia_YPI.doc

BAHASA-Annex L_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_management_Indonesia_YPI.docx

BAHASA-Annex N_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_MandE staff_Indonesia_YPI.doc

BAHASA-Annex P_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_field staff_Indonesia_YPI (Salinan berkonflik renta sihombing 2014-10-24).doc

BAHASA-Annex Q_5c endline observation sheet_Indonesia_YPI.doc

BAHASA-Interview Training_SRHR_Atik_Indonesia_YPI.doc

BAHASA-Interview Training_Stategic Communication_Hikmah_Indonesia_YPI.doc

BAHASA-interview training_Strategic Communication_Rajab_Indonesia_YPI.doc

Bahasa-Notulen Workshop.docx

ENGLISH_Annex ... 5c endline_questionnaire_PM&E Workshop_participant perspective_Indonesia_YPI_Usep Sholahudin.docx

ENGLISH_Annex X_ 5c endline_questionnaire_Process Tracing C1.2 Capacity SRHR_participant perspective_Indonesia_YPI_Usep Sholahudin 03022015.docx

# List of Respondents

**People Present at the Workshops**

| **Date:** | **4-7 April 2014** | **Organisation: YayasanPelitaIlmu** | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **NAME** | **ROLE IN THE ORGANISATION** | **DURATION OF SERVICE** | **PHONE** | **E-MAIL** |
| **Management** | | | | |
| Usep Solehudin | Secretary of Board of Management | 20 years | 081510550752 | uhudin@yahoo.com |
| **Program/ Project staff** | | | | |
| Wasiyati | Clinic Coordinator | 24 years | 0818780728 | cedefour@yahoo.com |
| Tika Suryaatmaja | Manager Program | - | - | - |
| | | | | |
| **Field staff staff** | | | | |
| Siti Sundari | Field staff | 16 years | 08129422321 | sitisundari2007@yahoo.com |
| Rajab Kurniawan | Field Staff for Dance for life Program | | | |
| Elok Nastiti | Field Staff MFS II | | | |
| | | | | |
| **Administration / Keuangan** | | | | |
| Agus Suhendra | Administration / Finance | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |

**List of People Interviewed**

| **Date:** | | **Organisation: YayasanPelitaIlmu** | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **NAME** | **ROLE IN THE ORGANISATION** | **DURATION OF SERVICE** | **PHONE** | **E-MAIL** |
| **Management** | | | | |
| Usep Solehudin | Secretary of Board of Management | 20 years | 081510550752 | uhudin@yahoo.com |
| Husein Habsyi | Vice chairman | | 08121834881 | habsyi98@yahoo.com |
| **Program/ Project staff** | | | | |
| Wasiyati | Clinic Coordinator | 24 years | 0818780728 | cedefour@yahoo.com |
| Tika Suryaatmaja | Manager Program | | | |
| | | | | |
| **Admininistration / finance** | | | | |
| Agus Suhendra | Administration / Finance | - | - | - |
| **Field staff staff** | | | | |
| Siti Sundari | Field staff | 16 years | 08129422321 | sitisundari2007@yahoo.com |
| Elok Nastiti | Field Staff MFS II | | | |
| Rajab Kurniawan | Field Staff for Dance for life Program | | | |
| Fatimah | | | | |
| Monitoring and Evaluation | | | | |
| Eni | Monev staff for NU program | - | 0818770086 | - |
| **Others** | | | | |
| Yusuf | The Director of Vesta (partner) | | 08164273868 | |

# Appendix 1 Methodological approach & reflection

## Introduction

This appendix describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around four key evaluation questions:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

Note: the methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report. At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

## Changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 1

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?**

This question was mainly addressed by reviewing changes in 5c indicators, but additionally a 'general causal map' based on the SPO perspective on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline has been developed. Each of these is further explained below. The development of the general causal map is integrated in the steps for the endline workshop, as mentioned below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012.[31] Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1. **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2. **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3. **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4. **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5. **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

[31] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Below each of these steps is further explained.

*Step 1. Provide the **description of indicators** in the relevant formats – CDI team*

- These formats were to be used when collecting data from SPO staff, CFA, partners, and consultants. For each of these respondents different formats have been developed, based on the list of 5C indicators, similar to the procedure that was used during the baseline assessment. The CDI team needed to add the 2012 baseline description of each indicator. The idea was that each respondent would be requested to review each description per indicator, and indicate whether the current situation is different from the baseline situation, how this situation has changed, and what the reasons for the changes in indicators are. At the end of each format, a more general question is added that addresses how the organisation has changed its capacity since the baseline, and what possible reasons for change exist. Please see below the questions asked for each indicator as well as the more general questions at the end of the list of indicators.

General questions about key changes in the capacity of the SPO

*What do you consider to be the key changes in terms of how the organisation/ SPO has developed its capacity since the baseline (2012)?*

*What do you consider to be the main explanatory reasons (interventions, actors or factors) for these changes?*

**List of questions to be asked for each of the 5C indicators** (The entry point is the the description of each indicator as in the 2012 baseline report):

1. *How has the situation of this indicator changed compared to the situation during the baseline in 2012? Please tick one of the following scores:*
   - -2 = Considerable deterioration
   - -1 = A slight deterioration
   - 0 = No change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012
   - +1 = Slight improvement
   - +2 = Considerable improvement
2. *Please describe what exactly has changed since the baseline in 2012*

3. *What interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation in 2012? Please tick and describe what interventions, actors or factors influenced this indicator, and how. You can tick and describe more than one choice.*
   - Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by **SPO**: ..... .
   - Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **Dutch CFA (MFS II funding)**: .... .
   - Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **other funders**: ..... .
   - **Other** interventions, actors or factors: ..... .
   - Don't know.

*Step 2. **Review** the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team*

Before the in-country team and the CDI team started collecting data in the field, it was important that they reviewed the description for each indicator as described in the baseline reports, and also added to the endline formats for review by respondents. These descriptions are based on document review, observation, interviews with SPO staff, CFA staff and external respondents during the baseline. It was important to explain this to respondents before they filled in the formats.

*Step 3. **Send the formats** adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)*

The CDI team was responsible for collecting data from the CFA:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – CFA perspective.

The in-country team was responsible for collecting data from the SPO and from external respondents (except CFA). The following formats were sent before the fieldwork started:

- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – SPO perspective.
- 5C Endline interview guides for externals: partners; OD consultants.

*Step 4. **Collect, upload & code the documents** from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team*

The CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team, collected the following documents from SPOs and CFAs:

- Project documents: project proposal, budget, contract (Note that for some SPOs there is a contract for the full MFS II period 2011-2015; for others there is a yearly or 2-yearly contract. All new contracts since the baseline in 2012 will need to be collected);
- Technical and financial progress reports since the baseline in 2012;.
- Mid-term evaluation reports;
- End of project-evaluation reports (by the SPO itself or by external evaluators);
- Contract intake forms (assessments of the SPO by the CFA) or organisational assessment scans made by the CFA that cover the 2011-2014 period;
- Consultant reports on specific inputs provided to the SPO in terms of organisational capacity development;
- Training reports (for the SPO; for alliance partners, including the SPO);
- Organisational scans/ assessments, carried out by the CFA or by the Alliance Assessments;
- Monitoring protocol reports, especially for the 5C study carried out by the MFS II Alliances;
- Annual progress reports of the CFA and of the Alliance in relation to capacity development of the SPOs in the particular country;
- Specific reports that are related to capacity development of SPOs in a particular country.

The following documents (since the baseline in 2012) were requested from SPO:

- Annual progress reports;
- Annual financial reports and audit reports;
- Organisational structure vision and mission since the baseline in 2012;
- Strategic plans;

- Business plans;
- Project/ programme planning documents;
- Annual work plan and budgets;
- Operational manuals;
- Organisational and policy documents: finance, human resource development, etc.;
- Monitoring and evaluation strategy and implementation plans;
- Evaluation reports;
- Staff training reports;
- Organisational capacity reports from development consultants.

The CDI team will coded these documents in NVivo (qualitative data analysis software program) against the 5C indicators.

*Step 5.* ***Prepare and organise the field visit*** *to the SPO – in-country team*

Meanwhile the in-country team prepared and organised the logistics for the field visit to the SPO:

- **General endline workshop** consisted about one day for the self-assessments (about ½ to ¾ of the day) and brainstorm (about 1 to 2 hours) on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline and underlying interventions, factors and actors ('general causal map'), see also explanation below. This was done with the five categories of key staff: managers; project/ programme staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin & HRM staff; field staff. Note: for SPOs involved in process tracing an additional 1 to 1½ day workshop (managers; program/project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff) was necessary. See also step 7;
- **Interviews with SPO staff** (roughly one day);
- **Interviews with external respondents** such as partners and organisational development consultants depending on their proximity to the SPO. These interviews coulc be scheduled after the endline workshop and interviews with SPO staff.

General causal map

During the 5C endline process, a 'general causal map' has been developed, based on key organisational capacity changes and underlying causes for these changes, as perceived by the SPO. The general causal map describes cause-effect relationships, and is described both as a visual as well as a narrative.

As much as possible the same people that were involved in the baseline were also involved in the endline workshop and interviews.

*Step 6.* ***Interview the CFA*** *– CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for sending the sheets/ formats to the CFA and for doing a follow-up interview on the basis of the information provided so as to clarify or deepen the information provided. This relates to:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet - CFA perspective.

*Step 7.* ***Run the endline workshop*** *with the SPO – in-country team*

This included running the endline workshop, including facilitation of the development of the general causal map, self-assessments, interviews and observations. Particularly for those SPOs that were selected for process tracing all the relevant information needed to be analysed prior to the field visit, so as to develop an initial causal map. Please see Step 6 and also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two).

An endline workshop with the SPO was intended to:

- Explain the purpose of the fieldwork;
- Carry out in the self-assessments by SPO staff subgroups (unless these have already been filled prior to the field visits) - this may take some 3 hours.
- Facilitate a brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012 and underlying interventions, factors and actors.

***Purpose of the fieldwork*:** to collect data that help to provide information on what changes took place in terms of organisational capacity development of the SPO as well as reasons for these changes. The baseline that was carried out in 2012 was to be used as a point of reference.

***Brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes and influencing factors***: a brainstorm was facilitated on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012. In order to kick start the discussion, staff were reminded of the key findings related to the historical time line carried out in the baseline (vision, mission, strategies, funding, staff). This was then used to generate a discussion on key changes that happened in the organisation since the baseline (on cards). Then cards were selected that were related to organisational capacity changes, and organised. Then a 'general causal map' was developed, based on these key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change as experienced by the SPO staff. This was documented as a visual and narrative.This general causal map was to get the story of the SPO on what they perceived as key organisational capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline, in addition to the specific details provided per indicator.

***Self-assessments*:** respondents worked in the respective staff function groups: management; programme/ project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin and HRM staff; field staff. Staff were assisted where necessary so that they could really understand what it was they were being asked to do as well as what the descriptions under each indicator meant.

Note: for those SPOs selected for process tracing an additional endline workshop was held to facilitate the development of detailed causal maps for each of the identified organisational change/ outcome areas that fall under the capability to act and commit, and under the capability to adapt and self-renew, and that are likely related to capacity development interventions by the CFA. See also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two). It was up to the in-country team whether this workshop was held straight after the initial endline workshop or after the workshop and the follow-up interviews. It could also be held as a separate workshop at another time.

*Step 8.* ***Interview SPO staff*** *– in-country team*

After the endline workshop (developing the general causal map and carrying out self-assessments in subgroups), interviews were held with SPO staff (subgroups) to follow up on the information that was provided in the self-assessment sheets, and to interview staff that had not yet provided any information.

*Step 9.* ***Fill-in observation sheets*** *– in-country team*

During the visit at the SPO, the in-country team had to fill in two sheets based on their observation:

- 5C Endline observation sheet;
- 5C Endline observable indicators.

*Step 10.* ***Interview externals*** *– in-country team & CDI team*

The in-country team also needed to interview the partners of the SPO as well as organisational capacity development consultants that have provided support to the SPO. The CDI team interviewed the CFA.

*Step 11.* ***Upload and auto-code all the formats*** *collected by in-country team and CDI team – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for uploading and auto-coding (in Nvivo) of the documents that were collected by the in-country team and by the CDI team.

*Step 12. Provide the* ***overview of information*** *per 5C indicator to in-country team – CDI team*

After the analysis in NVivo, the CDI team provided a copy of all the information generated per indicator to the in-country team for initial analysis.

*Step 13.* ***Analyse the data and develop a draft description*** *of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team*

The in-country team provided a draft description of the findings per indicator, based on the information generated per indicator. The information generated under the general questions were linked to the general causal map or detailed process tracing related causal map.

*Step 14.* ***Analyse the data and finalize the description*** *of the findings per indicator, per capability and general – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for checking the analysis by the in-country team with the Nvivo generated data and to make suggestions for improvement and ask questions for clarification to which the in-country team responded. The CDI team then finalised the analysis and provided final descriptions and scores per indicator and also summarize these per capability and calculated the summary capability scores based on the average of all indicators by capability.

*Step 15.* ***Analyse the information*** *in the general causal map –in-country team & CDI team*

The general causal map based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff present at the workshop, was further detailed by in-country team and CDI team, and based on the notes made during the workshop and where necessary additional follow up with the SPO. The visual and narrative was finalized after feedback by the SPO. During analysis of the general causal map relationships with MFS II support for capacity development and other factors and actors were identified. All the information has been reviewed by the SPO and CFA.

## Attributing changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 2

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: ***To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?***

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process. The box below provides some background information on process tracing.

Background information on process tracing

The essence of process tracing research is that scholars want to go beyond merely identifying correlations between independent variables (Xs) and outcomes (Ys). Process tracing in social science is commonly defined by its addition to trace causal mechanisms (Bennett, 2008a, 2008b; Checkle, 2008; George & Bennett, 2005). A causal mechanism can be defined as "a complex system which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts" (Glennan, 1996, p. 52). Process tracing involves "attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable" (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 206-207).

Process tracing can be differentiated into three variants within social science: theory testing, theory building, and explaining outcome process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

- Theory testing process tracing uses a theory from the existing literature and then tests whether evidence shows that each part of hypothesised causal mechanism is present in a given case, enabling within case inferences about whether the mechanism functioned as expected in the case and whether the mechanism as a whole was present. No claims can be made however, about whether the mechanism was the only cause of the outcome.
- Theory building process tracing seeks to build generalizable theoretical explanations from empirical evidence, inferring that a more general causal mechanism exists from the fact of a particular case.
- Finally, explaining outcome process tracing attempts to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific historical case. Here the aim is not to build or test more general theories but to craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case centric than theory oriented.

Explaining outcome process tracing is the most suitable type of process tracing for analysing the causal mechanisms for selected key organisational capacity changes of the SPOs. This type of process tracing can be thought of as a single outcome study defined as seeking the causes of the specific outcome in a single case (Gerring, 2006; in: Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Here the ambition is to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a particular outcome, with sufficiency defined as an explanation that accounts for all of the important aspects of an outcome with no redundant parts being present (Mackie, 1965).

Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research strategy that aims to trace the complex conglomerate of systematic and case specific causal mechanisms that produced the outcome in question. The explanation cannot be detached from the particular case. Explaining outcome process tracing refers to case studies whose primary ambition is to explain particular historical outcomes, although the findings of the case can also speak to other potential cases of the phenomenon. Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research process in which 'theories' are tested to see whether they can provide a minimally sufficient explanation of the outcome. Minimal sufficiency is defined as an explanation that accounts for an outcome, with no redundant parts. In most explaining outcome studies, existing theorisation cannot provide a sufficient explanation, resulting in a second stage in which existing theories are re-conceptualised in light of the evidence gathered in the preceding empirical analysis. The conceptualisation phase in explaining outcome process tracing is therefore an iterative research process, with initial mechanisms re-conceptualised and tested until the result is a theorised mechanism that provides a minimally sufficient explanation of the particular outcome.

Below a description is provided of how SPOs are selected for process tracing, and a description is provided on how this process tracing is to be carried out. Note that this description of process tracing provides not only information on the extent to which the changes in organisational development can be attributed to MFS II (evaluation question 2), but also provides information on other contributing factors and actors (evaluation question 4). Furthermore, it must be noted that the evaluation team has developed an adapted form of 'explaining outcome process tracing', since the data collection and analysis was an iterative process of research so as to establish the most realistic explanation for a particular outcome/ organisational capacity change. Below selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

**Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing**

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on

17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

**ETHIOPIA**

For Ethiopia the capabilities that are mostly targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 1

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Ethiopia*

| Capability to: | AMREF | CARE | ECFA | FSCE | HOA-REC | HUNDEE | NVEA | OSRA | TTCA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Relate | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| Achieve coherence | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Ethiopia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE. In fact, six SPOs would be suitable for process tracing. We just selected the first one per CFA following the criteria of not including more than one SPO per CFA for process tracing

Table 2

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Ethiopia*

| Ethiopia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AMREF | Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | AMREF NL | Yes |
| CARE | Dec 31, 2015 | Partly | Yes | Yes | Yes – slightly | CARE Netherlands | No - not fully matching |
| ECFA | Jan 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Child Helpline International | Yes |
| FSCE | Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN); Note: no info from Defence for Children – ECPAT Netherlands | Yes |
| HOA-REC | Sustainable Energy project (ICCO Alliance): 2014<br>Innovative WASH (WASH Alliance): Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes - slightly | ICCO | No - not fully matching |
| HUNDEE | Dec 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO & IICD | Yes |
| NVEA | Dec 2015 (both) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Edukans Foundation (under two consortia); Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN) | Suitable but SKN already involved for process tracing FSCE |
| OSRA | C4C Alliance project (farmers marketing): December 2014<br>ICCO Alliance project (zero grazing: 2014 (2nd phase) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO & IICD | Suitable but ICCO & IICD already involved for process tracing - HUNDEE |
| TTCA | June 2015 | Partly | Yes | No | Yes | Edukans Foundation | No - not fully matching |

**INDIA**

For India the capability that is mostly targeted by CFAs is the capability to act and commit. The next one in line is the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below in which a higher score means that the specific capability is more intensively targeted.

Table 3

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – India*[32]

| Capability to: | BVHA | COUNT | DRISTI | FFID | Jana Vikas | Samarthak Samiti | SMILE | SDS | VTRC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 5 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 4 |
| Relate | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, India.

Below you can see a table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether SPO and the CFA both expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE and VTRC. Except for SMILE (capability to act and commit only), for the other SPOs the focus for process tracing can be on the capability to act and commit and on the capability to adapt and self-renew.

Table 4

*SPOs selected for process tracing – India*

| India – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BVHA | 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Simavi | Yes; both capabilities |
| COUNT | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Woord en Daad | Yes; both capabilities |
| DRISTI | 31-03-2012 | Yes | Yes | No | no | Hivos | No - closed in 2012 |
| FFID | 30-09-2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |

[32] RGVN, NEDSF and Women's Rights Forum (WRF) could not be reached timely during the baseline due to security reasons. WRF could not be reached at all. Therefore these SPOs are not included in Table 1.

| India – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jana Vikas | 2013 | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No - contract is and the by now; not fully matching focus |
| NEDSF | | | | | | | No – delayed baseline |
| RGVN | | | | | | | No - delayed baseline |
| Samarthak Samiti (SDS) | 2013 possibly longer | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Hivos | No - not certain of end date and not fully matching focus |
| Shivi Development Society (SDS) | Dec 2013 intention 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No - not fully matching focus |
| Smile | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Wilde Ganzen | Yes; first capability only |
| VTRC | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Stichting Red een Kind | Yes; both capabilities |

**INDONESIA**

For Indonesia the capabilities that are most frequently targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 5

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Indonesia*

| Capability to: | ASB | Daya kologi | ECPAT | GSS | Lem baga Kita | Pt. PPMA | Rifka Annisa | WIIP | Yad upa | Yayasan Kelola | YPI | YRBI |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 4 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 3 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 |
| Relate | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, Indonesia.

The table below describes when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: ASB, ECPAT, Pt.PPMA, YPI, YRBI.

Table 6

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Indonesia*

| Indonesia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ASB | February 2012; extension Feb,1, 2013 – June,30, 2016 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Hivos | Yes |
| Dayakologi | 2013; no extension | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No: contract ended early and not matching enough |
| ECPAT | August 2013; Extension Dec 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes, a bit | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | Yes |
| GSS | 31 December 2012; no extension | Yes | Yes | Yes, a bit | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | No: contract ended early |
| Lembaga Kita | 31 December 2012; no extension | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | No - contract ended early |
| Pt.PPMA | May 2015 | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | IUCN | Yes, capability to act and commit only |
| Rifka Annisa | Dec, 31 2015 | No | Yes | No | Yes | Rutgers WPF | No - no match between expectations CFA and SPO |
| WIIP | Dec 2015 | Yes | Not MFS II | Yes | Not MFS II | Red Cross | No - Capacity development interventions are not MFS II financed. Only some overhead is MFS II |

| Indonesia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yayasan Kelola | Dec 30, 2013; extension of contract being processed for two years (2014-2015) | Yes | Not really | Yes | Not really | Hivos | No - no specific capacity development interventions planned by Hivos |
| YPI | Dec 31, 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Rutgers WPF | Yes |
| YRBI | Oct, 30, 2013; YRBI end of contract from 31st Oct 2013 to 31st Dec 2013. Contract extension proposal is being proposed to MFS II, no decision yet. | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |
| Yadupa | Under negotiation during baseline; new contract 2013 until now | Yes | Nothing committed | Yes | Nothing committed | IUCN | No, since nothing was committed by CFA |

**LIBERIA**

For Liberia the situation is arbitrary which capabilities are targeted most CFA's. Whilst the capability to act and commit is targeted more often than the other capabilities, this is only so for two of the SPOs. The capability to adapt and self-renew and the capability to relate are almost equally targeted for the five SPOs, be it not intensively. Since the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew are the most targeted capabilities in Ethiopia, India and Indonesia, we choose to focus on these two capabilities for Liberia as well. This would help the synthesis team in the further analysis of these capabilities related to process tracing. See also the table below.

Table 7

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Liberia*

| Capability to: | BSC | DEN-L | NAWOCOL | REFOUND | RHRAP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Relate | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, Liberia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Also, for two of the five SPOs capability to act and commit is targeted more intensively compared to the other capabilities. Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BSC and RHRAP.

Table 8

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Liberia*

| Liberia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BSC | Dec 31, 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | SPARK | Yes |
| DEN-L | 2014 | No | No | Unknown | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| NAWOCOL | 2014 | Yes | No | No | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| REFOUND | At least until 2013 (2015?) | Yes | No | Yes | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| RHRAP | At least until 2013 (2014?) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |

**Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study**

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ' general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

7.

Some definitions of the terminology used for this MFS II 5c evaluation

Based upon the different interpretations and connotations the use of the term causal mechanism we use the following terminology for the remainder of this paper:

- A **detailed causal map** (or **model of change)** = the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change.
- A **causal mechanism** = is the combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 176).
- **Part** or **cause** = one actor with its attributes carrying out activities/ producing outputs that lead to change in other parts. The final part or cause is the change/ outcome.
- **Attributes of the actor** = specificities of the actor that increase his chance to introduce change or not such as its position in its institutional environment.

*Step 1. Identify the **planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

Chapter 4.1 and 4.2 in the baseline report were reviewed. Capacity development interventions as planned by the CFA for the capability to act and commit and for the capability to adapt and self-renew were described and details inserted in the summary format. This provided an overview of the capacity development activities that were originally planned by the CFA for these two capabilities and assisted in focusing on relevant outcomes that are possibly related to the planned interventions.

*Step 2. Identify the **implemented capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

The input from the CFA was reviewed in terms of what capacity development interventions have taken place in the MFS II period. This information was be found in the 'Support to capacity development sheet - endline - CFA perspective' for the SPO, based on details provided by the CFA and further discussed during an interview by the CDI team.

The CFA was asked to describe all the MFS II supported capacity development interventions of the SPO that took place during the period 2011 up to now. The CDI team reviewed this information, not only the interventions but also the observed changes as well as the expected long-term changes, and

then linked these interventions to relevant outcomes in one of the capabilities (capability to act and commit; and capability to adapt and self-renew).

*Step 3. Identify **initial changes/ outcome areas** in these two capabilities – by CDI team & in-country team*

The CDI team was responsible for **coding** documents received from SPO and CFA in NVivo on the following:

- **5C Indicators**: this was to identify the changes that took place between baseline and endline. This information was coded in Nvivo.
- Information related to the **capacity development interventions implemented by the CFA** (with MFS II funding) (see also Step 2) to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. For example, the training on financial management of the SPO staff could be related to any information on financial management of the SPO. This information was coded in Nvivo.

In addition, the response by the CFA to the changes in 5C indicators format, was auto-coded.

The in-country team was responsible for timely collection of information from the SPO (before the fieldwork starts). This set of information dealt with:

- MFS II supported capacity development interventions during the MFS II period (2011 until now).
- Overview of all trainings provided in relation to a particular outcome areas/organisational capacity change since the baseline.
- For each of the identified MFS II supported trainings, training questionnaires have been developed to assess these trainings in terms of the participants, interests, knowledge and skills gained, behaviour change and changes in the organisation (based on Kirkpatrick's model), one format for training participants and one for their managers. These training questionnaires were sent prior to the field visit.
- Changes expected by SPO on a long-term basis ('Support to capacity development sheet - endline - SPO perspective').

For the selection of change/ outcome areas the following criteria were important:

- The change/ outcome area is in one of the two capabilities selected for process tracing: capability to act and commit or the capability to adapt and self-renew. This was the first criteria to select upon.
- There was a likely link between the key organisational capacity change/ outcome area and the MFS II supported capacity development interventions. This also was an important criteria. This would need to be demonstrated through one or more of the following situations:
  - In the 2012 **theory of change** on organisational capacity development of the SPO a link was indicated between the outcome area and MFS II support;
  - During the baseline the CFA indicated a link between **the planned MFS II support** to organisational development and the expected short-term or long-term results in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the **CFA** indicated a link between **the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions** and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the **SPO** indicated a link between **the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions** and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities.

Reviewing the information obtained as described in Step 1, 2, and 3 provided the basis for selecting key organisational capacity change/ outcome areas to focus on for process tracing. These areas were to be formulated as broader outcome areas, such as 'improved financial management', 'improved monitoring and evaluation' or 'improved staff competencies'.

Note: the outcome areas were to be formulated as intermediates changes. For example: an improved monitoring and evaluation system, or enhanced knowledge and skills to educate the target group on

climate change. Key outcome areas were also verified - based on document review as well as discussions with the SPO during the endline.

*Step 4. Construct the **detailed, initial causal map** (theoretical model of change) – CDI & in-country team*

A detailed initial causal map was developed by the CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team. This was based on document review, including information provided by the CFA and SPO on MFS II supported capacity development interventions and their immediate and long-term objectives as well as observed changes. Also, the training questionnaires were reviewed before developing the initial causal map. This detailed initial causal map was to be provided by the CDI team with a visual and related narrative with related references. This initial causal map served as a reference point for further reflection with the SPO during the process tracing endline workshop, where relationships needed to be verified or new relationships established so that the second (workshop-based), detailed causal map could be developed, after which further verification was needed to come up with the final, concluding detailed causal map.

It's important to note that organisational change area/ outcome areas could be both positive and negative.

For each of the selected outcomes the team needed to make explicit the theoretical model of change. This meant finding out about the range of different actors, factors, actions, and events etc. that have contributed to a particular outcome in terms of organisational capacity of the SPO.

A model of change of good quality includes:

- The causal pathways that relate the intervention to the realised change/ outcome;
- Rival explanations for the same change/ outcome;
- Assumptions that clarify relations between different components or parts;
- Case specific and/or context specific factors or risks that might influence the causal pathway, such as for instance the socio-cultural-economic context, or a natural disaster;
- Specific attributes of the actors e.g. CFA and other funders.

A model of change (within the 5C study called a 'detailed causal map') is a complex system which produces intermediate and long-term outcomes by the interaction of other parts. It consists of parts or causes that often consist of one actor with its attributes that is implementing activities leading to change in other parts (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). A helpful way of constructing the model of change is to think in terms of actors carrying out activities that lead to other actors changing their behaviour. The model of change can be explained as a range of activities carried out by different *actors* (including the CFA and SPO under evaluation) that will ultimately lead to an outcome. Besides this, there are also '*structural*' elements, which are to be interpreted as external factors (such as economic conjuncture); and *attributes* of the actor (does the actor have the legitimacy to ask for change or not, what is its position in the sector) that should be looked at (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). In fact Beach and Pedersen, make a fine point about the subjectivity of the actor in a dynamic context. This means, in qualitative methodologies, capturing the changes in the actor, acted upon area or person/organisation, in a non sequential and non temporal format. Things which were done recently could have corrected behavioural outcomes of an organisation and at the same ime there could be processes which incrementally pushed for the same change over a period of time. Beach and Pedersen espouse this methodology because it captures change in a dynamic fashion as against the methodology of logical framework. For the MFS II evaluation it was important to make a distinction between those paths in the model of change that are the result of MFS II and rival pathways.
The construction of the model of change started with the identified key organisational capacity change/ outcome, followed by an inventory of all possible subcomponents that possibly have caused the change/ outcome in the MFS II period (2011-up to now, or since the baseline). The figure below presents an imaginary example of a model of change. The different colours indicate the different types of support to capacity development of the SPO by different actors, thereby indicating different pathways of change, leading to the key changes/ outcomes in terms of capacity development (which in this case indicates the ability to adapt and self-renew).





***Figure 1*** *An imaginary example of a model of change*

*Step 5. Identify* ***types of evidence*** *needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams with support from CDI team*

Once the causal mechanism at theoretical level were defined, empirical evidence was collected so as to verify or discard the different parts of this theoretical model of change, confirm or reject whether subcomponents have taken place, and to find evidence that confirm or reject the causal relations between the subcomponents.

A key question that we needed to ask ourselves was, *"What information do we need in order to confirm or reject that one subcomponent leads to another, that X causes Y?"*. The evaluation team needed to agree on what information was needed that provides empirical manifestations for each part of the model of change.

There are four distinguishable types of evidence that are relevant in process tracing analysis: *pattern, sequence, trace, and account*. Please see the box below for descriptions of these types of evidence.

The evaluation team needed to agree on the types of evidence that was needed to verify or discard the manifestation of a particular part of the causal mechanism. Each one or a combination of these different types of evidence could be used to confirm or reject the different parts of the model of change. This is what is meant by robustness of evidence gathering. Since causality as a concept can bend in many ways, our methodology, provides a near scientific model for accepting and rejecting a particular type of evidence, ignoring its face value.

Types of evidence to be used in process tracing

- **Pattern evidence** relates to predictions of statistical patterns in the evidence. For example, in testing a mechanism of racial discrimination in a case dealing with employment, statistical patterns of employment would be relevant for testing this part of the mechanism.
- **Sequence evidence** deals with the temporal and spatial chronology of events predicted by a hypothesised causal mechanism. For example, a test of the hypothesis could involve expectations of the timing of events where we might predict that if the hypothesis is valid, we should see that the event B took place after event A took place. However, if we found that event B took place before event A took place, the test would suggest that our confidence in the validity of this part of the mechanism should be reduced (disconfirmation/ falsification).
- **Trace evidence** is evidence whose mere existence provides proof that a part of a hypothesised mechanism exists. For example, the existence of the minutes of a meeting, if authentic ones, provide strong proof that the meeting took place.
- **Account evidence** deals with the content of empirical material, such as meeting minutes that detail what was discussed or an oral account of what took place in the meeting.

*Source*: Beach and Pedersen, 2013

Below you can find a table that provides guidelines on what to look for when identifying types of evidence that can confirm or reject causal relationships between different parts/ subcomponents of the model of change. It also provides one example of a part of a causal pathway and what type of information to look for.

Table 9

*Format for identifying types of evidence for different causal relationships in the model of change (example included)*

| Part of the model of change | Key questions | Type of evidence needed | Source of information |
|---|---|---|---|
| Describe relationship between the subcomponents of the model of change | Describe questions you would like to answer a so as to find out whether the components in the relationship took place, when they took place, who was involved, and whether they are related | Describe the information that we need in order to answer these questions.<br>Which type of evidence can we use in order to reject or confirm that subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y?<br>Can we find this information by means of :<br>Pattern evidence;<br>Sequence evidence;<br>Trace evidence;<br>Account evidence? | Describe where you can find this information |
| Example:<br>Training workshops on M&E provided by MFS II funding and other sources of funding | Example:<br>What type of training workshops on M&E took place?<br>Who was trained?<br>When did the training take place?<br>Who funded the training?<br>Was the funding of training provided before the training took place?<br>How much money was available for the training? | Example:<br>Trace evidence: on types of training delivered, who was trained, when the training took place, budget for the training<br><br>Sequence evidence on timing of funding and timing of training<br><br>Content evidence: what the training was about | Example:<br>Training report<br>SPO Progress reports<br>interviews with the CFA and SPO staff<br>Financial reports SPO and CFA |

Please note that for practical reasons, the 5C evaluation team decided that it was easier to integrate the specific questions in the narrative of the initial causal map. These questions would need to be addressed by the in country team during the process tracing workshop so as to discover, verify or

discard particular causal mechanisms in the detailed, initial causal map. Different types of evidence was asked for in these questions.

*Step 6. **Collect data** to verify or discard causal mechanisms and develop workshop-based, detailed causal map – in-country team*

Once it was decided by the in-country and CDI evaluation teams what information was to be collected during the interaction with the SPO, data collection took place. The initial causal maps served as a basis for discussions during the endline workshop with a particular focus on process tracing for the identified organisational capacity changes. But it was considered to be very important to understand from the perspective of the SPO how they understood the identified key organisational capacity change/outcome area has come about. A new detailed, workshop-based causal map was developed that included the information provided by SPO staff as well as based on initial document review as described in the initial detailed causal map. This information was further analysed and verified with other relevant information so as to develop a final causal map, which is described in the next step.

*Step 7. **Assess the quality** of data and **analyse data**, and develop the **final detailed causal map** (model of change) – in-country team and CDI team*

Quality assurance of the data collected and the evidence it provides for rejecting or confirming parts of causal explanations are a major concern for many authors specialised in contribution analysis and process-tracing. Stern et al. (2012), Beach and Pedersen (2013), Lemire, Nielsen and Dybdal (2012), Mayne (2012) and Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) all emphasise the need to make attribution/ contribution claims that are based on pieces of evidence that are rigorous, traceable, and credible. These pieces of evidence should be as explicit as possible in proving that *subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y* and ruling out other explanations. Several tools are proposed to check the nature and the quality of data needed. One option is, Delahais and Toulemonde's Evidence Analysis Database, which we have adapted for our purpose.

Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) propose an Evidence Analysis Database that takes into consideration three criteria:

- Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no);
- Type of causal mechanism: intended contribution/ other contribution/ condition leading to intended contribution/ intended condition to other contribution/ feedback loop;
- Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak.

We have adapted their criteria to our purpose. The in-country team, in collaboration with the CDI team, used the criteria in assessing whether causal relationships in the causal map, were strong enough. This has been more of an iterative process trying to find additional evidence for the established relationships through additional document review or contacting the CFA and SPO as well as getting their feedback on the final detailed causal map that was established. Whilst the form below has not been used exactly in the manner depicted, it has been used indirectly when trying to validate the information in the detailed causal map. After that, the final detailed causal map is established both as a visual as well as a narrative, with related references for the established causal relations.

| *Example format for the adapted evidence analysis database (example included)* **Description of causal relation** | **Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no)** | **Type of information providing the background to the confirmation or rejection of the causal relation** | **Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak** | **Explanation for why the evidence is (rather) strong or (rather) weak, and therefore the causal relation is confirmed/ rejected** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| e.g. Training staff in M&E leads to enhanced M&E knowledge, skills and practice | e.g. Confirmed | e.g. Training reports confirmed that staff are trained in M&E and that knowledge and skills increased as a result of the training | | |

*Step 8.* ***Analyse and conclude*** *on findings– in-country team and CDI team*

The final detailed causal map was described as a visual and narrative and this was then analysed in terms of the evaluation question two and evaluation question four: *"To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?"* and *"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"* It was analysed to what extent the identified key organisational capacity change can be attributed to MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as to other related factors, interventions and actors.

## Explaining factors – evaluation question 4

This paragraph describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This has been explained in the first section of this appendix. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information was procured for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the process of process tracing as described in the section above.

## Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team.

**Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach:** this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has

provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

**Using standard indicators and scores**: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

**General causal map:** whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

**Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question:** this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is

crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

**Utilisation of the evaluation**

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

Design – mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

**Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication:** many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

**5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process:** The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process

tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

# Appendix 2 Background information on the five core capabilities framework

The 5 capabilities (5C) framework was to be used as a framework for the evaluation of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs) of the MFS II consortia. The 5C framework is based on a five-year research program on 'Capacity, change and performance' that was carried out by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). The research included an extensive review of the literature and sixteen case studies. The 5C framework has also been applied in an IOB evaluation using 26 case studies in 14 countries, and in the baseline carried out per organisation by the MFS II organisations for the purpose of the monitoring protocol.

The 5C framework is structured to understand and analyse (changes in) the capacity of an organization to deliver (social) value to its constituents. This introduction briefly describes the 5C framework, mainly based on the most recent document on the 5C framework (Keijzer et al., 2011).

The 5C framework sees capacity as an **outcome** of an **open system**. An organisation or collaborative association (for instance a network) is seen as a system interacting with wider society. The most critical practical issue is to ensure that relevant stakeholders share a common way of thinking about capacity and its core constituents or capabilities. Decisive for an organisation's capacity is the context in which the organisation operates. This means that **understanding context issues** is crucial. The use of the 5C framework requires a multi-stakeholder approach because shared values and results orientation are important to facilitate the capacity development process. The 5C framework therefore needs to **accommodate the different visions** of stakeholders and conceive different strategies for raising capacity and improving performance in a given situation.

The 5C framework defines capacity as '**producing social value'** and identifies five core capabilities that together result in that overall capacity. Capacity, capabilities and competences are seen as follows:

**Capacity** is referred to as the overall ability of an organisation or system to create value for others;

**Capabilities** are the collective ability of a group or a system to do something either inside or outside the system. The collective ability involved may be technical, logistical, managerial or generative (i.e. the ability to earn legitimacy, to adapt, to create meaning, etc.);

**Competencies** are the energies, skills and abilities of individuals.

Fundamental to developing capacity are inputs such as human, material and financial resources, technology, and information. To the degree that they are developed and successfully integrated, capabilities contribute to the overall capacity or ability of an organisation or system to create value for others. A single capability is not sufficient to create capacity. All are needed and are strongly interrelated and overlapping. Thus, to achieve its development goals, the 5C framework says that every organisation or system must have **five basic capabilities:**

- The capability to act and commit;
- The capability to deliver on development objectives;
- The capability to adapt and self-renew;
- The capability to relate (to external stakeholders);
- The capability to achieve coherence.

In order to have a common framework for evaluation, the five capabilities have been reformulated in outcome domains and for each outcome domain performance indicators have been developed. A detailed overview of capabilities with outcome domains and indicators is attached in Appendix 3.

There is some overlap between the five core capabilities but together the five capabilities result in a certain level of capacity. Influencing one capability may have an effect on one or more of the other capabilities. In each situation, the level of any of the five capabilities will vary. Each capability can become stronger or weaker over time.

# Appendix 3 Changes in organisational capacity of the SPO - 5C indicators

Below you will find a description for each of the indicators under each of the capabilities, what the situation is as assessed during the endline, how this has changed since the baseline and what are the reasons for change.

**Endline Description of Indicators Yayasan Pelita Ilmu (YPI)**
**Capability to Act and to Commit**

1.1 Responsive leadership: 'Leadership is responsive, inspiring and sensitive'

*This is about leadership within the organisation (operational, strategic). If there is a larger body then you may also want to refer to leadership at a higher level but not located at the local organisation.*

As in the baseline, leadership is still considered to be flexible, familial and sensitive. At this stage the leadership of YPI (referred to the board of executives) has shown improvement in their responsiveness and openness to organizational and programmatic issues. . The areas of leadership where improvements took place, are in the areas of program and strategic management, communication and partnership. YPI staff appreciated the improvement on how management responded to: 1) appreciation to the staff' ideas and providing constructive feedback 2) program implementation improved by having staff meetings at least once a week; 3) decision in office management strategy by merging 3 offices into 2 offices that lead to improved coordination; 4) firmness and promptness in decisions made; 5) stimulating inspiring and creative program design and implementation and 6) changing the form or relationship in their partnership with Vesta.

Score : From 4 to 4.75 (improvement)

1.2. Strategic guidance: 'Leaders provide appropriate strategic guidance (strategic leader and operational leader)

*This is about the extent to which the leader(s) provide strategic directions*

The changes indicated in strategic guidance have a strong relationship with the improvement in responsive leadership practiced over 2012-2014. Most of the findings presented that the leadership has practiced the same approach in strategic guidance where the formal and informal approaches are applied. The strategic guidance has become more specific and consistent with program strategic plans. The YPI's leadership has more attention to the program outputs delivered by Vesta. On the other hand, YPI has positioned themselves as equal partners to Vesta. It has created a change of their relationship. Vesta felt YPI has become more appreciative to their inputs, for example their advice to have more formal meetings at six monthly basis to facilitate program discussion has been taken into account. They are now using this event as an opportunity to review their program. On the other hand, the YPI leadership has been open to inputs and feedbacks that lead to their ability to respond creatively. This is shown by the approach of nurturing, sharing and learning amongst Vesta field office such as sharing data management. Furthermore, strategic guidance has improved in terms of improved coordination by merging 3 offices to 2, by making decisions more promptly and firmly and by stimulating creative and inspiring program design.

Score: From 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

1.3. Staff turnover: 'Staff turnover is relatively low'

*This is about staff turnover.*

In the baseline, there were 15 permanent staffs, 55 contract staffs, and 72 volunteers. However, since December 2013, the management decided after the contract staffs ended, there were no more contract staffs. Some contract staffs were given opportunities to become permanent staffs therefore the permanent staffs are 20 consists of 13 female and 7 male. Based on the amount of permanent staff, there is no staff resigned from YPI.

Score: From 3 to 3 (no change)

1.4 . Organisational structure 'Existence of clear organization structure reflecting the objectives of the organization"
*Observable indicator: Staff have copy of org. structure and understand this*

The organisational structure is still the same as during the baseline. There is a formal structure including a Board of Trustees, an Executive Board, staff and volunteers. Responsibilities and decision-making power are shared between these groups. The higher forums focus on policy aspects and lower forums on project implementation and day to day activities.

Score: From 3 to 3 (no change)

1.5 Articulated Strategies. Strategies are articulated and based on good situation analysis and adequate M&E
*Observable indicator: strategies are well articulated. Situation analysis and monitoring and evaluation are used to inform strategies.*

There is an improvement in monitoring and evaluation which assists YPI in developing work plans and strategies. They have quarterly meetings to follow up the data M&E. The findings in M&E will be followed up in each project. YPI strengthened the understanding of PME and the stages of implementation of project, knowing what a baseline survey is and how to do that, whilst also understanding how to use the field data which can be used for developing a new program.

Score: From 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

1.6. Daily operations: 'Day to day operations are in line with strategic plans'
*This is about the extent to which day-to-day operations are aligned with strategic plans.*

Leadership initiatives are supported by proactive staff, and now there is sufficient budget allocation from several funding sources. YPI has been implementing the activities in accordance with the organization's strategic plan, even though in implementation sometimes the operations depend on donor funding, but YPI now has a small budget allocation to ensure small activities keep going.

Score: From 3.5 to 3.75 (very slight improvement)

1.7. Staff skills: 'Staff have necessary skills to do their work
*This is about whether staff have the skills necessary to do their work and what skills they might they need.*

The staffs have the skills required to perform the work. Most of them are having related experience in implementing HIV/AIDS programs. YPI has responded to baseline findings on weaknesses in their staff' skills, by facilitating capacity building for their staff. Formally, the staffs are trained in several topics such as SRHR and strategic communication. The alternative approach to increase staff' skills through sharing sessions are regularly conducted at weekly meetings where one staff is appointed to deliver one relevant issue to be presented to colleagues. The management also facilitates the staff skills improvement through leading by example in terms of sharing experience and skills to the staff in an informal and less structured way. In addition to improve staff knowledge and skills on SRHR, staff skills has also improved in terms of data collection and reporting. Some staff also increases their capacity in managing program and financial management. However, staffs still lack analytical skills to understand problems in the field.

Score: From 3 to 3.5 (Slight improvement)

1.8. Training opportunities: 'Appropriate training opportunities are offered to staff'
*This is about whether staff at the SPO are offered appropriate training opportunities*

The management is open to their staff in terms of training opportunities coming from related programs or as collaboration with other NGOs. The numbers of opportunities did increased slightly from 2012 onwards, and training are still based on selecting people were able and willing to attend training. The staff noted that most of the time the same persons are sent to several trainings. An MFS II funded training on monitoring and evaluation in 2012, has increased the competencies of staff as a project officer of MFS II to collect and report on more accountable data. Furthermore, a writing skills

training in 2013, which was funded by MFS II, has improved the capacity of program manager write reports.

Score: From 4 to 4 (no change)

1.9.1 Incentives: 'Appropriate incentives are in place to sustain staff motivation'
*This is about what makes people want to work here. Incentives could be financial, freedom at work, training opportunities, etc.*

The staff still appreciates the many benefits like training opportunities; secondary benefits such as allowances and insurances; the warm atmosphere in the office; the contribution YPI makes to society; and the freedom at work and the ability to make decisions for yourself. In relation to changes in leadership capacity, additional benefits have been added such as annual bonuses, family support benefits and family excursions.

Score: From 4 to 4.5 (Slight improvement)

1.9.2. Funding sources: 'Funding from multiple sources covering different time periods'
*This is about how diversified the SPOs funding sources are over time, and how the level of funding is changing over time.*
The funding from Global Fund and Rutgers WPF are still running toward the year of 2015. At least two funding sources from the Social Ministry and Social Services are secured for the HIV/AIDS program. In addition to that, a different approach is taken by having a business approach to fund YPI. This business unit transformed into a company named PT Pelita Niaga Mandiri. Staffs have concerns about the financial sustainability of YPI.

Score: From 4 to 4 ( no change)

1.9.3. Funding procedures: 'clear procedures for exploring new funding opportunities'
*This is about whether there are clear procedures for getting new funding and staff are aware of these procedures.*

The YPI management has attempted to shift their approach of new funding and have explained to staff the importance of funding and the new funding mechanism. Furthermore, the management also has introduced the new business unit to support YPI's need for operational funding. This business unit operates under a name of PT Pelita Niaga Mandiri that assists in fundraising and ensures financial sustainability for the organization. This company supports the youth to be an entrepreneur through trainings and relate it with the provided programs.

Score: From 3 to 3.5 (Slight improvement)

**Summary Capability to Act and to Commit**
The leadership of YPI has improved slightly in terms of their responsiveness and openness to organizational and programmatic issues. The areas of leadership improvements are program and strategic management, communication and partnership. The strategic guidance has become more specific and consistent with program strategic plans. Furthermore, strategic guidance has improved in terms of improved coordination by merging 3 offices to 2, by making decisions more promptly and firmly and by stimulating creative and inspiring program design. Programmes strategies are now more based on monitoring and evaluation. Operations are based on the organizational strategies and by having a small budget it is possible to also keep running the activities even when funding is delayed. The structure of the organization hasn't changed since the baseline. There is no staff turnover during 2012-2014. However, staff is motivated by having more benefits compared to the baseline. The staff skills improved through training as well as informal sharing in weekly meetings on SRHR, data collection and reporting, and strategic communication Whilst diversity of funding sources hasn't really changed, YPI has developed a business unit named PT. Pelita Niaga Mandiri to assist in fundraising and ensure financial sustainability for the organization. The CFA has recommended that YPI further improve their strategic planning, external risk assessments and Budged vs. Actual (BvA) analysis.

Score: From 3.4 to 3.7 (very slight improvement)

**Capability to Adapt and Self Renew**
2.1. M&E Application: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess activities, outputs and outcomes'

*This is about what the monitoring and evaluation of the SPO looks at, what type of information they get at and at what level (individual, project, organisational).*
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is now more structured, particularly in relation to having a reporting system and a monitoring visit mechanism in place. However, monitoring and evaluation is still focused on activities and outputs rather than outcomes and impact. The monitoring and evaluation is embedded to program coordinator. However, staff indicated that the reporting template is implicated. There is however room for more improvement. A dedicated M&E person should be allocated in the program and more monitoring visits should be budgeted. Until now, M&E functions are implemented by staff including the management. Although staff has been trained in M&E (in particular, data collection and reporting). These tasks have to be performed along with other program implementation tasks. Monitoring results are only discussed and recorded at monthly meetings, quarterly meetings and annual evaluations.

Score: From 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

2.2. M&E competencies: 'Individual competencies for performing M&E functions are in place'
*This is about whether the SPO has a trained M&E person; whether other staff have basic understanding of M&E; and whether they know what information to collect, how to process the information, how to make use of the information so as to improve activities etc.*

Staff skills have improved in terms of data collection and reporting to for example the partners at provincial level. Currently YPI undertakes quantitative and qualitative data collection based on donor requirements and this is documented in their organization website - www.ypi.or.id. There is still no dedicated person for M&E but every program person in charge has responsibility for monitoring and evaluation of the program.

Score: From 2 to 2.5 (Slight improvement)

2.3. M&E for future strategies: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess the effects of delivered products and services (outcomes) for future strategies'
*This is about what type of information is used by the SPO to make decisions; whether the information comes from the monitoring and evaluation; and whether M&E info influences strategic planning.*

Since the baseline, there has been no change in relation to M&E for future strategies: this is still absent. YPI staffs are still confused about M&E in relation to strategic plans. M&E is mainly for operational management rather than strategic management. Operational management, however, has improved since now decisions are made based on monthly reports, quarterly reports and visits.

Score: From 2 to 2 (no change)

2.4. Critical reflection: 'Management stimulates frequent critical reflection meeting that also deal with learning from mistakes'
*This is about whether staff talk formally about what is happening in their programs; and, if so, how regular these meetings are; and whether staff are comfortable raising issues that are problematic.*

The quarterly-based meeting has been changed to monthly meeting as a response to a need of coordination among the staff. They can express their ideas in the meeting formally or informally according to what is more comfortable for them. An annual review was conducted in 2013. In this review, the staff presented their program achievement and their next planning. In addition to that, the management also presented about the foundation during the occasion.

Score: From 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

2.5. Freedom for ideas: 'staff feel free to come up with ideas for implementation of objectives'
*This is about whether staff feel that ideas they bring for implementation of the program are welcomed and used.*

The program staffs are now really discussing their ideas about program implementation with their supervisor or management. It is not something considered a new thing within the organization but the staff considered the trust and freedom in planning their individual implementation plan as improvement. Having merged offices, has also made it easier for staff to coordinate with others.

Score: From 4 to 4.25 (very slight improvement)

2.6. System for tracking environment: 'The organization has a system for being in touch with general trends and development in its operating environment'
*This is about whether the SPO knows what is happening in its environment and whether it will affect the organization.*

There has been an improvement in the way YPI is networking. YPI has been acknowledged as a partner with relevant knowledge and is often invited to the events related to their issues they are working on. The network with National AIDS Commission *(Komisi Penanggulangan AIDS Nasional)* and Jakarta AIDS Commissions for Youth Taskforce *(Pokja Remaja)* program. The use of social media has also improved along with improved of YPI website followers. Internally, YPI has intensified their relationship with beneficiaries and the networks. All of this has helped the organisation to be in touch with what is happening in their operating environment.

Score: From 3.5 to 3.75 (very slight improvement)

2.7. Stakeholders responsiveness: 'The organization is open and responsive to their stakeholders and general public'
*This is about what mechanisms the SPO has to get input from its stakeholders, and what they do with that input.*
There has been improvement in the way of YPI works with stakeholders. It started by building a good communication as well as involving partners and stakeholders to provide input for program planning purposes, which remained a best practice. A good example raised by Youth Forum that held a regular meeting every three years. Meanwhile, Rutgers WPF and YPI are also always invited by Ministry of Education in their meeting.

Score: From 4 to 4.25 (very slight improvement)

***Summary Capability to Adapt and to Self Renew***
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is now more structured, particularly in relation to having a reporting system and a monitoring visit mechanism in place. However, monitoring and evaluation is still focused on activities and outputs rather than outcomes and impact. However, improved networking and relationships with partners as well as having a monitoring visit mechanism in place can inform YPI on trends and developments in the operational environment. Staff competencies have improved in terms of data collection and reporting, but there are still no dedicated M&E person in place, and staff have to combine these tasks with their program implementation tasks. Having more regular meetings have helped the organization to reflect on progress and adjust plans. Staffs are still able to share their ideas freely and this is even improved since merging three buildings into two. The CFA has also recommended that YPI further improve their M&E system and knowledge management, as well as improve their analytical skill to improve their reports and other documents.
Score: From 3.1 to 3.4 (slight improvement)

**Capability to Deliver on Development Objectives**
3.1. Clear operational plans: 'Organization has clear operational plans for carrying out project which all staff fully understand'
*This is about whether each project has an operational work plan and budget, and whether staff use it in their day-to-day operations.*

There are no major improvements or changes in this indicator area since the baseline. All projects still have a work plan and budget which is used in day-to-day operations. Additionally, there are job descriptions, standard operational procedures, Terms of Reference and strategic plans that help in carrying out the programs. Sometimes the budget is revised when it is not sufficient for implementing the activities. All staff must understand the work plan. Moreover, YPI staffs are now also aware of the budget and funding sources for each program and how to obtain these funds. This was the result of openness shown by the Director.

Score: From 3 to 3.25 (very slight improvement)

3.2. Cost-effective resource use: 'Operations are based on cost-effective use of its resources'
*This is about whether the SPO has the resources to do the work, and whether resources are used cost-effectively.*

There are many improvements shown in this area. YPI has made decisions in their human resources through having less staff members and increasing the programme responsibilities per staff. . Merging 3 offices to 2 has also reduced operational costs, for example by having improved communication and coordination. . Furthermore, operation costs are being reduced by having a policy to print only important documents, and to purchase stationary purchasing based on activities. Also, now new computer has been purchased since 2012.

Score: From 4 to 4.75 (improvement)

3.3. Delivering planned outputs: 'Extent to which planned outputs are delivered'
*This is about whether the SPO is able to carry out the operational plans.*

Since the baseline in 2012 the capacity to implement the operational plans has improved by having more regular meeting among them. Furthermore, having operational plans and financial plans prior to implementation has helped in the implementation of program in the field. However, staffs still lack analytical skills to understand problems in the field. Therefore, the management opened a room of discussion to facilitate this problem that directly related to operational plan.

Score: From 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement )

3.4. Mechanism for beneficiary needs: 'The organization has mechanism in place to verify that services meet beneficiary needs'
*This is about how the SPO knows that their services are meeting beneficiary needs*

YPI has changed their participatory approach to assess the partners or beneficiaries needs by having two-way discussions. Furthermore, beneficiaries are involved in the program planning discussions at the end of the implementation year. YPI also conducted a joint planning where their partner played them active role to provide inputs for future program planning.

Score: From 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

3.5. Monitoring efficiency: 'The organization monitors its efficiency by linking outputs and related inputs (input-output ratio's)'
*This is about how the SPO knows they are efficient or not in their work.*

There are no major improvements or changes in this indicator area since the baseline. The basis for monitoring efficiency lies in the work plans and budgets that exist for all projects. A comparison is made between expenditures and achievements, and this is discussed in the team coordination meetings. Moreover since baseline and the united the three offices become two offices, the Board of Trustees is more involved in the progress implementation evaluation. However, there is no specific monitoring of the relation between the level of output (results) and the level of input (time and money spent).

Score: From 3 to 3.25 (very slight improvement)

3.6. Balancing quality-efficiency: 'The organization aims at balancing efficiency requirements with quality of its work'
*This is about how the SPO ensures quality work with the resources available*

There are slight improvements or changes in this indicator area since the baseline. For example in SRHR education for the young people program, YPI now create more structured plans and organizations which results in an improvement in quality. The balance between quality and efficiency is monitored by examining achievements, program interrelations, adherence to schedule and the expenditures. This is discussed in regular meetings, but there is no specific tool for quality assurance other than such staff discussions.

Score: From 3 to 4 (improvement)

**Summary Capability to deliver on development Objectives**
All projects still have a work plan and budget which is used in day-to-day operations. Resources are now used more cost effectively by having less staff with more programme implementation responsibilities, by merging three offices into two offices, and by reducing printing costs and stationary costs. Implementation has improved due to improved staff capacity, and by having operational,

financial plans in place, but the lack of analytical skills in implementation. Beneficiaries are now more involved in programme planning and by having the way discussions on their needs. The basis for monitoring efficiency lies in the work plans and budgets that exist for all projects. A comparisons is made between expenditures and achievements, and this is discussed in the team coordination meeting. Moreover since the baseline and the united the three offices become two offices, the board of trustees is more involved in the progress implementation evaluation. However, there is no specific monitoring of the relation between the level of output (results) and the level of input (time and money spent). YPI needs to further improve their HR policy and carefully design training and capacity building for staff according to the CFA in order to manage the vast growing number of people with HIV/AIDS in Indonesia. Additionally annual planning needs further improvement, and stronger relationships with strategic stakeholders must be built.

Score: From 3.2 to 3.7 (slight improvement)

**Capability to relate**
4.1. Stakeholder engagement in policies and strategies: 'The organization maintains relations-collaboration-alliances with its stakeholders for the benefit of the organization'
*This is about whether the SPO engages external groups in developing their policies and strategies, and how.*

YPI has escalated their position within their network. They have developed a training module and trained other organizations using it. An improved collaboration with *Aliansi Satu Visi, KPAN, KPAP* DKI Jakarta, Ministry of Social Affairs and District Social Offices demonstrates their capacity to engage stakeholders to play an active role in policies and strategies works. Moreover, YPI also involves their target groups in developing policies and strategies. One of the results is providing training for the medical assistant for ODHA as most of their family cannot assist them all day due to earning money for living.

Score: From 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

4.2. Engagement in networks: 'Extent to which the organization has relationships with existing networks-alliances-partnerships'
*This is about what networks/alliances/partnerships the SPO engages with and why; with they are local or international; and what they do together, and how do they do it.*

There are no major changes in this indicator. YPI keeps working with existing network identified in the baseline. YPI is still active in forums and networks that are suited to its mission and vision. At the international level, YPI is a member of Care for AIDS, and the CSO Forum. YPI has been supported by a number of foreign donor agencies (ICOM Malaysia, Rutgers WPF, Care for AIDS Community, International AIDS Committee) and has access to a number of others (including Ford Foundation, Global Fund, PLAN International). At the national level their partners are schools, hospitals and local forums like the Jabodetabek AIDS NGO Forum, One Vision Alliance (*Aliansi Satu Visi)*, and DKI Jakarta Youth Forum.

Score: From 4 to 4 (no change)

4.3. Engagement with target groups: 'The organization performs frequent visits to their target groups-beneficiaries in their living environment'
*This is about how and when the SPO meets with target groups.*

The situation is still very similar to the baseline situation. Every month, YPI has a gathering called OBRAS *(Obrolan Ringan dan Santap Siang/* Lunch Discussion), an activity where many people gather and have lunch together. In OBRAS they invite doctors to give any kind of information about specific health issues. There are also other gatherings, such as a gathering of female HIV patients every Wednesday, and a monthly gathering for children with HIV. Additionally, YPI makes visits to schools and hospitals, and even people's homes, and offer counseling. They do this also in remote areas and in lower class communities. Visits depend on the program but they also communicate via email and phone.
Apart from this, YPI extended their engagement with youth through a three-yearly meeting. On the other hand, they also performed school visits and youth meeting in the community.

Score: From 4 to 4.5 (slight improvement)

4.4. Relationships within organizations: 'Organisational structure and culture facilitates open internal contacts, communication, and decision-making'
*How do staff at the SPO communicate internally? Are people free to talk to whomever they need to talk to? When and at what forum? What are the internal mechanisms for sharing information and building relationships?*

The change in leadership openness has led to improvement in the staff communicating their ideas. The staff stated they can share their ideas openly using formal and informal ways of communication. The social gathering 'arisan' also contributed to the relationship among the staff where they can use this media to communicate the problem they faced. Furthermore, merging 3offices become 2 offices has further improved internal coordination and communication.

Score: From 4 to 4.25 (slight improvement)

**Summary Capability to relate**
YPI still collaborates with many stakeholders and target groups for learning and support, and to some extent for developing its policies. This is both at the international and national level. There are additionally close contacts with beneficiaries, which they even visit in their homes in remote areas. They have improved upon engaging with youth by having three-yearly meetings and performing school visits and youth meetings in the community. Within the organization communication is well developed and open and this has been further stimulated by a change in leadership, which stimulates openness as well as having 3 to 2 offices which has improved internal conclusion and coordination. There are regular staff meetings but communication can also occur using SMS, email or even Facebook. A mechanism for public accountability does not yet exist and can greatly benefit the organization. Stakeholders should be more involved in program planning and in sharing lessons-learned.

Score: From 3.7 to 4.1 (slight improvement)

**Capability to Achieve Coherence**
5.1. Revisiting vision, mission: 'Vision, mission and strategies regularly discussed in the organisations'
*This is about whether there is a vision, mission and strategies; how often staff discuss/revise vision, mission and strategies; and who is involved in this.*

YPI facilitated a meeting in 2013 to discuss and re-evaluate the organization's vision, mission and strategies. The meeting further discussed about the possibility of changing the activities if it is proven to conflict with the organization's vision, mission and strategies. The founder and the board of YPI realize about the situation that YPI is not the only institution working on HIV/AIDS issues. Therefore there are limitations to get funding. The board established the PT Pelita Niaga Mandiri as a business unit, so as to support fundraising.

Score: From 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

5.2. Operational guidelines: 'Operational guidelines (technical, admin, HRM) are in place and used and supported by the management'
*This is about whether there are operational guidelines, which operational guidelines exist; and how they are used.*

There are still operational guidelines in HRM and Finance. For the work in the programs, there are the work plans and budgets. Since the baseline a slight improvement showed in the work plans by having a regular discussion of implementing progress among the board trustees, the executive board and staff. On the other hand, a decree has been released relating to HR issues of deciding on the fixed employment status on December 2013. Since that the job descriptions is more clearly.

Score: From 2.5 to 3 (slight improvement)

5.3. Alignment with vision, mission: 'Projects, strategies and associated operations are in line with the vision and mission of the organizations'
*This is about whether the operations and strategies are line with the vision/mission of the SPO.*

There is no change in alignment with vision and mission. It is still same as in baseline since most of the program is the same as during the baseline in 2012 when YPI considered their operations and

strategies in line with the vision and mission. Their focus is on HIV/AIDS which is enveloped with health and educational issues. Gender and gender violence are still not incorporated.

Score: From 3 to 3 (no change)

5.4. Mutually supportive efforts: 'The portfolio of project (activities) provides opportunities for mutually supportive efforts'
*This is about whether the efforts in one project complement/support efforts in other projects.*

There is no change in mutually supportive efforts. It is still same as in baseline due to most of the program being the same as during the baseline in that the programs in YPI are considered mutually supportive by most of the staff. Mostly this is related to providing a comprehensive service. If for example an HIV infected person is encountered during an outreach program in schools, he or she will be referred to one of YPIs partner clinics for a medical check-up.


Score: From 3 to 3 (no change)

**Summary Capability to Achieve Coherence**
The vision, mission and strategies were discussed in 2013. In terms of operational guidelines, these are in place in terms of HRM and finance and there has been a decree on the status of staff employment since the baseline. Since that the job descriptions is more clearly. Projects, strategies and activities are still in line with the vision and mission of the organisation and to project activities are still mutually supportive. Operational planning and clear job descriptions are still areas that require further improvement as mentioned by the CFA.

Score: From 2.9 to 3.1 (very slight improvement)

# Appendix 4 Results - key changes in organisational capacity - general causal map

**General key changes YPI**



**Narrative**

The key change in YPI's organizational capacity since the baseline is an improvement in service quality [1]. Three underlying factors caused this improvement:

1. An increase in staff working performance [2]
2. An improved network maintenance s [3]
3. Strengthened organization independency [4]

Each of these factors is explained in detail below.

First of all, the staff's working performance increased for six different reasons:

1. Increased frequency of controlling beneficiaries for YPI program improvement [11]
    a. YPI beneficiaries were frequented and monitored more intensely which lead to overall program improvement. This was enabled by a greater number of staff members with Monitoring and Evaluations skills from other projects [18]. Staff capacity in general increased through training, which enabled the sharing of Monitoring and evaluation skills [23] and application across other programs. The increased focus on developing staff skills came from a greater need to professionalize all aspects in the organization to maintain credibility in the field [27] and to adhere to donor requirements [35].
2. Staff has opportunities to attend training, comparative studies and courses [12]
    a. Generally staffs that do not have enough skills will be trained or given opportunity to attend seminars/course locally and abroad. The availability of external funding and also leaders initiative to send staff to attend trainings, course was the primary reason for staff to to attend training and courses [19].The leader is selective however in choosing who can follow courses, only those people that are willing and able are chosenIncreased staff motivation in turn came about from increased incentives from the leadership [28] and more openness between staff and board/management [24]. The latter was a logical consequence from the close relationship between the staff's executive board and the founder of the organization [29] which developed soon after the change in leadership style [36].
3. Ideas from staff are accepted [13]
    a. Similarly to the previous line of developments, ideas from staff became more accepted and encouraged due to the openness between staff and board [24].
4. Response to problems in the field [14]
    a. The organization was able to respond to more problems and issues in the field by generally becoming more flexible and responsive [30]. This can largely be attributed to the change of leadership style which caused a much flatter organizational structure [36]
5. Appropriate action for offences because of a clear working description [15]
    a. Much like the previous factor, staff members were not only able to respond faster to problems, but also able to act more effectively by taking appropriate action for offences [15]. This came about from clearer and more detailed job descriptions of work activities[31] on the one hand, and a simplified organizational structure on the other. The revision of job descriptions was performed to make jobs easier and responsibilities clearer [33] and generally provide more guidelines for the organization's work [34]. The development of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's) lay at the foundation of all these formalization and specification actions [37]. The simplication of the organizational structure on the other hand happened for efficiency reasons [32], which went hand in hand with the change of leadership style [36].
6. Increased job security [5]
    a. Increased job security also played an important role in the increased staff working performance, which greatly impacted staff morale [5]. Since the baseline MFS2 5C evaluation, a salary standard was introduced [8] as well as an improvement in employment status (no more contract work) [9]. Both developments could be realized from cost-saving resulting from the simplification of the organizational structure [25].


The second factor that resulted in improved service quality of YPI was the improvement of YPI's network [3]. This resulted from an optimized use of social media as a communication platform for

stakeholders [6] on the one hand, and due to expanding networks to other actors and beneficiaries [10] on the other. More actors could now be served more effectively. Both these developments came about from contacting and including the new partners in the YPI programs [20], which in turn developed through the active networking and building of relationships with related organizations [26]. The latter resulted from the conscious decision of YPI to strengthen their networking activities.

The third and final factor affected YPI's improved service quality is the strengthened organization's independence from other organizations and stakeholders [4]. YPI achieved this by founding limited independent corporate entities to provide services such as training, facilitation, health services and accommodation. For example, YPI  have done various fundraising activities such as giving trainings, organizing music events, acting as facilitator and developing a clinic. For example, one of YPIs field offices has already established a self-sustained training center successfully. The income generated from this initiative covers the operational expenses of the camp itself. This has not been practiced for the whole organization yet.However some plan has been initiated to make it in a larger scale [7]. The former was achieved by YPI's proactive stance in finding new funds and partners in their network [17] after a decrease in donor support became evident soon after the baseline [21].

# Appendix 5 Results - attribution of changes in organisational capacity - detailed causal maps

**Narrative C1.1 More motivated staff**




During the endline workshop at YPI, a discussion was held around what staff perceived as the key changes in in the organisation since the baseline. This then led to a discussion on what were the key organisational capacity changes and why these changes have taken place according to staff present at the endline workshop. The discussion resulted in a 'general causal map' which is described below. The general causal map provides a comprehensive picture of organisational capacity changes that took place since the baseline, based on the perspective of SPO staff present at the endline workshop. Numbers in the narrative correspond to the numbers in the visual.

The identified organisational change under the capability to act and commit was ''more motivated staff [2] (Annex D, J, N), which is expected to contribute to increased work performance of staff to manage program activities [1] (Annex G, I, L, N, Q, workshop minutes meeting). The main underlying reason

for this change is the MFS II organisational capacity development (5c) baseline process [21] (Annex L, R, workshop minutes meeting) which has inspired staffs, management and board management to improve some organizational aspects (Annex J), in particular, leadership [18] (Annex G, I, L, P, R, workshop minutes meeting) for example more responsive, decisive and open feedback. Staff has become more motivated due to improved staff welfare [3] (Annex I, L) and a better management working mechanism [4] (Annex I, J, L). Below you can find an explanation of how these changes have come about.

There were four main reasons for **improved staff welfare** [3] (Annex I, L): provision of BJS linked to investment [8] (Annex I, L); better staff remuneration [9] (Annex I, L); increased/improved job security [5] (Annex J, N); and operational efficiency [6] (Annex L, N, P).

Provision of BJS and insurance was linked to investment [8] (Annex I, L) which led to improved staff welfare by ensuring their insurance of health [3].

There has been better staff remuneration which was increased since December 2013 [9] (Annex I, L). The management acknowledged that the YPI remuneration is relatively low compared to other local organizations, but it is substituted by the provision of BPJS[33] and insurance linked to the investment [8] (Annex I,L). The investment insurance scheme is given to the staff with at least two-year service period. This improved staff remuneration is the result the leader's response to employee concerns, which were raised by staff [14] (Annex L). Staff would not have been able to raise such concerns without the new leader's ability to allow for such feedback [15] (Annex G, I, J, L, R). The main reason for this was that there was a change of leadership style. Previously the leader (the Director) was less responsive to staff concerns, and now the Director has better understanding to staff concerns [18] (Annex G, I, L, P, R, workshop minutes meeting).

The third reason for improved staff welfare was improved job security [5] (Annex J, I, L, N). Staff perceived increased job security [5] (Annex J, I, L, N) due to a change from fixed term contracts to permanent staff employment [10] (Annex I, J, P). This too was one of the changes brought about by the change of leadership [18] (Annex G, I, L, P, R, workshop minutes meeting).

The fourth reason for improved staff welfare was improved operational efficiency [6] (Annex L, N, P). This was related to a reduction in the number of offices [13] (Annex L, I, R, Q, workshop minutes meeting), which had to happen to reduce operational costs [16] (Annex J, N). These reductions came straight from the process of internal evaluation [20] (Annex L, R, minutes endline workshop). In the internal evaluation there was discussion related to how to make the organization more efficient by reducing the number of offices (from 3 to 2) and using the saved money to increase staff welfare.

The second reason for improved staff motivation was having **a better management working mechanism** [4] (Annex I, J, L). This came about as a result of the active sharing of progress on activities and program evaluation results [7] (Annex J, training questionnaire_staff, training questionnaire_program manager, training questionnaire_secretary of executive board), which resulted from an increased staff habit to communicate and coordinate more intensively [11] (Annex G, I, J, L, N, R, Q). This habit resulted somewhat automatically from the fact that there was a reduction in the number of offices [13] (Annex L, I, R, Q workshop minutes meeting) allowing staff to communicate more easily. The reduction in the number of offices also affected to the operational efficiency [6] (Annex L,N,P) that led to better management working mechanism [4] (Annex L,I). Having fewer offices, reduced operational cost has enabled the management to manage the working mechanism better. In addition to this, the quality of meetings and relationships between staff management and the board also increased [17] (Annex I, L, Q, R). The latter resulted from an increased awareness to communicate more closely [19] (Annex Q), which was one of the results from the process of baseline workshop process conducted by MFS II in 2012 [21] (Annex L, R, workshop minutes meeting).

During the 5C baseline workshop in 2012 [21] (Annex L, R, workshop minutes meeting), the development of the *historical timeline* and the *theory of change*, made staff become more aware of the importance of having more intensive meeting amongst themselves, with management and with the executive board (source: CFA; additional sheet). The intensified meetings have increased staff's common understanding on the organization's current situation. It is also used as an internal forum for

[33] BJPS is the Administrator for the Social Security System


evaluation and at the same time as a means to strengthen the team work [20] (Annex L, R, workshop minutes meeting). YPI staff also said that they used to conduct regular meetings once in three months, but during the 5c baseline assessment, they became more aware of the importance of having more regular meetings. Intensive feedback and input through the internal evaluation has resulted to the change of leader's attitude. The leader is becoming more responsive, decisive and open to feedback [18] (Annex G, I, L, P, R, workshop minutes meeting).

The more intensive meetings also included an increased intensity of the board to have intensive interaction with staff [17] (Annex, I, L, Q, R). Through this, the board has better understanding on the updates of the organization. Before the baseline in 2012, meetings amongst management were not intensive and this was realized during the 5c baseline assessment in 2012 [19] (Annex L, R, workshop minutes meeting).

On the whole, the baseline 5c assessment in 2012 has had quite a big impact on the organisation in terms of a changed leadership style and ultimately motivated staff.

**Narrative C1.2 More recognized capacity to deliver SRHR training**

Below you will find a description of the 'More recognized capacity to deliver SRHR training' and how this has come about.




YPI has been recognized and acknowledged by its peers in providing trainings on SRHR in addition to being already considered as an HIV-AIDS expert in Indonesia [1] (Annex A, B, C). The many invitations that YPI has received in which the organization was requested to act as a facilitator, resource person or consultant in various forums at the local, regional as well as national level, serves as proof for this. YPI's staff has become more confident in giving trainings and delivering SRHR information to beneficiaries [2] (Annex A,X) as a result of knowledge sharing to other organizations through internships [3] (Annex C,X), as well as knowledge sharing to other organizations involved in the alliance [4] (Annex A,X).

On the one hand knowledge was shared through the internship positions that YPI had created [3] (Annex C,X). In order to develop the issues of SRHR and HIV-AIDS amongst the youths, YPI initiated a *youth forum* within DKI Jakarta. The idea was to bring about one forum that comes from, was run by, and made for, youths who were working with these two issues as a basis. YPI performed the role of initiator and facilitator. This forum was the place where YPI staffs' learning process was disseminated to the members of the youth forum.

On the other hand, knowledge was shared through organizations involved in the alliance [4] (Annex X). YPI is involved in as a member, official or initiator in several alliances related to SRHR issues. Among the most important ones is the Independent Youth Alliance (ARI). Each alliance possesses communication mechanism both in the form of direct meetings and electronic media (social media). In general, these alliances were established as a place for various organizations in sharing their problems, insights, knowledge, information and agenda-setting. It is from and through these alliance forums that YPI's staff improved their capacity on SRHR training and communication. They often share what they have learnt from the forums they participated in, as well as being asked to join as committee members or facilitators of activities initiated by the alliance.

The sharing of knowledge and participation in these forums was enabled by the improved capacity as SRHR experts of the organization. During 2013, YPI increasingly participated in SRHR initiatives and venues next to practicing their existing expertise on HIV-AIDS, improving the capacity of the organizations SRHR expertise [5] (Annex A, X). This was enabled by the improved competencies to train and communicate with target groups on SRHR issues [6] (Annex A, B) on the one hand, but also through the addition of new staff members and volunteers who were increasingly involved in the SRHR programs and contributed to the capacity growth of the organization in the field of SRHR [10] (Annex A, X).

Improved competencies to train and communicate with target groups on SRHR issues can be attributed to three MFS II funded capacity interventions. In each training there was an unwritten agreement obliging them to share what they have learnt to others internally (Annex X).

**SRHR Training [7] (Annex A, B, X**

This training was held by RutgersWPF, on October 2013. YPI received an invitation for 3 participants. Who all attended. In the training emphasis was put on holistic understanding on everything related to SRHR. All partners who had implemented SRHR modules presented and shared their work which enabled them to learn from each other.

**Training for Youth Friendly Services [8] (Annex A,B,X)**


This training was held by PKBI in Cibubur on November 2013, and funded by MFS II and the ASK program. One YPI staff member attended the training, who was an active volunteer in YPI, and also a youth forum member. Targeted training to promote new means of communication to modern youth was given. The use of social media was emphasized.

**Workshop on Strategic Communication [9] (Annex A,B,X)**

This training was held in Bogor on September 2013 by One Vision Alliance. On YPI staff member attended the training. The training was focused on the development of a communication strategy, and how to strengthen the organization's standpoint to give communication more impact.

**Narrative C3.1 Improved reporting**

The key organizational change in the capability to adapt and self renew was initially identified as 'improved monitoring and evaluation' but during the process was refined to 'improved reporting' since the focus was more on this part of monitoring and evaluation [2] (Annex A; training questionnaire_staff; training questionnaire program manager; training questionnaire secretary of the executive board; workshop minutes meeting); CFA Document). The improved reports help to develop work plans [1] (Annex P; training questionaire_staff; training questionaire_program manager; training questionnaire secretary of executive board).



Improved reporting has been influenced by three factors: getting more varied reports (report with more form of data such as more visual or pictures and photography) [3] (Annex C; workshop minutes meeting; training questionnaire secretary of executive board), an improved capacity to write reports [6] (Annex B; Annex M; training questionnaire program manager; training questionnaire staff; training questionnaire secretary of executive board) and getting more robust data for report writing [4] (Observation interview CFA; Annex G; Annex N; Annex I; Annex P; Annex R). Reports are getting more varied because they have lots of data and know how to present the data in their reports also the reporting format has become more complicated [3] (Annex A; C; workshop minutes meeting; training questionnaire secretary of executive board; workshop minutes of meeting).

Staff have improved their capacity to write reports [6] (Annex B; Annex M; training questionnaire program manager; training questionnaire staff, training questionnaire secretary of executive board; workshop minutes meeting), on the one hand because of the M&E training in 2012 [18] (Annex C; Annex B; training questionnaire program manager, training questionnaire staff), which came as a requirement by the CFA [21] (Annex D; Annex J). The second reason for improved reporting capacity was the sharing among staff of results of the writing skills training. One of the participants at workshop in YPI while facilitating sheet of perspective SPO said that they shared the training experience and knowledge to other colleagues) [10] (Training questionnaire_3 staffs). One of the managers indicated during an interview that staff who is responsible for the teenagers group, has better understanding in report writing (Annex C). One of the training participants admitted that before the training, she needed more guidance from the leader in report writing, while after the training she feels more independent and needs less guidance from the leader (training questionnaire program manager). The writing skills training itself was supported by RWPF in 2013 [19] (Annex C; Annex B; training questionnaire management; training questionnaire program manager), and led to better understanding of how to write a good reports [19] (Annex C; Annex B; training questionnaire management; training questionnaire program manager). Ultimately it was the requirement from the CFA for improved reporting which created the necessity to have the trainings on M&E and writing skills [21] (Annex D; Annex J).

The third reason for improved reporting [2] (training questionnaire staff; training questionnaire program manager; training questionnaire secretary of the executive board); CFA Document) is that more robust data are being supplied as material for the reports [4] (observation interview CFA; training questionnaire management; Annex G; Annex N; ; Annex R; workshop minutes of meeting). There are two reasons for getting more robust data: on the one hand more accountable data is being collected [5] (Annex J; Training questionnaire staff) and on the other hand meetings have improved [7] (Annex L; Annex P, Annex O, Annex R).

**More accountable data is being collected** [5] (Annex J; training questionnaire staff) by staff due to an increase in the competences to conduct interviews in the field, such as beneficiaries and teachers [9] (Annex M; Training questionnaire _staff), The competencies to has come as a result of improved awareness on the importance of validated data [14] (Annex M, Training questionnaire staff), not only by staff forward attended a training on monitoring and evaluation, but also staff who learned this from the people trained [8] (Annex M; training questionnaire program manager; training questionnaire program staff). This is mainly due to a training by RWPF on monitoring and evaluation, which was conducted in 2011 [18] (Annex C; Annex B; training questionnaire program manager; training questionnaire staff), and which was attended by the project officer, the program manager and the secretary of the executive board.

Other staff, who did not join the training also increased their awareness on the importance of data validation, since M&E training participants shared their training experience in organizational meetings [8] (Annex M; training questionnaire program manager; training questionnaire program staff). The need to share became clear to staff attending the training as their awareness of the importance of validated data collection increased [14] (Annex M, training questionnaire staff). Staff has begun to discuss with their colleagues about data collected in monthly discussions. The requirement from the CFA for improved reporting created the necessity to have the trainings on M&E and writing skills [21] (Annex D; Annex J).

**The second reason for having more robust data is that meetings have been improved** [7] (Annex L; Annex N; Annex P; Annex O; Annex R) for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the staff meetings are more intensive and regular, as stated by staff and executive board during the interview [11] (Annex D; Annex J; Annex L, Annex P; Annex R). YPI staff also said that they used to conduct regular meetings once in three months, but during the 5c baseline, they realized the importance of having more regular meetings [20] (CFA, Annex M, Annex R) and are now conducting monthly meetings as a result of baseline survey [11] (Annex D; Annex L; Annex L, Annex P).

Secondly, the executive board visits the YPI office more regularly [12] (Annex J; Annex L;). It is stated by the founder, that they initiate the meeting (Annex L). This statement is supported by one of the management, that the executive board is asking to conduct meetings to get information about the progress of activities (Annex L; Informal discussion with management) and is supported by admin staff [12] (Annex L) and by field staff (Annex J).

Thirdly, more staff are involved in regular meetings [13] (Annex L; Annex P; Annex N). In the last two years, YPI reduced the staff, which means that YPI doesn't have project staff anymore (Annex J; Annex L). Staff in YPI are permanent staff, who have rights and obligations based on YPI regulations. The smaller number of YPI staff, makes them being more involved in regular meetings.

During the 5C baseline workshop, and in particular the discussions on the historical time line and the theory of change, and during discussions with management [20] (Annex L, Annex R; Workshop minutes meeting), staff became aware of the importance of having intensive meetings among staff, management and the executive board [17] (Annex L, Annex R)

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Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen UR
P.O. Box 88
6700 AB Wageningen
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)317 48 68 00
www.wageningenUR.nl/cdi

Report CDI-15-050

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# Endline report – Indonesia, YRBI MFS II country evaluations

Capacity of Southern Partner Organisations (5C) component

Cecile Kusters[1]
Martijn Wieriks[2]
Bekti Dwi Andari[3]
Novina Suprobo[3]
Widya Priyahita[3]
Rumenta R. Sihombing[3]
Seto W. Rokhmatulloh[3]
Ita Rosita[3]

1 Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR
2 SEPAM Consultants Indonesia
3 SurveyMeter

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen, February 2015

Report CDI-15-051

Kusters, C., Wieriks, M., Dwi Andari, B., Suprobo, N., Priyahita, W., Sihombing, R.R., Rokhmatulloh, S.W., Rosita, I., 2015. *Endline report – Indonesia, YRBI. MFS II country evaluations; Capacity of Southern Partner Organisations (5C) component.* Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University & Research centre. Report CDI-15-051. Wageningen.

This report presents the findings of the endline of the evaluation of the organisational capacity component of the MFS II country evaluations. The focus of this report is Indonesia, YRBI. The format is based on the requirements by the synthesis team and NWO/WOTRO. The endline was carried out in 2014. The baseline was carried out in 2012.

Key words: 5C (five core capabilities); attribution; baseline; causal map; change; CFA (Co-financing Organisation) endline; organisational capacity development; SPO (Southern Partner Organisation).

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# Acknowledgements

We are grateful to all the people that have contributed to this report. We particularly would like to thank the Southern Partner Organisation YRBI and the Co-Financing Agency ICCO for their endless patience and support during this challenging task of collecting the endline data. We hope that this endline report will provide useful insights to YRBI, ICCO, the synthesis team, IOB and NWO/Wotro.

The Indonesia 5C evaluation team

# List of abbreviations and acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| 5 C | Capacity development model which focuses on 5 core capabilities |
| Causal map | Map with cause-effect relationships. See also 'detailed causal map'. |
| Causal mechanisms | The combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome |
| CDI | Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University & Research centre |
| CFA | Co-Financing Agency |
| CFO | Co-Financing Organisation |
| CS | Civil Society |
| Detailed causal map | Also 'model of change'. the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change. In the 5C evaluation identified key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms) are traced through process tracing (for attribution question). |
| Gambong | An administrative division in Aceh, Indonesia |
| General causal map | Causal map with key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms), based on SPO perception. |
| HRM | Human Resource Management |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MFS | Dutch co-financing system |
| MIS | Management Information System |
| MoFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| Mukim | Sub-district |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| OD | Organisational Development |
| PME | Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation |
| PRA | Priority Result Area |
| Process tracing | Theory-based approach to trace causal mechanisms |
| SOP | Standard Operating procedures |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |
| SSI | Semi-structured Interview |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| Wageningen UR | Wageningen University & Research centre |
| YRBI | Rumpun Bambu Indonesia Foundation |

# 1 Introduction & summary

## 1.1 Purpose and outline of the report

The Netherlands has a long tradition of public support for civil bi-lateral development cooperation, going back to the 1960s. The Co-Financing System (Medefinancieringsstelsel, or 'MFS') is its most recent expression. MFS II is the 2011-2015 grant framework for Co-Financing Agencies (CFAs), which is directed at achieving a sustainable reduction in poverty. A total of 20 consortia of Dutch CFAs have been awarded €1.9 billion in MFS II grants by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).

The overall aim of MFS II is to help strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. CFAs receiving MFS II funding work through strategic partnerships with Southern Partner Organisations.

The MFS II framework stipulates that each consortium is required to carry out independent external evaluations to be able to make valid, evaluative statements about the effective use of the available funding. On behalf of Dutch consortia receiving MFS II funding, NWO-WOTRO has issued three calls for proposals. Call deals with joint MFS II evaluations of development interventions at country level. Evaluations must comprise a baseline assessment in 2012 and a follow-up assessment in 2014 and should be arranged according to three categories of priority result areas as defined by MoFA:

Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) & themes;

Capacity development of Southern partner organisations (SPO) (5 c study);

Efforts to strengthen civil society.

This report focuses on the assessment of capacity development of southern partner organisations. This evaluation of the organisational capacity development of the SPOs is organised around four **key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The purpose of this report is to provide endline information on one of the SPOs involved in the evaluation: YRBI in Indonesia. The baseline report is described in a separate document.

Chapter 2 describes general information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO). Here you can find general information about the SPO, the context in which the SPO operates, contracting details and background to the SPO. In chapter 3 a brief overview of the methodological approach is described. You can find a more detailed description of the methodological approach in appendix 1.Chapter 4 describes the results of the 5c endline study. It provides an overview of capacity development interventions of the SPO that have been supported by MFS II. It also describes what changes in organisational capacity have taken place since the baseline and why (evaluation question is 1 and 4). This is described as a summary of the indicators per capability as well as a general causal map that provides an overview of the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline, as experienced by the SPO. The complete overview of descriptions per indicator, and how these have changed since the baseline is described in appendix 3. The complete visual and narrative for the key organisational capacity changes that have taken place since the baseline according to the SPO staff present at the endline workshop is presented in appendix 4.

For those SPOs involved in process tracing a summary description of the causal maps for the identified organisational capacity changes in the two selected capabilities (capability to act and commit; capability to adapt and self-renew) is provided (evaluation questions 2 and 4). These causal maps describe the identified key organisational capacity changes that are possibly related to MFS II

interventions in these two capabilities, and how these changes have come about. More detailed information can be found in appendix 5.

Chapter 5 presents a discussion on the findings and methodology and a conclusion on the different evaluation questions.

The overall methodology for the endline study of capacity of southern partner organisations is coordinated between the 8 countries: Bangladesh (Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath; INTRAC); DRC (Disaster Studies, Wageningen UR); Ethiopia (CDI, Wageningen UR); India (CDI, Wageningen UR: Indonesia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Liberia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Pakistan (IDS; MetaMeta); (Uganda (ETC). Specific methodological variations to the approach carried out per country where CDI is involved are also described in this document.

This report is sent to the Co-Financing Agency (CFA) and the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO) for correcting factual errors and for final validation of the report.

## 1.2 Brief summary of analysis and findings

Since the baseline, two years ago, YRBI has seen most changes under the capability to act and commit. Overall a slight deterioration took place as compared to the baseline, although some positive developments were found as well. Changes in the staff composition, including the leadership position, created a positive change in responsive leadership and internal communication, but a negative change in staff turnover, strategic guidance and the articulation of strategies. No new funding sources have been found after the ICCO contract ended which left the organization unable to act or perform. In terms of the capability to adapt and self-renew, a very slight deterioration took place. This could be attributed largely to the deterioration in terms of critical reflection. Less meetings, and opportunities for feedback from colleagues to management were the main reasons for this. The capability to deliver on development objectives has effectively remained unchanged. This was because although operational plans have become clearer, the efficiency of monitoring has slightly deteriorated. The capability to relate has very slightly improved. YRBI has expanded its network to several new networks and groups, but does not have the resources anymore to continue to engage with its target groups. Internal relations within the organization have improved. No changes occurred in terms of the capability to achieve coherence since the baseline in 2012.

The evaluators considered it important to also note down the SPO's story in terms of changes in the organisation since the baseline, and this would also provide more information about reasons for change, which were difficult to get for the individual indicators. Also for some issues there may not have been relevant indicators available in the list of core indicators provided by the evaluation team. During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by YRBI's staff:

1. staff capacity on *mukim* and *gampong* sovereignty issues is more recognized
2. an improved and more extensive network
3. reduced paid workforce and program funds

Two of these changes were selected for process tracing as they were tied to MFS II funded capacity development interventions, namely the 'poor financial situation of the organization' (the third change mentioned above), as well as 'YRBI becoming the leading organization in mukim and gampong sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia' (related to the first change mentioned above).

YRBI staff indicated that, according to them, staff capacity is more recognized due to more invitations from the community to share staff knowledge and skills on mukim and gampong issues. The increase of staff capacity can be attributed to internal knowledge sharing and learning from various staff capacity building activities by ICCO through MFS II funded capacity development interventions. This increase of staff capacity has also led to a more prominent recognition of YRBI in these areas. According to YRBI staff, YRBI has become the leading organization in mukim and gampong sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia. MFS II initiatives allowed YRBI to develop new empowement programs for the poor and programs focussed on participatory mapping of communities.

YRBI's network improved and became more extensive. The latter can be attributed to the optimal use of the organization's facilities for events and trainings, the initiation of sovereignty institutions, as well as mukim and gampong issues becoming more widespread and therefore attracting greater public attention. No relationship has been indicated with MFS II funded capacity development interventions. Most of the changes are due to the organisation's own initiatives.

The reduction in paid work force and program funds was a negative development, due to a poor financial situation that led to the closure of programs, staff leaving the organisation and staff not being paid. This poor financial situation can be partly attributed to a change of ICCO policy following the renewal of the MoU between ICCO and the Indonesian government, in which political areas and topics complicated the continuation of projects in the area. Furthermore, the organisation itself did not develop successful proposals since not many proposals were developed, even though staff at the capacity to write proposals, and the new leader didn't have adequate fundraising experience. Whilst there was no link indicated with MFS II funded capacity development interventions, the fact that the main funder ICCO (MFS II) withdrew from funding the organisation has had an important effect on the organisation's financial situation.

In terms of process tracing the following organisational capacity changes were focused on: 'poor financial situation' and 'Becoming the leading organization in *mukim* and *gampong* sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia'.

The poor financial situation of YRBI resulted from a lack of obtaining new funds, which in turn resulted from the expiration of the ICCO contract, no follow up on fundraising activities occurred, and rejection of proposals for funding (see 4.3.1) took place, even though the organisation has increased its capacity to provide financial reports based on donor standards. This developed competence cannot be related to any MFS II supported capacity development interventions. The expiration of the YRBI and ICCO contract was due to a change of ICCO policy. In this policy ICCO stated that they couldn't further support activities with "mukim and gampong" issues, as they did not receive permission to work in these areas in Aceh any longer after the renewal of the MoU between ICCO and the Government of Indonesia. No follow up for fundraising occurred, despite increased competencies in resource mobilization as the result of the Resource Mobilization training in 2013 by ICCO. The competencies to raise public funds as generated in the ICCO intervention to mobilise resources training in February 2013, were not utilized for YRBI's own financial situation. Instead YRBI elected to share these training outcomes amongst its beneficiary communities, some of which successfully applied this to raise public funds through cooperation with private parties.

No evidence for a relation could be found between the poor financial situation of YRBI and the improved transparency and accountability in financial reporting which resulted from the Financial Management training. Despite the positive outcomes in reaching the CFA's objectives in terms of utilizing the financial software and becoming a more transparent and accountable reporting organization, these developments did not impact the financial situation of YRBI. Instead the capacity built up in this area is now unused, as YRBI does not have any ICCO programs to carry out anymore.

YRBI has become more visible as a leading organisation in Mukim and Gampong sovereignity issues in Aceh in Indonesia. This was due to YRBI's staff capacity on Gampong and Mukim issues becoming more recognized amongst its stakeholders, due to more invitations from the community to share staff knowledge and skills.

Village maps were produced and utilized by the people as a result of the application of the training skills to some of the villages independently. This can be attributed to the increased staff ability to develop maps independently, following internal knowledge sharing gained from trainings. The knowledge shared in this case can be contributed to the participatory mapping internship (GIS) that took place in 2014 and was MFS II funded.

The 'Making Markets Work for the Poor' Training (MFS II), which took place in the course of 2014 parallel to the endline evaluation, resulted in the successful creation of a economic development project for beneficiary communities on the topic of honey bee exploitation and commercialisation. An increased amount of beneficiary groups has started getting involved in this project, again leading to greater trust amongst beneficiary communities.

Encouraging the community to use the results of training as a strategy to raise public and corporate funds resulted from the sharing of training knowledge to beneficiaries. This can be attributed to the gained staff skill to do fundraising from public or corporate CSR funds. This was due the internal knowledge sharing of the MFS II funded resource mobilization training that took place in 2013 as well.

On the whole, YRBI has grown into a leading organisation in Mukim and Gampong sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia, and this is mainly due to positive effects at community level of the projects implemented by staff whose competencies have been enhanced in the MFS II trainings on participatory mapping, 'Making Markets Work for the Poor' and resource mobilisation. the whole, the changes in the key organisational capacity change can be attributed to a large extent to MFS II supported capacity development interventions.

# 2 General Information about the SPO – Name SPO

## 2.1 General information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO)

| | |
|---|---|
| **Country** | Indonesia |
| **Consortium** | ICCO Alliance |
| **Responsible Dutch NGO** | ICCO |
| **Project (if applicable)** | Empowerment of Mukim and Gampong Capacity in Spatial Mananagement Phase II |
| **Southern partner organisation** | Rumpun Bambu Indonesia Foundation (YRBI) |

The project/partner is part of the sample for the following evaluation component(s):

| | |
|---|---|
| **Achievement of MDGs and themes** | X |
| **Capacity development of Southern partner organisations** | X |
| **Efforts to strengthen civil society** | |

## 2.2 The socio-economic, cultural and political context in which the partner operates

**The socio-economic, cultural and political context in which the partner operates**
The region of Aceh, historically divided into three hierarchy, they are kesultanan, (state), sago/negeri (province), Mukim (district) and Gampong (Village). Mukim is Traditional Institution, which grew up and rooted in social order of Aceh society which has a great role in management and spatial control and also their parts of life. Every Mukim has its clear boundaries.[1]

The project addresses issues of lack of capacities of those traditional institutions, gampong and mukim , in natural resources and spatial management. It aims to empower and enhance capacities of both gampong and mukim to deal with increasing problems related with land tenure, natural hazard, natural resources and spatial management in Aceh. The project is important, particularly, in the context of post-tsunami and post-conflict of Aceh, where society was quite significantly divided into conflicting groups and its environment was severely devastated due to the disaster. While the problems of post-conflict and post-tsunami are particular in Aceh, the weakness of traditional institutions was widespread throughout the archipelago.

The issues of deficiency of traditional institutions can be explained mainly as the consequence of two major developments that happened in modern history of Indonesia. Firstly, the modernization process that took place in the archipelago since several decades ago especially following colonial expansion and more particularly in the aftermath of Indonesia's independence in 1945. Secondly, strategic policy taken by the "new order" regime to implement the Law number 5/1979 on Village Governance which was part of the centralistic approach of President Soeharto.

While in the past gampong and mukim played an important role in social and economic activities of Aceh people, they have been weakened significantly as a consequence of the two developments. In the old days of Aceh, their role include government administrative roles, customary (adat) and hukom (law)[2]. The division of authority between gampong and mukim (association of gampong) is that

[1] YRBI Program Report The Empowerment of the Mukim and Gampong Capacity in Spatial Management Phase II Period: November 2010 until October 2011
[2] Source: correspondence with YRBI director Sanusi M. Syarif (2010: 67).

mukim deals with issues which are not resolved at gampong level and becomes the authorized reference for religious affairs. Mukim also deals with external affairs, while gampong addresses internal affairs. However, following the implementation of Law 5/1979 mukim had no longer central role and authority since the law only recognize the authority of gampong which is seen as a village, the smallest administration unit of government—assuming as part of homogenous pattern of village administration throughout the archipelago. Without such legal recognition and financial resources mukim played no significant role in Aceh society during the period. At the same time the nature of gampong which was characterized by collegial type of leadership (altogether with teungku meunasah and tuha peut) shifted to be a centralistic kind of leadership. In short, the head of village became the sole authority at village level[3].

Following the collapse of the New Order Regime in 1998 and in the aftermath of the tsunami attack in 2004, there have been new streams and movements to revive and to revitalize traditional institutions and laws in Aceh. There were, actually, efforts to give a 'special treatment' to Aceh by providing 'special autonomy' through UU No 18/2001 and UU No.11/2006 on Aceh governance. Yet the implementation of these laws was not followed by strong and significant efforts to re-strengthen Mukim institution. Both the national and local government of Aceh gave more attentions for doing physical reconstruction and rehabilitation programs of the post-tsunami rather than improving capacity of gampong and mukim to involve in development process. There are also too little efforts and resources available to enhance capacity of 6.408 gampong and 755 mukims throughout Aceh.

Following massive and intensive rehabilitation and reconstruction programs, land tenure and environment problems have become new crucial issues in Aceh. Besides hundreds of thousands people dead and colossal destruction in Aceh, the tsunami has also brought about another serious problem: the massive loss of land tenure documents. In some areas it has led to conflicting issues regarding boundaries between gampongs or between mukims. It became deteriorated in some areas particularly when new projects for natural resources exploitation took place. In several cases, both gampongs and mukims have not been involved in producing the license for natural resources exploitation which might end up in conflict between villagers and companies as well as among the villagers.

With these emerging problems in the backdrop, YRBI seeks to empower traditional institutions of *gampong* and *mukim* in Aceh to play more important roles in resolving conflict between groups as well as in better managing natural resources for a more prosperous and sustainable society.

In the 2012-2013 program period, the location of fieldwork conducted in several villages federation (mukim) at Aceh Besar Regency. That location are Mukim Siem, Mukim Lambaro Angan, Mukim Lamteuba and Mukim Lampanah. While in Aceh Jaya-South Aceh, focus in Mukim Pucok Panga, Mukim Sarah Raya, Mukim Panga Pasie and Gampong Jambo Papeun. Besides also the location of shared learning through discussion, mapping and site visits, followed by mukim's at Aceh Jaya Regency (Mukim Sarah Raya, Mukim Panga Pasie, and Mukim Pasie Teube) and South Aceh Regency (Gampong Jambo Papeun).[4]

The context between the project locations Siem and Lamteuba is different. Siem is sub-urban area where most population are working in the city as government officers and or employees, whereas Lamteuba is located in rural areas where most population are working as farmers or agricultural-related workers. This will explain why these two Mukim have a different approach in dealing with conflict and in their capacity to document their information (map and other important data/information). When the community is not able to keep and take care of the information, usually YRBI will help them keeping such data including the map.

[3] Source: correspondence with YRBI director Sanusi M. Syarif (2010:69, 70)

[4] Final-Report- 2014 "The Empowerment of the *Mukim* and the Gampong Capacity in Spatial Management Program Phase II"

## 2.3 Contracting details

When did cooperation with this partner start: 2005.

What is the MFS II contracting period: 1-11-2012 to 31-10-2013

Did cooperation with this partner end: Yes

If yes, when did it finish: 2013

What is the reason for ending the cooperation with this partner: Contract expired

Is there expected cooperation with this partner after 31st of December 2015: No.

## 2.4 Background to the Southern Partner Organisation

**History**
In 1995 YRBI was established by 4 founders concerned in empowering indigenous institutions, agriculture and environment[5]. In 1998, YRBI still had no donors and the organization consisted of a staff of six people and ten volunteers. As YRBI was dealing with the legal aspects of palm oil extraction, it had to function undercover[6]. The main issues YRBI was engaged with at this point were: democracy and human rights advocacy, identifying conflict origins and (eventually) reducing those, solving local conflicts using traditional wisdom and finally the engagement with issues concerning the sustainable use of natural resources[7].

In 1999 the Program of Panglima Laut was funded by local fishermen and in 2000 a YRBI volunteer was abducted by Indonesia's security force (Brimob) during the Aceh conflict [8]. In 2001 YRBI had its Standard Operational Procedures elaborated and the YRBI's office was moved to Banda Aceh. From 2001 to 2004 YRBI had a staff of 11 people and was funded by DAI-OTI-USAID in its program on civil society mapping, democracy and human rights[9]. From 2005 to 2008 the organization experienced little to no expansion due to limited resources[10].

From 2006 to the present YRBI has broadened its network of collaborating partners. As such, the organization has worked in joint activities with WALHI, SAMDANA and Pusaka Foundation, in the Forest People Program. In the last year YRBI started to focus also on climate change and it had a poor achievement in raising public funding[11].

**Vision**
YRBI envisions a community that *"will be able to manage natural resources independently and develop the potential of the region to achieve the prosperous life in a fair way"*[12].

**Mission**
**The Missions** [13]:
- Strengthen the management of natural resource and the area
- Strengthening of civil based economy
- Strengthening of local values
- Strengthening of public policy with community justification based
- Strengthen the solidarity among social community

**Strategies**

[5] Historical time line developed by Evaluation team (2012)
[6] Historical time line developed by Evaluation team (2012)
[7] Historical time line developed by Evaluation team (2012)
[8] Historical time line developed by Evaluation team (2012)
[9] Historical time line developed by Evaluation team (2012)
[10] Historical time line developed by Evaluation team (2012)
[11] Historical time line developed by Evaluation team (2012)
[12] YRBI (2010) Profil_English version
[13] Proposal YRBI-ICCO, 2010-2013, "The Empowerment of the *Mukim* and the Gampong Capacity in Spatial Management Program Phase II"

There are specific strategies developed for the achievement of each of the outputs. The aimed outputs and the respective strategies are described below.

**Output 1**

Increasing Mukim and gampong capacity in Aceh Besar, Aceh Jaya dan Aceh Selatan on layout, environmental effect analyzing and disasters management sectors. The activities include:

A. Workshop Program
   This activity is basic through all programs. Through the workshop, YBRI expects to collect valuable inputs from the participants in designing detail program and field program development.
B. Participatory Mukim Appraisal
   This investigation is run by using the PRA (Participatory Rural Appraisal) approach. The result of this activity offers basic information about the social, economic and traditional contexts of the Mukim environment. It is done in every focus location.
C. Periodic meeting, once in every three months
   A periodic meeting is carried out in focus locations and it serves as a communication forum point of Mukim.
D. Re-planting and agro forestry workshop
   The objective of this activity is that of offering concepts and practical guidance for the implementation of field assistance and re-planting activities.

**Output 2**

There are gampong/Mukim regulations about spatial of Natural Resources management with community based and continuity management design. The activities include:

A. Community Participatory Mapping
   The activity comprises producing sketches of the process of Mukim areas, identifying Mukim boundaries and drawing maps. This mapping activity is done in two Mukim areas, they are: Mukim Lam Teuba and Mukim Trieng Meuduro/ Gampong Panton Luas. The other goals of community mapping are: to identify water sources, and to re-arrange community forest protection (Climate Change related activity).
B. Spatial Planning and Mukim development
   This activity includes: identifying the potential of natural resources in Mukim areas, Mukim social resources, outlining an order of priorities, stipulating agreements in process development and defining Mukim spatial management. Since it is a follow-up activity after the mapping process it will also be implemented in two Mukim areas (Lam Teuba and Trieng Meuduro gampong Panton Luas). Through these activities, the communities could improve their struggle for better living conditions.
C. Revitalization Workshop of Tuha Peut
   This program aims at introducing concepts and guidance outlines which can be implemented in the process of field assistance for Tuha Peut institution. This workshop is done by every Tuha Peut from Mukim and gampong in target group area.
D. Training for Tuha Peut to make Rule of Gampong.
   This program is focused in guiding villages' leaders and Tuha Peut participants in arranging and stipulating gampong regulation by combining traditional and formal approaches.
E. Training of land tenure and customary right (the adat Aceh) for youth.
   This activity is aimed at identifying the Mukim land tenure and customary rights.

**Output 3**

Registration and documentation of local wisdom about Natural Resources management. The activities designed for reaching this objective include:

A. Documentation of local regulations and other connected regulations.
   The objective of this activity is that of helping the target society in documenting local wisdom and the society's customs.
B. Social research for Mukim Catle land (padang rumput) management.
   It is expected that this activity can contribute to the practitioners and local community in understanding cattle and land management issues in Aceh.
C. Social research for Mukim traditional market management.
   It is expected that this activity can contribute to the practitioners and local community in understanding the reality of the Mukim traditional market management in Aceh.
D. Bulletin Peureude and Info sheet publication "Suara Mukim" once for three months.
   These media publish the cases which are related to Mukim and field findings during the time of carrying out the programs.
E. Assistance
   This activity is run in focus area. The assistance is offered in areas of institution management and field process, which concerns the preservation of local customs. Besides that, this activity also proposes the strengthening of community organization.

**Output 4**

Increasing the amount of re-plantations in order to counter-weight the impact of climate change in program location. The activities comprise:

A. Identification of the river area and the sources of water
   It is expected that this activity can contribute for the local community's to understanding of the importance and actual situation of local river and other sources of water (Climate Change related activity).
B. Making billboard for water sources
   This activity produces billboards about preservation for water sources (Climate Change related activity). Distribution seed for farmer (Climate Change related activity)[14].

[14] YRBI(2010)Final Proposal 2010-2013

# 3 Methodological approach and reflection

## 3.1 Overall methodological approach

This chapter describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around **four key evaluation questions**:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

Note: this methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report A detailed overview of the approach is described in appendix 1.

The first (changes in organisational capacity) and the fourth evaluation question are addressed together through:

- **Changes in the 5C indicators since the baseline:** standard indicators have been agreed upon for each of the five capabilities of the five capabilities framework (see appendix 2) and changes between the baseline, and the endline situation have been described. For data collection a mix of data collection methods has been used, including self-assessments by SPO staff; interviews with SPO staff and externals; document review; observation. For data analysis, the Nvivo software program for qualitative data analysis has been used. Final descriptions per indicator and per capability with corresponding scores have been provided.
- **Key organisational capacity changes – 'general causal map':** during the endline workshop a brainstorm has been facilitated to generate the key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO since the baseline, with related underlying causes. For this purpose, a visual as well as a narrative causal map have been described.

In terms of the attribution question (2 and 4), **'process tracing'** is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to

focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

## 3.2 Assessing changes in organisational capacity and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?** And the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This is explained below. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

The evaluators considered it important to also note down a consolidated SPO story and this would also provide more information about what the SPO considered to be important in terms of organisational capacity changes since the baseline and how they perceived these key changes to have come about. Whilst this information has not been validated with sources other than SPO staff, it was considered important to understand how the SPOs has perceived changes in the organisation since the baseline.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information is provided for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the next session on the evaluation question on attribution, as described below and in the appendix 1.

How information was collected and analysed for addressing evaluation question 1 and 4, in terms of description of changes in indicators per capability as well as in terms of the general causal map, based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff, is further described below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012[15].

[15] The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1. **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2. **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3. **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4. **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5. **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team
15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Please see appendix 1 for a description of the detailed process and steps.

## 3.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity - evaluation question 2 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: **To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?** and the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Below, the selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

### 3.3.1 Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

For the detailed results of this selection, in the four countries that CDI is involved in, please see appendix 1. The following SPOs were selected for process tracing:

- Ethiopia: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE (4/9)
- India: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE, VTRC (5/10)
- Indonesia: ASB, ECPAT, PT.PPMA, YPI, YRBI (5/12)
- Liberia: BSC, RHRAP (2/5).

### 3.3.2 Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ' general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop

have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained. More information can be found in Appendix 1.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

### 3.3.3 Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team. These can also be found in appendix 1.

**Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach:** this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

**Using standard indicators and scores**: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

**General causal map:** whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

**Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question:** this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during

the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

**Utilisation of the evaluation**

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

Design – mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to

generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication: many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process: The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

# 4 Results

## 4.1 MFS II supported capacity development interventions

Below an overview of the different MFS II supported capacity development interventions of YRBI that have taken place since 2011 are described. The information is based on the information provided by ICCO.

Table 1
*Information about MFS II supported capacity development interventions since baseline*

| Title of the MFS II supported capacity development intervention | Objectives | Activities | Timing and duration | Budget |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Participatory Mapping Internship (GIS) | Develop staff competence in GIS application and development | Series of activities | October 2013 – January 2014 | n/a |
| Making Markets work for the Poor (MFP) Training | Develop economic empowerment programs | Series of training workshops, onsite coaching, business model and plan development workshops | March 2014-ongoing | 90,252 Euro |
| Resource Mobilization Training | Develop innovative strategies to become a sustainable organization | Training with other ICCO Alliance partners | February 2013 | n/a |
| Financial System Management training | Ensure that partners meet the minimal standard of financial reporting | Finance software training and standard guidelines for the system | March 2013 | 1200 Euro |


Source: 5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_CFA perspective_Indonesia_YRBI

## 4.2 Changes in capacity development and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

Below you can find a description of the changes in each of the five core capabilities. This information is based on the analysis of the information per each of the indicators. This detailed information for each of the indicators describes the current situation, and how and why it has changed since the baseline. See also annex 3.

### 4.2.1 Changes in the five core capabilities

**Capability to act and commit**




After a handing over the director's position to a younger staff member, YRBI has become a more open organization for its staff members. Communication with management, feedback and the ability to participate in decision making were enabled by the new director in charge. Staff is encouraged to create their own strategies, methods and approaches in work. Despite that, decision making still appears to be a slow process particularly in relation to "inherited" problems such as financial problems that have yet to be solved. On the whole strategic guidance needs to be further developed.

In term of organization structure, it is thinner due to the project activities and staffs reduction. This reduction has also caused M&E to no longer be conducted. They only hold informal forum to to discuss contemporary issues that develop at local, regional, and national which is called "Diskusi Lorong".


Overall, daily operations are in line with strategic planning, although the number of activities carried out has gone down significantly after the ICCO funded program was finalized. This is also affected staff turnover since staff had to leave the organisation due to closing the ICCO funded project. The number of staffs reduced from 14 to 8. No new major funds have been acquired since, although the organization is actively seeking out new opportunities and has applied to several potential donors. Staff skills have slightly improved over the observed period as a result of increased work experience and donor (ICCO) supported trainings in Participatory Mapping Internship [GIS], Making Market for the Poor Training (MFP), Resource Mobilization Training, and Financial Management Training between 2012-2014. Nonetheless further improvements are needed in terms of English language proficiency to improve the quality of proposals and negotiations.

The previous structure is actually still relevant with the organization needs but the project activities and staffs reduction caused the structure to be thinner.

Since YRBI closed their projects, M&E was no longer conducted. They only held informal forums to discuss contemporary issues that develop at local, regional, and national which is called "Diskusi Lorong".

Score: 2.7 to 2.4 (very slight deterioration)

**Capability to adapt and self-renew**





On the whole, there is a very slight deterioration in the capability to adapt and self-renew for YRBI. Although staff has indicated numerous times that they see the benefit and need to develop their monitoring and evaluation, it has not been prioritized until now. M&E resides with the Director as there is no trained staff assigned with this particular role. Limited but irregular M&E is done at the project level through infrequent meetings where staff is free to address outstanding issues. M&E is done in the form of discussions based on project agreements (activities, outputs and outcomes), so this is initially done for reporting back to donors. They are learning from it though, identifying obstacles and constraints and reducing the risk of failure by finding solutions.

Staff meetings in general have reduced in frequency, duration and intensity, providing fewer scheduled moments for feedback and discussion. Nonetheless office and organizational culture can be considered open and free and enables informal communication. With regards to keeping track of external developments YRBI continues to track media and its network at the local and national level, and picks up on current issues from there, but there is no formal system in place to do this tracking of the environment.

Communication and engagement with stakeholders and beneficiaries is done directly in the field and includes all level of staff, including the director. Active participation of the community allows YRBI to convey their expectations and this yields better results as well as a sense of ownership of the products amongst the beneficiaries. It also prevents wasting time and resources on unwanted activities.

Score: 2.5 to 2.3 ( very slight deterioration)

**Capability to deliver on development objectives**





There is an overall strategic plan in YRBI and day-to-day activities are based on the strategic plan. The ability to implement programs has increased since more staff understands the programs. Delegation is done effectively from the new director to the coordinators, but more difficult from coordinators to the staff, sparking the need for better job delegation and management practices. YRBI works closely together with its beneficiaries in a participatory approach, through which they are able to consistently deliver on donor-agreed outputs and and deliver quality results. The approach however is intensive and sometimes causes delays and affects efficiency.

Overall meetings to discuss program progress including linking inputs and outputs from projects are held, but there is no formal system in place to assess efficiency by linking inputs to outputs. This is in line with having a week monitoring and evaluation system in place. YRBI has a clear vision and is a focused organization. They cannot depend on funding anymore because the ICCO contract ended (only funder) and was not renewed and together with the community they work together hand in hand with the in sourcing funds. The terms of reference for the project have changed from a donor-driven process into community needs-driven process and on the whole, engagement with the beneficiaries is good.

All in all the capability to deliver on development objectives has remained unchanged, and there is room for improvement.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)


**Capability to relate**




Overall this capability has not changed. YRBI has a good network with local government institutions and NGOs which help them in their advocacy work. Stakeholders are involved and there is ongoing communication with these stakeholders and policy makers, but it is not clear to what extend the stakeholders also contributed to informing policies and strategies of YRBI. . Currently, there is an extension in YRBI's network with the addition of more NGOs. YRBIs network is at the local and national level, mainly with organizations working on similar issues in indigenous rights and the natural environment, or with organizations that outsource part of their projects to YRBI (subcontracting). Due to their participatory approach there are regular field visits, however the frequency of these visits has reduced due to budget constraints after closing projects which affected having less field officers available. There is a sense of family among the staff members, but also a respect for seniority that prevents junior staff from arguing with senior staff, even though there is an open atmosphere in which one can freely discuss any issue and give their input before a decision is made. With the change of leadership, the above situation sometimes still occur, but the new (young) director applies more egalitarian leadership style, which makes the junior-senior relationship smoother than before.

Score: from 3.2 to 3.4 (very slight improvement)

**Capability to achieve coherence**




There are no changes in the capability to achieve coherence. Overall the same approaches towards strategy, the application of vision and mission to daily operations and the alignment of all these factors have remained the same. Standard operating procedures are in still place for finance, but not for HRM.

Score: from 2.7 to 2.7 (no change)

### 4.2.2 General changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO

**Narrative of General Causal Map of Yayasan Rumpun Bambu Indonesia (YRBI)**
YRBI is an organization established in 1995 which works in the fields of indigenous community empowerment, agricultural development, and environmental conservation. Since 2006, YRBI has dealt with climate change issues until 2011 when they chose traditional community development as their main issue. Collaboration between YRBI and the Netherlands began in 2005 after the tsunami. The contract between MFS II and YRBI started on 1 November 2012 and ended on 31 October 2013 without being renewed.


The evaluation team carried out an end line assessment at YRBI from 14 to 16 July 2014. During this workshop, the team made a recap of key features of the organisation in the baseline in 2012 (such as vision, mission, strategies, clients, partnerships). This was the basis for discussing changes that had happened to the organisation since the baseline.

Some positive and negative changes have taken place in the organization since the baseline, and both of these have affected the organization in terms of being able to work or *on mukim* and *gampong* sovereignty issues [1] , and thereby becoming a leading organization on these issues [2]. *Mukim* and *gampong* are legal administrative community units[16] in Indonesia. YRBI wants to become a leading organization in terms of the issues in dealing with *mukim* and *gampong* sovereignty [2]. The extent to which the organisation has been able to work or on *mukim* and *gampong* sovereignty issues [1], can be attributed to three key organisational capacity changes:

4. staff capacity on *mukim* and *gampong* sovereignty issues is more recognised [4];
5. an improved and more extensive network [15];
6. reduced paid workforce and program funds [3], which is a negative development ;

[16] It has boundaries and authority to control and manage the interests of local communities based on the origin and the local customs which are recognized in the Indonesian Government system. In a nutshell is zoning based on local custom. In the structure, gampong is under mukim. Mukim formed by at least four gampong. Each mukm is led by a Uleebalang or a Mukim. This system is applied since the era of the Aceh Sultanate.

Each of these key organisational capacity changes and how they have come about is further explained below. Numbers in the narrative corresponds to numbers in the visual.




**Staff capacity on *mukim* and *gampong* sovereignty issues is more recognised [4]**

An increase in staff capacity has become more visible to stakeholders, partners and beneficiaries [4] as staff members carried out their duties. More invitations from the community for staff to share their knowledge and skills [9] made the public realize the increase in their knowledge and capacity.

The greater number of invitations from the community to share knowledge and skills is due to an increased trust from beneficiaries and stakeholders in YRBI's competencies [11]. This was due to a range of different issues:

- Staff improved the communities' awareness, comprehension and support to *mukim* and *gampong* sovereignty issues [17], Which was due to public education on these issues [27].
- Many communities succeed to raise funds from the public [18] after encouragement and assistance from YRBI [28]
- An increased number of village maps has been created and utilized by the people [19] after YRBI empowered the community with the skills to create their own social maps [29]
- Increased community economic development assistance [20] through honey bee forest exploitation [30].
- Government created a *mukim* and *gampong* regulation [21] after active and regular advocacy and lobbying of YRBI [31].
- Continuous sharing of knowledge on *mukim* and *gampong* issues [22] because these issues have become more mainstream in Aceh [32].

Each of these factors resulted from the overall development of the *Mukim* and *Gampong* sovereignity over the last two years [37], following the increased efforts and staff capacities to deliver work and carry out program activities [38]. This was due to more internal knowledge sharing [39]. It is custom for YRBI staff who have returned from an external event, whether it is a discussion, seminar, or training, to share the knowledge they received to the other staff members in a forum. This forum is called "*Diskusi Lorong"* [39]. It is held at least twice in one month. Aside from being a forum to share knowledge, *Diskusi Lorong* also benefits as a forum to discuss program development and contemporary issues that develop at local, regional, and national level.

Amongst the knowledge shared were several staff capacity building activities as supported by ICCO [40] and the establishment and initiation of *mukim* and *gampong* coalition for sovereignty natural resources governance. Capacity building activities for YRBI were supported by ICCO between 2012-2013[40], Which included: 1) Participatory Mapping Internship (GIS); 2) Making Market for The Poor Training; 3) Resource Mobilization Training.

The other issue that affected increased trust from beneficiaries and stakeholders [15] is an improved and more extensive network [15]. Since this also directly affected the organisation's capacity to address *mukim* and *gampong* sovereignty issues, it is further elaborated upon below,

**The network improved and is more extensive [15]**
YRBI's network has grown over the last two years [15]. The continuous sharing of knowledge and developments on *mukim* and *gampong* issues in the public, amongst stakeholders and community played a large role in this [22]. On the other hand, YRBI is now able to host meetings, trainings and *mukim* forums in themeeting room *(Bale Pertemuan)* in the new building , which has allowed more beneficiaries and stakeholders to get in touch with YRBI [42]. In fact, the *Bale Pertemuan* has now become a regular meeting point for civil society activists. Improved facilities have also contributed to being able to continuously share knowledge on *mukim gampong* and sovereignty issues [22]. This sharing is also due to *gampong* and *mukim* becoming a CSO mainstream issue in Aceh [32], which in turn is due to initiating sovereignty institutions to rescue *mukim* and *gampong* areas and natural resources [41].

**Reduced paid workforce and program funds [3]**
This is a negative change that occurred in YRBI since the baseline in 2012. There are a variety of reasons for this negative change:

- No salary being paid to staff members [6]
- No more program activities after 2013 [7]
- Reduction in the number of staff members [8]
- More voluntary work [5]
- Less decisive leadership [36].

Each of these factors was the result of the poor financial situation of YRBI [10] after no new funds could be obtained [13] after the contract with ICCO expired in 2013 [23]. A change in ICCO policy was the primary reason for this occurring [33] after specific new changes were included in the renewal of the MoU between ICCO and the government of Indonesia [43]. Prior to this, ICCO was more focused on local economic empowerment. Although YRBI has had the opportunity to submit new proposals in line with ICCO's policy, they chose to stick with the empowerment of *mukim* and *gampong* institutions, and as a result, the contract with ICCO ended.

No additional funds were acquired in the meantime either as proposals written by YRBI were rejected [16]. This was partly due to the limited number of proposals being developed, decreasing the chances of getting new funds significantly [24]. Proposals. riting and development was possible [34] because some senior staff already possessed the capacity and experiences to do so [44]. Nonetheless, a lack of experience in fundraising of the new director of YRBI [25] reduced YRBI's chances for success acquisition, and this new leadership came on board after a leadership change in the mid of 2013 [45]. The previous director, staff recalled, had better networking and fundraising skills.

Finally, the poor financial condition of the organization resulted in more voluntary work being done since 2013 [8]. This was the only way for YRBI to keep the organization at work with limited resources and capital. Volunteers, and staff working for free on a voluntary basis, were attracted to do so by

their motivation to work and contribute to the organization and its mission [14]. The increase in motivation could also be attributed to the fact that they were now more involved in decision making [26] which was enabled by the freedom and more democratic leadership style of the new director [35]. Unfortunately this increase in staff autonomy and empowerment by the new director also led to a less decisive leadership management [36], which some staff members indicated harmed the organization in need for change and funds.

## 4.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity development - evaluation question 2 and 4

Note: for each country about 50% of the SPOs has been chosen to be involved in process tracing, which is the main approach chosen to address evaluation question 2. For more information please also see chapter 3 on methodological approach. For each of these SPOs the focus has been on the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew, since these were the most commonly addressed capabilities when planning MFS II supported capacity development interventions for the SPO.

For each of the MFS II supported capacity development interventions -under these two capabilities- an outcome area has been identified, describing a particular change in terms of organisational capacity of the SPO. Process tracing has been carried out for each outcome area. In the capability to act and commit the following outcome area has been identified, based on document review and discussions with SPO and CFA: 'poor financial situation'.


In the capability to adapt and self-renew the following outcome area has been identified, based on document review and discussions with SPO and CFA: 'Becoming the leading organization in mukim and gampong sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia'

Table 2
*Information on selected capabilities, outcome areas and MFS II supported capacity development interventions since the baseline*

| Capability | Outcome area | MFS II supported capacity development intervention(2) |
|---|---|---|
| Capability to act and commit | Poor financial situation | Financial System Management Training (March 2013)<br>Resource Mobilization Training (February 2013) |
| Capability to adapt and self-renew | Becoming the leading organization in mukim and gampong sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia | Participatory Mapping Internship (GIS) (series of activities), October 2013 – January 2014<br>Making Markets work for the Poor (MFP) Training series, March 2014-ongoing<br>Resource Mobilization Training, February 2013 |

The next sections will describe the results of process tracing for each of the outcome areas, and will describe to what extent these outcome areas have taken place as a result of MFS II supported capacity development interventions and/or other related factors and actors.

### 4.3.1 Poor financial situation




The key capacity change that was focused on during the process tracing workshop was identified as 'poor financial situation' [5] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Minutes Meeting). Staff of YRBI indicated that this has led to salary not being paid since the beginning of 2014 [1] (Annex L, M, O, Workshop Min. Meeting); the ending of all program activities in 2013 [2] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min. Meeting); a considerable reduction in the number of staff [3] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min. Meeting); encourage staff working more on a voluntary basis [4] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min. Meeting).

The poor financial situation of YRBI [5] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min. Meeting) is due to fact that since the MFS II contract ended, in 2013, no new funds have been obtained [6] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min. Meeting). The reason for this was threefold. *First,* the YRBI and ICCO contract expired [7] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min. Meeting). *Secondly,* no follow up for fund raising activity based in the training attended [8] (Annex L, R; Training interview of Director; Workshop Min. Meeting). *Thirdly*, the rejection of proposals for program activities and funding [9] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min. Meeting). Each of these three reasons is explained in more detail below.

1. The ICCO contract expired on 31 Oktober 2013 and was not renewed due to political and administrative issues. This was due to an internal ICCO policy change [14] (Annex E, L, R; Workshop Min. Meeting), which directly resulted from the renewal of an MoU between ICCO and


the Government of Indonesia [17] (Annex L, R). The policy stated that ICCO couldn't further support activities with "mukim and gampong"[17] (zoning based on local custom) issues.
ICCO funded Financial Management Training [16] (Annex L, M, Workshop Min. Meeting) resulted in ability to develop report based on donor standard [13] (Annex L, M, R; Workshop Min. Meeting). The financial reports are now more transparent and accountable [13] (Annex L, R; Workshop Min. Meeting). This training has no further follow up since YRBI didn't need to develop reports as they didn't have programs anymore after the contract from ICCO has been ended.

2. There was no active follow up on fund raising activities [8] (Annex L, R; Tranining Interview of Director; Workshop Min. Meeting) as taught in the Resource mobilization Training supported by ICCO In 2013 [18] (Training Interview of Director), but the knowledge from the training had been shared and disseminated to the community to empower them to raise fund in a variety of ways. Despite no concrete fund raising activities being carried out after the resource mobilization training took place, the training did result in positive changes elsewhere. A number of beneficiary communities succeeded in raising public funds through cooperation with private sectors/companies or directly from the community with help of YRBI and the newly acquired capabilities in the training. They did this by creating proposals for cooperation or donations, selling merchandise, etc. Unfortunately these capabilities to raise public funds were not utilized for YRBI's own sake.
3. The final reason for the lack of securing new funds was the rejection of submitted proposals [9] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min. Meeting). During the field interviews, various people have noted that the new director was unable to maintain the level of fundraising and had a significant lack of experience in it and also in networking [11] (annex L, M, R). The change of leadership happened in 2013 [19] (annex L, M, O; Workshop Min. Meeting).

The other reason for rejection was that the number of proposals developed was actually very low [12] (Annex L, M, R; Workshop Min. Meeting). This despite the fact that some of the submitted proposals were developed by YRBI staff themselves [15] (Annex L, M, O, R), as they have capacity to do them [21] (annex L, M, O, R).

[17] Mukim and gampong is a legal community unit. It has boundaries and authority to control and manage the interests of local communities based on the origin and the local customs which are recognized in the Indonesian Government system. In a nutshell is zoning based on local custom. In the structure, gampong is under mukim. Mukim formed by at least four gampong. Each mukim is led by a Uleebalang or a Mukim. This system is applied since the era of the Aceh Sultanate.

### 4.3.2 Becoming the leading organization in mukim and gampong sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia




This process tracing map differs slightly from the other maps presented in this report in that it addresses not only competencies and organizational capacity, but also some implementation activities and targets. The two are inherently intertwined within YRBI and hard to separate when explained for this particular capacity. It should therefore be considered a "mixed" causal map.

Following is the narration for the YRBI causal map between 2012-2014. Within the two year time period since the MFS II baseline evaluation in 2012, a key organizational capacity change at YRBI was that it has become the leading organization in mukim and gampong18 sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia [1] (Annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). During the process tracing workshops and interviews it was made clear that this outcome is the direct result of an increased recognition in staff capacity on Gampong and Mukim issues [2] (Annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). This increased recognition can be explained through two factors:

1. More invitations from community to share staff knowledge and skills [3] (Annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting)
2. *Gampong* and *Mukim* becoming one of CSO mainstream issues [14] (Annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting)

Each of these changes is described below. First off the increase in invitations for staff to share their knowledge and skills [3] (Annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting) resulted from an increase in trust in YRBI from beneficiaries and stakeholders [4] (Annex L, M, R; Training Interview of Director, Field Staff; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). Four factors contributed to this increase in trust, which will be discussed in detail below:

1. Village maps being produced and utilized by people [5] (Annex R, Training Interview of Field Staff; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting).
2. An increased number of assisted bee project groups [6] (Annex L, R; Training Interview of Director; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting)
3. Encouragement of the community to use the results of training as a strategy to raise public and corporate funds [7] (Annex L, Training Interview of Director; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting)
4. A government initiation to create new regulations related to *mukim* and *gampong* [8] (Annex L; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting)

*First,* the village maps being produced by communities came forth from the transfer of staff knowledge to villagers [5] (Annex R; Training Interview of Field Staff; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). This program continues to this day and at least three social maps have successfully been completed, and were funded by the villagers themselves [10] (Annex C; Training Interview of Field Staff). This knowledge resulted from an increase in staff's ability to develop maps independently. Field Staff applied his knowledge by independently conducting social mapping in a number of villages [15] (Annex C; Training Interview of Field Staff). This was purely from Field Staff initiative, and YRBI functioned as a facilitator. He was one of the YRBI staff members who participated in the Participatory Mapping Internship (GIS) in Bogor, 2013 [23] (Training Interview Field Staff). He shared his knowledge with his colleagues in YRBI after his return from there [20] (annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting).

*Secondly,* an increased number of assisted bee project groups arose [6] (Annex L, R; Training Interview of Director; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting) after the honey bee project was aligned with organization issues wich is economic community empowerment [11] (Annex C, L; Training Interview of Director). There was development of new community empowerment on honey bee forest exploitation [16] (Annex C, L; Training Interview of Director). The number of communities increased from two to six benefiting communities. Actually honey exploitation is not a new activity. It was stagnant but has developed since one of YRBI staff participated and shared the knowledge about economic community empowerment with his colleagues. Together with his colleagues, then benefiting communities after their own skill raised [19] (annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). At the bottom of all this was the Making Market for the Poor Training (MFP) [24] (Annex C; Training Interview of Director). This activity was held in 2013 in the form of training by Penabulu supported by ICCO. The YRBI staff who participated in this training was–The YRBI Director. This training made

[18] Mukim and gampong is a legal community unit. It has boundaries and authority to control and manage the interests of local communities based on the origin and the local customs which are recognized in the Indonesian Government system. In a nutshell is zoning based on local custom. In the structure, gampong is under mukim. Mukim formed by at least four gampong. Each mukim is led by a Uleebalang or a Mukim. This system is applied since the era of the Aceh Sultanate.

efforts in providing participants with the competencies necessary to market their products. Oftentimes, the obstacle in the development of small to medium-sized industries is marketing products. Through this training, the products can be marketed well and in time so as to increase the economy of the community.

*Thirdly,* communities were encouraged to use the results of training as a strategy to raise public and corporate funds [7] (Annex L; Training Interview of Director; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). YRBI makes an active effort in order for the beneficiary communities to be able to not only raise resources, but also be able to identify and be firm towards companies involved in cases of corruption, environment, human rights, etc. A number of beneficiary communities succeeded in raising public funds through cooperation with private sectors/companies or directly from the community. They did this by creating proposals for cooperation or donations, selling merchandise, etc. However, YRBI asserted the beneficiary communities to pay attention to the background of those they would like to cooperate with, especially the private companies. That knowledge was shared by YRBI's staff to all beneficiaries [12] (Annex L; Training Interview of Director), and this knowledge was the result of skills gained to do fundraising from the public and the private sector [17] (Annex L; Training Interview of Director). At the basis of this increased capacity was the Resource Mobilization Training [25] (Annex C, L; Training Interview of Director). This activity was held in 2013 in the form of a training held by Penabulu with the support of ICCO. The YRBI staff sent to participate in the training was The YRBI Director. This training was on how beneficiary communities or the organization can raise public funds, therefore making this beneficial for the beneficiary communities and YRBI. The output was his improved competencies in raising public funds [17] (Annex C, L; Training Interview of Director). Unfortunately, the increased fundraising capacity was not successfully applied to the own organization.

In all three cases of ICCO supported trainings and activities, YRBI organized meetings to share the outcomes amongst the staff who didn't attend. *"Diskusi Lorong"* [20], as it is called, was actually YRBI's internal forum to discuss or share technical details dealing with program implementation and the performance of the organization or the subjects of the capacity building. The staffs who have recently attended trainings are often asked to share their knowledge with others through this forum. In addition, this forum is also used for updating the latest social issues developing in Aceh. Although this forum is informal, the staffs consider it very productive. Their capacities have significantly increased through this forum.

*The fourth* and last factor contributing to the increase in trust among beneficiaries and stakeholders was a shift in government regulation regarding *mukim* and *gampong* [8] (Annex L, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). This was the result of regulatory advocacy from YRBI on the one hand [13] (Annex l, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting) and the increasing spotlight on the CSO mainstream issues of *mukim* and *gampong* on the other hand [14] (annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). Both will be explained below.

*Firstly,* due to the government permitted exploitation of natural resources by companies, YRBI was motivated to increase public awareness, in this case the *mukim* and *gampong*, that they are the ones who truly have the sovereignty for natural resources. The government must include them in managing the natural resources. If companies want to exploit the natural resources, it must be permitted by *mukim* and *gampong*. YRBI trained and accompanied the community in managing the natural resources. They paid attention to a number of values, such as: environmentally friendly based on custom. In addition, YRBI also advocate so that issue was accommodated by the government as a regulation [13] (Annex L, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting).

*Secondly,* by starting with issues on managing natural resources, the *mukim* and government sovereignty became a mainstream issue for NGOs in the Aceh province [14] (annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). This forum succeeded in making *mukim* and *gampong* sovereignty a joined issue. Women NGOs, human rights NGOs, environmental NGOs, economic empowerment NGOs, etc, have made *mukim* and *gampong* the basis of their actions, and custom as the spirit. Productive communication, interaction and sharing between NGOs, or stakeholders, specifically dealing with *mukim* and *gampong* was done in this forum [18] (Annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). For YRBI itself, this forum made use of YRBI's infrastructure to optimize the work of the network [21] (Annex L, M, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). The development of YRBI's organization infrastructure resulted as part of an independent effort to become more sovereign [26]

(Annex L, M, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting) in the initiation of “Mukim Sovereignty Organizations for the Sovereignty of Natural Resources".

# 5 Discussion and conclusion

## 5.1 Methodological issues

**General: Applied to all or most SPOs**

With regard to the methodology, Indonesia has made some data collection adjustment based on the context. The first adjustment was related to the type of instrument used. To assess the organizational capacity, the study has provided self-assessment, observation and interview sheets. These all were used during the baseline with all SPOs. During the end line the team used self-assessment, interview and observation sheets. However the evaluator applied interview sheets as self-assessment—where participants were asked to fill these sheets by themselves. For the participants who did not attend the workshop, the interviews were done separately using the interview sheet and the results from the interview were included in the subgroup interview sheet that was already filled by the staff member. Were combined into the relevant sub categories in the interview sheet. Interview sheets were also applied for interviews with the CFAs, partners and consultants.

The baseline study showed that having two similar instruments (self assessments, and interview sheets) did not have any effect in relation to obtaining adequate and quality data.

Another adjustment to the methodology was the language. The team has translated all instruments in to Bahasa Indonesia to be able better understood by the SPO's. This also applied to the initial findings (translated back into Indonesia) for three SPOs that are YRBI, ASB and PT.PPMA.

To have some clarification post visit to all SPOs, the evaluator used email and phone interviews.

**YRBI**

The evaluator began the endline process by sending all the interview sheets prior to the field visit to the SPO. However none of them was returned back. This was due to the staff workload and the little time available for responding to the request to fill in these sheets. YRBI is one of the SPO's that was selected for process tracing. The evaluator visited the SPO twice.


The first visit was divided into two sessions. The first session was to develop the general causal map, based on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline, and to facilitate the interview. The second visit focused on verifying the general causal map and furthermore interviews with the former director and organizational partners [Director of the Aceh Human Rights Coalition and Imam Mukim (Local Leader)] were carried out.

Furthermore, process tracing was carried out during the second the field visit to the SPO. In relation to this process tracing, three staffs filled the training questionnaire related to MFS II funded training events since the baseline in 2012.One staff attended two different trainings in 2013 (Resource Mobilisation) and 2014 (Marketing for the Poor), while another staff attended one internship during 2013-2014 on PIWA—Custom Territory Land Mapping. It was not possible to engage YRBI staff that participated in the baseline study because they no longer worked in the organization due to the financial crisis of the organisation. In the baseline, 6 permanent staff and 8 program staff (non-permanent staff) participated. While in the end line, only 8 staff remained and participated in the study. They were, 1 management staff (director), 2 program staff, 2 admin and HRM staff, and 3 field staff..

## 5.2 Changes in organisational capacity development

This section aims to provide an answer to the first and fourth evaluation questions:

1. *What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?*
4. *What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?*




Changes in the five capabilities for YRBI have been both negative and positive, but largely unchanged. The greatest change took place under the capability to act and commit but was negative. The changes in each of the capabilities are further explained, by referring to the specific indicators that changed.

Over the last two years most changes for YRBI took place in the indicators under the capability to act and commit. Overall a slight deterioration took place as compared to the baseline, although some positive developments were found as well. Responsive leadership slightly improved as the director's position was handed over to a younger staff member, which made day to day interaction with colleagues easier. Strategic guidance however deteriorated as a result of a lack of detailed instructions on daily work activities by the new director. Staff turnover deteriorated as well, due to a lack of influx of new staff and existing staff members leaving due to a lack of funding of the organization. Organizational structure deteriorated related to this leaving of staff members. Critical functions of the organizations can no longer be fulfilled. Articulated strategies slightly deteriorated as after the closing of program activities there is no further need for developing analyses and performing M&E. Nonetheless, staff skills slightly improved due to various training offerings from ICCO in 2012-2014. In line with this, training opportunities for staff members improved slightly. A deterioration in terms of funding sources is evident in case of YRBI. After the contract with ICCO ended, no new funding sources have been found, leaving the organization unable to perform or act.

In terms of the capability to adapt and self-renew, a very slight deterioration took place. In terms of critical reflection the situation has deteriorated. Regular staff meetings are no longer held, and some staff members have indicated that it is difficult to provide and receive critical feedback from colleagues or management. Similarly, the freedom for ideas has slightly deteriorated, recently the regularity and duration of meetings has been reduced due to the limited amount of work activities.

The capability to deliver on development objectives has effectively remained unchanged although two particular indicators have changed. First, a slight improvement was found in clear operational plans. As all the information is now open on the table in terms of work plans and budget, it is very clear what can and cannot be done in terms of work. Secondly, a slight deterioration took place in terms of monitoring efficiency. Structural practices are missing and even deteriorating.

The capability to relate has very slightly improved. This resulted from a slight improvement in the engagement in networks. YRBI has expanded its network to several new networks and groups. In contrast to this is the slight deterioration, which occurred in terms of engagement with target groups. Although in practice the network is still strong and partners still support YRBI, the organisation does

not have the resources anymore to continue to engage with its target groups, which can lead to a slow erosion of relationships over time. Despite all this, relationships within the organization have slightly improved. Staff members have described internal relations as a "sense of family" and staff get along well with the new director.

No changes occurred in terms of the capability to achieve coherence since the baseline in 2012.

**General organisational capacity changes related to MFS II Interventions**

The evaluators considered it important to also note down the SPO's story in terms of changes in the organisation since the baseline, and this would also provide more information about reasons for change, which were difficult to get for the individual indicators. Also for some issues there may not have been relevant indicators available in the list of core indicators provide by the evaluation team. Please note that this information is based only on the information provided by YRBI staff during the endline workshop, but no validation of this information has been done like with the process tracing causal maps. For details in relation to attribution, we refer to the next section (5.3).

During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by YRBI staff, these have been captured in the general causal map in 4.2.2:

1. staff capacity on *mukim* and *gampong* sovereignty issues is more recognized
2. an improved and more extensive network
3. reduced paid workforce and program funds

All of these are expected to contribute to YRBI becoming the leading organization in mukim and gampong sovereignty issues. YRBI staff experienced these as the most important capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline.

Staff capacity is more recognized due to more invitations from the community to share staff knowledge and skills on mukim and gampong issues. This can be attributed to the increased trust from beneficiaries and stakeholders, which is due several developments; improved community awareness due to public education on the issue; successful fundraising of communities with YRBI's support and encouragement; more village maps produced with help from YRBI; increased economic community empowerment assistance through the honey bee exploitation program; and the government initiating specific mukim and gampung regulation after active advocacy. All of these factors can be attributed to mukim and gampong sovereignty becoming more developed as a result of increased staff capacities to develop the program. This was enabled through internal knowledge sharing, resulting from various staff capacity building activities by ICCO through MFS II funded capacity development interventions. Another factor affecting the trust of stakeholders was the continuous sharing of knowledge after mukim and gampong became a mainstream issue in Aceh following the initiation of sovereignty institutions to rescue these areas and their natural resources.

YRBI's network improved and became more extensive. The latter can be attributed to the optimal use of the organization's facilities for events and trainings, the initiation of sovereignty institutions, as well as the greater public attention resulting from the mainstream issue status.

There was also a negative change in the organisation: a reduction in paid work force and program funds. This resulted from no salary being paid, program activities being shut down, a reduction in the number of staff, and staff took up work on a voluntary basis as a result of this.. Each of these changes can be attributed to the poor financial situation of YRBI since no new funds were obtained after the expiration of the ICCO contract. This can be attributed to a change of ICCO policy following the renewal of the MoU between ICCO and the Indonesian government, in which political areas and topics complicated the continuation of projects in the area. No new funds were obtained as well due to the rejection of proposals and indecisive leadership. Proposals being rejected can be attributed to the limited number of proposals developed despite staff having the competencies to do so, as well as the lack of experience in fundraising of the new leader in charge. Finally more voluntary work was commissioned as staff remained motivated to work due to greater involvement in decision making and a more egalitarian and democratic leadership style of the new director. Whilst there was no link indicated with MFS II funded capacity development interventions, the fact that the main funder ICCO (MFS II) withdrew from funding the organisation has had an important effect on the organisation's financial situation. The organisation has not been able to restore the situation which has seriously affected its ability to implement programs.

In conclusion, and based on information provided during the endline workshop, only two branches of the general causal map can be partly attributed to MFS II funded interventions: the improved network of the organization, and staff capacity becoming more recognized in terms of mukim and gampong sovereignty issues. The network improvements can only be partially related, as other developments play a strong role as well. However, it must be noted that the information provided has not been verified through other sources of information. For this please refer to section 5.3 where process tracing has been applied to more carefully address this attribution question.

## 5.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity development to MFS II

This section aims to provide an answer to the second and fourth evaluation questions:

2. *To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?*
4. *What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?*

To address the question of attribution it was agreed that for all the countries in the 5C study, the focus would be on the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew, with a focus on MFS II supported organisational capacity development interventions that were possibly related to these capabilities. 'Process tracing' was used to get more detailed information about the changes in these capabilities that were possibly related to the specific MFS II capacity development interventions. The organisational capacity changes that were focused on were:

- Poor financial situation
- Becoming the leading organization in *mukim* and *gampong* sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia

The first organisational capacity change falls under the capability to act and commit. The second organisational capacity change falls under the capability to adapt and self-renew. The second organisational capacity is closely intertwined with some implementation activities and targets of YRBI. The organisational capacity change areas that were chosen are based on document review as well as discussions with the SPO and CFA. Each of these organisational capacity changes is further discussed below.

The following issues are discussed for the MFS II funded activities that are related to the above mentioned organisational capacity changes:

a. Design: the extent to which the MFS II supported capacity development intervention was well-designed. (Key criteria: relevance to the SPO; SMART objectives)
b. Implementation: the extent to which the MFS II supported capacity development was implemented as designed (key criteria: design, according to plans during the baseline);
c. Reaching objectives: the extent to which the MFS II capacity development intervention reached all its objectives (key criteria: immediate and long-term objectives, as formulated during the baseline);
d. the extent to which the observed results are attributable to the identified MFS II supported capacity development intervention (reference made to detailed causal map, based on 'process tracing').

Please note that whilst (d) addresses the evaluation question related to attribution (evaluation question 2), the other three issues (a, b and c) have been added by the synthesis team as additional reporting requirements. This was done when fieldwork for the endline process had already started, and is also not the focus on this 5c evaluation. With the minimum information available the evaluation team tried to address these first 3 questions.

**Poor financial situation**

The following MFS II capacity development interventions supported by ICCO were linked to the key organisational capacity change "poor financial situation":

1. Financial System Management Training (March 2013)

2. Resource Mobilisation Training, February 2013

*Financial System Management Training*

**Design**
This intervention was not specifically planned during the baseline. It is included here as well as in the detailed causal maps and narratives because the effects of this training were observed during the endline and it came up during document review, workshop, and interviews. The immediate objective of this training was to have YRBI apply the financial software in place to use a standard financial system which is conform donor standards. The long term objective was to create a strong financial management system with accountable financial reporting.

The training has been provided by ICCO to all ICCO partners to ensure that they meet the minimal standard of financial reporting, and therefore very relevant to the SPO. The training is however also relevant to YRBI's capacity building for staff. In the Theory of Change developed in the baseline in 2012, finance was identified as a technical competence that required strengthening. Prior to the baseline, several related interventions to finance and financial administration were already carried out. It was also indicated that such interventions may be ongoing activities, although at the time of the baseline, it was not exactly specified when and how this would occur.

The expected effects were partially formulated in a SMART way (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound). Then again, the evaluation team did not ask the CFA for SMART objectives but rather asked about the expected immediate and long term effects of the interventions.

**Implementation**
The intervention was not specifically planned for during the baseline. One staff member (the financial manager) attended the training in 2013 at a partner organization in Jakarta as a one day workshop, although an exact date and further information about the session are unknown to the evaluation team. As far as the evaluation team knows, it was implemented as designed, however, details about the specific design cannot be provided, since this wasn't the focus of the evaluation.

**Reaching objectives**
Not having objectives that were defined as very SMART objectives makes it difficult to assess this issue in detail. However, ICCO has stated that YRBI now successfully applies the financial software system, which was the intended immediate objective as stated by the ICCO account manager in the self-assessment and interview and in that respect the immediate objective has been reached. Similarly, both the CFA and SPO have stated that financial reports are now more transparent and accountable, which meets the long-term objective.

*Resource Mobilisation Training, February 2013*

**Design**
This intervention was planned during the baseline and laid out in the theory of change. ICCO stated here that next to past capacity development interventions, for the period of 2012-2015, the plan was to also pay attention to resource mobilization (with a focus on financial sustainability). A previous three day workshop in Jakarta on resource mobilisation and financial sustainability had already been given to the YRBI leader prior to the baseline evaluation in 2012. The resource mobilisation training in 2013 was a follow up on this earlier training.

The immediate expected effect of the intervention was that YRBI would have the capacity to mobilise available resources in their organisation and to create innovative approaches to generating income. The long term expected effects were for YRBI to be able to develop innovative strategies to become a sustainable organisation, and to develop fundraising strategies using their own resources.

Resource mobilisation is very relevant to YRBI now that ICCO has stopped its funding to the organisation. The contract between ICCO and YRBI expired on 31 October 2013 and was not renewed due to political and administrative issues. Having funded 100% of YRBI's activities in the past, ICCO wanted to ensure that YRBI could transition well to this new situation and become a sustainable organisation. After the contract with ICCO has ended, YRBI is required to find its own funding from new sources and sustain its activities by other means.

The above mentioned expected effects were not formulated in a very SMART way (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound). Then again, the evaluation team did not ask the CFA for SMART objectives specifically during the baseline, but rather asked about the expected immediate and long term effects of the interventions.

**Implementation**

This intervention took place in the form of a training in February 2013, and was attended by YRBI's director. About 25 other ICCO partners attended the event as well which was held in Depok, Jakarta. As far as the evaluation team knows, it was implemented as designed, however, details about the specific design cannot be provided, since this wasn't the focus of the evaluation.

**Reaching objectives**

Not having objectives that were defined as very SMART objectives makes it difficult to assess this issue in specific, however the causal map on the poor financial situation of YRBI, makes it clear that neither the immediate (ability to mobilise resources and create innovative approaches to generate income) nor the long term objectives (develop innovative sustainable strategies and develop fundraising strategies) have been realised as of yet.

YRBI was unable to apply the lessons learned in the training to itself. No concrete fund raising activities were carried out after the resource mobilisation training took place. Instead, YRBI used the knowledge to train its beneficiary communities in order to empower them to raise funds in a variety of ways. This yielded some positive results in that a number of beneficiary communities succeeded in raising public funds through cooperation with private parties. The lack of new funds has led to a poor financial situation for YRBI in which both the number of program activities, as well as the number of staff has been greatly reduced.

**Attribution of observed results to MFS II capacity development interventions**

The poor financial situation of YRBI resulted from a lack of obtaining new funds, which in turn resulted from the expiration of the ICCO contract, no follow up on fundraising activities occurred, and rejection of proposals for funding (see 4.3.1) took place, even though the organisation has increased its capacity to provide financial reports based on donor standards.

The expiration of the YRBI and ICCO contract was due to a change of ICCO policy. In this policy ICCO stated that they couldn't further support activities with "mukim and gampong" issues, as they did not receive permission to work in these areas in Aceh any longer after the renewal of the MoU between ICCO and the Government of Indonesia.

No follow up for fundraising occurred, despite increased competencies in resource mobilization as the result of the Resource Mobilization training in 2013 by ICCO. The competencies to raise public funds as generated in the ICCO intervention to mobilise resources training in February 2013, were not utilized for YRBI's own financial situation. Instead YRBI elected to share these training outcomes amongst its beneficiary communities, some of which successfully applied this to raise public funds through cooperation with private parties.

The rejection of proposals was do a lack of experience in fundraising on the one hand and a limited number of proposals being developed on the other. The role of fundraising remained an important function of the director, but the new director did not have the experience or networking skills to continue the level of initiatives of the previous director. A limited number of proposals was developed as well, making the chance of success slim. This despite the fact that proposal development was now a developed competence by the staff members. This developed competence cannot be related to any MFS II supported capacity development interventions.

No evidence for a relation could be found between the poor financial situation of YRBI and the improved transparency and accountability in financial reporting which resulted from the Financial Management training. Despite the positive outcomes in reaching the CFA's objectives in terms of utilizing the financial software and becoming a more transparent and accountable reporting organization, these developments did not impact the financial situation of YRBI. Instead the capacity built up in this area is now unused, as YRBI does not have any ICCO programs to carry out anymore.

In conclusion, two MFS II capacity development interventions were identified related to this organizational capacity outcome area, but their impact on the poor financial situation of YRBI remains

limited. Whilst better, more transparent and accountable financial reporting can be attributed to the MFS II funded financial management training, this could not improve the financial situation of the organization. On the other hand the improved competence in resource mobilization can be attributed to the MFS II funded resource mobilization training, but due to lack of follow up and application to YRBI itself, no new funds could be acquired and the financial situation remains poor.

**Becoming the leading organisation in mukim and gampong sovereignity issues in Aceh and Indonesia**

The following MFS II capacity development interventions supported by ICCO are linked to the key organisational capacity change "Becoming the leading organisation in mukim and gampong sovereignity issues in Aceh and Indonesia" (please also see section 4.3 of this report):

1. Participatory Mapping Internship (GIS) (series of activities), October 2013 – January 2014
2. Making Markets work for the Poor (MFP) Training series, March 2014-ongoing
3. Resource Mobilization Training, February 2013

*Participatory Mapping Internship (GIS) – Series of activities between October 2013 and January 2014*

**Design**

This intervention was not planned during the baseline. The participatory mapping internship was a training course for one staff member to develop his competence in GIS application and development, one of the core activities of YRBI. No specific immediate and long term objectives were formulated.

The intervention has been mentioned during the interviews, and self-assessments as very relevant to the SPO as Participatory Mapping is one of YRBI's core activities.

**Implementation**

The intervention was not planned for during the baseline and took place in 6 different sessions of approximately a 3-7 days per session in between October 2013 and February 2014 in Bogor at the School of spatial planning. As far as the evaluation team knows, it was implemented as designed, however, details about the specific design cannot be provided, since this wasn't the focus of the evaluation.

**Reaching objectives**

Since no objectives haven't been formulated , it is not possible to assess to what extent these objectives have been reached. However, it can be stated that the training was perceived positively by the attendee as noted in the interviews, and its contents were disseminated amongst YRBI colleagues and beneficiaries. This has led to various independent efforts with communities to implement the knowledge in practice (see for more information section 4.3.1).

*Making Markets Work for the Poor (MFP) Training series, March 2014-ongoing*

**Design**

This intervention was not planned for during the baseline evaluation. The intervention is an initiative of ICCO to train its 14 partners in their capacity for economic program development in a series of activities between March 2014 until December 2014.

The training was deemed relevant for YRBI by both the SPO as the CFA. YRBI's position close to its beneficiary communities, as well as their in-depth knowledge about the territory and its natural resources, makes the organization well suited for the development and implementation of economic development plans. YRBI's beneficiaries would greatly benefit from developing the economic capacity to exploit local natural resources.

The immediate objective as stated by ICCO was the recognition of a potential economic development program. For the long term , objective, ICCO stated that YRBI should have an economic development program for the community based on the Making Markets Work for the Poor approach as taught in the training.

The expected effects were not formulated in a SMART way (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound). Then again, the evaluation team did not ask the CFA for SMART objectives specifically , but rather asked about the expected immediate and long term effects of the interventions.

**Implementation**

Implementation of the activity took place parallel to the endline evaluation and started in March 2014 with an introduction workshop at PENABULU training center in Jakarta, which was attended by the YPRI director with 24 other ICCO partners. Further activities were planned in the form of on-site coaching (April-July 2014) and business model and plan development workshops in October – December 2014. As far as the evaluation team knows, the intervention was implemented as designed, however, details about the specific design cannot be provided, since this wasn't the focus of the evaluation.

**Reaching objectives**

The implementation of this intervention took place simultaneously to the endline evaluation which makes it difficult to fully assess the outcome of the efforts. Furthermore, since the objectives haven't been formulated as SMART objectives, it is difficult to assess to what extent these objectives have been reached.

Though not the focus of this evaluation, we can provide an indication of the extent to which the objectives as formulated during the baseline and endline, have been achieved.The CFA has stated that after the first workshop took place YRBI had already met the immediate objective of identifying a potential commodity for further development in to a community economic program. Over the past year, this has expanded into a an active community empowerment project to develop honey bee forest exploitation, which comes close to the long term objective of the CFA for YRBI to develop its own community economic development program.

*Resource Mobilisation Training, February 2013*

**Design**

This intervention was planned during the baseline and laid out in the theory of change. ICCO stated here that next to past interventions, for the period of 2012-2015, the plan was to also pay attention to resource mobilization (with a focus on financial sustainability). A previous three day workshop in Jakarta on resource mobilisation and financial sustainability had already been given to the YRBI leader prior to the baseline evaluation in 2012. The resource mobilisation training in 2013 was a follow up on this earlier training.

The immediate expected effect of this intervention was that YRBI would have the capacity to mobilise available resources in their organisation and to create innovative approaches to generating income. The long term expected effects were for YRBI to be able to develop innovative strategies to become a sustainable organisation, and to develop fundraising strategies using their own resources.

Resource mobilisation is very relevant to YRBI now that ICCO has stopped its funding to the organisation. The contract between ICCO and YRBI expired on 31 October 2013 and was not renewed due to political and administrative issues. Having funded 100% of YRBI's activities in the past, ICCO wanted to ensure that YRBI could transition well to this new situation and become a sustainable organisation. After the contract with ICCO has ended, YRBI is required to find its own funding from new sources and sustain its activities by other means. In addition, YRBI's beneficiary communities are constantly looking for additional support as well which YRBI's encourages. Developing and enabling communities with skills on how to fundraise is therefore also very relevant for YRBI.

The above mentioned expected effects were not formulated in a very SMART way (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound). Then again, the evaluation team did not ask the CFA for SMART objectives specifically during the baseline, but rather asked about the expected immediate and long term effects of the interventions.

**Implementation**

This intervention took place in the form of a training in February 2013, and was attended by YRBI's director. About 25 other ICCO partners attended the event as well which was held in Depok, Jakarta.

As far as the evaluation team knows, it was implemented as designed, however, details about the specific design cannot be provided, since this wasn't the focus of the evaluation.

**Reaching objectives**

Not having objectives that were defined as very SMART objectives makes it difficult to assess this issue in specific. The training was used successfully to share knowledge with YRBI's beneficiary communities, and to encourage them to use the material in practice. For some of the communities this worked out in favour, as they managed to gain access to new funds from private parties. In this sense, the intervention was successful for YRBI, although it was not primarily intended as such by the CFA. ICCO primarily wanted YRBI to develop its own fundraising capacity.

**Attribution of observed results to MFS II capacity development interventions**

YRBI has become more visible as a leading organisation in Mukim and Gampong sovereignity issues in Aceh in Indonesia. This was due to YRBI's staff capacity on Gampong and Mukim issues becoming more recognized amongst its stakeholders, due to more invitations from the community to share staff knowledge and skills.

Local communities started inviting YRBI more due to an increase of trust in the organisation, as well as as Gampong and Mukim issues becoming more mainstream. The increase of trust occurred because of the implementation of successful program activities that greatly involved and empowered the beneficiary communities. This included a village mapping initiative that was produced and utilized by the community itself (specifics unknown to evaluation team), an increase in the number of assisted bee project groups in the community economic development initiative, and fundraising training to community and successful encouragement of the community to seek public and private funds. Another reason for increased trust by communities and stakeholders is the fact that the government has initiated mukim and gampong regulations, as well as Gampong and Mukim becoming one of the CSO mainstream issues in Aceh.

Village maps were produced and utilized by the people as a result of the application of the training skills to some of the villages independently. This can be attributed to the increased staff ability to develop maps independently, following internal knowledge sharing gained from trainings. The knowledge shared in this case can be contributed to the participatory mapping internship (GIS) that took place in 2014 and was MFS II funded.

The increased number of assisted bee project groups was due to the utilization of the honey bee project to align with organizational issues, which resulted from the development of new community empowerment of honey bee forest exploitation. This can be attributed to increased staff capacity to do economic community empowerment, which resulted from internal knowledge sharing after the Making Markets work for the Poor Training in 2013 (MFS II funded).

Encouraging the community to use the results of training as a strategy to raise public and corporate funds resulted from the sharing of training knowledge to beneficiaries. This can be attributed to the gained staff skill to do fundraising from public or corporate CSR funds. This was due the internal knowledge sharing of the resource mobilization training that took place in 2013 as well.

Government initiating mukim and gampong regulation resulted from regulatory advocacy taking place which can be attributed to the organization continuously sharing knowledge on mukim and gampong issues to its shareholders, as well as this topic becoming a CSO mainstream issue. Sharing with stakeholders can be attributed to the internal knowledge sharing of trainings on the one hand, and on the availability of a building based in YRBI used for network meetings on the other. This can be attributed to the "Mukim Sovereignty Organizations for the sovereignty of natural resources" initiative which YRBI undertook.

First, the participatory mapping internship (MFS II) held between October 2013 and January 2014 led to the sharing of training outcomes amongst all YRBI staff through a special knowledge sharing medium in the organization named "diskusi lorong". This resulted in the increase in staff capacity in this field, which translated in active application in the field in close cooperation with beneficiary communities, who were taught in the process. Not only did this build trust, it also empowered these communities which lead to a more visible and leading stature of YRBI.

Secondly, the 'Making Markets Work for the Poor' Training (MFS II), which took place in the course of 2014 parallel to the endline evaluation, resulted in the successful creation of a economic development project for beneficiary communities on the topic of honey bee exploitation and commercialisation. An increased amount of beneficiary groups has started getting involved in this project, again leading to greater trust amongst beneficiary communities.

Thirdly, the resource mobilisation training held in 2013 in Jakarta and attended by YRBI's director resulted in sharing fundraising strategies with beneficiary communities Communities were encouraged to use the results of training as a strategy to raise public and corporate funds. YRBI has made an active effort in order for the beneficiary communities to be able to not only raise resources, but also be able to identify and be firm towards companies involved in cases of corruption, environment, human rights. A number of beneficiary communities succeeded in raising public funds through cooperation with private sectors/companies or directly from the community

On the whole, YRBI has grown into a leading organisation in Mukim and Gampong sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia, and this is mainly due to positive effects at community level of the projects implemented by staff whose competencies have been enhanced in the MFS II trainings on participatory mapping, 'Making Markets Work for the Poor' and resource mobilisation. the whole, the changes in the key organisational capacity change can be attributed to a large extent to MFS II supported capacity development interventions..

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10_061831.pdf

Annex A_5c endline_assessment sheet_Dutch co-financing organisations_Indonesia_YRBI_ICCO.docx

Annex B_5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_CFA perspective_Indonesia_YRBI_ICCO (2) (1).docx

Audit-Report.pdf

FINAL-Report-2014.docx
Halaman-1.pdf
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Annex C_5CBAHASA- endline_support to capacity development sheet_SPO perspective_indonesia_YRBI.doc
Annex C_5CBAHASA- endline_support to capacity development sheet_SPO perspective_name country_YRBI.docx
Annex Q_5c endline observation sheet_country_name YRBI.doc
BAHASA-Annex D_5c endline interview guide_mitra_NGOHAM_selected indicators.fix.doc
BAHASA-Annex L_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_management_Fahmi_selected indicators.docx
BAHASA-Annex M_5c endline Program ~ Agus Halim Wardana_finished.doc
BAHASA-Annex O_5c endline interview guide_subgroup_admin and HRM staff_Adrian Octaviandi.doc
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training interview_sebagai peserta pelatihan_Bang Jo Idrus.doc
training interview_sebagai peserta pelatihan_Making Marketing for the Poor_Fahmi.doc

# List of Respondents

**People Present at the Workshops**

| **Date:** | 14-16 July 2014 | **Organisation: YRBI (YayasanRumpunBambu Indonesia)** | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **NAME** | **ROLE IN THE ORGANISATION** | **DURATION OF SERVICE** | **PHONE** | **E-MAIL** |
| **Management** | | | | |
| Fahmi | Director | 11 years | 08126914981 | - |
| **Program/ Project staff** | | | | |
| Agus Halim Wardana | Program Coordinator | 6 years | 085277075318 | - |
| **Admin/ HR/Finance staff** | | | | |
| Adrian Oktaviandi | Administration / finance staff | 4 years | 081269187848 | - |
| Sulaiman Daud | Administration / Secretariat Coordinator | 12 years | 081360558111 | |
| **Field staff staff** | | | | |
| Syafridah | Indigenous System empowerment coordinator | 16 years | 081360146699 | - |
| M. Idrus | Field Staff | 8 years | 085286681852 | - |
| Hasbi | Field Staff | 9 years | - | - |
| **Others** | | | | |
| | | | | |

**List of People Inteviewed**

| **Date:** | 14 – 16 July 2014 | **Organisation: YRBI (YayasanRumpunBambu Indonesia)** | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **NAME** | **ROLE IN THE ORGANISATION** | **DURATION OF SERVICE** | **PHONE** | **E-MAIL** |
| **Management** | | | | |
| Fahmi | Director | 11 years | 08126914981 | - |
| **Program/ Project staff** | | | | |
| AgusHalimWardana | Program Coordinator | 6 years | 085277075318 | - |
| **Admin/ HR/Finance staff** | | | | |
| Adrian Oktaviandi | Administration / finance staff | 4 years | 081269187848 | - |
| SulaimanDaud | Administration / Secretariat Coordinator | 12 years | 081360558111 | |
| **Field staff staff** | | | | |
| | | | | |
| Syafridah | Indigenous System empowerment coordinator | 16 years | 081360146699 | - |
| M. Idrus | Field Staff | 8 years | 085286681852 | - |
| | | | | |
| **Others** | | | | |
| Zulfikar Muhammad | Partner | 16 years | - | - |

# Appendix 1 Methodological approach & reflection

## Introduction

This appendix describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the '5C study'. This 5C study is organised around four key evaluation questions:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

Note: the methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report. At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

## Changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 1

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?**

This question was mainly addressed by reviewing changes in 5c indicators, but additionally a 'general causal map' based on the SPO perspective on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline

has been developed. Each of these is further explained below. The development of the general causal map is integrated in the steps for the endline workshop, as mentioned below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012.19 Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1. **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and 'general causal map'**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a 'general causal map', based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;
2. **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;
3. **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;
4. **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;
5. **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

19 The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team
2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team
3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team
5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team
6. Interview the CFA – CDI team
7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team
8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team
9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team
10. Interview externals – in-country team
11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team
12. Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team – CDI team
13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team
14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team

15. Analyse the information in the general causal map –in-country team and CDI-team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Below each of these steps is further explained.

*Step 1. Provide the **description of indicators** in the relevant formats – CDI team*

- These formats were to be used when collecting data from SPO staff, CFA, partners, and consultants. For each of these respondents different formats have been developed, based on the list of 5C indicators, similar to the procedure that was used during the baseline assessment. The CDI team needed to add the 2012 baseline description of each indicator. The idea was that each respondent would be requested to review each description per indicator, and indicate whether the current situation is different from the baseline situation, how this situation has changed, and what the reasons for the changes in indicators are. At the end of each format, a more general question is added that addresses how the organisation has changed its capacity since the baseline, and what possible reasons for change exist. Please see below the questions asked for each indicator as well as the more general questions at the end of the list of indicators.

General questions about key changes in the capacity of the SPO

*capacity since the baseline (2012)?*

*What do you consider to be the main explanatory reasons (interventions, actors or factors) for these changes?*

**List of questions to be asked for each of the 5C indicators** (The entry point is the the description of each indicator as in the 2012 baseline report):

1. *How has the situation of this indicator changed compared to the situation during the baseline in 2012? Please tick one of the following scores:*
   - -2 = Considerable deterioration
   - -1 = A slight deterioration
   - 0 = No change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012
   - +1 = Slight improvement
   - +2 = Considerable improvement
2. *Please describe what exactly has changed since the baseline in 2012*

3. *What interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation in 2012? Please tick and describe what interventions, actors or factors influenced this indicator, and how. You can tick and describe more than one choice.*
   - Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by **SPO**: ..... .
   - Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **Dutch CFA (MFS II funding)**: .... .
   - Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the **other funders**: ..... .
   - **Other** interventions, actors or factors: ..... .

Step 2. **Review** the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team

Before the in-country team and the CDI team started collecting data in the field, it was important that they reviewed the description for each indicator as described in the baseline reports, and also added to the endline formats for review by respondents. These descriptions are based on document review, observation, interviews with SPO staff, CFA staff and external respondents during the baseline. It was important to explain this to respondents before they filled in the formats.

*Step 3. **Send the formats** adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)*

The CDI team was responsible for collecting data from the CFA:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – CFA perspective.

The in-country team was responsible for collecting data from the SPO and from external respondents (except CFA). The following formats were sent before the fieldwork started:

- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – SPO perspective.
- 5C Endline interview guides for externals: partners; OD consultants.

*Step 4. **Collect, upload & code the documents** from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team*

The CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team, collected the following documents from SPOs and CFAs:

- Project documents: project proposal, budget, contract (Note that for some SPOs there is a contract for the full MFS II period 2011-2015; for others there is a yearly or 2-yearly contract. All new contracts since the baseline in 2012 will need to be collected);
- Technical and financial progress reports since the baseline in 2012;.
- Mid-term evaluation reports;
- End of project-evaluation reports (by the SPO itself or by external evaluators);
- Contract intake forms (assessments of the SPO by the CFA) or organisational assessment scans made by the CFA that cover the 2011-2014 period;
- Consultant reports on specific inputs provided to the SPO in terms of organisational capacity development;
- Training reports (for the SPO; for alliance partners, including the SPO);
- Organisational scans/ assessments, carried out by the CFA or by the Alliance Assessments;
- Monitoring protocol reports, especially for the 5C study carried out by the MFS II Alliances;
- Annual progress reports of the CFA and of the Alliance in relation to capacity development of the SPOs in the particular country;
- Specific reports that are related to capacity development of SPOs in a particular country.

The following documents (since the baseline in 2012) were requested from SPO:

- Annual progress reports;
- Annual financial reports and audit reports;
- Organisational structure vision and mission since the baseline in 2012;
- Strategic plans;
- Business plans;
- Project/ programme planning documents;

- Annual work plan and budgets;
- Operational manuals;
- Organisational and policy documents: finance, human resource development, etc.;
- Monitoring and evaluation strategy and implementation plans;
- Evaluation reports;
- Staff training reports;
- Organisational capacity reports from development consultants.

The CDI team will coded these documents in NVivo (qualitative data analysis software program) against the 5C indicators.

*Step 5. **Prepare and organise the field visit** to the SPO – in-country team*

Meanwhile the in-country team prepared and organised the logistics for the field visit to the SPO:

- **General endline workshop** consisted about one day for the self-assessments (about ½ to ¾ of the day) and brainstorm (about 1 to 2 hours) on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline and underlying interventions, factors and actors ('general causal map'), see also explanation below. This was done with the five categories of key staff: managers; project/ programme staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin & HRM staff; field staff. Note: for SPOs involved in process tracing an additional 1 to 1½ day workshop (managers; program/project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff) was necessary. See also step 7;
- **Interviews with SPO staff** (roughly one day);
- **Interviews with external respondents** such as partners and organisational development consultants depending on their proximity to the SPO. These interviews coulc be scheduled after the endline workshop and interviews with SPO staff.

General causal map

During the 5C endline process, a 'general causal map' has been developed, based on key organisational capacity changes and underlying causes for these changes, as perceived by the SPO. The general causal map describes cause-effect relationships, and is described both as a visual as well as a narrative.

As much as possible the same people that were involved in the baseline were also involved in the endline workshop and interviews.

*Step 6. **Interview the CFA** – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for sending the sheets/ formats to the CFA and for doing a follow-up interview on the basis of the information provided so as to clarify or deepen the information provided. This relates to:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet - CFA perspective.

*Step 7. **Run the endline workshop** with the SPO – in-country team*

This included running the endline workshop, including facilitation of the development of the general causal map, self-assessments, interviews and observations. Particularly for those SPOs that were selected for process tracing all the relevant information needed to be analysed prior to the field visit, so as to develop an initial causal map. Please see Step 6 and also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two).

An endline workshop with the SPO was intended to:

- Explain the purpose of the fieldwork;
- Carry out in the self-assessments by SPO staff subgroups (unless these have already been filled prior to the field visits) - this may take some 3 hours.
- Facilitate a brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012 and underlying interventions, factors and actors.

**Purpose of the fieldwork:** to collect data that help to provide information on what changes took place in terms of organisational capacity development of the SPO as well as reasons for these changes. The baseline that was carried out in 2012 was to be used as a point of reference.

**Brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes and influencing factors:** a brainstorm was facilitated on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012. In order to kick start the discussion, staff were reminded of the key findings related to the historical time line carried out in the baseline (vision, mission, strategies, funding, staff). This was then used to generate a discussion on key changes that happened in the organisation since the baseline (on cards). Then cards were selected that were related to organisational capacity changes, and organised. Then a 'general causal map' was developed, based on these key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change as experienced by the SPO staff. This was documented as a visual and narrative.This general causal map was to get the story of the SPO on what they perceived as key organisational capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline, in addition to the specific details provided per indicator.

**Self-assessments:** respondents worked in the respective staff function groups: management; programme/ project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin and HRM staff; field staff. Staff were assisted where necessary so that they could really understand what it was they were being asked to do as well as what the descriptions under each indicator meant.

Note: for those SPOs selected for process tracing an additional endline workshop was held to facilitate the development of detailed causal maps for each of the identified organisational change/ outcome areas that fall under the capability to act and commit, and under the capability to adapt and self-renew, and that are likely related to capacity development interventions by the CFA. See also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two). It was up to the in-country team whether this workshop was held straight after the initial endline workshop or after the workshop and the follow-up interviews. It could also be held as a separate workshop at another time.

*Step 8.* ***Interview SPO staff*** *– in-country team*

After the endline workshop (developing the general causal map and carrying out self-assessments in subgroups), interviews were held with SPO staff (subgroups) to follow up on the information that was provided in the self-assessment sheets, and to interview staff that had not yet provided any information.

*Step 9.* ***Fill-in observation sheets*** *– in-country team*

During the visit at the SPO, the in-country team had to fill in two sheets based on their observation:

- 5C Endline observation sheet;
- 5C Endline observable indicators.

*Step 10.* ***Interview externals*** *– in-country team & CDI team*

The in-country team also needed to interview the partners of the SPO as well as organisational capacity development consultants that have provided support to the SPO. The CDI team interviewed the CFA.

*Step 11.* ***Upload and auto-code all the formats*** *collected by in-country team and CDI team – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for uploading and auto-coding (in Nvivo) of the documents that were collected by the in-country team and by the CDI team.

*Step 12. Provide the* ***overview of information*** *per 5C indicator to in-country team – CDI team*

After the analysis in NVivo, the CDI team provided a copy of all the information generated per indicator to the in-country team for initial analysis.

*Step 13.* ***Analyse the data and develop a draft description*** *of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team*

The in-country team provided a draft description of the findings per indicator, based on the information generated per indicator. The information generated under the general questions were linked to the general causal map or detailed process tracing related causal map.

*Step 14.* ***Analyse the data and finalize the description*** *of the findings per indicator, per capability and general – CDI team*

The CDI team was responsible for checking the analysis by the in-country team with the Nvivo generated data and to make suggestions for improvement and ask questions for clarification to which the in-country team responded. The CDI team then finalised the analysis and provided final descriptions and scores per indicator and also summarize these per capability and calculated the summary capability scores based on the average of all indicators by capability.

*Step 15.* ***Analyse the information*** *in the general causal map –in-country team & CDI team*

The general causal map based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff present at the workshop, was further detailed by in-country team and CDI team, and based on the notes made during the workshop and where necessary additional follow up with the SPO. The visual and narrative was finalized after feedback by the SPO. During analysis of the general causal map relationships with MFS II support for capacity development and other factors and actors were identified. All the information has been reviewed by the SPO and CFA.

## Attributing changes in partner organisation's capacity – evaluation question 2

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: ***To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?***

In terms of the attribution question (2), 'process tracing' is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process. The box below provides some background information on process tracing.

Background information on process tracing

The essence of process tracing research is that scholars want to go beyond merely identifying correlations between independent variables (Xs) and outcomes (Ys). Process tracing in social science is commonly defined by its addition to trace causal mechanisms (Bennett, 2008a, 2008b; Checkle, 2008; George & Bennett, 2005). A causal mechanism can be defined as "a complex system which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts" (Glennan, 1996, p. 52). Process tracing involves "attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable" (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 206-207).

Process tracing can be differentiated into three variants within social science: theory testing, theory building, and explaining outcome process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

- Theory testing process tracing uses a theory from the existing literature and then tests whether evidence shows that each part of hypothesised causal mechanism is present in a given case, enabling within case inferences about whether the mechanism functioned as expected in the case and whether the mechanism as a whole was present. No claims can be made however, about whether the mechanism was the only cause of the outcome.
- Theory building process tracing seeks to build generalizable theoretical explanations from empirical evidence, inferring that a more general causal mechanism exists from the fact of a particular case.
- Finally, explaining outcome process tracing attempts to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific historical case. Here the aim is not to build or test more general theories but to craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case centric than theory oriented.

Explaining outcome process tracing is the most suitable type of process tracing for analysing the causal mechanisms for selected key organisational capacity changes of the SPOs. This type of process tracing can be thought of as a single outcome study defined as seeking the causes of the specific outcome in a single case (Gerring, 2006; in: Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Here the ambition is to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a particular outcome, with sufficiency defined as an explanation that accounts for all of the important aspects of an outcome with no redundant parts being present (Mackie, 1965).

Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research strategy that aims to trace the complex conglomerate of systematic and case specific causal mechanisms that produced the outcome in question. The explanation cannot be detached from the particular case. Explaining outcome process tracing refers to case studies whose primary ambition is to explain particular historical outcomes, although the findings of the case can also speak to other potential cases of the phenomenon. Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research process in which 'theories' are tested to see whether they can provide a minimally sufficient explanation of the outcome. Minimal sufficiency is defined as an explanation that accounts for an outcome, with no redundant parts. In most explaining outcome studies, existing theorisation cannot provide a sufficient explanation, resulting in a second stage in which existing theories are re-conceptualised in light of the evidence gathered in the preceding empirical analysis. The conceptualisation phase in explaining outcome process tracing is therefore an iterative research process, with initial mechanisms re-conceptualised and tested until the result is a theorised mechanism that provides a minimally sufficient explanation of the particular outcome.

Below a description is provided of how SPOs are selected for process tracing, and a description is provided on how this process tracing is to be carried out. Note that this description of process tracing provides not only information on the extent to which the changes in organisational development can be attributed to MFS II (evaluation question 2), but also provides information on other contributing factors and actors (evaluation question 4). Furthermore, it must be noted that the evaluation team has developed an adapted form of 'explaining outcome process tracing', since the data collection and analysis was an iterative process of research so as to establish the most realistic explanation for a particular outcome/ organisational capacity change. Below selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

**Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing**

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the

purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

**ETHIOPIA**

For Ethiopia the capabilities that are mostly targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 1

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Ethiopia*

| Capability to: | AMREF | CARE | ECFA | FSCE | HOA-REC | HUNDEE | NVEA | OSRA | TTCA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Relate | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| Achieve coherence | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Ethiopia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE. In fact, six SPOs would be suitable for process tracing. We just selected the first one per CFA following the criteria of not including more than one SPO per CFA for process tracing

Table 2

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Ethiopia*

| Ethiopia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AMREF | Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | AMREF NL | Yes |
| CARE | Dec 31, 2015 | Partly | Yes | Yes | Yes – slightly | CARE Netherlands | No - not fully matching |
| ECFA | Jan 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Child Helpline International | Yes |
| FSCE | Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN); Note: no info from Defence for Children – ECPAT Netherlands | Yes |
| HOA-REC | Sustainable Energy project (ICCO Alliance): 2014 Innovative WASH (WASH Alliance): Dec 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes - slightly | ICCO | No - not fully matching |
| HUNDEE | Dec 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO & IICD | Yes |
| NVEA | Dec 2015 (both) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Edukans Foundation (under two consortia); Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN) | Suitable but SKN already involved for process tracing FSCE |
| OSRA | C4C Alliance project (farmers marketing): December 2014 ICCO Alliance project (zero grazing: 2014 (2nd phase) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO & IICD | Suitable but ICCO & IICD already involved for process tracing - HUNDEE |
| TTCA | June 2015 | Partly | Yes | No | Yes | Edukans Foundation | No - not fully matching |

**INDIA**

For India the capability that is mostly targeted by CFAs is the capability to act and commit. The next one in line is the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below in which a higher score means that the specific capability is more intensively targeted.

Table 3

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – India*[20]

| Capability to: | BVHA | COUNT | DRISTI | FFID | Jana Vikas | Samarthak Samiti | SMILE | SDS | VTRC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 5 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 4 |
| Relate | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, India.

Below you can see a table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether SPO and the CFA both expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE and VTRC. Except for SMILE (capability to act and commit only), for the other SPOs the focus for process tracing can be on the capability to act and commit and on the capability to adapt and self-renew.

Table 4

*SPOs selected for process tracing – India*

| India – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BVHA | 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Simavi | Yes; both capabilities |
| COUNT | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Woord en Daad | Yes; both capabilities |
| DRISTI | 31-03-2012 | Yes | Yes | No | no | Hivos | No - closed in 2012 |
| FFID | 30-09-2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |

[20] RGVN, NEDSF and Women's Rights Forum (WRF) could not be reached timely during the baseline due to security reasons. WRF could not be reached at all. Therefore these SPOs are not included in Table 1.

| India – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jana Vikas | 2013 | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No - contract is and the by now; not fully matching focus |
| NEDSF | | | | | | | No – delayed baseline |
| RGVN | | | | | | | No - delayed baseline |
| Samarthak Samiti (SDS) | 2013 possibly longer | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Hivos | No - not certain of end date and not fully matching focus |
| Shivi Development Society (SDS) | Dec 2013 intention 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No - not fully matching focus |
| Smile | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Wilde Ganzen | Yes; first capability only |
| VTRC | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Stichting Red een Kind | Yes; both capabilities |

**INDONESIA**

For Indonesia the capabilities that are most frequently targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

Table 5

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Indonesia*

| Capability to: | ASB | Daya kologi | ECPAT | GSS | Lem baga Kita | PT. PPMA | Rifka Annisa | WIIP | Yad upa | Yayasan Kelola | YPI | YRBI |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 4 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 3 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 |
| Relate | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, Indonesia.

The table below describes when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: ASB, ECPAT, PT.PPMA, YPI, YRBI.

Table 6

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Indonesia*

| Indonesia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ASB | February 2012; extension Feb,1, 2013 – June,30, 2016 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Hivos | Yes |
| Dayakologi | 2013; no extension | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No: contract ended early and not matching enough |
| ECPAT | August 2013; Extension Dec 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes, a bit | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | Yes |
| GSS | 31 December 2012; no extension | Yes | Yes | Yes, a bit | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | No: contract ended early |
| Lembaga Kita | 31 December 2012; no extension | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie | No - contract ended early |
| PT.PPMA | May 2015 | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | IUCN | Yes, capability to act and commit only |
| Rifka Annisa | Dec, 31 2015 | No | Yes | No | Yes | Rutgers WPF | No - no match between expectations CFA and SPO |
| WIIP | Dec 2015 | Yes | Not MFS II | Yes | Not MFS II | Red Cross | No - Capacity development interventions are not MFS II financed. Only some overhead is MFS II |

| Indonesia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yayasan Kelola | Dec 30, 2013; extension of contract being processed for two years (2014-2015) | Yes | Not really | Yes | Not really | Hivos | No - no specific capacity development interventions planned by Hivos |
| YPI | Dec 31, 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Rutgers WPF | Yes |
| YRBI | Oct, 30, 2013; YRBI end of contract from 31st Oct 2013 to 31st Dec 2013. Contract extension proposal is being proposed to MFS II, no decision yet. | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |
| Yadupa | Under negotiation during baseline; new contract 2013 until now | Yes | Nothing committed | Yes | Nothing committed | IUCN | No, since nothing was committed by CFA |

**LIBERIA**

For Liberia the situation is arbitrary which capabilities are targeted most CFA's. Whilst the capability to act and commit is targeted more often than the other capabilities, this is only so for two of the SPOs. The capability to adapt and self-renew and the capability to relate are almost equally targeted for the five SPOs, be it not intensively. Since the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew are the most targeted capabilities in Ethiopia, India and Indonesia, we choose to focus on these two capabilities for Liberia as well. This would help the synthesis team in the further analysis of these capabilities related to process tracing. See also the table below.

Table 7

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Liberia*

| Capability to: | BSC | DEN-L | NAWOCOL | REFOUND | RHRAP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Act and commit | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Deliver on development objectives | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Adapt and self-renew | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Relate | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Achieve coherence | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

*Source*: country baseline report, Liberia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Also, for two of the five SPOs capability to act and commit is targeted more intensively compared to the other capabilities. Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BSC and RHRAP.

Table 8

*SPOs selected for process tracing – Liberia*

| Liberia – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit– by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew –by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BSC | Dec 31, 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | SPARK | Yes |
| DEN-L | 2014 | No | No | Unknown | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| NAWOCOL | 2014 | Yes | No | No | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| REFOUND | At least until 2013 (2015?) | Yes | No | Yes | A little | ICCO | No – not matching enough |
| RHRAP | At least until 2013 (2014?) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ICCO | Yes |

**Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study**

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ' general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings– CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

Some definitions of the terminology used for this MFS II 5c evaluation

Based upon the different interpretations and connotations the use of the term causal mechanism we use the following terminology for the remainder of this paper:

- A **detailed causal map** (or **model of change)** = the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change.
- A **causal mechanism** = is the combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 176).
- **Part** or **cause** = one actor with its attributes carrying out activities/ producing outputs that lead to change in other parts. The final part or cause is the change/ outcome.
- **Attributes of the actor** = specificities of the actor that increase his chance to introduce change or not such as its position in its institutional environment.

*Step 1. Identify the **planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

Chapter 4.1 and 4.2 in the baseline report were reviewed. Capacity development interventions as planned by the CFA for the capability to act and commit and for the capability to adapt and self-renew were described and details inserted in the summary format. This provided an overview of the capacity development activities that were originally planned by the CFA for these two capabilities and assisted in focusing on relevant outcomes that are possibly related to the planned interventions.

*Step 2. Identify the **implemented capacity development interventions** within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team*

The input from the CFA was reviewed in terms of what capacity development interventions have taken place in the MFS II period. This information was be found in the 'Support to capacity development sheet - endline - CFA perspective' for the SPO, based on details provided by the CFA and further discussed during an interview by the CDI team.

The CFA was asked to describe all the MFS II supported capacity development interventions of the SPO that took place during the period 2011 up to now. The CDI team reviewed this information, not only the interventions but also the observed changes as well as the expected long-term changes, and then linked these interventions to relevant outcomes in one of the capabilities (capability to act and commit; and capability to adapt and self-renew).

*Step 3. Identify **initial changes/ outcome areas** in these two capabilities – by CDI team & in-country team*

The CDI team was responsible for coding documents received from SPO and CFA in NVivo on the following:

- 5C Indicators: this was to identify the changes that took place between baseline and endline. This information was coded in Nvivo.
- Information related to the capacity development interventions implemented by the CFA (with MFS II funding) (see also Step 2) to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. For example, the training on financial management of the SPO staff could be related to any information on financial management of the SPO. This information was coded in Nvivo.

In addition, the response by the CFA to the changes in 5C indicators format, was auto-coded.

The in-country team was responsible for timely collection of information from the SPO (before the fieldwork starts). This set of information dealt with:

- MFS II supported capacity development interventions during the MFS II period (2011 until now).
- Overview of all trainings provided in relation to a particular outcome areas/organisational capacity change since the baseline.
- For each of the identified MFS II supported trainings, training questionnaires have been developed to assess these trainings in terms of the participants, interests, knowledge and skills gained, behaviour change and changes in the organisation (based on Kirkpatrick's model), one format for training participants and one for their managers. These training questionnaires were sent prior to the field visit.
- Changes expected by SPO on a long-term basis ('Support to capacity development sheet - endline - SPO perspective').

For the selection of change/ outcome areas the following criteria were important:

- The change/ outcome area is in one of the two capabilities selected for process tracing: capability to act and commit or the capability to adapt and self-renew. This was the first criteria to select upon.
- There was a likely link between the key organisational capacity change/ outcome area and the MFS II supported capacity development interventions. This also was an important criteria. This would need to be demonstrated through one or more of the following situations:
  - In the 2012 theory of change on organisational capacity development of the SPO a link was indicated between the outcome area and MFS II support;
  - During the baseline the CFA indicated a link between the planned MFS II support to organisational development and the expected short-term or long-term results in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the CFA indicated a link between the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the SPO indicated a link between the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities.

Reviewing the information obtained as described in Step 1, 2, and 3 provided the basis for selecting key organisational capacity change/ outcome areas to focus on for process tracing. These areas were to be formulated as broader outcome areas, such as 'improved financial management', 'improved monitoring and evaluation' or 'improved staff competencies'.

Note: the outcome areas were to be formulated as intermediates changes. For example: an improved monitoring and evaluation system, or enhanced knowledge and skills to educate the target group on climate change. Key outcome areas were also verified - based on document review as well as discussions with the SPO during the endline.

*Step 4. Construct the **detailed, initial causal map** (theoretical model of change) – CDI & in-country team*

A detailed initial causal map was developed by the CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team. This was based on document review, including information provided by the CFA and SPO on MFS II supported capacity development interventions and their immediate and long-term objectives as well as observed changes. Also, the training questionnaires were reviewed before developing the initial causal map. This detailed initial causal map was to be provided by the CDI team with a visual and related narrative with related references. This initial causal map served as a reference point for further reflection with the SPO during the process tracing endline workshop, where relationships needed to be verified or new relationships established so that the second (workshop-based), detailed causal map could be developed, after which further verification was needed to come up with the final, concluding detailed causal map.

It's important to note that organisational change area/ outcome areas could be both positive and negative.

For each of the selected outcomes the team needed to make explicit the theoretical model of change. This meant finding out about the range of different actors, factors, actions, and events etc. that have contributed to a particular outcome in terms of organisational capacity of the SPO.

A model of change of good quality includes:

- The causal pathways that relate the intervention to the realised change/ outcome;
- Rival explanations for the same change/ outcome;
- Assumptions that clarify relations between different components or parts;
- Case specific and/or context specific factors or risks that might influence the causal pathway, such as for instance the socio-cultural-economic context, or a natural disaster;
- Specific attributes of the actors e.g. CFA and other funders.

A model of change (within the 5C study called a 'detailed causal map') is a complex system which produces intermediate and long-term outcomes by the interaction of other parts. It consists of parts or causes that often consist of one actor with its attributes that is implementing activities leading to change in other parts (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). A helpful way of constructing the model of change is to think in terms of actors carrying out activities that lead to other actors changing their behaviour. The model of change can be explained as a range of activities carried out by different *actors* (including the CFA and SPO under evaluation) that will ultimately lead to an outcome. Besides this, there are also '*structural*' elements, which are to be interpreted as external factors (such as economic conjuncture); and *attributes* of the actor (does the actor have the legitimacy to ask for change or not, what is its position in the sector) that should be looked at (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). In fact Beach and Pedersen, make a fine point about the subjectivity of the actor in a dynamic context. This means, in qualitative methodologies, capturing the changes in the actor, acted upon area or person/organisation, in a non sequential and non temporal format. Things which were done recently could have corrected behavioural outcomes of an organisation and at the same ime there could be processes which incrementally pushed for the same change over a period of time. Beach and Pedersen espouse this methodology because it captures change in a dynamic fashion as against the methodology of logical framework. For the MFS II evaluation it was important to make a distinction between those paths in the model of change that are the result of MFS II and rival pathways.

The construction of the model of change started with the identified key organisational capacity change/ outcome, followed by an inventory of all possible subcomponents that possibly have caused the change/ outcome in the MFS II period (2011-up to now, or since the baseline). The figure below presents an imaginary example of a model of change. The different colours indicate the different types of support to capacity development of the SPO by different actors, thereby indicating different pathways of change, leading to the key changes/ outcomes in terms of capacity development (which in this case indicates the ability to adapt and self-renew).





***Figure 1*** *An imaginary example of a model of change*

*Step 5. Identify **types of evidence** needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams with support from CDI team*

Once the causal mechanism at theoretical level were defined, empirical evidence was collected so as to verify or discard the different parts of this theoretical model of change, confirm or reject whether subcomponents have taken place, and to find evidence that confirm or reject the causal relations between the subcomponents.

A key question that we needed to ask ourselves was, *"What information do we need in order to confirm or reject that one subcomponent leads to another, that X causes Y?"*. The evaluation team needed to agree on what information was needed that provides empirical manifestations for each part of the model of change.

There are four distinguishable types of evidence that are relevant in process tracing analysis: *pattern, sequence, trace, and account*. Please see the box below for descriptions of these types of evidence.

The evaluation team needed to agree on the types of evidence that was needed to verify or discard the manifestation of a particular part of the causal mechanism. Each one or a combination of these different types of evidence could be used to confirm or reject the different parts of the model of change. This is what is meant by robustness of evidence gathering. Since causality as a concept can bend in many ways, our methodology, provides a near scientific model for accepting and rejecting a particular type of evidence, ignoring its face value.

Types of evidence to be used in process tracing

- **Pattern evidence** relates to predictions of statistical patterns in the evidence. For example, in testing a mechanism of racial discrimination in a case dealing with employment, statistical patterns of employment would be relevant for testing this part of the mechanism.
- **Sequence evidence** deals with the temporal and spatial chronology of events predicted by a hypothesised causal mechanism. For example, a test of the hypothesis could involve expectations of the timing of events where we might predict that if the hypothesis is valid, we should see that the event B took place after event A took place. However, if we found that event B took place before event A took place, the test would suggest that our confidence in the validity of this part of the mechanism should be reduced (disconfirmation/ falsification).
- **Trace evidence** is evidence whose mere existence provides proof that a part of a hypothesised mechanism exists. For example, the existence of the minutes of a meeting, if authentic ones, provide strong proof that the meeting took place.
- **Account evidence** deals with the content of empirical material, such as meeting minutes that detail what was discussed or an oral account of what took place in the meeting.

*Source*: Beach and Pedersen, 2013

Below you can find a table that provides guidelines on what to look for when identifying types of evidence that can confirm or reject causal relationships between different parts/ subcomponents of the model of change. It also provides one example of a part of a causal pathway and what type of information to look for.

Table 9

*Format for identifying types of evidence for different causal relationships in the model of change (example included)*

| Part of the model of change | Key questions | Type of evidence needed | Source of information |
|---|---|---|---|
| Describe relationship between the subcomponents of the model of change | Describe questions you would like to answer a so as to find out whether the components in the relationship took place, when they took place, who was involved, and whether they are related | Describe the information that we need in order to answer these questions.<br>Which type of evidence can we use in order to reject or confirm that subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y?<br>Can we find this information by means of :<br>Pattern evidence;<br>Sequence evidence;<br>Trace evidence;<br>Account evidence? | Describe where you can find this information |
| Example:<br>Training workshops on M&E provided by MFS II funding and other sources of funding | Example:<br>What type of training workshops on M&E took place?<br>Who was trained?<br>When did the training take place?<br>Who funded the training?<br>Was the funding of training provided before the training took place?<br>How much money was available for the training? | Example:<br>Trace evidence: on types of training delivered, who was trained, when the training took place, budget for the training<br><br>Sequence evidence on timing of funding and timing of training<br><br>Content evidence: what the training was about | Example:<br>Training report<br>SPO Progress reports<br>interviews with the CFA and SPO staff<br>Financial reports SPO and CFA |

Please note that for practical reasons, the 5C evaluation team decided that it was easier to integrate the specific questions in the narrative of the initial causal map. These questions would need to be

addressed by the in country team during the process tracing workshop so as to discover, verify or discard particular causal mechanisms in the detailed, initial causal map. Different types of evidence was asked for in these questions.

*Step 6. **Collect data** to verify or discard causal mechanisms and develop workshop-based, detailed causal map – in-country team*

Once it was decided by the in-country and CDI evaluation teams what information was to be collected during the interaction with the SPO, data collection took place. The initial causal maps served as a basis for discussions during the endline workshop with a particular focus on process tracing for the identified organisational capacity changes. But it was considered to be very important to understand from the perspective of the SPO how they understood the identified key organisational capacity change/outcome area has come about. A new detailed, workshop-based causal map was developed that included the information provided by SPO staff as well as based on initial document review as described in the initial detailed causal map. This information was further analysed and verified with other relevant information so as to develop a final causal map, which is described in the next step.

*Step 7. **Assess the quality** of data and **analyse data**, and develop the **final detailed causal map** (model of change) – in-country team and CDI team*

Quality assurance of the data collected and the evidence it provides for rejecting or confirming parts of causal explanations are a major concern for many authors specialised in contribution analysis and process-tracing. Stern et al. (2012), Beach and Pedersen (2013), Lemire, Nielsen and Dybdal (2012), Mayne (2012) and Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) all emphasise the need to make attribution/ contribution claims that are based on pieces of evidence that are rigorous, traceable, and credible. These pieces of evidence should be as explicit as possible in proving that *subcomponent X causes* subcomponent Y and ruling out other explanations. Several tools are proposed to check the nature and the quality of data needed. One option is, Delahais and Toulemonde's Evidence Analysis Database, which we have adapted for our purpose.

Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) propose an Evidence Analysis Database that takes into consideration three criteria:

- Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no);
- Type of causal mechanism: intended contribution/ other contribution/ condition leading to intended contribution/ intended condition to other contribution/ feedback loop;
- Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak.

We have adapted their criteria to our purpose. The in-country team, in collaboration with the CDI team, used the criteria in assessing whether causal relationships in the causal map, were strong enough. This has been more of an iterative process trying to find additional evidence for the established relationships through additional document review or contacting the CFA and SPO as well as getting their feedback on the final detailed causal map that was established. Whilst the form below has not been used exactly in the manner depicted, it has been used indirectly when trying to validate the information in the detailed causal map. After that, the final detailed causal map is established both as a visual as well as a narrative, with related references for the established causal relations.

| *Example format for the adapted evidence analysis database (example included)* **Description of causal relation** | **Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no)** | **Type of information providing the background to the confirmation or rejection of the causal relation** | **Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak** | **Explanation for why the evidence is (rather) strong or (rather) weak, and therefore the causal relation is confirmed/ rejected** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| e.g. Training staff in M&E leads to enhanced M&E knowledge, skills and practice | e.g. Confirmed | e.g. Training reports confirmed that staff are trained in M&E and that knowledge and skills increased as a result of the training | | |

*Step 8.* ***Analyse and conclude*** *on findings– in-country team and CDI team*

The final detailed causal map was described as a visual and narrative and this was then analysed in terms of the evaluation question two and evaluation question four: *"To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?"* and *"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"* It was analysed to what extent the identified key organisational capacity change can be attributed to MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as to other related factors, interventions and actors.

## Explaining factors – evaluation question 4

This paragraph describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the fourth evaluation question: **"What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?"**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This has been explained in the first section of this appendix. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the 'general causal map' has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information was procured for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the process of process tracing as described in the section above.

## Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team.

**Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach:** this has proven to a be very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has

provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

**Using standard indicators and scores:** using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

**General causal map:** whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

**Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question:** this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs.In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick's model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors , rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is

crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

**Utilisation of the evaluation**

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

Design – mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication: many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO's and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process: The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection

has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.

# Appendix 2 Background information on the five core capabilities framework

The 5 capabilities (5C) framework was to be used as a framework for the evaluation of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs) of the MFS II consortia. The 5C framework is based on a five-year research program on 'Capacity, change and performance' that was carried out by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). The research included an extensive review of the literature and sixteen case studies. The 5C framework has also been applied in an IOB evaluation using 26 case studies in 14 countries, and in the baseline carried out per organisation by the MFS II organisations for the purpose of the monitoring protocol.

The 5C framework is structured to understand and analyse (changes in) the capacity of an organization to deliver (social) value to its constituents. This introduction briefly describes the 5C framework, mainly based on the most recent document on the 5C framework (Keijzer et al., 2011).

The 5C framework sees capacity as an **outcome** of an **open system**. An organisation or collaborative association (for instance a network) is seen as a system interacting with wider society. The most critical practical issue is to ensure that relevant stakeholders share a common way of thinking about capacity and its core constituents or capabilities. Decisive for an organisation's capacity is the context in which the organisation operates. This means that **understanding context issues** is crucial. The use of the 5C framework requires a multi-stakeholder approach because shared values and results orientation are important to facilitate the capacity development process. The 5C framework therefore needs to **accommodate the different visions** of stakeholders and conceive different strategies for raising capacity and improving performance in a given situation.

The 5C framework defines capacity as '**producing social value'** and identifies five core capabilities that together result in that overall capacity. Capacity, capabilities and competences are seen as follows:

**Capacity** is referred to as the overall ability of an organisation or system to create value for others;

**Capabilities** are the collective ability of a group or a system to do something either inside or outside the system. The collective ability involved may be technical, logistical, managerial or generative (i.e. the ability to earn legitimacy, to adapt, to create meaning, etc.);

**Competencies** are the energies, skills and abilities of individuals.

Fundamental to developing capacity are inputs such as human, material and financial resources, technology, and information. To the degree that they are developed and successfully integrated, capabilities contribute to the overall capacity or ability of an organisation or system to create value for others. A single capability is not sufficient to create capacity. All are needed and are strongly interrelated and overlapping. Thus, to achieve its development goals, the 5C framework says that every organisation or system must have **five basic capabilities:**

- The capability to act and commit;
- The capability to deliver on development objectives;
- The capability to adapt and self-renew;
- The capability to relate (to external stakeholders);
- The capability to achieve coherence.

In order to have a common framework for evaluation, the five capabilities have been reformulated in outcome domains and for each outcome domain performance indicators have been developed. A detailed overview of capabilities with outcome domains and indicators is attached in Appendix 3.

There is some overlap between the five core capabilities but together the five capabilities result in a certain level of capacity. Influencing one capability may have an effect on one or more of the other capabilities. In each situation, the level of any of the five capabilities will vary. Each capability can become stronger or weaker over time.

# Appendix 3 Changes in organisational capacity of the SPO - 5C indicators

Below you will find a description for each of the indicators under each of the capabilities, what the situation is as assessed during the endline, how this has changed since the baseline and what are the reasons for change.

**Description of Endline Indicator Yayasan Rumpun Bambu Indonesia**
**Capability to act and commit**
1.1. Responsive leadership: 'Leadership is responsive, inspiring, and sensitive'

*This is about leadership within the organization (operational, strategic). If there is a larger body then you may also want to refer to leadership at a higher level but not located at the local organization.*

The director's position has been handed over to younger staff after the previous leader resigned. With this change came a change in the leadership style as well, which can now be characterized as more democratic, open and encompassing of staff opinion. Decisions are made in a democratic fashion through open discussions between staff and the director. The young new director's age and experience are similar to that of his subordinates. This makes communication and day to day interaction between him and his colleagues much easier and informal. Staff has indicated that they feel less reluctant to approach the new director as opposed to his predecessor. This has also resulted in a new habit for the coordinators who have now been empowered to communicate intensely with the community. Every staff is encouraged to contribute their ideas and energy to the development of YRBI, and to be the baseline involved as a part of YRBI which has increased their sense of responsibility.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

1.2.Strategic guidance: 'Leaders provide appropriate strategic guidance (strategic leader and operational leader)'

*This is about the extent to which the leader(s) provide strategic directions*

The director also allows the staff to create their own strategy, methods and approach in their work. The lack of detailed instructions on day to day work activities, and instead the greater autonomy in carrying out tasks, is seen as a sign of trust from the new director, and greatly appreciated by the staff. Nonetheless, some staff members indicate that they would still like to receive strategic guidance and detailed instructions in some aspects of their work.

On the other hand there are still many inherited problems that have yet to be solved by the new director. The discussion process to address these issues sometimes appears to take much longer than necessary to come to decisions.

Score: from 3.5 to 2.5 (deterioration)

1.3.Staff turnover: 'Staff turnover is relatively low'

This is about staff turnover.

Compared to the baseline evaluation, there has been no influx of new staff, but rather there has been a reduction of staff due to the deterioration of their financial condition.

In 2013, the contract between YRBI and ICCO ended without being renewed. Afterwards YRBI failed to get new funds therefore their financial condition deteriorated. This condition forced YRBI to close their project activities and reduce their staffs.

Before 2012, YRBI had 6 permanent staffs and 8 program staffs. In 2012, they removed 3 permanent staffs. Then, in February 2013, they removed 3 permanent staffs. So in 2014, they have a total of 8 permanent staffs.

Score: from 3.5 to 2.5 (deterioration)

1.4 .Organisational structure 'Existence of clear organization structure reflecting the objectives of the organization"

*Observable indicator: Staff have copy of org. structure and understand this*

The previous structure is actually still relevant with the organization needs but the project activities and staffs reduction caused the structure to be thinner.

Score: from 3.5 to 2.5 (deterioration)

1.5 Articulated Strategies. Strategies are articulated and based on good situation analysis and adequate M&E

*Observable indicator: strategies are well articulated. Situation analysis and monitoring and evaluation are used to inform strategies.*

Since YRBI closed their projects, M&E were no longer conducted. They only hold informal forum to discuss contemporary issues that develop at local, regional, and national which is called "Diskusi Lorong".

Score: From 2 to 1.5 (slight deterioration)

1.6.Daily operations: 'Day-to-day operations are in line with strategic plans'

*This is about the extent to which day-to-day operations are aligned with strategic plans.*

Day-to-day operations are currently aligned with the strategic plans in place. However, after the closing of ICCO funded program activities, the number of field activities has significantly decreased due to the limited operational budget, which made it more difficult to achieve target (strategic) results. Other staff members have indicated that the current daily operations are back in line again with the strategic planning and the organisation's vision and mission, which is to assists local mukim and gampong communities.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

1.7.Staff skills: 'Staff have necessary skills to do their work'

*This is about whether staff have the skills necessary to do their work and what skills they might need.*

Several training opportunities have been offered to staff of YRBI in the observed period which were supported by ICCO. There were: Participatory Mapping Internship [GIS] in 2014 for the field staff; 2) Making Market for the Poor Training (MFP) in 2013 for the director; 3) Resource Mobilization Training in 2013 for the director; 3) Financial Management Training (computer software course) in 2013 for Finance Staff. As a result, staff has indicated that their skills have generally improved. As an example, one of the field officers indicated that through the GIS training has enabled him to now use GPS data in mapping programs and was able assist the in-house GIS expert with his work. The GIS expert indicated that through his help, his job could now be done faster and more easily.

Despite general improvements in terms of capacity building and training for the staff, language still appears to be a problem in terms of writing and winning proposals, as well effective negotiation.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

1.8.Training opportunities: 'Appropriate training opportunities are offered to staff'

*This is about whether staffs at the SPO are offered appropriate training opportunities*

In general training opportunities are offered in numerous ways for staff, directors and volunteers, either to improve skills or to teach new ones. The decision on who gets to attend which training are discussed openly with everyone involved in the organization. The training opportunities were: Participatory Mapping Internship [GIS] in 2014 for the field staff; 2) Making Market for the Poor Training (MFP) in 2013 for the director; 3) Resource Mobilization Training in 2013 for the director; 3)

Financial Management Training (computer software course) in 2013 for Finance Staff. All of them were supported by ICCO.

Score: from 2.5 to 3 (slight improvement)

1.9.1.Incentives: 'Appropriate incentives are in place to sustain staff motivation'

*This is about what makes people want to work here. Incentives could be financial, freedom at work, training opportunities, etc.*

Since the baseline there have not been anychanges in term of incentive for the staff both before and after the contract between YRBI and ICCO ended in October 2013.- Up to now incentives for staff are numerous and come in the form of training opportunities but also flexible work times and freedom at work. Staff also mentioned that they considered the organizational culture and sense of belonging as an incentive to work for YRBI.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

1.9.2.Funding sources: 'Funding from multiple sources covering different time periods'

*This is about how diversified the SPOs funding sources are over time, and how the level of funding is changing over time.*

After the ending of the ICCO contract no new major funding sources have been found. This has led to some downsizing in staff capacity, and the inability to carry out all organizational activities. The organization has acquired a small project for the end of April 2014 for approximately seven months. But the project value is too low to fund additional staff or activities of YRBI.

YRBI has actively applied to new donors and completed assessment with other parties and potential partners. There are some possibilities for cooperation, but none of the ventures have led to agreements as of yet.

Score: from 1.5 to 0.5 (deterioration)

1.9.3.Funding procedures: 'Clear procedures for exploring new funding opportunities'

*This is about whether there are clear procedures for getting new funding and staff are aware of these procedures.*

There are still no clear and formal proposals for the development of proposals. Although the responsibility for proposal writing lies with the director, staff is invited to provide input and ideas during proposal development. Everyone in the organization is engaged to contribute, although overall proposal writing and negotiation skills still require further development.

Score: from 1.5 to 1.5 (no change)

**Summary capability to act and commit**
After a handing over the director's position to a younger staff member, YRBI has become a more open organization for its staff members. Communication with management, feedback and the ability to participate in decision making were enabled by the new director in charge. Staff is encouraged to create their own strategies, methods and approaches in work. Despite that, decision making still appears to be a slow process particularly in relation to "inherited" problems such as financial problems that have yet to be solved. On the whole strategic guidance needs to be further developed.

In term of organization structure, it is thinner due to the project activities and staffs reduction. This reduction has also caused M&E to no longer be conducted. They only hold informal forum to to discuss contemporary issues that develop at local, regional, and national which is called "Diskusi Lorong".

Overall, daily operations are in line with strategic planning, although the number of activities carried out has gone down significantly after the ICCO funded program was finalized. This is also affected staff turnover since staff had to leave the organisation due to closing the ICCO funded project. The number of staffs reduced from 14 to 8. No new major funds have been acquired since, although the organization is actively seeking out new opportunities and has applied to several potential donors. Staff skills have slightly improved over the observed period as a result of increased work experience and donor (ICCO) supported trainings in Participatory Mapping Internship [GIS], Making Market for the Poor Training (MFP), Resource Mobilization Training, and Financial Management Training between

2012-2014. Nonetheless further improvements are needed in terms of English language proficiency to improve the quality of proposals and negotiations.

The previous structure is actually still relevant with the organization needs but the project activities and staffs reduction caused the structure to be thinner.

Since YRBI closed their projects, M&E were no longer conducted. They only hold informal forum to to discuss contemporary issues that develop at local, regional, and national which is called "Diskusi Lorong".

Score: 2.7 to 2.4 (very slight deterioration)

**Capability to adapt and self-renew**

2.1. M&E application: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess activities, outputs and outcomes'

*This is about what the monitoring and evaluation of the SPO looks at, what type of information they get at and at what level (individual, project, organizational).*

Compared to the baseline, nothing has changed in terms of the application of M&E. There is still no comprehensive and functional M&E system in place and there are no written documents or formal procedures for M&E. M&E was mostly conducted through discussions between staff and coordinators. M&E is applied at the project level, not yet the organizational level. M&E is done in the form of discussions based on project agreements (activities, outputs and outcomes), so this is initially done for reporting back to donors. They are learning from it though, identifying obstacles and constraints and reducing the risk of failure by finding solutions.

Score: from 2 to 2 (no change)

2.2. M&E competencies: 'Individual competencies for performing M&E functions are in place'

*This is about whether the SPO has a trained M&E person; whether other staff have basic understanding of M&E; and whether they know what information to collect, how to process the information, how to make use of the information so as to improve activities etc.*

There is no trained staff on M&E, but people that have had training in program management have a basic understanding of it. The M&E of program implementation is done by the director and the coordinator. Measurement is based on program achievements and its conformity with the goal of the program.

Score: from 2 to 2 (no change)

2.3.M&E for future strategies: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess the effects of delivered products and services (outcomes) for future strategies'

*This is about what type of information is used by the SPO to make decisions; whether the information comes from the monitoring and evaluation; and whether M&E info influences strategic planning.*

During visits from the donor, YRBI talks about the projects to check the results based on the agreements in the contract. From the viewpoint of the donor this is aimed to monitor results, but at the same time also to inspire and show that results can be used for improvements to the strategic plan. YRBI is aware of the potential for using M&E, but a problem is that programs can run into a lack of funds, and cannot continue. In this way they cannot generate lessons learned which can be incorporated into new strategies.

Score: from 1.5 to 1.5 (no change)

2.4.Critical reflection: 'Management stimulates frequent critical reflection meetings that also deal with learning from mistakes'

*This is about whether staffs talk formally about what is happening in their programs; and, if so, how regular these meetings are; and whether staffs are comfortable raising issues that are problematic.*

Regular staff meetings are no longer held, although the open atmosphere in the organization encourages staff to talk freely about the particular challenges that they may be facing. This situation is supported and encouraged by the new director.  Nonetheless some staff has stated that it is difficult to

provide and receive consistent feedback and reflect due to the irregularity of meetings, particularly after a project or program has ended. During the informal meetings final decisions are agreed upon together. Volunteers are not involved in these meetings, although they are free to offer their opinions during regular work activities.

Score: from 3 to 2 (deterioration)

2.5. Freedom for ideas: 'Staff feel free to come up with ideas for implementation of objectives

*This is about whether staffs feel that ideas they bring for implementation of the program are welcomed and used.*

The staff can present their ideas during regular staff meetings. Although they have and offer many ideas, few of them appear to be followed up upon. Not all ideas can be implemented due to budgetary constraints, but staff has indicated that suitable and good ideas have a good chance of being implemented.

Recently, the regularity and duration of meetings have greatly reduced, as a result of which feedback and ideas could not be presented and considered by staff.

Score: from 2.5 to 2 (slight deterioration)

2.6. System for tracking environment: 'The organization has a system for being in touch with general trends and developments in its operating environment'

*This is about whether the SPO knows what is happening in its environment and whether it will affect the organization.*

Staff members have indicated that there is still no system in place to track the environment, although they agree that it's necessary. YRBI has a good network at the local and national level, and picks up on current issues from there. They also follow the media closely. This information is shared within the organization. Some staff members indicate that YRBI does not use the information on trends for its benefit though. Regular contact with beneficiaries can also provide relevant information. As there is no systematic M&E in place, following trends and developments is also not done systematically.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

2.7.Stakeholder responsiveness: 'The organization is open and responsive to their stakeholders and the general public'

*This is about what mechanisms the SPO has to get input from its stakeholders, and what they do with that input.*

There are regular informal meetings with stakeholders, for example indigenous communities, women's groups, village governments, higher level government, other NGOs, and *mukim* forum. The program staff, coordinator and director all meet with them. There is no more distinction between staff, coordinator or director in this regard, as everyone is considered to stay closely involved with stakeholders and beneficiaries.

Active participation of the community allows them to convey their expectations, and yields better results as well as a sense of ownership of the products. It also prevents wasting time and resources on unwanted activities.

Score: from 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

**Summary capability to adapt and self-renew**

On the whole, there is a very slight deterioration in the capability to adapt and self-renew for YRBI. Although staff has indicated numerous times that they see the benefit and need to develop their monitoring and evaluation, it has not been prioritized until now. M&E resides with the Director as there is no trained staff assigned with this particular role. Limited but irregular M&E is done at the project level through infrequent meetings where staff is free to address outstanding issues. M&E is done in the form of discussions based on project agreements (activities, outputs and outcomes), so this is initially done for reporting back to donors. They are learning from it though, identifying obstacles and constraints and reducing the risk of failure by finding solutions.

Staff meetings in general have reduced in frequency, duration and intensity, providing fewer scheduled moments for feedback and discussion. Nonetheless office and organizational culture can be considered open and free and enables informal communication. With regards to keeping track of external developments YRBI continues to track media and its network at the local and national level, and picks up on current issues from there, but there is no formal system in place to do this tracking of the environment.

Communication and engagement with stakeholders and beneficiaries is done directly in the field and includes all level of staff, including the director. Active participation of the community allows YRBI to convey their expectations and this yields better results as well as a sense of ownership of the products amongst the beneficiaries. It also prevents wasting time and resources on unwanted activities.

Score: 2.5 to 2.3 ( very slight deterioration)

**Capability to deliver on development objectives**

3.1.Clear operational plans: 'Organization has clear operational plans for carrying out projects which all staff fully understand'

*This is about whether each project has an operational work plan and budget, and whether staff use it in their day-to-day operations.*

There is an overall strategic plan, in place which is well understood by staff. Every staff member now has information on what these work plans and budgets are composed of, and how they are used. Program plans are distributed to all staff in the organization. The ability to implement programs has improved since all staff members as more staff now understands how to run the program.

Delegation from the new director to the coordinator runs smoothly but delegation from the coordinator to staff has to be monitored through more systematic job delegation.

Score: from 2 to 2.5 (slight improvement)

3.2.Cost-effective resource use: 'Operations are based on cost-effective use of its resources'
*This is about whether the SPO has the resources to do the work, and whether resources are used cost-effectively.*

YRBI works closely with its beneficiaries in a participatory approach, involving them in the implementation of projects. If beneficiaries are unresponsive to efforts made, program activities are reconsidered or even stopped entirely, in an overall effort to reduce waste of resources. This approach is the still same as it was during the baseline evaluation and has been proven as effective.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

3.3. Delivering planned outputs: 'Extent to which planned outputs are delivered'

*This is about whether the SPO is able to carry out the operational plans.*

Over the last two years YRBI has remained consistent in delivering donor-agreed outputs as outlined in the contracts. The strong involvement of beneficiaries in projects leads to positive results and in some cases even exceeds expectations. This approach remains however time consuming and can lead to delays. .

Score: from 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

3.4. Mechanisms for beneficiary needs: 'The organization has mechanisms in place to verify that services meet beneficiary needs'

*This is about how the SPO knows that their services are meeting beneficiary needs*

The participatory approach ensures that the target group decides whether they want to work with YRBI and that they actually need the project's output. If there is no active participation of the beneficiaries, the project is canceled. There are formal and informal discussions with beneficiaries on activities and how they use the end products. No change has occurred in this indicator.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)

3.5. Monitoring efficiency: 'The organization monitors its efficiency by linking outputs and related inputs (input-output ratio's)'

*This is about how the SPO knows they are efficient or not in their work.*

M&E remains a point for development for YRBI. Although meetings are held in which both staff, coordinators and leadership are included to discuss efficiency and processes, these are irregular and non-systematic. The lack of a formal system to measure efficiency remains, and roles are not clearly defined in the organization. Although the overall organizational culture under the new leadership supports an environment of critical reflection, structural practices are missing and even deteriorating. Meetings now occur less frequently and are generally considered to be shorter, allowing for less time to address ideas and feedback on process efficiency.

Score: from 2.5 to 2 (slight deterioration)

3.6. Balancing quality-efficiency: 'The organization aims at balancing efficiency requirements with the quality of its work'

*This is about how the SPO ensures quality work with the resources available*

YRBI has a clear vision and is a much focused organization. They cannot depend on funding anymore because the ICCO contract (only funder) ended without being renewed, and together with the community they work together hand in hand in sourcing budget.

The terms of reference for the project have changed from a donor-driven process to a community needs-driven process. With the community closely involved at all stages of project implementation quality is ensured at all times. Efficiency tradeoffs are made if needed, particularly if a beneficiary does not appear to be engaged or supportive of actions. Overall this indicator remains unchanged from the evaluation two years ago.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

**Summary capability to deliver on development objectives**

There is an overall strategic plan in YRBI and day-to-day activities are based on the strategic plan. The ability to implement programs has increased since more staff understands the programs. Delegation is done effectively from the new director to the coordinators, but more difficult from coordinators to the staff, sparking the need for better job delegation and management practices. YRBI works closely together with its beneficiaries in a participatory approach, through which they are able to consistently deliver on donor-agreed outputs and and deliver quality results. The approach however is intensive and sometimes causes delays and affects efficiency.

Overall meetings to discuss program progress including linking inputs and outputs from projects are held, but there is no formal system in place to assess efficiency by linking inputs to outputs. This is in line with having a week monitoring and evaluation system in place. YRBI has a clear vision and is a focused organization. They cannot depend on funding anymore because the ICCO contract ended (only funder) and was not renewed and together with the community they work together hand in hand with the in sourcing funds. The terms of reference for the project have changed from a donor-driven process into community needs-driven process and on the whole, engagement with the beneficiaries is good.

All in all the capability to deliver on development objectives has remained unchanged, and there is room for improvement.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

**Capability to relate**

4.1. Stakeholder engagement in policies and strategies: 'The organization maintains relations/ collaboration/alliances with its stakeholders for the benefit of the organization'

*This is about whether the SPO engages external groups in developing their policies and strategies, and how.*

YRBI has a good network with local government institutions and NGOs, and this network helps them especially in their advocacy work. They also attend international conferences on forest management, governance and indigenous peoples' rights. Stakeholders are involved in activities, and there is ongoing communication with these stakeholders and also with policy makers. Their network helps YRBI to implement its programs and get results, but it is not clear whether the stakeholders also help shape their policies and strategies.

At present, YRBI has extended its network to other NGO's through close cooperation in the areas of new and old beneficiaries. The working fields of these NGO's differ slightly from YRBI however, which makes the organization wonder how they can benefit from these new connections as of yet.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

4.2. Engagement in networks: 'Extent to which the organization has relationships with existing networks/alliances/partnerships'

*This is about what networks/alliances/partnerships the SPO engages with and why; with they are local or international; and what they do together, and how do they do it.*

YRBIs network is at the local and national level, mainly with organizations working on similar issues in indigenous rights and the natural environment, or with organizations that outsource part of their projects to YRBI (subcontracting). Over the years, YRBI has worked on a number of projects together with other organizations like Sedha, Danida, JKPP, ICCO, GEF and Samdhana. Locally they work together with the *Majlis Mukim Aceh Besar* and the *Pemerintah Daerah* (regional governments). Presently the number of NGO's in their network has increased through new cooperations in different fields of work dedicated to the same beneficiaries and locations.

For instance, YRBI has expanded its network to the, *Lembaga Pendukung Kedaulatan Mukim*, which consists of eighteen local organizations with mainstream movement in the advocacy for indigenous people. YRBI also acts as the main actor in an a Working Group, a multi stakeholder forum for climate change, and as a member of Walhi, YRBI has been in the position as a strategic partner in Walhi programs regarding environmental issues. YRBI also contributed to a coalition with NGO-HAM in regards to strengthening the *mukim*.

Score: from 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

4.3.Engagement with target groups: 'The organization performs frequent visits to their target groups/ beneficiaries in their living environment'

*This is about how and when the SPO meets with target groups.*

Although nothing has changed in the participatory approach through regular field visits, and relationships with beneficiaries continue to be close, YRBI is now challenged to continue these intensive practices with less field officers and lower budgets. This is mainly the result of the ending of specific program activities. YRBI has responded to this by lowering the frequency and intensity of field visits.

Score: from 3.5 to 3 (slight deterioration)

4.4.Relationships within organization: 'Organizational structure and culture facilitates open internal contacts, communication, and decision-making'
*How does staff at the SPO communicate internally? Are people free to talk to whomever they need to talk to? When and at what forum? What are the internal mechanisms for sharing information and building relationships?*

There is a sense of family among the staff members, but also a respect for seniority that is rooted in their culture. This prevents junior staff to argue with senior staff, even though there is an open atmosphere in which one can freely discuss any issue and give their input before a decision is made.

With the new changing of leadership, the above situation still sometimes occurs, but since the new director applies more egalitarian leadership style, according to some staffs, the junior-senior

relationship dynamic has become less formal. Junior staff feels more confident to defend their ideas during discussions. This is also enabled by the director who, due to his younger age is able to relate better to the younger staff members.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

**Summary capability to relate**
Overall this capability has not changed. YRBI has a good network with local government institutions and NGOs which help them in their advocacy work. Stakeholders are involved and there is ongoing communication with these stakeholders and policy makers, but it is not clear to what extend the stakeholders also contributed to informing policies and strategies of YRBI. . Currently, there is an extension in YRBI's network with the addition of more NGOs. YRBIs network is at the local and national level, mainly with organizations working on similar issues in indigenous rights and the natural environment, or with organizations that outsource part of their projects to YRBI (subcontracting). Due to their participatory approach there are regular field visits, however the frequency of these visits has reduced due to budget constraints after closing projects which affected having less field officers available. There is a sense of family among the staff members, but also a respect for seniority that prevents junior staff from arguing with senior staff, even though there is an open atmosphere in which one can freely discuss any issue and give their input before a decision is made. With the change of leadership, the above situation sometimes still occur, but the new (young) director applies more egalitarian leadership style, which makes the junior-senior relationship smoother than before.

Score: from 3.2 to 3.4 (very slight improvement)

**Capability to achieve coherence**
5.1.Revisiting vision, mission: 'Vision, mission and strategies regularly discussed in the organization'

*This is about whether there is a vision, mission and strategies; how often staff discuss/revise vision, mission and strategies; and who is involved in this.*

The strategic plan is extended to 2020 and also contains the same vision and mission that has been used by the organization for the past years. Although staff is not included in the formulation of high level strategy and revisions of mission and vision, they are well informed about the content and meaning of the strategic plan and how it applies to their work.

Score: from 2.5 to 2.5 (no change)

5.2. Operational guidelines: 'Operational guidelines (technical, admin, HRM) are in place and used and supported by the management'

*This is about whether there are operational guidelines, which operational guidelines exist; and how they are used.*

There is a standard operational procedure (SOP) on Finance & Organization, but not yet on HRM. This has not changed since the baseline and the draft SOP for HRM has yet to be finalized. Decisions regarding the formulation of these SOPs is done at the managerial level and not discussed with staff prior to finalization.

Score: from 2.5 to 2.5 (no change)

5.3.Alignment with vision, mission: 'Projects, strategies and associated operations are in line with the vision and mission of the organization'

*This is about whether the operations and strategies are line with the vision/mission of the SPO.*

YRBI's work on marginalized communities and natural resources is in line with their vision and mission. Both staff, donor and partners have acknowledged this. Prior to the implementation of project and program activities, the vision and mission are reviewed without any changes because it was still considered relevant, as was already the case during the baseline evaluation two years ago. Overall

staff remains well aware of strategic plans and directions, and is able to relate this to their day to day activities and operations.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

5.4.Mutually supportive efforts: 'The portfolio of project (activities) provides opportunities for mutually supportive efforts'

*This is about whether the efforts in one project complement/support efforts in other projects.*

Due to YRBI's limited funds and resources they are forced to be practical in the implementation of projects and program activities. Initiatives are closely discussed with beneficiaries and adapted accordingly, which makes their work to some extent related and mutually supportive. Overall no particular change has occurred in this indicator, other than that now more than ever, the need for practicality and efficiency exists due an even greater limitation in funds and resources.

Score: 3 to 3 (no change)

**Summary capability to achieve coherence**

There are no changes in the capability to achieve coherence. Overall the same approaches towards strategy, the application of vision and mission to daily operations and the alignment of all these factors have remained the same.  Standard operating procedures are in still place for finance, but not for HRM.

Score: from 2.7 to 2.7 (no change)

# Appendix 4 Results - key changes in organisational capacity - general causal map

**General Causal Map Yayasan Rumpun Bambu Indonesia (YRBI)**

**Narrative of General Causal Map of Yayasan Rumpun Bambu Indonesia (YRBI)**
YRBI is an organization established in 1995 which works in the fields of indigenous community empowerment, agricultural development, and environmental conservation. Since 2006, YRBI has dealt with climate change issues until 2011 when they chose traditional community development as their main issue. Collaboration between YRBI and the Netherlands began in 2005 after the tsunami. The contract between MFS II and YRBI started on 1 November 2012 and ended on 31 October 2013 without being renewed.


The evaluation team carried out an end line assessment at YRBI from 14 to 16 July 2014. During this workshop, the team made a recap of key features of the organisation in the baseline in 2012 (such as vision, mission, strategies, clients, partnerships). This was the basis for discussing changes that had happened to the organisation since the baseline.

Some positive and negative changes have taken place in the organization since the baseline, and both of these have affected the organization in terms of being able to work or *on mukim* and *gampong* sovereignty issues [1] , and thereby becoming a leading organization on these issues [2]. *Mukim* and *gampong* are legal administrative community units[21] in Indonesia. YRBI wants to become a leading organization in terms of the issues in dealing with *mukim* and *gampong* sovereignty [2]. The extent to which the organisation has been able to work or on *mukim* and *gampong* sovereignty issues [1], can be attributed to three key organisational capacity changes:

1. staff capacity on *mukim* and *gampong* sovereignty issues is more recognised [4];
2. an improved and more extensive network [15];
3. reduced paid workforce and program funds [3], which is a negative development ;

Each of these key organisational capacity changes and how they have come about is further explained below. Numbers in the narrative corresponds to numbers in the visual.

[21] It has boundaries and authority to control and manage the interests of local communities based on the origin and the local customs which are recognized in the Indonesian Government system. In a nutshell is zoning based on local custom. In the structure, gampong is under mukim. Mukim formed by at least four gampong. Each mukm is led by a Uleebalang or a Mukim. This system is applied since the era of the Aceh Sultanate.




**Staff capacity on *mukim* and *gampong* sovereignty issues is more recognised [4]**

An increase in staff capacity has become more visible to stakeholders, partners and beneficiaries [4] as staff members carried out their duties. More invitations from the community for staff to share their knowledge and skills [9] made the public realize the increase in their knowledge and capacity.

The greater number of invitations from the community to share knowledge and skills is due to an increased trust from beneficiaries and stakeholders in YRBI's competencies [11]. This was due to a range of different issues:

- Staff improved the communities' awareness, comprehension and support to *mukim* and *gampong* sovereignty issues [17], Which was due to public education on these issues [27].
- Many communities succeed to raise funds from the public [18] after encouragement and assistance from YRBI [28]
- An increased number of village maps has been created and utilized by the people [19] after YRBI empowered the community with the skills to create their own social maps [29]
- Increased community economic development assistance [20] through honey bee forest exploitation [30].
- Government created a *mukim* and *gampong* regulation [21] after active and regular advocacy and lobbying of YRBI [31].
- Continuous sharing of knowledge on *mukim* and *gampong* issues [22] because these issues have become more mainstream in Aceh [32].

Each of these factors resulted from the overall development of the *Mukim* and *Gampong* sovereignty over the last two years [37], following the increased efforts and staff capacities to deliver work and carry out program activities [38]. This was due to more internal knowledge sharing [39]. It is custom for YRBI staff who have returned from an external event, whether it is a discussion, seminar, or

training, to share the knowledge they received to the other staff members in a forum. This forum is called "*Diskusi Lorong"* [39]. It is held at least twice in one month. Aside from being a forum to share knowledge, *Diskusi Lorong* also benefits as a forum to discuss program development and contemporary issues that develop at local, regional, and national level.

Amongst the knowledge shared were several staff capacity building activities as supported by ICCO [40] and the establishment and initiation of *mukim* and *gampong* coalition for sovereignty natural resources governance. Capacity building activities for YRBI were supported by ICCO between 2012-2013[40], Which included: 1) Participatory Mapping Internship (GIS); 2) Making Market for The Poor Training; 3) Resource Mobilization Training.

The other issue that affected increased trust from beneficiaries and stakeholders [15] is an improved and more extensive network [15]. Since this also directly affected the organisation's capacity to address *mukim* and *gampong* sovereignty issues, it is further elaborated upon below,

**The network improved and is more extensive [15]**
YRBI's network has grown over the last two years [15]. The continuous sharing of knowledge and developments on *mukim* and *gampong* issues in the public, amongst stakeholders and community played a large role in this [22]. On the other hand, YRBI is now able to host meetings, trainings and *mukim* forums in themeeting room *(Bale Pertemuan)* in the new building , which has allowed more beneficiaries and stakeholders to get in touch with YRBI [42]. In fact, the *Bale Pertemuan* has now become a regular meeting point for civil society activists. Improved facilities have also contributed to being able to continuously share knowledge on *mukim gampong* and sovereignty issues [22]. This sharing is also due to *gampong* and *mukim* becoming a CSO mainstream issue in Aceh [32], which in turn is due to initiating sovereignty institutions to rescue *mukim* and *gampong* areas and natural resources [41].

**Reduced paid workforce and program funds [3]**
This is a negative change that occurred in YRBI since the baseline in 2012. There are a variety of reasons for this negative change:

- No salary being paid to staff members [6]
- No more program activities after 2013 [7]
- Reduction in the number of staff members [8]
- More voluntary work [5]
- Less decisive leadership [36].


Each of these factors was the result of the poor financial situation of YRBI [10] after no new funds could be obtained [13] after the contract with ICCO expired in 2013 [23]. A change in ICCO policy was the primary reason for this occurring [33] after specific new changes were included in the renewal of the MoU between ICCO and the government of Indonesia [43]. Prior to this, ICCO was more focused on local economic empowerment. Although YRBI has had the opportunity to submit new proposals in line with ICCO's policy, they chose to stick with the empowerment of *mukim* and *gampong* institutions, and as a result, the contract with ICCO ended.

No additional funds were acquired in the meantime either as proposals written by YRBI were rejected [16]. This was partly due to the limited number of proposals being developed, decreasing the chances of getting new funds significantly [24]. Proposals. riting and development was possible [34] because some senior staff already possessed the capacity and experiences to do so [44]. Nonetheless, a lack of experience in fundraising of the new director of YRBI [25] reduced YRBI's chances for success acquisition, and this new leadership came on board after a leadership change in the mid of 2013 [45]. The previous director, staff recalled, had better networking and fundraising skills.

Finally, the poor financial condition of the organization resulted in more voluntary work being done since 2013 [8]. This was the only way for YRBI to keep the organization at work with limited resources and capital. Volunteers, and staff working for free on a voluntary basis, were attracted to do so by their motivation to work and contribute to the organization and its mission [14]. The increase in motivation could also be attributed to the fact that they were now more involved in decision making [26] which was enabled by the freedom and more democratic leadership style of the new director [35]. Unfortunately this increase in staff autonomy and empowerment by the new director also led to a less decisive leadership management [36], which some staff members indicated harmed the organization in need for change and fun

# Appendix 5 Results - attribution of changes in organisational capacity - detailed causal maps

**Narrative of Causal Map C.1 Poorer Financial Situation Yayasan Rumpun Bambu Indonesia (YRBI)**




**Introduction**

The key capacity change that was focused on during the process tracing workshop was identified as 'poor financial situation' [5] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Minutes Meeting). Staff of YRBI indicated that this has led to salary not being paid since the beginning of 2014 [1] (Annex L, M, O, Workshop Min. Meeting); the ending of all program activities in 2013 [2] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min.

Meeting); a considerable reduction in the number of staff [3] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min. Meeting); encourage staff working more on a voluntary basis [4] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min. Meeting).


The poor financial situation of YRBI [5] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min. Meeting) is due to fact that since the MFS II contract ended, in 2013, no new funds have been obtained [6] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min. Meeting). The reason for this was threefold. *First,* the YRBI and ICCO contract expired [7] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min. Meeting). *Secondly,* no follow up for fund raising activity based in the training attended [8] (Annex L, R; Training interview of Director; Workshop Min. Meeting). *Thirdly*, the rejection of proposals for program activities and funding [9] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min. Meeting). Each of these three reasons is explained in more detail below.

1. The ICCO contract expired on 31 Oktober 2013 and was not renewed due to political and administrative issues. This was due to an internal ICCO policy change [14] (Annex E, L, R; Workshop Min. Meeting), which directly resulted from the renewal of an MoU between ICCO and the Government of Indonesia [17] (Annex L, R). The policy stated that ICCO couldn't further support activities with "mukim and gampong"[22] (zoning based on local custom) issues.
   ICCO funded Financial Management Training [16] (Annex L, M, Workshop Min. Meeting) resulted in ability to develop report based on donor standard [13] (Annex L, M, R; Workshop Min. Meeting). The financial reports are now more transparent and accountable [13] (Annex L, R; Workshop Min. Meeting). This training has no further follow up since YRBI didn't need to develop reports as they didn't have programs anymore after the contract from ICCO has been ended.
2. There was no active follow up on fund raising activities [8] (Annex L, R; Tranining Interview of Director; Workshop Min. Meeting) as taught in the Resource mobilization Training supported by ICCO In 2013 [18] (Training Interview of Director), but the knowledge from the training had been shared and disseminated to the community to empower them to raise fund in a variety of ways. Despite no concrete fund raising activities being carried out after the resource mobilization training took place, the training did result in positive changes elsewhere. A number of beneficiary communities succeeded in raising public funds through cooperation with private sectors/companies or directly from the community with help of YRBI and the newly acquired capabilities in the training. They did this by creating proposals for cooperation or donations, selling merchandise, etc. Unfortunately these capabilities to raise public funds were not utilized for YRBI's own sake.
3. The final reason for the lack of securing new funds was the rejection of submitted proposals [9] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min. Meeting). During the field interviews, various people have noted that the new director was unable to maintain the level of fundraising and had a significant lack of experience in it and also in networking [11] (annex L, M, R). The change of leadership happened in 2013 [19] (annex L, M, O; Workshop Min. Meeting).

The other reason for rejection was that the number of proposals developed was actually very low [12] (Annex L, M, R; Workshop Min. Meeting). This despite the fact that some of the submitted proposals were developed by YRBI staff themselves [15] (Annex L, M, O, R), as they have capacity to do them [21] (annex L, M, O, R).

[22] Mukim and gampong is a legal community unit. It has boundaries and authority to control and manage the interests of local communities based on the origin and the local customs which are recognized in the Indonesian Government system. In a nutshell is zoning based on local custom. In the structure, gampong is under mukim. Mukim formed by at least four gampong. Each mukim is led by a Uleebalang or a Mukim. This system is applied since the era of the Aceh Sultanate.

**Narrative of Causal Map C3 : Becoming the leading organization in *mukim* and *gampong* sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia**




**Narrative :**

This process tracing map differs slightly from the other maps presented in this report in that it addresses not only competencies and organizational capacity, but also some implementation activities

and targets. The two are inherently intertwined within YRBI and hard to separate when explained for this particular capacity. It should therefore be considered a "mixed" causal map.

Following is the narration for the YRBI causal map between 2012-2014. Within the two year time period since the MFS II baseline evaluation in 2012, a key organizational capacity change at YRBI was that it has become the leading organization in *mukim* and *gampong*[23] sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia [1] (Annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). During the process tracing workshops and interviews it was made clear that this outcome is the direct result of an increased recognition in staff capacity on *Gampong* and *Mukim* issues [2] (Annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). This increased recognition can be explained through two factors:

1. More invitations from community to share staff knowledge and skills [3] (Annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting)
2. *Gampong* and *Mukim* becoming one of CSO mainstream issues [14] (Annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting)

Each of these changes is described below. First off the increase in invitations for staff to share their knowledge and skills [3] (Annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting) resulted from an increase in trust in YRBI from beneficiaries and stakeholders [4] (Annex L, M, R; Training Interview of Director, Field Staff; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). Four factors contributed to this increase in trust, which will be discussed in detail below:

1. Village maps being produced and utilized by people [5] (Annex R, Training Interview of Field Staff; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting).
2. An increased number of assisted bee project groups [6] (Annex L, R; Training Interview of Director; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting)
3. Encouragement of the community to use the results of training as a strategy to raise public and corporate funds [7] (Annex L, Training Interview of Director; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting)
4. A government initiation to create new regulations related to *mukim* and *gampong* [8] (Annex L; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting)

*First,* the village maps being produced by communities came forth from the transfer of staff knowledge to villagers [5] (Annex R; Training Interview of Field Staff; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). This program continues to this day and at least three social maps have successfully been completed, and were funded by the villagers themselves [10] (Annex C; Training Interview of Field Staff). This knowledge resulted from an increase in staff's ability to develop maps independently. Field Staff applied his knowledge by independently conducting social mapping in a number of villages [15] (Annex C; Training Interview of Field Staff). This was purely from Field Staff initiative, and YRBI functioned as a facilitator. He was one of the YRBI staff members who participated in the Participatory Mapping Internship (GIS) in Bogor, 2013 [23] (Training Interview Field Staff). He shared his knowledge with his colleagues in YRBI after his return from there [20] (annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting).

*Secondly,* an increased number of assisted bee project groups arose [6] (Annex L, R; Training Interview of Director; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting) after the honey bee project was aligned with organization issues wich is economic community empowerment [11] (Annex C, L; Training Interview of Director). There was development of new community empowerment on honey bee forest exploitation [16] (Annex C, L; Training Interview of Director). The number of communities increased from two to six benefiting communities. Actually honey exploitation is not a new activity. It was stagnant but has developed since one of YRBI staff participated and shared the knowledge about economic community empowerment with his colleagues. Together with his colleagues, then benefiting communities after their own skill raised [19] (annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). At the bottom of all this was the Making Market for the Poor Training (MFP) [24] (Annex C; Training

[23] Mukim and gampong is a legal community unit. It has boundaries and authority to control and manage the interests of local communities based on the origin and the local customs which are recognized in the Indonesian Government system. In a nutshell is zoning based on local custom. In the structure, gampong is under mukim. Mukim formed by at least four gampong. Each mukim is led by a Uleebalang or a Mukim. This system is applied since the era of the Aceh Sultanate.

Interview of Director). This activity was held in 2013 in the form of training by Penabulu supported by ICCO. The YRBI staff who participated in this training was–The YRBI Director. This training made efforts in providing participants with the competencies necessary to market their products. Oftentimes, the obstacle in the development of small to medium-sized industries is marketing products. Through this training, the products can be marketed well and in time so as to increase the economy of the community.

*Thirdly,* communities were encouraged to use the results of training as a strategy to raise public and corporate funds [7] (Annex L; Training Interview of Director; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). YRBI makes an active effort in order for the beneficiary communities to be able to not only raise resources, but also be able to identify and be firm towards companies involved in cases of corruption, environment, human rights, etc. A number of beneficiary communities succeeded in raising public funds through cooperation with private sectors/companies or directly from the community. They did this by creating proposals for cooperation or donations, selling merchandise, etc. However, YRBI asserted the beneficiary communities to pay attention to the background of those they would like to cooperate with, especially the private companies. That knowledge was shared by YRBI's staff to all beneficiaries [12] (Annex L; Training Interview of Director), and this knowledge was the result of skills gained to do fundraising from the public and the private sector [17] (Annex L; Training Interview of Director). At the basis of this increased capacity was the Resource Mobilization Training [25] (Annex C, L; Training Interview of Director). This activity was held in 2013 in the form of a training held by Penabulu with the support of ICCO. The YRBI staff sent to participate in the training was The YRBI Director. This training was on how beneficiary communities or the organization can raise public funds, therefore making this beneficial for the beneficiary communities and YRBI. The output was his improved competencies in raising public funds [17] (Annex C, L; Training Interview of Director). Unfortunately, the increased fundraising capacity was not successfully applied to the own organization.

In all three cases of ICCO supported trainings and activities, YRBI organized meetings to share the outcomes amongst the staff who didn't attend. *"Diskusi Lorong"* [20], as it is called, was actually YRBI's internal forum to discuss or share technical details dealing with program implementation and the performance of the organization or the subjects of the capacity building. The staffs who have recently attended trainings are often asked to share their knowledge with others through this forum. In addition, this forum is also used for updating the latest social issues developing in Aceh. Although this forum is informal, the staffs consider it very productive. Their capacities have significantly increased through this forum.

*The fourth* and last factor contributing to the increase in trust among beneficiaries and stakeholders was a shift in government regulation regarding *mukim* and *gampong* [8] (Annex L, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). This was the result of regulatory advocacy from YRBI on the one hand [13] (Annex l, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting) and the increasing spotlight on the CSO mainstream issues of *mukim* and *gampong* on the other hand [14] (annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). Both will be explained below.

*Firstly,* due to the government permitted exploitation of natural resources by companies, YRBI was motivated to increase public awareness, in this case the *mukim* and *gampong*, that they are the ones who truly have the sovereignty for natural resources. The government must include them in managing the natural resources. If companies want to exploit the natural resources, it must be permitted by *mukim* and *gampong*. YRBI trained and accompanied the community in managing the natural resources. They paid attention to a number of values, such as: environmentally friendly based on custom. In addition, YRBI also advocate so that issue was accommodated by the government as a regulation [13] (Annex L, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting).

*Secondly,* by starting with issues on managing natural resources, the *mukim* and government sovereignty became a mainstream issue for NGOs in the Aceh province [14] (annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). This forum succeeded in making *mukim* and *gampong* sovereignty a joined issue. Women NGOs, human rights NGOs, environmental NGOs, economic empowerment NGOs, etc, have made *mukim* and *gampong* the basis of their actions, and custom as the spirit. Productive communication, interaction and sharing between NGOs, or stakeholders, specifically dealing with *mukim* and *gampong* was done in this forum [18] (Annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes

Meeting). For YRBI itself, this forum made use of YRBI's infrastructure to optimize the work of the network [21] (Annex L, M, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). The development of YRBI's organization infrastructure resulted as part of an independent effort to become more sovereign [26] (Annex L, M, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting) in the initiation of "*Mukim* Sovereignty Organizations for the Sovereignty of Natural Resources".

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen UR
P.O. Box 88
6700 AB Wageningen
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)317 48 68 00
www.wageningenUR.nl/cdi

Report CDI-15-051

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# Common Room end line report

MFS II country evaluations, Civil Society component

Dieuwke Klaver[1]
Hester Smidt

Kharisma Nugroho[2]
Kharisma Prasetyo

1 Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR, Netherlands
2 SurveyMeter, Indonesia

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen, February 2015



Report CDI-15-061

WAGENINGEN UR
For quality of life

Klaver, D.C., Smidt H., Nugroho, K., Prasetya, K. S.,February 2015, *Common Room end line report; MFS II country evaluations, Civil Society component,* Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR (University & Research centre) and SurveyMETER. Report CDI-15-061. Wageningen.

This report describes the findings of the end line assessment of the Indonesian organisation Common Room that is a partner of Hivos.

The evaluation was commissioned by NWO-WOTRO, the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research in the Netherlands and is part of the programmatic evaluation of the Co-Financing System - MFS II financed by the Dutch Government, whose overall aim is to strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. Apart from assessing impact on MDGs, the evaluation also assesses the contribution of the Dutch Co-Funding Agencies to strengthen the capacities of their Southern Partners, as well as the contribution of these partners towards building a vibrant civil society arena.

This report assesses Common Room's contribution towards strengthening Civil Society in Indonesia and for this exercise it used the CIVICUS analytical framework. It is a follow-up of a baseline study conducted in 2012. Key questions that are being answered comprise changes in the five CIVICUS dimensions to which Common Room contributed; the nature of its contribution; the relevance of the contribution made and an identification of factors that explain Common Room's role in civil society strengthening.

Keywords: Civil Society, CIVICUS, theory based evaluation, process-tracing



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Report CDI-15-061 |

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# Acknowledgements

SurveyMeter and CDI are thanking the staff and the leaders of all Southern Partner Organisations that participated in collecting information for the evaluation of the contribution of these partner organisations to creating a vibrant civil society in Indonesia. They also thank the Co-Funding Agencies and the Dutch Consortia they are a member of for making background documents available. We hope that this evaluation can support you in better positioning yourself in the Civil Society Arena of Indonesia.

# List of abbreviations and acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| ASEF | Asia Europe Foundation |
| Bappeda | *Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah* (Provincial or District Development Planning Agency) |
| BCfNMA | Bandung Centre for New Media Arts |
| BCCF | Bandung Creative City Forum |
| BCI | Basic Capabilities Index |
| BPS | *Badan Pusat Statistik* (Central Agency on Statistics) |
| CDI | Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR |
| CFA | Co-Financing Agency |
| CFO | Co-Financing Organisation |
| CS | Civil society |
| CSO | Civil society organisation |
| Dana Bansos | *Dana Bantuan Sosial* (Social Aid Funds) |
| Dinas KUKM | *Dinas Koperasi Usaha Kecil dan Menengah* (Department of Cooperatives and Small Medium Enterprises) |
| DIY | Design it Yourself |
| ELSAM | *Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat* (Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy) |
| Forum PRB | Bandung's Disaster Risk Reduction Forum |
| GNI | Gross National Income |
| HDI | Human Development Index |
| ICT | Information and communications technology |
| MFS | Dutch co-financing system |
| MoC | Model of Change |
| MoFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| NGO | Non-governmental organisation |
| Ormas | *Organisasi masyarakat* (Societal Organisations) |
| Pusdalisbang | *Pusat Data dan Analisa Pembangunan* (Centre for Development Data and Analysis) |
| RPJMD | *Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah* (Regional Mid-Term Development Plan) |
| SERF | Social Economic Rights Fulfilment |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |
| SSI | Semi-structured Interview |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| UN | United Nations |
| Wageningen UR | Wageningen University & Research Centre |
| WALHI | *Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia* (Friends of the Earth Indonesia) |

# 1 Introduction

This report presents the civil society end line findings of Common Room in Indonesia which is a partner of Hivos in Indonesia under the Dutch Consortium People Unlimited. It is a follow-up to the baseline assessment that was carried out in 2012. According to the information provided during the baseline study, Common Room is working on the theme 'governance'.

These findings are part of the overall evaluation of the joint MFS II evaluations to account for results of MFS II-funded or –co-funded development interventions implemented by Dutch CFAs and/or their Southern Partner Organisations (SPO) and to contribute to the improvement of future development interventions. The civil society evaluation uses the CIVICUS framework and seeks to answer the following questions:

- What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?
- To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
- What is the relevance of these changes?
- What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The CIVICUS framework that comprises five dimensions (civic engagement, level of organisation, practice of values, perception of impact and contexts influencing agency by civil society in general) has been used to orient the evaluation methodology.

*Changes in the civil society arena of the SPO*
In the 2012 – 2014 period the most important change that took place in the civil society arena of the SPO are related to 'perception of impact', specifically the impact of the emergence of a new sub-culture on the music scene in Bandung. Innovations supported by Common Room have generated greater public interest in, and acceptance of traditional Sundanese customs and the underground metal scene. This was achieved through the introduction of Karinding, a traditional Sundanese instrument, and supporting groups that were capable of offering a unique fusion of musical genres.

These findings were obtained through an analysis of documents, a workshop and follow-up interviews with the SPO, and interviews with external resources persons working in civil society organisations that receive support from the SPO; other civil society organisations with whom the SPO is collaborating; public or private sector agents and; external resource persons capable of overlooking the MDG or theme on which the SPO is concentrating.

*Contribution analysis*
Based upon an analysis of the projects and programmes financed by the Dutch CFAs a selection was made of SPOs to be included in an in-depth process tracing trajectory and those to be included for a quick contribution assessment. Common Room was selected for a quick assessment.

The outcome that we looked at is: the Karinding community has become more organized and capable of championing the revival of an interest in a traditional Sundanese instrument and supporting the underground metal scene. Common Room's innovation in combining Karinding – an instrument that lacked popularity, with the metal music genre has led to the development of a sub-culture amongst the youth of Bandung. The innovation has also brought the Karinding community and both affiliated communities, underground metal and Sundanese customary groups, into the public space. The pathway that most likely explains this outcome is a combination of Common Room's intervention, and the popularity of the personnel of the Karinding Attack band, and the emergence of a trend or hype. The contribution of the SPO towards achieving this outcome is in facilitating the musical experimentation, assisting artists in music composition, and providing space for trainings and performances.

*Relevance*
Interviews with staff of Common Room, with external resource person, with the liaison officer of Hivos, as well as contextual information helped to assess the relevance of Common Room's interventions in terms of; its Theory of Change (ToC) for Civil Society (SC) as designed during the baseline study; the context in which Common Room is operating; the CS policies of Hivos.

With regards to the baseline ToC, the interventions and outcomes achieved are to some extent relevant because it shows how the provision of public space contributes to strengthened creative industry, which in turn leads to a healthy society characterized with strong cultural identity and freedom of expression.

With regards to the context in which Common Room is operating, its interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant because public space in Bandung has been dominated by market-driven and hegemonic urban culture.

With regards to the Civil Society policies of Hivos, Common Room's interventions and outcomes are relevant because it is in line with Hivos' strategy to empower civil society and encourage knowledge sharing collaboration between communities and/or individuals. However Hivos observed that Common Room's organisational performance is hampering the organisation to effectively contribute to Hivos' policies, which was a reason for ending the partnership in December 2013.

*Explaining factors*
The information related to factors that explain the above findings was collected at the same time as the data were gathered for the previous questions. The evaluation team looked at internal factors within Common Room, the external context in which it operates and the relations between Common Room and Hivos.

Internal factors within the SPO that explain the findings are the degrading quality of Common Room's new facilities and Common Room's absolute dependency on its director and an inability to recruit more competent personnel.

External factors that explain the findings are the emergence of similar initiatives (alternative public spaces) in Bandung, a supportive government, and the trend of contemporary urban sub-culture.

The following chapter briefly describes the political context, the civil society context and the relevant background with regards to the MDG/theme Common Room is working on. Chapter three provides background information on Common Room, the relation of its MFS II interventions with the CIVICUS framework and specific information on the contract with Hivos. An evaluation methodology has been developed for the evaluation of the Civil Society component which can be found in Appendix 2 of the country report; however, deviations from this methodology, the choices made with regards to the selection of the outcomes for contribution analysis, as well as difficulties encountered during data collection are to be found in Chapter 4. The answers to each of the evaluation questions are being presented in Chapter 5, followed by a discussion on the general project design in relation to CS development; an assessment of what elements of the project design may possibly work in other contexts or be implemented by other organisations in Chapter 6. Conclusions are presented in Chapter 7.

# 2 Context

This paragraph briefly describes the context Common Room is working in. A description of the Civil Society Context assessed according to the CIVICUS framework is provided in appendix 3 of the country report for Civil Society.

## 2.1 Political context

### 2.1.1 Brief historical perspective

Indonesia's rise to being the world's third largest democratic nation has been lauded by many world leaders. The county is often considered to be a model Muslim democracy. As the fourth most populous nation with an estimated 250 million people[1], Indonesia has sustained its democratic commitment since transitioning from an authoritarian leadership to a democracy in 1998. The decentralized administration now consists of 34 provinces and 508 districts and municipalities.

Prior to 1998, Indonesia was under strict authoritarian regime. Suharto, known for his so-called New Order (1966-1998) regime, ushered in radical transformations that would place social and political forces under direct state supervision. The defining characteristics of the Suharto era were a focus on economic growth and controlled consensus and political stability devoid of dissent. A series of tumultuous economic and political transitions in the nineties severely diminished the credibility of ageing President Suharto, who was forced to resign amidst mass street protests.

His departure in 1998 laid bare three decades of social inequalities, state-perpetuated abuses against human rights, and a lack of civilian liberties. The regime change opened the way for a period of *Reformasi* started under the presidency of B. J. Habibie (1998-1999) and continued by Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001), Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001–2004), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014). Restrictions on citizen participation, press freedom and association were removed. Democratic reforms and decentralization led to direct elections, portioned authority, devolution of authority to regional authorities, formation of new political parties and ended the military's parliamentary influence. The distinct historical periods of the New Order Regime and *Reformasi* (1998-present) have shaped the emergence of civil society. Defining characteristics are summarized in the table below.

Table 1
*Characteristics that have defined the emergence of civil society in Indonesia*

| Characteristics | New Order, authoritarian period (1966 – 1998) | Reformasi (1998 – present) |
|---|---|---|
| **Political system** | Centralized, authoritarian characterized by unipolarity. Golkar as the dominant political party.<br><br>In 1999, there were 27 provinces, 306 districts and around 60,000 villages. | Decentralized, democratic. Fragmentation of power and atomization of patronage relationships. Emergence of numerous political parties. Direct presidential elections since 1999.<br><br>Decentralization altered the political and administrative landscape: 34 provinces, 410 districts, 98 municipalities, 6,944 sub-districts and 81,253.[2] |
| **State-citizen interaction** | Benevolent leader, obedient population. Down to the village level, the state permeated society. | Modern political culture marked by diminishing hierarchy between the state and citizens, |

[1] In 2010 the population was estimated to be around 237 million people (BPS 2010 Population Census). The current figure is an estimate from BKKBN and similar figures are cited in the CIA's World Fact Book and the World Bank.

[2] Rumah Pemilu, "Gambaran Singkat Pemilihan Umum 2014 di Indonesia", 3 July 2014. Available from http://www.rumahpemilu.org/in/read/3351/Gambaran-Singkat-Pemilihan-Umum-2014-di-Indonesia (accessed 25 October 2014)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | | allowing for citizens to interact more freely. |
| **Citizen representation and voice** | Strict control of speech, expression and association.<br><br>CSOs and their networks largely "hiding behind the screen", and operating under state surveillance. A period of growth occurred in 1995-98, as resistance was building. | Burgeoning of CSOs, pressure groups and NGOs following the political euphoria after Suharto's fall.<br><br>Indonesian CSOs began to establish new networks internationally. Up until the early 2000s the focus was on state-centrist issues. Later, issues that CSOs were tackling became more diverse, ranging from pluralism, poverty reduction to fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights. |
| **Media** | No free press, censorship and state-control. Suharto had firm grasp over how to use print & broadcast medias to promote political ideologies. | More vibrant media environment, flourishing of media businesses albeit in control of 12 main conglomerates that are mostly profit-driven and often have political ties. |
| | Limited public and CS use and access to internet until mid-90s. | Twitter nation, widespread social media use. |
| | | Growing realization of the importance of media/free press as the fourth pillar of democracy. |
| **Artistic forms of expression** | Art and literary censorship conducted by the state. Art forms were a means to reinforce political order. | Greater freedom of the arts and cultural sectors. Organisations able to hold art events more freely. Freedom of expression a catchphrase amongst individuals and artistic groups, but challenged by more conservative members of society. |
| **Religious expression and organisation** | Regime repressed religious groups, especially radical forms. | Emergence of religious groups seeking to restore Islamic values and defend Muslim values. |

With political reforms came greater freedom and space for civic engagement. In the *Reformasi* period, there was a remarkable increase in the number of civil society organisations, many of which were Islamic in character. In 2000, the Central Agency on Statistics (BPS) recorded around 70,000 registered organisations, compared to just 10,000 in 1996.[3]New groups sprung up with donors encouraging activists to establish NGOs they could fund. These organisations were eager to distance themselves from state and often took an anti-government stance. Proliferating CSOs and NGOs have taken advantage of decentralization and greater regional autonomy to engage in public affairs. Civil society and government relations have improved, although both sides remain sceptical of the others' intentions.

### 2.1.2 Recent trends in the political context

Indonesia is considered to be a story of democratic success, but it still struggles to realize the benefits of sustained and equitable economic growth. In the political context, the main challenges lie in governing such geographically vast and decentralized country, applying principles of good governance and the enormous task of reforming the country's bureaucracy.

Although, Indonesia's 'big bang' decentralization initiated at the turn of the century narrowed the gap between local government and citizens, it has also localized political power struggles. While the devolution of authorities relieved tensions between the central government and the regions, it has also created opportunities for corrupt and rent-seeking practices, at the local level. As indicated by Transparency International's corruption index scores, perceived corruption in Indonesia remains high.

[3] Wahid, Marzuki. 2010. LSM, Islam, dan Perempuan di Indonesia Paska Orde Baru. Presentation at the Asian Dialogues: Open Seminars in Asian Languages. Melbourne, 22 April. Available from http://intranet.law.unimelb.edu.au/staff/events/files/Microsoft%20PowerPoint%20-%20LSM%20dan%20Islam%20di%20Indonesia%20--Melbourne%202010-FINAL.pdf (accessed 25 October 2014)

Table 2

*Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer survey: Indonesia*

| Year | Corruption perceptions Index Score<br>*(0 perceived as highly corrupt and 100 perceived as clean)* | Rank |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 30 | 100/182 |
| 2012 | 32 | 118/174 |
| 2013 | 32 | 114/177 |

Source: Transparency International

In 2013, decentralization was taken a step further with the approval of the Village Law, intended to address weak governance arrangements and empower rural communities to participate politically. The new law could also lead to village elites distorting power relations and misusing government funding if not properly monitored.

Indonesia is still transitioning politically and many challenges lie ahead. According to the 2012 Indonesia Governance Index's Executive Report, "Indonesia is witnessing a paradox in its democracy. On one hand, a successful opening-up of civil liberty has led to the avalanche of democratic demands across the nation, however on the other hand, democratic institutions' are inadequately respond to those demands." Nonetheless, the Indonesian Governance Index, which focuses on measuring provincial governance, does show a general improvement in the performance of the government (political office) bureaucracy, civil society and economic society based on principles of participation, transparency, fairness, accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness between 2008 and 2012. Civil society scores improved the most significantly, while scores for bureaucracy rose slightly.[4]

Table 3

*Indonesia Governance Index: Average provincial scores*

| Arena | 2008 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| Government | 4.93 | 5.46 |
| Bureaucracy | 5.53 | 5.58 |
| Civil Society | 4.85 | 6.33 |
| Economic Society | 4.77 | 5.71 |

Source: http://www.kemitraan.or.id/igi

In the past decade, Indonesians have generally enjoyed a freedom to participate in the political process through a direct-election mechanism. However, in September 2014 lawmakers voted in favour of a bill reviving indirect elections of regional heads. The controversial vote provoked public outcry which saw peaceful protests and the public voicing their discontent through social media. In early October, just before the end of his term, president Yudhoyono issued a regulation in lieu of the law, effectively repealing the law until further judicial review.

The recent 2014 elections which marked the end of Yudhoyono's 10-year term, demonstrated that Indonesian voters are increasingly voting for popular figures irrespective of political party alliances. While practices of corruption, vote-buying and poor voter administration remained in the recent election, the public seems to have matured politically, indicated by the enormous interest in televised debates between the leading candidates. The appeal of the newly sworn in President Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, has come from his hands-on, man-of-the-people approach. As Jokowi begins his five-year term he will need to start addressing a myriad of challenges that include corruption, stagnant economic growth, and human rights concerns, particularly with respect to the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and religious intolerance. If left unaddressed, these challenges could seriously undermine Indonesia's stability and democratic reforms.

[4] The IGI uses a scale of 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest). Data is available online through their website. Indonesia Governance Index, Data, "IGI Executive Report". Available from http://www.kemitraan.or.id/igi/index.php/data/publication/factsheet/275-igi-executive-report (accessed 25 October 2014)

## 2.2 Civil Society context issues with regards to the MDG

Several important changes took place during the 2011 and 2014 period. First, the global financial crisis and Indonesia's rise to a middle-income country led to a decrease in international donor funding. Development actors, including CSOs and NGOs, have to compete harder for funding. Some have been more successful than others in diversifying funding by turning to the private sector or private foundations. At the expense of past idealism, local NGOs are now more disposed to receiving funding sources which in the past may have been criticized as supporting neoliberalism.

Regulatory changes also affected the civil society arena positively and negatively. Appendix 6 provides an overview of some of these important policy changes. Amongst the more controversial laws to spark reaction was Law No. 17/2013 on Societal Organisations. In an open letter sent before the bill was enacted, CIVICUS said the law would undermine freedom of association and "prevent CSOs from working on sensitive topics related to good governance and democratic reform in the public interest".[5] FORUM-ASIA deplored the repressive provisions in the law that "leave all groups vulnerable to attacks, undermining the hard-won democratic space that has been forged by civil society since the end of the New Order regime."[6]

Other laws passed that provoked criticism were the State Intelligence Law (October 2011) and the Social Conflict Law (April 2012). NGOs and media see these laws as imposing further restrictions on freedom of speech, potentially leading to the criminalization of human rights defenders and signifying a tightening of state control. Discriminatory content was also an issue in discussions on the Religious Harmony Bill in 2013, for which drafting was initiated in despite not being part of the planned National Legislative Program. Late in 2013, the House of Representatives came under fire again for its weak stance against religious intolerance when it re-endorsed a law that limits state-recognized religions to six.

Land rights and natural resource protection have been a long-standing issue for Indonesia. While Indonesia has adopted and amended laws to improve the rights of smallholders and indigenous communities, many of these regulations have faltered in their implementation. Part of the issue lies in the overlap and lack of clarity of laws adopted that regulate different sectors and local legislation. Another issue is that there is a lack of oversight in the procedures such as granting permits and licensing. These problems, which are commonly found across development sectors, are compounded by a lack of information among local communities on what the laws regulate and their rights vis-à-vis them.

[5] Civicus, "Civicus Releases an Open Letter Requesting the Indonesian Parliament to reject the Proposed Ormas Law and Create an Enabling Environment for Civil Society", 10 April 2013. Available from http://civicus.org/index.php/en/media-centre-129/open-letters/1581-open-letter-requesting-the-indonesian-parliament-to-reject-to-the-proposed-ormas-law-and-create-an-enabling-environment-for-civil-society (accessed 27 October 2014)

[6] Azhar, Haris. 2013. Repressive provision in the Ormas law. Statement to The Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, in Forum-Asia, "Indonesia: Passage of Ormas Bill Condemned, Campaign to Oppose the Law to Continue", Bangkok, 4 July 2013. Available from http://www.forum-asia.org/?p=16305 (accessed 27 October 2014)

# 3 Description of Common Room and its contribution to civil society/policy changes

## 3.1 Background Common Room

Common Room began under the auspices of the Bandung Centre for New Media Arts (BCfNMA), an organisation founded in 2001 by artists RE Hartanto and Gustaff H. Iskandar; architect T. Ismail Reza, and graphic designer Reina Wulansari. At the time, BCfNMA was meant to serve as a vehicle for the development of multidisciplinary arts and education in Indonesia. In 2003, BCfNMA began collaborating with Tobucil, a small bookstore, in setting up a shared space for literacy activities and the promotion of creative potential. It was from this collaborative initiative that Common Room was born. Tobucil decided to continue to expand its activities independently, while BCfNMA was merged into Common Room, taking on a new organisational structure. In 2006, Common Room Networks Foundation registered as a non-profit organisation.

Common Room aimed to develop a civil society through arts, culture and the use of technology (ICT/media). It wants civil society participation to be inclusive, and it desires to provide the means for communities and individuals from different backgrounds to communicate their creative ideas to one another, thereby enhancing societal harmony. Common Room functions as an open platform for various activities related to art, culture and use of ICT/media. Common Room has facilitated numerous exhibitions, screenings, workshops, lectures, discussions, small music concerts, cultural festivals, etc. with the purpose of developing public knowledge and creativity. It has become a place that facilitates dialogue and multidisciplinary cooperation intended to connect individuals, communities and various organisations with diverse economic, social and political interests.

## 3.2 MFS II interventions related to Civil Society

Since its establishment, Common Room has endeavoured to be more than just a physical space; striving to be a melting pot of activities, ideas and creative discourse. In its early engagement with Hivos, the creation of a platform for expression and engagement through arts, culture and the use of technology in Bandung was regarded as a milestone achievement. The 2012-2013 period focused on sustaining spaces for citizen engagement and interaction, with a focus on a pluralistic society. Interventions were to focus on:

1. Expression and appreciation through a range of events such as film screenings, art grants, festivals, discussions, lectures, concerts, exhibitions, etc.
2. Training and education for individual artists in art, culture, and ICT.
3. Producing publications that included thematic books, web articles, anthology, and reports.
4. Working with the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy to support the development of cultural centres through policy development and campaigns for creative economy, social, economic and cultural rights. [7]

Common Room intended to contribute to civil society by enhancing civic engagement, strengthening intermediary artists' organisations, and influencing policy. First, Common Room attempted to create a more pluralistic society, playing an intermediary role by encouraging interaction amongst artists and between artists and citizens through events with democratic, human rights or gender themes.

[7] "Kerschet Common Room 1005103", Hivos, 2012

Secondly, Common Room supported artist groups and collectives to engage with citizens and the public, whilst developing financial means to support the activities of creative communities. Thirdly the organisation aimed at getting involved in advocacy by assisting the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy in developing local cultural centres.

## 3.3 Basic information

Table 4

*Basic information Common Room*

| | | Details |
|---|---|---|
| Name of SPO | : | Common Room |
| Consortium | : | People Unlimited |
| CFA | : | Hivos |
| Start date of cooperation | : | MFS II: 31 May 2012<br>Earlier cooperation started in 2009 |
| MDG/Theme | : | Governance |
| MFS II Project Name | : | Open Platform for Expression and Citizen Engagement in Bandung and West Java, Indonesia (Project ID: 1005103) |
| Contract period | : | May 31, 2012 - December 30, 2013<br><br>Earlier contract (ID 189I01/Osiris No. 1001474) for period October 1, 2009 – September 30, 2011 € 47,900 |
| Total budget FPU | : | € 35,000 |
| Other donors if applicable | : | Dinas KUKM Bandung City, ASEF, Ministry for Tourism & Creative Economy |
| Estimation of % of budget for Civil Society[8] | : | 16% |

Sources: Project documents

[8] Costs that relate to civil society development or policy influence are those costs that possibly contribute to the development of the CIVICUS dimensions, excluding coordination and office costs; staff costs and financial reserves.

# 4 Data collection and analytical approach

## 4.1 Adjustments made in the methodology of the evaluation

The evaluation team tried to follow the operational guidelines to a great extent, but was unable to have a workshop with all of Common Room's sub-groups. Common Room currently consists of just three personnel (a director and two staff). None of the board members were able to participate in the workshop. Nevertheless, the workshop participants were highly committed to the workshop. They were also very helpful in arranging the meetings with external resource persons.

The evaluation team was unable to obtain averages or scores for each subgroup as participants found the guiding questions difficult to discern, and their responses once the questions were explained tended to be biased. The in-country team has assigned the scores in Appendix 4based on an analysis of the available evidence.

## 4.2 Difficulties encountered during data collection

During data collection, the team experienced the following difficulties:

- Workshop participants did not really understand, or were unfamiliar with the CS indicators or the CIVICUS framework. They found it difficult to relate Common Room's situation with these indicators, although all of them participated in the baseline process. This lessened the effectiveness of the workshop.
- Common Room's logical framework and reports were largely activity and output oriented. Thus it was difficult to obtain required information on higher-level outcome and impact level results. This also affected the quick process-tracing that was done for Common Room.
- The current Hivos Programme Officer for the Expression and Engagement Programme was unfamiliar with the details of the SPO portfolio because she began working on the programme in 2013.

## 4.3 Identification of two outcomes for process tracing

Given the limitations in the data and information available, only one outcome was selected for quick process tracing. The outcome, 'Karinding community has become more organized and capable of championing the revival of an interest in Karinding and supporting the underground metal scene', was selected to be measured for effectiveness.

The selection was made with the following considerations:

- Given the lack of data and challenges in collecting available information, it still seemed sensible to focus on finding evidence to confirm the outcome's achievement.
- The outcome is in line with Common Room's Theory of Change (ToC). The ToC developed in 2012 had two preconditions, namely the 'provision of public space', and 'strengthening the creative industry' that aligned with the outcome.
- This outcome is in line with the MFS-II end line evaluation orientation for Indonesia to focus on strengthening the relations with other organisations in civil society to undertake joint activities.

The outcome is also in line with the interests of the CFA, Hivos, particularly with regards to expression and engagement.

# 5 Results

## 5.1 Results obtained in relation to intervention logic

Table 5

*Overview of results achieved in relation to project plan Common Room*

| Programme area | Contract deliverables (2012-2013) | Level of achievement |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Expression & Appreciation | The events go as planned with more audiences than the previous years (Baseline: 2010: 1,308; 2011: 3,556). | Regularly facilitated exhibitions, music concerts and cultural & arts festivals.<br>Not achieved, because audience decreased<br>- 2012: 2,020<br>- 2013: 2,052<br>- 1st half 2014: 1,275 |
| | The increase of events with democracy, women issues and human rights themes (baseline: 2010: 2%; 2011: 1%) | Partially achieved:<br>2012: 1%, 2013: 32%<br>In 2013 with the following themes: Public Policy, Anti-Violence, Anti-Corruption, Social Political, Religious Harmony |
| | The strategy to expand the involvement of women participants (baseline: 2010: 30%; 2011: 23%) | Partially achieved: initial improvement in women's participation followed by decline:<br>- 2012: 36%<br>- 2013: 30%<br>- 1st half 2014: 28% |
| 2. Education & Training | No target identified in contract | Routine classroom trainings, which included classes in: psychology, dance, Karinding, computer, etc. |
| 3. Publication | The publishing of planned media: 3 journals and books and weekly updated website | Partially achieved:<br>In addition publications on their website and social media, Common Room published two books: one book archiving the Nu-Substance programme from 2007 to 2012 and "Reasoning" (a collection of writings produced in collaboration with the Moedomo Learning Initiative / MLI) with diverse themes focusing on science and education. |
| 4. Policy advocacy | The assistance of local cultural bodies running in at least 3 cities which one out of it resides in outside Java Island. | Partially achieved: Common Room supported Ministry of Tourism & Creative Economy in monitoring and evaluating activities of cultural centres in 9 provinces outside Java Island.<br>Cooperation with West Java provincial Development Planning Agency (Bappeda, specifically Pusdalitbang) in developing an academic paper entitled, 'utilization of natural resources and local culture for the development of ecotourism destinations and creative economy'. The collaboration resulted in the production of two policy recommendations documents that became reference material for the regional Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMD) in 2013. |
| | The synergy with another Hivos partner(s) in this assistance of local cultural bodies. | No evidence in Common Room reports. In ELSAM reports collaboration mentioned with regards to Common Room joining the Declaration of Internet Freedom together with 14 other organisations. |
| 5. Campaign | No target identified in contract | Insufficient information in reports. |
| 6. Community development | No target identified in contract | Unclear which activities specifically focused on improving dialogue between civil society elements |
| 7. Research & development | No target identified in contract | Research in the area of youth and creative economy.<br>New media forms explored and 20 works developed presented to the public. |
| 8. Fundraising | No target identified in contract | Not achieved: Common Room expected to mobilize funds from local government and private sector for events, but this fell short of expectations. |
| 9. Internal organisational | Institutional documents which guarantee the good organisational governance exist:<br>1. The Vision and Mission of the organisation.<br>2. Improved organisational structure.<br>3. Standard Operational Procedure on finance, organisational rules, recruitment and human resources relation, administration, library and media archiving. | Insufficient documentation/evidence available. |

It is difficult to conclude the extent to which planned results in the SPO's intervention logic were achieved. This is due to several reasons. First, the logical framework is activity-oriented. There are no clear linkages between the activities and the intended orientation and deliverables of the 2012-2013 programme. Information provided in the reports by Common Room is inconsistent and does not report clearly against contract deliverables. The contract documents for the Hivos and Common Room engagement over the 2012-2013 period also include a specific focus on building the SPO's internal organisational capacity. Yet very little seems to have been achieved in this area. Overall there is a lack of direction to the activities implemented, whilst the reported activities are difficult to match to a concise project plan.

## 5.2 Changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period

### 5.2.1 Civic engagement

Civic engagement describes the formal and informal activities and participation undertaken by individuals to advance shared interests at different levels. Participation within civil society is multi-faceted and encompasses socially-based and politically-based forms of engagement.

Since the baseline, Common Room has effectively used its space to bring together Bandung's creative community through a number of events, classes, discussions, workshops and other activities. Between 2012 and mid-2014, some 383 activities were organised on a wide range of themes. These themes included contemporary arts, public policy, anti-violence, anti-corruption, science, history, religion, ICT and media, and others. The majority of the activities were held at the local level and have attracted a more diverse audience and participants with different backgrounds and interests. Participants included foreign artists, photographers, high-school students, academia, forums, government, media, and small businesses. However, female participation averaged at around 30 percent, with no significant increase since the baseline.

Unfortunately, there has been a decline in the number of participants since 2011. In 2011 Common Room attracted 3,556 participants, which fell to 2,052 in 2013. This decline can be attributed to a decline in funding as well as Common Room's move to a new, less central location in 2012. While the number of individual artists utilizing Common Room's facilities dropped, the SPO has managed to work with more diverse groups and organisations, although these are less closely related to artistic expression and engagement. It has become less clear which groups Common Room aims to target through its interventions, with the exception of an alternative music genre.

Despite challenges, Common Room has managed to maintain its support to marginal forms of art such as Karinding and the underground metal scene, which has given rise to an alternative, counter-culture amongst youth in Bandung. Common Room has provided space for Karinding groups to emerge, plan, organize and develop. These groups have experimented with the fusion of metal and customary music genres, gaining not just popularity, but acceptance and support from the government.

With regards to Common Room's political engagement, the SPO's director has close personal relations with the local government. As such, Common Room has been able to gain more political support, financial backing from the government, and has to an extent influenced policies and practices in the areas of creative industry and arts and culture.

### 5.2.2 Level of organisation

This dimension assesses the organisational development, complexity and sophistication of civil society, by looking at the relationships among the actors within the civil society arena.

Since the baseline, Common Room's relations with other actors in the civil society arena have shifted. The SPO now has closer relations with education and youth-oriented CSOs and with fewer creative arts organisations. In addition, Common Room now engages in a local disaster risk reduction forum supported by International Organisation for Migration (IOM). According to Common Room's management team this shift is due to Common Room's relocation in 2012, and the lack of space for exhibitions.

Common Room remains close to Karinding groups and the underground metal scene, but has less intense relations with the Bandung Creative City Forum, Rumah Cemara and WALHI. Rather, regular informal and formal meetings now take place with the likes of the disaster risk reduction forum, Moedomo Learning Initiative, and the Indonesia Art Coalition. Karinding groups continue to experiment and practice music at Common Room's location on a regular basis.

Karinding has become a less marginalized art form. Karinding Attack, a band formed in 2009, and continuously supported by Common Room, has championed the popularity of the traditional music instrument, the Karinding. Their unique mix of underground metal and customary practices has challenged public perceptions of both musical genres. With Common Room's artistic and promotional support, and due to the popularity of Karinding Attack, a new contemporary sub-culture, which is modern yet seeks to connect to Sundanese cultural roots, has emerged. In turn, this has also reduced negative stigmas often associated with underground metal bands and garnered public interest and demand for this new form of musical expression.

As an organisation, Common Room is struggling with an unsteady financial resource base. Although Common Room has managed to gain financial support from the local government in 2011, 2012 and 2013, it has still depended heavily on Hivos funding. Annual expenditures have often exceeded annual incomes, and institutional costs were 50 percent in 2012 and 38 percent in 2013. Lower institutional expenses are most likely related to the slim staffing structure. At present, Common Room has just three staff.

### 5.2.3 Practice of Values

Practice of Values refers to the internal practice of values within the civil society arena. Important values that CIVICUS looks at such as transparency, democratic decision-making, taking into account diversity that are deemed crucial to gauge not only progressiveness but also the extent to which civil society's practices are coherent with their ideals.

With regards to Common's Rooms internal practices, there are no significant changes since the baseline in downward accountability. Common Room's board receives reports on an annual basis and only holds meetings when necessary. The board has expanded to include a representative of a Karinding group, one of Common Room's target groups. Although the executive claimed to have improved reporting practices and organisational policies, the size of Common Rooms staffing structure means that this does not have an extensive impact. Programmatic decisions and direction are determined solely by the current director, and Common Room is very much a 'one-man show'.

Common Room admits that they face internal challenges that reflect on its performance as an organisation. The SPO relates this mainly to the difficulties to obtain human resources cable of designing and developing activities based on the organisation's vision and mission.[9]

Common Room has allocated funds for external organisation audits in 2011, 2012 and 2013. The evaluation team only received the financial audit for 2011. None of the audit reports are publically available.

### 5.2.4 Perception of Impact

Perception of Impact assesses the perceived impact of civil society actors on politics and society as a whole as the consequences of collective action. In this, the perceptions of both civil society actors (internal) as well as actors outside civil society are taken into account. Specific sub-dimensions for this

[9] Email communication with Gustaff H. Iskandar, 29 January 2015

evaluation are the extent to which the SPO has contributed to engaging more people in social or political activities, strengthening CSOs and their networks, and has influenced public and private sector policies.

*Civil society arena*
Common Room's impact upon the civil society arena shows both slightly positive and slightly negative trends.

Generally speaking Common Room's most important positive impact has been its facilitation in the emergence of a new sub culture, which has become a new hype among urban youth in Bandung. This new culture merges a traditional instrument in the Sundanese customary community, the karinding, in the underground metal scene, another marginal subculture. Increasingly a trend is being observed among youth in Bandung to bring their karinding instruments with them, wearing traditional headbands as a means to show their identity and to socialise with individuals with the same interests. Underground metal groups, in the past labelled as antisocial and westernised, that now use the karinding observe how their position in society is improving. Apart from these, spells and mantras and burning incenses, often considered as a violation of Islamic rule, have become an integral part of karinding group performances. The popular karinding now also creates a market for those who make this instrument. Common Room has promoted this instrument since 2008.

Common Room's move to a less central location in 2012 with fewer facilities for artists (individuals and groups) meant in practice a decline in the number of activities organised in the new locality as well as less participants. At the same time the utilization of its facilities have not much decreased, but the diversity of artists making use of these facilities has gone down, with mostly karinding performance groups rehearsing, whereas other non – artist groups like the disaster risk reduction forum of Bandung frequently use these facilities.

*Public sector relations and policy-practice influence*
Since the baseline assessment Common Room has intensified its engagement with the public sector and continued to lobby the government on other issues than in 2012.

With regards to public sector relations, Common Room has engaged in a number of lobby activities in the areas of arts promotion, creative economy and risk reduction through forums and coalitions. Common Room's focus has been on developing policies and programmes related to creative economy. The SPO worked with the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy as well as the West Java Creative Economic Development Committee in this area.

It is unclear what tangible results these new forms of engagement have produced. What has been more successful has been the long-term campaign efforts by the Concerned Citizen Forum for Babakan Siliwangi, of which Common Room has been a part of, to convince the local government to revoke a building permit ranted to a private company that was planning to alter the function of a community forest area into a commercial area.

Common Room has also achieved some level of success in gaining government financial support and working alongside the government to develop policy inputs. In 2012, the SPO received funding support from the city government, and collaborated with the Provincial Development Planning Agency as well as the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy. Common Room produced recommendations on ecotourism and creative economy, and on the revitalization of cultural centres. The documents were said to have been used as reference materials by the government in formulating mid-term development plans. But for Common Room itself the collaboration was not satisfying since it was a challenge to receive payments for the technical services it provided to the government and because their inputs were not taken up sufficiently. Common Room remains critical of the effectiveness of government programs.

*Private sector relations and policy – practice influencing*
With regards to the private sector, Common Room has not engaged companies and other actors in strengthening the development of a creative industry. Although the SPO did collaborate with small businesses and media, event organizers this was limited to specific events such as the Nu-Substance festival and through the utilization of Common Room's facilities.

### 5.2.5 Civil Society Environment

The social, political and economic environment in which civil society operates affects its room for manoeuvre. The civil society context has been described in Chapter 3.

The civil society environment has not affected Common Room to a large extent. Rather Common Room's forced relocation has had a larger impact on its ability to influence and manoeuvre due to the less strategic location. This also illustrates Common Room overreliance on its facilities to relate to other civil society actors and artistic groups. Although Common Room has now opened up to collaborate with other actors, the choice of new partnerships seems to be less strategic to the organisation's vision and more driven by opportunistic motives for resource mobilization.

Common Room has put in place a more enabling environment for Karinding groups, who have become better acknowledged and now enjoy more government and public support. Young musicians and artists are now attracted to a sub-culture that promotes a customary-infused identity that is pluralistic in nature. Common Room is also likely to benefit from the personal relations that its director has with the current mayor of Bandung. But these favourable conditions may change if local elections usher in a new administration which is less open to creativity and artists' groups.

## 5.3 To what degree are the changes attributable to the Southern partners?

Common Room was not selected for in-depth process-tracing. The evaluation team was able to identify one outcome achieved in the 2012-2014 period for quick process-tracing. This outcome is that the Karinding community has become more organized and capable of championing the revival of an interest in Karinding, a traditional Sundanese musical instrument, through a unique combination with the heavy metal music genre. Karinding Attack, a music group established in 2009, is recognized as an 'ambassador' of a progressive Sundanese cultural movement amongst the youth.



***Figure 1*** *Karinding is a traditional Sundanese wind instrument from West Java. It typically measures at 20 cm long and is commonly made from the bark of palm or bamboo trees. (Photo from: http://traditionalmusicinstrument.blogspot.com)*

Common Room has helped the band Karinding Attack become popular. The band has become the champion of the unique blend of underground metal and Sundanese customary music. The underground metal community has grown to be more accepted and are enjoying a better position to exist in Bandung's urban scene. They have also received more support from the government, with an increasing demand for performances and trainings on how to play Karinding. Karinding has attracted urban youth interest in exploring Sundanese customs. This in turn has meant that Sundanese customary identity has become more acknowledged and has been afforded a space in society. Karinding groups, like Karinding Attack, are more able to express their identity and practices freely through burning incense, using mantras and wearing traditional clothing. In the past this was perceived to be peculiar by mainstream urban society. This outcome has also been confirmed by prominent cultural figures of Bandung.

There are three pathways that could explain this outcome. The first attributes the outcome as a result of the popularity of Karinding Attack's personnel among youth. The second attributes the outcome as a manifestation of a 'hype' (contemporary sub-culture), which has driven youth to seek new and unique forms of identity. The third pathway attributes the revival of Karinding to Common Room's support to Karinding Attack.

*Information that confirms or rejects the pathways:*

1. Pathway 1: Karinding Attack's personnel drive the popularity of Karinding

Karinding Attack was formed when Common Room began innovating the combination of Karinding (an unpopular instrument at the time) with other musical instruments and genres. The personnel of Karinding Attack are popular figures amongst the youth and known for their contribution to the underground metal group Ujungberung Rebels. It is possible that the revival and popularity of Karinding is due to the fame of the Karinding Attack personnel.

Information that *confirms* pathway 1:

Man Jasad and Kimung, two of the Karinding Attack's personnel, were already popular before Karinding Attack was formed. Man Jasad was a prominent figure among metal heads in Bandung as he was the vocalist of Jasad Band; while Kimung was a member of Burgerkill, a very famous band in the underground metal community in Indonesia.

Information that *rejects* pathway 1:

Man Jasad, does not deny that his popularity has been behind Karinding Attack's overall popularity. However, in his opinion, without Common Room's intervention they would never have existed, or gained the same level of popularity.

2. Pathway 2: A contemporary sub-culture hype drives Karinding's popularity

The urban youth are continuously seeking new forms of expression and unique identities, which often leads to new hypes. This could also become an explaining factor behind the rise of the Karinding trend.

Information that *confirms* pathway 2:

Bandung is popular as a barometer of lifestyle in Indonesia. Many new music groups and fashion trends have emerged from the city. Since the early 2000s, Bandung has boasted thriving underground music scene that includes punk, metal, hard-core and other alternative genres[10]. Underground metal 'activists' reported that at the time of Karinding Attack's formation (2008-2009), there was actually a downward trend in the metal underground scene. This drove many of its artists to seek out new forms of innovation.

[10] Martin-Iverson, S. 2007. *Community and Critique: Political performance in the Bandung DIY hardcore scene*. Music on the Edge – 2007 IASPM/ANZ Proceedings. Available from https://www.academia.edu/4689328/Community_and_Critique_Political_performance_in_the_Bandung_DIY_hardcore_scene (accessed 13 December 2014)



***Figure 2*** *Karinding Attack is a musical group that combines traditional instruments and heavy metal. (Photo by KOMPAS/RonyAriyanto Nugroho)*

Before Karinding Attack was formed, there was already a growing hype around Sundanese customary identity. Common Room's introduction of Karinding was actually a response to this hype. Outside the Karinding community, other forms of Sundanese cultural expression have also grown. Some examples of this include Rabu Nyunda, a city government initiative which stipulates that all students should wear Sundanese attributes and speak Sundanese on Wednesday; increased popularity of the Suku Baduy village, an isolated customary community, as a tourist destination and; trekking and hiking expeditions to Gunung Padang, famous for its remnants of an ancient mystical pyramid. The government and creative industries have sought to harness a 'creative city' development framework[11].

Information that *rejects* this pathway: none

3. Pathway 3: Common Room assisted Karinding Attack to become popular, in turn reviving an interest in Karinding

Information that *confirms* pathway 3:
Karinding Attack confirmed that Common Room helped them artistically and provided them a space for training and performing. Man Jasad, the lead singer of Karinding Attack, confirmed that without Common Room's intervention, Karinding Attack would not be where they are today with regards to their existence and popularity. Common Room helped to develop Karinding classes and teaching material, which allowed more people to be exposed to and learn Karinding, resulting in the emergences of more Karinding bands/groups.

Information that *rejects* pathway 3: none

[11] Prasetyo, F. A., Martin-Iverson, S. 2013. *Art, activism and the 'Creative Kampung': A case study from Dago Pojok, Bandung, Indonesia*. Paper presented at Planning In The ERA Of Uncertainty, International Conference March 4-5, 2013. Available from https://www.academia.edu/5014085/Art_activism_and_the_Creative_Kampung_A_case_study_from_Dago_Pojok_Bandung_Indonesia (accessed 13 December 2014)

*Conclusion:*
Based on the available data and information, we conclude that Pathway 1 is a *necessary* explanation for the outcome, but it needs Pathway 3 to be *sufficient*; and vice versa. This means that they are part of a causal package that are together sufficient to explain the outcome. Pathway 2 is a *sufficient* but not *necessary* explanation for the outcome, as both Pathway 1 and 2 may also explain the outcome. Common Room played an important role in helping underground metal artists experiment with Karinding. In the art sphere, institutions like Common Room offered a meeting space for various groups to redefine artistic expression[12]. Groups like Karinding Attack benefitted from the space offered by Common Room to practice and innovate, and also profited from the numerous festivals and events organized through the institute to gain a wider audience and fan base.

## 5.4 What is the relevance of these changes?

### 5.4.1 Relevance of the changes in relation to the Theory of Change of 2012

As mentioned in Chapter 4, the selection of the outcome identified for analysis is relevant to the 2012 Theory of Change. Common Room sees itself as a platform and bridge to bring together communities and individuals from different backgrounds. Broadly speaking, the interventions of Common Room are around offering education and training, policy advocacy, developing spaces for expression and the production and distribution of knowledge. However, the evaluation team has found that the preconditions that Common Room sought to achieve in 2012, have not been fully realized. Common Room itself attributes the limitations in achieving intended results to its lack of organisational capacity. As such, the relevance of changes to the ToC is limited.

First, internally Common Room's ability to network, mobilize human resources and sustain its interventions remains rather limited. Although they have made a name for themselves amongst the Karinding and underground metal scene, as well as gaining government recognition, Common Room organisationally remains rather weak. Second, the public space they offer is less accessible and less utilized by marginalized or non-mainstream artists compared to 2012.

Common Room intended to promote the use of ICT/media in their interventions. Other than developing some forms of explorative media and hosting workshops on ICT, the use of media and technology has not become a defining feature of Common Room's work although it did seem to be part in parcel of its ambitions in 2012.

The changes that are relevant to the ToC relate to the forms of cultural identity that Common Room has successfully promoted. Sundanese traditions have been reintroduced into modern forms of musical expression and there seems to be a tolerance amongst the public for the mystical, mantra-like performances of Karinding bands. There is also more tolerance and acceptance of metal bands, who were often stigmatised in the past. As such, former 'outcasts' so to speak have been able to innovate through the support provided by Common Room and the preservation of cultural identity has indeed contributed to positive associations with this new sub-culture.

### 5.4.2 Relevance of the changes in relation to the context in which the SPO is operating

Bandung as a city is still known for its creative industry, but much of this creativity has been commercialized. In urban centres like Bandung, artists have found it a challenge to survive without compromising idealism and creative values. The creative economy discourse has been present in

[12] Ciric, Biljana. *Towards a New Institutionalism in Southeast Asia: Case of Contemporary Art* (forthcoming). Available from https://www.academia.edu/7825317/Towards_a_New_Institutionalism_in_Southeast_Asia_Case_of_Contemporary_Art (accessed 13 December 2014)

Bandung since the late 2000s and originated from initiatives of creative networks[13]. The local government responded to pressures from alliances like Bandung Creative City Forum (BCCF) in formulating policies that promote creative industries. Although there is government support, arguably citizen-driven initiatives for dialogue and the exchange of knowledge and ideas are still as important to drive diversity and as elements of public spaces.

Common Room has continued to provide space for creative alternatives, especially in the music scene. Without the SPO's support, groups like Karinding Attack may not have been as influential in the youth sub-culture as they are today. Common Room was amongst the first to facilitate the fusion of traditional instruments with the metal genre.

Common Room, like many other cultural and artistic spaces, has supported the emergence of alternative cultural movements. As such, they have contributed to a more diverse civil society through the dynamic sphere of art and culture. The underground music scene "provides young Indonesians with a set of alternative identities and lifestyles, providing a route to escape from, challenge, or at least negotiate the dominant frameworks of nationally, ethnicity and class"[14].

### 5.4.3 Relevance of the changes in relation to the policies of the MFS II alliance and the CFA

The support provided to Common Room falls under Hivos' Expression and Engagement programme. This programme aims to generate social debate and cultural dialogue in order for a dynamic culture and new perspectives to emerge. Hivos considers space for socially engaged art and culture to be limited in developing countries and sees art and cultural expression as a means to generate critical reflection, pluralism and diversity.[15] "For Hivos, culture, media and other forms of communication are important means to promote citizenship" and a means to challenge dominant ideas.[16]

According to Hivos documents, Common Room was supported because its creative ideas were in line with Hivos' focus. Common Room was viewed to be working on "empowering civil society through encouraging knowledge sharing and collaboration between communities and/or individuals". The SPO was considered strategic for its support to communication and interaction, whilst maintaining principles of a democratic and pluralistic society.[17]

According to the current Expression and Engagement programme officer of Hivos' Regional Office for Southeast Asia who took over the management of the portfolio when Common Room support was coming to an end, the SPO did indeed provide a platform for alternative forms of artistic and cultural expression. However, Hivos found the interventions of the SPO to be less strategic. It was acknowledged that Common Room's director had many good linkages with the local government in Bandung and that sufficient support could be drawn from the government. However, the organisation seemed to have lacked a strategic vision on how generate greater influence. Moreover, the issues the organisation faces internally, specifically the inability to generate new emerging leaders or staff, have led to Hivos' decision to discontinue support to Common Room especially given that Hivos funds were also intended to improve Common Room's organisational performance.[18]

[13] Zul Fahmi, Fikri. 2014. *Creative Economy Policy in Developing Countries: The Case of Indonesia*. Paper presented at the 54th ESRA Conference. Saint Petersburg Russia, August 2014, p. 11

[14] Martin-Iverson, Sean. 2012. *Autonomous Youth? Independence and Precariousness in the Indonesian Underground Music Scene*. The Pacific Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 13, No. 4, August 2012, pp. 382-397. Available from https://www.academia.edu/4689441/Autonomous_Youth_Independence_and_Precariousness_in_the_Indonesian_Underground_Music_Scene (accessed 13 December 2014)

[15] "Hivos Business Plan 2011-2015", Hivos, 2010, p. 15

[16] "Hivos Vision Paper: Civil Society Building 2008", Hivos, 2008, p. 11

[17] "RO SEA at HO 1005103 Contract Intake Common Room, 2012-08-15 ", Hivos

[18] Interview with Dyana Savina Hutadjulu, Expression and Engagement programme officer of Hivos' Regional Office for Southeast Asia, December 2014

## 5.5 Explaining factors

### 5.5.1 Internal factors

In 2012, Hivos assessed the capacity of Common Room using the five capacities framework. The assessment scored the core capacities of Common Room, with most areas receiving respectable scores of 7 or 8 (9 being the maximum). The following table presents an overview of the scores:

Table 6

*Hivos assessment of Common Room against the 5C framework.*

| Capacity | Description | Score |
|---|---|---|
| | 5 Cs | |
| 1 | The capability to act and commit | Mean score of 6.67 |
| 1.1 | The organisation has a clear purpose and acts on decisions collectively. The leadership is accepted by staff, inspiring, action-oriented and reliable. | 7 |
| 1.2 | The organisation is capable to mobilise sufficient financial resources, and (where relevant) non material resources from members/ supporters. | 6 |
| 1.3 | The organisation is internally transparent and accountable. (Relations between staff, direction and board; quality of decision-making process | 7 |
| 2 | The capability to perform | Mean score of 6.75 |
| 2.1 | The number, composition and expertise of staff is adequate in view of the organisation's objectives and programmes. (Indicate when there is high staff turnover) | 7 |
| 2.2 | The organisation has a coherent and realistic strategic plan. (Context and problem analysis; Theory of Change; quality of formulation of objectives, intended results and indicators; explanation of strategic choices) | 7 |
| 2.3 | The quality of financial and administrative management is adequate. (Budget, funding plan, financial management, financial report) | 6 |
| 2.4 | The organisation has an appropriate monitoring and evaluation process (documentation & data collection, involvement of stakeholders, quality of analysis and learning) and uses it for accountability and learning purposes. | 7 |
| 3 | The capability to relate | Mean score of 7 |
| 3.1 | The organisation maintains relevant institutional relationships with external stakeholders and is seen as credible and legitimate. (Indicate main strategic relationships and collaboration with other actors) | 7 |
| 3.2 | The organisation is accountable to and communicates effectively with its primary constituents/ beneficiaries. (Describe downward or horizontal accountability process; specify for women) | 7 |
| 4 | The capability to adapt and self-renew | Mean score of 7 |
| 4.1 | The organisation (management) responds adequately to trends and changes in the context and uses up-to-date strategies and knowledge. | 7 |
| 4.2 | The organisation (management) encourages and supports internal learning and reflection processes. (Conditions, incentives) | 7 |
| 5 | Capability to maintain consistency | Mean score of 6 |
| 5.1 | The organisation is capable to maintain consistency between ambition, vision, strategy and operations. The management is able to deal strategically with external pressure and conflicting demands. | 6 |
| | Gender | |
| Quality 1 | To what extent has the organisation formulated objectives with regard to the position of women and issues of gender equality? | 7 |
| Quality 2 | To what extent does the organisation have internal gender expertise? | 4 |
| Quality 3 | To what extent does the organisation maintain relations with key GW&D actors in its context, e.g. women's movement, women's organisations, gender experts? | 5 |

Source: Hivos Partner Capacity Assessment Form 2012

In the 2012 partner capacity assessment, Common Room scored lowest in its capabilities to act and commit and to maintain consistency. The assessment pointed to a number of internal capacity issues that required strengthening in the areas of organisation, management and administration. It also noted that Common Room had high ambitions, but required staffing and funds to support these. In the end line evaluation, we found that little progress has been made in improving the areas found to be weak in 2012. In fact the expected achievements that were put forth in the baseline report with regards to the quality of Common Room's organisation have not been reached. With regards to networking Common Room expected to have 8 personnel, and it now only has 3. Common Room also expected to be less dependent on Hivos for funds and expected to have set up a running business unit. Neither of these have been achieved either.

During baseline in mid-2012, Common Room was in process of moving locations due to difficulties in agreeing to rental terms and conditions. Its current location is less central than its previous location[19]. The new office no longer has a gallery to display artworks or space to hold exhibitions. It is located in the middle of a residential area, where only a low level of noise and smaller crowds are tolerable. For youth and university students, it is further away and less accessible making it less attractive for young people to gather at Common Room. As an internal factor, the new location may explain why Common Room has seemingly become less effective in implementing its regular activities, which includes Karinding classes and a practice space for heavy metal groups.

In addition, Common Room's vision and its wide scope with regards to themes and target groups is rather utopian in the sense that it does not have an explicit political aspiration and practical vision of the organisation's direction[20]. This explains why Common Room has a vague definition of their target groups, as demonstrated by a lack of such a definition in their proposal or activity plans. While such a vague definition presents problems in measuring Common Room's effectiveness and efficiency, it also contradicts the high dependency of Common Room on its director, Gustaff H. Iskandar. External actors interviewed during the baseline criticized Common Room for being a 'one-man-show'. The evaluation team found that such criticism is still applicable for Common Room at present, and this was also confirmed by Hivos. The developments in the metal and Karinding scene could also be attributed to the promulgation of personal interests of the director, a fan as well as a prominent figure in the punk and metal scene[21].

### 5.5.2 External factors

An external factor that supported the achievements by Common Room is the enabling environment that exists in Bandung. The current mayor is generally supportive of art, culture and creative initiatives. He was the former head of the Bandung Creative City Forum (BCCF) before taking office. The mayor's involvement in BCCF, which claims to accommodate the interests of the public, made him amenable to engaging BCCF as a partner in developing the city's creative potential[22].

During the 2011-2014 period, similar initiatives for the creation of alternative public spaces have emerged in Bandung. These spaces include Simpul Space 1 & 2 (provided by BCCF)[23], Galeri Gerilya, as well as private sector initiatives such as Selasar Soenaryo Art Space, a gallery and cafe. In this sense, Common Room has had to compete with similar players in the arts and culture arena.

In 2011, the former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono established a new Ministry for Tourism and Creative Economy. Common Room received support from the government through this Ministry. Common Room was involved in the development of policies for creative economy for Bandung in 2013 and worked with the Ministry to support the revival of cultural centres[24]. In 2013, 44 percent of Common Room's funding came from the Ministry for Tourism and Creative Economy[25]. Following the 2014 elections, there has been a cabinet reshuffle and the Ministry has been renamed Ministry of Tourism. For Common Room this change is likely to impact their ability to receive financial support from the government as there is no longer an emphasis on creative economy.

[19] Common Room moved from Jalan Kyai Gede Utama to Jalan Muararjeun.
[20] Hjorth, L., King, N., Kataoka, M. 2014. *Art in the Asia-Pacific: Intimate Publics*. Routledge Advances in Art & Visual Studies. Routledge. March 14.
[21] Kevin Dunn, "One Punk's Travel Guide to Indonesia", *Razorcake*, 17 October 2013. Available from http://www.razorcake.org/columns/one-punks-travel-guide-to-indonesia-a-column-that-originally-ran-in-razorcake-76-now-an-ebook (accessed 13 December 2014)
[22] Suara Indonesia untuk Perubahan, Sosok, "Fikri Satari: Menjahit Komunitas Kreatif Hingga Melahirkan Pemimpin", 28 October 2014. Available from http://www.siperubahan.com/read/1709/Fiki-Satari-Menjahit-Komunitas-Kreatif-Hingga-Melahirkan-Pemimpin#sthash.V6UZLhoW.dpuf (accessed 13 December 2014)
[23] Bandung Creative City Forum, "About BCCF". Available from https://bandungcreativecityforum.wordpress.com/about/ (accessed 13 December 2014)
[24] "Review Kegiatan 2013", Common Room, 2013
[25] "Statistik Kegiatan 2009-2013", Common Room

### 5.5.3 Relations CFA-SPO

Common Room received support from Hivos since 2005, even before it was officially established as a foundation. It received micro-funds from Hivos twice in the 2005-2009 period before a regular partner contract was prepared in 2011[26].

Funds from Hivos in the 2012-2014 period were also meant to support the strengthening of Common Room organisationally. Hivos' support also helped cover the rental costs (20 percent of € 35,000 provided in 2012-2013), which were especially important when Common Room had to face the difficult decision to relocate. Other capacity development support provided by Hivos was in the form of two workshops on governance in the organisations (management, vision and mission) and on theory of change[27]. Hivos contracted Penabulu to provide direct assistance to Common Room to improve their financial reporting systems. According to Common Room training provided by Penabulu and Hivos has helped improve the organisational management and structured the financial reporting resulting in better audit results.

As illustrated in the table in Chapter 5.1, one of the deliverables in Common Room's contract with Hivos included the creation of synergy with other Hivos partners in the assistance of local cultural bodies. There is no evidence that this occurred, but there is evidence of collaboration between Common Room, ELSAM and ICT Watch in the area of internet governance. Common Room joined 14 other organisations to sign the Declaration of Internet Freedom in 2012.

Hivos has decided to discontinue the partnership with Common Room in 2014. In its current programme Hivos seeks to support integrated, multi-actor initiatives. Common Room is less of a strategic choice for Hivos because it seeks to create more vibrancy by bringing together actors under common platforms.

[26] Hivos, Partners, "Common Room". Available from http://www.hivos.nl/dut/community/partner/50008556 (accessed 13 December 2014)

[27] "Hivos Capacity Assessment Form Common Room", Hivos, August 2012

# 6 Discussion

## 6.1 Design of the intervention

The interventions of Common Room between 2012 and 2014 were designed to develop a platform for expression and engagement with civil society through arts, culture and the use of technology Bandung's urban area[28]. Although Common Room has promoted the development of a progressive sub-culture amongst youth through the fusion of musical genres and the revival of Sundanese traditions, this has not yet led to larger influences in the creative industry or economy of Bandung. Karinding itself could well just be a temporary hype and there is little evidence to suggest that Common Room has tried to infuse principles of tolerance or human rights within its support to the emergence of these groups.

Policy advocacy was included as an activity in the 2012-2014 period, but no relevant actions were taken beyond 2012 that led to tangible results in the areas of arts promotion and creative economy reduction through forums and coalitions.

Besides the Karinding and underground metal groups, Common Room does not have specific target groups or a specialized area of expertise. With growing competition from other artistic platforms in the Bandung area, it is unclear what sets Common Room apart and how the organisation will sustain as an open platform to encourage interactions that promote pluralism and diversity. Common Room has not been sufficiently innovative and seems to have continued along with business as usual, which may well lead to future challenges if Karinding proves to be a temporary hype and given its less strategic location.

[28] "Kerschet Common Room 1005103", Hivos, 2012

# 7 Conclusion

Common Room's interventions provided a platform for artists and musicians to collaborate and experiment with new forms of expression. The SPO laid the foundations for the emergence of a new sub-culture in Bandung. This is an important change because it has brought more marginalized music traditions and groups to the forefront and in public view. The revival of Karinding, a unique Sundanese instrument, and its fusion with the underground metal scene have benefitted both music genres and generated a greater appreciation amongst the general public and the local government.

Unfortunately, Common Room as an organisation was unable to bring about or influence policies and practices of the local government directly. Although they have successfully garnered public sector financial support and have been engaged to provide technical assistance and policy inputs, there was no evidence of significant influence in this regard. Common Room, together with a host of CSOs in Bandung did however manage to successfully convince the city government to preserve a city forest. But this is a result of campaign efforts that have been going on since the early 2000s, with Common Room providing support to the movement.

The organisational performance of Common Room has not improved in the way the SPO and Hivos had intended. Events, workshops, classes and other activities hosted by Common Room have been more diverse but have been unable to attract more participation and attendance. Only Karinding groups, or artist collaborations that are related to Karinding, have benefitted significantly from Common Room's support. Common Room has not been able to sufficiently identify who its target groups are, other than Karinding and the underground metal community.

The organisation had to face a tough decision in 2012 to move locations to a less central and less attractive space. This has resulted in fewer individual artists and other creative collectives utilizing Common Room. Common Room has coped with this situation by collaborating with other actors, like the disaster risk reduction forum, who are less relevant to the organisation's mission and vision. Internally, Common Room has also been unable to diversify its leadership and staffing structures.

Nonetheless, the outcome achieved with regards to Karinding's current niche in Bandung's youth culture is relevant in that it offers a non-mainstream and alternative form of expression. The achievement is relevant to the context of Bandung, which is known for its creative industry but where art and cultural forms are often commercialized.

Table 7

*Summary of findings.*

| When looking at the MFS II interventions of this SPO to strengthen civil society and/or policy influencing, how much do you agree with the following statements? | Score |
|---|---|
| The CS interventions were well designed | 5 |
| The CS interventions were implemented as designed | 5 |
| The CS interventions reached their objectives | 5 |
| The observed outcomes are attributable to the CS interventions | 6 |
| The observed CS outcomes are relevant to the beneficiaries of the SPO | 5 |

Score between 1 to 10, with 1 being "not at all" and 10 being "completely".

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**Resource persons consulted**

| *Name of key informant* | *Organisation* | *Function in organisation* | *Relation with SPO* | *Contact details including e-mail.* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gustaff Hariman Iskandar | Common Room | Director | Staff | blauloretta@gmail.com |
| Pitra Moeis | Common Room | Program Manager | Staff | pitra.moeis@gmail.com |
| Donna Satyadharma | Common Room | Finance Manager | Staff | dharmadonna@gmail.com |
| Iman Rahman (Kimung) | Common Room | Board | Staff | kimun666@gmail.com |
| Andar Manik | Common Room | Board | Staff | dalemwangi@gmail.com |
| Budi Dalton | Bandung Cultural Figure | | External resource person | |
| Budi Rajab | Sociologist | | External resource | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | person | |
| Man Jasad | Karinding Attack Band | Leader | Intermediate Organization | +6282116856660 |
| Dyana Savina Hutadjulu | Hivos | Programme Officer | CPA | |

# Appendix 1 Civil Society Scores

This table presents the appreciation of the evaluation team regarding changes occurred for each indicator between 2012 and 2014 on a scale of -2 to + 2

- 2 = Considerable deterioration
- 1 = A slight deterioration

0 = no change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012

+1 = slight improvement

+2 = considerable improvement

| Dimension | | Indicators | Question | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Civic engagement | 1 | Needs of marginalised groups | How does your organisation take the needs of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups into account in your planning, actions, activities, and/or strategies? | -1 |
| | 2 | Involvement of target groups | What is the level of participation of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups in the analysis, planning and evaluation of your activities? | 0 |
| | 3 | Political engagement | How intense is your (individual staff or organisational) participation in locally-nationally elected bodies and/or sectoral user groups? | +1 |
| | | | | |
| Level of organisation | 5 | Relations with other organisations | In the past 12 months what has been the most intensive interaction you had with other CSOs? | -1 |
| | 5 | Frequency of dialogue with closest CSO | In the past 12 months how many meetings did you have with the CSO that you have most intensive interaction with? | 0 |
| | 6 | Defending the interests of marginalised groups | Which CSO are most effective in defending the interests of your target groups? In the past 12 months, how did you relate to those CSOs? | +1 |
| | 7 | Composition current financial resource base | How does your organisation finance institutional costs such as workshops of the General Assembly (if applicable); attendance to workshops of other CSOs; costs for organisational growth and/or networking? | -1 |
| | | | | |
| Practice of Values | 8 | Downward accountability | To what extent can mandatory social organs (steering committee, general assembly, internal auditing group) ask your executive leaders to be accountable to them? | 0 |
| | 9 | Composition of social organs | What % of members of your mandatory social organs belong to the marginalised target groups you are working with/for? | +1 |
| | 10 | External financial auditing | How regularly is your organisation audited externally? | 0 |
| | | | | |
| Perception of impact | 11 | Client satisfaction | What are the most important concerns of your target groups? How do your services take into account those important concerns? | -1 |
| | 12 | Civil society impact. | In the past 12 months, what impact did you have on building a strong civil society? | +1 |
| | 13 | Relation with public sector organisations. | In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with public sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' objectives? | +1 |
| | 14 | Relation with private sector organisations | In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with private sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' perspective? | 0 |
| | 15 | Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations | How successful have you been in influencing public policies and practices in the past 2 years? | +1 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 16 | Influence upon private sector agencies' policies, rules, regulations. | How successful have you been in influencing private sector policies and practices in the past 2 years? | 0 |
| | | | | |
| CS context | 17 | Coping strategies | In the past 2 years, how did your organisation cope with these changes in the context that may have been positive or negative consequences for civil society. | -1 |

# Appendix 2 Changes in civil society indicators between 2012 and 2014

## 1. Civic Engagement

### 1.1. Needs of marginalised groups SPO

Common Room has been used as a space to share knowledge, exchange ideas, network and for actualizing expression and appreciation. On several occasions, Common Room was used as an incubation space for the exploration and development of potential creative ideas, including the development of discourses in the art and cultural arena, as well as developing knowledge and skills of individuals or groups.

From 2011 and 2013 the following activities took place in Common Room (see Appendix 5 for more details):

- 2011: 175 activities, 11 categories, 8 themes, 3,556 participants (24% women), 75% on a local scale;
- 2012: 110 activities, 8 categories, 8 themes, 2,020 participants (36% women), 86% on a local scale;
- 2013: 166 activities, 15 categories, 12 themes, 2,052 participants (30% women), 80% on a local scale;
- 2014 (up until June): 107 activities, 9 categories, 9 themes, 1,275 participants (28% women), 93% on a local scale

As illustrated above, there has been a decline in the number of participants and activities in 2013, when compared to the values in 2011. It can be concluded that Common Room has engaged fewer people between 2011 and 2013. Based on the increase in the number of categories and themes it is suffice to say that Common Room has served people with more diverse backgrounds or interests. However, there has not been a significant improvement in the number of female participants and it is not clear whether the participants were marginalised groups or not.

From the reports, the evaluation team also observed that the number of groups and organisations benefitting from Common Room's assistance varied slightly from year to year. In 2011, there were 42; in 2012 23; in 2013 28, and; in 2014 28. When the situation in 2014 is compared to the 2012 baseline situation, there has been a slight increase in the number of beneficiary groups. There has however been a larger increase in the number of traditional music groups supported, from just eight in 2011 to 17 in 2014.

Common Room has supported 'marginal' forms of art such as Karinding and the underground metal scene. Individual artists and groups in these genres are not part of the mainstream market, and in a sense is part of a 'counter-culture'. Through Common Room's support, these musical art forms have become less marginal in terms of public attention and appreciation.

### 1.2. Involvement of target groups SPO

It is hard to determine the change in Common Room's target group involvement since the SPO has a vague definition of its target group (see section 5.1). However, if Karinding music groups are presumed to be Common Room's most prominent target group, then it does seem as though Common Room has given more space for them to plan, organize, or evaluate their own activities with little intervention. Common Room does take into account the needs of its target groups, specifically for the use of its space and facilities. Common Room activities can be said to have been planned according to the requests of its target groups. However, there is no evidence that target groups have been involved

in Common Room's long-term planning and organisational evaluation. Overall, there is no change in this indicator compared to baseline.

### 1.3. Intensity of political engagement SPO

Common Room has sought to benefit from the close personal relationship between its director and the Bandung and West Java government leadership. They rely on this personal relationship to garner support and to conduct lobby and advocacy. As such, changes in the government leadership of Bandung or West Java will potentially affect Common Room's relationship with the public sector. In 2013, Ridwan Kamil assumed the office of Bandung's mayor. Common Room is known to have a good relation with him, and Kamil is also a member of the Bandung Creative City Forum (BCCF), a Common Room-affiliated organisation. Although there is no clear evidence, Common Room may have benefited from this as there are improvements in Indicators 4.3 and 4.5. Despite receiving financial backing from the government and supporting the mayor of Bandung, Common Room has remained critical of the lack of government support for the creative industry in the region[29].

Apart from Common Room's political engagement via lobby and advocacy, they also seek to communicate political messages through target groups' artistic expression. For example, some of the lyrics of Karinding Attack criticize power-hungry politicians[30].

## 2. Level of Organisation

### 2.1. Relations with other organisations SPO

Common Room currently perceives its closest relationship to be withthe following groups or CSOs: Bandung's Disaster Risk Reduction Forum (Forum PRB), *Komunitas Anak Bertanya*, Moedomo Learning Initiatives, the Indonesia Art Coalition (*Koalisi Seni Indonesia*), Bandung Creative City Forum (BCCF), and Karinding groups. Only the latter two were mentioned during baseline, while the likes of Openlabs, Bandung Oral History, Ruangrupa, are no longer mentioned. Common Room's management explained that this change is a result of missing features of Common Room's current location or building (see 5.1). But the change also signifies that Common Room is identifying more with youth groups and less with traditional contemporary art groups.

### 2.2. Frequency of dialogue with closest civil society organisation SPO

Apart from Karinding groups and Ujungberung Rebels, the CSOs and art groups with whom Common Room most frequently works with have changed since the baseline. Common Room no longer reported to have frequent dialogue with the Bandung Creative City Forum, Rumah Cemara, and WALHI. During the end line, Common Room's management reported to have more frequent dialogue with Forum PRB, Moedomo Learning Initiative, and the Indonesia Art Coalition. The frequency of this dialogue ranged from weekly informal meetings to regular monthly or biannual meetings. According to Common Room's management team the nature or intensity of these relations are no different from the baseline.

### 2.3. Defending the interests of marginalised groups SPO

Although Common Room has a vague definition of target groups, some of the groups that have benefitted from Common Rooms interventions can be considered to be marginalized. These marginalized groups include those pursuing alternative cultural and artistic aspirations. While generally

[29] Hjorth, L., King, N., Kataoka, M. 2014. *Art in the Asia-Pacific: Intimate Publics*. Routledge Advances in Art & Visual Studies. Routledge. March 14

[30] Agus Surono, "(Semoga) Karinding Bikin Politisi Merinding", *Intisari-Online.com*, 21 February 2012. Available from http://intisari-online.com/read/semoga-karinding-bikin-politisi-merinding (accessed 11 December 2014);
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being side-lined politically and with little supporting infrastructure, a number of these groups are unique in the position they occupy in society. Underground metal groups tend have a negative public image, especially amongst more hard-line religious communities[31]. After an incident where 11 youth were killed during a concert in 2008, the space provided to underground metal groups was very limited. Similarly, Karinding was nearly non-existent as a traditional music instrument, with only a handful of artists mastering the instrument. The instrument was less known to people in Bandung, and was only performed in some ceremonies[32]. Karinding also represented a marginalised Sundanese custom in the urban sphere of Bandung, which was dominated by hard-line religious interpretations[33]and a 'westernized' urban sub-culture[34].

Box 1: Karinding

Karinding is a Sundanese traditional musical instrument from West Java and Banten, Indonesia. It is usually made from bamboo and palm trees. Karinding made of palm tree is traditionally used by male players, and bamboo instruments are used by female players. To play Karinding, one places the instrument between one's lips, and one end is beaten by a finger to create vibrations. The rhythm of Karinding music is determined by the movement of the tongue and lips. The sound of Karinding is said to be similar to a frog. (source: Wikipedia)

Karinding Attack, is said to have been the result of Common Room's innovation to combine two marginalized forms of music: underground metal and Karinding. With Common Room's artistic and promotional support, and due to the popularity of the personnel amongst the underground metal community, Karinding Attack has gained popularity since the baseline. The group is now considered to be an icon[35]given the emergence of a new contemporary sub-culture which is modern yet seeks to connect to Sundanese cultural roots. The band has been performing in many occasions throughout the country, as well as abroad[36], received wide media coverage[37], and has gone 'viral' among young audiences in Bandung[38]. Karinding Attack has made impact in the societal landscape and has reduced the negative stigmas often associated with underground metal bands[39], while at the same time promoting a distinct Sundanese customary identity. As such, the underground metal community and Sundanese custom community have become more accepted by the general public and there is now space for the two to coexist[40].

[31] Kompasiana, Humaniora, Filsafat, Artikel, "Beragama Ala Komunitas Musik Cadas, 26 March 2011. Available from http://filsafat.kompasiana.com/2011/03/26/beragama-ala-komunitas-musik-cadas-349705.html (11 December 2011)

[32] Interview with Budi Rajab, Sociologist, Bandung, 10 September 2014

[33] Karinding have been often been labeled as an occultsim pracice; Youtube, "Dua Dunia – Rahasia Musik Karinding [Full Video] 19 Maret 2014". Available from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0j4zNUYacXU (accessed 11 December 2014)

[34] Bandung, "Angkat Budaya Sunda", 28 October 2011. Available from http://www.bandung.eu/2011/10/angkat-budaya-sunda.html (accessed 11 December 2011)

[35] Anjiblog, "Karinding", 12 November 2013. Available from http://anjigitalesmana.blogspot.com/2013/11/karinding.html (accessed 11 December 2013)

[36] Karindingawi, "Cara Merawat Celempung", 19 January 2013. Available from http://karindingawi.blogspot.com/search/label/Karinding-Celempung (accessed 11 December 2014)

[37] TEMPO.CO, Seleb, Panggung, "Getar Musik Karinding Menlusup ke Musik Metal", 14 March 2012. Available from http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2012/03/14/113390121/Getar-Musik-Karinding-Menelusup-ke-Musik-Metal (accessed 11 December 2014); Pradipta Nugrahanto, "Sundanis Laris Manis Dengan Sentuhan Etnik", *detikNews*, 4 June 2009. Available from http://news.detik.com/read/2009/06/04/105448/1142494/682/1/jahex.detik.com/statik/boxcommunity/index.php?fuseaction=app.editContent&type=blog&idkanal=22?nd771104blog (accessed 11 December 2014); Didit Putra Erlangga Rahardjo, "Karinding Attack Garap Lagu Peterpan", *KOMPAS.com*, 15 May 2012. Available from http://tekno.kompas.com/read/2012/05/15/22264346/karinding.attack.garap.lagu.peterpan (accessed 11 December 2014)

[38] Kimung, "Sejarah Karinding Klasik (Hingga 2010)", *Kelas Karinding*, 10 January 2013. Available from http://kelaskarinding.tumblr.com (accessed 11 December 2014)

[39] Ghifarie, "Beragama ala Komunitas Musik Metal Ujungberung Rebels #2". Available from http://bothiiwbrtc.blogspot.com/p/karinding.html (accessed 11 December 2014)

[40] Interview with Budi Dalton, Bandung Cultural Figure, Bandung, 11 September 2014

## 2.4. Composition financial resource base SPO

From Common Room's records there are observable changes in the SPO's income (in terms of funding) and expenditures over the past four years:

Table 14

*Overview of Common Room's income and expenditure 2010-2013*

| Year | Income (IDR) | Expenditure (IDR) | | | | | Difference (IDR) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Total | % non-institutional expenditures | % institutional | % assets | % auditor fees | |
| 2009 | 390,706,000 | 116,357,213 | 57 | 31 | 12 | - | 274,348,787 |
| 2010 | 390,706,000 | 442,070,648 | 63 | 36 | 1 | - | -51,364,648 |
| 2011 | 197,039,430.30 | 248,853,469 | 32 | 58 | 2 | 8 | -51,814,038.70 |
| 2012 | 535,691,100 | 395,292,635 | 31 | 59 | 2 | 8 | 140,398,465 |
| 2013 | 288,386,477 | 332,719,800 | 51 | 38 | - | 10 | -44,333,323 |
| 2014 | No data | | | | | | |

Source: Statistik Kegiatan 2009-2013, Common Room

The table above indicates that the SPO's income in 2013 was lower than that in 2010 and during the baseline in 2012, but higher than in 2011. The expenditures exceed the incomes for all years, except for 2012 and 2009. Non-institutional expenses (defined as program costs and media tools) in 2011and 2013 were lower than the institutional expenses (defined as employee salaries and office costs). This could indicate issues in the financial health of Common Room, although there is insufficient information to draw this conclusion.

Common Room's financial resource base has been decreasing over the past five years.

Table 15

*Common Room Income Contributors 2009-2013*

| Year | Total income | Funding Source | % of contribution |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2009 | 390,706,000 | Hivos<br>Bandung Creative City Forum<br>YES CLUB<br>CCF Bandung<br>Others | 72<br>6<br>5<br>3<br>14 |
| 2010 | 390,706,000 | Hivos<br>ASEF<br>Japan Foundation<br>CCF Bandung<br>YES CLUB<br>Goethe Institute Jakarta<br>Erasmus Huis<br>Others | 47<br>25<br>17<br>5<br>2<br>2<br>1<br>4 |
| 2011 | 197,039,430.30 | Hivos<br>Dinas KUKM Bandung City<br>ASEF<br>Others | 75<br>16<br>5<br>4 |
| 2012 | 535,691,100 | Hivos<br>City government<br>Others | 58<br>39<br>3 |
| 2013 | 288,386,477 | Hivos<br>Ministry for Tourism & Creative Economy<br>Others | 53<br>44<br>3 |

Source: Statistik Kegiatan 2009-2013, Common Room

Although Common Room is less dependent on Hivos, as seen from the decrease is Hivos' overall contribution between 2011 and 2013, there is less diversity in funding sources since 2011. Prior to 2011, Common Room was able to attract other sources of funding. Of notes is that in 2013, the Ministry for Tourism and Creative Economy provided Common Room with a consultancy fee for their services provided to the cultural centre revitalization project conducted in early 2012 (See 4.3 and 4.5). This was different from the funding provided through the Bandung City government in 2012, which Common Room was able to manage with greater flexibility.

# 3. Practice of Values

## 3.1. Downward accountability SPO

There is no significant change in Common Room's downward accountability, as Common Room's structure has not changed much. The board receives reports from the SPO's executive arm on an annual basis and only holds meetings when necessary. However, the management team reported that they have been improving their reporting quality and have a better organisational policy in place through developing standard operational procedures and financial procedures. The evaluation team, however, did not proceed with asking for evidence of this since Common Room is basically still a 'one-man show'. Common Room presently only consists of a director, a finance staff, and an administration staff[41]. With such minimum personnel, improved procedures or policies would not be very relevant to the organisation's overall accountability. Also of note is that the 2013 financial income figures show that institutional expenses are far higher than program expenses, which is considered a less healthy organisational practice, especially considering that the number of beneficiaries dropped in 2013.

## 3.2. Composition of social organs SPO

During the baseline in 2012, the evaluation team found that none of the board members represented the SPO's target groups. Common Room has taken the findings of the MFS-II baseline into account and has subsequently appointed an additional board member from a Karinding group they support[42]. As noted in the previous section, the executive of SPO now only consists of three staff. There has been no regeneration of staff members, and the director still controls all affairs and organisational direction.

## 3.3. External financial auditing SPO

Common Room has used Hivos funds to conduct external organisational audits for the financial year of 2011 in May 2012. They also claim to have allocated a budget to conduct audits for the financial years 2012 and 2013 (see table in 2.4), but the evaluation team did not receive copies of the financial audit reports for these years.

# 4. Perception of Impact

## 4.1. Client satisfaction SPO

The SPO does not measure client satisfaction, nor does it have staff with dedicated monitoring functions. The evaluation team was nonetheless able to draw a number of conclusions with regards to client satisfaction based on findings during the evaluation workshop and a review of documents and reports.

As previously noted, Common Room moved locations in 2012. Some missing features of the current space Common Room occupies (gallery, residency, attractive gathering space) have caused a decrease in the range and quality of services provided. As a result, some groups are no longer active in Common Room[43]. Common Room has responded to this situation by offering its services to different (but less relevant) groups and organisations, like the Disaster Risk Reduction Forum of Bandung.

Common Room's overall utilization has not decreased, but individual artists and non-Karinding bands no longer utilized Common Room's facilities in 2014.

[41] Common Room, "Profile (Bahasa Indonesia)". Available from http://commonroom.info/about/ (accessed 11 December 2014)
[42] Kharisma Prasetyo, "Evaluation Workshop Common Room", MFS-II evaluation 2014
[43] Ibid

Table 16

*Common Room beneficiaries and groups utilizing facilities*

| Year | # of individual artists | # of music bands | # of artist communities, government agencies, NGOs/CSOs, media, & others | Subtotal |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 9 | 8 | 42 | 59 |
| 2012 | 17 | 7 | 23 | 47 |
| 2013 | 8 | 14 | 28 | 50 |
| 2014 | 0 | 17 (16 of which Karinding) | 28 | 45 |

Source: Common Room records of beneficiaries 2011, 2012, 2013 & 2014

Not all target groups were less satisfied with Common Room despite the reduced facilities. Karinding groups are more satisfied with Common Room over the past two years due to the SPO's assistance in improving their artistic capabilities, which are important for developing the groups' identities[44].Karinding groups, more common on the outskirts of the city, also benefit from materials Common Room has developed for the music class, which they have been able to utilize without having to depend on Common Room or Karinding Attack[45]. Karinding groups have also received more support and acknowledgement from Bandung and West Java government (see 4.5).

The evaluation team also interviewed another artistic community/group benefiting from Common Room's support, Illuminator, a community of illustrators in the metal music industry. Illuminator also reported that they have been satisfied with Common Room for the space provided for drawing classes, and especially in linking them with the metal and Karinding communities. Illuminator now has better collaborative relationships with music groups and bands, producing themed designs for merchandise items such as t-shirts, stickers, tote bags, and hoodies.

## 4.2. Civil society impact SPO

The main civil society impact of Common Room has been its facilitation in the emergence of a new sub-culture. Karinding has become a new hype among urban youth in Bandung, with the following evidence:

- Increased demand for Karinding performances[46];
- Artists have begun to combine Karinding with other music genres, such as blues[47];
- Karinding classes, facilitated by Common Room and the government, currently have 40 members and have resulted in the emergence of 8 new bands[48];
- Before Karinding Attack was formed, there was a growing Karinding trend, but performances were still limited to exclusive audiences[49]. Karinding Attack believes that without Common Room's intervention, Karinding would not be as popular as it is now[50]
- The emergence of a trend among youth in Bandung to bring their Karinding instruments everywhere, wearing *iket* –traditional headbands, to show their identity as part of Karinding groups and to socialize with individuals with the same interests[51];
- Although spells and mantras and burning incenses are often considered to violate Islamic rules, it has become an integral part of Karinding group performances[52].

[44] Interview with Man Jasad, Leader of Karinding Attack band, Bandung, 12 September 2014

[45] Avitia Nurmatari, "Belajar Karinding di 'Kekar' Yuk!", *detikNews*, 8 September 2011. Available from http://news.detik.com/read/2011/09/08/084936/1717898/682/1/belajar-karinding-di-kekar-yuk (accessed 11 December 2014)

[46] Inilah.com, "Kekar to Learn Sanggar Karinding". Available from http://science-collention-2011.blogspot.com/2011/10/kekar-to-learn-sanggar-karinding.html (accessed 11 December 2014)

[47] Seputar-Indonesia.com, "Nge-blues dengan Karinding". Available from http://www.infobdg.com/v2/nge-blues-dengan-karinding/ (accessed 11 December 2014)

[48] Yatni Setianingsih, "Kekar tempat belajar Karinding Gratis di Bandung", *Inilah.com*, 8 September 2011. Available from http://m.inilah.com/read/detail/1772107/kekar-tempat-belajar-karinding-gratis-di-bandung (accessed 11 December 2014)

[49] Desi Naik Sapi, Karinding: Dari Sawah Turun Ke Hati", 8 December 2010. Available from http://gedeyenuyani.blogspot.com/2012/03/karinding.html (accessed 11 December 2014)

[50] Interview with Man Jasad, leader of Karinding Attack band, Bandung, 12 September 2014

[51] Kharisma Prasetyo, "Evaluation Workshop Common Room", MFS-II evaluation

As mentioned in 2.3, the popularity of Karinding has benefitted the underground metal scene as well as the Sundanese customary community. For the Sundanese customary community, Karinding Attack is regarded as a successful example of how to cope with urbanity. From the perspective of underground metal groups, Karinding has helped them promote an alternative outlook for their community which has in the past been labelled as antisocial, westernized, and heretic[53].The growing popularity of Karinding, from what used to be considered an old-fashioned instrument into a new trend among urban youth, is seen as an achievement for urban groups whose identity has been marginalised by the hegemonic culture. However, from another perspective, it could also been viewed as a commodification[54] which could be described as unauthentic and market-driven[55].

On an annual basis, Common Room has been organizing the Nu-Substance festival since 2007. Hivos supported the 2012 and 2013 Nu-Substance urban art and culture festivals. In 2012 the theme of the festival was 'contested space' and in 2013 the festival had the theme 're-connection'. Unfortunately, there is no documentation available showing the level of public interest and participation that the festival drew in each of the years. During the festival seminars, discussions, concerts, exhibitions, workshops and other events were held with the aim of stimulating creativity in Bandung and analysing social and cultural issues that exist in the city[56]. According to external resources, the festival takes on an "experimental and/or scholarly perspective" to the creative industry[57]. There is insufficient information to draw conclusions on the impact the festivals have had on the general public or on stimulating creativity of civil society.

## 4.3. Relation with public sector organisations SPO

Within the 2011-2014 period, Common Room related with the public sector through a number of activities. Common Room was a member of a number of coalitions and forums that engaged with public sector organisations. These included:

- Koalisi Seni Indonesia (Indonesia Art Coalition) through which Common Room lobbied the parliament to push government to issue regulations for art incentives;
- The Disaster Risk Reduction Forum(Forum PRB) which lobbied for the West Java provincial government to recognize the role of the multi-stakeholder forum in supporting risk reduction interventions;
- As part of BCCF, Common Room played a crucial role in providing inputs to the creative economy policy of the local government[58].

In 2012, Common Room was granted Social Aid Funds (Dana Bansos) by the Bandung city government. Due to limitations set by the Ministry of Home Affairs (Regulation No. 32/2011 on Guidelines for Dana Bansos), organisations like Common Room are unable to access such grants more than once. In addition, Dana Bansos is known for being largely misused and corrupted[59]. The former Bandung mayor, who was in charge when Common Room received the funds, has been under investigation over bribery charges related to Dana Bansos handled under his administration[60]. The fact

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[52] Ibid

[53] Ghifarie, "Beragama ala Komunitas Musik Metal Ujungberung Rebels #2". Available from http://bothiiwbrtc.blogspot.com/p/karinding.html (accessed 11 December 2014)

[54] Hinhin Agung Daryana, "Pengaruh Eksistensi Karinding Attack terhadap Kultur Urban di Bandung Sebuah Analisis Kritis Theodor Adorno", *Karinding Attack*. Available from http://karindingattack.com/pengaruh-eksistensi-karinding-attack-terhadap-kultur-urban-di-bandung-sebuah-analisis-kritis-theodor-adorno/ (accessed 11 December 2014)

[55] Adorno, Theodor W. 1991. *The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture*. London: Routledge

[56] Idhar Resmadi, "NU SUBSTANCE 2007-2012 (Common room Networks Foundation, 2013)", 20 March 2013. Available from http://www.idhar-resmadi.net/books/item/45-nu-substance-2007-2012 (accessed 11 December 2014)

[57] Edwin Jurriëns, "Art and the city: Indonesian artists are using new media to rethink urban space", Inside Indonesia 112: Apr-Jun 2013. Available from http://www.insideindonesia.org/feature-editions/art-and-the-city-2 (accessed 11 December 2014)

[58] Zul Fahmi, Fikri. 2014. *Creative Economy Policy in Developing Countries: The Case of Indonesia*. Paper presented at the 54th ESRA Conference. Saint Petersburg Russia, August 2014

[59] Merdeka.com, "Korupsi Bansos". Available from http://www.merdeka.com/tag/k/korupsi-bansos/ (accessed 11 December 2014)

[60] KOMPAS.com, "Kasus Suap Bansos Bandung". Available from http://lipsus.kompas.com/topikpilihanlist/2408/1/Kasus.Suap.Bansos.Bandung (accessed 11 December 2014)

that Common Room was selected as a grantee has left the SPO with a negative experience and a feeling of disappointment. Nonetheless, Common Room continued to collaborate with the local government through other initiatives.

In 2012, Common Room also cooperated with the West Java Provincial Development Planning Agency (Bappeda, specifically Pusdalisbang) to develop an academic paper entitled, 'Utilization of Natural Resources and Local Culture for the Development of Ecotourism Destinations and Creative Economy'. In the same year, Common Room worked with the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy on the revitalization of cultural centres (Taman Budaya) around Indonesia. The Ministry had appointed Common Room to provide technical advice on the revitalization initiative. During the evaluation workshop, Common Room's director expressed this cooperation was an unpleasant experience due to complicated payment issues and the precedent that such a consultancy assignment was merely a formality for the government, who needed to fulfil certain aspects of their program intervention.

Based on description above and the baseline report, it can be concluded that overall Common Room had more relations with the public sector since 2012. Findings under indicator 2.4 also support this conclusion.

## 4.4. Relation with private sector agencies SPO

Common Room does have regular or intensive relations with private sector agencies except for event sponsorships and a number of beneficiaries coming from the private sector. As such, there is no significant change from the conditions found during the baseline.

Larger private sector beneficiaries utilized Common Room's space and collaborated in different ways with Common Room in the 2012-2014 period: These included media (Engage Media & TV One), an event organizer (Atap Organizer), and a digital entertainment company (Tinker Games).

## 4.5. Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations SPO

While Common Room'slobby with Forum PRB, BCCF, and Koalisi Seni Indonesia has not yielded in tangible results; the collaboration with Bappeda and the Committee for Creative Economy of West Java resulted in the production of two policy recommendations documents. The first is a study of the development of eco-tourism destinations in 16 districts/cities of West Java. The second is on creative economic policy recommendations. Both documents became reference materials for the Regional Mid-Term Development Plan (RPJMD) in 2013. However, there is no clear evidence that the RPJMD 2013 significantly accommodated recommendations produced by Common Room.

With regards to Common Room's services provided to the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy in 2012 on the revitalization of cultural centres, Common Room is pessimistic of their influence. They are under the impression that the project was largely ineffective, as the Ministry has not brought Common Room's inputs into practice[61]. Design it Yourself (DIY) - a group that organizes annual design conferences from artistic communities, small businesses and academia in Surabaya – expressed that Common Room did have an influence. The group was thankful to Common Room for involving them in a national workshop[62]. As such, it seems that the interventions led by the Ministry may have actually adopted some of the material developed by Common Room, but that their policies are nonetheless rather abstract and without clear plans.

From 2011 to 2013, Common Room together with other CSOs (Aliansi Jurnalis Indonesia, Aliansi Keluarga Sunda Nusantara, Forum Diskusi Hukum Bandung, Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Bandung, Walhi, BCCF, etc.) and universities lobbied the government to withdraw their decision in authorizing a corporation (PT. Esa Gemilang Indah) to manage and change the designation of Babakan Siliwangi, Bandung's city forest[63]. This is also an example of successful collaboration with other CSOs to

[61] Kharisma Prasetyo, "Evaluation Workshop Common Room", MFS-II evaluation 2014

[62] Design It Yourself, "Workshop on Developing Arts and Culture", 14 July 2012. Available from http://diy.c2o-library.net/2012/07/report-workshop-nasional-seni-budaya/ (accessed 11 December 2014)

[63] Gustaff, "Isu Alih Fungsi Babakan Siliwangi Kembali Memanas", *Save Babakan Siliwangi City Park*, 1 February 2013. Available from http://savebabakansiliwangi.wordpress.com/page/3/ (accessed 11 December 2014)

influence public policy. There is no indication however that Hivos funding contributed directly to this achievement. In fact, Common Room and other organisations began lobbying efforts for the preservation of Babakan Siliwangi and pressing their case against the conversion of the area into a business district since 2002.

Box 2: 'Save Babakan Siliwangi City Park' campaign

In June 2013, the Bandung Government revoked a building permit granted to PT Esa Gemilang Indah. The company had planned to set up a restaurant in the city park area of Babakan Siliwangi. The retraction of the permit was considered a victory for several groups in Bandung, including environmental activists, lawyers, concerned citizens and CSOs, who had voiced their concerns over plans that threatened to encroach on the city's open green space since 2002[64].

In 2008, the coalition of concerned organisations and citizens had begun to raise money for a campaign and disseminate petitions against the commercialization and privatization of the area[65].

This campaign continued until 2013 by the Concerned Citizen Forum for Babakan Siliwangi (FWPBS), with protests expressed through art performances, demonstrations, more petitions and discussions, as well as hearings, with the city government. FWPBS gathered some 7,000 petition signatures and was supported by initiatives from a range a host of CSOs, including Common Room.[66]

Last, Karinding groups have perceived that improved support and acknowledgement from the government within the past four years has stemmed from Common Room's support. In 2011, the city government provided a public building space (Gedung Indonesia Menggugat) to groups to be used free of charge for Karinding classes[67]. In addition, the provincial government has since included the Karinding instrument in exhibitions and local craft product fairs[68].

## 4.5. Influence upon private sector agencies' policies, rules, regulations SPO

Although the private sector has little relevance to or relations with Common Room, the evaluation team noted that there has been an increased demand for Karinding music instruments, as well as accompanying instruments, and apparel products as a result of the new Karinding trend (see Indicator 4.2). Karinding Attack believes that bamboo craft producers are benefiting from this growing demand for their products[69]; a justified opinion from evaluation team's observations. In part, this seems to have been an intended result of Common Room since the SPO actually began actively promoting Karinding in 2008[70].

[64] Gustaff, "IMB PT EGI DICABUT!: Press Rilis Forum Warga Peduli babakan Siliwangi (FWPBS)", *Save Babakan Siliwangi City Park*, 28 June 2013. Available from http://savebabakansiliwangi.wordpress.com/2013/06/28/imb-pt-egi-dicabut-press-rilis-forum-warga-peduli-babakan-siliwangi-fwpbs-jumat-28-juni-2013/ (accessed 11 December 2014)

[65] Removal Logical, "Save Babakan Siliwangi", 20 October 2008. Available from http://kaguheroes.blogspot.com/2008/10/save-babakan-siliwangi.html (accessed 11 December 2014)

[66] Gustaff, "IMB PT EGI DICABUT!: Press Rilis Forum Warga Peduli babakan Siliwangi (FWPBS)", *Save Babakan Siliwangi City Park*, 28 June 2013. Available from http://savebabakansiliwangi.wordpress.com/2013/06/28/imb-pt-egi-dicabut-press-rilis-forum-warga-peduli-babakan-siliwangi-fwpbs-jumat-28-juni-2013/ (accessed 11 December 2014) and Gustaff Harriman Iskandar, "Project Documentation | Common Room Networks Foundation | 2003 – 2008". Available from http://www.slideshare.net/gustaffharriman/project-documentation-common-room-networks-foundation-2003-2008-presentation (accessed 11 December 2014)

[67] Yatni Setianingsih, "Kekar Tempat Belajar Karinding Gratis di Bandung", *Inilah.com*, 8 September 2011. Available from http://m.inilah.com/news/detail/1772107/kekar-tempat-belajar-karinding-gratis-di-bandung (accessed 11 December 2014)

[68] Sebandung.com, Budaya, "Yuk Menelusuri Sejarah di Museum Pos Bandung!", 14 March 2014. Available from http://sebandung.com/category/budaya/page/9/; http://www.sepertiini.com/read/2014/09/721/ngamumule-budaya-sunda-pasarkan-kerajinan-tradisional.html (accessed 11 December 2014)

[69] Kimung, "Karinding Menghajar Jalanan!!!", *Karinding Attack*. Available from http://karindingattack.com/karinding-menghajar-jalanan/ (accessed 11 December 2014)

[70] Kimung, "Sejarah Karinding Klasik (Hingga 2010)", *Kelas Karinding*, 10 January 2013. Available from http://kelaskarinding.tumblr.com (accessed 11 December 2014)

# 5. Civil Society context

## 5.1. Coping strategies


During the baseline in mid-2012, Common Room was in process of moving to its current location. While the SPO took its time to find a new location and move, their relocation had a number of drawbacks. The new location is less central than before, with no gallery or exhibition spaces. Located in a residential area, there is a low noise tolerance and the space Common Room now occupies is less attractive.


Between 2011 and 2012, Common Room received€ 54,000 from Hivos and was able to save office/building rental, which was basically free of charge. With just € 35,000 in funding support from Hivos in the 2012-2013 period, Common Room had to cope with additional rental costs, allocating 20 percent of the budget to this. In addition to their growing financial woes, Common Room was unable to apply for more Social Aid Funding from the Bandung city government, which in 2011 had constituted 39 percent of their total budget.

Common Room have tried to cope with these problems by widening their range of supported target groups. However, this may have added to their existing problems of having vaguely defined target groups. With ill-defined target groups, a lack of focus and a majority of funding going towards institutional support and non-programmatic costs, Common Room is losing its strategic position. The organisation relies very heavily on its director for strategic direction and has not been able to be effective enough or innovative in the way they plan their activities and seek out additional support to sustain interventions.


# Appendix 3 Common Room Statistics 2012-2013


Type of activities 2012-2013:









Themes 2012-2013:








Participants 2012-2013:




Expenses 2012-2013:



Pengeluaran Tahun 2012 (Total Rp.395.292.635,-)



Pengeluaran Tahun 2013 (Total Rp. 332.719.800,-)

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen UR
P.O. Box 88
6700 AB Wageningen
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)317 48 68 00
www.wageningenUR.nl/cdi

Report CDI-15-061

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# Combine Resource Institute end line report

MFS II country evaluations, Civil Society component

Dieuwke Klaver[1]
Hester Smidt

Kharisma Nugroho[2]
Kharisma Sinung Prasetyo

1 Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR, Netherlands
2 SurveyMeter, Indonesia

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen, November 2014



Report CDI-15-064

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Klaver, D.C., Smidt H., Nugroho, K., Prasetya, K. S., February 2015, *Combine Resource Institute (CRI) end line report; MFS II country evaluations, Civil Society component,* Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR (University & Research centre) and SurveyMETER. Report CDI-15-064. Wageningen.

This report describes the findings of the end line assessment of Combine Resource Institute (CRI) in Indonesia that that is a partner of Hivos.

The evaluation was commissioned by NWO-WOTRO, the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research in the Netherlands and is part of the programmatic evaluation of the Co-Financing System - MFS II financed by the Dutch Government, whose overall aim is to strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. Apart from assessing impact on MDGs, the evaluation also assesses the contribution of the Dutch Co-Funding Agencies to strengthen the capacities of their Southern Partners, as well as the contribution of these partners towards building a vibrant civil society arena.

This report assesses CRI's contribution towards strengthening Civil Society in Indonesia and for this exercise it used the CIVICUS analytical framework. It is a follow-up of a baseline study conducted in 2012. Key questions that are being answered comprise changes in the five CIVICUS dimensions to which CRI contributed; the nature of its contribution; the relevance of the contribution made and an identification of factors that explain CRI's role in civil society strengthening.

Keywords: Civil Society, CIVICUS, theory based evaluation, process-tracing

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The Centre for Development Innovation accepts no liability for any damage arising from the use of the results of this research or the application of the recommendations.

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# Acknowledgements

SurveyMETER and CDI are thanking the staff and the leaders of all Southern Partner Organisations that participated in collecting information for the evaluation of the contribution of these partner organisations to creating a vibrant civil society in India. They also thank the Co-Funding Agencies and the Dutch Consortia they are a member of for making background documents available. We hope that this evaluation can support you in better positioning yourself in the Civil Society Arena of Indonesia.

# List of abbreviations and acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| AMARC | World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters |
| BCI | Basic Capabilities Index |
| BPJS | *Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial* (Social Security Organizing Agency) |
| BPPT | *Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi* (Agency for Assessment and Application of Technology) |
| BPS | *Badan Pusat Statistik* (Central Agency on Statistics) |
| CDI | Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR |
| CFA | Co-Financing Agency |
| CFO | Co-Financing Organisation |
| Combine | Community Based Information Network |
| CS | Civil society |
| CSO | Civil society organisation |
| CRI | Combine Resource Institution |
| Combine | Community Based Information Network |
| DFID | Department for International Development, UK Government |
| DRR | Disaster risk reduction |
| GNI | Gross National Income |
| GOI | Government of Indonesia |
| HDI | Human Development Index |
| ICT | Information and communications technology |
| IDEP | Indonesian Development of Education & Permaculture Foundation |
| IDEA | Institute Development and Economic Analysis |
| ISAI | *Institut Studi Arus Informasi* (Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of Information) |
| Jamkesmas | *Jaminan Sosial Masyarakat* (National Health Insurance for the Poor and Near Poor) |
| Jarpuk | *Jaringan Perempuan Usaha Kecil* (Women in Small Business Network) |
| JICA | Japan International Cooperation Agency |
| JIL | *Jaringan Islam Liberal* (Liberal Islamic Network) |
| JRKI | *Jaringan Radio Komunitas Indonesia* (Indonesian Community Radio Network) |
| JSDF | Japan Social Development Fund |
| KID | *Komisi Informasi Daerah* (Regional Information Commission) |
| Komnas HAM | National Commission for Human Rights |
| MFS | Dutch co-financing system |
| MoC | Model of Change |
| MoFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| MoH | Ministry of Health |
| NGO | Non-governmental organisation |
| PAN | *Partai Amanat Nasional* (National Mandate Party) |
| PKBI | *Perhimpunan Keluarga Berencana Indonesia* (Indonesian Family Planning Association) |
| PNPM | *Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat* (National Program for Community Empowerment) |
| PT | *Perseroan Terbatas* (limited Liability Company) |
| PSF | PNPM Support Facility |
| *Relawan* TIK | ICT Volunteer |
| RRI | *Radio Republik Indonesia* (Radio Republic Indonesia) |
| *Sanggar MeTIK* | Studio for media and information-communication technology |
| Sekber | *Sekertariat Bersama* (Joint Secretary) |
| SIAR | *Saluran Informasi Akar Rumput* (Grassroots Information Channel) |
| SID | *Sistem Informasi Desa* (Village Information System) |
| SERF | Social Economic Rights Fulfilment |
| SK | *Suara Komunitas* (Voice of the Community) |

| | |
|---|---|
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |
| SSI | Semi-structured Interview |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| Tikus Darat | *Tim Informasi Komunikasi untuk Situasi Darurat* (Information Communication Team for Emergency Situations) |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| Wageningen UR | Wageningen University & Research Centre |
| WWF | World Wildlife Foundation |
| Yayasan SETARA | SETARA Foundation |

# 1 Introduction

This report presents the civil society end line findings of Combine Resource Institute (CRI), a partner of Hivos in Indonesia under the Dutch Consortium People Unlimited. It is a follow-up to the baseline assessment carried out in 2012. According to the information provided during the baseline study, Combine Resource Institute is working on the theme 'governance'.

These findings are part of the overall joint MFS II evaluations carried out to account for results of MFS II-funded or co-funded development interventions implemented by Dutch Co-Funding Agencies (CFAs) and/or their Southern Partner Organisations (SPO). They are also intended to contribute to the improvement of future development interventions. The civil society evaluation uses the CIVICUS framework and seeks to answer the following questions:

- What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?
- To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
- What is the relevance of these changes?
- What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The CIVICUS framework that comprises five dimensions (civic engagement, level of organization, practice of values, perception of impact, and context influencing agency by civil society in general) has been used to orient the evaluation methodology.

*Changes in the civil society arena of the SPO*
In the 2012 – 2014 period the two most important changes that took place in the civil society arena of the SPO are related to 'level of organisation' and 'perception of impact'.

With regards to 'level of organisation' CRI did not further expand its 2012 network, but it intensified its collaboration with the Indonesian Community Radio Network, which is an emanation of CRI. The division of roles became clearer and both organisations joined efforts to implement a National Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM) Support Facility-funded project which engages community radios in monitoring this government's program and to work towards the revision of the Broadcasting Law. CRI has sustained its resource base after Hivos withdrew in March 2014.

With regards to 'perception of impact' both progress has been made on the performance of Suara Komunitas (SK), a web-based citizen journalism platform, and on the collaboration with local governments.

Between 2012 and 2014, the number of contributors to SK has increased from 665 to 856 entities including community radios. In the same period the number of articles per contributor increased from 4 in 2012 to 5 in 2013, whereas the number of readers increased with 7 percent.

The capacity of the community radios to defend the interests of their listeners is said to have improved, however they and SK are not (yet) capable to engage in lobby and advocacy activities and to follow up on issues that are escalating on the online website.

The most important relation that CRI has had with the public sector in the 2012 -2014 period consists of the further implementation of the Village Information System in more than 200 villages. These systems are expected to improve the transparency at village level and encourage citizens to claim their rights in the near future.

These findings were obtained through an analysis of documents, a workshop with the SPO, and several interviews. These interviews were conducted with: CRI; external resources persons working in civil society organisations that receive support from the SPO; other civil society organisations with whom the SPO is collaborating; public or private sector agents and; external resource persons with knowledge of the MDG or theme on which the SPO is concentrating.

*Attribution question*
Based upon an analysis of the projects and programmes financed by the Dutch CFAs a selection was made of SPOs to be included in an in-depth process tracing trajectory and those to be included for a quick contribution assessment. Combine Resource Institute was selected for a quick assessment.

The first outcome that we looked at was the increasing participation of CRI's intermediate organisations in a web-based citizen journalism platform, known as *Suara Komunitas* (SK), as demonstrated by the increasing number of new contributors, articles produced, and website visitors. Such changes are important as they reflect an improved level of organisation among intermediate organisations, as the citizen journalism platform allows them to produce, share, and reflect upon information of grassroots interest. The pathway that most likely explains this outcome is the presence of a supporting network of several organisations including CRI to strengthen their capacity and critical interest. The existence of the online platform and a general trend that people have increasingly access to the internet are conditions to achieve the outcome. CRI's contribution consists of providing and maintaining the citizen-journalism website, and working through the network to mobilize and increase the capacity of community radios to participate in such a platform.

The second outcome that we looked at was the Ministry of Health's willingness to validate beneficiary data and emend the issuance of health insurance as stipulated in a letter issued by the government (Ministry of Health Letter No.149/2013 on Jamkesmas Participation). In response to CSO actors' actions, which entailed collecting and disseminating information on the issue, the validation of beneficiaries is important evidence that these actions impacted public sector practices. However, it seems that in this case there is more evidence to suggest that these changes occurred as a result of the interventions from a coalition of government and CSO actors rather than CRI's actions that entailed supporting the escalation of the issue to enforce public pressure and demand. Although CRI also claimed to have facilitated the coalition, there is no evidence that the coalition would not be effective without CRI's support.

*Relevance*
Interviews with staff of CRI, with external resource persons, with the liaison officer of Hivos, as well as contextual information helped to assess the relevance of CRI's interventions in terms of: its Theory of Change (ToC) for Civil Society (CS) as designed during the baseline study; the context in which CRI is operating; the CS policies of Hivos.

With regards to the baseline ToC, the interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant because each represents one of the ToC's two major preconditions (critical engagement and quality policy).

With regards to the context in which CRI is operating, its interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant because it provided measures for more civil society actors to use, produce, and share information relevant to grassroots communities to defend their interests, and by doing so were able to improve public sector delivery of services as one example of successful impact.

With regards to the CS policies of Hivos, CRI's interventions and outcomes are relevant because they are in line with Hivos' direction regarding the strategic use of information and communications technology (ICT). Hivos sees this as a shared area of interest with CRI: both seeking to encourage the use of ICT, as a creative and innovative response to development issues.

*Explaining factors*
The information relates to factors that explain the changes in CS, CRI's contribution to these changes, and the relevance of its interventions. Information was collected simultaneously with data collection for the previous questions. Apart from searching for explaining factors related to these evaluation questions, the evaluation team was also informed about other important factors such as the organisational performance of CRI, relations with Hivos that might have had an effect on its performance or external factors.

The most important factors that explain the changes in the civil society dimensions are related to the context, which has laid the groundwork for these changes to be possible. First, since the political reformation in 1998, the government has normatively shown an increased political will toward improving public services. Nonetheless, the delivery of services is far from satisfying, further exasperated by the size of the nation and the devolution of power. Since the political transformations in the late nineties, many local NGOs emerged claiming a watchdog function. Indonesia has since joined the era of open information and the boom in ICT. Civil society organisations, like CRI and

others, have been able to capitalize on these changes by making use of, producing, and disseminating information. At the same time, the parliament and legislative are increasingly losing credibility as representatives of the people. This situation has put greater stakes and expectations on the civil society movement.

The second, CRI's contribution to changes in civil society, are explained by Hivos' continued support since 2005 to CRI's core programs, which have also been in line with CRI's ToC. Hivos has also supported both CRI's organisational development as well as its interventions in potentially politically sensitive matters.

The above findings also relate to factors of CRI's own internal organisational capacity and focus. High staff turnovers; obsolete strategic planning; and the absence of dedicated monitoring and evaluation personnel are examples of CRI' organisational capacity issues that need to be addressed. Their decision to take on the responsibility of developing the critical awareness of their target groups requires a large number of personnel to master many issues. The nature of CRI's role as a "network operator" means that they are privy to many demands from their network and intermediary organisations calling for their intervention, which may stretch their focus and resources. This has also led the organisation to explore new areas of programmatic work, such as disaster risk reduction, which may be to the expense of more core program areas.

The following chapter briefly describes the political context, the civil society context and the relevant background with regards to the governance issues CRI is working on. Chapter 3 provides background information on CRI, the relation of its MFS II interventions with the CIVICUS framework and specific information on the contract with Free Press Unlimited. An evaluation methodology has been developed for the evaluation of the Civil Society component which can be found in Appendix 2 in the country report; however, deviations from this methodology, the choices made with regards to the selection of the outcomes for contribution analysis, as well as difficulties encountered during data collection are to be found in Chapter 4. The answers to each of the evaluation questions are being presented in Chapter 5, followed by a discussion on the general project design in relation to CS development; an assessment of what elements of the project design may possibly work in other contexts or be implemented by other organisations in Chapter 6. Conclusions are presented in Chapter 7.

# 2 Context

This paragraph briefly describes the context Combine Resource Institution is working in. A description of the Civil Society Context assessed according to the CIVICUS framework is provided in appendix 3 of the country report for Civil Society.

## 2.1 Political context

Indonesia's political context changed drastically when Suharto's New Order regime came to an end in 1998 which opened the possibilities for civil society to start playing its role in society. This paragraph briefly describes the political contexts of the past decades, and ends with an overview of the most important recent changes.

### 2.1.1 Brief historical perspective

Indonesia's rise to being the world's third largest democratic nation has been lauded by many world leaders. The county is often considered to be a model Muslim democracy. As the fourth most populous nation with an estimated 250 million people[1], Indonesia has sustained its democratic commitment since transitioning from an authoritarian leadership to a democracy in 1998. The decentralized administration now consists of 34 provinces and 508 districts and municipalities.

Prior to 1998, Indonesia was under strict authoritarian regime. Suharto, known for his so-called New Order (1966-1998) regime, ushered in radical transformations that would place social and political forces under direct state supervision. The defining characteristics of the Suharto era were a focus on economic growth and controlled consensus and political stability devoid of dissent. A series of tumultuous economic and political transitions in the nineties severely diminished the credibility of ageing President Suharto, who was forced to resign amidst mass street protests.

His departure in 1998 laid bare three decades of social inequalities, state-perpetuated abuses against human rights, and a lack of civilian liberties. The regime change opened the way for a period of *Reformasi* started under the presidency of B. J. Habibie (1998-1999) and continued by Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001), Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001–2004), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014). Restrictions on citizen participation, press freedom and association were removed. Democratic reforms and decentralization led to direct elections, portioned authority, devolution of authority to regional authorities, formation of new political parties and ended the military's parliamentary influence. The distinct historical periods of the New Order Regime and *Reformasi* (1998-present) have shaped the emergence of civil society. Defining characteristics are summarized in the table below.

Table 1
*Characteristics that have defined the emergence of civil society in Indonesia*

| Characteristics | New Order, authoritarian period (1966 – 1998) | Reformasi (1998 – present) |
|---|---|---|
| **Political system** | Centralized, authoritarian characterized by unipolarity. Golkar as the dominant political party.<br><br>In 1999, there were 27 provinces, 306 districts | Decentralized, democratic. Fragmentation of power and atomization of patronage relationships. Emergence of numerous political parties. Direct presidential elections since 1999.<br><br>Decentralization altered the political and administrative landscape: 34 provinces, 410 |

[1] In 2010 the population was estimated to be around 237 million people (BPS 2010 Population Census). The current figure is an estimate from BKKBN and similar figures are cited in the CIA's World Fact Book and the World Bank.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | and around 60,000 villages. | districts, 98 municipalities, 6,944 sub-districts and 81,253[2]. |
| **State-citizen interaction** | Benevolent leader, obedient population. Down to the village level, the state permeated society. | Modern political culture marked by diminishing hierarchy between the state and citizens, allowing for citizens to interact more freely. |
| **Citizen representation and voice** | Strict control of speech, expression and association.<br><br>CSOs and their networks largely "hiding behind the screen",operating under state surveillance. A period of growth occurred in 1995-98, as resistance was building. | Burgeoning of CSOs, pressure groups and NGOs following the political euphoria after Suharto's fall.<br><br>Indonesian CSOs began to establish new networks internationally. Up until the early 2000s the focus was on state-centrist issues. Later, issues that CSOs were tackling became more diverse, ranging from pluralism, poverty reduction to fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights. |
| **Media** | No free press, censorship and state-control. Suharto had firm grasp over how to use print & broadcast medias to promote political ideologies. | More vibrant media environment, flourishing of media businesses albeit in control of 12 main conglomerates that are mostly profit-driven and often have political ties. |
| | Limited public and CS use and access to internet until mid-90s. | Twitter nation, widespread social media use. |
| | | Growing realization of the importance of media/free press as the fourth pillar of democracy. |
| **Artistic forms of expression** | Art and literary censorship conducted by the state. Art forms were a means to reinforce political order. | Greater freedom of the arts and cultural sectors. Organizations able to hold art events more freely. Freedom of expression a catchphrase amongst individuals and artistic groups, but challenged by more conservative members of society. |
| **Religious expression and organization** | Regime repressed religious groups, especially radical forms. | Emergence of religious groups seeking to restore Islamic values and defend Muslim values. |

With political reforms came greater freedom and space for civic engagement. In the *Reformasi* period, there was a remarkable increase in the number of civil society organizations, many of which were Islamic in character. In 2000, the Central Agency on Statistics (BPS) recorded around 70,000 registered organizations, compared to just 10,000 in 1996[3]. New groups sprung up with donors encouraging activists to establish NGOs they could fund. These organizations were eager to distance themselves from state and often took an anti-government stance. Proliferating CSOs and NGOs have taken advantage of decentralization and greater regional autonomy to engage in public affairs. Civil society and government relations have improved, although both sides remain sceptical of the others' intentions.

### 2.2.2 Recent trends in the political context

Indonesia is considered to be a story of democratic success, but it still struggles to realize the benefits of sustained and equitable economic growth. In the political context, the main challenges lie in governing such geographically vast and decentralized country, applying principles of good governance and the enormous task of reforming the country's bureaucracy.

Although, Indonesia's 'big bang' decentralization initiated at the turn of the century narrowed the gap between local government and citizens, it has also localized political power struggles. While the devolution of authorities relieved tensions between the central government and the regions, it has also created opportunities for corrupt and rent-seeking practices, at the local level. As indicated by Transparency International's corruption index scores, perceived corruption in Indonesia remains high.

[2] Latest data (2014) See: Rumah Pemilu, "Gambaran Singkat Pemilihan Umum 2014 di Indonesia", 3 July 2014. Available from http://www.rumahpemilu.org/in/read/3351/Gambaran-Singkat-Pemilihan-Umum-2014-di-Indonesia (accessed 25 October 2014)

[3] Wahid, Marzuki. 2010. LSM, Islam, dan Perempuan di Indonesia Paska Orde Baru. Presentation at the Asian Dialogues: Open Seminars in Asian Languages. Melbourne, 22 April. Available from http://intranet.law.unimelb.edu.au/staff/events/files/Microsoft%20PowerPoint%20-%20LSM%20dan%20Islam%20di%20Indonesia%20--Melbourne%202010-FINAL.pdf (accessed 25 October 2014)

Table 2

*Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer survey: Indonesia*

| Year | Corruption perceptions Index Score<br>*(0 perceived as highly corrupt and 100 perceived as clean)* | Rank |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 30 | 100/182 |
| 2012 | 32 | 118/174 |
| 2013 | 32 | 114/177 |

Source: Transparency International

In 2013, decentralization was taken a step further with the approval of the Village Law, intended to address weak governance arrangements and empower rural communities to participate politically. The new law could also lead to village elites distorting power relations and misusing government funding if not properly monitored.

Indonesia is still transitioning politically and many challenges lie ahead. According to the 2012 Indonesia Governance Index's Executive Report, "Indonesia is witnessing a paradox in its democracy. On one hand, a successful opening-up of civil liberty has led to the avalanche of democratic demands across the nation, however on the other hand, democratic institutions' are inadequately respond to those demands." Nonetheless, the Indonesian Governance Index, which focuses on measuring provincial governance, does show a general improvement in the performance of the government (political office) bureaucracy, civil society and economic society based on principles of participation, transparency, fairness, accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness between 2008 and 2012. Civil society scores improved the most significantly, while scores for bureaucracy rose slightly.[4]

Table 3

*Indonesia Governance Index: Average provincial scores*

| Arena | 2008 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| Government | 4.93 | 5.46 |
| Bureaucracy | 5.53 | 5.58 |
| Civil Society | 4.85 | 6.33 |
| Economic Society | 4.77 | 5.71 |

Source: http://www.kemitraan.or.id/igi

In the past decade, Indonesians have generally enjoyed a freedom to participate in the political process through a direct-election mechanism. However, in September 2014 lawmakers voted in favour of a bill reviving indirect elections of regional heads. The controversial vote provoked public outcry which saw peaceful protests and the public voicing their discontent through social media. In early October, just before the end of his term, president Yudhoyono issued a regulation in lieu of the law, effectively repealing the law until further judicial review.

The recent 2014 elections which marked the end of Yudhoyono's 10-year term, demonstrated that Indonesian voters are increasingly voting for popular figures irrespective of political party alliances. While practices of corruption, vote-buying and poor voter administration remained in the recent election, the public seems to have matured politically, indicated by the enormous interest in televised debates between the leading candidates. The appeal of the newly sworn in President Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, has come from his hands-on, man-of-the-people approach. As Jokowi begins his five-year term he will need to start addressing a myriad of challenges that include corruption, stagnant economic growth, and human rights concerns, particularly with respect to the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and religious intolerance. If left unaddressed, these challenges could seriously undermine Indonesia's stability and democratic reforms.

[4] The IGI uses a scale of 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest). Data is available online through their website. Indonesia Governance Index, Data, "IGI Executive Report". Available from http://www.kemitraan.or.id/igi/index.php/data/publication/factsheet/275-igi-executive-report (accessed 25 October 2014)

## 2.2 Civil Society context issues with regards to governance theme

Several important changes took place during the 2011 and 2014 period. First, the global financial crisis and Indonesia's rise to a middle-income country led to a decrease in international donor funding. Development actors, including CSOs and NGOs, have to compete harder for funding. Some have been more successful than others in diversifying funding by turning to the private sector or private foundations. At the expense of past idealism, local NGOs are now more disposed to receiving funding sources which in the past may have been criticized as supporting neoliberalism.

Regulatory changes also affected the civil society arena positively and negatively. Amongst the more controversial laws to spark reaction was Law No. 17/2013 on Societal Organisations. In an open letter sent before the bill was enacted, CIVICUS said the law would undermine freedom of association and "prevent CSOs from working on sensitive topics related to good governance and democratic reform in the public interest"[5]. FORUM-ASIA deplored the repressive provisions in the law that "leave all groups vulnerable to attacks, undermining the hard-won democratic space that has been forged by civil society since the end of the New Order regime."[6]

Other laws passed that provoked criticism were the State Intelligence Law (October 2011) and the Social Conflict Law (April 2012). NGOs and media see these laws as imposing further restrictions on freedom of speech, potentially leading to the criminalization of human rights defenders and signifying a tightening of state control. Discriminatory content was also an issue in discussions on the Religious Harmony Bill in 2013, for which drafting was initiated in despite not being part of the planned National Legislative Program. Late in 2013, the House of Representatives came under fire again for its weak stance against religious intolerance when it re-endorsed a law that limits state-recognized religions to six.

The French NGO Reporters Without Borders published a report showing that Indonesia sank from position 117 in 2010 to 146 in 2011 with regards to press freedom: Increasing cases of intimidation, threat and violence (including kidnapping and killing) against journalists explain this decline. Other relevant trends related to media and journalism consist of the spread and penetration of internet and ICT technologies across the country expecting to rise to 33 percent by the end of 2013; the lack of widespread practical and professional journalism education; corruption affecting Indonesian media and journalism ethics[7].

[5] Civicus, "Civicus Releases an Open Letter Requesting the Indonesian Parliament to reject the Proposed Ormas Law and Create an Enabling Environment for Civil Society", 10 April 2013. Available from http://civicus.org/index.php/en/media-centre-129/open-letters/1581-open-letter-requesting-the-indonesian-parliament-to-reject-to-the-proposed-ormas-law-and-create-an-enabling-environment-for-civil-society (accessed 27 October 2014)

[6] Azhar, Haris. 2013. Repressive provision in the Ormas law. Statement to The Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, in Forum-Asia, "Indonesia: Passage of Ormas Bill Condemned, Campaign to Oppose the Law to Continue", Bangkok, 4 July 2013. Available from http://www.forum-asia.org/?p=16305 (accessed 27 October 2014)

[7] "Outcome report 2011-2013", Press Freedom 2.0, 2014

# 3 CRI and its contribution to civil society/policy changes

## 3.1 Background of CRI

Community Based Information Network (Combine) started in 1999 as a program. In 2001, it became a resource institution. CRI's vision is to provide access to knowledge and resources to communities so that they are in a better position and have stronger relationships with the government and private sector.[8] CRI aims to achieve "civic literacy" or autonomous communities able to be part of decision-making processes, especially as a means to exercise control in the public sphere. In order to do that CRI encourages the community's capacity as a knowledge producer though practicing ICT and empowering community network.[9]

Between 2001 and 2004 CRI's efforts focused on creating community forums (*forum warga*) in several pilot areas. These forums became instruments for community-oriented problem solving. It was also in this period that CRI began to incorporate the use of ICTs in its work[10]. Community radio was introduced as a working tool in 2003, becoming a core of CRI's interventions[11]. CRI's services in those years ranged from providing resources, expertise, training, and research specifically related to information systems, community-based journalism, and community organising. In 2004, when community radio stations reached a significant number, CRI began their initiative to integrate and link the various stations with the help of internet which led to establishment of *Suara Komunitas* in 2008. This aided in increasing the flow of information by creating ICT platforms that helped hundreds of community radios in Indonesia interact and communicate to escalate issues. By doing this, CRI expects to engage strategic stakeholders, such as decision and policy-makers. In the plan for the 2012-2014 period, CRI intended to take another step forward by raising critical awareness of citizen journalism platforms ready for engagement with the public sector, providing them with ammunition to act (i.e. 'act upon information').[12]

Based out of Yogyakarta, CRI carries out interventions across the country relating to four main programs areas that seek to have the following impacts:

1. *Suara Komunitas* (Voice of the Community): Power of information is realized to encourage the settlement of grassroots, community issues. Suara Komunitas is an interactive online platform used to promote citizen journalism and information exchange;
2. *Pasar Komunitas (Community Market)*: Grassroots economic empowerment by means of the stimulation of information-based market transactions;
3. *Lumbung Komunitas (Community Barn)*: Local governance capacity improvement by means of setting up village database systems; and
4. *Tikus Darat (Information Communication Team for Emergency Situations)*: Disaster risk reduction (DRR) through the creation of a mitigation information network.

[8] Summarised from: Combine Resource Institution, Profil, "Visi & Misi Lembaga". Available from http://www.combine.or.id/profil-2/visi-misi-lembaga/ (accessed 10 September 2014)
[9] Combine Resource Institution, Profil, "Sejarah Lembaga". Available from http://www.combine.or.id/profil-2/sejarah-lembaga/ (accessed 10 September 2014)
[10] Abud, Matt. 2012. *Indonesia: New Digital Nation?*. Internews Center for Innovation and Learning. Available from https://internews.org/sites/default/files/resources/Internews_Indonesia_DigitalNation_2012-07.pdf (accessed 10 September 2014)
[11] Hivos, Partners, "Combine Resource Institution". Available from http://www.hivos.nl/dut./community/partner/50008127 (accessed 2 September 2014)
[12] Hivos, Intake form Combine Resource Institution

CRI's organisational staffing structure endured some changes in the 2012-2014 period. CRI currently has 34 staff members, 11 more than during the baseline, managing the four programs. It has a board of directors, consisting of a president and five members; an IT department; and a R&D department.

CRI has been a partner of Hivos since 2005-2006. Objectives of previous collaboration were to increase the diversity of information and knowledge produced by community, increasing the performance of CSOs in managing and sharing resources and knowledge, and improving the performance of small medium enterprises by developing product and market quality. The 2012-initiated collaboration supported through MFS II was the third formal cooperation between Hivos and CRI. It focused specifically on supporting CRI's Suara Komunitas (SK) program. Suara Komunitas' aim is to become a strategic medium in supporting advocacy for the fulfilment of basic rights of citizens. It focuses on strengthening the community radio stations in Indonesia via the strategic use of ICT to drive act upon information by relevant stakeholders. As such, the 2012-2013 Hivos program is named as 'Act Upon Information' [13].

Besides Hivos, CRI received funding support for SK from Ford Foundation and a multi-donor trust fund managed by the World Bank aimed to support the government's National Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM Support Facility).[14] Since its establishment CRI has collaborated with numerous development of funding agencies, including TIFA Foundation, World Bank, WWF, Indonesian Government Agency for Assessment and Application of Technology (BPPT), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Department for International Development of the UK (DFID), and disaster risk reduction (DRR)-related partners like Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Japan Social Development Fund (JSDF), CARE International, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters (AMARC).

CRI cooperates with a host of other civil society organisations and platforms such as the Indonesian Community Radio Network, known locally as *Jaringan Radio Komunitas Indonesia* (JRKI); Fahmina and Institute Development and Economic Analysis (IDEA) in the area of advocacy, and; Air Putih, ICT Watch, Satu Dunia, and Relawan TIK (ICT Volunteers) on mainly ICT issues.

## 3.2 MFS II interventions related to Civil Society

Hivos supported CRI via a project named the 'Act Upon Information' in the 2012-2014 period, which specifically aimed to improve SK. By the end of 2013, SK counted 856 contributors, of which 307 were community radio actors. The SK website has been visited 169,390 times in 2013 onto which content produced by its contributors was uploaded. On average, some 368 articles and written pieces were uploaded each month. Contributions came from 60 districts in 20 provinces[15].

Through the project, CRI sought to facilitate community media in Indonesia to communicate more widely with strategic stakeholders by utilizing an online information and communication platform. CRI's target group included 287 community radio stations, linked in the *Suara Komunitas* network that was launched in 2008. The contract with Hivos specifically reinforced the SK program, aiming to support around 30 community radio stations located in six regions and 300 community journalists. Communities, radio stations, and women's cooperatives were the expected beneficiaries of the program.[16] In November 2012, an additional € 8,200 was provided for supplemental work aiming to influence the revision of Broadcasting Law No. 32/2002.[17]

To achieve this, CRI planned to conduct content analysis and dissemination; strengthen the capacity of community journalists and radio stations; expand *Suara Komunitas* membership; strengthen CSO

[13] "Assessed Report 2011", Hivos, 2011
[14] "Penjelasan Tambahan ke Hivos 2012", Combine Resource Institution, 2012
[15] Aris Harianto, "Infografis dan Analisis Konten Isu Konflik Sumber Daya Alam di Suara Komunitas", December 2013
[16] Intake form Combine Resource Institution & Act Upon Information Proposal, Hivos
[17] "Memo Budget Amendment 1004708", Hivos, 2012

capacity in the ICT field; contribute to policy discussions on the revision of Indonesia's broadcasting law; and improve internal organisational development.[18]

Below are the deliverables (or performance indicators) that were agreed upon in CRI's contract with Hivos:[19]

1. The "act upon information" in the issues brought up by community media facilitated by CRI is established in at least two regions.
2. The capacity of 150 community journalists, editor, managing staff and the organizations of community media is improved in at least 30 community radio stations in six regions.
3. Expanding *Suara Komunitas* members in Lampung, West Sumatera, Southeast Sulawesi, North Sulawesi, southern part of West Java and Riau.
4. *Sanggar MeTIK* established itself as the medium to learn about ICT for civil society organizations.
5. Ability of Hivos' partners (SETARA women's cooperation and Women in Small Business Network or Jarpuk in Bantul) on the use of ICT has increased.
6. Improved internal organizational development, specifically in internal mechanism and capacity building for management staff members.
7. Consensus and support from wider civil society (organization) towards the better revision of Broadcasting Law are developed.
8. Routine discussions are established between the actors of community broadcasting with the House of Representative members, especially the first commission and government.

CRI's interventions relate most closely to the CIVICUS dimensions of 'perception of impact' and 'level of organisation'. With regards to the first dimension, SK transitioned into an online platform to which CRI's community radio network are contributing. Of interest is the extent to which SK managed to mobilise community organisations to use information to demand for their rights. As was mentioned in the baseline report, CRI has undergone a number of changes in the last decade, which to some extent have been a natural transition as CRI and its network grew. From a focus of expanding its network, CRI moved towards introducing ICT to community radios, and lastly towards increasing political engagement through SK and its network. CRI's role in strengthening the civil society arena of community radios has thus been crucial.

## 3.3 Basic information

Table 8
*Basic information Combine Resource Institute*

| | | Details |
|---|---|---|
| Name of SPO | : | Combine Resource Institute (CRI) |
| Consortium | : | People Unlimited |
| CFA | : | Hivos |
| Start date of cooperation | : | 2005-2006 |
| MDG/Theme | : | Governance |
| MFS II Project Name | : | The Act Upon Information (Project ID: RO SEA at HO 1004708) |
| Contract period | : | February 29, 2012 - December 30, 2013, extended to March 2014 |
| Total budget | : | € 68,000 + € 8,200 = € 76,200 |
| Other donors if applicable | : | Ford Foundation (360,000 US$) and PSF (around 250,000 US$) that supported *Suara Komunitas*. |
| Estimation of % of budget for Civil Society20 | : | 59 % |

Sources: Project documents

[18]Project documents and Hivos contract
[19]"Partner Contract Hivos RO SEA at HO 1004708", Hivos, pp 1-6 and "Memo Budget Amendment 1004708", Hivos, 2012, pp. 7-8
[20]Costs that relate to civil society development or policy influence are those costs that possibly contribute to the development of the CIVICUS dimensions, excluding coordination and office costs; staff costs and financial reserves.

# 4 Data collection and analytical approach

## 4.1 Adjustments made in the methodology of the evaluation

The evaluation process started with an input-output-outcome analysis that utilized reports and other documents from the SPO. For CRI the analysis was based mainly on two project progress reports, which did not report against results or indicators systematically. As such, the evaluation team was only able to benefit partly from the input-output-outcome analysis for process-tracing.

The evaluation team followed the operational guidelines to a great extent, but was unable to have a workshop with all of CRI sub-groups as only executives and program managers attended the workshop. In practice the workshop lasted five hours, with the CRI executive only participating for half of the workshop period.

The evaluation team was unable to get averages or scores for each subgroup as participation was not consistent and staffs were hesitant to give scores due to a lack of confidence in undertaking critical self-assessment. The in-country team assigned the scores and then ran them past CRI to confirm the scores. When discussing outcomes, CRI wanted to focus on the positive outcomes and on proving that they were capable of influencing public sector.

Another obstacle was the recent staff changes that CRI has undergone. The CRI director has only been working with CRI for six months, and was recruited externally. Since the new director has limited institution knowledge, the in-country team conducted a follow-up interview with the SK program manager, rather than the director, as the most knowledgeable staff available to discuss the outcome selection and initial steps for in-depth tracing process.

## 4.2 Difficulties encountered during data collection

During data collection the team experienced the following difficulties:

- Workshop participants did not really understand, nor were they familiar with the CS indicators or the CIVICUS framework. They found it difficult to relate Combine's situation with the indicators, especially since none of them participated in the baseline process. This lessened the effectiveness of the workshop.
- At the end 2013, CRI's director changed and the organization experienced high staff turnovers. At the time of the end line, the longest serving program staff had been with the organization for just one year. The departing staff had much of the institutional knowledge and networks. As a result, current CRI staff provided the team with resource persons/respondents who were not always appropriate or relevant.
- CRI has not had a dedicated department or personnel for monitoring and evaluation. As such, it added difficulties to find hard data and affected the agreement on the outcomes.
- CRI has never had an evaluation conducted by an external party before (except the MFS-II baseline and end line) which affected their lack of preparation and minimum understanding of common evaluation practices.
- The evaluation team developed an online survey tool which was disseminated through SK, by e-mail, and through Facebook. However, in a month's period only 25 responses were received from a possible population of 865.
- Due to insufficient information acquired during the initial steps of the tracing process, the model of change had to be revisited often to be revised based on new information found by the evaluation team, which consequently meant that the evaluation team had to collect new evidence for the amended model of change.

- Hard data to show how many people benefited from the consolidation and validation (i.e. correction of invalid data) of recipients of the government's health insurance program (Outcome 2) was not available with CRI or with the Department of Health. The CSO coalition that was instrumental in achieving this outcome also did not monitor the impact of its work.
- There have been staff changes in Hivos' Regional Office for Southeast Asia. The current programme officer for the Expression and Engagement portfolio was not in charge of CRI during MFS II, and was only able to provide limited information with regards to the relevance of CRI's intervention to the CFA's priorities. Thus the relevance section is mostly based on a review of available documents.

## 4.3 Identification of two outcomes for in-depth process tracing

The first outcome is increased participation of community radios and community journalists in the SK online platform. The outcome was selected with the following considerations:

- It was one of several outcomes that all workshop participants agreed to as being a significant change.
- It is one of the most important elements in CRI's Theory of Change constructed during the baseline assessment in 2012
- Since this outcome is an indicator of increased level of organization, it can also be used to measure the extent of CRI's civic engagement as CRI depends substantially on its target groups' level of organisation.
- As one of the outcomes from CRI's proposal to Hivos, the evaluation team expected fewer difficulties to find supporting evidence.

The second outcome selected was: *Jaminan Sosial Masyarakat* (National Health Insurance for the Poor and Near Poor or Jamkesmas) beneficiary validation by the government's health department). This health insurance system was managed by the Ministry of Health since 2009 and is notorious for excluding people who claim to have a right to the benefits due to often erroneous beneficiary selection. The reasons for choosing this outcome are:

- It was one of the two available examples of impact on public sector policies or practices, while CRI's ToC and proposal specifically referred to this outcome as a critical element of their work.
- The other outcome provided was related to the SID program which was no longer supported by Hivos.
- CRI cannot provide strong evidence for their other outcomes as it was poorly monitored, and there was no available research from CRI or external parties that could be used.

The decision to focus on outcomes related only to the SK program was based upon the following considerations:

- According to baseline, SK is CRI's most strategic program to which all other CRI programs can be integrated or connected.
- SK receives the largest funds from three major donors; Hivos' support being almost exclusively for the SK program.
- In line with CRI's new strategy to delineate mandates between CRI and the Indonesian Community Radio Network (Jaringan Radio Komunitas Indonesia or JRKI), SK is the only program where CRI and JRKI have shared target groups.

Based upon an analysis of the projects and programmes financed by the Dutch CFAs, four strategic orientations for civil society were identified, two of which were selected for each SPO for in-depth process tracing. CDI suggested to the country team to look at the selected strategic orientations. For CRI, both outcomes matched with civil society orientations in multiple ways: ensuring that the organisations that receive support from the SPO (intermediary organisations) are capable of playing their role in civil society; strengthening the relations with other organisations in civil society to undertake joint activities, and; influencing policies and practices of public or private sector organisations. Also, based on CRI's ToC, each outcome represents "critical engagement" and "quality policy". Both preconditions are related and sit at the top level of the ToC. Therefore it was of interest to see whether there was a relation in practice and whether both were realized by CRI's contributions.

# 5 Results

## 5.1 Overview of planned and realised outcomes

Table 9

*Overview of results achieved in relation to project plan CRI*

| Planned results | | Level of achievement |
|---|---|---|
| Objective 1 | The occurrence of the follow-up actions undertaken by stakeholders at the regional level on issues/concerns raised by SK | Partially achieved: a number of issues escalated. |
| Objective 2 | SK able to reach target audience | Insufficient data available to conclude level of achievement. |
| Objective 3 | Development of the capacities of reporters, editors, managers and organization of SK | Partially achieved: From target of 150 people from 30 radio stations, only figures available for 2012: 99 people trained in journalistic skills. |
| Objective 4 | SK Network expansion | Achieved: Number of contributors grew from 543 in 2011 to 856 in 2013. In 2013 there were 169,390 visits to the SK website, compared to 152,513 in 2012. Number of articles/content published grew from 2,957 in 2012 to 4,631 in 2013. Unclear how any community radio stations were members in 2012, but currently 307 contribute to SK. |
| Objective 5 | Sanggar MeTIK becomes a vehicle for learning and media (ICT) for the strengthening of civil society | Not achieved: Sanggar MeTIK's activities were limited to providing trainings to high-school students.[21] |
| Objective 6 | Women's cooperatives - Koperasi Wanita Setara & JARPUK - able to use media and ICT to support the production and expansion of market access | Achieved: training provided to the cooperatives on how to use internet for small business promotion and using social media to build networks. (Overlap with *Pasar Komunitas* program). |
| (Additional) Objective 7 | Advocacy on revision of Broadcasting Law No. 32/2002 | Partially achieved: Although JRKI provided substantial inputs to the draft revision of the Law and advocacy activities carried out in 2012, Law has not been revised. |

Sources: CRI 2012 Report to Hivos, JRKI's Feb-April 2013 Report to CRI, and CRI's 2013 Annual Report.

With regards to assessing planned versus achieved results for CRI, it should be noted that the proposal submitted to Hivos, contract signed between the SPO and the CFA, and the project budget were not sufficiently aligned. In addition, the support from PSF and Ford Foundation to the *Suara Komunitas* network also has an impact on attributing realised outcomes to MFS II interventions.

## 5.2 Changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?

### 5.2.1 Civic Engagement

Civic engagement describes the formal and informal activities and participation undertaken by individuals to advance shared interests at different levels. Participation within civil society is multi-faceted and encompasses socially-based and politically-based forms of engagement.

CRI has not changed the way it engages civil society since the baseline. The SPO does not position itself as the frontline defender of marginalised groups. Rather, CRI works with its intermediate

[21] SanggarMeTIK's Twitter account was established at the end of 2011 and only successfully had 3 Tweets and 9 followers. No new feeds since 2011. Twitter, "Sanggar Me TIK". Available from https://twitter.com/SanggarMeTIK (accessed 1 November 2014)

organisations, in this case community radios, to promote citizen journalism so that alternative and credible grassroots information is brought into a public space through the internet platform of Suara Komunitas. CRI hopes that this form of journalism will be able to influence authorities and other stakeholders. Since 2012, there has been a 25 percent increase in the number of SK contributors, 37 percent of which are community radios. Since Suara Komunitas is an open, online network, many others have joined and contributed content. Members include NGO representatives, individuals and bloggers. Furthermore there has been an increase of 7 percent in the number of web visitors and 56 percent increase in articles produced.

CRI claims that community radios have become more involved and more capable in taking part in Suara Komunitas. While the SK structure now has an ethical board, executives, editors, and contributors, CRI was responsible for appointing individuals to these positions and the platform still relies on CRI for funding. At the same time, SK's leadership has requested greater decision-making roles in managing funds. CRI's management claimed that the SK program was formulated together with the target groups, however there is no evidence of greater participation of community radios or other contributors in program planning.

From 2009-2012, Hivos also funded interventions to develop Village Information Systems or *Sistem Informasi Desa* (SID), which provided villages with a platform to collect and store more accurate information. The project started as a pilot project in three villages, spreading to more villages in Central Java and Yogyakarta provinces in 2010. Hivos no longer funds these initiatives, but with the support of Ford Foundation, UNDP and other development partners, SID has been replicated to 221 villages across 5 provinces in 2013. Through SID there is greater transparency of data at the village level.

In both program areas, SK and SID, CRI sees itself as a connector, facilitating the sharing of information by providing ICT-based solutions to be used in communication or lobby to policy-makers. On its own, CRI does not have any direct political engagement and does not have a defined lobby or advocacy agenda. This has not changed since the baseline. CRI does provide inputs to JRKI on lobby issues, such as the revision of Law No. 32/2002 Broadcasting. In addition, CRI worked with Grassroots Information Channel (SIAR) and with Sekber Jamkesmas to lobby for a validation of Jamkesmas beneficiaries in 2013.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**
**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 1**

### 5.2.2 Level of Organisation

This dimension assesses the organisational development, complexity and sophistication of civil society, by looking at the relationships among the actors within the civil society arena.

Since the baseline, CRI has not expanded its network with other CSOs. Informal networks with Yogyakarta-based NGOs such as PKBI, KID, IRE, and IDEA have been maintained. Collaboration with these networks is subject to opportunities arising from funding resources or on issues that are relevant to Suara Komunitas and community radios. CRI's own networking capacity is likely to have been affected by high staff-turnover rate in 2013-2014, which saw staff with personal relations to Yogyakarta-based NGOs leave for positions elsewhere.

CRI's relation to its closest partner and 'younger brother', *Jaringan Radio Komunitas Indonesia* (JRKI), the official umbrella organization for community radios in Indonesia, is evolving. Set up in 2002 with CRI support, its capacity as an organization has grown over time and CRI is now trying to delineate a clear distinction of roles between it and JRKI. CRI sees itself as a resource provider and JRKI's role as expanding the network of community radios, providing technical support and registration of newly established stations. Despite a clearer distinction of roles, JRKI is still dependent on CRI for programs and funding. In 2014, the intensity of engagement with JRKI has increased due to collaborative efforts in implementing a National Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM) Support Facility-funded project which engages community radios in monitoring this government's program.

Another area of collaboration with JRKI has been on the revision of the Broadcasting Law. Both CRI and JRKI have a joint interest in providing inputs to a new legislation. Additionally, JRKI has assisted CRI to recruit more collaborators for the Suara Komunitas platform. However, JRKI has also been

critical of SK, as in their view it may pull community radio activists away from their core area of work, namely producing audio-content, to producing written material for the SK website.

CRI claims that between 2012 and 2014, community radio capacity to defend the interests of the communities they represent has improved through their participation and contribution to SK. Community radios' participation in SK has indeed improved as illustrated by the increase in contributors (including female contributors), production of content, and web page visitors. Respondents to a SurveyMETER-commissioned questionnaire said that their networking capacity has increased since joining Suara Komunitas. Respondents attributed this improved capacity predominantly to CRI. Despite improvements, CRI does not have a system in place to monitor satisfaction of SK contributors or to monitor the extent to which follow-up actions were undertaken as a result of issues raised on the SK platform.

But the survey results also revealed further demands for improved networking amongst the platform members (See Appendix 3 for detailed responses to the questionnaire). Suara Komunitas contributors who responded to the survey noted a number of areas where they expect CRI to play a role. These include more effective network capacity to follow up on issues raised through SK with relevant stakeholders, including developing skills in advocacy. CRI has identified a number of advocacy issues that could be part of joint advocacy support to community radios in September 2014. But it is still unclear how CRI will work with the community radios through the SK platform on these issues. The results of the process-tracing conducted for outcomes achieved by CRI since the baseline suggest that producing content on issues and increasing media coverage is not sufficient for changes in policies and practices to occur. Direct lobby and advocacy and partnership with other CSOs are also required and should be planned and budgeted for. It has taken CRI considerable time to prove its ToC ('the act upon information') through the Jamkesmas beneficiary validation; and it took funding from a donor to push for this achievement.

According to CRI they are now working with a smaller program budget than during the baseline, as a result of the discontinuation of Hivos funding. However, the extent to which this has indeed impacted heavily on the financial resource base of the SPO is unclear, as CRI has attracted sizeable funding from the Ford Foundation as well as contributions from the PNPM Support Facility (PSF), USAID, Misereor and others. Hivos was their second largest funder, thus going forward, CRI may indeed need to expand its resource base further. There will likely be opportunities for CRI to excel in the area of ICT. On a critical note, the evaluation team found that there were overlaps in funding. For example, the outcome achieved with regards to Jamkesmas beneficiary validation has been claimed by CRI to be a result of Hivos funding, although it is clear that Ford Foundation funds contributed to pushing the agenda forward.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**
**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 1**

### 5.2.3 Practice of Values

Practice of Values refers to the internal practice of values within the civil society arena. Important values that CIVICUS looks at such as transparency, democratic decision making, taking into account diversity that are deemed crucial to gauge not only progressiveness but also the extent to which civil society's practices are coherent with their ideals.

There has been no significant change in the downward accountability of CRI since the baseline. Quarterly meetings between the executive and the board continue to take place. None of the board members are constituents from community radios. CRI has also begun to make their annual reports accessible to the public. These reports contain some statistics about the share of donor contributions to their programs. CRI does not have a dedicated division or staff for monitoring and evaluation. Annual audits are performed, in line with CRI's code of conduct; although they are still financed by donors.

As a follow up to the baseline assessment conducted for MFS II in July 2012, a series of strategic planning meetings were held to improve CRI's overall direction. However since then, many of the former staff have left and this may influence the future direction of the SPO.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**

**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 0**

### 5.2.4 Perception of Impact

Perception of Impact assesses the perceived impact of civil society actors on politics and society as a whole as the consequences of collective action. In this, the perception of both civil society actors (internal) as actors outside civil society (outsiders) is taken into account. Specific sub dimensions for this evaluation are the extent to which CRI has contributed to engage more people in social or political activities, has contributed to strengthening CSOs and their networks, and has influenced public and private sector policies.

CRI does not monitor the satisfaction of its beneficiaries or target groups. CRI maintains that there is an increasing level of satisfaction of SK members and contributors. This has also been shown from the survey conducted for this end line evaluation. 88 percent of the respondents agreed that CRI contributed to facilitating/creating a network around them. 87.5 percent of the respondents believe that SK has unique features and that content is not like mainstream media news in that it is more relevant for the grassroots level. While many contributors joined SK for its potential to act on information, only 52 percent now perceive it as a benefit of joining SK. Although 68 percent said that there has been adequate follow-up toward escalated issues on SK, there is a disparity between the original expectations and the perception of current impact. CRI and SK do not properly monitor the extent to which SK has been utilized to urge a follow up of issues by the government or private sector. This has made it a challenge for the evaluation team to substantiate claims with evidence from specific cases. CRI and SK should invest in putting in place systems to measure the effectiveness of the SK platform.

With regards to the satisfaction of community radio, CRI admits that some may be less satisfied than during the baseline. They ascribe this to the repositioning and a new style of management that has taken root within CRI itself and see disappointment as a natural reaction to change. Without a monitoring system and no community radios represented in the board or organizational structure it is difficult for CRI to evaluate their performance vis-à-vis their community radio network, and even more difficult to track whether the community radios they have supported have improved their service delivery to grassroots populations. There is little evidence of the positive changes brought about by the SK network, other than the validation of Jamkesmas beneficiaries. CRI sees the successful Jamkesmas case as evidence for its ability, together with its network (SK and SIAR) to influence the public sector. But, issue of erroneous Jamkesmas beneficiary lists was not an issue that SK members urged CRI to take action on, rather CRI selected the case as an area of intervention to prove their theory of change (act upon information). As such, the increased coverage of the issue through Facebook, Twitter, community radio broadcasts and SK was very much driven by CRI (and to an extent the donor). Even in this case the issuance of a letter by the Ministry of Health on grassroots participation in beneficiary validation cannot be attributed to CRI efforts alone. CRI joined a coalition of other organisations led by the Yogyakarta Ombudsman, named *Sekertariat Bersama Jamkesmas,* to lobby the Ministry of Health. It is likely that the change would have occurred even without CRI's involvement since pressure from different groups had been building since 2012. The evaluation has not been able to trace how many people benefitted from this correction of beneficiary lists, since none of the actors involved maintained records.

While we do not doubt that there may have been other results from the work of community radios and SK at the local level, there is no sufficient evidence to substantiate this. What is clear is that there has been an increase in community radio participation in SK, and that in general community radios are positive about the benefits of the platform, especially in creating a network with other SK contributors. CRI is still regarded as reputable resource organization in the area of community media development, specializing in community radios.

CRI's collaborates with local governments at the district and village level for the purpose of implementing their village information systems. More villages are using these systems since the baseline. CRI, together with other NGOs, have also been involved in networks to lobby for change in public sector policy and practices, like in the Jamkesmas case. CRI also supported JRKI's collaboration with a number of CSOs to lobby for revisions of the Broadcasting Law. In this process, JRKI approached a party faction leader from Commission 1 of the National Parliament (*Komisi* 1 DPR) to

lead discussions on the revisions. Unfortunately, discussions of the revision have not been a priority for the government.

CRI does not attempt to engage directly with the private sector or in activities that may influence the private sector, other than where they interfere with community radios' ability to broadcast. Through the development of ICT systems, CRI has tried to link the economic potential of villages to the private sector to attract more investments or support the value chain of local products. CRI admits that SK and other information systems have yet to generate transparency in private sector practices and policies. The evaluation found no concrete trace evidence of concrete results in documentation provided, and did not assess potential results in this area.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 1**
**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 0**

### 5.2.5 Civil Society Environment

The social, political and economic environment in which civil society operates affects its room for manoeuvre. The civil society context has been described in chapter 3. In this section we describe how CRI is coping with that context.

During the 2012-2014 period, CRI and JRKI managed to stay engaged in discussions around the policy environment. This is especially important given that some legislation is limiting how social media and ICT can be used as a space for citizen engagement and freedom of speech. Although revisions to the Broadcasting Law were not passed in this period, JRKI and CRI did attempt to make meaningful contributions to a more enabling environment. Another example of this is CRI's and Indonesian ICT Volunteers' (*Relawan* TIK) membership to the Indonesian Civil Society Organizations' Network for Internet Governance (ID CONFIG) which seeks to facilitate exchange amongst CS actors working on Internet governance issues.

CRI has also repositioned in itself in the current context. Following the baseline evaluation in 2012, strategic meetings were undertaken to sharpen the focus on encouraging a more knowledgeable society and a responsive state. CRI now sees itself increasingly as a connector between the state and the community level, bridging the gap with ICT and media platforms. With an increased utilization of online media and information technology by the general public and the government, this is an important niche to fill.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**
**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 1**

## 5.3 To what degree are the changes attributable to the Southern partners?

Two outcomes were selected to measure the degree of MFS-II effectiveness. These were:

- Outcome 1: Increased community radio participation in Suara Komunitas. This outcome relates to capacity of intermediate organisations to play their role in civil society.
- Outcome 2: Ministry of Health's willingness to validate national health insurance beneficiary data as stipulated in Ministry of Health Letter No.149/2013 on Jamkesmas participation. This outcome relates to the strategic orientation of policy influencing.


### 5.3.1 Increased participation in Suara Komunitas

*The outcome achieved*

Indicators for increased community radio participation in Suara Komunitas consisted of changes in the number of contributors, topics, articles, visitors, and contributor satisfaction. From 2012-2013 the number of contributors increased with 35 percent to 833 contributions; the number of visitors increased with 7 percent, the number of articles that were produced increased with 56 percent and the number of articles per contributor increased with 25 percent (source: Project documents).

SurveyMETER also developed an online survey to capture the views and attitudes of Suara Komunitas contributors. Most questions were multiple choice, to anticipate a combination of possible answers. 88 percent of the 25 respondents that participated in the online survey reported that if SK had not existed, they would have missed out on certain benefits. 72 percent of contributors said they joined SK to escalate issues expecting follow-up from relevant stakeholders. When comparing the motivation for joining SK with the benefits respondents said they received after joining, there was a disparity. While 72 percent of the respondents joined SK because they so urge an "act upon information", only 52 percent of the respondents found this benefit to be realized. There is also a disparity between expectations upon joining and perceived benefit in the area of relevance of content produced. However respondents did report that they benefited from an improvement in their network. Also JRKI confirms that SK has been successful in attracting more contributors from community radios, to such extent that may even disrupt their own broadcasting activities (source: interview with JRKI).

The contribution of SK members to the online survey of SurveyMETER for this evaluation was only 25 out of possible population of 833 persons. The low level of response generated on the SK platform and the better response rates received through Facebook could be interpreted as a lack of participation in online activities, or a preference for regular use of social media over SK.




*Causal pathways that explain the outcome*

There are three possible pathways that may explain this outcome:

1. In the first pathway, the SK website is maintained and fully operational, enabling the participation of community radios. The SK platform is membership-based, open to anyone to sign up, but also has a managing team that has been appointed by CRI. Hivos funds supported the operations and maintenance of the platform, as well as the connectivity and development of Suarakomunitas.net. In addition to that, there were interventions to strengthen the institutional management of SK member representatives. To reject this pathway, we need evidence that the SK website has not been operational, or that the SK website has been operational without CRI's support.
2. In the second pathway, SK members have a network that supports their capacity building needs and interests. In order to participate effectively, SK members need to have adequate journalism capacity, critical awareness and interest, as well as the ability to sustain their day-to-day operations (majority being community radios). CRI doesn't see itself as a single provider for all. Instead, their strategy relies more on the creation of a network around the community radio stations. With such a network, CRI's strategy is to strengthen only a handful of radio stations as hubs through trainings, that then further support other radio stations in their region. As such, community radios need to rely on a wider network of organisations for capacity development and technical support. The development of community radio capacity can thus stem from different

causes or sources: CRI's initiative, JRKI's (the umbrella organization for community radios) interventions, or community radio's own initiatives. To reject this pathway, we need evidence that members have joined SK with no clear interest or adequate capacity, or that only a small fraction of members attribute their increased interest and capacity to their own initiatives or to other organisations in their network, outside CRI.

3. Lastly, social media trends or the agenda of external actors have driven the participation of members in SK. It is highly possible that members who are internet literate and savvy already use social media and other online mediums/platforms. As such they perceive SK as another form of social media. Some SK members' are also active in other CSO or NGO-driven networks (for example: WALHI), as such it might be possible that their intention was to use SK as an extension for their own messaging or campaigns. To reject this pathway, we need to prove that SK members have used SK for its unique features of publishing grassroots level information, making it distinguishable from social media. Or we could confirm that members have indeed used SK for their own interests.

*Information that confirms or rejects the pathways:*
Information that *confirms* pathway 1:
It's logical that without operational funds for the website as the platform, there would be no participation at all in SK. CRI allocated IDR 75 million (10 percent of the total budget) for website management, internet, and server colocation in the 2012-2013 period. Since its launch in July 2008, SK has continued to run and be a part of CRI's programmatic interventions. The Suarakomunitas.net domain was registered in March 2009.

In September 2012, a member-based organizational structure was created for SK as an independent entity, allowing SK to be responsible for operating and managing the citizen journalism website. In the period between 2012 and 2014, new articles and content were uploaded on a regular basis, suggesting that the web-based platform was functioning as intended. SK is run like social media platforms, in that it open to the general public to sign up and become a member. However, SK does remain dependent on CRI for funding support.

Information that *confirms* pathway 2:
In the multiple-response questionnaire, when asked which organisations contributed to an improved capacity, 72 percent of the 25 respondents felt that CRI contributed toward their increased capacity, while 60 percent attributed this capacity improvement to JRKI. Interestingly, 52 percent of the respondents reported that they built their capacity via self-initiative. So while there are more sources for capacity improvement, most respondents conclude that CRI is the most predominant actor.

CRI did not work alone to recruit more contributors for SK. CRI worked with JRKI to recruit more contributors from the West Sulawesi region. Trainings and workshops were provided to SK contributors in the 2012-2013 period, particularly improving their journalistic skills. In regions where CRI had a network, CRI used a number of community radios with more experience as hubs for other radio stations nearby. These hubs were able to promote SK and mobilize membership of the online platform.

Information that *confirms* pathway 3:
The spread and penetration of internet and ICT technologies across the country is increasing, with an expected growth of 33 percent in 2013[22]. This represents a general trend that more people are turning to internet and ICT and that radio and television are decreasing in importance as technologies to transfer information.

Information that *rejects* pathway 3:
96 percent of respondents from the SurveyMETER contributors' survey think that although SK has a similar function as other social media, SK has unique features that distinguish it from other online or social media. 87.5 percent of the respondents believe that these features lie in the relevancy of the news, because it does not produce content like mainstream media, but news relevant for the grassroots level. 41.7 percent of the respondents think that SK allows for more focused discourse that

[22] "Outcome report 2011-2013", Press Freedom 2.0, 2014

may lead to effective follow-up of issues by relevant stakeholders. 45.8 percent think that SK content is more credible than other social media.

Interestingly, the survey, although distributed through various means, received mediocre levels of response. 24 of the 25 survey responses were collected through Facebook links, and none from a SK web link, which is meant to be a two way communication platform. This suggests that contributors still prefer to use other social media more regularly.

Not all of the contributors to SK had internet connections prior to 2012. CRI allocated a budget to provide internet connectivity packages (3G modem) to 20 new SK members. This probably helped to increase participation in SK, as the assumption is that those that were provided with internet connections did not have access to online, social media. Although SK grew alongside social media outlets, what drives the participation is the platform's unique feature (grassroots news). But, internet-based journalism and social media are being used in a mutually contributing manner.

*Conclusion:*
Based upon the analysis of the information available, we conclude that the first pathway, the creation of the SK platform is necessary for increased online participation: it is a condition. Also the third pathway, more people having access to ICT and internet is necessary but not sufficient and hence a condition. The second pathway that consists of capacity building efforts by CRI, JRKI and by the online journalists themselves is a sufficient explanation for increased participation. However, given the fact that only 37 % of the contributors consist of community radios, the other contributors may have other strategies in place to build their capacities to participate.
As for causes that lead to pathway 2, the explanation is that CRI's intervention, JRKI's intervention, and members' own initiatives are all *sufficient* to build supporting networks that enhance member capacity and interests, but each organization on its own is not *necessary* since the intervention of others can explain the pathway as well. The majority of the respondents of the contributors' survey attributed their capacity development to a combination of actors, with 72 percent of 25 respondents choosing CRI and 60 percent choosing JRKI.

CRI's role is important in the outcome achievement, particularly in:
- Providing and maintaining the SK citizen journalism website;
- Creating a member based management structure that is open for anyone to join. Although it has its own management structure, appointed by CRI through a strategic planning meeting, SK still relies on CRI for funding.
- Providing trainings to developing capacity and interest of SK members; and
- Providing internet connectivity packages for new SK members.

### 5.3.2 MoH validates data concerning beneficiaries that should be covered by the national health insurance system as stipulated in MoH Letter No.149/2013 on Jamkesmas Participation

*The outcome achieved*
Jamkesmas, a health insurance system managed by the Ministry of Health (MoH) since 2009 has been unpopular nationwide due to the exclusion of people who claim to have a right to the benefits and due to often erroneous beneficiary selection.

Starting from September 2012, CRI began to see this issue as an opportunity to accelerate the achievement of Objective 1 of their logical framework "follow-up actions by stakeholders upon issues escalated in SK". Hence, with funding secured from the Ford Foundation, CRI commissioned *Saluran Informasi Akar Rumput* (Grassroots Information Channel) or SIAR to conduct a series of actions to engage the Ministry of Health to improve the beneficiary selection for Jamkesmas.

On 20 March 2013, the Health Minister signed a letter (No.149/2013) on Jamkesmas Participation, which allowed Jamkesmas beneficiary data validation to be carried out. In Yogyakarta Province, this allowed several people, who suffered from kidney-failure and could not afford proper health services, to be included as Jamkesmas beneficiaries. The validation of beneficiaries helped those potentially excluded to claim their rights for health insurance coverage. However, it seems that beneficiary validation and retargeting has not happened on a larger scale, mainly because the Ministry of Health (MoH) is transitioning into a new scheme under Social Security Agency for Health (BPJS *Kesehatan*), which merges all state-insurance providers under a single management and allows open beneficiary

registration (possibly as a reaction of Jamkesmas' failure). In addition, there is no information available as to how many people benefited from the validation of beneficiaries. Nevertheless, MoH's willingness to validate Jamkesmas beneficiary data as stipulated in the letter can be seen as a change in public sector practice. CRI claims to have contributed to this change. Other than health beneficiary validation, CRI is unable to provide another strong example of attaining Objective 1. Thus, it is worthy to trace whether CRI's effort have caused the issuance of the letter.

Box 1: Background on Jamkesmas, the government's health protection scheme

In 2004, the Ministry of Health introduced a health insurance system, as an initial step towards achieving universal health coverage through a scheme targeting the poor and near poor. *Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat* or Jamkesmas kicked off in January 2005 providing nearly 75 million people with free primary healthcare services.[23] The beneficiaries for the scheme are selected on the basis of household consumption rated determined through a nationally administered survey. Lists of eligible persons are received annually from the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS).[24] The government assigned P.T. Askes to administer membership and operate the program. In 2013, the scheme was expanded to 86.4 million people.[25]

In 2014, the government took a further step towards universal health coverage, by officiating plans to merge four existing health schemes, including Jamkesmas, into one: *Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial* or BPJS Kesehatan (Social Security Agency for Health). This action followed from the government enacted BPJS law in 2011, which saw the establishment of the, not-for-profit administrating agency.[26]

*Causal pathways*

There are three possible pathways that may explain this outcome:

1. MoH acted on public pressure escalated through the media: CRI, as well as mainstream media, conducted efforts to drive media coverage to escalate the issue, believing that this would impose necessary public pressure on MoH. To reject this pathway, evidence is required that shows that such pressure had not taken effect, or that such pressure escalation never materialized. We also proceeded with tracing whether CRI media coverage contributed to, and generated, public pressure upon the MoH.
2. MoH acted upon lobby and advocacy from different possible CSOs and public sector actors like a Yogyakarta-based CSO platform called Sekber Jamkesmas and parliamentarians from other regions such as Sukoharjo District, Central Java. CRI and SIAR are affiliates of Sekber Jamkesmas, who agreed to join forces to lobby MoH on the Jamkesmas case. CRI claims to have facilitated several Sekber Jamkesmas lobby activities. To reject this pathway, we attempted to find evidence that MoH reacted upon their initiative. We traced whether MoH reacted specifically upon Sekber Jamkemas' lobby or upon other CS elements or parliament lobby. Further, we traced whether Sekber Jamkesmas lobby would have worked accordingly without CRI or SIAR facilitation.
3. MoH acts upon its own initiative. To reject this pathway, we needed to prove that there was no media coverage on Jamkesmas issues, and that no CS elements or parliamentarians lobbied for the issuance of a letter. All confirming evidence for the other two pathways would automatically reject this pathway.

[23]Health Market Innovations, "Jamkesmas Scheme". Available from http://healthmarketinnovations.org/program/jamkesmas-scheme (accessed 2 November 2014)

[24]Harimurti, P., Pambudi, E., Pigazzini, A., Tandon, A. 2013. The Nuts & Bolts of Jamkesmas, Indonesia's Government-Financed Health Coverage Program for the Poor and Near-Poor. Washington DC: World Bank. Available from https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/13304 (accessed 2 November 2014)


[25]Elly Burhaini Faizal, "Jamkesmas in 2013 expended with 10 million more entitled", The Jakarta Post, 21 January 2013. Available from http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/01/21/jamkesmas-2013-expanded-with-10-million-more-entitled.html (accessed 2 November 2014)

[26]Harimurti, P., Pambudi, E., Pigazzini, A., Tandon, A. 2013. The Nuts & Bolts of Jamkesmas, Indonesia's Government-Financed Health Coverage Program for the Poor and Near-Poor. Washington DC: World Bank. Available from https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/13304 (accessed 2 November 2014)

*Information that confirms or rejects the pathways:*

Information that *rejects* pathway 1 that MoH reacted to public pressure created by media coverage is as follows. Although CRI supported online coverage through Suara Komunitas and social media, as well as radio coverage to pressure MoH into action, CRI reported that there was no (official) response from MoH to the public pressure from media coverage (herewith called "media pressure"). While there was indeed substantial media coverage of the issue by different media outlets, there is no evidence available to measure the extent to which media pressure on the Jamkesmas issue resulted in the change.

There is no evidence that CRI's media coverage escalated the issue to cause a response from the readers or audiences and in consequence pressurized MoH to take action. However, it is true that CRI contributed to Jamkesmas being covered in the media (via Suara Komunitas, Twitter, radio and TV broadcasts) and in turn that more people in the public probably read or heard about the issue.




Information that *confirms* pathway 2 that dialogue and more traditional forms of lobby by Sekber Jamkesmas and other CSOs in Yogyakarta, as well as pressure from parliamentarians in other regions resulted in the outcome are as follows. Sekber Jamkesmas, led by the Yogyakarta Ombudsman and joined by CSOs like PKBI, CRI and SIAR, began lobbying MoH in February 2013 to review practices on beneficiary selection and validation. Sekber Jamkesmas produced a policy brief that was disseminated six days after the MoH signature on the letter on 20 March 2013. There is no evidence that Sekber Jamkesmas' lobby prior to the issuance of the letter in March 2013 had an effect.

There is also no evidence that Sekber Jamkesmas would not have been able to lobby without CRI or SIAR facilitation. A member of Sekber Jamkesmas pointed to conducive personal relationships amongst members of Sekber Jamkesmas as the main driving factor behind their success. However, he did not deny that CRI and SIAR may have facilitated several meetings and hearings.

Based on an internet search of available documents, it seems that problems in the Jamkesmas beneficiary selection caused nation-wide reaction from CS elements and the parliaments as well[27]. In 2012, parliament members from Sukoharjo District lobbied the MoH regarding Jamkesmas beneficiary

[27]Manajemen Pembiayaan Kesehatan, "JAMKESMAS: DPRD Wonogiri Desak Validasi Data Jamkesmas". Available from http://www.manajemen-pembiayaankesehatan.net/index.php/list-berita/764-jamkesmas-dprd-wonogiri-desak-validasi-data-jamkesmas (accessed 2 November 2014)

issues. This followed community members submitting complaints to the parliament on Jamkesmas coverage. Evidence of these events can be found in local media (www.solopos.com, www.beritasatu.com and www.harianjogja.com). Thus, it is highly possible that other CS elements and local legislatives had moved before or in parallel with Sekber Jamkesmas.

Information that *rejects* pathway 3:
Confirming evidence for pathway 2 automatically rejects this pathway.

*Conclusion:*
Based upon the analysis of the information available, we conclude that the most likely explanation for the Ministry of Health's willingness to validate national health insurance beneficiary data as stipulated in Ministry of Health Letter No.149/2013 on Jamkesmas Participation is pathway 2, as other pathways are not confirmed. This means that the MoH reacted to direct lobby by civil society elements, including Sekber Jamkesmas, and local parliamentarians from Central Java. This is a *sufficient* and *necessary* cause for the outcome. The MoH letter was signed before Sekber Jamkesmas' policy brief was produced, thus Sekber Jamkesmas lobby is not a *sufficient* and *necessary* cause. But Sekber Jamkesmas' other activities prior to submitting their policy brief might have been taken into consideration by the MoH[28]. Sekber Jamkesmas' lobby and that of others CS elements or local parliament are both *sufficient* but not *necessary* to explain the outcome as there is no specific evidence to link the actions of certain actors to the change. Moreover, it can also be concluded that CRI' facilitation for Sekber Jamkesmas is *sufficient* but not *necessary*.

CRI's role was found not to be significant in the achievement of this outcome. First, in pathway 1 CRI did not seem to be successful in generating substantial public pressure through the media that was effective enough to obtain a response from MoH. The evaluation team was not able to find evidence that shows that an increase in media coverage, by CRI's supported Suara Komunitas, or other media outlets pressured MoH to take action. In pathway 2 while CRI participated in Sekber Jamkesmas as a member and claims to have facilitated a number of meetings, there is no evidence that CRI's contributions were necessary. PKBI, another member of Sekber Jamkesmas did not recall specifically how CRI contributed. On the other hand it is possible that early lobby by the Yogyakarta Ombudsman, who was later joined by CS elements to form the Sekber Jamkesmas, may have had a more prominent effect. However, there is insufficient documentary evidence to confirm this other than the fact that the MoH letter was issued prior to the production of Sekber Jamkesmas policy brief.

## 5.4 What is the relevance of these changes?

### 5.4.1 Relevance of the changes in relation to the Theory of Change of 2012

The outcomes for which process tracing was conducted were relevant to the 2012 Theory of Change (ToC). In fact, the baseline exercise in 2012 helped to inform strategic planning with CRI. The ultimate objective of CRI was for autonomous citizen forums or organisations to be more able to participate in collective decision-making and influence the public or private arena. Preconditions for this change to occur were determined in the baseline as follows:

- Critical engagement with government and civil society organisations, characterised by a constructive and impartial relationship between government and CSO;
- 'Information native' society: a society with an adequate capability for knowledge management, characterised by active citizenship, capability to act upon information, and freedom of speech;
- Functional platform for knowledge exchange: sharing of best-practices and lessons learned, characterised by a functional regional platform;
- Networking in information management (same indicator as above);
- Critical engagement, characterised by the active participation of community contributors and their content actuality.

[28]Ibid.

The evaluation focused on confirming the engagement and participation in SK as a functional platform and the 'act upon information'. What the end line has shown is that CRI has not been able fully prove that the platform has contributed to a more informed civil society successfully making demands for better service coverage by the government. CRI drove the production of content and information on the Jamkesmas issue, rather than the citizen forum, or SK, itself reacting to citizen concerns. This means that while interventions were closely related to the ToC, the preconditions were not fully fulfilled, especially in the area of raising critical awareness so that citizen journalism platforms would be ready to engage with the public sector.

Regarding the participation of community radios in the SK platform, CRI has been a significant force. Not only did they provide technical support, they also managed to successfully draw on their network of community radios to expand membership in the SK platform. Since CRI shares its constituency with JRKI, they too have played a role in creating an informative native society. One aspect not included in the ToC was the potentially negative impacts of SK on traditional audio broadcasting by community radio stations, pulling the attention away from producing audio materials to producing online content. Some members of SK raised this issue during the end line evaluation.

In conclusion, critical engagement and the use of ICT, both key elements of Suara Komunitas, are critical to all of CRI's interventions. However, more efforts will be needed for Suara Komunitas to be more than just a critical content provider. As illustrated in the Jamkesmas case, media coverage alone does not cause a change in policy. It was only in 2012 that SK became and independent entity and further organisational strengthening will be needed if it is expected to 'act upon information' autonomously.

### 5.4.2 Relevance of the changes in relation to the context in which the SPO is operating

The Reformation period (1998 and onwards) paved the way for journalists to become more critical and made media a more trusted source of public influence. Now, traditional media is making way to new media powered by the internet. Indonesia has approximately 63 million users, almost one-fourth of the total population.[29] However, "community radio occupies a unique position in Indonesia's local media scene, as it has been established and, where successful, sustained through grassroots initiatives".[30] As such it has the reputation of being a source of critical information and content. CRI has embraced ICT and media as means to critical engagement and freedom of expression, adapting to the changing context. CRI has sought to combine new ICT developments with its tradition network of community radios. In this sense, in terms of its strategy, it has adapted well to changes in the context. For community radios this is of relevance too, especially given a decrease in radio consumption in recent years.[31] However, for some radio stations engagement in SK may be stretching their limited resources to the limit.

Another area where CRI's interventions have been in line with the developing context is through village information systems or SID. In 2014, the government issued the Village Law which requires each village to develop an information system (Article 86)[32]. CRI has extensive experience in developing internet-based applications to assist the performance of village administrations (SID program). Additionally, CRI was able to leverage the utilization of SK in the policy-making process of

[29]Internet Governance Forum. 2014. *Building Bridges: Enhancing Multistakeholder Cooperation for Growth and Sustainable Development*. The Eighth Internet Governance Forum, Bali, Indonesia, 22 – 25 October 2013. United Nations publication. Available from http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/documents/publications/208-igf-2013-building-bridgesenhancing-multistakeholder-cooperation-for-growth-and-sustainable-development/file (accessed 3 November 2014)

[30]Abud, Matt. 2012. *Indonesia: New Digital Nation?*. Internews Center for Innovation and Learning. Available from https://internews.org/sites/default/files/resources/Internews_Indonesia_DigitalNation_2012-07.pdf (accessed 10 September 2014)

[31]Ambardi, K., Parahita, G., Lindawati, L., Sukarno, A., Aprilia, N. 2014. *Mapping Digital Media: Indonesia*. Country Report. London: Open Society Foundations. Available from http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/mapping-digital-media-indonesia-20140326.pdf (accessed 3 November 2014)

[32]Indonesia. 2014. *Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 6 Tahun 2014 Tentang Desa*. Available from http://www.spi.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/UU_NO_6_2014-Desa.pdf (accessed 3 November 2014)

the Village Law in 2012. A parliamentary meeting on the draft Village Bill was open to the general public through SK, allowing citizens to provide live feedback through SMS, Twitter and Facebook[33].

For CRI to remain relevant to these important developments, it will have to think carefully about its position. As discussed in other sections of this report, CRI experienced high staff turnover and is in the process of delimitating its role towards community radios vis-à-vis JRKI. CRI has claimed that it wants to play a connector role. As a 'resource institute' it has to consider what resources and vital services it plans to offer to whom; and how this will enhance critical engagement and widen space for representation, balancing traditional media with digital media.

### 5.4.3 Relevance of the changes in relation to the policies of the MFS II alliance and the CFA

In 2008, Hivos defined a strategy for 'civil society building' (CSB). Within the Hivos Vision Paper, Hivos defined civil society as a sphere "outside state, corporate sector and family – where people organise themselves to pursue their individual, group or common (public) interests". It further states, "Civil society is not restricted to (professional) intermediary, non-governmental organisations; on the contrary, it consists first and foremost of community-based and membership organisations, trade unions, religious organisations, and traditional associations."[34]

Hivos' support to CRI fits within the scope of the vision defined in 2008. In particular, Hivos recognized the important emergence of virtual movements that has gone hand-in-hand with the development of communications technology. Virtual networks are considered a form of collective action and a means to promote citizenship. Access to information promotes exchanges between citizens and is a tool to engage with other spheres.[35]

CRI's 'Act Upon Information' initiative falls under Hivos' Expression and Engagement programme. This programme aims to "improve the quality and diversity of the media, to give more people access to these media, to increase citizen's participation and to strengthen public support for the independent media"[36]. MFS II funds were intended to support this programme. Two Result Areas defined in the Hivos proposal under the Expression and Engagement programme are relevant to CRI: 1. the space for cultural expression and freedom of speech has been expanded and is actively used, and; 2. the space for citizen engagement in social processes has been expanded, resulting in social debate and cultural dialogue. In the proposal to MFS, Hivos proposed to expand the space for cultural and social expression, improve the quality of information and diversify information sources. Specifically, "ICT & (new) media play an essential role in constructing the desired critical dialogue between government and politics on the one hand and individual and organised citizens on the other."[37]

Out of four Hivos programmes outlined in the Business Plan, around 70 million (18 percent) of a total planned 387.9 MFS funding was budgeted for the Expression and Engagement portfolio globally[38]. Hivos received 20 percent less of the originally planned total from MFS II.[39] From 2011 to 2013, Expression and Engagement was the third largest out of the four programme areas in Indonesia in terms of annual expenditures (14.4 percent in 2011, 18.0 percent in 2012, and 17.9 percent in 2013).[40]

The changes achieved in the 2012-2014 period with regards to a strengthened media network and online platforms through CRI's interventions are relevant to the CFA's own strategy and proposed interventions. Through Suara Komunitas, community radios and other contributors have been given an opportunity to express their opinions and citizens have access to bottom-up information. As explained

[33] Nugroho, Yanuar and Syarif, S. Shinta. 2012. *Beyond Click-Activism? New Media and Political Processes in Contemporary Indonesia*. fesmedia Asia series. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Available from http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/asia-media/09240.pdf (accessed 3 November 2014)
[34] "Hivos Vision Paper on Civil Society Building", Hivos, 2008, p. 6
[35] Ibid, p. 11
[36] "Hivos Business Plan 2012-2015", p. 15
[37] "Hivos Alliance MFS application 2011-2015 Phase II", Hivos, p. 4 (English translation)
[38] "Hivos Business Plan 2012-2015", Hivos, p. 13
[39] "MFS Report Hivos Alliance 2011", Hivos, 2011, p. 67
[40] Expenditures by country / by programme taken from Hivos Alliance MFS Reports 2011, 2012 and 2013

in other sections, this has not yet resulted in broad citizen activism; acts upon information through CRI support are still limited to two cases.

## 5.5 Explaining factors

### 5.5.1 Internal factors

CRI's staff has almost entirely been replaced by new people, with just a handful left who were part of CRI during the baseline. The in-country evaluation team considers that high employee turnover may have potentially led to a loss in institutional knowledge, history and networks, which may translate into lower institutional efficiency. With so many employees leaving and or having being replaced, the organisation has been in the midst of recovering from the changes, which has cost time and attention. The absence of a monitoring and evaluation department has not helped this transition either, as knowledge and lesson learned were not properly documented, making it thus the more challenging to retain critical knowledge.

The baseline report and CRI's ToC expected that with the availability of information, critical awareness would be built leading to actions by grassroots groups or leading to pressure being applied on public or private sector actors. CRI expected this to occur organically. As it has turned out, direct interventions by CRI, such as the participation in Sekber Jamkesmas and pushing for the SK network to cover Jamkesmas cases, is still necessary. The SK program staff have had to manage a broad range of areas and issues, including monitoring the program. This has been quite a burden, in spite of an increase in the number of staff since the baseline.

### 5.5.2 External factors

SK as a platform for citizen journalism, community radios and the social media; has become more relevant and much more in demand. Civil society movements and government programs (such as BPJS online registration and tax registration) are increasingly making use of ICT and web platforms to produce and disseminate information. The combination of diminished state control over media since the Reformation and rapid technological and infrastructural development of ICT has given rise to these conditions. Indonesia is now the fifth largest Twitter user, and ranks fourth in global Facebook usage. Social media has become more important for civic engagement. The Coins for Prita movement is an example of how public support was rallied in 2009 through social media, drawing volunteers who were willing to collect donations that would help Prita Mulyasari seek justice through the court system. More people also use social media to shape values and opinion of others. The presidential elections in 2014 saw Facebook users openly declare their political aspirations, some trying to influence the choice of others. This has never happened on such a scale in Indonesia before, illustrating the penetration of online media into the daily lives and choices of people.

Alternative media platforms like SK that promote citizen journalism are popular amongst citizens that have become more critical of mainstream media. Many of the large television stations are owned by media conglomerates who are politically connected. In the recent elections, certain mainstream media were blatantly biased in their news coverage, trying to drive public votes to certain candidates. A national TV channel aired false quick count results, and even went as far as falsely declaring the victory of the candidate that received the backing of the television station's owner.

While there is a global trend which shows that more countries are beginning to limit internet freedom, Indonesia' internet freedom is not faring too badly: ranked 26$^{th}$ among 60 countries being evaluated as most case found is only related to "political, social, and/or religious content blocked".[41] CRI has been able to keep abreast with these developments in ICT and internet media, and are even helping to chart a new course. The current environment has been very conducive for the development of the SK

[41]Freedom House. 2013. *FREEDOM ON THE NET 2013: A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media*. Full Report. October 3. Available from https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/resources/FOTN%202013_Full%20Report_0.pdf (accessed 4 November 2014)

platform, especially given that it is linked to news sources that are trusts (citizen journalists and community radios).

### 5.5.3 Relations CFA-SPO

Hivos has supported CRI since 2006. The SK program has received long-term, crucial Hivos support since the very early stages of its development. SK has become an adjoining factor in all of CRI's interventions; and given the growth of the internet and its relevance, it will only become more important in the future. SK has become the flagship of CRI's programs, which have now attracted other donors to join Hivos in supporting it.

One of the specific objectives of Hivos' support to CRI was to develop the SPO's internal capacity (Objective 6: Improved internal organizational development, specifically in internal mechanism and capacity building for management staff members). In July 2012, CRI directors and managers agreed to the need to improve organizational capacity, and strategic planning meetings were undertaken seemingly with Hivos support. Both the Co Funding Agency and its partner looked to be aware of the need to improve internal capacity. During the end line, it did not appear that interventions had their intended affect. If SK is seen to have not reached its full potential, part of the problem lies with internal management.

Of note is that Hivos discontinued its partnership with CRI because it found that CRI was well positioned and successfully attracting sufficient donor support and no longer required Hivos' contribution[42]. Larger donors like the World Bank financed PNPM Support Facility and Ford Foundation are providing much larger and more significant support than Hivos.

[42]Interview with Dyana Savina Hutadjulu, Hivos Programme Officer for Expression & Engagement, 2014

# 6 Discussion

## 6.1 Design of the intervention

The Suara Komunitas interventions in the 2012-2014 period were designed to build on the foundations laid in previous support periods. In the design, follow-up actions to issues brought up through community media would be supported. The outputs identified in the logical framework developed by CRI were not sufficient to bring about this main objective. It was not clear how members trained in journalistic skills, the establishment of SK as a membership-based organisation, expansion of membership base, network expansion to including bloggers, technological support, and content analysis and distribution[43] would necessarily lead to the desired change.

Another observation is that the assumptions and preconditions in CRI's ToC were not sufficient. CRI assumed that creating critical awareness through citizen journalism platforms would 'naturally' or 'organically' provide ammunition to engage with the public sector and undertake actions. The assumption seemed to be that SK, as a platform, would promote an exchange of information which would lead to interventions undertaken by network members or would spark a reaction from the public or private sphere. What the evaluation showed was that specific actions were needed to bring about the 'act upon information'. SK members may need more than just critical journalism capacity to use their information to create change. They may need capacity in lobby and advocacy or campaign messaging. In hindsight, more inputs and actions would be required to create a space for interaction with decision and policy-makers. CRI itself could have facilitated this to a larger extent, or SK as an organisation could have played this role if it had sufficient institutional capacity support.

Whether or not there were local actions undertaken by SK members in regions supported by CRI cannot be determined since there were no specific indicators designed to monitor this, nor was there a system in place to capture and report such actions. It is also questionable whether or not SK as an independent organisation can undertake these functions since its social organs are composed of editors and journalists, rather including activist-based or experience lobby organisations.

Last, community radio's engagement and eagerness to contribute to SK may have led some of them away from their core business, which is producing audio content. This is a risk that could have been anticipated from the start.

From the experiences and practices of the 'Act Upon Information', it would be fair to say that the model applied by CRI is replicable. This model entails creating alternative online platforms that allow traditional media (like community radios), citizen journalists and bloggers to express their opinions of issues that are relevant to them. However, more resources and efforts need to go into building skills and ability to utilize these opinions and bottom-up information towards strategic lobby and advocacy agendas. Some small examples of how this can happen have begun emerge, such as the interactive policy debate on the Draft Bill for the Village Law in 2012, which placed SK in a position to challenge the government.

CRI's other ICT-based interventions, such as the village information systems, are also powerful tools to influence politicians and decision-makers in the need to be more transparent and accountable. SK can also function in similar areas by stimulating contributors to report on specific strategic issues such as corruption or elections. Content and information would have to be systematically compiled, on the basis of which SK or its network could demand for the public or private sphere to be more accountable for their performance.

[43] "Proposal Hivos SK 2012 final Combine", Hivos, 2012

# 7 Conclusion

In the 2012-2014 period, CRI identified two important changes in the civil society context to which they claimed to be contributing to. The first change related to and improved 'level of organisation' of their community radio constituents through the online platform Suara Komunitas or SK. The membership of SK grew by 22 percent between 2012 and 2014, from 665 to 856 contributing members. This correlated with a doubling of the number of articles produced. Evaluation findings confirm that SK has allowed for members to improve their ability to network and that news and information on the platform is more relevant to grassroots issues.

The SK platform was also intended to be a means for the generation of action resulting from disseminated information. This is one of the key elements of CRI's Theory of Change as well as the interventions proposed and supported through Hivos and MFS II. However, the evaluation team found that SK itself does not automatically generate follow up by public or private sector actors. Rather, more traditional forms of advocacy and lobby are still required and arguably more effective in generating pressure for better services to be delivered by the government. This is evident from the case of government health insurance beneficiary data. Escalated media coverage by CRI through SK, Twitter and television and radio broadcasting did not lead to the willingness of the Ministry of Health to validate and correct insurance beneficiary data. One of the weaknesses of CRI's interventions has been the inability to monitor the impact of content produced. Without such monitoring, it is difficult for CRI to claim 'acts upon information'.

Given the above, the evaluation team concludes that the first outcome can be attributed to the role of the SPO and MFS II funding, but that there is insufficient evidence to conclude the same about the second outcome.

Nonetheless, these changes are relevant to the current development context of Indonesia. The general public and the government is increasingly taking advantage of information and communications technology (ICT) to raise critical awareness, express views and opinions and improve the quality of information and services delivered to the public. CRI has demonstrated an ability to develop and apply ICT as a means to bridge the digital divide and to recognize the key role of the internet in media convergence. CRI, through its village information system initiatives, has provided communities with access to digital information that can be used to promote better governance and village administration functions. With regards to media convergence, SK has become a means to cross-promote content from community radio broadcast media, citizen journalism and bloggers. This has attracted the attention and support from a number of larger development partners and donors in the country.

As an organisation CRI is trying to reaffirm itself as a 'connector' that facilitates linkages between its network with public and private sector actors. To be a connector and facilitate two-way exchanges between citizens and public and private sectors, CRI will need to more clearly define what the shared priorities are between these actors.

Table 10

*Summary of findings.*

| When looking at the MFS II interventions of this SPO to strengthen civil society and/or policy influencing, how much do you agree with the following statements? | Score |
|---|---|
| The CS interventions were well designed | 6 |
| The CS interventions were implemented as designed | 6 |
| The CS interventions reached their objectives | 5 |
| The observed outcomes are attributable to the CS interventions | 5 |
| The observed CS outcomes are relevant to the beneficiaries of the SPO | 5 |

Score between 1 to 10, with 1 being "not at all" and 10 being "completely".

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| *Name of key informant* | *Organisation* | *Function in organisation* | *Relation with SPO* | *Contact details including e-mail.* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Akhmad Muharram | Combine | Director | Staff | akhmad@combine.or.id |
| Imung Yuniardi | Combine | Program Deputy Director | Staff | imung@combine.or.id |
| Aris Harianto | Combine | Program Manager | Staff | aris@combine.or.id |
| Irman Ariadi | Combine | Area Coordinator | Staff | iariadi@gmail.com |
| Anton Birowo | UGM | Vice Rector 3 | External Resource Person | +628112503193 |
| Feri Van Dalis | Walhi Bengkulu | Field Staff | Suara Komunitas Contributor | +628227682513 |
| Iman Abdurrahman | JRKI | Advocacy Coordinator | CSO network | abdurrahman2077@gmail.com |
| Istiatun | KID Yogyakarta | Commissioner | CSO network | sekretariat@komisiinformasi.go.id |
| Ignatius Praptorahardjo | PKBI | Board | CSO network | praptorahardjo@gmail.com |
| Dyana Savina | Hivos | Programme | CPA | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hutadjulu | | Officer for Expression and Engagement | | |

# Appendix 1 Civil Society Scores

This table presents the appreciation of the evaluation team regarding changes occurred for each indicator between 2012 and 2014 on a scale of -2 to + 2.

- 2 = Considerable deterioration
- 1 = A slight deterioration
  0 = no change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012
+1 = slight improvement
+2 = considerable improvement

| Dimension | | Indicators | Question | Change in the indicators in the 2012 – 2014 period |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Civic engagement** | 1 | Needs of marginalised groups | How does your organisation take the needs of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups into account in your planning, actions, activities, and/or strategies? | +1 |
| | 2 | Involvement of target groups | What is the level of participation of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups in the analysis, planning and evaluation of your activities? | +1 |
| | 3 | Political engagement | How intense is your (individual staff or organisational) participation in locally-nationally elected bodies and/or sectoral user groups? | 0 |
| | | | | |
| **Level of organisation** | 5 | Relations with other organisations | In the past 12 months what has been the most intensive interaction you had with other CSOs? | + 1 |
| | 5 | Frequency of dialogue with closest CSO | In the past 12 months how many meetings did you have with the CSO that you have most intensive interaction with? | + 1 |
| | 6 | Defending the interests of marginalised groups | Which CSO are most effective in defending the interests of your target groups? In the past 12 months, how did you relate to those CSOs? | +1 |
| | 7 | Composition current financial resource base | How does your organisation finance institutional costs such as workshops of the General Assembly (if applicable); attendance to workshops of other CSOs; costs for organisational growth and/or networking? | + 2 |
| | | | | |
| **Practice of Values** | 8 | Downward accountability | To what extent can mandatory social organs (steering committee, general assembly, internal auditing group) ask your executive leaders to be accountable to them? | +1 |
| | 9 | Composition of social organs | What % of members of your mandatory social organs belong to the marginalised target groups you are working with/for? | 0 |
| | 10 | External financial auditing | How regularly is your organisation audited externally? | 0 |
| | | | | |
| **Perception of impact** | 11 | Client satisfaction | What are the most important concerns of your target groups? How do your services take into account those important concerns? | +1 |
| | 12 | Civil society impact. | In the past 12 months, what impact did you have on building a strong civil society? | +1 |
| | 13 | Relation with public sector organisations | In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with public sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' objectives? | +1 |
| | 14 | Relation with private sector organisations | In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with private sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' perspective? | 0 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 15 | Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations | How successful have you been in influencing public policies and practices in the past 2 years? | 0 |
| | 16 | Influence upon private sector agencies' policies, rules, regulations. | How successful have you been in influencing private sector policies and practices in the past 2 years? | 0 |
| | | | | |
| **CS context** | 17 | Coping strategies | In the past 2 years, how did your organisation cope with these changes in the context that may have been positive or negative consequences for civil society? | +1 |

# Appendix 2 Changes in civil society indicators between 2012 and 2014

## 1. Civic Engagement

### 1.1. Needs of marginalised groups SPO

There is no change since the baseline in CRI's strategy to engage civil society. CRI does not position itself as the frontline defender of marginalised groups. As such, whether the interests of these marginalised groups are well addressed depends much more on the intermediate organisations (community radios) with which CRI is working. CRI has tried to mobilize the participation of community radios in a web-based citizen journalism platform, *Suara Komunitas* or SK (Voice of the Community) whose aim is to become a strategic medium to support advocacy regarding the fulfilling of basic rights of the citizens. With Hivos' support since 2006, there has been an increase in the number of SK web visitors, contributors, articles and topics as a result of CRI attempts to improve the participation and ability of community radios to reflect upon and produce information by improving their critical journalism capacity.

Based on CRI project documents, there is 20 percent increase in number of SK contributors from 2012 to 2013 (665 to 833), and up to August 2014 the number have become 856 contributors. There is only a 7 percent increase in number of web visitors from 2012-2013, but there is 56 percent increase in the number of articles produced in that period (which means that more participants are producing articles rather than just viewing). The number of articles rose from 2,951 to 4,630 from 2012-2013, which means that on average the production of content by each contributor increased from 4 articles in 2012 to 5 articles in 2013. These statistics show that more community radios are participating in SK and by doing so they are escalating issues and creating greater opportunity and power to engage the public and private sectors. Based on these findings, it can be concluded that during the past two years CRI has contributed to engaging more community radios and increasing their capability to defend marginalised groups.

### 1.2. Involvement of target groups SPO

According to CRI's management, community radios (CRI's intermediary organisations), have been more involved and been able to take more initiative in the past two years. In September 2012, SK's organisational structure was revamped, becoming an open membership community (*perkumpulan*) whose structure consists of an ethical board, executives, editor, and contributors[44]. This structure (member-based) has given CRI's target groups more opportunity to be involved and take greater responsibility in managing SK on their own, including website maintenance and editorial affairs, planning and organizing events and meetings, or contacting other partners. CRI management claimed that the SK program had been formulated together with the target groups, however there's no clear evidence as to when it has been done or whether all members were given equal opportunity to participate in the planning.

The involvement of SK members in strategic planning and in influencing the organizational direction of CRI seems to be limited. This may stem from the way financial resources are channelled to SK. As a new organisation, SK is still very much dependent on CRI for funding, and this financial dependence may allow the SK agenda to be driven by CRI. There is an uneasy contradiction between the increased level of involvement of community radios in SK vis-à-vis a financial dependence on CRI. This has

[44]http://suarakomunitas.net/baca/26319/bangun-lembaga-suara-komunitas/

surfaced through CRI's hesitancy to ask SK members to conduct stakeholder mapping, in requests from SK leadership to more freedom to manage funds according to their own initiatives[45], and in the form of requests from SK members for financial incentives to compensate for their contribution to SK[46].

### 1.3. Intensity of political engagement SPO

None of the new, or former, CRI personnel or board members are engaged in the political arena. As such, there is no change since the baseline. CRI has begun to see itself more as a 'connector', facilitating the ability of their network to share information which can be utilized in communication or lobby to policy-makers. CRI itself does not consider direct political engagement as an area where they should take part.

A recent example from this comes from JRKI's work in 2012 to lobby for the revision of Broadcasting Law No.32/2002 which is necessary for community radios' sustainability[47]. CRI facilitated JRKI to provide policy inputs, participating in the process but not leading it. With Ford Foundation support, CRI also worked with SIAR and a coalition of civil society actors to lobby the Ministry of Health for the validation of Jamkesmas beneficiaries in 2013. Currently CRI's role is less as a frontline in lobby activities compared to the baseline, and more as a facilitator and connector for their network to engage in political issues[48].

## 2. Level of Organisation

### 2.1 Relations with other organisations SPO

In terms of numbers, not much has changed with regards to CRI's network with other CSOs. CRI has kept its traditional and informal network with Yogyakarta-based CSOs such as PKBI, KID, IRE, IDEA. Although informal in nature, this network is considered proactive and responsive, as seen from how they worked together to advocate for better targeting of Jamkesmas (the social health insurance program for the poor and near-poor). See indicator 4.5 for further details on this. CRI's intermediate organizations reported that the number of organisations in their network has slightly increased as a result of CRI intervention[49].

CRI refers to *Jaringan Radio Komunitas Indonesia* (JRKI), the official umbrella organization for community radio, as their "younger brother". JRKI was set up in 2002[50] for the purpose of advocating for a broadcasting draft bill, in which CRI was involved as one of the frontline actor. JRKI's main responsibility is to engage politically, protecting the interest of its constituents. One their most important agenda at present is to revise the Broadcasting Law No.32/2002 which does not provide community radios with sufficient protection against private sector media. CRI is regarded by JRKI as the main knowledge resource provider for its constituents, and also partner in advocacy works.

CRI's relationship with JRKI has evolved as CRI has nurtured JRKI's capacity overtime, which has meant that some roles originally taken on by CRI have been completely transferred to JRKI, while others are still shared. CRI has left the tasks of expanding the community radio network and registration of community radios to JRKI since 2004. However, as JRKI's organisational capacity and capability is still weak, CRI's relationship with JRKI is still characterized by an interdependence relation. For JRKI, recent cooperation with CRI sought to benefit from CRI's management capacity, and experience in, for example, securing sponsors, budget management and reporting. CRI in turn benefitted from JRKI's fieldwork expertise and network base. An example of this type of partnership

[45] *Kharisma Prasetyo et al*, Evaluation Workshop, June 2014.
[46] *Kharisma Prasetyo et al*, Survey Kontributor SK, August 2014.
[47] Proposal_revisi_uu_penyiaran.doc
[48] *Kharisma Prasetyo et al*, Interview with JRKI, July 2014.
[49] *Kharisma Prasetyo et al*, Survey Kontributor SK, August 2014.
[50] http://jrki.wordpress.com/about/

was the 2012-initiated lobby for the revisions of the Broadcasting Law supported by Hivos[51]. In 2014, CRI and JRKI also partnered to secure funds from the PNPM Support Facility (engaging community radios for PNPM program monitoring).

As reported during the evaluation workshop, CRI's strategic planning conducted in late 2012 is another example of how the CRI-JRKI relationship has evolved. Although there are no available documents regarding the strategic planning results, actors close to CRI (including JRKI and community radios) confirmed that it has resulted in better and more consistent CRI positioning with a role as resource provider for community radios. For example, CRI no longer provides support for individual community radios on technical problems, encouraging them to seek help from other community radios within the JRKI network.

## 2.2. Frequency of dialogue with closest civil society organisation SPO

CRI's closest partner is JRKI given their shared network and interests and CRI's contribution to the founding of JRKI. Throughout 2014, CRI frequently interacted with JRKI as they were collaborating on the PSF-supported National Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM). For this purpose, JRKI staffs were working from the CRI office on a daily basis for a period of around four months. CRI also had an intense collaboration with JRKI and KontraS to monitor the presidential and legislative elections of 2014.

Reflecting on this most recent case described above, it would seem that the intensity of CRI's relations with JRKI has increased, in comparison to the baseline situation. Hivos' support also contributed to this increase as they funded the SK program and discussions on the revision of the Broadcasting Law, both platforms for CRI and JRKI cooperation. With regards to the SK initiative, CRI collaborated with JRKI to recruit contributors to the web platform in 2013.

However, there are concerns about the CRI-JRKI relationship, particularly with regards to each of the organisation's position in relation to their shared network of community radios. There is also concern that many of CRI's network relations with JRKI, as well as with other CSOs, have relied on personal relations of former CRI staff. This may affect the nature and frequency of CRI's relations to other CSOs in the future. Moreover, CRI's focus on SK does not always generate positive benefit to JRKI. The evaluation team received critical inputs from JRKI, namely that by mobilizing community radios to contribute to SK (internet-based media), CRI has unexpectedly pulled some community radio activists from their roots (audio-based media).

## 2.3. Defending the interests of marginalised groups SPO

Between 2012 and 2014, CRI aimed to improve their intermediate organisations' (community radios) capacity to defend the interest of the community they represent, by enabling them to participate and contribute to the citizen journalism website, SK. CRI believes that issues escalated through SK will be of use in lobbying the public or private sector for the benefit of the community. As earlier noted, there has been 20 percent increase in the number of SK contributors from 2012 to 2013, and a further increase in 2014 (22 percent). This has gone hand-in-hand with the production of more articles and website visitors. This shows that community radios are participating more in SK. Also worth noting is that the percentage of new female contributors grew between 2011 and 2012. In 2011, SK successfully attracted 97 new contributors, of which 24.75 percent were women. In 2012, SK grew with 92 contributors of which 31.6 percent were women.

Despite the improvements, CRI and its IOs do not have a system in place to monitor whether there are actions being undertaken by their target audience on the basis of information produced through the SK platform. In addition, it is difficult to know whether CRI, JRKI and SK contributors are always committed to representing community interests. The same could be said for new SK contributors, many of them bloggers. Critical remarks can also be made in the way the Jamkesmas issue was promoted and advocated. It was clear that CRI drove the production of relevant content push for the

[51]Proposal_revisi_uu_penyiaran.doc

escalation of the issue, rather than community radios in its network having critical awareness and driving an issue derived from the grassroots. It took Ford Foundation's financial contribution to push a chain of actions that should have happened regularly according to CRI' theory of change, and one that was clearly an objective in the proposal to Hivos. In their report to Ford Foundation, CRI admits that the program was an acceleration effort to achieve an outcome that should have been realized two years prior[52].

### 2.4. Composition financial resource base SPO

According to the participants in the workshop conducted with the SPO, compared to the previous program period, CRI is currently working with a smaller total budget as a result of decreasing Hivos support, while amounts from other sources remain the same. However, the extent to which this has indeed impacted heavily on the financial resource base of the SPO is unclear, as CRI has attracted sizeable funding from the Ford Foundation, five times larger than the contribution from Hivos. For example, during the 2012-2013 period, CRI received support from the following donors: Ford Foundation (US$ 360,000 for 24 months), Hivos (€60.000 for 22 months), and PSF (US$ 250,000 for 18 months). In 2012, Hivos contributed just 9 percent of CRI's total budget. In 2013 CRI received most of its funding from (in order of largest contributor to smallest): Ford Foundation, PSF, Hivos, ACCESS II, DAI-USAID, Misereor and Osaka University.[53] Going forward though, CRI may indeed face a challenge in maintaining the financial resources and funding base they have had.

In the 2012-2014 period, the three largest donors (Ford Foundation, PSF and Hivos) all supported SK. CRI differentiated each contribution based on the provinces covered. Hivos funds covered SK development in 6 provinces, Ford Foundation in 4 provinces, and PSF in 9 provinces. CRI also claimed to allocate each donor's funding to a specific focus. Hivos' funds aimed for activities related to strengthening the network at regional level; Ford Foundation for SK collaboration with other media to push the act upon information; while PSF for both strategies where it is related to PNPM program monitoring[54]. However, such differentiation still allows overlaps as similar initiatives are funded by all contributors. CRI can report the same result to two or more donors, as was the case with Jamkesmas validation mentioned in the indicator above (it is worthy to note that during the MFS-II evaluation workshop, the Jamkesmas validation was repeatedly mentioned by workshop participants as evidence for several indicators).

## 3. Practice of Values

### 3.1. Downward accountability SPO

CRI continues to hold regular quarterly meetings with the board members to allow the board to supervise organizational performance. However, CRI currently does not seem to have dedicated personnel for monitoring and evaluation in their organizational and personnel structure[55] although the baseline report and Hivos assessment suggested otherwise. As for sharing project and financial reports to CRI's target groups, in the SPO began to upload annual reports on their website for public access[56] (although the report does not provide figures for financial contributions by donors).

The MFS-II baseline in July 2012 was used as a valuable moment for CRI to reflect on its organization and led to a strategic planning meeting in December 2012. During the strategic planning, CRI tried to cope with increasing demand from the CS arena and aligned it with existing capacity and CRI's vision and mission[57].

[52]Laporan Pilot Kolaborasi Media Jan-Feb 2013.pdf, p.1
[53]Combine Resource Institute Annual Report 2013. Accessible online: issuu.com/combineri/docs/laporan_tahunan_2013?e=11457886/10009034
[54]PenjelasantambahankeHivos2012-Hivos.pdf
[55]http://www.combine.or.id/profil-2/struktur-lembaga/
[56]http://www.combine.or.id/2014/03/laporan-tahunan-combine-resource-institution-tahun-2013/
[57]Progress Report HIVOS COMBINE #RO.SEA at HO 1004708, p.13

### 3.2 Composition of social organs SPO

There are no significant changes in the composition of the social organs of the SPO, although there have been internal personnel changes. In the past three years, two additional personnel were included in CRI's board. One of the new board members is the former CRI program manager. As during the baseline, none of the board members come from community radios (CRI's IOs). Suara Komunitas is an open network-based organization with a board of experts, a board of ethics, a chief editor and regional editors in 31 provinces. Its membership has grown to include community radios, NGOs and bloggers. This indicator is less relevant for CRI.

### 3.3. External financial auditing SPO

Annual audits are, as during the baseline, a part of CRI's organizational code of conduct and an internal performance indicator. Audits have been conducted regularly since 2008[58]. Hivos funded CRI's institutional audit for 2012-2013.

## 4. Perception of Impact

### 4.1. Client satisfaction SPO

CRI does not monitor the satisfaction of the users of SK or SID. Evaluation workshop participants only referred to the increasing level of SK participation within the last two years as evidence of increased client satisfaction. For the purpose of this evaluation, a survey amongst SK contributors was conducted, with the following findings:

- 88 percent of the respondents agreed that CRI contributed to facilitating/creating a network around them.
- 72 percent of the respondents feel that CRI contributed to their increased capacity.
- 60 percent attribute capacity development to JRKI, and 52 percent reported that capacity improvement was through self-initiative.
- 32 percent agree that their capacity has increased since participating in SK. Moreover, all respondents felt they now had adequate capacity after they participated in SK, while before, on 24 percent felt they had required capacity.
- 87.5 percent of the respondents believe that SK has unique features and that content is not like mainstream media news in that it is more relevant for the grassroots level.
- 68 percent perceive that there has been adequate follow-up toward escalated issues on SK.

Overall, the above survey results strongly suggest that there is more satisfaction since the baseline, especially with regards to SK. However, the last finding is rather questionable since it is contrary to the general evaluation findings and it is not supported by documents. CRI does not inventory or monitor the extent to which issues are followed up. Aside from the Jamkesmas validation case, dissemination of several position papers regarding bird flu, and the tweeting of facts regarding BOS (government school operational funds program), there is no further evidence of issue follow-up within the past three years. There is no adequate evidence from the SK contributor survey to attribute a change in public service provision to SK interventions, although the survey findings do suggest a satisfaction of SK (and the service of providing information thought the platform).

With regards to the satisfaction of IOs (community radio stations) with CRI's services in general, the SPO admits that some of their IOs may be less satisfied than during the baseline. They ascribe this to the repositioning that has taken place within CRI itself and see disappointment as a natural reaction to such changes. CRI's position has brought in what the organization describes, "a new style of

[58]Dokumen "penjelasantambahankeHivos2012.pdf"

cooperation and new opportunities to be able to do something about issues faced in their communities"[59].

## 4.2. Civil society impact SPO

The evaluation team found no strong evidence in the workshop or in available documents of a stronger civil society through CRI's direct interventions, or by way of improved performance of the community radio network in providing services to the local population since the baseline. Except for one example that is not strongly attributable to CRI's interventions (community radio activists in Palopo, Sulawesi advocating the Department of Forestry to protect indigenous forests), there is no information about how CRI and its IOs have impacted civil society in the last two years. Rather it seems that CRI selects topics to be advocated based on what local community radio initiatives it finds interesting[60].

CRI's progress reports provided no specific evidence or cases regarding the impact of CRI's efforts in providing communities with alternative sources of information. The 2012 report, for example, only went as far as claiming that CRI had created more opportunities for such impacts to happen[61], and an increase of community radio participation in SK (as detailed in indicator 1.1) as impacts to civil society. The latter point on SK participation is a fair observation (as shown in increased number of contributors, visitors, coverage, and articles). As such it could be said that civil society actors, especially community radios, have come together in a joint effort to improve information to be used to influence public and private sector arenas. The SK contributor survey also supports this argument as it reported that 88 percent respondents agreed that CRI had contributed in facilitating/creating network around them. In response to another question in the survey, 72 percent referred to an escalation of issues to push follow-up from relevant stakeholders as their motivation in joining SK. This shows that SK (if we consider this as an IO platform of CRI) has improved its performance since the baseline.

With regards to improving effective network capacity of its community radios, CRI was expected to conduct stakeholder mapping/inventory. CRI reported that this was done for Yogyakarta and North Sumatra province, but there has been little evidence that it occurred beyond these provinces. In September 2014, CRI planned to conduct more stakeholder inventories as part of its joint advocacy support to community radios[62] on specific issues or cases.

The evaluation does not wish to discredit the potential impact of community radios at the local, grassroots level. There are certainly positive changes that occurred. However, with the given resources and time for this evaluation, the team was unable to find evidence of this. From our observation, CRI is still regarded as reputable resource organization in the area of community media development, specializing in community radios. Many community radios have been established in marginalised area with the help from CRI, and such interventions surely have had positive impacts on civil society. Many studies (Gaida & Searle, 1980; White, 1976, 1977; Leslie, 1978; Jamison & McAnany, 1978; Byram, Kaute, & Matenge, 1980; Hall & Dodds, 1977; McAnany, 1976) have shown that such interventions have a civic education value. In this regard, Sweeney and Parlato (1982, p. 13) concluded that "...radio plays an effective educational role both as the sole medium or in conjunction with print and group support." [63] It is unfortunate that no hard evidence can be collected given the limits of the evaluation. In the future, CRI and JRKI should put more efforts into monitoring and documenting such impacts and changes.

## 4.3. Relation with public sector organisations SPO

CRI has no direct relations with public sector organisations except by promoting the implementation of SID to village governments and engaging in lobby together with other CSO actors. The number of village governments implementing SID has increased in the 2012-2014 period, with more village

[59]Evaluation workshop conducted with CRI
[60]http://www.combine.or.id/2014/09/combine-dan-media-komunitas-advokasi-isu-lokal-pascapemilu-2014/
[61]Progress Report HIVOS COMBINE #RO.SEA at HO 1004708, p.4
[62]http://www.combine.or.id/2014/09/combine-dan-media-komunitas-advokasi-isu-lokal-pascapemilu-2014/
[63]Ndubuisi Goodluck Nwaerondu and Gordon Thompson, *The Use of Educational Radio in Developing Countries: Lessons from the Past*, Worldbank online archive.

governments being serviced by CRI (figures presented under Indicator 1.1). District governments have also been involved in coordinating the SID intervention. As for engagement in lobbying with other actors, since the baseline CRI contributed to the validation of Jamkesmas beneficiaries. CRI and a coalition of Yogyakarta-based actors have had good relationships with the public sector at provincial and district level, which is regarded as the main factor behind the successful Jamkesmas lobby.

CRI target groups' (i.e. community radios) relations with the public sector varies in intensity from one region the next, depending on local dynamics and challenges. It is unclear how CRI has attempted to cope with the complexity of regional conditions and how it has tried to support community radios in improving relations with the public sector. Other than taking an inventory of potential areas for joint lobby at the regional level with their community radio network in seven provinces[64], there is no indication that CRI has undertaken any action to improve relations between community radio network members and the government.

## 4.4. Relation with private sector agencies SPO

CRI also does not engage directly with the private sector. As admitted by workshop participants, CRI's interventions at the level of community ICT systems (through SID, Pasar Komunitas program, etc.) have not been able to reach the desired impact of linking economic potentials at the village level with the private sector. Part of the contract deliverables with Hivos for the 2012-2013 period included supporting women's cooperatives to develop web/internet skills for business promotion. The extent to which this intervention and others have attracted private sector investments is unclear and unmonitored. In addition, the MFS-II baseline noted that Hivos did not continue with support to SID in the 2012-2013 period because achievements were less than expected.

## 4.5. Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations SPO

Compared to baseline, there are no significant improvements regarding CRI's or its IOs' ability to influence the public sector in the 2012-2014 period, with the exception of the successful Jamkesmas (national health insurance scheme) beneficiary validation. The case of invalid beneficiary lists was actually selected by CRI as an area for intervention, with funds from the Ford Foundation, in an attempt to prove that their theory of change can work. CRI drove the escalation of the issue via SK and other media outlets such as Twitter, Facebook, community radio, and broadcasts on state radio, as a means to apply public pressure on decision-makers. CRI worked together with a Yogyakarta-based CSO coalition named *Sekertariat Bersama Jamkesmas* to lobbying the Ministry of Health at the national level and the Yogyakarta provincial government. The result was that the head of the Health Department of Yogyakarta Province was willing to validate several beneficiaries and to accept input from the community should such cases be found in the future, as stipulated in Ministry of Health Letter No.149/2013 on Jamkesmas Participation. However, no hard data can be found to measure the scope of the validation (number of people benefitting), either from CRI, the CSO coalition, or from the Ministry of Health. There is also no evidence to suggest that the intervention was replicated elsewhere. One reason for the lack of replication has been the change in government policy and programs in mid-2013, resulting in the transformation of Jamkesmas into a new scheme called BPJS[65]. Compared to Jamkesmas, the BPJS scheme offers better services and beneficiary selection mechanism as it allows open registration (including online registration) while Jamkesmas beneficiary selection was based solely on government assessments.

The contribution analysis found only weak evidence of CRI's contribution to the issuance of the Ministry of Health Letter No.149/2013 on Jamkesmas Participation. There was no evidence that CRI drove there to be significant media coverage to influence the decision of policy-makers. There was evidence that the Yogyakarta-based CSO coalition conducted lobby at the national and provincial levels, but there was no evidence that without CRI support such lobby activities would not have been effective.

[64] http://www.combine.or.id/2014/09/combine-dan-media-komunitas-advokasi-isu-lokal-pascapemilu-2014/

[65] BPJS merge different government insurances (public health, labor, delivery) into single provider. It was officially established on 1 January 2014 (http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/BPJS_Kesehatan)

CRI supported JRKI's collaboration with a number of CSOs to lobby for revisions of the Broadcasting Law. In this process, JRKI approached Commission 1 of the National Parliament (*Komisi* 1 DPR) to lead discussions on the revisions. Specifically, JRKI approached a member of the *Partai Amanat Nasional* (National Mandate Party) fraction to lead discussions with four relevant ministries. Unfortunately in 2013-2014, the agenda of parliamentarians and other politicians was influenced by Presidential elections, and the discussions of the revision took a backseat.[66]

As mentioned under indicator 4.4, CRI has done little to improve the level of engagement between its IOs and the public sector. As such there has been little influence on the public sector in the period since the baseline. Hivos' contribution to SK is still limited to increasing the potential for CRI's IOs to have an impact through a platform for credible information produced by community radios, bloggers and citizen journalists.

### 4.6. Influence upon private sector agencies' policies, rules, regulations SPO

Although CRI claimed that there were improvements in the extent to which the SPO has been able to influence the private sector, the evaluation team did not find any evidence of significant changes that occurred since the baseline. At present, CRI admits that information systems have not yet been able to generate transparency in private sector practices and policies. ICT support to villages has yet to open up market opportunities to local communities. Although the number of villages implementing and utilizing SID is increasing, the benefits are limited to improving administration processes of the village government. Additionally, there is no evidence yet that content produced through the SK platform has successfully influenced the practices or regulations of private sector actors. In this regard, there has been no improvement in CRI's ability to influence market actors.

## 5. Civil Society context

### 5.1. Coping strategies

A combination of obsolete strategic orientation (specifically the lack of a strategic plan) and increasing demand for CRI intervention from CS arena had caused the "organization to move without clear direction, becoming very lax in its efforts to meet the achievements"[67]. In response to this situation, CRI held a series of strategic planning meetings from October to December 2012, which were supported by Hivos through the 'Act Upon Information' program. These meetings were intended to "sharpen organisational performance in a variety of efforts to encourage a more knowledgeable society and responsive state"[68]. This vision was then to be translated into an adjusted strategy for each project in June 2013. The evaluation did not assess whether these changes have indeed materialized. However, JRKI and SK contributors have confirmed that there have been positive changes in CRI's approach since 2012.

Broadcasting Law No.32/2004 has provided community radios with the legitimacy and freedom to operate, but it still does not provide them with enough protection from private sector media. The law stipulates that community radios have to compete head-to-head with commercial radios in utilizing limited broadcasting bandwidth, while at the same time limiting their capability to generate funds. CRI and JRKI reacted to this issue by joining and strengthening existing efforts initiated by other actors such as PR2Media, *Masyarakat Peduli Media*, AJI, PKMBP, etc. CRI and JRKI expect to contribute by engaging its networks in lobby efforts to revise the law, facilitate personal lobby to parliament members, and drive public pressure by generating content on the SK platform, community radio, and social media. In this regard, CRI works together with JRKI to cope and respond to a perceived threat shared with by their target groups. Hivos supported this initiative by providing specific funding between 2012-2013 outside the 'Act Upon Information' program.

[66]JRKI's quarterly report to CRI: Laporan Tiga Bulanan Periode Febuari-April 2013, Advokasi Undang-undang Penyiaran Bagi Lembag Penyiaran Komunitas.
[67]Progress Report HIVOS COMBINE #RO.SEA at HO 1004708*, p.13*
[68]Ibid.

While SK is mainly used to publish news and articles[69] for a specific audience, the increased utilization of online and social media by the public sector presents opportunities for CRI. CRI can capitalize on existing opportunities to widen its engagement with civil society and bridge civil society actors with the public sector. CRI has already begun to connect and link Suara Komunitas with more popular media forms such as Twitter and Facebook. In addition, Ford Foundation funding in the 2012-2013 period specifically aimed to support CRI efforts to bridge the gap between the public sector and civil society, or grassroots, issues.


[69] As an interesting finding of this evaluation: from 25 SK contributors survey (an online survey) respondents, 24 of them participate via Facebook links, 1 via email, and none via SK link.

# Appendix 3 Suara Komunitas Contributors' Survey

***Survey information:***
The online survey was conducted over a three-week period, with a total of 25 valid responses. 22 of the 25 respondents responded to the survey via a Facebook link, while the other 3 responded to an email sent out to SK contributors. None the respondents responded through the *Suara Komunitas* website.

Most questions were multiple response, to anticipate a combination of answers and to capture respondents' views and attitudes.

**Length of respondents' participation in SK**
The survey found that out of 25 respondents, 13 had been part of SK for 2 years or less, while 12 had participated in SK for more than two years (7 of them for more than 3 years). This distribution may indicate that within the past 2 years, the number of SK members has increased significantly.




**Respondents' contribution of articles to the SK platform**

| Duration of participation in SK | | Since you joined SK, how many articles have you produced? | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Mean | Sum | Count |
| How long respondents have been part of SK | <1 year | 35 | 345 | 10 |
| | 1-2 years | 22 | 67 | 3 |

A total of 412 articles have been produced by the 13 respondents who joined SK within the past 2 years. Although with great variance, on average, each respondent produced roughly produce 15 articles annually, or a little more than one every month.

**Respondents' backgrounds**

Of the 25 respondents, 19 had a community radio background. Four of the 19 identified themselves as NGO activist, 1 as an independent contributor, and the other 14 did not provide detailed backgrounds.

Of the 6 respondents who did not have a community radio background, 5 come from NGOs who are interested in participating in SK, 2 of whom consider themselves as independent contributors. One respondent of the 25 with no NGO or community radio background.

**Participation in Suara Komunitas: What motivates contributors?**

| What is the purpose of/your motivation for contributing to SK? | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Answer Options** | **Response Percent** | **Response Count** |
| To obtain important information relevant to the community you represent | 56.0 | 14 |
| To join forces in a critical discourse | 48.0 | 12 |
| To urge stakeholders to follow up on garnering issues | 72.0 | 18 |
| To network and socialize with fellow contributors | 40.0 | 10 |
| To increase your own capacity or the capacity of the organization/community you represent | 52.0 | 13 |
| No specific purpose or motivation | 0 | 0 |

72 percent of contributors said they participated to escalate issues expecting follow-up from relevant stakeholders (in affirmation toward the "act upon information" theory). The second most chosen reason or motivation behind participation was to receive valuable information (56 percent of the respondents selected this as a reason for the motivation). 52 percent said a source of motivation was to increase their capacity. While 48 percent selected the participation in critical discourse as one of the reasons. The least selected response was to network or socialize with other contributors (40 percent).

**Participation in Suara Komunitas: Perceived benefits**

| What benefits has SK brought you so far? | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Answer Options** | **Response Percent** | **Response Count** |
| Received important information that is relevant to the community you represent. | 48.0 | 12 |
| The development of joint, critical discourse | 48.0 | 12 |
| Urged stakeholders to follow up on garnering issues | 52.0 | 13 |
| Networking and socializing with fellow contributors | 60.0 | 15 |
| Increased capacity | 52.0 | 13 |
| No specific benefits | 0 | 0 |

As with the above question, more than one response was allowed for this question. All respondents perceived one benefit or another from joining SK. Most respondents perceived networking to be the greatest benefit that has taken place (60 percent), followed by increased capacity and urging stakeholder follow up to emerging issues (both 52 percent). Benefits least realized were receiving important information relevant to the contributors and developing a critical discourse (both 48 percent).

Interestingly, when comparing the motivation with the benefits received, there is a disparity. While 72 percent of the respondents joined SK because to urge an "act upon information", only 52 percent of the respondents found this benefit to be realized. 40 percent of the respondents joined SK for networking reasons, yet 60 percent now actually feel this to be a benefit. Despite the disparities in these aforementioned areas, respondents generally perceive that SK has been delivering what they

had expected from it.

| Comparison between benefit perceived vs expected: | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Answer Options** | **Response Count expected** | **Response Count perceived** | **% deviation** |
| Received important information that is relevant to the community you represent. | 14 | 12 | - 14% |
| The development of joint, critical discourse | 12 | 12 | - |
| Urged stakeholders to follow up on garnering issues | 18 | 13 | - 28% |
| Networking and socializing with fellow contributors | 10 | 15 | + 50% |
| Increased individual capacity or the organization/community you represent | 13 | 13 | - |

In conclusion, we can say that respondents are overall satisfied with SK due to the benefits from improved networking. What seemingly has not met expectations is the relevance of content and the follow-up actions on issues.

Another question respondents were asked was the extent to which they felt that had SK not been there, there would be benefits they would be missing out on.

| To what extent do you agree with the following statement: If SK never existed, there would be a lot of benefits that you would have never have obtained. | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Answer Options** | **Response Percent** | **Response Count** |
| Strongly agree | 40.0 | 10 |
| Agree | 44.0 | 11 |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 4.0 | 1 |
| Do not agree | 12.0 | 3 |
| Strongly disagree | 0 | 0 |

84 percent of the respondents agree that if SK had never existed, they would be missing benefits, while 12 percent disagreed with the statement.

| In your opinion, has there already been adequate follow-up to issues raised by SK? | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Answer Options** | **Response Percent** | **Response Count** |
| Yes, adequate | 68.0 | 17 |
| No, not yet adequate | 24.0 | 6 |
| Do not know | 8.0 | 2 |

Although expectations regarding the follow-up of issues raised by SK have seemingly not been met, the responses to the adequacy of follow-up were generally positive, although a quarter said they were not adequate.

Input from respondents was also asked in the questionnaire. Below is a summary of inputs on what the expectations were of the respondents:

- More frequent meetings between contributors
- More contributors
- Improved communication between editors and contributors
- Improving journalism standards of written pieces
- Improving contributors' skills (not only in journalism/article writing), but also on critical-issues, networking, and advocacy
- Infrastructure support (internet connection)

- Better protection by the law for contributors
- To ensure independency
- More picture instead of text
- Incentives/rewards for contributors
- More follow-up on issues toward relevant stakeholders
- Media convergence (SK to include audio news from community radios as news source)
- Better SK website interface, design, and online reliability

**Social media trends: SK versus social media**

| **Relating to the presence of social media, how do you see the position of SK?** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Answer Options** | **Response Percent** | **Response Count** |
| SK has the same functions as social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, and other social media. | 4.0 | 1 |
| Although similar in function, SK has a unique function that cannot be replaced by Facebook, Twitter and other social media. | 96.0 | 24 |

96% of respondents think that although SK has unique features that distinguish it from other social media (thus signifying its relevance).

| **What distinguishes SK from other social media?** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Answer Options** | **Response Percent** | **Response Count** |
| Better quality news | 20.8 | 5 |
| More reliable and credible news source | 45.8 | 11 |
| More news that is relevant to grassroots, non-mainstream | 87.5 | 21 |
| There is a discourse that is more targeted/focused | 41.7 | 10 |
| More potential for follow-up to the discourse | 41.7 | 10 |

From multiple answers possible the majority or 87.5 percent of respondents believed that SK's unique feature lies in the news relevancy since content is more grassroots, unlike mainstream media. The second most picked response was that SK has more reliable and credible news sources. 41.7 percent also selected more targeted discourse and more potential for follow-up to the discourse as distinguishing features.

**Changes in capacity of respondents: prior to joining SK and at present**

| **To what extent do you agree with the following statement: Prior to joining SK, you already had sufficient capacity to process and deliver information** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Answer Options** | **Response Percent** | **Response Count** |
| Strongly agree | 8.0 | 2 |
| Agree | 24.0 | 6 |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 44.0 | 11 |
| Do not agree | 16.0 | 4 |
| Strongly disagree | 8.0 | 2 |

| **To what extent do you agree with the following statement: At present, you have enough capacity to process and deliver information** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Answer Options** | **Response Percent** | **Response Count** |
| Strongly agree | 28.0 | 7 |
| Agree | 56.0 | 14 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Neither agree nor disagree | 16.0 | 4 |
| Do not agree | 0 | 0 |
| Strongly disagree | 0 | 0 |

Prior to joining SK, only 32 percent felt strongly agreed or agreed that they had sufficient capacity. When asked about their current capacity, 84 percent strongly agreed or agreed that they have sufficient capacity. This is a variance/improvement of 52 percent. 24 percent of the respondents were inclined to disagree with the statement (i.e. indicating they did not have sufficient capacity prior to joining SK). This percentage declined to 0 percent when asked about the present situation.

**Perceived changes in capacity of respondents: attributed to what organisation**

| **Who played a role in increasing your capacity to process and convey information?** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Answer Options** | **Response Percent** | **Response Count** |
| CRI | 72.0 | 18 |
| JRKI | 60.0 | 15 |
| Other NGOs | 16.0 | 4 |
| Other community radios | 28.0 | 7 |
| Independent learning (own initiative) | 52.0 | 13 |

In this question, more than one response was allowed. The changes in capacity from prior to joining SK to the present situation, were mostly attributed to CRI (72 percent), followed by JRKI (60 percent). More than half of the respondents (52 percent) attributed a change in their capacity to their own self initiative. Just over a quarter attributed it partly to community radios, and 16 percent to other NGOs.

**Network of respondents: size & benefits**

| | | Currently, approximately how many organizations do you cooperate with as your network? | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Count | Mean | Maximum | Minimum |
| How long respondents have been part of SK | <1 year | 10 | 36 | 215 | 3 |
| | 1-2 years | 3 | 6 | 7 | 5 |
| | 2-3 years | 5 | 4 | 6 | 2 |
| | > 3 years | 7 | 13 | 25 | 3 |
| | Total | 25 | 19 | 215 | 2 |

On average, each respondent has 19 organisations that they consider as their network. However, some respondents only have two to five organisations in their network. Only 40 percent of respondents joined SK expecting benefits from networking, yet 60 percent report that upon joining there was a benefit from networking.

**Network: Combine Research Institute contribution**

| **To what extent do you agree with the following statement: CRI was instrumental in the creation of the network you currently have** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Answer Options** | **Response Percent** | **Response Count** |
| Strongly agree | 16.0 | 4 |
| Agree | 72.0 | 18 |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 12.0 | 3 |
| Do not agree | 0 | 0 |
| Strongly disagree | 0 | 0 |

88 percent of the respondents agree that CRI has contributed to facilitating or creating a network around them.

| Do you feel or notice any changes in CRI's role and approach before and after 2012? | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Answer Options** | **Response Percent** | **Response Count** |
| Yes | 84.0 | 21 |
| No | 8.0 | 2 |
| Don't know | 8.0 | 2 |

84 percent of the respondents acknowledge that there has been a change in CRI's approach since 2012. 62 percent of the respondents see this as a positive change, while less than a quarter are neutral, and around 15 percent see this as a negative change.

| If you have noticed any change, do you feel this is a positive change? | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Answer Options** | **Response Percent** | **Response Count** |
| Very positive | 14.3 | 3 |
| Positive | 47.6 | 10 |
| Neither positive nor negative | 23.8 | 5 |
| Negative | 9.5 | 2 |
| Very negative | 4.8 | 1 |

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen UR
P.O. Box 88
6700 AB Wageningen
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)317 48 68 00
www.wageningenUR.nl/cdi

Report CDI-15-064

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# ELSAM end line report

MFS II country evaluations, Civil Society component

Dieuwke Klaver[1]
Hester Smidt

Kharisma Nugroho[2]
Sopril Amir

1 Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR, Netherlands
2 SurveyMETER,Indonesia

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen, February 2015



Report CDI-15-039






Klaver, D.C., Nugroho, K., Smidt, H., February 2015, *ELSAM end line report; MFS II country evaluations, Civil Society component,* Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR (University & Research centre) and SurveyMETER. Report CDI-15-039. Wageningen.

This report describes the findings of the end line assessment of ELSAM that is a partner of Hivos.

The evaluation was commissioned by NWO-WOTRO, the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research in the Netherlands and is part of the programmatic evaluation of the Co-Financing System - MFS II financed by the Dutch Government, whose overall aim is to strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. Apart from assessing impact on MDGs, the evaluation also assesses the contribution of the Dutch Co-Funding Agencies to strengthen the capacities of their Southern Partners, as well as the contribution of these partners towards building a vibrant civil society arena.

This report assesses ELSAM's contribution towards strengthening Civil Society in Indonesia and it used the CIVICUS analytical framework. It is a follow-up of a baseline study conducted in 2012. Key questions that are being answered comprise changes in the five CIVICUS dimensions to which ELSAM contributed; the nature of its contribution; the relevance of the contribution made and an identification of factors that explain ELSAM's role in civil society strengthening.

Keywords: Civil Society, CIVICUS, theory based evaluation, process-tracing



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The Centre for Development Innovation accepts no liability for any damage arising from the use of the results of this research or the application of the recommendations.

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# Acknowledgements

SurveyMeter and CDI are thanking the staff and the leaders of all Southern Partner Organisations that participated in collecting information for the evaluation of the contribution of these partner organisations to creating a vibrant civil society in Indonesia. They also thank the Co-Funding Agencies and the Dutch Consortia they are a member of for making background documents available. We hope that this evaluation can support you in better positioning yourself in the Civil Society Arena of Indonesia.

# List of abbreviations and acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| AJI | *Aliansi Jurnalis Independen* (Independent Journalist Alliance) |
| APT | Association for the Prevention of Torture |
| CDI | Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR |
| CFAs | Co-Financing Agencies |
| CFO | Co-Financing Organisation |
| CICC | Coalition for the International Criminal Court |
| CS | Civil society |
| DFAT | Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government |
| ECOSOC | Economic and Social Council of the United Nations |
| EED | *Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst* |
| ELSAM | *Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat* (Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy) |
| HRWG | Human Rights Working Group |
| ICCPR | International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights |
| ICJR | Institute for Criminal Justice Reform |
| ICT | Information and communications technology |
| ICW | Indonesian Corruption Watch |
| IKOHI | *Ikatan Keluarga Orang Hilang Indonesia* (Association of Families of Missing Persons) |
| INFID | International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development |
| IRE | Institute for Research and Empowerment |
| Kemenkokesra | *Kementerian Koordinator Kesejahteraan Rakyat,* recently changed to *Kementerian Koordinator Pembangunan Manusia dan Kebudayaan Republik Indonesia -Kemenko PMK RI* (Coordinating Ministry for People's Welfare) |
| KKPK | *Koalisi Keadilan dan Pengungkapan Kebenaran* (Coalition for the Disclosure of the Truth) |
| KPSK | Koalisi Perlindungan Saksi dan Korban |
| Komnas HAM | *Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia* (National Commission for Human Rights) |
| KontraS | *Komisi Untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan* (Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence) |
| KUBE | *Kelompok Usaha Bersama* (Joint Business Group, program of the Ministry of Social Affairs) |
| KSI | Knowledge Sector Initiative, program funded by the Australian Government |
| INFID | International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development |
| LBH | *Lembaga Bantuan Hukum* (Institute for Legal Aid) |
| LBH Pers | *Lembaga Bantuan Hukum* (Institute for Legal Aid for the Press) |
| LPSK | *Lembaga Perlindungan Saksi dan Korban* (Witnesses and Victims Protection Agency) |
| Menkopolhukam | *Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Politik, Hukum dan Keamanan* (Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs) |
| MoFa | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| MFS | Dutch co-financing system |
| MoU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| NGO | Non-governmental organisation |
| OMCT | World Organisation Against Torture |
| Perpres | Presidential Regulation |
| PILNET | Public Interests Lawyers Network, Indonesia |
| PME | Planning, monitoring and evaluation |
| PT | Perseroan terbatas (limited liability company) |
| SOP | Strategic Operational Procedures |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |

| | |
|---|---|
| SSI | Semi-structured Interview |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| TRC | Truth and Reconciliation Commission |
| UKP4 | *Unit Kerja Presiden Bidang Pengawasan dan Pengendalian Pembangunan* (President's Delivery Unit for Development Monitoring and Oversight) |
| Wageningen UR | Wageningen University & Research Centre |
| WALHI | *Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia* (Friends of the Earth Indonesia) |
| WGAT | Working Group on the Advocacy against Torture |
| YLBHI | *Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia* (Indonesian Legal Aid Institute-Foundation) |

# 1 Introduction

This report presents the civil society end line findings of ELSAM, a partner of Hivos in Indonesia under the Dutch Consortium People Unlimited 4.1. It is a follow-up to the baseline assessment carried out in 2012. According to the information provided during the baseline study, ELSAM is working on the theme 'governance'.

These findings are part of the overall joint MFS II evaluations carried out to account for results of MFS II-funded or co-funded development interventions implemented by Dutch Co-Funding Agencies (CFAs) and/or their Southern Partner Organisations (SPO). They are also intended to contribute to the improvement of future development interventions. The civil society evaluation uses the CIVICUS framework and seeks to answer the following questions:

- What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?
- To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
- What is the relevance of these changes?
- What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The CIVICUS framework that comprises five dimensions (civic engagement, level of organization, practice of values, perception of impact, and context influencing agency by civil society in general) has been used to orient the evaluation methodology.

**Changes in the civil society arena of the SPO**

In the 2012 – 2014 period the two most important changes that took place in the civil society arena of the SPO were related to 'perception of impact', specifically the influence on public policy and civil society impact with regards to stronger intermediary organisations. More specifically, the capacity of the human rights movement was improved and ELSAM successfully was able to influence a public policy that will afford better protection of witness and victims of human rights abuses. In addition, there was an improvement in the quality of advocacy conducted by ELSAM's network organisations pertaining to the capability of generating and using evidence for policy advocacy.

These findings were obtained through an analysis of documents, a workshop with the SPO, and several interviews. These interviews were conducted with: ELSAM; external resources persons working in civil society organisations that receive support from the SPO; other civil society organisations with whom the SPO is collaborating; public or private sector agents and; external resource persons with knowledge of the MDG or theme on which the SPO is concentrating.

**Attribution**

Based upon an analysis of the projects and programmes financed by the Dutch CFAs a selection was made of SPOs to be included in an in-depth process tracing trajectory and those to be included for a quick contribution assessment. Elsam was selected for a quick assessment.

The first outcome that we looked at is the revised Law on Witnesses and Victim Protection approved in October 2014 after a long advocacy process since 2011 by a coalition of CSOs, of which ELSAM was a part of. The previous Law No. 13/2006 was replaced by Law No.31/2014 because it had fundamental limitations on probes into past rights abuses and had prevented the Witnesses and Victims Protection Agency (LPSK) from helping survivors. This new law will step up LPSK's efforts to support victims of past human rights abuses. The most important factor that explains the outcome is the collaboration of CSOs through a coalition. Most of the advocacy activities were conducted through this coalition and ELSAM's role was the provision of regulatory reviews and the drafting of the bill. Rival explanations were internal demands and pushes within LPSK and public pressure. However, the evaluation found limited evidence for these rival explanations.

The second outcome that we looked at is the improved quality of advocacy work conducted by ELSAM's network organisations through its capability to generate and use evidence to advocate for

policy change. ELSAM's networks organisations, especially at sub-national level have become more systematic in the manner in which data on human rights violations is collected, analysing the situation and responding to victims' need through follow up advocacy actions. ELSAM's role in this evidence-based advocacy system on human rights violations was to provide a platform for data collection and managing a national database system.[1]

**Relevance**

Interviews with staff of ELSAM, external resource persons, as well as contextual information helped to assess the relevance of ELSAM's interventions in terms of; its Theory of Change (ToC) for Civil Society (CS) as designed during the baseline study; the context in which ELSAM is operating; the CS policies of Hivos.

With regards to the baseline ToC, the interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant because these two outcomes serve both the grassroots and policy needs. Regarding the context in which ELSAM is operating, its interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant because through the new law of LPSK has the ability to increase their coverage of protection services provided to the victims of human rights violations. At network level, CSO monitoring of human rights violations at the sub-national level can feed into an advocacy agenda or can be linked to LPSK services. Lastly, ELSAM's interventions and outcomes are relevant to Hivos' strategies because ELSAM has adopted an alternative, more moderate lobby approach as opposed to more common 'radical' strategies often taken on by human rights activists in Indonesia.

**Explaining factors**

The information related to factors that explain the above findings was collected at the same time as the data were gathered for the previous questions. The evaluation team looked at internal factors within CWM, the external context in which it operates and the relations between ELSAM and Hivos.

The most internal factors that explain the findings consist of the organisational capacity of ELSAM, a smooth change in the leadership in 2010, which was also followed by younger staff taking over coordinator positions. The effective supervision by the board of the changes in leadership, as well as increased participation of ELSAM's members in research design and advocacy also explain the positive findings.

The relations with Hivos have been constructive and ELSAM benefitted from Hivos' other partners in Indonesia, as well as from its long term policy support and the flexibility afforded in the budgetary arrangements.

Other contributing factors to the revised Law on Witnesses and Victim Protection are the political incentives that may have led to support for revision within the parliament. In 2014, with elections approaching, parliamentarians sought out public sympathy in an effort to win votes. For the government's executive, one of the possible incentives for endorsing the revision was that it was considered a trade-off with the push for putting in place a law for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Human rights activities have unsuccessfully been advocating for such a law, which is considered to be highly sensitive.

For human rights organisations like ELSAM and its peers, the biggest challenges in Indonesia are poor law enforcement issues and weak recognition for human rights in laws. The government and security forces who should help enforce the law are, according to human rights organisations, part of the problem as they commit violations themselves or endorse them by not taking actions to oppose violence used by radical groups.[2] Unlike other human rights organisations in the country like Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence(KontraS) and Setara Institute, who address these regulatory gaps by building public pressure, ELSAM has chosen policy advocacy as its main strategy.

[1] ELSAM, "Data". Available from http://www.elsam.or.id/list.php?cat=statistik&lang=in (accessed 17 November 2014)

[2] KontraS. 2014. *Hak Asasi Diakui tapi Tidak Dilindungi: Catatan Hak Asasi Manusia dimasa Pemerintahan Presiden Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono [2004-2014]*. Available from http://kontras.org/data/Catatan%20Kondisi%20HAM%20-%2010%20tahun%20SBY.pdf (accessed 17 November 2014)

The following chapter briefly describes the political context, the civil society context and the relevant background with regards to the governance issues ELSAM is working on. Chapter three provides background information on ELSAM, the relation of its MFS II interventions with the CIVICUS framework and specific information on the contract with Hivos. An evaluation methodology has been developed for the evaluation of the Civil Society component which can be found in Appendix 2 of the country report; however, deviations from this methodology, the choices made with regards to the selection of the outcomes for contribution analysis, as well as difficulties encountered during data collection are to be found in Chapter 4. The answers to each of the evaluation questions are being presented in Chapter 5, followed by a discussion on the general project design in relation to CS development; an assessment of what elements of the project design may possibly work in other contexts or be implemented by other organisations in Chapter 6. Conclusions are presented in Chapter 7.

# 2 Context

This paragraph briefly describes the context ELSAM is working in. A description of the Civil Society Context assessed according to the CIVICUS framework is provided in appendix 3 of the country report for Civil Society.

## 2.1 Political context

### 2.1.1 Brief historical perspective

Indonesia's rise to being the world's third largest democratic nation has been lauded by many world leaders. The county is often considered to be a model Muslim democracy. As the fourth most populous nation with an estimated 250 million people[3], Indonesia has sustained its democratic commitment since transitioning from an authoritarian leadership to a democracy in 1998. The decentralized administration now consists of 34 provinces and 508 districts and municipalities.

Prior to 1998, Indonesia was under strict authoritarian regime. Suharto, known for his so-called New Order (1966-1998) regime, ushered in radical transformations that would place social and political forces under direct state supervision. The defining characteristics of the Suharto era were a focus on economic growth and controlled consensus and political stability devoid of dissent. A series of tumultuous economic and political transitions in the nineties severely diminished the credibility of ageing President Suharto, who was forced to resign amidst mass street protests.

His departure in 1998 laid bare three decades of social inequalities, state-perpetuated abuses against human rights, and a lack of civilian liberties. The regime change opened the way for a period of *Reformasi* started under the presidency of B. J. Habibie (1998-1999) and continued by Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001), Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001–2004), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014). Restrictions on citizen participation, press freedom and association were removed. Democratic reforms and decentralization led to direct elections, portioned authority, a devolution of authority to regional authorities, formation of new political parties and ended the military's parliamentary influence. The distinct historical periods of the New Order Regime and *Reformasi* (1998-present) have shaped the emergence of civil society. Defining characteristics are summarized in the table below.

Table 1
*Characteristics that have defined the emergence of civil society in Indonesia*

| Characteristics | New Order, authoritarian period (1966 – 1998) | Reformasi (1998 – present) |
|---|---|---|
| **Political system** | Centralized, authoritarian characterized by unipolarity. Golkar as the dominant political party.<br><br>In 1999, there were 27 provinces, 306 districts and around 60,000 villages. | Decentralized, democratic. Fragmentation of power and atomization of patronage relationships. Emergence of numerous political parties. Direct presidential elections since 1999.<br><br>Decentralization altered the political and administrative landscape: 34 provinces, 410 districts, 98 municipalities, 6,944 sub-districts and 81,253 villages[4]. |
| **State-citizen interaction** | Benevolent leader, obedient population. Down to the village level, the state permeated society. | Modern political culture marked by diminishing hierarchy between the state and citizens, allowing for citizens to interact more freely. |

[3] In 2010 the population was estimated to be around 237 million people (BPS 2010 Population Census). The current figure is an estimate from BKKBN and similar figures are cited in the CIA's World Fact Book and the World Bank.

[4] Rumah Pemilu "Gambaran Singkat Pemilihan Umum 2014 di Indonesia", 3 July 2014. Available from http://www.rumahpemilu.org/in/read/3351/Gambaran-Singkat-Pemilihan-Umum-2014-di-Indonesia (accessed 25 October 2014)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Citizen representation and voice** | Strict control of speech, expression and association.<br><br>CSOs and their networks largely "hiding behind the screen",operating under state surveillance. A period of growth occurred in 1995-98, as resistance was building. | Burgeoning of CSOs, pressure groups and NGOs following the political euphoria after Suharto's fall.<br><br>Indonesian CSOs began to establish new networks internationally. Up until the early 2000s the focus was on state-centrist issues. Later, issues that CSOs were tackling became more diverse, ranging from pluralism, poverty reduction to fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights. |
| **Media** | No free press, censorship and state-control. Suharto had firm grasp over how to use print & broadcast medias to promote political ideologies. | More vibrant media environment, flourishing of media businesses albeit in control of 12 main conglomerates that are mostly profit-driven and often have political ties. |
| | Limited public and CS use and access to internet until mid-90s. | Twitter nation, widespread social media use. |
| | | Growing realization of the importance of media/free press as the fourth pillar of democracy. |
| **Artistic forms of expression** | Art and literary censorship conducted by the state. Art forms were a means to reinforce political order. | Greater freedom of the arts and cultural sectors. Organizations able to hold art events more freely. Freedom of expression a catchphrase amongst individuals and artistic groups, but challenged by more conservative members of society. |
| **Religious expression and organization** | Regime repressed religious groups, especially radical forms. | Emergence of religious groups seeking to restore Islamic values and defend Muslim values. |

With political reforms came greater freedom and space for civic engagement. In the *Reformasi* period, there was a remarkable increase in the number of civil society organizations, many of which were Islamic in character. In 2000, the Central Agency on Statistics (BPS) recorded around 70,000 registered organizations, compared to just 10,000 in 1996[5]. New groups sprung up with donors encouraging activists to establish NGOs they could fund. These organizations were eager to distance themselves from state and often took an anti-government stance. Proliferating CSOs and NGOs have taken advantage of decentralization and greater regional autonomy to engage in public affairs. Civil society and government relations have improved, although both sides remain sceptical of the others' intentions.

### 2.1.2 Recent trends in the political context

Indonesia is considered to be a story of democratic success, but it still struggles to realize the benefits of sustained and equitable economic growth. In the political context, the main challenges lie in governing such geographically vast and decentralized country, applying principles of good governance and the enormous task of reforming the country's bureaucracy.

Although, Indonesia's 'big bang' decentralization initiated at the turn of the century narrowed the gap between local government and citizens, it has also localized political power struggles. While the devolution of authorities relieved tensions between the central government and the regions, it has also created opportunities for corrupt and rent-seeking practices, at the local level. As indicated by Transparency International's corruption index scores, perceived corruption in Indonesia remains high.

[5] Wahid, Marzuki. 2010. LSM, Islam, dan Perempuan di Indonesia Paska Orde Baru. Presentation at the Asian Dialogues: Open Seminars in Asian Languages. Melbourne, 22 April. Available from http://intranet.law.unimelb.edu.au/staff/events/files/Microsoft%20PowerPoint%20-%20LSM%20dan%20Islam%20di%20Indonesia%20--Melbourne%202010-FINAL.pdf (accessed 25 October 2014)

Table 2

*Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer survey: Indonesia*

| Year | Corruption perceptions Index Score<br>*(0 perceived as highly corrupt and 100 perceived as clean)* | Rank |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 30 | 100/182 |
| 2012 | 32 | 118/174 |
| 2013 | 32 | 114/177 |

Source: Transparency International

In 2013, decentralization was taken a step further with the approval of the Village Law, intended to address weak governance arrangements and empower rural communities to participate politically. The new law could also lead to village elites distorting power relations and misusing government funding if not properly monitored.

Indonesia is still transitioning politically and many challenges lie ahead. According to the 2012 Indonesia Governance Index's Executive Report: "Indonesia is witnessing a paradox in its democracy. On one hand, a successful opening-up of civil liberty has led to the avalanche of democratic demands across the nation, however on the other hand, democratic institutions' are inadequately respond to those demands." Nonetheless, the Indonesian Governance Index, which focuses on measuring provincial governance, does show a general improvement in the performance of the government (political office) bureaucracy, civil society and economic society based on principles of participation, transparency, fairness, accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness between 2008 and 2012. Civil society scores improved the most significantly, while scores for bureaucracy rose slightly.[6]

Table 3

*Indonesia Governance Index: Average provincial scores*

| Arena | 2008 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| Government | 4.93 | 5.46 |
| Bureaucracy | 5.53 | 5.58 |
| Civil Society | 4.85 | 6.33 |
| Economic Society | 4.77 | 5.71 |

Source: http://www.kemitraan.or.id/igi

In the past decade, Indonesians have generally enjoyed a freedom to participate in the political process through a direct-election mechanism. However, in September 2014 lawmakers voted in favour of a bill reviving indirect elections of regional heads. The controversial vote provoked public outcry which saw peaceful protests and the public voicing their discontent through social media. In early October, just before the end of his term, president Yudhoyono issued a regulation in lieu of the law, effectively repealing the law until further judicial review.

The recent 2014 elections which marked the end of Yudhoyono's 10-year term, demonstrated that Indonesian voters are increasingly voting for popular figures irrespective of political party alliances. While practices of corruption, vote-buying and poor voter administration remained in the recent election, the public seems to have matured politically, indicated by the enormous interest in televised debates between the leading candidates. The appeal of the newly sworn in President Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, has come from his hands-on, man-of-the-people approach. As Jokowi begins his five-year term he will need to start addressing a myriad of challenges that include corruption, stagnant economic growth, and human rights concerns, particularly with respect to the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and religious intolerance. If left unaddressed, these challenges could seriously undermine Indonesia's stability and democratic reforms.

[6] The IGI uses a scale of 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest). Data is available online through their website. Indonesia Governance Index, Data, "IGI Executive Report". Available from http://www.kemitraan.or.id/igi/index.php/data/publication/factsheet/275-igi-executive-report (accessed 25 October 2014)

## 2.2 Civil Society context issues with regards to governance

Several important changes took place during the 2011 and 2014 period. First, the global financial crisis and Indonesia's rise to a middle-income country led to a decrease in international donor funding. Development actors, including CSOs and NGOs, have to compete harder for funding. Some have been more successful than others in diversifying funding by turning to the private sector or private foundations. At the expense of past idealism, local NGOs are now more disposed to receiving funding sources which in the past may have been criticized as supporting neoliberalism.

Regulatory changes also affected the civil society arena positively and negatively. Amongst the more controversial laws to spark reaction was Law No. 17/2013 on Societal Organisations. In an open letter sent before the bill was enacted, CIVICUS said the law would undermine freedom of association and "prevent CSOs from working on sensitive topics related to good governance and democratic reform in the public interest"[7]. FORUM-ASIA deplored the repressive provisions in the law that "leave all groups vulnerable to attacks, undermining the hard-won democratic space that has been forged by civil society since the end of the New Order regime."[8]

On a positive note, between 2011 and 2014, the government did demonstrate a commitment to human rights by launching a National Action Plan on the issue endorsed through Presidential Regulation (Perpres) No. 23/2011. One of the actions contained in the plan was the ratification of 12 international human rights instruments/covenants. By the time this report was written, however, only four instruments were translated into national law: 1) convention on disabled people; 2) migrant workers; 3) involvement of children in armed conflict, and; 4) child trafficking, pornography and child prostitution.

Despite the above commitment, human rights groups have remained critical of the government's dedication to human rights and consider a number of laws to be discriminative or leave people vulnerable to human rights abuses[9]. Laws passed that provoked criticism were amongst others the State Intelligence Law (October 2011) and the Social Conflict Law (April 2012). NGOs and media see these laws as imposing further restrictions on freedom of speech, potentially leading to the criminalization of human rights defenders and signifying a tightening of state control. Discriminatory content was also an issue in discussions on the Religious Harmony Bill in 2013, for which drafting was initiated in despite not being part of the planned National Legislative Program. Late in 2013, the House of Representatives came under fire again for its weak stance against religious intolerance when it re-endorsed a law that limits state-recognized religions to six.

Land rights and natural resource protection have been a long-standing issue for Indonesia. While Indonesia has adopted and amended laws to improve the rights of smallholders and indigenous communities, many of these regulations have faltered in their implementation. Part of the issue lies in the overlap and lack of clarity of laws adopted that regulate different sectors and local legislation. Another issue is that there is a lack of oversight in the procedures such as granting permits and licensing. These problems, which are commonly found across development sectors, are compounded by a lack of information among local communities on what the laws regulate and their rights vis-à-vis them.

[7] Civicus, "Civicus Releases an Open Letter Requesting the Indonesian Parliament to reject the Proposed Ormas Law and Create an Enabling Environment for Civil Society", 10 April 2013. Available from http://civicus.org/index.php/en/media-centre-129/open-letters/1581-open-letter-requesting-the-indonesian-parliament-to-reject-to-the-proposed-ormas-law-and-create-an-enabling-environment-for-civil-society (accessed 27 October 2014)

[8] Azhar, Haris. 2013. Repressive provision in the Ormas law. Statement to The Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, in Forum-Asia, "Indonesia: Passage of Ormas Bill Condemned, Campaign to Oppose the Law to Continue", Bangkok, 4 July 2013. Available from http://www.forum-asia.org/?p=16305 (accessed 27 October 2014)

[9] Based on KontraS' report (2014), there are 21 sub-national regulations (Perda) that are discriminative and laws that are vulnerable to human rights abuses are the laws on intelligence, social conflict, mass organisation (Ormas), and presidential instruction on handling security disturbances.

# 3 ELSAM and its contribution to civil society/policy changes

## 3.1 Background of ELSAM

ELSAM (Institute of Policy Research and Advocacy) is one of the oldest human rights NGOs in Indonesia. It was established in 1993 by a number of human rights activists and lawyers from YLBHI, INFID, and WALHI. Within the broad objective of supporting the development of a democratic political order through strengthening civil society and human rights, ELSAM has carried out a wide range of activities related to human rights advocacy at both the policy and community level.

ELSAM had a significant role in the ratification Indonesia's ratification of the International Convention Against Torture and the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1998. In 2004, ELSAM successfully worked towards the promulgation of the Truth Reconciliation Commission Law, which is still under review by the Constitutional Court because of the sensitivity of the issue and the powerful opposition of those allegedly having committed human rights violations. Since 2003, ELSAM has studied the violations of civil and political rights in Aceh & Papua; and economic, social, cultural rights in Kalimantan and Sumatra. These studies help the organisation to monitor the implementation process of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and resolutions by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. ELSAM also engaged with the judges of the State Judicial Institution to strengthen their capacities on human rights by means of producing a manual for judges in 2012, together with the Supreme Court. ELSAM's most important strategies are to:

- Lobby and campaign against repressive laws as well as for the ratification by the Indonesian government of major international human rights instruments;
- Conduct studies on the rights of specific categories in society, such as labourers, indigenous people and to reports violations of these rights;
- Educate and train local NGOs and lawyers on human rights in the 'outer' regions;
- Provide legal aid for human rights victims;
- Facilitate the creation of local and national NGOs and human rights coalitions such as the Working Group on the Advocacy against Torture (WGAT) and the Coalition for Justice and Revelation of Truth (KKPK), and;
- Build alliances and/or co-operate with a wide range of organisations at the local, national and international levels.

## 3.2 MFS II interventions related to Civil Society

ELSAM has received funding from HIVOS for two different projects. The first, "Strengthening Human Rights Protection from the Threat of Impunity and Fundamentalism in Indonesia" was completed in March 2013 and had three components[10]:

1. The Settlement of Human Rights Violations to Realize Democracy and a Just Legal System. The interventions of this component all aimed to influence public policies and decrees, relating to the CIVICUS dimension 'perception of impact'. The outcome selected for in-depth process tracing is linked to this component.
2. Strengthening Human Rights Protection from Upcoming Threats of Market Fundamentalism, Religious Fundamentalism, and Communalism in Various Forms. The interventions under this

[10] "Project Number 416-900-1094 -- 2011 ELSAM Report", ELSAM, 2012, p.1

component aimed to defend the interests of human rights victims, which relates to the CIVICUS dimension 'level of organisation', as well to increase the number of individuals that are capable of using human rights instruments offered by ELSAM which relates to 'civic engagement'.

3. Institutional Strengthening of ELSAM as a credible, capable, accountable, and sustainable Resource Centre of Human Rights. This program aimed to rethink ELSAM's position in its environment and may have had relations with the 'practice of values'' dimension of CIVICUS.

The second project, entitled "Internet Governance Based on Human Rights Perspective" (1004945) aimed to integrate the human rights perspective into the debate on internet governance. Other contributions were made by Hivos to support ICT WATCH to ensure the collaboration with ELSAM to develop a website, campaign tools (such as YouTube clips), and a campaign program. This project relates to the CIVICUS dimensions of 'perception of impact' and 'civic engagement'.

## 3.3 Basic information

Table 4
*Basic information*

| | | Details |
|---|---|---|
| Name of SPO | : | ELSAM |
| Consortium | : | People Unlimited |
| CFA | : | HIVOS |
| Start date of cooperation | : | 1 January 2011 |
| MDG/Theme | : | Governance |
| **MSF Project 1** | | |
| MFS II Project Name | : | Strengthening Human Rights Protection from the Threat of Impunity and Fundamentalism in Indonesia 2011-2012 (RO SEA 1002309) |
| Contract period | : | January 1, 2011 - December 12, 2012, no-cost extension until March 2013 |
| Total budget Hivos | : | € 120,000 |
| Other donors if applicable | : | The total amount for the project was US$ 886.396 financed together with EED and Miserior for the period April 2010 - March 2013 |
| Estimation of % of budget for Civil Society[11] | : | 45 % |
| **MSF Project 2** | | |
| MFS II Project Name | : | Internet Governance Based On Human Rights Perspective (1004945) |
| Contract period | : | 1 July 2012 – 30 June 2013, no-cost extension until 30 January 2014 |
| Total budget Hivos | : | € 17,450 |
| Other donors if applicable | : | N/A |
| Estimation of % of budget for Civil Society[12] | : | 73% |

Sources: project documents

[11] Costs that relate to civil society development or policy influence are those costs that possibly contribute to the development of the CIVICUS dimensions, excluding coordination and office costs; staff costs and financial reserves.
[12] Ibid

# 4 Data collection and analytical approach

## 4.1 Adjustments made in the methodology of the evaluation

Based upon project proposals submitted to Hivos and progress reports submitted by ELSAM, an initial inventory was done to assess the extent to which ELSAM had produced the expected results as mentioned in the contracts with Hivos. However the information made available and analysed before SurveyMETER started its data collection in the field was incomplete, and not clear in terms of providing factual information of results and outcomes achieved. Therefore the team encountered difficulties to identify outcomes to be included for the in-depth process tracing, in particular because Hivos is supporting ELSAM on two completely different projects (a very small one on internet governance and another one on human rights protection).

The evaluation team in the field followed the operational guidelines to a great extent, but was unable to have a workshop with ELSAM for an entire day. In practice the workshop lasted three hours, forcing the evaluation team to set multiple follow-up meetings with ELSAM leadership and programme staff which also proved to be difficult. A separate meeting was scheduled to meet board members.

## 4.2 Difficulties encountered during data collection

During data collection the team also experienced the difficulty to obtain 'hard evidence' of ELSAM's roles or contributions in the Coalition for Witness and Victim Protection[13]that lobbied for the revision of the Law on the Witness and Victim Protection because a majority of the meetings conducted to discuss regulatory revisions with other actors were done informally, with little trace or documentary evidence. To triangulate verbal confirmation by coalition members on ELSAM's role, we did content analysis, comparing ELSAM's policy inputs with the approved revised law on LPSK (Law No. 31/2014).

Due to insufficient information acquired during the initial steps of the tracing process, the second model of change had to be revisited often to be revised based on new information found by the evaluation team, which consequently meant that the evaluation team had to collect new evidence for the amended model of change.

The Hivos Regional Office for Southeast Asia has experienced a number of staff changes recently. The evaluation team was unable to interview the staff member who was in charge of the ELSAM portfolio in the 2012-2014 period.

## 4.3 Identification of two outcomes for in-depth process tracing

As already mentioned, the project document analysis did not provide sufficient guidance to focus the in-depth process tracing. The suggestion was made to focus on one *recent* achievement for policy influencing, and one outcome related to strengthening the capacities of organisations that receive the support of ELSAM. However ELSAM's core activities are documentation and research and network

[13] The members of this coalition are: ELSAM, YLBHI, MAPPI FH UI, PSHK, LEIP, KONTRAS, LPHAM, LBH JAKARTA, ICJR, ILRC.

influencing, implying that it does not support intermediate organisations, but is an active member in coalitions like WGAT, KPSK and KKPK that are part of the networks that influence the government.

During the initial evaluation process, the policy influencing outcome selected. This outcome was related to a regulation passed in October 2013 that enlarged categories of human rights victims eligible for protection, compensation and psychosocial services to accommodate the immediate needs of victims. A far more reaching outcome was passed mid-way through the evaluation process, on 17 October 2014, namely the revision of the Law on Witness and Victim Protection just before the new parliament was sworn in.

Based on a follow-up interview with an ELSAM Board Member in November 2014, a second outcome was selected on the increased capacity of sub-national CSOs in monitoring human rights violations through more systematic data collection and analysis systems. This outcome was selected taking into consideration that the one of the key activities identified in ELSAM's Theory of Change was related to networking and improved sources of information. In addition the production of knowledge and data is one of ELSAM's focuses as an organisation.

# 5 Results

## 5.1 Overview of planned and realised outcomes

Table 5

*Overview of results achieved in relation to project plan ELSAM*

| Planned results | | Level of achievement |
|---|---|---|
| Strengthening Human Rights Protection from the Threat of Impunity and Fundamentalism in Indonesia 2011-2012 (RO SEA 1002309) | | |
| Program 1: Settlement of Human Rights Violations to Realize Democracy and Just Legal System | | |
| Result Indicator 1 | The existing human rights violations accountability mechanisms are strengthened and the alternative mechanism is provided | Partially achieved: LPSK develops concept of repatriation for victims of human rights violations promoting the settlement of past human rights violations, including through the mechanism of alternative settlements. Law on Victim and Witness Protection revised. |
| Result Indicator 2 | Collective activities with two networks: the Advocacy Network for the Peaceful Settlement of Past Human Rights Violations and the Working Group on the Advocacy against Torture (WGAT) to promote the implementation of an effective reparation for victims are conducted | Partially achieved: Continued support to the WGAT to lobby follow up efforts to ratify the optional protocol on the Convention Against Torture. |
| Result Indicator 3 | The adoption of the draft Law on Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is promoted | Achieved (although law not adopted): Joint advocacy on the settlement of past human rights violations, including support to KKPK. Background paper for new bill on TRC prepared by ELSAM and KKPK. Civil society activists managed to become candidate members of Komnas HAM, of whom three ELSAM members. ELSAM's involvement in KKPK has strengthened the coalition. ELSAM set up a database centre for past human rights abuses. Sharpened focus of action of the coalition to promote truth revealing as a modality in peacefully settling the past. |
| Result Indicator 4 | An effective reparation instrument and mechanism for victims of human rights violations is released | Partially achieved: Law on Victim and Witness Protection revised. |
| Program 2: Strengthening Human Rights Protection from Upcoming Threats of Market Fundamentalism, Religious Fundamentalism, and Communalism in Various Forms | | |
| Result Indicator 5 | Advocacy against the victim criminalization in the name of religion is conducted. | Achieved: Through its existing networks, ELSAM has been able to support victims and play a watch dog role with regards to threats from market and religious fundamentalism. Advocacy for the witnesses and victims of religious-based discrimination, pluralism research, monitoring cases of the attacks against minority religious groups, campaigns through the media about religious freedom, and lobby to the government were carried out. |
| Result Indicator 6 | The cases related to the market fundamentalism, religious fundamentalism and communalism are monitored by ELSAM training alumni | Achieved: Cases monitored by ELSAM and its network focusing on human rights abuses (past and present), land rights abuses, agrarian disputes. ELSAM appointed as member/CS representative of joint fact-finding mission with government in response to violent land disputes in Mesuji, Lampung. |
| Result Indicator 7 | ELSAM's recommendation about public policies that covers the right to education, housing, health and the right to job is released | Partially achieved: ELSAM, together with a coalition, were successful in revoking a policy which sought to introduce international benchmarks in state schools, which was considered as discriminating against the poor from accessing quality of education. ELSAM together with a network of NGOs filed a case to the constitutional court to revoke the pilot policy contained in Law on Education. |
| Result Indicator 8 | Alternative concept from ELSAM to the government about human rights protection against market fundamentalism, religious fundamentalism, and communalism is published. | Partially achieved: ELSAM formulated recommendations related to human rights protection from fundament threats and provided their expertise. For example, ELSAM in collaboration with an NGO network and the President's Delivery Unit for Development Monitoring and Oversight (UKP4) worked to influence a Ministerial Decree on plantation licensing, especially to eliminate the concentration of big companies owning plantations. Although this was unsuccessful, the efforts did lead to a |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | | revision in the time period available for local communities and the general public to respond to licensing applications put forth by companies (from 7 days to 30).<br><br>Human rights-based local regulation guidelines jointly formulated with Pontianak Institute and accepted by the local government of Sangau. |
| Result Indicator 9 | Civil society groups' effort to fight the policy that push and rectify and tolerate violence in the name of religion is initiated. | Partially achieved: National Workshop on the advocacy for the rights to freedom of religion and belief held in April 2012 with CSOs to develop a national advocacy strategy and plan for drafting an Academic paper for the bill on Protection of the right to freedom of religion or belief. |
| Result Indicator 10 | # of CSOs and individuals who master or make use of the instruments of human rights to face the threats of market fundamentalism is increased | Insufficient information. |
| Program 3: Institutional Strengthening of ELSAM as A Credible, Capable, Accountable, and Sustainable Resource Centre of Human Rights | | |
| Result Indicator 11 | The number of the beneficiaries of ELSAM Resource Center is increased | Insufficient information |
| Result Indicator 12 | The implementation of the concept of ELSAM as a Resource Center is reviewed | Partially achieved: Resource center/library equipped with materials, library collections digitalized, online data center and website developed and maintained. Public access to materials promoted. |
| Internet Governance Based On Human Rights Perspective (1004945) | | |
| Program 4: Human rights perspective is the main reference for internet governance discussion in Indonesia | | |
| Result Indicator 1 | A document on internet governance development strategy based on democracy and fairness is developed. This indicator is the responsibility of the three organizations: Hivos, ELSAM and ICT Watch | Insufficient information available. Unclear what strategy document was expected and what was achieved. |
| Result Indicator 2 | Strategic partners and not strategic partners for Internet Governance Forum are identified. This indicator will be prepared by ICT Watch and will be concluded with ELSAM's baseline study | Achieved: Network developed amongst organisations with similar concerns. Coordination developed with: Indonesian Internet Service Provider Association (APJII); Indonesia Internet Domain Registry (PANDI); the Communications and Information Technology Ministry; the National Commission on Human Rights; National Commission on Violence Against Women; CSOs Networks; Relawan TIK; ICT Watch; ID CONFIG; Indonesian Telecommunication and Information Society (MASTEL); CIPG, Air Putih, Idola.net, ICJR, Arus Pelangi, Erotics Indonesia, Satu Dunia Foundation, AJI Indonesia, PSHK, SAFENET, and Pamflet. |
| Result Indicator 3 | Serial of meetings between government, corporations and civil society. ICT Watch is responsible to identify the relevant topics of internet governance issue with the human rights point of view. ELSAM will conduct the meetings | Achieved: Several discussions held with above stakeholders in ahead of the 8th IGF in Bali. |
| Result Indicator 4 | Studies and publications about internet governance based on human rights, prepared by ELSAM:<br>- Case digest of freedom of information on the internet;<br>- Comparation study information freedom in ASEAN countries;<br>- Pocket book about freedom of information right in internet instruments. | Achieved: 3 studies on the internet governance conducted. 34 materials accessible for public. 3 policy briefs published on planned topics.<br><br>Handbook on Freedom of Expression on the Internet produced. In addition, ELSAM developed a paper "Internet Governance in Indonesia: Problems, Challenges and Development Format". |
| Result Indicator 5 | The availability of campaign materials, prepared by ELSAM. | Achieved: Above materials used for awareness campaign on rights-based internet governance. Apart from the written materials, 3 video talk shows uploaded to YouTube & 6 episodes of radio content for streaming. |
| Result Indicator 6 | Information distribution based on ELSAM's publication will be conducted by ICT Watch. | Achieved: Information distribution conducted over three periods of time: before, during and after IGF event in Bali. |
| Result Indicator 7 | The availability of open discussion on internet governance based on human rights in Indonesia. | Result is not tangible, difficult to measure achievement. Discussion on internet governance held between December 2012 and January 2014. This included a public discussion on the challenges of freedom of expression in the Cyber World |

Sources: ELSAM Reports to Hivos, ICT Watch Report to ELSAM/Hivos.

ELSAM implemented a programme on Human Rights Protection from the Threat of Impunity and Fundamentalism from January 2011 until March 2013 which was financed by Miserior, EED and Hivos (18% contribution) and a separate project on Internet Governance together with ICT Watch and Hivos

from July 2012 until February 2014. The table above shows the level of achievement of agreed results with Hivos. ELSAM programs are much broader than these result indicators, so a brief overview will be given of some of the achievements.

The first programme contained three components. Generally speaking activities have been carried out according to plan, for example ELSAM has been involved in influencing and lobbying for a revised Penal Code, lobbying the ratification of all protocols of the Convention against Torture (CAT), and working in tandem with the CSO coalition on Witnesses and Victims Protection (KPSK) that actively monitors the performance of Witnesses and Victims Protection Agency (LPSK).

One of the components aimed at establishing peaceful settlements of human rights violations by strengthening existing institutions, and by introducing effective reparation mechanisms for victims of human rights violations. Peaceful settlements and support to the victims were sought by ELSAM through campaigns; direct assistance to victims; lobby to government, and; by strengthening the Coalition for Justice and Revelation of Truth (KKPK) and Coalition for Witnesses and Victims (KPSK). ELSAM proposed a trust fund to support victims, which has been included in a bill drafted for a Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC), which is still being deliberated because of its sensitivity. To pass this Bill in Parliament requires broad support from CSOs and the government. ELSAM has helped establish a cooperative for the victims, run by the victims.

The end line evaluation has focused on this program area. Between 2012 and 2014 two main results were achieved, namely:

1. Revision of the law on the Witness and Victim Protection Agency (LPSK). Under the new law (No. 13/2014), a repatriation concept for victims of human rights violations has been included. Settlement of the past human rights violations through alternative means as well as through formal means that would involve KKPK, the Coordinating Ministry for People's Welfare/Kemenkokesra and the national human rights commission.
2. Strengthened human rights network. ELSAM developed and disseminated a framework and system for documenting human rights violations. A growing number of organisations are focusing on the importance of settling past human rights violations. They include organisations established and run by victims and other CSOs that come together in the KKPK, which advocates at the national level. Within KKPK, ELSAM coordinates the cluster for data collection and database development. ELSAM facilitated data collection and documentation of past human rights violations by a civil society network through collaborative research and analysis of findings to inform the advocacy agenda. The network spans CSOs from Aceh, Medan, Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Solo, Blitar, Pontianak, Bali, Palu, Makassar and Papua.

Between 2012 and 2014, ELSAM also remained active in two other networks to promote settlement of abuses and protection of victims: the Advocacy Network for the Peaceful Settlement of Past Human Rights Violations and the Working Group on the Advocacy against Torture (WGAT).

The second programme focussed on human rights protection from market and religious fundamentalism and communalism. ELSAM has contributed to the successful judicial review of the Plantation Law, specifically the abolishment of 2 articles that were used to criminalize peasants. The period in which local communities and the public are allowed to respond to licensing applications by companies was successfully extended. In addition, ELSAM and a coalition of NGOs booked success with regards to achieving a judicial review of the National Education System which were considered discriminatory against the access of the poor to quality education. But, the threats of fundamentalism are too large for ELSAM (and its supporting network) to reduce. Civil society as a whole should come to play a more direct role in dealing with fundamentalism. ELSAM's support to protect human rights in the face of fundamentalism has been rather reactive[14].

There is not much information in the progress reports on the third component that concerns internal processes within ELSAM. Although ELSAM's ambition was to digitalise its database and make it available online, as well as link to the HURIDOCS system (an internationally recognized data system

[14] "2007-2011 Evaluation report", ELSAM

that is focuses on human rights abuse documentation), no progress has been reported on this component.

The Internet Governance project has to be contextualised in the light of the 2013 annual Internet Governance Forum (IGF) that took place in Bali. ELSAM produced various documents that were used for campaigning in-country, but despite these they did not manage to revise the Indonesian laws and regulations on internet governance in favour of freedom of expression and the right to seek information.

## 5.2 Changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period?

### 5.2.1 Civic Engagement

Generally speaking, no change was recorded with regards to civic engagement in the 2012-2014 period. ELSAM is by design politically engaged in sensitive arenas that seek remedy for victims and for truth and reconciliation since its creation in 1993. In this period ELSAM decided to reduce its involvement in the direct provision of services to human rights victims and to reorient their program on providing advisory services to civil society organisations and the government with regards to research and policy influence on human rights. Having been involved in the creation of the Witness and Victims Protection Agency (LPSK) in 2006, ELSAM has continuously monitored the effectiveness of reparation and indemnification by the agency. A number of gaps were identified in the original law establishing LSPK (Law No. 13/2006) and in the definitions for eligibility to repartition. As such, ELSAM though Komnas HAM[15] was involved in improving the categories for eligibility so that more human rights victims could access services provided by, amongst others, LPSK. This had an immediate effect on the number of victims obtaining services: from 750 in the last quarter of 2013 to 1,000 persons in the first semester of 2014.

Throughout the period, ELSAM continued to document human rights atrocities committed and organised for victims to provide testimony of their experiences during critical meetings and/or events to support their lobby and advocacy agenda. Apart from this, victims were consulted to ensure that position papers and policy drafts produced by ELSAM responded to their needs.

A key successful advocacy agenda brought to fruition was ELSAM influence of a revision of the Witness and Victim Protection Law to improve the protection and services already provided through LPSK to witnesses and victims. 2014 was characterised by an increased political engagement by ELSAM because of legislative and presidential elections taking place.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 3**
**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 0**

### 5.2.2 Level of Organisation

ELSAM's engagement with other networks in civil society slightly improved in the 2012 – 2014 period. ELSAM remained engaged in a number of coalitions including: 1) Coalition for Justice and Revelation of Truth (KKPK); 2) Coalition for Victim and Witness Protection (KPSK); 3) Anti Forest-Mafia Coalition (KAMH); 4) Judicial Monitoring Coalition (KPP); and, 5) Indonesia's NGO Coalition for International Human Rights Advocacy. The SPO maintains a wide network with NGOs and CSOs working in a range of issues where human rights is a concern. ELSAM also holds an important membership position in the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM). ELSAM's contribution to networking remains one of its strengths as an organisation.

[15] ELSAM assisted Komnas HAM and LPSK to streamline their procedures in handling the victims as there were delays in service provision due the incompatibility of systems. This resulted in the signing of a MoU on how to streamline their services to the victims through alignment of eligibility procedures in June 2014.

KPSK, of which ELSAM is a member, intensified its lobby in early 2014 to ensure that a new law regarding Witness and Victim Protection was promulgated in October 2014, just before the new parliament was sworn in.

Apart from this, ELSAM together with the Public Interest Lawyers Network (PIL-NET) reviewed the 2004 plantation law and worked with ICT Rights Watch on internet governance. ELSAM expanded its network with Indonesian research organisations working beyond the human rights scope in 2013 by securing funding from Knowledge Sector Initiative, a five to eight-year Australian Government-funded initiative in 2013 to strengthen ELSAM's capacity in knowledge production and to improve its evidence based policy advocacy. This is an indication that the SPO has the capacity to diversify its financial sources.

As already described above, ELSAM decided to decrease its direct involvement with human rights victims, implying fewer interventions to defend their interests.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**
**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 1**

### 5.2.3 Practice of Values

Since the baseline there have been no changes in how decisions are made within ELSAM or in how it applies transparency or internal accountability measures. ELSAM is an independent association (*perkumpulan*) that works with human rights activists, academia lawyers and other NGOs. ELSAM has a board, members of association, and an executive arm. The board and the executive meet on a regular basis. The composition of both remains unchanged since the baseline, with three of the five board members and 40 percent of the members of association being women. A new chairperson of the board, a well-known women's activist, was selected to hold the position for the period 2014-2019 (replacing a male human rights activist). The current female executive director will end her second term in 2015.

When the baseline was conducted in 2012, ELSAM could not provide an audited financial report for 2011 and 2012. During the end line evaluation, ELSAM was able to provide both. The 2013 audit report has been completed but the report is not yet available. In this regard, there have been no changes in the way the organisation conducts financial auditing.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**
**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 0**

### 5.2.4 Perception of Impact

ELSAM has two main direct clients: individual victims of human rights violations and CSOs. On Client satisfaction, in the absence of regular monitoring data on client satisfaction, the interviews conducted for this evaluation reported high satisfaction of what ELSAM has done for them (based on two testimonies of clients). In addition, observation of ELSAM's website and Twitter account do not show any evidence of the use of public forums to provide feedback or launch complaints.

At the organizational level, the Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (KontraS) and the National Commission for Human Rights (Komnas HAM) expressed their appreciation for continued support and leadership of ELSAM in the Coalition for Justice and Revelation of Truth (KKPK). For Komnas HAM and KontraS, we can conclude that their level of satisfaction remains the same.

On the SPO's civil society impact, the role of ELSAM as a 'knowledge organisation' that feeds their networks with data to promote human rights protection is acknowledged by the coalition members. However, there is no significant difference, in this area compared with situation in 2012.

With regards to the strategy to increase their contribution to CS arena, in 2014 ELSAM introduced a new focus to their mid-term plans, namely to:

1. Improve their communication's strategy for producing better knowledge for use by policymakers and civil society to strengthen their advocacy strategies;
2. Maximize the use of ICT to expand the outreach for dissemination and potential beneficiaries; and

3. Reform the internal 'corporate culture' of ELSAM, including strengthening leadership, organisational performance enhancement through a better planning, monitoring and evaluation system, and strengthening staff capacity.

This new focus is a good reflection of where ELSAM has been able to demonstrate its strengths, namely in representing marginalised groups, in this case victims of human rights abuses and minorities, and influencing policies and practices to take up the concerns of these groups and to ensure an adherence to human rights principles.

During the baseline, ELSAM's contributions to CS arena were identified as providing data (research) and training for human rights activists (up to 350 trainees). These roles seem to have decreased due to a reliance on project-based funding to implement the activities. On provision of data/knowledge to other CSOs, there were two activities implemented by ELSAM with regard to their role in CS arena: 1) improving information and documentation systems, including the production of user-friendly information on human rights research findings and data for usage by other CSOs[16], and; 2) increasing the number of users accessing information through the web by digitizing 13,876 human rights documents.

ELSAM's relation with government agencies remains the same; they maintain their reputation as a 'moderate 'human rights organisation. For example, ELSAM was appointed as a CS representative to take part in a joint fact-finding mission with the Coordinating Ministry for Politics, Law and Security (Menkopolhukam) in response to violent land disputes between communities and plantation companies in Mesuji, Lampung –while KontraS, in other hand, is seen as "hard-line" defender in this case. ELSAM was also well positioned vis-à-vis the Office of the President and Komnas HAM to continue to push for the disclosure of truth about past human rights violations.

In terms of service delivery, in the baseline, ELSAM reported support to the public sector officials through a series of trainings for local law enforcers (police, public prosecutors and judges at the lower, higher and supreme courts) to instil human rights standards. In the last two years, these trainings were discontinued due to change in program strategy that now focuses on policy advocacy[17].

On ELSAM's relation with private sector agencies, there has been a strategy shift in the last two years. On the one hand, ELSAM continues to advocate for poor and/or land-less farmers who come in conflict with plantations companies occurring in Medan, North Sumatra; Ketapang, West Kalimantan; Kebumen, Central Java; Batanghari and Sarolangun, Jambi; and Blitar, East Java. Findings from investigations carried out by ELSAM were submitted to the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM), the Indonesian national police, and LPSK. This successfully sparked responses from each of the agencies that sought to protect and provide reparations for those affected in the land dispute with the private companies. Besides this more confrontational approach, ELSAM has employed a voluntary approach through which it seeks to promote better company practices. It has produced a manual for companies on "how to do business without violating human rights".

One major outcome of ELSAM has been its continued efforts to improve the regulatory framework for the Witness and Victims Protection Agency (LPSK) by engaging in a CSO coalition. In 2014, a revision was passed of the original Law that saw the establishment of LPSK in 2006. In addition to that, ELSAM contributed to improved governance of Komnas HAM and LPSK in handling the victims of human rights violations by improving the procedures for granting statements for victims and their families (Regulation No. 004/Komnas HAM/X/2013, for example). A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was also signed between Komnas HAM and LPSK on 25 June 2014 to secure an agreement on better coordination in handling victims. Linkages were maintained with CSOs and grassroots organizations such as the Solo Survivors Network and similar victim organisations in Palu and Jakarta

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 3**

[16] For example by providing references and updates in human rights that are available at http://referensi.elsam.or.id/?lang=in

[17] Training for human rights lawyers is still going on, for example 15 selected lawyers will participate in advance course on January 12-20, 2015. ELSAM, Pendidikan HAM, "PENDIDIKAN HAM: Pengumuman Hasil Seleksi". Available from http://www.elsam.or.id/article.php?act=content&id=3175&cid=504&lang=in#.VKovNiuUcu8 (accessed 23 November 2014)

**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 1**

### 5.2.5 Civil Society Environment

As an organization with a broad mandate to defend human rights ELSAM needs to stay abreast with concerns of its constituents, the general public, whilst monitoring policy developments in the country. In this regard, ELSAM collaborates with other human rights organisations to monitor the situation. ELSAM has demonstrated an ability to remain relevant to contextual developments. For example, it engaged with ICT Watch to campaign for the preservation of the right to expression in the area of internet governance, taking advantage of the existing momentum in the lead up to an international conference. In the run up to the presidential elections, ELSAM stepped up its campaign messaging on the human rights backgrounds of running candidates. On a another issue, ELSAM joined forces with a host of civil society organisations to protest the parliamentary approval of direct elections of regional heads of government, considering this to be an infringement of people's political rights.

While ELSAM has been successful in influencing the policy formulation process and in lobbying for human rights to be upheld, the organization has been less successful in addressing how policies are implemented, and poor law enforcement is common problem in Indonesia, not only in human rights issues. Although new policies and commitments to upholding human rights are made by the government, there continues to be a wavering of its actual response to human rights abuses, violence and discrimination. In the future, ELSAM may need to think of how it positions itself to push for a better translation of the human rights lingua franca in policies to practice.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**
**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 1**

## 5.3 To what degree are the changes attributable to the Southern partners?

This paragraph assesses the extent to which some outcomes achieved can be "attributed" to ELSAM. Starting with an outcome, the evaluation team developed a model of change that identifies different pathways that possibly explain the outcome achieved. Data collection was done to obtain evidence that confirms or rejects each of these pathways. Based upon this assessment, the evaluation team concludes about the most plausible explanation of the outcome and the most plausible relation between (parts of) pathways and the outcome. The relations between the pathways and the outcomes can differ in nature as is being explained in table 6.

Table 6

*Nature of the relation between parts in the Model of Change*

| Nature of the relation between parts and other parts or outcome | |
|---|---|
| The part is the only causal explanation for the outcome. No other interventions or factors explain it. (necessary and sufficient) |  |
| The part does not explain the outcome at all: other subcomponents explain the outcomes. |  |
| The part explains the outcome but other parts explain the outcome as well: there are multiple pathways (sufficient but not necessary) |  |
| The part is a condition for the outcome but won't make it happen without other factors (necessary but not sufficient) |  |
| The part is a contributory cause it is part of a 'package' of causal actors and factors that together are sufficient to produce the intended effect. |  |

Sources: Mayne, 2012; Stern et al, 2012

The following paragraph assesses CWM's contribution to two outcomes. Each paragraph first describes the outcome achieved and the evidence obtained to confirm that the outcome has been achieved. It then presents the pathways identified that possibly explain the outcomes, as well as present information that confirms or refutes these pathways. The last section concludes in the first place about the most plausible explanation of the outcome, followed by a conclusion regarding the role of the SPO in explaining the outcome.

Two outcomes were selected to measure the degree of MFS-II effectiveness. These were:

- Outcome 1: Revised Law on Witness and Victim Protection;
- Outcome 2: ELSAM's network organisations are more capable of data collection and analysis for use in local advocacy.

### 5.3.1 Revised Law on Witness and Victim Protection

On 17 October 2014, a revised Law on Witness and Victim Protection was formally put in place following parliamentary approval in September 2014. Law No. 31/2014 replaced Law No. 13/2006. The new law is a major milestone for human rights organisations who have lobbied for changes for over four years. The implications of the new law for human rights are as follows:

- Expanded coverage of services for victims of human rights abuses, which now includes victims of trafficking, terrorism, sexual abuse and other crimes;
- Clarity on the types of protection services provided to the witnesses, justice collaborators and corruption whistle-blowers and special treatment for the child witnesses;
- Strengthened authority of the Witness and Victim Protection Agency (LPSK), established in 2006, in its ability to request the police to provide protection services[18].





***Figure 1:*** *Pathways that possibly explain outcomes and conclusions about the nature of the relations between pathways and the outcome, law No. 31/2014*

**Causal pathways**

The Model of Change in Figure 1 presents three different pathways that may explain this outcome:

1. The first pathway is that ELSAM developed policy inputs based upon research, which were shared and discussed with the Coalition for the Protection of Witnesses and Victims (KPSK) of which ELSAM is a member. This coalition actively monitored the implementation of the 2006 Law since its 100 first days of its implementation[19]. In doing so inputs and information from victims and LPSK were used to inform the need for the formulation of an amendment of the 2006 Law. Based upon research conducted by ELSAM in 2010-2011 and data provided by another coalition member,

[18] Hukum Online, "RUU PSK Jadi UU, Era Baru Perlindungan Saksi dan Korban: ICJR mash melihat beberapa kelemahan dari UU PSK hasil revisi", 24 September 2014. Available from http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt5422a2e761919/ruu-psk-jadi-uu--era-baru-perlindungan-saksi-dan-korban (accessed 27 November 2014)

[19] See KPSK Position Paper # 5 Tahun 2008 written by ELSAM (Lead), ICW, YLBHI, ICJR on 100 days of LPSK.

the Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (KontraS), ELSAM developed an Academic Paper followed by a draft proposal of the amending bill. After the proposal was discussed and accepted by the Advisory Committee of the President, the bill was tabled in Parliament in 2014.

2. In the second pathway, human rights abuse victims took the initiative to link with CSOs/NGOs to start lobbying the government and parliament, without any ELSAM involvement.
3. In the third pathway, the government-led National Commission for Human Rights (Komnas Ham) together with LPSK lobbied the parliament to amend the law. Public pressure had been building for the need to revise the law through media exposure and from victims groups since the implementation of Law in 2006.

**Information that confirms or rejects the pathways**

*Information that confirms pathway 1*
Even before the former 2006 Law was put in place, ELSAM had been critical of the legal foundations offering witness and victim protection. In 2006, the head of ELSAM's legal service unit at that time, Supriyadi Widodo Eddyono, authored a policy paper on witness and victim protection entitled "The Forgotten Witnesses of the Criminal Justice System: Critical Notes against the Witness and Victim Protection Bill"[20].

In 2007, one of the Deputy Program Directors of ELSAM was selected to head LPSK for the 2008-2013 period. He remained a member of ELSAM until he was chosen to be one of ELSAM's five board members for the 2010-2014period. ELSAM has thus been strategically linked to LPSK since 2008.

ELSAM has been a member of KPSK since 2001, along with organisations like the Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), KontraS, WALH, Sawit Watch, TuK Indonesia, YLBHI, LBH Pers, ICJR, YLBH Universalia[21]. The KPSK secretariat is also located in the ELSAM Office in Jakarta. ELSAM's role in the drafting of Law No. 31/2014 as a KPSK member was also confirmed by other coalition members from KontraS and from IKOHI.

In 2010, discussions on the revision of Law 31/2006 gained momentum and an email was sent by LPSK in November 2010 clearly stating ELSAM as the lead drafter of the Academic Paper. Since then there has been evidence of ELSAM's involvement, not only in discussions on the revision but also through the provision of policy input. In May 2012, during a workshop hosted by LPSK with CSOs and NGOs, the role of ELSAM in KPSK in conducting policy/regulatory research was clearly stated. Available meeting records organised by KPSK and victims to discuss the revision of the Law show that ELSAM was present in at least 4 meetings (19 November 2010, 2 January 2013, 17 & 28 June 2013). In June 2014, KPSK provided further input to the law proposing the inclusion of the protection of child witness into the law; this paper was co-authored by two of LPPSLH's Deputy Directors (Zainal Abidin and Wahyu Wagiman).

The new law has taken up a number of ELSAM's and KPSK's inputs reflected in a Position Paper published in June 2014[22]. One of KPSK policy inputs policy inputs in May 2013 stated that the protection should be expanded to whistle-blowers, justice collaborators, and victims of terrorism, sexual violence, and human trafficking. This, as well as the input to protect child witnesses (proposed in a KPSK Position Paper in June 2014) has been taken up in the revised law.

[20] Eddyono, S. W. 2006. *Saksi, Yang Terlupakan Dari Sisitem Peradilan Pidana: Beberapa Catatan Kritis Terhadap RUU Perlindungan Saksi Dan Korban*. Policy Paper. Jakarta: ELSAM. Available from http://perlindungansaksi.files.wordpress.com/2008/05/catatan-kritis-terhadap-ruu-perlindungan-saksi-dpr.pdf (accessed 27 November 2014)

[21] Wagiman, W., Wiryawan, S. M., Eddyono, S. W., Yuntho, E. 2007. *Naskah Akademis dan Rancangan Peraturan Pemerintah: Prosedur Pemberian Kompensasi dan Restitusi*. Jakarta: Indonesia Corruption Watch. Available from http://web.iaincirebon.ac.id/ebook/moon/mixed/bukurpppemberiankompensasi.pdf (accessed 27 November 2014)

[22] Eddyono, S. W., Abidin, Z., Yuntho, E., Wagiman, W., Anggara, Napitupulu, E. 2014. *Masukan Terhadap Perubahan UU No 13 Tahun 2006 Tentang Perlindungan Saksi Dan Korban*. Jakarta: Koalisi Perlindungan Saksi dan Korban. Available from http://www.elsam.or.id/downloads/607366_Briefing_Paper_Koalisi___24_Juni_2014_Final.pdf (accessed 27 November 2014)

*Information that rejects pathway 1*
In June 2010 a hearing took place during which Commission III and LPSK discussed challenges in LPSK's institutional performance. During the hearing, LPSK received support from Commission III to revise Law No. 13/2006[23]. In 2011, LPSK proposed unsuccessfully for the revision to be taken up in the government's legislative agenda for 2012[24].

Not all recommendations put forth by KPSK in June 2014 were taken up in the final revision of the Law.

*Information that confirms pathway 2*
None

*Information that rejects pathway2*
All information confirming pathway 1 rejects pathway 2. In addition, there is no evidence of any other CSOs or human rights defenders in Indonesia lobbied for a revision of the law without engaging with KPSK. In fact, the membership of the coalition is quite extensive with all major human rights lobby NGOs or groups (YLBHI, KontraS, Setara, Imparsial, ICW, ICJR, LBH) being a part of KPSK. There is also an internal mechanism for the division of work. For example KontraS leads any activities relating to the Munir case, KontraS and Imparsial lead advocacy, and ELSAM concentrates on LPSK issues. Active individuals of the KPSK coalition who are also closely involved in LPSK include Wahyu Wagiman, Supriyadi Widodo Eddyono, Zainal Abidin, Syahrial Wiryawan Martanto, and Emerson Yuntho (three of whom are or have worked with ELSAM). As a host of the KPSK's coalition, ELSAM reviews formal policy inputs released by KPSK.

Abdul Haris Semendawai was the head of LPSK until 2013[25] and his name appears on a proposed draft revision of the Law dated 16 May 2013[26]. It is implausible that ELSAM was not involved considering Semendawai was a program director with ELSAM before joining LPSK.

*Information that confirms pathway 3*
There is a working relationship in place and coordination between Komnas HAM and LPSK takes place regularly[27]. Both agencies collaborate to identify victims and witnesses requiring protection and application of victims of human rights abuses requesting LPSK protection need to be verified by Komnas HAM[28]. Both LPSK and Komnas HAM have the right to propose law revisions. LPSK pressured for the revision to be part of the legislative agendas in 2011, 2013 and 2014 (as evident from media coverage and LPSK publications on its website).

Komnas HAM and LPSK did organise meetings with civil society and victims to discuss their needs. For example, on 13 June 2014 Komnas HAM organised a meeting with victims[29]. On May 30, 2012 LPSK organised a meeting with civil society elements, which included KPSK members[30].

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[23] Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indinesia, "Laporan Singkat Rapat Dengar Pendapat Komisi III DPR RI Dengan Lembaga Perlindungan Saksi Dan Korban (LPSK)", 3 June 2010. Available from www.dpr.go.id/dokakd/dokumen/K3_laporan_Lapsing_RDP_Komisi_III_dengan_LPSK.doc (accessed 27 November 2014)

[24] Restika Ayu Prasasty, "LPSK Kecewa UU Perlindungan Saksi dan Korban Tak Masuk Prolegnas DPR", *detikNews*, 17 December 2011. Available from http://news.detik.com/read/2011/12/17/194316/1793601/10/ (accessed 27 November 2014)

[25] Lembaga Perlindungan Saksi dan Korban, Profil, "Biodata Abdul Haris Semendawai, S.H., LLM. (Ketua LPSK). Available from http://www.lpsk.go.id/profil/profil_detail/14 (accessed 27 November 2014)

[26] ELSAM. 2013. *Draft RUU LPSK (Rancangan Undang-undang Lembaga Perlindungan Saksi dan Korban)*. Jakarta. Available from http://elsam.or.id/downloads/420655_Draft_RUU_LPSK.pdf (accessed 27 November 2014)

[27] ELSAM. 2014. *Pokok-Pokok Masukan Koalisi dan Pengungkapan Kebenaran (KKPK) (Tim Kerja Penguatan Korban) Kepada Lembaga Perlindungan Saksi dan Korban (LPSK)*. 10 Maret. Available from http://www.elsam.or.id/downloads/235761_KKPK-Pokok_pokok_Masukan_KKPK_Kepada_LPSK_rekomendasi.pdf (accessed 27 November 2014)

[28] Article 13 in LPSK's Guidelines on Protection Service Application. Lembaga Perlindungan Saksi dan Korban. 2011. *Peraturan Lembaga Perlindungan Saksi Dan Korban Nomor 1 Tahun 2011 Tentang Pedoman Pelayanan Permohonan Perlindungan Pada Lembaga Perlindungan Saksi Dan Korban*. Available from http://lpsk.go.id/upload/berkas/2011/Nomor%201%20Tahun%202011.PDF (accessed 27 November 2014)

[29] Fransiskan Papua, Suara SKPKC, "Keluarga Korban Kekerasan di Papua Menuntut Keadilan", 24 June 2014. Available from http://www.fransiskanpapua.net/2014/06/1381/keluarga-korban-kekerasan-di-papua-menuntut-keadilan.php (accessed 27 November 2014)

[30] Meeting organised by LPSK on 30 May 2012. Maharani Siti Shopia, "LPSK Maksimalkan Pemenuhan Hak Korban Pelanggaran HAM Masa Lalu", *Lembaga Perlindungan Saksi dan Korban*, 31 Mei 2012. Available from http://www.lpsk.go.id/berita/berita_detail/70#sthash.86vTTyqW.dpuf (accessed 27 November 2014)

*Information that rejects pathway 3*

In an editorial published by LPSK in 2012, Komnas HAM was not mentioned as an actor pushing for the revision of the Law[31]. While LPSK has admitted to the media that many actors have supported the revision of the Law, it does not specifically mention a role Komnas HAM[32].

For Komnas HAM itself - who has a mandate to monitor international human rights treaties, investigate the implementation of human rights, cooperate with agencies for the protection of human rights and disseminate information about human rights[33] – the revision of Law No. 13 was less a priority since it does have direct implications on its roles and functions. Rather, Komnas HAM has focused on proposing the revision of Law 39/1999 on Human Rights and Law 26/2000 on Human Rights Court, which have more direct consequences for its mandate.

In the May 2012 meeting organised by LPSK, KPSK members pushed for the need to change the procedures of LPSK since the bureaucratic obstacles (particularly the requirements of a Komnas HAM statement to be issued to applicants) that impeded victims from accessing their rights to compensation, restitution and rehabilitation[34].

**Conclusion**

Based upon the analysis of the information available, we conclude that the most valid explanation for the amendment of the Law is that the coalition members provided inputs, including assisting LPSK in drafting the Academic Paper, the draft Law, and other forms of policy inputs. LPSK played an important role in the process, such as by taking a lead in proposing for the law revision to be taken up in the legislative agenda. As such external pressure was needed to raise the stakes and enhance support for the revision of the law. This is evident from the failures of getting a revision endorsed in 2011 and 2013 despite being a part of the legislative agenda.

Other external factors also contributed to the parliamentary approval of the revision. These include mounting public pressure, dissatisfaction over LPSK's services, the President's commitment to uncovering the culprits of the Munir murder in 2004, the impending end of the parliament's term and the upcoming elections, endorsing the revisions was considered to be a trade-off with more controversial regulatory proposals (TRC), and increased attention to the lack of satisfactory legislation to deal with whistle-blowers in high profile corruption cases.

Given ELSAM's role in KPSK and its personal relations with the head of LPSK, it is plausible to assume that were well positioned to influence the revisions. ELSAM's role was: *necessary* but not *sufficient*. ELSAM provided technical expertise, drafted policy inputs, and utilized their experience in working with victims and LPSK to identify gaps.

[31] M. Nur, "Penyempurnaan UU Perlindungan Saksi dan Korban", *Buletin Kesaksian*, Edisi No. 2 Tahun 2012, p. 10. Available from http://www.lpsk.go.id/upload/Majalah%20Kesaksian%20Edisi%20II%20tes35.pdf (accessed 27 November 2014)

[32] KOMPAS.com, News, Hukum, "LPSK Bahas Revisi UU Perlindungan Saksi", 3 August 2010. Available from http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2010/08/03/19400249/LPSK.Bahas.Revisi.UU.Perlindungan.Saksi (accessed 27 November 2014)

[33] Asia Pacific Forum, Members, Full Members, "Indonesia". Available from http://www.asiapacificforum.net/members/full-members/indonesia (accessed 27 November 2014)

[34] Meeting organised by LPSK on 30 May 2012. Maharani Siti Shopia, "LPSK Maksimalkan Pemenuhan Hak Korban Pelanggaran HAM Masa Lalu", Lembaga Perlindungan Saksi dan Korban, 31 Mei 2012. Available from http://www.lpsk.go.id/berita/berita_detail/70#sthash.86vTTyqW.dpuf (accessed 27 November 2014)

### 5.3.2 ELSAM's network organisations are more capable of data collection and analysis for use in local advocacy

The second outcome that the evaluators looked at was the improved capability of CSO networks that receive support from ELSAM in documenting human rights violations as a means to help influence policies. Prior to MFS II funding, ELSAM already had established a network of CSOs at both national and sub-national level. But compared to the 2012 situation, ELSAM has received more systematic





***Figure 2:*** *Pathways that possibly explain outcomes and conclusions about the nature of the relations between pathways and the outcome, capacity of CSOs*

information through its network, which has allowed it to expand the number of reports produced. In 2012 only a number of subnational cases were covered in ELSAM's national report.[35] In the first semester of 2014, by comparison, there was a better analysis of the types of the violations, impacts and the settlement of these.[36]On freedom of expression violations, in 2011, there were only 2 cases documented, and in 2013, ELSAM documented 18 cases received from its networks and correspondents in more than 15 districts. There is no evidence at partner level since the outcome was suggested by ELSAM's board member and confirmed in minutes of a KPKK meeting of the Coalition for the Disclosure of the Truth (KPPK) on 4 January 2013, and by ELSAM's documentation on the online portal.

**Causal pathways**

The Model of Change in figure 2 presents two different pathways that may explain this outcome:

1. The first pathway that explains this outcome is that ELSAM supported CSOs in monitoring and documenting human rights violations. ELSAM provided the basic framework for the analysis of human rights violations: vertical (by state) abuses; horizontal (communal), and gender-based violence to their 375training alumni covering at least 30 CSOs across Indonesia. The cases related to market fundamentalism, religious fundamentalism and communalism were monitored by ELSAM's training alumni. ELSAM developed a content management system to record human rights abuses that is published on its website[37]. Based on these cases, the CSOs and ELSAM can develop recommendations for law enforcement, improved service delivery for the victims to prevent victim retaliation that may violate the law, and policy change agendas.
2. In the second pathway other CSOs (YLBHI, KontraS, Setara) are looking after the sub-national CSOs for human rights monitoring.

**Information that confirms or rejects the pathways**

*Information that confirms pathway 1*
ELSAM's first joint human rights monitoring report with other CSOs (LBH, INFID and WALHI) was produced in 1993 on the topic of human rights violations in Indonesia's family planning program and the construction of a dam in Central Java (Kedung Ombo). ELSAM continues to publish and author annual human reports on the human rights situation in Indonesia. Beginning in 2012, ELSAM started providing space for local organisations (victims organisations like IKOHI, for example) to contribute in the report.

ELSAM strengthened the supply side by providing a framework for human rights monitoring to network organisations. ELSAM's technical assistance to CSOs in documenting human rights cases is in the form of managing a special portal where their network provides information. ELSAM's website: http://www.dokumentasi.elsam.or.id/ contains data and information on human rights violations that are sourced from the reports from ELSAM's network, submissions by email, phone or SMS, and the monitoring of print and online media. Network organisations also use ELSAM's website to disseminate their reports and data[38]. ELSAM reports that they have provided training to some 30 CSOs across Indonesia. Until the end of 2013 ELSAM provided 13 trainings had been conducted for of 375 people[39]. Meetings were organised by ELSAM to discuss the needs for consolidated data and assisted network organisation in data collection analysis. In the first quarter of 2012, ELSAM started producing quarterly human rights updates informed by reports from CSO partners. In June 2013, in a meeting with CSOs partners, ELSAM discussed the need to have a consolidated report (Source: meeting notes ELSAM CSO

[35] ELSAM, "Pelanggaran Kebebasan Beragama/Berkeyakinan 2012". Available from http://www.elsam.or.id/downloads/587096_PELANGGARAN_KEBEBASAN_BERAGAMA_2012.pdf (accessed 27 November 2014)
[36] ELSAM, "Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan Januari-Juni 2014". Available from http://www.elsam.or.id/downloads/223356_2014_Jan-Jun_Kebebasan_Beragama_dan_Berkeyakinan.pdf (accessed 27 November 2014)
[37] ELSAM, "Data". Available from http://www.elsam.or.id/list.php?cat=statistik&lang=en (accessed 27 November 2014)
[38] An example of a publication by a network in Kalimantan. ELSAM, Publikasi Jaringan, "Kalimantan Update edisi Juni 2014". Available from http://www.elsam.or.id/article.php?act=content&id=2960&cid=408&lang=in#.VH15sDGUcu8 (accessed 27 November 2014)
[39] Facebook, Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat (ELSAM), "Undangan Mengikuti KursusHAM untuk Pengacara". Available from https://id-id.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=10151749606224811&id=130077823697089 (accessed 27 November 2014)

28 June 2014). A number of consolidated reports have been produced since. For example, in October 2014, KPKK launched a monitoring report of human rights abuses in which primary data was provided by KPKK members, managed by ELSAM[40].

Network organisations confirmed ELSAM's role in data management. An interview conducted with Rumah Kitab, an NGO working on gender and women's rights issues confirmed that ELSAM has a significant role in monitoring data. By comparison, the role of the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YBHI) in the area of data management has been shrinking.

*Information that rejects pathway 1*
None

**Pathway number 2**

*Information that confirms pathway 2*
ELSAM does not have offices established at the sub-national level and thus has less frequent and less intense communication with its network organisations. Other human rights organisations like YLBHI do have a network at the sub-national level, and organisations like Setara and KontraS collect and publish data and information obtained through a similar network to ELSAM.

*Information that rejects pathway 2*
From information obtained through the Asia Foundation, the evaluation team learned that YLBHI no longer has the ability to coordinate data collection through its subnational network due to a lack of funds. Setara[41] and KontraS[42] do not support regular updating by subnational networks. Rather, they collect data depending on specific needs or policy agenda. The evaluation team reviewed some of the Setara and KontraS reports and found that the publications tend to be more like situational analysis and not an analysis of trends from regular data updates.

ELSAM is in a better position to link CSO networks and links them with human rights service providers such as Komnas HAM and LPSK. On 4 October 2013, ELSAM provided policy inputs to Komnas HAM on how to improve their procedures for endorsing the applications of victims that want to obtain services from LPSK.

**Conclusion**
Based upon the analysis of the information available, we conclude that the most valid explanation for the stronger human rights data monitoring is ELSAM's support to its CSO partners at the subnational level. ELSAM's website allows for members to contribute data and information on human rights violations and upload their reports. This has also assisted ELSAM at the national level in its lobby efforts, such as with the revision of Law on Witness and Victim Protection. ELSAM's support – in the form of providing a data management framework, creating a web-based database, and linking to national service providers - is *necessary but not sufficient* as past support from organisations like YLBHI may have also contributed to improved monitoring: Although KontraS and Setara's approach may not be to monitor data trends, they provide other valuable inputs to subnational networks.

[40] Kartika Virgianti, "3-4 Oktober, KKPK Rilis Laporan Pelanggaran HAM Masa Lalu", *SatuHarapan.com*, 2 October 2014. Available from http://www.satuharapan.com/read-detail/read/3-4-oktober-kkpk-rilis-laporan-pelanggaran-ham-masa-lalu (accessed 27 November 2014)

[41] SETARA Institute for Democracy and Peace is an NGO that conducts research and advocacy on democracy, political freedom and human rights. Its core research focused in answering the actual need of society. Its establishment in 2005 is to response on fundamentalism, discrimination and violence on behalf of religion and morality in many fields that threat the pluralism and human rights. SETARA Institute works in secular space (human rights and constitution based) and did not penetrate to religious theologies. SETARA Institute is a pioneer for Condition of freedom of religion/belief report in Indonesia, which influences the promotion on civil freedom and policy change to push pluralism and human rights.

[42] KontraS (Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence) in Indonesia is a human rights NGO that deals with human rights issues in Indonesia, particularly civil and political rights. Abolition of the death penalty is one of its advocacy objectives.

## 5.4 What is the relevance of these changes?

### 5.4.1 Relevance of the changes in relation to the Theory of Change of 2012

The results achieved in the period 2012-2014 are in line with ELSAM's Theory of Change (ToC) in 2012. As stated in the baseline, in its vision and strategy, ELSAM seeks to promote a democratic political society by empowering civil society through advocacy and the promotion of human rights. The SPO has maintained its focus on lobbying and campaigning for better laws that promote human rights. ELSAM continued and strengthened the monitoring, analysis and reporting on human rights abuses at the national and subnational levels. Information has been made accessible to the public through ELSAM's website.

The strategies employed by ELSAM have been successful in improving the responsiveness and effectiveness of handling the reparations of human rights violations. A number of initiatives have responded to religious and market fundamentalism, but this has been limited to a handful of high-profile cases where ELSAM documented and disseminated their findings to government institutions, calling for better protection. Full settlements of human rights violations through mechanisms like the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) remain unattainable; however this reflective of the context and the sensitivity of such matters.

One area of work that did not appear explicitly in the ToC in 2012 was ELSAM's efforts in collaboration with ICT Watch on the issue of internet governance. Nonetheless, this fits with the organisation's overall vision as the efforts focused on researching the human rights perspective of internet governance, promoting freedom of expression as a basic right, and incorporating a human rights perspectives into preliminary discussions on internet governance from the get-go.

The achievements attained are justified as the ToC's main assumption rested the interaction between public pressure created by CS networks and a pro-human rights government (i.e. political will). Between 2010 and 2012, the government has applied human rights rhetoric, supported by blandishments but addressing human rights abuses and violations fully continues to be a highly political and sensitive issues. With regards to creating public pressure, ELSAM has played a critical role by documenting cases of human rights abuses and using its extensive experience and knowledge to provide policy inputs whilst working with a range of network organisations with shared values and interests.

### 5.4.2 Relevance of the changes in relation to the context in which the SPO is operating

When Law 13/2006 was passed, Indonesia was hailed for improving the protection available to victims and witnesses. However, it took two years to establish LPSK, and another two for gaps to be identified in its mandates and procedures for service delivery. Deficiencies identified early on included the lack of protection for victims of sexual violence[43]. LPSK's service coverage remained limited, partly because of the complex and incoherent procedures for seeking reparation, as well as the lack of political will for reparations[44]. In addition, the Law included a narrow definition for witnesses and ambiguity over when the state was obligated to protect them, including whistle-blowers. More ironically, in 2010 and 2011, high-profile corruptors from within the state apparatus "discovered that the Law on Witness Protection can be used as a means to evade corruption investigations" by seeking out the help of LPSK to avoid arrest and interrogations[45]. Against this backdrop, a new law was long awaited and public pressure

[43] Indonesia: Briefing to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Women and girl domestic workers, Amnesty International. Amnesty International, Report, "Indonesia: Briefing to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Women and girl domestic workers", 1 January 2011. http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/indonesia-briefing-to-the-un-committee-on-the-elimination-of-discrimination-against-women-women-and?page=6 (accessed 15 December 2014)

[44] ICTJ, IKOHI and KKPK. 2011. *Indonesia's Obligations to Provide Reparations for Victims of Gross Human Rights Violations*. Policy Briefing. New York: The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), p. 6. Available from http://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Indonesia-Reparations-Policy-Briefing-2011-English.pdf (15 December 2014)

[45] Freedom House, "Countries at the Crossroads 2012: Indonesia". Available from https://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Indonesia%20-%20FINAL.pdf (15 December 2014)

was mounting. Momentum was also gained as the parliamentary and administration's terms were drawing to a close in 2014.

With respect to ELSAM's longstanding role in human rights abuse monitoring, investigation and reporting, an improved online system to manage and disseminate data and information is welcomed progress. In Indonesia the Internet is an important means for communication and the government is adopting e-government systems. Data and information systems are also being espoused to monitor progress and inform policy decisions. The National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS) was developed by the Habibie Centre and adopted by the Coordinating Ministry for Human Development and Culture (formerly Kemenkokesra). Like ELSAM's data system, NVMS relies predominantly on media reports. Given such developments, it is important to maintain independent or 'shadow' reports and data that may offer an alternative view of the government's performance and continue to monitor compliance with human rights treaties and national legislation.

Also of note has been ELSAM's more recent and innovative work on internet governance. Indonesia has one of the largest number of internet users in the world (a quarter of its population)[46]. There has been an absence of legislation and laws to regulate Internet usage and protect human rights. Laws that do exist tend to be about exercising control and this has led to the criminalization of freedom of expression, cybercrime and unregulated filtering or blocking of content. In 2003, Indonesia was set to host the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). This created an opportune momentum to discuss internet issues given the absence of any concentrated efforts in the area. ICT Watch partnered with ELSAM to develop timely and relevant policy messages and public campaigns in the lead up to the IGF summit.

### 5.4.3 Relevance of the changes in relation to the policies of the MFS II alliance and the CFA

Hivos' long-term partnership with ELSAM falls under its Rights and Citizenship Programme, which aims to the recognition of human rights and women's rights, good governance and a pluralistic society[47]. Support is also in line with Hivos' 2008 Vision Paper on Civil Society Building, describing the CFA's appreciation for "the development of alternative policy options, the defence of the interests of disenfranchised groups, monitoring implementation of policies"[48]. ELSAM's efforts are contributing to legislation and policy that guarantees the rights of citizens. Hivos supported ELSAM's due advocacy on human rights issues, particularly on impunity and human rights violations[49].Hivos' first contract with ELSAM started in 2000 and recent support fell under ELSAM's donors' consortium together with EED and Misereor.

Another reason why Hivos continued to support ELSAM in the MFS II period was to cope with organisation challenges and regeneration caused by the departure of its director in 2010. Hivos also expected ELSAM to shift focus from concentrating on past human rights violations to more mainstream and local level policy making.[50]To a certain degree this was achieved through the work on internet governance, the focus on the policy inputs for witnesses and victim protection (i.e. to include children, whistle-blowers and victims of sexual violence), support to subnational CSO partners in data management, advocacy on agrarian conflict between farmers and plantations, and the formulation of a human rights-based regulation in Sanggau, West Kalimantan. Nonetheless, ELSAM's focus continued to be on national-level advocacy.

One of Hivos' interests has been to facilitate linkages between partner organisations working in different areas of expertise to create awareness and stimulate cross-pollination between development areas. The collaboration between ICT Watch and ELSAM was an example of such an effort. ICT Watch had no prior exposure to human rights organisations while ELSAM had very limited knowledge of internet safety and internet rights. Hivos supported this initiative because of its relevance to the

[46] Statista, Industries, Internet, Demographics & Use, "Number of internet users in Indonesia from 2013 to 2018 (in millions)". Available from http://www.statista.com/statistics/254456/number-of-internet-users-in-indonesia/ (accessed 15 December 2014)
[47] "Hivos Business Plan 2011-2015", Hivos, p. 3
[48] "Hivos Vision Paper: Civil Society Building", Hivos, 2008, p. 12
[49] "Contract Intake Form ELSAM RO SEA at HO 1004456", ELSAM, 19 May 2011
[50] Shita Laksmi, Hivos Memo 10+ to DPP, 7 May 2011

context for both government and civil society and necessity to have a baseline on internet governance[51].

## 5.5 Explaining factors

### 5.5.1 Internal factors – Organisational Capacity SPO

In 2011 and 2012, Hivos assessed the capacity of ELSAM using the five capacities framework for each of the projects supported. The assessment scored the core capacities of ELSAM, with most areas receiving respectable scores of 7 or 8 (9 being the maximum). The following table presents an overview of the scores:

Table 7

*Hivos' assessment of ELSAM against the 5C framework.*

| Capacity | Description | Scores March 2011 | Scores July 2012 |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 5 Cs | | |
| 1 | The capability to act and commit | Mean score of 7.6 | Mean score of 7.3 |
| 1.1 | The organisation has a clear purpose and acts on decisions collectively. The leadership is accepted by staff, inspiring, action-oriented and reliable. | 8 | 8 |
| 1.2 | The organisation is capable to mobilise sufficient financial resources, and (where relevant) non material resources from members/ supporters. | 7 | 7 |
| 1.3 | The organisation is internally transparent and accountable. (Relations between staff, direction and board; quality of decision-making process | 8 | 7 |
| 2 | The capability to perform | Mean score of 7 | Mean score of 7.25 |
| 2.1 | The number, composition and expertise of staff is adequate in view of the organisation's objectives and programmes. (Indicate when there is high staff turnover) | 7 | 7 |
| 2.2 | The organisation has a coherent and realistic strategic plan. (Context and problem analysis; Theory of Change; quality of formulation of objectives, intended results and indicators; explanation of strategic choices) | 7 | 7 |
| 2.3 | The quality of financial and administrative management is adequate. (Budget, funding plan, financial management, financial report) | 7 | 7 |
| 2.4 | The organisation has an appropriate monitoring and evaluation process (documentation & data collection, involvement of stakeholders, quality of analysis and learning) and uses it for accountability and learning purposes. | 7 | 8 |
| 3 | The capability to relate | Mean score of 7 | Mean score of 7 |
| 3.1 | The organisation maintains relevant institutional relationships with external stakeholders and is seen as credible and legitimate. (Indicate main strategic relationships and collaboration with other actors) | 7 | 7 |
| 3.2 | The organisation is accountable to and communicates effectively with its primary constituents/ beneficiaries. (Describe downward or horizontal accountability process; specify for women) | 7 | 7 |
| 4 | The capability to adapt and self-renew | Mean score of 7.5 | Mean score of 7.5 |
| 4.1 | The organisation (management) responds adequately to trends and changes in the context and uses up-to-date strategies and knowledge. | 8 | 8 |
| 4.2 | The organisation (management) encourages and supports internal learning and reflection processes. (Conditions, incentives) | 7 | 7 |
| 5 | Capability to maintain consistency | Mean score of 7 | Mean score of 7 |
| 5.1 | The organisation is capable to maintain consistency between ambition, vision, strategy and operations. The management is able to deal strategically with external pressure and conflicting demands. | 7 | 7 |
| | Gender | | |
| Quality 1 | To what extent has the organisation formulated objectives with regard to the position of women and issues of gender equality? | 7 | 7 |
| Quality 2 | To what extent does the organisation have internal gender expertise? | 7 | 7 |
| Quality 3 | To what extent does the organisation maintain relations with key GW&D actors in its context, e.g. women's movement, women's organisations, | 6 | 7 |

[51] "Contract Intake Form ELSAM RO SEA at HO 1005452", ELSAM, 10 July 2012

| | |
|---|---|
| | gender experts? |

Source: Hivos Partner Capacity Assessment Forms March 23, 2011 & July 13, 2012

Overall ELSAM's scores remained unchanged, with a slight decline in the capability to act and commit, a slight increase in the capability to perform, and an increase in its relations with women's groups.

In 2010, ELSAM experienced a change in organizational leadership with the departure of one of its directors. A new director was appointed and younger staff took on coordinator positions. ELSAM has handled this change well, as reflected in its scores.

According to ELSAM's Executive Director and one of board member interviewed, internal factors contributing to the achievement of organizational and program outcomes included effective supervision by the board. Another important factor was the role and participation of ELSAM's members in the research design and advocacy. For example, policy inputs provided to Komnas HAM in October 2013 were developed through a peer review process by the executive director and the board members.

### 5.5.2 Relations Alliance - CFA-SPO

During program implementation and beyond Hivos funded activities, ELSAM benefited from a linkage with other Hivos' partners in terms of getting resource persons, references, facilitators from organisations like Remdec, USC Satunama, Pacivic UI, Yayasan Pena Bulu, Demos, Prakarsa. A number of these were part of the Hivos, EED, and Misereor partner network.

ELSAM has benefitted from Hivos' long-term policy support and appreciated the flexibility afforded by Hivos in the budgetary arrangements allowing the SPO to act in response to unanticipated circumstances and policy demands[52]. Hivos did not demand for their funds to support a specific programmatic area. However, the evaluation team found the result indicators agreed upon in the first project to be rather vague and difficult to measure, making it harder to attribute changes to MFS II funding. Some of the policy deliverables were also rather ambitious and depended a lot on contributing factors for successful achievement.

### 5.5.3 External factors

As illustrated in Chapter 2, Indonesia has a poor reputation for corruption: ranking 114$^{th}$ out of 177 countries in Transparency International's ranking. The level of corruption amongst government officials has come under the spotlight in recent years; as has the weak legislative and institutional framework despite more than a decade of work by the Corruption Eradication Commission. Since the trial of the Democratic Party's Treasurer Muhammad Nazaruddin in 2011, numerous investigations were launched into alleged corruption of senior government officials[53]. These high-profile cases also brought to light the uneven application of laws providing protection to whistle-blowers[54]. Lobby by anti-corruption actors like the Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) played a role in increasing the pressure applied on the government and parliament for the need of better laws to protect whistle-blowers.

In addition, the parliament's willingness to amend the LPSK bill is likely to have stemmed partly from their need to demonstrate a commitment to human rights. Giving into some of the pressure coming from human rights groups could well have been a tool for political campaigns or have been driven by the need to maintain the country's image internationally. More concrete results in resolving injustices of the past, through for example revising legislation for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)

[52] "MFS II country evaluations: Civil Society Component, Baseline report for Indonesia – ELSAM", ELSAM, 2012

[53] Crossin, C., Brown, M., Norris, S. 2013. *Anti-Corruption in Indonesia*. London: Control Risks. Available from http://www.controlrisks.com/~/media/Public%20Site/Files/Oversized%20Assets/indonesia_whitepaper_2013.pdf (accessed 15 December 2014)

[54] United States Department of State. 2014. *2013 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Indonesia*. 27 February. Available from http://www.refworld.org/docid/53284aca14.html (accessed 15 December 2014)

have been to be put in place. "Courts have been doing all they can to delay, obfuscate and complicate the process" because many of those responsible for crimes are still in power[55].

[55] Bob Lowry, "Review: Coming to term with 1965: Can the descendants of both sides of 1965 come together to help the nation achieve reconciliation?", *Inside Indonesia*, Edition 117: Jul-Sep 2014. Available from http://www.insideindonesia.org/current-edition/review-coming-to-terms-with-1965 (accessed from 15 December 2014)

# 6 Discussion

## 6.1 Design of the interventions

Both of the outcomes identified for ELSAM through this evaluation (i.e. policy influencing and the capacity of network partners to document human rights cases) relate to how civil society organizations support the development of public policy. Given its area of work, ELSAM can be defined as being part of the 'knowledge sector'. In 2009, the Australian Government's Tertiary Education and Knowledge Sector Unit commissioned a review of the Indonesian Knowledge Sector. It is useful to draw from the findings of the report published in 2010.

The report indicates that the Government of Indonesia lacks the structure for obtaining reliable internal policy analysis[56]. Experiences have shown that where CSOs are involved in collecting, analysing and disseminating data and information to government officials, they have been challenged to provide solutions based on the knowledge they produce[57]. The report also states that "development policy makers…have clear yet unfulfilled knowledge needs"[58] and that the knowledge sector would benefit from a focus on supporting government to increase and assess its performance[59]. Given this context, the design of ELSAM's interventions has been suitable to the prevailing conditions. Not only has ELSAM been producing information and data on human rights abuses, it has succeeded in working with the government to seek policy solutions by providing its expertise in producing legislative inputs.

Since the report was published, the Australian Government has funded the establishment of the Knowledge Sector Initiative (KSI) in 2013, which now also supports ELSAM. KSI has produced so called 'stories of change' on successful interventions of its partners. From an analysis of the report it can be concluded that these were: 1) being able to collect research evidence to inform policy makers; 2) the existence of a need for data and information within the government; 3) organizational reputation; 4) engagement with the parliament; 5) collaboration with network organizations; 6) media engagement, and 7) an understanding of the context.[60]

By comparing these elements to ELSAM's role in amending the Law on Victim and Witness Protection and its broader but related work to document human rights violations, we can infer that many of the same success factors were present in the SPO's design. First, ELSAM's database contains records covering a 14-year period (from 2000 until the present), with continuous monthly updates. Second, LPSK itself recognized that the 2006 law limited its mandate and constricted its actions. Led by a person with links with ELSAM and CSOs, there was better grounds for collaboration. ELSAM had built up a good reputation for its role in policy work and rights monitoring, and unlike other organisations they were less confrontational in their approach. An organizational network with other CSOs was well-established through KPSK. Although there was less direct media engagement, ELSAM used its website to disseminate and publicize papers.

Another paper produced by the Overseas Development Institute on the political economy and policy making in Indonesia, confirms that NGOs in Indonesia can bring about policy change through "energetic activism" and links to policy makers[61]. ELSAM has successfully positioned and designed its interventions as a source of knowledge external to the government, and as organization willing to provide assistance and input to improve policy frameworks that are conducive for human rights.

[56] Karetji, Petrarca Chawaro. 2010. *Overview of the Indonesian Knowledge Sector: Final Report*. AusAID. 30 September, p. 8
[57] Ibid, p. 12
[58] Ibid, p. 26
[59] Ibid
[60] Pellini, A., Angelina, M., Purnawati, E. 2014. *Working Politically: A Story of Change about the contribution of research evidence to the new Village Law in Indonesia (Revised Version)*. Australian Aid Knowledge Sector Initiative
[61] Datta, A., Jones, H., Febriany, V., Harris, D., Dewi, R. K., Wild, L., Young, J. 2011. *The political economy of policy-making in Indonesia: Opportunities for improving the demand for and use of knowledge*. Working Paper 340. London: Overseas Development Institute, p. 58

# 7 Conclusion

The two most important changes that took place in the civil society arena were the influence on the amendment of the law pertaining to victim and witness protection, and more systematized data collection and management on human rights violations by ELSAM and its network. These outcomes were selected for in-depth process-tracing. ELSAM was better positioned to utilize its expertise, rich data and policy analysis to work with other CSOs in developing policy inputs. ELSAM's role in this evidence-based advocacy system on human rights violations was to provide a platform for data collection and managing a national database system.

With a new law passed by parliament in October 2014, the coverage of LPSK services will expand to children, victims of domestic violence, and whistle-blowers. This result comes after more than four years of lobby and engagement by a host of organisations. ELSAM was well positioned amongst civil society networks and had personal networks with LPSK. Its less confrontational style of lobby was well suited to the context.

With regards to the baseline ToC, the interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant because the two outcomes serve both the grassroots and policy needs. Regarding the context in which ELSAM is operating, its interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant because through the new law, LPSK now has the ability to increase their coverage of protection services provided. At the network level, CSO monitoring of human rights violations at the sub-national level could feed into an advocacy agenda or be linked to LPSK services. Lastly, ELSAM's interventions and outcomes are relevant to Hivos' strategies because ELSAM has adopted an alternative, more moderate lobby approach as opposed to more common 'radical' strategies often taken on by human rights activists in Indonesia.

A number of external and contributing factors explain the changes in the civil society dimensions. First, ELSAM did not work alone, but conducted advocacy activities through KPSK. ELSAM's role in this coalition was to provide regulatory reviews and assist in drafting of the bill. Other civil society groups, particularly those working on anti-corruption issues also emerged as a pressure factor.

Within LPSK, there was a realization that its protections services were less than optimal. The parliament, showing initial support for the revision of the 2006 law in 2010, had delayed discussions on the bill. In 2014, with national elections approaching, the parliament was more included to respond to civil society and media pressure as a means to gain public sympathy. To some extent, the Law on Witness and Victim Protection was a trade-off with other more sensitive laws being advocated by human rights groups.

Another explaining factor has to do with the regulatory and political context of Indonesia and the strategy ELSAM has chosen to adopt. Unlike other human rights organisations, who address regulatory gaps by building public pressure, ELSAM has chosen policy advocacy as its main strategy. Its credibility as an organization and its knowledge of the policy environment, allowed ELSAM to foster constructive engagement so that political reforms could materialize.

Table 8
*Summary of findings.*

| When looking at the MFS II interventions of this SPO to strengthen civil society and/or policy influencing, how much do you agree with the following statements? | Score |
|---|---|
| The CS interventions were well designed | 8 |
| The CS interventions were implemented as designed | 7 |
| The CS interventions reached their objectives | 7 |
| The observed outcomes are attributable to the CS interventions | 7 |
| The observed CS outcomes are relevant to the beneficiaries of the SPO | 8 |

Score between 1 to 10, with 1 being "not at all" and 10 being "completely".

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"Detailed Budget ELSAM 2010- 2013", Hivos, 2009

"Detailed workplan ELSAM Jan- Dec 2012", Hivos, 2012

"External Evaluation of ELSAM 2007-2011", Hivos, 2012

"Financial Report ID-IGF-Hivos (Nov 2012 - Jan 2014)-Final", Hivos, 2014

Hester Smidt, "ELSAM Input-Output Analysis", MFS-II evaluation 2014, p. 3

"Hivos Business Plan 2011-2015", Hivos, p. 3

"Hivos Vision Paper: Civil Society Building", Hivos, 2008, p. 12

"Partner Capacity Assessment Form ELSAM", Hivos, 2011

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**Resource persons consulted**

| Name of key informant | Relation with SPO | Function in organisation | Contact details including e-mail |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yati Andriyani | KPKK coalition member | Advocacy Coordinator KontraS | purikencanaputri@gmail.com |
| Wanma Yetti | In collaborations with SPO | IKOHI/association of human rights victims | wy01sikumbang@gmail.com<br>Hp: +6281314991648 |
| Indriaswati Dyah Saptaningrum | Executive Leadership | Executive Director, ELSAM | indri@elsam.or.id<br>indrids@gmail.com<br>Hp: +6281380305728 |
| Wahyu Wagiman | Executive Leadership | Deputy Director Human Rights Defenders | Wahyu@elsam.or.id<br>Hp: +6285218664128 |
| Zainal Abidin | Executive Leadership | Deputy Director Human Resources | Zainal@elsam.or.id<br>Hp: +628128292015 |
| Otto Adi Yulianto | Executive Leadership | Head of Research and Institutional Development Bureau | Otto@elsam.or.id<br>otto_ay@yahoo.com<br>Hp: +628161861781 atau +6287747897180 |
| Triana Dyah | Executive Leadership | Head of Information and Data | Ana@elsam.or.id<br>Hp: 08129685784 |
| Wahyudi Djafar | Programme Manager | Program Officer | Wahyudi@elsam.or.id<br>Hp: +6281382083993 |
| Lies Marcoes | Board Member | ELSAM | Hp 08129528231 |
| Rizal Malik | NGO Network | Kemitraan Governance Project | rizal_malik@yahoo.com |
| Windu Kisworo | NGO Network | The Asia Foundation, Justice Sector Program | Windu.kisworo@asiafoundation.org |
| Esterini Pratsnawati (via Phone) | ELSAM | Executive Program of Policy Monitoring and Network Development of Victims | Rini.elsam@gmail.com |

# Appendix 1 Civil Society Scores

This table presents the appreciation of the evaluation team regarding changes occurred for each indicator between 2012 and 2014 on a scale of -2 to + 2

- 2 = Considerable deterioration
- 1 = A slight deterioration
  0 = no change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012
+1 = slight improvement
+2 = considerable improvement

| Dimension | | Indicators | Question | Changes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Civic engagement | 1 | Needs of marginalised groups | How does your organisation take the needs of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups into account in your planning, actions, activities, and/or strategies? | 0 |
| | 2 | Involvement of target groups | What is the level of participation of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups in the analysis, planning and evaluation of your activities? | 0 |
| | 3 | Political engagement | How intense is your (individual staff or organisational) participation in locally-nationally elected bodies and/or sectoral user groups? | + 1 |
| | | | | |
| Level of organisation | 5 | Relations with other organisations | In the past 12 months what has been the most intensive interaction you had with other CSOs? | + 1 |
| | 5 | Frequency of dialogue with closest CSO | In the past 12 months how many meetings did you have with the CSO that you have most intensive interaction with? | + 1 |
| | 6 | Defending the interests of marginalised groups | Which CSO are most effective in defending the interests of your target groups? In the past 12 months, how did you relate to those CSOs? | 0 |
| | 7 | Composition current financial resource base | How does your organisation finance institutional costs such as workshops of the General Assembly (if applicable); attendance to workshops of other CSOs; costs for organisational growth and/or networking? | + 2 |
| | | | | |
| Practice of Values | 8 | Downward accountability | To what extent can mandatory social organs (steering committee, general assembly, internal auditing group) ask your executive leaders to be accountable to them? | +1 |
| | 9 | Composition of social organs | What % of members of your mandatory social organs belong to the marginalised target groups you are working with/for? | 0 |
| | 10 | External financial auditing | How regularly is your organisation audited externally? | 0 |
| | | | | |
| Perception of impact | 11 | Client satisfaction | What are the most important concerns of your target groups? How do your services take into account those important concerns? | +1 |
| | 12 | Civil society impact | In the past 12 months, what impact did you have on building a strong civil society? | - 1 |
| | 13 | Relation with public sector organisations. | In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with public sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' objectives? | 0 |
| | 14 | Relation with private sector organisations | In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with private sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' perspective? | - 1 |
| | 15 | Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations | How successful have you been in influencing public policies and practices in the past 2 years? | + 1 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 16 | Influence upon private sector agencies' policies, rules, regulations. | How successful have you been in influencing private sector policies and practices in the past 2 years? | + 1 |
| | | | | |
| **CS context** | 17 | Coping strategies | In the past 2 years, how did your organisation cope with these changes in the context that may have been positive or negative consequences for civil society. | +1 |

# Appendix 2 Changes in civil society indicators between 2012 and 2014

## 1. Civic Engagement

### 1.1. Needs of marginalised groups SPO

ELSAM addresses the needs of human rights victims through direct and indirect services. ELSAM directly engages with the victims of human rights violations by supporting them to organise themselves into a victims' organisations, providing referral services to government service providers such as Komnas HAM and LPSK, and providing financial support through cooperatives. Indirect services to the victims are in the forms of policy advocacy work, including research and CSO coalitions on specific issues such as witness and victims protection (KPSK).

With regards to direct services provided to human rights victims, there are no significant changes. ELSAM continued to work with the same networks and organisations throughout the 2012 to 2014 period and coverage remained rather limited. For example, ELSAM worked with Solidaritas Indonesia to ensure a medical and psycho-social referral system is in place. Annually, this benefits around seven to 10 victims. Other direct services ELSAM supported have a wider coverage, such as the cooperative 'Gemah Ripah' for victims of human rights abuses established by ELSAM in collaboration with the Association of Families of Missing Persons (IKOHI) and Working Group on the Disclosure of Truth (*Koalisi Keadilan dan Pengungkapan Kebenaran*/KKPK) in 2012. From original seed money amounting to Euro 350 provided to the cooperative, the number of active members grew from 30 in 2012 to 45 in 2013. This further expanded to overage of 80 victims after ELSAM facilitated linkages between the cooperative and a Ministry of Social Affairs' grant program (KUBE).

On indirect services, namely assisting CSOs and other human rights groups with human rights research and policy advocacy, LPSK[62] and ELSAM succeeded in translating demands from victims for increased coverage of the services[63] into a new draft policy that encompassed a broader recognition of human rights violations that in consequence led to an increase in services delivered to those entitled. ELSAM provided policy inputs to Komnas HAM[64] and these inputs were adopted into a regulation and as a result, Komnas HAM has managed to endorse the support for 750 victims in early 2013, of which 409 were addressed by LPSK[65]. In 2014, LPSK is reaching the threshold of 1,000 victims to be serviced[66]. Whilst ELSAM's advocacy for policy change focused on human rights victims, the results booked have also benefited witnesses of crimes and abuses.

[62] For example LPSK organized a focus group discussion with the stakeholder on 30 may 2012 to identify the regulatory issues and in September 2014, finally LPSK issued a new regulation on standard operating procedures to manage victims' case management.

[63] Compilation of media coverage from showing strong demand by the victims (complains, expectations, etc) to the LPSK. See http://perlindungansaksi.files.wordpress.com/2009/02/liputan-100-hari-lpsk.doc and http://www.elsam.or.id/article.php?act=content&id=2954&cid=15&lang=in#.VFw1efmUeSo

[64] On 4 October 2013, ELSAM submitted a policy input to Komnas HAM on dealing with the victims of human rights violations. See "MASUKAN ELSAM TERHADAP RANCANGAN PERATURAN KOMNAS HAM TENTANG STANDAR OPERASIONAL PROSEDUR/MEKANISME PEMBERIAN SURAT KETERANGAN KORBAN DAN/ATAU KELUARGA KORBAN PELANGGARAN HAM YANG BERAT".

[65] Aris Setiawan, "LPSK Bantu Rehabilitasi 409 Korban Pelanggaran HAM", *VIVAnews*, 9 May 2013. Available from http://nasional.news.viva.co.id/news/read/411536-lpsk-bantu-rehabilitasi-409-korban-pelanggaran-ham (accessed 13 December 2014)


[66] Lembaga Perlindungan Saksi dan Korban, Informasi LPSK, "Jumlah Permohonan Perlindungan LPSK", 18 June 2014. Available from http://www.lpsk.go.id/publikasi/informasi_detail/2100 (accessed 13 December 2014)

### 1.2. Involvement of target groups SPO

In the baseline assessment, ELSAM had the highest score (3) for this indicator since there was evidence of a high level of involvement of target groups (government, CSOs, and the marginalized people) in their program planning and implementation. For example, in developing policy inputs and papers, target groups are asked to provide feedback and are involved in instances where a parliamentary audience is required. There is no significant change in from the baseline. During the end line, ELSAM management and staff reported that they continued to involve target groups in each stage of the project cycle. In developing policy briefs/inputs for Komnas HAM, ELSAM began with an analysis of human rights violation case reports and held discussions with survivors, continuously engaging them in advocacy activities like public hearings. Victims and survivors are an indispensable resource as their testimonies and experiences carry much weight and are important inputs in developing position papers and policy drafts. ELSAM continued its strategic involvement in the KKPK by maintaining a database on past human rights abuses[67] and leading the policy/regulatory review. This has sharpened the focus of action of the coalition to promote truth-revealing as a modality in peacefully settling the past[68].

Although in their daily activities, the involvement of target groups is intensive, target group involvement in ELSAM's organisational organ is limited due to the nature of ELSAM's business entity as a "perkumpulan" or association that, by law, does not provide a formal position for the victims in the organisational structure, such as board of trustees or executive body. This is understandable because ELSAM is not a membership organisation. The involvement of target groups in the overall organisational process is considered as an ethical operational standard rather than organisational inclusion.

### 1.3. Intensity of political engagement SPO




ELSAM by design is a political organisation. Since its creation it has called for the rights human rights victims to be protected, whether through compensation, regulatory frameworks or psychosocial services. They engage in highly politically sensitive issues, such as calling for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission Law, which is still under review by the Constitutional Court. Their core business is to influence policies and legislative bodies. ELSAM is however not affiliated to any political party and keeps it impartiality.

In 2014, ELSAM has stepped up its engagement and messaging at the national level because of the 2014 presidential elections. It released several press releases and disseminated information regarding candidates and their history and experience with human rights. The newly elected president has been urged to select an Attorney General without a record on corruption and human rights violations[69]. This attention to the elections is not associated with the Hivos-supported program, which ended in January 2014.

## 2. Level of Organisation

### 2.1. Relations with other organisations SPO

With regards to ELSAM's relations and networks with other organisations involved in advocacy for human rights victims, there was a slight expansion or change during the 2012-2014 period. ELSAM worked with its longstanding network that includes organisations like KKPK, IKOHI, Solidaritas

[67] See for example "Perkembangan Penyelesaian Pelanggaran HAM Masa Lalu ELSAM/Direktorat PSDHAM/Desember 2012" published by Elsam, can assessed at http://www.elsam.or.id/list.php?cat=stat_pengadilan_ham&lang=in
[68] Hester Smidt, "ELSAM Input-Output Analysis", MFS-II evaluation 2014, p. 3
[69] See ELSAM's press release dated 2 November 2014

Indonesia/SI, Pakorba Solo, etc. However, through ELSAM's active participation in KPSK on advocacy for the revision of law on LPSK, there was an increase in the frequency of meetings and collaborative work with KPSK members. In addition to that, on advocacy for freedom of expression through internet governance, ELSAM has widened its network to cooperate with organisations like ICT Watch. ELSAM was involved in setting up a national forum on the issue, which is now engaging with Ministries that work on ICT and internet.

It is worth noting that since 2013, ELSAM has started to collaborate with the Australian government-funded Knowledge Sector Initiative. This has widened ELSAM's network with Indonesian research organisations working on a broad range of issues, but this new network cannot be attributed to the Dutch-funded program.

## 2.2. Frequency of dialogue with closest civil society organisation SPO

In 2014, ELSAM has conducted more collaboration and cooperation with close CSOs compared to 2012. This is because of their involvement in: 1) KKPK (advocacy to revise the law on LPSK), 2) Public Interest Lawyers Network (PILNET) for judicial review on the Law No 18/2004 on Plantation, and 3) with ICT Rights Watch on internet governance. ELSAM's collaboration with the KKPK has become effective and efficient over the years as ELSAM has a niche role to play. ELSAM's monitoring of cases in freedom of expression through social media/internet has put ELSAM in an intensive dialogue and collaborative with other CSOs. For example, , together with the Institute for Criminal Justice Reform (ICJR), *Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Pers* (LBH Pers), and *Perkumpulan Mitra* TIK Indonesia (ICT Watch), ELSAM brought the Ministerial Regulation No. 19/2014 on Internet Governance to the Constitutional Court[70].

## 2.3. Defending the interests of marginalised groups SPO

As described under Indicator 1.1 on needs of marginalised groups, ELSAM has managed to influence LPSK's internal regulation on eligibility for protection that resulted in an increase in coverage of LPSK as well as expanding the scope of services not only to direct victims but also to the affected family members through the revision of the new law on LPSK (Law No. 31/2014). In this regard, ELSAM managed to defend more (quantitatively and qualitatively) interests of the victims of human rights violations. Most of the victims served are victims of 1965 human rights abuses, and religious or market fundamentalism. ELSAM's ability to influence national level policies may very well have a wider impact on the human rights situation in Indonesia, but this is difficult to measure.

## 2.4. Composition financial resource base SPO

Prior to 2011, ELSAM relied heavily on three donors: Misereor, Hivos and EED with total funding Eur 890,000, as evident from their 2010 audited financial report. In 2013, ELSAM managed to secure long-term core funding[71] from the Knowledge Sector Initiative (KSI) funded by the Australian Government for at least five years with possibility to of another three-year extension. Support from this non-European donor is a positive indication that ELSAM is able to diverse its funding sources.

[70] See ELSAM's press release on this issue at http://www.elsam.or.id/article.php?act=content&id=3134&cid=302&lang=in#.VIPF-fmUeSo

[71] Core funding is a term used by Australia's Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) to distinguish it with regular grants to NGOs that are driven by donor program objectives. Core funding is given to support the NGO to achieve their mandates, not to help the donor to achieve donor's program objectives.

# 3. Practice of Values

## 3.1 Downward accountability SPO

From a programmatic perspective, and due the influx of social media communication, the public and victims of human rights violations are generally more informed of ELSAM's activities. ELSAM has continued the practice of producing public information materials such as the Bulletin ASASI and Journal Dignitas, as well as sending out email newsletters. Other information, such as ELSAM's Reports to Public are available online. Information on financial reports/performance, however is not available on their website.

## 3.2 Composition of social organs SPO

There was no change in the composition of the Board since 2012. Female representation in the board remains the same with the situation in 2012 (two out of five board of trustee members). ELSAM's executive body is led by a female director and she will end her second term in 2015. Human rights victims are not represented in the Board, because ELSAM is not a membership-based organisation.

## 3.3. External financial auditing SPO

During the baseline, the audited financial report of ELSAM was not available, but in 2013 they published their 2011 and 2012 audited financial reports. ELSAM has conducted external financial audits for the fiscal year of 2013, but up to November 2014, the report has not been completed and they will combine it with audit for fiscal year 2014. It is understandable from an efficiency point of view where the external audit is conducted for two fiscal years, but from a management control perspective, it is not a good practice.

# 4. Perception of Impact

## 4.1. Client satisfaction SPO

ELSAM does not have a monitoring and evaluation system in place that extends to the services they provide to victims of human rights abuses. Their main attention is on recording past cases of abuse, rather than tracking satisfaction of their target groups regularly. ELSAM has set up a website and Twitter account where people can give feedback or complain and the analysis of this media do detect dissatisfaction on ELSAM's performance. At an individual level, there is evidence available of two beneficiaries (victims of human rights violations) whom ELSAM assisted in receiving LPSK assistance. They reported high satisfaction with what ELSAM has done for them.

At the organizational level, KontraS and Komnas HAM expressed their appreciation for continued support and leadership of ELSAM in the coalition. For Komnas HAM and KontraS, we can conclude that their level of satisfaction remains the same as during the baseline.

## 4.2. Civil society impact SPO

During the baseline, ELSAM saw its contributions to civil society as being through their provision of data (research) and training of human rights activists. These roles seem to have abated since they were very much project-based and when the project ended, the activities did not continue. Currently, ELSAM aims to transform itself into a Centre for Human Rights involved policy-making as part of a broader attempt at strengthening civil society and promoting the protection of human rights. So the impact on the civil society arena that ELSAM is trying to bring about is building evidence-based policy advocacy through providing more evidence to the policy-making process initiated by CSOs. Although the role of ELSAM in the revision of the law on LPSK was significant, ELSAM reported that there have been no increased number of research publications (or working papers) published by ELSAM during 2012-2014 period. In 2013, ELSAM produced 5 working papers (3 of which were on the issue of

internet governance), and one in 2014 (also on internet governance)[72]. It seems that the number and type of working papers produced is related to the kind of donor support ELSAM obtains.

## 4.3. Relation with public sector organisations SPO

As an organisation whose core business is policy advocacy, ELSAM's main counterpart and target group is the government. In the 2012-2014 period, ELSAM has continued their intensive relationship with government agencies such as with Komnas HAM and LPSK on the protection services for the victims of human rights violations, and with the Ministry of Law and Human Rights on the revision of Law on LPSK. In this regard, ELSAM's relation with government agencies remains intensive, unchanged since 2012, illustrated by press releases from ELSAM and media clippings[73]. The government has acknowledged ELSAM's role, reflected in the participation of ELSAM in joint government and non-government fact-finding missions in response to violent land disputes between plantations and companies in Lampung. In terms of service delivery, during the baseline, ELSAM reported that it supported public sector officials through a series of trainings for local law enforcers (police, public prosecutors and judges at the lower, higher and supreme courts) to instil human rights standards. In the last two years, these trainings were discontinued due to a change in program strategy that now focuses on policy advocacy.

## 4.4. Relation with private sector agencies SPO

ELSAM employs two strategies to influence private sector policies and practices: one is confronting and the other engaging. Through the latter more voluntary/persuasive model, ELSAM has been promoting a manual/guidance on how to do human-rights friendly business. This represents a shift in strategy since the baseline in terms of how it is dealing with private sector agencies.

As a research and advocacy organisation, ELSAM has produced more papers and publications on the relation between business and human rights. In 2012, there were 5 publications and advocacy papers produced by ELSAM, which doubled in 2014 when they published 10 joint research papers on business and human rights[74].

## 4.5. Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations SPO

ELSAM's has contributed to the improved governance of Komnas HAM and LPSK in handling the victims of human rights violations (Regulation No. 004/Komnas HAM/X/2013). As a result an agreement was reached on June 25, 2014 cumulating in the signing of a MoU between Komnas HAM and LPSK on better coordination, governance and procedures for handling victims. In another case, ELSAM successfully advocated a case regarding the handling of plantation disputes and a civil law suit against the Ministry of Environment's issuance of a permit to PT. Newmont (a mining company active in Nusa Tenggara Barat) to dispose waste into the sea. ELSAM supported the public lawsuit against PT. Newmont in 2012. Unfortunately PT. Newmont won the case and the civil suit against the company has continued until the present.

## 4.6. Influence upon private sector agencies' policies, rules, regulations SPO

During 2012-2014 period, ELSAM has supported a series of investigations of conflict between smallholders/farmers and plantation corporations occurring in Medan, Ketapang in West Kalimantan, Kebumen, Jambi and Blitar. The results have then been published and used to call for policy changes, official investigations, and/or reparation for victims. Some of these reports have been submitted to the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM), the Indonesian national police, and LPSK. In response to the submission, Komnas HAM carried out an investigation of police officers suspected of committing human rights violations and found that company practices to pay police to ensure the

[72] For the list of ELSAM's working paper, please visit: http://www.elsam.or.id/publication.php?cat=kertaskerja&lang=in
[73] See for example http://www.elsam.or.id/list.php?cat=media&lang=in
[74] ELSAM, Fokus, "Bisnis dan HAM". Available from http://www.elsam.or.id/list.php?start=10&lang=in&cat=bisnis_dan_ham&orderby= (accessed 13 December 2014)

security of their staff is illegal. In one case, a company in South Kalimantan changed its security policy in 2012 as a result. However, since the baseline, there have been no additional cases similar to this.

# 5. Civil society context

## 5.1. Coping strategies

As an organisation defending human rights, ELSAM needs to stay relevant to the needs of the public, especially to their constituents' needs. As such, besides conducing advocacy research, ELSAM has continued to monitor the human rights situation periodically. On the basis of this monitoring, ELSAM regularly analyses findings and report the results to the public as a strategy to keep their advocacy agenda relevant and contextual. The work of ELSAM has remained relevant in the last two years since violence, both by the state and radical groups have increased due to what is referred to as "ignorant policy" set forth by the administration. During his term, former President Yudhoyono was criticized for not being able to uphold human rights enshrined in the 1945 Constitution and in the 2005-ratified International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). ELSAM, jointly with other members of Indonesia's NGO Coalition for International Human Rights Advocacy submitted several reports to the Human Right Committee on concerns relating to the implementation of ICCPR. In 2013, the report highlighted a number of issues include incidents of violence against religious minorities and inability of the government to protect citizens from conducting religious activities[75]. As reported by KontraS in their 2014 annual report, the human rights situation in the last 10 years has been getting better in terms of number of human rights policies[76] and rhetoric of the government, however, at implementation level, protection and services provided by the government have worsened. In this context, ELSAM may be successful in influencing policy (since the government is relatively supportive to issuance of policies such as the revision of Law on LPSK), but the problem is in the implementation of such regulations. In this regard, ELSAM's approach and strategy may need to be expanded further to cope with a government that says the right things, but is unable to follow up its rhetoric with concrete action. Compared with the situation in 2012, ELSAM's focus continues to be on influencing policy formulation, and thus there has been no change in the extent to which the SPO has had a role in policy implementation. The monitoring of policy implementation is very much needed, and if ELSAM's strategy does not change (i.e. continued focus on policy formulation and positive engagement with the government), the relevance of their work may decrease in the next five years as a new administration takes over. The work that ELSAM has done with coalitions like the International Human Rights Advocacy is more appropriate, but this may need to focus more on applying direct pressure nationally.

[75] Indonesia's NGO Coalition on International Human Rights Advocacy (HRWG). 2013. *Indonesia Civil Society Report on the Implementation of the ICCPR (Replies to the List of Issue CCPR/C/IND/Q/1)*. Available from http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/IDN/INT_CCPR_NGO_IDN_14339_E.pdf (accessed 13 December 2014)

[76] Although there are also some policies that endanger the human rights such as Law on information, communication and telecommunication, Law on Mass Organization.

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen UR
P.O. Box 88
6700 AB Wageningen
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)317 48 68 00
www.wageningenUR.nl/cdi

Report CDI-15-039

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# FIELD end line report

MFS II country evaluations, Civil Society component

Dieuwke Klaver[1]
Hester Smidt

Kharisma Prasetyo[2]
Sutikno

1 Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR, Netherlands
2 SurveyMeter, Indonesia

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen, February 2015

Report CDI-15-067

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Klaver, D.C., Prasetyo, K., Smidt, H., February 2015, *FIELD end line report; MFS II country evaluations, Civil Society component*, Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR (University & Research centre) and SurveyMETER. Report CDI-15-067. Wageningen.

This report describes the findings of the end line assessment of FIELD that is a partner of Hivos.

The evaluation was commissioned by NWO-WOTRO, the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research in the Netherlands and is part of the programmatic evaluation of the Co-Financing System - MFS II financed by the Dutch Government, whose overall aim is to strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. Apart from assessing impact on MDGs, the evaluation also assesses the contribution of the Dutch Co-Funding Agencies to strengthen the capacities of their Southern Partners, as well as the contribution of these partners towards building a vibrant civil society arena.

This report assesses FIELD's contribution towards strengthening Civil Society in Indonesia and it used the CIVICUS analytical framework. It is a follow-up of a baseline study conducted in 2012. Key questions that are being answered comprise changes in the five CIVICUS dimensions to which FIELD contributed; the nature of its contribution; the relevance of the contribution made and an identification of factors that explain FIELD's role in civil society strengthening.

Keywords: Civil Society, CIVICUS, theory based evaluation, process-tracing



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The Centre for Development Innovation accepts no liability for any damage arising from the use of the results of this research or the application of the recommendations.

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# Acknowledgements

SurveyMeterand CDI are thanking the staff and the leaders of all Southern Partner Organisations that participated in collecting information for the evaluation of the contribution of these partner organisations to creating a vibrant civil society in Indonesia. They also thank the Co-Funding Agencies and the Dutch Consortia they are a member of for making background documents available. We hope that this evaluation can support you in better positioning yourself in the Civil Society Arena of Indonesia.

# List of abbreviations and acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| ADS | *Aliansi Desa Sejahtera* (Alliance for Prosperous Villages) |
| AGRA | Alliance of Agricultural Reform Movement |
| API | *Aliansi Petani Indonesia* (Indonesian Farmer Alliance) |
| BALITPA | *Balai Penelitian Tanaman Padi* (Indonesian Institute for Rice Research) |
| Balitbang | *Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan* (Research and Development Unit) |
| BCI | Basic Capabilities Index |
| BPS | *Badan Pusat Statistik* (Central Agency on Statistics) |
| CDI | Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR |
| CFA | Co-Financing Agency |
| CFO | Co-Financing Organisation |
| CS | Civil society |
| CSO | Civil society organisation |
| CSR | Corporate social responsibility |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organisation |
| FFS | Farmers' field school |
| FIELD | Farmers' Initiatives for Ecological Livelihoods and Democracy |
| FOR PANEN | *Forum Petani dan Nelayan Indramayu* (Farmers and Fishers Forum of Indramayu) |
| G33 | Group of 33 |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GNI | Gross National Income |
| HDI | Human Development Index |
| ICJ | Indonesia for Global Justice |
| IFACS | Indonesia Forest And Climate Support |
| IHCS | Indonesian Human Rights Committee for Social Justice |
| IPPHTI | *Ikatan Petani Pengendalian Hama Terpadu Indonesia* (Indonesian Farmers Integrated Pest Control Organization) |
| IPM | Integrated Pest Management |
| KEHATI | Indonesian Biodiversity Foundation |
| KIARA | *Koalisi Rakyat untuk Keadilan Perikanan* (People's Coalition for Fisheries Justice) |
| KPA | *Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria* |
| KRKP | *Koalisi Rakyat untuk Kedaulatan Pangan* (People's Coalition for Food Sovereignty) |
| LPPSLH | *Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengembangan Sumberdaya dan Lingkungan Hidup* (Foundation for Research & Development of Natural Resources and Environment) |
| MDG | Millennium Development Goal |
| MFS | Dutch co-financing system |
| MK | *Mahkamah Konstitusi* (Constitutional Court) |
| MoC | Model of Change |
| MoFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| NGO | Non-governmental organisation |
| Ormas | *Organisasi masyarakat* (Societal Organizations) |
| PEDIGREA | Participatory Enhancement of Diversity of Genetic Resources in Asia |
| PPB | Participatory plant breeding |
| Puskopdit | *Pusat Koperasi Kredit* (Credit Cooperative Center) |
| REDD | Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation |
| SERF | Social Economic Rights Fulfilment |
| SKP | *Solidaritas Kedaulatan Petani* |
| SKPS | *Serikat Petani Kelapa Sawit* (Palm Oil Farmers Union) |

| | |
|---|---|
| SP | *Solidaritas Perempuan* (Women's Solidarity) |
| SPI | *Serikat Petani Indonesia* (Indonesian Farmers Union) |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |
| SPPQT | *Serikat Paguyuban Petani Qaryah Thayyibah* (Qaryah Thayyibah Farmer Union) |
| SSI | Semi-structured Interview |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| Wageningen UR | Wageningen University & Research Centre |
| WALHI | *Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia* (Friends of the Earth Indonesia) |
| WTO | World Trade Organization |

# 1 Introduction

This report presents the civil society end line findings of FIELD in Indonesia which is a partner of Hivos in Indonesia under the Dutch Consortium People Unlimited 4.1. It is a follow-up to the baseline assessment that was carried out in 2012. According to the information provided during the baseline study, FIELD is working on MDG7ab.

These findings are part of the overall evaluation of the joint MFS II evaluations to account for results of MFS II-funded or –co-funded development interventions implemented by Dutch CFAs and/or their Southern Partner Organisations (SPO) and to contribute to the improvement of future development interventions. The civil society evaluation uses the CIVICUS framework and seeks to answer the following questions:

- What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?
- To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
- What is the relevance of these changes?
- What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The CIVICUS framework that comprises five dimensions (civic engagement, level of organization, practice of values, perception of impact and contexts influencing agency by civil society in general) has been used to orient the evaluation methodology.

*Changes in the civil society arena of the SPO*
In the 2012 – 2014 period the two most important changes that took place in the civil society arena of the SPO are related to Level of Organisation and Perception of Impact.

With regards to the 'level of organisation', the evaluation team observes that FIELD strengthened its relations with a number of coalitions to provide more protection for farmers under regulatory frameworks by proposing amendments of laws. At the grassroots level, farmer groups and cooperatives strengthened their organisational, financial and cultivation capacities. In consequence farmers have become less dependent upon seed companies for input supplies and upon middlemen for loans. However, farmers still remain dependent upon these middlemen to market their produce. FIELD took part in international and regional networks to lobby against World Trade Organization (WTO) policies. FIELD took advantage of the WTO meeting held in Bali in December 2013, to collaborate with other global CS actors to voice their protest against trade agreements.

With regards to 'perception of impact', a major success is the amendment of Law N0.12/1992 in 2013, which decreased farmers' dependency on seed companies who sell hybrid seedlings and gave farmers back their right to breed their own seeds.

These findings were obtained through an analysis of documents, a workshop and follow-up interviews with the SPO, and interviews with external resources persons working in civil society organisations that receive support from the SPO; other civil society organisations with whom the SPO is collaborating; public or private sector agents and; external resource persons capable of overlooking the MDG or theme on which the SPO is concentrating.

*Contribution analysis*
Based upon an analysis of the projects and programmes financed by the Dutch NGOs, four orientations strategic for civil society development were identified: Ensuring that more people from more diverse background are engaging in civil society activities; ensuring that the organisations that receive support from the SPO are capable of playing their role in civil society – intermediate organisations; strengthening the relations with other organisations in civil society to undertake joint activities, and; influencing policies and practices of public or private sector organisations. For Indonesia the focus was on the capacity of intermediate organisations to play their role in civil society and on policy influencing.

Based upon an estimation of the percentage of the total MFS II budget related to interventions that are relevant for civil society, those SPOs whose absolute budgets for civil society were most important were selected for in-depth process tracing on two outcomes related to the above mentioned strategic orientations. FIELD was amongst those SPOs selected for a quick process tracing.

The first outcome that we looked at was the strengthened capacity of farmers through the development of cooperatives. FIELD has facilitated the establishment of 6 new cooperatives and increased their asset base, from around IDR 13 million per cooperative in 2011 to more than IDR 60 million in 2014. One of the cooperatives visited by the evaluation team even had assets worth IDR 300 million. The pathway that most likely explains this outcome is FIELD's intervention to strengthen the capacity of farmer credit unions through providing trainings and technical assistance on cooperative governance and networking.

The second outcome that we looked at is farmers are better positioned to have the freedom to plant different crop strains through the revision of national legalisation. Farmers were dependent to the seeds produced by large seed companies and were at risk of criminalization if they wanted to develop their own strains. FIELD together with a coalition of NGOs lobbied to secure the judicial review of Law No. 12/1992 on Plant Cultivation System. The pathway that most likely explains this outcome is that FIELD, together with the coalition, developed policy inputs and mobilized farmers' to provide evidence and testimonies that have resulted in a ruling in their favour.

*Relevance*
Interviews with staff of FIELD, with external resource person, with the liaison officer of Hivos, as well as contextual information helped to assess the relevance of FIELD's interventions in terms of; its Theory of Change (ToC) for Civil Society (CS) as designed during the baseline study; the context in which FIELD is operating; the CS policies of Hivos.

With regards to the baseline ToC, the outcomes achieved are relevant because both outcomes represent the preconditions of the ToC, namely creating an enabling policy environment for farmers and organising farmers so that they have access to, and control of resources. Both are critical elements to attain FIELD's ultimate goal of independent and sovereign farmers.

With regards to the context in which FIELD is operating, its outcomes achieved are relevant because they are helping farmers come to terms with the long-term impacts of the Green Revolution. Through FIELD's support farmers are regaining independence from commercial seeds that require intensive agricultural inputs and are retaining their traditional knowledge.

With regards to the CS policies of Hivos, FIELD's outcomes are relevant to the Green Entrepreneurship programme. Through this programme, the CFA has supported smallholder participation in markets that are driven by sustainable economic and environmental principles.

*Explaining factors*
The information related to factors that explain the above findings was collected at the same time as the data were gathered for the previous questions. The evaluation team looked at internal factors within FIELD, the external context in which it operates and the relations between FIELD and Hivos.

Internal factors within the SPO that explain the outcomes are FIELD's application of the Farmers' Field School (FFS), which has contributed to greater farmer confidence and is a key factor to the achievement of both outcomes. Through the FFS networks, FIELD has been able to mobilize the farmers both for technical assistance and the advocacy work.

External factors that explain the findings are the existing enabling environment for cooperative development and support from other CSOs that made lobbying as a coalition possible. The government considers cooperative development to be one of the key pillars of economic growth, contributing to favourable conditions for cooperative development. With regards to policy advocacy, the CSO coalition, which consists of longstanding NGOs that work on food and farmers issues, was an important factor that contributed to the revision of the Cultivation Law.

Factors that explain the findings that are related to the relation between the FIELD and Hivos are the linkages that Hivos has facilitated between FIELD and other organisations and its long-term support to FIELD and other organisations in its network. The Hivos-supported project benefitted from already existing linkages with farmers' groups in Indramayu and FIELD's experience in the areas of participatory plant breeding and FFS, which had been developed through preceding donor-support.

The following chapter briefly describes the political context, the civil society context and the relevant background with regards to the MDG/theme FIELD is working on. Chapter three provides background information on FIELD, the relation of its MFS II interventions with the CIVICUS framework and specific information on the contract with Hivos. An evaluation methodology has been developed for the evaluation of the Civil Society component which can be found in Appendix 2 of the country report; however, deviations from this methodology, the choices made with regards to the selection of the outcomes for contribution analysis, as well as difficulties encountered during data collection are to be found in Chapter 4. The answers to each of the evaluation questions are being presented in Chapter 5, followed by a discussion on the general project design in relation to CS development; an assessment of what elements of the project design may possibly work in other contexts or be implemented by other organisations in Chapter 6. Conclusions are presented in Chapter 7.

# 2 Context

## 2.1 Political context

### 2.1.1 Brief historical perspective

Indonesia's rise to being the world's third largest democratic nation has been lauded by many world leaders. The county is often considered to be a model Muslim democracy. As the fourth most populous nation with an estimated 250 million people[1], Indonesia has sustained its democratic commitment since transitioning from an authoritarian leadership to a democracy in 1998. The decentralized administration now consists of 34 provinces and 508 districts and municipalities.

Prior to 1998, Indonesia was under strict authoritarian regime. Suharto, known for his so-called New Order (1966-1998) regime, ushered in radical transformations that would place social and political forces under direct state supervision. The defining characteristics of the Suharto era were a focus on economic growth and controlled consensus and political stability devoid of dissent. A series of tumultuous economic and political transitions in the nineties severely diminished the credibility of ageing President Suharto, who was forced to resign amidst mass street protests.

His departure in 1998 laid bare three decades of social inequalities, state-perpetuated abuses against human rights, and a lack of civilian liberties. The regime change opened the way for a period of *Reformasi* started under the presidency of B. J. Habibie (1998-1999) and continued by Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001), Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001–2004), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014). Restrictions on citizen participation, press freedom and association were removed. Democratic reforms and decentralization led to direct elections, portioned authority, devolution of authority to regional authorities, formation of new political parties and ended the military's parliamentary influence. The distinct historical periods of the New Order Regime and *Reformasi* (1998-present) have shaped the emergence of civil society. Defining characteristics are summarized in the table below.

Table 1
*Characteristics that have defined the emergence of civil society in Indonesia*

| Characteristics | New Order, authoritarian period (1966 – 1998) | Reformasi (1998 – present) |
|---|---|---|
| **Political system** | Centralized, authoritarian characterized by unipolarity. Golkar as the dominant political party.<br><br>In 1999, there were 27 provinces, 306 districts and around 60,000 villages. | Decentralized, democratic. Fragmentation of power and atomization of patronage relationships. Emergence of numerous political parties. Direct presidential elections since 1999.<br><br>Decentralization altered the political and administrative landscape: 34 provinces, 410 districts, 98 municipalities, 6,944 sub-districts and 81,253 villages.[2] |
| **State-citizen interaction** | Benevolent leader, obedient population. Down to the village level, the state permeated society. | Modern political culture marked by diminishing hierarchy between the state and citizens, allowing for citizens to interact more freely. |
| **Citizen representation and** | Strict control of speech, expression and association. | Burgeoning of CSOs, pressure groups and NGOs following the political euphoria after Suharto's |

[1] In 2010 the population was estimated to be around 237 million people (BPS 2010 Population Census). The current figure is an estimate from BKKBN and similar figures are cited in the CIA's World Fact Book and the World Bank.

2 Latest data (2014) See: Rumah Pemilu, "Gambaran Singkat Pemilihan Umum 2014 di Indonesia", 3 July 2014. Available from http://www.rumahpemilu.org/in/read/3351/Gambaran-Singkat-Pemilihan-Umum-2014-di-Indonesia (accessed 25 October 2014)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **voice** | CSOs and their networks largely "hiding behind the screen", and operating under state surveillance. A period of growth occurred in 1995-98, as resistance was building. | fall.<br><br>Indonesian CSOs began to establish new networks internationally. Up until the early 2000s the focus was on state-centrist issues. Later, issues that CSOs were tackling became more diverse, ranging from pluralism, poverty reduction to fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights. |
| **Media** | No free press, censorship and state-control. Suharto had firm grasp over how to use print & broadcast medias to promote political ideologies. | More vibrant media environment, flourishing of media businesses albeit in control of 12 main conglomerates that are mostly profit-driven and often have political ties. |
| | Limited public and CS use and access to internet until mid-90s. | Twitter nation, widespread social media use. |
| | | Growing realization of the importance of media/free press as the fourth pillar of democracy. |
| **Artistic forms of expression** | Art and literary censorship conducted by the state. Art forms were a means to reinforce political order. | Greater freedom of the arts and cultural sectors. Organizations able to hold art events more freely. Freedom of expression a catchphrase amongst individuals and artistic groups, but challenged by more conservative members of society. |
| **Religious expression and organization** | Regime repressed religious groups, especially radical forms. | Emergence of religious groups seeking to restore Islamic values and defend Muslim values. |

With political reforms came greater freedom and space for civic engagement. In the *Reformasi* period, there was a remarkable increase in the number of civil society organizations, many of which were Islamic in character. In 2000, the Central Agency on Statistics (BPS) recorded around 70,000 registered organizations, compared to just 10,000 in 1996.[3]New groups sprung up with donors encouraging activists to establish NGOs they could fund. These organizations were eager to distance themselves from state and often took an anti-government stance. Proliferating CSOs and NGOs have taken advantage of decentralization and greater regional autonomy to engage in public affairs. Civil society and government relations have improved, although both sides remain sceptical of the others' intentions.

### 2.1.2 Recent trends in the political context

Indonesia is considered to be a story of democratic success, but it still struggles to realize the benefits of sustained and equitable economic growth. In the political context, the main challenges lie in governing such geographically vast and decentralized country, applying principles of good governance and the enormous task of reforming the country's bureaucracy.

Although, Indonesia's 'big bang' decentralization initiated at the turn of the century narrowed the gap between local government and citizens, it has also localized political power struggles. While the devolution of authorities relieved tensions between the central government and the regions, it has also created opportunities for corrupt and rent-seeking practices, at the local level. As indicated by Transparency International's corruption index scores, perceived corruption in Indonesia remains high.

[3] Wahid, Marzuki. 2010. LSM, Islam, dan Perempuan di Indonesia Paska Orde Baru. Presentation at the Asian Dialogues: Open Seminars in Asian Languages. Melbourne, 22 April. Available from http://intranet.law.unimelb.edu.au/staff/events/files/Microsoft%20PowerPoint%20-%20LSM%20dan%20Islam%20di%20Indonesia%20--Melbourne%202010-FINAL.pdf (accessed 25 October 2014)

Table 2

*Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer survey: Indonesia*

| Year | Corruption perceptions Index Score<br>*(0 perceived as highly corrupt and 100 perceived as clean)* | Rank |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 30 | 100/182 |
| 2012 | 32 | 118/174 |
| 2013 | 32 | 114/177 |

Source: Transparency International

In 2013, decentralization was taken a step further with the approval of the Village Law, intended to address weak governance arrangements and empower rural communities to participate politically. The new law could also lead to village elites distorting power relations and misusing government funding if not properly monitored.

Indonesia is still transitioning politically and many challenges lie ahead. According to the 2012 Indonesia Governance Index's Executive Report, "Indonesia is witnessing a paradox in its democracy. On one hand, a successful opening-up of civil liberty has led to the avalanche of democratic demands across the nation, however on the other hand, democratic institutions' are inadequately respond to those demands." Nonetheless, the Indonesian Governance Index, which focuses on measuring provincial governance, does show a general improvement in the performance of the government (political office) bureaucracy, civil society and economic society based on principles of participation, transparency, fairness, accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness between 2008 and 2012. Civil society scores improved the most significantly, while scores for bureaucracy rose slightly.[4]

Table 3

*Indonesia Governance Index: Average provincial scores*

| Arena | 2008 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| Government | 4.93 | 5.46 |
| Bureaucracy | 5.53 | 5.58 |
| Civil Society | 4.85 | 6.33 |
| Economic Society | 4.77 | 5.71 |

Source: http://www.kemitraan.or.id/igi

In the past decade, Indonesians have generally enjoyed a freedom to participate in the political process through a direct-election mechanism. However, in September 2014 lawmakers voted in favour of a bill reviving indirect elections of regional heads. The controversial vote provoked public outcry which saw peaceful protests and the public voicing their discontent through social media. In early October, just before the end of his term, president Yudhoyono issued a regulation in lieu of the law, effectively repealing the law until further judicial review.

The recent 2014 elections which marked the end of Yudhoyono's 10-year term, demonstrated that Indonesian voters are increasingly voting for popular figures irrespective of political party alliances. While practices of corruption, vote-buying and poor voter administration remained in the recent election, the public seems to have matured politically, indicated by the enormous interest in televised debates between the leading candidates. The appeal of the newly sworn in President JokoWidodo, popularly known as Jokowi, has come from his hands-on, man-of-the-people approach. As Jokowi begins his five-year term he will need to start addressing a myriad of challenges that include corruption, stagnant economic growth, and human rights concerns, particularly with respect to the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and religious intolerance. If left unaddressed, these challenges could seriously undermine Indonesia's stability and democratic reforms.

[4] The IGI uses a scale of 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest). Data is available online through their website. Indonesia Governance Index, Data, "IGI Executive Report". Available from http://www.kemitraan.or.id/igi/index.php/data/publication/factsheet/275-igi-executive-report (accessed 25 October 2014)

## 2.2 Civil Society context

### 2.2.1 Socio-political context

Today, there are tens of thousands of civil organisations in the country5, comprising of religious organisations, unions, mass-based membership organisations, ethnic groups, professional associations, politically affiliated organisations, NGOs, and other community organisations.6 CSOs in Indonesia work on wide range of themes. Thematic areas recently prominent include democratization and human rights; issue-based campaigns; protecting economic, social and cultural rights; promoting community access to basic services; environmental and natural resources management, and; climate change and disaster risk reduction. In 2012, the Ministry of Home Affairs documented more than 65,000 organizations, of which around 9,000 were officially registered with the Ministry.7 A year later, the figure increased to more than 130 thousand foundations, associations, NGOs, research institutions, and other organisations.8 It is worth noting that NGOs in Indonesia are also allowed to establish cooperatives or SMEs, of which there are 203,701 with a membership reaching 35.2 million people.[9] Under recently reinstated Law No. 25/1992 concerning cooperatives, the cooperatives' objectives are to improve the welfare of its members and participate in developing the economy.[10] Given these regulations it is possible to expand the definition of civil society to include cooperatives.[11]

The civil society stage has become more diverse; the stage is now "shared with more players, like political parties, religious organizations and universities, all able to speak out and publicize their views in a multitude of media outlets that have sprung up in recent years.[12]" NGOs and civil society in Indonesia are now starting to deal with the dissolve of traditionally-compartmentalized roles and responsibilities as their activities begin to overlap with those of the government and private sector. As one recent report stated, "NGOs that were united against Suharto are now without a common enemy and something to unite them to a common vision.[13]" While the government has come to recognize that "a strong civil society is an important contributor to both launching and sustaining a transition to democratic governance"[14], NGOs and CSO networks continue to be scrutinized and criticized for being vehicles of foreign intervention.

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[5] Under state law, there are two forms of organization recognized legally: "yayasan" or foundations, and "perkumpulan" or associations. The main difference between foundations and associations is that the latter is member-based and in the way they are governed internally and under law. A large majority of NGOs in Indonesia are private foundations.

[6] Jordan, Lisa and van Tuijl, Peter, eds. 2006. *NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles and Innovations*. London: Earthscan

[7] Koran Jakarta, "1.000 Ormas Perbarui Pendaftaran", 23 November 2013. Available from http://www.koran-jakarta.com/?112-1000-ormas-perbarui-pendaftaran (accessed 25 October 2014); Ibrahim, Rustam. 2011. "Civil Society in Indonesia", in Chong, Terence and Elies, Stefanie, eds. 2011. *An Asean Community for All: Exploring the Scope for Civil Society Engagement*. Singapore: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

[8] Direktorat Jenderal Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik Kementerian Dalam Negeri Republik Indonesia, "Pemerintah: Ada Ormas yang Diperalat untuk Kepentingan Asing", 1 November 2013. Available from http://kesbangpol.kemendagri.go.id/index.php/subblog/read/2013/2515/Pemerintah-Ada-Ormas-yang-Diperalat-untuk-Kepentingan-Asing/2330 (accessed 25 October 2014); Kesbang Pemkab Bulukumba, "Sambutan Dirjen Kesbangpol Pada Pertemuan Sosialisasi Undang-Undang Nomor 17 Tahun 2013", 18 November 2013. Available from http://www.kesbangpolbulukumba.info/berita-sambutan--dirjen-kesbangpol------pada-----pertemuan--sosialisasi-undangundang--nomor-17-tahun-2013-.html (accessed 25 October 2014)

[9] Kementerian Koperasi dan Usaha Kecil dan Menengah Republik Indonesia, "Pemerintahan Jokowi Diminta Terus Beber Koperasi dan UMKM", 20 October 2014. Available from http://www.depkop.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1471:pemerintahan-jokowi-diminta-terus-beber-koperasi-dan-umkm&catid=50:bind-berita&Itemid=97 (accessed 25 October 2014)

[10] A cooperative is defined in Article 3 as: "an economic organization of the people with a social content (character) having persons or legal cooperative societies as members, farming economic entity as a collective endeavour based upon mutual help" (FAO, A study of cooperative legislation in selected Asian and Pacific countries).

[11] World Economic Forum. 2013. *The Future Role of Civil Society*. World Scenario Series. Switzerland. Available from http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_FutureRoleCivilSociety_Report_2013.pdf (accessed 25 October 2014)

[12] Jordan, Lisa and van Tuijl, Peter, eds. 2006. *NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles and Innovations*. London: Earthscan

[13] STATT. 2012. *NGO Sector Review*. Jakarta

[14] Hadi, Suprayoga. 2014. Evolution and Challenges of Civil Society Organizations in Promoting Democratization in Indonesia. Presentation at the Partnership for Development Knowledge Conference. Sana'a, Yemen, 4 March. Available from http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Event/MNA/yemen_cso/english/Yemen_CSO_conf_Pres_Indonesia_ENG.pdf (accessed 25 October 2014)

Despite the considerable number of organisations, those operating effectively are likely to be a small proportion.[15] The accountability and transparency of CSOs and NGOs themselves has also come under greater scrutiny. "Donors have started to become impatient with some of their NGO counterparts, who have difficulties accepting that they now have to fulfil much greater demands"[16]. In recent years foreign donor funding has depleted, which has led to more organizations turning to the private sector and government programmes.

Since 1985 the state has regulated member-based, citizen organizations under a Mass Organizations Law making it obligatory for social organisations to register with government. This law was largely ignored in the period of reform following 1998. However, in 2013 the law was replaced by a new controversial Mass/Societal Organizations (*Ormas*) Law No. 17, reinforcing control of foundations and associations. The Law could be used to prohibit or dissolve CSOs. Many NGOs and civil society networks deplored the Law for constricting democratic space and the freedom of civil society. The 2014 Freedom House Index's ratings for civil liberties in Indonesia declined from Free to Partly Free as a result of the new law[17].

Table 4

*Indonesia's Rank & Score: Freedom House Indices*

| Arena | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Freedom status | Free | Free | Free | Partially Free |
| Political rights | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Civil liberties | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 |

Source: http://www.freedomhouse.org

The 2013 CIVICUS report hinted that the legislation could be part of the state's reaction to a perceived threat that environmental, land rights and indigenous activists pose to political and economic interests due to the "shadowy connections that can exist between transnational corporations and politicians" in the agriculture extractive and construction industries.

The annual Freedom of the Press Index produced by Freedom House illustrates that Indonesia's media remains "partly free". From 2011 to 2012 there was significant numerical improvement from 53 points to 49 with the reduction of restrictions and a greater ability of journalists to cover news more freely. From 2012 to 2014, the country's rating remained steady at 49, with slight changes in global ranking (2012: 97$^{th}$, 2013: 96$^{th}$, 2014: 98$^{th}$).[18]

Overall, the press system in Indonesia is vibrant, with a wide range of news sources and perspectives, further growing with the developments in digital media. "Indonesia's online growth in recent years is recognised as nothing short of phenomenal" (Matt Abud 2012). While the Internet is seen as a new space for debate and participation, current laws still curtail openness, accessibility, inclusiveness and place limits on its use for expression. Only a limited number of organisations like ICT Watch are addressing freedom of expression and online rights. Nonetheless, citizens are using cyber space to set up online communities and organize campaigns. Some recent examples include the commuter movement 'masukbusway.com' aimed to capture and shame traffic violators in Jakarta.

Less progressive sources of rhetoric can be found amongst a number of hard-line religious groups and leaders, such as *Front Pembela Islam* (Islamic Defenders Front or FPI), who have links with traditional religious schools (pesantren) and recruit members through these and online networks. Radical groups

[15] Ibrahim, Rustam. 2011. "Civil Society in Indonesia", in Chong, Terence and Elies, Stefanie, eds. 2011. *An Asean Community for All: Exploring the Scope for Civil Society Engagement*. Singapore: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

[16] Ibid

[17] Freedom House, Reports, Freedom In The World, "Freedom in the World 2014". Available from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2014#.VE4BahbarZk (accessed 25 October 2014)

[18] Freedom House, Reports, Freedom Of The Press, "Freedom of the Press 2011". Available from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2011#.VI_qF8mRKgw; "Freedom of the Press 2012". Available from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2012#.VI_rGMmRKgw; "Freedom of the Press 2013". Available from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2013#.VI_qksmRKgw; "Freedom of the Press 2014". Available from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2014#.VI_q5cmRKgw (accessed 25 October 2014)

organize frequent protests to apply pressure on the government and are a threat to diversity and freedom.[19]

### 2.2.2 Socio-economic context

At a macro-level, Indonesia's socio-economic situation has been improving. The country is a regional and global economic force, and has recently graduated to lower-middle income country (LMIC) status.

Table 5
*Indonesia's Rank & Score: UN Human Development Reports*

| | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HDI Rank (scale 1 – 187 for all years except 2010 out of 169) | 108 | 124 | 121 | 108 |
| HDI Value | 0.671 | 0.640 | 0.681 | 0.684 |
| Category | Medium human development | | | |
| Life expectancy at birth (years) | 70.2 | 70.4 | 70.6 | 70.8 |
| Mean years of schooling (years) | 7.4 | 7.5 | 7.5 | 7.5 |
| Expected years of schooling | 12.5 | 12.7 | 12.7 | 12.7 |
| GNI per capita (2011 PPP$) | 7,802 | 8,201 | 8,601 | 8,970 |
| Gender Inequality Index (value & rank) | 0.680<br>100<br>(2008 data) | 0.505<br>100 | 0.494<br>106 | 0.500<br>103 |

Source: Human Development Report 2014 & Explanatory Note for Indonesia

In recent years, Indonesia has consistently been ranked in the medium development category of the UN's Human Development Index (HDI) measuring a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. In 2013, the HDI value was 0.684with a rank of 108 out of 187 countries and territories. However, the value falls to 0.553, or 19.2 percent, when taking into account inequality. Indonesia's HDI is above its peers in the medium development category but below the average of 0.703 in East Asia and the Pacific. The Gross National Income (GNI) per capita is steadily rising to US$ 8,970, a remarkable feat considering it was just 2,931 in 1980. Despite improvements, the 2014 report and its explanatory note show that growth is slowing and the country has yet to achieve equitable growth. For example, women only hold 18.6 percent of the seats in parliament, 10 percent fewer women reach secondary education compared to men, and women's labour market participation is 51.3 percent compared to 84.4 percent for men.[20]

The Basic Capabilities Index (BCI) produced by Social Watch offers a picture of the status of key human capabilities of accessing basic services. It utilizes three main indicators: under-five mortality rate, births attended by skilled personnel, and enrolment of children up to the 5th grade. Countries are categorized into five groups accordingly based on their BCI values: 1) Basic: 98 and over; 2) Medium: from 91 to 97; 3) Low: from 81 to 90; 4) Very Low: from 71 to 80, and; 5) Critical: values below 70. Results for Indonesia saw stable or improving scores for child and maternal health, but a regression for education. While no data beyond 2011 is available, other data sources confirm that Indonesia still has high maternal mortality rates but basic education through primary school enrolment is improving.[21]

[19] Hamayotsu, Kikue. 2013. *The Limits of Civil Society in Democratic Indonesia: Media Freedom and Religious Intolerance*. Journal of Contemporary Asia. London: Routledge

[20] Explanatory note on the 2014 Human Development Report composite indices Indonesia. (United Nation Development Programme. 2014. *Human Development Report 2014: Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience*. United States: PBM Graphics)

[21] See: Social Progress Imperative. 2014. *Social Progress Index 2014 Country Scorecards*. 21 April. Available from http://www.socialprogressimperative.org/system/resources/W1siZiIsIjIwMTQvMDQvMjEvMjIvMTYvMjUvOTg1L1NvY2lhbF9Qcm9ncmVzc19JbmRleF8yMDE0X1Njb3JlY2FyZHMucGRmIl1d/Social%20Progress%20Index%202014_Scorecards.pdf (accessed 26 October 2014); World Bank, News, "Indonesia Development Policy Review 2014", 23 June 2014. Available from http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/06/23/indonesia-2014-development-policy-review (accessed 26 October 2014)

Table 6

*Indonesia's Rank & Score: Basic Capabilities Index*

| Year | Children reaching 5th grade | Survival up to 5 | Births attended by skilled health personnel | BCI |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 87 (low) | 96 (medium) | 73 (very low) | 88 (low) |
| 2010 | 94 (medium) | 96 (medium) | 79 (very low) | 90 (low) |
| 2000 | | | | 86 (low) |
| 1990 | | | | 74 (very low) |

Source: Social Watch

Indonesia does not fare too well on the Social and Economic Rights Fulfilment (SERF) Index. In 2012 Indonesia achieved 67.86 percent of protecting social and economic rights. Although there was an improvement compared to 2011 values, performance worsened when compared to 2010. The country consistently preforms poorly in the areas of right to food and right to work, although it improved in fulfilling rights to education.

Table 7

*Social and Economic Rights Fulfilment (SERF) Index Values: Indonesia*

| Year | SERF Index Value | Right to Food | Right to Heath | Right to Education | Right to Housing | Right to Work |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2012 | 67.86 | 45.33 | 83.95 | 95.19 | 64.26 | 50.56 |
| 2011 | 65.71 | 45.01 | 85.16 | 93.43 | 63.88 | 41.09 |
| 2010 | 69.29 | 45.75 | 85.95 | 93.82 | 65.88 | 54.72 |

Source: Social Watch, Core Country SERF Indices 2010, 2011 and 2012 (Note that 2010 data was adjusted in 2013).

Trends in the country's Economic Freedom Scores produced by The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal are also rather bleak. From 2010 to 2014 the country has been categorized as 'Mostly Unfree', with only a small increase in its score from 55.5 to 58.5.[22]

These macro-level figures illustrate the complexity of the socio-economic context. While the economy has grown, 65 million people remain highly vulnerable to shocks. Disparities in income and geographic areas remain, made more complex by the number of people 'floating' between the poor and middle class'.[23]





*Figure 1Indonesia's 2014 Social Progress Index Scorecard illustrating selected elements of the Opportunity component.*

## 2.2.3 Socio-cultural context

With respect to the socio-cultural context it is of interest to look at global indices that provide some insight into the level of trust between ordinary people and the extent to which tolerance exists. On a whole, Indonesia has been able to maintain peace as indicated in the improvements in scores recorded by the annual Global Peace Index. In 2010, the country scored 1.950 on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being the best score. This has gradually improved to 1.853 in 2014, with a rank of 54 out of 162 countries.

[22] Heritage, "2014 Index of Economic Freedom". Available from http://www.heritage.org/index/country/indonesia (accessed 26 October 2014)

[23] World Bank, News, "Indonesia Development Policy Review 2014", 23 June 2014. Available from http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/06/23/indonesia-2014-development-policy-review (accessed 26 October 2014)

Nonetheless, inequality, socio-economic conditions and rights claims (especially land rights) are still a source of localized incidences of conflict in Indonesia. Between 2010 and 2014 there has been a rising incidence of resource and identity-based conflicts as well as vigilantism.[24]

Amongst other components, the Social Progress Index published in 2014 examines whether there is opportunity for individuals to reach their full potential by scoring four different components: personal rights; personal freedom and choice; tolerance and inclusion; and access to advanced education. Indonesia scores low in this regard, at just 43.86 out of 100 and ranking 92nd out of 132 countries. Freedom of religion, tolerance for immigrants and religious intolerance are all considered to be weak (red), while the majority of the components are scored as neutral (yellow).

The Edelman Trust Barometer Survey, which collects annual data from 33,000 respondents in 27 countries has shown that on aggregate, Indonesians' confidence in nongovernmental organisations, government, media and businesses increased by 10 percent in the 2014 trust index. Interestingly, businesses, with 82 percent, are the most trusted of the four sectors compared to 73 percent for NGOs, 53 percent for government and 73 percent of respondents putting their trust in the media. According to survey results, Indonesians believe businesspeople are more inclined to tell the truth than their government counterparts and three times more likely to fix problems.[25]

The trends in levels of trust in NGOs over the past four years are noteworthy. In 2011, the trust level was at 61 percent, decreasing to 53 percent in 2012 and 51 percent in 2013. Reports claimed this was due to a lack of transparency and accountability. Edelman reported that the trust levels in 2013 were the lowest amongst eight Asia Pacific countries surveyed, ascribed to the growth of horizontal, peer-to-peer networks and a preference for social media.[26] The most recent results released in 2014 show substantial jump to 73 percent in 2014 which is attributed to NGOs now being able to 'walk the talk' in accountability and transparency, as well as the emergence of 'corporate NGOs'.[27]

## 2.3 Civil Society context issues with regards to the MDG

Land rights and natural resource protection have been a long-standing issues for Indonesia. While Indonesia has adopted and amended laws to improve the rights of smallholders and indigenous communities, many of these regulations have faltered in their implementation. Part of the issue lies in the overlap and lack of clarity of laws adopted that regulate different sectors and local legislation. Another issue is that there is a lack of oversight in the procedures such as granting permits and licensing. These problems, which are commonly found across development sectors, are compounded by a lack of information among local communities on what the laws regulate and their rights vis-à-vis them.

Indonesia's agricultural sector remains dominated by smallholders. The sector is the second largest contributor to the country's GDP after manufacturing and remains the largest sources of employment. Nonetheless, the proportion of labour employed in agriculture has been declining steadily from 56

[24] National Violence Monitoring System Indonesia, Reports, "SNPK Monthly Report (September 2014)". Available from http://www.snpk-indonesia.com/AnalysisReport/Index?lang=en&randdo=d25debd9-516a-4c3b-bef5-69077a80219a&userid=7427839&type=2 (accessed 26 October 2014)

[25] Harriet Conron and Nicole Jade Millane, "Indonesians Trust Businesses More Than Govt, Survey Shows", *The Jakarta Globe*, 5 February 2014. Available from http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/indonesians-trust-businesses-more-than-govt-survey-shows/ (accessed 26 October 2014); Edelman Indonesia, "Further Rise in Trust in Indonesia, with Business as the Most Trusted Institution in the Country, Says the 2014 Edelman Trust Barometer", 5 February 2014. Available from http://www.edelman.id/edelman-indonesia/further-rise-in-trust-in-indonesia-with-business-as-the-most-trusted-institution-in-the-country-says-the-2014-edelman-trust-barometer/ (accessed 26 October 2014)

[26] David Brain, "Guest Post: A Crisis of Trust in Indonesian NGOs?", *Edelman*, 29 April 2013. Available from http://www.edelman.com/post/guest-post-a-crisis-of-trust-in-indonesian-ngos/ (accessed 26 October 2014)

[27] Harriet Conron and Nicole Jade Millane, "Indonesians Trust Businesses More Than Govt, Survey Shows", *The Jakarta Globe*, 5 February 2014. Available from http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/indonesians-trust-businesses-more-than-govt-survey-shows/ (accessed 26 October 2014)

percent in 1990 to 38.3 in 2010.[28] Rice is a staple food crop and one of the country's most important agricultural products. Yet, Indonesia has become the seventh largest rice importer[29].

Indonesia's agricultural productivity has stagnated since the 1990s due to a decrease in investments in the sector, a decline of extension services and a lack of beneficial impacts from technologies introduced to enhance productivity[30]. Prior to this period, the country had invested significantly in the agricultural sector. Under the Suharto regime, agricultural development was given primary priority and an agricultural modernization program known as the Green Revolution, was stepped up. Although the Green Revolution resulted in spectacular increases in rice production, the large-scale introduction of hybrid crops that were heavily dependent on chemical fertilizers and pesticides, left farmers vulnerable to pest-resistant epidemics[31]. This top-down approach pushed farmers to adopt hybrid rice production. Vast amounts of seeds were purchased from companies (some of which had political connections) and offered free of charge to farmers. Many farmers signed up to these schemes, but discovered that hybrid varieties are highly susceptible to pests and diseases and that more pesticides and chemical fertilizers are needed. "In Indonesia, as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Green Revolution disproportionately benefited wealthier rural residents, who used the new technologies to increase production and shed traditional obligations to women and poorer neighbours, who were pushed onto more marginal land or off the land entirely"[32]. These initiatives also undermined farmer creativity and disempowered bottom-up approaches that encouraged farmers to share knowledge about seeds[33]. Despite its intentions to address food insecurity and self-sufficiency, the Green Revolution has become known to be one of the most unsuccessful development projects in history[34].

The 1980s saw the emergence of the Farmer Field School (FFS) in Indonesia, introduced to address the risks of high use of toxic pesticides promoted aggressively by the government and the private sector[35]. Integrated pest management control methods and more holistic on-the-ground support to farmers were geared towards helping farmers understand agro-ecology and cultivation problems and their causes. Many NGOs and development actors continue to apply the FFS approach until today as a means to carry out group-based experimental learning activities for farmers.

Before becoming a World Trade Organisation (WTO) member in 1995, Indonesia passed a Law that denied farmers control over their basic means of production. The Law on Plant Cultivation System (Law No. 12/1992) resulted in the loss of knowledge of techniques and criminalized farmers for using and distributing certified seeds[36]. In 2000, after entry into the WTO, the Law on Plant Variety Protection (No. 29/2000) was passed to protect intellectual property, including plant varieties. The Law in essence forbade farmers from producing progenies or varieties being produced by other

[28] Tambunan , Tulus T. H. 2013. *A Survey of Business Models for Agricultural Investment in Indonesia*. TKN Report. The Canada: International Institute for Sustainable Development

[29] United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Foreign Agricultural Service, "Commodity Intelligence Report: INDONESIA: Stagnating Rice Production Ensures Continued Need for Imports", 19 March 2012. Available from http://www.pecad.fas.usda.gov/highlights/2012/03/Indonesia_rice_Mar2012/ (accessed 26 October 2014)

[30] FSG, "Indonesia: Background". Available from http://www.fsg.org/Portals/0/Uploads/Documents/PDF/Indonesia.pdf?cpgn=WP%20DL%20-%20Smallholder%20Donor%20%28Indonesia%29 (accessed 26 October 2014)

[31] Welker, Marina. 2012. *The Green Revolution's ghost: Unruly subjects of participatory development in rural Indonesia*. American Ethnologist, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 389-406. American Anthropological Association. Available from http://anthropology.cornell.edu/faculty/upload/Welker-2012-Green-Revolutions-Ghost.pdf (accessed 26 October 2014)

[32] Ibid

[33] Biotani and GRAIN, "Indonesia: Farmers lose in hybrid rice lottery", *GRAIN*, 8 January 2009. Available from http://www.grain.org/es/article/entries/1678-indonesia-farmers-lose-in-hybrid-rice-lottery (accessed 26 October 2014)

[34] Jonathan Sepe, "The Impact of the Green Revolution and Capitalized Farming on the Balinese Water Temple System". Available from http://eclectic.ss.uci.edu/~drwhite/Anthro129/balinesewatertemplesJonathanSepe.htm (accessed 26 October 2014)

[35] Braun, Arnoud and Duveskog, Deborah. 2008. *The Farmer Field School Approach – History, Global Assessment and Success Stories*. Background Paper for the IFAD Rural Poverty Report 2011. Available from http://www.ifad.org/rpr2011/background/1.pdf (accessed 26 October 2014)

[36] Indonesian Human Rights Committee for Social Justice, "Our seed, our sovereignty – seed law victory in Indonesia", *GRAIN*, 22 August 2013. Available from http://www.grain.org/bulletin_board/entries/4774-our-seed-our-sovereignty-seed-law-victory-in-indonesia (accessed 26 October 2014)

institutions or individuals.[37] This further limited the creativity of farmers and seed breeders and allowed for private sector monopolization of seed distribution[38].

More recently, two Laws have been passed that are seen as curtailing farmer rights. These are: Law No. 18/2012 on Food and Law No. 19/2013 on the Protection and Empowerment of Farmers. The former is considered by critics to offer little protection to small businesses and complicates the right to food with unclear accountability as to what the state's obligations are to protect citizens' right to food[39]. The latter is criticised for being discriminatory and for not covering land ownership rights of smallholder farmers and allowing only for rental and usage rights[40].

The regulatory environment has had a negative impact on the recognition of farmers' rights. FIELD has collaborated with other NGOs to strengthen the position of farmers. These efforts led to a constitutional court amendment of Law No. 12/1992. On the ground, FIELD's efforts in Indramayu, West Java (considered to be one of the main rice-producing areas in the country) have focused on participatory plant breeding and certification of seed varieties. Without certification, farmers have limited rights to sell seeds.

[37] Winarto, Y. T. and Ardhianto, I. 2007. *Becoming Plant Breeders, Rediscovering Local Varieties: The Creativity of Farmers in Indramayu, Indonesia*. Available from http://www.sristi.org/cms/files/creativity_of_farmers.pdf (accessed 26 October 2014)

[38] Indonesian Human Rights Committee for Social Justice, "Our seed, our sovereignty – seed law victory in Indonesia", *GRAIN*, 22 August 2013. Available from http://www.grain.org/bulletin_board/entries/4774-our-seed-our-sovereignty-seed-law-victory-in-indonesia (accessed 26 October 2014)

[39] Joko Susilo, "MK tolak gugatan UU Pangan", *ANTARA News*, 3 December 2014. Available from http://www.antaranews.com/berita/467366/mk-tolak-gugatan-uu-pangan (23 December 2014)

[40] International Land Coalition. 2014. *Promoting people centred land governance: Indonesia*. NES ILC's National Engagement Strategy. Available: http://www.landcoalition.org/en/publications/promoting-people-centred-land-governance-indonesia (23 December 2014)

# 3 Description of FIELD and its contribution to civil society/policy changes

## 3.1 Background FIELD

Farmers' Initiatives for Ecological Livelihoods and Democracy (FIELD) was established in June 2001 by former FAO staff who provided technical assistance for the Integrated Pest Management (IPM) Programme for farmers in Asia between 1998 and 2002. The same team that established FIELD also helped to found the Indonesian IPM Farmers Association (IPPHTI) in 1999. FIELD aims to develop farmer and rural community movements in order to enhance democracy, justice and a healthy environment. They aim to reach this long-term goal by strengthening farmer and rural community movements through participatory education, action research and network building.

FIELD has been part of the creation and application of widely praised approaches such as farmer field schools, farmer-to-farmer training and farmer action research. IPPHTI is FIELD's main partner in organising farmer-to-farmer movement, strengthening farmer-led research, and advocacy on farmer rights. FIELD has also trained more than 26,000 men and women farmer trainers experienced in facilitating and supporting others farmers.

FIELD is based in Indramayu, West Java, where it continues to have a presence. In 2002, FIELD initiated the 'Participatory Enhancement of Diversity of Genetic Resources' (PEDIGREA) project in Indramayu. Indramayu was chosen because it produced the largest share of rice in Indonesia and was the target area of Government's Green Revolution Program in 1970s. Through farmer field school interventions, one of the PEDIGREA program components focused on Participatory Plant Breeding (PPB), or the selection and development of crop varieties by farmers, for rice and vegetables. Since the 1970s, the government has promoted the use of agricultural company-produced farmer inputs such as seeds and fertilizer. Farmers have become increasingly dependent on these external inputs to the expense of genetic and agro-diversity. This has eroded much of their traditional knowledge seed varieties. With the introduction of Law No. 4/2006 on the Protection of Plant Varieties, the state has exercised more control and constricted farmers' breeding practices.

FIELD has continued to work on the issue of PBB, and considers it critical for farmers to retain knowledge and expertise in this area. FIELD has expanded its efforts to strengthen farmers' organisations through participatory education, networking and action research to include other areas such as Ciamis, West Java and Lampung, Sumatra.

## 3.2 MFS II interventions related to Civil Society

The so-called 'Green Revolution' started under Sukarno in the 1960s and intensified in the era of the New Order military regime, resulted in few farmers breeding or conserving their own seed varieties/strains. With the intensification of agriculture, farmers have become dependent on seed companies (many of them importing GMO seeds). Furthermore, after Indonesia became involved in in the WTO, Indonesia has become trapped in the privatization of seeds – companies, government and universities are the only ones able to obtain licenses for seed production and distribution. Under the Law on Cultivation System, farmers are prohibited from undertaking plant breeding and are often discriminated against, criminalized or imprisoned. This Law is considered by many to be violating human rights.

In the current agricultural system, farmers have become dependent on private sector companies for agricultural input and technical knowledge. Dependence has become structuralized by government regulations and the political economy. Many of the seeds available on the market require intensive use of fertilizer and pesticides, with obvious degradation effects on the environment. The agricultural

sector as a whole is contributing less to the national economy and many of the nation's poor live in rural areas.

To address this dependence, FIELD has adopted a twin-strategy of supporting farmers groups and promoting seed legalization. At the grassroots level, FIELD develops farmer seed systems, raises farmer awareness, links with the local government for recognition of farmer seeds, and organises farmers (through cooperatives and credit unions) to give them a better position vis-à-vis private companies and middlemen who provide agricultural inputs to farmers. Organising farmers is considered to be a vital step in improving their position vis-à-vis external market forces and promoting (organic) agricultural products. Seed legalisation is a means for farmers to regain control and reduce the level of dependence on external inputs. In turn this is expected to improve productivity and sustainable agricultural cultivation.

FIELD is well connected with national and international networks that work on farmer's rights. At the national level, the institute has a strong alliance with NGOs assisting farmers and engaged in rural community development. FIELD also collaborates with organizations to advocate for policies that protect farmer rights, such as demanding for a constitutional court review of the Law on Cultivation System to allow small-scale farmers to breed their own varieties/strains. At the international level, FIELD involved in the global network to support organic agriculture and farmer empowerment.

## 3.3 Basic information

Table 8

*Basic information FIELD*

| | | Details |
|---|---|---|
| Name of SPO | : | FIELD |
| Consortium | : | People Unlimited |
| CFA | : | Hivos |
| Start date of cooperation | : | 28 February 2011 |
| MDG/Theme | : | MDG7ab |
| MFS II Project Name | : | Local economic development and promotion of local seed system to Indonesia national policy(Project ID: RO SEA 1001853) |
| Contract period | : | February 28, 2011 – February 27, 2013 |
| Total budget | : | € 112,000 |
| Other donors if applicable | : | USAID, Oxfam Novib, PEDIGREA, private sector donors (Unilever), and TIFA Foundation |
| Estimation of % of budget for Civil Society[41] | : | 8% |

Sources: Project documents

[41] Costs that relate to civil society development or policy influence are those costs that possibly contribute to the development of the CIVICUS dimensions, excluding coordination and office costs; staff costs and financial reserves.

# 4 Data collection and analytical approach

## 4.1 Adjustments made in the methodology of the evaluation

The evaluation began with an input-output-outcome analysis drawing on available reports and other documentary evidence. The analysis was able to identify two main possible focus areas for further evaluation: namely strengthening of intermediary organisations as well as lobby and advocacy. However, considering that reports by the SPO were rather weak, the evaluation team was only partly able to benefit from the analysis.

The evaluation team followed the operational guidelines of the evaluation methodology to a great extent, and was able to hold a workshop with all of FIELD's sub-groups. In practice, the workshop lasted six hours, with full participation of all sub-groups. However, due to unfamiliarity with CS dimensions and the large number of workshop participants, the workshop was not fully efficient.

Another obstacle was the lack of participant preparation for the workshop, despite the evaluation team's efforts to share the baseline report and CS dimensions change prior to the workshop. All of the participants found it difficult to respond to the CS dimensions of change questions, mostly because they did not understand the questions. This required the evaluation team to explain the questions one-by-one and encourage responses from the participants.

Within the time and resource limits of the evaluation, the evaluation team decided to focus on assessing civil society dimensions and results amongst two of the six cooperatives supported by FIELD. One large cooperative (Jati Asih with assets valued at IDR 300 million or 4,200 Euro) and one small cooperative (Karya Peduli Tani with assets valued at IDR 60 million or 21,400 Euro) were selected.

## 4.2 Difficulties encountered during data collection

During data collection, the team experienced the following difficulties:

- Workshop participants did not really understand, or were unfamiliar with the CS indicators or the CIVICUS framework. They found it difficult to relate FIELD's situation with these indicators, although most of them participated in the baseline process. This lessened the effectiveness of the workshop.
- FIELD does not have a strong monitoring and evaluation system in place, nor does it have dedicated personnel for monitoring. As such, it added to difficulties in finding hard data and effected the agreement on the outcomes. FIELD has not monitored or reported to Hivos on important indicators of progress such as the number of farmers benefiting from FIELD's Farmer Field Schools (FFS), quantitative data on the total area that has applied organic farming practices, the number of farmers cultivating their own seeds, the number of farmers accessing loans from the cooperatives, cooperative membership, and qualitative data on participation and effectiveness of interventions.
- The objectives that FIELD had set were rather unrealistic given project's timeframe. The project objectives were identical with the SPO's core programme. Support from Hivos only constituted 8-10 percent of FIELD's entire programme (2012).

## 4.3 Identification of two outcomes for in-depth process tracing

FIELD was not selected for in-depth process tracing, which means that the evaluation team only conducted a quick assessment of outcomes.

The first outcome, strengthened capacity of farmers' cooperatives, was selected based on the following considerations:

- This outcome is in line with MFS-II end line evaluation orientation for Indonesia to focus on strengthening the relations with other (intermediary) organisations in civil society to undertake joint activities. Considering the difficulties in collecting information, it still seemed sensible to find evidence to confirm this outcome's achievement.
- It is relevant with FIELD's Theory of Change as the cooperative can be seen as part of 'production infrastructure' which aims to organise small farmers and marginalized groups so that they have access to, and control of resources. As the cooperative can be considered a means to protect farmers against loan sharks and middlemen, it is sensible to assume that the outcome is crucial to the ToC's ultimate goal of independent and sovereign farmers.
- The outcome can also be used as a measure of FIELD's effectiveness in civic engagement, especially how the SPO attracts farmers into the cooperative model and how members can scale-up or sustain organic farming practices promoted by FIELD.

The second outcome, "more guarantees for farmers' rights to breed and plant seed varieties (i.e. farmers are better positioned to have the freedom to plant different crop strains by having legalisation in place that protects their rights)." was selected to represent FIELD's effectiveness in policy influencing. It has been selected based on the following considerations:

- This outcome is quite a substantial achievement as it provides a strong basis for the continued efforts of FIELD to defend farmers' rights and benefits farmers outside the direct intervention area.
- The outcome selected also represents one of the ToC's preconditions of creating an enabling policy environment for farmers.

# 5 Results

## 5.1 Results obtained in relation to intervention logic

Table 9

*Overview of results achieved in relation to project plan FIELD*

| Result Level | Description | Level of achievement |
|---|---|---|
| Specific Objectives 1 & 2 | Strengthening community economic institutions; development of rural economy through cooperatives and community business development | Partially achieved: 6 cooperatives (out of a total 8 planned) established but not yet effectively supporting community business/economy. Membership of 161 (no sex-disaggregated figures), falling well short of target of 1,500 for the first year alone.<br><br>Benefits for cooperative members include: compulsory savings schemes, collective sale of agricultural produce for higher prices, utilizing cooperative savings to improve irrigation canals.<br><br>Focus on rice production (local varieties/seeds). Eight of the nine farmer groups supported have produced rice. No data for change in employment and business opportunities. |
| Specific Objectives 3 & 4 | Legalisation of farmers' seeds: legal guarantees for plant breeding and recognition of farmers' products | Almost achieved: 8 farmer groups actively involved in seed breeding. They have experimented with a range of local seeds (more than a dozen local names appear in the report, but not sure about the exact numbers). 2 seeds selected. Certification process still appears to be underway.<br><br>FIELD together with 9 other NGOs called for a constitutional court review of Law No. 12/1992. Farmers in Indramayu involved in national advocacy network. On 18 July 2013, the constitutional court supported the proposed reviews declaring that Articles 9, 12 and 60 void for small-scale farmers. More government support still required for the development of informal farmer seed systems.<br><br>The technical process of seed registration has been completed and is still awaiting government legalization. Two strains have been identified: Gadis Indramayu (Code IPPHTI 1) and Pemuda Idaman (Code IPPHTI 2). |

From the reports submitted by FIELD to Hivos, it is apparent that for some of the objectives and indicators set, FIELD has faced difficulties in monitoring the results. For example, there was insufficient monitoring and documentation of improvements in the rural economy and the establishment of new business opportunities. The extent to which the objectives were achieved is rather difficult to assess given that they are largely unrealistic and rather vague. While FIELD may have underachieved against its original plan, the results of the interventions are quite substantial, especially in the area of legal guarantees for farmer plant breeding. FIELD also helped farmers to prepare their strategy to sustain the investment made during the program (exit strategy). One of the intended outputs in this regard was the existence of a strategic action plan on the implementation of ecological agriculture and plant breeding in Lampung. FIELD organised a workshop with farmers in Lampung to prepare an exit strategy[42].

[42] Lampung Exit Strategy Report, 2012

## 5.2 Changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period

### 5.2.1 Civic engagement

Civic engagement describes the formal and informal activities and participation undertaken by individuals to advance shared interests at different levels. Participation within civil society is multi-faceted and encompasses socially-based and politically-based forms of engagement.

FIELD has a long history of providing small farmers (defined as those owning no land or owning land up to 2 hectares) with assistance to better understand and adopt sustainable agricultural practices within the existing environment and political economy. FIELD works with both farmer groups and cooperatives, which are often set up under farmer groups. The number of groups supported in Indramayu remains the same as during the baseline in 2012 (i.e. eight farmer groups and six cooperatives).

FIELD's targeted beneficiaries remain unchanged. For the seed system program, they work mainly with small farmers that own small plots of land, while for the credit program, the targeted beneficiaries are landless farmers, forming the majority of FIELD's target groups. There is a gender balance in the cooperative membership. However, as during the baseline, there are no specific female-targeted interventions. FIELD's project management continued to take the needs of the rural community in account in planning and implementation. Farmer groups were facilitated by FIELD to organise themselves into cooperatives. Six cooperatives were established since the start of the project in 2011 and the evaluation team has evidence that membership of two cooperatives more than doubled (from 77 to 166 members) since the baseline with a slight increase in female membership, reaching 45 % in 2014.

During the baseline, FIELD's focus was on building common critical awareness and setting up farmer organisations. FIELD facilitated many groups to learn from each other using the Farmer Field School (FFS) method. FFS is an 'open-air' and 'on-site' process that allows for fluid interaction between farmers and field staff. FFS is used to develop farmers' cultivation capacity as well as a space for communal learning. The cooperatives are considered to be a means to keep farmers away from middlemen and loan sharks so that they can put to practice what they have learnt in the FFS without external pressure. In addition, learning and exchange have moved beyond just the FFS. FIELD facilitated linkages between the cooperatives they support and the local government, which resulted in cooperative members being assigned to train government-supported cooperatives in West Java. Although FIELD has continued with FFS, in the last two years, more attention has been paid to networking and advocacy.

The 2012 baseline found that FIELD mostly worked through non-political and non-state actors and facilitated farmers in the process of seed certification by accompanying them through bureaucratic steps. In the last two years, FIELD utilized its network of non-governmental organizations and governmental access to influence policies, even at the highest level of policy advocacy, i.e. judicial review of regulations by the constitutional court (MK). FIELD facilitated meetings between farmers and the local government, as well as other CS actors to revaluate the impacts of regulations on farmers. Farmers also testified in court and provided inputs to the proposed revisions put forth by FIELD and its coalition.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3:** **2**
**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2):** **+1**

### 5.2.2 Level of organization

This dimension assesses the organisational development, complexity and sophistication of civil society, by looking at the relationships among the actors within the civil society arena.

FIELD's level of organisation has improved since the baseline. Relations with other CSOs were strengthened as the SPO worked together in a number of coalitions to propose judicial reviews of several Laws. From 2012 to 2013, revisions to the Crop Cultivation Law (No.12/1992) were put forth to the Constitutional Court. These lobby efforts demanded a higher frequency of coordination

meetings. The organisations with whom FIELD collaborated with in lobby and advocacy efforts are as follows: the Indonesian Human Rights Committee for Social Justice (IHCS), Indonesian Farmer Alliance (API), Bina Desa Sadawijaya Foundation, People's Coalition for Food Sovereignty (KRKP), Indonesian Farmers Integrated Pest Control Organization (IPPHTI), Palm Oil Farmers Union (SPKS), Sawit Watch, Indonesian Farmer Union (SPI), and the Alliance of Agricultural Reform Movement (AGRA), Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria (KPA), Solidaritas Perempuan (SP), WALHI, Indonesia for Global Justice (IGJ), and Koalisi Rakyat untuk Keadilan Perikanan (KIARA).

In defending the interests of the farmers, FIELD worked at two levels: at the grassroots level FIELD's support to farmers groups and cooperatives strengthened organisational, financial and cultivation (especially in the area of seed breeding) capacities of farmers. Farmers have more independence to make their own cultivation choices and financial capacity through the cooperatives to deal with loan sharks. Networking amongst farmers also led to a mobilisation of information and knowledge to identify problems and solutions in cultivation and plant breeding. At the macro level, FIELD has been active in CSO coalitions to provide more protection for farmers under regulatory frameworks by proposing the amendment of Laws such as No. 12/1992, which obtained a favourable constitutional court ruling in 2013 (Decree of MK No. 99/PUU-X/2012).

At international level, FIELD took part in international and regional networks to lobby against World Trade Organization (WTO) policies. FIELD took advantage of the WTO meeting held in Bali in December 2013, to collaborate with other global CS actors to voice their protest against trade agreements.

On the composition of financial resources, there is no evidence that FIELD has been able to diversify funding sources. Currently its main donors are USAID and FAO, and the SPO also receives Unilever CSR funding. Neither Oxfam Novib nor Hivos have continued funding the SPO.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**
**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): +1**

### 5.2.3 Practice of Values

Practice of Values refers to the internal practice of values within the civil society arena. Important values that CIVICUS looks at such as transparency, democratic decision-making, taking into account diversity that are deemed crucial to gauge not only progressiveness but also the extent to which civil society's practices are coherent with their ideals.

Like in the situation in 2012, FIELD's internal control system follows the government regulations on foundations. Each program is supervised and controlled by the board of Trustees and the supervisory Board, which have the right and authority to request evaluations and to hold the executive accountable. At least once a year, the Supervisory Board and the Board of Trustees meet and request a progress report. Cooperative members are informed of the financial conditions and have the right to inquire with the cooperative on these issues or to express their ideas in the general assembly.

However, comparing the two cooperatives visited, the evaluation found that the leadership model or style influences the level of participation of cooperative members.

There is no change in the composition of social organs. Instead of including farmers or target groups in their social organs, FIELD's strategy is to help organise farmers by establishing and supporting organisations that they can run on their own, such as IPPHTI.

With regards to audit arrangements, these are conducted annually but are still project-based as during the baseline.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**
**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 0**

### 5.2.4 Perception of Impact

Perception of Impact assesses the perceived impact of civil society actors on politics and society as a whole as the consequences of collective action. In this, the perceptions of both civil society actors

(internal) as well as actors outside civil society are taken into account. Specific sub-dimensions for this evaluation are the extent to which the SPO has contributed to engaging more people in social or political activities, strengthening CSOs and their networks, and has influenced public and private sector policies.

The level of satisfaction among the cooperative members remains high over the last two years. The two visited cooperatives both expressed that they were very satisfied with FIELD's program since they were able to gain knowledge, obtain benefits from the established cooperatives, increase their incomes after implementing organic farming taught by FIELD, broaden their network is, and become less dependent on middlemen. Cooperative members also said that through FIELD's support there is a greater interest in farming and that farmers have regained pride in what they do[43]. But they did express that they still had difficulties to link to markets to sell their produce and seeds; and in this area they are still dependent on middlemen[44].

With regards to relations with the public sector, the end line evaluation found that FIELD has been able to continue its strategic relation with the government. At the national level, FIELD has been able to influence policy change with the revision of the Law on Cultivation System. At the village level, the village government has been very supportive of the cooperatives. In addition, the local government has also helped fund multi-location trials for seed breeding.

FIELD's policy interventions at the national level are helping farmers gain a better position vis-à-vis the commercial interests and a dependency on the private sector for agricultural inputs. According to the head of a FFS in Indramayu, the policy revisions have helped farmers gain more authority and power over their production resources, which is considered as 'farming democratization'. With the amended Law No.12/1992, farmers' dependency on seed companies like Monsanto has been decreasing, as they no longer have to buy and use mass produced, hybrid seedlings and fertilizers[45].

Box 1: Seed Law Victory in Indonesia

*We don't want to live as second class citizens anymore. We have always been discriminated against, but we are legal citizens of this country. We had to breed our local seeds in hiding, since if government knew about this we wouldn't get any support from government. This victory at the constitutional court gives us back our Dignity. Recognition and openness to continue our creativity is the dignity for farmers and breeders.*

- Joharipin, a breeder from Indramayu, Kertasemaya, Indonesia)

The Plant Cultivation System Law, adopted in 1992, was meant to improve and expand diversification of crops to meet the needs for food, clothing, housing and health, as well as to support domestic industries and export; it was also intended to improve income and living standards for farmers and encourage the expansion and distribution of employment and business opportunities.

But the agricultural system it has enabled relies on industrially-produced seeds and other expensive inputs. Farmers are denied control over their basic means of production - seeds and soil - and their own techniques and technologies are disappearing.

A coalition of groups brought the case to the constitutional court in September 2012, arguing that the Plant Cultivation Law unfairly treated small farmers and breeders as though they were large commercial enterprises.

The court agreed, ruling that articles 9, 12 and 60 are unconstitutional. This means that peasant farmers will no longer need permission from the government to collect local seeds, produce their own seeds, or to distribute it.

"This victory at the constitutional court is a victory for all struggles of farmers and local breeders, not only on Indonesia but for all peasants and local breeders that feed the world," said Amalia Pulungan, a

[43] Interview withRokhi, vice chairman of Jati Asih cooperative
[44] Interview with Mr. Jito, the chairman of the cooperative Karya Peduli Tani
[45] The amendment of the Law on Cultivation System covered a number of articles. These revisions also have implications on how private sector agencies manage their seed businesses.

policy advisor for the Indonesia Peasant Alliance (API, Aliansi Petani Indonesia).

*Source: 'Our seed, our sovereignty - seed law victory in Indonesia' by GRAIN Staff, originally published by GRAIN, September 4, 2013. Available: http://www.resilience.org/stories/2013-09-04/our-seed-our-sovereignty-seed-law-victory-in-indonesia*

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**
**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 1**

### 5.2.5 Civil Society Environment

The social, political and economic environment in which civil society operates affects its room for manoeuvre. The civil society context has been described in Chapter 3. In this section we describe how FIELD is coping with that context.

Since the baseline, FIELD has demonstrated its capacity to respond to the existing operational context through Hivos and non-Hivos supported interventions. At the grassroots level, FIELD continued to support the organisation of farmers in groups, cooperatives and forums to help them to deal with daily challenges faced to secure a sustainable, agricultural-based livelihood. The focus has been on making smallholder farmers more resilient and independent. FIELD has also been well aware of the impacts of policy frameworks on small holders. For this reason, they have been actively engaged in coalitions at the national level to lobby for revisions of regulations that have a direct impact on farmers.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**
**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 0**

## 5.3 To what degree are the changes attributable to the Southern partners?

FIELD was not selected for in-depth process-tracing. There are two outcomes achieved in the 2011-2014 period that were selected for quick process-tracing:

1. Strengthened capacity of farmers' cooperatives
2. More guarantees for farmers' rights to breed and plant seed varieties (i.e. farmers are better positioned to have the freedom to plant different crop strains by having legalisation in place that protects their rights).

The following sections will describe the pathways to these outcomes and the information that confirm or reject in each pathway.

### 5.3.1 Strengthened capacity of farmers' cooperatives

For FIELD, farmers' cooperatives/credit unions are a key element for the development of rural economy. Through these institutions, farmers can access credit from compulsory savings schemes to develop new business opportunities. There are 6 FIELD sponsored cooperatives (out of 8 planned) established during the program period. In 2011, the total value of assets of the cooperatives reached IDR 87 million (roughly 13 million/cooperative) with an average of 27 members in each cooperative. In 2011, Hivos and FIELD reported that the number of cooperative members was lower than expected, with only around 30 percent of targeted membership being fulfilled due to inadequate managerial capacity. Hivos assigned a consultant to assist the cooperative to develop their management skills. Although there were no reported membership increases reported up until 2013, the evaluation team found that two cooperatives (Jati Asih and Karya Peduli) now have more members than when they started out in 2011. This is seen as an indicator of improved cooperative capacity. The tables below summarize cooperative growth:

Table 10

*Cooperative growth 2011-2014 I terms of membership and asset value*

| Cooperative | 2011 | | | 2014 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Male | Female | Asset value | Male | Female | Asset value |
| Jati Asih | 25 | 10 | 1,5 million IDR | 21 | 21 | 1,1 million IDR |
| Karya Peduli Tani | 60 | 41 | 300 million IDR | 32 | 33 | 60 million IDR |

Sumber Asih Cooperative has been able to recruit 101 members in 2014 whereas in 2011, its membership was just 35. Karya Peduli Tani Cooperative now has 65 members, compared to 42 in 2011. Although assets and membership growth are two key elements of institutional capacity, the focus of the establishment of the cooperative is on the capacity of farmers to organize their economic activities. Therefore, the analysis focuses on the level of farmer organization.

Based on the data from program reports and interviews conducted during the end line evaluation, there are two possible pathways described below that explain the outcome.

*Information that confirms or rejects the pathways:*

1. Pathway 1: FIELD strengthened the capacity of farmer cooperatives through trainings and technical assistance

Information that *confirms* pathway 1:

At the start of FIELD's interventions funded by Hivos, an assessment was carried out in Indramayu, which resulted in the identification of eight villages and potential farmer group members. Prior to the 2011-2013 Hivos-funded project, FIELD had already been organising farmers into 10 groups and providing them with training on plant breeding through FFS in collaboration with PEDIGREA[46].

During the implementation of the Hivos-funded project, basic training was provided on the areas of good governance principles for representatives from 7 villages in Indramayu, as well as representatives from Purwakarta and Subang. 2 to 5 people from each village were trained, amongst them the future cooperative board members (Source: Project Reports). In 2012, six cooperatives were established. Further training was conducted in 2012 for credit cooperatives that had been set up and were running (Wanguk Sliyeg; Jengkok, Tenajar, kedokan, Kalensari, Bunder). These trainings focused on skills and capacities needed to run a credit cooperative, such as risk management, financial planning, organisation and cash flow. Members of cooperatives expressed their satisfaction of the unique cooperative model offered. Short, simple procedures, security, and soft loans with low interests make the cooperative a preferred source of credit compared to other existing institutions such as banks.

The cooperatives also functioned to manage seeds of new varieties that resulted from breeding activities, which included the distribution of seeds and supervision of planting[47].

Information that *rejects* pathway 1:

Although the 2013 progress report mentioned that FIELD-sponsored cooperatives have been improving their capacity to provide financial services to their members and improve their assets and profits, this claim is not backed by evidence such as cooperative financial statements or formal organizational capacity assessments.

2. Pathway 2: After the establishment of the cooperatives, their institutional capacity has been growing without direct support from FIELD but due to support from FFS.

The evidence that the establishment of the cooperatives was initiated by FIELD is acknowledged by all the informants. However, the improved institutional capacity of the cooperative members after their establishment can also be explained by support from the FFS and farmers groups. In parallel to the

[46] Winarto, Y. T. and Ardhianto, I. 2007. *Becoming Plant Breeders, Rediscovering Local Varieties: The Creativity of Farmers in Indramayu, Indonesia*. Available from http://www.sristi.org/cms/files/creativity_of_farmers.pdf (accessed 26 October 2014)

[47] Mohammad Suhendrik, "Desa Gadingan inspirasi pertanian daerah", 21 June 2012. Available from http://indramayugadingan.blogspot.com/ (accessed 24 December 2014)

cooperative establishment, trainings and plant breeding activities continued through the FFS. Farmers were encouraged to join the cooperative to be able to receive loans for both productive activities.

Information that *confirms* pathway 2:
During the end line evaluation, the evaluation team found that FIELD no longer has close relations with all the cooperatives. It was difficult for FIELD to provide information on the current status of all six cooperatives. This suggests that FIELD's support to the cooperatives did not go beyond providing assistance in the formal establishment and developing procedures and mechanisms to run the cooperatives.

In general, the evaluation team observed that during the Focus Group Discussions held with farmers from the two cooperative visited, participants were enthusiastic about sharing how they have benefitted from the cooperative. They mentioned that they gained knowledge on how to produce seeds themselves. The advantage of this was that they could save money and no longer had to purchase seeds. According to the respondents, the cooperative also taught them how to produce their own organic fertilizer and pesticides. By not having to spend money on purchasing agricultural inputs, cooperative members were able to pay off their debt to middlemen. In fact, Karya Peduli Tani, before forming a cooperative, was already able to produce sufficient seeds themselves since 2008 and no longer needed to purchase seeds[48]. This indicates that much of the valued skills and knowledge gained have actually been derived from the FFS and further disseminated through the cooperative mechanism, rather than through direct interventions by FIELD targeting the cooperative.

Respondents also mentioned that a farmer group had taken a loan from the cooperative to rent land on which they practiced organic farming. They said that since organic farming has been financially more beneficial, they were motivated to increase their production capacity. This is in line with the cooperative policy to prioritize loans for productive activities rather than for consumptive expenses.

Information that *rejects* pathway 2:
Information that confirms pathway 1 serves as rejecting evidence for the second pathway, i.e. that institutional capacity was improved through interventions other than direct training to cooperatives by FIELD.

*Conclusion*
It is clear that the establishment of the cooperatives are to be attributed to FIELD's interventions. FIELD's support partially explains the increased institutional capacity of farmer cooperatives and their members. There is insufficient evidence to prove that the establishment of the cooperatives have led to improved business opportunities or production capacities. Rather, the available evidence indicates that the trainings provided through the FFS and later through the cooperative have in fact been critical to strengthening productive capacities. Thus, the evaluation team concludes that the capacities of the farmers' cooperatives have been strengthened both by FIELD's trainings that were aimed at establishing institutional capacities, as well as continued assistance by the cooperative members themselves and the FFS to increase productive capacities.

### 5.3.2 More guarantees for farmers' rights to breed and plant seed varieties

At the community level, FIELD supported participatory plant breeding and community seed registry of rice varieties. This involved the selection, breeding, planting (multi-location tests), verification, and testing of potential seed strains by farmers in four districts. All activities were closely monitored by the Indonesian Institute for Rice Research (BALITPA). Smallholders were supported with IDR 173 million from Hivos to carry out these activities, which included gaining acknowledgement of varieties by BALITPA. Three farmers' groups successfully bred a new variety of rice.

However, the formal recognition for farmers' seeds was still inhibited by national regulations, specifically by Law No. 12/1992 on Plant Cultivation System. This Law had in the past resulted in intimidation, losses and criminalization of farmers. Farmers from Indramayu were actively involved in

[48] Haryo Damardono and Hermas E. Prabowo, "Perlawanan Petani Pemulia Indramayu", *KOMPAS.com*, 17 September 2008. Available from http://entertainment.kompas.com/read/2008/09/17/01522177/perlawanan.petani.pemulia.indramayu (accessed 24 December 2014)

a national advocacy network that called for the revision of articles in the Law to guarantee the rights of farmers to produce their own seeds. Lobby efforts began in 2010. The law was considered to constrain farmers' right to cultivate their own seeds, reducing varieties, and increasing farmers' dependency on mass-produced, commercialized seeds.

On 18 July 2013, the Constitutional Court signed a revision to the 1992. Small-scale farmers are now allowed to breed their own varieties and as such are less dependent of commercial seed companies to buy expensive and sometimes fake seeds.

There are two pathways that explain this outcome and FIELD's contribution.

*Information that confirms or rejects the pathways:*

1. Pathway 1: FIELD played an important role in advocating for the revision of Law No. 12/2012. FIELD developed policy inputs based on its long-term experience in supporting farmers to conserve and breed local seed varieties.

Information that *confirms* pathway 1

In 2010, FIELD organised a workshop on the protection of farmers' rights in the conservation of plant varieties with Hivos' support. During the workshop several inhibiting regulations were discussed, including Law No. 12/1992 and specific articles on seed varieties and breeders rights (Articles 8 & 9)[49].

The Constitution Court decision revising the 1992 Law, No.99/PUU-X/201250 clearly mentions FIELD as one of the parties that requested the judicial review of the Law. The other parties mentioned are: the Indonesia Human Rights Committee for Social Justice (IHCS), Aliansi Petani Indonesia (API), Yayasan Bina Desa Sadjiwa (Bina Desa), Koalisi Rakyat untuk Kedaulatan Pangan (KRKP), Ikatan Petani Pengendalian Hama Terpadu Indonesia (IPPHTI), Serikat Petani Kelapa Sawit (SPKS), Sawit Watch, Serikat Petani Indonesia (SPI), Aliansi Gerakan Reformasi Agraria (AGRA), and two farmers. The aforementioned NGOs and FIELD are part of a coalition called *Koalisi Kedaulatan Petani Pemulia Tanaman Indonesia.* Articles 5, 6, 9, 12 & 60 were revised.

One of the two farmers that are named comes from Indramayu District, where FIELD has been actively supporting farmers since the mid-2000s. The former director of LPPSLH (part of KRKP coalition) reported that FIELD had been organizing the overall joint advocacy process. Two publications produced by FIELD in 2009[51] were submitted as evidence to the Constitutional Court.

FIELD together with IHCS organised several consultations with the farmers to inform them of the judicial review process, as well as to obtain testimonies and identify potential farmers willing to testify in court[52]. In the court proceedings, Joharipin from Tani Karya Peduli (FIELD's target group), is cited as a witness testifying on behalf of the plaintiffs requesting a judicial review.

Information that *rejects* this pathway
There is no rejecting evidence that FIELD was not part of the coalition that lobbied for the judicial review of Law No. 12/1992.

2. Pathway 2: FIELD did not contribute to the outcome: the CSO coalition for Food Sovereignty (*Koalisi Kedaulatan Petani Pemulia Tanaman Indonesia)* was behind the judicial review initiative, without any FIELD involvement.

Information that *confirms* this pathway:

[49] Lutfiyah Hanim, "Undang-Undang Tidak Memberikan Keadilan Bagi Petani", *Berita Bumi*, 1 July 2010. Available from http://beritabumi.or.id/undang-undang-tidak-memberikan-keadilan-bagi-petani/ (24 December 2014)

[50] Serikat Petani Indonesia, "Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi tentang uji materi Undang-Undang Perlindungan dan Pemberdayaan Petani (Perlintan) no. 19 Tahun 2013". Available from http://www.spi.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/putusan_sidang_99-PUU-2012-tanaman-telah-ucap-18-Juli-2013.pdf (24 December 2014)

[51] Sriyanti, W., Isfandri, L., Sutarya, E., Kuswara, E., Wienarto, N. 2009. *Katalog Benih Petani: Pendokumentasian benih hasil persilangan dan benih lokal oleh petani pemulia di Kabupaten Indramayu, Jawa Barat*. Jakarta: FIELD Indonesia; Wienarto, N., Munthaha, D., Kuswara, E., Adi, T. P., Sutarya, E., Isfandri, L., Wijaya, R. K. 2009. *Hak Petani Dalam Pengelolaan Benih Dan Pemuliaan Tanaman Pangan Dalam Pertanian*. Jakarta: FIELD Indonesia

[52] Didiet C'cars, "Petani Indramayu Siapkan Strategi ke MK", 15 October 2012. Available from https://haideakiri.wordpress.com/2012/10/15/petani-indramayu-siapkan-strategi-ke-mk/#more-467 (accessed 24 December 2014)

In 2010, farmers from the Solidarity for Farmers' Sovereignty (Solidaritas Kedaulatan Petani or SKP) rallied in Kediri, East Java to demand for the revision of Law No. 12/1992. The farmers felt victimized by the law, which they saw as serving the interests of foreign investors and seed companies. The rally followed a jail sentence for a local farmer accused of producing corn seeds illegally. Aliansi Petani Indonesia (API), helped to coordinate the actions[53].

However, of note is that API is a member of the collation it shares with FIELD. It is likely that similar local actions took place and were supported by members of the coalition, but advocacy efforts were jointly undertaken.

Information that *rejects* this pathway

All information confirming pathway 1 rejects pathway 2. In addition, there is no evidence of any other CSOs in Indonesia lobbying for a revision of Law No. 12/1992 without engaging FIELD.

*Conclusion*
FIELD as a member of a coalition that lobbied the government played an important role in achieving the outcome. The coalition is a *necessary and sufficient* explanation to the outcome in which FIELD plaid a key role. Without FIELD support, the evidence presented to the Constitutional Court would have been weaker and it is unlikely that the farmers who testified or played a role in collecting evidence would have been able to participate. Apart from helping to organise other CSOs in joint advocacy efforts, FIELD provided evidence for the judicial review based on its extensive experience in seed certification, testing and legalization.

## 5.4 What is the relevance of these changes?

### 5.4.1 Relevance of the changes in relation to the Theory of Change of 2012

In the 2012 Theory of Change (ToC), FIELD identified that the marginalization and poverty of farmers were exponents of structural problems. As such, FIELD focused not only on improving farmer welfare and security, but intended to take up issues that were obstructing the independence and sovereignty of farmers. FIELD's ultimate goal is to ensure farmers' independence and more secure control over their own interests, in particular in terms of the seed system. An essential component of FIELD's mandate has been to support the development of a 'farmers movements' by providing them support to organise themselves and understand the agro-ecosystems so that they can improve their resilience and self-reliance.

The achievements and outcomes described in the previous chapters are illustrative of FIELD's key strategies. FIELD has supported policy revisions that provide for better agricultural opportunities for farmers. The focus of FIELD's lobby agenda has been to improve the position of smallholder farmers in an agricultural system dominated by commercial players and WTO-imposed agreements. At the grassroots level, interventions through the FFS and participatory plant breeding have encouraged solidarity between farmers groups.

However, the evaluation team observes that the establishment of farmers' credit cooperatives have not led to observable market linkages. Although farmers interviewed have said that organic products are more lucrative, cooperative members also noted that they required more assistance in creating market access. There is still a dependency on middle men in this respect. With regards to improving farmers' capacities, the cooperative is more of an extension of the FFS and existing farmer groups. Of note is that the establishment of community business units, which was one of the Hivos deliverable, was not achieved. With regards to the formal registration of farmers' seeds, other than achieving recognizable success at the policy level, it remains unclear how many varieties of rice were registered with the government. At the community level registration systems were to a large extent already in place prior to Hivos' support. Overall however, the changes achieved since the baseline are relevant to the ToC.

[53] Asian Farmers Association for Sustainable Rural Development, "Dalam Berita (Indonesia): Demo Petani Kediri Desak Revisi UU", 29 July 2010. Available from http://asianfarmers.org/?s=kediri (accessed 24 December 2014)

### 5.4.2 Relevance of the changes in relation to the context in which the SPO is operating

FIELD's results have been relevant both to the local context as well as to policy influencing agendas of FIELD and its network. Indramayu has historically been one of the primary rice producing districts in the country[54]. The price of rice is controlled by the government and often does not reflect its economic value. Imported rice is cheaper than rice produced in the country.

The district and FIELD's target groups are still coming to terms with the long-term impacts of the Green Revolution. The negative consequences of the Green Revolution include a dependency on agricultural companies for inputs, a loss of local knowledge on plant breeding, loss of agro-biodiversity with the introduction of commercial seeds, and vulnerability to pests and diseases.

Box 2: Coping with the impacts of the Green Revolution

"Before the Green Revolution we were the selectors of local seeds. During the Green Revolution we have been the buyers and planters of government seeds. Now, we want to be plant breeders, producing our own ideal seeds." (Quote by a member of a farmers group in Indramayu where participatory plant breeding has been introduced by FIELD and PEDIGREA starting the mid-2000s)

Source: 'Becoming Plant Breeders, Rediscovering Local Varieties: The Creativity of Farmers in Indramayu, Indonesia' by Yunita T. Winarto & Imam Ardhianto. 2007

FIELD's interventions to organise farmers have certainly been relevant to the context. Farmers are taking more pride in their work and are sharing techniques and knowledge with one another. The FFS has introduced alternatives to commercialized seeds and lessened the dependency on agricultural inputs that have to be purchased.

With regards to the policy environment, FIELD has chosen to focus on advocating for revisions of existing policies that are unfavourable to the economic conditions of smallholder farmers who dominate the sector. Given that agriculture remains the second largest contributor to the country's GDP and the depletion of agricultural productivity, these lobby efforts remain very relevant to the socio-political context.

### 5.4.3 Relevance of the changes in relation to the policies of the MFS II alliance and the CFA

The interventions of FIELD fall under the Green Entrepreneurship programme of Hivos. This programme area, Hivos' largest globally, focuses on "enterprising men and women as catalysts for green socio-economic progress"[55]. Under this programme focus, Hivos supports small producers to improve their productivity (not at the expense of biodiversity) and strengthening their representative organisations.

The relevance of FIELD for Hivos' previous country policy were high since the SPO promoted organic farming which was considered a priority issue[56]. In Hivos' 2008 Vision Paper on Civil Society Building, Hivos states that, "In the economic domain it is civil society's role to counterbalance short-term profit policies, and to struggle for long term production policies which are socially and environmentally sound."[57] In addition, Hivos aims to support social movements and community and member-based organisations.

One of the motivations for Hivos' support to FIELD under MFS-II was to improve the capacity of farmer-based organisations so that the economic position of smallholders and rural outreach would be improved[58]. FIELD also supported the development of cooperatives, which Hivos considers to be

[54] Wikipedia, "Indramayu". Available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indramayu (accessed 24 December 2014)
[55] "Hivos Business Plan 2011-2015", Hivos, p. 21
[56] "Hivos Organisational Scan of FIELD", Hivos, 2006
[57] "Hivos Vision Paper on Civil Society Building", Hivos, 2008, p. 9
[58] Hivos' response to CFA Questionnaire sent by CDI

democratically-run and controlled by its members allowing economic benefits to be distributed proportionally, whilst offering a means to sustain without a continued reliance on external donor support.[59] Hivos considered FIELD's FFS to be a means though which farmers are taught good agricultural practices and soil management, both which contribute to MDG7[60].

## 5.5 Explaining factors

### 5.5.1 Internal factors

FIELD-sponsored farmers' training and learning through the FFS is one of key factors that contributed to the achievement of both outcomes. Through the FFS networks that have been built over the years, FIELD was able to mobilise farmers for both technical assistance and advocacy work. FIELD has facilitated many groups to learn from each other using the FFS method. FFS is one of the methods used to develop farmers' cultivation capacity as well as indirectly bringing farmers together for advocacy purposes.

The adoption of the FFS approach is attributable to the PEDIGREA Programme, in which it was central and placed an emphasis on community development and empowerment. Established in 2002, PEDIGREA systematically applied farmer-led approaches that allowed farmers to decide their own objectives.[61] This predecessor programme, like the Hivos-funded project was implemented in Indramayu.

### 5.5.2 External factors

Two external factors contributed to the achievement of the outcomes are an existing enabling environment for cooperative development and support from other CSOs through the coalition for food sovereignty (KRKP) and the Koalisi Kedaulatan Petani Pemulia Tanaman Indonesia. These coalitions consist of longstanding NGOs that have worked on food and farmers' issues for more than a decade. These organisations include ADS, API, Bina Desa, BITRA Indonesia, Elsppat, FIELD, Gita Pertiwi, KEHATI, Lesman, LPPSLH, Mitra Tani and SPPQT[62].

The government has an incentive scheme for farmers to establish cooperatives such as micro-credit cooperatives[63]. In every district, there is a dedicated office or department for cooperatives with a main task of strengthening cooperatives as one of the pillars of the national economic system.

### 5.5.3 Relations CFA-SPO

In addition to direct support provided to FIELD, indirect support was provided by Hivos to a FIELD-affiliated organisation. Hivos provided € 67,678 to a KRKP project called 'Increased Food Security through Pro-poor Food Policy and Community-based Enterprise Development' managed over the 2011-2014 period[64]. As mentioned previously, KRKP and FIELD collaborated on policy advocacy efforts in 2012-2013.

FIELD also received support from Hivos and Oxfam Novib through the Biodiversity Fund. The Fund, established in 2000, supported organisations to revive and expand sustainable production and sought to protect the interests of farmers, amongst others[65]. FIELD was able to develop a number of

[59] Information based on a questionnaire filled out Hivos Green Entrepreneurship Programme Officer
[60] Ibid
[61] Almekinders, Conny and Hardon, Jaap (eds). 2006. *Bringing Farmers Back Into Breeding: Experiences with Participatory Plant Breeding and Challenges for Institutionalisation*. Agromisa Special 5. Wageningen: Agromisa Foundation, p. 23
[62] Available from http://kedaulatanpangan.net/jaringan/ (accessed 24 December 2014)
[63] "Strategic Planning Ministry of Cooperative and Small-Medium Enterprise 2009-2014", FIELD Indonesia, p. 23
[64] Hivos, Where we work, "Increase Food Security through Pro-poor Food Policy and Community-based Enterprise Development, 2011-2014: Indonesia". Available from https://www.hivos.org/activity/increase-food-security-through-pro-poor-food-policy-and-community-based-enterprise (accessed 24 December 2014)
[65] Hivos and Oxfam Novib. 2009. *Biodiversity, Livelihoods, and Poverty: Lessons learned from 8 years of development aid through the Biodiversity Fund*. Available from

publications with this support, including a case study on women's roles and contribution to livestock production management in Indramayu[66] and a document on farmer breeders in 2009.

Hivos has also facilitated a linkage between FIELD and other organisations through Agri-ProFocus Indonesia, an open network that promotes farmer entrepreneurship and business linkages. Because Agri-Profocus was established in 2013, just when support to FIELD was ending, it is difficult to say how FIELD benefitted from this wider network.

FIELD also met some difficulties in improving the organisational capacity of the cooperatives they established. This is evident from the targeted membership not having been reached (only around 30% achieved according to submitted reports). Hivos assigned a consultant to assist FIELD in this area. But up until 2013, according to the reports submitted to Hivos, the number of members had not increased. The figures collected by the evaluation team do however suggest an increase in membership over time. Jati Asih membership almost tripled (188.6 percent increase) from 2011 to 2014, while Karya Peduli Tani's membership increased by 54.8 percent over the same period. It likely that because there was no other external support to the cooperatives, this change can be attributed to the FIELD's investment.

http://www.hivos.net/var/hivos/storage/original/application/12fe54c40485f3e2e98efa0a830d4c33.pdf (accessed 24 December 2014)

[66] Sriyanti, Wiwik and Bertuso, Arma R. 2009. *Gender and Livestock in Indramayu, Indonesia: A case study on women's role and contribution to livestock production and management*. Jakarta: FIELD Indonesia. Available from https://www.scribd.com/doc/185962137/Gender (accessed 24 December 2014)

# 6 Discussion

## 6.1 Design of the intervention

The design of FIELD's interventions had three main components. The first focused on the learning and empowerment processes of creating and sharing knowledge through the FFS. The second component of FIELD's design focused on legalizing farmers' seeds both formally and informally. Finally, FIELD intended to contribute to economic development by setting up cooperatives and businesses, which would be linked to plant breeding. The cooperative model was considered as an institutional tool to garner participation in the rural economy.

The first component, the FFS approach, which originated in Indonesia, has been widely recognized an inclusive approach that is central to interventions relating to participatory plant breeding (PPB). FFS promotes self-reliance and decision-making[67]. As the approach is based on experimental learning and adult education principles[68], farmers are able to easily understand the application of new cultivation techniques. However, studies have also shown that FFS is less suitable for profit-driven approaches to rural development that includes credit cooperatives[69]. While these sort of interventions can be considered to be complementary, a boost in production through FFS does not always lead to market access since there are numerous external factors that may inhibit farmers' participation in and access to markets. "The road to collective marketing of produce is long and FFS interventions need to build on strong organizational and management skills along with technical skills".[70] Within the intervention design of FIELD the linkages between cooperative development, market access and learning through the FFS is rather vague. The evaluation team found that the cooperatives acted more as an extension of the FFS rather than a means to develop businesses and markets for produce and seeds. The intervention logic did not specify whether FIELD intended to use PPB as a vehicle to compete with the commercial seed sector or whether the project intended for organic, farmer varieties of produce to be marketed. Whatever the case, there did not seem to be sufficient resources or inputs going into addressing product quality, transportation, or creating ways to inform farmers of markets.

Studies have shown that reducing poverty through the cooperative model hinges on inclusion and effectiveness, and that long-term impacts of membership on poverty reduction are rarely monitored or analysed[71]. The evaluation team found that cooperative membership was inclusive to both men and women (more than 40 percent of cooperative members were female). However, in one of the two cooperatives visited, there was no open leadership and participation of members seemed limited.

FIELD's strategy to legalize farmers' seeds took into account the possibility of formal recognition not being achieved. The community seed registry is a good approach to ensure that knowledge and local varieties are retained at the community level. Rather than trying to fit PBB into the highly regulated systems, FIELD devised a system for seed breeders to continue their practice at the local level. Formal certification of farmers' seeds before the Constitutional Court's decision in mid-2013 to revise Law No.12/1992 was seemingly a long and arduous process that required recognition from local authorities. Up until 2014, it is unclear whether FIELD has successfully helped farmers to navigate the bureaucratic procedures and how many varieties are officially legalized. Nonetheless, there are more opportunities now for the recognition of farmers' rights. FIELD's strategy to mobilize farmers into

[67] Almekinders, Conny and Hardon, Jaap (eds). 2006. *Bringing Farmers Back Into Breeding: Experiences with Participatory Plant Breeding and Challenges for Institutionalisation*. Agromisa Special 5. Wageningen: Agromisa Foundation, p. 23

[68] Braun, Arnoud and Duveskog, Deborah. 2008. *The Farmer Field School Approach – History, Global Assessment and Success Stories*. Unedited draft. Background Paper for the IFAD Rural Poverty Report 2011. Available from http://web.ifad.org/rural/rpr2008/chapter3/3.pdf (accessed 27 December 2014)

[69] Ibid

[70] Ibid, page 24

[71] Ibid

action, whilst supporting a national coalition to lobby for revisions has proven to be successful in the case of Law No.12/1992. Nonetheless, more laws will require revision and continued lobby by national-level coalitions.

Essential ingredients for replication of similar interventions as well as sustained success are summarized below:

1. Continue to collaborate with national coalitions to lobby for revisions of Law No. 18/2012 on Food, Law No. 19/2013 on Protection and Empowerment of Farmers. Opportunities may arise under the new administration. Continue to engage farmers' groups in lobby activities by facilitating them to prepare testimonies and evidence required for judicial reviews;
2. The work of FIELD is sometimes highly technical, especially pertaining to seed breeding. FIELD should consider developing new publications that are properly packaged and geared towards informing policy makers of the importance of supporting farmers' seed production;
3. Work on improving market access for farmers. This may require looking beyond the current demands and preferences of local farmers to market preferences. Access to informal markets can also be supported through seed exchanges and barter between farmers (which can also contribute to farmers' welfare);
4. Invest more resources to capacitate farmers with marketing skills. Farmers are currently still dependent on middlemen for the marketing of their products. Work with farmers (and perhaps also middlemen) to create linkages to premium, organic markets. Carefully consider market demand and sufficiency of supplies;
5. Explore opportunities to support the continuous experimentation with seed varieties, which is important to reducing the risk of crop failure given changing environmental and climatic conditions. Link farmers with universities and research institutes so they can share their knowledge and genuinely participate in dialogues on new technologies and cultivation practise;
6. Monitor how collective actions through the cooperative model are leading to economic benefits; and,
7. Ensure democratic principles are held up by the cooperatives.

# 7 Conclusion

In the 2012-2014 period, the first key change found was improved organisation of FIELD's target groups in Indramayu through the establishment of cooperatives. These cooperatives, together with pre-existing farmers groups and Farmers' Field Schools, are playing a role in organising marginalized farmers so they are less dependent on seed companies and loan sharks who monopolize seeds and agricultural inputs. This change is relevant to the context, FIELD's ultimate goal, and Hivos' strategies for the country. Farmers in Indramayu are becoming more self-reliant and are able to grow rice organically through techniques that have been taught through the FFS. The cooperatives are functioning to organize seed distribution and provide credit to farmers to support agricultural production.

The second change since the baseline has been the lobby and advocacy efforts that have demanded for a judicial review of the Law on Crop Cultivation System. This 1992 Law had been prohibiting farmers from undertaking plant breeding and had often led to the criminalization of farmers accused of stealing patented seeds. Efforts to lobby for a revision of the Law began in 2010, and were stepped up in 2012. FIELD successfully worked with a coalition of NGOs to advocate for a greater recognition of farmers rights within the regulated cultivation system. The policy change means that farmers are in a better position to undertake seed breeding activities more freely and without fear of criminalization.

Both outcomes are important for farmers to gain greater sovereignty following decades of top-down agricultural policies which have imposed commercial seeds and agricultural intensification practices that had detrimental effects on the agri-ecosystem and farmers' resilience. These changes are attributable to MFS II support, but would not have been possible without pre-existing interventions carried out by FIELD in Indramayu since the mid-2000s.

While farmers are becoming more self-reliant, further support is needed to establish stronger market linkages which would allow smallholders to expand seed sales and organic rice commodities. This would give further economic benefits to farmers. The cooperatives established through Hivos' support could play an important role in this regard. In the area of policy influencing, there is still more work to be done as other Laws still create unfavourable conditions for smallholders and tend to support commercial and business interests. FIELD should continue to work in collaboration with other NGOs and farmers to lobby for regulatory revisions at the national level.

Table 11
*Summary of findings.*

| When looking at the MFS II interventions of this SPO to strengthen civil society and/or policy influencing, how much do you agree with the following statements? | Score |
|---|---|
| The CS interventions were well designed | 6 |
| The CS interventions were implemented as designed | 5 |
| The CS interventions reached their objectives | 7 |
| The observed outcomes are attributable to the CS interventions | 7 |
| The observed CS outcomes are relevant to the beneficiaries of the SPO | 8 |

Score between 1 to 10, with 1 being "not at all" and 10 being "completely".

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**Resource persons consulted**

| *Name of key informant* | *Organisation* | *Function in organisation* | *Relation with SPO* | *Contact details including e-mail.* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Widada Bujowiryono | FIELD | Board Member | Staff | |
| Aditiajaya | FIELD | Program Manager | Staff | Adtjaya67@gmail.com |
| Widyastama Cahyana | FIELD | Executive Director | Staff | widyastamacahyana@gmail.com |
| Simon HT | FIELD | Program Director/Adult Education and Field School Specialist | Staff | simonht54@yahoo.com |
| Jito | Jati Asih Cooperative | Chairman Cooperative | Beneficiary | Balongadem |
| Tatipin | Jati Asih Cooperative | Credit section | Beneficiary | Balongadem |
| Tariman | Jati Asih Cooperative | Cooperative member | Beneficiary | Balongadem |
| Karyoto | Jati Asih Cooperative | Supervisor | Beneficiary | Balongadem – 085314398643 |
| Kulmin | Jati Asih Cooperative | Cooperative member | Beneficiary | Balongadem |
| Warman | Jati Asih Cooperative | Credit section | Beneficiary | Balongadem |
| Casmadi | Jati Asih Cooperative | Cooperative member | Beneficiary | Balongadem |
| Tanusi | Jati Asih Cooperative | Supervisor | Beneficiary | Balongadem |
| Warmoto | Jati Asih Cooperative | Credit Officer | Beneficiary | Balongadem |
| Darsih | Jati Asih Cooperative | Tresurer | Beneficiary | Balongadem |
| Warsinih | Jati Asih Cooperative | Cooperative member | Beneficiary | Balongadem |
| Ratiah | Jati Asih Cooperative | Cooperative member | Beneficiary | Balongadem |
| H. Narih | Jati Asih | Cooperative | Beneficiary | Balongadem |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Cooperative | member | | |
| Darminih | Jati Asih Cooperative | Cooperative member | Beneficiary | Balongadem |
| Nurhayati | Jati Asih Cooperative | Cooperative member | Beneficiary | Balongadem |
| Rokhi | Jati Asih Cooperative | Vice chairperson | Beneficiary | Balongadem – 082127255100 – rokhimas@gmail.com |
| Muhammad Suryaman | Karya Peduli Tani Cooperative | Cooperative member | Beneficiary | Jengkok – 081624633459 |
| Usman | Karya Peduli Tani Cooperative | Farmer | Beneficiary | Jengkok – 081313134439 |
| Joharipin | Karya Peduli Tani Cooperative | Chaiperson | Beneficiary | Jengkok – 081395572866 |
| Sakur | Karya Peduli Tani Cooperative | Cooperative member | Beneficiary | Jengkok – 081807000851 |
| Kariri | Karya Peduli Tani Cooperative | Cooperative member | Beneficiary | Jengkok - 087879181847 |

# Appendix 1 Civil Society Scores

This table presents the appreciation of the evaluation team regarding changes occurred for each indicator between 2012 and 2014 on a scale of -2 to + 2

- 2 = Considerable deterioration
- 1 = A slight deterioration

0 = no change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012

+1 = slight improvement

+2 = considerable improvement

| Dimension | | Indicators | Question | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Civic engagement** | 1 | Needs of marginalised groups | How does your organisation take the needs of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups into account in your planning, actions, activities, and/or strategies? | +1 |
| | 2 | Involvement of target groups | What is the level of participation of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups in the analysis, planning and evaluation of your activities? | 0 |
| | 3 | Political engagement | How intense is your (individual staff or organisational) participation in locally-nationally elected bodies and/or sectoral user groups? | +1 |
| | | | | |
| **Level of organisation** | 5 | Relations with other organisations | In the past 12 months what has been the most intensive interaction you had with other CSOs? | +1 |
| | 5 | Frequency of dialogue with closest CSO | In the past 12 months how many meetings did you have with the CSO that you have most intensive interaction with? | +1 |
| | 6 | Defending the interests of marginalised groups | Which CSO are most effective in defending the interests of your target groups? In the past 12 months, how did you relate to those CSOs? | +2 |
| | 7 | Composition current financial resource base | How does your organisation finance institutional costs such as workshops of the General Assembly (if applicable); attendance to workshops of other CSOs; costs for organisational growth and/or networking? | 0 |
| | | | | |
| **Practice of Values** | 8 | Downward accountability | To what extent can mandatory social organs (steering committee, general assembly, internal auditing group) ask your executive leaders to be accountable to them? | 0 |
| | 9 | Composition of social organs | What % of members of your mandatory social organs belong to the marginalised target groups you are working with/for? | 0 |
| | 10 | External financial auditing | How regularly is your organisation audited externally? | 0 |
| | | | | |
| **Perception of impact** | 11 | Client satisfaction | What are the most important concerns of your target groups? How do your services take into account those important concerns? | +1 |
| | 12 | Civil society impact | In the past 12 months, what impact did you have on building a strong civil society? | +1 |
| | 13 | Relation with public sector organisations. | In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with public sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' objectives? | +1 |
| | 14 | Relation with private sector organisations | In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with private sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' perspective? | 0 |
| | 15 | Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations | How successful have you been in influencing public policies and practices in the past 2 years? | +1 |
| | 16 | Influence upon private sector agencies' policies, | How successful have you been in influencing private sector policies and practices in the past 2 years? | 0 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | rules, regulations. | | |
| | | | | |
| CS context | 17 | Coping strategies | In the past 2 years, how did your organisation cope with these changes in the context that may have been positive or negative consequences for civil society. | 0 |

# Appendix 2 Changes in civil society indicators between 2012 and 2014

## 1. Civic Engagement

### 1.1. Needs of marginalised groups SPO

The FIELD program supported by Hivos in the 2011-2013 period targeted five sub-districts in Indramayu, West Java[72]. FIELD applied the Farmer Field School (FFS) approach, which it is known for in Indonesia. Farmers and farmer groups were facilitated to learn from each other and develop capacities for cultivation, as well as benefitting from communal learning. This communal learning was carried out within one planting season. In this activity, farmers were invited to identify how agro-ecosystems work until eventually they were capable of producing seedlings for their own needs. Knowledge about plant breeding is actually a science passed down from one generation to another among the farmers. But due to the monopolization of seedlings and fertilizers by large industries since the Green Revolution, farmers have lost this knowledge and become marginalized in their dependence on large companies for agricultural inputs. Prior to the Green Revolution, farmers were capable of producing their own seedlings, fertilizers, and medicines. The Hivos-funded project continued to support FIELD's longer-term efforts to revive plant breeding. Specifically, FIELD facilitated seedling registration and accompanied farmers in the steps towards gaining recognition for varieties produced by farmers. In addition, FIELD and its intermediary farmer groups joined other CS actors to lobby for an amendment of a Law considered to be disadvantageous to farmers.

Participants of the FFS were not limited to cooperative members. Farmers outside the FFS coverage area also benefited from learning exchanges on organic farming. It is unfortunate that the evaluation team was unable to obtain figures on the number of farmers trained or assisted through the FFS from the reports available and from the field visit as these records seem to be unavailable. However, the number of cooperative members can be considered an adequate indicator of how many more people have been reached since the baseline.

Eight farmer's groups were provided support in the 2011 – 2013 project period and six cooperatives were established for these farmer groups to further strengthen their economic position. Cooperatives have been set up to help farmers gain a better position vis-à-vis middlemen and loan sharks, and to be less dependent on agricultural practices that are favoured by large companies. The data FIELD provided on cooperative membership in their reports to Hivos was found to be inaccurate. As illustrated in the table below, annual reports suggested no change in membership, but this in fact has not been the case. No sex-disaggregated data was reported in any of the years.

Table 12

*Cooperative membership reported in 2011, 2012 & 2013*

| Name of village | Name of cooperative | Membership reported in 2011 | Membership reported in 2012 | Membership reported in 2013 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wanguk | Jati Asih (called Sumber Sriasih in reports to Hivos) | 31 | 31 | 31 |
| Jengkok | Karya Peduli Tani | 30 | 30 | 30 |
| Silyeg | Warga Mulya | 33 | 33 | 33 |
| Tenajar | Tunas Batajar | 20 | 22 | 22 |
| Kedokan Bunder | Sri Tirta | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| Kalensari | Ruwart Remaja | 30 | 30 | 30 |
| | Subtotal | 159 | 161 | 161 |

[72] "Meeting Report FIELD-Jakarta April 20121515", FIELD Indonesia

Source: FIELD reports to Hivos

The evaluation team visited two of the six cooperatives, namely Jati Asih Cooperative in Wanguk Village and Karya Peduli Tani Cooperative in Jengkok Village. During the visit, the team found an increase in the number members. Sumber Asih Cooperative had recruited 101 members in 2014 whereas in 2011, it only had 35 members. Karya Peduli Tani Cooperative, now has 65 members, where as in 2011 it had 42. The membership increase of the two cooperatives is illustrated in the table below.

Table 13

*Cooperative membership 2011-2014*

| Name of cooperative | # of members in 2011 | | | # of members in 2014 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Male | Female | Subtotal | Male | Female | Subtotal |
| Jati Asih | 25 | 10 | 35 | 60 | 41 | 101 |
| Karya Peduli Tani | 21 | 21 | 42 | 32 | 33 | 65 |
| TOTAL | 46 | 31 (40.26%) | 77 | 92 | 74 (44.58%) | 166 |

Source: End line Evaluation interviews and data collection

The evaluation team was also able to obtain data on the composition of the membership, based on sex and land ownership. As illustrated in the tables, women's percentual membership has increased slightly and is well above the project's target of 30 percent. In fact, the Karya Peduli Tani cooperative has equal female and male membership. Despite these figures, there is no evidence of specific interventions targeted for female farmers.

Table 14

*Landownership of members*

| Name of cooperative | # of land owners | percentage | # of landless | percentage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jati Asih | 11 | 10.89% | 90 | 89.11% |
| Karya Peduli Tani | 33 | 50.77% | 32 | 49.23% |

Source: End line Evaluation interviews and data collection

With regards to the landownership of cooperative members, a large majority of Jati Asih are landless farmers, while in Karya Peduli Tani landless farmers make up just under 50 percent of the members. This shows that cooperatives are open to both landless and land-owning members. The percentages may vary depending on local conditions, but overall FIELD has continued to target small-sized farmers. Even those who own land, generally do not own more than 2 hectares.

Table 15

*Cooperative assets 2011-2014*

| Name of cooperative | Value of assets in 2011 | Value of assets in 2014 | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jati Asih | IDR 1,500,000 | IDR 300,000,000 | + 298,500,000 |
| Karya Peduli Tani | IDR 1,100,000 | IDR 60,000,000 | + 58,900,000 |
| TOTAL | IDR 2,600,000 | IDR 360,000,000 | +357,400,000 |

Source: End line Evaluation interviews and data collection

Given the above information, the evaluation team concludes that there has been an improvement with regards to the number of people who have been reached by FIELD since the 2012 baseline, and that these target groups represent marginalized groups (female farmers and landless farmers).

## 1.2. Involvement of target groups SPO

Cooperative members and farmers groups have the opportunity to participate in decision making. This has not changed since the baseline. The evaluation team found that farmers were able to decide for themselves what kind of cooperative they needed and how it would be managed. In a Focus Group Discussion held during the field visit of the evaluation team, one of the participants stated that:

> "When we wished to form a cooperative, the facilitator asked us what kind of cooperative we needed. We were confused since what we needed was a cooperative that could serve like a bank. Therefore, we asked for assistance. The facilitator then gave us some explanations, and

we finally said that we wanted a bank-like cooperative. He suggested a credit union cooperative because it would not require a lot of space. A consumer's cooperative on the other hand, would demand a storage building. In a credit union we would only deal with money. And that's how we agreed upon establishing a credit union cooperative"[73] .

The cooperative members, many of them 'graduates' from the farmer field schools, have been well-exposed to expressing and sharing their ideas and opinions. The FFS promotes 'learning by doing' and experimentation by farmers to find the right breeding and planting techniques. As such, it promotes farmer ownership of results and successes.

The evaluation team did however find that despite FIELD's promotion of grassroots decision-making, there are some elitist symptoms in one of the cooperatives. This seems to have emerged as a result of unbalanced roles of the members. One individual seemed to have too many roles, while in the other cooperative these roles were more equally distributed between staff and members. Members of this second cooperative were more self-confident and optimistic.

As illustrated under Indicator 1.1, women make up a good part of cooperative membership. While FIELD has not done very well in reporting on the level of participation of women farmers, the evaluation team has found evidence of women's participation. Aside from the cooperative structure, the FFS approach has also been found by other external actors, in this case USAID, to be an effective approach that has a "positive impact on women's self-esteem, strengthening her knowledge and capacity to use new farming practices and technologies right along-side men", in turn resulting in more equal gender positions[74]. The same USAID review, found that FIELD beneficiaries were provided with options to select interventions to improve their lives[75].

### 1.3. Intensity of political engagement SPO

During the baseline, FIELD's work was found to be non-political. The end line evaluation found that the intensity of political engagement increased since the baseline. FIELD successfully facilitated meetings between farmers and the government, particularly the Department of Agriculture. This led to cooperative members under FIELD's support to be assigned to provide training to another farmers' cooperative in West Java.

More significantly, FIELD, together with some of its farmer groups, collaborated with non-governmental organizations to lobby for a judicial review of a regulation that was considered to be greatly disadvantageous to farmers involved in their own plant breeding. This is clearly an improvement from merely facilitating farmers to navigate through the bureaucratic process of gaining recognition for their seed varieties to engaging politically with national-level CSOs and government actors.

## 2. Level of Organisation

### 2.1. Relations with other organisations SPO

FIELD's collaboration with other CS actors and non-governmental organizations in its network intensified since the baseline. These interactions focused on advocating on the amendment of 1992 Plant Cultivation System Law through coalitions and consortiums. The organisations with whom FIELD networked were as follows: the Indonesian Human Rights Committee for Social Justice (IHCS), Indonesian Farmer Alliance (API), Bina Desa Sadawijaya Foundation, People's Coalition for Food Sovereignty (KRKP), Indonesian Farmers Integrated Pest Control Organization (IPPHTI), Palm Oil Farmers Union (SPKS), Sawit Watch, Indonesian Farmer Union (SPI), and the Alliance of Agricultural

[73] Interview with Taripin, Credit Section of Jati Asih Cooperative, 26 November 2014
[74] Berman, L., Hartanto, J., Dewi, R. 2013. *Women's Empowerment in Agriculture Assessment: Indonesia 2013*. Weidemann Associates, Inc., A crown Agents USA Company, p. 20
[75] Ibid, Page 23

Reform Movement (AGRA). Following the ruling in favour of the coalition's calls for the Law's amendment, FIELD continued to socialize the regulatory change to the organisations in its network.

In the 2012-2013 period, FIELD further worked with another 11 NGOs to lobby for a judicial review of Law No. 18/2012 on Food. The following organisations submitted a request to the Constitutional Court in November 2013, which was later rejected: IHCS, API, SPI, Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria (KPA), Solidaritas Perempuan (SP), KRKP, Sawit Watch, FIELD, WALHI, Indonesia for Global Justice (IGJ), Koalisi Rakyat untuk Keadilan Perikanan (KIARA) and Bina Desa.

In supporting the development of the cooperatives, FIELD cooperated with the West Java Puskopdit to provide trainings for new cooperatives formed by farmers. The collaboration between Puskopdit and these cooperatives did not seize after FIELD's direct collaboration with Puskopdit. This means that FIELD successfully established long-term linkages between farmers' cooperatives and Pudkopdit.

At international level, FIELD took part in international and regional networks to lobby against World Trade Organization (WTO) policies. In the lead up to the WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali in 2013, FIELD joined other global CSOs to issue letters to the G33 (a group of developing countries, Indonesia amongst them, that coordinates on trade and economic issues) calling for the imbalance in global agricultural subsidies to be addressed and for greater support to guaranteeing smallholder livelihoods and food consumption[76]. FIELD also joined other civil society groups to protest WTO discussions on "REDD Rice", a proposal to offset carbon emissions by promoting so called 'farming carbon'[77]. A No REDD Rice Manifesto was signed by FIELD and 74 other organisations to defend rice from "the clutches of carbon traders and the WTO"[78]. Following the WTO Bali meeting in December 2013, further letters were issued by a group of some 118 organisations to express concern on the G33 proposal on food security and trade agreements[79].

In addition, the success of FIELD's farmers in Indramayu has attracted the interest of other farmer groups from Cirata and Pasundan who have come to learn plant breeding. Farmer groups from these areas exchanged knowledge and practices on plant breeding techniques. The collaboration successfully led to the establishment of a FFS in Cirata and Pasundan, facilitated by farmers from Indramayu.

These are illustrations that suggest an improvement in terms of the relations with other CSOs and NGOs since the 2012 baseline. Networking amongst farmers has led to a mobilisation of information and knowledge to identify problems and solutions in cultivation and plant breeding. At the national level, networking has resulted in successful policy advocacy. Internationally, FIELD joined a host of other CSOs to protest against WTO plans and agreements.

## 2.2. Frequency of dialogue with closest civil society organisation SPO

FIELD's relation with other CSOs has improved since 2012, when the SPO began to actively participate in the coalition set up to lobby for a judicial review of Law No. 12 of 1992. These efforts cumulated in a victory, when the constitution court ruled three articles to be unconstitutional. The ruling meant that farmers were allowed to collect, produce and distribute local seeds without government permission. Farmers groups supported by FIELD also joined the lobby efforts.

## 2.3. Defending the interests of marginalised groups SPO

As reported in the baseline, FIELD is viewed as a credible organisation that assists farmers to improve their cultivation practices and navigate the bureaucratic steps required to test and certify seeds. The

[76] Our World Is Not For Sale (OWINFS), "Global civil society calls for a permanent Solution to G 33 Food Security Proposal in WTO", 20 November 2013. Available from http://ourworldisnotforsale.org/en/signon/global-civil-society-calls-permanent-solution-g-33-food-security-proposal-wto (accessed 28 December 2014)

[77] Health Of Mother Earth Foundation (HOMEF), "No REDD Rice Manifesto: No WTO! No REDD! No to using Rice for Carbon Markets!", 6 December 2013. Available from http://www.homef.org/pressrelease/no-redd-rice-manifesto-no-wto-no-redd-no-using-rice-carbon-markets (accessed 28 December 2014)

[78] Available from http://no-redd.com/wto-protesters-denounce-redd-rice/ (accessed 28 December 2014)

[79] Our World Is Not For Sale (OWINFS), "Global civil society letter to WTO members regarding public food stockholding programs", 24 November 2014. Available from http://www.ourworldisnotforsale.org/en/signon/global-civil-society-letter-wto-members-regarding-public-food-stockholding-programs (accessed 28 December 2014)

FFS introduced by FIELD has invited farmers in Indramayu to re-identify agro-ecosystems and find a way to improve agricultural management. The focus of FIELD under the Hivos-supported project was on plant breeding and allowing farmers to produce seedlings independently, a skill suppressed since the New Order. Through the farmer field schools, farmers have regained these skills, as well as skills to produce their own fertilizer and plant-based medicines. This is contributing to greater self-reliance and is a stepping stone to regaining confidence and pride as farmers, as well as recognition by other stakeholders. In 2012, one of FIELD's long-term beneficiaries, Joharipin, earned recognition through a Danamon Award for Farmer Empowerment. He was credited for his efforts to conserve seed varieties, which in turn led to an increased production of four tonnes of rice per hectare to 7-10 tonnes.[80] Farmers are also selling these seeds locally for additional income.

As explained under other indicators, FIELD, together with a coalition of other NGOs and CSOs (including farmers groups themselves) lobbied for the amendment of the Cultivation Law. FIELD together with IHCS facilitated the collection of farmer testimonies from the village of Jengkok and farmers were allowed to testify as witnesses in court to make their case. The resulting constitutional court review has provided the foundation for better protection of farmers' basic rights. In the past farmers were imprisoned because seed companies accused farmers of stealing parent seeds patented by large corporations. With the amended law, farmers' interests are better protected against the interests of commercial companies and businesses. Farmers can now produce their own breeds with less fear of being criminalized. They also have the ability to be less dependent on commercialized seeds that require more agricultural inputs and are more susceptible to pests and diseases.

In addition, the establishment of credit union cooperatives have decreased the farmers' dependency on loan sharks. Cooperatives are also helping farmers with no, or little land, to gain access to loans needed as capital to rent production land.

### 2.4 Composition financial resource base SPO

The baseline report mentions that FIELD was supported by various donors who funding different projects in different locations. For example, USAID funded a project in West Sumatra, while Unilever funds were used to carry out a project in East Java and later Pangandaran, West Java. The continuation of FIELD's support to farmer groups in Indramayu was funded by Hivos.

The evaluation team has not found evidence of diversified funding resources. Donors that presently continue to support FIELD are USAID, Unilever and FAO. With USAID support, FIELD has begun to work with rural communities in several provinces to carry out vulnerability assessments in order to develop and implement strategic action plans for climate change adaptation[81]. While the number of donors is decreasing, there is insufficient data regarding the amount of money currently managed by FIELD.

## 3. Practice of Values

### 3.1. Downward accountability SPO

FIELD, through the cooperatives has applied transparency principles well. Cooperative members are informed of the financial conditions and have the right to inquire with the cooperative on these issues or to express their ideas in the general assembly. However, comparing the two cooperatives visited, the evaluation found that the leadership model applied in each cooperative has influenced the downward accountability. The Jati Asih cooperative applies an open leadership style, which allows the

[80] Hadi Suprapto and Nina Rahayu, "Joharipin, Petani Sukses dari Bibit Lokal", *VIVAnews*, 18 July 2012. Available from http://bisnis.news.viva.co.id/news/read/336489-petani-yang-sukses-dari-bibit-lokal (accessed 28 December 2014)

[81] Indonesia Forest and Climate Support (IFACS), Who we work with, "Farmers' Initiatives for Ecological Livelihoods and Democracy (FIELD)". Available from http://www.ifacs.or.id/who-we-work-with/farmers-initiatives-for-ecological-livelihoods-and-democracy-field/ (accessed 28 December 2014)

members to participate actively in discussions. The Karya Peduli Tani cooperative's leadership seems to allow less room and opportunity for its members to express their opinions.

For FIELD itself, one of the board members explained that there has been less downward accountability recently due to gaps in organisational awareness amongst FIELD staff. Overall however, FIELD maintains the same internal control mechanisms between the board of directors, advisors, supervisors and the executive. This is according to the laws that regulate foundations.

### 3.2 Composition of social organs SPO

As stated in the baseline report, there are no farmer representatives in FIELD's board. However, farmers do get a chance to participate in determining FIELD's vision, mission and policies through their representatives in IPPHTI, who are present in each annual meeting.

### 3.3. External financial auditing SPO

FIELD's financial accountability mechanism is already well managed. Every year external audits are conducted, however the audit is still project-based and not institutionally based. There is no change in this indicator since the baseline. Financial reports are not made public.

## 4. Perception of Impact

### 4.1. Client satisfaction SPO

The two visited cooperatives both expressed that they were very satisfied with FIELD's program. From their perspective, they have benefitted from the knowledge gained from FIELD through the FFS. Other benefits they mentioned were the assistance received to establish the cooperatives and increased incomes from applying organic farming techniques taught to them by FIELD. In addition, they mentioned that they had a better network and were less dependent on middle men for cash or loans. However, they expressed that there is still a need for FIELD's assistance to find suitable markets for their agricultural produce. They are unable to access end-users or buyers of their products themselves and still rely on middle men in this regard.

### 4.2. Civil society impact SPO

Before FIELD's intervention, farmers were marginalized by public sector regulations which created a dependency on commercial input suppliers. After the implementation of the project, farmers have gained more authority and a say in their production resources and tools. This achievement is considered to be a part of 'farming democratization' according to the head of FIELD's FFS.

Another achievement in the area of civil society, according to the vice chairman of Jati Asih cooperative, is a revived interest in farming. Before the project was implemented, youth were not interested at all in becoming farmers as it was considered to be a low-paying job for the poorest in the community. Many community members in the Indramayu area became (construction) labourers as a result. Since FIELD's interventions, farmers have gained pride in their work. The vice chairman himself said that he now more confident and proud to be a farmer.

The relation between farmers and middlemen has also changed as the result of FIELD's intervention. Farmers have become less dependent on middlemen for production input and capital. But according to the chairman of Jati Asih, farmers still depend on middlemen to market and sell their product. Farmers hope that future interventions by FIELD will assist them to address this issue.

As mentioned under other indicators, FIELD has also created room for 'activism' amongst farmers. Farmer groups were directly engaged to discuss the revisions required in the Cultivation Law and participated in petitioning for the Constitutional Court review. Other examples of FIELD's contribution to strengthening civil society are evident in the SPO's efforts to organise smallholders. In March 2013, a local Farmers and Fishers Forum of Indramayu (Forum Petani dan Nelayan Indramayu or FOR PANEN) was set up. This Forum has since collaborated with IHCS to disseminate information to

smallholders about their rights and has sought to protect, conserve and document local knowledge especially pertaining to seed varieties.

## 4.3. Relation with public sector organisations SPO

During the baseline evaluation, it was found that FIELD had strategic relations with the government, but that this had not led to policy change. The end line evaluation has found that together with its partners, FIELD has been successful in pushing for the revision of the Law on Cultivation Systems.

At the local level, through USAID-IFACS support, FIELD has also begun to engage more with the local government. Government officials have been invited to FFS to receive training and efforts have been made to improve relations between farmers and the local government[82]. In Indramayu, FIELD engaged the Agency for Agricultural Research and Development (*Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan Pertanian* or Balitbang) to support multi-location trials for plan breeding. In 2013, Balitbang provided some parallel funding for the trials (IDR 20 million per 1,500 square meters)[83].

The cooperatives have closer relations with the government. In one of the villages visited, village government staff had become cooperative members. The village government was even interested in making the cooperative a part of the village government's financial arm with the chance of receiving funds from the village. The cooperative decided to reject the offer because they did not want to be co-opted or influenced by the village administration in their daily affairs. The local village government has responded positively to the development of the cooperative and FIELD's presence and assistance. However, other than being supportive, the evaluation team did not find any meaningful improvements with regards to more strategic collaboration between farmers' groups/cooperatives and the government.

## 4.4. Relation with private sector agencies SPO

This indicator is of less relevance to FIELD since the SPO does not engage directly with private sector actors. Rather, FIELD's advocacy is targeted to reduce farmers' dependency on private sector produced seeds and agricultural inputs. In this sense, FIELD has successfully contributed in decreasing dependency on mass produced seedlings and fertilizers.

As mentioned before, FIELD does collaborate with the private sector for funding through corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs. Unilever has supported FIELD in providing assistance to farmers to improve the processing of raw materials for food, as well as to support the production of soybeans[84].

## 4.5. Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations SPO

One of the key achievements booked in 2012 by the consortium of CSOs lobbying for a judicial review of the Law on Cultivation, of which FIELD was a part of, was the issuance of the Constitutional Court Decree No.99/PUU-X/2012 mandating the revisions of five articles in the 1992 Law (5, 6, 9, 12 & 60). With this revision, the interests of smallholder farmers are better protected.

In another separate effort, FIELD and 11 other NGOs failed to influence Law 18/2012 on Food. A petition was submitted to the Constitutional Court in 2013 proposing for revisions[85]. The proposed

[82] Suara Merdeka Cetak, "USAID Latih Petani Hutan", 24 November 2014. Available from http://berita.suaramerdeka.com/smcetak/usaid-latih-petani-hutan/ (accessed 28 December 2014)
[83] "Field Annual Review 2013", Hivos
[84] CSR Society Indonesia, "Unilever – Mempraktikan Agroekosistem Budidaya Kedele Hitam", 17 September 2014. Available from http://indonesiacsrsociety.com/mempraktikan-agroekosistem-budidaya-kedele-hitam/ (accessed 28 december 2014)
[85] Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia. 2013. *Putusan Nomor 89/PUU-XI/2013*. Available from http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/putusan/putusan_sidang_2099_98%20PUU%202013-UU_Pangan-telahucap-3_Des_2014-%20wmActionWiz.pdf (accessed 28 December 2014)

revisions, which sought to support the fulfilment of food rights, protect small businesses and individuals from criminalization, and limit genetic engineering, were rejected by the Court[86].

Other than these findings, there are no changes in this indicator even though there is an improvement in the relations between FIELD and the government.

### 4.6. Influence upon private sector agencies' policies, rules, regulations SPO

There is no change in this indicator from the 2012 baseline. The indicator is less relevant to FIELD since they seek to influence public policy to protect smallholder farmers from commercial interests that undermine farmers' position. As such, FIELD does not work to influence private sector policies and practices directly.

## 5. Civil Society context

### 5.1. Coping strategies

Since the baseline, FIELD has demonstrated its capacity to respond to the existing operational context through Hivos and non-Hivos supported interventions. At the grassroots level, FIELD continued to support the organisation of farmers in groups, cooperatives and forums to help them to deal with daily challenges faced to secure a sustainable, agricultural-based livelihood. The focus has been on making smallholder farmers more resilient and independent. However, there have been challenges. FIELD has faced difficulties in improving the organizational capacities of the cooperatives they established. This is evident from the number of cooperative members, which is lower than expected (30% of targeted membership). Hivos assigned a consultant assist in developing the management of the cooperatives. Nonetheless, the number of members did not increase as expected.

FIELD has also been well aware of the impacts of policy frameworks on small holders. For this reason, they have been actively engaged in coalitions at the national level to lobby for revisions of regulations that have a direct impact on farmers. These include Law No. 18/2012 on Food, Law No. 19/2013 on Protection and Empowerment of Farmers, and Law No.12/1992 on Cultivation System. FIELD has managed to cultivate its strong grassroots base as a means to provide inputs to proposed policy revisions that protect seed breeding and ensure farmers have a steady income.

[86] Hukumonline.com, "MK: UU Pangan Konstitusional – Pemohon kecewa dengan putusan MK ini", 3 December 2014. Available from http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt547f280353e0c/mk--uu-pangan-konstitusional (accessed 28 December 2014)

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen UR
P.O. Box 88
6700 AB Wageningen
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)317 48 68 00
www.wageningenUR.nl/cdi

Report CDI-15-067

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# Kantor Berita Radio (KBR) end line report

MFS II country evaluations, Civil Society component

Dieuwke Klaver[1]
Hester Smidt[1]
Kharisma Nugroho[2]
Sopril Amir[2]

1 Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR, Netherlands
2 SurveyMETER, Indonesia

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen, February 2015



Report CDI-15-024

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Klaver, D.C., Smith H., Nugroho K., Amir S., February 2015, *KBR end line report; MFS II country evaluations, Civil Society component,* Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR (University & Research centre) and SurveyMETER. Report CDI-15-024. Wageningen.

This report describes the findings of the end line assessment of the Kantor Berita Radio 68H (KBR68H), a partner of Free Press Unlimited in Indonesia.

The evaluation was commissioned by NWO-WOTRO, the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research in the Netherlands and is part of the programmatic evaluation of the Co-Financing System - MFS II financed by the Dutch Government, whose overall aim is to strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. Apart from assessing impact on MDGs, the evaluation also assesses the contribution of the Dutch Co-Funding Agencies to strengthen the capacities of their Southern Partners, as well as the contribution of these partners towards building a vibrant civil society arena.

This report assesses how KBR68H has contributed towards strengthening civil society in Indonesia using the CIVICUS analytical framework. It is a follow-up of a baseline study conducted in 2012. Key questions that are being answered relate to changes in the five CIVICUS dimensions to which KBR68H contributed; the nature of its contribution; the relevance of the contribution made, and an identification of factors that explain KBR68H's role in civil society strengthening.

Keywords: Civil society, CIVICUS, theory-based evaluation, process-tracing



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# Acknowledgements

SurveyMETER and CDI are thanking the staff and the leaders of all Southern Partner Organisations that participated in collecting information for the evaluation of the contribution of these partner organisations to creating a vibrant civil society in India. They also thank the Co-Funding Agencies and the Dutch Consortia they are a member of for making background documents available. We hope that this evaluation can support you in better positioning yourself in the Civil Society Arena of Indonesia.

# List of abbreviations and acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| AJI | *Aliansi Jurnalis Independen* (Independent Journalist Alliance) |
| CDI | Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR |
| CFA | Co-Financing Agency |
| CFO | Co-Financing Organisation |
| CS | Civil society |
| CSR | Corporate social responsibility |
| FPU | Free Press Unlimited |
| ILO | International Labour Organization |
| ISAI | *Institut Studi Arus Informasi* (Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of Information) |
| JIL | *Jaringan Islam Liberal* (Liberal Islamic Network) |
| MFS | Dutch co-financing system |
| KBR68H | Kantor Berita Radio 68H (Radio News Office) |
| KKN | Kids News Network |
| NGO | Non-governmental organisation |
| NWO-WOTRO | Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research |
| PT | Perseroan terbatas (limited liability company) |
| RRI | Radio Republik Indonesia (Radio Republic Indonesia) |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| Wageningen UR | Wageningen University & Research Centre |
| WKN | World Kids News |
| YPMA | *Yayasan Pengembangan Media Anak* (Children Media Development Foundation) |

# 1 Introduction

This report presents the civil society end line findings of KBR, a partner of Free Press Unlimited. It is a follow-up to the baseline assessment carried out in 2012. According to the information provided during the baseline study, KBR is working on the theme 'governance'.

These findings are part of the overall joint MFS II evaluations carried out to account for results of MFS II-funded or co-funded development interventions implemented by Dutch Co-Funding Agencies (CFAs) and/or their Southern Partner Organisations (SPO). They are also intended to contribute to the improvement of future development interventions. The civil society evaluation uses the CIVICUS framework (see Appendix 1) and seeks to answer the following questions:

- What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?
- To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
- What is the relevance of these changes?
- What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The CIVICUS framework that comprises five dimensions (civic engagement, level of organization, practice of values, perception of impact, and context influencing agency by civil society in general) has been used to orient the evaluation methodology (see Appendix 1).

**Changes in the civil society arena of the SPO**
In the 2012 – 2014 period the most important change that took place in KBR's civil society arena is related to Civic Engagement. Between 2011 and 2013 Teen Voice expanded through televised and radio broadcasted programs. According to KBR68H's own estimated the relay of the show through 52 radio stations and 22 television stations relayed an estimated 1.17 million youth and teenagers. This number is impressive. The content was produced involving youth reporters and presenters with a focus on presenting issues through the viewpoints of teenagers. As the audience survey, covering 300 children showed, the audience was enthusiastic about the content of the shows. Children enjoyed the content and felt that it was of use in their daily lives. In the second period, Teen Voice television and radio was discontinued due to a lack of interest from potential funders. Fortunately, KBR68H had already begun to expand Teen Voice online through a portal. KBR succeeded to disseminate content through its KBR68H portal and through social media ensuring that Teen Voice continues until today. The online platform affords new opportunities for the show to engage audiences. Two-way communication has improved through Twitter and Facebook.

Throughout 2012-2014, KBR68H also expanded its networks with radio stations. The network grew from 850 to 900 radio stations in this period. KBR68H maintains a reputable position as an independent media source known for its high-quality content and has the infrastructure to broadcast in the Asia-Pacific region. For Teen Voice the network expansion did not have measurable positive consequences, rather it signifies positive trends for KBR68H as an organization. This implies that it improved it 'level of organisation' in CIVICUS terms.

These findings were obtained through an analysis of documents, a workshop with the SPO, and several interviews. These interviews were conducted with: KBR; external resources persons working in civil society organisations that receive support from KBR; other civil society organisations with whom KBR is collaborating; public or private sector agents and; external resource persons with knowledge of the MDG or theme on which KBR is concentrating.

**Contribution analysis**
Based upon an analysis of the projects and programmes financed by the Dutch CFAs a selection was made of SPOs to be included in an in-depth process tracing trajectory and those to be included for a quick contribution assessment. KBR68H was selected for a quick assessment.

The above mentioned changes can be attributed to KBR68H and partially to FPU funding during the first period. Although the televised and radio shows have been discontinued due to a lack of funds, including those from FPU, KBR68H has managed to adapt and make use of the opportunities available through the internet. KBR's intention with Teen Voice is that it remains an interactive platform that would allow for the seeds of democratic traits, such as freedom of expression and constructive dialogue, to be planted. Unfortunately the Teen Voice programme discontinued on radio and television in 2014 and its portal is neither frequently visited nor social media are being used by children to continue raising their voice. The interventions were not sustainable.

**Relevance**
Interviews with staff of KBR, with external resource person, with the liaison officer of FPU, as well as contextual information helped to assess the relevance of KBR's interventions in terms of: its Theory of Change (ToC) for Civil Society (SC) as designed during the baseline study; the context in which KBR is operating; the CS policies of FPU.

With regards to the baseline ToC, the interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant since KBR68H was able to produce quality content, target an underserved age group, and engage its network disseminate content through television and radio up until 2013.

With regards to the context in which KBR68H is operating, its interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant because media plays a critical role in shaping opinions. Online media and television are the main media outlets in the country programs like Teen Voice fill an important gap in an adult dominated space.

With regards to the CS policies of Free Press Unlimited (FPU), KBR's interventions and outcomes were relevant, but not sustainable. KBR continued to engage with the international Kids News Network, but FPU did not react to a request for a short interview on this network and KBR's role in it.

**Explaining factors**
Interviews with staff of KBR, external resource persons, as well as contextual information helped to assess the relevance of its interventions in terms of; its Theory of Change (ToC) for Civil Society (CS) as designed during the baseline study; the context in which KBR is operating; the CS policies of KBR

Internal factors that explain the findings are KBR68H's migration of the Teen Voice radio and television programs to a web portal and social media platform and the fact that it did not succeed to develop a business plan capable of financing the further mainstreaming children's programmes into ongoing activities. External factors that explain the findings are the drop of commercial television and radio interest in the continuation of Teen Voice. Factors that explain the findings that are related to the relation between FPU and KBR68H are the support FPU provided through trainings, Teen Voice's membership to the Kids News Network (KKN). FPU supports its partners by means of project packages that last 18 months. KBR was not able to find alternative sources to continue the Teen Voice programme that ended in 31 December 2012

The following chapter briefly describes the political context, the civil society context and the relevant background with regards to the governance issues KBR is working on. Chapter 3 provides background information on KBR, the relation of its MFS II interventions with the CIVICUS framework and specific information on the contract with Free Press Unlimited. An evaluation methodology has been developed for the evaluation of the Civil Society component which can be found in Appendix 2 in the country report; however, deviations from this methodology, the choices made with regards to the selection of the outcomes for contribution analysis, as well as difficulties encountered during data collection are to be found in Chapter 4. The answers to each of the evaluation questions are being presented in Chapter 5, followed by a discussion on the general project design in relation to CS development; an assessment of what elements of the project design may possibly work in other contexts or be implemented by other organisations in Chapter 6. Conclusions are presented in Chapter 7.

# 2 Context

## 2.1 Political context

This paragraph briefly describes the context KBR68H is working in. A description of the Civil Society Context assessed according to the CIVICUS framework is provided in appendix 3 of the country report for Civil Society.

### 2.1.1 Brief historical perspective

Indonesia's rise to being the world's third largest democratic nation has been lauded by many world leaders. The county is often considered to be a model Muslim democracy. As the fourth most populous nation with an estimated 250 million people[1], Indonesia has sustained its democratic commitment since transitioning from an authoritarian leadership to a democracy in 1998. The decentralized administration now consists of 34 provinces and 508 districts and municipalities.

Prior to 1998, Indonesia was under strict authoritarian regime. Suharto, known for his so-called New Order (1966-1998) regime, ushered in radical transformations that would place social and political forces under direct state supervision. The defining characteristics of the Suharto era were a focus on economic growth and controlled consensus and political stability devoid of dissent. A series of tumultuous economic and political transitions in the nineties severely diminished the credibility of ageing President Suharto, who was forced to resign amidst mass street protests.

His departure in 1998 laid bare three decades of social inequalities, state-perpetuated abuses against human rights, and a lack of civilian liberties. The regime change opened the way for a period of *Reformasi* started under the presidency of B. J. Habibie (1998-1999) and continued by Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001), Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001–2004), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014). Restrictions on citizen participation, press freedom and association were removed. Democratic reforms and decentralization led to direct elections, portioned authority, devolution of authority to regional authorities, formation of new political parties and ended the military's parliamentary influence. The distinct historical periods of the New Order Regime and *Reformasi* (1998-present) have shaped the emergence of civil society. Defining characteristics are summarized in table 1.

With political reforms came greater freedom and space for civic engagement. In the *Reformasi* period, there was a remarkable increase in the number of civil society organizations, many of which were Islamic in character. In 2000, the Central Agency on Statistics (BPS) recorded around 70,000 registered organizations, compared to just 10,000 in 1996.[2] New groups sprung up with donors encouraging activists to establish NGOs they could fund. These organizations were eager to distance themselves from state and often took an anti-government stance. Proliferating CSOs and NGOs have taken advantage of decentralization and greater regional autonomy to engage in public affairs. Civil society and government relations have improved, although both sides remain sceptical of the others' intentions.

[1] In 2010 the population was estimated to be around 237 million people (BPS 2010 Population Census). The current figure is an estimate from BKKBN and similar figures are cited in the CIA's World Fact Book and the World Bank.

[2] Wahid, Marzuki. 2010. *LSM, Islam, dan Perempuan di Indonesia Paska Orde Baru*. Presentation at the Asian Dialogues: Open Seminars in Asian Languages. Melbourne, 22 April. Available from http://intranet.law.unimelb.edu.au/staff/events/files/Microsoft%20PowerPoint%20-%20LSM%20dan%20Islam%20di%20Indonesia%20--Melbourne%202010-FINAL.pdf (accessed 25 October 2014)

Table 1

*Characteristics that have defined the emergence of civil society in Indonesia*

| Characteristics | New Order, authoritarian period (1966 – 1998) | Reformasi (1998 – present) |
|---|---|---|
| **Political system** | Centralized, authoritarian characterized by unipolarity. Golkar as the dominant political party.<br><br>In 1999 there were 27 provinces, 306 districts and around 60,000 villages. | Decentralized, democratic. Fragmentation of power and atomization of patronage relationships. Emergence of numerous political parties. Direct presidential elections since 1999.<br><br>Decentralization altered the political and administrative landscape: 34 provinces, 410 districts, 98 municipalities, 6,944 sub-districts and 81,253 villages.[3] |
| **State-citizen interaction** | Benevolent leader, obedient population. Down to the village level, the state permeated society. | Modern political culture marked by diminishing hierarchy between the state and citizens, allowing for citizens to interact more freely. |
| **Citizen representation and voice** | Strict control of speech, expression and association.<br><br>CSOs and their networks largely "hiding behind the screen", and operating under state surveillance. A period of growth occurred in 1995-98, as resistance was building. | Burgeoning of CSOs, pressure groups and NGOs following the political euphoria after Suharto's fall.<br><br>Indonesian CSOs began to establish new networks internationally. Up until the early 2000s the focus was on state-centrist issues. Later, issues that CSOs were tackling became more diverse, ranging from pluralism, poverty reduction to fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights. |
| **Media** | No free press, censorship and state-control. Suharto had firm grasp over how to use print & broadcast medias to promote political ideologies. | More vibrant media environment, flourishing of media businesses albeit in control of 12 main conglomerates that are mostly profit-driven and often have political ties. |
| | Limited public and CS use and access to internet until mid-90s. | Twitter nation, widespread social media use. |
| | | Growing realization of the importance of media/free press as the fourth pillar of democracy. |
| **Artistic forms of expression** | Art and literary censorship conducted by the state. Art forms were a means to reinforce political order. | Greater freedom of the arts and cultural sectors. Organizations able to hold art events more freely. Freedom of expression a catchphrase amongst individuals and artistic groups, but challenged by more conservative members of society. |
| **Religious expression and organization** | Regime repressed religious groups, especially radical forms. | Emergence of religious groups seeking to restore Islamic values and defend Muslim values. |

### 2.1.2 Recent trends in the political context

Indonesia is considered to be a story of democratic success, but it still struggles to realize the benefits of sustained and equitable economic growth. In the political context, the main challenges lie in governing such geographically vast and decentralized country, applying principles of good governance and the enormous task of reforming the country's bureaucracy.

Although, Indonesia's 'big bang' decentralization initiated at the turn of the century narrowed the gap between local government and citizens, it has also localized political power struggles. While the devolution of authorities relieved tensions between the central government and the regions, it has also created opportunities for corrupt and rent-seeking practices, at the local level. As indicated by Transparency International's corruption index scores, perceived corruption in Indonesia remains high.

[3] Rumah Pemilu, "Gambaran Singkat Pemilihan Umum 2014 di Indonesia", 3 July 2014. Available from http://www.rumahpemilu.org/in/read/3351/Gambaran-Singkat-Pemilihan-Umum-2014-di-Indonesia (accessed 25 October 2014)

Table 2

*Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer survey: Indonesia*

| Year | Corruption perceptions Index Score<br>*(0 perceived as highly corrupt and 100 perceived as clean)* | Rank |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 30 | 100/182 |
| 2012 | 32 | 118/174 |
| 2013 | 32 | 114/177 |

Source: Transparency International

In 2013, decentralization was taken a step further with the approval of the Village Law, intended to address weak governance arrangements and empower rural communities to participate politically. The new law could also lead to village elites distorting power relations and misusing government funding if not properly monitored.

Indonesia is still transitioning politically and many challenges lie ahead. According to the 2012 Indonesia Governance Index's Executive Report, "Indonesia is witnessing a paradox in its democracy. On one hand, a successful opening-up of civil liberty has led to the avalanche of democratic demands across the nation, however on the other hand, democratic institutions' are inadequately respond to those demands." Nonetheless, the Indonesian Governance Index, which focuses on measuring provincial governance, does show a general improvement in the performance of the government (political office) bureaucracy, civil society and economic society based on principles of participation, transparency, fairness, accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness between 2008 and 2012. Civil society scores improved the most significantly, while scores for bureaucracy rose slightly[4].

Table 3

*Indonesia Governance Index: Average provincial scores*

| Arena | 2008 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| Government | 4.93 | 5.46 |
| Bureaucracy | 5.53 | 5.58 |
| Civil Society | 4.85 | 6.33 |
| Economic Society | 4.77 | 5.71 |

Source: http://www.kemitraan.or.id/igi

In the past decade, Indonesians have generally enjoyed a freedom to participate in the political process through a direct-election mechanism. However, in September 2014 lawmakers voted in favour of a bill reviving indirect elections of regional heads. The controversial vote provoked public outcry which saw peaceful protests and the public voicing their discontent through social media. In early October, just before the end of his term, president Yudhoyono issued a regulation in lieu of the law, effectively repealing the law until further judicial review.

The recent 2014 elections which marked the end of Yudhoyono's 10-year term, demonstrated that Indonesian voters are increasingly voting for popular figures irrespective of political party alliances. While practices of corruption, vote-buying and poor voter administration remained in the recent election, the public seems to have matured politically, indicated by the enormous interest in televised debates between the leading candidates. The appeal of the newly sworn in President Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, has come from his hands-on, man-of-the-people approach. As Jokowi begins his five-year term he will need to start addressing a myriad of challenges that include corruption, stagnant economic growth, and human rights concerns, particularly with respect to the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and religious intolerance. If left unaddressed, these challenges could seriously undermine Indonesia's stability and democratic reforms.

[4] The IGI uses a scale of 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest). Data is available online through their website. Indonesia Governance Index, Data, "IGI Executive Report". Available from http://www.kemitraan.or.id/igi/index.php/data/publication/factsheet/275-igi-executive-report (accessed 25 October 2014)

## 2.2 Civil Society context issues with regards to the MDG

Several important changes took place during the 2011 and 2014 period. First, the global financial crisis and Indonesia's rise to a middle-income country led to a decrease in international donor funding. Development actors, including CSOs and NGOs, have to compete harder for funding. Some have been more successful than others in diversifying funding by turning to the private sector or private foundations. At the expense of past idealism, local NGOs are now more disposed to receiving funding sources which in the past may have been criticized as supporting neoliberalism.

Regulatory changes also affected the civil society arena positively and negatively. Amongst the more controversial laws to spark reaction was Law No. 17/2013 on Societal Organisations. In an open letter sent before the bill was enacted, CIVICUS said the law would undermine freedom of association and "prevent CSOs from working on sensitive topics related to good governance and democratic reform in the public interest"[5]. FORUM-ASIA deplored the repressive provisions in the law that "leave all groups vulnerable to attacks, undermining the hard-won democratic space that has been forged by civil society since the end of the New Order regime"[6].

Other laws passed that provoked criticism were weak the State Intelligence Law (October 2011) and the Social Conflict Law (April 2012). NGOs and media see these laws as imposing further restrictions on freedom of speech, potentially leading to the criminalization of human rights defenders and signifying a tightening of state control. Discriminatory content was also an issue in discussions on the Religious Harmony Bill in 2013, for which drafting was initiated in despite not being part of the planned National Legislative Program. Late in 2013, the House of Representatives came under fire again for its stance against religious intolerance when it re-endorsed a law that limits state-recognized religions to six.

Land rights and natural resource protection have been a long-standing issue for Indonesia. While Indonesia has adopted and amended laws to improve the rights of smallholders and indigenous communities, many of these regulations have faltered in their implementation. Part of the issue lies in the overlap and lack of clarity of laws adopted that regulate different sectors and local legislation. Another issue is that there is a lack of oversight in the procedures such as granting permits and licensing. These problems, which are commonly found across development sectors, are compounded by a lack of information among local communities on what the laws regulate and their rights vis-à-vis them.

[5] Civicus, "Civicus Releases an Open Letter Requesting the Indonesian Parliament to reject the Proposed Ormas Law and Create an Enabling Environment for Civil Society", 10 April 2013. Available from http://civicus.org/index.php/en/media-centre-129/open-letters/1581-open-letter-requesting-the-indonesian-parliament-to-reject-to-the-proposed-ormas-law-and-create-an-enabling-environment-for-civil-society (accessed 27 October 2014)

[6] Azhar, Haris. 2013. Repressive provision in the Ormas law. Statement to The Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, in Forum-Asia, "Indonesia: Passage of Ormas Bill Condemned, Campaign to Oppose the Law to Continue", Bangkok, 4 July 2013. Available from http://www.forum-asia.org/?p=16305 (accessed 27 October 2014)

# 3 KBR and its contribution to civil society/policy changes

## 3.1 Background of KBR68H

Kantor Berita Radio 68H (KBR68H) began in 1999, as a part of *Institut Studi Arus Informasi* (ISAI)[7], in response to the closure of three vocal magazines (Tempo, Editor and Detak) by the Suharto government. During the Suharto regime, radio broadcasting suffered heavily from media restrictions, with the only source of news being the state agency. KBR68H chose radio as a medium because of its affordability and potential reach. In the transition to democracy, KBR was able to seize the opportunity to become the first radio news agency acting outside of the state.

In the same year of its establishment, KBR68H was brought under a limited company, PT. Media Lintas Inti Nusantarato to allow for greater flexibility, marketing power, and positioning within the media landscape of Indonesia. By joining the new media market, KBR has the ability to compete with private capital-driven media and has come out as the largest private radio news agency in Indonesia, producing a variety of high-quality information, based on public interest programming. PT. Media Lintas Inti Nusantara is also the parent company of Green Radio Jakarta, Pekanbaru Green Radio, Tempo TV and Portal KBR. In the end of 2013, the company further expanded its reach by signing a business partnership agreement with SmartFM[8].

Given its position within the private sector, KBR's relations with its constituents can be considered as business exchanges. These relations, however, are quite flexible. For example, community radio stations may receive KBR services free of charge, and they also receive shares of revenue from commercial advertisements. Notwithstanding, KBR68H has an explicit public service ethos. As an independent radio news agency, KBR68H is "committed to freedom of information, good quality media, and increasing information access". It considers itself "a friend for listeners during a process of democratic transition, moving towards a better future for the country"[9]. Broadcasted programs serve as a medium for public education and cover critical content, such as legal reform, regional autonomy, environment, public health, small and medium enterprises, education, religion and tolerance, and democracy. KBR believes that their constituents choose them primarily for their content quality, along with the prospect of profit. Interestingly, radio stations and government-funded information campaigns often prefer KBR68H over official government radio (RRI) because of KBR's reputation for quality content.

Starting off with 30 minutes of on-air time and seven relaying partners, KBR currently serves up to eight hours of on-air programming to 900 radio stations throughout Indonesia (100 of which are community radio stations), as well as 9 countries in Asia. KBR is supported by 50 journalists in Jakarta, 100 correspondents in numerous cities in Indonesia and 20 contributors across Asia. Aside from delivering content, KBR commits itself to raising the standards of the radio industry by providing:

1. Training for aspiring and intermediate journalists;
2. Training for radio technicians;
3. Marketing training, and;
4. Support to the development of radio stations in remote areas.

[7] ISAI itself is a member of the *Komunitas Utan Kayu* affiliation set up in 1994. The same affiliation also gave birth to *Komunitas Salihara*, who specializes in art media and *Jaringan Islam Liberal* (Liberal Islamic Network).

[8] Green Radio FM Pekanbaru, Radio Profile, "Perluas Jaringan Informasi, KBR68H Gandeng SmartFM Radio Network". 15 December 2014. Available from https://greenradiofmpekanbaru.wordpress.com/2013/12/15/perluas-jaringan-informasi-kbr68h-gandeng-smartfm-radio-network/ (accessed 15 November 2014)

[9] "Company Profile", KBR68H, no date (probably from 2010)

KBR68H has received numerous national and international awards, both for journalists and institutional merits.

## 3.2 MFS II interventions related to Civil Society

In general, KBR68H's impact on civil society is the encouragement of democracy, tolerance and civic participation, through the production and distribution of high-quality information by a network of local radio stations as well as by promoting professionalism in the media world[10].

Free Press Unlimited (FPU)'s support to KBR68H specifically falls under the Teen Voice Program, which aims to deliver news to young, teenage audiences. KBR68H considers this program to be ground-breaking, as it is one of the very few of its kind to be produced by a private news agency. For KBR it is critical to provide youth with informative programming on issues such as corruption; and to provide teens with an outlet to voice their opinions. They see this as a means to enhance teenagers' confidence and prepare them to be future actors in the national reformation process. Teen Voice, implemented by KBR with € 279,403 in funding, had two main objectives:

- Provide children and teens (target age group 10-14) in Indonesia with the tools to gain a better understanding and insight into their world, and a platform to express their opinions;
- Improve the journalistic quality of children's news reporters in Indonesia.The Teen Voice intervention relates most closely to the CIVICUS dimension of 'civic engagement' sought to deliver educational and critical content *to* teenagers *by* teenagers - telling the story through their eyes. Teen Voice was expected to give opportunities to teens to express their opinions on daily issues. As such, it was intended to plant the seeds of democratic traits such as freedom of expression and constructive dialogue.

Other aspects of the program have some relevance to 'level of organisation' of KBR68H, especially the ability to cooperate, network and build productive linkages with similar actors. FPU provided opportunities for Teen Voice and KBR to network internationally through the Kids News Network (KNN). Internally, KBR relies on the quality of networking and the organisation's relation vis-à-vis the public and private sector to maintain a balance between profitability with societal idealism.

[10] King Baudouin Foundation. 2009. *Press Release: The 2008-2009 King Baudouin International Development Prize has been awarded to the radio press agency KBR68H (Indonesia) in recognition of its contribution to democratic development*. Brussel, 19 May. Available from https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDUQFjAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.kbprize.org%2FuploadedFiles%2FKBPrize%2F04Winners%2FAll_winners%2F2009_persbericht_Eng.doc&ei=qChoVNv7N5CMuASa8YDwCQ&usg=AFQjCNHeACVmEStIKqAOL8aNCTSF_VP2Yg&sig2=3WwQzt7IAk_4fsUH4_efxA (accessed 16 November 2014)

## 3.3 Basic information

Table 4

*Basic information KB68H*

| | | Details |
|---|---|---|
| Name of SPO | : | Kantor Berita Radio 68H (KBR68H) |
| Consortium | : | Press Freedom 2.0 |
| CFA | : | Free Press Unlimited |
| Start date of cooperation | : | 1 July 2011 |
| MDG/Theme | : | Governance |
| MFS II Project Name | : | Teen Voice (Project#: F-ID-02-11-01) |
| Contract period | : | July 1, 2011 - December 31, 2012 |
| Total budget FPU | : | € 279,403 |
| Other donors if applicable | : | From the project's financing scheme, KBR68H contributed its own resources valued at € 12,268 and other donors (name not provided) contributed a value of € 19,797 specifically for equipment support. |
| Estimation of % of budget for Civil Society[11] | : | 7% |

Sources: Project documents

[11] Costs that relate to civil society development or policy influence are those costs that possibly contribute to the development of the CIVICUS dimensions, excluding coordination and office costs; staff costs and financial reserves.

# 4 Data collection and analytical approach

## 4.1 Adjustments made in the methodology of the evaluation

The documentation provided by Free Press Unlimited at the start of the end line assessment period was quite comprehensive. This allowed CDI to provide direction to the in-country team on what areas to focus the evaluation on following an input-output-outcome analysis. In addition, Free Press undertook an audience perception baseline and end line survey, which allowed the evaluation to focus on whether Teen Voice was successfully continued or mainstreamed in KBR68H's programming or networks.

The evaluation team in the field followed the operational guidelines to a great extent, but was unable to have a workshop with all KBR68H for an entire day. In practice, the workshop lasted half a day and was followed up with separate interviews with relevant staff. A separate meeting was scheduled to meet external parties and network organisations.

## 4.2 Difficulties encountered during data collection

Since the FPU-funded project ended in 2012, some key staff, with the exception of the director, have moved fromKBR68H. This presented challenges in assessing the extent to which KBR68H's level of organisation has changed. However, the team managed to contact some of the beneficiaries of the program who were also interviewed during the baseline.

Because of the time frame of the project and that of the end line, few changes occurred since the 2012 baseline. As a result, the in-country team focused on reconfirming the findings from the baseline and assessing the extent to which the changes had been sustained in the period since 2012. Ideally, the baseline assessment would have taken place earlier (in 2010) rather than during a period in which most of the SPO's activities were wrapping up. This would have made it easier to identify and track how changes occurred from base to end line.

## 4.3 Identification of outcomes for in-depth process tracing

This project was not selected for process tracing; however, in identifying the changes in 2012-2014 period, one outcome related on civic engagement was identified. Because KBR68H's program was very focused on increasing the exposure of teenagers and youth to news coverage, only one outcome was selected for evaluation. This outcome was selected because it represents major inputs of the program and taking into consideration the availability of evidence.

# 5 Results

## 5.1 Results obtained in relation to intervention logic

Table 5

*Overview of results achieved in relation to project plan KB68H*

| Planned results | | Level of achievement |
|---|---|---|
| Objective 1 | Provide children and teens (target age group 10-14) in Indonesia with the tools to gain a better understanding and insight into their world, and a platform to express their opinions | Overall, children have positive opinions about Teen Voice television & radio programs |
| Result 1.1 | After 18 months, at least 128 episodes of Teen Voice radio (2 new episodes/week excluding reruns) and 192 episodes of Teen Voice TV (3 new episodes/week excluding reruns) have been produced and broadcast | Achieved, 148 episodes broadcast on radio. 165 episodes of Teen Voice TV completed. |
| Result 1.2 | Children in Indonesia have a platform to freely express their opinions and to gain understanding and knowledge of their world | Achieved, episodes covered children's' and teen's issues. Teen Voice is the kids' news programme in Indonesia. |
| Objective 2 | Improve the journalistic quality of children's news reporters in Indonesia | Partially achieved, two awards for KBR68H journalists (Ikhsan Raharjo and Liza Desylanhi) on child issues from UNICEF and ILO[12]. |
| Result 2.1 | A team of 6 radio reporters and 6 TV reporters are trained and experienced in producing a high quality kids news program | Achieved, a team of 12 journalists received extensive training on how to produce quality news and information programme (for both radio and TV) aimed at children 10 to 14 years of age. |
| Result 2.2 | South-South exchange through network cooperation & item exchange with other KNN members (via the Online Exchange Server/ WKN program) | Achieved |
| Result 2.3 | The program will be financially sustainable after the project period | Not achieved, still dependent on external funding. |

While we can conclude that most of the planned activities were implemented and milestones were achieved, at the outcome level, specifically the first outcome, it is more difficult to draw an assessment on the level of achievement. There are three main sources of information that provide relevant insights, namely: 1) an audience survey commissioned by FPU, conducted by Yayasan Pengembangan Media Anak (YPMA), which generally concluded on the basis of surveys that children have positive opinions of Teen Voice television and radio program; 2) FPU's own assessments of the of KBR's reports that reported successful interventions with regards to the creation of radio and TV episodes and online platforms (website, Facebook, Twitter) but some discrepancies between planned and actual results, and 3) interviews conducted during the evaluation.

The main area where KBR fell short was in sustaining the Teen Voice program[13]. Specifically, long-term financial sustainability was not achieved despite efforts to develop a business plan of acceptable quality, which admittedly took a long time to formulate (submitted only in August 2013). This was identified as a risk from the start of the intervention, but KBR struggled to find a balance between quality programming and market or private-sector ideas of commercialisation. Fundraising and sales were not properly embedded within the organization and seemed to have lacked priority. Revenues to

[12] Liza Desylanhi's report on traumatized Ahmadiyah children in Bogor (AJI-UNICEF)and Ikhsan Raharjo on child labour (ILO)

[13] According to discussion between FPU and KBR in mid -January 2015, as a result of business split between KBR and Tempo Group as of 1 January 2015 ,Teen Voice is now under the Tempo Group with the idea, among others, to make again a TV version possible in the very near future.

continue Teen Voice were not generated because insufficient donors were found, permanent viewership was not mobilized, and off-air events did not generate sufficient visibility and awareness.

## 5.2 Changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period

Teen Voice radio and television programs ended in December 2012, thus changes in civil society will be discussed in this section by focusing on the extent to which changes or results delivered through the project were sustained in the 2012-2014 period and how KBR has coped with current challenges.

### 5.2.1 Civic Engagement

Civic engagement describes the formal and informal activities and participation undertaken by individuals to advance shared interests at different levels. Participation within civil society is multi-faceted and encompasses socially-based and politically-based forms of engagement.

From July 2011 to December 2012, KBR was able to enhance civic engagement through Teen Voice. Teen Voice is considered by many to be unique amongst commercial media in Indonesia given that there are very few programs that serve quality fare for children. According to estimates, 81 million viewers of television in Indonesia are under the age of 18, but very few programmes cater to this age group.[14] The broadcasted shows sought to inspire children and teenagers through compelling news content so that children would have a more active interest in issues covered by Teen Voice.[15] The involvement of teenage reporters helped to tell the story from the eyes of the teenagers.

In 2012, Teen Voice expanded from radio shows to the popular mediums of television and internet platforms with support from FPU. Teen Voice was (re)broadcast on 22 local television stations as well as a subscription-based TV channel (AORA TV) and social media. At its height, some 53 radio stations relayed televised versions of Teen Voice. The number of radio stations broadcasting Teen Voice dropped from 53 to 51 in November 2012.[16] In early 2013 the frequency of broadcasting fell to once a week after FPU project funding ended. In 2013, KBR estimated that when Teen Voice was broadcast through mainstream media, some 400,000 viewers were reached and around 770,000 young people listened to Teen Voice[17].

In the last year of the project, Teen Voice discontinued relaying programs through mainstream media. KBR68H turned to the use of online media. Although fewer audiences have been reached, the internet and social media allowed for more interactive engagement. Teen Voice did improved its online presence through a fan page and Twitter account. It also began broadcasting on YouTube and moved its website to the parent channel of KBR68H (http://www.portalkbr.com/teenvoice/).

Despite its reputable programs, Teen Voice has failed to position its program within the market and has been unable to continue to produce content and maintain an audience base. As an illustration, one of its episodes available through the WKN's WaDaDa YouTube channel (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YCYyfYzKbjA) only received 45 views as of 16 November 2014.[18]

New possibilities to launch the TeenVoice programme again on television have been created when the programme was shifted to the Tempo Group since 2015[19].

[14] Free Press Unlimited, "Indonesia's Teen Voice: on the right track", 10 September 2012. Available from https://www.freepressunlimited.org/en/article/indonesia%E2%80%99s-teen-voice-right-track (accessed 21 November 2014)https://www.freepressunlimited.org/en/article/indonesia%E2%80%99s-teen-voice-right-track

[15] According to the proposal submitted in early 2011, this program was expected to reach around a million radio listeners and 100 thousands television viewers from various groups. Teens and also parents are expected to obtain information from this program, be it from direct listening, from the information passed on by their children or from media reporting the content of this program.

[16] "Activity Report Term III Children's News Bulletin Teen Voice KBR68H Jakarta (July – December 2012)", KBR68H, 2013

[17] "Teen Voice Business Plan", KBR68H, 2013

[18] 'WaDaDa' provides a selection of news items produced by members of the World Kid's Network all over the world.

[19] Information received from FPU Program Manager South Asia on 21 January 2015

With regards to its reach, Teen Voice's ability to attain a larger audience and involve more children and teenagers through its programming has diminished; fewer people have been reached since Teen Voice through radio and television was discontinued in January 2014 and continued through web-portal. However, KBR remains a reliable and active member of the Kids News Network of Free Press Unlimited.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**

**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 0**

### 5.2.2 Level of Organisation

This dimension assesses the organisational development, complexity and sophistication of civil society, by looking at the relationships among the actors within the civil society arena.

Given how Teen Voice fared in the 2012-2014 period, the SPO's relations with other CSOs working on the concerns of teenagers and youth has decreased with the discontinuation of the televised and radio-broadcasted programmes. Due to budget constraints in 2013, the number of crew members was cut back from six to three. Compared to the baseline, KBR has thus been less effective in defending the interests of teens and youths as a marginalised group in mainstream media. FPU has recognized that the main challenge of Teen Voice laid in its long-term sustainability of the project (in terms of finances and funding, business management, viewership and audience base)[20]. The business plan finalized in August 2013 seems to have been unsuccessful. From the evaluation team's perspective, working to bring teen voices into mainstream media requires considerable investment and financial sustainability within the given timeframe of Teen Voice was probably not a realistic expectation.

However, KBR itself continues to be Indonesia's leading independent radio network with 900 partner radio stations across Indonesia and in nine countries in Asia and Australia. The SPO's network has grown significantly since 2000, when it encompassed just seven radio stations, and 2000 when 600 radios were part of the network. In 2013, KBR's parent company signed a business partnership agreement with SmartFM, which could also be considered a competitor of KBR. The collaboration is seen as mutually beneficial: KBR expands its audience base in the cities of Jakarta, Medan, Palembang, Semarang, Surabaya, Manado, Makassar, Balikpapan and Banjarmasin; while SmartFM is able to air its programs through KBR's extended network. However, the Teen Voice programme has not been part of this network expansion. While there is a general consensus amongst the network of the importance of teen or youth-oriented programmes, the discontinuation of Teen Voice radio and infrequent updates of the KBR web portal mean that Teen Voice is not relayed by the network.

With its activist roots, KBR68H maintains an affiliation with AJI and the Tempo group, which includes organisations such as Komunitas Utan Kayu, Salihara and international NGOs (Hivos, The Asia Foundation, Ford Foundation amongst others). The collaboration between KBR68H and its network of radio station is a demand-and-supply oriented relationship. In 2013, KBR68H launched a successful subsidiary online news portal, PortalKBR.com in partnership with TV Tempo to further extend its reach by allowing radio partners to send and receive information more effectively. "PortalKBR.com is the result of the convergence of the radio world and the online world with a specific mission to become a news portal that provides a place for the flow of information from the regions."[21]

This recent development is also reflected in the financial resources and internal governance of KBR. A new division for creative and marketing services has been set up since the baseline demonstrating new priorities and a need to be more business savvy. Organisationally, KBR has sought out creative ways to generate revenue, favouring a mixed business model that draws revenues from advertising, sponsorships and events[22]Government ministries and agencies have contributed to revenue generation by paying for the broadcast of public service announcements about family planning, AIDS prevention, forest conservation and other issues.

[20] See report by Chermene Fisser, 28 August 2013 p.2

[21] Translated from PortalKBR.com's website: http://portalkbr.com/tentangkami.html

[22] George, Cherian, ed. 2014. *Asia Journalism Focus: Sustaining Independent Journalism*. August 26. Available from http://www.scribd.com/doc/237725106/Asia-Journalism-Focus-Sustaining-Independent-Journalism#scribd (accessed 17 November 2014)

The SPO has diversified the composition of its financial resources. According to information provided by KBR to the evaluation team, only 10 percent of the revenues now come from donor agencies, compared to 31 percent during the baseline[23]. This could also be a reflection of trend in foreign aid funding rather than the success of KBR alone. KRB has had problems with financing the continuation of several programs, not only Teen Voice. In May 2014, it was forced to take 'Asia Calling', its award-winning program off the air due to a lack of funding. Fortunately it was able to revive the program due to a new sponsor. This illustrates that KBR68H still has some way to go in making its business model a success.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 3**

**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 1**

### 5.2.3 Practice of Values

Practice of Values refers to the internal practice of values within the civil society arena. Important values that CIVICUS looks at such as transparency, democratic decision making, taking into account diversity that are deemed crucial to gauge not only progressiveness but also the extent to which civil society's practices are coherent with their ideals.

As during the baseline, the composition of shareholders of KBR's parent company PT. Median Lintas Inti Nusantara, remains the same, i.e. Koperasi Utan Kayu, Yayasan ISAI, other institutions and some individual shareholders. These shareholders continue to meet at least once a year to review the progress of KBR68H. As a limited company, financial audits are followed as regulated by the government. Overall, there is no change in terms of downward accountability and the public can access the company's financial information.

With KBR drawing revenue from advertising and sponsorships, the organisation has set up internal standards which forbid it to receive advertising income from tobacco companies and firms with poor environmental records as this would contradict the organisation's mission and concerns. In addition, the production teams are separate from the marketing divisions, so the latter does not influence the content of programs.[24] Despite claiming that revenue sources are carefully selected, KBR continued to work with private patrons, like Exxon Mobile, who sponsored talk shows on women's issues. Exxon Mobil has received criticism in the past for environmental performance and the collaboration would suggest that internal codes are not followed or implemented.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 3**

**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 0**

### 5.2.4 Perception of Impact

Perception of Impact assesses the perceived impact of civil society actors on politics and society as a whole as the consequences of collective action. In this, the perceptions of both civil society actors (internal) as well as actors outside civil society are taken into account. Specific sub-dimensions for this evaluation are the extent to which the SPO has contributed to engaging more people in social or political activities, strengthening CSOs and their networks, and has influenced public and private sector policies.

By design, KBR68H's contribution to civil society is indirect through the production of high-quality information and independent journalism in line with freedom of information. This situation did not change since the baseline. FPU's support, such as building the capacity of journalists to produce children's programs, was more relevant to KBR68H as an organisation rather than directly impacting

[23] According to the document cited in the previous paragraph, donor contributions still amount to 20 percent of KBR's revenues. In 1999 when KBR was founded it relied solely on foreign grants.

[24] George, Cherian, ed. 2014. *Asia Journalism Focus: Sustaining Independent Journalism*. August 26. Available from http://www.scribd.com/doc/237725106/Asia-Journalism-Focus-Sustaining-Independent-Journalism#scribd (accessed 17 November 2014)

teens. The discontinuation of Teen Voice is illustrative that the SPO has not been able to build a strong link with civil society to create a high demand for the continuation of the program.

With regards to assessing the change in client satisfaction in 2012-2014 period, it is worth discussing Teen Voice participants and audience. Social media is one indication of satisfaction. Since KBR initiated its @TEENVO1CE Twitter account, its followers grew to 700 in March 2013[25] to 889 in November 2013 and 1,016[26] in mid-November 2014[27]. Although growth in followers has slowed (189 in nine months to 127 in 12 months) this is not surprising given Teen Voice's discontinuation. FPU commissioned base and end line audience surveys to collect opinions of Teen Voice target audience, intended to help Tempo TV/ KBR68H improve its program and website. Overall findings showed that the majority enjoyed watching and listening to Teen Voice. Three quarters of those surveyed said they learned from the television programs and 88 percent said they learned from radio programs. Almost all children surveyed found Teen Voice to be useful in their daily life, in for example learning and confidence building[28]. This evaluation was unable to conduct a similar survey, but data from interviews and former training participants reported high satisfaction of Teen Voice. The program was seen as providing a venue for the children to express themselves and open the potential for children's participation in media; this was unlike other mass media that sometimes exploited them.

Regarding KBR68H's relations with the public and private sector, and its ability to influence rules, regulations and practices, the evaluation found no significant changes occurring since the baseline. As a platform for public interaction KBR68H considers the public sector to be both a source and recipient of information, or even a client. KBR engaged a number of government representatives by inviting them to be resource persons in Teen Voice episodes. In addition, their client base included the National Family Planning Coordinating Agency, Ombudsman Commission, National Law Commission, Government-owned corporation PT. Pegadaian (Persero), and Ministry of National Education.

As mentioned before, KBR maintains relations with private sector agencies, considering them to be revenue sources. This has not changed since the baseline. KBR received corporate social responsibility (CSR) funding from Danone, Coca Cola and Exxon Mobil. There is no evidence that KBR68H has influenced private or public policies and practices. The only way it does so is indirectly, by publishing and airing credible news of issues which may concern policies and practices.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**

**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 0**

### 5.2.5 Civil Society Environment

The social, political and economic environment in which civil society operates affects its room for manoeuvre. The civil society context has been described in chapter 3. In this section we describe how KBR68H is coping with that context.

Indonesians have come to embrace social media. Given this context, the launching of PortalKBR.com since the baseline has been a strategic move. The portal is a logical development for the radio network. As the managing director, Tosca Santoso, explained, "All mainstream media need to think about the fundamental transition to digital media". He believes that this is the next best step for KBR68H. In 2012, Teen Voice starting using Facebook and Twitter as a platform for audience interaction. Both forms of social media are popular amongst Indonesian youth.

KBR68H institutionally has been able to adapt to changes in the media environment. Through the web portal and the internet, KBR68H has changed the flow of information from being one-way to two-way communication with radio partners and audiences.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**

**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 1**

[25] "Activity Report Term III Children's News Bulletin Teen Voice KBR68H Jakarta (July – December 2012)", KBR68H, 2013
[26] "Report of the Kids News Network Summit 2013", Free Press Unlimited, 2013
[27] Twitter, "Teen Voice". Available from https://twitter.com/teenvo1ce, (accessed 17 November 2014)
[28] "Final Report of Audience Survey Teen Voice", YPMA, 2013

## 5.3 To what degree are the changes attributable to the Southern partners?

### 5.3.1 Civic engagement

The identified change, i.e. increased participation of teenagers in the news program Teen Voice, was achieved in the period 2011 - 2013. More teenagers were exposed to independent news produced specifically for a young audience. The televised and radio broadcasted version of the program reached a wide audience by through 51 radio stations reaching some 770,000 young people and 23 television stations reaching some 400,000 viewers in 2013. In 2013, however, the audience numbers dropped with the discontinuation of Teen Voice television and radio.

Since 2012, the last year of the program, KBR expanded to web-based platforms. This new media form, although it has reached fewer audiences, has in 2013 been able to create more interactive communication with a smaller social media audience.

There are two pathways that were considered for the increased participation. The first attributed this change to the expansion of Teen Voice to digital media, whilst the later considered this as a result of traditional media forms, i.e. television and radio.

*Pathway 1:* KBR68H's use of social media platforms, Facebook and Twitter, and KBR68H's portal resulted in a larger audience.

The web-based platforms allow for an optimum utilization of social media for more interactive interaction with target groups. Social media platforms expand the opportunities for teenager viewers to be reporters and to propose story ideas, enlarging opportunities for engagement. The involvement of teenage reporters helps sharpen the story angle to capture the views of target audiences.

The following information confirms this pathway to increased participation of teenagers:
- The web portal, social media and Twitter are active and have 63,000 followers (as of 17 November 2014);
- Teen Voice is part of KBR web portal (Source: PortalKBR)[29]
- Participation by teenagers is documented in the portal[30]
- Content analysis of teen voice news by the evaluator in the web portal shows contents produced by teenagers (see for example interview by teen reporter as reported at http://www.portalkbr.com/teenvoice/bincang-kita/3030616_6437.html).

The following information rejects this pathway:
- Better coverage through traditional media forms (television and radio);
- Visitor-specific information per age-group (this information was unavailable).

*Pathway 2:* The Teen Voice program was expanded through mainstream media (television and radio). The following information confirms this pathway to increased participation of teenagers:

- Broadcasting of Teen Voice television episodes broadcast three times a week with 30-minute episodes on 22 local television stations, as well as on Channel 068, subscription-based AORA TV;
- Broadcasting of live shows twice a week on two radio stations in Jakarta, which was then relayed by 51 local radio stations;
- Content produced focuses on youth/teenagers (10-17 years old) as an audience and target groups are satisfied.

[29] PortalKBR. Available from http://www.portalkbr.com/teenvoice/index.html (accessed 17 November 2014)
[30] Ibid

The following information rejects this pathway:

- Pilot project with TransTV cancelled;
- Teen Voice program was discontinued on mainstream media.

**Conclusion**
Based upon the analysis of information available, we conclude that the most valid explanation for the increased quality of participation of the target group in Teen Voice since the baseline is the shift towards a web-based platform for Teen Voice. However, from July 2011 to December 2012, mainstream media was responsible for an increased exposure of teenagers to news broadcasts. In particular, the expansion of Teen Voice to television in 2011 created a larger audience base and more opportunities for participation. Thus, all three formats were necessary to achieve the outcome. It was the combination of both pathways that created the change from July 2011 to 2014. The role of the SPO was the production of content, the training of 12 journalists, training of young presenters, and the dissemination of content through their network and the development of a web-portal to make materials available through the internet. All these elements facilitated interaction through three different formats: television, radio and web-based.

## 5.4 What is the relevance of these changes?

### 5.4.1 Relevance of the changes in relation to the Theory of Change of 2012

The Theory of Change (ToC) of the 2012 baseline illustrated that KBR sought to provide quality news content aiming to assist the formation of an open, independent and ever growing society. The main critical assumption lay in the connection between quality of information and quality networking; and finding a balance between profitability and idealism. The second assumption rested on the government maintaining an environment that supported freedom of information and a conducive civil society that promoted positive forms of expression. Last, professional management was considered to essential in achieving desired changes.

With regards to the changes in civil society dimension in improving the network of radio stations, this is still very much relevant to the ToC. One of the preconditions of the ToC was quality networking. While no significant expansion has taken place and expectations for 2014 were not attained quantitatively (the number of radio stations in the network remains 900, falling short of the expected 1,000), the development of PortalKBR represents a significant improvement in the ability of transactions to occur between KBR and its network.

KBR's coverage remains prestigious, although it failed to secure new sponsors to enable it to sustain Teen Voice television and radio. The ToC assumed that a high level of organisation would lead to sustainability. The end line found that KBR68H is pushing the boundaries with regards to how it disseminated content, expanding to social and digital media. Nonetheless, KBR still needs to find innovative ways of raising its own funds in order to attract new sponsorship and investment, which has become even more critical given that traditional donors are phasing out of Indonesia since the country became a LMIC.

As for quality of information, success of delivering independent, accurate, credible and sought information was to be rated from KBR's recognition as a reputable organisation. Since the baseline, KBR continued to hold a unique and undisputed position as the largest independent station. In 2013, KBR's subsidiary, Green Radio, successfully encouraged off-air re-forestry actions in West Java that gained support from prominent Indonesians including the former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono; writer Ayu Utami; social activist and Ramon Magsaysay Awardee, Teten Masduki; and presenter Olga Lidya. Recently in 2014 Luvi Ana, an editor for Portalkbr.com, was nominated as a candidate for the N-PEACE awards for her work in advocating peace, tolerance, and striving against the women and minority marginalization[31].

[31] N-Peace Network, N-Peace Awards, Nominees 2014, "Luvi Ana: A powerful voice for equality". Available from http://n-peace.net/candidate/candidate-300 (accessed 22 November 2014)

As far as Teen Voice is concerned, external stakeholders interviewed during the evaluation positively confirmed the quality of information produced for Teen Voice, and quantitatively, the program reached a wide audience by being broadcast on 51 radio stations and 23 television stations. Furthermore, the audience survey commissioned by FPU showed that target groups were satisfied with the content produced.

Although the changes in civil society are still relevant to the ToC in 2012, KBR continued to struggle to find its position as a private sector agent with a triangular model of cooperation with the public sector, private sector and civil society. Granted, KBR now has an online and social media following, but this public support has not been able to create pressure and demands for continued production of civic education content on television and radio. The roles of the public and private sectors are limited as KBR's clientele and a financial resource base.

### 5.4.2 Relevance of the changes in relation to the context in which the SPO is operating

Although Teen Voice did not kick off as expected, and now only continues through online media, the interventions of KBRH68 remain relevant to civic engagement. "In comparison to the other age groups, teenagers and young adults consume more TV & radio programs; go more often to the cinemas, surf the internet and read magazines or tabloids more frequently than adults.[32]" The expansion of Teen Voice to television in 2011 and the transition to a web-based platform made sense considering trends in media consumption. Indonesian teens watch up to 4.5[33] to 5[34] hours of television a day. A recent 2014 UNICEF report claims that 30 million Indonesian teens are online; with most on social media. With the growing influence of media on the lives of teenagers and youth, and the numbers of internet expected to increase as technology becomes more affordable, disseminating positive and news-worthy messages can certainly have an influence on the views and opinions of the next generation. New media forms provide opportunities for engagement and ICT-based interventions are attracting more recognition.

In Indonesia's current media landscape, media ownership is concentrated in the hands of a few large multi-media conglomerates. The owners of these conglomerates are politically connected, some even running for presidential candidacy in 2014.[35] Mergers and acquisitions have led to media groups expanding their control in telecommunications. For instance, the CT Group acquired detik.com, one of the largest online media platforms, expanding its influence beyond television to online media.[36]

The Tempo Media Group, which operates KBR68H, unlike its more commercial, advertisement-oriented peers, is renowned for maintaining a high quality of journalism, focusing on the production of documentaries and producing content for local television stations.[37] As such, KBR68H and Tempo fill an important niche in Indonesia by providing quality content.

### 5.4.3 Relevance of the changes in relation to the policies of the MFS II alliance and the CFA

The official terms of reference for sending in MFS II proposals did not mention the requirement to report on Civil Society Outcomes and was only communicated after consortia started to implement

[32] Tjahjono, Godo. 2006. *Teenagers, Young Adults and the Media: A Study of Media Behavior in Jakarta*. Jakarta: University of Indonesia.

[33] Nielsen. 2009. *How Teens Use Media: A Nielsen report on the myths and realities of teen media trends*. Available from http://www.universitycircle.org/downloads/How%20Teens%20Use%20Media.pdf (accessed 22 November 2014)

[34] Free Press Unlimited, "Indonesia's Teen Voice: on the right track", 10 September 2012. Available from https://www.freepressunlimited.org/en/article/indonesia%E2%80%99s-teen-voice-right-track (accessed 21 November 2014)

[35] *Indonesia Media and Telecoms Landscape Guide*. Available from http://www.cdacnetwork.org/contentAsset/raw-data/0df69be9-1727-43af-8e97-c3e72bb9596f/attachedFile (accessed 22 November 2014)

[36] Nugroho, Y., Putri, D. N., Laksmi, S. 2012. *Mapping the landscape of the media industry in contemporary Indonesia*. Report Series. Engaging Media, Empowering Society: Assessing media policy and governance in Indonesia through the lens of citizens' rights. Research collaboration of Centre for Innovation Policy and Governance and HIVOS Regional Office Southeast Asia, funded by Ford Foundation. Jakarta: CIPG and HIVOS

[37] Ibid

their programme. There programme included a programmatic line on Governance with two specific objectives: SPOs including media play an effective role in terms of providing checks and balances related to legislative processes, policymaking and/or policy implementation and; SPOs including media participate more actively, have a stronger voice in political processes at different societal levels and/or deliver more quality. The KBR Teen Voice programme links to this second objective.

In Indonesia, Press Freedom 2.0 has three objectives: To promote gender equality in the Indonesian society with a focus on the prevention of women trafficking and support for its victims; To promote a free and professional media landscape with a focus on the development of high quality news and information programs aimed at children and youth (through Kids News Network), as well as independent journalists; To strengthen the capacities of and links and synergy between civil society organizations and media initiatives. The Teen Voice programme links to the second objective.

The KBR programme hence has been relevant in the light of these programmatic frameworks. After the project ended KBR continued to engage with the international Kids News Network, but Free Press Unlimited did not react to a request for a short interview on this network and KBR's role in it.

As noted by FPU, the biggest challenge with KBR was to develop and implement a sound business strategy that would ensure sufficient income to cover production and broadcast costs, which however did not materialize.

## 5.5 Explaining factors

### 5.5.1 Internal factors

When the project ended in December 2012, the number of crew members was cut back from six to three, hence decreasing KBR's capacity to ensure that children's voices continued to be heard and seen in Teen Voice Program. KBR was not successful in making a business plan in 2013 that would ensure the continuation of the Teen Voice Programme. However mainstreaming these voices requires considerable investments and financial sustainability which was not guaranteed with the MFS II project.

KBR68H is run by a respected media group, Tempo. Tempo started out in 1971 as a magazine by current affairs critic Goenawan Mohamad and the journalist Yusril Djalinu. The media group is known for publishing and producing critical content, sometimes making it unpopular amongst those with power. KBR68H's longstanding history, links with the Tempo Group, and large network have allowed it to continue to broadcast, able to pay the substantial fees required for frequency leasing.

FPU used the five capacities framework to assess the baseline capacities of KBR68H, later repeated at the end of 2011 (unfortunately no further assessments were made available to the evaluation team).

The following scores were reported:

Table 6
*FPU assessment of KBR68H against the 5C framework.*

| No. | Capacity | Baseline value | 2011 score |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1C | The Southern organisation is capable to commit and act. | 3.0 | 3.2 |
| 2C | The partner organisation is capable to deliver on development objectives. | 3.3 | 3.6 |
| 3C | The partner organisation is capable to relate. | 3.0 | 3.0 |
| 4C | The partner organisation is capable to adapt and self-renew. | 2.4 | 2.9 |
| 5C | The partner organisation is capable to achieve coherence. | 3.2 | 3.3 |

Source: Free Press Unlimited Annual Report 2011 – Result Area Capacity Strengthening

The assessment shows that KBR68H scored relatively well during the baseline, with slight increasing capacities when implementation was underway. Its online presence was strengthened and training was delivered to staff to improve the quality and information of radio broadcasts. In some elements relevant to civil society, the scores of KBR68H were high (range from 3.5-4, with 4 being the highest score). This partially explains why the networking activities with local radio stations were implemented smoothly. These detailed indicators under the core capacities illustrate this point.

Table 7

*FPU assessment of KBR68H against the 5C framework.*

| Core Capacity (5C) | Press Freedom Consortium Sub-indicator | 2011 score |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Strategy to engage with the media. | 4 |
| 2 | Organisation's infrastructure is considered sufficient and relevant for its core tasks. | 3.8 |
| 2 | The organisation supports the development of quality media, participation of civil society and/or the accountability of democratic institutions | 4 |
| 3 | The organisation enters into coalition with relevant stakeholders and maintains them. | 3.5 |
| 5 | The organisation has a balanced approach towards engaging in media – civil society co-operations. | 3.8 |

Source: Free Press Unlimited 5C Scan 2011

We may need to acknowledge support from other donor such as MDIF (Media Development Investment Fund) that since year 2000 has been a constant partner, providing a variety of finance and business support to develop KBR68H's content and geographic coverage.[38]

Another internal factor contributing to KBR68H's success is the distribution of its radio content to its partners via satellite. In the past, there was no way for partners to return information back to KBR68H apart from through telephone. The online portal has also acted as a hub, allowing radio partners to send back information daily.

### 5.5.2 External factors

KBR68H has proved to be reasonably capable of adjusting its programs to developments in the external environment. It has been able to find appropriate resource people to be part of the Teen Voice program and has keep abreast with issues that dominate the public discourse. One area where perhaps the SPO was unable to respond sufficiently was the migration of Teen Voice to the web and social media platform of KBR68H. This decision was made amidst financial challenges faced by Teen Voice[39]. The Chief Editor of KBR68H admitted that his organisation responded late and that the move was perhaps not innovative enough.

The number of internet users in Indonesia continues to grow. This trend is very likely to be a contributing factor to an increased popularity of PortalKBR. In 2011, Indonesia counted 55 million internet users[40]. According to the same survey company, MarkPlus Insight, user numbers grew to 61 million in 2012 and 75 million in 2013 (roughly 30 percent of the population)[41]. Amongst the respondents, who used internet more than three hours a day, the 15-30 year-old age group dominated.

Internet in Indonesia has great potential if media is used as a means to improve the quality of life and information distribution. But distribution is still marked by a digital divide. According to a report produced by Internews, "This is not only a result of geography, but also a consequence of government policy and programs, and of business practices[42]." More citizens may be using internet but those who are internet literate tend to reside in urban areas as 65 percent of the country's villages have no access to any network[43]. In the future, mobile internet usage has the potential to lessen this divide.

[38] Media Development Investment Fund, Case stories, "KBR68H, Indonesia: Opening Indonesia to the world". Available from http://www.mdif.org/kbr68h-indonesia/ (accessed 25 November 2014)

[39] Vivi Zabkie, "Heru Hendratmoko: Eh, siapa anak itu namanya?", *PortalKBR*, 23 October 2014. AvilableAvailable from http://www.portalkbr.com/offair/3360132_4227.html (accessed 25 November 2014)

[40] Amir Karimuddin, "MarkPlus Insight Survey: Indonesia Has 55 million Internet Users", *Daily Social*, 1 November 2011. Available from http://en.dailysocial.net/post/markplus-insight-survey-indonesia-has-55-million-internet-users (accessed 25 November 2014)

[41] MarkPlus Insight, "Indonesian Netizen Monitoring 2013". Available from http://www.markplusinsight.com/product/research_report/detail/44/indonesia-netizen-report-2013 (accessed 25 November 2014)

[42] Page 3, Abud, Matt. 2012. *Indonesia: New Digital Nation?*. Internews Center for Innovation and Learning, p. 3. Available from https://internews.org/sites/default/files/resources/Internews_Indonesia_DigitalNation_2012-07.pdf (accessed 25 November 2014)

[43] Ibid, p.8

By comparison, the penetration of television is higher, with almost 100 percent of household owning a television in 2011[44]. What this means is that with Teen Voice now only being broadcast through the Internet, its audiences are likely to be the urban rather than rural youth.

In March 2011, a book-pack edged bomb was sent to KBR68H's office. The package was suspected to be targeting a moderate Islamic scholar with links to ISAI and a reaction to KBR68H's show on religious tolerance. Concerns over a conducive media environment remain. At the policy level, there are many overlapping regulations on the access to information but no revisions to laws regulating the media since the baseline. Law No. 32/2002 on Broadcasting is seen to create unfair advantages to large media conglomerates and there is a risk that ownership may become too concentrate at the expense of diversity of opinions[45]. Additionally, the application of the Electronic Information and Transaction (ITE) Law No. 11/2008 has drawn concern from groups like Amnesty International for criminalizing freedom of expression and potential paving the way for restrictions to online media[46].

### 5.5.3 Relations CFA-SPO

FPU undertook a series of trainings to support the Teen Voice project. The aim was to assist KBR68H in capacitating Teen Voice staff to produce news content for children, which required a different journalistic approach[47]. Most of the trainings received positive feedback from KBR68H.

A second element of support from FPU was in the form of creating linkages between Teen Voice and the World Kids Network and Kids News Network. These linkages were intended to create a platform for cooperation and generate revenues for Teen Voice. The exchanges with WKN came quiet late in the intervention and it is unclear how effective the KNN platform was in generating revenues. Inputs from FPU were considered by KBR68H as the facilitating factors to their achievement.

[44] Nugroho, Yanuar and Syarif, S. Shinta. 2012. *Beyond Click-Activism? New Media and Political Processes in Contemporary Indonesia*. Fesmedia Asia series. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Available from http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/asia-media/09240.pdf (accessed 25 November 2014)

[45] Ambardi, K., Parahita, G., Lindawati, L., Sukarno, A., Aprilia, N. 2014. Mapping Digital Media: Indonesia. Country Report. London: Open Society Foundations. Available from http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/mapping-digital-media-indonesia-20140326.pdf (accessed 16 November 2014)

[46] Amnesty International. 2014. *Indonesia, Setting The Agenda: Human Rights Priorities For The New Government*. London: Amnesty International Publications. Available from http://www.amnesty.ca/sites/default/files/indonesiahumanrightsagenda29april14.pdf (accessed 25 November 2014)

[47] "Consulting Agreement F-ID-02-11-05.",", KBR68H, 5 July 2011

# 6 Discussion

## 6.1 Design of the interventions

KBR68H's interventions were based on the assumption that youth and teenagers are underrepresented in Indonesian media, and that were very few programs that cater to this under-served target group. KBR's Teen Voice was based on the premise that television and radio programing could provide venue for civic education that in turn would promote civic engagement by creating a well-informed and engaged youth/teenage public who promoted democratic ideals.

While this assumption was valid, the program design and interventions would have benefited from a more in-depth assessment of the links between civic participation and media usage among youth, factoring in specific age groups, types of media used, and identifying information gaps. This kind of assessment would of course require financial resources and a willingness on the part of the funding agencies to invest as well as consensus between SPO and the CFA that the choice of the target group made by the SPO, not the CFA

Another feature of the design which could have been stronger was the targeted age group. This seemed to vary from one report and document to another; some mentioning 10 to 14, others 10-17 and 12-17). The audience survey also found that younger, elementary school-aged children were more impressed with Teen Voice than older children. Content could have expressly targeted an even more specific age bracket. This would facilitate the development of appropriate content, selection of prime-times for this age group, as well as taking into account media habits (such as the distancing of urban adolescents from radio and the growing usage of mobile phones and internet).

A majority of the respondents in the audience survey reported to watch Teen Voice with friends and classmates, and many said it helped them at school. The end line survey also goes on to recommend a better linkage between Teen Voice content and school lessons. This is probably a worthwhile suggestion for improving future designs, especially since it offers a link with the most widespread source of civic education, namely formal school systems. At a regional level, this could then be linked to KBR's radio network, promoting youth activism in local radio stations. Additionally, it would potentially provide KBR with a means to promote public or government financing of such a program.

At the design stage, KBR68H expected support and sponsorship for Teen Voice from the commercial sector and government to sustain the program. FPU also linked it to KNN to derive revenues from uploaded content on the web platform. But KBR was unable to maintain the operations and benefits of Teen Voice beyond 2013. This is partly because planning for sustainability happened too late. The business plan development began late in 2012 and wasn't completed until after the project life time. Other interventions were not sufficiently timely. For example, the Kids News Summit held in November 2013 included a session on business plan development, but this came too late for Teen Voice. The issue of financial sustainability should have been addressed from the start and integrated into the way the project was implemented. For instance, the linking and networking activities supported by FPU, as well as the trainings, should have been focused equally developing quality programming as on KBR's institutional ability to attract long-term public and private funding for such programs.

If Teen Voice, or similar interventions, is considered for replication, then development partners will need to take the ever-changing media landscape into account. More specifically, the internet should be considered as both a source for sharing and promoting and a source of revenue. PortalKBR.com and KNN are already using this concept. Nonetheless, the power of the internet is still underutilized. For instance, KBR68H could be pushing the boundaries in developing mobile technology or web-based applications to spur greater engagement of their target youth audiences. Even in countries like Indonesia, schools are using online platforms and Internet tools for course content and home work. Getting involved in this area through web-based content or applications is a potential worth exploring. This would also drive an interest from private and public sector players to invest in KBR and contribute

to sustainability. A solid sustainability plan should be drawn up from the start, identifying what resources may be needed to build the capacity of the SPO and make the program financially viable.

KBR68H will need to start pushing the boundaries of how to integrate traditional media and internet. Some options could include exploring podcasting and developing YouTube channels that appeal more to a young target audience. YouTube stars may start to rival television stars in Indonesia and are attracting youth interest. Promoting young television and radio presenters coming from KBR's regional network on YouTube would be a way to tap into the new medium. This would also offer an opportunity to promote more youth leadership, rather than just focusing on promoting participation as was done by the Teen Voice intervention.

# 7 Conclusion

In this chapter we summarise our findings in relation to each of the evaluation questions:

**Changes in the civil society arena of the SPO**
In the 2012 – 2014 period the most important change that took place in KBR's civil society arena is related to Civic Engagement. Between 2011 and 2013 Teen Voice expanded through televised and radio broadcasted programs. According to KBR68H's own estimated the relay of the show through 52 radio stations and 22 television stations relayed an estimated 1.17 million youth and teenagers. This number is impressive. The content was produced involving youth reporters and presenters with a focus on presenting issues through the viewpoints of teenagers. As the audience survey, covering 300 children showed, the audience was enthusiastic about the content of the shows. Children enjoyed the content and felt that it was of use in their daily lives. In the second period, Teen Voice television and radio was discontinued due to a lack of interest from potential funders. Fortunately, KBR68H had already begun to expand Teen Voice online through a portal. KBR succeeded to disseminate content through its KBR68H portal and through social media ensuring that Teen Voice continues until today. The fact that more and more Indonesian youth are consuming media content through their computers and mobile devices justifies the decision to shift the Teen Voice to an online version, in addition to financial constraints. However, there is still a plan to televise the Teen Program by the Tempo Group. Teen Voice has been brought under the Tempo Group since January 2015.[48]. The online platform affords new opportunities for the show to engage audiences. Two-way communication has improved through Twitter and Facebook. Apart from this, initiatives have developed to start the television programme again because Teen Voice is now under the Tempo Group[49].

Throughout 2012-2014, KBR68H also expanded its networks with radio stations. The network grew from 850 to 900 radio stations in this period. KBR68H maintains a reputable position as an independent media source known for its high-quality content and has the infrastructure to broadcast in the Asia-Pacific region. This implies that it improved it 'level of organisation' in CIVICUS terms. There is no evidence that this network expansion had positive consequences for Teen Voice since the programme has not become part of KBR68H's core programme, nor has it been institutionalized by its radio network.

**Contribution analysis**
The above mentioned changes can be attributed to KBR68H and partially to FPU funding during the first period. Although the televised and radio shows have been discontinued due to a lack of funds, including those from FPU, KBR68H has managed to adapt and make use of the opportunities available through the internet. KBR's intention with Teen Voice is that it remains an interactive platform that would allow for the seeds of democratic traits, such as freedom of expression and constructive dialogue, to be planted. Unfortunately the Teen Voice programme discontinued on radio and television in 2014 and its portal is neither frequently visited nor social media are being used by children to continue raising their voice. The interventions were not sustainable.

**Relevance**
With regards to the baseline ToC, the interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant since KBR68H was able to produce quality content, target an underserved age group, and engage its network disseminate content through television and radio up until 2013.

With regards to the context in which KBR68H is operating, its interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant because media plays a critical role in shaping opinions. Online media and television are the main media outlets in the country programs like Teen Voice fill an important gap in an adult dominated space.

[48] Information received from FPU Program Manager South Asia on 21 January 2015
[49] Information received from FPU Program Manager South Asia on 21 January 2015

With regards to the CS policies of Free Press Unlimited (FPU), KBR's interventions and outcomes were relevant, but not sustainable. KBR continued to engage with the international Kids News Network, but FPU did not react to a request for a short interview on this network and KBR's role in it.

**Explaining factors**

Internal factors that explain the findings are KBR68H's migration of the Teen Voice radio and television programs to a web portal and social media platform and the fact that it did not succeed to develop a business plan capable of financing the further mainstreaming children's programmes into ongoing activities. External factors that explain the findings are the drop of commercial television and radio interest in the continuation of Teen Voice. Factors that explain the findings that are related to the relation between FPU and KBR68H are the support FPU provided through trainings, Teen Voice's membership to the Kids News Network (KKN), and the discontinuation of FPU funding support to the Teen Voice program.

**Design of similar interventions**

Future similar interventions need to take the ever-changing media landscape into account and in particular possibilities to use internet as a source for sharing and promoting children's programmes as well as a possibility to raise revenues. This could be accompanied by the use of mobile technologies that further engage youth.

Table 8

*Summary of findings.*

| When looking at the MFS II interventions of this SPO to strengthen civil society and/or policy influencing, how much do you agree with the following statements? | Score |
|---|---|
| The CS interventions were well designed | 6 |
| The CS interventions were implemented as designed | 6 |
| The CS interventions reached their objectives | 5 |
| The observed outcomes are attributable to the CS interventions | 7 |
| The observed CS outcomes are relevant to the beneficiaries of the SPO | 7 |

Score between 1 to 10, with 1 being "not at all" and 10 being "completely".

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| Name of key informant | Organisation | Function in organisation | Relation with SPO | Contact details including e-mail. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Santoso | KBR | Director KBR | Staff | 0811-149916; tosca68h@yahoo.com |
| Heru Hendratmoko | KBR | Chief Editor | Staff | 0811 851083, heru@kbr68h.com |
| Felica | Tempo TV | Producer Teen Voice | Group Tempo | 0821 22853334, chicha.tea@yahoo.com |
| Eko Maryadi | AJI/South East Asia Press Alliance | Chairperson | Journalist network | 0811852857, itemic@gmail.com |
| Sandra Hamid | The Asia Foundation | Country Representative | NGO network | 0811840797, sandra.hamid@asiafoundation.org |
| Febriana Sari | KBR | Contributor | Contributor | 0811258658, namakusinta@yahoo.com |
| Melodya | | Former reporter Teen Voice | | 089635977665 - melo.apriliana@gmail.com |
| Michael Pavicic | Free Press Unlimited | Liaison officer | Liaison officer | pavicic@freepressunlimited.org |

# Appendix 1 Civil Society Scores

This table presents the appreciation of the evaluation team regarding changes occurred for each indicator between 2012 and 2014 on a scale of -2 to + 2

- 2 = Considerable deterioration
- 1 = A slight deterioration
  0 = no change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012
+1 = slight improvement
+2 = considerable improvement

| Dimension | | Indicators | Question | Change in the indicators in the 2012 – 2014 period |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Civic engagement** | 1 | Needs of marginalised groups | How does your organisation take the needs of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups into account in your planning, actions, activities, and/or strategies? | -1 |
| | 2 | Involvement of target groups | What is the level of participation of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups in the analysis, planning and evaluation of your activities? | +1 |
| | 3 | Political engagement | How intense is your (individual staff or organisational) participation in locally-nationally elected bodies and/or sectoral user groups? | 0 |
| **Level of organisation** | 5 | Relations with other organisations | In the past 12 months what has been the most intensive interaction you had with other CSOs? | + 1 |
| | 5 | Frequency of dialogue with closest CSO | In the past 12 months how many meetings did you have with the CSO that you have most intensive interaction with? | + 1 |
| | 6 | Defending the interests of marginalised groups | Which CSO are most effective in defending the interests of your target groups? In the past 12 months, how did you relate to those CSOs? | -1 |
| | 7 | Composition current financial resource base | How does your organisation finance institutional costs such as workshops of the General Assembly (if applicable); attendance to workshops of other CSOs; costs for organisational growth and/or networking? | + 2 |
| **Practice of Values** | 8 | Downward accountability | To what extent can mandatory social organs (steering committee, general assembly, internal auditing group) ask your executive leaders to be accountable to them? | 0 |
| | 9 | Composition of social organs | What % of members of your mandatory social organs belong to the marginalised target groups you are working with/for? | 0 |
| | 10 | External financial auditing | How regularly is your organisation audited externally? | 0 |
| **Perception of impact** | 11 | Client satisfaction | What are the most important concerns of your target groups? How do your services take into account those important concerns? | +1 |
| | 12 | Civil society impact. | In the past 12 months, what impact did you have on building a strong civil society? | - 1 |
| | 13 | Relation with public sector organisations. | In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with public sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' objectives? | 0 |
| | 14 | Relation with private sector organisations | In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with private sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' perspective? | 0 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 15 | Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations | How successful have you been in influencing public policies and practices in the past 2 years? | 0 |
| | 16 | Influence upon private sector agencies' policies, rules, regulations. | How successful have you been in influencing private sector policies and practices in the past 2 years? | + 1 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **CS context** | 17 | Coping strategies | In the past 2 years, how did your organisation cope with these changes in the context that may have been positive or negative consequences for civil society. | +1 |

# Appendix 2 Changes in civil society indicators between 2012 and 2014

## 1 Civic Engagement

### 1.1 Needs of marginalised groups SPO

In early 2013, the frequency of programing had already dropped to once a week after FPU funding ended. Due to budget constraints there was also a reduction in crew members from 6 to 3. Fewer people and fewer segments of civil society have been reached through the Teen Voice program as the television and radio program ended in January 2014. When it was still being produced for mainstream media, Teen Voice was broadcast on 52 radio stations and 22 local television stations, as well as AORA TV, a subscription-based channel. According to the proposal submitted in early 2011, this program was expected to reach around a million radio listeners and 100,000 television viewers from various groups. Teens and also parents were expected to obtain information from this program, be it from direct listening, from the information passed on by their children or from media reporting the content of this program. In 2013, KBR68H reported that Teen Voice reached 770,000 youth listeners and 400,000 youth viewers[50]. Teen Voice fell short of its radio target, but exceeded its television audience.

In 2012, Teen Voice expanded to online media with support from FPU, uploading content to internet platforms and social media. The program now only continues through an online format. Teen Voice moved from a Facebook group to a fan page (50,609 likes). Later Teen Voice was moved from its own web platform to the KBR68H portal (http://www.portalkbr.com/teenvoice/). Teen Voice's own Twitter site has not grown significantly over the past year (from 889 in November 2013 to around 1,000 currently). But the number of Twitter followers of KBR68H has swelled to 64,900 followers. Teen Voice episodes were uploaded to YouTube, but viewership remains limited[51].

Although in terms of coverage and reach Teen Voice is decreasing, the coverage of KBR68H itself amongst a general population has increased according to published figures. Portalkbr.com receives about 5,839 unique visitors, 3,920 visitors per day, and 7,591 (1.30 per visitor) page views per day (Alexa Traffic Rank).This figure is higher compared with situation in March 2013 (1,000 visitors) as reported in FPU final report assessment. . KBR68H's social media (Twitter and Facebook) now has 64,900 followers. As of November 2014, KBR as a news agency serves some 900 stations in its network across the country, compared with 850 stations in 2012[52].

KBR does not have any age disaggregated information to show whether the audiences reached include teenagers and youth, and other more marginalized groups.

### 1.2 Involvement of target groups SPO

KBR68H's target groups include network radio stations and teenage/youth audiences. Compared to the baseline, the situation in 2014 provides more opportunity for two-way interaction with target groups. This is mainly because of the move to online platforms where interaction is easier, and KBR68H's ability to communicate with its network via satellite, providing opportunities for two-way communication. The establishment of a web portal and the use of social media both invite more interactive contact with listeners and viewers. More participation is encouraged by getting teenage

[50] "Teen Voice Business Plan", KBR68H, 2013

[51] For an example of a video see: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YCYyfYzKbjA --with only 45 views by 16 November 2014.

[52] "KBR Proposal", KBR68H, 2012. Available from http://wikimedia.or.id/w/images/5/56/Proposal_KBR68H.pdf (accessed 16 November 2014)

viewers to check the portal, which has on-air materials, as well as other additional materials to be commented on by the viewers. This social media platform is able to give teenager viewers the opportunity to be reporters and to propose story ideas. The involvement of teenage reporters helps sharpen the story angle in terms of seeing the story through the eyes of the teenagers.

Aside from being a more efficient medium to promote involvement, the use of the internet, web portals and social media allows access to a wider audience. KBR expects this to propel the popularity of Teen Voice. Visitors to the KBR portal and social media can now receive Teen Voice updates.

### 1.3 Intensity of political engagement SPO

There is no evidence that KBR68H is more intensely politically engaged with elected agencies. However, some network journalists and local radios reported close relations with local parliament members in journalism relationship. In the workshop with the management, KBR68H claimed that they and their network radios have closer relations with political parties. This relation is one of mutual interest however: parliament members need media coverage and journalists needs news.

## 2 Level of Organisation

### 2.1 Relations with other organisations SPO

As a journalism agency, KBR68H's relations with some 900 radios in their network and other CSOs did intensify, with a larger network. KBR68H's journalists are organised in various networks/umbrella organisations. Examples of radio stations with which it is engaging are SONYA FM, GRESS FM, SP FM, PASPATI FM, KEI FM, SETIANADA FM, MAX FM, PIKON ANAI FM, SWARA ALAM FM, CHANDRA FM. Recently it expanded to partner with SMART FM[53]. Apart from this, KBR68H continued to engage with a number CSOs for advocacy purposes or thematically. Some of these include AJI, WAHLI and ELSAM. CSOs utilize KBR68H's online portal, providing comment and feedback to Twitter feeds for example.

However, on teens and youth, their relations with CSOs who have similar concerns are decreasing as the visibility of teen issues decreases as well. At global level, as reported by FPU in September 2013, KBR is a reliable and active member of Kids News Network:

- KBR has successfully pioneered in the creation of a KNN programme with two broadcast platforms - radio and television.
- KBR participated in both KNN Summits (2011, 2012) since they came on board;
- KBR contributes to WKN according to schedule;
- Teen Voice's editor in chief Fia Martaniah provided two weeks of training to NEFEJ, new KNN member in Nepal in 2012.

### 2.2 Frequency of dialogue with closest civil society organisation SPO

The collaboration between KBR68H and radio stations in its network is characterized by a demand-and supply relationship. As a news provider for its radio networks, KBR68H supplies content regularly to its members. With the launching of PortalKBR.com, there has been more frequent dialogue and exchange between KBR and its network. For instance, the radio networks and the portal have worked together on the design of the websites of their partners. The portal also allows radio partners to send information back to KBR68H more effectively. Right now, KBR68H distributes its radio content to its partners via satellite, but in the past, there has been no way for partners to return information back to KBR68H, apart from through the telephone. The portal acts as a hub, allowing radio partners to send back information daily and changing the nature of information flows, from being one-way to two-way (partner to KBR and KBR to partner).

[53] PortalKBR, "Perluas Jaringan Informasi, KBR68H Gandeng Smartfm Radio Network", 11 December 2013. Available from http://www.portalkbr.com/berita/nasional/3053880_4202.html (accessed 16 November 2014)

It should be noted that radio stations in KBR's network are established as private sector agencies (PT), but they are the closest in nature to KBR itself. KBR also maintains relations with CSO affiliated with AJI and Tempo group, such as Komunitas Utan Kayu and Salihara. In addition, KBR has relations with international NGOs (Hivos, The Asia Foundation, Ford Foundation etc.) in promoting pluralism and freedom of expression as key elements of democracy. However, there is hard evidence showing that KBR's involvement in this network has increased structured dialogue with these CSOs.

## 2.3 Defending the interests of marginalised groups SPO

As demonstrated in KBR's Teen Voice proposal, KBR considers teenagers and youth to be marginalised groups in Indonesian media. Very few mainstream media outlets are available for this age bracket, and those that are tend to be of low quality. Through Teen Voice, KBR68H's has brought teen voices into mainstream media through TV and radio shows. In addition, KBR branched out to social media as a means to engage youth. However, since the baseline KBR has been defending the interests of fewer people because of the closure of the Teen Voice program in 2014. While some of KBR's initiatives still give space for teens to participate in radio, television, and social media, as well as in their portal (http://www.portalkbr.com/teenvoice/), the coverage of these marginalised groups is not monitored. The last data from KBR provided in their business plan (2013) state that overall Teen Voice reached 770,000 youth listeners and 400,000 viewers.

According to KBR staff one group that has been reached with the creation of the KBR portal are migrant workers in Malaysia. The portal allows them to stream content from the local radio stations of their choice. While this is relevant, the assumption can also be made that with the discontinuation of televised and radio broadcasted versions of Teen Voice, fewer rural teenagers are likely to be reached since television and radio is still more popular in urban areas.

## 2.4 Composition financial resource base SPO

In 2011, donor funds compromised 31 percent of KBR's income. In 2014, this dropped to 10 percent. This suggests that KBR is more capable of diversifying its funding sources by mobilizing domestic funds and reaching out to commercial sponsors. It should be noted though that this cannot be attributed to KBR's efforts alone as aid from development agencies in Indonesian has declined as a whole. Nonetheless, commercial funding constitutes 90 percent of KBR's income. KBR68H has succeeded in diversifying its sources of financing. Private patrons and corporations support KRB through their CSR programs. Exxon Mobile and Astra, for example, sponsor talk shows on women's issues. In addition, KBR generates revenues through advertising. KBR is looking at more creative ways to team up with other radio networks, which could be considered rivals as well, seeking areas of shared and mutual interest to expand its audience base.[54] According to a recent report, "The most successful business model in the media to date has been developed by KBR68H, which attracted foreign partners to produce and distribute radio programs." Open Society Foundations, who produced the report, credit KBR for being able to draw on inter-state market funding for their programs while at the same time maintaining their independence and quality.[55] Other evidence, like outcome of the Teen Voice program which was discontinued, suggests that this resource base while improving, is still on shaky ground. KBR faced challenges in securing the sustainability of Teen Voice, and almost had to discontinue its award-winning program 'Asia Calling' as well.

KBR also continues to enjoy the support of international NGOs like Plan International, Ford Foundation and The Asia Foundation, but due to changes in donors' communication strategy, support to KBR has decreased since the baseline. In 2014, most of programs from NGOs are in the forms of short-term programs. A number of ministries and sub-national government agencies also pay for the

[54] Cherian George, August 26, 2014. George, Cherian, ed. 2014. Asia Journalism Focus: Sustaining Independent Journalism. August 26. Available from http://www.scribd.com/doc/237725106/Asia-Journalism-Focus-Sustaining-Independent-Journalism#scribd (accessed 17 November 2014)

[55] Ambardi, K., Parahita, G., Lindawati, L., Sukarno, A., Aprilia, N. 2014. Mapping Digital Media: Indonesia. Country Report. London: Open Society Foundations. Available from http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/mapping-digital-media-indonesia-20140326.pdf (accessed 16 November 2014)

broadcasting of public service announcements on family planning, AIDS prevention, forest conservation and other issues.

# 3 Practice of Values

## 3.1 Downward accountability SPO

There is no change since the baseline on financial transparency. As a limited company under PT. Media Lintas Inti Nusantara, KBR68H follows strict regulations on financial audits set by the government. In this regard, the main audience for the financial report is the shareholders (Koperasi Utan Kayu, Yayasan ISAI, individuals and other institutions), although as a limited company, the public can access financial information through the ministry law and human rights.

With regards to the internal control system, there is no difference with the baseline. As a private sector organization, KBR68H's internal control system strictly follows the commercial business standards. There are shareholders, a supervisory board, internal audits, etc. At least once a year there is a shareholders meeting to review the progress of KBR68H, examining both financial and programmatic progress. The board remains the same: representative from ISAI, Koperasi Utan Kayu and Mr. Gunawan Muhammad.

## 3.2 Composition of social organs SPO

There is no change in the organisation structure and as a limited company under PT. Media Lintas Inti Nusantara as the holding company, there are no people representing the beneficiaries (teen) or the marginalized groups as the shareholders. Composition of the shareholders remain the same i.e. Koperasi Utan Kayu, Yayasan ISAI, other institutions and minority individual shareholders.

## 3.3 External financial auditing SPO

In the in 2012-2014 period, there are no changes in the external auditing practices of the SPO. As a limited company under PT. Media Lintas Inti Nusantara, KBR68H follows strict regulations on financial audits set by the government. Their financial report is annually audited by an external auditor and 2013 audited financial report is available and seen by the evaluator.

# 4 Perception of Impact

## 4.1 Client satisfaction SPO

If we want to see whether there was a change in client satisfaction between 2012 and 2014, we need to see at two domains: 1) the network of radios that are clients of KBR68H as news provider and 2) the opinion of the children who were target audiences of Teen Voice.

In 2013, FPU commissioned a second audience survey to assess the opinions of target audiences of Teen Voice. The report found that overall children have positive opinions about Teen Voice television & radio programs. The majority enjoyed watching and listening to Teen Voice. However, many mentioned it was at times uninteresting. Three quarters of those surveyed said they learned from the television programs and 88% said they learned from radio programs. Almost all of children found Teen Voice (TV and radio) to be useful in their daily life, ex: learning and confidence building. Furthermore, the audience survey reported that a majority of children (81%) found content to be appropriate and not frightening. There is a split opinion about whether Teen Voice was sometimes boring: 17% said "yes", 43% said "a little bit", while 40% said "no". For children in the TV group, Teen Voice has several advantages compared to the 'normal' news for adults: more fun (48%); more about children (23%), easier to understand (15%).

This evaluation did not conduct a similar audience survey like the one commissioned by FPU, so there is no statistically representative data to confirm whether there is a change between 2013 and 2014.

What we have is data from interviews with 3 former trainees and participants of Teen Voice. They reported high satisfaction of the Teen Voice program. Unlike other program, according to the respondents, Teen Voice did not exploit youth or teen, but instead was able to go beyond just providing a venue for the children by opening horizons for the participation of youth in media.

In terms of radio network, there is a rapid change in terms of number of network radio, from 7 radios in 2000, 600 radios in 2009 and at least 900 radios over Indonesia and 9 countries in Asia and Australia plus social media networks[56].

## 4.2 Civil society impact SPO

KBR68H's contribution to civil society by design is indirect through independent journalism to support freedom of information. During period 2012-2014, there is no change in this modality. The program funded by FPU added components on teen issues and capacity building for local journalists. In general, the impact on civil society is more relevant to KBR68H as an organisation, rather than the Teen Voice program. In general, KBR68H has impact on civil society through the encouragement of democracy, tolerance and civic participation. KBR also contributes through the production and distribution of high-quality information disseminated throughout a network of local radio stations as well as for its promotion of professionalism in the media world[57].

## 4.3 Relation with public sector organisations SPO

There has been no change since the baseline. As a platform for public interaction, KBR68H considers public sector organisations (PSO) to be in various positions. First, PSOs are sources of information as well as recipients of information. The public is engaged through interactive dialogue episode in radio programs, for example. In a commercial relationship, PSOs are clients of KBR68H that pay for placing news, advertisements, or public service announcements in their program. Their clients are both national and sub-national government, such as the National Family Planning Coordinating Agency, Ombudsman Commission, National Law Commission, corporation PT. Pegadaian (Persero), Ministry of National Education, etc.

## 4.4 Relation with private sector agencies SPO

There is no change during the 2012-2014 period in terms of the nature and type of relationships with private sector agencies. KBR68H maintains a company-to-company relationship and private sector agencies, who are both clients (utilizing KBR's services, such as advertising) and donors (through their corporate social responsibility programs). ASTRA, an Indonesian company and others (Danone, Coca Cola, Exxon Mobile) remain their clients in 2014.

With regards to KBR's relations with other private sector agencies in the same field, more is mentioned under indicators 2.1 and 2.2. Also worth mentioning is the expansion of KBR68H's audience reach which was a result of a new business partnership agreement signed with SmartFM in 2013, giving KBR a better footing in a number of major cities in Indonesia.

[56] PortalKBR, "Perluas Jaringan Informasi, KBR68H Gandeng Smartfm Radio Network", 11 December 2013. Available from http://www.portalkbr.com/berita/nasional/3053880_4202.html (accessed 16 November 2014)

[57] King Baudouin Foundation. 2009. *Press Release: The 2008-2009 King Baudouin International Development Prize has been awarded to the radio press agency KBR68H (Indonesia) in recognition of its contribution to democratic development*. Brussel, 19 May. Available from https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDUQFjAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.kbprize.org%2FuploadedFiles%2FKBPrize%2F04Winners%2FAll_winners%2F2009_persbericht_Eng.doc&ei=qChoVNv7N5CMuASa8YDwCQ&usg=AFQjCNHeACVmEStIKqAOL8aNCTSF_VP2Yg&sig2=3WwQzt7IAk_4fsUH4_efxA (accessed 16 November 2014)

## 4.5 Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations SPO

The role of KBR68H in influencing public policy remains the same as in 2012, i.e. indirect influence through setting the public discourse that later together with other factors cumulatively will build public pressure. In 2014, as in 2012, there is no mechanism to track KBR68H's contribution to developing public pressure for policy change by reporting on "headline news" through their radio network. One recent example found was a 2013 Indonesian Civil Society Report on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). KBR articles posted on their website were cited as trusted news sources on events relating to religious discrimination.[58] This suggests, that amongst Indonesian NGOs, they have become an important source of information. Any policy influence KBR has had in the past two years has been indirect.

## 4.6 Influence upon private sector agencies' policies, rules, regulations SPO

KBR68H's main target is freedom of information and private sector agencies' policies are not their immediate target. They do not seek to influence the private sector although they wish to set an example amongst competitors of an independent company that adheres to democratic principles. This position has not changed since the baseline. Like in 2012, during 2013-2014 KBR has been strengthening their focus on environmental issues, continuing to cooperate with ASTRA and Green Radio to promote "green journalism".

# 5 Civil Society context

## 5.1 Coping strategies

Indonesians have come to embrace social media. According to social media consultancy Socialbakers, some 7.6 million Indonesians joined Facebook in September 2014 alone. In this regard, KBR68H has kept abreast with the latest media developments and the pace its consumers have set, moving online and using their mobile phones at an increased frequency. The launching of PortalKBR.com since the baseline has been a strategic move. The portal is a logical development for the radio network. As the managing director, Tosca Santoso, explained, "All mainstream media need to think about the fundamental transition to digital media". He believes that this is the next best step for KBR68H.

This social media boom has had a large impact on political and social issues. With regard to civil society dynamics, the transformation of KBR68H from mainstream radio to digital and social media can be seen as good coping strategy. When interviewed, Santoso stated that social media plays a supportive, rather than simply competitive, role with respect to traditional media. Social media can be used to increase the loyalty of radio listeners by reaching out to them, involving them in stories and engaging them. According to KBR's management, social media allows them to reach out to people where terrestrial radio cannot reach, which speaks to the expanding footprint of mobile phone service in Indonesia.

The above situation is well recognised by KBR68H as an institution and the fact that KBR68H now is growing bigger in terms of number of staff and portfolio, we may say that institutionally, KBR68H can cope with the recent development in media and journalism arena. However, KBR has not yet capitalized on these developments to advance specific issues, like teenage voice and representation in the media. These concerns were also raised by FPU assessors (Chermene Fisser and Yvonne Pinxteren) who conducted an assessment of Teen Voice in August-September 2013. They noted that Teen Voice has not adequately coped with the financial and market challenges.

[58] HRWG. 2013. *Indonesia: Civil Society Report on the Implementation of the ICCPR (Replies to the List of Issues CCPR/C/IND/Q/1)*. Available from http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/IDN/INT_CCPR_NGO_IDN_14339_E.pdf (accessed 16 November 2014)

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen UR
P.O. Box 88
6700 AB Wageningen
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)317 48 68 00
www.wageningenUR.nl/cdi

Report CDI-15-024

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# KWLM end line report

MFS II country evaluations, Civil Society component

Dieuwke Klaver[1]
Hester Smidt

Kharisma Prasetyo[2]
Sutikno

1 Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR, Netherlands
2 SurveyMeter, Indonesia

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen, February 2015

Report CDI-15-066

WAGENINGEN UR
For quality of life

Klaver, D.C., Prasetyo, K., Smidt, H., February 2015, *KWLM end line report; MFS II country evaluations, Civil Society component*, Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR (University & Research centre) and SurveyMETER. Report CDI-15-066. Wageningen.

This report describes the findings of the end line assessment of KWLM that is a partner of Hivos.

The evaluation was commissioned by NWO-WOTRO, the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research in the Netherlands and is part of the programmatic evaluation of the Co-Financing System - MFS II financed by the Dutch Government, whose overall aim is to strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. Apart from assessing impact on MDGs, the evaluation also assesses the contribution of the Dutch Co-Funding Agencies to strengthen the capacities of their Southern Partners, as well as the contribution of these partners towards building a vibrant civil society arena.

This report assesses KWLM's contribution towards strengthening Civil Society in Indonesia and it used the CIVICUS analytical framework. It is a follow-up of a baseline study conducted in 2012. Key questions that are being answered comprise changes in the five CIVICUS dimensions to which KWLM contributed; the nature of its contribution; the relevance of the contribution made and an identification of factors that explain KWLM's role in civil society strengthening.

Keywords: Civil Society, CIVICUS, theory based evaluation, process-tracing



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# Acknowledgements

SurveyMeter and CDI are thanking the staff and the leaders of all Southern Partner Organisations that participated in collecting information for the evaluation of the contribution of these partner organisations to creating a vibrant civil society in Indonesia. They also thank the Co-Funding Agencies and the Dutch Consortia they are a member of for making background documents available. We hope that this evaluation can support you in better positioning yourself in the Civil Society Arena of Indonesia.

# List of abbreviations and acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| AAC | Annual allowable cut |
| AMAN | *Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara* (Indigenous Peoples' Alliance of the Archipelago) |
| BPDAS | Departments for Watershed Management |
| BCI | Basic Capabilities Index |
| BPS | *Badan Pusat Statistik* (Central Agency on Statistics) |
| CDI | Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR |
| CFA | Co-Financing Agency |
| CFO | Co-Financing Organisation |
| CoC | Chain of custody |
| Comlog | Community logging |
| CS | Civil society |
| CSO | Civil society organisation |
| CUKATA | *Koperasi Kredit Tali Asih* (Credit Cooperative/Union Tali Asih) |
| Disperindagkop | Department of Industry, Trade and Cooperatives |
| FLEGT | Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade |
| FSC | Forest Stewardship Council |
| GNI | Gross National Income |
| HDI | Human Development Index |
| HELP | Human security, Ecological debt, Land Tenure, Production and consumption |
| HuMa | Association for Community and Ecology-Based Law Reform |
| ICCO | Interchurch Cooperative for Development Cooperation |
| ICT | Information and communications technology |
| JAVLEC | Community-based Forest Management Network |
| JTT | *Jatah Tebang Tahnunan* (AAC in English) |
| KHJL | *Koperasi Hutan Jaya Lestari* |
| KWLM | *Koperasi Wana Lestari Menoreh* (Wana Lestari Menoreh Cooperative) |
| LEI | Lembaga Ekolabel Indonesia (Indonesian Ecolablelling Institute) |
| MFS | Dutch co-financing system |
| MoC | Model of Change |
| MoFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| NGO | Non-governmental organisation |
| Ormas | *Organisasi masyarakat* (Societal Organizations) |
| PT | *Perseroan Terbatas* (Limited Company) |
| REDD | Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation |
| SERF | Social Economic Rights Fulfilment |
| SKAU | *Surat keterangan asal usul* (Letter of Origin) |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |
| SPTN | *Sekretariat Pelayanan Tani dan Nelayan* |
| SSI | Semi-structured Interview |
| SVLK | *Sistem Verifikasi Legalitas Kayu* (Indonesia’s Timber Legality Verification System) |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| Wageningen UR | Wageningen University & Research Centre |
| YABIMA | Yayasan Bina Insan Mandiri |

# 1 Introduction

This report presents the civil society end line findings of Koperasi Wana Lestari Menoreh (KWLM) in Indonesia which is a partner of Hivos under the Dutch Consortium People Unlimited 4.1. It is a follow-up to the baseline assessment that was carried out in 2012. According to the information provided during the baseline study, KWLM is working on MDG7ab.

These findings are part of the overall evaluation of the joint MFS II evaluations to account for results of MFS II-funded or –co-funded development interventions implemented by Dutch CFAs and/or their Southern Partner Organisations (SPO) and to contribute to the improvement of future development interventions. The civil society evaluation uses the CIVICUS framework and seeks to answer the following questions:

- What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?
- To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
- What is the relevance of these changes?
- What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The CIVICUS framework that comprises five dimensions (civic engagement, level of organization, practice of values, perception of impact and contexts influencing agency by civil society in general) has been used to orient the evaluation methodology.

*Changes in the civil society arena of the SPO*
In the 2012 – 2014 period the most important change that took place in the civil society arena of KWLM is related to Civic Engagement and Level of Organisation according to the findings in chapter 5. These findings were obtained through an analysis of documents, a workshop and follow-up interviews with the SPO, and interviews with external resources persons working in civil society organisations that receive support from the SPO; other civil society organisations with whom the SPO is collaborating; public or private sector agents and; external resource persons capable of overlooking the MDG or theme on which the SPO is concentrating.

*Contribution analysis*
Based upon an analysis of the projects and programmes financed by the Dutch NGOs, four orientations strategic for civil society development were identified: Ensuring that more people from more diverse background are engaging in civil society activities; ensuring that the organisations that receive support from the SPO are capable of playing their role in civil society – intermediate organisations; strengthening the relations with other organisations in civil society to undertake joint activities, and; influencing policies and practices of public or private sector organisations. For Indonesia the focus was on the capacity of intermediate organisations to play their role in civil society and on policy influencing.

Based upon an estimation of the percentage of the total MFS II budget related to interventions that are relevant for civil society, those SPOs whose absolute budgets for civil society were most important were selected for in-depth process tracing on two outcomes related to the above mentioned strategic orientations. The evaluation team conducted a quick assessment on contribution of the other SPOs. KWLM was not amongst those SPOs selected for in-depth-process tracing and only one outcome was selected for the evaluation.

The evaluation team selected one outcome to evaluate the effectiveness of KWLM in civic engagement and level of organisation. Under KWLM, smallholders have been organised to produce certified, legal timber. Smallholders have gained an interest in sustainable community logging because the certified timber can fetch a better price. Credit services have also been offered to smallholders, and this has helped them become less dependent on middlemen. The cooperative model of KWLM, which combines business with sustainable community forest management, has been effective to engage communities and to link communities to a premium market. It has attracted smallholders in the cooperative ranks,

which has grown from 322 persons in 2009 to 1,207 persons in 2014, with another 1,100 waitlisted. KWLM's certification service and transparent timber price calculation are key incentives for community members as it gives better prices for timber products. Active and expanded membership of KWLM is a proxy of participation undertaken by individuals to advance shared interests at different levels. The contribution of the SPO towards achieving this outcome is through combining agricultural services, namely certified timber, the provision of free seedlings and access to credit. A contributing factor has been the enabling environment, where the Kulon Progo government has promoted community forest management and have been keen to learn from KWLM's approach.

*Relevance*
Interviews with staff of KWLM, with external resource person, with the liaison officer of Hivos, as well as contextual information helped to assess the relevance of KWLM's interventions in terms of; its Theory of Change (ToC) for Civil Society (CS) as designed during the baseline study; the context in which KWLM is operating; the CS policies of Hivos.

With regards to the baseline ToC, the interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant because KWLM's ultimate objective is to support the prosperity and autonomy of forest-dependent communities. The delivery of services, in this case certification, credit, the promotion of reforestation, ant others has led to support from the public sector, community awareness of the importance of sustaining timber production, and access to markets.

With regards to the context in which KWLM is operating, its interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant because they are in line with the Government of Indonesia's efforts to combat illegal logging and promote community forestry schemes. Pressure to address these issues have arisen from global market actors and consumers, and the Government of Indonesia is keen to maintain its position as an exporter of certified timber.

With regards to the CS policies of Hivos, KWLM's interventions and outcomes are relevant to the Green Entrepreneurship programme. Through this programme, the CFA has supported smallholder participation in markets that are driven by sustainable economic and environmental principles.

*Explaining factors*
The information related to factors that explain the above findings was collected at the same time as the data were gathered for the previous questions. The evaluation team looked at internal factors within the KWLM, the external context in which it operates and the relations between KWLM and Hivos.

Internal factors within the SPO that explain the findings are KWLM's position to bridge the communities with private sector buyers as well as being a frontline service provider. KWLM implements a diversified outreach strategy through which in links cooperative members to credit union services. However, there are also inhibiting factors that have affected the extent to which the cooperative has grown. KWLM faces difficulties to maintain cash flows between buyers and the communities, and this is inhibiting the further expansion of the cooperative.

External factors that influence KWLM's achievements have been the growing demands by global markets that imported timber products are certified and come from sustainably managed forest areas. The Government of Indonesia has responded to these demands by developing its own certification system, which has also been applied by KWLM.

Factors that explain the findings that are related to the relation between the KWLM and Hivos are the linkages that Hivos has facilitated between KWLM and Telapak, another Hivos partner that is active in sustainable forest management. This network helped KWLM obtain FSC certification.

The following chapter briefly describes the political context, the civil society context and the relevant background with regards to the MDG/theme KWLM is working on. Chapter three provides background information on KWLM, the relation of its MFS II interventions with the CIVICUS framework and specific information on the contract with Hivos. An evaluation methodology has been developed for the evaluation of the Civil Society component which can be found in Appendix 2 of the country report; however, deviations from this methodology, the choices made with regards to the selection of the outcomes for contribution analysis, as well as difficulties encountered during data collection are to be found in Chapter 4. The answers to each of the evaluation questions are being presented in Chapter 5, followed by a discussion on the general project design in relation to CS development; an assessment

of what elements of the project design may possibly work in other contexts or be implemented by other organisations in Chapter 6. Conclusions are presented in Chapter 7.

# 2 Context

## 2.1 Political context

### 2.1.1 Brief historical perspective

Indonesia's rise to being the world's third largest democratic nation has been lauded by many world leaders. The county is often considered to be a model Muslim democracy. As the fourth most populous nation with an estimated 250 million people[1], Indonesia has sustained its democratic commitment since transitioning from an authoritarian leadership to a democracy in 1998. The decentralized administration now consists of 34 provinces and 508 districts and municipalities.

Prior to 1998, Indonesia was under strict authoritarian regime. Suharto, known for his so-called New Order (1966-1998) regime, ushered in radical transformations that would place social and political forces under direct state supervision. The defining characteristics of the Suharto era were a focus on economic growth and controlled consensus and political stability devoid of dissent. A series of tumultuous economic and political transitions in the nineties severely diminished the credibility of ageing President Suharto, who was forced to resign amidst mass street protests.

His departure in 1998 laid bare three decades of social inequalities, state-perpetuated abuses against human rights, and a lack of civilian liberties. The regime change opened the way for a period of *Reformasi* started under the presidency of B. J. Habibie (1998-1999) and continued by Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001), Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001–2004), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014). Restrictions on citizen participation, press freedom and association were removed. Democratic reforms and decentralization led to direct elections, portioned authority, devolution of authority to regional authorities, formation of new political parties and ended the military's parliamentary influence. The distinct historical periods of the New Order Regime and *Reformasi* (1998-present) have shaped the emergence of civil society. Defining characteristics are summarized in the table below.

Table 1
*Characteristics that have defined the emergence of civil society in Indonesia*

| Characteristics | New Order, authoritarian period (1966 – 1998) | Reformasi (1998 – present) |
|---|---|---|
| **Political system** | Centralized, authoritarian characterized by unipolarity. Golkar as the dominant political party.<br><br>In 1999, there were 27 provinces, 306 districts and around 60,000 villages. | Decentralized, democratic. Fragmentation of power and atomization of patronage relationships. Emergence of numerous political parties. Direct presidential elections since 1999.<br><br>Decentralization altered the political and administrative landscape: 34 provinces, 410 districts, 98 municipalities, 6,944 sub-districts and 81,253 villages.[2] |
| **State-citizen interaction** | Benevolent leader, obedient population. Down to the village level, the state permeated society. | Modern political culture marked by diminishing hierarchy between the state and citizens, allowing for citizens to interact more freely. |
| **Citizen representation and** | Strict control of speech, expression and association. | Burgeoning of CSOs, pressure groups and NGOs following the political euphoria after Suharto's |

[1] In 2010 the population was estimated to be around 237 million people (BPS 2010 Population Census). The current figure is an estimate from BKKBN and similar figures are cited in the CIA's World Fact Book and the World Bank.

[2] Rumah Pemilu, "Gambaran Singkat Pemilihan Umum 2014 di Indonesia", 3 July 2014. Available from http://www.rumahpemilu.org/in/read/3351/Gambaran-Singkat-Pemilihan-Umum-2014-di-Indonesia (accessed 25 October 2014)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **voice** | CSOs and their networks largely "hiding behind the screen", and operating under state surveillance. A period of growth occurred in 1995-98, as resistance was building. | fall.<br>Indonesian CSOs began to establish new networks internationally. Up until the early 2000s the focus was on state-centrist issues. Later, issues that CSOs were tackling became more diverse, ranging from pluralism, poverty reduction to fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights. |
| **Media** | No free press, censorship and state-control. Suharto had firm grasp over how to use print & broadcast medias to promote political ideologies. | More vibrant media environment, flourishing of media businesses albeit in control of 12 main conglomerates that are mostly profit-driven and often have political ties. |
| | Limited public and CS use and access to internet until mid-90s. | Twitter nation, widespread social media use. |
| | | Growing realization of the importance of media/free press as the fourth pillar of democracy. |
| **Artistic forms of expression** | Art and literary censorship conducted by the state. Art forms were a means to reinforce political order. | Greater freedom of the arts and cultural sectors. Organizations able to hold art events more freely. Freedom of expression a catchphrase amongst individuals and artistic groups, but challenged by more conservative members of society. |
| **Religious expression and organization** | Regime repressed religious groups, especially radical forms. | Emergence of religious groups seeking to restore Islamic values and defend Muslim values. |

With political reforms came greater freedom and space for civic engagement. In the *Reformasi* period, there was a remarkable increase in the number of civil society organizations, many of which were Islamic in character. In 2000, the Central Agency on Statistics (BPS) recorded around 70,000 registered organizations, compared to just 10,000 in 1996.[3]New groups sprung up with donors encouraging activists to establish NGOs they could fund. These organizations were eager to distance themselves from state and often took an anti-government stance. Proliferating CSOs and NGOs have taken advantage of decentralization and greater regional autonomy to engage in public affairs. Civil society and government relations have improved, although both sides remain sceptical of the others' intentions.

### 2.1.2 Recent trends in the political context

Indonesia is considered to be a story of democratic success, but it still struggles to realize the benefits of sustained and equitable economic growth. In the political context, the main challenges lie in governing such geographically vast and decentralized country, applying principles of good governance and the enormous task of reforming the country's bureaucracy.

Although, Indonesia's 'big bang' decentralization initiated at the turn of the century narrowed the gap between local government and citizens, it has also localized political power struggles. While the devolution of authorities relieved tensions between the central government and the regions, it has also created opportunities for corrupt and rent-seeking practices, at the local level. As indicated by Transparency International's corruption index scores, perceived corruption in Indonesia remains high.

[3] Wahid, Marzuki. 2010. LSM, Islam, dan Perempuan di Indonesia Paska Orde Baru. Presentation at the Asian Dialogues: Open Seminars in Asian Languages. Melbourne, 22 April. Available from http://intranet.law.unimelb.edu.au/staff/events/files/Microsoft%20PowerPoint%20-%20LSM%20dan%20Islam%20di%20Indonesia%20--Melbourne%202010-FINAL.pdf (accessed 25 October 2014)

Table 2

*Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer survey: Indonesia*

| Year | Corruption perceptions Index Score<br>*(0 perceived as highly corrupt and 100 perceived as clean)* | Rank |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 30 | 100/182 |
| 2012 | 32 | 118/174 |
| 2013 | 32 | 114/177 |

Source: Transparency International

In 2013, decentralization was taken a step further with the approval of the Village Law, intended to address weak governance arrangements and empower rural communities to participate politically. The new law could also lead to village elites distorting power relations and misusing government funding if not properly monitored.

Indonesia is still transitioning politically and many challenges lie ahead. According to the 2012 Indonesia Governance Index's Executive Report, "Indonesia is witnessing a paradox in its democracy. On one hand, a successful opening-up of civil liberty has led to the avalanche of democratic demands across the nation, however on the other hand, democratic institutions' are inadequately respond to those demands." Nonetheless, the Indonesian Governance Index, which focuses on measuring provincial governance, does show a general improvement in the performance of the government (political office) bureaucracy, civil society and economic society based on principles of participation, transparency, fairness, accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness between 2008 and 2012. Civil society scores improved the most significantly, while scores for bureaucracy rose slightly.[4]

Table 3

*Indonesia Governance Index: Average provincial scores*

| Arena | 2008 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| Government | 4.93 | 5.46 |
| Bureaucracy | 5.53 | 5.58 |
| Civil Society | 4.85 | 6.33 |
| Economic Society | 4.77 | 5.71 |

Source: http://www.kemitraan.or.id/igi

In the past decade, Indonesians have generally enjoyed a freedom to participate in the political process through a direct-election mechanism. However, in September 2014 lawmakers voted in favour of a bill reviving indirect elections of regional heads. The controversial vote provoked public outcry which saw peaceful protests and the public voicing their discontent through social media. In early October, just before the end of his term, president Yudhoyono issued a regulation in lieu of the law, effectively repealing the law until further judicial review.

The recent 2014 elections which marked the end of Yudhoyono's 10-year term, demonstrated that Indonesian voters are increasingly voting for popular figures irrespective of political party alliances. While practices of corruption, vote-buying and poor voter administration remained in the recent election, the public seems to have matured politically, indicated by the enormous interest in televised debates between the leading candidates. The appeal of the newly sworn in President JokoWidodo, popularly known as Jokowi, has come from his hands-on, man-of-the-people approach. As Jokowi begins his five-year term he will need to start addressing a myriad of challenges that include corruption, stagnant economic growth, and human rights concerns, particularly with respect to the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and religious intolerance. If left unaddressed, these challenges could seriously undermine Indonesia's stability and democratic reforms.

[4] The IGI uses a scale of 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest). Data is available online through their website. Indonesia Governance Index, Data, "IGI Executive Report". Available from http://www.kemitraan.or.id/igi/index.php/data/publication/factsheet/275-igi-executive-report (accessed 25 October 2014)

## 2.2 Civil Society context issues with regards to the MDG

Land rights and natural resource protection have been a long-standing issue for Indonesia. While Indonesia has adopted and amended laws to improve the rights of smallholders and indigenous communities, many of these regulations have faltered in their implementation. Part of the issue lies in the overlap and lack of clarity of laws adopted that regulate different sectors and local legislation. Another issue is that there is a lack of oversight in the procedures such as granting permits and licensing. These problems, which are commonly found across development sectors, are compounded by a lack of information among local communities on what the laws regulate and their rights vis-à-vis them.

In 1999 the Government of Indonesia passed the Forestry Law (Law No. 41/1999). This law classified all land into two designations: 1) state forests (*kawasan hutan*) as land bearing no ownership rights and further categorized by three allowable land uses, namely conservation, protection and production forests, and; 2) non-forest estates (*area pengunaan lain*) as those areas designated for non-forestry use such as agriculture and settlement[5]. Law 41/1999 regulated the administrative authority of the forest sector. It was designed to reaffirm control of the forest sector in the hands of the central government after the issuance of Law 22/1999 on Regional Governance, which for a brief period saw district governments taking a proactive role in administering forests and issuing timber extraction permits[6].

In 2007, the Government of Indonesia issued a regulation on Forest Management Planning (PP No.6/2007) which introduced schemes for community forestry, opening up opportunities for these initiatives to be registered.[7] The schemes granted long-term forest management rights to communities. *Hutan desa* (village forest) is one such a scheme that has the potential to improve the welfare of rural communities. More recently in 2013, the country's constitutional court accepted a petition form the Indigenous People's Alliance (AMAN) to review articles of the 1999 Forestry Law. This resulted in a greater recognition for indigenous people's rights by declaring that customary forests should not be classified as state forest areas[8].

Nonetheless, there continue to be many gaps in Indonesia's regulatory framework that have allowed for the over-exploitation of natural resources. For example, the Forest Law does not contain clear criteria for land status conversion[9]. Inconsistent legislation has led to different interpretations of existing policies.

In the context of decentralisation, the devolution of power to the subnational level has increased deforestation and forest degradation rates[10]. Local authorities have issued forest permits and permits for estate crop production and mining activities with little concern for sustainable natural resource management. "In essence, the devolution of law-making authority to regional officials has, in the absence of unambiguous laws, transparent processes, clearly defined powers and supervision, resulted in a mixed bag of rules and regulations and hence inappropriate and overlapping permits, such as the issuance of estate crop permits for forested areas.[11]"

Despite the above issues, the last decade has seen a unique transformation of the government's position on illegal logging "from denial to open acknowledgement that illegal logging is a severe

[5] Rosenbarger, A., Gingold, B., Prasodjo, R., Alisjahbana, A., Putraditama, A., Tresya D. 2013. How to Change Legal Land Use Classifications to Support More Sustainable Palm Oil in Indonesia. Issue Brief. World Resources Institute, p. 6

[6] Barr, Christopher and others (eds). 2006. *Decentralization of Forest Administration in Indonesia: Implications for Forest Sustainability, Economic Development and Community Livelihoods*. Center for International Forestry Research, pp. 43-44

[7] RECOFTC – The Center for People and Forests. 2013. Community forestry in Asia and the Pacific: Pathway to inclusive development. Bangkok, Thailand.

[8] AMAN, "Putusan Nomor 35/PUU-X/2012", *United Nations Office for REDD+ Coordination in Indonesia (UNORCID)*, 16 May 2013. Available from http://www.unorcid.org/index.php/about-redd/redd-in-the-news/sustainable-development/129-landmark-verdict-by-the-indonesian-constitutional-court-separates-customary-forest-from-state-forest (accessed 25 October 2014)

[9] Indrarto, G. B., Murharjanti, P., Khatarina, J., Pulungan, I., Ivalerina, F., Rahman, J., Prana, M. N., Resosudarmo, I. A. P. and Muharrom, E. 2012 The Context of REDD+ in Indonesia: Drivers, agents and institutions. Working Paper 92. CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia.

[10] Ibid

[11] Ibid, p. 9

problem"[12]. Pushed forward by consumer countries and global timer markets, as well as NGO campaigns, timber legality certification gained traction in Indonesia in 2007. Efforts cumulated in the enactment of Indonesia's own verification mechanism in 2009. This mechanism is meant to improve the credibility and legality of timber products from Indonesia[13]. An Indonesian Eco-labelling Institute (*Lembaga Ekolabel Indonesia*/LEI) was formed to facilitate the developments of standards compatible with FSC and market demands. In 2011, Indonesia also signed bilateral Voluntary Partnership Agreement with the European Union. This laid the ground work for the European Union's acceptance of the development of a national legality assurance system that could track timber movement from producers to the international market.

[12] Katila, P., Galloway, G., de Jong, W., Pacheco, P., Mery, G. (eds). 2014. *Forests under pressure: Local responses to global issues*. IUFRO World Series Volume 32. Vienna, p. 242

[13] EU FLEGT Facility. 2010. *Scoping baseline information for Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade*. Jakarta

# 3 Description of KWLM and its contribution to civil society/policy changes

## 3.1 Background KWLM

*Koperasi Wana Lestari Menoreh* (KWLM) was officially established in April 2009. Based out of Kulon Progo District, Yogyakarta Province, the vision of KWLM is to develop Kulon Progo to realize a sustainable natural environment that can generate profits for community members in a fair manner[14]. The mission of the cooperative is threefold, namely:

1. To achieve a sustainable natural environment that has optimal ecological and environmental functions;
2. To create jobs for citizens of Kulon Progo, especially for cooperative members;
3. To empower communities in increasing revenues generated from sustainable forestry, agriculture, plantations, animal husbandry and fisheries.[15]

The members of KWLM consist mainly of small-holder timber farmers. Agro-forestry is the predominant livelihoods of residents in Kulon Progo. Farmers cultivate several wood varieties including teak, mahogany, *albaziafalcataria*, Indian rosewood, *hibiscus tiliaceus* and acacia.

Since the beginning, KWLM has been assisted by Bina InsanMandiri Foundation (YABIMA) and Bogor-based PerkumpulanTelapak[16]. Telapak, an environmental organisation, has a wide national and international network from which KWLM has been able to benefit as it was assigned by Hivos to provide direct technical assistance to KWLM. The cooperative model of KWLM is based on Forest Cooperative Lestari Jaya in Southeast Sulawesi. KWLM is a modestly-sized cooperative with members in 15 villages and 12 paid staff members. KWLM's strategy is to create employment opportunities through sustainable forest management and to develop non-timber forest products that have a high competitive advantage. It refers this as 'community logging' (Comlog). KWLM has introduced eco-label certification as a solution to over-exploitation of timber and low commodity prices.

KWLM manages three business units, which are: 1) certified timber, 2) herb and spices, vegetables and other agricultural products, and 3) seedlings. These products are marketed under the name of Poros Nusantara Utama, Ltd, of which KWLM is shareholder. This company is a socially responsible corporation that works together with KWLM and its members. KWLM and PT.Poros are market leaders for certified timber in Kulon Progo district.

## 3.2 MFS II interventions related to Civil Society

Target communities in Kulon Progo face frequent droughts and unsustainable logging practices have led to environmental degradation and economic inefficiency. Until 2010, most of the people in these areas were practicing "wallet" driven logging, meaning if they need cash, they cut their trees. Prior to the intervention, communities had limited access to premium timber markets and no linkages to eco-certification. KWLM introduced community-based forestry and logging standards to help local farmers addressing these issues. As stipulated in their proposal submitted to Hivos for period 2010-2012, main objectives of the program are sustainable forests and the welfare of forest dependent community in Kulon Progro district through introducing this logging standards and increasing farmers' capacity to access premium market.

[14] "Cooperative Profile: Profil Koperasi Wana Lestari Menoreh", KWLM
[15] "Hivos Application Form A_KWLM", Hivos
[16] The Forests Dialogue, "Field Dialogue on Investing in Locally Controlled Forestry". Available from http://theforestsdialogue.org/sites/default/files/ilcf_indonesia_field_visit_itinerary_english.pdf (26 October 2014)

KWLM's interventions are intended to contribute to developing the capacity of target populations with regards to enterprise and strengthening their economic position. In addition, the interventions are meant to introduce knowledge and innovative strategies that improve the position of small-scale producers who are vulnerable to fluctuating markets and climates.[17]Hivos supported the initiative because of what it considered to be a unique combination of 'business' and 'environment'[18]. The 2010-2012 project followed from earlier Hivos support in 2008-2009 that focused on strengthening KWLM as an organisation, transferring skills and knowledge on sustainable forest management and small-holder certification.

Through the project interventions, members of the cooperative (i.e. smallholders) would obtain a sustainable income through sustainable forest management and the creation of timber and non-timber forest products. KWLM's activities also focused on building farmers' self-reliance and organisational development so that the cooperative would become independent, professional, and self-sustained. This is most closely linked to 'level of organisation' in the CIVICUS framework.

## 3.3 Basic information

Table 4

*Basic information KWLM*

| | | Details |
|---|---|---|
| Name of SPO | : | KWLM |
| Consortium | : | People Unlimited |
| CFA | : | Hivos |
| Start date of cooperation | : | 1 January 2010 |
| MDG/Theme | : | MDG7ab |
| MFS II Project Name | : | Community-based Local Economic Development through Sustainable Forest Management (Kulon Progo) (Project ID230S01) |
| Contract period | : | January 1, 2010 – November 30, 2012 |
| Total budget | : | € 59,558 |
| Other donors if applicable | : | N/A |
| Estimation of % of budget for Civil Society[19] | : | 12% |

Sources: Project documents

[17] "Hivos Organisational Assessment of KWLM", Hivos

[18] "Kenschets KWLM", Hivos

[19] Costs that relate to civil society development or policy influence are those costs that possibly contribute to the development of the CIVICUS dimensions, excluding coordination and office costs; staff costs and financial reserves.

# 4 Data collection and analytical approach

## 4.1 Adjustments made in the methodology of the evaluation

The evaluation team followed the operational guidelines to a great extent, and was able to hold a workshop with all of KWLM's sub-groups. In practice, the workshop lasted six hours, with full participation of all sub-groups. However, due to unfamiliarity with CS dimensions and the large number of workshop participants, the workshop was not fully efficient. Moreover, most participants were elderly farmers with a limited education background. This led to a difficulty amongst participants in understanding the CS dimensions and questions.

Another obstacle was the lack of participant preparation for the workshop, which in the case of KWLM was understandable. Workshop participants were mostly farmers who did not have time to read and understand relevant documents (baseline report, CS dimensions change) shared with them prior to the workshop. All of the participants found it difficult to respond to the CS dimensions of change questions. The evaluation team had to go over each question several times, explaining each one-by-one. Nonetheless, from the level of response, it was clear that some of the participants nonetheless had difficulties in comprehending the questions.

## 4.2 Difficulties encountered during data collection

During data collection, the team experienced the following difficulties:

- Workshop participants did not really understand, or were unfamiliar with the CS indicators or the CIVICUS framework. They found it difficult to relate KWLM's situation with these indicators, although most of them participated in the baseline process. This lessened the effectiveness of the workshop.
- As a cooperative, KWLM does not have a monitoring and evaluation system in place to measure changes other than those directly relevant to the daily operations of the cooperative. This added to difficulties in finding hard data and affected the agreement on the outcomes.
- KWLM has not experience with an external evaluation prior to the MFS-II base- and end line evaluations, which resulted in a lack of preparation and minimum understanding of common evaluation practices.
- Because of the time frame of the project and that of the end line, few changes occurred since the 2012 baseline. The project ended nine months after the baseline was conducted. As a result, the in-country team focused on reconfirming the findings and assessing the extent to which additional changes had occurred and whether interventions and results were sustainable. Ideally, the baseline assessment should have taken place earlier (in 2010). This would have made it easier to identify and track how changes occurred from base to end line.

## 4.3 Identification of two outcomes for in-depth process tracing

This project was not selected for in-depth process tracing. Given the limitations in the data and information available, only one outcome was selected for quick process tracing. The outcome, "smallholder farmers are organised to produce certified, legal timber" was selected to be measured for effectiveness.

The selection was made with the following considerations:

- This is relevant as the pathway and the outcome reflect the pre-conditions stated in ToC such as 'well organized community, capacity to access market' and 'community environmental awareness'.
- The outcome is relevant to two CIVICUS dimensions, namely 'level of organisation' (the cooperative's ability to organise smallholders) and 'civic engagement' (cooperative members gain benefits from being organised, as well as access to markets).
- 'Prosperous and autonomous communities', which is the ultimate goal of the cooperative, cannot only be measured from a better prices that are offered to members for certified timber, but there are other benefits which as a package contribute to sustainable livelihoods. An increase in the number of the cooperative members reflects that more community members have become more 'prosperous and autonomous'.
- Although improved community environmental awareness –as an impact in civil society- can be seen as an interesting outcome to look at, it will not be traced as a distinguished outcome since it is explained and incorporated as one of the pathways which constructs the chosen outcome.
- As a cooperative, KWLM does not have intermediary organisations (IOs) thus it is most suitable to look at the organisation of smallholders into the cooperative as an indicator for level of organisation.

# 5 Results

## 5.1 Results obtained in relation to intervention logic

Table 5

*Overview of results achieved in relation to project plan KWLM*

| Result Level | Description | Level of achievement |
|---|---|---|
| Main Objective | To provide sustainable income to smallholder forest producers through sustainable forest management and the creation of vibrant enterprise of timber and non-timber forest products.<br><br>Implemented in 15 villages, 3 sub-districts, Kulon Progo District. Expected beneficiaries: 2,600 households (min. 30% women actively participate). | Partially achieved: While coverage was expanded to 18 villages, over 4 sub-districts, the number people benefiting as cooperative members was lower than expected. The number of women members in the cooperative is only 20%. |
| Outcome | Cooperative members' income increased (improved welfare) significantly through better and fairer price paid by the consumers as they confidence of the sustainability of the products that they purchased. | Achieved: Although there is no measurement on whether cooperative members' income has increased, members are making more profit in the sales of timber through KWLM. KWLM timber products for IDR 300,000 more per cubic meter compared to the price offered by middlemen. The cooperative is transparent with its system. The cooperative has also gained trust from regular buyers. |
| | Forest area is maintained/protected for its economic value to the community. | Partially achieved: There is no base and end line data or Forestry Department data showing any changes forest area. However, there is evidence that the community is active in protecting and replanting the forest area. KWLM provides 10 seedlings for every tree cut for timber. |
| | Market of certified sustainable timber and non-timber products is expanded. | Partially achieved: An expansion of two buyers of certified wood produced by KWLM to six. However, KWLM still faces difficulties in finding buyers able to pay the amounts necessary for covering operational costs. |
| Output | An increase in the number of registered members as many as 2,600 by end of 2012 | Partially achieved: Membership did not grow as expected, due to additional membership requirements. In March 2012 there were 903 members, which grew to 1,207 during the end line. More potential members have registered but KWLM does not have the capacity to absorb them. |
| | 2,000 hectares of smallholders' forest land receive FSC certificate | Partially achieved: only 417 hectares of smallholders' forest land received FSC certification. |
| | KWLM produces and sells FSC certified timber products. | Partially achieved: KWLM only produced 800 timber products in 2013. The cooperative has limited capital to optimize production and sales. Plans to set up a saw mill did not materialize. |
| | Establishment of demonstration nurseries which provide seedlings to KWLM members. 60,000 seedlings for 1,000 ha in 2011 and 130,000 seedlings for 2,000 hectares in 2012. | Insufficient data: KWLM has a separate unit for managing nurseries. Seedling support for 2012-2014 provided by the local government. |

Most of the planned results were partially achieved. KWLM's reports to Hivos were not very comprehensive and lacked detailed information. This is understandable considering that they are a local cooperative and many of its members have only received basic education, while KWLM's staff are busy running the cooperative's daily operations.

The main area where KWLM fell short was in achieving expected organisational growth. Membership, production and sales were lower than expected. This could also mean that original targets were too ambitious for KWLM. It is also clear that KWLM has struggled to find a cash-flow system that works for them. There is also no substantial evidence that KWLM had any success in expanding the production of non-timber forest products. Nonetheless, in the last two years KWLM has successfully gained the interest and support of the local government who are looking at ways to replicate KWLM's model.

## 5.2 Changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period

### 5.2.1 Civic engagement

Civic engagement describes the formal and informal activities and participation undertaken by individuals to advance shared interests at different levels. Participation within civil society is multi-faceted and encompasses socially-based and politically-based forms of engagement.

KWLM's main focus is on sustainable timber production. As during the baseline, the cooperative's members are predominantly male, land-owners. Since 2012, KWLM has expanded its interventions to an additional sub-district. The number of members has also increased from 903 in 2012 to 1,207 in 2014. An additional 1,100 people are waitlisted as potential members. KWLM has not been able to absorb a larger number due to cash-flow problems.

Females make up just 20 percent of the current members because entry requirements require members to own land or be involved in timber production, both which are male-dominated. Interventions to support female farmers in the production of herbs and spices did not run as expected because KWLM failed to find buyers.

During the end line, the evaluation team found an improvement in the knowledge and confidence of cooperative staff. Compared to the baseline, staff and members were better informed of KWLM's systems and procedures.

The intensity of political engagement of the cooperative did not change since the baseline. KWLM does not have a specific strategy for political engagement, and in fact bars its members from engaging in politics. This is to ensure that the cooperative is not influenced by the interests of specific political parties.

### 5.2.2 Level of organization

This dimension assesses the organisational development, complexity and sophistication of civil society, by looking at the relationships among the actors within the civil society arena.

KWLM's relationships with other like-minded actors has remained the same since the baseline. The networks with whom they are involved stem from the period of Hivos' support. Telapak remains its closest ally, representing KWLM at the national level. At the local level, KWLM has strong ties to CUKATA credit union and collaborates with them to provide credit to KWLM members. In fact both share a similar membership base, area of operations, as well as target locations.

The frequency of dialogue with its closest partners has decreased since the baseline. Coordination and collaboration with Telapak has become less routine, since Telapak's support earlier had focused on technical assistance to get the cooperative up and running. KWLM no longer engages with Yayasan Bina Insan Mandiri (YABIMA), with whom KWLM was promoting community logging, since this local organization has become inactive.

The cooperative also has a broadened network with university students, many of whom have taken a keen interest in studying how KWLM runs its sustainable forestry programme and in certified timber.

Although most of KWLM's members own land, these farmers are small-holders in scale and are still dependent on others for market linkages to sell their timber. KWLM has taken over the position of traditional middlemen, and has supported farmers receive better prices for their timber. As a result of KWLM's support, cooperative members have been practicing a more systematized form of logging and have better financial safeguards. They are no longer forced to cut down trees and sell them at monopolized prices to middlemen when they are in critical need for cash. KWLM has offered them a means not only to see timber at better prices through certification, but also access to credit. KWLM still offers cooperative members swift payments, although there have been some issues relating to cash flow problems. Cooperative members can contact KWLM when they are ready to sell their timber logs, which are then inspected, paid for, and picked up for redistribution to an external buyer.

Compared to the baseline situation, KWLM now has more buyers. The cooperative regularly supplies timber to six buyers who are in the export business. There is still a lack of interest amongst local buyers in more expensive, certified wood. As mentioned before, KWLM has issues with cash flow, since substantial capital is required to purchase ordered amounts from farmers. Payment terms are such that full payments are made upon receipt of the timber, and even then buyers often do not make timely payments.

KWLM also has struggled to diversify its funding resources. Since Hivos funding ended in 2012, no new donors have been identified to provide grants to KWLM. A loan from ICCO has been secured in 2014, which will hopefully help KWLM address the cash flow problems.

### 5.2.3 Practice of Values

Practice of Values refers to the internal practice of values within the civil society arena. Important values that CIVICUS looks at such as transparency, democratic decision-making, taking into account diversity that are deemed crucial to gauge not only progressiveness but also the extent to which civil society's practices are coherent with their ideals.

There has been no change in downward accountability, composition of social organs and in auditing practices since the baseline. With regards to the latter, KWLM has yet to be audited externally since this was requested by Hivos.

KWLM is governed by cooperative principles, which by Law are based on kinship values and on improving the welfare of members. KWLM is accountable to its members, who are aware of the prices at which wood is bought and sold and are informed of the financial conditions. General assemblies are conducted as mandated by law. The cooperative's internal procedures are guided by its bylaws (AD/ART).

The composition of the social organs of KWLM remains the same. KWLM is open for women members but the numbers of women are still limited. As described in above sections, cooperative members are of an 'elite' group and landless farmers are unable to join the cooperative. As such, power relations remain the same, which is internally spread over the Board of Supervisors, Executing Agency and Director.

### 5.2.4 Perception of Impact

Perception of Impact assesses the perceived impact of civil society actors on politics and society as a whole as the consequences of collective action. In this, the perceptions of both civil society actors (internal) as well as actors outside civil society are taken into account. Specific sub-dimensions for this evaluation are the extent to which the SPO has contributed to engaging more people in social or political activities, strengthening CSOs and their networks, and has influenced public and private sector policies.

The increase in membership since 2012 is an indicator of client satisfaction. There is certainly no lack of interest from community members in joining KWLM, with more than 1,000 other waiting to join up. It is unfortunate the problems with cash flow have affected KWLM's ability to grow further. In addition, the evaluation team interviewed three cooperative members who complained about late payments being made as a result. However, the general satisfaction remains high.

One of the main impacts of KWLM's work has been in promoting legal timber as a means to improve the bargaining position of members vis-à-vis middlemen. Farmers have better options with regards to whom they sell wood to and are less dependent on middle men since KWLM has facilitated the availability of loans.

Public and private sector actors have taken an interest in KWLM. The cooperative model of KWLM has been replicated in Lampung Province while the wood certification system has been taken up by local governments in East Java. Under the current regulations, all concessionaries and forestry companies have to obtain certification. The government of Kulon Progo has requested KWLM's assistance to provide trainings on the process of certifying wood products. This illustrates that KWLM has been able to provide its services to the public sector and has become a model for replication. In 2013, KWLM

was also recognized by the British Council and the Arthur Guinness Fund for its community-based social enterprise and was awarded in the Community Entrepreneurs Challenge.

KWLM continued to maintain relations with local government offices in Kulon Progo District which is characterized by mutual exchanges and partnerships. The Forestry Department has provided seedlings to KWLM and KWLM on its part has transferred its technical know-how and expertise to the government. The Forestry Department is also replicating KWLM's GPS-based inventory system to locate, track and record trees and timber. KWLM has helped streamline district certification processes. Its close relations with government officials earned KWLM the trust to issue letters of origin for the wood they sell without long bureaucratic processes.

With regards to the private sector, KWLM does not seek to influence policies and practices directly. Rather the cooperative's social business model and certified wood products are its selling points for private sector partnership. KWLM offers traceability, chain of custody and a transparent system. As noted above, KWLM sells certified wood to six private companies. The demands are currently much higher than what KWLM can manage to deliver and are constrained by cash flow. KWLM has not been able to negotiate terms of payments and often has to deal with delayed payments.

### 5.2.5 Civil Society Environment

The social, political and economic environment in which civil society operates affects its room for manoeuvre. The civil society context has been described in Chapter 3. In this section we describe how KWLM is coping with that context.

Timber certification and verification has received greater attention of the Government of Indonesia and the global market. KWLM has responded well to this situation, gaining FSC certification and responding to in-country development in the area of certification. KWLM is in the position to promote the benefits of certified timber to the community and provides farmers with a link to the global market. These conditions have been favourable for KWLM whose mission is to support sustainable community logging while ensuring forests are conserved. KWLM plans to diversify its products, expanding from just providing raw, unfinished timber to furniture production.


## 5.3 To what degree are the changes attributable to the Southern partners?

### 5.3.1 Smallholder farmers are organised to produce certified, legal timber

KWLM was not selected for in-depth process-tracing. The evaluation team was able to identify one outcome achieved in the period up to 2014 for quick process-tracing. This outcome is: "Smallholder farmers are organised to produce certified, legal timber". The indicators for the achievement of the outcome are the increased number of KWLM members and the access to six local buyers who are willing to pay the premium price for certified timber.

During the period of 1980-2007, individual logging was a common practice by communities spread around 17,000 hectares of forest area in Kulon Progro district[20]. This kind of forest management practice endangered the sustainability of forest areas since there was no standard for logging and made community members were reliant on middlemen. KWLM introduced the concept of community forest management in after a pilot supported by Telapak Foundation in Sulawesi was proven to be successful.

[20] Overview of KWLM. Didi Sutadi, "Pemenang Community Entrepreneurs Challenge (CEC) Wave III", *NihDia.com*, 25 March 2013. Available from http://www.nihdia.com/2013/03/25/pemenang-community-entrepreneurs-challenge-wave-iii/ (accessed 20 December 2014)




Map of Community Forest in Kulonprogo (KWLM)

Cooperatives in the Indonesian context are generally seen effective means to engage and organize communities as it combines social and economic interests. Since KWLM was founded in 2009, its membership base has grown from 322 people to 903 in March 2012, and 1,207 in 2014. Another 1,100 people are interested in joining the cooperative, but have been wait listed. Having more members is considered an indicator of the outcome's achievement because it means that sustainable community logging practices are taking root and spreading. KWLM has also expanded its interventions to a new sub-district (Nanggulan) following success in Samigaluh, Kalibawang and Girimulyo. As explained in other sections of this report, KWLM has had problems with internal cash-flow and has yet to accept more of the wait-listed members[21]. KWLM is still trying to increase their capital from accumulated profits so that it can accommodate more people in the area. Nonetheless, there is evidence for a high level of interest amongst smallholder farmers to join the cooperative. The government has also been interested in KWLM's model and has begun to draw from KWLM's experience and technical know-how.

There are three pathways that could explain this outcome. The first attributes the organisation of farmers to the incentives offered by KWLM. The main incentives are a premium price offered for timber and access to savings and loans. The second pathway attributes the outcome to a greater environmental awareness amongst community members of the importance of sustainable forest management practice. In the third pathway, the outcome is explained by government support for community forest management.

*Information that confirms or rejects the pathways:*

1. Pathway 1: KWLM offers incentives for smallholder farmers to participate in sustainable timber harvesting

KWLM has received two types of certification for the production of legal timber. The first is FSC certification for chain of custody received in 2011 and valid up to 2015. The second is SVLK certification, which KWLM secured in 2012. The costs for certification were covered with Hivos support. This certification provides the basis for KWLM to sell timber at a premium price, and in turn it can offer financial incentives to smallholders interested in joining the cooperative.

*Information that confirms pathway 1:*

Cooperative members earn up to IDR 300,000 more for each cubic meter of certified timber they sell to KWLM. Based on interviews with the cooperative staff and members, middlemen can only offer between IDR 2.8 to 3 million for the same amount of timber that KWLM buys for IDR 3.3 million. KWLM offers better prices for timber products, especially when the location of the logging is near the main road. This is a clear financial incentive for smallholders to join the cooperative. External sources

[21] The target as stipulated in the proposal was 2,600 but "accepting more members means that they have to be able to provide cash for the credit to their members" (interview with KWLM Director", MFS-II evaluation 2014).

also confirm that one of the selling points of KWLM has been that it can offer 30-40% higher prices than middlemen[22].

Other than the premium price, cooperative members also appreciate KWLM's transparent price calculations and the ease of transactions. When smallholders sell through the cooperative they obtain a documented calculation and a receipt of payment. When cooperative members are ready to sell their timber, they only have to call or send a message to KWLM, and the cooperative organizes the rest.[23]

The second incentive that KWLM has offered is the improvement of access to financial credit. Prior to KWLM's interventions, trees were cut and sold when community members needed cash urgently. Middle men would be able to offer cheap prices for the timber. Interviews with KWLM and cooperative members revealed that the ability to access savings and loans through a non-monopolized system has been another motivation to join the KWLM. KWLM works with a local credit union, CUKATA to offer loans to its members. Smallholders are able to offer their trees as collateral and can now save money, which is paid out annually to the members. This information was confirmed by the Tosari sub-district leader. Cooperative members are able to benefit from better financial management and no longer have to resort to cutting their trees when a family member falls ill or when they need to pay school fees. Rather, they can save money through the credit union. The bigger their saving, the larger annual benefits they receive at the end of the year.

*Information that rejects pathway 1:*
Through KWLM's system, only four types of wood can be certified, purchased, and resold to retailers, furniture producers or wood exporters. This means that not all types of wood produced by smallholders can be bought at better prices.

KWLM reported in their annual reports to Hivos that membership was not growing according to expected targets due to the fact that community members could not comply with expected requirements. Some of these requirements require potential members to spend money to obtain the right documentation proving their land ownership. This means that while there are financial incentives for joining the cooperative, there are also disincentives.

The management team of KWLM mentioned that it cannot accept 1,100 wait-listed potential members because of cash flow problems. The issues with cash flow have also affected the satisfaction of cooperative members who told the evaluation team that payments are sometimes being delayed.

2. Pathway 2: Community members take up sustainable logging out of a concern for the environment
Community awareness plays an important role in stopping illegal logging practices and in efforts to promote reforestation. Deforestation, climate change and global warming are well-broadcasted issues. Data shows that KWLM conducted outreach/socialization in 4 sub-districts.

*Information that confirms pathway 2:*
According to written reports and documents, KWLM invested in undertaking regular socialization meetings to promote community logging in their targeted villages. Socialization covered more than 81 hamlets. Although the main purpose was to attract new members, KWLM's vision and mission (which is to promote sustainable forest management) were spread by these activities. Also, new members, upon joining KWLM undergo orientation on sustainable community logging so that they comply with cooperative standards and certification standards.

Cooperative members interviewed confirmed that their villages were much greener than a couple of years ago. They are aware of the importance of conserving forest areas as a means to sustain their future livelihoods. One cooperative member interviewed said that what motivated him to plant more was that one day he would get a return on his investments. Conservation is thus being seen as a means to secure future financial opportunities.

[22] British Council Indonesia, "Profil Pemenang AGF-BC Wave III: Koperasi Wanalestarai Menorah", 19 March 2013. Available from http://news.britishcouncil.or.id/2013/03/koperasi-wanalestari-menoreh/#sthash.3QeuICAp.dpuf (accessed 20 December 2014)
[23] Interviews with Wagiman and Suradi, member and field facilitator of KWLM, MFS II evaluation 2014

KWLM applies a system through which it offers ten free seedlings for every tree sold by cooperative members. This stimulates cooperative members to plant more trees. In addition, trees must be a minimum of 20-25 cm (depending on the species) to be cut. These Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) help ensure that forests are conserved[24].

KWLM's efforts to combine 'environment' with 'enterprise' have been recognized by the Arthur Guinness Fund and the British Council in March 2014 (KWLM won an award "Community Enterprise Challenge Wave III" for 2013)[25]. KWLM was acknowledged for creating awareness among community members of the importance of protecting natural resources.

*Information that rejects pathway 2:*
The evaluation found limited rejecting evidence. There was no indication of illegal logging activities going on in the area, and no media reports were found of such cases. A study conducted by Syahadat (no year)[26] revealed that unorganised initiatives undertaken by communities to manage forests have led to poor forestry practices that are unsustainable and do not produce optimum product revenues.

None of the cooperative members interviewed mentioned concern for the environment as their primary motivation for joining KWLM.

Cooperative members interviewed said that KWLM sometimes 'persuaded' them to sell their timber even though they had rather wait. This is because KWLM had to fulfil orders from their buyers. These practices go against sustainable logging practices and counteract the conservation messages promoted by KWLM.

3. Pathway 3: Government support for community forest management promotes smallholder organisation

*Information that confirms pathway 3:*
The Forestry Law No.41/1999 stipulates that the government supports community logging and forestry. It provides the basis for government recognition of community-based forest management schemes.

The long-term development plan of Kulon Progo district (2005-2025) recognizes the function of communities in managing forest areas and pays special attention to improving the management, conservation and utilization of natural resources in the Menoreh area[27] where KWLM works. The District Government of Kulon Progo has expanded the area of community managed forests from 18,731.97 hectares in 2010[28] to 20,177.69 hectares in 2013[29]. This expansion is important because it reflects stronger measures to defend the interests of communities dependent on forests for livelihoods and at the same time recognizes the need to conserve forest areas.

KWLM developed a five-year forest management plan (2010-2014) with a projection that the cooperative would manage up to 5,000 hectares of land. Based on this assumption, KWLM has calculated annual allowable cuts or AAC (jatah tebang tahunan/JTT). Every year, KWLM proposes AACs to the Forestry Department of Kulon Progo based on their latest inventory.[30]

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[24] PERSEPSI (Perhimpunan untuk Studi dan Pengembangan Ekonomi dan Sosial), "Kunjungan FMU Enggal Mulyo ke Kulon Progo", 24 July 2014. Available from http://www.persepsi-klaten.org/berita-artikel/kunjungan-fmu-enggal-mulyo-ke-kulon-progo (21 December 2014)

[25] Didi Sutadi, "Pemenang Community Entrepreneurs Challenge (CEC) Wave III", NihDia.com, 25 March 2013. Available from http://www.nihdia.com/2013/03/25/pemenang-community-entrepreneurs-challenge-wave-iii/ (accessed 20 December 2014)

[26] Syahadat, Epi. 2006. *Study on Forest Product Administration Orientation in Community Forest as a Basic Reference in Community Forest Usage*. Available at http://forda-mof.org/files/71.KAJIAN%20PEDOMAN%20PENATAUSAHAAN%20HASIL%20HUTAN%20DI%20HUTAN%20RAKYAT%20SEBAGAI%20DASAR%20ACUAN%20PEMANFAATAN%20HUTAN%20RAKYAT.pdf (accessed 21 December 2014)

[27] "RJPJ Kulon Progo 2005-2025"

[28] KOMPAS.com, "Sertifikasi Kayu Murah Diminati, 8 November 2012. Available from http://sains.kompas.com/read/2012/11/08/10380835/Sertifikasi.Kayu.Murah.Diminati (accessed 21 December 2014)

[29] Sutarmi, "Hutan rakyat Kulon Progo 20.177,69 hektare", *Antara Jogja*, 10 March 2014. Available from http://jogja.antaranews.com/berita/320505/hutan-rakyat-kulon-progo-2017769-hektare (accessed 21 December 2014)

[30] Menoreh Sustainable Wood, "Penghargaan dari The British Council". Available from https://menorehwood.wordpress.com/ (accessed 21 December 2014)

*Information that rejects pathway 3:*
While the local government has been supportive of community forest schemes on paper (through policies, for example), they lack technical know-how on how to implement sustainable community logging. This is evident from the fact that they have requested KWLM's support to provide trainings and are also replicating KWLM's timber/forest inventory system.

According to the local parliament, the government of Kulon Progo has not invested sufficiently in developing farming, forestry and plantation opportunities that exist in the Menoreh Mountain area[31].

*Conclusion*
Based on the available data and information, we conclude that all three pathways form a causal package to explain the achievement of the outcome" Smallholder farmers are organised to produce certified, legal timber". KWLM's certification service and transparent timber price calculation are attractive for community members as it gives certainty and better prices for timber products. Pathway 1 is *sufficient* but not *necessary*, while pathways 2 and 3 are *necessary but not sufficient* as it requires pathways 1 to be able to explain the outcome. The package offered by KWLM is primarily grounded in economic incentives, which has also successfully introduced sustainable forestry practices as communities become aware of the importance of maintaining forests for their future livelihoods. Government policies and efforts provide an enabling environment in terms of legal framework and supportive relations.

## 5.4 What is the relevance of these changes?

### 5.4.1 Relevance of the changes in relation to the Theory of Change of 2012

In the 2011 Theory of Change (ToC), KWLM's main goal was the development of a prosperous and autonomous forest-dependent community. In order to reach these objectives, KWLM identified a number of conditions, which were: 1) delivery of good services; 2) community environmental awareness; 3) support from the public sector and 4) capacity to access markets. The main assumption was that environmental sustainability and economic resilience had to be linked through sustainable management of forest resources.

Since the baseline, KWLM has not altered its ideas and intervention strategies. The cooperative's main service consistently provided has been its FSC and SVLK certification. In addition, KWLM has facilitated links to savings and loans provided through a credit union. Support from the public sector, although beneficial has not been a necessary factor for the achievement of the outcome. Rather, it has expanded KWLM's scope of service delivery to government officials in the Forestry Department and aided its ability to provide seedlings to community members as compensation for every tree cut, as well as a means to promote environmental values. While certification has opened access to a niche market, KWLM's capacity to access markets hinges on its ability to fulfil market demands and identify potential buyers. It is in this last area, which is probably the most critical of the preconditions that KWLM has struggled. KWLM's supply of timber is dependent on the production of its members, from whom it buys wood to be resold. Membership has not increased because of cash flow issues. This means essentially that KWLM has not yet found a balance between supply and demand based on available capital.

Regarding community environmental awareness the indicator was that members practice the standard operation procedures in conducting community logging. The evaluation has found that there have been cases when community members have been pressured to sell wood before reaching the ideal diameter so as to fulfil orders. In essence this goes against the very ideals that KWLM has set for itself as an organisation.

[31] Antara Jogja, "Dewan: Pembangunan Antar Wilayah Kulon Progo terjadi ketimpangan". Available from http://www.antarayogya.com/print/318037/dewan-pembangunan-antarwilayah-kulon-progo-terjadi-ketimpangan (accessed 21 December 2014)

### 5.4.2 Relevance of the changes in relation to the context in which the SPO is operating

The interventions and results of KWLM have been relevant both to the local context as well as to current policy directions of the government.

Within the Province of Yogyakarta, Kulon Progo District has the second largest forest area with just over 60 percent (2013) classified as 'hutan rakyat', or community forest[32]. Many timber products in Yogyakarta come from the District. Deforestation in the area has been polemic since the 70s and reached its peak in 1999[33]. This has led to landslides and the loss of ground water resources. Past logging practices have not been sustainable and have caused overexploitation as well as economic inefficiency. According to KWLM, timber production for an area of around 8,000 hectares should be 77,000 $m^3$, but has reached 234,000 $m^3$, far exceeding sustainable logging standards[34]. As a country, a new study released in 2014 suggested that Indonesia has the highest deforestation rates globally[35]. According to National Statistic Agency (BPS), there are around 14.1 million (2006) forest-dependent communities. For them, community logging is their main livelihood, as it is in Kulon Progo where KWLM works.

In recent years, the District has sought to address deforestation, which was taken up in its Long (2005 – 2025) and Mid-Term (2011-2016) Development Plans. The local government set targets for the expansion of 'hutan rakyat', which were surpassed in 2013[36]. These developments are in line with national policy directions.

The Indonesian government established bilateral cooperation with the European Union through a Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) with the aim to improve forest sector governance and ensure exported timber is legal. To support the implementation of this bilateral cooperation, the Government of Indonesia issued standards and guidelines for sustainable forest management and timber verification in 2009 and 2011, imposing a mandatory certification system for forestry businesses[37]. By 2012, there were 202 businesses or units holding certification[38], KWLM being one of them. In 2014, the Indonesian timber certification and verification system was accepted by the European Union.

KWLM introduced community-based forestry and logging standards to help local farmers address the above issues within the existing regulatory framework. KWLM's promotion of sustainable community logging and access to premium markets is also in line with the momentum gained for REDD+ initiatives. Illegal logging is of relevance to REDD+ because it is an important cause of deforestation and degradation and sustainable forestry management is a priority for REDD+ mechanism[39].

### 5.4.3 Relevance of the changes in relation to the policies of the MFS II alliance and the CFA

The interventions of KWLM fall under the Green Entrepreneurship programme of Hivos. This programme area, Hivos' largest globally, focuses on "enterprising men and women as catalysts for green socio-economic progress"[40]. Hivos considered KWLM as a farmer-based cooperative that has

[32] "LKPJ DIY Tahun 2013"
[33] Hardiyanto, Gladi. 2003. *Idealita & Realita Pengelolaan HUTAN DESA di Kabupaten Kulon Progo, Yogyakarta*. Yayasan DAMAR. Available from http://www.hkmhd.ditbps.com/artikel/Pengelolaan%20HUTAN%20DESA%20DI%20KULON%20PROGO.pdf (accessed 21 December 2014)
[34] "KWLM proposal 2010", KWLM, 2010, p. 1
[35] Melissa Hellmann, "Indonesia Now has the Highest Rate of Deforestation in the World", *TIME*, 1 July 2014. Available from http://time.com/2944030/indonesia-now-has-the-highest-rate-of-deforestation-in-the-world/ (accessed 21 December 2014)
[36] Harianjogja.com, "Luas Hutan Rakyat di Kulonprogo Terus Bertambah", 11 March 2014. Available from http://www.harianjogja.com/baca/2014/03/11/luas-hutan-rakyat-di-kulonprogo-terus-bertambah-495355 (accessed 21 December 2014)
[37] "Yang Legal, Yang Beruntung Laporan Hasil Penjajajagan Perspektif Sektor Swasta terhadap SVLK, Kemitraan 2012
[38] Ibid
[39] Luttrell, C., Obidzinski, K., Brockhaus, M., Muharrom, E., Petkova, E., Wardell, A. and Halperin, J. 2011 *Lessons for REDD+ from measures to control illegal logging in Indonesia.* Bogor, Indonesia: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Center for International Forestry Research
[40] "Hivos Business Plan 2011-2015", Hivos, p. 21

strong concern on the environment and employment aspects[41]. In Hivos' 2008 Vision Paper on Civil Society Building, Hivos states that, "In the economic domain it is civil society's role to counterbalance short-term profit policies, and to struggle for long term production policies which are socially and environmentally sound."[42] As such, Hivos supports activities related to market participation since it contributes to fairer economic relations.

One of the motivations for Hivos' support to KWLM was its initiative of combining the 'business' and 'environment' into programme, a relatively new approach for producers organisations in Indonesia. By supporting KWLM, Hivos intended to improve the bargaining position of farmers in order to improve their welfare. In order to achieve this Hivos supported the organisation of farmers into groups or cooperatives to improve their collective capabilities and confidence to engage and link with other stakeholders, such as buyers. Hivos considers cooperatives to be democratically-run and controlled by its members allowing economic benefits to be distributed proportionally, whilst offering a means to sustain without a continued reliance on external donor support.[43]

## 5.5 Explaining factors

### 5.5.1 Internal factors

The Hivos-supported activities do not seem sufficient to achieve the identified outputs and outcomes. Project activities were focused on three big issues: environmental education (called "socialization"), inventory of potential timber supply, and the process of certification. These do not describe how more certified timer will be sold or how this will contribute to an expansion of market, which in turn is meant to lead to increased incomes and incentives to attract more members to the cooperative. These kind of activities require a large proportion of the budget to cover salary costs as well as inventory. Other inhibiting internal factors seem to have been challenges at the human resource level, especially with regards to business and financial management skills. The evaluation team finds that the problems with cash flow are an illustration of these challenges.

Supporting internal factors mainly related to KWLM's ability to bridge the communities they support to the private sector. KWLM is in a strategic position both in bridging the communities with private sectors and well as being a frontline service provider. They have offered good incentives for cooperative members which include a 'cash and carry' mechanism of payment, better prices for timber, free seedlings for timber rejuvenation, and linkages to a local credit union, CUKATA. This credit union shares the same founding father as KWLM. This personal link has been the basis for a cooperative relationship. Last, as an organisation with a local basis, KWLM benefits from close day-to-day interaction with the farmers. This, in combination with the incentives they have offered and the extensive socialization, has been important for building trust.

### 5.5.2 External factors

The global market for certified timber products has been one of the driving forces behind the government's renewed interest in sustainable forest management. The increased demand resulted in an expansion of areas certified under the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), from 833,000 hectare in January 2011 to 1,679,117 hectares in July 2013[44]. The Government of Indonesia's own standards on the legality of timber origins (SVLK) has also strengthened the demand for timber certification of community logging enterprises. KWLM who has both FSC certification for chain of custody and SLVK certification created an incentive for the community to take up sustainable management practices.

[41] "Kenschets KWLM", Hivos, 2010
[42] "Hivos Vision Paper on Civil Society Building", Hivos, 2008, p. 9
[43] Information based on a questionnaire filled out Hivos Green Entrepreneurship Programme Officer
[44] Andi Fachrizal, "Sekolah Alam Negeri Pertama Berdiri di Singkawang", *Mongabay Indonesia*, 23 July 2013. Available fom http://www.mongabay.co.id/2013/07/23/ (accessed 18 January 2015)

Smallholder farmers on their own would not have been able to apply for certification without KWLM's assistance.

### 5.5.3 Relations CFA-SPO

Prior to 2010, KWLM had received support from Hivos through a micro-fund project. Through this support KWLM was able to benefit from improved skills and knowledge in forest management, support for the official registration of the cooperative, and supporting FSC certification. However, in the second period of collaboration Hivos was unable to provide direct financial assistance to further enhance staff and member capacity[45] but hired Telapak as a consultant to provide capacity building on sustainable forestry and business development to KWLM. Telapak's support was key in obtaining FSC certification. Of note is that Hivos did not continue its partnership with KWLM after the project closed in 2012 because of a new programmatic emphasis on sustainable food production.

[45] Wishnu Tirta, "FSC Certified Wood", *Poros Nusantara Utama*, 10 January 2012. Available from https://bogorkurir.wordpress.com/2012/01/10/fsc-certified-wood/ (accessed 18 January 2015)

# 6 Discussion

## 6.1 Design of the intervention

The design of KWLM's interventions did not focus on improving forestry laws and regulations as a means to promote community participation in sustainable forest management. Rather, the focus was on creating a market-oriented instrument through timber certification as a way to bring about more responsible and sustainable community logging. The cooperative model was considered as an institutional tool to garner small-holder participation in the market.

While there is renewed interest in cooperatives as a means to organize farmers, this model has also received criticism. Empirical research on agricultural cooperatives has found that the poorest farmers are the least likely to participate, suggesting that agricultural cooperatives can be rather exclusive[46]. Studies also show that reducing poverty through the cooperative model hinges on inclusion and effectiveness, and that long-term impacts of membership on poverty reduction are rarely monitored or analysed[47]. The evaluation team found that KWLM's membership is not inclusive and that insufficient interventions are undertaken to support entry into the cooperative. KWLM reported that community members were finding it hard to comply with requirements for cooperative membership, but there is no evidence that KWLM addressed the issue. Women's membership remained low, and did not reach the target of 30 percent set at the start of interventions in 2010.

With regards to effectiveness, KWLM's interventions were focused on four areas: 1) socialization, 2) inventory, 3) nursery development and 4) certification. These activities focused more on ensuring that market demands were met rather than direct actions to assist farmers. What was missing in the design was a focus on ensuring a sustainable supply chain, building skills to ensure better cash flow, and providing marketing and business development training for cooperative members. KWLM has not yet found a way to deal with the payment systems applied by buyers, which requires KWLM to have sufficient financial capital to purchase timber from cooperative members up front for which buyers pay for fully upon delivery of the full order of timber.

It is useful to compare KWLM to Koperasi Hutan Jaya Lestari (KHJL), the first community forest group in Indonesia to achieve FSC certification in 2005. During the start-up phase KHJL members were provided intensive training and support on management practices for teak wood. Farmers also benefited from direct capacity building on wood quality, meeting contract commitments and consistency of supply. Intensive monitoring was conducted to ensure production did not surpass community capacity. Members were provided with start-up, no-interest loans that helped them fulfil FSC requirements, particularly obtaining letters/documents to prove land ownership and other permits.[48] KHJL also profited from the support of The Forest Trust, an organisation with extensive links to international factories and buyers[49].

The elements described above were to a large extent missing in KWLM's interventions. What both cooperatives do have in common is that FSC certification brought them credibility and recognition from the local government. In addition, both KWLM and KHJL worked to organise farmers so that timber could be sold collectively at premium prices. Costs for initial certification were in both instances covered by external donor support.

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[46] Verhofstadt, Ellen and Maertens, Miet. 2014. *Can agricultural cooperatives reduce poverty? Heterogeneous impact of cooperative membership on farmers' welfare in Rwanda*. Bioeconomics Working Paper Series. Working Paper 2014/2. Available from http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/164803/2/BioeconWP_2014_2.pdf (accessed 18 January 2015)

[47] Ibid

[48] Barr, Robin. 2007. The *Role of Small and Medium Forest Enterprise Associations in Reducing Poverty*. FAO Corporate Document Repository. Available from http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/ag131e/ag131e24.htm (accessed 18 January 2015)

[49] Forest Stewardship Council, "Successful Forest Cooperative in Indonesia", January 2013. Available from https://ic.fsc.org/preview.indonesia.a-614.pdf (accessed 18 January 2015)

Essential ingredients for replication of similar interventions as well as sustained success can be summarized as below. These draw both on findings from KWLM and KHJL, as well as general ingredients required for sustainable interventions:

1. A greater focus on building the capacity of farmers;
2. Working within the production capacities of the farmers;
3. Certification costs and salaries need to be factored into the production, sales and profit calculations;
4. Supporting farmers with loans to fulfil FSC or cooperative entry requirements, thus enabling farmers with less capital to participate;
5. Where funds are available, develop interventions that also benefit non-members, especially if membership requires proof of land ownership, which can lead to exclusion of women and poorer farmers;
6. Collaborate with organisations that have links to international markets, especially where national markets are insufficient;
7. Continue to provide premium prices for timber. This contributes to a decrease in illegal logging as well as encouragement for reforestation;
8. Explore and support value added businesses, such as furniture production;
9. Monitor how collective actions through the cooperative model are leading to economic benefits, and;
10. Ensure democratic principles are held up by the cooperative.

# 7 Conclusion

KWLM's 'Community-based Local Economic Development through Sustainable Forest Management' Project supported by Hivos has successfully expanded the opportunities for smallholder farmers to produce certified timber. Certification has allowed small holders, organised by KWLM through a cooperative model, to collectively participate in markets that offer a better price for timber sourced in sustainable ways. While better prices are the main incentives that have resulted in an expanded cooperative membership, community members have come to adopt more environmentally sound logging practices as they understand that future income will depend on maintaining prized forest resources. In addition, KWLM has offered other services to cooperative members to assist them in reforestation and also to become less dependent on middle men who in the past monopolized timber prices. The linkage with a local credit union has been one of the key explaining factors to their ability to attract more small holders.

Hivos support was critical in allowing KWLM to obtain certification from FSC as well as Indonesia's SVLK certification. The services offered by KWLM has resulted in an increase in membership has grown from 322 in 2009, to 903 in 2012 and now consists of 1,207 members. This means that even after Hivos' support ended in November 2012, KWLM continued to expand to engage more smallholders. While these smallholders are benefitting economically from KWLM's support, it should be noted that the stringent standards of certification have also prevented landless and women farmers from directly participating in the scheme. KWLM's efforts to support these groups through the development of other agricultural products has not been successful.

Nonetheless, the changes related to growth of sustainable community logging are relevant to the context in which the SPO is operating in. Global market demands have pushed for timber products to be traceable and sustainably harvested. KWLM is able to participate in this market by creating linkages with local private sector actors. The local government has also demonstrated an interest in KWLM's systems and approach.

Hivos' support has helped to finance FSC certification, which is valid until 2015. It is unclear whether KWLM will try to extend its certification beyond this period, but if it does, this will have financial implications. Moreover, despite KWLM's success, the SPO still faces challenges in maintaining a proper cash flow system. Cooperative members, while still satisfied with KWLM, have started to voice complaints over late payments. KWLM is trying to address matters, but it may need further technical assistance to ensure the issues are fully addressed. In order for the cooperative's interventions to remain relevant to its beneficiaries, it will need to maintain is capacity to manage financial lows, markets, and continue with transparent business practices.

Table 6

*Summary of findings.*

| When looking at the MFS II interventions of this SPO to strengthen civil society and/or policy influencing, how much do you agree with the following statements? | Score |
|---|---|
| The CS interventions were well designed | 5 |
| The CS interventions were implemented as designed | 5 |
| The CS interventions reached their objectives | 6 |
| The observed outcomes are attributable to the CS interventions | 6 |
| The observed CS outcomes are relevant to the beneficiaries of the SPO | 7 |

Score between 1 to 10, with 1 being "not at all" and 10 being "completely".

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| *Name of key informant* | *Organisation* | *Function in organisation* | *Relation with SPO* | *Contact details including e-mail.* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| B. Sad Windratmo | KWLM | Chief of KWLM | | 085292812799, Bernadussadwindratmo@yahoo.co.id |
| Damarsono | KWLM | Secretary | | 085228668447 |
| Sukardi | KWLM | Treasurer I | | |
| Slamet | KWLM | Board/ Management team | Staff | 081381599272 |
| Rujiman | KWLM | Board/ Management team | Staff | 082133718696 |
| Sudiyono | KWLM | Board | Staff | 0811258364 |
| Sulasno | KWLM | Member | Beneficiary | 082133718696 |
| Mulyono | KWLM | Member | Beneficiary | 0811258364 |
| Subagyo | KWLM | Management team | | 081227828670 |
| Bambang Triwahono | KWLM | Secretary | | 087839898752 |
| Astuti | KWLM | Management team | | 081903706189 |
| Mujiman | KWLM | Cooperative member | Beneficiary | |
| Mudjiman | KWLM | Cooperative Member | Beneficiary | |
| Senthot | Local forestry office | Head of division | | 081328243479 |
| Budiharsono | Local forestry office | Chief | | |
| Hadri | Cukata credit cooperative | Director | Partner | 081804113971 |
| Suparyanto | | Head of Tosari sub-village | Cooperative member | |
| Suradi | | Head of Madigondo sub-village | Cooperative member | |
| Herny | KWLM | Cooperative head of herbs division | | 081328795531 |
| Joko | Java | Marketing manager | Buyer of the | 081328377444 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Furniture | | cooperative | |
| Agung | PT Kwas | Manager | Buyer of the cooperative | 081904808010 |

# Appendix 1 Civil Society Scores

This table presents the appreciation of the evaluation team regarding changes occurred for each indicator between 2012 and 2014 on a scale of -2 to + 2

- 2 = Considerable deterioration
- 1 = A slight deterioration

0 = no change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012

+1 = slight improvement

+2 = considerable improvement

| Dimension | | Indicators | Question | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Civic engagement | 1 | Needs of marginalised groups | How does your organisation take the needs of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups into account in your planning, actions, activities, and/or strategies? | +1 |
| | 2 | Involvement of target groups | What is the level of participation of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups in the analysis, planning and evaluation of your activities? | +1 |
| | 3 | Political engagement | How intense is your (individual staff or organisational) participation in locally-nationally elected bodies and/or sectoral user groups? | 0 |
| | | | | |
| Level of organisation | 5 | Relations with other organisations | In the past 12 months what has been the most intensive interaction you had with other CSOs? | 0 |
| | 5 | Frequency of dialogue with closest CSO | In the past 12 months how many meetings did you have with the CSO that you have most intensive interaction with? | -1 |
| | 6 | Defending the interests of marginalised groups | Which CSO are most effective in defending the interests of your target groups? In the past 12 months, how did you relate to those CSOs? | +1 |
| | 7 | Composition current financial resource base | How does your organisation finance institutional costs such as workshops of the General Assembly (if applicable); attendance to workshops of other CSOs; costs for organisational growth and/or networking? | -1 |
| | | | | |
| Practice of Values | 8 | Downward accountability | To what extent can mandatory social organs (steering committee, general assembly, internal auditing group) ask your executive leaders to be accountable to them? | 0 |
| | 9 | Composition of social organs | What % of members of your mandatory social organs belong to the marginalised target groups you are working with/for? | 0 |
| | 10 | External financial auditing | How regularly is your organisation audited externally? | 0 |
| | | | | |
| Perception of impact | 11 | Client satisfaction | What are the most important concerns of your target groups? How do your services take into account those important concerns? | +1 |
| | 12 | Civil society impact | In the past 12 months, what impact did you have on building a strong civil society? | +1 |
| | 13 | Relation with public sector organisations. | In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with public sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' objectives? | 0 |
| | 14 | Relation with private sector organisations | In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with private sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' perspective? | +1 |
| | 15 | Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations | How successful have you been in influencing public policies and practices in the past 2 years? | +1 |
| | 16 | Influence upon private sector agencies' policies, rules, regulations. | How successful have you been in influencing private sector policies and practices in the past 2 years? | 0 |
| | | | | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CS context | 17 | Coping strategies | In the past 2 years, how did your organisation cope with these changes in the context that may have been positive or negative consequences for civil society. | +1 |

# Appendix 2 Changes in civil society indicators between 2012 and 2014

## 1. Civic Engagement

### 1.1. Needs of marginalised groups SPO

Since the baseline, KWLM has expanded its support to one new sub-district, Nanggulan following the success in the sub-districts of Samigaluh, Kalibawang and Girimulyo. This means that its interventions cover more people now compared to the baseline. In 2012, KWLM reported that it had a total of 903 members in three sub-districts. By the end of 2014, membership had expanded to 1,207 people. In addition, there are 1,100 people who are 'wait-listed' to become new members. However, due to internal cash-flow problems within KWLM, the cooperative has not yet been able to accept a further expansion of its membership base[50]. According to the director, KWLM is still trying to increase its capital from accumulated profits so that it can accommodate more people in the area.

KWLM's members consist mostly of farmers that own their own land. KWLM has provided some support to marginalised or landless households in the area through interventions in the area of herbs and spices, vegetables and other agricultural products. However, these products are not the core business of KWLM.

Female membership in KWLM is much lower than male membership. Just 243 women are members, which constitutes 20 percent of the total membership. This is partially explainable by land registration practices and Islamic Law. The latter prescribes rather complicated rules for the division of property, and generally sons inherit twice as much as daughters[51]. On Java, land certificates are more frequently issued in the names of men (65% as of 1998) rather than women (30%), and only a small portion of households in Indonesia have joint or multiple names registered (5%)[52]. Land rights are generally only titled to women if she owns separate property, while marital property is in the name of the husband[53]. KWLM's eligibility requirements oblige members to own land enabling them to produce timber. In addition, the involvement of women in timber production is so limited because KWLM utilizes farmer's groups as a means to incite participation, which tend to be dominated by a patriarchal culture. Although KWLM's herb business mostly covers women beneficiaries, there is little indication that this business is sustainable or has produced recent results. KWLM used to work together with STPN for the production of herbs and processed food with women members, with STPN providing capacity building support to women. Unfortunately, KWLM and STPN have not been able to find buyers for the products.

### 1.2. Involvement of target groups SPO

Qualitatively, the involvement of target groups has improved. At the start of KWLM's initiatives, Telapak Foundation, as the 'father' of KWLM, intensively supported the newly set up cooperative which had minimal management and organizational skills. The current director, who is also a member of Telapak Foundation, is still the main actor running the cooperative. But compared to the baseline, the

[50] Interview with KWLM Director, MFS-II evaluation 2014

[51] Brown, Jennifer. 2003. *Rural Women's Land Rights in Java, Indonesia: Strengthened by Family Law, but Weakened by Land Registration*. Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal Association, Vol. 12 No. 3, pp 631–651. Available from https://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/737/12PacRimL%26PolyJ631.pdf?sequence=1. (accessed 15 January 2015)

[52] Ibid

[53] USAID. 2010. *USAID Country Profile – Property Rights and Resource Governance: Indonesia*. Available from http://usaidlandtenure.net/sites/default/files/country-profiles/full-reports/USAID_Land_Tenure_Indonesia_Profile_0.pdf (accessed 15 January 2015)

other management team members who previously knew very little about how to run a cooperative have strengthened their knowledge, skills and have broadened their networks. From evaluation team's observation during the end line workshop, cooperative staff are more confident than in 2012 and are able to speak up for themselves[54]. The director has delegated the tasks of dealing with new buyers, public relations with universities or other cooperatives, and the tree inventory (taking GPS coordinates that are then shared with the local Forest Department) to other staff.

The evaluation team did not observe any significant changes in the involvement of cooperative members in decision-making. Members fulfil a crucial role in certification of wood since they supply FSC certified timber.

### 1.3. Intensity of political engagement SPO

There is no significant change in the last two years in the area of political engagement. KWLM staff can still be considered as 'activists' in the agriculture and food security sector but there is no change in the intensity of individual staff or the organisation itself in participation in locally elected bodies. The organisation remains politically independent. KWLM continues to focus on improving conditions for farmers, making political engagement less of a priority unless farmers' issues require such. Political engagement of cooperative members is forbidden.

## 2. Level of Organisation

### 2.1. Relations with other organisations SPO

In general, the relations between KWLM and other CSOs remain the same since the baseline. KWLM's closest relations with organisations working on similar issues are connected to the Hivos network. At the national level they continue to engage with Telapak, Samdhana Institute and PT Poros Nusantara Utama (PT PNU). Relations with Telapak are characterized as being less dependent since the organisation no longer provides intensive capacity building support. Telapak does still represent KWLM at the national level as KWLM's umbrella organisation.

As mentioned before, KWLM still works together with STPN to provide female members of the cooperative with trainings and technical assistance.

Previously KWLM also worked together with Yabima, however, since the death of its founder, the organisation has become inactive. KWLM's director reported that it has been difficult for KWLM to exand its local networks since there are not many CSOs or cooperatives in the area working on the same issue, i.e. legal timber production[55]. As such, KWLM collaborates more with other cooperatives or credit unions working in the same sub-districts. One of its closest relations is with Koperasi Kredit Tali Asih (or CUKATA), established in 2002. Both share the same founder (Bernadaus Sad Windratmo)[56] as well as members[57]. CUKATA functions to provide credit, while KWLM focuses on sustainable forest management. But both cooperatives share a vision that conservation is not just about the environment, but about providing economic sustainability and upholding traditional and cultural values[58].

[54] The baseline reported that members were involved in the consultation, but the management provided the framework, defines the problems and provide solutions. For projects with donor, the involvement of members and non – members is even lesser.

[55] Ibid

[56] Liputan6.com, "[VIDEO] Windratmo, Pengagas Koperasi Pecinta Lingkungan", 10 November 2013. Available from http://news.liputan6.com/read/742233/video-windratmo-pengagas-koperasi-pecinta-lingkungan (15 January 2015)

[57] Community Logging, "Pertemuan Refleksi dan Koordinasi Gerakan Community Logging Part 1", 13 March 2013. Available from http://bumi-sajagad.blogspot.com/2013/03/pertemuan-refleksi-dan-koordinasi.html (15 January 2015)

[58] KulonprogoNews, "Dua Koperasi di Kulonprogo Sambut Masa Panen Padi", 11 June 2014. Available from http://kulonprogonews.com/news/dua-koperasi-di-kulonprogo-sambut-masa-panen-padi/ (accessed 15 January 2015)

## 2.2. Frequency of dialogue with closest civil society organisation SPO

The collaboration and cooperation between KWLM and Telapak has become less routine compared to when the cooperative was newly established. In 2012, there was an annual meeting between KWLM and Telapak to discuss project progress and adjustments needed in its strategy[59]. In 2013, KWLM held a national consolidation meeting with its network. There is no evidence of joint initiatives between the two organisaions in 2014.

KWLM's most frequent dialogue is with CUKATA because they share the same founder and work in the same sub-districts. As mentioned above, both cooperatives share the same members but intervene in different issues and provide different kinds of support to members[60].

## 2.3. Defending the interests of marginalised groups SPO

KWLM's strategy in defending farmers' interests remains the same compared with the baseline, but in terms of quantity, the numbers have increased. KWLM supports farmers to defend their interests through:

1. Encourage conservation by planting more and more trees: KWLM provides 10 seedlings to cooperative members each time they cut a tree. Members are not allowed to cut trees under a certain age.
2. Better financial capacity (through a savings and loans mechanism): Before joining the cooperative, members tended to cut trees whenever they needed money to fulfil their needs. Middle men would take advantage of the need for cash by buying up wood cheaply. Now cooperative members can take out loans, using their trees/wood as collateral.
3. Increased earnings from premium priced wood. KWLM offers IDR 300,000 more per meter cubic of teak wood compared to middle men.
4. Price transparency and clearer market prospects: producers are now more aware of the value of their products.
5. Broadened network: There are many university students now doing research in KWLM target locations about certified wood for their thesis or dissertations. This has helped 'spread the word' about KWLM since many of the resulting works are available on the internet. ICCO has agreed to provide a loan to KWLM through its credit union.

While the community logging project is exclusively for farmers whose land, KWLM has been trying to address the interests of landless farmers through herb and spices, vegetables and other agricultural products.

KWLM sees itself as a social business because it seeks to address problems faced by farmers. According to KWLM, the position of middlemen has become less dominant. It also claims to have contributed to a decrease in illegal logging activities by offering income generating activities through legal timber.[61]

## 2.4. Composition financial resource base SPO

KWLM is still struggling to diversify its funding sources. KWLM still relies in the first place on donor grants for promoting community logging. Post-Hivos support (which ended in 2012), KWLM has not been able to attract other donors. Hivos chose to work with cooperative models as a means to sustain the delivery of services to their members[62]. Although its scheme is promising, KWLM has problems

[59] Interview with KWLM executive, MFS II evaluation 2014

[60] According to an online source, in January 2015, Cukata had 1,439 members and KWLM had "more than 1,000" members. It is unclear how many of the members overlap.
Wahyu Tri Atmojo, "Koperasi Wana Lestari Menoreh dan Koperasi Cukata", *PLUT-KUMKM*, 15 January 2015. Available from http://www.plutjogja.com/koperasi-wana-lestari-menoreh-dan-koperasi-cukata/ (accessed 15 January 2015)

[61] Gustyanita Pratiwi, "Konglomerasi Sosial a la Perkumpulan Telapak", *SWA*, 9 November 2012. Available from https://swa.co.id/entrepreneur/konglomerasi-sosial-a-la-perkumpulan-telapak (accessed 15 January 2015)

[62] Miranda, PO Hivos GE Portfolio

with cash flow, which has limited their ability to expand their business, and in turn has affected member satisfaction. KWLM's scheme is for certified wood to provide income to fund KWLM's activities, assuming that buyers, who are mostly furniture export companies, are willing to pay a premium price. These buyers often pay out the full amount once they receive the wood from KWLM. In the meantime, KWLM pays out its members individually. This means that there is a gap from the time when KWLM purchases the wood from its members to when it receives payment from the furniture companies, who sometimes do not pay on time. The issues with cash flow have restricted a further expansion of members. Members have also complained that KWLM has started to make late payments to them.

In the current condition, KWLM needs IDR 2.4 billion to buy wood from its member. Their current reserve is just IDR 300 million and buyers' down payment of IDR 600 million IDR. They fall short of IDR 1.5 billion in reserves to purchase wood from its members until they receive the full payment from buyers. To cope with this, KWLM has tried to borrow money from various sources, one of which being a soft loan from ICCO, secured in December 2014. Inevitably, they are found in a position where they often have to postpone payments to members.

Another challenge with KWLM's cash flow problem is that most timber producers tend to sell in certain periods (Ied Mubarak, for instance), such that KWLM has to ensure that it has sufficient reserves for months when transactions are high.

# 3. Practice of Values

## 3.1. Downward accountability SPO

KWLM is governed by cooperative principles in the decision-making process and how they run their business.

In Indonesia, the ultimate goal of a cooperative is the welfare of its members. In other words, while it may be a profit-making entity, its services and capital benefit its members. Economic benefits are distributed proportionally to members based on their level of participation in the cooperative. Cooperatives have an important social function since they mobilize members for a common interest.

There has been no change in the downward accountability of KWLM, as it remains accountable to its members as in 2012. Cooperative members are informed of the financial conditions and have the right to inquire with the cooperative on these issues or to express their ideas in the general assembly. During annual general assemblies, members are guaranteed equal rights and voice. Cooperative members are also aware of the prices and the volumes of wood sold to the cooperative. KWLM also discloses the price of the wood sold to its buyer and the profit-sharing mechanisms with its members. The same system has been applied in the cooperative since the beginning, so nothing has changed in the way KWLM applies accountability.

## 3.2. Composition of social organs SPO

There is also no change in the composition of KWLM's social organs. The 20 founders of KWLM and the majority of the management of the cooperative are an 'elite group'. This is illustrated by the fact that only community members who own land can apply for membership, while landless farmers are excluded from joining the cooperative. These power relationships have not changed.

KWLM has an effective separation of authority between the executive and the regulatory body. The highest authority is the General Assembly that meets every 3 years or less if needed. Underneath it is the Governing Body and the Board of Supervisors, as well the Executing Agency with its Director. Each organ's rights and duties have been drawn up in detail in the bylaws (AD / ART). However, most strategic discussions are still dominated by the Chairman. Because the Hivos grant was managed separately, most members did not know about its administration.

From the baseline, up until now the composition of the social organs of KWLM remains the same. KWLM is open for women members but the numbers of women are still limited.

### 3.3. External financial auditing SPO

The cooperative has never been audited externally, although in their budget proposal KWLM allocated IDR 20,000,000 for an organizational audit[63]. This situation is similar with the baseline where the external audit was conducted at the request of Hivos. Also, the administration of the Hivos grant is not subject of the internal procedures of the cooperative and as such are not discussed in the General Assembly or consolidated in financial reports.

## 4. Perception of Impact

### 4.1. Client satisfaction SPO

The trend of increasing cooperative members number was identified in the baseline as one of the indicators of success linked to the increased demand for sustainable forest products. The increased membership can be considered evidence of member satisfaction, as does the large number of membership applicants that are still waiting to join the cooperative once cash flows have improved.

Nonetheless, the evaluation team found dissatisfaction from members with regards to the swiftness of payments. During the baseline, one of the key benefits of KWLM identified was its 'cash-and-carry' scheme. However, as mentioned in 2.4, KWLM's current cash flow problem has caused dissatisfaction among some KWLM members[64]. In addition, the evaluation team found that members sometimes are 'persuaded' to sell their wood to KWLM to meet external demands (during months when demand is very high). This is sometimes not in line with aspirations of the members themselves. The benefits described under 2.3 still outweigh these complaints, and as such the evaluation team still rates that there has been an improvement in client satisfaction.

### 4.2. Civil society impact SPO

KWLM gives its members the option to whom they want to sell their timber to, thus providing grounds for a better bargaining position of its members vis-à-vis middle men; and this is a proxy of empowered community groups being able to defend their interests. Before joining the cooperative, community members would sell their trees to the middle men whenever they needed cash. This allowed the middlemen to monopolize prices. Since joining the cooperative, members have learned how to apply financial planning. KWLM has helped them access loans from credit unions when needed. Farmers have become better organised through the cooperative system. By joining KWLM, and following the certification procedure, cooperative members have benefitted economically. They are able to sell their timber to KWLM for IDR 300,000 more than the prices offered by middle men. In addition to this benefit, cooperative members relatively have a better financial well-being compared with non-members as they have access to financial credit, using their uncut trees as collateral for loans. From a sustainable forest management perspective, this mechanism is beneficial to farmers as well as to forest conservation.

As mentioned by a KWLM management team personnel, the cooperative model of KWLM has been replicated in Lampung Province with the assistance of Telapak Foundation. The wood certification system of KWLM was also replicated by the local government of Pasuruan and Ponorogo Districts, East Java. This means that the coverage of services has been both directly and indirectly influenced by KWLM.

[63] "Budget calculations 2010-2012", KWLM
[64] Interview with KWLM Director, MFS-II evaluation 2014

## 4.3. Relation with public sector organisations SPO

There was no significant change in the relation with public sector agencies in the last two years. Since the baseline, KWLM has had conducive relations with district level government offices. The relationship is characterised by mutual interests. For example, the Forestry Department has donated seeds to the cooperatives while KWLM has provided technical expertise to the office through trainings and by sharing its best practices. Other offices with whom KWLM maintain relations with include the Departments for Watershed Management (BPDAS) and the Department of Industry, Trade and Cooperatives (Disperindagkop).

## 4.4. Relation with private sector agencies SPO

KWLM functions as a "good" middlemen and this role requires KWLM to function as a private sector agency to smoothen the relationship with buyers. KWLM managed expand its market since the baseline. There are now 6 furniture companies working with the cooperative. These companies are satisfied with quality of wood supplied by KWLM. Java Furniture, a furniture exporter in Yogyakarta, has become KWLM's permanent buyer. The company actually needs around 24 cubic meters of certified teakwood per month, but KWLM is only able to provide 16. Since the cooperative directly sells the wood to export companies, they are able to obtain a premium price. KWLM has been successful in linking the farmers to larger buyers. Although KWLM has taken up a 'middle man' role, their cooperative mechanism ensures that they are accountable to the farmers and that their activities contribute to improved welfare.

KWLM has tried to seek out partnerships with bonafide and reputable buyers so that payments are settled punctually. KWLM does not sign agreements with companies who do not have clear, continuous demands for certain quantities of wood or do not have secure markets.

## 4.5. nfluence upon public policies, rules, regulations SPO

In the baseline, there was no indicator to show KWLM's influence on policies, rules and regulations in the sector. The project was also not intended to influence public policies and practices, but rather focused on creating a better system of trading and increasing the value of timber, as well as maximizing non-wood products. There is not much evidence in progress reports on lobby and advocacy to influence public policy. However, because of longstanding relations with district authorities, as claimed by KWLM Director, they have influenced district policy through streamlining the certification process at district level. In 2014, KWLM was entrusted by the local government to issue 'origin of wood documents' (surat keterangan asal usul/SKAU). In the past, only appointed local government staff had the right to issue these documents. This permission simplifies the procedures for KWLM to sell wood to other parties. The GPS-based tree inventory system applied by KWLM has impressed the local forestry department, who are now trying to replicate the system. KWLM has also implemented an Annual Allowable Cut (AAC) system or 'jatah tebang tahunan' (JTT) in Kulon Progo District, which has socialized to the local government. AAC is a mechanism that calculates the amount of wood permitted for harvest each year to ensure productivity and sustainability of forests.

KWLM's model has become well known and is an example to the government on how to improve the economic welfare of communities, whilst conserving forest resources and allow communities to manage these resources. The wood certification system of the cooperative has been replicated in Pasuruan and Ponorogo Districts. Recently, the local government issued a regulation obligating all timber production to be certified. The Kulon Progo District Forestry Office has asked KWLM to train the persons in charge of the wood certification system.

## 4.6. Influence upon private sector agencies' policies, rules, regulations SPO

In 2012, KWLM's involvement in improving the position of small scale forest entrepreneurs was still at the stage of initiation, so its influence on the market for timber was still limited. In 2014, the relations of the cooperative with the public sector has broadened in terms of coordination and information sharing, but KWLM has still not been able to influence the private sector agencies' policies, especially the "terms of payment" of its buyers. KWLM has not found a strategy to negotiate with the private

sector for more suitable payment conditions. They often face problems because their buyers are two weeks to two months late with payments, in some cases even later.

# 5. Civil Society context

## 5.1. Coping strategies

In mid-2014, the 2012 Law on Cooperatives was annulled through a Constitutional Court decision. This means that the law currently recognized is the predeceasing Law. No. 25/1992. The revision was welcomed by many as since it protects and support cooperatives as it provides clearer distinctions between cooperatives and corporations. Since the passing of the 2012 Law, the growth of cooperatives had slowed and the former law allowed non-members to inject capital into the cooperatives and take control of cooperatives[65]. The Law did not have implications for KWLM because its main mission is to conserve forest resources and improve the economic welfare of farmers. In addition, KWLM has from the start been run in such a manner that profits of the sales of timber were returned to its members, which is in line with the principles of the 1992 Law.

In 2011, KWLM obtained FSC certification for forest management and chain-of-custody (CoC). FSC is one of the two certification schemes with an international scope. KWLM is one of the 74 CoC holders for logs (Category W1 Rough Wood) in the country[66]. KWLM also responded to legislation that was passed in 2009, followed by further implementing regulations in 2011 on Indonesia's Timber Legality Verification System (*Sistem Verifikasi Legalitas Kayu*/SVLK). SVLK emerged as in response to increasing pressure from export markets and the passage of policies in consumer countries. Fearing doors to international markets would be closed, SVLK represents and institutionalized effort to support the legality of timber products. [67] SVLK regulates that forestry businesses (concessionaries and companies) must obtain certification. KWLM successfully responded to these policy developments and obtained SVLK certification in July 2012[68].

SVLK is becoming the dominant system for legal timber, and is being promoted by the Ministry of Forestry over FSC schemes[69]. Given that KWLM's FSC certification is set to end in 2015, SVLK certification is important for the sustainability of KWLM's activities. In addition, the European Union, one of the main importers of Indonesian timber products, has ratified the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Voluntary Partnership Agreement with Indonesia in February 2014. This establishes the acceptance of timber products with SVLK certification and establishes SVLK as the key instrument for assuring the legality of exported products originating from sustainable forest management[70]. Of note is that SVLK has been criticized by NGOs for its weak standards and shortcomings in implementation[71]. Nonetheless, for KWLM obtaining certification ensures that its products are eligible for export and guarantees a market base.

[65] MSME News Network, "Indonesia court annuls Cooperatives law", 30 May 2014. Available from http://www.msmenewsnetwork.com/asia-pacific/news/item/2816-indonesia-court-annuls-cooperatives-law (accessed 15 January 2015)

[66] Forest Stewardship Council, "Welcome to the FSC Public Search". Available from http://info.fsc.org/ (accessed 15 January 2015)

[67] Katila, P., Galloway, G., de Jong, W., Pacheco, P., Mery, G. (eds). 2014. *Forests under pressure: Local responses to global issues*. IUFRO World Series Volume 32. Vienna, p. 242

[68] Bellina Rosellini and Igg Maha Adi, "Siapa Bilang Kayu Bersertifikat Tak Laku?", *Nature Green*, 17 November 2012. Available from http://naturegreen.i.gp/kayubersetifikat.php (accessed 15 January 2015)

[69] Rely on Rowlinson, "Indonesia promotes SVLK over FSC", 17 September 2013. Available from http://www.ttjonline.com/news/indonesia-promotes-svlk-over-fsc (accessed 15 January 2015)

[70] WWF Global, "Improve Timber Legality Assurance System (SVLK)!", 20 March 2014. Available from http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/how_we_work/conservation/forests/?218130/Improve-Timber-Legality-Assurance-System-SVLK (accessed 15 January 2014)

[71] Mongabay.com, "Indonesian logging giant pulls out of FSC certification scheme", 22 June 2013. Available from http://news.mongabay.com/2013/0622-april-fsc.html#fhHjzXpQtPAIsmMg.99 (accessed 15 January 2015)

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen UR
P.O. Box 88
6700 AB Wageningen
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)317 48 68 00
www.wageningenUR.nl/cdi

Report CDI-15-066

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# LPPSLH end line report

MFS II country evaluations, Civil Society component

Dieuwke Klaver[1]
Hester Smidt

Kharisma Nugroho[2]
Kharisma Sinung Prasetyo
Sutikno Sutantio

1 Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR, Netherlands
2 SurveyMeter, Indonesia

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen, February 2015



Report CDI-15-060

WAGENINGEN UR
*For quality of life*

Klaver, D.C., Smidt H., Nugroho, K., Prasetya, K. S., February 2015, *LPPSLH end line report; MFS II country evaluations, Civil Society component,* Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR (University & Research centre) and SurveyMETER. Report CDI-15-060. Wageningen.

This report describes the findings of the end line assessment of the Indonesian Foundation for Research and Development of Natural Resources and Environment –LPPSLH that is a partner of Hivos.

The evaluation was commissioned by NWO-WOTRO, the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research in the Netherlands and is part of the programmatic evaluation of the Co-Financing System - MFS II financed by the Dutch Government, whose overall aim is to strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. Apart from assessing impact on MDGs, the evaluation also assesses the contribution of the Dutch Co-Funding Agencies to strengthen the capacities of their Southern Partners, as well as the contribution of these partners towards building a vibrant civil society arena.

This report assesses LPPSLH's efforts towards strengthening Civil Society in Indonesia, based upon the CIVICUS analytical framework. It is a follow-up of a baseline study conducted in 2012. Key questions that are being answered comprise changes in the five CIVICUS dimensions to which LPPSLH contributed; the nature of its contribution; the relevance of the contribution made and an identification of factors that explain LPPSLH's role in civil society strengthening.

Keywords: Civil Society, CIVICUS, theory based evaluation, process-tracing

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# Acknowledgements

SurveyMeter and CDI are thanking the staff and the leaders of all Southern Partner Organisations that participated in collecting information for the evaluation of the contribution of these partner organisations to creating a vibrant civil society. They also thank the Co-Funding Agencies and the Dutch Consortia they are a member of for making background documents available. We also hope that this evaluation will help you in better positioning yourself in the Civil Society Arena in your country.

# List of abbreviations and acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| AOI | *Aliansi Organik Indonesia* (Organic Alliance Indonesia) |
| Bappeda | *Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah* (Provincial or District Development Planning Agency) |
| Bank BPD | *Bank Pembangunan Daerah* (Regional Development Bank) |
| BCI | Basic Capabilities Index |
| BPS | *Badan Pusat Statistik* (Central Agency on Statistics) |
| CDI | Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR |
| CFA | Co-Financing Agency |
| CFO | Co-Financing Organisation |
| CS | Civil society |
| CSO | Civil society organisation |
| CSR | Corporate social responsibility |
| CV | *Comanditaire Venootschap* (Unlimited Liability Company with a minimum of two partners) |
| FEDEP | Forum for Economic Development and Employment Promotion |
| HIV/AIDS | Human immunodeficiency virus / Acquired immune deficiency syndrome |
| ICS | Internal control system |
| JAKER-PO | *Jaringan Kerja Pertanian Oganik* (Indonesian Organic Farming Network) |
| KKI | *Kampung Kearifan Indonesia* |
| KRKP | *Koalisi Rakyat untuk Kedaulatan Pangan Tani* (People's Coalition for Food Sovereignty) |
| KRT | *Komunitas Rembug Tani* (Community for Rembug Farmers) |
| KSU | *Koperasi Serba Usaha* (Multipurpose Cooperative) |
| KUB | *Kelompok Usaha Bersama* (Joint Business Group) |
| LPPSLH | *Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengembangan Sumberdaya dan Lingkungan Hidup* (Foundation for Research and Development of Natural Resources and Environment) |
| MFS | Dutch co-financing system |
| MoC | Model of Change |
| MoFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| MoU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| MSME | Micro, small and medium enterprise |
| NGO | Non-governmental organisation |
| Ormas | *Organisasi masyarakat* (Societal Organizations) |
| P3R | *Pusat Pengembangan Produk Rakyat* (Civil Product Development Center) |
| PDIP | *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan* (Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle) |
| PKBI | *Perkumpulan Keluarga Berencana Indonesia* (Indonesian Family Planning Association) |
| PT | *Perseroan terbatas* (limited liability company) |
| SERF | Social Economic Rights Fulfilment |
| SME | Small and medium enterprises |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |
| SSI | Semi-structured Interview |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| UD | *Usaha Dagang* (Trading company) |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| Wageningen UR | Wageningen University & Research Centre |

# 1 Introduction

This report presents the civil society end line findings of LPPSLH in Indonesia, which is a partner of Hivos under the Dutch Consortium People Unlimited 4.1. It is a follow-up to the baseline assessment that was carried out in 2012. According to the information provided during the baseline study, LPPSLH is working under the theme MDG7ab.

These findings are part of the overall evaluation of the joint MFS II evaluations to account for results of MFS II-funded or co-funded development interventions implemented by Dutch Co-Funding Agencies (CFA) and/or their Southern Partner Organisations (SPO) and to contribute to the improvement of future development interventions. The civil society evaluation uses the CIVICUS framework and seeks to answer the following questions:

- What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?
- To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
- What is the relevance of these changes?
- What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The CIVICUS framework that comprises five dimensions (civic engagement, level of organization, practice of values, perception of impact and contexts influencing agency by civil society in general) has been used to orient the evaluation methodology.

**Changes *in the civil society arena of the SPO***

In the 2012 – 2014 period the two most important changes that took place in the civil society arena of the SPO are related to level of organisation and perception of impact, specifically the impact on civil society.

Since the baseline, LPPSLH's level of organisation has improved: It slightly expanded its network of NGOs to collaborate with and intensified its collaboration with some of them; It improved its financial resource base, and; it's cooperative model has also strengthened the relations between producers and middlemen at community level and in consequence, improving the social network and the capacity to defend one's interests. Other actors currently seek LPPSLH's support to introduce the model in their own district.

With regards to 'perception of impact', the livelihoods of some 1750 persons, of which 75 percent do not own land and 33 percent are women have improved, not only in the material sense by increased income, but also in immaterial terms: cooperative members have broadened their network, are engaging in the cooperative's live and management, and have gained more confidence in engaging with government officials in their district. The relations between middlemen and sugar producers have changed, decreasing the dependence of producers to take loans from middlemen. Middlemen who become cooperative members also have benefited in terms of an easier management of their cash flows.

The three cooperatives are functioning according to their bylaws and they ensure that the crystal sugar produced complies with the standards of premium markets, including organic niche markets.

Since the baseline LPPSLH and district governments collaborate to enhance the successes of the cooperatives. In this relation LPPSLH is increasingly being seen as an expert upon whom these governments can rely. Also the cooperatives receive more support from the local governments and both actors are regularly invited at meetings.

LPPSLH has also raised the awareness of the three local governments that crystal palm sugar is a potential export product, consequently leading to policy changes in favour of sugar. Apart from these the governments have started to influence the utilization of chemical fertilizer on other crops, such as

rice, as contaminants could spill into the organic coconut plantation area. The organic certification, of which crystal sugar marketing depends upon, requires such rigorous standards.

These findings were obtained through an analysis of documents, a workshop and follow-up interviews with LPPSLH, and interviews with external resources persons working in civil society organisations that receive support from LPPSLH; other civil society organisations with whom the SPO is collaborating; public or private sector agents and; external resource persons capable of providing a view of the MDG or theme which the SPO is concentrating on.

**Contribution analysis**

Based upon an analysis of the projects and programmes financed by the Dutch CFAs a selection was made of SPOs to be included in an in-depth process tracing trajectory and those to be included for a quick contribution assessment. KBR was amongst those SPOs selected for a quick process tracing. LPPSLH was amongst those SPOs selected for in-depth process-tracing.

The first outcome that we looked at is "small-scale palm sugar producers are organized into three cooperatives that are operational and profitable". This outcome illustrates how marginalised people have been engaged and organised, such that they are able to defend their own economic interests. The pathway that most likely explains this outcome is the success of LPPSLH's approach in organising the farmers and the marketability of the palm sugar the farmers produce. The contribution of the SPO towards achieving this outcome is in their support to the community in producing a marketable product of good quality and quantity, and linking farmer cooperatives with premium markets.

The second outcome that we looked at is "improved palm sugar farmers' position vis-à-vis middlemen". This outcome is important as it shows that LPPSLH's intervention have had an impact on social mobility, which is a precondition for a healthy civil society. This outcome has been achieved as a result of the SPO's role in the establishment of a new palm sugar value chain that has rivalled the domination of traditional value chains.

**Relevance**

Interviews with staff of LPPSLH, external resource persons, the liaison officer of Hivos, as well as contextual information helped to assess the relevance of LPPSLH's interventions in terms of its Theory of Change (ToC) for Civil Society (CS) as designed during the baseline study; the context in which LPPSLH is operating; and the CS policies of Hivos.

LPPSLH's business model developed for the palm sugar sector is relevant for the goals it formulated in its 2012 Theory of Change: sustainable agriculture and food sovereignty; improved access and control to economic resources and; organisational development. The interventions and outcomes achieved show that organising marginalised groups improves their social mobility. Although many strategies have been used to reach these goals, no evidence is available that LPPSLH has capacitated farmers to demand their rights and enhance their participation in the political economy.

With regards to the context in which LPPSLH is operating, its interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant since palm sugar production is a dominant livelihood strategy and source of income generation in all three districts which has received little attention by the government or the private sector. More traditional forms of sugar production have not allowed for an empowerment of small-scale farmers and producers. LPPSLH has demonstrated that diversified sugar products can be sold at premium market prices, and providing producers with access to these markets can help alleviate social and economic inequalities. LPPSLH's model has begun to draw the attention of the local government and private sector.

LPPSLH's interventions and outcomes are relevant to the civil society policies of Hivos and in line with Hivos' green entrepreneurship theme.

**Explaining factors**

The information related to factors that explain the changes in civil society, LPPSLH's contribution to these changes, and the relevance of its interventions were collected at the same time as the data were gathered for the previous questions. Apart from searching for explaining factors related to these evaluation questions, the evaluation team was also informed about other important factors such as the organisational performance of LPPSLH and relations with Hivos that might have had an effect on its performance, as well as external factors.

The most important factor that explains the changes in the civil society dimensions are Hivos' support, which has enabled LPPSLH to intensively accompany and organise palm sugar producers in three cooperatives in three districts of Central Java. Factors that explain LPPSLH's contribution to changes in civil society are LPPSLH's success in diversifying palm sugar products and linking to, or accessing, a suitable premium market. Factors that explain the relevance of LPPSLH's interventions and outcomes are related to public and private sector perception of palm sugar as an unprofitable product. Other factors that explain the evaluation findings are of LPPSLH's reliance on economic incentives offered by the premium market.

The following chapter briefly describes the political context, the civil society context and the relevant background with regards to the governance issues LPPSLH is working on. Chapter 3 provides background information on LPPSLH, the relation of its MFS II interventions with the CIVICUS framework and specific information on the contract with Hivos. An evaluation methodology has been developed for the evaluation of the Civil Society component which can be found in Appendix 2 of the country report; however, deviations from this methodology, the choices made with regards to the selection of the outcomes for contribution analysis, as well as difficulties encountered during data collection are to be found in Chapter 4. The answers to each of the evaluation questions are being presented in Chapter 5, followed by a discussion on the general project design in relation to CS development; an assessment of what elements of the project design may possibly work in other contexts or be implemented by other organisations in Chapter 6. Conclusions are presented in Chapter 7.

# 2 Context

This paragraph briefly describes the context LPPSLH is working in. A description of the Civil Society Context assessed according to the CIVICUS framework is provided in appendix 3 of the country report for Civil Society.

## 2.1 Political context

### 2.1.1 Brief historical perspective

Indonesia's rise to being the world's third largest democratic nation has been lauded by many world leaders. The county is often considered to be a model Muslim democracy. As the fourth most populous nation with an estimated 250 million people[1], Indonesia has sustained its democratic commitment since transitioning from an authoritarian leadership to a democracy in 1998. The decentralized administration now consists of 34 provinces and 508 districts and municipalities.

Prior to 1998, Indonesia was under strict authoritarian regime. Suharto, known for his so-called New Order (1966-1998) regime, ushered in radical transformations that would place social and political forces under direct state supervision. The defining characteristics of the Suharto era were a focus on economic growth and controlled consensus and political stability devoid of dissent. A series of tumultuous economic and political transitions in the nineties severely diminished the credibility of ageing President Suharto, who was forced to resign amidst mass street protests.

His departure in 1998 laid bare three decades of social inequalities, state-perpetuated abuses against human rights, and a lack of civilian liberties. The regime change opened the way for a period of *Reformasi* started under the Presidency of B. J. Habibie (1998-1999) and continued by Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001), Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001–2004), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014). Restrictions on citizen participation, press freedom and association were removed. Democratic reforms and decentralization led to direct elections, portioned authority, devolution of authority to regional authorities, formation of new political parties and ended the military's parliamentary influence. The distinct historical periods of the New Order Regime and *Reformasi* (1998-present) have shaped the emergence of civil society. Defining characteristics are summarized in the table below.

Table 1
*Characteristics that have defined the emergence of civil society in Indonesia*

| Characteristics | New Order, authoritarian period (1966 – 1998) | Reformasi (1998 – present) |
|---|---|---|
| **Political system** | Centralized, authoritarian characterized by unipolarity. Golkar as the dominant political party.<br><br>In 1999, there were 27 provinces, 306 districts and around 60,000 villages. | Decentralized, democratic. Fragmentation of power and atomization of patronage relationships. Emergence of numerous political parties. Direct presidential elections since 1999.<br>Decentralization altered the political and administrative landscape: 34 provinces, 410 districts, 98 municipalities, 6,944 sub-districts and 81,253.2 |
| **State-citizen interaction** | Benevolent leader, obedient population. Down to the village level, the state permeated society. | Modern political culture marked by diminishing hierarchy between the state and citizens, allowing for citizens to interact more freely. |

[1] In 2010 the population was estimated to be around 237 million people (BPS 2010 Population Census). The current figure is an estimate from BKKBN and similar figures are cited in the CIA's World Fact Book and the World Bank.

[2] Rumah Pemilu, "Gambaran Singkat Pemilihan Umum 2014 di Indonesia", 3 July 2014. Available from http://www.rumahpemilu.org/in/read/3351/Gambaran-Singkat-Pemilihan-Umum-2014-di-Indonesia (accessed 25 October 2014)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Citizen representation and voice** | Strict control of speech, expression and association. | Burgeoning of CSOs, pressure groups and NGOs following the political euphoria after Suharto's fall. |
| | CSOs and their networks largely "hiding behind the screen", and operating under state surveillance. A period of growth occurred in 1995-98, as resistance was building. | Indonesian CSOs began to establish new networks internationally. Up until the early 2000s the focus was on state-centrist issues. Later, issues that CSOs were tackling became more diverse, ranging from pluralism, poverty reduction to fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights. |
| **Media** | No free press, censorship and state-control. Suharto had firm grasp over how to use print & broadcast medias to promote political ideologies. | More vibrant media environment, flourishing of media businesses albeit in control of 12 main conglomerates that are mostly profit-driven and often have political ties. |
| | Limited public and CS use and access to internet until mid-90s. | Twitter nation, widespread social media use. |
| | | Growing realization of the importance of media/free press as the fourth pillar of democracy. |
| **Artistic forms of expression** | Art and literary censorship conducted by the state. Art forms were a means to reinforce political order. | Greater freedom of the arts and cultural sectors. Organizations able to hold art events more freely. Freedom of expression a catchphrase amongst individuals and artistic groups, but challenged by more conservative members of society. |
| **Religious expression and organization** | Regime repressed religious groups, especially radical forms. | Emergence of religious groups seeking to restore Islamic values and defend Muslim values. |

With political reforms came greater freedom and space for civic engagement. In the *Reformasi* period, there was a remarkable increase in the number of civil society organizations, many of which were Islamic in character. In 2000, the Central Agency on Statistics (BPS) recorded around 70,000 registered organizations, compared to just 10,000 in 1996.[3]New groups sprung up with donors encouraging activists to establish NGOs they could fund. These organizations were eager to distance themselves from state and often took an anti-government stance. Proliferating CSOs and NGOs have taken advantage of decentralization and greater regional autonomy to engage in public affairs. Civil society and government relations have improved, although both sides remain sceptical of the others' intentions.

### 2.1.2 Recent trends in the political context

Indonesia is considered to be a story of democratic success, but it still struggles to realize the benefits of sustained and equitable economic growth. In the political context, the main challenges lie in governing such geographically vast and decentralized country, applying principles of good governance and the enormous task of reforming the country's bureaucracy.

Although, Indonesia's 'big bang' decentralization initiated at the turn of the century narrowed the gap between local government and citizens, it has also localized political power struggles. While the devolution of authorities relieved tensions between the central government and the regions, it has also created opportunities for corrupt and rent-seeking practices, at the local level. As indicated by Transparency International's corruption index scores, perceived corruption in Indonesia remains high.

[3] Wahid, Marzuki. 2010. LSM, Islam, dan Perempuan di Indonesia Paska Orde Baru. Presentation at the Asian Dialogues: Open Seminars in Asian Languages. Melbourne, 22 April. Available from http://intranet.law.unimelb.edu.au/staff/events/files/Microsoft%20PowerPoint%20-%20LSM%20dan%20Islam%20di%20Indonesia%20--Melbourne%202010-FINAL.pdf (accessed 25 October 2014)

Table 2

*Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer survey: Indonesia*

| Year | Corruption perceptions Index Score<br>*(0 perceived as highly corrupt and 100 perceived as clean)* | Rank |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 30 | 100/182 |
| 2012 | 32 | 118/174 |
| 2013 | 32 | 114/177 |

Source: Transparency International

In 2013, decentralization was taken a step further with the approval of the Village Law, intended to address weak governance arrangements and empower rural communities to participate politically. The new law could also lead to village elites distorting power relations and misusing government funding if not properly monitored.

Indonesia is still transitioning politically and many challenges lie ahead. According to the 2012 Indonesia Governance Index's Executive Report, "Indonesia is witnessing a paradox in its democracy. On one hand, a successful opening-up of civil liberty has led to the avalanche of democratic demands across the nation, however on the other hand, democratic institutions' are inadequately respond to those demands." Nonetheless, the Indonesian Governance Index, which focuses on measuring provincial governance, does show a general improvement in the performance of the government (political office) bureaucracy, civil society and economic society based on principles of participation, transparency, fairness, accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness between 2008 and 2012. Civil society scores improved the most significantly, while scores for bureaucracy rose slightly.[4]

Table 3

*Indonesia Governance Index: Average provincial scores*

| Arena | 2008 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| Government | 4.93 | 5.46 |
| Bureaucracy | 5.53 | 5.58 |
| Civil Society | 4.85 | 6.33 |
| Economic Society | 4.77 | 5.71 |

Source: http://www.kemitraan.or.id/igi

In the past decade, Indonesians have generally enjoyed a freedom to participate in the political process through a direct-election mechanism. However, in September 2014 lawmakers voted in favour of a bill reviving indirect elections of regional heads. The controversial vote provoked public outcry which saw peaceful protests and the public voicing their discontent through social media. In early October, just before the end of his term, president Yudhoyono issued a regulation in lieu of the law, effectively repealing the law until further judicial review.

The recent 2014 elections which marked the end of Yudhoyono's 10-year term, demonstrated that Indonesian voters are increasingly voting for popular figures irrespective of political party alliances. While practices of corruption, vote-buying and poor voter administration remained in the recent election, the public seems to have matured politically, indicated by the enormous interest in televised debates between the leading candidates. The appeal of the newly sworn in President Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, has come from his hands-on, man-of-the-people approach. As Jokowi begins his five-year term he will need to start addressing a myriad of challenges that include corruption, stagnant economic growth, and human rights concerns, particularly with respect to the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and religious intolerance. If left unaddressed, these challenges could seriously undermine Indonesia's stability and democratic reforms.

[4] The IGI uses a scale of 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest). Data is available online through their website. Indonesia Governance Index, Data, "IGI Executive Report". Available from http://www.kemitraan.or.id/igi/index.php/data/publication/factsheet/275-igi-executive-report (accessed 25 October 2014)

## 2.2 Civil Society context issues with regards to the MDG

Several important changes took place during the 2011 and 2014 period. First, the global financial crisis and Indonesia's rise to a middle-income country led to a decrease in international donor funding. Development actors, including CSOs and NGOs, have to compete harder for funding. Some have been more successful than others in diversifying funding by turning to the private sector or private foundations. At the expense of past idealism, local NGOs are now more disposed to receiving funding sources which in the past may have been criticized as supporting neoliberalism.

Regulatory changes also affected the civil society arena positively and negatively. Annex 7 provides an overview of some of these important policy changes. Amongst the more controversial laws to spark reaction was Law No. 17/2013 on Societal Organisations. In an open letter sent before the bill was enacted, CIVICUS said the law would undermine freedom of association and "prevent CSOs from working on sensitive topics related to good governance and democratic reform in the public interest".[5] FORUM-ASIA deplored the repressive provisions in the law that "leave all groups vulnerable to attacks, undermining the hard-won democratic space that has been forged by civil society since the end of the New Order regime."[6]

Other laws passed that provoked criticism were the State Intelligence Law (October 2011) and the Social Conflict Law (April 2012). NGOs and media see these laws as imposing further restrictions on freedom of speech, potentially leading to the criminalization of human rights defenders and signifying a tightening of state control. Discriminatory content was also an issue in discussions on the Religious Harmony Bill in 2013, for which drafting was initiated in despite not being part of the planned National Legislative Program. Late in 2013, the House of Representatives came under fire again for its weak stance against religious intolerance when it re-endorsed a law that limits state-recognized religions to six.

Land rights and natural resource protection have been a long-standing issue for Indonesia. While Indonesia has adopted and amended laws to improve the rights of smallholders and indigenous communities, many of these regulations have faltered in their implementation. Part of the issue lies in the overlap and lack of clarity of laws adopted that regulate different sectors and local legislation. Another issue is that there is a lack of oversight in the procedures such as granting permits and licensing. These problems, which are commonly found across development sectors, are compounded by a lack of information among local communities on what the laws regulate and their rights vis-à-vis them.

[5] Civicus, "Civicus Releases an Open Letter Requesting the Indonesian Parliament to reject the Proposed Ormas Law and Create an Enabling Environment for Civil Society", 10 April 2013. Available from http://civicus.org/index.php/en/media-centre-129/open-letters/1581-open-letter-requesting-the-indonesian-parliament-to-reject-to-the-proposed-ormas-law-and-create-an-enabling-environment-for-civil-society (accessed 27 October 2014)

[6] Azhar, Haris. 2013. Repressive provision in the Ormas law. Statement to The Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, in Forum-Asia, "Indonesia: Passage of Ormas Bill Condemned, Campaign to Oppose the Law to Continue", Bangkok, 4 July 2013. Available from http://www.forum-asia.org/?p=16305 (accessed 27 October 2014)

# 3 Description of LPPSLH and its contribution to civil society/policy changes

## 3.1 Background LPPSLH

*Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengembangan Sumberdaya dan Lingkungan Hidup* or the Foundation for Research and Development of Natural Resources and Environment (LPPSLH) was established in 1987. LPPSLH's vision is to become a professional and self-sustained organisation that contributes to social justice and democratisation on the principles of equality and interdependency in the fields of natural resources and environment. The missions of LPPSLH are as follows[7]:

- Ensuring effective management of organisational resources for the sustainability of community empowerment activities;
- Building a reputable organisation and expanding networks;
- Conducting advocacy and civic education to strengthen peoples' organisations as the motor of social movements;
- Developing professional institutional systems through effective and accountable administrative, MIS and finance systems.

To realize its vision and mission, LPPSLH has four programmes[8]:

1. Agriculture: aiming to facilitate the development of sustainable agriculture in order realize the independence of farmers and food sovereignty.
2. Forestry: aiming to facilitate the development of community forestry in order to realize the fair, democratic and sustainable forest management.
3. Urban development: aiming to facilitate the development and improvement of community participation, especially the poor and marginalized
4. Small business development: aiming to facilitate the development of small and micro enterprises in order to realize access to and control over economic resources.

Since 2008, Hivos has supported LPPSLH's agricultural programme in Central Java, where its interventions are concentrated in seven districts. LPPSLH has assisted small-holders and producers through support from government, development banks and multilateral agencies, private sector actors, international NGOs and national grant-making organisations. Assistance to coconut palm sugar producers has been provided for almost 20 years by the organisation. LPPSLH has experience in supporting the establishment of cooperatives. The organisation also has developed a business unit. Apart from its concern on agricultural and livelihood issues, LPPSLH has supported women's empowerment issues (also with Hivos support) by providing assistance to small-scale women entrepreneurs.

## 3.2 MFS II interventions related to Civil Society

The MFS II interventions that relate to civil society in LPPSLH's project are associated with the support provided to small-scale producers. LPPSLH works to minimize the vulnerability of small-scale sugar producers by organising them and creating market access opportunities to sell their products at

[7] "Profil LPPSLH", LPPSLH, 2012
[8] Ibid

reasonable and fair prices. In consequence, producers improve their incomes and socio-economic position.

LPPSLH's interventions are invariably related to 'strengthening of intermediary organisations' and 'civic engagement'. By supporting cooperatives, the project has played a role in developing the palm sugar value chain that benefits small-scale farmers. Creating community organisations facilitates the participation of marginalised groups in the local economy, while direct actions to improve livelihoods address structural poverty by increasing control over economic resources. LPPSLH's efforts in the agricultural sector are considered to be contributing to sustainable growth, which takes into account the environment, community involvement and gender parity. LPPSLH's interventions contribute to building a strong civil society, as well as assisting the district government to regulate an insurance scheme for palm sugar farmers and tappers. The district government engaged Bank Pembangunan Daerah or BPD of (Regional Development Bank) Central Java, a provincial government–owned bank to provide the insurance scheme.

Support to palm sugar producers takes place in three districts in Central Java: Banjarnegara, Purbalingga and Banyumas (See map below). Interventions began in Banyumas and were then replicated in Banjarnegara and Purbalingga.





***Figure 1*** *Target areas of LPPSLH support for palm sugar producers.*

## 3.3 Basic information

Table 4

*Basic information LPPSLH*

| | | Details |
|---|---|---|
| Name of SPO | : | LPPSLH |
| Consortium | : | People Unlimited 4.1 |
| CFA | : | Hivos |
| Start date of cooperation | : | 2008 |
| MDG/Theme | : | MDG 7ab |
| MFS II Project Name | : | Quality improvement and Market Access Development of Organic Palm Sugars Produced by Smallholder Farmers in Central Java – Indonesia (Project ID: RO SEA 1002298)<br><br>Strengthening Palm Sugar Producer's Cooperative, Identification and Pilot Initiative on Productive Landscape in Banyumas Central Java, 2013 – 2015 (Project ID: RO SEA 1007811) |
| Contract period | : | April 1, 2011 - March 31, 2013<br>December 1, 2013 – August 1, 2015 |
| Total budget Hivos | : | € 54,833<br>€ 67,200 |
| Other donors if applicable | : | N/A |
| Estimation of % of budget for CS[9] | : | 55% |

Sources: Project documents

[9] Costs that relate to civil society development or policy influence are those costs that possibly contribute to the development of the CIVICUS dimensions, excluding coordination and office costs; staff costs and financial reserves.

# 4 Data collection and analytical approach

## 4.1 Adjustments made in the methodology of the evaluation

The evaluation process began with an input-output-outcome analysis of documents made available by the CFA and any relevant documents from the baseline evaluation. While generally this preliminary step was able to provide guidance to the in-country evaluation team for the focus of process-tracing, there were some challenges due to incomplete documentation, particularly pertaining to the project documents for interventions beginning in 2013. LPPSLH project documents were not fully helpful for the evaluation team as some progress was not reported systematically according to program's logical framework. There was some confusion and ambiguity because reports made reference to three different project titles. Moreover, the progress was primarily reported on one cooperative (in Banyumas) while there are actually three cooperatives receiving LPPSLH assistance. Nonetheless, because the support during the 2013-2015 period is more or less a continuation of earlier support (2011-2013), the input-output-outcome analysis was still of benefit to the team.

The evaluation team followed the operational guidelines to a great extent, and was able to hold a workshop with all of LPPSLH sub-groups. In practice, the workshop lasted five hours, with full participation of all sub-groups. However, due to unfamiliarity with CS dimensions and a large turnout (around 20 participants), the workshop was not fully efficient. As a result, of participant's difficulties in understanding CS dimensions and questions, the evaluation team was unable to obtain averages or scores for each subgroup. The in-country team assigned the scores and then confirmed these with LPPSLH.

Another obstacle was the lack of participant preparation for the workshop. Not all participants had fully read or understood relevant documents (baseline report, CS dimensions change) shared with them prior to the workshop. All of the participants found it difficult to respond to the CS dimensions of change questions, partly due to confusion over whether or not the evaluation's scope was focused on the Hivos-funded projects or more general for organisational/institutional changes.

There was also some discussion between CDI and the in-country evaluation team as to whether or not the cooperative structure should still be considered part of civil society, especially since the cooperative also had a business objective. But since LPPSLH is not a cooperative itself and claims to have a strong basis at the grassroots level, cooperative establishment was considered to be a means to organize small-scale farmers and producers.

## 4.2 Difficulties encountered during data collection

During data collection, the team experienced the following difficulties:

- Workshop participants did not really understand, nor were they familiar with the CS indicators or the CIVICUS framework. They found it difficult to relate LPPSLH's situation with the indicators, although most of them participated in the baseline process. This lessened the effectiveness of the workshop.
- LPPSLH does not have a strong monitoring and evaluation system in place, nor does it have dedicated personnel. As such, it added to difficulties in finding hard data and effected the agreement on the outcomes. Of note is that a new research and development division was formed nine months ago, which is supposed to take on the role of external reporting.

- LPPSLH has not had an evaluation conducted by an external party before (except the MFS-II baseline and end line) which resulted in a lack of preparation and minimum understanding of common evaluation practices.
- The outcomes identified for process-tracing should ideally be supported by more extensive data collection (through for example a survey) to infer a general conclusion from LPPSLH beneficiaries. However, with the available time and resources, such data collection could not be conducted.
- Identification of two outcomes for in-depth process tracing

The first outcome (small-scale palm sugar producers are organized into three cooperatives that are operational and profitable) was selected with the following considerations:

- It was one of several outcomes that all workshop participants agreed to as being a significant achievement.
- It is one of the elements in LPPSLH's Theory of Change (ToC), and the resulting model of change also addresses the ToC's main assumptions.
- The input-output-outcome analysis also provided similar directions for in-depth process-tracing.
- Since this outcome is an indicator of increased level of organization, it can also be used to measure the extent of LPPSLH's civic engagement.
- Since the contract with Hivos specified performance indicators that focused on cooperative growth and capacity improvements, the evaluation team expected fewer difficulties to find supporting evidence.

The second outcome (Improved position of palm sugar farmers' vis-à-vis middlemen) was selected because:

- It was one of several outcomes that all workshop participants agreed to as being a significant achievement.
- The baseline report suggested that the cooperative work was building a stronger civil society and identified the decreasing control of middlemen in the value chain as an area of impact.
- The outcome was linked to the assumptions and elements of Theory of Change (ToC) from the baseline, which included a goal for building farmers' self and control of economic resources.
- It was more suitable to LPPSLH's intervention design, which does not focus on influencing public and private sector.
- The second outcome is related to the first outcome. The second outcome achievement requires the first outcome as part of its causal explanation.

Based upon an analysis of the projects and programmes financed by the Dutch CFAs, four strategic orientations for civil society were identified. Two of which were selected for each SPO for in-depth process tracing. In the preliminary guidance, CDI suggested to the country team to look at the selected strategic orientations. For LPPSLH, only the first outcome matched with civil society orientations in: ensuring that the organisations that receive support from the SPO (intermediary organisations) are capable of playing their role in civil society; the influence in public sector was not selected as LPPSLH's intervention design does not oriented specifically to this dimension. As a more relevant replacement, the evaluation team decided to look at impact on civil society.

# 5 Results

## 5.1 Results obtained in relation to intervention logic

Table 5

*Overview of results achieved in relation to project plan LPPSLH*

| Result Level | Description | Level of achievement |
|---|---|---|
| Objective 1 | Palm sugar farmers have a role and control in managing business and product quality assurance | Achieved: Farmers able to implement a quality management system. Farmers also have the ability to regulate the income and expenditure in the business, reduce dependency on collectors / brokers. Improved land production assets and increased numbers of crops. Farmers able to apply agreed standards of quality for organic palm sugar, and produce grade A quality sugar. |
| Result 1.1 | Farmers have capacity in managing palm sugar businesses | Achieved: Farmers have improved skills in business management. 533 farmers have records of production, sales and revenue.<br><br>Cooperative Nira Satria (KSU) has an agreement with CV P3R for the sale of sugar on domestic and international markets, agreements with 6 buyers for export and 4 buyers for domestic market |
| Result 1.2 | Improved quality of palm sugar products, oriented towards a proper internal management system that is in line with consumer needs. | Achieved: By early 2013 1,044 farmers have become certified members of ICS to apply the quality management system. Not all members of Nira Satria are certified. |
| Objective 2 | Organization built (cooperative) for palm sugar farmers that is able to market products and provide health insurance services. | Achieved: In December 2011, the farmers formed cooperative Nira Satria, registered as a legal entity. By 2012 cooperative membership reached 1,044 certified producers covering 9 villages. Insurance scheme provides minimal coverage. LPPSLH worked with the local government to organize an insurance scheme for palm sugar farmers and tappers provided through a state-owned bank. |
| Result 2.1 | Palm sugar farmers organization built, which is able to market its products. | Achieved: Increase in cooperative membership. 1,044 palm sugar farmers from four sub districts in Banyumas district. From Feb 2012 - Feb 2013 the cooperative has marketed 99,115 tons of sugar. Improved capacity of cooperative in: managing palm sugar business; participatory management through internal control system; in providing support and assistance to palm sugar producers; build partnerships and networks with a number of actors: Dinperindagkop, Dispertanhutbun, banks - BI & BRI, Unsoed, and CSOs like GDM (Gerakan Desa Membangun). |
| Result 2.2 | Palm sugar farmers' organization has certification and can provide health insurance services to the community. Indicator - 1,000 palm sugar farmers registered with the ICS member institutions (cooperatives) as the holders of the certificate of organic palm sugar. | Achieved: The ICS coordinator of the cooperative coordinates ICS teams established at the village level. ICS team performs quality control, production training, technical supervision and checks for products that are not in accordance with the internal organic standards. |
| Other performance indicators not captured by above results | Income of members of the cooperative increases significantly through the palm sugar business and their health also improves through an insurance scheme offered by the cooperative. | Achieved: Increased income of 35% for 520 producers, more efficient production increases income/return 30% through use of more efficient cookstoves. 7 members injured at work are covered through the community insurance scheme. |
| | Improved capacity of LPPSLH to manage earned income. | Achieved: LPPSLH trusted by government and Swisscontact to undertake training and research. Increase in earned income through CV P3R, as much as IDR 5 billion per year. |

LPPSLH reports did not always follow the intervention logic and plan. The above results have been summarized from the documents made available CDI[10]. Based on LPPSLH's institutional audit, there is an explicit distinction between two Hivos projects: *Strengthening of Rural Women to Manage and Improve Market Access for Agricultural Product* and *Improving the Welfare of Coconut Sugar Producers in Purbalingga and Banjarnegara District through Improved Product Quality and Market Access.* However, in their reports LPPSLH used the title *Quality improvement and Market Access Development of Organic Palm Sugars Produced by Smallholder Farmers in Central Java*. Also, LPPSLH did not report on specifically formulated objectives with regard to the position of women and gender equality, nor did project reports mention progress in Purbalingga and Banjarnegara Districts.

Box1: Crystal coconut palm sugar vis-à-vis traditional coconut cast sugar

Coconut sugar syrup can be processed into two kinds of product. Traditionally, the syrup is boiled and then condensed into casts or blocks. The new approach introduced grinding the condensed syrup instead of casting, resulting in crystal-like or grain sugar (thus domestically popular as 'crystal coconut sugar' or 'ant sugar'). With its grainy form and longer processing, crystal sugar has less moisture content allowing for better packaging and longer expiry duration. Crystal sugar is a product preferred by premium and export consumers while traditional cast sugar is more widely used domestically. To increase its added value, crystal coconut sugar has to be certified to ensure it is produced organically. As a diversified product, crystal coconut sugar is a new or alternative value chain from its traditional counterpart. The traditional value chain has been well known to marginalise farmers /producers as it is identical with debt, untransparent pricing, and monopolization by middlemen.

The Quality improvement and Market Access Development of Organic Palm Sugars Produced by Smallholder Farmers in Central Java corresponds with the Hivos contract RO SEA 1002298, implemented in between April 2011 and March 2013. This project was followed up by another contract (RO SEA 1007811) with the title: Strengthening Palm Sugar Producer's Cooperative, Identification and Pilot Initiative on Productive Landscape in Banyumas Central Java, 2013 – 2015.

## 5.2 Changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period

### 5.2.1 Civic engagement

Civic engagement describes the formal and informal activities and participation undertaken by individuals to advance shared interests at different levels. Participation within civil society is multi-faceted and encompasses socially-based and politically-based forms of engagement.

Since the baseline assessment, LPPSLH has contributed to a slight improvement of civic engagement because membership of the three cooperatives that it has created has increased and because the cooperative's management has improved.

The Hivos supported program initially targeted interventions in only one district, Banyumas. It started with the creation of the multi-purpose cooperative Nira Satria that has given the impetus for the replication of LPPSLH's model to the districts of Banjarnegara and Purbalingga. In addition, Cilacap district officials have now approached LPPSLH, also requesting their assistance. More small-scale sugar producers are benefitting from LPPSLH's interventions. Since their establishment, all three cooperatives have grown in membership size and have successfully included different farmer groups: men, women, landowners, landless and middlemen. The Nira Satria cooperative started with 46 members in 2011, but two years later the three cooperatives counted a total membership of 1,749[11]. Women comprise 33 percent of cooperative members, while landless farmers comprise almost 75 percent (Nira Satria and Nira Perwira).

[10] Analysis of achieved results mainly based on the following documents: Progress Program LPPSLH berdasarkan Indikator Kontrak, Proposal Program Lanjutan Gula Kelapa Banyumas 291113, Proposal _ Rencana Kerja Hivos-LPPSLH 2011.

[11] There is no clear data for 2014 except for Nira Perwira. If the 2014 figures for this cooperative are taken into account, then the total membership now counts 1,770

The cooperatives offer benefits beyond the generation of profit. Members benefit from trainings, monitoring of production, certification of the sugar products, savings, and a better ability to pay off debts through the higher prices the cooperative can offer for crystal sugar. With the establishment of the cooperatives, the quality of organic palm sugar produced by smallholder farmers has improved and there is access to premium markets for crystal sugar based upon coconut and palms.

LPPSLH has tried to address gender equality through promoting women's representation in the cooperative management structure and by engaging women in the production of refined sugar. The processing of sugar relies on both women and men carrying out particular tasks, but how women benefit from increased palm sugar markets is not measured.

Box 1: Coconut palm sugar and processing methods

The producers make coconut sugar (also known as coco sugar, coconut palm sugar or coco sap sugar) is a sugar produced from the sap of cut flower buds of the coconut palm. Coconut sugar has been used as a traditional sweetener for thousands of years in the South and South-East Asian regions where the coconut palm is in abundant supply. The world's largest producers of coconuts are the Philippines and Indonesia.

Coconut sugar syrup can be processed into two kinds of product. Traditionally, the syrup is boiled and then condensed into casts or blocks. The new approach introduced grinding the condensed syrup instead of casting, resulting in crystal-like or grain sugar (thus domestically popular as 'crystal coconut sugar' or 'ant sugar'). With its grainy form and longer processing, crystal sugar has less moisture content allowing for better packaging and longer expiry duration. Crystal coconut sugar is a product preferred by premium and export consumers while traditional cast sugar is more widely used domestically. To increase its added value, crystal coconut sugar has to be certified to ensure it is produced organically. As a diversified product, crystal coconut sugar is a new or alternative value chain from its traditional counterpart. The traditional value chain has been well known to marginalise farmers /producers as it is identical with debt, untransparent pricing, and monopolization by middlemen.

Farmers themselves make up the executive management of the cooperatives. Mandatory meetings are held by the cooperatives to discuss planning and progress. There is evidence that the cooperatives' organisational capacity has also increased, and that non-performing executive committees have been replaced. The cooperatives are independent institutionally from LPPSLH and can sell sugar to any buyer, although they prefer to sell to *Pusat Pengembangan Produk Rakyat* or P3R (Civil Product Development Centre, the marketing unit of LPPSLH). Al three cooperatives have been recognized for their success through various awards and acknowledgement by the district government. LPPSLH maintains an institution-to-institution relationship between themselves and farmers' cooperatives.

Whereas LPPSLH, during the baseline still had to engage with the local government of Banyumas district to decrease the regulatory burden of both the first cooperative and their members, this is not necessary anymore, because the leadership of the district changed.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**
**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 1**

### 5.2.2 Level of organization

This dimension assesses the organisational development, complexity and sophistication of civil society, by looking at the relationships among the actors within the civil society arena.

Since the baseline, LPPSLH's level of organisation has improved: It slightly expanded its network of NGOs to collaborate with and intensified its collaboration with some of them; It improved its financial resource base, and; it's cooperative model has also strengthened the relations between producers and middlemen at community level and in consequence, improving the social network and the capacity to defend one's interests.

Since the baseline strategic collaboration and partnerships were maintained with organisations working on similar issues (i.e. agriculture and the economic position of small-scale farmers and producers). At the regional level, LPPSLH became the coordinator Komunitas Rembug Tani

(Community for Rembug Farmers) in 2013, a network that promotes organic farming and food security. LPPSLH's collaboration with these organisations, especially the People's Coalition for Food Sovereignty (KRKP) and Rembug Tani) is quite regular. At the national level, since 2014 LPPSLH is engaged in a new network called Agri-Profocus Indonesia, which works with members in the areas of youth in farming, access to finances, market access, and sustainable development services on different agricultural crops and value chains.

Generally, LPPSLH has increasingly been able to defend the interests of the producers who joined the cooperatives, initially created in only one district but now performing in three districts. It has developed a tried and tested a model for improving the capacities of farmer cooperatives that has led to better economic position of small producers. In addition to intensive accompaniment, one of the key elements of success of the model has been the appropriateness of the interventions with respect to the rural dynamics and the complex relations between farmers and middlemen. LPPSLH has been open to the participation of middlemen in its cooperative model. Middlemen and farmers have enjoyed benefits from the diversification of sugar products and the introduction of a new value chain. With the introduction of a new export-oriented market for organic crystal coconut palm sugar offering better profit margins, farmers have an alternative to traditionally produced cast sugar products. This in turn has led to a better position vis-à-vis middlemen, who themselves are joining the cooperative ranks because of improved cash flow opportunities. However, for non-cooperative members and members who continue to produce the traditional forms of cast sugar, middlemen are still in a position to control prices, especially amongst farmers who rely on middlemen for loans. Farmers who are not cooperative members have little option but to sell their products to middlemen as a means to pay off debts.

LPPSLH's support to the cooperatives is still essential although the cooperatives are becoming more independent. The cooperatives have greater financially independency, as illustrated in their ability to pay for General Assemblies utilizing their own fund. All three cooperative still rely on the market linkages created by LPPSLH (through P3R), intensive accompaniment, financing of routine certification, and rigorous quality control. Only Nira Satria has been able to cover half the certification costs. LPPSLH has also established a quality control unit, known as ICS (Internal Control System) and has trained farmers to regularly monitor whether crystal sugar is produced to international export standards. In doing so, LPPSLH has applied a participative farmer-to-farmer approach that relies on social pressure and incentives.

In its work with sugar farmers, LPPSLH has diversified funding sources. The government has supported much of LPPSLH's work either through funding arrangements or by assisting the cooperatives through the provision of tools or other production inputs. There is a high level of interest from neighbouring districts like Cilacap to fund the replication of LPPSLH's model. With the current resource base, LPPSLH's support to the three cooperatives could be sustained even without external donor funding. With regards to other program areas, LPPSLH receives funding from USAID and Global Fund for an HIV/AIDS intervention and Ford Foundation for a programme on agroforestry.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3:** **2**

**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2):** **1**

### 5.2.3 Practice of Values

Practice of Values refers to the internal practice of values within the civil society arena. Important values that CIVICUS looks at such as transparency, democratic decision-making, taking into account diversity that are deemed crucial to gauge not only progressiveness but also the extent to which civil society's practices are coherent with their ideals.

In 2013, LPPSLH improved its organisational structure by clearly separating the functions of the executive management and the board. Another improvement since 2012 has been in LPPSLH's auditing practices. The SPO now conducts both project-based audits and institutional audits. The institutional audit is funded by LPPSLH themselves. The composition of the social organs and diversity of them remains the same as during the baseline: There are no community members or persons representing marginalized groups in the social organs, which is not unusual for foundations in Indonesia.

As during the baseline, LPPSLH has applied transparency principles within the cooperative structures as well. Cooperative members are informed of the financial conditions and have the right to inquire with the cooperative on these issues or to express their ideas in the general assembly. Cooperative members are also aware of the prices of palm sugar on the international market and profit-sharing mechanisms.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**

**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 1**

### 5.2.4 Perception of Impact

Perception of Impact assesses the perceived impact of civil society actors on politics and society as a whole as the consequences of collective action. In this, the perceptions of both civil society actors (internal) as well as actors outside civil society are taken into account. Specific sub-dimensions for this evaluation are the extent to which the SPO has contributed to engaging more people in social or political activities, strengthening CSOs and their networks, and has influenced public and private sector policies.

**Impact upon the civil society arena**

Since the baseline LPPSLH's interventions have slightly improved the civil society arena in which it operates.

In the first place, the livelihoods of some 1750 persons, of which 75 percent do not own land and 33 percent are women have improved, not only in the material sense by increased income, but also in immaterial terms: cooperative members have broadened their network, are engaging in the cooperative's live and management, and have gained more confidence in engaging with government officials in their district.

In the second place the relations between middlemen and producers are being challenged by the cooperatives that are capable of producing crystal sugar for premium markets, thus offer new opportunities for sugar producing farmers and decreasing their chance of becoming trapped in debt pay-off arrangements with middlemen which further impoverish them. Also middlemen, in particular smaller and vulnerable middlemen, who due to the non-payment of debts in time, also faced difficulties in managing their cash flows; join the cooperatives and accept the cooperative arrangements in place. Their advantage is an easier management of their cash flows.

In the third place, apart from the three cooperatives created between 2011 and 2013 that continue to grow in membership, other districts are also interested to have such cooperatives being created, some of which experienced this is not possible without the support given by LPPSLH. Some of these districts have started to approach LPPSLH to assist them in this.

The three cooperatives are performing and a key element of their success is that they have a quality control system in place that ensures that the crystal sugar produced complies with the standards of premium markets, including organic niche markets. According to LPPSLH this success is not only induced by economic incentives, but also by social incentives in place that consist of farmers working together based upon the principles of solidarity and sense of belonging.

The cooperatives are functioning according to their bylaws and internal accountability systems in at least one of them were used to replace the management committee when they are not performing. The cooperatives finance their annual general assemblies and increasingly become financially independent. However, they still require LPPSLH to fund routine certification and quality inspection, monitoring, and promotional activities. They also still rely on the market linkages created by LPPSLH, in particular through P3R, the business unit within LPPSLH.

**Public sector collaboration and policy influencing**

LPPSLH considerably improved its collaboration with the public sector and based upon the successes of the cooperatives it also increased its influence upon local governments since the baseline assessment in 2012.

It started its collaboration with two new districts with a memorandum of understanding and its relations with the first district improved due to a change of leadership in that district. Given the

successes obtained until so far, other districts also gained an interest in collaborating with LPPSLH with funding coming from the CSR fund of a state-corporation.

The district Offices for Cooperatives and SMEs in the three districts have learned from LPPSLH's success in supporting cooperatives and the SPO is now perceived as an expert agent that can support local governments. The SPO also helped to change the negative perceptions these governments used to have with regards to NGOs.

Also the collaboration between the cooperatives and district officials has become more open and beneficial for both. Officials are regularly being invited at meetings of cooperatives and vice-versa and they take colleagues from other districts with them to visit the cooperatives. Apart from these, local governments have waved registration costs for the last two cooperatives; provided production tools; assisted in certification and; built a central processing unit for one of the coops. However LPPSLH is at the same time concerned that more intense engagement with the local governments may result in a negative backlash for the cooperatives: the cooperative that received support in the construction of the central processing unit was forced to pay unexpected additional costs to the government-appointed contractor and threatened that the construction process would stop if they refused to do so.

The cooperatives are invited to national and international events to promote crystal sugar as a local product and received several awards until so far, amongst which one by former President Yudhyono.

LPPSLH has successfully influenced local governments on two issues that are important for organic crystal palm sugar: In the first place they created the awareness amongst government officials to see crystal sugar as a potential export product from Indonesia and in consequence two of the three districts have changed their plans for small-scale district industries in favour of palm sugar as a priority product.

In the second place the three districts are now protecting the palms and coconuts used for the production of organic crystal sugar from an overuse of chemical fertilizer: the governments have campaigned to reduce the utilization of chemical fertilizer on other crops, such as rice, as contaminants could spill into the organic coconut plantation area. The organic certification, of which crystal sugar marketing depends upon, requires such rigorous standards.

In addition to these two issues, LPPSLH also managed to contribute to the district's government practice to provide for an insurance scheme for palm sugar farmers and tappers.

**Private sector collaboration and policy influencing**

Generally speaking, there is no change compared with the situation the baseline. LPPSLH continues working with a palm sugar exporter company PT. Kampung Kearifan Indonesia (PT KKI), PT Big Tree Farm and PT ALM, however, there is no information on influence to private sector agencies' policies and practices.

Since 2013, LPPSLH's cooperation with a company that made available a CSR fund for the rehabilitation of the Nusakambangan forest ended and since then no new relations were established with private sector organisations. However in the future LPPSLH is likely to receive CSR funds from a state-corporation in a district that wants to create a sugar cooperative.

The SPO's parent foundation's business unit, *Pusat Pengembangan Produk Rakyat* (People's Product Development Center or P3R) is however engaging with the private sector. P3R was initiated in 1995 and is currently sourcing crystal palm sugar through the cooperatives (the cooperatives are free to sell to others buyers), who in turn receive a premium price. P3R's exports increased from 20 tons/month in 2012 to 90 tons/month in 2014 and the organisation is not the only exporter of premium crystal sugar.

The positive experiences of LPPSLH in the three districts also mobilise other CRS funding from private sector organisations in support of crystal sugar production. One example is that of a ceramic tile corporation supported the three districts in financing hygienic upgrades in the production of palm sugar.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**

**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 2**

### 5.2.5 Civil Society Environment/Coping strategies

The social, political and economic environment in which civil society operates affects its room for manoeuvre. The civil society context has been described in Chapter 3. In this section we describe how LPPSLH has coped with the national and local context.

In mid-2014, the 2012 Law on Cooperatives was annulled through a Constitutional Court decision. This means that the law currently recognized is the predeceasing Law. No. 25/1992. To cope with this change, LPPSLH helped the cooperative administration to comply with the policy, although the change in legislation did not have a significant impact since they did implement schemes allowed under the annulled law.

More relevant to LPPSLH are the local dynamics and the relations between middlemen and farmers, which are explained in other sections. Also of relevance is the prominence of economic development on Indonesia's development agenda. The national government has implemented large initiatives like the Master Plan for Accelerating and Expanding its Economic (MP3EI) and local governments are also attempting to secure economic growth. Cooperative development is regarded as one of the ways through which the Indonesian economy can be developed. Local governments have a keen interest in supporting such initiatives. This is one of the reasons why LPPSLH has received such wide acknowledgement. There are however some potential negative impacts resulting from government support to LPPSLH's cooperatives due to the lack of transparency and potential corrupt practices in the implementation of government programs. LPPSLH has asked their field facilitators to pay more attention to such issues.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3:** **1**

**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2):** **1**

## 5.3 To what degree are the changes attributable to the Southern partners?

This paragraph assesses the extent to which some outcomes achieved can be "attributed" to LPPSLH. Starting with an outcome, the evaluation team developed a model of change that identifies different pathways that possibly explain the outcome achieved. Data collection was done to obtain evidence that confirms or rejects each of these pathways. Based upon this assessment, the evaluation team concludes about the most plausible explanation of the outcome and the most plausible relation between (parts of) pathways and the outcome. The relations between the pathways and the outcomes can differ in nature as is being explained in table 6.

Table 6

*Nature of the relation between parts in the Model of Change*

| Nature of the relation between parts and other parts or outcome | |
|---|---|
| The part is the only causal explanation for the outcome. No other interventions or factors explain it. (necessary and sufficient) |  |
| The part does not explain the outcome at all: other subcomponents explain the outcomes. |  |
| The part explains the outcome but other parts explain the outcome as well: there are multiple pathways (sufficient but not necessary) |  |
| The part is a condition for the outcome but won't make it happen without other factors (necessary but not sufficient) |  |
| The part is a contributory cause it is part of a 'package' of causal actors and factors that together are sufficient to produce the intended effect. |  |

Sources: Mayne, 2012; Stern et al, 2012

The following paragraph assesses LPPSLH's contribution to two outcomes. Each paragraph first describes the outcome achieved and the evidence obtained to confirm that the outcome has been achieved. It then presents the pathways identified that possibly explain the outcomes, as well as present information that confirms or refutes these pathways. The last section concludes in the first place about the most plausible explanation of the outcome, followed by a conclusion regarding the role of the SPO in explaining the outcome.

The two outcomes that were selected are:

- Small-scale crystal sugar producers are organized into three operational and profitable cooperatives
- Improved sugar farmers position vis-à-vis middle-men

### 5.3.1 Outcome 1: Small-scale crystal sugar producers are organized into three operational and profitable cooperatives

This outcome represents an improvement in civil society 'level of organisation'. The indicators of this outcome are: cooperatives have a legal status and are acknowledged by the government and market actors; the number or trend of farmers being organised within the cooperatives; crystal sugar productivity, and; average profit received by each member (on a monthly basis). The latter indicator is included to show that improved level of organisation is beneficial for the marginalised sugar producers (the organisation helps defend their economic interests), and as such it is more likely to be sustainable.

Nira Satria cooperative was established on 23 December 2011 in Rancamaya village, Banyumas district, and legalized with a notary act. This is further confirmed by the Forum for Economic Development and Employment Promotion (FEDEP) Banyumas, and by project documents. Nira Satria has 1,070 members[12] with 1,044 certified producers in 9 villages[13]. Project reports and online information confirms that the production capacity for grade-A crystal coconut palm sugar by the cooperative in 2013 reached 90 tons/month. Given the production amount and the price at which one kilogram of sugar is purchased from the farmers and the price the same amount fetches on the premium market, the evaluation team estimates that each producer receives net profits of IDR 280,000 per month. This is 68 percent of what Indonesia considers to be the poverty line margin (IDR 407,000/month, BPS standards in 2013).

The second cooperative, Nira Perwira, was established in Purbalingga district on 11 June 2013, legalized through a notary act in July 2013. It has around 380 members in 5 villages, and has marketed 15 tons of sugar per month in 2014. It is estimated that each member receives a net profit of IDR 155,000/month (38 percent of poverty line margin). Nira Kamukten cooperative was established in Banjarnegara district on 30 April 2013 under direct supervision of the District Department of Industry, Trade and Cooperatives. It has 299 members and a similar production capacity to Nira Perwira.


The number of members of each cooperative has increased since they were established. Each cooperative has received an award or recognition from the government at national, provincial, or district level, as well as substantial media exposure.

*Causal pathways*

There are four possible pathways that may explain this outcome:

1. Pathway 1: Product marketability
   The marketability of crystal coconut palm sugar offers the producers clear prospect for profit, which is believed to be their main incentive in joining the cooperatives. This pathway explains the outcome by mainly external market factors. To reject this pathway, we need to prove that: the cooperatives were established before they were able to market their product; or that the cooperatives would still be operational even if the product is no longer marketable; or that its members have joined for other incentives other than financial profit.

[12] Fedep Banyumas, Profil, "Koperasi Nira Satria". Available from http://www.fedepbanyumas.com/index.php/profil/koperasi-nira-satria (accessed 19 December 2014)
[13] "2012 Annual Report LPPSLH", LPPSLH, 2012




2. Pathway 2: LPPSLH's approach to organise producers
   LPPSLH's approach is characterized by intensive accompaniment, linkage to market, and inclusion of middlemen in the cooperatives. This pathway is in direct opposition to pathway 3 and 4, which together represent the influence and interventions of external actors as contributing to the outcome's achievement. To reject this pathway, we need to find evidence that without LPPSLH's approach, the outcome would still be achieved.

3. Pathway 3: Government's approach and intervention to organise producers
   As an antithesis for pathway 2, the government's approach is characterized by a lack of intensive accompaniment, no linkage to market, and the exclusion of middlemen. To reject this pathway, we need evidence that the government's approach has not been successful in any of the three districts and that the government has not approached or supported LPPSLH's cooperatives (Nira Satria, Nira Perwira, Nira Kamukten).

4. Pathway 4: Other CS actors' contribution
   This pathway anticipates the role of external actors which could be critical to the outcome achievement, regardless of pathway 2 and 3. To reject this pathway, we need to find that without the intervention of CS actors the outcome would still be achieved.

Information that confirms or rejects the pathways:

<u>Pathway 1: Product marketability</u>

Information that *confirms* pathway 1:

Various sources (LPPSLH, government, cooperative, media coverage) report that the premium price of crystal sugar has been attracting more producers to process coconut palm sugar syrup into crystal sugar instead of traditional cast sugar. As such, members have joined the cooperatives to gain knowledge, benefit from quality control and assistance, gain market access, and to be supported by production facilities. These elements are all needed to ensure that their product meets premium market standards. If premium price was not significant (crystal coconut sugar is no longer marketable), cooperative members would likely turn back to producing traditional cast sugar instead of crystal sugar, and traditional cast sugar producers would be less interested in joining cooperatives because it requires extra efforts from both women and men to produce crystal sugar.

LPPSLH began experimenting with the production of crystal sugar prior to 2009, but was unable to attract producers to join a cooperative structure. It was only in 2009, that they were able to link with the premium organic market. The first crystal sugar cooperative (Nira Satria) was established two years after that event, indicating the importance of premium market access and the higher prices offered as being a strong motivating factor behind joining cooperatives.

Information that *rejects* pathway1: none

Pathway 2: External market factors explain the change

Information that *confirms* pathway 2:
Various sources (districts government, cooperatives, and media) acknowledge that without LPPSLH's accompaniment, the outcome would not be achieved. As an expression of acknowledgment, neighbouring Cilacap district government has requested LPPSLH to conduct similar interventions, applying their approach in the district, as they have failed to adopt a successful model themselves. In contrast, CV Inagro Jinawi, a private sector actor founded in 2010 by a former LPPSLH staff member, has successfully replicated the LPPSLH approach and model.

According to LPPSLH's management, the SPO only works with a few other NGOs in providing assistance to cooperatives. These organizations include Penabulu and Agriterra who provide financial management training for Nira Satria. In the districts were Nira Perwira and Nira Kamukten are active, there are almost no other CS actors. As such, the establishment of all three cooperatives should be attributed to LPPSLH.

Information that *rejects* pathway 2: none

Pathway 3: Government's approach and intervention to organise producers

Information that *confirms* pathway 3*:*
Purbalingga and Banjarnegara district governments have supported the establishment of Nira Perwira and Nira Kamukten (specifically in fulfilling administrative and government requirements) cooperatives in 2013, but did not provide such assistance when Nira Satria cooperative was established in 2011.

Information that *rejects* pathway 3:

The government only provided support to cooperative establishment in two of the three districts. This demonstrates that government support is not necessary. In fact, the Purbalingga and Banjarnegara district governments began providing support because they acknowledge the success of Nira Satria. Neighbouring district Cilacap has failed in their own efforts to support crystal sugar cooperatives. They have requested LPPSLH's assistance. This indicates that the government has not been able to develop a successful model on its own.

Pathway 4: Other CS actors' contribution

Information that *confirms* pathway 4: none

Information that *rejects* pathway 4*:*
All confirming evidence for pathway 2 (LPPSLH's approach to organise producers to explain the outcome) automatically rejects this pathway. As such, there is no evidence that without other CS actors' contribution the outcome would not be achieved.

**Conclusions**

Based on an analysis of the evidence confirming or rejecting different pathways, it can be concluded that product marketability is a *necessary* factor for the outcome. But without interventions to organise crystal coconut palm sugar producers, this pathway itself would not be *sufficient*. LPPSLH's mode of approach is *necessary* for the outcome, but is not *sufficient* as it can only be effective with pathway 1. This means that both pathways are parts of a causal package that together are sufficient to produce the intended effect.

There is no evidence that the government has provided significant support to all three cooperatives or that it has developed a successful model elsewhere. There is also no evidence that without other CS actors' intervention the outcome would not have been achieved. Thus, pathways 3 and 4 do not explain the outcome.

To achieve these outcomes, the role of LPPSLH has been very important. They have created the market outlet, have supported farmers to create and manage the cooperatives and have ensured that an internal quality control system is in place within the cooperatives to ensure the premium quality of the crystal sugar.

### 5.3.2 Outcome 2: Improved position of coconut palm sugar farmers vis-à-vis middlemen

A second outcome achieved is that those farmers that produce crystal sugar have improved their bargaining position vis-à-vis their middlemen with whom they do business for cast sugar. This outcome contributes to 'civic engagement'.

The achievement of this outcome was confirmed by LPPSLH, cooperative members, cooperative staff, middlemen who have become cooperative members, as well as middlemen outside the cooperative. In the old situation, farmers were trapped in non-transparent price setting practices and into a system monopolized by middlemen.

**Causal Pathways**


There are three possible pathways that may explain this outcome:

Pathway 1: Crystal coconut palm sugar value chain

Due to the premium market prices for crystal sugar premium and the organization of around 1,750 small crystal sugar producers into three operational cooperatives farmers have better incomes, reduced debt, or improved marketing options. As such, this pathway specifically positions LPPSLH's contribution in outcome 1 (organising farmers into cooperatives) and product marketability as the explaining causes. To reject this pathway, we need to find evidence that the crystal sugar value chain has not led to increased incomes, reduced debt, or better options for farmers.

Pathway 2: Traditional cast coconut palm sugar value chain.

This pathway challenges pathway 1 by stipulating that the traditional value chain of cast sugar (as opposed to LLPSLH's crystal sugar) itself could have improved the conditions of farmers, making them less dependent on middlemen. To reject this pathway, we need to find evidence that the traditional value chain is not preferred by farmers because it does no offer benefits like debt reduction, price




transparency, or reduced monopoly practices.

Pathway 3: External actors' interventions

This pathway explores the probability that external actors have intervened to reduce producers' debts, promote market transparency, or reduce monopoly practices. To reject this pathway, we need to find evidence that without other the interventions of other actors, the outcome would still be achieved, or that such interventions do not exist.

Information *that confirms or rejects the pathways:*

Pathway 1: Crystal coconut palm sugar value chain explains decreased dependency upon middlemen
Information that *confirms* pathway 1:
The Head of District Department of Industry, Trade and Cooperatives in Banjarnegara reported that Nira Kamukten cooperative members are now in a better position vis-à-vis middlemen, as they now have an option to sell their product to the cooperative. She also added that indebted farmers have the freedom to choose how they process and sell their products.

From the perspective of the producers, it was found that reluctance to pay off debts did not necessarily stem from a lack of financial capacity, but rather from the lack of other options. Now with a better value chain to choose from, farmers stated that their preference for the crystal value chain hinges on better profitability and transparency and non-monopolized practices.

From the perspective of middlemen who choose to join the new value chain, it was found that the traditional value chain created problems not only for farmers but for middlemen themselves. In the traditional value chain, middlemen provide many loans and have problems ensuring debt is repaid, affecting their cash flow. Middlemen who have decided to join the cooperative say that the benefit of better cash flow/liquidity motivated their decision.

Non-member middlemen confirmed that farmers have broader options, as they can choose to sell their product to them or to the cooperative. They also reported a decreased supply (in terms of quantity) of cast sugar since more farmers choose to invest their resources into producing the more lucrative crystal form of sugar. They reported that they considered joining the cooperative to accommodate the preference of the farmers.

The evaluation team also found that cooperative members now have better capacity to pay off their debt to the middlemen using the profit from crystal sugar production. As such they are no longer obligated to sell the sugar they produce to middlemen (at prices fixed by middlemen) as a form of debt repayment.

Regarding the causes that explain this pathway, it was found that the success of the crystal sugar value chain is dependent on the premium price difference. If crystal forms of sugar no longer fetch better prices, farmers will turn to the traditional cast sugar value chain since fewer inputs are required, in particular manpower. It is also clear that without the cooperative organisation (outcome 1), farmers would be unable to produce marketable products (according to premium standards) or access external, export markets.

Information that *rejects* pathway 1:

According to Nira Perwira's management, not all farmers have fully converted to crystal sugar. This is due to several reasons such as limited resources (manpower) and the social and kinship nature of the relations they have with cast sugar middlemen.

Pathway 2: Traditional cast coconut palm sugar value chain explains decreased dependency upon middlemen

Information that *confirms* pathway2:

Rejecting evidence for pathway 1 (crystal sugar value chain) automatically confirms this pathway.

Information that *rejects* pathway 2:

All confirming evidence for pathway 1 automatically rejects that the dependency on middlemen can be reduced through the traditional cast sugar value chain.

Pathway 3: External actors' interventions explain decreased dependency upon middlemen

Information that *confirms* pathway 3: none

Information that *rejects* pathway3:

LPPSLH only works with few NGOs in providing assistance to their cooperatives, namely Penabulu and Agriterra who provided financial management training to Nira Satria. For Nira Perwira and Nira Kamukten, LPPSLH confirmed through the evaluation workshop that there are no other CS actors involved. Moreover, media coverage has exclusively mentioned LPPSLH and Hivos' support as being the driving factors for the cooperative's success.

**Conclusion:**

Pathway 1 provides a *necessary and sufficient* explanation for the decreased dependency of farmers from their middlemen: without the existence of the crystal sugar value chain, the farmers would still be dependent on middlemen and their old practices. The evidence shows that the new value chain offers a rather peaceful solution for both producers and middlemen. Important preconditions that need to be in place for farmers to start producing crystal sugar and hence become independent are the following: in the first place farmers need to avail of the necessary manpower for the premium market product which is labour intensive and their social and kinship relation with the cast sugar middlemen needs to allow for this change in product. In the second place farmers will turn to crystal sugar production if the difference of the premium price to the price of regular cast sugar is significant enough. A third precondition is the capacity of producers to collaborate in a cooperative structure that ensures the product quality.

Pathway 2 does not explain the outcome and the monopoly position of middlemen can only be broken by the creation of alternative value chains. Pathway 3 also does not explain the outcome because the evaluation team did not find any evidence that other actors contributed significantly in creating an alternative value chain or in decreasing the dependency on middlemen.

LPPSLH's role in achieving this outcome is the same as mentioned under outcome one, and no other actors are known to have contributed to this outcome achieved regarding the relation between middlemen and farmers.

## 5.4 What is the relevance of these changes?

### 5.4.1 Relevance of the changes in relation to the Theory of Change of 2012

The goals identified in LPPSLH's Theory of Change (ToC) in 2012 were: 1) sustainable agriculture to build farmers' self-reliance and food sovereignty, 2) improved access and control towards economic resources through micro and small business, and 3) organisational development that makes farmer's organisations independent. The achievements booked since the baseline are in line to these goals in the ToC. The model propagated by LPPSLH is one based on sustainable business development practices that promote organic products and traceability. In essence, LPPSLH has provided services to cooperatives to develop business models for crystal sugar commodities. As described in the previous sections, the cooperatives are becoming more self-reliant although there is still a dependency on LPPSLH. Cooperative members have a better socio-economic position as evident from increased earnings and less dependency on middlemen.

A number of strategies were also identified to achieve the goals of the Theory of Change. Not all of these strategies have been applied. For instance, there is little evidence of concrete efforts to enhance the awareness amongst farmers that would allow them to demand their rights and enhance their participation in the political economy. This element in the ToC has proven to be rather ambitious, especially given LPPSLH's prioritization of creating a more sustainable market and the lack of attention to policy change. What is evident is that community organising has been critical to the achievement of outcomes by LPPSLLH. The strategies applied for this have included direct accompaniment, training, improvement of product quality, development of a participatory quality management system, and a diversification of sugar products.

### 5.4.2 Relevance of the changes in relation to the context in which the SPO is operating

Over the years the contribution of Indonesia's agricultural sector to the country's gross domestic product (GDP) has declined significantly. At current levels, agriculture contributes to around 14-15

percent of the GDP[14], the third largest sector behind industry and services[15]. Although the agriculture has grown at a slower pace than other sectors, it still provides income and employment for 34 percent[16] of Indonesia's households. The agricultural sector is dominated by large plantations and smallholders.

Self-sufficiency is high on the agenda of the Government of Indonesia, especially for crops such as soy beans, sugar, rice and corn[17]. The government has invested in programs aiming to raise the production of smallholders, but it is uncertain whether self-sufficiency will be reached. This presents favourable conditions for interventions in the sugar sector[18.]

Coconut palm sugar production is the dominant domestic industry in the districts where LPPSLH intervenes. In Purbalingga, for example, the palm sugar industry represents 50 percent of the small enterprise workforce with close to 42,000 labourers[19]. The main source of income of households in the region is from sugar production. Income from palm sugar has traditionally been used to meet daily needs. The value chain of traditional cast sugar production involves sugar producers, tree owners and collectors or middlemen. Middlemen often also own the trees tapped by the producers and have complex stratified relations with larger middlemen. Prior to the interventions, coconut palm sugar producers relied more heavily on their relations with middlemen to cover the costs of production and basic necessities. Both men and women are involved in the production process of turning sap into sugar, while men generally are responsible for taking the sap from the trees.

LPPSLH's interventions have deliberately worked to create a new marketing chain rather than cutting out the middlemen. From the data and information gathered in the evaluation process, this approach has been successful. Small-scale producers rely less on middlemen and are able to earn better incomes and are able to generate savings.

However, it is understandable that the impact is still limited. Based on data from the Banyumas Disperindagkop, the palm sugar industry comprises 74 percent of total small-medium enterprises in the district (Banyumas), involving 110,000 workers and 28 cooperatives. Nira Satria, the most successful LPPSLH cooperative, only has around 1,000 members, which is less than 1 percent of the workforce involved in the palm sugar industry of the district.

### 5.4.3 Relevance of the changes in relation to the policies of the MFS II alliance and the CFA

The interventions of LPPSLH fall under the Green Entrepreneurship program focus of Hivos. This program area, Hivos' largest globally, focuses on "enterprising men and women as catalysts for green socio-economic progress"[20]. According to Hivos, LPPSLH contributes to improved capacity of farmer organisations that in turn lead to improved economic positions of small producers and increase rural outreach[21]. Small producers are considered to be marginalised groups with weak negotiating power and a lack of opportunities to improve production processes. In Hivos' 2008 Vision Paper on Civil Society Building, Hivos states that, "In the economic domain it is civil society's role to counterbalance short-term profit policies, and to struggle for long term production policies which are socially and

[14] World Bank, Data, "Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)". Available from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS?page=1 (accessed 20 December 2014)

[15] Index Mundi, Factbook, Countries, Indonesia, "Indonesia Economy Profile 2014". Available from http://www.indexmundi.com/indonesia/economy_profile.html (accessed 20 December 2014)

[16] Sudaryanto, Tahlim. 2014. *The Frame of Agricultural Policy and Recent Major Agricultural Policies in Indonesia*. FFTC Agricultural Policy Database. Taiwan. 2 July. Available from http://ap.fftc.agnet.org/ap_db.php?id=256 (accessed 20 December 2014)

[17] Ibid

[18] Global Business Guide Indonesia, Agriculture, "Opportunities in Indonesia's Downstream Sugar Industry", 2013. Available from http://www.gbgindonesia.com/en/agriculture/article/2013/opportunities_in_indonesia_s_downstream_sugar_industry.php (accessed 20 December 2014)

[19] Investor & Pialang, Sectoral, Agriculture, "Purbalingga-Hivos Tingkatkan kesejahteraan Produsen Gula Kelapa", 23 May 2013. Available from http://investorpialang.com/read-news-4-13-4192-purbalingga-hivos-tingkatkan-kesejahteraan-produsen-gula-kelapa.investor.pialang (accessed 20 December 2014)

[20] "Hivos Business Plan 2011-2015", Hivos, 2010

[21] "Evaluation Questionnaire", Hivos, December 2014

environmentally sound.[22]" As such, Hivos supports activities related to market participation since it contributes to fairer economic relations.

One of the motivations for Hivos' support to LPPSLH was it focus on sustainable agriculture and women's empowerment[23], although the results of the later are vague. The changes that Hivos considers to be of importance are the improved enabling environment for entrepreneurship that has been made possible through business development services to farmers, ensured by LPPSLH.[24]

[22] "Hivos Vision Paper: Civil Society Building 2008", Hivos, 2008, p. 9
[23] Kenschets LPPSLH
[24] "Hivos 2013 Annual Report MFS II", Hivos, 2013

## 5.5 Explaining factors

### 5.5.1 Internal factors

In 2013, Hivos assessed the capacity of LPPSLH using the five capacities framework. The assessment scored the core capacities of LPPSLH, with most areas receiving respectable scores of 7 or 8 (9 being the maximum). The following table presents an overview of the scores:

Table 7
*Hivos' assessment of LPPSLH against the 5C framework.*

| Capacity | Description | Score |
|---|---|---|
| | 5 Cs | |
| 1 | The capability to act and commit | Mean score of 7.3 |
| 1.1 | The organisation has a clear purpose and acts on decisions collectively. The leadership is accepted by staff, inspiring, action-oriented and reliable. | 8 |
| 1.2 | The organisation is capable to mobilise sufficient financial resources, and (where relevant) non material resources from members/ supporters. | 7 |
| 1.3 | The organisation is internally transparent and accountable. (Relations between staff, direction and board; quality of decision-making process | 7 |
| 2 | The capability to perform | Mean score of 6.75 |
| 2.1 | The number, composition and expertise of staff is adequate in view of the organisation's objectives and programmes. (Indicate when there is high staff turnover) | 7 |
| 2.2 | The organisation has a coherent and realistic strategic plan. (Context and problem analysis; Theory of Change; quality of formulation of objectives, intended results and indicators; explanation of strategic choices) | 7 |
| 2.3 | The quality of financial and administrative management is adequate. (Budget, funding plan, financial management, financial report) | 7 |
| 2.4 | The organisation has an appropriate monitoring and evaluation process (documentation & data collection, involvement of stakeholders, quality of analysis and learning) and uses it for accountability and learning purposes. | 6 |
| 3 | The capability to relate | Mean score of 8 |
| 3.1 | The organisation maintains relevant institutional relationships with external stakeholders and is seen as credible and legitimate. (Indicate main strategic relationships and collaboration with other actors) | 8 |
| 3.2 | The organisation is accountable to and communicates effectively with its primary constituents/ beneficiaries. (Describe downward or horizontal accountability process; specify for women) | 8 |
| 4 | The capability to adapt and self-renew | Mean score of 6.5 |
| 4.1 | The organisation (management) responds adequately to trends and changes in the context and uses up-to-date strategies and knowledge. | 7 |
| 4.2 | The organisation (management) encourages and supports internal learning and reflection processes. (Conditions, incentives) | 6 |
| 5 | Capability to maintain consistency | Mean score of 7 |
| 5.1 | The organisation is capable to maintain consistency between ambition, vision, strategy and operations. The management is able to deal strategically with external pressure and conflicting demands. | 7 |
| Gender | | |
| Quality 1 | To what extent has the organisation formulated objectives with regard to the position of women and issues of gender equality? | 7 |
| Quality 2 | To what extent does the organisation have internal gender expertise? | 7 |
| Quality 3 | To what extent does the organisation maintain relations with key GW&D actors in its context, e.g. women's movement, women's organisations, gender experts? | 7 |

Source: Hivos Partner Capacity Assessment Form 2013

LPPSLH scores highest in the 'capability to act and commit' and 'capability to relate'. The lowest scores are in the capability to 'adaptor self-renew'. The findings of the evaluation confirm that these scores are justifiable. LPPSLH staff admit that they are still weak in their ability to monitor and evaluate and lack the ability to document lessons learned. However, as explained in Section 5.5.3 below, the evaluation did not find sufficient evidence of LPPSLH's capacity in the area of gender.

The success of Nira Satria, the first sugar cooperative set up by LPPSLH, has become a model for other interventions. With a high level of recognition from the government and farmers themselves,

LPPSLH has been able to replicate the model in other areas, especially since there are clear benefits for both the community and government. LPPSLH has facilitated peer-exchange visits between cooperatives as a means to promote farmer-to-farmer learning. Unfortunately, LPPSLH staff have limitations in their ability to record and document their success. Without these capacities, further support and funding is limited to actors in the target districts who mostly hear about LPPSLH's interventions by word of mouth.

A critical factor explaining the outcome and the changes in civil society is the LPPSLH model. Unlike government forms of assistance, LPPSLH provides intensive community accompaniment during all stages of implementation, from the establishment of the cooperative to day-to-day administration. This has been the reason why LPPSLH has been more successful than public-sector driven interventions. This form of accompaniment requires staff to be highly motivated and a high degree of idealism and belief in the principles of community empowerment. LPPSLH's staff have been able to relate with the conditions of the rural and less-educated sugar producers.

Through P3R, the economic business unit of LPPSLH, the SPO has been one of the factors behind the success of the model. Buyers looking for crystal coconut palm sugar are able to contact P3R to pace orders. P3R plays an important role in linking potential buyers to the smallholders organised through the cooperatives set up by LPPSLH.

### 5.5.2 External factors

Administrative changes at the district level have been a positive factor in support for LPPSLH. In Banjarnegara district, elections led to a new dominant party in the district's leadership. The party that is backing the new head of district comes from the Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) fraction, a party that has been known for its support to the agricultural sector. The district head is also more approachable than his predecessor, especially since he comes from the same party fraction as the governor who has closer relations with LPPSLH's network.

As described in other sections, LPPSLH's model of intervention depends on premium market valuation of crystal sugar. Up until now, the premium price offers significant profit incentives for the farmers as the demand for the product is still very high, and the premium price has not been very volatile. However, it will be interesting to see how LPPSLH's model would cope if premium export prices dropped and profit margins would be less or equal to traditionally processed sugar market price for a long period. Traditional cast coconut palm sugar prices vary between IDR 5600 – IDR 12.000[25], while crystal coconut palm sugar are of less volatile range between IDR 11.000[26] – IDR 25.000[27] per-kilogram.

### 5.5.3 Relations CFA-SPO

Hivos sees its role as providing input on program development, funding activities, facilitating linkages to other players and monitoring[28]. Hivos has been enthusiastically engaged in the project, as seen from their involvement in signing a tripartite MoU in Banjarnegara. Hivos has received good coverage and exposure in print and electronic media and has been recognized for its support to LPPSLH.

While Hivos has previously supported LPPSLH under a gender thematic focus and has claimed better gender mainstreaming practices, LPPSLH does not implement targeted interventions for men and women. Nonetheless, the development of a product chain for organic coconut palm sugar has been a

[25] Republika Online, "Harga Anjlok, Perajin Gula Kelapa Kelimpungan", 24 February 2014. Available from http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/daerah/14/02/24/n1hrg9-harga-anjlok-perajin-gula-kelapa-kelimpungan (accessed 21 December 2014)

[26] Radar Banyumas, "Gula Semut Masuki Pasar Eksport", 28 August 2014. Available from http://www.radarbanyumas.co.id/gula-semut-masuki-pasar-ekspor/ (accessed 21 December 2014)

[27] Pamuji Trinastiti, "Turki Pesan Gula Semut Dari Jawa Tengah 200 Ton Per Bulan", *Bisnis.com*, 13 September 2013. Available from http://industri.bisnis.com/read/20130913/12/162760/turki-pesan-gula-semut-dari-jawa-tengah-200-ton-per-bulan (accessed 21 December 2014)

[28] "PARTNER CAPACITY ASSESSMENT FORM LPPSLH 1007811 2013", Hivos, 2013, p. 7

Hivos priority[29]. LPPSLH has benefitted from Hivos' support since 2008, and this long-term support is one of the reasons why LPPSLH's interventions now have resulted in economic and social benefits.

According to Hivos the MFS funds allowed for support to be provided to improve the organisational capacity of CS actors. In its agreement with LPPSLH, one of the indicators for success was improved capacity of LPPSLH to manage earned incomes. Unfortunately, in the reports there was no mention of how Hivos or other organisations have supported internal capacity improvements of LPPSLH. A capacity assessment undertaken in 2013 (See 5.5.1) did report an augmentation in all of the SPO's capacity areas.

Hivos has also facilitated LPPSLH's linkage to other organisations through Agri-ProFocus Indonesia, an open network that promotes farmer entrepreneurship and business linkages. Because Agri-Profocus was established in 2013, it may be too early to say how LPPSLH will benefit from this wider network. Of note is that Hivos' 2013 Annual Report for MFS II mentions that Unilever Indonesia has agreed to support the scale-up of small-scale coconut production in the area of quality standards, cost reduction and productivity[30], as a result of Hivos' own initiative. Other areas where Hivos intended to provide support are in developing a quality management system through ICS and in introducing cleaner production facilities and cook stoves. In both of these areas there is an improvement, although the introduction of cleaner production facilities was also supported by the local government.

[29] "Annual MFS II Report Hivos 2012", Hivos, 2012, p. 20
[30] "Annual MFS II Report Hivos 2013", Hivos, 2013, p. 26

# 6 Discussion

## 6.1 Design of the intervention

Overall the design of LPPSLH's intervention was found to be sufficient; although the performance indicators agreed upon on the contract between the CFA and the SPO did not all fit well within the logical framework. Notwithstanding, actual work on the ground by LPPSLH was guided by a clear organisational direction and ideas of what results they wished to attain.

There was also a lack of clarity as to how support in the 2011 -2013 period built upon preceding interventions that focused on women's participation in sugar production. In fact, there were no specific interventions targeting women in the project design.

There were also weaknesses in how the performance of the value chains was measured. This is arguably a crucial element of successfully managing business development, even at the small-scale farmer level. Additionally, organic certification of crystal palm sugar requires traceability making this kind of monitoring even more important. In hindsight the SPO would have benefited from a computerized information technology system for improved product traceability. Hivos works with a number of organisations in the area of ICT, and it is unfortunate that no linkages were created with such organisations.

LPPSLH's ToC had an implicit assumption that unfair markets are the cause of structural poverty. While the SPO successfully developed closer relations with the government, and as a result, an insurance scheme has been initiated by the government in collaboration with a provincial government-owned bank (Bank BPD Central Java). While LPPSLH's model has seemingly influenced the prioritization of sugar in agricultural development plans at the district level, the project would have benefited from clearer actions to influence and assist the formulation of such plans. This would help to ensure that successful models are fed back into policy development and that an enabling environment helps to sustain the improved conditions of sugar producers.

LPPSLH itself has shown that it is capable to replicate the model of creating cooperatives of palm sugar farmers in other districts, as well as a former staff of LPPSLH. Efforts of the Cilacap district to put in place a similar structure however failed (reasons unknown).

Important conditions that need to be in place are the existence and access to premium markets, a project duration of some 3 to 4 years and organisational competences needed. Apart from these, the management of the relations between middle-men and small scale coconut palm sugar producers is another key factor for success.

# 7 Conclusion

Since the baseline, LPPSLH has contributed to changes in the organisation and position of small producers. Organised through three cooperatives, sugar producers have been able to benefit through the diversification of coconut sugar products and the creation of an alternative value chain. This in turn has brought benefits to some 1,749 (2013) farmers in terms of improved income generation and less dependency on middlemen who controlled the traditional value chain. The success of LPPSLH's model hinges on the ability to provide intensive accompaniment and access to profitable export markets for crystal sugar. Rather than cutting out the middlemen in the value chain, LPPSLH has introduced alternatives for sugar producers.

The cooperative model itself offers an opportunity for farmers to be involved in decision-making since institutionally they are independent of LPPSLH. More support is probably needed to make the cooperative fully self-reliant, but this is makes good sense since two of the cooperatives were officially established in 2013. Notwithstanding, there is general satisfaction amongst beneficiaries of the benefits they now enjoy as cooperative members.

LPPSLH's approach has garnered significant interest and acknowledgement at the district as well as the national level. The cooperatives LPPSLH helped establish have been recognized for their sustainable business practices and farmer-based initiatives through a number of awards. A number of actors have begun to replicate the production and marketing of crystal coconut sugar. Neighbouring districts, like Cilacap have also taken a keen interest and have requested LPPSLH's assistance after their own interventions failed to generate the same level of success. Although the interventions of LPPSLH did not touch upon direct policy influence, they have influenced the government's attitudes towards coconut sugar, which is now seen as a viable agricultural product worth prioritizing. Organisationally, LPPSLH has bene able to capitalize on government interest, generating more public sector funding and support for its coconut sugar program. In addition, there has been an emergence of more private sector actors in the area of crystal coconut sugar production.

These changes, particularly the replication of Nira Satria's success to two other districts can be attributed to Hivos and MFS II support. As a result, more sugar producers now have an opportunity to improve their socio-economic conditions. Overall the interventions and results achieved are relevant to the context in which the SPO is operating, as well as to the organisational visions and missions of both LPPSLH and Hivos. Small scale coconut sugar producers now have better relations with public sector actors and are in a better position with the introduction of new means of production and access to markets.

Table 8
*Summary of findings*

| When looking at the MFS II interventions of this SPO to strengthen civil society and/or policy influencing, how much do you agree with the following statements? | Score |
|---|---|
| The CS interventions were well designed | 7 |
| The CS interventions were implemented as designed | 7 |
| The CS interventions reached their objectives | 7 |
| The observed outcomes are attributable to the CS interventions | 7 |
| The observed CS outcomes are relevant to the beneficiaries of the SPO | 8 |

Score between 1 to 10, with 1 being "not at all" and 10 being "completely".

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**Resource persons consulted**

| Name of key informant | Organisation | Function in organisation | Relation with SPO | Contact details including e-mail. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bangkit Ari Sasongko | LPPSLH | Director | Staff | bangkit29@gmail.com |
| Kukuh Haryadi | LPPSLH | Program Manager | Staff | kharyadi75@gmail.com |
| Tri Hadiyanto | | | Staff | |
| Andy Yunanto | | Manager | Staff | |
| Sakun Ahmad Saroni | | | | |
| Agus Riyanto | Disperindagkop Banjarnegara | Industry Division Head | Government | |
| Agus Wiguno | Bappeda Banjarnegara | | Government | |
| Ratmoko | Disperindagkop Cilacap | Industry Division Head | Government | |
| Aswin | Nira Perwira | Member | IO | |
| Misro | | | Farmer Non Beneficiary | 085777768176 |
| Wahini | Nira Perwira | Treasurer | IO | 082136143115 |
| Samsu | Nira Perwira | Chief | IO | 085726799272 |
| Suratman | | | Middleman Non Beneficiary | |
| | CV P3R | Director | | |

# Appendix 1 Civil Society Scores

This table presents the appreciation of the evaluation team regarding changes occurred for each indicator between 2012 and 2014 on a scale of -2 to + 2

- 2 = Considerable deterioration
- 1 = A slight deterioration

0 = no change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012

+1 = slight improvement

+2 = considerable improvement

| Dimension | | Indicators | Question | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Civic engagement** | 1 | Needs of marginalised groups | How does your organisation take the needs of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups into account in your planning, actions, activities, and/or strategies? | +1 |
| | 2 | Involvement of target groups | What is the level of participation of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups in the analysis, planning and evaluation of your activities? | +1 |
| | 3 | Political engagement | How intense is your (individual staff or organisational) participation in locally-nationally elected bodies and/or sectoral user groups? | -1 |
| | | | | |
| **Level of organisation** | 5 | Relations with other organisations | In the past 12 months what has been the most intensive interaction you had with other CSOs? | +1 |
| | 5 | Frequency of dialogue with closest CSO | In the past 12 months how many meetings did you have with the CSO that you have most intensive interaction with? | +1 |
| | 6 | Defending the interests of marginalised groups | Which CSO are most effective in defending the interests of your target groups? In the past 12 months, how did you relate to those CSOs? | +1 |
| | 7 | Composition current financial resource base | How does your organisation finance institutional costs such as workshops of the General Assembly (if applicable); attendance to workshops of other CSOs; costs for organisational growth and/or networking? | +2 |
| | | | | |
| **Practice of Values** | 8 | Downward accountability | To what extent can mandatory social organs (steering committee, general assembly, internal auditing group) ask your executive leaders to be accountable to them? | +1 |
| | 9 | Composition of social organs | What % of members of your mandatory social organs belong to the marginalised target groups you are working with/for? | 0 |
| | 10 | External financial auditing | How regularly is your organisation audited externally? | +1 |
| | | | | |
| **Perception of impact** | 11 | Client satisfaction | What are the most important concerns of your target groups? How do your services take into account those important concerns? | +1 |
| | 12 | Civil society impact | In the past 12 months, what impact did you have on building a strong civil society? | +1 |
| | 13 | Relation with public sector organisations. | In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with public sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' objectives? | +2 |
| | 14 | Relation with private sector organisations | In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with private sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' perspective? | 0 |
| | 15 | Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations | How successful have you been in influencing public policies and practices in the past 2 years? | +2 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 16 | Influence upon private sector agencies' policies, rules, regulations. | How successful have you been in influencing private sector policies and practices in the past 2 years? | 0 |
| | | | | |
| CS context | 17 | Coping strategies | In the past 2 years, how did your organisation cope with these changes in the context that may have been positive or negative consequences for civil society. | +1 |

# Appendix 2 Changes in civil society indicators between 2012 and 2014

## 4.1 Civic Engagement

### 4.1.1 Needs of marginalised groups SPO

The LPPSLH program supported by Hivos in the 2011-2013 period initially targeted only Banyumas district. LPPSLH was able to expand to two new districts, Banjarnegara and Purbalingga, where two cooperatives were set up following the success in Banyumas. This means that their interventions now cover more people over three districts. Furthermore, LPPSLH has been approached by the local government of Cilacap to replicate similar interventions, with government corporation support. In general the interventions of LPPSLH benefit small-scale, landless sugar producers. The sugar producers in the area are enthusiastic about LPPSLH and many more want to join the cooperative.

LPPSLH assisted the organisation of farmers into cooperatives. All three cooperatives are multi-purpose cooperatives (KSU) with roles in organising farmer groups, training them on agribusiness practices & financial management, monitoring, certifying the sugar products, allocating income for savings, and assisting members to pay off debts. As such, the cooperatives have provided additional services/benefits for the famers, beyond just functioning to generate profit. The cooperative structure has been selected as a means for civic engagement, where farmers have access and control over the production process and can defend their interests. Through the cooperatives, the quality of organic palm sugar produced by smallholder farmers has been improved and the cooperative has facilitated market access.

The membership increase of the three cooperatives is illustrated in the table below.

Table 9
*LPPSLH cooperative membership 2011-2013*

| Name of cooperative | # of members in 2011 | | | # of members in 2012 | | | # of members in 2013 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Male | Female | Subtotal | Male | Female | Subtotal | Male | Female | Subtotal |
| Nira Satria | 34 | 12 | 46 | No specific data | | | 739 | 331 | 1,070 |
| Nira Kamukten | Not yet established in 2011 | | | 25 | 5 | 30 | 175 | 124 | 299 |
| Nira Perwira | Not yet established in 2011 | | | 30 | 5 | 35 | 260 | 120 | 380 |
| TOTAL | 34 | 12 (26%) | 46 | 55 | 10 (15%) | 65 | 1,164 | 575 (33%) | 1,749 |

Source: Project reports and interviews

Table 10
*Landownership of members*

| Name of cooperative | # of land owners | percentage | # of landless | percentage | Subtotal |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nira Satria (2013) | 261 | 24% | 809 | 76% | 1,070 |
| Nira Perwira (2014) | 101 | 25% | 300 | 75% | 401 |
| Nira Kamukten | No data | | | | |

Source: Project reports and interviews

Hivos regarded LPPSLH's intervention as a means to strengthen women's roles and improve their market access since women play an important role in the production of palm sugar. As illustrated in the table above, cooperative membership has been open to women as well as men, with 33 percent of women as members in the cooperative structure in 2013. LPPSLH's management claims that women

have been able to improve income generation (as small-scale palm sugar production requires males and females within one household to cooperate). LPPSLH also promoted women's representation in the cooperative management structure. However, there's no evidence of LPPSLH's achievements with regards to empowerment since there are no indicators that track the benefits for men and women separately.

From the table above, we can also infer that landless farmers have been able to benefit from cooperative interventions. The percentages of landless farmers is 74 – 75 percent in the cooperatives of Nira Satria and Nira Perwira. This is a significant difference with members owning land.

### 4.1.2 Involvement of target groups SPO

The involvement of the target groups has increased at the level of the cooperatives. The farmers themselves make up the executive management of the cooperatives set up by LPPSLH. At the start of the initiative the newly set up cooperative had minimal management and organizational skills. With intensive LPPSLH support, they have been able to strengthen these skills, as well as broaden their networks. This has made cooperatives more independent. For example, the executive management of Nira Satria, a cooperative set up in 23 December 2011[31]in Banyumas District, is attracting the attention of new buyers and has received a recognition award from former president Yudhoyono.

Cooperatives hold regular meetings at least every three months and have a general assembly meeting to discuss planning and progress achieved. The internal relation between more 'elite' or persons with more influence and regular members seems to be healthy and democratic. For example, the management personnel of Nira Perwira was replaced due to their poor performance rather than because of a favouritism or the influence of those with more power at the village level.

LPPSLH also maintains an institution-to-institution relationship between themselves and farmers' cooperatives. The accompaniment strategy of LPPSLH is nonpartisan, by which the SPO promotes the independence and self-sufficiency of cooperatives by ensuring they perform properly and have linkages to the government.

### 4.1.3 Intensity of political engagement SPO

In comparison to the baseline assessment that states that LPPSLH is engaging politically to improve operational rules and regulations for producers, such as for permits to establish market outlets and for the simplification of obtaining a business permit for cooperatives, LPPSLH is currently less politically engaged.

LPPSLH's focus is on improving conditions for small producers and farmers, making political engagement less of a priority unless farmers' issues require political engagement. During the end line assessment, relations with the local government were found to be conducive. Since 2012, relations with the district leader in Banjarnegara have improved, but this is mainly due to external factors (his vision accommodates LPPSLH's initiatives and he is more approachable than his predecessor). Although there's no explicit rule to forbid cooperative members from political engagement, the cooperative generally does not see themselves as interested with such engagement. Their focus is on improving conditions for palm sugar farmers and producers. This is also in accordance with the existing regulatory framework, whereby cooperatives should function to develop economic potential of its members and community[32].

By law cooperatives are business entities, whose activities are based on principles of cooperation and family values with a critical function to promote economic and social welfare. Although there are no articles in the cooperative Law No. 25/1992 that ban political engagement, this law stipulates that management of the cooperative is democratic and membership is voluntary and open[33]. The definition

[31] Fedep Banyumas, Profil, "Koperasi Nira Satria". Available from http://www.fedepbanyumas.com/index.php/profil/koperasi-nira-satria (accessed 19 December 2014)
[32] Sriro, Andrew I. 2006. *Sriro's Desk Reference of Indonesian Law*. Equinox Publishing
[33] Indonesia. 1992. Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 25 Tahun 1992 tentang Perkoperasian. Available from http://perundangan.pertanian.go.id/admin/uu/UU-25-92.pdf (accessed 19 December 2014)

of a cooperative and cooperative principles in the law contain elements of neutrality although they are not specified.

## 4.2 Level of organisation

### 4.2.1 Relations with other organisations SPO

The relations between LPPSLH and other CSOs generally remain the same since the baseline. They still coordinate and cooperate with the same organisations such as consortium KRKP (*Koalisi Rakyat untuk Kedaulatan Pangan Tani*) based in Bogor (as a coalition member) and Organic Farming Network (*Jaringan Kerja Pertanian Organik* or Jaker PO), AOI (Aliansi Organik Indonesia), as well as *Asosiasi Pendamping Perempuan Usaha Kecil* (ASPPUK). The notable change is that LPPSLH has become the coordinator of Komunitas Rembug Tani since 2013. This coalition promotes organic farming and food security in five districts (Banjarnegara, Purbalingga, Banyumas, Cilacap and Kebumen).

Since 2013, LPPSLH, through Hivos as a member of Agri-ProFocus, has been engaged in so-called Agri-Hubs set up to promote farmer entrepreneurship[34]. Agri-ProFocus Indonesia is an open network with members working with agricultural products like coffee, cocoa, palm sugar, rice and others. The coalition has a joint agenda with four focus areas: youth in farming, access to finances, increasing market access and sustainable development models and services.[35] Because activities commenced in 2014, it is too early to say how LPPSLH will benefit from this wider network.

### 4.2.2 Frequency of dialogue with closest civil society organisations SPO

The collaboration and cooperation between LPPSLH and other CSOs (KRKP and Komunitas Rembug Tani Jawa Tengah) has become more regular (once a month). With regards to the palm sugar sector, LPPSLH does not involve other NGOs/CSOs, with the exception of Agriterra in providing financial training in Banyumas district. LPPSLH's staff however have a wide network with other NGOs/CSOs on a range of issues.

### 4.2.3 Defending the interests of marginalised groups SPO

LPPSLH has been able to defend the interests of more people since the baseline as the initial pilot cooperative in Banyumas has grown and LPPSLH has successfully replicated the model to two new districts, reaching more small-scale sugar producers. The majority of the cooperative members are small producers who do not own land. Cooperatives have also successfully included small middlemen into their ranks, and even middlemen who have not joined the cooperative do not rule out that possibility of joining the cooperative in the future[36].

LPPLSH is basically creating a new export-oriented market of a diversified palm sugar product (also familiar as "crystal coconut or palm sugar"), as an alternative to the traditional palm sugar market (also familiar as "cast coconut or palm sugar") which is dominated by middlemen. In doing this, they have widened the options for palm sugar farmers to produce or sell their palm sugar. LPPSLH is not in a position to eliminate middlemen but to challenge their monopoly. LPPSLH initially met some resistance from middlemen who were afraid of decreasing traditional palm sugar inputs. To overcome this challenge, LPPSLH communicated with middlemen regularly and provided opportunities to integrate middlemen in the new palm sugar value chain. Middlemen buy sugar from farmers with a controlled margin, allowing middlemen to continue with their own economic activities.

[34] Agri-ProFocus. 2013. *Promoting Farmer Entrepreneurship, Multi-stakeholder workshop: Setting the Agenda for Agri-Profocus Indonesia*. Bogor, 2 – 4 October 2013
[35] Agri-Hub Indonesia. 2014. *Annual Report 2013 Agri-Profocus Partnership*. Jakarta
[36] Interview with Suratman, Middleman non beneficiary, Purbalingga, 11 August 2014

LPPSLH's management reported that non-cooperative members have tried to produce crystal sugar, but most of them discontinued the practice since they do not have the ability to market their product according to certain standards. LPPSLH admits that their model requires intensive community accompaniment, access to premium market, and rigorous quality control. Without strong farmers' organisations (via the cooperatives), quality control would not be possible. The cooperatives' quality control unit, known as ICS (Internal Control System), are trained farmers who are responsible to regularly monitor whether crystal sugar is produced in compliance to international export standards. LPPSLH believes that a participative farmer-to-farmer approach is required in addition to control by external actors. Economic incentives are not sufficient guarantees for full compliance by the farmers. Rather, success also requires a social incentive based on principles of solidarity, or belonging. As such, cooperatives have been the most suitable model of choice for LPPSLH.

The inclusion of middlemen has been one of the keys to LPPSLH's successful approach. The relations between middlemen and farmers have a long history and are complex, without instant solutions. Middlemen are often the relatives of producers they buy sugar from or religious leaders. They themselves are sometimes economically vulnerable due to accumulated debts owed to them by farmers, which become sizeable liabilities for them (especially smaller middlemen). In practice, middlemen are still in a position to control prices, especially amongst farmers who they loaned money to. These farmers have little option but to sell their products to middlemen as a means to pay off debt. The inclusion of middlemen has prevented any negative impacts on the social structure, and offers a solution for both farmers and middlemen deadlocked in debt problems. From the evaluation team's interviews with several middlemen, it is evident that while middlemen who join the cooperative can no longer control prices, they prefer the cooperative arrangements as it gives them a more secure cash flow.

### 4.2.4 Composition financial resource base SPO

In the baseline report, it was stated that 43 percent of Hivos' funds were being used to cover salary costs of LPPSLH's field facilitators. Given that one of the key elements of their model is intensive accompaniment for the cooperatives, and that this model has led to benefits for small-scale producers, the investment in salary costs has been pragmatic and worthwhile.

In their work with palm sugar farmers, LPPSLH has not been able to diversify funding sources since the baseline. Hivos, local governments, and LPPSLH's own contribution continue to be the resource base for interventions. In 2011-2012, Hivos' support constituted 35 percent of the total budgets, the government 41 percent, and LPPSLH 24 percent[37]. The internal contribution has been made possible through LPPSLH's business divisions and activities, which include car rental, consultancy, and *Pusat Pengembangan Produk Rakyat* (P3R) as the main buyer of palm sugar products from the cooperatives.

With the current resource base, LPPSLH's support to the cooperatives could be sustained even without external donor funding. LPPSLH's director reported that the SPO has agreed to follow up a request from the district of Cilacap to assist in the establishment of cooperatives in the area. Cilacap officials met with the Banjarnegara's Department of Industry, Trade and Cooperatives (Disperindagkop) when this evaluation was taking place, leading to the agreement to collaborate. Funding for further replication to Cilacap will come from the district government and CSR programmes of state-corporations'.

The institutional audit for the 2013 financial year does not provide detailed information regarding funding for other LPPSLH projects such as USAID (HIV/AIDS), Ford Foundation (Agroforestry). LPPSLH has been attracting more prominent donors for their HIV project in addition to the existing PKBI-Global fund. Based on the financial audits of 2012 and 2013, it can be seen that HIV/AIDS has been one of LPPSLH's major projects on par with the Hivos-funded palm sugar project in terms of funding amounts.

Regarding LPPSLH's intermediary organisations, the cooperatives have become more financially independent. General Assemblies are conducted by the cooperatives on an annual basis, paid for

[37] "1002298-Audit Review-FY12", Hivos, 2012

through their own funds. However, they still require LPPSLH to fund routine certification and quality inspection, monitoring, and promotional activities.

## 4.3 Practice of values

### 4.3.1 Downward accountability SPO

LPPSLH, through the cooperatives, has applied transparency principles well. Cooperative members are informed of the financial conditions and have the right to inquire with the cooperative on these issues or to express their ideas in the general assembly. Cooperative members are also aware of the prices of palm sugar on the international market and profit-sharing mechanisms. The same system has been applied in the cooperatives since the baseline, so there are no changes in how LPPSLH applies accountability.

In LPPSLH itself, there was a change in the position of director in 2013 and also an improvement in the structure of the organization by separating the functions of the executive and the board. During the baseline, the LPPSLH director was also a board member. At present, the new director is no longer part of the board and he reports to the board regularly (every three months). The previous director is now only a board member.

### 4.3.2 Composition of social SPO

From the baseline, up until now the composition of the social organs of LPPSLH remains the same. There are no community members or other persons representing marginalized groups in the social organs. Of note, is that new board members were selected in 2013. LPPSLH chose individuals with significant experience in assisting marginalized groups to become board members, bringing in to some degree a beneficiary perspective into the board. There were no major differences in diversity observed in the mandatory social organs compared to the baseline.

### 4.3.3 External financial auditing SPO

LPPSLH institutional audits have been conducted by professional auditors the fiscal years of 2012 and 2013, in addition to regular project-based audits. This is an improvement compared to baseline findings, especially given that LPPSLH has conducted such auditing using their own funds[38]. Audit of the cooperatives are done by the local cooperative department, as part of reporting material for the annual general assembly. External audits of the cooperative will be conducted within the next year.

## 4.4 Perception of impact

### 4.4.1 Client satisfaction SPO

The beneficiaries are more satisfied with the services delivered than during the baseline. Cooperative members have benefitted from a number of advantages, such as: 1) new knowledge and skills that have allowed them to diversify palm sugar products offered through continuous accompaniment and training provided by LPPSLH; 2) increased earnings; 3) producing a product with a clear international market demand; 4) cooperative and member savings; and, 5) a broadened network. The newly established cooperatives have a large potential membership base as many community members are interested in joining.

As of 2012, LPPSLH reported that 520 Nira Satria cooperatives members' incomes have increased by 35 percent from selling palm sugar, and 30 percent from using energy-efficient furnaces. The

[38] "LPPSLH Budget final", LPPSLH

cooperative insurance scheme has covered 7 members who suffered from work accidents. Nira Satria cooperative was able to sell 12 tons of palm sugar a month, with a net profit around 3,000 USD/month from their business[39]. It is safe to assume that currently production and profit have further increased along with the expansion of Nira Satria's membership (see 1.1). In 2013, Nira Satria was able to contribute 50 percent of the costs for certification.

From the evaluation team's interviews with Nira Kamukten cooperative members, it is reported that farmers' incomes before joining cooperatives was approximately IDR 975,000/month. Now they can earn up to IDR 1,680,000/month. In 2012, the Nira Kamukten cooperative had no savings. Total savings currently amount to IDR 120,000,000.[40]Meanwhile, Nira Perwira cooperative members reported that on average, their members have individual savings amounting to around IDR 6 million. The savings can be withdrawn partially once a year (during Ied Mubarak), to ensure it is properly used41.

From the perspective of cooperatives' middlemen, they benefit from better cash flow compared to the traditional palm sugar value chain. Having a large base of borrowers, or using their power to dominate pricing, has fewer benefits for them than joining the cooperative. From the perspective of middlemen, who have not joined the cooperatives, there is an interest in joining the cooperative, but they have not done so because they are not fully aware of the potential benefits. Nira Perwira, established in 2012 and officiated in 2013, said that they are currently not prioritizing member mobilization as they want to first ensure their system is well established.

### 4.4.2 Civil society impact SPO

Since the late 90s, LPPSLH has been involved in strengthening community organisations in Java and encourage their independence. Since the baseline, the number of cooperatives and cooperative members has increased. Two additional sugar cooperatives were established and LPPSLH has provided continuous support to help establish good functioning mechanism within the cooperatives. This has included several aspects such as financial management and other cooperative principles. LPPSLH's interventions also helped build confidence of members to engage with external actors, especially with government officials. Through the cooperative, community members are organized to attain a better economic and social status. This has become evident through better earnings and a better position vis-à-vis middlemen (as described in 2.3).

An improved position vis-a-vis middlemen is an interesting impact to look at as it reflects social mobility, which is a required precondition for a fair, democratic, and inclusive society[42]. However, it is understandable that the impact is still limited. Based on data from the Banyumas Disperindagkop, the palm sugar industry comprises 74 percent of total small-medium enterprises in the district, involving 110,000 workers and 28 cooperatives. Nira Satria, the most successful LPPSLH cooperative, only has around 1,000 members, which is less than 1 percent of the workforce involved in the palm sugar industry of the district.

LPPSLH's management reported that farmers outside the cooperatives have tried to produce crystal sugar, but most discontinued due to an inability to market quality products. LPPSLH's model requires intensive community accompaniment, rigorous quality control, and access to premium markets. As such, it is unlikely that farmers –albeit organized - can benefit from producing crystal sugar without external assistance.

As the intensity of cooperatives' relation with the government is increasing, there is concern from LPPSLH's management that there may be a negative backlash for the cooperatives as governments become more engaged. Government practices are well known to often disregard participative values, be co-optative, and are often considered to be identical with corruption and collusion. The evaluation

[39] "Annual Review LPPSLH 2012_Hivos_Banyumas". Hivos, 2012, p. 7
[40] Sutikno Sutantio, "FGD with Nira Kamukten", MFS-II evaluation 2014
[41] Kharisma Prasetyo, "FGD with Nira Perwira", MFS-II evaluation 2014
[42] Ransford, 1980: 491

team found that there is ground for such concerns. Nira Perwira cooperative was compelled to pay unexpected additional costs to a government-appointed contractor assigned to build a central palm-sugar processing unit for the cooperative, threatening to stop the construction progress if they refused to do so[43].Other than this case, the evaluation team did not find further evidence of similar forms of extortion or threats.

### 4.4.3 Relation with public sector organisations SPO

In May 2013, a tripartite MoU was signed between LPPSLH, the local governments of Purbalingga and Banjarnegara, which laid the groundwork for conducive relations with the government. This was different from Banyumas, where LPPSLH has had interventions for a longer period. During the previous district administration, relations were less conducive. Fortunately, with election of a new district head in April 2013, the Banyumas government has become more approachable and is open to supporting community-oriented development programs.

In Purbalingga and Banjarnegara, where the two new cooperatives were more recently established, LPPSLH is seen as exemplary by the local government. The local government has high expectations that it will be able to replicate LPPSLH's success in Banyumas where the cooperative has been exporting palm sugar and making palm sugar a flagship product in their district. LPPSLH enjoys government recognition and is often approached by the district government. The local government of Cilacap, the neighbouring district, has often solicited LPPSLH's assistance to establish similar cooperatives. LPPSLH have agreed to respond to this request, although knowing that they might have to do it without donor support. The Cilacap district government convinced LPPSLH that there will be enough resources available from the district budget and CSR funds from a state corporation[44].

Overall, the relations between LPPSLH and the local government have improved. Specifically, LPPSLH maintains relations with district offices that work on similar issues like the Office for Cooperatives and SMEs, Forestry, and Agriculture. The district Office for Cooperatives and SMEs (Dinas Koperasi dan UMKM, in some districts Disperindagkop) has been able to learn from LPPSLH's success in supporting cooperatives. LPPSLH is now perceived as a competent extension agent that can help the government, fill its gaps in intensive accompaniment and marketing skills[45]. The government also admits that from their cooperation with LPPSLH, they have learned to take on a new attitude towards NGOs, whom they perceived of negatively in the past[46].

As previously mentioned, the cooperative members themselves feel more confident in approaching and engaging local government. Government officials are often invited directly by the cooperative to attend meetings and discussions. On the other hand, government officials also often invited cooperative leadership, or invited other district government to visit the cooperative, for public relations or learning activities.

### 4.4.4 Relation with private sector organisations SPO

LPPSLH's cooperation with PT.HOLCIM via a CSR scheme for Nusakambangan forest rehabilitation ended in 2013. LPPSLH has not had cooperation with the private sector since. However, as mentioned in 4.3, in the future LPPSLH is likely to receive CSR funds from a state-corporation based in Cilacap to replicate its successful palm sugar cooperative model in this district. However, there is no further information available since LPPSLH is still awaiting a formal agreement with the head of Cilacap's Department of Industry, Trade and Cooperatives.

Institutionally, LPPSLH is not active in the private sector. But LPPSLH's parent foundation's business unit, *Pusat Pengembangan Produk Rakyat* (People's Product Development Center or P3R) does. P3R was initiated in 1995; they source their produce through the cooperatives (the cooperatives are free to sell to others buyers). The cooperatives prefer to sell to P3R that offers a premium price. P3R

[43] Kharisma Prasetyo, "FGD with Nira Perwira", MFS-II evaluation 2014
[44] Ibid
[45] Ibid
[46] Interview with Agus Riyanto, Industry Division Head Disperindagkop Banjarnegara, Banjarnegara, 11 August 2014

purchases certified sugar from the cooperative (at IDR 12,000/kg), which is then sold to an exporter. On the international market, palm sugar can fetch a price of between IDR 20-25,000. It is estimated that P3R sells the sugar for IDR 15,000-20,000/kg. Some of the profits go back to LPPSLH's parent foundation that also has a car rental and a construction consulting business unit.

P3R is currently selling at least 90 tons of crystal palm sugar a month[47], of which mostly is exported to America, Europe, and Japan. This is an improvement from 2012 when they were only able to sell 20 tons/month, indicating P3R is growing into an important market actor. Outside P3R, other prominent crystal sugar sellers are: CV.Inagro Jinawi, KUB Manggar Tuwuh, UD Nira Asli Cilongok, KUB Sari Nira Food, KUB Sari Bumi Purbalingga, and KSU Jatirogo Kulonprogo. For comparison, KSU Jatirogo (another Hivos grantee) sells 150 tons/month[48], while CV.Inagro Jinawi (ex-LPPSLH staff) sells 80 tons/month[49]. LPPSLH also continues working with a palm sugar exporter company PT. Kampung Kearifan Indonesia (PT KKI), PT Big Tree Farm and PT ALM, however, there is no information on influence to private sector agencies' policies and practices.

Although P3R is increasingly becoming a more important market player, from P3R's perspective, there is no competition with other producers or sellers as they have not yet been able to meet their own quota (200 ton/month). Moreover, the organic certification system stipulates a fixed value chain to enable product tracing, such that each seller has their own designated area or farmer groups. In this scheme, direct competition to source palm sugar is less likely.

### 4.4.5 Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations SPO

LPPSLH's cooperative model has become well known and an example to the government on how to stimulate economic activities amongst small sugar producers as well as how to establish a functioning cooperative. This has led to more support from the government to the cooperatives. For instance, the District Department of Industry, Trade and Cooperatives waved registration costs for Nira Perwira and Nira Kamukten. The Department of Agriculture supported the cooperative with production tools. The Department for Trade and Industry also provided production tools, assisted in certification and built a central processing unit for Nira Perwira. In addition, the cooperatives have been invited to national and international events to promote crystal sugar as a local product. This outcome has been achieved as a result of LPPSLH's relations with the government, and from the success of LPPSLH's model, which has received media exposure and awards, including:

- 2011, Manggar Manis group (a group under Nira Satria Cooperative) was recognized with the *Ketahanan Pangan Adhikarya Pangan Nusantara* (Food Security) award by former President Yudhyono.
- 2013, Nira Kamukten Cooperative was chosen as runner up of *Kewirausahaan Sosial Berbasis Komunitas*(Community-Based Social Entrepreneurship) competition, British Council.
- 2013 Nira Kamukten Cooperative took first prize in the same competition.

LPPSLH has successfully influenced the government and created awareness amongst government officials to see crystal sugar as a potential product from Indonesia[50]. In prioritizing plans for small-scale district industries, Banjarnegara's Development Planning Agency (Bappeda) used to focus on the

[47] Arbi Anugrah, "Menengok Cara Pembuatan Gula Semut Organik di Banyumas", *detikFinance*, 26 October 2013. Available from http://finance.detik.com/read/2013/10/26/122449/2396183/1036/4/menengok-cara-pembuatan-gula-semut-organik-di-banyumas (accessed 19 December 2014); Jatengprov.go.id, "15 Ton Gula Semut Siap Eksport", 28 August 2014. Available from http://jatengprov.go.id/id/newsroom/15-ton-gula-semut-siap-eksport (accessed 19 December 2014)

[48] Sutarmi, "KSU Jatirogo tingkatkan posisi tawar petani gula*", Antara Jogja*, 23 June 2014. Available from http://www.antarayogya.com/berita/323434/ksu-jatirogo-tingkatkan-posisi-tawar-petani-gula (accessed 19 December 2014)

[49] KOMPAS.com, Ekonomi, Inspirasi, "Pentingnya Kemitraan antara Perusahaan dengan Petani", 5 December 2015. Available from http://bisniskeuangan.kompas.com/read/2013/12/05/1108168/Pentingnya.Kemitraan.antara.Perusahaan.dengan.Petani (accessed 19 December 2014)

[50] Jatengprov.go.id, "15 Ton Gula Semut Siap Eksport", 28 August 2014. Available from http://jatengprov.go.id/id/newsroom/15-ton-gula-semut-siap-eksport (accessed 19 December 2014)

ceramics industry, a popular, yet less prospective sector. Purbalingga in the past promoted a Korean-owned cosmetics industry. Now both have prioritized palm sugar as their district priority product, upon realizing that the large majority of small industries are in this sector. District offices in turn have shared their success with other districts in the provinces through promotional activities. As a result, Cilacap district followed in their steps, even trying, unsuccessfully, to develop their own crystal sugar production before finding out that LPPSLH's expertise would be of benefit to them. In their attempt to leverage crystal sugar production, the Cilacap district government has lobbied for CSR support.

In addition, LPPSLH successfully influenced the local government in 3 districts (Banjarnegara, Banyumas and Purbalingga) to protect the palms and coconuts used for the production of crystal sugar from an overuse of chemical fertilizer. As a result, the governments have also campaigned to reduce the utilization of chemical fertilizer on other crops, such as rice, as contaminants could spill into the organic coconut plantation area. The organic certification, of which crystal sugar marketing depends upon, requires such rigorous standards.

### 4.4.6 Influence upon private sector agencies' policies, rules, regulations SPO

Although LPPSLH contributes to the emergence of new and important actors in the crystal coconut sugar industry and market (thus contribute to its overall growth), the traditional cast sugar industry or market is not affected. Based on data from the Banyumas Department of Industry, Trade and Cooperatives, crystal sugar production in 2011 was only 0.58 percent compared to cast coconut sugar. With such small production ratios of crystal sugar, it is obvious why traditional cast sugar production is still unaffected. Moreover, crystal sugar products are predominately produced for an export market, while cast sugar is mainly for domestic consumption51.

In 2013, the Ministry of Industry supported crystal sugar production in Banyumas, Purbalingga, and Banjarnegara with hygienic upgrades in the production. A ceramic tile corporation, PT Arwana Citramulia Tbk, supported the government in their efforts through a CSR scheme[52]. This case, in additional to plans of the Cilacap district government to obtain CSR support (as discussed before in 4.4), demonstrates that more private sector companies are willing to support small-scale crystal sugar producers through CSR initiatives. Although this support is not caused by LPPSLH's direct interventions, LPPSLH's improved relation and influence on the public sector has allowed this to happen.

Another finding of the evaluation is that LPPSLH initiatives have resulted in the emergence of more diversified actors in crystal coconut sugar production. In 2010, an ex-LPPSLH staff member decided to found her own crystal coconut sugar business, CV.Inagro Jinawi. Its current aggregate production is even larger than LPPSLH's P3R. CV.Inagro Jinawi's founder adopted the knowledge and practices gained from her experience with LPPSLH in her approach, although without founding cooperatives. CV Inagro Jinawi is supporting a farmer group called Nyiur Sejahtera, comprising of 748 members in 3 villages[53]and has been recognized though an award from the Ministry of Agriculture in 2013. In Cilacap, the district government attempted to support the production of crystal sugar on its own accord. They intend to obtain CSR support to commission LPPSLH's support in the near future. These cases illustrate that with an unfulfilled market demand for crystal sugar, private sector actors have an interest in replicating LPPSLH's success.

[51] Arbi Anugrah, "Menengok Cara Pembuatan Gula Semut Organik di Banyumas", *detikFinance*, 26 October 2013. Available from http://finance.detik.com/read/2013/10/26/122449/2396183/1036/4/menengok-cara-pembuatan-gula-semut-organik-di-banyumas (accessed 19 December 2014)

[52] Kementerian Perindustrian Republik Indonesia, Siaran Pers, "Demi Meningkatkan Daya Saing IKM Penderes Gula Kelapa Kemenperin Menggandeng Produsen Keramik". Available from http://www.kemenperin.go.id/artikel/6928/Demi-Meningkatkan-Daya-Saing-IKM-Penderes-Gula-Kelapa-Kemenperin-Menggandeng-Produsen-Keramik (accessed 19 December 2014)

[53] KOMPAS.com, Ekonomi, Inspirasi, "Pentingnya Kemitraan antara Perusahaan dengan Petani", 5 December 2015. Available from http://bisniskeuangan.kompas.com/read/2013/12/05/1108168/Pentingnya.Kemitraan.antara.Perusahaan.dengan.Petani (accessed 19 December 2014)

## 4.5 Civil Society context

### 4.5.1 Coping Strategies

In mid-2014, the 2012 Law on Cooperatives was annulated through a Constitutional Court decision. This means that the law currently recognized is the predeceasing Law. No. 25/1992. The regulatory change is considered by many as an indicator of the government's intention to protect and support cooperatives[54] as it provides clearer distinctions between cooperatives and corporations (i.e. source of capital, accountability mechanism). To cope with this change, LPPSLH has helped the cooperative administration to comply with the policy although for the cooperatives the change in legislation did not have a significant impact since they did not use cooperative capital certificates to generate capital (such a scheme was allowed under the annulated law).

With regard to potential negative impacts resulting from more intensive relations between the cooperatives and the government (as discussed in 4.2), LPPSLH has asked their field facilitators to pay more attention to issues regarding cooperative transparency and accountability.

[54] TEMPO.CO, Politik, Hukum, "MK Batalkan Undang-Undang Perkoperasian", 29 May 2014. Available from http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2014/05/29/063581004/MK-Batalkan-Undang-Undang-Perkoperasian (19 December 2014)

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen UR
P.O. Box 88
6700 AB Wageningen
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)317 48 68 00
www.wageningenUR.nl/cdi

Report CDI-15-060

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# NTFP-EP end line report

MFS II country evaluations, Civil Society component

Dieuwke Klaver[1]
Hester Smidt

Kharisma Nugroho[2]
Ciptaningrat Larastiti

1 Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR, Netherlands
2 SurveyMETER, Indonesia

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen, February 2015



Report CDI-15-068
ISSN 0000-0000



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Klaver, D.C., Smidt H., Nugroho, K., Larastiti.C, February 2015, *NTFP-EP end line report; MFS II country evaluations, Civil Society component,* Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR (University & Research centre) and SurveyMETER. Report CDI-15-068. Wageningen.

This report describes the findings of the end line assessment of the Non Timber Forest Product-Exchange Programme (NTFP-EP) that is a partner of IUCN and a part of the Ecosystem Alliance.

The evaluation was commissioned by NWO-WOTRO, the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research in the Netherlands and is part of the programmatic evaluation of the Co-Financing System - MFS II financed by the Dutch Government, whose overall aim is to strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. Apart from assessing impact on MDGs, the evaluation also assesses the contribution of the Dutch Co-Funding Agencies to strengthen the capacities of their Southern Partners, as well as the contribution of these partners towards building a vibrant civil society arena.

This report assesses NTFP-EP's contributions towards strengthening Civil Society in Indonesia and it used the CIVICUS analytical framework. It is a follow-up of a baseline study conducted in 2012. Key questions that are being answered comprise changes in the five CIVICUS dimensions to which NTFP-EP contributed; the nature of its contribution; the relevance of the contribution made and an identification of factors that explain NTFP-EP's role in civil society strengthening.

Keywords: Civil Society, CIVICUS, theory based evaluation, process-tracing

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Report CDI-15-068 | ISSN 0000-0000 | ISBN/EAN 000-00-0000-000-0

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# Acknowledgements

SurveyMETER and CDI are thanking the staff and the leaders of all Southern Partner Organisations that participated in collecting information for the evaluation of the contribution of these partner organisations to creating a vibrant civil society in India. They also thank the Co-Funding Agencies and the Dutch Consortia they are a member of for making background documents available. We hope that this evaluation can support you in better positioning yourself in the Civil Society Arena of Indonesia.

# List of abbreviations and acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| AMAN | *Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara* (Indigenous Peoples' Alliance of the Archipelago) |
| APL | *Areal Penggunaan Lain* (Non-forest estate) |
| AOI | *Aliansi Organik Indonesia* (Organic Alliance Indonesia) |
| BCI | Basic Capabilities Index |
| BPS | *Badan Pusat Statistik* (Central Agency on Statistics) |
| BPD | *Badan Permusyawaratan Desa* (Village Consultative Body) |
| BUR | *Bina Usaha Rotan* |
| CDI | Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR |
| CFA | Co-Financing Agency |
| CFO | Co-Financing Organisation |
| CIFOR | Center for International Forestry Research |
| CS | Civil society |
| CSO | Civil society organisation |
| Disperindagkop | *Dinas Perindustrian Perdagangan dan Koperasi* (Department of Industry, Trade and Cooperatives) |
| EA | Ecosystem Alliance |
| FKKM | *Forum Komunikasi Kehutanan Masyarakat* (Community Forestry Communication Forum) |
| GNI | Gross National Income |
| GOI | Government of Indonesia |
| GPS | Global Positioning System |
| HDI | Human Development Index |
| HuMa | *Perkumpulan untuk Pembaharuan Hukum Berbasis Masyarakat dan Ekologis* (Association for Legal Reform and Community-Based Ecology) |
| Hutan Desa | Village Forest |
| ICCA | Indigenous Community Conserved Area |
| IUCN | International Union for Conservation of Nature |
| JKPP | *Jaringan Kerja Pemetaan Partisipatif* (Participatory Mapping Network) |
| JMHI | *Jaringan Madu Hutan Indonesia* (Indonesian Network of Wild Honey) |
| JMM | Jasa Menun Mandiri (weaving cooperative) |
| KIARA | *Koalisi Rakyat Untuk Keadilan Perikanan* (The People's Coalition for Fisheries Justice) |
| KpSHK | *Konsorsium Pendukung Sistem Hutan Kerakyatan* (Consortium for the Support of Community Forest Systems) |
| LEI | *Lembaga Ekolabeling Indonesia* (The Indonesian Eco labelling Institute) |
| LP3M | *Lembaga Pemerhati dan Pemberdayaan Dayak Punan Malinau* (Institute for the Overseeing and Empowerment of the Dayak Punan, Malinau) |
| MFS | Dutch co-financing system |
| MoC | Model of Change |
| MoF | Ministry of Forestry |
| MoFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| NGO | Non-governmental organisation |
| NTFP | Non-timber forest product |
| NTFP-EP | Non Timber Forest Product-Exchange Program |
| Ormas | *Organisasi masyarakat* (Societal Organizations) |
| P3R | *Perkumpulan Petani dan Pengrajin Rotan* (Association for Rattan Farmers and Artisans) |
| PGS | Participatory Guarantee System |
| PRCF | People Resource and Conservation Foundation |
| REDD+ | Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation |

| | |
|---|---|
| ROLES | Rotan Lestari |
| SERF | Social Economic Rights Fulfilment |
| SLIMs | Sustainable Livelihood Initiatives and Models |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |
| SSI | Semi-structured Interview |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| Wageningen UR | Wageningen University & Research Centre |
| WWF | World Wildlife Foundation |
| YADUPA | *Yayasan Anak Dusun Papua* (Papua Villagers Foundation) |
| YMI | *Yayasan Mitra Insani* |

# 1 Introduction

This report presents the civil society end line findings of NTFP-EP in Indonesia which is a partner of IUCN under the Dutch Consortium Ecosystem Alliance. It is a follow-up to the baseline assessment that was carried out in 2012. According to the information provided during the baseline study, NTFP-EP is working on MDG 7.

These findings are part of the overall evaluation of the joint MFS II evaluations to account for results of MFS II-funded or –co-funded development interventions implemented by Dutch Co-Funding Agencies (CFA) and/or their Southern Partner Organisations (SPO) and to contribute to the improvement of future development interventions. The civil society evaluation uses the CIVICUS framework and seeks to answer the following questions:

- What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?
- To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
- What is the relevance of these changes?
- What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The CIVICUS framework that comprises five dimensions (civic engagement, level of organization, practice of values, perception of impact and contexts influencing agency by civil society in general) has been used to orient the evaluation methodology.

*Changes in the civil society arena of the SPO*
In the 2012 – 2014 period, the most important change that took place in the civil society arena of the SPO are related to civic engagement: NTFP-EP managed to increase membership of groups that engage in the production and sales of NTFP products with 13 percent, whilst at the same time increasing their income from € 53 in 2012 to € 137 in 2013. However, participation of women in a participatory certification system for rattan product, as well as their participation in community eco-cultural mappings is marginal.

Another change that was realised with regards to the 'perception of impact' dimension, in particular in relation to local policy influencing, consists of communities having made their eco-cultural mappings as a means to influence districts in charge of spatial planning. On one occasion this helped to refute a demand by a palm oil company.

Also of note is that with regards to Practice of Values, NTFP-EP has undergone an institutional transformation in mid-2012 becoming an independent foundation. This has arguably led to better accountability.

These findings were obtained through an analysis of documents, a workshop and follow-up interviews with NTFP-EP, and interviews with external resources persons working in civil society organisations that receive support from NTFP-EP; other civil society organisations with whom the SPO is collaborating; public or private sector agents and; external resource persons capable of overlooking the MDG or theme on which the SPO is concentrating.

*Contribution analysis*
Based upon an analysis of the projects and programmes financed by the Dutch CFAs a selection was made of SPOs to be included in an in-depth process tracing trajectory and those to be included for a quick contribution assessment. NTFP-EP was amongst those SPOs selected for in-depth-process tracing.

A first outcome that we looked at concerns and increased income earned from crafts by 17 weavers. Their incomes in absolute values (but not corrected for inflation) representing € 15, € 23 and € 24 per month per weaver in respectively 2012, 2013 and 2014. In the same period the share of crafts work increased from 8 percent of total household incomes in 2012 to 12 percent in 2014. The most plausible explanation of this increased income consists of increased sales to in the first place other

buyers than Borneo Chic, a business unit created by the Craft Kalimantan network supported by NTFP-EP in collaboration with Cordaid and Both Ends until 2011 and with MFS II funding. In the second place Borneo Chic, NTFP-EP and the association of the weavers explain the outcome. In the third place the Participatory Guarantee System that was launched in 2014 with support from IUCN-NL provided some additional value. Each of these actors and factors are a sufficient explanation for the increased outcome, but other factors such as women selling their product to other buyers, also explain the outcome.

The second outcome the evaluation traced was the ability of forest dependent communities to claim their rights to managing forest resources and land in four target villages. Multiple pathways can explain the outcome. NTFP-EP's efforts to develop participatory eco-cultural maps form the building blocks for greater recognition of community rights to manage forests, but this alone is not sufficient to bring about government acknowledgement and commitment. Other actors played an important role in terms of organising communities and lobbying the district to obtain the endorsement of the village maps. NTFP-EP recognizes that achievements were a result of joint efforts by itself and other CSOs and NGOs. Although NTFP-EP conducted lobby efforts directed at the local government, the legal recognition of the maps and community rights has not yet been achieved. Advocacy for recognition by government of community maps may take longer than the time afforded by the project period. In this regard, the sustainability of the outcome (communities able to claim their rights) will require additional efforts to ensure district policies and practices do not annul or influence current achievements.

From a CIVICUS perspective the contribution of both outcomes towards enhancing civic engagement, strengthening CBOs like the weaver group is limited.

*Relevance*
Interviews with staff of NTFP-EP, with external resource persons, with the liaison officer of IUCN, as well as contextual information helped to assess the relevance of NTFP-EP's interventions in terms of; its Theory of Change (ToC) for Civil Society (SC) as designed during the baseline study; the context in which NTFP-EP is operating; the CS policies of IUCN.

With regards to the baseline ToC, the interventions and outcome achieved are relevant because they are in line with the ultimate objective of NTFP-EP to improve rural livelihoods through better forest management, in particular through mainstreaming NTFPs in forest management. However, the interventions did not address preconditions identified in the 2012 ToC, specifically with regards to a conducive political context.

With regards to the context in which NTFP-EP is operating, its interventions and outcome achieved are relevant because the Governments 'concession regime' has infringed the capacity of forest-dependent communities to attain sustainable livelihoods options that do not contribute to the depletion of scarce forest resources.

With regards to the CS policies of IUCN, NTFP-EP's interventions and outcome are only partly relevant because although the existence of community maps may help the communities' bargaining position to deal with land use change with the private sector agencies and government, legal recognition of these community-produced maps has not yet been realised. While communities are taking forest management more seriously, structural change is more challenging, especially considering that communities palm oil permits and mining permits have been granted around forested areas. Nonetheless, there are opportunities for communities to make sure these forested areas are not converted to plantation areas. For example, in one of the target villages, an agreement was reached with a palm oil company on land-use, which is in line with the overarching goal of the Ecosystem Alliance support.

*Explaining factors*
The information related to factors that explain the changes in CS, NTFP-EP's contribution to these changes and the relevance of its interventions were collected at the same time as the data were gathered for the previous questions. Apart from searching for explaining factors related to these evaluation questions, the evaluation team was also informed about other important factors such as the organisational performance of NTFP-EP, relations with IUCN that might have had an effect on its performance or external factors.

The most important factors that explain the changes from the internal organization point of view is the institutional transformation that allows NTFP-EP to make in-country decisions. Interventions preceding NTFP-EP's project supported by MFS-II have formed an important basis for continued support and community participation. NTFP-EP benefited from previous investments by Cordaid and other donors in the same project areas. Other influencing factors with regards to participatory community mapping relate to high local political dynamics, as well as lack of capacity of NTFP-EP and implementing partners to undertake strategic lobby interventions. While the evaluation team recognizes that NTFP-EP has undertaken lobby interventions, there is a need for more strategic interventions at a higher level because current interventions have not yet resulted in legal recognition from district authorities.

The following chapter briefly describes the political context, the civil society context and the relevant background with regards to the governance issues NTFP-EP is working on. Chapter three provides background information on NTFP-EP, the relation of its MFS II interventions with the CIVICUS framework and specific information on the contract with IUCN. An evaluation methodology has been developed for the evaluation of the Civil Society component which can be found in appendix 2 of the country report; however, deviations from this methodology, the choices made with regards to the selection of the outcomes for contribution analysis, as well as difficulties encountered during data collection are to be found in chapter 4. The answers to each of the evaluation questions are being presented in chapter 5, followed by a discussion on the general project design in relation to CS development; an assessment of what elements of the project design may possibly work in other contexts or be implemented by other organisations in chapter 6. Conclusions are presented in chapter 7.

# 2 Context

This section briefly describes the context NTFP-EP is working in. A description of the Civil Society Context assessed according to the CIVICUS framework is provided in appendix 3 of the country report for Civil Society.

## 2.1 Political context

Indonesia's political context changed drastically when Suharto's New Order regime came to an end in 1998 which opened the possibilities for civil society to start playing its role in society. This paragraph briefly describes the political contexts of the past decades, and ends with an overview of the most important recent changes.

### 2.1.1 Brief historical perspective

Indonesia's rise to being the world's third largest democratic nation has been lauded by many world leaders. The county is often considered to be a model Muslim democracy. As the fourth most populous nation with an estimated 250 million people[1], Indonesia has sustained its democratic commitment since transitioning from an authoritarian leadership to a democracy in 1998. The decentralized administration now consists of 34 provinces and 508 districts and municipalities.

Prior to 1998, Indonesia was under strict authoritarian regime. Suharto, known for his so-called New Order (1966-1998) regime, ushered in radical transformations that would place social and political forces under direct state supervision. The defining characteristics of the Suharto era were a focus on economic growth and controlled consensus and political stability devoid of dissent. A series of tumultuous economic and political transitions in the nineties severely diminished the credibility of ageing President Suharto, who was forced to resign amidst mass street protests.

His departure in 1998 laid bare three decades of social inequalities, state-perpetuated abuses against human rights, and a lack of civilian liberties. The regime change opened the way for a period of *Reformasi* started under the presidency of B. J. Habibie (1998-1999) and continued by Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001), Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001–2004), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014). Restrictions on citizen participation, press freedom and association were removed. Democratic reforms and decentralization led to direct elections, portioned authority, a devolution of authority to regional authorities, formation of new political parties and ended the military's parliamentary influence. The distinct historical periods of the New Order Regime and *Reformasi* (1998-present) have shaped the emergence of civil society. Defining characteristics are summarized in the table below.

Table 1
*Characteristics that have defined the emergence of civil society in Indonesia*

| Characteristics | New Order, authoritarian period (1966 – 1998) | Reformasi (1998 – present) |
|---|---|---|
| **Political system** | Centralized, authoritarian characterized by unipolarity. Golkar as the dominant political party.<br><br>In 1999, there were 27 provinces, 306 districts | Decentralized, democratic. Fragmentation of power and atomization of patronage relationships. Emergence of numerous political parties. Direct presidential elections since 1999.<br><br>Decentralization altered the political and administrative landscape: 34 provinces, 410 |

[1] In 2010 the population was estimated to be around 237 million people (BPS 2010 Population Census). The current figure is an estimate from BKKBN and similar figures are cited in the CIA's World Fact Book and the World Bank.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | and around 60,000 villages. | districts, 98 municipalities, 6,944 sub-districts and 81,253[2]. |
| **State-citizen interaction** | Benevolent leader, obedient population. Down to the village level, the state permeated society. | Modern political culture marked by diminishing hierarchy between the state and citizens, allowing for citizens to interact more freely. |
| **Citizen representation and voice** | Strict control of speech, expression and association.<br><br>CSOs and their networks largely "hiding behind the screen", operating under state surveillance. A period of growth occurred in 1995-98, as resistance was building. | Burgeoning of CSOs, pressure groups and NGOs following the political euphoria after Suharto's fall.<br><br>Indonesian CSOs began to establish new networks internationally. Up until the early 2000s the focus was on state-centrist issues. Later, issues that CSOs were tackling became more diverse, ranging from pluralism, poverty reduction to fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights. |
| **Media** | No free press, censorship and state-control. Suharto had firm grasp over how to use print & broadcast medias to promote political ideologies. | More vibrant media environment, flourishing of media businesses albeit in control of 12 main conglomerates that are mostly profit-driven and often have political ties. |
| | Limited public and CS use and access to internet until mid-90s. | Twitter nation, widespread social media use. |
| | | Growing realization of the importance of media/free press as the fourth pillar of democracy. |
| **Artistic forms of expression** | Art and literary censorship conducted by the state. Art forms were a means to reinforce political order. | Greater freedom of the arts and cultural sectors. Organizations able to hold art events more freely. Freedom of expression a catchphrase amongst individuals and artistic groups, but challenged by more conservative members of society. |
| **Religious expression and organization** | Regime repressed religious groups, especially radical forms. | Emergence of religious groups seeking to restore Islamic values and defend Muslim values. |

Source: project documents

With political reforms came greater freedom and space for civic engagement. In the *Reformasi* period, there was a remarkable increase in the number of civil society organizations, many of which were Islamic in character. In 2000, the Central Agency on Statistics (BPS) recorded around 70,000 registered organizations, compared to just 10,000 in 1996[3]. New groups sprung up with donors encouraging activists to establish NGOs they could fund. These organizations were eager to distance themselves from state and often took an anti-government stance. Proliferating CSOs and NGOs have taken advantage of decentralization and greater regional autonomy to engage in public affairs. Civil society and government relations have improved, although both sides remain sceptical of the others' intentions.

### 2.1.2 Recent trends in the political context

Indonesia is considered to be a story of democratic success, but it still struggles to realize the benefits of sustained and equitable economic growth. In the political context, the main challenges lie in governing such geographically vast and decentralized country, applying principles of good governance and the enormous task of reforming the country's bureaucracy.

Although, Indonesia's 'big bang' decentralization initiated at the turn of the century narrowed the gap between local government and citizens, it has also localized political power struggles. While the devolution of authorities relieved tensions between the central government and the regions, it has also

2 Latest data (2014) See: Rumah Pemilu, "http://www.rumahpemilu.org/in/read/3351/Gambaran -Singkat -Pemilihan -Umum -2014 -di -Indonesia", 3 July 2014. Available from http://www.rumahpemilu.org/in/read/3351/Gambaran-Singkat-Pemilihan-Umum-2014-di-Indonesia (accessed 25 October 2014)

[3] Wahid, Marzuki. 2010. LSM, Islam, dan Perempuan di Indonesia Paska Orde Baru. Presentation at the Asian Dialogues: Open Seminars in Asian Languages. Melbourne, 22 April. Available from http://intranet.law.unimelb.edu.au/staff/events/files/Microsoft%20PowerPoint%20-%20LSM%20dan%20Islam%20di%20Indonesia%20--Melbourne%202010-FINAL.pdf (accessed 25 October 2014) http://intranet.law.unimelb.edu.au/staff/events/files/Microsoft%20PowerPoint%20-%20LSM%20dan%20Islam%20di%20Indonesia%20--Melbourne%202010-FINAL.pdf

created opportunities for corrupt and rent-seeking practices, at the local level. As indicated by Transparency International's corruption index scores, perceived corruption in Indonesia remains high.

Table 2

*Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer survey: Indonesia*

| Year | Corruption perceptions Index Score<br>*(0 perceived as highly corrupt and 100 perceived as clean)* | Rank |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 30 | 100/182 |
| 2012 | 32 | 118/174 |
| 2013 | 32 | 114/177 |

Source: Transparency International

In 2013, decentralization was taken a step further with the approval of the Village Law, intended to address weak governance arrangements and empower rural communities to participate politically. The new law could also lead to village elites distorting power relations and misusing government funding if not properly monitored.

Indonesia is still transitioning politically and many challenges lie ahead. According to the 2012 Indonesia Governance Index's Executive Report: "Indonesia is witnessing a paradox in its democracy. On one hand, a successful opening-up of civil liberty has led to the avalanche of democratic demands across the nation, however on the other hand, democratic institutions' are inadequately respond to those demands." Nonetheless, the Indonesian Governance Index, which focuses on measuring provincial governance, does show a general improvement in the performance of the government (political office) bureaucracy, civil society and economic society based on principles of participation, transparency, fairness, accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness between 2008 and 2012. Civil society scores improved the most significantly, while scores for bureaucracy rose slightly.[4]

Table 3

*Indonesia Governance Index: Average provincial scores*

| Arena | 2008 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| Government | 4.93 | 5.46 |
| Bureaucracy | 5.53 | 5.58 |
| Civil Society | 4.85 | 6.33 |
| Economic Society | 4.77 | 5.71 |

Source: http://www.kemitraan.or.id/igi

In the past decade, Indonesians have generally enjoyed a freedom to participate in the political process through a direct-election mechanism. However, in September 2014 lawmakers voted in favour of a bill reviving indirect elections of regional heads. The controversial vote provoked public outcry which saw peaceful protests and the public voicing their discontent through social media. In early October, just before the end of his term, president Yudhoyono issued a regulation in lieu of the law, effectively repealing the law until further judicial review.

The recent 2014 elections which marked the end of Yudhoyono's 10-year term, demonstrated that Indonesian voters are increasingly voting for popular figures irrespective of political party alliances. While practices of corruption, vote-buying and poor voter administration remained in the recent election, the public seems to have matured politically, indicated by the enormous interest in televised debates between the leading candidates. The appeal of the newly sworn in President Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, has come from his hands-on, man-of-the-people approach. As Jokowi begins his five-year term he will need to start addressing a myriad of challenges that include corruption, stagnant economic growth, and human rights concerns, particularly with respect to the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and religious intolerance. If left unaddressed, these challenges could seriously undermine Indonesia's stability and democratic reforms.

[4] The IGI uses a scale of 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest). Data is available online through their website.

## 2.2 Civil Society context issues with regards to MDG 7

There are two issues with regards to MDG 7 and forest management that are relevant to the SPO. These issues are tenurial access and the non-timber forest product market. This context is important since it defines community access and management over forest resources and how the government has regulated natural resource management.

In 1999 the Government of Indonesia passed the Forestry Law (Law No. 41/1999). This law classified all land into two designations: 1) state forests (*kawasan hutan*) as land bearing no ownership rights and further categorized by three allowable land uses, namely conservation, protection and production forests, and; 2) non-forest areas (*area pengunaan lain*) as those areas designated for non-forestry use such as agriculture and settlement[5]. Law 41/1999 regulated the administrative authority of the forest sector. It was designed to reaffirm control of the forest sector in the hands of the central government after the issuance of Law 22/1999 on Regional Governance, which for a brief period saw district governments taking a proactive role in administering forests and issuing timber extraction permits[6].

Table 4

*Land-use and forest classifications in Indonesia*

| Classification | Sub-classification | Function | Permitted activities |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Forest estate (Kawasan Hutan)** | | | |
| **Conservation forest (*Hutan Konservasi*)** | Natural reserve (*Hutan suaka*) | Preserve animal and plant biodiversity as well as its ecosystem, also functions as an area for life-supporting systems. | Research, science, education, and limited tourism |
| | Nature Conservation area (*Hutan pelestarian alam*) | Protect life-supporting systems, preserve biodiversity and sustainable utilization of natural resources and their ecosystems. | Research, science, education, cultivation activities, cultural activities, and limited tourism |
| **Protection forest (*Hutan Lindung*)** | | Main function of protecting life-supporting systems for hydrology, preventing floods, controlling erosion, preventing sea water intrusion, and maintaining soil fertility | Forest area utilization activities (cultivating medicinal/decorative plants, fungi, apiculture, swiftlet nests, capturing wildlife, cattle feed) utilization of environmental services (water flow, ecotourism, biodiversity, environmental protection, carbon absorption and storage) extraction of non-timber forest products (rattan, bamboo, honey, resin, fruits, fungi) |
| **Production forest (*Hutan Produksi*)** | Limited production forest (*Hutan Produksi Terbatas*) | Main function of generating forest products via selective/limited logging scheme | Timber extraction through selective logging. Village forest or community forest (*hutan desa, hutan kemasyarakatan*) schemes allowed. |
| | Permanent production forest (*Hutan Produksi Tetap*) | Main function of generating forest products | Clear cutting forests and industrial timber plantations. Village forest or community forest (*hutan desa, hutan kemasyarakatan*) schemes allowed. |
| | Convertible production forest (*Hutan Produksi Konversi*) | Main function of generating forest products but spatially reserved for use of development other than forestry | Clear cutting and industrial timber plantations, can also be released to be non-forest land (APL). Village forest or community forest (*hutan desa, hutan kemasyarakatan*) schemes allowed. |
| Non-forest estate (*Areal Penggunaan Lain*/APL) | | Land outside the forest estate designated for non-forestry use such as agriculture, settlement, etc. | |

Source: World Resources Institute, October 2013, based on Law No.41/1999

In 2007, the Government of Indonesia issued a regulation on Forest Management Planning (PP No.6/2007) which introduced schemes for community forestry, opening up opportunities for these

[5] Rosenbarger, A., Gingold, B., Prasodjo, R., Alisjahbana, A., Putraditama, A., Tresya D. 2013. Page 6, How to Change Legal Land Use Classifications to Support More Sustainable Palm Oil in Indonesia. Issue Brief. World Resources Institute, October 2013, page 6.

[6] Barr, C., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Dermawan, A., McCarthy J, eds. 2006. Pages 43-44, Decentralization of Forest Administration in Indonesia: Implications for Forest Sustainability, Economic Development and Community Livelihoods. Bogor, Indonesia:Edited byChristopher Barr et al. 2006 by Center for International Forestry Research, pp. 43-44

initiatives to be registered.[7] The schemes granted long-term forest management rights to communities. *Hutan desa* (village forest) is one such a scheme that has the potential to improve the welfare of rural communities. More recently in 2013, the country's constitutional court accepted a petition form the Indigenous People's Alliance (AMAN) to review articles of the 1999 Forestry Law. This resulted in a greater recognition for indigenous people's rights by declaring that customary forests should not be classified as state forest areas[8].

Nonetheless, there continue to be many gaps in Indonesia's regulatory framework that have allowed for the over-exploitation of natural resources. For example, the Forest Law does not contain clear criteria for land status conversion[9]. Inconsistent legislation has led to different interpretations of existing policies.

In the context of decentralisation, the devolution of power to the subnational level has increased deforestation and forest degradation rates[10]. Local authorities have issued forest permits and permits for estate crop production and mining activities with little concern for sustainable natural resource management. "In essence, the devolution of law-making authority to regional officials has, in the absence of unambiguous laws, transparent processes, clearly defined powers and supervision, resulted in a mixed bag of rules and regulations and hence inappropriate and overlapping permits, such as the issuance of estate crop permits for forested areas.[11]"





***Figure 1*** *Planted oil palm, oil palm leases, timber leases and protected areas in Kalimantan. Source: Nature Climate Change (2013), http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/v3/n3/fig_tab/nclimate1702_F1.html.*

The palm oil and pulp sectors have had a negative impact on Indonesia's forests. Indonesia is now one of the world's top producers of palm oil. The expansion of the sector has resulted in forests being

[7] RECOFTC – The Center for People and Forests. 2013. Community forestry in Asia and the Pacific: Pathway to inclusive development. RECOFTC November 2013. Bangkok, Thailand.

[8] Indigenous People's Alliance of the Archipelago (AMAN), "PUTUSAN Nomor 35/PUU-X/2012", *United Nations Office for REDD+ Coordination in Indonesia (UNORCID)*, 16 May 2013. Available from http://www.unorcid.org/index.php/about-redd/redd-in-the-news/sustainable-development/129-landmark-verdict-by-the-indonesian-constitutional-court-separates-customary-forest-from-state-forest (accessed 25 October 2014) http://www.unorcid.org/index.php/about-redd/redd-in-the-news/sustainable-development/129-landmark-verdict-by-the-indonesian-constitutional-court-separates-customary-forest-from-state-forest

[9] Indrarto, G. B., Murharjanti, P., Khatarina, J., Pulungan, I., Ivalerina, F., Rahman, J., Prana, M. N., Resosudarmo, I. A. P. and Muharrom, E. 2012. The Context of REDD+ in Indonesia: Drivers, agents and institutions. CIFOR Working Paper No. 92. CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia: Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR).

[10] Ibid

[11] P. 91, Ibid, page 91.

converted to plantations[12]. There are often overlapping allocations of areas designated for forest areas, palm oil production and local communities, which have often led to conflicts between state, community and private sector actors. A study published in 2012 indicated that 90 percent of lands converted to oil palm from 1990 to 2010 in Kalimantan were forested[13]. Local governments in Indonesia are being driven by the new commodity boom of palm oil. In Kalimantan alone, planned oil palm expansion is occurring at an unprecedented rate, encroaching into indigenous territories and protected areas[14]. In West and East Kalimantan the plantation and mining industries have detrimental effects on biodiversity, ecosystems and tenurial and livelihoods security of forest peoples.

In 2011, Indonesia moved to ban the export of a number of the country's raw materials, from minerals to non-timber forest products. A ban on raw rattan exports started on 1 January, 2012. The justification for this policy was to reduce competition so that domestic furniture producers would fare better in export markets[15]. Under these protectionist measures, many rattan farmers and traders have not fared well. Although exports of processed rattan have increased, producers have complained that prices have dropped and much of their produce has gone unsold[16]. The ban has affected actors unequally depending on their position in the value chain and the nature of their production activities, and the policy has generally served to benefit elite interests[17].

The issues relating to the rattan and palm oil sector are small examples of larger problems stemming from legal frameworks that do not provide just and equal conditions. The way tenure systems and forest management have been regulated have failed to protect community and indigenous rights, and have generally favoured market dominant actors. Corrupt practices, limited avenues for access to justice, a lack of protection for smallholders and domestic industries, and land grabs are some of the key issues for civil society. Community groups and NGOs are seeking ways to curb the trajectory of deplorable state of forestry through alternative livelihoods, community empowerment, advocacy and education[18].

[12]Rosenbarger, A., Gingold, B., Prasodjo, R., Alisjahbana, A., Putraditama, A., Tresya D. 2013. How to Change Legal Land Use Classifications to Support More Sustainable Palm Oil in Indonesia. Issue Brief. World Resources Institute, October 2013.

[13]Carlson, Kimberly M., Carlson, Lisa M. Curran, Lisa M., Asner, Gregory P., Pittman,. Asner, Alice McDonald, Trigg Pittman, Simon N., Adeney,. Trigg & J. Marion. 2012. "Carbon emissions from forest *conversion*Conversion by Kalimantan oil palm plantations." Nature Climate Change 3, pp.: 283–287. Available from http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/v3/n3/full/nclimate1702.html#/ref-link-10 (accessed 25 October 2014)87. http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/v3/n3/full/nclimate1702.html#/ref-link-10.

[14]"NTFP-EP EA Concept PaperNote for Indonesia", The Ecosystem Alliance (EA) programme, June, 2011.

[15]Trade Sift, "Are Indonesia's proposed export taxes and export bans a good idea?", January 2013. Available from http://www.tradesift.com/%28S%28wmuz3cenp2vkwz45utegx5y1%29%29/%5CReports%5CTradeSift%20Sample%20Report_Are%20Indonesia%27s%20proposed%20export%20taxes%20and%20export%20bans%20a%20good%20idea_January%202013.pdf (accessed 25 October 2014)http://www.tradesift.com/%28S%28wmuz3cenp2vkwz45utegx5y1%29%29/%5CReports%5CTradeSift%20Sample%20Report_Are%20Indonesia%27s%20proposed%20export%20taxes%20and%20export%20bans%20a%20good%20idea_January%202013.pdf

[16]Andi, "Indonesia's rattan products expected to undergo robust growth", ANTARA News, 6 December 2014. Available from http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/96823/indonesias-rattan-products-expected-to-undergo-robust-growth. And Otniel Tamindael, "Rattan export ban makes its farmers miserable", *ANTARA News*, 19 June 2013. Available from http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/89443/rattan-export-ban-makes-its-farmers-miserable (accessed 25 October 2014) & http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/89443/rattan-export-ban-makes-its-farmers-miserable

[17]Myers, Rodd. 2014. What the Indonesian rattan export ban means for domestic and international markets, forests, and the livelihoods of rattan collectors., Rodd Myers, 2014. Forest Policy and Economics (Impact Factor: 1.81). 07/2014;

[18]"Proposal Micro Grant Fund for Community-Based NTFP Initiatives (MGF), Non-Timber Forest Products Exchange Programme (NTFP-EP) for South and Southeast Asia", NTFP, May 2007.

# 3 NTFP-EP and its contribution to civil society/policy changes

## 3.1 Background of NTFP-EP

The Non-Timber Forest Products Exchange Programme (NTFP-EP) is as a collaborative, regional network of over 60 NGOs and community-based organisations in South and Southeast Asia seeking to build the capacity of forest-based communities in the sustainable management, especially in the conservation and trade of non-timber forest products. NTFP-EP initially covered six Asian countries and with its headquarters in Manila, Philippines. In mid-2012, the Indonesian arm of the programme set up an independent foundation. NTFP-EP Indonesia registered as *Yayasan Pengembangan Sumberdaya Hutan Indonesia* (referred to as NTFP-EP in this report for simplicity).

The shared goal of NTFP-EP is to promote forest conservation through the empowerment of forest-based communities and the sustainable management of NTFPs[19]. NTFP-EP works to catalyse and support activities that strengthen the capacities of its partner organisations working with forest-dependent communities. NTFP-EP serves as a platform for knowledge and information exchange of appropriate resource management techniques and experiences. Its partner organizations work together with communities in developing and implementing initiatives that meet local needs, while the platform aims to provide technical support.

NTFP-EP aims to strengthen the capacity of forest-based communities and its partner organisations in the fields of:

1. Forest conservation through management and sustainable harvesting of NTFPs;
2. Land tenure security and the recognition and enforcement of user rights through legal measures and policy advocacy;
3. Livelihood security through the enhancement of subsistence uses of NTFPs and promotion of indigenous culture and knowledge;
4. Climate change adaptation and mitigation through social forestry endeavours;
5. Increased income from value addition and marketing of NTFPs – domestic and regional/ international; and,
6. Strengthened negotiating position of forest-dependent communities' vis-à-vis traders, policy makers and other external agents on issues which may affect their environment and livelihood.[20]

The regional NTFP-EP network based in the Philippines also works to facilitate knowledge exchange, providing venues to showcase valuable experiences and to become a clearinghouse for relevant information in the fields of sustainable forest management and NTFP development[21].

Through strategies at the local, national and regional levels, they work to achieve these objectives by:

1. Facilitating the exchange of expertise, experiences and approaches;
2. Providing technical support/backstopping and enabling training;
3. Giving inputs in strategy discussions;
4. Documenting best practices and success stories and providing information on NTFP-related issues;
5. Mobilising resources and essential contacts; and
6. Sourcing advocacy support for local initiatives and helping articulate needs and aspirations.

[19]"2013 Annual Report, Non-Timber Forest Products - Exchange Programme for South and Southeast Asia (NTFP-EP)", NTFP-EP,). Published 2014. Philippines.
[20]Ibid;" & NTFP-EP 2007 Brochure", NTFP-EP., Available from http://www.ntfp.org/downloads/ntfp_ep_brochure_2007.pdf (accessed 25 October 2014): http://www.ntfp.org/downloads/ntfp_ep_brochure_2007.pdf
[21]"NTFP-EP 2007 Brochure", NTFP-EP. Available from http://www.ntfp.org/downloads/ntfp_ep_brochure_2007.pdf (accessed 25 October 2014) NTFP-EP 2007 Brochure

## 3.2 MFS II interventions related to Civil Society

In the 2011-2014 period, two interventions were supported under the NTFP Exchange Programme. Both focused on sustainable community-based forest livelihoods. The first project, 'Upscaling sustainable, community-based forest livelihoods' (2011-2014 and extended until June 2015) sought to provide and upgrade innovative livelihood models and explore tenurial options for indigenous peoples through landscape models of sustainable forest livelihoods[22]. The focus of the second intervention, 'Sustainable Livelihood Initiatives and Models' (February 2013-July 2015) was on promoting models of sustainable forest livelihoods to the government to draw greater attention and support for their endorsement, as well as to stimulate learning[23].

The specific objectives of the 'Upscaling sustainable, community-based forest livelihoods' Project implemented in East Kalimantan, West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan were as follows:

1. To upscale and ecologically "upgrade" community-based forest livelihoods (e.g. forest honey and crafts)
2. To introduce and test community-based forest management and tenure schemes and participatory spatial planning towards more inclusive land use planning
3. To promote and better profile an example of a landscape level model of ecological and culture-based livelihoods and conservation schemes
4. To improve the leverage of NTFP producers through better organization and through the exploration of market mechanisms (certification).[24]

A select number of community livelihoods and ecosystems interventions were supported. These included production and expansion of forest honey, community mapping exercises to explore tenurial models, ecological and cultural zonation, organizing rattan farmers through a participatory eco-certification scheme, and upgrading the crafts enterprises.

The second initiative, which aimed to mainstream sustainable livelihood initiatives and models of community-based forestry to the government and consumers in Indonesia had the following objectives:

1. To draw attention to and develop programme and policy support for SLIMs at the national level; and,
2. To raise consumer awareness and support for Sustainable Livelihoods Initiatives and Models (SLIMs).[25]

As such, both projects have a relation to strengthening intermediate organizations and lobby and advocacy. To some extent NTFP's network in and outside of Indonesia also provides an opportunity for intermediate organizations from one country to learn from experiences of those in another country.

[22]"NTFP-EP EA Concept Paper for Indonesia",. The Ecosystem Alliance (EA) programme, June 2011.
[23]"SLIMs Final Project Proposal", The Ecosystem Alliance, December 2012
[24]"NTFP-EP EA Concept Paper for Indonesia",. The Ecosystem Alliance (EA) programme, June 2011.
[25]Ecosystem Alliance Technical Progress Report, SLIMs covering the period from 1 February 2013-31 January 2014.

## 3.3 Basic information

Table 5

*Basic information Non-Timber Forest Exchange Programme (NTFP-EP)*

| | | Details |
|---|---|---|
| Name of SPO | : | Non-Timber Forest Exchange Programme (NTFP-EP) |
| Consortium | : | Ecosystem Alliance (EA) |
| CFA | : | International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) |
| Start date of cooperation | : | 2004 (regional NTFP-EP) |
| MDG/Theme | : | MDG 7a,b: Sustainable living environment & forests and biodiversity |
| MFS II Project Name 1 | : | Upscaling sustainable, community-based forest livelihoods in Kalimantan |
| Contract period | : | 15 September 2011 – 25 March 2014, extended till June 2015 |
| Total budget | : | € 135,217 |
| Other donors if applicable | : | € 127,100 from Cordaid through the Community of Change Alliance for the Crafts Kalimantan Network Project (Oct 2008 – Oct 2011). A second Cordaid-funded initiative is the Enhancing Eco-Cultural Enterprises Project (July 2012 to June 2013), amount unknown.<br><br>Other past donors (up until 2011) have included: Broederlijk Delen (Belgium), SDC (Swiss), Hivos, Misereor, The Asia Foundation, Both ENDS, European Union, FFI/TEFI, Toyota Foundation, ILO Regional Office Bangkok, WWF, OHK, & ARUN |
| Estimation of % of budget for Civil Society | : | 43 % |
| MFS II Project Name 2 | : | Sustainable livelihood initiatives and models (SLIMs) |
| Contract period | : | 1 February 2013 – 31 July 2015 |
| Total budget | : | € 45,950 |
| Other donors if applicable | : | (see above project) |
| Estimation of % of budget for Civil Society | : | No budget information available |

Sources: Project documents

# 4 Data collection and analytical approach

## 4.1 Adjustments made in the methodology of the evaluation

The evaluation process started with an input-output-outcome analysis that utilized reports and other documents from the SPO. For NTFP-EP, the analysis was based mainly on project progress reports, which did not report against results or indicators systematically. Only one progress report for the second project was available. As such, the evaluation team was only able to benefit partly from the input-output-outcome analysis for process-tracing. The evaluation team followed the operational guidelines to a great extent, especially on the structure of the workshop with NTFP-EP and the development of model of change[26]. However, the team faced challenges in obtaining evidence and triangulating data with stakeholders, since almost all of them were located in Kalimantan. In addition, the structure of the project was such that there was one main intervention in each of the seven districts and these interventions were not uniform. With the given resources, the evaluation team only managed to conduct a field visit to one of the target districts, namely Sintang.

Since NTFP-EP does not directly implement interventions itself, except in Kutai Barat district[27], but works with/through implementing partner organisations, data at community level and at beneficiary was not available during the visit to NTFP-EP office in Jakarta. Furthermore, this sub-contracting mode has made it difficult to distinguish which activities conducted by the implementing partners are supported by NTFP-EP. In many instances, current partner interventions are a continuation of previous NTFP-EP projects or are also funded by other donors[28]. The evaluation team conducted the field visit to one of the implementing partners (JMM) and met with relevant district officials in Sintang district to collect more information about the government's perceptions on eco-cultural zonation/participatory community mapping and to confirm some claims made by NTFP-EP Jakarta.

## 4.2 Difficulties encountered during data collection

During the data collection process, the team experienced three main challenges. These included the timing of the evaluation, the distance to project locations, and the lack of hard evidence provided by the SPO. At the time of meeting NTFP-EP staff and director, the SPO was in the midst of preparing for an event to be held in Jakarta. As such, the NTFP-EP team in Jakarta could only allocate one day for meeting with the evaluation team. Given the resources for the evaluation, only one field visit to

[26]For example, in the workshop with NTFP EP staff, we started with an input-output analysis to guide the discussion of each indicator. During the discussion, NTFP EP emphasized that the previous project such as Craft Kalimantan is importantly related with the current project from IUCN. They provided a reason why PGS certification is urgently needed by the community for improved capabilities to be dependent on non- timber forest product to improve their livelihood. But the evaluation team also considered certain postponed or failed objectives that were addressed in the input-output analysis. The evaluation team also went to Sintang as one of the region that got support from IUCN in order to improve the ability of forest dependent communities to claim their right over forest resource. NTFP- EP handed the project to the local participatory mapping consultant and used the existing community group to do the participatory mapping.

[27]In Kutai Barat, NTFP-EP has one staff

[28]For instance, when the evaluation team went to Sintang District to assess the outcome achieved (forest dependent people claiming their rights over forest resources), we found that community groups engaged in NTFP-EP's participatory mapping had been established by other projects and actors (People Resource and Conservation Foundation-PRCF), but NTFP EP and PRCF mapping worked in different area, i.e. NTFP EP worked in peat land area and PRCF in hilly area (source: community map provided by informant from Koperasi Jasa Menenun Mandiri). Mapping activities in three villages (Ensaid Panjang, Gembang Raya, dan Karya Jaya Bakti) are managed by Koperasi Jasa Menenun Mandiri. In Village Ensaid Panjang, the community has established a group called community forest management.

Kalimantan was possible and this visit only covered one of the seven locations where NTFP-EP implemented interventions.

Other difficulties emerged in seeking hard evidence to confirm or reject outcome pathways. Data provided by the SPO was limited to documentary evidence that included workshop minutes, activity reports and letters with the local government.

In addition, general difficulties encountered included:

- Workshop participants did not really understand, nor were they familiar with the CS indicators or the CIVICUS framework. They found it difficult to relate NTFP-EP's situation with the indicators, especially since none of them participated in the baseline process. This lessened the effectiveness of the workshop.
- Internal dynamics within the evaluation team and one staff leaving NTFP-EP meant that from both sides those participating in the end line evaluation were not the same as those in the baseline.
- Miscommunication between the evaluation team and NTFP-EP staff regarding the process of soliciting feedback and what documentation was needed. The evaluation team was not aware of internal monitoring systems and documentation processes within NTFP-EP making it difficult to make targeted requests for documents, which were not readily available when the base line was conducted.
- NTFP-EP does not have a dedicated department or personnel for monitoring and evaluation. As such, it added difficulties to find hard data and affected the agreement on the outcomes.
- NTFP-EP has very few field staff in Kalimantan (only one staff in Kutai Barat for PGS sites). Project initiatives are generally implemented through local organizations rather than directly by NTFP-EP. For some interventions, such as the eco zonation mapping, only one dedicated staff/personnel is in charge. This resulted in difficulties to meet with relevant staff and actors who had been involved in the projects.
- Due to interrupted steps of the tracing process, and this partly due to difficulty to match the evaluators' schedule and NTFP EP management, the model of change had to be revisited often to be revised based on new information found by the evaluation team, which consequently meant that the evaluation team had to collect new evidence for the amended model of change.
- Hard data on how the interventions had influenced government policies and practices was lacking. Part of the problem stems from the lack of documentation of program's result changes and the fact that NTFP-EP Indonesia is still in its infancy as an organisation having been established in 2012.

## 4.3 Identification of two outcomes for in-depth process tracing

Based upon an analysis of the projects and programmes financed by the Dutch CFAs, four strategic orientations for civil society were identified. Two of which were selected for each SPO for in-depth process tracing. CDI suggested to the country team to look at the selected strategic orientations which are intermediate organisations and policy influencing.

The first outcome that the evaluation team has looked at is the improved capabilities of minority groups dependent on non-timber forest products to improve their livelihoods. One specific example that the team looked at is increased household incomes through the production of rattan bags, including efforts to set up a certification system. The outcome was selected with the following considerations:

- It was one of several outcomes that all workshop participants agreed to as being a significant change. NTFP-EP staff and the director suggested this outcome during the evaluation workshop because the development of standards for the chain of custody in rattan production was considered a major achievement.
- The outcome is an important element in the Theory of Change (ToC) of the SPO and has relevance to both project interventions, as well as the mission of NTFP-EP.
- Since this outcome is possibly the result of the weavers group that produces the bags, it aligns with the CIVICUS orientation of civic engagement.

The second outcome selected was: forest-dependent communities are able to claim their rights over forest-resources. This outcome relates to the participatory eco-cultural zonation interventions implemented by NTFP-EP, which were also relevant to lobby and advocacy efforts. The reasons for choosing this outcome are:

- The outcome is an important element in the Theory of Change (ToC) of NTFP-EP.
- The outcome was selected following discussions between the in-country evaluation team and CDI and was in line with suggestions for in-depth process tracing.
- As one of the sub-projects from NTFP-EP's proposal to IUCN, the evaluation team expected fewer difficulties to find supporting evidence.
- The outcome is in line with the evaluation's focus for Indonesia. It relates to the efforts of the SPO to ensure government recognition over community land use planning. This recognition process is strategic to NTFP-EP as well as to the communities given the local context which has seen large concessions granted to palm oil plantations.

# 5 Results

## 5.1 Overview of planned and realised outcomes

This paragraph describes outputs and objectives achieved based upon the project documents that CDI and SurveyMETER received from IUCN and NTFP-EP that are relevant to civil society. The level of achievement is based on results up to 2014. It should be noted that both NTFP-EP projects continue until 2015, and as such achievements are not yet final.

Table 6

*Overview of results achieved in relation to project plan NTFP-EP*

| Planned results | | Level of achievement |
|---|---|---|
| Objective 1 | To upscale and ecologically "upgrade" community-based forest livelihoods (e.g. forest honey) in Kapuas Hulu and Paser | Not yet achieved: Some preliminary evidence after workshops of increased value or more efficient production. Weather patterns affected forest honey production and honey farmers focused on rice farming. A honey centre was established as a hub for product develop and trade in Kapuas Hulu in cooperation with the Ministry of Forestry. In response to the impact of climate change on honey production, NTFP-EP worked with local partners and honey producers to address forest fires, drought, incessant rain and production. |
| Objective 2 | To introduce and test community-based forest management and tenure schemes and participatory spatial planning towards more inclusive land use planning in Malinau | Partially achieved: There is already a district regulation on community-based forest management in Malinau in 2012 (Perda No.10/2012 and later in November 2014 Perda No. 201/2014 on district agency for indigenous people issues (BPUNA) as a result of joint advocacy by CSOs during 2012-2014. NTFP EP specific inputs were on Eco-cultural and participatory mapping that were conducted in Sintang and Malinau districts and managed to be presented to the local government. These maps at community level have been completed and a series of lobby activities in Malinau were carried out by NTFP-EP and local partners in 2012 and 2013 for legal recognition by the government. However, it has not been recognised by the government and included in the district land-use/spatial planning RT-RW). |
| Objective 3 | To promote and better profile an example of a landscape level model of ecological and culture-based livelihoods and conservation schemes in Sintang | Partially achieved: While a model has been developed with four eco-cultural maps prepared in Sintang with communities, this has not yet been replicated by the government. Communities reported to be more confident about their claims and possible recognition. Successful collaboration with other NGOs namely: Gemawan, Titian and WWF. This has added leverage to the application within the district, which NTFP-EP hopes will inspire local policies protecting community rights and provide villages with the means to defend against private sector encroachment. Mapping did result in the identification of area where natural dye is produced and efforts to protect this dye. |
| Objective 4 | To improve the leverage of NTFP producers through better organization and through the exploration of market mechanisms (certification) in Kutai Barat & Kapuas | Partially achieved: Participatory Guarantee System (PGS) developed for certification of rattan and piloted in two districts. Organisation of rattan farmers set up. Rotan Lestari Indonesia (Indonesian Sustainable Rattan Initiative) launched in March 2012. Products sold by weavers to Borneo Chic fetch between IDR 60,000-110,000. According to NTFP-EP's income monitoring of 17 weavers there has been a gradual increase in income since 2009 with the establishment of BUR; a women's group. In the last two years, in total, the annual income earned from crafts by 17 weavers increased to around 50 percent per year or € 6.50 per household per month. Compared to the income produced by other livelihoods activities, such as the sale of rubber, this contributes 12 percent of generated income. |
| Objective 5 (SLIMs Project) | To raise consumer awareness and support for Sustainable Livelihoods Initiatives and Models (SLIMs) | Not yet achieved because planned for June 2015: Participation in SLIMs fairs took place to promote sustainable products and promotional video produced to showcase initiatives. More stakeholders (now 20 NGOs) committed time, staff and resources to the SLIMs festival. No evidence yet of increased consumer awareness. Activities to continue until 2015. |
| Objective 6 (SLIMs Project) | To draw attention to and develop program and policy support for SLIMs at the national level | Not yet achieved/insufficient evidence: Policy research not implemented as planned because partner organizations unable to deliver inputs. NGOs involved included: WARSI, Yayasan Mitra Insani (YMI), & YADUPA. WARSI is now conducting policy research. Activities to continue until 2015. |

Sources: Progress Reports 'Upscaling sustainable, community-based forest livelihoods in Kalimantan' & 'Sustainable livelihood initiatives and models' (SLIMs); 2012 & 2013 Annual Reports NTFP-EP for South & Southeast Asia.

With regards to assessing planned versus achieved results for NTFP-EP, it should be noted that the progress reports submitted by the Indonesia office to IUCN were predominantly activity and output

oriented. It was difficult to assess the achievement of higher-level results, especially on how these relate to changes in civil society. In addition, prior support through the Ecosystem Alliance, and other Dutch organizations especially Cordaid, have formed a basis for many of the interventions in the 2012-2014 period.

## 5.2 Changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?

### 5.2.1 Civic Engagement

Civic engagement describes the formal and informal activities and participation undertaken by individuals to advance shared interests at different levels. Participation within civil society is multi-faceted and encompasses socially-based and politically-based forms of engagement.

The overall goal of the Ecosystem Alliance, under which the efforts of NTFP-EP fell, was "to improve the livelihoods of the poor and to create a more inclusive economy, through participatory, responsible and transparent management of ecosystems"[29]. Based on the defined goal, civic engagement forms an important component of sustainable forest management since there is specific attention to participation processes. In the case of NTFP-EP, forest-dependent communities are considered to be marginalized groups. Since the baseline, there has been some enhancement in civic engagement to advance the interests of forest communities in Kalimantan, especially in how NTFP-EP take up the needs of marginalized farmers and forest community in their programming process.

The SPO sought to engage more communities through such interventions as participatory mapping of forest resources and eco-certification of rattan and woven materials. The following table presents the growth in the outreach of NTFP-EP in the 2012 – 2013 period: NTFP-EP intervenes in 75 villages, supporting 37 community groups to become income earning groups and that regroup in total 1,440 members, which is a slight increase since 2012. The same table shows that whereas sales per member were estimated at € 53 in 2012, in 2013 they reached € 137 per member.

Table 7
*The reach of NTFP-EP's livelihoods/income-generation support in Indonesia 2012-2013*

| Year | # of community groups/enterprises supported | # of people involved | # of villages covered | NTFPs used | Reported sales (in Euros) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2012 | 30 | 1,254 | 68 villages | Bamboo, beeswax, rattan, honey, leaf fibre, natural dyes, water reed | 66,623 |
| 2013 | 37 | 1,440 | 75 villages | Bamboo, rattan, honey, leaf fibre, natural dyes, water reed, honey and honey products, seeds, pandan | 197,386.14 |
| Difference | +7 | +186 | +7 | | +130,763.14 |

Sources: NTFP-EP for South & Southeast Asia Annual Reports 2012, 2013

Generally, the beneficiary engagement strategy over the past two years focused on building/strengthening intermediary organisations. For example, a group of women weavers was helped to sustain their rattan supplies through the introduction of a certification model that involved 20 members from an existing group called Bina Usaha Rotan (BUR) from the Craft Kalimantan network supported by Cordaid (with MFS II funds). The participatory guarantee system (PGS) aimed to "place[s] the action in the hands of the community members and civil society and empower the

[29] "Annex-#3a ID NTFP EP CONTRACT AE IUCN NL", IUCN, pp. (p.2-3)

community[30]. Rotan Lestari Indonesia was established to manage rattan eco certification and market access for certified rattan products. While rattan farmers and producers provided inputs to the PGS standards the focus on supporting intermediary groups has also brought a risk of less direct involvement of weavers and producers. It is hoped that with the success of BUR and PGS, more communities will be encouraged to maintain and not sell their rattan gardens.

Participatory eco-cultural zonation or mapping has addressed the needs of target communities, many of which were highly interested as they faced the encroachment of palm oil companies. The evaluation found evidence of participation of target groups being involved in the mapping exercises. In Sintang, for example, members of Jasa Menunun Mandiri Cooperative, participated in collecting geographic data and creating maps. The maps were shared with villagers to obtain consent/agreement, after which community groups were often organized to define borders and adjust village plans and policies. There were no specific roles for women in the process, and no evidence was found of meaningful participation, rather women were expected to prepare meals for the men during the mapping process. The level of community participation and involvement seems to have varied from one location to the next. In Malinau, target group involvement was limited to meetings with village leaders of neighbouring communities and youth engagement in taking GPS coordinates[31].

With regards to the intensity of political engagement, NTFP-EP partners continue to engage the government through workshops and providing venues for community experiences and testimonies to be used as inputs to policy dialogue at the national and local government levels. LP3M reported positive responses from the local government through the review of Perda No. 10/2012 on acknowledgement from district government on indigenous rights over forest management after holding a local workshop in Malinau in September 2013[32]. But there is still far more to achieve so that decision-making powers are granted to targeted local communities. Only in Sintang were results of participatory mapping used by the forest management group to refuse to consent to palm oil concessions.

The approach that has been taken in marketing and selling crafts is to organize women craft makers, assist them in marketing to various channels whether they be local, provincial or national. NTFP-EP has also linked them to a high-end retail shop in Jakarta. Rattan bags produced by women are sold to BUR for IDR 60,000 – 110,000. BUR then resells the bags to Borneo Chic for IDR 10,000 more per bag. Borneo Chic then refurbishes the bags to become luxury items that can fetch up to IDR 1 million on the high-end market. With certification, women can earn IDR 5,000 more than if the same product is sold on the local market. Until so far 20 members have registered into the PGS rattan scheme in 2014, which will increase marketability of products. NTFP-EP also facilitated the participation of BUR in several national and international craft fairs. One of these fairs in Sante Fe in 2014 contributed to profits for BUR in the same year of IDR 23 million or around IDR € 80 per year per person or € 6.50 per month per person. Although market channels are being expanded, the scale of the profits generated are not yet sufficient to support financial independency of BUR.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**

**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 0**

### 5.2.2 Level of Organisation

This dimension assesses the organisational development, complexity and sophistication of civil society, by looking at the relationships among the actors within the civil society arena.

[30]"PGS Rattan: Not Just Another Label",. Undated Brochure by NTFP-EP. Available from http://www.ntfp.org/ntfpadmin/publications-pdf/Rattan_PGS.pdf (accessed 13 November 2014, AOI (Indonesian Organic Alliance), and Setara

[31]Source: Interview with Nikolaus Boro Suban, staff LP3M (Lembaga Pemerhati dan Pemberdayaan Dayak Punan Malinau), MFS II Evaluation

[32]Other source reported that this Perda was possible due to support from AMAN and Komnas HAM (National Commission on Human Rights), See http://dishut.jabarprov.go.id/?mod=detilBerita&idMenuKiri=&idBerita=3655, accessed 18on February 18th, 2015.

In terms of intensity of relations with other organisations, defending the interests of forest-dependent farmers/communities and composition of the financial resource base, no changes occurred in the last two years. NTFP-EP's relation with actors in the civil society arena has three distinct typologies, namely relations with: community-based organisations and networks, local NGOs and national CSOs. In 2012, NTFP-EP transitioned from a programme into an independent organisation. Much of the SPO's relations are still defined by its earlier form. Local NGOs, like Yayasan PADI, Yayasan Dian Tama, Yayasan Riak Bumi, Yayasan Petak Danum and Lembaga Pemerhati dan Pemberdayaan Dayak Punan Malinau (LP3M) are implementers; carrying out direct activities at the community level. NTFP-EP, together with Riak Bumi, established a forest honey network (JMHI) in 2005. Since then, JMHI has formed an integral part of NTFP-EP's program, and relations have become closer in 2014. NTFP-EP's director is even a member of the JMHI board. Also of note is that NTFP-EP and its local NGO network (Yayasan Dian Tama, Yayasan Petak Danum, Jasa Menenun Mandiri Cooperative and Yayasan Riak Bumi) established a limited company, PT Lamin Betang, to continue to produce products for Borneo Chic. The strategy, which is largely driven by profit-generation, stimulates the production and selling the community forest products. In terms of frequency, NTFP-EP continued to hold regular formal meetings with their network of local NGO partners in Malinau, Sintang, Berau, and Jakarta four times a year; as well as attending the annual Ecosystem Alliance meeting and an annual weaver's meeting.

For strategic lobby work, NTFP-EP still engages with Sawit Watch, Telapak, Aliansi Organik Indonesia (AOI), Lembaga Ekolabeling Indonesia (LEI), AMAN, WWF Indonesia, WALHI, Warsi, Sawit Watch, HuMa, JKPP, KIARA, CIFOR and others. Through networks such as Forum Komunikasi Kehutanan Masyarakat and the Working Group on Indigenous Community Conserved Areas (ICCAs), NTFP-EP has been part of progressive advancements towards the registration of indigenous lands that have been documented and mapped.

During the end line workshop, NTFP-EP frequently mentioned that a key effort to defend marginalized forest groups was developing livelihood opportunities for forest groups by creating access to market. While the production of rattan and handicrafts has been scaled up, this has not yet led to visible changes at the grassroots level or in the market structure, which is still volatile to price fluctuations.

The Hutan Desa (village forest) scheme and the participatory mapping provides more opportunities for defending marginalized groups. NTFP-EP and its lobby partners have been advocating for the recognition of community land use and indigenous people's rights. Although success has been limited due to a local government that favours palm oil expansion, NTFP-EP's efforts have provided a means for communities to voice their needs and interests to the district government. However, this has sparked a repressive reaction from the district government, who told the community to refrain from provoking palm oil companies. In the cases of Ensaid Panjang and Kelumbik villages, this has led to increasingly tense relations with palm oil companies. Nonetheless, NTFP-EP feels that in the long-term, continued pressure will eventually promote a pro-indigenous administration to be elected in the 2016 district elections.

The composition financial resource base has not changed and the SPO remains dependent on external funding. The institutional transformation (to an Indonesian-based foundation in mid-2012) did not change the funding structure. Plans to develop a consultancy wing that would help NTFP-EP be more self-reliant have materialised in 2014, when NTFP-EP Asia created EXCEED. Board members have found their roles as fund raisers to be a challenge.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**

**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 0**

### 5.2.3 Practice of Values

Practice of Values refers to the internal practice of values within the civil society arena. Important values that CIVICUS looks at such as transparency, democratic decision making, taking into account diversity that are deemed crucial to gauge not only progressiveness but also the extent to which civil society's practices are coherent with their ideals.

The transition into an independent foundation has improved the accountability mechanisms of the organization. NTFP-EP now has mandatory social organs (board of trustees, supervisory board, and executive office). NTFP-EP's organizational structure has grown from four to 11 staff, many of whom

come from the geographic target areas. As during the baseline, decision-making takes place through the long-distance communication between field facilitators in Kalimantan with the Program Director in Jakarta, with regular quarterly meetings held between field and Jakarta-based program staff.

NTFP-EP recognizes the importance of having target groups in their staff structure and board. While currently the board does not have representatives from target groups, there are still opportunities for this in the future. At present, the six board members (half of whom are women) include forestry experts, researchers, activists, and related business institutes. The board's performance is not yet ideal and should have an uneven number of members. One area of improvement since 2012, has been in improving the effectiveness and ownership of the annual board meetings where the executive arm of NTFP-EP reports on progress. Another aspect of downward accountability which the evaluation team is concerned with is the financial management of Borneo Chic. Information about profit-sharing has been shared with weavers during meetings, but clarity on the mechanisms and system for producers to have access to financial information needs to be institutionalized.

On external financial auditing, since its establishment as an independent foundation, NTFP-EP has not been audited externally as an organization but they have been audited for donor-funded projects as was the case with European Union (in 2013) and Swiss funding in July 2014.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**

**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 0**

### 5.2.4 Perception of Impact

Perception of Impact assesses the perceived impact of civil society actors on politics and society as a whole as the consequences of collective action. In this, the perception of both civil society actors (internal) as actors outside civil society (outsiders) is taken into account. Specific sub dimensions for this evaluation are the extent to which the SPO has contributed to engage more people in social or political activities, has contributed to strengthening CSOs and their networks, and has influenced public and private sector policies.

According the NTFP-EP's own assessment, communities they serve are generally satisfied with the implemented initiatives, whether directly carried out by NTFP-EP or through their local partners. Since 2008, they have been building better relations and their interventions have never been refused by target communities. Acceptance by communities is considered an indication of constituent satisfaction. NTFP-EP sees itself as a trusted partner to local organizations and others working on similar issues. This was confirmed to some degree by implementing partners, LP3M and Craft Kalimantan, who expressed satisfaction over the project activities and the way which NTFP manages its projects. The degree to which beneficiaries are satisfied with improved livelihoods and incomes has not been measured by the SPO and the changes are not yet significant enough to result in widespread beneficiary satisfaction.

Civil society impacts achieved in the 2012-2014 period by NTFP-EP relate to the work carried out on rattan certification and participatory mapping. Since 2012, NTFP-EP has piloted a Participatory Guarantee System (PGS) for certification with BUR in Kutai Barat. PGS, is an eco-social alternative to third-party certification and is easier for small-scale producers to implement. Certification standards were developed and shared locally and nationally. The Rotan Lestari (ROLEs) unit in West Kutai, a multi-stakeholder platform, was established with members representing AMAN, other NGOs, Department of Industry, Trade and Cooperatives (Disperindagkop), middle-men, rattan farmers and NTFP-EP. In addition, NTFP-EP participates in the Community Forestry Communication Forum (FKKM) to lobby for and promote the optimization of forest resources and community forest products. While there seems to be growing recognition for PGS amongst local government and organisations like CIFOR and WWF, the scope of producer engagement is still limited.

Crafts Kalimantan has contributed to this promotion through the participation in exhibitions and festivals. Currently, however the sale of certified handicrafts through Crafts Kalimantan brings very limited benefits to producers in the community. Not only because of a lack of profit sharing mechanisms, but also because handicraft production is not the main source of income. Information provided by NTFP-EP shows that the contribution of crafts production to the total household income was 12 percent in 2014, an increase of from 8 percent in 2012. As such, women producing rattan bags

do so for supplemental income. There is no evidence that women have been able to improve their livelihoods by selling products through NTFP-EP-supported Borneo Chic.

The above illustrates that the relations with private sector actors remain limited to the supply side, with NTFP-EP working with third parties for the manufacturing of products. In addition to the work on PGS certification, NTFP-EP has assisted JMHI to receive national standard certification through Dian Niaga, a social business enterprise, and was able to link JMHI with a marketing chain.

With respect to the participatory mapping, the resulting maps are being used by communities to contest palm oil expansion and concessions in customary forests. In addition, in Sintang, the maps resulted in a greater recognition of the need to protect forest assets, such as a natural dye-producing plant that is used in the production of woven materials and crafts. Unfortunately the ability to influence public sector policies and practices is still limited and dependent upon the willingness of the government. Through the *Forum Komunikasi Kehutanan Masyarakat* (FKKM), NTFP-EP is active in influencing advocacy agendas on community forestry issues in the form of multi-stakeholders focus group discussions and sharing evidence although this influence is limited to public debates.

In Sintang and Malinau, NTFP-EP has been less successful, whereas in Kutai Barat, where PGS is implemented, government relations have proven more conducive. Nonetheless, none of the community forest maps have received official government recognition. The overall landscape of public sector relations thus remains unchanged. Although there has been more frequent interaction with government actors in the eco-cultural zonation initiative[33], especially with the Departments of Culture and Cooperatives, support from the local government remains stagnant due to high turnover of local government staff.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**

**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 0**

### 5.2.5 Civil Society Environment

The social, political and economic environment in which civil society operates affects its room for manoeuvre. The civil society context has been described in chapter 3. In this section we describe how NTFP-EP is coping with that context.

Small-scale producers have been pressured by market demands and protectionist trade policies. Effective since 2012, the export ban on raw rattan products has had implication on the livelihoods of rattan collectors and small-scale producers. As in 1986, when a similar policy was put in place, the ban has resulted in lower demands and prices - even for sustainable rattan; and has had negative impacts on revenues and profits[34]. Producers are paid lower prices for rattan since the raw product is no longer being exported and there is more domestic supply.

Meanwhile there are greater demands for legal and certified rattan products on the international market, requiring the traceability of the product[35]. In Kalimantan, there is significant potential for rattan but producers have generally been unable to compete with the monopoly the market by large furniture producers in Java[36]. Certification schemes give added value to products, but involve high transaction costs to put in place and are often inflexible. NTFP-EP has introduced an alternative to third-party certification through the PGS, which has been tested and applied in a number of countries

[33]NTFP EP reported that several activities done by the project, i.e.: audience with district head on April 17, 2013. Project also had audiences with several head of offices to report the project activities and to get local government support on policy to protect eco-zonation

[34]Trade Sift, "Are Indonesia'sIndonesia's proposed export taxes and export bans a good idea?",? January 2013. Available from http://www.tradesift.com/%28S%28wmuz3cenp2vkwz45utegx5y1%29%29/%5CReports%5CTradeSift%20Sample%20Report_Are%20Indonesia%27s%20proposed%20export%20taxes%20and%20export%20bans%20a%20good%20idea_January%202013.pdf (accessed 25 October 2014)Trade Sift.

[35]WWF Indonesia, "Indonesia profit from Greater Mekong Rattan programme", 1 November 2011. Available from http://www.wwf.or.id/en/?23542/wwf-indonesia-hadiri-lokakarya-rotan-lestari-di-vientiane-laos (accessed 13 November 2014) http://www.wwf.or.id/en/?23542/wwf-indonesia-hadiri-lokakarya-rotan-lestari-di-vientiane-laos

[36]Meijaard, E.,, Achdiawan, R.,, Wan, M., and Taber, A. 2014. Rattan: The decline of a once-important non-timber forest product in Indonesia. CIFOR Occasional Paper No. 101. Bogor, Indonesia: Center for International Forestry Research

including New Zealand, India and Brazil. In addition, Fair Trade Furniture UK has expressed an interest in testing PGS rattan. PGS is a simple method that can be implemented by farmers themselves. "The system enables organic farmers to obtain certification without having to take on the burden of expensive third party audits[37]." PGS certification costs are said to be 10-50 percent lower than third party or international schemes[38].

According to NTFP-EP, alternatives are needed to the Ministry of Trade's regulation banning exports of raw rattan, which may have positive economic impacts but restricts market access for rattan farmers. "Possibly certified PGS rattan can ensure government and private sector players that sustainably produced rattan is available for sale and can assuage fears that export of rattan will lead to depletion of the resources[39]". Another response of NTFP-EP has been its active involvement in multi-stakeholder forums such as FKKM, Yayasan Setara, and AOI, which support, promote and advocate community forestry and improvements in policies, as well as partnering with CIFOR. More extensive engagement with Yayasan Rotan Indonesia strengthened advocacy and coordination with the Ministry of Forestry on rattan policy issues in 2013.

A constitutional court decision in 2013 recognized that the customary forests (*hutan adat*) no longer fall under state control. NTFP-EP has recognized that this is an opportunity for communities it supports to gain tenurial rights, but is also aware that there are still lengthy procedures involved in implementing this policy change. In addition, district heads and the Ministry of Forestry (merged with the Ministry of Environment in 2014) have not been receptive to the constitutional court decision. Other challenges in enforcing this law pertain to the formalization of land use plans and their inclusion into spatial plans, where customary areas have been historically been absent. Ignoring the tenurial rights of customary forest groups spurs poverty, hinders economic development, and deters environmental stewardship. NTFP-EP efforts to help communities develop maps and land use plans are strategies that can help address these issues. But, NTFP-EP and its partners need to work more politically and strategically on this issue as none of community eco-cultural zonation initiatives have been acknowledged by the government. Local political conditions are highly dynamic and often result in high turn overs. This is a common situation all over Indonesia, and will require a flexible and mult-level lobby approach. More political space may open up in the future under the newly elected administration and through the support of large REDD programmes in Indonesia.

NTFP-EP Indonesia's support is shifting *from* direct community interventions that include providing livelihoods assistance and community resource mapping *to* place more emphasis on upstream, policy advocacy engagement. This means that NTFP-EP is relying more on intermediary organisations to conduct grassroots, community level work and this strategy is chosen as a part of strategy to strengthen local CSOs. NTFP-EP sees itself as a convener of actors at the national level. In area where local capacity is considered weak, NTFP-EP continues to work directly on the ground. This institutional adjustment is suitable considering NTFP-EP's strengths. Given that the SPO relies on a host of implementing partners for downstream work, it should be able to capitalize on the partnerships it has created with local NGOs for use in policy dialogues, influencing tenure issues, and working on markets for NTFPs. This shift will require different capabilities which the SPO does not yet fully command.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3:** **1**

**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2):** **1**

[37]Analog Forestry Network, "Analog Forest: e bulletin by IAFN – Bulletin # 5. May 2013". Available from http://www.analogforestrynetwork.org/newsletter/eng/bulletin_5_complete.html (accessed 13 November 2014) http://www.analogforestrynetwork.org/newsletter/eng/bulletin_5_complete.html

[38]"PGS Rattan: Not Just Another Label",. NTFP-EP Indonesia. Available from http://www.ntfp.org/ntfpadmin/publications-pdf/Rattan_PGS.pdf (accessed 13 November 2014): http://www.ntfp.org/ntfpadmin/publications-pdf/Rattan_PGS.pdf

[39]Ibid

## 5.3 To what degree are the changes attributable to the Southern partners?

This section assesses the extent to which some outcomes achieved can be "attributed" to NTFP-EP. Starting with an outcome, the evaluation team developed a model of change that identifies different pathways that possibly explain the outcome achieved. Data collection was done to obtain evidence that confirms or rejects each of these pathways. Based upon this assessment, the evaluation team concludes about the most plausible explanation of the outcome and the most plausible relation between (parts of) pathways and the outcome. The relations between the pathways and the outcomes can differ in nature as is being explained in Table 7.

Table 8

*Nature of the relation between parts in the Model of Change*

| Nature of the relation between parts and other parts or outcome | |
|---|---|
| The part is the only causal explanation for the outcome. No other interventions or factors explain it. (necessary and sufficient) |  |
| The part does not explain the outcome at all: other subcomponents explain the outcomes. |  |
| The part explains the outcome but other parts explain the outcome as well: there are multiple pathways (sufficient but not necessary) |  |
| The part is a condition for the outcome but won't make it happen without other factors (necessary but not sufficient) |  |
| The part is a contributory cause it is part of a 'package' of causal actors and factors that together are sufficient to produce the intended effect. |  |

Sources: Mayne, 2012; Stern et al, 2012

The following paragraph assesses NTFP-EP's contribution to two outcomes. Each paragraph first describes the outcome achieved and the evidence obtained to confirm that the outcome has been achieved. It then presents the pathways identified that possibly explain the outcomes, as well as present information that confirms or refutes these pathways. The last section concludes in the first place about the most plausible explanation of the outcome, followed by a conclusion regarding the role of the SPO in explaining the outcome.

The evaluation team initially selected two outcomes to measure the degree of MFS-II effectiveness. These were:

- Outcome 1: Ensuring sustainable NTFP-based community livelihoods, in particular rattan, in Kutai Barat
- Outcome 2: Forest-dependent communities in Sintang are in a better position to claim their rights over forest-resources as a result of participatory mapping.

### 5.3.1 Ensuring sustainable NTFP-EP based community livelihoods, in particular rattan, in Kutai Barat.

*The outcome achieved*

Table 9 shows that the income earned from crafts by 17 weavers increased with 63 percent in the 2012 – 2014 period, representing € 15 per month per weaver in 2012, € 23 in 2013 and € 24 in 2014. In the same period the share of crafts work increased from 8 percent of total household incomes in 2012 to 12 percent in 2014.

Between 2012 and 2014, total household incomes decreased with nearly 2 percent, mostly explained by decreased income sources from other persons in the family and remittances. At the same time, salaries for other work than plantation work increased with 85 percent as compared to the 63 percent of income increase for crafts. Incomes from agricultural crops increased with 43 percent which is less than the 63 percent of income increase due to crafts.

Table 9

*Household income and contribution from crafts in IDR and Euro, not compensated for inflation*

| Crafts Income | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Labor Cost in sales to BC/NTFP EP & Warung BUR | 3,736,000 | 11,604,000 | 6,255,000 | 18,408,000 | 16,910,000 | 23,001,000 |
| Sales to Direct Buyers outside of BC / NTFP-EP / CK and Warung BUR | | | 34,937,500 | 24,374,000 | 48,190,000 | 41,025,000 |
| Additional income from another business set up or profiting though income from crafts e.g. handlooms sold, payment for crafts demonstration, etc | | | 436,000 | 2,493,750 | 3,308,750 | 7,872,000 |
| **Total Income from Crafts In IDR** | **3,736,000** | **11,604,000** | **41,628,500** | **45,275,750** | **68,408,750** | **71,898,000** |
| **In EURO** | | | | **3,101** | **4,686** | **4,925** |
| **Per member** | | | | **182** | **276** | **290** |
| **Other Sources of Income** | | | | | | |
| Sales from agricultural crops, livestock etc | 8,100,000 | 16,000,000 | 89,505,900 | 25,785,000 | 36,640,000 | 59,585,000 |
| Cash from other persons in the family or remittances | 12,000,000 | 23,500,000 | 273,776,800 | 478,466,400 | 360,096,000 | 399,927,264 |
| Convenience store (warung/toko kecil) | 36,000,000 | 71,000,000 | 49,500,000 | - | 8,000,000 | - |
| Plantation work | 3,636,000 | - | - | - | - | - |
| Salary for other work (as teacher or other work) | 23,400,000 | 23,400,000 | 33,290,000 | 43,670,000 | 53,500,000 | 51,180,000 |
| **Total non-crafts income in IDR** | **83,136,000** | **133,900,000** | **446,072,700** | **547,921,400** | **458,236,000** | **510,692,264** |
| **In EURO** | | | | **37,529** | **31,386** | **34,979** |
| **Total Household Income** | **86,872,000** | **145,504,000** | **487,701,200** | **593,197,150** | **526,644,750** | **582,590,264** |
| **% of crafts in total household income** | **4** | **8** | **9** | **8** | **13** | **12** |

Source: Information provided by NTFP-EP

Table 9 shows that in absolute figures sales through Borneo Chic, NTFP-EP and BUR increased in the 2011 – 2014 period. However when comparing the sales by weavers to these actors with other buyers and other additional incomes, the percentage of sales through Borneo Chic, NTFP-EP and BUR raised from 15 percent in 2011 to 41 percent in 2012, after which it dropped again in 2013 to increase to 32 percent in 2014 (Table10).

Table 10

*Buyers of rattan bags in percentage of total incomes of 17 weavers in the 2011 – 2014 period*

| Year | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sales to Borneo Chic, NTFP EP and Warung BUR | 15.03 | 40.66 | 24.72 | 31.99 |
| Sales to Direct Buyers others than Borneo Chic, NTFP-EP and Warung BUR | 83.93 | 53.83 | 70.44 | 57.06 |
| Additional incomes from crafts e.g. handlooms sold, payment for crafts demonstration, etc | 1.05 | 5.51 | 4.84 | 10.95 |
| Total | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 |

Source: Information provided by NTFP-EP

*Pathways that explain the outcome*

1. The first pathway is that the Participatory Guarantee System, developed for certification of rattan, explains increased incomes. IUCN's support enabled NTFP-EP to develop PGS standards and promote community participation. PGS standards were developed with the expertise of AOI and LEI and consulted with a host of local NGOs at the national and local level. A weaver group with 20 female members (BUR) was engaged to pilot PGS.

Information that confirms this pathway

- The Rotan Lestari Indonesia (Indonesian Sustainable Rattan Initiative) was launched in March 2012 and its role is to manage the eco certification of rattan and to ensure the market access for certified rattan products.
- The development of the PGS certification was initiated in 2012, engaging a range of actors including LEI, KpSKH, Setara Foundation, CIFOR, AOI and Yayasan Rotan. Standards and guidelines were developed and piloted in 2013.
- During this process a management unit for the certification process was set up engaging district government offices, local NGO representatives and the Association for Rattan Farmers and Artisans

(P3R). Resulting guidelines produced outline the role of rattan farmers and producers in carrying out assurance and highlight that certification is based on the principles of participation, joint vision, transparency, trust, affordability, simplicity, and democratic principles (non-hierarchical).
- 99 percent of all PGS labelled bags were sold in the United States in July 2014, and this increased the total sales of the weaver group BUR with 30 percent in that year. As a result more weavers are said to become interested to plant rattan and NTFP-EP is now in the position to expand its production, sales and marketing of certified products.
- Data from interviews and reports show that following the introduction of PGS, bags fetched an additional 7-10 percent value added.
- According to NTFP-EP the increase of sales through the aforementioned actors between 2013 and 2014 is to be attributed to the Participatory Guarantee System. This is reflected in table 10 by the increase of the percentage of sales through Borneo Chic, NTFP-EP and BUR from 25 percent in 2013 to 32 percent in 2014.

Information that rejects this pathway
- The certification system was only piloted for the first time in 2014 during which monthly household incomes from craft product reached € 1.20 as compared to the previous year, when monthly household income from crafts reached €7.80 per month (see table 9).
- The value added for women of selling certified rattan bags compared to non-certified bags to Borneo Chic is not yet significant with an added value of between 7-10 percent.

2. The second pathway that explains increased incomes from rattan processing consists of Cordaid's support through the Craft Kalimantan network until 2011. This network laid the building blocks for community groups to participate in the development of PGS standards because it gave birth to the women's weaver group Bina Usaha Rotan (BUR) that piloted PGS and also provided market linkage through a high-end retail store, Borneo Chic.

Information that confirms this pathway:
Borneo Chic is the business unit of the Craft Kalimantan network that was set up under the auspices of PT Lamin Betang Persada together by NTFP-EP and four other organisations. Borneo Chic received a World Craft Council of excellence for its handicrafts. BUR sells its products to Borneo Chic.
The Craft Kalimantan network has been funded by Cordaid and Both ENDS and is being facilitated by NTFP-EP Indonesia. Furthermore, staff partly funded by IUCN - NL is involved in Craft Kalimantan training activities: Panthom Priyandoko, JT, even Natasya also through work on harvest protocols for natural dyes in Sintang. This implies that all activities are being funded with MFS II funding, although not all through the Ecosystem Alliance.

Information that rejects this pathway
The BUR weavers' association income statement for the 2012-2014 period also confirms an increased net income of the association in 2012 and 2013, but a considerable decline in 2014 as can be seen in table 11.

Table 11
*BUR Income Statement 2012-2014 (in IDR)*

| Income statement | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
|---|---|---|---|
| GROSS SALES | 39,927,000.00 | 53,075,000.00 | 42,817,000.00 |
| COSTS (labour and raw materials) | 31,796,500.00 | 41,874,000.00 | 36,741,000.00 |
| GROSS PROFIT | 8,130,500.00 | 11,201,000.00 | 6,076,000.00 |
| | | | |
| OPERATING EXPENSES | 3,032,750.00 | 4,788,750.00 | 3,172,000.00 |
| NET PROFIT | 5,097,750.00 | 6,412,250 | 2,904,000.00 |
| ADD OTHER INCOMES (Interests, donations) | 647,000.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| NET INCOME BUR | 5,744,750.00 | 6,412,250.00 | 2,904,000.00 |

Source: Information provided by NTFP-EP

In addition, table 12 shows that in the 2012 – 2014 period, the share of sales of rattan bags through BUR declined in comparison to the total sales at household level. Whereas women sold 70 percent of their bags to BUR in 2012, this percentage dropped to 51 percent in 2014.

Table 12

*Total sales at household level compared to sales through BUR in the 2012 – 2014 period*

| | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total income from crafts at household level in IDR | 45,275,750 | 68,408,750 | 71,898,000 |
| Total sales through BUR in IDR | 31,796,500 | 41,874,000 | 36,741,000 |
| **Percentage** | 70.23 | 61.21 | 51.10 |
| In Euro | 2,177.83 | 2,868.30 | 2,516.68 |
| Per person/month | 10.68 | 14.06 | 12.34 |

Sources: see table 9 for total incomes from crafts at household level; see BUR income statement for an estimation of labour costs paid to women (table 11)

*Conclusion:*

The contribution of the sales of rattan products to general household income has increased in percentage and in absolute values; however these figures have not been corrected for inflation rates. The 17 female weavers sell their products mostly to other buyers than Borneo Chic, NTFP-EP and BUR. The increased share of sales through the three aforementioned buyers from 25 percent in 2013 to 32 percent in 2014 is, according to NTFP-EP, to be partially explained by the Participatory Guarantee System put in place in 2014. Other factors that explain the increased contribution of sales of rattan products to general household income are the Craft Kalimantan network supported by Cordaid and women selling their products to other buyers. All these factors and actors provide a sufficient but not necessary explanation for the increased income.

*Observations with regards to the CIVICUS dimension*

The outcome achieved was amongst others selected to observe the capacity of the BUR association to contribute to the increase of household incomes of the 17 women. However, despite an increased income of the association, weavers prefer to sell their crafts to other buyers than to BUR. In this respect the role of BUR as a civil society organisation with an economic focus is limited.

Also the level of participation of producer groups in developing the guidelines, in this case BUR and P3R, was limited to providing inputs through workshops and meetings without knowing how these would be used but the consultant in charge of developing the guidelines. P3R was given a role in the managerial unit established for PGS. BUR weavers were involved in piloting standards developed. The women weavers were not a part of the first PGS unit as their products were being evaluated by external parties, in this case P3R. The position of women weavers in certification is thus as the 'producer', subject to verification and control. There is a plan to rotate roles within the PGS unit, which will allow P3R's rattan products to be evaluated by BUR.

### 5.3.1 Forest-dependent communities in Sintang are in a better position to claim their rights

*The outcome achieved*

This outcome entails one of the key focuses of the Ecosystem Alliance and was also one of the intended results of the NTFP-EP project implemented in the 2011-2014 period. There is evidence that NTFP-EP supported the undertaking of mapping exercises in four villages in Sintang. This work was subcontracted to a mapping expert who engaged with community groups in the process. By the end of 2014, the four participatory maps produced were presented to the village and district governments for endorsement. So far, the project has only been able to obtain consent from the village and its neighbours. Regulations to acknowledge the maps, neither at district or at village level were issued. The most significant success was in the village of Ensaid Panjang where the community was able to refute the expansion of palm oil using the map produced by NTFP-EP.


The evaluation team was able to visit two of the villages where participatory mapping was undertaken to verify the results and obtain evidence for process-tracing.

*Pathways identified and evidence obtained to confirm or reject pathways*

1. The first pathways consists of NTFP-EP (through technical experts and local partner network) conducting participatory mapping for eco-cultural zonation

Information *confirming* this pathway and its contribution to the outcome:

- Participatory maps produced and signed by village officials[40]




- NTFP-EP supported the drafting of a normative template for village regulations[41] as well as preparing draft regulations for each of the four villages[42]. These drafts regulate the protection and utilization of eco-cultural forest areas, including the size of the protected areas, and how income derived from utilization is managed. In addition a sample matrix describing the roles of community forest groups within the village regulation was formulated[43].
- NTFP-EP's participatory mapping consultant together with JMM undertook lobby efforts to gain support of the District Department of Industry, Trade and Cooperatives (Disperindagkop) office to advocate for a District regulation to recognize the results of participatory mapping in 2013[44]. Unfortunately the head of the Department, who was supportive of the initiative, was replaced in April 2013. As such, a joint initiative was undertaken to organize a meeting with the district and village heads to discuss the village regulations in November 2013[45].





*Figure 2: Pathways that explain the outcome*

- Two official letters (August 2012) were issued jointly by the head of the village of Jaya Karya Bakti, the sub-village head and a palm oil company called PT. Agro Sukses Lestari in which the parties

[40]NTFP-EP maps, see figures below of two of the samples of resulting maps
[41]"Kerangka Struktur Peraturan Desa", NTFP-EP, 2013
[42]"Draf PeraturanPertaturan Desa Empaka Kebiau Raya, Ensaid Panjang, Gemba Raya and Jaya Karya Bakti", NTFP-EP
[43]"Matrik Sistematik Penyusunan Peraturan Desa", NTFP-EP, 2013
[44]Consultant Report and interview with JMM manager
[45]Interview with Head of Village Administration Office, Sintang District

agreed that certain areas of the village would be protected and both timber and NTFPs were not allowed to be exploited in those areas without the agreement of the sub-village head[46].

- In January 2014, the village of Ensaid Panjang obtained the official endorsement from the Ministry of Forestry of a village forest area (Hutan Desa) measuring around 345 hectares. This endorsement is required for the community to apply for the rights to manage the forest area at the district level[47]. Apart from NTFP-EP who sees their role as a convener, other actors were involved as will be further elaborated below.

Information *rejecting* this pathway and its contribution to the outcome:

- According to community members in the two villages (Ensaid Panjang and Gemba Raya), community members were not trained in participatory mapping techniques. The community members reported that they only participated in a one day socialization event, while the facilitators were trained for three days. This one day participation is not considered enough for quality participation[48]. However in Ensaid Panjang most villagers are said to be against expansion of palm oil.
- Participatory mapping engaged members and staff of the Cooperative Jasa Menun Mandiri (JMM), set up by an organisation called Kobus prior to NTFP-EP interventions, and was limited to taking GPS coordinates, women preparing food, and the village mapping team/representatives engaged by the project agreeing to forest boundaries[49].
- People Resource and Conservation Foundation (PRCF) has been supporting the village of Ensaid Panjang since before NTFP-EP's interventions began. In April-July 2011 they conducted participatory mapping (without NTFP-EP support) to map village forest areas (hutan desa), identifying potential resources to support community livelihoods and the ecosystem potential50. The map produced by NTFP-EP clearly states that the results were produced with PRCF support[51].
- NTFP-EP admits that they lack a strategic lobby and advocacy plan for participatory mapping interventions[52].

2. The second pathway consists of interventions external to IUCN also contributing to participatory mapping and communities claiming their rights

Information *confirming* this pathway and its contribution to the outcome:

- Jasa Menun Mandiri (JMM) was set up by an organisation called Kobus prior to NTFP-EP interventions. The consultant hired to undertake participatory mapping engaged JMM members and staff to assist in participatory mapping, especially taking GPS coordinates, facilitating consultations with village elite and women preparing food[53].
- PRCF had already established a CBFM group prior to NTFP-EP interventions.[54]
- Efforts to encourage and advocate for social forestry and hutan desa at the district level have been undertaken by Titian Institute, WWF and PRCF.[55]

[46]Full name of the documents covering two areas (Selabang and Senibung): Berita Acara Kesepakatan Mendata, Perintisan dan Pengukuran Tata Batas Antara Tanah Masyarakat, Perusahaan dengan Kawasan Hutan Adat Pendam/Makam Senibug, Dusun Kelumbik, Desa Karya Jaya Bakti Kecemataan Kelam Permai Kabupaten Sintang

[47]Menteri Kehutanan Republik Indonesia. 9 January 2014. Keputusan Menteri Kehutanan Republik Indonesia 26/Menhut-II/2014., 9 January 2014

[48]FGDs in both villages (Ensaid Panjang and Gemba Raya) with community members, village administration and JMM members.

[49]FGDs in both villages with community members, village administration and JMM members

[50]"PRCF report 'Pengembangan Hutan Desa di Ensaid Panjang, Community Based Forest Management Program", PRCFProgram', 2011

[51]Maps of Ensaid Panjang.

[52]Evaluation Workshop with NTFP-EP, MFS II evaluation 2014

[53]Consultant Report & Phone interview with consultant, and interview with JMM staff

[54]FGD with community in Ensaid Pajang & Fifiyati, "Cerita dari Pendamping Penenun Ikat dayak di Kalimantan Barat: http://www.prcfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Keikhlasan -akan -Berbuah -Keberkahan -dan -Kemudahan", *PRCF Indonesia*, 2011. Available from http://www.prcfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Keikhlasan-akan-Berbuah-Keberkahan-dan-Kemudahan-Fifiyati.pdf (17 November 2014)-Fifiyati.pdf

[55]Dedy Wahyudi, "Menteri kehutanan Serahkan Penetapan Areal Kerja Hutan Desa", *WWF Indonesia*, 14 March 2014. Available from http://www.wwf.or.id/?32062/Menteri-Kehutanan-Serahkan-Penetapan-Areal-Kerja-Hutan-Desa) (accessed 17 November 2014)

- WWF Indonesia has initiated the hutan desa scheme in the villages of Jasa and Rasau together with Titian Foundation since 2009 while Ensaid Panjang received support from PRCF[56].

Information *rejecting* this pathway and its contribution to the outcome: None

3. The third pathway relates to the external local political context that lacks the receptiveness to participatory mapping and communities claiming rights

Information *confirming* this pathway and its contribution to the outcome:

- Village leaders have not been receptive to issuing village decrees formalizing the maps and eco-zonation. The village head of Ensaid Panjang is employed by a palm oil company, making him reluctant to recognize zonation of areas that are off-limits to estate companies[57]. However in the same village the traditional leader plaid a constructive role in the mapping process.
- In Gemba Raya, the village head has not formalized the village maps because he claims not to understand what steps are required as follow up and is dependent on the consultant's assistance[58]. Note: NTFP-EP reported that the mapping team met with head of village on 27 July 2013 and that the village head agreed to invite the head of the Village Consultative Body (*Badan Permusyawaratan Desa*/BPD) to facilitate a village regulation for the map. The evaluation has no evidence of this decree.
- Sintang's District Head has signed concessions for palm oil companies covering the same areas that were mapped with NTFP-EP support[59]. It should be noted however that the community in Ensaid Panjang does not agree to expanding oil palm in their area.
- Circular letter issued by the Head of the District calling of 'provocations' that may damage relations with palm oil companies.[60]
- The local parliament of Sintang (elected for the 2009-2014) period failed to pass a regulation on indigenous, customary forests, which means that non-state forest lands (APL) are still being subject to estate crop expansion, pressuring indigenous peoples.[61]
- The Head of Sintang District has been supportive of palm oil expansion, and considers this as an important source of economic development.[62]

Information *rejecting* this pathway and its contribution to the outcome:

- The Sintang District government has received significant financial support from the Ministry of Forestry (MoF). MoF in 2014 provided funds to the District of Sintang (Special Allocation Funds) amounting to IDR 2.5 billion to support forestry developments. Financial assistance was also provided to support community-based forest conservation development with IDR 50 million being provided to 11 community groups[63].
- MoF issued decrees for village forests (hutan desa) covering a total land area of 5,000 hectares in Sintang[64].

[56]Senentang new.com, "Tiga hutan desa di Sintang Siapkan RKDH – Dorong Penguatan Perhutanan Sosial di Sintang", 14 October 2014. Available from http://senentangnews.com/read/2432/tiga-hutan-desa-di-sintang-siapkan-rkhd-dorong-penguatan-perhutanan-sosial-di-sintang.html#sthash.rkNUCLIG.dpuf (accessed 17 November 2014) http://senentangnews.com/read/2432/tiga-hutan-desa-di-sintang-siapkan-rkhd-dorong-penguatan-perhutanan-sosial-di-sintang.html#sthash.rkNUCLIG.dpuf

[57]FGDs with community groups in Ensaid Panjang and Gemba Raya, interview with JMM manager, phone interview with mapping consultant, interview with Head of Village Administrative Office, Sintang

[58]Interview with Head of Village, Gemba Raya

[59]FGDs with communities in Ensaid Panjang and an invitation dated August 2014 to a socialization meeting on the expansion of palm oil areas under PT Palma Adinusa Jaya

[60]Consultant Report

[61]http://yayasantitian.org/realisasi-perda-ulayat-sintang-tersandung-kenapa/

[62]DSN Group, "Bupati Sintang Tanam Sawit Hasil kerjasama PT KAP dengan 5 Koperasi", 27 October 2014. Available from http://dsn.co.id/m/media_center_news/detail/45/Bupati-Sintang-Tanam-Sawit-Hasil-Kerjasama-PT-KAP-dengan-5-Koperasi (accessed 17 November 2014). And Ridwan Saidi, "Bupati Sintang Minta Perusahaan sawit Bangun PMKS", *Info Sawit*, 22 November 2014. Available from http://www.infosawit.com/index.php/news/detail/bupati-sintang-minta-perusahaan-sawit-bangun-pmks (accessed 17 November 2014)& http://www.infosawit.com/index.php/news/detail/bupati-sintang-minta-perusahaan-sawit-bangun-pmks

[63]Herry Rosadi, "Terima SK Hutan Desa", *Indopos*, 14 March 2014. Available from http://www.indopos.co.id/2014/03/terima-sk-hutan-desa.html (accessed 17 November 2014) http://www.indopos.co.id/2014/03/terima-sk-hutan-desa.html

[64]ANTARA News, "Menhut serahkan SK hutan Desa 5.000 hektar di Kalbar", 13 March 2014. Available from http://www.antaranews.com/berita/423862/menhut-serahkan-sk-hutan-desa-5000-hektar-di-kalbar (accessed 17 November 2014)

- The Department of Forestry in Sintang has been supportive of efforts by WWF, Titian Institute and PRCF to propose CBFM and hutan desa schemes[65].

*Analysis:*
The evidence shows that NTFP-EP indeed supported participatory mapping in four villages, including non-forest areas. Without NTFP support these maps would not have been produced (they are *a necessary but insufficient explanation* for the outcome). But, the mapping exercises only resulted in positive developments in two of the four villages (Jaya Karya Bakti and Ensaid Panjang) and did not lead to formal recognition by local authorities in the form of district spatial plans (RTRW)—a land use plan that has legal power to manage the land use change. External actors and factors have largely influenced positive results that were achieved. In Ensaid Panjang, NTFP-EP's efforts were preceded by PRCF, who had already undertaken participatory mapping and was in the process of assisting CBFM propose a village forest (Hutan Desa) scheme, which was approved by the MoF in 2014. NTFP-EP assisted the mapping of other areas of the village that were not classified as forest areas. The endorsement of these maps by the MoF was likely to have been achieved even without NTFP-EP support. The mapping areas outside the forest areas supported by NTFP-EP will help the villages defend their rights to managing resources in these non-forest areas.

In Jaya Karya Bakti, the results are likely to have stemmed from support from the village administration to the mapping exercises. But the agreement reached with the palm oil company on zonated areas would not have been achieved without the maps.

In all four villages, NTFP-EP conducted some efforts to organize community members to conduct village mapping, as was done through the JMM cooperative who were enlisted by the consultant hired to undertake participatory mapping. In this regard, there is a risk that the process has not led to a transfer of knowledge and skills. Under the project, a number of audiences with local government were organized to report project activities and mapping results. More intense and long-term relationship building with the local government are more desirable for mapping efforts to be recognized and endorsed. Without skill transfer and intensively working to improve the participation and organization of community members not just in mapping but in village and district lobby efforts to negotiate for the legalization of the maps by the local government, it is unsurprising that the maps were not used in all four locations.

Local political dynamics have also shaped the rather sluggish response from the government. The Ministry of Forestry has provided sufficient support for community-based forestry initiatives in the district but this has only resulted in selective support on the part of the district government. On the other hand, WWF, Titan Institute and PRCF working in the district have received support from the district government.

*Conclusion:*
Forest depending communities being able to claim their rights in the four villages that NTFP-EP is working with can be explained by multiple pathways that consist of interventions by different actors. These processes differed from village to village. This implies that multiple pathways in the villages explain the outcome in a sufficient but not necessary way.

The evaluation team concludes that NTFP-EP's efforts to develop participatory maps form the building blocks for greater recognition of community rights to manage forests, but that this alone is not sufficient to bring about government acknowledgement and commitment. The project benefited from previous initiatives that managed to organize the communities. Local political dynamics have also played an important role in shaping the extent to which community claims are supported. However, although lobby activities were undertaken by NTFP-EP and its partners in the form of government audiences and consultations with government offices they have not yet resulted in a formal acknowledgement by the government to include the community maps in the district regulation (spatial plan).

From a CIVICUS perspective that addresses civil society building, the evaluation team observes that the interventions of NTFP-EP have been built upon existing groups created by other actors. This in

[65] http://yayasantitian.org/408/

itself is efficient and effective, but at the same time implies that NTFP-EP has only partially contributed towards enhancing civil society.

## 5.4 What is the relevance of these changes?

### 5.4.1 Relevance of the changes in relation to the Theory of Change of 2012

The outcomes for which process tracing was conducted were relevant to the 2012 Theory of Change (ToC) but the strategies applied to achieve the outcomes seemed to have estranged somewhat from the underlying preconditions. As identified in the ToC, NTFP-EP's outcomes related to the CIVICUS framework's 'perception of impact' – policy influence, networking and social entrepreneurship, whereas the end line findings concentrate upon improving livelihoods and tenurial rights.

The ultimate objective of NTFP-EP was improved rural livelihoods through improved forest management, in particular through mainstreaming NTFPs in forest management. Preconditions for this change to occur were determined in the baseline as follows:

1. Favourable policies and practices regarding NTFP that would be met if: 1) indigenous communities obtain rights and access to forests as collectors and craftsmen, 2) international pressure increased to protect Indonesia's forests, and if 3) existing market for NTFP products.
2. Successful marketing and sales efforts at international, national, regency and local level. Increased consumer demands that arise from campaign efforts, middle-class interest, use of new technologies and successful marketing. Improved capacities of producers to react to market volatility and consumer behaviour.
3. Expansion of social entrepreneurship through better networks between NTFP producers and consumers, the generation of practical knowledge amongst community producers, and support for NTFP by local governments.

NTFP-EP identified its interventions as building the capacity of forest communities, conducting research and policy influence, and strengthening the organization of producers. Since all three preconditions hinged to a large extent on improved community capability and government support, the evaluation focused on confirming whether community groups have improved their livelihoods and whether there was government recognition for community rights and access.

What the end line has shown is that NTFP-EP's ToC has been rather ambitious. Important achievements have been attained, but the SPO still has some way to go for NTFPs to become viable options that are the preferred choice of the communities and for tenurial security to be achieved through acknowledgement of community rights.

Much of NTFP-EP's efforts seemed to have focused on community development and developing a model that works. Their linkages with other CSOs/NGOs working on forestry issues have certainly been beneficial in keeping NTFP development on the policy agenda at the national level, but NTFP-EP seems to have underestimated the need and importance of working intensively at the district level to influence the government. Empowering indigenous communities so that they can claim their rights (a strategy not identified in the ToC, but part of the logical framework) requires a clear advocacy agenda at the district level because it implies the integration of community maps and plans into local government land use plans. It is true that NTFP-EP conducted many workshops at the local level, some of which worked very well such as in Kutai Barat where support from the local government was garnered for PGS rattan, trade fairs, and trainings. But, due to the highly dynamic political-economic nature of the district, continuous efforts to maintain the momentum for sustainability of changes needs to be incorporated into the advocacy strategy. Workshops, audiences and consultations alone may not be sufficient to incite government responsiveness and support.

Future initiatives that seek to strengthen civil society would benefit from indicators that measure the responsiveness of the public and private sector to taking up socio-economic and environmental concerns of community groups, the impact of organizing communities on policy influence, and the changes in attitudes of intermediary organisations as well as the public and private sector towards NTFPs and tenurial issues.

### 5.4.2 Relevance of the changes in relation to the context in which the SPO is operating

In recent years, the Government of Indonesia (GOI) has implemented reforms to address deforestation through improved forest governance. REDD+ has become one of the key priorities of the government, with institutional arrangements moving forward sine the creation of a Presidential REDD+ Task Force in September 2010. In 2013, 10 working groups were established to help the Task Force roll out a national program. In the same year, an official REDD+ Agency was established.

Another relevant change in the context was the issuance of a forest conversion moratorium in 2011 (extended in 2013), effectively postponing new permits to be issued and providing an opportune moment for development actors to address forest governance issues[66]. At the same time, the implementation of community-based forest management had become more feasible with the issuance of implementation decrees in 2007 and 2008. Licenses that were exempt from suspension under the moratorium included those for the use of NTFPs, but also those issued by mining and crop estate sectors[67] - a juxtaposition of policy. The current policy framework, including Decrees issued by the Ministry of Trade generally favours large-scale industries and restrains smallholders from optimal benefits[68].

Oil palm and pulp are amongst the fastest growing sectors in the plantation sector, with much of the expansion taking place in six provinces, of which three are in Kalimantan[69]. In the past two decades, palm oil has expanded with large tracts of land being converted to palm oil. Planned expansion in Kalimantan is occurring at an unprecedented rate; in West Kalimantan there were plans to convert over 2 million hectares into plantations[70]. The industry offers little benefit to local communities and has ignited any conflicts over land. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, of 1,000 conflicts in 2012, 59 percent were linked to palm oil companies, with 439 conflict in West, East, Central and South Kalimantan alone[71]. NTFP-EP's approach, which has sought to address these issues by improving tenurial security of forest peoples and by promoting local economic models of sustainable livelihoods based on NTFPs, is highly relevant to this context.

One of the reasons why the SPO has focused on NTFPs such as rattan, dyes, and honey is their potential for sustainable forest management and a reduction to deforestation. A 2014 paper released by CIFOR stated that "in theory" it is possible that revenues from rattan could be a disincentive for deforestation, but that rapid economic development, high demands from plantation and mining companies willing to buy up land, and a lack of tenurial security are providing rattan farmers with alternatives[72]. In the context of civil society, particularly the rights of minority forest communities, NTFP-EP's interventions are relevant as they seek to develop sustainable livelihoods models for groups that are facing market- and forest-exploitation. However, NTFP-EP failed to obtain endorsement for their mapping initiatives, and were thus unable to provide a basis for the recognition of these rights by

[66]"Mid-Term Progress Report on the REDD+ Readiness Process in Indonesia", NTFP-EP,, Jakarta 2013

[67]Page 36. Indrarto, G. B., Murharjanti, P., Khatarina, J., Pulungan, I., Ivalerina, F., Rahman, J., Prana, M. N., Resosudarmo, I. A. P. and Muharrom, E. 2012. The Context of REDD+ in Indonesia: Drivers, agents and institutions. CIFOR Working Paper No. 92. Bogor, Indonesia: Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), p. 36. And Muharrom, E. 2012 *The Context of REDD+ in Indonesia: Drivers, agents and institutions*. Working Paper 92. CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia.

[68]Adiwinata, Ani and Manalu, Philip. 2014. Understanding policy frameworks to facilitate smallholders' production and integrated marketing of timber and NTFPs in Indonesia. Presentation at the Forest Asia Summit. Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR). Available: http://www.slideshare.net/CIFOR/understanding-policy-frameworks-to-facilitate-smallholders-production-and-integrated-marketing-of-timber-and-ntfps-in-indonesia (accessed 18 November 2014)CIFOR Presentation. May 2014. Available: http://www.slideshare.net/CIFOR/understanding-policy-frameworks-to-facilitate-smallholders-production-and-integrated-marketing-of-timber-and-ntfps-in-indonesia

[69]The Forest Dialogue. 2014. *4Fs Field Dialogue, 16th – 19th March 2014: Indonesia*. Factsheet prepared for CIFOR-TFD participants. Available from http://theforestsdialogue.org/sites/default/files/tfd_4fs_indonesia_fact_sheet_about_indonesia_english.pdf (accessed 18 November 2014) http://theforestsdialogue.org/sites/default/files/tfd_4fs_indonesia_fact_sheet_about_indonesia_english.pdf

[70]"NTFP-EP EA Concept Paper for Indonesia", The Ecosystem Alliance (EA) programme, June 2011

[71]Satria Eka Hadinaryanto, "Special Report: Palm oil, politics, and land use in Indonesia Borneo (Part 1)", *Mongabay Indonesia*, 24 April 2014. Available from http://news.mongabay.com/2014/0424-Hadinaryanto-palmoil-kalimantan.html#ixzz3Ozrtbn00 (accessed 18 November 2014) http://news.mongabay.com/2014/0424-Hadinaryanto-palmoil-kalimantan.html#ixzz3Ozrtbn00

[72]Page 30. Meijaard, E.,, Achdiawan, R.,, Wan, M., and Taber, A. 2014. Rattan: The decline of a once-important non-timber forest product in Indonesia. CIFOR Occasional Paper No. 101. Bogor, Indonesia: Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), p. 30CIFOR

the public or private sectors. Supporting NTFPs without successfully influencing market drivers and policies that are in favour of estate crops and extractive industries will remain an uphill battle.

### 5.4.3 Relevance of the changes in relation to the policies of the MFS II alliance and the CFA

Ecosystem Alliance's programme goal is *"to improve the livelihoods of the poor and create an inclusive economy, through participatory and responsible management of ecosystems".* It contains three programmatic themes: Livelihoods & Ecosystems, Greening the Economy and People and Climate Change. Three intervention strategies that link these themes are direct poverty alleviation, building civil society, and influencing policy. Major components in the programme are capacity building and learning. NTFP-EP contributes to the Livelhoods and Ecosystems programme.

Ecosystem Alliance introduced the programmatic approach as a means to contribute to civil society development and policy influence. This implies that all EA partners in Indonesia work together to reach joint results. At the EA programmatic level four objectives were set, of which two were merged later.

NTFP-EP is the coordinator to obtain achievements with regards to Sustainable Livelihood Initiatives and Models (SLIMs). This programme will culminate in the organisation of a SLIMs festival as a closure of the EA MFS-II programme in 2015. According to IUCN and NTFP-EP, the SLIMs festival initative has already successfully mobilized funding commitments of more than US $ 16,000. Films will be shown, music will be listened to that related to nature and ecosystems and products will be marketed. The objective is to attract the Indonesian middle class as a consumer and to show the government what is possible by sustainably sourcing and eco-cultural systems' conservation and restoration. The evaluation team found some evidence of EA partners collaborating through exchange visits (between the Dayak Punan in Malinau and the Warsi-supported hutan desa project) and national lobby interventios, both EA and non-EA funded. Since the project is underway, it not yet possible to make conclusions on the achievements of SLIMs and to what extent an interest of middle class consumers will be able to influence government attitudes and practices.

The original idea of the EA programme in Indonesia was to halt the expansion of palm oil concessions and mineral concessions. In this light, the evaluation team did not find evidence that NTFP-EPs participatory mapping exercises with communities has led to the recognition of these maps by the district of Sintang, and that NTFP-EP has not yet developed an approach to lobby the district to endorse participatory village maps. There is evidence of an agreement being reached with a palm oil company in one village on land-use, but other than that the achievements have not contributed to the overarching goal of the Ecosystem Alliance support.

## 5.5 Explaining factors

### 5.1.1 Internal factors

At the start of the implementation of the project, IUCN conducted an organisational scan of NTFP-EP using the five capacities framework and applying two additional EA capacities. Five capacities (capability to act, generate, relate, adapt and achieve) were assessed. Overall, most core capacities and sub-capacities received scores between 2.5 and 3 (4 being the maximum). The following table presents an overview of the scores for each core capacity.

Table 12

*IUCN assessment of NTFP-EP against the 5C framework.*

| Capacity | Description | Score (between 0 and 4) |
|---|---|---|
| 5 Cs | | |
| 1 | The capability to act | Mean score of 2.7 |
| 2 | The capability to generate | Mean score of 2.7 |
| 3 | The capability to relate | Mean score of 2.9 |
| 4 | The capability to adapt and self-renew | Mean score of 3 |
| 5 | The capability to achieve coherence | Mean score of 2.75 |
| IUCN 2 Cs | | |
| 6 | The capability to integrate environmental issues in sustainable development discussions / practice | Mean score of 2.67 |
| 7 | The capability to work in fragile states and on sensitive issues | No scores for NTFP-EP Indonesia |

Source: IUCN Organisational Scan 2011 (filled in by NTFP Philippines and commented by NTFP-EP Indonesia)

NTFP-EP Indonesia scored highest in its capability to relate (defined as how the organisation starts and maintain relationships with other organisations), and the lowest in IUCN's capability to integrate. Since the baseline, the capacity to relate remains one of the core strengths of NTFP-EP. These strengths are particularly evident in the SPO's ability to collaborate with a host of local organizations (although the evaluation team does have some feedback relating to this in Chapter 6) and its alliances with other CSOs/NGOs that share similar goals and principles, as well as engaging in national and regional forums on issues related to NTFP management.

Internal factors contributing to the achievement of the outcome relate to NTFP-EP's institutional transformation. Since the establishment of NTFP-EP Indonesia, in-country decision-making has become more effective and efficient. The size of the SPO's staffing has increased from four to 11 staff in 2014. NTFP-EP claims that half of the staff are technical staff who can give direct assistance to the partner organizations. However, the in-country evaluation team notes that as a whole NTFP-EP still operates very much like a small-grants programme, providing funds to (or 'sub-contracting') local partners to implement the programme in Kalimantan. NTFP-EP's office is located in Jakarta, with minimum field presence in Kutai Barat only. This means that the onsite oversight is challenging. In addition there is a lack of technical support to lobby and advocacy with political actors at the district level. This could explain why community forest zonations are not yet acknowledged by the government.

NTFP-EP's personnel have good personal networks. Some of the individuals working for NTFP-EP are also engaged with partner organizations, as in the case with JMHI. The NTFP-EP programme also contributed to the establishment of Setara Foundation in the early 2000s. These personal linkages are likely to have contributed to conducive working relations with local partners. Additionally, NTFP-EP has provided secretariat support to the Indigenous and Community Conserved Areas (ICCAs) Working Group in Indonesia. Many of NTFP-EP's implementing partners in turn have had long-standing relations with the communities supported through NTFP-EP, facilitating the implementation of downstream work.

### 5.1.2 External factors

External factors that have affected the achievement of the outcomes include market structure and demand as well as political commitment of local district governments. Demands for eco-certified products are mainly driven by global and export markets. The majority of Indonesian consumers still cannot afford the premium that certification implies, or lack an interest in labelled products. At the same time the market for organic products is growing. Only educated consumers in a small number of big cities in Indonesia have shown interest in eco-labelling. Yet even in such cities, knowledge of certification in the consuming public is limited.

The restrictions placed on the export of raw rattan have in some cases led to rattan farmers no longer being interested in joining groups or organisations because of the drop in the price of rattan. A CIFOR study published in 2014 noted that producers and farmers lack interest in maintaining their rattan gardens because they can obtain higher revenues from the sale of other forest products and by selling

their land to coal mining and palm oil companies. In some areas the production of rattan handicrafts have ceased all together because there is no motivation for such work.[73]

PGS certification was completed in 2014 but the impact on farmers' livelihoods with the promised "premium price" has not yet materialized at a sufficient scale to lead to critical mass for livelihood improvement. International literature shows that in many cases such promise has many challenges. For example, in Mexico, certification did not ease slumps in chicle sales and did not provide better market access, while in South Africa there was no improved demand for more expensive, high-quality, certified medicinal plants[74].

In its progress reports, NTFP-EP reported that political dynamics at the district level negatively affected the implementation of several interventions. In 2012, a newly elected district head of Malinau was in favour of palm oil expansion, which made it difficult for the community and the implementing partner to lobby for recognition of community forest management rights. Furthermore, dynamics between the local district head and the legislative branch in 2013 created unconducive conditions to hold workshops on the issue of sustainable livelihood landscape models. In Sintang District, NTFP-EP lost one of its champions when the Head of the Industry, Trade and Culture Office was moved to another office, affecting the efforts implemented.

### 5.1.3 Relations CFA-SPO

NTFP-EP benefited from previous investments by Cordaid and other donors in the same project areas on similar issues. Cordaid projects have focused on establishing markets for indigenous crafts and promoting high-end craft items.

IUCN has supported regional NTFP-EP initiatives through its sub-grant programme since 2004, which have consistently included Kalimantan as a project location. As a part of a collaborative network of over 60 organisations, NTFP-EP Indonesia can draw from the knowledge and experience of forest-based initiatives from five other countries. NTFP-EP and partners also benefited from linkages with other IUCN partners. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the IUCN and NTFP networks in and outside of Indonesia have provided an opportunity for partner organisations and community groups to learn from each other. Indonesia has both hosted and taken part in these exchanges. For instance, in 2012 a study tour was organized between the Forest Department of Sarawak and West Kalimantan to learn from NTFP development for possible replication in Malaysia[75]. In 2013, the regional NTFP-EP organized seed sharing and exchange between India and Indonesia. In the same year, Dayak weavers from Indonesia took part in a study tour to the Philippines where they learned from local craft production experiences. Further exchanges were planned for 2014, include exposure visits, participation in regional and international events, trainings, as well as codification of best practices. For example, in September 2014 NTFP-EP facilitate an exchange between Indonesia and the Philippines on Indigenous and Community Conserved Areas (ICCAs) and tenure issues, which successfully triggered further sharing and exchange between the two countries.

[73]Ibid Meijaard E, Achdiawan R, Wan M and Taber A. 2014. Rattan: The decline of a once-important non-timber forest product in Indonesia. Occasional Paper 101. Bogor, Indonesia: CIFOR.

[74]Alan Pierce, A.,Patricia Shanley, P.,Sarah Laird S. 2003. Certification of non-timber forest products: Limitations and implications of a market-based conservation tool. Paper presented at The International Conference on Rural Livelihoods, Forests and Biodiversity 19-23 May 2003, Bonn, Germany

[75]"2012 NTFP-EP for South and Southeast Asia Annual Report", NTFP-EP, 2012

# 6 Discussion

## 6.1 Design of the intervention

Overall, NTFP-EP's intervention logic and project design fell short of clearly identifying how interventions as the community level would lead to strategic results for civil society. There was a gap between the activities and their associated results. For example, to achieve the result (2.1) "target communities are organized and empowered to manage and benefit from ecosystems and claim their rights on natural resources", three activities were identified. These were participatory community mapping, learning visits, and cross visits. While activities may have been successfully implemented, these did not necessarily lead to community empowerment and the ability to claim rights.

Another area in the design that could be improved was lobby and advocacy. The concept note stated that NTFP-EP would be working with the local government, who had been working with grassroots partners for some time. There seemed to be an assumption that partners to whom activities were subcontracted would be able to influence the district governments. During implementation, implementing partners did engage with other NGOs, district heads and the Departments of Forestry and Trade, but this seemed to be mainly through workshops and presentations. A clear and focused lobby strategy, integrated into the design, should have included influencing government policies. Future interventions would benefit from a plan of action that could include: 1) an analysis of the enabling environment and the policies at local level that are supportive of community natural resource management; 2) jointly developing NTFP management plans with local government; 3) working with the government to establish working groups with relevant departments on NTFP management; 4) assisting local governments to produce regulations that support sustainable community management of NTFPs, and; 5) improved value chain analysis to help the government and community organisations identify strategic interventions needed to make NTFP-based livelihoods more sustainable.

NTFP-EP identified its role as being a catalyst, facilitator and networker. NTFP-EP has indeed been able to create a good network of local organizations, as well as working with well-known NGOs at the national level. However, the evaluation team questions whether the model of subcontracting is a valid approach for civil society building. As mentioned in other sections, NTFP-EP itself did not have a strong field presence and had minimal field presence. Activities were dispersed over seven districts in Kalimantan. This has inherent challenges not only for oversight, but also for assisting subcontractors (in this case local NGOs) to strengthen their own organisation. As a convener of local organisations and networks, NTFP-EP can benefit from a three-pronged approach, namely: 1) to further improve the capacities and skills of local stakeholders/institutions (which include local partners) in NTFP management for civil society and conservation benefits; and 2) empowering local, NTFP-dependent communities, and 3) influencing district officials and strategic plans. NTFP-EP could focus more on ensuring that its network and local CSOs and cooperatives it supports improve their position in the civil society arena through collaborative efforts that are geared towards sustained community benefits of NTFP management and influencing public and private sector policies and practices. In order to implement such interventions effectively and with the given resources, a smaller geographic scope is recommended (one province, and two or three selected districts within that province).

Another observation is that NTFP-EP is working on sensitive issues, namely community tenurial rights and the encroachment of large estate companies. Some of the NTFPs, such as rattan, may be on land demarcated for non-forest use. This means that it competes directly with estate crops such as rubber, oil palm and pulp. In turn, protecting community claims to natural resource management ideally should include engaging Ministries and Departments that oversee these areas, such as the Ministry of Agriculture. Effective protection of community tenurial rights means determining first what kind of local land-use systems and practices are in place, and then determining how these relate to forest classifications (See Chapter 2) that have been set by the government for a particular area. Where state forest land has been demarcated for production forest, the village forest (hutan desa) scheme, as supported by Warsi in Jambi and West Sumatra, may be an appropriate strategy. Exchanges

between NTFP-EP and Warsi have been facilitated through the project, but more intensive direct technical assistance is probably needed to support customary groups in Kalimantan to successfully replicate Warsi's model. However, addressing community management rights through formal recognition does not automatically lead to better community livelihoods. Without alternative livelihoods, community members may still fall back on unsustainable practices that lead to deforestation.

There is no easy solution to the dilemmas faced by communities living in forest and non-forest areas that are rich in NTFPs. IUCN is already facilitating exchanges between partners that implement different approaches and strategies. This is the right course to take, especially for NTFP-EP who considers itself to be a convener. Documenting what works and what doesn't work is critical if approaches are to be combined with another.

With regards to strengthening community-based NTFP enterprises, the evaluation team notes that Borneo Chic, the marketing arm of Crafts Kalimantan, has been successful in the marketing and sales of community products. While producers are making more profits through certification and participation in craft fairs, these benefits will have to be brought to scale in order to generate wider positive economic impact for villages. Communities that are aware of the economic opportunities of NTFPs will more likely become active citizens and undertake efforts to advance their shared interests at different levels.

# 7 Conclusion

*Changes in the civil society arena of the SPO*
In the 2012 – 2014 period, the most important change that took place in the civil society arena of the SPO are related to civic engagement: NTFP-EP managed to increase membership of groups that engage in the production and sales of NTFP products with 13 percent, whilst at the same time increasing their income from € 53 in 2012 to € 137 in 2013. However, participation of women in a participatory certification system for rattan product, as well as their participation in community eco-cultural mappings is marginal.

Another change that was realised with regards to the 'perception of impact' dimension, in particular in relation to local policy influencing, consists of communities having made their eco-cultural mappings as a means to influence districts in charge of spatial planning. On one occasion this helped to refute a demand by a palm oil company.

Also of note is that with regards to Practice of Values, NTFP-EP has undergone an institutional transformation in mid-2012 becoming an independent foundation. This has arguably led to better accountability.

*Contribution analysis*
A first outcome that we looked at concerns and increased income earned from crafts by 17 weavers. Their incomes in absolute values (but not corrected for inflation) representing € 15, € 23 and € 24 per month per weaver in respectively 2012, 2013 and 2014. In the same period the share of crafts work increased from 8 percent of total household incomes in 2012 to 12 percent in 2014. The most plausible explanation of this increased income consists of increased sales to in the first place other buyers than Borneo Chic, a business unit created by the Craft Kalimantan network supported by NTFP-EP in collaboration with Cordaid and Both Ends until 2011 and with MFS II funding. In the second place Borneo Chic, NTFP-EP and the association of the weavers explain the outcome. In the third place the Participatory Guarantee System that was launched in 2014 with support from IUCN-NL provided some additional value. Each of these actors and factors are a sufficient explanation for the increased outcome, but other factors such as women selling their product to other buyers, also explain the outcome.

The second outcome the evaluation traced was the ability of forest dependent communities to claim their rights to managing forest resources and land in four target villages. Multiple pathways can explain the outcome. NTFP-EP's efforts to develop participatory eco-cultural maps form the building blocks for greater recognition of community rights to manage forests, but this alone is not sufficient to bring about government acknowledgement and commitment. Other actors played an important role in terms of organising communities and lobbying the district to obtain the endorsement of the village maps. NTFP-EP recognizes that achievements were a result of joint efforts by itself and other CSOs and NGOs. Although NTFP-EP conducted lobby efforts directed at the local government, the legal recognition of the maps and community rights has not yet been achieved. Advocacy for recognition by government of community maps may take longer than the time afforded by the project period. In this regard, the sustainability of the outcome (communities able to claim their rights) will require additional efforts to ensure district policies and practices do not annul or influence current achievements.

From a CIVICUS perspective the contribution of both outcomes towards enhancing civic engagement, strengthening CBOs like the weaver group is limited.

*Relevance*
With regards to the baseline ToC, the interventions and outcome achieved are relevant because they are in line with the ultimate objective of NTFP-EP to improve rural livelihoods through better forest management, in particular through mainstreaming NTFPs in forest management. However, the interventions did not address preconditions identified in the 2012 ToC, specifically with regards to a conducive political context.

With regards to the context in which NTFP-EP is operating, its interventions and outcome achieved are relevant because the Governments 'concession regime' has infringed the capacity of forest-dependent communities to attain sustainable livelihoods options that do not contribute to the depletion of scarce forest resources.

With regards to the CS policies of IUCN, NTFP-EP's interventions and outcome are only partly relevant because although the existence of community maps may help the communities' bargaining position to deal with land use change with the private sector agencies and government, legal recognition of these community-produced maps has not yet been realised. While communities are taking forest management more seriously, structural change is more challenging, especially considering that communities palm oil permits and mining permits have been granted around forested areas. Nonetheless, there are opportunities for communities to make sure these forested areas are not converted to plantation areas. For example, in one of the target villages, an agreement was reached with a palm oil company on land-use, which is in line with the overarching goal of the Ecosystem Alliance support.

*Explaining factors*
The most important factors that explain the changes from the internal organization point of view is the institutional transformation that allows NTFP-EP to make in-country decisions. Interventions preceding NTFP-EP's project supported by MFS-II have formed an important basis for continued support and community participation. NTFP-EP benefited from previous investments by Cordaid and other donors in the same project areas. Other influencing factors with regards to participatory community mapping relate to high local political dynamics, as well as lack of capacity of NTFP-EP and implementing partners to undertake strategic lobby interventions. While the evaluation team recognises that NTFP-EP has undertaken lobby interventions, there is a need for more strategic interventions at a higher level because current interventions have not yet resulted in legal recognition from district authorities.

*Design*
NTFP-EP's project design fell short of clearly identifying how interventions as the community level would lead to strategic results for civil society. This is in particular the case with regards to communities claiming their rights on natural resources and lobbying districts governments to endorse natural resources maps for land use with a forest or an agricultural destination. Future interventions would benefit from a plan of action that includes: a context analysis including the identification of favourable district policies; a joint development of NTFP management plans with local government; creating working groups within the local government regarding NTFP management; support them to produce regulations in favour of the participatory management of NTFPs, and; improved value chain analysis meant to make NTFP-based livelihoods more sustainable and which includes market access through Borneo chic.

The project design could further benefit from a concentration of efforts on fewer districts; building the capacities of local stakeholders and partners in NTFP management and; empowering them to claim their rights.

Table 13
*Summary of findings.*

| When looking at the MFS II interventions of this SPO to strengthen civil society and/or policy influencing, how much do you agree with the following statements? | Score |
|---|---|
| The CS interventions were well designed | 5 |
| The CS interventions were implemented as designed | 6 |
| The CS interventions reached their objectives | 5 |
| The observed outcomes are attributable to the CS interventions | 5 |
| The observed CS outcomes are relevant to the beneficiaries of the SPO | 7 |

Score between 1 to 10, with 1 being "not at all" and 10 being "completely".

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**Resource persons consulted**

| *Name of key informant* | *Organisation* | *Function in organisation* | *Relation with SPO* | *Contact details including e-mail.* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nikolaus Boro Suban | LP3M- Lembaga Pemerhati dan Pemberdayaan Dayak Punan Malinau | | Local Partner | Jl. Raja PanditaRt 7/5, Malinau-77554, Kalimantan Timur Indonesia Ph. +62 813 464 51113 jerri_niko@yahoo.co.id> http://punan-malinau.blogspot.com |
| JusuftaTarigan Jusupta Tarigan | NTFP-EP | Executive Director | Management | +62 812 92500 13 jtarigans@gmail.com |
| Natasya Muliandari | NTFP-EP | Conservation Officer | | +62 818 973 726 |
| Merry Tobing | NTFP-EP | Enterprise Officer | | +62 812 5578 372 Merrycr.tobing@gmail.com |
| | | | | |
| Wiji Rahayu | NTFP-EP | Finance Officer | | +62 815 85 84 820 844 |
| Dewi | Bina Usaha Rotan | Rattan artist | | |
| Cepi | Beneficeries of Participatory Mapping in Sintang | Kelompok Lemambang Keliung | | |
| Sugiman | Member of JasaMenenunMandiri Cooperation | Manager of Jasa Menenun Mandiri Cooperation | | |
| Sagiman | Facilitator of participatory mapping | Staff of Jasa Menenun Mandiri Cooperation | | |
| Irawan | Participatory mapping consultant | | | |

# Appendix 1 Civil Society Scores

This table presents the appreciation of the evaluation team regarding changes occurred for each indicator between 2012 and 2014 on a scale of -2 to + 2

- 2 = Considerable deterioration
- 1 = A slight deterioration
  0 = no change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012
+1 = slight improvement
+2 = considerable improvement

| Dimension | | Indicators | Question | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Civic engagement** | 1 | Needs of marginalised groups | How does your organisation take the needs of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups into account in your planning, actions, activities, and/or strategies? | +1 |
| | 2 | Involvement of target groups | What is the level of participation of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups in the analysis, planning and evaluation of your activities? | 0 |
| | 3 | Political engagement | How intense is your (individual staff or organisational) participation in locally-nationally elected bodies and/or sectoral user groups? | 0 |
| | | | | |
| **Level of organisation** | 5 | Relations with other organisations | In the past 12 months what has been the most intensive interaction you had with other CSOs? | 0 |
| | 5 | Frequency of dialogue with closest CSO | In the past 12 months how many meetings did you have with the CSO that you have most intensive interaction with? | +1 |
| | 6 | Defending the interests of marginalised groups | Which CSO are most effective in defending the interests of your target groups? In the past 12 months, how did you relate to those CSOs? | 0 |
| | 7 | Composition current financial resource base | How does your organisation finance institutional costs such as workshops of the General Assembly (if applicable); attendance to workshops of other CSOs; costs for organisational growth and/or networking? | 0 |
| | | | | |
| **Practice of Values** | 8 | Downward accountability | To what extent can mandatory social organs (steering committee, general assembly, internal auditing group) ask your executive leaders to be accountable to them? | +1 |
| | 9 | Composition of social organs | What % of members of your mandatory social organs belong to the marginalised target groups you are working with/for? | 0 |
| | 10 | External financial auditing | How regularly is your organisation audited externally? | 0 |
| | | | | |
| **Perception of impact** | 11 | Client satisfaction | What are the most important concerns of your target groups? How do your services take into account those important concerns? | 0 |
| | 12 | Civil society impact. | In the past 12 months, what impact did you have on building a strong civil society? | 0 |
| | 13 | Relation with public sector organisations. | In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with public sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' objectives? | 0 |
| | 14 | Relation with private sector organisations | In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with private sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' perspective? | +1 |
| | 15 | Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations | How successful have you been in influencing public policies and practices in the past 2 years? | 0 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 16 | Influence upon private sector agencies' policies, rules, regulations. | How successful have you been in influencing private sector policies and practices in the past 2 years? | N/A |
| | | | | |
| CS context | 17 | Coping strategies | In the past 2 years, how did your organisation cope with these changes in the context that may have been positive or negative consequences for civil society. | 1 |

# Appendix 2 Changes in civil society indicators between 2012 and 2014

## 1. Civic Engagement

### 1.1. Needs of marginalised groups SPO

NTFP-EP Indonesia considers forest-dependent communities like the Dayaks in Kalimantan to be marginalized by government and private sector actors. Concessions are granted to the public and private sector to exploit forest resources, leading to deforestation and threatening the livelihoods of communities. Under decentralization, local authorities are able to grant such concessions to release non-forest and even forest lands in favour of booming estate crops such as palm oil. In terms of approach and process, during the evaluation workshop, NTFP-EP claimed that they have taken the needs of their target groups into account. This claim has been confirmed by a member of a local partner organization in Malinau[76].

During the 2012 baseline, NTFP-EP mainly supported community groups that produced NTFPs such as rattan, honey and natural dyes through livelihood support. During 2012-2014 period, NTFP-EP continued to support such community-based forest livelihoods, working on increasing access, value added through eco-certification and supporting the sales of NTFP products. In Kutai Barat District, for example, a group of women weavers has been helped to sustain their rattan supplies by introducing an eco-certification model through a regional body called 'Unit Rotan Lestari' that involved 20 members from the existing beneficiary group Bina Usaha Rotan from the Craft Kalimantan project supported by Cordaid. Overall, there was an increase in the number of community groups, people and villages covered by these initiatives. It should be noted that upscaling indigenous crafts initiatives was not supported by the Ecosystem Alliance although certification activities were.

Table 14

*The reach of NTFP-EP's livelihoods/income-generation support in Indonesia 2012-2013*

| Year | # of community groups/enterprises supported | # of people involved | # of villages covered | NTFPs used | Reported sales (in Euros) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2012 | 30 | 1,254 | 68 villages | Bamboo, beeswax, rattan, honey, leaf fibre, natural dyes, water reed | 66,623 |
| 2013 | 37 | 1,440 | 75 villages | Bamboo, rattan, honey, leaf fibre, natural dyes, water reed, honey and honey products, seeds, pandan | 197,386.14 |
| Difference | +7 | +186 | +7 | | +130,763.14 |

Sources: NTFP-EP for South & Southeast Asia Annual Reports 2012, 2013

In addition, NTFP-EP tried to take the needs of their beneficiaries up through the introduction of participatory land use mapping and advocacy for the recognition of eco-cultural mapping by the government. In Sintang District, known for longstanding land disputes with palm oil companies since 2007, NTFP-EP helped 4 villages conduct participatory mapping in 2013. In their reports, NTFP-EP mentioned that four eco-cultural maps had been prepared for Sintang district using participatory methods resulting in communities being more confident about their claims and possible recognition[77].

[76]Interview with Nikolaus Boro SubanS, staff Lembaga Pemerhati dan Pemberdayaan Dayak Punan Malinau – LP3M, MFS II evaluation 2014

[77]"NTFP-EP Third Technical Progress Report (1/1/2013 – 28/02/2014)", NTFP-EP)

In Malinau District, the community maps were presented to the District government for recognition of indigenous rights as well as "community-managed forestry" or *hutan kemasyarakatan*. However, until the end of 2014, legal recognition in the form of a district spatial plan and a decree from Ministry of Forestry, had not been issued by the authorities. NTFP-EP recognized that legal acknowledgement by the government of community maps may take longer than expected.

Based on the above findings the evaluation team rates that there has been an improvement in taking into account the needs of marginalized target groups.

## 1.2. Involvement of target groups SPO

NTFP-EP's approach to ensuring quality participation of target groups (men and women, and youth) and other stakeholders has shifted. In the last two years, NTFP-EP's engagement strategy focused more on supporting intermediary partner organisations to engage with beneficiaries. This shift has brought a risk of detaching from direct engagement with weavers and other producers. This approach is different with their engagement approach in 2012 when NTFP-EP used a beneficiary assessment in its project cycle management and Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) methods in the assessment phase.

In Kutai Barat, where NTFP-EP designed certification standards for forest products, weavers and producers did participate to some extent by providing inputs to work implemented by external consultants hired to develop standards. After developing certification standards for rattan, NTFP-EP established a regional management unit to oversee certification (Unit Rotan Lestari) with representation of a rattan producer group, Perkumpulan Petani dan Pengrajin Rotan (P3R), as product inspectors. This role has a function in monitoring the implementation of standards by women weavers. According to the Rotan Lestari document (April 2014), inspectors will verify whether production meets plans submitted by women weavers. Of note is that there are no women involved as decision-makers in the unit, despite their dominant role in production. Currently the women are not involved in Unit Rotan Lestari because it is their products which are being certified and controlled. However, NTFP-EP foresees a potential future role for the women weaver's group if PGS is expanded to include other producer groups. The women weavers would then play a role in inspecting the products of other community groups.

Participatory eco-cultural zonation or mapping has addressed the needs of target communities, many of which were highly interested as they faced the encroachment of palm oil companies. Work on participatory mapping has relied on the ability of consultants and implementing partners to involve target groups. The participatory eco-zonation mapping in Sintang supported two kinds of involvement. The consultant engaged staff from the NTFP-EP-supported cooperative Jasa Menenun Mandiri in taking GPS coordinates and producing maps. Second, facilitators also involved community groups to clear forest paths, define borders between forest and cultivation areas, and adjusting Village Regulations as community recognition for participatory maps. Women were engaged in traditional roles such as preparing food for the community members conducting forest mapping.

The lack of engagement of women was also found in participatory land use mapping activities in Malinau. An interview with NTFP-EP's partner, LP3M, revealed that the mapping process involved mainly village the village leadership, and to some extent youth were involved in GPS trainings, but women were relatively excluded in the process. The end line evaluation finds that there are similar concerns as during the baseline on equal participation of target groups, especially where gender is concerned.

In the evaluation workshop, NTFP-EP reported that the involvement of target groups in project activities has increased quantitatively as well as an expanded focus on engaging policy makers (See Indicator 4.3). The evaluation team has found evidence of involvement of target groups, however the level of that involvement seems to have varied in each location and was dependent on the performance of intermediary organisations. As such, we do not consider there to be an improvement since the baseline.

### 1.3. Intensity of political engagement SPO

NTFP-EP's strategy and partnership approach[78] shows that SPO is making a conscious effort to link their work on sustainable livelihoods with the political and economic dimensions of forest governance. In the baseline, advocacy efforts were mainly driven by local political needs such as collecting evidence and testimonies from the community to demonstrate to the head of districts (Bupati) that there were alternative options for boosting districts' economies and to convince local legislators that NTFP-EP's programmes were in line with district development plans and/or Bupati visions for indigenous peoples. National level political engagement mainly targeted the Ministry of Forestry and is being implemented in collaboration with other CSOs such as KKI-Warsi, Yadupa Papua, Telapak, Gita Buana Foundation and Mitra Insani Foundation.

At the district level, there is no particular strategy for political engagement other than obtaining buy-in and recognition of local authorities of community maps and certification. The main strategy has been to invite district offices to workshops and meetings and expose them to NTFP-EP's model In Kutai Barat, NTFP-EP worked with the Departments of Trade and Forestry and has managed to engage them in the unit that manages certification standards. These results were attainable because of the relations that had been established through the Craft Kalimantan project since 2008, which the new initiative simply continued (this included monthly meetings with the government).

There is no fundamental change in terms of NTFP-EP's political engagement as there have been no significant changes to local forest governance: the community eco-cultural zonation has not yet been legalized by the government. There was a district regulation issued in Malinau District that acknowledges the indigenous people rights on forest (Perda No. 10/2012), but this regulation was issued in 2012 (baseline period) and according to the website of the Provincial Forest Department, the main actors that were responsible for lobbying for the regulation were AMAN, Komnas HAM, and WWF[79].

What has changed is that there seems to be more resistance amongst political power holders to community-managed forestry. For instance, NTFP-EP, through its network in Sintang, has been working to encourage the head of district to issue a letter instructing village heads and the sub-district to prioritize community access to forest resources given the ongoing conflict and tension with palm oil companies. However, the head of district instead issued a letter to the community warning them against provoking palm oil companies[80]. LP3M, NTFP-EP's implementing partner, also reported that although many meetings had been organised with local authorities to lobby them to adopt the participatory forest zonation resulting in positive government feedback, there has been no concrete follow up in terms of action and regulations by local authorities specific on eco-cultural zonation.

## 2. Level of Organisation

### 2.1 Relations with other organisations SPO

The baseline reported that NTFP-EP manages multi-level CSO networking. In the 2012-2014 period there has been no fundamental change in the SPO's CSO relations. There is a slight change in the strategy of collaboration. Three current strategic levels are identifiable: 1) NTFP-EP's relations with community-based organisations and enterprises to expand and scale up NTFP production and management; 2) NTFP-EP's engagement with local NGOs as implementing partners, and; 3) collaboration with organisations working on similar issues at the grassroots, national and regional level.

[78] Engagement with KKI-Warsi, Yadupa Papua, Telapak, Gita Buana Foundation and Mitra Insani Foundation to strengthen their advocacy and be a part of the ASEAN Social Forestry Network

[79] Dinas Kehutanan Jabar, "Hutan Adat dalam Tumpukan Penguasaan Hutan". Available from http://dishut.jabarprov.go.id/?mod=detilBerita&idMenuKiri=&idBerita=3655 (accessed 15 December 2014)

[80] The head of district letter could not be found during the evaluation, but there is a consultant report/notes of the results of a community meeting with the villages of Ensaid Panjang and Kelumbik on 26-27 July 2013.

Collaboration with grassroots organisations continued, such as community cooperatives and NGOs that are linked to the Craft Kalimantan initiative as shareholders of Borneo Chic, the marketing division of PT Lamin Betang. These Kalimantan-based organisations include Jasa Menenun Mandiri Cooperative, Yayasan Petak Danum, Yayasan Riak Bumi, and Yayasan Dina Tama. Together, since 2011 these organisations have worked to stimulate the production and sales of community forest products through a high-end retail store based in Jakarta[81]. At the same time, NTFP-EP has worked with Jasa Menenun Mandiri Cooperative on community land use planning. This effort is helping to protect natural dyes found in the forest area that are also a main input to producing woven products (tenun ikat).

With regards to the second strategic level identified above, NTFP-EP subcontracted work to NGOs and networks, including *Jaringan Madu Hutan Indonesia* (JMHI), LP3M, *Aliansi Organis Indonesia, and* the Participatory Mapping Network (JKPP). For example, NTFP-EP together with Riak Bumi, began work with *Jaringan Madu Hutan Indonesia* (JMHI) in locations around Sentarum Lake, West Kalimantan[82] and an expansion to Berau Barat District in 2014[83]. This is part of an effort to upscale community-based forest livelihoods. Of note is that NTFP-EP's director is also a member of JMHI's board. Similarly, NTFP-EP organised rattan producers under the Rotan Lestari Indonesia (Indonesian Sustainable Rattan Initiative) launched in March 2012, which also systematizes certification under the Participatory Guarantee System.

With regards to the third level of organisation, NTFP-EP's engagement strategy is generally issue-based. For example, NTFP-EP was able to initiate eco-certification by enlisting the assistance of national networks such as *Aliansi Organik Indonesia* (AOI), *Lembaga Ekolabeling Indonesia* (LEI), and CIFOR, as well as international networks with Keystone India and NTFP-EP Philippines. NTFP-EP is also a part of several networks that work to advance the rights of communities by attaining recognition for indigenous communities and 'hutan desa' or village/community forest. Through networks such as *Forum Komunikasi Kehutanan Masyarakat* (FKKM), and the Working Group on Indigenous Community Conserved Areas (ICCAs), NTFP-EP engages with AMAN, KKI-Warsi, Sawit Watch, HUMA, JKPP, KIARA, Forest People Program, WALHI and WWF Indonesia. In Indonesia, ICCAs are advancing progressively as the role of Customary Territory Registration Body (*Badan Registrasi Wilayah Adat* or BRWA) has become crucial to the formal registration and recognition of indigenous, communal lands that have been documented and mapped[84]. In advocacy works, NTFP-EP also collaborates with other environmental NGOs like Sawit Watch and Telapak for national advocacy.

At the regional level, NTFP-EP continued to work with the ASEAN Social Forestry Network (ASFN), a network in South East Asia which focuses on issues of social forestry and climate change. NTFP-EP was involved actively discussions on these issues, encouraging the mainstreaming of NTFP management into policies of the Indonesian Government, through the Ministry of Forestry. NTFP-EP Indonesia also benefited from exchanges organised by the NTFP-EP regional network.

## 2.2. Frequency of dialogue with closest civil society organisation SPO

There has been a slight improvement was in the frequency of dialogue with NTFP-EP's closest civil society partners. In the baseline, NTFP-EP worked intensively with four NGOs in Sanggau (Yayasan Dian Tama), Lake Sentarum (RiakBumi), Sintang (Koperasi Jasa Menenun Mandiri) and with Kapuas (Petak Danum Foundation) with quarterly visits to these NGOs. In the last two years, NTFP-EP continued to manage quarterly meetings with partners in Malinau, Sintang, Berau Barat and Jakarta and expanded collaboration. Other forms of collaboration that took place in the 2012-2014 period included cross visits involving community members and LP3M (hosted by WARSI) and learning exchange, as well as taking part in annual Ecosystem Alliance meetings. The SPO also helped to organise annual Bina Usaha Rotan meetings as a venue for dialogue. In Jakarta, NTFP-EP helped to

[81]"NTFP-EP. 2011. *Craft Kalimantan Narrative Report*", NTFP-EP, 2011. Supported by Cordaid

[82]Earlier engagement with Yayasan Padi in Paser District was not successful. In response, NTFP-EP began to engage with JMHI.

[83]Jaringan Madu Hutan Indonesia, "Survey potensi madu hutan di Kabupaten Berau", 23 August 2014. Available from http://www.jmhi.info/?p=149 (accessed 10 November 2014)

[84]Non-Timber Forest Products, "Calendar". Available from www.ntfp.org (accessed 10 November 2014); www.ntfp.org, ICCA calendar (Indonesia)

host ICCA working group meetings with eight NGOs (HuMA, AMAN, YKPP, WWF, Sawit Watch, Pusaka, KIARA, and WALHI), which also served as opportunity to exchange ideas and other lessons with ICCA members. Regular collaboration also took place with NGOs base in West Kalimantan, such as Titian, Gemawan, and WWF.

## 2.3. Defending the interests of marginalised groups SPO

NTFP-EP's main strategy to defend the interests of community members remained the same over the 2012-2014 period. This strategy entails: 1) linking forest–based communities to a broader market networks and providing capacity building activities such as training in production and marketing (branding), organizing exhibitions etc.; and 2) implementing Hutan Desa schemes similar to what WARSI has done in Sumatra and advocating for the government recognition of customary land and granting forest management rights to communities.

Unfortunately, in the last two years, interventions have not yet led to high-level results. With regards to the livelihood strategy, certification and exhibitions have increased the visibility and appreciation for products produced by NTFP-EP communities. But certification schemes are not yet fully viable, especially for rattan and honey because further testing is required for the Participatory Guarantee System (PGS) and honey production has not been consistent due to unpredictable weather patterns. Activities and outputs geared towards this objective were also postponed. The idea to upscale and ecologically "upgrade" community-based forest livelihoods (honey) in Kapuas Hulu and Paser, for example, was postponed due to lack of raw materials. Women rattan basket weavers may be getting slightly more (€ 80 per month) for their raw products, which are then further styled and sold through Borneo Chic, but there are no changes yet in the market structure and rattan basket production is not yet a dominant source of income generation.

Similarly, expected results from the eco-cultural mapping on land/forest boundaries in Sintang and Malinau were not fully achieved. Results of participatory mapping were presented to the local authorities, but there was no follow up by the government to recognize these maps. More resources (time, specialized advocacy personnel, intensive lobby efforts at the district, provincial and national levels) are needed for this to be realized.

During the workshop with NTFP-EP, staff acknowledged that there was no change in defending the interest of marginalized groups.

## 2.4. Composition financial resource base SPO

In the 2011-2013 period, NTFP-EP Indonesia's funding has come from external sources with three major donors (IUCN Netherlands, Cordaid, and the European Union). Together these three donors contributed to more than 62 percent of the SPO's resource base. The remaining resources came from other donors, including PT Lamin Betang (subsidiary of Borneo Chic). The dependency on external donor support remains the same in 2014. It should be noted however that NTFP-EP considers the greater independency of NTFP-EP as a separate, registered foundation to be critical in terms of achieving a better financial resource base. However, income-generating activities that were expected to support NTFP-EP Indonesia to become more self-reliant were not realized in the 2012-2014 period and the board members have struggled to raise funds[85] although some additional funds from Cordaid were secured. This dependency on external donors is also reflected amongst NTFP-EP's implementing partner organisations and their end beneficiaries. Honey farmers and rattan groups have not been able to sell more because of certification, although the prices they fetch have increased slightly. NTFP-EP Indonesia is exploring possible support from the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (SSNC) to continue alternative certification for rattan. Fair Trade Furniture UK has also expressed an interest in testing PGS rattan.

It is also of interest to note that NTFP-EP reported in 2013 that Borneo Chic recorded a 25 percent increase in sales of community-produced crafts. Although initial discussions on a profit-sharing

[85]Interview with Tarigan, NTFP Executive Director, 7 October 2014.

mechanism with women weavers have taken place, Borneo Chic will need to find and maintain a sustainable market for community crafts before nett profits are reinvested into the communities.

# 3. Practice of Values

## 3.1. Downward accountability SPO

Since the baseline, NTFP-EP Indonesia as an independent organization has grown due to the 2012 institutional transformation. There are now 11 staff (from four staff in 2012) and there is a clearer decision-making process and accountability mechanism. NTFP-EP Indonesia has been able to adopt business processes from the previous institutional set-up, which was run out of the Philippines. But there has been a significant overhaul, so to speak, from a project-based initiative under NTFP-EP regional, to an independent institution. NTFP-EP has put in place all mandatory social organs (board of trustees, supervisory board, and executive) and this structure allows for better accountability and internal control mechanisms compared to the baseline situation.

Oversight and supervision are now legally the responsibility of the foundation's board of trustees, following the Indonesian regulation on foundations (Law No/16/2001). However, during the workshop with NTFP-EP, staff implicitly mentioned that the board is not as active as they would have hoped, partly because they are geographically dispersed. Annual meetings are conducted nonetheless. In addition to accountability procedures not following government regulations, there is also regular donor oversight. This, according to NTFP-EP's management signifies an improvement from the baseline situation.

However, the evaluation team notes that the director of NTFP-EP is also on the board of JMHI, and since JMHI is one of the grantees, this could potentially become a conflict of interest.

Also, downward accountability of Borneo Chic to its producers could be improved so that producers are more aware of profit-sharing mechanisms. Initial discussions on the matter have taken place, but ideally information pertaining to financial reports should be available to the public.

## 3.2 Composition of social organs SPO

With NTFP-EP transforming into a foundation in 2012, its organizational structure and diversity of social organs have changed significantly. First, the law regulating foundations in Indonesia requires for a board of trustees, supervisory board, and an executive body to be established. This has been done in accordance with the law. Board members (50 percent of whom are women) are representatives from various professions (a professor of Social Forestry, the director of a website that publishes environmental news and an activist and founder of ASPUK). The supervisory board also has representatives from the private sector (the directors of Martha Tilaar Inc. and Dian Niaga) and honey expert. There are no representatives of target groups like the Dayak in the board, which is made up of people from outside Kalimantan. The executive director is aware of this situation and NTFP-EP plans to add a Dayak native to the board.

## 3.3. External financial auditing SPO

On external financial auditing, since its establishment as an independent foundation, NTFP-EP has not been audited externally as an organization. They have, however, been audited for donor-funded projects as was the case with European Union in 2013 and Swiss funding in July 2014.

# 4. Perception of Impact

## 4.1. Client satisfaction SPO

NTFP-EP has not measured the satisfaction of its beneficiaries and it is beyond the scope of this evaluation to carry out such an assessment. There are monitoring instruments in place to track the

income generated from craft production and sales. But there are no instruments to monitor the satisfaction of target groups, such as whether villages are satisfied with participatory mapping. From NTFP-EP's regular income monitoring of targeted households and the group businesses, there is an increased income from crafts production and sales. However the income improvements are not yet significant if we calculate per capita income, i.e. around € 5 per month per capita in the last 24 months. Women weavers only make minimal additional profits by selling certified bags and baskets to Borneo Chic. Through PGS certification, the purchase price of semi-finished rattan handicraft products increased by 20-30 percent. However, craft production is not their main source of livelihood, thus the money made is probably considered as a bonus.

In the absence of client satisfaction data, the evaluation team can only assess the satisfaction of NTFP-EP's local partner organisations and projects such as LP3M, Craft Kalimantan, and JMHI. LP3M and Craft Kalimantan staff expressed their satisfaction with project activities and technical assistance provided by NTFP-EP. However, this satisfaction seems limited to how NTFP manages the project activities rather than substantive satisfaction with the results achieved. This activity-level satisfaction is echoed by NTFP-EP staff, who measure satisfaction of beneficiaries with community acceptance of their activities and their attendance and participation in meetings and interventions[86]. NTFP-EP is also well aware that positive reception by the community has also been due to the fact that the project has not started from zero; community relations were in place before 2011.

## 4.2. Civil society impact SPO

Since 2012, NTFP-EP has actively and extensively networked with other CSOs, bringing them together to develop certification standards as well as to conduct and lobby for community recognition of forest and NTFP management. Collaborative efforts with other CSOs to improve the position of small-scale producers and indigenous groups vis-à-vis the government's concession regime have not led to significant achievements. It seems that all NTFP-EP's efforts require more time and resources to fully bring them to fruition.

There are some results worth mentioning, although they are not yet scalable. First, it is clear that communities who are threatened by palm oil expansion have responded well to the mapping efforts. For villages it is a way to record and communicate their claims to land and resources, which they can then use to refute and reject plans to expand the production area of estate crops. In some villages, village regulations have been issued as an initial step. In Sintang, the mapping exercise resulted in the discovery of natural dyes in the customary forest, which are threatened by palm oil expansion. The findings were presented to the district as a means to advocate for the protection of the forest area.

Second, the Participatory Guarantee System (PGS) and the Rotan Lestari Certification Standards should provide value added to rattan. The certification process and standards have been tested in two districts and Rotan Lestari Indonesia (Indonesian Sustainable Rattan Initiative) was launched in March 2012. NTFP-EP ensured multiple stakeholders were engaged, including community groups (Bina Usaha Rotan/BUR in Eheng Village), Yayasan Setara, Aliansi Organik Indonesia (AOI), Lembaga Ekolabelling Indonsia (LEI) and the Ministry of Forestry. NTFP-EP supported BUR in Kutai Barat to pilot PGS and brought in local partners like AMAN and P3R to support the farmers.

NTFP-EP continued supporting the Jaringan Madu Hutan Indonesia (JMHI) for similar standardization and certification efforts. In addition, local partners of NTFP-EP, Yayasan Dian Tama, Yayasan Petak Danum, Jasa Menenun Mandiri Cooperative and Yayasan Riak Bumi set up a Limited Company (PT Lamin Betang) to continue Craft Kalimantan and Borneo Chic. This strategy has successfully stimulated the production and sales of community forest products, with a reported 25 percent income increase for Borneo Chic in 2013.

[86] Eco-Certification staff mentioned this during the workshop.

## 4.3. Relation with public sector organisations SPO

NTFP-EP's main focus has been on raising the concern for sustainable NTFP management and forestry issues. Overall, NTFP-EP claims that relations with the national-level government (Ministry of Forestry and Ministry of Trade) have improved. NTFP-EP coordinates what they call the social forestry team, which is made up of NTFP-EP, Warsi and HuMA and is engaged nationally with the aforementioned ministries. This is funded through the ASEAN Swiss Partnership for Climate Change Project, for which NTFP-EP is the regional coordinator.

The relationship with the sub-national government is acknowledged to be "stagnant" due to unfavourable external political dynamics, especially in Sintang District. In Kutai Barat, NTFP-EP and its partners have had more conducive relations with the Department of Industry, Trade and Cooperatives (Disperindagkop) and the Forest Department in the area of PGS certification. This resulted in Disperindagkop becoming a member of the executive team within Rotan Lestari Unit. Another stakeholder involved in developing certification standards was the Department for Plantation, Food Crops, Livestock and Fisheries of West Kutai.

In the last two years, NTFP-EP has been working more intensively in participatory eco cultural zonation. Their eco cultural zonation activities have put them in close interaction with the government, but there is no materialised support received from the government and no acknowledgement by the government on the community map. NTFP-EP and its partners have tried to build relations with stakeholders involved in recognizing community maps. However, both in Sintang and in Malinau, the government was largely unresponsive. NTFP-EP described their relations as being "flat". The district head of Sintang has not been supportive, while support for the Department of Culture and the Department of Cooperatives in both districts has relied on personal commitment. Support from the government is still mainly in the form of complying with workshop invitations. This lack of response from the government has been despite regular dialogue through NGO networks and in a joint working group on forest tenure that works to pressure and encourage the Ministry of Forestry.

## 4.4. Relation with private sector agencies SPO

During the baseline, the relation with private sector was still limited the supply side, i.e. NTFP working with communities to supply NTFP products and improve the production quality. While continuing to work in similar areas, NTPP-EP also expanded to influencing the value chain through PGS certification. Although still in its infancy, PGS Lestari Rotan is providing value added. NTFP-EP established a management unit for certification in 2014, engaging both public, community and NGO actors. This unit delivers certification services that are participatory. There is no sufficient information on the effectiveness of the certification and whether newly established links with the private sector will benefit the communities because the system has not yet been adopted and put to full-scale use. Nonetheless, community groups like BUR were able to participate in more national and international exhibitions (such as the International Folk Art Market in Santa Fe, New Mexico) that are helping to expand their market access. One of the BUR members expressed her satisfaction over the amount of exposure the group has enjoyed since the eco-certification project was initiated.

Another successful intervention was the facilitation of JMHI to comply with the Indonesian National Standards (SNI) from the Ministry of Forestry. This was possible through support from Dian Niaga, a small company, whose director is on NTFP-EP's supervisory board. Marketing links have been created with PT. UKMI and Amway for the sale and distribution of honey. JMHI has also established links with cosmetic company, L'Oreal.

These examples illustrate that where there is significant traction and interest in a particular product, NTFP-EP can help facilitate linkages between community and producer networks with private sector actors, including compliance with market demands – whether this is in the form of eco-certification or meeting required standards.

## 4.5. Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations SPO

NTFP-EP is aware that their work depends on public policies, and as such they have continued to conduct policy advocacy through different approaches, which include influencing the agenda-setting of

public debates and influencing policy formulation by presenting evidence and proposals that are based on empirical data collected. NTFP-EP, through eco cultural zonation conducted with the community, has tried to influence land-use planning (spatial plans). Community maps have been presented to district authorities, who have not yet recognized community claims and proposals. Through FKKM (Forum Komunikasi Kehutanan Masyarakat), NTFP-EP has been active in influencing the agenda setting in community forestry issues in the form of multi-stakeholder focus group discussions and sharing evidence. However, there have been no tangible successes beyond agenda setting.

At the national level, NTFP-EP continued to coordinate with key actors such as CIFOR, WALHI, WWF and other environmental NGOs and those involved in the ICCAs platform. These efforts have been geared towards influencing the Ministries of Forest and Trade to mainstream NTFPs and support community efforts. There have been no distinct policy changes that NTFP-EP has contributed to since the baseline.

### 4.6. Influence upon private sector agencies' policies, rules, regulations SPO

This indicator is not applicable for NTFP-EP.

## 5. Civil Society context

### 5.1. Coping strategies

The establishment of NTFP-EP Indonesia (as an Indonesia-based foundation) can be seen as a strategy to cope with changes in funding opportunities where foreign aid is decreasing. This strategy seems appropriate to mobilise domestic funds from private sector (through CSR) and the government, as well as potentially benefiting from the REDD+ initiatives being undertaken in the country (which include Central Kalimantan as a priority area).

Small-scale producers have been pressured by market demands and protectionist trade policies. Effective since 2012, the export ban on raw rattan products has had implication on the livelihoods of rattan collectors and small-scale producers. As in 1986, when a similar policy was put in place, the ban has resulted in lower demands and prices - even for sustainable rattan; and has had negative impacts on revenues and profits[87]. Producers are paid lower prices for rattan since the raw product is no longer being exported and there is more domestic supply. Indonesia is the world's largest supplier of rattan and policies that ban the export of un- and semi-processed rattan may put the industry at risk as well as jeopardize forests.

Meanwhile there are greater demands for legal and certified rattan products on the international market, requiring the traceability of the product[88]. In Kalimantan, there is significant potential for rattan but producers have generally been unable to compete with the monopoly the market by large furniture producers in Java[89].

Given these conditions, one of the coping strategies of NTFP-EP was the hosting of a collaborative workshop with the Forest Department of Kutai Barat District, Department of Industry and WWF Indonesia on schemes and systems for sustainable rattan in January 2013. The aim of this workshop was to spark an interest in sustainable rattan certification and resulted in the establishment of the

[87]Trade Sift, "Are Indonesia's Indonesia's proposed export taxes and export bans a good idea?",? January 2013. Available from http://www.tradesift.com/%28S%28wmuz3cenp2vkwz45utegx5y1%29%29/%5CReports%5CTradeSift%20Sample%20Report_Are%20Indonesia%27s%20proposed%20export%20taxes%20and%20export%20bans%20a%20good%20idea_January%202013.pdf (accessed 25 October 2014)Trade Sift.

[88]WWF Indonesia, "Indonesia profit from greater Mekong Rattan programme", 1 November 2011. Available from http://www.wwf.or.id/en/?23542/wwf-indonesia-hadiri-lokakarya-rotan-lestari-di-vientiane-laos (accessed 10 November 2014) http://www.wwf.or.id/en/?23542/wwf-indonesia-hadiri-lokakarya-rotan-lestari-di-vientiane-laos

[89]Meijaard, E.,, Achdiawan, R.,, Wan, M., and Taber, A. 2014. Rattan: The decline of a once-important non-timber forest product in Indonesia. CIFOR Occasional Paper No. 101. Bogor, Indonesia: Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR)

Rotan Lestari Unit in Kutai Barat and the development of a certification plan. Certification schemes give added value to products, but involve high transaction costs to put in place and are often inflexible. NTFP-EP has introduced an alternative to third-party certification through the Participatory Guarantee System (PGS), which has been tested and applied in a number of countries including New Zealand, India and Brazil. PGS is a simple method that can be implemented by farmers themselves. "The system enables organic farmers to obtain certification without having to take on the burden of expensive third party audits[90]." PGS certification costs are said to be 10-50 percent lower than third party or international schemes[91].

According to NTFP-EP, alternatives are needed to the Ministry of Trade's regulation banning exports of raw rattan, which may have positive economic impacts but restricts market access for rattan farmers. "Possibly certified PGS rattan can ensure government and private sector players that sustainably produced rattan is available for sale and can assuage fears that export of rattan will lead to depletion of the resources[92]". Another response of NTFP-EP has been its active involvement in multi-stakeholder forums such as FKKM, Yayasan Setara, and AOI, which support, promote and advocate community forestry and improvements in policies, as well as partnering with CIFOR. More extensive engagement with Yayasan Rotan Indonesia strengthened advocacy and coordination with the Ministry of Forestry on rattan policy issues in 2013.

A constitutional court decision in 2013 recognized that the customary forests (*hutan adat*) no longer fall under state control. NTFP-EP has recognized that this is an opportunity for communities it supports to gain tenurial rights, but is also aware that there are still lengthy procedures involved in implementing this policy change. In addition, district heads and the Ministry of Forestry (merged with the Ministry of Environment in 2014) have not been receptive to the constitutional court decision. Other challenges in enforcing this law pertain to the formalization of land use plans and their inclusion into spatial plans, where customary areas have been historically been absent. Ignoring the tenurial rights of customary forest groups spurs poverty, hinders economic development, and deters environmental stewardship. NTFP-EP efforts to help communities develop maps and land use plans are strategies that can help address these issues. But, NTFP-EP and its partners need to work more politically and strategically on this issue as none of community eco-cultural zonation initiatives have been acknowledged by the government. However, a lessons learned from the project is that government ministries must provide further clarity on how community plans will be incorporated into the formal spatial planning process. More political space may open up in the future under the newly elected administration and through the support of large REDD programmes in Indonesia.

NTFP-EP Indonesia's support is shifting *from* direct community interventions that include providing livelihoods assistance and community resource mapping *to* place more emphasis on upstream, policy advocacy engagement. This means that NTFP-EP is relying more on intermediary organisations to conduct grassroots, community level work and this strategy is chosen as a part of strategy to strengthen local CSOs. NTFP-EP sees itself as a convener of actors at the national level. In area where local capacity is considered weak, NTFP-EP continues to work directly on the ground. This institutional adjustment is suitable considering NTFP-EP's strengths. Given that the SPO relies on a host of implementing partners for downstream work, it should be able to capitalize on the partnerships it has created with local NGOs for use in policy dialogues, influencing tenure issues, and working on markets for NTFPs. This shift will require different capabilities which the SPO does not yet fully command.

[90]Analog Forestry Network, "Analog Forest: e bulletin by IAFN – Bulletin # 5. May 2013". Available from http://www.analogforestrynetwork.org/newsletter/eng/bulletin_5_complete.html (accessed 13 November 2014)
[91]"PGS Rattan: Not Just Another Label",. NTFP-EP. Available from Indonesia. Availbale: http://www.ntfp.org/ntfpadmin/publications-pdf/Rattan_PGS.pdf (accessed 13 November 2014)
[92]Ibid

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen UR
P.O. Box 88
6700 AB Wageningen
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)317 48 68 00
www.wageningenUR.nl/cdi

Report CDI-15-068
ISSN 0000-0000

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# Yayasan RUANGRUPA end line report

MFS II country evaluations, Civil Society component

Dieuwke Klaver[1]
Hester Smidt

Kharisma Nugroho[2]
Kharisma Prasetyo

1 Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR, Netherlands
2 SurveyMeter, Indonesia

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen, February 2015

Report CDI-15-038

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Klaver, D.C., Smidt H., Nugroho, K., Prasetya, K. S., February 2015, Yayasan RUANGRUPA *end line report; MFS II country evaluations, Civil Society component,* Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR (University & Research centre) and SurveyMETER. Report CDI-15-38 Wageningen.

This report describes the findings of the end line assessment of Yayasan RUANGRUPA that is a partner of Hivos.

The evaluation was commissioned by NWO-WOTRO, the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research in the Netherlands and is part of the programmatic evaluation of the Co-Financing System - MFS II financed by the Dutch Government, whose overall aim is to strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. Apart from assessing impact on MDGs, the evaluation also assesses the contribution of the Dutch Co-Funding Agencies to strengthen the capacities of their Southern Partners, as well as the contribution of these partners towards building a vibrant civil society arena.

This report assesses RUANGRUPA's contributions towards strengthening Civil Society in Indonesia and it used the CIVICUS analytical framework. It is a follow-up of a baseline study conducted in 2012. Key questions that are being answered comprise changes in the five CIVICUS dimensions to which RUANGRUPA contributed; the nature of its contribution; the relevance of the contribution made and an identification of factors that explain RUANGRUPA's role in civil society strengthening.

Keywords: Civil Society, CIVICUS, theory based evaluation, process-tracing

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The Centre for Development Innovation accepts no liability for any damage arising from the use of the results of this research or the application of the recommendations.

Report CDI 15-038 |

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# Acknowledgements

SurveyMETER and CDI are thanking the staff and the leaders of all Southern Partner Organisations that participated in collecting information for the evaluation of the contribution of these partner organisations to creating a vibrant civil society in Indonesia. They also thank the Co-Funding Agencies and the Dutch Consortia they are a member of for making background documents available. We hope that this evaluation can support you in better positioning yourself in the Civil Society Arena of Indonesia.

# List of abbreviations and acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| BCI | Basic Capabilities Index |
| BPS | *Badan Pusat Statistik* (Central Agency on Statistics) |
| CDI | Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR |
| CFA | Co-Financing Agency |
| CFO | Co-Financing Organisation |
| CS | Civil society |
| CSO | Civil society organisation |
| GNI | Gross National Income |
| HDI | Human Development Index |
| ICT | Information and communications technology |
| ISAD | Indonesia Street Art Database |
| IVAA | Indonesian Visual Art Archive |
| *Koalisi Seni* | Arts Coalition |
| KontraS | *Komisi Untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan* (Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence) |
| MFS | Dutch co-financing system |
| MoC | Model of Change |
| MoFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| NGO | Non-governmental organisation |
| Ormas | *Organisasi masyarakat* (Societal Organisations) |
| PSHK | *Pusat Hukum dan Kebijakan* (Center for Law and Policy) |
| RRRec | Record Music Festival |
| SERF | Social Economic Rights Fulfilment |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |
| SSI | Semi-structured Interview |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| Wageningen UR | Wageningen University & Research Centre |

# 1 Introduction

This report presents the civil society end line findings of RUANGRUPA in Indonesia which is a partner of Hivos in Indonesia under the Dutch Consortium People Unlimited. It is a follow-up to the baseline assessment that was carried out in 2012. According to the information provided during the baseline study, RUANGRUPA is working on the theme 'governance'.

These findings are part of the overall evaluation of the joint MFS II evaluations to account for results of MFS II-funded or –co-funded development interventions implemented by Dutch CFAs and/or their Southern Partner Organisations (SPO) and to contribute to the improvement of future development interventions. The civil society evaluation uses the CIVICUS framework and seeks to answer the following questions:

- What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?
- To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
- What is the relevance of these changes?
- What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The CIVICUS framework that comprises five dimensions (civic engagement, level of organisation, practice of values, perception of impact and contexts influencing agency by civil society in general) has been used to orient the evaluation methodology.

## 1.1 Changes in the civil society arena of the SPO

In the 2012 – 2014 period the most important change that took place in the civil society arena of the SPO are related to civic engagement and level of organisation. RUANGRUPA has been successful in promoting inclusive contemporary visual art to allow more upcoming young artists from various backgrounds to explore issues of surrounding context through creative expression. In doing so, RUANGRUPA has defended those who have been marginalised by market interests and played an important role in the improvement of the contemporary arts infrastructure. RUANGRUPA's stature has also been growing as an avant-garde organisation able to organise collective and collaborative efforts that seek to engage a wider audience.

These findings were obtained through an analysis of documents, a workshop and follow-up interviews with the SPO, and interviews with external resources persons working in civil society organisations that receive support from the SPO; other civil society organisations with whom the SPO is collaborating; public or private sector agents and; external resource persons capable of overlooking the MDG or theme on which the SPO is concentrating.

## 1.2 Contribution analysis

Based upon an analysis of the projects and programmes financed by the Dutch CFAs a selection was made of SPOs to be included in an in-depth process tracing trajectory and those to be included for a quick contribution of the other SPOs. RUANGRUPA Ruangrupa was selected for a quick assessment.

The outcome that we looked at is the development of infrastructure for contemporary visual and video art in Jakarta. The most likely explanation to this outcome is that RUANGRUPA has become a benchmark for contemporary visual arts and has contributed significantly to the improvement of arts infrastructure in Jakarta. The contribution of the SPO towards achieving this outcome is in promoting contemporary arts to a common audience, supporting new initiatives for alternative expression and being a knowledge producer in the area of contemporary arts.

## 1.3 Relevance

Interviews with staff of RUANGRUPA, with external resource person, with the liaison officer of Hivos, as well as contextual information helped to assess the relevance of RUANGRUPA's interventions in terms of; its Theory of Change (ToC) for Civil Society (SC) as designed during the baseline study; the context in which RUANGRUPA is operating; the CS policies of Hivos.

With regards to the baseline ToC, the interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant because they comprise of the ToC's preconditions, such as existence of public space, networking, and increasing the capacity of society. With regards to the context in which RUANGRUPA is operating, its interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant because the SPO defended those marginalised by market domination in contemporary visual arts. With regards to the CS policies of Arts Collaboratory, RUANGRUPA's interventions and outcomes are relevant because all RUANGRUPA's objectives fit with Hivos and Arts Collaboratory policies[1].

## 1.4 Explaining factors

The information related to factors that explain the above findings was collected at the same time as the data were gathered for the previous questions. The evaluation team looked at internal factors within the RUANGRUPA, the external context in which it operates and the relations between RUANGRUPA and Hivos.

Internal factors within the SPO that explain the findings are the open character of RUANGRUPA and the fact that the organisation is an artist-run initiative with a relaxed and informal atmosphere. By organising numerous events, RUANGRUPA has also been able to ensure a dynamic leadership, with alumni taking an active role in the organisation.

External factors that explain the findings are an increasing demand for contemporary arts content and alternative forms of expression. The popularity of contemporary arts has likely contributed to greater audience participation, but has also shaped how RUANGRUPA navigates between idealism and the commodification of contemporary art.

Factors that explain the findings that are related to the relation between RUANGRUPA and Hivos are continuous Hivos support from 2003 to 2013[2] and increased RUANGRUPA's role as Arts Collaboratory associate partner since 2008.

The following chapter briefly describes the political context, the civil society context and the relevant background with regards to the MDG/theme RUANGRUPA is working on. Chapter three provides background information on RUANGRUPA, the relation of its MFS II interventions with the CIVICUS framework and specific information on the contract with Hivos. An evaluation methodology has been developed for the evaluation of the Civil Society component which can be found in Appendix 2 of the country report; however, deviations from this methodology, the choices made with regards to the selection of the outcomes for contribution analysis, as well as difficulties encountered during data collection are to be found in Chapter 4. The answers to each of the evaluation questions are being presented in Chapter 5, followed by a discussion on the general project design in relation to CS development; an assessment of what elements of the project design may possibly work in other contexts or be implemented by other organisations in Chapter 6. Conclusions are presented in Chapter 7.

[1] "RUANGRUPA Organisational Assesment Final_2008-2010", Hivos,.docx", p. 2

[2] Hivos, Partners, Yayasan RUANGRUPA. Available from http://www.hivos.nl/dut/community/partner/10003068 (accessed 25 October 2014)

# 2 Context

This paragraph briefly describes the context RUANGRUPA is working in. A description of the Civil Society Context assessed according to the CIVICUS framework is provided in appendix 3 of the country report for Civil Society.

## 2.1 Political context

### 2.1.1 Brief historical perspective

Indonesia's rise to being the world's third largest democratic nation has been lauded by many world leaders. The county is often considered to be a model Muslim democracy. As the fourth most populous nation with an estimated 250 million people[3], Indonesia has sustained its democratic commitment since transitioning from an authoritarian leadership to a democracy in 1998. The decentralized administration now consists of 34 provinces and 508 districts and municipalities.

Prior to 1998, Indonesia was under strict authoritarian regime. Suharto, known for his so-called New Order (1966-1998) regime, ushered in radical transformations that would place social and political forces under direct state supervision. The defining characteristics of the Suharto era were a focus on economic growth and controlled consensus and political stability devoid of dissent. A series of tumultuous economic and political transitions in the nineties severely diminished the credibility of ageing President Suharto, who was forced to resign amidst mass street protests.

His departure in 1998 laid bare three decades of social inequalities, state-perpetuated abuses against human rights, and a lack of civilian liberties. The regime change opened the way for a period of *Reformasi* started under the presidency of B. J. Habibie (1998-1999) and continued by Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001), Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001–2004), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014). Restrictions on citizen participation, press freedom and association were removed. Democratic reforms and decentralization led to direct elections, portioned authority, devolution of authority to regional authorities, formation of new political parties and ended the military's parliamentary influence. The distinct historical periods of the New Order Regime and *Reformasi* (1998-present) have shaped the emergence of civil society. Defining characteristics are summarized in the table below.

Table 1
*Characteristics that have defined the emergence of civil society in Indonesia*

| Characteristics | New Order, authoritarian period (1966 – 1998) | Reformasi (1998 – present) |
|---|---|---|
| Political system | Centralized, authoritarian characterized by unipolarity. Golkar as the dominant political party. | Decentralized, democratic. Fragmentation of power and atomization of patronage relationships. Emergence of numerous political parties. Direct presidential elections since 1999. |
| | In 1999, there were 27 provinces, 306 districts and around 60,000 villages. | Decentralization altered the political and administrative landscape: 34 provinces, 410 districts, 98 municipalities, 6,944 sub-districts and 81,253 villages.[4] |
| State-citizen interaction | Benevolent leader, obedient population. Down to the village level, the state permeated | Modern political culture marked by diminishing hierarchy between the state and citizens, |

[3] In 2010 the population was estimated to be around 237 million people (BPS 2010 Population Census). The current figure is an estimate from BKKBN and similar figures are cited in the CIA's World Fact Book and the World Bank.

[4] Rumah Pemilu,"Gambaran Singkat Pemilihan Umum 2014 di Indonesia", 3 July 2014. Available from http://www.rumahpemilu.org/in/read/3351/Gambaran-Singkat-Pemilihan-Umum-2014-di-Indonesia (accessed 25 October 2014)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | society. | allowing for citizens to interact more freely. |
| Citizen representation and voice | Strict control of speech, expression and association. | Burgeoning of CSOs, pressure groups and NGOs following the political euphoria after Suharto's fall. |
| | CSOs and their networks largely "hiding behind the screen", and operating under state surveillance. A period of growth occurred in 1995-98, as resistance was building. | Indonesian CSOs began to establish new networks internationally. Up until the early 2000s the focus was on state-centrist issues. Later, issues that CSOs were tackling became more diverse, ranging from pluralism, poverty reduction to fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights. |
| Media | No free press, censorship and state-control. Suharto had firm grasp over how to use print & broadcast medias to promote political ideologies. | More vibrant media environment, flourishing of media businesses albeit in control of 12 main conglomerates that are mostly profit-driven and often have political ties. |
| | Limited public and CS use and access to internet until mid-90s. | Twitter nation, widespread social media use. |
| | | Growing realization of the importance of media/free press as the fourth pillar of democracy. |
| Artistic forms of expression | Art and literary censorship conducted by the state. Art forms were a means to reinforce political order. | Greater freedom of the arts and cultural sectors. Organisations able to hold art events more freely. Freedom of expression a catchphrase amongst individuals and artistic groups, but challenged by more conservative members of society. |
| Religious expression and organisation | Regime repressed religious groups, especially radical forms. | Emergence of religious groups seeking to restore Islamic values and defend Muslim values. |

With political reforms came greater freedom and space for civic engagement. In the Reformasi period, there was a remarkable increase in the number of civil society organisations, many of which were Islamic in character. In 2000, the Central Agency on Statistics (BPS) recorded around 70,000 registered organisations, compared to just 10,000 in 1996.5New groups sprung up with donors encouraging activists to establish NGOs they could fund. These organisations were eager to distance themselves from state and often took an anti-government stance. Proliferating CSOs and NGOs have taken advantage of decentralization and greater regional autonomy to engage in public affairs. Civil society and government relations have improved, although both sides remain sceptical of the others' intentions.

[5] Wahid, Marzuki. 2010. LSM, Islam, dan Perempuan di Indonesia Paska Orde Baru. Presentation at the Asian Dialogues: Open Seminars in Asian Languages. Melbourne, 22 April. Available from http://intranet.law.unimelb.edu.au/staff/events/files/Microsoft%20PowerPoint%20-%20LSM%20dan%20Islam%20di%20Indonesia%20--Melbourne%202010-FINAL.pdf (accessed 25 October 2014)

### 2.1.2 Recent trends in the political context

Indonesia is considered to be a story of democratic success, but it still struggles to realize the benefits of sustained and equitable economic growth. In the political context, the main challenges lie in governing such geographically vast and decentralized country, applying principles of good governance and the enormous task of reforming the country's bureaucracy.

Although, Indonesia's 'big bang' decentralization initiated at the turn of the century narrowed the gap between local government and citizens, it has also localized political power struggles. While the devolution of authorities relieved tensions between the central government and the regions, it has also created opportunities for corrupt and rent-seeking practices, at the local level. As indicated by Transparency International's corruption index scores, perceived corruption in Indonesia remains high.

Table 2

*Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer survey: Indonesia*

| Year | Corruption perceptions Index Score<br>*(0 perceived as highly corrupt and 100 perceived as clean)* | Rank |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 30 | 100/182 |
| 2012 | 32 | 118/174 |
| 2013 | 32 | 114/177 |

Source: Transparency International

In 2013, decentralization was taken a step further with the approval of the Village Law, intended to address weak governance arrangements and empower rural communities to participate politically. The new law could also lead to village elites distorting power relations and misusing government funding if not properly monitored.

Indonesia is still transitioning politically and many challenges lie ahead. According to the 2012 Indonesia Governance Index's Executive Report, "Indonesia is witnessing a paradox in its democracy. On one hand, a successful opening-up of civil liberty has led to the avalanche of democratic demands across the nation, however on the other hand, democratic institutions' are inadequately respond to those demands." Nonetheless, the Indonesian Governance Index, which focuses on measuring provincial governance, does show a general improvement in the performance of the government (political office) bureaucracy, civil society and economic society based on principles of participation, transparency, fairness, accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness between 2008 and 2012. Civil society scores improved the most significantly, while scores for bureaucracy rose slightly.[6]

Table 3

*Indonesia Governance Index: Average provincial scores*

| Arena | 2008 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| Government | 4.93 | 5.46 |
| Bureaucracy | 5.53 | 5.58 |
| Civil Society | 4.85 | 6.33 |
| Economic Society | 4.77 | 5.71 |

Source: http://www.kemitraan.or.id/igi

In the past decade, Indonesians have generally enjoyed a freedom to participate in the political process through a direct-election mechanism. However, in September 2014 lawmakers voted in favour of a bill reviving indirect elections of regional heads. The controversial vote provoked public outcry which saw peaceful protests and the public voicing their discontent through social media. In early October, just before the end of his term, president Yudhoyono issued a regulation in lieu of the law, effectively repealing the law until further judicial review.

[6] The IGI uses a scale of 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest). Data is available online through their website. Indonesia Governance Index, Data, "IGI Executive Report". Available from http://www.kemitraan.or.id/igi/index.php/data/publication/factsheet/275-igi-executive-report (accessed 25 October 2014)

The recent 2014 elections which marked the end of Yudhoyono's 10-year term, demonstrated that Indonesian voters are increasingly voting for popular figures irrespective of political party alliances. While practices of corruption, vote-buying and poor voter administration remained in the recent election, the public seems to have matured politically, indicated by the enormous interest in televised debates between the leading candidates. The appeal of the newly sworn in President Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, has come from his hands-on, man-of-the-people approach. As Jokowi begins his five-year term he will need to start addressing a myriad of challenges that include corruption, stagnant economic growth, and human rights concerns, particularly with respect to the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and religious intolerance. If left unaddressed, these challenges could seriously undermine Indonesia's stability and democratic reforms.

## 2.2 Civil Society context issues

Several important changes took place during the 2011 and 2014 period. First, the global financial crisis and Indonesia's rise to a middle-income country led to a decrease in international donor funding. Development actors, including CSOs and NGOs, have to compete harder for funding. Some have been more successful than others in diversifying funding by turning to the private sector or private foundations. At the expense of past idealism, local NGOs are now more disposed to receiving funding sources which in the past may have been criticized as supporting neoliberalism.

Regulatory changes also affected the civil society arena positively and negatively. Amongst the more controversial laws to spark reaction was Law No. 17/2013 on Societal Organisations. In an open letter sent before the bill was enacted, CIVICUS said the law would undermine freedom of association and "prevent CSOs from working on sensitive topics related to good governance and democratic reform in the public interest".[7] FORUM-ASIA deplored the repressive provisions in the law that "leave all groups vulnerable to attacks, undermining the hard-won democratic space that has been forged by civil society since the end of the New Order regime."[8]

Other laws passed that provoked criticism were the State Intelligence Law (October 2011) and the Social Conflict Law (April 2012). NGOs and media see these laws as imposing further restrictions on freedom of speech, potentially leading to the criminalization of human rights defenders and signifying a tightening of state control. Discriminatory content was also an issue in discussions on the Religious Harmony Bill in 2013, for which drafting was initiated in despite not being part of the planned National Legislative Program. Late in 2013, the House of Representatives came under fire again for its weak stance against religious intolerance when it re-endorsed a law that limits state-recognized religions to six.

Land rights and natural resource protection have been a long-standing issue for Indonesia. While Indonesia has adopted and amended laws to improve the rights of smallholders and indigenous communities, many of these regulations have faltered in their implementation. Part of the issue lies in the overlap and lack of clarity of laws adopted that regulate different sectors and local legislation. Another issue is that there is a lack of oversight in the procedures such as granting permits and licensing. These problems, which are commonly found across development sectors, are compounded by a lack of information among local communities on what the laws regulate and their rights vis-à-vis them.

[7] Civicus, "Civicus Releases an Open Letter Requesting the Indonesian Parliament to reject the Proposed Ormas Law and Create an Enabling Environment for Civil Society", 10 April 2013. Available from http://civicus.org/index.php/en/media-centre-129/open-letters/1581-open-letter-requesting-the-indonesian-parliament-to-reject-to-the-proposed-ormas-law-and-create-an-enabling-environment-for-civil-society (accessed 27 October 2014)

[8] Quote from Haris Azhar, Executive Committee & KontraS coordinator, taken from http://www.forum-asia.org/?p=16305

# 3 Description of RUANGRUPA and its contribution to civil society/policy changes

## 3.1 Background of RUANGRUPA

Established in January 2000 by six artists in Jakarta, the aim of Yayasan RUANGRUPA is to give critical views on Indonesian urban contemporary issues. RUANGRUPA focuses on supporting the development of art in the cultural context through research, documentation, exhibitions, residency programmes, art projects, workshops and publication. It promotes collaborative projects involving artists and other disciplines, such as social science, politics, technology, and media. This collaboration is based on the realisation that art can no longer stay passive and isolate itself from reality.

Since its establishment, RUANGRUPA has initiated many art activities, playing a strategic role in providing knowledge on the development of artists' initiatives in Indonesia. It has built its credibility as a progressive and a visual arts organisation that is consistently providing alternative views on urban contemporary art compared to many other artists' initiatives.

## 3.2 MFS II interventions related to Civil Society

RUANGRUPA considers market-oriented art, especially in urban settings like Jakarta, to be stifling creative expression. The organisation tries to challenge market-driven and commercialized art by providing opportunities and supporting artists to express themselves without compromising their idealism and values. Another basic problem that RUANGRUPA tries to address is the inadequacy of infrastructure for cultural development. With few spaces for artists to explore, meet and present their work, RUANGRUPA functions as a creative, autonomous workspace for artists. At the same time, events and exhibitions bring together the general public and artists in a non-exclusive contemporary arts setting. Hivos has supported RUANGRUPA because of its innovative approach and attention towards creating a new arts audience/public in Jakarta and other cities. In addition, the organisation plays an important role in the development of contemporary visual arts and building the capacity of video artists.

Hivos continues its support to RUANGRUPA because of its important role in the development of contemporary visual arts focusing on urban contemporary issues in Jakarta and in Indonesia in general. All four of RUANGRUPA's programmatic areas were supported by Hivos in the 2010-2013 period. These four areas are as follows:

1. Art Laboratory: Research and creative collaboration between artists with a focus on urban issues.
2. Support and Dissemination: Providing a platform to produce, promote, disseminate and sustain creative ideas from artists, critics, curators and cultural organisations in Indonesia.
3. Video Art Development: Promote video art as another form of visual art work to reflect, express and provide statements of the artists to reach a new audience, and in doing so increasing public appreciation for video art.
4. Research and Development: Conduct a series of studies and research to develop in-depth understanding and develop new strategies towards the recent contemporary art scene in Indonesia, in order to later position various forms of visual arts in new media.

Given its programmatic focus, RUANGRUPA has sought to be an initiator of alternative art spaces as well as being a knowledge centre of sorts. As an organisation, it has persistently focused on marginalized and alternative forms of art, and has tried to support independent artists with the means and capability to share their ideas and creativity with the public.

## 3.3 Basic information

Table 4

*Basic information RUANGRUPA*

| | | Details |
|---|---|---|
| Name of SPO | : | RUANGRUPA |
| Consortium | : | People Unlimited |
| CFA | : | Hivos |
| Start date of cooperation | : | 2003 |
| MDG/Theme | : | Governance |
| MFS II Project Name | : | Art space as support to the development of the arts within Indonesian contemporary culture (Project ID: RO SEA 1002716) |
| Contract period | : | December 31, 2010 – December 30, 2013 |
| Total budget | : | € 105,000 |
| Other donors if applicable | : | DOEN Stichting with contribution of € 95,000 |
| Estimation of % of budget for Civil Society[9] | : | 28% |

Sources: Project documents

[9] Costs that relate to civil society development or policy influence are those costs that possibly contribute to the development of the CIVICUS dimensions, excluding coordination and office costs; staff costs and financial reserves.

# 4 Data collection and analytical approach

## 4.1 Adjustments made in the methodology of the evaluation

The evaluation process started with an input-output-outcome analysis that utilized reports and other documents from the SPO. For RUANGRUPA the analysis was to some extent inadequate because it was based on project progress reports and other documents that mostly covered just the 2011-2012 period. In mid-2014 when the evaluation was initiated, RUANGRUPA had yet to submit its 2013 report to Hivos; while the existing reports were compilations from each of RUANGRUPA's programme units with little integration, and with only some of the units making an effort to report against target indicators. As such, the evaluation team was only able to benefit partly from the input-output-outcome analysis.

The evaluation team tried to follow the operational guidelines to a great extent, but was unable to have a workshop with all of RUANGRUPA's sub-groups as only one program manager was available at the time agreed upon. Other program managers as well as the director were three hours late and did not appear to pay full attention to the workshop nor did they make up for the lost time. In practice, the workshop was inefficient and lasted five hours during which the workshop took place in a rather sporadic manner. RUANGRUPA's board and field staff were not invited to the workshop. The evaluation team was unable to get averages or scores for each subgroup as participation was not consistent and the participants found the guiding questions hard to discern. The in-country team assigned the scores without further confirmation.

## 4.2 Difficulties encountered during data collection

During data collection the team experienced the following difficulties:

- It was difficult to agree upon a schedule for the evaluation workshop with RUANGRUPA since the SPO was organising two large events during the evaluation period. In addition, the impromptu character of RUANGRUPA made it hard to pin down the staff.
- To compensate for the lack of information from documented materials, the evaluation team utilized the workshop time to ask RUANGRUPA for any kind of documents that could be helpful in analysing changes in the civil society dimensions. However, three weeks later, RUANGRUPA only sent one document on their showcased events over the past five years (see Appendix 3).
- Since the workshop was largely inefficient and ineffective, the evaluation team was left with little indications as to whom could be contacted as external resource persons. As a result, the evaluation team was only able to conduct one interview with Jakarta 32° C during the fieldwork period.
- Workshop participants did not really understand, nor were they familiar with the CS indicators or the CIVICUS framework. They found it difficult to relate RUANGRUPA's situation with the indicators, although all of them participated in the baseline process. This lessened the effectiveness of the workshop.
- RUANGRUPA's logical framework was largely activity and output oriented, thus it was difficult to get required information at the outcome or impact level, which ideally should be part of a proposal or work plan. Given this challenge, as well as the abovementioned challenges, it was not possible to confirm RUANGRUPA's impact in inspiring the emergence of similar initiatives, nor was it possible to measure the satisfaction of Jakarta 32° C participants, or to identify how many (or whether any) CSOs have benefited from RUANGRUPA's produced knowledge. As a result, there were not many options of outcomes that could be selected to measure effectiveness through quick process-tracing.
- The current Hivos Programme Officer for the Expression and Engagement portfolio was not in charge of the programme during the 2011-2014 period. Hivos now manages its partnership with

RUANGRUPA directly from the Netherlands through the Arts Collaboratory initiative which is a program promoted by Hivos and Doen Foundation to support independent visual arts organisations in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

## 4.3 Identification of outcome for process tracing

Yayasan RUANGRUPA was not selected for in-depth process tracing, implying that only a quick scan has been made. 'Infrastructure for contemporary visual arts in Jakarta has improved' has been selected as an outcome to be measured for effectiveness. The selection is made with following considerations:

- Considering all the difficulties in collecting information, it still seemed sensible to find evidence to confirm this outcome's achievement.
- It is in line with RUANGRUPA's Theory of Change (ToC), as it is the aggregate of the ToC's preconditions 'networking' and 'increasing the capacity of society'.
- This outcome is relevant to RUANGRUPA's broadened focus to become a knowledge or resource provider, as stipulated in the proposal, and its mission to develop the arts infrastructure in Indonesia.
- This outcome is in line with MFS-II end line evaluation orientation for Indonesia to focus on strengthening the relations with other organisations in civil society to undertake joint activities.

# 5 Results

## 5.1 Results obtained in relation to intervention logic

Table 5

*Overview of results achieved in relation to project plan RUANGRUPA*

| Programme area | Description | Level of achievement |
|---|---|---|
| 1: Art Laboratory | Research & creative collaborations between artists focusing on urban and media issues. 6 exhibitions and 3 presentations involving 24 artists (6 of whom) women. Exhibitions draw 2,500 visitors. | Partially achieved: while detailed data for each year is lacking, positive progress overall. Lack of data on women artist participation. |
| 2: Support and Dissemination | Produce, promote and disseminate, and sustain creative ideas from artists, critics, curators and cultural organisations. 6 exhibitions (5 personal and 1 collective) showcasing the works of 30 artists (9 of whom women); 1 student artist exhibition (Jakarta 32$^{o}$ C); 3 art critics & 3 curatorial workshops (10 participants each); and website development. Exhibitions draw 8,000 visitors & website 60,000 online visitors. | Partially achieved: events took place as planned, drawing more than 3,500 a year. More than 100,000 visitors to the website and sub-domains annually. No separate curatorial workshops held, merged with other events. |
| 3: Video Art Development | Expand public appreciation for audio visual art work, and develop, collect and distribute video art works of Indonesian artists. Hosting a video festival (OK.Video) involving 50 artists and drawing 5,000 visitors. Each year, the work of 20 video artists produced & disseminated. Over 3 years 9 workshops held; exhibitions & video screenings in 5 locations in Java, Sulawesi, Sumatra, Europe and Australia, with 500 visitors for each exhibition; and symposium and book publication. | Insufficient information to draw conclusion: Data for 2013 not available (annual report). OK.Video festival took place in 2011 & 2013. In 2011, 134 artists participated from 30 countries; 37 from Indonesia. 150 works exhibited & 272 videos screened. No information of screenings in other locations. |
| 4: Research & Development | In-depth research and development. Publication of studies (1,000 copies-2 publications/year), an updated database of young contemporary artists and 3 public discourses and lectures annually. | Insufficient information to draw conclusion: Updated database available. Insufficient information about discourses, lectures and publications. KarbonJurnal experienced a vacuum. Street art was a research theme in 2010 – 2011. Unclear if anything was published other than a book on contemporary art and culture in Indonesia in 2012 (SIASAT). |
| 5: Internal organisational | Strengthened financial independence & revenue management through business unit, which contributes 20% of the overall costs, especially operating expenses. | Partially achieved: Business unit established in 2011 and started providing paid services to businesses. While RURU Corps (business unit) received growing interest, unclear how much it contributed to operational costs. No figures of financial contribution in reports. |

It is difficult to conclude the extent to which planned results in the SPO's intervention logic were achieved. This is due to several reasons. First, in mid-2014 when the evaluation was initiated RUANGRUPA had yet to submit its 2013 report to Hivos. Second, from RUANGRUPA's reports it appears that each programme division reports separately, which is then put together in a report. This means that there is little integration in the report and not all programme units have made an effort to report against target indicators. Despite a lack of information, overall the evaluators find that RUANGRUPA has been successful in creating a platform for the examination of ideas and urban space, bringing together artists and the general public. RUANGRUPA has established itself within the creative art sphere as a promoter of video visual art.

## 5.2 Changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period ?

### 5.2.1 Civic engagement

Civic engagement describes the formal and informal activities and participation undertaken by individuals to advance shared interests at different levels. Participation within civil society is multi-faceted and encompasses socially-based and politically-based forms of engagement.

RUANGRUPA's interventions are intended to provide a network and an alternative space for artists in Indonesia, especially for young independent artists in Jakarta. Through the Ruru Gallery, Jakarta 32° C festival and the OK.Video festival, RUANGRUPA provides platforms for aspiring artists to present their work while introducing the public to new forms of artistic expression. The SPO has also embraced the Internet as a medium to engage the public, with several web-based platforms being created for events and for groups it supports.

In the documentation and reports of RUANGRUPA, audience and participating artists figures are not consistently captured because the SPO has not always collected participation data properly. Nonetheless, the SPO has made a name for itself through regularly hosted festivals. OK.Video, held at least every two years, has attracted international artists from more than 50 countries and is considered a barometer for contemporary video development. Jakart32 festival, another well-known event, has been growing in size with over 100 participating artists each time it was held and up to 4,000 visitors in 2012. In 2010, RUANGRUPA initiated the Record Music Festival (RRRec Fest), which attracted more visitors the second time it was held, growing from 2,200 to 2,500 in 2011. The festival provided a venue for independent musicians and artists to collaborate through music and videos. Ruru gallery also had more visitors in 2012 compared to 2012, although fewer artists participated in exhibitions.

It is difficult to quantify whether women's participation has improved with regards to audience participation since there is insufficient data. However, fewer women artists participated in exhibitions hosted by Ruru gallery in 2012 compared to 2011 (from 21 percent to 15 percent).

Both Jakarta 32° C and OK.Video festival have become large enough to warrant the creation of separate divisions under RUANGRUPA, with independent planning and capacity to relate to other organisations. The personnel involved are selected from event alumni. As such target groups have become more engaged in planning, implementing and making decisions related to RUANGRUPA's regular events.

As illustrated above by the regular RUANGRUPA-hosted events, there have been decreases in some areas with regards to participation. This is partly due to a shift in the SPO's strategic orientation from becoming an imitator or pioneer of alternative art platforms to becoming a knowledge producer and developer. The SPO does not have a specific political agenda, since their focus continues to be on supporting the development of contemporary art and artists.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 3**
**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 1**

### 5.2.2 Level of organisation

This dimension assesses the organisational development, complexity and sophistication of civil society, by looking at the relationships among the actors within the civil society arena.

Since the baseline, RUANGRUPA has improved its level of organisation. With regards to defending the interests of marginalized groups, the artists supported by RUANGRUPA are those that are marginalized by the dominance of commercialized art. With the absence of government support or museums, artists not oriented to the market are provided with a space for expression. RUANGRUPA also provided space for female artists, although the percentage of female artists remained small in comparison to their male counterparts (just below 21% in 2010 and 2011, and 15% in 2012). Young upcoming artists constitute the main target group, especially those exploring contemporary visual arts. Since the baseline there was generally an increased level of engagement of these artists.

The SPO maintains partnerships with other artist-run organisations in Java and has been recognized as an Indonesian contemporary arts actor. RUANGRUPA is now one of the associate partners for the Arts Collaboratory initiative in Indonesia, which has helped it expand its domestic network. As during the baseline, RUANGRUPA also continued to be engaged in the Indonesian Coalition for the Arts, which aims to improve government support for artist-run initiatives and a more enabling environment to promote independent art.

Relations with Forum Lenteng and Serrum, RUANGRUPA's closest allies, have intensified since the establishment of RURU Corps, a joint venture established to respond to the need to generate financial resources as well as to promote the work of supported artists.

Internationally, RUANGRUPA has successfully networked with art institutions and organisations in a number of countries, taking advantage of the opportunities offered under Arts Collaboratory to disseminate its work and share experiences. Festivals and events hosted by RUANGRUPA in Indonesia have invited the participation of international artists. OK.Video and Jakarta 32° C are not just barometers for Indonesian arts, but are also receiving international recognition.

Since 2011, RUANGRUPA has worked on diversifying funding streams. Although there has been some degree of success with the establishment of RURU Corps and external financial support from the Ford Foundation, international donor dependency has remained relatively high. This is also influenced by external factors, namely the lack of support from the Indonesian government for artist-run initiatives.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**
**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): +1**

### 5.2.3 Practice of Values

Practice of Values refers to the internal practice of values within the civil society arena. Important values that CIVICUS looks at such as transparency, democratic decision-making, taking into account diversity that are deemed crucial to gauge not only progressiveness but also the extent to which civil society's practices are coherent with their ideals.

Since the baseline there has been no significant change in the SPO's downward accountability. Internal control systems between the board and the executive are in place although there are no reporting or evaluation mechanisms. The SPO does not have a dedicated monitoring or evaluation systems or personnel in place and reporting against targets, outcomes and impact is limited. The different units under RUANGRUPA function independently, but also work collaboratively. RURU Corps' income sources have been separated from RUANGRUPA's in an effort to maintain a focus on the civil society and engagement role of RUANGRUPA. Unfortunately, there were no available audit reports for RUANGRUPA for the period covered by this evaluation. As such, the evaluation team concludes that institutional audits have yet to take place.

The composition of the SPO's social organs remains unchanged with a mix of artists and non-art professionals. This reflects RUANGRUPA's intentions to engage actors beyond the art scene to contribute to meaningful discussions and discourses that are relevant to the environment in which it operates.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**
**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 0**

### 5.2.4 Perception of Impact

Perception of Impact assesses the perceived impact of civil society actors on politics and society as a whole as the consequences of collective action. In this, the perceptions of both civil society actors (internal) as well as actors outside civil society are taken into account. Specific sub-dimensions for this evaluation are the extent to which the SPO has contributed to engaging more people in social or political activities, strengthening CSOs and their networks, and has influenced public and private sector policies.

Through its regular events, which include Jakarta 32° C and OK.Video festival, RUANGRUPA has been able to engage more with the general public. These events have also been venues for young students

to explore contemporary visual art forms. Some of these events, like the Jakarta 32° C festival have taken place beyond the Ruru Gallery venue, to include settings in Jakarta's urban landscapes as well as other cities. The approach of RUANGRUPA is rooted in the context of an urban city scape and is based on collaborative efforts between artist-run initiatives, artists and curators. However, it should be noted that Jakarta 32° C has recently supported fewer artists and displayed fewer artworks in favour of more workshops. This has been a conscious decision and an attempt to distinguish the organisation's role as a knowledge provider from a plethora of new initiatives and actors that have emerged and to maintain creative benchmarks in the contemporary arts scene.

Box 1: RUANGRUPA's reception

"To talk about the contemporary art scene in Indonesia, especially Jakarta, it's hard not to think of RUANGRUPA's name. Not only is it one of the most active art collectives in the city, their footprints are all over the city's contemporary creative scene. Using their own approach, RUANGRUPA helped shape the identity of Jakarta's contemporary art world. RUANGRUPA's modest approach revamped the Jakarta's creative society, making it more accessible to the public through their programs."

*http://www.whiteboardjournal.com/focus/18928/populist-art/*

"RUANGRUPA itself was the most active and consistent of all in focusing on developing the discourse and practice of video art in a stimulating way, by hosting a variety of video art projects, including music video workshops […] until they finally were able to hold, for the first time in 2003, the OK.Video: International Video Art Festival, which has continued to evolve and be held routinely since then. Today, everyone who is arts-literate knows and recognizes OK.Video as the first event in Indonesia to specifically address video, and to do so at an international scale, and it remains to this day the only one that organises regularly every two years."

*http://arsipfarahwardani.tumblr.com/post/81373125985/realities-of-contemporary-art-the-new-media-in*

While the organisation is now trying to become more than an initiator of contemporary art forms, it has built its reputation by experimenting in the area of visual and video art forms. This has supported the emergence of new and upcoming artists who have become popular in a contemporary subculture among youth in Jakarta interested in new forms of expression and alternative artists' merchandise. This has been aided by the use of the internet as a means to promote engagement with the public audience. RUANGRUPA has improved its online presence by developing specific web domains for events and areas of work. In 2012, it also began with streaming online radio content to engage audiences in discussions on a range of issues from a contemporary arts point of view. Unfortunately, RUANGRUPA has not monitored the impact of its interventions in stimulating discourses and artistic exploration of societal issues.

RUANGRUPA does not have a specific advocacy or lobby agenda other than its involvement in the Indonesian Arts Coalition, which has not had measureable impacts with regards to greater government support for artist-run initiatives. Government support, specifically the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy, did not extend beyond RUANGRUPA's events, the launching of a book, participation in government-hosted events and financing participation in a recent triennial abroad. The SPO has not actively sought out engagement with the public sector.

The relations with the private sector remain limited. RUANGRUPA engaged with a few small local businesses in Jakarta through the festivals it hosted. Some of these businesses were venues for arts dissemination while others helped sponsor events or stimulate dissemination of artwork. Media has been involved to gain better coverage of events. RUANGRUPA has focused on supporting alternatives to mainstream, market-oriented art forms. RURU Corps and Ruru shop can be considered as business entities, but their main aim is to support the promotion of alternative artists and artworks, as well as to stimulate the involvement of artists in shaping public spaces.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**
**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 1**

### 5.2.5 Civil Society Environment

The social, political and economic environment in which civil society operates affects its room for manoeuvre. The civil society context has been described in Chapter 3. In this section we describe how RUANGRUPA is coping with that context.

The internet has been a very strategic medium to spread visual and video-based artwork. RUANGRUPA has utilized the internet to showcase its target groups' artwork, to disseminate archived knowledge and publications, to promote their events, and to attract youth participation. RUANGRUPA is aware that the internet is a tool that can be used to promote the development of discourses in contemporary arts.

In addition, many of themes and issues that are explored through artwork supported by RUANGRUPA are grounded in the surrounding context. These themes do not always have a political agenda and the majority of artworks produced explore contemporary, day-to-day issues.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**
**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 2**

## 5.3 To what degree are the changes attributable to the Southern partners??

### 5.3.1 Level of organisation & alternative engagement

*The outcome achieved*

Since 2000, RUANGRUPA has been promoting and supporting non-commercial video and visual contemporary artists that have been marginalized by the mainstream market. RUANGRUPA itself is very much an organization established by artists for artists. One of its missions is to develop the contemporary arts infrastructure. To do so effectively, RUANGRUPA needs to succeed in improving its internal level of organization and in creating forms of alternative engagement.

The evaluation team selected the outcome 'infrastructure for contemporary visual arts in Jakarta has improved' because there is evidence that RUANGRUPA has contributed, if not driven improvements. Indicators for this include audience receptiveness; RUANGRUPA's networking capability, the establishment of a separate business unit (RURU Corps), knowledge management initiatives undertaken by RUANGRUPA and in improved use of online media.

There are two pathways that can explain this outcome. The first attributes the outcome to the result of RUANGRUPA's improved reputation and capability as a resource in contemporary visual arts. The second considered the outcome as a result of the actions of other actors (market-oriented, public sector, or CS actors).

1. ***Pathway 1:*** RUANGRUPA has improved the platform for contemporary visual art in Jakarta. RUANGRUPA has been a pioneer in promoting contemporary visual arts to a wider audience who would unlikely have had the chance to explore this art from or have the chance to explore it as a freely-expressed art form without RUANGRUPA's intervention.

*Information that **confirms** this pathway:*

- Although contemporary visual art are openly accessible, RUANGRUPA is popular and distinguishable for their unusual and edgy approach and style[10].
- Art bloggers recognize RUANGRUPA as shaping the identity of Jakarta's contemporary art world[11] and a well-known initiator in the field of contemporary video art work[12]

[10] http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2002/08/11/ruangrupa-unusual-edgy-art-forms.html
[11] http://www.whiteboardjournal.com/focus/18928/populist-art/
[12] http://arsipfarahwardani.tumblr.com/post/81373125985/realities-of-contemporary-art-the-new-media-in

- Audience receptiveness & growth of Jakarta 32°C: Jakarta 32° C has drawn at least 1,000 people as an audience in 2004. In 2012, the festival expanded its audience base to around 4,000 people[13]. Jakarta 32° C has inspired the emergence of similar events and contemporary visual art communities[14]
- Increased network of RUANGRUPA through international exposure [15] and more international artists' participation in the OK.Video Festival: from 10-20 in 2011 to 51 in 2013[16]
- RUANGRUPA is open to both professional artists, as well as young students wanting to express themselves and explore creative expression, such as the group Gambar Selaw.[17] Most of the Jakarta 32°C alumni (participating artists) worked in private sectors, and only a few decided to be professional artists[18]. This is evidence of RUANGRUPA's support of non-commercial art forms.
- RUANGRUPAhas a stronger position as a knowledge producer and developer: There are only a few actors who can be considered competent in contemporary visual arts knowledge from CS, the academic sector or the private sector. RUANGRUPA's director is also a lecturer for contemporary visual arts, but the academic institution with whom he is affiliated with is less approachable than RUANGRUPA[19]
- RUANGRUPA[20]has a library and a research and development unit. Its collection contains some 10,000 books and digital archives.[21]
- RUANGRUPA has established a business unit that can offer contemporary arts services to CSOs and private sector actors, such as advertising agencies. In 2011, RUANGRUPA decided to redistribute it's income generating capacity to its partner CSOs Forum Lenteng and Serrum through the foundation of RURU Corps; a visual communication agency. It is estimated that RUANGRUPA, Forum Lenteng, and Serrum have together made at least USD 30,000 in 2012. RURU Corps services range from publications, products, and event organising, or artwork installation [22]. In 2013, RURU Corps has made more profit than in 2012, and it plans to divide its accumulated profit for each CSO or to conduct a joint project. RUANGRUPA has strengthened its own, and Forum Lenteng and Serrum's sustainability and financial capacity[23].
- RUANGRUPA can offer a competitive consultancy price compared to advertising agencies, since their overhead costs have been covered via Hivos' support[2425].
- In addition to a traditional, offline presence in the form of a gallery and event hosting, RUANGRUPAhas strengthened its online presence

*Information that **rejects** this pathway:*

- It is easily observable that contemporary visual art has become generally more popular amongst the young urban population in Jakarta that seek alternative forms of expression.
- The number of artworks submitted for Jakarta 32° C decreased from 172 in 2008, to 128 in 2010 and 103 in 2012.[26]

2. ***Pathway 2:*** Other actors have improved the platform for contemporary visual art in Jakarta

Although RUANGRUPAhas helped promote contemporary visual arts to a wider audience, it is not plausible to conclude that they are the only contributing CSO actor.

[13] Jakarta 32° C interview & Annual Report RUANGRUPA 2012
[14] Jakarta 32° C interview
[15] List of showcases in Annex 3 provided by RUANGRUPA
[16] RUANGRUPA progress reports and media/web coverage
[17] http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2013/06/04/114485818/Gambar-Selaw-Menggambar-di-Malam-Jumat
[18] Jakarta 32° C interview
[19] Art Lab program manager
[20] Art Lab program manager
[21] RUANGRUPA Progress Reports 2011 & 2012
[22] RURU Corps.com
[23] communication/interview with RUANGRUPA director
[24] communication/interview with RUANGRUPA director
[25] Analysis from RUANGRUPA budget
[26] http://Jakarta 32o C .org/home/festival/statistics/

*Information that **confirms** this pathway:*

There are a number of other organisations that have promoted contemporary visual arts in a less commercialized setting. These include the following:

- Kawanusa in Bali, who have been organizing community video festivals since 2007
- Kampung Halaman, Cemeti Art House, MES 56 in Yogyakarta
- Common Room in Bandung
- Forum Lenteng in Jakarta
- Video activists: KoPI, Offstream and Video Babes[27][28]

*Information that **rejects** this pathway:*

- Most of the organizations mentioned above operate outside of Jakarta. Those that do operate in Jakarta are partners of or collaborate with RUANGRUPA
- There is a general lack of initiatives and plans for better art infrastructure and development of state museums by the Indonesian government29
- Regardless of whether there is a 'hype' in contemporary visual arts, there is an increasing demand for contemporary visual arts content by private sector actors, especially for advertising purposes. The large demand allows RURU Corps to take part in the market share [30].

*Conclusion*

Based upon the analysis of information available, we conclude that the most valid explanation for the outcome is that RUANGRUPA has played a role in strengthening the infrastructure for contemporary visual art in Jakarta as well as an increased demand for contemporary visual arts. Hence, pathway 1 is *sufficient* in explaining the outcome.

*The role of the SPO*

RUANGRUPA's interventions have contributed to the emergence of contemporary art as alternative engagement and by strengthening the level of organization internally and for artists. RUANGRUPA has over the years built a reputation for itself as supporting new initiatives and is now emerging as a knowledge producer and provider.

## 5.4 What is the relevance of these changes?

### 5.4.1 Relevance of the changes in relation to the Theory of Change of 2012

The Theory of Change (ToC) constructed during 2012 baseline illustrated that RUANGRUPA's ultimate goal was for a critical, creative, plural and inclusive society to take shape. The preconditions for this were the existence of public space, healthy engagement with the public and private sector and a capacitated and well-networked society. Public space for RUANGRUPA was the most strategic precondition. The critical assumptions rested on the need and demand for a public space separate from private or public sector actors, art being an effective media for civic engagement and RUANGRUPA being able to sustain itself in terms of values, personnel and finances. The changes achieved by RUANGRUPA in the civil society dimensions 'civic engagement' and 'level of organisation' are relevant to the ToC.

[27] Ferdiansyah Thajib, Nuraini Juliastuti, Andrew Lowenthal and Alexandra Crosby, A Chronicle of Video Activism and Online Distribution in Post-New Order Indonesia

[28] Video Vortex Reader II: moving images beyond YouTube. Editors: Geert Lovink and Rachel Somers Miles, Publisher: Institute of Network Cultures, Amsterdam 2011

[29] Hujatnikajennong, Agung. 2010. "The Contemporary Turns: Indonesian Contemporary Art of the '80s", in Knol, Meta and others. 2010. *Beyond the Dutch: Indonesia, The Netherlands and the Visual Arts from 1900 until now*. KIT Publisher. Available from http://www.academia.edu/1049142/The_Contemporary_Turns_Indonesian_Contemporary_Arts_of_the_1980s (accessed 19 December 2014)

[30] see: http://rurucorps.com/home/work/mizone/ for an example

RUANGRUPA has contributed to the availability of public space through its support for regular events for contemporary visual and video art, as well as through its own gallery space. An increasing demand for public space is evident from the public's receptiveness and an increase in visitors and audience. The organisation has managed to keep initiatives independent, collaborating with the private and public sector for support of its interventions.

With regards to art influencing civic engagement, RUANGRUPA's interventions can be defined as following a 'discursive theory of action', intended to provide a setting for artists and the public to come together to discuss issues, connect and take action[31]. Artists and their art work supported by RUANGRUPA have included mural art, performance art, video art and other forms seeking to engage the general public. RUANGRUPA has also used online formats and websites to invite the general public to contribute in art works and be engaged. Discursive approaches have also been used to promote young, upcoming artists to explore themes relevant to their urban setting.

The institutional performance of RUANGRUPA has progressed, although the SPO still relies on external support to sustain itself. RURU Corps is a model for generating income through artistic services that can be offered to the private or public sector. There has been sufficient re-generation amongst the personnel of the SPO and each unit of RUANGRUPA has its own team that seems to function independently, whilst maintaining collaboration with other units and divisions. Since the baseline, RUANGRUPA has improved its engagement with other like-minded actors and expanded its international network. The SPO has been invited to a host of international events to share experiences or feature work produced through the organisation's support in countries like Australia, Japan, South Korea, The Netherlands, Colombia, Brazil, Singapore, and China. This expanded the SPO's network and helped establish itself as an international player in contemporary arts.

### 5.4.2 Relevance of the changes in relation to the context in which the SPO is operating

With regards to the context in which RUANGRUPA is operating, its interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant because the organisation has defended those marginalised by market domination in contemporary visual arts and public spaces.

During the Suharto era, much of the cultural and artistic discourse was political and opposing the regime[32]. As the Indonesian economy began to develop in the 80s and 90s, a demand for commercial artworks saw the rise of commercial art galleries. In the same period, cultural institutions like Erasmus Huis, Goethe-Institut and the Japan Foundation took a footing in Indonesia and began supporting performances, exhibitions and artist exchanges[33]. Alternative spaces, like Cemeti Art House, began emerging in the early 90s[34]. Following the fall of Suharto in 1998 and Indonesia's democratization, new artistic directions began to take shape[35]. This development continued into the early 2000s with the establishment of RUANGRUPA and other arts centres and organisations.

Since 2007-2008, there has been a boom in commercialized art, with high demands for Indonesian art globally. In 2008, a contemporary art work of Nyoman Masriadi was sold with a lavish price tag of 1 million US dollars[36]. In the midst of the art market boom, a few upcoming artists became 'market

[31] Stern, M. J. and Seifert, S. C. 2009. Civic Engagement and the Arts: Issues of Conceptualization and Measurement. Philadelphia: The Arts and Civic Engagement Impact Initiative of Americans for the Arts/Animating Democracy. Available from http://animatingdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/CE_Arts_SternSeifert.pdf (accessed 19 December 2014)

[32] Adrian Vickers, "What is contemporary Indonesian art?" Inside Indonesia 112: Apr-Jun 2013. Available from http://www.insideindonesia.org/feature-editions/what-is-contemporary-indonesian-art-3 (accessed 19 December 2014)

[33] Rifky Effendy, "Indonesian Contemporary Art and the Development of Art Infrastructure: Influences, Appropriations, and Tensions", *Nukta Art Magazine*. Available: http://www.nuktaartmag.com/Nukta/GeneralContent/View/108 (accessed 19 December 2014)

[34] Ibid

[35] Adrian Vickers, "What is contemporary Indonesian art?",Inside Indonesia 112: Apr-Jun 2013. Available from http://www.insideindonesia.org/feature-editions/what-is-contemporary-indonesian-art-3 (accessed 19 December 2014)

[36] Ibid

darlings', leading to tension between young aspiring artists and indirectly led to the development of spaces for progressive artwork in isolation of market forces[37].

The Indonesian contemporary art scene has developed in the absence of strong art institutions, museum support and state financial support. This gap has been filled by private sponsors and collectors and has contributed to the dominance of commercialized art forms[38]. Given the increased freedom of expression and speech since the late 90s, there has been a growth in independent art centres like RUANGRUPA[39]. Since 2010, international exposure for both market and alternative art actors has grown, as has the local art scene[40]. Independent organisations have become sites for multidisciplinary communities to come together to discuss all sorts of issues with a common desire to engage with urban space partly in reaction to the commercialization of the Indonesian art market[41].

Given this context, RUANGRUPA's achievements have been very much relevant as they have consistently offered an alternative scene for artists and practitioners to explore new media. RUANGRUPA is simultaneously a site of production as well as a focal point for projects of social improvement, without selling out to the commercialization trends[42].

### 5.4.3 Relevance of the changes in relation to the policies of the MFS II alliance and the CFA

The support provided to RUANGRUPA falls under Hivos' Expression and Engagement programme. This programme aims to generate social debate and cultural dialogue in order for a dynamic culture and new perspectives to emerge. Hivos considers space for socially engaged art and culture to be limited in developing countries and sees art and cultural expression as a means to generate critical reflection, pluralism and diversity.[43] "For Hivos, culture, media and other forms of communication are important means to promote citizenship" and a means to challenge dominant ideas[44].

RUANGRUPA was supported because its creative ideas were in line with Hivos' focus. The SPO is considered to have an "important role in in the development of contemporary visual arts in Jakarta and in Indonesia in general". Hivos supported the SPO because of the "extrapolation effects of events happening in Jakarta to other areas in Indonesia and because of its innovative approach and attention towards creating a new arts audience/public".[45]RUANGRUPA is considered a strategic organisation that has promoted progressive ideas and a network/coalition that works on strengthening cultural infrastructure.

According to the current Expression and Engagement programme officer of Hivos' Regional Office for Southeast Asia, Hivos has continued to support RUANGRUPA because it has proven its ability to host regular workshops and events. In doing so RUANGRUPA has created a space for artists to experiment, while expanding organisationally through the creation of different units.[46]

Through the Arts Collaboratory initiative, support is being continued with the partnership now being handled directly by Hivos' headquarters. Arts Collaboratory consider culture to be a potential driver of

[37] Miamatahari, "Exposition Saga – Indonesian Art Scene". Available from http://miamatahari.blogspot.com/2014/01/exposition-saga-indonesian-art-scene.html (accessed 19 December 2014)
[38] Adrian Vickers, "What is contemporary Indonesian art?",. Inside Indonesia 112: Apr-Jun 2013. Available from http://www.insideindonesia.org/feature-editions/what-is-contemporary-indonesian-art-3 (accessed 19 December 2014)
[39] Edwin Jurriëns, "Art and the city: Indonesian artists are using new media to rethink urban space",Inside Indonesia 112: Apr-Jun 2013. Available from http://www.insideindonesia.org/feature-editions/art-and-the-city-2 (accessed 19 December 2014)
[40] Miamatahari, "Exposition Saga – Indonesian Art Scene". Available from http://miamatahari.blogspot.com/2014/01/exposition-saga-indonesian-art-scene.html (accessed 19 December 2014)
[41] Edwin Jurriëns, "Art and the city: Indonesian artists are using new media to rethink urban space", Inside Indonesia 112: Apr-Jun 2013. Available from http://www.insideindonesia.org/feature-editions/art-and-the-city-2 (accessed 19 December 2014)
[42] Adrian Vickers, "What is contemporary Indonesian art?",. Inside Indonesia 112: Apr-Jun 2013. Available from http://www.insideindonesia.org/feature-editions/what-is-contemporary-indonesian-art-3 (accessed 19 December 2014)
[43] "P. 15 Hivos Business Plan 2011-2015", Hivos, 2010, p. 15
[44] "P. 11 Hivos Vision Paper: Civil Society Building 2008" Hivos, 2008, p. 11
[45] "RUANGRUPA Kenschets 2008-2010", Hivos, 2010
[46] Interview with Dyana Savina Hutadjulu, Expression and Engagement programme officer of Hivos' Regional Office for Southeast Asia, December 2014

social innovation and change and views artistic processes as a means to facilitate relations that bring people together to develop new perspectives[47].

## 5.5 Explaining factors

### 5.5.1 Internal factors

RUANGRUPA is not wholly dependent on a single leadership figure to determine the direction of their organisations. Besides Ade Darmawan, the well-recognized cofounder and director, there are other figures that have emerged from the ranks of RUANGRUPA like Hafiz, Reza 'Asung' Afisina and Indra Ameng[48].The international scope of events and RUANGRUPA's participation in biennials abroad have brought recognition for curators, artists and directors opening the way for a new generation of artists to emerge[49].

RUANGRUPA has not applied an open recruitment mechanism. Given the increasing number of events and scope of activities, the personnel were prone to being overworked and overburdened. The establishment of separate divisions for Jakarta 32°C and OK.Video, as well as the establishment of RURU Corps, can be seen as an effort to deal with this issue, as well as to improve the involvement of RUANGRUPA's target groups and strengthening the organisation's (and other CSOs) financial capacity.

RUANGRUPA has a relaxed, egalitarian, informal, and friendly working atmosphere which suits with its target group characteristics. As an open-house, target groups often come to RUANGRUPA just to hang out and interact with RUANGRUPA personnel. With busy schedules and an expansion of target groups, as well as the emergence of many new art spaces, RUANGRUPA has decided to shift their focus from being an initiator of alternative art spaces into a resource provider. Generally speaking, RUANGRUPA has been able to cope with changing contexts and adapt to situations quite well.

### 5.5.2 External factors

Contemporary visual arts and the internet have a highly mutual relationship. As an art space that is separate and relatively free from direct market intervention, the internet has contributed to the widespread application of contemporary visual arts, which in turn has shaped the internet society. As the internet society and its users have grown, the demand for contemporary visual content has also increased.

A similar relation also exists between contemporary visual arts vis-à-vis urban contemporary sub-culture. Private sector and more market-driven actors have contributed to the emergence of new alternative and creative expression. As a potential niche, there has been an increasing demand for contemporary visual arts content or alternative approaches to marketing strategies of private sector actors. RURU Corps has been created to deal with this particular factor and to help non-mainstream artists promote their work. With contemporary art becoming one of the latest trends in Indonesia[50], this presents both opportunities as well as threats for artist-run initiatives like RUANGRUPA. On the one hand it may contribute to increased audience appreciation, while on the other hand it could discourage more critical and provocative discourse. It is generally harder for alternative art spaces like RUANGRUPA to garner interests among artists to work on experimental projects because of the

[47] Arts Collaboratory, "Funding opportunities: Project Fund for 'Visual Arts and Social Innovation'". Available from http://old.artscollaboratory.org/funding (19 December 2014)

[48] Interview with Dyana Savina Hutadjulu, Expression and Engagement programme officer of Hivos' Regional Office for Southeast Asia, December 2014

[49] Farah Wardani Archive, "Realities of Contemporary Art & The New Media in the Indonesian Art Market (Sarasvati Magazine, 2013)". Available from http://arsipfarahwardani.tumblr.com/post/81373125985/realities-of-contemporary-art-the-new-media-in (accessed 19 December 2014))

[50] Katerina Valdivia Bruch, "Turning Targets: 25 Years of Cemeti Art House interview with Nindityo Adipurnomo and Mella Jaarsma". Available from https://www.academia.edu/3200155/Turning_Targets_25_Years_of_Cemeti_Art_House_Interview_with_Nindityo_Adipurnomo_and_Mella_Jaarsma (19 December 2014)

dominance of market orientations in Indonesian arts. Many of such organisations have to "navigate between idealism and commodity"[51].

### 5.5.3 Relations CFA-SPO

RUANGRUPA has received support from Hivos since the early 2000s. Funds from Hivos in the 2012-2014 period were also used to support its organisational capacity building, specifically in the areas of developing a business unit and improving organisational practices. In addition, RUANGRUPA has benefitted from the Arts Collaboratory, a joint initiative supported by Hivos and Stichting DOEN. Arts Collaboratory recently began a second phase of financial support focusing on the development of new perspectives on specific contextual issues and new forms of collaboration[52]. With the appointment of RUANGRUPA as an Arts Collaboratory associate partner in 2008, RUANGRUPA's stature has grown nationally and internationally.

[51] Briony Galligan, "Cemeti Art House on turning twenty-five", UN Magazine 7.2. Available from http://unprojects.org.au/magazine/issues/issue-7-2/cemeti-art-house-on-turning-twenty-five/ (accessed 19 December 2014)

[52] Arts Collaboratory, "We are launching a new phase and building a new visual identity and online platform. Coming Soon!". Available from http://www.artscollaboratory.org/ (accessed 19 December 2014)

# 6 Discussion

## 6.1 Design of the intervention

The art scene in Indonesia is concentrated in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Bandung and Bali. In Jakarta, there are few home-grown organisations that have had the same level of success as RUANGRUPA. Some other non-profit organisations and artist-run spaces that have a made a name for themselves in Jakarta include Lontar Gallery, Bentera Budaya, Forum Lenteng, and Engagemedia. In Yogyakarta, one of the most successful artist-run initiatives has been Cemeti Art House. Like RUANGRUPA, the organisation promoted Indonesian contemporary art nationally and overseas by providing a space for artists to explore critical expression, and by supporting collaboration, networking and residency programmes.

Since 2008-2009, RUANGRUPA's interventions supported by Hivos have been designed around four main programmes or areas: 1) Art Laboratory – providing space for research and artistic collaboration; 2) Support and Dissemination – finding, promoting and sustaining creative artists, critics, curators and arts organisations through workshops, exhibitions and events; 3) Video Art Development – focusing on supporting and promoting alternative non-mainstream video art; and 4) Research and Development to create better understanding of and develop strategies towards the contemporary art scene. As an Artist-Run Initiative (ARI), RUANGRUPA has successfully combined different models[53] that include experimentation and exhibition format, an open and informal environment to initiate and redefine artistic practices, and regular festival programming.

According to RUANGRUPA, its strategy and success is not necessarily replicable in other context. This is because the urban context in which art initiatives operate vary from place to place, which requires adjustments in the approach and activities implemented. On the other hand, there are more events emerging in Jakarta that cover visual and video art. But it is difficult to assess whether similar events were inspired by RUANGRUPA. The SPO has brought contemporary art closer to the masses so to speak, making it possible for those without an artistic background to take part in shaping the discourse.

Like so many other ARI's, RUANGRUPA faces a number of challenges and opportunities that are defined by its more informal model of organisation. Advantages include flexibility, immediacy and direct approach (often covering everyday subjects in artworks, including socially marginal subjects and issues), enthusiasm from its target groups (i.e. non-mainstream and non-commercial, often young artists), collaboration with other groups in both informal and formal settings, and lower operational costs. Disadvantages include weaker management structures, financing difficulties, a lack of influence over decision-making and policy, and less visibility and unmeasured or limited impact.[54]RUANGRUPA's interventions include activities designed to address some of the challenges. For example, RURU Corps as a collective initiative seeks enterprising means to contribute to the institution's sustainability and regeneration. In fact, one of the reasons for establishing the Indonesia Arts Coalition, of which RUANGRUPA is a part of, was to address the need to advocate for more support of non-profit arts

[53] Gallery Models – low-fi auxiliaries of established modes, providing spaces for experimentation in exhibition format, as well as the development of professional skills in areas such as administration, curation and negotiation; Practice Models – the extension of prior learning within an open peer environment to define and refine artist practice through critical development of preconceived forms; Project Models – the locus for short-term, temporary or one-off projects that critically exist within conceptual or predetermined situations such as artist publishing or festival programming, and; Collective Models – a non-spatial but centralised focus for formal and informal group activities based on shared artistic, philosophical or material enquiry." See: Din Heagney, "A History of Success?". Available from: https://visualarts.net.au/media/uploads/files/Din_Heagney_ESSAY.pdf (19 December 2014)

[54] The advantages and disadvantages are based on those mentioned in UNESCO supported Master Thesis, "Artist-run Initiatives Advantages and Disadvantages of the Informal Model in Societies in Transition" MARIJA SKOKO, September 2011, that explores ARIs in Serbia.

organisations since coalition members are dependent on international funding[55]. The impact that RUANGRUPA wishes to have as an actor of change on policies and practices is less clear in RUANGRUPA's design. Despite RUANGRUPA's engagement with the Indonesian Coalition for the Arts, which also seeks to improve the cultural policies of the government, there are no specific actions designed in the area of policy advocacy.

[55] Mella Jaarsma and Ninditya Adipurnomo, "What are We Waiting for?", ArtAsiaPasific Nov/Dec 2012. Available from http://artasiapacific.com/Magazine/81/WhatAreWeWaitingFor (accessed 19 December 2014)

# 7 Conclusion

RUANGRUPA has successfully promoted and supported non-commercial visual contemporary artists that are being marginalized by the mainstream market. The organisation itself is an artist-run initiative which has successfully undertaken different streams of work that have resulted in improved infrastructure for contemporary arts in Jakarta. The general public has been largely receptive to RUANGRUPA's exploration of public space and the artworks it has to offer. The SPO has maintained a reputation for being an initiator and is now emerging as a knowledge producer and provider.

The changes that attributed to the SPO and MFS II funding, as well as to longer-term Hivos support, are the improvements in civic engagement, level of organisation and civil society impact. With MFS II funding, RUANGRUPA has continued to provide a space for artistic collaboration and hosted regular events that supported the dissemination of contemporary art forms. RUANGRUPA has been one of the few actors in Indonesia to promote and support video art development, focusing on providing opportunities to young, upcoming artists who otherwise might not have the opportunities to develop explorative forms of art.

The aforementioned changes are relevant to the 2012 Toc, the context in which RUANGRUPA is operating in, and polices of Hivos. Public space for RUANGRUPA is one of the most strategic preconditions in its ToC and the critical assumptions rest on the ability of RUANGRUPA to sustain itself as an organisation and its ability to support alternative engagement. RUANGRUPA has contributed to the availability of public space through its support for regular events for contemporary visual and video art, as well as through its own gallery space. The SPO operates in a context where contemporary art has been dominated by market-oriented galleries. As such, the SPO has provided a space for artists marginalized by art commodities to engage in alternative forms of expression. As an independent, artist-run organisation, they have provided a platform for multidisciplinary communities to come together. These interventions are also very much in line with Hivos' Expression and Engagement programme which supports the generation of alternative forms of cultural expression.

Factors that explain the evaluation findings include RUANGRUPA's strength as a reputable contemporary arts organisation and its internal capacity to regenerate leadership in artist-run initiatives. Nationally RUANGRUPA has collaborative networking relations with a host of like-minded organisations. The SPO is recognized in the country and abroad for its innovative organisational practices and as being an initiator in the contemporary art scene. Hivos and Art Collaboratory support have contributed to the RUANGRUPA's growth and its networking capabilities. RUANGRUPA has adapted to external factors, which includes the emergence of the internet as a means to disseminate creative forms of expression and as a tool to stimulate interaction and developments in the contemporary arts discourse. The events and exhibitions organised have continued to explore themes that are relevant to the target groups as well as the context in which it operates.

Table 6

*Summary of findings.*

| When looking at the MFS II interventions of this SPO to strengthen civil society and/or policy influencing, how much do you agree with the following statements? | Score |
|---|---|
| The CS interventions were well designed | 7 |
| The CS interventions were implemented as designed | 6 |
| The CS interventions reached their objectives | 6 |
| The observed outcomes are attributable to the CS interventions | 6 |
| The observed CS outcomes are relevant to the beneficiaries of the SPO | 7 |

Score between 1 to 10, with 1 being "not at all" and 10 being "completely".

# References and resource persons

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"Annual Report 2012", RUANGRUPA, 2012
"Ruangrupa Budget Plan 2011-13 revisi final 1506", RUANGRUPA, 2011
"Ruangrupa Proposal 2011-2013", RUANGRUPA, 2011
"Ruangrupa Workplan 2012", RUANGRUPA, 2012
"Ruangrupa Workplan 2013", RUANGRUPA, 2013

**Documents by CFA**

Title"2013 Memo for AC", RUANGRUPA, 2013
"Hivos Business Plan 2011-2015", Hivos, 2010
"Hivos Vision Paper: Civil Society Building 2008" Hivos, 2008
"Ruangrupa Amendment Memo Internal Ruangrupa", Hivos, 2011
"RUANGRUPA Contract 2011-2013", Hivos, 2011
"RUANGRUPA Kenschets 2008-2010", Hivos, 2010
"RUANGRUPA Organisational Assessment Final_2008-2010", Hivos

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**Resource persons consulted**

| *Name of key informant* | *Organisation* | *Function in organisation* | *Relation with SPO* | *Contact details including e-mail.* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ade Darmawan | RUANGRUPA | Director | Staff | robot_murka@yahoo.com |
| Ajeng Nurul Aini | RUANGRUPA | Manager | Staff | ajengnurulaini@gmail.com |
| Reza Afisina | RUANGRUPA | Program Manager | Staff | jungle.squad@gmail.com |
| Indra Ameng | RUANGRUPA | Program Manager | Staff | indra.ameng@gmail.com |
| Andang Kelana | Forum Lenteng | General Secretary | CSO network | andang.kelana@gmail.com |
| Dyana Savina Hutadjulu | Hivos | Programme Officer | CFA | |

# Appendix 1 Civil Society Scores

This table presents the appreciation of the evaluation team regarding changes occurred for each indicator between 2012 and 2014 on a scale of -2 to + 2

- 2 = Considerable deterioration
- 1 = A slight deterioration
0 = no change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012
+1 = slight improvement
+2 = considerable improvement

| Dimension | | Indicators | Question | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Civic engagement** | 1 | Needs of marginalised groups | How does your organisation take the needs of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups into account in your planning, actions, activities, and/or strategies? | +1 |
| | 2 | Involvement of target groups | What is the level of participation of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups in the analysis, planning and evaluation of your activities? | +2 |
| | 3 | Political engagement | How intense is your (individual staff or organisational) participation in locally-nationally elected bodies and/or sectoral user groups? | 0 |
| | | | | |
| **Level of organisation** | 5 | Relations with other organisations | In the past 12 months what has been the most intensive interaction you had with other CSOs? | +1 |
| | 5 | Frequency of dialogue with closest CSO | In the past 12 months how many meetings did you have with the CSO that you have most intensive interaction with? | +2 |
| | 6 | Defending the interests of marginalised groups | Which CSO are most effective in defending the interests of your target groups? In the past 12 months, how did you relate to those CSOs? | +1 |
| | 7 | Composition current financial resource base | How does your organisation finance institutional costs such as workshops of the General Assembly (if applicable); attendance to workshops of other CSOs; costs for organisational growth and/or networking? | +1 |
| | | | | |
| **Practice of Values** | 8 | Downward accountability | To what extent can mandatory social organs (steering committee, general assembly, internal auditing group) ask your executive leaders to be accountable to them? | 0 |
| | 9 | Composition of social organs | What % of members of your mandatory social organs belong to the marginalised target groups you are working with/for? | 0 |
| | 10 | External financial auditing | How regularly is your organisation audited externally? | 0 |
| | | | | |
| **Perception of impact** | 11 | Client satisfaction | What are the most important concerns of your target groups? How do your services take into account those important concerns? | +1 |
| | 12 | Civil society impact. | In the past 12 months, what impact did you have on building a strong civil society? | +1 |
| | 13 | Relation with public sector organisations. | In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with public sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' objectives? | 0 |
| | 14 | Relation with private sector organisations | In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with private sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' perspective? | +1 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 15 | Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations | How successful have you been in influencing public policies and practices in the past 2 years? | 0 |
| | 16 | Influence upon private sector agencies' policies, rules, regulations. | How successful have you been in influencing private sector policies and practices in the past 2 years? | +1 |
| | | | | |
| **CS context** | 17 | Coping strategies | In the past 2 years, how did your organisation cope with these changes in the context that may have been positive or negative consequences for civil society. | +2 |

# Appendix 2 Changes in civil society indicators between 2012 and 2014

## 1 Civic Engagement

### 1.1 Needs of marginalised groups SPO

As during the baseline, RUANGRUPA continued to support young, idealistic artists with a space to explore and express themselves artistically, who otherwise may have lacked such opportunities in an environment that is normally dominated by commercialization and market-orientation. The artists that benefited from the space and support provided by RUANGRUPA worked on more contemporary urban issues and forms of expression that are generally less common in Indonesia. RUANGRUPA has reached audiences through regular festivals like Jakarta 32° C and OK.Video, but has also utilized the Internet to expand its reach.





*Figure 2 Statistics Jakarta 32° C: Audience participation, artist participants and artworks. Source: http://jakarta32c.org/home/festival/statistics/*

Via the Jakarta 32° C festival, RUANGRUPA engaged more young student audiences with an increase of 40 percent every two years since 2004. During the event in 2012, 103 artworks were displayed attracting an audience of some 4,000 people, and around 100 artists, or aspiring artists, attending workshops organised during the festival[56].Although audience figures went up from around 3,000 in 2010, there was a drop in the number of workshop participants and artworks displayed (120 participants and 128 artworks in 2010).

RUANGRUPA is regarded as an 'avant garde organisation' because it has introduced video art in Indonesia on a relatively significant scale in the form of regular festivals. Since 2004 the OK.Video festival has become a national and international barometer for contemporary video development. In

[56] Jakarta 32°C, Previous Festival, "Statistics". Available from http://jakarta32c.org/home/festival/statistics/ (accessed 18 December 2014)

2011, it drew 500 applicants of which 60 were selected for display (10 by international artists and 50 by Indonesian artists[57]). In 2013, there were 303 applicants and 91 selected artworks (29 of them from open-submissions). What is significant is that since 2004, OK.Video has been able to attract more international artists from more countries: from 20 in 2011 to 51 in 2013[58].

RUANGRUPA also continued to host the annual RRRec Fest. In 2010, it was estimated that 2,200 people participated, which grew to 2,500 in 2011. This event engaged non-mainstream bands/musicians in promoting visual contemporary art.

The Ruru gallery of RUANGRUPA also had an increased number of visitors from 1,100 in 2011 to 1,203 in 2012[59]. However, the number of participating artists in exhibitions decreased from 135 in 2011 to 40 in 2012. Another RUANGRUPA event hosted twice since the start of 2011 has been the writing workshop. 29 young people were trained on how to write about contemporary art issues.

With regards to the participation of women, RUANGRUPA claimed to have encouraged women's participation by targeting a number of women artists or audiences in their projects. However, the evaluation team found that fewer women participated in 2012 compared to 2011, as seen in decreased women's participation in exhibitions from 21 percent to 15 percent. RUANGRUPA did not consistently track sex disaggregated data, making it difficult to assess whether this decreased participation was a common characteristic in all RUANGRUPA-organised events or not.

Given the nature of contemporary visual and digital artwork[60] and RUANGRUPA's target group characteristics there has been an increased use of the internet as an important space for expression of contemporary visual art. It is plausible that this digital technology has widened the reach for contemporary visual artists beyond that of commercial galleries or festivals, including those produced by RUANGRUPA supported artists and groups. For example, @thepopoh[61] now has 60,200 Twitter followers[62]and had 420,226 website visitors.

As illustrated above by the regular RUANGRUPA-hosted events, there have been decreases in some areas with regards to participation. RUANGRUPA explained that this decrease stemmed from the emergence of similar artistic initiatives[63] and by the SPO's strategic change in orientation to move further into becoming a *knowledge producer and developer* rather than a *mere initiator or pioneer of alternative art space or art activities,* as put forth in their latest proposal[64]. Unfortunately, there is little information available to measure the extent of RUANGRUPA's improvement with regards to its new orientation (see section 5.1).

## 1.2 Involvement of target groups SPO

Jakarta 32° C and OK.Video festival were RUANGRUPA's largest platforms in terms of audience and participation. Both have become separate divisions under RUANGRUPA, with independent planning and capacity to relate to other organisations. For example, OK.Video secured funding from the Japan Foundation support since 2011[65]. Jakarta 32° C participated in the Darwin Festival in Australia in August 2014, and plans to organise student exchanges with Willem de Kooning Academie of Rotterdam for their next event in 2015[66].

Both divisions consist of ad-hoc personnel selected from event alumni and committees. As such these divisions consist of RUANGRUPA's target groups. Hence, target groups have become more involved in

[57] Indonesian Visual Art Archive, "Menghadirkan Daging di Hadapan Pemirsa". Available from http://archive.ivaa-online.org/files/uploads/texts/14-19.pdf (accessed 18 December 2014)
[58] Astrid Septriana, "Muslihat – OK Video Festival 2013 (1) 'Akal-akalan' di 10 tahun OK Video festival", *detikHOT*, 9 September 2013. Available from http://hot.detik.com/celeb-personal/read/2013/09/09/093513/2352845/1059/akal-akalan-di-10-tahun-ok-video-festival (accessed 18 December 2014)
[59] Hester Smidt,"Input-Output Analysis RUANGRUPA", MFS-II evaluation 2014
[60] This is an example of a digital artwork: https://www.behance.net/aganharahap
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[64] "2013 Memo for AC", RUANGRUPA, 2013.doc, p. 4
[65] Japan Foundation, "OK. Video Flesh – 5th Jakarta International Video Festival 2011". Available from www.jpf.or.id/id/music-video-program-ok-video-di-jf (accessed 18 December 2014)
[66] "Interview with Jakarta 32°C", MFS-II evaluation 2014

RUANGRUPA's planning, implementation and decision-making processes, especially those relating to Jakarta 32° C and OK.Video events. However, RUANGRUPA's target groups have not participated in RUANGRUPA's organisational planning or evaluation exercises, but this is also because RUANGRUPA hardly conducts such strategic actions themselves.

### 1.3 Intensity of political engagement SPO

This indicator is less applicable to RUANGRUPA. The daily practices and organisational direction of the SPOs helps to set up the benchmarks in the art and cultural movement, not to engage politically. During the 2014 presidential election, most of RUANGRUPA staff and affiliates were clearly supporting one presidential candidate. They individually participated in creative campaigns through contemporary visual arts mediums. However, the organisation remained neutral and actually utilized the momentum to hold creative competitions amongst artists, engaging artists who supported both presidential candidates.

## 2 Level of Organisation

### 2.1. Relations with other organisations SPO

RUANGRUPA still closely works with CSOs with whom they share similar missions. As during the baseline, RUANGRUPA collaborates with the Jakarta Arts Council, the Indonesian Visual Arts Archive (Yogyakarta), MES56 (Yogyakarta), Jatiwangi Art Factory (East Java); and still shares target groups with traditional allies such as Forum Lenteng and Serrum.

However, RUANGRUPA has emerged to play a more important and leading role in its relations to other civil society organisations. Along with Kunci Cultural Studies, RUANGRUPA is Indonesia's associate partner of the Arts Collaboratory. Through Arts Collaboratory, RUANGRUPA has garnered a domestic network that includes the likes of Lifepatch, Langgeng Art Foundation, Jatiwangi Art Factory, Serrum, Forum Lenteng, Gardu House, MES56, and ISAD.RUANGRUPA worked with Hivos, Casco, and Kunci Cultural Studies to host the first Arts Collaboratory assembly in May 2014[67], which involved Indonesian and international CSO partners of Arts Collaboratory.

RUANGRUPA is also involved in the Indonesian Coalition for the Arts. This is a coalition which was established in 2010 to strengthen the cultural infrastructure from the civil society side and to push for improved cultural policy by the government.

Internationally, RUANGRUPA's network has been well developed through its own interventions as well as those with Arts Collaboratory support. From 2011 to 2014, RUANGRUPA has been working with more international organisations from Singapore, Korea, China, India, Germany, the Netherlands, Australia, UK, Australia, and Brazil (see Appendix5 for details).

RRRec Fest has also expanded RUANGRUPA's network into the Indonesian music scene, which often shares an audience with the alterative video scene. RUANGRUPA considers this form of collaboration to be mutually beneficial since development in music industry will increase demands for contemporary visual art products, and vice versa. In the last three years, the music festival has improved RUANGRUPA's relations with actors from outside the contemporary visual art sphere.

### 2.2. Frequency of dialogue with closest civil society organisation SPO

RUANGRUPA has been working more frequently with its traditional partners namely Forum Lenteng and Serrum as they often share personnel and have a common 'founding father' so to speak: Hafiz, the leader of Forum Lenteng and also a board of RUANGRUPA helped found both organisations. Their intense relationship has resulted in the materialization of RURU Corps in 2011. RURU Corps is a visual

[67] Casco, "Arts Collaboratory Assembly: Indonesia, Seminar/Room, 19 May 2014 – 25 May 2014". Available from http://cascoprojects.org/arts-collaboratory-assembly-indonesia (accessed 18 December 2014)

communication agency serving clients with contemporary visual art design services, expertise, event organising, or producing print and visual materials. RURU Corps acts as a business unit for RUANGRUPA, Forum Lenteng, and Serrum[68].RURU Corps should be appreciated as RUANGRUPA's initiative, and for the distribution of benefits generated to the strengthening of its partners.

RUANGRUPA's network has improved in terms of quantity and scope, but apart from hosting the Arts Collaboratory Assembly in 2014 and the establishment of RURU Corps, the evaluation team did not find further evidence that the intensity of relations or the frequency of dialogue has improved since the baseline.

## 2.3. Defending the interests of marginalised groups SPO

Contemporary visual art was born as an elite branch of visual art, and had been kept exclusive by market and profit-oriented actors. As such, by nature contemporary visual art tended to engage very little with audiences. As with other genres of art, the appreciation of contemporary visual artwork has often been driven by the market, sometimes to an irrational degree and creating opportunities for falsified artworks[69]. Artists have not been completely free to express themselves as their livelihoods depend on being able to serve market tastes. Public space for appreciation or critique of artwork has been limited and was also dominated by market preferences resulting in little diversity. Non-market oriented artists and their audiences have had little space for expression. Unlike cultural centres such as Yogyakarta and Bali, the Jakarta art scene has not been conducive for contemporary artists.

Female artists have also been traditionally marginalised due to a lack of acknowledgement from mainstream art critiques. Historically female artists have focused on feminine expression. Contemporary visual art holds opportunities for the advancement of women artists since this genre is less patriarchal than other visual art genres.

RUANGRUPA's mission has been to advance public services for artists marginalised by market factors since "*public interest values in media are threatened by access and control issues, diminishing the potential for millions to become better informed and engaged in the critical matters shaping the future*"[70]. RUANGRUPA is considered as an important actor in this regard[71].Given RUANGRUPA's mission, and based on the activities it has supported, its target groups can be defined as:

Students or youth interested in exploring contemporary visual art as artists, curators, or writers;
Interdisciplinary actors interested in urban issues, media, and public space issue;
Visual art stakeholders benefitting from RUANGRUPA's exploration, ideas, and knowledge production, and;
Female contemporary visual artists.

With increased target group engagement (as discussed in 1.1) and improved level organisation with other CSOs (2.1 and 2.2), RUANGRUPA has been more successful in improving their target groups' access and control in the development of contemporary visual arts in Indonesia. Their engagement is important to create a balance with market or other civil society actor domination of public spaces, to promote diversity and wider participation, and to ensure freedom of expression. Moreover, RUANGRUPA and Kunci were officially entrusted by the Arts Collaboratory to recommend grantees in Indonesia[72]. The latter highlights that RUANGRUPA is growing into a more important organisation in defending the interests of the contemporary visual arts community in Indonesia.

[68] Facebook, "RURU Corps". Available from https://www.facebook.com/rurucorps/info?tab=page_info (accessed 18 December 2014)
[69] Consider the similar case with photography fine art at http://www.theage.com.au/entertainment/art-and-design/buyer-beware-treat-peter-lik-photo-sale-with-scepticism-20141212-125khz.html
[70] Ford Foundation, Issues, Freedom of Expression, Advancing Public Service Media, "Overview". Available from http://www.fordfoundation.org/issues/freedom-of-expression/advancing-public-service-media (accessed 18 December 2014)
[71] Ford Foundation, Grants, "Yayasan Ruang Rupa". Available from http://www.fordfoundation.org/grants/grantdetails?grantid=116351 (accessed 18 December 2014)
[72] Arts Collaboratory, Exchange, "Artist in Residence Program from Arts Collaboratory Network to Colombia Arts Collaboratory & Ministry of Culture of Colombia". Available from http://www.artscollaboratory.org/exchange.html (accessed 18 December 2014)

## 2.4 Composition financial resource base SPO

In 2012, RUANGRUPA received USD 150,000 from the Ford Foundation for mobile cinema screenings in ten underserved communities of Jakarta as well as to develop a mobile application for low-income vendors in Southeast Jakarta's informal economy[73]. This funding diversified RUANGRUPA's financial composition of financial resources, with non-Hivos donor support growing from 41 percent in 2011 to 79 percent in 2012.

With regards to short-term projects, RUANGRUPA has been able to draw on ad-hoc support to fund their activities. For example, RUANGRUPA was supported by the Ministry of Creative Economy to attend the Brisbane Triennial Festival in 2013. Other sponsorships allowed the SPO to attend the Sao Paolo Biennale in 2014 and a host of international exhibitions. However, apart from Ford Foundation and Hivos (Arts Collaboratory), RUANGRUPA has not yet received long-term donor support from other sources.

RURU Corps has been operational as a business unit for RUANGRUPA, Forum Lenteng, and Serrum. However, they have not yet decided how to use the accumulated profit, whether divided or used for joint activities. From the website of RURU Corps website, it seems that the business unit has been able to attract private sector clients apart from working upon RUANGRUPA-commissioned works[74]. In RUANGRUPA's financial report for 2012, the budget line tilted 'other income' totalled just USD 3,800, while a year prior they managed USD 33,000. RUANGRUPA's director explained that the decrease represented the amount of income that had been redirected to RURU Corps. He also added that in 2013 RURU Corps generated more income that 2012.

# 3 Practice of Values

## 3.1. Downward accountability SPO

Since the baseline there has been no significant change in the SPO's downward accountability. Although an internal control system is in place, including a supervisory structure, there are no reporting or evaluation mechanisms between the board and the management. The management team reported that they have conducted more meetings to evaluate their activities, as a consequence of more activities being conducted. But the SPO does not have dedicated monitoring or evaluation systems or personnel in place. The submission of reports to Hivos has also been late, as was the case with the submission of the 2013 progress report. The 2011 and 2012 reports were very similar in terms of content and were written along the lines of the organisation's structure rather than the agreed upon activities and results.

RUANGRUPA's decision to establish RURU Corps should be seen as an effort to improve organisational accountability, as by establishing a separate business unit with different income sources, RUANGRUPA intends to keep their identity as a civil society organisation. RUANGRUPA's director reported that in the near future RURU Corps will merge with other income-generating units (RRRec Fest, Rurushop, and Ruru radio) so RUANGRUPA can focus on its CS role.

## 3.2 Composition of social organs SPO

There has been no change in the composition of social organs of the SPO since the baseline. The composition of the board and the executive remain the same. The board of trustees and supervisory board of RUANGRUPA still consists of a mix between artists and non-art professionals, including academia. This composition is still in line with the organisation's strategy to bring together the creative and artistic domains with other public domains, although there are no artists on the board.

[73] Ford Foundation, Grants, "Yayasan Ruang Rupa". Available from http://www.fordfoundation.org/grants/grantdetails?grantid=116351 (accessed 18 December 2014)
[74] RuruCorps, "Works". Available from http://rurucorps.com/home/works/ (accessed 18 December 2014)

## 3.3. External financial auditing SPO

RUANGRUPA participated in a workshop organised by Hivos on transparency and accountability in 2011. RUANGRUPA itself recognized the need for a strategy to strengthen their financial systems and saw the workshop as an effort to improve their internal accountability[75]. No audit reports were made available to the evaluation team, although there were two audit assessments conducted by Hivos in 2011 and 2012. The evaluation team concludes that RUANGRUPA has not conducted an external institutional audit, as such there is no change from the baseline.

# 4 Perception of Impact

## 4.1. Client satisfaction SPO

Jakarta 32° C appreciates RUANGRUPA's role in engaging young students from at least 20 campuses or various study programmes to explore their interest in contemporary visual art. RUANGRUPA has provided space for free expression and appreciation, encouraged critical yet egalitarian art discourse, and promoted research-based collaborative-voluntary artwork development. The latter distinguishes RUANGRUPA's approach from other existing on-campus festivals. As a division under RUANGRUPA, Jakarta 32° C has become a more independent organisation and has organised roadshows in two provincial capitals to promote and trigger development of similar initiatives outside Jakarta. Jakarta 32° C has been recognized internationally, having been invited to participate in international events such as the more recent Darwin Festival in Australia in August 2014. RUANGRUPA is also planning to arrange student exchanges with Willem de Kooning Academie of Rotterdam for its next event in 2015.

Jakarta 32° C has been replicated into similar events held by universities, to an extent where it has caused a decrease in the number of selected artworks in recent events (due to lesser overall submitted artwork quality)[76]. Jakarta 32° C has coped with this by planning more workshops in upcoming events compared to artworks selection and presentations. In doing this, Jakarta 32° C is trying to shift from providing a venue or public space into becoming more of a knowledge provider, following along with RUANGRUPA's general organisational strategy.

RUANGRUPA has no evidence that the emergence of similar initiatives (contemporary visual art festivals or gallery-hosted events) that have increased in frequency since 2008 can be attributed to their interventions; but at the same time they do not reject that this may be a possibility. RUANGRUPA considers the emergence of new initiatives and events in the contemporary arts scene as positive development in civil society. The decision to cope with these changes by shifting the organisational strategy to becoming a knowledge provider has been a conscious one that aims to maintain the quality of contemporary art works. As a consequence, it is understandable that not all clients are satisfied with this coping strategy as RUANGRUPA has started to receive criticism for being more distant and elitist. In this regard, RUANGRUPA and Jakarta 32° C share the same opinion that they would rather risk receiving such criticism in order to trigger the emergence of new benchmarks in contemporary arts and to keep pushing for creativity of expression.

## 4.2. Civil society impact SPO

Although there is no tangible evidence-based research, RUANGRUPA is regarded by Jakarta 32° C and the Arts Collaboratory to be an organisation that inspires younger artists who then form their own communities in various cities or online platforms. RUANGRUPA's position as an Arts Collaboratory associate partner has helped bring international exposure to RUANGRUPA partners (as mentioned in 2.1) to support their sustainability as well as artistic development. RUANGRUPA has become a benchmark for a collaborative and contextual contemporary visual arts development. RUANGRUPA and its partners shared values of 'collaboration' and 'being contextual' is even seen as a unique approach

[75] "RUANGRUPA Annual Report 2011", RUANGRUPA, 2011
[76] Interview with Jakarta 32°C, MFS-II evaluation 2014, see also: http://jakarta32c.org/home/festival/statistics/

missing in other countries[77]. Unlike other participants of the 2014 Sao Paolo Biennale, RUANGRUPA was invited specifically to present its approach rather than its artwork[78].

RUANGRUPA can be considered successful in promoting inclusive contemporary visual art, freedom of expression, an egalitarian cooperation culture, and contextualization through their engagement with young students. These values are expected to be adopted by this younger generation for future, wider application. Although RUANGRUPA does not focus on improving young artists' livelihoods directly through marketing, some Jakarta 32° C alumni have actually earned their living through selling contemporary visual artworks which are not likely to be marketable through galleries[79], resembling a phenomenon known as "artist merchandising". This is phenomenon is possible since contemporary visual arts has become part of a contemporary subculture among youngsters in Jakarta, who in combination with other contemporary art forms, have created their own idols and market.

As RUANGRUPA promoted the creation of non-gallery artwork such as videos, their supported contemporary visual artists have utilized the internet as an alternative art space. As a result, their artwork has more potential to be accessed by a wider audience. The internet offers a space to engage a wider public with unlimited time, something market-oriented galleries cannot offer. There is also a higher demand from internet users for visual material. Thus contemporary visual art and the internet are mutually supporting. There are also examples of how internet users have used contemporary visual arts to advance various interests like political aspirations (as can be seen from this example[80]).

RUANGRUPA and its partners have improved its online presence[81], developing websites for each of its events that targeted between 50,000 and 60,000 visitors. In 2011, RUANGRUPA's main website was visited by 26,780 unique visitors and their subdomains visited by 80,991 unique visitors. In 2012, visitors to the subdomains reached 82,425 people and 19,677 unique visitors to the main website, with another 16,071 to the updates page. In 2012, RUANGRUPA also began radio streaming through the Rurushop radio. Online radio content covers topics from a contemporary arts point of view. RUANGRUPA has tried to improved civic engagement and level of organisation through the internet.

RUANGRUPA intends to engage the wider society, especially urban Jakarta, not by "coming up with solutions and providing answers", but by "*eliciting questions regarding societal issues and creating experiences that start people thinking*"[82]. However, RUANGRUPA has not monitored or paid special attention to measure this particular intended impact. Although art is a medium for communicating values and ideas, the nature of contemporary visual art itself allows for multiple interpretations. Hence, it is hard to measure whether RUANGRUPA's impact on civil society has reached beyond those related to or interested in contemporary visual art, or that it has contributed to other CS movements. In the baseline, the evaluation team noted that RUANGRUPA had helped KontraS, a vocal lobby CSO, in designing attractive and artistic campaign materials targeting youth audience. RUANGRUPA had also supported Sanggar Akar in designing attractive teaching material for homeless children. However, we did not find other or additional results during the end line evaluation.

## 4.3. Relation with public sector organisations SPO

RUANGRUPA does not have an advocacy or lobby strategy and conducts very few activities that directly affect policy-makers except through the involvement of RUANGRUPA's director in the

[77] Arts Collaboratory, Assembly: Indonesia, "Collectiveness vs Competitiveness". Available from http://artscollaboratory-assembly.tumblr.com/post/89566663327/collectiveness-vs-competitiveness (accessed 18 December 2014)
[78] Kharisma Prasetyo, "Evaluation Workshop RUANGRUPA", MFS-II evaluation 2014
[79] *Ibid;* see examples of artwork at: http://thepopopaint.blogspot.com/ and http://rurushopradio.ruangrupa.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/e-flyer-thepopoXwoof.jpg
[80] Behance, Discover, Agan Harahap, "Poscard for Jokowi-Jk". Available from https://www.behance.net/gallery/18194551/POST-CARD-FOR-JOKOWI-JK (accessed 18 December 2014)
[81] Websites developed by RUANGRUPA: www.karbonjournal.org, www.ruangrupa.org, jakarta32c.org/, http://ruangrupa.org/web, http://decompression.ruangrupa.org, http://rrrec.ruangrupa.org, http://okvideofestival.org, http://bung.ruangrupa.org, www.jarakpandang.net
[82] Arts Collaboratory, "RUANGRUPA and the Shared History between Indonesia and Netherland". Available from http://old.artscollaboratory.org/projects/RUANGRUPA-and-shared-history-between-indonesia-and-netherlands-0 (accessed 18 December 2014)

Indonesian Arts Coalition(*Koalisi Seni Indonesia*), which aims to foster government support for the creative art industry through, for example, tax incentives for art-supporting corporations[83].

As a prominent collaborative artwork production platform, RUANGRUPA has been recognized by the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Industry as indicated in their sponsorship of RUANGRUPA's attendance to the 2013 Brisbane Triennial and the commissioning of four individual contemporary visual artists. However this support actually came as a surprise to RUANGRUPA since they do not consider themselves close to the ministry, nor did they engage in any specific efforts to establish collaborative relations with them[84].In 2013, RUANGRUPA participated in an exhibition on archives and documentation of contemporary art held by The Ministry of Culture and Education, which RUANGRUPA also considers an acknowledgment from the government.

Other than this, there have been some collaborative efforts with the public sector since the baseline, but these focused mostly on the events hosted by RUANGRUPA. For example, RUANGRUPA worked with Jakarta's Office for Tourism and Culture and the Ministry of Education and Culture to launch a book on the Jakarta 32° C festival in 2012. RUANGRUPA also participated in government-hosted events to showcase the work of young artists submitted to the OK.Video festival in 2012.

## 4.4. Relation with private sector agencies SPO

With the establishment of RURU Corps and Rurushop, RUANGRUPA has made a clear distinction in its position as being a non-market actor. RURU Corps and Rurushop have their own management and the income streams have been separated. While these business entities have become separate units, the relations that RUANGRUPA has with the private sector have increased since the baseline through RURU Corps.

RUANGRUPA engaged with a few small-scale local businesses in Jakarta through the festivals that it hosted. In 2011 the RRRec Fest was held in a location with many small businesses. A small bread shop and a local café became the locations for staging performances and screenings. RRRec Fest also collaborated with indie labels and production companies such as Demajors, Organic records and G Production. Similarly, RUANGRUPA collaborated with a number of private sector actors in the Jakarta 32° C festival of 2012, working with a printing company, local clothing brands, a beverage company and a bakery that helped sponsor the event.

RUANGRUPA also worked with private and public media (both print and online) to widen the coverage of its events. Media sponsors collaborated in the OK.Video helping to promote the festival and improve its effectiveness.

The contemporary visual art community's own artwork market is beyond the domain of private sector agencies (artist merchandise), but not for Rurushop who target this niche. Outside this domain, private sector agencies, especially for advertising, are beginning to recognize the appeal of contemporary art to promote their product. Some examples include Kedai Seni Djakarte[85], a cafe with contemporary visual-artistic touch which often holds artist discussions or artwork presentations (including from RUANGRUPA and Jakarta 32° C); or Pasar Santa[86], a recently flourishing food court for 'hipsters'. RURU Corps aims to benefit from private sector interest, and has worked for several brands such as Mizone, Otobursa, Google Chrome to promote their products[87]. Collaboration with Google Chrome utilized the Open Spaces application to promote the brand as well as mural art that was supported by RUANGRUPA.

[83] Koalisi Seni Indonesia, Program, Kebijakan Kesenian, "Insentif Pajak untuk Seni dan Budaya". Available from http://www.koalisiseni.or.id/program/kebijakan-kesenian/insentif-pajak-untuk-seni-budaya/ (accessed 18 December 2014)
[84] Kharisma Prasetyo, "Evaluation Workshop RUANGRUPA", MFS-II evaluation 2014
[85] Twitter, "Kedai Seni Djakarte". Available from https://twitter.com/KedaiSeniJKT (accessed 18 December 2014)
[86] Twitter, "#jajandipasar". Available from https://twitter.com/hashtag/jajandipasar (accessed 18 December 2014)
[87] RuruCorps, "Archives". Available from http://rurucorps.com/home/work/ (accessed 18 December 2014)

### 4.5. Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations SPO

RUANGRUPA's involvement in the Indonesian Arts Coalition has not had an impact on the public sector. Apart from supporting RUANGRUPA's participation in the 2013 Brisbane Triennial, there has been no direct effort to strengthen the cultural infrastructure or policies of the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Industry or special attention to contemporary visual art.

In 2013, RUANGRUPA's Jurnal Karbon (a RUANGRUPA-produced journal) worked with the Center for Law and Policy to organise a training on people's rights in the midst of the domination of commercialization of Jakarta's public spaces. This was funded by Tifa Foundation and resulted in the publication of a book. It is unlikely that this publication had much influence.

### 4.6. Influence upon private sector agencies' policies, rules, regulations SPO

This indicator is less applicable to RUANGRUPA since the organisation aims to support non-mainstream art forms and artists. There has been a growing trend in Jakarta for alternative public spaces that combine creativity with small businesses. It could be argued that RUANGRUPA is part of this trend or has influenced the trend, but there is insufficient evidence to draw this conclusion.

# 5 Civil Society context

## 5.1. Coping strategies

The internet has been a very strategic medium to spread visual and video-based artwork. There is also a high demand and interest for visual contemporary art. As the Director of the Visual Arts Network in South Africa, Joseph Grayland, pointed out, the proliferation of internet access and web-based technologies have provided the fuel for RUANGRUPA projects that is predicated on dynamic networks and the smart use of technology.[88] As such, RUANGRUPA has utilized their website to showcase their target groups' artwork, to disseminate archived knowledge and publications, to promote their events, and to attract youth participation with its contemporary design and issues covered. RUANGRUPA has an online radio and several subdomain websites:

- ruangrupa.org
- okvideofestival.org
- jakarta32c.org
- artlab.ruangrupa.org
- decompression.ruangrupa.org
- rrrec.ruangrupa.org
- rurushop.ruangrupa.org
- rururadio.org
- bung.ruangrupa.org
- www.jarakpandang.net
- www.karbonjournal.org
- rurucorps.com

From the attractive website designs and the expansion of subdomains, it is clear that RUANGRUPA is very aware of the importance of having an online presence and have put much effort into using the internet for their advantage.

RUANGRUPA is aware of the challenges in maintaining a balance between serving civil society and the visual arts community. RUANGRUPA considers it important to keep groups a part of RUANGRUPA's organisational value and identity, and thus have tried to keep the development of artworks grounded to the surrounding context. For example, the OK.Video festival in 2011 attempted to bridge the gap

[88] Arts Collaboratory, "A Joburger in Jakarta: notes on RUANGRUPA and the Art of the Network". Available from http://old.artscollaboratory.org/projects/joburger-jakarta-notes-RUANGRUPA-and-art-network (accessed 18 December 2014)

between video art development and its relevance with the social-political environment by inviting two resource persons from international film festivals representing each mainstream (Germany Obbenhauser Short Film Festival and Toronto Film Festival) to a workshop[89]. Other themes covered by RUANGRUPA which have relevance beyond contemporary art included urban issues, local identity, the public role of art, post-colonialism, creative industry and work opportunities, and technology.

RUANGRUPA has been aware of the importance of sustainability or contemporary arts organisations. RURU Corps is RUANGRUPA's response to the commercialization of visual arts and the need to develop a network amongst arts groups that have the capability of being more financial independent. Similarly, Rurushop and Rururadio are initiatives that seek to benefit from the phenomenon of "artist merchandising" in such a way as to derive financial benefits for RUANGRUPA and the artists it supports without concede creativity or art space.

[89] Indonesian Visual Art Archive, "Menghadirkan Daging di Hadapan Pemirsa". Available from 18 December 2014)

# Appendix 3 List of RUANGRUPA Showcases from 2009-2014

**2009**

- RUANGRUPA presentation, Utrecht Manifest Biennial for Social Design: The Grand Domestic Revolution, Beyond The Dutch, Casco – office for art, design & theory, (Utrecht, The Netherlands).
- Conference, On Globalism, MuseumMOderner Kunst / MUMOK, (Vienna, Austria).
- OK.Video – 4th Jakarta International Video Festival, (Jakarta, Indonesia).

**2010 - 2011**

- Exhibition, Singapore Night Festival, Singapore Art Museum, (Singapore).
- A RUANGRUPA collaborative traveling exhibition series: Hanya Memberi Tak Harap Kembali, held in three cities: Bandung (Soemardja Gallery), Yogyakarta (Kedai Kebun Forum) & Jakarta (National Gallery of Indonesia).
- RUANGRUPA 10th Anniversary, DECOMPRESSION#10 – Expanding The Space and Public, exhibitions, public art projects, workshops, film screening, seminars, bazaar, music festival and launch of RUANGRUPA publications, (Jakarta, Bandung & Yogyakarta, Indonesia).
- Art project, 4th Jakarta 32°C, exhibition, workshop, public art project and discussion program for Jakarta students, (Jakarta, Indonesia).

**2011**

- Exhibition, "The Singapore Fiction", OPEN HOUSE - Singapore Biennale, National Museum of Singapore (Singapore)
- Exhibition, "Mini OK.Video Festival", LAUNCHING MARKER - Art Dubai (Dubai)
- Exhibition, DYSFASHIONAL, National Gallery of Indonesia (Jakarta, Indonesia)
- OK.Video – 5th Jakarta International Video Festival (Jakarta, Indonesia)
- International Conferences, AAF Global Network Project, "Pioneer the Future with the Power of Culture – Spirit of Tohoku, Voices Of Asia", Asahi Art Festival (Hachinohe - Tokyo, Japan)
- Exhibition, BEASTLY, Cemeti Art House (Yogyakarta, Indonesia)
- Symposium, Asian Arts Mobility, Asian Arts Space Network Meeting, Kunsthalle Gwangju, (Korea)
- Exhibition, City Net Asia 2011, Seoul Museum of Art (SeMA)
- Exhibition, Institution for The Future, Asia Triennial Manchester, Chinese Arts Centre (Manchester, England)
- Exhibition, BEASTLY, Salihara Gallery (Jakarta, Indonesia)

**2012**

- Exhibition, RURU ZIP: Quote Edition, Reclaim doc, National Gallery of Indonesia (Jakarta, Indonesia)
- Exhibition, THE KUDA: The Untold Story of Indonesian Underground Music in the 70s, 2012, Commissioned for The 7th Asia Pacific Triennial of Contemporary Art, Queensland Art Gallery | Gallery of Modern Art, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia
- Exhibition, RUANGRUPA Small Archive, URBAN GALLERY, Busan Biennale, Seoul, South Korea
- Exhibition, The Sweet and Story of Sugar, Project Collaboration between RUANGRUPA and Noorderlicht – The Netherlands, Kuntskring Gallery, Jakarta, Indonesia

**2013**

- Award, Best 10, Visible Award, Cittadellarte – Pistoletto Foundation and Fondazione Zegna, Van Abbe museum, Eindhoven
- Exhibition, Embrio: Pameran Arsipdan Dokumentasi Seni Rupa Indonesia, Ministry of Education and Culture, GaleriNasional Indonesia, Jakarta
- Forum, Turning Target: Forum Manajemen Organisasi Seni Rupa, Cemeti Art House, Yogyakarta

**2014**

- Exhibition, *Arts Collaboratory Showcase,* RURU Gallery, Jakarta
- Exhibition, *The Growing Manual,* Seoul Museum of Art, Seoul, Korea
- Forum, *Mitting: Art and Cultural Network Forum,* URS 21 Chung Shan Creative Hub, Taipei (Organised by Open Contemporary Art Center (OCAC) and the Thai artist duo Jiandyin (Pornpilai Meemalai and Jiradej Meemalai)
- Workshop, *Making Change Project*, Making Change Production Sprint, Bangalore, India (In cooperation with the Centre for Internet and Society and the Tactical Technology Collective in Bangalore, HIVOS in the Netherlands and the Centre for Digital Cultures at the University of Lüneburg in Germany)
- Public art project, *Temporary Territory,* 2014, at Darwin Festival, Australia
- Exhibition, Art Project, *ruru*, 2014, Commissioned work for The 31st Biennale de Sao Paulo, Fundacao Biennale de Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo, Brazil

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen UR
P.O. Box 88
6700 AB Wageningen
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)317 48 68 00
www.wageningenUR.nl/cdi

Report CDI-15-038

The Centre for Development Innovation works on processes of innovation and change in the areas of food and nutrition security, adaptive agriculture, sustainable markets, ecosystem governance, and conflict, disaster and reconstruction. It is an interdisciplinary and internationally focused unit of Wageningen UR within the Social Sciences Group. Our work fosters collaboration between citizens, governments, businesses, NGOs, and the scientific community. Our worldwide network of partners and clients links with us to help facilitate innovation, create capacities for change and broker knowledge.

The mission of Wageningen UR (University & Research centre) is 'To explore the potential of nature to improve the quality of life'. Within Wageningen UR, nine specialised research institutes of the DLO Foundation have joined forces with Wageningen University to help answer the most important questions in the domain of healthy food and living environment. With approximately 30 locations, 6,000 members of staff and 9,000 students, Wageningen UR is one of the leading organisations in its domain worldwide. The integral approach to problems and the cooperation between the various disciplines are at the heart of the unique Wageningen Approach.

# KKI-WARSI end line report

MFS II country evaluations, Civil Society component

Dieuwke Klaver[1]
Hester Smidt

Kharisma Nugroho[2]
Kharisma Sinung Prasetya

1 Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR, Netherlands
2 SurveyMeter, Indonesia

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen, February 2015



Report CDI-15-062

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Klaver, D.C., Smidt H., Nugroho, K., Prasetya, K. S., February 2015, *KKI-WARSI end line report; MFS II country evaluations, Civil Society component,* Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR (University & Research centre) and SurveyMETER. Report CDI-15-062. Wageningen.

This report describes the findings of the end line assessment of the Indonesian Organisation KKI-WARSI that is a partner of IUCN-NL.

The evaluation was commissioned by NWO-WOTRO, the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research in the Netherlands and is part of the programmatic evaluation of the Co-Financing System - MFS II financed by the Dutch Government, whose overall aim is to strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. Apart from assessing impact on MDGs, the evaluation also assesses the contribution of the Dutch Co-Funding Agencies to strengthen the capacities of their Southern Partners, as well as the contribution of these partners towards building a vibrant civil society arena.

This report assesses KKI-WARSI's efforts towards strengthening Civil Society in Indonesia and it used the CIVICUS analytical framework. It is a follow-up of a baseline study conducted in 2012. Key questions that are being answered comprise changes in the five CIVICUS dimensions to which KKI-WARSI contributed; the nature of its contribution; the relevance of the contribution made and an identification of factors that explain the organisation's role in civil society strengthening.

Keywords: Civil Society, CIVICUS, theory based evaluation, process-tracing



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# Acknowledgements

SurveyMETER and CDI are thanking the staff and the leaders of all Southern Partner Organisations that participated in collecting information for the evaluation of the contribution of these partner organisations to creating a vibrant civil society in Indonesia. They also thank the Co-Funding Agencies and the Dutch Consortia they are a member of for making background documents available. We hope that this evaluation can support you in better positioning yourself in the Civil Society Arena of Indonesia.

# List of abbreviations and acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| AMAN | *Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara* (Indigenous Peoples' Alliance of the Archipelago) |
| AMPAL | *Aliansi Masyarakat Peduli Hutan dan Lahan* (Alliance of Concerned Citizens of Forest and Land) |
| ASB | Established as 'Alternatives to Slash-and-Burn', but now known as Partnership of the Tropical Forest Margins |
| Bappeda | *Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah* (Provincial or District Development Planning Agency) |
| Bapedalda | *Badan Pengendalian Dampak Lingkungan Daerah* (Environmental Impact Management Agency) |
| BCI | Basic Capabilities Index |
| BPDAS | *Balai Pengelolaan Daerah Aliran Sungai* (Provincial-level Watershed Management Bureau) |
| BPS | *Badan Pusat Statistik* (Central Agency on Statistics) |
| CBFM | Community-based forest management |
| CDI | Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR |
| CFA | Co-Financing Agency |
| CFO | Co-Financing Organisation |
| CIFOR | Center for International Forestry Research |
| CS | Civil society |
| CSO | Civil society organisation |
| EA | Ecosystem Alliance |
| GNI | Gross National Income |
| GOI | Government of Indonesia |
| HDI | Human Development Index |
| Hutan Desa | Village Forest |
| ICRAF | International Centre for Research in Agroforestry, now known as World Agroforestry Centre |
| IUCN | International Union for Conservation of Nature |
| KEHATI | *Yayasan Keanekaragaman Hayati Indonesia* (Indonesian Biodiversity Foundation) |
| KKI-WARSI | *Komunitas Konservasi Indonesia* WARSI (Indonesian Conservation Community WARSI) |
| LBH | *Lembaga Bantuan Hukum* (Legal Aid Foundation) |
| MFS | Dutch co-financing system |
| MoC | Model of Change |
| MoF | Ministry of Forestry |
| MoFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| MoU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| Nagari | Traditional village units in West Sumatra |
| NGO | Non-governmental organisation |
| NTFP | Non-timber forest product |
| NTFP-EP | Non-Timber Forest Products Exchange Programme |
| Ormas | *Organisasi masyarakat* (Societal Organizations) |
| PKBI | *Perkumpulan Keluarga Berencana Indonesia* (Indonesian Family Planning Association) |
| Pt. PPMA | *Perkumpulan terbatas untuk Pengkajian dan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Adat* (Limited Association for the Assessment and Empowerment of Indigenous Peoples) |
| PNPM | *Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat* (National Program for Community Empowerment) |

| | |
|---|---|
| PP | *Peraturan Pemerintah* (Government Regulation) |
| PPO | *Penatuan Petani. Organik* (Organic Farmers Association) |
| REDD+ | Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation |
| RSPB | Royal Society for the Protection of Birds |
| SERF | Social Economic Rights Fulfilment |
| SLIMs | Sustainable Livelihood Initiatives and Models |
| SPO | Southern Partner Organisation |
| SRAP | REDD+ Provincial Strategy and Action Plan |
| SSI | Semi-structured Interview |
| SSS-Pundi Sumatera | Sumatra Sustainable Support --Pundi Sumatera |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| Wageningen UR | Wageningen University & Research Centre |
| WALHI | *Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia* (Friends of the Earth Indonesia) |
| YKWS | *Yayasan Konservasi Way Seputih* (Way Seputih Conservation Foundation) |
| YMI | *Yayasan Mitra Insani* |

# 1. Introduction

This report presents the civil society end line findings of KKI-WARSI in Indonesia, which is a partner of IUCN under the Dutch Consortium Ecosystem Alliance. It is a follow-up to the baseline assessment that was carried out in 2012. According to the information provided during the baseline study, WARSI is working under the theme MDG7ab.

These findings are part of the overall evaluation of the joint MFS II evaluations to account for results of MFS II-funded or co-funded development interventions implemented by Dutch Co-Funding Agencies (CFA) and/or their Southern Partner Organisations (SPO) and to contribute to the improvement of future development interventions. The civil society evaluation uses the CIVICUS framework and seeks to answer the following questions:

- What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?
- To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
- What is the relevance of these changes?
- What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The CIVICUS framework that comprises five dimensions (civic engagement, level of organization, practice of values, perception of impact and contexts influencing agency by civil society in general) has been used to orient the evaluation methodology.

*Changes in the civil society arena of the SPO*
In the 2012 – 2014 period the two dimensions that saw the most considerable changes are 'level or organisation' and 'perception of impact'.

Generally speaking, WARSI's level of organisation has improved since the baseline: The SPO has expanded its network of NGOs working at community level, as well as with NGOs that engage in lobby and advocacy. Through the Village Forest scheme, it has been able to defend the interests of increasingly more forest people. At the same time, WARSI has considerably expanded its resource base, becoming a well settled NGO.

With regards to perception of impact, an increasing number of villages have obtained their village forests which are being management by community based forest management (CBFM) groups in an effort to prevent the invasion of these forests by mining companies and the agribusiness sector. Although the participatory resource mapping, defining village boundaries and forming CBFM groups improve the capacities of forest people to defend their interests, the impact of these forests on their livelihoods is yet very limited. Meanwhile the CBFM groups have taken the initiative to organise themselves in an umbrella organisation which is still in its embryonic phase. Other NGOs have started to replicate WARSI's success with the CBFM groups in other districts.

With regards to public sector collaboration and policy influencing, WARSI employs a two pronged approach. In the first place it works with existing policies (Government Regulation No.6/2007 and No 3/2008) that established a legal basis for CBFM. In the second place it tries to influence existing policies and practices: 1) together with other EA grantees, which has just recently yielded successful result and 2) by providing technical inputs to district governments (Jambi) and the provincial government (West Sumatra) to set up task forces in support of the creation of CBFM groups and village forests and by mainstreaming the village forest scheme policies into new rules and regulations.

The findings show that WARSI target groups have been more organised and are more capable of defending the interests of marginalised groups. With regards to impact upon the public sector, the findings also confirm that WARSI has influenced the government of West Sumatra Province to mainstream community-based forest management (CBFM) schemes into their forestry policy and practices.

These findings were obtained through an analysis of documents, a workshop and follow-up interviews with WARSI, and interviews with external resources persons working in civil society organisations that receive support from WARSI; other civil society organisations with whom the SPO is collaborating; public or private sector agents and; external resource persons capable of overlooking the MDG or theme on which the SPO is concentrating.

*Contribution analysis*
Based upon an analysis of the projects and programmes financed by the Dutch CFAs a selection was made of SPOs to be included in an in-depth process tracing trajectory and those to be included for a quick contribution of the other SPOs. WARSI was amongst those SPOs selected for in-depth process-tracing.

The first outcome that we looked at is "community-based forest management (CBFM) groups in 9 villages have received full endorsement". Such endorsement is important for communities to be able to utilize village-forest areas to improve and sustain their livelihood via community logging, agroforestry, and ecotourism. While sustainable livelihoods for forest-edge dwellers are believed to be a solution for deforestation, the endorsement also defends the community (and the forest) from long-term issues such as tenure conflicts. The pathway most likely to explain this outcome is improved political will of the government along with WARSI's efforts to support the communities through intensive accompaniment. The contribution of the SPO toward achieving this outcome is in building the capacity of community organisations, and supporting them to navigate their proposals for community forest schemes through complicated bureaucratic terrain.

The second outcome that we looked at is "community-based forest management (CBFM) is mainstreamed into West Sumatra Province's forestry policy". This outcome is very important to be validated since by mainstreaming CBFM, the government offers opportunities for CBFM scheme application on a massive scale. As can be inferred from the first outcome, scaled-up CBFM scheme implementation implies that more communities will be engaged to protect, as well as to benefit from, the forest. This outcome has been achieved as a result of WARSI's lobby and advocacy, which were supported by MFS-II and REDD+.

*Relevance*
Interviews with staff of WARSI, with external resource persons, with the liaison officer of IUCN, as well as contextual information helped to assess the relevance of WARSI's interventions in terms of; its Theory of Change (ToC) for Civil Society (SC) as designed during the baseline study; the context in which WARSI is operating; the CS policies of IUCN.

With regards to the baseline ToC, the interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant because their combined benefit is c*onserved forest and welfare for communities*, which is the ToC's ultimate goal. Some of WARSI's ToC preconditions such as *campaign on community-based forest management*, *increased value of non-timber forest products (NTFP) and ecosystem-based economy*, and major assumption such as p*olitical will from the Ministry of Forestry* and *political momentum* are well reflected from the outcome's contribution analysis.

With regards to the context in which WARSI is operating, its interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant because WARSI has developed its interventions on the opportunities that present itself in the existing policy environment, political will and international pressure and support.

With regards to the CS policies of IUCN, WARSI's collaboration with the other EA grantees is relevant as a strategy to lobby the government to simplify the procedures for the implementation of the village forest scheme. In addition to the joint advocacy success, WARSI's own project is relevant because it is in line with the EA's objective to halt the expansion of extractive industries and agribusinesses, but limited evidence was found confirming that CBFM increases livelihood assets and that households use sustainable land and resource practices to protect the Hutan Desa they manage.

*Explaining factors*
The information related to factors that explain the above findings was collected at the same time as the data were gathered for the previous questions. The evaluation team looked at internal factors within WARSI, the external context in which it operates and the relations between WARSI and IUCN.

WARSI has demonstrated that it is a mature organisation which is capable to achieve development outcomes due to its technical, managerial, administrative and financial capacities. One smaller issue that requires further attention is to prevent reporting one same result to different donors.

The external context in which WARSI operates, in particular the state's acknowledgement of forest communities' rights and the existing regulation to ensure CBFM is conducive. WARSI has used this context to bring further the agenda at all administrative levels.

The relations between IUCN-NL and WARSI are healthy and WARSI has been encouraged to partner with other Ecosystem grantees to lobby for land tenure rights. These efforts started in 2013 and have been successful in simplifying procedures at district and provincial level, as well as simplifying CBFM work plan formats, and ensuring community facilitation.

The following chapter briefly describes the political context, the civil society context and the relevant background with regards to the governance issues WARSI is working on. Chapter 3 provides background information on WARSI, the relation of its MFS II interventions with the CIVICUS framework and specific information on the contract with IUCN. An evaluation methodology has been developed for the evaluation of the Civil Society component which can be found in Appendix 2 of the country report; however, deviations from this methodology, the choices made with regards to the selection of the outcomes for contribution analysis, as well as difficulties encountered during data collection are to be found in Chapter 4. The answers to each of the evaluation questions are being presented in Chapter 5, followed by a discussion on the general project design in relation to CS development; an assessment of what elements of the project design may possibly work in other contexts or be implemented by other organisations in Chapter 6. Conclusions are presented in Chapter 7.

# 2. Context

## 2.1 Political context

### 2.1.1 Brief historical perspective

Indonesia's rise to being the world's third largest democratic nation has been lauded by many world leaders. The county is often considered to be a model Muslim democracy. As the fourth most populous nation with an estimated 250 million people[1], Indonesia has sustained its democratic commitment since transitioning from an authoritarian leadership to a democracy in 1998. The decentralized administration now consists of 34 provinces and 508 districts and municipalities.

Prior to 1998, Indonesia was under strict authoritarian regime. Suharto, known for his so-called New Order (1966-1998) regime, ushered in radical transformations that would place social and political forces under direct state supervision. The defining characteristics of the Suharto era were a focus on economic growth and controlled consensus and political stability devoid of dissent. A series of tumultuous economic and political transitions in the nineties severely diminished the credibility of ageing President Suharto, who was forced to resign amidst mass street protests.

His departure in 1998 laid bare three decades of social inequalities, state-perpetuated abuses against human rights, and a lack of civilian liberties. The regime change opened the way for a period of *Reformasi* started under the Presidency of B. J. Habibie (1998-1999) and continued by Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001), Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001–2004), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014). Restrictions on citizen participation, press freedom and association were removed. Democratic reforms and decentralization led to direct elections, portioned authority, devolution of authority to regional authorities, formation of new political parties and ended the military's parliamentary influence. The distinct historical periods of the New Order Regime and *Reformasi* (1998-present) have shaped the emergence of civil society. Defining characteristics are summarized in the table below.

Table 1
*Characteristics that have defined the emergence of civil society in Indonesia*

| Characteristics | New Order, authoritarian period (1966 – 1998) | Reformasi (1998 – present) |
|---|---|---|
| **Political system** | Centralized, authoritarian characterized by unipolarity. Golkar as the dominant political party.<br><br>In 1999, there were 27 provinces, 306 districts and around 60,000 villages. | Decentralized, democratic. Fragmentation of power and atomization of patronage relationships. Emergence of numerous political parties. Direct presidential elections since 1999.<br><br>Decentralization altered the political and administrative landscape: 34 provinces, 410 districts, 98 municipalities, 6,944 sub-districts and 81,253.[2] |
| **State-citizen interaction** | Benevolent leader, obedient population. Down to the village level, the state permeated society. | Modern political culture marked by diminishing hierarchy between the state and citizens, allowing for citizens to interact more freely. |
| **Citizen representation and voice** | Strict control of speech, expression and association.<br><br>CSOs and their networks largely "hiding behind the screen", and operating under state surveillance. A period of growth occurred in 1995-98, as resistance was building. | Burgeoning of CSOs, pressure groups and NGOs following the political euphoria after Suharto's fall.<br><br>Indonesian CSOs began to establish new networks internationally. Up until the early 2000s the focus was on state-centrist issues. Later, issues that CSOs were tackling became |

[1] In 2010 the population was estimated to be around 237 million people (BPS 2010 Population Census). The current figure is an estimate from BKKBN and similar figures are cited in the CIA's World Fact Book and the World Bank.

[2] Rumah Pemilu, "Gambaran Singkat Pemilihan Umum 2014 di Indonesia", 3 July 2014. Available from http://www.rumahpemilu.org/in/read/3351/Gambaran-Singkat-Pemilihan-Umum-2014-di-Indonesia (accessed 25 October 2014)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | | more diverse, ranging from pluralism, poverty reduction to fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights. |
| **Media** | No free press, censorship and state-control. Suharto had firm grasp over how to use print & broadcast medias to promote political ideologies. | More vibrant media environment, flourishing of media businesses albeit in control of 12 main conglomerates that are mostly profit-driven and often have political ties. |
| | Limited public and CS use and access to internet until mid-90s. | Twitter nation, widespread social media use. |
| | | Growing realization of the importance of media/free press as the fourth pillar of democracy. |
| **Artistic forms of expression** | Art and literary censorship conducted by the state. Art forms were a means to reinforce political order. | Greater freedom of the arts and cultural sectors. Organizations able to hold art events more freely. Freedom of expression a catchphrase amongst individuals and artistic groups, but challenged by more conservative members of society. |
| **Religious expression and organization** | Regime repressed religious groups, especially radical forms. | Emergence of religious groups seeking to restore Islamic values and defend Muslim values. |

With political reforms came greater freedom and space for civic engagement. In the *Reformasi* period, there was a remarkable increase in the number of civil society organizations, many of which were Islamic in character. In 2000, the Central Agency on Statistics (BPS) recorded around 70,000 registered organizations, compared to just 10,000 in 1996.[3] New groups sprung up with donors encouraging activists to establish NGOs they could fund. These organizations were eager to distance themselves from state and often took an anti-government stance. Proliferating CSOs and NGOs have taken advantage of decentralization and greater regional autonomy to engage in public affairs. Civil society and government relations have improved, although both sides remain sceptical of the others' intentions.

### 2.1.2 Recent trends in the political context

Indonesia is considered to be a story of democratic success, but it still struggles to realize the benefits of sustained and equitable economic growth. In the political context, the main challenges lie in governing such geographically vast and decentralized country, applying principles of good governance and the enormous task of reforming the country's bureaucracy.

Although, Indonesia's 'big bang' decentralization initiated at the turn of the century narrowed the gap between local government and citizens, it has also localized political power struggles. While the devolution of authorities relieved tensions between the central government and the regions, it has also created opportunities for corrupt and rent-seeking practices, at the local level. As indicated by Transparency International's corruption index scores, perceived corruption in Indonesia remains high.

Table 2

*Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer survey: Indonesia*

| Year | Corruption perceptions Index Score<br>*(0 perceived as highly corrupt and 100 perceived as clean)* | Rank |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 30 | 100/182 |
| 2012 | 32 | 118/174 |
| 2013 | 32 | 114/177 |

Source: Transparency International

In 2013, decentralization was taken a step further with the approval of the Village Law, intended to address weak governance arrangements and empower rural communities to participate politically. The new law could also lead to village elites distorting power relations and misusing government funding if not properly monitored.

[3] Wahid, Marzuki. 2010. LSM, Islam, dan Perempuan di Indonesia Paska Orde Baru. Presentation at the Asian Dialogues: Open Seminars in Asian Languages. Melbourne, 22 April. Available from http://intranet.law.unimelb.edu.au/staff/events/files/Microsoft%20PowerPoint%20-%20LSM%20dan%20Islam%20di%20Indonesia%20--Melbourne%202010-FINAL.pdf (accessed 25 October 2014)

Indonesia is still transitioning politically and many challenges lie ahead. According to the 2012 Indonesia Governance Index's Executive Report, "Indonesia is witnessing a paradox in its democracy. On one hand, a successful opening-up of civil liberty has led to the avalanche of democratic demands across the nation, however on the other hand, democratic institutions' are inadequately respond to those demands." Nonetheless, the Indonesian Governance Index, which focuses on measuring provincial governance, does show a general improvement in the performance of the government (political office) bureaucracy, civil society and economic society based on principles of participation, transparency, fairness, accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness between 2008 and 2012. Civil society scores improved the most significantly, while scores for bureaucracy rose slightly.[4]

Table 3

*Indonesia Governance Index: Average provincial scores*

| Arena | 2008 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|
| Government | 4.93 | 5.46 |
| Bureaucracy | 5.53 | 5.58 |
| Civil Society | 4.85 | 6.33 |
| Economic Society | 4.77 | 5.71 |

Source: http://www.kemitraan.or.id/igi

In the past decade, Indonesians have generally enjoyed a freedom to participate in the political process through a direct-election mechanism. However, in September 2014 lawmakers voted in favour of a bill reviving indirect elections of regional heads. The controversial vote provoked public outcry which saw peaceful protests and the public voicing their discontent through social media. In early October, just before the end of his term, president Yudhoyono issued a regulation in lieu of the law, effectively repealing the law until further judicial review.

The recent 2014 elections which marked the end of Yudhoyono's 10-year term, demonstrated that Indonesian voters are increasingly voting for popular figures irrespective of political party alliances. While practices of corruption, vote-buying and poor voter administration remained in the recent election, the public seems to have matured politically, indicated by the enormous interest in televised debates between the leading candidates. The appeal of the newly sworn in President Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, has come from his hands-on, man-of-the-people approach. As Jokowi begins his five-year term he will need to start addressing a myriad of challenges that include corruption, stagnant economic growth, and human rights concerns, particularly with respect to the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and religious intolerance. If left unaddressed, these challenges could seriously undermine Indonesia's stability and democratic reforms.

## 2.2 Civil Society context issues with regards to the MDG

Several important changes took place during the 2011 and 2014 period. First, the global financial crisis and Indonesia's rise to a middle-income country led to a decrease in international donor funding. Development actors, including CSOs and NGOs, have to compete harder for funding. Some have been more successful than others in diversifying funding by turning to the private sector or private foundations. At the expense of past idealism, local NGOs are now more disposed to receiving funding sources which in the past may have been criticized as supporting neoliberalism.

Regulatory changes also affected the civil society arena positively and negatively. Amongst the more controversial laws to spark reaction was Law No. 17/2013 on Societal Organisations. In an open letter sent before the bill was enacted, CIVICUS said the law would undermine freedom of association and "prevent CSOs from working on sensitive topics related to good governance and democratic reform in the public interest".[5] FORUM-ASIA deplored the repressive provisions in the law that "leave all groups

[4] The IGI uses a scale of 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest). Data is available online through their website. Indonesia Governance Index, Data, "IGI Executive Report". Available from http://www.kemitraan.or.id/igi/index.php/data/publication/factsheet/275-igi-executive-report (accessed 25 October 2014)

[5] Civicus, "Civicus Releases an Open Letter Requesting the Indonesian Parliament to reject the Proposed Ormas Law and Create an Enabling Environment for Civil Society", 10 April 2013. Available from http://civicus.org/index.php/en/media-

vulnerable to attacks, undermining the hard-won democratic space that has been forged by civil society since the end of the New Order regime."[6]

Other laws passed that provoked criticism were the State Intelligence Law (October 2011) and the Social Conflict Law (April 2012). NGOs and media see these laws as imposing further restrictions on freedom of speech, potentially leading to the criminalization of human rights defenders and signifying a tightening of state control. Discriminatory content was also an issue in discussions on the Religious Harmony Bill in 2013, for which drafting was initiated in despite not being part of the planned National Legislative Program. Late in 2013, the House of Representatives came under fire again for its weak stance against religious intolerance when it re-endorsed a law that limits state-recognized religions to six.

Land rights and natural resource protection have been a long-standing issue for Indonesia. While Indonesia has adopted and amended laws to improve the rights of smallholders and indigenous communities, many of these regulations have faltered in their implementation. Part of the issue lies in the overlap and lack of clarity of laws adopted that regulate different sectors and local legislation. Another issue is that there is a lack of oversight in the procedures such as granting permits and licensing. These problems, which are commonly found across development sectors, are compounded by a lack of information among local communities on what the laws regulate and their rights vis-à-vis them.

Since 1999, local governments in Indonesia have been granted more policy and decision-making space. In the same year, the Ministry of Forestry recognized under Law No. 44 the rights of customary institutions in forest management. However these rights are limited to resource management rather than ownership since the government retains tenure rights. Subsequent regulations recognized the responsibilities of local communities and governments in natural resource management. In 2007 and 2008 a legal basis for CBFM was created, in part to offer a solution to conflicts between communities and concession companies.[7] In 2013, the Constitutional Court also accepted a Judicial Review of the Forestry Law No. 41/1999 recognizing that customary forests are not state forests and that indigenous peoples have legal rights. This is a landmark ruling and an important step for the recognition of indigenous people's rights. Village forest designation (*Hutan Desa*) has been seen as a promising solution that can bring welfare to communities and prevent further deforestation.

Other positive context factors consists of the prolongation of the 2011 moratorium on new concessions for primary forests and peat lands with another two years and the signature of a Memorandum of Agreement between 12 ministries and state agencies to collaborate on creating one resource map and to accelerate the determination of forest status, prevent corruption and resolve forest conflicts[8].

The forestry sector in Indonesia has been criticized for its mismanagement and high levels of corruption in recent years. The country's Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) conducted a forest sector review in 2010 that identified many weaknesses and loopholes in regulations, institutions and operations. Data from Indonesian Corruption Watch (2011) showed that there is a correlation between the quantity of concession licences and elections of district/province heads. A Human Rights Watch Report in 2013 stated that "financial costs of poor governance in the forestry sector are enormous."[9] Given the government's own prioritization of anti-corruption efforts and in light of the significant investment of foreign funding into Indonesia's REDD+ program that underscored the importance of more open and transparent practices, the government has been more open to improving forest governance.

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centre-129/open-letters/1581-open-letter-requesting-the-indonesian-parliament-to-reject-to-the-proposed-ormas-law-and-create-an-enabling-environment-for-civil-society (accessed 27 October 2014)

6 Azhar, Haris. 2013. Repressive provision in the Ormas law. Statement to The Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, in Forum-Asia, "Indonesia: Passage of Ormas Bill Condemned, Campaign to Oppose the Law to Continue", Bangkok, 4 July 2013. Available from http://www.forum-asia.org/?p=16305 (accessed 27 October 2014)

7 Bock, Mattew J. 2012. *Formalization and Community Forestry in Jambi, Indonesia: Indigenous Rights, Rural Migrants, and The Informal Divide*. The Josef Korbel Journal of Advance International Studies – Summer 2012, Volume 4, p. 56. Available from https://www.du.edu/korbel/jais/journal/volume4/volume4_bock.pdf (accessed 27 October 2014)

8 "MFS II Annual Report 2013", Ecosystems Alliance, 2013

9 Human Rights Watch. 2013. *The Dark Side of Green Growth: Human Rights Impacts of Weak Governance in Indonesia's Forestry Sector*. United States of America. Available from http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/indonesia0713webwcover_1.pdf (accessed 27 October 2014)

# 3. KKI-WARSI and its contribution to civil society/policy changes

## 3.1 Background KKI-WARSI

WARSI, officially established in January 1993[10] by an alliance of 20 Sumatra-based organisations, currently forms a network organisation of twelve regional NGOs based in four provinces: South Sumatra, West Sumatra, Bengkulu and Jambi. WARSI was formed with the vision of supporting sustainable development, defined as development that fulfils the needs and guarantees the welfare of people in the present, without endangering the continued survival of future generations[11]. In 2003, the organisation amended its name, adding 'Indonesian Conservation Community' to become KKI – WARSI. Since then, WARSI's efforts have focused on biodiversity/natural conservation and community development. The mission of WARSI is to uphold conservation principles of indigenous communities and encourage the development of a model for conservation area management in Sumatra. As such, WARSI has developed a concept termed 'conservation with community'.[12] WARSI's motto, "conservation for community prosperity" does not discard community prosperity for the sake of conservation.[13]

This concept is meant to provide solutions in the current context where a "concession regime" reigns. Indigenous communities living in forest areas lack the authority to stop destructive practices, such as illegal logging, clearing fields in the forest, hunting, and the opening of forest areas for mining by outsiders. Under this so-called regime, the government owns the forest and can legally give concessions to private sector companies for mining, plantation and other extractive activities. As a consequence to this arrangement, there are frequent conflicts between concession licence-holders and communities, which have even led to allegations of human rights violations. Operating in these conditions, WARSI's goals are two-fold: preserving the forest and defending the rights of forest communities to fulfil their needs without endangering the survival of future generations.
To reach its aims, WARSI has developed several intervention strategies that include:

1. Becoming a clearing house for issues dealing with natural conservation and community development;
2. Developing communication and cooperation, whilst mediating between local, national and international stakeholders;
3. Establishing forums and opportunities for education and training, research and other activities;
4. Communicating the importance of conservation and community development in Sumatra;
5. Carrying out conservation actions in the field using participatory methods.[14]

## 3.2 MFS II interventions related to Civil Society

KKI-WARSI's interventions relate to civil society with respect to securing forest resource management rights for communities, which include greater decision-making power over access, better distribution of benefits and governance aspects. According to WARSI, communities or indigenous groups living in forest areas (like the Orang Rimba in Jambi) are disadvantaged groups. Their rights go unrecognized and the government would prefer to see forest areas to be free of communities or people. WARSI works to facilitate a recognition for community governance of forest areas through the *Hutan Desa*

[10] "REDD Project Audit Report 2011", WARSI, 2011
[11] WARSI, "KKI WARSI: The Indonesian Conservation Community". Available from http://www.warsi.or.id/ (accessed 28 October 2014)
[12] "Full Proposal Final", WARSI
[13] WARSI, "Profile". Available from http://www.warsi.or.id/about_us/Profile.php (accessed 28 October 2014)
[14] Ibid

scheme (Village Forest scheme). Communities have local wisdom in forest management and can sustainably manage forest areas if their rights are recognized. Once communities obtain rights to manage forest areas, they can benefit from agroforestry, community logging, income from non-timber forest products (NTFPs) and ecotourism. This in turn protects forests against ongoing conversion to plantation or mining areas.

WARSI's organizational goal is concerned with conservation, based on principles of people's empowerment and participation. WARSI could be considered to be 'custodial' in orientation since they seek to safeguard community control of land (forest areas) and forest resources through the village forest scheme. Within the scheme, WARSI's strategy can be divided into two main approaches:

- building the capacity of 'forest managing groups' (which can be considered intermediary organizations)
- facilitating lobby and advocacy initiatives to support communities in their efforts to secure forest management rights

KKI-WARSI's role is to guarantee that the government does not issue conversion licenses to private initiatives, and to obtain recognition of the *Hutan Desa* to secure sustainable and local forest management.

The above interventions are most relevant to the CIVICUS dimensions of 'level of organisation' and 'perception of impact'. WARSI assists communities in guaranteeing a better acknowledgement of their rights to forest resources, while working to influence the public sector (local government) for an endorsement of these rights. WARSI has been successful in West Sumatra and Jambi in promoting and replicating CBFM schemes.

## 3.3 Basic information

Table 4
*Basic information KKI-WARSI*

| | | Details |
|---|---|---|
| Name of SPO | : | KKI-WARSI |
| Consortium | : | Ecosystem Alliance |
| CFA | : | IUCN |
| Start date of cooperation | : | 1 October 2010 |
| MDG/Theme | : | MDG 7ab |
| MFS Project 1 | | |
| MFS II Project Name | : | Increasing Community Welfare through Participative Forest Management at Batanghari Basin (Project No.: 600523) |
| Contract period | : | October 1, 2011 – October 1, 2014, extended until 30 April 2015 |
| Total budget | : | € 180,750 |
| Estimation of % of budget for CS[15] | : | 39% |
| MFS Project 2 | | |
| MFS II Project Name | : | Advocacy on Rules of licensing procedures of Village Forest and Community Forestry at Central Government (Project No.: 600634) |
| Contract period | : | January 1, 2013 – June 30, 2015 |
| Total budget FPU | : | € 42,876 |
| Other donors if applicable | : | Norwegian Rainforest Foundation, Norway/NORAD, & USAID and KEHATI (do not contribute to MFS II projects according to WARSI) |
| Estimation of % of budget for CS | : | not known, no budget made available |

Sources: Project documents

[15] Costs that relate to civil society development or policy influence are those costs that possibly contribute to the development of the CIVICUS dimensions, excluding coordination and office costs; staff costs and financial reserves.

# 4. Data collection and analytical approach

## 4.1 Adjustments made in the methodology of the evaluation

The evaluation team followed the operational guidelines to a great extent, but was unable to have a workshop with all of WARSI sub-groups as only the executive and program managers attended the workshop. In practice the workshop lasted five hours, without the full participation of the executive. In order to get board's perspective, a separate interview was scheduled with one of WARSI's board members. However, given the available time, the interview focused on confirming the model of change instead of discussing changes in each CS dimensions.

The evaluation team was unable to get averages or scores for each subgroup as participation was not consistent and other difficulties which made the workshop less effective. The in-country team assigned the scores and then ran them past WARSI to confirm the scores.

Another obstacle was the lack of participant preparation for the workshop. Not all participants had fully read or understood relevant documents (baseline report, CS dimensions change) shared with them prior to the workshop. All of the participants found it difficult to respond to the CS dimensions of change questions, partly due to confusion over whether or not the evaluation's scope was focused on IUCN programs or more general for organisational/institutional changes. WARSI's overlapping projects (as a finding of this evaluation), added difficulties in defining the evaluation scope since the CBFM interventions also received non-IUCN donor funding. While WARSI initially claimed that donor funds were segregated by geographic areas, later other evidence emerged to suggest that this was not always the case. Fortunately, much of the information obtained through the workshop and subsequent interviews could be triangulated with evidence found in documents and online research.

## 4.2 Difficulties encountered during data collection

During data collection the team experienced the following difficulties:

- Workshop participants did not really understand, nor were they familiar with the CS indicators or the CIVICUS framework. They found it difficult to relate WARSI's situation with the indicators, especially since only half of them participated in the baseline process. This lessened the effectiveness of the workshop.
- WARSI does not have a dedicated monitoring and evaluation team. Rather, a new research and development division has been formed nine months ago. This division is supposed to take on the role of external reporting. As such, it added difficulties to find hard data and affected the agreement on the outcomes.
- WARSI was not completely prepared for this evaluation.
- WARSI provided several references of potential external resource persons. However, the evaluation team was unable to arrange meetings with them within the available fieldwork time. As a consequence, some interviews had to be conducted via telephone. Moreover, not all of evaluation team's attempts for telephone interviews received positive response.

## 4.3 Identification of two outcomes for in-depth process tracing

The first outcome (Community-based forest management groups in 9 villages have received full endorsement) was selected with the following considerations:

- It was one of several outcomes that all workshop participants agreed to as being a significant achievement.
- It is one of the elements in WARSI's Theory of Change (ToC), and the resulting model of change also addresses the ToC's main assumptions. The baseline report suggested this outcome to be selected, to test WARSI's ToC elements and assumptions.
- The input-output-outcome analysis also provided similar directions for in-depth process-tracing.
- As one of the outcomes from WARSI's proposal to IUCN, the evaluation team expected fewer difficulties to find supporting evidence.

The second outcome (CBFM is mainstreamed into West Sumatra Province's forestry policy) was selected because:

- It was one of several outcomes that all workshop participants agreed to as being a significant achievement.
- It is one of the elements in WARSI's ToC, and the resulting model of change also addressed one of the ToC's main assumptions (government political will). The baseline report suggested this outcome to be selected, to test WARSI's ToC elements and assumptions.
- The input-output-outcome analysis also provided similar directions for in-depth process-tracing.
- As one of the outcomes from WARSI's proposal to IUCN, the evaluation team expected fewer difficulties to find supporting evidence.
- The second outcome is related to the first outcome. The second outcome achievement offers opportunities to leverage the first outcome through replication to a wider scale beyond WARSI's outreach.

Based upon an analysis of the projects and programmes financed by the Dutch CFAs, four strategic orientations for civil society were identified. Two of which were selected for each SPO for in-depth process tracing. CDI suggested to the country team to look at the selected strategic orientations. For WARSI, both outcomes matched with civil society orientations in: ensuring that the organisations that receive support from the SPO (intermediary organisations) are capable of playing their role in civil society; and; influencing policies and practices of public or private sector organisations.

WARSI, together with other EA grantees started a joint advocacy process in 2013 to simplify the procedures for Hutan Desa permits and the authority to manage these by CBFM groups. Both the documents made available for input-output analysis and the discussions with the WARSI team did not highlight these efforts as a potential outcome to look at, although this would match with EA's programmatic approach to strengthen civil society.

# 5. Results

## 5.1 Results obtained in relation to intervention logic

This paragraph makes an inventory of results and objectives achieved versus planned according to the documents made available to the evaluation team.

Table 5

*Overview of results achieved in relation to project plan WARSI*

| Result Level | Description | Level of achievement |
|---|---|---|
| Project 1: Increasing Community Welfare through Participative Forest Management at Batanghari Basin: October 2010-2014 | | |
| Objective 1 | Communities are organised for village-based forest management | Achieved: 16 communities (from targeted 13) organized for village-based forest management. Another 3 in the process of obtaining designations from the Ministry of Forestry, which will bring the number to 19 villages. |
| Result 1.1 | Established a strong institution at the community level manage the village forests<br><br>Indicator:<br>Capacities to defend community rights enhanced of 10 villages | Achieved: 16 communities have designed participatory village-forest management plans. |
| Objective 2 | System of sustainable natural resource use is established | Partially achieved: Activities conducted include participatory survey, training to introduce multi-tier commodity/agro forestry, assessment of market and social potentials in the villages. The results of this have been documented in the forest management plans, which are to be approved by the governor. |
| Result 2.1 | Improved skills on management forest products and community incomes increased by opening access to use natural resource (activities under Obj. 3 also contribute to this result) | Partially achieved: 20 model households reported additional income of IDR 400-500,000 per month |
| Objective 3 | Government recognition for village-based forest management | Partially achieved[16]:<br>WARSI facilitated the recognition of 16 villages from the MoF. CBFM permits (full endorsement) were granted for 9 villages. Remaining 7 villages are in the process of obtaining village forest management rights from the governor. |
| Result 3.1 | Government support at the district, provincial and central levels to the management of village forest | Achieved: 2 district CBFM task-forces established in Jambi province, and 1 provincial CBFM task-force for West Sumatra. |
| Objective 4 | Villages have their own electricity generation | Partially achieved: electricity generator benefits limited number of households in SenamatUlu village |
| Result 4.1 | Developed hydroelectric power as a simple and cheap alternative energy source<br><br>Indicators: # of households that benefit from improvements in livelihoods assets<br><br># of communities that are voicing their rights in policy and planning discussions | 48 households were provided with electricity. Bungo district government agreed to support micro hydro generator for Senamat Ulu village, estimated to serve 110 households. |
| Objective 5 | Model study area developed for climate change mitigation and adaptation | No evidence |
| Result 5.1 | Developed a model study area of mitigation and | No evidence: Nothing about a specific 'study |

[16] The logical framework does not specify the level of government recognition. Full endorsement of the village forest at all levels will ensure promised benefits for the community level.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | adaptation to climate change<br><br>Indicators:<br># of CSOs that are trained in ecosystem-based climate change adaptation and mitigation<br><br>Area of land used by communities under ecosystem-based climate change adaptation plans | area' reported |
| Objective 6 | Project activities of other EA-partners Sumatra are coordinated | No evidence: seems to have been move into Project 2 (land-tenure) |
| Result 6.1 | Coordination to IUCN's partners in Sumatra | No evidence: seems to have been move into Project 2 (land-tenure) |
| Project 2: Advocacy on Rules of licensing procedures of Village Forest and Community Forestry at Central Government (land-tenure program: January 2013 – June 2015 | | |
| Objective 1 | The License procedure of HutanDesa (Forestry Minister Regulation on HutanDesa) can be shortened and simplified at the provincial and national levels | Achieved: Joint lobby resulted in simplified procedures. Two regulations issued for this by MoF: PeraturanMenteriKehutanan No. 89/Menhut-II/2014 and PeraturanMenteriKehutanan No. 88/Menhut-II/2014 |
| Result 1.1 | License Procedure for HutanDesa and Community Forestry is revised to be more simple and shortened from 27 steps to 15 steps at Forestry Department of Indonesian Republic | Achieved: Series of meetings with other EA grantees resulted in a position paper regarding procedure streamlining. The position paper has been submitted to MoF. Three of four advocacy inputs have been accommodated via the new regulations. |
| Objective 2 | Review and analyse the need for facilitation support management institution of HutanDesa and HutanKemasyarakatan for the preparations of the work plan and its implementation in the community can be collected | Achieved: studies on established CBFM groups conducted |
| Result 2.1 | Document review and analyse of the need for facilitation support management institution of HutanDesa and HutanKemasyarakatan can be arranged. | Achieved: Study carried out by a team formed by EA grantees at Riau, Jambi, West Sumatera, South Sumatera, Lampung, and Java provinces. |
| Objective 3 | Financial support from National Development Budget is available for facilitation of Community Based-Forest Management at the provincial and district levels. | No evidence |
| Result 3.1 | Communities from various regions that got the license from the Forestry Minister get financial facilitation from the General Service Agency of the Forestry Ministry | No evidence |
| Result Level | Description | Level of achievement |

While WARSI seems to be successful in facilitating lobby and advocacy initiatives, they were only partially successful in building the capacity of forest management groups. Nine new forest management groups were established out of a targeted 16. Objectives 2 and 4, which focus on community welfare, are critical for sustainable CBFM and for successful application of concessional rights. It has to be noted that reports tended to be activity-oriented rather than reporting at the output and outcome levels.

Regarding the second project, the desired results have not yet been achieved partly because the project will be completed in 2015. Objective 3 is only attainable if Objectives 1 and 2 are achieved first. There seems to be an assumption that policy reforms will have an immediate effect, which is unlikely given the changes in the country's administration and the regular bureaucracy involved in socializing new procedures.

## 5.2 Changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period

### 5.2.1 Civic engagement

Civic engagement describes the formal and informal activities and participation undertaken by individuals to advance shared interests at different levels. Participation within civil society is multi-faceted and encompasses socially-based and politically-based forms of engagement.

Since the baseline assessment, WARSI has managed to engage more communities into its community forest management programme through the establishment of community based forest management groups (CBFM). In the same period, the representatives of two of these groups have joined the WARSI network. WARSI's position as a politically impartial organisation is being questioned since WARSI plans to support its members in campaigning in district elections. However, it can also be argued that involvement in local politics is a democratic right, which is acceptable so long as there are no conflicts of interest. It can be considered a strategy to promote the mission and vision of the organisation, especially in Indonesian where politics have in the past been dominated by business people and elite families.

In WARSI's interventions, civic engagement was promoted through the establishment of CBFM groups. Forest communities are often marginalized by natural resource extraction and unfavourable government policies. The interventions sought to engage communities in the management of forest resources by giving them more decision-making powers the *Hutan Desa* or village forest scheme. Since the baseline, WARSI has supported 19 villages, of which 16 were IUCN-funded. By December 2014, nine of these received endorsement and recognition from the Ministry of Forestry and the local government for their rights to manage forest areas for the next 35 years. WARSI's role has been to encourage the formation of CBFM groups and facilitate them in meeting requirements for *Hutan Desa* application (27 steps for endorsement from the Ministry of Forestry). Without such facilitation, communities would unlikely receive recognition for their long-term rights to manage forest resources through permits/concessions from the government.

The evaluation was unable to assess how communities are engaged at the grassroots, community level due time and resource constrains. But there has been some criticism (from a resource person interviewed) that WARSI is drifting away from intense community interaction as it gains recognition for its CBFM interventions. Organizationally, the WARSI network gained two members in 2013 who are CBFM group representatives. This is a positive step, although there is no evidence yet of how this membership may affect the direction and decision-making of the SPO.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 3**
**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 1**

### 5.2.2 Level of organization

This dimension assesses the organisational development, complexity and sophistication of civil society, by looking at the relationships among the actors within the civil society arena.

Generally speaking, WARSI's level of organisation has improved since the baseline: The SPO has expanded its network of NGOs working at community level, as well as with NGOs that engage in lobby and advocacy. Through the Village Forest scheme, it has been able to defend the interests of increasingly more forest people. At the same time, WARSI has considerably expanded its resource base, becoming a well settled NGO.

WARSI works to promote community forest rights within the confines of existing forest policies. Through the *Hutan Desa* scheme, WARSI promotes the recognition of community rights vis-à-vis actors seeking to exploit forest resources. The SPO defends the interests of forest communities, which it sees as being in a disadvantaged position. *Hutan Desa* is considered to be a sustainable solution that conserves forests and promotes community welfare. While CBFM is promising, improper implementation could have negative results. The evaluation team cannot conclude whether such negative impacts occurred due to constraints in time and resources. Rather, we draw attention to potential risks if marginalized groups are not defended properly (See Appendix 2). Potential issues include: 1) a lack of follow up to improve livelihoods and create economic alternatives for communities that have received forest management rights; and 2) a lack of representation or inclusiveness of the community within the CBFM group.

Nevertheless, WARSI is still highly regarded for its sustainable forest management work and its lobby strengths. This has helped it attract diverse external donor support. There is substantial international interest in forestry and REDD+ issues in Indonesia. Within this context, WARSI has received funds from a range of donors including the Norwegian Rainforest Foundation, USAID and others.

As a network organisation with a strong basis in Sumatra, WARSI has good relations with other NGOs working in the same geographic area or on CBFM issues. These organisations include WALHI, Telapak, SSS-Pundi, Gita Buana, and PKBI amongst others. While there are no formal arrangements for collaboration with these NGOs, cooperation is considered mutually beneficial since each organisation contributes according to their capacity and expertise to community empowerment. Interestingly, many of individuals active in one organisation also hold other positions in another. This means that while the network of organisations is extensive, many of the people that are engaged are the same individuals.

WARSI is also engaged in thematic and advocacy networks. In particular with the other EA grantees, , they are involved in a joint advocacy group led by NTFP-EP for Mainstreaming Sustainable Livelihood Initiatives and Models (SLIMs) and WARSI is taking the lead to simplify the license procedures with regards to CBFM at the provincial and national level. According to EA, bringing together EA partners who were previously not willing or able to work together or did not even know of the other's existence are now cooperating. In so doing, they are learning about their own relative strengths and how they can complement each other; both in terms of assets (as knowledge, skills and networks) as well as in their roles. This enables a more effective organisation of advocacy with one partner using the carrot and the other the stick and together achieving more impact[17].

With regards to CBFM group endorsement or *Hutan Desa* interventions, WARSI generally coordinates with other organisations to ensure no overlaps occur. But there are some cases where more than one organisation supports the same village. Recognition of community-based forest management rights has been received enthusiastically by other CSOs and NGOs, which in turn has generated more support from their side. Regular meetings are also held with CBFM groups to report progress and share lessons. This also helps the groups exchange ideas and skills amongst themselves.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**
**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 1**

### 5.2.3 Practice of Values

Practice of Values refers to the internal practice of values within the civil society arena. Important values that CIVICUS looks at such as transparency, democratic decision-making, taking into account diversity that are deemed crucial to gauge not only progressiveness but also the extent to which civil society's practices are coherent with their ideals.

Since the baseline, WARSI, as a member-based organisation, has broadened its membership base with 18 new members from community groups, customary leaders and community leaders. This has been a deliberate intervention undertaken to maintain relations with community groups that have received support in the past. These members have voting powers in the general assembly and can influence strategies of WARSI. Whether or not community representatives will have a say is not yet measurable, and will have to wait for the next general assembly planned in 2016.

During the 2013 general assembly, which takes place every three years, apart from expanding its membership, WARSI appointed a new director. Structural adjustments have also taken place, namely the setting up of a Research and Development division, headed by the former director.

The evaluation found that there are still weaknesses with regards to monitoring and evaluation. WARSI has no dedicated division for this and no external evaluations have taken to assess programme results holistically. Similarly, financial audits have been project-based, undertaken to comply with donor requirements. With no institutional audit, it is difficult to discern with certainty which donors contributed to what results although WARSI claims that donor support is segregated by geographic area.

As during the baseline, WARSI's board and executive arm meets on a regular basis to discuss progress and performance. The board structure does not contain representatives of WARSI's target groups. Women are well represented in on the monitoring and advisory boards, fulfilling an internal requirement of a minimum 30 percent female representation. This is no change since the baseline.

[17] Interview with Evelien van den Broek, IUCN, 2014

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**
**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 1**

### 5.2.4 Perception of Impact

Perception of Impact assesses the perceived impact of civil society actors on politics and society as a whole as the consequences of collective action. In this, the perceptions of both civil society actors (internal) as well as actors outside civil society are taken into account. Specific sub-dimensions for this evaluation are the extent to which the SPO has contributed to engaging more people in social or political activities, strengthening CSOs and their networks, and has influenced public and private sector policies.

*Impact upon civil society*
Since the baseline 16 new community-based forest management (CBFM) groups have been created in the provinces of Jambi and West Sumatra. Until so far 10 of the 20 villages supported have received the state recognition and authority necessary to use the village forest are for production activities for the next 35 years. Nine of these are IUCN supported. Many actors see this official recognition as the most appropriate political instrument to defend the interests of minority forest groups and of local communities' vis-à-vis forest concessions controlled by private sector organisations. The communities only have a two-year period to acquire village forest permits. If no permit is granted within that period, the village forest designation will be withdrawn. Until so far in Jambi Province one CBFM group has been successful in preventing a company to obtain a concession and three villages rejected plans of their local governments to designate forest land into an industrial forest plantation area[18].

The CBFM scheme, and in particular the mapping of forest resources and boundaries is a critical process for granting management rights to the community: setting the boundaries may cause conflicts with neighbouring villages which requires processes of conflict resolution. West Sumatra province decided to mainstream the CBFM scheme in their forest policy as a strategy to solve land disputes in its Nagari forest which is under forest customary law. Although some researchers have commended this strategy to mainstream the CBFM scheme in Provincial Regulations concerning Nagari Forest, the evaluation team did not find evidence that conflict resolution was facilitated by WARSI in the 2012 – 2014 period. WARSI managed to clarify the boundaries between three villages in Jambi province after a conflict had arisen due to the mapping of resources and boundaries.

With regards to the efforts of WARSI to create the CBFM groups, the evaluation team observes that the extent to which community interests are being defended by these groups could be an issue of concern, because respondents state that increasingly the WARSI facilitators communicate with the village elites, rather than with the community itself. Limited communication with elites incurs the risk that CBFM groups may be influenced by elites that are attracted to potential financial returns offered by corporations. However, where CBFM groups are democratically elected, this will help overcome the challenge of building grassroots organisations to perform without falling into the hands of elites. In Bantanghari District for example, some elites were persuaded by a company to conserve the forest for timber, which was not agreed upon by members of the CBFM group. WARSI claims however that village forest management groups have been democratically elected and that interventions require the approval of villagers. The characteristics of the Hutan Desa scheme are limited to usage rights and watershed management, which according to IUCN is less likely to offer financial incentives to exploit the scheme in highland areas.

Until so far there is limited evidence that the communities that have their own village forest are improving their livelihoods. By the end of 2014, some 110 households benefitted from a hydro power generator with a capacity of 27,000 Watt. According to WARSI, livelihood incomes increased with some IDR 50,000 per month, whereas the poverty line is IDR 407,437 per month according to BPS standards for 2013[19], with a monthly inflation rate of around 6 percent[20].

[18] According to WARSI data, community forest rights only cover 64,384 hectares compared to 776,652 hectares designated for industrial forest areas
[19] Berita Resmi Statistik BPS Provinsi DKI Jakarta. 2014. *Tingkat Kemiskinan di DKI Jakarta Maret 2014*, p. 1. Available from http://jakarta.bps.go.id/fileupload/brs/2014_07_01_12_50_20.pdf (accessed 21 November 2014)

WARSI staff reported that based on a longitudinal study on 800 households between 2012 and 2013, household income increased an average of IDR 50,000 a month (no further documentation received on this). The valuation team estimates that an increase of just under USD 5 is insignificant compared to the poverty line (IDR 407,437/month according to BPS standards for 201321) and monthly inflation rates of around 6 percent[22].

Meanwhile the CBFM groups are engaging with the government annually to present their work plans and achievements so far and they have started to meet share and learn from each other occasionally. They are about to form and umbrella organisation.

WARSI's success with the CBFM group is being replicated by other organisations and at least 8 districts in West Sumatra Province have asked WARSI to assist them; however the organisation has not yet been able to fulfil all of these requests. The formation of officially recognised CBFM groups is still an extensive process and communities will continue to rely on third-party, external assistance in the technical mapping process, navigating procedures and funding the process.

WARSI continued to work with NGOs in four provinces in Sumatra who all have a shared focus on conservation and community empowerment at community level. Although through its collaboration with NGOs at community level, WARSI seeks complementarity in the interventions that target the same CBFM groups, no evidence has been found that this is the case and information is available that these NGOs conduct similar activities with the same CBFM group. This might explain communities' limited satisfaction with the impacts of the village forests at household level.

WARSI also still works with the same network that lobbies for more land tenure rights for forest people and since 2013 it collaborates with other EA grantees as a lead for joint advocacy efforts on land tenure rights: This collaboration has become more intensive and on their behalf WARSI also engages the working group of the Ministry of Forestry on revisions of the village forest scheme.

*Collaboration with the public sector and policy influence*
WARSI employs a two pronged approach in its relations with the public sector. In the first place it works with existing policies (Government Regulation No.6/2007 and No 3/2008) to operationalise CBFM. In the second place it tries to influence existing policies and practices. Its efforts to do so have intensified since the baseline study in 2012.

With regards to the implementation of existing rules and regulations, WARSI supports CBFM groups to obtain the necessary letters of recommendations written by the district, province and national level, to obtain the necessary permits with the Village-Forest Agency of the Ministry of Forestry. Their most important strategy consists of showing the net benefit of CBFM for both the public sector and local communities at each of these administrative levels (ASB, 2013). This does not always work and also depends upon the government's inclination to side with companies or with forest people.

With regards to influencing policies, WARSI, together with other EA grantees successfully managed to simplify the above mentioned procedures for CBFM since 2013. Two regulations were issued for this simplification: Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan No. 89/Menhut-II/2014 and Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan No. 88/Menhut-II/2014.

In Jambi, WARSI has successfully lobbied two districts to form CBFM task forces in charge of helping village communities apply for CBFM permits. Another district decided to further support a Village Forest Management Plan and has allocated funds from the 2014 annual budget to support the plan (IDR 1.2 billion).

In West Sumatra, WARSI has successfully influenced the provincial government after it decided to become a priority province for the national REDD+ program in May 2012, clearly stipulating that mainstreaming CBFM is their main implementation strategy. Several districts and the province organized the establishment of a Task Force that assists communities in village forest management as a means to accelerate the implementation of forest schemes. The provincial government has made the

[20] Bank Indonesia, Inflasi, "LAPORAN INFLASI (Indeks Harga Konsumen)". Available from http://www.bi.go.id/id/moneter/inflasi/data/Default.aspx (accessed 21 November 2014)
[21] http://jakarta.bps.go.id/fileupload/brs/2014_07_01_12_50_20.pdf, p.1
[22] http://www.bi.go.id/id/moneter/inflasi/data/Default.aspx

Task Force a one-stop service for the expansion of CBFM schemes and developed a five-year road map (2012-2017) for CBFM with a target of 500,000 hectares to be managed by communities. This is a first in Indonesia. This means that in the future, there will likely be more opportunities for community groups to regain control of forest resources.

*Collaboration with the private sector and policy influence*
WARSI stopped collaborating with private sector organisations meant for ecological restoration and marketing of NTFPs. The organisation's successes to 'win the race' against the control of forest areas by mining and agribusiness companies positions it as a competitor for those companies. In Jambi province, WARSI has hypothetically blocked a number of private sector companies from gaining forest and land usage rights in at least 10 villages along the Batanghari watershed. However, technically the opportunity still exists if CBFM groups fail in protecting the village forest or if they become inactive: The area covered by village forests (25 villages covering only 54,978 hectares) is just a tiny fraction compared to the 853,430 hectares of forest land authorized to 18 corporations[23].
Given the fact that in West Sumatra forest management by Nagari is based upon customary rules and traditions, possibilities for companies were very limited and cumbersome until 2011. As of that year the Ministry of Forest issued a decree that converted some protected forest areas into limited production forests including those eligible for a Hutan Desa status. WARSI has until so far successfully protected 9 villages from private sector organisations.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**
**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 2**

### 5.2.5 Civil Society Context/Coping strategies

The social, political and economic environment in which civil society operates affects its room for manoeuvre. The civil society context has been described in Chapter 3. In this section we describe how WARSI is coping with that context.

As the first nation to declare its commitment to voluntarily reducing carbon emissions, REDD+ may have changed the face of the Indonesian forestry policy environment. WARSI has been able to capitalize on the increased international pressure and spotlight put on Indonesia to address conservation. Two changes in the context of WARSI to which the organisation reacted positively show its coping strategies:

In the first place WARSI seized the momentum in 2012-2013 to lobby the West Sumatra province to mainstream CBFM in their forest policy, when both a Presidential Instruction on the 2011 forest moratorium cited conflict resolution as a priority for forest boundary conflicts, followed by a similar statement by the Corruption Eradication Committee or KPK also encouraged forest conflict resolution as a priority in 2012.

In the second place, in 2012 WARSI increased its assistance from 2 to 9 villages in Jambi province, when the Ministry of Forestry redefined some protected forest areas as Limited Production Forests that opened opportunities for companies to obtain exploration licences .

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**
**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 2**

## 5.3 To what degree are the changes attributable to the Southern partners?

This paragraph assesses the extent to which some outcomes achieved can be "attributed" to WARSI. Starting with an outcome, the evaluation team developed a model of change that identifies different

[23] WARSI, Press Release 2013, Hutan Desa, "Gubernur Tandatangani 17 Hak Pengelolaan Hutan Desa", 19 August 2013. Available from http://www.warsi.or.id/news/2013/News_201308_Gubernur_Tandatangani_17_Hak_Pengelolaan_Hutan_Desa.php?year=2013&file=News_201308_Gubernur_Tandatangani_17_Hak_Pengelolaan_Hutan_Desa.php&id=249 (accessed 22 November 2014)

pathways that possibly explain the outcome achieved. Data collection was done to obtain evidence that confirms or rejects each of these pathways. Based upon this assessment, the evaluation team concludes about the most plausible explanation of the outcome and the most plausible relation between (parts of) pathways and the outcome. The relations between the pathways and the outcomes can differ in nature as is being explained in table 6.

Table 6

*Nature of the relation between parts in the Model of Change*

| Nature of the relation between parts and other parts or outcome | |
|---|---|
| The part is the only causal explanation for the outcome. No other interventions or factors explain it. (necessary and sufficient) |  |
| The part does not explain the outcome at all: other subcomponents explain the outcomes. |  |
| The part explains the outcome but other parts explain the outcome as well: there are multiple pathways (sufficient but not necessary) |  |
| The part is a condition for the outcome but won't make it happen without other factors (necessary but not sufficient) |  |
| The part is a contributory cause it is part of a 'package' of causal actors and factors that together are sufficient to produce the intended effect. |  |

Sources: Mayne, 2012; Stern et al, 2012

The following paragraph assesses WARSI's contribution to two outcomes. Each paragraph first describes the outcome achieved and the evidence obtained to confirm that the outcome has been achieved. It then presents the pathways identified that possibly explain the outcomes, as well as present information that confirms or refutes these pathways. The last section concludes in the first place about the most plausible explanation of the outcome, followed by a conclusion regarding the role of the SPO in explaining the outcome.

Two outcomes were selected to measure the degree of MFS-II effectiveness. These were:
- Outcome 1: CBFM groups in 9 villages in 3 districts of 2 provinces have received full endorsement.
- Outcome 2: CBFM is mainstreamed into West Sumatra province forestry policy.

### 5.3.1 Outcome 1: CBFM groups in 9 villages in 3 districts of 2 provinces have received full endorsement.

Since the baseline, WARSI has helped 9 CBFM groups to successfully apply for village forest concessions, which have been endorsed by the Ministry of Forestry and the local government. The outcome was mentioned by WARSI during the evaluation workshop and verified by secondary resources and records. The villages that obtained their endorsement were the following:
- In Jambi Province: Senamat Ulu, Laman Panjang, Sungai Telang, and Buat Village in Bungo District, Jelutih, Olak Besar and Hajran Villages in Batanghari District;
- In West Sumatra Province: Jorong Simancuang Nagari Alam Pauh Duo in South Solok Districtand Simanauin Solok District.

There are still another 7 villages awaiting endorsement with the support of IUCN-NL. In addition to the IUCN-supported villages, one other village gained full endorsement since the baseline with other donor support. WARSI fell a little bit short of its expected targets of achieving the endorsement of sixteen CBFM groups within the originally intended timeframe[24]. The project was extended until June 30, 2015 to accommodate for the achievement of intended results. Regardless of this level of achievement and the efficiency of results, for the purpose of this evaluation the outcome is still relevant for an analysis of whether MFS-II supported interventions have contributed to the achieved outcome.

[24] After the extension, WARSI expanded from 13 villages that were listed in their proposal to assist 16 villages with IUCN-NL support.

***Causal Pathways***

There are three possible pathways that may explain this outcome:

1. The first pathway explains the outcome by means of the government's political will to endorse village applications because each administrative level perceives the net benefits of the CBFM scheme.
2. The second pathway explains the outcome by the efforts of WARSI to help the communities meeting the application requirements for village forest concessions and to navigate the bureaucratic procedures leading to endorsement. Specifically, WARSI helped set up CBFM groups, helped formulate forest management plans and proposals and assisted in mapping forest resources and boundaries. To reject this pathway, we need to prove that WARSI advocacy and assistance was not essential (i.e. communities are able to apply for forest management concessions without WARSI facilitation) or that other actors or factors explain the outcome (pathway 3)





*Figure 1: Pathways that possibly explain the outcome and the nature of the relations between pathways and the outcome, CBFM groups have received full endorsement*

3. The last pathway considers the role of other NGOs to be pertinent in achieving the outcome. In other words, other actors helped the communities to navigate the procedures and requirements for CBFM endorsement.

*Information that confirms or rejects the pathways:*

1. Government's political will to endorse the CBFM groups and their village forest areas explains the outcome

*Information that confirms Pathway 1:*

The issuance of CBFM permits itself can be considered as de jure statements of government's political will. External documents and policy reviews, such as the Alternatives to Slash and Burn (ASB) policy brief (2013) show government support at the local level and amongst government officials for CBFM schemes. Reasons for this support are that CBFM provided an alternative for resolving tenure conflict issues, and that international support backs wider application of CBFM. As such, it may have tipped the balance in favour of community forestry. Various external sources also infer that forest management and tenure issues have become a government interest as it is relevant to the REDD+ and anti-corruption eradication agendas. The issuance of regulatory improvements (Law No. 41/1999 and its Judicial review in 2013, PP No.6/2007 and No.3/2008 providing the basis for CBFM schemes) also indicates government political will.

*Information that rejects Pathway 1:*

Government political will is not always equal at all levels. This information is confirmed in WARSI's own experience where they almost failed to acquire three CBFM permits in Sarolangun District since the former regent was inclined to support the extractive mining industry. Only 6 of the 16 CBFM groups received full endorsement. This is mainly because some of the district heads, such as

Sarolangun and South Solok were initially reluctant and seemed to favour private sector extractive industry development in the area. The areas designated for community forestry are still small. In 2011, only 3 percent of the total forest area designated for CBFM in Jambi met the requirements for CBFM endorsement. Complicated procedures and bureaucratic red tape inhibit more CBFM groups from obtaining endorsement. Often, local governments and community groups do not comprehend the national legislation or are not willing to implement them. In addition, there are very few organisations like WARSI who are policy and procedure savvy and are taking the lead to inform and pressure local governments.

2. WARSI's support to the CBFM groups explains the outcome.

*Information that confirms Pathway 2:*
The head of the Provincial-level Watershed Management Bureau (*Balai Pengelolaan Daerah Aliran Sungai*/BPDAS) Jambi confirmed that WARSI has been assisting the 4 villages in the province in acquiring CBFM permits. A WARSI board member said there is no doubt that WARSI has helped the villages acquire their permits given their competences in lobby and advocacy. WARSI's progress reports show a consistent and logical progress of interventions (establishing managing groups, training, fulfilling requirements, etc.). WARSI's success in CBFM practices and applying the *Hutan Desa* scheme had been acknowledged widely. Another 8 districts have requested their assistance to replicate initiatives. Because of the complicated procedures and the lack of village capacity to comply on its own third-party assistance is still required. There is no evidence of CBFM groups being successful in obtaining recognition without NGO support.

*Information that rejects Pathway 2*: None.

3. Other actors/factors explain the outcome

*Information that confirms Pathway 3:*
WARSI's facilitator in Batanghari district reported that the International Centre for Research in Agroforestry (ICRAF), now known as the World Agroforestry Centre, has contributed by giving additional training on village forest management, while the Alliance of Concerned Citizens of Forest and Land (*Aliansi Masyarakat Peduli Hutan dan Lahan*/AMPAL) has helped with the mapping of forest boundaries. These interventions are independent of WARSI or IUCN support.

*Information that rejects Pathway 3:*
From a desk study of external, secondary resources, the evaluation team found no evidence that other actors have assisted the 9 CBFM groups' proposals and endorsement process. There has been some assistance from other actors, but there has been a division of working areas amongst NGOs with regards to which villages receive assistance from what NGOs in obtaining endorsement. According to the head of BPDAS Jambi, overlaps in assistance were not possible as WARSI and other NGOs coordinated their areas of intervention before assisting villages with the procedural process. With so little of the designated areas for CBFM (3 percent in Jambi) being recognized, there is no reason for competition between NGOs. Other NGOs are indeed active in the province, but no overlaps could be found in target areas. Official data from Jambi's Department of Forestry website shows, for example, that SSS-Pundi Sumatra has assisted 8 CBFM permits in Merangin District (non-WARSI area of intervention).

***Conclusion:***
Based upon the analysis of the information available, we conclude that the first and second pathway are both necessary for explaining the outcome and are only sufficient together: each in itself is not sufficient, but together they are sufficient enough to explain the outcome. They are a causal package that together is necessary and minimally sufficient to explain the outcome. However, the government's political will to endorse CBFM groups and their forests is a careful balance at each administrative level of opponents (companies and officials with close ties to these companies) and supporters of the village forest concessions Pathway 3, namely that the outcome was caused by other actors, does not explain the endorsement of the 9 CBFM groups supported by WARSI, but other actors are known to support similar processes in other districts.

A precondition that explains the general trend to create CBFM groups and to seek their endorsement for the management of village forest areas is the issuance of regulations that made the CBFM scheme possible (PP No.6/2007 and No.3/2008). Although WARSI might have also contributed to the issuance

of these legal instruments, such a hypothesis will not be elaborated in this report since it occurred outside MFS-II support.

*WARSI's role* is very important in the outcome achievement, particularly in terms of providing direct assistance to the nine communities so that they could meet requirements and go through each step required to obtain endorsement. In addition, WARSI's lobby and advocacy has been an important push factor in gaining political will at each administrative level.

### 5.3.2 Outcome 2: CBFM is mainstreamed into West Sumatra province forestry policy.

The second outcome achieved is: "CBFM mainstreamed into West Sumatra provincial forestry policy". The achievement of this outcome is justified with strong evidence in the form of legislation issued by the Provincial Forest Department of West Sumatra, with clear references to CBFM. In June 2012, the Department issued a five-year plan for social forestry development as CBFM mainstreaming roadmap. It stipulates the formation of village forest task forces at provincial level responsible for accelerating the implementation of village forest schemes in West Sumatera[25]. The evaluation team also received scans of the authorization letter signed by the head of West Sumatra's Provincial Forestry Department (SK No.522.4/1089/RHL-2012) as proof of this evidence. In addition, the Governor of West Sumatra has been supportive and open to conservation and forest protection interventions. In January 2013, he signed the REDD+ Provincial Strategy and Action Plan (SRAP) document which stipulated CBFM mainstreaming[26]. Despite these positive changes, the implementation of new initiatives and policies has been laborious and protracted. Very recently, in October 2014, an online news media outlet reported that the West Sumatra Governor had not yet granted permits for 32,386 hectares of village forest due to sparse district initiatives. While there may be other evidence of sluggish government response, this does not automatically indicate a lack of political will. The district governments under the province are still awaiting the submission of CBFM proposals. The district government offices themselves do not have the resources (especially field facilitators) to undertake interventions themselves and rely on NGOs to conduct community-level work. As discussed under MoC 1, there is a lot of bureaucratic red tape that has to be overcome, thus assistance from NGOs is still relevant and much needed to enable village communities to meet prerequisites for *Hutan Desa*.





*Figure 2: Pathways that possibly explain the outcome and the nature of the relations between pathways and the outcome, CBFM mainstreamed into West Sumatra province forestry policy*

***Causal Pathways***

There are three possible pathways that possibly explain this outcome:

1. The government's own political will explain the mainstreaming of CBFM in the provincial forest policy. Much like the first pathway of the outcome explained in paragraph 5.3.1, the West

[25] "Dokumen Roadmap PHBM Sumbar", WARSI
[26] "Dokumen SRAP REDD+ Sumbar", WARSI

Sumatra Provincial Government's issuance of a regulation on the strategic plan is in itself a statement of political will. This pathway cannot be rejected.

2. WARSI's advocacy explains the outcome. WARSI contributed to the formulation of the plans and regulations. Its position within the REDD+ Task Force has allowed it to take a prominent role in the formulation of the policy. To reject this pathway, we need evidence showing that WARSI did not have any role CBFM mainstreaming in West Sumatra.
3. The third pathway attributes the role of policy formulation to other NGOs' lobby and advocacy efforts. To reject this pathway we need to find evidence showing that no other NGO except WARSI was involved in the policy formulation process.

*Information that confirms or rejects the pathways:*

1. The government's own political will explain the mainstreaming of CBFM in the provincial forest policy

*Information that confirms Pathway 1*:

All confirming evidence from Pathway 1 in MoC 1 can be applied to confirm Pathway 1 of MoC 2: The issuance of CBFM permits itself is a de jure statement of the government's political will. External documents and policy reviews show government support at the local level and amongst government officials for CBFM schemes (ASB, 2013). CBFM is expected to provide an alternative for resolving tenure conflicts, and international support is backing the wider application of CBFM. As such, it may have tipped the balance in favour of community forestry: Forest management and tenure issues have become a government interest because it is relevant to the REDD+ and anti-corruption eradication agendas. The issuance of regulatory improvements (Law No. 41/1999 and its Judicial review in 2013, PP No.6/2007 and No.3/2008 providing the basis for CBFM schemes) also indicates government political will. In addition, an interview with the head of BPDAS Jambi confirms that WARSI often facilitated provincial or district leaders to attend international forums where government officials became the public faces for promoting CBFM. According to the WARSI director, this is a common approach that is implemented by WARSI to obtain government commitment in all its intervention areas, including West Sumatra. The establishment of two CBFM groups in West Sumatra earned WARSI a good reputation that positioned it well to lobby the government.

*Information that rejects Pathway 1:*

In October 2014, an online media reported that West Sumatra's governor had not granted permit for 32,386 hectares of village forest area due to a lack of district initiatives[27].However, this does not automatically mean that there is a lack of political will since the government also lacks the resources and the know-how to undertake interventions themselves, especially relating to community outreach. This information hence weakly rejects Pathway 1.

2. WARSI's advocacy explains the outcome

*Information that confirms Pathway 2:*

The SRAP document was co-authored by Rainal Daus (WARSI program manager for the IUCN program). The West Sumatra social forestry development plan for year 2012-2017 mentioned WARSI as the only CSO appointed to work with the Provincial-level Watershed Management Bureau (BPDAS) to develop a CBFM task force, which was confirmed by external documents. Based on the sequence of events, it is quite plausible that Pathway 2 may explain the outcome.

*Information that rejects Pathway 2:*

WARSI project reports do not provide enough information regarding lobby and advocacy activities which specifically confirm this pathway.

3. The third pathway attributes the role of policy formulation to other NGOs' lobby and advocacy efforts

*Information that confirms Pathway 3:*

All other authors of SRAP documents are either government officials (Ministry of Forestry, Development Planning Agency, Environmental Impact Management Agency/Bapedalda, National

[27] Dua Koto Pas, Berita Sumbar, "Dishut: Pengelolaan Hutan Nagari di Sumbar Tunggu SK Gubernur," 8 October 2014. Available from http://www.duakotopas.com/2014/10/dishut-pengelolaan-hutan-nagari-di.html (25 November 2014)

Program for Community Empowerment/PNPM) or academia and NGOs (WARSI and WALHI). NGO elements are appointed as part of authors to provide expertise admittedly lacking from the government side.

*Information that rejects Pathway 3:*
The West Sumatra Social Forestry Development Plan for 2012-2017 mentions WARSI as the only CSO appointed to work with BPDAS to develop a task force.

***Conclusion:***
The mainstreaming of CBFM into the West Sumatra Forest policy is the result of different actors that together provide a sufficient explanation for the outcome: they are part of a causal package. The provincial government's willingness to mainstream CBFM into its policies is evidenced in several policies, the formulation of which was co-authored by WAHLI and WARSI, academics and others. WARSI and WALHI hold a strategic position vis-à-vis the local government, which has allowed it to contribute to new strategies and policies. WARSI's reputation was probably influenced by their existing CBFM model and the application of it in two of West Sumatra's districts.

## 5.4 What is the relevance of these changes?

### 5.4.1 Relevance of the changes in relation to the Theory of Change of 2012

The outcomes for which process tracing was conducted were relevant to the institutional goal of WARSI as identified in the 2012 Theory of Change (ToC). WARSI's strategy to achieve the conservation of natural forests and the welfare of forest communities is based upon the accommodation and positive engagement with its stakeholders"[28]. The SPO identified the following pillars to achieve its goal:

- Recognition from the state of management of natural resources by indigenous people and communities.
- Sustainable ecosystems through forest conservation
- Enabling (political) environment through lobby and advocacy for forest management schemes by indigenous people and communities
- Increased value of non-wood forest and ecosystem services
- Government supports at all levels for natural resource management based on ecosystem/landscape and community cultural values

These pillars were also in line with program strategies, which included policy and advocacy and capacity building. The end line evaluation confirms that WARSI's interventions and outcomes are relevant for the realisation of its ToC Both the central government and the sub-national governments are willing to implement CBFM schemes, although the scope may be limited for now. But the government has been responding to international pressure, in particular REDD+ advocates. At the moment political will seems to be strong, but this may change as the newly elected government finalizes the formulation of its new five-year development plan.

As noted in other sections of this report, WARSI's success in increasing household incomes and in providing eco-system services seems to be moderate. This refutes one of the presumptions in the ToC of 2012 as it demonstrates that communities are willing to apply the *Hutan Desa* scheme as a means to 'battle' pressures from encroaching extractive industries, without first having sustainable livelihoods. But this also exposes a gap in the ToC and the results obtained so far. With communities now recognized for their rights to manage the forest, the bigger challenge lies ahead in terms of following up a positive policy environment and official endorsement with real interventions that will sustain community management practices through the creation of economic opportunities. Without alternative livelihoods, community members may still fall back on illegal logging practices or other unsustainable practices that lead to deforestation.

[28] MFS II country evaluations Civil Society component: Baseline Report Indonesia WARSI, November 2012

### 5.4.2 Relevance of the changes in relation to the context in which the SPO is operating

In recent years, the Government of Indonesia (GOI) has implemented reforms to address deforestation through improved forest governance. REDD+ has become one of the key priorities of the government, with institutional arrangements moving forward since the creation of a Presidential REDD+ Task Force in September 2010. In 2013, 10 working groups were established to help the Task Force roll out a national program. In 2013, an official REDD+ Agency was established.

Another relevant change in the context was the issuance of a forest conversion moratorium in 2011 (extended in 2013), effectively postponing new permits to be issued and providing an opportune moment for development actors to address forest governance issues[29].

At the same time, the implementation of CBFM had become more feasible with the issuance of implementation decrees in 2007 and 2008. WARSI, active in Sumatra since the early 90s, had already established positive relations with the local governments. These conditions paved the way for Lubuk Beringin in Jambi to obtain the first *Hutan Desa* certification in 2009. With a successfully implemented model under its belt, WARSI gained a reputable position in Indonesia. A growing interest in deforestation issues and REDD+ has propelled the replication of this model to other districts in Jambi and West Sumatra. This has also been aided by the start of the implementation of REDD+ at the sub-national level for provinces identified as priority areas. These include Jambi and West Sumatra along with 9 other provinces. West Sumatra and Jambi have also committed to taking part in REDD+ implementation through the signing of Memorandums of Understandings (MoUs) with the newly established national REDD+ agency.

### 5.4.3 Relevance of the changes in relation to the policies of the MFS II alliance and the CFA

Ecosystem Alliance's programme goal is *"to improve the livelihoods of the poor and create an inclusive economy, through participatory and responsible management of ecosystems".* It contains three programmatic themes: Livelihoods & Ecosystems, Greening the Economy and People and Climate Change. Three intervention strategies that link these themes are direct poverty alleviation, building civil society, and influencing policy. Major components in the programme are capacity building and learning. WARSI contributes to the Livelihoods and Ecosystems programme.

Ecosystem Alliance introduced the programmatic approach as a means to contribute to civil society development and policy influence. This implies that all EA partners in Indonesia work together to reach joint results. At the EA programmatic level four objectives were set, of which two were merged:

1. The Sustainable Livelihood Initiatives and Models (SLIMs) are a joint effort of the partners under the coordination of NTFP-EP: this will culminate in the organisation of a SLIMs festival as a closure of the EA MFS II programme in 2015. Films will be shown, music will be listened to that related to nature and ecosystems and products will be marketed. The objective is to attract the Indonesian middle class as a consumer and to show the government what is possible by sustainably sourcing and eco-cultural systems' conservation and restoration.
2. Improving land tenure rights are a joint effort under the coordination of WARSI which started in 2013. Two Ministry of Forest regulations were issued in 2014: Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan No. 89/Menhut-II/2014 to replace Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan No. 49/Menhut-II/2008 and Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan No. 88/Menhut-II/2014 which replaced Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan No. 37/Menhut-II/2007. These new procedures mean that the licensing process for communities has been simplified as a result of this joint advocacy as CBFM licenses no longer need to be obtained from the governor.
3. Integrated Landscape Development in Papua and in East Kalimantan. This approach aims to integrate value chain approaches with eco-system restauration. This seemingly new approach helps to overcome the limitations of voluntary standards developed for single commodities, such

[29] Forest Carbon Asia, Other Publication, "Mid-Term Progress Report on the REDD+ Readiness Process in Indonesia", August 2013. Available from http://www.forestcarbonasia.org/other-publications/mid-term-progress-report-redd-readiness-process-indonesia/ (accessed 28 November 2014)

as those for palm oil and to stimulate and integrated perspective on landscape development, connecting different scales of decision making. In Indonesia the focus is on the palm-oil sector and 20 pilot families saw their incomes rise by up to € 30 per month after participating in a pilot on "multilevel commodities" from agroforestry (i.e. various types of crops that can be harvested in different times of the year).

Until so far the impact of WARSI upon livelihoods improvements did not materialise, whereas the assumption under the Livelihoods and Ecosystem's programme is to combine both ecosystems and livelihoods.

The original idea of the EA programme in Indonesia was to halt the expansion of palm oil concessions and mineral concessions. In this light, WARSI's efforts until so far have prevented one mining company to obtain concession rights in Jambi Province and three CBFM groups successfully rejected plans of their local governments to designate forest land into an industrial forest plantation area.[30] WARSI's advocacy in the past has led to the legal recognition of Village Forests and their uptake as a means to invest REDD+ money in Jambi and West Sumatra and its participatory mapping was further implemented by EA partners in Sumatra, Kalimantan and Papua[31].

WARSI's advocacy, together with other EA grantees to simplify the procedures at national and provincial level to obtain Hutan Desa permits and the authority to manage these by CBFM groups, is very relevant to further protect village forests from stopping concessions being given to private sector companies. Also WARSI's efforts at its own project level are relevant contributions to civil society: its attempts to secure local land tenure and resource rights by participatory mapping and planning for CBFM are relevant because national policies are not yet well defined. WARSI has shown that evidence based lobby and advocacy based upon the creation of CBFM groups, helps to change policies at different level in favour. These same efforts also enhance the engagement of communities in defending their own natural resources. However no evidence was found that CBFM helps to create livelihoods assets and that households use sustainable land and resource practices to protect the Hutan Desa they manage.

## 5.5 Explaining factors

### 5.5.1 Internal factors

As a network organisation that has been running for over ten years, WARSI has gained a good reputation for its work in Sumatra. It is one of the better known organisations working in the conservation and forestry field.

At the start of the implementation of the project, IUCN conducted an organisational scan of WARSI using the five capacities framework and applying two additional EA capacities. Four capacities (capability to act, generate, relate, and achieve) were assessed; no scores were provided for the capacity to adapt. Overall, most core capacities and sub-capacities received a respectable '3' (4 being the maximum). The following table presents an overview of the scores for each core capacity and high and low scores from sub-capacities:

Table 7
*IUCN assessment of WARSI against the 5C framework.*

| Capacity | Description | Score |
|---|---|---|
| | 5 Cs | |
| 1 | The capability to act | Mean score of 3 |
| 1.3 | Capability to mobilize human, institutional and financial resources. | 4 |
| 1.5 | Capability to sustain commitment towards target groups | 2 |
| 2 | The capability to generate | Mean score of 2.8 |
| 2.2 | Capability to strengthen public and private institutions and services | 3.3 |

[30] According to WARSI data, community forest rights only cover 64,384 hectares compared to 776,652 hectares designated for industrial forest areas
[31] "MFS II Annual Report 2013", Ecosystems Alliance, 2013

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 3 | The capability to relate: | Mean score of 3 |
| 4 | The capability to adapt and self-renew | No scores |
| 5 | The capability to achieve coherence | Mean score of 3 |
| 5.1 | Capability to develop a clear mandate, vision and strategy | 4 |
| 5.2 | Capability to put in place a well-defined set of operating principles | 2 |
| | IUCN 2 Cs | |
| 6 | The capability to integrate environmental issues in sustainable development discussions / practice | Mean score of 2.67 |
| 6.3 | Capability to participate in the monitoring of environmental issues and share lessons | 2 |
| 7 | The capability to work in fragile states and on sensitive issues | Mean score of 2.33 |
| 7.2 | Capability to assess a regular working environment (risks, threats, vulnerabilities) | 2 |
| 7.3 | Capability to cope with increasing security challenges | 2 |

Source: IUCN Organisational Scan 2011 (filled in by filled in by Pete Wood, Samdhana)

Since the baseline, WARSI has demonstrated that it is overall a competent organisation. This has also been confirmed by a source within UNDP. The source shared that in 2014 a capacity assessment was conducted as a requirement for grantees. The assessment found WARSI's legal status, mandates and policies, constituency and external support to be satisfactory; as well as its technical, managerial, administrative and financial capacities. There are however some critical findings from the in-country team on WARSI's accountability (See Appendix 2) in terms of reporting the same result to different donors. The IUCN assessment remarked that relations with communities depended on individuals and that beneficiaries were not formally involved in the project structure. This was confirmed during the end line.

### 5.5.2 External factors

Following the *Reformasi* in 1998, the government has normatively demonstrated an increased political will towards forest conservation via the issuance of forestry laws in 1999. Civil society participation was constricted for a long time due to the absence of supporting regulations that prescribed how CBFM should be implemented. Regulations No.6/2007 and No.3/2008 marked the state's acknowledgment of forest community rights, and provide the CBFM implementation guidance. Both regulations worked in combination with other external factors that have been drivers of political will include the anti-corruption agenda and REDD+ schemes. These have opened greater opportunity for civil society actors to mediate between government and community interests. WARSI did not waste such opportunities and was the bridge to government political will and the community interests via a CBFM scheme. CBFM is now a preferred REDD+ strategy and as a result WARSI has earned the trust of the REDD+ agency at the national level as well as from provincial governments interested in REDD+ schemes. This has been an important factor for WARSI's lobby and advocacy effectiveness.

### 5.5.3 Relations CFA-SPO

The Ecosystem Alliance and IUCN have encouraged grantees to jointly cooperate in thematic projects. WARSI is engaged in the Mainstreaming Sustainable Livelihood Initiatives and Models (SLIMs) initiative in Kalimantan. Through the Ecosystem Alliance, WARSI engaged with 9 other organisations (of which one contract was terminated due to performance issues).

WARSI also leads the "land-tenure" project working group that aims to streamline the long and difficult CBFM permit procedures and obtaining government funds for CBFM groups. In doing this, WARSI indicates their awareness and responsiveness to use CFA support to leverage their impact. Had land tenure project been successful (or started earlier), WARSI's interventions could have become less relevant if the CBFM application process was made straightforward enough for communities to apply for management rights on their own. In addition to connecting WARSI to the EA network and stimulating exchange and learning amongst local partner organisations, the CFA-SPO relationship facilitated financial sustainability trainings for all EA partners in November 2014 and January 2015.

# 6. Discussion

## 6.1 Design of the intervention

Overall, WARSI's intervention logic and project design were of good quality. There were two clear focuses, namely on lobby efforts and community level interventions. However, in the implementation WARSI fell short of achieving their objectives at the community level. The priority seems to have been on overseeing the endorsement of community proposals for forest management and supporting the recognition of community-managed *HutanDesa* schemes. WARSI was focused on ensuring that community forest groups could lay claim to forest areas before extractive companies or small holders did so. While this is important and relevant, to sustain development impact interventions that lead to improved livelihood assets based upon NTFP and agroforestry need more emphasis. Without creating economic incentives for the communities who now have forest management rights, WARSI there is a risk that CBFM schemes may not be sustainable. There are sufficient funding opportunities for the SPO to undertake such activities. Future community-based forest management support should have an equal focus on livelihoods interventions as this will create a sufficient exit/sustainability strategy.

WARSI should also utilize its broad network with other CSOs to create economic opportunities. For example, WARSI could work with Mitra Aksi and its own network of partners which include organisations with an expertise in the sustainable livelihoods approach and biogas. Another option would be to focus on a select number of NTFPs produced by community members in the same area and strengthen the value chain and linkages to the international market. WARSI would also benefit from a specific focus on vulnerable groups within forest communities, such as the semi-migratory groups (Orang Rimba) in Jambi and landless farmers living on the edge of nationally protected forest areas.

Another observation is that WARSI is working on sensitive issues, namely the demarcation of community forest land area. If 'do no harm' principles are not properly applied, relations between neighbouring villages could easily sour. This could happen even after forest boundaries have been mapped and officially recognized. WARSI should incorporate this potential risk into project designs and work with experts or organisations that have specific experience in resolving natural resource conflict. Ideally, the local government should be engaged in the process, as mandated under the Social Conflict Management Law of 2012.

The evaluation team also concludes that WARSI's model and design is replicable if certain conditions are in place. First and foremost, external third-party assistance is still required for communities to navigate through the bureaucratic requirements of obtaining endorsement of forest management rights through the Hutan Desa scheme. NGOs or other organisations providing such assistance need to have close relations with the local government, both at district and provincial level. Advocacy and lobby efforts by the NGO need to be clear and focused and ideally should relate to existing policy frameworks. The Hutan Desa status needs to be approved by different government levels, and each needs to be convinced of the net benefit of approving the application. Environmental organisations need to take advantage of political momentum, as WARSI did when official guidelines/procedures for obtaining Hutan Desa endorsement were released by the government in 2007-2008. Success is still dependent on political dynamics, such as leadership stability, regional development plans, and supporting legislation at the local level.

# 7. Conclusion

WARSI's interventions and outcomes were relevant to both the civil society context and MDG 7 because they addressed a gap between natural resource management policies and the opportunities of forest communities to rightfully claim more decision-making power and usage rights over forest resources. On aggregate, WARSI's performance against CIVICUS indicators improved in all five areas: level of organization, practice of values, civic engagement, perception of impact and coping strategies.

WARSI achieved two important outcomes namely: 1) helping nine more villages obtain decrees and endorsements for preserving the village forest (*Hutan Desa*) area; and 2) contributing to the mainstreaming of CBFM in the provincial forest policies of West Sumatra. The first outcome can be clearly attributed to the role of WARSI and MFS II funding. WARSI's role was to assist communities navigate the endorsement process by preparing proposals, establishing forest management groups and developing forest management plans. The success of WARSI's CBFM model has enabled it to gain recognition from the government, which allowed it to play a key role in influencing the West Sumatra provincial policy planning process.

Through the above achievements, WARSI has contributed to reducing forest degradation rates and improving the recognition for community managed forests. In order for these interventions to sustain into the future, more will need to be done to address the economic conditions of village forest groups.

These changes are very relevant in the current context of Indonesia, which also partly explain the causes of the changes that occurred. Indonesia has committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 26 percent by 2020. Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) focus on improving forest management and governance. Community forest management practices have gained recognition and political support and are one of the potential means by which carbon emissions can be reduced. As such, WARSI's work has been highly strategic and is likely to gain continued support. However there is not yet an improvement of the livelihoods of those households that manage the Hutan Desa.

Table 8
*Summary of findings*

| When looking at the MFS II interventions of this SPO to strengthen civil society and/or policy influencing, how much do you agree with the following statements? | Score |
|---|---|
| The CS interventions were well designed | 7 |
| The CS interventions were implemented as designed | 5 |
| The CS interventions reached their objectives | 5 |
| The observed outcomes are attributable to the CS interventions | 7 |
| The observed CS outcomes are relevant to the beneficiaries of the SPO | 7 |

Score between 1 to 10, with 1 being "not at all" and 10 being "completely".

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World Bank, News, "Indonesia Development Policy Review 2014", 23 June 2014. Available from http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/06/23/indonesia-2014-development-policy-review (accessed 26 October 2014)

**Resource persons consulted**

| *Name of key informant* | *Organisation* | *Function in organisation* | *Relation with SPO* | *Contact details including e-mail.* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Diki Kurniawan | Warsi | Director | Staff | di_awan2005@yahoo.com |
| Rainal Daus | Warsi | Program Manager | Staff | gumesrain@gmail.com |
| Rahmat Hidayat | Warsi | Program Manager | Staff | er.ha@warsi.or.id |
| Riche Dewita | Warsi | Assistant Coordinator | Staff | riche.dewita@gmail.com |
| Yulqari | Warsi | Program Manager | Staff | yul.qari@gmail.com |
| Hambali | Warsi | Board | Staff | mitraaksi@yahoo.co.id |
| Nofri Hidayat | Warsi | Field Facilitator | Staff | |
| Ir. Misram | BPDAS Jambi | Chief | Government | |

# Appendix 1 Civil Society Scores

This table presents the appreciation of the evaluation team regarding changes occurred for each indicator between 2012 and 2014 on a scale of -2 to + 2

- 2 = Considerable deterioration
- 1 = A slight deterioration

0 = no change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012

+1 = slight improvement

+2 = considerable improvement

| Dimension | | Indicators | Question | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Civic engagement | 1 | Needs of marginalised groups | How does your organisation take the needs of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups into account in your planning, actions, activities, and/or strategies? | +1 |
| | 2 | Involvement of target groups | What is the level of participation of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups in the analysis, planning and evaluation of your activities? | +1 |
| | 3 | Political engagement | How intense is your (individual staff or organisational) participation in locally-nationally elected bodies and/or sectoral user groups? | -1 |
| | | | | |
| Level of organisation | 5 | Relations with other organisations | In the past 12 months what has been the most intensive interaction you had with other CSOs? | +1 |
| | 5 | Frequency of dialogue with closest CSO | In the past 12 months how many meetings did you have with the CSO that you have most intensive interaction with? | +1 |
| | 6 | Defending the interests of marginalised groups | Which CSO are most effective in defending the interests of your target groups? In the past 12 months, how did you relate to those CSOs? | +1 |
| | 7 | Composition current financial resource base | How does your organisation finance institutional costs such as workshops of the General Assembly (if applicable); attendance to workshops of other CSOs; costs for organisational growth and/or networking? | +2 |
| | | | | |
| Practice of Values | 8 | Downward accountability | To what extent can mandatory social organs (steering committee, general assembly, internal auditing group) ask your executive leaders to be accountable to them? | 0 |
| | 9 | Composition of social organs | What % of members of your mandatory social organs belong to the marginalised target groups you are working with/for? | +1 |
| | 10 | External financial auditing | How regularly is your organisation audited externally? | 0 |
| | | | | |
| Perception of impact | 11 | Client satisfaction | What are the most important concerns of your target groups? How do your services take into account those important concerns? | +1 |
| | 12 | Civil society impact | In the past 12 months, what impact did you have on building a strong civil society? | +1 |
| | 13 | Relation with public sector organisations. | In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with public sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' objectives? | +2 |
| | 14 | Relation with private sector organisations | In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with private sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' perspective? | -1 |
| | 15 | Influence upon public policies, | How successful have you been in influencing public policies and practices in the past 2 years? | +2 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | rules, regulations | | |
| | 16 | Influence upon private sector agencies' policies, rules, regulations. | How successful have you been in influencing private sector policies and practices in the past 2 years? | 0 |
| | | | | |
| CS context | 17 | Coping strategies | In the past 2 years, how did your organisation cope with these changes in the context that may have been positive or negative consequences for civil society. | +2 |

# Appendix 2 Changes in civil society indicators between 2012 and 2014

## 1. Civic Engagement

### 1.1. Needs of marginalised groups SPO

Table 9

*Current status of WARSI assisted CBFM villages*

| No | Province | District | Village | Status | Donor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Jambi | Bungo | Senamat Ulu Village | Fully endorsed | IUCN |
| 2 | | | Laman Panjang Village | Fully endorsed | IUCN |
| 3 | | | Buat Village | Fully endorsed | IUCN |
| 4 | | | Sungai Telang Village | Fully endorsed | IUCN |
| 5 | | | Lubuk Beringin Village | Fully endorsed (prior to baseline) | Non-IUCN* |
| 6 | | Batanghari | Jelutih Village | Fully endorsed | IUCN |
| 7 | | | Hajran Village | Fully endorsed | IUCN |
| 8 | | | Olak Besar Village | Fully endorsed | IUCN |
| 9 | | Sarolangun | Lubuk Bedorong Village | Have not been designated by the ministry | IUCN |
| 10 | | | Napal Melintang Village | Have not been designated by the ministry | IUCN |
| 11 | | | Berkun Village | Have not been designated by the ministry | IUCN |
| 12 | West Sumatra | Solok | Nagari Simanau | Fully endorsed | IUCN |
| 13 | | | Nagari Sariek Alahan Tigo | Waiting initial approval | IUCN |
| 14 | | | Nagari Sirukam | Waiting initial approval | IUCN |
| 15 | | | Nagari Sungai Abu | Waiting initial approval | IUCN |
| 16 | | South Solok | Nagari Jorong Simancuang | Fully endorsed | IUCN |
| 17 | | | Nagari Pakan Raba'a | Waiting final approval | IUCN |
| 18 | | | Nagari Pasir Talang Timur | Waiting final approval | IUCN |
| 19 | | | Nagari Koto Baru | Waiting final approval | IUCN |
| 20 | | | Nagari Pulakek Koto Baru | Waiting final approval | IUCN |

Sources: evaluation workshop, project documents, Department of Forestry website West Sumatra
Note: The blue highlights represent endorsed CBFM groups since the baseline that are IUCN-funded. Villages number 1, 2, 4 were already in the middle of endorsement process when IUCN project commenced. Villages in Sarolangun district have not been officially designated by the Ministry, thus WARSI excludes them for the moment from being reported as having CBFM groups established.

IUCN supported WARSI to assist the establishment and endorsement of 16 community-based forest management (CBFM) groups in five districts along the Batanghari watershed, which runs through the provinces of Jambi and West Sumatra. A total of 20 villages have been supported by WARSI, of which 10 have received state-recognition and authority to use the village forest area for production activities (agroforestry, community logging, NTFP, ecotourism) for the next 35 years. Nine of these are IUCN-supported. Without the existence of CBFM groups and government recognition, it is likely that private sector will be the one to benefit from forest resources by obtaining concession rights. WARSI's role has been to encourage and facilitate the CBFM groups to meet bureaucratic requirements. Without such facilitation, communities would unlikely receive recognition for their long-term rights to manage forest resources through permits/concessions from the government. These CBFM groups are supposed to defend the rights of ethnic minorities that are dependent upon forest resources.

The CBFM model is being replicated by other organizations in Sumatra. By rule, the community should acquire a governor's permit for at least two years after an area has been designated village forest. If no permit is acquired in the two years after the designation, the Ministry of Forestry can change the status/designation of the forest area.

The successes of South Solok and Solok Districts in West Sumatra generated a number of requests from communities in the area for WARSI to facilitate similar activities. There are at least another 8

districts in West Sumatra Province asking for assistance, but WARSI has not yet been able to fulfil all of these requests. In 2012, the Provincial Government of West Sumatra produced a five-year road map (2012-2017) for the expansion of village forests and social forest schemes to cover an area of 500,000 hectares. The government established a Task Force on Social Forestry, which functions as a focal point for communities and stakeholders to propose community-based forest management and for the expansion of community-based forestry management (village forests, social forests and customary forests). West Sumatera has become the first province to mainstream village forest schemes in their forestry policy. With such a policy, it is expected that more communities can benefit from CBFM in the near future.

Recently, WARSI and other Ecosystem Alliance (EA) grantees were successful to widen the application of CBFM by advocating the Ministry of Forestry to streamline the application procedures. As this effort aims to shorten and simplify procedures required for CBFM authorisation, it opens the opportunity for more village communities in Indonesia to attain the benefit of CBFM. This can be considered a very strategic effort and important success[32].

The nature of change would perfectly match civic engagement (more marginalised groups reached) if there were no questions about the accountability and capacity of CBFM groups to defend the interests of the community they represent (See 2.7). WARSI has been criticized as becoming more 'elitist' in their attitude and interventions since they have received considerable recognition for their efforts at the national and international level.

## 1.2. Involvement of target groups SPO

As during the baseline, WARSI claimed that their field staff play a critical role in accompanying communities. Although the SPO claims to encourage and ensure community participation by having rigorous standard operational procedures for community facilitation in place, target groups' decision-making space is limited only to the affairs of each CBFM. The in-country team came across criticisms of WARSI's growing tendency to be less engaged at the community level. Facilitators are growing less willing to have close engagement with villagers, preferring to limit engagement to more accessible members of the community like village leaders.

In the 2013 general assembly, two CBFM group representatives became WARSI members. In spite of this, there are no examples which demonstrate that the representation of target groups has had any effect on decision-making within WARSI. Nevertheless, it can still be considered an improvement in the involvement of target groups compared to the baseline situation.

## 1.3. Intensity of political engagement SPO

During the past two years, there has been some controversy within the SPO on the way they see themselves with regards to political engagement. This controversy arose when WARSI decided to support some individual WARSI members in district legislative elections, which was seen by some as an opportunity to have more power to influence pro-conservation policies. In doing this, WARSI has attempted to influence the public's political choices using their resources, and may have inevitably affiliated themselves with certain political parties. This may be seen as contradicting WARSI's own organisational values, described in their strategic plan as being "non-partisan"[33].

External to this rather controversial issue, WARSI's strength still lies in their ability as a network to influence and work with local governments. WARSI works within the confines of forest policies, and as such is able to lobby and advocate for strategies that recognize community forestry rights.

[32] Akiefnawati, R., Villamor, G. B., Ayat, A., Galudra, G., van Noordwijk, M. 2010. *Stewardship Agreements to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) in Indonesia*. ASB Policybrief 18. Nairobi: ASB Partnership for the Tropical Forest Margins, p. 1-2. Available from http://www.worldagroforestrycentre.org/sea/Publications/files/policybrief/PB0013-10.PDF (accessed 20 November 2014)

[33] "Rencana Strategis WARSI 2010-2020", WARSI, 2010, p. 23. Available from http://warsi.or.id/download/Buku%20Renstra%20Warsi%202010-2020.pdf (accessed 20 November 2014)

# 2. Level of organisation

## 2.1. Relations with other organisations SPO

WARSI was formed on 1992 as an alliance of CSOs from four provinces (Jambi, Bengkulu, West Sumatera, and Riau) in Sumatra who had a shared focus on conservation and community empowerment[34].WARSI is well known for their work on spatial planning and social forestry issues. Some members of the alliance are currently still working as independent CSOs/NGOs, therefore WARSI has traditional alliances with the likes of PKBI, Yayasan Gita Buana, and LBH Palembang. WARSI's network is not limited to working with other CSOs on community initiatives, but also expands to lobby work.

WARSI cooperates with other Ecosystem Alliance grantees on thematic projects. WARSI leads a joint advocacy intervention with WALHI, Telapak, and Samdhana focusing on land tenure rights. Together with Telapak, WALHI, Gita Buana, YMI, Samdhana, PT PPMA, and YKWS, WARSI is also a member of a joint advocacy group led by NTFP-EP for Mainstreaming Sustainable Livelihood Initiatives and Models (SLIMs)[35]. The Ecosystem Alliance encouraged and facilitated such cooperation since 2013. WARSI's program logical framework also specifically includes this cooperation into its agenda. WARSI has worked successfully to simplify the procedures for obtaining hutan desa endorsement, as seen from the issuance of Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan No. 89/Menhut-II/2014 and Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan No. 88/Menhut-II/2014 to replace Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan No. 49/Menhut-II/2008 and Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan No. 37/Menhut-II/2007.

WARSI worked together with WALHI in West Sumatra, and with ICRAF (the International Centre for Research in Agroforestry, better known as World Agroforestry Centre) and RSPB (Royal Society for the Protection of Birds) in Jambi, in the REDD+ Task Force which also consists of academicians, forestry officials, the Provincial Development Planning Agency (Bappeda), and the provincial environment impact planning agency.

At CBFM group level, WARSI often shares their target groups with other NGOs such as: Mitra Aksi (focus on education, DRR, and reproductive health), AMAN (indigenous rights), SSS-Pundi Sumatera (livelihood), and PPO (organic farming) to form strategic partnerships on specific issues. WARSI considers such cooperation as mutual considering WARSI's limited capacity[36]in community development. However, based on an interview conducted by the evaluation team with a WARSI field facilitator, it seems that the support from other CSOs/NGOs is sometimes overlapping rather than mutually beneficial. Jelutih, Hajran, and Olak Besar CBFM groups have received assistance from Ampal for biodiversity mapping, Setara for land intensification, and ICRAF for community forest management[37]. All of the aforementioned areas of support are also part of WARSI's planned activities. As such, it raises concerns regarding accountability as sometimes a single outcome can be claimed by many actors[38]. Nevertheless, the establishment and recognition of CBFM groups has attracted more CSOs/NGOs to work with these groups, as such it can be seen as an improvement of this indicator. In other words, the recognition of community groups' forest management rights has attracted greater support from other CSOs.

## 2.2. Frequency of dialogue with closest civil society organisations SPO

Since January 2013, WARSI has been working with and leading other Ecosystem Alliance grantees in a thematic working group on land tenure rights. This task force shares documents and data, coordinates strategies, attends various national forums. WARSI engages intensively with the Working Group Pemberdayaan (WGP) in the Ministry of Forestry[39] to provide inputs to revisions on regulations

[34] KKI WARSI, "Sejarah Pendirian". Available from https://kkiwarsi.wordpress.com/warsi-itu/ (accessed 20 November 2014)
[35] Ecosystem Alliance, Indonesia, "Summary of EA Programme". Available from http://www.ecosystem-alliance.org/countries/indonesia?page=4 (accessed 20 November 2014)
[36] Workshop with WARSI, Jambi, 12 November 2014
[37] Interview with Nofri Hidayat, WARSI field facilitator, Jambi, 14 November 2014
[38] Interview with Hambali, WARSI board, Jambi, 13 November 2014
[39] "Concept Note Land Tenure Thematic", WARSI, 18 May 2012, p. 4

pertaining to *Hutan Desa*. In this regard, the intensity and frequency of relations among CSOs within the task force has improved compared to the baseline as a result of IUCN's intervention.

During the workshop organised as part of the evaluation, participants claimed that WARSI benefits from sharing target groups and intervention areas with other CSOs/NGOs at the CBFM level (as mentioned in prior indicator). But there is no evidence that such mutual relationships have been well planned or programmatically acknowledged (i.e. coordination meetings, MoU, etc.). A board member also mentioned that WARSI never formally approached Mitra Aksi to discuss their cooperation. Another interesting finding is that the same individuals seem to be involved in different organisations, holding a number of titles and positions. For example, one WARSI board members is also on the board of Mitra Aksi and the treasurer for SSS-Pundi Sumatera. In another example, the former WARSI director is also a board member of SSS-Pundi Sumatera[40]. This indicates that while WARSI's network seems to be extensive, it deals with many of the same individuals holding different positions in a host of CSOs.

At the CBFM level, monthly informal meetings are held, and formal meetings annually with the government where they have to present their work plan, report results achieved, obstacles, etc. CBFM groups have also started to meet, share and learn from each other, although this is still not a regular affair. For example, three CBFM villages in Batanghari District have picked up skills in cardamom agroforestry, learning from their counterparts from Solok District[41].

## 2.3. Defending the interests of marginalised groups SPO

The communities of 10 villages (9 IUCN funded) have been given legal authority to use the village forest for limited production activities. Without this recognition, they would be exposed to legal penalties or would compete with corporations and companies over forest management rights. The recognition of this right is still considered the most appropriate political instrument to defend the interests of minority forest groups and of local communities' vis-à-vis forest concessions controlled by private sector organisations.

The communities only have a two-year period to acquire village forest permits. If no permit is granted within that period, the village forest designation will be withdrawn. This almost happened in Sarolangun District, where the community had to race against a mining corporation who had proposed to utilize the limited production forest area. The village forest scheme and CBFM groups also protect the designated area from unclear or conflicting regulations issued by the government. The protection afforded by the *Hutan Desa* scheme provides an opportunity for communities to stake a claim to forest resources and challenge concessions. In another case, WARSI assisted three villages to approach the local government to voice their rejection of plans to designate a large area of land as industrial forest plantation area (*Hutan Tanaman Industri* or HTI). According to WARSI data, community forest rights only cover 64,384 hectares compared to 776,652hectaes designated for industrial forest areas[42].

For villages in the Province of West Sumatra, CBFM is in line with the customary land scheme (the "Nagari" forest) which previously was not acknowledged by the state. This could be the main reason why West Sumatra chose to mainstream CBFM in their forestry policy as there have been numerous disputes caused by the absence of state acknowledgment of the "Nagari" forest customary law. The "Nagari" customary law see lands as extended family property, rather than individually owned.

Although CBFM intend to defend the interests of marginalized forest communities, critical flaws in its practical implementation could lead to negative results. Without solid interventions to organise the community, the CBFM group could fall into the hands of new elites at village level. In combination with weak livelihoods interventions to create sustainable alternative incomes, such a situation could attract elements from the private sector seeking to benefit from village forests. This is especially a risk if the

[40] Pusat Informasi Kehutanan Provinsi Jambi, "LSM di Provinsi Jambi". Available from http://infokehutanan.jambiprov.go.id/?v=pr&id=165 (20 November 2014)

[41] Interview with Nofri Hidayat, WARSI field facilitator, Jambi, 14 November 2014

[42] Aji Wihardandi, "Tiga Desa di Jambi Tolak Ekspansi Perkebunan HTI", Mongabay Indonesia, 22 November 2013. Available from http://www.mongabay.co.id/2013/11/22/tiga-desa-di-jambi-tolak-ekspansi-perkebunan-hti/ (accessed 20 November 2014); Bock, Mattew J. 2012. Formalization and Community Forestry in Jambi, Indonesia: Indigenous Rights, Rural Migrants, and The Informal Divide. The Josef Korbel Journal of Advance International Studies – Summer 2012, Volume 4, p. 56. Available from https://www.du.edu/korbel/jais/journal/volume4/volume4_bock.pdf (accessed 27 October 2014)

CBFM group is run by village elites that are attracted to quick financial returns offered by corporations of this nature. Should this happen, the CBFM scheme would basically shift poor policy-making practices from district to village level, making it even harder to control or rectify. Erin Sills, senior researcher of Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) purported that "if you cannot offer a sustainable livelihood, your intervention basically only shifts or postpones deforestation"[43]. These concerns are shared by some on WARSI's board who are critical towards WARSI's lack of progress in CBFM livelihood development[44]. Even if WARSI's prioritization of winning the race against the corporate sector can be justified, they should not be complacent with the follow-up interventions.

Referring to input-output-outcome analysis[45], WARSI has achieved most targets related to community organisation (Objective 1); however the logical framework did not anticipate CBFM group inclusivity issues. As such, WARSI has seemingly not anticipated to what degree the CBFM groups truly represent the community. In order for the CBFM groups to be sustainable, they need to perform a function at the community level. CBFM group capacity to defend the interest of the community is also likely to depend on WARSI's assistance to make CBFM groups effective in providing community support, especially in the area of livelihoods interventions. Indicator 4.1 will provide more detailed analysis about this, but it can be concluded in short that with regards to sustainable or alternative livelihoods, most CBFM groups are still not satisfied. Moreover, the evaluation input-output analysis stipulated that external documents do criticize the development of the plans and the Hutan Desa and have noted that once Hutan Desa status has been acquired, the financial burden to implement falls on the village. This has led to some villages considering 'giving back' the permit to the government[46]. Village forest permits can also be terminated based on a joint evaluation between forest authorities and the CBFM group.

It is unfortunate that this evaluation cannot select indicator 2.3 and 4.1 for process tracing to get a better judgment due to limited time and resources available.

### 2.4. Composition financial resource base SPO

WARSI has been able to secure more funding sources in recent years. From RFN, WARSI received USD 1.8 million for an indigenous people protection program (2012-2017) and USD 550,000 for a REDD+ program (2013-2015). From TFCA-Sumatra (USAID) they receive around USD 640,000 for a conservation project around Kerinci Seblat National Park (2011-2016). Another USD 550,000 was secured from the Climate and Land Use Alliance (CLUA) for a sustainable forest management project in 2013. WARSI also received around USD 300,000 from the Margaret A. Cargill grant scheme. This indicates that WARSI is able to benefit from a growing donor interest in community forestry issues and REDD+ in Indonesia. Nonetheless, WARSI still depends highly on international donor support.

## 3. Practice of values

### 3.1. Downward accountability SPO

WARSI holds general assembly meetings every three years, during which WARSI's members evaluate the management's accountability, and decide whether or not to change the composition of the board

[43] Michael Day, "Apakah proyek 'mata pencaharian alternatif' efektif", Kabar HUTAN, 17 February 2014. Available from http://blog.cifor.org/21368/apakah-proyek-mata-pencaharian-alternatif-efektif#.VHN7IWdPE24 (accessed 20 November 2014)

[44] Interview with Hambali, WARSI board, Jambi, 13 November 2014

[45] Hester Smidt, "Warsi Input-Output Analysis", MFS-II evaluation 2014

[46] Sari, Intan Maya. 2013. *Community Forests at a Crossroads: Lessons Learned from Lubuk Beringin Village Forest and Guguk Customary Forest in Jambi Province – Sumatra, Indonesia*. Thesis. Blindern, Norway: Center for Development and the Environment University of Oslo, p. 78. Available from https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/36822/SARI-Master.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 20 November 2014); Maryudi, Ahmad. 2013. *Enabling Forest Users to Exercise Their Rights: Rethinking Barriers to Communities and Smallholders Earning Their Living from Timber in Indonesia*. Paper prepared for RECOFTC The Center for People and Forests, Yogyakarta, February 2013, p. 14. Available from http://www.rightsandresources.org/wp-content/exported-pdf/reportindonesiaenablingforestuserstoexercisetheirrightsfinal.pdf (accessed 20 November 2014)

or the management. The last general assembly was held in 2013. WARSI appointed a new director to replace the former since based on WARSI's articles of association; the director cannot hold the position for more than a two-year period. WARSI undertakes organisational evaluations every five years (a mid-term in their 10 year-strategic planning cycle), and the evaluation is to be reported at the forthcoming general assembly. WARSI's board and executives also meet at least once every 6 months to monitor WARSI's organisational course and performance. However, there have been reports that these meetings are not effective enough and that WARSI has never conducted an external evaluation. During the workshop of this evaluation, WARSI's program manager for the IUCN project was unable to provide information regarding WARSI's current financial composition as this was regarded to be the authority of the director.

## 3.2. Composition of social SPO

The composition of WARSI's board changes every three years. There are no representatives of WARSI's target groups in the board structure. The advisory board consists of 4 men and 2 women, while the monitoring board consists of 2 men and 1 woman. WARSI applies a 30 percent quota for women representation in the board and management as part of their commitment towards gender mainstreaming.

During the 2013 general assembly, WARSI inaugurated 18 new members consisted of 2 CBFM group leaders, 2 customary leaders, and other community leaders. Although WARSI's membership is open, candidates have to pass a fit-and-proper test and need at least two references from two members who have been part of the general assembly for a minimum of two years. WARSI's director reported that they decided to include members representing target groups as a strategy to maintain WARSI's relationship with their target groups and focal points. While this is an improvement in the composition of WARSI's membership base, it does not change the structure of the board. The new members will have voting power as members, but their ability to influence organisation direction can only be measured in the next general assembly which is to take place in 2016.

## 3.3. External financial auditing SPO

WARSI has not conducted an external financial audit for their institution; all audits are project-based. This is the same as the conditions during the baseline.

WARSI management reported that overlaps in funding are possible and considered beneficial to cope with unanticipated needs[47].WARSI's director further explained that most projects are separated geographically, but that there is mutual complementary between REDD+ and IUCN projects. But the evaluation team has some concerns with this explanation since this cannot be backed up by an institutional audit. WARSI could claim the same achievements for different projects. The evaluation team notes that it is hard to distinguish between REDD+ and EA contributions to WARSI's achievement in influencing the Province of West Sumatra province to mainstream CBFM without reviewing an institutional audit result (see 4.5).

In 2010 WARSI reported facing difficulties in "finding the balance between organisational independence and the need to serve public sector's and donor's agenda"[48] as one of their challenges. Based on comments from one of the board members and responses from WARSI's management it seems that this challenge continues to persist.

[47] Workshop with WARSI, Jambi, 12 November 2014

[48] "Rencana Strategis WARSI 2010-2020", WARSI, 2010, p. 17. Available from http://warsi.or.id/download/Buku%20Renstra%20Warsi%202010-2020.pdf (accessed 20 November 2014)

# 4. Perception of impact

## 4.1. Client satisfaction SPO

WARSI's management is confident that the 9 IUCN-supported CBFM groups are satisfied with the legal certainty regarding the rights to use village forests, but WARSI management are less confident with CBFM groups' satisfaction regarding livelihood improvement as they admit that such benefits are still very limited. The above statement is consistent with the findings from the input-output-outcome analysis. There is no evidence that households have adopted more sustainable land and resource use practices or that they benefit from improvements in livelihoods assets, except for 20 model households selected for "multilevel commodities" interventions. The incomes of these households reportedly increased by IDR 500,000 per month. Participants in the end line workshop reported that based on a longitudinal study on 800 households between 2012 and 2013, household income increased an average of IDR 50,000 a month. However, the evaluation team did not receive this document from WARSI. Even if the evidence does exist, an increase of just under USD 5 dollars is insignificant compared to the poverty line (IDR 407,437/month according to BPS standards for 2013[49]) and monthly inflation rates of around 6 percent[50].

With regards to the interventions to support villages in having their own electricity supply, only 48 houses from one village benefitted from the hydroelectric power generation in 2013 with a possible addition of 160 houses in 2014. However, it is worthy to note that the addition resulted from the government financial support to the scheme in response to WARSI's lobby and a community's proposal. In conclusion, with regards to sustainable or alternative livelihoods, most CBFM groups are still not satisfied.

It is unfortunate that WARSI does not monitor client satisfaction. This kind of information would be beneficial to WARSI to illustrate how their assistance in completing administrative requirements for the *Hutan Desa* scheme has been received by the villages and the CBFM groups. It is likely that the formal process was sped up with WARSI's help.

## 4.2. Civil society impact SPO

WARSI' acceptance of the P.49/Menhut-II/2008 regulation has caused controversy among other forest conservation NGOs (notably WALHI and AMAN). Most notably, AMAN rejected the concessionary arrangements because it only recognized formally established villages in and around production or protection forests and excluded nomadic groups living in forested areas51. However, WARSI decided to use the law as an opportunity, rather than oppose it as they believe that if no concrete action is taken to ensure that forest people manage their own forest, then the private sector will be the first to benefit. WARSI's stand point is that competing with the private sector to acquire authority to use limited production forests is more impactful than waiting for a flawless policy to be put in place. Thus, the scale up of CBFM has been their priority. This decision resulted in WARSI being the first NGO to put in place a village forest in 2009 (Lubuk Beringin Village, Jambi). At present more NGOs have followed suit in Jambi and other provinces, including those who initially disagreed with WARSI[52]. After WARSI's success, Alternatives to Slash and Burn (ASB) reported that "*Expectations that resolving tenure conflicts would facilitate flows of REDD investment to the first Hutan Desa case*"[53]. These

[49] Berita Resmi Statistik BPS Provinsi DKI Jakarta. 2014. *Tingkat Kemiskinan di DKI Jakarta Maret 2014*, p. 1. Available from http://jakarta.bps.go.id/fileupload/brs/2014_07_01_12_50_20.pdf (accessed 21 November 2014)

[50] Bank Indonesia, Inflasi, "LAPORAN INFLASI (Indeks Harga Konsumen)". Available from http://www.bi.go.id/id/moneter/inflasi/data/Default.aspx (accessed 21 November 2014)

[51] Hein, Jonas. 2013. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+), Transnational Conservation and Access to Land in Jambi, Indonesia. EFForTS Discussion Paper Series No. 2 (October 2013). Goettingen, Germany: GOEDOC, Dokumenten- und Publikationsserver der Georg-August-Universitait, p. 11

[52] Workshop with WARSI, Jambi, 12 November 2014

[53] Akiefnawati, R., Villamor, G. B., Ayat, A., Galudra, G., van Noordwijk, M. 2010. Stewardship Agreements to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) in Indonesia. ASB Policybrief 18. Nairobi: ASB Partnership for the Tropical Forest Margins, p. 1. Available from http://www.worldagroforestrycentre.org/sea/Publications/files/policybrief/PB0013-10.PDF (accessed 20 November 2014)

conditions have indeed emerged. This may also explain why more NGOs have joined the CBFM bandwagon. Jambi province currently has 25 CBFM groups covering 54,978 hectare of village-forest area; the largest in Indonesia. However, some NGOs (i.e. AMAN) still think the CBFM scheme is not a fair solution for customary communities whose forest has been taken over by the state[54], as such they insist on a special acknowledgment outside the CBFM scheme[55].

As CBFM groups have become stronger, they are starting to form an umbrella organization and have begun to interact with one another to share and learn[56]. This entails regular meetings between CBFM groups and government officials. No official entity has been set up, but according to WARSI this is likely to take shape in the next coming years.

WARSI and IUCN have noted that one of the benefits of establishing the CBFM scheme is in the mapping of forest resources and boundaries. In the *Hutan Desa* scheme, verifying boundaries is a critical step in the process for granting management rights to the community. During the evaluation team visit, it was found that WARSI field staff had just recently mediated a conflict about village borders between three villages in Batanghari District. However, the opposite conclusion could also be drawn, namely that the mapping of village forests and boundaries is cause for disputes between villages. Poorly defined borders, in combination with an increased interest in the benefits of village forests can cause potential conflict to resurface. This information is based on the evaluation team's interview with a WARSI village facilitator of Bantanghari District who had just mediated the resolution of village boundaries between three villages. In conclusion, establishing boundaries can be a barrier to formalizing the *Hutan Desa*, as the process is difficult and sensitive and can lead to very positive or very negative consequences.

In West Sumatra, the absence of state acknowledgement of the Nagari customary land regulations up to2008 caused horizontal disputes within the society. The CBFM scheme mainstreamed by the West Sumatran government through the Provincial Regulation No.16/2008, aimed to accommodate and utilize customary Nagari land for forest conservation. This means that in the process, the provincial government and NGOs working on mainstreaming had to deal with disputes, with possible positive or negative impacts. The CBFM scheme has been hailed by some researchers because it *offers prospects for wider use in conflict resolution of forest boundaries*[57]. However, for the period under review, there is little evidence from WARSI reports that conflict resolution has indeed occurred, except for a case in Batanghari District. Based on the evaluation team's interview with a WARSI facilitator, they have just mediated a border resolution among three CBFM villages (Hajran, Jelutih, Olak Besar)[58] which saw Hajran village, whose village-forest area is only 2 percent compared to other villages, receive more forest areas from the two neighbouring villages. Although it seems that the resolution was likely aimed to give Hajran village more incentives to sustain their CBFM program, border issues among the three villages have been solved as for now (although issues over forest area control could emerge in the future).

Gaining formal recognition for Hutan Desa and CBFM is still an extensive process. Even if WARSI's lobby for a more streamlined process is successful, communities will probably still rely on third-party, external assistance in the technical mapping process, navigating procedures and funding the process. For villages where the scheme is in place, successful conservation will rely on the ability of the community group to safeguard forest areas, establish and enforce rules, and deterring destructive practices that may arise from within the village or from neighbouring communities. Granted, for a number of communities they have been victorious against extractive companies, but there is still a

[54] Sapariah Saturi, "Menuntut Pengakuan Hutan Adat yang Tersangkut di Kemenhut", *Mongabay Indonesia*, 17 March 2014. Available from http://www.mongabay.co.id/2014/03/17/menuntut-pengakuan-hutan-adat-yang-tersangkut-di-kemenhut/ (accessed 21 November 2014)

[55] Sapariah Saturi, "Mahkamah Konstitusi Putuskan Hutan Adat Bukan Hutan Negara", *Mongabay Indonesia*, 16 May 2013. Available from http://www.mongabay.co.id/2013/05/16/mahkamah-konstitusi-putuskan-hutan-adat-bukan-hutan-negara/ (accessed 21 November 2014)

[56] Ibid

[57] Akiefnawati, R., Villamor, G. B., Ayat, A., Galudra, G., van Noordwijk, M. 2010. Stewardship Agreements to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) in Indonesia. ASB Policybrief 18. Nairobi: ASB Partnership for the Tropical Forest Margins, p. 1. Available from http://www.worldagroforestrycentre.org/sea/Publications/files/policybrief/PB0013-10.PDF (accessed 20 November 2014)

[58] Interview with Nofri Hidayat, WARSI field facilitator, Jambi, 14 November 2014

way to go in making the forest they have protected an economically profitable to them as a means to sustain their livelihoods.

## 4.3. Relation with public sector organisations SPO

WARSI's management has a specific operational strategy for their relationship with the government, which includes different approaches (soft-moderate-hard) based on potential responses. Soft approaches or lobby are considered the most effective in gaining the commitment and attention of the public sector. WARSI also works on gaining recognition by bringing local stakeholders, such as provincial and district leaders, to international forums where they are 'compelled' to become the voice and the face for CBFM public relations[59].

A policy brief produced by ASB suggested that WARSI has been successful in building relations with public sector because their ability in "communicating net benefit at each government level". However, WARSI's relationship with government also depends on the government's own political will. In Sarolangun District, WARSI's assisted proposals still have not passed district approval due to the regent's inclination to side with mining corporations.

Although Regulations No.6/2007 and No.3/2008, and P.49/Menhut-II/2008 detail how to reconcile forest management targets and livelihood interests of forest communities within the framework of a permanent forest estate, the implementation of the CBFM procedures is complicated. The bureaucracy involved means that it remains difficult for villagers to comply. In 2011, Jambi Province had achieved only 3 percent of its target for designated CBFM[60], while there was growing international and national pressure and interest for CBFM as a solution to forestry issues (see 5.1). In this regard, WARSI is facilitating the implementation of government policies and practices. WARSI was appointed to be part of the REDD+ Task Forces in West Sumatra and Jambi[61]. In West Sumatra they have been asked to assist in the formulation of REDD+ strategic plan by the local government. WARSI was also appointed by the Department of Forestry in West Sumatra to help establish and guide a West Sumatran CBFM task-force. What this indicates is that the relations with the local government are mutually beneficial. WARSI provides technical inputs to the government, while as an organization they are able to approach decision-makers and try to influence their agenda.

Overall, lobby and advocacy seems to be the main strength of the WARSI as affirmed by one of its board members: "There is no doubt that WARSI is very good at it"[62]. But he also added that WARSI's tendency to rely on their ability and good relationship with government 'elite' may turn them into civil society 'elite'. According to him, "current field staff tend to take the easy way by approaching only the village leadership instead of the common people". The evaluation team have not shared these critical views with WARSI's management team, but from our interview with one of WARSI's field staff we got the impression that there is some justification of the views of the board member. The field staff currently has to handle 3 villages in a vast and geographically difficult terrain with just a year of experience. During the interview, the field staff reported that he found it very difficult to relate with common villagers whose education background is low, and that for him it works best to approach the community leaders since the villagers are not homogenous and conformist[63]. With regards to public sector relations, the conducive relations with village leaders is positive, however not if this is at the expense of taking into account the views of other groups in the community.

Since the baseline, relations with the district and provincial governments have generally improved and have become more formal. This is a result of WARSI's appointment as jointly being responsible for forming a CBFM provincial task force in Jambi (2013) and West Sumatra (end of 2012) together with

[59] Workshop with WARSI, Jambi, 12 November 2014

[60] WARSI, Press Release 2011, Hutan Desa, "Jambi Dapat Tambahan Sembilan Hutan Desa Lagi: Warsi pertanyakan nasib 14 calon hutan desa lainnya", 1 August 2011. Available from http://warsi.or.id/news/2011/News_201108_HutanDesa.php?year=2011&file=News_201108_HutanDesa.php&id=209 (accessed 21 November 2014)

[61] KKI WARSI, "KKI WARSI dan Komda REDD+ Tandatangani Nota Kesepakatan, 22 May 2012. Available from http://kkiwarsi.wordpress.com/2012/05/22/kki-warsi-dan-komda-redd-tandatangani-nota-kesepakatan/ (accessed 21 November 2014)

[62] Interview with Hambali, WARSI board, Jambi, 13 November 2014

[63] Interview with Nofri Hidayat, WARSI field facilitator, Jambi, 14 November 2014

BPDAS. This has helped WARSI receive formal recognition of its role to coordinate CBFM. At the district level, WARSI faced constraints with the district of Sarolangun during the baseline due to the government's inclination to support mining activities. WARSI successfully approached the Forestry Department of the District to build support for CBFM interventions. This in turn resulted in more conducive relations. In South Solok, where a CBFM task force was already in place, CBFM interventions were in fact expanded to four villages due to support gained from the Department of Forestry. These examples illustrate improved relations with local government since the baseline.

## 4.4. Relation with private sector organisations SPO

In the past, WARSI has undertaken joint efforts with the private sector in the area of ecological restoration and marketing of NTFPs. But since 2012 until the present, they have not had similar relations. During the evaluation workshop, WARSI's director reported that such forms of collaboration are no longer continued sine they are considered to be ineffective.

P.49/Menhut-II/2008 provided opportunities for village communities, customary communities, and small holders to use protected-forest edge areas. However, the complicated bureaucracy gives private sector companies an advantage in navigating regulations and procedures. With WARSI working with communities to 'win the race' against private sector control of forest areas, WARSI continues to be perceived by most private sector actors, especially mining and plantation corporations, as a threat or a competitor in land tenure authorization.

## 4.5. Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations SPO

In obtaining CBFM permits, the process begins with WARSI assisting villages in mapping exercises to determine their socio-economic characteristics, define spatial boundaries and map forests and biodiversity. WARSI then assists the villages in establishing forest managing groups through a consultative process. These are administrative requirements to obtain the Hutan Desa permit. WARSI then helps these groups navigate through bureaucratic terrain at different levels: district, province and Ministerial level to apply for the permit. However, this bottom-up approach would not be sufficient if WARSI did not work on the top-down policy level as well. WARSI has been working on both approaches, and worked with other IUCN-NL grantees to simplify the official procedures to obtain the official recognition for CBFM.

At district and provincial level, WARSI's lobby activities include facilitating regular dialogue between CBFM groups and the related stakeholders, promoting forest managing groups to convince local government of their ability (for example by convening both parties at national forestry conferences), and persuading district and provincial governments that village forests will benefit both the community and the government. All authorized CBFM permits required district and provincial governments to submit a proposal (containing recommendations to grant the permits villages) to the Village Forest Agency of the Ministry of Forestry. As such, it can be said that WARSI has contributed to turning district's and provinces' political will and policy in favour of village communities.

WARSI has successfully lobbied for Batanghari and Sarolangun district governments in Jambi to form *Pokja PHBM* (CBFM task forces) dedicated to helping village communities apply for CBFM permits[64]. The regent of South Solok District, West Sumatra has also decided to further support a long-term Village Forest Management Plan and has allocated funds from the 2014 annual budget to support the plan (IDR 1.2 billion). WARSI has influenced the local government to give special attention to village communities.

In West Sumatra, WARSI seems to have been more successful in influencing the provincial government. On 20 March 2012, West Sumatra proposed to be selected as priority province for the national REDD+ program, clearly stipulating CBFM mainstreaming as their strategy. The proposal was approved in May 2012, and in response the province issued a REDD+ Provincial Strategy and Action

[64] Workshop with WARSI, Jambi, 12 November 2014

Plan (SRAP) in January 2013[65]. WARSI was part of the REDD+ Task Force that formulated the strategic planning, with Rainal Daus (WARSI program manager for IUCN's supported CBFM program) mentioned as one of the SRAP's authors[66]. In June 2012, West Sumatra also issued a social forestry development plan for 2012-2017 as well as a CBFM mainstreaming roadmap covering the same period. The roadmap stipulated the formation of a village forest task force at the provincial level responsible for accelerating the implementation of village forest schemes in West Sumatra. The document also mentioned WARSI as the only CSO working with the Provincial-level Watershed Management Bureau (BPDAS) to develop the task force[67]. It is clear that WARSI was instrumental in the issuance of both policies, and surely contributing in keeping both policies in-line with one another.

An external study conducted by ASB found that since procedures for the application and approval of village forest status involves the village, district, provincial and national government; only cases providing net benefits at each level will be approved[68]. The study further noted that there are still forces, especially at the national level, that do not support such schemes but that active interest of agencies involved in REDD implementation "tipped the balance in favour of supporting a village forest showcase"[69].

Despite these positive findings, it is hard to judge whether such achievements should be attributed to the support to WARSI from REDD+ related interventions or from the EA. It is clear that REDD+ is a factor behind policy influence. However, WARSI reported this achievement in their report to EA as well as in the evaluation workshop. WARSI explained that the presence of WARSI's CBFM efforts in West Sumatra (which were supported by IUCN) was a contributing factor to the selection of the province for REDD+ implementation. As discussed in under other indicators, WARSI considers the interventions to be complementary. For example, IUCN funds were used to lobby the West Sumatra government to attend international forums.

WARSI's joint advocacy with other EA grantees have successfully simplified the procedures to obtain village and community forest licenses. Ministry of Forestry Regulations No. 89/Menhut-II/2014 and No. 88/Menhut-II/2014 accommodate three of the four policy recommendations put forth by WARSI, namely: input on simplifying district and provincial procedures, CBFM work plan format simplification, and obligatory community facilitation. The proposed simplification in steps for area designation steps at the Ministerial level have not been taken up into these regulations.

## 4.6. Influence upon private sector agencies' policies, rules, regulations SPO

In Jambi province, WARSI have hypothetically blocked a number of private sector companies from gaining forest and land usage rights in at least 10 villages along the Batanghari watershed. However, technically the opportunity still exists if CBFM groups fail in protecting the village forest or if they become inactive. The area covered by village forests is just a tiny fraction compared to those given to corporations. As such it could be said that WARSI-led civil society resistance has not been considered a significant threat from the private sector's perspective. There are currently 25 village forests in Jambi covering only 54,978 hectares, while there are 853,430 hectares of forest land authorized to 18 corporations[70].

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[65] Pusat Penelitian dan Pengembangan Perubahan Iklim dan Kebijakan, Berita, "Propinsi Sumatera Barat Sebagai Propinsi Prioritas Implementasi REDD+ dan Dukungan Puspijak", 13 February 2013. Available from http://fcpfindonesia.org/halkomentar-125-2.html#.VH4KlmdPE24 (accessed 22 November 2014)

[66] Hermansah and others. 2014. *Strategi dan Rencana Aksi Provinsi untuk Implementasi REDD+ di Sumatra Barat*. Presented at Acara Lokakarya Kemitraan Dinas Kehutanan Provinsi Sumatra Barat, Padang, 22 January 2014. Available from http://www.slideshare.net/deriratharahap/presntasi-kemitraan-dishut-22-januari-2014 (accessed 22 November 2014)

[67] "Rencana Kerja Pokja PHBM Sumbar-final", WARSI, p. 2

[68] Akiefnawati, R., Villamor, G. B., Ayat, A., Galudra, G., van Noordwijk, M. 2010. Stewardship Agreements to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) in Indonesia. ASB Policybrief 18. Nairobi: ASB Partnership for the Tropical Forest Margins, p. 1. Available from http://www.worldagroforestrycentre.org/sea/Publications/files/policybrief/PB0013-10.PDF (accessed 20 November 2014)

[69] Ibid, p.2

[70] WARSI, Press Release 2013, Hutan Desa, "Gubernur Tandatangani 17 Hak Pengelolaan Hutan Desa", 19 August 2013. Available from http://www.warsi.or.id/news/2013/News_201308_Gubernur_Tandatangani_17_Hak_Pengelolaan_Hutan_Desa.php?year=

In West Sumatra the situation is more complicated as forest management by Nagari is based on customary rules and traditions. Until 2011, the private sector was actually never a serious threat for forest conservation because the Nagari Land customary law and resulting disputes are too complicated to deal with. But, the Ministry of Forestry issued a Decree No.304 that created chances for the private sector because it redefined some protected forest areas (including those proposed by the community as *Hutan Desa* into Limited Production Forests. WARSI has until so far successfully protected9 villages from private sector organisations. Also WARSI's success in convincing governments to mainstream CBFM also implies that they do not favour the involvement of the private sector.

# 5. Civil Society context

## 5.1 Coping Strategies

As the first nation to declare its commitment to voluntarily reducing carbon emissions, REDD+ may have changed the face of the Indonesian forestry policy environment. WARSI's program since 2009 is mainly geared to benefit from such change. For example, REDD+ encouraged the Indonesian Government to declare a forest moratorium via Presidential Instruction No.10/2011 which cited forest boundary conflict resolution as a priority[71]. In addition, Indonesia's anti-corruption agenda led by the Corruption Eradication Committee or KPK also encouraged forest conflict resolution as a priority[72]. As the CBFM scheme offers great prospects in resolving disputes over forest areas[73], WARSI has successfully utilized the momentum in 2012-2013 to lobby the West Sumatra province to mainstream CBFM in their forestry policy.

At the end of 2011, the Ministry of Forestry issued a Decree No.304 to amend the status of forest areas in West Sumatra. Under the decree, some protected forest areas in South Solok were redefined as Limited Production Forests. This includes an area proposed by the community as *Hutan Desa*. The change from protected forest to limited production forest is an opportunity for communities to apply for *Hutan Desa,* but also a threat because it has allowed six iron ore and gold mining companies to obtain exploration licenses[74]. As a reaction, WARSI increased their assistance in Solok and South Solok District from 2 to 9 villages. In Jambi, WARSI CBFM proposals in Sarolangun district had been stalled by the regent who favoured mining corporations. In response, WARSI lobbied the Forest Department to establish a CBFM Task Force to put pressure on the district leadership.

For better or worse, WARSI has capitalized on the increasing interests of international donors in forestry issues. WARSI seems to be aware of their advantageous position in being able to leverage their experience to gain funding support.

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2013&file=News_201308_Gubernur_Tandatangani_17_Hak_Pengelolaan_Hutan_Desa.php&id=249 (accessed 22 November 2014)

[71] Center for International Forestry Research, Library, "Moratorium hutan Indonesia: Batu loncatan untuk memperbaiki tata kelola hutan?", 2011. Available from http://www.cifor.org/library/3631/moratorium-hutan-indonesia-batu-loncatan-untuk-memperbaiki-tata-kelola-hutan/ (accessed 22 November 2014)

[72] Mancayo, Andiko S. 2012. *Pergulatan Tenurial Hutan di Indonesia Sejak Revormasi*. Paper prepared for book's publication of Forest Watch Indonesia 2013, p. 6. Available from http://www.academia.edu/6282012/Pergulatan_Tenurial_Hutan_Indonesia_Paska_Revormasi (accessed 22 November 2014)

[73] Akiefnawati, R., Villamor, G. B., Ayat, A., Galudra, G., van Noordwijk, M. 2010. Stewardship Agreements to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) in Indonesia. ASB Policybrief 18. Nairobi: ASB Partnership for the Tropical Forest Margins, p. 1. Available from http://www.worldagroforestrycentre.org/sea/Publications/files/policybrief/PB0013-10.PDF (accessed 20 November 2014)

[74] "1206-First 6 months report of IUCN-Warsi-Final", WARSI, p. 3

Centre for Development Innovation
Wageningen UR
P.O. Box 88
6700 AB Wageningen
The Netherlands
T +31 (0)317 48 68 00
www.wageningenUR.nl/cdi

Report CDI-15-062

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