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# Catholic Church of Gamo Gofa and South Omo (CCGG&SO) end line report

MFS II country evaluations, Civil Society component

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This report describes the findings of the end line assessment of the Ethiopian Catholic Church of Gamo Gofa and South Omo (SSGG&SO) that is a partner of CORDAID.

The evaluation was commissioned by NWO-WOTRO, the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research in the Netherlands and is part of the programmatic evaluation of the Co-Financing System - MFS II financed by the Dutch Government, whose overall aim is to strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. Apart from assessing impact on MDGs, the evaluation also assesses the contribution of the Dutch Co-Funding Agencies to strengthen the capacities of their Southern Partners, as well as the contribution of these partners towards building a vibrant civil society arena.

This report assesses CCGG&SO's contribution towards strengthening Civil Society in Ethiopia and it used the CIVICUS analytical framework. It is a follow-up of a baseline study conducted in 2012. Key questions that are being answered comprise changes in the five CIVICUS dimensions to which CCGG&SO contributed; the nature of its contribution; the relevance of the contribution made and an identification of factors that explain CCGG&SO's role in civil society strengthening.

Keywords: Civil Society, CIVICUS, theory based evaluation, process-tracing



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# List of abbreviations and acronyms

ABE	Alternative Basic Education
ADA	Austrian State/ Department for Development Cooperation
AFD	Action For Development
CCGG&SO	Catholic Church of Gamo Gofa and South Omo
CCRDA	Consortium of Christian Relief and Development Association
CDI	Wageningen UR Centre for Development Innovation
CFAs	Co-Financing Agencies
CFO	Co-Financing Organisation
CLFZ	Child Labour Free Zones
CMC	Centre Management Committee
Cordaid	Catholic Organisation for Relief and Development Aid
CS	Civil Society
CSA	Central Statistics Agency
CST	CAFOD/SCIAF/Trocaire
DA	Development Agent
DKA	Dreikönigsaktion Österreich
EFM	Early Forced Marriage
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
ECS	Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
HEW	Health Extension Workers
HTP	Harmful Traditional Practices
ICDP	International Child Development Programme
ICDP	Integrated Community Development Project
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Centre
IGA	Income Generating Activities
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MoFa	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
PFS	Pastoral Field School
PTA	Parent Teacher Association
SILC	Saving and Internal Lending Communities
SPO	Southern Partner Organisation
TBA	Traditional Birth Attendant
ToC	Theory of Change
Wageningen UR	Wageningen University & Research centre



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# 1 Introduction

This report presents the civil society end line findings of the Catholic Church of Gamo Gofa and South Omo (CCGG&SO) in Ethiopia which is a partner of Cordaid under the Communities of Change consortium. It is a follow-up to the baseline assessment that was carried out in 2012. According to the information provided during the baseline study CCGG&SO is working on MDG 1.

These findings are part of the overall evaluation of the joint MFS II evaluations to account for results of MFS II-funded or –co-funded development interventions implemented by Dutch CFAs and/or their Southern Partner Organisations (SPO) and to contribute to the improvement of future development interventions. The civil society evaluation uses the CIVICUS framework and seeks to answer the following questions:

- What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?
- To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
- What is the relevance of these changes?
- What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The CIVICUS framework that comprises five dimensions (civic engagement, level of organization, practice of values, perception of impact and contexts influencing agency by civil society in general) has been used to orient the evaluation methodology.

## *Changes in the civil society arena of the SPO*

In the 2012 – 2014 period CCGG&SO has seen a decrease of its civil society arena as well as the possibilities to collaborate with the local government. Most of its achievements on civic engagement date back from before the 2012 assessment; its collaboration with other NGO's decreased (level of organisation); its impact upon both civil society and upon the government decreased as well as its relation with the woreda government (perception of impact). Only its dimension 'practice of values' remained the same.

These findings were obtained through an analysis of documents, a workshop and follow-up interviews with CCGG&SO, and interviews with external resources persons working in civil society organisations that receive support from CCGG&SO; other civil society organisations with whom CCGG&SO is collaborating; public or private sector agents and; external resource persons capable of overlooking the MDG or theme on which CCGG&SO is concentrating.

## *Contribution analysis*

Based upon an analysis of the projects and programmes financed by the Dutch CFAs a selection was made of SPOs to be included in an in-depth process tracing trajectory and those to be included for a quick contribution assessment. CCGG&SO is amongst those SPOs selected for in-depth-process tracing.

The in-country evaluation team only looked at one outcome which is the capacity of community based organisations, and in particular health micro finance schemes, cooperatives, Saving and Internal Lending Communities (SILC) and groups organised around income generating activities to improve food security of an estimated 1300 households.

The evaluation team in the first place concludes that no evidence is available to state that 1300 households improved their food security situation. The most likely strategies that may explain improved food security at household level consist of CCGG&SO's support to introduce income generating activities as well as a food safety net programme that is currently in place. There is no information available that confirms that the popular health micro finance scheme contributes to increased food security. The cooperatives and the SILC are not contributing. CCGG&SO's has been minimal because the local government failed to follow up upon groups handed over as agreed; because CCGG&SO has not been

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operational since the beginning of 2014 due to internal problems that escalated. CCGG&SO also does not have any monitoring and evaluation system in place that helps to assess progress towards impact at household level.

#### *Relevance*

Interviews with staff of CCGG&SO with external resource person, with the liaison officer of Cordaid, as well as contextual information helped to assess the relevance of CCGG&SO's interventions in terms of; its Theory of Change (ToC) for Civil Society (SC) as designed during the baseline study; the context in which CCGG&SO is operating; the CS policies of Cordaid.

In relation to its 2012 ToC that stated that the capacities of CBOs need to be build and that they need to network and also relate to the public sector, the evaluators conclude that no progress has been made and that CCGG&SO's interventions have not been relevant.

In relation to the external context in which CCGG&SO is operating interventions are relevant for Hamar woreda which is a very isolated and nearly abandoned area by the government. But in relation to the severe food security problems that the 43,000 inhabitants of the district face, the outcomes achieved are negligible.

Important civil society elements for the communities of change alliance consist of strong CBOs, good relations with local government and using opportunities to influence policies. None of these elements have materialised in the past two years.

#### *Explaining factors*

The most important explaining factor of the evaluation findings consists of CCGG&SO firing three staff in January 2014, which escalated when the three staff members allegedly accused the SPO of corruption and filed a complaint with the government. In consequence the office was closed and awaiting an audit imposed by the government. Although all allegations proved to be untrue, CCGG&SO now faced difficulties in getting back on track.

A second important factor is also that the Lower Omo Valley has many fertile grounds and a river suitable for the construction of a hydroelectric dam to be followed by large scale land acquisitions for irrigated agriculture. Indigenous people like those living in the Hamar district are not being informed, and the government proceeds with forced resettlements. According to Human Rights Watch, the government is implicated in human rights atrocities. This tense situation may possibly, in contrary to other zones where the evaluators are assessing civil society impact, explain the non-constructive collaboration between NGOs and the local government.

The following chapter briefly describes the political context, the civil society context and the relevant background with regards to the Health sector that CCGG&SO is working on. Chapter three provides background information on CCGG&SO, the relation of its MFS II interventions with the CIVICUS framework and specific information on the contract with Cordaid. An evaluation methodology has been developed for the evaluation of the Civil Society component which can be found in appendix 2; however, deviations from this methodology, the choices made with regards to the selection of the outcomes for contribution analysis, as well as difficulties encountered during data collection are to be found in chapter 4. The answers to each of the evaluation questions are being presented in chapter 5, followed by a discussion on the general project design in relation to CS development; an assessment of what elements of the project design may possibly work in other contexts or be implemented by other organisations in chapter 6. Conclusions are presented in chapter 7.

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## 2 Context

This paragraph briefly describes the context CCGG&SO is working in.

### 2.1 Political context

The Ethiopian Government has enacted a five year Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) to implement over the period of 2011-2015.<sup>1</sup> Two of the major objectives of the plan are to maintain at least an average real GDP growth rate of 11%, meet the Millennium Development Goals, and expand and ensure the qualities of education and health services thereby achieving the MDGs in the social sectors (FDRE, 2010). The government acknowledged that NGO's and CSOs have an important role to play in the implementation of this plan: According to the preamble of the new charities and societies proclamation NO. 621/2009 of Ethiopia, civil society's role is to help and facilitate in the overall development of the country<sup>2</sup>. This is manifested in the government's approach of participatory development planning procedures. For example, NGOs established a taskforce under the umbrella of the CCRDA to take part in the formulation of the country's first Poverty Reduction Strategy paper formulation. They were a major stakeholder in the planning process of the five year GTP plan. Despite fears that the NO. 621/2009 proclamation was thought to have negative impacts on Civil Society, the number of newly registered charities and societies have increased considerably. 800 new charities and civil societies were registered between 2010/11 and 2011/12 and as of February 2012, these were implementing over 113.916 projects in different social, economic and governance related sectors. Governance related projects comprise interventions in the area of democracy and good governance, peace and security, human rights, justice, and capacity building. The charities and societies are most engaged in the health sector (19.8%), followed by child affairs (11.9%), education (9.2%), governance (8.3%) and other social issues (7.8%). These figures are more or less similar to the pre-proclamation period, and would imply that new charities or societies have replaced foreign and Ethiopian charities that are not allowed to work on sectors related to governance and human rights.<sup>3</sup> This might indicate that there might have been some flexibility in the interpretation of some of the provisions of the proclamation.

### 2.2 Civil Society context

This section describes the civil society context in Ethiopia that is not SPO specific. The socioeconomic, socio-political, and sociocultural context can have marked consequences for civil society, perhaps more significantly at the lower levels of social development. The information used is in line with the information used by CIVICUS.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> November 2010, *Growth and Transformation Plan 2011 – 2015*, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, (November 2010), Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

<sup>2</sup> February 2009, *Charities and Societies Proclamation (proc. no.621/2009)*, Federal Negarit Gazeta, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

<sup>3</sup> UNDP, January 2014, *Civic Engagement for Effective Service Delivery in Ethiopia: Tools, Opportunities and Challenges*, UNDP Ethiopia Working Paper Series No. 2/2014

<sup>4</sup> Mati J.M., Silva F., Anderson T., April 2010, *Assessing and Strengthening Civil Society Worldwide; An updated programme description of the CIVICUS Civil Society Index: Phase 2008 to 2010.*, CIVICUS

## 2.2.1 Socio-economic context

**Table 1**

*Ethiopia's rank on respectively the Human Development Index, World Bank Voice and Accountability Index and Failed State Index*

Ranking Body	Rank	Ranking Scale (best – worst possible)
UN Human Development Index	173 (2013)	1 – 187
World Bank Voice & Accountability Indicators	12 (2012)	100 – 0
Failed State Index	19 (2013)	177 – 1

Sources: UNDP, World Bank Governance Indicators, and Fund for Peace

The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure for assessing long-term progress in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living.<sup>5</sup> Ethiopia's HDI value for 2013 is 0.435— which is in the low human development category—positioning the country at 173 out of 187 countries and territories. Between 2000 and 2013, Ethiopia's HDI value increased from 0.284 to 0.435, an increase of 53.2 percent or an average annual increase of about 3.34 percent.

An alternative non-monetary measure of poverty and well-being is the Basic Capabilities Index (BSI). This index is based on key human capabilities that are indispensable for survival and human dignity.<sup>6</sup> Ethiopia falls with a BCI of 58 in the critical BCI category, which means the country faces major obstacles to achieving well-being for the population. 10% of children born alive do not grow to be five years old, only 6 % of women are attended by skilled health personnel and only 33% of school age children are enrolled in education and attain five years of schooling.

Ethiopia scores relatively low on the Social and Economic Rights Fulfilment Index (SERF Index)<sup>7</sup>. In 2012 Ethiopia is only protecting 58.10% of all its social and economic rights feasible given its resources, and the situation has worsened between 2010 and 2012. Especially the right to food and the right to housing remain problematic.

The Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer survey shows how 1,000 Ethiopian people assess corruption and bribery in their home country: A low score indicates that a country is perceived as highly corrupt, while a high score indicates that a country is perceived as very clean. Ethiopia has a Corruption Perception Index score of 3.3 out of 10 in 2014, which places the country on position 110 out of 174 countries.<sup>8</sup> Survey participants were furthermore asked to rate their perceptions of corruption within major institutions in their home country on a scale of 1 to 5, 5 being most corrupt and 1 being least corrupt<sup>9</sup>. With a range of perceived corruption scores from around 2 (military, education and NGO's) to over 3 (private sector, public officials, and judiciary), most major institutions are perceived as corrupt.

Ethiopia's economic freedom score in 2014 is 50.0, making its economy the 151st freest out of 174 countries in the 2014 Index. Its 2014 score is 0.6 point higher than in 2013 due to improvements in five

<sup>5</sup> A long and healthy life is measured by life expectancy. Access to knowledge is measured by: i) mean years of education among the adult population, which is the average number of years of education received in a life-time by people aged 25 years and older; and ii) expected years of schooling for children of school-entry age, which is the total number of years of schooling a child of school-entry age can expect to receive if prevailing patterns of age-specific enrolment rates stay the same throughout the child's life. Standard of living is measured by Gross National Income (GNI) per capita expressed in constant 2011 international dollars converted using purchasing power parity (PPP) rates.

<sup>6</sup> [http://www.socialwatch.org/sites/default/files/BCI-MeasuringProgress2012\\_eng.pdf](http://www.socialwatch.org/sites/default/files/BCI-MeasuringProgress2012_eng.pdf)

<sup>7</sup> [http://www.socialwatch.org/sites/default/files/SERF2012\\_eng.pdf](http://www.socialwatch.org/sites/default/files/SERF2012_eng.pdf)

<sup>8</sup> <http://www.transparency.org/country/#ETH>

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=ethiopia>

of the 10 economic freedoms, including business freedom, labour freedom, and fiscal freedom. Ethiopia is ranked 35<sup>th</sup> out of 46 countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa region, and its overall score continues to be below the regional average.<sup>10</sup>

2.2.2 Socio-political context

In February 2009, the Government adopted the NO. 621/2009 Proclamation which is Ethiopia’s first comprehensive law governing the registration and regulation of NGOs. This law violates international standards relating to the freedom of association. Notably, the Proclamation restricts NGOs that receive more than 10% of their financing from foreign sources from engaging in essentially all human rights and advocacy activities.

The UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Mr. Maina Kiai, has commented that “The enforcement of these provisions has a devastating impact on individuals’ ability to form and operate associations effectively, and has been the subject of serious alarms expressed by several United Nations treaty bodies.” Mr. Kiai went on to recommend that “the Government revise the 2009 CSO law due to its lack of compliance with international norms and standards related to freedom of association, notably with respect to access to funding”.<sup>11</sup> The Ethiopian Proclamation may effectively silence civil society in Ethiopia by starving NGOs of resources, and thus essentially extinguish their right to expression.<sup>12</sup>

In November 2011, the Ethiopian Charities and Societies Agency issued the Guideline on Determining the Administrative and Operational Costs of CSOs, which is applicable to all charities and societies (international and domestic). Retroactive to July 2011, when approved by the Agency without any consultation with organizations or donors, the “70/30” regulation limits administrative costs for all charities and societies to a maximum of 30% of their budgets.<sup>13</sup>

Freedom of assembly and association are guaranteed by the constitution but limited in practice. Organizers of large public meetings must request permission from the authorities 48 hours in advance. Applications by opposition groups are routinely denied. Peaceful demonstrations were held outside mosques in July 2012, but the security forces responded violently, detaining protestors, including several prominent Muslim leaders. A total of 29 Muslims were eventually charged with offences under the antiterrorism law. They were awaiting trial at year’s end.<sup>14</sup>

**Table 2**  
*Ethiopia’s rank on respectively the World Bank Rule of Law Index, Transparency International Perception of Corruption Index and Freedom House’s Ratings of Freedom*

Ranking Body	Rank	Ranking Scale (best – worst possible)
World Bank Rule of Law Index	31 (2012)	100 – 0
Transparency International perception of corruption index	111 (2013)	1 – 178
Freedom House: Freedom in the World	Status: Not Free Political Rights: 6 Civil Liberties: 6 (2014)	Free/Partly Free/Not Free 1 – 7 1 – 7

Sources: World Bank Governance Indicators, Transparency International and Freedom House

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2014/countries/ethiopia.pdf>  
<sup>11</sup> see UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, April 24, 2013.  
<sup>12</sup> <http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/ethiopia.html>  
<sup>13</sup> Idem  
<sup>14</sup> Idem

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Freedom House evaluates the state of freedom in 195 countries annually. In 2014, Ethiopia scored a 6 on both the political rights and civil liberties ratings, indicating that the country is neither politically free nor performing on protecting civil rights.<sup>15</sup> Its total aggregate scores from the Freedom House Index decreased with 15 points in the 2008-2012 period.<sup>16</sup>

The media are dominated by state-owned broadcasters and government-oriented newspapers. One of the few independent papers in the capital, Addis Neger, closed in 2009, claiming harassment by the authorities. Privately-owned papers tend to steer clear of political issues and have low circulations. A 2008 media law criminalizes defamation and allows prosecutors to seize material before publication in the name of national security<sup>17</sup>.

Trade union rights are tightly restricted. All unions must be registered, and the government retains the authority to cancel registration. Two-thirds of union members belong to organizations affiliated with the Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions, which is under government influence. Independent unions face harassment. There has not been a legal strike since 1993.

Women are relatively well represented in Parliament, having won 152 seats in the lower house in the 2010 elections. Legislation protects women's rights, but they are routinely violated in practice. Enforcement of the law against rape and domestic abuse is patchy, with cases routinely stalling in the courts. Forced child labour is a significant problem, particularly in the agricultural sector. Same-sex sexual activity is prohibited by law and punishable with imprisonment.<sup>18</sup>

### 2.2.3 Socio-cultural context

The World Values Survey Wave 2005-2009 asked 1500 Ethiopians the question: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" Out of 1500 respondents, only 21,4 % stated that most people can be trusted. 66,2% indicated they needed to be very careful.<sup>19</sup> Additionally, only 36,1% of the respondents mentioned 'tolerance and respect for other people' as a quality that needs to be encouraged to learn children at home.<sup>20</sup> 74% of the respondents think that churches are giving adequate answers to people's spiritual needs.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Puddington, Arch (2013) <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/ethiopia-0>

<sup>16</sup> <http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%202013%20Booklet.pdf>

<sup>17</sup> Puddington, Arch (2013) <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/ethiopia-0>

<sup>18</sup> Idem

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSONline.jsp>

<sup>20</sup> Idem

<sup>21</sup> Idem

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## 3 Description of CCGG&SO and its contribution to civil society/policy changes

### 3.1 Background of CCGG&SO

#### **History**

The Catholic Church of Gamo Gofa and South Omo is a church based NGO. It has been engaged in community based development interventions over the last 35 years. The church has a pastoral program and an Integrated Community Development Program (ICDP) that both have a holistic approach to human development. CC-GGSO has a development board which falls under the responsibility of the Vicariate of Sodo-Hossana. The Catholic Church 16 maintains the necessary degree of control and direction of the Integrated Community Development Programme through its own management structure and development board.

Cordaid has been supporting CC-GGSO since the mid-1980s. In 1996 the donor organisations Dreikönigsaktion Österreich, Cordaid and Misereor asked for an evaluation to ensure compliance to their requirement and to rectify drawbacks witnessed in the implementation of programmes. The evaluation led to a re-orientation and the formulation of a new strategic plan. The influence of the Holy Ghost fathers decreased and was later replaced by a professional board. Despite the slow pace in depletion of funds, the Church has been effective in recent years mainly due to good leadership, program focus and imitation of innovative projects that are in line with community demands and priorities.

#### **Vision and mission:**

The vision of the vicariate is to see a society where all its spiritual, physical, socio-cultural needs are met and where all people are living in harmony, solidarity, equity, justice and peace. The Church's mission is to contribute to the economic, social and spiritual development of its community, and to ensure growth and self-reliance. Sustainability as well as ownership are crucial values within this mission.

#### **Main strategic actions:**

Towards the realization of its vision and mission, the Church, through their social development wing, is undertaking its social and development projects through grass root level project site structures, comprising Community Based Technical facilitators assisted by the local community, and other line bureaus.

Interventions are identified through a series of consultations and assessments jointly undertaken with line bureaus and community representatives. Major areas of emphasis include:

- Health, HIV/AIDS prevention and awareness; water development;
- Education;
- Agriculture/Food Security, and
- WID/GAD promotion activities.

CCGG&SO is based in ARBA Minch and has 20 staff members. It has a program in Gamo Gofa and in South Omo, the latter being managed from a field office in Dimeka. Cordaid currently only supports the program in South Omo which has a program coordinator, three technical facilitators, one community based social facilitator, two community animators, one assistant director, one finance administrator and one accountant.

CCGG&SO is implementing its MFS II funded Integrated Community Development Project (ICDP) in South Omo. Its first phase (2010-2012) targeted the rural pastoral and agro-pastoral communities of the woredas Hamar (Kufur, Gedback, Lala, Algone and Dimeka town) and Malle (Golloberendo and Doiso) in Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS). In the next phase (2013-2015) the

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project will target the pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities in seven villages of Hamar Woreda namely: Kufur, Shanko, Woro, Wolfo, Simbele, Besheda and Dimeka. The overall goal of the project is to enable the selected communities to contribute proactively to the improvement of their living conditions.

## 3.2 MFS II interventions related to Civil Society

In terms of direct beneficiaries, the ICDP project does livelihood improvement interventions at individual level for 940 households (at least 50% women), an immunization program targeting 1296 children and 6269 women, an alternative basic education component for 180 children (20% girls) and functional adult literacy for 350 adults (20% women). Most of the project interventions will offer communal benefits to the entire target group, which is 14,054 people (approximately 2,969 households, out of which 42% are women headed households).

The ICDP programme in Hamar district, targeting seven communities comprises five result areas: Sanitation & hygiene conditions; community based, maternal & child health care; access to and quality of basic education for children and adults; household food security, and; women socially and economically empowered<sup>22</sup>.

This civil society evaluation will focus on household food security and women empowerment which relate to MDG 1 that Cordaid identified as the main intervention for CCGGS&O in 2012. This component comprises several activities in the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors and is linked to nutrition as well as to income. For the CIVICUS dimension 'civic engagement', results include:

- At least 600 women will be directly involved in the social and economic empowerment activities and have improvement in their livelihood
- Train selected heads/members of 100 households directly practicing the beekeeping for 5 days
- 80 women will benefit from the provision of goats
- 100 vulnerable community members will benefit from various skill trainings and seed capital
- Support backyard animal fattening initiatives of pastoralists
- Introduce small scale drip irrigation schemes for vegetable production near water schemes
- Train and equip 10 para-vet scouts on sharing bases
- Train pastoralists on improved dairy production & management techniques

For the dimension 'level of organisation', results include:

- At least six microfinance- projects will be initiated and implemented in Malle, this will benefit 8000 community members
- Two co-operatives will be organized and obtain legal entity and provide service to the community
- Establishment of goat production women groups by handing out 270 goats, and assist them to start animal husbandry

Results to look at for the dimension 'perception of impact' are:

- Exposure visit with a team of 24 people including participants of the Pastoral Field School (PFS), ICDP staff, government staff
- Link all beneficiaries that are involved in income generating activities (IGA) to 6 Saving and Internal Lending (SILC) activity. Examples of IGAs are collective dairy production, agriculture or horticulture around drip irrigation, collective goat production
- Two co-operatives will be organized and obtain a legal status and provide service to the community

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<sup>22</sup> Project kenschets and considerations



### 3.3 Basic information

Table 3: basic information on CCGG&SO

Details				
Name of SPO	Catholic Church of Gamo Gofa and South Omo (CCGG&SO)			
Consortium and CFA	Communities of Change/Cordaid			
Project name	Integrated Community Based Development Program South Omo Zone Hamar and Malle Woredas (CC-ICDP)			
MDG/theme on which the CS evaluation focusses	MDG 1 – Poverty			
Start date of cooperation between the CFA and the SPO	Since the mid-eighties			
Other donors if applicable	Other funders for the first contract January 2010 – December 2012: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ADA (€ 286.072; 54%)</li> <li>• Koornzaayer Foundation and Willow Wheelers (€ 40.000; 8%)</li> </ul> Other funders for the second contract: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Horizont 3000 (€ 318.181 + audit payment of € 80.000)</li> <li>• CAFOD/SCIAF/Trocaire (€ 291.703)</li> </ul>			
Contracts signed in the MFS II period	Period	# months	Total budget	Estimation of % for Civil Society
First Phase of the project	January 2010 – December 2012	36	€ 200.000	
Second Phase of the Project	January 2013 – December 2015	36	€ 225.000	
<b>Total</b>			€ 425.000	38%

Sources: project documents

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## 4 Data collection and analytical approach

### 4.1 Adjustments made in the methodology of the evaluation

CC-GGSO is implementing its MFS II funded Integrated Community Development Project (ICDP) in South Omo. Its first phase (2010-2012) targeted the rural pastoral and agro-pastoral communities of the woredas Hamar (Kufur, Gedback, Lala, Algone and Dimeka town) and Malle (Golloberendo and Doiso) in Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS). In the second phase (2013-2015) the project will target the pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities in seven villages of Hamar Woreda namely: Kufur, Shanko, Woro, Wolfo, Simbele, Besheda and Dimeka.

This means that Kufur and Dimeka town receive support for the entire MFS II period (2010 – 2015) and that Gedback, Lala, Alagone, Golloberendo and Dioso received support during the 2010-2012 period and that Shanko, Woro, Wolfo, Simbele, Besheda are new kebeles in which CCGG&SO intervenes in the 2013 – 2015 period.

Initially, Cordaid mentioned that no project documentation was available. Later on, the evaluation team received project documents in hard copy that only covered the period January 2010 – June 2013. As a result the evaluation team encountered difficulties in compiling all information from the project documents as a means to obtain a complete overview of outcomes and outputs achieved in line with the logical framework.

### 4.2 Difficulties encountered during data collection

CCGG&SO was very collaborative in the whole process of the evaluation. They showed great hospitality by offering the guest houses to the evaluation team and because of their support it was possible to conduct the evaluation. Though this was the case, data collection turned out to be difficult as the SPO was still partially closed due to the audit conducted by the local government and consequently the files were not accessible. In addition, some key resource persons were not available during the evaluation process. In the in-country evaluation team found the process tracing tools relevant in tracing the changes occurred and explaining them. The team further observed that contextualisation in social, cultural and political terms was necessary to fully use these tools.

CCGG&SO did not have many documented evidence in terms of progress being made on their interventions. The SPO hands over groups/cooperatives to the local government after their establishment and after having given them the necessary training. Follow up efforts by CCGG&SO are minimal leading to the SPO not having up to date information.

### 4.3 Identification of two outcomes for in-depth process tracing

In-depth process tracing was used to explain one outcome achieved, which relates to the extent to which CCGG&SO's contributed to improved food security of households in 7 kebeles in the Hamar district. According to the SPO household food security of some 1300 direct beneficiaries should have been improved between 2010 and 2015. CCGG&SO states to have contributed to food security by means of

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the creation of Saving and Internal Lending Communities, Community Health Micro Finance Schemes, and cooperatives.

Because the office of CCGG&SO is closed, a second outcome achieved could not be identified.

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## 5 Results

### 5.1 Results obtained in relation to project logframe

The Hamar community is still highly affected by deep-rooted harmful traditional practices, which include abandoning (killing) children for ritual reasons, biting women during the initiation ceremony, committing abortion if women conceive prior to this ritual ceremony, being resistant to girls education, and high spending for traditional events such as initiation, funerals, commemorations. These Harmful Traditional Practices, together with low levels of community participation in development efforts hinder the development of the Hamar Community.

In the second phase CCGG&SO included new villages in its program: Shanqo-Kelema, Shanqo-Wolfo, Woro, Besheda and Sembele and it phased out of most of the communities that received support 2010-2012 period such as the villages Doyosso and Goloberendo of Malle woreda and that of Gedback, Algonie and Lala in Hamar woreda. The SPO pulled out of Malle woreda to focus on Hamar. Kufur & Demeka Zuria are few of the previous areas it has continued to work in. The livelihoods improvement component has now got funding through the joint CAFOD/SCIAF/Trocaire office (CST) that was not there previously.

#### *Outputs for the January 2011 to December 2012 programme*

4011 children and 2112 women (229 children and 1753 women planned) have been vaccinated; 650 persons (150 planned) attended nutrition demonstration sessions; 20 Health Extension Workers (HEW) were trained on first aid provision, 5 HEWs were trained on immunization practice and improved vaccine management and 10 traditional birth attendants (TBAs) (3 TBAs planned) were trained. These outputs relate to ICDP's result 'community based maternal & child health care'.

20 government workers and 23 students have been trained in computer skills; 14 community teachers have been trained and are serving in alternative basic education schools where 385 children are enrolled and have received scholastic materials; 4 school committees were formed and trained and 23 pastoralist students receive basic computer training and English. These outputs relate to ICDP's result 'access to and quality of basic education for children and adults'.

Another 651 people (457 female and 194 male) have been trained in nutrition practices, but the evaluators ignore if these are the same persons that attended the nutrition demonstrations. Eight micro-finance schemes with over 820 members have been set up where members can take out loans when referred to higher level health facilities (3 health insurance schemes planned). These outputs relate to ICDP's result 'household food security' and/or 'women socially and economically empowered'.

The reports do not mention how many mothers and children have been reached under the primary health care component (1829 mothers and children planned); if progress has been made with regards to biological family spacing methods; if a minor treatment service was created in Kufur; if 100 community members were trained on various health issues to serve as role models for community members; if 1200 individuals got health education and if information, education and communication materials on health issues were produced and distributed.

#### *Outputs for the January – June 2013 period*

The ICDP programme in Hamar district, targeting seven communities comprises five result areas: Sanitation & hygiene conditions; community based, maternal & child health care; access to and quality of

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basic education for children and adults; household food security, and; women socially and economically empowered<sup>23</sup>.

With regards to the expected result 'sanitation and hygiene' one training was planned for HEW on the topic 'community led total sanitation'.

With regards to the health component, and in particular the vaccination programme, this has been carried out in all seven kebeles on a monthly basis, reaching 80 fully vaccinated children in the first semester of 2013. Four kebeles received information on the community based health insurance scheme.

The report further states that 8 micro-finance schemes were created which is three more than planned. This information is however in contradiction with the evaluation in the field where CCGG&SO staff mentioned the creation of 4 health micro-finance schemes.

At the time of the end evaluation, the SPO has started the construction of a new Health Centre in Shanqo with funding from CST.

The evaluation team has not received progress reports that cover project activities beyond June 2013. This might be due to the fact that the CCGG&SO office has been closed for several months since the beginning of 2014.

CCGG&SO office in Hamar district was closed in the first semester of 2014, after three fired staff members filed a complaint with the local government, allegedly accusing CCGG&SO of corruption. Although the allegations proved to be false, CCGG&SO has difficulties to get back on track.

## 5.2 Changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period

### 5.2.1 Civic engagement

Civic engagement describes the formal and informal activities and participation undertaken by individuals to advance shared interests at different levels. Participation within civil society is multi-faceted and encompasses socially-based and politically-based forms of engagement.

Before the start of phase two of the project (2013-2015), orientation meetings were held in each kebele to familiarize communities with the project plan. Over 200 people participated in the meetings, out of which 60 were women. Clarifications were made on the implementation strategies, role of communities, government and the project.

Having agreed upon the targeting criteria with the community, the beneficiary identification process started. Community leaders, agricultural extension workers, and the project team played a leading role in the beneficiary identification process and their selection. In general the Hamar community is reluctant to try new ideas until they see someone else try it and succeed, so they do not volunteer to much interventions. In this light, involving them actively in project design and extensive awareness creation seems important.

Eventually, 30 beneficiaries were selected for vegetable production and put into groups of 10 in the 2010-2012 period. They were then trained on land management and vegetation using the training manuals developed by government experts. Trained beneficiaries are then provided with farming materials and seeds by CCGG&SO and provided with a land plot by the government. CCGG&SO contributes with transportation when possible aside from following up at least for the first few months. The Development Agents in the Agriculture offices at the various sites also provided consulting service and follow up. This supports capacitate the groups which then leads to improved income and nutrition of group members. However, most of the groups put together for this purpose have either lost some of

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<sup>23</sup> Project kenschets and considerations

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their members (reaching up to 5 members) or have all members working individually. Reason for leaving the group is mostly the nature of the community to work individually than wait for each other to work as a group. They are pastoralists so herding cattle is their main activity and growing vegetables comes second.

CCGG has also created awareness on the benefits of cooperatives and collected and established 3 cooperatives in the area between 2012-2014: one in town and two in rural areas. The two in the rural areas were handed over to the government for follow up but due to the lack of follow up the two have failed in performing well. The one in the town is operating well. They are expected to provide consumer goods such as oil and sugar aside from other goods to prohibit traders from inflating the prices in times of shortage.

The main changes in community involvement were observed in the first few months of 2012 where the SPO had community discussions on phase two of the project and selection of new beneficiaries. However, due to the emergence of internal problems the SPO has not been in contact with any parts of the community for almost a year between the baseline and the end-line study.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**  
**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): -1**

### 5.2.2 Level of organization

This dimension assesses the organisational development, complexity and sophistication of civil society, by looking at the relationships among the actors within the civil society arena.

The baseline study mentions strong interaction between CCGG&SO and the 30 community groups established by CCGG&SO to discuss the progress obtained with regards to the implementation of the project and to come with joint proposal for solutions. However the situation in 2014 has deteriorated because all activities have been handed over to the local government who fails to provide the necessary guidance.

Practice also learns that community groups, in particular the vegetable groups are not working, because individuals of these groups prefer to work on their own plot and realise considerably higher yields and incomes than the collective groups.

CCGG&SO participates in the annual NGO forum called by the government where the 11 NGOs working in the area participate. However, this forum serves as a political instrument where the government discusses its points and asks the support/ adherence of the attending NGOs. There are several NGOs working in the area like Action for Development (working on water and sanitation- also working on IGA where groups are producing soap from aloe vera grown in the area), AMREF (Health), Save the Children (Children) and Mom Child (OVC). The SPO also participates in an annual review meeting on health where NGOs participate but as the direct responsible person is no longer with the organization details were not available.

Collaboration with the NGOs in the area has not increased since the baseline. NGOs in the area still prefer to work within their own space and time rather than communicating and collaborating with each other. Currently there also is little dialogue going on between CCGG&SO and Red Cross after the first aid training and handing over of the ambulance.

CCGG&SO's financial resource base for Hamar woreda has increased since the baseline.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**  
**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): -1**

### 5.2.3 Practice of Values

Practice of Values refers to the internal practice of values within the civil society arena. Important values that CIVICUS looks at such as transparency, democratic decision making, taking into account diversity

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that are deemed crucial to gauge not only progressiveness but also the extent to which civil society's practices are coherent with their ideals.

Since the baseline, annual audit of accounts have been made by external auditors based on the preference of the donor partners in selection/ commissioning of audit firms. The necessary actions were taken on the report by program management and the reports were shared among stakeholders (donors and government partners).

People of marginalized target groups are not represented in the official organs of the SPO, because the community by and large is illiterate to get representation in the CC development structures and the necessity is yet to be debated at the higher organization level and clarified if the constitution of the Social & Development Coordinating offices allow that. The trend & practice of having representations of marginalized groups in their immediate community organizations has not changed since 2012.

In 2014, all monthly staff cost, from store keeper, mechanic, cashier and watchmen to community animators, technical facilitators and program coordinator, had increased by at least 40 since 2011. This increase is reasonable in light of the high inflation rate in the country.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**  
**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 0**

#### 5.2.4 Perception of Impact

Perception of Impact assesses the perceived impact of civil society actors on politics and society as a whole as the consequences of collective action. In this, the perception of both civil society actors (internal) as actors outside civil society (outsiders) is taken into account. Specific sub dimensions for this evaluation are the extent to which the SPO has contributed to engage more people in social or political activities, has contributed to strengthening CSOs and their networks, has influenced public and private sector policies.

##### *Civil society arena*

In 2013 CCGG&SO mainly concentrated on either individual or group IGA activities in the livelihood component of the programme: In 2012, 144 vulnerable women were involved in goat keeping; 97 people (59 women) engaged in vegetable production; 97 persons (40 % women) received skills training in carpentry, grain mill maintenance and tailoring; an unknown number of women were organised in poultry groups. These women can also receive counselling and consultancy from the local Development Agents. CCGG&SO selects IGA beneficiaries together with kebele officers and provide training together with experts from the Woreda in different IGA's such as vegetable production, beekeeping, fattening, carpentry, and poultry. After the training the beneficiaries are supplied with inputs and monitored by CCGG&SO and the DA's at Kebele level.

The results of CCGG&SO to support IGAs are mixed. Some beneficiaries that were involved in the goat groups indicate their lives have changed for the better, others mention their goats died and they ended up with nothing<sup>24</sup>. The same applies to the women who received chickens. The groups formed around vegetable production stayed together for one season only and then individual members decided to disburse further on their own. These individuals see no benefits in working in a group since with their own efforts they earn considerably more<sup>25</sup>. Some beneficiaries are making money from carpentry and poultry. They mention that honey production is not successful as the bees wouldn't stay in the hives provided for them.

According to the pastoral office the most significant change in relation of the introduction of IGAs is that of changing mindsets that stimulate people to try different IGAs. The office observes an impressive mental change regarding the readiness to try vegetable production. CCGG&SO organises coffee

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<sup>24</sup> Interview with female beneficiaries involved in goat keeping.

<sup>25</sup> Interview with vegetable group member

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ceremonies to inform beneficiaries about different income generating activities. It is mentioned by a beneficiary that he would never had tried vegetable production if it has not been introduced by CCGG&SO.<sup>26</sup>

GGCC&SO planned that all IGA beneficiaries would earn enough to start saving in SILCs or in community health micro finance schemes. The plan was to have six SILCs operational in six kebeles by 2015. The 2013 project document learns that by the end of 2015 some 1050 households should be able to increase their income and hence become a potential member of the SILC<sup>27</sup>. A SILC is managed by a group of 15 – 30 self selected members. In 2013, CCGG&SO established two SILC groups in Demeka town, one group having 34 members (5 male and 29 female- this SILC was established before 2012 and had 12 members in 2012) and one group having 7 members (all members). Savings are kept by the SILC treasurer and not interest rates are paid, whilst Ethiopia's inflation rate between 2006 and 2014 is estimated at 19 percent a year. Saving in the official micro finance institution is more beneficial because some interest is being paid and because people can withdraw money when needed.

In the 2010-2012, eight community health micro finance schemes were established instead of the four planned, and they counted 821 families instead of 1600 families planned. The 2013 – 2015 programme foresees 7 of such schemes, 1 in each kebele (those in Malle were not anymore followed because another church started working in that district). At the beginning of 2014, 1 health scheme in four kebeles was realised. The health schemes were given 5000 birr initial capital. The health schemes mobilise local resources in terms of livestock or cash. Based upon those community savings, CCGG&SO also contributes funds in order to create an emergency and resilience community fund for medical purposes. Members are able to borrow money and then reimburse after having sold livestock, honey etc on the local market (once a week). The group has its own management committee in which the HEW, kebele leaders and community members are represented. They have their own bylaws. No figures are available of members currently associated with these health micro finance schemes and neither their performance in terms of service delivery to members.

None of the three cooperatives is functional. CCGG&SO organised two multipurpose cooperatives and one consumer cooperative which are supposed to help their members improve their lives. They claim to have stabilised the local inflation level and to prevent shortage of supplies by purchasing consumables from wholesale suppliers and selling these with a minimum of profit. The government cooperative promotion office who is in charge of supervising all three cooperatives fails to do so because they do not receive the financial support from the woreda administration. In addition, the government is unwilling to provide the cooperatives with working area, particularly in the Demeka area, which troubles their existence since they are not able to pay the rent.

Although CCGG&SO's interventions have not reached many people and interventions in the 2013 – 2015 period are considerably lagging behind plans, some individuals have changed their mind sets because they understand the utility of income diversification. In particular the poultry and goat scheme have proven to be beneficial for widows and destitute women. These few successes inspire others to also diversify their livelihood strategies and some are said to have become change agents.

Negative unintended effects of the project however, are in the fields of the phase out strategy, high expectations by the community and the unknown effects of the project interventions on culture.

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<sup>26</sup> Interview with beneficiary from Shanko

<sup>27</sup> in the 2013 – 2015 period, 100 pastoralists from 7 kebeles should be able to earn an income through improved dairy production and management; 100 households from 7 kebeles should be able to earn an income through the introduction of improved seedlings for fruit varieties; 100 households should be able to earn an income through beekeeping; 100 households should be able to earn an income through animal fattening; 90 households, through improved drip irrigation should be able to earn an income through vegetable production. In the 2010-2012 period, some 100 persons were targeted for vegetable production. In the 2013 – 2015 period, 200 women should be able to earn an income through IGA. In the 2013 – 2015 period, At least 180 households, later 360 households should be able to increase their income through goat keeping solidarity groups. In the 2010 – 2012 period the target was 208 women to be involved in goat keeping. In the 2010-2012 period, 100 persons should be able to earn an income after a skills training



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*Collaboration with the public sector and policy influencing*

Collaboration with the public sector has deteriorated since the baseline. In the first place CCGG&SO and some 10 other NGOs participate in annual meetings convened by the government, who set its own agenda and to ask participating NGOs to adhere to this agenda rather than stimulating dialogue. CCGG&SO, after having established groups for income generating activities and cooperatives, has to handle over these activities to the woreda government, who fails to supervise these activities. An ambulance given to the Red Cross was confiscated by the health office and in not always used to transport sick people.

The six months closure of CCGG&SO in the beginning of 2014 and imposed by the local government was the lowest point in relations with the government since 2012.

*Collaboration with the private sector and policy influencing*

Apart from working with suppliers of advisory services or materials, CCGG&SO is not collaborating with the private sector.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**  
**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): -1**

### 5.2.5 Civil Society Environment

The social, political and economic environment in which civil society operates affects its room for manoeuvre. The civil society context has been described in chapter 3. In this section we describe how CCGG&SO is coping with that context. The 2009 Proclamation to Provide for the Registration and Regulation of Charities and Societies (CSP) and the related "70/30" regulation that limits administrative costs for all charities and societies to 30% of their budgets.

A corrective management decision to fire three staff members in the Hamar program who broke regulations in January 2014 has resulted in unfavourable turn of events. The fired employees filed a complaint with the local government, leading to the closure of the office from March to July 2014. The former employees asked for an unconditional return and an investigation and audit of accounts. Meanwhile, the SPO did its best to hold talks with the authorities that ended up in deadlocks because nobody in local government was cooperative.

CCGG&SO reported the event to the Regional Bureau of Finance via its headquarters, the Vicariate of Soddo & the Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat (ECS), which recommended a mediation process between the local government office and CCGG&SO at the beginning of the dispute. Later, upon receipt of a letter of the zonal Administrator, an investigation was carried out. The investigation took place after a lapse of two months. Based on the findings of the investigators, a report was sent to the Federal Central Statistics Agency (CSA) which sent down a delegation to resolve the issue and accordingly it was agreed to open the office.

In its decision, the Federal CSA commended on the responsiveness of the SPO on five points out of the ten points reported by the Regional Bureau of Finance. The Bureau of Finance also cited weaknesses and measures to be taken by the CCGG&SO. Weaknesses of the local government were also been spelt out and advised not to repeat. As a result, the false allegations made against the church are clarified and the issues that need legal attention concerning the fired employees are referred to the labour court. It is agreed to get back to program implementation. The current position of the partnership with the government is similar to the way it was before.

However, the whole incident has created division, triggered confusion, and threats were made against fellow staff members. Additionally, false and disproportionate rumours about the leadership and its transparency were going around. As a result, staff composition has changed. The human resources administration and their manuals for job performance appraisal and supplies procurement are under review and reassurance was given to donors that system overhaul is being made.






**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2**  
**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): -1**

## 5.3 To what degree are the changes attributable to the Southern partner?

This paragraph assesses the extent to which CCGG&SO contributed to increased food security in Hamar district in the 2010 -2015 period. Starting with an outcome, the evaluation team developed a model of change that identifies different pathways that possibly explain the outcome achieved. Data collection was done to obtain evidence that confirms or rejects each of these pathways. Based upon this assessment, the evaluation team concludes about the most plausible explanation of the outcome and the most plausible relation between (parts of) pathways and the outcome. The relations between the pathways and the outcomes can differ in nature as is being explained in table 4.

**Table 4**

*Nature of the relation between parts in the Model of Change*

Nature of the relation between parts and other parts or outcome	
The part is the only causal explanation for the outcome. No other interventions or factors explain it. (necessary and sufficient)	
The part does not explain the outcome at all: other subcomponents explain the outcomes.	
The part explains the outcome but other parts explain the outcome as well: there are multiple pathways (sufficient but not necessary)	
The part is a condition for the outcome but won't make it happen without other factors (necessary but not sufficient)	
The part is a contributory cause it is part of a 'package' of causal actors and factors that together are sufficient to produce the intended effect.	

Sources: Mayne, 2012; Stern et al, 2012

The following paragraph assesses CCGG&SO's contribution to two outcomes. Each paragraph first describes the outcome achieved and the evidence obtained to confirm that the outcome has been achieved. It then presents the pathways identified that possibly explain the outcomes, as well as present information that confirms or refutes these pathways. The last section concludes in the first place about the most plausible explanation of the outcome, followed by a conclusion regarding the role of the SPO in explaining the outcome.

### 5.3.1 Strong organisations lead to improved food security of households in the Hamar district

#### *Outcome and evidence found*

The evaluation team looked at the extent to which the SILCs, the health micro finance schemes secured savings for their members, who also benefitted from support given by CCGG&SO to start income generating activities such as goat keeping, poultry, carpentry, beekeeping, horticulture. According to CCGG&SO some 1300 participants, in particular women, should have been involved in these IGA and hence become a member of the SILCs or the health micro finance scheme, which in turn should lead to improved food security. Another strategy to improve food security consisted of setting up cooperatives. The evaluation team did *not find* evidence regarding the exact number of persons adhering to the cooperatives, the health micro finance schemes and the SILCs showing trends in the 2010-2014 period in Hamar district. The evaluation team did *not find* any figures that show that food security in general has improved in Hamar district in the 2010 -2015 period.

The following pathways were identified that each should lead to improved food security:

1. Households are able to access small loans and emergency grants via SILCs put in place by CCGG&SO
2. Community Health Micro Finance Schemes make households more resilient to health and food security problems. These were put in place by CCGG&SO
3. Cooperatives provide consumer goods to prohibit traders from inflating prices in times of shortage. Three of such cooperatives were created by CCGG&SO

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4. Food security is most likely to be increased through individual IGA. A number of IGAs were supported by CCGG&SO
  5. Households earn an income through the cash/food for work programme and will access the Household Asset Building program with an initial capital from government. This is a programme run by the Government.

There is one underlying assumption in CCGG&SO's model that states that those beneficiaries that participate in IGA at a certain moment become member of the SILC or the Health Micro Finance Scheme.

*Evidence that confirms or rejects pathways*

*Pathway 1: Households are able to access small loans and emergency grants via SILCs*

A SILC is managed by a group of 15 – 30 self selected members and offers a safe opportunity to save and allows them access to small loans or emergency grants. CCGG&SO planned to have 6 SILCs operational in 6 kebeles in the 2012 -2014 period and that some 1050 persons should have been able to increase their income through IGAs and hence become a member of the SILC by 2015.

*Information that rejects this pathway:*

Only two SILC groups are operational in Demeka town, one that started with 12 members in 2012 and has 34 members of which 9 women in 2014 and one with seven members only. In comparison to the expectation of having 6 SILCs and 1050 members according to plan this result is neglectible.

As already mentioned before, members who deposit their savings can not access it for a whole year and no interest rates are applied when savings are kept in a savings box: The average inflation in Ethiopia is estimated at 19 % between 2006 and 2014 and therefore it is more attractive for people and groups to deposit their savings at the micro finance institution that they can have access to at any moment and that is supposed to give some interest.

The Omo micro-finance confirms that groups (vegetable group and stove group) but also individuals who belong to groups have accounts with them and are saving on a regular basis.

*Information that confirms this:*

One SILC group confirms that there is a relation between IGAs and savings. The seven members of the SILC group started this because they are a stove group<sup>28</sup>.

*Pathway 2: Community Health Micro Finance Schemes make households more resilient to health and food security problems*

The health micro finance schemes mobilise both resources in cash and kind. Based upon those community savings, CCGG&SO also contributes funds in order to create an emergency and resilience community fund for medical purposes. Members can borrow money and then reimburse after having sold livestock, honey etc on the local market (once a week). The group has its own management committee in which the HEW, kebele leaders and community members are represented. They have their own bylaws.

*Information that confirms this pathway*

Eight community health micro finance schemes were established between 2010 and 2012 instead of the four planned, including 821 families instead of 1600 families planned. During the 2013 – 2014 period four additional schemes were realised in four kebeles, whereas seven of such schemes were foreseen.<sup>29</sup> These health schemes were given 5000 birr initial capital. One interviewee explains there is a lot of interest in the schemes because people hear positive stories from the ones who benefitted.

*Assumption to pathway 1 and 2:*

Both pathways assume that beneficiaries that participate in IGA earn enough money to save in the SILC or the Health micro finance scheme.

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<sup>28</sup> Interview with SPO staff

<sup>29</sup> Those in Malle were not followed anymore because another church started working in that district

Information that *confirms* the assumption consists of one initial trial to establish a SILC in Dimeka town failed due to too low income levels.<sup>30</sup> Apart from a stove group that created its SILC *there is no evidence* that supports

the assumption, although some of the IGA yielded better incomes, such as was the case with horticulture which is more successful as an individual rather than as a group (126 beneficiaries of which 59 women); the goat (144

women) and the poultry scheme

(figures unknown); and carpentry and others IGAs (97 persons of which 40 % female).

*Pathway 3: Cooperatives provide consumer goods to prohibit traders from inflating prices in times of shortage*

Information that *rejects* this pathway:

None of the three cooperatives created by CCGG&SO is operational: these cooperatives were handed over to the Woreda government who failed to ensure a good supervision and technical assistance to keep the cooperatives running. The cooperatives claim to have stabilised the local inflation level and to prevent shortage of supplies by purchasing consumables from wholesale suppliers and selling these with a minimum of profit.

*Pathway 4: Food security is most likely to be increased through individual IGA*

Information that *confirms* this is available in particular for horticulture, goat keeping, poultry and carpentry but not for beekeeping. According to CCGG&SO some 500 persons received individual IGAs which were expected to grow to 1050 persons. No exact figures are however available.

However the number of people that have engaged in IGA due to CCGG&SO are by far the 1300 expected at the outcome level.

*Pathway 5: Households earn an income through the cash/food for work programme and will access the Household Asset Building programme with an initial capital from the government*

Information that *confirms* this is that over 45 % of the 43,000 people living in Hamar woreda are supported by Productive Safety Net Programs.<sup>31</sup> In this program, vulnerable groups either get direct support or contribute labour and get paid.

Information that *rejects* this pathway consists of the fact that this program is not very sustainable as it may help to solve transitory food shocks, but that it cannot help to break the poverty circle. By design,




Figure 1: Pathways that possibly explain outcomes and conclusions about the nature of the relations between pathways and the outcome, intermediate organisations

<sup>30</sup> Based on project documents

<sup>31</sup> Kenschets and considerations

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beneficiaries have to graduate after they accumulate assets but graduation in this Woreda has not yet started. Targeting problems, small grants and frequent drought in the area make the program unsuccessful and it just only helps to narrow the food gap.

#### *Conclusions*

A first conclusion is that there is no information available that food security improved for some 1300 beneficiaries of the CCGG&SO program. Food security may have been increased for a fraction of the approximately 500 persons that received support in terms of diversifying their IGAs. This pathway and that of the Productive Safety Net Program both might sufficiently but not necessarily explain increased food security for a very limited number of Hamar Woreda's population. There is no information available to confirm that the health micro finance schemes improve food security at household level.

The creation of SILCs and cooperatives has not at all contributed to improved food security and that of the popular health micro finance insurance schemes is unknown. These are hence non necessary and not sufficient causes to explain increased food security.

The role of CCGG&SO has been minimal in increasing food security for the following reasons: In the first place, after handing over some of the activities such as the cooperatives, the vegetable groups and others, the woreda government failed to develop adequate technical assistance strategies; in the second place CCGG&SO was not operational anymore since January 2014, and; in the third place CCGG&SO does not have a monitoring and evaluation system in place to assess outcome and impact at household level and therefore leading to important information gaps for the evaluation team.

## 5.4 What is the relevance of these changes?

### 5.4.1 Relevance of the changes in relation to the Theory of Change of 2012

In its 2012 ToC CCGG&SO formulated its overall goal with regards to civil society as "Improved health, improved livelihood, and education of the people of South Omo by creating self-sufficient and performing civil societies". In order to reach this goal CCGG&SO identified five conditions that need to be in place: the capacities of civil society organisations need to be build; civil society needs to network between each other and public sector; follow up on a culture sensitive strategy for CSOs' activities is needed; local skills and knowledge need to be identified and developed, and CSO's need a conducive environment.

Until so far we conclude that the conditions have not been met since the groups and cooperatives formed are not functioning. Hence, civil society is not yet able to provide services to society. An exemption can be made for the goat groups as these groups are functioning as the women grasp this opportunity to become less dependent on men<sup>32</sup>.

### 5.4.2 Relevance of the changes in relation to the context in which CCGG&SO is operating

The 7 kebeles from the Hamar District were identified to be the project target areas because of their relative level of poverty, the fact that they were poorly addressed by development actors and the availability of local resource potentials to build on.<sup>33</sup> The target group consists of semi pastoralists whose main way of living is livestock herding, but when the weather is conducive they grow different crops such as maize and sorghum. In recent years, the area has been severely affected by consecutive drought resulting in frequent crop failures. Accordingly, the government has been provided food aid for a number of years, followed by the recent productive safety net program. Since the Woreda is far from the centre, pastoralists are marginalized in terms of infrastructure and other basic facilities such as health and

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<sup>32</sup> Interview with member of cooperative

<sup>33</sup> Based on project documents

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education. The evaluation team even learned that some of the kebeles were totally forgotten by the local government, and they did not have schools, health posts or rural roads. In this regard, CCGG&SO's presence is relevant but negligible given the insignificant number of beneficiaries (a maximum of 500 persons) reached and the severe food security problems in the district that has some 43,000 inhabitants.

### 5.4.3 Relevance of the changes in relation to the policies of the MFS II alliance and Cordaid

For Cordaid, Community Based Organisations form the main strongholds of societies and hence strengthening civil society means working via- and strengthening the capacity of CBOs and that of volunteers. Cordaid believes that strengthening forces within communities will bring about change. Since the Ethiopian civil society context leaves little room for policy influencing Cordaid tries to create awareness by supporting other themes such as livelihood improvement or economic empowerment. In relation to CCGG&SO Cordaid stressed the importance to include government people in training efforts so improve relations. This has resulted in a quick approval of road construction works and improvements in irrigation systems.<sup>34</sup>

In their 'eindafweging' Cordaid furthermore highlights the importance of CCGG&SO in relation to policy influencing as the Catholic Church has been talking (diplomatically) to a number of Embassies and donors (a.o. DFID and USAID) about the current worrying developments in South Omo. This evaluation found no support for this claim.

## 5.5 Explaining factors

### 5.5.1 Internal factors

The closure of the Hamar office between March and July 2014 did not only cause a delay in the implementation of the activities of CCGG&SO<sup>35</sup>, the termination of the contracts of some employees also created division, triggered confusion, and threats were made against fellow staff members. Additionally, false and disproportionate rumours about the leadership and its transparency were going around. As a result, the staff composition has changed. Human resources administration procedures including job performance appraisal & supplies procurement manuals are under review and reassurance was given to donors that system overhaul is being made.

As a consequence, CCGG&SO's monitoring and evaluation efforts were not adequate. This was even reinforced by the bad follow up of the local government on groups/cooperatives which resulted in a gap between CCGG&SO's knowledge of the status and the actual status. With the three people that were fired a lot of CCGG&SO's institutional knowledge had gone.

### 5.5.2 External factors

Inaccessibility of the area, recurrent drought, unpredictable rains, land availability, and epidemics are common features of the district that challenge the effectiveness of CCGG&SO. Especially water shortage is a problem, community members are now fetching water from the river themselves which is very difficult.<sup>36</sup> Additionally, High national inflation increased costs for nearly all items needed by the project.

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<sup>34</sup> Interview with CORDAID Programme Officer

<sup>35</sup> In the project documents it is mentioned that 'new activities for 2013 to 2014 are half -implemented due to the recent setback we met in our relationship with local government during the first six months of 2014'.

<sup>36</sup> Interview with beneficiary from Shanko

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CCGG&SO furthermore mentions that the -sometimes sudden- changes in government policy makes it very difficult for the project to adapt accordingly.<sup>37</sup>

Human Right Watches reports of human rights atrocities committed against indigenous people living in the Lower Omo Valley, including the hamar population. The valley has many fertile grounds, and the government is constructing a massive hydroelectric dam, to be associated with large scale land acquisitions for irrigated agriculture and the forced resettlement of indigenous people.<sup>38</sup> This situation is being largely ignored but may definitely explain the constrained civil society space in which CCGG&SO is operating.

### 5.5.3 Relations Cordaid-CCGG&SO

With the information available it is not possible to explore the relations between Cordaid and CCGG&SO and how they might have affected the evaluation findings of civil society.

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<sup>37</sup> Based on project documents

<sup>38</sup> Human Rights Watch, 2012, "What Will Happen if Hunger Comes?" Abuses against the Indigenous Peoples of Ethiopia's Lower Omo Valley

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## 6 Discussion

### 6.1 Design of the intervention

CCGG&SO's intervention strategy in relation to the livelihood component of their program has been to first change the community's attitude by creating awareness and then to increase their resilience by deploying alternative sources of income through different IGAs. A number of reasons can be mentioned for the difference in effectiveness of the interventions, such as the group members' participation and dedication, water availability, land availability, communities' perception to different IGAs and the social context. In their project design CCGG&SO acknowledged that, especially in the pastoralist community they operate in, new technologies introduced in the community should be compatible to the existing traditions and should be simple to use and replicate.

As the pastoralist community is known to be reluctant to change, awareness creation on intensive alternative ways of earning an income is an apparent need. The fact that the beneficiaries are willing to try new activities points towards the success of CCGG&SO's awareness raising activities. Even though the project documents mention the forming of groups could be useful for training and peer-learning, the need to form groups for IGA activities does not become evident as beneficiaries point out they do not see the benefits and rather work individually<sup>39</sup>. This is especially the case in the male groups, as the female groups have a social and emancipatory component next to an economical one. The resistance of the community to work in groups could have been observed from the groups formed between 2010 and 2012. When designing a new programme in 2012 it could have been worthwhile to consider providing training in groups but support individuals to deploy their IGA.

### 6.2 Replication of the intervention

Little (2001) argues there are many reasons why pastoralists diversify their income strategies, and much local variation in rationale and activities should be anticipated. Diversification options vary according to gender and proximity to towns and settlements. In general, options for women (petty trade) differ from those available for men (wage employment, livestock trade). Salaried employment may be most vital for promotion of food security (idem, 2001). Herders who reside less than 40 kilometers from towns typically have more alternative income generating options than those living further away. He furthermore argues that diversification is not always the panacea that it assumes to be, since some forms of diversification may increase risk. Interventions should prioritize promotion of customary resource use strategies (promoting mobility and livestock species diversity) where possible. Medium-term investments should focus on rural education since education is most likely to lead to options for salaried employment. For the settled poor, activities such as dairy trade, sustainable fuel production (forestry), and re-stocking schemes may have the most value.

Berhanu, Colman, and Fayissa (2005) add that an examination of the pastoralist activity choices reveals that the younger households which are literate and have more exposure display a more diversified income portfolio preference. Their findings underscore the importance of human capital investment and related support services for improving risk. This last finding supports the human capacity development training approach of CCGG&SO, but also puts extra emphasis for the need for CCGG&SO to assure follow

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<sup>39</sup> Interview with beneficiary from Algone; Interview with beneficiary from Shanko



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up and support services, which was not the case in the current program because constraint by the woreda government. Additionally, a focus on younger households who are more open for change could yield greater results.

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## 7 Conclusion

### *Changes in the civil society arena of the SPO*

In the 2012 – 2014 period CCGG&SO has seen a decrease of its civil society arena as well as the possibilities to collaborate with the local government. Most of its achievements on civic engagement date back from before the 2012 assessment; its collaboration with other NGO's decreased (level of organisation); its impact upon both civil society and upon the government decreased as well as its relation with the woreda government (perception of impact). Only its dimension 'practice of values' remained the same.

### *Contribution analysis*

For CCGG&SO, the in-country evaluation team only looked at one outcome which is the capacity of community based organisations, and in particular health micro finance schemes, cooperatives, Saving and Internal Lending Communities (SILC) and groups organised around income generating activities to improve food security of an estimated 1300 households.

The evaluation team in the first place concludes that no evidence is available to state that 1300 households improved their food security situation. The most likely strategies that may explain improved food security at household level consist of CCGG&SO's support to introduce income generating activities as well as a food safety net programme that is currently in place. There is no information available that confirms that the popular health micro finance scheme contributes to increased food security. The cooperatives and the SILC are not contributing. CCGG&SO's has been minimal because the local government failed to follow up upon groups handed over as agreed; because CCGG&SO has not been operational since the beginning of 2014 due to internal problems that escalated. CCGG&SO also does not have any monitoring and evaluation system in place that helps to assess progress towards impact at household level.

### *Relevance*

In relation to its 2012 ToC that stated that the capacities of CBOs need to be build and that they need to network and also relate to the public sector, the evaluators conclude that no progress has been made and that CCGG&SO's interventions have not been relevant.

In relation to the external context in which CCGG&SO is operating interventions are relevant for Hamar woreda which is a very isolated and nearly abandoned area by the government. But in relation to the severe food security problems that the 43,000 inhabitants of the district face, the outcomes achieved are negligible.

Important civil society elements for the communities of change alliance consist of strong CBOs, good relations with local government and using opportunities to influence policies. None of these elements have materialised in the past two years.

### *Explaining factors*

The most important explaining factor of the evaluation findings consists of CCGG&SO firing three staff in January 2014, which escalated when the three staff members allegedly accused the SPO of corruption and filed a complaint with the government. In consequence the office was closed and awaiting an audit imposed by the government. Although all allegations proved to be untrue, CCGG&SO now faced difficulties in getting back on track.

A second important factor is also that the Lower Omo Valley has many fertile grounds and a river suitable for the construction of a hydroelectric dam to be followed by large scale land acquisitions for irrigated agriculture. Indigenous people like those living in the Hamar district are not being informed, and the government proceeds with forced resettlements. According to Human Rights Watch, the government is implicated in human rights atrocities. This tense situation may possibly, in contrary to other zones

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where the evaluators are assessing civil society impact, explain the non-constructive collaboration between NGOs and the local government.

*Design*

Given the existing context in which SSGG&SO operates, the evaluators conclude that there was too much interference by the local government to make the interventions successful; that individual approaches for income generating activities than collective approaches would have made more sense, followed by continuous awareness raising activities to highlight how successful households that diversified their livelihood strategies are, and to develop strategies that help to send girls and schools to school as a means for further exposure.

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**Table 5**  
*Summary of findings.*

<b>When looking at the MFS II interventions of this SPO to strengthen civil society and/or policy influencing, how much do you agree with the following statements?</b>	<b>Score</b>
The CS interventions were well designed	4
The CS interventions were implemented as designed	3
The CS interventions reached their objectives	3
The observed outcomes are attributable to the CS interventions	3
The observed CS outcomes are relevant to the beneficiaries of the SPO	3

Score between 1 to 10, with 1 being "not at all" and 10 being "completely".

# References and resource persons

## Documents

### Documents by SPO

Title	Year
Project Proposal 2010-2012	2010
Project Proposal 2013 -2015	2012
Final evaluation report 2010-2012	2013
Biannual report January-June 2013	2013
Audit report (translated by evaluation team)	2014

### Documents by CFA

Title	Year
Contract 2010-2012	2010
Contract 2013	2013
Jaarplan 2012 Ethiopie	2012
Monitoringprotocol 2011-2015	2011
Organinzation scan	2012
Gamo Gofa project kenschets and considerations	2012
Results civil society baseline	2011

### Documents by Alliance

Title	Year
Year report alliance 2011	2011
Beleid tav Zuidelijke Partners	?
Managementsamenvatting	?
MFS II aanvraag fase II	2010
Results Civil Society Baseline	2011

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- United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council. 24 April 2013. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, Maini Kiai.

### Webpages

Author	Title	Webpage link	date
The International Center for Not-For-Profit Law (ICNL)	NGO Law Monitor: Ethiopia	<a href="http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/ethiopia.html">http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/ethiopia.html</a>	2014
Freedom House	Freedom in the World: Ethiopia	<a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/ethiopia-0">https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/ethiopia-0</a>	2014
Fund for Peace	Failed States Index	<a href="http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable">http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable</a>	2013
Social Watch	Basic Capabilities Index 2011. The boom and	<a href="http://www.socialwatch.org/sites/default/files/BCI-MeasuringProgress2012_eng.pdf">http://www.socialwatch.org/sites/default/files/BCI-MeasuringProgress2012_eng.pdf</a>	2011

	the busted		
Social Watch Transparency International	Social and Economic Rights Fulfillment Index Corruption by Country: Ethiopia	<a href="http://www.socialwatch.org/sites/default/files/SERF2012_eng.pdf">http://www.socialwatch.org/sites/default/files/SERF2012_eng.pdf</a>	2011
Transparency International	Global Corruption Barometer: Ethiopia	<a href="http://www.transparency.org/country/#ETH">http://www.transparency.org/country/#ETH</a>	2014
Heritage	Economic Freedom Score: Ethiopia	<a href="http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=ethiopia">http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=ethiopia</a>	2014
UNDP	Human Development Indicators Ethiopia	<a href="http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2014/countries/ethiopia.pdf">http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2014/countries/ethiopia.pdf</a>	2014
World Bank Institute for Future Studies	Governance Indicators: Country Data report for Ethiopia 1996-2013	<a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/ETH">http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/ETH</a>	2013
	World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009	<a href="http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/c72.pdf">http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/c72.pdf</a>	2013
		<a href="http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSONline.jsp">http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSONline.jsp</a>	2009

## Resource persons

<b>Name of key informant</b>	<b>Organisation</b>	<b>Function in organisation</b>	<b>Relation with SPO</b>	<b>Contact details</b>
Alba Espinoza Rocca	CORDAID	Programme Officer		+31(0)70 3136640 alba.espinoza.rocca@cordaid.nl
Kaliti Geyole	Hamar Woreda Cooperative office	Delegate to Head of the Cooperative Office	Is collaborating with SPO	-
Almaz Zeleke	Hamar Woreda Cooperative office	Auditor	Is collaborating with SPO	-
Tamiru Tariki	Hamar Woreda Pastoralist Office	Delegate to Head of the pastoralist Office	Is collaborating with SPO	-
Abin baye	Vegetable, Chicken and Goat group	Member	Receives support for other reasons	-
Awi Bada	Vegetable group	Beneficiary and Farmers	Receives support for other reasons	-
Rebo Mele	Health Micro finance /Vegetable group	Beneficiary and Farmers	Receives support for other reasons	-
Qecha Arbala	Chicken group	Beneficiary	Receives support for other reasons	-
Redo Mele	Chicken group	Beneficiary		-
Eshetu Eno	Hamar Woreda Health Office	Delegate to Head of the Health Office	Is collaborating with SPO	-
Filimon Asfaw		First aid Volunteer		-
Asrat Markos		First aid volunteer		-
Tigist	Omo micro finance	Finance		-
Ashenafi	Omo micro finance	Loan officer		-
Aster	Stove group	Secretary	Receives support for other reasons	-
Hailu Wele	Vegetable group	member	Receives support for other reasons	-
Lechi Debmule	Vegetable group	member	Receives support for other reasons	-
Almaz Atsan	Saving group	finance	Receives support for other reasons	-
Girgir Zeleka	Cooperative	Chair	Receives support for other reasons	-
Auri Bada	Goat group	Beneficiary	Receives support for other reasons	-
Fr. Martin Kelly	CCGG&SO- Gamo Gofa	Member of Advisory Board & program management		artikelly@yahoo.com 11

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Bonkie Gana	CCGG&SO- Gamo Gofa	Community Facilitator	soicdp@score-et.org
Mesfin Shiferaw	CCGG&SO- Gamo Gofa	Assistant Program Director & member of the program management	assispdire@score-et.org

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# Appendix 1 CIVICUS and Civil Society Index Framework

CIVICUS, the World Alliance for Citizen Participation is an international alliance of members and partners which constitutes an influential network of organisations at the local, national, regional and international levels, and spans the spectrum of civil society. It has worked for nearly two decades to strengthen citizen action and civil society throughout the world. CIVICUS has a vision of a global community of active, engaged citizens committed to the creation of a more just and equitable world. This is based on the belief that the health of societies exists in direct proportion to the degree of balance between the state, the private sector and civil society.

One of the areas that CIVICUS works in is the Civil Society Index (CSI). Since 2000, CIVICUS has measured the state of civil society in 76 countries. In 2008, it considerably changed its CSI.

## 1.1 Guiding principles for measuring civil society

**Action orientation:** the principal aim of the CSI is to generate information that is of practical use to civil society practitioners and other primary stakeholders. Therefore, its framework had to identify aspects of civil society that can be changed, as well as generate knowledge relevant to action-oriented goals.

**CSI implementation must be participatory by design:** The CSI does not stop at the generation of knowledge alone. Rather, it also actively seeks to link knowledge-generation on civil society, with reflection and action by civil society stakeholders. The CSI has therefore continued to involve its beneficiaries, as well as various other actors, in this particular case, civil society stakeholders, in all stages of the process, from the design and implementation, through to the deliberation and dissemination stages.

This participatory cycle is relevant in that such a mechanism can foster the self-awareness of civil society actors as being part of something larger, namely, civil society itself. As a purely educational gain, it broadens the horizon of CSO representatives through a process of reflecting upon, and engaging with, civil society issues which may go beyond the more narrow foci of their respective organisations. A strong collective self-awareness among civil society actors can also function as an important catalyst for joint advocacy activities to defend civic space when under threat or to advance the common interests of civil society vis-à-vis external forces. These basic civil society issues, on which there is often more commonality than difference among such actors, are at the core of the CSI assessment.

**CSI is change oriented:** The participatory nature that lies at the core of the CSI methodology is an important step in the attempt to link research with action, creating a diffused sense of awareness and ownerships. However, the theory of change that the CSI is based on goes one step further, coupling this participatory principle with the creation of evidence in the form of a comparable and contextually valid assessment of the state of civil society. It is this evidence, once shared and disseminated, that ultimately constitutes a resource for action.

**CSI is putting local partners in the driver's seat:** CSI is to continue being a collaborative effort between a broad range of stakeholders, with most importance placed on the relationship between CIVICUS and its national partners.

## 1.2 Defining Civil Society

The 2008 CIVICUS redesign team modified the civil society definition as follows:

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*The arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market – which is created by individual and collective actions, organisations and institutions to advance shared interests.*

*Arena:* In this definition the arena refers to the importance of civil society's role in creating public spaces where diverse societal values and interests interact (Fowler 1996). CSI uses the term 'arena' to describe the particular realm or space in a society where people come together to debate, discuss, associate and seek to influence broader society. CIVICUS strongly believes that this arena is distinct from other arenas in society, such as the market, state or family.

Civil society is hence defined as a political term, rather than in economic terms that resemble more the 'non-profit sector'.

Besides the spaces created by civil society, CIVICUS defines particular spaces for the family, the state and the market.

*Individual and collective action, organisations and institutions:* Implicit in a political understanding of civil society is the notion of agency; that civil society actors have the ability to influence decisions that affect the lives of ordinary people. The CSI embraces a broad range of actions taken by both individuals and groups. Many of these actions take place within the context of non-coercive organisations or institutions ranging from small informal groups to large professionally run associations.

*Advance shared interests:* The term 'interests' should be interpreted very broadly, encompassing the promotion of values, needs, identities, norms and other aspirations.

They encompass the personal and public, and can be pursued by small informal groups, large membership organisations or formal associations. The emphasis rests however on the element of 'sharing' that interest within the public sphere.

### 1.3 Civil Society Index- Analytical Framework

The 2008 Civil Society Index distinguishes 5 dimensions of which 4 (civic engagement, level of organisation, practice of values and perception of impact), can be represented in the form of a diamond and the fifth one (external environment) as a circle that influences upon the shape of the diamond.

*Civic Engagement*, or 'active citizenship', is a crucial defining factor of civil society. It is the hub of civil society and therefore is one of the core components of the CSI's definition. Civic engagement describes the formal and informal activities and participation undertaken by individuals to advance shared interests at different levels. Participation within civil society is multi-faceted and encompasses socially-based and politically-based forms of engagement.

*Level of Organisation.* This dimension assesses the organisational development, complexity and sophistication of civil society, by looking at the relationships among the actors within the civil society arena. Key sub dimensions are:

- Internal governance of Civil Society Organisations;
- Support infrastructure, that is about the existence of supporting federations or umbrella bodies;
- Self-regulation, which is about for instance the existence of shared codes of conducts amongst Civil Society Organisations and other existing self-regulatory mechanisms;
- Peer-to-peer communication and cooperation: networking, information sharing and alliance building to assess the extent of linkages and productive relations among civil society actors;
- Human resources, that is about the sustainability and adequacy of human resources available for CSOs in order to achieve their objectives:
  - Financial and technological resources available at CSOs to achieve their objectives;



- International linkages, such as CSO's membership in international networks and participation in global events.

*Practice of Values.* This dimension assesses the internal practice of values within the civil society arena. CIVICUS identified some key values that are deemed crucial to gauge not only progressiveness but also the extent to which civil society's practices are coherent with their ideals. These are:

- Democratic decision-making governance: how decisions are made within CSOs and by whom;
- Labour regulations: includes the existence of policies regarding equal opportunities, staff membership in labour unions, training in labour rights for new staff and a publicly available statement on labour standards;
- Code of conduct and transparency: measures whether a code of conduct exists and is available publicly. It also measures whether the CSO's financial information is available to the public.
- Environmental standards: examines the extent to which CSOs adopt policies upholding environmental standards of operation;
- Perception of values within civil society: looks at how CSOs perceive the practice of values, such as non-violence. This includes the existence or absence of forces within civil society that use violence, aggression, hostility, brutality and/or fighting, tolerance, democracy, transparency, trustworthiness and tolerance in the civil society within which they operate.


*Perception of Impact.* This is about the perceived impact of civil society actors on politics and society as a whole as the consequences of collective action. In this, the perception of both civil society actors (internal) as actors outside civil society (outsiders) is taken into account. Specific sub dimensions are

- Responsiveness in terms of civil society's impact on the most important social concerns within the country. "Responsive" types of civil society are effectively taking up and voicing societal concerns.
- Social impact measures civil society's impact on society in general. An essential role of civil society is its contribution to meet pressing societal needs;
- Policy impact: covers civil society's impact on policy in general. It also looks at the impact of CSO activism on selected policy issues;
- Impact on attitudes: includes trust, public spiritedness and tolerance. The sub dimensions reflect a set of universally accepted social and political norms. These are drawn, for example, from sources such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as CIVICUS' own core values. This dimension measures the extent to which these values are practised within civil society, compared to the extent to which they are practised in society at large.

*Context Dimension: External*

*Environment.* It is crucial to give consideration to the social, political and economic environments in which it exists, as the environment both directly and indirectly affects civil society. Some features of the environment may enable the growth of civil society. Conversely, other features of the environment hamper the development of civil society. Three elements of the external environment are captured by the CSI:

- Socio-economic context: The Social Watch's basic capabilities index and measures of corruption, inequality and macro-economic health are used to portray the socioeconomic context that can have marked consequences for civil society, and perhaps most significantly at the lower levels of social development;



- 
- Socio-political context: This is assessed using five indicators. Three of these are adapted from the Freedom House indices of political and civil rights and freedoms, including political rights and freedoms, personal rights and freedoms within the law and associational and organisational rights and freedoms. Information about CSO experience with the country's legal framework and state effectiveness round out the picture of the socio-political context;
  - Socio-cultural context: utilises interpersonal trust, which examines the level of trust that ordinary people feel for other ordinary people, as a broad measure of the social psychological climate for association and cooperation. Even though everyone experiences relationships of varying trust and distrust with different people, this measure provides a simple indication of the prevalence of a world view that can support and strengthen civil society. Similarly, the extent of tolerance and public spiritedness also offers indication of the context in which civil society unfolds.

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## Appendix 2 Methodology

This appendix describes the evaluation methodology that was developed to evaluate the efforts of Dutch NGOs and their Southern Partner Organisations (SPO) to strengthen Civil Society in India, Ethiopia and Indonesia. The first paragraph introduces the terms of reference for the evaluation and the second discusses design issues, including sampling procedures and changes in the terms of reference that occurred between the 2012 and 2014 assessment. The third paragraph presents the methodologies developed to answer each of the evaluation questions. The evaluation team uses the qualitative software programme NVIVO and how this is being used is presented in paragraph 1.4.

### 2.1 Introduction

#### 2.1.1 Terms of reference for the evaluation

The Netherlands has a long tradition of public support for civil bi-lateral development cooperation, going back to the 1960s. The Co-Financing System (MFS) is its most recent expression. MFS II is the 2011-2015 grant programme which meant to achieve sustainable reduction in poverty. A total of 20 consortia of Dutch Co Financing Agencies have been awarded €1.9 billion in MFS II grants by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).

One component of the MFS II programme addresses the extent to which the Southern Partners of the Dutch Consortia are contributing towards strengthening civil society and this evaluation assesses this contribution for Southern Partner countries in Indonesia, India and Ethiopia. The evaluation comprised a baseline study, carried out in 2012, followed by an end line study in 2014.

The entire MFS II evaluation comprises assessments in eight countries where apart from a civil society component, also assessments towards achieving MDGs and strengthening the capacity of the southern partner organisations by the CFAs. A synthesis team is in place to aggregate findings of all eight countries. This team convened three synthesis team meetings, one in 2012, one in 2013 and one in 2014. All three meetings aimed at harmonising evaluation methodologies for each component across countries. CDI has been playing a leading role in harmonising its Civil Society and Organisational Capacity assessment with the other organisations in charge for those components in the other countries.

This appendix describes the methodology that has been developed for the evaluation of the efforts to strengthen civil society priority result area. We will first explain the purpose and scope of this evaluation and then present the overall evaluation design. We will conclude with describing methodological adaptations, limitations and implications.

#### 2.1.2 Civil Society assessment – purpose and scope

The overall purpose of the joint MFS II evaluations is to account for results of MFS II-funded or –co-funded development interventions implemented by Dutch CFAs and/or their Southern partners and to contribute to the improvement of future development interventions.

The civil society evaluation is organised around 5 key questions:

- What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?
- To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
- What is the relevance of these changes?

- 
- Were the development interventions of the MFS II consortia efficient?
  - What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

Furthermore, the evaluation methodology for efforts to strengthen civil society should:

- Describe how a representative sample of Southern partner organisations of the Dutch CFAs in the country will be taken
- Focus on five priority result areas that correspond with dimensions of the Civil Society Index (CSI) developed by CIVICUS (see paragraph 6.4 - Call for proposal). For each of those dimensions the call for proposal formulated key evaluation questions.
- Should compare results with available reference data (i.e. a CSI report or other relevant data from the country in question).

The results of this evaluation are to be used by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Dutch Consortia and their partner organisations. The evaluation methodology has to be participatory in the sense that Dutch Consortia and their partner organisation would be asked to give their own perception on a range of indicators of the adjusted CIVICUS analytical framework in 2012 and in 2014.

## 2.2 Designing the methodology

### 2.2.1 Evaluation principles and standards

The overall approach selected is a participatory, theory-based evaluation through a before and after comparison. This paragraph briefly describes these principles and how these have been translated into data collection principles. It also describes how a 'representative sample' of Southern Partner Organisations was selected and how the initial terms of references were adjusted with the consent of the commissioner of the evaluation, given the nature of the evaluation component and the resources available for the evaluation.

#### *Recognition of complexity*

The issues at stake and the interventions in civil society and policy influence are complex in nature, meaning that cause and effect relations can sometimes only be understood in retrospect and cannot be repeated. The evaluation methods should therefore focus on recurring patterns of practice, using different perspectives to understand changes and to acknowledge that the evaluation means to draw conclusions about complex adaptive systems (Kurtz and Snowden, 2003)<sup>40</sup>.

Changes in the values of the Civil Society Indicators in the 2012-2014 period are then the result of conflict management processes, interactive learning events, new incentives (carrots and sticks) that mobilise or demobilise civil society, rather than the result of a change process that can be predicted from A to Z (a linear or logical framework approach)<sup>41</sup>.

#### *A theory-based evaluation*

Theory-based evaluation has the advantage of situating the evaluation findings in an analysis that includes both what happened over the life of the project as well as the how and why of what happened (Rogers 2004). It demonstrates its capacity to help understand why a program works or fails to work, going further than knowing only outcomes by trying to systematically enter the black box (Weiss 2004).

Theory-based evaluations can provide a framework to judge effectiveness in context of high levels of complexity, uncertainty, and changeability when traditional (impact) evaluation methods are not suitable: the use of control groups for the civil society evaluation is problematic since comparable organizations with comparable networks and operating in a similar external environment would be quite difficult to identify and statistical techniques of matching cannot be used because of a small n.

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<sup>40</sup> C. F. Kurtz, D. J. Snowden, The new dynamics of strategy: Sense-making in a complex and complicated world, in IBM Systems Journal vol 42, no 3, 2003)

<sup>41</sup> Caluwe de, L & Vermaak H. (2003) "Learning to Change. A Guide for Organization Change Agents" Sage Publications.

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Because SPO's theories of change regarding their efforts to build civil society or to influence policies may alter during the 2012-2014 period, it requires us to develop a deep understanding of the change process and the dynamics that affect civil society and policies. It is important to understand what has led to specific (non-) changes and (un)-expected changes. These external factors and actors, as well as the SPO's agency need to be taken into account for the attribution question. Linear input-activities-outputs-outcomes-impact chains do not suffice for complex issues where change is both the result of SPOs' interventions as those by other actors and/or factors.

Therefore, the most reasonable counterfactual that can be used for this evaluation is that of considering alternative causal explanations of change (White and Philips, 2012). Therefore the SPOs' Theory of Change constructed in 2012 is also related to a Model of Change constructed in 2014 that tries to find the ultimate explanations of what happened in reality, including other actors and factors that might possibly explain the outcomes achieved.

#### *Triangulation of methods and sources of information*

For purposes of triangulation to improve the robustness, validity or credibility of the findings of the evaluation we used different types of data collection and analysis methods as well as different sources of information. The CIVICUS analytical framework was adjusted for this evaluation in terms of providing standard impact outcome indicators to be taken into account. Data collection methods used consisted of workshops with the SPO, interviews with key resource persons, focus group discussions, social network analysis (during the baseline), consultation of project documents; MFS II consortia documents and other documents relevant to assess general trends in civil society.

#### *Participatory evaluation*

The evaluation is participatory in that both baseline and end line started with a workshop with SPO staff, decision makers and where possible board members. The baseline workshop helped SPOs to construct their own theory of change with regards to civil society. Detailed guidelines and tools have been developed by CDI for both baseline and follow-up, and these have been piloted in each of the countries CDI is involved in. Country based evaluators have had a critical input in reviewing and adapting these detailed guidelines and tools. This enhanced a rigorous data collection process. Additionally, the process of data analysis has been participatory where both CDI and in-country teams took part in the process and cross-check each other's inputs for improved quality. Rigorous analysis of the qualitative data was done with the assistance of the NVivo software program.

#### *Using the evaluation standards as a starting point*

As much as possible within the boundaries of this accountability driven evaluation, the evaluation teams tried to respect the following internationally agreed upon standards for program evaluation (Yarbrough et al, 2011). These are, in order of priority: Utility; Feasibility; Propriety; Accuracy; Accountability. However, given the entire set-up of the evaluation, the evaluation team cannot fully ensure the extent to which the evaluation is utile for the SPO and their CFAs; and cannot ensure that the evaluation findings are used in a proper way and not for political reasons;

## 2.2.2 Sample selection

The terms of reference for this evaluation stipulate that the evaluators draw a sample of southern partner organisations to include in the assessment. Given the fact that the first evaluation questions intends to draw conclusions for the MDGs or the themes (governance or fragile states) for each countries a sample was drawn for the two or three most frequent MDGs or themes that the SPOs are working in.

The Dutch MFS II consortia were asked to provide information for each SPO regarding the MDG/theme it is working on, if it has an explicit agenda in the area of civil society strengthening and/or policy influence. The database then give an insight into the most important MDG/themes covered by the partner organisations, how many of these have an explicit agenda regarding civil society strengthening and/or policy influence. For Indonesia, 5 partner organisations were randomly selected for respectively MDG 7 (natural resources) and 5 for the governance theme. For India 5 SPOs were selected for MDG 1 (economic or agricultural development) and 5 others for the theme governance. The sample in Ethiopia

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consists of 3 SPOs working on MDG 4,5 and 6 (Health); 3 SPOs for MDG 2 (education) and 3 SPOs for MDG 1 (economic or agricultural development).

### 2.2.3 Changes in the original terms of reference

Two major changes have been introduced during this evaluation and accepted by the commissioner of the MFS II evaluation. These changes were agreed upon during the 2013 and the 2014 synthesis team meetings.

#### *The efficiency evaluation question:*

During the June 2013 synthesis meeting the following decision was made with regards to measuring how efficient MFS II interventions for organisational capacity and civil society are:

*[...] it was stressed that it is difficult to disentangle budgets for capacity development and civil society strengthening. SPOs usually don't keep track of these activities separately; they are included in general project budgets. Therefore, teams agreed to assess efficiency of CD [capacity development] and CS activities in terms of the outcomes and/or outputs of the MDG projects. This implies no efficiency assessment will be held for those SPOs without a sampled MDG project. Moreover, the efficiency assessment of MDG projects needs to take into account CD and CS budgets (in case these are specified separately). Teams will evaluate efficiency in terms of outcomes if possible. If project outcomes are unlikely to be observed already in 2014, efficiency will be judged in terms of outputs or intermediate results (e-mail quotation from Gerton Rongen at February 6, 2014).*

#### *Attribution/contribution evaluation question*

During the June 2013 NWO-WOTRO workshop strategies were discussed to fit the amount of evaluation work to be done with the available resources. Therefore,

1. The number of SPOs that will undergo a full-fledged analysis to answer the attribution question, were to be reduced to 50 percent of all SPOs. Therefore the evaluation team used the following selection criteria:
  - An estimation of the annual amount of MFS II funding allocated to interventions that have a more or less direct relation with the civil society component. This implies the following steps to be followed for the inventory:
    - Covering all MDGs/themes in the original sample
    - Covering a variety of Dutch alliances and CFAs
2. The focus of the attribution question will be on two impact outcome areas, those most commonly present in the SPO sample for each country. The evaluation team distinguishes four different impact outcome areas:
  - The extent to which the SPO, with MFS II funding, engages more and diverse categories of society in the 2011-2014 period (Civicus dimensions "Civic engagement" and "perception of impact")
  - The extent to which the SPOs supports its intermediate organisations to make a valuable contribution to civil society in the 2011 -2014 period (Civicus dimension "Level of organisation" and "perception of impact")
  - The extent to which the SPO itself engages with other civil society organisations to make a valuable contribution to civil society in the 2011-2014 period (Civicus dimension "level of organisation")
  - The extent to which the SPO contributes to changing public and private sector policies and practices in the 2011-2014 period (Civicus dimension "perception of impact")
3. The CS dimension 'Practice of Values' has been excluded, because this dimension is similar to issues dealt with for the organisational capacity assessment.

The aforementioned analysis drew the following conclusions:

**Table 6**

*SPOs to be included for full-fledged process tracing analysis.*

Country	SPO in the in-depth analysis	Strategic CS orientation to include
Indonesia	Elsam, WARSI, CRI, NTFP-EP, LPPSLH	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Strengthening intermediate organisations AND influencing policies and practices</li> <li>2. If only one of the two above mentioned is applicable, then select another appropriate impact outcome area to look at.</li> </ol>
India	NNET, CWM, CECEOEDCON, Reds Tumkur, CSA	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Enhancing civic engagement AND strengthening intermediate organisations</li> <li>2. If only one of the two above mentioned is applicable then select another appropriate impact outcome area to look at.</li> </ol>
Ethiopia	OSSA, EKHC, CCGG&SO, JeCCDO and ADAA	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Strengthening the capacities of intermediate organisations AND SPO's engagement in the wider CS arena</li> <li>2. If only one of the two above mentioned is applicable then select another appropriate impact outcome area to look at.</li> </ol>

Source: Consultation of project documents

## 2.3 Answering the evaluation questions

### 2.3.1 Evaluation question 1 - Changes in civil society for the relevant MDGs/topics

Evaluation question 1: *What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?*

#### *Indicators and tools used*

In line with the CIVICUS Civil Society Index, a scoring tool was developed in 2012 which comprises 17 indicators. The selection was inspired by those suggested in the terms of reference of the commissioner. Each indicator was, also in line with the CIVICUS index accompanied by an open evaluation question to be used for data collection in 2012 and 2014. In 2012 the scoring tool contained four statements describing the level of achievements of the indicator and scores ranged from 0 to 3 (low score - high score).

A comparison of the scores obtained in 2012 informed the evaluation team that there was a positive bias towards high scores, mostly between 2 and 3. Therefore during the 2014 assessment, it was decided to measure relative changes for each indicator in the 2012 – 2014 period, as well as the reasons for changes or no changes and assigning a score reflecting the change between -2 (considerable deterioration of the indicator value since 2012) and +2 (considerable improvement).

In 2012 and based upon the Theory of Change constructed with the SPO, a set of *standard indicators* were identified that would ensure a relation between the standard CIVICUS indicators and the interventions of the SPO. However, these indicators were not anymore included in the 2014 assessment because of the resources available and because the methodology fine-tuned for the attribution question in 2013, made measurement of these indicators redundant.

Also in 2012, as a means to measure the 'level of organisation' dimension a *social network analysis tool* was introduced. However this tool received very little response and was discontinued during the end line study.

#### *Key questions to be answered for this evaluation question*

In 2012, SPO staff and leaders, as well as outside resource persons were asked to provide answers to 17 questions, one per standard indicator of the scoring tool developed by CDI.

In 2012, the SPO staff and leaders were given the description of each indicator as it was in 2012 and had to answer the following questions:

1. How has the situation of this indicator changed compared to its description of the 2012 situation? Did it deteriorate considerably or did it improve considerably (-2 → +2)
2. What exactly has changed since 2012 for the civil society indicator that you are looking at? Be as specific as possible in your description.
3. What interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the situation in 2012? Please tick and describe what happened and to what change this led. It is possible to tick and describe more than one choice.
  - Intervention by SPO, NOT financed by any of your Dutch partners .....
  - Intervention SPO, financed by your Dutch partner organisation .....(In case you receive funding from two Dutch partners, please specify which partner is meant here)
  - Other actor NOT the SPO, please specify.....
  - Other factor, NOT actor related, please specify.....
  - A combination of actors and factors, INCLUDING the SPO, but NOT with Dutch funding, please specify...
  - A combination of actors and factors, INCLUDING the SPO, but WITH Dutch funding, please specify...
  - Don't know
4. Generally speaking, which two of the five CIVICUS dimensions (civic engagement, level of organisation, practice of values, perception of impact, environment) changed considerably between 2012 – 2014? For each of these changes, please describe:
  - Nature of the change
  - Key interventions, actors and factors (MFS II or non-MFS II related) that explain each change (entirely or partially).

#### *Sources for data collection*

During the baseline and the end line and for purposes of triangulation, several methods were used to collect data on each (standard) indicator:

- Self-assessment per category of staff within the SPO: where possible, three subgroups were made to assess the scores: field staff/programme staff, executive leadership and representatives of the board, general assembly, and internal auditing groups if applicable completed with separate interviews;
- Interviews with external resource persons. These consisted of three categories: key actors that are knowledgeable about the MDG/theme the SPO is working on and who know the civil society arena around these topics; civil society organisations that are being affected by the programme through support or CSOs with which the SPO is collaborating on equal footing, and; representatives of public or private sector organisations with which the SPO is interacting
- Consultation and analysis of reports that relate to each of the five CIVICUS dimensions.
- Project documents, financial and narrative progress reports, as well as correspondence between the SPO and the CFA.
- Social network analysis (SNA), which was discontinued in the end line study.

During the follow-up, emphasis was put on interviewing the same staff and external persons who were involved during the baseline for purpose of continuity.

### 2.3.2 Evaluation question 2 – “Attribution” of changes in civil society to interventions of SPOs.

*Evaluation question 2: To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?*

#### *Adapting the evaluation question and introduction to the methodology chosen*

In line with the observation of Stern et al. (2012) that the evaluation question, the programme attributes, and the evaluation approaches all provide important elements to conclude on the evaluation design to select, the teams in charge of evaluating the civil society component concluded that given the attributes of the programmes it was impossible to answer the *attribution* question as formulated in the



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Terms of References of the evaluation and mentioned above. Therefore, the evaluation teams worked towards answering the extent *to which the programme contributed towards realising the outcomes*.

For this endeavour explaining outcome process-tracing<sup>42</sup> was used. The objective of the process tracing methodology for MFS II, in particular for the civil society component is to:

- Identify what interventions, actors and factors explain selected impact outcomes for process tracing.
- Assess how the SPO with MFS II funding contributed to the changes in the selected impact outcomes and how important this contribution is given other actors and factors that possibly influence the attainment of the outcome. Ruling out rival explanations, which are other interventions, actors or factors that are not related to MFS II funding.

#### *Methodology – getting prepared*

As described before a limited number of SPOs were selected for process tracing and for each country strategic orientations were identified as a means to prevent a bias occurring towards only positive impact outcomes and as a means to support the in-country evaluation teams with the selection of outcomes to focus on as much as was possible, based upon the project documents available at CDI. These documents were used to track realised outputs and outcomes against planned outputs and outcomes. During the workshop (see evaluation question on changes in civil society) and follow-up interviews with the SPO, two impact outcomes were selected for process tracing.

#### *Steps in process tracing*

1. Construct the theoretical model of change – by in-country evaluation team

After the two impact outcomes have been selected and information has been obtained about what has actually been achieved, the in-country evaluation team constructs a visual that shows all pathways that might possibly explain the outcomes. The inventory of those possible pathways is done with the SPO, but also with external resource persons and documents consulted. This culminated in a Model of Change. A MoC of good quality includes: The causal pathways that relate interventions/parts by any actor, including the SPO to the realised impact outcome; assumptions that clarify relations between different parts in the pathway, and; case specific and/or context specific factors or risks that might influence the causal pathway, such as for instance specific attributes of the actor or socio-cultural-economic context. The Models of Change were discussed with the SPO and validated.

2. Identify information needs to confirm or reject causal pathways as well as information sources needed.

This step aims to critically reflect upon what information is needed that helps to confirm one of causal pathways and at that at same time helps to reject the other possible explanations. Reality warns that this type of evidence will hardly be available for complex development efforts. The evaluators were asked to behave as detectives of Crime Scene Investigation, ensuring that the focus of the evaluation was not only on checking if parts/interventions had taken place accordingly, but more specifically on identifying information needs that confirm or reject the relations between the parts/interventions. The key question to be answered was: "What information do we need in order to confirm or reject that one part leads to another part or, that X causes Y?". Four types of evidence were used, where appropriate:<sup>43</sup>

- *Pattern evidence* relates to predictions of statistical patterns in the evidence. This may consist of trends analysis and correlations.
- *Sequence evidence* deals with the temporal and spatial chronology of events predicted by a hypothesised causal mechanism. For example, a test of the hypothesis could involve expectations of the timing of events where we might predict that if the hypothesis is valid, we should see that the event B took place after event A. However, if we found that event B took place before event A, the test

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<sup>42</sup> Explaining outcome process tracing attempts to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific historical case. Here the aim is not to build or test more general theories but to craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case centric than theory oriented. The aim of process tracing is not to verify if an intended process of interventions took place as planned in a particular situation, but that it aims at increasing our understanding about what works under what conditions and why (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

<sup>43</sup> Beach and Pederson, 2013

would suggest that our confidence in the validity of this part of the mechanism should be reduced (disconfirmation/ falsification).

- *Trace evidence* is evidence whose mere existence provides proof that a part of a hypothesised mechanism exists. For example, the existence of meeting minutes, if authentic, provides strong proof that the meeting took place.
- *Account evidence* deals with the content of empirical material, such as meeting minutes that detail what was discussed or an oral account of what took place in the meeting.

3. Collect information necessary to confirm or reject causal pathways

Based upon the inventory of information needs the evaluation teams make their data collection plan after which data collection takes place.

4. Analyse the data collected and assessment of their quality.

This step consists of compiling all information collected in favour or against a causal pathway in a table or in a list per pathway. For all information used, the sources of information are mentioned and an assessment of the strength of the evidence takes place, making a distinction between strong, weak and moderate evidence. For this we use the traffic light system: **green letters mean strong evidence**, **red letters mean weak evidence** and **orange letter mean moderate evidence**: The following table provides the format used to assess these issues.

Table 7

*Organisation of information collected per causal pathway and assessing their quality*

Causal pathway	Information that confirms (parts of) this pathway	Source of information	Information that rejects (parts of) this pathway	Source of information
Pathway 1	<b>Information 1</b>	Source of information	<b>Information 1</b>	Source of information
Part 1.1	<b>Information 2</b>	Source of information	<b>Information 2</b>	Source of information
Part 1.2	<b>Information 3</b>	Source of information	<b>Information 3</b>	Source of information
Etc	etc	etc	etc	etc
Pathway 2	<b>Information 1</b>	Source of information	<b>Information 1</b>	Source of information
Part 2.1	<b>Information 2</b>	Source of information	<b>Information 2</b>	Source of information
Part 2.2	<b>Information 3</b>	Source of information	<b>Information 3</b>	Source of information
Etc.	etc	etc	etc	etc
Pathway 3				






Sources: Dieuwke Klaver

5. Assessing the nature of the relations between parts in the model of change

The classification of all information collected is being followed by the identification of the pathways that most likely explain the impact outcome achieved. For this the evaluators assess the nature of the relations between different parts in the MoC. Based upon Mayne (2012) and Stern et al (2012) the following relations between parts in the MoC are mapped and the symbols inserted into the original MoC.

Table 8

*Nature of the relation between parts in the Model of Change*

Nature of the relation between parts and other parts or outcome	
The part is the only causal explanation for the outcome. No other interventions or factors explain it. (necessary and sufficient)	
The part does not explain the outcome at all: other subcomponents explain the outcomes.	
The part explains the outcome but other parts explain the outcome as well: there are multiple pathways (sufficient but not necessary)	
The part is a condition for the outcome but won't make it happen without other factors (necessary but not sufficient)	
The part explains the outcome, but requires the help of other parts to explain the outcome in a sufficient and necessary way (not a sufficient cause, but necessary) → it is part of a causal package	

Sources: Mayne, 2012; Stern et al, 2012

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## 6. Write down the contribution and assess the role of the SPO and MFS II funding

This final step consists of answering the following questions, as a final assessment of the contribution question:

- The first question to be answered is: What explains the impact outcome?
- The second question is: What is the role of the SPO in this explanation?
- The third question, if applicable is: what is the role of MFS II funding in this explanation?

### *Sources for data collection*

Information necessary to answer this evaluation question is to be collected from:

- Interviews with resource persons inside and outside the SPO
- Project documents and documentation made available by other informants
- Websites that possibly confirm that an outcome is achieved and that the SPO is associated with this outcome
- Meeting minutes of meetings between officials
- Time lines to trace the historical relations between events
- Policy documents
- etc

## 2.3.3 Evaluation question 3 – Relevance of the changes

Evaluation question 3: *What is the relevance of these changes?*

The following questions are to be answered in order to assess the relevance of the changes in Civil Society.

- How do the MFS II interventions and civil society outcomes align with the Theory of Change developed during the baseline in 2012? What were reasons for changing or not changing interventions and strategies?
- What is the civil society policy of the Dutch alliance that collaborates with the SPO? And how do the MFS II interventions and civil society outcomes align with the civil society policy of the Dutch alliance that collaborates with the SPO?
- How relevant are the changes achieved in relation to the context in which the SPO is operating?
- What is the further significance of these changes for building a vibrant civil society for the particular MDG/ theme in the particular context?

### *Sources for data collection*

For this question the following sources are to be consulted:

- Review of the information collected during interviews with the SPO and outside resource persons
- The 2012 Theory of Change
- Interview with the CFA liaison officer of the SPO;
- Review of reports, i.e: the civil society policy document of the Dutch Alliance that was submitted for MFS II funding, relevant documents describing civil society for the MDG/ theme the SPO is working on in a given context.

## 2.3.4 Evaluation question 4, previously 5 - Factors explaining the findings

Evaluation question 4: *What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?*

To answer this question we look into information available that:

- Highlight changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO
- Highlight changes in the relations between the SPO and the CFA
- Highlight changes in the context in which the SPO is operating and how this might affect positively or negatively its organisational capacity.

### *Sources for data collection*

Sources of information to be consulted are:

- Project documents

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- Communications between the CFA and the SPO
  - Information already collected during the previous evaluation questions.

## 2.4 Analysis of findings

A qualitative software programme NVivo 10 (2010) was used to assist in organizing and making sense of all data collected. Although the software cannot take over the task of qualitative data analysis, it does 1) improve transparency by creating a record of all steps taken, 2) organize the data and allow the evaluator to conduct a systematic analysis, 3) assist in identifying important themes that might otherwise be missed, and 4) reduce the danger of bias due to human cognitive limitations, compared to "intuitive data processing" (Sadler 1981). The qualitative data in the evaluation consisted of transcripts from semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions workshops, field notes from observation, and a range of documents available at the SPO or secondary information used to collect reference data and to obtain a better understanding of the context in which the CS component evolves.

To analyse this diverse collection of data, several analytical strategies are envisioned, specifically content analysis, discourse analysis, and thematic analysis. Although each of these strategies can be understood as a different lens through which to view the data, all will require a carefully developed and executed coding plan.

Data have been coded according to: standard civil society indicator; outcome included for in-depth contribution analysis; relevance, and; explaining factors.

This qualitative analysis will be supported by a limited amount of quantitative data largely arising from the score assigned by the evaluation team to each performance indicator described in the civil society scoring tool. Other quantitative data in this study are drawn information provided in background literature and organisational documents as well as the Social Network Analysis method.

## 2.5 Limitations to the methodology

### 2.5.1 General limitations with regards to the MFS II evaluation

#### *The MFS II programme and CIVICUS*

Although the MFS II programme stated that all proposals need to contribute to civil society strengthening in the South<sup>44</sup>, mention was made of the use of the CIVICUS framework for monitoring purposes. The fact that civil society was to be integrated as one of the priority result areas next to that of organisational capacity and MDGs became only clear when the MoFA communicated its mandatory monitoring protocol. In consequence, civil society strengthening in the MFS II programmes submitted to the ministry is mainstreamed into different sub programmes, but not addressed as a separate entity.

This late introduction of the Civil Society component also implies that project documents and progress reports do not make a distinction in MDG or theme components vs those of civil society strengthening, leaving the interpretation of what is a civil society intervention our outcome and what not to the interpretation of the evaluation team.

At the same time the evaluation team observes that SPOs and CFAs have started to incorporate the organisational capacity tool that is being used in the monitoring protocol in their own organisational assessment procedures. None of the SPOs is familiar with the CIVICUS framework and how it fits into their interventions.

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<sup>44</sup> Policy Framework Dutch Cofinancing System II 2011 - 2015

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### *Differences between CIVICUS and MFS II evaluation*

CIVICUS developed a Civil Society Index that distinguishes 5 dimensions and for each of these a set of indicators has been developed. Based upon a variety of data collection methods, a validation team composed of civil society leaders provides the scores for the civil society index.

Major differences between the way the Civil Society Index is been used by CIVICUS and for this MFS II evaluation is the following:

1. CIVICUS defines its unit of analysis in terms of the civil society arena at national and/or subnational level and does not start from individual NGOs. The MFS II evaluation put the SPO in the middle of the civil society arena and then looked at organisations that receive support; organisations with which the SPO is collaborating. The civil society arena boundaries for the MFS II evaluation are the public or private sector organisations that the SPO relates to or whose policies and practices it aims to influence
2. The CIVICUS assessments are conducted by civil society members itself whereas the MFS II evaluation is by nature an external evaluation conducted by external researchers. CIVICUS assumes that its assessments, by organising them as a joint learning exercise, will introduce change that is however not planned. With the MFS II evaluation the focus was on the extent to which the interventions of the SPO impacted upon the civil society indicators.
3. CIVICUS has never used its civil society index as a tool to measure change over a number of years. Each assessment is a stand-alone exercise and no efforts are being made to compare indicators over time or to attribute changes in indicators to a number of organisations or external trends.

### *Dimensions and indicator choice*

The CIVICUS dimensions in themselves are partially overlapping; the dimension 'perception of impact' for instance contains elements that relate to 'civic engagement' and to 'level of organisation'. Similar overlap is occurring in the civil society scoring tool developed for this evaluation and which was highly oriented by a list of evaluation questions set by the commissioner of the evaluation.

Apart from the overlap, we observe that some of the standard indicators used for the civil society evaluation were not meaningful for the SPOs under evaluation. This applies for instance for the political engagement indicator "How intense is your (individual staff or organisational) participation in locally-nationally elected bodies and/or sectoral user groups?".

### *Measuring change over a two-year period*

The MFS II programme started its implementation in 2011 and it will finish in 2015, whereas its evaluation started mid-2012 and will end in the beginning of 2014. The period between the baseline and the end line measurement hardly covers 2 years in some cases. Civil society building and policy influence are considered the type of interventions that requires up to 10 years to reap significant results, especially when taking into account attitudes and behaviour. Apart from the fact that the baseline was done when MFS II was already operational in the field for some 1,5 years, some SPO interventions were a continuation of programmes designed under the MFS I programme, hence illustrating that the MFS II period is not a clear boundary. Contracts with other SPOs ended already in 2012, and practically coincided with the baseline assessment being conducted at the moment the relationship with the CFA had practically ended.

### *Aggregation of findings*

Although working with standard indicators and assigning them scores creates expectations of findings being compared and aggregated at national and international level, this may lend itself to a quick but inaccurate assessment of change. Crude comparison between programs on the basis of findings is problematic, and risks being politically abused. The evaluation team has to guard against these abuses by ensuring the necessary modesty in extrapolating findings and drawing conclusions.

### *Linking the civil society component to the other components of the MFS II evaluation*

The Theory of Change in the terms of reference assumes that CFAs are strengthening the organisational capacity of their partners, which is evaluated in the organisational capacity components, which then leads to impact upon MDGs or upon civil society. Because the evaluation methodology designed for both the organisational capacity and the civil society evaluation require considerable time investments of the SPOs, a deliberate choice was made not to include SPOs under the organisational capacity component in

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that of Civil Society. This may possibly hamper conclusions regarding the assumption of capacitated SPOs being able to impact upon civil society. However, where information is available and where it is relevant, the civil society component will address organisational capacity issues.

No such limitations were made with regards to SPOs in the MDG sample, however, apart from Indonesia; none of the SPOs in the civil society sample is also in that of MDG.

### 2.5.2 Limitations during baseline with regards to the methodology

A very important principle upon which this evaluation methodology is based is that of triangulation, which implies that different stakeholders and documents are consulted to obtain information about the same indicator from different perspectives. Based upon these multiple perspectives, a final score can be given on the same indicator which is more valid and credible.

For Ethiopia this has not always been possible:

- A Survey Monkey questionnaire was developed to assess the intensity of the interaction between stakeholders in the Basic Education Network of Ethiopia. Out of 85 actors that were invited to fill in this 5 minute questionnaire, none of them effectively filled in the questionnaire. The online Social Network Analysis aims at having both the opinion of the SPO on the intensity of the interaction with another actor, as well as the opinion of the other actor for triangulation. Important reasons for not filling in this form are that actors in the network are not technology savvy, or that they have difficulties in accessing internet.
- With regards to filling in offline interview forms or answering questions during interviews a number of civil society actors did not want to score themselves because they do not benefit from the interventions of the MFS II projects. Having the scores of their own organisations will help to assess the wider environment in which the SPO operates and possibly an impact of the SPO on other civil society organisations in 2014.
- All respondents working for CSOs are working on a voluntary basis. It has not been easy for the evaluation team to fix appointments with them. Voluntary work so high staff turn-over → new staff is not knowledgeable about the interview topics ( loss of institutional memory)
- SPOs in Ethiopia are not influencing public sector policies but are implementing these public sector policies. This means that most often there will be no efforts to influence those policies, but efforts are made to make those policies operational at local level and to revitalise them.

### 2.5.3 Limitations during end line with regards to the methodology

#### *Project documentation*

The methodology assumed that project documents and progress reports would be helpful in linking project interventions to the CIVICUS framework and obtaining an overview of outputs-outcomes achieved versus planned. These overviews would then be used to orient the in-country evaluation teams for the quick or in-depth contribution analysis.

In practice the most recent progress reports were hardly available with the CFAs or were made available later in the process. These reports often were not helpful in accumulating outputs towards to the planned outputs and even outcomes. Hardly any information is available at outcome or impact level and no monitoring systems are available to do so. Key information missing and relevant for civil society impact (but also to track progress being made on effects of project interventions) is for instance a comprehensive overview of the organisational performance of organisations supported by the SPO. For a number of SPOs the reality was different than the progress reports reflected which meant that constant fine-tuning with the in-country evaluation team was necessary and that CDI could not always provide them with the guidance needed for the selection of impact outcomes for contribution analysis.

A number of organisations that the evaluation team looked at for the civil society component are working in a programmatic approach with other partner organisations. In consequence reporting was organised at the programme level and to a lesser extent at the level of the individual partner, which seriously

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hampered the possibilities to get oversight on outcomes and output achieved. This was the case with EKHC and MKC-RDA, ERSHA, EfDA and JeCCDO.

The Ethiopian evaluation team made the following evaluation remarks with regards to the methodology.

*1. What worked?*

The team had no difficulties in triangulating information obtained from different resource persons (Government, beneficiaries and SPOs) which helped to cross check information.

The document analysis by CDI, including providing guidance for the fieldwork has been helpful for the team.

The use of the Models of Change for process-tracing helped both the evaluation team as the SPO staff in obtaining a clear picture of the inputs, out puts and outcomes and to get a general picture of the evaluation.

*2. What didn't work and why?*

There was repetition in a number of questions in the evaluation methodology, such the forms used during the workshop with the SPO, the interviews with the SPO after the workshops; questions were interpreted by the SPO staff of being more or less the same and therefore made them less interested to go into detail or be specific.

The workshop form to be filled in for the CS indicators was long and therefore answers given may have been too general. Some of the questions were not clear and seemed similar to the others and therefore were misunderstood and got wrong responses.

*3. Challenges encountered*

The team observes that it was very difficult to obtain exact information from resource persons, including those representing the SPOs. Resource persons were able to give facts based upon general observations in most cases but were not able to provide figures. Therefore the in country team suggests to identify a number of indicators during the baseline and to ask the SPO and their headquarters to monitor those indicators since the baseline as a means to inform the end line study.

Some beneficiaries were not aware or did not keep track of numbers and figures, making it also difficult to confirm or reject quantitative information from the SPO. The in-country evaluation team suggests to incorporate quantitative analysis in the evaluation of the CS component.

The partner organisations do not keep records of progress and what they document is available in hard copy. They also keep (monthly) records but do not aggregate these.

High staff turnover within the SPOs also hampered the evaluation.

## Civil Society Scoring tool - baseline

### Civil Society Assessment tool – Standard Indicators

Dimension	Outcome domains		Question	Statements				x	What are factors (strengths, weaknesses) that explain the current situation?
				0	1	2	3		
Civic engagement	1	Needs of marginalised groups	How does your organisation take the needs of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups into account in your planning, actions, activities, and/or strategies?	Are NOT taken into account	Are POORLY taken into account	Are PARTLY taken into account	Are FULLY taken into account	Question not relevant, because .....	
	2	Involvement of target groups	What is the level of participation of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups in the analysis, planning and evaluation of your activities?	They are INFORMED about on-going and/or new activities that you will implement	They are CONSULTED by your organisation. You define the problems and provide the solutions.	They CARRY OUT activities and/or form groups upon your request. They provide resources (time, land, labour) in return for your assistance (material and/or immaterial)	They ANALYSE PROBLEMS AND FORMULATE IDEAS together with your organisation and/or take action independently from you.	Question not relevant, because .....	
	3	Political engagement	How intense is your (individual staff or organisational) participation in locally-nationally elected bodies and/or sectoral user groups?	No participation	You are occasionally CONSULTED by these bodies	You are a member of these bodies. You attend meetings as a participant	You are a member of these bodies. You are chairing these bodies or sub groups	Question not relevant, because .....	



organisation level of	5	Relations with other organisations	In the past 12 months what has been the most intensive interaction you had with other CSOs?	No interaction at all	Networking - Cooperation: Inform each other; roles somewhat defined; all decisions made independently	Coordination - Coalition: ideas and resources shared; roles defined and divided; all have a vote in decision making	Collaboration: organisations belong to one system; mutual trust; consensus on all decisions.	Question not relevant, because .....	
	5	Frequency of dialogue with closest CSO	In the past 12 months how many meetings did you have with the CSO that you have most intensive interaction with?	No interaction at all	Less than 2 times a year	Between 2 and 3 times a year	More than 4 times a year	Question not relevant, because .....	
	6	Defending the interests of marginalised groups:	Which CSO are most effective in defending the interests of your target groups? In the past 12 months, how did you relate to those CSOs?	No interaction at all	Networking - Cooperation: Inform each other; roles somewhat defined; all decisions made independently	Coordination - Coalition: ideas and resources shared; roles defined and divided; all have a vote in decision making	Collaboration: organisations belong to one system; mutual trust; consensus on all decisions.	Question not relevant, because .....	
	7	Composition current financial resource base	How does your organisation finance institutional costs such as workshops of the General Assembly (if applicable); attendans to workshops of other CSOs; costs for organisational growth and/or networking?	Depends on 1 international donor	Depends on few financial sources: one fund cover(s) more than 75% of all costs.	Depends on a variety of financial sources; one fund cover(s) more than 50% of all costs.	Depends on a variety of sources of equal importance. Wide network of domestic funds	Question not relevant, because .....	
Practice of Values	8	Downward accountability	To what extent can mandatory social organs (steering committee, general assembly, internal auditing group) ask your executive leaders to be accountable to them?	(financial) information is made available and decisions are taken openly	They fulfil their formal obligation to explain strategic decisions and actions	They react to requests of social organs to justify/explain actions and decisions made	Social organs use their power to sanction management in case of misconduct or abuse	Question not relevant, because .....	
	9	Composition of social organs	What % of members of your mandatory social organs belong to the marginalised target groups you are working with/for?	Between 0-10 % of all members of the social organs	Between 11-30 % of all members of the social organs	Between 31-65 % of all members of the social organs	More than 65% of all members of the social organs	Question not relevant, because .....	

	10	External financial auditing	How regularly is your organisation audited externally?	Never	Occasionally, upon request of funders	Periodically and regularly, because our external funder asks for it	Periodically and regularly, because it is part of our code of conduct	Question not relevant, because .....	
Perception of impact	11	Client satisfaction	What are the most important concerns of your target groups? How do your services take into account those important concerns?	Majority of target groups are NOT satisfied	Majority of target groups are POORLY satisfied	Majority of target groups are PARTLY satisfied	Majority of target groups are MOSTLY satisfied	Question not relevant, because .....	
	12	Civil society impact.	In the past 12 months, what impact did you have on building a strong civil society?	You have not undertaken any activities of this kind	You have undertaken activities of this kind but there is no discernible impact	You have undertaken activities of this kind but impact is limited	You have undertaken activities and examples of significant success can be detected.	Question not relevant, because .....	
	13	Relation with public sector organisations.	In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with public sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' objectives?	No direct interaction	You have been invited by public sector organisations for sharing of information	You have been invited by public sector organisations for regular consultations (but public sector decides)	Formal and regular meetings as a multi-stakeholder task force.	Question not relevant, because .....	
	14	Relation with private sector organisations	In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with private sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' perspective?	No direct interaction	You have been invited by private sector organisations for sharing of information	You have been invited by private sector organisations for regular consultations (but public sector decides)	Formal and regular meetings as a multi-stakeholder task force.	Question not relevant, because .....	
	15	Influence upon public policies, regulations	How successful have you been in influencing public policies and practices in the past 2 years?	No activities developed in this area	Some activities developed but without discernible impact	Many activities developed in this area, but impact until so far has been limited	Many activities developed in this area and examples of success can be detected	Question not relevant, because .....	

		Influence upon private sector agencies' policies, rules, regulations.	How successful have you been in influencing private sector policies and practices in the past 2 years?	No activities developed in this area	Some activities developed but without discernible impact	Many activities developed in this area, but impact until so far has been limited	Many activities developed in this area and examples of success can be detected	Question not relevant, because .....	
	16								
context Environmental			In the past 2 years, how did your organisation cope with these changes in the context that may have been positive or negative consequences for civil society.	No analysis of the space and role of civil society has been done.	You are collecting information of the space and role of civil society but not regularly analysing it.	You are monitoring the space and role of civil society and analysing the consequences of changes in the context for your own activities. Examples are available.	You are involved in joint action to make context more favourable. Examples are available.	Question not relevant, because .....	
	17	Coping strategies							



## Appendix 3 Civil Society Scores

This table presents the appreciation of the evaluation team regarding changes occurred for each indicator between 2012 and 2014 on a scale of -2 to + 2

- 2 = Considerable deterioration

- 1 = A slight deterioration

0 = no change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012

+1 = slight improvement

+2 = considerable improvement

Dimension		Indicators	Question	Change
Civic engagement	1	Needs of marginalised groups	How does your organisation take the needs of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups into account in your planning, actions, activities, and/or strategies?	-1
	2	Involvement of target groups	What is the level of participation of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups in the analysis, planning and evaluation of your activities?	0
	3	Political engagement	How intense is your (individual staff or organisational) participation in locally-nationally elected bodies and/or sectoral user groups?	0
Level of organisation	5	Relations with other organisations	In the past 12 months what has been the most intensive interaction you had with other CSOs?	0
	5	Frequency of dialogue with closest CSO	In the past 12 months how many meetings did you have with the CSO that you have most intensive interaction with?	-1
	6	Defending the interests of marginalised groups	Which CSO are most effective in defending the interests of your target groups? In the past 12 months, how did you relate to those CSOs?	0
	7	Composition current financial resource base	How does your organisation finance institutional costs such as workshops of the General Assembly (if applicable); attendance to workshops of other CSOs; costs for organisational growth and/or networking?	+1
Practice of Values	8	Downward accountability	To what extent can mandatory social organs (steering committee, general assembly, internal auditing group) ask your executive leaders to be accountable to them?	0
	9	Composition of social organs	What % of members of your mandatory social organs belong to the marginalised target groups you are working with/for?	0
	10	External financial auditing	How regularly is your organisation audited externally?	0
Perception of impact	11	Client satisfaction	What are the most important concerns of your target groups? How do your services take into account those important concerns?	+1
	12	Civil society impact.	In the past 12 months, what impact did you have on building a strong civil society?	0
	13	Relation with public sector organisations.	In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with public sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' objectives?	-2
	14	Relation with private sector organisations	In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with private sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' perspective?	0
	15	Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations	How successful have you been in influencing public policies and practices in the past 2 years?	-2
	16	Influence upon private sector agencies' policies, rules, regulations.	How successful have you been in influencing private sector policies and practices in the past 2 years?	0

CS context	17	Coping strategies	In the past 2 years, how did your organisation cope with these changes in the context that may have been positive or negative consequences for civil society.	-1
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# Appendix 4 Changes in civil society indicators between 2012 and 2014

## 1. Civic Engagement

### 1.1 Needs of marginalised groups SPO

Awareness raising meetings were conducted in each kebele prior to the beginning of the academic calendar and the woreda cabinet members played a significant role in this regard to improve participation of pastoralists in the education program. Education committees are also involved in the implementation process. As a result, some Hamar community members are motivated to send children to school. However, there is still resistance to send children to school particularly for girls' education. The most important reasons are low level of community awareness, high demand for child labour for keeping livestock and extremely high dowry. Preparation is going on to organize a woreda level education forum with all concerned partners including higher government officials, influential community leaders and NGOs working in the education sector.

Although there are changes in the community since 2012 most of the changes observed are from the interventions prior to 2012. The SPO had administrative problems which then led to an audit by the local government temporarily suspending the plans and activities of the SPO. This and the lack of follow up on the side of the government led to deterioration on some of the interventions. For instance, a cooperative shop was closed due to lack of input, some vegetable groups have not started operation even though inputs have been stored in the area, some materials for water harvesting have been laying on project sites for more than 9 months without being installed hence not serving any purpose. Some of the groups put together have also been dissolved for lack of motivation among members.

**Score: -1**

### 1.2 Involvement of target groups SPO

Before the start of the second phase of the project, orientation meetings were held in each new kebele to familiarize communities with the project plan. Over 200 people participated in the meetings, out of which 60 were women. Clarifications were made on the implementation strategies, role of communities, government and the project. The participants showed their readiness to participate in the project to maximize their benefits. In the occasion an old man from Simbele said, "We are just like oxen that plough the field. Unless we move in the same direction, we won't perform a job" emphasizing the need for collaboration.

Having agreed upon the targeting criteria with the community, the beneficiary identification process was started on some project activities. Community leaders and agricultural extension workers played a leading role on beneficiary identification together with the project team. The selection criteria include: vulnerable households, female headed households, persons with disability, elderly people who do not have support, those interested to participate, those who can be models for others, local potential to implement the activity. CCGG&SO then enters the community to create awareness on the use of vegetable production in terms of income generation and nutrition. Volunteers from the community then register to be part of the groups being formed. In general the Hamar community is reluctant to try new ideas until they see someone else try it and succeed, so they do not volunteer too much.

Eventually, 30 beneficiaries were selected and put into groups of 10. Then they were trained on land management and vegetation using the training manuals developed by government experts and after this they received farming materials and seeds by CCGG&SO and a land plot by the government. CCGG&SO further contributes transportation costs when possible and follows-up the activities at least for the first few months. The Development Agents (DA) of the agriculture offices at the various sites

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also provide consulting services and follow up. This support capacitates the groups which then leads to improved income and nutrition of group members. However, most of the groups put together for this purpose have either lost some of their members (reaching up to 5 members) or have all members working individually, because communities are not familiar with working as a group: They are pastoralists so herding cattle is their main activity and growing vegetables comes next.

CCGG has also created awareness on the benefits of cooperatives and established 3 cooperatives in the area: one in town and two in rural areas. The three cooperatives were handed over to the government for follow up who however failed to do so. Their purpose is to provide consumer goods such as oil and sugar aside other goods to prevent that traders increase prices in times of shortage.

The above outcomes help to motivate others when they realise the positive impacts for beneficiaries to also get engaged and to become successful. Those already involved in the intervention are also expected to further improve their livelihood, be able to afford/access better services and improve their food nutrition at household level. These changes in the Hamar society are relevant because they are changing people's mindset in terms of diversifying their income sources and in terms of consuming the products they produce with support of CCGG&SO. Concrete IGAs that motivate more people are poultry and goat keeping activities by destitute and widowed women, and vegetable growing.

Before 2012 women were oppressed but the government and NGOs like CCGG&SO are raising the awareness of for instance cooperative administrators about women's role, who in their turn will inform the community. Young women now are increasingly allowed to become a member of saving associations when their spouses die.

These aforementioned changes in community involvement were observed in the first few months of 2012 when CCGG&SO introduced the second phase of the project in the new kebeles and started the identification of new beneficiaries.

However, due to the emergence of internal problems the SPO has not been in contact with any parts of the community for almost a year until the conducting of the end-line study.

**Score: 0**

### 1.3 Intensity of political engagement SPO

The SPO does not involve in any political activities. No change has occurred since the baseline.

**Score: 0**

## 2 Level of Organisation

### 2.1 Relations with other organisations SPO

CCGG&SO, together with 10 other NGOs, participates in the annual NGO forum convened by the government. However, these meetings do not allow for further cooperation between the NGOs, but are used by the government to set its own agenda and to ask participating NGOs to adhere to this agenda. These NGOs are for example Action For Development (AFD), working on water and sanitation and IGA such as collective soap making with aloe vera as a local resource; AMREF working on the health sector; Save the Children and; Mom Child working with Orphans and Vulnerable Children.

CCGG&SO also participates in an annual review meeting on health but the person in charge is left and no further information is available.

CSOs in the area prefer to work individually rather than communicating and collaborating with each other because the locations they work are very different. CCGG&SO's initial collaboration with RED Cross stopped after the first aid training and handing over of the ambulance financed by the SPO.

CCGG&SO does not maintain relations with the IGA groups and cooperatives it creates and trains. After their creation all responsibilities are handed over to the woreda government. The government failed to supervise the three cooperatives. The SPO's interventions are limited to providing training at individual target group level, kebele and zonal level.



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**Score: 0**

## 2.2 Frequency of dialogue with closest civil society organisation SPO

Until February 2014, CCGG&SO managed to have regular meetings with the eight health insurance schemes, attended zonal health and education sector review meetings and hold meetings with community leaders in the 7 Kebeles. Due to internal problems the SPO did not continue these contacts as of February 2014.

**Score: -1**

## 2.3 Defending the interests of marginalised groups SPO

There is no evidence that CCGG&SO has been capable of defending the interests of its beneficiaries.

Score: 0

## 2.4 Composition financial resource base SPO

The three year ICDP project of 2010 – 2012 had a budget of €391,045 and the three year ICDP project of 2013 – 2015 has a total budget of €834,884, whereas Cordaid's share increased from €150,000 to €225,000.

This information indicates that CCGG&So's financial resource base has increased with regards to the implementation of its project in Hamar.

**Score: +1**

# 3 Practice of Values

## 3.1 Downward accountability SPO

No changes occurred with regards to downward accountability since the baseline. There are no formal accountability mechanisms in place to inform beneficiaries.

However CC-GGSO conducts meetings during which progress is reported from its side and from the community groups. The various CCGG&SO departments and offices are accountable to their managers who in turn report to the executive leaders. These are accountable to the development board of the church. However field staff and lower level managers are relatively autonomous in the implementation of the ICDP at field level.

The strength of CC-GGSO with regard to downward accountability is the fact that the framework for project interventions is set by the executive leaders which, helps share accountability and improve transparency. However, delay on decision making was seen as one weakness.

The church is highly involved in dispersing its values of downward accountability. It also practices a democratic way of implementing things.

**Score: 0**

## 3.2 Composition of social organs SPO

The composition of social organs did not change since the baseline assessment. According to the director of CCGG&SO the high illiteracy rates of communities makes their participation in the social organs of Catholic Church impossible.

**Score: 0**

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### 3.3 External financial auditing SPO

After three fired staff members filed a complaint with the Hamar woreda government, this in turn imposed an audit of the first two months of 2014, because suspicion had risen of financial irregularities in 2013. This extra audit served the purpose of transparency and cleared unfounded suspicions on the part of government partners.

Apart from this extra audit, annual audits have been made by external auditors based on the preference of the donor partners who seat in the selection commission.

The evaluation team has however only seen an external audit of 2011.

**Score: 0**

## 4 Perception of Impact

### 4.1 Client satisfaction SPO

#### *Food security component*

Target groups that are satisfied are women who access the revolving goat scheme and the poultry scheme; individuals who learned to grow vegetables, and; those engaged in carpentry.

Until so far 144 women have received 432 goats which in the meanwhile have produced 48 other goats that were passed on to new beneficiaries. Nevertheless some women lost their goats whereas one woman is said to have been able to buy a cow after having sold her goats.

Vegetable groups are not functioning as a group, but individuals are said to have benefited from this activity. Between 2012 and 2014, 126 beneficiaries (67 men and 59 women) were trained in horticulture and organised in groups. Most groups only stay together for one season after which members continue growing vegetables on their own plot, apparently earning much more money: one group sold vegetables for an amount of 600 birr, another group sold green pepper for 60 birr and onions for 70 birr, but an individual sold tomatoes in two rounds for 4500 birr and green peppers for 1000 birr. This last person was able to send his three children to school and save money in the micro-finance institution. Other individuals have bought mobile phones to access market information, have established business relations with traders in town and were capable to rebuild their houses with the income earned.

Vegetable growing is a new livelihoods activity in the area of mainly pastoralist populations, which has been introduced by CCGG&SO who also provides transportation services to market their produce in the nearby town. Although CCGG&SO observed already in the 2010 -2012 period that group wise horticulture was not working, they did not change their approach.

Not all women were lucky with their poultry activities: some of them were able to improve their livelihoods, such as a woman who sold the eggs in the first place and later her chickens as a means to buy a goat. Another woman told the evaluators that her chickens were either stolen or eaten by a wild animal.

Carpentry has been a successful activity, but no more information is available.

The beekeeping activity did not satisfy beneficiaries because there were technical problems with the hives. The government provided technical assistance but it is not known if this was before the technical problems arose or after.

#### *Social component*

The progress reports learn that in the 2010 – 2012 period 4011 children and 2112 women have been vaccinated; that many nutrition demonstration sessions were held reaching 650 persons and that HEW and TBAs were trained. Furthermore CCGG&SO handed over one ambulance to the woreda health centre. Only one of the three ambulances in the woreda is still functioning and the other two are misused for other purposes. However child delivery at the health centre increased from 185 to 250 and 257 children in the 2011 – 2014 period. The only documented information from the 2013 – 2015 period is that now 80 children are fully vaccinated since the first semester of 2013.

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Children's access to education continues to be a delicate issue because elders resist sending their children to school, fearing to lose their culture and identity. No accurate data are available that describe the current situation with regards to school enrolment. Some girls and boys have started class in two of the seven kebeles in the ICDP. Functional adult literacy programmes are existing (level of operation not known) and their attendance is good because people understand the importance of education. It is however noted that alternative basic education and functional adult literacy were highly formalised whilst they are considered as informal education.

Almost all of the changes observed on the end-line survey were through the interventions done before 2012. Specifically, for instance, the group approach for vegetable groups is not functioning as expected due to the nature and practice of the community. The people of the area do not function well when working in groups so CCGG&SO could have made these observations from the 2010-2012 groups and changed the approach to more individual based. Almost all of the vegetable groups have gotten dissolved after one round.

#### *General changes*

The general situation also slightly improved in Hamar woreda because since 2012 10 kms of road was constructed which helped to increase access to farm inputs and access to health facilities with the ambulance provided by CCGG&SO.

#### *Conclusion observations*

Although CCGG&SO's interventions have not reached many people and interventions in the 2013 – 2015 period are considerably lagging behind plans, some individuals have changed their mind sets because they understand the utility of income diversification. In particular the poultry and goat scheme have proven to be beneficial for widows and destitute women. These few successes inspire others to also diversify their livelihood strategies and some are said to have become change agents.

Negative unintended effects of the project however, are in the fields of the phase out strategy, high expectations by the community and the unknown effects of the project interventions on culture.

**Score: +1**

## 4.2 Civil society impact SPO

CCGG&SO created both health micro finance groups and saving and internal lending communities (SILCs): Those are meant to help those beneficiaries involved in income generating activities to save money.

According to the progress documents of the 2010-2012 period, eight health micro finance schemes with more than 820 members have been created where members can take out loans when being referred to higher level health facilities. According to the in-country evaluation team, another four schemes were created in four kebeles in 2013. Each scheme was given a start-up capital of 5000 birr and members are expected to contribute some 5-10 birr every two months. Money is kept by the treasurer of the group and books are kept. Apparently these schemes are highly appreciated and participation is high but no figures that show membership increase over the past years, loans given and returned, and neither the situation of those eight schemes that were created in the 2012 -2012 period.

Contrary to health micro finance groups, SILCs were not given any capital. The 2013-2015 project document mentions the creation of six SILCs that should be able to service 1050 members who have received support from CCGG&SO for income generating activities. One experiment in Dimeka in 2012 failed, but CCGG&S), another SILC started with 12 members in 2012 and has 34 members in 2014, of which 29 are female. Another new group started in 2013 which has seven members.<sup>45</sup>

SILC members have to save money for one year, and at the end of the year they divide savings again. Savings are kept by the SILC treasurer and not interest rates are paid, whilst Ethiopia's inflation rate between 2006 and 2014 is estimated at 19 percent a year. Saving in the official micro finance

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<sup>45</sup> Interview with SPO staff

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institution is more beneficial because some interest is being paid and because people can withdraw money when needed.

None of the three cooperatives is functional. CCGG&SO organised two multipurpose cooperatives and one consumer cooperative which are supposed to help their members improve their lives. They claim to have stabilised the local inflation level and to prevent shortage of supplies by purchasing consumables from wholesale suppliers and selling these with a minimum of profit. The government cooperative promotion office who is in charge of supervising all three cooperatives fails to do so because they do not receive the financial support from the woreda administration. In addition, the government is unwilling to provide the cooperatives with working area, particularly in the Demeka area, which troubles their existence since they are not able to pay the rent.

**Score: 0**

#### 4.3 Relation with public sector organisations SPO

CCGG&SO consults with community and the local government in its selection of beneficiaries for the various IGA groups. After the beneficiaries have been identified, trained and provided with necessary inputs the assumption is that the local government would provide a regular follow up and support which was also the risk observed since the local government is not following up and not cooperating or supporting these groups which is affecting their effectiveness aside from other factors.

The SPO also has contacts with government offices in the areas it is working on as it is necessary to involve these offices in putting in place the planned interventions. It is through the government offices in the different kebeles that the SPO is able to gather the community and distribute inputs. However, the outcome of this network is not as effective as it should be because of reasons like the high turnover of the Development Agents on sites, the lack of motivation of the Development Agents and hence the low follow up and the consulting service being provided.

Jinka FM Radio Station and Jinka Agricultural Research Centre (JARC) have been in technical collaboration with the SPO's health care & livelihoods improvement components. The Government Pastoralist Affairs Office has also provided the SPO with expertise in studying the potential and constraints of the beekeeping production in Hamar.

The government fails to support interventions by the CCGG&SO which they were supposed to take over: there are 26 cooperatives in the Hamar Woreda now which should be supervised by the cooperative promotion office financed by local government itself. No meetings are organised and the office acknowledges it is not doing as much as expected.

CCGG&SO's ambulance initially given to the Red Cross has been confiscated by the health office and is not always being used for the transportation of sick people.

The 2010-2012 report states that there is a high turnover of government staff and that 'the sudden changes in government policy made it very difficult for the project to adapt accordingly'. The six months closure of the program office by local government partners in Woreda/ Zone, was the lowest point in relations with the government since 2012.

**Score: -2**

#### 4.4 Relation with private sector agencies SPO

Although CCGG&SO had started engaging in contractual agreements with private agencies and agricultural input suppliers such as local goat dealers, water well diggers, roof water harvesting facility makers, drip irrigation experts, boar goat breeding station, chicken breeding centre, field-crop seed multiplication centre & building contractors for its planned health centre establishment, the closure of the office in Demeka has suspended all these activities indefinitely.

**Score: 0**

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#### 4.5 Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations SPO

Given the actual relation between the government and the SPO, possibilities to influence policies have considerably decreased.

**Score: -2**

#### 4.6 Influence upon private sector agencies' policies, rules, regulations SPO

**Score: not applicable**

### 5 Environment

#### 5.1 Coping strategies

A corrective management decision to fire three staff members in the Hamar program who broke regulations in January 2014 has resulted in unfavourable turn of events. The fired employees filed a complaint with the local government, leading to the closure of the office from March to July 2014. The former employees asked for an unconditional return and an investigation and audit of accounts. Meanwhile, the SPO did its best to hold talks with the authorities that ended up in deadlocks because nobody in local government was cooperative.

CCGG&SO reported the event to the Regional Bureau of Finance via its headquarters, the Vicariate of Soddo & the Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat (ECS), which recommended a mediation process between the local government office and CCGG&SO at the beginning of the dispute. Later, upon receipt of a letter of the zonal Administrator, an investigation was carried out. The investigation took place after a lapse of two months. Based on the findings of the investigators, a report was sent to the Federal Central Statistics Agency (CSA) which sent down a delegation to resolve the issue and accordingly it was agreed to open the office.

In its decision, the Federal CSA commended on the responsiveness of the SPO on five points out of the ten points reported by the Regional Bureau of Finance. The Bureau of Finance also cited weaknesses and measures to be taken by the CCGG&SO. Weaknesses of the local government were also been spelt out and advised not to repeat. As a result, the false allegations made against the church are clarified and the issues that need legal attention concerning the fired employees are referred to the labour court. It is agreed to get back to program implementation. The current position of the partnership with the government is similar to the way it was before.

However, the whole incident has created division, triggered confusion, and threats were made against fellow staff members. Additionally, false and disproportionate rumours about the leadership and its transparency were going around. As a result, staff composition has changed. The human resources administration and their manuals for job performance appraisal and supplies procurement are under review and reassurance was given to donors that system overhaul is being made.

**Score: 0**

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