Endline report – Indonesia, YRBI MFS II country evaluations

Capacity of Southern Partner Organisations (5C) component

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This report presents the findings of the endline of the evaluation of the organisational capacity component of the MFS II country evaluations. The focus of this report is Indonesia, YRBI. The format is based on the requirements by the synthesis team and NWO/WOTRO. The endline was carried out in 2014. The baseline was carried out in 2012.

Key words: 5C (five core capabilities); attribution; baseline; causal map; change; CFA (Co-financing Organisation) endline; organisational capacity development; SPO (Southern Partner Organisation).

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The Indonesia 5C evaluation team
## List of abbreviations and acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>5 C</td>
<td>Capacity development model which focuses on 5 core capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causal map</td>
<td>Map with cause-effect relationships. See also 'detailed causal map'.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Causal mechanisms</td>
<td>The combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDI</td>
<td>Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University &amp; Research centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>Co-Financing Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFO</td>
<td>Co-Financing Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Civil Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>Detailed causal map</td>
<td>Also 'model of change'. the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change. In the 5C evaluation identified key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms) are traced through process tracing (for attribution question).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gambong</td>
<td>An administrative division in Aceh, Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>General causal map</td>
<td>Causal map with key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change (causal mechanisms), based on SPO perception.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRM</td>
<td>Human Resource Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFS</td>
<td>Dutch co-financing system</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIS</td>
<td>Management Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukim</td>
<td>Sub-district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OD</td>
<td>Organisational Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PME</td>
<td>Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRA</td>
<td>Priority Result Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>Process tracing</td>
<td>Theory-based approach to trace causal mechanisms</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPO</td>
<td>Southern Partner Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSI</td>
<td>Semi-structured Interview</td>
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<td>ToC</td>
<td>Theory of Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wageningen UR</td>
<td>Wageningen University &amp; Research centre</td>
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<td>YRBI</td>
<td>Rumpun Bambu Indonesia Foundation</td>
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1 Introduction & summary

1.1 Purpose and outline of the report

The Netherlands has a long tradition of public support for civil bi-lateral development cooperation, going back to the 1960s. The Co-Financing System (Medefinancieringsstelsel, or “MFS”) is its most recent expression. MFS II is the 2011-2015 grant framework for Co-Financing Agencies (CFAs), which is directed at achieving a sustainable reduction in poverty. A total of 20 consortia of Dutch CFAs have been awarded €1.9 billion in MFS II grants by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).

The overall aim of MFS II is to help strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. CFAs receiving MFS II funding work through strategic partnerships with Southern Partner Organisations.

The MFS II framework stipulates that each consortium is required to carry out independent external evaluations to be able to make valid, evaluative statements about the effective use of the available funding. On behalf of Dutch consortia receiving MFS II funding, NWO-WOTRO has issued three calls for proposals. Call deals with joint MFS II evaluations of development interventions at country level. Evaluations must comprise a baseline assessment in 2012 and a follow-up assessment in 2014 and should be arranged according to three categories of priority result areas as defined by MoFA:

Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) & themes;
Capacity development of Southern partner organisations (SPO) (5 c study);
Efforts to strengthen civil society.

This report focuses on the assessment of capacity development of southern partner organisations. This evaluation of the organisational capacity development of the SPOs is organised around four key evaluation questions:
1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The purpose of this report is to provide endline information on one of the SPOs involved in the evaluation: YRBI in Indonesia. The baseline report is described in a separate document.

Chapter 2 describes general information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO). Here you can find general information about the SPO, the context in which the SPO operates, contracting details and background to the SPO. In chapter 3 a brief overview of the methodological approach is described. You can find a more detailed description of the methodological approach in appendix 1. Chapter 4 describes the results of the 5c endline study. It provides an overview of capacity development interventions of the SPO that have been supported by MFS II. It also describes what changes in organisational capacity have taken place since the baseline and why (evaluation question is 1 and 4). This is described as a summary of the indicators per capability as well as a general causal map that provides an overview of the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline, as experienced by the SPO. The complete overview of descriptions per indicator, and how these have changed since the baseline is described in appendix 3. The complete visual and narrative for the key organisational capacity changes that have taken place since the baseline according to the SPO staff present at the endline workshop is presented in appendix 4.

For those SPOs involved in process tracing a summary description of the causal maps for the identified organisational capacity changes in the two selected capabilities (capability to act and commit; capability to adapt and self-renew) is provided (evaluation questions 2 and 4). These causal maps describe the identified key organisational capacity changes that are possibly related to MFS II.
interventions in these two capabilities, and how these changes have come about. More detailed information can be found in appendix 5.

Chapter 5 presents a discussion on the findings and methodology and a conclusion on the different evaluation questions.

The overall methodology for the endline study of capacity of southern partner organisations is coordinated between the 8 countries: Bangladesh (Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath; INTRAC); DRC (Disaster Studies, Wageningen UR); Ethiopia (CDI, Wageningen UR); India (CDI, Wageningen UR); Indonesia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Liberia (CDI, Wageningen UR); Pakistan (IDS; MetaMeta); (Uganda (ETC). Specific methodological variations to the approach carried out per country where CDI is involved are also described in this document.

This report is sent to the Co-Financing Agency (CFA) and the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO) for correcting factual errors and for final validation of the report.

1.2 Brief summary of analysis and findings

Since the baseline, two years ago, YRBI has seen most changes under the capability to act and commit. Overall a slight deterioration took place as compared to the baseline, although some positive developments were found as well. Changes in the staff composition, including the leadership position, created a positive change in responsive leadership and internal communication, but a negative change in staff turnover, strategic guidance and the articulation of strategies. No new funding sources have been found after the ICCO contract ended which left the organization unable to act or perform. In terms of the capability to adapt and self-renew, a very slight deterioration took place. This could be attributed largely to the deterioration in terms of critical reflection. Less meetings, and opportunities for feedback from colleagues to management were the main reasons for this. The capability to deliver on development objectives has effectively remained unchanged. This was because although operational plans have become clearer, the efficiency of monitoring has slightly deteriorated. The capability to relate has very slightly improved. YRBI has expanded its network to several new networks and groups, but does not have the resources anymore to continue to engage with its target groups. Internal relations within the organization have improved. No changes occurred in terms of the capability to achieve coherence since the baseline in 2012.

The evaluators considered it important to also note down the SPO’s story in terms of changes in the organisation since the baseline, and this would also provide more information about reasons for change, which were difficult to get for the individual indicators. Also for some issues there may not have been relevant indicators available in the list of core indicators provided by the evaluation team. During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by YRBI’s staff:

1. staff capacity on mukim and gampong sovereignty issues is more recognized
2. an improved and more extensive network
3. reduced paid workforce and program funds

Two of these changes were selected for process tracing as they were tied to MFS II funded capacity development interventions, namely the ‘poor financial situation of the organization’ (the third change mentioned above), as well as ‘YRBI becoming the leading organization in mukim and gampong sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia’ (related to the first change mentioned above).

YRBI staff indicated that, according to them, staff capacity is more recognized due to more invitations from the community to share staff knowledge and skills on mukim and gampong issues. The increase of staff capacity can be attributed to internal knowledge sharing and learning from various staff capacity building activities by ICCO through MFS II funded capacity development interventions. This increase of staff capacity has also led to a more prominent recognition of YRBI in these areas. According to YRBI staff, YRBI has become the leading organization in mukim and gampong sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia. MFS II initiatives allowed YRBI to develop new empowerment programs for the poor and programs focussed on participatory mapping of communities.
YRBI’s network improved and became more extensive. The latter can be attributed to the optimal use of the organization’s facilities for events and trainings, the initiation of sovereignty institutions, as well as mukim and gampong issues becoming more widespread and therefore attracting greater public attention. No relationship has been indicated with MFS II funded capacity development interventions. Most of the changes are due to the organization’s own initiatives.

The reduction in paid work force and program funds was a negative development, due to a poor financial situation that led to the closure of programs, staff leaving the organisation and staff not being paid. This poor financial situation can be partly attributed to a change of ICCO policy following the renewal of the MoU between ICCO and the Indonesian government, in which political areas and topics complicated the continuation of projects in the area. Furthermore, the organisation itself did not develop successful proposals since not many proposals were developed, even though staff at the capacity to write proposals, and the new leader didn’t have adequate fundraising experience. Whilst there was no link indicated with MFS II funded capacity development interventions, the fact that the main funder ICCO (MFS II) withdrew from funding the organisation has had an important effect on the organisation’s financial situation.

In terms of process tracing the following organisational capacity changes were focused on: ‘poor financial situation’ and ‘Becoming the leading organization in mukim and gampong sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia’.

The poor financial situation of YRBI resulted from a lack of obtaining new funds, which in turn resulted from the expiration of the ICCO contract, no follow up on fundraising activities occurred, and rejection of proposals for funding (see 4.3.1) took place, even though the organisation has increased its capacity to provide financial reports based on donor standards. This developed competence cannot be related to any MFS II supported capacity development interventions. The expiration of the YRBI and ICCO contract was due to a change of ICCO policy. In this policy ICCO stated that they couldn’t further support activities with “mukim and gampong” issues, as they did not receive permission to work in these areas in Aceh any longer after the renewal of the MoU between ICCO and the Government of Indonesia. No follow up for fundraising occurred, despite increased competencies in resource mobilization as the result of the Resource Mobilization training in 2013 by ICCO. The competencies to raise public funds as generated in the ICCO intervention to mobilise resources training in February 2013, were not utilized for YRBI’s own financial situation. Instead YRBI elected to share these training outcomes amongst its beneficiary communities, some of which successfully applied this to raise public funds through cooperation with private parties.

No evidence for a relation could be found between the poor financial situation of YRBI and the improved transparency and accountability in financial reporting which resulted from the Financial Management training. Despite the positive outcomes in reaching the CFA’s objectives in terms of utilizing the financial software and becoming a more transparent and accountable reporting organization, these developments did not impact the financial situation of YRBI. Instead the capacity built up in this area is now unused, as YRBI does not have any ICCO programs to carry out anymore.

YRBI has become more visible as a leading organisation in Mukim and Gampong sovereignty issues in Aceh in Indonesia. This was due to YRBI’s staff capacity on Gampong and Mukim issues becoming more recognized amongst its stakeholders, due to more invitations from the community to share staff knowledge and skills.

Village maps were produced and utilized by the people as a result of the application of the training skills to some of the villages independently. This can be attributed to the increased staff ability to develop maps independently, following internal knowledge sharing gained from trainings. The knowledge shared in this case can be contributed to the participatory mapping internship (GIS) that took place in 2014 and was MFS II funded.

The ‘Making Markets Work for the Poor’ Training (MFS II), which took place in the course of 2014 parallel to the endline evaluation, resulted in the successful creation of an economic development project for beneficiary communities on the topic of honey bee exploitation and commercialisation. An increased amount of beneficiary groups has started getting involved in this project, again leading to greater trust amongst beneficiary communities.
Encouraging the community to use the results of training as a strategy to raise public and corporate funds resulted from the sharing of training knowledge to beneficiaries. This can be attributed to the gained staff skill to do fundraising from public or corporate CSR funds. This was due the internal knowledge sharing of the MFS II funded resource mobilization training that took place in 2013 as well.

On the whole, YRBI has grown into a leading organisation in Mukim and Gampong sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia, and this is mainly due to positive effects at community level of the projects implemented by staff whose competencies have been enhanced in the MFS II trainings on participatory mapping, ‘Making Markets Work for the Poor’ and resource mobilisation. the whole, the changes in the key organisational capacity change can be attributed to a large extent to MFS II supported capacity development interventions.
2 General Information about the SPO – Name SPO

2.1 General information about the Southern Partner Organisation (SPO)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
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<tr>
<td>Consortium</td>
<td>ICCO Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsible Dutch NGO</td>
<td>ICCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project (if applicable)</td>
<td>Empowerment of Mukim and Gampong Capacity in Spatial Management Phase II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern partner organisation</td>
<td>Rumpun Bambu Indonesia Foundation (YRBI)</td>
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The project/partner is part of the sample for the following evaluation component(s):

- Achievement of MDGs and themes
- Capacity development of Southern partner organisations
- Efforts to strengthen civil society

2.2 The socio-economic, cultural and political context in which the partner operates

The socio-economic, cultural and political context in which the partner operates

The region of Aceh, historically divided into three hierarchy, they are kesultanan, (state), sago/negeri (province), Mukim (district) and Gampong (Village). Mukim is Traditional Institution, which grew up and rooted in social order of Aceh society which has a great role in management and spatial control and also their parts of life. Every Mukim has its clear boundaries.¹

The project addresses issues of lack of capacities of those traditional institutions, gampong and mukim, in natural resources and spatial management. It aims to empower and enhance capacities of both gampong and mukim to deal with increasing problems related with land tenure, natural hazard, natural resources and spatial management in Aceh. The project is important, particularly, in the context of post-tsunami and post-conflict of Aceh, where society was quite significantly divided into conflicting groups and its environment was severely devastated due to the disaster. While the problems of post-conflict and post-tsunami are particular in Aceh, the weakness of traditional institutions was widespread throughout the archipelago.

The issues of deficiency of traditional institutions can be explained mainly as the consequence of two major developments that happened in modern history of Indonesia. Firstly, the modernization process that took place in the archipelago since several decades ago especially following colonial expansion and more particularly in the aftermath of Indonesia’s independence in 1945. Secondly, strategic policy taken by the “new order” regime to implement the Law number 5/1979 on Village Governance which was part of the centralistic approach of President Soeharto.

While in the past gampong and mukim played an important role in social and economic activities of Aceh people, they have been weakened significantly as a consequence of the two developments. In the old days of Aceh, their role include government administrative roles, customary (adat) and hukom (law).² The division of authority between gampong and mukim (association of gampong) is that

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¹ YRBI Program Report The Empowerment of the Mukim and Gampong Capacity in Spatial Management Phase II Period: November 2010 until October 2011
mukim deals with issues which are not resolved at gampong level and becomes the authorized reference for religious affairs. Mukim also deals with external affairs, while gampong addresses internal affairs. However, following the implementation of Law 5/1979 mukim had no longer central role and authority since the law only recognize the authority of gampong which is seen as a village, the smallest administration unit of government—assuming as part of homogenous pattern of village administration throughout the archipelago. Without such legal recognition and financial resources mukim played no significant role in Aceh society during the period. At the same time the nature of gampong which was characterized by collegial type of leadership (altogether with teungku meunasah and tuha peut) shifted to be a centralistic kind of leadership. In short, the head of village became the sole authority at village level.\(^3\)

Following the collapse of the New Order Regime in 1998 and in the aftermath of the tsunami attack in 2004, there have been new streams and movements to revive and to revitalize traditional institutions and laws in Aceh. There were, actually, efforts to give a ‘special treatment’ to Aceh by providing ‘special autonomy’ through UU No 18/2001 and UU No.11/2006 on Aceh governance. Yet the implementation of these laws was not followed by strong and significant efforts to re-strengthen Mukim institution. Both the national and local government of Aceh gave more attentions for doing physical reconstruction and rehabilitation programs of the post-tsunami rather than improving capacity of gampong and mukim to involve in development process. There are also too little efforts and resources available to enhance capacity of 6.408 gampong and 755 mukims throughout Aceh.

Following massive and intensive rehabilitation and reconstruction programs, land tenure and environment problems have become new crucial issues in Aceh. Besides hundreds of thousands people dead and colossal destruction in Aceh, the tsunami has also brought about another serious problem: the massive loss of land tenure documents. In some areas it has led to conflicting issues regarding boundaries between gampongs or between mukims. It became deteriorated in some areas particularly when new projects for natural resources exploitation took place. In several cases, both gampongs and mukims have not been involved in producing the license for natural resources exploitation which might end up in conflict between villagers and companies as well as among the villagers.

With these emerging problems in the backdrop, YRBI seeks to empower traditional institutions of gampong and mukim in Aceh to play more important roles in resolving conflict between groups as well as in better managing natural resources for a more prosperous and sustainable society.

In the 2012-2013 program period, the location of fieldwork conducted in several villages federation (mukim) at Aceh Besar Regency. That location are Mukim Siem, Mukim Lambaro Angan, Mukim Lamteuba and Mukim Lampanah. While in Aceh Jaya-South Aceh, focus in Mukim Pucok Panga, Mukim Sarah Raya, Mukim Panga Pasie and Gampong Jambo Papeun. Besides also the location of shared learning through discussion, mapping and site visits, followed by mukim’s at Aceh Jaya Regency (Mukim Sarah Raya, Mukim Panga Pasie, and Mukim Pasie Teube) and South Aceh Regency (Gampong Jambo Papeun).\(^4\)

The context between the project locations Siem and Lamteuba is different. Siem is sub-urban area where most population are working in the city as government officers and or employees, whereas Lamteuba is located in rural areas where most population are working as farmers or agricultural-related workers. This will explain why these two Mukim have a different approach in dealing with conflict and in their capacity to document their information (map and other important data/information). When the community is not able to keep and take care of the information, usually YRBI will help them keeping such data including the map.

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\(^3\) Source: correspondence with YRBI director Sanusi M. Syarif (2010:69, 70)

2.3 Contracting details

When did cooperation with this partner start: 2005.
What is the MFS II contracting period: 1-11-2012 to 31-10-2013
Did cooperation with this partner end: Yes
If yes, when did it finish: 2013
What is the reason for ending the cooperation with this partner: Contract expired
Is there expected cooperation with this partner after 31st of December 2015: No.

2.4 Background to the Southern Partner Organisation

History
In 1995 YRBI was established by 4 founders concerned in empowering indigenous institutions, agriculture and environment. In 1998, YRBI still had no donors and the organization consisted of a staff of six people and ten volunteers. As YRBI was dealing with the legal aspects of palm oil extraction, it had to function undercover. The main issues YRBI was engaged with at this point were: democracy and human rights advocacy, identifying conflict origins and (eventually) reducing those, solving local conflicts using traditional wisdom and finally the engagement with issues concerning the sustainable use of natural resources.

In 1999 the Program of Panglima Laut was funded by local fishermen and in 2000 a YRBI volunteer was abducted by Indonesia’s security force (Brimob) during the Aceh conflict. In 2001 YRBI had its Standard Operational Procedures elaborated and the YRBI’s office was moved to Banda Aceh. From 2001 to 2004 YRBI had a staff of 11 people and was funded by DAI-OTI-USAID in its program on civil society mapping, democracy and human rights. From 2005 to 2008 the organization experienced little to no expansion due to limited resources.

From 2006 to the present YRBI has broadened its network of collaborating partners. As such, the organization has worked in joint activities with WALHI, SAMDANA and Pusaka Foundation, in the Forest People Program. In the last year YRBI started to focus also on climate change and it had a poor achievement in raising public funding.

Vision
YRBI envisions a community that "will be able to manage natural resources independently and develop the potential of the region to achieve the prosperous life in a fair way".

Mission
The Missions:
- Strengthen the management of natural resource and the area
- Strengthening of civil based economy
- Strengthening of local values
- Strengthening of public policy with community justification based
- Strengthen the solidarity among social community

Strategies
There are specific strategies developed for the achievement of each of the outputs. The aimed outputs and the respective strategies are described below.

**Output 1**
Increasing Mukim and gampong capacity in Aceh Besar, Aceh Jaya dan Aceh Selatan on layout, environmental effect analyzing and disasters management sectors. The activities include:

A. Workshop Program
   This activity is basic through all programs. Through the workshop, YBRI expects to collect valuable inputs from the participants in designing detail program and field program development.

B. Participatory Mukim Appraisal
   This investigation is run by using the PRA (Participatory Rural Appraisal) approach. The result of this activity offers basic information about the social, economic and traditional contexts of the Mukim environment. It is done in every focus location.

C. Periodic meeting, once in every three months
   A periodic meeting is carried out in focus locations and it serves as a communication forum point of Mukim.

D. Re-planting and agro forestry workshop
   The objective of this activity is that of offering concepts and practical guidance for the implementation of field assistance and re-planting activities.

**Output 2**
There are gampong/Mukim regulations about spatial of Natural Resources management with community based and continuity management design. The activities include:

A. Community Participatory Mapping
   The activity comprises producing sketches of the process of Mukim areas, identifying Mukim boundaries and drawing maps. This mapping activity is done in two Mukim areas, they are: Mukim Lam Teuba and Mukim Trieng Meuduro/ Gampong Panton Luas. The other goals of community mapping are: to identify water sources, and to re-arrange community forest protection (Climate Change related activity).

B. Spatial Planning and Mukim development
   This activity includes: identifying the potential of natural resources in Mukim areas, Mukim social resources, outlining an order of priorities, stipulating agreements in process development and defining Mukim spatial management. Since it is a follow-up activity after the mapping process it will also be implemented in two Mukim areas (Lam Teuba and Trieng Meuduro gampong Panton Luas). Through these activities, the communities could improve their struggle for better living conditions.

C. Revitalization Workshop of Tuha Peut
   This program aims at introducing concepts and guidance outlines which can be implemented in the process of field assistance for Tuha Peut institution. This workshop is done by every Tuha Peut from Mukim and gampong in target group area.

D. Training for Tuha Peut to make Rule of Gampong.
   This program is focused in guiding villages’ leaders and Tuha Peut participants in arranging and stipulating gampong regulation by combining traditional and formal approaches.

E. Training of land tenure and customary right (the adat Aceh) for youth.
   This activity is aimed at identifying the Mukim land tenure and customary rights.

**Output 3**
Registration and documentation of local wisdom about Natural Resources management. The activities designed for reaching this objective include:

A. Documentation of local regulations and other connected regulations.
   The objective of this activity is that of helping the target society in documenting local wisdom and the society’s customs.

B. Social research for Mukim Cattle land (padang rumput) management.
   It is expected that this activity can contribute to the practitioners and local community in understanding cattle and land management issues in Aceh.

C. Social research for Mukim traditional market management.
   It is expected that this activity can contribute to the practitioners and local community in understanding the reality of the Mukim traditional market management in Aceh.

D. Bulletin Peureude and Info sheet publication “Suara Mukim” once for three months.
   These media publish the cases which are related to Mukim and field findings during the time of carrying out the programs.

E. Assistance
   This activity is run in focus area. The assistance is offered in areas of institution management and field process, which concerns the preservation of local customs. Besides that, this activity also proposes the strengthening of community organization.
Output 4
Increasing the amount of re-plantations in order to counter-weight the impact of climate change in program location. The activities comprise:

A. Identification of the river area and the sources of water
   It is expected that this activity can contribute for the local community's to understanding of the importance and actual situation of local river and other sources of water (Climate Change related activity).

B. Making billboard for water sources
   This activity produces billboards about preservation for water sources (Climate Change related activity). Distribution seed for farmer (Climate Change related activity)\(^\text{14}\).

\(^{14}\) YRBI(2010)Final Proposal 2010-2013
3 Methodological approach and reflection

3.1 Overall methodological approach

This chapter describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the ‘5C study’. This 5C study is organised around four key evaluation questions:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations’ capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

Note: this methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report A detailed overview of the approach is described in appendix 1.

The first (changes in organisational capacity) and the fourth evaluation question are addressed together through:

- **Changes in the 5C indicators since the baseline**: standard indicators have been agreed upon for each of the five capabilities of the five capabilities framework (see appendix 2) and changes between the baseline, and the endline situation have been described. For data collection a mix of data collection methods has been used, including self-assessments by SPO staff; interviews with SPO staff and externals; document review; observation. For data analysis, the Nvivo software program for qualitative data analysis has been used. Final descriptions per indicator and per capability with corresponding scores have been provided.

- **Key organisational capacity changes – ‘general causal map’**: during the endline workshop a brainstorm has been facilitated to generate the key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO since the baseline, with related underlying causes. For this purpose, a visual as well as a narrative causal map have been described.

In terms of the attribution question (2 and 4), ‘process tracing’ is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to
focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

3.2 Assessing changes in organisational capacity and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: **What are the changes in partner organisations’ capacity during the 2012-2014 period?** And the fourth evaluation question: **“What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?”**

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This is explained below. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the ‘general causal map’ has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

The evaluators considered it important to also note down a consolidated SPO story and this would also provide more information about what the SPO considered to be important in terms of organisational capacity changes since the baseline and how they perceived these key changes to have come about. Whilst this information has not been validated with sources other than SPO staff, it was considered important to understand how the SPOs has perceived changes in the organisation since the baseline.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information is provided for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the next session on the evaluation question on attribution, as described below and in the appendix 1.

How information was collected and analysed for addressing evaluation question 1 and 4, in terms of description of changes in indicators per capability as well as in terms of the general causal map, based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff, is further described below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012\(^\text{*}\).

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\(^\text{*}\)The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.
Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1. **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and ‘general causal map’**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a ‘general causal map’, based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;

2. **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;

3. **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;

4. **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;

5. **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Review the descriptions per indicator – in-country team &amp; CDI team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Collect, upload &amp; code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Interview the CFA – CDI team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Interview externals – in-country team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo – CDI team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Provide to the overview of information per Sc indicator to in-country team – CDI team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions – CDI team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Analyse the information in the general causal map – in-country team and CDI-team</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch Sc country coordinator as well as the overall Sc coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The Sc country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Please see appendix 1 for a description of the detailed process and steps.
3.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity - evaluation question 2 and 4

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: **To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?** and the fourth evaluation question: **“What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?”**

In terms of the attribution question (2), ‘process tracing’ is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Below, the selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

### 3.3.1 Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will participate in this process tracing for the purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

For the detailed results of this selection, in the four countries that CDI is involved in, please see appendix 1. The following SPOs were selected for process tracing:

- Ethiopia: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE (4/9)
- India: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE, VTRC (5/10)
- Indonesia: ASB, ECPAT, PT.PPMA, YPI, YRBI (5/12)
- Liberia: BSC, RHRAP (2/5).

### 3.3.2 Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/ project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the ‘general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop
have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained. More information can be found in Appendix 1.

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings – CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

3.3.3 Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team. These can also be found in appendix 1.

Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach: this has proven to be a very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

Using standard indicators and scores: using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

General causal map: whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the 5C evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question: this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during
the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs. In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick’s model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The 5C evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors, rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is crucial. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

Utilisation of the evaluation

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

**Design** – mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to
generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

**Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication:** many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO’s and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilisation.

**5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process:** The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.
4 Results

4.1 MFS II supported capacity development interventions

Below an overview of the different MFS II supported capacity development interventions of YRBI that have taken place since 2011 are described. The information is based on the information provided by ICCO.

Table 1
Information about MFS II supported capacity development interventions since baseline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title of the MFS II supported capacity development intervention</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Timing and duration</th>
<th>Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participatory Mapping Internship (GIS)</td>
<td>Develop staff competence in GIS application and development</td>
<td>Series of activities</td>
<td>October 2013 – January 2014</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making Markets work for the Poor (MFP) Training</td>
<td>Develop economic empowerment programs</td>
<td>Series of training workshops, onsite coaching, business model and plan development workshops</td>
<td>March 2014-ongoing</td>
<td>90,252 Euro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource Mobilization Training</td>
<td>Develop innovative strategies to become a sustainable organization</td>
<td>Training with other ICCO Alliance partners</td>
<td>February 2013</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial System Management training</td>
<td>Ensure that partners meet the minimal standard of financial reporting</td>
<td>Finance software training and standard guidelines for the system</td>
<td>March 2013</td>
<td>1200 Euro</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SC endline_support to capacity development sheet_CFA perspective_Indonesia_YRBI

4.2 Changes in capacity development and reasons for change - evaluation question 1 and 4

Below you can find a description of the changes in each of the five core capabilities. This information is based on the analysis of the information per each of the indicators. This detailed information for each of the indicators describes the current situation, and how and why it has changed since the baseline. See also annex 3.
4.2.1 Changes in the five core capabilities

**Capability to act and commit**

After a handing over the director’s position to a younger staff member, YRBI has become a more open organization for its staff members. Communication with management, feedback and the ability to participate in decision making were enabled by the new director in charge. Staff is encouraged to create their own strategies, methods and approaches in work. Despite that, decision making still appears to be a slow process particularly in relation to “inherited” problems such as financial problems that have yet to be solved. On the whole strategic guidance needs to be further developed.

In term of organization structure, it is thinner due to the project activities and staffs reduction. This reduction has also caused M&E to no longer be conducted. They only hold informal forum to discuss contemporary issues that develop at local, regional, and national which is called “Diskusi Lorong”.

Overall, daily operations are in line with strategic planning, although the number of activities carried out has gone down significantly after the ICCO funded program was finalized. This is also affected staff turnover since staff had to leave the organisation due to closing the ICCO funded project. The number of staffs reduced from 14 to 8. No new major funds have been acquired since, although the organization is actively seeking out new opportunities and has applied to several potential donors. Staff skills have slightly improved over the observed period as a result of increased work experience and donor (ICCO) supported trainings in Participatory Mapping Internship [GIS], Making Market for the Poor Training (MFP), Resource Mobilization Training, and Financial Management Training between 2012-2014. Nonetheless further improvements are needed in terms of English language proficiency to improve the quality of proposals and negotiations.

The previous structure is actually still relevant with the organization needs but the project activities and staffs reduction caused the structure to be thinner.

Since YRBI closed their projects, M&E was no longer conducted. They only held informal forums to discuss contemporary issues that develop at local, regional, and national which is called “Diskusi Lorong”.

Score: 2.7 to 2.4 (very slight deterioration)
On the whole, there is a very slight deterioration in the capability to adapt and self-renew for YRBI. Although staff has indicated numerous times that they see the benefit and need to develop their monitoring and evaluation, it has not been prioritized until now. M&E resides with the Director as there is no trained staff assigned with this particular role. Limited but irregular M&E is done at the project level through infrequent meetings where staff is free to address outstanding issues. M&E is done in the form of discussions based on project agreements (activities, outputs and outcomes), so this is initially done for reporting back to donors. They are learning from it though, identifying obstacles and constraints and reducing the risk of failure by finding solutions.

Staff meetings in general have reduced in frequency, duration and intensity, providing fewer scheduled moments for feedback and discussion. Nonetheless office and organizational culture can be considered open and free and enables informal communication. With regards to keeping track of external developments YRBI continues to track media and its network at the local and national level, and picks up on current issues from there, but there is no formal system in place to do this tracking of the environment.

Communication and engagement with stakeholders and beneficiaries is done directly in the field and includes all level of staff, including the director. Active participation of the community allows YRBI to convey their expectations and this yields better results as well as a sense of ownership of the products amongst the beneficiaries. It also prevents wasting time and resources on unwanted activities.

Score: 2.5 to 2.3 (very slight deterioration)
There is an overall strategic plan in YRBI and day-to-day activities are based on the strategic plan. The ability to implement programs has increased since more staff understands the programs. Delegation is done effectively from the new director to the coordinators, but more difficult from coordinators to the staff, sparking the need for better job delegation and management practices. YRBI works closely together with its beneficiaries in a participatory approach, through which they are able to consistently deliver on donor-agreed outputs and deliver quality results. The approach however is intensive and sometimes causes delays and affects efficiency.

Overall meetings to discuss program progress including linking inputs and outputs from projects are held, but there is no formal system in place to assess efficiency by linking inputs to outputs. This is in line with having a week monitoring and evaluation system in place. YRBI has a clear vision and is a focused organization. They cannot depend on funding anymore because the ICCO contract ended (only funder) and was not renewed and together with the community they work together hand in hand with the in sourcing funds. The terms of reference for the project have changed from a donor-driven process into community needs-driven process and on the whole, engagement with the beneficiaries is good.

All in all the capability to deliver on development objectives has remained unchanged, and there is room for improvement.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)
Overall this capability has not changed. YRBI has a good network with local government institutions and NGOs which help them in their advocacy work. Stakeholders are involved and there is ongoing communication with these stakeholders and policy makers, but it is not clear to what extend the stakeholders also contributed to informing policies and strategies of YRBI. Currently, there is an extension in YRBI’s network with the addition of more NGOs. YRBI’s network is at the local and national level, mainly with organizations working on similar issues in indigenous rights and the natural environment, or with organizations that outsource part of their projects to YRBI (subcontracting). Due to their participatory approach there are regular field visits, however the frequency of these visits has reduced due to budget constraints after closing projects which affected having less field officers available. There is a sense of family among the staff members, but also a respect for seniority that prevents junior staff from arguing with senior staff, even though there is an open atmosphere in which one can freely discuss any issue and give their input before a decision is made. With the change of leadership, the above situation sometimes still occur, but the new (young) director applies more egalitarian leadership style, which makes the junior-senior relationship smoother than before.

Score: from 3.2 to 3.4 (very slight improvement)
There are no changes in the capability to achieve coherence. Overall the same approaches towards strategy, the application of vision and mission to daily operations and the alignment of all these factors have remained the same. Standard operating procedures are in still place for finance, but not for HRM.

Score: from 2.7 to 2.7 (no change)

4.2.2 General changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO

Narrative of General Causal Map of Yayasan Rumpun Bambu Indonesia (YRBI)

YRBI is an organization established in 1995 which works in the fields of indigenous community empowerment, agricultural development, and environmental conservation. Since 2006, YRBI has dealt with climate change issues until 2011 when they chose traditional community development as their main issue. Collaboration between YRBI and the Netherlands began in 2005 after the tsunami. The contract between MFS II and YRBI started on 1 November 2012 and ended on 31 October 2013 without being renewed.

The evaluation team carried out an end line assessment at YRBI from 14 to 16 July 2014. During this workshop, the team made a recap of key features of the organisation in the baseline in 2012 (such as vision, mission, strategies, clients, partnerships). This was the basis for discussing changes that had happened to the organisation since the baseline.

Some positive and negative changes have taken place in the organization since the baseline, and both of these have affected the organization in terms of being able to work on mukim and gampong sovereignty issues [1], and thereby becoming a leading organization on these issues [2]. Mukim and gampong are legal administrative community units in Indonesia. YRBI wants to become a leading organization in terms of the issues in dealing with mukim and gampong sovereignty [2]. The extent to which the organisation has been able to work on mukim and gampong sovereignty issues [1], can be attributed to three key organisational capacity changes:

4. staff capacity on mukim and gampong sovereignty issues is more recognised [4];
5. an improved and more extensive network [15];
6. reduced paid workforce and program funds [3], which is a negative development.

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16 It has boundaries and authority to control and manage the interests of local communities based on the origin and the local customs which are recognized in the Indonesian Government system. In a nutshell is zoning based on local custom. In the structure, gampong is under mukim. Mukim formed by at least four gampong. Each mukm is led by a Uleebalang or a Mukim. This system is applied since the era of the Aceh Sultanate.
Each of these key organisational capacity changes and how they have come about is further explained below. Numbers in the narrative corresponds to numbers in the visual.

**Staff capacity on mukim and gampong sovereignty issues is more recognised [4]**

An increase in staff capacity has become more visible to stakeholders, partners and beneficiaries [4] as staff members carried out their duties. More invitations from the community for staff to share their knowledge and skills [9] made the public realize the increase in their knowledge and capacity.

The greater number of invitations from the community to share knowledge and skills is due to an increased trust from beneficiaries and stakeholders in YRBI’s competencies [11]. This was due to a range of different issues:

- Staff improved the communities’ awareness, comprehension and support to *mukim* and *gampong* sovereignty issues [17]. Which was due to public education on these issues [27].
- Many communities succeed to raise funds from the public [18] after encouragement and assistance from YRBI [28]
- An increased number of village maps has been created and utilized by the people [19] after YRBI empowered the community with the skills to create their own social maps [29]
- Increased community economic development assistance [20] through honey bee forest exploitation [30].
- Government created a *mukim* and *gampong* regulation [21] after active and regular advocacy and lobbying of YRBI [31].
- Continuous sharing of knowledge on *mukim* and *gampong* issues [22] because these issues have become more mainstream in Aceh [32].
Each of these factors resulted from the overall development of the Mukim and Gampong sovereignty over the last two years [37], following the increased efforts and staff capacities to deliver work and carry out program activities [38]. This was due to more internal knowledge sharing [39]. It is custom for YRBI staff who have returned from an external event, whether it is a discussion, seminar, or training, to share the knowledge they received to the other staff members in a forum. This forum is called “Diskusi Lorong” [39]. It is held at least twice in one month. Aside from being a forum to share knowledge, Diskusi Lorong also benefits as a forum to discuss program development and contemporary issues that develop at local, regional, and national level.

Amongst the knowledge shared were several staff capacity building activities as supported by ICCO [40] and the establishment and initiation of mukim and gampong coalition for sovereignty natural resources governance. Capacity building activities for YRBI were supported by ICCO between 2012-2013 [40], Which included: 1) Participatory Mapping Internship (GIS); 2) Making Market for The Poor Training; 3) Resource Mobilization Training.

The other issue that affected increased trust from beneficiaries and stakeholders [15] is an improved and more extensive network [15]. Since this also directly affected the organisation’s capacity to address mukim and gampong sovereignty issues, it is further elaborated upon below,

**The network improved and is more extensive [15]**

YRBI’s network has grown over the last two years [15]. The continuous sharing of knowledge and developments on mukim and gampong issues in the public, amongst stakeholders and community played a large role in this [22]. On the other hand, YRBI is now able to host meetings, trainings and mukim forums in the meeting room (Bale Pertemuan) in the new building, which has allowed more beneficiaries and stakeholders to get in touch with YRBI [42]. In fact, the Bale Pertemuan has now become a regular meeting point for civil society activists. Improved facilities have also contributed to being able to continuously share knowledge on mukim gampong and sovereignty issues [22]. This sharing is also due to gampong and mukim becoming a CSO mainstream issue in Aceh [32], which in turn is due to initiating sovereignty institutions to rescue mukim and gampong areas and natural resources [41].

**Reduced paid workforce and program funds [3]**

This is a negative change that occurred in YRBI since the baseline in 2012. There are a variety of reasons for this negative change:

- No salary being paid to staff members [6]
- No more program activities after 2013 [7]
- Reduction in the number of staff members [8]
- More voluntary work [5]
- Less decisive leadership [36].

Each of these factors was the result of the poor financial situation of YRBI [10] after no new funds could be obtained [13] after the contract with ICCO expired in 2013 [23]. A change in ICCO policy was the primary reason for this occurring [33] after specific new changes were included in the renewal of the MoU between ICCO and the government of Indonesia [43]. Prior to this, ICCO was more focused on local economic empowerment. Although YRBI has had the opportunity to submit new proposals in line with ICCO’s policy, they chose to stick with the empowerment of mukim and gampong institutions, and as a result, the contract with ICCO ended.

No additional funds were acquired in the meantime either as proposals written by YRBI were rejected [16]. This was partly due to the limited number of proposals being developed, decreasing the chances of getting new funds significantly [24]. Proposals, rating and development was possible [34] because some senior staff already possessed the capacity and experiences to do so [44]. Nonetheless, a lack of experience in fundraising of the new director of YRBI [25] reduced YRBI’s chances for success acquisition, and this new leadership came on board after a leadership change in the mid of 2013 [45].

The previous director, staff recalled, had better networking and fundraising skills.

Finally, the poor financial condition of the organization resulted in more voluntary work being done since 2013 [8]. This was the only way for YRBI to keep the organization at work with limited resources and capital. Volunteers, and staff working for free on a voluntary basis, were attracted to do so by
their motivation to work and contribute to the organization and its mission [14]. The increase in motivation could also be attributed to the fact that they were now more involved in decision making [26] which was enabled by the freedom and more democratic leadership style of the new director [35]. Unfortunately this increase in staff autonomy and empowerment by the new director also led to a less decisive leadership management [36], which some staff members indicated harmed the organization in need for change and funds.

4.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity development - evaluation question 2 and 4

Note: for each country about 50% of the SPOs has been chosen to be involved in process tracing, which is the main approach chosen to address evaluation question 2. For more information please also see chapter 3 on methodological approach. For each of these SPOs the focus has been on the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew, since these were the most commonly addressed capabilities when planning MFS II supported capacity development interventions for the SPO.

For each of the MFS II supported capacity development interventions -under these two capabilities- an outcome area has been identified, describing a particular change in terms of organisational capacity of the SPO. Process tracing has been carried out for each outcome area. In the capability to act and commit the following outcome area has been identified, based on document review and discussions with SPO and CFA: ‘poor financial situation’.

In the capability to adapt and self-renew the following outcome area has been identified, based on document review and discussions with SPO and CFA: ‘Becoming the leading organization in mukim and gampong sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability</th>
<th>Outcome area</th>
<th>MFS II supported capacity development intervention(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capability to act and commit</td>
<td>Poor financial situation</td>
<td>Financial System Management Training (March 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Resource Mobilization Training (February 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability to adapt and self-renew</td>
<td>Becoming the leading organization in mukim and gampong sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia</td>
<td>Participatory Mapping Internship (GIS) (series of activities), October 2013 – January 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Making Markets work for the Poor (MFP) Training series, March 2014-ongoing</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Resource Mobilization Training, February 2013</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The next sections will describe the results of process tracing for each of the outcome areas, and will describe to what extent these outcome areas have taken place as a result of MFS II supported capacity development interventions and/or other related factors and actors.
The key capacity change that was focused on during the process tracing workshop was identified as ‘poor financial situation’ [5] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Minutes Meeting). Staff of YRBI indicated that this has led to salary not being paid since the beginning of 2014 [1] (Annex L, M, O, Workshop Min. Meeting); the ending of all program activities in 2013 [2] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min. Meeting); a considerable reduction in the number of staff [3] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min. Meeting); the ending of all program activities in 2013 [2] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min. Meeting); encourage staff working more on a voluntary basis [4] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min. Meeting).

The poor financial situation of YRBI [5] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min. Meeting) is due to fact that since the MFS II contract ended, in 2013, no new funds have been obtained [6] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min. Meeting). The reason for this was threefold. First, the YRBI and ICCO contract expired [7] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min. Meeting). Secondly, no follow up for fund raising activity based in the training attended [8] (Annex L, R; Training interview of Director; Workshop Min. Meeting). Thirdly, the rejection of proposals for program activities and funding [9] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min. Meeting). Each of these three reasons is explained in more detail below.

1. The ICCO contract expired on 31 Oktober 2013 and was not renewed due to political and administrative issues. This was due to an internal ICCO policy change [14] (Annex E, L, R; Workshop Min. Meeting), which directly resulted from the renewal of an MoU between ICCO and
the Government of Indonesia [17] (Annex L, R). The policy stated that ICCO couldn't further support activities with "mukim and gampong"17 (zoning based on local custom) issues.

ICCO funded Financial Management Training [16] (Annex L, M, Workshop Min. Meeting) resulted in ability to develop report based on donor standard [13] (Annex L, M, R; Workshop Min. Meeting). The financial reports are now more transparent and accountable [13] (Annex L, R; Workshop Min. Meeting). This training has no further follow up since YRBI didn't need to develop reports as they didn't have programs anymore after the contract from ICCO has been ended.

2. There was no active follow up on fund raising activities [8] (Annex L, R; Training Interview of Director; Workshop Min. Meeting) as taught in the Resource mobilization Training supported by ICCO In 2013 [18] (Training Interview of Director), but the knowledge from the training had been shared and disseminated to the community to empower them to raise fund in a variety of ways. Despite no concrete fund raising activities being carried out after the resource mobilization training took place, the training did result in positive changes elsewhere. A number of beneficiary communities succeeded in raising public funds through cooperation with private sectors/companies or directly from the community with help of YRBI and the newly acquired capabilities in the training. They did this by creating proposals for cooperation or donations, selling merchandise, etc. Unfortunately these capabilities to raise public funds were not utilized for YRBI's own sake.

3. The final reason for the lack of securing new funds was the rejection of submitted proposals [9] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min. Meeting). During the field interviews, various people have noted that the new director was unable to maintain the level of fundraising and had a significant lack of experience in it and also in networking [11] (annex L, M, R). The change of leadership happened in 2013 [19] (annex L, M, O; Workshop Min. Meeting).

The other reason for rejection was that the number of proposals developed was actually very low [12] (Annex L, M, R; Workshop Min. Meeting). This despite the fact that some of the submitted proposals were developed by YRBI staff themselves [15] (Annex L, M, O, R), as they have capacity to do them [21] (annex L, M, O, R).

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17 Mukim and gampong is a legal community unit. It has boundaries and authority to control and manage the interests of local communities based on the origin and the local customs which are recognized in the Indonesian Government system. In a nutshell is zoning based on local custom. In the structure, gampong is under mukim. Mukim formed by at least four gampong. Each mukim is led by a Uleebalang or a Mukim. This system is applied since the era of the Aceh Sultanate.
4.3.2 Becoming the leading organization in mukim and gampong sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia

This process tracing map differs slightly from the other maps presented in this report in that it addresses not only competencies and organizational capacity, but also some implementation activities and targets. The two are inherently intertwined within YRBI and hard to separate when explained for this particular capacity. It should therefore be considered a "mixed" causal map.
Following is the narration for the YRBI causal map between 2012-2014. Within the two year time period since the MFS II baseline evaluation in 2012, a key organizational capacity change at YRBI was that it has become the leading organization in mukim and gampong sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia [1] (Annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). During the process tracing workshops and interviews it was made clear that this outcome is the direct result of an increased recognition in staff capacity on Gampong and Mukim issues [2] (Annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). This increased recognition can be explained through two factors:

1. More invitations from community to share staff knowledge and skills [3] (Annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting)
2. *Gampong* and *Mukim* becoming one of CSO mainstream issues [14] (Annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting)

Each of these changes is described below. First off the increase in invitations for staff to share their knowledge and skills [3] (Annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting) resulted from an increase in trust in YRBI from beneficiaries and stakeholders [4] (Annex L, M, R; Training Interview of Director, Field Staff; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). Four factors contributed to this increase in trust, which will be discussed in detail below:

2. An increased number of assisted bee project groups [6] (Annex L, R; Training Interview of Director; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting)
3. Encouragement of the community to use the results of training as a strategy to raise public and corporate funds [7] (Annex L, Training Interview of Director; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting)
4. A government initiation to create new regulations related to *mukim* and *gampong* [8] (Annex L; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting)

*First*, the village maps being produced by communities came forth from the transfer of staff knowledge to villagers [5] (Annex R; Training Interview of Field Staff; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). This program continues to this day and at least three social maps have successfully been completed, and were funded by the villagers themselves [10] (Annex C; Training Interview of Field Staff). This knowledge resulted from an increase in staff’s ability to develop maps independently. Field Staff applied his knowledge by independently conducting social mapping in a number of villages [15] (Annex C; Training Interview of Field Staff). This was purely from Field Staff initiative, and YRBI functioned as a facilitator. He was one of the YRBI staff members who participated in the *Participatory Mapping Internship (GIS)* in Bogor, 2013 [23] (Training Interview Field Staff). He shared his knowledge with his colleagues in YRBI after his return from there [20] (annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting).

*Secondly*, an increased number of assisted bee project groups arose [6] (Annex L, R; Training Interview of Director; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting) after the honey bee project was aligned with organization issues which is economic community empowerment [11] (Annex C, L; Training Interview of Director). There was development of new community empowerment on honey bee forest exploitation [16] (Annex C, L; Training Interview of Director). The number of communities increased from two to six benefiting communities. Actually honey exploitation is not a new activity. It was stagnant but has developed since one of YRBI staff participated and shared the knowledge about economic community empowerment with his colleagues. Together with his colleagues, then benefiting communities after their own skill raised [19] (annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). At the bottom of all this was the *Making Market for the Poor Training (MFP)* [24] (Annex C; Training Interview of Director). This activity was held in 2013 in the form of training by Penabulu supported by ICCO. The YRBI staff who participated in this training was–The YRBI Director. This training made

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18 Mukim and gampong is a legal community unit. It has boundaries and authority to control and manage the interests of local communities based on the origin and the local customs which are recognized in the Indonesian Government system. In a nutshell is zoning based on local custom. In the structure, gampong is under mukim. Mukim formed by at least four gampong. Each mukim is led by a Uleebalang or a Mukim. This system is applied since the era of the Aceh Sultanate.
efforts in providing participants with the competencies necessary to market their products. Oftentimes, the obstacle in the development of small to medium-sized industries is marketing products. Through this training, the products can be marketed well and in time so as to increase the economy of the community.

Thirdly, communities were encouraged to use the results of training as a strategy to raise public and corporate funds [7] (Annex L; Training Interview of Director; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). YRBI makes an active effort in order for the beneficiary communities to be able to not only raise resources, but also be able to identify and be firm towards companies involved in cases of corruption, environment, human rights, etc. A number of beneficiary communities succeeded in raising public funds through cooperation with private sectors/companies or directly from the community. They did this by creating proposals for cooperation or donations, selling merchandise, etc. However, YRBI asserted the beneficiary communities to pay attention to the background of those they would like to cooperate with, especially the private companies. That knowledge was shared by YRBI’s staff to all beneficiaries [12] (Annex L; Training Interview of Director), and this knowledge was the result of skills gained to do fundraising from the public and the private sector [17] (Annex L; Training Interview of Director). At the basis of this increased capacity was the Resource Mobilization Training [25] (Annex C, L; Training Interview of Director). This activity was held in 2013 in the form of a training held by Penabulu with the support of ICCO. The YRBI staff sent to participate in the training was The YRBI Director. This training was on how beneficiary communities or the organization can raise public funds, therefore making this beneficial for the beneficiary communities and YRBI. The output was his improved competencies in raising public funds [17] (Annex C, L; Training Interview of Director). Unfortunately, the increased fundraising capacity was not successfully applied to the own organization.

In all three cases of ICCO supported trainings and activities, YRBI organized meetings to share the outcomes amongst the staff who didn’t attend. "Diskusi Lorong" [20], as it is called, was actually YRBI’s internal forum to discuss or share technical details dealing with program implementation and the performance of the organization or the subjects of the capacity building. The staffs who have recently attended trainings are often asked to share their knowledge with others through this forum. In addition, this forum is also used for updating the latest social issues developing in Aceh. Although this forum is informal, the staffs consider it very productive. Their capacities have significantly increased through this forum.

The fourth and last factor contributing to the increase in trust among beneficiaries and stakeholders was a shift in government regulation regarding mukim and gampong [8] (Annex L, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). This was the result of regulatory advocacy from YRBI on the one hand [13] (Annex I, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting) and the increasing spotlight on the CSO mainstream issues of mukim and gampong on the other hand [14] (annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). Both will be explained below.

Firstly, due to the government permitted exploitation of natural resources by companies, YRBI was motivated to increase public awareness, in this case the mukim and gampong, that they are the ones who truly have the sovereignty for natural resources. The government must include them in managing the natural resources. If companies want to exploit the natural resources, it must be permitted by mukim and gampong. YRBI trained and accompanied the community in managing the natural resources. They paid attention to a number of values, such as: environmentally friendly based on custom. In addition, YRBI also advocate so that issue was accommodated by the government as a regulation [13] (Annex L, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting).

Secondly, by starting with issues on managing natural resources, the mukim and government sovereignty became a mainstream issue for NGOs in the Aceh province [14] (annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). This forum succeeded in making mukim and gampong sovereignty a joined issue. Women NGOs, human rights NGOs, environmental NGOs, economic empowerment NGOs, etc, have made mukim and gampong the basis of their actions, and custom as the spirit. Productive communication, interaction and sharing between NGOs, or stakeholders, specifically dealing with mukim and gampong was done in this forum [18] (Annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). For YRBI itself, this forum made use of YRBI’s infrastructure to optimize the work of the network [21] (Annex L, M, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). The development of YRBI’s organization infrastructure resulted as part of an independent effort to become more sovereign [26]
(Annex L, M, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting) in the initiation of “Mukim Sovereignty Organizations for the Sovereignty of Natural Resources”.
5 Discussion and conclusion

5.1 Methodological issues

**General: Applied to all or most SPOs**

With regard to the methodology, Indonesia has made some data collection adjustment based on the context. The first adjustment was related to the type of instrument used. To assess the organizational capacity, the study has provided self-assessment, observation and interview sheets. These all were used during the baseline with all SPOs. During the end line the team used self-assessment, interview and observation sheets. However the evaluator applied interview sheets as self-assessment—where participants were asked to fill these sheets by themselves. For the participants who did not attend the workshop, the interviews were done separately using the interview sheet and the results from the interview were included in the subgroup interview sheet that was already filled by the staff member. Were combined into the relevant sub categories in the interview sheet. Interview sheets were also applied for interviews with the CFAs, partners and consultants.

The baseline study showed that having two similar instruments (self assessments, and interview sheets) did not have any effect in relation to obtaining adequate and quality data.

Another adjustment to the methodology was the language. The team has translated all instruments in to Bahasa Indonesia to be able better understood by the SPO’s. This also applied to the initial findings (translated back into Indonesia) for three SPOs that are YRBI, ASB and PT.PPMA.

To have some clarification post visit to all SPOs, the evaluator used email and phone interviews.

**YRBI**

The evaluator began the endline process by sending all the interview sheets prior to the field visit to the SPO. However none of them was returned back. This was due to the staff workload and the little time available for responding to the request to fill in these sheets. YRBI is one of the SPO’s that was selected for process tracing. The evaluator visited the SPO twice.

The first visit was divided into two sessions. The first session was to develop the general causal map, based on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline, and to facilitate the interview. The second visit focused on verifying the general causal map and furthermore interviews with the former director and organizational partners [Director of the Aceh Human Rights Coalition and Imam Mukim (Local Leader)] were carried out.

Furthermore, process tracing was carried out during the second the field visit to the SPO. In relation to this process tracing, three staffs filled the training questionnaire related to MFS II funded training events since the baseline in 2012. One staff attended two different trainings in 2013 (Resource Mobilisation) and 2014 (Marketing for the Poor), while another staff attended one internship during 2013-2014 on PIWA—Custom Territory Land Mapping. It was not possible to engage YRBI staff that participated in the baseline study because they no longer worked in the organization due to the financial crisis of the organisation. In the baseline, 6 permanent staff and 8 program staff (non-permanent staff) participated. While in the end line, only 8 staff remained and participated in the study. They were, 1 management staff (director), 2 program staff, 2 admin and HRM staff, and 3 field staff.
5.2 Changes in organisational capacity development

This section aims to provide an answer to the first and fourth evaluation questions:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations' capacity during the 2012-2014 period?

4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

Changes in the five capabilities for YRBI have been both negative and positive, but largely unchanged. The greatest change took place under the capability to act and commit but was negative. The changes in each of the capabilities are further explained, by referring to the specific indicators that changed.

Over the last two years most changes for YRBI took place in the indicators under the capability to act and commit. Overall a slight deterioration took place as compared to the baseline, although some positive developments were found as well. Responsive leadership slightly improved as the director’s position was handed over to a younger staff member, which made day to day interaction with colleagues easier. Strategic guidance however deteriorated as a result of a lack of detailed instructions on daily work activities by the new director. Staff turnover deteriorated as well, due to a lack of influx of new staff and existing staff members leaving due to a lack of funding of the organization. Organizational structure deteriorated related to this leaving of staff members. Critical functions of the organizations can no longer be fulfilled. Articulated strategies slightly deteriorated as after the closing of program activities there is no further need for developing analyses and performing M&E. Nonetheless, staff skills slightly improved due to various training offerings from ICCO in 2012-2014. In line with this, training opportunities for staff members improved slightly. A deterioration in terms of funding sources is evident in case of YRBI. After the contract with ICCO ended, no new funding sources have been found, leaving the organization unable to perform or act.

In terms of the capability to adapt and self-renew, a very slight deterioration took place. In terms of critical reflection the situation has deteriorated. Regular staff meetings are no longer held, and some staff members have indicated that it is difficult to provide and receive critical feedback from colleagues or management. Similarly, the freedom for ideas has slightly deteriorated, recently the regularity and duration of meetings has been reduced due to the limited amount of work activities.

The capability to deliver on development objectives has effectively remained unchanged although two particular indicators have changed. First, a slight improvement was found in clear operational plans. As all the information is now open on the table in terms of work plans and budget, it is very clear what can and cannot be done in terms of work. Secondly, a slight deterioration took place in terms of monitoring efficiency. Structural practices are missing and even deteriorating.

The capability to relate has very slightly improved. This resulted from a slight improvement in the engagement in networks. YRBI has expanded its network to several new networks and groups. In contrast to this is the slight deterioration, which occurred in terms of engagement with target groups. Although in practice the network is still strong and partners still support YRBI, the organisation does
not have the resources anymore to continue to engage with its target groups, which can lead to a slow erosion of relationships over time. Despite all this, relationships within the organization have slightly improved. Staff members have described internal relations as a “sense of family” and staff get along well with the new director.

No changes occurred in terms of the capability to achieve coherence since the baseline in 2012.

**General organisational capacity changes related to MFS II Interventions**

The evaluators considered it important to also note down the SPO’s story in terms of changes in the organisation since the baseline, and this would also provide more information about reasons for change, which were difficult to get for the individual indicators. Also for some issues there may not have been relevant indicators available in the list of core indicators provide by the evaluation team.

Please note that this information is based only on the information provided by YRBI staff during the endline workshop, but no validation of this information has been done like with the process tracing causal maps. For details in relation to attribution, we refer to the next section (5.3).

During the endline workshop some key organisational capacity changes were brought up by YRBI staff, these have been captured in the general causal map in 4.2.2:

1. staff capacity on mukim and gampong sovereignty issues is more recognized
2. an improved and more extensive network
3. reduced paid workforce and program funds

All of these are expected to contribute to YRBI becoming the leading organization in mukim and gampong sovereignty issues. YRBI staff experienced these as the most important capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline.

Staff capacity is more recognized due to more invitations from the community to share staff knowledge and skills on mukim and gampong issues. This can be attributed to the increased trust from beneficiaries and stakeholders, which is due several developments; improved community awareness due to public education on the issue; successful fundraising of communities with YRBI’s support and encouragement; more village maps produced with help from YRBI; increased economic community empowerment assistance through the honey bee exploitation program; and the government initiating specific mukim and gampong regulation after active advocacy. All of these factors can be attributed to mukim and gampong sovereignty becoming more developed as a result of increased staff capacities to develop the program. This was enabled through internal knowledge sharing, resulting from various staff capacity building activities by ICCO through MFS II funded capacity development interventions. Another factor affecting the trust of stakeholders was the continuous sharing of knowledge after mukim and gampong became a mainstream issue in Aceh following the initiation of sovereignty institutions to rescue these areas and their natural resources.

YRBI’s network improved and became more extensive. The latter can be attributed to the optimal use of the organization’s facilities for events and trainings, the initiation of sovereignty institutions, as well as the greater public attention resulting from the mainstream issue status.

There was also a negative change in the organisation: a reduction in paid work force and program funds. This resulted from no salary being paid, program activities being shut down, a reduction in the number of staff, and staff took up work on a voluntary basis as a result of this. Each of these changes can be attributed to the poor financial situation of YRBI since no new funds were obtained after the expiration of the ICCO contract. This can be attributed to a change of ICCO policy following the renewal of the MoU between ICCO and the Indonesian government, in which political areas and topics complicated the continuation of projects in the area. No new funds were obtained as well due to the rejection of proposals and indecisive leadership. Proposals being rejected can be attributed to the limited number of proposals developed despite staff having the competencies to do so, as well as the lack of experience in fundraising of the new leader in charge. Finally more voluntary work was commissioned as staff remained motivated to work due to greater involvement in decision making and a more egalitarian and democratic leadership style of the new director. Whilst there was no link indicated with MFS II funded capacity development interventions, the fact that the main funder ICCO (MFS II) withdrew from funding the organisation has had an important effect on the organisation’s financial situation. The organisation has not been able to restore the situation which has seriously affected its ability to implement programs.
In conclusion, and based on information provided during the endline workshop, only two branches of
the general causal map can be partly attributed to MFS II funded interventions: the improved network
of the organization, and staff capacity becoming more recognized in terms of mukim and gampong
sovereignty issues. The network improvements can only be partially related, as other developments
play a strong role as well. However, it must be noted that the information provided has not been
verified through other sources of information. For this please refer to section 5.3 where process
tracing has been applied to more carefully address this attribution question.

5.3 Attributing changes in organisational capacity
development to MFS II

This section aims to provide an answer to the second and fourth evaluation questions:
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development
interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

To address the question of attribution it was agreed that for all the countries in the 5C study, the
focus would be on the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew, with a
focus on MFS II supported organisational capacity development interventions that were possibly
related to these capabilities. ‘Process tracing’ was used to get more detailed information about the
changes in these capabilities that were possibly related to the specific MFS II capacity development
interventions. The organisational capacity changes that were focused on were:

• Poor financial situation
• Becoming the leading organization in mukim and gampong sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia

The first organisational capacity change falls under the capability to act and commit. The second
organisational capacity change falls under the capability to adapt and self-renew. The second
organisational capacity is closely intertwined with some implementation activities and targets of YRBI.
The organisational capacity change areas that were chosen are based on document review as well as
discussions with the SPO and CFA. Each of these organisational capacity changes is further discussed
below.

The following issues are discussed for the MFS II funded activities that are related to the above
mentioned organisational capacity changes:

a. Design: the extent to which the MFS II supported capacity development intervention was well-
designed. (Key criteria: relevance to the SPO; SMART objectives)
b. Implementation: the extent to which the MFS II supported capacity development was implemented
as designed (key criteria: design, according to plans during the baseline);
c. Reaching objectives: the extent to which the MFS II capacity development intervention reached all
its objectives (key criteria: immediate and long-term objectives, as formulated during the
baseline);
d. the extent to which the observed results are attributable to the identified MFS II supported
capacity development intervention (reference made to detailed causal map, based on ‘process
tracing’).

Please note that whilst (d) addresses the evaluation question related to attribution (evaluation
question 2), the other three issues (a, b and c) have been added by the synthesis team as additional
reporting requirements. This was done when fieldwork for the endline process had already started,
and is also not the focus on this 5c evaluation. With the minimum information available the evaluation
team tried to address these first 3 questions.

Poor financial situation
The following MFS II capacity development interventions supported by ICCO were linked to the key
organisational capacity change “poor financial situation”:

1. Financial System Management Training (March 2013)
2. Resource Mobilisation Training, February 2013

Financial System Management Training

**Design**
This intervention was not specifically planned during the baseline. It is included here as well as in the detailed causal maps and narratives because the effects of this training were observed during the endline and it came up during document review, workshop, and interviews. The immediate objective of this training was to have YRBI apply the financial software in place to use a standard financial system which is conform donor standards. The long term objective was to create a strong financial management system with accountable financial reporting.

The training has been provided by ICCO to all ICCO partners to ensure that they meet the minimal standard of financial reporting, and therefore very relevant to the SPO. The training is however also relevant to YRBI’s capacity building for staff. In the Theory of Change developed in the baseline in 2012, finance was identified as a technical competence that required strengthening. Prior to the baseline, several related interventions to finance and financial administration were already carried out. It was also indicated that such interventions may be ongoing activities, although at the time of the baseline, it was not exactly specified when and how this would occur.

The expected effects were partially formulated in a SMART way (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound). Then again, the evaluation team did not ask the CFA for SMART objectives but rather asked about the expected immediate and long term effects of the interventions.

**Implementation**
The intervention was not specifically planned for during the baseline. One staff member (the financial manager) attended the training in 2013 at a partner organization in Jakarta as a one day workshop, although an exact date and further information about the session are unknown to the evaluation team. As far as the evaluation team knows, it was implemented as designed, however, details about the specific design cannot be provided, since this wasn’t the focus of the evaluation.

**Reaching objectives**
Not having objectives that were defined as very SMART objectives makes it difficult to assess this issue in detail. However, ICCO has stated that YRBI now successfully applies the financial software system, which was the intended immediate objective as stated by the ICCO account manager in the self-assessment and interview and in that respect the immediate objective has been reached. Similarly, both the CFA and SPO have stated that financial reports are now more transparent and accountable, which meets the long-term objective.

Resource Mobilisation Training, February 2013

**Design**
This intervention was planned during the baseline and laid out in the theory of change. ICCO stated here that next to past capacity development interventions, for the period of 2012-2015, the plan was to also pay attention to resource mobilization (with a focus on financial sustainability). A previous three day workshop in Jakarta on resource mobilisation and financial sustainability had already been given to the YRBI leader prior to the baseline evaluation in 2012. The resource mobilisation training in 2013 was a follow up on this earlier training.

The immediate expected effect of the intervention was that YRBI would have the capacity to mobilise available resources in their organisation and to create innovative approaches to generating income. The long term expected effects were for YRBI to be able to develop innovative strategies to become a sustainable organisation, and to develop fundraising strategies using their own resources.

Resource mobilisation is very relevant to YRBI now that ICCO has stopped its funding to the organisation. The contract between ICCO and YRBI expired on 31 October 2013 and was not renewed due to political and administrative issues. Having funded 100% of YRBI’s activities in the past, ICCO wanted to ensure that YRBI could transition well to this new situation and become a sustainable organisation. After the contract with ICCO has ended, YRBI is required to find its own funding from new sources and sustain its activities by other means.
The above mentioned expected effects were not formulated in a very SMART way (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound). Then again, the evaluation team did not ask the CFA for SMART objectives specifically during the baseline, but rather asked about the expected immediate and long term effects of the interventions.

Implementation

This intervention took place in the form of a training in February 2013, and was attended by YRBI’s director. About 25 other ICCO partners attended the event as well which was held in Depok, Jakarta. As far as the evaluation team knows, it was implemented as designed, however, details about the specific design cannot be provided, since this wasn’t the focus of the evaluation.

Reaching objectives

Not having objectives that were defined as very SMART objectives makes it difficult to assess this issue in specific, however the causal map on the poor financial situation of YRBI, makes it clear that neither the immediate (ability to mobilise resources and create innovative approaches to generate income) nor the long term objectives (develop innovative sustainable strategies and develop fundraising strategies) have been realised as of yet.

YRBI was unable to apply the lessons learned in the training to itself. No concrete fund raising activities were carried out after the resource mobilisation training took place. Instead, YRBI used the knowledge to train its beneficiary communities in order to empower them to raise funds in a variety of ways. This yielded some positive results in that a number of beneficiary communities succeeded in raising public funds through cooperation with private parties. The lack of new funds has led to a poor financial situation for YRBI in which both the number of program activities, as well as the number of staff has been greatly reduced.

Attribution of observed results to MFS II capacity development interventions

The poor financial situation of YRBI resulted from a lack of obtaining new funds, which in turn resulted from the expiration of the ICCO contract, no follow up on fundraising activities occurred, and rejection of proposals for funding (see 4.3.1) took place, even though the organisation has increased its capacity to provide financial reports based on donor standards.

The expiration of the YRBI and ICCO contract was due to a change of ICCO policy. In this policy ICCO stated that they couldn’t further support activities with “mukim and gampong” issues, as they did not receive permission to work in these areas in Aceh any longer after the renewal of the MoU between ICCO and the Government of Indonesia.

No follow up for fundraising occurred, despite increased competencies in resource mobilization as the result of the Resource Mobilization training in 2013 by ICCO. The competencies to raise public funds as generated in the ICCO intervention to mobilise resources training in February 2013, were not utilized for YRBI’s own financial situation. Instead YRBI elected to share these training outcomes amongst its beneficiary communities, some of which successfully applied this to raise public funds through cooperation with private parties.

The rejection of proposals was do a lack of experience in fundraising on the one hand and a limited number of proposals being developed on the other. The role of fundraising remained an important function of the director, but the new director did not have the experience or networking skills to continue the level of initiatives of the previous director. A limited number of proposals was developed as well, making the chance of success slim. This despite the fact that proposal development was now a developed competence by the staff members. This developed competence cannot be related to any MFS II supported capacity development interventions.

No evidence for a relation could be found between the poor financial situation of YRBI and the improved transparency and accountability in financial reporting which resulted from the Financial Management training. Despite the positive outcomes in reaching the CFA’s objectives in terms of utilizing the financial software and becoming a more transparent and accountable reporting organization, these developments did not impact the financial situation of YRBI. Instead the capacity built up in this area is now unused, as YRBI does not have any ICCO programs to carry out anymore.

In conclusion, two MFS II capacity development interventions were identified related to this organizational capacity outcome area, but their impact on the poor financial situation of YRBI remains
limited. Whilst better, more transparent and accountable financial reporting can be attributed to the MFS II funded financial management training, this could not improve the financial situation of the organization. On the other hand the improved competence in resource mobilization can be attributed to the MFS II funded resource mobilization training, but due to lack of follow up and application to YRBI itself, no new funds could be acquired and the financial situation remains poor.

**Becoming the leading organisation in mukim and gampong sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia**
The following MFS II capacity development interventions supported by ICCO are linked to the key organisational capacity change “Becoming the leading organisation in mukim and gampong sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia” (please also see section 4.3 of this report):

2. Making Markets work for the Poor (MFP) Training series, March 2014-ongoing

**Participatory Mapping Internship (GIS) – Series of activities between October 2013 and January 2014**

**Design**
This intervention was not planned during the baseline. The participatory mapping internship was a training course for one staff member to develop his competence in GIS application and development, one of the core activities of YRBI. No specific immediate and long term objectives were formulated.

The intervention has been mentioned during the interviews, and self-assessments as very relevant to the SPO as Participatory Mapping is one of YRBI’s core activities.

**Implementation**
The intervention was not planned for during the baseline and took place in 6 different sessions of approximately a 3-7 days per session in between October 2013 and February 2014 in Bogor at the School of spatial planning. As far as the evaluation team knows, it was implemented as designed, however, details about the specific design cannot be provided, since this wasn’t the focus of the evaluation.

**Reaching objectives**
Since no objectives haven’t been formulated, it is not possible to assess to what extent these objectives have been reached. However, it can be stated that the training was perceived positively by the attendee as noted in the interviews, and its contents were disseminated amongst YRBI colleagues and beneficiaries. This has led to various independent efforts with communities to implement the knowledge in practice (see for more information section 4.3.1).

**Making Markets Work for the Poor (MFP) Training series, March 2014-ongoing**

**Design**
This intervention was not planned for during the baseline evaluation. The intervention is an initiative of ICCO to train its 14 partners in their capacity for economic program development in a series of activities between March 2014 until December 2014.

The training was deemed relevant for YRBI by both the SPO as the CFA. YRBI’s position close to its beneficiary communities, as well as their in-depth knowledge about the territory and its natural resources, makes the organization well suited for the development and implementation of economic development plans. YRBI’s beneficiaries would greatly benefit from developing the economic capacity to exploit local natural resources.

The immediate objective as stated by ICCO was the recognition of a potential economic development program. For the long term, objective, ICCO stated that YRBI should have an economic development program for the community based on the Making Markets Work for the Poor approach as taught in the training.
The expected effects were not formulated in a SMART way (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound). Then again, the evaluation team did not ask the CFA for SMART objectives specifically, but rather asked about the expected immediate and long term effects of the interventions.

Implementation

Implementation of the activity took place parallel to the endline evaluation and started in March 2014 with an introduction workshop at PENABULU training center in Jakarta, which was attended by the YPRI director with 24 other ICCO partners. Further activities were planned in the form of on-site coaching (April-July 2014) and business model and plan development workshops in October – December 2014. As far as the evaluation team knows, the intervention was implemented as designed, however, details about the specific design cannot be provided, since this wasn’t the focus of the evaluation.

Reaching objectives

The implementation of this intervention took place simultaneously to the endline evaluation which makes it difficult to fully assess the outcome of the efforts. Furthermore, since the objectives haven’t been formulated as SMART objectives, it is difficult to assess to what extent these objectives have been reached.

Though not the focus of this evaluation, we can provide an indication of the extent to which the objectives as formulated during the baseline and endline, have been achieved. The CFA has stated that after the first workshop took place YRBI had already met the immediate objective of identifying a potential commodity for further development in to a community economic program. Over the past year, this has expanded into a an active community empowerment project to develop honey bee forest exploitation, which comes close to the long term objective of the CFA for YRBI to develop its own community economic development program.

Resource Mobilisation Training, February 2013

Design

This intervention was planned during the baseline and laid out in the theory of change. ICCO stated here that next to past interventions, for the period of 2012-2015, the plan was to also pay attention to resource mobilization (with a focus on financial sustainability). A previous three day workshop in Jakarta on resource mobilisation and financial sustainability had already been given to the YRBI leader prior to the baseline evaluation in 2012. The resource mobilisation training in 2013 was a follow up on this earlier training.

The immediate expected effect of this intervention was that YRBI would have the capacity to mobilise available resources in their organisation and to create innovative approaches to generating income. The long term expected effects were for YRBI to be able to develop innovative strategies to become a sustainable organisation, and to develop fundraising strategies using their own resources.

Resource mobilisation is very relevant to YRBI now that ICCO has stopped its funding to the organisation. The contract between ICCO and YRBI expired on 31 October 2013 and was not renewed due to political and administrative issues. Having funded 100% of YRBI’s activities in the past, ICCO wanted to ensure that YRBI could transition well to this new situation and become a sustainable organisation. After the contract with ICCO has ended, YRBI is required to find its own funding from new sources and sustain its activities by other means. In addition, YRBI’s beneficiary communities are constantly looking for additional support as well which YRBI’s encourages. Developing and enabling communities with skills on how to fundraise is therefore also very relevant for YRBI.

The above mentioned expected effects were not formulated in a very SMART way (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound). Then again, the evaluation team did not ask the CFA for SMART objectives specifically during the baseline, but rather asked about the expected immediate and long term effects of the interventions.

Implementation

This intervention took place in the form of a training in February 2013, and was attended by YRBI’s director. About 25 other ICCO partners attended the event as well which was held in Depok, Jakarta.
As far as the evaluation team knows, it was implemented as designed, however, details about the specific design cannot be provided, since this wasn’t the focus of the evaluation.

**Reaching objectives**

Not having objectives that were defined as very SMART objectives makes it difficult to assess this issue in specific. The training was used successfully to share knowledge with YRBI’s beneficiary communities, and to encourage them to use the material in practice. For some of the communities this worked out in favour, as they managed to gain access to new funds from private parties. In this sense, the intervention was successful for YRBI, although it was not primarily intended as such by the CFA. ICCO primarily wanted YRBI to develop its own fundraising capacity.

**Attribution of observed results to MFS II capacity development interventions**

YRBI has become more visible as a leading organisation in Mukim and Gampong sovereignty issues in Aceh in Indonesia. This was due to YRBI’s staff capacity on Gampong and Mukim issues becoming more recognized amongst its stakeholders, due to more invitations from the community to share staff knowledge and skills.

Local communities started inviting YRBI more due to an increase of trust in the organisation, as well as Gampong and Mukim issues becoming more mainstream. The increase of trust occurred because of the implementation of successful program activities that greatly involved and empowered the beneficiary communities. This included a village mapping initiative that was produced and utilized by the community itself (specifics unknown to evaluation team), an increase in the number of assisted bee project groups in the community economic development initiative, and fundraising training to community and successful encouragement of the community to seek public and private funds. Another reason for increased trust by communities and stakeholders is the fact that the government has initiated mukim and gampong regulations, as well as Gampong and Mukim becoming one of the CSO mainstream issues in Aceh.

Village maps were produced and utilized by the people as a result of the application of the training skills to some of the villages independently. This can be attributed to the increased staff ability to develop maps independently, following internal knowledge sharing gained from trainings. The knowledge shared in this case can be contributed to the participatory mapping internship (GIS) that took place in 2014 and was MFS II funded.

The increased number of assisted bee project groups was due to the utilization of the honey bee project to align with organizational issues, which resulted from the development of new community empowerment of honey bee forest exploitation. This can be attributed to increased staff capacity to do economic community empowerment, which resulted from internal knowledge sharing after the Making Markets work for the Poor Training in 2013 (MFS II funded).

Encouraging the community to use the results of training as a strategy to raise public and corporate funds resulted from the sharing of training knowledge to beneficiaries. This can be attributed to the gained staff skill to do fundraising from public or corporate CSR funds. This was due the internal knowledge sharing of the resource mobilization training that took place in 2013 as well.

Government initiating mukim and gampong regulation resulted from regulatory advocacy taking place which can be attributed to the organization continuously sharing knowledge on mukim and gampong issues to its shareholders, as well as this topic becoming a CSO mainstream issue. Sharing with stakeholders can be attributed to the internal knowledge sharing of trainings on the one hand, and on the availability of a building based in YRBI used for network meetings on the other. This can be attributed to the “Mukim Sovereignty Organizations for the sovereignty of natural resources” initiative which YRBI undertook.

First, the participatory mapping internship (MFS II) held between October 2013 and January 2014 led to the sharing of training outcomes amongst all YRBI staff through a special knowledge sharing medium in the organization named “diskusi lorong”. This resulted in the increase in staff capacity in this field, which translated in active application in the field in close cooperation with beneficiary communities, who were taught in the process. Not only did this build trust, it also empowered these communities which lead to a more visible and leading stature of YRBI.
Secondly, the ‘Making Markets Work for the Poor’ Training (MFS II), which took place in the course of 2014 parallel to the endline evaluation, resulted in the successful creation of an economic development project for beneficiary communities on the topic of honey bee exploitation and commercialisation. An increased amount of beneficiary groups has started getting involved in this project, again leading to greater trust amongst beneficiary communities.

Thirdly, the resource mobilisation training held in 2013 in Jakarta and attended by YRBI’s director resulted in sharing fundraising strategies with beneficiary communities. Communities were encouraged to use the results of training as a strategy to raise public and corporate funds. YRBI has made an active effort in order for the beneficiary communities to be able to not only raise resources, but also be able to identify and be firm towards companies involved in cases of corruption, environment, human rights. A number of beneficiary communities succeeded in raising public funds through cooperation with private sectors/companies or directly from the community.

On the whole, YRBI has grown into a leading organisation in Mukim and Gampong sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia, and this is mainly due to positive effects at community level of the projects implemented by staff whose competencies have been enhanced in the MFS II trainings on participatory mapping, ‘Making Markets Work for the Poor’ and resource mobilisation. The whole, the changes in the key organisational capacity change can be attributed to a large extent to MFS II supported capacity development interventions.
References and Resources

Overall evaluation methodology


Delahais, Thomas and Jacques Toulemonde. 2012. Applying contribution analysis: Lessons from five years of practice. Evaluation July 2012 vol. 18 no. 3 281-293


Research documentation and resources received from CFA/SPO:
! YRBI Program Report_ICCO_Final_revised January 2012.docx
1_Proposal_YRBI_ICCO_2010_2013 Final.doc
2_LFA_Proposal_YRBI_ICCO_2011_2013.doc
10_061831.pdf
Annex A_5c endline_assessment sheet_Dutch co-financing organisations_Indonesia_YRBI_ICCO.docx
Annex B_5C endline_support to capacity development sheet_CFA perspective_Indonesia_YRBI_ICCO (2) (1).docx
Audit-Report.pdf
## List of Respondents

### People Present at the Workshops

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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zulfikar Muhammad</td>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>16 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 1   Methodological approach & reflection

Introduction

This appendix describes the methodological design and challenges for the assessment of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs), also called the ‘5C study’. This 5C study is organised around four key evaluation questions:

1. What are the changes in partner organisations’ capacity during the 2012-2014 period?
2. To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
3. Were the efforts of the MFS II consortia efficient?
4. What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

It has been agreed that the question (3) around efficiency cannot be addressed for this 5C study. The methodological approach for the other three questions is described below. At the end, a methodological reflection is provided.

In terms of the attribution question (2), ‘process tracing’ is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. This approach was presented and agreed-upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 by the 5C teams for the eight countries of the MFS II evaluation. A more detailed description of the approach was presented during the synthesis workshop in February 2014. The synthesis team, NWO-WOTRO, the country project leaders and the MFS II organisations present at the workshop have accepted this approach. It was agreed that this approach can only be used for a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process.

Please find below an explanation of how the above-mentioned evaluation questions have been addressed in the 5C evaluation.

Note: the methodological approach is applied to 4 countries that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre is involved in in terms of the 5C study (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The overall approach has been agreed with all the 8 countries selected for this MFS II evaluation. The 5C country teams have been trained and coached on this methodological approach during the evaluation process. Details specific to the SPO are described in chapter 5.1 of the SPO report. At the end of this appendix a brief methodological reflection is provided.

Changes in partner organisation’s capacity – evaluation question 1

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the first evaluation question: What are the changes in partner organisations’ capacity during the 2012-2014 period?

This question was mainly addressed by reviewing changes in 5C indicators, but additionally a ‘general causal map’ based on the SPO perspective on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline
has been developed. Each of these is further explained below. The development of the general causal map is integrated in the steps for the endline workshop, as mentioned below.

During the baseline in 2012 information has been collected on each of the 33 agreed upon indicators for organisational capacity. For each of the five capabilities of the 5C framework indicators have been developed as can be seen in Appendix 2. During this 5C baseline, a summary description has been provided for each of these indicators, based on document review and the information provided by staff, the Co-financing Agency (CFA) and other external stakeholders. Also a summary description has been provided for each capability. The results of these can be read in the baseline reports.

The description of indicators for the baseline in 2012 served as the basis for comparison during the endline in 2014. In practice this meant that largely the same categories of respondents (preferably the same respondents as during the baseline) were requested to review the descriptions per indicator and indicate whether and how the endline situation (2014) is different from the described situation in 2012. Per indicator they could indicate whether there was an improvement or deterioration or no change and also describe these changes. Furthermore, per indicator the interviewee could indicate what interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation. See below the specific questions that are asked for each of the indicators. Per category of interviewees there is a different list of indicators to be looked at. For example, staff members were presented with a list of all the indicators, whilst external people, for example partners, are presented with a select number of indicators, relevant to the stakeholder.

The information on the indicators was collected in different ways:

1. **Endline workshop at the SPO - self-assessment and ‘general causal map’**: similar to data collection during the baseline, different categories of staff (as much as possible the same people as during the baseline) were brought together in a workshop and requested to respond, in their staff category, to the list of questions for each of the indicators (self-assessment sheet). Prior to carrying out the self-assessments, a brainstorming sessions was facilitated to develop a ‘general causal map’, based on the key organisational capacity changes since the baseline as perceived by SPO staff. Whilst this general causal map is not validated with additional information, it provides a sequential narrative, based on organisational capacity changes as perceived by SPO staff;

2. **Interviews with staff members**: additional to the endline workshop, interviews were held with SPO staff, either to provide more in-depth information on the information provided on the self-assessment formats during the workshop, or as a separate interview for staff members that were not present during the endline workshop;

3. **Interviews with externals**: different formats were developed for different types of external respondents, especially the co-financing agency (CFA), but also partner agencies, and organisational development consultants where possible. These externals were interviewed, either face-to-face or by phone/Skype. The interview sheets were sent to the respondents and if they wanted, these could be filled in digitally and followed up on during the interview;

4. **Document review**: similar to the baseline in 2012, relevant documents were reviewed so as to get information on each indicator. Documents to be reviewed included progress reports, evaluation reports, training reports, etc. (see below) since the baseline in 2012, so as to identify changes in each of the indicators;

5. **Observation**: similar to what was done in 2012, also in 2014 the evaluation team had a list with observable indicators which were to be used for observation during the visit to the SPO.

The same categories were used as during the baseline (except beneficiaries, other funders): staff categories including management, programme staff, project staff, monitoring and evaluation staff, field staff, administration staff; stakeholder categories including co-financing agency (CFA), consultants, partners.
Below the key steps to assess changes in indicators are described.

### Key steps to assess changes in indicators are described

1. **Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats** – CDI team
2. **Review the descriptions per indicator** – in-country team & CDI team
3. **Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO** – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)
4. **Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo** – CDI team
5. **Organise the field visit to the SPO** – in-country team
6. **Interview the CFA** – CDI team
7. **Run the endline workshop with the SPO** – in-country team
8. **Interview SPO staff** – in-country team
9. **Fill-in observation sheets** – in-country team
10. **Interview externals** – in-country team
11. **Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team in NVivo** – CDI team
12. **Provide to the overview of information per 5c indicator to in-country team** – CDI team
13. **Analyse data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions** – in-country team
14. **Analyse data and develop a final description of the findings per indicator and per capability and for the general questions** – CDI team
15. **Analyse the information in the general causal map** – in-country team and CDI team

Note: the CDI team include the Dutch 5c country coordinator as well as the overall 5c coordinator for the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia). The 5c country report is based on the separate SPO reports.

Below each of these steps is further explained.

**Step 1. Provide the description of indicators in the relevant formats – CDI team**

- These formats were to be used when collecting data from SPO staff, CFA, partners, and consultants. For each of these respondents different formats have been developed, based on the list of 5C indicators, similar to the procedure that was used during the baseline assessment. The CDI team needed to add the 2012 baseline description of each indicator. The idea was that each respondent would be requested to review each description per indicator, and indicate whether the current situation is different from the baseline situation, how this situation has changed, and what the reasons for the changes in indicators are. At the end of each format, a more general question is added that addresses how the organisation has changed its capacity since the baseline, and what possible reasons for change exist. Please see below the questions asked for each indicator as well as the more general questions at the end of the list of indicators.

### General questions about key changes in the capacity of the SPO

**capacity since the baseline (2012)?**

**What do you consider to be the main explanatory reasons (interventions, actors or factors) for these changes?**

**List of questions to be asked for each of the 5C indicators** (The entry point is the the description of each indicator as in the 2012 baseline report):

1. **How has the situation of this indicator changed compared to the situation during the baseline in 2012?**
   **Please tick one of the following scores:**
   - -2 = Considerable deterioration
   - -1 = A slight deterioration
   - 0 = No change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012
   - +1 = Slight improvement
   - +2 = Considerable improvement

2. **Please describe what exactly has changed since the baseline in 2012**
3. What interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the baseline situation in 2012? Please tick and describe what interventions, actors or factors influenced this indicator, and how. You can tick and describe more than one choice.

- Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by SPO: 
- Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the Dutch CFA (MFS II funding): 
- Intervention, actor or factor at the level of or by the other funders: 
- Other interventions, actors or factors: 

Step 2. **Review** the descriptions per indicator – in-country team & CDI team

Before the in-country team and the CDI team started collecting data in the field, it was important that they reviewed the description for each indicator as described in the baseline reports, and also added to the endline formats for review by respondents. These descriptions are based on document review, observation, interviews with SPO staff, CFA staff and external respondents during the baseline. It was important to explain this to respondents before they filled in the formats.

Step 3. **Send the formats adapted to the SPO to CFA and SPO – in-country team (formats for SPO) and CDI team (formats for CFA)**

The CDI team was responsible for collecting data from the CFA:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – CFA perspective.

The in-country team was responsible for collecting data from the SPO and from external respondents (except CFA). The following formats were sent before the fieldwork started:

- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet – SPO perspective.
- 5C Endline interview guides for externals: partners; OD consultants.

**Step 4. Collect, upload & code the documents from CFA and SPO in NVivo – CDI team**

The CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team, collected the following documents from SPOs and CFAs:

- Project documents: project proposal, budget, contract (Note that for some SPOs there is a contract for the full MFS II period 2011-2015; for others there is a yearly or 2-yearly contract. All new contracts since the baseline in 2012 will need to be collected);
- Technical and financial progress reports since the baseline in 2012;
- Mid-term evaluation reports;
- End of project-evaluation reports (by the SPO itself or by external evaluators);
- Contract intake forms (assessments of the SPO by the CFA) or organisational assessment scans made by the CFA that cover the 2011-2014 period;
- Consultant reports on specific inputs provided to the SPO in terms of organisational capacity development;
- Training reports (for the SPO; for alliance partners, including the SPO);
- Organisational scans/ assessments, carried out by the CFA or by the Alliance Assessments;
- Monitoring protocol reports, especially for the 5C study carried out by the MFS II Alliances;
- Annual progress reports of the CFA and of the Alliance in relation to capacity development of the SPOs in the particular country;
- Specific reports that are related to capacity development of SPOs in a particular country.

The following documents (since the baseline in 2012) were requested from SPO:

- Annual progress reports;
- Annual financial reports and audit reports;
- Organisational structure vision and mission since the baseline in 2012;
- Strategic plans;
- Business plans;
- Project/ programme planning documents;
- Annual work plan and budgets;
- Operational manuals;
- Organisational and policy documents: finance, human resource development, etc.;
- Monitoring and evaluation strategy and implementation plans;
- Evaluation reports;
- Staff training reports;
- Organisational capacity reports from development consultants.

The CDI team will code these documents in NVivo (qualitative data analysis software program) against the 5C indicators.

**Step 5. Prepare and organise the field visit to the SPO – in-country team**

Meanwhile the in-country team prepared and organised the logistics for the field visit to the SPO:

- **General endline workshop** consisted about one day for the self-assessments (about ½ to ¾ of the day) and brainstorm (about 1 to 2 hours) on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline and underlying interventions, factors and actors ('general causal map'), see also explanation below. This was done with the five categories of key staff: managers; project/ programme staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin & HRM staff; field staff. Note: for SPOs involved in process tracing an additional 1 to 1½ day workshop (managers; program/project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff) was necessary. See also step 7;
- **Interviews with SPO staff** (roughly one day);
- **Interviews with external respondents** such as partners and organisational development consultants depending on their proximity to the SPO. These interviews could be scheduled after the endline workshop and interviews with SPO staff.

**General causal map**

During the 5C endline process, a ‘general causal map’ has been developed, based on key organisational capacity changes and underlying causes for these changes, as perceived by the SPO. The general causal map describes cause-effect relationships, and is described both as a visual as well as a narrative.

As much as possible the same people that were involved in the baseline were also involved in the endline workshop and interviews.

**Step 6. Interview the CFA – CDI team**

The CDI team was responsible for sending the sheets/ formats to the CFA and for doing a follow-up interview on the basis of the information provided so as to clarify or deepen the information provided. This relates to:

- 5C Endline assessment Dutch co-financing organisation;
- 5C Endline support to capacity sheet - CFA perspective.

**Step 7. Run the endline workshop with the SPO – in-country team**

This included running the endline workshop, including facilitation of the development of the general causal map, self-assessments, interviews and observations. Particularly for those SPOs that were selected for process tracing all the relevant information needed to be analysed prior to the field visit, so as to develop an initial causal map. Please see Step 6 and also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two).

An endline workshop with the SPO was intended to:

- Explain the purpose of the fieldwork;
- Carry out in the self-assessments by SPO staff subgroups (unless these have already been filled prior to the field visits) - this may take some 3 hours.
- Facilitate a brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012 and underlying interventions, factors and actors.
Purpose of the fieldwork: to collect data that help to provide information on what changes took place in terms of organisational capacity development of the SPO as well as reasons for these changes. The baseline that was carried out in 2012 was to be used as a point of reference.

Brainstorm on key organisational capacity changes and influencing factors: a brainstorm was facilitated on key organisational capacity changes since the baseline in 2012. In order to kick start the discussion, staff were reminded of the key findings related to the historical timeline carried out in the baseline (vision, mission, strategies, funding, staff). This was then used to generate a discussion on key changes that happened in the organisation since the baseline (on cards). Then cards were selected that were related to organisational capacity changes, and organised. Then a ‘general causal map’ was developed, based on these key organisational capacity changes and underlying reasons for change as experienced by the SPO staff. This was documented as a visual and narrative. This general causal map was to get the story of the SPO on what they perceived as key organisational capacity changes in the organisation since the baseline, in addition to the specific details provided per indicator.

Self-assessments: respondents worked in the respective staff function groups: management; programme/project staff; monitoring and evaluation staff; admin and HRM staff; field staff. Staff were assisted where necessary so that they could really understand what it was they were being asked to do as well as what the descriptions under each indicator meant.

Note: for those SPOs selected for process tracing an additional endline workshop was held to facilitate the development of detailed causal maps for each of the identified organisational change/outcome areas that fall under the capability to act and commit, and under the capability to adapt and self-renew, and that are likely related to capacity development interventions by the CFA. See also the next section on process tracing (evaluation question two). It was up to the in-country team whether this workshop was held straight after the initial endline workshop or after the workshop and the follow-up interviews. It could also be held as a separate workshop at another time.

Step 8. Interview SPO staff – in-country team

After the endline workshop (developing the general causal map and carrying out self-assessments in subgroups), interviews were held with SPO staff (subgroups) to follow up on the information that was provided in the self-assessment sheets, and to interview staff that had not yet provided any information.

Step 9. Fill-in observation sheets – in-country team

During the visit at the SPO, the in-country team had to fill in two sheets based on their observation:

- 5C Endline observation sheet;
- 5C Endline observable indicators.

Step 10. Interview externals – in-country team & CDI team

The in-country team also needed to interview the partners of the SPO as well as organisational capacity development consultants that have provided support to the SPO. The CDI team interviewed the CFA.

Step 11. Upload and auto-code all the formats collected by in-country team and CDI team – CDI team

The CDI team was responsible for uploading and auto-coding (in Nvivo) of the documents that were collected by the in-country team and by the CDI team.

Step 12. Provide the overview of information per 5C indicator to in-country team – CDI team

After the analysis in NVivo, the CDI team provided a copy of all the information generated per indicator to the in-country team for initial analysis.

Step 13. Analyse the data and develop a draft description of the findings per indicator and for the general questions – in-country team

The in-country team provided a draft description of the findings per indicator, based on the information generated per indicator. The information generated under the general questions were linked to the general causal map or detailed process tracing related causal map.
Step 14. **Analyse the data and finalize the description** of the findings per indicator, per capability and general – CDI team

The CDI team was responsible for checking the analysis by the in-country team with the Nvivo generated data and to make suggestions for improvement and ask questions for clarification to which the in-country team responded. The CDI team then finalised the analysis and provided final descriptions and scores per indicator and also summarize these per capability and calculated the summary capability scores based on the average of all indicators by capability.

Step 15. **Analyse the information** in the general causal map – in-country team & CDI team

The general causal map based on key organisational capacity changes as perceived by the SPO staff present at the workshop, was further detailed by in-country team and CDI team, and based on the notes made during the workshop and where necessary additional follow up with the SPO. The visual and narrative was finalized after feedback by the SPO. During analysis of the general causal map relationships with MFS II support for capacity development and other factors and actors were identified. All the information has been reviewed by the SPO and CFA.

**Attributing changes in partner organisation’s capacity – evaluation question 2**

This section describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the second evaluation question: **To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to (capacity) development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?**

In terms of the attribution question (2), ‘process tracing’ is used. This is a theory-based approach that has been applied to a selected number of SPOs since it is a very intensive and costly methodology, although it provides rich information and can generate a lot of learning within the organisations. Key organisational capacity changes/ outcomes of the SPO were identified, based on their relationship to the two selected capabilities, the capability to act and commit the capability to adapt and self-renew, and an expected relationship with CFA supported capacity development interventions (MFS II funding). It was agreed to focus on these two capabilities, since these are the most targeted capabilities by the CFAs, as established during the baseline process. The box below provides some background information on process tracing.
Background information on process tracing

The essence of process tracing research is that scholars want to go beyond merely identifying correlations between independent variables (Xs) and outcomes (Ys). Process tracing in social science is commonly defined by its addition to trace causal mechanisms (Bennett, 2008a, 2008b; Checkle, 2008; George & Bennett, 2005). A causal mechanism can be defined as “a complex system which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts” (Glennan, 1996, p. 52). Process tracing involves “attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 206-207).

Process tracing can be differentiated into three variants within social science: theory testing, theory building, and explaining outcome process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

- Theory testing process tracing uses a theory from the existing literature and then tests whether evidence shows that each part of hypothesised causal mechanism is present in a given case, enabling within case inferences about whether the mechanism functioned as expected in the case and whether the mechanism as a whole was present. No claims can be made however, about whether the mechanism was the only cause of the outcome.
- Theory building process tracing seeks to build generalizable theoretical explanations from empirical evidence, inferring that a more general causal mechanism exists from the fact of a particular case.
- Finally, explaining outcome process tracing attempts to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific historical case. Here the aim is not to build or test more general theories but to craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case centric than theory oriented.

Explaining outcome process tracing is the most suitable type of process tracing for analysing the causal mechanisms for selected key organisational capacity changes of the SPOs. This type of process tracing can be thought of as a single outcome study defined as seeking the causes of the specific outcome in a single case (Gerring, 2006; in: Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Here the ambition is to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a particular outcome, with sufficiency defined as an explanation that accounts for all of the important aspects of an outcome with no redundant parts being present (Mackie, 1965).

Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research strategy that aims to trace the complex conglomerate of systematic and case specific causal mechanisms that produced the outcome in question. The explanation cannot be detached from the particular case. Explaining outcome process tracing refers to case studies whose primary ambition is to explain particular historical outcomes, although the findings of the case can also speak to other potential cases of the phenomenon. Explaining outcome process tracing is an iterative research process in which ‘theories’ are tested to see whether they can provide a minimally sufficient explanation of the outcome. Minimal sufficiency is defined as an explanation that accounts for an outcome, with no redundant parts. In most explaining outcome studies, existing theorisation cannot provide a sufficient explanation, resulting in a second stage in which existing theories are re-conceptualised in light of the evidence gathered in the preceding empirical analysis. The conceptualisation phase in explaining outcome process tracing is therefore an iterative research process, with initial mechanisms re-conceptualised and tested until the result is a theorised mechanism that provides a minimally sufficient explanation of the particular outcome.

Below a description is provided of how SPOs are selected for process tracing, and a description is provided on how this process tracing is to be carried out. Note that this description of process tracing provides not only information on the extent to which the changes in organisational development can be attributed to MFS II (evaluation question 2), but also provides information on other contributing factors and actors (evaluation question 4). Furthermore, it must be noted that the evaluation team has developed an adapted form of ‘explaining outcome process tracing’, since the data collection and analysis was an iterative process of research so as to establish the most realistic explanation for a particular outcome/ organisational capacity change. Below selection of SPOs for process tracing as well as the different steps involved for process tracing in the selected SPOs, are further explained.

Selection of SPOs for 5C process tracing

Process tracing is a very intensive methodology that is very time and resource consuming (for development and analysis of one final detailed causal map, it takes about 1-2 weeks in total, for different members of the evaluation team). It has been agreed upon during the synthesis workshop on 17-18 June 2013 that only a selected number of SPOs will take part in this process tracing for the
purpose of understanding the attribution question. The selection of SPOs is based on the following criteria:

- MFS II support to the SPO has not ended before 2014 (since this would leave us with too small a time difference between intervention and outcome);
- Focus is on the 1-2 capabilities that are targeted most by CFAs in a particular country;
- Both the SPO and the CFA are targeting the same capability, and preferably aim for similar outcomes;
- Maximum one SPO per CFA per country will be included in the process tracing.

The intention was to focus on about 30-50% of the SPOs involved. Please see the tables below for a selection of SPOs per country. Per country, a first table shows the extent to which a CFA targets the five capabilities, which is used to select the capabilities to focus on. A second table presents which SPO is selected, and takes into consideration the selection criteria as mentioned above.

**ETHIOPIA**

For Ethiopia the capabilities that are mostly targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

### Table 1

*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Ethiopia*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability to:</th>
<th>AMREF</th>
<th>CARE</th>
<th>ECFA</th>
<th>FSCE</th>
<th>HOA-REC</th>
<th>HUNDEE</th>
<th>NVEA</th>
<th>OSRA</th>
<th>TTCA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Act and commit</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliver on development objectives</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adapt and self-renew</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relate</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achieve coherence</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Ethiopia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: AMREF, ECFA, FSCE, HUNDEE. In fact, six SPOs would be suitable for process tracing. We just selected the first one per CFA following the criteria of not including more than one SPO per CFA for process tracing.
Table 2

**SPOs selected for process tracing – Ethiopia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethiopia – SPOs</th>
<th>End of contract</th>
<th>Focus on capability to act and commit – by SPO</th>
<th>Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA</th>
<th>Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA</th>
<th>CFA</th>
<th>Selected for process tracing</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMREF</td>
<td>Dec 2015</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>AMREF NL Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Dec 31, 2015</td>
<td>Partly</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes – slightly</td>
<td>CARE Netherlands No - not fully matching</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECFA</td>
<td>Jan 2015</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Child Helpline International Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSCE</td>
<td>Dec 2015</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN); Note: no info from Defence for Children – ECPAT Netherlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>HOA-REC</td>
<td>Sustainable Energy project (ICCO Alliance): 2014 Innovative WASH (WASH Alliance): Dec 2015</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes - slightly</td>
<td>ICCO</td>
<td>No - not fully matching</td>
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<td>HUNDEE</td>
<td>Dec 2014</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>ICCO &amp; IICD Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>NVEA</td>
<td>Dec 2015 (both)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Edukans Foundation (under two consortia); Stichting Kinderpostzegels Netherlands (SKN) Suitable but SKN already involved for process tracing - FSCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSRA</td>
<td>C4C Alliance project (farmers marketing): December 2014 ICCO Alliance project (zero grazing: 2014 (2nd phase))</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>ICCO &amp; IICD</td>
<td>Suitable but ICCO &amp; IICD already involved for process tracing - HUNDEE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTCA</td>
<td>June 2015</td>
<td>Partly</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Edukans Foundation No - not fully matching</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDIA

For India the capability that is mostly targeted by CFAs is the capability to act and commit. The next one in line is the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below in which a higher score means that the specific capability is more intensively targeted.

Table 3
*The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – India*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability to:</th>
<th>BVHA</th>
<th>COUNT</th>
<th>DRISTI</th>
<th>FFID</th>
<th>Jana Vikas</th>
<th>Samarthak Samiti</th>
<th>SMILE</th>
<th>SDS</th>
<th>VTRC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Act and commit</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliver on development objectives</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adapt and self-renew</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relate</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achieve coherence</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, India.

Below you can see a table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether SPO and the CFA both expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BVHA, COUNT, FFID, SMILE and VTRC. Except for SMILE (capability to act and commit only), for the other SPOs the focus for process tracing can be on the capability to act and commit and on the capability to adapt and self-renew.

Table 4
*SPOs selected for process tracing – India*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>India – SPOs</th>
<th>End of contract</th>
<th>Focus on capability to act and commit – by SPO</th>
<th>Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA</th>
<th>Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO</th>
<th>Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA</th>
<th>CFA Selected for process tracing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BVHA</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Simavi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNT</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Woord en Daad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRISTI</td>
<td>31-03-2012</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Hivos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFID</td>
<td>30-09-2014</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>ICCO</td>
<td>No - closed in 2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RGVN, NEDSF and Women's Rights Forum (WRF) could not be reached timely during the baseline due to security reasons. WRF could not be reached at all. Therefore these SPOs are not included in Table 1.
India – SPOs | End of contract | Focus on capability to act and commit – by SPO | Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO | Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA | CFA | Selected for process tracing
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---
Jana Vikas | 2013 | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No - contract is and the by now; not fully matching focus
NEDSF | 2013 | Yes | Yes | No | | | No – delayed baseline
RGVN | 2013 | Yes | Yes | No | | | No - delayed baseline
Samarthak Samiti (SDS) | 2013 possibly longer | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Hivos | No - not certain of end date and not fully matching focus
Shivi Development Society (SDS) | Dec 2013 intention 2014 | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Cordaid | No - not fully matching focus
Smile | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Wilde Ganzen | Yes; first capability only
VTRC | 2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Stichting Red een Kind | Yes; both capabilities

### INDONESIA

For Indonesia the capabilities that are most frequently targeted by CFAs are the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew. See also the table below.

#### Table 5
The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Indonesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability to:</th>
<th>ASB</th>
<th>Daya kologi</th>
<th>ECPAT</th>
<th>GSS</th>
<th>Lem baga Kita</th>
<th>PT</th>
<th>PPMA</th>
<th>Rifka Annisa</th>
<th>WIIP</th>
<th>Yad upa</th>
<th>Yayasan Kelida</th>
<th>YPI</th>
<th>YRI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Act and commit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliver on development objectives</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adapt and self-renew</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achieve coherence</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Indonesia.
The table below describes when the contract with the SPO is to be ended and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (MFS II funding). Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: ASB, ECPAT, PT.PPMA, YPI, YRBI.

### Table 6

**SPOs selected for process tracing – Indonesia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indonesia – SPOs</th>
<th>End of contract</th>
<th>Focus on capability to act and commit – by SPO</th>
<th>Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA</th>
<th>Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO</th>
<th>Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA</th>
<th>CFA</th>
<th>Selected for process tracing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASB</td>
<td>February 2012; extension Feb, 1, 2013 – June, 30, 2016</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Hivos</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dayakologi</td>
<td>2013; no extension</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Cordaid</td>
<td>No: contract ended early and not matching enough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECPAT</td>
<td>August 2013; Extension Dec 2014</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, a bit</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSS</td>
<td>31 December 2012; no extension</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, a bit</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie</td>
<td>No: contract ended early</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lembaga Kita</td>
<td>31 December 2012; no extension</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Free Press Unlimited - Mensen met een Missie</td>
<td>No - contract ended early</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT.PPMA</td>
<td>May 2015</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>IUCN</td>
<td>Yes, capability to act and commit only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifka Annisa</td>
<td>Dec, 31 2015</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Rutgers WPF</td>
<td>No - no match between expectations CFA and SPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIIP</td>
<td>Dec 2015</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not MFS II</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not MFS II</td>
<td>Red Cross</td>
<td>No - Capacity development interventions are not MFS II financed. Only some overhead is MFS II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia – SPOs</td>
<td>End of contract</td>
<td>Focus on capability to act and commit - by SPO</td>
<td>Focus on capability to act and commit - by CFA</td>
<td>Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew - by SPO</td>
<td>Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew - by CFA</td>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>Selected for process tracing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yayasan Kelola</td>
<td>Dec 30, 2013; extension of contract being processed for two years (2014-2015)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not really</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not really</td>
<td>Hivos</td>
<td>No - no specific capacity development interventions planned by Hivos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YPI</td>
<td>Dec 31, 2015</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Rutgers WPF</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YRBI</td>
<td>Oct, 30, 2013; YRBI end of contract from 31st Oct 2013 to 31st Dec 2013. Contract extension proposal is being proposed to MFS II, no decision yet.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>ICCO</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yadupa</td>
<td>Under negotiation during baseline; new contract 2013 until now</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Nothing committed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Nothing committed</td>
<td>IUCN</td>
<td>No, since nothing was committed by CFA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LIBERIA**

For Liberia the situation is arbitrary which capabilities are targeted most CFA’s. Whilst the capability to act and commit is targeted more often than the other capabilities, this is only so for two of the SPOs. The capability to adapt and self-renew and the capability to relate are almost equally targeted for the five SPOs, be it not intensively. Since the capability to act and commit and the capability to adapt and self-renew are the most targeted capabilities in Ethiopia, India and Indonesia, we choose to focus on these two capabilities for Liberia as well. This would help the synthesis team in the further analysis of these capabilities related to process tracing. See also the table below.
Table 7
The extent to which the Dutch NGO explicitly targets the following capabilities – Liberia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability to:</th>
<th>BSC</th>
<th>DEN-L</th>
<th>NAWOCOL</th>
<th>REFOUND</th>
<th>RHRAP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Act and commit</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliver on development objectives</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adapt and self-renew</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achieve coherence</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Number 1 stands for not targeted, 5 for intensively targeted. These scores are relative scores for the interventions by the CFA to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. The scores are relative to each other, a higher score means that this capability gets more attention by the CFA compared to other capabilities.

Source: country baseline report, Liberia.

Below you can see the table describing when the contract with the SPO is to be ended, and whether both SPO and the CFA expect to focus on these two selected capabilities (with MFS II funding). Also, for two of the five SPOs capability to act and commit is targeted more intensively compared to the other capabilities. Based on the above-mentioned selection criteria the following SPOs are selected for process tracing: BSC and RHRAP.

Table 8
SPOs selected for process tracing – Liberia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liberia – SPOs</th>
<th>End of contract</th>
<th>Focus on capability to act and commit – by SPO</th>
<th>Focus on capability to act and commit – by CFA</th>
<th>Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by SPO</th>
<th>Focus on capability to adapt and self-renew – by CFA</th>
<th>CFA</th>
<th>Selected for process tracing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BSC</td>
<td>Dec 31, 2015</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>SPARK</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEN-L</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>A little</td>
<td>ICCO</td>
<td>No – not matching enough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAWOCOL</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>A little</td>
<td>ICCO</td>
<td>No – not matching enough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFOUND</td>
<td>At least until 2013 (2015?)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>A little</td>
<td>ICCO</td>
<td>No – not matching enough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RHRAP</td>
<td>At least until 2013 (2014?)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>ICCO</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study
In the box below you will find the key steps developed for the 5C process tracing methodology. These steps will be further explained here. Only key staff of the SPO is involved in this process: management; programme/project staff; and monitoring and evaluation staff, and other staff that could provide information relevant to the identified outcome area/key organisational capacity change. Those SPOs selected for process tracing had a separate endline workshop, in addition to the general endline workshop. This workshop was carried out after the initial endline workshop and the interviews during the field visit to the SPO. Where possible, the general and process tracing endline workshop have been held consecutively, but where possible these workshops were held at different points in time, due to the complex design of the process. Below the detailed steps for the purpose of process tracing are further explained.
Key steps in process tracing for the 5C study

1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
2. Identify the implemented MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team
3. Identify initial changes/ outcome areas in these two capabilities – CDI team & in-country team
4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI team & in-country team
5. Identify types of evidence needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams, with support from CDI team
6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and construct workshop based, detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team
7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data and develop final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team with CDI team
8. Analyse and conclude on findings – CDI team, in collaboration with in-country team

Some definitions of the terminology used for this MFS II 5c evaluation

Based upon the different interpretations and connotations the use of the term causal mechanism we use the following terminology for the remainder of this paper:

- A detailed causal map (or model of change) = the representation of all possible explanations – causal pathways for a change/ outcome. These pathways are that of the intervention, rival pathways and pathways that combine parts of the intervention pathway with that of others. This also depicts the reciprocity of various events influencing each other and impacting the overall change.

- A causal mechanism = is the combination of parts that ultimately explains an outcome. Each part of the mechanism is an individually insufficient but necessary factor in a whole mechanism, which together produce the outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 176).

- Part or cause = one actor with its attributes carrying out activities/ producing outputs that lead to change in other parts. The final part or cause is the change/ outcome.

- Attributes of the actor = specificities of the actor that increase his chance to introduce change or not such as its position in its institutional environment.

Step 1. Identify the planned MFS II supported capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team

Chapter 4.1 and 4.2 in the baseline report were reviewed. Capacity development interventions as planned by the CFA for the capability to act and commit and for the capability to adapt and self-renew were described and details inserted in the summary format. This provided an overview of the capacity development activities that were originally planned by the CFA for these two capabilities and assisted in focusing on relevant outcomes that are possibly related to the planned interventions.

Step 2. Identify the implemented capacity development interventions within the selected capabilities (capability to act and commit and capability to adapt and self-renew) – CDI team

The input from the CFA was reviewed in terms of what capacity development interventions have taken place in the MFS II period. This information was be found in the ‘Support to capacity development sheet - endline - CFA perspective’ for the SPO, based on details provided by the CFA and further discussed during an interview by the CDI team.

The CFA was asked to describe all the MFS II supported capacity development interventions of the SPO that took place during the period 2011 up to now. The CDI team reviewed this information, not only the interventions but also the observed changes as well as the expected long-term changes, and then linked these interventions to relevant outcomes in one of the capabilities (capability to act and commit; and capability to adapt and self-renew).
Step 3. Identify **initial changes/ outcome areas** in these two capabilities – by CDI team & in-country team

The CDI team was responsible for **coding** documents received from SPO and CFA in NVivo on the following:

- **5C Indicators**: this was to identify the changes that took place between baseline and endline. This information was coded in NVivo.
- Information related to the **capacity development interventions implemented by the CFA** (with MFS II funding) (see also Step 2) to strengthen the capacity of the SPO. For example, the training on financial management of the SPO staff could be related to any information on financial management of the SPO. This information was coded in NVivo.

In addition, the response by the CFA to the changes in 5C indicators format, was auto-coded.

The in-country team was responsible for timely collection of information from the SPO (before the fieldwork starts). This set of information dealt with:

- MFS II supported capacity development interventions during the MFS II period (2011 until now).
- Overview of all trainings provided in relation to a particular outcome areas/organisational capacity change since the baseline.
- For each of the identified MFS II supported trainings, training questionnaires have been developed to assess these trainings in terms of the participants, interests, knowledge and skills gained, behaviour change and changes in the organisation (based on Kirkpatrick’s model), one format for training participants and one for their managers. These training questionnaires were sent prior to the field visit.
- Changes expected by SPO on a long-term basis (‘Support to capacity development sheet - endline - SPO perspective’).

For the selection of change/ outcome areas the following criteria were important:

- The change/ outcome area is in one of the two capabilities selected for process tracing: capability to act and commit or the capability to adapt and self-renew. This was the first criteria to select upon.
- There was a likely link between the key organisational capacity change/ outcome area and the MFS II supported capacity development interventions. This also was an important criteria. This would need to be demonstrated through one or more of the following situations:
  - In the 2012 theory of change on organisational capacity development of the SPO a link was indicated between the outcome area and MFS II support;
  - During the baseline the CFA indicated a link between the planned MFS II support to organisational development and the expected short-term or long-term results in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the CFA indicated a link between the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities;
  - During the endline the SPO indicated a link between the implemented MFS II capacity development interventions and observed short-term changes and expected long-term changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO in one of the selected capabilities.

Reviewing the information obtained as described in Step 1, 2, and 3 provided the basis for selecting key organisational capacity change/ outcome areas to focus on for process tracing. These areas were to be formulated as broader outcome areas, such as ‘improved financial management’, ‘improved monitoring and evaluation’ or ‘improved staff competencies’.

Note: the outcome areas were to be formulated as intermediates changes. For example: an improved monitoring and evaluation system, or enhanced knowledge and skills to educate the target group on climate change. Key outcome areas were also verified - based on document review as well as discussions with the SPO during the endline.
**Step 4. Construct the detailed, initial causal map (theoretical model of change) – CDI & in-country team**

A detailed initial causal map was developed by the CDI team, in collaboration with the in-country team. This was based on document review, including information provided by the CFA and SPO on MFS II supported capacity development interventions and their immediate and long-term objectives as well as observed changes. Also, the training questionnaires were reviewed before developing the initial causal map. This detailed initial causal map was to be provided by the CDI team with a visual and related narrative with related references. This initial causal map served as a reference point for further reflection with the SPO during the process tracing endline workshop, where relationships needed to be verified or new relationships established so that the second (workshop-based), detailed causal map could be developed, after which further verification was needed to come up with the final, concluding detailed causal map.

It’s important to note that organisational change area/ outcome areas could be both positive and negative.

For each of the selected outcomes the team needed to make explicit the theoretical model of change. This meant finding out about the range of different actors, factors, actions, and events etc. that have contributed to a particular outcome in terms of organisational capacity of the SPO.

A model of change of good quality includes:

- The causal pathways that relate the intervention to the realised change/ outcome;
- Rival explanations for the same change/ outcome;
- Assumptions that clarify relations between different components or parts;
- Case specific and/or context specific factors or risks that might influence the causal pathway, such as for instance the socio-cultural-economic context, or a natural disaster;
- Specific attributes of the actors e.g. CFA and other funders.

A model of change (within the 5C study called a ‘detailed causal map’) is a complex system which produces intermediate and long-term outcomes by the interaction of other parts. It consists of parts or causes that often consist of one actor with its attributes that is implementing activities leading to change in other parts (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). A helpful way of constructing the model of change is to think in terms of actors carrying out activities that lead to other actors changing their behaviour. The model of change can be explained as a range of activities carried out by different actors (including the CFA and SPO under evaluation) that will ultimately lead to an outcome. Besides this, there are also ‘structural’ elements, which are to be interpreted as external factors (such as economic conjuncture); and attributes of the actor (does the actor have the legitimacy to ask for change or not, what is its position in the sector) that should be looked at (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). In fact Beach and Pedersen, make a fine point about the subjectivity of the actor in a dynamic context. This means, in qualitative methodologies, capturing the changes in the actor, acted upon area or person/organisation, in a non sequential and non temporal format. Things which were done recently could have corrected behavioural outcomes of an organisation and at the same time there could be processes which incrementally pushed for the same change over a period of time. Beach and Pedersen espouse this methodology because it captures change in a dynamic fashion as against the methodology of logical framework. For the MFS II evaluation it was important to make a distinction between those paths in the model of change that are the result of MFS II and rival pathways.

The construction of the model of change started with the identified key organisational capacity change/ outcome, followed by an inventory of all possible subcomponents that possibly have caused the change/ outcome in the MFS II period (2011-up to now, or since the baseline). The figure below presents an imaginary example of a model of change. The different colours indicate the different types of support to capacity development of the SPO by different actors, thereby indicating different pathways of change, leading to the key changes/ outcomes in terms of capacity development (which in this case indicates the ability to adapt and self-renew).
Step 5. Identify **types of evidence** needed to verify or discard different causal relationships in the model of change – in-country teams with support from CDI team

Once the causal mechanism at theoretical level were defined, empirical evidence was collected so as to verify or discard the different parts of this theoretical model of change, confirm or reject whether subcomponents have taken place, and to find evidence that confirm or reject the causal relations between the subcomponents.

A key question that we needed to ask ourselves was, "What information do we need in order to confirm or reject that one subcomponent leads to another, that X causes Y?". The evaluation team needed to agree on what information was needed that provides empirical manifestations for each part of the model of change.

There are four distinguishable types of evidence that are relevant in process tracing analysis: **pattern, sequence, trace, and account.** Please see the box below for descriptions of these types of evidence.

The evaluation team needed to agree on the types of evidence that was needed to verify or discard the manifestation of a particular part of the causal mechanism. Each one or a combination of these different types of evidence could be used to confirm or reject the different parts of the model of change. This is what is meant by robustness of evidence gathering. Since causality as a concept can bend in many ways, our methodology, provides a near scientific model for accepting and rejecting a particular type of evidence, ignoring its face value.
Types of evidence to be used in process tracing

- **Pattern evidence** relates to predictions of statistical patterns in the evidence. For example, in testing a mechanism of racial discrimination in a case dealing with employment, statistical patterns of employment would be relevant for testing this part of the mechanism.

- **Sequence evidence** deals with the temporal and spatial chronology of events predicted by a hypothesised causal mechanism. For example, a test of the hypothesis could involve expectations of the timing of events where we might predict that if the hypothesis is valid, we should see that the event B took place after event A took place. However, if we found that event B took place before event A took place, the test would suggest that our confidence in the validity of this part of the mechanism should be reduced (disconfirmation/ falsification).

- **Trace evidence** is evidence whose mere existence provides proof that a part of a hypothesised mechanism exists. For example, the existence of the minutes of a meeting, if authentic ones, provide strong proof that the meeting took place.

- **Account evidence** deals with the content of empirical material, such as meeting minutes that detail what was discussed or an oral account of what took place in the meeting.

*Source: Beach and Pedersen, 2013*

Below you can find a table that provides guidelines on what to look for when identifying types of evidence that can confirm or reject causal relationships between different parts/ subcomponents of the model of change. It also provides one example of a part of a causal pathway and what type of information to look for.

### Table 9

**Format for identifying types of evidence for different causal relationships in the model of change (example included)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part of the model of change</th>
<th>Key questions</th>
<th>Type of evidence needed</th>
<th>Source of information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Describe relationship between the subcomponents of the model of change</td>
<td>Describe questions you would like to answer so as to find out whether the components in the relationship took place, when they took place, who was involved, and whether they are related</td>
<td>Describe the information that we need in order to answer these questions. Which type of evidence can we use in order to reject or confirm that subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y? Can we find this information by means of: Pattern evidence; Sequence evidence; Trace evidence; Account evidence?</td>
<td>Describe where you can find this information</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Example:**

- Training workshops on M&E provided by MFS II funding and other sources of funding

**Example:**

- What type of training workshops on M&E took place? Who was trained? When did the training take place? Who funded the training? Was the funding of training provided before the training took place? How much money was available for the training?

**Example:**

- Trace evidence: on types of training delivered, who was trained, when the training took place, budget for the training

**Example:**

- Training report SPO Progress reports interviews with the CFA and SPO staff Financial reports SPO and CFA

Content evidence: what the training was about

Please note that for practical reasons, the 5C evaluation team decided that it was easier to integrate the specific questions in the narrative of the initial causal map. These questions would need to be
addressed by the in country team during the process tracing workshop so as to discover, verify or discard particular causal mechanisms in the detailed, initial causal map. Different types of evidence was asked for in these questions.

**Step 6. Collect data to verify or discard causal mechanisms and develop workshop-based, detailed causal map – in-country team**

Once it was decided by the in-country and CDI evaluation teams what information was to be collected during the interaction with the SPO, data collection took place. The initial causal maps served as a basis for discussions during the endline workshop with a particular focus on process tracing for the identified organisational capacity changes. But it was considered to be very important to understand from the perspective of the SPO how they understood the identified key organisational capacity change/outcome area has come about. A new detailed, workshop-based causal map was developed that included the information provided by SPO staff as well as based on initial document review as described in the initial detailed causal map. This information was further analysed and verified with other relevant information so as to develop a final causal map, which is described in the next step.

**Step 7. Assess the quality of data and analyse data, and develop the final detailed causal map (model of change) – in-country team and CDI team**

Quality assurance of the data collected and the evidence it provides for rejecting or confirming parts of causal explanations are a major concern for many authors specialised in contribution analysis and process-tracing. Stern et al. (2012), Beach and Pedersen (2013), Lemire, Nielsen and Dybdal (2012), Mayne (2012) and Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) all emphasise the need to make attribution/contribution claims that are based on pieces of evidence that are rigorous, traceable, and credible. These pieces of evidence should be as explicit as possible in proving that subcomponent X causes subcomponent Y and ruling out other explanations. Several tools are proposed to check the nature and the quality of data needed. One option is, Delahais and Toulemonde’s Evidence Analysis Database, which we have adapted for our purpose.

Delahais and Toulemonde (2012) propose an Evidence Analysis Database that takes into consideration three criteria:

- Confirming/ rejecting a causal relation (yes/no);
- Type of causal mechanism: intended contribution/ other contribution/ condition leading to intended contribution/ intended condition to other contribution/ feedback loop;
- Strength of evidence: strong/ rather strong/ rather weak/ weak.

We have adapted their criteria to our purpose. The in-country team, in collaboration with the CDI team, used the criteria in assessing whether causal relationships in the causal map, were strong enough. This has been more of an iterative process trying to find additional evidence for the established relationships through additional document review or contacting the CFA and SPO as well as getting their feedback on the final detailed causal map that was established. Whilst the form below has not been used exactly in the manner depicted, it has been used indirectly when trying to validate the information in the detailed causal map. After that, the final detailed causal map is established both as a visual as well as a narrative, with related references for the established causal relations.
Step 8. Analyse and conclude on findings – in-country team and CDI team

The final detailed causal map was described as a visual and narrative and this was then analysed in terms of the evaluation question two and evaluation question four: “To what degree are the changes identified in partner capacity attributable to development interventions undertaken by the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?” and “What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?” It was analysed to what extent the identified key organisational capacity change can be attributed to MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as to other related factors, interventions and actors.

Explaining factors – evaluation question 4

This paragraph describes the data collection and analysis methodology for answering the fourth evaluation question: “What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?”

In order to explain the changes in organisational capacity development between baseline and endline (evaluation question 1) the CDI and in-country evaluation teams needed to review the indicators and how they have changed between baseline and endline and what reasons have been provided for this. This has been explained in the first section of this appendix. It has been difficult to find detailed explanations for changes in each of the separate 5c indicators, but the ‘general causal map’ has provided some ideas about some of the key underlying factors actors and interventions that influence the key organisational capacity changes, as perceived by the SPO staff.

For those SPOs that are selected for process tracing (evaluation question 2), more in-depth information was procured for the identified key organisational capacity changes and how MFS II supported capacity development interventions as well as other actors, factors and interventions have influenced these changes. This is integrated in the process of process tracing as described in the section above.

Methodological reflection

Below a few methodological reflections are made by the 5C evaluation team.

Use of the 5 core capabilities framework and qualitative approach: this has proven to be a very useful framework to assess organisational capacity. The five core capabilities provide a comprehensive picture of the capacity of an organisation. The capabilities are interlinked, which was also reflected in the description of standard indicators, that have been developed for the purpose of this 5C evaluation and agreed upon for the eight countries. Using this framework with a mainly qualitative approach has
provided rich information for the SPOs and CFAs, and many have indicated this was a useful learning exercise.

**Using standard indicators and scores:** using standard indicators is useful for comparison purposes. However, the information provided per indicator is very specific to the SPO and therefore makes comparison difficult. Whilst the description of indicators has been useful for the SPO and CFA, it is questionable to what extent indicators can be compared across SPOs since they need to be seen in context, for them to make meaning. In relation to this, one can say that scores that are provided for the indicators, are only relative and cannot show the richness of information as provided in the indicator description. Furthermore, it must be noted that organisations are continuously changing and scores are just a snapshot in time. There cannot be perfect score for this. In hindsight, having rubrics would have been more useful than scores.

**General causal map:** whilst this general causal map, which is based on key organisational capacity changes and related causes, as perceived by the SPO staff present at the endline workshop, has not been validated with other sources of information except SPO feedback, the SC evaluation team considers this information important, since it provides the SPO story about how and which changes in the organisation since the baseline, are perceived as being important, and how these changes have come about. This will provide information additional to the information that has been validated when analysing and describing the indicators as well as the information provided through process tracing (selected SPOs). This has proven to be a learning experience for many SPOs.

**Using process tracing for dealing with the attribution question:** this theory-based and mainly qualitative approach has been chosen to deal with the attribution question, on how the organisational capacity changes in the organisations have come about and what the relationship is with MFS II supported capacity development interventions and other factors. This has proven to be a very useful process, that provided a lot of very rich information. Many SPOs and CFAs have already indicated that they appreciated the richness of information which provided a story about how identified organisational capacity changes have come about. Whilst this process was intensive for SPOs during the process tracing workshops, many appreciated this to be a learning process that provided useful information on how the organisation can further develop itself. For the evaluation team, this has also been an intensive and time-consuming process, but since it provided rich information in a learning process, the effort was worth it, if SPOs and CFAs find this process and findings useful.

A few remarks need to be made:

- Outcome explaining process tracing is used for this purpose, but has been adapted to the situation since the issues being looked at were very complex in nature.
- Difficulty of verifying each and every single change and causal relationship:
  - Intensity of the process and problems with recall: often the process tracing workshop was done straight after the general endline workshop that has been done for all the SPOs. In some cases, the process tracing endline workshop has been done at a different point in time, which was better for staff involved in this process, since process tracing asks people to think back about changes and how these changes have come about. The word difficulties with recalling some of these changes and how they have come about. See also the next paragraph.
  - Difficulty of assessing changes in knowledge and behaviour: training questionnaire is have been developed, based on Kirkpatrick’s model and were specifically tailored to identify not only the interest but also the change in knowledge and skills, behaviour as well as organisational changes as a result of a particular training. The retention ability of individuals, irrespective of their position in the organisation, is often unstable. The SC evaluation team experienced that it was difficult for people to recall specific trainings, and what they learned from those trainings. Often a change in knowledge, skills and behaviour is a result brought about by a combination of different factors, rather than being traceable to one particular event. The detailed causal maps that have been established, also clearly pointed this. There are many factors at play that make people change their behaviour, and this is not just dependent on training but also internal/personal (motivational) factors as well as factors within the organisation, that stimulate or hinder a person to change behaviour. Understanding how behaviour change works is important when trying to really understand the extent to which behaviour has changed as a result of different factors, actors and interventions. Organisations change because people change and therefore understanding when and how these individuals change behaviour is
cruical. Also attrition and change in key organisational positions can contribute considerably to the outcome.

Utilisation of the evaluation

The 5C evaluation team considers it important to also discuss issues around utility of this evaluation. We want to mention just a few.

Design – mainly externally driven and with a focus on accountability and standard indicators and approaches within a limited time frame, and limited budget: this MFS II evaluation is originally based on a design that has been decided by IOB (the independent evaluation office of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and to some extent MFS II organisations. The evaluators have had no influence on the overall design and sampling for the 5C study. In terms of learning, one may question whether the most useful cases have been selected in this sampling process. The focus was very much on a rigorous evaluation carried out by an independent evaluation team. Indicators had to be streamlined across countries. The 5C team was requested to collaborate with the other 5C country teams (Bangladesh, Congo, Pakistan, Uganda) to streamline the methodological approach across the eight sampled countries. Whilst this may have its purpose in terms of synthesising results, the 5C evaluation team has also experienced the difficulty of tailoring the approach to the specific SPOs. The overall evaluation has been mainly accountability driven and was less focused on enhancing learning for improvement. Furthermore, the timeframe has been very small to compare baseline information (2012) with endline information (2014). Changes in organisational capacity may take a long, particularly if they are related to behaviour change. Furthermore, there has been limited budget to carry out the 5C evaluation. For all the four countries (Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Liberia) that the Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen University and Research centre has been involved in, the budget has been overspent.

However, the 5C evaluation team has designed an endline process whereby engagement of staff, e.g. in a workshop process was considered important, not only due to the need to collect data, but also to generate learning in the organisation. Furthermore, having general causal maps and detailed causal maps generated by process tracing have provided rich information that many SPOs and CFAs have already appreciated as useful in terms of the findings as well as a learning process.

Another issue that must be mentioned is that additional requests have been added to the country teams during the process of implementation: developing a country based synthesis; questions on design, implementation, and reaching objectives of MFS II funded capacity development interventions, whilst these questions were not in line with the core evaluation questions for the 5C evaluation.

Complexity and inadequate coordination and communication: many actors, both in the Netherlands, as well as in the eight selected countries, have been involved in this evaluation and their roles and responsibilities, were often unclear. For example, 19 MFS II consortia, the internal reference group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Partos, the Joint Evaluation Trust, NWO-Wotro, the evaluators (Netherlands and in-country), 2 external advisory committees, and the steering committee. Not to mention the SPO’s and their related partners and consultants. CDI was involved in 4 countries with a total number of 38 SPOs and related CFAs. This complexity influenced communication and coordination, as well as the extent to which learning could take place. Furthermore, there was a distance between the evaluators and the CFAs, since the approach had to be synchronised across countries, and had to adhere to strict guidelines, which were mainly externally formulated and could not be negotiated or discussed for the purpose of tailoring and learning. Feedback on the final results and report had to be provided mainly in written form. In order to enhance utilisation, a final workshop at the SPO to discuss the findings and think through the use with more people than probably the one who reads the report, would have more impact on organisational learning and development. Furthermore, feedback with the CFAs has also not been institutionalised in the evaluation process in the form of learning events. And as mentioned above, the complexity of the evaluation with many actors involved did not enhance learning and thus utilization.

5C Endline process, and in particular thoroughness of process tracing often appreciated as learning process: The SPO perspective has also brought to light a new experience and technique of self-assessment and self-corrective measures for managers. Most SPOs whether part of process tracing or not, deeply appreciated the thoroughness of the methodology and its ability to capture details with robust connectivity. This is a matter of satisfaction and learning for both evaluators and SPOs. Having a process whereby SPO staff were very much engaged in the process of self-assessment and reflection
has proven for many to be a learning experience for many, and therefore have enhanced utility of the 5C evaluation.
Appendix 2  Background information on the five core capabilities framework

The 5 capabilities (5C) framework was to be used as a framework for the evaluation of capacity development of Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs) of the MFS II consortia. The 5C framework is based on a five-year research program on ‘Capacity, change and performance’ that was carried out by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). The research included an extensive review of the literature and sixteen case studies. The 5C framework has also been applied in an IOB evaluation using 26 case studies in 14 countries, and in the baseline carried out per organisation by the MFS II organisations for the purpose of the monitoring protocol.

The 5C framework is structured to understand and analyse (changes in) the capacity of an organization to deliver (social) value to its constituents. This introduction briefly describes the 5C framework, mainly based on the most recent document on the 5C framework (Keijzer et al., 2011).

The 5C framework sees capacity as an outcome of an open system. An organisation or collaborative association (for instance a network) is seen as a system interacting with wider society. The most critical practical issue is to ensure that relevant stakeholders share a common way of thinking about capacity and its core constituents or capabilities. Decisive for an organisation’s capacity is the context in which the organisation operates. This means that understanding context issues is crucial. The use of the 5C framework requires a multi-stakeholder approach because shared values and results orientation are important to facilitate the capacity development process. The 5C framework therefore needs to accommodate the different visions of stakeholders and conceive different strategies for raising capacity and improving performance in a given situation.

The 5C framework defines capacity as ‘producing social value’ and identifies five core capabilities that together result in that overall capacity. Capacity, capabilities and competences are seen as follows:

**Capacity** is referred to as the overall ability of an organisation or system to create value for others;

**Capabilities** are the collective ability of a group or a system to do something either inside or outside the system. The collective ability involved may be technical, logistical, managerial or generative (i.e. the ability to earn legitimacy, to adapt, to create meaning, etc.);

**Competencies** are the energies, skills and abilities of individuals.

Fundamental to developing capacity are inputs such as human, material and financial resources, technology, and information. To the degree that they are developed and successfully integrated, capabilities contribute to the overall capacity or ability of an organisation or system to create value for others. A single capability is not sufficient to create capacity. All are needed and are strongly interrelated and overlapping. Thus, to achieve its development goals, the 5C framework says that every organisation or system must have five basic capabilities:

- The capability to act and commit;
- The capability to deliver on development objectives;
- The capability to adapt and self-renew;
- The capability to relate (to external stakeholders);
- The capability to achieve coherence.

In order to have a common framework for evaluation, the five capabilities have been reformulated in outcome domains and for each outcome domain performance indicators have been developed. A detailed overview of capabilities with outcome domains and indicators is attached in Appendix 3.
There is some overlap between the five core capabilities but together the five capabilities result in a certain level of capacity. Influencing one capability may have an effect on one or more of the other capabilities. In each situation, the level of any of the five capabilities will vary. Each capability can become stronger or weaker over time.
Appendix 3   Changes in organisational capacity of the SPO - 5C indicators

Below you will find a description for each of the indicators under each of the capabilities, what the situation is as assessed during the endline, how this has changed since the baseline and what are the reasons for change.

**Description of Endline Indicator Yayasan Rumpun Bambu Indonesia**

**Capability to act and commit**

1.1. Responsive leadership: ‘Leadership is responsive, inspiring, and sensitive’

*This is about leadership within the organization (operational, strategic). If there is a larger body then you may also want to refer to leadership at a higher level but not located at the local organization.*

The director’s position has been handed over to younger staff after the previous leader resigned. With this change came a change in the leadership style as well, which can now be characterized as more democratic, open and encompassing of staff opinion. Decisions are made in a democratic fashion through open discussions between staff and the director. The young new director’s age and experience are similar to that of his subordinates. This makes communication and day to day interaction between him and his colleagues much easier and informal. Staff has indicated that they feel less reluctant to approach the new director as opposed to his predecessor. This has also resulted in a new habit for the coordinators who have now been empowered to communicate intensely with the community. Every staff is encouraged to contribute their ideas and energy to the development of YRBI, and to be the baseline involved as a part of YRBI which has increased their sense of responsibility.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

1.2. Strategic guidance: ‘Leaders provide appropriate strategic guidance (strategic leader and operational leader)’

*This is about the extent to which the leader(s) provide strategic directions*

The director also allows the staff to create their own strategy, methods and approach in their work. The lack of detailed instructions on day to day work activities, and instead the greater autonomy in carrying out tasks, is seen as a sign of trust from the new director, and greatly appreciated by the staff. Nonetheless, some staff members indicate that they would still like to receive strategic guidance and detailed instructions in some aspects of their work.

On the other hand there are still many inherited problems that have yet to be solved by the new director. The discussion process to address these issues sometimes appears to take much longer than necessary to come to decisions.

Score: from 3.5 to 2.5 (deterioration)

1.3. Staff turnover: ‘Staff turnover is relatively low’

This is about staff turnover.

Compared to the baseline evaluation, there has been no influx of new staff, but rather there has been a reduction of staff due to the deterioration of their financial condition.

In 2013, the contract between YRBI and ICCO ended without being renewed. Afterwards YRBI failed to get new funds therefore their financial condition deteriorated. This condition forced YRBI to close their project activities and reduce their staffs.
Before 2012, YRBI had 6 permanent staffs and 8 program staffs. In 2012, they removed 3 permanent staffs. Then, in February 2013, they removed 3 permanent staffs. So in 2014, they have a total of 8 permanent staffs.

Score: from 3.5 to 2.5 (deterioration)

1.4 Organisational structure "Existence of clear organization structure reflecting the objectives of the organization"

Observable indicator: Staff have copy of org. structure and understand this

The previous structure is actually still relevant with the organization needs but the project activities and staffs reduction caused the structure to be thinner.

Score: from 3.5 to 2.5 (deterioration)

1.5 Articulated Strategies. Strategies are articulated and based on good situation analysis and adequate M&E

Observable indicator: strategies are well articulated. Situation analysis and monitoring and evaluation are used to inform strategies.

Since YRBI closed their projects, M&E were no longer conducted. They only hold informal forum to discuss contemporary issues that develop at local, regional, and national which is called “Diskusi Lorong”.

Score: From 2 to 1.5 (slight deterioration)

1.6. Daily operations: 'Day-to-day operations are in line with strategic plans'

This is about the extent to which day-to-day operations are aligned with strategic plans.

Day-to-day operations are currently aligned with the strategic plans in place. However, after the closing of ICCO funded program activities, the number of field activities has significantly decreased due to the limited operational budget, which made it more difficult to achieve target (strategic) results. Other staff members have indicated that the current daily operations are back in line again with the strategic planning and the organisation’s vision and mission, which is to assists local mukim and gampong communities.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

1.7 Staff skills: 'Staff have necessary skills to do their work'

This is about whether staff have the skills necessary to do their work and what skills they might need.

Several training opportunities have been offered to staff of YRBI in the observed period which were supported by ICCO. There were: Participatory Mapping Internship [GIS] in 2014 for the field staff; 2) Making Market for the Poor Training (MFP) in 2013 for the director; 3) Resource Mobilization Training in 2013 for the director; 3) Financial Management Training (computer software course) in 2013 for Finance Staff. As a result, staff has indicated that their skills have generally improved. As an example, one of the field officers indicated that through the GIS training has enabled him to now use GPS data in mapping programs and was able assist the in-house GIS expert with his work. The GIS expert indicated that through his help, his job could now be done faster and more easily.

Despite general improvements in terms of capacity building and training for the staff, language still appears to be a problem in terms of writing and winning proposals, as well effective negotiation.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

1.8 Training opportunities: 'Appropriate training opportunities are offered to staff'

This is about whether staffs at the SPO are offered appropriate training opportunities

In general training opportunities are offered in numerous ways for staff, directors and volunteers, either to improve skills or to teach new ones. The decision on who gets to attend which training are discussed openly with everyone involved in the organization. The training opportunities were: Participatory Mapping Internship [GIS] in 2014 for the field staff; 2) Making Market for the Poor Training (MFP) in 2013 for the director; 3) Resource Mobilization Training in 2013 for the director; 3)
Financial Management Training (computer software course) in 2013 for Finance Staff. All of them were supported by ICCO.

Score: from 2.5 to 3 (slight improvement)

1.9.1. Incentives: ‘Appropriate incentives are in place to sustain staff motivation’

This is about what makes people want to work here. Incentives could be financial, freedom at work, training opportunities, etc.

Since the baseline there have not been any changes in term of incentive for the staff both before and after the contract between YRBI and ICCO ended in October 2013. Up to now incentives for staff are numerous and come in the form of training opportunities but also flexible work times and freedom at work. Staff also mentioned that they considered the organizational culture and sense of belonging as an incentive to work for YRBI.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

1.9.2. Funding sources: ‘Funding from multiple sources covering different time periods’

This is about how diversified the SPOs funding sources are over time, and how the level of funding is changing over time.

After the ending of the ICCO contract no new major funding sources have been found. This has led to some downsizing in staff capacity, and the inability to carry out all organizational activities. The organization has acquired a small project for the end of April 2014 for approximately seven months. But the project value is too low to fund additional staff or activities of YRBI.

YRBI has actively applied to new donors and completed assessment with other parties and potential partners. There are some possibilities for cooperation, but none of the ventures have led to agreements as of yet.

Score: from 1.5 to 0.5 (deterioration)

1.9.3. Funding procedures: ‘Clear procedures for exploring new funding opportunities’

This is about whether there are clear procedures for getting new funding and staff are aware of these procedures.

There are still no clear and formal proposals for the development of proposals. Although the responsibility for proposal writing lies with the director, staff is invited to provide input and ideas during proposal development. Everyone in the organization is engaged to contribute, although overall proposal writing and negotiation skills still require further development.

Score: from 1.5 to 1.5 (no change)

**Summary capability to act and commit**

After a handing over the director’s position to a younger staff member, YRBI has become a more open organization for its staff members. Communication with management, feedback and the ability to participate in decision making were enabled by the new director in charge. Staff is encouraged to create their own strategies, methods and approaches in work. Despite that, decision making still appears to be a slow process particularly in relation to “inherited” problems such as financial problems that have yet to be solved. On the whole strategic guidance needs to be further developed.

In term of organization structure, it is thinner due to the project activities and staffs reduction. This reduction has also caused M&E to no longer be conducted. They only hold informal forum to discuss contemporary issues that develop at local, regional, and national which is called “Diskusi Lorong”.

Overall, daily operations are in line with strategic planning, although the number of activities carried out has gone down significantly after the ICCO funded program was finalized. This is also affected staff turnover since staff had to leave the organisation due to closing the ICCO funded project. The number of staffs reduced from 14 to 8. No new major funds have been acquired since, although the organization is actively seeking out new opportunities and has applied to several potential donors. Staff skills have slightly improved over the observed period as a result of increased work experience and donor (ICCO) supported trainings in Participatory Mapping Internship [GIS], Making Market for the Poor Training (MFP), Resource Mobilization Training, and Financial Management Training between
2012-2014. Nonetheless further improvements are needed in terms of English language proficiency to improve the quality of proposals and negotiations.

The previous structure is actually still relevant with the organization needs but the project activities and staffs reduction caused the structure to be thinner.

Since YRBI closed their projects, M&E were no longer conducted. They only hold informal forum to to discuss contemporary issues that develop at local, regional, and national which is called "Diskusi Lorong".

Score: 2.7 to 2.4 (very slight deterioration)

**Capability to adapt and self-renew**

2.1. M&E application: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess activities, outputs and outcomes'

*This is about what the monitoring and evaluation of the SPO looks at, what type of information they get at and at what level (individual, project, organizational).*

Compared to the baseline, nothing has changed in terms of the application of M&E. There is still no comprehensive and functional M&E system in place and there are no written documents or formal procedures for M&E. M&E was mostly conducted through discussions between staff and coordinators. M&E is applied at the project level, not yet the organizational level. M&E is done in the form of discussions based on project agreements (activities, outputs and outcomes), so this is initially done for reporting back to donors. They are learning from it though, identifying obstacles and constraints and reducing the risk of failure by finding solutions.

Score: from 2 to 2 (no change)

2.2. M&E competencies: 'Individual competencies for performing M&E functions are in place'

*This is about whether the SPO has a trained M&E person; whether other staff have basic understanding of M&E; and whether they know what information to collect, how to process the information, how to make use of the information so as to improve activities etc.*

There is no trained staff on M&E, but people that have had training in program management have a basic understanding of it. The M&E of program implementation is done by the director and the coordinator. Measurement is based on program achievements and its conformity with the goal of the program.

Score: from 2 to 2 (no change)

2.3. M&E for future strategies: 'M&E is effectively applied to assess the effects of delivered products and services (outcomes) for future strategies'

*This is about what type of information is used by the SPO to make decisions; whether the information comes from the monitoring and evaluation; and whether M&E info influences strategic planning.*

During visits from the donor, YRBI talks about the projects to check the results based on the agreements in the contract. From the viewpoint of the donor this is aimed to monitor results, but at the same time also to inspire and show that results can be used for improvements to the strategic plan. YRBI is aware of the potential for using M&E, but a problem is that programs can run into a lack of funds, and cannot continue. In this way they cannot generate lessons learned which can be incorporated into new strategies.

Score: from 1.5 to 1.5 (no change)

2.4. Critical reflection: ‘Management stimulates frequent critical reflection meetings that also deal with learning from mistakes'

*This is about whether staffs talk formally about what is happening in their programs; and, if so, how regular these meetings are; and whether staffs are comfortable raising issues that are problematic.*

Regular staff meetings are no longer held, although the open atmosphere in the organization encourages staff to talk freely about the particular challenges that they may be facing. This situation is supported and encouraged by the new director. Nonetheless some staff has stated that it is difficult to
provide and receive consistent feedback and reflect due to the irregularity of meetings, particularly after a project or program has ended. During the informal meetings final decisions are agreed upon together. Volunteers are not involved in these meetings, although they are free to offer their opinions during regular work activities.

Score: from 3 to 2 (deterioration)

2.5. Freedom for ideas: 'Staff feel free to come up with ideas for implementation of objectives

This is about whether staffs feel that ideas they bring for implementation of the program are welcomed and used.

The staff can present their ideas during regular staff meetings. Although they have and offer many ideas, few of them appear to be followed up upon. Not all ideas can be implemented due to budgetary constraints, but staff has indicated that suitable and good ideas have a good chance of being implemented.

Recently, the regularity and duration of meetings have greatly reduced, as a result of which feedback and ideas could not be presented and considered by staff.

Score: from 2.5 to 2 (slight deterioration)

2.6. System for tracking environment: 'The organization has a system for being in touch with general trends and developments in its operating environment'

This is about whether the SPO knows what is happening in its environment and whether it will affect the organization.

Staff members have indicated that there is still no system in place to track the environment, although they agree that it’s necessary. YRBI has a good network at the local and national level, and picks up on current issues from there. They also follow the media closely. This information is shared within the organization. Some staff members indicate that YRBI does not use the information on trends for its benefit though. Regular contact with beneficiaries can also provide relevant information. As there is no systematic M&E in place, following trends and developments is also not done systematically.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

2.7. Stakeholder responsiveness: 'The organization is open and responsive to their stakeholders and the general public'

This is about what mechanisms the SPO has to get input from its stakeholders, and what they do with that input.

There are regular informal meetings with stakeholders, for example indigenous communities, women’s groups, village governments, higher level government, other NGOs, and mukim forum. The program staff, coordinator and director all meet with them. There is no more distinction between staff, coordinator or director in this regard, as everyone is considered to stay closely involved with stakeholders and beneficiaries.

Active participation of the community allows them to convey their expectations, and yields better results as well as a sense of ownership of the products. It also prevents wasting time and resources on unwanted activities.

Score: from 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

Summary capability to adapt and self-renew

On the whole, there is a very slight deterioration in the capability to adapt and self-renew for YRBI. Although staff has indicated numerous times that they see the benefit and need to develop their monitoring and evaluation, it has not been prioritized until now. M&E resides with the Director as there is no trained staff assigned with this particular role. Limited but irregular M&E is done at the project level through infrequent meetings where staff is free to address outstanding issues. M&E is done in the form of discussions based on project agreements (activities, outputs and outcomes), so this is initially done for reporting back to donors. They are learning from it though, identifying obstacles and constraints and reducing the risk of failure by finding solutions.
Staff meetings in general have reduced in frequency, duration and intensity, providing fewer scheduled moments for feedback and discussion. Nonetheless office and organizational culture can be considered open and free and enables informal communication. With regards to keeping track of external developments YRBI continues to track media and its network at the local and national level, and picks up on current issues from there, but there is no formal system in place to do this tracking of the environment.

Communication and engagement with stakeholders and beneficiaries is done directly in the field and includes all level of staff, including the director. Active participation of the community allows YRBI to convey their expectations and this yields better results as well as a sense of ownership of the products amongst the beneficiaries. It also prevents wasting time and resources on unwanted activities.

Score: 2.5 to 2.3 (very slight deterioration)

**Capability to deliver on development objectives**

3.1. Clear operational plans: ‘Organization has clear operational plans for carrying out projects which all staff fully understand’

*This is about whether each project has an operational work plan and budget, and whether staff use it in their day-to-day operations.*

There is an overall strategic plan, in place which is well understood by staff. Every staff member now has information on what these work plans and budgets are composed of, and how they are used. Program plans are distributed to all staff in the organization. The ability to implement programs has improved since all staff members as more staff now understands how to run the program.

Delegation from the new director to the coordinator runs smoothly but delegation from the coordinator to staff has to be monitored through more systematic job delegation.

Score: from 2 to 2.5 (slight improvement)

3.2. Cost-effective resource use: ‘Operations are based on cost-effective use of its resources’

*This is about whether the SPO has the resources to do the work, and whether resources are used cost-effectively.*

YRBI works closely with its beneficiaries in a participatory approach, involving them in the implementation of projects. If beneficiaries are unresponsive to efforts made, program activities are reconsidered or even stopped entirely, in an overall effort to reduce waste of resources. This approach is the still same as it was during the baseline evaluation and has been proven as effective.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

3.3. Delivering planned outputs: ‘Extent to which planned outputs are delivered’

*This is about whether the SPO is able to carry out the operational plans.*

Over the last two years YRBI has remained consistent in delivering donor-agreed outputs as outlined in the contracts. The strong involvement of beneficiaries in projects leads to positive results and in some cases even exceeds expectations. This approach remains however time consuming and can lead to delays.

Score: from 3.5 to 3.5 (no change)

3.4. Mechanisms for beneficiary needs: ‘The organization has mechanisms in place to verify that services meet beneficiary needs’

*This is about how the SPO knows that their services are meeting beneficiary needs*

The participatory approach ensures that the target group decides whether they want to work with YRBI and that they actually need the project’s output. If there is no active participation of the beneficiaries, the project is canceled. There are formal and informal discussions with beneficiaries on activities and how they use the end products. No change has occurred in this indicator.

Score: from 4 to 4 (no change)
3.5. Monitoring efficiency: 'The organization monitors its efficiency by linking outputs and related inputs (input-output ratio’s)'

This is about how the SPO knows they are efficient or not in their work.

M&E remains a point for development for YRBI. Although meetings are held in which both staff, coordinators and leadership are included to discuss efficiency and processes, these are irregular and non-systematic. The lack of a formal system to measure efficiency remains, and roles are not clearly defined in the organization. Although the overall organizational culture under the new leadership supports an environment of critical reflection, structural practices are missing and even deteriorating. Meetings now occur less frequently and are generally considered to be shorter, allowing for less time to address ideas and feedback on process efficiency.

Score: from 2.5 to 2 (slight deterioration)

3.6. Balancing quality-efficiency: 'The organization aims at balancing efficiency requirements with the quality of its work'

This is about how the SPO ensures quality work with the resources available

YRBI has a clear vision and is a much focused organization. They cannot depend on funding anymore because the ICCO contract (only funder) ended without being renewed, and together with the community they work together hand in hand in sourcing budget.

The terms of reference for the project have changed from a donor-driven process to a community needs-driven process. With the community closely involved at all stages of project implementation quality is ensured at all times. Efficiency tradeoffs are made if needed, particularly if a beneficiary does not appear to be engaged or supportive of actions. Overall this indicator remains unchanged from the evaluation two years ago.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

**Summary capability to deliver on development objectives**

There is an overall strategic plan in YRBI and day-to-day activities are based on the strategic plan. The ability to implement programs has increased since more staff understands the programs. Delegation is done effectively from the new director to the coordinators, but more difficult from coordinators to the staff, sparking the need for better job delegation and management practices. YRBI works closely together with its beneficiaries in a participatory approach, through which they are able to consistently deliver on donor-agreed outputs and deliver quality results. The approach however is intensive and sometimes causes delays and affects efficiency.

Overall meetings to discuss program progress including linking inputs and outputs from projects are held, but there is no formal system in place to assess efficiency by linking inputs to outputs. This is in line with having a week monitoring and evaluation system in place. YRBI has a clear vision and is a focused organization. They cannot depend on funding anymore because the ICCO contract ended (only funder) and was not renewed and together with the community they work together hand in hand with the in sourcing funds. The terms of reference for the project have changed from a donor-driven process into community needs-driven process and on the whole, engagement with the beneficiaries is good.

All in all the capability to deliver on development objectives has remained unchanged, and there is room for improvement.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

**Capability to relate**

4.1. Stakeholder engagement in policies and strategies: 'The organization maintains relations/collaboration/alliances with its stakeholders for the benefit of the organization'

This is about whether the SPO engages external groups in developing their policies and strategies, and how.
YRBI has a good network with local government institutions and NGOs, and this network helps them especially in their advocacy work. They also attend international conferences on forest management, governance and indigenous peoples’ rights. Stakeholders are involved in activities, and there is ongoing communication with these stakeholders and also with policy makers. Their network helps YRBI to implement its programs and get results, but it is not clear whether the stakeholders also help shape their policies and strategies.

At present, YRBI has extended its network to other NGO’s through close cooperation in the areas of new and old beneficiaries. The working fields of these NGO’s differ slightly from YRBI however, which makes the organization wonder how they can benefit from these new connections as of yet.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

4.2. Engagement in networks: 'Extent to which the organization has relationships with existing networks/alliances/partnerships'

This is about what networks/alliances/partnerships the SPO engages with and why; with they are local or international; and what they do together, and how do they do it.

YRBI’s network is at the local and national level, mainly with organizations working on similar issues in indigenous rights and the natural environment, or with organizations that outsource part of their projects to YRBI (subcontracting). Over the years, YRBI has worked on a number of projects together with other organizations like Sedha, Danida, JKPP, ICCO, GEF and Samdhana. Locally they work together with the Majlis Mukim Aceh Besar and the Pemerintah Daerah (regional governments).

Presently the number of NGO’s in their network has increased through new cooperations in different fields of work dedicated to the same beneficiaries and locations.

For instance, YRBI has expanded its network to the, Lembaga Pendukung Kedaulatan Mukim, which consists of eighteen local organizations with mainstream movement in the advocacy for indigenous people. YRBI also acts as the main actor in an a Working Group, a multi stakeholder forum for climate change, and as a member of Walhi, YRBI has been in the position as a strategic partner in Walhi programs regarding environmental issues. YRBI also contributed to a coalition with NGO-HAM in regards to strengthening the mukim.

Score: from 3.5 to 4 (slight improvement)

4.3. Engagement with target groups: 'The organization performs frequent visits to their target groups/beneficiaries in their living environment'

This is about how and when the SPO meets with target groups.

Although nothing has changed in the participatory approach through regular field visits, and relationships with beneficiaries continue to be close, YRBI is now challenged to continue these intensive practices with less field officers and lower budgets. This is mainly the result of the ending of specific program activities. YRBI has responded to this by lowering the frequency and intensity of field visits.

Score: from 3.5 to 3 (slight deterioration)

4.4. Relationships within organization: 'Organizational structure and culture facilitates open internal contacts, communication, and decision-making'

How does staff at the SPO communicate internally? Are people free to talk to whomever they need to talk to? When and at what forum? What are the internal mechanisms for sharing information and building relationships?

There is a sense of family among the staff members, but also a respect for seniority that is rooted in their culture. This prevents junior staff to argue with senior staff, even though there is an open atmosphere in which one can freely discuss any issue and give their input before a decision is made.

With the new changing of leadership, the above situation still sometimes occurs, but since the new director applies more egalitarian leadership style, according to some staffs, the junior-senior
relationship dynamic has become less formal. Junior staff feels more confident to defend their ideas during discussions. This is also enabled by the director who, due to his younger age is able to relate better to the younger staff members.

Score: from 3 to 3.5 (slight improvement)

**Summary capability to relate**

Overall this capability has not changed. YRBI has a good network with local government institutions and NGOs which help them in their advocacy work. Stakeholders are involved and there is ongoing communication with these stakeholders and policy makers, but it is not clear to what extend the stakeholders also contributed to informing policies and strategies of YRBI. Currently, there is an extension in YRBI’s network with the addition of more NGOs. YRBI’s network is at the local and national level, mainly with organizations working on similar issues in indigenous rights and the natural environment, or with organizations that outsource part of their projects to YRBI (subcontracting). Due to their participatory approach there are regular field visits, however the frequency of these visits has reduced due to budget constraints after closing projects which affected having less field officers available. There is a sense of family among the staff members, but also a respect for seniority that prevents junior staff from arguing with senior staff, even though there is an open atmosphere in which one can freely discuss any issue and give their input before a decision is made. With the change of leadership, the above situation sometimes still occur, but the new (young) director applies more egalitarian leadership style, which makes the junior-senior relationship smoother than before.

Score: from 3.2 to 3.4 (very slight improvement)

**Capability to achieve coherence**

5.1.Revisiting vision, mission: ‘Vision, mission and strategies regularly discussed in the organization’

This is about whether there is a vision, mission and strategies; how often staff discuss/revise vision, mission and strategies; and who is involved in this.

The strategic plan is extended to 2020 and also contains the same vision and mission that has been used by the organization for the past years. Although staff is not included in the formulation of high level strategy and revisions of mission and vision, they are well informed about the content and meaning of the strategic plan and how it applies to their work.

Score: from 2.5 to 2.5 (no change)

5.2. Operational guidelines: ‘Operational guidelines (technical, admin, HRM) are in place and used and supported by the management’

This is about whether there are operational guidelines, which operational guidelines exist; and how they are used.

There is a standard operational procedure (SOP) on Finance & Organization, but not yet on HRM. This has not changed since the baseline and the draft SOP for HRM has yet to be finalized. Decisions regarding the formulation of these SOPs is done at the managerial level and not discussed with staff prior to finalization.

Score: from 2.5 to 2.5 (no change)

5.3.Alignment with vision, mission: ‘Projects, strategies and associated operations are in line with the vision and mission of the organization’

This is about whether the operations and strategies are line with the vision/mission of the SPO.

YRBI’s work on marginalized communities and natural resources is in line with their vision and mission. Both staff, donor and partners have acknowledged this. Prior to the implementation of project and program activities, the vision and mission are reviewed without any changes because it was still considered relevant, as was already the case during the baseline evaluation two years ago. Overall
staff remains well aware of strategic plans and directions, and is able to relate this to their day to day activities and operations.

Score: from 3 to 3 (no change)

5.4. Mutually supportive efforts: ‘The portfolio of project (activities) provides opportunities for mutually supportive efforts’

This is about whether the efforts in one project complement/support efforts in other projects.

Due to YRBI’s limited funds and resources they are forced to be practical in the implementation of projects and program activities. Initiatives are closely discussed with beneficiaries and adapted accordingly, which makes their work to some extent related and mutually supportive. Overall no particular change has occurred in this indicator, other than that now more than ever, the need for practicality and efficiency exists due an even greater limitation in funds and resources.

Score: 3 to 3 (no change)

**Summary capability to achieve coherence**

There are no changes in the capability to achieve coherence. Overall the same approaches towards strategy, the application of vision and mission to daily operations and the alignment of all these factors have remained the same. Standard operating procedures are in still place for finance, but not for HRM.

Score: from 2.7 to 2.7 (no change)
Appendix 4  Results - key changes in organisational capacity - general causal map

General Causal Map Yayasan Rumpun Bambu Indonesia (YRBI)

Narrative of General Causal Map of Yayasan Rumpun Bambu Indonesia (YRBI)

YRBI is an organization established in 1995 which works in the fields of indigenous community empowerment, agricultural development, and environmental conservation. Since 2006, YRBI has dealt with climate change issues until 2011 when they chose traditional community development as their main issue. Collaboration between YRBI and the Netherlands began in 2005 after the tsunami. The contract between MFS II and YRBI started on 1 November 2012 and ended on 31 October 2013 without being renewed.

The evaluation team carried out an end line assessment at YRBI from 14 to 16 July 2014. During this workshop, the team made a recap of key features of the organisation in the baseline in 2012 (such as vision, mission, strategies, clients, partnerships). This was the basis for discussing changes that had happened to the organisation since the baseline.

Some positive and negative changes have taken place in the organization since the baseline, and both of these have affected the organization in terms of being able to work on mukim and gampong sovereignty issues [1], and thereby becoming a leading organization on these issues [2]. Mukim and gampong are legal administrative community units21 in Indonesia. YRBI wants to become a leading organization in terms of the issues in dealing with mukim and gampong sovereignty [2]. The extent to which the organisation has been able to work on mukim and gampong sovereignty issues [1], can be attributed to three key organisational capacity changes:

1. staff capacity on mukim and gampong sovereignty issues is more recognised [4];
2. an improved and more extensive network [15];
3. reduced paid workforce and program funds [3], which is a negative development ;

Each of these key organisational capacity changes and how they have come about is further explained below. Numbers in the narrative corresponds to numbers in the visual.

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21 It has boundaries and authority to control and manage the interests of local communities based on the origin and the local customs which are recognized in the Indonesian Government system. In a nutshell is zoning based on local custom. In the structure, gampong is under mukim. Mukim formed by at least four gampong. Each mukim is led by a Uleebalang or a Mukim. This system is applied since the era of the Aceh Sultanate.
Staff capacity on _mukim_ and _gampong_ sovereignty issues is more recognised [4]

An increase in staff capacity has become more visible to stakeholders, partners, and beneficiaries [4] as staff members carried out their duties. More invitations from the community for staff to share their knowledge and skills [9] made the public realize the increase in their knowledge and capacity.

The greater number of invitations from the community to share knowledge and skills is due to an increased trust from beneficiaries and stakeholders in YRBI’s competencies [11]. This was due to a range of different issues:

- Staff improved the communities’ awareness, comprehension, and support to _mukim_ and _gampong_ sovereignty issues [17], which was due to public education on these issues [27].
- Many communities succeeded in raising funds from the public [18] after encouragement and assistance from YRBI [28].
- An increased number of village maps has been created and utilized by the people [19] after YRBI empowered the community with the skills to create their own social maps [29].
- Increased community economic development assistance [20] through honey bee forest exploitation [30].
- Government created a _mukim_ and _gampong_ regulation [21] after active and regular advocacy and lobbying of YRBI [31].
- Continuous sharing of knowledge on _mukim_ and _gampong_ issues [22] because these issues have become more mainstream in Aceh [32].

Each of these factors resulted from the overall development of the _Mukim_ and _Gampong_ sovereignty over the last two years [37], following the increased efforts and staff capacities to deliver work and carry out program activities [38]. This was due to more internal knowledge sharing [39]. It is custom for YRBI staff who have returned from an external event, whether it is a discussion, seminar, or
training, to share the knowledge they received to the other staff members in a forum. This forum is called “Diskusi Lorong” [39]. It is held at least twice in one month. Aside from being a forum to share knowledge, Diskusi Lorong also benefits as a forum to discuss program development and contemporary issues that develop at local, regional, and national level.

Amongst the knowledge shared were several staff capacity building activities as supported by ICCO [40] and the establishment and initiation of mukim and gampong coalition for sovereignty natural resources governance. Capacity building activities for YRBI were supported by ICCO between 2012-2013[40], Which included: 1) Participatory Mapping Internship (GIS); 2) Making Market for The Poor Training; 3) Resource Mobilization Training.

The other issue that affected increased trust from beneficiaries and stakeholders [15] is an improved and more extensive network [15]. Since this also directly affected the organisation's capacity to address mukim and gampong sovereignty issues, it is further elaborated upon below,

The network improved and is more extensive [15]

YRBI’s network has grown over the last two years [15]. The continuous sharing of knowledge and developments on mukim and gampong issues in the public, amongst stakeholders and community played a large role in this [22]. On the other hand, YRBI is now able to host meetings, trainings and mukim forums in the meeting room (Bale Pertemuan) in the new building, which has allowed more beneficiaries and stakeholders to get in touch with YRBI [42]. In fact, the Bale Pertemuan has now become a regular meeting point for civil society activists. Improved facilities have also contributed to being able to continuously share knowledge on mukim gampong and sovereignty issues [22]. This sharing is also due to gampong and mukim becoming a CSO mainstream issue in Aceh [32], which in turn is due to initiating sovereignty institutions to rescue mukim and gampong areas and natural resources [41].

Reduced paid workforce and program funds [3]

This is a negative change that occurred in YRBI since the baseline in 2012. There are a variety of reasons for this negative change:

- No salary being paid to staff members [6]
- No more program activities after 2013 [7]
- Reduction in the number of staff members [8]
- More voluntary work [5]
- Less decisive leadership [36].

Each of these factors was the result of the poor financial situation of YRBI [10] after no new funds could be obtained [13] after the contract with ICCO expired in 2013 [23]. A change in ICCO policy was the primary reason for this occurring [33] after specific new changes were included in the renewal of the MoU between ICCO and the government of Indonesia [43]. Prior to this, ICCO was more focused on local economic empowerment. Although YRBI has had the opportunity to submit new proposals in line with ICCO's policy, they chose to stick with the empowerment of mukim and gampong institutions, and as a result, the contract with ICCO ended.

No additional funds were acquired in the meantime either as proposals written by YRBI were rejected [16]. This was partly due to the limited number of proposals being developed, decreasing the chances of getting new funds significantly [24]. Proposals riting and development was possible [34] because some senior staff already possessed the capacity and experiences to do so [44]. Nonetheless, a lack of experience in fundraising of the new director of YRBI [25] reduced YRBI’s chances for success acquisition, and this new leadership came on board after a leadership change in the mid of 2013 [45]. The previous director, staff recalled, had better networking and fundraising skills.

Finally, the poor financial condition of the organization resulted in more voluntary work being done since 2013 [8]. This was the only way for YRBI to keep the organization at work with limited resources and capital. Volunteers, and staff working for free on a voluntary basis, were attracted to do so by their motivation to work and contribute to the organization and its mission [14]. The increase in motivation could also be attributed to the fact that they were now more involved in decision making [26] which was enabled by the freedom and more democratic leadership style of the new director [35]. Unfortunately this increase in staff autonomy and empowerment by the new director also led to a less decisive leadership management [36], which some staff members indicated harmed the organization in need for change and fun.
Appendix 5  Results - attribution of changes in organisational capacity - detailed causal maps

Narrative of Causal Map C.1 Poorer Financial Situation Yayasan Rumpun Bambu Indonesia (YRBI)

Introduction
The key capacity change that was focused on during the process tracing workshop was identified as 'poorer financial situation' [5] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Minutes Meeting). Staff of YRBI indicated that this has led to salary not being paid since the beginning of 2014 [1] (Annex L, M, O, Workshop Min. Meeting); the ending of all program activities in 2013 [2] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min.

The poor financial situation of YRBI [5] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min. Meeting) is due to fact that since the MFS II contract ended, in 2013, no new funds have been obtained [6] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min. Meeting). The reason for this was threefold. First, the YRBI and ICCO contract expired [7] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min. Meeting). Secondly, no follow up for fund raising activity based in the training attended [8] (Annex L, R; Training interview of Director; Workshop Min. Meeting). Thirdly, the rejection of proposals for program activities and funding [9] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min. Meeting). Each of these three reasons is explained in more detail below.

1. The ICCO contract expired on 31 Oktober 2013 and was not renewed due to political and administrative issues. This was due to an internal ICCO policy change [14] (Annex E, L, R; Workshop Min. Meeting), which directly resulted from the renewal of an MoU between ICCO and the Government of Indonesia [17] (Annex L, R). The policy stated that ICCO couldn’t further support activities with “mukim and gampong”22 (zoning based on local custom) issues. ICCO funded Financial Management Training [16] (Annex L, M, Workshop Min. Meeting) resulted in ability to develop report based on donor standard [13] (Annex L, M, R; Workshop Min. Meeting). The financial reports are now more transparent and accountable [13] (Annex L, R; Workshop Min. Meeting). This training has no further follow up since YRBI didn’t need to develop reports as they didn’t have programs anymore after the contract from ICCO has been ended.

2. There was no active follow up on fund raising activities [8] (Annex L, R; Training Interview of Director; Workshop Min. Meeting) as taught in the Resource mobilization Training supported by ICCO In 2013 [18] (Training Interview of Director), but the knowledge from the training had been shared and disseminated to the community to empower them to raise fund in a variety of ways. Despite no concrete fund raising activities being carried out after the resource mobilization training took place, the training did result in positive changes elsewhere. A number of beneficiary communities succeeded in raising public funds through cooperation with private sectors/companies or directly from the community with help of YRBI and the newly acquired capabilities in the training. They did this by creating proposals for cooperation or donations, selling merchandise, etc. Unfortunately these capabilities to raise public funds were not utilized for YRBI’s own sake.

3. The final reason for the lack of securing new funds was the rejection of submitted proposals [9] (Annex L, M, O, R; Workshop Min. Meeting). During the field interviews, various people have noted that the new director was unable to maintain the level of fundraising and had a significant lack of experience in it and also in networking [11] (annex L, M, R). The change of leadership happened in 2013 [19] (annex L, M, O; Workshop Min. Meeting).

The other reason for rejection was that the number of proposals developed was actually very low [12] (Annex L, M, R; Workshop Min. Meeting). This despite the fact that some of the submitted proposals were developed by YRBI staff themselves [15] (Annex L, M, O, R), as they have capacity to do them [21] (annex L, M, O, R).

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22 Mukim and gampong is a legal community unit. It has boundaries and authority to control and manage the interests of local communities based on the origin and the local customs which are recognized in the Indonesian Government system. In a nutshell is zoning based on local custom. In the structure, gampong is under mukim. Mukim formed by at least four gampong. Each mukim is led by a Uleebalang or a Mukim. This system is applied since the era of the Aceh Sultanate.
Narrative of Causal Map C3: Becoming the leading organization in mukim and gampong sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia

This process tracing map differs slightly from the other maps presented in this report in that it addresses not only competencies and organizational capacity, but also some implementation activities.
and targets. The two are inherently intertwined within YRBI and hard to separate when explained for this particular capacity. It should therefore be considered a “mixed” causal map.

Following is the narration for the YRBI causal map between 2012-2014. Within the two year time period since the MFS II baseline evaluation in 2012, a key organizational capacity change at YRBI was that it has become the leading organization in mukim and gampong²³ sovereignty issues in Aceh and Indonesia [1] (Annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). During the process tracing workshops and interviews it was made clear that this outcome is the direct result of an increased recognition in staff capacity on Gampong and Mukim issues [2] (Annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). This increased recognition can be explained through two factors:

1. More invitations from community to share staff knowledge and skills [3] (Annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting)
2. Gampong and Mukim becoming one of CSO mainstream issues [14] (Annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting)

Each of these changes is described below. First off the increase in invitations for staff to share their knowledge and skills [3] (Annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting) resulted from an increase in trust in YRBI from beneficiaries and stakeholders [4] (Annex L, M, R; Training Interview of Director, Field Staff; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). Four factors contributed to this increase in trust, which will be discussed in detail below:

2. An increased number of assisted bee project groups [6] (Annex L, R; Training Interview of Director; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting)
3. Encouragement of the community to use the results of training as a strategy to raise public and corporate funds [7] (Annex L, Training Interview of Director; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting)
4. A government initiation to create new regulations related to mukim and gampong [8] (Annex L; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting)

First, the village maps being produced by communities came forth from the transfer of staff knowledge to villagers [5] (Annex R; Training Interview of Field Staff; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). This program continues to this day and at least three social maps have successfully been completed, and were funded by the villagers themselves [10] (Annex C; Training Interview of Field Staff). This knowledge resulted from an increase in staff’s ability to develop maps independently. Field Staff applied his knowledge by independently conducting social mapping in a number of villages [15] (Annex C; Training Interview of Field Staff). This was purely from Field Staff initiative, and YRBI functioned as a facilitator. He was one of the YRBI staff members who participated in the Participatory Mapping Internship (GIS) in Bogor, 2013 [23] (Training Interview Field Staff). He shared his knowledge with his colleagues in YRBI after his return from there [20] (annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting).

Secondly, an increased number of assisted bee project groups arose [6] (Annex L, R; Training Interview of Director; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting) after the honey bee project was aligned with organization issues which is economic community empowerment [11] (Annex C, L; Training Interview of Director). There was development of new community empowerment on honey bee forest exploitation [16] (Annex C, L; Training Interview of Director). The number of communities increased from two to six benefiting communities. Actually honey exploitation is not a new activity. It was stagnant but has developed since one of YRBI staff participated and shared the knowledge about economic community empowerment with his colleagues. Together with his colleagues, then benefiting communities after their own skill raised [19] (annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). At the bottom of all this was the Making Market for the Poor Training (MFP) [24] (Annex C; Training...

²³ Mukim and gampong is a legal community unit. It has boundaries and authority to control and manage the interests of local communities based on the origin and the local customs which are recognized in the Indonesian Government system. In a nutshell is zoning based on local custom. In the structure, gampong is under mukim. Mukim formed by at least four gampong. Each mukim is led by a Uleebalang or a Mukim. This system is applied since the era of the Aceh Sultanate.
Productive communication, interaction and sharing between NGOs, or stakeholders, specifically dealing with NGOs, etc, have made a joined issue. Women NGOs, human rights NGOs, environmental NGOs, economic empowerment, and sovereignty became a mainstream issue for NGOs in the Aceh province [14] (annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). Secondly, the government permitted exploitation of natural resources by companies, YRBI was motivated to increase public awareness, in this case the mukim and gampong, that they are the ones who truly have the sovereignty for natural resources. The government must include them in managing the natural resources. If companies want to exploit the natural resources, it must be permitted by mukim and gampong. YRBI trained and accompanied the community in managing the natural resources. They paid attention to a number of values, such as: environmentally friendly based on custom. In addition, YRBI also advocate so that issue was accommodated by the government resources. They paid attention to a number of values, such as: environmentally friendly based on custom. In addition, YRBI also advocate so that issue was accommodated by the government.

Thirdly, communities were encouraged to use the results of training as a strategy to raise public and corporate funds [7] (Annex L; Training Interview of Director; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). YRBI makes an active effort in order for the beneficiary communities to be able to not only raise resources, but also be able to identify and be firm towards companies involved in cases of corruption, environment, human rights, etc. A number of beneficiary communities succeeded in raising public funds through cooperation with private sectors/companies or directly from the community. They did this by creating proposals for cooperation or donations, selling merchandise, etc. However, YRBI asserted the beneficiary communities to pay attention to the background of those they would like to cooperate with, especially the private companies. That knowledge was shared by YRBI’s staff to all beneficiaries [12] (Annex L; Training Interview of Director), and this knowledge was the result of skills gained to do fundraising from the public and the private sector [17] (Annex L; Training Interview of Director). At the basis of this increased capacity was the Resource Mobilization Training [25] (Annex C, L; Training Interview of Director). This activity was held in 2013 in the form of a training held by Penabulu with the support of ICCO. The YRBI staff sent to participate in the training was The YRBI Director. This training was on how beneficiary communities or the organization can raise public funds, therefore making this beneficial for the beneficiary communities and YRBI. The output was his improved competencies in raising public funds [17] (Annex C, L; Training Interview of Director). Unfortunately, the increased fundraising capacity was not successfully applied to the own organization.

In all three cases of ICCO supported trainings and activities, YRBI organized meetings to share the outcomes amongst the staff who didn’t attend. "Diskusi Lorong" [20], as it is called, was actually YRBI’s internal forum to discuss or share technical details dealing with program implementation and the performance of the organization or the subjects of the capacity building. The staffs who have recently attended trainings are often asked to share their knowledge with others through this forum. In addition, this forum is also used for updating the latest social issues developing in Aceh. Although this forum is informal, the staffs consider it very productive. Their capacities have significantly increased through this forum.

The fourth and last factor contributing to the increase in trust among beneficiaries and stakeholders was a shift in government regulation regarding mukim and gampong [8] (Annex L, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). This was the result of regulatory advocacy from YRBI on the one hand [13] (Annex L, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting) and the increasing spotlight on the CSO mainstream issues of mukim and gampong on the other hand [14] (annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). Both will be explained below.

Firstly, due to the government permitted exploitation of natural resources by companies, YRBI was motivated to increase public awareness, in this case the mukim and gampong, that they are the ones who truly have the sovereignty for natural resources. The government must include them in managing the natural resources. If companies want to exploit the natural resources, it must be permitted by mukim and gampong. YRBI trained and accompanied the community in managing the natural resources. They paid attention to a number of values, such as: environmentally friendly based on custom. In addition, YRBI also advocate so that issue was accommodated by the government as a regulation [13] (Annex L, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting).

Secondly, by starting with issues on managing natural resources, the mukim and government sovereignty became a mainstream issue for NGOs in the Aceh province [14] (annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). This forum succeeded in making mukim and gampong sovereignty a joined issue. Women NGOs, human rights NGOs, environmental NGOs, economic empowerment NGOs, etc, have made mukim and gampong the basis of their actions, and custom as the spirit. Productive communication, interaction and sharing between NGOs, or stakeholders, specifically dealing with mukim and gampong was done in this forum [18] (Annex L, M, O, R; Process Tracing Minutes
Meeting). For YRBI itself, this forum made use of YRBI’s infrastructure to optimize the work of the network [21] (Annex L, M, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting). The development of YRBI’s organization infrastructure resulted as part of an independent effort to become more sovereign [26] (Annex L, M, R; Process Tracing Minutes Meeting) in the initiation of "Mukim Sovereignty Organizations for the Sovereignty of Natural Resources".
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