The rise and fall of tourism for poverty reduction within SNV Netherlands Development Organisation

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The rise and fall of tourism for poverty reduction within SNV Netherlands Development Organisation
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The rise and fall of tourism for poverty reduction within SNV Netherlands Development Organisation

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Chapter 1

Introduction
1.1. Introduction

In the summer of 1993, I had a meeting with Rajesh Shrestha, programme officer at SNV Nepal, in his office in Kathmandu. I had just returned from a fieldtrip to the Annapurna Conservation Area Project to study the development of ecotourism (see Hummel, 1994a,b). Rajesh and I knew each other from our forestry study in Wageningen. He was doing his PhD and I had just finished my Masters. We talked about forestry, conservation and tourism. I asked him why SNV was not involved in tourism as a tool for nature conservation and development. He answered that sustainable tourism was identified by several local SNV partner organizations as a potential tool in integrated development and conservation projects, emphasized that local governments, local conservation and development organizations in Nepal were eager to include tourism as a development tool in their initiatives, and agreed that there could be a clear role for SNV to support such development initiatives. However, according to him, the SNV management, especially at the head office in The Hague, was not interested. SNV did not have the expertise, and more generally was not sure whether and, if so, how tourism could strategically contribute to nature conservation and poverty reduction.

A year later, consultants from the Retour Foundation helped SNV Tanzania to launch a small project with a group of Maasai in the northern part of the country. In 1995, SNV hired its first tourism adviser to develop the project. A year after that, I was hired as SNV’s second tourism adviser, to start and coordinate a small rural tourism project for SNV in Albania.

For a long time, I wondered why the organization changed its views about tourism as a development tool in just over a year, from disallowing tourism, to cautiously investing in tourism for poverty reduction. By the mid-2000s, SNV included sustainable tourism as a ‘practice area’, one of the main development sectors in SNV to reduce poverty. By that time, sustainable tourism was considered a successful development sector, and was included in SNV’s development policy. How and why had tourism as a development tool and as a practice, become successful? What criteria for success were used, and by whom? Which results were important, how were these assessed, and who decided on what needed to be assessed?

In 2007, I decided to focus my PhD research on these and similar questions, and I started to collect material and organize my observations for further analysis. In the second half of 2010, I considered leaving SNV to work on my PhD thesis. I had been working for the organization for 15 year, and felt it might be time to move on. SNV planned to hand over my role as tourism network leader for SNV Asia to the
tourism sector leader of SNV Vietnam, Phil Harman. I visited his office in Hanoi in the second week of December 2010 and spent half a day talking with him about the network leadership and discussing priorities for the tourism network of SNV Asia for 2011. As the regional office of SNV Asia was in the same building, I also visited my SNV Asia colleagues. The regional business development coordinator also acted as the coordinator for the various regional sector network leaders. During our conversation, he indicated that because of the budget cuts in the Netherlands, tourism as a sector might be phased out. This news took me by surprise. Although I knew that tourism as a development sector in some SNV regions had been under threat, I also knew that in the regional strategies and in the corporate strategic plan tourism had been chosen as a development sector in all regions for the period 2010–2012 (SNV, 2010a).

I was asked by SNV Vietnam to return a few weeks later to make a presentation on the SNV supported process of tourism marketing and branding of the northern provinces in Vietnam in a Vietnam National Administration of Tourism/UNWTO organized workshop on destination branding. This gave me the opportunity to meet the SNV Asia regional director in Hanoi, and discuss with him the future of tourism as a development sector within SNV Asia and SNV overall. However, it seemed a decision had already been taken. He explained that he had hoped to keep tourism as a development sector in Asia, as tourism had been one of SNV’s important development sectors. However, in light of the budget cuts announced by the Dutch government, in 2011 SNV decided to focus on the agriculture, renewable energy, and water, sanitation & hygiene development sectors, and phase out of forestry, education, health, and tourism. By the time I left the organization in the summer of 2011, most tourism advisers in Africa had already left their jobs. In Asia, due to earlier commitments made by the EU and the British Department for International Development, tourism would be supported for a few more years in Nepal, Cambodia and Vietnam.

How could an organization that to begin with was not interested in tourism, then hesitantly introduced tourism as a development tool, be considered one of the most ‘successful’ development organizations in tourism for poverty reduction, less than a decade later? Why did the organization decide to phase out the tourism sector only a few years thereafter? This thesis reconstructs the rise and fall of tourism within SNV.

1.2. Exploration of the problem

SNV was established in 1965 as a Dutch development organization. In the 1990s it changed from employing volunteers to providing work for paid national and
international development experts. Since 2000, SNV has provided advisory services to clients and partner organizations, rather than implement its own projects. In 2009, SNV supported over 2,100 clients, through almost 900 advisers, in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Balkans. In that year, around 60 tourism advisers supported tourism initiatives in 25 countries (SNV Annual Report, 2009). SNV was one of the first development organizations involved in tourism for poverty reduction. It first got involved in isolated tourism projects or components of larger integrated rural development projects (with initial research and consultancy activities in 1993), but by 2004 tourism was a corporate ‘practice area’, one of the development sectors SNV would concentrate on for almost a decade. By studying the rise and the subsequent fall of tourism in SNV, I aim to make a contribution to three development debates.

First, there has been a long debate on whether tourism can be a relevant development approach to reducing poverty (Britton, 1982; de Kadt, 1979; Lea, 1988; Mowforth & Munt, 2003; Scheyvens, 2011). The relationship between tourism and development has been a field of fierce debate for 60 years (Mowforth & Munt, 2003; Scheyvens, 2011; Sharpley, 2009; Sharpley & Telfer, 2002; Smith & Eadington, 1992). In this period, academic views on tourism and poverty reduction have changed considerably. In the 1950s, tourism was identified as a modernization strategy that could help developing countries to create jobs and earn foreign exchange. In the 1970s and 1980s, several social scientists claimed that poor countries and poor people were excluded from what tourism had to offer (Scheyvens, 2007, 2011), and that the tourism industry exploited labour and resources in these countries, degrading the environment, entrenching inequality and deepening poverty (Scheyvens, 2011). It was only in the 1990s that tourism entered the development aid arena (Harrison, 2010). Given the rigour of the critique of the 1970s and 1980s, Scheyvens (2011, p. 2) wondered, ‘how there has been a concerted push towards the reversal of this thinking coinciding with the development industry’s global focus on poverty alleviation from the 1990s onwards’. In this period, development agencies, such as SNV, became involved in tourism. To study how these paradigms affected and were translated within SNV, how that influenced the choice of development sectors and practices in the organization, and whether and, if so, how it influenced the decision to accept tourism as a relevant development tool in SNV, will shed light on the development relevance of tourism.

The second debate, which is related to the first debate, is how development organizations should develop and implement tourism, and what their role in the implementation of tourism for poverty reduction should be. This debate not only depends on the development paradigms used in these organizations, but also relates to the organizational goals and internal logics of the development organizations
involved, the priorities of donor agencies, etc. In this thesis, I examine how SNV was internally organized over the years and how that influenced tourism for poverty reduction in the organization. By doing so, I add to the debate on the current and future roles of development agencies in tourism for poverty reduction.

The third debate centres on how success in tourism development for poverty reduction is defined and assessed. Recent discussions about development are particularly concerned with development impact, in all development sectors, not only in tourism (Byrne, 2013; Mitchell & Ashley, 2010; Roberts, 2013; Snilstveit, Oliver & Vojtkova, 2012; Spenceley & Meyer, 2012; Tanburn, 2008; Van Lieshout, Went & Kremer, 2010; White, 2010; Woolcock, 2013). What are development successes, how are they defined, how are they measured, and who should be involved in measuring development results? I address these questions by examining how this was done in SNV over the years, and how this related to measuring development results in tourism for poverty reduction.

Contributing to these debates requires in-depth analysis of development debates, organizational logics and the way success is generated in development organizations. In this thesis, I therefore use an ethnographic research approach that builds on a critical engagement with development and development agencies (Lewis & Mosse, 2005; Mosse, 2004, 2005; Mosse & Lewis, 2005; Quarles van Ufford, Kumar & Mosse, 2003). Gould and Marcussen (2004) termed this research approach ‘aidnography’. Recent aidnography studies rely on actor-oriented ethnography and actor-network theory approaches to uncover the subtler political processes at work that explain why development intervention outcomes are so often contrary to the original objectives, yet still retain legitimacy (Lewis & Mosse, 2005). ‘Aidnographers’ show how ‘subjects’ often reinforce and so further legitimate interventions by playing along while appropriating the intervention for their own ends (Long & Arce, 1992; Long & Long, 1992; Mosse, 2005a). Only two studies have examined tourism as a development practice in development organizations, namely that by Hawkins and Mann (2007) on the World Bank, and the study by Harrison and Schipani (2007, 2009) on the Asian Development Bank (ADB). However, Harrison and Schipani mainly focused on one particular project in relation to the involvement of the ADB and barely looked at the workings of the ADB; and Hawkins and Mann discussed the policy decisions at the World Bank in relation to tourism, but did not focus on the development practices in the organization.

In most articles on tourism and poverty reduction, development organizations have either been ignored or presented as ‘black boxes’ (Latour, 1987). In this thesis, I undo part of that black boxing by analysing the tourism development practices
within SNV. Following some of the ideas of Mosse (2004, 2005a,b, 2007, 2011), I analyse the way heterogeneous entities – people, concepts and ideas, interest, events (conferences, workshops, training courses) and objects (country and project offices, departments, strategy documents, manuals and toolboxes, websites, subsidy agreements, reporting formats) – were materially and conceptually tied together within SNV to achieve development success. As Mosse (2005a, p. 232) argues,

[…] in order to work, policy models and programme designs have to be transformed into practice. They have to be translated into the different logic of the intentions, goals and ambitions of the many people and institutions they bring together. […] Failures arise from inadequacy of translation and interpretation: from the inability to recruit local interest, or to connect actions/events to policy or to sustain politically viable models and representations.

According to Mosse (2005a, pp. 2–4), understanding the relationship between policy discourse and development practice has been impeded by the dominance of two opposing views on development policy: the instrumental view of policy as rational problem solving, and the critical view that sees policy as a rationalizing technical discourse concealing hidden bureaucratic power or dominance. In the latter view, development is not policy to be implemented, but domination to be resisted. Neither of these views does justice to the complexity of policymaking and its relation to development practice, or the creativity and skills involved in negotiating development. Recent studies in development, especially ethnographic studies, have gone beyond these rational planning and domination/resistance frameworks to focus on how development works, and how it has become ‘successful’ or has ‘failed’. The question how development aid and development organizations produce development success is at the heart of this thesis.

In this study, I specifically analyse the way SNV, its managers and tourism advisers, development partners and clients, shaped the tourism for poverty reduction practice area between 1993 and 2013. I emphasize the work of SNV in Asia, as SNV countries in Asia have included tourism as a central development practice in their development portfolio since the end of the 1990s, and advisers and managers in SNV Asia were at forefront of shaping the practice within the organization. In doing so, this thesis links the development of tourism as a development practice within SNV with international development discourses, the processes of policy and strategy development in SNV itself, and the role of tourism within the organization, as well as the continued request for assistance in tourism development in developing countries. The aim of this thesis is therefore to increase our understanding of tourism, poverty reduction and the role of international development organizations, as part of development studies and tourism studies.
In doing so, the focus is not primarily on whether tourism and development worked, but on how it worked. In other words, the issue is not whether linking tourism and development within SNV was successful, but how success in this organization was defined and pursued. As such, this thesis contributes to the recent surge in ‘aidnography’ as introduced by Mosse (2004, 2005a,b, 2007, 2011) and Büscher (2010).

The objective of this thesis is therefore:

*To write an ethnographic analysis of the rise and fall of tourism in SNV Netherlands Development Organisation, especially in Asia, between 1993 and 2013.*

1.3. Research questions

To reach this objective the main question to be answered is:

*How and why have concepts of and practices in tourism for poverty reduction changed within SNV Netherlands Development Organisation over time?*

Which leads to the following empirical questions:

1. *How and why was tourism, as a tool for poverty reduction, introduced in SNV, and how did it take shape in the organization?*
2. *How did international and national development debates influence SNV as a development organization, and how did that influence tourism as a development practice in the organization?*
3. *How and why did tourism approaches and tools in the SNV organization change over time?*
4. *How did SNV’s internal organization change over the years, and how did that influence tourism as a development practice in the organization?*
5. *How were development results in tourism measured and presented in SNV, and how did that change over time?*
6. *How and why was SNV’s tourism as a development practice phased out?*

1.4. Outline of the thesis

This chapter has sketched the main lines of argument in this thesis. In Chapter 2, I introduce the main concepts that served as my theoretical inspiration: processes of translation, modes of ordering, the production of durability (Callon, 1986; Callon & Latour, 1992; Law, 2003, 2007, 2009), qualculation and non-qualculation (Callon &
In the second part of the chapter, I explain the research methods underlying this thesis.

In Chapter 3, I present a history of changing development paradigms, concepts and tools in pro-poor sustainable tourism in SNV. I show how development concepts and tools changed over time, as well as how these concepts and tools, projects, programmes and advisers were made durable and temporarily stabilized the tourism practice in SNV. It shows how SNV’s strategy and operations changed due to changing material and discursive orderings. It presents SNV’s involvement with tourism in six phases, starting before 1995 and ending after the decision to phase out tourism at the beginning of 2011. As such, this chapter contributes to answering the first three questions, and question 6.

In Chapter 4, I analyse three SNV cases from Asia: the tourism programmes in Laos, Bhutan and Vietnam. The three cases show a gradual shift from isolated SNV managed and implemented projects, often focusing on creating new destinations, to a wider pro-poor tourism destination approach involving a wide range of stakeholders, including private sector companies, in more established destinations. This chapter contributes to answering questions 2 and 3.

Chapter 5 addresses question 4. In it, I present the internal organizational modes of ordering in SNV Netherlands Development Organisation. Here, I examine how SNV has organized itself, and how that influenced the tourism development practice in the organization. I show that in every development phase a particular mix of modes of ordering prevailed, where and how these modes collided and interacted, and that in each phase particular modes of ordering were more dominant than others.

In Chapter 6, I answer question 5 by analysing the way SNV measured (or did not measure) its pro-poor tourism impacts. I explore why SNV had so much difficulty measuring and showing development results. To do so, I use the theoretical concepts of ‘qualification’ and ‘non-qualification’ to analyse development impact (see Chapter 2).

Finally, in Chapter 7, I present a summary of the main findings and conclusions. I reflect on the six questions as addressed in the previous section, and the three main development debates presented at the beginning of this chapter. I then reflect on the use of aidnography as a research approach in tourism for poverty reduction. Finally, I look back at the relevance of tourism as a sector in development aid, and the roles development organizations play in tourism for poverty reduction.
Chapter 2
Analysing policy and practice in development organizations
2.1. Concepts for analysing tourism as a development practice in SNV

Promoting development through tourism is a complex endeavour. A large number of actors – ranging from poor individuals, communities, local and national governmental and non-governmental organizations, private sector companies, to development agencies at different levels and donor agencies – are involved in a large number of interactions, and they deploy varying resources and have different development objectives (cf. Mosse, 2004, 2005a; Mosse & Lewis, 2005; Lewis & Mosse, 2006a,b). In this convoluted world, development agencies are trying to achieve their policies, transform these policies into approaches and tools, implement and evaluate these on the ground, show results to donor agencies, and try to make this into a ‘development success’. To be able to study these processes, below I present a number of concepts that helped me to analyse tourism as a development practice in SNV.

A first starting point of this thesis is the idea that ethnographic research can shed light on the intricate ways in which development agencies like SNV are trying to achieve their goals. Ethnographic research can provide development advisers, policymakers, donor aid managers and academics with insights into the implementation of policies and the way in which ‘successful’ international development is strived for or achieved. To understand SNV as an organization involved in tourism as a development practice, I therefore used elements of organizational ethnography. Throughout the years, SNV’s way of working in tourism was partly shaped by these complex organizational processes, relations in the organization, organizational changes and interactions with other organizations. The study opens and examines the organizational ‘black box’, as introduced in Chapter 1, to be able to grasp the things that actors (persons and things) do within organizations. In organizations, actors keep organizing, continuously creating relations, changing and resisting changes in the organization, and interacting with the environment around the organization, connecting people and materials in growing networks.

Second, to be able to examine and understand tourism practices within a development organization, I also employed a set of concepts and insights put forward by actor-network theorists, like John Law, Michel Callon and Bruno Latour, and those inspired by the actor-network theory approach, like David Mosse and David Lewis on international development, and Rene van der Duim, Carina Ren and Gunnar Thor Johannesson on tourism.

Following these insights, I first examine SNV’s involvement in tourism for poverty reduction in terms of processes of ordering (Law, 1986, 2007, 2009). Actor-network theory analyses multiple processes of social–material ordering by
tracing the associations through which heterogeneous actor networks are stabilized (Latour, 2005; Law, 2009; van der Duim, 2007; Wester, 2008). Through ordering processes, actors build messy networks of material and social elements (Law, 1994, 2009; Wester, 2008). The entities (human and non-human) bound together in these actor networks are at the same time constituted and shaped by these networks. I then examine how through these processes of social–material ordering SNV tried to achieve durability and stability, obviously in close relation and in response to other ordering attempts by, for instance, communities, local governments and ministries, other development agencies (e.g. the Asian Development Bank, the Overseas Development Institute, etc.) and the local and international tourism industry. As Law argued in his Organizing Modernity (1994), and his later work (2002, 2007, 2009), achieving durability and stability in actor networks is an ongoing process, and needs a lot of effort. If relations are not kept in place, networks might disappear.

Third, I use the neologism ‘qualculation’, a contraction of the words calculation and quality, which redefines calculation to include judgment (Callon & Law, 2005, Cochoy, 2002, 2008). Qualculation is a process in which entities ‘are detached from other contexts, reworked, displayed, related, manipulated, transformed, and summed in a single space’ (Callon & Law, 2005, p. 730). Development, and development aid, needs to be calculated, evaluated and judged. This is not a neutral process. Figures, numbers and results are reworked, displayed, related, manipulated and transformed in order to create a successful development result. This implies that measuring development results is also about creating ‘development successes’. Through presenting development result stories, development organizations try to convince donor agencies, policymakers, journalists and wider audiences of the ‘development success’ in particular development sectors (Lewis & Mosse, 2006; Mosse, 2005a; Mosse & Lewis, 2005).

These ideas are detailed below. They do not constitute a complete theoretical framework, however, but offer theoretical and methodological inspirations for the following chapters. They present a toolbox for telling interesting stories about, and interfering in, how relations assemble or fail to assemble. More profoundly, these inspirations provide the messy practices of relationality and materiality with sensibility (Law, 2004, 2009).

As Latour (1999, pp. 19–21) argued, actor-network theory ‘was never a theory of what the social was made of’ but rather a ‘very crude method to learn from the actors without imposing on them an a priori definition of their world-building capacities.’ In other words, there is no underpinning social theory, other than sensibilities in research activities that interact with the vocabulary of the actor’s practices. Actor-
network theory is merely a ‘…method and not a theory, a way to travel from one spot to the next, from one field site to the next, not an interpretation of what actors do simply glossed in a different more palatable and more universalist language’ (ibid.). I therefore also discuss in this chapter the methods used.

2.1.1. Processes of ordering

The ethnographic task, as developed in actor-network theory, is to show how, despite fragmentation and dissent, actors in development are constantly engaged in processes of ordering (Latour, 2000). It involves studying the way heterogeneous entities – people, development ideas, events, ATM machines, technologies, marketing strategies, organizational structures, Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), numbers of tourists visiting a destination per year, mobile phone network, training courses, etc. – are tied together by translation into material and conceptual orderings of a project or development practice (Latour, 2000). This way of looking at SNV stems from a number of assertions made by actor-network theorists such as Law (1994, 2003, 2009) and Mosse (2004, 2005a, 2011).

First, actor-network theory does not strive to uncover the ‘order of things’, but rather to describe the diverse and multiple processes of ordering through which our world emerges. As such, ‘order’ does not exist, nothing (people, things and their relations) stays the same, and nothing remains stable in itself. In all the empirical chapters, I examine SNV’s involvement with tourism in terms of these processes of ordering. This entails that I am primarily interested not in what development is, but in how development in SNV works, how it is assembled, enacted and ordered (van der Duim et al., 2013). Development organizations like SNV are constantly organizing and ordering themselves. The organization is in a continuous process of movement. If an organization no longer moves, it stops; it is no longer working. However, focusing on processes of ordering is difficult. It is easier to label SNV a proponent of pro-poor tourism, or to declare it a player in community-based tourism, than to describe and analyse how it is continuously implementing tourism, developing, practising, measuring, strategizing, experimenting, learning and measuring again. It is easier to ‘black box’ an organization, to declare it a singular entity, than to try to keep focusing on the processes that are inside or related to it.

The central endeavour of actor-network theory therefore is to study the associations that actors create, forming actor networks, and in particular the transformation from weaker associations into stronger associations, and vice versa. These associations are established in processes through which actors relate to one another in such a way that the resulting network becomes more stable (Wester, 2008). This process
through which actors enrol others into actor networks is what Callon (1986) calls ‘translation’. Translation is about transforming, moving terms, concepts and approaches around, and changing them in the process, so that it fits in the changed network of relations. As briefly introduced in Chapter 1 (Mosse, 2005a), it is the way that policy is transformed into development practice on the ground, and that the results of practice in the field are transformed back into development results and ‘development success’.

For instance, SNV tourism managers and advisers have put into circulation a number of concepts and tools that function as mobilising metaphors (e.g. ‘capacity development’, ‘partnerships’, ‘value chain’) and that mean many things to many people. This allows development initiatives and their specific practices to win and retain the support of a range of actors with very different interests and agendas (Mosse, 2004). The ambiguity and lack of conceptual precision conceals ideological differences: it allowed compromising and enrolling different interests, building coalitions, distributing agency and the multiplication of criteria of success within development initiatives (Mosse, 2004). So, all entities, people and things, concepts and ideas, are changing from one development practice to another, from one network to the next (Gad & Jensen, 2010). It is in these networks that entities, people and things, define and shape one another (Law, 2009).

Second, as illustrated in the above, development organizations like SNV cannot be reduced to only the social, but are material heterogeneous set of arrangements, connecting and producing staff, strategy papers, reports, project offices, development tools and manuals, PowerPoint presentations and ‘development results’. According to actor-network theory, agency is not restricted to people (Callon, 1986; Law, 2003, 2009; Gad & Jensen, 2010; Müller, 2012). It is not only the human that counts: the non-human matters as much.

Third, as Law shows (1994, 2003, 2004, 2009), things and humans are assembled in networks in certain ways, and not in others. In theory, there are endless possible ways entities could be related in processes of ordering. In practice, however, networks of concepts, tools, people and things are assembled in only a limited number of ways. Ways of ordering are defined by conditions of possibility and necessity, making some ways of ordering easier and others more difficult or impossible. Some concepts are connected to other concepts, people and things; others might not be easily linked to that same network. There seem to be a limited number of strong networks in which concepts, approaches, people and things are connected in communities, organizations, etc. As Law (1994) shows in the case of the Daresbury Laboratory, arguably only a few dominant organizational modes of ordering existed in the lab.
Studying the Daresbury Laboratory, Law concluded that there were (at least) four modes of ordering – four recursive logics – at work among the managers of the laboratory. Sometimes managers acted as entrepreneurs, and sometimes as bureaucrats or administrators; sometimes they were real ‘Kuhnian puzzle-solvers’ and sometimes they acted with a great deal of charisma. He shows that this was based not on individual characters, but on modes of ordering, which are extended through people, events, technologies, materials and organizational arrangements. Law (1994, p. 20, italics in original) explains that he came

… to believe that if the organization might be treated as a recursive, self-performing, network, then it and its components might be understood as an effect generated in the telling, partial performance, and concrete embodiment of [these] modes of ordering. And, they might, in particular, be treated as effects generated by the interaction between these (and other) modes of ordering.

These modes of ordering are implicit and explicit strategies to pattern, as repeating and persisting logics, discursive and material networks (Law, 1994, 2003). These modes of ordering come in the form of stories and accounts. Throughout this thesis, these stories and accounts tell about the orderings in SNV.

Van der Duim (2007, p. 970), following van der Ploeg (2003), concludes that these modes of ordering are based on a more or less explicit framework of interconnected ideas, with which to read the empirical reality, defining the situation. It is a coherent set of strategic notions about the way the organization should function and develop that are based on a cultural repertoire and that guide practical actions. For example the decision to emphasize capacity development in SNV, instead of project implementation, created a whole new set of ideas (inscribed in strategies and guidelines) around the way development had to be done (through facilitation) in SNV.

However, modes of ordering do not only consist of a set of ideas, but also include a certain set of practices and relations that are informed by the definition of the situation. These practices also might give feedback that might modify the definitions of the situation, sometimes resulting in a strengthened and more coherent definition of the situation (Law & Singleton, 2013; van der Duim, 2007). In this case, coherence and congruence are ordering ‘successes’, which temporarily stabilizes the mode of ordering (Law, 1994, p. 110).

Fourth, these different implicit and explicit strategies (modes of ordering) are at work, intersecting with each other. There are multiple modes of ordering
undermining each other, sometimes supporting each other. For example, in international development, ideas about ‘empowerment’ or ‘movement’ are not straightforwardly linked to ‘business’ or ‘marketing’; they seem to be part of different modes of ordering. Modes of ordering stressing private sector involvement were not considered in SNV in the mid-1990s. Yet, they were dearly missed in tourism in the second part of the 2000s, when business development had become an important practice and part of SNV (Goodwin, 2006a; Wehkamp, 2010).

In organizations like SNV, different modes of ordering interact and collide. This interweaving of modes of ordering produces the particular ways SNV over time has integrated tourism as a poverty reduction development practice. Modes of ordering always imply particular ways of integrating with other modes of ordering, as practices are realized through the interweaving of different (conceptual and material) orderings. As I argue in Chapter 5, the fact that these modes of ordering are different and coexist, also contributed to achieving new stabilities in SNV, because it enabled SNV to shift the combination of modes of ordering to adapt to new situations and made these new situations durable for some time (Law, 1994, 2003, 2004, 2009).

Organizations work because they are non-coherent and messy. Although the imputation of patterns of ordering to complex empirical circumstances is always open to discussion and objection (Law, 1994, 2001), we can be sure about multiplicity, about the coexistence of different modes of ordering or different styles of justification, which may overlap with one another and reveal partial connection (Mol & Law, 2002 in Law, 2004). Of course, in other organizations, including development organizations, divisions between ordering modes can be otherwise; this is an empirical matter (Law, 1994, p. 82).

2.1.2. Relative durability and stability

Despite the messiness and flux of organizations like SNV, particular combinations of modes of ordering might – at least temporarily – lead to stability. Law identifies three overlapping ways to achieve durability and stability (2009). First of all, material durability is about producing and performing social arrangements transformed into physical forms (a development organization’s head office, country offices project offices, particular units in offices, rooms, desks, computers, specific software, printed strategy documents, ‘road maps’, etc.). Physical forms tend to hold their shape better than those that depend on face-to-face interaction (which is certainly one of the reasons development agencies put so much effort into publishing and disseminating their strategy documents). It is not enough to discuss tourism and poverty reduction: strategies on tourism development for poverty reduction have to
be written down and published in books and documents, shown on websites, referred to in project documents, and made into databases and computer programs. There is a caveat, as it is all relational effects. It is the configuration and relations in the network that produce stability; it is not inherent in the materials themselves. Project documents, databases, conferences and advisers work better if they are part of a network that includes national and project reporting systems, computers and national databases, and bureaucracies reporting on progress. In the end it is the configuration of the network or web that produces durability. Stability does not inhere in materials themselves (Law, 2007, 2009).

Second, *strategic durability* is well illustrated by Law’s case-study on the historic Portuguese maritime network – vessels, navigation, the route to India and long-distance control. Law (1986) shows how the narratives of innovations in shipbuilding and navigation come together with politics or economics of imperialism. The Portuguese experimented with innovative ship designs suitable for exploration and exploitation. They also, as a matter of explicit royal policy, created a system of celestial navigation. These were deliberate strategies to create a durable network. As important for the network stability was the translation of strategies in other networks (e.g. the art of growing spices, or the desire of Arab mariners to avoid lethal battle). Such strategically durable configurations were translated whole and ‘black boxed’ into the Portuguese web. How they worked was of little direct interest, though mostly they were durable and reliable (Law, 1986).

The third form is *discursive durability*. As highlighted in the above, in his work on Daresbury Laboratory, Law (1994) concluded that managers in the laboratory worked in series of different logics. He argued that this was not because of different individual characters, but of different modes of ordering that extended through people to include technologies and organizational arrangements. Law characterized these modes of ordering as mini-discourses, as introduced by Foucault. Foucault insists that discourses define conditions of possibility, making some ways of ordering webs of relations easier and others difficult or impossible. The fact that these orderings are different also contributes to stability. As Law explains (2007), every discourse sets limits to its conditions of possibility so it cannot recognize certain kinds of realities. But those realities exist and have to be handled. In Law’s *Organizing Modernity* (1994), in which he studies the management of Daresbury Laboratory, it was the multi-discursive ordering of the laboratory that secured its relative durability. When one mode of ordering became problematic, others turned out to be more effective. In Chapter 5, I use this notion of multi-discursive modes of ordering in organizations to analyse SNV’s internal organizational logics.
2.1.3. Qualculation and production of development success

In Chapter 6, I analyse the measuring and presenting of development results and development success, making use of the notions of qualculation and non-qualculation. The production and regulation of information is based on calculations, texts, explanations and judgements. In development aid, calculations and judgements have always been part of the process of producing the legitimacy of development interventions.

Calculation can be understood as a three-stage process (Callon & Muniesa, 2005). First, relevant entities are sorted out, detached and displayed within a space (sheet of paper, spreadsheet, database, annual report, a reference to the eight MDGs). Second, those entities are manipulated and transformed; relations are being created (summing up the evidence, adding up the contribution of development programmes to, for instance, the eight MDGs). Third, a result is extracted, a new entity is produced, a ranking, a sum, a calculation, a judgment. The new entity corresponds to the relations and manipulations that have been performed along the way. Callon and Law state that one can think in the same terms about (quantitative) calculations and (qualitative) judgments. They are all about ‘arraying and manipulating entities in a space in order to achieve an outcome’ (Callon & Law, 2005, p. 719). Quantitative in one way or the other, qualitative in one way or the other, and everything in between – so calculation, whether arithmetical in form or not, the manipulation of objects with a single spatiotemporal frame, which can be manipulated in indefinitely many ways – in other words ‘qualculation’ (Cochoy 2002).

Qualculation implies qualification. For instance, in impact evaluations this includes asking the ‘right’ questions, agreeing on what needs to be measured, what is ‘credible evidence’, and how to draw ‘valid conclusions’. Things have to qualify before they can enter a process of qualculation. The elements on which they work need to be disentangled from wherever they were, and from whatever form they had before, and manipulated into one single space, in a shape that fits, a shape that did not exist before (Callon & Law, 2005, p. 719/720). It takes a lot of effort to achieve qualculation, but also to secure the absence of qualculation; the making and un-making of relations takes effort. Therefore, the boundary is no longer between judgment and calculation, but between material arrangements that allow qualculation and those that resist it or make it impossible (Callon & Law, 2005; Cochoy, 2008).

The power of a qualculation depends on the number of entities that can be enlisted, and the number and strength of relations between the entities, and in the quality of tools for classifying, manipulating and ranking them. This implies a material
ordering of its own, and which can be done in endless different ways. The same counts for non-qualculation. It depends on the number of entities that were deleted and silenced, and relations un-made to avoid listing and ranking; methods of non-qualculation may also be more or less powerful, and more or less effective (Callon & Law, 2005, p. 720). There can be resistance to calculation.

Callon and Law (2005) show how resistance to calculation is a strategy for preventing or impeding qualculation, to achieve non-qualculation. As with qualculation, it is about spaces where social–material associations and practices are generated, but unlike qualculation, they work in one way or another to refuse the provisional capacity to enumerate, to list, transform and rank. This can be done in two distinct ways. In the first, rarefaction, qualculation is undermined by withdrawing the necessary resources to calculate and judge; resources have to be taken away, qualitative entanglements have to be set aside.

The second, proliferation, works the other way around. It impedes calculation by providing an overload of qualculative resources (Callon & Law, 2005). In a process of proliferation, possibilities of qualculation are undermined by an excess of entities that interact with and undermine one another. Callon and Law (ibid., pp. 726–728) introduce a case of a railway crash in the UK, followed by a public inquiry, which shows an attempt to prevent the possibility of calculation. Many parties had an interest in the inquiries: train operators, track and signal owners, maintenance companies, passenger groups and relatives of the bereaved, trade-unions, the police, their barristers, and a lot more, all accounting for the accident in very different, sometimes overlapping and sometimes contradictory accounts. The accounts proliferated, and made it impossible to account for the accident, and pushed the events beyond the accountable, the qualculable. Both rarefaction and proliferation take a lot of effort. Calculation is historically linked with accountability, and it takes a lot of work to create unaccountability and non-calculability.

However, the railway accident inquiry was charged to come to conclusions, and so it came to conclusions. Callon and Law (2005) relate this to ‘closure’, as they have seen/studied in the sociology of scientific knowledge debates. While there are frequent controversies in science, these usually get resolved in some mixture of negotiation and power - ‘closure’ is achieved (see for instance also Latour, 1991 and Law, 1994). In the example of the railway accident, the legal system with its practices, its regulations about proper accountability, locations, together with its clear material arrangements for producing ‘closure’, secured qualculability for some time. In development aid, similar processes are happening. External consultants are hired to evaluate programmes, country programmes or development sectors, and are
requested to provide a judgement on the development success of those programmes or sectors, based on an overload of input papers, progress documents and reports, interviews, datasheets, indicators, budgets and calculations of different approaches.

Similarly, Phillips and Edwards (2000), discussing an impact evaluation of a development project in South Asia, argue that there are no objective truths that can be easily uncovered about the impact of a project. The evaluators have to create their own interpretations and meanings on the basis of large amounts of information, like monitoring reports, programme documents, input papers, terms of references, country programme documents, job descriptions, key-stakeholder interviews and their transcriptions, staff meetings, annual reports, organizational charts, all gathered as part of the evaluation process. They then have to construct a narrative that creates coherence out of the diversity. Since much is at stake, the knowledge constructed is neither neutral nor value free. It is an act of power through processes of silencing and closure (ibid.); through a process of arraying, manipulating and framing to achieve to a conclusion. Project staff, country office staff and development partner organizations often feel threatened by impact evaluations. In the case study by Phillips and Edwards, concern and anger were expressed through the use of a number of resistance strategies and challenges that centred on questioning the authority of the evaluation team to construct knowledge, and the validity of the produced knowledge by the evaluation.

It was the resistance of the evaluated to the evaluators that created temporary non-qualculation. After a process of putting in place negotiation strategies between evaluated and evaluators, joint field-research, and texts the evaluators negotiated and produced, a new entity was produced; an evaluation report was drafted and agreed upon, and a decision was taken to fund a next phase of the project. It made it qualculeable again, by insisting on the salience of certain links, while insisting on the irrelevance on other possible connections. It is an example of the kind of qualculeable space that generates judgements that have little to do with numerical calculation.

Development ‘success’ is produced in the same web of indicators, aggregated data, monitoring results, information sheets, computing programmes, project evaluations, progress reports, project programme and country procedures, reworking of data and information at head office, production of annual reports, and internal and external judgements on these results. Producing development success and legitimacy is qualculative. Success in development depends upon the stabilization of particular interpretations of policy models. Authoritative interpretations have to be made and sustained socially (Mosse, 2004). Development projects need ‘interpretive communities’: they have to enrol a range of supporting actors with reasons ‘to
participate in the established order as if its representations were reality’ (Li, 1999, p. 374 in Mosse 2004, p. 646). The more interests that are tied up with their particular interpretations, the more stable and dominant they become. In Chapter 6, I analyse how SNV produced successes and how qualification was part of that.

2.2. Research methods

2.2.1. An ethnographic account

To position oneself at an angle, to provide a ‘cross-eyed’ vision and independent voice, is of course what we count on and expect ethnographers to provide as an intrinsic component of their work. It is also what makes ethnography a good deal more complicated than simply a method of collecting data. (van Maanen, 2001, p. 239)

This account of SNV’s involvement with tourism is based on a number of sources. First, it is based on my direct involvement in the development organization as a tourism adviser, and in some years also as a managerii. The thesis reflects on the development work I and my colleagues did in the tourism for poverty reduction development practice in the organization between 1993 and 2013.

Practices and experiences were written down in notebooks and field visit reports, as well as in programme proposals, progress reports, annual plans, training materials, workshop reports, feasibility studies, etc. (a few examples include Hummel, 1998a,b; 1999b; 2000a; 2001a,b,c, Hummel & Manandhar, 1999, Hummel & Ritsma, 2005; Hummel & Shrestha, 2000; Kruk, Hummel & Banskota, 2007a,b). It follows Mosse’s (2005a, p. ix) description of an:

… unusual type of social research; complex, long-term, multi-sited and initially unintentional drawing on insights as a participant-insider. It is both social investigation and lived experience. It is based on the best available evidence, but does not cease to be a personal analytical account – an ethnography in which I am myself the principal informant.

Other documents and reports reflecting the tourism development practice in SNV, especially in Asia (see for instance Alcock, 2003; Budhathoki, 2002; Greenfield, 2013; Hummel, 1996, 1999a, 2000b, 2002, 2004; Leijzer, 2005; Oliveros, 2006; Saville, 2001; SNV Nepal, 2002), were also gathered and analysed. Several students studied tourism development practice in the SNV Asia programme (cf. Buijtendijk, 2009; Hendriks, 2010; van de Wouw, 2009), and on some occasions external consultants undertook evaluations (including Ashley, 2006a; Ashley,
Another source of information was internal and external SNV documents – strategy documents, annual reports, publications, workshop reports, evaluations, etc. – gathered in 2009 and 2010 from SNV’s archives in the various countries in Asia and in the SNV head office in The Hague, the Netherlands. This source also includes specific folders, CD-ROMs and USB sticks containing background information gathered for specific team meetings and events, like the SNV Asia regional Pro-Poor Sustainable Tourism (PPST) practice area meetings (2003–2010) or Extended Regional Management Team (E-RMT) meetings of SNV Asia (2006–2010), conferences organized by the PPST practice area, like the ‘Mainstreaming pro-poor principles, market linkages and enterprise development in sustainable tourism development’ in Hanoi, Vietnam (December 2005) and the IFC/SNV Conference ‘Poverty Alleviation through Tourism – Impact Measurement in Tourism Chain Development’ in Phnom Penh, Cambodia (December 2007), and from training courses like the Management for Development Foundation (MDF) Project Management course (1999) or the Action for Enterprise (AFE) Market Based Solutions approach in Value Chain Analysis and Development for SNV in Bhutan (2007). One particular source was the gathered information for the SNV Asia pro-poor sustainable tourism practice area evaluation of 2005/2006. More than 400 tourism-specific SNV internal and external documents were gathered from the Asia region, and the five countries SNV tourism engaged with (Nepal, Bhutan, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam), at the time.

Another source of information was interviews with and feedback from members and ex-members of SNV staff and other people (hired consultants, staff of local NGOs) related to SNV’s policies and practices. These informants had distinctive roles in the development process within or around SNV, and were chosen because they were ‘information rich’ as a result of their positions in and around the organization, and known to be ‘insiders’ involved in key policy processes and in practice (Bramwell & Meyer, 2007). These individuals were selected on the basis of suggestions by informants and my own knowledge and experience within the SNV organization. Most of the informants had been working with SNV for a longer period of time. I had more or less direct working relations with all the informants I interviewed. The informants included people involved before and in the initial years that SNV engaged with tourism, and in the first years that tourism was implemented in projects in the organization (seven informants), and SNV advisers who were involved with the tourism development practice during the 2000s (eight informants) and the phase-out (eight informants). Other informants had particular staff positions at the head office in The Hague, or management roles in various SNV Asia countries, and were
involved in internal and external strategic organizational decisions (20 informants). Some of the informants were interviewed because they met more than one qualifying criterion; for instance, they were involved not only in the initial years but also during the 2000s. I interviewed them face to face (25 interviews) and more recently also via Skype (15 interviews). For a list of all the interviewees and the main reasons to interview them, see Appendix 1.

I conducted a total of 39 semi-structured interviews with 37 key informants (mostly individual interviews; one interview in a group of three, one with two people). With a few people, two interviews (four informants), and with one individual three interviews, were held. These additional interviews were mainly to update on the phase-out, and to discuss the texts of the chapters. All interviews were open and flexible interactions, using a brief topic guide to generate the most important issues on the topics discussed, revealing both the interviewee’s information and his or her perspectives on the issue. That aim of each interview was to clarify and deepen the understanding of the particular topics covered, and each interviewee was probed for rich, detailed accounts (see also Bramwell & Meyer, 2007; van Wijk, 2009). All interviews were recorded, and were listened to more than once, and most important parts of the conversations were transcribed. Most interviews lasted between 60 and 90 minutes; some lasted more than three hours.

The interviews were analysed on, for example, the use of particular development concepts, implementation approaches, descriptions of development practices, important events in tourism for poverty reduction in the organization, and references to development results. The interviews were triangulated with internal and external documents in SNV, and my own observations and experiences in the organization.

Finally, three interviewees (besides other colleagues and friends) read the thesis or parts thereof in order to provide feedback on the accuracy of the narratives. It also gave them an opportunity to object to what was said about them.

2.2.2. ‘Traveling’

One of the main methods of enquiry in this thesis to understand SNV’s involvement in tourism and poverty reduction was ‘traveling’ (see Anderson, 2002). In the literal sense, I have been traveling between SNV countries for years. I have lived in Albania and a few SNV Asia countries, and I have worked in all SNV countries in Asia at one time or another. My ‘duty stations’ were Thethi, Albania (1996), Kathmandu, Nepal (1997–2004), Thimphu, Bhutan (2004–2006), Kathmandu again (2006–2009), Utrecht, the Netherlands (2009) and Luang Prabang, Laos (2010–2012).
also travelled between remote areas in Nepal, Bhutan, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia and Albania, and between the province and national capitals in the respective countries.

I also travelled to conferences in regional hubs like Bangkok, and visited donor headquarters like the Asian Development Bank in Manila. I gathered information in the SNV archives of the countries in Asia and The Hague, as well as via the web (the SNV Asia PPST d-group and the wider SNV intranet). So, besides spending time in the field, in the projects and programmes, I carried out most of the research in SNV offices, hotels, conference halls and at my desk at home in Asmara (2005), Kathmandu (2007, 2009), Utrecht (2009) and Luang Prabang (2011), and after I left SNV, at my desk in Chang Mai (2012/2013) and Johannesburg (2013/2015), besides my visits to the university in Wageningen, the Netherlands.

In a figurative sense, I have been traveling in time – travelling back and forth with the development of this thesis over the years. My involvement in research on tourism, sustainable development and poverty reduction started in the 1990s. In the mid-2000s, I decided to work on this thesis and I travelled back and forth in the history of the organization, while time progressed. I held most of the interviews between 2007 and 2010, with additional interviews in 2013, 2014 and 2015. The information for the cases in Chapter 4 and the impact measurement were mainly gathered in 2009, 2010 and 2011. Most of the additional document research in the SNV archives was done in 2009 and 2010. In all, the research spanned a period of nine years.

However, for me, ‘traveling’ was more. It was part of my work, and part of my life, for 20 years. Living in all these different SNV countries, traveling to different sites, experiencing different cultures and languages, changed me – and my way of interactive researching – in relation to people, things, sites, countries and SNV.

2.2.3. Reflexivity

If we attend practice we are also led to issues of reflexivity. In particular, we need to ask whether we are able and willing to recognise that our methods also craft realities. (Law, 2004, p. 153, italics in original)

Reflexivity has come to have two distinct meanings, one that refers to the researcher’s awareness of an analytic focus on his or her relationship to the field of study, and the other that attends to the ways that practices involve consciousness and commentary on themselves. Put simply, reflexivity is an explicit self-consciousness about the researcher’s position in relation to how he or she might have influenced the design, execution and interpretation of the theory, data and conclusions (Griffiths, 1998).
Like many researchers before me, I argue that since all research is affected by the social and political position of the researcher, making this position clear is one way of avoiding bias:

Bias comes not from having ethical and political positions – this is inevitable – but from not acknowledging them. Not only does such acknowledgment help to unmask any bias that is implicit in those views, but it helps to provide a way of responding critically and sensitively to the research. (Griffith, 1998, p. 133)

I was studying and writing this thesis about a development organization I was working for. I was both researching and part of the researched in this thesis. In a sense, I have been involved in reality-making in relation to SNV twice, once in the tourism development practice as a development adviser, and once as a researcher crafting realities about SNV and its tourism practice, in a research process and the writing up of that process in this thesis.

I am well aware that I have been ordering in the researching and writing of this thesis. In my observations, analysis of internal and external SNV documents, the interviews, the triangulation and checking with advisers and managers involved, I aimed to achieve saturation of data. I talked to most of the important and relevant people, according to the interviewees and my own observations over the years, but not to others. I included certain examples of development approaches, some results of impact evaluations, parts of documents, etc., but not others. I included some stories, not others. This ordering is precarious, per definition incomplete, and there are bound to be some things that have escaped me, even though I was so closely related to them – or perhaps because I was.

The anthropological challenge is to ‘break free from, or at least become sensitized to, the discursive hold of even one’s most cherished policy discourse and one’s own expertise, to try to understand perceptions and actions from another perspective’ (Mosse, 2005b, p. 18). This is what I tried to achieve in this thesis: I tried to impute different overlapping and colliding perspectives on development concepts in relation to tourism, tourism for poverty reduction approaches, organizational logics, the measuring and presenting of development results, and changes over time, also in my own thinking and acting within the organization. Of course, also this remained incomplete; orderings might always be different.

A characteristic of the study has been that I collaborated with many people and that much of the material presented in this thesis was the result of joint practices, joint research and publications. These joint researches, and especially the discussions on
the results, have enriched my understanding of the topics studied. In each chapter reference is made to the other authors of the joint publications used in the chapters. In this thesis, I have adapted the texts and I take full responsibility for them.
Chapter 3

Development at work

This chapter is based on:

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter I present an overview of the rise and fall of SNV’s involvement with tourism and explain how the main tourism and development discourses of the last 60 years were included in SNV’s work. I identify six phases of how tourism and development was dealt with within SNV, and discuss the conceptual and material ordering processes at stake. I describe how SNV got involved in tourism for poverty reduction, especially due to changed international development paradigms and influences of other development-related organizations in the Netherlands. I show how SNV used changing development concepts and approaches, and how that changed the way of working in tourism over the studied 20 years. I also describe and analyse the last stage: the phasing out of tourism as a development practice within SNV. As such, this chapter contributes to answering research questions 1–3 and 6.

3.2. Tourism, development and poverty reduction

Over the years, the relationship between tourism and development has been conceptualized in a variety of ways. The early liberal approach to tourism embodied the logic of the modernization paradigm. In the 1950s and 1960s, tourism was identified as a potential modernization strategy that could help newly independent and ‘third world’ countries to earn foreign exchange. Tourism was promoted as a development strategy to transfer technology, increase employment and gross domestic product, attract foreign capital and promote a modern way of life based on Western values (see Scheyvens, 2007; Sharpley & Telfer, 2002; Telfer, 2009). The World Bank led the way in the 1970s, financing infrastructural projects and providing credit for foreign investment; however, it closed its Tourism Projects Department at the end of the decade, leaving tourism to the private sector (Harrison, 2008; Hawkins & Mann, 2007).

The neoliberal agenda of the 1980s stressed the role of the free market and a minimal role for the state. However, to strengthen tourism as an export industry, international organizations like the European Union and the World Bank (through its International Finance Corporation) invested in infrastructure, product and market development, and strategy development. Structural adjustment programmes inspired by the World Bank and the IMF highlighted the strategic importance of the private sector in the development of tourism. These programmes reduced the role of governments to providing investment incentives that would stimulate the participation of private companies in the tourism sector (see Sharpley & Telfer, 2002; Harrison 2008; Hawkins & Mann, 2007).
At the end of 1970s, the World Bank and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) organized the first international seminar on tourism and development. This initiated a body of research on the impacts of tourism development (Hawkins & Mann, 2007) and linked tourism to the dependency paradigm, arguing that tourism might add to the inequalities between developed and developing countries (Britton, 1982; Hardy, Beeton & Pearson, 2002; Hawkins & Mann, 2007). Influenced by political economy and structuralist schools of thought, many social scientists soon started to argue that poor people and non-Western countries were typically excluded from or disadvantaged by what tourism can offer (Scheyvens, 2007). In the Netherlands, several organizations were established, for example Tourism and the Third World (1984) and the Retour Foundation (1986). These organizations studied tourism and development impacts, and tried to encourage Dutch development agencies like SNV to become critically involved in tourism development (de Man, 1996).

Alternative approaches to tourism development emerged as a result of the pre- and post-Rio discussions on sustainable development. Informed by a number of schools of thought, they embraced ideas about local participation, equity, gender sensitivity and empowerment, and therefore focussed on grassroots development (Scheyvens, 2007). Similar to trends in development theory, whereby scholars became dissatisfied with existing development philosophies, tourism analysts became disillusioned with mass tourism and abandoned it in favour of community-based tourism and small-scale and locally owned developments. This led to the rapid expansion of alternative forms of tourism (Hardy, Beeton & Pearson, 2002; Sharpley & Telfer, 2002). In the 1980s and 1990s, ecotourism dominated the development agenda (Boo, 1990, 1992; Hummel, 1994; van der Duim, 1993; Ziffer, 1989). However, in the 1990s increased attention was paid to the equity dimensions of sustainable development, which led to new interest in the community as a critical element in achieving development goals and diversifying communities’ livelihood options (Hardy, Beeton & Pearson, 2002). This also sparked a new interest in the relation between tourism development and pro-poor strategies (Hall, 2007). As I elaborate below, around that time tourism entered SNV and other development organizations. In countries where SNV supported rural development projects, local non-governmental organizations and governments asked for SNV’s assistance with ‘sustainable tourism development’. In response to this, SNV supported development initiatives in small-scale tourism in Tanzania and Albania.

In the last 15 years, the focus has been on poverty reduction (see Goodwin 2008, 2009). At the end of the 1990s, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) commissioned an overview study of the activities of development organizations in
the field of tourism and development (Bennett, Ashley & Roe, 1999). The report concluded that earlier concepts like ‘sustainable tourism’ and ‘community-based tourism’ had not sufficiently addressed poverty reduction. Therefore, a more explicit concept was framed, namely ‘pro-poor tourism’. In 2002, the concept was endorsed at the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development, and the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) launched the Sustainable Tourism–Eliminating Poverty (ST–EP) initiative. The UNWTO invited UN agencies, governments, donor agencies, NGOs and other stakeholders to unite in a concerted effort to use the socioeconomic benefits that derive from tourism in actively combating poverty throughout the world ( UNWTO, 2002a, 2002b, 2004). SNV became one of the leading partners in this effort (SNV, 2004, 2006a; UNWTO 2002a, 2004).

The concept of pro-poor tourism is now seen as an overall approach specifically focussed on unlocking opportunities for the poor within tourism. An essential aspect is that tourism is not necessarily just small scale and alternative, as previously proposed in alternative approaches. Instead, pro-poor tourism seeks to harness the tourism industry as a whole to contribute to development aims (Goodwin, 2008; Meyer, 2007; van de Mosselaer & van der Duim, 2012). The concept pays specific attention to obstacles that constrain the poor’s greater participation in tourism. Pro-poor tourism initiatives aim to establish a direct link between tourism and poverty reduction, and emphasize the voices and needs of the poor in tourism development. The poor become the focus of concern (Zhao & Ritchie, 2007). The benefits that can accrue to the poor in destination areas have become a popular and appealing moral focus (Harrison, 2008).

In the wake of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, the market once again became central to the development debate, as did partnerships (van Tulder & Fortanier, 2009). As Meyer (2009, p. 199) summarizes:

> Amongst the development community there seems to be a consensus today that the private sector can play a considerable role in the fight against poverty by helping to speed up economic development through its core business activities in the workplace, the market place, along the supply chain, through their social investment and philanthropic activities, and through their engagement in public policy dialogue and advocacy.

However, far less attention has been paid to the private sector’s ‘economic multipliers and impacts along local and global value chains to contribute to local economic development and poverty reduction in destinations in developing countries’ (Meyer, 2009, p. 199).
Pro-poor tourism includes a variety of approaches (and thus amalgamates various development paradigms), all of which have contributed in some way to the growth of interest in pro-poor tourism (see Scheyvens 2007; Telfer & Sharpley, 2008). Liberal/neoliberal, critical and alternative development approaches have contributed in different ways to the growth of interest in tourism and poverty reduction, although it has been particularly influenced by neoliberal and alternative development thinking (see Scheyvens, 2007, 2011). These approaches seem to have recently converged at least partly around such concepts as ‘value chain development’, a strong market-orientation, an engaged, ‘socially responsible’ private sector, and multilevel and multi-stakeholder collaboration (cf. Ashley, 2006b; Ashley & Goodwin, 2007; Ashley & Haysom, 2006; Ashley & Mitchell, 2005, 2007, 2008; Ashley, Roe & Goodwin, 2001; Kremer, van Lieshout & Went, 2009; Mitchell & Ashley, 2007, 2009, 2010).

3.3. Twenty years of tourism and poverty reduction within SNV

The history of tourism and poverty reduction within SNV embodies the shifting paradigms presented above. It also shows how shifting paradigms and concepts, as well as people (especially advisers and managers at SNV and partner organizations), subsidy agreements and the strategies of SNV departments in the field and at its headquarters, and many other ‘things’ have been ordering pro-poor sustainable tourism practices within SNV through six emerging phases (see Table 3.1).

3.3.1. The end of opposition to tourism (Phase 1: pre–1995)

Tourism growth since the 1990s has been characterized by a pronounced geographical expansion. Along with the increase in the number of destinations, tourist arrivals increased significantly in many developing countries. Between 1990 and 2006, the growth rates in international arrivals and international tourism receipts for developing countries were 196% and 419%, respectively. Of the 30 countries with the largest poor populations, 10 saw a growth in international arrivals of over 200% between 1990 and 2001. This rate of growth is significantly higher than that achieved by developed countries (Leijzer, 2007).

A combination of the growth in tourism to developing countries since the early 1990s, growing global environmental concerns, and the efforts of international conservation organizations (e.g. the WWF, Conservation International and the IUCN) and local conservation and development NGOs, led to increased interest in developing forms of tourism that would contribute to sustainable development and the creation of tourism development initiatives, many of them small scale. Development agencies,
Table 3.1. Six phases of tourism and development at SNV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Approach</th>
<th>Main concepts and ideas in relation to the tourism - development nexus</th>
<th>Tourism phases in SNV</th>
<th>Main elements and concepts of the tourism-development nexus in SNV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950s and 1960s</td>
<td>Modernization&lt;br&gt;Lots of tourists, which contributes to economic growth, employment generation and foreign exchange; benefits trickle down&lt;br&gt;</td>
<td>Phase 1. Before 1995</td>
<td>Involved, but only through scattered studies and consultancies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>Dependency&lt;br&gt;Tourism is associated with dependency on foreign capital and expertise, growing social and economic disparities and it often undermines local cultures</td>
<td>Phase 2. 1995-2000</td>
<td>Strong focus on small-scale tourism development (sustainable tourism, ecotourism, community-based tourism).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s Neoliberalism (Washington consensus)</td>
<td>Private sector tourism development; primacy of the free competitive markets and privatization as the way out; encourages foreign investment; provides employment, income generation and foreign exchange</td>
<td>Phase 3. 2001-2004</td>
<td>Phasing out of tourism projects, focus on advisory services and capacity development, growth of SNV’s tourism practice in Asia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s and 2010s Beyond the impasse; the search for new paradigms ‘Inclusive neoliberal’ (Craig and Porter, 2006)</td>
<td>No ‘magic story’ for development; combination of approaches&lt;br&gt;Tourism as a complex system in which local people may be able to resist, subvert, manipulate or transform tourism&lt;br&gt;Pro-poor tourism, engagement of the (international) private sector, public–private sector partnerships, multi-stakeholder approaches.</td>
<td>Phase 5. 2007-2010</td>
<td>Focus on development impact – ‘impact areas’. Re-confirmation of pro-poor sustainable tourism as a ‘value chain’; focus on private sector development, public–private partnerships (multi-stakeholder approaches).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Phase 6. 2011 and beyond</td>
<td>Phasing out tourism as a development sector, involvement in a few complex projects (using value chains and result chains).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ashley & Harrison (2007); Craig & Porter (2006); DFID (2009); Kemper et al. (2009); Maxwell (2005); Mowforth & Munt (2003); Scheyvens (2007); Sharples & Telfer (2002); Telfer (2009); Telfer & Sharples (2008); Van der Duim (2008).
however, hardly ever discussed tourism as a tool for development, and often regarded tourism development as ‘commercial’, ‘private sector driven’ or ‘elitist’. The prevailing discourse reflected the dependency paradigm of the 1970s and 1980s. This is exemplified by an SNV memorandum on tourism (Loermans, 1995, p. 3):

Despite the economic significance of tourism to the South, development organizations have so far given it scant consideration. At best they had no opinion on the matter, but usually they were against it, on the grounds that only the elite benefited.

However, tourism gradually entered the agenda of SNV through a number of particular events. First, a small number of tourism initiatives, instigated at the request of NGOs and SNV staff, paved the way. The gradual shift from a critical tourism discourse to a more alternative/sustainable development discourse (cf. Scheyvens, 2007), in which tourism was increasingly seen as a tool for local development and environmental conservation, resulted in local requests for assistance. One of these requests came from the Maasai around Arusha in northern Tanzania. SNV supported several economic development initiatives with these Maasai, but the initiatives were not very successful (Leijzer, personal communication, 2007). Continued requests from the Maasai for tourism development were initially not granted, as tourism was not part of the regular development activities of SNV, and the organization had no experience with tourism.

An employee based in Tanzania, working at SNV’s Dienst Internationale Dimensie (Department International Dimension, DID), which had been set up to link development activities in the SNV countries with organizations in the Netherlands, allocated a small budget to start a tourism activity with the Maasai. As SNV was not involved in the implementation of tourism initiatives, the project was subcontracted to a small Dutch sustainable tourism advocacy NGO, the Retour Foundation. This NGO had been quite successful in advocating the development of tourism products and the marketing of small-scale community-based tourism in the Netherlands. Links with Dutch tour operators were quickly established. Overland trucks brought tourists to the project, resulting in revenue of US$10,000 in the first year (Leijzer, personal communication, 2007; de Man, personal communication, 2007; van der Duim, Peters & Wearing, 2005). Requests from other countries, for example Albania, followed.

At the time, SNV advisers directly supported ‘groups of poor, disadvantaged and oppressed people’ through a ‘process approach’. Target groups were involved in problem identification and analysis, choice of approach to solving problems and the pace of implementation (Verhoeven, 2002). These groups kept requesting support for tourism development. SNV country directors and staff decided to explore ways
in which tourism could promote local development and poverty reduction in their respective countries. This resulted in the carrying out of a tourism feasibility study in Albania in 1994 and an investigation of tourism development potential in Botswana, and in SNV Zimbabwe’s small-scale involvement in the Campfire programme in 1995 (Loermans, 1995).

Second, DID was instrumental at a practical and operational level in developing these initial tourism initiatives. Its main task was to facilitate the raising of awareness in the Netherlands of development cooperation. It also offered SNV target groups in the South direct access to Northern (mainly Dutch) networks of information, contacts and finance (Verhoeven, 2002). It received requests (e.g. from SNV Tanzania) to create linkages between local tourism projects and potential tour operators, and allocated some of its own budget to launch the small-scale tourism initiative with the Maasai.

Third, an internal memorandum (Loermans, 1995) opened up the discussion about the role of tourism in development assistance within SNV. The abovementioned initiatives were discussed within SNV. This led to the first Memorandum on Tourism, which reflected the growing interest in tourism and development among academics and NGOs/development organizations in the Netherlands. For example, around the same time Oxfam Novib started community-based tourism initiatives in the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand (de Man 1996; Westerlaken, 1998 in van Wijk, 2009). The Memorandum on Tourism also addressed the changes in SNV’s environment. It reflects how tourism became a part of SNV, albeit not comfortably:

Although many have debated this subject before us, tourism is a new subject for SNV. Until recently we were one of the few in Dutch development circles to broach the issue. We had a scoop when we presented the results of a modest study in a single field area to the press. From the PR point of view this was important, but in the Policy Department we weren’t entirely comfortable with it. We felt that, as an organization, we didn’t have enough experience and weren’t really sure where we wanted to go. In short, we lacked both a policy and a long-term vision. (Loermans, 1995, p. 27)

The memorandum led to a wider discussion on tourism development within SNV and provided the first ideas on policy development (SNV Nepal, BDB & BBA, 2000). It conceptualized tourism and development in terms of ‘local participation’, ‘target groups’, ‘community empowerment’ and ‘host–guest relationships’ – all elements of the ‘process approach’. It also resonated with the emerging alternative development approach by referring to ‘sustainable’ and ‘small-scale development’. The discourse at DID and SNV headquarters seemed highly influenced by critical and alternative
development approaches. The previously critical development discourse was slowly replaced by one that included both critical and alternative development discourses. The SNV Memorandum on Tourism both reflects this duality and opened the doors to tourism as a development sector:

A more positive attitude to tourism has gradually come about even within SNV. Some seven field areas have indicated that they are investigating the subject of tourism or plan to do so. The impression is that we can no longer oppose tourism. (Loermans, 1995, p. 4)

Thus, the first Memorandum on Tourism was a result of the changing discourse, the activities of other development organizations in tourism in the Netherlands, the initial involvement of DID in Tanzania, the subsequent attention paid to the initiative by the Dutch media and the response within SNV to this initiative. The memorandum heralded SNV’s entry into tourism development for poverty reduction. SNV was involved in tourism, and could no longer ‘oppose’ it.

3.3.2. A modest start in tourism (Phase 2: 1995–2000)

In 1990–1995, tourism projects increasingly became part of rural development and conservation programmes in a small number of countries. Examples are the cultural tourism project in Tanzania (SNV, 1999a), the sustainable tourism project in the Shala Valley in Albania (Glastra, 1995; Hummel, 1996), a tourism component in the community-based natural resource management project in Botswana (Rozemeijer, 2001) and tourism initiatives in the integrated rural tourism projects in Nepal (Hummel, 1999a, 2002, 2004). These projects were started with the active support of the respective SNV country managements. For the first time, tourism advisers were hired by SNV itself. As a consequence, SNV started to develop its own tourism expertise within the organization, establishing SNV as an advisory organization involved in tourism development for poverty reduction.

The processes of ordering in this phase are clearly illustrated by four related events and developments. First, tourism was embedded in SNV by linking it to the corporate strategy for 1996–2000 (SNV, 1996). SNV reformulated its commitments to technical assistance as its core business. It defined four ‘product groups’, namely capacity building, project implementation, mediation and service provision to Northern organizations (SNV, 2000; Verhoeven, 2002). The tourism projects became integrated into the product groups’ ‘capacity development’ and ‘project implementation’. Here, SNV focused on ‘sustainable regional development’. Moreover, a tourism officer was appointed at the Services and Mediation Bureau (Bureau Diensten en Bemiddeling; BDB), the successor to DID. This bureau
served as an intermediary between North and South and facilitated the exchange of knowledge and maintained strategic forms of cooperation in the Netherlands. The tourism officer supplied information, facilitated workshops, developed networks and contributed to policy development. He was also responsible for marketing support and public relations (Mulder, 2000). Through BDB, SNV showed that it had a role to play in linking the tourism industry, development agencies and universities in the Netherlands. As a consequence, the isolated SNV tourism projects linked up with BDB to share experiences and lessons learned in their projects.

Second, the small-scale tourism projects in Tanzania, Albania and, soon afterwards, Botswana, and the tourism advisers employed in these projects, which were supported by SNV country directors and staff and BDB, entrenched tourism as a part of SNV. Tourism entered the organization as the projects had close links with the themes of natural resource management (NRM) and private sector development (PSD). These themes, along with the theme of local governance, had been identified in the 1998 strategy paper as the major themes that SNV should focus on and narrowed down the earlier identified ‘sustainable regional development’ (SNV 1996, 2000).

Third, among the tourism advisers, the need arose to share

[...] experiences in order to attain better concepts and strategies of tourism development which serves local poor groups and individuals. At the same time there was a need at SNV policy level to gain insight into how tourism could contribute to the economic structural development of poor people in marginalized areas. (Hummel, 1999b, p. 12)

To address this need, the BDB tourism officer and the policy officer for economic development of the Policy Affairs Bureau (BBA) of SNV The Hague, and the tourism adviser at SNV Nepal organized the first ‘SNV tourism advisers’ meeting. In the autumn of 1999, advisers from Bolivia, Laos, Nepal, Tanzania and Vietnam, and representatives of the BDB and BBA departments at SNV headquarters, met in Nepal. Just as Loermans’ memorandum of 1995 demarcated the first phase, the Nepal meeting defined the progress made in the second phase. It was the first time that SNV advisers had tried to ‘elevate tourism within SNV to the next level’ (Stoer, personal communication, 2007). At the meeting, strategies and guidelines for and checklists on sustainable tourism development were shared. The meeting was a turning point in the development and exchange of knowledge. Stoer considers it as pioneering knowledge management at SNV. The event created ‘momentum’ and a ‘critical mass’ (Stoer, personal communication, 2007). The results were recorded in a joint workshop document (SNV Nepal, BDB & BBA, 2000).
Fourth, SNV’s work in tourism became nationally and internationally recognized. For instance, in 1999 the cultural tourism project in Tanzania – a community tourism project consisting of several tour/village modules – received the TO DO award (SNV/Caalders & Cottrell, 2001). These results generated recognition both outside and within the organization (see e.g. SNV Annual Reports of 1998 and 1999).

This phase embodied tourism within SNV, reaffirmed by SNV’s ‘commitment to tourism programmes in the regions’ (SNV Annual Report, 1999: p. 11, my translation). However, although the request for a policy document from the advisers gathered in Nepal was not fulfilled, it did result in 2001 in a sustainable tourism background paper (SNV/Caalders & Cottrell, 2001), which led to increasing recognition by other organizations of the role of SNV as a development actor in tourism for poverty reduction. Success was embodied in a few advisers, a tourism officer, a few projects, the first development results, an award, documentation, and commitments recorded in annual reports. However, SNV’s main donor agency – the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs – did not acknowledge the development of the tourism sector as being part of Dutch development aid (Bennett, Ashley & Roe, 1999).

3.3.3. Projects phasing out, countries phasing in (Phase 3: 2001–2004)

At the beginning of the 1990s, SNV was one of the first development organizations to start advising communities on developing tourism projects. Although at the time it was seen as an almost revolutionary step, it is now impossible to imagine sustainable tourism not being part of the work of SNV and many other development organizations. (Leijzer in SNV/Caalders & Cottrell, 2001)

In 2002, the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg and the Ecotourism Summit clearly illustrated the increased interest in tourism, development and poverty reduction. The concept of pro-poor tourism, as suggested by Bennett, Ashley and Roe (1999; see also Goodwin, 2008), had been endorsed. During the World Summit, the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) launched the Sustainable Tourism–Eliminating Poverty (ST–EP) initiative. The aim of the initiative was to use seven mechanisms to enhance the local economic impact of tourism and benefit the poor (UNWTO, 2004). This clearly reflected changes in the importance given to development approaches by the UNWTO. The focus in the international development discourse shifted to tourism and poverty reduction, and to a need for partnerships and an increasing emphasis on the role of the private sector.

In addition to ST–EP, other initiatives, documents (see e.g. Ashley et al., 2001; Roe & Urquhart, 2001) and websites supported the move towards an increasing focus
on the potential role of tourism in poverty reduction. Especially the documents on
the Pro-Poor Tourism Partnership website became very influential in the debate on
tourism and poverty reduction (see Goodwin, 2008), and gradually influenced the
development discourse within SNV.

However, the first years of the new century were characterized by an attempt to
consolidate the position of tourism within SNV (Leijzer, personal communication,
2007). Internal changes influenced the way that tourism related to poverty reduction
was conceptualized and materialized.

First, in 20002, after a process lasting several years, SNV became a fully independent
NGO, unleashed from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Apart from a
larger degree of independence of the ministry, this also implied that government
subsidies would be more dependent on the organization’s results and effectiveness
(Brinkman & Hoek, 2005). At the same time, SNV changed from an organization
involved in project implementation into an advisory services organization (SNV,
2000). SNV was transformed into an organization focussing on supplying ‘advisory
services’ to meso-level, governmental and non-governmental organizations in
developing countries, operating in a ‘demand-driven way’ and establishing ‘a stronger
knowledge function’ and a ‘stronger regional outreach’. In 2000, SNV defined its
mission as providing capacity building support to meso-level organizations and local
capacity builders with the aim of improving governance and reducing poverty (SNV,
2000, 2002). Technical assistance was replaced by notions of capacity development
and institutional development, government-to-government agreements and budget
support to enhance the national ownership of development processes, while societal
interaction with and consensus on effective development were encouraged by, for
example, poverty reduction planning processes (Ubels & van der Gronden, 2004).

This discursive change reflected a broader reorientation in the 1990s of the
‘development industry’, which switched from project implementation to larger scale
programmatic approaches. Underlying this change was a new view on the nature
of development, that is, development as an expansion of people’s capabilities or a
widening of their choices, as exemplified by, for instance, Sen’s Development as
Freedom (1999). Similarly, the World Bank’s report of 2000/2001 presented the
multidimensional nature of poverty and the importance of such factors as governance
and social institutions. This report clearly influenced the strategic choices of SNV
(Ubels & van der Gronden, 2004). It also changed the language in which tourism
was conceptualized: SNV programmes became ‘portfolios’, ‘implementers’ became
‘change facilitators’, and SNV advisers no longer worked only with community-
based organizations, but also with a wider group of ‘clients’, such as national governments, destination management organizations, knowledge and training institutes, and tourism business associations (SNV Asia, 2005).

Second, and related to the first, during these years, projects were phased out as they reached the end of their project cycles (e.g. the cultural tourism project in Tanzania), and tourism as a subsector was phased in, especially in several Asian countries. SNV’s decision to opt for three broad thematic areas (local governance, natural resource management and conservation, and private sector development) led to some countries viewing tourism as a part of natural resource management, and to others including tourism in private sector development (Allcock, 2003; SNV/Caalders & Cottrell, 2001). At the time, tourism was still referred to within SNV as ‘cultural tourism’, ‘ecotourism’, ‘community-based tourism’ or ‘tourism for rural poverty reduction’ (SNV Annual Reports 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003; SNV/Caalders & Cottrell, 2001). This shows that although the ‘pro-poor tourism’ development concept had already entered SNV (see Ashley et al., 2001; Hummel, 2002, 2004; Goodwin, 2005; Saville, 2001), the alternative/sustainable development approach was still prevalent within the organization.

Third, and most importantly, tourism became a ‘practice area’. Ever since the corporate plan of 1996, SNV had tried to focus its development efforts in a few themes or sectors. The broad themes needed to be narrowed down to more specific ones (SNV, 2000, p. 15). In 2003, two workshops identified ‘sustainable tourism’ as an SNV development sector. The SNV Annual Report 2004 states (p. 10):

> In the course of 2004, SNV has further defined its fields of work into practice areas. We moved from three large container themes to four corporate fields of expertise and four regional fields of expertise, with underlying products and services.

Tourism became one of these ‘corporate fields’. The ordering of ‘pro-poor sustainable tourism’ as an emerging practice area was supported by a number of documents: a background document on sustainable tourism within SNV (SNV/Caalders & Cottrell, 2001); an internal memorandum to include ‘Tourism: Pro-poor, Sustainable and Networked’ as part of SNV’s corporate identity (Nass, 2001); publications on tourism initiatives in Botswana (Rozemeijer, 2001) and Asia (Allcock, 2003); and a reference guide on sustainable tourism development. Some of these documents were referred to in UNWTO ST–EP publications of 2002 and 2004 (UNWTO, 2002, 2004). All these documents reflected the wish to enhance SNV’s role in knowledge development and brokering. The documents were shared and discussed with a wide
network of contacts in other development and conservation organizations. During the World Ecotourism Summit (2002), a meeting between SNV and the UNWTO laid the foundation for a memorandum of understanding. The memorandum was signed in 2004, demarcating the next phase.

The third phase had a strong focus on human development and capacity strengthening, combined with elements of a pragmatic pro-poor tourism development perspective. However, this perspective was not yet clearly embedded in SNV. Despite this, the role of SNV was increasingly recognized by other donor agencies in Asia through project linkages (e.g. the Mekong Tourism Development Project of the Asian Development Bank in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam; see Harrison & Schipani, 2007) and donor funding (e.g. in the DFID/UNDP/SNV Tourism for Rural Poverty Alleviation Programme). Moreover, within SNV the tourism practice area was considered a high achiever as it clearly contributed to the fulfilment of the ‘success’ criteria set by the Dutch subsidy agreement, expressed in terms of numbers of ‘clients’ and ‘advisory services’, in a ‘recognized role in the sector’, through ‘working in a regional context’ and by a ‘diversified funding base’ (Leijzer, 2005).

3.3.4. Tourism as a rapidly growing practice area (Phase 4: 2004–2007)

The fourth phase was characterized by a large increase in the number of tourism advisers within SNV. Pro-poor sustainable tourism as a practice area became firmly institutionalized within SNV. When tourism was selected as a corporate practice area, other SNV countries eagerly studied the possibility of including tourism in their country’s portfolios. The number of tourism advisers jumped from around 10 working in six countries in 2000, to over 40 advisers in around 26 countries at the end of 2005. This process of institutionalization was supported by three developments: the incorporation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and, closely related to this, an increased and more explicit focus on development impacts in SNV’s work; the partnership with the UNWTO; and SNV’s focus on the concept of ‘pro-poor tourism’ and the consequences of pro-poor tourism as an intervention strategy.

First, the MDGs were integrated as the leading framework in SNV’s work. With the adoption of the Millennium Declaration and the MDGs in 2000, and the reaffirmation of the declaration and the goals during the UN World Summit in 2005, the focus of capacity development in development organizations began to shift. The introduction of the MDGs as a point of reference resulted in a stronger focus on impacts. It reinforced a result-oriented approach to development, one that looked beyond input–output relationships to the assessment of the impact of interventions (Yocarini, 2007). Only in 2004 and beyond was impact measurement taken up (see

  Capacity development services are more effective in contributing to poverty reduction and the promotion of good governance if they are context sensitive, evidence based, offered to (groups of) clients that have the potential to make a difference to the lives of poor people, and are explicitly focused on impact. (SNV, 2007, p. 12)

As a consequence, the MDGs were included in the tourism sector strategies (see e.g. SNV Asia, 2005) and impact assessments were included in tourism case-studies (Yocarini, 2007). However, a framework for impact measurement within SNV was developed only in 2007, and measuring impact was still not part of SNV’s overall annual reporting.

Second, the international significance of the role of SNV in the tourism development debate increased, as illustrated by, for instance, the signing in 2004 of a memorandum of understanding between the UNWTO and SNV (SNV, 2006). This memorandum reflected the pressure from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs to establish partnerships, which in turn reflected the outcomes of the World Summit on Sustainable Development and the increasing influence of the MDGs. In the period 2005–2007, SNV contributed substantially to the financing of advisory services and technical assistance (UNWTO, 2005). Closer collaboration with the Overseas Development Institute, the Asian Development Bank, the Pacific Asia Travel Association (PATA) and other international organizations reflected SNV’s shift from an inward to a more outward looking attitude.

Third, the pro-poor tourism development debate strongly influenced SNV. In the previous phase, SNV’s work already had direct relations with the pro-poor tourism initiative (Ashley et al., 2001; Goodwin, 2005; Saville, 2001), and in 2001 the term ‘pro-poor sustainable tourism’ (PPST) was mentioned for the first time in the SNV background paper (SNV/Caalders & Cottrell, 2001). However, the importance of the concept increased significantly as a result of the evaluation of the PPST subsector in Asia by Goodwin, Ashley and Roe from the Pro-Poor Tourism Partnership at the end 2005 and beginning of 2006. The evaluation concluded that SNV had a clear and specific advisory role in tourism development for poverty reduction, but asserted that the organization needed to focus more on poverty impact and ways to better measure this impact (Goodwin, 2006a, 2008).

The work by the Overseas Development Institute and Ashley in Africa (Ashley 2006c; SNV ESA, 2007) and Asia (Ashley 2006b) at around the same time, showed the importance of out-of-pocket expenditure (see also Ashley’s later work for SNV
Rwanda in 2007, and that by Mitchell, Keane and Laidlaw in Tanzania in 2009), of supply chains in tourism destinations (see especially Ashley, 2006b), and of policy approaches to boosting pro-poor impact, in particular good destination development and management. Through such studies and cases, not only the concept of pro-poor tourism, but also the attempt to measure success in terms of impacts on ‘the poor’ began to guide the work of SNV tourism advisers.

3.3.5. Impacts through partnerships (Phase 5: 2007–2010)

SNV can look back on an important year in which it concluded its 2002–2006 subsidy agreement underlining the importance of building capacity in developing countries. In 2006 we achieved concrete gains in developing human capacities within institutional settings. We also succeeded in jump-starting our programme for the next decade. (SNV Annual Report, 2006)

In 2006 and 2007, SNV again went through a process of internal change, which also defined the role of tourism within SNV. An extensive process of discussions and negotiations involving a wide range of SNV advisers and managers, clients, partners and development experts resulted in a new corporate strategy: ‘Local impact, Global presence’ (SNV, 2007). Based on this strategy, the Dutch government awarded the organization a second subsidy agreement for nine years (2007–2015). Compared to the previous phase, the emphasis in this agreement clearly shifted to impact measurement and partnerships. The work of SNV tourism advisers increasingly reflected the post-WSSD focus on partnerships, the private sector, value chains and ‘inclusive business’. In its advisory work, SNV emphasized the socioeconomic impacts of tourism and result measurement through a value chain approach. As Laumans (personal communication, 2008) explained for SNV East and Southern Africa (but also reflecting SNV’s work in other regions):

The focus has to be on mainstream tourism, not on community-based tourism. By mainstream tourism we mean that tourism development should be considered an inclusive business, in which the poor will benefit from investments from the private sector. Governments will have to play their role to assure that the poor are not forgotten. This will include, for instance, a legislative environment that favours PPT development. And there is also still a huge amount of work to do in terms of changing the mind-set of the public and the private sector towards a pro-poor development in tourism.

Although not explicitly mentioned in the SNV strategy 2007–2015, in the period 2007–2009, sustainable tourism was chosen as a development subsector in four of the
five SNV regions. The aim was to create an impact in terms of ‘production, income and employment’. In 2009, all regions included tourism for poverty reduction as a development sector for the period 2010–2012.

In 2008, SNV signed a second memorandum of understanding with the UNWTO and the ST–EP Foundation covering a further three-year period. SNV aimed to support 21 programmes in Latin America, Africa, the Balkans and Asia. All programmes explicitly addressed the expected contribution to impact measurement, policy and strategy formulation, and knowledge development and management. By renewing its partnership with the UNWTO and intensifying processes of sharing and learning between tourism advisers and clients in SNV countries and regions, SNV aimed to strengthen its clients’ ability to enhance the local socioeconomic impact from tourism, through services in sustainable destination development and management, business development services, policy and strategy development, and the development of market linkages (SNV Asia, 2008). SNV thus adhered to the emerging development agenda, which is ‘more one of investments and business models than of subsidies and philanthropy’ (van Tulder & Fortanier, 2009, p. 211).

In this period, SNV tourism advisers also tried to address the increasing pressure to measure and quantify tangible results in terms of poverty alleviation. To do so, SNV worked closely with the Overseas Development Institute and Action for Enterprise, which conducted several of SNV’s studies on pro-poor value chain analysis. Although this emphasis on value chain analysis has been welcomed as a step towards understanding tourism’s diverse poverty reducing impacts (Meyer, 2011), it has faced (and still faces) important methodological and conceptual problems (see also van de Mosselaer & van der Duim, 2012). Evidence has not been fully convincing or consistent due to the diversity of the methods used, the ambiguous ways of defining poverty and its indicators, and the problem of attribution (for an overview, see Mitchell & Ashley, 2010). It showed that attributing observed changes to any particular cause – such as a development intervention by SNV (or any other development organization) – is fraught with difficulties. It also showed that the tourism value chain will be affected by the practices of many stakeholders and events, literally all round the world, which obviously creates important obstacles to producing evidence on pro-poor tourism impacts (for a full discussion, see Ashley & Mitchell, 2008).

In addition to value chain analysis, and as part of the strategy changes in 2007, SNV developed a ‘Managing for Results’ policy framework to explicitly measure SNV’s development impact. The attention shifted to emphasizing ‘what is to be achieved
instead of what is to be done’. Managing for Results implied that ‘SNV management asks the right questions and promotes result orientation throughout the organization; and result orientation becomes part of SNV culture’ (SNV, 2007b, p. 3). In the same year, SNV Asia requested the Overseas Development Institute (Ashley & Mitchell, 2007) to support the organization with an input paper for the SNV/IFC conference on ‘Measuring and Enhancing Impact through Pro-Poor Interventions in Tourism Value Chains’, which was held in Cambodia in December 2007 (Ashley & Mitchell, 2008). Discussions resulted in the further development of the pro-poor tourism value chain approach (Mitchell & Ashley, 2009), but also revealed the difficulties in finding indicators to identify the poverty reduction impact of tourism.

3.3.6. Phasing out tourism for poverty reduction (Phase 6: 2011 and beyond)

Although SNV shifted its tourism development approaches, it had still not managed to demonstrate its development impact in a convincing manner within the organization (see also Chapter 6). The tourism development programmes had not yet resulted in clearly presented net benefits for poorer households in SNV countries (see also Goodwin, 2008). SNV’s way of measuring development impact had changed from counting the numbers of beneficiaries in community-based tourism projects, via more general outcome indicators based on capacity building (improved capacity of ‘clients’), to an alignment with the Donor Committee for Enterprise Development (DCED) standards. These standards are a common approach to impact measurement, with eight control points and corresponding compliance criteria, using three ‘universal impact indicators’ across programmes: scale (number of target enterprises that realize a financial benefit), net additional income created and net number of additional jobs created (DCED, 2009, p. 3). As a result, SNV identified beneficiaries in terms of numbers of jobs and increases in the income of the poor. Although crucial for justifying development interventions, it also became clear that assessing these impacts required a considerable investment in terms of both time and financial resources. Additionally, it was not always in the interest of advisers and managers to be accountable for their development impacts (see also Chapters 4 and 6).

In early 2011, however, even before development impacts could be presented, SNV decided to focus on those sectors that had a high probability and visibility of impacts as well as a clear alignment with donor agency priorities. Tourism was not among them.

In the spring of 2010, the SNV management initiated a 2015+ trajectory to prepare the organization for its continuation beyond 2015, the year the second subsidy agreement would end. The organization felt that several external and internal drivers
were forcing the organization to study its future (Elsen, 2010). SNV’s CEO (ibid.) stated that the SNV management was experiencing an unfavourable political climate, and that there was a growing demand for more focus and demonstrable results, more emphasis on global themes (energy, water, climate, finance) and less dependence on aid, as was for instance also expressed in the influential Dutch Scientific Council for Policy document ‘Less pretension, more ambition: Development in times of globalization’ (Van Lieshout et al., 2010). The organization received clear signals from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the subsidy agreement would not necessarily be renewed. SNV felt that reducing the number of development sectors would boost quality and results (ibid.).

A SNV 2015+ project team was established to study the feasibility of reducing the number of development sectors to three. Consultants were hired to screen the SNV’s seven development sectors on three criteria, namely potential development impact, fundability (by donor agencies), and available expertise in the SNV organization. Three initial ‘leading’ development sectors were identified: agriculture, renewable energy, and water and sanitation. Education, health, forestry and tourism were considered ‘non-leading’ development sectors. To further this initial screening, in October 2010 a workshop with senior managers and advisers from all SNV regions, the 2015+ project team, consultants and head office staff, focused on screening sectors and approaches more thoroughly.

The workshop group found that tourism was implemented in all five regions, but only in ‘more or less 15 countries’. The group observed that ‘SNV had not succeeded to develop a solid corporate practice across the regions, which prohibits potential for replication and scaling up of (corporate) approaches’, and that due ‘to impact concerns, this sector has a generally lower donor priority with major bilateral and multilateral donors’ (SNV, 2010, p. 20).

In 2010, the regional network leader of SNV West and Central Africa already felt that tourism as a sector might be under threat. She indicated that it was difficult for the tourism practice to generate resources for tourism initiatives. The tourism network leader in the Balkans had a similar story. However, that year, funding was secured from the EU for projects in seven African and Asian countries on tourism and vocational training, and from the UK Department of International Development for the Great Himalaya Trail in Nepal.

The ‘Global Workshop 2015+’ group was uncertain about tourism as a development sector. After assessing the sector, it observed that tourism had moved from ‘small-scale community development tourism to larger scale mainstream tourism
destinations’ (SNV, 2010, p. 20), but that the scale and impact of the practice was still questioned. It had not yet shown impact convincingly. The group saw two ways forward: either phase out or scale-up (and invest and further sharpen the corporate approaches – multi-stakeholder approaches and larger private sector engagement; replicate the approaches across regions with mainstream partners and funders). It was even proposed that before ‘taking a decision to phase out or not, it is suggested to compare our outcomes in the tourism sector with our outcomes in other sectors’ (ibid., p. 8). However, this comparison was never conducted.

Finally, after a process of calculating and judging potential development impact, possible funding opportunities, and existing expertise in SNV in the sector, the group of managers and advisers confirmed that agriculture, renewable energy, and water and sanitation were the ‘leading’ development sectors. Tourism was ranked ‘non-leading’. The reasons given by interviewees varied: tourism had not shown enough development results, the sector had not generated sufficient funds, and the sector was too small regarding the number of advisers and the number of countries it was involved in.

In the various SNV regions, it was not yet clear to managers and advisers what the meaning and significance would be of ‘leading’ and ‘non-leading’ sectors within the organization. For instance, within the management of SNV Asia, the feeling was that there would be space for regions to include ‘non-leading’ sectors in their portfolio, so that in one form or another, tourism could still be a development practice. As communicated by SNV’s CEO (Elsen, 2010) in December, however, this was not the case.

Due to a new coalition government in the Netherlands – and also fuelled by the national and international debates on the future of development cooperation, as reflected in the report of the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (van Lieshout, Went & Kremer, 2010) – in the autumn of 2010, Dutch development organizations were confronted with serious budget cuts by this new government (see Schulpen, 2010). As a consequence, they had to ‘refocus’ their development involvement, ‘rethink’ their way of working and ‘reorganize’. And it had to be done quickly. In an internal letter to the staff of SNV dated 22 December 2010, the SNV director wrote:
The breakneck speed at which budget cut decisions were taken by [the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] and the expectation that they will be implemented already as of 2011 are frustrating as they have left no time for broader consultation and have put enormous pressure on us to accelerate the pace of change, whether we like it or not. (Elsen, 2010, p. 1)

In early 2011, SNV decided not to cut the budget for all sectors and activities, but to withdraw from ‘non-leading’ sectors altogether. For SNV, this meant the end of a period in which it had been rather influential nationally and internationally in conceptualizing and implementing the relation between tourism and development.

3.4. Conclusions

In this chapter, I presented a particular and arguable reconstruction of the ways in which SNV and its associates ordered tourism in their development practices between 1993 and 2013. I showed how the organization reluctantly started with a small number of tourism projects and advisers in a few countries in the 1990s, and grew into a global player with 60 tourism advisers in 25 countries, especially after identifying ‘pro-poor sustainable tourism’ as an ‘emerging practice area’ in the organization in 2004. During these 20 years, SNV’s tourism advisers put into circulation a number of concepts and tools (e.g. ‘local participation’, ‘community-based tourism’, ‘pro-poor sustainable tourism’, ‘inclusive business’, ‘multi-stakeholder approaches’ and ‘value chain analysis and development’), which were influenced by ever-shifting development paradigms and debates within and outside the Netherlands.

These debates were reflected in the subsidy agreements that SNV had to negotiate from time to time with the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Changes in development discourses and policies were translated into SNV’s objectives and practices, the way success was measured and, subsequently, the way tourism was first disallowed, then accepted and eventually phased out as a development practice. SNV could get involved in tourism only when the development paradigm shifted from the critical and neoliberal development paradigms of the 1970s and 1980s, to the alternative/sustainable development paradigm of the 1990s.

In turn, SNV’s work on tourism increasingly influenced the international discussion on the relation between tourism and poverty reduction (see e.g. Mitchell & Ashley, 2007, 2009, 2010). Mobilizing metaphors – such as ‘pro-poor sustainable tourism’, ‘multi-stakeholder approaches’ and ‘value chain analysis and development’ – allowed SNV and its associates to enrol and mobilize various interests and actors, and to obtain further funding and support. The resulting and the related material orderings
– which included subsidy agreements, internal and external documents, toolboxes, websites, partnerships with organizations and, of course, ‘clients’ (intermediary organizations, local, regional/national governmental bodies, and the ‘poor’) – were sustained by and in turn supported the processes of conceptual ordering.

In the spring of 2010, SNV started a process to decide which three development sectors had shown most development impacts and were well aligned with donor priorities, for the period after 2015, when the second subsidy agreement would finish. At the end of 2010, Dutch development organizations were confronted with severe budget cuts by the Dutch government. To stretch its budget, SNV decided to prioritize the three development sectors it had initially selected (agriculture, water and sanitation, and renewable energy) and to phase out the other sectors, including tourism. By early 2011, SNV had started to phase out tourism.

This history in six phases should not be seen as an account of eras in which coherent ideas and practices shaped the realities on the ground. Through efforts to create particular, fractional and fragile conceptual and material orderings, SNV attempted to stabilize chaotic practices and to validate and fit together its ideas and practices for various publics (donor managers, politicians, professionals, scientists, colleagues in other countries, civil servants, clients, etc.). Although these ideas were sometimes ignored or resisted by some people, others ‘consumed’ or tactically used them. The workings of SNV implied not only putting concepts and tools into practice, but also – and even more importantly – transforming these concepts and tools into the different logic of the intentions, goals and ambitions of the many people and institutions they had brought together (or the people and organizations they had failed to link together in their networks).

This obviously leads to the question whether SNV’s 20-year involvement in tourism was successful. This is analysed further in Chapter 6, in which the way development successes were measurement and presented are analysed. However, I first illustrate how the changing development approaches of tourism for poverty reduction worked out in three countries in Asia (Chapter 4), and analyse the changed modes of internal organization of SNV and its relation and consequences to the tourism development practices in the organization (Chapter 5).
Chapter 4

Evolution of tourism development approaches in SNV Asia

This chapter is based on:

4.1. Introduction

In this chapter I analyse the tourism programmes of SNV Netherlands Development Organisation in Laos, Bhutan and Vietnam, in order to illustrate how the concepts and approaches in tourism for poverty reduction changed over time in SNV Asia, influenced by development debates and practices in SNV Netherlands Development Organisation and vice versa. This chapter therefore contributes to answering research question 3.

4.2. SNV and tourism development approaches in Asia in the last decade

SNV’s involvement in tourism in Asia started in the second half of the 1990s. An identification mission was undertaken in Nepal in 1997. It resulted in small tourism-development components in larger integrated rural development projects, and local multi-stakeholder capacity strengthening programmes, like the District Partners Programme in West Nepal. The approach was based on a regional tourism planning and development approach, focusing on substitution with local products and services (Goodwin, 2008; Hummel, 1999a,b, 2002, 2004; SNV Nepal, BDB & BBA, 2000; UNWTO, 2002). The impact of the initiative was retrospectively analysed using a sustainable livelihoods approach (Saville, 2001; Goodwin, 2008).

The new corporate strategy that SNV adopted in 2000 focused on capacity strengthening rather than project implementation, and it changed SNV’s tourism practice in Nepal. The Tourism for Rural Poverty Alleviation Programme (TRPAP) was developed as a multi-stakeholder subsector pro-poor tourism programme implemented at the national level and in six destinations in the country. SNV in Laos and Vietnam started tourism development activities at this time (Allcock, 2003; SNV Nepal et al., 2000), followed by tourism interventions in Bhutan (2002) and Cambodia (2004), resulting in tourism ‘practice areas’ in five of SNV Asia’s country programmes. The emphasis was shifted to explicit development impact only in the mid-2000s (SNV, 2007a,b,c). Table 4.1. below summarizes the main changes between the phases at the level of approaches, tourism initiatives in these countries, stakeholders involved, and the number of advisers working for SNV at the time.

In Nepal and Bhutan, tourism was included in the Private Sector Development portfolio, while community-based tourism programmes in Laos and Vietnam (and later Cambodia) were part of SNV’s Natural Resource Management portfolio. An enabling policy environment was supported with sustainable tourism policies and laws in Vietnam and Bhutan, a pro-poor tourism policy in Nepal as part of
the Tourism for Rural Poverty Alleviation Programme, and ecotourism strategies in Laos and Cambodia. These focused on poverty reduction, or on environmental and social sustainability. SNV switched to facilitating and strengthening multi-stakeholder initiatives and policy frameworks.

The external SNV Asia pro-poor sustainable tourism practice area evaluation (Goodwin, 2006a) recommended a closer collaboration with the private sector. With the exception of Nepal, the private sector had only recently emerged in the countries where SNV was working. Thus, since 2006 tourism initiatives in Asia included value chain analyses and subsequent programme designs (e.g. Luang Prabang in Laos, Nabji and Paro in Bhutan, Sapa in Vietnam, and the Great Himalaya Trail in Nepal), multi-stakeholder destination development programmes (Mekong Discovery Trail in Cambodia, Great Himalaya Trail in Nepal, Northern Heritage Trail in Laos, Haa in Bhutan) and Responsible Business in Tourism programmes (Marketing Assistance for Sustainable Tourism Products in Nepal, and the Responsible Tourism Club in Vietnam) to reach out and engage with tourism enterprises.

Table 4.1 shows how in Asia SNV moved from a phase with a strong focus on community and poverty reduction, but a limited scale and impact, to a phase where both community-based tourism and more explicit tourism for poverty reduction programmes, like the Tourism for Rural Poverty Alleviation Programme, existed side by side. The different focus of approaches and scale in the countries also shows that the pro-poor tourism approach and poverty reduction potential remained somewhat undefined. In the mid-2000s, a stronger focus on development impact at scale and a growing market-orientation emerged.

As shown in Table 4.1, in Asia tourism as development practice developed slightly differently compared to the six phases presented in Chapter 3. In Asia, tourism for poverty reduction was introduced in Nepal in the last years of the 1990s, and in Laos and Vietnam only around the turn of the century. It started in 1996 with a question from SNV Philippines to other SNV Asia countries, whether SNV should be engaged in tourism for poverty reduction, and whether it would not be ‘a mission impossible’. As the only country in the Balkans, SNV Albania was included in the Asian region of SNV. Albania was the only country involved in tourism development. SNV Albania therefore wrote a document describing the project in Albania, and answering the question of SNV Philippines (Hummel, 1996a). The report motivated SNV Nepal to invite the tourism adviser from SNV Albania to explore possibilities in Nepal. In Asia, tourism was only initiated in phase 2 (see Chapter 3). It also meant that tourism was introduced during the transition from projects to capacity development.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases of Chapter 3</th>
<th>Until and including 2000 From projects to capacity development</th>
<th>2001-2006 Focus on advisory practice</th>
<th>2006-2010 Focus on impact</th>
<th>2011 and beyond Capacity development for impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SNV approach</strong></td>
<td>Own implemented integrated rural development projects Focus on capacity strengthening, target groups, and empowerment</td>
<td>Focus on advisory practice/capacity development Introduction of pro-poor tourism and MDGs Focus on both private sector development (PSD) and natural resource management (NRM)</td>
<td>In 2004, SNV selects pro-poor sustainable tourism as emerging ‘practice area’ Continued focus on advisory practice/capacity development More focus on private sector development</td>
<td>Focus on development impact, involvement of private sector, capacity development More focus on pro-poor tourism impact Focus on multi-stakeholder value chain analysis and development (VC&amp;D); destination development; responsible business in tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tourism Initiatives</strong></td>
<td>Tourism as a component of integrated development project/ integrated rural development project (District Partners Programme)</td>
<td>Focus on community-based tourism in Laos, Vietnam, as part of NRM (e.g. Sapa in Vietnam; and Luang Prabang in Laos) Tourism included in PSD in Nepal and Bhutan (cf. Tourism for Rural Poverty Alleviation Programme in Nepal) Sustainable policy and law in Vietnam and Bhutan (focus on responsible and pro-poor tourism), and pro-poor tourism policy in Nepal; ecotourism strategies in Laos and Cambodia</td>
<td>VCA&amp;D programme designs (Luang Prabang, Bhutan, Sapa) Multi-stakeholder destination development (Mekong Discovery Trail, Great Himalaya Trail) Responsible business in tourism</td>
<td>Great Himalaya Trail Development project in Nepal; high impact tourism training (in Nepal, Cambodia, Vietnam and four countries in Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stakeholders</strong></td>
<td>Strong focus on local and national governments For funding and knowledge sharing focus on Netherlands</td>
<td>Focus on meso-level Wider range of local stakeholders Wide international development partners network</td>
<td>Focus on meso-level Wide range of local, national and international partners; Partnership with UNWTO starts in 2004</td>
<td>Focus on micro–macro divide. Stronger focus on private sector partners. International development partners network. Continued partnership with UNWTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Advisers</strong></td>
<td>One adviser in 1999 (in Nepal), four advisers by end of 2000 (Nepal, Vietnam, Laos)</td>
<td>Growth in number of advisers (especially in Laos) and countries (Bhutan, Cambodia)</td>
<td>Almost 30 advisers in 2005 and 2006 (of whom 10 in Laos)</td>
<td>Gradual reduction of number of tourism advisers to around 20 (on average 4 advisers per country) in 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author
This means that the initial involvement of SNV was part of projects or project components, but that development debates about multi-stakeholder sector-wide development approaches would also enter the tourism development practice network.

While in other SNV regions projects were phased out (Albania, Botswana and Tanzania; see also Chapter 3), in the first years of the 21st century SNV in Asia built up its development practice in Nepal, Laos and Vietnam, followed by practices in Bhutan and Cambodia. When SNV selected tourism as a practice area in the organization, the practice area had already become established in Asia. After the radical conceptual and organizational changes in SNV around 2000, the tourism practice area in Asia transformed gradually between 2001 and 2006.

In this period in Asia, tourism steadily developed as an ‘advisory practice’, comprising phases 3 and 4 of Chapter 3. After the SNV Asia pro-poor sustainable tourism practice evaluation in 2005/2006, the focus on development impact was introduced in Asia faster than in other SNV regions. Tourism for poverty reduction as a development sector was phased out in early 2011 in all SNV regions, more or less at the same time, except for two already committed projects (see Table 4.1).

4.3. Case Studies: the evolution of tourism development approaches in Laos, Bhutan and Vietnam

To illustrate the evolution of SNV’s approaches in the last decade, I now discuss the tourism development approaches of three Asian countries. There was a change from a project approach to an emphasis on capacity development in organizations before the PPST Asia evaluation. After the evaluation, through an emphasis on private sector development and development impact, a focus on a market-based value chain analysis and development (VCA&D) approach in destinations emerged.

4.3.1. Laos – from communities at provincial level to VCA&D in destinations

SNV began working in Laos in 1999 and tourism programmes commenced a year later. The initial focus was on supporting provincial and national needs, and advisers were placed in several provincial tourism offices. In Luang Namtha Province, an adviser supported the Laos National Tourism Authority/UNESCO Nam Ha Ecotourism Project, a seminal initiative in northern Laos that later informed the Asian Development Bank-funded Mekong Tourism Development Project, in which SNV would also be involved (Gujadhur, Rattanavong & Panyanouvong, 2008). In other provinces, SNV advisers supported the development of tourism products and
services that involved rural communities in and around protected areas. Activities included tourism information gathering, development of treks, establishing guides units, village-level awareness raising and training, and capacity building of provincial tourism offices.

Much of SNV’s advisory work was determined by the low level of capacity of the provincial tourism offices and the nascent state of tourism in all provinces except Luang Prabang. Advisers worked with provincial tourism office staff, providing training and implementing activities at the district and village level, and this would continue with the commencement of the Mekong Tourism Development Project in 2003. In this project, SNV had an unofficial but key role as capacity-builder of the provincial tourism offices responsible for carrying out activities in three of the five target provinces (Harrison & Schipani, 2007, 2009). The Mekong Tourism Development Project and its particular formula for community-based tourism development helped to brand Laos as an ecotourism and trekking destination, and dominated the approach to tourism taken by the government and development agencies like SNV for much of the decade.

In 2003, at the request of the Science Technology and Environment Agency and UNDP, SNV also began work on the design and implementation of a national Ecotourism Strategy and Action Plan, and signed an agreement with the National University of Laos to develop an ecotourism course. This solidified SNV’s two-tiered approach with national-level policy interventions and provincial-level interventions to support implementation, and SNV’s commitment to ecotourism and community-based tourism.

In 2005, there was a slight shift in SNV’s approach, with a stronger focus on organizational strengthening. Provincial tourism offices were evaluated on their overall capabilities, leading advisers to broader interventions such as job description development, leadership trainings, team-building and strategic planning. This was due to the recognition of the importance of strong organizations and governance for effective and sustainable development. These actions supplemented direct tourism activities instead of replacing them, but certainly generalized SNV’s impacts on tourism and poverty.

In response to the SNV Asia pro-poor tourism practice area evaluation, SNV diversified its client base to include the private sector, recognizing that the government tourism departments were often not the primary agents for local economic development. Partnerships between tourism companies and government offices and development agencies were developed; the Fair Trek brand in Luang Prabang is an
example of such partnerships. Further, to maximize impact with higher numbers of poor and marginalized target groups, SNV began employing a value chain approach as a basic starting point, rather than focusing only on community-based tourism product development in rural areas. The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) was commissioned to perform a value chain analysis of Luang Prabang in 2006 (Ashley, 2006b; Ashley & Mitchell, 2007, 2008). Due to SNV’s focus on product development and the Lao government’s focus on community-based ecotourism, the vast majority of interventions had been focused on the rural areas outside of town. To gain a more comprehensive understanding of the tourism economy in Luang Prabang, the role of the poor and new opportunities to increase income and employment for the poor, a ‘rapid’ value chain analysis was carried out over two weeks (Ashley, 2006b).

This value chain analysis focused on four sub-chains of the overall tourism value chain: accommodation, food and beverages, handicrafts, and excursions. Although the analysis was abbreviated and based largely on approximations and rough sampling, the results were revealing. It was estimated that each year at least US$6 million of tourist expenditure was flowing directly to the poor (for this study, defined as semi-skilled and unskilled people), representing approximately 27% of the total receipts in Luang Prabang. This is a relative large percentage for a tourist destination (Ashley & Mitchell, 2008; Mitchell & Ashley, 2007, 2009).

The food and beverages sub-chain was the largest source of earnings for the poor, with a large percentage of tourist expenditure on food accruing to semi-skilled and unskilled people (45% or US$3 million). This was followed by handicrafts, with US$1.8 million (about 40% of souvenir spending) going to local poor. For both sub-chains, revenues were flowing both to producers within Luang Prabang province and to suppliers in other parts of Laos. In comparison, excursions (such as community-based tourism treks) and accommodation generated much lower incomes for the poor.

This would seem to indicate that SNV’s interventions had been misdirected, as so much had been dedicated to rural tourism product development. However, the value chain analysis also indicated that excursions had a relatively high potential to improve the earnings of the poor. The food chain involved a great number of poor people, but to introduce new crops, improve quality and adjust supply arrangements would be a large and complicated undertaking across many different provinces. In comparison, it seemed more realistic to improve handicraft product designs and quality, or support small upgrades of out-of-town tourism excursions to encourage tourists to spend more in poor rural communities.
The recommendations resulting from the analysis were still being implemented in 2010, when the decision was taken to phase out of tourism by 2011. Although the value chain analysis in Laos was informative on what could be done to improve the participation of the poor in specific tourism value chains, where and how to intervene was more challenging, and the value chain analysis lacked a clear development intervention logic. More was needed to implement a value chain analysis and development approach as an intervention, rather than just a diagnostic tool. Intervention logics were included in the value chain development analysis and development approaches as introduced in the cases of Bhutan and Vietnam, below. In both approaches the private sector was included from the start as an implementing development partner.

4.3.2. Bhutan - from community tourism to multi-stakeholder partnerships

Between 2002 and 2011, SNV supported the Royal Government of Bhutan with tourism for development based on a direct request from the Tourism Council of Bhutan (TCB; formerly known as the Department of Tourism). The TCB requested SNV’s assistance because of its expertise in sustainable and community tourism development in the Himalayas and its long involvement in integrated rural development programmes in Bhutan. SNV helped Bhutan to maximize the contribution of tourism – the single largest earner of foreign exchange – to employment generation and poverty reduction, in line with its national development objectives. In 2002 and the first half of 2003, short-term consultancies were offered, one to provide further insight into Bhutan’s unique tariff system and its implications for the seasonality of tourism, and one on market demand.

SNV also supported the organization of a national stakeholder workshop that opened a dialogue between the private sector and the government to address seasonality and tourism product diversification. Based on the outcome of the workshop, the TCB, the Nature Conservation Division and the Association of Bhutanese Tour Operators decided to explore possibilities for community tourism and initiate a pilot project (Hummel & Ritsma, 2005, 2006; Ritsma, Hummel & Gyeltshen, 2010).

In 2003 SNV signed an agreement with the Tourism Council of Bhutan, focussing advisory services on tourism product development, organizational and institutional development, data management and research capacity strengthening of the TCB, and advisory support to the private sector through the Association of Bhutanese Tour Operators. The TCB set up a research cell to collect and share information about tourism resources, tourist arrivals, and tourist demands, informing policymakers and private sector stakeholders. The organization was also supported with the participatory
development of the country’s sustainable tourism legislation framework, based on SNV’s experiences in Vietnam (Hummel & Ritsma, 2006).

A feasibility study for community tourism in the most promising areas was conducted. Two trails – selected by the tourism industry in Bhutan – were considered attractive to tourists, and could contribute to the redistribution of socioeconomic benefits and to nature and culture conservation. In the end, one of them – the Nabji trail – was identified by the private sector for further development. A multi-stakeholder partnership was developed. With the Association of Bhutanese Tour Operators in the lead, a detailed proposal was drafted and submitted to UNDP’s Global Environment Facility for funding.

By introducing tourism as an alternative income generating activity to the community, the project envisioned an increased awareness on the value of conservation and the introduction of more environmental friendly practices. Being accessible during the winter months, the trail also supported the extension of the tourism season and tourists’ length of stay. This could generate income for tour operators as well as extra revenue for the government through its special tax system. The development of the six-day trekking trail started in 2005; it was officially opened in the winter of 2006/2007.

A value chain analysis of the Nabji trail was initiated to reconcile objectives related to income generation with environmental and social objectives in impact monitoring. On the basis of a baseline study before the implementation of the project, the TCB monitored the pilot by carrying out annual household surveys in the region (DoT, 2007). Three of the TCB’s impact studies collected information about the local communities’ income generation from tourism and their perceived environmental and sociocultural benefits. The studies took into account tour operators’ and tourists’ perceptions of the tourism experience to provide the project managers with recommendations to improve the products and services for maximum community benefit.

An analysis of three impact assessments (Dorji, 2010) shows a clear rise in income, with over US$100 per household generated directly from tourism during the first four years of operation (excluding indirect income from sales of handicrafts, agricultural products, donations, etc.). With a relatively limited impact in terms of poor people (approximately 210 households; 1,600 people) and market (300 visitors in four years), the initiative could easily be questioned. However, with a project cost of US$115,000 and earnings of US$413,000 (including government revenue of US$149,000) in the first four years, the return on investment justified the initiative.
The external SNV Asia pro-poor tourism practice area evaluation confirmed that
SNV Bhutan was on the right track by involving the private sector in tourism product
development (Goodwin, 2006a). The TCB remained the main client for SNV
Bhutan’s technical assistance to the tourism industry (following RGOB regulations)
but allowed for direct engagement with the private sector. This resulted in private
sector-driven product development and extended organizational strengthening
support to the various tourism business associations. It also introduced sustainability
issues to the tourism industry collectively’.

However, rural enterprise development in the Nabji area has not been significant.
One reason is Bhutan’s tourism industry’s structure, with the dominating role of
the national tour operator in organizing all-inclusive travel packages. The Nabji
programme has not been able to address this issue effectively. The government still
controls development within protected areas and combined with the small number
of visitors to the area, might not have provided an ideal business environment. The
question remains whether investments at other tourism sites might have generated
more development impact and benefit more people. Dorji (2010) proposes replicating
the model in other areas of Bhutan, but only based on leadership and investment
by the private sector, and clear distribution mechanisms for local benefits. This
investment by the private sector is included in the approach developed in Vietnam.

4.3.3. Vietnam – from community-based tourism products to value chain and
multi-province circuit development

In 2000, SNV started its tourism activities in Vietnam together with the World
Conservation Union (IUCN) in Sapa district (SNV Nepal et al., 2000). A joint
community-based tourism programme was initiated along two short trekking routes
just outside Sapa town. In addition, a tourism visitor centre was developed. Based on
these experiences, SNV launched a similar programme in Hue province (Hainsworth,
2008). The support focused on product development involving local communities
and the capacity strengthening of local tourism authorities.

Three years later, SNV Vietnam linked up with the Asian Development Bank’s
Mekong Tourism Development Project. SNV supported the project’s pro-poor
tourism and public–private partnership components by proving advisory services. It
also supported site-specific agro tourism and multi-province circuit development in
the northwest of the country.
In a joint initiative with the UNWTO, SNV assisted the Vietnam tourism authority with a participatory process to draft a tourism law. Within the same UNWTO Sustainable Tourism–Eliminating Poverty framework, handicraft villages in Ha Tay province were developed.

Following the SNV Asia pro-poor tourism practice area evaluation, in 2007 SNV Vietnam developed a three-year tourism strategy, which focused activities on private sector support in value chains (Majerus, Pham Ngoc, Do Nguyen, Garrido Rubio & Cao Dai, 2008). A pro-poor tourism value chain programme design was conducted in spring 2008 in Sapa. It followed a market-based solutions approach developed by Action for Enterprise (ibid.). This involves steps and tools that combine the strengths of the value chain analysis with methods to identify commercially viable market solutions that promote micro, small and medium enterprises and industry competitiveness. The study and programme design exercise was to determine appropriate sustainable interventions to contribute to long-term solutions to poverty reduction through tourism value chain development.

A process was followed to select those sub-chains with the most potential for SNV to promote market growth and benefit large numbers of low-income groups in Sapa district. The two sub-chains selected were excursions (village visits) and embroidery handicrafts. These sub-chains were mapped and analysed, and an assessment was made of market-based solutions that address bottlenecks. In addition, focus group discussions and additional interviews were held with market actors to identify potential interventions. Finally, an intervention plan was developed for the two sub-chains (Majerus et al., 2008).

The strong support of community-based tourism in the area provided a foundation for the value chain analysis of excursions. The data of the community-based tourism initiative were used as the baseline for the value chain analysis and development approach. The programme gathered prices of excursions in the villages, average income per month of specific activities and services per village, and numbers of people involved in tourism activities in the villages. Due to this earlier data gathering, the calculations for the number of beneficiaries and the percentage increase in income could be estimated more accurately and easily (Majerus et al., 2008; Harman, 2010; Hummel, 2009).

As businesses were involved throughout the analysis and the programme design, they better understood tourism development constraints and were willing to support the programme and invest in the interventions. The design team had the opportunity
to facilitate relationships between market actors, local authorities and SNV that have had lasting positive impacts on the excursions industry, and to a lesser extent on embroidery handicrafts. The joint design facilitated an agreement between the private sector and the local authorities to open up more villages for day visits and more trekking routes in the area. Tour operators invested in three new tourism routes that benefit an additional 10 villages (Harman, 2010).

4.4. Conclusions

In this chapter, I reviewed the tourism development approaches implemented by SNV in Asia in the last decade, illustrating how development discourses influenced the tourism strategy and practice of SNV Asia, and how the organization field tested approaches and operationalized them.

Tourism for poverty reduction in SNV Asia developed in three phases. In an initial phase at the end of the 1990s, like in Phase 2 described in Chapter 3, a few tourism advisers and projects or programme elements reached a small but significant number of poor beneficiaries. These projects were too small and isolated to generate large numbers of beneficiaries. A second phase, between 2001 and 2006, showed SNV in transition towards a stronger capacity development organization. During this phase, pro-poor sustainable tourism emerged as a specific corporate ‘practice area’ in the organization. SNV had switched to providing broad capacity-building support to tourism authorities with a wider but less clear development impact on poorer households. As in SNV Asia the tourism development practice gradually developed during these years, it combined Phases 3 and 4 described in Chapter 3. As predominantly SNV Asia was involved in tourism in the early 2000s, the tourism development practice in Asia strongly influenced the tourism development practice of SNV at the time.

After an external evaluation of its activities in 2005/2006, SNV started utilizing the value chain analysis and development approach to expand development interventions throughout the tourism sector, to increase development impact. In particular, market-based solutions, private sector development, and broader destination development approaches were applied. This resulted in a wider destination development approach, linking the micro-level development initiatives to the macro-level policy environment. It involved a wider group of stakeholders, with more private sector engagement.

The focus was on ‘creating new destinations’ to support private sector development in rural areas, rather than looking for opportunities to strengthen backward linkages
with established tourism destinations. This was due to opportunities to diversify the tourism product and government interest in creating economic activity in the less developed regions, achieving development impact that could not be easily scaled-up. However, these initiatives are still continuing without the support of SNV through SNV’s clients (government and private sector), generating socioeconomic benefits for communities involved. As such, these initiatives are providing lasting socioeconomic benefits for the communities involved.

To engage more with the private sector and increase development impact, the value chain analysis and development approach was developed. The cases of the three countries show a gradual development of the approach since 2006. Directly after the pro-poor sustainable tourism evaluation, the main focus was on the different stakeholders in the chain and the importance of overall revenues, financial flows in sub-chains, and the percentage reaching the poor. In Luang Prabang, four sub-chains (accommodation, food and beverages, handicrafts, and excursions) were identified and analysed. However, SNV clients and advisers had difficulty identifying the steps to take to improve the functioning of the chains, as clearly defined intervention logics were missing.

The case of Nabji in Bhutan showed how the private sector was involved in the development from the start, but did not focus on private sector investments or market-based solutions. In Sapa, the market-based solutions approach was introduced in SNV’s value chain analysis and development methodology. Ultimately, the intervention logic and specific buy-in from the private sector in Sapa has led to a more efficient and effective development impact. A combination of the strong analysis of the first study in Luang Prabang and later market-based solutions approach, including a clear intervention logic, provided a strong value chain analysis and development approach for SNV in Asia.

Impact measurement frameworks were progressing with the development of the value chain analysis and development approach (cf. Mitchell & Ashley, 2009). The value chain analysis and development approach in Bhutan and Vietnam included an intervention logic and result chain. Development impact was measured on the basis of baseline studies and impact assessments. Whereas the Luang Prabang value chain analysis still focused on the pro-poor impact in terms of a percentage (see also Chapter 6), Nabji and Sapa included a result chain based on numbers of poor beneficiaries.

Among the lessons learned from the three cases in SNV Asia is that development impact and its measurement have to be integrated into interventions from the start.
The measurement needs to include not only direct development impact, but also indirect and dynamic impacts. Before I analyse the production of development results and success further in Chapter 6, I first turn to the internal organization of SNV and show how managing results as a mode of ordering has become more and more important in recent years.
Chapter 5

SNV’s way of working

Part of this chapter is submitted as article to Tourism Management as:

Hummel, J. and van der Duim, R. SNV’s ways of working: organizing tourism as practice in a development agency
5.1. Introduction

SNV has as much difficulty with organizational learning as all those other development organizations. Too busy, too involved with the organization, too afraid to make mistakes and to admit to these mistakes, and little space to experiment and research as development results have to be achieved. At this moment, within SNV there is not much learning, even considering the large will to learn. However, there is one learning area: SNV has an incredible ability to totally reinvent itself and stay relevant, on a regular basis. (Zevenbergen, 2010, p. 3; my translation)

Over the years, SNV has gone through several internal organizational changes, caused by paradigm shifts in development theory, changes in the political landscape in the Netherlands, learning from practice, and changed organizational thinking. In this chapter, I explore SNV’s internal organizational logics, especially in relation to the tourism as a development sector. In short, I examine how SNV has been organizing itself and how that influenced the tourism practice area in SNV. By doing so, I contribute to the answering of research question 4.

I first briefly introduce the notion of organizational modes of ordering. I then present the findings of this chapter as six organizational modes of ordering in SNV and analyse the workings of these modes of ordering in each of the earlier detected six phases of Chapter 3. My conclusion is that combinations of modes of ordering interweave different development concepts and organizational logics, producing discursive, strategic and material durability for some time, and influence the way development organizations work in tourism for poverty reduction.

5.2. Organizations as modes of ordering

In this chapter, I look at an organization not as a static and stable social and material order, but as an ongoing process of ordering (Doolin, 2003; Law, 1994). Behind the façade of organizations, a large number of humans and things need to be coordinated and knitted together to make an organization capable of acting (Müller, 2012). Organizations are precarious, and need permanent ordering and stabilizing. Any stability or durability is the result of more or less successful ordering attempts (Doolin, 2003). Modes of ordering are explicit and implicit strategic effects; different modes of ordering within the same organization produce and achieve durability for some period of time (Law, 1994).

As introduced in Chapter 2, Law (2009) identifies three ways to achieve durability. Law is concerned not only with explicit strategies formulated or enacted by
participants in the organization, but also with the strategies’ physical forms (at
different places) in the organization, and different development and organizational
concepts, approaches and instruments used in different situations and places in the
same organization at the same time. Of course, there are many explicit strategies
in an organization, and they may indeed embody, perform and reproduce modes
of ordering. But Law looks at matters more broadly, and identifies less explicit
strategies, often recursive logics. As Law (1994, p. 109) explains, there are good
reasons for assuming that such strategies tend to get embedded and performed in
the networks of the social; that there are ‘an indefinite number of modes of self-
reflexivity’, but that only ‘a relatively small number may be instantiated in the
networks of the social at a given time and place’.

5.3. Modes of ordering in SNV in the last two decades

Based on my fieldwork, I distinguish six modes of ordering in the SNV organization
within the studied 20 years. In Table 5.1., I present these six modes of ordering,
the main characteristics of each mode of ordering and their significance for SNV’s
tourism development practice.

5.3.1. Administering programmes

In all phases of the 20 years this research covers, administration has been a consistent
and robust mode of ordering in SNV. To the outside world, SNV presented the image
of a very well administered development organization, an organization that had
‘everything in place’, that had it all worked out; its offices, advisers, development
strategies, development approaches, background documentation, reporting systems,
project cars, copy machines, and a regular supply of coffee, workshop supply formats,
rules and regulations for renting a house, pick-ups from the airport. It was what
people outside the organization and new staff would tell about their first impression
of SNV: that it was all ‘so well organized’.

Administration, as a mode of ordering, is about following routines. It is about
clarity on implementation and reporting. Administration is concerned with the
well-regulated organization, its people, files and machines and their specified roles.
It is about hierarchical structures of offices with defined procedures for ordering
exchanges between those offices. It has organized and rational divisions of labour;
and management as the art of planning, implementing and policing that structure.
It is careful and systematic, fair and committed to the official, proper and legal
way of doing things – to due process. According to others in the organization,
‘administrators’ pick over detail, worry about formalities; dilute and divert (Law,
Table 5.1. Organizational modes of ordering in SNV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational mode of ordering</th>
<th>Main characteristics</th>
<th>Significance of ordering mode for SNV’s tourism practice area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administering programmes [administration]</td>
<td>Following routines, emphasizing clarity on implementation, reporting and roles, focusing on singular development results, coherence and consistency.</td>
<td>Guidelines for tourism implementation. Focus on primary process days in reporting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing and implementing projects [project management]</td>
<td>Celebrates implementation performance; project implementation central to professional ‘success’ (coherence); sets projects aside from organization.</td>
<td>Implementing tourism projects. Celebrating development ‘success’ in tourism projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enterprising, fundraising, selling [enterprise]</td>
<td>Agency, celebrating opportunism, pragmatism, performance, and (singular and coherent) ‘results’</td>
<td>Tourism sector as sellable and ‘bankable’ product; successful fundraising in tourism projects and programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development brokering, advising and capacity building [development brokering]</td>
<td>Development facilitation ‘on the ground’; linking development levels and making development practical (and coherent) and diverse (open and messy).</td>
<td>Adopting sector, multi-stakeholder, value chain development approaches for tourism; focus on the advisory role of SNV in tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing vision and development knowledge [development visioning]</td>
<td>Visionary leadership and development theory; embracing complexity and reflexivity in development; cutting off from mundane organizational matters.</td>
<td>Role of SNV in knowledge debates in tourism. Network learning with leading tourism and development organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development result managing [result management]</td>
<td>Producing development results; accountability and programming (with a focus on coherence, singularity and closure)</td>
<td>Measuring development results in tourism-related initiatives. Result chains and ‘impact measurement’ in tourism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author
1994). Sometimes, of course, administrations fail, as organizations can be strangled by red tape if this is the only mode of ordering (Law, 2009).

Tourism in SNV clearly reflected this mode of ordering. During the 1990s, tourism was implemented through specific rural development projects. These projects followed the detailed SNV (and sometimes donor agency) annual and quarterly planning and reporting systems, applied SNV’s implementation guidelines, and tourism-related outputs were counted as ‘activity’ in the development results system of SNV (cf. Annual Reports of 1998, 1999). In tourism, implementation was not only based on the project document, indicating all interventions, but was also informed by progress reporting to SNV and the donor agency, several volumes of SNV’s implementation guidelines, instructions for the utilization of the project car, the SNV office functioning, home-leave and sick-leave forms, the support staff in the office to report to, and all the abbreviations used in the organization (cf. Glastra, 1995).

Advisers were trained in approaches and steps for implementation. The training was followed by workshops developing detailed action plans and formats, followed by regular visits to the field. Very detailed monitoring and evaluation plans were developed. However, advisers sometimes still complained that an implementation manual was not in place, and that they were worried how to implement the programme. Their worry was not so much what could be achieved, but whether they were following the right formal steps and procedures (see e.g. Hummel, 1998a,b).

Within SNV, administration has been redefined over and over again, for instance in the uitvoeringsinstructies (implementation guidelines) of the 1990s, or the discussion process, outputs and outcome of the ‘Grand Design – new internal organization of SNV Netherlands Development Organisation’ of the early 2000s (SNV, 2002b), elaborate reporting and accounting systems, and its country and regional controllers. SNV has always discussed its administrative processes, systems and guidelines. It made these processes, systems and guidelines part of practices, in every phase, and it had its systems and staff firmly in place.

5.3.2. Managing and implementing development projects

A project is any single time-bound intervention with clearly defined activities, necessary resources and expected results, often defined in a conceptual framework (such as LFA [Logical Framework Approach]). A programme might be covered by a single project but does not need to be so. (SNV Asia – Programming Concept Note, 2010, p. 1)
Managing and implementing development projects as mode of ordering links pragmatism and opportunism to a set structure of the project, with ‘success’ based on project implementation and development results (often based on project output indicators). This mode of ordering is about achieving professional (as well as enterprising) and coherent project implementation ‘success’.

Within SNV, project management is about separation and integration. Projects are partly set aside from the main organizational operations. Projects have a beginning and an end, are bound by specific activities, and have their resources and needs for results. Project management promises order and control, and also includes the potential for innovation, experimentation and entrepreneurship. By isolating the project in space and time, it becomes possible to avoid unnecessary complexity and establish clear goals. The process of detachment often includes constructing an independent organizational unit, with its own identity, hierarchy and rationality, to make the project manageable (Johansson, Löfström & Ohlson, 2007). A project’s identity is, for instance, established and maintained through its tasks, its name and its descriptions of existing resources in the project, like the project team, money, time and knowledge. It is further strengthened by efforts to create commitment and establishing a specific culture in the project. It separates the project from the organization (ibid.). Some interviewees therefore referred to country directors and project managers, who were active in the 1990s and early 2000s, as ‘kings in their own kingdoms’. They could present and claim the results of the project as their own development results, although at the same time they were an important part of SNV as an organization.

However, project managers must be aware that the results of the project have to become part of the overall organization again. There is a need to reattach, to integrate the project and its results in the permanent organization. Project managers are balancing this separation and integration as part of their organizational ordering (ibid.).

Tourism could be initiated and incorporated into development projects upon the invitation of these ‘kings’. SNV hired tourism project coordinators and project staff, who were directly responsible for the development results of the project and the project’s success (cf. Hummel, 1996). This mode of ordering emerged on several occasions during evaluations. The Pro-Poor Sustainable Tourism Practice Area Evaluation of 2005/2006 referred to the earlier District Partners Programme in Nepal as successful, because of the focus on development results and own project implementation (Goodwin, 2006a,b). The evaluation compared this project with the capacity building of organizations in a sector-wide approach, in which for instance
development results were more difficult to measure. More recent development initiatives of SNV, like the Great Himalaya Trail Pilot Project in the West of Nepal, also have many characteristics of this mode of ordering.

This mode of ordering is also still part of programming in SNV Asia. In fact, it was never fully abandoned by SNV, even when the organization tried to abandon this mode for some time in the early 2000s. The mode’s discursive, strategic and material ordering has changed over time, especially in combination with development brokering, result management and enterprise, as for instance presented in the concept note on ‘programming in SNV Asia’ (2010).

5.3.3. Enterprising, fundraising and selling

If possible we would like to market and sell a programme as a whole, as one ‘opportunity for impact investment’. This would be easier if programmes are defined as time-bound operational units. (SNV Asia – Programming Concept Note, 2010, p. 2)

Enterprise is about agency, which celebrates opportunism, pragmatism and performance, and making pragmatic sense. It demands strongly articulated result claims. This mode embraces performance and success at the organizational level; it is sensitive to shifting opportunities and demands, and capitalizes on these opportunities. It is about securing funding for the organization, exploring funding opportunities, through project and programme financing proposals and partnerships (e.g. with the World Tourism Organization, the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, and private sector organizations) and through shifts in development sectors.

As early as 1996, SNV wrote in its annual report: ‘It becomes clearer that a more independent and market-oriented positioning, a sharp content profiling, and a larger organizational consistency are necessary to contribute to the desired operational power’ (p. 7, my translation). Several years later, the SNV Annual Report of 2004 (p. 27) stated: ‘Internally we want to improve our productivity and increase our resource mobilization’. As presented in that same annual report, one way of organizing resource mobilization is by focusing on ‘low-hanging fruits’, as development sectors ready to offer to the market, as a ‘product’. The ‘low-hanging fruits’ were introduced as part of the Resource Mobilization strategy, discussing how SNV could package its implementation strategy and sell it to donor agencies. A ‘product’ was defined as more specific than a subsector; it was assumed that it would be easy to find external funding to bring to scale (Wehkamp, 2010). The SNV Annual Report 2004 proposes Biogas and Pro-Poor Sustainable Tourism practice areas as such ‘products’.
the Dutch government was not very interested in funding tourism as a tool for development, from the 1990s SNV had to obtain project and programme funding from other donor agencies, and it did. This created a feeling that tourism was ready to be a ‘low-hanging fruit’ and could be sold as a ‘product’ to donor agencies.

The SNV Annual Report of 2009 reads:

Funds are growing ever scarcer, and being new to this market increases the challenge for SNV. Our engagement with the private sector and with multi-sector responses to poverty reduction continues to grow with two innovative business development initiatives: Inclusive Business and Value Chain Financing. (p. 62)

And:

Across regions an effective way to attract external funding and raise SNV’s profile in 2009 proved to be by offering recognizable capacity development packages within programmes. The Mekong Discovery Trail in Cambodia, biogas programmes in various countries in Asia (with the Asian Development Bank) and Africa (with Hivos) and a water and sanitation programme in Zambia (with UNICEF) were all good examples of this. (p. 64)

The tourism development sector in SNV was often enacted in economic development, private sector development and the opportunistic flair of enterprise. At the end of the 1990s, SNV Nepal introduced tourism and non-timber forest products as economic opportunities. The advisers were hired as flexible advisers not related to specific projects, but as sector or subsector specialists who could help attract funding and be more enterprising.

In the tourism development sector of SNV, projects and programmes were often funded by donor agencies rather than the Dutch government, like the Tourism for Rural Poverty Alleviation Programme, a funding collaboration between UK Department for International Development, UNDP, SNV and the Nepal government, in Nepal at the turn of the century, or the UNWTO/SNV ST-EP projects (like the Mekong Discovery Trail in Cambodia, and the pilot project of the Great Himalaya Trail in Nepal), a funding collaboration between the government of South Korea, the World Tourism Organization and SNV in the mid-2000s.

Like the other modes of ordering, the enterprise mode has been defined and redefined in the SNV organization, slightly changing over time. SNV has been discussing fund diversification since the mid-1990s. At that time, country directors and project
officers could be more enterprising and attract their own project funding, and on a small scale that is what they did. As part of the process of becoming independent, SNV agreed to try to attract funding from donors other than the Dutch government, and through different funding channels. With the establishment of Business Development units at regional offices and at head office, enterprising became even more institutionalized in the organization.

5.3.4. Development brokering

The most common form of support SNV renders is advisory services to meso-level organizations, either directly or indirectly through local capacity builders. SNV also, and increasingly, provides advisory services at national level. (SNV Asia – Programming Concept Note, 2010, p. 2)

Development brokering is about facilitation, advising, capacity development, thematic and/or change expertise; about development at work. It is about development facilitators/providers in projects, programmes, sectors and in value chains. It is about being simultaneously at the forefront and at the rear; helping ‘people gain greater ability to run their own affairs and pursue their own development’ (Ubels, Bokhoven & Acquaye-Baddoo, 2011, p. 1). It is about ‘linking up’, ‘building connections’ and ‘strengthening interactions’ (Ubels & van der Gronden, 2004). It is about understanding that ‘real capacity development is a tricky undertaking because it means getting to grips with complex processes of change’ on the one hand, and is an ‘intervention discipline’ with a ‘focus on performance in society, on people and organizations’ and the use of ‘an eclectic set of methods to achieve meaningful change’ on the other (Ubels, Bokhoven & Acquaye-Baddoo, 2011, p. 1). It tells about expertise and about the creative and self-starting way expertise is linked to practice (Law, 1994).

Reporting on the history of SNV, Verhoeven (2002) argues that throughout the years SNV had built up a body of knowledge, expertise and networks. All these could ‘be put to good use for the benefit of the client. SNV wants to act as a broker, helping to bring about linkages among parties at different levels’ (Verhoeven, 2002, p. 38). SNV moved on from using volunteers in 1980s to hiring ‘experienced experts’ in the 1990s (Brinkman & Hoek, 2005) to ‘development brokers and translators’ (Lewis & Mosse, 2005), at the interface between the SNV organization and the development initiatives of ‘clients’ in the ‘field’, in the 2000s.

Already in the 1990s, the SNV ‘development philosophy’ of ‘process approach’ and ‘local ownership’ emerged (SNV, 1993; SNV AR 1995). These concepts were
later integrated in capacity development. The 2001 SNV corporate Annual Report states: ‘Our work is geared entirely towards capacity building’ (SNV AR, 2001, p. 2). In SNV, this mode of ordering is about the advisers in the field, who are working directly with SNV’s ‘clients’ and ‘partner organizations’. It entails the process of capacity strengthening and facilitation, it is about training courses, workshops, coaching, mentoring and thematic knowledge within SNV. Since the early 2000s, it has included both ‘thematic expertise’ and ‘organizational change facilitation’ (SNV, 2002a, 2003).

In tourism, this mode of ordering became more important with the introduction of SNV’s new strategy in 2000. However, at the end of the 1990s, in Nepal SNV’s tourism development practice was already recognized for its social mobilization, Appreciative Participatory Planning Action and multi-stakeholder approaches (see e.g. Ashley et al., 2001; Hummel, 2002, 2004; Saville, 2001). These approaches were replicated by and adapted in other SNV countries of Asia in the early 2000s, and were part of the Tourism for Rural Poverty Alleviation Programme in the first half of the 2000s (Allcock, 2003). Developing and supporting multi-stakeholder approaches and capacity strengthening of stakeholders of pro-poor value chains remained an important part of the tourism work of SNV in the second half of the 2000s (Ashley & Mitchell, 2008; Scheyvens, 2011; UNWTO/SNV, 2010a, 2010b).

This mode of ordering achieved discursive, strategic and material stability in all phases, but especially during the last decade. It was central in all discourses in SNV and presented in SNV documents. It was defined and redefined over the years. Via the ‘process approach’ laid down in the 1995 policy document, and the discussion on the process approach in parliament, it was included as capacity development and local ownership in the SNV strategy document of 2000 and later strategic documents (see also Ubels & van der Gronden, 2004). It culminated in the book Capacity Development in Practice (Ubels, Acquaye-Baddoo & Fowler, 2010). In recent years, this mode of ordering has some of its effectiveness, with the growing importance and interweaving of other modes of ordering, especially the enterprise mode.

5.3.5. Developing vision and development knowledge

Being a knowledge-based (advisory) organization, we are exceptionally reliant on the intelligence and ability of our staff to extract meaning from their everyday experience and share that internally and with outside organizations and clients. (SNV – The Learning Strategy, 2004)
This mode of ordering is about strategic direction, vision and development knowledge leadership in SNV. Developing vision and development knowledge in SNV is linked to the ‘vision’ mode of ordering in the terminology of Law (1994, pp. 66–69). It tells about charisma and grace, genius and transcendence (ibid., p. 79), and is distancing itself from mundane organizational matters (ibid., p. 66), or being set free for strategy development. Vision can be profoundly elitist (ibid., p. 80) and can even take the form of exclusion.

In the first years of the 2000s, knowledge at SNV was initiated, developed and institutionalized in the Core Team, a group that was appointed to shape SNV’s development ideas and practices and provide direction to the ‘new’ SNV organization. This group was selected from all over SNV. It operated directly under the SNV director, but was relatively autonomous in its way of working and deciding what would be worked on. It was appointed in the middle of 2001 and dissolved almost two years later (internal document SNV, 2002). It was the vision, charisma and agency of the Core Team, linked to the subsidy agreement and presented in ‘SNV’s Advisory Services: Emerging Lines’, that generated SNV’s changed ‘way of working’, integrating advisory services in projects and development initiatives. However, within the organization the group also became known as ‘arrogant and elitist’, and had made the ‘change process very abstract, always trying to incorporate everything, without making real choices’ (Core Team, 2003b, p. 2). The new SNV director, who arrived at the end of 2002, raised questions about the added value of the Core Team. In early 2003, the Core Team was disbanded.

Two of the main visionaries and representatives of the dismantled Core Team remained in strategic positions in the organization, one as the head of the Knowledge Management Unit, the other as Strategic Coordinator and Chief Strategy Officer. Both continued to publish articles on capacity development and development aid. One was one of the co-editors of the book Capacity Development in Practice (Ubels, Acquaye-Baddoo & Fowler, 2010), and has been chair of the editorial committee of Capacity.Org – a resource portal and a journal for the practice of capacity development. He is still working in SNV; the other left SNV in 2008. The Knowledge Management Unit, established in 2003, merged into a Shared Services Unit a few years later.

SNV’s linking and interweaving of tourism and poverty reduction and its leading role in capacity development created a new social–material network. Defining and redefining tourism from a poverty reduction and capacity development perspective provided SNV with a leading organizational role in development of knowledge on concepts, strategies and practice in tourism (Goodwin, 2006a; Meyer, 2007;
As already indicated in Chapters 3 and 4, by the mid-2000s, SNV had become ‘widely recognized as the development agency with the leading role in pro-poor tourism across its advisory practice areas in Africa, Asia and South America’, and had ‘more experience in pro-poor tourism than any other organization and has secured a pre-eminent reputation for its work in this field …’ (Goodwin, 2006a, p. 4; see also Leijzer, 2005).

This resulted in collaboration and partnerships with organizations like the World Tourism Organization, the Asian Development Bank and the Pro-Poor Tourism Partnership. With other agencies, SNV organized several knowledge development events around pro-poor tourism value chain development. It played an important role in knowledge development in the field of pro-poor sustainable tourism (PPST), also outside the SNV organization. For instance, the Asian Development Bank is still using PPST concepts in the latest Greater Mekong Subregion tourism strategy (ADB, 2011). However, the PPST development sector did not manage to institutionalize this development knowledge solidly in the organization.

### 5.3.6. Measuring and managing results

A programme is an integrated set of assignments, knowledge activities and/or projects which together lead to a measurable and significant positive impact on a defined target group within a given time period and of which components are sellable. (SNV Asia – Programming Concept Note, 2010, p. 2)

This mode of ordering is about accountability, being answerable for development results, for measuring and showing results from development support; it tells about singularity, definiteness and closure, about calculation and judgment. It is about producing coherent programming and univocal and clearly presented development results. Through the years, SNV referred in several annual reports and other documents to the importance of this mode of ordering (see also Chapter 6). Already in 1994, SNV mentioned in its corporate Annual Report that it needed to start measuring its development results. Two years later, its Annual Report (1996, p. 12) stated: ‘As a good data base is missing, it is difficult to analyse the overall SNV programme.’ A year after that, the SNV Annual Report stated (1997, p. 12): ‘With DAS [Data Activities SNV], SNV will be able to connect data of activities (such as sector, product groups, partner organizations involved, and focus areas) and other information (personnel, budget, etc.). It is necessary to provide extra attention to define and use a uniform framework of SNV’s concepts.’
Again a few years later, the SNV Annual Report (2001, p. 17) mentioned:

As in previous years, SNV carried out a systematic reporting and monitoring programme at various levels of the organization to monitor progress with plan implementation. Within the programme countries, periodic progress reports, on both contents and finance, were submitted to field offices. Each quarter, the field offices submitted their progress report to the head office. Head office departments and the bureau submitted their reports to the director of SNV. The reporting discipline and quality of reporting and responses varies, but there was an overall improvement compared to 2000 and previous years. This practice will be continued in 2002; however, reports will be shorter, more result-oriented …

Like with other modes of ordering, the result management mode slightly changed over time. In the 1990s, the development results emphasized input and output (activities), in the early 2000s the emphasis was on output and outcome (as improved performance) and who should measure what, and at the end of the 2000s the emphasis changes to impact measurement. In Chapter 6, I analyse these shifts in more detail.

5.4. Interweaving modes of ordering in SNV

Below, I present an overview of the relative importance and concurrences of the various modes of ordering in the last 20 years, in relation to four organizational types (SNV as a quango; as an advisory services NGO; as a social enterprise; and recently as an international development NGO) and the phases of tourism for poverty reduction in SNV as discerned in Chapter 3 (see table 5.2.). It shows the assembling of the modes of ordering through time.

5.4.1. Phases 1 and 2 (till 2001): A quango focussing on project implementation

Before SNV became independent of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the dominant modes of ordering were administration and project management, with in the second half of the 1990s a growing importance of the development brokering mode.

In the 1990s a complex interplay between global developments, policies in the Netherlands and internal dynamics in SNV changed the organization considerably; issues had become organized more at the international scale through technological innovations, such as the internet and mobile phones (Brinkman & Hoek, 2010). As Verhoeven (2002, p. 26) notes:
Table 5.2. Modes of ordering in relation to the tourism for development phases in SNV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>Project management</th>
<th>Enterprise</th>
<th>Development brokering</th>
<th>Development vision</th>
<th>Result management</th>
<th>External influences</th>
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<td>SNV as Quango</td>
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<td>Phase 1 before 1995</td>
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<td>Uitvoerings instructies</td>
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<td>Globalization; Internationalization of development aid; violence in countries</td>
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<td>Phase 2 1995-2001</td>
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<td>Changes in development aid in the Netherlands (less international technical assistance)</td>
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<td>Data Activities SNV (DAS)</td>
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<td>Projects</td>
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<td>Phase 3 2001-2004</td>
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<td>Focus on advisory services; Focus on knowledge and change in International Aid; Focus on development practice</td>
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<td>New organizational systems and culture</td>
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<td>Advisers working with one or more organizations</td>
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<td>Advisory services; capacity strengthening</td>
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<td>Over 50 discussion groups in the organization</td>
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<td>Need for improvement result measuring</td>
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<td>Regional offices in place</td>
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<td>Poverty as freedom; Sustainable Development; MDGs</td>
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<td>'Low-hanging fruits'</td>
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<td>Advisory services; multi-stakeholder approaches</td>
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<td>Knowledge is only needed for improving advisory practice</td>
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<td>Managing for Results (MfR); focus on Result chains; DCED compliance</td>
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<td>SNV as social enterprise</td>
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<td>Focus on partnerships; value chain approach; private sector development; development aid is being challenged</td>
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<td>Phase 5 2007-2010</td>
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<td>Partnership and resource mobilisation policy, vision and procedures</td>
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<td>Business development unit in SNV; focus on funding</td>
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<td>SNV as international development NGO</td>
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<td>Changing political climate for development aid in the Netherlands</td>
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<td>Phase 6 2011 and beyond</td>
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<td>Focus on budget; fund raising</td>
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<td>Strong focus on funding; competitive bidding</td>
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Dominant mode of ordering in SNV: ; Significant and supporting mode of ordering in SNV: ; Less significant, but present mode of ordering:  
Source: Author
A new strategy, changes in the Board, new responsibilities, another reorganization, a new name ... it seemed as though everything was changing at the start of the 1990s. SNV was abuzz with working groups, seminars and courses. Responsibilities were moved out of head office in The Hague and towards the field staff. This was done on the basis of ‘result-oriented management’: field offices would produce annual plans beforehand and would report at year end. This led to an inevitable increase in bureaucracy. Everywhere, efforts were made to get a grip on the multitude of processes that were going on in the organization.

During these years, the organization decided ‘to shift emphasis from “direct support for groups of poor, disadvantaged and oppressed people” to “increasing their social, economic and political resilience”. This it did through its own projects and a new method: the process approach’ (Verhoeven, 2002, p. 26). By 1995, SNV had appointed a new director. Under this director a new corporate plan was outlined and a new mission stated. The general objective of ‘increasing resilience’ was replaced by ‘contributing to sustainable development processes’. This was to be achieved by putting expertise at the disposal of ‘clients’ (Verhoeven, 2002). SNV decided to concentrate on two themes; first, ‘sustainable rural development’, an issue that had been on the SNV agenda for some time; and second, a relatively new theme, ‘local governance processes’. This theme was closely linked to recently emerging international attention to issues of ‘good governance’, which included local decentralization and democratization (ibid.).

In the 1990s, SNV changed from an organization deploying SNV volunteers with partner organizations, to a self-implementing project organization, based on the work of development workers, labelled ‘technical assistance’ (Brinkman & Hoek, 2005; Verhoeven, 2002). Relations between SNV and employees became more professional, and specialized work required expertise and experience (Verhoeven, 2002). At the beginning of the 1990s, around 40% of staff members had completed higher vocational training and around 50% held university degrees. In 1992, there were only 45 local staff members; three years later, 122 of the 600 development workers were local staff members (ibid., p. 29). At the end of the 1990s, 350 employees – around 40% of SNV’s staff – were local (Brinkman & Hoek, 2010). By that time, almost all staff were ‘in possession of a university degree in agriculture, social sciences or economy, very experienced in the field of development and earning a corresponding salary’ (ibid., p. 35). At this time, SNV was implementing around 380 projects (‘activities’ in the SNV Annual Reports), supported by over 700 professional staff (Brinkman & Hoek, 2005; Verhoeven, 2002).
SNV had grown from a volunteer organization into a quasi-NGO, a so-called quango (Verhoeven, 2002). The relation with the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs changed. Before the 1990s, SNV was fully dependent on the ministry; in the 1990s SNV became more independent in matters of policy (Brinkman & Hoek, 2005; Verhoeven, 2002). In financial terms, however, SNV remained closely linked to the ministry. Financial dependence even increased, as SNV became more or less a subcontractor for the ministry. At the time, SNV acted almost purely as the executive arm of Dutch international development (Verhoeven, 2002). Because of this closeness to the ministry, SNV also showed ‘a tendency towards bureaucratic procedures and hierarchical structures that are all too often characteristics of state systems’ (Brinkman & Hoek, 2010, p. 197). SNV kept this ambivalent quango status with the ministry until 2002.

The dominant modes of ordering were project management and administration. This, however, was not the whole story. A new director arrived from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He brought with him a background of administration, but was interested in making SNV more enterprising, initiating the 1996 ‘corporate plan’, emphasizing ‘projects’. Concepts like ‘process approach’ and ‘advisory services’ had been used in the organization for some time already, and even a SNV ‘policy document’ on the process approach was published in 1995. Although it merely remained a concept on paper in SNV till the end of the 1990s, it heralded the development brokering mode of ordering. As most managers and development workers had not worked with the approach, it was hardly performed and embodied as a development practice in the organization at the time.

The same was true for the result management mode. Although measuring development results was mentioned in the annual reports of the 1990s, it was only performed in the measured and presented results of isolated development projects. However, various measuring instruments were devised to enable better monitoring and steering of activities in the field. An information system called Data Activities SNV (DAS) initiated a digital registration of data on SNV activities. A documentation information system (DIS) was designed to bring together existing knowledge and information. ‘Control self-assessments’ were carried out in the programme countries, in order to improve internal management. ‘There was no uniform praise: too many changes on paper only, too much bureaucracy, too much focus on policy’ (Verhoeven, 2002, p. 34).

Throughout the 1990s, SNV’s quasi-NGO status caused discomfort and conflict. In SNV and in ministerial circles, the discussions about the status of SNV were about the independence of the organization. ‘In the concept version of the first business plan
in 1996 it was recommended that SNV should aspire to a more independent position towards the ministry than the present quango statute’ (Brinkman & Hoek, 2010, p. 198). At the same time, the Minster for Development Cooperation openly doubted the value of expatriate technical assistance and felt that this form of development aid had become expensive and ineffective (ibid.). She even ‘attacked the Dutch development sector by questioning the genuine objectives of many organizations, holding that they were merely pursuing their own interest’ (ibid., p. 196).

Although the minister clashed with SNV’s project management and administration modes of ordering, she also provided the way out. In August 1999, she wrote a letter to the Dutch parliament about SNV and its 10 years of experience with the process approach (Herfkens, 1999). The minister informed parliament that international development aid was not very effective, as aid was donor-driven and interventions were rigid, limited attention was paid to local dynamics, there was limited institutionalized local participation and limited use of local capacity and potential. These limitations demanded another approach, the ‘process approach’. This approach focused on flexibility in programming. It would achieve more local ownership. According to the minister, the process approach still played an important role in SNV, especially in ‘local governance’. SNV focused on process advising, technical advising and, if there was need, other forms of programme support. According to the minister’s letter, the process approach was essential for sustainable capacity strengthening and local ownership of development processes. She concluded her letter by stating that SNV would continue to use the process approach to support sustainable development.

In the same year, the minister also asked the IBO (Interdepartementaal beleidsonderzoek; Interdepartmental Policy Research) to study the Dutch international technical assistance in development. The study concluded that expatriate experts should stop implementing projects and focus on providing advice and services; it should become a ‘development broker’. The report recommended that the ‘development organization SNV will be entirely detached from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: the administrative and financial interweaving between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and SNV will be ended’ (Brinkman & Hoek, 2010, p. 198).

In tourism, a few enterprising SNV country directors and country management teams, who were relatively autonomous when it came to deciding on development programmes and projects, agreed in the mid-1990s to start sustainable (and cultural) tourism projects in Tanzania, Botswana and Albania. SNV engaged in tourism as a development tool, through individual directors who saw development (and funding)
opportunities, especially with support of DID (in 1997 changed to Bureau Services and Mediation, Bureau Diensten en Bemiddeling, BDB) (see Chapter 3). Tourism in SNV was performed only in a few projects in a few programme countries, and in separate building of the ID Department /BDB in The Hague, as a very small network in SNV.

Besides fitting the changing development paradigms (Loermans, 1995; see also Chapter 3), tourism could be effectuated, especially through the project management mode of ordering and few enterprising directors, combined with the administration mode. Within these modes of ordering, tourism projects were designed and funded, tourism project staff hired, progress reports written, leave forms filled out, SNV development concepts adhered to, and project development processes and results presented in country annual reports and donor reports and as country results in the SNV corporate Annual Reports. In The Hague, BDB organized market research for the European Market (ECEAT/CAV, 1997) and participated in tourism trade fairs on behalf of the tourism projects of a few SNV countries. These activities were also presented in the SNV corporate Annual Report of the last years of the 1990s, producing and performing tourism as a development sector in SNV.

In 1998, an evaluation of the Policy and Operations Department (IOB) of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs concluded that SNV was not sufficiently involved in economic development as a development sector (SNV AR, 1998). SNV hired an economic policy officer to develop SNV’s role in local economic development. The tourism officer of BDB convinced the newly hired economic officer to jointly organize with the tourism adviser in SNV Nepal, a tourism advisers’ conference to discuss SNV’s way of working in tourism (as part of local economic development). The conference was planned and a budget was agreed for the event, and SNV advisers and partner organizations developed presentations and papers on approaches and tools. At this stage, however, SNV head office management became hesitant. The knowledge development event would be too expensive and might not fit in with SNV’s up-coming development direction. The tourism officer explained that the organization of the event had already progressed significantly, and that this knowledge event would fit in with SNV’s change towards a knowledge-based development brokering role.

The tourism officer convinced the head office management and the conference was held in October 1999 in Nepal, with SNV staff from Bolivia, Tanzania, Vietnam, Laos, Nepal and the head office (Pieter Stoer, personal communication, 2007). The results of the conference were reported in a resource document, in which the SNV’s way of working in tourism was presented (SNV Nepal, BDB & BBA,
2000). It brought together several of SNV’s modes of ordering, besides the earlier project management and administration modes of ordering, and also interwove the development brokering and visioning modes. Again, it also interacted with the enterprise mode of ordering through the local economic development discourse, and the involvement of the economic development officer from The Hague in the meeting. In the SNV Annual Report of 1999, sustainable tourism was mentioned for the first time as a development practice in SNV.

By that time, SNV had gradually grown from an organization working at the micro-level to one mainly working at the meso- and macro-levels, or as the Interim Director DGIS in 2002 (Verhoeven, 2002, p. 42), noticed:

As a development organization, you are partly in the business of creating your own counter force. As time goes by, you become superfluous. In this fashion, SNV is now gradually being pushed out of the micro level. Which is good; it is what all this is about.

Through a process of developing the SNV strategy of 2000, the strategy itself, the letter from the minister to parliament, evaluations like the IOB evaluation of 1998, and quotations like the one from the interim director of DGIS in 2002, the shift emerged from SNV as a project implementing organization, working at the micro-level, to an advisory organization, focusing on facilitating development processes at the meso level. Ubels and van der Gronden (2004, p. 2) summarized the change in a Capacity.Org special edition on ‘meso-level capacity development’ of 2004, as:

In 2001, the SNV decided to fundamentally reorient its operations towards capacity development through the delivery of a distinct set of advisory services. Having formerly taken on line responsibilities in combating poverty, the SNV now supports meso-level organizations in their struggle against deprivation, exclusion and poverty imbalances. Meso-level organizations provide services to groups of poor people, represent their interests, and/or create enabling environments. Their performance is critical in nurturing and sustaining local initiatives to alleviate poverty.

However, the project management mode of ordering would remain important throughout the years, even though the minister, the IBO report, the SNV strategy of 2000 and several SNV annual reports stated that SNV should no longer implement projects. The project management mode collided with the developing brokering and knowledge development modes of ordering for several years, but reappeared strongly, combined with the enterprise mode of ordering, as ‘programming’, almost a decade later.
Reorganizing SNV, from a quango into an international non-governmental advisory organization, created considerable opposition and resistance among SNV staff in the Netherlands. It resulted in the transfer of the previous director and the appointment of an interim director to steer the transition period.

5.4.2. Phases 3 and 4 (2001–2007): An advisory services NGO

*During this period, the dominant modes of ordering were development brokering and development vision, supported by administration and enterprise. During these years project management as a mode of ordering had to be silenced and deleted.*

Between the national and the local level there is great need for an intermediary function. I think that until now SNV has lingered too much at the local level and has been too much the acting agency on the ground. You suffocate things, while your job is to create room to manoeuvre at that intermediate level. It is, therefore, important, that SNV directs itself at that intermediate level and from there acts as a catalyst for exchanging experiences. (Joan Boer, interim director general for international cooperation, DGIS, in Verhoeven, 2002, p. 42)

SNV’s independence of the ministry, and the switch of focus away from project implementation and technical assistance, provided it with an opportunity to review and redefine its development practice. A process was developed to formulate a new development strategy and a new organization. In the early 2000s, the development broker mode of ordering became central in SNV and has remained central ever since. As the SNV Annual Report of 2000 indicated, SNV would focus more on the capacity development of organizations (at the meso-level) and the services provided would focus on networking, have a demand orientation, and be flexible and more result oriented. In the subsidy agreement of 2001, also the development visioning, result management and enterprising modes of ordering were emphasized, and a new administration for the NGO was agreed on. The project management ordering mode was deleted from the subsidy agreement, however.

This is also reflected in the words of the new interim director, when she explained the new direction of the organization. She remarked in 2002 (Verhoeven, 2002, p. 41):

*We must also stop carrying out projects. We must stay away from the controls; that is something the people themselves must handle. Our role is being an advisor for organizations that are engaged in the battle against poverty. We are, in fact, a special kind of organizational advisor. We know and understand structures and issues but*
we also have a network. We can bring all kinds of parties together. We also want to support our clients and work from their perspective. This cannot be done in a top-down organization, which is why we detach ourselves from the Ministry and all its regulations. We are not central to the story, the clients are. This means that the organization and its people will have to be educated anew. Being an advisor is a business in its own right; one must be able to tell when it is time to go. One will be required to show results. What have been the actual results of your presence and work in a country? For this, measuring instruments are needed.

SNV realized that it had to accumulate ‘new’ advisory and development knowledge to become a ‘new’ development advisory organization. A Core Team was appointed, and a Knowledge Management Unit was established in the first years of the 2000s to develop further the development sectors (‘practice areas’) and the internal organization of SNV. SNV expressed its knowledge ambition explicitly in the 2001 subsidy agreement, as ‘a leading knowledge organization in the areas of its expertise’ (SNV, 2003, p. 4). It seemed that development success was seen as being based on a direct knowledge position in development discourses, rather than development results on the ground: ‘it is essential that we get a stronger face in the sector and thus show that our considerable resources are also made useful in that way. Our improved performance in knowledge sharing and development will be an essential foundation for our future.’ (SNV, 2003, p. 30)

At this stage, a lot of discussion had been going on about whether SNV needed to become an NGO type consultancy firm or an advising NGO. As SNV realized it was not really a consultancy business. As its staff had limited consultancy experience, the organization went for the option of an advisory NGO. SNV had not yet created a strong enterprise mode of ordering. By 2002, SNV had become an independent NGO. Apart from a larger degree of independence of the ministry, this also implied that government subsidies would be more dependent on SNV’s results, effectiveness and efficiency. According to Brinkman and Hoek (2010, p. 200) in the subsidy agreement between SNV and the ministry reference was made to efficiency and budgeting, and SNV itself proposed efficiency targets. The change in direction, in combination with the efficiency targets, created considerable unrest in the organization. At head office, due to new tasks and functions, most SNV staff had to reapply for their jobs. Sometimes the profile of the SNV staff did not fit the new requirements. Some people were replaced by new staff. As more tasks were allocated to country offices and new regional structures, the number of staff at head office decreased from 108 in 2001, to 79 in 2003 and to 65 in 2005 (ibid., p. 201), and at the same time increased in the SNV regions and countries.
SNV reached its first subsidy agreement for five years (2002–2006), based on a new strategy (SNV, 2000) and a drastic change process. The whole transition is summarized by Verhoeven (2002, p. 38) as:

At the beginning of the new millennium SNV is faced with big changes in the organization and the way it works. A new strategy was devised in September 2000, following extensive internal and external consultations. New notions have come to the fore: ‘measurable’, ‘demand-driven’ and ‘client-oriented’. SNV no longer wants to act as the implementing agency on the ground; rather it wants to present itself as an advisor for organizations that are fighting poverty. The emphasis will be at the intermediate level that is the space between local interest groups and national governments. Here, one can find both governments and nongovernmental organizations. They can request support and advice when they are developing their capacities and increasing their effectiveness. […] Throughout the years, the organization has built up a body of knowledge, expertise and networks; all these can be put to good use for the benefit of the client. SNV wants to act as a broker, helping to bring about linkages among parties at different levels.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and SNV agreed on a 10-point list as part of the subsidy agreement showing the changes in the context of strategy and advisory practice within SNV to be accomplished by the end of the agreement in 2006 (SNV AR 2001 pp. 9/11). These 10 points were:

1. SNV is a specialized supplier of advisory services to meso-level (governmental and non-governmental) organizations in developing countries. In providing services, SNV follows a demand-driven approach.
2. SNV has developed a distinctive advisory practice for the above, which combines thematic, organizational and process expertise, has a clear methodological basis, and reflects strategic visions on strengthening organizations at meso-level.
3. SNV personnel operate as advisers.
4. SNV’s management integrates relevant methodologies to facilitate effective result measurement in demand-oriented setting, utilizing a combination of up-to-date instruments and methods.
5. SNV has investigated, developed and tested a financing strategy.
6. On the basis of its involvement in activities at the meso level, SNV plays a recognizable role in national and international discussions in three areas of specialization (local governance processes, natural resource management and private sector development).
7. SNV has effective alliances for accomplishing its strategy, especially with regard to collaboration with local parties and contributing to international knowledge networks.
8. SNV is developing itself towards a knowledge centre of national and international significance.
9. SNV works in regional contexts (rather than solely in countries), thereby stimulating knowledge development and South-South exchange.
10. SNV has realized a significant gain in efficiency, through servicing more clients/partners, strategically chosen partners/clients (who themselves reach others again), stronger knowledge function and regional outreach of its organizational set-up.

These 10 points of the subsidy agreement referred to advisory services, knowledge development, partnerships, finances and result management. They indicate an interacting of the development brokering, development visioning, result management and enterprising modes, and were an attempt to abandon the project management mode.

The 10 points no longer referred to the implementation and management of projects. The text of the SNV Annual Report 2001 (p. 11) was very explicit about ‘projects’: ‘SNV is not implementing projects’ and a little further ‘our experts do not implement projects’. However, it also stated (ibid.): ‘our capacity building activities might include a range of interventions such as interim project management (if required to build capacity in certain cases), financial brokerage and resourcing (if we can legitimately use this to build capacity), and so on.’

Development brokering was one of the modes of ordering SNV had always been somewhat uncertain about and uncomfortable with. Brinkman and Hoek (2005, p. 42) explain this discomfort as a dilemma between capacity strengthening of local organizations and bringing in expert knowledge: ‘SNV claims to have expertise on a number of issues; otherwise there would be no need for its activities. This dilemma – between participation on an equal basis and the claim to expertise – knows no solution, yet needs to be addressed as policies are designed.’ It is also related to the role of the external expertise, how to support development processes, creating innovation and change, without taking over the transformation process (as an expert). It is precisely the role of the ‘development broker’ (cf. Lewis & Mosse, 2006; see also Box. 5.1.).

The role of the adviser changed from a micro-level development worker to a meso- and macro-level adviser to district, provincial and national level (Verhoeven, 2002). Towards the end of the 1990s, SNV hired more experienced and older experts (Brinkman & Hoek, 2005; Verhoeven, 2002). After the end of the 1990s, there was an increased focus on the ‘need for improving the quality of advisers’ (SNV Annual Reports of different years).

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In the SNV countries, employees were no longer to be integrated in existing host organizations: they needed to form interdisciplinary teams and work from the SNV offices. More than in the 1990s, SNV recruited personnel from different nationalities, strengthening the multicultural nature of the organization (Verhoeven, 2002). The percentage of national advisers and managers rose steadily. By 1999, this figure was 40%; in 2004 it had grown to 67% (Brinkman & Hoek, 2005, p. 39). Between 2004 and 2005, the number of advisers increased from 672 to 937 advisers, a growth of almost 40%. The average age of SNV advisers had increased to almost 40 years by 2005 (ibid.)

Box 5.1. Starting with thematic expertise or with organizational change?

For years, the SNV development organization focused on development and change knowledge, in which the advisers were the developers and brokers of this knowledge (Ubels & van der Gronden, 2004). The facilitation of organizational change and thematic expert advice have been presented and discussed as a dichotomy, and as a mix. This mix of thematic and change expertise is a central element of ‘SNV’s way of working’ (Brinkman & Hoek, 2005, 2010; SNV, 2002; Ubels & van der Gronden, 2004; Verhoeven, 2002; Zevenbergen, 2010). However, one question went unanswered over the years: where to start in the advisory practice of SNV? Did it need to start with capacity development needs and facilitation of organizational change as an overall theme, or with specific thematic development sectors and the concerns for development within that sector? It was still one of the main topics during an SNV internal discussion with former Dutch SNV staff members in The Hague in June 2011, on the way ahead for SNV. The organization had chosen three sectors, but several of the former advisers were of the opinion that capacity development and organizational change were the main forte of SNV; the sector would need to be identified per country (internal document SNV, 2011).

Since SNV had developed a new strategy (SNV, 2000) and become independent of the ministry, the organization would not automatically attract funding. SNV no longer played the role of funding agency, but pursued a more ‘equal and honest relationship’ in which clients and SNV would look for funding, together: SNV did not have an easy task explaining its new policy. Many SNV advisers appreciated the greater responsibilities given to clients, but were unsure ‘as to what an advisory role may mean in practice’ (Brinkman & Hoek, 2005, p. 40; see also Verhoeven, 2002). Looking back at the first half of the 2000s, the two SNV overall directors wrote in an internal email (9 June 2006) preparing all staff for the second subsidy agreement (2007–2015):
Six years ago, […] an inspired core group of SNV professionals came together to plant the seeds for a new kind of development organization. An organization forging a new path by boldly stating, contrary to popular opinion, that aid without capacity would not be sustainable and that funding alone would not ensure an end to global poverty.

Development visioning, as a mode of ordering, quickly materialized in the early 2000s as a central part of the first subsidy agreement with the Dutch government, through a small group of visionaries at head office, in the Knowledge Management Unit, and the further development of the advisory services in SNV, embodied in the Core Team and presented in several SNV documents (‘SNV’s Advisory Practice: Emerging Lines’ of 2002; ‘Embracing a Wild Life’ of 2003; 23 reference guides as presented in the SNV AR of 2003; and the documents and manuals on the ‘Triple AAA’ approach of 2004).

However, the focus on complex development knowledge generation, introducing a more open, demand-driven, multi-layered and multi-stakeholder development approach, also set the Core Team and the Knowledge Management Unit somewhat aside from other more practical and pragmatic everyday capacity development implementation parts of SNV. In the first half of the 2000s, the main modes of ordering were development brokering and development visioning, which resulted in a very open multi-layered, multi-actor development approach, with visionaries at head office and advisers producing and enacting the capacity development practice in the SNV countries and regions.

Between 2000 and 2003, the development visioning and development brokering modes of ordering were visible everywhere and in everything in SNV. As an effect of the changing global environment, development paradigm shifts in development aid in the Netherlands (moving away from foreign expert implemented projects towards capacity development, development facilitation and sector approach), reorganization at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the SNV’s independence of the ministry, the previous prevalent (more singular) project management and administration modes of ordering changed to knowledge development and development brokering modes of ordering. It was these interacting modes that made possible such rapid changes in the organization. Both modes embraced a more open development approach, in which advisers would facilitate locally owned development processes.

In addition to these modes, in the early 2000s members of the Core Team were also supporting a whole ‘new’ administration, as the organization changed from a government bureaucracy to an NGO organization. SNV detailed this change in the policy document ‘Contours and Principles, Internal Organization SNV’ (2001)
and ‘Grand Design’ (2002b), and in its documents on competence management and harmonizing human resources worldwide. The administration mode remained important in SNV, embodied in staff at head office and at all the country offices, and was presented in progress and annual planning and reporting formats, training course materials, etc.

SNV also produced and enacted a network on ‘resource mobilization’, as part of an enterprise mode of ordering. A small group of SNV staff members studied the diversification of funding opportunities, in addition to the subsidy from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Broadening of the funding base of SNV was one of the requirements the ministry imposed on SNV in the first subsidy agreement (SNV AR, 2002). One of the strategies to achieve funding from other agencies was a focus on developing the earlier introduced ‘low-hanging fruit’ (SNV Asia, 2010); another was working in ‘partnerships’, or as was stated in the SNV Annual Report of 2005 (p. 11): ‘Partnerships may also well stimulate innovation and generate financial resources’.

Tourism as a development sector did not receive project funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Managers and advisers had to find separate funding to pay for programme activities, actively mobilizing resources and thus being entrepreneurial. The Tourism for Poverty Alleviation Programme in Nepal was mainly funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and for a small part by UNDP and SNV (only advisory services). DFID wanted SNV to manage the project, but SNV refused, as it no longer managed projects. The Nabji Trail in Bhutan was funded through the Small Grant Project of the Global Environment Facility, with additional funding from the government of Bhutan and SNV’s advisory services. In Vietnam, SNV was providing paid-for advisory services in the Mekong Tourism Development Project (as part of the ADB loan to the government of Vietnam). Through UNWTO, small projects were paid for in Laos and Vietnam, etc. In the 1990s this was considered a drawback; however, with the changed organizational structure (and subsequent changed modes of ordering), external funding for project implementation and SNV’s advisory services, it was considered favourable from the early 2000s. The selection of the tourism development practice as ‘low-hanging fruit’ was based on this interaction of modes of ordering. It brought together the project management, development brokering, development visioning and enterprise modes of ordering.

Based on the documentation of SNV’s way of working in tourism (cf. Nass, 2001), the selection of tourism as ‘low-hanging fruit’, and the global partnership with the World Tourism Organization (to jointly develop and the Sustainable Tourism – Eliminating
Poverty programme), the inclusion of SNV in the case studies of the Pro-Poor Tourism Partnership, SNV selected tourism as ‘corporate practice area’. The selection of tourism as a development sector in SNV (SNV AR, 2004) effectuated a surge in the hiring of tourism advisers and countries where SNV wanted to support the tourism sector to reduce poverty (see also Chapter 3).

The tourism practice in Asia was especially redefining and practising the development brokering and the knowledge development modes of ordering. A project management mode was still visible in the various tourism projects and initiatives in the SNV Asia countries (Tourism for Rural Poverty Alleviation Programme, the community-based tourism projects in Laos, etc.). With the strong focus on showing what SNV was good at in its tourism development practice, the organization only measured its development results in the projects it supported. In the organization, the result management mode became somewhat silenced, also as it proved difficult to measure capacity development results in tourism for poverty reduction as an effect (see also Chapters 4 and 6). This was similar to the rest of the organization, as Brinkman and Hoek (2005, p. 41) concluded: ‘[a]ttempts have also been made to assess SNV results in an effort to improve the organization’s management and structure, but this has been no easy task given the intangible nature of advisory practice.’


This strategy is the result of a 1.5 year creative process. It has been fed by lessons from our client work over the last few years, strategy discussions by the Extended Board in 2005, a major external evaluation of SNV in early 2006 as well as various specific evaluations, a subsidy negotiation process with the Ministry for Development Co-operation mid-2006, discussions at ‘strategy road shows’ in all regions during the autumn of 2006, explorations and proposals by three cross-regional taskforces and some parallel policy development trajectories during the first half of 2007, and on-going regional preparations for the strategic plan 2008/2009.

A more flexible stand towards staff was taken and the number of staff hired would be based on successful fundraising, or as the strategy 2007–2015 (SNV, 2007, p. 40) stated:
It is impossible to predict how staff levels will evolve over the coming nine years. Staff volume will become more closely linked to our external fundraising and will greatly depend on the development of our profile and collaborations. There may also be significant variations between countries and regions. In view of the strategic choices made overall staff levels may tend to decline to some extent, depending on our success in mobilizing additional resources. Detailed formation planning will be done in the three-year strategic plan periods.

By mid-2006, SNV was no longer mainly focusing on knowledge development and development brokering modes of ordering. ‘The year 2006 was characterized by a further expansion of SNV’s advisory practice, the forging of new partnerships, and an increased focus on impact, coupled with gains in cost efficiency’ (SNV AR, 2006, p. 9). According to the SNV directors in the earlier mentioned internal email (9 June 2006), capacity development had to focus on achieving development impact, and could no longer be a goal in itself.


In the first years of the second subsidy agreement, the dominant modes of ordering were a combination of development brokering, enterprise and result management, supported by administration. In these years, development vision was much more silenced.

Increasing our focus and revising our revenue model are important elements of the road ahead. Business as usual is not an option. Imminent budget cuts add to the sense of urgency. Preparing ourselves for the future starts today. We need to engage and adapt for us to continue to be relevant, successful and sustainable beyond 2015. (Internal email to all staff, Elsen, 2010, p. 1)

In this internal email to all staff at the end of 2010, the director (the role was renamed CEO in 2009) explained how SNV could remain relevant in a time of budget cuts in Dutch development aid. He introduced SNV’s ‘corporate story’, developed in close collaboration with SNV’s Extended Board. The CEO (2010, p. 1) introduced SNV as:

… a thriving social enterprise, pursuing social objectives in a business-like and (financially) sustainable manner; […] catalysts, ‘market makers’, […] make connections that catalyse change for improved income, employment and access to basic services; […] guided by three core principles: trust, results, and sustainability.
In this quotation, he is referring to SNV as a social enterprise focusing on development results/impacts pursued in a business-like way. This focus was presented in several planning and reporting documents of that time. It shows the shift towards the result management and enterprise modes of ordering.

Earlier, in 2006, the second subsidy agreement was drafted and a new corporate strategy was developed, introducing a strong focus on development impact and diversified funding (SNV, 2007a). In 2007, after a lengthy internal development and consultation process, the Partnership and Resource Mobilization Policy and Procedures were finalized. The vision included (SNV, 2007b, p. 4):

To work on partnership and resource mobilisation is to work from the outside-in. It is to connect, not to delineate. It is to create opportunities, not define turf. It is to seek alignment with the external rather than to segment from within. It is to be an innovating entrepreneur as well as a manager and administrator. In short it is about advancing and increasing opportunities for impact and sustainability.

The policy and procedures documents redefined the enterprise mode of ordering, and brought this ordering mode even more into the limelight, but also stated that administering and managing impact results modes of ordering are also important components of ‘partnerships and resource mobilisation’.

Around the same time, the SNV Managing for Results 2007–2015 – Policy Framework (SNV, 2007c), the Primary Process Guidelines (SNV Asia, 2006) and four White Papers (‘Strategic Choices within Impact Areas’, ‘Delivery Channels’, ‘Local Capacity Builders’, and ‘Governance for Empowerment’) to further strategize the overall SNV 2007–2015 strategy, were drafted and finalized. Through all these documents (subsidy agreement, strategy paper, policy frameworks, guidelines and White Papers), SNV tried to show how it was interweaving the complexity of development with the singularity of projects and results. These characteristics belong to different modes of ordering. Complexity, diversity and messiness are elements of development visioning and development broker modes of ordering, and the narratives of coherence and singularity are characteristics of the enterprise, result management and administration modes of ordering. Thus, phase 5 reveals the interweaving of the acceptance of complexity of capacity development of the first half of the 2000s, and combined it with more singular, linear and definite characteristics of development results, proposed in ‘development impact’.

A few years later, the modes of ordering shifted even more towards enterprise, result management and project management (towards more cohesion and solidity).
A Business Development unit was established at head office, and business development officers were hired in each region to help SNV attract more donor agency funding, especially through projects. In 2010, SNV Asia wrote a ‘programming concept note’ in which it presented SNV’s corporate key strategic priorities for the years after 2010, as ‘improving SNV’s track record in terms of value for money’, and ‘solidify its resource base by diversifying income streams’ (SNV Asia, 2010, p. 1). In line with these priorities, and ‘in order to reach large numbers of poor, SNV Asia decided to engage in programmes that offer high levels of impact and scalability’ (ibid., p. 1).

Also the SNV Corporate Strategic Plan 2010–2012 (p. 57) emphasizes this changed direction:

> The future looks bright for SNV resource diversification. The experience of recent years teaches us that SNV does have a potent mix of track record and assets. Our local presence and local networks, our brokering expertise, our investment in knowledge and product development, our ability to combine change management skills with topical expertise to deliver on locally relevant solutions, our ability to scale these up, connecting policy ambitions to realities on the ground: these are features of our practice that progressively attract the interest of financing partners

In the Annual Report of 2009, it is mentioned that it is crucial for SNV to be able to demonstrate tangible and sustainable results of its work in poverty reduction. As well as the organization’s own wish, ‘there is pressure from politicians, funders and the general public to show that the money invested in international development work is leading to concrete results’ (SNV AR, 2009, p. 71). According to the same report, since 2005, SNV had worked hard on results management, and in 2009, Managing for Results had become a priority project, which finalized at the end of 2011.

In SNV’s corporate strategy for 2010–2012 (SNV, 2010a), the organization looks back at its main concerns during the 2007–2010 strategy implementation period. It focused on the seven points as agreed in the subsidy agreement of 2007 with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It evaluated its main activities in the two impact areas: basic services (BASE) and production, income and employment (PIE). According to the strategy, SNV was able to create a clearer focus within the main development sectors; external evaluations stressed the relevance of SNV’s policy choices and appreciated the growing alignment with national development strategies.
Main lessons learned included a continued corporate focus on a limited number of sectors; BASE and PIE were mutually strengthening each other, but that could produce “hidden results”, as well; intervention logics needed to be fine-tuned even more; and the validation of contribution to impact needed attention. (SNV, 2010a, p. 9)

The strategy (ibid.) continued explaining that in 2010, one of the key objectives ‘was to translate the impact areas to attainable results and associated indicators for change’.

In the corporate strategy, next to the managing for results framework, SNV stated that it would further develop the Actor Constellation Mapping process to better inform multi-stakeholder interventions, as part of the Triple AAA approach. It would focus more strongly on actor constellations or ‘complex systems’ in which SNV and its clients operate. The multi-stakeholder multilevel value chain development approach would also be further developed.

This also led to more partnerships, and how SNV worked with and funded those partners, as described in the SNV strategy 2010–2012 (SNV, 2010a, pp. 11–12):

In addition to a small number of carefully selected, high-profile corporate partnerships, SNV has purposefully reached out to local and international partners – which now total 160 – in regional and especially country programmes to increase the relevance and critical mass of our work. We have diversified our resources and increased targets. Partnerships show better results when there are equal contributions from partners; Internal leadership of partnerships needs improvement; Complementarity is key in partnerships for achieving results, partners are now often overlapping; Resource mobilisation pipeline management needs to be improved, i.e. time between proposal and contract signed, and the time between contract signed and revenue; New resource mobilisation contracts often lead to additional costs (i.e. new hires, additional LCBs and consultants) so that not all additional resource mobilisation result in additional revenue; SNV’s local presence and track record is attractive to new partners, but accessible documentation needs improvement. The Partnership and Resource Mobilisation project will focus its 2010 activities on building a diverse portfolio of funders and growing and using strategic partnerships to leverage funding. In this project the lessons learned as mentioned above will be taken into account.

Although SNV recognized complexity in development by the continued focus on capacity development, and the use of the Actor Constellation Map and the Triple AAA approach, at the same time the organization was also producing and enacting itself as a social enterprise, a business with clear and linear products, and standardized
and harmonized development approaches with straightforward implementation steps (see also ‘Programming – A Concept Note’, SNV Asia, 2010). For instance, SNV tried to develop the Value Chain Development Approach, which is implicitly complex, as one singular ‘bankable’ product. In line with the interweaving shown in the strategic documents of SNV (2007–2015), this demonstrates how diverse and complex development processes on the ground were transformed into coherent and singular organizational processes that tried to achieve coherence and singularity. It is again the combination of (the complex and open) development broker, and knowledge development modes of ordering, with the (more singular and closed) enterprise, result management, project management and administration modes.

Towards the end of the 2000s, a business approach based on ‘bankable products’ had become more and more significant. Business development had become important in the organization:

We continued to invest in building internal expertise to manage or support large proposals. Ad hoc teams provided advice and support in proposal review, assessment of eligibility and budgeting support. Internal experts also prepared training materials and business development tips and conducted skills building sessions on business development and proposal writing (WCA and Balkans). (SNV AR 2010, p. 50)

In the tourism development sector, following the SNV Asia pro-poor tourism practice area evaluation in 2005/2006, the organization tried to change its way of working. After a focus on knowledge development and development brokering (in projects and destinations at the national and the regional level) as, for instance, exemplified by regional knowledge documents, often drafted with partners organizations (Developing Sustainable Communities in 2004; Monitoring and Managing CBT in 2005; Tourism SME Development in 2005; Facilitating Sustainable Mountain Communities with ICIMOD in 2007; Impact Measuring with ODI in 2008; Joining Forces, and Destination Planning with UNWTO in 2010), the focus shifted to development results and donor funding possibilities.

For instance, funding was secured by SNV Bhutan for the Nabji Trail and the Sustainable Tourism Policy and Law project. SNV Nepal was also successful in securing donor funding for Marketing Assistance for Sustainable Tourism Products in Nepal (MAST–Nepal, with UNEP, funded by the EU), the Great Himalaya Trail Development Programme (first a pilot project as part of the UNWTO/ST–EP; the larger programme with funding support of the UK Department for International Development), and the EU funded Higher Impact Tourism Training programme
in seven countries in Asia and Africa. At the end of the 2000s, developing donor funding proposals was an important part of the enterprise mode of ordering.

However, a large joint proposal with the International Centre of Integrated Mountain Development to develop the Great Himalaya Trail in several Himalaya countries, submitted to the European Union mission in Nepal, failed to get funding in 2006 (although as mentioned earlier, parts of the programme got funded in the UNWTO/ST-EP/SNV partnership and later through the UK Department for International Development). And a proposal submitted by SNV Bhutan for marketing and product development in East Bhutan failed to get funding from the EU in 2007. Both proposals were prepared in a period when SNV started its efforts to obtain more external funding systematically and professionally. These projects were submitted just before business development had become an established practice in SNV.

In an internal memo, the then regional director of SNV in Asia (Wehkamp, 2010), looking back at five years of SNV Asia’s development work, concluded that it was not easy to develop sellable ‘products’ in pro-poor tourism. She provided several lessons learned (p. 14):

Market research is required in an early stage to verify choices. Products should be sellable and they should be the most relevant approaches for achieving impact in a particular sector. Products should be deduced from the core business of SNV, ‘The SNV Way’, which needs to be made explicit before products can be identified.

According to Wehkamp (ibid., but also see Goodwin, 2006a) it also helped to hire new staff with a background in the private sector.

As mentioned in Chapters 3 and 4, for her and others in SNV, for example the 2015+ Trajectory Group (SNV, 2010b), tourism as a development practice did not present enough fundability, besides not demonstrating its development impacts sufficiently (SNV/OC&C, 2010). To some in the organization, tourism had not adhered to the enterprising and result management modes of ordering, enough.

However, considering that SNV managed to secure funding for two large projects in tourism (at the end of 2010), would suggest otherwise. ‘Three of our biggest deals of 2010 (ASI/DFID in Kenya, MSI/USAID in Ghana, and an EU global grant for vocational education in tourism) were generated through partnerships identified by early intelligence from SNV staff’ (SNV AR, 2010, p. 50). The High Impact Tourism Training Programme (HITT, funded by the EU in four SNV countries in
Africa and three in Asia) at the end of the 2000s, was part of competitive bidding with the EU. The Great Himalaya Tourism Development Programme (funded through UK Department for International Development) was favoured by DFID, because of SNV’s tourism development approach. Both were actively supported by the Business Development units of SNV.

5.5. Conclusions

In this chapter, I analysed SNV’s internal organizational changes, and how that influenced tourism as a development practice in the organization. As such, this chapter contributed to answering question 4.

Based on my research, I distinguished six organizational modes of ordering. In all phases over the studied 20 years, traces of each mode of ordering could be identified, each defining and redefining the situation and resulting in particular organizational practices. Modes of ordering worked out differently at different times and places in the organization, and they collided, overlapped or interacted, effectuating ‘SNV’s way of working’ and securing stability for some time. Indeed, SNV could remain relevant exactly because of multi-discursive modes of ordering. In every period a particular mix of modes of ordering prevailed. It is the interweaving of different modes of ordering in SNV that produced, enacted and embodied the organization. The changing combinations of modes of ordering provided the possibilities for ‘organizational change’ in SNV, to ‘totally reinvent’ itself and ‘stay relevant’ at the same time.

In the second half of the 1990s, an effective combination of administration and project management, supported by an enterprise ordering mode, resulted in a quasi-NGO implementing SNV-owned projects at the micro-level. Other modes of ordering, like development brokering (‘process approach’), and result management were present, but were less articulated and pronounced. As introduced in Chapter 3, in the 1990s tourism could emerge, partly because of changing development paradigms in SNV, but also because of the strong autonomy of directors and project managers in the various countries.

Due to external and internal development and organizational changes, in the early 2000s, the effective combination shifted to development brokering, development visioning and the administration modes of ordering, welcoming complexity in development aid and the establishment of the organization as a Netherlands-based international NGO, focusing on capacity strengthening of meso-level organizations.
To enable such a radical shift in the modes of ordering, the organization had to silence the project management mode. In these years, tourism became an important development sector as part of development brokering, development visioning and enterprising interacting modes of ordering.

After the radical shift in the organization in the first years of the 2000s, a more gradual shift emerged around the mid-2000s towards development impact and measuring these impacts. By that time, a combination of development brokering, result management, enterprise and administration modes of ordering was effective. The project management mode had re-emerged (to make it easier to sell SNV ‘products’), as supportive to this combination. Development visioning was only to contribute and be supportive to the development brokering mode, and had become less effective as a separate ordering mode.

By the mid-2000s, multiple modes of ordering constituting the tourism development practice included knowledge development (vision) and development brokering (multi-stakeholder development initiative at national and local level), project management and enterprise modes of ordering. This strong combination resulted in a ‘SNV corporate practice area’, a partnership with the World Tourism Organization, and a status as ‘low-hanging fruit’, a development sector for resource mobilization.

With the second subsidy agreement, the combined result management and enterprise modes of ordering became even more important in the SNV’s 2007–2015 strategy, which focused on impact areas, partnerships and ‘sellable development products’ (SNV Asia, 2010). Although in some SNV Asia countries tourism projects were externally funded, overall in SNV resource mobilization results came too late to show the organization that tourism had put central the result management and enterprise modes of ordering. As tourism could not show enough development and fundraising success, the development sector was phased out in SNV in 2011.

The multiple modes of ordering also influenced the way development success was produced and measured in the organization. In the researched 20 years, the measurement and the presentation of development results have been defined and redefined, resulting in changing calculating and judging practices. This is the topic of the next chapter.
Chapter 6

Measuring pro-poor tourism impact

Part of this chapter is submitted as article to Journal of Sustainable Tourism as:

Hummel, J. and van der Duim, R. Measuring tourism’s development impact; the case of SNV in Asia
6.1. Introduction

For SNV, it is crucial to be able to demonstrate the tangible and sustainable results of our work in poverty reduction. As well as our own desire to do this, there is pressure from politicians, funders and the general public to show that the money invested in international development work is leading to concrete results. Since 2005, SNV has worked hard on results management, and in 2009, ‘Managing for Results’ (MfR) became a priority project, to be finalised at the end of 2010. (SNV Annual Report, 2009, p.71)

In this chapter, I focus on answering research question 5. Development agencies like SNV have been facing a growing demand to better demonstrate and communicate development results. It has been one of the main concerns in international development in recent years (see e.g. Altenburg, 2007; Bamberger, Rao & Woolcock, 2010; Brouwers et al., 2010; IOB, 2011; Roefs & Ooms, 2011; Tanburn, 2008; Ton, Vellema & de Ruyter de Wildt, 2011). Also in tourism, demonstrating development results has been problematic (Ashley & Mitchell, 2008; Mitchell & Ashley, 2007, 2009, 2010). In the 20 years that SNV was involved in tourism, debates on development results and measuring pro-poor impacts remained centre stage. What exactly needed to be measured? Who would be responsible for measuring? Did results needed to be measured at the level of output, outcome or impact? This chapter explores how development results in tourism were measured and presented in SNV, and how that changed over time.

First, I introduce theories and practice of how development results have been measured in recent decades, and show the growing complexity of multi-layered development initiatives, involving a growing numbers of parties, and increased accountability demands of donor agencies. Second, I show how difficult it has been for development agencies and academia alike to measure pro-poor impact from tourism development. Third, I present findings related to different phases in which SNV in Asia tried to measure and demonstrate the pro-poor impact of tourism, and discuss these findings in terms of qualification and non-qualification. Finally, I present some conclusions.

6.2. Measuring development results

Over the past 30 years, controversies about the merits of providing and receiving aid have shifted focus from ideological discussions on development results to pragmatic questions, like whether it works (Mayoux, 2005). In the 1980s and 1990s, impact evaluations became important for showing accountability. They were of significance to aid agencies in terms of meeting the ever increasing accountability demands of
their governments and for contesting the rhetoric of the anti-aid lobby (Mayoux & Mosedale, 2005). Ever since the principles for aid effectiveness were outlined in a declaration in Rome in 2003, the focus on development results and measuring these results has increasingly been on the development aid agenda (ActionAid, 2011). The increasing interest in demonstrating development impact was reflected in the Millennium Development Goals, and the aid effectiveness meetings in Paris (2005), Accra (2008) and Busan (2011). This led to a call for more impact measurement of development interventions in developing countries (Hansen, Klejntrup & Andersen, 2011).

In the Paris Declaration of 2005, donor countries and aid recipients agreed to hold each other accountable for the declaration commitments. The Declaration committed developing and donor countries to, for example, focus on and measure development results (ActionAid, 2011). Especially after the Evaluation Gap Working Group’s (Centre of Global Development) publication “When will we ever learn? Improving lives through Impact Evaluation” (Savedoff, Levine & Birdsell, 2006), there was a surge in donor funded impact evaluations, and a new entity for funding impact evaluations (International Institute for Impact Evaluations – 3ie) was established. A network for impact evaluation networks and groups within development aid emerged (Hansen, Klejntrup & Andersen, 2011).

Most development programmes are based on a more or less complex causal development model: emphasis is put on the use of a logical planning model to structure the chain of causality between programme inputs, outputs and outcomes (Späth, 2004). The OECD/DAC (2002, in Späth, 2004, p. 4) defines output as ‘the products, capital goods and services which result from a development intervention; […] may also include changes resulting from the intervention which are relevant to the achievement of outcomes’. It defines outcome as ‘the likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention’s output’ (ibid.). Monitoring and evaluation systems measure the effectiveness of inputs, and evaluate outputs and outcomes of development projects. According to the World Bank (2002), the aim of monitoring and evaluating development activities is to provide government officials, development managers and civil society with better means for learning from past experience, improving service delivery, planning and allocating resources, and demonstrating results as part of accountability to key stakeholders.

Whereas outcomes are directly related to the objectives of a development project, impacts refer to ‘positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended’ (OECD/DAC, 2002, in Späth, 2004, p. 4). Impact evaluations, therefore, focus on
the long-term impacts of project interventions. These impact evaluations measure the wider effect of the project. It attempts to measure changes that occurred because the programme was implemented and would not have happened otherwise (Hendriks, 2010). Späth (2004) defines an impact evaluation as ‘the systematic identification of the effect positive or negative, intended or unintended, on individual households, institutions and the environment caused by a given development activity such as a programme or project’. The impact evaluation approach maps out a causal (result) chain from inputs to outcomes and impact, and test the underlying assumptions (White, 2009).

However, this causal impact evaluation model is not without problems. First, many actors and factors are at play in effecting the changes observed at a higher aggregated level (Jamieson, Goodwin & Edmonds, 2004; Phillips & Edwards, 2000). The more abstract the measurement, the harder it is to measure impact with confidence, as changes cannot reliably be traced back to specific interventions or programmes (Späth, 2004). According to Späth, this is a ‘fundamental methodological problem of impact analysis’ (ibid., p. 6), leading to an ‘attribution gap’ (Kuby, 1999 in Douthwaite, Kuby, van de Fliert & Schulz, 2003), dividing the ‘impact chain’ into two parts, one in close proximity to the project, but far away from development results, and another one up in the realms of overall development progress (see Figure 6.1.).

Figure 6.1. GTZ (German Agency for Technical Cooperation) impact model

Source: Douthwaite, Kuby, van de Fliert, and Schulz, 2003, p. 250
The second problem is the issue of the extent to which livelihood impacts can or need to be quantified. Beneficiaries, like community members, are generally not per se interested in all the pros and cons of an intervention, let alone in the reduction of these impacts in numerical or monetary terms, because they can make decisions by prioritizing only those aspects that are valuable to them. However, for reporting livelihood impacts to outsiders, making comparisons with other interventions, and identifying implications for policymakers (showing accountability), systematic quantification is wanted (Ashley, 2000; Ashley & Hussein, 2000). Since the late 1990s, donors, the development community and researchers have become increasingly interested in the potential of impact assessment and monitoring and evaluation to capture the complexities of development and link assessment with ‘improving practice’ (Mayoux & Mosedale, 2005). According to Hulme (2000, p. 80):

… explicitly, Impact Assessments are promoted by both the sponsors and implementers of programmes so that they can learn what is being achieved and improve the effectiveness and efficiency of their activities. Implicitly, Impact Assessments are a method by which sponsors seek to get more information about programme effectiveness than is available from the routine accountability systems of implementing organizations.

So the basic question becomes for whom do we measure impacts and show accountability? Is it for donor agencies and the development community, who need verifiable results for justifications of their actions and the necessity of their existence? Or are impacts and accountability measured to analyse the long-term impacts on the livelihoods of the beneficiaries of aid interventions? There has been a growing concern that impact evaluation had to be more practically useful, moving from a focus on ‘proving impact’ to ‘improving’ practice (Hulme, 2000). In SNV this shift was clearly visible in the shift away from projects, and measuring outputs in projects at the 1990s, to a focus on practice areas, and improving SNV’s advisory services in the early years of the 2000s.

Third, and related to the above, as the importance of impact evaluations increased so did the expectations and the challenges. As Mayoux and Chambers (2005) explain, in the 1990s impact evaluations focused mainly on the economic dimension of poverty, whereas at the end of the 1990s, the multidimensionality of poverty, and less quantifiable dimensions like vulnerability and voicelessness, became important. The expectation was that more widely defined poverty impacts could be measured. The challenge was how to do so.

Fourth, the observed changes are often only partly the result of an intervention. Other factors, in or outside the area, can interact or interfere with the effects of
the intervention. Further, other unplanned events can affect the results, like natural hazards, urbanization, growing economies, business cycles, war or climate change (Leeuw & Vaessen, 2009).

Finally, the assumption that in social projects measurement after a certain period of time should show a steady increase in development impact, is not per se to be expected. According to Woolcock (2009), the way development is achieved over time in many, or even most of the projects of development agencies, are not well understood: ‘We know we need “baseline” and follow-up data, but the content and shape of the proverbial “black box” connecting these data points remains wholly a mystery, to the development industry’s peril’ (ibid., p. 5). These projects could then undeservedly be deemed failures (Woolcock, 2009). This is one of the reasons why a simple before and after measurement with a control group does not always give a representative view of reality. Result measurement is nevertheless dependent on political attention spans and organizational goals, and international mandates to achieve ‘targets’ like the Millennium Development Goals. This is consequently leading to ‘preferring “high initial impact” projects over projects that might actually respond to the problems that poor countries themselves deem a priority, but which are inherently complex, hard to measure and/or necessarily slow to demonstrate positive impact’ (ibid., 2009, p. 7).

The problem of attribution is especially prevalent in social development projects that are aimed at improving participation or enhancing empowerment for example, like the overarching capacity strengthening objective of SNV.

6.2.1. Credible evidence and valid conclusions

Struggles with different schools of thought and use of methods, complicate impact evaluations even further. White (2009, 2010) discussed the ‘somewhat heated’ debates about impact evaluation within the development aid community, especially about differences in definitions of impact evaluation, contribution rather than attribution, and the use of the best available combination of methods. There was a demand for more effective and innovative ways to monitor and evaluate the nature and extent of the impacts of development initiatives.

This resulted in a school that called for a ‘gold standard’ or best acceptable quantitative evaluations using randomized trials, and obtaining statistically rigorous counterfactuals (Bamberger et al., 2010). It is part of an ongoing debate about evaluation design and ‘more generally about what constitutes rigorous quantitative evidence of causal impact’ (Hansen, Klejntrup & Andersen, 2011). This school
focuses on what White (2010, p. 155) describes as an ‘attribution analysis’. In this definition, an impact evaluation is a study that tackles the issue of attribution by identifying the counterfactual value of the indicator of interest in a rigorous manner (White, 2010, p. 154). In other words, it measures the situation without development interventions (through control groups or control situations), compared to one with development interventions, in which the difference is referred to as the development impact. The increased focus on ‘attribution analysis’ resulted in a growing number of evaluations, a range of institutions working on impact measurement, the establishment of new specialized institutions and networks, like 3ie, and even the establishment of a specialized scientific journal, Journal of Development Effectiveness (cf. White, 2009).

Another school of thought focuses on all evaluations that refer to impact (and often outcome) indicators as an impact evaluation (White, 2010, p 154). This school is based on the earlier mentioned definition of the Development Assistance Agency of the OECD (in Späth, 2004), in which any long-term effect produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended, is considered development impact. These impact evaluations often propose the use of a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods that include questions about the social, cultural and political context within which development problems are embedded (Bamberger et al., 2010). The impact evaluations in SNV have been based on this definition of impact evaluation (cf. MfR HO Team, 2010; SNV, 2007; van der Laan, 2011). Bamberger et al. (2010) argue that considerable progress has been made in the application of mixed methods. However a number of challenges continue to face evaluators who wish to apply mixed methods in impact evaluations.

A first challenge is that mixed method evaluations developed and conducted by larger development organizations over many years use somewhat ad hoc approaches, and most do not apply the methodological rigor that is required by academic journals. A second is that although claims are made that mixed methods are accepted in impact evaluations of development projects, in several countries and situations divisions between quantitative and qualitative researchers can still be quite pronounced, resulting in quantitative surveys that are not clearly linked to in-depth case studies or other qualitative data collection. A third is that the senior staff of governmental planning agencies and even development agencies have only been trained in economics and quantitative methods; the same applies to the staff of local universities (Bamberger et al., 2010).

However, according to Ton (2012), there can be a synergy between the different schools of impact evaluation, especially when complexity and dynamism are duly
recognized (Rogers, 2009) and specific key evaluation questions are formulated. Ton et al. (2011) formulated the following basic questions for which information and ‘credible’ evidence has to be collected: Does it work? (What positive or negative changes did the intervention generate?); How does it work? (What components of the support generated intended or unintended outcomes, for whom and under what condition?); and Will it work elsewhere? (What components might work for whom under what conditions?). The main question then is how to arrive at an appropriate combination of evaluation questions with a proper research design to measure outcome patterns, obtain insight into the inner workings of the interventions and gain an appreciation of the social embedding of the impacts. The three questions need different information with particular depth and detail.

The answers to the questions need to be ‘robust’ and be able to address the most obvious threats to validity claims (Ton et al. 2011, pp. 70–71). Following Shadish, Cook and Campbell (2002), Ton et al. (2011) diagnosed four threats to ‘valid conclusions’: statistical conclusion validity (comply with proven methods to estimate association or correlation between variables); internal validity (the way causality is attributed in the evaluation; the logic behind the observed correlations); construct validity (the way that generalizations are made from categories used in the evaluation to broader units of representation; this stresses for instance the importance of precise definitions and concepts); and external validity (the way that the findings are generalized to other persons, times and contexts) (ibid., p. 71).

In short, the main issues in these types of impact evaluations are: what questions to ask (what do we want to measure? How is what we want to measure defined?); and what qualifies (what is ‘credible evidence’, and how can we collect it? And how can we draw ‘valid conclusions’?).

6.2.2. Measuring development results in tourism

In the field of tourism, showing development results, gathering credible evidence and drawing valid conclusions has been equally challenging (Ashley & Goodwin, 2007; Goodwin, 2006a; Jamieson, Goodwin & Edmonds, 2004; Mitchell & Ashley, 2010; Mitchell, 2012). Especially Mitchell and Ashley have contributed to the discussion on tourism and development impacts on the ‘poor’. Apart from the more generic problems mentioned earlier, according to Mitchell and Ashley (2010, p. 8), it is not only difficult to find the appropriate methods to measure development impact in tourism, it starts already with the difficulty of defining ‘tourism’: ‘this is partly because tourism is an economic activity which is a composite of services and goods surrounded by rather unclear boundaries – so it is inherently a slippery
animal.’ Tourism development has been distinguished as essentially unstable and unpredictable, more ‘complex’ as an activity or system, which makes tourism development different from other industries (Farrell & Twining-Ward, 2004; Schianetz, Kavanagh & Lockington, 2007; Hendriks, 2010). The dynamics of tourism, like fast declining or rising visitor numbers, make it harder to quantify the impacts of tourism on communities and local livelihoods (Simpson, 2007).

Part of the complexity of tourism that makes it ‘a slippery animal’ is that not only tangible impacts matter to the beneficiaries. A wide range of non-financial livelihood impacts ‘serve to decrease vulnerability, develop skills, improve access to information, enhance and create new infrastructure, provide credit and markets, improve food security and strengthen community organizations’ (Simpson, 2007, p. 2). The less-tangible attributes include renewed pride, empowerment, physical security, cultural benefits, optimism and participation in decision making (ibid.). Taking a livelihoods perspective helps to identify the wide range of impacts – direct and indirect, positive and negative – that matter to local people. It contrasts with narrow evaluations of local benefits that focus only on job creation and cash income (Ashley, 2000).

A second challenge is that it is not easy to define and measure how tourism contributes to poverty reduction. Mitchell and Ashley (2010, p. 10) state that the contribution of tourism to poverty reduction is related to pro-poor growth. Already in 2001, Ashley, Roe and Goodwin (2001, p. 44) showed that, based on six case studies from different parts of the world, it seemed possible to ‘tilt’ the tourism sector at the edges, to create more opportunities for the poor, for example by switching to locally-produced products and services, expanding business linkages, protecting the assets of the poor and including the voice of the poor in tourism plans. The case studies were especially able to show an increasing demand for goods and services provided by the poor, and an increased asset base for the poor (two of the key characteristics of pro-poor growth within tourism). Based on the six cases, according to the authors, recognition of the poor as legitimate stakeholders as well as attitudinal changes in government and the private sector, and a spread of participatory approaches were likely to be of long-term significance.

However, a few years later, in the Pro-Poor Tourism Partnership Annual Register of 2007, Ashley, Roe and Goodwin show their frustration with the limited demonstrated development impacts of tourism. They state (PPT Partnership, 2007, p. 1):

As is evident from this year’s edition we still do not have enough examples of initiatives with clear demonstrable impacts. Similarly we lack case-studies which demonstrate
the mainstreaming of tourism and poverty reduction strategies. There is legislation in Vietnam, but there is no published data to demonstrate to demonstrate its impact on the livelihoods of the poor. There are some projects listed here with clear and direct benefits to the poor, such as Gambia is Good in The Gambia, the Nabji Korphu Trail in Bhutan, and the Nam Ha project in Laos. But in most cases we do not have data on impacts. Such data is essential if we are to identify best practice and to encourage funders to back initiatives.

It is therefore not surprising that Mitchell and Ashley in their 2010 publication state that the concept of pro-poor growth within tourism remains contested. After a short discussion on the difficulties with the term, they conclude (ibid., p. 10):

However, agonizing over subtle nuances in which definition of pro-poor tourism to adopt is not the best use of our time. Of concern to policy makers and practitioners in the field is not so much how to label their tourism, but how – and how much – to invest in tourism; the likely impact on poverty; and how to enhance the poverty reduction effect. This pragmatic approach represents an implicit acceptance of Osmani’s relative definition (2005) – growth is pro-poor if it benefits the resource poor more than in the past.

A third and related challenge is the definition of ‘poor’ in tourism. As argued by Mayoux and Chambers (2005), the definition of poor changed from an economic definition to a wider multidimensional one that includes cultural, social and environmental dimensions (see also Späth, 2004). Based on an elaborate tourism and development literature research, Mitchell and Ashley (2010, p. 12) conclude that ‘poor’ was defined only in ‘a rather crude way’ in the literature reviewed. Either authors did not address it, or it was assumed that tourism growth would benefit the poor. These authors, for instance, focused on specific groups of people (craftsmen, fishermen) as proxies for the poor, or identified certain poor regions in developing countries and assumed that all or most of the people in the area were poor.

In their own research and development work, Mitchell and Ashley (ibid., p. 12) also encountered difficulties defining ‘poor’ and ‘poverty’ and concluded:

In our own work we are increasingly using a dynamic and self-categorizing definition of ‘poverty’. For instance, asking hotel managers what proportion of their staff are from a poor background, as a way of estimating the role of tourism in lifting hotel employees out of poverty over time.

This of course is problematic when comparing development results within a destination, but especially between tourism destinations. If definitions of poor
already change between different hotel managers based on their perceptions of poor, and getting out of poverty over time, comparing and judging these development results becomes almost impossible.

Being pragmatic, and after circumventing definition obstacles, Mitchell and Ashley (2009, 2010) tried to find ways to demonstrate development impact. Based on an extensive literature study, they found that the main research methods used to demonstrate impacts at the level of destinations (the level where SNV and most development organizations are involved), include the livelihoods analysis, enterprise analysis, local economic mapping and pro-poor value chain analysis. At destination level, a local economic mapping/pro-poor value chain analysis appears to have the broadest coverage of ways to benefit the poor (Meyer, 2008; Mitchell, 2012; Mitchell & Ashley, 2010).

In a recent study, Thomas (2014) compares different pro-poor value chains, using a pro-poor impact percentage (PPI%) to indicate development impact on the poor in a destination. He shows that in the comparison per case a different definition of poor can be used. He presents three methodologies for calculating the PPI% for two pro-poor tourism value chain case studies in Laos and Mali that use different definitions of ‘poor’ and achieve varying conclusions on pro-poor impact. He concludes that using different methodologies leads to very different claims on development success. Even though a lot of effort went in to the calculations of these PPI% (also in several studies related to SNV, e.g. Ashley, 2006b; Ashley, Ellis & Schramm, 2009; Ashley, Hummel & Mitchell, 2007; Mitchell, 2012; Mitchell & Ashley, 2009, 2010; Mitchell et al., 2009; Thomas, 2014), it was of less significance to SNV as it did not identify the number of people or households benefitting socio-economically from tourism, as was agreed as impact indicator in SNV by 2007. Of course, these percentages can still provide donor agencies with an indication of the relative importance of tourism for local development in particular destinations.

As shall be seen, the problems with defining ‘tourism’, ‘pro-poor growth’ and ‘poor’, debates on definitions and elements of impact evaluations (what are the right questions, what do we need to measure, how do we define what is being measured?), difficulties finding the best and most practical research methods (or a mix of research methods), and what qualifies to be measured (what is credible evidence, and how to draw valid conclusions?), have all been elements in the struggle of SNV to measure pro-poor tourism impact, and to demonstrate and communicate development results. As mentioned before these problems are unquestionably not only restricted to the tourism sector, but apply to all development sectors.
6.3. Calculation and qualifying: qualculation and non-qualculation

To study the struggle of SNV with impact measurement in tourism, insights from actor-network theory are used. As introduced in Chapter 2, Callon and Muniesa (2005) understand calculation as a three-stage process: first all relevant entities are sorted out, detached and displayed within a single space, like a sheet of paper or a spreadsheet; then, entities are manipulated and transformed; and finally, a result is extracted. A new entity is produced, in the form of a ranking, a sum, a decision.

In line with the argumentation of Callon and Law (2005), in this chapter the notion of calculation is broadened to include judgment, with which it is usually contrasted. In order for calculation to collide with judgment, the neologism ‘qualculation’ was introduced by Cochoy (2002). (Quantitative) calculations and (qualitative) judgments are all about arraying, manipulating and framing entities – in an endless variety of ways – in one space in order to achieve a particular outcome, a particular conclusion (Callon and Law, 2005).

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the power of a qualculation depends on the number of entities that can be enlisted, the relations between those entities, and the quality of tools for classifying, manipulating and ranking them. This implies a material ordering that can be done in endless different ways. The same holds true for non-qualculation. There can be resistance to qualculation. It depends on the number of entities that can be deleted and silenced, and relations un-made to avoid listing and ranking. This can be done through rarefication – that is, taking away entities to calculate and judge – or by proliferation, namely providing an overload of resources impeding calculation. Similar to qualculation, methods of non-qualculation may be more or less powerful, and more or less effective (Callon & Law, 2005, p. 720).

Through development impact stories, policymakers, managers and advisers of development organizations convince donor agencies, policymakers, journalists and wider audiences of the ‘development success’ in particular development sectors (Mosse, 2005, 2011; Mosse & Lewis, 2005; Phillips & Edwards, 2000). From this perspective, measuring development success builds on the stabilization of a particular interpretation of events, in which development impact is temporarily calculated and judged successfully. As success is fragile and failure a political problem, a hegemonic narrative has to be produced, and has to be socially and materially worked out. A dominant account enlists more and more entities, is negotiated, agreed upon and documented.
6.4. Proving, improving and moving: 20 years of development impact measurement in SNV

In the researched 20 years, SNV repeatedly stated in its annual reports that measuring development results was important to the organization. In the section below I describe and analyse the impact measuring attempts of the organization in three cases in Nepal and Asia, related to the main phases discerned in Chapter 4. The first case is situated in the period before SNV became independent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the end of the 1990s and the beginning of 2000s, SNV implemented tourism in Nepal as an economic component in the District Partners Programme in the west of the country, when the Pro-Poor Tourism Partnership asked SNV if they could study the tourism component as a case in their PPT project (Ashley et al., 2001; Saville 2001).

In the early years of the 2000s, the tourism programmes in Laos and Vietnam were started up. As described in Chapters 3 and 4, in these years in Asia the tourism development practice grew rapidly. In 2005, SNV decided to evaluate the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the tourism practice in Asia. It was the first time the SNV had evaluated a development practice in a whole region. This is the second case I introduce. SNV Nepal’s involvement in the Tourism for Rural Poverty Alleviation Project is part of the study.

The third case is that of measuring development results along The Great Himalaya Trail in Nepal. In 2008 a pilot project started along the Great Himalaya Trail in western Nepal (the same area as introduced in the first case) and expanded the whole Great Himalaya Trail in 2010 with funding of the British Department for International Development (DFID). Two DFID reviews (2012 and 2013) and one final impact assessment by SNV Nepal (2013) were conducted.

In these three cases I show how measuring development results and presenting development successes changed over time. I analyse the production of development results and successes as processes of qualculation, and how that is achieved.

My initial information about these cases originated from my involvement in these projects and programmes. In the first case I was a tourism adviser for SNV Nepal working closely together with the PPT Partnership consultant who studied and developed the case. During the second case I was the SNV Asia regional network leader, and as such involved in coordinating the evaluation with SNV head office, the tourism advisers in the different SNV Asia countries, the SNV Asia management, and the evaluators. In the third case I was involved in the further development of the Great Himalaya Trail concept with the International Centre for Integrated Mountain...
Development (as a coordinator for the Himalaya programme), the design phase of the pilot project in western Nepal (as part of the UNWT/ST-EP/SNV partnership), but was not involved directly in the implementation and evaluation of the DFID funded project.

6.4.1. Till 2001 – Projects showing development results

Before 2000, SNV had only been involved in isolated small-scale tourism projects in a few countries. At that time, Nepal was the only country in Asia where SNV was involved in tourism. Sustainable tourism development activities were initially very small components in a few integrated rural development projects. Based on a consultancy and an initial SNV Nepal background paper (Hummel, 1999a), a tourism proposal was developed, which was included as a considerable component in the District Partners Programme (DPP), implemented in the Karnali of western Nepal. The overall DPP had three interlinking strands: improving governance by strengthening the capacities of local organizations and government agencies; social mobilization to generate enthusiasm and support within communities; and economic development through the provision of advice, training, small grants and loans. The DPP staff worked directly with local governments, supported business development activities and offered training in business planning. In tourism, the DPP primarily focused on the micro-level and the meso-level, working with local governments, local NGOs, community-based organizations and micro-businesses, and undertaking and commissioning studies on the potential impacts on ‘the poor’ of developing tourism products in Humla.

Partnerships were established with other organizations to provide training in skills ranging from report writing to bookkeeping. Local partner agencies such as Women’s Welfare Service and Snowland Integrated Development Centre, and international agencies, like The Mountain Institute, were involved in programme components. Financial support for small projects or business ventures was available for community or business ventures within DPP, through a District-level and Village-level Infrastructure Development Fund, a Community Support Fund, and a Venture Capital Fund. The first two schemes involved grants and required co-funding and labour from district or village communities. The third scheme offered loans to groups, although individuals were given access to group funds. Funding allocation was based on the acceptance of a business plan. The aim of these schemes was to encourage the development of business skills such as accounting and bookkeeping as well as business management among individuals and groups who would not be eligible for bank loans or other forms of assistance (Allcock, 2003).
The DPP developed its own monitoring and evaluation system, based on a logical framework that was part of the project document. As tourism was only a part of the project, it did not have a specific focus on tourism development outputs and outcomes. It was included in the economic development output and outcome indicators of the overall DPP project monitoring and evaluation system. As such, the development results of tourism would not be measured separately, and would remain hidden in the output and outcome indicators of the economic development objective of the DPP.

An initial feasibility and baseline study was developed, conducted and documented in 1998, to generate initial data for monitoring evaluation and for setting development targets for the tourism component in the DPP. It concluded that over 400 households in the district could generate income from portering, driving pack animals, running local teashops and camping sites, and selling local souvenirs (Hummel, 1998b, 2000). However, the DPP manager was not convinced about the possibilities of tourism as a tool for poverty reduction. He believed that only relatively richer people in the district would benefit from tourism development. He wanted to have external feasibility studies developed for the Simikot–Hilsa trekking trail to be sure that benefits would be generated for the poor in the Humla district. Two feasibility studies were conducted. Both concluded that tourism benefiting the poor was feasible (Paudyal & Manandar, 2000; Paudyal & Sharma, 2000).

After reading the earlier mentioned SNV Nepal background document, one of the coordinators of the Pro-Poor Tourism (PPT) Partnership Project visited the SNV office in Kathmandu. During discussions at the office, it was suggested that the tourism component of the DPP be included as a case in the best practices study of the PPT Partnership. The tourism adviser based in Kathmandu and the director in the SNV country office embraced the idea, and the DPP manager agreed to be involved.

The PPT Partnership developed its own impact evaluation format to study the cases and hired an external Nepali-speaking international consultant (Saville, 2001). The consultant worked closely with DPP staff in the Humla district, and with the support of the local staff interviewed 56 local people along the main Simikot–Hilsa trekking trail. Based on local knowledge (gained through interviews), national knowledge (Nepal’s poverty definition) and international knowledge (US$1 per day) of poverty lines, she devised several categories of poor and one category of less poor (above US$1 per day), and categorized the interviewed and overall population in the district. It was clear that the majority of people in Humla, including those living along the Simikot–Hilsa trail, could be categorized as poor according to the international poverty line of US$1 per day per household member. Of the 56 people interviewed, only two would not rank as poor by international standards; 96% of the Humla
community would earn less than US$1 a day. Saville’s study (2001) calculated and judged that tourism could reach poorer people, perhaps not the poorest of the poor, but certainly people living on less than US$1 per day.

Saville calculated that due to the programme’s tourism initiatives, by January 2001, 40 households in Simikot and 360 households along the trail from Dandaphaya to Yari were affected by social mobilization, and that if each household member involved distributed benefits to the entire household some 2,800 people in the district would benefit. She counted 28–30 ‘teashop’ style lodges, over 20 campsites, around 50 horsemen and about 12 porters active along the Simikot–Hilsa trekking trail. She summarized the progress of the tourism component of the DPP as shown in Table 6.1. Several outputs were enumerated in a single table.

Table 6.1. Main progress of the District Partners Programme’s sustainable tourism programme between October 1999 and January 2001

- 410 toilets built along trail.
- Community-based organizations (CBOs) mobilized in all the communities along the trail.
- 6 Appreciative Participatory Planning and Action (APPA) business plans prepared by CBOs.
- 32 Community Support Funds approved for the development of micro-enterprises by stakeholders along the trail and in Simikot.
- 6 Venture Capital Fund loans approved for micro-enterprise development throughout Humla.
- 4 district level and 2 Village Development Committee level Infrastructure Development Funds approved for improved water supplies, electricity, irrigation etc. throughout Humla.
- Tax of $2 per tourist for trail maintenance now being levied by District Development Committee.
- 1 community campsite already started by Kermi Youth Club.
- Tax on grazing of community pasture by trekking pack animals started in one community (Kermi) and planned for others.
- Community enterprises options studied and plans for implementation underway (hot springs, community campsites, village tours).
- Multiple-use visitor centre to act as a nodal point for tourism actors studied and planned.
- 1 orientation field trip for CBO and NGO members to view village tourism in Gorkha district conducted.

Source: Saville, 2001
By explaining her categorization of poor in her final report, recording which jobs were done by which categories of poor, and presenting enumerated lists of project outputs in single tables, Saville’s calculations showed how these were transformed into new material arrangements (numbers, tables and texts in printed reports), systems of measurement (devised and used categories of poor and less poor), and methods of displacement (a report that is used in the DPP, SNV and the PPT Partnership, and spread throughout the internet).

When summarizing ‘the main achievements, so far’, Saville (2001, p. 39) started with the successes of SNV before the tourism component was implemented in the area, and linked in this way the previous development results to the tourism component:

Even before the start of DPP, a major SNV achievement was to open the trail between Simikot and Hilsa for use by yaks and mules. Without this, trekking tourism could not have developed. Under DPP, supplementary infrastructure developments continue to be made such as drinking water supplies, trail improvements, irrigation, electrification, and so on. Now local government and their contractors (with DPP funding and technical support) implement infrastructural improvements themselves. This means that local capacities are being built to generate and maintain the necessary infrastructure for tourism. One main achievement of DPP’s sustainable tourism programmes to date (since October 1999) has been improved sanitation due to 410 toilets built between Simikot and Yari. This will improve the health of Humla people but will also make a better impression on tourists so that they want to come back or tell their friends about the area.

She linked the basic services component of the programme to the tourism component, and continued with the development results of the social mobilization approach of SNV, again linking tourism to wider development results (ibid.):

Another [achievement] is social mobilisation through the formation of some active and forward-looking CBOs along the Simikot-Hilsa trail. These CBO members have the potential to gain from tourism through small business. Already improved capacity to analyse their situation, prepare business plans and make funding proposals is being achieved by the most active CBO members. If social mobilisation can be developed further, changes in gender norms and constraints and in caste discrimination might be possible, though they are far from being achieved at this stage. On the policy level DPP has managed to generate some rapport with local government officials and strengthen their capacity to support CBOs.
Saville summarized the achievements of the economic component of the DPP as:

… generating income from tourism within Humla through tourist group taxes for trail maintenance and exploitation of community resources. With time, Humla people will gain the skills to enable them to participate in tourism (guiding, cooking) or in providing tourism-related commodities (vegetable, poultry, apple, honey and beeswax production, handicrafts). Similarly they will acquire a better understanding of tourist requirements. Lastly a significant achievement has been bringing hope to a very poor and under-developed remote area.

Saville’s report showed the programme staff and SNV how tourism was related to the programme’s objectives and to wider integrated rural development aims (including private sector development and governance focuses), and judged it to be a significant achievement.

Through her study, Saville calculated and judged the progress and impact of tourism development along the Simikot–Hilsa trekking trail. She enumerated the numbers of toilets, the grazing taxes, the camping sites and the categories of poor, and transformed it all into severable tables in one report. Her research with the programme staff in Humla, her discussion with local people and staff in the district, the DPP office in Nepalganj, and advisers and managers at the Country Office in Kathmandu, her convincing single narrative, as written down in the PPT Partnership report, linked to the earlier mentioned SNV Nepal tourism documents, created a space for pro-poor tourism in the SNV Nepal office. Saville’s work in Humla changed the discourse, as her explicit focus in the final report on poor and her judgement that tourism could benefit the poor in the project area, allayed the concerns of the project manager and convinced the managers of SNV Nepal that tourism for poverty reduction could be successful.

After a period in which the outputs and outcome of tourism were hidden in the overall monitoring and evaluation system of the DPP, a process of withdrawing the possibilities to calculate the development results of tourism, the PPT exercise succeeded in emphasizing the actual and potential development results of tourism for the poor together in one review report. In the case study research, Saville had enumerated, reworked and transformed the pro-poor development of tourism in Humla. She summed up these results in tables, lists of outputs, categories of poor, assembled in one single space – the study report. Programme staff, the programme manager and SNV accepted Saville’s report. The categories of poor, and the numbers of jobs and activities the poor in the different categories were involved in, qualified as benefits to the poor for the programme manager. The initial resistance against tourism
as a development tool in the DPP (in the form of the manager’s objection to carrying out a baseline study and to measuring the development results of tourism as a separate development practice), a process of rarefication, was overcome by the enrolment of the tourism practice in the PPT Partnership exercise. Saville’s case study created space for calculation and judgement in tourism. The initial achievements of tourism development in the programme as described by Saville, and the recognition that SNV had achieved significant development results in tourism in the DPP, were accepted and embraced in the organization. The report had achieved qualculation within SNV Nepal.

The study achieved more. Saville’s report was part of a larger research PPT Partnership research project, based on six case studies from around the world. That project extracted lessons learned and enumerated the cases in new tables, aggregating and transforming development results in an overall lessons-learned document (Ashley et al., 2001; UNWTO, 2002). The toilets, camping sites, categories of poor, the beauty and remoteness of Humla, the potential of benefiting the poor, were described in other tourism and development documents, on the Pro-Poor Tourism (PPT) Partnership website, in a chapter in a book on successful pro-poor tourism of the World Tourism Organization (see UNWTO, 2002) and in a presentation at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. As part of the PPT Partnership Project, the calculations and judgements in Saville’s report were once more compared, reworked, manipulated, transformed and summed up in single places, like the UNWTO report of 2002 and the 2001 PPT overview document prepared by Ashley, Roe and Goodwin. More qualculation was realized; through these reports and presentations, the project was transformed into a global development success as part of the PPT network.

To summarize this phase, development success was measured and judged through indicators, monitoring and evaluation systems, based on logical frameworks, which mainly focused on measuring input and output in single rural development projects. This situation was similar for the SNV projects in Tanzania (Leijzer, 1999) and Botswana (Rozemeijer et al., 2001). Consultants and staff collected data on input and output indicators themselves, and reported directly to higher levels inside and outside the organization. Impact evaluations were conducted at the level of projects or countries. Calculation and judgment were relatively easy, and development success was directly based on the input of advisers in the projects, and the output results measured and presented from the projects. As advisers were directly involved or closely linked to development and production of the impact evaluations, resistance from advisers (resulting in non-qualculability) was limited. As shown in the case above, resistance with tourism as tool for poverty reduction was mounted by the manager of the DPP, as he opposed a separate baseline and evaluation of the tourism
development results, which made gathering information on tourism results difficult. The PPT partnership case study overcame this temporary non-qualification, by developing and implementing an accepted separate exercise.

6.4.2. 2002–2006 – Improving ‘practice areas’

Einstein once stated: Not all what is measurable is important. And not all that is important is measurable. In this era of fast measurable results, it is good to pay heed of this statement. If you are an adviser, you do not achieve the ultimate results yourself, but the country you provided advice to. And that is exactly the principle. (Rob van den Berg, former director IOB, director Evaluation of the Global Environment Facility in Washington, as cited in the SNV Annual Report of 2004)

At the end of the 1990s, the discussion in SNV shifted from a focus on own implemented projects to capacity strengthening in particular development sectors, which SNV called ‘practice areas’. An extensive SNV internal learning process gradually selected first nine (SNV, 2003) and later four practice areas. SNV’s Annual Report of 2004 introduced these four corporate practice areas, ‘sustainable tourism’ being one of them.

In the first years of the 2000s, SNV’s focus changed from an organization implementing projects, to an advisory organization. It expressed its ambition explicitly in the 2001 subsidy agreement, as ‘a leading knowledge organization in the areas of its expertise’ (SNV, 2003, p. 4). It seemed that development success was based on a direct knowledge position in development discourses, rather than on development results on the ground: ‘it is essential that we get a stronger face in the sector and thus show that our considerable resources are also made useful in that way. Our improved performance in knowledge sharing and development will be an essential foundation for our future.’ (SNV, 2003, p. 30)

It was assumed that through better advisory services, based on a set of values, poverty reduction would be achieved:

We (can) apply our values in deciding what issues we focus on, whom we work with (identifying key ‘circles of clients’), and how we work (values are woven into our capacity development services and thematic areas). There seemed to be a consensus among the participants of the specialisation trajectory that till date we have insufficiently used the powerful potential that values have in improving our practice. Applying our values consistently is one of the key options we have in making our work with clients more poverty relevant. (SNV, 2003, p. 8, italics in original)
In this phase the focus on assessing impact was mainly through ‘diagnosing and learning’ (ibid.). Together with clients, SNV wanted to ‘assess the impact from time to time, in terms of acquired capacities and poverty reduction results. This learning then may feed into strategy or partnership revisions’ (SNV, 2003, p. 9, emphasis in original). It focused on ‘[e]nhancing action-based learning and knowledge development on poverty in general and on the specific development problems our client-organizations face, through diagnosing, benchmarking, impact assessments and innovative research together with our clients and other actors’ (ibid., p. 10). However, SNV did not want to do these impact assessments on its own; it had to be studies of SNV’s clients: ‘Our ultimate results are our clients’ results. Let us not all build separate structures for measuring our results beyond output. It would be a waste of valuable money’ (SNV AR 2004, p. 11). As shown in the following paragraphs, this refusal to measure development impact was not related to cost efficiency or budget cuts, but was based on more conceptual arguments: the organization did not want to measure development results that were beyond its control.

The Annual Report of 2004 presented a section on ‘the result debate’. It is one of the few SNV annual reports reflecting on the need for and effectiveness of development aid in general, and development result measurement in particular. It was produced around the time of the Paris Declaration, and the presentation of the Millennium Project Report. Although the chapter focused on the change from output measurement to development impact, at that time the organization did not want to take full ownership of impact measurement. However, SNV wanted to make results plausible through research. The SNV Annual Report of 2004 stated (p. 11):

SNV is 100% accountable for the services we deliver, but cannot be held fully accountable for what is beyond our control. We nevertheless have to learn whether our approach works, and to investigate how we can improve our work and not just fumble in the dark. Dealing with these issues implies the following:

• We can be held accountable for the choice of clients, so we ensure we are working with those organizations that have the potential to make a difference and are representing the interests of the poor.
• Through research and joint evaluations, we can make plausible claims as to how we contribute to poverty reduction. The research need not to be continuous or every time we are involved, as this would disrupt the cost benefit balance and further question of the effectiveness of money spent.
In the same annual report of 2004 (p. 12), SNV explicitly stated which development results it wanted to show:

- We are fully accountable for the services we deliver to our clients. Our clients are our raison d’être, and their opinion on our work is important to us. Through satisfaction reviews we ‘measure’ our clients’ satisfaction with the quality of our service, our approach, and relevance of our service.
- We provide services to clients to strengthen their capacities. Whether these capacities are indeed strengthened is beyond our control. However, at the end of all assignments we review the capacity strengthening objectives that were laid down in the initial contract, and assess (based on indicators) how well we reached those objectives.
- On top of these ‘scoring systems’, we illustrate our way of working through case descriptions, an activity we spend at least 10% of our advisory days engaged in.
- After a few years (depending on the type of intervention), we sit down with the various stakeholders from the region or practice area we have been working in and conduct joint evaluations. We may also conduct studies challenge or validate our most important assumptions, and analyse how poverty levels have changed and what our relative roles and contributions were.
- In addition, we have more strategic evaluations that examine at a corporate level whether our approach works or not.

The SNV Asia pro-poor sustainable tourism (PPST) practice area evaluation, conducted at the end of 2005 and finalized by mid-2006, had been one of the impact evaluations contributing to the overall evaluation process for the second subsidy agreement. For the first time a whole development sector in one of the SNV regions had been evaluated. The evaluation was proposed in 2005 as a joint learning evaluation, as an exercise to improve the PPST practice, but changed during the process of the development of the Terms of Reference into a full external impact evaluation to show development success, and was included as one of the elements to prove to the Dutch government that the first subsidy agreement had been implemented successfully.

An M&E specialist and the private sector development officer at SNV head office in The Hague, together with the PPST network leader for Asia, jointly agreed to organize the evaluation in three parts. The first part consisted of an overview of the main achievements of tourism initiatives in the five SNV Asia countries (Nepal, Bhutan, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam). This part of the study was particularly concerned with the output of the PPST practice in Asia. The second part of the evaluation focused on four case studies, selected to provide an insight into the areas where
SNV tried to improve its practice, at an overall knowledge development sharing level, a national policy level and a local destination level. Cases from Nepal and Laos were selected at project level (Tourism for Rural Poverty Alleviation Project in Nepal, and two community-based tourism sites in Laos), and in Vietnam and Bhutan at policy level (the process of the development of the pro-poor tourism law was included in both Vietnam and Bhutan). At the Asian region level, the performance of the PPST knowledge network as a knowledge development and sharing platform, and as an overall emerging development practice area in SNV, was included in the evaluation. The third part of the evaluation was a compilation of the overall evaluation of the PPST practice based on the first two parts of the evaluation. Three external consultants were hired to develop and conduct the second and third parts; the first part was conducted by a former employee of SNV, who had been involved in the tourism practice in Asia.

The first part of the evaluation was an overview of the SNV Asia PPST tourism practice, based on over 400 SNV tourism documents of five SNV countries that had been produced during the period 2002–2005 (Stoer, 2006). These documents included project proposals, progress reports, field reports, activity reports, reports on the number of days advisers worked on specific tourism-related tasks (entered and enumerated in a software programme called timetell), job descriptions, etc. It took more than four months to compile all these data into a story that could support the evaluation; especially calculating the number of advisory days per specific tourism project and initiative and enumerating them in one table and one story was time consuming (Goodwin, 2006a). As it took time to assemble this information, it only could be used towards the end of the evaluation (ibid.). It created a situation in which the evaluators had the feeling that SNV did not have an overview of the inputs and outputs of the tourism programme in Asia. There was so much information at different places – in the projects, at the country offices, in all the different reporting documents – and so many ways of recording the time spent on activities and projects (Stoer, 2007, personal communication), that it was difficult to assemble it all in such a short time, in one place, the Part A document of the evaluation. The sheer proliferation of information in different documents, data systems, direct advisory days (and the calculations of these days), different projects and development initiatives, information spread over several countries and with different advisers, impeded calculation and judgement and led to unintended non-qualculturability for some time.

The second part of the evaluation, Part B, consisted of four case studies. Two case studies focused on the activities of SNV in various projects in Nepal and Laos. The evaluators concluded in the case study reports that considerable work had been done
by SNV and outputs had been reached. However, according to the evaluators, it had been difficult for them to calculate the number of beneficiaries, and they concluded that although SNV had the potential to reach large numbers of beneficiaries, it was not clear whether they actually reached them (Goodwin, 2006a). In the case of the development processes of the design and drafting of sustainable tourism laws in Vietnam and Bhutan, the evaluators judged that the initiatives were very relevant, but that the number of beneficiaries could not be counted, or at least not yet. The improved laws would impact beneficiaries only, several years down the road. It was not clear to the evaluators how this impact would be measured in the two countries and within SNV (ibid.).

In the PPST knowledge network of SNV in Asia (the last case the evaluators studied), the aim of the network was to disseminate the knowledge generated in the SNV projects and initiatives, and to bring in innovations in tourism for poverty reduction from outside SNV. Developing and sharing development practice knowledge was an important development paradigm in the early years of the 2000s, and was considered very relevant by the evaluators for the further development of the tourism and development sector in SNV and wider development aid. Building the capacity of the staff of partner organizations is one of the main aims of the organization. However, again, it was very difficult to establish how many people had benefited from this initiative. Therefore, in all cases the evaluators found it difficult to show the development results. Even though there was a large amount of information gathered in the organization, the significance of the information was questioned by the evaluators during the Part B phase. It remained difficult for them to enumerate and calculate the available information, and to bring it together. It seemed that SNV lacked the instruments to easily evaluate results (cf. van der Laan, 2010).

For the evaluators it was also not clear why the cases had been chosen by SNV. The evaluators had the feeling that they should have focused far more on the case studies that worked with beneficiaries in projects, to assess and prove development impact, while SNV in the evaluation was still focusing on ‘improving practice’, showing that SNV had changed from an organization that was only working in projects, to a development advisory organization that strengthened capacities through improved policies and increased knowledge flows within the whole tourism sector. The evaluators had moved beyond that and were already looking for development impacts, as presented in Managing for Results (SNV, 2007b).

At the same time, the evaluators emphasized a ‘pressing need to begin to measure and report impacts’ (Goodwin in Mitchell & Ashley, 2010, p. 5), to focus more on commercial viability in SNV programmes and to develop stronger linkages to the
private sector. This already shows the changing development approach, away from joint learning, away from how it was done and to improve on it, to a focus on what development impact SNV aims to achieve through the development and promotion of ‘development products’ (Toon Keijsers, 2009, personal communication). These ‘development products’ had to be ‘bankable’ and promoted to donor agencies (Eelco Baan, 2009, personal communication).

In the third part of the evaluation, the findings of the earlier parts of the evaluation still had to be assembled. The two earlier parts were analysed and conclusions were drawn on the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the PPST practice area in Asia. The work of the practice area was judged relevant by the evaluators, but more emphasis needed to be put on impact measurement. The draft evaluation was discussed at the SNV head office, and with the senior tourism advisers and managers involved in SNV Asia. After some debate over incorrect facts in the case studies of the different countries and several discussions about the presentation of the results with the tourism advisers and managers, a final version was agreed upon between the M&E officer, the management in Hanoi and The Hague, and the consultants. The management team of SNV Asia wrote an official management response, indicating how they would implement the recommendations of the evaluation (more focus on measuring and documenting development impact, and more engagement with the private sector), and the practice area remained one of development sectors within SNV.

The SNV annual report of 2005 (p. 15) mentions that the SNV Asia PPST evaluation report concluded that the tourism practice area clearly contributed to poverty reduction, had a huge potential market and that SNV was the leading niche player in Asia. In the early years of the 2000s, this would certainly qualify as a development success in SNV. At that time, SNV considered the satisfaction of clients, and the establishment of ‘a face and position in the sector and contribute to international debates’ (SNV, 2003, p. 4), as essential to becoming a leading knowledge organization in that development sector. The evaluators clearly recognized this leading role of SNV as a development organization in tourism (Goodwin, 2006a). As such, SNV’s tourism development sector had been successful, and was recognized for that by SNV, as reflected in the annual report of 2005. At the same time SNV, changed into an organization that had put development impact, and measuring those impacts, more central. SNV Asia’s PPST practice had not demonstrated those impacts compellingly.

As the study concluded that SNV’s work in Asia was very relevant, and that a stronger impact orientation in tourism and development in Asia was needed (Goodwin, 2006a), SNV Asia agreed to adjust its tourism for poverty programmes, focusing more on
development impact and impact measurement. For the phase of 2007–2015, SNV Asia countries stated that they would emphasize pro-poor impact in all their tourism development activities (SNV Asia, 2008). Together, the final report, the response of SNV head office and the official SNV Asia management response achieved a final settled result, achieved closure. It resulted in SNV continuing with tourism as a development sector, but the development practice had to emphasize impact measurement.

The above illustrates how large internal organizational changes in SNV had their consequences for the way results were measured and weighed. As also shown in Chapter 5, over a period of about five years, SNV transformed itself from an organization that at the end of the 1990s implemented its own-managed and measured development projects, via a period as an advisory organization, into an advisory organization that wanted to show what it achieved, what its main development impact was. These shifts also influenced development result measurement, as presented in 2007 in the SNV managing for results framework. The framework introduced a shift from ‘proving’ development impact, via ‘improving’ development practice, to ‘moving’ managing for development impact as the direction for development results measurement (Ashley & Mitchell, 2008; SNV, 2007b).

**6.4.3. 2007–2010 and 2011 and beyond; ‘managing for results’**

Impact value for money - We need to further improve the quality, relevance and accountability of our advisory practice by strengthening our own capability to prove our advisory results (outcome) – as well as the development results by our clients (impact).

(Internal SNV memo, 2010, p.1)

In 2006, just after the SNV Asia pro-poor sustainable tourism evaluation was concluded, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs commissioned an independent consultancy firm to evaluate the SNV’s overall work. The then chairman of the board of SNV concluded in the annual report of 2006 that ‘[t]he evaluation resulted in a favourable judgment of SNV’s performance’ (SNV AR, 2006, p 5). The annual report further mentioned that the year was characterized by ‘a further expansion of SNV’s advisory practice, the forging of new partnerships, and an increased focus on impact, coupled with gains in cost efficiency’ (ibid., p. 6). Lessons learned from the first half of the 2000s were incorporated ‘in a tailor-made strategy for the period 2007–2015. The approval by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs of a subsidy in support of the strategy has set the stage for the realization of these ambitions’ (ibid.). According to the SNV Corporate Strategic Plan 2010–2012 (p. 75), the Managing for Results 2007–2015 policy framework was approved as the monitoring protocol by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the middle of 2007.
The new SNV strategy, the recommendations of the SNV Asia pro-poor sustainable tourism practice area evaluation, and programming for the second phase of the collaboration with the World Tourism Organization in 2007, provided a context for an increased emphasis on the value chain development approach and impact measurement in the SNV tourism practice in Asia towards the end of the 2000s.

SNV’s partnership with the World Tourism Organization evolved from a first phase (2004–2007) in which tourism (as part of the UNWTO’s ST–EP framework) was implemented in a wide range of small and less coherent development projects, to a second phase (2008–2010) in which a focused package of larger tourism projects were implemented in 15 countries, and whose designs explicitly integrated monitoring and reporting on poverty reduction impacts. The Memorandum of Understanding for the second phase stated (SNV/UNWTO/ST-EP Foundation, 2008, p. 13):

To be able to present realistic data on the contribution tourism makes to poverty reduction, partners will cooperate on developing, testing and applying methodologies for measuring the impact from tourism. Partners will further develop, disseminate and apply the tourism value chain analysis as a methodology toward this end and explore how this methodology can be best applied in the tourism projects. This will allow partners to more accurately estimate the overall contribution that the projects make in reducing poverty.

This focus fitted well with development debates on the use of the value chain approach in tourism and poverty reduction, and contributed to the changing conceptualization of pro-poor tourism (PPT) as a development approach (Meyer, 2009, 2011). However, it also posed uncertainties about asking the right development impact questions: what would qualify as development impact, and how it should be measured? SNV wanted to scale-up its development practice and so that a larger number of poor people would benefit from tourism development in Asia. The question was how the developed pro-poor value chain approach could increase the number of beneficiaries, and how to measure it subsequently.

The tourism value chain analysis study by Ashley (2006b) on Luang Prabang was a direct result of the PPST evaluation in Laos (Ashley, 2006a). Based on the recommendations of the evaluation, Ashley was requested to advise SNV how to implement a wider range of PPT interventions, achieving more development impact and engaging the private sector in Luang Prabang and Laos. This study was the start of several specific value chain related studies and events in PPST, supporting a change process in development approach in tourism in SNV Asia and in Africa (Ashley, 2006b,c, 2007; Ashley & Mitchell, 2007, 2008; Majerus, 2009; Majerus et al., 2008, 2009; Mitchell & Ashley, 2009; Mitchell & Coles, 2009; Mitchell et al., 2009).
In a paper titled ‘Value chain analysis and poverty reduction at scale’, Mitchell and Ashley (2009) summarize their main findings based on these and other tourism value chain and enterprise development studies and training courses, and conclude that there are several implications for tourism practitioners who want to have a greater impact on poverty reduction. The first is the need for a detailed analysis to challenge development intervention assumptions. There should be a focus on analysis, intervention logic, and monitoring and evaluating impact. Second, the potential scale of the pro-poor impact generation should be assessed. Third, benefitting the poor does not necessarily mean working directly with them. Fourth, the way value chains are governed (creating an enabling policy and implementation environment, or not doing so) can result in different pro-poor impacts. Finally, it takes the whole tourism sector in a destination, sometimes even beyond, as the unit of analysis.

According to the paper (ibid.), the strength of the value chain approach is that it challenges assumptions and generates an empirical basis to evaluate possible interventions, particularly related to the scale of poverty reduction impact. Combining a wide perspective of the multiple strands and actors in the chain with a specific focus on barriers to entry and terms of engagement of the poor target group, helps inform the design of market-based interventions. The authors claim that the value chain approach generates benchmarks through comparable analysis in contrasting destinations. Explaining how and why a destination is different from others helps to explain the key factors differentiating tourism-poverty linkages.

The value chain approach used by the Overseas Development Institute was based on calculating a PPI% (pro-poor impact percentage), the percentage of the total amount of money generated in the value chain that reaches the poor. SNV wanted to scale-up its development practices and was interested in reaching a larger number of poor beneficiaries. The PPI% did not indicate the number of poor beneficiaries achieved, and as such the approach developed with the Overseas Development Institute could not provide the results information needed by SNV (the same was true for the need to achieve larger numbers of poor beneficiaries in the UNWTO/ST–EP/SNV partnership). The SNV did not regard PPI% as a results indicator, as with the percentage the tourism development practice could not easily show development success in terms of beneficiary numbers, within SNV.

Around the same time, SNV’s managing of development results evolved into explicitly measuring results at two different levels. Roefs and Ooms (2011) explain how managing for results happened at the operational (the project or local) level and at the organizational (corporate) level. The authors state that in order to manage development results at both levels, SNV had to develop a set of Managing for
Results Standards, supported by an evaluation policy and a planning, monitoring and evaluation (PME) format, to assemble and show development results at the SNV corporate level, while at the same time more and other information (with a wider variety of tools and methods) could be gathered to show development results at operational level on the ground (often in projects).

The Standards provide minimum quality criteria for planning, monitoring, evaluation, learning, and the organization of these processes. The evaluation policy provides for a framework within which evaluations will be carried out. No methods or approaches are prescribed. The PME format is compulsory, but methods and tools for planning, monitoring, evaluation and learning are not. (Roefs & Ooms, 2011, p. 3)

These efforts show how SNV tried to provide clarity on what qualified as results, what the relevant entities were and how they needed to be summed up at corporate level. Manuals detailing the process of collecting information were written, a new reporting format was designed and letters explaining what information needed to be collected were sent to the various SNV countries (Arts & van der Laan, 2010; van der Laan, 2011). Thus, more entities were put into circulation in order to achieve a new summing up (numbers of beneficiaries in one document) at corporate level.

In the following, I analyse the measuring and documenting of development results at the local level and the corporate level at the end of the 2000s. First, I introduce the Great Himalaya Trail project at the operational (local/project) level, as this project was the successor of the tourism initiatives in western Nepal around the turn of the century, followed by the Tourism for Rural Poverty Alleviation Programme of the first half of the 2000s. The pilot project was initially implemented in western Nepal, under the UNWTO/ST–EP/SNV partnership, between 2007 and 2010. It was followed by a larger project, along the whole Great Himalaya Trail in Nepal, financially supported by the UK Department for International Development (DFID). The Great Himalaya Trail pilot project and the larger DFID project included a value chain analysis and development approach to increase development impact.

I then assess the process of aggregating development results in one place at the corporate level, as was proposed in the Managing for Results project. Following that, I bring the operational and organizational levels back together, in a discussion on why it did not work out in this case. Calculation was achieved at the operational level through the calculations and judgements in the evaluations of the DFID. However, as tourism was already excluded as a development sector by 2011, SNV decided that it no longer needed to show development impact to the corporate level. Therefore, tourism as a development practice could not show its development impact within the organization.
The operational level: Demonstrating pro-poor impact in the Great Himalaya Trail Development Project

The Great Himalaya Trail Development Project focused on tourism destination development, along the main trekking routes in the mountains of Nepal, and included value chain development, small enterprise development and multi-stakeholder capacity development approaches. In a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between UNWTO/ST–EP and SNV, specific development impact targets had been developed, based on a logical framework. At the end of the pilot phase a small internal impact evaluation was conducted, comparing impact targets with number of beneficiaries achieved. As the larger DFID project was already agreed upon, the (positive) development results of this pilot phase were mainly neglected.

The pilot project had been implemented in Humla (the same case area that Saville studied during the first phase) and Dolpa. The project was then expanded to include Manaslu/Myagdi, Lower SoloKhumbu and Taplejung. SNV had been active as a development organization in Humla, Dolpa and Taplejung since the 1980s. In all three areas it had run tourism-related development projects since the end of the 1990s. The larger Great Himalaya Trail had three destinations overlapping with the Tourism for Rural Poverty Alleviation Programme (Dolpa, Lower SoloKhumbu and Taplejung). As such, the support to the destinations along The Great Himalaya Trail mainly built on the earlier tourism support of SNV as presented in the earlier phases (Goodwin, 2006a,b; Saville 2001).

The main elements of the larger DFID-supported Great Himalaya Trail Development Project included the branding and marketing of the trail; developing the capacity of key partners to plan, develop and manage an inclusive tourism sector; enhancing market-oriented tourism businesses along the trail; and improving social and environmental outcomes in the target districts. It included a value chain approach to support small-scale enterprise development along the trail.

According to the 2012 internal annual review of the programme (DFID internal report), the project was at least as successful as the earlier District Partners Programme and Tourism for Rural Poverty Alleviation Programme. The report (ibid., p. 16) stated that the programme was ‘arguably Nepal’s best designed and executed tourism programme to date’.

The internal document (DFID internal report, 2012) mentioned that the project had been branding and marketing the trail very successfully, and that the capacity
of local stakeholders to plan and manage tourism development in the district had been enhanced. However, at that moment, it remained unsure whether poor local people had benefited from the interventions. The project could not yet show any calculated development impact, other than marketing efforts, media coverage and training output (ibid.). As was explained in the report, the project had not appointed a planning, monitoring & evaluation adviser and no data on the social-economic and environmental indicators could be collected. With only a few calculations, and outputs mainly based on narratives, the project was judged an A+ (outputs moderately exceeded expectations).

A year later, the next internal review of SNV and DFID gave a similar picture (DFID internal report, 2013), again without thorough calculations. Output 1: marketing and promotion of the Great Himalaya Trail (GHT) improved, scored an A++ (substantially succeeded expectations); output 2: ability of key partners to plan, develop and manage an inclusive tourism sector is improved, resulted in an A+; output 3: market-oriented tourism businesses along the GHT developed, totalled an A (met expectations); and output 4: improved social and environmental outcomes in targeted districts, scored a B (moderately did not meet expectations). Again this resulted in an overall judgement of A+.

The report stated that the Great Himalaya Trail had been branded globally as Nepal’s new iconic product, and resulted in a strong buy-in from Nepal’s and international tourism industry. The government leadership and support from the Nepal Tourism Board in the multi-stakeholder tourism strategy development was also regarded as very good. In the report it was assumed that together these outputs will enable tourism companies and host communities and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises along the trail to maximize benefits (DFID internal report, 2013). At the same time, the report proposed the immediate carrying out of a thorough study on impacts, as the development impacts had still not been calculated.

In the second half of 2013, SNV’s Great Himalaya Trail project advisers calculated (‘based on data and information/inputs from the district and secondary sources’) the project end results in a separate document. The project’s initial logframe target stated: ‘increase the income of 1,072 micro, small and medium enterprises by US$1.21 million and create 2,251 jobs by 2013’. At the end of 2013, the project team calculated that there were 772 engaged micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (40% new, 60% improved; 45% run by women), with a total annual earnings of US$1.78 million (US$2,328 per enterprise) and 1,388 people employed (either self-employed or by the enterprises). The number of enterprises established/ improved
and the number of jobs generated were lower than targeted, but overall earnings seemed significant. It remained unclear how many of the poor benefitted from these jobs and the income generated by these new/improved enterprises. The advisers seem to assume that all enterprises contributed to poverty reduction.

Based on the earlier mentioned annual reviews and a scoping review carried out by the Adam Smith Institute in February 2013, DFID considered the project successful (even before the impact results were available), and proposed a continuation for the programme. As SNV was phasing out of tourism as a development sector, it is not involved in the current phase of the project, which the Adam Smith Institute is implementing.

By the time the SNV project staff could report on its development impacts in the second half of 2013, SNV Nepal no longer needed to report on these development results in the SNV corporate Management for Results PME format, as it was closing down tourism as a development sector (Tej Raj Dahal, personal communication, 2014).

The organizational level: Managing for Results corporate standards

With the change from project implementation in the 1990s to capacity development through advisory services in the first half of the 2000s, SNV felt a need to create an approach that would help practitioners to monitor the changing relation between their short-term activities and longer-term strategic objective (Greyn & Fowler, 2010). During the first several years of the 2000s, SNV developed the Triple AAA approach, a model that described the advisory services process of SNV as a capacity development organization (ibid.). The Triple AAA approach signified the ongoing process of analysis & planning, action & monitoring, and assessing results & evaluation, in three interconnected cycles, namely a strategy cycle stretching over three years or longer, a client engagement cycle of one to three years, and an assignment cycle for individual activities of between a few weeks and a few months (ibid., p. 258).

By the middle of the 2000s a managing for results (MfR) framework was developed to help staff to measure SNV’s development results better (SNV, 2007b). In 2009, SNV internally assessed its impact measuring approaches to further improve the development results reporting in the organization (van der Laan, 2010). Randomly selected programme coordinators of different SNV countries and former Triple AAA learning group members were contacted and interviewed, and a draft report shared among those interviewed.
Van der Laan (2010) explains the extremely diverse contexts in the SNV organization, with different regional realities and different needs for quality standards, tools and formats; what worked well in one country, could hamper progress in another. Summarizing what was successful in the Triple AAA in relation to development result measurement, van der Laan (ibid.) shows that the Triple AAA approach was used by the whole organization. Assignment agreements and memorandums of understanding were signed with local clients, and SNV country teams developed actor constellation maps and result chains as part of the Triple AAA process. The interviewed staff agreed that the approach created a results focus in planning and implementation, better specified goals with clients, and a higher quality of reporting with more concrete information on outcome. At the same time, most interviewees indicated that they needed more support with planning for results and results management. Based on the interviews, van der Laan (ibid.) concluded that the old review tools were not useful to assess output and outcome. The Triple AAA did not have the tools to plan for and measure the contribution to impact, to do baselines, and also did not calculate return on investment. In general, the weakness of the Triple AAA model was its lack of tools to assess results (Arts & van der Laan, 2010; van der Laan, 2010).

In short, SNV was working with a wide range of development planning and implementation instruments, but it was not monitoring and calculating its development results carefully. The management for results project of 2009 had to set up a framework to bring all development results information together, and transform it, in one single place at the SNV head office. In the new framework, the project focused on the Triple AAA and management for results instruments, and included the use of result chains with a focus on also measuring results from private sector development.

In a PowerPoint presentation, the management for results project (van der Laan, 2010, slide 14) recommended continuing the Triple AAA approach, but to make the use of the approach easier, improve some Triple AAA tools ‘so they become more useful and help the SNV staff to do a better job at planning, monitoring and evaluation’, make the formats simpler, use them as a checklist and focus them on multi-client work. Van der Laan (ibid.) proposed developing and introducing missing steps and tools, so that SNV’s corporate standards for planning, monitoring, and evaluating its primary process would be complete. She also proposed implementing Triple AAA and management for results ‘properly, with active management support, so that the standards can do what they were intended to do: help staff to be more effective, efficient and relevant’, and to ‘communicate about importance and successes in Triple AAA & Management for Results to help change our results orientation culture’ (van der Laan, 2010, slide 14).
A few of the last slides of the management for results presentation (van der Laan, 2010) included an analysis of why the previous implementation of the Triple AAA and management for results approaches had not been fully successful. Some issues related to internal management of SNV (A ‘head office thing from The Hague’, no resources provided, staff not trained, only those formats that were internally audited were used). However, the main reason given by the interviewees was that there was too much competition with resource mobilization. There was little management inspiration energy devoted to the implementation of Triple AAA and management for results approaches, as all energy was devoted to raising funds for new initiatives and projects in the various SNV countries.

The members of the management for results project were certain that the implementation of a monitoring and evaluation system based on the Triple AAA and management for results approach would work this time, as many people in SNV believed that (van der Laan, 2010, p. 21) ‘there is a sense of urgency about results measurement now: to mobilize resources we need to demonstrate concrete outcome and impact results, and we need baselines, SMART indicators, harmonized outcomes, an intervention logic with results chains.’ Van der Laan (ibid.) stressed that ‘donor requirements for results measurement are stricter than our old client satisfaction review’, that donors appreciate quality standards for internal processes, and above all that ‘managers realize that resource mobilisation and Triple AAA & MfR are interdependent. MfR is one of the two prioritized corporate projects, next to Resource Mobilization.’

As a result of the managing for results project, SNV introduced six quality standards in the organization, which included a review whether the project or programme was in line with SNV’s policies, and the implementation of the Triple AAA cycle (impact-oriented analysis and planning for results using intervention logics; implementing plans and using baselines and targets to monitor progress on a regular basis; and assessing and evaluating intended and unintended results and reviewing the validity of intervention logics), followed by a reflection on results and lessons learnt, sharing findings and feeding them back into strategy, policies and planning, and finally an impact evaluation. As was stated on the SNV website (SNV, 2015):

Together these standards encourage the participation of development stakeholders in the planning, monitoring, evaluation and learning. The standards underscore the importance of recognizing complexity in developing capacity and being flexible in planning processes, and introduce real-time evaluation, which strongly supports learning.
Each standard had been worked out into quality criteria, and for each criterion guidelines were provided and corresponding references were made to tools, policies and formats (Roefs & Ooms, 2011). With these tools, SNV provided staff in the various SNV countries a set of tools to work with to report development results at corporate level. At the same time, the monitoring and evaluation frameworks of the project donors were used at the local level. SNV tried to develop a reporting system that would work for projects (and their donor agencies) and have a minimum of aggregated reporting at corporate level. It tried to fill part of the gap (identified in figure 6.1) between the development results produced at the local level and the reporting needs at the corporate level.

Closing the gap between the operational and organizational level

Before 2001, the unit of impact assessment was clearly the project or country level. With the establishment of regional offices around 2005, the unit for impact assessment moved to ‘practice areas’ in the SNV regions, with the pro-poor sustainable tourism evaluation as an example. At the end of the 2000s, SNV shifted from emphasizing monitoring especially for learning, towards more focus on accountability; and from focussing on improving advisory services, towards development impact measurement and fundraising.

Around 2010 the unit of assessment became the level of projects again, but now complemented with development reporting requirements at the corporate level, such as the use of a development result chain (SNV, 2007; van der Laan, 2010), the quality standards and the PME format (Roefs & Ooms, 2011). The difference between what was being measured on the ground and what needed to be reported to the corporate level had always existed in SNV, but was now made explicit in the management for results project, with an operational and organizational level. The project tried to interconnect these levels through the quality standards and formats.

The project also tried to link the accounting (proving) with learning (improving) and managing (moving), as introduced in the managing for results framework of 2007. In a brochure of 2012, SNV brings it all together, and explains the need for its managing for results system as ‘accounting for results we achieve during and after our work’ (proving); ‘learning from results we achieved and those we have not’ (improving); ‘steering management decisions based on results’; and ‘profiling SNV’s added value’ (moving) (SNV, 2012, p. 1, bold in original).

At the same time, the example of the Great Himalaya Trail in Nepal shows the project team’s full compliance with the DFID result reporting system, and its far
less consideration for the internal corporate SNV standards. By 2013, this was also no longer necessary, as tourism no longer needed to account for its numbers of beneficiaries in the reporting system of SNV.

The reporting at two levels is similar to what Ton et al. (2012) noticed in impact evaluations in value chain development. On the one hand, these authors see a need for more case-based impact measurement, with a specific focus on credible evidence and validity. This implies that a mechanism or intervention can never ‘always’ and ‘universally’ work, and any ‘average’ measure of impact needs to be defended by a clear specification of the context in which it applies. On the other hand, more systematic and meta-level impact assessments need to be conducted to show development results. Case studies can be useful to make the link between these two levels, as they are context specific and can identify complex development outcomes, while at the same time they can demonstrate more robust development results (cf. Vellema et al., 2013).

6.5. Conclusions

This chapter focused on answering research question 5. Over the years, the way in which SNV development results were measured and reported changed considerably. In each development phase, output, outcome and impact were defined and redefined, measured and present differently, due to changes in development concepts, approaches, subsidy agreements and modes of ordering in SNV.

Until the early 2000s, development success was measured and judged through output and outcome indicators in individual projects. The process focused on accounting at the project level. At the corporate level, development initiatives and projects were aggregated as ‘activities’, and development impact was not measured, beyond a very occasional country evaluation.

Between 2001 and 2007, SNV was transformed into an advisory organization, which tried to show how it implemented development. SNV focused more on how it could improve its development practices and how it achieved results, than on what development results had been achieved. At the corporate level, the organization measured development results through clients’ satisfaction reviews. It was difficult to show development impact at either the project or the corporate level.

Over the years, SNV was gradually transformed into an organization that wanted to show what its main development impacts were, what it was achieving. The SNV Asia pro-poor sustainable tourism practice area evaluation was conducted during
this period. The results of the evaluation became part of the justification for SNV’s second subsidy agreement. Therefore, the purpose of this evaluation partly changed from being an exercise in joint learning and improving practice, into a development impact measurement evaluation.

As in overall development aid, in the last couple of years impact measurement has become a specific area of attention within SNV. Between 2007 and 2010, SNV tried to establish an impact measurement system based on an approach that was developed in an attempt to improve SNV’s development practices (the Triple AAA approach). The Managing for Results review of 2010 therefore concluded that impacts had to be measured and presented more explicitly.

After 2010, the unit of measurement became the level of projects again, but now based on a more centralized result framework, using corporate standards and formats. SNV tried to close the gap between measuring at the local or project level and the corporate level (see figure 6.1.), but did not succeed in the case of tourism as a development practice, mainly because this practice was no longer a concern of the organization.

In the years that tourism was a development practice in SNV Asia, SNV was never convincingly clear about what to measure and how, let alone in a position to stabilize and ‘black box’ its evaluation system. About every five years the concepts and development emphases changed, and with that the way development results were defined and measured. SNV kept developing and changing its measurement approaches and instruments, from using a logical framework approach, to reporting in the Triple AAA approach using a considerable number of small case studies focusing on lessons learned, to the managing for results framework and project introducing result chains (and the DCED framework for impact measurement in private sector development). Organizational changes and shifting development concepts and approaches changed so fast that no routines in development measurement could be built. Measurement systems could never be sufficiently stabilized and fixed for enough time to demonstrate convincingly their development results.

In several impact evaluations in SNV, development results were defined and measured using the new concepts of the following phase, instead of the previous phase on which the programme theory for defining development objectives was based. Like in the case of the SNV practice area evaluation (studying the period 2002–2005), the evaluators were asked to focus the evaluation on pro-poor development impact, whereas most of the development initiatives in Asia were still focusing on improving advisory practice or even logical frameworks in small-scale projects. Advancing
insights within SNV, changing donor and reporting requirements, and ever changing consultants with their own ideas about what should be focused on, led to a situation in which stable and durable networks could not easily be achieved.

In each phase, the ordering of tourism development results in SNV led to non-qualification for a while, through rarefication – as developments results were not measured (as was the case for some time in the Great Himalaya Trail Development Project in Nepal), information was not analysed or documented, or the measuring of results was resisted altogether (as was the case for a while with the manager of the District Partners Programme in Nepal) – or through proliferation, as there was too much information to easily condense into one table, spreadsheet or document (as in the case of the Part A document in the practice area evaluation in 2005/2006). Because results had to be presented, in all three analysed cases qualification eventually had to be achieved. More than once in these cases, qualifications by external consultants or organizations were indispensable in order to present final development results, a final judgment, and thus closure.
Chapter 7

Conclusions and discussion
7.1. Introduction

In this thesis, I analysed the rise and fall of tourism as a development approach and practice in SNV Netherlands Development Organisation between 1993 and 2013. The overall research question was:

How and why have concepts of and practices in tourism for poverty reduction changed within SNV Netherlands Development Organisation over time?

In Chapter 1, I raised several interrelated research questions:

1. How and why was tourism, as a tool for poverty reduction, introduced in SNV, and how did it take shape in the organization?
2. How did international and national development debates influence SNV as a development organization, and how did that influence tourism as a development practice in the organization?
3. How and why did tourism approaches and tools in the SNV organization change over time?
4. How did SNV’s internal organization change over the years, and how did that influence tourism as a development practice in the organization?
5. How did SNV measure and present development results in tourism, and how did that change over time?
6. How and why was SNV’s tourism as a development practice phased out?

Inspired by actor-network theory and based on document review, interviews and my personal observations during the 15 years I worked within SNV, I reconstructed the way tourism gradually became an important development practice within the organization, but was eventually phased out.

In this final chapter, I first answer the six research questions. In the section thereafter I make a case for more ‘aidnography’ related to tourism and development. In the last sections of the chapter, I discuss the wider implications of this research for the development debates introduced in Chapter 1. I first discuss the relevance of tourism as a development sector, especially in relation to development impact, and then the role of development organizations in tourism for poverty reduction.
7.2. Conclusions

Before I go into more detailed outcomes, I provide short concluding answers to each of the six research questions.

1. Tourism emerged as a tool for poverty reduction in SNV when development paradigms changed from the critical and neoliberal development paradigms of the 1970s and 1980s, to an alternative/sustainable development paradigm in the 1990s, providing possibilities for tourism to be introduced as an element of integrated rural development. A few SNV directors started tourism initiatives with external project funding, independent of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

2. The development discourses of SNV and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs have always been closely related. Both also reflected and in turn influenced international development debates. In the 1990s, as a quasi-NGO, SNV was directly part of the ministry and its policies. Around the turn of the millennium, SNV shifted its main development concepts, emphasizing capacity development, in line with international debates, especially the ideas of Sen as expressed in Development as Freedom (1999). In the second half of the 2000s, partnerships for development became more important. The tourism development practice in SNV was enabled by and followed these paradigm shifts.

3. In line with overall paradigm shifts in SNV, the organization also changed its tourism development approaches and tools. In this thesis I discerned six phases. In the first years tourism was an element in sustainable rural development projects, especially in relation to local participatory planning. A few years later, the tourism practice focused more on capacity development in organizations and between organizations, using multi-stakeholder approaches. Finally, in the years before phasing out tourism, private sector engagement and support, and value chain analysis and development, became the dominant approaches.

4. The way tourism was organized and implemented in the organization was strongly related to the way SNV changed its internal organization over the years. The combinations of six different organizational modes of ordering created possibilities for organizational change, which kept SNV relevant as a development organization, and consequently influenced the tourism development practice.

5. In every discerned phase (as presented in Chapters 3 and 4), the way SNV was measuring (or trying to measure) its results changed, and consequently its definition of development success also changed. SNV needed periods of conceptual and material
stability to get its result frameworks in place. Even when there was clarity about what needed to be measured and how, networks needed to be solidified. Indicators had to be developed and agreed upon, guidelines for the use of the indicators had to be developed, staff had to be trained to use the guidelines, data had to be gathered according to the new indicators and entered in changed reporting systems, etc. This took a considerable amount of time in every phase. Within SNV and in development aid in general, ideas on what needed to be measured changed; changes occurred in the way development results had to be measured and documented, by whom and when. Consequently, in the different phases impact was not measured thoroughly, and if results were measured, sometimes the development concepts, approaches and indicators of the new phase were used to measure the results of the previous phase, further adding to the difficulties of showing development impact.

6. In early 2011, tourism as a development sector was rather suddenly phased out by SNV. In the spring of 2010, the SNV management initiated a 2015+ trajectory to prepare SNV for its continuation beyond 2015, the year the second subsidy agreement would end. A team of SNV managers and advisers concluded that tourism had not convincingly demonstrated its development impact and had limited donor funding potential, and that not enough expertise was available in SNV in comparison to other development sectors. It also seemed that tourism as a development sector in SNV did not have a strong internal or external lobby. Due to announced budget cuts for the end of 2010 by a new coalition government in the Netherlands, SNV decided to concentrate on its most prominent development sectors, namely agriculture, water and sanitation, and renewable energy. Tourism and other development sectors were phased out.

In the following section, I reflect on the first three questions. Questions 4 to 6 are answered in the subsequent sections.

7.2.1. Tourism as a development practice in SNV

My study showed how SNV hesitantly initiated a small number of tourism projects and hired advisers in a few countries in the 1990s, and grew into one of the leading organizations with around 60 tourism advisers in 25 countries between 2005 and 2011. This development was accelerated when ‘pro-poor sustainable tourism’ was identified as an ‘emerging practice area’ in the organization in 2004. In 2011, SNV phased out of tourism, as it had not identified tourism as one of its three leading development sectors. In Chapter 3, I discerned six phases that cover the rise from an initial rejection at corporate level, and a few consultancies at country level (Phase 1),
to a few projects and advisers (Phase 2), a gradual growth of tourism and capacity development initiatives (Phase 3), to a corporate ‘sustainable tourism’ practice area (Phase 4), a consolidation in tourism partnerships for development impact (Phase 5) and the phasing out in early 2011 (Phase 6).

SNV could only get involved in tourism when the dominant development paradigms shifted from the critical and neoliberal development paradigms of the 1970s and 1980s, to an alternative/sustainable development paradigm in the 1990s. This shift created possibilities for SNV to link elements of its sustainable development approaches, such as its policies on natural resource management and process approach, with the concept of sustainable tourism, and particularly tourism as a tool for participatory local development, poverty reduction and environmental conservation. The growing interests among academics and NGOs in the Netherlands, a few initial requests from national NGOs and SNV country directors, and an initial small project in Tanzania, led to a memorandum discussing tourism in SNV. This memorandum of 1995 stated: ‘the impression is that we can no longer oppose tourism.’ A few enterprising country directors took these initial initiatives further by developing tourism-related projects and getting them funded by donor agencies other than the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

These changes in the development concepts and initiatives of SNV directors in the field resulted in a network between a few SNV countries (e.g. Tanzania, Albania, Botswana and Nepal), which started tourism development initiatives and hired the first tourism advisers. In these countries, a few tourism projects were initiated with a small number of tourism advisors, using SNV-specific development approaches aimed at poverty reduction and community participation, integrating tourism into rural development. These first projects were considered successful, as was reflected in the TO DO award in 1999 for the Cultural Tourism Project in Tanzania, and the inclusion of the tourism component of the District Partners Programme in West Nepal in the Pro-Poor Tourism Partnership case studies.

In all the distinguished phases, national and international development debates influenced SNV. Before 2002, SNV was still part of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, of course, this strongly influenced SNV conceptually and administratively. In the 1990s, the focus was on SNV advisers implementing projects, often integrated rural development projects. Throughout the decade, ministers responsible for development cooperation, donor agencies and development agencies proposed to shift to a sector-wide approach, supporting a whole sector in a country in a concerted effort, rather than through isolated projects. The main focus was on
capacity development to strengthen that sector. These changing international and national development discourses, and the start of the disentanglement process of SNV from the Dutch government between 1999 and 2002, resulted in a new strategy in 2000, emphasizing meso-level capacity development in SNV.

Throughout the 2000s, capacity development remained at the centre of SNV’s development policy. However, in the second half of the 2000s, more and more emphasis was given to partnership development (like the one with the World Tourism Organization), private sector engagement and development impact. The second subsidy agreement between SNV and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for 2007–2015, emphasized the importance of contributing to the Millennium Development Goals, strengthening the link between development actors at the local level and the national level, and the capacity development of local and national actors.

At the end of 2010, external factors, like the publication of the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (Van Lieshout, Went & Kremer, 2010) report ‘Less pretension, more ambition’ (which focused on ‘global goods’, like agriculture and water), the new policies of the coalition government in the Netherlands and the budget cuts for SNV, combined with the SNV’s desire to focus on only the most effective development sectors (agriculture, water and sanitation, and renewable energy), led to tourism being dropped from the SNV portfolio.

However, this history in six phases is not an account of eras in which coherent and consistent development concepts and well-defined practices shaped the realities on the ground. SNV as an organization continuously tried to create particular conceptual and material orderings, to stabilize chaotic practices, and to validate and fit together ideas and practices for different audiences (donor managers, politicians, scientists, colleagues, clients, etc.). Some neglected and resisted these ideas, whereas others adopted and tactically used them. The work of SNV implied not only putting concepts, approaches and tools into practice, but also transforming these into the different logics of intentions and ambitions of the people, materials and institutions; they were tied – or failed to be tied – together.

During these years, it took a lot of work to assemble these networks. Between 1993 and 2013, SNV managers and tourism advisers had to put into circulation several concepts, approaches and tools. Shifting development discourses and concepts – such as ‘sustainable tourism’, ‘pro-poor tourism’, ‘multi-stakeholder approaches’ and ‘value chain analysis and development’ – acted as mobilizing metaphors and
allowed SNV and its alliances to enrol and mobilize various interests, actors and networks, and to obtain funding and support inside and outside the organization. The resulting material orderings, including subsidy agreements, documents, ‘products’, tools, websites, partnerships and ‘clients’ (intermediary organizations, local and national governmental bodies, the ‘poor’), were imputed in and supported the process of further conceptual and material orderings in the following phases, as was shown throughout this thesis.

7.2.2. Organizational modes of ordering in SNV

In describing and analysing SNV’s organizational modes of ordering in Chapter 5, I answered research question 4. During the six phases discerned in Chapter 3, continuously interweaving organizational logics or modes of ordering influenced the SNV development practices, including the tourism practice area. Based on my research, I distinguished six modes of ordering (administration, project management, development brokering, enterprise, development visioning, and result management) that were present within SNV in all phases, but that differed in articulation and importance in each of the phases.

Administration, the first mode of ordering, is about routines and emphasises roles and reporting, clarity on implementation, and the production and presentation of development results. Project management focuses on project implementation and project ‘success’ as central to professional ‘success’, and sets projects aside from the organization, allowing projects to achieve their own individual goals. Development brokering is about development facilitation and working in the ‘field’. It links different levels in society (from the local to the national level) and allows complexity in development. Enterprise is about opportunistic agency, pragmatism and performance, and demands results. Development visioning entails visionary leadership and development theory, embraces the understanding of complexity and reflexivity in development, and engages less with mundane organizational matters. Finally, result management is about producing evidence of development results, and accountability and programming.

In every phase, these modes of ordering defined and redefined particular organizational practices, effectuating ‘SNV’s way of working’ and securing temporary stability, and also influencing SNV’s tourism practices. It was the interaction of these modes of ordering that provided the possibilities for rapid organizational adaptation to the changing development debates outside SNV. The organization could ‘stay relevant’ by changing the combinations of modes of ordering. The effective combinations
of modes of ordering resulted in each phase in a sometimes fragile and always temporary discursive, strategic and material durability in the organization.

In the second half of 1990s, SNV achieved permanence with the formulation of the corporate plan and the quango relation of SNV vis-à-vis the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the early 2000s, it achieved stability through a radical discursive shift towards a process approach and focus on capacity development in line with the Dutch development aid, SNV’s disentanglement from the ministry and a subsequent five-year subsidy. The focus on the Millennium Development Goals as the basis of the second subsidy agreement for nine years with the Dutch government for the second half of the 2000s, culminating in the formulation of the SNV ‘Strategy Paper 2007-2015: Local Impact – Global Presence’, again achieved discursive and strategic stability for some time after 2007. Even though this strategy was to secure stability for nine years, it was replaced in 2011 by the subsequent strategic document. For the first five-year subsidy (2002–2006), SNV had to conceal its project management mode of ordering and emphasize its development brokering (‘process approach’). For the second nine-year agreement (2007–2015), development visioning was concealed and the result management ordering mode (‘impact areas’) was pushed forward.

Another external factor contributing to SNV’s strategic stability was its partnerships with global sectoral organizations. Within SNV, the partnership with the World Tourism Organization was considered one of the successful partnerships. In the second agreement between UNWTO/ST-EP/SNV (2008–2010) the partnership developed programmes and generated funding for tourism projects in 17 countries in Latin America, Africa, the Balkans and Asia.

The organization also changed every few years in a material sense, closing project offices, moving out of certain countries, starting in other countries, moving office in The Hague, making funding arrangements for the subsidy agreements, opening regional offices, and changing logo and house style three times in 20 years. Yet, even with all these changes SNV endured, particularly through its continued ‘presence on the ground’, local offices, internet connections, regular local meetings, and availability and presence of advisers. Several of the project and country evaluations considered this presence on the ground one of the strengths of the organization.

All these changes effected tourism as a development practice in SNV, from the way tourism was organized and implemented in isolated projects in the 1990s, to a capacity development focus in multi-stakeholder programmes in countries and regions in the 2000s, and a shift to development impact and fund raising in in the 2010s, eventually resulting in the phasing out of tourism.
7.2.3. Producing development success

Research question 5 was mainly answered in Chapter 6. At SNV, the process of measuring and presenting development results has been continuously defined and redefined, resulting in changing calculating and judging practices. I argue that development successes were produced in processes of qualculation – a contraction of the words calculation and quality, which redefines calculation to include judgement – in which PowerPoint presentations, advisers, project reports, M&E manuals, managers, annual reports, evaluators, qualitative and quantitative research, and impact evaluation reports all played their part. Numbers and stories were gathered, enumerated and transformed into one space, and judged, negotiated or framed as development success (or failure), with development results based (or not based) on ‘credible evidence’ and ‘valid conclusions’.

Shifting development paradigms led to different ways of measuring development results, and consequently to different ways of defining pro-poor impacts. In the 1990s, development success was measured and judged as individual project effectiveness, through output and outcome indicators. In the early 2000s SNV transformed to an advisory organization, and measured development results in terms of ‘client’ satisfaction. At the end of the last decade, evaluation shifted back to the project level, but now based on a more centralized framework using development result chains. This corresponded with the concepts presented in 2007 in the SNV Managing for Results framework, which introduced a shift from ‘proving’ development impact, via ‘improving’ development practice, to ‘moving’ or managing for development impact.

Whereas in the second half of the 1990s, it was sufficient to demonstrate success by the number of advisers, projects and project results, and in the early 2000s by the number of advisory services days or the number of clients of capacity building activities, more recent development discourses stressed the need to produce quantifiable poverty reduction impacts.

Analysing SNV’s tourism development practices showed that impact measurement by itself will always be impeded. Before the 2000s, the resistance by some SNV managers against tourism as a development tool resulted in certain cases in the postponement of development activities, slowing down calculation and judgment. During the first half of the 2000s, especially the SNV Asia pro-poor tourism practice area evaluation of 2005/06, an impact evaluation at regional level, produced an overflow of information of outputs (and outcomes) hidden in all these materials, rendering tourism poverty reduction temporary non-qualcutable. Only after several
months, forced by the need for a final evaluation result, was the evaluation made qualifiable again, through a negotiated and agreed final report on the SNV Asia pro-poor sustainable tourism evaluation (Goodwin, 2006a; SNV AR, 2006). The development practice was judged relevant, but had to improve its impact measurement in the years to come.

The results of the attempts to measure tourism development impacts based on value chain analysis and the Donor Committee for Enterprise Development standards in the Managing for Results framework (the latter fitting neatly into the current and dominant development discourses) were not convincing enough to withstand the volatility of policymaking and, more importantly, the recent cuts in budgets within SNV and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, SNV’s main donor. In 2010, the development sectors of SNV were assessed on the basis of development impact, funding opportunities and available expertise in SNV. A group of SNV managers and advisers together calculated the importance of SNV’s development sectors. Even though individuals in this group mentioned that in none of the sectors could development impact be robustly measured, the development sectors were ranked and judged, and made qualifiable.

SNV has been able to show development ‘success’ in tourism predominantly through its international agenda setting, its increasing number of advisers, projects and partnerships, its expanding number of clients, its clients’ satisfaction with SNV’s work, its international awards for specific tourism projects, references by other development agencies to SNV’s tourism development initiatives, and the total economic and non-economic effects of the tourism initiatives, rather than clearly measured, quantified and neatly presented development impact results. Outside the Netherlands, SNV has stimulated and mobilized a great deal of support for tourism as a development practice, and has influenced the international development debates, through cooperation with the World Tourism Organization, the UK Overseas Development Institute, and many national and regional tourism and non-tourism actors, especially in Asia. The organization has left significant marks on national policies and practices and provided socioeconomic benefits primarily in remoter areas of the countries it has supported. However as indicated, tourism as a development practice did not have a convincing ‘impact narrative’ to persuade managers and senior advisers in SNV to include tourism as a practice area in the ‘leading’ development sectors to be chosen for the period after 2015.
7.2.4. Phasing out tourism as a development sector

A combination of external and internal drivers caused SNV to withdraw from tourism as a development sector from the organization at the beginning of 2011. Externally, the SNV management experienced an unfavourable political climate; there was a growing demand for more focus and demonstrable results, and more emphasis on global themes (energy, water, climate, finance). Besides, the organization received clear signals from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that a next subsidy agreement would not necessarily be concluded. Internally, SNV felt that reducing the number of development sectors would boost quality and results, position SNV better globally, and attract more external funding.

At the same time, SNV’s tourism development sector had shifted its implementation approaches by the end of the 2000s, to achieve and show more development results and attract more donor agency funding, fitting the dominant combination of modes of ordering in SNV at that time. However, it still had not managed to measure and present its development impact in a convincing manner. Also in some SNV regions, the tourism practice had not attracted sufficient project funding. In early 2011, even before development impacts in tourism could be presented, SNV decided to withdraw from tourism as one its development sectors.

In the spring of 2010, the SNV management initiated a trajectory to prepare SNV for the year 2015, when the second subsidy agreement would end. Based on a screening of the development sectors of SNV on three criteria – namely development impact, fundability and available expertise in the SNV organization – three initial ‘leading’ development sectors were identified: agriculture, renewable energy, and water and sanitation. These sectors also fitted the ‘global themes’ in development better (cf. Van Lieshout et al., 2010). It seemed the internal and external networks in these development sectors were more robust to keep these sectors on SNV’s policy agenda.

In October 2010, existing sectors and approaches were screened more comprehensively. A workshop group concluded that SNV had not managed to develop a firm corporate tourism practice across the regions. The scale and impact of the tourism practice was still questioned. After a process of judging potential development impact, possible funding opportunities and existing expertise in the sector within SNV, the group of senior managers and advisers judged tourism to be ‘non-leading’; the three ‘leading’ development sectors they had selected scored better.

A newly formed Dutch coalition government announced by the end of 2010 that it would drastically reduce the overall development aid budget, including a budget
cut for SNV. Rather than divide its reduced budget among all sectors and activities, SNV decided to withdraw from ‘non-leading’ sectors altogether, thus reducing its number of development sectors from seven to three. As tourism was not among the three ‘leading’ sectors, it was phased out in 2011.

This rather quickly taken decision shows the volatility of policymaking in development organizations. SNV honoured the commitments it had already made to donor agencies regarding two larger tourism programmes, and remained involved in these programmes until the end of 2013. All other initiatives were closed down in the course of 2011.

7.3. Discussion

In the following sections I reflect on the possibilities of using ‘aidnography’ in the field of tourism and development, before exploring the broader implications of my findings. I discuss the relevance of tourism as a development practice, especially in relation to development impact, and possible roles of development organizations in tourism.

7.3.1. Reflections on ‘aidnography’

In this thesis I contributed to the emerging field of aidnography, especially in relation to tourism and development. So far, only a few studies have focused on development organizations involved in tourism. Aidnography goes well beyond the instrumental and critical development perspectives, and opens up possibilities to study development organizations in relation to the complexity of policy and strategy development, and the ways in which negotiated development success is achieved.

Aidnography often includes notions of actor-oriented and actor-network theory approaches. I applied these notions and showed how actors in and around SNV were constantly engaged in processes of ordering to form associations of people and things, transforming these into networks that for a time were stable. Such networks translated development policies into implementation practices in the field, and transformed development practices into ‘results’ and ‘successes’ (and ‘failures’) through calculation, as discussed in Chapter 6.

Using notions from actor-network theory, the aidnographic study of the tourism development practices in SNV, offers some highly relevant insights into tourism for poverty reduction.
Firstly, in most of the tourism literature development organizations have been either rendered invisible or presented as ‘black boxes’. In this study, I undid part of that black boxing by unravelling the tourism development concepts and practices that emerged in several phases within SNV, and by unfolding the multiple organizational modes of ordering at work. Therefore, one of the contributions of this research to tourism and development studies is the empirical grounding for the understanding of tourism as development practice in development organizations as being complex and multiple in nature. The actor-network approach provided opportunities for critical understanding, engagement and reflection, in order to achieve better development impacts for the poor and distributing wealth in tourism destinations. None of this is possible without a detailed study and analysis of the organizations involved in shaping development practices.

Secondly, as the findings in this thesis show, SNV’s development policymakers were greatly concerned with categorizing. Various categories emerged, such as the number of development sectors and practice areas, ‘leading’ and ‘non-leading’ sectors, development approaches and tools, and development result indicators. Managers and advisers seemed to be almost continuously categorizing in order to reconstruct and reassemble their practices, and to effectuate these through the channelling of resources, such as programme funding and advice. The number of ways of categorizing and thus ordering development as such, as well as ordering organizations internally, is multiple but not countless, as was shown throughout this thesis.

Processes of ‘donor harmonization’, the alignment of international development agencies in development approaches (as for instance shown in the use of value chain analysis), learning from the organization’s own development practices, negotiated subsidy agreements and the development of strategies—together produce convergence in ways of working in development organizations. This convergence results in a limited number of modes of ordering in development organizations. Policy processes, from realities ‘on the ground’ to categorized, aggregated and transformed policies ‘upwards’, are leading to policymaking at ever higher management levels (and within donor agencies). These higher management levels demand policy coherence and singularity, ‘unambiguous’ development interventions and robust development results, rather than understand and recognize complex development practices ‘on the ground’. International development is more about generating consensus on approaches and framing models that link investment to perceived overall, singular development impacts, than on establishing ‘working’ implementation modalities and complex development results on the ground.
Thirdly, the concept of qualculation was used in this thesis to further the notion of the production of development results and success in development organizations. As shown in Chapter 6, organizations like SNV changed their way of measuring and presenting development success regularly over the years. Development success had to be constantly produced and stabilized in networks of defined and redefined development results, reporting formats, computing programs, and reports, and in ‘interpretive communities’. Donor agencies, politicians and the general public increasingly demand ‘robust’, ‘valid’ and ‘evidence-based’ development results. However, impact evaluations can never achieve the objectivity that development practitioners and the public seek. As I showed in this thesis, development results are not simply ‘out there’, waiting to be gathered and noted down. They are actively produced by actors at different ‘levels’ involved in monitoring, data collection and evaluations, through a process of summing up, manipulating, negotiating, silencing and wrapping up, achieving qualculability and closure.

At the same time, information about development results does not flow unchanged within development organizations from one ‘level’ to the other. Information is aggregated and interpretations change at every level. Development results, therefore, become transformed between one nested network and the next. As shown in Chapter 6, the development results of the tourism component in western Nepal were transformed from social mobilization results and infrastructure construction results along a local trekking trail, into a comparison of six aggregated case-studies in a Pro-Poor Partnership report. Information changes shape from development practices on the ground to policymaking ‘higher-up’ in the organization. So, qualculation demands not only an information flow, but also information ‘fluidity’.

Discussing these on-going transformations of information is a contribution to the debates in tourism studies as well as in development studies, opening ‘black boxes’ of impact measurement.

Fourthly, because measuring development results is always impeded and success is qualculated, measuring singular development interventions has limited value and is useful in only very specific circumstances. It therefore appears that continual describing, analysing and comparing case studies, using mixed methods and ethnographic approaches, might provide more understanding of tourism as a development practice.

Fifthly, this aidnographic study of tourism illustrates the importance of the embeddedness of the researcher and the role of case studies. Embeddedness seems more and more part and parcel of the ethnographical approach in international...
development (cf. Falzon, 2009; Gould, 2004b; Mosse 2011). The embeddedness in development organizations provides the primary source of the ethnographer’s research data. The researcher might not be only a participant observer; he or she often becomes an ‘observing participant’ (cf. Mosse, 2005, 2011). It is not always easy to achieve embeddedness, but it seems almost a prerequisite to gaining sufficient insight into the internal and external orderings of development organizations. Aidnography seems an important research approach to get close to the development practice and at the same time provides sufficient possibilities to keep a critical distance. It is a position rarely taken in tourism for development research, and one that I hope will be considered more often by both researchers and development practitioners.

Finally, the theoretical notions as introduced in actor-network theory can contribute significantly to comparative studies on tourism and development. Every complex development intervention can be considered as a case. In this study, I studied cases and sub-cases in different countries and on different aspects, like the changing development approaches and tools in tourism in the three SNV Asia countries, and the cases on result measurement over time. Comparing cases provided insight into how similarities and differences between these cases could be studied and, within limits, allowed for generalization. Comparing cases provides indications of what works where (in what context), why and when.

In development studies, most of these insights are not entirely new (cf. Lewis & Mosse, 2006a; Mosse, 2005, 2011; Mosse & Lewis, 2005); however, in studies focussing on tourism and development this is relatively novel and unstudied (cf. Mitchell & Ashley, 2010; Scheyvens, 2011).

Therefore, to be able to focus more on local development processes and results in tourism and development practices, I argue for more aidnographic research, involving multiple sites and multiple cases. Case study research opens possibilities for policy innovation based on empirical research and on learning that takes place in the same context in which it is applied (situated learning). This research and learning is a social process in which knowledge is co-constructed and context-specific within the local environment. Situated learning gains by developing close connections with local and international organizations involved, the policymaking processes, and critical reflection on the local situation.

When implementing and evaluating complex social interventions, like tourism, the introduction of case studies seems more appropriate and valuable than only implementing quantitative and aggregated measurements. Mutual learning, involving organizations close to the local level (governmental, non-governmental and private
sector organizations, local and national universities), might allow to build a realistic development agenda ‘in the field’ befitting the complex local stakeholder context, and to create a negotiated and more explicit evaluation framework. It offers prospects for real development services to those in poverty, as I elaborate in the sections below.

7.3.2. Relevance of tourism as a development practice – practical implications

In existing and potential tourism destinations where poverty persists, tourism can make significant contributions to poverty reduction. In 2010, tourists spent more than US$ 681 billion in developing countries (WTTC, 2011), five times the budget of worldwide development aid (US$ 129 billion; OECD, 2011). It is already the largest voluntary transfer of resources from rich countries to poor countries (Mitchell & Ashley, 2010). In most of the poor countries, the main issue remains how to increase the benefits for the poor from tourism. Tourism is about additional jobs (farmers working as tourist porters and guides, or being builders or carpenters constructing small lodges) and income (renting out pack animals, selling vegetables and agricultural produce to teashops or restaurants, making handicrafts in the winter), residents’ use of facilities and services that were initially developed for tourists (drinking water, sanitation, health posts, energy), improving local livelihoods, locally-owned integrated development planning and innovation processes, etc.

However, to strengthen the development impact of tourism the focus needs to be on existing and potential tourism destinations, as tourism is area-specific and depends on attracting tourists to often unique places or destinations. It is difficult to scale up to other less unique and less attractive places, and tourism development is thus limited to only particular areas of a country. Of course, within these areas, tourism as a development sector still needs to be scrutinized for its opportunities to reduce poverty. In other development sectors like agriculture, drinking water or health, it seems easier to scale up, as once a development approach has shown to be successful, it can be replicated in other, almost identical areas. However, also in these development sectors, place is important; for instance, agriculture in the rain shadow of the higher Himalaya might not easily be scaled up. In some cases, like along the remote and mountainous Great Himalaya Trail in Nepal, tourism might provide more development and poverty reduction opportunities than agriculture.

Tourism is a composite and complex crosscutting development sector that is made up of (sometimes a large number of) small and varied development results in a particular destination. As such, tourism is almost always also part of other sectors, for example agriculture, forestry (non-timber forest products like handicrafts), energy, or water
and sanitation. The beneficiaries of tourism development efforts are often seen and counted as part of these other sectors, rather than as exclusively part of tourism for local social and economic development. Therefore, the composite development impacts of tourism are difficult not only to measure, but also to attribute to tourism development. Yet, demonstrating such impacts as part of a development strategy is important to gain traction for government and industry engagement in the stimulation and regulation of positive outcomes for the poor.

It is more important to demonstrate indicative results and learn from mistakes and good practice than to aim to produce the ‘perfect’ evaluation. As Ashley and Mitchell (2008) argued, ‘doing the right thing approximately, not the wrong thing precisely’ is to be preferred. Consequently, impact measurement needs to be more approximate and timely, rather than very elaborate, expensive and time-consuming. The latter might even prove to be less insightful, due to the many instances of aggregation and transformation. International development organizations can support this complex and situated measuring and learning process.

Moreover, to improve tourism for poverty reduction impact assessments, the focus should not be limited to employment and income, but should be broadened to include the multiple impacts (based on direct, indirect and dynamic effects) of tourism in destinations. Also in this respect, case studies could support local learning by providing not only numbers and calculations, but also a narrative about the context and process in which these numbers were generated, so that case studies can be more easily compared. They might provide space for ‘good practices’ and promising ‘lessons learned’ with the idea of showing possibilities for interventions in comparable contexts and conditions. More complex and situated impact assessments demand efforts from development agencies (and donor agencies) to invest in a critical analysis and reasoning while developing interventions, or intervention logics and result chains, which can be monitored and assessed.

### 7.3.3. The role of development organizations in tourism

Although tourism as an instrument for development is now a subject of international and national debates, it has been phased out not only by SNV but also by other Dutch development and conservation agencies. This seems to suggest that, at least in the Netherlands, there is an on-going shift of attention in development aid away from tourism facilitated and implemented by development and conservation NGOs, towards an engagement of only the private sector in tourism for development.
In this thesis, I showed how in SNV and other development organizations, concepts and practices in tourism have progressed significantly since the introduction of tourism for poverty reduction in the early 1990s. The way of working of these organizations changed from a focus on small-scale tourism and interventions in poor communities in the second half of the 1990s, to an inclusive destination development approach focusing on market development, using multi-stakeholder and value chain development approaches, involving the private sector, at the end of the 2000s. To initiate and support these multi-stakeholder processes, a facilitating organization is often still required. This can be a governmental organization, a private sector membership organization, a national NGO, a specific multi-stakeholder destination development and management organization or, but not necessarily, a development organization. Such an organization should preferably act as a catalyst, building on a relationship of trust, accountability and mutuality that this organization establishes with other actors (cf. IOB, 2011).

As local capacities increase, the role of ‘outside’ development agencies will become smaller and smaller. In many countries, however, there is still a need for considerable investment in supporting the local expertise that is required to enable local tourism development for poverty reduction. Development organizations can underpin the resourcefulness of multi-stakeholder destination development and management organizations with research, general knowledge and experiences, and feedback on different policy approaches, and stimulate situated learning, experimenting and innovating. I particularly envision three roles for development organizations.

Firstly, facilitating, linking and networking remain needed in order to enhance perspectives on ‘inclusive’ tourism destination development. National and local governments, local community organizations, NGOs and the private sector all have their roles to play, to enable positive poverty impacts. Even donor agencies may still be involved. One of the opportunities for development organizations, therefore, is to link and facilitate these different actors. Development organizations can assist these actors with wider policy perspectives. For example, they can help governments to create an enabling environment that will benefit the poor and the private sector, and to obtain funding, support programming and assist with measuring impacts of tourism. They can also stimulate ‘downward’ responsiveness to stakeholders in tourism destinations, by linking the tourism industry, local governmental and non-governmental organizations, local enterprises, communities and the poor in pro-poor tourism value chains.
When promoting tourism, development organizations might especially be aware of and able to address the potential power play and power hierarchies, exclusion of ethnic groups, unequal participation of men and women, corruption, attaining land rights, etc., that could prevent access for the poor. For instance, increasing access for the poor to a fair judicial system, supporting a fair and equal labour system, and helping small enterprises to register might all be part of a tourism development perspective for poverty reduction.

Secondly, complexity needs to be explicitly included in these development processes, including in joint multi-stakeholder analysis, programming, implementing and measuring development results. This requires capacity development. Development organizations can give support by highlighting the capacities of local organizations needed to enhance strategy development, participatory planning processes, multi-stakeholder platforms, pro-poor value chain development approaches and impact measurement. Where these local capacities are lacking or too weak, development organizations might support the identification of the required capacities and have a role in capacity strengthening. They can underpin the importance of destination branding and strategic marketing, private sector campaigns and pro-poor product development, based on their international perspective. Support could also focus on lessons for local organizations to learn from their own practices. The role of development organizations might decrease as the strength of established stakeholder platforms and institutionalized mechanisms for collaboration increases.

Thirdly, tourism development practices could be supported by research and knowledge development focused on what tourism is basically about and how different forms of tourism might be appropriate to reduce poverty in different situations. Academic institutions are the logical agents for research and knowledge development. They have a tendency to focus on general understandings of tourism behaviour, target groups and product development, and frequently lack an understanding of specific local requirements. Concepts like ‘inclusive destination development’ and its ‘enabling environment’ need to be understood better in order to be able to engage the local poor in each destination. Tourism involves complex local contexts and therefore calls for exploring contextualized solutions. Development organizations that have networks at the destination level can facilitate action research, situated learning and the development of implementation strategies. Knowledge institutes and development organizations can collaborate to shed more light on how tourism ‘works’ for poverty reduction (and in some cases, fails to do so), and achieve a better comprehension of the wide range of linkages between tourism and the local economy, like in the case of the cooperation between SNV and the International Centre for Integrated Development along the Great Himalaya Trail, as presented in Chapters 4 and 6.
In short, this suggests that development organizations need to focus on innovative and contextualized solutions, and provide time and space for experimenting and situated learning when using tourism to further local social and economic development, and create more dynamic pathways for inclusive and sustainable growth at the local level from the start. By considering more effects of tourism on poverty reduction (financial and non-financial, direct, indirect and dynamic) within the local social, political, administrative and financial context, the benefits can be more pronounced. I firmly believe that development organizations and knowledge institutes should initiate and implement comparative case-study research that uses aidnographic approaches, and consider the results of and learn from such research. They could then share the lessons learned with local policymakers to guide the integration of tourism in local development and poverty reduction.

Even without a conclusive demonstration of poverty reduction efficacy, tourism will remain on the agenda of countries, local governments, private sector companies and development agencies (at least in Asia). However, there are a lot of places in developing countries where tourism is being developed without considering the contribution tourism could make to poverty reduction. Not using tourism to drive poverty reduction in existing and potential destinations is wasting a good opportunity to help the poor to attain sustainable livelihoods. In that respect, it is unfortunate that SNV Netherlands Development Organisation did not further pursue and adapt its strategies for promoting tourism for poverty reduction development processes in the various destinations.
In the 1980s and early 1990s, in planning and development, tourism was often referred to as either ‘a tool for development’ (cf. Clarke, 1981; Lane, 1994; Telfer & Sharply, 2002; Chok, Macbeth & Warren, 2007), or as an ‘agent of change’ (Greenwood, 1976). The first, ‘development tool’, indicated that tourism could be used as a concrete (instrumental) strategic planning tool in regional development; it is presented as instrument, as a part of ‘structure’. In the second, ‘agent of change’, tourism is presented as an acting agent, as if tourism could change (rural) realities all by itself, as having ‘agency’. Of course, tourism involved many social actors (tourists, travel agents, tour operators, hotel owners, government officials), and materials (buses, plains, hotels, camping grounds, computers, booking systems, laws, border offices) and ideas (concepts to use tourism for development) to support and achieve (regional) planning and development, so it about the interaction between these ‘structures’ and ‘agents’. Since the early 1990s, terminology included tourism as a ‘system’ (Inskeep, 1991) to show the involvement of these different social actors and materials, and their relations. However, systems can be easily seen as fixed, the way things have to be ordered and how they are; processes of change in relations of social actors and things are sometimes less obvious. For these changing relations between things and people in tourism and tourism development, van der Duim (2005, 2007) coined ‘tourismscapes’ (see also chapter 2).

I was hired by SNV in early 1996 and left the organization in the summer of 2011. I was recruited as a project coordinator for a sustainable tourism project in rural Albania, as the second tourism advisor in SNV. At the time, SNV hired me ‘via the back door’ as they were still not sure whether they wanted to be recognized as a development organization engaged with tourism for development. In 1997, I moved to SNV Nepal to explore possibilities to include tourism in the integrated rural development programmes of SNV in the country. In the country I worked as one of the first ‘flexible advisers’ in SNV, not related to one of the projects, but supporting all SNV Nepal’s initiatives. In the early 2000s, I became the managing adviser for a small group of flexible private sector advisers in SNV Nepal. By the end of 2003, I was requested by SNV to coordinate, as a managing adviser, the programming of tourism in the Himalaya (developing vision and implementation strategies and attracting funding). A few years later, I was appointed as the SNV Asia tourism knowledge network leader (mid 2005–end of 2010) and regional tourism adviser (2007-2010). In 2009 I took a sabbatical to work on my PhD, and in 2010, I worked as a tourism adviser in Luang Prabang, Laos. I was a development adviser throughout these years, but also took on management and knowledge development and management tasks in some of the years.

End notes

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I actually also ‘moved’ through SNV ‘upwards’ (influencing policymaking) and ‘downwards’ (implementing on the ground), working in villages as project coordinator in Albania and at the same time providing presentations for the regional SNV meeting on tourism as a possibility for poverty reduction in SNV Balkan and Asian countries (Hummel, 1996), later as flexible adviser providing training courses in remote districts of Nepal, and discussing tourism as development practice with the overall director at the head office in The Hague. Even later, as the knowledge network leader for SNV in Asia, I was for instance involved in developing and coordinating the SNV/IFC Mekong Private Sector Development Facility (IFC MPDF) Conference on Measuring and Enhancing Impact in Tourism Value Chains in Cambodia (cf. Ashley & Mitchell, 2007, 2008) in which a variety of Asian development agencies participated and discussed their approaches to the value chain, and developing the Memorandum of Understanding between UNWTO/ST–EP/SNV negotiating a programme of tourism projects in 15 countries between 2007 and 2010, while around that same time providing on the spot training courses on Appreciative Participatory Planning and Action for tourism sites, in remote villages of Cambodia and Laos, or training a multi-stakeholder tourism development committee in Humla in Nepal. It was this ‘traveling’ in the organization, which partly made this aidnographic research possible, moving within the organization between the realities of the field and the policymaking in SNV Asia county offices and regional office, and the head office in The Hague.

Bhutan has a unique payment system in place in which each tourist pays a minimum daily fee of US$200 for an all-inclusive tourism package. The US$200 daily tariff includes a so-called royalty of US$65 and an additional US$5 in taxes, which RGOB withholds for every day of the visit. These taxes are channelled back into the government budget.

The private sector is involved but has not yet bought itself into the development of products. The Nabji project did not instigate private sector investment in product development, but made national tour operators invest time and human resources to facilitate decision making, training and the marketing of the products.

Even though this mode of ordering had not become a dominant mode in the organization, yet, the enterprising directors (and managers) in the organization were important for introducing and establishing tourism as a development practice in the organization. They secured external funding for initial small-scale tourism projects and hired the first tourism advisers. Partly, because of this external project funding (outside the overall funding of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to SNV), it was later also identified as a ‘low-hanging fruit’ in the organization. The development
practice had shown since its introduction in the organization that it could attract external funding.

An actor constellation map shows all the relevant actors in the sector or subsector and how they interrelate. It is an instrument to visualize organizations, groups, networks and even influential individuals that have the potential to influence changes in a sector or subsector and to contribute to the impact target (Arts & van der Laan, 2010).

In Asia, all production income and employment impact areas (agriculture, forestry and tourism) use the market-based solutions approach developed by Action for Enterprise (AfE). In tourism, several implementation design projects were done with AfE in Vietnam (Sapa), Bhutan (Paro) and Nepal (The Great Himalaya Trail); see also Chapters 4 and 6. In the Balkans and West Africa, the tourism development practices followed the ODI 10-step model, and in Mozambique, SNV developed its own approach. So, even though SNV tried to harmonize its approach for the organization, even with sectors different approaches were applied. Of course, even in every country and specific destination the approach will be slightly adapted.

In SNV Asia, the tourism practice encountered several possibilities to get donor funding (especially from the EU). However, at the end of 2010, SNV no longer allowed the tourism practice to submit project proposals, as the decision to phase out of tourism had already been taken. Within SNV it was even considered withdrawing from the GHT project with DFID and the High Impact Tourism Training in seven SNV countries, funded by the EU. In both cases, SNV accepted to implement the programmes, as the organization was worried that it would have negative implications if it had given the projects back to the donor agencies.

As for instance the managing for results framework mentions (SNV, 2007, p. 7, italics in original): ‘Moving up the result chain these assumed cause–effect relations become more and more complex due to the increasing influence of other actors and factors. At the level of outcome and impact we focus on assessing the plausibility of SNV’s contribution to impact’. On the next page the document (ibid. p. 8, italics in original) reads: ‘Impact is generated through the collaborative efforts of many actors’, and on the same page: ‘Assessing impact is done by collecting information from existing databases, complemented by in-depth studies that scrutinise the plausibility of the relation between impact indicators and SNV’s contribution’. According to the same document SNV is assessing their impact through strategic reviews of impact indicators and specific corporate evaluations, reviews of the memorandums of understanding with their ‘clients’ and case studies. On page 9 it
reads: ‘Cases ideally cover SNV practice at output, outcome and impact level. Case studies are prepared to learn why something has been a success or a failure and to demonstrate to a wider audience how SNV works. Case studies are particularly helpful to zoom in on crucial elements of the work’. The document shows SNV’s use of mixed methods, and a focus on SNV’s contribution rather than strict attribution and use of only quantitative methods of the first school.

xi It is interesting to see how the PPT Partnership identifies development initiatives with a clear project set-up and logical framework, like the Nabji Trail (see also Chapter 4) and the Nam Ha project for their development impact. Both cases were potential tourism destinations (both based on visiting ethnic and local communities and on trekking) with hardly any or no tourists visiting at the start of the project, so development impact could all be claimed by these projects. Besides, data had been gathered and documented in clear development impact stories (Harrison & Schipani, 2007; 2009; Hummel & Ritsma, 2005, 2006; Ritsma, et al., 2010).

xii In both case study areas SNV was involved in the researched tourism development initiatives. In the case of the tourism workers from a poor background in the south of Laos, in one of the three methodologies (likelihood to be poor), using the national established poverty line, 1.9% of the workers were poor. If a less than US$2 a day poverty line were used in the same methodology, the percentage would increase to 65.93%. If the methodology of Prosperity International (Likelihood to come from a poor background) is used for less than US$2 a day, it is 61.60%, and if the last methodology of Conway (Poverty background based on income per head in the household/family) is used for the US$2 poverty line, it is 79.80%. Depending on methodology and poverty line, the percentage of poor people benefiting in the Laos case ranged from less than 2% to almost 80% (Thomas, 2014).
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Over 400 articles were gathered on a CD for the SNV Asia PPST Practice Area evaluation of 2005/2006, and studied as part of this thesis.
## Appendix 1. Interview list

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Position (at the time of interview and before)</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>May/June 2007</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcel Leijzer</td>
<td>UWTO officer; SNV Private Sector Development officer; SNV sustainable tourism officer; SNV tourism adviser Tanzania</td>
<td>May 14, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frans de Man</td>
<td>Consultant for SNV Tanzania (Retour Foundation); Founder Retour Foundation</td>
<td>May 20, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pieter Stoer</td>
<td>SNV Laos programme officer; SNV sustainable tourism officer</td>
<td>May 29, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eelco Baan</td>
<td>Knowledge network leader and senior regional adviser Private Sector Development, SNV Asia</td>
<td>June 20, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>April/June 2009</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagendra Buddhatokhi</td>
<td>Director Dolpo Institute; Consultant for SNV Nepal</td>
<td>April 17, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mim Hamal</td>
<td>GHT tourism adviser, SNV Nepal</td>
<td>April 21, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amar Ting Tamang</td>
<td>Business Development Services Adviser, SNV Nepal</td>
<td>April 22, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajesh Shreshta</td>
<td>Senior adviser for SNV in different countries (Nepal, Vietnam, Ghana, Pakistan); Programme Officer, SNV Nepal</td>
<td>June 12, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cily Keizer</td>
<td>SNV Bhutan Director; Sponsor director tourism, SNV Asia (2005-2007)</td>
<td>June 14, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicolette Mathijssen</td>
<td>SNV Laos Director; Sponsor director tourism, SNV Asia (2005-2007)</td>
<td>June 15, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hans Heijdra</td>
<td>SNV Nepal Director; (Core Group member 2001-2003)</td>
<td>June 19, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>September/December 2009</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigitte Nitsch</td>
<td>Tourism advisor SNV Nepal (in TRPAP)</td>
<td>Sept. 21, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albert Soer</td>
<td>Resource Mobilisation TF member</td>
<td>Oct. 12, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eelco Baan*</td>
<td>Knowledge network leader and senior regional adviser Private Sector Development, SNV Asia</td>
<td>Nov. 12, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nico Janssen*</td>
<td>Agriculture and Renewable Energy Portfolio Coordinator, SNV Cambodia</td>
<td>Nov. 13, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heinz Greijn*</td>
<td>Former Triple AAA specialist, SNV The Hague; Editor Capacity.Org</td>
<td>Nov. 20, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position/Role</td>
<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sonia Ooms, Anita van der Laan, Marlene Roefs</td>
<td>SNV Managing for Results Unit members, SNV The Hague</td>
<td>Dec. 3, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>November 2010/ May 2011</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tara Gujadhur</td>
<td>SNV Laos tourism adviser; SNV Asia knowledge network leader (2009)</td>
<td>Nov. 12, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanda Ritsma*</td>
<td>SNV Bhutan tourism adviser</td>
<td>Nov. 15, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phil Harman</td>
<td>SNV Vietnam tourism sector leader</td>
<td>Dec. 8, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andy Wehkamp*</td>
<td>SNV Asia director</td>
<td>Jan. 25, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monica Oliveros*</td>
<td>SNV Nepal (GHT) tourism adviser</td>
<td>March 12, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linda Bezemer*</td>
<td>SNV Nepal (GHT) tourism adviser</td>
<td>March 15, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ken Wood*</td>
<td>VSO tourism adviser</td>
<td>April 20, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcello Notarrianni*</td>
<td>SNV Balkans tourism sector leader</td>
<td>April 22, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federico Vignati*</td>
<td>SNV Mozambique tourism sector leader</td>
<td>April 24, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominique Verdugo*</td>
<td>SNV West Africa tourism sector leader</td>
<td>April 25, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margriet Poel</td>
<td>SNV Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist; (2015+ Trajectory group member)</td>
<td>May 12, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jessie Bokhoven</td>
<td>SNV head of strategy (2015+ Trajectory group member), SNV The Hague</td>
<td>May 12, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan Vloet, Naa-Aku Acquaye-Baddoo*</td>
<td>Head of strategy and partnerships for the Asia region; Senior strategy adviser (both 2015+ Trajectory group members)</td>
<td>May 15, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>October/November 2013</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Margriet Poel</td>
<td>SNV Monitoring &amp; Evaluation specialist; (2015+ Trajectory group member)</td>
<td>Nov. 28, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jessie Bokhoven</td>
<td>SNV head of strategy; (2015+ Trajectory group member)</td>
<td>Nov. 28, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsa Scholte</td>
<td>Head of communications, SNV The Hague</td>
<td>Nov. 28, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>April 2014</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicolette Mathijsen</td>
<td>SNV Director SNV Laos; Sponsor director tourism in Asia</td>
<td>April 20, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>January 2015</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eelco Baan*</td>
<td>Senior strategy officer agriculture, SNV The Hague</td>
<td>Jan. 05, 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tej Raj Dahal*</td>
<td>Former senior planning and monitoring adviser GHT, SNV Nepal</td>
<td>Jan. 25, 2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author; * interview via skype
Phases of tourism for poverty reduction in SNV

Appendix 2. Phases of tourism for poverty reduction in SNV

Phases of tourism for poverty reduction in SNV

Before 1995

1995-2000
A few projects

2001-2004
Transforming to a practice area

2004-2007
PPST practice area

2007-2010
PPST in PIE impact area

2011
Phasing out PPST

Main explicit strategies

Modes of ordering

Development results in tourism

PPST practice area in SNV

Tourism for poverty reduction

Internal organization SNV

Source: Author
### Phases of tourism for poverty reduction in SNV

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development paradigms</td>
<td>Critical/Alternative development</td>
<td>Alternative development/Neo-liberal</td>
<td>Neoliberal/Alternative development</td>
<td>Alternative modernization/Inclusive neoliberal</td>
<td>Inclusive neoliberal</td>
<td>Inclusive neoliberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of organization</td>
<td>Quasi NGO (linked to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs)</td>
<td>Disentangled international Netherlands based advisory services NGO</td>
<td>SNV as a social enterprise</td>
<td>‘A non-profit development organisation’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant Modes of ordering in SNV</td>
<td>Project Management</td>
<td>Project management; Enterprise</td>
<td>Development brokering; Knowledge development</td>
<td>Development brokering; Result management; Enterprise</td>
<td>Development brokering; Result management; Enterprise</td>
<td>Development brokering; Enterprise; Project management; Result management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measuring development approaches and results</td>
<td>Input oriented</td>
<td>Input and output oriented; output measured in projects</td>
<td>SNV responsible for capacity development of clients; number of clients and client satisfaction measured</td>
<td>Triple AAA; Strategic/client/assignment levels; number of clients and client satisfaction measured; number of advisory days measured</td>
<td>Management for Results Framework and Project; Result Chains (DCED); cases presented; number of advisory days measured</td>
<td>Management for Results Framework; Result Chains (DCED); cases presented; number of advisory days measured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism approaches (in SNV Asia)</td>
<td>Few consultancies; consultants hired from outside SNV</td>
<td>Tourism as a component of integrated rural development project in Nepal; focus on capacity development of target groups, project implementation</td>
<td>Advisory practice/capacity development; organizational strengthening and institutional development. Introduction of pro-poor tourism and Millennium Development Goals. PSD and NRM</td>
<td>Pro Poor Sustainable Tourism, focus on MDGs, poverty reduction, private sector development. Advisory practice/capacity development (towards Destination development and Responsible Business in Tourism &quot;products&quot;)</td>
<td>Focus on development impact, stronger involvement of the private sector, capacity development; pro-poor tourism; VCA&amp;D and multi-stakeholder approaches</td>
<td>(Complex) projects – Great Himalaya Trail and High Impact Tourism Training</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author
Summary

SNV Netherlands Development Organisation is a not-for-profit international development organization, focusing on poverty reduction and capacity development in agriculture, renewable energy, and water and sanitation development. SNV recently phased out tourism, which it introduced as a development tool in the early 1990s.

In this thesis, I studied the rise and fall of tourism in SNV. The main research question was:

How and why have concepts of and practices in tourism for poverty reduction changed within SNV Netherlands Development Organisation over time?

I answered this question by answering six sub-questions:

1. How and why was tourism, as a tool for poverty reduction, introduced in SNV, and how did it take shape in the organization?
2. How did international and national development debates influence SNV as a development organization, and how did that influence tourism as a development practice in the organization?
3. How and why did tourism approaches and tools in the SNV organization change over time?
4. How did SNV’s internal organization change over the years, and how did that influence tourism as a development practice in the organization?
5. How were development results in tourism measured and presented in SNV, and how did that change over time?
6. How and why was SNV’s tourism as a development practice phased out?

Only a few researches have studied tourism development practices in development organizations. To study on these development practices, I used notions that are of importance at the intersection of tourism studies, development studies and organization studies. As such, this thesis contributes to ‘aidnography’, an ethnographic approach to study institutions, organizations and people involved in international development. Aidnography often includes notions of the actor-oriented and actor-network theory approaches. In Chapter 2, I introduced three interrelated theoretical notions from actor-network theory to analyse tourism as a development practice in SNV.
Firstly, I studied SNV’s involvement in tourism in terms of processes of ordering. Actor-network theory analyses multiple processes of social–material ordering by tracing the associations through which heterogeneous actor-networks are stabilized. It involves studying the way heterogeneous entities – people, development ideas, events, technologies, marketing strategies, organizational structures, training courses, etc. – are tied together by translation into material and conceptual orderings of a project or development practice.

In theory, there are endless possible ways entities could be related in processes of ordering. In practice, however, networks of concepts, tools, people and things are assembled in a limited number of ways. These modes of ordering are defined by conditions of possibility and necessity, making some ways of ordering easier and others more difficult or impossible. There seems to be a limited number of strong networks in which concepts, approaches, people and things are connected in communities, organizations, etc. In organizations like SNV, different modes of ordering interact and collide. This interweaving of modes of ordering produces the particular ways that, over the years, SNV integrated the tourism development practice.

Secondly, I examined how through these processes of social–material ordering SNV tried to achieve durability and stability, an on-going process that needs a lot of effort. If relations are not kept in place, networks might disappear. Durability and stability can be achieved materially, strategically and discursively. Networks hold together more easily and for longer if they are inscribed or embodied in policy documents, offices, cars, computers and computing software. Strategic durability is about explicit strategies inscribed in policy documents, rules and regulations, contracts and agreements. Finally, discursive durability concerns the use of particular concepts, because different concepts and logics result in different ways of ordering. These different ways of ordering collide and interweave, and this often results in more stability.

Thirdly, success or failure in international development is produced in these ordering networks. Success depends on how certain concepts and practices achieve stability and on the durability of certain specific interpretations, ‘successful’ qualculations. The neologism qualculation is a contraction of the words calculation and quality. In the concept calculation is broadened to include judgment. ‘Development success’ is produced in networks of indicators, data gathering, computer programs, defining and redefining, summing up and aggregations, and judgments. The more relations and interests are interlocked into the actor networks, the more stable, dominant and successful these interpretations become. Creating development success and
legitimation is therefore qualculation. These analytic notions were used and elaborated in the empirical chapters.

In Chapter 3, I analysed how SNV ordered its tourism development practice. I researched how, during the 20-year period, continuously changing development paradigms and debates both within and outside the Netherlands influenced tourism development approaches and tools. These debates were reflected in, for instance, the subsidy agreements between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and SNV. Changes in development discourses were translated into SNV’s objectives and development practices, and how SNV measured and presented its development results. These development discourses, strategies and practices relate to SNV’s initial disallowing of tourism as a development practice, followed by a hesitant acceptance of tourism in particular projects, its identification as ‘practice area’ in the organization and finally the termination of tourism as a development practice in SNV.

SNV could only become involved in tourism for poverty reduction when development paradigms shifted from critical and neoliberal in the 1980s, to an alternative/sustainable development paradigm in 1990s. Tourism as a development tool grew into a ‘practice’ when, in the early years of the 2000s, development paradigms shifted again towards an alternative neoliberal paradigm.

On the basis of my research, I discerned six phases of tourism for poverty reduction in SNV. In the first phase (before 1995), tourism was cautiously accepted as a possible tool for development. In the second phase (1995–2000), a small number of projects were started in a few specific countries with a limited number of tourism advisers. In the third phase (2001–2004), after a radical conceptual and organizational change within SNV around the turn of the century, SNV’s tourism development practice changed. Tourism as a practice was phased out in some countries (especially in Africa), and phased in in others (especially Asia). In the 1990s the emphasis was on project implementation at community and village level; in the first years of the 2000s, the focus changed to capacity development at the district and the provincial level. This change made it more difficult to show development results. In the same period, SNV spent several years trying to reduce the number of development sectors it was involved in. During this process, ‘sustainable tourism’ emerged as a new corporate ‘practice area’ in 2004.

In the fourth phase (2004–2007), the organization underwent further transformation. As SNV identified tourism as a ‘practice area’, tourism as a development practice grew rapidly within the organization. SNV countries in Africa, Latin America and the Balkans started tourism programmes and hired tourism advisers. The practice
also expanded in Asia. At the same time, there was increased pressure from donor agencies and the general public to show development results. In the fifth phase (2007–2010), the emphasis shifted to measuring and presenting development results. In collaboration with the private sector, development results had to be achieved and demonstrated. At the end of 2010, SNV concluded that tourism had shown these development results insufficiently, and that the sector attracted limited external financing. In the first year of the sixth phase (2011 and beyond), the organization decided to wind down tourism as a development sector.

In Chapter 4, I analysed cases from SNV in Laos, Bhutan and Vietnam. SNV’s first involvement with tourism in Asia was in Nepal in the second half of the 1990s. In 2000, SNV started development initiatives in Vietnam and Laos, initially focused on implementing local projects, supporting groups and organizations at the community level. Tourism activities were initiated in Bhutan and Cambodia direct at district and national level, a few years later. In the SNV Asia countries, tourism advisers and managers supported each other with the development of their country practices. Together with the private sector development officer at the head office in The Hague, SNV in Asia managed to get tourism and the organization more interconnected and interwoven, resulting in sustainable tourism as a corporate ‘practice area’ within SNV and a partnership on tourism and poverty reduction with the World Tourism Organization, in 2004.

Since the SNV Asia tourism evaluation of 2005/2006, engagement with the private sector and the value chain approach received more emphasis. The value chain approach in tourism for poverty reduction was experimented with and developed further to engage the private sector with local social and economic development, and to achieve more development impact. The introduced cases show how tourism practices changed over time, and also explain how the value chain approach evolved from one case to the next.

The three cases show how ‘intervention logics’ and ‘result chains’ were explicitly included in the value chain approach, and ‘base-line studies’ and ‘impact assessments’ were proposed and implemented. However, it remained difficult to show development results. This was related to internal logics of SNV (Chapter 5), as well as to wider debates about measuring and presenting development results and success (see Chapter 6).

In Chapter 5, I analysed the internal organization of SNV. Through the years, development concepts shifted, SNV learned from its development practices and the political landscape in the Netherlands changed, as did thinking about development
organizations, transforming SNV and its internal organization. These changes in turn influenced the tourism development practices in SNV. Based on my fieldwork, I distinguished six organizational modes of ordering in the SNV organization, namely administration, project management, development brokering, enterprise, development visioning and result management. All six modes existed in each development phase (as introduced in Chapter 3), overlapping and colliding in different places and times in the organization. The multiple interactions between these modes created possibilities for ‘organizational change’ in SNV, and produced temporary stability. At the same time, the different combinations of modes of ordering resulted in an SNV organization that could remain ‘relevant’ and ‘successful’.

In the second half of the 1990s, an effective combination of administration and project management resulted in SNV managing and implementing projects at the village level. Other modes of ordering – such as enterprise (with a few bold and opportunistic directors), development brokering and result management – were present, but less visible. At the turn of the century, as a result of changing national and international developments (shifting development paradigms, a new minister of Development Cooperation, etc.), and the subsequent transformation of SNV into an NGO, the effective combination of modes of ordering in SNV shifted. The new combination included administration and development brokering and visioning, in which complexity in development debates was more integrated in the organization. At the same time, project management as a mode of ordering had to be silenced.

With the arrival of a new director and changing emphasis in development debates, the combination of modes of ordering shifted again to include development brokering, result management, enterprise, administration and a return of project management, around the mid-2000s. By this time, development visioning had been pushed aside and silenced as ‘abstract arrogance’. After signing the second subsidy agreement in 2007, SNV presented itself as a social enterprise, and since 2011, SNV had portrayed itself as not-for-profit international development organization.

For tourism, a few enterprising country directors were introducing tourism as a development tool in SNV. The combined enterprise and project management (and administration) modes of ordering offered possibilities to attract funding for tourism projects. After the radical changes in development concepts and organizational modes of ordering around the year 2000, tourism fitted well with the new combination of development brokering and development visioning modes of ordering. The development practices in tourism emphasized multi-stakeholder approaches at the local and the national level, had several advisers who were actively learning and sharing from experiences in the field, created networks with other...
development organizations, universities and the private sector in the Netherlands and internationally, and documented development approaches and instruments. The tourism development practices combined development brokering, development visioning and enterprise. This combination in Asia partly created the possibilities within SNV to be selected in 2004 as a practice area.

Around the mid-2000s, enterprise and result management received more emphasis. As in tourism SNV advisers and managers generated programme funding to implement tourism initiatives, tourism was still considered successful in SNV, although it was difficult for the advisers in the development practice to demonstrate the tourism’s development results. After signing the second subsidy agreement with the Dutch government in 2007, result management was even more emphasized. As tourism practices in different countries in Asia and other SNV regions could not demonstrate employment and income development results convincingly, in early 2011 it was decided not to continue with tourism.

In Chapter 6, I analysed in more detail how SNV measured and presented development results. Over the years, the way SNV development results were measured and reported changed considerably. In each development phase, output, outcome and impact indicators were defined and redefined, measured and presented differently, due to changes in development concepts, approaches, subsidy agreements and modes of ordering in SNV. Till the early 2000s, development success was measured and judged through output and outcome indicators in individual projects. It focused on accounting at project level. At the corporate level, development initiatives and projects were aggregated as ‘activities’, and development impact was not measured, beyond a very occasional country evaluation.

In the years after 2000, SNV changed into an advisory organization. SNV focused more on how it could improve its development practices and how it achieved results, rather than what development results had been achieved. At the corporate level, the organization measured development results through clients’ satisfaction reviews. At both the project and the corporate level it was difficult to show development impact. By the mid-2000s, SNV had become an organization that wanted to show what its main development impacts were, what it was achieving. The SNV Asia tourism practice area evaluation was conducted during this period. The results of the evaluation became part of the justification for SNV’s second subsidy agreement. Partly because of that, the purpose of this evaluation changed from a joint learning and improving practice exercise, to a development impact measurement evaluation.
The Managing for Results project of 2009/10 concluded that impacts needed to be measured and presented more explicitly, using a centralized result framework. After 2010, the unit of measurement became the level of projects again, but now based on this more centralized result framework, using corporate standards and formats. SNV tried to close the gap between measuring at the local or project level and measuring at the corporate level (see figure 6.1.). Tourism was not included in the framework, mainly because the organization no longer regarded tourism as a development sector.

In the years that tourism was a development practice in SNV, it was never completely clear about what to measure and how. About every five years the concepts and development emphases changed, and with it the way development results were defined and measured. Development concepts and organizational progressed so fast that no routines in development measurement could be built. Measurement systems could never be sufficiently stabilized and fixed for long enough to demonstrate its development results convincingly.

In several impact evaluations in SNV, development results were defined and measured using the new concepts of the following phase, instead of the previous phase on which the programme theory for defining development objectives was based. Like in the case of the SNV practice area evaluation (studying the period 2002–2005), the evaluators were asked to focus the evaluation on pro-poor development impact, while most of the development initiatives in Asia were still focusing on improving advisory practice or even logical frameworks in small-scale projects. Advancing insights within SNV, changing donor and reporting requirements, and ever changing consultants with their own ideas of what should be focused on, hindered the development of stable and durable networks.

In each phase, enumerating tourism development results in SNV led to non-qualculation for a while, either through rarefication – as developments results were not measured, information was not analysed or documented, or measuring results was resisted all together – or through proliferation, as so much information was available that it was not easy to condense it into one table, spreadsheet or document. But as results had to be presented, qualculation had to be achieved. In these presented cases, the qualculations of outside consultants or organizations were indispensable on more than one occasion in order to present final development results and a final judgment, and thus closure.

Finally, in Chapter 7, I presented the conclusions of this thesis and discussed the contribution it makes to aidnography, as well as the current debates on the relevance
of tourism in international development and the role of development organizations in tourism poverty reduction.

To summarize the conclusions per research question (see page 185 for a recap):

1. Tourism emerged as a tool for poverty reduction in SNV when development paradigms changed to an alternative/sustainable development paradigm in the 1990s, providing possibilities for tourism to be introduced as an element of integrated rural development. A few enterprising SNV directors started tourism initiatives.

2. The development discourses of SNV and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs have always been closely related, reflecting and influencing international development debates. Around the turn of the millennium, SNV changed its main development concepts, emphasizing capacity development. In the second half of the 2000s, partnerships for development became more important. Tourism in SNV was enabled by and followed these paradigm shifts.

3. In line with these shifts, SNV changed its tourism development approaches and tools. In this thesis I discerned six phases. In the first years tourism was an element in sustainable rural development projects, especially in relation to local participatory planning. A few years later, the tourism practice focused more on capacity development, using multi-stakeholder approaches. Finally, in the years before phasing out, private sector engagement and support, and value chain analysis and development, became dominant approaches.

4. The way tourism was organized and implemented in the organization, was strongly related to the way SNV changed its internal organization over the years. Combinations of six organizational modes of ordering created possibilities for organizational change, which kept SNV relevant as a development organization and consequently influenced the tourism development practice.

5. The way SNV measured its results changed in every phase, and consequently its definition of development success changed in every phase. SNV needed periods of conceptual and material stability to get its result frameworks in place. Within SNV, and in development aid in general, ideas about what needed to be measured changed; changes occurred in the way development results had to be measured and documented, by whom and when. Therefore, impact was not measured thoroughly in the various phases.

6. In early 2011, tourism as a development sector was rather suddenly phased out by SNV. The organization concluded that tourism had not demonstrated its development impact convincingly and had limited donor funding potential, and that not enough expertise was available within SNV in comparison to other
development sectors. It also seemed that tourism as a development sector in SNV did not have a strong internal or external lobby. Due to announced budget cuts for the end of 2010 by a new coalition government in the Netherlands, SNV decided to immediately focus only on its most prominent development sectors, namely agriculture, water and sanitation, and renewable energy. Tourism and other development sectors were phased out.

This study contributed conceptually in several ways to aidnography in tourism and development:

• The role of development organizations in tourism for poverty reduction is often rendered invisible or presented as a black box. By using the actor-network theory’s social-material ordering approach, this thesis contributed to understanding the complex development contexts development organizations are working in and how tourism for poverty reduction is part of that.
• Categorization and ordering shape and change development practices in development organizations, and influence tourism and development concepts, approaches and tools; insights into these categorizations and orderings contribute to an increased understanding of the role of development agencies in tourism and local development.
• Policy models that transform realities and lessons learned on the ground into aggregated policies, demand coherence, unambiguous development interventions and robust development results, rather than an examination and understanding of complex development practices on the ground. Understanding these policy and practice development processes has hardly been attempted in tourism studies.
• Even though increasingly robust, valid and evidence-based development results are demanded, the measurement of results is always impeded, as results are actively produced in processes of summing-up, aggregating and transforming. Achieving development results and success is calculation. Discussing information transformation in producing development success is a contribution to the development results’ debates in tourism studies.
• It appears that continued describing, analysing and comparing case studies, using mixed methods and ethnographic approaches, might provide more understanding of the impact of tourism as a development practice, than only measuring singular development interventions.
• This study illustrates the importance of the embeddedness of the researcher in the studied organization. Embeddedness seems almost inevitable to gain sufficient insight into the internal and external orderings of the organization involved.
• The theoretical notions as introduced in actor-network theory can contribute significantly to comparative studies on tourism and development. Comparing case studies provides indications of what works where (in what context), why and when.

Tourism as a development sector remains relevant wherever poverty persists in existing or potential tourism destinations. It is a growing sector in several developing countries. Tourism can propel innovative local development and provides opportunities for ethnic minority groups and remoter communities. An inclusive destination development approach is proposed, combining an enabling policy environment with strategic marketing and product development, capacity development, local enterprise development, and impact measurement on the ground. To support these multi-stakeholder development processes, a facilitating organization is often required to act as a catalyst.

If no local organizations are readily available to take the facilitating role, development organizations can support tourism for poverty reduction through three interrelated roles: facilitating, linking and networking; capacity development of local organizations and in local contexts; and knowledge development, innovating and sharing.; It is suggested that development organizations focus on innovative solutions and on time and space for experimenting and situated learning from the start of new development initiatives, and use tourism for poverty reduction to pull local social and economic development, demanding more dynamic pathways for inclusive and sustainable growth at the local level.

As tourism for poverty reduction is a composite and complex cross-cutting development sector, development impacts are difficult to measure and demonstrate. To improve impact assessments, the focus might need to be broadened beyond employment and income to include the multiple impacts (based on direct, indirect and dynamic effects) of tourism for poverty reduction in destinations. The focus could be on multi-stakeholder capacity development situations, with more emphasis on local learning. There seems a need for more case studies and impact narratives in tourism for development. Continued analysis and comparison of case studies will enhance situated learning and increase understanding of tourism in development and poverty reduction.
Samenvatting

SNV Nederlandse Ontwikkelingsorganisatie is een internationale ‘not-for profit’ ontwikkelingsorganisatie gericht op armoedebestrijding en capaciteitsopbouw in landbouw, duurzame energie en water, gezondheid en hygiëne. SNV beëindigde onlangs haar toerismeprogramma, dat het in het begin van de 90er jaren was begonnen.

In dit proefschrift onderzoek ik de opkomst en neergang van toerisme binnen SNV. De centrale onderzoeksvraag was:

Hoe en waarom zijn in de loop van de tijd binnen SNV de opvattingen over en praktijken in toerisme voor armoedebestrijding veranderd?

Ik beantwoordde deze hoofdvraag aan de hand van een aantal deelvragen:

1. Hoe en waarom werd toerisme als instrument voor armoedebestrijding binnen SNV geïntroduceerd en vorm gegeven?
2. Hoe werd SNV beïnvloed door internationale en nationale ontwikkelingsdebatten, en wat voor gevolgen had dat voor de toerisme als ontwikkelingspraktijk binnen de organisatie?
3. Hoe en waarom veranderden binnen SNV toerisme benaderingen en instrumenten in loop van de tijd?
4. Hoe veranderde de interne organisatie in SNV door de jaren heen, en wat voor gevolgen had dat voor de toerisme als ontwikkelingspraktijk?
5. Hoe werden de resultaten met betrekking tot toerisme in SNV gemeten en gepresenteerd, en hoe veranderde dat in de loop der jaren?
6. Hoe en waarom werd de toepassing van toerisme door SNV weer beëindigd?

Allereerst heb ik SNV’s betrokkenheid bij toerisme bestudeerd in termen van ordeningsprocessen. Actor-netwerk theorie bestudeert de manier waarop heterogene entiteiten, zoals mensen, ontwikkelingsideeën, gebeurtenissen, technologieën, marketing strategieën, organisaties, trainingen, enz., door ‘translatie’ worden verbonden in materiële en conceptuele ordeningen in een project of ontwikkelingspraktijk. In theorie zijn er eindeloos veel mogelijkheden om relaties tussen entiteiten te leggen. In de praktijk zijn netwerken van concepten, instrumenten, mensen en dingen vaak maar op een beperkt aantal manieren geordend. Deze manieren van ordening worden bepaald door mogelijkheden of noodzaak, die maken dat sommige manieren van ordenen gemakkelijker en andere moeilijker of zelfs onmogelijk worden. Vaak blijven maar een beperkt aantal sterke netwerken over die in organisaties zoals SNV op elkaar botsen of met elkaar interacteren. Deze verwevenheid leidde tot specifieke manieren waarop SNV in de loop der jaren toerisme integreerde in de organisatie.


Ten derde heb ik onderzocht hoe in ontwikkelingssamenwerking ‘succes’ of ‘falen’ ook in ordeningsnetwerken worden geproduceerd. Succes hangt samen met hoe bepaalde opvattingen en praktijken leiden tot stabiliteit en verduurzaming van specifieke interpretaties, een bepaalde ‘successvolle’ kwalculatie. Het neologisme ‘kwaculatie’ (‘qualculation’) is een samentrekking van calculatie en kwaliteit. In dit begrip wordt het calculeren verbonden aan de beoordeling van die calculatie. ‘Ontwikkelingssucces’ wordt geproduceerd in netwerken van indicatoren, gegevensverzameling, computerprogramma’s, definities en herdefiniëringen, optellingen en samenvoegingen en beoordelingen. Hoe meer relaties en belangen op bepaalde manieren in de netwerken worden verbonden, hoe stabiler, dominanter
en ‘succesvoller’ die interpretaties worden. Het creëren van ontwikkelingssucces en legitimatie is een kwestie van kwalculatie. Dit begrippenkader wordt in de verschillende hoofdstukken toegepast en verder uitgewerkt.

In hoofdstuk 3 analyseer ik hoe SNV toerisme als ontwikkelingspraktijk heeft geordend. Ik heb onderzocht hoe gedurende 20 jaar voortdurend veranderende ontwikkelingsparadigma’s en debatten binnen en buiten Nederland, toerisme en ontwikkelingsbenaderingen en -instrumenten hebben beïnvloed. Deze debatten werden gereflecteerd in bijvoorbeeld de subsidieaanvragen van SNV aan het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken. Veranderingen in ontwikkelingsdiscoursen werden vertaald in SNV’s doelstellingen en ontwikkelingspraktijken en in hoe ontwikkelingsresultaten werden gemeten. Deze ontwikkelingsdiscoursen zijn nauw verwant aan de manier waarop eerst toerisme uit SNV werd geweerd, vervolgens schoorvoetend werd geaccepteerd, uitgroeide tot één van de ontwikkelingssectoren in SNV, en uiteindelijk als sector weer werd beëindigd.

SNV kon alleen bij toerisme voor armoedebestrijding betrokken raken toen ontwikkelingsparadigma’s verschoven van kritisch en neo-liberaal in de 80er jaren, naar het alternatieve/duurzame ontwikkelings-paradigma van de 90er jaren. Toerisme als ontwikkelingsinstrument kon vervolgens aan het begin van deze eeuw binnen SNV uitgroeien tot een eigen ‘praktijk’ door een verschuiving naar een alternatief neo-liberaal ontwikkelingsparadigma.

onvoldoende overtuigend had laten zien dat het zichtbare ontwikkelingsresultaten behaalde en dat het onvoldoende eigen financieringwist aan te trekken. Daarom besloot de organisatie toerisme in het eerste jaar van de zesde fase (2011 en verder) te beëindigen.


Na de SNV Azië toerisme evaluatie kwam in alle landen meer nadruk op waardeketens en de rol van het bedrijfsleven te liggen. De waardeketenbenadering in toerisme werd binnen SNV verder ontwikkeld om het bedrijfsleven en andere belanghebbenden meer bij de ontwikkelingssector te betrekken en om meer ontwikkelingsimpact te kunnen bereiken. De drie Aziatische cases laten zien hoe in de loop van de tijd de toerismepraktijken en de waardeketenbenadering in SNV veranderden.

De drie cases laten ook zien hoe door duidelijker 'interventie logica's' en 'resultaatketens' in de waardeketenbenadering en eenduidiger 'base-line studies' en 'impact assessments' SNV Azië de ontwikkelingsimpact van toerisme beter probeerde te meten. Toch bleef het ook in deze periode moeilijk om resultaten te laten zien. Dit had te maken met de interne organisatielogica's binnen SNV (hoofdstuk 5), maar tevens met bredere discussies over het meten en presenteren van ontwikkelingsresultaten en ontwikkelingssucces (hoofdstuk 6).

In hoofdstuk 5 heb ik de interne organisatie van SNV geanalyseerd. Door de jaren heen is het ontwikkelingsdenken veranderd, het politieke landschap in Nederland veranderd en hebben er zich veranderingen in denken over organisaties voorgedaan, met veranderingen in SNV en haar interne organisatie tot gevolg. De veranderingen in de organisatie hebben ook invloed gehad op de toerismepraktijk in SNV. Op basis van het veldwerk heb ik zes verschillende stijlen van organiseren binnen
de SNV organisatie onderscheiden, te weten: administratie, projectmanagement, ondernemerschap, ontwikkelingsbemiddeling, visieontwikkeling, en resultaatmanagement. Alle ordeningsstijlen kwamen in elke ontwikkelingsfase, zoals geïdentificeerd in hoofdstuk 3, voor en werkten in verschillende combinaties op verschillende plaatsen en tijden in de organisatie op elkaar in. De meervoudige interacties tussen deze ordeningsstijlen veroorzaakten de mogelijkheden voor ‘organisatorische verandering’ in SNV en zorgden tevens voor een tijdelijke stabiliteit. Tegelijkertijd zorgden de wisselwerking tussen de verschillende combinaties van organisatiestijlen ervoor dat een organisatie als SNV ‘relevant’ en ‘succesvol’ kon blijven.

In de tweede helft van de 90er jaren resulteerde een effectieve combinatie van administratie en projectmanagement in door SNV zelf uitgevoerde projecten op dorpsniveau. Rond de eeuwwisseling verschoof de effectieve combinatie van organisatiestijlen naar ontwikkelingsbemiddeling en visieontwikkeling (en administratie), waardoor binnen de organisatie complexiteit in het ontwikkelingsdenken ruimte kreeg. Tegelijkertijd moest projectmanagement als organisatiestijl worden uitgebannen.


Voor toerisme waren ondernemende landendirecteuren belangrijk bij de introductie van toerisme als praktijk binnen SNV. Binnen de organisatiestijlen projectmanagement en ondernemerschap (en administratie) zagen zij mogelijkheden om financiën voor toerismeprojecten aan te trekken. Na de grote verschuiving in ontwikkelingsconcepten en organisatiestijlen rond 2000 paste toerisme goed in de nieuwe combinatie van de organisatiestijlen van ontwikkelingsbemiddeling en visieontwikkeling. In de ontwikkelingspraktijk lag de nadruk op het werken met meerdere actoren op lokaal en nationaal niveau, een aantal kennis uitwisselende toerismeadviseurs, netwerken met andere ontwikkelingsorganisaties, universiteiten en bedrijfsleven in Nederland (en snel ook daarbuiten) en werden de ontwikkelingsbenaderingen en -instrumenten goed gedocumenteerd. Mede daardoor werd toerisme in 2004 een ‘practice area’ binnen SNV.
Rond die tijd kwam de nadruk ook meer op ondernemen en resultaatmanagement te liggen. In toerisme genereerden SNV adviseurs en managers al eigen fondsen om toerismeprogramma’s te kunnen implementeren en werd toerisme daarom binnen SNV als succesvol gezien, hoewel het niet goed lukte om ontwikkelingsresultaten overtuigend te presenteren. Na de ondertekening van de tweede subsidieovereenkomst met de Nederlandse overheid in 2007 werd nog meer nadruk op ontwikkelingsimpact gelegd. Omdat toerisme nog steeds geen duidelijke resultaten kon laten zien werd begin 2011 besloten om niet verder te gaan met toerisme als ontwikkelingspraktijk.


In de jaren na 2000 veranderde SNV naar een adviesorganisatie. SNV concentreerde zich op hoe het ontwikkelingspraktijken kon verbeteren en hoe resultaten konden worden bereikt. Op organisatieniveau mat de organisatie ontwikkelingsresultaten door middel van het onderzoeken van ‘klantentevredenheid’ (client satisfaction). Zowel op project- als op organisatieniveau was het moeilijk om ontwikkelingsimpact te laten zien. Rond het midden van het decennium was SNV een organisatie geworden die wilde laten zien wat haar belangrijkste ontwikkelingsimpacts waren. De SNV Azië toerismesector evaluatie werd in deze periode uitgevoerd. De resultaten van deze evaluatie werden onderdeel van de verantwoordelijke voor SNV’s tweede subsidieovereenkomst. Gedeeltelijk daardoor veranderde deze evaluatie van een exercitie om de toerismepraktijk te verbeteren in een ontwikkelingsimpact evaluatie.

In de jaren dat toerisme ontwikkelingspraktijk was, is SNV nooit helemaal duidelijk geweest over wat het wilde meten en hoe. Ongeveer elke vijf jaren verschoven ontwikkelingsconcepten en aandachtsgebieden en daarmee hoe ontwikkelingsresultaten werden gedefinieerd en gemeten. Ontwikkelingsconcepten en organisatorische veranderingen volgden elkaar zo snel op dat routines in het meten van ontwikkeling niet konden worden opgebouwd. Meetsystemen konden niet lang genoeg worden gestabiliseerd om ontwikkelingsresultaten overtuigend aan te tonen.

In verschillende impact evaluaties in SNV werden ontwikkelingsresultaten gedefinieerd en gemeten met gebruikmaking van de nieuwe concepten uit de volgende fase in plaats van de fase waarop de programmatheorie voor de definiëring van de ontwikkningsdoelstellingen was gebaseerd. Een goed voorbeeld hiervan is de evaluatie van de SNV toerismepraktijk (die de periode 2002-2005 besloeg) waarin de evaluatoren werden gevraagd om de ‘pro-poor’ ontwikkelingsimpact te evalueren, terwijl de meeste initiatieven in Azië zich nog steeds op een verbeterende adviespraktijk of ouputs en outcomes van ‘logical frameworks’ in kleinschalige projecten concentreerden. Voortschrijdende inzichten in SNV, veranderende donor rapportage voorschriften, en telkens andere consultants met eigen ideeën over waarop in de toerisme praktijk geconcentreerd moest worden, hinderden de ontwikkeling van stabiele netwerken.

In elke fase leidde het optellen van ontwikkelingsresultaten voor een tijdje tot non-kwalificatie, omdat ontwikkelingsresultaten niet werden gemeten, informatie niet werd geanalyseerd of gedocumenteerd, het meten van resultaten werd tegengewerkt, of omdat er teveel informatie beschikbaar was, waardoor het moeilijk was om alle informatie samen te vatten. Omdat er toch resultaten moesten worden gepresenteerd werd uiteindelijk kwalificatie bereikt. In enkele van de gepresenteerde cases waren kwalificaties van consultants of organisaties van buiten noodzakelijk om de uiteindelijke resultaten en een conclusie te presenteren en daarmee tot een afronding van de evaluatie te komen.

Tenslotte presenteer ik in hoofdstuk 7 de conclusies van dit proefschrift en bespreek ik de bijdrage die het heeft geleverd aan aidnografie en aan de huidige debatten over de relevantie van toerisme in internationale ontwikkeling en de rol van ontwikkelingsorganisaties in toerisme voor armoedebestrijding. Samenvattend zijn de conclusies per onderzoeksvraag (zie bladzijde 195 voor de vragen):
1. Toerisme als instrument voor armoedebestrijding kwam in SNV naar voren toen ontwikkelingsparadigma’s veranderenden naar een alternatief/duurzame ontwikkelingsparadigma in de 90er jaren. Hierdoor kon toerisme worden geïntroduceerd als onderdeel van geïntegreerde rurale ontwikkeling. Ondernemende SNV directeuren namen het initiatief om toerisme activiteiten te starten.

2. De ontwikkelingsdiscoursen van SNV en het Nederlandse Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, beïnvloed door internationale debatten, zijn altijd nauw met elkaar verweven geweest. Rond de eeuwisseling veranderde SNV haar ontwikkelingsconcepten naar een nadruk op capaciteitsopbouw. In de tweede helft van het decennium werden partnerschappen en resultaatmeten steeds belangrijker. Toerisme volgde deze paradigmaverschuivingen.

3. Ook de toerisme ontwikkelingsbenaderingen en –instrumenten veranderden. In dit proefschrift heb ik zes fases onderscheiden. In de beginjaren was toerisme een element in duurzame rurale ontwikkelingsprojecten, vooral in relatie tot lokale participatieve planning. Een paar jaren later concentreerde de toerisempraktijk zich meer op capaciteitsopbouw met aandacht voor meervoudige belangenbehartiging. In de laatste jaren voordat toerisme werd uitgevaseerd waren betrokkenheid en ondersteuning van de private sector en waardeketenontwikkeling belangrijke benaderingen.

4. De manier waarop toerisme in de organisatie werd georganiseerd en geïmplementeerd was sterk verweven met de manier waarop SNV haar interne organisatie in de loop der jaren veranderde. Combinaties van zes stijlen van organiseren schiepen mogelijkheden voor veranderingen in de organisatie om relevant te blijven als ontwikkelingsorganisatie en beïnvloedde de toerisme ontwikkelingspraktijk.

5. De manier waarop SNV resultaten mat veranderde in elke fase en daarmee veranderde ook telkens de definitie van ontwikkelingssucces. SNV had periodes van conceptuele en materiële stabilititeit nodig om raamwerken voor resultaatmeting in te kunnen voeren. Binnen SNV, en in ontwikkelingssamenwerking in het algemeen, veranderden voortdurend ideeën over wat, de manier waarop, door wie en wanneer, gemeten moest worden. Daardoor kon impact in de verschillende fases niet grondig gemeten worden;

6. In het begin van 2011 heeft SNV toerisme als ontwikkelingssector nogal plotseling uitgevaseerd. De organisatie concludeerde dat toerisme niet overtuigend genoeg ontwikkelingsimpact had laten zien, dat er te weinig potentiële donorfondsen voor toerisme beschikbaar waren en dat er in vergelijking met andere sectoren onvoldoende expertise in SNV was. Als gevolg van aangekondigde bezuinigingen door de nieuwe regeringscoalitie
in Nederland nam SNV het besluit om zich per onmiddellijk alleen op de drie meest prominente ontwikkelingssectoren te richten. Toerisme en andere ontwikkelingssectoren werden uitgefaceerd.

Deze studie heeft verder op een aantal manieren bijgedragen aan aidnografie in toerisme en ontwikkeling:

- De rol van ontwikkelingsorganisaties in toerisme voor armoedebestrijding is vaak onzichtbaar of wordt gepresenteerd als een ‘black box’. Door bepaalde noties ontleend aan actor-netwerk theorie te gebruiken kon dit proefschrift bijdragen aan een beter begrip van de complexe ontwikkelingscontexten waarin ontwikkelingsorganisaties werken en hoe toerisme voor armoedebestrijding daar onderdeel van is.
- Beleidsmodellen die realiteiten en lessen uit het veld transformeren in geaggregeerd beleid vragen vaak om coherente en eenduidige interventies en robuuste ontwikkelingsresultaten in plaats van om bestudering en begrip van complexe ontwikkelingspraktijken in het veld. In toerismestudies is onderzoek naar deze beleids- en praktijkprocessen schaars.
- Ooknuersteedsmeermorobuuste, geldiggeenbewijsbareontwikkelingsresultaten gevraagd wordt zal het meten van resultaten altijd gebrekkig blijven, omdat resultaten actief geconstrueerd worden in processen van optellen, aggregeren, en transformeren. Het bereiken van ontwikkelingsresultaten en -succes is en blijft een kwestie van ‘kwalculatie’. Het bediscussiëren van informatietransformatie in de productie van ontwikkelingssucces is een bijdrage aan debatten over ontwikkelingsresultaten in toerismestudies.
- Het lijkt erop dat het beschrijven, analyseren en vergelijken van casestudies, met gebruikmaking van mixed methods en etnografische benaderingen, meer begrip van de impact van toerisme als ontwikkelingspraktijk oplevert, dan alleen het meten van resultaten van enkelvoudige ontwikkelingsinterventies.
- Deze studie illustreert het belang van het actief participeren (‘embeddedness’) van de onderzoeker in de onderzochte organisatie. Actieve participatie lijkt bijna onvermijdelijk om voldoende inzicht te krijgen in de interne en externe ordeningen van de betreffende organisatie.
De theoretische noties zoals gebruikt in dit proefschrift kunnen ook gebruikt worden in andere studies naar toerisme en ontwikkeling. Het vergelijken van casestudies verschaf indicaties van wat werkt waar (in welke context), waarom en wanneer.

Toerisme is nog steeds relevant als ontwikkelingssector, vooral in bestaande en potentiële toerismebestemmingen waar armoede heerst. In veel ontwikkelingslanden is het een groeiende sector. Toerisme kan innovatieve lokale sociale en economische ontwikkeling aanjagen en ontwikkelingsmogelijkheden voor etnische minderheden en afgelegen gemeenschappen bieden. Ik bepleit daarom een inclusieve ontwikkelingsbenadering op de bestemming, waarin een adequaat beleidskader, strategische marketing en product ontwikkeling, capaciteitsopbouw, lokale bedrijfsontwikkeling en impact meting ter plekke worden gecombineerd, om zo bij te dragen aan armoedebestrijding. Om zulke ontwikkelingsprocessen die verschillende belanghebbenden bijeen brengen te ondersteunen is vaak een faciliterende organisatie nodig als katalysator.

Als er geen lokale organisaties beschikbaar zijn, die deze faciliterende rol op zich kunnen nemen, kunnen ontwikkelingsorganisaties toerisme voor armoedebestrijding ondersteunen door drie rollen te spelen: kennisontwikkeling, innovatie en kennisdelen; faciliteren, koppelen en netwerken; en capaciteitsopbouw van lokale organisaties in de lokale context. Ontwikkelingsorganisaties zouden zich daarbij moeten concentreren op ‘innovatieve oplossingen’ en vanaf het begin van ontwikkelingsinitiatieven tijd en ruimte moeten bieden voor experimenteren en gezamenlijk leren en toerisme voor armoedebestrijding gebruiken als een manier om sociale en economische ontwikkeling te stimuleren. Toerisme vormt een ingang voor inclusieve en duurzame groei op lokaal niveau.

Omdat toerisme voor armoedebestrijding een samengestelde en complexe sector-overschrijdende ontwikkelingssector is, is het niet gemakkelijk om ontwikkelingsimpact van toerisme te meten en aan te tonen. Om het meten van impact te verbeteren zal de focus niet alleen op werkgelegenheid en inkomens effecten moeten liggen, maar op meervoudige impacts (zowel direct, indirect, als dynamische effecten) van toerisme op armoedebestrijding in bestemmingen. De nadruk zou bij capaciteitsontwikkeling van verschillende belanghebbenden en hun interacties kunnen liggen, met gerichte ondersteuning voor het stimuleren van gezamenlijk leren. Er lijkt een noodzaak voor meer casestudies en impact verhalen; het voortdurend vergelijken en analyseren van casestudies zal het begrip van de mogelijke bijdrage van toerisme aan lokale sociale en economische ontwikkeling en armoedebestrijding verhogen.
Curriculum Vitae

John Hummel was born in Assen, a town in the northeast of the Netherlands. He entered Wageningen Agricultural University in 1984 to study Bosbouw (Forestry), specializing in tourism and recreation in protected areas, sustainable development and leisure sociology. During his internship in India and Nepal, where he visited HNB Garhwal University (Uttarkhand, India) and the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) in Kathmandu, he decided to focus his study fully on tourism, the environment and local development in developing countries. His Master’s thesis was on the role of tourism and forestry governments, and local communities in the conservation and development of a nature reserve in the Garhwal Himalaya in India.

Since completing his Master’s in 1991, he has worked in tourism, poverty reduction and sustainable development. He was an SNV tourism adviser in several countries in the Himalaya, the Mekong region and the Balkans from 1996 until 2011. Before he joined SNV, he was a project researcher at Wageningen University (studying the concepts and development practices of ecotourism in Costa Rica, India and Nepal) and a tour leader in the mountains of Europe, India and Nepal for a Dutch tour operator.

John was one of SNV’s first tourism advisers and was involved in shaping the tourism programmes in Albania (1996), Nepal (1997) and Bhutan (2003). He managed the SNV private sector programme in Nepal (2001/02) and coordinated the regional tourism programme in the Himalaya (2005/06). He took on the role of tourism network leader for SNV in Asia between 2005 and 2010. He led SNV Asia’s tourism strategy and knowledge development, advisory product development and profiling, and coordinated the partnership with the World Tourism Organization (2007–10). He developed and conducted capacity-development training courses on pro-poor and sustainable tourism development for development agencies and education institutes, and initiated and coordinated the development of training manuals and lessons learned documents with the World Tourism Organization, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), Asian Development Bank, and International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development.

Between May 2012 and June 2014, he was senior adviser and lecturer at the Community Based Tourism International Research for Development Centre (CBT-IRDC), Payap University, Thailand. He has published articles on eco, sustainable and pro-poor tourism, rural development and value chain development, and has guest lectured at universities in Europe and Asia. He currently lives in Johannesburg, South Africa.