Yayasan RUANGRUPA end line report

MFS II country evaluations, Civil Society component

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This report describes the findings of the end line assessment of Yayasan RUANGRUPA that is a partner of Hivos.

The evaluation was commissioned by NWO-WOTRO, the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research in the Netherlands and is part of the programmatic evaluation of the Co-Financing System - MFS II financed by the Dutch Government, whose overall aim is to strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. Apart from assessing impact on MDGs, the evaluation also assesses the contribution of the Dutch Co-Funding Agencies to strengthen the capacities of their Southern Partners, as well as the contribution of these partners towards building a vibrant civil society arena.

This report assesses RUANGRUPA’s contributions towards strengthening Civil Society in Indonesia and it used the CIVICUS analytical framework. It is a follow-up of a baseline study conducted in 2012. Key questions that are being answered comprise changes in the five CIVICUS dimensions to which RUANGRUPA contributed; the nature of its contribution; the relevance of the contribution made and an identification of factors that explain RUANGRUPA’s role in civil society strengthening.

Keywords: Civil Society, CIVICUS, theory based evaluation, process-tracing
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List of abbreviations and acronyms

- **BCI**  Basic Capabilities Index
- **BPS**  *Badan Pusat Statistik* (Central Agency on Statistics)
- **CDI**  Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR
- **CFA**  Co-Financing Agency
- **CFO**  Co-Financing Organisation
- **CS**  Civil society
- **CSO**  Civil society organisation
- **GNI**  Gross National Income
- **HDI**  Human Development Index
- **ICT**  Information and communications technology
- **ISAD**  Indonesia Street Art Database
- **IVAA**  Indonesian Visual Art Archive
- **Koalisi Seni**  Arts Coalition
- **KontraS**  *Komisi Untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan* (Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence)
- **MFS**  Dutch co-financing system
- **MoC**  Model of Change
- **MoFA**  Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- **NGO**  Non-governmental organisation
- **Ormas**  *Organisasi masyarakat* (Societal Organisations)
- **PSHK**  *Pusat Hukum dan Kebijakan* (Center for Law and Policy)
- **RRRec**  Record Music Festival
- **SERF**  Social Economic Rights Fulfilment
- **SPO**  Southern Partner Organisation
- **SSI**  Semi-structured Interview
- **ToC**  Theory of Change
- **Wageningen UR**  Wageningen University & Research Centre
1 Introduction

This report presents the civil society end line findings of RUANGRUPA in Indonesia which is a partner of Hivos in Indonesia under the Dutch Consortium People Unlimited. It is a follow-up to the baseline assessment that was carried out in 2012. According to the information provided during the baseline study, RUANGRUPA is working on the theme ‘governance’.

These findings are part of the overall evaluation of the joint MFS II evaluations to account for results of MFS II-funded or –co-funded development interventions implemented by Dutch CFAs and/or their Southern Partner Organisations (SPO) and to contribute to the improvement of future development interventions. The civil society evaluation uses the CIVICUS framework and seeks to answer the following questions:

- What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?
- To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
- What is the relevance of these changes?
- What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The CIVICUS framework that comprises five dimensions (civic engagement, level of organisation, practice of values, perception of impact and contexts influencing agency by civil society in general) has been used to orient the evaluation methodology.

1.1 Changes in the civil society arena of the SPO

In the 2012 – 2014 period the most important change that took place in the civil society arena of the SPO are related to civic engagement and level of organisation. RUANGRUPA has been successful in promoting inclusive contemporary visual art to allow more upcoming young artists from various backgrounds to explore issues of surrounding context through creative expression. In doing so, RUANGRUPA has defended those who have been marginalised by market interests and played an important role in the improvement of the contemporary arts infrastructure. RUANGRUPA’s stature has also been growing as an avant-garde organisation able to organise collective and collaborative efforts that seek to engage a wider audience.

These findings were obtained through an analysis of documents, a workshop and follow-up interviews with the SPO, and interviews with external resources persons working in civil society organisations that receive support from the SPO; other civil society organisations with whom the SPO is collaborating; public or private sector agents and; external resource persons capable of overlooking the MDG or theme on which the SPO is concentrating.

1.2 Contribution analysis

Based upon an analysis of the projects and programmes financed by the Dutch CFAs a selection was made of SPOs to be included in an in-depth process tracing trajectory and those to be included for a quick contribution of the other SPOs. RUANGRUPA Ruangrupa was selected for a quick assessment.

The outcome that we looked at is the development of infrastructure for contemporary visual and video art in Jakarta. The most likely explanation to this outcome is that RUANGRUPA has become a benchmark for contemporary visual arts and has contributed significantly to the improvement of arts infrastructure in Jakarta. The contribution of the SPO towards achieving this outcome is in promoting contemporary arts to a common audience, supporting new initiatives for alternative expression and being a knowledge producer in the area of contemporary arts.
1.3 Relevance

Interviews with staff of RUANGRUPA, with external resource person, with the liaison officer of Hivos, as well as contextual information helped to assess the relevance of RUANGRUPA’s interventions in terms of; its Theory of Change (ToC) for Civil Society (SC) as designed during the baseline study; the context in which RUANGRUPA is operating; the CS policies of Hivos.

With regards to the baseline ToC, the interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant because they comprise of the ToC’s preconditions, such as existence of public space, networking, and increasing the capacity of society. With regards to the context in which RUANGRUPA is operating, its interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant because the SPO defended those marginalised by market domination in contemporary visual arts. With regards to the CS policies of Arts Collaboratory, RUANGRUPA’s interventions and outcomes are relevant because all RUANGRUPA’s objectives fit with Hivos and Arts Collaboratory policies.

1.4 Explaining factors

The information related to factors that explain the above findings was collected at the same time as the data were gathered for the previous questions. The evaluation team looked at internal factors within the RUANGRUPA, the external context in which it operates and the relations between RUANGRUPA and Hivos.

Internal factors within the SPO that explain the findings are the open character of RUANGRUPA and the fact that the organisation is an artist-run initiative with a relaxed and informal atmosphere. By organising numerous events, RUANGRUPA has also been able to ensure a dynamic leadership, with alumni taking an active role in the organisation.

External factors that explain the findings are an increasing demand for contemporary arts content and alternative forms of expression. The popularity of contemporary arts has likely contributed to greater audience participation, but has also shaped how RUANGRUPA navigates between idealism and the commodification of contemporary art.

Factors that explain the findings that are related to the relation between RUANGRUPA and Hivos are continuous Hivos support from 2003 to 2013 and increased RUANGRUPA’s role as Arts Collaboratory associate partner since 2008.

The following chapter briefly describes the political context, the civil society context and the relevant background with regards to the MDG/theme RUANGRUPA is working on. Chapter three provides background information on RUANGRUPA, the relation of its MFS II interventions with the CIVICUS framework and specific information on the contract with Hivos. An evaluation methodology has been developed for the evaluation of the Civil Society component which can be found in Appendix 2; however, deviations from this methodology, the choices made with regards to the selection of the outcomes for contribution analysis, as well as difficulties encountered during data collection are to be found in Chapter 4. The answers to each of the evaluation questions are being presented in Chapter 5, followed by a discussion on the general project design in relation to CS development; an assessment of what elements of the project design may possibly work in other contexts or be implemented by other organisations in Chapter 6. Conclusions are presented in Chapter 7.

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1 “RUANGRUPA Organisational Assessment Final_2008-2010”, Hivos,.docx”, p. 2
2  Context

This paragraph briefly describes the context RUANGRUPA is working in.

2.1 Political context

2.1.1  Brief historical perspective

Indonesia’s rise to being the world’s third largest democratic nation has been lauded by many world leaders. The country is often considered to be a model Muslim democracy. As the fourth most populous nation with an estimated 250 million people\(^3\), Indonesia has sustained its democratic commitment since transitioning from an authoritarian leadership to a democracy in 1998. The decentralized administration now consists of 34 provinces and 508 districts and municipalities.

Prior to 1998, Indonesia was under strict authoritarian regime. Suharto, known for his so-called New Order (1966-1998) regime, ushered in radical transformations that would place social and political forces under direct state supervision. The defining characteristics of the Suharto era were a focus on economic growth and controlled consensus and political stability devoid of dissent. A series of tumultuous economic and political transitions in the nineties severely diminished the credibility of ageing President Suharto, who was forced to resign amidst mass street protests.

His departure in 1998 laid bare three decades of social inequalities, state-perpetuated abuses against human rights, and a lack of civilian liberties. The regime change opened the way for a period of Reformasi started under the presidency of B. J. Habibie (1998-1999) and continued by Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001), Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001–2004), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014). Restrictions on citizen participation, press freedom and association were removed. Democratic reforms and decentralization led to direct elections, portioned authority, devolution of authority to regional authorities, formation of new political parties and ended the military’s parliamentary influence. The distinct historical periods of the New Order Regime and Reformasi (1998–present) have shaped the emergence of civil society. Defining characteristics are summarized in the table below.

Table 1  Characteristics that have defined the emergence of civil society in Indonesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political system</td>
<td>Centralized, authoritarian characterized by unipolarity. Golkar as the dominant political party.</td>
<td>Decentralized, democratic. Fragmentation of power and atomization of patronage relationships. Emergence of numerous political parties. Direct presidential elections since 1999.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In 1999, there were 27 provinces, 306 districts and around 60,000 villages.</td>
<td>Decentralization altered the political and administrative landscape: 34 provinces, 410 districts, 98 municipalities, 6,944 sub-districts and 81,253 villages.(^4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-citizen interaction</td>
<td>Benevolent leader, obedient population. Down to the village level, the state permeated society.</td>
<td>Modern political culture marked by diminishing hierarchy between the state and citizens, allowing for citizens to interact more freely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen representation and association</td>
<td>Strict control of speech, expression and association.</td>
<td>Burgeoning of CSOs, pressure groups and NGOs following the political euphoria after</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^3\) In 2010 the population was estimated to be around 237 million people (BPS 2010 Population Census). The current figure is an estimate from BKKBN and similar figures are cited in the CIA’s World Fact Book and the World Bank.

CSOs and their networks largely “hiding behind the screen”, and operating under state surveillance. A period of growth occurred in 1995-98, as resistance was building. Indonesian CSOs began to establish new networks internationally. Up until the early 2000s the focus was on state-centrist issues. Later, issues that CSOs were tackling became more diverse, ranging from pluralism, poverty reduction to fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media</th>
<th>Artistic forms of expression</th>
<th>Religious expression and organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No free press, censorship and state-control. Suharto had firm grasp over how to use print &amp; broadcast medias to promote political ideologies.</td>
<td>Art and literary censorship conducted by the state. Art forms were a means to reinforce political order.</td>
<td>Regime repressed religious groups, especially radical forms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More vibrant media environment, flourishing of media businesses albeit in control of 12 main conglomerates that are mostly profit-driven and often have political ties.</td>
<td>Greater freedom of the arts and cultural sectors. Organisations able to hold art events more freely. Freedom of expression a catchphrase amongst individuals and artistic groups, but challenged by more conservative members of society.</td>
<td>Emergence of religious groups seeking to restore Islamic values and defend Muslim values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited public and CS use and access to internet until mid-90s.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twitter nation, widespread social media use.</td>
<td>Growing realization of the importance of media/free press as the fourth pillar of democracy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With political reforms came greater freedom and space for civic engagement. In the Reformasi period, there was a remarkable increase in the number of civil society organisations, many of which were Islamic in character. In 2000, the Central Agency on Statistics (BPS) recorded around 70,000 registered organisations, compared to just 10,000 in 1996.5New groups sprung up with donors encouraging activists to establish NGOs they could fund. These organisations were eager to distance themselves from state and often took an anti-government stance. Proliferating CSOs and NGOs have taken advantage of decentralization and greater regional autonomy to engage in public affairs. Civil society and government relations have improved, although both sides remain sceptical of the others’ intentions.

2.1.2 Recent trends in the political context

Indonesia is considered to be a story of democratic success, but it still struggles to realize the benefits of sustained and equitable economic growth. In the political context, the main challenges lie in governing such geographically vast and decentralized country, applying principles of good governance and the enormous task of reforming the country’s bureaucracy.

Although, Indonesia’s ‘big bang’ decentralization initiated at the turn of the century narrowed the gap between local government and citizens, it has also localized political power struggles. While the devolution of authorities relieved tensions between the central government and the regions, it has also created opportunities for corrupt and rent-seeking practices, at the local level. As indicated by Transparency International’s corruption index scores, perceived corruption in Indonesia remains high.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Corruption perceptions Index Score</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100/182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>118/174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>114/177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Transparency International

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In 2013, decentralization was taken a step further with the approval of the Village Law, intended to address weak governance arrangements and empower rural communities to participate politically. The new law could also lead to village elites distorting power relations and misusing government funding if not properly monitored.

Indonesia is still transitioning politically and many challenges lie ahead. According to the 2012 Indonesia Governance Index’s Executive Report, “Indonesia is witnessing a paradox in its democracy. On one hand, a successful opening-up of civil liberty has led to the avalanche of democratic demands across the nation, however on the other hand, democratic institutions’ are inadequately respond to those demands.” Nonetheless, the Indonesian Governance Index, which focuses on measuring provincial governance, does show a general improvement in the performance of the government (political office) bureaucracy, civil society and economic society based on principles of participation, transparency, fairness, accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness between 2008 and 2012. Civil society scores improved the most significantly, while scores for bureaucracy rose slightly.6

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arena</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>5.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucracy</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>5.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>6.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Society</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>5.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.kemitraan.or.id/igi

In the past decade, Indonesians have generally enjoyed a freedom to participate in the political process through a direct-election mechanism. However, in September 2014 lawmakers voted in favour of a bill reviving indirect elections of regional heads. The controversial vote provoked public outcry which saw peaceful protests and the public voicing their discontent through social media. In early October, just before the end of his term, president Yudhoyono issued a regulation in lieu of the law, effectively repealing the law until further judicial review.

The recent 2014 elections which marked the end of Yudhoyono’s 10-year term, demonstrated that Indonesian voters are increasingly voting for popular figures irrespective of political party alliances. While practices of corruption, vote-buying and poor voter administration remained in the recent election, the public seems to have matured politically, indicated by the enormous interest in televised debates between the leading candidates. The appeal of the newly sworn in President Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, has come from his hands-on, man-of-the-people approach. As Jokowi begins his five-year term he will need to start addressing a myriad of challenges that include corruption, stagnant economic growth, and human rights concerns, particularly with respect to the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and religious intolerance. If left unaddressed, these challenges could seriously undermine Indonesia’s stability and democratic reforms.

2.2 Civil Society context

This section describes the civil society context in Indonesia that is not SPO specific but in line with the information criteria used by CIVICUS.7

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2.2.1 Socio-political context

Today, there are tens of thousands of civil organisations in the country\(^8\), comprising of religious organisations, unions, mass-based membership organisations, ethnic groups, professional associations, politically affiliated organisations, NGOs, and other community organisations.\(^9\) CSOs in Indonesia work on wide range of themes. Thematic areas recently prominent include democratization and human rights; issue-based campaigns; protecting economic, social and cultural rights; promoting community access to basic services; environmental and natural resources management, and; climate change and disaster risk reduction. In 2012, the Ministry of Home Affairs documented more than 65,000 organisations, of which around 9,000 were officially registered with the Ministry.\(^10\) A year later, the figure increased to more than 130 thousand foundations, associations, NGOs, research institutions, and other organisations.\(^11\) It is worth noting that NGOs in Indonesia are also allowed to establish cooperatives or SMEs, of which there are 203,701 with a membership reaching 35.2 million people.\(^12\) Under recently reinstated Law No. 25/1992 concerning cooperatives, the cooperatives’ objectives are to improve the welfare of its members and participate in developing the economy.\(^13\) Given these regulations it is possible to expand the definition of civil society to include cooperatives.\(^14\)

The civil society stage has become more diverse; the stage is now “shared with more players, like political parties, religious organisations and universities, all able to speak out and publicize their views in a multitude of media outlets that have sprung up in recent years.”\(^15\) NGOs and civil society in Indonesia are now starting to deal with the dissolve of traditionally-compartmentalized roles and responsibilities as their activities begin to overlap with those of the government and private sector. As one recent report stated, “NGOs that were united against Suharto are now without a common enemy and something to unite them to a common vision.”\(^16\) While the government has come to recognize that “a strong civil society is an important contributor to both launching and sustaining a transition to democratic governance”\(^17\), NGOs and CSO networks continue to be scrutinized and criticized for being vehicles of foreign intervention.

Despite the considerable number of organisations, those operating effectively are likely to be a small proportion.\(^18\) The accountability and transparency of CSOs and NGOs themselves has also come under greater scrutiny. “Donors have started to become impatient with some of their NGO counterparts, who have difficulties accepting that they now have to fulfil much greater demands”\(^19\). In recent years foreign donor funding has depleted, which has led to more organisations turning to the private sector and government programmes.

Since 1985 the state has regulated member-based, citizen organisations under a Mass Organisations Law making it obligatory for social organisations to register with government. This law was largely ignored in the period of reform following 1998. However, in 2013 the law was replaced by a new controversial Mass/Societal Organisations (Ormas) Law No. 17, reinforcing control of foundations and associations. The Law could be used to prohibit or dissolve CSOs. Many NGOs and civil society

\(^8\) Under state law, there are two forms of organisation recognized legally: “yayasan” or foundations, and “perkumpulan” or associations. The main difference between foundations and associations is that the latter is member-based and in the way they are governed internally and under law. A large majority of NGOs in Indonesia are private foundations.

\(^9\) NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles and Innovations edited by Lisa Jordan, Peter van Tuijl

\(^10\) Source: http://www.koran-jakarta.com/7112-1000-ormas-perbarui-pendaftaran. This figure is similar to 2010 data provided by Rustam Ibrahim in An ASEAN Community for All: Exploring the Scope for Civil Society Engagement, FES 2011.


\(^12\) Article entitled: Pemerintah Jokowi Diminta Terus Beber Koperasi dan UMKM, 20 October 2014, Available at: http://www.depkop.go.id/

\(^13\) A cooperative is defined in Article 3 as: “an economic organisation of the people with a social content (character) having persons or legal cooperative societies as members, farming economic entity as a collective endeavor based upon mutual help” (FAO, A study of cooperative legislation in selected Asian and Pacific countries).


\(^15\) NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles and Innovations, Edited by Lisa Jordan and Peter van Tuijl (2006)

\(^16\) STATT NGO Sector Review 2012

\(^17\) Evolution and Challenges of Civil Society Organisations in Promoting Democratization in Indonesia

\(^18\) Rustam Ibrahim comments on this in in FES 2011

\(^19\) Ibid
networks deplored the Law for constricting democratic space and the freedom of civil society. The 2014 Freedom House Index’s ratings for civil liberties in Indonesia declined from Free to Partly Free as a result of the new law.\(^{20}\)

**Table 4**

*Indonesia’s Rank & Score: Freedom House Indices*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arena</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom status</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Partially Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political rights</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil liberties</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.freedomhouse.org

The 2013 CIVICUS report hinted that the legislation could be part of the state’s reaction to a perceived threat that environmental, land rights and indigenous activists pose to political and economic interests due to the "shadowy connections that can exist between transnational corporations and politicians" in the agriculture extractive and construction industries.

The annual Freedom of the Press Index produced by Freedom House illustrates that Indonesia’s media remains "partly free". From 2011 to 2012 there was significant numerical improvement from 53 points to 49 with the reduction of restrictions and a greater ability of journalists to cover news more freely. From 2012 to 2014, the country’s rating remained steady at 49, with slight changes in global ranking (2012: 97\(^{st}\), 2013: 96\(^{st}\), 2014: 98\(^{st}\)).\(^{21}\)

Overall, the press system in Indonesia is vibrant, with a wide range of news sources and perspectives, further growing with the developments in digital media. "Indonesia’s online growth in recent years is recognised as nothing short of phenomenal" (Matt Abud 2012). While the Internet is seen as a new space for debate and participation, current laws still curtail openness, accessibility, inclusiveness and place limits on its use for expression. Only a limited number of organisations like ICT Watch are addressing freedom of expression and online rights. Nonetheless, citizens are using cyber space to set up online communities and organize campaigns. Some recent examples include the commuter movement ‘masukbusway.com’ aimed to capture and shame traffic violators in Jakarta.

Less progressive sources of rhetoric can be found amongst a number of hard-line religious groups and leaders, such as Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front or FPI), who have links with traditional religious schools (pesantren) and recruit members through these and online networks. Radical groups organize frequent protests to apply pressure on the government and are a threat to diversity and freedom.\(^{22}\)

### 2.2.2 Socio-economic context

At a macro-level, Indonesia’s socio-economic situation has been improving. The country is a regional and global economic force, and has recently graduated to lower-middle income country (LMIC) status.

**Table 5**

*Indonesia’s Rank & Score: UN Human Development Reports*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HDI Rank (scale 1 – 187 for all years except 2010 out of 169)</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI Value</td>
<td>0.671</td>
<td>0.640</td>
<td>0.681</td>
<td>0.684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Medium human development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth (years)</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>70.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean years of schooling (years)</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{22}\) The Limits of Civil Society in Democratic Indonesia: Media Freedom and Religious Intolerance, Kikue Hamayotsu. Journal of Contemporary Asia, March 2013
In recent years, Indonesia has consistently been ranked in the medium development category of the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI) measuring a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. In 2013, the HDI value was 0.684 with a rank of 108 out of 187 countries and territories. However, the value falls to 0.553, or 19.2 percent, when taking into account inequality. Indonesia’s HDI is above its peers in the medium development category but below the average of 0.703 in East Asia and the Pacific. The Gross National Income (GNI) per capita is steadily rising to US$ 8,970, a remarkable feat considering it was just 2,931 in 1980. Despite improvements, the 2014 report and its explanatory note show that growth is slowing and the country has yet to achieve equitable growth. For example, women only hold 18.6 percent of the seats in parliament, 10 percent fewer women reach secondary education compared to men, and women’s labour market participation is 51.3 percent compared to 84.4 percent for men.23

The Basic Capabilities Index (BCI) produced by Social Watch offers a picture of the status of key human capabilities of accessing basic services. It utilizes three main indicators: under-five mortality rate, births attended by skilled personnel, and enrolment of children up to the 5th grade. Countries are categorized into five groups accordingly based on their BCI values: 1) Basic: 98 and over; 2) Medium: from 91 to 97; 3) Low: from 81 to 90; 4) Very Low: from 71 to 80, and; 5) Critical: values below 70. Results for Indonesia saw stable or improving scores for child and maternal health, but a regression for education. While no data beyond 2011 is available, other data sources confirm that Indonesia still has high maternal mortality rates but basic education through primary school enrolment is improving.24

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Children reaching 5th grade</th>
<th>Survival up to 5</th>
<th>Births attended by skilled health personnel</th>
<th>BCI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>87 (low)</td>
<td>96 (medium)</td>
<td>73 (very low)</td>
<td>88 (low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>94 (medium)</td>
<td>96 (medium)</td>
<td>79 (very low)</td>
<td>90 (low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>86 (low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>74 (very low)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Social Watch

Indonesia does not fare too well on the Social and Economic Rights Fulfilment (SERF) Index. In 2012 Indonesia achieved 67.86 percent of protecting social and economic rights. Although there was an improvement compared to 2011 values, performance worsened when compared to 2010. The country consistently preforms poorly in the areas of right to food and right to work, although it improved in fulfilling rights to education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>SERF Index Value</th>
<th>Right to Food</th>
<th>Right to Health</th>
<th>Right to Education</th>
<th>Right to Housing</th>
<th>Right to Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>67.86</td>
<td>45.33</td>
<td>83.95</td>
<td>95.19</td>
<td>64.26</td>
<td>50.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>65.71</td>
<td>45.01</td>
<td>85.16</td>
<td>93.43</td>
<td>63.88</td>
<td>41.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>69.29</td>
<td>45.75</td>
<td>85.95</td>
<td>93.82</td>
<td>65.88</td>
<td>54.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Social Watch, Core Country SERF Indices 2010, 2011 and 2012 (Note that 2010 data was adjusted in 2013).

Trends in the country’s Economic Freedom Scores produced by The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal are also rather bleak. From 2010 to 2014 the country has been categorized as ‘Mostly Unfree’, with only a small increase in its score from 55.5 to 58.5.\(^{25}\)

These macro-level figures illustrate the complexity of the socio-economic context. While the economy has grown, 65 million people remain highly vulnerable to shocks. Disparities in income and geographic areas remain, made more complex by the number of people ‘floating’ between the poor and middle class’.\(^{26}\)

### 2.2.3 Socio-cultural context

With respect to the socio-cultural context it is of interest to look at global indices that provide some insight into the level of trust between ordinary people and the extent to which tolerance exists. On a whole, Indonesia has been able to maintain peace as indicated in the improvements in scores recorded by the annual Global Peace Index. In 2010, the country scored 1.950 on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being the best score. This has gradually improved to 1.853 in 2014, with a rank of 54 out of 162 countries.

Nonetheless, inequality, socio-economic conditions and rights claims (especially land rights) are still a source of localized incidences of conflict in Indonesia. Between 2010 and 2014 there has been a rising incidence of resource and identity-based conflicts as well as vigilantism.\(^{27}\)

Amongst other components, the Social Progress Index published in 2014 examines whether there is opportunity for individuals to reach their full potential by scoring four different components: personal rights; personal freedom and choice; tolerance and inclusion; and access to advanced education. Indonesia scores low in this regard, at just 43.86 out of 100 and ranking 92\(^{28}\) out of 132 countries. Freedom of religion, tolerance for immigrants and religious intolerance are all considered to be weak (red), while the majority of the components are scored as neutral (yellow).

The Edelman Trust Barometer Survey, which collects annual data from 33,000 respondents in 27 countries has shown that on aggregate, Indonesians’ confidence in nongovernmental organisations, government, media and businesses increased by 10 percent in the 2014 trust index. Interestingly, businesses, with 82 percent, are the most trusted of the four sectors compared to 73 percent for NGOs, 53 percent for government and 73 percent of respondents putting their trust in the media. According to survey results, Indonesians believe businesspeople are more inclined to tell the truth than their government counterparts and three times more likely to fix problems.\(^{28}\)

The trends in levels of trust in NGOs over the past four years are noteworthy. In 2011, the trust level was at 61 percent, decreasing to 53 percent in 2012 and 51 percent in 2013. Reports claimed this was due to a lack of transparency and accountability. Edelman reported that the trust levels in 2013 were

\(^{25}\) http://www.heritage.org/index/

\(^{26}\) World Bank’s Indonesia Development Policy Review 2014

\(^{27}\) Data from the National Violence Monitoring System: www.snpk-indonesia.com/

the lowest amongst eight Asia Pacific countries surveyed, ascribed to the growth of horizontal, peer-to-peer networks and a preference for social media. The most recent results released in 2014 show a substantial jump to 73 percent in 2014 which is attributed to NGOs now being able to ‘walk the talk’ in accountability and transparency, as well as the emergence of ‘corporate NGOs’.

2.3 Civil Society context issues

Several important changes took place during the 2011 and 2014 period. First, the global financial crisis and Indonesia’s rise to a middle-income country led to a decrease in international donor funding. Development actors, including CSOs and NGOs, have to compete harder for funding. Some have been more successful than others in diversifying funding by turning to the private sector or private foundations. At the expense of past idealism, local NGOs are now more disposed to receiving funding sources which in the past may have been criticized as supporting neoliberalism.

Regulatory changes also affected the civil society arena positively and negatively. Amongst the more controversial laws to spark reaction was Law No. 17/2013 on Societal Organisations. In an open letter sent before the bill was enacted, CIVICUS said the law would undermine freedom of association and “prevent CSOs from working on sensitive topics related to good governance and democratic reform in the public interest”. FORUM-ASIA deplored the repressive provisions in the law that “leave all groups vulnerable to attacks, undermining the hard-won democratic space that has been forged by civil society since the end of the New Order regime.”

Other laws passed that provoked criticism were the State Intelligence Law (October 2011) and the Social Conflict Law (April 2012). NGOs and media see these laws as imposing further restrictions on freedom of speech, potentially leading to the criminalization of human rights defenders and signifying a tightening of state control. Discriminatory content was also an issue in discussions on the Religious Harmony Bill in 2013, for which drafting was initiated in despite not being part of the planned National Legislative Program. Late in 2013, the House of Representatives came under fire again for its weak stance against religious intolerance when it re-endorsed a law that limits state-recognized religions to six.

Land rights and natural resource protection have been a long-standing issue for Indonesia. While Indonesia has adopted and amended laws to improve the rights of smallholders and indigenous communities, many of these regulations have faltered in their implementation. Part of the issue lies in the overlap and lack of clarity of laws adopted that regulate different sectors and local legislation. Another issue is that there is a lack of oversight in the procedures such as granting permits and licensing. These problems, which are commonly found across development sectors, are compounded by a lack of information among local communities on what the laws regulate and their rights vis-à-vis them.

30 Jakarta Globe (Indonesians Trust Businesses More Than Govt Survey Shows)
32 Quote from Haris Azhar, Executive Committee & KontraS coordinator, taken from http://www.forum-asia.org/?p=16305
3 Description of RUANGRUPA and its contribution to civil society/policy changes

3.1 Background of RUANGRUPA

Established in January 2000 by six artists in Jakarta, the aim of Yayasan RUANGRUPA is to give critical views on Indonesian urban contemporary issues. RUANGRUPA focuses on supporting the development of art in the cultural context through research, documentation, exhibitions, residency programmes, art projects, workshops and publication. It promotes collaborative projects involving artists and other disciplines, such as social science, politics, technology, and media. This collaboration is based on the realisation that art can no longer stay passive and isolate itself from reality.

Since its establishment, RUANGRUPA has initiated many art activities, playing a strategic role in providing knowledge on the development of artists’ initiatives in Indonesia. It has built its credibility as a progressive and a visual arts organisation that is consistently providing alternative views on urban contemporary art compared to many other artists’ initiatives.

3.2 MFS II interventions related to Civil Society

RUANGRUPA considers market-oriented art, especially in urban settings like Jakarta, to be stifling creative expression. The organisation tries to challenge market-driven and commercialized art by providing opportunities and supporting artists to express themselves without compromising their idealism and values. Another basic problem that RUANGRUPA tries to address is the inadequacy of infrastructure for cultural development. With few spaces for artists to explore, meet and present their work, RUANGRUPA functions as a creative, autonomous workspace for artists. At the same time, events and exhibitions bring together the general public and artists in a non-exclusive contemporary arts setting. Hivos has supported RUANGRUPA because of its innovative approach and attention towards creating a new arts audience/public in Jakarta and other cities. In addition, the organisation plays an important role in the development of contemporary visual arts and building the capacity of video artists.

Hivos continues its support to RUANGRUPA because of its important role in the development of contemporary visual arts focusing on urban contemporary issues in Jakarta and in Indonesia in general. All four of RUANGRUPA’s programmatic areas were supported by Hivos in the 2010-2013 period. These four areas are as follows:

1. Art Laboratory: Research and creative collaboration between artists with a focus on urban issues.
2. Support and Dissemination: Providing a platform to produce, promote, disseminate and sustain creative ideas from artists, critics, curators and cultural organisations in Indonesia.
3. Video Art Development: Promote video art as another form of visual art work to reflect, express and provide statements of the artists to reach a new audience, and in doing so increasing public appreciation for video art.
4. Research and Development: Conduct a series of studies and research to develop in-depth understanding and develop new strategies towards the recent contemporary art scene in Indonesia, in order to later position various forms of visual arts in new media.

Given its programmatic focus, RUANGRUPA has sought to be an initiator of alternative art spaces as well as being a knowledge centre of sorts. As an organisation, it has persistently focused on marginalized and alternative forms of art, and has tried to support independent artists with the means and capability to share their ideas and creativity with the public.
### 3.3 Basic information

Table 8  
**Basic information RUANGRUPA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name of SPO</td>
<td>RUANGRUPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consortium</td>
<td>People Unlimited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>Hivos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start date of cooperation</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG/Theme</td>
<td>Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFS II Project Name</td>
<td>Art space as support to the development of the arts within Indonesian contemporary culture (Project ID: RO SEA 1002716)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract period</td>
<td>December 31, 2010 – December 30, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total budget</td>
<td>€ 105,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other donors if applicable</td>
<td>DOEN Stichting with contribution of € 95,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimation of % of budget for Civil Society³³</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Project documents

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³³ Costs that relate to civil society development or policy influence are those costs that possibly contribute to the development of the CIVICUS dimensions, excluding coordination and office costs; staff costs and financial reserves.
4 Data collection and analytical approach

4.1 Adjustments made in the methodology of the evaluation

The evaluation process started with an input-output-outcome analysis that utilized reports and other documents from the SPO. For RUANGRUPA the analysis was to some extent inadequate because it was based on project progress reports and other documents that mostly covered just the 2011-2012 period. In mid-2014 when the evaluation was initiated, RUANGRUPA had yet to submit its 2013 report to Hivos; while the existing reports were compilations from each of RUANGRUPA’s programme units with little integration, and with only some of the units making an effort to report against target indicators. As such, the evaluation team was only able to benefit partly from the input-output-outcome analysis.

The evaluation team tried to follow the operational guidelines to a great extent, but was unable to have a workshop with all of RUANGRUPA’s sub-groups as only one program manager was available at the time agreed upon. Other program managers as well as the director were three hours late and did not appear to pay full attention to the workshop nor did they make up for the lost time. In practice, the workshop was inefficient and lasted five hours during which the workshop took place in a rather sporadic manner. RUANGRUPA’s board and field staff were not invited to the workshop. The evaluation team was unable to get averages or scores for each subgroup as participation was not consistent and the participants found the guiding questions hard to discern. The in-country team assigned the scores without further confirmation.

4.2 Difficulties encountered during data collection

During data collection the team experienced the following difficulties:

- It was difficult to agree upon a schedule for the evaluation workshop with RUANGRUPA since the SPO was organising two large events during the evaluation period. In addition, the impromptu character of RUANGRUPA made it hard to pin down the staff.
- To compensate for the lack of information from documented materials, the evaluation team utilized the workshop time to ask RUANGRUPA for any kind of documents that could be helpful in analysing changes in the civil society dimensions. However, three weeks later, RUANGRUPA only sent one document on their showcased events over the past five years (see Appendix 3).
- Since the workshop was largely inefficient and ineffective, the evaluation team was left with little indications as to whom could be contacted as external resource persons. As a result, the evaluation team was only able to conduct one interview with Jakarta 32° C during the fieldwork period.
- Workshop participants did not really understand, nor were they familiar with the CS indicators or the CIVICUS framework. They found it difficult to relate RUANGRUPA’s situation with the indicators, although all of them participated in the baseline process. This lessened the effectiveness of the workshop.
- RUANGRUPA’s logical framework was largely activity and output oriented, thus it was difficult to get required information at the outcome or impact level, which ideally should be part of a proposal or work plan. Given this challenge, as well as the abovementioned challenges, it was not possible to confirm RUANGRUPA’s impact in inspiring the emergence of similar initiatives, nor was it possible to measure the satisfaction of Jakarta 32° C participants, or to identify how many (or whether any) CSOs have benefited from RUANGRUPA’s produced knowledge. As a result, there were not many options of outcomes that could be selected to measure effectiveness through quick process-tracing.
- The current Hivos Programme Officer for the Expression and Engagement portfolio was not in charge of the programme during the 2011-2014 period. Hivos now manages its partnership with
RUANGRUPA directly from the Netherlands through the Arts Collaboratory initiative which is a program promoted by Hivos and Doen Foundation to support independent visual arts organisations in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

4.3 Identification of outcome for process tracing

Yayasan RUANGRUPA was not selected for in-depth process tracing, implying that only a quick scan has been made. ‘Infrastructure for contemporary visual arts in Jakarta has improved’ has been selected as an outcome to be measured for effectiveness. The selection is made with following considerations:

- Considering all the difficulties in collecting information, it still seemed sensible to find evidence to confirm this outcome’s achievement.
- It is in line with RUANGRUPA’s Theory of Change (ToC), as it is the aggregate of the ToC’s preconditions ‘networking’ and ‘increasing the capacity of society’.
- This outcome is relevant to RUANGRUPA’s broadened focus to become a knowledge or resource provider, as stipulated in the proposal, and its mission to develop the arts infrastructure in Indonesia.
- This outcome is in line with MFS-II end line evaluation orientation for Indonesia to focus on strengthening the relations with other organisations in civil society to undertake joint activities.
5 Results

5.1 Results obtained in relation to intervention logic

Table 9
Overview of results achieved in relation to project plan RUANGRUPA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme area</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Level of achievement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: Art Laboratory</td>
<td>Research &amp; creative collaborations between artists focusing on urban and media issues. 6 exhibitions and 3 presentations involving 24 artists (6 of whom women). Exhibitions draw 2,500 visitors.</td>
<td>Partially achieved: while detailed data for each year is lacking, positive progress overall. Lack of data on women artist participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: Support and Dissemination</td>
<td>Produce, promote and disseminate, and sustain creative ideas from artists, critics, curators and cultural organisations. 6 exhibitions (5 personal and 1 collective) showcasing the works of 30 artists (9 of whom women); 1 student artist exhibition (Jakarta 32° C); 3 art critics &amp; 3 curatorial workshops (10 participants each); and website development. Exhibitions draw 8,000 visitors &amp; website 60,000 online visitors.</td>
<td>Partially achieved: events took place as planned, drawing more than 3,500 a year. More than 100,000 visitors to the website and sub-domains annually. No separate curatorial workshops held, merged with other events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: Video Art Development</td>
<td>Expand public appreciation for audio visual art work, and develop, collect and distribute video art works of Indonesian artists. Hosting a video festival (OK.Video) involving 50 artists and drawing 5,000 visitors. Each year, the work of 20 video artists produced &amp; disseminated. Over 3 years 9 workshops held; exhibitions &amp; video screenings in 5 locations in Java, Sulawesi, Sumatra, Europe and Australia, with 500 visitors for each exhibition; and symposium and book publication.</td>
<td>Insufficient information to draw conclusion: Data for 2013 not available (annual report). OK.Video festival took place in 2011 &amp; 2013. In 2011, 134 artists participated from 30 countries; 37 from Indonesia. 150 works exhibited &amp; 272 videos screened. No information of screenings in other locations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Research &amp; Development</td>
<td>In-depth research and development. Publication of studies (1,000 copies-2 publications/year), an updated database of young contemporary artists and 3 public discourses and lectures annually.</td>
<td>Insufficient information to draw conclusion: Updated database available. Insufficient information about discourses, lectures and publications. KarbonJournal experienced a vacuum. Street art was a research theme in 2010 – 2011. Unclear if anything was published other than a book on contemporary art and culture in Indonesia in 2012 (SIASAT).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: Internal organisational</td>
<td>Strengthened financial independence &amp; revenue management through business unit, which contributes 20% of the overall costs, especially operating expenses.</td>
<td>Partially achieved: Business unit established in 2011 and started providing paid services to businesses. While RURU Corps (business unit) received growing interest, unclear how much it contributed to operational costs. No figures of financial contribution in reports.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is difficult to conclude the extent to which planned results in the SPO’s intervention logic were achieved. This is due to several reasons. First, in mid-2014 when the evaluation was initiated RUANGRUPA had yet to submit its 2013 report to Hivos. Second, from RUANGRUPA’s reports it appears that each programme division reports separately, which is then put together in a report. This means that there is little integration in the report and not all programme units have made an effort to report against target indicators. Despite a lack of information, overall the evaluators find that RUANGRUPA has been successful in creating a platform for the examination of ideas and urban space, bringing together artists and the general public. RUANGRUPA has established itself within the creative art sphere as a promoter of video visual art.
5.2 Changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period?

5.2.1 Civic engagement

Civic engagement describes the formal and informal activities and participation undertaken by individuals to advance shared interests at different levels. Participation within civil society is multi-faceted and encompasses socially-based and politically-based forms of engagement.

RUANGRUPA’s interventions are intended to provide a network and an alternative space for artists in Indonesia, especially for young independent artists in Jakarta. Through the Ruru Gallery, Jakarta 32° C festival and the OK.Video festival, RUANGRUPA provides platforms for aspiring artists to present their work while introducing the public to new forms of artistic expression. The SPO has also embraced the Internet as a medium to engage the public, with several web-based platforms being created for events and for groups it supports.

In the documentation and reports of RUANGRUPA, audience and participating artists figures are not consistently captured because the SPO has not always collected participation data properly. Nonetheless, the SPO has made a name for itself through regularly hosted festivals. OK.Video, held at least every two years, has attracted international artists from more than 50 countries and is considered a barometer for contemporary video development. Jakart32 festival, another well-known event, has been growing in size with over 100 participating artists each time it was held and up to 4,000 visitors in 2012. In 2010, RUANGRUPA initiated the Record Music Festival (RRRec Fest), which attracted more visitors the second time it was held, growing from 2,200 to 2,500 in 2011. The festival provided a venue for independent musicians and artists to collaborate through music and videos. Ruru gallery also had more visitors in 2012 compared to 2012, although fewer artists participated in exhibitions.

It is difficult to quantify whether women’s participation has improved with regards to audience participation since there is insufficient data. However, fewer women artists participated in exhibitions hosted by Ruru gallery in 2012 compared to 2011 (from 21 percent to 15 percent).

Both Jakarta 32° C and OK.Video festival have become large enough to warrant the creation of separate divisions under RUANGRUPA, with independent planning and capacity to relate to other organisations. The personnel involved are selected from event alumni. As such target groups have become more engaged in planning, implementing and making decisions related to RUANGRUPA’s regular events.

As illustrated above by the regular RUANGRUPA-hosted events, there have been decreases in some areas with regards to participation. This is partly due to a shift in the SPO’s strategic orientation from becoming an imitator or pioneer of alternative art platforms to becoming a knowledge producer and developer. The SPO does not have a specific political agenda, since their focus continues to be on supporting the development of contemporary art and artists.

Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 3
Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 1

5.2.2 Level of organisation

This dimension assesses the organisational development, complexity and sophistication of civil society, by looking at the relationships among the actors within the civil society arena.

Since the baseline, RUANGRUPA has improved its level of organisation. With regards to defending the interests of marginalized groups, the artists supported by RUANGRUPA are those that are marginalized by the dominance of commercialized art. With the absence of government support or museums, artists not oriented to the market are provided with a space for expression. RUANGRUPA also provided space for female artists, although the percentage of female artists remained small in comparison to their male counterparts (just below 21% in 2010 and 2011, and 15% in 2012). Young upcoming artists constitute the main target group, especially those exploring contemporary visual arts. Since the baseline there was generally an increased level of engagement of these artists.
The SPO maintains partnerships with other artist-run organisations in Java and has been recognized as an Indonesian contemporary arts actor. RUANGRUPA is now one of the associate partners for the Arts Collaboratory initiative in Indonesia, which has helped it expand its domestic network. As during the baseline, RUANGRUPA also continued to be engaged in the Indonesian Coalition for the Arts, which aims to improve government support for artist-run initiatives and a more enabling environment to promote independent art.

Relations with Forum Lenteng and Serrum, RUANGRUPA’s closest allies, have intensified since the establishment of RURU Corps, a joint venture established to respond to the need to generate financial resources as well as to promote the work of supported artists.

Internationally, RUANGRUPA has successfully networked with art institutions and organisations in a number of countries, taking advantage of the opportunities offered under Arts Collaboratory to disseminate its work and share experiences. Festivals and events hosted by RUANGRUPA in Indonesia have invited the participation of international artists. OK.Video and Jakarta 32° C are not just barometers for Indonesian arts, but are also receiving international recognition.

Since 2011, RUANGRUPA has worked on diversifying funding streams. Although there has been some degree of success with the establishment of RURU Corps and external financial support from the Ford Foundation, international donor dependency has remained relatively high. This is also influenced by external factors, namely the lack of support from the Indonesian government for artist-run initiatives.

Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2
Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): +1

5.2.3 Practice of Values

Practice of Values refers to the internal practice of values within the civil society arena. Important values that CIVICUS looks at such as transparency, democratic decision-making, taking into account diversity that are deemed crucial to gauge not only progressiveness but also the extent to which civil society’s practices are coherent with their ideals.

Since the baseline there has been no significant change in the SPO’s downward accountability. Internal control systems between the board and the executive are in place although there are no reporting or evaluation mechanisms. The SPO does not have a dedicated monitoring or evaluation systems or personnel in place and reporting against targets, outcomes and impact is limited. The different units under RUANGRUPA function independently, but also work collaboratively. RURU Corps’ income sources have been separated from RUANGRUPA’s in an effort to maintain a focus on the civil society and engagement role of RUANGRUPA. Unfortunately, there were no available audit reports for RUANGRUPA for the period covered by this evaluation. As such, the evaluation team concludes that institutional audits have yet to take place.

The composition of the SPO’s social organs remains unchanged with a mix of artists and non-art professionals. This reflects RUANGRUPA’s intentions to engage actors beyond the art scene to contribute to meaningful discussions and discourses that are relevant to the environment in which it operates.

Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2
Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 0

5.2.4 Perception of Impact

Perception of Impact assesses the perceived impact of civil society actors on politics and society as a whole as the consequences of collective action. In this, the perceptions of both civil society actors (internal) as well as actors outside civil society are taken into account. Specific sub-dimensions for this evaluation are the extent to which the SPO has contributed to engaging more people in social or political activities, strengthening CSOs and their networks, and has influenced public and private sector policies.

Through its regular events, which include Jakarta 32° C and OK.Video festival, RUANGRUPA has been able to engage more with the general public. These events have also been venues for young students...
to explore contemporary visual art forms. Some of these events, like the Jakarta 32° C festival have taken place beyond the Ruru Gallery venue, to include settings in Jakarta’s urban landscapes as well as other cities. The approach of RUANGRUPA is rooted in the context of an urban cityscape and is based on collaborative efforts between artist-run initiatives, artists and curators. However, it should be noted that Jakarta 32° C has recently supported fewer artists and displayed fewer artworks in favour of more workshops. This has been a conscious decision and an attempt to distinguish the organisation’s role as a knowledge provider from a plethora of new initiatives and actors that have emerged and to maintain creative benchmarks in the contemporary arts scene.

Box 1: RUANGRUPA’s reception

“To talk about the contemporary art scene in Indonesia, especially Jakarta, it’s hard not to think of RUANGRUPA’s name. Not only is it one of the most active art collectives in the city, their footprints are all over the city’s contemporary creative scene. Using their own approach, RUANGRUPA helped shape the identity of Jakarta’s contemporary art world. RUANGRUPA’s modest approach revamped the Jakarta’s creative society, making it more accessible to the public through their programs.”

http://www.whiteboardjournal.com/focus/18928/populist-art/

“RUANGRUPA itself was the most active and consistent of all in focusing on developing the discourse and practice of video art in a stimulating way, by hosting a variety of video art projects, including music video workshops […] until they finally were able to hold, for the first time in 2003, the OK.Video: International Video Art Festival, which has continued to evolve and be held routinely since then. Today, everyone who is arts-literate knows and recognizes OK.Video as the first event in Indonesia to specifically address video, and to do so at an international scale, and it remains to this day the only one that organises regularly every two years.”


While the organisation is now trying to become more than an initiator of contemporary art forms, it has built its reputation by experimenting in the area of visual and video art forms. This has supported the emergence of new and upcoming artists who have become popular in a contemporary subculture among youth in Jakarta interested in new forms of expression and alternative artists’ merchandise. This has been aided by the use of the internet as a means to promote engagement with the public audience. RUANGRUPA has improved its online presence by developing specific web domains for events and areas of work. In 2012, it also began with streaming online radio content to engage audiences in discussions on a range of issues from a contemporary arts point of view. Unfortunately, RUANGRUPA has not monitored the impact of its interventions in stimulating discourses and artistic exploration of societal issues.

RUANGRUPA does not have a specific advocacy or lobby agenda other than its involvement in the Indonesian Arts Coalition, which has not had measurable impacts with regards to greater government support for artist-run initiatives. Government support, specifically the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy, did not extend beyond RUANGRUPA’s events, the launching of a book, participation in government-hosted events and financing participation in a recent triennial abroad. The SPO has not actively sought out engagement with the public sector.

The relations with the private sector remain limited. RUANGRUPA engaged with a few small local businesses in Jakarta through the festivals it hosted. Some of these businesses were venues for arts dissemination while others helped sponsor events or stimulate dissemination of artwork. Media has been involved to gain better coverage of events. RUANGRUPA has focused on supporting alternatives to mainstream, market-oriented art forms. RURU Corps and Ruru shop can be considered as business entities, but their main aim is to support the promotion of alternative artists and artworks, as well as to stimulate the involvement of artists in shaping public spaces.

Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2
Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 1
5.2.5 Civil Society Environment

The social, political and economic environment in which civil society operates affects its room for manoeuvre. The civil society context has been described in Chapter 3. In this section we describe how RUANGRUPA is coping with that context.

The internet has been a very strategic medium to spread visual and video-based artwork. RUANGRUPA has utilized the internet to showcase its target groups’ artwork, to disseminate archived knowledge and publications, to promote their events, and to attract youth participation. RUANGRUPA is aware that the internet is a tool that can be used to promote the development of discourses in contemporary arts.

In addition, many of themes and issues that are explored through artwork supported by RUANGRUPA are grounded in the surrounding context. These themes do not always have a political agenda and the majority of artworks produced explore contemporary, day-to-day issues.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3:** 2

**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2):** 2

5.3 To what degree are the changes attributable to the Southern partners??

5.3.1 Level of organisation & alternative engagement

The outcome achieved

Since 2000, RUANGRUPA has been promoting and supporting non-commercial video and visual contemporary artists that have been marginalized by the mainstream market. RUANGRUPA itself is very much an organization established by artists for artists. One of its missions is to develop the contemporary arts infrastructure. To do so effectively, RUANGRUPA needs to succeed in improving its internal level of organization and in creating forms of alternative engagement.

The evaluation team selected the outcome ‘infrastructure for contemporary visual arts in Jakarta has improved’ because there is evidence that RUANGRUPA has contributed, if not driven improvements. Indicators for this include audience receptiveness; RUANGRUPA’s networking capability, the establishment of a separate business unit (RURU Corps), knowledge management initiatives undertaken by RUANGRUPA and in improved use of online media.

There are two pathways that can explain this outcome. The first attributes the outcome to the result of RUANGRUPA’s improved reputation and capability as a resource in contemporary visual arts. The second considered the outcome as a result of the actions of other actors (market-oriented, public sector, or CS actors).

1. **Pathway 1:** RUANGRUPA has improved the platform for contemporary visual art in Jakarta. RUANGRUPA has been a pioneer in promoting contemporary visual arts to a wider audience who would unlikely have had the chance to explore this art from or have the chance to explore it as a freely-expressed art form without RUANGRUPA’s intervention.

   **Information that confirms this pathway:**

   - Although contemporary visual art are openly accessible, RUANGRUPA is popular and distinguishable for their unusual and edgy approach and style34.
   - Art bloggers recognize RUANGRUPA as shaping the identity of Jakarta’s contemporary art world35 and a well-known initiator in the field of contemporary video art work36.

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35 http://www.whiteboardjournal.com/focus/18928/populist-art/
• Audience receptiveness & growth of Jakarta 32°C: Jakarta 32°C has drawn at least 1,000 people as an audience in 2004. In 2012, the festival expanded its audience base to around 4,000 people. Jakarta 32°C has inspired the emergence of similar events and contemporary visual art communities.

• Increased network of RUANGRUPA through international exposure and more international artists’ participation in the OK. Video Festival: from 10-20 in 2011 to 51 in 2013.

• RUANGRUPA is open to both professional artists, as well as young students wanting to express themselves and explore creative expression, such as the group Gambar Selaw. Most of the Jakarta 32°C alumni (participating artists) worked in private sectors, and only a few decided to be professional artists. This is evidence of RUANGRUPA’s support of non-commercial art forms.

• RUANGRUPA has a stronger position as a knowledge producer and developer: There are only a few actors who can be considered competent in contemporary visual arts knowledge from CS, the academic sector or the private sector. RUANGRUPA’s director is also a lecturer for contemporary visual arts, but the academic institution with whom he is affiliated with is less approachable than RUANGRUPA.

• RUANGRUPA has a library and a research and development unit. Its collection contains some 10,000 books and digital archives.

• RUANGRUPA has established a business unit that can offer contemporary arts services to CSOs and private sector actors, such as advertising agencies. In 2011, RUANGRUPA decided to redistribute its income generating capacity to its partner CSOs Forum Lenteng and Serrum through the foundation of RURU Corps; a visual communication agency. It is estimated that RUANGRUPA, Forum Lenteng, and Serrum have together made at least USD 30,000 in 2012. RURU Corps services range from publications, products, and event organising, or artwork installation. In 2013, RURU Corps has made more profit than in 2012, and it plans to divide its accumulated profit for each CSO or to conduct a joint project. RUANGRUPA has strengthened its own, and Forum Lenteng and Serrum’s sustainability and financial capacity.

• RUANGRUPA can offer a competitive consultancy price compared to advertising agencies, since their overhead costs have been covered via Hivos’ support.

• In addition to a traditional, offline presence in the form of a gallery and event hosting, RUANGRUPA has strengthened its online presence.

Information that rejects this pathway:

• It is easily observable that contemporary visual art has become generally more popular amongst the young urban population in Jakarta that seek alternative forms of expression.

• The number of artworks submitted for Jakarta 32°C decreased from 172 in 2008, to 128 in 2010 and 103 in 2012.

2. Pathway 2: Other actors have improved the platform for contemporary visual art in Jakarta

Although RUANGRUPA has helped promote contemporary visual arts to a wider audience, it is not plausible to conclude that they are the only contributing CSO actor.

37 Jakarta 32°C Interview & Annual Report RUANGRUPA 2012
38 Jakarta 32°C Interview
39 List of showcases in Annex 3 provided by RUANGRUPA
40 RUANGRUPA progress reports and media/web coverage
41 Jakarta 32°C Interview
42 Art Lab program manager
43 Art Lab program manager
44 RUANGRUPA Progress Reports 2011 & 2012
45 RURU Corps.com
46 communication/interview with RUANGRUPA director
47 communication/interview with RUANGRUPA director
48 Analysis from RUANGRUPA budget
49 http://Jakarta 32° C .org/home/festival/statistics/
Information that confirms this pathway:

There are a number of other organisations that have promoted contemporary visual arts in a less commercialized setting. These include the following:

- Kawanusa in Bali, who have been organizing community video festivals since 2007
- Kampung Halaman, Cemeti Art House, MES 56 in Yogyakarta
- Common Room in Bandung
- Forum Lenteng in Jakarta
- Video activists: KoPI, Offstream and Video Babes

Information that rejects this pathway:

- Most of the organizations mentioned above operate outside of Jakarta. Those that do operate in Jakarta are partners of or collaborate with RUANGRUPA
- There is a general lack of initiatives and plans for better art infrastructure and development of state museums by the Indonesian government
- Regardless of whether there is a ‘hype’ in contemporary visual arts, there is an increasing demand for contemporary visual arts content by private sector actors, especially for advertising purposes. The large demand allows RURU Corps to take part in the market share.

Conclusion

Based upon the analysis of information available, we conclude that the most valid explanation for the outcome is that RUANGRUPA has played a role in strengthening the infrastructure for contemporary visual art in Jakarta as well as an increased demand for contemporary visual arts. Hence, pathway 1 is sufficient in explaining the outcome.

The role of the SPO

RUANGRUPA’s interventions have contributed to the emergence of contemporary art as alternative engagement and by strengthening the level of organization internally and for artists. RUANGRUPA has over the years built a reputation for itself as supporting new initiatives and is now emerging as a knowledge producer and provider.

5.4 What is the relevance of these changes?

5.4.1 Relevance of the changes in relation to the Theory of Change of 2012

The Theory of Change (ToC) constructed during 2012 baseline illustrated that RUANGRUPA’s ultimate goal was for a critical, creative, plural and inclusive society to take shape. The preconditions for this were the existence of public space, healthy engagement with the public and private sector and a capacitated and well-networked society. Public space for RUANGRUPA was the most strategic precondition. The critical assumptions rested on the need and demand for a public space separate from private or public sector actors, art being an effective media for civic engagement and RUANGRUPA being able to sustain itself in terms of values, personnel and finances. The changes achieved by RUANGRUPA in the civil society dimensions ‘civic engagement’ and ‘level of organisation’ are relevant to the ToC.

51 Ferdiansyah Thajib, Nuraini Juliastuti, Andrew Lowenthal and Alexandra Crosby, A Chronicle of Video Activism and Online Distribution in Post-New Order Indonesia
52 Video Vortex Reader II: moving images beyond YouTube. Editors: Geert Lovink and Rachel Somers Miles, Publisher: Institute of Network Cultures, Amsterdam 2011
54 see: http://rurucorps.com/home/work/mizone/ for an example
RUANGRUPA has contributed to the availability of public space through its support for regular events for contemporary visual and video art, as well as through its own gallery space. An increasing demand for public space is evident from the public’s receptiveness and an increase in visitors and audience. The organisation has managed to keep initiatives independent, collaborating with the private and public sector for support of its interventions.

With regards to art influencing civic engagement, RUANGRUPA’s interventions can be defined as following a ‘discursive theory of action’, intended to provide a setting for artists and the public to come together to discuss issues, connect and take action. Artists and their art work supported by RUANGRUPA have included mural art, performance art, video art and other forms seeking to engage the general public. RUANGRUPA has also used online formats and websites to invite the general public to contribute in art works and be engaged. Discursive approaches have also been used to promote young, upcoming artists to explore themes relevant to their urban setting.

The institutional performance of RUANGRUPA has progressed, although the SPO still relies on external support to sustain itself. RURU Corps is a model for generating income through artistic services that can be offered to the private or public sector. There has been sufficient re-generation amongst the personnel of the SPO and each unit of RUANGRUPA has its own team that seems to function independently, whilst maintaining collaboration with other units and divisions. Since the baseline, RUANGRUPA has improved its engagement with other like-minded actors and expanded its international network. The SPO has been invited to a host of international events to share experiences or feature work produced through the organisation’s support in countries like Australia, Japan, South Korea, The Netherlands, Colombia, Brazil, Singapore, and China. This expanded the SPO’s network and helped establish itself as an international player in contemporary arts.

5.4.2 Relevance of the changes in relation to the context in which the SPO is operating

With regards to the context in which RUANGRUPA is operating, its interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant because the organisation has defended those marginalised by market domination in contemporary visual arts and public spaces.

During the Suharto era, much of the cultural and artistic discourse was political and opposing the regime. As the Indonesian economy began to develop in the 80s and 90s, a demand for commercial artworks saw the rise of commercial art galleries. In the same period, cultural institutions like Erasmus Huis, Goethe-Institut and the Japan Foundation took a footing in Indonesia and began supporting performances, exhibitions and artist exchanges. Alternative spaces, like Cemeti Art House, began emerging in the early 90s. Following the fall of Suharto in 1998 and Indonesia’s democratization, new artistic directions began to take shape. This development continued into the early 2000s with the establishment of RUANGRUPA and other arts centres and organisations.

Since 2007-2008, there has been a boom in commercialized art, with high demands for Indonesian art globally. In 2008, a contemporary art work of Nyoman Masriadi was sold with a lavish price tag of 1 million US dollars. In the midst of the art market boom, a few upcoming artists became 'market

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58 Ibid
60 Ibid
darlings’, leading to tension between young aspiring artists and indirectly led to the development of spaces for progressive artwork in isolation of market forces\(^61\).

The Indonesian contemporary art scene has developed in the absence of strong art institutions, museum support and state financial support. This gap has been filled by private sponsors and collectors and has contributed to the dominance of commercialized art forms\(^62\). Given the increased freedom of expression and speech since the late 90s, there has been a growth in independent art centres like RUANGRUPA\(^63\). Since 2010, international exposure for both market and alternative art actors has grown, as has the local art scene\(^64\). Independent organisations have become sites for multidisciplinary communities to come together to discuss all sorts of issues with a common desire to engage with urban space partly in reaction to the commercialization of the Indonesian art market\(^65\).

Given this context, RUANGRUPA’s achievements have been very much relevant as they have consistently offered an alternative scene for artists and practitioners to explore new media. RUANGRUPA is simultaneously a site of production as well as a focal point for projects of social improvement, without selling out to the commercialization trends\(^66\).

5.4.3 Relevance of the changes in relation to the policies of the MFS II alliance and the CFA

The support provided to RUANGRUPA falls under Hivos’ Expression and Engagement programme. This programme aims to generate social debate and cultural dialogue in order for a dynamic culture and new perspectives to emerge. Hivos considers space for socially engaged art and culture to be limited in developing countries and sees art and cultural expression as a means to generate critical reflection, pluralism and diversity.\(^67\) “For Hivos, culture, media and other forms of communication are important means to promote citizenship”\(^68\) and a means to challenge dominant ideas\(^69\).

RUANGRUPA was supported because its creative ideas were in line with Hivos’ focus. The SPO is considered to have an “important role in in the development of contemporary visual arts in Jakarta and in Indonesia in general”. Hivos supported the SPO because of the “extrapolation effects of events happening in Jakarta to other areas in Indonesia and because of its innovative approach and attention towards creating a new arts audience/public”.\(^70\) RUANGRUPA is considered a strategic organisation that has promoted progressive ideas and a network/coalition that works on strengthening cultural infrastructure.

According to the current Expression and Engagement programme officer of Hivos’ Regional Office for Southeast Asia, Hivos has continued to support RUANGRUPA because it has proven its ability to host regular workshops and events. In doing so RUANGRUPA has created a space for artists to experiment, while expanding organisationally through the creation of different units.\(^71\)

Through the Arts Collaboratory initiative, support is being continued with the partnership now being handled directly by Hivos’ headquarters. Arts Collaboratory consider culture to be a potential driver of

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\(^69\) “RUANGRUPA Kenschets 2008-2010”, Hivos, 2010

\(^70\) Interview with Dyana Savina Hutadju, Expression and Engagement programme officer of Hivos’ Regional Office for Southeast Asia, December 2014
social innovation and change and views artistic processes as a means to facilitate relations that bring people together to develop new perspectives\(^\text{71}\).

### 5.5 Explaining factors

#### 5.5.1 Internal factors

RUANGRUPA is not wholly dependent on a single leadership figure to determine the direction of their organisations. Besides Ade Darmawan, the well-recognized cofounder and director, there are other figures that have emerged from the ranks of RUANGRUPA like Hafiz, Reza ‘Asung’ Afisina and Indra Ameng\(^\text{72}\). The international scope of events and RUANGRUPA’s participation in biennials abroad have brought recognition for curators, artists and directors opening the way for a new generation of artists to emerge\(^\text{73}\).

RUANGRUPA has not applied an open recruitment mechanism. Given the increasing number of events and scope of activities, the personnel were prone to being overworked and overburdened. The establishment of separate divisions for Jakarta 32°C and OK.Video, as well as the establishment of RURU Corps, can be seen as an effort to deal with this issue, as well as to improve the involvement of RUANGRUPA’s target groups and strengthening the organisation’s (and other CSOs) financial capacity.

RUANGRUPA has a relaxed, egalitarian, informal, and friendly working atmosphere which suits its target group characteristics. As an open-house, target groups often come to RUANGRUPA just to hang out and interact with RUANGRUPA personnel. With busy schedules and an expansion of target groups, as well as the emergence of many new art spaces, RUANGRUPA has decided to shift their focus from being an initiator of alternative art spaces into a resource provider. Generally speaking, RUANGRUPA has been able to cope with changing contexts and adapt to situations quite well.

#### 5.5.2 External factors

Contemporary visual arts and the internet have a highly mutual relationship. As an art space that is separate and relatively free from direct market intervention, the internet has contributed to the widespread application of contemporary visual arts, which in turn has shaped the internet society. As the internet society and its users have grown, the demand for contemporary visual content has also increased.

A similar relation also exists between contemporary visual arts vis-à-vis urban contemporary subculture. Private sector and more market-driven actors have contributed to the emergence of new alternative and creative expression. As a potential niche, there has been an increasing demand for contemporary visual arts content or alternative approaches to marketing strategies of private sector actors. RURU Corps has been created to deal with this particular factor and to help non-mainstream artists promote their work. With contemporary art becoming one of the latest trends in Indonesia\(^\text{74}\), this presents both opportunities as well as threats for artist-run initiatives like RUANGRUPA. On the one hand it may contribute to increased audience appreciation, while on the other hand it could discourage more critical and provocative discourse. It is generally harder for alternative art spaces like RUANGRUPA to garner interests among artists to work on experimental projects because of the

\(^{71}\) Arts Collaboratory, "Funding opportunities: Project Fund for 'Visual Arts and Social Innovation'". Available from http://old.artscollaboratory.org/funding (19 December 2014)

\(^{72}\) Interview with Dyana Savina Hutadjulu, Expression and Engagement programme officer of Hivos’ Regional Office for Southeast Asia, December 2014


dominance of market orientations in Indonesian arts. Many of such organisations have to "navigate between idealism and commodity"."75

5.5.3 Relations CFA-SPO

RUANGRUPA has received support from Hivos since the early 2000s. Funds from Hivos in the 2012-2014 period were also used to support its organisational capacity building, specifically in the areas of developing a business unit and improving organisational practices. In addition, RUANGRUPA has benefitted from the Arts Collaboratory, a joint initiative supported by Hivos and Stichting DOEN. Arts Collaboratory recently began a second phase of financial support focusing on the development of new perspectives on specific contextual issues and new forms of collaboration."76 With the appointment of RUANGRUPA as an Arts Collaboratory associate partner in 2008, RUANGRUPA’s stature has grown nationally and internationally.

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76 Arts Collaboratory, "We are launching a new phase and building a new visual identity and online platform. Coming Soon!". Available from http://www.artscollaboratory.org/ (accessed 19 December 2014)
6 Discussion

6.1 Design of the intervention

The art scene in Indonesia is concentrated in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Bandung and Bali. In Jakarta, there are few home-grown organisations that have had the same level of success as RUANGRUPA. Some other non-profit organisations and artist-run spaces that have a made a name for themselves in Jakarta include Lontar Gallery, Bentera Budaya, Forum Lenteng, and Engagemedia. In Yogyakarta, one of the most successful artist-run initiatives has been Cemeti Art House. Like RUANGRUPA, the organisation promoted Indonesian contemporary art nationally and overseas by providing a space for artists to explore critical expression, and by supporting collaboration, networking and residency programmes.

Since 2008-2009, RUANGRUPA’s interventions supported by Hivos have been designed around four main programmes or areas: 1) Art Laboratory – providing space for research and artistic collaboration; 2) Support and Dissemination – finding, promoting and sustaining creative artists, critics, curators and arts organisations through workshops, exhibitions and events; 3) Video Art Development – focusing on supporting and promoting alternative non-mainstream video art; and 4) Research and Development to create better understanding of and develop strategies towards the contemporary art scene. As an Artist-Run Initiative (ARI), RUANGRUPA has successfully combined different models that include experimentation and exhibition format, an open and informal environment to initiate and redefine artistic practices, and regular festival programming.

According to RUANGRUPA, its strategy and success is not necessarily replicable in other context. This is because the urban context in which art initiatives operate vary from place to place, which requires adjustments in the approach and activities implemented. On the other hand, there are more events emerging in Jakarta that cover visual and video art. But it is difficult to assess whether similar events were inspired by RUANGRUPA. The SPO has brought contemporary art closer to the masses so to speak, making it possible for those without an artistic background to take part in shaping the discourse.

Like so many other ARI’s, RUANGRUPA faces a number of challenges and opportunities that are defined by its more informal model of organisation. Advantages include flexibility, immediacy and direct approach (often covering everyday subjects in artworks, including socially marginal subjects and issues), enthusiasm from its target groups (i.e. non-mainstream and non-commercial, often young artists), collaboration with other groups in both informal and formal settings, and lower operational costs. Disadvantages include weaker management structures, financing difficulties, a lack of influence over decision-making and policy, and less visibility and unmeasured or limited impact. RUANGRUPA’s interventions include activities designed to address some of the challenges. For example, RURU Corps as a collective initiative seeks enterprising means to contribute to the institution’s sustainability and regeneration. In fact, one of the reasons for establishing the Indonesia Arts Coalition, of which RUANGRUPA is a part of, was to address the need to advocate for more support of non-profit arts

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77 Gallery Models – low-fi auxiliaries of established modes, providing spaces for experimentation in exhibition format, as well as the development of professional skills in areas such as administration, curation and negotiation; Practice Models – the extension of prior learning within an open peer environment to define and refine artist practice through critical development of preconceived forms; Project Models – the locus for short-term, temporary or one-off projects that critically exist within conceptual or predetermined situations such as artist publishing or festival programming, and; Collective Models – a non-spatial but centralised focus for formal and informal group activities based on shared artistic, philosophical or material enquiry.” See: Din Heagney, “A History of Success?”. Available from: https://visualarts.net.au/media/uploads/files/Din_Heagney_ESSAY.pdf (19 December 2014)

organisations since coalition members are dependent on international funding\textsuperscript{79}. The impact that RUANGRUPA wishes to have as an actor of change on policies and practices is less clear in RUANGRUPA’s design. Despite RUANGRUPA’s engagement with the Indonesian Coalition for the Arts, which also seeks to improve the cultural policies of the government, there are no specific actions designed in the area of policy advocacy.

\textsuperscript{79} Mella Jaarsma and Nindityo Adipurnomo, "What are We Waiting for?", ArtAsiaPacific Nov/Dec 2012. Available from http://artasiapacific.com/Magazine/81/WhatAreWeWaitingFor (accessed 19 December 2014)
7 Conclusion

RUANGRUPA has successfully promoted and supported non-commercial visual contemporary artists that are being marginalized by the mainstream market. The organisation itself is an artist-run initiative which has successfully undertaken different streams of work that have resulted in improved infrastructure for contemporary arts in Jakarta. The general public has been largely receptive to RUANGRUPA’s exploration of public space and the artworks it has to offer. The SPO has maintained a reputation for being an initiator and is now emerging as a knowledge producer and provider.

The changes that attributed to the SPO and MFS II funding, as well as to longer-term Hivos support, are the improvements in civic engagement, level of organisation and civil society impact. With MFS II funding, RUANGRUPA has continued to provide a space for artistic collaboration and hosted regular events that supported the dissemination of contemporary art forms. RUANGRUPA has been one of the few actors in Indonesia to promote and support video art development, focusing on providing opportunities to young, upcoming artists who otherwise might not have the opportunities to develop explorative forms of art.

The aforementioned changes are relevant to the 2012 Toc, the context in which RUANGRUPA is operating in, and polices of Hivos. Public space for RUANGRUPA is one of the most strategic preconditions in its ToC and the critical assumptions rest on the ability of RUANGRUPA to sustain itself as an organisation and its ability to support alternative engagement. RUANGRUPA has contributed to the availability of public space through its support for regular events for contemporary visual and video art, as well as through its own gallery space. The SPO operates in a context where contemporary art has been dominated by market-oriented galleries. As such, the SPO has provided a space for artists marginalized by art commodities to engage in alternative forms of expression. As an independent, artist-run organisation, they have provided a platform for multidisciplinary communities to come together. These interventions are also very much in line with Hivos’ Expression and Engagement programme which supports the generation of alternative forms of cultural expression.

Factors that explain the evaluation findings include RUANGRUPA’s strength as a reputable contemporary arts organisation and its internal capacity to regenerate leadership in artist-run initiatives. Nationally RUANGRUPA has collaborative networking relations with a host of like-minded organisations. The SPO is recognized in the country and abroad for its innovative organisational practices and as being an initiator in the contemporary art scene. Hivos and Art Collaboratory support have contributed to the RUANGRUPA’s growth and its networking capabilities. RUANGRUPA has adapted to external factors, which includes the emergence of the internet as a means to disseminate creative forms of expression and as a tool to stimulate interaction and developments in the contemporary arts discourse. The events and exhibitions organised have continued to explore themes that are relevant to the target groups as well as the context in which it operates.

Table 10
Summary of findings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When looking at the MFS II interventions of this SPO to strengthen civil society and/or policy influencing, how much do you agree with the following statements?</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The CS interventions were well designed</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The CS interventions were implemented as designed</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The CS interventions reached their objectives</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The observed outcomes are attributable to the CS interventions</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>The observed CS outcomes are relevant to the beneficiaries of the SPO</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Score between 1 to 10, with 1 being “not at all” and 10 being “completely”.
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**Resource persons consulted**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of key informant</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Function in organisation</th>
<th>Relation with SPO</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ade Darmawan</td>
<td>RUANGRUPA</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td><a href="mailto:robot_murka@yahoo.com">robot_murka@yahoo.com</a></td>
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<td>RUANGRUPA</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td><a href="mailto:ajengnurulaini@gmail.com">ajengnurulaini@gmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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Appendix 1 CIVICUS and Civil Society Index

CIVICUS, the World Alliance for Citizen Participation is an international alliance of members and partners which constitutes an influential network of organisations at the local, national, regional and international levels, and spans the spectrum of civil society. It has worked for nearly two decades to strengthen citizen action and civil society throughout the world. CIVICUS has a vision of a global community of active, engaged citizens committed to the creation of a more just and equitable world. This is based on the belief that the health of societies exists in direct proportion to the degree of balance between the state, the private sector and civil society.

One of the areas that CIVICUS works in is the Civil Society Index (CSI). Since 2000, CIVICUS has measured the state of civil society in 76 countries. In 2008, CIVICUS has considerably changed its CSI.

1. Guiding principles for measuring civil society

*Action orientation:* the principal aim of the CSI is to generate information that is of practical use to civil society practitioners and other primary stakeholders. Therefore, its framework had to identify aspects of civil society that can be changed, as well as generate knowledge relevant to action-oriented goals.

*CSI implementation must be participatory by design:* The CSI does not stop at the generation of knowledge alone. Rather, it also actively seeks to link knowledge-generation on civil society, with reflection and action by civil society stakeholders. The CSI has therefore continued to involve its beneficiaries, as well as various other actors, in this particular case, civil society stakeholders, in all stages of the process, from the design and implementation, through to the deliberation and dissemination stages. This participatory cycle is relevant in that such a mechanism can foster the self-awareness of civil society actors as being part of something larger, namely, civil society itself. As a purely educational gain, it broadens the horizon of CSO representatives through a process of reflecting upon, and engaging with, civil society issues which may go beyond the more narrow foci of their respective organisations. A strong collective self-awareness among civil society actors can also function as an important catalyst for joint advocacy activities to defend civic space when under threat or to advance the common interests of civil society vis-à-vis external forces. These basic civil society issues, on which there is often more commonality than difference among such actors, are at the core of the CSI assessment.

*CSI is change oriented:* The participatory nature that lies at the core of the CSI methodology is an important step in the attempt to link research with action, creating a diffused sense of awareness and ownerships. However, the theory of change that the CSI is based on goes one step further, coupling this participatory principle with the creation of evidence in the form of a comparable and contextually valid assessment of the state of civil society. It is this evidence, once shared and disseminated, that ultimately constitutes a resource for action.

*CSI is putting local partners in the driver’s seat:* CSI is to continue being a collaborative effort between a broad range of stakeholders, with most importance placed on the relationship between CIVICUS and its national partners.
2. Defining Civil Society

The 2008 CIVICUS redesign team modified the civil society definition as follows:

The arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market – which is created by individual and collective actions, organisations and institutions to advance shared interests.

Arena: In this definition the arena refers to the importance of civil society’s role in creating public spaces where diverse societal values and interests interact (Fowler 1996). CSI uses the term ‘arena’ to describe the particular realm or space in a society where people come together to debate, discuss, associate and seek to influence broader society. CIVICUS strongly believes that this arena is distinct from other arenas in society, such as the market, state or family.

Civil society is hence defined as a political term, rather than in economic terms that resemble more the ‘non-profit sector’.

Besides the spaces created by civil society, CIVICUS defines particular spaces for the family, the state and the market.

Individual and collective action, organisations and institutions: Implicit in a political understanding of civil society is the notion of agency; that civil society actors have the ability to influence decisions that affect the lives of ordinary people. The CSI embraces a broad range of actions taken by both individuals and groups. Many of these actions take place within the context of non-coercive organisations or institutions ranging from small informal groups to large professionally run associations.

Advance shared interests: The term ‘interests’ should be interpreted very broadly, encompassing the promotion of values, needs, identities, norms and other aspirations.

They encompass the personal and public, and can be pursued by small informal groups, large membership organisations or formal associations. The emphasis rests however on the element of ‘sharing’ that interest within the public sphere.

3. Civil Society Index- Analytical Framework

The 2008 Civil Society Index distinguishes 5 dimensions of which 4 (civic engagement, level of organisation, practice of values and perception of impact), can be represented in the form of a diamond and the fifth one (external environment) as a circle that influences upon the shape of the diamond. Civic Engagement, or ‘active citizenship’, is a crucial defining factor of civil society. It is the hub of civil society and therefore is one of the core components of the CSI’s definition. Civic engagement describes the formal and informal activities and participation undertaken by individuals to advance shared interests at different levels. Participation within civil society is multi-faceted and encompasses socially-based and politically-based forms of engagement.

Level of Organisation. This dimension assesses the organisational development, complexity and sophistication of civil society, by looking at the relationships among the actors within the civil society arena. Key sub dimensions are:

- Internal governance of Civil Society Organisations;
- Support infrastructure, that is about the existence of supporting federations or umbrella bodies;
- Self-regulation, which is about for instance the existence of shared codes of conducts amongst Civil Society Organisations and other existing self-regulatory mechanisms;
- Peer-to-peer communication and cooperation: networking, information sharing and alliance building to assess the extent of linkages and productive relations among civil society actors;
- Human resources, that is about the sustainability and adequacy of human resources available for CSOs in order to achieve their objectives:
  - Financial and technological resources available at CSOs to achieve their objectives;
• International linkages, such as CSO’s membership in international networks and participation in global events.

**Practice of Values.** This dimension assesses the internal practice of values within the civil society arena. CIVICUS identified some key values that are deemed crucial to gauge not only progressiveness but also the extent to which civil society’s practices are coherent with their ideals. These are:

- Democratic decision-making governance: how decisions are made within CSOs and by whom;
- Labour regulations: includes the existence of policies regarding equal opportunities, staff membership in labour unions, training in labour rights for new staff and a publicly available statement on labour standards;
- Code of conduct and transparency: measures whether a code of conduct exists and is available publicly. It also measures whether the CSO’s financial information is available to the public.
- Environmental standards: examines the extent to which CSOs adopt policies upholding environmental standards of operation;
- Perception of values within civil society: looks at how CSOs perceive the practice of values, such as non-violence. This includes the existence or absence of forces within civil society that use violence, aggression, hostility, brutality and/or fighting, tolerance, democracy, transparency, trustworthiness and tolerance in the civil society within which they operate.

**Perception of Impact.** This is about the perceived impact of civil society actors on politics and society as a whole as the consequences of collective action. In this, the perception of both civil society actors (internal) as actors outside civil society (outsiders) is taken into account. Specific sub dimensions are

- Responsiveness in terms of civil society’s impact on the most important social concerns within the country. “Responsive” types of civil society are effectively taking up and voicing societal concerns.
- Social impact measures civil society’s impact on society in general. An essential role of civil society is its contribution to meet pressing societal needs;
- Policy impact: covers civil society’s impact on policy in general. It also looks at the impact of CSO activism on selected policy issues;
- Impact on attitudes: includes trust, public spiritedness and tolerance. The sub dimensions reflect a set of universally accepted social and political norms. These are drawn, for example, from sources such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as CIVICUS’ own core values. This dimension measures the extent to which these values are practised within civil society, compared to the extent to which they are practised in society at large.

**Context Dimension: External Environment.** It is crucial to give consideration to the social, political and economic environments in which it exists, as the environment both directly and indirectly affects civil society. Some features of the environment may enable the growth of civil society. Conversely, other features of the environment hamper the development of civil society. Three elements of the external environment are captured by the CSI:

- Socio-economic context: The Social Watch’s basic capabilities index and measures of corruption, inequality and macro-economic health are used portray the socioeconomic context that can have marked consequences for civil society, and perhaps most significantly at the lower levels of social development;
• Socio-political context: This is assessed using five indicators. Three of these are adapted from the Freedom House indices of political and civil rights and freedoms, including political rights and freedoms, personal rights and freedoms within the law and associational and organisational rights and freedoms. Information about CSO experience with the country’s legal framework and state effectiveness round out the picture of the socio-political context;
• Socio-cultural context: utilises interpersonal trust, which examines the level of trust hat ordinary people feel for other ordinary people, as a broad measure of the social psychological climate for association and cooperation. Even though everyone experiences relationships of varying trust and distrust with different people, this measure provides a simple indication of the prevalence of a world view that can support and strengthen civil society. Similarly, the extent of tolerance and public spiritedness also offers indication of the context in which civil society unfolds.
Appendix 2 Evaluation methodology

This Appendix describes the evaluation methodology that was developed to evaluate the efforts of Dutch NGOs and their Southern Partner Organisations (SPO) to strengthen Civil Society in India, Ethiopia and Indonesia. The first paragraph introduces the terms of reference for the evaluation and the second discusses design issues, including sampling procedures and changes in the terms of reference that occurred between the 2012 and 2014 assessment. The third paragraph presents the methodologies developed to answer each of the evaluation questions.

1. Introduction

1.1 Terms of reference for the evaluation

The Netherlands has a long tradition of public support for civil bi-lateral development cooperation, going back to the 1960s. The Co-Financing System (’MFS) is its most recent expression. MFS II is the 2011-2015 grant programme which meant to achieve sustainable reduction in poverty. A total of 20 consortia of Dutch Co Financing Agencies have been awarded €1.9 billion in MFS II grants by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).

One component of the MFS II programme addresses the extent to which the Southern Partners of the Dutch Consortia are contributing towards strengthening civil society and this evaluation assesses this contribution for Southern Partner countries in Indonesia, India and Ethiopia. The evaluation comprised a baseline study, carried out in 2012, followed by an end line study in 2014.

The entire MFS II evaluation comprises assessments in eight countries where apart from a civil society component, also assessments towards achieving MDGs and strengthening the capacity of the southern partner organisations by the CFAs. A synthesis team is in place to aggregate findings of all eight countries. This team convened three synthesis team meetings, one in 2012, one in 2013 and one in 2014. All three meetings aimed at harmonising evaluation methodologies for each component across countries. CDI has been playing a leading role in harmonising its Civil Society and Organisational Capacity assessment with the other organisations in charge for those components in the other countries. This Annex describes the methodology that has been developed for the evaluation of the efforts to strengthen civil society priority result area. We will first explain the purpose and scope of this evaluation and then present the overall evaluation design. We will conclude with describing methodological adaptations, limitations and implications.

1.2 Civil Society assessment – purpose and scope

The overall purpose of the joint MFS II evaluations is to account for results of MFS II-funded or –co-funded development interventions implemented by Dutch CFAs and/or their Southern partners and to contribute to the improvement of future development interventions.

The civil society evaluation is organised around 5 key questions:

- What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?
- To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
- What is the relevance of these changes?
Were the development interventions of the MFS II consortia efficient?
What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

Furthermore, the evaluation methodology for efforts to strengthen civil society should:
- Describe how a representative sample of Southern partner organisations of the Dutch CFAs in the country will be taken.
- Focus on five priority result areas that correspond with dimensions of the Civil Society Index (CSI) developed by CIVICUS (see paragraph 6.4 - Call for proposal). For each of those dimensions the call for proposal formulated key evaluation questions.
- Should compare results with available reference data (i.e. a CSI report or other relevant data from the country in question).

The results of this evaluation are to be used by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Dutch Consortia and their partner organisations. The evaluation methodology has to be participatory in the sense that Dutch Consortia and their partner organisation would be asked to give their own perception on a range of indicators of the adjusted CIVICUS analytical framework in 2012 and in 2014.

2. Designing the methodology

2.1 Evaluation principles and standards

The overall approach selected is a participatory, theory-based evaluation through a before and after comparison. This paragraph briefly describes these principles and how these have been translated into data collection principles. It also describes how a ‘representative sample’ of Southern Partner Organisations was selected and how the initial terms of references were adjusted with the consent of the commissioner of the evaluation, given the nature of the evaluation component and the resources available for the evaluation.

Recognition of complexity
The issues at stake and the interventions in civil society and policy influence are complex in nature, meaning that cause and effect relations can sometimes only be understood in retrospect and cannot be repeated. The evaluation methods should therefore focus on recurring patterns of practice, using different perspectives to understand changes and to acknowledge that the evaluation means to draw conclusions about complex adaptive systems (Kurtz and Snowden, 2003)\(^80\).

Changes in the values of the Civil Society Indicators in the 2012-2014 period are then the result of conflict management processes, interactive learning events, new incentives (carrots and sticks) that mobilise or demobilise civil society, rather than the result of a change process that can be predicted from A to Z (a linear or logical framework approach)\(^81\).

A theory-based evaluation
Theory-based evaluation has the advantage of situating the evaluation findings in an analysis that includes both what happened over the life of the project as well as the how and why of what happened (Rogers 2004). It demonstrates its capacity to help understand why a program works or fails to work, going further than knowing only outcomes by trying to systematically enter the black box (Weiss 2004). Theory-based evaluations can provide a framework to judge effectiveness in context of high levels of complexity, uncertainty, and changeability when traditional (impact) evaluation methods are not suitable: the use of control groups for the civil society evaluation is problematic since comparable


organisations with comparable networks and operating in a similar external environment would be quite difficult to identify and statistical techniques of matching cannot be used because of a small n. Because SPO’s theories of change regarding their efforts to build civil society or to influence policies may alter during the 2012-2014 period, it requires us to develop a deep understanding of the change process and the dynamics that affect civil society and policies. It is important to understand what has led to specific (non-) changes and (un)-expected changes. These external factors and actors, as well as the SPO’s agency need to be taken into account for the attribution question. Linear input-activities-outputs-outcomes-impact chains do not suffice for complex issues where change is both the result of SPOs’ interventions as those by other actors and/or factors.

Therefore, the most reasonable counterfactual that can be used for this evaluation is that of considering alternative causal explanations of change (White and Philips, 2012). Therefore the SPOs’ Theory of Change constructed in 2012 is also related to a Model of Change constructed in 2014 that tries to find the ultimate explanations of what happened in reality, including other actors and factors that might possibly explain the outcomes achieved.

**Triangulation of methods and sources of information**

For purposes of triangulation to improve the robustness, validity or credibility of the findings of the evaluation we used different types of data collection and analysis methods as well as different sources of information. The CIVICUS analytical framework was adjusted for this evaluation in terms of providing standard impact outcome indicators to be taken into account. Data collection methods used consisted of workshops with the SPO, interviews with key resource persons, focus group discussions, social network analysis (during the baseline), consultation of project documents; MFS II consortia documents and other documents relevant to assess general trends in civil society.

**Participatory evaluation**

The evaluation is participatory in that both baseline and end line started with a workshop with SPO staff, decision makers and where possible board members. The baseline workshop helped SPOs to construct their own theory of change with regards to civil society. Detailed guidelines and tools have been developed by CDI for both baseline and follow-up, and these have been piloted in each of the countries CDI is involved in. Country based evaluators have had a critical input in reviewing and adapting these detailed guidelines and tools. This enhanced a rigorous data collection process. Additionally, the process of data analysis has been participatory where both CDI and in-country teams took part in the process and cross-check each other’s inputs for improved quality. Rigorous analysis of the qualitative data was done with the assistance of the NVivo software program.

**Using the evaluation standards as a starting point**

As much as possible within the boundaries of this accountability driven evaluation, the evaluation teams tried to respect the following internationally agreed upon standards for program evaluation (Yarbrough et al, 2011). These are, in order of priority: Utility; Feasibility; Propriety; Accuracy; Accountability. However, given the entire set-up of the evaluation, the evaluation team cannot fully ensure the extent to which the evaluation is utile for the SPO and their CFAs; and cannot ensure that the evaluation findings are used in a proper way and not for political reasons.

### 2.2 Sample selection

The terms of reference for this evaluation stipulate that the evaluators draw a sample of southern partner organisations to include in the assessment. Given the fact that the first evaluation questions intends to draw conclusions for the MDGs or the themes (governance or fragile states) for Indonesia a sample was drawn for the two or three most frequent MDGs or themes that the SPOs are working in. In 2012, the Dutch MFS II consortia were asked to provide information for each SPO regarding the MDG/theme it is working on, if it has an explicit agenda in the area of civil society strengthening and/or policy influence. The database then provided an insight into the most important MDG/themes covered by the partner organisations, how many of these have an explicit agenda regarding civil society.
strengthening and/or policy influence. The entire population of SPOs in Indonesia was 120, of which those exclusively working on the governance theme (28 SPOs), those working on MDG 7ab (26 SPOs) and on MDG 3 (26 SPOs) where the most frequent ones. With regards to MDG 3 and MDG 7ab the evaluator decided to select MDG 7ab, which is a very specific and relevant MDG for Indonesia. Five 5 partner organisations were randomly selected for respectively MDG 7 (natural resources) of a population of 26 SPOs and 5 for the governance theme from 28 SPOs.

2.3 Changes in the original terms of reference

Two major changes have been introduced during this evaluation and accepted by the commissioner of the MFS II evaluation. These changes were agreed upon during the 2013 and the 2014 synthesis team meetings.

The efficiency evaluation question

During the June 2013 synthesis meeting the following decision was made with regards to measuring how efficient MFS II interventions for organisational capacity and civil society are: [...] it was stressed that it is difficult to disentangle budgets for capacity development and civil society strengthening. SPOs usually don’t keep track of these activities separately; they are included in general project budgets. Therefore, teams agreed to assess efficiency of CD [capacity development] and CS activities in terms of the outcomes and/or outputs of the MDG projects. This implies no efficiency assessment will be held for those SPOs without a sampled MDG project. Moreover, the efficiency assessment of MDG projects needs to take into account CD and CS budgets (in case these are specified separately). Teams will evaluate efficiency in terms of outcomes if possible. If project outcomes are unlikely to be observed already in 2014, efficiency will be judged in terms of outputs or intermediate results (e-mail quotation from Gerton Rongen at February 6, 2014).

Attribution/contribution evaluation question

During the June 2013 NWO-WOTRO workshop strategies were discussed to fit the amount of evaluation work to be done with the available resources. Therefore,

1. The number of SPOs that will undergo a full-fledged analysis to answer the attribution question, were to be reduced to 50 percent of all SPOs. Therefore the evaluation team used the following selection criteria:
   - An estimation of the annual amount of MFS II funding allocated to interventions that have a more or less direct relation with the civil society component. This implies the following steps to be followed for the inventory:
   - Covering all MDGs/themes in the original sample
   - Covering a variety of Dutch alliances and CFAs

2. The focus of the attribution question will be on two impact outcome areas, those most commonly present in the SPO sample for each country. The evaluation team distinguishes four different impact outcome areas:
   - The extent to which the SPO, with MFS II funding, engages more and diverse categories of society in the 2011-2014 period (Civicus dimensions "Civic engagement" and "perception of impact")
   - The extent to which the SPOs supports its intermediate organisations to make a valuable contribution to civil society in the 2011 -2014 period (Civicus dimension "Level of organisation" and "perception of impact")
   - The extent to which the SPO itself engages with other civil society organisations to make a valuable contribution to civil society in the 2011-2014 period (Civicus dimension "level of organisation")

See the evaluation methodology for the civil society component as described in the annex of the baseline report.
• The extent to which the SPO contributes to changing public and private sector policies and practices in the 2011-2014 period (Civicus dimension “perception of impact”)

3. The CS dimension ‘Practice of Values’ has been excluded, because this dimension is similar to issues dealt with for the organisational capacity assessment.

The aforementioned analysis drew the following conclusions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>SPO in the in-depth analysis</th>
<th>Strategic CS orientation to include</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Indonesia| ELSAM, WARSI, CRI, NTPF-EP, LPPSLH | 1. Strengthening intermediate organisations AND influencing policies and practices  
2. If only one of the two above mentioned is applicable, then select another appropriate impact outcome area to look at. |
| India    | NNET, CWM, CECOEDCON, Reds Tumkur, CSA | 1. Enhancing civic engagement AND strengthening intermediate organisations  
2. If only one of the two above mentioned is applicable then select another appropriate impact outcome area to look at. |
| Ethiopia | OSSA, EKHC, CCGG&SO, JeCCDO, and ADAA | 1. Strengthening the capacities of intermediate organisations AND SPO’s engagement in the wider CS arena  
2. If only one of the two above mentioned is applicable then select another appropriate impact outcome area to look at. |

Source: Consultation of project documents available in February 2014

3. Answering the evaluation questions

3.1 Evaluation question 1 - Changes in civil society for the relevant MDGs/topics

Evaluation question 1: What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?

Indicators and tools used
In line with the CIVICUS Civil Society Index, a scoring tool was developed in 2012 which comprises 17 indicators. The selection was inspired by those suggested in the terms of reference of the commissioner. Each indicator was, also in line with the CIVICUS index accompanied by an open evaluation question to be used for data collection in 2012 and 2014. In 2012 the scoring tool contained four statements describing the level of achievements of the indicator and scores ranged from 0 to 3 (low score - high score).

A comparison of the scores obtained in 2012 informed the evaluation team that there was a positive bias towards high scores, mostly between 2 and 3. Therefore during the 2014 assessment, it was decided to measure relative changes for each indicator in the 2012 – 2014 period, as well as the reasons for changes or no changes and assigning a score reflecting the change between -2 (considerable deterioration of the indicator value since 2012) and +2 (considerable improvement).

In 2012 and based upon the Theory of Change constructed with the SPO, a set of standard indicators were identified that would ensure a relation between the standard CIVICUS indicators and the interventions of the SPO. However, these indicators were not anymore included in the 2014 assessment because of the resources available and because the methodology fine-tuned for the attribution question in 2013, made measurement of these indicators redundant.

Also in 2012, as a means to measure the ‘level of organisation’ dimension a social network analysis tool was introduced. However this tool received very little response and was discontinued during the end line study.

Key questions to be answered for this evaluation question
In 2012, SPO staff and leaders, as well as outside resource persons were asked to provide answers to 17 questions, one per standard indicator of the scoring tool developed by CDI.
In 2012, the SPO staff and leaders were given the description of each indicator as it was in 2012 and had to answer the following questions:

1. How has the situation of this indicator changed compared to its description of the 2012 situation? Did it deteriorate considerably or did it improve considerably (-2 → +2)
2. What exactly has changed since 2012 for the civil society in indicator that you are looking at? Be as specific as possible in your description.
3. What interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the situation in 2012? Please tick and describe what happened and to what change this led. It is possible to tick and describe more than one choice.
   - Intervention by SPO, NOT financed by any of your Dutch partners
   - Intervention SPO, financed by your Dutch partner organisation
   - Other actor NOT the SPO, please specify
   - Other factor, NOT actor related, please specify
   - A combination of actors and factors, INCLUDING the SPO, but NOT with Dutch funding, please specify
   - A combination of actors and factors, INCLUDING the SPO, but WITH Dutch funding, please specify
   - Don't know
4. Generally speaking, which two of the five CIVICUS dimensions (civic engagement, level of organisation, practice of values, perception of impact, environment) changed considerably between 2012 – 2014? For each of these changes, please describe:
   - Nature of the change
   - Key interventions, actors and factors (MFS II or non-MFS II related) that explain each change (entirely or partially).

Sources for data collection
During the baseline and the end line and for purposes of triangulation, several methods were used to collect data on each (standard) indicator:

- Self-assessment per category of staff within the SPO: where possible, three subgroups were made to assess the scores: field staff/programme staff, executive leadership and representatives of the board, general assembly, and internal auditing groups if applicable completed with separate interviews;
- Interviews with external resource persons. These consisted of three categories: key actors that are knowledgeable about the MDG/theme the SPO is working on and who know the civil society arena around these topics; civil society organisations that are being affected by the programme through support or CSOs with which the SPO is collaborating on equal footing, and; representatives of public or private sector organisations with which the SPO is interacting
- Consultation and analysis of reports that relate to each of the five CIVICUS dimensions.
- Project documents, financial and narrative progress reports, as well as correspondence between the SPO and the CFA.
- Social network analysis (SNA), which was discontinued in the end line study.

During the follow-up, emphasis was put on interviewing the same staff and external persons who were involved during the baseline for purpose of continuity.

3.2 Evaluation question 2 – “Attribution” of changes in civil society to interventions of SPOs.

Evaluation question 2: To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
Adapting the evaluation question and introduction to the methodology chosen

In line with the observation of Stern et al. (2012) that the evaluation question, the programme attributes, and the evaluation approaches all provide important elements to conclude on the evaluation design to select, the teams in charge of evaluating the civil society component concluded that given the attributes of the programmes it was impossible to answer the attribution question as formulated in the Terms of References of the evaluation and mentioned above. Therefore, the evaluation teams worked towards answering the extent to which the programme contributed towards realising the outcomes. For this endeavour explaining outcome process-tracing was used. The objective of the process tracing methodology for MFS II, in particular for the civil society component is to:

- Identify what interventions, actors and factors explain selected impact outcomes for process tracing.
- Assess how the SPO with MFS II funding contributed to the changes in the selected impact outcomes and how important this contribution is given other actors and factors that possibly influence the attainment of the outcome. Ruling out rival explanations, which are other interventions, actors or factors that are not related to MFS II funding.

Methodology – getting prepared

As described before a limited number of SPOs were selected for process tracing and for each country strategic orientations were identified as a means to prevent a bias occurring towards only positive impact outcomes and as a means to support the in-country evaluation teams with the selection of outcomes to focus on a much as was possible, based upon the project documents available at CDI. These documents were used to track realised outputs and outcomes against planned outputs and outcomes. During the workshop (see evaluation question on changes in civil society) and follow-up interviews with the SPO, two impact outcomes were selected for process tracing.

Steps in process tracing

1. Construct the theoretical model of change – by in-country evaluation team

After the two impact outcomes have been selected and information has been obtained about what has actually been achieved, the in-country evaluation team constructs a visual that shows all pathways that might possibly explain the outcomes. The inventory of those possible pathways is done with the SPO, but also with external resource persons and documents consulted. This culminated in a Model of Change. A MoC of good quality includes: The causal pathways that relate interventions/parts by any actor, including the SPO to the realised impact outcome; assumptions that clarify relations between different parts in the pathway, and; case specific and/or context specific factors or risks that might influence the causal pathway, such as for instance specific attributes of the actor or socio-cultural-economic context. The Models of Change were discussed with the SPO and validated.

2. Identify information needs to confirm or reject causal pathways as well as information sources needed.

This step aims to critically reflect upon what information is needed that helps to confirm one of causal pathways and at that at same time helps to reject the other possible explanations. Reality warns that this type of evidence will hardly be available for complex development efforts. The evaluators were asked to behave as detectives of Crime Scene Investigation, ensuring that the focus of the evaluation was not only on checking if parts/interventions had taken place accordingly, but more specifically on identifying information needs that confirm or reject the relations between the parts/interventions. The key question to be answered was: "What information do we need in order to confirm or reject that one part leads to another part or, that X causes Y?". Four types of evidence were used, where appropriate:

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83 Explaining outcome process tracing attempts to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific historical case. Here the aim is not to build or test more general theories but to craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case centric than theory oriented. The aim of process tracing is not to verify if an intended process of interventions took place as planned in a particular situation, but that it aims at increasing our understanding about what works under what conditions and why (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

84 Beach and Pederson, 2013
• **Pattern evidence** relates to predictions of statistical patterns in the evidence. This may consist of trends analysis and correlations.

• **Sequence evidence** deals with the temporal and spatial chronology of events predicted by a hypothesised causal mechanism. For example, a test of the hypothesis could involve expectations of the timing of events where we might predict that if the hypothesis is valid, we should see that the event B took place after event A. However, if we found that event B took place before event A, the test would suggest that our confidence in the validity of this part of the mechanism should be reduced (disconfirmation/ falsification).

• **Trace evidence** is evidence whose mere existence provides proof that a part of a hypothesised mechanism exists. For example, the existence of meeting minutes, if authentic, provides strong proof that the meeting took place.

• **Account evidence** deals with the content of empirical material, such as meeting minutes that detail what was discussed or an oral account of what took place in the meeting.

3. Collect information necessary to confirm or reject causal pathways

Based upon the inventory of information needs the evaluation teams make their data collection plan after which data collection takes place.

4. Analyse the data collected and assessment of their quality.

This step consists of compiling all information collected in favour or against a causal pathway in a table or in a list per pathway. For all information used, the sources of information are mentioned and an assessment of the strength of the evidence takes place, making a distinction between strong, weak and moderate evidence. For this we use the traffic light system: **green letters mean strong evidence, red letters mean weak evidence** and **orange letter mean moderate evidence**. The following table provides the format used to assess these issues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal pathway</th>
<th>Information that confirms (parts of) this pathway</th>
<th>Information that rejects (parts of) this pathway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pathway 1</td>
<td>Information 1 Source of information information 2 Source of information Information 1 Source of information</td>
<td>Information 1 Source of information Information 2 Source of information Information 3 Source of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part 1.1</td>
<td>Information 2 Source of information information 3 Source of information</td>
<td>Information 1 Source of information Information 2 Source of information Information 3 Source of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part 2.1</td>
<td>Information 1 Source of information</td>
<td>Information 2 Source of information Information 3 Source of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etc</td>
<td>Information 3 Source of information</td>
<td>Information 1 Source of information Information 2 Source of information Information 3 Source of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pathway 3</td>
<td>Information 1 Source of information</td>
<td>Information 2 Source of information Information 3 Source of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part 2.2</td>
<td>Information 1 Source of information</td>
<td>Information 2 Source of information Information 3 Source of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etc</td>
<td>Information 3 Source of information</td>
<td>Information 1 Source of information Information 2 Source of information Information 3 Source of information</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Assessing the nature of the relations between parts in the model of change

The classification of all information collected is being followed by the identification of the pathways that most likely explain the impact outcome achieved. For this the evaluators assess the nature of the relations between different parts in the MoC. Based upon Mayne (2012) and Stern et al (2012) the following relations between parts in the MoC are mapped and the symbols inserted into the original MoC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of the relation between parts and other parts or outcome</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The part is the only causal explanation for the outcome. No other interventions or factors explain it. (necessary and sufficient)</td>
<td><img src="green" alt="Yellow" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The part does not explain the outcome at all: other subcomponents explain the outcomes.</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The part explains the outcome but other parts explain the outcome as well: there are multiple pathways (sufficient but not necessary)</td>
<td><img src="green" alt="Yellow" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The part is a condition for the outcome but won't make it happen without other factors (necessary but not sufficient)</td>
<td><img src="green" alt="Yellow" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The part explains the outcome, but requires the help of other parts to explain the outcome in a sufficient and necessary way (not a sufficient cause, but necessary) → it is part of a causal package</td>
<td><img src="green" alt="Yellow" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Mayne, 2012; Stern et al, 2012
6. Write down the contribution and assess the role of the SPO and MFS II funding

This final step consists of answering the following questions, as a final assessment of the contribution question:

- The first question to be answered is: What explains the impact outcome?
- The second question is: What is the role of the SPO in this explanation?
- The third question, if applicable is: what is the role of MFS II finding in this explanation?

7. Sources for data collection

Information necessary to answer this evaluation question is to be collected from:

- Interviews with resource persons inside and outside the SPO
- Project documents and documentation made available by other informants
- Websites that possibly confirm that an outcome is achieved and that the SPO is associated with this outcome
- Meeting minutes of meetings between officials
- Time lines to trace the historical relations between events
- Policy documents
- etc

3.3 Evaluation question 3 – Relevance of the changes

Evaluation question 3: What is the relevance of these changes?

The following questions are to be answered in order to assess the relevance of the changes in Civil Society.

- How do the MFS II interventions and civil society outcomes align with the Theory of Change developed during the baseline in 2012? What were reasons for changing or not changing interventions and strategies?
- What is the civil society policy of the Dutch alliance that collaborates with the SPO? And how do the MFS II interventions and civil society outcomes align with the civil society policy of the Dutch alliance that collaborates with the SPO?
- How relevant are the changes achieved in relation to the context in which the SPO is operating?
- What is the further significance of these changes for building a vibrant civil society for the particular MDG/ theme in the particular context?

Sources for data collection

For this question the following sources are to be consulted:

- Review of the information collected during interviews with the SPO and outside resource persons
- The 2012 Theory of Change
- Interview with the CFA liaison officer of the SPO;
- Review of reports, i.e: the civil society policy document of the Dutch Alliance that was submitted for MFS II funding, relevant documents describing civil society for the MDG/ theme the SPO is working on in a given context.

3.4 Evaluation question 4, previously 5 - Factors explaining the findings

Evaluation question 4: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

To answer this question we look into information available that:

- Highlight changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO
- Highlight changes in the relations between the SPO and the CFA
- Highlight changes in the context in which the SPO is operating and how this might affect positively or negatively its organisational capacity.

**Sources for data collection**
Sources of information to be consulted are:
- Project documents
- Communications between the CFA and the SPO
- Information already collected during the previous evaluation questions.

4. Analysis of findings

A qualitative software programme NVivo 10 (2010) was used to assist in organising and making sense of all data collected. Although the software cannot take over the task of qualitative data analysis, it does 1) improve transparency by creating a record of all steps taken, 2) organise the data and allow the evaluator to conduct a systematic analysis, 3) assist in identifying important themes that might otherwise be missed, and 4) reduce the danger of bias due to human cognitive limitations, compared to "intuitive data processing" (Sadler 1981). The qualitative data in the evaluation consisted of transcripts from semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions workshops, field notes from observation, and a range of documents available at the SPO or secondary information used to collect reference data and to obtain a better understanding of the context in which the CS component evolves.

To analyse this diverse collection of data, several analytical strategies are envisioned, specifically content analysis, discourse analysis, and thematic analysis. Although each of these strategies can be understood as a different lens through which to view the data, all will require a carefully developed and executed coding plan.

Data have been coded according to: standard civil society indicator; outcome included for in-depth contribution analysis; relevance, and; explaining factors.

This qualitative analysis will be supported by a limited amount of quantitative data largely arising from the score assigned by the evaluation team to each performance indicator described in the civil society scoring tool. Other quantitative data in this study are drawn information provided in background literature and organisational documents as well as the Social Network Analysis method.

5. Limitations to the methodology

5.1 General limitations with regards to the MFS II evaluation

**The MFS II programme and CIVICUS**

Although the MFS II programme stated that all proposals need to contribute to civil society strengthening in the South\(^{85}\), mention was made of the use of the CIVICUS framework for monitoring purposes. The fact that civil society was to be integrated as one of the priority result areas next to that of organisational capacity and MDGs became only clear when the MoFA communicated its mandatory monitoring protocol.

In consequence, civil society strengthening in the MFS II programmes submitted to the ministry is mainstreamed into different sub programmes, but not addressed as a separate entity. This late introduction of the Civil Society component also implies that project documents and progress reports to not make a distinction in MDG or theme components vs those of civil society strengthening, leaving the interpretation of what is a civil society intervention our outcome and what not to the interpretation of the evaluation team.

\(^{85}\) Policy Framework Dutch Co-financing System II 2011 - 2015
At the same time the evaluation team observes that SPOs and CFAs have started to incorporate the organisational capacity tool that is being used in the monitoring protocol in their own organisational assessment procedures. None of the SPOs is familiar with the CIVICUS framework and how it fits into their interventions.

**Differences between CIVICUS and MFS II evaluation**

CIVICUS developed a Civil Society Index that distinguishes 5 dimensions and for each of these a set of indicators has been developed. Based upon a variety of data collection methods, a validation team composed of civil society leaders provides the scores for the civil society index.

Major differences between the way the Civil Society Index is been used by CIVICUS and for this MFS II evaluation is the following:

1. CIVICUS defines its unit of analysis is terms of the civil society arena at national and/or subnational level and does not start from individual NGOs. The MFS II evaluation put the SPO in the middle of the civil society arena and then looked at organisations that receive support; organisations with which the SPO is collaborating. The civil society arena boundaries for the MFS II evaluation are the public or private sector organisations that the SPO relates to or whose policies and practices it aims to influence.

2. The CIVICUS assessments are conducted by civil society members itself whereas the MFS II evaluation is by nature an external evaluation conducted by external researchers. CIVICUS assumes that its assessments, by organising them as a joint learning exercise, will introduce change that is however not planned. With the MFS II evaluation the focus was on the extent to which the interventions of the SPO impacted upon the civil society indicators.

3. CIVICUS has never used its civil society index as a tool to measure change over a number of years. Each assessment is a stand-alone exercise and no efforts are being made to compare indicators over time or to attribute changes in indicators to a number of organisations or external trends.

**Dimensions and indicator choice**

The CIVICUS dimensions in themselves are partially overlapping; the dimension ‘perception of impact’ for instance contains elements that relate to ‘civic engagement’ and to ‘level of organisation’. Similar overlap is occurring in the civil society scoring tool developed for this evaluation and which was highly oriented by a list of evaluation questions set by the commissioner of the evaluation.

Apart from the overlap, we observe that some of the standard indicators used for the civil society evaluation were not meaningful for the SPOs under evaluation. This applies for instance for the political engagement indicator “How intense is your (individual staff or organisational) participation in locally-nationally elected bodies and/or sectoral user groups?”

**Measuring change over a two-year period**

The MFS II programme started its implementation in 2011 and it will finish in 2015, whereas its evaluation started mid-2012 and will end in the beginning of 2014. The period between the baseline and the end line measurement hardly covers 2 years in some cases. Civil society building and policy influence are considered the type of interventions that requires up to 10 years to reap significant results, especially when taking into account attitudes and behaviour. Apart from the fact that the baseline was done when MFS II was already operational in the field for some 1.5 years, some SPO interventions were a continuation of programmes designed under the MFS I programme, hence illustrating that the MFS II period is not a clear boundary. Contracts with other SPOs ended already in 2012, and practically coincided with the baseline assessment being conducted at the moment the relationship with the CFA had practically ended.

**Aggregation of findings**

Although working with standard indicators and assigning them scores creates expectations of findings being compared and aggregated at national and international level, this may lend itself to a quick but inaccurate assessment of change. Crude comparison between programs on the basis of findings is problematic, and risks being politically abused. The evaluation team has to guard against these abuses by ensuring the necessary modesty in extrapolating findings and drawing conclusions.
Linking the civil society component to the other components of the MFS II evaluation

The Theory of Change in the terms of reference assumes that CFAs are strengthening the organisational capacity of their partners, which is evaluated in the organisational capacity components, which then leads to impact upon MDGs or upon civil society. Because the evaluation methodology designed for both the organisational capacity and the civil society evaluation require considerable time investments of the SPOs, a deliberate choice was made not to include SPOs under the organisational capacity component in that of Civil Society. This may possibly hamper conclusions regarding the assumption of capacitated SPOs being able to impact upon civil society. However, where information is available and where it is relevant, the civil society component will address organisational capacity issues.

No such limitations were made with regards to SPOs in the MDG sample, however, apart from Indonesia; none of the SPOs in the civil society sample is also in that of MDG.

5.2 Limitations during baseline with regards to the methodology

A very important principle upon which this evaluation methodology is based is that of triangulation, which implies that different stakeholders and documents are consulted to obtain information about the same indicator from different perspectives. Based upon these multiple perspectives, a final score can be given on the same indicator which is more valid and credible.

For Indonesia this has not always been possible:
- For 7 out of 10 SPOs a Survey Monkey questionnaire was developed to assess the intensity of the interaction between stakeholders in the network. Out of 156 actors that were invited to fill in this 5 minute questionnaire, only 7 actors effectively filled in the questionnaire = 4.5 %. The online Social Network Analysis aims at having both the opinion of the SPO on the intensity of the interaction with another actor, as well as the opinion of the other actor for triangulation. Important reasons for not filling in this form are that actors in the network are not technology savvy, or that they have difficulties in accessing internet. Data obtained by survey monkey were not used in the baseline. Instead the evaluation team did a social network assessment during the baseline workshop with the SPO.
- With regards to filling in offline interview forms or answering questions during interviews a number of civil society actors did not want to score themselves because they do not benefit from the interventions of the MFS II projects. Having the scores of their own organisations will help to assess the wider environment in which the SPO operates and possibly an impact of the SPO on other civil society organisations in 2014.
- With regards to public officials the evaluation team faced difficulties to have their opinions on a certain number of indicators such as perception of impact on policy influencing and relations between public organisations and civil society. Public officials fear that they will be quoted in the assessment, which may have repercussions for their position.

5.3 Experiences during end line from in-country teams - Indonesia

The in-country team experienced difficulties in working on the first evaluation question regarding changes in civil society. The team would have preferred a similar workshop as during the baseline that would recapitulate the essence of the CIVICUS model and the content of each standard indicator developed. Although some members of the in-country team were also involved in the 2012 base line assessment, they and their new colleagues experienced a kind of “CS dimension shock” when these topics where not addressed during the workshop, where a lot of time was spend to work on the second evaluation question on contribution. A guidance sent later in the year was helpful but came late according to the Indonesian team.
The many appendices prepared for data collection and meant as a step-wide approach for the end line study, sometimes became a burden and a limitation when applied directly in collecting data. Like mentioned for the baseline study the questions sometimes limited the probing for information. In addition, in-country team members had to deal with the “CS dimension shock”. The organisation of the entire MFS II evaluation did provide very little opportunities for SPOs to engage with the evaluation and to feel concerned. For many of the SPOs the evaluation does not provide a strategic value in terms of drawing lessons. This lack of ownership is felt more strongly with those SPOs that already ended their contract with the Dutch MFS II organisation and with those SPOs that due to high staff turn overs were confronted with past tense issues that they did not experience. Some of the SPOs simply didn’t care about the evaluation. This could have been anticipated if there had been a special workshop (for the directors, perhaps, and the CFAs) prior to the endline. Via such workshops, appointments and agreements could have been set, allowing the in-country teams to plan their time and schedule. What ended up happening was that many of the SPOs kept putting off appointments and this also affected the schedule of the team.

Many SPOs are unfamiliar with the CIVICUS framework and the in-country team tried to ease them into it by sending background information and the indicator questions regarding changes in civil society prior to the workshop. This was effective for some SPOs (Common Room, WARS), but not very effective for LPPSLH, RUANGRUPA, and CRI. The latter three found it too difficult to answer these questions by themselves. Common Room, on the other hand dedicated a special discussion session to discuss the questions internally. The questions were however the same as those dealt with during the baseline and possibly high staff turnovers may also explain this “CS dimension shock”. Fieldwork was sometimes inefficient since the in-country team assumed that each step (workshop, interview, drafting model of change, selecting outcome, finding evidences) would neatly fall into sequence and could be packed tightly within 4 or 5 days with strong commitment from the SPO. This often did not happen.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Outcome domains</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>x</th>
<th>What are factors (strengths, weaknesses) that explain the current situation?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic engagement</td>
<td>Needs of marginalised groups</td>
<td>How does your organisation take the needs of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups into account in your planning, actions, activities, and/or strategies?</td>
<td>Are NOT taken into account</td>
<td>Are POORLY taken into account</td>
<td>Are PARTLY taken into account</td>
<td>Are FULLY taken into account</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement of target groups</td>
<td>What is the level of participation of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups in the analysis, planning and evaluation of your activities?</td>
<td>They are INFORMED about ongoing and/or new activities that you will implement</td>
<td>They are CONSULTED by your organisation. You define the problems and provide the solutions.</td>
<td>They CARRY OUT activities and/or form groups upon your request. They provide resources (time, land, labour) in return for your assistance (material and/or immaterial)</td>
<td>They ANALYSE PROBLEMS AND FORMULATE IDEAS together with your organisation and/or take action independently from you.</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political engagement</td>
<td>How intense is your (individual staff or organisational) participation in locally-nationally elected bodies and/or sectoral user groups?</td>
<td>No participation</td>
<td>You are occasionally CONSULTED by these bodies</td>
<td>You are a member of these bodies. You attend meetings as a participant</td>
<td>You are a member of these bodies. You are chairing these bodies or sub groups</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of organisation</td>
<td>Relations with other organisations</td>
<td>In the past 12 months what has been the most intensive interaction you had with other CSOs?</td>
<td>No interaction at all</td>
<td>Networking - Cooperation: Inform each other; roles somewhat defined; all decisions made independently</td>
<td>Coordination - Coalition: ideas and resources shared; roles defined and divided; all have a vote in decision making</td>
<td>Collaboration: organisations belong to one system; mutual trust; consensus on all decisions.</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimension</td>
<td>Outcome domains</td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Statements</td>
<td>What are factors (strengths, weaknesses) that explain the current situation?</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Frequency of dialogue with closest CSO</td>
<td>In the past 12 months how many meetings did you have with the CSO that you have most intensive interaction with?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No interaction at all</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Defending the interests of marginalised groups:</td>
<td>Which CSO are most effective in defending the interests of your target groups? In the past 12 months, how did you relate to those CSOs?</td>
<td>No interaction at all</td>
<td>Networking - Cooperation: Inform each other; roles somewhat defined; all decisions made independently</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Composition current financial resource base</td>
<td>How does your organisation finance institutional costs such as workshops of the General Assembly (if applicable); attendants to workshops of other CSOs; costs for organisational growth and/or networking?</td>
<td>Depends on 1 international donor</td>
<td>Depends on few financial sources: one fund cover(s) more than 75% of all costs.</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Practice of Values</td>
<td>To what extent can mandatory social organs (steering committee, general assembly, internal auditing group) ask your executive leaders to be accountable to them?</td>
<td>(financial) information is made available and decisions are taken openly</td>
<td>They fulfil their formal obligation to explain strategic decisions and actions</td>
<td>Social organs use their power to sanction management in case of misconduct or abuse</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Composition of social organs</td>
<td>What % of members of your mandatory social organs belong to the marginalised target groups you are working with/for?</td>
<td>Between 0-10 % of all members of the social organs</td>
<td>Between 11-30 % of all members of the social organs</td>
<td>More than 65% of all members of the social organs</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimension</td>
<td>Outcome domains</td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Statements</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>What are factors (strengths, weaknesses) that explain the current situation?</td>
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<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>External financial auditing</td>
<td>How regularly is your organisation audited externally?</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Occasionally, upon request of funders</td>
<td>Periodically and regularly, because our external funder asks for it</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Client satisfaction</td>
<td>What are the most important concerns of your target groups? How do your services take into account those important concerns?</td>
<td>Majority of target groups are NOT satisfied</td>
<td>Majority of target groups are POORLY satisfied</td>
<td>Majority of target groups are PARTLY satisfied</td>
<td>Majority of target groups are MOSTLY satisfied</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Civil society impact.</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what impact did you have on building a strong civil society?</td>
<td>You have not undertaken any activities of this kind but there is no discernible impact</td>
<td>You have undertaken activities of this kind</td>
<td>You have undertaken activities of this kind but impact is limited</td>
<td>You have undertaken activities and examples of significant success can be detected.</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Relation with public sector organisations.</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with public sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations’ objectives?</td>
<td>No direct interaction</td>
<td>You have been invited by public sector organisations for regular consultations (but public sector decides)</td>
<td>You have been invited by public sector organisations for sharing of information</td>
<td>Formal and regular meetings as a multi-stakeholder task force.</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Relation with private sector organisations.</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with private sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations’ perspective?</td>
<td>No direct interaction</td>
<td>You have been invited by private sector organisations for regular consultations (but public sector decides)</td>
<td>You have been invited by private sector organisations for sharing of information</td>
<td>Formal and regular meetings as a multi-stakeholder task force.</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations</td>
<td>How successful have you been in influencing public policies and practices in the past 2 years?</td>
<td>No activities developed in this area and examples of success can be detected.</td>
<td>Many activities developed in this area, but impact until so far has been limited</td>
<td>Some activities developed but without discernible impact</td>
<td>Many activities developed in this area and examples of success can be detected.</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimension</td>
<td>Outcome domains</td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Statements</td>
<td>What are factors (strengths, weaknesses) that explain the current situation?</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence upon private sector agencies’ policies, rules, regulations.</td>
<td>How successful have you been in influencing private sector policies and practices in the past 2 years?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No activities developed in this area</td>
<td>Many activities developed in this area and examples of success can be detected</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Some activities developed but without discernible impact</td>
<td>Many activities developed in this area, but impact until so far has been limited</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Many activities developed in this area, but impact until so far has been limited</td>
<td>Many activities developed in this area and examples of success can be detected</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Many activities developed in this area and examples of success can be detected</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental context</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No analysis of the space and role of civil society has been done.</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coping strategies</td>
<td>In the past 2 years, how did your organisation cope with these changes in the context that may have been positive or negative consequences for civil society.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>You are collecting information of the space and role of civil society but not regularly analysing it.</td>
<td>You are involved in joint action to make context more favourable. Examples are available.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>You are monitoring the space and role of civil society and analysing the consequences of changes in the context for your own activities. Examples are available.</td>
<td>You are involved in joint action to make context more favourable. Examples are available.</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 3  Civil Society Scores

This table presents the appreciation of the evaluation team regarding changes occurred for each indicator between 2012 and 2014 on a scale of -2 to +2

- 2 = Considerable deterioration
- 1 = A slight deterioration
0 = no change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012
+1 = slight improvement
+2 = considerable improvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic engagement</td>
<td>Needs of marginalised groups</td>
<td>How does your organisation take the needs of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups into account in your planning, actions, activities, and/or strategies?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic engagement</td>
<td>Involvement of target groups</td>
<td>What is the level of participation of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups in the analysis, planning and evaluation of your activities?</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic engagement</td>
<td>Political engagement</td>
<td>How intense is your (individual staff or organisational) participation in locally-nationally elected bodies and/or sectoral user groups?</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of organisation</td>
<td>Relations with other organisations</td>
<td>In the past 12 months what has been the most intensive interaction you had with other CSOs?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of organisation</td>
<td>Frequency of dialogue with closest CSO</td>
<td>In the past 12 months how many meetings did you have with the CSO that you have most intensive interaction with?</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of organisation</td>
<td>Defending the interests of marginalised groups</td>
<td>Which CSO are most effective in defending the interests of your target groups? In the past 12 months, how did you relate to those CSOs?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of organisation</td>
<td>Composition current financial resource base</td>
<td>How does your organisation finance institutional costs such as workshops of the General Assembly (if applicable); attendance to workshops of other CSOs; costs for organisational growth and/or networking?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practice of Values</td>
<td>Downward accountability</td>
<td>To what extent can mandatory social organs (steering committee, general assembly, internal auditing group) ask your executive leaders to be accountable to them?</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practice of Values</td>
<td>Composition of social organs</td>
<td>What % of members of your mandatory social organs belong to the marginalised target groups you are working with/for?</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of Impact</td>
<td>External financial auditing</td>
<td>How regularly is your organisation audited externally?</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of Impact</td>
<td>Client satisfaction</td>
<td>What are the most important concerns of your target groups? How do your services take into account those important concerns?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of Impact</td>
<td>Civil society impact.</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what impact did you have on building a strong civil society?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of Impact</td>
<td>Relation with public sector organisations</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with public sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' objectives?</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of Impact</td>
<td>Relation with private sector organisations</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with private sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' perspective?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations</td>
<td>How successful have you been in influencing public policies and practices in the past 2 years?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Influence upon private sector agencies' policies, rules, regulations.</td>
<td>How successful have you been in influencing private sector policies and practices in the past 2 years?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Coping strategies</td>
<td>In the past 2 years, how did your organisation cope with these changes in the context that may have been positive or negative consequences for civil society.</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 4  Changes in civil society indicators between 2012 and 2014

1  Civic Engagement

1.1  Needs of marginalised groups SPO

As during the baseline, RUANGRUPA continued to support young, idealistic artists with a space to explore and express themselves artistically, who otherwise may have lacked such opportunities in an environment that is normally dominated by commercialization and market-orientation. The artists that benefited from the space and support provided by RUANGRUPA worked on more contemporary urban issues and forms of expression that are generally less common in Indonesia. RUANGRUPA has reached audiences through regular festivals like Jakarta 32° C and OK.Video, but has also utilized the Internet to expand its reach.

![Figure 2](http://jakarta32c.org/home/festival/statistics/)

Figure 2  Statistics Jakarta 32° C: Audience participation, artist participants and artworks. Source: [http://jakarta32c.org/home/festival/statistics/](http://jakarta32c.org/home/festival/statistics/)

Via the Jakarta 32° C festival, RUANGRUPA engaged more young student audiences with an increase of 40 percent every two years since 2004. During the event in 2012, 103 artworks were displayed attracting an audience of some 4,000 people, and around 100 artists, or aspiring artists, attending workshops organised during the festival. Although audience figures went up from around 3,000 in 2010, there was a drop in the number of workshop participants and artworks displayed (120 participants and 128 artworks in 2010).

RUANGRUPA is regarded as an ‘avant garde organisation’ because it has introduced video art in Indonesia on a relatively significant scale in the form of regular festivals. Since 2004 the OK.Video festival has become a national and international barometer for contemporary video development. In

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2011, it drew 500 applicants of which 60 were selected for display (10 by international artists and 50 by Indonesian artists\(^87\)). In 2013, there were 303 applicants and 91 selected artworks (29 of them from open-submissions). What is significant is that since 2004, OK.Video has been able to attract more international artists from more countries: from 20 in 2011 to 51 in 2013\(^88\).

RUANGRUPA also continued to host the annual RRRec Fest. In 2010, it was estimated that 2,200 people participated, which grew to 2,500 in 2011. This event engaged non-mainstream bands/musicians in promoting visual contemporary art.

The Ruru gallery of RUANGRUPA also had an increased number of visitors from 1,100 in 2011 to 1,203 in 2012\(^89\). However, the number of participating artists in exhibitions decreased from 135 in 2011 to 40 in 2012. Another RUANGRUPA event hosted twice since the start of 2011 has been the writing workshop. 29 young people were trained on how to write about contemporary art issues.

With regards to the participation of women, RUANGRUPA claimed to have encouraged women’s participation by targeting a number of women artists or audiences in their projects. However, the evaluation team found that fewer women participated in 2012 compared to 2011, as seen in decreased women’s participation in exhibitions from 21 percent to 15 percent. RUANGRUPA did not consistently track sex disaggregated data, making it difficult to assess whether this decreased participation was a common characteristic in all RUANGRUPA-organised events or not.

Given the nature of contemporary visual and digital artwork\(^90\) and RUANGRUPA’s target group characteristics there has been an increased use of the internet as an important space for expression of contemporary visual art. It is plausible that this digital technology has widened the reach for contemporary visual artists beyond that of commercial galleries or festivals, including those produced by RUANGRUPA supported artists and groups. For example, @thepopoh\(^91\) now has 60,200 Twitter followers\(^92\) and had 420,226 website visitors.

As illustrated above by the regular RUANGRUPA-hosted events, there have been decreases in some areas with regards to participation. RUANGRUPA explained that this decrease stemmed from the emergence of similar artistic initiatives\(^93\) and by the SPO’s strategic change in orientation to move further into becoming a knowledge producer and developer rather than a mere initiator or pioneer of alternative art space or art activities, as put forth in their latest proposal\(^94\). Unfortunately, there is little information available to measure the extent of RUANGRUPA’s improvement with regards to its new orientation (see section 5.1).

### 1.2 Involvement of target groups SPO

Jakarta 32\(^{o}\) C and OK.Video festival were RUANGRUPA’s largest platforms in terms of audience and participation. Both have become separate divisions under RUANGRUPA, with independent planning and capacity to relate to other organisations. For example, OK.Video secured funding from the Japan Foundation support since 2011\(^95\). Jakarta 32\(^{o}\) C participated in the Darwin Festival in Australia in August 2014, and plans to organise student exchanges with Willem de Kooning Academie of Rotterdam for their next event in 2015\(^96\).

Both divisions consist of ad-hoc personnel selected from event alumni and committees. As such these divisions consist of RUANGRUPA’s target groups. Hence, target groups have become more involved in

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89 Hester Smid,”Input-Output Analysis RUANGRUPA”, MFS-II evaluation 2014
90 This is an example of a digital artwork: https://www.behance.net/aganharahap
91 Twitter, “Popo”. Available from https://twitter.com/thepopoh (accessed 18 December 2014)
93 Interview with Jakarta 32\(^{o}\)C, MFS-II evaluation 2014
94 “2013 Memo for AC”, RUANGRUPA, 2013.doc, p. 4
96 Interview with Jakarta 32\(^{o}\)C, MFS-II evaluation 2014
RUANGRUPA’s planning, implementation and decision-making processes, especially those relating to Jakarta 32° C and OK.Video events. However, RUANGRUPA’s target groups have not participated in RUANGRUPA’s organisational planning or evaluation exercises, but this is also because RUANGRUPA hardly conducts such strategic actions themselves.

1.3 Intensity of political engagement SPO

This indicator is less applicable to RUANGRUPA. The daily practices and organisational direction of the SPOs helps to set up the benchmarks in the art and cultural movement, not to engage politically. During the 2014 presidential election, most of RUANGRUPA staff and affiliates were clearly supporting one presidential candidate. They individually participated in creative campaigns through contemporary visual arts mediums. However, the organisation remained neutral and actually utilized the momentum to hold creative competitions amongst artists, engaging artists who supported both presidential candidates.

2 Level of Organisation

2.1. Relations with other organisations SPO

RUANGRUPA still closely works with CSOs with whom they share similar missions. As during the baseline, RUANGRUPA collaborates with the Jakarta Arts Council, the Indonesian Visual Arts Archive (Yogyakarta), MES56 (Yogyakarta), Jatiwangi Art Factory (East Java); and still shares target groups with traditional allies such as Forum Lenteng and Serrum.

However, RUANGRUPA has emerged to play a more important and leading role in its relations to other civil society organisations. Along with Kunci Cultural Studies, RUANGRUPA is Indonesia’s associate partner of the Arts Collaboratory. Through Arts Collaboratory, RUANGRUPA has garnered a domestic network that includes the likes of Lifepatch, Langgeng Art Foundation, Jatiwangi Art Factory, Serrum, Forum Lenteng, Gardu House, MES56, and ISAD.RUANGRUPA worked with Hivos, Casco, and Kunci Cultural Studies to host the first Arts Collaboratory assembly in May 201497, which involved Indonesian and international CSO partners of Arts Collaboratory.

RUANGRUPA is also involved in the Indonesian Coalition for the Arts. This is a coalition which was established in 2010 to strengthen the cultural infrastructure from the civil society side and to push for improved cultural policy by the government.

Internationally, RUANGRUPA’s network has been well developed through its own interventions as well as those with Arts Collaboratory support. From 2011 to 2014, RUANGRUPA has been working with more international organisations from Singapore, Korea, China, India, Germany, the Netherlands, Australia, UK, Australia, and Brazil (see Appendix 5 for details).

RRRec Fest has also expanded RUANGRUPA’s network into the Indonesian music scene, which often shares an audience with the alternative video scene. RUANGRUPA considers this form of collaboration to be mutually beneficial since development in music industry will increase demands for contemporary visual art products, and vice versa. In the last three years, the music festival has improved RUANGRUPA’s relations with actors from outside the contemporary visual art sphere.

2.2. Frequency of dialogue with closest civil society organisation SPO

RUANGRUPA has been working more frequently with its traditional partners namely Forum Lenteng and Serrum as they often share personnel and have a common ‘founding father’ so to speak: Hafiz, the leader of Forum Lenteng and also a board of RUANGRUPA helped found both organisations. Their intense relationship has resulted in the materialization of RURU Corps in 2011. RURU Corps is a visual

communication agency serving clients with contemporary visual art design services, expertise, event organising, or producing print and visual materials. RURU Corps acts as a business unit for RUANGRUPA, Forum Lenteng, and Serrum98. RURU Corps should be appreciated as RUANGRUPA’s initiative, and for the distribution of benefits generated to the strengthening of its partners.

RUANGRUPA’s network has improved in terms of quantity and scope, but apart from hosting the Arts Collaboratory Assembly in 2014 and the establishment of RURU Corps, the evaluation team did not find further evidence that the intensity of relations or the frequency of dialogue has improved since the baseline.

2.3. Defending the interests of marginalised groups SPO

Contemporary visual art was born as an elite branch of visual art, and had been kept exclusive by market and profit-oriented actors. As such, by nature contemporary visual art tended to engage very little with audiences. As with other genres of art, the appreciation of contemporary visual artwork has often been driven by the market, sometimes to an irrational degree and creating opportunities for falsified artworks99. Artists have not been completely free to express themselves as their livelihoods depend on being able to serve market tastes. Public space for appreciation or critique of artwork has been limited and was also dominated by market preferences resulting in little diversity. Non-market oriented artists and their audiences have had little space for expression. Unlike cultural centres such as Yogyakarta and Bali, the Jakarta art scene has not been conducive for contemporary artists.

Female artists have also been traditionally marginalised due to a lack of acknowledgement from mainstream art critiques. Historically female artists have focused on feminine expression. Contemporary visual art holds opportunities for the advancement of women artists since this genre is less patriarchal than other visual art genres.

RUANGRUPA’s mission has been to advance public services for artists marginalised by market factors since “public interest values in media are threatened by access and control issues, diminishing the potential for millions to become better informed and engaged in the critical matters shaping the future”100. RUANGRUPA is considered as an important actor in this regard101. Given RUANGRUPA’s mission, and based on the activities it has supported, its target groups can be defined as:

- Students or youth interested in exploring contemporary visual art as artists, curators, or writers;
- Interdisciplinary actors interested in urban issues, media, and public space issue;
- Visual art stakeholders benefitting from RUANGRUPA’s exploration, ideas, and knowledge production, and;
- Female contemporary visual artists.

With increased target group engagement (as discussed in 1.1) and improved level organisation with other CSOs (2.1 and 2.2), RUANGRUPA has been more successful in improving their target groups’ access and control in the development of contemporary visual arts in Indonesia. Their engagement is important to create a balance with market or other civil society actor domination of public spaces, to promote diversity and wider participation, and to ensure freedom of expression. Moreover, RUANGRUPA and Kunci were officially entrusted by the Arts Collaboratory to recommend grantees in Indonesia102. The latter highlights that RUANGRUPA is growing into a more important organisation in defending the interests of the contemporary visual arts community in Indonesia.

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In 2012, RUANGRUPA received USD 150,000 from the Ford Foundation for mobile cinema screenings in ten underserved communities of Jakarta as well as to develop a mobile application for low-income vendors in Southeast Jakarta's informal economy. This funding diversified RUANGRUPA’s financial composition of financial resources, with non-Hivos donor support growing from 41 percent in 2011 to 79 percent in 2012.

With regards to short-term projects, RUANGRUPA has been able to draw on ad-hoc support to fund their activities. For example, RUANGRUPA was supported by the Ministry of Creative Economy to attend the Brisbane Triennial Festival in 2013. Other sponsorships allowed the SPO to attend the Sao Paolo Biennale in 2014 and a host of international exhibitions. However, apart from Ford Foundation and Hivos (Arts Collaboratory), RUANGRUPA has not yet received long-term donor support from other sources.

RURU Corps has been operational as a business unit for RUANGRUPA, Forum Lenteng, and Serrum. However, they have not yet decided how to use the accumulated profit, whether divided or used for joint activities. From the website of RURU Corps website, it seems that the business unit has been able to attract private sector clients apart from working upon RUANGRUPA-commissioned works. In RUANGRUPA’s financial report for 2012, the budget line titled `other income’ totalled just USD 3,800, while a year prior they managed USD 33,000. RUANGRUPA’s director explained that the decrease represented the amount of income that had been redirected to RURU Corps. He also added that in 2013 RURU Corps generated more income that 2012.

3 Practice of Values

3.1. Downward accountability SPO

Since the baseline there has been no significant change in the SPO’s downward accountability. Although an internal control system is in place, including a supervisory structure, there are no reporting or evaluation mechanisms between the board and the management. The management team reported that they have conducted more meetings to evaluate their activities, as a consequence of more activities being conducted. But the SPO does not have dedicated monitoring or evaluation systems or personnel in place. The submission of reports to Hivos has also been late, as was the case with the submission of the 2013 progress report. The 2011 and 2012 reports were very similar in terms of content and were written along the lines of the organisation’s structure rather than the agreed upon activities and results.

RUANGRUPA’s decision to establish RURU Corps should be seen as an effort to improve organisational accountability, as by establishing a separate business unit with different income sources, RUANGRUPA intends to keep their identity as a civil society organisation. RUANGRUPA’s director reported that in the near future RURU Corps will merge with other income-generating units (RRRec Fest, Rurushop, and Ruru radio) so RUANGRUPA can focus on its CS role.

3.2 Composition of social organs SPO

There has been no change in the composition of social organs of the SPO since the baseline. The composition of the board and the executive remain the same. The board of trustees and supervisory board of RUANGRUPA still consists of a mix between artists and non-art professionals, including academia. This composition is still in line with the organisation’s strategy to bring together the creative and artistic domains with other public domains, although there are no artists on the board.

3.3. External financial auditing SPO

RUANGRUPA participated in a workshop organised by Hivos on transparency and accountability in 2011. RUANGRUPA itself recognized the need for a strategy to strengthen their financial systems and saw the workshop as an effort to improve their internal accountability\textsuperscript{105}. No audit reports were made available to the evaluation team, although there were two audit assessments conducted by Hivos in 2011 and 2012. The evaluation team concludes that RUANGRUPA has not conducted an external institutional audit, as such there is no change from the baseline.

4  Perception of Impact

4.1. Client satisfaction SPO

Jakarta 32° C appreciates RUANGRUPA’s role in engaging young students from at least 20 campuses or various study programmes to explore their interest in contemporary visual art. RUANGRUPA has provided space for free expression and appreciation, encouraged critical yet egalitarian art discourse, and promoted research-based collaborative-voluntary artwork development. The latter distinguishes RUANGRUPA’s approach from other existing on-campus festivals. As a division under RUANGRUPA, Jakarta 32° C has become a more independent organisation and has organised roadshows in two provincial capitals to promote and trigger development of similar initiatives outside Jakarta. Jakarta 32° C has been recognized internationally, having been invited to participate in international events such as the more recent Darwin Festival in Australia in August 2014. RUANGRUPA is also planning to arrange student exchanges with Willem de Kooning Academie of Rotterdam for its next event in 2015.

Jakarta 32° C has been replicated into similar events held by universities, to an extent where it has caused a decrease in the number of selected artworks in recent events (due to lesser overall submitted artwork quality)\textsuperscript{106}. Jakarta 32° C has coped with this by planning more workshops in upcoming events compared to artworks selection and presentations. In doing this, Jakarta 32° C is trying to shift from providing a venue or public space into becoming more of a knowledge provider, following along with RUANGRUPA’s general organisational strategy.

RUANGRUPA has no evidence that the emergence of similar initiatives (contemporary visual art festivals or gallery-hosted events) that have increased in frequency since 2008 can be attributed to their interventions; but at the same time they do not reject that this may be a possibility. RUANGRUPA considers the emergence of new initiatives and events in the contemporary arts scene as positive development in civil society. The decision to cope with these changes by shifting the organisational strategy to becoming a knowledge provider has been a conscious one that aims to maintain the quality of contemporary art works. As a consequence, it is understandable that not all clients are satisfied with this coping strategy as RUANGRUPA has started to receive criticism for being more distant and elitist. In this regard, RUANGRUPA and Jakarta 32° C share the same opinion that they would rather risk receiving such criticism in order to trigger the emergence of new benchmarks in contemporary arts and to keep pushing for creativity of expression.

4.2. Civil society impact SPO

Although there is no tangible evidence-based research, RUANGRUPA is regarded by Jakarta 32° C and the Arts Collaboratory to be an organisation that inspires younger artists who then form their own communities in various cities or online platforms. RUANGRUPA’s position as an Arts Collaboratory associate partner has helped bring international exposure to RUANGRUPA partners (as mentioned in 2.1) to support their sustainability as well as artistic development. RUANGRUPA has become a benchmark for a collaborative and contextual contemporary visual arts development. RUANGRUPA and its partners shared values of ‘collaboration’ and ‘being contextual’ is even seen as a unique approach

\textsuperscript{105} "RUANGRUPA Annual Report 2011", RUANGRUPA, 2011

\textsuperscript{106} Interview with Jakarta 32°C, MFS-II evaluation 2014, see also: http://jakarta32c.org/home/festival/statistics/
missing in other countries\textsuperscript{107}. Unlike other participants of the 2014 Sao Paolo Biennale, RUANGRUPA was invited specifically to present its approach rather than its artwork\textsuperscript{108}.

RUANGRUPA can be considered successful in promoting inclusive contemporary visual art, freedom of expression, an egalitarian cooperation culture, and contextualization through their engagement with young students. These values are expected to be adopted by this younger generation for future, wider application. Although RUANGRUPA does not focus on improving young artists’ livelihoods directly through marketing, some Jakarta 32\textsuperscript{o} C alumni have actually earned their living through selling contemporary visual artworks which are not likely to be marketable through galleries\textsuperscript{109}, resembling a phenomenon known as “artist merchandising”. This is a phenomenon is possible since contemporary visual arts have become part of a contemporary subculture among youngsters in Jakarta, who in combination with other contemporary art forms, have created their own idols and market.

As RUANGRUPA promoted the creation of non-gallery artwork such as videos, their supported contemporary visual artists have utilized the internet as an alternative art space. As a result, their artwork has more potential to be accessed by a wider audience. The internet offers a space to engage a wider public with unlimited time, something market-oriented galleries cannot offer. There is also a higher demand from internet users for visual material. Thus contemporary visual art and the internet are mutually supporting. There are also examples of how internet users have used contemporary visual arts to advance various interests like political aspirations (as can be seen from this example\textsuperscript{110}).

RUANGRUPA and its partners have improved its online presence\textsuperscript{111}, developing websites for each of its events that targeted between 50,000 and 60,000 visitors. In 2011, RUANGRUPA’s main website was visited by 26,780 unique visitors and their subdomains visited by 80,991 unique visitors. In 2012, visitors to the subdomains reached 82,425 people and 19,677 unique visitors to the main website, with another 16,071 to the updates page. In 2012, RUANGRUPA also began radio streaming through the Ruru shop radio. Online radio content covers topics from a contemporary arts point of view. RUANGRUPA has tried to improved civic engagement and level of organisation through the internet.

RUANGRUPA intends to engage the wider society, especially urban Jakarta, not by "coming up with solutions and providing answers", but by "eliciting questions regarding societal issues and creating experiences that start people thinking"\textsuperscript{112}. However, RUANGRUPA has not monitored or paid special attention to measure this particular intended impact. Although art is a medium for communicating values and ideas, the nature of contemporary visual art itself allows for multiple interpretations. Hence, it is hard to measure whether RUANGRUPA’s impact on civil society has reached beyond those related to or interested in contemporary visual art, or that it has contributed to other CS movements. In the baseline, the evaluation team noted that RUANGRUPA had helped KontraS, a vocal lobby CSO, in designing attractive and artistic campaign materials targeting youth audience. RUANGRUPA had also supported Sanggar Akar in designing attractive teaching material for homeless children. However, we did not find other or additional results during the end line evaluation.

4.3. Relation with public sector organisations SPO

RUANGRUPA does not have an advocacy or lobby strategy and conducts very few activities that directly affect policy-makers except through the involvement of RUANGRUPA’s director in the


\textsuperscript{108} Kharisma Prasetyo, “Evaluation Workshop RUANGRUPA”, MFS-\textsuperscript{II} evaluation 2014


Indonesian Arts Coalition (Koalisi Seni Indonesia), which aims to foster government support for the creative art industry through, for example, tax incentives for art-supporting corporations. As a prominent collaborative artwork production platform, RUANGRUPA has been recognized by the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Industry as indicated in their sponsorship of RUANGRUPA’s attendance to the 2013 Brisbane Triennial and the commissioning of four individual contemporary visual artists. However this support actually came as a surprise to RUANGRUPA since they do not consider themselves close to the ministry, nor did they engage in any specific efforts to establish collaborative relations with them. In 2013, RUANGRUPA participated in an exhibition on archives and documentation of contemporary art held by The Ministry of Culture and Education, which RUANGRUPA also considers an acknowledgment from the government.

Other than this, there have been some collaborative efforts with the public sector since the baseline, but these focused mostly on the events hosted by RUANGRUPA. For example, RUANGRUPA worked with Jakarta’s Office for Tourism and Culture and the Ministry of Education and Culture to launch a book on the Jakarta 32° C festival in 2012. RUANGRUPA also participated in government-hosted events to showcase the work of young artists submitted to the OK.Video festival in 2012.

4.4. Relation with private sector agencies SPO

With the establishment of RURU Corps and Rurushop, RUANGRUPA has made a clear distinction in its position as being a non-market actor. RURU Corps and Rurushop have their own management and the income streams have been separated. While these business entities have become separate units, the relations that RUANGRUPA has with the private sector have increased since the baseline through RURU Corps.

RUANGRUPA engaged with a few small-scale local businesses in Jakarta through the festivals that it hosted. In 2011 the RRRec Fest was held in a location with many small businesses. A small bread shop and a local café became the locations for staging performances and screenings. RRRec Fest also collaborated with indie labels and production companies such as Demajors, Organic records and G Production. Similarly, RUANGRUPA collaborated with a number of private sector actors in the Jakarta 32° C festival of 2012, working with a printing company, local clothing brands, a beverage company and a bakery that helped sponsor the event.

RUANGRUPA also worked with private and public media (both print and online) to widen the coverage of its events. Media sponsors collaborated in the OK.Video helping to promote the festival and improve its effectiveness.

The contemporary visual art community’s own artwork market is beyond the domain of private sector agencies (artist merchandise), but not for Rurushop who target this niche. Outside this domain, private sector agencies, especially for advertising, are beginning to recognize the appeal of contemporary art to promote their product. Some examples include Kedai Seni Djakarte, a café with contemporary visual-artistic touch which often holds artist discussions or artwork presentations (including from RUANGRUPA and Jakarta 32° C); or Pasar Santa, a recently flourishing food court for ‘hipster’. RURU Corps aims to benefit from private sector interest, and has worked for several brands such as Mizone, Otobursa, Google Chrome to promote their products. Collaboration with Google Chrome utilized the Open Spaces application to promote the brand as well as mural art that was supported by RUANGRUPA.

114 Kharisma Prasetyo, "Evaluation Workshop RUANGRUPA", MFS-II evaluation 2014
115 Twitter, "Kedai Seni Djakarte". Available from https://twitter.com/KedaiSeniJKT (accessed 18 December 2014)
116 Twitter, "#jajandipasar". Available from https://twitter.com/hashtag/jajandipasar (accessed 18 December 2014)
4.5. Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations SPO

RUANGRUPA’s involvement in the Indonesian Arts Coalition has not had an impact on the public sector. Apart from supporting RUANGRUPA’s participation in the 2013 Brisbane Triennial, there has been no direct effort to strengthen the cultural infrastructure or policies of the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Industry or special attention to contemporary visual art.

In 2013, RUANGRUPA’s Jurnal Karbon (a RUANGRUPA-produced journal) worked with the Center for Law and Policy to organise a training on people’s rights in the midst of the domination of commercialization of Jakarta’s public spaces. This was funded by Tifa Foundation and resulted in the publication of a book. It is unlikely that this publication had much influence.

4.6. Influence upon private sector agencies’ policies, rules, regulations SPO

This indicator is less applicable to RUANGRUPA since the organisation aims to support non-mainstream art forms and artists. There has been a growing trend in Jakarta for alternative public spaces that combine creativity with small businesses. It could be argued that RUANGRUPA is part of this trend or has influenced the trend, but there is insufficient evidence to draw this conclusion.

5 Civil Society context

5.1. Coping strategies

The internet has been a very strategic medium to spread visual and video-based artwork. There is also a high demand and interest for visual contemporary art. As the Director of the Visual Arts Network in South Africa, Joseph Grayland, pointed out, the proliferation of internet access and web-based technologies have provided the fuel for RUANGRUPA projects that is predicated on dynamic networks and the smart use of technology.\(^{118}\) As such, RUANGRUPA has utilized their website to showcase their target groups’ artwork, to disseminate archived knowledge and publications, to promote their events, and to attract youth participation with its contemporary design and issues covered. RUANGRUPA has an online radio and several subdomain websites:

- ruangrupa.org
- okvideofestival.org
- jakarta32c.org
- artlab.ruangrupa.org
- decompression.ruangrupa.org
- rrrec.ruangrupa.org
- rurushop.ruangrupa.org
- rururadio.org
- bung.ruangrupa.org
- www.jarakpandang.net
- www.karbonjournal.org
- rurucorps.com

From the attractive website designs and the expansion of subdomains, it is clear that RUANGRUPA is very aware of the importance of having an online presence and have put much effort into using the internet for their advantage.

RUANGRUPA is aware of the challenges in maintaining a balance between serving civil society and the visual arts community. RUANGRUPA considers it important to keep groups a part of RUANGRUPA’s organisational value and identity, and thus have tried to keep the development of artworks grounded to the surrounding context. For example, the OK.Video festival in 2011 attempted to bridge the gap

between video art development and its relevance with the social-political environment by inviting two resource persons from international film festivals representing each mainstream (Germany Obbenhauser Short Film Festival and Toronto Film Festival) to a workshop. Other themes covered by RUANGRUPA which have relevance beyond contemporary art included urban issues, local identity, the public role of art, post-colonialism, creative industry and work opportunities, and technology.

RUANGRUPA has been aware of the importance of sustainability or contemporary arts organisations. RURU Corps is RUANGRUPA’s response to the commercialization of visual arts and the need to develop a network amongst arts groups that have the capability of being more financial independent. Similarly, Rurushop and Rururadio are initiatives that seek to benefit from the phenomenon of “artist merchandising” in such a way as to derive financial benefits for RUANGRUPA and the artists it supports without concede creativity or art space.

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Appendix 5  List of RUANGRUPA Showcases from 2009-2014

2009
- OK.Video – 4th Jakarta International Video Festival, (Jakarta, Indonesia).

2010 - 2011
- Exhibition, Singapore Night Festival, Singapore Art Museum, (Singapore).
- A RUANGRUPA collaborative traveling exhibition series: Hanya Memberi Tak Harap Kembali, held in three cities: Bandung (Soemardja Gallery), Yogyakarta (Kedai Kebun Forum) & Jakarta (National Gallery of Indonesia).
- RUANGRUPA 10th Anniversary, DECOMPRESSION#10 – Expanding The Space and Public, exhibitions, public art projects, workshops, film screening, seminars, bazaar, music festival and launch of RUANGRUPA publications, (Jakarta, Bandung & Yogyakarta, Indonesia).
- Art project, 4th Jakarta 32°C, exhibition, workshop, public art project and discussion program for Jakarta students, (Jakarta, Indonesia).

2011
- Exhibition, “The Singapore Fiction”, OPEN HOUSE - Singapore Biennale, National Museum of Singapore (Singapore)
- Exhibition, “Mini OK.Video Festival”, LAUNCHING MARKER - Art Dubai (Dubai)
- Exhibition, DYSFASHIONAL, National Gallery of Indonesia (Jakarta, Indonesia)
- OK.Video – 5th Jakarta International Video Festival (Jakarta, Indonesia)
- International Conferences, AAF Global Network Project, “Pioneer the Future with the Power of Culture – Spirit of Tohoku, Voices Of Asia”, Asahi Art Festival (Hachinohe - Tokyo, Japan)
- Exhibition, BEASTLY, Cemeti Art House (Yogyakarta, Indonesia)
- Symposium, Asian Arts Mobility, Asian Arts Space Network Meeting, Kunsthalle Gwangju, (Korea)
- Exhibition, City Net Asia 2011, Seoul Museum of Art (SeMA)
- Exhibition, Institution for The Future, Asia Triennial Manchester, Chinese Arts Centre (Manchester, England)
- Exhibition, BEASTLY, Salihara Gallery (Jakarta, Indonesia)

2012
- Exhibition, RURU ZIP: Quote Edition, Reclaim doc, National Gallery of Indonesia (Jakarta, Indonesia)
- Exhibition, THE KUDA: The Untold Story of Indonesian Underground Music in the 70s, 2012, Commissioned for The 7th Asia Pacific Triennial of Contemporary Art, Queensland Art Gallery | Gallery of Modern Art, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia
- Exhibition, RUANGRUPA Small Archive, URBAN GALLERY, Busan Biennale, Seoul, South Korea
- Exhibition, The Sweet and Story of Sugar, Project Collaboration between RUANGRUPA and Noorderlicht – The Netherlands, Kuntskring Gallery, Jakarta, Indonesia

2013
- Award, Best 10, Visible Award, Cittadellarte – Pistoletto Foundation and Fondazione Zegna, Van Abbe museum, Eindhoven
- Exhibition, Embrio: Pameran Arsipdan Dokumentasi Seni Rupa Indonesia, Ministry of Education and Culture, GaleriNasional Indonesia, Jakarta
- Forum, Turning Target: Forum Manajemen Organisasi Seni Rupa, Cemeti Art House, Yogyakarta
2014

- Exhibition, *Arts Collaboratory Showcase*, RURU Gallery, Jakarta
  (Organised by Open Contemporary Art Center (OCAC) and the Thai artist duo Jiandyin (Pornpilai Meemalai and Jiradej Meemalai)
- Workshop, *Making Change Project*, Making Change Production Sprint, Bangalore, India (In cooperation with the Centre for Internet and Society and the Tactical Technology Collective in Bangalore, HIVOS in the Netherlands and the Centre for Digital Cultures at the University of Lüneburg in Germany)
- Public art project, *Temporary Territory*, 2014, at Darwin Festival, Australia
- Exhibition, Art Project, *ruru*, 2014, Commissioned work for The 31st Biennale de Sao Paulo, Fundacao Biennale de Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo, Brazil
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