KKI-WARSI end line report

MFS II country evaluations, Civil Society component

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This report describes the findings of the end line assessment of the Indonesian Organisation KKI-WARSI that is a partner of IUCN-NL.

The evaluation was commissioned by NWO-WOTRO, the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research in the Netherlands and is part of the programmatic evaluation of the Co-Financing System - MFS II financed by the Dutch Government, whose overall aim is to strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. Apart from assessing impact on MDGs, the evaluation also assesses the contribution of the Dutch Co-Funding Agencies to strengthen the capacities of their Southern Partners, as well as the contribution of these partners towards building a vibrant civil society arena.

This report assesses KKI-WARSI’s efforts towards strengthening Civil Society in Indonesia and it used the CIVICUS analytical framework. It is a follow-up of a baseline study conducted in 2012. Key questions that are being answered comprise changes in the five CIVICUS dimensions to which KKI-WARSI contributed; the nature of its contribution; the relevance of the contribution made and an identification of factors that explain the organisation’s role in civil society strengthening.

Keywords: Civil Society, CIVICUS, theory based evaluation, process-tracing
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Acknowledgements

SurveyMETER and CDI are thanking the staff and the leaders of all Southern Partner Organisations that participated in collecting information for the evaluation of the contribution of these partner organisations to creating a vibrant civil society in Indonesia. They also thank the Co-Funding Agencies and the Dutch Consortia they are a member of for making background documents available. We hope that this evaluation can support you in better positioning yourself in the Civil Society Arena of Indonesia.
**List of abbreviations and acronyms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMAN</td>
<td>Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (Indigenous Peoples’ Alliance of the Archipelago)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMPAL</td>
<td>Aliansi Masyarakat Peduli Hutan dan Lahan (Alliance of Concerned Citizens of Forest and Land)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASB</td>
<td>Established as ‘Alternatives to Slash-and-Burn’, but now known as Partnership of the Tropical Forest Margins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bappeda</td>
<td>Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah (Provincial or District Development Planning Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bapedalda</td>
<td>Badan Pengendalian Dampak Lingkungan Daerah (Environmental Impact Management Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCI</td>
<td>Basic Capabilities Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPDAS</td>
<td>Balai Pengelolaan Daerah Aliran Sungai (Provincial-level Watershed Management Bureau)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS</td>
<td>Badan Pusat Statistik (Central Agency on Statistics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFO</td>
<td>Co-Financing Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBFM</td>
<td>Community-based forest management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDI</td>
<td>Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>Co-Financing Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>Ecosystem Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOI</td>
<td>Government of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hutan Desa</td>
<td>Village Forest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRAF</td>
<td>International Centre for Research in Agroforestry, now known as World Agroforestry Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUCN</td>
<td>International Union for Conservation of Nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEHATI</td>
<td>Yayasan Keanekaragaman Hayati Indonesia (Indonesian Biodiversity Foundation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KKI-WARSI</td>
<td>Komunitas Konservasi Indonesia WARSI (Indonesian Conservation Community WARSI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LBH</td>
<td>Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (Legal Aid Foundation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFS</td>
<td>Dutch co-financing system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoC</td>
<td>Model of Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoF</td>
<td>Ministry of Forestry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagari</td>
<td>Traditional village units in West Sumatra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTFP</td>
<td>Non-timber forest product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTFP-EP</td>
<td>Non-Timber Forest Products Exchange Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ormas</td>
<td>Organisasi masyarakat (Societal Organizations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKBI</td>
<td>Perkumpulan Keluarga Berencana Indonesia (Indonesian Family Planning Association)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pt. PPMA</td>
<td>Perkumpulan terbatas untuk Pengkajian dan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Adat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(Limited Association for the Assessment and Empowerment of Indigenous Peoples)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PNPM</td>
<td>Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (National Program for Community Empowerment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Peraturan Pemerintah (Government Regulation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPO</td>
<td>Penatuan Petani. Organik (Organic Farmers Association)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REDD+</td>
<td>Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSPB</td>
<td>Royal Society for the Protection of Birds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERF</td>
<td>Social Economic Rights Fulfilment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLIMs</td>
<td>Sustainable Livelihood Initiatives and Models</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPO</td>
<td>Southern Partner Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRAP</td>
<td>REDD+ Provincial Strategy and Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSI</td>
<td>Semi-structured Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSS-Pundi Sumatera</td>
<td>Sumatra Sustainable Support --Pundi Sumatera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ToC</td>
<td>Theory of Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wageningen UR</td>
<td>Wageningen University &amp; Research Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WALHI</td>
<td>Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (Friends of the Earth Indonesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YKWS</td>
<td>Yayasan Konservasi Way Seputih (Way Seputih Conservation Foundation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>YMI</td>
<td>Yayasan Mitra Insani</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
1. Introduction

This report presents the civil society end line findings of KKI-WARSI in Indonesia, which is a partner of IUCN under the Dutch Consortium Ecosystem Alliance. It is a follow-up to the baseline assessment that was carried out in 2012. According to the information provided during the baseline study, WARSI is working under the theme MDG7ab.

These findings are part of the overall evaluation of the joint MFS II evaluations to account for results of MFS II-funded or co-funded development interventions implemented by Dutch Co-Funding Agencies (CFA) and/or their Southern Partner Organisations (SPO) and to contribute to the improvement of future development interventions. The civil society evaluation uses the CIVICUS framework and seeks to answer the following questions:

- What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?
- To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
- What is the relevance of these changes?
- What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The CIVICUS framework that comprises five dimensions (civic engagement, level of organization, practice of values, perception of impact and contexts influencing agency by civil society in general) has been used to orient the evaluation methodology.

Changes in the civil society arena of the SPO

In the 2012 – 2014 period the two dimensions that saw the most considerable changes are ‘level or organisation’ and ‘perception of impact’.

Generally speaking, WARSI’s level of organisation has improved since the baseline: The SPO has expanded its network of NGOs working at community level, as well as with NGOs that engage in lobby and advocacy. Through the Village Forest scheme, it has been able to defend the interests of increasingly more forest people. At the same time, WARSI has considerably expanded its resource base, becoming a well settled NGO.

With regards to perception of impact, an increasing number of villages have obtained their village forests which are being management by community based forest management (CBFM) groups in an effort to prevent the invasion of these forests by mining companies and the agribusiness sector. Although the participatory resource mapping, defining village boundaries and forming CBFM groups improve the capacities of forest people to defend their interests, the impact of these forests on their livelihoods is yet very limited. Meanwhile the CBFM groups have taken the initiative to organise themselves in an umbrella organisation which is still in its embryonic phase. Other NGOs have started to replicate WARSI’s success with the CBFM groups in other districts.

With regards to public sector collaboration and policy influencing, WARSI employs a two pronged approach. In the first place it works with existing policies (Government Regulation No.6/2007 and No 3/2008) that established a legal basis for CBFM. In the second place it tries to influence existing policies and practices: 1) together with other EA grantees, which has just recently yielded successful result and 2) by providing technical inputs to district governments (Jambi) and the provincial government (West Sumatra) to set up task forces in support of the creation of CBFM groups and village forests and by mainstreaming the village forest scheme policies into new rules and regulations.

The findings show that WARSI target groups have been more organised and are more capable of defending the interests of marginalised groups. With regards to impact upon the public sector, the findings also confirm that WARSI has influenced the government of West Sumatra Province to
mainstream community-based forest management (CBFM) schemes into their forestry policy and practices.

These findings were obtained through an analysis of documents, a workshop and follow-up interviews with WARSI, and interviews with external resources persons working in civil society organisations that receive support from WARSI; other civil society organisations with whom the SPO is collaborating; public or private sector agents and; external resource persons capable of overlooking the MDG or theme on which the SPO is concentrating.

Contribution analysis
Based upon an analysis of the projects and programmes financed by the Dutch CFAs a selection was made of SPOs to be included in an in-depth process tracing trajectory and those to be included for a quick contribution of the other SPOs. WARSI was amongst those SPOs selected for in-depth process-tracing.

The first outcome that we looked at is "community-based forest management (CBFM) groups in 9 villages have received full endorsement". Such endorsement is important for communities to be able to utilize village-forest areas to improve and sustain their livelihood via community logging, agroforestry, and ecotourism. While sustainable livelihoods for forest-edge dwellers are believed to be a solution for deforestation, the endorsement also defends the community (and the forest) from long-term issues such as tenure conflicts. The pathway most likely to explain this outcome is improved political will of the government along with WARSI’s efforts to support the communities through intensive accompaniment. The contribution of the SPO toward achieving this outcome is in building the capacity of community organisations, and supporting them to navigate their proposals for community forest schemes through complicated bureaucratic terrain.

The second outcome that we looked at is "community-based forest management (CBFM) is mainstreamed into West Sumatra Province’s forestry policy". This outcome is very important to be validated since by mainstreaming CBFM, the government offers opportunities for CBFM scheme application on a massive scale. As can be inferred from the first outcome, scaled-up CBFM scheme implementation implies that more communities will be engaged to protect, as well as to benefit from, the forest. This outcome has been achieved as a result of WARSI’s lobby and advocacy, which were supported by MFS-II and REDD+.

Relevance
Interviews with staff of WARSI, with external resource persons, with the liaison officer of IUCN, as well as contextual information helped to assess the relevance of WARSI’s interventions in terms of; its Theory of Change (ToC) for Civil Society (SC) as designed during the baseline study; the context in which WARSI is operating; the CS policies of IUCN.

With regards to the baseline ToC, the interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant because their combined benefit is conserved forest and welfare for communities, which is the ToC’s ultimate goal. Some of WARSI’s ToC preconditions such as campaign on community-based forest management, increased value of non-timber forest products (NTFP) and ecosystem-based economy, and major assumption such as political will from the Ministry of Forestry and political momentum are well reflected from the outcome’s contribution analysis.

With regards to the context in which WARSI is operating, its interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant because WARSI has developed its interventions on the opportunities that present itself in the existing policy environment, political will and international pressure and support.

With regards to the CS policies of IUCN, WARSI’s collaboration with the other EA grantees is relevant as a strategy to lobby the government to simplify the procedures for the implementation of the village forest scheme. In addition to the joint advocacy success, WARSI’s own project is relevant because it is in line with the EA’s objective to halt the expansion of extractive industries and agribusinesses, but limited evidence was found confirming that CBFM increases livelihood assets and that households use sustainable land and resource practices to protect the Hutan Desa they manage.
Explaining factors

The information related to factors that explain the above findings was collected at the same time as the data were gathered for the previous questions. The evaluation team looked at internal factors within WARSI, the external context in which it operates and the relations between WARSI and IUCN.

WARSI has demonstrated that it is a mature organisation which is capable to achieve development outcomes due to its technical, managerial, administrative and financial capacities. One smaller issue that requires further attention is to prevent reporting one same result to different donors.

The external context in which WARSI operates, in particular the state’s acknowledgement of forest communities’ rights and the existing regulation to ensure CBFM is conducive. WARSI has used this context to bring further the agenda at all administrative levels.

The relations between IUCN-NL and WARSI are healthy and WARSI has been encouraged to partner with other Ecosystem grantees to lobby for land tenure rights. These efforts started in 2013 and have been successful in simplifying procedures at district and provincial level, as well as simplifying CBFM work plan formats, and ensuring community facilitation.

The following chapter briefly describes the political context, the civil society context and the relevant background with regards to the governance issues WARSI is working on. Chapter 3 provides background information on WARSI, the relation of its MFS II interventions with the CIVICUS framework and specific information on the contract with IUCN. An evaluation methodology has been developed for the evaluation of the Civil Society component which can be found in Appendix 2; however, deviations from this methodology, the choices made with regards to the selection of the outcomes for contribution analysis, as well as difficulties encountered during data collection are to be found in Chapter 4. The answers to each of the evaluation questions are being presented in Chapter 5, followed by a discussion on the general project design in relation to CS development; an assessment of what elements of the project design may possibly work in other contexts or be implemented by other organisations in Chapter 6. Conclusions are presented in Chapter 7.
2. Context

2.1 Political context

2.1.1 Brief historical perspective

Indonesia’s rise to being the world’s third largest democratic nation has been lauded by many world leaders. The country is often considered to be a model Muslim democracy. As the fourth most populous nation with an estimated 250 million people\(^1\), Indonesia has sustained its democratic commitment since transitioning from an authoritarian leadership to a democracy in 1998. The decentralized administration now consists of 34 provinces and 508 districts and municipalities.

Prior to 1998, Indonesia was under strict authoritarian regime. Suharto, known for his so-called New Order (1966-1998) regime, ushered in radical transformations that would place social and political forces under direct state supervision. The defining characteristics of the Suharto era were a focus on economic growth and controlled consensus and political stability devoid of dissent. A series of tumultuous economic and political transitions in the nineties severely diminished the credibility of ageing President Suharto, who was forced to resign amidst mass street protests.


Table 1
**Characteristics that have defined the emergence of civil society in Indonesia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political system</strong></td>
<td>Centralized, authoritarian characterized by unipolarity. Golkar as the dominant political party.</td>
<td>Decentralized, democratic. Fragmentation of power and atomization of patronage relationships. Emergence of numerous political parties. Direct presidential elections since 1999.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In 1999, there were 27 provinces, 306 districts and around 60,000 villages.</td>
<td>Decentralization altered the political and administrative landscape: 34 provinces, 410 districts, 98 municipalities, 6,944 sub-districts and 81,253.(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State-citizen interaction</strong></td>
<td>Benevolent leader, obedient population. Down to the village level, the state permeated society.</td>
<td>Modern political culture marked by diminishing hierarchy between the state and citizens, allowing for citizens to interact more freely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizen representation and voice</strong></td>
<td>Strict control of speech, expression and association.</td>
<td>Burgeoning of CSOs, pressure groups and NGOs following the political euphoria after Suharto’s fall.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^1\) In 2010 the population was estimated to be around 237 million people (BPS 2010 Population Census). The current figure is an estimate from BKKBN and similar figures are cited in the CIA’s World Fact Book and the World Bank.

CSOs and their networks largely “hiding behind the screen”, and operating under state surveillance. A period of growth occurred in 1995-98, as resistance was building. Indonesian CSOs began to establish new networks internationally. Up until the early 2000s the focus was on state-centrist issues. Later, issues that CSOs were tackling became more diverse, ranging from pluralism, poverty reduction to fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media</th>
<th>No free press, censorship and state-control. Suharto had firm grasp over how to use print &amp; broadcast medias to promote political ideologies.</th>
<th>More vibrant media environment, flourishing of media businesses albeit in control of 12 main conglomerates that are mostly profit-driven and often have political ties.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Limited public and CS use and access to internet until mid-90s.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Growing realization of the importance of media/free press as the fourth pillar of democracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artistic forms of expression</td>
<td>Art and literary censorship conducted by the state. Art forms were a means to reinforce political order.</td>
<td>Greater freedom of the arts and cultural sectors. Organizations able to hold art events more freely. Freedom of expression a catchphrase amongst individuals and artistic groups, but challenged by more conservative members of society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious expression and organization</td>
<td>Regime repressed religious groups, especially radical forms.</td>
<td>Emergence of religious groups seeking to restore Islamic values and defend Muslim values.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With political reforms came greater freedom and space for civic engagement. In the Reformasi period, there was a remarkable increase in the number of civil society organizations, many of which were Islamic in character. In 2000, the Central Agency on Statistics (BPS) recorded around 70,000 registered organizations, compared to just 10,000 in 1996. New groups sprang up with donors encouraging activists to establish NGOs they could fund. These organizations were eager to distance themselves from state and often took an anti-government stance. Proliferating CSOs and NGOs have taken advantage of decentralization and greater regional autonomy to engage in public affairs. Civil society and government relations have improved, although both sides remain sceptical of the others’ intentions.

2.1.2 Recent trends in the political context

Indonesia is considered to be a story of democratic success, but it still struggles to realize the benefits of sustained and equitable economic growth. In the political context, the main challenges lie in governing such geographically vast and decentralized country, applying principles of good governance and the enormous task of reforming the country’s bureaucracy.

Although, Indonesia’s ‘big bang’ decentralization initiated at the turn of the century narrowed the gap between local government and citizens, it has also localized political power struggles. While the devolution of authorities relieved tensions between the central government and the regions, it has also created opportunities for corrupt and rent-seeking practices, at the local level. As indicated by Transparency International’s corruption index scores, perceived corruption in Indonesia remains high.

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Table 2

Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer survey: Indonesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Corruption perceptions Index Score (0 perceived as highly corrupt and 100 perceived as clean)</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100/182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>118/174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>114/177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Transparency International

In 2013, decentralization was taken a step further with the approval of the Village Law, intended to address weak governance arrangements and empower rural communities to participate politically. The new law could also lead to village elites distorting power relations and misusing government funding if not properly monitored.

Indonesia is still transitioning politically and many challenges lie ahead. According to the 2012 Indonesia Governance Index’s Executive Report, “Indonesia is witnessing a paradox in its democracy. On one hand, a successful opening-up of civil liberty has led to the avalanche of democratic demands across the nation, however on the other hand, democratic institutions are inadequately respond to those demands.” Nonetheless, the Indonesian Governance Index, which focuses on measuring provincial governance, does show a general improvement in the performance of the government (political office) bureaucracy, civil society and economic society based on principles of participation, transparency, fairness, accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness between 2008 and 2012. Civil society scores improved the most significantly, while scores for bureaucracy rose slightly.

Table 3

Indonesia Governance Index: Average provincial scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arena</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>5.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucracy</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>5.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>6.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Society</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>5.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.kemitraan.or.id/igi

In the past decade, Indonesians have generally enjoyed a freedom to participate in the political process through a direct-election mechanism. However, in September 2014 lawmakers voted in favour of a bill reviving indirect elections of regional heads. The controversial vote provoked public outcry which saw peaceful protests and the public voicing their discontent through social media. In early October, just before the end of his term, president Yudhoyono issued a regulation in lieu of the law, effectively repealing the law until further judicial review.

The recent 2014 elections which marked the end of Yudhoyono’s 10-year term, demonstrated that Indonesian voters are increasingly voting for popular figures irrespective of political party alliances. While practices of corruption, vote-buying and poor voter administration remained in the recent election, the public seems to have matured politically, indicated by the enormous interest in televised debates between the leading candidates. The appeal of the newly sworn in President Jokowi, popularly known as Jokowi, has come from his hands-on, man-of-the-people approach. As Jokowi begins his five-year term he will need to start addressing a myriad of challenges that include corruption, stagnant economic growth, and human rights concerns, particularly with respect to the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and religious intolerance. If left unaddressed, these challenges could seriously undermine Indonesia’s stability and democratic reforms.

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2.2 Civil Society context

This section describes the civil society context in Indonesia that is not SPO specific but in line with the information criteria used by CIVICUS.⁵

2.2.1 Socio-political context

Today, there are tens of thousands of civil organisations in the country⁶, comprising of religious organisations, unions, mass-based membership organisations, ethnic groups, professional associations, politically affiliated organisations, NGOs, and other community organisations.⁷ CSOs in Indonesia work on a wide range of themes. Thematic areas recently prominent include democratization and human rights; issue-based campaigns; protecting economic, social and cultural rights; promoting community access to basic services; environmental and natural resources management, and; climate change and disaster risk reduction. In 2012, the Ministry of Home Affairs documented more than 65,000 organisations, of which around 9,000 were officially registered with the Ministry.⁸ A year later, the figure increased to more than 130 thousand foundations, associations, NGOs, research institutions, and other organisations.⁹ It is worth noting that NGOs in Indonesia are also allowed to establish cooperatives or SMEs, of which there are 203,701 with a membership reaching 35.2 million people.¹⁰ Under recently reinstated Law No. 25/1992 concerning cooperatives, the cooperatives’ objectives are to improve the welfare of its members and participate in developing the economy.¹¹ Given these regulations it is possible to expand the definition of civil society to include cooperatives.¹²

The civil society stage has become more diverse; the stage is now “shared with more players, like political parties, religious organisations and universities, all able to speak out and publicize their views in a multitude of media outlets that have sprung up in recent years.”¹³ NGOs and civil society in Indonesia are now starting to deal with the dissolve of traditionally-compartmentalized roles and responsibilities as their activities begin to overlap with those of the government and private sector. As one recent report stated, “NGOs that were united against Suharto are now without a common enemy and something to unite them to a common vision.”¹⁴ While the government has come to recognize that “a strong civil society is an important contributor to both launching and sustaining a transition to democratic governance”,¹⁵ NGOs and CSO networks continue to be scrutinized and criticized for being vehicles of foreign intervention.

Despite the considerable number of organisations, those operating effectively are likely to be a small proportion.¹⁶ The accountability and transparency of CSOs and NGOs themselves has also come under

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⁶Under state law, there are two forms of organisation recognized legally: “yayasan” or foundations, and “perkumpulan” or associations. The main difference between foundations and associations is that the latter is member-based and in the way they are governed internally and under law. A large majority of NGOs in Indonesia are private foundations.
⁷NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles and Innovations edited by Lisa Jordan, Peter van Tuijl
⁸Source: http://www.koran-jakarta.com/?1112-1000-ormas-perbarui-pendaftaran. This figure is similar to 2010 data provided by Rustam Ibrahim in An ASEAN Community for All: Exploring the Scope for Civil Society Engagement, FES 2011.
¹⁰Article entitled: Pemeringihan Jokowi Diminta Terus Beber Koperasi dan UMKM, 20 October 2014, Available at: http://www.depkop.go.id/
¹¹A cooperative is defined in Article 3 as: ”an economic organisation of the people with a social content (character) having persons or legal cooperative societies as members, farming economic entity as a collective endeavor based upon mutual help” (FAO, A study of cooperative legislation in selected Asian and Pacific countries).
¹⁴STATT NGO Sector Review 2012
¹⁵Evolution and Challenges of Civil Society Organisations in Promoting Democratization in Indonesia
¹⁶Rustam Ibrahim comments on this in FES 2011
greater scrutiny. "Donors have started to become impatient with some of their NGO counterparts, who have difficulties accepting that they now have to fulfil much greater demands". In recent years foreign donor funding has depleted, which has led to more organisations turning to the private sector and government programmes.

Since 1985 the state has regulated member-based, citizen organisations under a Mass Organisations Law making it obligatory for social organisations to register with government. This law was largely ignored in the period of reform following 1998. However, in 2013 the law was replaced by a new controversial Mass/Societal Organisations (Ormas) Law No. 17, reinforcing control of foundations and associations. The Law could be used to prohibit or dissolve CSOs. Many NGOs and civil society networks deplored the Law for constricting democratic space and the freedom of civil society. The 2014 Freedom House Index’s ratings for civil liberties in Indonesia declined from Free to Partly Free as a result of the new law.

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arena</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom status</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Partially Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political rights</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil liberties</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.freedomhouse.org

The 2013 CIVICUS report hinted that the legislation could be part of the state’s reaction to a perceived threat that environmental, land rights and indigenous activists pose to political and economic interests due to the "shadowy connections that can exist between transnational corporations and politicians" in the agriculture extractive and construction industries.

The annual Freedom of the Press Index produced by Freedom House illustrates that Indonesia’s media remains "partly free". From 2011 to 2012 there was significant numerical improvement from 53 points to 49 with the reduction of restrictions and a greater ability of journalists to cover news more freely. From 2012 to 2014, the country’s rating remained steady at 49, with slight changes in global ranking (2012: 97th, 2013: 96th, 2014: 98th).

Overall, the press system in Indonesia is vibrant, with a wide range of news sources and perspectives, further growing with the developments in digital media. "Indonesia’s online growth in recent years is recognised as nothing short of phenomenal" (Matt Abud 2012). While the Internet is seen as a new space for debate and participation, current laws still curtail openness, accessibility, inclusiveness and place limits on its use for expression. Only a limited number of organisations like ICT Watch are addressing freedom of expression and online rights. Nonetheless, citizens are using cyber space to set up online communities and organize campaigns. Some recent examples include the commuter movement ‘masukbusway.com’ aimed to capture and shame traffic violators in Jakarta.

Less progressive sources of rhetoric can be found amongst a number of hard-line religious groups and leaders, such as Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front or FPI), who have links with traditional religious schools (pesantren) and recruit members through these and online networks. Radical groups organize frequent protests to apply pressure on the government and are a threat to diversity and freedom.

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17 Ibid
2.2.2 Socio-economic context

At a macro-level, Indonesia’s socio-economic situation has been improving. The country is a regional and global economic force, and has recently graduated to lower-middle income country (LMIC) status.

Table 5
Indonesia’s Rank & Score: UN Human Development Reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>HDI Rank (scale 1 – 187 for all years except 2010 out of 169)</th>
<th>HDI Value</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth (years)</th>
<th>Mean years of schooling (years)</th>
<th>Expected years of schooling</th>
<th>GNI per capita (2011 PPP$)</th>
<th>Gender Inequality Index (value &amp; rank)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>0.671</td>
<td>0.640</td>
<td>0.681</td>
<td>0.684</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium human development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Life expectancy at birth (years)</td>
<td>Mean years of schooling (years)</td>
<td>Expected years of schooling</td>
<td>GNI per capita (2011 PPP$)</td>
<td>Gender Inequality Index (value &amp; rank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>0.680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>100</td>
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<td>0.505</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Human Development Report 2014 & Explanatory Note for Indonesia

In recent years, Indonesia has consistently been ranked in the medium development category of the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI) measuring a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. In 2013, the HDI value was 0.684 with a rank of 108 out of 187 countries and territories. However, the value falls to 0.553, or 19.2 percent, when taking into account inequality. Indonesia’s HDI is above its peers in the medium development category but below the average of 0.703 in East Asia and the Pacific. The Gross National Income (GNI) per capita is steadily rising to US$ 8,970, a remarkable feat considering it was just 2,931 in 1980. Despite improvements, the 2014 report and its explanatory note show that growth is slowing and the country has yet to achieve equitable growth. For example, women only hold 18.6 percent of the seats in parliament, 10 percent fewer women reach secondary education compared to men, and women’s labour market participation is 51.3 percent compared to 84.4 percent for men.  

The Basic Capabilities Index (BCI) produced by Social Watch offers a picture of the status of key human capabilities of accessing basic services. It utilizes three main indicators: under-five mortality rate, births attended by skilled personnel, and enrolment of children up to the 5th grade. Countries are categorized into five groups accordingly based on their BCI values: 1) Basic: 98 and over; 2) Medium: from 91 to 97; 3) Low: from 81 to 90; 4) Very Low: from 71 to 80, and; 5) Critical: values below 70. Results for Indonesia saw stable or improving scores for child and maternal health, but a regression for education. While no data beyond 2011 is available, other data sources confirm that Indonesia still has high maternal mortality rates but basic education through primary school enrolment is improving.  

Table 6
Indonesia’s Rank & Score: Basic Capabilities Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Children reaching 5th grade</th>
<th>Survival up to 5</th>
<th>Births attended by skilled health personnel</th>
<th>BCI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>87 (low)</td>
<td>96 (medium)</td>
<td>73 (very low)</td>
<td>88 (low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>94 (medium)</td>
<td>96 (medium)</td>
<td>79 (very low)</td>
<td>90 (low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td>86 (low)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indonesia does not fare too well on the Social and Economic Rights Fulfilment (SERF) Index. In 2012 Indonesia achieved 67.86 percent of protecting social and economic rights. Although there was an improvement compared to 2011 values, performance worsened when compared to 2010. The country consistently performs poorly in the areas of right to food and right to work, although it improved in fulfilling rights to education.

Table 7
Social and Economic Rights Fulfilment (SERF) Index Values: Indonesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>SERF Index Value</th>
<th>Right to Food</th>
<th>Right to Health</th>
<th>Right to Education</th>
<th>Right to Housing</th>
<th>Right to Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>67.86</td>
<td>45.33</td>
<td>83.95</td>
<td>95.19</td>
<td>64.26</td>
<td>50.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>65.71</td>
<td>45.01</td>
<td>85.16</td>
<td>93.43</td>
<td>63.88</td>
<td>41.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>69.29</td>
<td>45.75</td>
<td>85.95</td>
<td>93.82</td>
<td>65.88</td>
<td>54.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Social Watch, Core Country SERF Indices 2010, 2011 and 2012 (Note that 2010 data was adjusted in 2013).

Trends in the country’s Economic Freedom Scores produced by The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal are also rather bleak. From 2010 to 2014 the country has been categorized as ‘Mostly Unfree’, with only a small increase in its score from 55.5 to 58.5.23

These macro-level figures illustrate the complexity of the socio-economic context. While the economy has grown, 65 million people remain highly vulnerable to shocks. Disparities in income and geographic areas remain, made more complex by the number of people ‘floating’ between the poor and middle class’.24

2.2.3 Socio-cultural context

With respect to the socio-cultural context it is of interest to look at global indices that provide some insight into the level of trust between ordinary people and the extent to which tolerance exists. On a whole, Indonesia has been able to maintain peace as indicated in the improvements in scores recorded by the annual Global Peace Index. In 2010, the country scored 1.950 on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being the best score. This has gradually improved to 1.853 in 2014, with a rank of 54 out of 162 countries. Nonetheless, inequality, socio-economic conditions and rights claims (especially land rights) are still a source of localized incidences of conflict in Indonesia. Between 2010 and 2014 there has been a rising incidence of resource and identity-based conflicts as well as vigilantism.25

Amongst other components, the Social Progress Index published in 2014 examines whether there is opportunity for individuals to reach their full potential by scoring four different components: personal rights; personal freedom and choice; tolerance and inclusion;

Figure 1 Indonesia’s 2014 Social Progress Index Scorecard illustrating selected elements of the Opportunity

23 http://www.heritage.org/index/
24 World Bank’s Indonesia Development Policy Review 2014
25 Data from the National Violence Monitoring System: www.snpk-indonesia.com/
and access to advanced education. Indonesia scores low in this regard, at just 43.86 out of 100 and ranking 92nd out of 132 countries. Freedom of religion, tolerance for immigrants and religious intolerance are all considered to be weak (red), while the majority of the components are scored as neutral (yellow).

The Edelman Trust Barometer Survey, which collects annual data from 33,000 respondents in 27 countries has shown that on aggregate, Indonesians' confidence in nongovernmental organisations, government, media and businesses increased by 10 percent in the 2014 trust index. Interestingly, businesses, with 82 percent, are the most trusted of the four sectors compared to 73 percent for NGOs, 53 percent for government and 73 percent of respondents putting their trust in the media. According to survey results, Indonesians believe businesspeople are more inclined to tell the truth than their government counterparts and three times more likely to fix problems.26

The trends in levels of trust in NGOs over the past four years are noteworthy. In 2011, the trust level was at 61 percent, decreasing to 53 percent in 2012 and 51 percent in 2013. Reports claimed this was due to a lack of transparency and accountability. Edelman reported that the trust levels in 2013 were the lowest amongst eight Asia Pacific countries surveyed, ascribed to the growth of horizontal, peer-to-peer networks and a preference for social media.27 The most recent results released in 2014 show substantial jump to 73 percent in 2014 which is attributed to NGOs now being able to 'walk the talk' in accountability and transparency, as well as the emergence of 'corporate NGOs'.28

2.3 Civil Society context issues with regards to the MDG

Several important changes took place during the 2011 and 2014 period. First, the global financial crisis and Indonesia's rise to a middle-income country led to a decrease in international donor funding. Development actors, including CSOs and NGOs, have to compete harder for funding. Some have been more successful than others in diversifying funding by turning to the private sector or private foundations. At the expense of past idealism, local NGOs are now more disposed to receiving funding sources which in the past may have been criticized as supporting neoliberalism.

Regulatory changes also affected the civil society arena positively and negatively. Amongst the more controversial laws to spark reaction was Law No. 17/2013 on Societal Organisations. In an open letter sent before the bill was enacted, CIVICUS said the law would undermine freedom of association and "prevent CSOs from working on sensitive topics related to good governance and democratic reform in the public interest".29 FORUM-ASIA deplored the repressive provisions in the law that "leave all groups vulnerable to attacks, undermining the hard-won democratic space that has been forged by civil society since the end of the New Order regime."30

Other laws passed that provoked criticism were the State Intelligence Law (October 2011) and the Social Conflict Law (April 2012). NGOs and media see these laws as imposing further restrictions on freedom of speech, potentially leading to the criminalization of human rights defenders and signifying a tightening of

state control. Discriminatory content was also an issue in discussions on the Religious Harmony Bill in 2013, for which drafting was initiated in despite not being part of the planned National Legislative Program. Late in 2013, the House of Representatives came under fire again for its weak stance against religious intolerance when it re-endorsed a law that limits state-recognized religions to six.

Land rights and natural resource protection have been a long-standing issue for Indonesia. While Indonesia has adopted and amended laws to improve the rights of smallholders and indigenous communities, many of these regulations have faltered in their implementation. Part of the issue lies in the overlap and lack of clarity of laws adopted that regulate different sectors and local legislation. Another issue is that there is a lack of oversight in the procedures such as granting permits and licensing. These problems, which are commonly found across development sectors, are compounded by a lack of information among local communities on what the laws regulate and their rights vis-à-vis them.

Since 1999, local governments in Indonesia have been granted more policy and decision-making space. In the same year, the Ministry of Forestry recognized under Law No. 44 the rights of customary institutions in forest management. However these rights are limited to resource management rather than ownership since the government retains tenure rights. Subsequent regulations recognized the responsibilities of local communities and governments in natural resource management. In 2007 and 2008 a legal basis for CBFM was created, in part to offer a solution to conflicts between communities and concession companies. In 2013, the Constitutional Court also accepted a Judicial Review of the Forestry Law No. 41/1999 recognizing that customary forests are not state forests and that indigenous peoples have legal rights. This is a landmark ruling and an important step for the recognition of indigenous people’s rights. Village forest designation (Hutan Desa) has been seen as a promising solution that can bring welfare to communities and prevent further deforestation.

Other positive context factors consists of the prolongation of the 2011 moratorium on new concessions for primary forests and peat lands with another two years and the signature of a Memorandum of Agreement between 12 ministries and state agencies to collaborate on creating one resource map and to accelerate the determination of forest status, prevent corruption and resolve forest conflicts.

The forestry sector in Indonesia has been criticized for its mismanagement and high levels of corruption in recent years. The country’s Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) conducted a forest sector review in 2010 that identified many weaknesses and loopholes in regulations, institutions and operations. Data from Indonesian Corruption Watch (2011) showed that there is a correlation between the quantity of concession licences and elections of district/province heads. A Human Rights Watch Report in 2013 stated that “financial costs of poor governance in the forestry sector are enormous.” Given the government’s own prioritization of anti-corruption efforts and in light of the significant investment of foreign funding into Indonesia’s REDD+ program that underscored the importance of more open and transparent practices, the government has been more open to improving forest governance.

3. KKI-WARSI and its contribution to civil society/policy changes

3.1 Background KKI-WARSI

WARSI, officially established in January 1993\textsuperscript{34} by an alliance of 20 Sumatra-based organisations, currently forms a network organisation of twelve regional NGOs based in four provinces: South Sumatra, West Sumatra, Bengkulu and Jambi. WARSI was formed with the vision of supporting sustainable development, defined as development that fulfils the needs and guarantees the welfare of people in the present, without endangering the continued survival of future generations\textsuperscript{35}. In 2003, the organisation amended its name, adding ‘Indonesian Conservation Community’ to become KKI – WARSI. Since then, WARSI’s efforts have focused on biodiversity/natural conservation and community development. The mission of WARSI is to uphold conservation principles of indigenous communities and encourage the development of a model for conservation area management in Sumatra. As such, WARSI has developed a concept termed ‘conservation with community’.\textsuperscript{36} WARSI’s motto, “conservation for community prosperity” does not discard community prosperity for the sake of conservation.\textsuperscript{37}

This concept is meant to provide solutions in the current context where a “concession regime” reigns. Indigenous communities living in forest areas lack the authority to stop destructive practices, such as illegal logging, clearing fields in the forest, hunting, and the opening of forest areas for mining by outsiders. Under this so-called regime, the government owns the forest and can legally give concessions to private sector companies for mining, plantation and other extractive activities. As a consequence to this arrangement, there are frequent conflicts between concession licence-holders and communities, which have even led to allegations of human rights violations. Operating in these conditions, WARSI’s goals are two-fold: preserving the forest and defending the rights of forest communities to fulfil their needs without endangering the survival of future generations.

To reach its aims, WARSI has developed several intervention strategies that include:

1. Becoming a clearing house for issues dealing with natural conservation and community development;
2. Developing communication and cooperation, whilst mediating between local, national and international stakeholders;
3. Establishing forums and opportunities for education and training, research and other activities;
4. Communicating the importance of conservation and community development in Sumatra;
5. Carrying out conservation actions in the field using participatory methods.\textsuperscript{38}

3.2 MFS II interventions related to Civil Society

KKI-WARSI’s interventions relate to civil society with respect to securing forest resource management rights for communities, which include greater decision-making power over access, better distribution of benefits and governance aspects. According to WARSI, communities or indigenous groups living in forest areas (like the Orang Rimba in Jambi) are disadvantaged groups. Their rights go unrecognized and the government would prefer to see forest areas to be free of communities or people. WARSI works to

\textsuperscript{34} “REDD Project Audit Report 2011”, WARSI, 2011
\textsuperscript{35} WARSI, "KKI WARSI: The Indonesian Conservation Community". Available from http://www.warsi.or.id/ (accessed 28 October 2014)
\textsuperscript{36} “Full Proposal Final”, WARSI
\textsuperscript{37} WARSI, "Profile". Available from http://www.warsi.or.id/about_us/Profile.php (accessed 28 October 2014)
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid
facilitate a recognition for community governance of forest areas through the *Hutan Desa* scheme (Village Forest scheme). Communities have local wisdom in forest management and can sustainably manage forest areas if their rights are recognized. Once communities obtain rights to manage forest areas, they can benefit from agroforestry, community logging, income from non-timber forest products (NTFPs) and ecotourism. This in turn protects forests against ongoing conversion to plantation or mining areas.

WARSI’s organizational goal is concerned with conservation, based on principles of people’s empowerment and participation. WARSI could be considered to be ‘custodial’ in orientation since they seek to safeguard community control of land (forest areas) and forest resources through the village forest scheme. Within the scheme, WARSI’s strategy can be divided into two main approaches:

- building the capacity of ‘forest managing groups’ (which can be considered intermediary organizations)
- facilitating lobby and advocacy initiatives to support communities in their efforts to secure forest management rights

KKI-WARSI’s role is to guarantee that the government does not issue conversion licenses to private initiatives, and to obtain recognition of the *Hutan Desa* to secure sustainable and local forest management.

The above interventions are most relevant to the CIVICUS dimensions of ‘level of organisation’ and ‘perception of impact’. WARSI assists communities in guaranteeing a better acknowledgement of their rights to forest resources, while working to influence the public sector (local government) for an endorsement of these rights. WARSI has been successful in West Sumatra and Jambi in promoting and replicating CBFM schemes.

### 3.3 Basic information

**Table 8**

*Basic information KKI-WARSI*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name of SPO : KKI-WARSI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consortium : Ecosystem Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFA : IUCN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start date of cooperation : 1 October 2010</td>
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<td>MDG/Theme : MDG 7ab</td>
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<td>MFS Project 1</td>
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<td>Project Name : Increasing Community Welfare through Participative Forest Management at Batanghari Basin (Project No.: 600523)</td>
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<td>Contract period : October 1, 2011 – October 1, 2014, extended until 30 April 2015</td>
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<td>Total budget : € 180,750</td>
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<td>Estimation of % of budget for CS : 39%</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFS Project 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project Name : Advocacy on Rules of licensing procedures of Village Forest and Community Forestry at Central Government (Project No.: 600634)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total budget FPU : € 42,876</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other donors if applicable : Norwegian Rainforest Foundation, Norway/NORAD, &amp; USAID and KEHATI (do not contribute to MFS II projects according to WARSI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimation of % of budget for CS : not known, no budget made available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Project documents

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39 Costs that relate to civil society development or policy influence are those costs that possibly contribute to the development of the CIVICUS dimensions, excluding coordination and office costs; staff costs and financial reserves.
4. Data collection and analytical approach

4.1 Adjustments made in the methodology of the evaluation

The evaluation team followed the operational guidelines to a great extent, but was unable to have a workshop with all of WARSI sub-groups as only the executive and program managers attended the workshop. In practice the workshop lasted five hours, without the full participation of the executive. In order to get board’s perspective, a separate interview was scheduled with one of WARSI’s board members. However, given the available time, the interview focused on confirming the model of change instead of discussing changes in each CS dimensions.

The evaluation team was unable to get averages or scores for each subgroup as participation was not consistent and other difficulties which made the workshop less effective. The in-country team assigned the scores and then ran them past WARSI to confirm the scores.

Another obstacle was the lack of participant preparation for the workshop. Not all participants had fully read or understood relevant documents (baseline report, CS dimensions change) shared with them prior to the workshop. All of the participants found it difficult to respond to the CS dimensions of change questions, partly due to confusion over whether or not the evaluation’s scope was focused on IUCN programs or more general for organisational/institutional changes. WARSI’s overlapping projects (as a finding of this evaluation), added difficulties in defining the evaluation scope since the CBFM interventions also received non-IUCN donor funding. While WARSI initially claimed that donor funds were segregated by geographic areas, later other evidence emerged to suggest that this was not always the case. Fortunately, much of the information obtained through the workshop and subsequent interviews could be triangulated with evidence found in documents and online research.

4.2 Difficulties encountered during data collection

During data collection the team experienced the following difficulties:

- Workshop participants did not really understand, nor were they familiar with the CS indicators or the CIVICUS framework. They found it difficult to relate WARSI’s situation with the indicators, especially since only half of them participated in the baseline process. This lessened the effectiveness of the workshop.
- WARSI does not have a dedicated monitoring and evaluation team. Rather, a new research and development division has been formed nine months ago. This division is supposed to take on the role of external reporting. As such, it added difficulties to find hard data and affected the agreement on the outcomes.
- WARSI was not completely prepared for this evaluation.
- WARSI provided several references of potential external resource persons. However, the evaluation team was unable to arrange meetings with them within the available fieldwork time. As a consequence, some interviews had to be conducted via telephone. Moreover, not all of evaluation team’s attempts for telephone interviews received positive response.
4.3 Identification of two outcomes for in-depth process tracing

The first outcome (Community-based forest management groups in 9 villages have received full endorsement) was selected with the following considerations:

- It was one of several outcomes that all workshop participants agreed to as being a significant achievement.
- It is one of the elements in WARSI’s Theory of Change (ToC), and the resulting model of change also addresses the ToC’s main assumptions. The baseline report suggested this outcome to be selected, to test WARSI’s ToC elements and assumptions.
- The input-output-outcome analysis also provided similar directions for in-depth process-tracing.
- As one of the outcomes from WARSI’s proposal to IUCN, the evaluation team expected fewer difficulties to find supporting evidence.

The second outcome (CBFM is mainstreamed into West Sumatra Province’s forestry policy) was selected because:

- It was one of several outcomes that all workshop participants agreed to as being a significant achievement.
- It is one of the elements in WARSI’s ToC, and the resulting model of change also addressed one of the ToC’s main assumptions (government political will). The baseline report suggested this outcome to be selected, to test WARSI’s ToC elements and assumptions.
- The input-output-outcome analysis also provided similar directions for in-depth process-tracing.
- As one of the outcomes from WARSI’s proposal to IUCN, the evaluation team expected fewer difficulties to find supporting evidence.
- The second outcome is related to the first outcome. The second outcome achievement offers opportunities to leverage the first outcome through replication to a wider scale beyond WARSI’s outreach.

Based upon an analysis of the projects and programmes financed by the Dutch CFAs, four strategic orientations for civil society were identified. Two of which were selected for each SPO for in-depth process tracing. CDI suggested to the country team to look at the selected strategic orientations. For WARSI, both outcomes matched with civil society orientations in: ensuring that the organisations that receive support from the SPO (intermediary organisations) are capable of playing their role in civil society; and; influencing policies and practices of public or private sector organisations.

WARSI, together with other EA grantees started a joint advocacy process in 2013 to simplify the procedures for Hutan Desa permits and the authority to manage these by CBFM groups. Both the documents made available for input-output analysis and the discussions with the WARSI team did not highlight these efforts as a potential outcome to look at, although this would match with EA’s programmatic approach to strengthen civil society.
5. Results

5.1 Results obtained in relation to intervention logic

This paragraph makes an inventory of results and objectives achieved versus planned according to the documents made available to the evaluation team.

Table 9
Overview of results achieved in relation to project plan WARSI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Result Level</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Level of achievement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project 1</strong>: Increasing Community Welfare through Participative Forest Management at Batanghari Basin: October 2010-2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective 1</td>
<td>Communities are organised for village-based forest management</td>
<td>Achieved: 16 communities (from targeted 13) organized for village-based forest management. Another 3 in the process of obtaining designations from the Ministry of Forestry, which will bring the number to 19 villages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result 1.1</td>
<td>Established a strong institution at the community level manage the village forests</td>
<td>Achieved: 16 communities have designed participatory village forest management plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator: Capacities to defend community rights enhanced of 10 villages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective 2</td>
<td>System of sustainable natural resource use is established</td>
<td>Partially achieved: Activities conducted include participatory survey, training to introduce multi-tier commodity/agro forestry, assessment of market and social potentials in the villages. The results of this have been documented in the forest management plans, which are to be approved by the governor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result 2.1</td>
<td>Improved skills on management forest products and community incomes increased by opening access to use natural resource (activities under Obj. 3 also contribute to this result)</td>
<td>Partially achieved: 20 model households reported additional income of IDR 400-500,000 per month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective 3</td>
<td>Government recognition for village-based forest management</td>
<td>Partially achieved**: WARSI facilitated the recognition of 16 villages from the MoF. CBFM permits (full endorsement) were granted for 9 villages. Remaining 7 villages are in the process of obtaining village forest management rights from the governor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result 3.1</td>
<td>Government support at the district, provincial and central levels to the management of village forest</td>
<td>Achieved: 2 district CBFM task-forces established in Jambi province, and 1 provincial CBFM task-force for West Sumatra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective 4</td>
<td>Villages have their own electricity generation</td>
<td>Partially achieved: electricity generator benefits limited number of households in SenamatUlu village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result 4.1</td>
<td>Developed hydroelectric power as a simple and cheap alternative energy source</td>
<td>48 households were provided with electricity. Bungo district government agreed to support micro hydro generator for Senamat Ulu village, estimated to serve 110 households.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

40 The logical framework does not specify the level of government recognition. Full endorsement of the village forest at all levels will ensure promised benefits for the community level.
## Objective 5

**Model study area developed for climate change mitigation and adaptation**

No evidence

### Result 5.1

Developed a model study area of mitigation and adaptation to climate change

**Indicators:**

- # of CSOs that are trained in ecosystem-based climate change adaptation and mitigation
- Area of land used by communities under ecosystem-based climate change adaptation plans

No evidence: Nothing about a specific ‘study area’ reported

## Objective 6

**Project activities of other EA-partners Sumatra are coordinated**

No evidence: seems to have been move into Project 2 (land-tenure)

### Result 6.1

Coordination to IUCN’s partners in Sumatra

No evidence: seems to have been move into Project 2 (land-tenure)

### Project 2: Advocacy on Rules of licensing procedures of Village Forest and Community Forestry at Central Government (land-tenure program: January 2013 – June 2015)

**Objective 1**

The License procedure of HutanDesa (Forestry Minister Regulation on HutanDesa) can be shortened and simplified at the provincial and national levels

Achieved: Joint lobby resulted in simplified procedures. Two regulations issued for this by MoF: PeraturanMenteriKehutanan No. 89/Menhut-II/2014 and PeraturanMenteriKehutanan No. 88/Menhut-II/2014

### Result 1.1

License Procedure for HutanDesa and Community Forestry is revised to be more simple and shortened from 27 steps to 15 steps at Forestry Department of Indonesian Republic

 Achieved: Series of meetings with other EA grantees resulted in a position paper regarding procedure streamlining. The position paper has been submitted to MoF. Three of four advocacy inputs have been accommodated via the new regulations.

**Objective 2**

Review and analyse the need for facilitation support management institution of HutanDesa and HutanKemasyarakatan for the preparations of the work plan and its implementation in the community can be collected

Achieved: studies on established CBFM groups conducted

### Result 2.1

Document review and analyse of the need for facilitation support management institution of HutanDesa and HutanKemasyarakatan can be arranged.

Achieved: Study carried out by a team formed by EA grantees at Riau, Jambi, West Sumatera, South Sumatera, Lampung, and Java provinces.

**Objective 3**

Financial support from National Development Budget is available for facilitation of Community Based Forest Management at the provincial and district levels.

### Result 3.1

Communities from various regions that got the license from the Forestry Minister get financial facilitation from the General Service Agency of the Forestry Ministry

No evidence

### Result Level Description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Level of achievement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

While WARSi seems to be successful in facilitating lobby and advocacy initiatives, they were only partially successful in building the capacity of forest management groups. Nine new forest management groups were established out of a targeted 16. Objectives 2 and 4, which focus on community welfare, are critical for sustainable CBFM and for successful application of concessional rights. It has to be noted that reports tended to be activity-oriented rather than reporting at the output and outcome levels.

Regarding the second project, the desired results have not yet been achieved partly because the project will be completed in 2015. Objective 3 is only attainable if Objectives 1 and 2 are achieved first. There seems to be an assumption that policy reforms will have an immediate effect, which is unlikely given the changes in the country’s administration and the regular bureaucracy involved in socializing new procedures.
5.2 Changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period

5.2.1 Civic engagement

Civic engagement describes the formal and informal activities and participation undertaken by individuals to advance shared interests at different levels. Participation within civil society is multi-faceted and encompasses socially-based and politically-based forms of engagement.

Since the baseline assessment, WARSI has managed to engage more communities into its community forest management programme through the establishment of community based forest management groups (CBFM). In the same period, the representatives of two of these groups have joined the WARSI network. WARSI’s position as a politically impartial organisation is being questioned since WARSI plans to support its members in campaigning in district elections. However, it can also be argued that involvement in local politics is a democratic right, which is acceptable so long as there are no conflicts of interest. It can be considered a strategy to promote the mission and vision of the organisation, especially in Indonesian where politics have in the past been dominated by business people and elite families.

In WARSI’s interventions, civic engagement was promoted through the establishment of CBFM groups. Forest communities are often marginalized by natural resource extraction and unfavourable government policies. The interventions sought to engage communities in the management of forest resources by giving them more decision-making powers the Hutan Desa or village forest scheme. Since the baseline, WARSI has supported 19 villages, of which 16 were IUCN-funded. By December 2014, nine of these received endorsement and recognition from the Ministry of Forestry and the local government for their rights to manage forest areas for the next 35 years. WARSI’s role has been to encourage the formation of CBFM groups and facilitate them in meeting requirements for Hutan Desa application (27 steps for endorsement from the Ministry of Forestry). Without such facilitation, communities would unlikely receive recognition for their long-term rights to manage forest resources through permits/concessions from the government.

The evaluation was unable to assess how communities are engaged at the grassroots, community level due time and resource constrains. But there has been some criticism (from a resource person interviewed) that WARSI is drifting away from intense community interaction as it gains recognition for its CBFM interventions. Organizationally, the WARSI network gained two members in 2013 who are CBFM group representatives. This is a positive step, although there is no evidence yet of how this membership may affect the direction and decision-making of the SPO.

Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 3
Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 1

5.2.2 Level of organization

This dimension assesses the organisational development, complexity and sophistication of civil society, by looking at the relationships among the actors within the civil society arena.

Generally speaking, WARSI’s level of organisation has improved since the baseline: The SPO has expanded its network of NGOs working at community level, as well as with NGOs that engage in lobby and advocacy. Through the Village Forest scheme, it has been able to defend the interests of increasingly more forest people. At the same time, WARSI has considerably expanded its resource base, becoming a well settled NGO.

WARSI works to promote community forest rights within the confines of existing forest policies. Through the Hutan Desa scheme, WARSI promotes the recognition of community rights vis-à-vis actors seeking to exploit forest resources. The SPO defends the interests of forest communities, which it sees as being in a disadvantaged position. Hutan Desa is considered to be a sustainable solution that conserves forests and promotes community welfare. While CBFM is promising, improper implementation could have negative
results. The evaluation team cannot conclude whether such negative impacts occurred due to constraints in time and resources. Rather, we draw attention to potential risks if marginalized groups are not defended properly (See Appendix 2). Potential issues include: 1) a lack of follow up to improve livelihoods and create economic alternatives for communities that have received forest management rights; and 2) a lack of representation or inclusiveness of the community within the CBFM group.

Nevertheless, WARSI is still highly regarded for its sustainable forest management work and its lobby strengths. This has helped it attract diverse external donor support. There is substantial international interest in forestry and REDD+ issues in Indonesia. Within this context, WARSI has received funds from a range of donors including the Norwegian Rainforest Foundation, USAID and others.

As a network organisation with a strong basis in Sumatra, WARSI has good relations with other NGOs working in the same geographic area or on CBFM issues. These organisations include WALHI, Telapak, SSS-Pundi, Gita Buana, and PKBI amongst others. While there are no formal arrangements for collaboration with these NGOs, cooperation is considered mutually beneficial since each organisation contributes according to their capacity and expertise to community empowerment. Interestingly, many of individuals active in one organisation also hold other positions in another. This means that while the network of organisations is extensive, many of the people that are engaged are the same individuals.

WARSI is also engaged in thematic and advocacy networks. In particular with the other EA grantees, they are involved in a joint advocacy group led by NTFP-EP for Mainstreaming Sustainable Livelihood Initiatives and Models (SLIMs) and WARSI is taking the lead to simplify the license procedures with regards to CBFM at the provincial and national level. According to EA, bringing together EA partners who were previously not willing or able to work together or did not even know of the other’s existence are now cooperating. In so doing, they are learning about their own relative strengths and how they can complement each other; both in terms of assets (as knowledge, skills and networks) as well as in their roles. This enables a more effective organisation of advocacy with one partner using the carrot and the other the stick and together achieving more impact.

With regards to CBFM group endorsement or Hutan Desa interventions, WARSI generally coordinates with other organisations to ensure no overlaps occur. But there are some cases where more than one organisation supports the same village. Recognition of community-based forest management rights has been received enthusiastically by other CSOs and NGOs, which in turn has generated more support from their side. Regular meetings are also held with CBFM groups to report progress and share lessons. This also helps the groups exchange ideas and skills amongst themselves.

Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2
Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 1

5.2.3 Practice of Values

Practice of Values refers to the internal practice of values within the civil society arena. Important values that CIVICUS looks at such as transparency, democratic decision-making, taking into account diversity that are deemed crucial to gauge not only progressiveness but also the extent to which civil society’s practices are coherent with their ideals.

Since the baseline, WARSI, as a member-based organisation, has broadened its membership base with 18 new members from community groups, customary leaders and community leaders. This has been a deliberate intervention undertaken to maintain relations with community groups that have received support in the past. These members have voting powers in the general assembly and can influence strategies of WARSI. Whether or not community representatives will have a say is not yet measurable, and will have to wait for the next general assembly planned in 2016.

41 Interview with Evelien van den Broek, IUCN, 2014
During the 2013 general assembly, which takes place every three years, apart from expanding its membership, WARSI appointed a new director. Structural adjustments have also taken place, namely the setting up of a Research and Development division, headed by the former director.

The evaluation found that there are still weaknesses with regards to monitoring and evaluation. WARSI has no dedicated division for this and no external evaluations have taken to assess programme results holistically. Similarly, financial audits have been project-based, undertaken to comply with donor requirements. With no institutional audit, it is difficult to discern with certainty which donors contributed to what results although WARSI claims that donor support is segregated by geographic area.

As during the baseline, WARSI’s board and executive arm meets on a regular basis to discuss progress and performance. The board structure does not contain representatives of WARSI’s target groups. Women are well represented in on the monitoring and advisory boards, fulfilling an internal requirement of a minimum 30 percent female representation. This is no change since the baseline.

Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2
Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 1

5.2.4 Perception of Impact

Perception of Impact assesses the perceived impact of civil society actors on politics and society as a whole as the consequences of collective action. In this, the perceptions of both civil society actors (internal) as well as actors outside civil society are taken into account. Specific sub-dimensions for this evaluation are the extent to which the SPO has contributed to engaging more people in social or political activities, strengthening CSOs and their networks, and has influenced public and private sector policies.

Impact upon civil society

Since the baseline 16 new community-based forest management (CBFM) groups have been created in the provinces of Jambi and West Sumatra. Until so far 10 of the 20 villages supported have received the state recognition and authority necessary to use the village forest are for production activities for the next 35 years. Nine of these are IUCN supported. Many actors see this official recognition as the most appropriate political instrument to defend the interests of minority forest groups and of local communities’ vis-à-vis forest concessions controlled by private sector organisations. The communities only have a two-year period to acquire village forest permits. If no permit is granted within that period, the village forest designation will be withdrawn. Until so far in Jambi Province one CBFM group has been successful in preventing a company to obtain a concession and three villages rejected plans of their local governments to designate forest land into an industrial forest plantation area.\(^{42}\)

The CBFM scheme, and in particular the mapping of forest resources and boundaries is a critical process for granting management rights to the community: setting the boundaries may cause conflicts with neighbouring villages which requires processes of conflict resolution. West Sumatra province decided to mainstream the CBFM scheme in their forest policy as a strategy to solve land disputes in its Nagari forest which is under forest customary law. Although some researchers have commended this strategy to mainstream the CBFM scheme in Provincial Regulations concerning Nagari Forest, the evaluation team did not find evidence that conflict resolution was facilitated by WARSI in the 2012 –2014 period. WARSI managed to clarify the boundaries between three villages in Jambi province after a conflict had arisen due to the mapping of resources and boundaries.

With regards to the efforts of WARS\(\text{I}\) to create the CBFM groups, the evaluation team observes that the extent to which community interests are being defended by these groups could be an issue of concern, because respondents state that increasingly the WARS\(\text{I}\) facilitators communicate with the village elites, rather than with the community itself. Limited communication with elites incurs the risk that CBFM

\[\text{According to WARS}\text{I data, community forest rights only cover 64,384 hectares compared to 776,652 hectares designated for industrial forest areas}\]

\(^{42}\)
groups may be influenced by elites that are attracted to potential financial returns offered by corporations. However, where CBFM groups are democratically elected, this will help overcome the challenge of building grassroots organisations to perform without falling into the hands of elites. In Bantanghari District for example, some elites were persuaded by a company to conserve the forest for timber, which was not agreed upon by members of the CBFM group. WARSİ claims however that village forest management groups have been democratically elected and that interventions require the approval of villagers. The characteristics of the Hutan Desa scheme are limited to usage rights and watershed management, which according to IUCN is less likely to offer financial incentives to exploit the scheme in highland areas.

Until so far there is limited evidence that the communities that have their own village forest are improving their livelihoods. By the end of 2014, some 110 households benefitted from a hydro power generator with a capacity of 27,000 Watt. According to WARSİ, livelihood incomes increased with some IDR 50,000 per month, whereas the poverty line is IDR 407,437 per month according to BPS standards for 2013\(^{43}\), with a monthly inflation rate of around 6 percent\(^{44}\).

WARSİ staff reported that based on a longitudinal study on 800 households between 2012 and 2013, household income increased an average of IDR 50,000 a month (no further documentation received on this). The valuation team estimates that an increase of just under USD 5 is insignificant compared to the poverty line (IDR 407,437/month according to BPS standards for 2013\(^{45}\)) and monthly inflation rates of around 6 percent\(^{46}\).

Meanwhile the CBFM groups are engaging with the government annually to present their work plans and achievements so far and they have started to meet share and learn from each other occasionally. They are about to form and umbrella organisation.

WARSİ’s success with the CBFM group is being replicated by other organisations and at least 8 districts in West Sumatra Province have asked WARSİ to assist them; however the organisation has not yet been able to fulfil all of these requests. The formation of officially recognised CBFM groups is still an extensive process and communities will continue to rely on third-party, external assistance in the technical mapping process, navigating procedures and funding the process.

WARSİ continued to work with NGOs in four provinces in Sumatra who all have a shared focus on conservation and community empowerment at community level. Although through its collaboration with NGOs at community level, WARSİ seeks complementarity in the interventions that target the same CBFM groups, no evidence has been found that this is the case and information is available that these NGOs conduct similar activities with the same CBFM group. This might explain communities’ limited satisfaction with the impacts of the village forests at household level.

WARSİ also still works with the same network that lobbies for more land tenure rights for forest people and since 2013 it collaborates with other EA grantees as a lead for joint advocacy efforts on land tenure rights: This collaboration has become more intensive and on their behalf WARSİ also engages the working group of the Ministry of Forestry on revisions of the village forest scheme.

Collaboration with the public sector and policy influence

WARSİ employs a two pronged approach in its relations with the public sector. In the first place it works with existing policies (Government Regulation No.6/2007 and No 3/2008) to operationalise CBFM. In the second place it tries to influence existing policies and practices. Its efforts to do so have intensified since the baseline study in 2012.


\(^{46}\) http://www.bi.go.id/id/moneter/inflasi/data/Default.aspx
With regards to the implementation of existing rules and regulations, WARSI supports CBFM groups to obtain the necessary letters of recommendations written by the district, province and national level, to obtain the necessary permits with the Village-Forest Agency of the Ministry of Forestry. Their most important strategy consists of showing the net benefit of CBFM for both the public sector and local communities at each of these administrative levels (ASB, 2013). This does not always work and also depends upon the government’s inclination to side with companies or with forest people.

With regards to influencing policies, WARSI, together with other EA grantees successfully managed to simplify the above mentioned procedures for CBFM since 2013. Two regulations were issued for this simplification: Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan No. 89/Menhut-II/2014 and Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan No. 88/Menhut-II/2014.

In Jambi, WARSI has successfully lobbied two districts to form CBFM task forces in charge of helping village communities apply for CBFM permits. Another district decided to further support a Village Forest Management Plan and has allocated funds from the 2014 annual budget to support the plan (IDR 1.2 billion).

In West Sumatra, WARSI has successfully influenced the provincial government after it decided to become a priority province for the national REDD+ program in May 2012, clearly stipulating that mainstreaming CBFM is their main implementation strategy. Several districts and the province organized the establishment of a Task Force that assists communities in village forest management as a means to accelerate the implementation of forest schemes. The provincial government has made the Task Force a one-stop service for the expansion of CBFM schemes and developed a five-year road map (2012-2017) for CBFM with a target of 500,000 hectares to be managed by communities. This is a first in Indonesia. This means that in the future, there will likely be more opportunities for community groups to regain control of forest resources.

**Collaboration with the private sector and policy influence**

WARSI stopped collaborating with private sector organisations meant for ecological restoration and marketing of NTFPs. The organisation’s successes to ‘win the race’ against the control of forest areas by mining and agribusiness companies positions it as a competitor for those companies. In Jambi province, WARSI has hypothetically blocked a number of private sector companies from gaining forest and land usage rights in at least 10 villages along the Batanghari watershed. However, technically the opportunity still exists if CBFM groups fail in protecting the village forest or if they become inactive: The area covered by village forests (25 villages covering only 54,978 hectares) is just a tiny fraction compared to the 853,430 hectares of forest land authorized to 18 corporations.

Given the fact that in West Sumatra forest management by Nagari is based upon customary rules and traditions, possibilities for companies were very limited and cumbersome until 2011. As of that year the Ministry of Forest issued a decree that converted some protected forest areas into limited production forests including those eligible for a Hutan Desa status. WARSI has until so far successfully protected 9 villages from private sector organisations.

| Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: | 2 |
| Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): | 2 |

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5.2.5 Civil Society Context/Coping strategies

The social, political and economic environment in which civil society operates affects its room for manoeuvre. The civil society context has been described in Chapter 3. In this section we describe how WARS I is coping with that context.

As the first nation to declare its commitment to voluntarily reducing carbon emissions, REDD+ may have changed the face of the Indonesian forestry policy environment. WARS I has been able to capitalize on the increased international pressure and spotlight put on Indonesia to address conservation. Two changes in the context of WARS I to which the organisation reacted positively show its coping strategies:

In the first place WARS I seized the momentum in 2012-2013 to lobby the West Sumatra province to mainstream CBFM in their forest policy, when both a Presidential Instruction on the 2011 forest moratorium cited conflict resolution as a priority for forest boundary conflicts, followed by a similar statement by the Corruption Eradication Committee or KPK also encouraged forest conflict resolution as a priority in 2012.

In the second place, in 2012 WARS I increased its assistance from 2 to 9 villages in Jambi province, when the Ministry of Forestry redefined some protected forest areas as Limited Production Forests that opened opportunities for companies to obtain exploration licences.

Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2
Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 2

5.3 To what degree are the changes attributable to the Southern partners?

This paragraph assesses the extent to which some outcomes achieved can be "attributed" to WARS I. Starting with an outcome, the evaluation team developed a model of change that identifies different pathways that possibly explain the outcome achieved. Data collection was done to obtain evidence that confirms or rejects each of these pathways. Based upon this assessment, the evaluation team concludes about the most plausible explanation of the outcome and the most plausible relation between (parts of) pathways and the outcome. The relations between the pathways and the outcomes can differ in nature as is being explained in table 10.

Table 10
Nature of the relation between parts in the Model of Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of the relation between parts and other parts or outcome</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The part is the only causal explanation for the outcome. No other interventions or factors explain it. (necessary and sufficient)</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="icon" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The part does not explain the outcome at all: other subcomponents explain the outcomes.</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="icon" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The part explains the outcome but other parts explain the outcome as well: there are multiple pathways (sufficient but not necessary)</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="icon" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The part is a condition for the outcome but won’t make it happen without other factors (necessary but not sufficient)</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="icon" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The part is a contributory cause it is part of a ‘package’ of causal actors and factors that together are sufficient to produce the intended effect.</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="icon" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Mayne, 2012; Stern et al, 2012

The following paragraph assesses WARS I’s contribution to two outcomes. Each paragraph first describes the outcome achieved and the evidence obtained to confirm that the outcome has been achieved. It then presents the pathways identified that possibly explain the outcomes, as well as present information that confirms or refutes these pathways. The last section concludes in the first place about the most plausible explanation of the outcome, followed by a conclusion regarding the role of the SPO in explaining the outcome.

Two outcomes were selected to measure the degree of MFS-II effectiveness. These were:
- Outcome 1: CBFM groups in 9 villages in 3 districts of 2 provinces have received full endorsement.
- Outcome 2: CBFM is mainstreamed into West Sumatra province forestry policy.

5.3.1 Outcome 1: CBFM groups in 9 villages in 3 districts of 2 provinces have received full endorsement.

Since the baseline, WARSI has helped 9 CBFM groups to successfully apply for village forest concessions, which have been endorsed by the Ministry of Forestry and the local government. The outcome was mentioned by WARSI during the evaluation workshop and verified by secondary resources and records. The villages that obtained their endorsement were the following:

- In Jambi Province: Senamat Ulu, Laman Panjang, Sungai Telang, and Buat Village in Bungo District, Jelutih, Olak Besar and Hajran Villages in Batanghari District;
- In West Sumatra Province: Jorong Simancuang Nagari Alam Pauh Duo in South Solok District and Simanauin Solok District.

There are still another 7 villages awaiting endorsement with the support of IUCN-NL. In addition to the IUCN-supported villages, one other village gained full endorsement since the baseline with other donor support. WARSI fell a little bit short of its expected targets of achieving the endorsement of sixteen CBFM groups within the originally intended timeframe. The project was extended until June 30, 2015 to accommodate for the achievement of intended results. Regardless of this level of achievement and the efficiency of results, for the purpose of this evaluation the outcome is still relevant for an analysis of whether MFS-II supported interventions have contributed to the achieved outcome.

*Causal Pathways*

There are three possible pathways that may explain this outcome:

1. The first pathway explains the outcome by means of the government’s political will to endorse village applications because each administrative level perceives the net benefits of the CBFM scheme.

2. The second pathway explains the outcome by the efforts of WARSI to help the communities meeting the application requirements for village forest concessions and to navigate the bureaucratic procedures leading to endorsement. Specifically, WARSI helped set up CBFM groups, helped

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48 After the extension, WARSI expanded from 13 villages that were listed in their proposal to assist 16 villages with IUCN-NL support.
formulate forest management plans and proposals and assisted in mapping forest resources and boundaries. To reject this pathway, we need to prove that WARSI advocacy and assistance was not essential (i.e. communities are able to apply for forest management concessions without WARSI facilitation) or that other actors or factors explain the outcome (pathway 3)

3. The last pathway considers the role of other NGOs to be pertinent in achieving the outcome. In other words, other actors helped the communities to navigate the procedures and requirements for CBFM endorsement.

*Information that confirms or rejects the pathways:*

1. Government’s political will to endorse the CBFM groups and their village forest areas explains the outcome

*Information that confirms Pathway 1:*
The issuance of CBFM permits itself can be considered as de jure statements of government’s political will. External documents and policy reviews, such as the Alternatives to Slash and Burn (ASB) policy brief (2013) show government support at the local level and amongst government officials for CBFM schemes. Reasons for this support are that CBFM provided an alternative for resolving tenure conflict issues, and that international support backs wider application of CBFM. As such, it may have tipped the balance in favour of community forestry. Various external sources also infer that forest management and tenure issues have become a government interest as it is relevant to the REDD+ and anti-corruption eradication agendas. The issuance of regulatory improvements (Law No. 41/1999 and its Judicial review in 2013, PP No.6/2007 and No.3/2008 providing the basis for CBFM schemes) also indicates government political will.

*Information that rejects Pathway 1:*
Government political will is not always equal at all levels. This information is confirmed in WARSI’s own experience where they almost failed to acquire three CBFM permits in Sarolangun District since the former regent was inclined to support the extractive mining industry. Only 6 of the 16 CBFM groups received full endorsement. This is mainly because some of the district heads, such as Sarolangun and South Solok were initially reluctant and seemed to favour private sector extractive industry development in the area. The areas designated for community forestry are still small. In 2011, only 3 percent of the total forest area designated for CBFM in Jambi met the requirements for CBFM endorsement. Complicated procedures and bureaucratic red tape inhibit more CBFM groups from obtaining endorsement. Often, local governments and community groups do not comprehend the national legislation or are not willing to implement them. In addition, there are very few organisations like WARSI who are policy and procedure savvy and are taking the lead to inform and pressure local governments.

2. WARSI’s support to the CBFM groups explains the outcome.

*Information that confirms Pathway 2:*
The head of the Provincial-level Watershed Management Bureau (Balai Pengelolaan Daerah Aliran Sungai/BPDAS) Jambi confirmed that WARSI has been assisting the 4 villages in the province in acquiring CBFM permits. A WARSI board member said there is no doubt that WARSI has helped the villages acquire their permits given their competences in lobby and advocacy. WARSI’s progress reports show a consistent and logical progress of interventions (establishing managing groups, training, fulfilling requirements, etc.). WARSI’s success in CBFM practices and applying the Hutan Desa scheme had been acknowledged widely. Another 8 districts have requested their assistance to replicate initiatives. Because of the complicated procedures and the lack of village capacity to comply on its own third-party assistance is still required. There is no evidence of CBFM groups being successful in obtaining recognition without NGO support.

*Information that rejects Pathway 2: None.*

3. Other actors/factors explain the outcome

*Information that confirms Pathway 3:*
WARSI’s facilitator in Batanghari district reported that the International Centre for Research in Agroforestry (ICRAF), now known as the World Agroforestry Centre, has contributed by giving additional training on village forest management, while the Alliance of Concerned Citizens of Forest and Land
Aliansi Masyarakat Peduli Hutan dan Lahan (AMPAL) has helped with the mapping of forest boundaries. These interventions are independent of WARSI or IUCN support.

Information that rejects Pathway 3:
From a desk study of external, secondary resources, the evaluation team found no evidence that other actors have assisted the 9 CBFM groups’ proposals and endorsement process. There has been some assistance from other actors, but there has been a division of working areas amongst NGOs with regards to which villages receive assistance from what NGOs in obtaining endorsement. According to the head of BPDAAS Jambi, overlaps in assistance were not possible as WARSI and other NGOs coordinated their areas of intervention before assisting villages with the procedural process. With so little of the designated areas for CBFM (3 percent in Jambi) being recognized, there is no reason for competition between NGOs. Other NGOs are indeed active in the province, but no overlaps could be found in target areas. Official data from Jambi’s Department of Forestry website shows, for example, that SSS-Pundi Sumatra has assisted 8 CBFM permits in Merangin District (non-WARS area of intervention).

Conclusion:
Based upon the analysis of the information available, we conclude that the first and second pathway are both necessary for explaining the outcome and are only sufficient together: each in itself is not sufficient, but together they are sufficient enough to explain the outcome. They are a causal package that together is necessary and minimally sufficient to explain the outcome. However, the government’s political will to endorse CBFM groups and their forests is a careful balance at each administrative level of opponents (companies and officials with close ties to these companies) and supporters of the village forest concessions Pathway 3, namely that the outcome was caused by other actors, does not explain the endorsement of the 9 CBFM groups supported by WARSI, but other actors are known to support similar processes in other districts.

A precondition that explains the general trend to create CBFM groups and to seek their endorsement for the management of village forest areas is the issuance of regulations that made the CBFM scheme possible (PP No.6/2007 and No.3/2008). Although WARSI might have also contributed to the issuance of these legal instruments, such a hypothesis will not be elaborated in this report since it occurred outside MFS-II support.

WARSI’s role is very important in the outcome achievement, particularly in terms of providing direct assistance to the nine communities so that they could meet requirements and go through each step required to obtain endorsement. In addition, WARSI’s lobby and advocacy has been an important push factor in gaining political will at each administrative level.

5.3.2 Outcome 2: CBFM is mainstreamed into West Sumatra province forestry policy.

The second outcome achieved is: “CBFM mainstreamed into West Sumatra provincial forestry policy”. The achievement of this outcome is justified with strong evidence in the form of legislation issued by the Provincial Forest Department of West Sumatra, with clear references to CBFM. In June 2012, the Department issued a five-year plan for social forestry development as CBFM mainstreaming roadmap. It stipulates the formation of village forest task forces at provincial level responsible for accelerating the implementation of village forest schemes in West Sumatera. The evaluation team also received scans of the authorization letter signed by the head of West Sumatra’s Provincial Forestry Department (SK No.522.4/1089/RHL-2012) as proof of this evidence. In addition, the Governor of West Sumatra has been supportive and open to conservation and forest protection interventions. In January 2013, he signed the REDD+ Provincial Strategy and Action Plan (SRAP) document which stipulated CBFM mainstreaming. Despite these positive changes, the implementation of new initiatives and policies has

49 “Dokumen Roadmap PHBM Sumbar”, WARSI
50 “Dokumen SRAP REDD+ Sumbar”, WARSI
been laborious and protracted. Very recently, in October 2014, an online news media outlet reported that the West Sumatra Governor had not yet granted permits for 32,386 hectares of village forest due to sparse district initiatives. While there may be other evidence of sluggish government response, this does not automatically indicate a lack of political will. The district governments under the province are still awaiting the submission of CBFM proposals. The district government offices themselves do not have the resources (especially field facilitators) to undertake interventions themselves and rely on NGOs to conduct community-level work. As discussed under MoC 1, there is a lot of bureaucratic red tape that has to be overcome, thus assistance from NGOs is still relevant and much needed to enable village communities to meet prerequisites for Hutan Desa.

Causal Pathways
There are three possible pathways that possibly explain this outcome:

1. The government’s own political will explains the mainstreaming of CBFM in the provincial forest policy. Much like the first pathway of the outcome explained in paragraph 5.3.1, the West Sumatra Provincial Government’s issuance of a regulation on the strategic plan is in itself a statement of political will. This pathway cannot be rejected.

2. WARSI’s advocacy explains the outcome. WARSI contributed to the formulation of the plans and regulations. Its position within the REDD+ Task Force has allowed it to take a prominent role in the formulation of the policy. To reject this pathway, we need evidence showing that WARSI did not have any role CBFM mainstreaming in West Sumatra.

3. The third pathway attributes the role of policy formulation to other NGOs’ lobby and advocacy efforts. To reject this pathway we need to find evidence showing that no other NGO except WARSI was involved in the policy formulation process.

Information that confirms or rejects the pathways:
1. The government’s own political will explains the mainstreaming of CBFM in the provincial forest policy

Information that confirms Pathway 1:
All confirming evidence from Pathway 1 in MoC 1 can be applied to confirm Pathway 1 of MoC 2: The issuance of CBFM permits itself is a de jure statement of the government’s political will. External documents and policy reviews show government support at the local level and amongst government officials for CBFM schemes (ASB, 2013). CBFM is expected to provide an alternative for resolving tenure conflicts, and international support is backing the wider application of CBFM. As such, it may have tipped the balance in favour of community forestry: Forest management and tenure issues have become a government interest because it is relevant to the REDD+ and anti-corruption eradication agendas. The issuance of regulatory improvements (Law No. 41/1999 and its Judicial review in 2013, PP No.6/2007 and No.3/2008 providing the basis for CBFM schemes) also indicates government political will. In addition, an interview with the head of BPDAS Jambi confirms that WARSI often facilitated provincial or district leaders to

Figure 2: Pathways that possibly explain the outcome and the nature of the relations between pathways and the outcome; CBFM mainstreamed into West Sumatra province forestry policy
attend international forums where government officials became the public faces for promoting CBFM. According to the WARSI director, this is a common approach that is implemented by WARSI to obtain government commitment in all its intervention areas, including West Sumatra. The establishment of two CBFM groups in West Sumatra earned WARSI a good reputation that positioned it well to lobby the government.

Information that rejects Pathway 1:
In October 2014, an online media reported that West Sumatra’s governor had not granted permit for 32,386 hectares of village forest area due to a lack of district initiatives. However, this does not automatically mean that there is a lack of political will since the government also lacks the resources and the know-how to undertake interventions themselves, especially relating to community outreach. This information hence weakly rejects Pathway 1.

2. WARSI’s advocacy explains the outcome

Information that confirms Pathway 2:
The SRAP document was co-authored by Rainal Daus (WARSI program manager for the IUCN program). The West Sumatra social forestry development plan for year 2012-2017 mentioned WARSI as the only CSO appointed to work with the Provincial-level Watershed Management Bureau (BP Das) to develop a CBFM task force, which was confirmed by external documents. Based on the sequence of events, it is quite plausible that Pathway 2 may explain the outcome.

Information that rejects Pathway 2:
WARSI project reports do not provide enough information regarding lobby and advocacy activities which specifically confirm this pathway.

3. The third pathway attributes the role of policy formulation to other NGOs’ lobby and advocacy efforts

Information that confirms Pathway 3:
All other authors of SRAP documents are either government officials (Ministry of Forestry, Development Planning Agency, Environmental Impact Management Agency/Bapedalda, National Program for Community Empowerment/PNPM) or academia and NGOs (WARSI and WALHI). NGO elements are appointed as part of authors to provide expertise admittedly lacking from the government side.

Information that rejects Pathway 3:
The West Sumatra Social Forestry Development Plan for 2012-2017 mentions WARSI as the only CSO appointed to work with BP Das to develop a task force.

Conclusion:
The mainstreaming of CBFM into the West Sumatra Forest policy is the result of different actors that together provide a sufficient explanation for the outcome: they are part of a causal package. The provincial government’s willingness to mainstream CBFM into its policies is evidenced in several policies, the formulation of which was co-authored by WAHLI and WARSI, academics and others. WARSI and WALHI hold a strategic position vis-à-vis the local government, which has allowed it to contribute to new strategies and policies. WARSI’s reputation was probably influenced by their existing CBFM model and the application of it in two of West Sumatra’s districts.

5.4 What is the relevance of these changes?

5.4.1 Relevance of the changes in relation to the Theory of Change of 2012

The outcomes for which process tracing was conducted were relevant to the institutional goal of WARSI as identified in the 2012 Theory of Change (ToC). WARSI’s strategy to achieve the conservation of

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natural forests and the welfare of forest communities is based upon the accommodation and positive engagement with its stakeholders\(^{52}\). The SPO identified the following pillars to achieve its goal:

- Recognition from the state of management of natural resources by indigenous people and communities.
- Sustainable ecosystems through forest conservation
- Enabling (political) environment through lobby and advocacy for forest management schemes by indigenous people and communities
- Increased value of non-wood forest and ecosystem services
- Government supports at all levels for natural resource management based on ecosystem/landscape and community cultural values

These pillars were also in line with program strategies, which included policy and advocacy and capacity building. The end line evaluation confirms that WARI’s interventions and outcomes are relevant for the realisation of its ToC Both the central government and the sub-national governments are willing to implement CBFM schemes, although the scope may be limited for now. But the government has been responding to international pressure, in particular REDD+ advocates. At the moment political will seems to be strong, but this may change as the newly elected government finalizes the formulation of its new five-year development plan.

As noted in other sections of this report, WARI’s success in increasing household incomes and in providing eco-system services seems to be moderate. This refutes one of the presumptions in the ToC of 2012 as it demonstrates that communities are willing to apply the Hutan Desa scheme as a means to ‘battle’ pressures from encroaching extractive industries, without first having sustainable livelihoods. But this also exposes a gap in the ToC and the results obtained so far. With communities now recognized for their rights to manage the forest, the bigger challenge lies ahead in terms of following up a positive policy environment and official endorsement with real interventions that will sustain community management practices through the creation of economic opportunities. Without alternative livelihoods, community members may still fall back on illegal logging practices or other unsustainable practices that lead to deforestation.

5.4.2 Relevance of the changes in relation to the context in which the SPO is operating

In recent years, the Government of Indonesia (GOI) has implemented reforms to address deforestation through improved forest governance. REDD+ has become one of the key priorities of the government, with institutional arrangements moving forward since the creation of a Presidential REDD+ Task Force in September 2010. In 2013, 10 working groups were established to help the Task Force roll out a national program. In 2013, an official REDD+ Agency was established.

Another relevant change in the context was the issuance of a forest conversion moratorium in 2011 (extended in 2013), effectively postponing new permits to be issued and providing an opportune moment for development actors to address forest governance issues\(^{53}\).

At the same time, the implementation of CBFM had become more feasible with the issuance of implementation decrees in 2007 and 2008. WARI, active in Sumatra since the early 90s, had already established positive relations with the local governments. These conditions paved the way for Lubuk Beringin in Jambi to obtain the first Hutan Desa certification in 2009. With a successfully implemented model under its belt, WARI gained a reputable position in Indonesia. A growing interest in deforestation issues and REDD+ has propelled the replication of this model to other districts in Jambi and West

\(^{52}\) MFS II country evaluations Civil Society component: Baseline Report Indonesia WARI, November 2012

Sumatra. This has also been aided by the start of the implementation of REDD+ at the sub-national level for provinces identified as priority areas. These include Jambi and West Sumatra along with 9 other provinces. West Sumatra and Jambi have also committed to taking part in REDD+ implementation through the signing of Memorandums of Understandings (MoUs) with the newly established national REDD+ agency.

5.4.3 Relevance of the changes in relation to the policies of the MFS II alliance and the CFA

Ecosystem Alliance’s programme goal is “to improve the livelihoods of the poor and create an inclusive economy, through participatory and responsible management of ecosystems”. It contains three programmatic themes: Livelihoods & Ecosystems, Greening the Economy and People and Climate Change. Three intervention strategies that link these themes are direct poverty alleviation, building civil society, and influencing policy. Major components in the programme are capacity building and learning. WARSI contributes to the Livelihoods and Ecosystem programme.

Ecosystem Alliance introduced the programmatic approach as a means to contribute to civil society development and policy influence. This implies that all EA partners in Indonesia work together to reach joint results. At the EA programmatic level four objectives were set, of which two were merged:

1. The Sustainable Livelihood Initiatives and Models (SLIMs) are a joint effort of the partners under the coordination of NTFP-EP: this will culminate in the organisation of a SLIMs festival as a closure of the EA MFS II programme in 2015. Films will be shown, music will be listened to that related to nature and ecosystems and products will be marketed. The objective is to attract the Indonesian middle class as a consumer and to show the government what is possible by sustainably sourcing and eco-cultural systems’ conservation and restoration.

2. Improving land tenure rights are a joint effort under the coordination of WARSI which started in 2013. Two Ministry of Forest regulations were issued in 2014: Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan No. 89/Menhut-II/2014 to replace Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan No. 49/Menhut-II/2008 and Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan No. 88/Menhut-II/2014 which replaced Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan No. 37/Menhut-II/2007. These new procedures mean that the licensing process for communities has been simplified as a result of this joint advocacy as CBFM licenses no longer need to be obtained from the governor.

3. Integrated Landscape Development in Papua and in East Kalimantan. This approach aims to integrate value chain approaches with eco-system restauration. This seemingly new approach helps to overcome the limitations of voluntary standards developed for single commodities, such as those for palm oil and to stimulate and integrated perspective on landscape development, connecting different scales of decision making. In Indonesia the focus is on the palm-oil sector and 20 pilot families saw their incomes rise by up to € 30 per month after participating in a pilot on “multilevel commodities” from agroforestry (i.e. various types of crops that can be harvested in different times of the year).

Until so far the impact of WARSI upon livelihoods improvements did not materialise, whereas the assumption under the Livelihoods and Ecosystem’s programme is to combine both ecosystems and livelihoods.

The original idea of the EA programme in Indonesia was to halt the expansion of palm oil concessions and mineral concessions. In this light, WARSI’s efforts until so far have prevented one mining company to obtain concession rights in Jambi Province and three CBFM groups successfully rejected plans of their local governments to designate forest land into an industrial forest plantation area.54

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54 According to WARSI data, community forest rights only cover 64,384 hectares compared to 776,652 hectares designated for industrial forest areas
WARSI’s advocacy in the past has led to the legal recognition of Village Forests and their uptake as a means to invest REDD+ money in Jambi and West Sumatra and its participatory mapping was further implemented by EA partners in Sumatra, Kalimantan and Papua55.

WARSI’s advocacy, together with other EA grantees to simplify the procedures at national and provincial level to obtain Hutan Desa permits and the authority to manage these by CBFM groups, is very relevant to further protect village forests from stopping concessions being given to private sector companies. Also WARSI’s efforts at its own project level are relevant contributions to civil society: its attempts to secure local land tenure and resource rights by participatory mapping and planning for CBFM are relevant because national policies are not yet well defined. WARSI has shown that evidence based lobby and advocacy based upon the creation of CBFM groups, helps to change policies at different level in favour. These same efforts also enhance the engagement of communities in defending their own natural resources. However no evidence was found that CBFM helps to create livelihoods assets and that households use sustainable land and resource practices to protect the Hutan Desa they manage.

5.5 Explaining factors

5.5.1 Internal factors

As a network organisation that has been running for over ten years, WARSI has gained a good reputation for its work in Sumatra. It is one of the better known organisations working in the conservation and forestry field.

At the start of the implementation of the project, IUCN conducted an organisational scan of WARSI using the five capacities framework and applying two additional EA capacities. Four capacities (capability to act, generate, relate, and achieve) were assessed; no scores were provided for the capacity to adapt. Overall, most core capacities and sub-capacities received a respectable ‘3’ (4 being the maximum). The following table presents an overview of the scores for each core capacity and high and low scores from sub-capacities:

Table 11
IUCN assessment of WARSI against the 5C framework.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The capability to act</td>
<td>Mean score of 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Capability to mobilize human, institutional and financial resources.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Capability to sustain commitment towards target groups</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The capability to generate</td>
<td>Mean score of 2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Capability to strengthen public and private institutions and services</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The capability to relate:</td>
<td>Mean score of 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The capability to adapt and self-renew</td>
<td>No scores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The capability to achieve coherence</td>
<td>Mean score of 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Capability to develop a clear mandate, vision and strategy</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Capability to put in place a well-defined set of operating principles</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| IUCN 2 Cs | |
| 6        | The capability to integrate environmental issues in sustainable development discussions / practice | Mean score of 2.67 |
| 6.3      | Capability to participate in the monitoring of environmental issues and share lessons | 2 |
| 7        | The capability to work in fragile states and on sensitive issues | Mean score of 2.33 |
| 7.2      | Capability to assess a regular working environment (risks, threats, vulnerabilities) | 2 |
| 7.3      | Capability to cope with increasing security challenges | 2 |

Source: IUCN Organisational Scan 2011 (filled in by Pete Wood, Samdhana)

Since the baseline, WARSi has demonstrated that it is overall a competent organisation. This has also been confirmed by a source within UNDP. The source shared that in 2014 a capacity assessment was conducted as a requirement for grantees. The assessment found WARSi’s legal status, mandates and policies, constituency and external support to be satisfactory; as well as its technical, managerial, administrative and financial capacities. There are however some critical findings from the inside team on WARSi’s accountability (See Appendix 2) in terms of reporting the same result to different donors. The IUCN assessment remarked that relations with communities depended on individuals and that beneficiaries were not formally involved in the project structure. This was confirmed during the end line.

5.5.2 External factors

Following the Reformasi in 1998, the government has normatively demonstrated an increased political will towards forest conservation via the issuance of forestry laws in 1999. Civil society participation was constricted for a long time due to the absence of supporting regulations that prescribed how CBFM should be implemented. Regulations No.6/2007 and No.3/2008 marked the state’s acknowledgment of forest community rights, and provide the CBFM implementation guidance. Both regulations worked in combination with other external factors that have been drivers of political will include the anti-corruption agenda and REDD+ schemes. These have opened greater opportunity for civil society actors to mediate between government and community interests. WARSi did not waste such opportunities and was the bridge to government political will and the community interests via a CBFM scheme. CBFM is now a preferred REDD+ strategy and as a result WARSi has earned the trust of the REDD+ agency at the national level as well as from provincial governments interested in REDD+ schemes. This has been an important factor for WARSi’s lobby and advocacy effectiveness.

5.5.3 Relations CFA-SPO

The Ecosystem Alliance and IUCN have encouraged grantees to jointly cooperate in thematic projects. WARSi is engaged in the Mainstreaming Sustainable Livelihood Initiatives and Models (SLIMs) initiative in Kalimantan. Through the Ecosystem Alliance, WARSi engaged with 9 other organisations (of which one contract was terminated due to performance issues).

WARSi also leads the “land-tenure” project working group that aims to streamline the long and difficult CBFM permit procedures and obtaining government funds for CBFM groups. In doing this, WARSi indicates their awareness and responsiveness to use CFA support to leverage their impact. Had the land tenure project been successful (or started earlier), WARSi’s interventions could have become less relevant if the CBFM application process was made straightforward enough for communities to apply for management rights on their own. In addition to connecting WARSi to the EA network and stimulating exchange and learning amongst local partner organisations, the CFA-SPO relationship facilitated financial sustainability trainings for all EA partners in November 2014 and January 2015.
6. Discussion

6.1 Design of the intervention

Overall, WARSI’s intervention logic and project design were of good quality. There were two clear focuses, namely on lobby efforts and community level interventions. However, in the implementation WARSI fell short of achieving their objectives at the community level. The priority seems to have been on overseeing the endorsement of community proposals for forest management and supporting the recognition of community-managed HutanDesa schemes. WARSI was focused on ensuring that community forest groups could lay claim to forest areas before extractive companies or small holders did so. While this is important and relevant, to sustain development impact interventions that lead to improved livelihood assets based upon NTFP and agroforestry need more emphasis. Without creating economic incentives for the communities who now have forest management rights, WARSI there is a risk that CBFM schemes may not be sustainable. There are sufficient funding opportunities for the SPO to undertake such activities. Future community-based forest management support should have an equal focus on livelihoods interventions as this will create a sufficient exit/sustainability strategy.

WARSI should also utilize its broad network with other CSOs to create economic opportunities. For example, WARSI could work with Mitra Aksi and its own network of partners which include organisations with an expertise in the sustainable livelihoods approach and biogas. Another option would be to focus on a select number of NTFPs produced by community members in the same area and strengthen the value chain and linkages to the international market. WARSI would also benefit from a specific focus on vulnerable groups within forest communities, such as the semi-migratory groups (Orang Rimba) in Jambi and landless farmers living on the edge of nationally protected forest areas.

Another observation is that WARSI is working on sensitive issues, namely the demarcation of community forest land area. If ‘do no harm’ principles are not properly applied, relations between neighbouring villages could easily sour. This could happen even after forest boundaries have been mapped and officially recognized. WARSI should incorporate this potential risk into project designs and work with experts or organisations that have specific experience in resolving natural resource conflict. Ideally, the local government should be engaged in the process, as mandated under the Social Conflict Management Law of 2012.

The evaluation team also concludes that WARSI’s model and design is replicable if certain conditions are in place. First and foremost, external third-party assistance is still required for communities to navigate through the bureaucratic requirements of obtaining endorsement of forest management rights through the Hutan Desa scheme. NGOs or other organisations providing such assistance need to have close relations with the local government, both at district and provincial level. Advocacy and lobby efforts by the NGO need to be clear and focused and ideally should relate to existing policy frameworks. The Hutan Desa status needs to be approved by different government levels, and each needs to be convinced of the net benefit of approving the application. Environmental organisations need to take advantage of political momentum, as WARSI did when official guidelines/procedures for obtaining Hutan Desa endorsement were released by the government in 2007-2008. Success is still dependent on political dynamics, such as leadership stability, regional development plans, and supporting legislation at the local level.
7. Conclusion

WARSI’s interventions and outcomes were relevant to both the civil society context and MDG 7 because they addressed a gap between natural resource management policies and the opportunities of forest communities to rightfully claim more decision-making power and usage rights over forest resources. On aggregate, WARSI’s performance against CIVICUS indicators improved in all five areas: level of organization, practice of values, civic engagement, perception of impact and coping strategies.

WARSI achieved two important outcomes namely: 1) helping nine more villages obtain decrees and endorsements for preserving the village forest (Hutan Desa) area; and 2) contributing to the mainstreaming of CBFM in the provincial forest policies of West Sumatra. The first outcome can be clearly attributed to the role of WARSI and MFS II funding. WARSI’s role was to assist communities navigate the endorsement process by preparing proposals, establishing forest management groups and developing forest management plans. The success of WARSI’s CBFM model has enabled it to gain recognition from the government, which allowed it to play a key role in influencing the West Sumatra provincial policy planning process.

Through the above achievements, WARSI has contributed to reducing forest degradation rates and improving the recognition for community managed forests. In order for these interventions to sustain into the future, more will need to be done to address the economic conditions of village forest groups.

These changes are very relevant in the current context of Indonesia, which also partly explain the causes of the changes that occurred. Indonesia has committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 26 percent by 2020. Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) focus on improving forest management and governance. Community forest management practices have gained recognition and political support and are one of the potential means by which carbon emissions can be reduced. As such, WARSI’s work has been highly strategic and is likely to gain continued support. However there is not yet an improvement of the livelihoods of those households that manage the Hutan Desa.

Table 12
Summary of findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When looking at the MFS II interventions of this SPO to strengthen civil society and/or policy influencing, how much do you agree with the following statements?</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The CS interventions were well designed</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The CS interventions were implemented as designed</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The CS interventions reached their objectives</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The observed outcomes are attributable to the CS interventions</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The observed CS outcomes are relevant to the beneficiaries of the SPO</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Score between 1 to 10, with 1 being “not at all” and 10 being “completely”.
References and resource persons

Documents by SPO
"1206-First 6 months report of IUCN-Warsi-Final", WARSI, p. 3
"Full Proposal Final", WARSI
"Concept Note Land Tenure Thematic", WARSI, 18 May 2012, p. 4
"Dokumen Roadmap PHBM Sumbar", WARSI
"Dokumen SRAP REDD+ Sumbar", WARSI
"Rencana Kerja Pokja PHBM Sumbar-final", WARSI, p. 2
Workshop with WARSI, Jambi, 12 November 2014

Documents by CFA

Other documents


**Webpages**


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Resource persons consulted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of key informant</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Function in organisation</th>
<th>Relation with SPO</th>
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<td>Ir. Misram</td>
<td>BPDAS Jambi</td>
<td>Chief</td>
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Appendix 1  CIVICUS and Civil Society Index

CIVICUS, the World Alliance for Citizen Participation is an international alliance of members and partners which constitutes an influential network of organisations at the local, national, regional and international levels, and spans the spectrum of civil society. It has worked for nearly two decades to strengthen citizen action and civil society throughout the world. CIVICUS has a vision of a global community of active, engaged citizens committed to the creation of a more just and equitable world. This is based on the belief that the health of societies exists in direct proportion to the degree of balance between the state, the private sector and civil society.

One of the areas that CIVICUS works in is the Civil Society Index (CSI). Since 2000, CIVICUS has measured the state of civil society in 76 countries. In 2008, it considerably changed its CSI.

1. Guiding principles for measuring civil society

*Action orientation:* the principal aim of the CSI is to generate information that is of practical use to civil society practitioners and other primary stakeholders. Therefore, its framework had to identify aspects of civil society that can be changed, as well as generate knowledge relevant to action-oriented goals.

*CSI implementation must be participatory by design:* The CSI does not stop at the generation of knowledge alone. Rather, it also actively seeks to link knowledge-generation on civil society, with reflection and action by civil society stakeholders. The CSI has therefore continued to involve its beneficiaries, as well as various other actors, in this particular case, civil society stakeholders, in all stages of the process, from the design and implementation, through to the deliberation and dissemination stages.

This participatory cycle is relevant in that such a mechanism can foster the self-awareness of civil society actors as being part of something larger, namely, civil society itself. As a purely educational gain, it broadens the horizon of CSO representatives through a process of reflecting upon, and engaging with, civil society issues which may go beyond the more narrow foci of their respective organisations. A strong collective self-awareness among civil society actors can also function as an important catalyst for joint advocacy activities to defend civic space when under threat or to advance the common interests of civil society vis-à-vis external forces. These basic civil society issues, on which there is often more commonality than difference among such actors, are at the core of the CSI assessment.

*CSI is change oriented:* The participatory nature that lies at the core of the CSI methodology is an important step in the attempt to link research with action, creating a diffused sense of awareness and ownerships. However, the theory of change that the CSI is based on goes one step further, coupling this participatory principle with the creation of evidence in the form of a comparable and contextually valid assessment of the state of civil society. It is this evidence, once shared and disseminated, that ultimately constitutes a resource for action.

*CSI is putting local partners in the driver’s seat:* CSI is to continue being a collaborative effort between a broad range of stakeholders, with most importance placed on the relationship between CIVICUS and its national partners.
2. Defining Civil Society

The 2008 CIVICUS redesign team modified the civil society definition as follows:

*The arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market – which is created by individual and collective actions, organisations and institutions to advance shared interests.*

Arena: In this definition the arena refers to the importance of civil society’s role in creating public spaces where diverse societal values and interests interact (Fowler 1996). CSI uses the term ‘arena’ to describe the particular realm or space in a society where people come together to debate, discuss, associate and seek to influence broader society. CIVICUS strongly believes that this arena is distinct from other arenas in society, such as the market, state or family.

Civil society is hence defined as a political term, rather than in economic terms that resemble more the ‘non-profit sector’.

Besides the spaces created by civil society, CIVICUS defines particular spaces for the family, the state and the market.

*Individual and collective action, organisations and institutions:* Implicit in a political understanding of civil society is the notion of agency; that civil society actors have the ability to influence decisions that affect the lives of ordinary people. The CSI embraces a broad range of actions taken by both individuals and groups. Many of these actions take place within the context of non-coercive organisations or institutions ranging from small informal groups to large professionally run associations.

*Advance shared interests:* The term ‘interests’ should be interpreted very broadly, encompassing the promotion of values, needs, identities, norms and other aspirations.

They encompass the personal and public, and can be pursued by small informal groups, large membership organisations or formal associations. The emphasis rests however on the element of ‘sharing’ that interest within the public sphere.

3. Civil Society Index- Analytical Framework

The 2008 Civil Society Index distinguishes 5 dimensions of which 4 (civic engagement, level of organisation, practice of values and perception of impact), can be represented in the form of a diamond and the fifth one (external environment) as a circle that influences upon the shape of the diamond. Civic Engagement, or ‘active citizenship’, is a crucial defining factor of civil society. It is the hub of civil society and therefore is one of the core components of the CSI’s definition. Civic engagement describes the formal and informal activities and participation undertaken by individuals to advance shared interests at different levels. Participation within civil society is multi-faceted and encompasses socially-based and politically-based forms of engagement.

*Level of Organisation.* This dimension assesses the organisational development, complexity and sophistication of civil society, by looking at the relationships among the actors within the civil society arena. Key sub dimensions are:

- Internal governance of Civil Society Organisations;
- Support infrastructure, that is about the existence of supporting federations or umbrella bodies;
- Self-regulation, which is about for instance the existence of shared codes of conducts amongst Civil Society Organisations and other existing self-regulatory mechanisms;
- Peer-to-peer communication and cooperation: networking, information sharing and alliance building to assess the extent of linkages and productive relations among civil society actors;
- Human resources, that is about the sustainability and adequacy of human resources available for CSOs in order to achieve their objectives:
  - Financial and technological resources available at CSOs to achieve their objectives;
International linkages, such as CSO’s membership in international networks and participation in global events.

**Practice of Values.** This dimension assesses the internal practice of values within the civil society arena. CIVICUS identified some key values that are deemed crucial to gauge not only progressiveness but also the extent to which civil society’s practices are coherent with their ideals. These are:
- Democratic decision-making governance: how decisions are made within CSOs and by whom;
- Labour regulations: includes the existence of policies regarding equal opportunities, staff membership in labour unions, training in labour rights for new staff and a publicly available statement on labour standards;
- Code of conduct and transparency: measures whether a code of conduct exists and is available publicly. It also measures whether the CSO’s financial information is available to the public.
- Environmental standards: examines the extent to which CSOs adopt policies upholding environmental standards of operation;
- Perception of values within civil society: looks at how CSOs perceive the practice of values, such as non-violence. This includes the existence or absence of forces within civil society that use violence, aggression, hostility, brutality and/or fighting, tolerance, democracy, transparency, trustworthiness and tolerance in the civil society within which they operate.

**Perception of Impact.** This is about the perceived impact of civil society actors on politics and society as a whole as the consequences of collective action. In this, the perception of both civil society actors (internal) as actors outside civil society (outsiders) is taken into account. Specific sub dimensions are
- Responsiveness in terms of civil society’s impact on the most important social concerns within the country. “Responsive” types of civil society are effectively taking up and voicing societal concerns.
- Social impact measures civil society’s impact on society in general. An essential role of civil society is its contribution to meeting pressing societal needs;
- Policy impact: covers civil society’s impact on policy in general. It also looks at the impact of CSO activism on selected policy issues;
- Impact on attitudes: includes trust, public spiritedness and tolerance. The sub dimensions reflect a set of universally accepted social and political norms. These are drawn, for example, from sources such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as CIVICUS’ own core values. This dimension measures the extent to which these values are practised within civil society, compared to the extent to which they are practiced in society at large.

**Context Dimension: External Environment.** It is crucial to give consideration to the social, political and economic environments in which it exists, as the environment both directly and indirectly affects civil society. Some features of the environment may enable the growth of civil society. Conversely, other features of the environment hamper the development of civil society. Three elements of the external environment are captured by the CSI:
- **Socio-economic context**: The Social Watch’s basic capabilities index and measures of corruption, inequality and macro-economic health are used to portray the socioeconomic context that can have marked consequences for civil society, and perhaps most significantly at the lower levels of social development;

- **Socio-political context**: This is assessed using five indicators. Three of these are adapted from the Freedom House indices of political and civil rights and freedoms, including political rights and freedoms, personal rights and freedoms within the law and associational and organizational rights and freedoms. Information about CSO experience with the country’s legal framework and state effectiveness round out the picture of the socio-political context;

- **Socio-cultural context**: Utilises interpersonal trust, which examines the level of trust that ordinary people feel for other ordinary people, as a broad measure of the social psychological climate for association and cooperation. Even though everyone experiences relationships of varying trust and distrust with different people, this measure provides a simple indication of the prevalence of a worldview that can support and strengthen civil society. Similarly, the extent of tolerance and public spiritedness also offers indication of the context in which civil society unfolds.
Appendix 2 Evaluation methodology

This Appendix describes the evaluation methodology that was developed to evaluate the efforts of Dutch NGOs and their Southern Partner Organisations (SPO) to strengthen Civil Society in India, Ethiopia and Indonesia. The first paragraph introduces the terms of reference for the evaluation and the second discusses design issues, including sampling procedures and changes in the terms of reference that occurred between the 2012 and 2014 assessment. The third paragraph presents the methodologies developed to answer each of the evaluation questions.

1. Introduction

1.1 Terms of reference for the evaluation

The Netherlands has a long tradition of public support for civil bi-lateral development cooperation, going back to the 1960s. The Co-Financing System ("MFS") is its most recent expression. MFS II is the 2011-2015 grant programme which meant to achieve sustainable reduction in poverty. A total of 20 consortia of Dutch Co Financing Agencies have been awarded €1.9 billion in MFS II grants by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).

One component of the MFS II programme addresses the extent to which the Southern Partners of the Dutch Consortia are contributing towards strengthening civil society and this evaluation assesses this contribution for Southern Partner countries in Indonesia, India and Ethiopia. The evaluation comprised a baseline study, carried out in 2012, followed by an end line study in 2014.

The entire MFS II evaluation comprises assessments in eight countries where apart from a civil society component, also assessments towards achieving MDGs and strengthening the capacity of the southern partner organisations by the CFAs. A synthesis team is in place to aggregate findings of all eight countries. This team convened three synthesis team meetings, one in 2012, one in 2013 and one in 2014. All three meetings aimed at harmonising evaluation methodologies for each component across countries. CDI has been playing a leading role in harmonising its Civil Society and Organisational Capacity assessment with the other organisations in charge for those components in the other countries.

This Annex describes the methodology that has been developed for the evaluation of the efforts to strengthen civil society priority result area. We will first explain the purpose and scope of this evaluation and then present the overall evaluation design. We will conclude with describing methodological adaptations, limitations and implications.

1.2 Civil Society assessment – purpose and scope

The overall purpose of the joint MFS II evaluations is to account for results of MFS II-funded or –co-funded development interventions implemented by Dutch CFAs and/or their Southern partners and to contribute to the improvement of future development interventions.

The civil society evaluation is organised around 5 key questions:

- What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?
- To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
- What is the relevance of these changes?
• Were the development interventions of the MFS II consortia efficient?
• What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

Furthermore, the evaluation methodology for efforts to strengthen civil society should:
• Describe how a representative sample of Southern partner organisations of the Dutch CFAs in the country will be taken
• Focus on five priority result areas that correspond with dimensions of the Civil Society Index (CSI) developed by CIVICUS (see paragraph 6.4 - Call for proposal). For each of those dimensions the call for proposal formulated key evaluation questions.
• Should compare results with available reference data (i.e. a CSI report or other relevant data from the country in question).

The results of this evaluation are to be used by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Dutch Consortia and their partner organisations. The evaluation methodology has to be participatory in the sense that Dutch Consortia and their partner organisation would be asked to give their own perception on a range of indicators of the adjusted CIVICUS analytical framework in 2012 and in 2014.

2. Designing the methodology

2.1 Evaluation principles and standards

The overall approach selected is a participatory, theory-based evaluation through a before and after comparison. This paragraph briefly describes these principles and how these have been translated into data collection principles. It also describes how a ‘representative sample’ of Southern Partner Organisations was selected and how the initial terms of references were adjusted with the consent of the commissioner of the evaluation, given the nature of the evaluation component and the resources available for the evaluation.

Recognition of complexity

The issues at stake and the interventions in civil society and policy influence are complex in nature, meaning that cause and effect relations can sometimes only be understood in retrospect and cannot be repeated. The evaluation methods should therefore focus on recurring patterns of practice, using different perspectives to understand changes and to acknowledge that the evaluation means to draw conclusions about complex adaptive systems (Kurtz and Snowden, 2003)\textsuperscript{56}. Changes in the values of the Civil Society Indicators in the 2012-2014 period are then the result of conflict management processes, interactive learning events, new incentives (carrots and sticks) that mobilise or demobilise civil society, rather than the result of a change process that can be predicted from A to Z (a linear or logical framework approach)\textsuperscript{57}.

A theory-based evaluation

Theory-based evaluation has the advantage of situating the evaluation findings in an analysis that includes both what happened over the life of the project as well as the how and why of what happened (Rogers 2004). It demonstrates its capacity to help understand why a program works or fails to work, going further than knowing only outcomes by trying to systematically enter the black box (Weiss 2004). Theory-based evaluations can provide a framework to judge effectiveness in context of high levels of complexity, uncertainty, and changeability when traditional (impact) evaluation methods are not suitable: the use of control groups for the civil society evaluation is problematic since comparable


organisations with comparable networks and operating in a similar external environment would be quite difficult to identify and statistical techniques of matching cannot be used because of a small n. Because SPO’s theories of change regarding their efforts to build civil society or to influence policies may alter during the 2012-2014 period, it requires us to develop a deep understanding of the change process and the dynamics that affect civil society and policies. It is important to understand what has led to specific (non-) changes and (un)-expected changes. These external factors and actors, as well as the SPO’s agency need to be taken into account for the attribution question. Linear input-activities-outputs-outcomes-impact chains do not suffice for complex issues where change is both the result of SPOs’ interventions as those by other actors and/or factors. Therefore, the most reasonable counterfactual that can be used for this evaluation is that of considering alternative causal explanations of change (White and Philips, 2012). Therefore the SPOs’ Theory of Change constructed in 2012 is also related to a Model of Change constructed in 2014 that tries to find the ultimate explanations of what happened in reality, including other actors and factors that might possibly explain the outcomes achieved.

Triangulation of methods and sources of information
For purposes of triangulation to improve the robustness, validity or credibility of the findings of the evaluation we used different types of data collection and analysis methods as well as different sources of information. The CIVICUS analytical framework was adjusted for this evaluation in terms of providing standard impact outcome indicators to be taken into account. Data collection methods used consisted of workshops with the SPO, interviews with key resource persons, focus group discussions, social network analysis (during the baseline), consultation of project documents; MFS II consortia documents and other documents relevant to assess general trends in civil society.

Participatory evaluation
The evaluation is participatory in that both baseline and end line started with a workshop with SPO staff, decision makers and where possible board members. The baseline workshop helped SPOs to construct their own theory of change with regards to civil society. Detailed guidelines and tools have been developed by CDI for both baseline and follow-up, and these have been piloted in each of the countries CDI is involved in. Country based evaluators have had a critical input in reviewing and adapting these detailed guidelines and tools. This enhanced a rigorous data collection process. Additionally, the process of data analysis has been participatory where both CDI and in-country teams took part in the process and cross-check each other’s inputs for improved quality. Rigorous analysis of the qualitative data was done with the assistance of the NVivo software program.

Using the evaluation standards as a starting point
As much as possible within the boundaries of this accountability driven evaluation, the evaluation teams tried to respect the following internationally agreed upon standards for program evaluation (Yarbrough et al, 2011). These are, in order of priority: Utility; Feasibility; Propriety; Accuracy; Accountability. However, given the entire set-up of the evaluation, the evaluation team cannot fully ensure the extent to which the evaluation is utile for the SPO and their CFAs; and cannot ensure that the evaluation findings are used in a proper way and not for political reasons.

2.2 Sample selection
The terms of reference for this evaluation stipulate that the evaluators draw a sample of southern partner organisations to include in the assessment. Given the fact that the first evaluation questions intends to draw conclusions for the MDGs or the themes (governance or fragile states) for Indonesia a sample was drawn for the two or three most frequent MDGs or themes that the SPOs are working in. In 2012, the Dutch MFS II consortia were asked to provide information for each SPO regarding the MDG/theme it is working on, if it has an explicit agenda in the area of civil society strengthening and/or policy influence. The database then provided an insight into the most important MDG/themes covered by the partner organisations, how many of these have an explicit agenda regarding civil society.
strengthening and/or policy influence. The entire population of SPOs in Indonesia was 120, of which those exclusively working on the governance theme (28 SPOs), those working on MDG 7ab (26 SPOs) and on MDG 3 (26 SPOs) where the most frequent ones. With regards to MDG 3 and MDG 7ab the evaluator decided to select MDG 7ab, which is a very specific and relevant MDG for Indonesia. Five 5 partner organisations were randomly selected for respectively MDG 7 (natural resources) of a population of 26 SPOs and 5 for the governance theme from 28 SPOs.

2.3 Changes in the original terms of reference

Two major changes have been introduced during this evaluation and accepted by the commissioner of the MFS II evaluation. These changes were agreed upon during the 2013 and the 2014 synthesis team meetings.

The efficiency evaluation question

During the June 2013 synthesis meeting the following decision was made with regards to measuring how efficient MFS II interventions for organisational capacity and civil society are:

[...] it was stressed that it is difficult to disentangle budgets for capacity development and civil society strengthening. SPOs usually don’t keep track of these activities separately; they are included in general project budgets. Therefore, teams agreed to assess efficiency of CD [capacity development] and CS activities in terms of the outcomes and/or outputs of the MDG projects. This implies no efficiency assessment will be held for those SPOs without a sampled MDG project. Moreover, the efficiency assessment of MDG projects needs to take into account CD and CS budgets (in case these are specified separately). Teams will evaluate efficiency in terms of outcomes if possible. If project outcomes are unlikely to be observed already in 2014, efficiency will be judged in terms of outputs or intermediate results (e-mail quotation from Gerton Rongen at February 6, 2014).

Attribution/contribution evaluation question

During the June 2013 NWO-WOTRO workshop strategies were discussed to fit the amount of evaluation work to be done with the available resources. Therefore,

1. The number of SPOs that will undergo a full-fledged analysis to answer the attribution question, were to be reduced to 50 percent of all SPOs. Therefore the evaluation team used the following selection criteria:

   - An estimation of the annual amount of MFS II funding allocated to interventions that have a more or less direct relation with the civil society component. This implies the following steps to be followed for the inventory:
   - Covering all MDGs/themes in the original sample
   - Covering a variety of Dutch alliances and CFAs

2. The focus of the attribution question will be on two impact outcome areas, those most commonly present in the SPO sample for each country. The evaluation team distinguishes four different impact outcome areas:

   - The extent to which the SPO, with MFS II funding, engages more and diverse categories of society in the 2011-2014 period (Civicus dimensions “Civic engagement” and “perception of impact”)
   - The extent to which the SPOs supports its intermediate organisations to make a valuable contribution to civil society in the 2011 -2014 period (Civicus dimension “Level of organisation” and “perception of impact”)  
   - The extent to which the SPO itself engages with other civil society organisations to make a valuable contribution to civil society in the 2011-2014 period (Civicus dimension “level of organisation”)

58 See the evaluation methodology for the civil society component as described in the annex of the baseline report.
3. The CS dimension ‘Practice of Values’ has been excluded, because this dimension is similar to issues dealt with for the organisational capacity assessment.

The aforementioned analysis drew the following conclusions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>SPO in the in-depth analysis</th>
<th>Strategic CS orientation to include</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Indonesia | ELSAM, WARSI, CRI, NTFP-EP, LPPSLH | 1. Strengthening intermediate organisations AND influencing policies and practices  
2. If only one of the two above mentioned is applicable, then select another appropriate impact outcome area to look at. |
| India | NNET, CWM, CECODECON, Reds Tumkur, CSA | 1. Enhancing civic engagement AND strengthening intermediate organisations  
2. If only one of the two above mentioned is applicable then select another appropriate impact outcome area to look at. |
| Ethiopia | OSSA, EKHC, CCGG&SO, JeCCDO and ADAA | 1. Strengthening the capacities of intermediate organisations AND SPO’s engagement in the wider CS arena  
2. If only one of the two above mentioned is applicable then select another appropriate impact outcome area to look at. |

Source: Consultation of project documents available in February 2014

3. Answering the evaluation questions

3.1 Evaluation question 1 - Changes in civil society for the relevant MDGs/topics

Evaluation question 1: What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?

Indicators and tools used

In line with the CIVICUS Civil Society Index, a scoring tool was developed in 2012 which comprises 17 indicators. The selection was inspired by those suggested in the terms of reference of the commissioner. Each indicator was, also in line with the CIVICUS index accompanied by an open evaluation question to be used for data collection in 2012 and 2014. In 2012 the scoring tool contained four statements describing the level of achievements of the indicator and scores ranged from 0 to 3 (low score - high score).

A comparison of the scores obtained in 2012 informed the evaluation team that there was a positive bias towards high scores, mostly between 2 and 3. Therefore during the 2014 assessment, it was decided to measure relative changes for each indicator in the 2012 – 2014 period, as well as the reasons for changes or no changes and assigning a score reflecting the change between -2 (considerable deterioration of the indicator value since 2012) and +2 (considerable improvement).

In 2012 and based upon the Theory of Change constructed with the SPO, a set of standard indicators were identified that would ensure a relation between the standard CIVICUS indicators and the interventions of the SPO. However, these indicators were not anymore included in the 2014 assessment because of the resources available and because the methodology fine-tuned for the attribution question in 2013, made measurement of these indicators redundant.

Also in 2012, as a means to measure the ‘level of organisation’ dimension a social network analysis tool was introduced. However this tool received very little response and was discontinued during the end line study.

Key questions to be answered for this evaluation question

In 2012, SPO staff and leaders, as well as outside resource persons were asked to provide answers to 17 questions, one per standard indicator of the scoring tool developed by CDI.
In 2012, the SPO staff and leaders were given the description of each indicator as it was in 2012 and had to answer the following questions:

1. How has the situation of this indicator changed compared to its description of the 2012 situation? Did it deteriorate considerably or did it improve considerably (-2 \rightarrow +2)
2. What exactly has changed since 2012 for the civil society indicator that you are looking at? Be as specific as possible in your description.
3. What interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the situation in 2012? Please tick and describe what happened and to what change this led. It is possible to tick and describe more than one choice.
   - Intervention by SPO, NOT financed by any of your Dutch partners .................
   - Intervention SPO, financed by your Dutch partner organisation ........(In case you receive funding from two Dutch partners, please specify which partner is meant here)
   - Other actor NOT the SPO, please specify......
   - Other factor, NOT actor related, please specify......
   - A combination of actors and factors, INCLUDING the SPO, but NOT with Dutch funding, please specify...
   - A combination of actors and factors, INCLUDING the SPO, but WITH Dutch funding, please specify...
   - Don't know
4. Generally speaking, which two of the five CIVICUS dimensions (civic engagement, level of organisation, practice of values, perception of impact, environment) changed considerably between 2012 – 2014? For each of these changes, please describe:
   - Nature of the change
   - Key interventions, actors and factors (MFS II or non-MFS II related) that explain each change (entirely or partially).

Sources for data collection
During the baseline and the end line and for purposes of triangulation, several methods were used to collect data on each (standard) indicator:
- Self-assessment per category of staff within the SPO: where possible, three subgroups were made to assess the scores: field staff/programme staff, executive leadership and representatives of the board,, general assembly, and internal auditing groups if applicable completed with separate interviews;
- Interviews with external resource persons. These consisted of three categories: key actors that are knowledgeable about the MDG/theme the SPO is working on and who know the civil society arena around these topics; civil society organisations that are being affected by the programme through support or CSOs with which the SPO is collaborating on equal footing, and; representatives of public or private sector organisations with which the SPO is interacting
- Consultation and analysis of reports that relate to each of the five CIVICUS dimensions.
- Project documents, financial and narrative progress reports, as well as correspondence between the SPO and the CFA.
- Social network analysis (SNA), which was discontinued in the end line study.

During the follow-up, emphasis was put on interviewing the same staff and external persons who were involved during the baseline for purpose of continuity.

3.2 Evaluation question 2 – “Attribution” of changes in civil society to interventions of SPOs.

Evaluation question 2: To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
Adapting the evaluation question and introduction to the methodology chosen

In line with the observation of Stern et al. (2012) that the evaluation question, the programme attributes, and the evaluation approaches all provide important elements to conclude on the evaluation design to select, the teams in charge of evaluating the civil society component concluded that given the attributes of the programmes it was impossible to answer the attribution question as formulated in the Terms of References of the evaluation and mentioned above. Therefore, the evaluation teams worked towards answering the extent to which the programme contributed towards realising the outcomes. For this endeavour explaining outcome process-tracing was used. The objective of the process tracing methodology for MFS II, in particular for the civil society component is to:

- Identify what interventions, actors and factors explain selected impact outcomes for process tracing.
- Assess how the SPO with MFS II funding contributed to the changes in the selected impact outcomes and how important this contribution is given other actors and factors that possibly influence the attainment of the outcome. Ruling out rival explanations, which are other interventions, actors or factors that are not related to MFS II funding.

Methodology – getting prepared

As described before a limited number of SPOs were selected for process tracing and for each country strategic orientations were identified as a means to prevent a bias occurring towards only positive impact outcomes and as a means to support the in-country evaluation teams with the selection of outcomes to focus on a much as was possible, based upon the project documents available at CDI. These documents were used to track realised outputs and outcomes against planned outputs and outcomes. During the workshop (see evaluation question on changes in civil society) and follow-up interviews with the SPO, two impact outcomes were selected for process tracing.

Steps in process tracing

1. Construct the theoretical model of change – by in-country evaluation team

After the two impact outcomes have been selected and information has been obtained about what has actually been achieved, the in-country evaluation team constructs a visual that shows all pathways that might possibly explain the outcomes. The inventory of those possible pathways is done with the SPO, but also with external resource persons and documents consulted. This culminated in a Model of Change. A MoC of good quality includes: The causal pathways that relate interventions/parts by any actor, including the SPO to the realised impact outcome; assumptions that clarify relations between different parts in the pathway, and; case specific and/or context specific factors or risks that might influence the causal pathway, such as for instance specific attributes of the actor or socio-cultural-economic context. The Models of Change were discussed with the SPO and validated.

2. Identify information needs to confirm or reject causal pathways as well as information sources needed.

This step aims to critically reflect upon what information is needed that helps to confirm one of causal pathways and at that at same time helps to reject the other possible explanations. Reality warns that this type of evidence will hardly be available for complex development efforts. The evaluators were asked to behave as detectives of Crime Scene Investigation, ensuring that the focus of the evaluation was not only on checking if parts/interventions had taken place accordingly, but more specifically on identifying information needs that confirm or reject the relations between the parts/interventions. The key question to be answered was: "What information do we need in order to confirm or reject that one part leads to another part or, that X causes Y?“. Four types of evidence were used, where appropriate:90

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90 Explaining outcome process tracing attempts to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific historical case. Here the aim is not to build or test more general theories but to craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case centric than theory oriented. The aim of process tracing is not to verify if an intended process of interventions took place as planned in a particular situation, but that it aims at increasing our understanding about what works under what conditions and why (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

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Beach and Pederson, 2013
• **Pattern evidence** relates to predictions of statistical patterns in the evidence. This may consist of trends analysis and correlations.

• **Sequence evidence** deals with the temporal and spatial chronology of events predicted by a hypothesised causal mechanism. For example, a test of the hypothesis could involve expectations of the timing of events where we might predict that if the hypothesis is valid, we should see that the event B took place after event A. However, if we found that event B took place before event A, the test would suggest that our confidence in the validity of this part of the mechanism should be reduced (disconfirmation/falsification).

• **Trace evidence** is evidence whose mere existence provides proof that a part of a hypothesised mechanism exists. For example, the existence of meeting minutes, if authentic, provides strong proof that the meeting took place.

• **Account evidence** deals with the content of empirical material, such as meeting minutes that detail what was discussed or an oral account of what took place in the meeting.

3. Collect information necessary to confirm or reject causal pathways

Based upon the inventory of information needs the evaluation teams make their data collection plan after which data collection takes place.

4. Analyse the data collected and assessment of their quality.

This step consists of compiling all information collected in favour or against a causal pathway in a table or in a list per pathway. For all information used, the sources of information are mentioned and an assessment of the strength of the evidence takes place, making a distinction between strong, weak and moderate evidence. For this we use the traffic light system: **green letters mean strong evidence, red letters mean weak evidence** and **orange letter mean moderate evidence**: The following table provides the format used to assess these issues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal pathway</th>
<th>Information that confirms (parts of) this pathway</th>
<th>Information that rejects (parts of) this pathway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pathway 1</strong></td>
<td>Information 1</td>
<td>Information 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part 1.1</strong></td>
<td>Information 2</td>
<td>Information 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part 1.2</strong></td>
<td>Information 3</td>
<td>Information 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Etc</strong></td>
<td>etc</td>
<td>etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pathway 2</strong></td>
<td>Information 1</td>
<td>Information 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part 2.1</strong></td>
<td>Information 2</td>
<td>Information 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part 2.2</strong></td>
<td>Information 3</td>
<td>Information 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Etc.</strong></td>
<td>etc</td>
<td>etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pathway 3</strong></td>
<td>Information 1</td>
<td>Information 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Assessing the nature of the relations between parts in the model of change

The classification of all information collected is being followed by the identification of the pathways that most likely explain the impact outcome achieved. For this the evaluators assess the nature of the relations between different parts in the MoC. Based upon Mayne (2012) and Stern et al (2012) the following relations between parts in the MoC are mapped and the symbols inserted into the original MoC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of the relation between parts and other parts or outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The part is the only causal explanation for the outcome. No other interventions or factors explain it. (necessary and sufficient)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The part does not explain the outcome at all: other subcomponents explain the outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The part explains the outcome but other parts explain the outcome as well: there are multiple pathways (sufficient but not necessary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The part is a condition for the outcome but won't make it happen without other factors (necessary but not sufficient)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The part explains the outcome, but requires the help of other parts to explain the outcome in a sufficient and necessary way (not a sufficient cause, but necessary) → it is part of a causal package</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Mayne, 2012; Stern et al, 2012
6. Write down the contribution and assess the role of the SPO and MFS II funding

This final step consists of answering the following questions, as a final assessment of the contribution question:
- The first question to be answered is: What explains the impact outcome?
- The second question is: What is the role of the SPO in this explanation?
- The third question, if applicable is: what is the role of MFS II finding in this explanation?

7. Sources for data collection

Information necessary to answer this evaluation question is to be collected from:
- Interviews with resource persons inside and outside the SPO
- Project documents and documentation made available by other informants
- Websites that possibly confirm that an outcome is achieved and that the SPO is associated with this outcome
- Meeting minutes of meetings between officials
- Time lines to trace the historical relations between events
- Policy documents
- etc

3.3 Evaluation question 3 – Relevance of the changes

Evaluation question 3: What is the relevance of these changes?

The following questions are to be answered in order to assess the relevance of the changes in Civil Society.
- How do the MFS II interventions and civil society outcomes align with the Theory of Change developed during the baseline in 2012? What were reasons for changing or not changing interventions and strategies?
- What is the civil society policy of the Dutch alliance that collaborates with the SPO? And how do the MFS II interventions and civil society outcomes align with the civil society policy of the Dutch alliance that collaborates with the SPO?
- How relevant are the changes achieved in relation to the context in which the SPO is operating?
- What is the further significance of these changes for building a vibrant civil society for the particular MDG/ theme in the particular context?

Sources for data collection

For this question the following sources are to be consulted:
- Review of the information collected during interviews with the SPO and outside resource persons
- The 2012 Theory of Change
- Interview with the CFA liaison officer of the SPO;
- Review of reports, i.e: the civil society policy document of the Dutch Alliance that was submitted for MFS II funding, relevant documents describing civil society for the MDG/ theme the SPO is working on in a given context.

3.4 Evaluation question 4, previously 5 - Factors explaining the findings

Evaluation question 4: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

To answer this question we look into information available that:
- Highlight changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO
- Highlight changes in the relations between the SPO and the CFA
• Highlight changes in the context in which the SPO is operating and how this might affect positively or negatively its organisational capacity.

**Sources for data collection**
Sources of information to be consulted are:

• Project documents
• Communications between the CFA and the SPO
• Information already collected during the previous evaluation questions.

4. Analysis of findings

A qualitative software programme NVivo 10 (2010) was used to assist in organising and making sense of all data collected. Although the software cannot take over the task of qualitative data analysis, it does 1) improve transparency by creating a record of all steps taken, 2) organise the data and allow the evaluator to conduct a systematic analysis, 3) assist in identifying important themes that might otherwise be missed, and 4) reduce the danger of bias due to human cognitive limitations, compared to "intuitive data processing" (Sadler 1981). The qualitative data in the evaluation consisted of transcripts from semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions workshops, field notes from observation, and a range of documents available at the SPO or secondary information used to collect reference data and to obtain a better understanding of the context in which the CS component evolves.

To analyse this diverse collection of data, several analytical strategies are envisioned, specifically content analysis, discourse analysis, and thematic analysis. Although each of these strategies can be understood as a different lens through which to view the data, all will require a carefully developed and executed coding plan.

Data have been coded according to: standard civil society indicator; outcome included for in-depth contribution analysis; relevance, and; explaining factors.

This qualitative analysis will be supported by a limited amount of quantitative data largely arising from the score assigned by the evaluation team to each performance indicator described in the civil society scoring tool. Other quantitative data in this study are drawn information provided in background literature and organisational documents as well as the Social Network Analysis method.

5. Limitations to the methodology

5.1 General limitations with regards to the MFS II evaluation

**The MFS II programme and CIVICUS**

Although the MFS II programme stated that all proposals need to contribute to civil society strengthening in the South, mention was made of the use of the CIVICUS framework for monitoring purposes. The fact that civil society was to be integrated as one of the priority result areas next to that of organisational capacity and MDGs became only clear when the MoFA communicated its mandatory monitoring protocol. In consequence, civil society strengthening in the MFS II programmes submitted to the ministry is mainstreamed into different sub programmes, but not addressed as a separate entity.

This late introduction of the Civil Society component also implies that project documents and progress reports to not make a distinction in MDG or theme components vs those of civil society strengthening, leaving the interpretation of what is a civil society intervention our outcome and what not to the interpretation of the evaluation team.

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At the same time the evaluation team observes that SPOs and CFAs have started to incorporate the organisational capacity tool that is being used in the monitoring protocol in their own organisational assessment procedures. None of the SPOs is familiar with the CIVICUS framework and how it fits into their interventions.

**Differences between CIVICUS and MFS II evaluation**

CIVICUS developed a Civil Society Index that distinguishes 5 dimensions and for each of these a set of indicators has been developed. Based upon a variety of data collection methods, a validation team composed of civil society leaders provides the scores for the civil society index.

Major differences between the way the Civil Society Index is been used by CIVICUS and for this MFS II evaluation is the following:

1. CIVICUS defines its unit of analysis is terms of the civil society arena at national and/or subnational level and does not start from individual NGOs. The MFS II evaluation put the SPO in the middle of the civil society arena and then looked at organisations that receive support; organisations with which the SPO is collaborating. The civil society arena boundaries for the MFS II evaluation are the public or private sector organisations that the SPO relates to or whose policies and practices it aims to influence.

2. The CIVICUS assessments are conducted by civil society members itself whereas the MFS II evaluation is by nature an external evaluation conducted by external researchers. CIVICUS assumes that its assessments, by organising them as a joint learning exercise, will introduce change that is however not planned. With the MFS II evaluation the focus was on the extent to which the interventions of the SPO impacted upon the civil society indicators.

3. CIVICUS has never used its civil society index as a tool to measure change over a number of years. Each assessment is a stand-alone exercise and no efforts are being made to compare indicators over time or to attribute changes in indicators to a number of organisations or external trends.

**Dimensions and indicator choice**

The CIVICUS dimensions in themselves are partially overlapping; the dimension ‘perception of impact’ for instance contains elements that relate to ‘civic engagement’ and to ‘level of organisation’. Similar overlap is occurring in the civil society scoring tool developed for this evaluation and which was highly oriented by a list of evaluation questions set by the commissioner of the evaluation.

Apart from the overlap, we observe that some of the standard indicators used for the civil society evaluation were not meaningful for the SPOs under evaluation. This applies for instance for the political engagement indicator “How intense is your (individual staff or organisational) participation in locally-nationally elected bodies and/or sectoral user groups?”

**Measuring change over a two-year period**

The MFS II programme started its implementation in 2011 and it will finish in 2015, whereas its evaluation started mid-2012 and will end in the beginning of 2014. The period between the baseline and the end line measurement hardly covers 2 years in some cases. Civil society building and policy influence are considered the type of interventions that requires up to 10 years to reap significant results, especially when taking into account attitudes and behaviour. Apart from the fact that the baseline was done when MFS II was already operational in the field for some 1,5 years, some SPO interventions were a continuation of programmes designed under the MFS I programme, hence illustrating that the MFS II period is not a clear boundary. Contracts with other SPOs ended already in 2012, and practically coincided with the baseline assessment being conducted at the moment the relationship with the CFA had practically ended.

**Aggregation of findings**

Although working with standard indicators and assigning them scores creates expectations of findings being compared and aggregated at national and international level, this may lend itself to a quick but inaccurate assessment of change. Crude comparison between programs on the basis of findings is problematic, and risks being politically abused. The evaluation team has to guard against these abuses by ensuring the necessary modesty in extrapolating findings and drawing conclusions.
Linking the civil society component to the other components of the MFS II evaluation

The Theory of Change in the terms of reference assumes that CFAs are strengthening the organisational capacity of their partners, which is evaluated in the organisational capacity components, which then leads to impact upon MDGs or upon civil society. Because the evaluation methodology designed for both the organisational capacity and the civil society evaluation require considerable time investments of the SPOs, a deliberate choice was made not to include SPOs under the organisational capacity component in that of Civil Society. This may possibly hamper conclusions regarding the assumption of capacitated SPOs being able to impact upon civil society. However, where information is available and where it is relevant, the civil society component will address organisational capacity issues.

No such limitations were made with regards to SPOs in the MDG sample, however, apart from Indonesia; none of the SPOs in the civil society sample is also in that of MDG.

5.2 Limitations during baseline with regards to the methodology

A very important principle upon which this evaluation methodology is based is that of triangulation, which implies that different stakeholders and documents are consulted to obtain information about the same indicator from different perspectives. Based upon these multiple perspectives, a final score can be given on the same indicator which is more valid and credible.

For Indonesia this has not always been possible:

- For 7 out of 10 SPOs a Survey Monkey questionnaire was developed to assess the intensity of the interaction between stakeholders in the network. Out of 156 actors that were invited to fill in this 5 minute questionnaire, only 7 actors effectively filled in the questionnaire = 4.5 %. The online Social Network Analysis aims at having both the opinion of the SPO on the intensity of the interaction with another actor, as well as the opinion of the other actor for triangulation. Important reasons for not filling in this form are that actors in the network are not technology savvy, or that they have difficulties in accessing internet. Data obtained by survey monkey were not used in the baseline. Instead the evaluation team did a social network assessment during the baseline workshop with the SPO.
- With regards to filling in offline interview forms or answering questions during interviews a number of civil society actors did not want to score themselves because they do not benefit from the interventions of the MFS II projects. Having the scores of their own organisations will help to assess the wider environment in which the SPO operates and possibly an impact of the SPO on other civil society organisations in 2014.
- With regards to public officials the evaluation team faced difficulties to have their opinions on a certain number of indicators such as perception of impact on policy influencing and relations between public organisations and civil society. Public officials fear that they will be quoted in the assessment, which may have repercussions for their position.

5.3 Experiences during end line from in-country teams - Indonesia

The in-country team experienced difficulties in working on the first evaluation question regarding changes in civil society. The team would have preferred a similar workshop as during the baseline that would recapitulate the essence of the CIVICUS model and the content of each standard indicator developed. Although some members of the in-country team were also involved in the 2012 base line assessment, they and their new colleagues experienced a kind of “CS dimension shock” when these topics where not addressed during the workshop, where a lot of time was spend to work on the second evaluation question on contribution. A guidance sent later in the year was helpful but came late according to the Indonesian team.
The many appendices prepared for data collection and meant as a step-wide approach for the end line study, sometimes became a burden and a limitation when applied directly in collecting data. Like mentioned for the baseline study the questions sometimes limited the probing for information. In addition, in-country team members had to deal with the “CS dimension shock”.

The organisation of the entire MFS II evaluation did provide very little opportunities for SPOs to engage with the evaluation and to feel concerned. For many of the SPOs the evaluation does not provide a strategic value in terms of drawing lessons. This lack of ownership is felt more strongly with those SPOs that already ended their contract with the Dutch MFS II organisation and with those SPOs that due to high staff turn overs were confronted with past tense issues that they did not experience. Some of the SPOs simply didn’t care about the evaluation. This could have been anticipated if there had been a special workshop (for the directors, perhaps, and the CFAs) prior to the endline. Via such workshops, appointments and agreements could have been set, allowing the in-country teams to plan their time and schedule. What ended up happening was that many of the SPOs kept putting off appointments and this also affected the schedule of the team.

Many SPOs are unfamiliar with the CIVICUS framework and the in-country team tried to ease them into it by sending background information and the indicator questions regarding changes in civil society prior to the workshop. This was effective for some SPOs (Common Room, WARS), but not very effective for LPPSLH, RUANGRUPA, and CRI. The latter three found it too difficult to answer these questions by themselves. Common Room, on the other hand dedicated a special discussion session to discuss the questions internally. The questions were however the same as those dealt with during the baseline and possibly high staff turnovers may also explain this “CS dimension shock”.

Fieldwork was sometimes inefficient since the in-country team assumed that each step (workshop, interview, drafting model of change, selecting outcome, finding evidences) would neatly fall into sequence and could be packed tightly within 4 or 5 days with strong commitment from the SPO. This often did not happen.
## Civil Society Scoring tool - baseline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Outcome domains</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>x</th>
<th>What are factors (strengths, weaknesses) that explain the current situation?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic engagement</td>
<td>Needs of marginalised groups</td>
<td>How does your organisation take the needs of your beneficiaries/target groups into account in your planning, actions, activities, and/or strategies?</td>
<td>Are NOT taken into account</td>
<td>Are POORLY taken into account</td>
<td>Are PARTLY taken into account</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Involvement of target groups</td>
<td>What is the level of participation of your beneficiaries/target groups in particular marginalised groups in the analysis, planning and evaluation of your activities?</td>
<td>They are INFORMED about on-going and/or new activities that you will implement</td>
<td>They are CONSULTED by your organisation. You define the problems and provide the solutions.</td>
<td>They CARRY OUT activities and/or form groups upon your request. They provide resources (time, land, labour) in return for your assistance (material and/or immaterial)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political engagement</td>
<td>How intense is your (individual staff or organisational) participation in locally- nationally elected bodies and/or sectoral user groups?</td>
<td>No participation</td>
<td>You are occasionally CONSULTED by these bodies</td>
<td>You are a member of these bodies. You attend meetings as a participant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relations with other organisations</td>
<td>In the past 12 months what has been the most intensive interaction you had with other CSOs?</td>
<td>No interaction at all</td>
<td>Networking - Cooperation: Inform each other; roles somewhat defined; all decisions made independently</td>
<td>Coordination - Coalition: ideas and resources shared; roles defined and divided; all have a vote in decision making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimension</td>
<td>Outcome domains</td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Statements</td>
<td>What are factors (strengths, weaknesses) that explain the current situation?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
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<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Frequency of dialogue with closest CSO</td>
<td>In the past 12 months how many meetings did you have with the CSO that you have most intensive interaction with?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No interaction at all</td>
<td>No interaction at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Defending the interests of marginalised groups:</td>
<td>Which CSO are most effective in defending the interests of your target groups? In the past 12 months, how did you relate to those CSOs?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Less than 2 times a year</td>
<td>Networking - Cooperation: Inform each other; roles somewhat defined; all decisions made independently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Composition current financial resource base</td>
<td>How does your organisation finance institutional costs such as workshops of the General Assembly (if applicable); attendants to workshops of other CSOs; costs for organisational growth and/or networking?</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Between 2 and 3 times a year</td>
<td>Coordination - Coalition: ideas and resources shared; roles defined and divided; all have a vote in decision making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Practice of Values</td>
<td>To what extent can mandatory social organs (steering committee, general assembly, internal auditing group) ask your executive leaders to be accountable to them?</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>More than 4 times a year</td>
<td>Collaboration: organisations belong to one system; mutual trust; consensus on all decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Downward accountability</td>
<td>What % of members of your mandatory social organs belong to the marginalised target groups you are working with/for?</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Composition of social organs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Outcome domains</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>What are factors (strengths, weaknesses) that explain the current situation?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>External financial auditing</td>
<td>How regularly is your organisation audited externally?</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>Occasionally, upon request of funders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Perception of impact</td>
<td>Client satisfaction</td>
<td>What are the most important concerns of your target groups? How do your services take into account those important concerns?</td>
<td>Majority of target groups are NOT satisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Civil society impact.</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what impact did you have on building a strong civil society?</td>
<td>You have not undertaken any activities of this kind</td>
<td>You have undertaken activities of this kind but there is no discernible impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Relation with public sector organisations.</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with public sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' objectives?</td>
<td>No direct interaction</td>
<td>You have been invited by public sector organisations for sharing of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Relation with private sector organisations</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with private sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' perspective?</td>
<td>No direct interaction</td>
<td>You have been invited by private sector organisations for sharing of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations</td>
<td>How successful have you been in influencing public policies and practices in the past 2 years?</td>
<td>No activities developed in this area</td>
<td>Some activities developed but without discernible impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimension</td>
<td>Outcome domains</td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Statements</td>
<td>What are factors (strengths, weaknesses) that explain the current situation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Influence upon private sector agencies' policies, rules, regulations.</td>
<td>How successful have you been in influencing private sector policies and practices in the past 2 years?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No activities developed in this area</td>
<td>Some activities developed but without discernible impact</td>
<td>Many activities developed in this area, but impact until so far has been limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Many activities developed in this area and examples of success can be detected</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>In the past 2 years, how did your organisation cope with these changes in the context that may have been positive or negative consequences for civil society.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coping strategies</td>
<td>No analysis of the space and role of civil society has been done.</td>
<td>You are collecting information of the space and role of civil society but not regularly analysing it.</td>
<td>You are involved in joint action to make context more favourable. Examples are available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>You are monitoring the space and role of civil society and analysing the consequences of changes in the context for your own activities. Examples are available.</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3  Civil Society Scores

This table presents the appreciation of the evaluation team regarding changes occurred for each indicator between 2012 and 2014 on a scale of -2 to +2
- 2 = Considerable deterioration
- 1 = A slight deterioration
 0 = no change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012
+1 = slight improvement
+2 = considerable improvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic engagement</td>
<td>1 Needs of marginalised groups</td>
<td>How does your organisation take the needs of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups into account in your planning, actions, activities, and/or strategies?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Involvement of target groups</td>
<td>What is the level of participation of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups in the analysis, planning and evaluation of your activities?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Political engagement</td>
<td>How intense is your (individual staff or organisational) participation in locally-nationally elected bodies and/or sectoral user groups?</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of organisation</td>
<td>5 Relations with other organisations</td>
<td>In the past 12 months what has been the most intensive interaction you had with other CSOs?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 Frequency of dialogue with closest CSO</td>
<td>In the past 12 months how many meetings did you have with the CSO that you have most intensive interaction with?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 Defending the interests of marginalised groups</td>
<td>Which CSO are most effective in defending the interests of your target groups? In the past 12 months, how did you relate to those CSOs?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 Composition current financial resource base</td>
<td>How does your organisation finance institutional costs such as workshops of the General Assembly ((if applicable); attendance to workshops of other CSOs; costs for organisational growth and/or networking?</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practice of Values</td>
<td>8 Downward accountability</td>
<td>To what extent can mandatory social organs (steering committee, general assembly, internal auditing group) ask your executive leaders to be accountable to them?</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 Composition of social organs</td>
<td>What % of members of your mandatory social organs belong to the marginalised target groups you are working with/for?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 External financial auditing</td>
<td>How regularly is your organisation audited externally?</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of impact</td>
<td>11 Client satisfaction</td>
<td>What are the most important concerns of your target groups? How do your services take into account those important concerns?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 Civil society impact</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what impact did you have on building a strong civil society?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13 Relation with public sector organisations.</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with public sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations’ objectives?</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14 Relation with private sector organisations</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with private sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' perspective?</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15 Influence upon</td>
<td>How successful have you been in influencing public</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS context</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Influence upon private sector agencies’ policies, rules, regulations.</td>
<td>How successful have you been in influencing private sector policies and practices in the past 2 years?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Coping strategies</td>
<td>In the past 2 years, how did your organisation cope with these changes in the context that may have been positive or negative consequences for civil society.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 4 Changes in civil society indicators between 2012 and 2014

1. Civic Engagement

1.1. Needs of marginalised groups SPO

Table 13
Current status of WARSI assisted CBFM villages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Donor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Jambi</td>
<td>Bungo</td>
<td>Senamat Ulu Village</td>
<td>Fully endorsed</td>
<td>IUCN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lamani Panjang Village</td>
<td>Fully endorsed</td>
<td>IUCN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Buat Village</td>
<td>Fully endorsed</td>
<td>IUCN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sungai Telang Village</td>
<td>Fully endorsed</td>
<td>IUCN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lubuk Beringin Village</td>
<td>Fully endorsed (prior to baseline)</td>
<td>Non-IUCN*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Batanghari</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jeluth Village</td>
<td>Fully endorsed</td>
<td>IUCN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hajran Village</td>
<td>Fully endorsed</td>
<td>IUCN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Olak Besar Village</td>
<td>Fully endorsed</td>
<td>IUCN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Sarolangun</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lubuk Bedorong Village</td>
<td>Have not been designated by the ministry</td>
<td>IUCN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Napal Melintang Village</td>
<td>Have not been designated by the ministry</td>
<td>IUCN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Berkun Village</td>
<td>Have not been designated by the ministry</td>
<td>IUCN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>West Sumatra</td>
<td>Solok</td>
<td>Nagari Simanau</td>
<td>Fully endorsed</td>
<td>IUCN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nagari Sariek Alahan Tigo</td>
<td>Waiting initial approval</td>
<td>IUCN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nagari Sirukam</td>
<td>Waiting initial approval</td>
<td>IUCN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nagari Sungai Abu</td>
<td>Waiting initial approval</td>
<td>IUCN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>South Solok</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nagari Jorong Simancuang</td>
<td>Fully endorsed</td>
<td>IUCN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nagari Pakan Raba’a</td>
<td>Waiting final approval</td>
<td>IUCN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nagari Pasir Talang Timur</td>
<td>Waiting final approval</td>
<td>IUCN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nagari Koto Baru</td>
<td>Waiting final approval</td>
<td>IUCN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nagari Pulakek Koto Baru</td>
<td>Waiting final approval</td>
<td>IUCN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: evaluation workshop, project documents, Department of Forestry website West Sumatra

Note: The blue highlights represent endorsed CBFM groups since the baseline that are IUCN-funded. Villages number 1, 2, 4 were already in the middle of endorsement process when IUCN project commenced. Villages in Sarolangun district have not been officially designated by the Ministry, thus WARSI excludes them for the moment from being reported as having CBFM groups established.

IUCN supported WARSI to assist the establishment and endorsement of 16 community-based forest management (CBFM) groups in five districts along the Batanghari watershed, which runs through the provinces of Jambi and West Sumatra. A total of 20 villages have been supported by WARSI, of which 10 have received state-recognition and authority to use the village forest area for production activities (agroforestry, community logging, NTFP, ecotourism) for the next 35 years. Nine of these are IUCN-supported. Without the existence of CBFM groups and government recognition, it is likely that private sector will be the one to benefit from forest resources by obtaining concession rights. WARSI’s role has been to encourage and facilitate the CBFM groups to meet bureaucratic requirements. Without such facilitation, communities would unlikely receive recognition for their long-term rights to manage forest resources through permits/concessions from the government. These CBFM groups are supposed to defend the rights of ethnic minorities that are dependent upon forest resources.

The successes of South Solok and Solok Districts in West Sumatra generated a number of requests from communities in the area for WARSI to facilitate similar activities. There are at least another 8
districts in West Sumatra Province asking for assistance, but WARSI has not yet been able to fulfil all of these requests. In 2012, the Provincial Government of West Sumatra produced a five-year road map (2012-2017) for the expansion of village forests and social forest schemes to cover an area of 500,000 hectares. The government established a Task Force on Social Forestry, which functions as a focal point for communities and stakeholders to propose community-based forest management and for the expansion of community-based forestry management (village forests, social forests and customary forests). West Sumatera has become the first province to mainstream village forest schemes in their forestry policy. With such a policy, it is expected that more communities can benefit from CBFM in the near future.

Recently, WARSI and other Ecosystem Alliance (EA) grantees were successful to widen the application of CBFM by advocating the Ministry of Forestry to streamline the application procedures. As this effort aims to shorten and simplify procedures required for CBFM authorisation, it opens the opportunity for more village communities in Indonesia to attain the benefit of CBFM. This can be considered a very strategic effort and important success.

The nature of change would perfectly match civic engagement (more marginalised groups reached) if there were no questions about the accountability and capacity of CBFM groups to defend the interests of the community they represent (See 2.7). WARSI has been criticized as becoming more ‘elitist’ in their attitude and interventions since they have received considerable recognition for their efforts at the national and international level.

1.2. Involvement of target groups SPO

As during the baseline, WARSI claimed that their field staff play a critical role in accompanying communities. Although the SPO claims to encourage and ensure community participation by having rigorous standard operational procedures for community facilitation in place, target groups’ decision-making space is limited only to the affairs of each CBFM. The in-country team came across criticisms of WARSI’s growing tendency to be less engaged at the community level. Facilitators are growing less willing to have close engagement with villagers, preferring to limit engagement to more accessible members of the community like village leaders.

In the 2013 general assembly, two CBFM group representatives became WARSI members. In spite of this, there are no examples which demonstrate that the representation of target groups has had any effect on decision-making within WARSI. Nevertheless, it can still be considered an improvement in the involvement of target groups compared to the baseline situation.

1.3. Intensity of political engagement SPO

During the past two years, there has been some controversy within the SPO on the way they see themselves with regards to political engagement. This controversy arose when WARSI decided to support some individual WARSI members in district legislative elections, which was seen by some as an opportunity to have more power to influence pro-conservation policies. In doing this, WARSI has attempted to influence the public’s political choices using their resources, and may have inevitably affiliated themselves with certain political parties. This may be seen as contradicting WARSI’s own organisational values, described in their strategic plan as being “non-partisan”.

External to this rather controversial issue, WARSI’s strength still lies in their ability as a network to influence and work with local governments. WARSI works within the confines of forest policies, and as such is able to lobby and advocate for strategies that recognize community forestry rights.

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2. Level of organisation

2.1. Relations with other organisations SPO

WARSI was formed on 1992 as an alliance of CSOs from four provinces (Jambi, Bengkulu, West Sumatera, and Riau) in Sumatra who had a shared focus on conservation and community empowerment. WARSI is well known for their work on spatial planning and social forestry issues. Some members of the alliance are currently still working as independent CSOs/NGOs, therefore WARSI has traditional alliances with the likes of PKBI, Yayasan Gita Buana, and LBH Palembang. WARSI’s network is not limited to working with other CSOs on community initiatives, but also expands to lobby work.

WARSI cooperates with other Ecosystem Alliance grantees on thematic projects. WARSI leads a joint advocacy intervention with WALHI, Telapak, and Samdhana focusing on land tenure rights. Together with Telapak, WALHI, Gita Buana, YMI, Samdhana, PT PPMA, and YKWS, WARSI is also a member of a joint advocacy group led by NTFP-EP for Mainstreaming Sustainable Livelihood Initiatives and Models (SLIMs). The Ecosystem Alliance encouraged and facilitated such cooperation since 2013. WARSI’s program logical framework also specifically includes this cooperation into its agenda. WARSI has worked successfully to simplify the procedures for obtaining hutan desa endorsement, as seen from the issuance of Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan No. 89/Menhut-II/2014 and Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan No. 88/Menhut-II/2014 to replace Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan No. 49/Menhut-II/2008 and Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan No. 37/Menhut-II/2007.

WARSI worked together with WALHI in West Sumatra, and with ICRAF (the International Centre for Research in Agroforestry, better known as World Agroforestry Centre) and RSPB (Royal Society for the Protection of Birds) in Jambi, in the REDD+ Task Force which also consists of academicians, forestry officials, the Provincial Development Planning Agency (Bappeda), and the provincial environment impact planning agency.

At CBFM group level, WARSI often shares their target groups with other NGOs such as: Mitra Aksi (focus on education, DRR, and reproductive health), AMAN (indigenous rights), SSS-Pundi Sumatera (livelihood), and PPO (organic farming) to form strategic partnerships on specific issues. WARSI considers such cooperation as mutual considering WARSI’s limited capacity in community development. However, based on an interview conducted by the evaluation team with a WARSI field facilitator, it seems that the support from other CSOs/NGOs is sometimes overlapping rather than mutually beneficial. Jeluth, Hajran, and Olak Besar CBFM groups have received assistance from Ampal for biodiversity mapping, Setara for land intensification, and ICRAF for community forest management. All of the aforementioned areas of support are also part of WARSI’s planned activities. As such, it raises concerns regarding accountability as sometimes a single outcome can be claimed by many actors. Nevertheless, the establishment and recognition of CBFM groups has attracted more CSOs/NGOs to work with these groups, as such it can be seen as an improvement of this indicator. In other words, the recognition of community groups’ forest management rights has attracted greater support from other CSOs.

2.2. Frequency of dialogue with closest civil society organisations SPO

Since January 2013, WARSI has been working with and leading other Ecosystem Alliance grantees in a thematic working group on land tenure rights. This task force shares documents and data, coordinates strategies, attends various national forums. WARSI engages intensively with the Working Group Pemberdayaan (WGP) in the Ministry of Forestry to provide inputs to revisions on regulations.

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66 Workshop with WARSI, Jambi, 12 November 2014

67 Interview with Nofri Hidayat, WARSI field facilitator, Jambi, 14 November 2014

68 Interview with Hambali, WARSI board, Jambi, 13 November 2014

69 “Concept Note Land Tenure Thematic”, WARSI, 18 May 2012, p. 4
pertaining to Hutan Desa. In this regard, the intensity and frequency of relations among CSOs within the task force has improved compared to the baseline as a result of IUCN’s intervention.

During the workshop organised as part of the evaluation, participants claimed that WARSI benefits from sharing target groups and intervention areas with other CSOs/NGOs at the CBFM level (as mentioned in prior indicator). But there is no evidence that such mutual relationships have been well planned or programmatically acknowledged (i.e. coordination meetings, MoU, etc.). A board member also mentioned that WARSI never formally approached Mitra Aksi to discuss their cooperation. Another interesting finding is that the same individuals seem to be involved in different organisations, holding a number of titles and positions. For example, one WARSI board members is also on the board of Mitra Aksi and the treasurer for SSS-Pundi Sumatera. In another example, the former WARSI director is also a board member of SSS-Pundi Sumatera. This indicates that while WARSI’s network seems to be extensive, it deals with many of the same individuals holding different positions in a host of CSOs.

At the CBFM level, monthly informal meetings are held, and formal meetings annually with the government where they have to present their work plan, report results achieved, obstacles, etc. CBFM groups have also started to meet, share and learn from each other, although this is still not a regular affair. For example, three CBFM villages in Batanghari District have picked up skills in cardamom agroforestry, learning from their counterparts from Solok District.

2.3. Defending the interests of marginalised groups SPO

The communities of 10 villages (9 IUCN funded) have been given legal authority to use the village forest for limited production activities. Without this recognition, they would be exposed to legal penalties or would compete with corporations and companies over forest management rights. The recognition of this right is still considered the most appropriate political instrument to defend the interests of minority forest groups and of local communities’ vis-à-vis forest concessions controlled by private sector organisations.

The communities only have a two-year period to acquire village forest permits. If no permit is granted within that period, the village forest designation will be withdrawn. This almost happened in Sarolangun District, where the community had to race against a mining corporation who had proposed to utilize the limited production forest area. The village forest scheme and CBFM groups also protect the designated area from unclear or conflicting regulations issued by the government. The protection afforded by the Hutan Desa scheme provides an opportunity for communities to stake a claim to forest resources and challenge concessions. In another case, WARSI assisted three villages to approach the local government to voice their rejection of plans to designate a large area of land as industrial forest plantation area (Hutan Tanaman Industri or HTI). According to WARSI data, community forest rights only cover 64,384 hectares compared to 776,652 hectares designated for industrial forest areas.

For villages in the Province of West Sumatra, CBFM is in line with the customary land scheme (the “Nagari” forest) which previously was not acknowledged by the state. This could be the main reason why West Sumatra chose to mainstream CBFM in their forestry policy as there have been numerous disputes caused by the absence of state acknowledgment of the “Nagari” forest customary law. The “Nagari” customary law see lands as extended family property, rather than individually owned.

Although CBFM intend to defend the interests of marginalized forest communities, critical flaws in its practical implementation could lead to negative results. Without solid interventions to organise the community, the CBFM group could fall into the hands of new elites at village level. In combination with weak livelihoods interventions to create sustainable alternative incomes, such a situation could attract elements from the private sector seeking to benefit from village forests. This is especially a risk if the

71 Interview with Nofri Hidayat, WARSI field facilitator, Jambi, 14 November 2014
CBFM group is run by village elites that are attracted to quick financial returns offered by corporations of this nature. Should this happen, the CBFM scheme would basically shift poor policy-making practices from district to village level, making it even harder to control or rectify. Erin Sills, senior researcher of Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) purported that “if you cannot offer a sustainable livelihood, your intervention basically only shifts or postpones deforestation”75. These concerns are shared by some on WARSIs board who are critical towards WARSIs lack of progress in CBFM livelihood development76. Even if WARSIs prioritization of winning the race against the corporate sector can be justified, they should not be complacent with the follow-up interventions.

Referring to input-output-outcome analysis75, WARSIs has achieved most targets related to community organisation (Objective 1); however the logical framework did not anticipate CBFM group inclusivity issues. As such, WARSI has seemingly not anticipated to what degree the CBFM groups truly represent the community. In order for the CBFM groups to be sustainable, they need to perform a function at the community level. CBFM group capacity to defend the interest of the community is also likely to depend on WARSIs assistance to make CBFM groups effective in providing community support, especially in the area of livelihoods interventions. Indicator 4.1 will provide more detailed analysis about this, but it can be concluded in short that with regards to sustainable or alternative livelihoods, most CBFM groups are still not satisfied. Moreover, the evaluation input-output analysis stipulated that external documents do criticize the development of the plans and the Hutan Desa and have noted that once Hutan Desa status has been acquired, the financial burden to implement falls on the village. This has led to some villages considering ‘giving back’ the permit to the government77. Village forest permits can also be terminated based on a joint evaluation between forest authorities and the CBFM group.

It is unfortunate that this evaluation cannot select indicator 2.3 and 4.1 for process tracing to get a better judgment due to limited time and resources available.

2.4. Composition financial resource base SPO

WARSI has been able to secure more funding sources in recent years. From RFN, WARSI received USD 1.8 million for an indigenous people protection program (2012-2017) and USD 550,000 for a REDD+ program (2013-2015). From TFCA-Sumatra (USAID) they receive around USD 640,000 for a conservation project around Kerinci Seblat National Park (2011-2016). Another USD 550,000 was secured from the Climate and Land Use Alliance (CLUA) for a sustainable forest management project in 2013. WARSI also received around USD 300,000 from the Margaret A. Cargill grant scheme. This indicates that WARSI is able to benefit from a growing donor interest in community forestry issues and REDD+ in Indonesia. Nonetheless, WARSI still depends highly on international donor support.

3. Practice of values

3.1. Downward accountability SPO

WARSI holds general assembly meetings every three years, during which WARSIs members evaluate the management’s accountability, and decide whether or not to change the composition of the board.

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76 Interview with Hambali, WARSI board, Jambi, 13 November 2014
77 Hester Smidt, “Warsi Input-Output Analysis”, MFS-II evaluation 2014
or the management. The last general assembly was held in 2013. WARSI appointed a new director to replace the former since based on WARSI’s articles of association; the director cannot hold the position for more than a two-year period. WARSI undertakes organisational evaluations every five years (a mid-term in their 10 year-strategic planning cycle), and the evaluation is to be reported at the forthcoming general assembly. WARSI’s board and executives also meet at least once every 6 months to monitor WARSI’s organisational course and performance. However, there have been reports that these meetings are not effective enough and that WARSI has never conducted an external evaluation. During the workshop of this evaluation, WARSI’s program manager for the IUCN project was unable to provide information regarding WARSI’s current financial composition as this was regarded to be the authority of the director.

3.2. Composition of social SPO

The composition of WARSI’s board changes every three years. There are no representatives of WARSI’s target groups in the board structure. The advisory board consists of 4 men and 2 women, while the monitoring board consists of 2 men and 1 woman. WARSI applies a 30 percent quota for women representation in the board and management as part of their commitment towards gender mainstreaming.

During the 2013 general assembly, WARSI inaugurated 18 new members consisted of 2 CBFM group leaders, 2 customary leaders, and other community leaders. Although WARSI’s membership is open, candidates have to pass a fit-and-proper test and need at least two references from two members who have been part of the general assembly for a minimum of two years. WARSI’s director reported that they decided to include members representing target groups as a strategy to maintain WARSI’s relationship with their target groups and focal points. While this is an improvement in the composition of WARSI’s membership base, it does not change the structure of the board. The new members will have voting power as members, but their ability to influence organisation direction can only be measured in the next general assembly which is to take place in 2016.

3.3. External financial auditing SPO

WARSI has not conducted an external financial audit for their institution; all audits are project-based. This is the same as the conditions during the baseline.

WARSI management reported that overlaps in funding are possible and considered beneficial to cope with unanticipated needs. WARSI’s director further explained that most projects are separated geographically, but that there is mutual complementary between REDD+ and IUCN projects. But the evaluation team has some concerns with this explanation since this cannot be backed up by an institutional audit. WARSI could claim the same achievements for different projects. The evaluation team notes that it is hard to distinguish between REDD+ and EA contributions to WARSI’s achievement in influencing the Province of West Sumatra province to mainstream CBFM without reviewing an institutional audit result (see 4.5).

In 2010 WARSI reported facing difficulties in “finding the balance between organisational independence and the need to serve public sector’s and donor’s agenda” as one of their challenges. Based on comments from one of the board members and responses from WARSI’s management it seems that this challenge continues to persist.

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77 Workshop with WARSI, Jambi, 12 November 2014
4. Perception of impact

4.1. Client satisfaction SPO

WARSI’s management is confident that the 9 IUCN-supported CBFM groups are satisfied with the legal certainty regarding the rights to use village forests, but WARSI management are less confident with CBFM groups’ satisfaction regarding livelihood improvement as they admit that such benefits are still very limited. The above statement is consistent with the findings from the input-output-outcome analysis. There is no evidence that households have adopted more sustainable land and resource use practices or that they benefit from improvements in livelihoods assets, except for 20 model households selected for “multilevel commodities” interventions. The incomes of these households reportedly increased by IDR 500,000 per month. Participants in the end line workshop reported that based on a longitudinal study on 800 households between 2012 and 2013, household income increased an average of IDR 50,000 a month. However, the evaluation team did not receive this document from WARSI. Even if the evidence does exist, an increase of just under USD 5 dollars is insignificant compared to the poverty line (IDR 407,437/month according to BPS standards for 201379) and monthly inflation rates of around 6 percent80.

With regards to the interventions to support villages in having their own electricity supply, only 48 houses from one village benefitted from the hydroelectric power generation in 2013 with a possible addition of 160 houses in 2014. However, it is worthy to note that the addition resulted from the government financial support to the scheme in response to WARSI’s lobby and a community’s proposal. In conclusion, with regards to sustainable or alternative livelihoods, most CBFM groups are still not satisfied.

It is unfortunate that WARSI does not monitor client satisfaction. This kind of information would be beneficial to WARSI to illustrate how their assistance in completing administrative requirements for the Hutan Desa scheme has been received by the villages and the CBFM groups. It is likely that the formal process was sped up with WARSI’s help.

4.2. Civil society impact SPO

WARSI’ acceptance of the P.49/Menhut-II/2008 regulation has caused controversy among other forest conservation NGOs (notably WALHI and AMAN). Most notably, AMAN rejected the concessionary arrangements because it only recognized formally established villages in and around production or protection forests and excluded nomadic groups living in forested areas81. However, WARSI decided to use the law as an opportunity, rather than oppose it as they believe that if no concrete action is taken to ensure that forest people manage their own forest, then the private sector will be the first to benefit. WARSI’s stand point is that competing with the private sector to acquire authority to use limited production forests is more impactful than waiting for a flawless policy to be put in place. Thus, the scale up of CBFM has been their priority. This decision resulted in WARSI being the first NGO to put in place a village forest in 2009 (Lubuk Beringin Village, Jambi). At present more NGOs have followed suit in Jambi and other provinces, including those who initially disagreed with WARSI82. After WARSI’s success, Alternatives to Slash and Burn (ASB) reported that “Expectations that resolving tenure conflicts would facilitate flows of REDD investment to the first Hutan Desa case”83. These

82 Workshop with WARSI, Jambi, 12 November 2014
conditions have indeed emerged. This may also explain why more NGOs have joined the CBFM bandwagon. Jambi province currently has 25 CBFM groups covering 54,978 hectare of village-forest area; the largest in Indonesia. However, some NGOs (i.e. AMAN) still think the CBFM scheme is not a fair solution for customary communities whose forest has been taken over by the state, as such they insist on a special acknowledgment outside the CBFM scheme.

As CBFM groups have become stronger, they are starting to form an umbrella organization and have begun to interact with one another to share and learn. This entails regular meetings between CBFM groups and government officials. No official entity has been set up, but according to WARSI this is likely to take shape in the next coming years.

WARSI and IUCN have noted that one of the benefits of establishing the CBFM scheme is in the mapping of forest resources and boundaries. In the Hutan Desa scheme, verifying boundaries is a critical step in the process for granting management rights to the community. During the evaluation team visit, it was found that WARSI field staff had just recently mediated a conflict about village borders between three villages in Batanghari District. However, the opposite conclusion could also be drawn, namely that the mapping of village forests and boundaries is cause for disputes between villages. Poorly defined borders, in combination with an increased interest in the benefits of village forests can cause potential conflict to resurface. This information is based on the evaluation team’s interview with a WARSI village facilitator of Batanghari District who had just mediated the resolution of village boundaries between three villages. In conclusion, establishing boundaries can be a barrier to formalizing the Hutan Desa, as the process is difficult and sensitive and can lead to very positive or very negative consequences.

In West Sumatra, the absence of state acknowledgement of the Nagari customary land regulations up to 2008 caused horizontal disputes within the society. The CBFM scheme mainstreamed by the West Sumatran government through the Provincial Regulation No.16/2008, aimed to accommodate and utilize customary Nagari land for forest conservation. This means that in the process, the provincial government and NGOs working on mainstreaming had to deal with disputes, with possible positive or negative impacts. The CBFM scheme has been hailed by some researchers because it offers prospects for wider use in conflict resolution of forest boundaries. However, for the period under review, there is little evidence from WARSI reports that conflict resolution has indeed occurred, except for a case in Batanghari District. Based on the evaluation team’s interview with a WARSI facilitator, they have just mediated a border resolution among three CBFM villages (Hajran, Jelutih, Olak Besar) which saw Hajran village, whose village-forest area is only 2 percent compared to other villages, receive more forest areas from the two neighbouring villages. Although it seems that the resolution was likely aimed to give Hajran village more incentives to sustain their CBFM program, border issues among the three villages have been solved as for now (although issues over forest area control could emerge in the future).

Gaining formal recognition for Hutan Desa and CBFM is still an extensive process. Even if WARSI’s lobby for a more streamlined process is successful, communities will probably still rely on third-party external assistance in the technical mapping process, navigating procedures and funding the process. For villages where the scheme is in place, successful conservation will rely on the ability of the community group to safeguard forest areas, establish and enforce rules, and deterring destructive practices that may arise from within the village or from neighbouring communities. Granted, for a number of communities they have been victorious against extractive companies, but there is still a

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86 Ibid
88 Interview with Nofri Hidayat, WARSI field facilitator, Jambi, 14 November 2014
way to go in making the forest they have protected an economically profitable to them as a means to sustain their livelihoods.

4.3. Relation with public sector organisations SPO

WARSI’s management has a specific operational strategy for their relationship with the government, which includes different approaches (soft-moderate-hard) based on potential responses. Soft approaches or lobby are considered the most effective in gaining the commitment and attention of the public sector. WARSI also works on gaining recognition by bringing local stakeholders, such as provincial and district leaders, to international forums where they are ‘compelled’ to become the voice and the face for CBFM public relations.

A policy brief produced by ASB suggested that WARSI has been successful in building relations with public sector because their ability in "communicating net benefit at each government level". However, WARSI’s relationship with government also depends on the government’s own political will. In Sarolangun District, WARSI’s assisted proposals still have not passed district approval due to the regent’s inclination to side with mining corporations.

Although Regulations No.6/2007 and No.3/2008, and P.49/Menhut-II/2008 detail how to reconcile forest management targets and livelihood interests of forest communities within the framework of a permanent forest estate, the implementation of the CBFM procedures is complicated. The bureaucracy involved means that it remains difficult for villagers to comply. In 2011, Jambi Province had achieved only 3 percent of its target for designated CBFM, while there was growing international and national pressure and interest for CBFM as a solution to forestry issues (see 5.1). In this regard, WARSI is facilitating the implementation of government policies and practices. WARSI was appointed to be part of the REDD+ Task Forces in West Sumatra and Jambi.

In West Sumatra they have been asked to assist in the formulation of REDD+ strategic plan by the local government. WARSI was also appointed by the Department of Forestry in West Sumatra to help establish and guide a West Sumatran CBFM task-force. What this indicates is that the relations with the local government are mutually beneficial. WARSI provides technical inputs to the government, while as an organization they are able to approach decision-makers and try to influence their agenda.

Overall, lobby and advocacy seems to be the main strength of the WARSI as affirmed by one of its board members: "There is no doubt that WARSI is very good at it". But he also added that WARSI’s tendency to rely on their ability and good relationship with government ‘elite’ may turn them into civil society ‘elite’. According to him, “current field staff tend to take the easy way by approaching only the village leadership instead of the common people”. The evaluation team have not shared these critical views with WARSI’s management team, but from our interview with one of WARSI’s field staff we got the impression that there is some justification of the views of the board member. The field staff currently has to handle 3 villages in a vast and geographically difficult terrain with just a year of experience. During the interview, the field staff reported that he found it very difficult to relate with common villagers whose education background is low, and that for him it works best to approach the community leaders since the villagers are not homogenous and conformist. With regards to public sector relations, the conducive relations with village leaders is positive, however not if this is at the expense of taking into account the views of other groups in the community.

Since the baseline, relations with the district and provincial governments have generally improved and have become more formal. This is a result of WARSI’s appointment as jointly being responsible for forming a CBFM provincial task force in Jambi (2013) and West Sumatra (end of 2012) together with

89 Workshop with WARSI, Jambi, 12 November 2014
92 Interview with Hambali, WARSI board, Jambi, 13 November 2014
93 Interview with Nofri Hidayat, WARSI field facilitator, Jambi, 14 November 2014
BPDAS. This has helped WARSI receive formal recognition of its role to coordinate CBFM. At the district level, WARSI faced constraints with the district of Sarolangun during the baseline due to the government’s inclination to support mining activities. WARSI successfully approached the Forestry Department of the District to build support for CBFM interventions. This in turn resulted in more conducive relations. In South Solok, where a CBFM task force was already in place, CBFM interventions were in fact expanded to four villages due to support gained from the Department of Forestry. These examples illustrate improved relations with local government since the baseline.

4.4. Relation with private sector organisations SPO

In the past, WARSI has undertaken joint efforts with the private sector in the area of ecological restoration and marketing of NTFPs. But since 2012 until the present, they have not had similar relations. During the evaluation workshop, WARSI’s director reported that such forms of collaboration are no longer continued since they are considered to be ineffective.

P.49/Menhut-II/2008 provided opportunities for village communities, customary communities, and small holders to use protected-forest edge areas. However, the complicated bureaucracy gives private sector companies an advantage in navigating regulations and procedures. With WARSI working with communities to ‘win the race’ against private sector control of forest areas, WARSI continues to be perceived by most private sector actors, especially mining and plantation corporations, as a threat or a competitor in land tenure authorization.

4.5. Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations SPO

In obtaining CBFM permits, the process begins with WARSI assisting villages in mapping exercises to determine their socio-economic characteristics, define spatial boundaries and map forests and biodiversity. WARSI then assists the villages in establishing forest managing groups through a consultative process. These are administrative requirements to obtain the Hutan Desa permit. WARSI then helps these groups navigate through bureaucratic terrain at different levels: district, province and Ministerial level to apply for the permit. However, this bottom-up approach would not be sufficient if WARSI did not work on the top-down policy level as well. WARSI has been working on both approaches, and worked with other IUCN-NL grantees to simplify the official procedures to obtain the official recognition for CBFM.

At district and provincial level, WARSI’s lobby activities include facilitating regular dialogue between CBFM groups and the related stakeholders, promoting forest managing groups to convince local government of their ability (for example by convening both parties at national forestry conferences), and persuading district and provincial governments that village forests will benefit both the community and the government. All authorized CBFM permits required district and provincial governments to submit a proposal (containing recommendations to grant the permits villages) to the Village Forest Agency of the Ministry of Forestry. As such, it can be said that WARSI has contributed to turning district’s and provinces’ political will and policy in favour of village communities.

WARSI has successfully lobbied for Batanghari and Sarolangun district governments in Jambi to form Pokja PHBM (CBFM task forces) dedicated to helping village communities apply for CBFM permits94. The regent of South Solok District, West Sumatra has also decided to further support a long-term Village Forest Management Plan and has allocated funds from the 2014 annual budget to support the plan (IDR 1.2 billion). WARSI has influenced the local government to give special attention to village communities.

In West Sumatra, WARSI seems to have been more successful in influencing the provincial government. On 20 March 2012, West Sumatra proposed to be selected as priority province for the national REDD+ program, clearly stipulating CBFM mainstreaming as their strategy. The proposal was approved in May 2012, and in response the province issued a REDD+ Provincial Strategy and Action

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94 Workshop with WARSI, Jambi, 12 November 2014
Plan (SRAP) in January 2013. WARS! was part of the REDD+ Task Force that formulated the strategic planning, with Rainal Daus (WARS! program manager for IUCN's supported CBFM program) mentioned as one of the SRAP's authors. In June 2012, West Sumatra also issued a social forestry development plan for 2012-2017 as well as a CBFM mainstreaming roadmap covering the same period. The roadmap stipulated the formation of a village forest task force at the provincial level responsible for accelerating the implementation of village forest schemes in West Sumatra. The document also mentioned WARS! as the only CSO working with the Provincial-level Watershed Management Bureau (BPDAS) to develop the task force. It is clear that WARS! was instrumental in the issuance of both policies, and surely contributing in keeping both policies in-line with one another.

An external study conducted by ASB found that since procedures for the application and approval of village forest status involves the village, district, provincial and national government; only cases providing net benefits at each level will be approved. The study further noted that there are still forces, especially at the national level, that do not support such schemes but that active interest of agencies involved in REDD implementation “tipped the balance in favour of supporting a village forest showcase”.

Despite these positive findings, it is hard to judge whether such achievements should be attributed to the support to WARS! from REDD+ related interventions or from the EA. It is clear that REDD+ is a factor behind policy influence. However, WARS! reported this achievement in their report to EA as well as in the evaluation workshop. WARS! explained that the presence of WARS!’s CBFM efforts in West Sumatra (which were supported by IUCN) was a contributing factor to the selection of the province for REDD+ implementation. As discussed in under other indicators, WARS! considers the interventions to be complementary. For example, IUCN funds were used to lobby the West Sumatra government to attend international forums.

WARS!’s joint advocacy with other EA grantees have successfully simplified the procedures to obtain village and community forest licenses. Ministry of Forestry Regulations No. 89/Menhut-II/2014 and No. 88/Menhut-II/2014 accommodate three of the four policy recommendations put forth by WARS!, namely: input on simplifying district and provincial procedures, CBFM work plan format simplification, and obligatory community facilitation. The proposed simplification in steps for area designation steps at the Ministerial level have not been taken up into these regulations.

4.6. Influence upon private sector agencies’ policies, rules, regulations SPO

In Jambi province, WARS! have hypothetically blocked a number of private sector companies from gaining forest and land usage rights in at least 10 villages along the Batanghari watershed. However, technically the opportunity still exists if CBFM groups fail in protecting the village forest or if they become inactive. The area covered by village forests is just a tiny fraction compared to those given to corporations. As such it could be said that WARSI-led civil society resistance has not been considered a significant threat from the private sector’s perspective. There are currently 25 village forests in Jambi covering only 54,978 hectares, while there are 853,430 hectares of forest land authorized to 18 corporations.

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In West Sumatra the situation is more complicated as forest management by Nagari is based on customary rules and traditions. Until 2011, the private sector was actually never a serious threat for forest conservation because the Nagari Land customary law and resulting disputes are too complicated to deal with. But, the Ministry of Forestry issued a Decree No.304 that created chances for the private sector because it redefined some protected forest areas (including those proposed by the community as *Hutan Desa*) into Limited Production Forests. WARSİ has until so far successfully protected 9 villages from private sector organisations. Also WARSİ’s success in convincing governments to mainstream CBFM also implies that they do not favour the involvement of the private sector.

5. Civil Society context

5.1 Coping Strategies

As the first nation to declare its commitment to voluntarily reducing carbon emissions, REDD+ may have changed the face of the Indonesian forestry policy environment. WARSİ’s program since 2009 is mainly geared to benefit from such change. For example, REDD+ encouraged the Indonesian Government to declare a forest moratorium via Presidential Instruction No.10/2011 which cited forest boundary conflict resolution as a priority. In addition, Indonesia’s anti-corruption agenda led by the Corruption Eradication Committee or KPK also encouraged forest conflict resolution as a priority. As the CBFM scheme offers great prospects in resolving disputes over forest areas, WARSİ has successfully utilized the momentum in 2012-2013 to lobby the West Sumatra province to mainstream CBFM in their forestry policy.

At the end of 2011, the Ministry of Forestry issued a Decree No.304 to amend the status of forest areas in West Sumatra. Under the decree, some protected forest areas in South Solok were redefined as Limited Production Forests. This includes an area proposed by the community as *Hutan Desa*. The change from protected forest to limited production forest is an opportunity for communities to apply for *Hutan Desa*, but also a threat because it has allowed six iron ore and gold mining companies to obtain exploration licenses. As a reaction, WARSİ increased their assistance in Solok and South Solok District from 2 to 9 villages. In Jambi, WARSİ CBFM proposals in Sarolangun district had been stalled by the regent who favoured mining corporations. In response, WARSİ lobbied the Forest Department to establish a CBFM Task Force to put pressure on the district leadership.

For better or worse, WARSİ has capitalized on the increasing interests of international donors in forestry issues. WARSİ seems to be aware of their advantageous position in being able to leverage their experience to gain funding support.

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104 “1206-First 6 months report of IUCN-Warsi-Final”, WARSİ, p. 3
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