Combine Resource Institute end line report

MFS II country evaluations, Civil Society component

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This report describes the findings of the end line assessment of Combine Resource Institute (CRI) in Indonesia that that is a partner of Hivos.

The evaluation was commissioned by NWO-WOTRO, the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research in the Netherlands and is part of the programmatic evaluation of the Co-Financing System - MFS II financed by the Dutch Government, whose overall aim is to strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. Apart from assessing impact on MDGs, the evaluation also assesses the contribution of the Dutch Co-Funding Agencies to strengthen the capacities of their Southern Partners, as well as the contribution of these partners towards building a vibrant civil society arena.

This report assesses CRI’s contribution towards strengthening Civil Society in Indonesia and for this exercise it used the CIVICUS analytical framework. It is a follow-up of a baseline study conducted in 2012. Key questions that are being answered comprise changes in the five CIVICUS dimensions to which CRI contributed; the nature of its contribution; the relevance of the contribution made and an identification of factors that explain CRI’s role in civil society strengthening.

Keywords: Civil Society, CIVICUS, theory based evaluation, process-tracing

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The Centre for Development Innovation accepts no liability for any damage arising from the use of the results of this research or the application of the recommendations.
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SurveyMETER and CDI are thanking the staff and the leaders of all Southern Partner Organisations that participated in collecting information for the evaluation of the contribution of these partner organisations to creating a vibrant civil society in India. They also thank the Co-Funding Agencies and the Dutch Consortia they are a member of for making background documents available. We hope that this evaluation can support you in better positioning yourself in the Civil Society Arena of Indonesia.
### List of abbreviations and acronyms

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMARC</td>
<td>World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCI</td>
<td>Basic Capabilities Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPJS</td>
<td>Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial (Social Security Organizing Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPPT</td>
<td>Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi (Agency for Assessment and Application of Technology)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS</td>
<td>Badan Pusat Statistik (Central Agency on Statistics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDI</td>
<td>Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>Co-Financing Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFO</td>
<td>Co-Financing Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combine</td>
<td>Community Based Information Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRI</td>
<td>Combine Resource Institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combine</td>
<td>Community Based Information Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development, UK Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster risk reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOI</td>
<td>Government of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and communications technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDEP</td>
<td>Indonesian Development of Education &amp; Permaculture Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDEA</td>
<td>Institute Development and Economic Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAI</td>
<td>Institut Studi Arus Informasi (Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of Information)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamkesmas</td>
<td>Jaminan Sosial Masyarakat (National Health Insurance for the Poor and Near Poor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jarpuk</td>
<td>Jaringan Perempuan Usaha Kecil (Women in Small Business Network)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIL</td>
<td>Jaringan Islam Liberal (Liberal Islamic Network)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRKI</td>
<td>Jaringan Radio Komunitas Indonesia (Indonesian Community Radio Network)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSDF</td>
<td>Japan Social Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KID</td>
<td>Komisi Informasi Daerah (Regional Information Commission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komnas HAM</td>
<td>National Commission for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFS</td>
<td>Dutch co-financing system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoC</td>
<td>Model of Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoH</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKBI</td>
<td>Perhimpunan Keluarga Berencana Indonesia (Indonesian Family Planning Association)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNPM</td>
<td>Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (National Program for Community Empowerment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>Perseroan Terbatas (limited Liability Company)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSF</td>
<td>PNPM Support Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relawan TIK</td>
<td>ICT Volunteer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRI</td>
<td>Radio Republik Indonesia (Radio Republic Indonesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanggar MeTIK</td>
<td>Studio for media and information-communication technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sekber</td>
<td>Sekertariat Bersama (Joint Secretary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIAR</td>
<td>Saluran Informasi Akar Rumput (Grassroots Information Channel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SID</td>
<td>Sistem Informasi Desa (Village Information System)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERF</td>
<td>Social Economic Rights Fulfilment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>Suara Komunitas (Voice of the Community)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SPO  Southern Partner Organisation
SSI  Semi-structured Interview
ToC  Theory of Change
Tikus Darat  *Tim Informasi Komunikasi untuk Situasi Darurat* (Information Communication Team for Emergency Situations)
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
Wageningen UR  Wageningen University & Research Centre
WWF  World Wildlife Foundation
Yayasan SETARA  SETARA Foundation
1 Introduction

This report presents the civil society end line findings of Combine Resource Institute (CRI), a partner of Hivos in Indonesia under the Dutch Consortium People Unlimited. It is a follow-up to the baseline assessment carried out in 2012. According to the information provided during the baseline study, Combine Resource Institute is working on the theme ‘governance’.

These findings are part of the overall joint MFS II evaluations carried out to account for results of MFS II-funded or co-funded development interventions implemented by Dutch Co-Funding Agencies (CFAs) and/or their Southern Partner Organisations (SPO). They also intend to contribute to the improvement of future development interventions. The civil society evaluation uses the CIVICUS framework and seeks to answer the following questions:

- What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?
- To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
- What is the relevance of these changes?
- What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The CIVICUS framework that comprises five dimensions (civic engagement, level of organization, practice of values, perception of impact, and context influencing agency by civil society in general) has been used to orient the evaluation methodology.

Changes in the civil society arena of the SPO

In the 2012 – 2014 period the two most important changes that took place in the civil society arena of the SPO are related to ‘level of organisation’ and ‘perception of impact’.

With regards to ‘level of organisation’ CRI did not further expand its 2012 network, but it intensified its collaboration with the Indonesian Community Radio Network, which is an emanation of CRI. The division of roles became clearer and both organisations joined efforts to implement a National Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM) Support Facility-funded project which engages community radios in monitoring this government’s program and to work towards the revision of the Broadcasting Law. CRI has sustained its resource base after Hivos withdrew in March 2014.

With regards to ‘perception of impact’ both progress has been made on the performance of Suara Komunitas (SK), a web-based citizen journalism platform, and on the collaboration with local governments.

Between 2012 and 2014, the number of contributors to SK has increased from 665 to 856 entities including community radios. In the same period the number of articles per contributor increased from 4 in 2012 to 5 in 2013, whereas the number of readers increased with 7 percent.

The capacity of the community radios to defend the interests of their listeners is said to have improved, however they and SK are not (yet) capable to engage in lobby and advocacy activities and to follow up on issues that are escalating on the online website.

The most important relation that CRI has had with the public sector in the 2012 -2014 period consists of the further implementation of the Village Information System in more than 200 villages. These systems are expected to improve the transparency at village level and encourage citizens to claim their rights in the near future.

These findings were obtained through an analysis of documents, a workshop with the SPO, and several interviews. These interviews were conducted with: CRI; external resources persons working in civil society organisations that receive support from the SPO; other civil society organisations with whom the SPO is collaborating; public or private sector agents and; external resource persons with knowledge of the MDG or theme on which the SPO is concentrating.
Attribution question
Based upon an analysis of the projects and programmes financed by the Dutch CFAs a selection was made of SPOs to be included in an in-depth process tracing trajectory and those to be included for a quick contribution assessment. Combine Resource Institute was selected for a quick assessment.

The first outcome that we looked at was the increasing participation of CRI’s intermediate organisations in a web-based citizen journalism platform, known as Suara Komunitas (SK), as demonstrated by the increasing number of new contributors, articles produced, and website visitors. Such changes are important as they reflect an improved level of organisation among intermediate organisations, as the citizen journalism platform allows them to produce, share, and reflect upon information of grassroots interest. The pathway that most likely explains this outcome is the presence of a supporting network of several organisations including CRI to strengthen their capacity and critical interest. The existence of the online platform and a general trend that people have increasingly access to the internet are conditions to achieve the outcome. CRI’s contribution consists of providing and maintaining the citizen-journalism website, and working through the network to mobilize and increase the capacity of community radios to participate in such a platform.

The second outcome that we looked at was the Ministry of Health’s willingness to validate beneficiary data and emend the issuance of health insurance as stipulated in a letter issued by the government (Ministry of Health Letter No.149/2013 on Jamkesmas Participation). In response to CSO actors’ actions, which entailed collecting and disseminating information on the issue, the validation of beneficiaries is important evidence that these actions impacted public sector practices. However, it seems that in this case there is more evidence to suggest that these changes occurred as a result of the interventions from a coalition of government and CSO actors rather than CRI’s actions that entailed supporting the escalation of the issue to enforce public pressure and demand. Although CRI also claimed to have facilitated the coalition, there is no evidence that the coalition would not be effective without CRI’s support.

Relevance
Interviews with staff of CRI, with external resource persons, with the liaison officer of Hivos, as well as contextual information helped to assess the relevance of CRI’s interventions in terms of: its Theory of Change (ToC) for Civil Society (CS) as designed during the baseline study; the context in which CRI is operating; the CS policies of Hivos.

With regards to the baseline ToC, the interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant because each represents one of the ToC’s two major preconditions (critical engagement and quality policy).

With regards to the context in which CRI is operating, its interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant because it provided measures for more civil society actors to use, produce, and share information relevant to grassroots communities to defend their interests, and by doing so were able to improve public sector delivery of services as one example of successful impact.

With regards to the CS policies of Hivos, CRI’s interventions and outcomes are relevant because they are in line with Hivos’ direction regarding the strategic use of information and communications technology (ICT). Hivos sees this as a shared area of interest with CRI: both seeking to encourage the use of ICT, as a creative and innovative response to development issues.

Explaining factors
The information relates to factors that explain the changes in CS, CRI’s contribution to these changes, and the relevance of its interventions. Information was collected simultaneously with data collection for the previous questions. Apart from searching for explaining factors related to these evaluation questions, the evaluation team was also informed about other important factors such as the organisational performance of CRI, relations with Hivos that might have had an effect on its performance or external factors.

The most important factors that explain the changes in the civil society dimensions are related to the context, which has laid the groundwork for these changes to be possible. First, since the political reformation in 1998, the government has normatively shown an increased political will toward improving public services. Nonetheless, the delivery of services is far from satisfying, further exasperated by the size of the nation and the devolution of power. Since the political transformations in the late nineties, many local NGOs emerged claiming a watchdog function. Indonesia has since joined the era of open information and the boom in ICT. Civil society organisations, like CRI and
others, have been able to capitalize on these changes by making use of, producing, and disseminating information. At the same time, the parliament and legislative are increasingly losing credibility as representatives of the people. This situation has put greater stakes and expectations on the civil society movement.

The second, CRI’s contribution to changes in civil society, are explained by Hivos’ continued support since 2005 to CRI’s core programs, which have also been in line with CRI’s ToC. Hivos has also supported both CRI’s organisational development as well as its interventions in potentially politically sensitive matters.

The above findings also relate to factors of CRI’s own internal organisational capacity and focus. High staff turnovers; obsolete strategic planning; and the absence of dedicated monitoring and evaluation personnel are examples of CRI’s organisational capacity issues that need to be addressed. Their decision to take on the responsibility of developing the critical awareness of their target groups requires a large number of personnel to master many issues. The nature of CRI’s role as a “network operator” means that they are privy to many demands from their network and intermediary organisations calling for their intervention, which may stretch their focus and resources. This has also led the organisation to explore new areas of programmatic work, such as disaster risk reduction, which may be to the expense of more core program areas.

The following chapter briefly describes the political context, the civil society context and the relevant background with regards to the governance issues CRI is working on. Chapter 3 provides background information on CRI, the relation of its MFS II interventions with the CIVICUS framework and specific information on the contract with Free Press Unlimited. An evaluation methodology can be found in Appendix 2; however, deviations from this methodology, the choices made with regards to the selection of the outcomes for contribution analysis, as well as difficulties encountered during data collection are to be found in Chapter 4. The answers to each of the evaluation questions are being presented in Chapter 5, followed by a discussion on the general project design in relation to CS development; an assessment of what elements of the project design may possibly work in other contexts or be implemented by other organisations in Chapter 6. Conclusions are presented in Chapter 7.
2 Context

This paragraph briefly describes the context Combine Resource Institution is working in.

2.1 Political context

Indonesia’s political context changed drastically when Suharto’s New Order regime came to an end in 1998 which opened the possibilities for civil society to start playing its role in society. This paragraph briefly describes the political contexts of the past decades, and ends with an overview of the most important recent changes.

2.1.1 Brief historical perspective

Indonesia’s rise to being the world’s third largest democratic nation has been lauded by many world leaders. The county is often considered to be a model Muslim democracy. As the fourth most populous nation with an estimated 250 million people, Indonesia has sustained its democratic commitment since transitioning from an authoritarian leadership to a democracy in 1998. The decentralized administration now consists of 34 provinces and 508 districts and municipalities.

Prior to 1998, Indonesia was under strict authoritarian regime. Suharto, known for his so-called New Order (1966-1998) regime, ushered in radical transformations that would place social and political forces under direct state supervision. The defining characteristics of the Suharto era were a focus on economic growth and controlled consensus and political stability devoid of dissent. A series of tumultuous economic and political transitions in the nineties severely diminished the credibility of ageing President Suharto, who was forced to resign amidst mass street protests.

His departure in 1998 laid bare three decades of social inequalities, state-perpetuated abuses against human rights, and a lack of civilian liberties. The regime change opened the way for a period of Reformasi started under the presidency of B. J. Habibie (1998-1999) and continued by Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001), Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001–2004), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014). Restrictions on citizen participation, press freedom and association were removed. Democratic reforms and decentralization led to direct elections, portioned authority, devolution of authority to regional authorities, formation of new political parties and ended the military’s parliamentary influence. The distinct historical periods of the New Order Regime and Reformasi (1998-present) have shaped the emergence of civil society. Defining characteristics are summarized in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political system</td>
<td>Centralized, authoritarian characterized by unipolarity. Golkar as the dominant political party.</td>
<td>Decentralized, democratic. Fragmentation of power and atomization of patronage relationships. Emergence of numerous political parties. Direct presidential elections since 1999. Decentralization altered the political and administrative landscape: 34 provinces, 410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In 1999, there were 27 provinces, 306 districts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 In 2010 the population was estimated to be around 237 million people (BPS 2010 Population Census). The current figure is an estimate from BKKBN and similar figures are cited in the CIA’s World Fact Book and the World Bank.
and around 60,000 villages. districts, 98 municipalities, 6,944 sub-districts and 81,253.

| State-citizen interaction | Benevolent leader, obedient population. Down to the village level, the state permeated society. | Modern political culture marked by diminishing hierarchy between the state and citizens, allowing for citizens to interact more freely. |
| Citizen representation and voice | Strict control of speech, expression and association. CSOs and their networks largely “hiding behind the screen”, operating under state surveillance. A period of growth occurred in 1995-98, as resistance was building. | Burgeoning of CSOs, pressure groups and NGOs following the political euphoria after Suharto’s fall. Indonesian CSOs began to establish new networks internationally. Up until the early 2000s the focus was on state-centrist issues. Later, issues that CSOs were tackling became more diverse, ranging from pluralism, poverty reduction to fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights. |

| Media | No free press, censorship and state-control. Suharto had firm grasp over how to use print & broadcast medias to promote political ideologies. | More vibrant media environment, flourishing of media businesses albeit in control of 12 main conglomerates that are mostly profit-driven and often have political ties. |
| | Limited public and CS use and access to internet until mid-90s. | Twitter nation, widespread social media use. |
| | | Growing realization of the importance of media/free press as the fourth pillar of democracy. |
| Artistic forms of expression | Art and literary censorship conducted by the state. Art forms were a means to reinforce political order. | Greater freedom of the arts and cultural sectors. Organizations able to hold art events more freely. Freedom of expression a catchphrase amongst individuals and artistic groups, but challenged by more conservative members of society. |
| Religious expression and organization | Regime repressed religious groups, especially radical forms. | Emergence of religious groups seeking to restore Islamic values and defend Muslim values. |

With political reforms came greater freedom and space for civic engagement. In the Reformasi period, there was a remarkable increase in the number of civil society organizations, many of which were Islamic in character. In 2000, the Central Agency on Statistics (BPS) recorded around 70,000 registered organizations, compared to just 10,000 in 1996\(^2\). New groups sprang up with donors encouraging activists to establish NGOs they could fund. These organizations were eager to distance themselves from state and often took an anti-government stance. Proliferating CSOs and NGOs have taken advantage of decentralization and greater regional autonomy to engage in public affairs. Civil society and government relations have improved, although both sides remain sceptical of the others’ intentions.

2.1.2 Recent trends in the political context

Indonesia is considered to be a story of democratic success, but it still struggles to realize the benefits of sustained and equitable economic growth. In the political context, the main challenges lie in governing such geographically vast and decentralized country, applying principles of good governance and the enormous task of reforming the country’s bureaucracy.

Although, Indonesia’s ‘big bang’ decentralization initiated at the turn of the century narrowed the gap between local government and citizens, it has also localized political power struggles. While the devolution of authorities relieved tensions between the central government and the regions, it has also created opportunities for corrupt and rent-seeking practices, at the local level. As indicated by Transparency International’s corruption index scores, perceived corruption in Indonesia remains high.


Table 2
Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer survey: Indonesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Corruption perceptions Index Score (0 perceived as highly corrupt and 100 perceived as clean)</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100/182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>118/174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>114/177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Transparency International

In 2013, decentralization was taken a step further with the approval of the Village Law, intended to address weak governance arrangements and empower rural communities to participate politically. The new law could also lead to village elites distorting power relations and misusing government funding if not properly monitored.

Indonesia is still transitioning politically and many challenges lie ahead. According to the 2012 Indonesia Governance Index’s Executive Report, “Indonesia is witnessing a paradox in its democracy. On one hand, a successful opening-up of civil liberty has led to the avalanche of democratic demands across the nation, however on the other hand, democratic institutions’ are inadequately respond to those demands.” Nonetheless, the Indonesian Governance Index, which focuses on measuring provincial governance, does show a general improvement in the performance of the government (political office) bureaucracy, civil society and economic society based on principles of participation, transparency, fairness, accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness between 2008 and 2012. Civil society scores improved the most significantly, while scores for bureaucracy rose slightly.

Table 3
Indonesia Governance Index: Average provincial scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arena</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>5.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucracy</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>5.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>6.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Society</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>5.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.kemitraan.or.id/igi

In the past decade, Indonesians have generally enjoyed a freedom to participate in the political process through a direct-election mechanism. However, in September 2014 lawmakers voted in favour of a bill reviving indirect elections of regional heads. The controversial vote provoked public outcry which saw peaceful protests and the public voicing their discontent through social media. In early October, just before the end of his term, president Yudhoyono issued a regulation in lieu of the law, effectively repealing the law until further judicial review.

The recent 2014 elections which marked the end of Yudhoyono’s 10-year term, demonstrated that Indonesian voters are increasingly voting for popular figures irrespective of political party alliances. While practices of corruption, vote-buying and poor voter administration remained in the recent election, the public seems to have matured politically, indicated by the enormous interest in televised debates between the leading candidates. The appeal of the newly sworn in President Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, has come from his hands-on, man-of-the-people approach. As Jokowi begins his five-year term he will need to start addressing a myriad of challenges that include corruption, stagnant economic growth, and human rights concerns, particularly with respect to the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and religious intolerance. If left unaddressed, these challenges could seriously undermine Indonesia’s stability and democratic reforms.

2.2 Civil Society context

This section describes the civil society context in Indonesia that is not SPO specific but in line with the information sources used by CIVICUS.5

2.2.1 Socio-political context

Today, there are tens of thousands of civil organisations in the country6, comprising of religious organisations, unions, mass-based membership organisations, ethnic groups, professional associations, politically affiliated organisations, NGOs, and other community organisations.7 CSOs in Indonesia work on wide range of themes. Thematic areas recently prominent include democratization and human rights; issue-based campaigns; protecting economic, social and cultural rights; promoting community access to basic services; environmental and natural resources management, and; climate change and disaster risk reduction. In 2012, the Ministry of Home Affairs documented more than 65,000 organisations, of which around 9,000 were officially registered with the Ministry.8 A year later, the figure increased to more than 130 thousand foundations, associations, NGOs, research institutions, and other organisations.9 It is worth noting that NGOs in Indonesia are also allowed to establish cooperatives or SMEs, of which there are 203,701 with a membership reaching 35.2 million people.10 Under recently reinstated Law No. 25/1992 concerning cooperatives, the cooperatives’ objectives are to improve the welfare of its members and participate in developing the economy.11 Given these regulations it is possible to expand the definition of civil society to include cooperatives.12

The civil society stage has become more diverse; the stage is now “shared with more players, like political parties, religious organisations and universities, all able to speak out and publicize their views in a multitude of media outlets that have sprung up in recent years.13 NGOs and civil society in Indonesia are now starting to deal with the dissolve of traditionally-compartmentalized roles and responsibilities as their activities begin to overlap with those of the government and private sector. As one recent report stated, “NGOs that were united against Suharto are now without a common enemy and something to unite them to a common vision.”14 While the government has come to recognize that “a strong civil society is an important contributor to both launching and sustaining a transition to democratic governance”15, NGOs and CSO networks continue to be scrutinized and criticized for being vehicles of foreign intervention.

Despite the considerable number of organisations, those operating effectively are likely to be a small proportion.16 The accountability and transparency of CSOs and NGOs themselves has also come under greater scrutiny. “Donors have started to become impatient with some of their NGO counterparts, who have difficulties accepting that they now have to fulfil much greater demands”17. In recent years

6 Under state law, there are two forms of organisation recognized legally: “yayasan” or foundations, and “perkumpulan” or associations. The main difference between foundations and associations is that the latter is member-based and in the way they are governed internally and under law. A large majority of NGOs in Indonesia are private foundations.
7 NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles and Innovations edited by Lisa Jordan, Peter van Tuijl
8 Source: http://www.koran-jakarta.com/7112-1000-ormas-perbarui-pendaftaran. This figure is similar to 2010 data provided by Rustam Ibrahim in An ASEAN Community for All: Exploring the Scope for Civil Society Engagement, FES 2011.
9 Source: http://kesbangpolbulukumba.info/berita---sambutan---dirjen-kesbangpol2013/2012/07/19/ormas-di-dalam-dan-luar-negeri
dan, somatisasi-undang-undang-2013.html
11 A cooperative is defined in Article 3 as: “an economic organisation of the people with a social content (character) having persons or legal cooperative societies as members, farming economic entity as a collective endeavor based upon mutual help” (FAO, A study of cooperative legislation in selected Asian and Pacific countries).
14 STATT NGO Sector Review 2012
15 Evolution and Challenges of Civil Society Organisations in Promoting Democratization in Indonesia
16 Rustam Ibrahim comments on this in FES 2011
17 Ibid
foreign donor funding has depleted, which has led to more organisations turning to the private sector and government programmes.

Since 1985 the state has regulated member-based, citizen organisations under a Mass Organisations Law making it obligatory for social organisations to register with government. This law was largely ignored in the period of reform following 1998. However, in 2013 the law was replaced by a new controversial Mass/Societal Organisations (Ormas) Law No. 17, reinforcing control of foundations and associations. The Law could be used to prohibit or dissolve CSOs. Many NGOs and civil society networks deplored the Law for constricting democratic space and the freedom of civil society. The 2014 Freedom House Index’s ratings for civil liberties in Indonesia declined from Free to Partly Free as a result of the new law\(^{18}\).

### Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arena</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom status</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Partially Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political rights</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil liberties</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [http://www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)

The 2013 CIVICUS report hinted that the legislation could be part of the state’s reaction to a perceived threat that environmental, land rights and indigenous activists pose to political and economic interests due to the "shadowy connections that can exist between transnational corporations and politicians” in the agriculture extractive and construction industries.

The annual Freedom of the Press Index produced by Freedom House illustrates that Indonesia’s media remains “partly free”. From 2011 to 2012 there was significant numerical improvement from 53 points to 49 with the reduction of restrictions and a greater ability of journalists to cover news more freely. From 2012 to 2014, the country’s rating remained steady at 49, with slight changes in global ranking (2012: 97th, 2013: 96th, 2014: 98th).\(^{19}\)

Overall, the press system in Indonesia is vibrant, with a wide range of news sources and perspectives, further growing with the developments in digital media. “Indonesia’s online growth in recent years is recognised as nothing short of phenomenal” (Matt Abud 2012). While the Internet is seen as a new space for debate and participation, current laws still curtail openness, accessibility, inclusiveness and place limits on its use for expression. Only a limited number of organisations like ICT Watch are addressing freedom of expression and online rights. Nonetheless, citizens are using cyber space to set up online communities and organize campaigns. Some recent examples include the commuter movement ‘masukbusway.com’ aimed to capture and shame traffic violators in Jakarta.

Less progressive sources of rhetoric can be found amongst a number of hard-line religious groups and leaders, such as Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front or FPI), who have links with traditional religious schools (pesantren) and recruit members through these and online networks. Radical groups organize frequent protests to apply pressure on the government and are a threat to diversity and freedom.\(^{20}\)

#### 2.2.2 Socio-economic context

At a macro-level, Indonesia’s socio-economic situation has been improving. The country is a regional and global economic force, and has recently graduated to lower-middle income country (LMIC) status.


\(^{20}\) The Limits of Civil Society in Democratic Indonesia: Media Freedom and Religious Intolerance, Kikue Hamayotsu. Journal of Contemporary Asia, March 2013
Table 5

Indonesia’s Rank & Score: UN Human Development Reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>HDI Rank (scale 1 – 187 for all years except 2010 out of 169)</th>
<th>HDI Value</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth (years)</th>
<th>Mean years of schooling (years)</th>
<th>Expected years of schooling</th>
<th>GNI per capita (2011 PPP$)</th>
<th>Gender Inequality Index (value &amp; rank)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>0.671</td>
<td>Medium human development</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>7,802</td>
<td>0.680 (2008 data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>0.640</td>
<td>Medium human development</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>8,201</td>
<td>0.505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>0.681</td>
<td>Medium human development</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>8,601</td>
<td>0.494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>0.684</td>
<td>Medium human development</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>8,970</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Human Development Report 2014 & Explanatory Note for Indonesia

In recent years, Indonesia has consistently been ranked in the medium development category of the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI) measuring a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. In 2013, the HDI value was 0.684 with a rank of 108 out of 187 countries and territories. However, the value falls to 0.553, or 19.2 percent, when taking into account inequality. Indonesia’s HDI is above its peers in the medium development category but below the average of 0.703 in East Asia and the Pacific. The Gross National Income (GNI) per capita is steadily rising to US$ 8,970, a remarkable feat considering it was just 2,931 in 1980. Despite improvements, the 2014 report and its explanatory note show that growth is slowing and the country has yet to achieve equitable growth. For example, women only hold 18.6 percent of the seats in parliament, 10 percent fewer women reach secondary education compared to men, and women’s labour market participation is 51.3 percent compared to 84.4 percent for men.

The Basic Capabilities Index (BCI) produced by Social Watch offers a picture of the status of key human capabilities of accessing basic services. It utilizes three main indicators: under-five mortality rate, births attended by skilled personnel, and enrolment of children up to the 5th grade. Countries are categorized into five groups accordingly based on their BCI values: 1) Basic: 98 and over; 2) Medium: from 91 to 97; 3) Low: from 81 to 90; 4) Very Low: from 71 to 80, and; 5) Critical: values below 70. Results for Indonesia saw stable or improving scores for child and maternal health, but a regression for education. While no data beyond 2011 is available, other data sources confirm that Indonesia still has high maternal mortality rates but basic education through primary school enrolment is improving.

Table 6

Indonesia’s Rank & Score: Basic Capabilities Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Children reaching 5th grade</th>
<th>Survival up to 5</th>
<th>Births attended by skilled health personnel</th>
<th>BCI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>87 (low)</td>
<td>96 (medium)</td>
<td>73 (very low)</td>
<td>88 (low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>94 (medium)</td>
<td>96 (medium)</td>
<td>79 (very low)</td>
<td>90 (low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>86 (low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>74 (very low)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Social Watch

Indonesia does not fare too well on the Social and Economic Rights Fulfilment (SERF) Index. In 2012 Indonesia achieved 67.86 percent of protecting social and economic rights. Although there was an improvement compared to 2011 values, performance worsened when compared to 2010. The country consistently preforms poorly in the areas of right to food and right to work, although it improved in fulfilling rights to education.

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Table 7
Social and Economic Rights Fulfilment (SERF) Index Values: Indonesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>SERF Index Value</th>
<th>Right to Food</th>
<th>Right to Health</th>
<th>Right to Education</th>
<th>Right to Housing</th>
<th>Right to Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>67.86</td>
<td>45.33</td>
<td>83.95</td>
<td>95.19</td>
<td>64.26</td>
<td>50.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>65.71</td>
<td>45.01</td>
<td>85.16</td>
<td>93.43</td>
<td>63.88</td>
<td>41.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>69.29</td>
<td>45.75</td>
<td>85.95</td>
<td>93.82</td>
<td>65.88</td>
<td>54.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Social Watch, Core Country SERF Indices 2010, 2011 and 2012 (Note that 2010 data was adjusted in 2013).

Trends in the country’s Economic Freedom Scores produced by The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal are also rather bleak. From 2010 to 2014 the country has been categorized as ‘Mostly Unfree’, with only a small increase in its score from 55.5 to 58.5.23

These macro-level figures illustrate the complexity of the socio-economic context. While the economy has grown, 65 million people remain highly vulnerable to shocks. Disparities in income and geographic areas remain, made more complex by the number of people ‘floating’ between the poor and middle class’.24

2.2.3 Socio-cultural context

With respect to the socio-cultural context it is of interest to look at global indices that provide some insight into the level of trust between ordinary people and the extent to which tolerance exists. On a whole, Indonesia has been able to maintain peace as indicated in the improvements in scores recorded by the annual Global Peace Index. In 2010, the country scored 1.950 on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being the best score. This has gradually improved to 1.853 in 2014, with a rank of 54 out of 162 countries. Nonetheless, inequality, socio-economic conditions and rights claims (especially land rights) are still a source of localized incidences of conflict in Indonesia. Between 2010 and 2014 there has been a rising incidence of resource and identity-based conflicts as well as vigilantism.25

Amongst other components, the Social Progress Index published in 2014 examines whether there is opportunity for individuals to reach their full potential by scoring four different components: personal rights; personal freedom and choice; tolerance and inclusion; and access to advanced education. Indonesia scores low in this regard, at just 43.86 out of 100 and ranking 92nd out of 132 countries. Freedom of religion, tolerance for immigrants and religious intolerance are all considered to be weak (red), while the majority of the components are scored as neutral (yellow).

The Edelman Trust Barometer Survey, which collects annual data from 33,000 respondents in 27 countries has shown that on aggregate, Indonesians’ confidence in nongovernmental organisations, government, media and businesses increased by 10 percent in the 2014 trust index. Interestingly, businesses, with 82 percent, are the most trusted of the four sectors compared to 73 percent for NGOs, 53 percent for government and 73 percent of respondents putting their trust in the media.

23 http://www.heritage.org/index/
24 World Bank’s Indonesia Development Policy Review 2014
25 Data from the National Violence Monitoring System: www.snpk-indonesia.com/
According to survey results, Indonesians believe businesspeople are more inclined to tell the truth than their government counterparts and three times more likely to fix problems.  

The trends in levels of trust in NGOs over the past four years are noteworthy. In 2011, the trust level was at 61 percent, decreasing to 53 percent in 2012 and 51 percent in 2013. Reports claimed this was due to a lack of transparency and accountability. Edelman reported that the trust levels in 2013 were the lowest amongst eight Asia Pacific countries surveyed, ascribed to the growth of horizontal, peer-to-peer networks and a preference for social media. The most recent results released in 2014 show substantial jump to 73 percent in 2014 which is attributed to NGOs now being able to ‘walk the talk’ in accountability and transparency, as well as the emergence of ‘corporate NGOs.’

2.3 Civil Society context issues with regards to governance theme

Several important changes took place during the 2011 and 2014 period. First, the global financial crisis and Indonesia’s rise to a middle-income country led to a decrease in international donor funding. Development actors, including CSOs and NGOs, have to compete harder for funding. Some have been more successful than others in diversifying funding by turning to the private sector or private foundations. At the expense of past idealism, local NGOs are now more disposed to receiving funding sources which in the past may have been criticized as supporting neoliberalism.

Regulatory changes also affected the civil society arena positively and negatively. Amongst the more controversial laws to spark reaction was Law No. 17/2013 on Societal Organisations. In an open letter sent before the bill was enacted, CIVICUS said the law would undermine freedom of association and “prevent CSOs from working on sensitive topics related to good governance and democratic reform in the public interest.” FORUM-ASIA deplored the repressive provisions in the law that “leave all groups vulnerable to attacks, undermining the hard-won democratic space that has been forged by civil society since the end of the New Order regime.”

Other laws passed that provoked criticism were the State Intelligence Law (October 2011) and the Social Conflict Law (April 2012). NGOs and media see these laws as imposing further restrictions on freedom of speech, potentially leading to the criminalization of human rights defenders and signifying a tightening of state control. Discriminatory content was also an issue in discussions on the Religious Harmony Bill in 2013, for which drafting was initiated in despite not being part of the planned National Legislative Program. Late in 2013, the House of Representatives came under fire again for its weak stance against religious intolerance when it re-endorsed a law that limits state-recognized religions to six.

The French NGO Reporters Without Borders published a report showing that Indonesia sank from position 117 in 2010 to 146 in 2011 with regards to press freedom: Increasing cases of intimidation, threat and violence (including kidnapping and killing) against journalists explain this decline. Other relevant trends related to media and journalism consist of the spread and penetration of internet and ICT technologies across the country expecting to rise to 33 percent by the end of 2013; the lack of

28 Jakarta Globe (Indonesians Trust Businesses More Than Govt Survey Shows)
widespread practical and professional journalism education; corruption affecting Indonesian media and journalism ethics.\textsuperscript{31}

3 CRI and its contribution to civil society/policy changes

3.1 Background of CRI

Community Based Information Network (Combine) started in 1999 as a program. In 2001, it became a resource institution. CRI’s vision is to provide access to knowledge and resources to communities so that they are in a better position and have stronger relationships with the government and private sector. CRI aims to achieve “civic literacy” or autonomous communities able to be part of decision-making processes, especially as a means to exercise control in the public sphere. In order to do that CRI encourages the community’s capacity as a knowledge producer though practicing ICT and empowering community network. Between 2001 and 2004 CRI’s efforts focused on creating community forums (forum warga) in several pilot areas. These forums became instruments for community-oriented problem solving. It was also in this period that CRI began to incorporate the use of ICTs in its work. Community radio was introduced as a working tool in 2003, becoming a core of CRI’s interventions. CRI’s services in those years ranged from providing resources, expertise, training, and research specifically related to information systems, community-based journalism, and community organising. In 2004, when community radio stations reached a significant number, CRI began their initiative to integrate and link the various stations with the help of internet which led to establishment of Suara Komunitas in 2008. This aided in increasing the flow of information by creating ICT platforms that helped hundreds of community radios in Indonesia interact and communicate to escalate issues. By doing this, CRI expects to engage strategic stakeholders, such as decision and policy-makers. In the plan for the 2012-2014 period, CRI intended to take another step forward by raising critical awareness of citizen journalism platforms ready for engagement with the public sector, providing them with ammunition to act (i.e. ‘act upon information’).

Based out of Yogyakarta, CRI carries out interventions across the country relating to four main programs areas that seek to have the following impacts:

1. Suara Komunitas (Voice of the Community): Power of information is realized to encourage the settlement of grassroots, community issues. Suara Komunitas is an interactive online platform used to promote citizen journalism and information exchange;
2. Pasar Komunitas (Community Market): Grassroots economic empowerment by means of the stimulation of information-based market transactions;
3. Lumbung Komunitas (Community Barn): Local governance capacity improvement by means of setting up village database systems; and
4. Tikus Darat (Information Communication Team for Emergency Situations): Disaster risk reduction (DRR) through the creation of a mitigation information network.

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36 Hivos, Intake form Combine Resource Institution
CRI’s organisational staffing structure endured some changes in the 2012-2014 period. CRI currently has 34 staff members, 11 more than during the baseline, managing the four programs. It has a board of directors, consisting of a president and five members; an IT department; and a R&D department.

CRI has been a partner of Hivos since 2005-2006. Objectives of previous collaboration were to increase the diversity of information and knowledge produced by community, increasing the performance of CSOs in managing and sharing resources and knowledge, and improving the performance of small medium enterprises by developing product and market quality. The 2012-initiated collaboration supported through MFS II was the third formal cooperation between Hivos and CRI. It focused specifically on supporting CRI’s Suara Komunitas (SK) program. Suara Komunitas’ aim is to become a strategic medium in supporting advocacy for the fulfilment of basic rights of citizens. It focuses on strengthening the community radio stations in Indonesia via the strategic use of ICT to drive act upon information by relevant stakeholders. As such, the 2012-2013 Hivos program is named as ‘Act Upon Information’.37

Besides Hivos, CRI received funding support for SK from Ford Foundation and a multi-donor trust fund managed by the World Bank aimed to support the government’s National Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM Support Facility).38 Since its establishment CRI has collaborated with numerous development of funding agencies, including TIFA Foundation, World Bank, WWF, Indonesian Government Agency for Assessment and Application of Technology (BPPT), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Department for International Development of the UK (DFID), and disaster risk reduction (DRR)-related partners like Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Japan Social Development Fund (JSDF), CARE International, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters (AMARC).

CRI cooperates with a host of other civil society organisations and platforms such as the Indonesian Community Radio Network, known locally as Jaringan Radio Komunitas Indonesia (JRKI); Fahmina and Institute Development and Economic Analysis (IDEA) in the area of advocacy, and; Air Putih, ICT Watch, Satu Dunia, and Relawan TIK (ICT Volunteers) on mainly ICT issues.

3.2 MFS II interventions related to Civil Society

Hivos supported CRI via a project named the ‘Act Upon Information’ in the 2012-2014 period, which specifically aimed to improve SK. By the end of 2013, SK counted 856 contributors, of which 307 were community radio actors. The SK website has been visited 169,390 times in 2013 onto which content produced by its contributors was uploaded. On average, some 368 articles and written pieces were uploaded each month. Contributions came from 60 districts in 20 provinces.39

Through the project, CRI sought to facilitate community media in Indonesia to communicate more widely with strategic stakeholders by utilizing an online information and communication platform. CRI’s target group included 287 community radio stations, linked in the Suara Komunitas network that was launched in 2008. The contract with Hivos specifically reinforced the SK program, aiming to support around 30 community radio stations located in six regions and 300 community journalists. Communities, radio stations, and women’s cooperatives were the expected beneficiaries of the program.40 In November 2012, an additional € 8,200 was provided for supplemental work aiming to influence the revision of Broadcasting Law No. 32/2002.41

To achieve this, CRI planned to conduct content analysis and dissemination; strengthen the capacity of community journalists and radio stations; expand Suara Komunitas membership; strengthen CSO

40Intake form Combine Resource Institution & Act Upon Information Proposal, Hivos
41“Memo Budget Amendment 1004708”, Hivos, 2012
capacity in the ICT field; contribute to policy discussions on the revision of Indonesia’s broadcasting law; and improve internal organisational development.\(^{42}\)

Below are the deliverables (or performance indicators) that were agreed upon in CRI’s contract with Hivos:\(^ {43}\)

1. The “act upon information” in the issues brought up by community media facilitated by CRI is established in at least two regions.
2. The capacity of 150 community journalists, editor, managing staff and the organizations of community media is improved in at least 30 community radio stations in six regions.
3. Expanding Suara Komunitas members in Lampung, West Sumatera, Southeast Sulawesi, North Sulawesi, southern part of West Java and Riau.
4. Sanggar MeTIK established itself as the medium to learn about ICT for civil society organizations.
5. Ability of Hivos’ partners (SETARA women’s cooperation and Women in Small Business Network or Jarpuk in Bantul) on the use of ICT has increased.
6. Improved internal organizational development, specifically in internal mechanism and capacity building for management staff members.
7. Consensus and support from wider civil society (organization) towards the better revision of Broadcasting Law are developed.
8. Routine discussions are established between the actors of community broadcasting with the House of Representative members, especially the first commission and government.

CRI’s interventions relate most closely to the CIVICUS dimensions of ‘perception of impact’ and ‘level of organisation’. With regards to the first dimension, SK transitioned into an online platform to which CRI’s community radio network are contributing. Of interest is the extent to which SK managed to mobilise community organisations to use information to demand for their rights. As was mentioned in the baseline report, CRI has undergone a number of changes in the last decade, which to some extent have been a natural transition as CRI and its network grew. From a focus of expanding its network, CRI moved towards introducing ICT to community radios, and lastly towards increasing political engagement through SK and its network. CRI’s role in strengthening the civil society arena of community radios has thus been crucial.

### 3.3 Basic information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8</th>
<th>Basic information Combine Resource Institute</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Details</strong></td>
<td><strong>Name of SPO</strong> : Combine Resource Institute (CRI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Start date of cooperation</strong> :</td>
<td>2005-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MDG/Theme</strong> :</td>
<td>Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contract period</strong> :</td>
<td>February 29, 2012 - December 30, 2013, extended to March 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other donors if applicable</strong> :</td>
<td>Ford Foundation (360,000 US$) and PSF (around 250,000 US$) that supported Suara Komunitas.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Project documents

\(^{42}\)Project documents and Hivos contract

\(^{43}\)Partner Contract Hivos RO SEA at HO 1004708*, Hivos, pp 1-6 and ”Memo Budget Amendment 1004708”, Hivos, 2012, pp. 7-8

\(^{44}\)Costs that relate to civil society development or policy influence are those costs that possibly contribute to the development of the CIVICUS dimensions, excluding coordination and office costs; staff costs and financial reserves.
4 Data collection and analytical approach

4.1 Adjustments made in the methodology of the evaluation

The evaluation process started with an input-output-outcome analysis that utilized reports and other documents from the SPO. For CRI the analysis was based mainly on two project progress reports, which did not report against results or indicators systematically. As such, the evaluation team was only able to benefit partly from the input-output-outcome analysis for process-tracing.

The evaluation team followed the operational guidelines to a great extent, but was unable to have a workshop with all of CRI sub-groups as only executives and program managers attended the workshop. In practice the workshop lasted five hours, with the CRI executive only participating for half of the workshop period.

The evaluation team was unable to get averages or scores for each subgroup as participation was not consistent and staffs were hesitant to give scores due to a lack of confidence in undertaking critical self-assessment. The in-country team assigned the scores and then ran them past CRI to confirm the scores. When discussing outcomes, CRI wanted to focus on the positive outcomes and on proving that they were capable of influencing public sector.

Another obstacle was the recent staff changes that CRI has undergone. The CRI director has only been working with CRI for six months, and was recruited externally. Since the new director has limited institution knowledge, the in-country team conducted a follow-up interview with the SK program manager, rather than the director, as the most knowledgeable staff available to discuss the outcome selection and initial steps for in-depth tracing process.

4.2 Difficulties encountered during data collection

During data collection the team experienced the following difficulties:

- Workshop participants did not really understand, nor were they familiar with the CS indicators or the CIVICUS framework. They found it difficult to relate Combine’s situation with the indicators, especially since none of them participated in the baseline process. This lessened the effectiveness of the workshop.
- At the end 2013, CRI’s director changed and the organization experienced high staff turnovers. At the time of the end line, the longest serving program staff had been with the organization for just one year. The departing staff had much of the institutional knowledge and networks. As a result, current CRI staff provided the team with resource persons/respondents who were not always appropriate or relevant.
- CRI has not had a dedicated department or personnel for monitoring and evaluation. As such, it added difficulties to find hard data and affected the agreement on the outcomes.
- CRI has never had an evaluation conducted by an external party before (except the MFS-II baseline and end line) which affected their lack of preparation and minimum understanding of common evaluation practices.
- The evaluation team developed an online survey tool which was disseminated through SK, by e-mail, and through Facebook. However, in a month’s period only 25 responses were received from a possible population of 865.
- Due to insufficient information acquired during the initial steps of the tracing process, the model of change had to be revisited often to be revised based on new information found by the evaluation team, which consequently meant that the evaluation team had to collect new evidence for the amended model of change.
• Hard data to show how many people benefited from the consolidation and validation (i.e. correction of invalid data) of recipients of the government’s health insurance program (Outcome 2) was not available with CRI or with the Department of Health. The CSO coalition that was instrumental in achieving this outcome also did not monitor the impact of its work.
• There have been staff changes in Hivos’ Regional Office for Southeast Asia. The current programme officer for the Expression and Engagement portfolio was not in charge of CRI during MFS II, and was only able to provide limited information with regards to the relevance of CRI’s intervention to the CFA’s priorities. Thus the relevance section is mostly based on a review of available documents.

4.3 Identification of two outcomes for in-depth process tracing

The first outcome is increased participation of community radios and community journalists in the SK online platform. The outcome was selected with the following considerations:

• It was one of several outcomes that all workshop participants agreed to as being a significant change.
• It is one of the most important elements in CRI’s Theory of Change constructed during the baseline assessment in 2012
• Since this outcome is an indicator of increased level of organization, it can also be used to measure the extent of CRI’s civic engagement as CRI depends substantially on its target groups’ level of organisation.
• As one of the outcomes from CRI’s proposal to Hivos, the evaluation team expected fewer difficulties to find supporting evidence.

The second outcome selected was: *Jaminan Sosial Masyarakat* (National Health Insurance for the Poor and Near Poor or Jamkesmas) beneficiary validation by the government’s health department). This health insurance system was managed by the Ministry of Health since 2009 and is notorious for excluding people who claim to have a right to the benefits due to often erroneous beneficiary selection. The reasons for choosing this outcome are:

• It was one of the two available examples of impact on public sector policies or practices, while CRI’s ToC and proposal specifically referred to this outcome as a critical element of their work.
• The other outcome provided was related to the SID program which was no longer supported by Hivos.
• CRI cannot provide strong evidence for their other outcomes as it was poorly monitored, and there was no available research from CRI or external parties that could be used.

The decision to focus on outcomes related only to the SK program was based upon the following considerations:

• According to baseline, SK is CRI’s most strategic program to which all other CRI programs can be integrated or connected.
• SK receives the largest funds from three major donors; Hivos’ support being almost exclusively for the SK program.
• In line with CRI’s new strategy to delineate mandates between CRI and the Indonesian Community Radio Network (Jaringan Radio Komunitas Indonesia or JRKI), SK is the only program where CRI and JRKI have shared target groups.

Based upon an analysis of the projects and programmes financed by the Dutch CFAs, four strategic orientations for civil society were identified, two of which were selected for each SPO for in-depth process tracing. CDI suggested to the country team to look at the selected strategic orientations. For CRI, both outcomes matched with civil society orientations in multiple ways: ensuring that the organisations that receive support from the SPO (intermediary organisations) are capable of playing their role in civil society; strengthening the relations with other organisations in civil society to undertake joint activities, and; influencing policies and practices of public or private sector organisations. Also, based on CRI’s ToC, each outcome represents “critical engagement” and “quality policy”. Both preconditions are related and sit at the top level of the ToC. Therefore it was of interest to see whether there was a relation in practice and whether both were realized by CRI’s contributions.
5 Results

5.1 Overview of planned and realised outcomes

Table 9
Overview of results achieved in relation to project plan CRI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planned results</th>
<th>Level of achievement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective 1 The occurrence of the follow-up actions undertaken by stakeholders at the regional level on issues/concerns raised by SK</td>
<td>Partially achieved: a number of issues escalated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective 2 SK able to reach target audience</td>
<td>Insufficient data available to conclude level of achievement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective 3 Development of the capacities of reporters, editors, managers and organization of SK</td>
<td>Partially achieved: From target of 150 people from 30 radio stations, only figures available for 2012: 99 people trained in journalistic skills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective 4 SK Network expansion</td>
<td>Achieved: Number of contributors grew from 543 in 2011 to 856 in 2013. In 2013 there were 169,390 visits to the SK website, compared to 152,513 in 2012. Number of articles/content published grew from 2,957 in 2012 to 4,631 in 2013. Unclear how any community radio stations were members in 2012, but currently 307 contribute to SK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective 5 Sanggar MeTIK becomes a vehicle for learning and media (ICT) for the strengthening of civil society</td>
<td>Not achieved: Sanggar MeTIK’s activities were limited to providing trainings to high-school students.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective 6 Women’s cooperatives - Koperasi Wanita Setara &amp; JARPUK - to use media and ICT to support the production and expansion of market access</td>
<td>Achieved: training provided to the cooperatives on how to use internet for small business promotion and using social media to build networks. (Overlap with Pasar Komunitas program).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Additional) Objective 7 Advocacy on revision of Broadcasting Law No. 32/2002</td>
<td>Partially achieved: Although JRKI provided substantial inputs to the draft revision of the Law and advocacy activities carried out in 2012, Law has not been revised.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


With regards to assessing planned versus achieved results for CRI, it should be noted that the proposal submitted to Hivos, contract signed between the SPO and the CFA, and the project budget were not sufficiently aligned. In addition, the support from PSF and Ford Foundation to the Suara Komunitas network also has an impact on attributing realised outcomes to MFS II interventions.

5.2 Changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?

5.2.1 Civic Engagement

Civic engagement describes the formal and informal activities and participation undertaken by individuals to advance shared interests at different levels. Participation within civil society is multifaceted and encompasses socially-based and politically-based forms of engagement.

CRI has not changed the way it engages civil society since the baseline. The SPO does not position itself as the frontline defender of marginalised groups. Rather, CRI works with its intermediate

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45SanggarMeTIK’s Twitter account was established at the end of 2011 and only successfully had 3 Tweets and 9 followers. No new feeds since 2011. Twitter, “Sanggar Me TIK”. Available from https://twitter.com/SanggarMeTIK (accessed 1 November 2014)
organisations, in this case community radios, to promote citizen journalism so that alternative and credible grassroots information is brought into a public space through the internet platform of Suara Komunitas. CRI hopes that this form of journalism will be able to influence authorities and other stakeholders. Since 2012, there has been a 25 percent increase in the number of SK contributors, 37 percent of which are community radios. Since Suara Komunitas is an open, online network, many others have joined and contributed content. Members include NGO representatives, individuals and bloggers. Furthermore there has been an increase of 7 percent in the number of web visitors and 56 percent increase in articles produced.

CRI claims that community radios have become more involved and more capable in taking part in Suara Komunitas. While the SK structure now has an ethical board, executives, editors, and contributors, CRI was responsible for appointing individuals to these positions and the platform still relies on CRI for funding. At the same time, SK’s leadership has requested greater decision-making roles in managing funds. CRI’s management claimed that the SK program was formulated together with the target groups, however there is no evidence of greater participation of community radios or other contributors in program planning.

From 2009-2012, Hivos also funded interventions to develop Village Information Systems or Sistem Informasi Desa (SID), which provided villages with a platform to collect and store more accurate information. The project started as a pilot project in three villages, spreading to more villages in Central Java and Yogyakarta provinces in 2010. Hivos no longer funds these initiatives, but with the support of Ford Foundation, UNDP and other development partners, SID has been replicated to 221 villages across 5 provinces in 2013. Through SID there is greater transparency of data at the village level.

In both program areas, SK and SID, CRI sees itself as a connector, facilitating the sharing of information by providing ICT-based solutions to be used in communication or lobby to policy-makers. On its own, CRI does not have any direct political engagement and does not have a defined lobby or advocacy agenda. This has not changed since the baseline. CRI does provide inputs to JRKI on lobby issues, such as the revision of Law No. 32/2002 Broadcasting. In addition, CRI worked with Grassroots Information Channel (SIAR) and with Sekber Jamkesmas to lobby for a validation of Jamkesmas beneficiaries in 2013.

Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2
Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 1

5.2.2 Level of Organisation

This dimension assesses the organisational development, complexity and sophistication of civil society, by looking at the relationships among the actors within the civil society arena.

Since the baseline, CRI has not expanded its network with other CSOs. Informal networks with Yogyakarta-based NGOs such as PKBI, KID, IRE, and IDEA have been maintained. Collaboration with these networks is subject to opportunities arising from funding resources or on issues that are relevant to Suara Komunitas and community radios. CRI’s own networking capacity is likely to have been affected by high staff-turnover rate in 2013-2014, which saw staff with personal relations to Yogyakarta-based NGOs leave for positions elsewhere.

CRI’s relation to its closest partner and ‘younger brother’, Jaringan Radio Komunitas Indonesia (JRKI), the official umbrella organization for community radios in Indonesia, is evolving. Set up in 2002 with CRI support, its capacity as an organization has grown over time and CRI is now trying to delineate a clear distinction of roles between it and JRKI. CRI sees itself as a resource provider and JRKI’s role as expanding the network of community radios, providing technical support and registration of newly established stations. Despite a clearer distinction of roles, JRKI is still dependent on CRI for programs and funding. In 2014, the intensity of engagement with JRKI has increased due to collaborative efforts in implementing a National Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM) Support Facility-funded project which engages community radios in monitoring this government’s program.

Another area of collaboration with JRKI has been on the revision of the Broadcasting Law. Both CRI and JRKI have a joint interest in providing inputs to a new legislation. Additionally, JRKI has assisted CRI to recruit more collaborators for the Suara Komunitas platform. However, JRKI has also been
critical of SK, as in their view it may pull community radio activists away from their core area of work, namely producing audio-content, to producing written material for the SK website.

CRI claims that between 2012 and 2014, community radio capacity to defend the interests of the communities they represent has improved through their participation and contribution to SK. Community radios’ participation in SK has indeed improved as illustrated by the increase in contributors (including female contributors), production of content, and web page visitors. Respondents to a SurveyMETER-commissioned questionnaire said that their networking capacity has increased since joining Suara Komunitas. Respondents attributed this improved capacity predominantly to CRI. Despite improvements, CRI does not have a system in place to monitor satisfaction of SK contributors or to monitor the extent to which follow-up actions were undertaken as a result of issues raised on the SK platform.

But the survey results also revealed further demands for improved networking amongst the platform members (See Appendix 5 for detailed responses to the questionnaire). Suara Komunitas contributors who responded to the survey noted a number of areas where they expect CRI to play a role. These include more effective network capacity to follow up on issues raised through SK with relevant stakeholders, including developing skills in advocacy. CRI has identified a number of advocacy issues that could be part of joint advocacy support to community radios in September 2014. But it is still unclear how CRI will work with the community radios through the SK platform on these issues. The results of the process-tracing conducted for outcomes achieved by CRI since the baseline suggest that producing content on issues and increasing media coverage is not sufficient for changes in policies and practices to occur. Direct lobby and advocacy and partnership with other CSOs are also required and should be planned and budgeted for. It has taken CRI considerable time to prove its ToC (‘the act upon information’) through the Jamkesmas beneficiary validation; and it took funding from a donor to push for this achievement.

According to CRI they are now working with a smaller program budget than during the baseline, as a result of the discontinuation of Hivos funding. However, the extent to which this has indeed impacted heavily on the financial resource base of the SPO is unclear, as CRI has attracted sizeable funding from the Ford Foundation as well as contributions from the PNPM Support Facility (PSF), USAID, Misereor and others. Hivos was their second largest funder, thus going forward, CRI may indeed need to expand its resource base further. There will likely be opportunities for CRI to excel in the area of ICT. On a critical note, the evaluation team found that there were overlaps in funding. For example, the outcome achieved with regards to Jamkesmas beneficiary validation has been claimed by CRI to be a result of Hivos funding, although it is clear that Ford Foundation funds contributed to pushing the agenda forward.

Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2
Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): 1

5.2.3 Practice of Values

Practice of Values refers to the internal practice of values within the civil society arena. Important values that CIVICUS looks at such as transparency, democratic decision making, taking into account diversity that are deemed crucial to gauge not only progressiveness but also the extent to which civil society’s practices are coherent with their ideals.

There has been no significant change in the downward accountability of CRI since the baseline. Quarterly meetings between the executive and the board continue to take place. None of the board members are constituents from community radios. CRI has also begun to make their annual reports accessible to the public. These reports contain some statistics about the share of donor contributions to their programs. CRI does not have a dedicated division or staff for monitoring and evaluation. Annual audits are performed, in line with CRI’s code of conduct; although they are still financed by donors.

As a follow up to the baseline assessment conducted for MFS II in July 2012, a series of strategic planning meetings were held to improve CRI’s overall direction. However since then, many of the former staff have left and this may influence the future direction of the SPO.

Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: 2
5.2.4 Perception of Impact

Perception of Impact assesses the perceived impact of civil society actors on politics and society as a whole as the consequences of collective action. In this, the perception of both civil society actors (internal) as actors outside civil society (outsiders) is taken into account. Specific sub dimensions for this evaluation are the extent to which CRI has contributed to engage more people in social or political activities, has contributed to strengthening CSOs and their networks, and has influenced public and private sector policies.

CRI does not monitor the satisfaction of its beneficiaries or target groups. CRI maintains that there is an increasing level of satisfaction of SK members and contributors. This has also been shown from the survey conducted for this end line evaluation. 88 percent of the respondents agreed that CRI contributed to facilitating/creating a network around them. 87.5 percent of the respondents believe that SK has unique features and that content is not like mainstream media news in that it is more relevant for the grassroots level. While many contributors joined SK for its potential to act on information, only 52 percent now perceive it as a benefit of joining SK. Although 68 percent said that there has been adequate follow-up toward escalated issues on SK, there is a disparity between the original expectations and the perception of current impact. CRI and SK do not properly monitor the extent to which SK has been utilized to urge a follow up of issues by the government or private sector. This has made it a challenge for the evaluation team to substantiate claims with evidence from specific cases. CRI and SK should invest in putting in place systems to measure the effectiveness of the SK platform.

With regards to the satisfaction of community radio, CRI admits that some may be less satisfied than during the baseline. They ascribe this to the repositioning and a new style of management that has taken root within CRI itself and see disappointment as a natural reaction to change. Without a monitoring system and no community radios represented in the board or organizational structure it is difficult for CRI to evaluate their performance vis-à-vis their community radio network, and even more difficult to track whether the community radios they have supported have improved their service delivery to grassroots populations. There is little evidence of the positive changes brought about by the SK network, other than the validation of Jamkesmas beneficiaries. CRI sees the successful Jamkesmas case as evidence for its ability, together with its network (SK and SIAR) to influence the public sector. But, issue of erroneous Jamkesmas beneficiary lists was not an issue that SK members urged CRI to take action on, rather CRI selected the case as an area of intervention to prove their theory of change (act upon information). As such, the increased coverage of the issue through Facebook, Twitter, community radio broadcasts and SK was very much driven by CRI (and to an extent the donor). Even in this case the issuance of a letter by the Ministry of Health on grassroots participation in beneficiary validation cannot be attributed to CRI efforts alone. CRI joined a coalition of other organisations led by the Yogyakarta Ombudsman, named Sekertariat Bersama Jamkesmas, to lobby the Ministry of Health. It is likely that the change would have occurred even without CRI’s involvement since pressure from different groups had been building since 2012. The evaluation has not been able to trace how many people benefitted from this correction of beneficiary lists, since none of the actors involved maintained records.

While we do not doubt that there may have been other results from the work of community radios and SK at the local level, there is no sufficient evidence to substantiate this. What is clear is that there has been an increase in community radio participation in SK, and that in general community radios are positive about the benefits of the platform, especially in creating a network with other SK contributors. CRI is still regarded as reputable resource organization in the area of community media development, specializing in community radios.

CRI’s collaborates with local governments at the district and village level for the purpose of implementing their village information systems. More villages are using these systems since the baseline. CRI, together with other NGOs, have also been involved in networks to lobby for change in public sector policy and practices, like in the Jamkesmas case. CRI also supported JRKI’s collaboration with a number of CSOs to lobby for revisions of the Broadcasting Law. In this process, JRKI approached a party faction leader from Commission 1 of the National Parliament (Komisi 1 DPR) to
lead discussions on the revisions. Unfortunately, discussions of the revision have not been a priority for the government.

CRI does not attempt to engage directly with the private sector or in activities that may influence the private sector, other than where they interfere with community radios’ ability to broadcast. Through the development of ICT systems, CRI has tried to link the economic potential of villages to the private sector to attract more investments or support the value chain of local products. CRI admits that SK and other information systems have yet to generate transparency in private sector practices and policies. The evaluation found no concrete trace evidence of concrete results in documentation provided, and did not assess potential results in this area.

| Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: | 1 |
| Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): | 0 |

### 5.2.5 Civil Society Environment

The social, political and economic environment in which civil society operates affects its room for manoeuvre. The civil society context has been described in chapter 3. In this section we describe how CRI is coping with that context.

During the 2012-2014 period, CRI and JRKI managed to stay engaged in discussions around the policy environment. This is especially important given that some legislation is limiting how social media and ICT can be used as a space for citizen engagement and freedom of speech. Although revisions to the Broadcasting Law were not passed in this period, JRKI and CRI did attempt to make meaningful contributions to a more enabling environment. Another example of this is CRI’s and Indonesian ICT Volunteers’ (Relawan TIK) membership to the Indonesian Civil Society Organizations’ Network for Internet Governance (ID CONFIG) which seeks to facilitate exchange amongst CS actors working on Internet governance issues.

CRI has also repositioned in itself in the current context. Following the baseline evaluation in 2012, strategic meetings were undertaken to sharpen the focus on encouraging a more knowledgeable society and a responsive state. CRI now sees itself increasingly as a connector between the state and the community level, bridging the gap with ICT and media platforms. With an increased utilization of online media and information technology by the general public and the government, this is an important niche to fill.

| Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3: | 2 |
| Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2): | 1 |

### 5.3 To what degree are the changes attributable to the Southern partners?

Two outcomes were selected to measure the degree of MFS-II effectiveness. These were:

- **Outcome 1:** Increased community radio participation in Suara Komunitas. This outcome relates to capacity of intermediate organisations to play their role in civil society.
- **Outcome 2:** Ministry of Health’s willingness to validate national health insurance beneficiary data as stipulated in Ministry of Health Letter No.149/2013 on Jamkesmas participation. This outcome relates to the strategic orientation of policy influencing.

#### 5.3.1 Increased participation in Suara Komunitas

*The outcome achieved*

Indicators for increased community radio participation in Suara Komunitas consisted of changes in the number of contributors, topics, articles, visitors, and contributor satisfaction. From 2012-2013 the number of contributors increased with 35 percent to 833 contributions; the number of visitors increased with 7 percent, the number of articles that were produced increased with 56 percent and the number of articles per contributor increased with 25 percent (source: Project documents).
SurveyMETER also developed an online survey to capture the views and attitudes of Suara Komunitas contributors. Most questions were multiple choice, to anticipate a combination of possible answers. 88 percent of the 25 respondents that participated in the online survey reported that if SK had not existed, they would have missed out on certain benefits. 72 percent of contributors said they joined SK to escalate issues expecting follow-up from relevant stakeholders. When comparing the motivation for joining SK with the benefits respondents said they received after joining, there was a disparity. While 72 percent of the respondents joined SK because they so urge an "act upon information”, only 52 percent of the respondents found this benefit to be realized. There is also a disparity between expectations upon joining and perceived benefit in the area of relevance of content produced. However respondents did report that they benefited from an improvement in their network. Also JRKI confirms that SK has been successful in attracting more contributors from community radios, to such extent that may even disrupt their own broadcasting activities (source: interview with JRKI).

The contribution of SK members to the online survey of SurveyMETER for this evaluation was only 25 out of possible population of 833 persons. The low level of response generated on the SK platform and the better response rates received through Facebook could be interpreted as a lack of participation in online activities, or a preference for regular use of social media over SK.

Causal pathways that explain the outcome
There are three possible pathways that may explain this outcome:

1. In the first pathway, the SK website is maintained and fully operational, enabling the participation of community radios. The SK platform is membership-based, open to anyone to sign up, but also has a managing team that has been appointed by CRI. Hivos funds supported the operations and maintenance of the platform, as well as the connectivity and development of Suarakomunitas.net. In addition to that, there were interventions to strengthen the institutional management of SK member representatives. To reject this pathway, we need evidence that the SK website has not been operational, or that the SK website has been operational without CRI’s support.

2. In the second pathway, SK members have a network that supports their capacity building needs and interests. In order to participate effectively, SK members need to have adequate journalism capacity, critical awareness and interest, as well as the ability to sustain their day-to-day operations (majority being community radios). CRI doesn’t see itself as a single provider for all. Instead, their strategy relies more on the creation of a network around the community radio stations. With such a network, CRI’s strategy is to strengthen only a handful of radio stations as hubs through trainings, that then further support other radio stations in their region. As such, community radios need to rely on a wider network of organisations for capacity development and technical support. The development of community radio capacity can thus stem from different
causes or sources: CRI’s initiative, JRKI’s (the umbrella organization for community radios) interventions, or community radio’s own initiatives. To reject this pathway, we need evidence that members have joined SK with no clear interest or adequate capacity, or that only a small fraction of members attribute their increased interest and capacity to their own initiatives or to other organisations in their network, outside CRI.

3. Lastly, social media trends or the agenda of external actors have driven the participation of members in SK. It is highly possible that members who are internet literate and savvy already use social media and other online mediums/platforms. As such they perceive SK as another form of social media. Some SK members’ are also active in other CSO or NGO-driven networks (for example: WALHI), as such it might be possible that their intention was to use SK as an extension for their own messaging or campaigns. To reject this pathway, we need to prove that SK members have used SK for its unique features of publishing grassroots level information, making it distinguishable from social media. Or we could confirm that members have indeed used SK for their own interests.

Information that confirms or rejects the pathways:

Information that confirms pathway 1:
It’s logical that without operational funds for the website as the platform, there would be no participation at all in SK. CRI allocated IDR 75 million (10 percent of the total budget) for website management, internet, and server colocation in the 2012-2013 period. Since its launch in July 2008, SK has continued to run and be a part of CRI’s programmatic interventions. The Suarakomunitas.net domain was registered in March 2009.

In September 2012, a member-based organizational structure was created for SK as an independent entity, allowing SK to be responsible for operating and managing the citizen journalism website. In the period between 2012 and 2014, new articles and content were uploaded on a regular basis, suggesting that the web-based platform was functioning as intended. SK is run like social media platforms, in that it open to the general public to sign up and become a member. However, SK does remain dependent on CRI for funding support.

Information that confirms pathway 2:
In the multiple-response questionnaire, when asked which organisations contributed to an improved capacity, 72 percent of the 25 respondents felt that CRI contributed toward their increased capacity, while 60 percent attributed this capacity improvement to JRKI. Interestingly, 52 percent of the respondents reported that they built their capacity via self-initiative. So while there are more sources for capacity improvement, most respondents conclude that CRI is the most predominant actor.

CRI did not work alone to recruit more contributors for SK. CRI worked with JRKI to recruit more contributors from the West Sulawesi region. Trainings and workshops were provided to SK contributors in the 2012-2013 period, particularly improving their journalistic skills. In regions where CRI had a network, CRI used a number of community radios with more experience as hubs for other radio stations nearby. These hubs were able to promote SK and mobilize membership of the online platform.

Information that confirms pathway 3:
The spread and penetration of internet and ICT technologies across the country is increasing, with an expected growth of 33 percent in 2013. This represents a general trend that more people are turning to internet and ICT and that radio and television are decreasing in importance as technologies to transfer information.

Information that rejects pathway 3:
96 percent of respondents from the SurveyMETER contributors’ survey think that although SK has a similar function as other social media, SK has unique features that distinguish it from other online or social media. 87.5 percent of the respondents believe that these features lie in the relevancy of the news, because it does not produce content like mainstream media, but news relevant for the grassroots level. 41.7 percent of the respondents think that SK allows for more focused discourse that

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may lead to effective follow-up of issues by relevant stakeholders. 45.8 percent think that SK content is more credible than other social media.

Interestingly, the survey, although distributed through various means, received mediocre levels of response. 24 of the 25 survey responses were collected through Facebook links, and none from a SK web link, which is meant to be a two-way communication platform. This suggests that contributors still prefer to use other social media more regularly.

Not all of the contributors to SK had internet connections prior to 2012. CRI allocated a budget to provide internet connectivity packages (3G modem) to 20 new SK members. This probably helped to increase participation in SK, as the assumption is that those that were provided with internet connections did not have access to online, social media. Although SK grew alongside social media outlets, what drives the participation is the platform’s unique feature (grassroots news). But, internet-based journalism and social media are being used in a mutually contributing manner.

**Conclusion:**

Based upon the analysis of the information available, we conclude that the first pathway, the creation of the SK platform is necessary for increased online participation: it is a condition. Also the third pathway, more people having access to ICT and internet is necessary but not sufficient and hence a condition. The second pathway that consists of capacity building efforts by CRI, JRKI and by the online journalists themselves is a sufficient explanation for increased participation. However, given the fact that only 37% of the contributors consist of community radios, the other contributors may have other strategies in place to build their capacities to participate.

As for causes that lead to pathway 2, the explanation is that CRI’s intervention, JRKI’s intervention, and members’ own initiatives are all sufficient to build supporting networks that enhance member capacity and interests, but each organization on its own is not necessary since the intervention of others can explain the pathway as well. The majority of the respondents of the contributors’ survey attributed their capacity development to a combination of actors, with 72 percent of 25 respondents choosing CRI and 60 percent choosing JRKI.

CRI’s role is important in the outcome achievement, particularly in:
- Providing and maintaining the SK citizen journalism website;
- Creating a member-based management structure that is open for anyone to join. Although it has its own management structure, appointed by CRI through a strategic planning meeting, SK still relies on CRI for funding.
- Providing trainings to developing capacity and interest of SK members; and
- Providing internet connectivity packages for new SK members.

5.3.2 MoH validates data concerning beneficiaries that should be covered by the national health insurance system as stipulated in MoH Letter No.149/2013 on Jamkesmas Participation

_The outcome achieved_

Jamkesmas, a health insurance system managed by the Ministry of Health (MoH) since 2009 has been unpopular nationwide due to the exclusion of people who claim to have a right to the benefits and due to often erroneous beneficiary selection.

Starting from September 2012, CRI began to see this issue as an opportunity to accelerate the achievement of Objective 1 of their logical framework “follow-up actions by stakeholders upon issues escalated in SK”. Hence, with funding secured from the Ford Foundation, CRI commissioned *Saluran Informasi Akar Rumput* (Grassroots Information Channel) or SIAR to conduct a series of actions to engage the Ministry of Health to improve the beneficiary selection for Jamkesmas.

On 20 March 2013, the Health Minister signed a letter (No.149/2013) on Jamkesmas Participation, which allowed Jamkesmas beneficiary data validation to be carried out. In Yogyakarta Province, this allowed several people, who suffered from kidney-failure and could not afford proper health services, to be included as Jamkesmas beneficiaries. The validation of beneficiaries helped those potentially excluded to claim their rights for health insurance coverage. However, it seems that beneficiary validation and retargeting has not happened on a larger scale, mainly because the Ministry of Health (MoH) is transitioning into a new scheme under Social Security Agency for Health (BPJS Kesehatan), which merges all state-insurance providers under a single management and allows open beneficiary
registration (possibly as a reaction of Jamkesmas’ failure). In addition, there is no information available as to how many people benefited from the validation of beneficiaries. Nevertheless, MoH’s willingness to validate Jamkesmas beneficiary data as stipulated in the letter can be seen as a change in public sector practice. CRI claims to have contributed to this change. Other than health beneficiary validation, CRI is unable to provide another strong example of attaining Objective 1. Thus, it is worthy to trace whether CRI’s effort have caused the issuance of the letter.

There are three possible pathways that may explain this outcome:

1. **Causal pathways**

   **Causal pathways**

   There are three possible pathways that may explain this outcome:

   1. **MoH acted on public pressure escalated through the media**: CRI, as well as mainstream media, conducted efforts to drive media coverage to escalate the issue, believing that this would impose necessary public pressure on MoH. To reject this pathway, evidence is required that shows that such pressure had not taken effect, or that such pressure escalation never materialized. We also proceeded with tracing whether CRI media coverage contributed to, and generated, public pressure upon the MoH.

   2. **MoH acted upon lobby and advocacy from different possible CSOs and public sector actors like a Yogyakarta-based CSO platform called Sekber Jamkesmas and parliamentarians from other regions such as Sukoharjo District, Central Java.** CRI and SIAR are affiliates of Sekber Jamkesmas, who agreed to join forces to lobby MoH on the Jamkesmas case. CRI claims to have facilitated several Sekber Jamkesmas lobby activities. To reject this pathway, we attempted to find evidence that MoH reacted upon their initiative. We traced whether MoH reacted specifically upon Sekber Jamkemas’ lobby or upon other CS elements or parliament lobby. Further, we traced whether Sekber Jamkesmas lobby would have worked accordingly without CRI or SIAR facilitation.

   3. **MoH acts upon its own initiative.** To reject this pathway, we needed to prove that there was no media coverage on Jamkesmas issues, and that no CS elements or parliamentarians lobbied for the issuance of a letter. All confirming evidence for the other two pathways would automatically reject this pathway.

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**Information that confirms or rejects the pathways:**

Information that rejects pathway 1 that MoH reacted to public pressure created by media coverage is as follows. Although CRI supported online coverage through Suara Komunitas and social media, as well as radio coverage to pressure MoH into action, CRI reported that there was no (official) response from MoH to the public pressure from media coverage (hereafter called "media pressure"). While there was indeed substantial media coverage of the issue by different media outlets, there is no evidence available to measure the extent to which media pressure on the Jamkesmas issue resulted in the change.

There is no evidence that CRI’s media coverage escalated the issue to cause a response from the readers or audiences and in consequence pressurized MoH to take action. However, it is true that CRI contributed to Jamkesmas being covered in the media (via Suara Komunitas, Twitter, radio and TV broadcasts) and in turn that more people in the public probably read or heard about the issue.

Information that confirms pathway 2 that dialogue and more traditional forms of lobby by Sekber Jamkesmas and other CSOs in Yogyakarta, as well as pressure from parliamentarians in other regions resulted in the outcome are as follows. Sekber Jamkesmas, led by the Yogyakarta Ombudsman and joined by CSOs like PKBI, CRI and SIAR, began lobbying MoH in February 2013 to review practices on beneficiary selection and validation. Sekber Jamkesmas produced a policy brief that was disseminated six days after the MoH signature on the letter on 20 March 2013. There is no evidence that Sekber Jamkesmas’ lobby prior to the issuance of the letter in March 2013 had an effect.

There is also no evidence that Sekber Jamkesmas would not have been able to lobby without CRI or SIAR facilitation. A member of Sekber Jamkesmas pointed to conducive personal relationships amongst members of Sekber Jamkesmas as the main driving factor behind their success. However, he did not deny that CRI and SIAR may have facilitated several meetings and hearings.

Based on an internet search of available documents, it seems that problems in the Jamkesmas beneficiary selection caused nation-wide reaction from CS elements and the parliaments as well. In 2012, parliament members from Sukoharjo District lobbied the MoH regarding Jamkesmas beneficiary

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issues. This followed community members submitting complaints to the parliament on Jamkesmas coverage. Evidence of these events can be found in local media (www.solopos.com, www.beritasatu.com and www.harianjogja.com). Thus, it is highly possible that other CS elements and local legislatives had moved before or in parallel with Sekber Jamkesmas.

Information that rejects pathway 3:
Confirming evidence for pathway 2 automatically rejects this pathway.

Conclusion:
Based upon the analysis of the information available, we conclude that the most likely explanation for the Ministry of Health’s willingness to validate national health insurance beneficiary data as stipulated in Ministry of Health Letter No.149/2013 on Jamkesmas Participation is pathway 2, as other pathways are not confirmed. This means that the MoH reacted to direct lobby by civil society elements, including Sekber Jamkesmas, and local parliamentarians from Central Java. This is a sufficient and necessary cause for the outcome. The MoH letter was signed before Sekber Jamkesmas’ policy brief was produced, thus Sekber Jamkesmas lobby is not a sufficient and necessary cause. But Sekber Jamkesmas’ other activities prior to submitting their policy brief might have been taken into consideration by the MoH52. Sekber Jamkesmas’ lobby and that of others CS elements or local parliament are both sufficient but not necessary to explain the outcome as there is no specific evidence to link the actions of certain actors to the change. Moreover, it can also be concluded that CRI’s facilitation for Sekber Jamkesmas is sufficient but not necessary.

CRI’s role was found not to be significant in the achievement of this outcome. First, in pathway 1 CRI did not seem to be successful in generating substantial public pressure through the media that was effective enough to obtain a response from MoH. The evaluation team was not able to find evidence that shows that an increase in media coverage, by CRI’s supported Suara Komunitas, or other media outlets pressured MoH to take action. In pathway 2 while CRI participated in Sekber Jamkesmas as a member and claims to have facilitated a number of meetings, there is no evidence that CRI’s contributions were necessary. PKBI, another member of Sekber Jamkesmas did not recall specifically how CRI contributed. On the other hand it is possible that early lobby by the Yogyakarta Ombudsman, who was later joined by CS elements to form the Sekber Jamkesmas, may have had a more prominent effect. However, there is insufficient documentary evidence to confirm this other than the fact that the MoH letter was issued prior to the production of Sekber Jamkesmas policy brief.

5.4 What is the relevance of these changes?

5.4.1 Relevance of the changes in relation to the Theory of Change of 2012

The outcomes for which process tracing was conducted were relevant to the 2012 Theory of Change (ToC). In fact, the baseline exercise in 2012 helped to inform strategic planning with CRI. The ultimate objective of CRI was for autonomous citizen forums or organisations to be more able to participate in collective decision-making and influence the public or private arena. Preconditions for this change to occur were determined in the baseline as follows:

- Critical engagement with government and civil society organisations, characterised by a constructive and impartial relationship between government and CSO;
- ‘Information native’ society: a society with an adequate capability for knowledge management, characterised by active citizenship, capability to act upon information, and freedom of speech;
- Functional platform for knowledge exchange: sharing of best-practices and lessons learned, characterised by a functional regional platform;
- Networking in information management (same indicator as above);
- Critical engagement, characterised by the active participation of community contributors and their content actuality.

52Ibid.
The evaluation focused on confirming the engagement and participation in SK as a functional platform and the 'act upon information'. What the end line has shown is that CRI has not been able fully prove that the platform has contributed to a more informed civil society successfully making demands for better service coverage by the government. CRI drove the production of content and information on the Jamkesmas issue, rather than the citizen forum, or SK, itself reacting to citizen concerns. This means that while interventions were closely related to the ToC, the preconditions were not fully fulfilled, especially in the area of raising critical awareness so that citizen journalism platforms would be ready to engage with the public sector.

Regarding the participation of community radios in the SK platform, CRI has been a significant force. Not only did they provide technical support, they also managed to successfully draw on their network of community radios to expand membership in the SK platform. Since CRI shares its constituency with JRKI, they too have played a role in creating an informative native society. One aspect not included in the ToC was the potentially negative impacts of SK on traditional audio broadcasting by community radio stations, pulling the attention away from producing audio materials to producing online content. Some members of SK raised this issue during the end line evaluation.

In conclusion, critical engagement and the use of ICT, both key elements of Suara Komunitas, are critical to all of CRI's interventions. However, more efforts will be needed for Suara Komunitas to be more than just a critical content provider. As illustrated in the Jamkesmas case, media coverage alone does not cause a change in policy. It was only in 2012 that SK became and independent entity and further organisational strengthening will be needed if it is expected to 'act upon information' autonomously.

5.4.2 Relevance of the changes in relation to the context in which the SPO is operating

The Reformation period (1998 and onwards) paved the way for journalists to become more critical and made media a more trusted source of public influence. Now, traditional media is making way to new media powered by the internet. Indonesia has approximately 63 million users, almost one-fourth of the total population.53 However, "community radio occupies a unique position in Indonesia’s local media scene, as it has been established and, where successful, sustained through grassroots initiatives".54 As such it has the reputation of being a source of critical information and content. CRI has embraced ICT and media as means to critical engagement and freedom of expression, adapting to the changing context. CRI has sought to combine new ICT developments with its tradition network of community radios. In this sense, in terms of its strategy, it has adapted well to changes in the context. For community radios this is of relevance too, especially given a decrease in radio consumption in recent years.55 However, for some radio stations engagement in SK may be stretching their limited resources to the limit.

Another area where CRI's interventions have been in line with the developing context is through village information systems or SID. In 2014, the government issued the Village Law which requires each village to develop an information system (Article 86)56. CRI has extensive experience in developing internet-based applications to assist the performance of village administrations (SID program). Additionally, CRI was able to leverage the utilization of SK in the policy-making process of

the Village Law in 2012. A parliamentary meeting on the draft Village Bill was open to the general public through SK, allowing citizens to provide live feedback through SMS, Twitter and Facebook. For CRI to remain relevant to these important developments, it will have to think carefully about its position. As discussed in other sections of this report, CRI experienced high staff turnover and is in the process of delimitating its role towards community radios vis-à-vis JRKI. CRI has claimed that it wants to play a connector role. As a ‘resource institute’ it has to consider what resources and vital services it plans to offer to whom; and how this will enhance critical engagement and widen space for representation, balancing traditional media with digital media.

5.4.3 Relevance of the changes in relation to the policies of the MFS II alliance and the CFA

In 2008, Hivos defined a strategy for ‘civil society building’ (CSB). Within the Hivos Vision Paper, Hivos defined civil society as a sphere “outside state, corporate sector and family – where people organise themselves to pursue their individual, group or common (public) interests”. It further states, “Civil society is not restricted to (professional) intermediary, non-governmental organisations; on the contrary, it consists first and foremost of community-based and membership organisations, trade unions, religious organisations, and traditional associations.”

Hivos’ support to CRI fits within the scope of the vision defined in 2008. In particular, Hivos recognized the important emergence of virtual movements that has gone hand-in-hand with the development of communications technology. Virtual networks are considered a form of collective action and a means to promote citizenship. Access to information promotes exchanges between citizens and is a tool to engage with other spheres.

CRI’s ‘Act Upon Information’ initiative falls under Hivos’ Expression and Engagement programme. This programme aims to “improve the quality and diversity of the media, to give more people access to these media, to increase citizen’s participation and to strengthen public support for the independent media.” MFS II funds were intended to support this programme. Two Result Areas defined in the Hivos proposal under the Expression and Engagement programme are relevant to CRI: 1. the space for cultural expression and freedom of speech has been expanded and is actively used, and; 2. the space for citizen engagement in social processes has been expanded, resulting in social debate and cultural dialogue. In the proposal to MFS, Hivos proposed to expand the space for cultural and social expression, improve the quality of information and diversify information sources. Specifically, “ICT & (new) media play an essential role in constructing the desired critical dialogue between government and politics on the one hand and individual and organised citizens on the other.”

Out of four Hivos programmes outlined in the Business Plan, around 70 million (18 percent) of a total planned 387.9 MFS funding was budgeted for the Expression and Engagement portfolio globally. Hivos received 20 percent less of the originally planned total from MFS II. From 2011 to 2013, Expression and Engagement was the third largest out of the four programme areas in Indonesia in terms of annual expenditures (14.4 percent in 2011, 18.0 percent in 2012, and 17.9 percent in 2013).

The changes achieved in the 2012-2014 period with regards to a strengthened media network and online platforms through CRI’s interventions are relevant to the CFA’s own strategy and proposed interventions. Through Suara Komunitas, community radios and other contributors have been given an opportunity to express their opinions and citizens have access to bottom-up information. As explained

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59 Ibid, p. 11
60 Hivos Business Plan 2012-2015”, p. 15
61 Hivos Alliance MFS application 2011-2015 Phase II”, Hivos, p. 4 (English translation)
64 Expenditures by country / by programme taken from Hivos Alliance MFS Reports 2011, 2012 and 2013
in other sections, this has not yet resulted in broad citizen activism; acts upon information through CRI support are still limited to two cases.

5.5 Explaining factors

5.5.1 Internal factors

CRI’s staff has almost entirely been replaced by new people, with just a handful left who were part of CRI during the baseline. The in-country evaluation team considers that high employee turnover may have potentially led to a loss in institutional knowledge, history and networks, which may translate into lower institutional efficiency. With so many employees leaving and or having being replaced, the organisation has been in the midst of recovering from the changes, which has cost time and attention. The absence of a monitoring and evaluation department has not helped this transition either, as knowledge and lesson learned were not properly documented, making it thus the more challenging to retain critical knowledge.

The baseline report and CRI’s ToC expected that with the availability of information, critical awareness would be built leading to actions by grassroots groups or leading to pressure being applied on public or private sector actors. CRI expected this to occur organically. As it has turned out, direct interventions by CRI, such as the participation in Sekber Jamkesmas and pushing for the SK network to cover Jamkesmas cases, is still necessary. The SK program staff have had to manage a broad range of areas and issues, including monitoring the program. This has been quite a burden, in spite of an increase in the number of staff since the baseline.

5.5.2 External factors

SK as a platform for citizen journalism, community radios and the social media; has become more relevant and much more in demand. Civil society movements and government programs (such as BPJS online registration and tax registration) are increasingly making use of ICT and web platforms to produce and disseminate information. The combination of diminished state control over media since the Reformation and rapid technological and infrastructural development of ICT has given rise to these conditions. Indonesia is now the fifth largest Twitter user, and ranks fourth in global Facebook usage. Social media has become more important for civic engagement. The Coins for Prita movement is an example of how public support was rallied in 2009 through social media, drawing volunteers who were willing to collect donations that would help Prita Mulyasari seek justice through the court system. More people also use social media to shape values and opinion of others. The presidential elections in 2014 saw Facebook users openly declare their political aspirations, some trying to influence the choice of others. This has never happened on such a scale in Indonesia before, illustrating the penetration of online media into the daily lives and choices of people.

Alternative media platforms like SK that promote citizen journalism are popular amongst citizens that have become more critical of mainstream media. Many of the large television stations are owned by media conglomerates who are politically connected. In the recent elections, certain mainstream media were blatantly biased in their news coverage, trying to drive public votes to certain candidates. A national TV channel aired false quick count results, and even went as far as falsely declaring the victory of the candidate that received the backing of the television station’s owner.

While there is a global trend which shows that more countries are beginning to limit internet freedom, Indonesia’s internet freedom is not faring too badly: ranked 26th among 60 countries being evaluated as most case found is only related to “political, social, and/or religious content blocked”. CRI has been able to keep abreast with these developments in ICT and internet media, and are even helping to chart a new course. The current environment has been very conducive for the development of the SK

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platform, especially given that it is linked to news sources that are trusts (citizen journalists and community radios).

5.5.3 Relations CFA-SPO

Hivos has supported CRI since 2006. The SK program has received long-term, crucial Hivos support since the very early stages of its development. SK has become an adjoining factor in all of CRI’s interventions; and given the growth of the internet and its relevance, it will only become more important in the future. SK has become the flagship of CRI’s programs, which have now attracted other donors to join Hivos in supporting it.

One of the specific objectives of Hivos’ support to CRI was to develop the SPO’s internal capacity (Objective 6: Improved internal organizational development, specifically in internal mechanism and capacity building for management staff members). In July 2012, CRI directors and managers agreed to the need to improve organizational capacity, and strategic planning meetings were undertaken seemingly with Hivos support. Both the Co Funding Agency and its partner looked to be aware of the need to improve internal capacity. During the end line, it did not appear that interventions had their intended affect. If SK is seen to have not reached its full potential, part of the problem lies with internal management.

Of note is that Hivos discontinued its partnership with CRI because it found that CRI was well positioned and successfully attracting sufficient donor support and no longer required Hivos’ contribution66. Larger donors like the World Bank financed PNPM Support Facility and Ford Foundation are providing much larger and more significant support than Hivos.

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66 Interview with Dyana Savina Hutadjulu, Hivos Programme Officer for Expression & Engagement, 2014
6 Discussion

6.1 Design of the intervention

The Suara Komunitas interventions in the 2012-2014 period were designed to build on the foundations laid in previous support periods. In the design, follow-up actions to issues brought up through community media would be supported. The outputs identified in the logical framework developed by CRI were not sufficient to bring about this main objective. It was not clear how members trained in journalistic skills, the establishment of SK as a membership-based organisation, expansion of membership base, network expansion to including bloggers, technological support, and content analysis and distribution would necessarily lead to the desired change.

Another observation is that the assumptions and preconditions in CRI’s ToC were not sufficient. CRI assumed that creating critical awareness through citizen journalism platforms would ‘naturally’ or ‘organically’ provide ammunition to engage with the public sector and undertake actions. The assumption seemed to be that SK, as a platform, would promote an exchange of information which would lead to interventions undertaken by network members or would spark a reaction from the public or private sphere. What the evaluation showed was that specific actions were needed to bring about the ‘act upon information’. SK members may need more than just critical journalism capacity to use their information to create change. They may need capacity in lobby and advocacy or campaign messaging. In hindsight, more inputs and actions would be required to create a space for interaction with decision and policy-makers. CRI itself could have facilitated this to a larger extent, or SK as an organisation could have played this role if it had sufficient institutional capacity support.

Whether or not there were local actions undertaken by SK members in regions supported by CRI cannot be determined since there were no specific indicators designed to monitor this, nor was there a system in place to capture and report such actions. It is also questionable whether or not SK as an independent organisation can undertake these functions since its social organs are composed of editors and journalists, rather including activist-based or experience lobby organisations.

Last, community radio’s engagement and eagerness to contribute to SK may have led some of them away from their core business, which is producing audio content. This is a risk that could have been anticipated from the start.

From the experiences and practices of the ‘Act Upon Information’, it would be fair to say that the model applied by CRI is replicable. This model entails creating alternative online platforms that allow traditional media (like community radios), citizen journalists and bloggers to express their opinions of issues that are relevant to them. However, more resources and efforts need to go into building skills and ability to utilize these opinions and bottom-up information towards strategic lobby and advocacy agendas. Some small examples of how this can happen have begun emerge, such as the interactive policy debate on the Draft Bill for the Village Law in 2012, which placed SK in a position to challenge the government.

CRI’s other ICT-based interventions, such as the village information systems, are also powerful tools to influence politicians and decision-makers in the need to be more transparent and accountable. SK can also function in similar areas by stimulating contributors to report on specific strategic issues such as corruption or elections. Content and information would have to be systematically compiled, on the basis of which SK or its network could demand for the public or private sphere to be more accountable for their performance.

7 Conclusion

In the 2012-2014 period, CRI identified two important changes in the civil society context to which they claimed to be contributing to. The first change related to and improved ‘level of organisation’ of their community radio constituents through the online platform Suara Komunitas or SK. The membership of SK grew by 22 percent between 2012 and 2014, from 665 to 856 contributing members. This correlated with a doubling of the number of articles produced. Evaluation findings confirm that SK has allowed for members to improve their ability to network and that news and information on the platform is more relevant to grassroots issues.

The SK platform was also intended to be a means for the generation of action resulting from disseminated information. This is one of the key elements of CRI’s Theory of Change as well as the interventions proposed and supported through Hivos and MFS II. However, the evaluation team found that SK itself does not automatically generate follow up by public or private sector actors. Rather, more traditional forms of advocacy and lobby are still required and arguably more effective in generating pressure for better services to be delivered by the government. This is evident from the case of government health insurance beneficiary data. Escalated media coverage by CRI through SK, Twitter and television and radio broadcasting did not lead to the willingness of the Ministry of Health to validate and correct insurance beneficiary data. One of the weaknesses of CRI’s interventions has been the inability to monitor the impact of content produced. Without such monitoring, it is difficult for CRI to claim ‘acts upon information’.

Given the above, the evaluation team concludes that the first outcome can be attributed to the role of the SPO and MFS II funding, but that there is insufficient evidence to conclude the same about the second outcome.

Nonetheless, these changes are relevant to the current development context of Indonesia. The general public and the government is increasingly taking advantage of information and communications technology (ICT) to raise critical awareness, express views and opinions and improve the quality of information and services delivered to the public. CRI has demonstrated an ability to develop and apply ICT as a means to bridge the digital divide and to recognize the key role of the internet in media convergence. CRI, through its village information system initiatives, has provided communities with access to digital information that can be used to promote better governance and village administration functions. With regards to media convergence, SK has become a means to cross-promote content from community radio broadcast media, citizen journalism and bloggers. This has attracted the attention and support from a number of larger development partners and donors in the country.

As an organisation CRI is trying to reaffirm itself as a ‘connector’ that facilitates linkages between its network with public and private sector actors. To be a connector and facilitate two-way exchanges between citizens and public and private sectors, CRI will need to more clearly define what the shared priorities are between these actors.

Table 10
Summary of findings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When looking at the MFS II interventions of this SPO to strengthen civil society and/or policy influencing, how much do you agree with the following statements?</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tr>
<td>The CS interventions were well designed</td>
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<tr>
<td>The CS interventions were implemented as designed</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>The CS interventions reached their objectives</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The observed outcomes are attributable to the CS interventions</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>The observed CS outcomes are relevant to the beneficiaries of the SPO</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Score between 1 to 10, with 1 being “not at all” and 10 being “completely”.
References and resource persons

Documents by SPO
Aris Harianto, "Infografis dan Analisis Konten Isu Konflik Sumber Daya Alam di Suara Komunitas", December 2013
"Final Budget", Combine Resource Institution
"Laporan Pilot Kolaborasi Media Jan-Feb 2013", Combine Resource Institution, 2013
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"Hivos Business Plan 2012-2015", Hivos
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"Memo Budget Amendment 1004708", Hivos, 2012
"Partner Contract Hivos RO SEA at HO 1004708", Hivos
"Progress Report HIVOS COMBINE #RO.SEA at HO 1004708", Hivos

Other documents


Prasetyo, Kharisma et al, "Combine Resource Institution Evaluation Workshop", June 2014

Prasetyo, Kharisma et al, "Survey Kontributor SK", August 2014

Smitd, Hester, "Input-output-outcome analysis CRI", MFS-II evaluation 2014


**Webpages**


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**Resource persons consulted**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of key informant</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Function in organisation</th>
<th>Relation with SPO</th>
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<td>CPA</td>
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Appendix 1   CIVICUS and Civil Society Index

CIVICUS, the World Alliance for Citizen Participation is an international alliance of members and partners which constitutes an influential network of organisations at the local, national, regional and international levels, and spans the spectrum of civil society. It has worked for nearly two decades to strengthen citizen action and civil society throughout the world. CIVICUS has a vision of a global community of active, engaged citizens committed to the creation of a more just and equitable world. This is based on the belief that the health of societies exists in direct proportion to the degree of balance between the state, the private sector and civil society.

One of the areas that CIVICUS works in is the Civil Society Index (CSI). Since 2000, CIVICUS has measured the state of civil society in 76 countries. In 2008, it considerably changed its CSI.

1. Guiding principles for measuring civil society

*Action orientation:* the principal aim of the CSI is to generate information that is of practical use to civil society practitioners and other primary stakeholders. Therefore, its framework had to identify aspects of civil society that can be changed, as well as generate knowledge relevant to action-oriented goals.

*CSI implementation must be participatory by design:* The CSI does not stop at the generation of knowledge alone. Rather, it also actively seeks to link knowledge-generation on civil society, with reflection and action by civil society stakeholders. The CSI has therefore continued to involve its beneficiaries, as well as various other actors, in this particular case, civil society stakeholders, in all stages of the process, from the design and implementation, through to the deliberation and dissemination stages.

This participatory cycle is relevant in that such a mechanism can foster the self-awareness of civil society actors as being part of something larger, namely, civil society itself. As a purely educational gain, it broadens the horizon of CSO representatives through a process of reflecting upon, and engaging with, civil society issues which may go beyond the more narrow foci of their respective organisations. A strong collective self-awareness among civil society actors can also function as an important catalyst for joint advocacy activities to defend civic space when under threat or to advance the common interests of civil society vis-à-vis external forces. These basic civil society issues, on which there is often more commonality than difference among such actors, are at the core of the CSI assessment.

*CSI is change oriented:* The participatory nature that lies at the core of the CSI methodology is an important step in the attempt to link research with action, creating a diffused sense of awareness and ownerships. However, the theory of change that the CSI is based on goes one step further, coupling this participatory principle with the creation of evidence in the form of a comparable and contextually valid assessment of the state of civil society. It is this evidence, once shared and disseminated, that ultimately constitutes a resource for action.

*CSI is putting local partners in the driver’s seat:* CSI is to continue being a collaborative effort between a broad range of stakeholders, with most importance placed on the relationship between CIVICUS and its national partners.
2. Defining Civil Society

The 2008 CIVICUS redesign team modified the civil society definition as follows:

*The arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market – which is created by individual and collective actions, organisations and institutions to advance shared interests.*

_Arena_: In this definition the arena refers to the importance of civil society’s role in creating public spaces where diverse societal values and interests interact (Fowler 1996). CSI uses the term ‘arena’ to describe the particular realm or space in a society where people come together to debate, discuss, associate and seek to influence broader society. CIVICUS strongly believes that this arena is distinct from other arenas in society, such as the market, state or family.

Civil society is hence defined as a political term, rather than in economic terms that resemble more the ‘non-profit sector’.

Besides the spaces created by civil society, CIVICUS defines particular spaces for the family, the state and the market.

_Individual and collective action, organisations and institutions_: Implicit in a political understanding of civil society is the notion of agency; that civil society actors have the ability to influence decisions that affect the lives of ordinary people. The CSI embraces a broad range of actions taken by both individuals and groups. Many of these actions take place within the context of non-coercive organisations or institutions ranging from small informal groups to large professionally run associations.

_Advance shared interests_: The term ‘interests’ should be interpreted very broadly, encompassing the promotion of values, needs, identities, norms and other aspirations.

They encompass the personal and public, and can be pursued by small informal groups, large membership organisations or formal associations. The emphasis rests however on the element of ‘sharing’ that interest within the public sphere.

3. Civil Society Index - Analytical Framework

The 2008 Civil Society Index distinguishes 5 dimensions of which 4 (civic engagement, level of organisation, practice of values and perception of impact), can be represented in the form of a diamond and the fifth one (external environment) as a circle that influences upon the shape of the diamond. _Civic Engagement_, or ‘active citizenship’, is a crucial defining factor of civil society. It is the hub of civil society and therefore is one of the core components of the CSI’s definition. Civic engagement describes the formal and informal activities and participation undertaken by individuals to advance shared interests at different levels. Participation within civil society is multi-faceted and encompasses socially-based and politically-based forms of engagement.

_Level of Organisation_. This dimension assesses the organisational development, complexity and sophistication of civil society, by looking at the relationships among the actors within the civil society arena. Key sub dimensions are:

- Internal governance of Civil Society Organisations;
- Support infrastructure, that is about the existence of supporting federations or umbrella bodies;
- Self-regulation, which is about for instance the existence of shared codes of conducts amongst Civil Society Organisations and other existing self-regulatory mechanisms;
- Peer-to-peer communication and cooperation: networking, information sharing and alliance building to assess the extent of linkages and productive relations among civil society actors;
- Human resources, that is about the sustainability and adequacy of human resources available for CSOs in order to achieve their objectives:
  - Financial and technological resources available at CSOs to achieve their objectives;
- International linkages, such as CSO's membership in international networks and participation in global events.

**Practice of Values.** This dimension assesses the internal practice of values within the civil society arena. CIVICUS identified some key values that are deemed crucial to gauge not only progressiveness but also the extent to which civil society's practices are coherent with their ideals. These are:
  - Democratic decision-making governance: how decisions are made within CSOs and by whom;
  - Labour regulations: includes the existence of policies regarding equal opportunities, staff membership in labour unions, training in labour rights for new staff and a publicly available statement on labour standards;
  - Code of conduct and transparency: measures whether a code of conduct exists and is available publicly. It also measures whether the CSO’s financial information is available to the public.
  - Environmental standards: examines the extent to which CSOs adopt policies upholding environmental standards of operation;
  - Perception of values within civil society: looks at how CSOs perceive the practice of values, such as non-violence. This includes the existence or absence of forces within civil society that use violence, aggression, hostility, brutality and/or fighting, tolerance, democracy, transparency, trustworthiness and tolerance in the civil society within which they operate.

**Perception of Impact.** This is about the perceived impact of civil society actors on politics and society as a whole as the consequences of collective action. In this, the perception of both civil society actors (internal) as actors outside civil society (outsiders) is taken into account. Specific sub dimensions are:
  - Responsiveness in terms of civil society’s impact on the most important social concerns within the country. “Responsive” types of civil society are effectively taking up and voicing societal concerns.
  - Social impact measures civil society's impact on society in general. An essential role of civil society is its contribution to meet pressing societal needs;
  - Policy impact: covers civil society’s impact on policy in general. It also looks at the impact of CSO activism on selected policy issues;
  - Impact on attitudes: includes trust, public spiritedness and tolerance. The sub dimensions reflect a set of universally accepted social and political norms. These are drawn, for example, from sources such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as CIVICUS’ own core values. This dimension measures the extent to which these values are practised within civil society, compared to the extent to which they are practised in society at large.

**Context Dimension: External Environment.** It is crucial to give consideration to the social, political and economic environments in which it exists, as the environment both directly and indirectly affects civil society. Some features of the environment may enable the growth of civil society. Conversely, other features of the environment hamper the development of civil society. Three elements of the external environment are captured by the CSI:
  - Socio-economic context: The Social Watch’s basic capabilities index and measures of corruption, inequality and macro-economic health are used portray the socioeconomic context that can have marked consequences for civil society, and perhaps most significantly at the lower levels of social development;
Socio-political context: This is assessed using five indicators. Three of these are adapted from the Freedom House indices of political and civil rights and freedoms, including political rights and freedoms, personal rights and freedoms within the law and associational and organisational rights and freedoms. Information about CSO experience with the country’s legal framework and state effectiveness round out the picture of the socio-political context;

Socio-cultural context: utilises interpersonal trust, which examines the level of trust that ordinary people feel for other ordinary people, as a broad measure of the social psychological climate for association and cooperation. Even though everyone experiences relationships of varying trust and distrust with different people, this measure provides a simple indication of the prevalence of a world view that can support and strengthen civil society. Similarly, the extent of tolerance and public spiritedness also offers indication of the context in which civil society unfolds.
Appendix 2 Evaluation methodology

This Appendix describes the evaluation methodology that was developed to evaluate the efforts of Dutch NGOs and their Southern Partner Organisations (SPO) to strengthen Civil Society in India, Ethiopia and Indonesia. The first paragraph introduces the terms of reference for the evaluation and the second discusses design issues, including sampling procedures and changes in the terms of reference that occurred between the 2012 and 2014 assessment. The third paragraph presents the methodologies developed to answer each of the evaluation questions.

1. Introduction

1.1 Terms of reference for the evaluation

The Netherlands has a long tradition of public support for civil bi-lateral development cooperation, going back to the 1960s. The Co-Financing System ("MFS") is its most recent expression. MFS II is the 2011-2015 grant programme which meant to achieve sustainable reduction in poverty. A total of 20 consortia of Dutch Co Financing Agencies have been awarded €1.9 billion in MFS II grants by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).

One component of the MFS II programme addresses the extent to which the Southern Partners of the Dutch Consortia are contributing towards strengthening civil society and this evaluation assesses this contribution for Southern Partner countries in Indonesia, India and Ethiopia. The evaluation comprised a baseline study, carried out in 2012, followed by an end line study in 2014.

The entire MFS II evaluation comprises assessments in eight countries where apart from a civil society component, also assessments towards achieving MDGs and strengthening the capacity of the southern partner organisations by the CFAs. A synthesis team is in place to aggregate findings of all eight countries. This team convened three synthesis team meetings, one in 2012, one in 2013 and one in 2014. All three meetings aimed at harmonising evaluation methodologies for each component across countries. CDI has been playing a leading role in harmonising its Civil Society and Organisational Capacity assessment with the other organisations in charge for those components in the other countries. This Annex describes the methodology that has been developed for the evaluation of the efforts to strengthen civil society priority result area. We will first explain the purpose and scope of this evaluation and then present the overall evaluation design. We will conclude with describing methodological adaptations, limitations and implications.

1.2 Civil Society assessment – purpose and scope

The overall purpose of the joint MFS II evaluations is to account for results of MFS II-funded or –co-funded development interventions implemented by Dutch CFAs and/or their Southern partners and to contribute to the improvement of future development interventions.

The civil society evaluation is organised around 5 key questions:

- What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?
- To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
- What is the relevance of these changes?
• Were the development interventions of the MFS II consortia efficient?
• What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

Furthermore, the evaluation methodology for efforts to strengthen civil society should:
• Describe how a representative sample of Southern partner organisations of the Dutch CFAs in the country will be taken
• Focus on five priority result areas that correspond with dimensions of the Civil Society Index (CSI) developed by CIVICUS (see paragraph 6.4 - Call for proposal). For each of those dimensions the call for proposal formulated key evaluation questions.
• Should compare results with available reference data (i.e. a CSI report or other relevant data from the country in question).

The results of this evaluation are to be used by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Dutch Consortia and their partner organisations. The evaluation methodology has to be participatory in the sense that Dutch Consortia and their partner organisation would be asked to give their own perception on a range of indicators of the adjusted CIVICUS analytical framework in 2012 and in 2014.

2. Designing the methodology

2.1 Evaluation principles and standards

The overall approach selected is a participatory, theory-based evaluation through a before and after comparison. This paragraph briefly describes these principles and how these have been translated into data collection principles. It also describes how a ‘representative sample’ of Southern Partner Organisations was selected and how the initial terms of references were adjusted with the consent of the commissioner of the evaluation, given the nature of the evaluation component and the resources available for the evaluation.

Recognition of complexity
The issues at stake and the interventions in civil society and policy influence are complex in nature, meaning that cause and effect relations can sometimes only be understood in retrospect and cannot be repeated. The evaluation methods should therefore focus on recurring patterns of practice, using different perspectives to understand changes and to acknowledge that the evaluation means to draw conclusions about complex adaptive systems (Kurtz and Snowden, 2003)68.
Changes in the values of the Civil Society Indicators in the 2012-2014 period are then the result of conflict management processes, interactive learning events, new incentives (carrots and sticks) that mobilise or demobilise civil society, rather than the result of a change process that can be predicted from A to Z (a linear or logical framework approach)69.

A theory-based evaluation
Theory-based evaluation has the advantage of situating the evaluation findings in an analysis that includes both what happened over the life of the project as well as the how and why of what happened (Rogers 2004). It demonstrates its capacity to help understand why a program works or fails to work, going further than knowing only outcomes by trying to systematically enter the black box (Weiss 2004). Theory-based evaluations can provide a framework to judge effectiveness in context of high levels of complexity, uncertainty, and changeability when traditional (impact) evaluation methods are not suitable: the use of control groups for the civil society evaluation is problematic since comparable

organisations with comparable networks and operating in a similar external environment would be quite difficult to identify and statistical techniques of matching cannot be used because of a small n. Because SPO’s theories of change regarding their efforts to build civil society or to influence policies may alter during the 2012-2014 period, it requires us to develop a deep understanding of the change process and the dynamics that affect civil society and policies. It is important to understand what has led to specific (non-) changes and (un)-expected changes. These external factors and actors, as well as the SPO’s agency need to be taken into account for the attribution question. Linear input-activities-outputs-outcomes-impact chains do not suffice for complex issues where change is both the result of SPOs’ interventions as those by other actors and/or factors. Therefore, the most reasonable counterfactual that can be used for this evaluation is that of considering alternative causal explanations of change (White and Philips, 2012). Therefore the SPOs’ Theory of Change constructed in 2012 is also related to a Model of Change constructed in 2014 that tries to find the ultimate explanations of what happened in reality, including other actors and factors that might possibly explain the outcomes achieved.

**Triangulation of methods and sources of information**
For purposes of triangulation to improve the robustness, validity or credibility of the findings of the evaluation we used different types of data collection and analysis methods as well as different sources of information. The CIVICUS analytical framework was adjusted for this evaluation in terms of providing standard impact outcome indicators to be taken into account. Data collection methods used consisted of workshops with the SPO, interviews with key resource persons, focus group discussions, social network analysis (during the baseline), consultation of project documents; MFS II consortia documents and other documents relevant to assess general trends in civil society.

**Participatory evaluation**
The evaluation is participatory in that both baseline and end line started with a workshop with SPO staff, decision makers and where possible board members. The baseline workshop helped SPOs to construct their own theory of change with regards to civil society. Detailed guidelines and tools have been developed by CDI for both baseline and follow-up, and these have been piloted in each of the countries CDI is involved in. Country based evaluators have had a critical input in reviewing and adapting these detailed guidelines and tools. This enhanced a rigorous data collection process. Additionally, the process of data analysis has been participatory where both CDI and in-country teams took part in the process and cross-check each other’s inputs for improved quality. Rigorous analysis of the qualitative data was done with the assistance of the NVivo software program.

**Using the evaluation standards as a starting point**
As much as possible within the boundaries of this accountability driven evaluation, the evaluation teams tried to respect the following internationally agreed upon standards for program evaluation (Yarbrough et al, 2011). These are, in order of priority: Utility; Feasibility; Propriety; Accuracy; Accountability. However, given the entire set-up of the evaluation, the evaluation team cannot fully ensure the extent to which the evaluation is utile for the SPO and their CFAs; and cannot ensure that the evaluation findings are used in a proper way and not for political reasons.

### 2.2 Sample selection

The terms of reference for this evaluation stipulate that the evaluators draw a sample of southern partner organisations to include in the assessment. Given the fact that the first evaluation questions intends to draw conclusions for the MDGs or the themes (governance or fragile states) for Indonesia a sample was drawn for the two or three most frequent MDGs or themes that the SPOs are working in. In 2012, the Dutch MFS II consortia were asked to provide information for each SPO regarding the MDG/theme it is working on, if it has an explicit agenda in the area of civil society strengthening and/or policy influence. The database then provided an insight into the most important MDG/themes covered by the partner organisations, how many of these have an explicit agenda regarding civil society
strengthening and/or policy influence. The entire population of SPOs in Indonesia was 120, of which those exclusively working on the governance theme (28 SPOs), those working on MDG 7ab (26 SPOs) and on MDG 3 (26 SPOs) where the most frequent ones. With regards to MDG 3 and MDG 7ab the evaluator decided to select MDG 7ab, which is a very specific and relevant MDG for Indonesia. Five 5 partner organisations were randomly selected for respectively MDG 7 (natural resources) of a population of 26 SPOs and 5 for the governance theme from 28 SPOs.

2.3 Changes in the original terms of reference

Two major changes have been introduced during this evaluation and accepted by the commissioner of the MFS II evaluation. These changes were agreed upon during the 2013 and the 2014 synthesis team meetings.

The efficiency evaluation question

During the June 2013 synthesis meeting the following decision was made with regards to measuring how efficient MFS II interventions for organisational capacity and civil society are:

 [...] it was stressed that it is difficult to disentangle budgets for capacity development and civil society strengthening. SPOs usually don’t keep track of these activities separately; they are included in general project budgets. Therefore, teams agreed to assess efficiency of CD [capacity development] and CS activities in terms of the outcomes and/or outputs of the MDG projects. This implies no efficiency assessment will be held for those SPOs without a sampled MDG project. Moreover, the efficiency assessment of MDG projects needs to take into account CD and CS budgets (in case these are specified separately). Teams will evaluate efficiency in terms of outcomes if possible. If project outcomes are unlikely to be observed already in 2014, efficiency will be judged in terms of outputs or intermediate results (e-mail quotation from Gerton Rongen at February 6, 2014).

Attribution/contribution evaluation question

During the June 2013 NWO-WOTRO workshop strategies were discussed to fit the amount of evaluation work to be done with the available resources. Therefore,

1. The number of SPOs that will undergo a full-fledged analysis to answer the attribution question, were to be reduced to 50 percent of all SPOs. Therefore the evaluation team used the following selection criteria:
   - An estimation of the annual amount of MFS II funding allocated to interventions that have a more or less direct relation with the civil society component. This implies the following steps to be followed for the inventory:
     - Covering all MDGs/themes in the original sample
     - Covering a variety of Dutch alliances and CFAs
   - The focus of the attribution question will be on two impact outcome areas, those most commonly present in the SPO sample for each country. The evaluation team distinguishes four different impact outcome areas:
     - The extent to which the SPO, with MFS II funding, engages more and diverse categories of society in the 2011-2014 period (Civicus dimensions "Civic engagement" and "perception of impact")
     - The extent to which the SPOs supports its intermediate organisations to make a valuable contribution to civil society in the 2011-2014 period (Civicus dimension "Level of organisation" and "perception of impact")
     - The extent to which the SPO itself engages with other civil society organisations to make a valuable contribution to civil society in the 2011-2014 period (Civicus dimension "level of organisation")

70 See the evaluation methodology for the civil society component as described in the annex of the baseline report.
• The extent to which the SPO contributes to changing public and private sector policies and practices in the 2011-2014 period (Civicus dimension “perception of impact”)

3. The CS dimension ‘Practice of Values’ has been excluded, because this dimension is similar to issues dealt with for the organisational capacity assessment.

The aforementioned analysis drew the following conclusions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>SPO in the in-depth analysis</th>
<th>Strategic CS orientation to include</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Indonesia | ELSAM, WARS, CRI, NTFP-EP, LPPSLH | 1. Strengthening intermediate organisations AND influencing policies and practices  
2. If only one of the two above mentioned is applicable, then select another appropriate impact outcome area to look at. |
| India     | NNET, CWM, CECDEDECON, Reds Tumkur, CSA | 1. Enhancing civic engagement AND strengthening intermediate organisations  
2. If only one of the two above mentioned is applicable then select another appropriate impact outcome area to look at. |
| Ethiopia  | OSSA, EKHC, CCGG&SO, JeCCDO and ADAA | 1. Strengthening the capacities of intermediate organisations AND SPO’s engagement in the wider CS arena  
2. If only one of the two above mentioned is applicable then select another appropriate impact outcome area to look at. |

Source: Consultation of project documents available in February 2014

3. Answering the evaluation questions

3.1 Evaluation question 1 - Changes in civil society for the relevant MDGs/topics

Evaluation question 1: What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?

Indicators and tools used

In line with the CIVICUS Civil Society Index, a scoring tool was developed in 2012 which comprises 17 indicators. The selection was inspired by those suggested in the terms of reference of the commissioner. Each indicator was, also in line with the CIVICUS index accompanied by an open evaluation question to be used for data collection in 2012 and 2014. In 2012 the scoring tool contained four statements describing the level of achievements of the indicator and scores ranged from 0 to 3 (low score - high score).

A comparison of the scores obtained in 2012 informed the evaluation team that there was a positive bias towards high scores, mostly between 2 and 3. Therefore during the 2014 assessment, it was decided to measure relative changes for each indicator in the 2012 – 2014 period, as well as the reasons for changes or no changes and assigning a score reflecting the change between -2 (considerable deterioration of the indicator value since 2012) and +2 (considerable improvement).

In 2012 and based upon the Theory of Change constructed with the SPO, a set of standard indicators were identified that would ensure a relation between the standard CIVICUS indicators and the interventions of the SPO. However, these indicators were not anymore included in the 2014 assessment because of the resources available and because the methodology fine-tuned for the attribution question in 2013, made measurement of these indicators redundant. Also in 2012, as a means to measure the ‘level of organisation’ dimension a social network analysis tool was introduced. However this tool received very little response and was discontinued during the end line study.

Key questions to be answered for this evaluation question

In 2012, SPO staff and leaders, as well as outside resource persons were asked to provide answers to 17 questions, one per standard indicator of the scoring tool developed by CDI.
In 2012, the SPO staff and leaders were given the description of each indicator as it was in 2012 and had to answer the following questions:

1. How has the situation of this indicator changed compared to its description of the 2012 situation? Did it deteriorate considerably or did it improve considerably (−2 → +2)
2. What exactly has changed since 2012 for the civil society indicator that you are looking at? Be as specific as possible in your description.
3. What interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the situation in 2012? Please tick and describe what happened and to what change this led. It is possible to tick and describe more than one choice.
   - Intervention by SPO, NOT financed by any of your Dutch partners ………………
   - Intervention SPO, financed by your Dutch partner organisation ……..(In case you receive funding from two Dutch partners, please specify which partner is meant here)
   - Other actor NOT the SPO, please specify……
   - Other factor, NOT actor related, please specify……
   - A combination of actors and factors, INCLUDING the SPO, but NOT with Dutch funding, please specify…
   - A combination of actors and factors, INCLUDING the SPO, but WITH Dutch funding, please specify…
   - Don’t know
4. Generally speaking, which two of the five CIVICUS dimensions (civic engagement, level of organisation, practice of values, perception of impact, environment) changed considerably between 2012 – 2014? For each of these changes, please describe:
   - Nature of the change
   - Key interventions, actors and factors (MFS II or non-MFS II related) that explain each change (entirely or partially).

**Sources for data collection**

During the baseline and the end line and for purposes of triangulation, several methods were used to collect data on each (standard) indicator:

- Self-assessment per category of staff within the SPO: where possible, three subgroups were made to assess the scores: field staff/programme staff, executive leadership and representatives of the board,, general assembly, and internal auditing groups if applicable completed with separate interviews;
- Interviews with external resource persons. These consisted of three categories: key actors that are knowledgeable about the MDG/theme the SPO is working on and who know the civil society arena around these topics; civil society organisations that are being affected by the programme through support or CSOs with which the SPO is collaborating on equal footing, and; representatives of public or private sector organisations with which the SPO is interacting
- Consultation and analysis of reports that relate to each of the five CIVICUS dimensions.
- Project documents, financial and narrative progress reports, as well as correspondence between the SPO and the CFA.
- Social network analysis (SNA), which was discontinued in the end line study.

During the follow-up, emphasis was put on interviewing the same staff and external persons who were involved during the baseline for purpose of continuity.

### 3.2 Evaluation question 2 – “Attribution” of changes in civil society to interventions of SPOs.

Evaluation question 2: To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
Adapting the evaluation question and introduction to the methodology chosen

In line with the observation of Stern et al. (2012) that the evaluation question, the programme attributes, and the evaluation approaches all provide important elements to conclude on the evaluation design to select, the teams in charge of evaluating the civil society component concluded that given the attributes of the programmes it was impossible to answer the attribution question as formulated in the Terms of References of the evaluation and mentioned above. Therefore, the evaluation teams worked towards answering the extent to which the programme contributed towards realising the outcomes. For this endeavour explaining outcome process-tracing was used. The objective of the process tracing methodology for MFS II, in particular for the civil society component is to:

- Identify what interventions, actors and factors explain selected impact outcomes for process tracing.
- Assess how the SPO with MFS II funding contributed to the changes in the selected impact outcomes and how important this contribution is given other actors and factors that possibly influence the attainment of the outcome. Ruling out rival explanations, which are other interventions, actors or factors that are not related to MFS II funding.

Methodology – getting prepared

As described before a limited number of SPOs were selected for process tracing and for each country strategic orientations were identified as a means to prevent a bias occurring towards only positive impact outcomes and as a means to support the in-country evaluation teams with the selection of outcomes to focus on a much as was possible, based upon the project documents available at CDI. These documents were used to track realised outputs and outcomes against planned outputs and outcomes. During the workshop (see evaluation question on changes in civil society) and follow-up interviews with the SPO, two impact outcomes were selected for process tracing.

Steps in process tracing

1. Construct the theoretical model of change – by in-country evaluation team

After the two impact outcomes have been selected and information has been obtained about what has actually been achieved, the in-country evaluation team constructs a visual that shows all pathways that might possibly explain the outcomes. The inventory of those possible pathways is done with the SPO, but also with external resource persons and documents consulted. This culminated in a Model of Change. A MoC of good quality includes: The causal pathways that relate interventions/parts by any actor, including the SPO to the realised impact outcome; assumptions that clarify relations between different parts in the pathway, and; case specific and/or context specific factors or risks that might influence the causal pathway, such as for instance specific attributes of the actor or socio-cultural-economic context. The Models of Change were discussed with the SPO and validated.

2. Identify information needs to confirm or reject causal pathways as well as information sources needed.

This step aims to critically reflect upon what information is needed that helps to confirm one of causal pathways and at that at same time helps to reject the other possible explanations. Reality warns that this type of evidence will hardly be available for complex development efforts. The evaluators were asked to behave as detectives of Crime Scene Investigation, ensuring that the focus of the evaluation was not only on checking if parts/interventions had taken place accordingly, but more specifically on identifying information needs that confirm or reject the relations between the parts/interventions. The key question to be answered was: "What information do we need in order to confirm or reject that one part leads to another part or, that X causes Y?". Four types of evidence were used, where appropriate:

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71 Explaining outcome process tracing attempts to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific historical case. Here the aim is not to build or test more general theories but to craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case centric than theory oriented. The aim of process tracing is not to verify if an intended process of interventions took place as planned in a particular situation, but that it aims at increasing our understanding about what works under what conditions and why (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

72 Beach and Pederson, 2013
• **Pattern evidence** relates to predictions of statistical patterns in the evidence. This may consist of trends analysis and correlations.

• **Sequence evidence** deals with the temporal and spatial chronology of events predicted by a hypothesised causal mechanism. For example, a test of the hypothesis could involve expectations of the timing of events where we might predict that if the hypothesis is valid, we should see that the event B took place after event A. However, if we found that event B took place before event A, the test would suggest that our confidence in the validity of this part of the mechanism should be reduced (disconfirmation/ falsification).

• **Trace evidence** is evidence whose mere existence provides proof that a part of a hypothesised mechanism exists. For example, the existence of meeting minutes, if authentic, provides strong proof that the meeting took place.

• **Account evidence** deals with the content of empirical material, such as meeting minutes that detail what was discussed or an oral account of what took place in the meeting.

3. **Collect information necessary to confirm or reject causal pathways**

Based upon the inventory of information needs the evaluation teams make their data collection plan after which data collection takes place.

4. **Analyse the data collected and assessment of their quality**

This step consists of compiling all information collected in favour or against a causal pathway in a table or in a list per pathway. For all information used, the sources of information are mentioned and an assessment of the strength of the evidence takes place, making a distinction between strong, weak and moderate evidence. For this we use the traffic light system: **green letters mean strong evidence, red letters mean weak evidence** and **orange letter mean moderate evidence**: The following table provides the format used to assess these issues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal pathway</th>
<th>Information that confirms (parts of) this pathway</th>
<th>Information that rejects (parts of) this pathway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pathway 1</td>
<td>Information 1 Source of information Information 1 Source of information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part 1.1</td>
<td>Information 2 Source of information Information 2 Source of information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part 1.2</td>
<td>Information 3 Source of information Information 3 Source of information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etc</td>
<td>etc Source of information etc Source of information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pathway 2</td>
<td>Information 1 Source of information Information 1 Source of information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part 2.1</td>
<td>Information 2 Source of information Information 2 Source of information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part 2.2</td>
<td>Information 3 Source of information Information 3 Source of information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etc</td>
<td>etc Source of information etc Source of information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pathway 3</td>
<td>Information 1 Source of information Information 1 Source of information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. **Assessing the nature of the relations between parts in the model of change**

The classification of all information collected is being followed by the identification of the pathways that most likely explain the impact outcome achieved. For this the evaluators assess the nature of the relations between different parts in the MoC. Based upon Mayne (2012) and Stern et al (2012) the following relations between parts in the MoC are mapped and the symbols inserted into the original MoC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of the relation between parts and other parts or outcome</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The part is the only causal explanation for the outcome. No other interventions or factors explain it. (necessary and sufficient)</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The part does not explain the outcome at all: other subcomponents explain the outcomes.</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The part explains the outcome but other parts explain the outcome as well: there are multiple pathways (sufficient but not necessary)</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The part is a condition for the outcome but won't make it happen without other factors (necessary but not sufficient)</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The part explains the outcome, but requires the help of other parts to explain the outcome in a sufficient and necessary way (not a sufficient cause, but necessary) → it is part of a causal package</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Mayne, 2012; Stern et al, 2012
6. Write down the contribution and assess the role of the SPO and MFS II funding

This final step consists of answering the following questions, as a final assessment of the contribution question:

- The first question to be answered is: What explains the impact outcome?
- The second question is: What is the role of the SPO in this explanation?
- The third question, if applicable is: what is the role of MFS II finding in this explanation?

7. Sources for data collection

Information necessary to answer this evaluation question is to be collected from:

- Interviews with resource persons inside and outside the SPO
- Project documents and documentation made available by other informants
- Websites that possibly confirm that an outcome is achieved and that the SPO is associated with this outcome
- Meeting minutes of meetings between officials
- Time lines to trace the historical relations between events
- Policy documents
- etc

3.3 Evaluation question 3 – Relevance of the changes

Evaluation question 3: What is the relevance of these changes?

The following questions are to be answered in order to assess the relevance of the changes in Civil Society.

- How do the MFS II interventions and civil society outcomes align with the Theory of Change developed during the baseline in 2012? What were reasons for changing or not changing interventions and strategies?
- What is the civil society policy of the Dutch alliance that collaborates with the SPO? And how do the MFS II interventions and civil society outcomes align with the civil society policy of the Dutch alliance that collaborates with the SPO?
- How relevant are the changes achieved in relation to the context in which the SPO is operating?
- What is the further significance of these changes for building a vibrant civil society for the particular MDG/ theme in the particular context?

Sources for data collection

For this question the following sources are to be consulted:

- Review of the information collected during interviews with the SPO and outside resource persons
- The 2012 Theory of Change
- Interview with the CFA liaison officer of the SPO;
- Review of reports, i.e: the civil society policy document of the Dutch Alliance that was submitted for MFS II funding, relevant documents describing civil society for the MDG/ theme the SPO is working on in a given context.

3.4 Evaluation question 4, previously 5 - Factors explaining the findings

Evaluation question 4: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

To answer this question we look into information available that:

- Highlight changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO
- Highlight changes in the relations between the SPO and the CFA
• Highlight changes in the context in which the SPO is operating and how this might affect positively or negatively its organisational capacity.

Sources for data collection
Sources of information to be consulted are:
• Project documents
• Communications between the CFA and the SPO
• Information already collected during the previous evaluation questions.

4. Analysis of findings

A qualitative software programme NVivo 10 (2010) was used to assist in organising and making sense of all data collected. Although the software cannot take over the task of qualitative data analysis, it does 1) improve transparency by creating a record of all steps taken, 2) organise the data and allow the evaluator to conduct a systematic analysis, 3) assist in identifying important themes that might otherwise be missed, and 4) reduce the danger of bias due to human cognitive limitations, compared to "intuitive data processing" (Sadler 1981). The qualitative data in the evaluation consisted of transcripts from semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions workshops, field notes from observation, and a range of documents available at the SPO or secondary information used to collect reference data and to obtain a better understanding of the context in which the CS component evolves.

To analyse this diverse collection of data, several analytical strategies are envisioned, specifically content analysis, discourse analysis, and thematic analysis. Although each of these strategies can be understood as a different lens through which to view the data, all will require a carefully developed and executed coding plan.

Data have been coded according to: standard civil society indicator; outcome included for in-depth contribution analysis; relevance, and; explaining factors.

This qualitative analysis will be supported by a limited amount of quantitative data largely arising from the score assigned by the evaluation team to each performance indicator described in the civil society scoring tool. Other quantitative data in this study are drawn information provided in background literature and organisational documents as well as the Social Network Analysis method.

5. Limitations to the methodology

5.1 General limitations with regards to the MFS II evaluation

The MFS II programme and CIVICUS

Although the MFS II programme stated that all proposals need to contribute to civil society strengthening in the South73, mention was made of the use of the CIVICUS framework for monitoring purposes. The fact that civil society was to be integrated as one of the priority result areas next to that of organisational capacity and MDGs became only clear when the MoFA communicated its mandatory monitoring protocol. In consequence, civil society strengthening in the MFS II programmes submitted to the ministry is mainstreamed into different sub programmes, but not addressed as a separate entity.

This late introduction of the Civil Society component also implies that project documents and progress reports to not make a distinction in MDG or theme components vs those of civil society strengthening, leaving the interpretation of what is a civil society intervention our outcome and what not to the interpretation of the evaluation team.

73 Policy Framework Dutch Co-financing System II 2011 - 2015
At the same time the evaluation team observes that SPOs and CFAs have started to incorporate the organisational capacity tool that is being used in the monitoring protocol in their own organisational assessment procedures. None of the SPOs is familiar with the CIVICUS framework and how it fits into their interventions.

**Differences between CIVICUS and MFS II evaluation**

CIVICUS developed a Civil Society Index that distinguishes 5 dimensions and for each of these a set of indicators has been developed. Based upon a variety of data collection methods, a validation team composed of civil society leaders provides the scores for the civil society index.

Major differences between the way the Civil Society Index is been used by CIVICUS and for this MFS II evaluation is the following:

1. CIVICUS defines its unit of analysis is terms of the civil society arena at national and/or subnational level and does not start from individual NGOs. The MFS II evaluation put the SPO in the middle of the civil society arena and then looked at organisations that receive support; organisations with which the SPO is collaborating. The civil society arena boundaries for the MFS II evaluation are the public or private sector organisations that the SPO relates to or whose policies and practices it aims to influence.

2. The CIVICUS assessments are conducted by civil society members itself whereas the MFS II evaluation is by nature an external evaluation conducted by external researchers. CIVICUS assumes that its assessments, by organising them as a joint learning exercise, will introduce change that is however not planned. With the MFS II evaluation the focus was on the extent to which the interventions of the SPO impacted upon the civil society indicators.

3. CIVICUS has never used its civil society index as a tool to measure change over a number of years. Each assessment is a stand-alone exercise and no efforts are being made to compare indicators over time or to attribute changes in indicators to a number of organisations or external trends.

**Dimensions and indicator choice**

The CIVICUS dimensions in themselves are partially overlapping; the dimension ‘perception of impact’ for instance contains elements that relate to ‘civic engagement’ and to ‘level of organisation’. Similar overlap is occurring in the civil society scoring tool developed for this evaluation and which was highly oriented by a list of evaluation questions set by the commissioner of the evaluation. Apart from the overlap, we observe that some of the standard indicators used for the civil society evaluation were not meaningful for the SPOs under evaluation. This applies for instance for the political engagement indicator “How intense is your (individual staff or organisational) participation in locally-nationally elected bodies and/or sectoral user groups?”

**Measuring change over a two-year period**

The MFS II programme started its implementation in 2011 and it will finish in 2015, whereas its evaluation started mid-2012 and will end in the beginning of 2014. The period between the baseline and the end line measurement hardly covers 2 years in some cases. Civil society building and policy influence are considered the type of interventions that requires up to 10 years to reap significant results, especially when taking into account attitudes and behaviour. Apart from the fact that the baseline was done when MFS II was already operational in the field for some 1,5 years, some SPO interventions were a continuation of programmes designed under the MFS I programme, hence illustrating that the MFS II period is not a clear boundary. Contracts with other SPOs ended already in 2012, and practically coincided with the baseline assessment being conducted at the moment the relationship with the CFA had practically ended.

**Aggregation of findings**

Although working with standard indicators and assigning them scores creates expectations of findings being compared and aggregated at national and international level, this may lend itself to a quick but inaccurate assessment of change. Crude comparison between programs on the basis of findings is problematic, and risks being politically abused. The evaluation team has to guard against these abuses by ensuring the necessary modesty in extrapolating findings and drawing conclusions.
Linking the civil society component to the other components of the MFS II evaluation

The Theory of Change in the terms of reference assumes that CFAs are strengthening the organisational capacity of their partners, which is evaluated in the organisational capacity components, which then leads to impact upon MDGs or upon civil society. Because the evaluation methodology designed for both the organisational capacity and the civil society evaluation require considerable time investments of the SPOs, a deliberate choice was made not to include SPOs under the organisational capacity component in that of Civil Society. This may possibly hamper conclusions regarding the assumption of capacitated SPOs being able to impact upon civil society. However, where information is available and where it is relevant, the civil society component will address organisational capacity issues.

No such limitations were made with regards to SPOs in the MDG sample, however, apart from Indonesia; none of the SPOs in the civil society sample is also in that of MDG.

5.2 Limitations during baseline with regards to the methodology

A very important principle upon which this evaluation methodology is based is that of triangulation, which implies that different stakeholders and documents are consulted to obtain information about the same indicator from different perspectives. Based upon these multiple perspectives, a final score can be given on the same indicator which is more valid and credible.

For Indonesia this has not always been possible:

- For 7 out of 10 SPOs a Survey Monkey questionnaire was developed to assess the intensity of the interaction between stakeholders in the network. Out of 156 actors that were invited to fill in this 5 minute questionnaire, only 7 actors effectively filled in the questionnaire = 4.5 %. The online Social Network Analysis aims at having both the opinion of the SPO on the intensity of the interaction with another actor, as well as the opinion of the other actor for triangulation. Important reasons for not filling in this form are that actors in the network are not technology savvy, or that they have difficulties in accessing internet. Data obtained by survey monkey were not used in the baseline. Instead the evaluation team did a social network assessment during the baseline workshop with the SPO.

- With regards to filling in offline interview forms or answering questions during interviews a number of civil society actors did not want to score themselves because they do not benefit from the interventions of the MFS II projects. Having the scores of their own organisations will help to assess the wider environment in which the SPO operates and possibly an impact of the SPO on other civil society organisations in 2014.

- With regards to public officials the evaluation team faced difficulties to have their opinions on a certain number of indicators such as perception of impact on policy influencing and relations between public organisations and civil society. Public officials fear that they will be quoted in the assessment, which may have repercussions for their position.

5.3 Experiences during end line from in-country teams - Indonesia

The in-country team experienced difficulties in working on the first evaluation question regarding changes in civil society. The team would have preferred a similar workshop as during the baseline that would recapitulate the essence of the CIVICUS model and the content of each standard indicator developed. Although some members of the in-country team were also involved in the 2012 base line assessment, they and their new colleagues experienced a kind of “CS dimension shock” when these topics where not addressed during the workshop, where a lot of time was spend to work on the second evaluation question on contribution. A guidance sent later in the year was helpful but came late according to the Indonesian team.
The many appendices prepared for data collection and meant as a step-wide approach for the end line study, sometimes became a burden and a limitation when applied directly in collecting data. Like mentioned for the baseline study the questions sometimes limited the probing for information. In addition, in-country team members had to deal with the “CS dimension shock”.

The organisation of the entire MFS II evaluation did provide very little opportunities for SPOs to engage with the evaluation and to feel concerned. For many of the SPOs the evaluation does not provide a strategic value in terms of drawing lessons. This lack of ownership is felt more strongly with those SPOs that already ended their contract with the Dutch MFS II organisation and with those SPOs that due to high staff turn overs were confronted with past tense issues that they did not experience.

Some of the SPOs simply didn’t care about the evaluation. This could have been anticipated if there had been a special workshop (for the directors, perhaps, and the CFAs) prior to the endline. Via such workshops, appointments and agreements could have been set, allowing the in-country teams to plan their time and schedule. What ended up happening was that many of the SPOs kept putting off appointments and this also affected the schedule of the team.

Many SPOs are unfamiliar with the CIVICUS framework and the in-country team tried to ease them into it by sending background information and the indicator questions regarding changes in civil society prior to the workshop. This was effective for some SPOs (Common Room, WARS), but not very effective for LPPSH, RUANGRUPA, and CRI. The latter three found it too difficult to answer these questions by themselves. Common Room, on the other hand dedicated a special discussion session to discuss the questions internally. The questions were however the same as those dealt with during the baseline and possibly high staff turnovers may also explain this “CS dimension shock”.

Fieldwork was sometimes inefficient since the in-country team assumed that each step (workshop, interview, drafting model of change, selecting outcome, finding evidences) would neatly fall into sequence and could be packed tightly within 4 or 5 days with strong commitment from the SPO. This often did not happen.
## Civil Society Scoring tool - baseline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Outcome domains</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>x</th>
<th>What are factors (strengths, weaknesses) that explain the current situation?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic engagement</td>
<td>Needs of marginalised groups</td>
<td>How does your organisation take the needs of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups into account in your planning, actions, activities, and/or strategies?</td>
<td>Are NOT taken into account</td>
<td>Are POORLY taken into account</td>
<td>Are PARTLY taken into account</td>
<td>Are FULLY taken into account</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement of target groups</td>
<td></td>
<td>They are INFORMED about on-going and/or new activities that you will implement. You define the problems and provide the solutions.</td>
<td>They are CONSULTED by your organisation.</td>
<td>They CARRY OUT activities and/or form groups upon your request. They provide resources (time, land, labour) in return for your assistance (material and/or immaterial)</td>
<td>They ANALYSE PROBLEMS AND FORMULATE IDEAS together with your organisation and/or take action independently from you.</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political engagement</td>
<td></td>
<td>No participation</td>
<td>You are occasionally CONSULTED by these bodies</td>
<td>You are a member of these bodies. You attend meetings as a participant</td>
<td>You are a member of these bodies. You are chairing these bodies or sub groups</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of organisation</td>
<td>Relations with other organisations</td>
<td>In the past 12 months what has been the most intensive interaction you had with other CSOs?</td>
<td>No interaction at all</td>
<td>Networking - Cooperation: Inform each other; roles somewhat defined; all decisions made independently</td>
<td>Coordination - Coalition: ideas and resources shared; roles defined and divided; all have a vote in decision making</td>
<td>Collaboration: organisations belong to one system; mutual trust; consensus on all decisions.</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimension</td>
<td>Outcome domains</td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Statements</td>
<td>What are factors (strengths, weaknesses) that explain the current situation?</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Frequency of dialogue with closest CSO</td>
<td>In the past 12 months how many meetings did you have with the CSO that you have most intensive interaction with?</td>
<td>0: No interaction at all 1: Less than 2 times a year 2: Between 2 and 3 times a year 3: More than 4 times a year</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because ....</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Defending the interests of marginalised groups:</td>
<td>Which CSO are most effective in defending the interests of your target groups? In the past 12 months, how did you relate to those CSOs?</td>
<td>No interaction at all 1: Networking - Cooperation: Inform each other; roles somewhat defined; all decisions made independently 2: Coordination - Coalition: ideas and resources shared; roles defined and divided; all have a vote in decision making 3: Collaboration: organisations belong to one system; mutual trust; consensus on all decisions</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because ....</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Composition current financial resource base</td>
<td>How does your organisation finance institutional costs such as workshops of the General Assembly (if applicable); attendans to workshops of other CSOs; costs for organisational growth and/or networking?</td>
<td>Depends on 1 international donor 1: Depends on few financial sources: one fund cover(s) more than 75% of all costs. 2: Depends on a variety of financial sources; one fund cover(s) more than 50% of all costs. 3: Depends on a variety of sources of equal importance. Wide network of domestic funds</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because ....</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Practice of Values</td>
<td>To what extent can mandatory social organs (steering committee, general assembly, internal auditing group) ask your executive leaders to be accountable to them?</td>
<td>(financial) information is made available and decisions are taken openly 1: They fulfil their formal obligation to explain strategic decisions and actions 2: They react to requests of social organs to justify/explain actions and decisions made</td>
<td>Social organs use their power to sanction management in case of misconduct or abuse Question not relevant, because ....</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Composition of social organs</td>
<td>What % of members of your mandatory social organs belong to the marginalised target groups you are working with/for?</td>
<td>Between 0-10 % of all members of the social organs 1: Between 11-30 % of all members of the social organs 2: Between 31-65 % of all members of the social organs 3: More than 65% of all members of the social organs</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because ....</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dimension</td>
<td>Outcome domains</td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Statements</td>
<td>What are factors (strengths, weaknesses) that explain the current situation?</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>External financial auditing</td>
<td>How regularly is your organisation audited externally?</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Perception of impact</td>
<td>Client satisfaction</td>
<td>What are the most important concerns of your target groups? How do your services take into account those important concerns?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Civil society impact</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what impact did you have on building a strong civil society?</td>
<td>You have not undertaken any activities of this kind</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Relation with public sector organisations</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with public sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' objectives?</td>
<td>No direct interaction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Relation with private sector organisations</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with private sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' perspective?</td>
<td>No direct interaction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 15        | Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations | How successful have you been in influencing public policies and practices in the past 2 years? | No activities developed in this area | Question not relevant, because .....
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Outcome domains</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>What are factors (strengths, weaknesses) that explain the current situation?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Influence upon private sector agencies’ policies, rules, regulations.</td>
<td>How successful have you been in influencing private sector policies and practices in the past 2 years?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No activities developed in this area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Some activities developed but without discernible impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental context</td>
<td>In the past 2 years, how did your organisation cope with these changes in the context that may have been positive or negative consequences for civil society.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Many activities developed in this area, but impact until so far has been limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Coping strategies</td>
<td>No analysis of the space and role of civil society has been done.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>You are monitoring the space and role of civil society and analysing the consequences of changes in the context for your own activities. Examples are available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>You are collecting information of the space and role of civil society but not regularly analysing it.</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>You are involved in joint action to make context more favourable. Examples are available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3  Civil Society Scores

This table presents the appreciation of the evaluation team regarding changes occurred for each indicator between 2012 and 2014 on a scale of -2 to +2.
- 2 = Considerable deterioration
- 1 = A slight deterioration
0 = no change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012
+1 = slight improvement
+2 = considerable improvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Change in the indicators in the 2012 – 2014 period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civic engagement</strong></td>
<td>1 Needs of marginalised groups</td>
<td>How does your organisation take the needs of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups into account in your planning, actions, activities, and/or strategies?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Involvement of target groups</td>
<td>What is the level of participation of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups in the analysis, planning and evaluation of your activities?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Political engagement</td>
<td>How intense is your (individual staff or organisational) participation in locally-nationally elected bodies and/or sectoral user groups?</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of organisation</strong></td>
<td>5 Relations with other organisations</td>
<td>In the past 12 months what has been the most intensive interaction you had with other CSOs?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 Frequency of dialogue with closest CSO</td>
<td>In the past 12 months how many meetings did you have with the CSO that you have most intensive interaction with?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 Defending the interests of marginalised groups</td>
<td>Which CSO are most effective in defending the interests of your target groups? In the past 12 months, how did you relate to those CSOs?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 Composition current financial resource base</td>
<td>How does your organisation finance institutional costs such as workshops of the General Assembly (if applicable); attendance to workshops of other CSOs; costs for organisational growth and/or networking?</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Practice of Values</strong></td>
<td>8 Downward accountability</td>
<td>To what extent can mandatory social organs (steering committee, general assembly, internal auditing group) ask your executive leaders to be accountable to them?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 Composition of social organs</td>
<td>What % of members of your mandatory social organs belong to the marginalised target groups you are working with/for?</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 External financial auditing</td>
<td>How regularly is your organisation audited externally?</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perception of Impact</strong></td>
<td>11 Client satisfaction</td>
<td>What are the most important concerns of your target groups? How do your services take into account those important concerns?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 Civil society impact</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what impact did you have on building a strong civil society?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
<td>Relation with public sector organisations</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with public sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' objectives?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td>Relation with private sector organisations</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with private sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations' perspective?</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td>Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations</td>
<td>How successful have you been in influencing public policies and practices in the past 2 years?</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td>Influence upon private sector agencies’ policies, rules, regulations.</td>
<td>How successful have you been in influencing private sector policies and practices in the past 2 years?</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
<td>Coping strategies</td>
<td>In the past 2 years, how did your organisation cope with these changes in the context that may have been positive or negative consequences for civil society?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 4  Changes in civil society indicators between 2012 and 2014

1. Civic Engagement

1.1. Needs of marginalised groups SPO

There is no change since the baseline in CRI’s strategy to engage civil society. CRI does not position itself as the frontline defender of marginalised groups. As such, whether the interests of these marginalised groups are well addressed depends much more on the intermediate organisations (community radios) with which CRI is working. CRI has tried to mobilize the participation of community radios in a web-based citizen journalism platform, Suara Komunitas or SK (Voice of the Community) whose aim is to become a strategic medium to support advocacy regarding the fulfilling of basic rights of the citizens. With Hivos’ support since 2006, there has been an increase in the number of SK web visitors, contributors, articles and topics as a result of CRI attempts to improve the participation and ability of community radios to reflect upon and produce information by improving their critical journalism capacity.

Based on CRI project documents, there is 20 percent increase in number of SK contributors from 2012 to 2013 (665 to 833), and up to August 2014 the number have become 856 contributors. There is only a 7 percent increase in number of web visitors from 2012-2013, but there is 56 percent increase in the number of articles produced in that period (which means that more participants are producing articles rather than just viewing). The number of articles rose from 2,951 to 4,630 from 2012-2013, which means that on average the production of content by each contributor increased from 4 articles in 2012 to 5 articles in 2013. These statistics show that more community radios are participating in SK and by doing so they are escalating issues and creating greater opportunity and power to engage the public and private sectors. Based on these findings, it can be concluded that during the past two years CRI has contributed to engaging more community radios and increasing their capability to defend marginalised groups.

1.2. Involvement of target groups SPO

According to CRI’s management, community radios (CRI’s intermediary organisations), have been more involved and been able to take more initiative in the past two years. In September 2012, SK’s organisational structure was revamped, becoming an open membership community (perkumpulan) whose structure consists of an ethical board, executives, editor, and contributors74. This structure (member-based) has given CRI’s target groups more opportunity to be involved and take greater responsibility in managing SK on their own, including website maintenance and editorial affairs, planning and organizing events and meetings, or contacting other partners. CRI management claimed that the SK program had been formulated together with the target groups, however there’s no clear evidence as to when it has been done or whether all members were given equal opportunity to participate in the planning.

The involvement of SK members in strategic planning and in influencing the organizational direction of CRI seems to be limited. This may stem from the way financial resources are channelled to SK. As a new organisation, SK is still very much dependent on CRI for funding, and this financial dependence may allow the SK agenda to be driven by CRI. There is an uneasy contradiction between the increased level of involvement of community radios in SK vis-à-vis a financial dependence on CRI. This has

74http://suarakomunitas.net/baca/26319/bangun-lembaga-suara-komunitas/
surfaced through CRI’s hesitancy to ask SK members to conduct stakeholder mapping, in requests from SK leadership to more freedom to manage funds according to their own initiatives, and in the form of requests from SK members for financial incentives to compensate for their contribution to SK.

1.3. Intensity of political engagement SPO

None of the new, or former, CRI personnel or board members are engaged in the political arena. As such, there is no change since the baseline. CRI has begun to see itself more as a ‘connector’, facilitating the ability of their network to share information which can be utilized in communication or lobby to policy-makers. CRI itself does not consider direct political engagement as an area where they should take part.

A recent example from this comes from JRKI’s work in 2012 to lobby for the revision of Broadcasting Law No.32/2002 which is necessary for community radios’ sustainability. CRI facilitated JRKI to provide policy inputs, participating in the process but not leading it. With Ford Foundation support, CRI also worked with SIAR and a coalition of civil society actors to lobby the Ministry of Health for the validation of Jamkesmas beneficiaries in 2013. Currently CRI’s role is less as a frontline in lobby activities compared to the baseline, and more as a facilitator and connector for their network to engage in political issues.

2. Level of Organisation

2.1 Relations with other organisations SPO

In terms of numbers, not much has changed with regards to CRI’s network with other CSOs. CRI has kept its traditional and informal network with Yogyakarta-based CSOs such as PKBI, KID, IRE, IDEA. Although informal in nature, this network is considered proactive and responsive, as seen from how they worked together to advocate for better targeting of Jamkesmas (the social health insurance program for the poor and near-poor). See indicator 4.5 for further details on this. CRI’s intermediate organizations reported that the number of organisations in their network has slightly increased as a result of CRI intervention.

CRI refers to Jaringan Radio Komunitas Indonesia (JRKI), the official umbrella organization for community radio, as their “younger brother”. JRKI was set up in 2002 for the purpose of advocating for a broadcasting draft bill, in which CRI was involved as one of the frontline actor. JRKI’s main responsibility is to engage politically, protecting the interest of its constituents. One their most important agenda at present is to revise the Broadcasting Law No.32/2002 which does not provide community radios with sufficient protection against private sector media. CRI is regarded by JRKI as the main knowledge resource provider for its constituents, and also partner in advocacy works.

CRI’s relationship with JRKI has evolved as CRI has nurtured JRKI’s capacity overtime, which has meant that some roles originally taken on by CRI have been completely transferred to JRKI, while others are still shared. CRI has left the tasks of expanding the community radio network and registration of community radios to JRKI since 2004. However, as JRKI’s organisational capacity and capability is still weak, CRI’s relationship with JRKI is still characterized by an interdependence relation. For JRKI, recent cooperation with CRI sought to benefit from CRI’s management capacity, and experience in, for example, securing sponsors, budget management and reporting. CRI in turn benefitted from JRKI’s fieldwork expertise and network base. An example of this type of partnership

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75Kharisma Prasetyo et al, Evaluation Workshop, June 2014.
76Kharisma Prasetyo et al, Survey Kontributor SK, August 2014.
77Proposal_revisi_uu_penyiaran.doc
78Kharisma Prasetyo et al, Interview with JRKI, July 2014.
80http://jrki.wordpress.com/about/
was the 2012-initiated lobby for the revisions of the Broadcasting Law supported by Hivos. In 2014, CRI and JRKI also partnered to secure funds from the PNPM Support Facility (engaging community radios for PNPM program monitoring).

As reported during the evaluation workshop, CRI’s strategic planning conducted in late 2012 is another example of how the CRI-JRKI relationship has evolved. Although there are no available documents regarding the strategic planning results, actors close to CRI (including JRKI and community radios) confirmed that it has resulted in better and more consistent CRI positioning with a role as resource provider for community radios. For example, CRI no longer provides support for individual community radios on technical problems, encouraging them to seek help from other community radios within the JRKI network.

2.2. Frequency of dialogue with closest civil society organisation SPO

CRI’s closest partner is JRKI given their shared network and interests and CRI’s contribution to the founding of JRKI. Throughout 2014, CRI frequently interacted with JRKI as they were collaborating on the PSF-supported National Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM). For this purpose, JRKI staffs were working from the CRI office on a daily basis for a period of around four months. CRI also had an intense collaboration with JRKI and KontraS to monitor the presidential and legislative elections of 2014.

Reflecting on this most recent case described above, it would seem that the intensity of CRI’s relations with JRKI has increased, in comparison to the baseline situation. Hivos’ support also contributed to this increase as they funded the SK program and discussions on the revision of the Broadcasting Law, both platforms for CRI and JRKI cooperation. With regards to the SK initiative, CRI collaborated with JRKI to recruit contributors to the web platform in 2013.

However, there are concerns about the CRI-JRKI relationship, particularly with regards to each of the organisation’s position in relation to their shared network of community radios. There is also concern that many of CRI’s network relations with JRKI, as well as with other CSOs, have relied on personal relations of former CRI staff. This may affect the nature and frequency of CRI’s relations to other CSOs in the future. Moreover, CRI’s focus on SK does not always generate positive benefit to JRKI. The evaluation team received critical inputs from JRKI, namely that by mobilizing community radios to contribute to SK (internet-based media), CRI has unexpectedly pulled some community radio activists from their roots (audio-based media).

2.3. Defending the interests of marginalised groups SPO

Between 2012 and 2014, CRI aimed to improve their intermediate organisations’ (community radios) capacity to defend the interest of the community they represent, by enabling them to participate and contribute to the citizen journalism website, SK. CRI believes that issues escalated through SK will be of use in lobbying the public or private sector for the benefit of the community. As earlier noted, there has been 20 percent increase in the number of SK contributors from 2012 to 2013, and a further increase in 2014 (22 percent). This has gone hand-in-hand with the production of more articles and website visitors. This shows that community radios are participating more in SK. Also worth noting is that the percentage of new female contributors grew between 2011 and 2012. In 2011, SK successfully attracted 97 new contributors, of which 24.75 percent were women. In 2012, SK grew with 92 contributors of which 31.6 percent were women.

Despite the improvements, CRI and its IOs do not have a system in place to monitor whether there are actions being undertaken by their target audience on the basis of information produced through the SK platform. In addition, it is difficult to know whether CRI, JRKI and SK contributors are always committed to representing community interests. The same could be said for new SK contributors, many of them bloggers. Critical remarks can also be made in the way the Jamkesmas issue was promoted and advocated. It was clear that CRI drove the production of relevant content push for the

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81Proposal_revisi_uu_penyiaran.doc
escalation of the issue, rather than community radios in its network having critical awareness and driving an issue derived from the grassroots. It took Ford Foundation’s financial contribution to push a chain of actions that should have happened regularly according to CRI’s theory of change, and one that was clearly an objective in the proposal to Hivos. In their report to Ford Foundation, CRI admits that the program was an acceleration effort to achieve an outcome that should have been realized two years prior.82

2.4. Composition financial resource base SPO

According to the participants in the workshop conducted with the SPO, compared to the previous program period, CRI is currently working with a smaller total budget as a result of decreasing Hivos support, while amounts from other sources remain the same. However, the extent to which this has indeed impacted heavily on the financial resource base of the SPO is unclear, as CRI has attracted sizeable funding from the Ford Foundation, five times larger than the contribution from Hivos. For example, during the 2012-2013 period, CRI received support from the following donors: Ford Foundation (US$ 360,000 for 24 months), Hivos (€60.000 for 22 months), and PSF (US$ 250,000 for 18 months). In 2012, Hivos contributed just 9 percent of CRI’s total budget. In 2013 CRI received most of its funding from (in order of largest contributor to smallest): Ford Foundation, PSF, Hivos, ACCESS II, DAI-USaid, Misereor and Osaka University.83 Going forward though, CRI may indeed face a challenge in maintaining the financial resources and funding base they have had.

In the 2012-2014 period, the three largest donors (Ford Foundation, PSF and Hivos) all supported SK. CRI differentiated each contribution based on the provinces covered. Hivos funds covered SK development in 6 provinces, Ford Foundation in 4 provinces, and PSF in 9 provinces. CRI also claimed to allocate each donor’s funding to a specific focus. Hivos’ funds aimed for activities related to strengthening the network at regional level; Ford Foundation for SK collaboration with other media to push the act upon information; while PSF for both strategies where it is related to PNPM program monitoring.84 However, such differentiation still allows overlaps as similar initiatives are funded by all contributors. CRI can report the same result to two or more donors, as was the case with Jamkesmas validation mentioned in the indicator above (it is worthy to note that during the MFS-II evaluation workshop, the Jamkesmas validation was repeatedly mentioned by workshop participants as evidence for several indicators).

3. Practice of Values

3.1. Downward accountability SPO

CRI continues to hold regular quarterly meetings with the board members to allow the board to supervise organizational performance. However, CRI currently does not seem to have dedicated personnel for monitoring and evaluation in their organizational and personnel structure although the baseline report and Hivos assessment suggested otherwise. As for sharing project and financial reports to CRI’s target groups, in the SPO began to upload annual reports on their website for public access (although the report does not provide figures for financial contributions by donors).

The MFS-II baseline in July 2012 was used as a valuable moment for CRI to reflect on its organization and led to a strategic planning meeting in December 2012. During the strategic planning, CRI tried to cope with increasing demand from the CS arena and aligned it with existing capacity and CRI’s vision and mission.85

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81Laporan Pilot Kolaborasi Media Jan-Feb 2013.pdf, p.1
83Penjelasan tambahan ke Hivos 2012-Hivos.pdf
84http://www.combine.or.id/profil-2/struktur-lembaga/
85http://www.combine.or.id/2014/03/laporan-tahunan-combine-resource-institution-tahun-2013/
86Progress Report HIVOS COMBINE #RO.SEA at HO 1004708, p.13
3.2 Composition of social organs SPO

There are no significant changes in the composition of the social organs of the SPO, although there have been internal personnel changes. In the past three years, two additional personnel were included in CRI’s board. One of the new board members is the former CRI program manager. As during the baseline, none of the board members come from community radios (CRI’s IOs). Suara Komunitas is an open network-based organization with a board of experts, a board of ethics, a chief editor and regional editors in 31 provinces. Its membership has grown to include community radios, NGOs and bloggers. This indicator is less relevant for CRI.

3.3. External financial auditing SPO

Annual audits are, as during the baseline, a part of CRI’s organizational code of conduct and an internal performance indicator. Audits have been conducted regularly since 2008. Hivos funded CRI’s institutional audit for 2012-2013.

4. Perception of Impact

4.1. Client satisfaction SPO

CRI does not monitor the satisfaction of the users of SK or SID. Evaluation workshop participants only referred to the increasing level of SK participation within the last two years as evidence of increased client satisfaction. For the purpose of this evaluation, a survey amongst SK contributors was conducted, with the following findings:

- 88 percent of the respondents agreed that CRI contributed to facilitating/creating a network around them.
- 72 percent of the respondents feel that CRI contributed to their increased capacity.
- 60 percent attribute capacity development to JRKI, and 52 percent reported that capacity improvement was through self-initiative.
- 32 percent agree that their capacity has increased since participating in SK. Moreover, all respondents felt they now had adequate capacity after they participated in SK, while before, on 24 percent felt they had required capacity.
- 87.5 percent of the respondents believe that SK has unique features and that content is not like mainstream media news in that it is more relevant for the grassroots level.
- 68 percent perceive that there has been adequate follow-up toward escalated issues on SK.

Overall, the above survey results strongly suggest that there is more satisfaction since the baseline, especially with regards to SK. However, the last finding is rather questionable since it is contrary to the general evaluation findings and it is not supported by documents. CRI does not inventory or monitor the extent to which issues are followed up. Aside from the Jamkesmas validation case, dissemination of several position papers regarding bird flu, and the tweeting of facts regarding BOS (government school operational funds program), there is no further evidence of issue follow-up within the past three years. There is no adequate evidence from the SK contributor survey to attribute a change in public service provision to SK interventions, although the survey findings do suggest a satisfaction of SK (and the service of providing information thought the platform).

With regards to the satisfaction of IOs (community radio stations) with CRI’s services in general, the SPO admits that some of their IOs may be less satisfied than during the baseline. They ascribe this to the repositioning that has taken place within CRI itself and see disappointment as a natural reaction to such changes. CRI’s position has brought in what the organization describes, "a new style of

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88 Dokumen "penjelasantambahaneHivos2012.pdf"
cooperation and new opportunities to be able to do something about issues faced in their communities.”

4.2. Civil society impact SPO

The evaluation team found no strong evidence in the workshop or in available documents of a stronger civil society through CRI’s direct interventions, or by way of improved performance of the community radio network in providing services to the local population since the baseline. Except for one example that is not strongly attributable to CRI’s interventions (community radio activists in Palopo, Sulawesi advocating the Department of Forestry to protect indigenous forests), there is no information about how CRI and its IOs have impacted civil society in the last two years. Rather it seems that CRI selects topics to be advocated based on what local community radio initiatives it finds interesting.

CRI’s progress reports provided no specific evidence or cases regarding the impact of CRI’s efforts in providing communities with alternative sources of information. The 2012 report, for example, only went as far as claiming that CRI had created more opportunities for such impacts to happen, and an increase of community radio participation in SK (as detailed in indicator 1.1) as impacts to civil society. The latter point on SK participation is a fair observation (as shown in increased number of contributors, visitors, coverage, and articles). As such it could be said that civil society actors, especially community radios, have come together in a joint effort to improve information to be used to influence public and private sector arenas. The SK contributor survey also supports this argument as it reported that 88 percent respondents agreed that CRI had contributed in facilitating/creating network around them. In response to another question in the survey, 72 percent referred to an escalation of issues to push follow-up from relevant stakeholders as their motivation in joining SK. This shows that SK (if we consider this as an IO platform of CRI) has improved its performance since the baseline.

With regards to improving effective network capacity of its community radios, CRI was expected to conduct stakeholder mapping/inventory. CRI reported that this was done for Yogyakarta and North Sumatra province, but there has been little evidence that it occurred beyond these provinces. In September 2014, CRI planned to conduct more stakeholder inventories as part of its joint advocacy support to community radios on specific issues or cases.

The evaluation does not wish to discredit the potential impact of community radios at the local, grassroots level. There are certainly positive changes that occurred. However, with the given resources and time for this evaluation, the team was unable to find evidence of this. From our observation, CRI is still regarded as reputable resource organization in the area of community media development, specializing in community radios. Many community radios have been established in marginalised area with the help from CRI, and such interventions surely have had positive impacts on civil society. Many studies (Gaida & Searle, 1980; White, 1976, 1977; Leslie, 1978; Jamison & McAnany, 1978; Byram, Kaute, & Matenge, 1980; Hall & Dodds, 1977; McAnany, 1976) have shown that such interventions have a civic education value. In this regard, Sweeney and Parlato (1982, p. 13) concluded that "...radio plays an effective educational role both as the sole medium or in conjunction with print and group support." It is unfortunate that no hard evidence can be collected given the limits of the evaluation. In the future, CRI and JRKI should put more efforts into monitoring and documenting such impacts and changes.

4.3. Relation with public sector organisations SPO

CRI has no direct relations with public sector organisations except by promoting the implementation of SID to village governments and engaging in lobby together with other CSO actors. The number of village governments implementing SID has increased in the 2012-2014 period, with more village.

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89Evaluation workshop conducted with CRI
91Progress Report HIVOS COMBINE #RO.SEA at HO 1004708, p.4
93Ndubuisi Goodluck Nwaerondu and Gordon Thompson, The Use of Educational Radio in Developing Countries: Lessons from the Past, Worldbank online archive.
governments being serviced by CRI (figures presented under Indicator 1.1). District governments have also been involved in coordinating the SID intervention. As for engagement in lobbying with other actors, since the baseline CRI contributed to the validation of Jamkesmas beneficiaries. CRI and a coalition of Yogyakarta-based actors have had good relationships with the public sector at provincial and district level, which is regarded as the main factor behind the successful Jamkesmas lobby.

CRI target groups’ (i.e. community radios) relations with the public sector varies in intensity from one region the next, depending on local dynamics and challenges. It is unclear how CRI has attempted to cope with the complexity of regional conditions and how it has tried to support community radios in improving relations with the public sector. Other than taking an inventory of potential areas for joint lobby at the regional level with their community radio network in seven provinces, there is no indication that CRI has undertaken any action to improve relations between community radio network members and the government.

4.4. Relation with private sector agencies SPO

CRI also does not engage directly with the private sector. As admitted by workshop participants, CRI’s interventions at the level of community ICT systems (through SID, Pasar Komunitas program, etc.) have not been able to reach the desired impact of linking economic potentials at the village level with the private sector. Part of the contract deliverables with Hivos for the 2012-2013 period included supporting women’s cooperatives to develop web/internet skills for business promotion. The extent to which this intervention and others have attracted private sector investments is unclear and unmonitored. In addition, the MFS-II baseline noted that Hivos did not continue with support to SID in the 2012-2013 period because achievements were less than expected.

4.5. Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations SPO

Compared to baseline, there are no significant improvements regarding CRI’s or its IOs’ ability to influence the public sector in the 2012-2014 period, with the exception of the successful Jamkesmas (national health insurance scheme) beneficiary validation. The case of invalid beneficiary lists was actually selected by CRI as an area for intervention, with funds from the Ford Foundation, in an attempt to prove that their theory of change can work. CRI drove the escalation of the issue via SK and other media outlets such as Twitter, Facebook, community radio, and broadcasts on state radio, as a means to apply public pressure on decision-makers. CRI worked together with a Yogyakarta-based CSO coalition named Sekretariat Bersama Jamkesmas to lobbying the Ministry of Health at the national level and the Yogyakarta provincial government. The result was that the head of the Health Department of Yogyakarta Province was willing to validate several beneficiaries and to accept input from the community should such cases be found in the future, as stipulated in Ministry of Health Letter No.149/2013 on Jamkesmas Participation. However, no hard data can be found to measure the scope of the validation (number of people benefitting), either from CRI, the CSO coalition, or from the Ministry of Health. There is also no evidence to suggest that the intervention was replicated elsewhere. One reason for the lack of replication has been the change in government policy and programs in mid-2013, resulting in the transformation of Jamkesmas into a new scheme called BPJS. Compared to Jamkesmas, the BPJS scheme offers better services and beneficiary selection mechanism as it allows open registration (including online registration) while Jamkesmas beneficiary selection was based solely on government assessments.

The contribution analysis found only weak evidence of CRI’s contribution to the issuance of the Ministry of Health Letter No.149/2013 on Jamkesmas Participation. There was no evidence that CRI drove there to be significant media coverage to influence the decision of policy-makers. There was evidence that the Yogyakarta-based CSO coalition conducted lobby at the national and provincial levels, but there was no evidence that without CRI support such lobby activities would not have been effective.

95BPJS merge different government insurances (public health, labor, delivery) into single provider. It was officially established on 1 January 2014 (http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/BPJS_Kesehatan)
CRI supported JRKI’s collaboration with a number of CSOs to lobby for revisions of the Broadcasting Law. In this process, JRKI approached Commission 1 of the National Parliament (Komisi 1 DPR) to lead discussions on the revisions. Specifically, JRKI approached a member of the Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party) fraction to lead discussions with four relevant ministries. Unfortunately in 2013-2014, the agenda of parliamentarians and other politicians was influenced by Presidential elections, and the discussions of the revision took a backseat.96

As mentioned under indicator 4.4, CRI has done little to improve the level of engagement between its IOs and the public sector. As such there has been little influence on the public sector in the period since the baseline. Hivos’ contribution to SK is still limited to increasing the potential for CRI’s IOs to have an impact through a platform for credible information produced by community radios, bloggers and citizen journalists.

4.6. Influence upon private sector agencies’ policies, rules, regulations SPO

Although CRI claimed that there were improvements in the extent to which the SPO has been able to influence the private sector, the evaluation team did not find any evidence of significant changes that occurred since the baseline. At present, CRI admits that information systems have not yet been able to generate transparency in private sector practices and policies. ICT support to villages has yet to open up market opportunities to local communities. Although the number of villages implementing and utilizing SID is increasing, the benefits are limited to improving administration processes of the village government. Additionally, there is no evidence yet that content produced through the SK platform has successfully influenced the practices or regulations of private sector actors. In this regard, there has been no improvement in CRI’s ability to influence market actors.

5. Civil Society context

5.1. Coping strategies

A combination of obsolete strategic orientation (specifically the lack of a strategic plan) and increasing demand for CRI intervention from CS arena had caused the “organization to move without clear direction, becoming very lax in its efforts to meet the achievements”. In response to this situation, CRI held a series of strategic planning meetings from October to December 2012, which were supported by Hivos through the ‘Act Upon Information’ program. These meetings were intended to “sharpen organisational performance in a variety of efforts to encourage a more knowledgeable society and responsive state”. This vision was then to be translated into an adjusted strategy for each project in June 2013. The evaluation did not assess whether these changes have indeed materialized. However, JRKI and SK contributors have confirmed that there have been positive changes in CRI’s approach since 2012.

Broadcasting Law No. 32/2004 has provided community radios with the legitimacy and freedom to operate, but it still does not provide them with enough protection from private sector media. The law stipulates that community radios have to compete head-to-head with commercial radios in utilizing limited broadcasting bandwidth, while at the same time limiting their capability to generate funds. CRI and JRKI reacted to this issue by joining and strengthening existing efforts initiated by other actors such as PR2Media, Masyarakat Peduli Media, AJI, PKMBP, etc. CRI and JRKI expect to contribute by engaging its networks in lobby efforts to revise the law, facilitate personal lobby to parliament members, and drive public pressure by generating content on the SK platform, community radio, and social media. In this regard, CRI works together with JRKI to cope and respond to a perceived threat shared with by their target groups. Hivos supported this initiative by providing specific funding between 2012-2013 outside the ‘Act Upon Information’ program.

96JRKI’s quarterly report to CRI: Laporan Tiga Bulanan Periode Februari-April 2013, Advokasi Undang-undang Penyiaran Bagi Lembag Penyiaran Komunitas.
97Progress Report HIVOS COMBINE #RO.SEA at HO 1004708, p.13
98Ibid.
While SK is mainly used to publish news and articles for a specific audience, the increased utilization of online and social media by the public sector presents opportunities for CRI. CRI can capitalize on existing opportunities to widen its engagement with civil society and bridge civil society actors with the public sector. CRI has already begun to connect and link Suara Komunitas with more popular media forms such as Twitter and Facebook. In addition, Ford Foundation funding in the 2012-2013 period specifically aimed to support CRI efforts to bridge the gap between the public sector and civil society, or grassroots, issues.

As an interesting finding of this evaluation: from 25 SK contributors survey (an online survey) respondents, 24 of them participate via Facebook links, 1 via email, and none via SK link.
Appendix 5 Suara Komunitas
Contributors’ Survey

Survey information:
The online survey was conducted over a three-week period, with a total of 25 valid responses. 22 of the 25 respondents responded to the survey via a Facebook link, while the other 3 responded to an email sent out to SK contributors. None the respondents responded through the Suara Komunitas website.

Most questions were multiple response, to anticipate a combination of answers and to capture respondents’ views and attitudes.

Length of respondents’ participation in SK
The survey found that out of 25 respondents, 13 had been part of SK for 2 years or less, while 12 had participated in SK for more than two years (7 of them for more than 3 years). This distribution may indicate that within the past 2 years, the number of SK members has increased significantly.

How long have you participated in SK?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration of participation in SK</th>
<th>Since you joined SK, how many articles have you produced?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;1 year</td>
<td>Mean 35, Sum 345, Count 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 years</td>
<td>Mean 22, Sum 67, Count 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A total of 412 articles have been produced by the 13 respondents who joined SK within the past 2 years. Although with great variance, on average, each respondent produced roughly 15 articles annually, or a little more than one every month.
Respondents’ backgrounds

Of the 25 respondents, 19 had a community radio background. Four of the 19 identified themselves as NGO activist, 1 as an independent contributor, and the other 14 did not provide detailed backgrounds.

Of the 6 respondents who did not have a community radio background, 5 come from NGOs who are interested in participating in SK, 2 of whom consider themselves as independent contributors. One respondent of the 25 with no NGO or community radio background.

Participation in Suara Komunitas: What motivates contributors?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To obtain important information relevant to the community you represent</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To join forces in a critical discourse</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To urge stakeholders to follow up on garnering issues</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To network and socialize with fellow contributors</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To increase your own capacity or the capacity of the organization/community you represent</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No specific purpose or motivation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

72 percent of contributors said they participated to escalate issues expecting follow-up from relevant stakeholders (in affirmation toward the “act upon information” theory). The second most chosen reason or motivation behind participation was to receive valuable information (56 percent of the respondents selected this as a reason for the motivation). 52 percent said a source of motivation was to increase their capacity. While 48 percent selected the participation in critical discourse as one of the reasons. The least selected response was to network or socialize with other contributors (40 percent).

Participation in Suara Komunitas: Perceived benefits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Received important information that is relevant to the community you represent</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The development of joint, critical discourse</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urged stakeholders to follow up on garnering issues</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networking and socializing with fellow contributors</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased capacity</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No specific benefits</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As with the above question, more than one response was allowed for this question. All respondents perceived one benefit or another from joining SK. Most respondents perceived networking to be the greatest benefit that has taken place (60 percent), followed by increased capacity and urging stakeholder follow up to emerging issues (both 52 percent). Benefits least realized were receiving important information relevant to the contributors and developing a critical discourse (both 48 percent).

Interestingly, when comparing the motivation with the benefits received, there is a disparity. While 72 percent of the respondents joined SK because to urge an “act upon information”, only 52 percent of the respondents found this benefit to be realized. 40 percent of the respondents joined SK for networking reasons, yet 60 percent now actually feel this to be a benefit. Despite the disparities in these aforementioned areas, respondents generally perceive that SK has been delivering what they
had expected from it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comparison between benefit perceived vs expected:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Answer Options</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received important information that is relevant to the community you represent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The development of joint, critical discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urged stakeholders to follow up on garnering issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networking and socializing with fellow contributors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased individual capacity or the organization/community you represent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In conclusion, we can say that respondents are overall satisfied with SK due to the benefits from improved networking. What seemingly has not met expectations is the relevance of content and the follow-up actions on issues.

Another question respondents were asked was the extent to which they felt that had SK not been there, there would be benefits they would be missing out on.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To what extent do you agree with the following statement: If SK never existed, there would be a lot of benefits that you would have never have obtained.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Answer Options</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

84 percent of the respondents agree that if SK had never existed, they would be missing benefits, while 12 percent disagreed with the statement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In your opinion, has there already been adequate follow-up to issues raised by SK?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Answer Options</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, adequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, not yet adequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although expectations regarding the follow-up of issues raised by SK have seemingly not been met, the responses to the adequacy of follow-up were generally positive, although a quarter said they were not adequate.

Input from respondents was also asked in the questionnaire. Below is a summary of inputs on what the expectations were of the respondents:

- More frequent meetings between contributors
- More contributors
- Improved communication between editors and contributors
- Improving journalism standards of written pieces
- Improving contributors’ skills (not only in journalism/article writing), but also on critical-issues, networking, and advocacy
- Infrastructure support (internet connection)
• Better protection by the law for contributors
• To ensure independency
• More picture instead of text
• Incentives/rewards for contributors
• More follow-up on issues toward relevant stakeholders
• Media convergence (SK to include audio news from community radios as news source)
• Better SK website interface, design, and online reliability

Social media trends: SK versus social media

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relating to the presence of social media, how do you see the position of SK?</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SK has the same functions as social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, and other social media.</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Although similar in function, SK has a unique function that cannot be replaced by Facebook, Twitter and other social media.</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

96% of respondents think that although SK has unique features that distinguish it from other social media (thus signifying its relevance).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What distinguishes SK from other social media?</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Better quality news</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More reliable and credible news source</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More news that is relevant to grassroots, non-mainstream</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is a discourse that is more targeted/focused</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More potential for follow-up to the discourse</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From multiple answers possible the majority or 87.5 percent of respondents believed that SK’s unique feature lies in the news relevancy since content is more grassroots, unlike mainstream media. The second most picked response was that SK has more reliable and credible news sources. 41.7 percent also selected more targeted discourse and more potential for follow-up to the discourse as distinguishing features.

Changes in capacity of respondents: prior to joining SK and at present

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To what extent do you agree with the following statement: Prior to joining SK, you already had sufficient capacity to process and deliver information</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not agree</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To what extent do you agree with the following statement: At present, you have enough capacity to process and deliver information</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Prior to joining SK, only 32 percent felt strongly agreed or agreed that they had sufficient capacity. When asked about their current capacity, 84 percent strongly agreed or agreed that they have sufficient capacity. This is a variance/improvement of 52 percent. 24 percent of the respondents were inclined to disagree with the statement (i.e. indicating they did not have sufficient capacity prior to joining SK). This percentage declined to 0 percent when asked about the present situation.

**Perceived changes in capacity of respondents: attributed to what organisation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CRI</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRKI</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other NGOs</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other community radios</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent learning (own initiative)</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this question, more than one response was allowed. The changes in capacity from prior to joining SK to the present situation, were mostly attributed to CRI (72 percent), followed by JRKI (60 percent). More than half of the respondents (52 percent) attributed a change in their capacity to their own self initiative. Just over a quarter attributed it partly to community radios, and 16 percent to other NGOs.

**Network of respondents: size & benefits**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How long respondents have been part of SK</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;1 year</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 years</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3 years</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 3 years</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On average, each respondent has 19 organisations that they consider as their network. However, some respondents only have two to five organisations in their network. Only 40 percent of respondents joined SK expecting benefits from networking, yet 60 percent report that upon joining there was a benefit from networking.

**Network: Combine Research Institute contribution**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not agree</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
88 percent of the respondents agree that CRI has contributed to facilitating or creating a network around them.

### Do you feel or notice any changes in CRI’s role and approach before and after 2012?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

84 percent of the respondents acknowledge that there has been a change in CRI’s approach since 2012. 62 percent of the respondents see this as a positive change, while less than a quarter are neutral, and around 15 percent see this as a negative change.

### If you have noticed any change, do you feel this is a positive change?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very positive</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither positive nor negative</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very negative</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Centre for Development Innovation works on processes of innovation and change in the areas of food and nutrition security, adaptive agriculture, sustainable markets, ecosystem governance, and conflict, disaster and reconstruction. It is an interdisciplinary and internationally focused unit of Wageningen UR within the Social Sciences Group. Our work fosters collaboration between citizens, governments, businesses, NGOs, and the scientific community. Our worldwide network of partners and clients links with us to help facilitate innovation, create capacities for change and broker knowledge.

The mission of Wageningen UR (University & Research centre) is 'To explore the potential of nature to improve the quality of life'. Within Wageningen UR, nine specialised research institutes of the DLO Foundation have joined forces with Wageningen University to help answer the most important questions in the domain of healthy food and living environment. With approximately 30 locations, 6,000 members of staff and 9,000 students, Wageningen UR is one of the leading organisations in its domain worldwide. The integral approach to problems and the cooperation between the various disciplines are at the heart of the unique Wageningen Approach.