Kantor Berita Radio (KBR) end line report

MFS II country evaluations, Civil Society component

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This report describes the findings of the end line assessment of the Kantor Berita Radio 68H (KBR68H), a partner of Free Press Unlimited in Indonesia.

The evaluation was commissioned by NWO-WOTRO, the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research in the Netherlands and is part of the programmatic evaluation of the Co-Financing System - MFS II financed by the Dutch Government, whose overall aim is to strengthen civil society in the South as a building block for structural poverty reduction. Apart from assessing impact on MDGs, the evaluation also assesses the contribution of the Dutch Co-Funding Agencies to strengthen the capacities of their Southern Partners, as well as the contribution of these partners towards building a vibrant civil society arena.

This report assesses how KBR68H has contributed towards strengthening civil society in Indonesia using the CIVICUS analytical framework. It is a follow-up of a baseline study conducted in 2012. Key questions that are being answered relate to changes in the five CIVICUS dimensions to which KBR68H contributed; the nature of its contribution; the relevance of the contribution made, and an identification of factors that explain KBR68H’s role in civil society strengthening.

Keywords: Civil society, CIVICUS, theory-based evaluation, process-tracing
Acknowledgements

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SurveyMETER and CDI are thanking the staff and the leaders of all Southern Partner Organisations that participated in collecting information for the evaluation of the contribution of these partner organisations to creating a vibrant civil society in India. They also thank the Co-Funding Agencies and the Dutch Consortia they are a member of for making background documents available. We hope that this evaluation can support you in better positioning yourself in the Civil Society Arena of Indonesia.
List of abbreviations and acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AJI</td>
<td>Aliansi Jurnalis Independen (Independent Journalist Alliance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDI</td>
<td>Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>Co-Financing Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFO</td>
<td>Co-Financing Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSR</td>
<td>Corporate social responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPU</td>
<td>Free Press Unlimited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAI</td>
<td>Institut Studi Arus Informasi (Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of Information)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIL</td>
<td>Jaringan Islam Liberal (Liberal Islamic Network)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFS</td>
<td>Dutch co-financing system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBR68H</td>
<td>Kantor Berita Radio 68H (Radio News Office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KKN</td>
<td>Kids News Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWO-WOTRO</td>
<td>Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>Perseroan terbatas (limited liability company)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRI</td>
<td>Radio Republik Indonesia (Radio Republic Indonesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPO</td>
<td>Southern Partner Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ToC</td>
<td>Theory of Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wageningen UR</td>
<td>Wageningen University &amp; Research Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WKN</td>
<td>World Kids News</td>
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<tr>
<td>YPMA</td>
<td>Yayasan Pengembangan Media Anak (Children Media Development Foundation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1 Introduction

This report presents the civil society end line findings of KBR, a partner of Free Press Unlimited. It is a follow-up to the baseline assessment carried out in 2012. According to the information provided during the baseline study, KBR is working on the theme 'governance'.

These findings are part of the overall joint MFS II evaluations carried out to account for results of MFS II-funded or co-funded development interventions implemented by Dutch Co-Funding Agencies (CFAs) and/or their Southern Partner Organisations (SPO). They are also intended to contribute to the improvement of future development interventions. The civil society evaluation uses the CIVICUS framework (see Appendix 1) and seeks to answer the following questions:

- What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?
- To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
- What is the relevance of these changes?
- What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

The CIVICUS framework that comprises five dimensions (civic engagement, level of organization, practice of values, perception of impact, and context influencing agency by civil society in general) has been used to orient the evaluation methodology.

Changes in the civil society arena of the SPO

In the 2012 – 2014 period the most important change that took place in KBR’s civil society arena is related to Civic Engagement. Between 2011 and 2013 Teen Voice expanded through televised and radio broadcasted programs. According to KBR68H’s own estimated the relay of the show through 52 radio stations and 22 television stations relayed an estimated 1.17 million youth and teenagers. This number is impressive. The content was produced involving youth reporters and presenters with a focus on presenting issues through the viewpoints of teenagers. As the audience survey, covering 300 children showed, the audience was enthusiastic about the content of the shows. Children enjoyed the content and felt that it was of use in their daily lives. In the second period, Teen Voice television and radio was discontinued due to a lack of interest from potential funders. Fortunately, KBR68H had already begun to expand Teen Voice online through a portal. KBR succeeded to disseminate content through its KBR68H portal and through social media ensuring that Teen Voice continues until today. The online platform affords new opportunities for the show to engage audiences. Two-way communication has improved through Twitter and Facebook.

Throughout 2012-2014, KBR68H also expanded its networks with radio stations. The network grew from 850 to 900 radio stations in this period. KBR68H maintains a reputable position as an independent media source known for its high-quality content and has the infrastructure to broadcast in the Asia-Pacific region. For Teen Voice the network expansion did not have measurable positive consequences, rather it signifies positive trends for KBR68H as an organization. This implies that it improved it 'level of organisation' in CIVICUS terms.

These findings were obtained through an analysis of documents, a workshop with the SPO, and several interviews. These interviews were conducted with: KBR; external resources persons working in civil society organisations that receive support from KBR; other civil society organisations with whom KBR is collaborating; public or private sector agents and; external resource persons with knowledge of the MDG or theme on which KBR is concentrating.

Contribution analysis

Based upon an analysis of the projects and programmes financed by the Dutch CFAs a selection was made of SPOs to be included in an in-depth process tracing trajectory and those to be included for a quick contribution assessment. KBR68H was selected for a quick assessment.
The above mentioned changes can be attributed to KBR68H and partially to FPU funding during the first period. Although the televised and radio shows have been discontinued due to a lack of funds, including those from FPU, KBR68H has managed to adapt and make use of the opportunities available through the internet. KBR's intention with Teen Voice is that it remains an interactive platform that would allow for the seeds of democratic traits, such as freedom of expression and constructive dialogue, to be planted. Unfortunately the Teen Voice programme discontinued on radio and television in 2014 and its portal is neither frequently visited nor social media are being used by children to continue raising their voice. The interventions were not sustainable.

Relevance
Interviews with staff of KBR, with external resource person, with the liaison officer of FPU, as well as contextual information helped to assess the relevance of KBR’s interventions in terms of: its Theory of Change (ToC) for Civil Society (SC) as designed during the baseline study; the context in which KBR is operating; the CS policies of FPU.

With regards to the baseline ToC, the interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant since KBR68H was able to produce quality content, target an underserved age group, and engage its network disseminate content through television and radio up until 2013.

With regards to the context in which KBR68H is operating, its interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant because media plays a critical role in shaping opinions. Online media and television are the main media outlets in the country programs like Teen Voice fill an important gap in an adult dominated space.

With regards to the CS policies of Free Press Unlimited (FPU), KBR’s interventions and outcomes were relevant, but not sustainable. KBR continued to engage with the international Kids News Network, but FPU did not react to a request for a short interview on this network and KBR’s role in it.

Explaining factors
Interviews with staff of KBR, external resource persons, as well as contextual information helped to assess the relevance of its interventions in terms of; its Theory of Change (ToC) for Civil Society (CS) as designed during the baseline study; the context in which KBR is operating; the CS policies of KBR

Internal factors that explain the findings are KBR68H’s migration of the Teen Voice radio and television programs to a web portal and social media platform and the fact that it did not succeed to develop a business plan capable of financing the further mainstreaming children’s programmes into ongoing activities. External factors that explain the findings are the drop of commercial television and radio interest in the continuation of Teen Voice. Factors that explain the findings that are related to the relation between FPU and KBR68H are the support FPU provided through trainings, Teen Voice’s membership to the Kids News Network (KKN). FPU supports its partners by means of project packages that last 18 months. KBR was not able to find alternative sources to continue the Teen Voice programme that ended in 31 December 2012

The following chapter briefly describes the political context, the civil society context and the relevant background with regards to the governance issues KBR is working on. Chapter 3 provides background information on KBR, the relation of its MFS II interventions with the CIVICUS framework and specific information on the contract with Free Press Unlimited. An evaluation methodology has been developed for the evaluation of the Civil Society component which can be found in Appendix 2; however, deviations from this methodology, the choices made with regards to the selection of the outcomes for contribution analysis, as well as difficulties encountered during data collection are to be found in Chapter 4. The answers to each of the evaluation questions are being presented in Chapter 5, followed by a discussion on the general project design in relation to CS development; an assessment of what elements of the project design may possibly work in other contexts or be implemented by other organisations in Chapter 6. Conclusions are presented in Chapter 7.
2 Context

2.1 Political context

This paragraph briefly describes the context KBR68H is working in. A description of the Civil Society Context assessed according to the CIVICUS framework is provided in appendix 1.

2.1.1 Brief historical perspective

Indonesia’s rise to being the world’s third largest democratic nation has been lauded by many world leaders. The county is often considered to be a model Muslim democracy. As the fourth most populous nation with an estimated 250 million people\(^1\), Indonesia has sustained its democratic commitment since transitioning from an authoritarian leadership to a democracy in 1998. The decentralized administration now consists of 34 provinces and 508 districts and municipalities.

Prior to 1998, Indonesia was under strict authoritarian regime. Suharto, known for his so-called New Order (1966-1998) regime, ushered in radical transformations that would place social and political forces under direct state supervision. The defining characteristics of the Suharto era were a focus on economic growth and controlled consensus and political stability devoid of dissent. A series of tumultuous economic and political transitions in the nineties severely diminished the credibility of ageing President Suharto, who was forced to resign amidst mass street protests.

His departure in 1998 laid bare three decades of social inequalities, state-perpetuated abuses against human rights, and a lack of civilian liberties. The regime change opened the way for a period of Reformasi started under the presidency of B. J. Habibie (1998-1999) and continued by Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001), Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001–2004), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014). Restrictions on citizen participation, press freedom and association were removed. Democratic reforms and decentralization led to direct elections, portioned authority, devolution of authority to regional authorities, formation of new political parties and ended the military’s parliamentary influence. The distinct historical periods of the New Order Regime and Reformasi (1998-present) have shaped the emergence of civil society. Defining characteristics are summarized in table 1.

With political reforms came greater freedom and space for civic engagement. In the Reformasi period, there was a remarkable increase in the number of civil society organizations, many of which were Islamic in character. In 2000, the Central Agency on Statistics (BPS) recorded around 70,000 registered organizations, compared to just 10,000 in 1996.\(^2\) New groups sprung up with donors encouraging activists to establish NGOs they could fund. These organizations were eager to distance themselves from state and often took an anti-government stance. Proliferating CSOs and NGOs have taken advantage of decentralization and greater regional autonomy to engage in public affairs. Civil society and government relations have improved, although both sides remain sceptical of the others’ intentions.

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\(^1\) In 2010 the population was estimated to be around 237 million people (BPS 2010 Population Census). The current figure is an estimate from BKKBN and similar figures are cited in the CIA’s World Fact Book and the World Bank.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political system</strong></td>
<td>Centralized, authoritarian characterized by unipolarity. Golkar as the dominant political party. In 1999 there were 27 provinces, 306 districts and around 60,000 villages.</td>
<td>Decentralized, democratic. Fragmentation of power and atomization of patronage relationships. Emergence of numerous political parties. Direct presidential elections since 1999. Decentralization altered the political and administrative landscape: 34 provinces, 410 districts, 98 municipalities, 6,944 sub-districts and 81,253 villages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State-citizen interaction</strong></td>
<td>Benevolent leader, obedient population. Down to the village level, the state permeated society.</td>
<td>Modern political culture marked by diminishing hierarchy between the state and citizens, allowing for citizens to interact more freely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizen representation and voice</strong></td>
<td>Strict control of speech, expression and association. CSOs and their networks largely &quot;hiding behind the screen&quot;, and operating under state surveillance. A period of growth occurred in 1995-98, as resistance was building.</td>
<td>Burgeoning of CSOs, pressure groups and NGOs following the political euphoria after Suharto’s fall. Indonesian CSOs began to establish new networks internationally. Up until the early 2000s the focus was on state-centrist issues. Later, issues that CSOs were tackling became more diverse, ranging from pluralism, poverty reduction to fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Media</strong></td>
<td>No free press, censorship and state-control. Suharto had firm grasp over how to use print &amp; broadcast medias to promote political ideologies. Limited public and CS use and access to internet until mid-90s.</td>
<td>More vibrant media environment, flourishing of media businesses albeit in control of 12 main conglomerates that are mostly profit-driven and often have political ties. Growing realization of the importance of media/free press as the fourth pillar of democracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Artistic forms of expression</strong></td>
<td>Art and literary censorship conducted by the state. Art forms were a means to reinforce political order.</td>
<td>Greater freedom of the arts and cultural sectors. Organizations able to hold art events more freely. Freedom of expression a catchphrase amongst individuals and artistic groups, but challenged by more conservative members of society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious expression and organization</strong></td>
<td>Regime repressed religious groups, especially radical forms.</td>
<td>Emergence of religious groups seeking to restore Islamic values and defend Muslim values.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1.2 Recent trends in the political context

Indonesia is considered to be a story of democratic success, but it still struggles to realize the benefits of sustained and equitable economic growth. In the political context, the main challenges lie in governing such geographically vast and decentralized country, applying principles of good governance and the enormous task of reforming the country’s bureaucracy.

Although, Indonesia’s ‘big bang’ decentralization initiated at the turn of the century narrowed the gap between local government and citizens, it has also localized political power struggles. While the devolution of authorities relieved tensions between the central government and the regions, it has also created opportunities for corrupt and rent-seeking practices, at the local level. As indicated by Transparency International’s corruption index scores, perceived corruption in Indonesia remains high.

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Table 2
Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer survey: Indonesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Corruption perceptions Index Score (0 perceived as highly corrupt and 100 perceived as clean)</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100/182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>118/174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>114/177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Transparency International

In 2013, decentralization was taken a step further with the approval of the Village Law, intended to address weak governance arrangements and empower rural communities to participate politically. The new law could also lead to village elites distorting power relations and misusing government funding if not properly monitored.

Indonesia is still transitioning politically and many challenges lie ahead. According to the 2012 Indonesia Governance Index’s Executive Report, “Indonesia is witnessing a paradox in its democracy. On one hand, a successful opening-up of civil liberty has led to the avalanche of democratic demands across the nation, however on the other hand, democratic institutions’ are inadequately respond to those demands.” Nonetheless, the Indonesian Governance Index, which focuses on measuring provincial governance, does show a general improvement in the performance of the government (political office) bureaucracy, civil society and economic society based on principles of participation, transparency, fairness, accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness between 2008 and 2012. Civil society scores improved the most significantly, while scores for bureaucracy rose slightly.

Table 3
Indonesia Governance Index: Average provincial scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arena</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>5.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucracy</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>5.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>6.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Society</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>5.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.kemitraan.or.id/igi

In the past decade, Indonesians have generally enjoyed a freedom to participate in the political process through a direct-election mechanism. However, in September 2014 lawmakers voted in favour of a bill reviving indirect elections of regional heads. The controversial vote provoked public outcry which saw peaceful protests and the public voicing their discontent through social media. In early October, just before the end of his term, president Yudhoyono issued a regulation in lieu of the law, effectively repealing the law until further judicial review.

The recent 2014 elections which marked the end of Yudhoyono’s 10-year term, demonstrated that Indonesian voters are increasingly voting for popular figures irrespective of political party alliances. While practices of corruption, vote-buying and poor voter administration remained in the recent election, the public seems to have matured politically, indicated by the enormous interest in televised debates between the leading candidates. The appeal of the newly sworn in President Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, has come from his hands-on, man-of-the-people approach. As Jokowi begins his five-year term he will need to start addressing a myriad of challenges that include corruption, stagnant economic growth, and human rights concerns, particularly with respect to the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and religious intolerance. If left unaddressed, these challenges could seriously undermine Indonesia’s stability and democratic reforms.

2.2 Civil Society context

This section describes the civil society context in Indonesia that is not SPO specific but in line with the information source used by CIVICUS.5

2.2.1 Socio-political context

Today, there are tens of thousands of civil organisations in the country6, comprising of religious organisations, unions, mass-based membership organisations, ethnic groups, professional associations, politically affiliated organisations, NGOs, and other community organisations.7 CSOs in Indonesia work on wide range of themes. Thematic areas recently prominent include democratization and human rights; issue-based campaigns; protecting economic, social and cultural rights; promoting community access to basic services; environmental and natural resources management, and; climate change and disaster risk reduction. In 2012, the Ministry of Home Affairs documented more than 65,000 organisations, of which around 9,000 were officially registered with the Ministry.8 A year later, the figure increased to more than 130 thousand foundations, associations, NGOs, research institutions, and other organisations.9 It is worth noting that NGOs in Indonesia are also allowed to establish cooperatives or SMEs, of which there are 203,701 with a membership reaching 35.2 million people.10 Under recently reinstated Law No. 25/1992 concerning cooperatives, the cooperatives’ objectives are to improve the welfare of its members and participate in developing the economy.11

Given these regulations it is possible to expand the definition of civil society to include cooperatives.12

The civil society stage has become more diverse; the stage is now “shared with more players, like political parties, religious organisations and universities, all able to speak out and publicize their views in a multitude of media outlets that have sprung up in recent years.”13 NGOs and civil society in Indonesia are now starting to deal with the dissolve of traditionally-compartmentalized roles and responsibilities as their activities begin to overlap with those of the government and private sector. As one recent report stated, “NGOs that were united against Suharto are now without a common enemy and something to unite them to a common vision.”14 While the government has come to recognize that “a strong civil society is an important contributor to both launching and sustaining a transition to democratic governance”15, NGOs and CSO networks continue to be scrutinized and criticized for being vehicles of foreign intervention.

Despite the considerable number of organisations, those operating effectively are likely to be a small proportion.16 The accountability and transparency of CSOs and NGOs themselves has also come under greater scrutiny. “Donors have started to become impatient with some of their NGO counterparts, who have difficulties accepting that they now have to fulfil much greater demands.”17 In recent years

6 Under state law, there are two forms of organisation recognized legally: “yayasan” or foundations, and “perkumpulan” or associations. The main difference between foundations and associations is that the latter is member-based and in the way they are governed internally and under law. A large majority of NGOs in Indonesia are private foundations.
7 NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles and Innovations edited by Lisa Jordan, Peter van Tuijl
11 A cooperative is defined in Article 3 as: “an economic organisation of the people with a social content (character) having persons or legal cooperative societies as members, farming economic entity as a collective endeavor based upon mutual help” (FAO, A study of cooperative legislation in selected Asian and Pacific countries).
14 STATT NGO Sector Review 2012
15 Evolution and Challenges of Civil Society Organisations in Promoting Democratization in Indonesia
16 Rustam Ibrahim comments on this in FES 2011
17 Ibid
foreign donor funding has depleted, which has led to more organisations turning to the private sector and government programmes.

Since 1985 the state has regulated member-based, citizen organisations under a Mass Organisations Law making it obligatory for social organisations to register with government. This law was largely ignored in the period of reform following 1998. However, in 2013 the law was replaced by a new controversial Mass/Societal Organisations (Ormas) Law No. 17, reinforcing control of foundations and associations. The Law could be used to prohibit or dissolve CSOs. Many NGOs and civil society networks deplored the Law for constricting democratic space and the freedom of civil society. The 2014 Freedom House Index’s ratings for civil liberties in Indonesia declined from Free to Partly Free as a result of the new law.18

Table 4
Indonesia’s Rank & Score: Freedom House Indices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arena</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom status</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Partially Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political rights</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil liberties</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.freedomhouse.org

The 2013 CIVICUS report hinted that the legislation could be part of the state’s reaction to a perceived threat that environmental, land rights and indigenous activists pose to political and economic interests due to the “shadowy connections that can exist between transnational corporations and politicians” in the agriculture extractive and construction industries.

The annual Freedom of the Press Index produced by Freedom House illustrates that Indonesia’s media remains “partly free”. From 2011 to 2012 there was significant numerical improvement from 53 points to 49 with the reduction of restrictions and a greater ability of journalists to cover news more freely. From 2012 to 2014, the country’s rating remained steady at 49, with slight changes in global ranking (2012: 97th, 2013: 96th, 2014: 98th).19

Overall, the press system in Indonesia is vibrant, with a wide range of news sources and perspectives, further growing with the developments in digital media. “Indonesia’s online growth in recent years is recognised as nothing short of phenomenal” (Matt Abud 2012). While the Internet is seen as a new space for debate and participation, current laws still curtail openness, accessibility, inclusiveness and place limits on its use for expression. Only a limited number of organisations like ICT Watch are addressing freedom of expression and online rights. Nonetheless, citizens are using cyber space to set up online communities and organize campaigns. Some recent examples include the commuter movement ‘masukbusway.com’ aimed to capture and shame traffic violators in Jakarta.

Less progressive sources of rhetoric can be found amongst a number of hard-line religious groups and leaders, such as Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front or FPI), who have links with traditional religious schools (pesantren) and recruit members through these and online networks. Radical groups organize frequent protests to apply pressure on the government and are a threat to diversity and freedom.20

2.2.2 Socio-economic context

At a macro-level, Indonesia’s socio-economic situation has been improving. The country is a regional and global economic force, and has recently graduated to lower-middle income country (LMIC) status.

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In recent years, Indonesia has consistently been ranked in the medium development category of the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI) measuring a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. In 2013, the HDI value was 0.684 with a rank of 108 out of 187 countries and territories. However, the value falls to 0.553, or 19.2 percent, when taking into account inequality. Indonesia’s HDI is above its peers in the medium development category but below the average of 0.703 in East Asia and the Pacific. The Gross National Income (GNI) per capita is steadily rising to US$ 8,970, a remarkable feat considering it was just 2,931 in 1980. Despite improvements, the 2014 report and its explanatory note show that growth is slowing and the country has yet to achieve equitable growth. For example, women only hold 18.6 percent of the seats in parliament, 10 percent fewer women reach secondary education compared to men, and women’s labour market participation is 51.3 percent compared to 84.4 percent for men.²¹

The Basic Capabilities Index (BCI) produced by Social Watch offers a picture of the status of key human capabilities of accessing basic services. It utilizes three main indicators: under-five mortality rate, births attended by skilled personnel, and enrolment of children up to the 5th grade. Countries are categorized into five groups accordingly based on their BCI values: 1) Basic: 98 and over; 2) Medium: from 91 to 97; 3) Low: from 81 to 90; 4) Very Low: from 71 to 80, and; 5) Critical: values below 70. Results for Indonesia saw stable or improving scores for child and maternal health, but a regression for education. While no data beyond 2011 is available, other data sources confirm that Indonesia still has high maternal mortality rates but basic education through primary school enrolment is improving.²²

### Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>HDI Rank (scale 1 – 187 for all years except 2010 out of 169)</th>
<th>HDI Value</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth (years)</th>
<th>Mean years of schooling (years)</th>
<th>Expected years of schooling</th>
<th>GNI per capita (2011 PPP$)</th>
<th>Gender Inequality Index (value &amp; rank)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>0.671</td>
<td>Medium human development</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>7,802</td>
<td>0.680 (2008 data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>0.640</td>
<td>Medium human development</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>8,201</td>
<td>0.505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>0.681</td>
<td>Medium human development</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>8,601</td>
<td>0.494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>0.684</td>
<td>Medium human development</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>8,970</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Human Development Report 2014 & Explanatory Note for Indonesia

Indonesia does not fare too well on the Social and Economic Rights Fulfilment (SERF) Index. In 2012 Indonesia achieved 67.86 percent of protecting social and economic rights. Although there was an improvement compared to 2011 values, performance worsened when compared to 2010. The country consistently preforms poorly in the areas of right to food and right to work, although it improved in fulfilling rights to education.


Table 7

Social and Economic Rights Fulfilment (SERF) Index Values: Indonesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>SERF Index Value</th>
<th>Right to Food</th>
<th>Right to Health</th>
<th>Right to Education</th>
<th>Right to Housing</th>
<th>Right to Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>67.86</td>
<td>45.33</td>
<td>83.95</td>
<td>95.19</td>
<td>64.26</td>
<td>50.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>65.71</td>
<td>45.01</td>
<td>85.16</td>
<td>93.43</td>
<td>63.88</td>
<td>41.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>69.29</td>
<td>45.75</td>
<td>85.95</td>
<td>93.82</td>
<td>65.88</td>
<td>54.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Social Watch, Core Country SERF Indices 2010, 2011 and 2012 (Note that 2010 data was adjusted in 2013).

Trends in the country’s Economic Freedom Scores produced by The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal are also rather bleak. From 2010 to 2014 the country has been categorized as ‘Mostly Unfree’, with only a small increase in its score from 55.5 to 58.5.23

These macro-level figures illustrate the complexity of the socio-economic context. While the economy has grown, 65 million people remain highly vulnerable to shocks. Disparities in income and geographic areas remain, made more complex by the number of people ‘floating’ between the poor and middle class’.24

2.2.3 Socio-cultural context

With respect to the socio-cultural context it is of interest to look at global indices that provide some insight into the level of trust between ordinary people and the extent to which tolerance exists. On a whole, Indonesia has been able to maintain peace as indicated in the improvements in scores recorded by the annual Global Peace Index. In 2010, the country scored 1.950 on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being the best score. This has gradually improved to 1.853 in 2014, with a rank of 54 out of 162 countries. Nonetheless, inequality, socio-economic conditions and rights claims (especially land rights) are still a source of localized incidences of conflict in Indonesia. Between 2010 and 2014 there has been a rising incidence of resource and identity-based conflicts as well as vigilantism.25

Amongst other components, the Social Progress Index published in 2014 examines whether there is opportunity for individuals to reach their full potential by scoring four different components: personal rights; personal freedom and choice; tolerance and inclusion; and access to advanced education. Indonesia scores low in this regard, at just 43.86 out of 100 and ranking 92nd out of 132 countries. Freedom of religion, tolerance for immigrants and religious intolerance are all considered to be weak (red), while the majority of the components are scored as neutral (yellow).

The Edelman Trust Barometer Survey, which collects annual data from 33,000 respondents in 27 countries has shown that on aggregate, Indonesians’ confidence in nongovernmental organisations, government, media and businesses increased by 10 percent in the 2014 trust index. Interestingly, businesses, with 82 percent, are the most trusted of the four sectors compared to 73 percent for NGOs, 53 percent for government and 73 percent of respondents putting their trust in the media.

23 http://www.heritage.org/index/
24 World Bank’s Indonesia Development Policy Review 2014
25 Data from the National Violence Monitoring System: www.snpk-indonesia.com/
According to survey results, Indonesians believe businesspeople are more inclined to tell the truth than their government counterparts and three times more likely to fix problems.\(^{26}\) The trends in levels of trust in NGOs over the past four years are noteworthy. In 2011, the trust level was at 61 percent, decreasing to 53 percent in 2012 and 51 percent in 2013. Reports claimed this was due to a lack of transparency and accountability. Edelman reported that the trust levels in 2013 were the lowest amongst eight Asia Pacific countries surveyed, ascribed to the growth of horizontal, peer-to-peer networks and a preference for social media.\(^{27}\) The most recent results released in 2014 show a substantial jump to 73 percent in 2014 which is attributed to NGOs now being able to ‘walk the talk’ in accountability and transparency, as well as the emergence of ‘corporate NGOs’.\(^{28}\)

### 2.3 Civil Society context issues with regards to the MDG

Several important changes took place during the 2011 and 2014 period. First, the global financial crisis and Indonesia’s rise to a middle-income country led to a decrease in international donor funding. Development actors, including CSOs and NGOs, have to compete harder for funding. Some have been more successful than others in diversifying funding by turning to the private sector or private foundations. At the expense of past idealism, local NGOs are now more disposed to receiving funding sources which in the past may have been criticized as supporting neoliberalism.

Regulatory changes also affected the civil society arena positively and negatively. Amongst the more controversial laws to spark reaction was Law No. 17/2013 on Societal Organisations. In an open letter sent before the bill was enacted, CIVICUS said the law would undermine freedom of association and “prevent CSOs from working on sensitive topics related to good governance and democratic reform in the public interest”.\(^{29}\) FORUM-ASIA deplored the repressive provisions in the law that “leave all groups vulnerable to attacks, undermining the hard-won democratic space that has been forged by civil society since the end of the New Order regime”.\(^{30}\)

Other laws passed that provoked criticism were the State Intelligence Law (October 2011) and the Social Conflict Law (April 2012). NGOs and media see these laws as imposing further restrictions on freedom of speech, potentially leading to the criminalization of human rights defenders and signifying a tightening of state control. Discriminatory content was also an issue in discussions on the Religious Harmony Bill in 2013, for which drafting was initiated in despite not being part of the planned National Legislative Program. Late in 2013, the House of Representatives came under fire again for its stance against religious intolerance when it re-endorsed a law that limits state-recognized religions to six.

Land rights and natural resource protection have been a long-standing issue for Indonesia. While Indonesia has adopted and amended laws to improve the rights of smallholders and indigenous communities, many of these regulations have faltered in their implementation. Part of the issue lies in the overlap and lack of clarity of laws adopted that regulate different sectors and local legislation. Another issue is that there is a lack of oversight in the procedures such as granting permits and licensing. These problems, which are commonly found across development sectors, are compounded


\(^{28}\) Jakarta Globe (Indonesians Trust Businesses More Than Govt Survey Shows)


by a lack of information among local communities on what the laws regulate and their rights vis-à-vis them.
3  KBR and its contribution to civil society/policy changes

3.1 Background of KBR68H

Kantor Berita Radio 68H (KBR68H) began in 1999, as a part of Institut Studi Arus Informasi (ISAI)\(^{31}\), in response to the closure of three vocal magazines (Tempo, Editor and Detak) by the Suharto government. During the Suharto regime, radio broadcasting suffered heavily from media restrictions, with the only source of news being the state agency. KBR68H chose radio as a medium because of its affordability and potential reach. In the transition to democracy, KBR was able to seize the opportunity to become the first radio news agency acting outside of the state.

In the same year of its establishment, KBR68H was brought under a limited company, PT. Media Lintas Inti Nusantara to allow for greater flexibility, marketing power, and positioning within the media landscape of Indonesia. By joining the new media market, KBR has the ability to compete with private capital-driven media and has come out as the largest private radio news agency in Indonesia, producing a variety of high-quality information, based on public interest programming. PT. Media Lintas Inti Nusantara is also the parent company of Green Radio Jakarta, Pekanbaru Green Radio, Tempo TV and Portal KBR. In the end of 2013, the company further expanded its reach by signing a business partnership agreement with SmartFM\(^{32}\).

Given its position within the private sector, KBR's relations with its constituents can be considered as business exchanges. These relations, however, are quite flexible. For example, community radio stations may receive KBR services free of charge, and they also receive shares of revenue from commercial advertisements. Notwithstanding, KBR68H has an explicit public service ethos. As an independent radio news agency, KBR68H is "committed to freedom of information, good quality media, and increasing information access". It considers itself "a friend for listeners during a process of democratic transition, moving towards a better future for the country"\(^{33}\). Broadcasted programs serve as a medium for public education and cover critical content, such as legal reform, regional autonomy, environment, public health, small and medium enterprises, education, religion and tolerance, and democracy. KBR believes that their constituents choose them primarily for their content quality, along with the prospect of profit. Interestingly, radio stations and government-funded information campaigns often prefer KBR68H over official government radio (RRI) because of KBR's reputation for quality content.

Starting off with 30 minutes of on-air time and seven relaying partners, KBR currently serves up to eight hours of on-air programming to 900 radio stations throughout Indonesia (100 of which are community radio stations), as well as 9 countries in Asia. KBR is supported by 50 journalists in Jakarta, 100 correspondents in numerous cities in Indonesia and 20 contributors across Asia. Aside from delivering content, KBR commits itself to raising the standards of the radio industry by providing:

1. Training for aspiring and intermediate journalists;
2. Training for radio technicians;
3. Marketing training, and;
4. Support to the development of radio stations in remote areas.

\(^{31}\) ISAI itself is a member of the Komunitas Utan Kayu affiliation set up in 1994. The same affiliation also gave birth to Komunitas Salihara, who specializes in art media and Jaringan Islam Liberal (Liberal Islamic Network).


\(^{33}\) "Company Profile", KBR68H, no date (probably from 2010)
KBR68H has received numerous national and international awards, both for journalists and institutional merits.

### 3.2 MFS II interventions related to Civil Society

In general, KBR68H’s impact on civil society is the encouragement of democracy, tolerance and civic participation, through the production and distribution of high-quality information by a network of local radio stations as well as by promoting professionalism in the media world.

Free Press Unlimited (FPU)’s support to KBR68H specifically falls under the Teen Voice Program, which aims to deliver news to young, teenage audiences. KBR68H considers this program to be groundbreaking, as it is one of the very few of its kind to be produced by a private news agency. For KBR it is critical to provide youth with informative programming on issues such as corruption; and to provide teens with an outlet to voice their opinions. They see this as a means to enhance teenagers’ confidence and prepare them to be future actors in the national reformation process. Teen Voice, implemented by KBR with €279,403 in funding, had two main objectives:

- Provide children and teens (target age group 10-14) in Indonesia with the tools to gain a better understanding and insight into their world, and a platform to express their opinions;
- Improve the journalistic quality of children’s news reporters in Indonesia. The Teen Voice intervention relates most closely to the CIVICUS dimension of ‘civic engagement’ sought to deliver educational and critical content to teenagers by teenagers - telling the story through their eyes. Teen Voice was expected to give opportunities to teens to express their opinions on daily issues. As such, it was intended to plant the seeds of democratic traits such as freedom of expression and constructive dialogue.

Other aspects of the program have some relevance to ‘level of organisation’ of KBR68H, especially the ability to cooperate, network and build productive linkages with similar actors. FPU provided opportunities for Teen Voice and KBR to network internationally through the Kids News Network (KNN). Internally, KBR relies on the quality of networking and the organisation’s relation vis-à-vis the public and private sector to maintain a balance between profitability with societal idealism.

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### 3.3 Basic information

**Table 8**  
*Basic information KB68H*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Details</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name of SPO</td>
<td>Kantor Berita Radio 68H (KBR68H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consortium</td>
<td>Press Freedom 2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>Free Press Unlimited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start date of cooperation</td>
<td>1 July 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG/Theme</td>
<td>Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFS II Project Name</td>
<td>Teen Voice (Project #: F-ID-02-11-01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract period</td>
<td>July 1, 2011 - December 31, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total budget FPU</td>
<td>€ 279,403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other donors if applicable</td>
<td>From the project's financing scheme, KBR68H contributed its own resources valued at € 12,268 and other donors (name not provided) contributed a value of € 19,797 specifically for equipment support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimation of % of budget for Civil Society(^{35})</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Project documents

\(^{35}\) Costs that relate to civil society development or policy influence are those costs that possibly contribute to the development of the CIVICUS dimensions, excluding coordination and office costs; staff costs and financial reserves.
4 Data collection and analytical approach

4.1 Adjustments made in the methodology of the evaluation

The documentation provided by Free Press Unlimited at the start of the end line assessment period was quite comprehensive. This allowed CDI to provide direction to the in-country team on what areas to focus the evaluation on following an input-output-outcome analysis. In addition, Free Press undertook an audience perception baseline and end line survey, which allowed the evaluation to focus on whether Teen Voice was successfully continued or mainstreamed in KBR68H’s programming or networks.

The evaluation team in the field followed the operational guidelines to a great extent, but was unable to have a workshop with all KBR68H for an entire day. In practice, the workshop lasted half a day and was followed up with separate interviews with relevant staff. A separate meeting was scheduled to meet external parties and network organisations.

4.2 Difficulties encountered during data collection

Since the FPU-funded project ended in 2012, some key staff, with the exception of the director, have moved from KBR68H. This presented challenges in assessing the extent to which KBR68H’s level of organisation has changed. However, the team managed to contact some of the beneficiaries of the program who were also interviewed during the baseline.

Because of the time frame of the project and that of the end line, few changes occurred since the 2012 baseline. As a result, the in-country team focused on reconfirming the findings from the baseline and assessing the extent to which the changes had been sustained in the period since 2012. Ideally, the baseline assessment would have taken place earlier (in 2010) rather than during a period in which most of the SPO’s activities were wrapping up. This would have made it easier to identify and track how changes occurred from base to end line.

4.3 Identification of outcomes for in-depth process tracing

This project was not selected for process tracing; however, in identifying the changes in 2012-2014 period, one outcome related on civic engagement was identified. Because KBR68H’s program was very focused on increasing the exposure of teenagers and youth to news coverage, only one outcome was selected for evaluation. This outcome was selected because it represents major inputs of the program and taking into consideration the availability of evidence.
5 Results

5.1 Results obtained in relation to intervention logic

Table 9
Overview of results achieved in relation to project plan KB68H

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planned results</th>
<th>Level of achievement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective 1: Provide children and teens (target age group 10-14) in Indonesia with the tools to gain a better understanding and insight into their world, and a platform to express their opinions</td>
<td>Overall, children have positive opinions about Teen Voice television &amp; radio programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result 1.1: After 18 months, at least 128 episodes of Teen Voice radio (2 new episodes/week excluding reruns) and 192 episodes of Teen Voice TV (3 new episodes/week excluding reruns) have been produced and broadcast</td>
<td>Achieved, 148 episodes broadcast on radio. 165 episodes of Teen Voice TV completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result 1.2: Children in Indonesia have a platform to freely express their opinions and to gain understanding and knowledge of their world</td>
<td>Achieved, episodes covered children’s and teen’s issues. Teen Voice is the kids’ news programme in Indonesia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective 2: Improve the journalistic quality of children’s news reporters in Indonesia</td>
<td>Partially achieved, two awards for KBR68H journalists (Ikhsan Raharjo and Liza Desylanhi) on child issues from UNICEF and ILO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result 2.1: A team of 6 radio reporters and 6 TV reporters are trained and experienced in producing a high quality kids news program</td>
<td>Achieved, a team of 12 journalists received extensive training on how to produce quality news and information programme (for both radio and TV) aimed at children 10 to 14 years of age.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result 2.2: South-South exchange through network cooperation &amp; item exchange with other KNN members (via the Online Exchange Server/ WKN program)</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result 2.3: The program will be financially sustainable after the project period</td>
<td>Not achieved, still dependent on external funding.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While we can conclude that most of the planned activities were implemented and milestones were achieved, at the outcome level, specifically the first outcome, it is more difficult to draw an assessment on the level of achievement. There are three main sources of information that provide relevant insights, namely: 1) an audience survey commissioned by FPU, conducted by Yayasan Pengembangan Media Anak (YPMA), which generally concluded on the basis of surveys that children have positive opinions of Teen Voice television and radio program; 2) FPU’s own assessments of the of KBR’s reports that reported successful interventions with regards to the creation of radio and TV episodes and online platforms (website, Facebook, Twitter) but some discrepancies between planned and actual results, and 3) interviews conducted during the evaluation.

The main area where KBR fell short was in sustaining the Teen Voice program. Specifically, long-term financial sustainability was not achieved despite efforts to develop a business plan of acceptable quality, which admittedly took a long time to formulate (submitted only in August 2013). This was identified as a risk from the start of the intervention, but KBR struggled to find a balance between quality programming and market or private-sector ideas of commercialisation. Fundraising and sales were not properly embedded within the organization and seemed to have lacked priority. Revenues to

36 Liza Desylanhi’s report on traumatized Ahmadiyah children in Bogor (AJI-UNICEF) and Ikhsan Raharjo on child labour (ILO)

37 According to discussion between FPU and KBR in mid-January 2015, as a result of business split between KBR and Tempo Group as of 1 January 2015, Teen Voice is now under the Tempo Group with the idea, among others, to make again a TV version possible in the very near future.
continue Teen Voice were not generated because insufficient donors were found, permanent viewership was not mobilized, and off-air events did not generate sufficient visibility and awareness.

5.2 Changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period

Teen Voice radio and television programs ended in December 2012, thus changes in civil society will be discussed in this section by focusing on the extent to which changes or results delivered through the project were sustained in the 2012-2014 period and how KBR has coped with current challenges.

5.2.1 Civic Engagement

Civic engagement describes the formal and informal activities and participation undertaken by individuals to advance shared interests at different levels. Participation within civil society is multi-faceted and encompasses socially-based and politically-based forms of engagement.

From July 2011 to December 2012, KBR was able to enhance civic engagement through Teen Voice. Teen Voice is considered by many to be unique amongst commercial media in Indonesia given that there are very few programs that serve quality fare for children. According to estimates, 81 million viewers of television in Indonesia are under the age of 18, but very few programmes cater to this age group. The broadcasted shows sought to inspire children and teenagers through compelling news content so that children would have a more active interest in issues covered by Teen Voice. The involvement of teenage reporters helped to tell the story from the eyes of the teenagers.

In 2012, Teen Voice expanded from radio shows to the popular mediums of television and internet platforms with support from FPU. Teen Voice was (re)broadcast on 22 local television stations as well as a subscription-based TV channel (AORA TV) and social media. At its height, some 53 radio stations relayed televised versions of Teen Voice. The number of radio stations broadcasting Teen Voice dropped from 53 to 51 in November 2012. In early 2013 the frequency of broadcasting fell to once a week after FPU project funding ended. In 2013, KBR estimated that when Teen Voice was broadcast through mainstream media, some 400,000 viewers were reached and around 770,000 young people listened to Teen Voice.

In the last year of the project, Teen Voice discontinued relaying programs through mainstream media. KBR68H turned to the use of online media. Although fewer audiences have been reached, the internet and social media allowed for more interactive engagement. Teen Voice did improve its online presence through a fan page and Twitter account. It also began broadcasting on YouTube and moved its website to the parent channel of KBR68H (http://www.portalkbr.com/teenvoice/).

Despite its reputable programs, Teen Voice has failed to position its program within the market and has been unable to continue to produce content and maintain an audience base. As an illustration, one of its episodes available through the WKN’s WaDaDa YouTube channel (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YCYyfYzKbjA) only received 45 views as of 16 November 2014.

New possibilities to launch the TeenVoice programme again on television have been created when the programme was shifted to the Tempo Group since 2015.


39 According to the proposal submitted in early 2011, this program was expected to reach around a million radio listeners and 100 thousands television viewers from various groups. Teens and also parents are expected to obtain information from this program, be it from direct listening, from the information passed on by their children or from media reporting the content of this program.


42 WaDaDa provides a selection of news items produced by members of the World Kid’s Network all over the world.

43 Information received from FPU Program Manager South Asia on 21 January 2015
With regards to its reach, Teen Voice’s ability to attain a larger audience and involve more children and teenagers through its programming has diminished; fewer people have been reached since Teen Voice through radio and television was discontinued in January 2014 and continued through web-portal. However, KBR remains a reliable and active member of the Kids News Network of Free Press Unlimited.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3:** 2

**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2):** 0

### 5.2.2 Level of Organisation

This dimension assesses the organisational development, complexity and sophistication of civil society, by looking at the relationships among the actors within the civil society arena.

Given how Teen Voice fared in the 2012-2014 period, the SPO’s relations with other CSOs working on the concerns of teenagers and youth has decreased with the discontinuation of the televised and radio-broadcasted programmes. Due to budget constraints in 2013, the number of crew members was cut back from six to three. Compared to the baseline, KBR has thus been less effective in defending the interests of teens and youths as a marginalised group in mainstream media. FPU has recognized that the main challenge of Teen Voice laid in its long-term sustainability of the project (in terms of finances and funding, business management, viewership and audience base). The business plan finalized in August 2013 seems to have been unsuccessful. From the evaluation team’s perspective, working to bring teen voices into mainstream media requires considerable investment and financial sustainability within the given timeframe of Teen Voice was probably not a realistic expectation.

However, KBR itself continues to be Indonesia’s leading independent radio network with 900 partner radio stations across Indonesia and in nine countries in Asia and Australia. The SPO’s network has grown significantly since 2000, when it encompassed just seven radio stations, and 2000 when 600 radios were part of the network. In 2013, KBR’s parent company signed a business partnership agreement with SmartFM, which could also be considered a competitor of KBR. The collaboration is seen as mutually beneficial: KBR expands its audience base in the cities of Jakarta, Medan, Palembang, Semarang, Surabaya, Manado, Makassar, Balikpapan and Banjarmasin; while SmartFM is able to air its programs through KBR’s extended network. However, the Teen Voice programme has not been part of this network expansion. While there is a general consensus amongst the network of the importance of teen or youth-oriented programmes, the discontinuation of Teen Voice radio and infrequent updates of the KBR web portal mean that Teen Voice is not relayed by the network.

With its activist roots, KBR68H maintains an affiliation with AJI and the Tempo group, which includes organisations such as Komunitas Utan Kayu, Salihara and international NGOs (Hivos, The Asia Foundation, Ford Foundation amongst others). The collaboration between KBR68H and its network of radio station is a demand-and-supply oriented relationship. In 2013, KBR68H launched a successful subsidiary online news portal, PortalKBR.com in partnership with TV Tempo to further extend its reach by allowing radio partners to send and receive information more effectively. "PortalKBR.com is the result of the convergence of the radio world and the online world with a specific mission to become a news portal that provides a place for the flow of information from the regions."45

This recent development is also reflected in the financial resources and internal governance of KBR. A new division for creative and marketing services has been set up since the baseline demonstrating new priorities and a need to be more business savvy. Organisationally, KBR has sought out creative ways to generate revenue, favouring a mixed business model that draws revenues from advertising, sponsorships and events.46 Government ministries and agencies have contributed to revenue generation by paying for the broadcast of public service announcements about family planning, AIDS prevention, forest conservation and other issues.

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44 See report by Chermene Fisser, 28 August 2013 p.2
45 Translated from PortalKBR.com’s website: http://portalkbr.com/tentangkami.html
The SPO has diversified the composition of its financial resources. According to information provided by KBR to the evaluation team, only 10 percent of the revenues now come from donor agencies, compared to 31 percent during the baseline.\(^{47}\) This could also be a reflection of trend in foreign aid funding rather than the success of KBR alone. KRB has had problems with financing the continuation of several programs, not only Teen Voice. In May 2014, it was forced to take ‘Asia Calling’, its award-winning program off the air due to a lack of funding. Fortunately it was able to revive the program due to a new sponsor. This illustrates that KBR68H still has some way to go in making its business model a success.

\textbf{Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3:} 3

\textbf{Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2):} 1

5.2.3 Practice of Values

Practice of Values refers to the internal practice of values within the civil society arena. Important values that CIVICUS looks at such as transparency, democratic decision making, taking into account diversity that are deemed crucial to gauge not only progressiveness but also the extent to which civil society’s practices are coherent with their ideals.

As during the baseline, the composition of shareholders of KBR’s parent company PT. Median Lintas Inti Nusantara, remains the same, i.e. Koperasi Utan Kayu, Yayasan ISAI, other institutions and some individual shareholders. These shareholders continue to meet at least once a year to review the progress of KBR68H. As a limited company, financial audits are followed as regulated by the government. Overall, there is no change in terms of downward accountability and the public can access the company’s financial information.

With KBR drawing revenue from advertising and sponsorships, the organisation has set up internal standards which forbid it to receive advertising income from tobacco companies and firms with poor environmental records as this would contradict the organisation’s mission and concerns. In addition, the production teams are separate from the marketing divisions, so the latter does not influence the content of programs.\(^{48}\) Despite claiming that revenue sources are carefully selected, KBR continued to work with private patrons, like Exxon Mobile, who sponsored talk shows on women’s issues. Exxon Mobil has received criticism in the past for environmental performance and the collaboration would suggest that internal codes are not followed or implemented.

\textbf{Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3:} 3

\textbf{Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2):} 0

5.2.4 Perception of Impact

Perception of Impact assesses the perceived impact of civil society actors on politics and society as a whole as the consequences of collective action. In this, the perceptions of both civil society actors (internal) as well as actors outside civil society are taken into account. Specific sub-dimensions for this evaluation are the extent to which the SPO has contributed to engaging more people in social or political activities, strengthening CSOs and their networks, and has influenced public and private sector policies.

By design, KBR68H’s contribution to civil society is indirect through the production of high-quality information and independent journalism in line with freedom of information. This situation did not change since the baseline. FPU’s support, such as building the capacity of journalists to produce children’s programs, was more relevant to KBR68H as an organisation rather than directly impacting

\(^{47}\) According to the document cited in the previous paragraph, donor contributions still amount to 20 percent of KBR’s revenues. In 1999 when KBR was founded it relied solely on foreign grants.

teens. The discontinuation of Teen Voice is illustrative that the SPO has not been able to build a strong link with civil society to create a high demand for the continuation of the program.

With regards to assessing the change in client satisfaction in 2012-2014 period, it is worth discussing Teen Voice participants and audience. Social media is one indication of satisfaction. Since KBR initiated its @TEENVO1CE Twitter account, its followers grew to 700 in March 2013 to 889 in November 2013 and 1,016 in mid-November 2014. Although growth in followers has slowed (189 in nine months to 127 in 12 months) this is not surprising given Teen Voice’s discontinuation. FPU commissioned base and end line audience surveys to collect opinions of Teen Voice target audience, intended to help Tempo TV/ KBR68H improve its program and website. Overall findings showed that the majority enjoyed watching and listening to Teen Voice. Three quarters of those surveyed said they learned from the television programs and 88 percent said they learned from radio programs. Almost all children surveyed found Teen Voice to be useful in their daily life, in for example learning and confidence building. This evaluation was unable to conduct a similar survey, but data from interviews and former training participants reported high satisfaction of Teen Voice. The program was seen as providing a venue for the children to express themselves and open the potential for children’s participation in media; this was unlike other mass media that sometimes exploited them.

Regarding KBR68H’s relations with the public and private sector, and its ability to influence rules, regulations and practices, the evaluation found no significant changes occurring since the baseline. As a platform for public interaction KBR68H considers the public sector to be both a source and recipient of information, or even a client. KBR engaged a number of government representatives by inviting them to be resource persons in Teen Voice episodes. In addition, their client base included the National Family Planning Coordinating Agency, Ombudsman Commission, National Law Commission, Government-owned corporation PT. Pegadaian (Persero), and Ministry of National Education.

As mentioned before, KBR maintains relations with private sector agencies, considering them to be revenue sources. This has not changed since the baseline. KBR received corporate social responsibility (CSR) funding from Danone, Coca Cola and Exxon Mobil. There is no evidence that KBR68H has influenced private or public policies and practices. The only way it does so is indirectly, by publishing and airing credible news of issues which may concern policies and practices.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3:** 2

**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2):** 0

### 5.2.5 Civil Society Environment

The social, political and economic environment in which civil society operates affects its room for manoeuvre. The civil society context has been described in chapter 3. In this section we describe how KBR68H is coping with that context.

Indonesians have come to embrace social media. Given this context, the launching of PortalKBR.com since the baseline has been a strategic move. The portal is a logical development for the radio network. As the managing director, Tosca Santoso, explained, “All mainstream media need to think about the fundamental transition to digital media”. He believes that this is the next best step for KBR68H. In 2012, Teen Voice starting using Facebook and Twitter as a platform for audience interaction. Both forms of social media are popular amongst Indonesian youth.

KBR68H institutionally has been able to adapt to changes in the media environment. Through the web portal and the internet, KBR68H has changed the flow of information from being one-way to two-way communication with radio partners and audiences.

**Score baseline 2012 on an absolute scale from 0-3:** 2

**Score end line 2014, relative change on a scale of (-2, +2):** 1

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5.3 To what degree are the changes attributable to the Southern partners?

5.3.1 Civic engagement

The identified change, i.e. increased participation of teenagers in the news program Teen Voice, was achieved in the period 2011 - 2013. More teenagers were exposed to independent news produced specifically for a young audience. The televised and radio broadcasted version of the program reached a wide audience by through 51 radio stations reaching some 770,000 young people and 23 television stations reaching some 400,000 viewers in 2013. In 2013, however, the audience numbers dropped with the discontinuation of Teen Voice television and radio.

Since 2012, the last year of the program, KBR expanded to web-based platforms. This new media form, although it has reached fewer audiences, has in 2013 been able to create more interactive communication with a smaller social media audience.

There are two pathways that were considered for the increased participation. The first attributed this change to the expansion of Teen Voice to digital media, whilst the later considered this as a result of traditional media forms, i.e. television and radio.

Pathway 1: KBR68H’s use of social media platforms, Facebook and Twitter, and KBR68H’s portal resulted in a larger audience.

The web-based platforms allow for an optimum utilization of social media for more interactive interaction with target groups. Social media platforms expand the opportunities for teenager viewers to be reporters and to propose story ideas, enlarging opportunities for engagement. The involvement of teenage reporters helps sharpen the story angle to capture the views of target audiences.

The following information confirms this pathway to increased participation of teenagers:
- The web portal, social media and Twitter are active and have 63,000 followers (as of 17 November 2014);
- Teen Voice is part of KBR web portal (Source: PortalKBR)\(^{53}\)
- Participation by teenagers is documented in the portal\(^{54}\)
- Content analysis of teen voice news by the evaluator in the web portal shows contents produced by teenagers (see for example interview by teen reporter as reported at http://www.portalkbr.com/teenvoice/bincang-kita/3030616_6437.html).

The following information rejects this pathway:
- Better coverage through traditional media forms (television and radio);
- Visitor-specific information per age-group (this information was unavailable).

Pathway 2: The Teen Voice program was expanded through mainstream media (television and radio). The following information confirms this pathway to increased participation of teenagers:
- Broadcasting of Teen Voice television episodes broadcast three times a week with 30-minute episodes on 22 local television stations, as well as on Channel 068, subscription-based AORA TV;
- Broadcasting of live shows twice a week on two radio stations in Jakarta, which was then relayed by 51 local radio stations;
- Content produced focuses on youth/teenagers (10-17 years old) as an audience and target groups are satisfied.


\(^{54}\) Ibid
The following information rejects this pathway:

- Pilot project with TransTV cancelled;
- Teen Voice program was discontinued on mainstream media.

**Conclusion**

Based upon the analysis of information available, we conclude that the most valid explanation for the increased quality of participation of the target group in Teen Voice since the baseline is the shift towards a web-based platform for Teen Voice. However, from July 2011 to December 2012, mainstream media was responsible for an increased exposure of teenagers to news broadcasts. In particular, the expansion of Teen Voice to television in 2011 created a larger audience base and more opportunities for participation. Thus, all three formats were necessary to achieve the outcome. It was the combination of both pathways that created the change from July 2011 to 2014. The role of the SPO was the production of content, the training of 12 journalists, training of young presenters, and the dissemination of content through their network and the development of a web-portal to make materials available through the internet. All these elements facilitated interaction through three different formats: television, radio and web-based.

**5.4 What is the relevance of these changes?**

**5.4.1 Relevance of the changes in relation to the Theory of Change of 2012**

The Theory of Change (ToC) of the 2012 baseline illustrated that KBR sought to provide quality news content aiming to assist the formation of an open, independent and ever growing society. The main critical assumption lay in the connection between quality of information and quality networking; and finding a balance between profitability and idealism. The second assumption rested on the government maintaining an environment that supported freedom of information and a conducive civil society that promoted positive forms of expression. Last, professional management was considered to essential in achieving desired changes.

With regards to the changes in civil society dimension in improving the network of radio stations, this is still very much relevant to the ToC. One of the preconditions of the ToC was quality networking. While no significant expansion has taken place and expectations for 2014 were not attained quantitatively (the number of radio stations in the network remains 900, falling short of the expected 1,000), the development of PortalKBR represents a significant improvement in the ability of transactions to occur between KBR and its network.

KBR’s coverage remains prestigious, although it failed to secure new sponsors to enable it to sustain Teen Voice television and radio. The ToC assumed that a high level of organisation would lead to sustainability. The end line found that KBR68H is pushing the boundaries with regards to how it disseminated content, expanding to social and digital media. Nonetheless, KBR still needs to find innovative ways of raising its own funds in order to attract new sponsorship and investment, which has become even more critical given that traditional donors are phasing out of Indonesia since the country became a LMIC.

As for quality of information, success of delivering independent, accurate, credible and sought information was to be rated from KBR’s recognition as a reputable organisation. Since the baseline, KBR continued to hold a unique and undisputed position as the largest independent station. In 2013, KBR’s subsidiary, Green Radio, successfully encouraged off-air re-forestry actions in West Java that gained support from prominent Indonesians including the former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono; writer Ayu Utami; social activist and Ramon Magsaysay Awardee, Teten Masduki; and presenter Olga Lidya. Recently in 2014 Luvi Ana, an editor for Portalkbr.com, was nominated as a candidate for the N-PEACE awards for her work in advocating peace, tolerance, and striving against the women and minority marginalization.

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As far as Teen Voice is concerned, external stakeholders interviewed during the evaluation positively confirmed the quality of information produced for Teen Voice, and quantitatively, the program reached a wide audience by being broadcast on 51 radio stations and 23 television stations. Furthermore, the audience survey commissioned by FPU showed that target groups were satisfied with the content produced.

Although the changes in civil society are still relevant to the ToC in 2012, KBR continued to struggle to find its position as a private sector agent with a triangular model of cooperation with the public sector, private sector and civil society. Granted, KBR now has an online and social media following, but this public support has not been able to create pressure and demands for continued production of civic education content on television and radio. The roles of the public and private sectors are limited as KBR’s clientele and a financial resource base.

5.4.2 Relevance of the changes in relation to the context in which the SPO is operating

Although Teen Voice did not kick off as expected, and now only continues through online media, the interventions of KBRH68 remain relevant to civic engagement. "In comparison to the other age groups, teenagers and young adults consume more TV & radio programs; go more often to the cinemas, surf the internet and read magazines or tabloids more frequently than adults." The expansion of Teen Voice to television in 2011 and the transition to a web-based platform made sense considering trends in media consumption. Indonesian teens watch up to 4.57 to 548 hours of television a day. A recent 2014 UNICEF report claims that 30 million Indonesian teens are online; with most on social media. With the growing influence of media on the lives of teenagers and youth, and the numbers of internet expected to increase as technology becomes more affordable, disseminating positive and news-worthy messages can certainly have an influence on the views and opinions of the next generation. New media forms provide opportunities for engagement and ICT-based interventions are attracting more recognition.

In Indonesia’s current media landscape, media ownership is concentrated in the hands of a few large multi-media conglomerates. The owners of these conglomerates are politically connected, some even running for presidential candidacy in 2014.59 Mergers and acquisitions have led to media groups expanding their control in telecommunications. For instance, the CT Group acquired detik.com, one of the largest online media platforms, expanding its influence beyond television to online media.50

The Tempo Media Group, which operates KBR68H, unlike its more commercial, advertisement-oriented peers, is renowned for maintaining a high quality of journalism, focusing on the production of documentaries and producing content for local television stations.51 As such, KBR68H and Tempo fill an important niche in Indonesia by providing quality content.

5.4.3 Relevance of the changes in relation to the policies of the MFS II alliance and the CFA

The official terms of reference for sending in MFS II proposals did not mention the requirement to report on Civil Society Outcomes and was only communicated after consortia started to implement

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55 Ibid.
their programme. There programme included a programmatic line on Governance with two specific objectives: SPOs including media play an effective role in terms of providing checks and balances related to legislative processes, policymaking and/or policy implementation and; SPOs including media participate more actively, have a stronger voice in political processes at different societal levels and/or deliver more quality. The KBR Teen Voice programme links to this second objective.

In Indonesia, Press Freedom 2.0 has three objectives: To promote gender equality in the Indonesian society with a focus on the prevention of women trafficking and support for its victims; To promote a free and professional media landscape with a focus on the development of high quality news and information programs aimed at children and youth (through Kids News Network), as well as independent journalists; To strengthen the capacities of and links and synergy between civil society organizations and media initiatives. The Teen Voice programme links to the second objective.

The KBR programme hence has been relevant in the light of these programmatic frameworks. After the project ended KBR continued to engage with the international Kids News Network, but Free Press Unlimited did not react to a request for a short interview on this network and KBR’s role in it.

As noted by FPU, the biggest challenge with KBR was to develop and implement a sound business strategy that would ensure sufficient income to cover production and broadcast costs, which however did not materialize.

5.5 Explaining factors

5.5.1 Internal factors

When the project ended in December 2012, the number of crew members was cut back from six to three, hence decreasing KBR’s capacity to ensure that children’s voices continued to be heard and seen in Teen Voice Program. KBR was not successful in making a business plan in 2013 that would ensure the continuation of the Teen Voice Programme. However mainstreaming these voices requires considerable investments and financial sustainability which was not guaranteed with the MFS II project.

KBR68H is run by a respected media group, Tempo. Tempo started out in 1971 as a magazine by current affairs critic Goenawan Mohamad and the journalist Yusril Djalinu. The media group is known for publishing and producing critical content, sometimes making it unpopular amongst those with power. KBR68H’s longstanding history, links with the Tempo Group, and large network have allowed it to continue to broadcast, able to pay the substantial fees required for frequency leasing.

FPU used the five capacities framework to assess the baseline capacities of KBR68H, later repeated at the end of 2011 (unfortunately no further assessments were made available to the evaluation team).

The following scores were reported:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Baseline value</th>
<th>2011 score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1C</td>
<td>The Southern organisation is capable to commit and act.</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2C</td>
<td>The partner organisation is capable to deliver on development objectives.</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3C</td>
<td>The partner organisation is capable to relate.</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4C</td>
<td>The partner organisation is capable to adapt and self-renew.</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5C</td>
<td>The partner organisation is capable to achieve coherence.</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The assessment shows that KBR68H scored relatively well during the baseline, with slight increasing capacities when implementation was underway. Its online presence was strengthened and training was delivered to staff to improve the quality and information of radio broadcasts. In some elements relevant to civil society, the scores of KBR68H were high (range from 3.5-4, with 4 being the highest score). This partially explains why the networking activities with local radio stations were implemented smoothly. These detailed indicators under the core capacities illustrate this point.
Table 11
FPUs assessment of KBR68H against the 5C framework.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Capacity (5C)</th>
<th>Press Freedom Consortium Sub-indicator</th>
<th>2011 score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Strategy to engage with the media.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Organisation's infrastructure is considered sufficient and relevant for its core tasks.</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The organisation supports the development of quality media, participation of civil society and/or the accountability of democratic institutions</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The organisation enters into coalition with relevant stakeholders and maintains them.</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The organisation has a balanced approach towards engaging in media – civil society co-operations.</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Free Press Unlimited 5C Scan 2011

We may need to acknowledge support from other donor such as MDIF (Media Development Investment Fund) that since year 2000 has been a constant partner, providing a variety of finance and business support to develop KBR68H’s content and geographic coverage.62

Another internal factor contributing to KBR68H’s success is the distribution of its radio content to its partners via satellite. In the past, there was no way for partners to return information back to KBR68H apart from through telephone. The online portal has also acted as a hub, allowing radio partners to send back information daily.

5.5.2 External factors

KBR68H has proved to be reasonably capable of adjusting its programs to developments in the external environment. It has been able to find appropriate resource people to be part of the Teen Voice program and has keep abreast with issues that dominate the public discourse. One area where perhaps the SPO was unable to respond sufficiently was the migration of Teen Voice to the web and social media platform of KBR68H. This decision was made amidst financial challenges faced by Teen Voice63. The Chief Editor of KBR68H admitted that his organisation responded late and that the move was perhaps not innovative enough.

The number of internet users in Indonesia continues to grow. This trend is very likely to be a contributing factor to an increased popularity of PortalKBR. In 2011, Indonesia counted 55 million internet users64. According to the same survey company, MarkPlus Insight, user numbers grew to 61 million in 2012 and 75 million in 2013 (roughly 30 percent of the population)65. Amongst the respondents, who used internet more than three hours a day, the 15-30 year-old age group dominated.

Internet in Indonesia has great potential if media is used as a means to improve the quality of life and information distribution. But distribution is still marked by a digital divide. According to a report produced by Internews, “This is not only a result of geography, but also a consequence of government policy and programs, and of business practices66.” More citizens may be using internet but those who are internet literate tend to reside in urban areas as 65 percent of the country’s villages have no access to any network67. In the future, mobile internet usage has the potential to lessen this divide.

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67 Ibid, p.8
By comparison, the penetration of television is higher, with almost 100 percent of household owning a television in 2011. What this means is that with Teen Voice now only being broadcast through the Internet, its audiences are likely to be the urban rather than rural youth.

In March 2011, a book-pack edged bomb was sent to KBR68H’s office. The package was suspected to be targeting a moderate Islamic scholar with links to ISAI and a reaction to KBR68H’s show on religious tolerance. Concerns over a conducive media environment remain. At the policy level, there are many overlapping regulations on the access to information but no revisions to laws regulating the media since the baseline. Law No. 32/2002 on Broadcasting is seen to create unfair advantages to large media conglomerates and there is a risk that ownership may become too concentrate at the expense of diversity of opinions. Additionally, the application of the Electronic Information and Transaction (ITE) Law No. 11/2008 has drawn concern from groups like Amnesty International for criminalizing freedom of expression and potential paving the way for restrictions to online media.

5.5.3 Relations CFA-SPO

FPU undertook a series of trainings to support the Teen Voice project. The aim was to assist KBR68H in capacitating Teen Voice staff to produce news content for children, which required a different journalistic approach. Most of the trainings received positive feedback from KBR68H. A second element of support from FPU was in the form of creating linkages between Teen Voice and the World Kids Network and Kids News Network. These linkages were intended to create a platform for cooperation and generate revenues for Teen Voice. The exchanges with WKN came quiet late in the intervention and it is unclear how effective the KNN platform was in generating revenues. Inputs from FPU were considered by KBR68H as the facilitating factors to their achievement.
6 Discussion

6.1 Design of the interventions

KBR68H’s interventions were based on the assumption that youth and teenagers are underrepresented in Indonesian media, and that there were very few programs that cater to this under-served target group. KBR’s Teen Voice was based on the premise that television and radio programing could provide venue for civic education that in turn would promote civic engagement by creating a well-informed and engaged youth/teenage public who promoted democratic ideals.

While this assumption was valid, the program design and interventions would have benefited from a more in-depth assessment of the links between civic participation and media usage among youth, factoring in specific age groups, types of media used, and identifying information gaps. This kind of assessment would of course require financial resources and a willingness on the part of the funding agencies to invest as well as consensus between SPO and the CFA that the choice of the target group made by the SPO, not the CFA.

Another feature of the design which could have been stronger was the targeted age group. This seemed to vary from one report and document to another; some mentioning 10 to 14, others 10-17 and 12-17). The audience survey also found that younger, elementary school-aged children were more impressed with Teen Voice than older children. Content could have expressly targeted an even more specific age bracket. This would facilitate the development of appropriate content, selection of prime-times for this age group, as well as taking into account media habits (such as the distancing of urban adolescents from radio and the growing usage of mobile phones and internet).

A majority of the respondents in the audience survey reported to watch Teen Voice with friends and classmates, and many said it helped them at school. The end line survey also goes on to recommend a better linkage between Teen Voice content and school lessons. This is probably a worthwhile suggestion for improving future designs, especially since it offers a link with the most widespread source of civic education, namely formal school systems. At a regional level, this could then be linked to KBR’s radio network, promoting youth activism in local radio stations. Additionally, it would potentially provide KBR with a means to promote public or government financing of such a program.

At the design stage, KBR68H expected support and sponsorship for Teen Voice from the commercial sector and government to sustain the program. FPU also linked it to KNN to derive revenues from uploaded content on the web platform. But KBR was unable to maintain the operations and benefits of Teen Voice beyond 2013. This is partly because planning for sustainability happened too late. The business plan development began late in 2012 and wasn’t completed until after the project life time. Other interventions were not sufficiently timely. For example, the Kids News Summit held in November 2013 included a session on business plan development, but this came too late for Teen Voice. The issue of financial sustainability should have been addressed from the start and integrated into the way the project was implemented. For instance, the linking and networking activities supported by FPU, as well as the trainings, should have been focused equally developing quality programming as on KBR’s institutional ability to attract long-term public and private funding for such programs.

If Teen Voice, or similar interventions, is considered for replication, then development partners will need to take the ever-changing media landscape into account. More specifically, the internet should be considered as both a source for sharing and promoting and a source of revenue. PortalKBR.com and KNN are already using this concept. Nonetheless, the power of the internet is still underutilized. For instance, KBR68H could be pushing the boundaries in developing mobile technology or web-based applications to spur greater engagement of their target youth audiences. Even in countries like Indonesia, schools are using online platforms and Internet tools for course content and home work. Getting involved in this area through web-based content or applications is a potential worth exploring. This would also drive an interest from private and public sector players to invest in KBR and contribute
to sustainability. A solid sustainability plan should be drawn up from the start, identifying what resources may be needed to build the capacity of the SPO and make the program financially viable.

KBR68H will need to start pushing the boundaries of how to integrate traditional media and internet. Some options could include exploring podcasting and developing YouTube channels that appeal more to a young target audience. YouTube stars may start to rival television stars in Indonesia and are attracting youth interest. Promoting young television and radio presenters coming from KBR’s regional network on YouTube would be a way to tap into the new medium. This would also offer an opportunity to promote more youth leadership, rather than just focusing on promoting participation as was done by the Teen Voice intervention.
7 Conclusion

In this chapter we summarise our findings in relation to each of the evaluation questions:

**Changes in the civil society arena of the SPO**

In the 2012 – 2014 period the most important change that took place in KBR’s civil society arena is related to Civic Engagement. Between 2011 and 2013 Teen Voice expanded through televised and radio broadcasted programs. According to KBR68H’s own estimated the relay of the show through 52 radio stations and 22 television stations relayed an estimated 1.17 million youth and teenagers. This number is impressive. The content was produced involving youth reporters and presenters with a focus on presenting issues through the viewpoints of teenagers. As the audience survey, covering 300 children showed, the audience was enthusiastic about the content of the shows. Children enjoyed the content and felt that it was of use in their daily lives. In the second period, Teen Voice television and radio was discontinued due to a lack of interest from potential funders. Fortunately, KBR68H had already begun to expand Teen Voice online through a portal. KBR succeeded to disseminate content through its KBR68H portal and through social media ensuring that Teen Voice continues until today. The fact that more and more Indonesian youth are consuming media content through their computers and mobile devices justifies the decision to shift the Teen Voice to an online version, in addition to financial constraints. However, there is still a plan to televisе the Teen Program by the Tempo Group. Teen Voice has been brought under the Tempo Group since January 2015.\(^\text{72}\) The online platform affords new opportunities for the show to engage audiences. Two-way communication has improved through Twitter and Facebook. Apart from this, initiatives have developed to start the television programme again because Teen Voice is now under the Tempo Group\(^\text{73}\).

Throughout 2012–2014, KBR68H also expanded its networks with radio stations. The network grew from 850 to 900 radio stations in this period. KBR68H maintains a reputable position as an independent media source known for its high-quality content and has the infrastructure to broadcast in the Asia-Pacific region. This implies that it improved it ‘level of organisation’ in CIVICUS terms. There is no evidence that this network expansion had positive consequences for Teen Voice since the programme has not become part of KBR68H’s core programme, nor has it been institutionalized by its radio network.

**Contribution analysis**

The above mentioned changes can be attributed to KBR68H and partially to FPU funding during the first period. Although the televised and radio shows have been discontinued due to a lack of funds, including those from FPU, KBR68H has managed to adapt and make use of the opportunities available through the internet. KBR’s intention with Teen Voice is that it remains an interactive platform that would allow for the seeds of democratic traits, such as freedom of expression and constructive dialogue, to be planted. Unfortunately the Teen Voice programme discontinued on radio and television in 2014 and its portal is neither frequently visited nor social media are being used by children to continue raising their voice. The interventions were not sustainable.

**Relevance**

With regards to the baseline ToC, the interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant since KBR68H was able to produce quality content, target an underserved age group, and engage its network disseminate content through television and radio up until 2013.

\(^\text{72}\) Information received from FPU Program Manager South Asia on 21 January 2015

\(^\text{73}\) Information received from FPU Program Manager South Asia on 21 January 2015
With regards to the context in which KBR68H is operating, its interventions and outcomes achieved are relevant because media plays a critical role in shaping opinions. Online media and television are the main media outlets in the country programs like Teen Voice fill an important gap in an adult dominated space.

With regards to the CS policies of Free Press Unlimited (FPU), KBR’s interventions and outcomes were relevant, but not sustainable. KBR continued to engage with the international Kids News Network, but FPU did not react to a request for a short interview on this network and KBR’s role in it.

**Explaining factors**

Internal factors that explain the findings are KBR68H’s migration of the Teen Voice radio and television programs to a web portal and social media platform and the fact that it did not succeed to develop a business plan capable of financing the further mainstreaming children’s programmes into ongoing activities. External factors that explain the findings are the drop of commercial television and radio interest in the continuation of Teen Voice. Factors that explain the findings that are related to the relation between FPU and KBR68H are the support FPU provided through trainings, Teen Voice’s membership to the Kids News Network (KKN), and the discontinuation of FPU funding support to the Teen Voice program.

**Design of similar interventions**

Future similar interventions need to take the ever-changing media landscape into account and in particular possibilities to use internet as a source for sharing and promoting children’s programmes as well as a possibility to raise revenues. This could be accompanied by the use of mobile technologies that further engage youth.

**Table 12**

**Summary of findings.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When looking at the MFS II interventions of this SPO to strengthen civil society and/or policy influencing, how much do you agree with the following statements?</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The CS interventions were well designed</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The CS interventions were implemented as designed</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The CS interventions reached their objectives</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The observed outcomes are attributable to the CS interventions</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The observed CS outcomes are relevant to the beneficiaries of the SPO</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Score between 1 to 10, with 1 being "not at all" and 10 being "completely".
References and resource persons

Documents by SPO
"Company Profile", KBR68H, 2010

Documents by CFA
"5C Scan Indonesia 2011 KBR68H", Free Press Unlimited, 2011
"Consulting Agreement F-ID-02-11-05", Free Press Unlimited, 5 July 2011
"F-ID-02-11-01 Final audit draft", Free Press Unlimited, 2012
"Free Press Unlimited 5C Scan 2011", Free Press Unlimited, 2011

Documents by Alliance
N/A

Other documents


STATT. 2012. NGO Sector Review. Jakarta

Tjahjono, Godo. 2006. Teenagers, Young Adults and the Media: A Study of Media Behavior in Jakarta. Jakarta: University of Indonesia


Webpages


Twitter, ”Teen Voice”. Available from https://twitter.com/teenvoice (accessed November 17 November 2014)


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**Resource persons consulted**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of key informant</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Function in organisation</th>
<th>Relation with SPO</th>
<th>Contact details including e-mail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Santoso</td>
<td>KBR</td>
<td>Director KBR</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>0811-149916; <a href="mailto:tosca68h@yahoo.com">tosca68h@yahoo.com</a></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Producer Teen Voice</td>
<td>Group Tempo</td>
<td>0821 22853334, <a href="mailto:chicha.tea@yahoo.com">chicha.tea@yahoo.com</a></td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Febriana Sari</td>
<td>KBR</td>
<td>Contributor</td>
<td>Contributor</td>
<td>0811258658, <a href="mailto:namakusinta@yahoo.com">namakusinta@yahoo.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melodya</td>
<td></td>
<td>Former reporter Teen Voice</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Free Press Unlimited</td>
<td>Liaison officer</td>
<td>Liaison officer</td>
<td><a href="mailto:pavicic@freepressunlimited.org">pavicic@freepressunlimited.org</a></td>
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</table>
Appendix 1 CIVICUS and Civil Society Index

CIVICUS, the World Alliance for Citizen Participation is an international alliance of members and partners which constitutes an influential network of organisations at the local, national, regional and international levels, and spans the spectrum of civil society. It has worked for nearly two decades to strengthen citizen action and civil society throughout the world. CIVICUS has a vision of a global community of active, engaged citizens committed to the creation of a more just and equitable world. This is based on the belief that the health of societies exists in direct proportion to the degree of balance between the state, the private sector and civil society.

One of the areas that CIVICUS works in is the Civil Society Index (CSI). Since 2000, CIVICUS has measured the state of civil society in 76 countries. In 2008, it considerably changed its CSI.

1. Guiding principles for measuring civil society

*Action orientation:* the principal aim of the CSI is to generate information that is of practical use to civil society practitioners and other primary stakeholders. Therefore, its framework had to identify aspects of civil society that can be changed, as well as generate knowledge relevant to action-oriented goals.

*CSI implementation must be participatory by design:* The CSI does not stop at the generation of knowledge alone. Rather, it also actively seeks to link knowledge-generation on civil society, with reflection and action by civil society stakeholders. The CSI has therefore continued to involve its beneficiaries, as well as various other actors, in this particular case, civil society stakeholders, in all stages of the process, from the design and implementation, through to the deliberation and dissemination stages.

This participatory cycle is relevant in that such a mechanism can foster the self-awareness of civil society actors as being part of something larger, namely, civil society itself. As a purely educational gain, it broadens the horizon of CSO representatives through a process of reflecting upon, and engaging with, civil society issues which may go beyond the more narrow foci of their respective organisations. A strong collective self-awareness among civil society actors can also function as an important catalyst for joint advocacy activities to defend civic space when under threat or to advance the common interests of civil society vis-à-vis external forces. These basic civil society issues, on which there is often more commonality than difference among such actors, are at the core of the CSI assessment.

*CSI is change oriented:* The participatory nature that lies at the core of the CSI methodology is an important step in the attempt to link research with action, creating a diffused sense of awareness and ownerships. However, the theory of change that the CSI is based on goes one step further, coupling this participatory principle with the creation of evidence in the form of a comparable and contextually valid assessment of the state of civil society. It is this evidence, once shared and disseminated, that ultimately constitutes a resource for action.

*CSI is putting local partners in the driver’s seat:* CSI is to continue being a collaborative effort between a broad range of stakeholders, with most importance placed on the relationship between CIVICUS and its national partners.
2. Defining Civil Society

The 2008 CIVICUS redesign team modified the civil society definition as follows:

The arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market – which is created by individual and collective actions, organisations and institutions to advance shared interests.

Arena: In this definition the arena refers to the importance of civil society’s role in creating public spaces where diverse societal values and interests interact (Fowler 1996). CSI uses the term ‘arena’ to describe the particular realm or space in a society where people come together to debate, discuss, associate and seek to influence broader society. CIVICUS strongly believes that this arena is distinct from other arenas in society, such as the market, state or family.

Civil society is hence defined as a political term, rather than in economic terms that resemble more the ‘non-profit sector’.

Besides the spaces created by civil society, CIVICUS defines particular spaces for the family, the state and the market.

Individual and collective action, organisations and institutions: Implicit in a political understanding of civil society is the notion of agency; that civil society actors have the ability to influence decisions that affect the lives of ordinary people. The CSI embraces a broad range of actions taken by both individuals and groups. Many of these actions take place within the context of non-coercive organisations or institutions ranging from small informal groups to large professionally run associations.

Advance shared interests: The term ‘interests’ should be interpreted very broadly, encompassing the promotion of values, needs, identities, norms and other aspirations.

They encompass the personal and public, and can be pursued by small informal groups, large membership organisations or formal associations. The emphasis rests however on the element of ‘sharing’ that interest within the public sphere.

3. Civil Society Index- Analytical Framework

The 2008 Civil Society Index distinguishes 5 dimensions of which 4 (civic engagement, level of organisation, practice of values and perception of impact), can be represented in the form of a diamond and the fifth one (external environment) as a circle that influences upon the shape of the diamond. Civic Engagement, or ‘active citizenship’, is a crucial defining factor of civil society. It is the hub of civil society and therefore is one of the core components of the CSI’s definition. Civic engagement describes the formal and informal activities and participation undertaken by individuals to advance shared interests at different levels. Participation within civil society is multi-faceted and encompasses socially-based and politically-based forms of engagement.

Level of Organisation. This dimension assesses the organisational development, complexity and sophistication of civil society, by looking at the relationships among the actors within the civil society arena. Key sub dimensions are:

- Internal governance of Civil Society Organisations;
- Support infrastructure, that is about the existence of supporting federations or umbrella bodies;
- Self-regulation, which is about for instance the existence of shared codes of conducts amongst Civil Society Organisations and other existing self-regulatory mechanisms;
- Peer-to-peer communication and cooperation: networking, information sharing and alliance building to assess the extent of linkages and productive relations among civil society actors;
- Human resources, that is about the sustainability and adequacy of human resources available for CSOs in order to achieve their objectives:
  - Financial and technological resources available at CSOs to achieve their objectives;
International linkages, such as CSO’s membership in international networks and participation in global events.

**Practice of Values.** This dimension assesses the internal practice of values within the civil society arena. CIVICUS identified some key values that are deemed crucial to gauge not only progressiveness but also the extent to which civil society’s practices are coherent with their ideals. These are:

- Democratic decision-making governance: how decisions are made within CSOs and by whom;
- Labour regulations: includes the existence of policies regarding equal opportunities, staff membership in labour unions, training in labour rights for new staff and a publicly available statement on labour standards;
- Code of conduct and transparency: measures whether a code of conduct exists and is available publicly. It also measures whether the CSO’s financial information is available to the public.
- Environmental standards: examines the extent to which CSOs adopt policies upholding environmental standards of operation;
- Perception of values within civil society: looks at how CSOs perceive the practice of values, such as non-violence. This includes the existence or absence of forces within civil society that use violence, aggression, hostility, brutality and/or fighting, tolerance, democracy, transparency, trustworthiness and tolerance in the civil society within which they operate.

**Perception of Impact.** This is about the perceived impact of civil society actors on politics and society as a whole as the consequences of collective action. In this, the perception of both civil society actors (internal) as actors outside civil society (outsiders) is taken into account. Specific sub dimensions are:

- Responsiveness in terms of civil society’s impact on the most important social concerns within the country. “Responsive” types of civil society are effectively taking up and voicing societal concerns.
- Social impact measures civil society’s impact on society in general. An essential role of civil society is its contribution to meet pressing societal needs;
- Policy impact: covers civil society’s impact on policy in general. It also looks at the impact of CSO activism on selected policy issues;
- Impact on attitudes: includes trust, public spiritedness and tolerance. The sub dimensions reflect a set of universally accepted social and political norms. These are drawn, for example, from sources such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as CIVICUS’ own core values. This dimension measures the extent to which these values are practised within civil society, compared to the extent to which they are practised in society at large.

**Context Dimension: External Environment.** It is crucial to give consideration to the social, political and economic environments in which it exists, as the environment both directly and indirectly affects civil society. Some features of the environment may enable the growth of civil society. Conversely, other features of the environment hamper the development of civil society. Three elements of the external environment are captured by the CSI:

- Socio-economic context: The Social Watch’s basic capabilities index and measures of corruption, inequality and macro-economic health are used portray the socioeconomic context that can have marked consequences for civil society, and perhaps most significantly at the lower levels of social development;
• Socio-political context: This is assessed using five indicators. Three of these are adapted from the Freedom House indices of political and civil rights and freedoms, including political rights and freedoms, personal rights and freedoms within the law and associational and organisational rights and freedoms. Information about CSO experience with the country’s legal framework and state effectiveness round out the picture of the socio-political context;
• Socio-cultural context: utilises interpersonal trust, which examines the level of trust that ordinary people feel for other ordinary people, as a broad measure of the social psychological climate for association and cooperation. Even though everyone experiences relationships of varying trust and distrust with different people, this measure provides a simple indication of the prevalence of a world view that can support and strengthen civil society. Similarly, the extent of tolerance and public spiritedness also offers indication of the context in which civil society unfolds.
Appendix 2  Evaluation methodology

This Appendix describes the evaluation methodology that was developed to evaluate the efforts of Dutch NGOs and their Southern Partner Organisations (SPO) to strengthen Civil Society in India, Ethiopia and Indonesia. The first paragraph introduces the terms of reference for the evaluation and the second discusses design issues, including sampling procedures and changes in the terms of reference that occurred between the 2012 and 2014 assessment. The third paragraph presents the methodologies developed to answer each of the evaluation questions.

1. Introduction

1.1 Terms of reference for the evaluation

The Netherlands has a long tradition of public support for civil bi-lateral development cooperation, going back to the 1960s. The Co-Financing System (‘MFS) is its most recent expression. MFS II is the 2011-2015 grant programme which meant to achieve sustainable reduction in poverty. A total of 20 consortia of Dutch Co Financing Agencies have been awarded €1.9 billion in MFS II grants by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).

One component of the MFS II programme addresses the extent to which the Southern Partners of the Dutch Consortia are contributing towards strengthening civil society and this evaluation assesses this contribution for Southern Partner countries in Indonesia, India and Ethiopia. The evaluation comprised a baseline study, carried out in 2012, followed by an end line study in 2014.

The entire MFS II evaluation comprises assessments in eight countries where apart from a civil society component, also assessments towards achieving MDGs and strengthening the capacity of the southern partner organisations by the CFAs. A synthesis team is in place to aggregate findings of all eight countries. This team convened three synthesis team meetings, one in 2012, one in 2013 and one in 2014. All three meetings aimed at harmonising evaluation methodologies for each component across countries. CDI has been playing a leading role in harmonising its Civil Society and Organisational Capacity assessment with the other organisations in charge for those components in the other countries.

This Annex describes the methodology that has been developed for the evaluation of the efforts to strengthen civil society priority result area. We will first explain the purpose and scope of this evaluation and then present the overall evaluation design. We will conclude with describing methodological adaptations, limitations and implications.

1.2 Civil Society assessment – purpose and scope

The overall purpose of the joint MFS II evaluations is to account for results of MFS II-funded or –co-funded development interventions implemented by Dutch CFAs and/or their Southern partners and to contribute to the improvement of future development interventions.

The civil society evaluation is organised around 5 key questions:

- What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?
- To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?
- What is the relevance of these changes?
Were the development interventions of the MFS II consortia efficient?
What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

Furthermore, the evaluation methodology for efforts to strengthen civil society should:
- Describe how a representative sample of Southern partner organisations of the Dutch CFAs in the country will be taken
- Focus on five priority result areas that correspond with dimensions of the Civil Society Index (CSI) developed by CIVICUS (see paragraph 6.4 - Call for proposal). For each of those dimensions the call for proposal formulated key evaluation questions.
- Should compare results with available reference data (i.e. a CSI report or other relevant data from the country in question).

The results of this evaluation are to be used by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Dutch Consortia and their partner organisations. The evaluation methodology has to be participatory in the sense that Dutch Consortia and their partner organisation would be asked to give their own perception on a range of indicators of the adjusted CIVICUS analytical framework in 2012 and in 2014.

2. Designing the methodology

2.1 Evaluation principles and standards

The overall approach selected is a participatory, theory-based evaluation through a before and after comparison. This paragraph briefly describes these principles and how these have been translated into data collection principles. It also describes how a ‘representative sample’ of Southern Partner Organisations was selected and how the initial terms of references were adjusted with the consent of the commissioner of the evaluation, given the nature of the evaluation component and the resources available for the evaluation.

Recognition of complexity

The issues at stake and the interventions in civil society and policy influence are complex in nature, meaning that cause and effect relations can sometimes only be understood in retrospect and cannot be repeated. The evaluation methods should therefore focus on recurring patterns of practice, using different perspectives to understand changes and to acknowledge that the evaluation means to draw conclusions about complex adaptive systems (Kurtz and Snowden, 2003). Changes in the values of the Civil Society Indicators in the 2012-2014 period are then the result of conflict management processes, interactive learning events, new incentives (carrots and sticks) that mobilise or demobilise civil society, rather than the result of a change process that can be predicted from A to Z (a linear or logical framework approach).

A theory-based evaluation

Theory-based evaluation has the advantage of situating the evaluation findings in an analysis that includes both what happened over the life of the project as well as the how and why of what happened (Rogers 2004). It demonstrates its capacity to help understand why a program works or fails to work, going further than knowing only outcomes by trying to systematically enter the black box (Weiss 2004). Theory-based evaluations can provide a framework to judge effectiveness in context of high levels of complexity, uncertainty, and changeability when traditional (impact) evaluation methods are not suitable: the use of control groups for the civil society evaluation is problematic since comparable

organisations with comparable networks and operating in a similar external environment would be quite
difficult to identify and statistical techniques of matching cannot be used because of a small n.
Because SPO’s theories of change regarding their efforts to build civil society or to influence policies may
alter during the 2012-2014 period, it requires us to develop a deep understanding of the change process
and the dynamics that affect civil society and policies. It is important to understand what has led to
specific (non-) changes and (un)-expected changes. These external factors and actors, as well as the
SPO’s agency need to be taken into account for the attribution question. Linear input-activities-outputs-
outcomes-impact chains do not suffice for complex issues where change is both the result of SPOs’
terventions as those by other actors and/or factors.
Therefore, the most reasonable counterfactual that can be used for this evaluation is that of considering
alternative causal explanations of change (White and Philips, 2012). Therefore the SPOs’ Theory of
Change constructed in 2012 is also related to a Model of Change constructed in 2014 that tries to find
the ultimate explanations of what happened in reality, including other actors and factors that might
possibly explain the outcomes achieved.

Triangulation of methods and sources of information
For purposes of triangulation to improve the robustness, validity or credibility of the findings of the
evaluation we used different types of data collection and analysis methods as well as different sources of
information. The CIVICUS analytical framework was adjusted for this evaluation in terms of providing
standard impact outcome indicators to be taken into account. Data collection methods used consisted of
workshops with the SPO, interviews with key resource persons, focus group discussions, social network
analysis (during the baseline), consultation of project documents; MFS II consortia documents and other
documents relevant to assess general trends in civil society

Participatory evaluation
The evaluation is participatory in that both baseline and end line started with a workshop with SPO staff,
decision makers and where possible board members. The baseline workshop helped SPOs to construct
their own theory of change with regards to civil society. Detailed guidelines and tools have been
developed by CDI for both baseline and follow-up, and these have been piloted in each of the countries
CDI is involved in. Country based evaluators have had a critical input in reviewing and adapting these
detailed guidelines and tools. This enhanced a rigorous data collection process. Additionally, the process
of data analysis has been participatory where both CDI and in-country teams took part in the process
and cross-check each other’s inputs for improved quality. Rigorous analysis of the qualitative data was
done with the assistance of the NVivo software program.

Using the evaluation standards as a starting point
As much as possible within the boundaries of this accountability driven evaluation, the evaluation teams
tried to respect the following internationally agreed upon standards for program evaluation (Yarbrough et
al, 2011). These are, in order of priority: Utility; Feasibility; Propriety; Accuracy; Accountability.
However, given the entire set-up of the evaluation, the evaluation team cannot fully ensure the extent to
which the evaluation is utile for the SPO and their CFAs; and cannot ensure that the evaluation findings
are used in a proper way and not for political reasons.

2.2 Sample selection
The terms of reference for this evaluation stipulate that the evaluators draw a sample of southern
partner organisations to include in the assessment. Given the fact that the first evaluation questions
intends to draw conclusions for the MDGs or the themes (governance or fragile states) for Indonesia a
sample was drawn for the two or three most frequent MDGs or themes that the SPOs are working in.
In 2012, the Dutch MFS II consortia were asked to provide information for each SPO regarding the
MDG/theme it is working on, if it has an explicit agenda in the area of civil society strengthening and/or
policy influence. The database then provided an insight into the most important MDG/themes covered by
the partner organisations, how many of these have an explicit agenda regarding civil society
strengthening and/or policy influence. The entire population of SPOs in Indonesia was 120, of which those exclusively working on the governance theme (28 SPOs), those working on MDG 7ab (26 SPOs) and on MDG 3 (26 SPOs) where the most frequent ones. With regards to MDG 3 and MDG 7ab the evaluator decided to select MDG 7ab, which is a very specific and relevant MDG for Indonesia.

Five 5 partner organisations were randomly selected for respectively MDG 7 (natural resources) of a population of 26 SPOs and 5 for the governance theme from 28 SPOs.

2.3 Changes in the original terms of reference

Two major changes have been introduced during this evaluation and accepted by the commissioner of the MFS II evaluation. These changes were agreed upon during the 2013 and the 2014 synthesis team meetings.

The efficiency evaluation question

During the June 2013 synthesis meeting the following decision was made with regards to measuring how efficient MFS II interventions for organisational capacity and civil society are:

[...] it was stressed that it is difficult to disentangle budgets for capacity development and civil society strengthening. SPOs usually don't keep track of these activities separately; they are included in general project budgets. Therefore, teams agreed to assess efficiency of CD [capacity development] and CS activities in terms of the outcomes and/or outputs of the MDG projects. This implies no efficiency assessment will be held for those SPOs without a sampled MDG project. Moreover, the efficiency assessment of MDG projects needs to take into account CD and CS budgets (in case these are specified separately). Teams will evaluate efficiency in terms of outcomes if possible. If project outcomes are unlikely to be observed already in 2014, efficiency will be judged in terms of outputs or intermediate results (e-mail quotation from Gerton Rongen at February 6, 2014).

Attribution/contribution evaluation question

During the June 2013 NWO-WOTRO workshop strategies were discussed to fit the amount of evaluation work to be done with the available resources. Therefore,

1. The number of SPOs that will undergo a full-fledged analysis to answer the attribution question, were to be reduced to 50 percent of all SPOs. Therefore the evaluation team used the following selection criteria:
   - An estimation of the annual amount of MFS II funding allocated to interventions that have a more or less direct relation with the civil society component. This implies the following steps to be followed for the inventory:
   - Covering all MDGs/themes in the original sample
   - Covering a variety of Dutch alliances and CFAs

2. The focus of the attribution question will be on two impact outcome areas, those most commonly present in the SPO sample for each country. The evaluation team distinguishes four different impact outcome areas:
   - The extent to which the SPO, with MFS II funding, engages more and diverse categories of society in the 2011-2014 period (Civicus dimensions "Civic engagement" and "perception of impact")
   - The extent to which the SPOs supports its intermediate organisations to make a valuable contribution to civil society in the 2011 -2014 period (Civicus dimension "Level of organisation" and "perception of impact")
   - The extent to which the SPO itself engages with other civil society organisations to make a valuable contribution to civil society in the 2011-2014 period (Civicus dimension "level of organisation")

See the evaluation methodology for the civil society component as described in the annex of the baseline report.
The extent to which the SPO contributes to changing public and private sector policies and practices in the 2011-2014 period (Civicus dimension “perception of impact”)

3. The CS dimension ‘Practice of Values’ has been excluded, because this dimension is similar to issues dealt with for the organisational capacity assessment.

The aforementioned analysis drew the following conclusions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>SPO in the in-depth analysis</th>
<th>Strategic CS orientation to include</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Indonesia | ELSAM, WARSI, CRI, NTPP-EP, LPPSLH | 1. Strengthening intermediate organisations AND influencing policies and practices  
2. If only one of the two above mentioned is applicable, then select another appropriate impact outcome area to look at. |
| India | NNET, CWM, CECCDECON, Reds Tumkur, CSA | 1. Enhancing civic engagement AND strengthening intermediate organisations  
2. If only one of the two above mentioned is applicable then select another appropriate impact outcome area to look at. |
| Ethiopia | OSSA, EKHC, CCGG&SO, JeCCDO and ADAA | 1. Strengthening the capacities of intermediate organisations AND SPO’s engagement in the wider CS arena  
2. If only one of the two above mentioned is applicable then select another appropriate impact outcome area to look at. |

Source: Consultation of project documents available in February 2014

3. Answering the evaluation questions

3.1 Evaluation question 1 - Changes in civil society for the relevant MDGs/topics

Evaluation question 1: What are the changes in civil society in the 2012-2014 period, with particular focus on the relevant MDGs & themes in the selected country?

Indicators and tools used
In line with the CIVICUS Civil Society Index, a scoring tool was developed in 2012 which comprises 17 indicators. The selection was inspired by those suggested in the terms of reference of the commissioner. Each indicator was, also in line with the CIVICUS index accompanied by an open evaluation question to be used for data collection in 2012 and 2014. In 2012 the scoring tool contained four statements describing the level of achievements of the indicator and scores ranged from 0 to 3 (low score - high score).

A comparison of the scores obtained in 2012 informed the evaluation team that there was a positive bias towards high scores, mostly between 2 and 3. Therefore during the 2014 assessment, it was decided to measure relative changes for each indicator in the 2012 – 2014 period, as well as the reasons for changes or no changes and assigning a score reflecting the change between -2 (considerable deterioration of the indicator value since 2012) and +2 (considerable improvement).

In 2012 and based upon the Theory of Change constructed with the SPO, a set of standard indicators were identified that would ensure a relation between the standard CIVICUS indicators and the interventions of the SPO. However, these indicators were not anymore included in the 2014 assessment because of the resources available and because the methodology fine-tuned for the attribution question in 2013, made measurement of these indicators redundant.

Also in 2012, as a means to measure the ‘level of organisation’ dimension a social network analysis tool was introduced. However this tool received very little response and was discontinued during the end line study.

Key questions to be answered for this evaluation question
In 2012, SPO staff and leaders, as well as outside resource persons were asked to provide answers to 17 questions, one per standard indicator of the scoring tool developed by CDI.
In 2012, the SPO staff and leaders were given the description of each indicator as it was in 2012 and had to answer the following questions:

1. How has the situation of this indicator changed compared to its description of the 2012 situation? Did it deteriorate considerably or did it improve considerably (-2 → +2)
2. What exactly has changed since 2012 for the civil society indicator that you are looking at? Be as specific as possible in your description.
3. What interventions, actors and other factors explain this change compared to the situation in 2012? Please tick and describe what happened and to what change this led. It is possible to tick and describe more than one choice.
   - Intervention by SPO, NOT financed by any of your Dutch partners ..............
   - Intervention SPO, financed by your Dutch partner organisation .........(In case you receive funding from two Dutch partners, please specify which partner is meant here)
   - Other actor NOT the SPO, please specify.......  
   - Other factor, NOT actor related, please specify.......  
   - A combination of actors and factors, INCLUDING the SPO, but NOT with Dutch funding, please specify...
   - A combination of actors and factors, INCLUDING the SPO, but WITH Dutch funding, please specify...
   - Don’t know
4. Generally speaking, which two of the five CIVICUS dimensions (civic engagement, level of organisation, practice of values, perception of impact, environment) changed considerably between 2012 – 2014? For each of these changes, please describe:
   - Nature of the change
   - Key interventions, actors and factors (MFS II or non-MFS II related) that explain each change (entirely or partially).

Sources for data collection
During the baseline and the end line and for purposes of triangulation, several methods were used to collect data on each (standard) indicator:

- Self-assessment per category of staff within the SPO: where possible, three subgroups were made to assess the scores: field staff/programme staff, executive leadership and representatives of the board,, general assembly, and internal auditing groups if applicable completed with separate interviews;
- Interviews with external resource persons. These consisted of three categories: key actors that are knowledgeable about the MDG/theme the SPO is working on and who know the civil society arena around these topics; civil society organisations that are being affected by the programme through support or CSOs with which the SPO is collaborating on equal footing, and; representatives of public or private sector organisations with which the SPO is interacting
- Consultation and analysis of reports that relate to each of the five CIVICUS dimensions.
- Project documents, financial and narrative progress reports, as well as correspondence between the SPO and the CFA.
- Social network analysis (SNA), which was discontinued in the end line study.
During the follow-up, emphasis was put on interviewing the same staff and external persons who were involved during the baseline for purpose of continuity.
3.2 Evaluation question 2 – “Attribution” of changes in civil society to interventions of SPOs.

Evaluation question 2: To what degree are the changes identified attributable to the development interventions of the Southern partners of the MFS II consortia (i.e. measuring effectiveness)?

Adapting the evaluation question and introduction to the methodology chosen

In line with the observation of Stern et al. (2012) that the evaluation question, the programme attributes, and the evaluation approaches all provide important elements to conclude on the evaluation design to select, the teams in charge of evaluating the civil society component concluded that given the attributes of the programmes it was impossible to answer the attribution question as formulated in the Terms of References of the evaluation and mentioned above. Therefore, the evaluation teams worked towards answering the extent to which the programme contributed towards realising the outcomes.

For this endeavour explaining outcome process-tracing was used. The objective of the process tracing methodology for MFS II, in particular for the civil society component is to:

- Identify what interventions, actors and factors explain selected impact outcomes for process tracing.
- Assess how the SPO with MFS II funding contributed to the changes in the selected impact outcomes and how important this contribution is given other actors and factors that possibly influence the attainment of the outcome. Ruling out rival explanations, which are other interventions, actors or factors that are not related to MFS II funding.

Methodology – getting prepared

As described before a limited number of SPOs were selected for process tracing and for each country strategic orientations were identified as a means to prevent a bias occurring towards only positive impact outcomes and as a means to support the in-country evaluation teams with the selection of outcomes to focus on a much as was possible, based upon the project documents available at CDI. These documents were used to track realised outputs and outcomes against planned outputs and outcomes. During the workshop (see evaluation question on changes in civil society) and follow-up interviews with the SPO, two impact outcomes were selected for process tracing.

Steps in process tracing

1. Construct the theoretical model of change – by in-country evaluation team

After the two impact outcomes have been selected and information has been obtained about what has actually been achieved, the in-country evaluation team constructs a visual that shows all pathways that might possibly explain the outcomes. The inventory of those possible pathways is done with the SPO, but also with external resource persons and documents consulted. This culminated in a Model of Change. A MoC of good quality includes: The causal pathways that relate interventions/parts by any actor, including the SPO to the realised impact outcome; assumptions that clarify relations between different parts in the pathway, and; case specific and/or context specific factors or risks that might influence the causal pathway, such as for instance specific attributes of the actor or socio-cultural-economic context. The Models of Change were discussed with the SPO and validated.

2. Identify information needs to confirm or reject causal pathways as well as information sources needed.

This step aims to critically reflect upon what information is needed that helps to confirm one of causal pathways and at that at same time helps to reject the other possible explanations. Reality warns that this type of evidence will hardly be available for complex development efforts. The evaluators were asked 77 Explaining outcome process tracing attempts to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific historical case. Here the aim is not to build or test more general theories but to craft a (minimally) sufficient explanation of the outcome of the case where the ambitions are more case centric than theory oriented. The aim of process tracing is not to verify if an intended process of interventions took place as planned in a particular situation, but that it aims at increasing our understanding about what works under what conditions and why (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).
to behave as detectives of Crime Scene Investigation, ensuring that the focus of the evaluation was not only on checking if parts/interventions had taken place accordingly, but more specifically on identifying information needs that confirm or reject the relations between the parts/interventions. The key question to be answered was: "What information do we need in order to confirm or reject that one part leads to another part or, that X causes Y?". Four types of evidence were used, where appropriate: 

- **Pattern evidence** relates to predictions of statistical patterns in the evidence. This may consist of trends analysis and correlations.
- **Sequence evidence** deals with the temporal and spatial chronology of events predicted by a hypothesised causal mechanism. For example, a test of the hypothesis could involve expectations of the timing of events where we might predict that if the hypothesis is valid, we should see that the event B took place after event A. However, if we found that event B took place before event A, the test would suggest that our confidence in the validity of this part of the mechanism should be reduced (disconfirmation/ falsification).
- **Trace evidence** is evidence whose mere existence provides proof that a part of a hypothesised mechanism exists. For example, the existence of meeting minutes, if authentic, provides strong proof that the meeting took place.
- **Account evidence** deals with the content of empirical material, such as meeting minutes that detail what was discussed or an oral account of what took place in the meeting.

3. Collect information necessary to confirm or reject causal pathways

Based upon the inventory of information needs the evaluation teams make their data collection plan after which data collection takes place.

4. Analyse the data collected and assessment of their quality.

This step consists of compiling all information collected in favour or against a causal pathway in a table or in a list per pathway. For all information used, the sources of information are mentioned and an assessment of the strength of the evidence takes place, making a distinction between strong, weak and moderate evidence. For this we use the traffic light system: **green letters mean strong evidence, red letters mean weak evidence** and **orange letter mean moderate evidence**: The following table provides the format used to assess these issues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal pathway</th>
<th>Information that confirms (parts of) this pathway</th>
<th>Information that rejects (parts of) this pathway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pathway 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part 1.1</td>
<td>Information 1</td>
<td>Information 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part 1.2</td>
<td>Information 2</td>
<td>Information 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etc</td>
<td>Information 3</td>
<td>Information 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>etc</td>
<td>etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pathway 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part 2.1</td>
<td>Information 1</td>
<td>Information 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part 2.2</td>
<td>Information 2</td>
<td>Information 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etc</td>
<td>Information 3</td>
<td>Information 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>etc</td>
<td>etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pathway 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Assessing the nature of the relations between parts in the model of change

The classification of all information collected is being followed by the identification of the pathways that most likely explain the impact outcome achieved. For this the evaluators assess the nature of the relations between different parts in the MoC. Based upon Mayne (2012) and Stern et al (2012) the following relations between parts in the MoC are mapped and the symbols inserted into the original MoC.

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78 Beach and Pederson, 2013
6. **Write down the contribution and assess the role of the SPO and MFS II funding**

This final step consists of answering the following questions, as a final assessment of the contribution question:
- The first question to be answered is: What explains the impact outcome?
- The second question is: What is the role of the SPO in this explanation?
- The third question, if applicable is: what is the role of MFS II finding in this explanation?

7. **Sources for data collection**

Information necessary to answer this evaluation question is to be collected from:
- Interviews with resource persons inside and outside the SPO
- Project documents and documentation made available by other informants
- Websites that possibly confirm that an outcome is achieved and that the SPO is associated with this outcome
- Meeting minutes of meetings between officials
- Time lines to trace the historical relations between events
- Policy documents
- etc

### 3.3 Evaluation question 3 – Relevance of the changes

**Evaluation question 3: What is the relevance of these changes?**

The following questions are to be answered in order to assess the relevance of the changes in Civil Society.
- How do the MFS II interventions and civil society outcomes align with the Theory of Change developed during the baseline in 2012? What were reasons for changing or not changing interventions and strategies?
- What is the civil society policy of the Dutch alliance that collaborates with the SPO? And how do the MFS II interventions and civil society outcomes align with the civil society policy of the Dutch alliance that collaborates with the SPO?
- How relevant are the changes achieved in relation to the context in which the SPO is operating?
- What is the further significance of these changes for building a vibrant civil society for the particular MDG/ theme in the particular context?

**Sources for data collection**
For this question the following sources are to be consulted:
- Review of the information collected during interviews with the SPO and outside resource persons
- The 2012 Theory of Change
- Interview with the CFA liaison officer of the SPO;
• Review of reports, i.e: the civil society policy document of the Dutch Alliance that was submitted for MFS II funding, relevant documents describing civil society for the MDG/ theme the SPO is working on in a given context.

3.4 Evaluation question 4, previously 5 - Factors explaining the findings

Evaluation question 4: What factors explain the findings drawn from the questions above?

To answer this question we look into information available that:
• Highlight changes in the organisational capacity of the SPO
• Highlight changes in the relations between the SPO and the CFA
• Highlight changes in the context in which the SPO is operating and how this might affect positively or negatively its organisational capacity.

Sources for data collection
Sources of information to be consulted are:
• Project documents
• Communications between the CFA and the SPO
• Information already collected during the previous evaluation questions.

4. Analysis of findings

A qualitative software programme NVivo 10 (2010) was used to assist in organising and making sense of all data collected. Although the software cannot take over the task of qualitative data analysis, it does 1) improve transparency by creating a record of all steps taken, 2) organise the data and allow the evaluator to conduct a systematic analysis, 3) assist in identifying important themes that might otherwise be missed, and 4) reduce the danger of bias due to human cognitive limitations, compared to "intuitive data processing" (Sadler 1981). The qualitative data in the evaluation consisted of transcripts from semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions workshops, field notes from observation, and a range of documents available at the SPO or secondary information used to collect reference data and to obtain a better understanding of the context in which the CS component evolves.

To analyse this diverse collection of data, several analytical strategies are envisioned, specifically content analysis, discourse analysis, and thematic analysis. Although each of these strategies can be understood as a different lens through which to view the data, all will require a carefully developed and executed coding plan.

Data have been coded according to: standard civil society indicator; outcome included for in-depth contribution analysis; relevance, and; explaining factors.

This qualitative analysis will be supported by a limited amount of quantitative data largely arising from the score assigned by the evaluation team to each performance indicator described in the civil society scoring tool. Other quantitative data in this study are drawn information provided in background literature and organisational documents as well as the Social Network Analysis method.
5. Limitations to the methodology

5.1 General limitations with regards to the MFS II evaluation

The MFS II programme and CIVICUS

Although the MFS II programme stated that all proposals need to contribute to civil society strengthening in the South, mention was made of the use of the CIVICUS framework for monitoring purposes. The fact that civil society was to be integrated as one of the priority result areas next to that of organisational capacity and MDGs became only clear when the MoFA communicated its mandatory monitoring protocol. In consequence, civil society strengthening in the MFS II programmes submitted to the ministry is mainstreamed into different sub programmes, but not addressed as a separate entity. This late introduction of the Civil Society component also implies that project documents and progress reports to not make a distinction in MDG or theme components vs those of civil society strengthening, leaving the interpretation of what is a civil society intervention our outcome and what not to the interpretation of the evaluation team.

At the same time the evaluation team observes that SPOs and CFAs have started to incorporate the organisational capacity tool that is being used in the monitoring protocol in their own organisational assessment procedures. None of the SPOs is familiar with the CIVICUS framework and how it fits into their interventions.

Differences between CIVICUS and MFS II evaluation

CIVICUS developed a Civil Society Index that distinguishes 5 dimensions and for each of these a set of indicators has been developed. Based upon a variety of data collection methods, a validation team composed of civil society leaders provides the scores for the civil society index.

Major differences between the way the Civil Society Index is been used by CIVICUS and for this MFS II evaluation is the following:

1. CIVICUS defines its unit of analysis is terms of the civil society arena at national and/or subnational level and does not start from individual NGOs. The MFS II evaluation put the SPO in the middle of the civil society arena and then looked at organisations that receive support; organisations with which the SPO is collaborating. The civil society arena boundaries for the MFS II evaluation are the public or private sector organisations that the SPO relates to or whose policies and practices it aims to influence

2. The CIVICUS assessments are conducted by civil society members itself whereas the MFS II evaluation is by nature an external evaluation conducted by external researchers. CIVICUS assumes that its assessments, by organising them as a joint learning exercise, will introduce change that is however not planned. With the MFS II evaluation the focus was on the extent to which the interventions of the SPO impacted upon the civil society indicators.

3. CIVICUS has never used its civil society index as a tool to measure change over a number of years. Each assessment is a stand-alone exercise and no efforts are being made to compare indicators over time or to attribute changes in indicators to a number of organisations or external trends.

Dimensions and indicator choice

The CIVICUS dimensions in themselves are partially overlapping; the dimension ‘perception of impact’ for instance contains elements that relate to ‘civic engagement’ and to ‘level of organisation’. Similar overlap is occurring in the civil society scoring tool developed for this evaluation and which was highly oriented by a list of evaluation questions set by the commissioner of the evaluation.

Apart from the overlap, we observe that some of the standard indicators used for the civil society evaluation were not meaningful for the SPOs under evaluation. This applies for instance for the political

engagement indicator "How intense is your (individual staff or organisational) participation in locally-nationally elected bodies and/or sectoral user groups?"

Measuring change over a two-year period

The MFS II programme started its implementation in 2011 and it will finish in 2015, whereas its evaluation started mid-2012 and will end in the beginning of 2014. The period between the baseline and the end line measurement hardly covers 2 years in some cases. Civil society building and policy influence are considered the type of interventions that requires up to 10 years to reap significant results, especially when taking into account attitudes and behaviour. Apart from the fact that the baseline was done when MFS II was already operational in the field for some 1,5 years, some SPO interventions were a continuation of programmes designed under the MFS I programme, hence illustrating that the MFS II period is not a clear boundary. Contracts with other SPOs ended already in 2012, and practically coincided with the baseline assessment being conducted at the moment the relationship with the CFA had practically ended.

Aggregation of findings

Although working with standard indicators and assigning them scores creates expectations of findings being compared and aggregated at national and international level, this may lend itself to a quick but inaccurate assessment of change. Crude comparison between programs on the basis of findings is problematic, and risks being politically abused. The evaluation team has to guard against these abuses by ensuring the necessary modesty in extrapolating findings and drawing conclusions.

Linking the civil society component to the other components of the MFS II evaluation

The Theory of Change in the terms of reference assumes that CFAs are strengthening the organisational capacity of their partners, which is evaluated in the organisational capacity components, which then leads to impact upon MDGs or upon civil society. Because the evaluation methodology designed for both the organisational capacity and the civil society evaluation require considerable time investments of the SPOs, a deliberate choice was made not to include SPOs under the organisational capacity component in that of Civil Society. This may possibly hamper conclusions regarding the assumption of capacitated SPOs being able to impact upon civil society. However, where information is available and where it is relevant, the civil society component will address organisational capacity issues.

No such limitations were made with regards to SPOs in the MDG sample, however, apart from Indonesia; none of the SPOs in the civil society sample is also in that of MDG.

5.2 Limitations during baseline with regards to the methodology

A very important principle upon which this evaluation methodology is based is that of triangulation, which implies that different stakeholders and documents are consulted to obtain information about the same indicator from different perspectives. Based upon these multiple perspectives, a final score can be given on the same indicator which is more valid and credible.

For Indonesia this has not always been possible:

• For 7 out of 10 SPOs a Survey Monkey questionnaire was developed to assess the intensity of the interaction between stakeholders in the network. Out of 156 actors that were invited to fill in this 5 minute questionnaire, only 7 actors effectively filled in the questionnaire = 4.5 %. The online Social Network Analysis aims at having both the opinion of the SPO on the intensity of the interaction with another actor, as well as the opinion of the other actor for triangulation. Important reasons for not filling in this form are that actors in the network are not technology savvy, or that they have difficulties in accessing internet. Data obtained by survey monkey were not used in the baseline. Instead the evaluation team did a social network assessment during the baseline workshop with the SPO.

• With regards to filling in offline interview forms or answering questions during interviews a number of civil society actors did not want to score themselves because they do not benefit from the interventions of the MFS II projects. Having the scores of their own organisations will help to assess the wider
environment in which the SPO operates and possibly an impact of the SPO on other civil society organisations in 2014.

- With regards to public officials the evaluation team faced difficulties to have their opinions on a certain number of indicators such as perception of impact on policy influencing and relations between public organisations and civil society. Public officials fear that they will be quoted in the assessment, which may have repercussions for their position.

5.3 Experiences during end line from in-country teams - Indonesia

The in-country team experienced difficulties in working on the first evaluation question regarding changes in civil society. The team would have preferred a similar workshop as during the baseline that would recapitulate the essence of the CIVICUS model and the content of each standard indicator developed. Although some members of the in-country team were also involved in the 2012 base line assessment, they and their new colleagues experienced a kind of “CS dimension shock” when these topics were not addressed during the workshop, where a lot of time was spend to work on the second evaluation question on contribution. A guidance sent later in the year was helpful but came late according to the Indonesian team.

The many appendices prepared for data collection and meant as a step-wide approach for the end line study, sometimes became a burden and a limitation when applied directly in collecting data. Like mentioned for the baseline study the questions sometimes limited the probing for information. In addition, in-country team members had to deal with the “CS dimension shock”.

The organisation of the entire MFS II evaluation did provide very little opportunities for SPOs to engage with the evaluation and to feel concerned. For many of the SPOs the evaluation does not provide a strategic value in terms of drawing lessons. This lack of ownership is felt more strongly with those SPOs that already ended their contract with the Dutch MFS II organisation and with those SPOs that due to high staff turn overs were confronted with past tense issues that they did not experience.

Some of the SPOs simply didn’t care about the evaluation. This could have been anticipated if there had been a special workshop (for the directors, perhaps, and the CFAs) prior to the endline. Via such workshops, appointments and agreements could have been set, allowing the in-country teams to plan their time and schedule. What ended up happening was that many of the SPOs kept putting off appointments and this also affected the schedule of the team.

Many SPOs are unfamiliar with the CIVICUS framework and the in-country team tried to ease them into it by sending background information and the indicator questions regarding changes in civil society prior to the workshop. This was effective for some SPOs (Common Room, WARSII), but not very effective for LPPSLH, RUANGRUPA, and CRI. The latter three found it too difficult to answer these questions by themselves. Common Room, on the other hand dedicated a special discussion session to discuss the questions internally. The questions were however the same as those dealt with during the baseline and possibly high staff turnovers may also explain this “CS dimension shock”.

Fieldwork was sometimes inefficient since the in-country team assumed that each step (workshop, interview, drafting model of change, selecting outcome, finding evidences) would neatly fall into sequence and could be packed tightly within 4 or 5 days with strong commitment from the SPO. This often did not happen.
## Civil Society Scoring tool - baseline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Outcome domains</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>What are factors (strengths, weaknesses) that explain the current situation?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic engagement</td>
<td>Needs of marginalised groups</td>
<td>How does your organisation take the needs of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups into account in your planning, actions, activities, and/or strategies?</td>
<td>0 (Are NOT taken into account) 1 (Are POORLY taken into account) 2 (Are PARTLY taken into account) 3 (Are FULLY taken into account)</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Involvement of target groups</td>
<td>What is the level of participation of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups in the analysis, planning and evaluation of your activities?</td>
<td>They are INFORMED about on-going and/or new activities that you will implement They are CONSULTED by your organisation. You define the problems and provide the solutions. They CARRY OUT activities and/or form groups upon your request. They provide resources (time, land, labour) in return for your assistance (material and/or immaterial) They ANALYSE PROBLEMS AND FORMULATE IDEAS together with your organisation and/or take action independently from you.</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political engagement</td>
<td>How intense is your (individual staff or organisational) participation in locally-nationally elected bodies and/or sectoral user groups?</td>
<td>No participation You are occasionally CONSULTED by these bodies You are a member of these bodies. You attend meetings as a participant You are a member of these bodies. You are chairing these bodies or sub groups</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relations with other organisations</td>
<td>In the past 12 months what has been the most intensive interaction you had with other CSOs?</td>
<td>No interaction at all Networking - Cooperation: Inform each other; roles somewhat defined; all decisions made independently Coordination - Coalition: ideas and resources shared; roles defined and divided; all have a vote in decision making Collaboration: organisations belong to one system; mutual trust; consensus on all decisions.</td>
<td>Question not relevant, because .....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimension</td>
<td>Outcome domains</td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Statements</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Frequency of dialogue with closest CSO</td>
<td>In the past 12 months how many meetings did you have with the CSO that you have most intensive interaction with?</td>
<td>No interaction at all</td>
<td>Less than 2 times a year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Defending the interests of marginalised groups:</td>
<td>Which CSO are most effective in defending the interests of your target groups? In the past 12 months, how did you relate to those CSOs?</td>
<td>No interaction at all</td>
<td>Networking - Cooperation: Inform each other; roles somewhat defined; all decisions made independently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Composition of current financial resource base</td>
<td>How does your organisation finance institutional costs such as workshops of the General Assembly (if applicable); attendants to workshops of other CSOs; costs for organisational growth and/or networking?</td>
<td>Depends on 1 international donor</td>
<td>Depends on few financial sources: one fund cover(s) more than 75% of all costs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Practice of Values</td>
<td>Downward accountability</td>
<td>To what extent can mandatory social organs (steering committee, general assembly, internal auditing group) ask your executive leaders to be accountable to them?</td>
<td>(financial) information is made available and decisions are taken openly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Composition of social organs</td>
<td>What % of members of your mandatory social organs belong to the marginalised target groups you are working with/for?</td>
<td>Between 0-10 % of all members of the social organs</td>
<td>Between 11-30 % of all members of the social organs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimension</td>
<td>Outcome domains</td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Statements</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>External financial auditing</td>
<td>How regularly is your organisation audited externally?</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Perception of impact</td>
<td>Client satisfaction</td>
<td>What are the most important concerns of your target groups? How do your services take into account those important concerns?</td>
<td>Majority of target groups are NOT satisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Civil society impact.</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what impact did you have on building a strong civil society?</td>
<td>You have not undertaken any activities of this kind but there is no discernible impact</td>
<td>You have undertaken activities of this kind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Relation with public sector organisations</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with public sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations’ objectives?</td>
<td>No direct interaction</td>
<td>You have been invited by public sector organisations for sharing of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Relation with private sector organisations</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with private sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations’ perspective?</td>
<td>No direct interaction</td>
<td>You have been invited by private sector organisations for sharing of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations</td>
<td>How successful have you been in influencing public policies and practices in the past 2 years?</td>
<td>No activities developed in this area and without discernible impact</td>
<td>Some activities developed but without discernible impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimension</td>
<td>Outcome domains</td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Statements</td>
<td>What are factors (strengths, weaknesses) that explain the current situation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Influence upon private sector agencies’ policies, rules, regulations.</td>
<td>How successful have you been in influencing private sector policies and practices in the past 2 years?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In the past 2 years, how did your organisation cope with these changes in the context that may have been positive or negative consequences for civil society.</td>
<td>No analysis of the space and role of civil society has been done.</td>
<td>No activities developed in this area</td>
<td>Some activities developed but without discernible impact</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Environmental | Coping strategies | You are monitoring the space and role of civil society and analysing the consequences of changes in the context for your own activities. Examples are available. | You are involved in joint action to make context more favourable. Examples are available. | Question not relevant, because ..... |

Question not relevant, because.....
### Appendix 3  Civil Society Scores

This table presents the appreciation of the evaluation team regarding changes occurred for each indicator between 2012 and 2014 on a scale of -2 to +2

- 2 = Considerable deterioration  
- 1 = A slight deterioration  
0 = no change occurred, the situation is the same as in 2012  
+1 = slight improvement  
+2 = considerable improvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Change in the indicators in the 2012 – 2014 period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civic engagement</strong></td>
<td>1 Needs of marginalised groups</td>
<td>How does your organisation take the needs of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups into account in your planning, actions, activities, and/or strategies?</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Involvement of target groups</td>
<td>What is the level of participation of your beneficiaries/target groups, in particular marginalised groups in the analysis, planning and evaluation of your activities?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Political engagement</td>
<td>How intense is your (individual staff or organisational) participation in locally-nationally elected bodies and/or sectoral user groups?</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of organisation</strong></td>
<td>5 Relations with other organisations</td>
<td>In the past 12 months what has been the most intensive interaction you had with other CSOs?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 Frequency of dialogue with closest CSO</td>
<td>In the past 12 months how many meetings did you have with the CSO that you have most intensive interaction with?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 Defending the interests of marginalised groups</td>
<td>Which CSO are most effective in defending the interests of your target groups? In the past 12 months, how did you relate to those CSOs?</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 Composition current financial resource base</td>
<td>How does your organisation finance institutional costs such as workshops of the General Assembly (if applicable); attendance to workshops of other CSOs; costs for organisational growth and/or networking?</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Practice of Values</strong></td>
<td>8 Downward accountability</td>
<td>To what extent can mandatory social organs (steering committee, general assembly, internal auditing group) ask your executive leaders to be accountable to them?</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 Composition of social organs</td>
<td>What % of members of your mandatory social organs belong to the marginalised target groups you are working with/for?</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 External financial auditing</td>
<td>How regularly is your organisation audited externally?</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perception of impact</strong></td>
<td>11 Client satisfaction</td>
<td>What are the most important concerns of your target groups? How do your services take into account those important concerns?</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 Civil society impact</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what impact did you have on building a strong civil society?</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13Relation with public sector organisations.</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with public sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations’ objectives?</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td>Relation with private sector organisations</td>
<td>In the past 12 months, what interaction did you have with private sector organisations to realise your programme and organisations’ perspective?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td>Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations</td>
<td>How successful have you been in influencing public policies and practices in the past 2 years?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td>Influence upon private sector agencies’ policies, rules, regulations.</td>
<td>How successful have you been in influencing private sector policies and practices in the past 2 years?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
<td>Coping strategies</td>
<td>In the past 2 years, how did your organisation cope with these changes in the context that may have been positive or negative consequences for civil society.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 4  Changes in civil society indicators between 2012 and 2014

1  Civic Engagement

1.1  Needs of marginalised groups SPO

In early 2013, the frequency of programming had already dropped to once a week after FPU funding ended. Due to budget constraints there was also a reduction in crew members from 6 to 3. Fewer people and fewer segments of civil society have been reached through the Teen Voice program as the television and radio program ended in January 2014. When it was still being produced for mainstream media, Teen Voice was broadcast on 52 radio stations and 22 local television stations, as well as AORA TV, a subscription-based channel. According to the proposal submitted in early 2011, this program was expected to reach around a million radio listeners and 100,000 television viewers from various groups. Teens and also parents were expected to obtain information from this program, be it from direct listening, from the information passed on by their children or from media reporting the content of this program. In 2013, KBR68H reported that Teen Voice reached 770,000 youth listeners and 400,000 youth viewers. Teen Voice fell short of its radio target, but exceeded its television audience.

In 2012, Teen Voice expanded to online media with support from FPU, uploading content to internet platforms and social media. The program now only continues through an online format. Teen Voice moved from a Facebook group to a fan page (50,609 likes). Later Teen Voice was moved from its own web platform to the KBR68H portal (http://www.portalkbr.com/teenvoice/). Teen Voice’s own Twitter site has not grown significantly over the past year (from 889 in November 2013 to around 1,000 currently). But the number of Twitter followers of KBR68H has swelled to 64,900 followers. Teen Voice episodes were uploaded to YouTube, but viewership remains limited.

Although in terms of coverage and reach Teen Voice is decreasing, the coverage of KBR68H itself amongst a general population has increased according to published figures. Portalkbr.com receives about 5,839 unique visitors, 3,920 visitors per day, and 7,591 (1.30 per visitor) page views per day (Alexa Traffic Rank). This figure is higher compared with situation in March 2013 (1,000 visitors) as reported in FPU final report assessment. KBR68H’s social media (Twitter and Facebook) now has 64,900 followers. As of November 2014, KBR as a news agency serves some 900 stations in its network across the country, compared with 850 stations in 2012.

KBR does not have any age disaggregated information to show whether the audiences reached include teenagers and youth, and other more marginalized groups.

1.2  Involvement of target groups SPO

KBR68H’s target groups include network radio stations and teenage/youth audiences. Compared to the baseline, the situation in 2014 provides more opportunity for two-way interaction with target groups. This is mainly because of the move to online platforms where interaction is easier, and KBR68H’s ability to communicate with its network via satellite, providing opportunities for two-way communication. The establishment of a web portal and the use of social media both invite more interactive contact with listeners and viewers. More participation is encouraged by getting teenage youth involved through social media platforms.

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81 For an example of a video see: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YCYyfYzKbjA --with only 45 views by 16 November 2014.
viewers to check the portal, which has on-air materials, as well as other additional materials to be commented on by the viewers. This social media platform is able to give teenager viewers the opportunity to be reporters and to propose story ideas. The involvement of teenage reporters helps sharpen the story angle in terms of seeing the story through the eyes of the teenagers.

Aside from being a more efficient medium to promote involvement, the use of the internet, web portals and social media allows access to a wider audience. KBR expects this to propel the popularity of Teen Voice. Visitors to the KBR portal and social media can now receive Teen Voice updates.

1.3 Intensity of political engagement SPO

There is no evidence that KBR68H is more intensely politically engaged with elected agencies. However, some network journalists and local radios reported close relations with local parliament members in journalism relationship. In the workshop with the management, KBR68H claimed that they and their network radios have closer relations with political parties. This relation is one of mutual interest however: parliament members need media coverage and journalists needs news.

2 Level of Organisation

2.1 Relations with other organisations SPO

As a journalism agency, KBR68H’s relations with some 900 radios in their network and other CSOs did intensify, with a larger network. KBR68H’s journalists are organised in various networks/umbrella organisations. Examples of radio stations with which it is engaging are SONYA FM, GRESS FM, SP FM, PASPATI FM, KEI FM, SETIANADA FM, MAX FM, PIKON ANAI FM, SWARA ALAM FM, CHANDRA FM. Recently it expanded to partner with SMART FM. Apart from this, KBR68H continued to engage with a number CSOs for advocacy purposes or thematically. Some of these include AJI, WAHLI and ELSAM. CSOs utilize KBR68H’s online portal, providing comment and feedback to Twitter feeds for example.

However, on teens and youth, their relations with CSOs who have similar concerns are decreasing as the visibility of teen issues decreases as well. At global level, as reported by FPU in September 2013, KBR is a reliable and active member of Kids News Network:

- KBR has successfully pioneered in the creation of a KNN programme with two broadcast platforms - radio and television.
- KBR participated in both KNN Summits (2011, 2012) since they came on board;
- KBR contributes to WKN according to schedule;
- Teen Voice's editor in chief Fia Martaniah provided two weeks of training to NEFEJ, new KNN member in Nepal in 2012.

2.2 Frequency of dialogue with closest civil society organisation SPO

The collaboration between KBR68H and radio stations in its network is characterized by a demand-and supply relationship. As a news provider for its radio networks, KBR68H supplies content regularly to its members. With the launching of Portalkbr.com, there has been more frequent dialogue and exchange between KBR and its network. For instance, the radio networks and the portal have worked together on the design of the websites of their partners. The portal also allows radio partners to send information back to KBR68H more effectively. Right now, KBR68H distributes its radio content to its partners via satellite, but in the past, there has been no way for partners to return information back to KBR68H, apart from through the telephone. The portal acts as a hub, allowing radio partners to send back information daily and changing the nature of information flows, from being one-way to two-way (partner to KBR and KBR to partner).

It should be noted that radio stations in KBR's network are established as private sector agencies (PT), but they are the closest in nature to KBR itself. KBR also maintains relations with CSO affiliated with AJI and Tempo group, such as Komunitas Utan Kayu and Salihara. In addition, KBR has relations with international NGOs (Hivos, The Asia Foundation, Ford Foundation etc.) in promoting pluralism and freedom of expression as key elements of democracy. However, there is hard evidence showing that KBR’s involvement in this network has increased structured dialogue with these CSOs.

### 2.3 Defending the interests of marginalised groups SPO

As demonstrated in KBR’s Teen Voice proposal, KBR considers teenagers and youth to be marginalised groups in Indonesian media. Very few mainstream media outlets are available for this age bracket, and those that are tend to be of low quality. Through Teen Voice, KBR68H’s has brought teen voices into mainstream media through TV and radio shows. In addition, KBR branched out to social media as a means to engage youth. However, since the baseline KBR has been defending the interests of fewer people because of the closure of the Teen Voice program in 2014. While some of KBR’s initiatives still give space for teens to participate in radio, television, and social media, as well as in their portal (http://www.portalkbr.com/teenvoice/), the coverage of these marginalised groups is not monitored. The last data from KBR provided in their business plan (2013) state that overall Teen Voice reached 770,000 youth listeners and 400,000 viewers.

According to KBR staff one group that has been reached with the creation of the KBR portal are migrant workers in Malaysia. The portal allows them to stream content from the local radio stations of their choice. While this is relevant, the assumption can also be made that with the discontinuation of televised and radio broadcasted versions of Teen Voice, fewer rural teenagers are likely to be reached since television and radio is still more popular in urban areas.

### 2.4 Composition financial resource base SPO

In 2011, donor funds compromised 31 percent of KBR’s income. In 2014, this dropped to 10 percent. This suggests that KBR is more capable of diversifying its funding sources by mobilizing domestic funds and reaching out to commercial sponsors. It should be noted though that this cannot be attributed to KBR’s efforts alone as aid from development agencies in Indonesian has declined as a whole. Nonetheless, commercial funding constitutes 90 percent of KBR’s income. KBR68H has succeeded in diversifying its sources of financing. Private patrons and corporations support KRB through their CSR programs. Exxon Mobile and Astra, for example, sponsor talk shows on women’s issues. In addition, KBR generates revenues through advertising. KBR is looking at more creative ways to team up with other radio networks, which could be considered rivals as well, seeking areas of shared and mutual interest to expand its audience base. According to a recent report, “The most successful business model in the media to date has been developed by KBR68H, which attracted foreign partners to produce and distribute radio programs.” Open Society Foundations, who produced the report, credit KBR for being able to draw on inter-state market funding for their programs while at the same time maintaining their independence and quality. Other evidence, like outcome of the Teen Voice program which was discontinued, suggests that this resource base while improving, is still on shaky ground. KBR faced challenges in securing the sustainability of Teen Voice, and almost had to discontinue its award-winning program ‘Asia Calling’ as well.

KBR also continues to enjoy the support of international NGOs like Plan International, Ford Foundation and The Asia Foundation, but due to changes in donors’ communication strategy, support to KBR has decreased since the baseline. In 2014, most of programs from NGOs are in the forms of short-term programs. A number of ministries and sub-national government agencies also pay for the

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broadcasting of public service announcements on family planning, AIDS prevention, forest conservation and other issues.

3 Practice of Values

3.1 Downward accountability SPO

There is no change since the baseline on financial transparency. As a limited company under PT. Media Lintas Inti Nusantara, KBR68H follows strict regulations on financial audits set by the government. In this regard, the main audience for the financial report is the shareholders (Koperasi Utan Kayu, Yayasan ISAI, individuals and other institutions), although as a limited company, the public can access financial information through the ministry law and human rights.

With regards to the internal control system, there is no difference with the baseline. As a private sector organization, KBR68H’s internal control system strictly follows the commercial business standards. There are shareholders, a supervisory board, internal audits, etc. At least once a year there is a shareholders meeting to review the progress of KBR68H, examining both financial and programmatic progress. The board remains the same: representative from ISAI, Koperasi Utan Kayu and Mr. Gunawan Muhammad.

3.2 Composition of social organs SPO

There is no change in the organisation structure and as a limited company under PT. Media Lintas Inti Nusantara as the holding company, there are no people representing the beneficiaries (teen) or the marginalized groups as the shareholders. Composition of the shareholders remain the same i.e. Koperasi Utan Kayu, Yayasan ISAI, other institutions and minority individual shareholders.

3.3 External financial auditing SPO

In the in 2012-2014 period, there are no changes in the external auditing practices of the SPO. As a limited company under PT. Media Lintas Inti Nusantara, KBR68H follows strict regulations on financial audits set by the government. Their financial report is annually audited by an external auditor and 2013 audited financial report is available and seen by the evaluator.

4 Perception of Impact

4.1 Client satisfaction SPO

If we want to see whether there was a change in client satisfaction between 2012 and 2014, we need to see at two domains: 1) the network of radios that are clients of KBR68H as news provider and 2) the opinion of the children who were target audiences of Teen Voice.

In 2013, FPU commissioned a second audience survey to assess the opinions of target audiences of Teen Voice. The report found that overall children have positive opinions about Teen Voice television & radio programs. The majority enjoyed watching and listening to Teen Voice. However, many mentioned it was at times uninteresting. Three quarters of those surveyed said they learned from the television programs and 88% said they learned from radio programs. Almost all of children found Teen Voice (TV and radio) to be useful in their daily life, ex: learning and confidence building. Furthermore, the audience survey reported that a majority of children (81%) found content to be appropriate and not frightening. There is a split opinion about whether Teen Voice was sometimes boring: 17% said “yes”, 43% said “a little bit”, while 40% said “no”. For children in the TV group, Teen Voice has several advantages compared to the ‘normal’ news for adults: more fun (48%); more about children (23%), easier to understand (15%).
This evaluation did not conduct a similar audience survey like the one commissioned by FPU, so there is no statistically representative data to confirm whether there is a change between 2013 and 2014.

What we have is data from interviews with 3 former trainees and participants of Teen Voice. They reported high satisfaction of the Teen Voice program. Unlike other program, according to the respondents, Teen Voice did not exploit youth or teen, but instead was able to go beyond just providing a venue for the children by opening horizons for the participation of youth in media.

In terms of radio network, there is a rapid change in terms of number of network radio, from 7 radios in 2000, 600 radios in 2009 and at least 900 radios over Indonesia and 9 countries in Asia and Australia plus social media networks.\(^8^6\)

4.2 Civil society impact SPO

KBR68H’s contribution to civil society by design is indirect through independent journalism to support freedom of information. During period 2012-2014, there is no change in this modality. The program funded by FPU added components on teen issues and capacity building for local journalists. In general, the impact on civil society is more relevant to KBR68H as an organisation, rather than the Teen Voice program. In general, KBR68H has impact on civil society through the encouragement of democracy, tolerance and civic participation. KBR also contributes through the production and distribution of high-quality information disseminated throughout a network of local radio stations as well as for its promotion of professionalism in the media world.\(^8^7\)

4.3 Relation with public sector organisations SPO

There has been no change since the baseline. As a platform for public interaction, KBR68H considers public sector organisations (PSO) to be in various positions. First, PSOs are sources of information as well as recipients of information. The public is engaged through interactive dialogue episode in radio programs, for example. In a commercial relationship, PSOs are clients of KBR68H that pay for placing news, advertisements, or public service announcements in their program. Their clients are both national and sub-national government, such as the National Family Planning Coordinating Agency, Ombudsman Commission, National Law Commission, corporation PT. Pegadaian (Persero), Ministry of National Education, etc.

4.4 Relation with private sector agencies SPO

There is no change during the 2012-2014 period in terms of the nature and type of relationships with private sector agencies. KBR68H maintains a company-to-company relationship with private sector agencies, who are both clients (utilizing KBR’s services, such as advertising) and donors (through their corporate social responsibility programs). ASTRA, an Indonesian company and others (Danone, Coca Cola, Exxon Mobile) remain their clients in 2014.

With regards to KBR’s relations with other private sector agencies in the same field, more is mentioned under indicators 2.1 and 2.2. Also worth mentioning is the expansion of KBR68H’s audience reach which was a result of a new business partnership agreement signed with SmartFM in 2013, giving KBR a better footing in a number of major cities in Indonesia.

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4.5 Influence upon public policies, rules, regulations SPO

The role of KBR68H in influencing public policy remains the same as in 2012, i.e. indirect influence through setting the public discourse that later together with other factors cumulatively will build public pressure. In 2014, as in 2012, there is no mechanism to track KBR68H’s contribution to developing public pressure for policy change by reporting on “headline news” through their radio network. One recent example found was a 2013 Indonesian Civil Society Report on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). KBR articles posted on their website were cited as trusted news sources on events relating to religious discrimination. This suggests, that amongst Indonesian NGOs, they have become an important source of information. Any policy influence KBR has had in the past two years has been indirect.

4.6 Influence upon private sector agencies’ policies, rules, regulations SPO

KBR68H’s main target is freedom of information and private sector agencies’ policies are not their immediate target. They do not seek to influence the private sector although they wish to set an example amongst competitors of an independent company that adheres to democratic principles. This position has not changed since the baseline. Like in 2012, during 2013-2014 KBR has been strengthening their focus on environmental issues, continuing to cooperate with ASTRA and Green Radio to promote “green journalism”.

5 Civil Society context

5.1 Coping strategies

Indonesians have come to embrace social media. According to social media consultancy Socialbakers, some 7.6 million Indonesians joined Facebook in September 2014 alone. In this regard, KBR68H has kept abreast with the latest media developments and the pace its consumers have set, moving online and using their mobile phones at an increased frequency. The launching of PortalKBR.com since the baseline has been a strategic move. The portal is a logical development for the radio network. As the managing director, Tosca Santoso, explained, “All mainstream media need to think about the fundamental transition to digital media”. He believes that this is the next best step for KBR68H.

This social media boom has had a large impact on political and social issues. With regard to civil society dynamics, the transformation of KBR68H from mainstream radio to digital and social media can be seen as good coping strategy. When interviewed, Santoso stated that social media plays a supportive, rather than simply competitive, role with respect to traditional media. Social media can be used to increase the loyalty of radio listeners by reaching out to them, involving them in stories and engaging them. According to KBR’s management, social media allows them to reach out to people where terrestrial radio cannot reach, which speaks to the expanding footprint of mobile phone service in Indonesia.

The above situation is well recognised by KBR68H as an institution and the fact that KBR68H now is growing bigger in terms of number of staff and portfolio, we may say that institutionally, KBR68H can cope with the recent development in media and journalism arena. However, KBR has not yet capitalized on these developments to advance specific issues, like teenage voice and representation in the media. These concerns were also raised by FPU assessors (Chermene Fisser and Yvonne Pinxteren) who conducted an assessment of Teen Voice in August-September 2013. They noted that Teen Voice has not adequately coped with the financial and market challenges.

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