Global Climate Governance Beyond 2012


Architecture, Agency, and Adaptation

Frank Biermann IVM, VU University Amsterdam









Key research interest:

- Developing and assessing options for global climate governance in a long-term perspective.
- Building on current negotiations while researching underlying core dilemmas.
- Combining concrete policy advice with fundamental social science analysis.







Long-term Climate Governance: Where we come from ... COP15 COP25 COPENHAGEN COPENHAGEN





The Research Team

VU University Amsterdam. Institute for **Environmental Studies**

F. Biermann, P. Pattberg, H. van

Asselt

Tyndall Centre, U East Anglia

F Zelli et al

Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research

O. Edenhofer, C. Flachsland et al.

Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency

A. Hof, den Elzen et al.

TERI - The Energy and Resources Institute

N. Goel et al.

Center for International Climate and Environmental

G. Eskeland et al.

Research - Oslo **Lund** University

J. Stripple, K. Bäckstrand

Centre for European Policy Studies

C. Egenhofer et al.







Three Research Domains:

- **1. Architecture**: What architectures of long-term climate governance are likely to be most effective?
- 2. Agency: What is the relevance of non-state actors in a long-term climate governance system (including the role of market-based and private mechanisms)?
- 3. Adaptiveness: What mechanisms of global adaptation governance are likely to be most effective?










Three Assessment Methods:


- Policy Analysis legal, political and institutional analysis
- **2. Modelling** e.g., based on the FAIR or REMIND models
- 3. Participatory Methods: Workshops
 - 1. With trade community, on architecture
 - 2. With finance community, on agency/CDM
 - 3. With development community, on adaptation
 - 4. With decision-makers, in Brussels















Research Questions

- 1. What are the costs, or benefits, of different types of fragmentation?
- 2. What are political and legal solutions to emerging problems?







Advantages of Fragmentation:

- 1. Small-n agreements may be faster to negotiate
- 2. Small-n agreements may be easier to implement
- 3. Small-n agreements may be more progressive
- 4. Fragmentation allows for side payments (bilateral deals)
- 5. Fragmentation helps integration of nonstate actors
- 6. Fragmentation helps innovation through competition
- 7. Circumventing negotiation stalemates







Disadvantages of Fragmentation:

- 1. Serves particular interests
- 2. Increases bargaining power of larger countries
- 3. Favours short-term orientation
- 4. Undermines momentum for large-n deals
- 5. Reduces options for package deals
- 6. Complicates other inter-linkages
- 7. "Regulatory chaos" with no clear signals
- 8. Increases global negotiation costs







Overall conclusion here...

- Increasing fragmentation reduces effectiveness of the overall governance architecture.
- Negotiators should strive to minimise fragmentation by supporting a stable multilateral (or even "universal") governance architecture.







The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures: A Framework for Analysis

Frank Biermann, Philipp Pattberg, Harro van Asselt, and Fariborz Zelli

Introduction

Most research on global governance has focused either on theoretical accounts of the overall phenomenon or on empirical studies of distinct institutions to solve particular governance challenges. Only very recently have scholars begun to investigate the middle level, that is, larger systems of institutions and governance mechanisms in particular areas of world politics, which are sometimes referred to as regime complexes, clusters, or networks. In this article, we conceive of such clusters of norms, principles, regimes and other institutions as the "governance architecture" of an issue area. We focus our analysis on one aspect of global governance architecturers that, we argue, is turning into a major source of concern for observers and policy-makers alike: the "fragmentation" of governance in important issue areas of world politics. Our investigation is driven by an apparent lack of consensus in the academic literature on the consequences of fragmentation. In the different strands of academic research that we outline in this article, we find different predictions that range from a positive, affirmative assessment of fragmentation to a rather negative one.

A key example is global climate governance, where the advantages and dis-

. For valuable comments on previous versions of this research, we thank Steinar Andre cel Berk, Daniel Bodansky, Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, Dagmar Droogsma, Christiand, Nitu Goel, Auri Gupa, Alex Elsaeltine, Andries Irof, Mille Tuline, Willem Th Ierland, Norichika Kanie, Bo Kjellen, Eric Massey, Benito Miller, Lars Müller, Blerny, Sebastian Oberthur, Kare O'Neill, Woah Sakona, Johannes Striple, Simon Tay, Micl Jesworth, and Oran R. Young, as well as the three anonymous reviewers of GEP. This was not of the Eurocean research forcarm "Automation and Militation Strateles." S

ADAM Adaptation and Mitigation Strategies





More research on architecture

- "The consequences of a fragmented climate governance architecture: a policy appraisal"
- "Environmental effectiveness and economic consequences of fragmented versus universal regimes: what can we learn from model studies?"
- "Developing the international carbon market beyond 2012"
- "The overlap between the UN climate regime and the World Trade Organization: lessons for climate governance beyond 2012"
- "An architecture for long-term climate change North-South cooperation based on equity and common but differentiated responsibilities"
- "Shaping the architecture of future climate governance: perspectives from the South"







Second Research Domain: Agency Beyond the State IT'S TIME. BENEVA DIE ENERGY

Example:

Public-private partnerships as solution?

Some argue that partnerships are an <u>innovative</u> form of governance that addresses deficits of inter-state politics, such as

- Regulatory deficit
- Implementation deficit
- Participation deficits

Others see it as a problematic form of governance that

- Privileges more powerful actors, in particular "the North" and "big business"
- Consolidates the privatization of governance
- Reinforces dominant neo-liberal modes of globalization
- Lacks accountability







Demand or supply-driven?

In theory, partnerships fulfill implementation needs especially of developing countries.

In practice, most partnerships are not initiated by countries, but rather by

- international organisations (29%) and
- large transnational nongovernmental organisations (24%)
- OECD countries (22%)







By and large....

- Regulatory deficit partnerships are not predominantly active in areas where regulation is weak
- Implementation deficit partnerships are often underfinanced, with often few observable effects. Many appear to be nonexistent.
- Participation deficit many partnerships appear to reflect existing constellations of power and engagement. There is no predominant role of otherwise marginalised actors.







More research on agency


- Agency in global climate governance: setting the stage
- The role and relevance of networked climate governance
- Carbon market governance beyond the public-private divide
- A staged sectoral approach for climate mitigation
- Technological change and the role of non-state actors











Climate refugees are defined here....

.... People who have to leave their habitat, immediately or in the near future, because of sudden or gradual alterations in their natural environment related to at least one of three impacts of climate change: sea-level rise, extreme weather events, and drought and water scarcity.







Predictions and presumptions

- 50 million in 2010 according to UN climate secretariat
- 200-250 million by 2050 according to Myers
- "Hundreds of millions" according to Stern Report "even though not tested"
- 300 million flooded each year by 3-4 degree temp incr.
- 1 billion according to Christian Aid
- 12 million from Egypt by 2050
- 250 million at high risk in Ganges Brahmaput
- Etc.







The Current System – the UNHCR

- The 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees – and the UNHCR – protect individual refugees who flee their country because of state-led persecution.
 - not per se climate refugees
- Shall the Geneva Convention be amended?
 - Political feasibility uncertain
 - Effectiveness doubtful given character of UNHCR
 - Impact on existing political refugees possibly negative







Governing the Future Climate Refugee Crisis

Three questions need to be addressed:

- 1. What are the core governance principles?
- 2. What is the best institutional and organisational setting?
- 3. Who will pay the bill?







Possible Solution...

Legally binding agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change:


Protocol on Recognition, Protection, and **Resettlement of Climate Refugees**

- The agreement would provide for:
 - Decision-making procedure on determination of local populations affected by severe climate change damages (e.g., islands, low-lying regions)
 - Decision-making procedure on international cooperation, including funding
 - Respect of national sovereignty









Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees







More research on adaptation

- "Global adaptation governance: setting the stage"
- "Costs, benefits and interlinkages between adaptation and mitigation"
- "Global adaptation governance: the case of protecting climate refugees"
- "Global adaptation governance beyond 2012: developing country perspectives"
- "Shaping future adaptation governance: perspectives from the poorest of the poor"









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