



HUMANITARIAN ARENA IN MALI

a case study about the coordination structure and influence of the UN
integrated mission on the humanitarian arena in Mali

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~

“Are you going to Mali to investigate the cooperation between MINUSMA and NGOs? Oh well, there are no problems between them, everything is running smooth and well”

Employee of a ministry in a donor country

~

“You came to Mali to investigate the cooperation between all actors in the humanitarian arena? Oh well, that is a hell of a job, good luck with that, there is almost no cooperation!”

Almost everybody in Mali when I told them about this research

~

FOREWORD

This thesis is the result of a qualitative research based on four months of fieldwork in Bamako, the capital of Mali (June – October 2014). It has been performed as part of the master program International Development Studies of Wageningen University and Research Centre in The Netherlands. This research is supervised by Assistant Professor Bram Jansen, working for the Sociology of Development and Change Group. Local support was provided by the Dutch NGO SPARK, under the supervision of Ruud van Soelen, Country Manager.

This thesis could not have been completed with the help, commitment and support of different people. First of all, I would like to thank all people I interviewed, for the information they shared with me and the insights they gave me in the humanitarian arena. Their knowledge and opinions form the basis of this thesis. I want to thank them for their time, their openness and their honesty. I would also like to thank my supervisor of the university, Bram Jansen, for his cooperation and assistance. He gave me new insights in the theme and showed me other ways to approach the subject. Furthermore, I would like to thank my supervisor in Bamako, Ruud van Soelen, for his support in the first weeks of my fieldwork. He introduced me to colleagues, explained the context analysis of the country and helped me construct my own network. Without his confidence in this research, it would have never been conducted. Finally I would like to thank my family and friends, both in Bamako and in the Netherlands, who were always interested in the progress of this research and willing to discuss new findings. *Initié!*

All pictures on the front pages of the different chapters were taken during my fieldwork in Mali. Each picture refers to the content of the following chapter and is accompanied by a quote. Herewith, I hope to bring the reader with me to Mali and to give them more insight in what it is like to live and work in this place.

I hope you have a pleasant read,

Jopy Willems

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SUMMARY

Mali has a long history of different natural and political crises. Several cross-border problems have fuelled the internal instability of the country. Already since the 1970's, various NGOs and international institutes have been interfering in the country and have tried to improve governmental institutes, the level of education and healthcare. The events of 2012 – the civil war, the coup d'état and the declaration of the independent state of Azawad – formed the basis for a large-scale international intervention. Requested by the local government, the UN started the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in July 2013.

The goal of this research project is to find out how the involved actors think about the coordination structure and what the influence of the United Nations Integrated Mission is on the actors already present in the humanitarian field in Mali. This research provides an insight in the coordination structure of Mali and the discourses and perceptions the different actors have on each other's mandate, the reconstruction of the country and the humanitarian arena. Why and how have these different discourses arisen? The following research questions is answered in this thesis: **How do the different perceptions of actors in the humanitarian arena in Mali influence the coordination structure?** This study is an exploratory and descriptive research and makes use of qualitative data collection methods. During a period of four months fieldwork in Mali, 38 interviews with several employees working for the UN, NGOs, donor organisations and the National Civil Society have been conducted.

The situation in Mali could be described as a 'complex political emergency' and fits within the worldwide War on Terror. The conflict is trans-boundary and does not have a clear beginning, it is a process of years of social change. Different armed groups try to ensure local control with the use of extreme violence; not only against the state, but also against civilians. After the events in spring 2012 the western world and especially France and the United Nations framed the Jihadists in north Mali as an international threat; not only for the security and stability in the West-African region, but also to Europe and the rest of the world. The current phase of reconstruction could be described as a continuous cycle of periods of stability alternated with periods of violence. Reconstruction is a process focusing on five different domains (physical, safety, politics, social and economic) that are considered equally important by the main actors. The discussions with the interviewees showed that they have different explanations for the key problems in the country, which is linked again to the different perceptions they have about the reconstruction phase, the root causes of the conflict and the formation of the humanitarian arena. The humanitarian arena is a place where the conditions and practices of aid are being framed through negotiations. Especially since the arrival of the UN Integrated Mission, the arena has changed enormously. Several NGOs decided to launch new programs and various donors released new funds. As such, the MINUSMA mission has had and still has an important influence on the composition of the humanitarian arena and the coordination structure.

The six most important actors in the humanitarian arena in Mali are the UN (both the UN agencies and the MINUSMA mission), international NGOs, donors, National Civil Society (local actors such as religious leaders, local NGOs and local entrepreneurs), the government and the International Private Sector (multinationals). Together they are responsible for the reconstruction and the way aid is given to the country. Coordination in the arena takes place in different forms: between solely civil actors, between civil and military actors and between different UN entities (in the Integrated Mission – the 'one UN approach'). All these actors have a different Code of Conduct, have another application of the Humanitarian Principles (neutrality, independence, humanity and impartiality) and have a different focus on security. While NGOs focus more on the needs and wellbeing of the civilians (Human Security), the UN has a dual focus. They prioritize the security of the state (State Security) through their peace negotiations and the strengthening of state institutions, but at the same time the civil UN actors focus on Human Security, due to their focus on human rights, protection of civilians and support for humanitarian assistance. This difference in the focus on State Security and Human Security

does not hinder the coordination; all actors agree that different mandates can complement each other, as long as there is mutual respect, understanding and openness. On the other hand, a mismatch in expectations does impede the coordination between different actors. The expectations the humanitarian actors have from each other do not always meet the perceptions they have about their own roles; there is sometimes a mismatch or displeasure about the work other humanitarian actors in the arena do. Especially in the case of the MINUSMA mission, the expectations do not meet the actual implementation of the mandate. The humanitarian community expects that MINUSMA is mainly engaged in ensuring safety and does not engage with humanitarian programs, while their mandate is actually much broader. Besides the different mandates, the personalities of the involved employees influence the coordination structure as well. Due to large differences in rotation speed, personal commitment, experience, background, education or individual ideas between the two parties, topics like partnerships and coordination are influenced.

Because of the important role MINUSMA plays in the arena, the knowledge gap concerning their mandate is a serious disadvantage for the continuation of the work and the coordination between different actors in the arena. Such coordination is important to prevent duplication of programs, to strive for a sustainable continuation of the programs, to ensure personal development and to exchange experience and knowledge. On the other hand, coordination brings some risk to the involved actors. An important disadvantage is the possible blurring of lines, whereby humanitarian actors are mistaken for military contingents by the local population.

There are many prejudices about the extent of coordination in the humanitarian arena. During several interviews, respondents expressed their disappointment about the way different organisations interact. Especially between civil and military actors, coordination is difficult and sensitive. There is acceptance for each other's presence, but the way of coordination could be best described as 'co-existence'. Civil actors themselves, on the other hand, coordinate a lot together. But although information is exchanged, cooperation (the implementation of projects together) hardly occurs. Even though the coordination between MINUSMA and civil actors has already improved since the start of the mission in July 2013, some further improvements are necessary. To make the coordination structure in the country more effective, it is necessary to create more transparency in the arena. When there is more openness and understanding about the individual goals and mandates, more respect will be created and it would be easier to find linkages to coordinate. Interviewees argued it is not wrong to have different perceptions about the reconstruction phase, the humanitarian arena or the coordination structure, as long as there is clarity about the individual mandates and as long as the involved actors can see the added values of each actor.

To conclude, the prejudices, the different perceptions and the knowledge gap concerning the mandates influence the way actors in the arena coordinate. Due to ignorance and a mismatch in expectations, actors sometimes do not understand each other and get disappointed. Since the UN Integrated Mission arrived in Mali, the humanitarian arena has changed enormously. Due to their power, funds and massive presence it is impossible to ignore them or coordinate without them. The concept of the 'one UN approach' has changed partnerships and made UN civil actors less neutral and independent. Although the coordination between the UN and humanitarian agencies has already improved since the start of the mission, some further improvements are necessary for a better continuation of the reconstruction phase and the work which is done in the humanitarian arena.

To fully understand the coordination structure and the influence of an UN Integrated Mission during a complex emergency, additional research is necessary. It is recommended to investigate the perceptions of the local people of the work the UN is doing in their country to be able to adapt the mission more to the needs. The involvement of the International Private Sector should be investigated more as well, to be able to find out their added value in the reconstruction phase and the humanitarian arena.

SOMMAIRE

Le Mali connaît une longue histoire de crises variées, politiques ou naturelles. Plusieurs problèmes transfrontaliers ont nourri l'instabilité interne du pays. Déjà, depuis les années 70, plusieurs ONGs et institutions internationales ont interféré dans le pays et ont tenté d'améliorer les institutions gouvernementales, le niveau de l'éducation et l'accès aux soins. Les événements de 2012 - la guerre civile, le coup d'état et la déclaration de l'état indépendant d'Azawad - ont formé la base pour une intervention internationale de large envergure. Demandées par le gouvernement local, les Nations Unies ont commencé avec le MINUSMA (Mission Intégrée Multidimensionnelle de Stabilisation au Mali) en juillet 2013.

Le but de ce projet de recherche est de figurer quelle est l'influence de la mission intégrée des Nations Unies sur les acteurs déjà présents sur le champ humanitaire au Mali. Cette recherche fournit une vue d'ensemble de la structure de la coordination malienne, les discours et les perceptions que les différents acteurs ont les uns des autres, sur leurs mandats, sur la reconstruction du pays et sur l'arène humanitaire. Donc, la question de recherche à laquelle cette thèse tente de répondre est la suivante : **De quelle manière les différentes perceptions des acteurs de l'arène humanitaire influencent la structure de la coordination?** Cette étude est une recherche explicative et descriptive basée sur des méthodes de recherche et sur une collecte de données de qualité. Durant 4 mois de travail sur le terrain au Mali, 38 entretiens avec plusieurs employés travaillant pour les Nations Unies, les ONGs, organisations de dons et la Société Civile Nationale ont été réalisés.

La situation au Mali pourrait être décrite comme une « urgence politique complexe ». Le conflit est transfrontalier et n'a pas de commencement précis, il est le résultat d'années de mutations sociales. Le conflit au Mali rentre dans les critères de la guerre mondiale sur la terreur et la tendance à la sécurisation. Différents groupes armés essaient d'assurer un contrôle local en utilisant de l'extrême violence ; non seulement contre l'état, mais aussi envers les civils. La phase de reconstruction actuelle pourrait être décrite comme un cercle vicieux, où des périodes de stabilité alternent avec des périodes de violence. La reconstruction est en cours, concentrée sur cinq domaines différents (physique, sécuritaire, politique, social et économique), qui sont considérés comme étant d'importance égale par les acteurs principaux. Les discussions avec les gens interviewés ont montré qu'ils avaient des explications diverses quant aux problèmes clés de ce pays, en relation avec les perceptions très variées qu'ils ont de la phase de reconstruction, de l'origine du conflit et de la formation de l'arène humanitaire. L'arène humanitaire est un lieu où les conditions et pratiques de l'aide sont encadrées. C'est une communauté qui est en construction constante. Particulièrement depuis l'arrivée de la Mission intégrée des Nations Unies, l'Arène a énormément changé. Plusieurs ONGs ont décidé de lancer de nouveaux programmes et des donateurs variés ont libéré de nouveaux fonds. En tant que telle la mission MINUSMA a eu et a toujours une influence importante sur la composition de l'arène humanitaire et sur la structure de coordination. Grâce à leur place substantielle dans l'arène, il est impossible pour les autres institutions de les ignorer.

Les 6 plus grands acteurs de l'arène humanitaire au Mali sont les Nations Unies (agences ET mission MINUSMA), les ONGs internationales, les donateurs, la Société Civile Nationale (acteurs locaux tels que leaders religieux, NGOs locales, et entrepreneurs locaux), le gouvernement et le Secteur Privé International (multinationales). Ensemble, ils sont responsables de la reconstruction et de la façon dont l'aide est distribuée dans le pays. La coordination dans l'arène se passe entre tous ses acteurs sous différentes formes : entre acteurs civils uniquement, entre acteurs civils et militaires, et entre différentes entités des nations unies (dans la mission intégrée – « L'approche Nation Unies »). Tous ces acteurs ont un code de conduite différent, adhèrent à des principes humanitaires différents (neutralité, indépendance, humanité et impartialité) et ont tous un intérêt différent quant à la sécurité. Alors que les ONGs se concentrent plus sur les besoins et le bien-être des civils (Sécurité Humaine), les Nations Unies se concentrent et sur la Sécurité de l'Etat (via leurs négociations de paix,

et le renforcement des institutions d'état) et sur la Sécurité Humaine (les acteurs civils des Nations Unies donnent la priorité à la Sécurité Humaine de par le fait qu'ils se concentrent sur les droits de l'Homme, la protection des civils, et le soutien à l'assistance humanitaire). Cette différence d'intérêt pour la sécurité de l'état ou des civils entre les divers acteurs ne porte pas préjudice à la coordination; tous les acteurs sont d'accord que divers mandats peuvent se compléter les uns les autres, tant que les principes humanitaires sont tenus et tant que tout se fait dans le respect mutuel.

Cependant, des attentes mal calibrées empêchent la coordination entre les différents acteurs. Les attentes que les acteurs civils (tels que les ONGs et la Société Civile Nationale) ont envers eux-mêmes sont largement atteintes, mais, particulièrement dans le cas de la mission MINUSMA, les attentes n'atteignent pas l'implantation réelle du mandat. Les acteurs civils s'attendent à ce que MINUSMA soit principalement engagé dans la sécurité sans s'impliquer dans les programmes humanitaires, alors qu'en réalité leur mandat est bien plus large. Au-delà des différents mandats, les personnalités des employés concernées influencent la coordination de la structure. En raison de grandes différences au niveau de leur engagement personnel, de leur origine, leur éducation ou leurs idées personnelles, des sujets tels que les partenariats et la coordination sont influencés.

A cause du rôle important que joue MINUSMA dans l'arène, le manque de connaissances au sujet de leur mandat est un sérieux désavantage pour la continuité du travail et la coordination entre les différents acteurs dans l'arène. Une telle coordination est importante pour prévenir la duplication des programmes, mais aussi afin de se battre pour une continuité durable des programmes, pour faire en sorte d'assurer le développement personnel et pour échanger les expériences et le savoir. Cependant, la coordination génère des risques pour les acteurs impliqués. Un désavantage principal est la possibilité de rendre les limites floues, au point où les acteurs humanitaires sont confondus avec des contingents militaires par la population locale.

Il y a beaucoup de préjugés à propos de l'étendue de la coordination dans l'arène humanitaire. Pendant de nombreux entretiens, les personnes interrogées ont exprimé leur déception sur la façon dont différentes organisations interagissent. Particulièrement entre les acteurs civils et militaires, la coordination est difficile et sensible. Il y a une acceptation de la présence de l'autre, mais l'étendue de leur coordination pourrait être au mieux décrite comme une « coexistence ». D'autre part, les acteurs civils entre eux travaillent main dans la main. Mais, malgré le fait que les informations soient échangées, la coopération (l'implantation des projets ensemble) n'a pas lieu. Même si la coordination entre les Nations Unies et les acteurs civils s'est déjà améliorée depuis le début de la mission en juillet 2013, de nouvelles améliorations sont encore nécessaires. Afin de rendre la structure de la coordination dans le pays plus efficace, il est nécessaire de créer plus de transparence dans l'arène. Quand il y aura plus d'ouverture et de compréhension à propos des buts individuels et des mandats, générant ainsi plus de respect, il sera alors plus facile de trouver de meilleurs moyens de se coordonner. Les personnes interrogées ont argué que ce n'était pas une mauvaise chose d'avoir des perceptions et des points de vue différents et variés quant à la phase de reconstruction, tant qu'il y a de la clarté à propos des mandats de chacun et tant que les acteurs impliqués peuvent voir la valeur ajoutée de chacun.

Pour conclure, les préjugés, les perceptions différentes et le manque de connaissances à propos des mandats influencent la façon dont les acteurs dans l'arène se coordonnent.

À cause de l'ignorance et des attentes non calibrées, les acteurs parfois ne se comprennent pas les uns les autres et sont déçus. Depuis que la mission intégrée des Nations Unies est arrivée au Mali, l'arène humanitaire a énormément changé. Grâce à leur pouvoir, leurs fonds et leur présence massive, il est impossible de les ignorer ou de se coordonner sans eux. Malgré le fait que la coordination entre les Nations Unies et les acteurs civils se soit déjà améliorée depuis le début de la mission, de nouvelles améliorations sont encore nécessaires pour une meilleure communication dans la phase de reconstruction et pour le travail qui est effectué dans l'arène humanitaire.

Pour comprendre pleinement la structure de la coordination et l'influence de la mission intégrée des Nations unies dans une situation d'urgence complexe, des recherches supplémentaires sont nécessaires. Il est recommandé d'étudier la perception des habitants locaux à propos du travail des Nations Unies pour pouvoir mieux adapter la mission à leurs besoins. Aussi, l'implication du Secteur Privé International devrait être sujette à plus de recherches, afin de mettre à jour quelle est leur valeur ajoutée dans une phase de reconstruction et dans une arène humanitaire

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission to Mali
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
CCOE	Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence
CIMIC	Civil-Military Coordination
CS	Copenhagen School
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration of rebel groups
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
ECOWAS	Economic Community Of West African States
EFSA	Emergency Food Security Assessment
EUTM	European Union Training Mission in Mali
FONGIM	Forum des ONG Internationales au Mali
GTAH	Groupe Thématique Assistance Humanitaire
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HPG	Humanitarian Policy Group
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IFS	Integrated Strategic Framework
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
(i)NGO	(International) Non-Governmental Organisation
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MNLA	Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad
MUJAO	Mouvement pour l'Unité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
QIP	Quick Impact Project
RC	Residence Coordinator
SC	Security Council
SG	Secretary-General
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDSS	United Nations Department for Safety and Security
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WFP	World Food Program
WoT	War on Terror
e.a.	et alii = and others
i.a.	inter alia= among others

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1. CONTEXT ANALYSIS, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY



1. CONTEXT ANALYSIS, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY

“Are you going to Mali? Are you out of your mind?! That whole country has been in a war for decades! That place is so big and wild, if you get lost they will never find you again! There is fighting everywhere and even if you do not die in a fight, there is a high risk of getting Ebola or being kidnapped by Tuaregs! No, you better stay here safe with us and do not go to that third-world-place where there is no government, only hungry French-speaking people, wild animals and scary illnesses.” - People in the Netherlands when I told them about this fieldwork.

1.1. WHY THIS RESEARCH?

During a crisis or an emergency situation, sometimes already within a few hours, different actors come together at the disaster area and start with their relief assistance. Some of these actors are doing the same kind of work; they have the same focus and the same goal. Other actors have other long-term goals, but try to reach the same beneficiaries. Fact is, however, that all those actors are working in the same disaster field and have to deal with each other's existence.

The way the actors cooperate or coordinate together during an emergency situation interests me. During my internship at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Netherlands (August 2013 – January 2014), a number of crises have occurred. For example typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (November 2013), where different actors were present in the field within a few hours. Both military actors, NGOs, local institutes and different embassies started with the search for survivors and the first emergency aid to the beneficiaries. From our position in the Netherlands, it looked like all the actors joined their forces and started together with relief aid, without being worried about a blurring of lines or struggles about different mandates or humanitarian principles. At the same time, the MINUSMA mission to Mali had just started. I saw how policy makers tried to implement the Dutch 3D approach and I talked with NGOs about their ideas for the reconstruction of the country and their view on cooperation. I noticed that the drive to cooperate was there, but sometimes there was miscommunication or ignorance about each other's goals or intentions. People did not know how to fill in a partnership or what to expect from other organisations. In an early phase I already found out that the expectations from people working in the donor country were not meeting each other. Another complex factor, was that this was the first time many involved people had to deal with an integrated UN mission, and not everybody knew how this works and what this meant for their colleagues in the field. All those misperceptions, different expectations and ignorance together stimulated me to set up this research.

This research investigates the different perceptions of the involved actors in the humanitarian arena about the reconstruction of the country and the influence of the UN integrated mission. Do all actors describe the current state of reconstruction in the same way, do they all have the same desirable future in mind or are there different discourses amongst them and even more important, why do these discourses exist and arise? Besides, this research explores the coordination among the different actors. To what extent is there coordination or even cooperation in the arena? Is it important to all have the same desirable blueprints in mind in order to work together in the arena or can coordination also work if organisations have other ideals in mind? Also the changing context of the conflict is investigated. How does the more violent situation influence the humanitarian field and the relationships? Finally, what does the presence of the UN integrated mission mean for the other actors working in the field? All these questions together form the basis for this research.

The quotes on page ii perfectly represent the need for this research. Policy makers in the Western world think there are no problems in the coordination structure in the humanitarian arena in Mali, while almost everybody I met in Mali said there is no cooperation amongst the different actors in the arena. There are a lot of different perceptions between people working behind a desk and people working in the field themselves. This research gives people working in donor countries more insights in the coordination structure in the field and the different perceptions that prevail and at the same time

it will provide some recommendations for people who are already present in the field. The exact research questions and the knowledge gap are explained more detailed in paragraph 1.3.

1.2. CONTEXT ANALYSIS

This paragraph gives a context analysis of the situation in Mali. Important historic events are explained to understand the present situation, the conflict and the need or desire to start a stabilisation mission. Besides, the establishment of the UN stabilisation mission is explained shortly. Figure 1 shows a map of the country and the most important places where will be referred back to in this research.

Figure 1: Map of Mali



Source: UNHCR (2013)

1.2.1. Context analysis

Historical overview

The country of Mali has a long history full of tensions and humanitarian problems. In the 19th century, Mali became a French colony. In 1960 the country became independent again, with Modibo Keita as the first president. Until the '90's, there was a coup, border fighting with Burkina Faso and elections. The period from 1992 – 2000 is marked as 'democracy'. Although some people were killed due to fights in the North, it was a quite calm and peaceful period marked with a peace agreement with the Tuareg in 1995, which led to the return of thousands of refugees. The beginning of the new millennium started with the election of Touré as the new president (April 2002). However, already a few months later the government resigned, without public explanation. The new government was unveiled in October 2002. In the following years, there were again some fights between different rival Muslim groups. In June 2006 the government signed a peace deal with Tuareg rebels, seeking greater autonomy for their northern desert region. However, the peace did not last long; the following five years were dominated by rebel activity. Tuareg rebels abducted and killed several soldiers and civilians.¹⁻²

¹ BBC News (2013), Mali Profile, Timeline

² Missie Mali (2015b)

In April 2010 Mali, Algeria, Mauritania and Niger set up a joint command to tackle down the threat of terrorism. Just two years later (March 2012), after the flee of civilians to Mauritania due to new Tuareg attacks, the military officers deposed President Touré, accusing him of failing to deal effectively with the Tuareg rebellion. In this same month the African Union suspended Mali. A few weeks later, the Tuareg rebels took control of northern Mali and declared independence. At the same time, the military handed over power to a civilian interim government, led by President Traoré. His power did not last long: on March 22 of the year 2012 some protesters stormed the presidential compound and beat Traoré unconscious; a coup was committed. A few days later, the Tuareg MNLA and Islamist Ansar al-Dine rebel groups merged and declared northern Mali to be an Islamic state: Azawad. They also started to impose Islamic law in Timbuktu. In the summer of 2012, Ansar al-Dine and its ally al-Qaeda captured the main northern cities of Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao. They began to destroy many Muslim shrines and cultural heritage. In the same time, Prime Minister Diarra formed a new government in order to satisfy regional demands for a transition from military-dominated rule. The following few months the Islamic rebels consolidated their hold on the north. They crossed into the central part of Mali and came closer to the government-held south-west. In November 2012, ECOWAS (Economic Community Of West African States) agreed on a coordinated military expedition to recapture the North, with the help of the UN and the African Union. One month later, Prime Minister Diarra resigned, under pressure from army leaders who opposed plans for ECOWAS military intervention. President Traoré appointed a presidential official, Django Sissoko, to succeed him. The UN and USA threatened sanctions. The period of 2012 (with the coup d'état as the start) – 2013 (till Operation Serval started) is considered a civil war. Thousands of people have fled from the northern areas to neighbouring countries and Amnesty declared this period as “the worst humanitarian crisis in Mali since 20 years”.³⁻⁴

In the year 2013, the French intervention ‘Operation Serval’ started. In January of that year, President Traoré asked France for help. French troops rapidly captured Gao and Timbuktu and at the end of the month they entered Kidal, the last major rebel-held town. European countries pledged to help retrain the Malian army. In April, France begun with a withdrawal of their troops. On April 25, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2100, in which was decided that a UN stabilisation mission would take over the duties of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) from July 1 - 2013 onwards. This UN stabilisation mission is called ‘United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali’, and will be referred to as ‘MINUSMA’ in the rest of this research. In May, an international conference pledged four billion dollar to help rebuild Mali. One month later the government signed a peace deal with Tuareg nationalist rebels to pave way for elections. Rebels agreed to hand over the northern town of Kidal that they captured after French troops forced out Islamists in January. In summer 2013, Keita won the presidential elections and the situation seemed stable. However, in September the first clashes with Tuareg rebels since the signing of the peace accord in June occurred.⁵⁻⁶

In July 2014, peace negotiations started in Algeria. Several representatives from the Malian government and different rebel groups have since tried to find an outcome for the conflict and the violence. Until this moment no decisions have been made and no agreements have been signed. Since the beginning of 2015, the violence has intensified with different attacks on UN targets. The UN responded with several interferences during demonstrations and other forms of rebellion.⁷⁻⁸ On the first of August 2014 Operation Serval was replaced by Operation Barkhane, to fight Islamic rebels in

³ Balt (2014) Lecture at Webster University in Leiden, Friday February 21, 2014

⁴ Upact (2013)

⁵ Balt (2014) Lecture at Webster University in Leiden, Friday February 21, 2014

⁶ BBC News (2013), Mali Profile, Timeline

⁷ Upact (2013)

⁸ Missie Mali (2015b)

the entire Sahel region. This new operation is another example of an intervention which fits within the War on Terror.⁹

Cross border problems

As the short outline above explains, the current instability in the country is caused by several (cross border) factors. Not only did internal political problems create instability, the interference of neighbouring countries like Libya and Algeria aggravated the conflict as well. The unrest and tensions in neighbouring countries spread like an oil slick across the region and also influenced the situation in Mali. Due to the nomad lifestyle of the Tuareg, the smuggling of weapons and drugs has become easier. The northern part of the country forms a frequently used route to smuggle drugs from Southern America to Europe via Morocco.¹⁰

Besides the smuggle, the country has also faced some problems of droughts and related famine. In 2011, there has been a period of severe drought, which had decreased the agricultural production. This caused a food and nutrition crisis in 2012.¹¹ In July 2013 the WFP, FAO and 15 other partners conducted an Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA). This EFSA indicated that 75% of the households in the northern regions are food insecure or heavily dependent on food assistance. WFP estimates that in 2014, 1.5 million people will need food assistance.¹² Among others, this drought and food insecurity has forced many people to leave their areas of origin to more southern areas. However, the number of IDP's has been decreasing the last few years. In January 2015 there were 99.000 IDP's in the country and the hope is that the number will have decreased to 25.000 by December 2015.¹³

Donor darling

Since Mali's independence in 1960, the country has faced several political and natural crises. Periods of drought and famine were alternated with periods of civil unrest; a military coup and the proclamation of the independent state of Azawad. Due to the period of extreme drought at the beginning of the '70's, several NGOs started humanitarian assistance programs in the northern areas. Later on, these programs changed to more long term development programs, related to i.a. education, good governance and health care.¹⁴ Also, foreign governments provided development aid in the form of direct budget support. In the '90s Mali became the donor darling of the West. A lot of money, time and investments went to the country, in order to prevent the country from a collapse or a setback.¹⁵ Since 2011, the focus is more on humanitarian assistance again. Drought and conflicts have exacerbated food insecurity and other development needs. The UN estimated that in the beginning of 2014, 3.3 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance.¹⁶ To meet the needs of those vulnerable people, the country received 361 million dollar humanitarian funding in 2014. In 2013 this amount was 368 million dollars and in 2012 it was 213 million dollars.¹⁷

Rebel groups

As was explained in the previous paragraphs, different actors on different levels are involved in the conflict. The most important and most influencing rebel groups are the MNLA (Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad), AQIM (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), Ansar al-Dine and MUJAO (Mouvement pour l'Unité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest). The latter three groups are religious

⁹ The National Interest (2014)

¹⁰ Soumia Ait-Hida, Theo Brinkel (2011), p. 35

¹¹ WFP (2014)

¹² IRIN (2014)

¹³ UNHCR (2015)

¹⁴ Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (2008)


¹⁵ Balt (2012)

¹⁶ US AID (2015)

¹⁷ Financial Tracking Service (2015a)

coalitions, while the first mentioned group is fighting for freedom of the northern area. There are many more smaller groups, but these four groups have the most influence on the conflict.

Figure 2: Map of Azawad



Source: Political Geography Now (2012)

Figure 3: Living area Tuareg tribe



Source: Wikipedia (2014)

The MNLA is the most notorious rebel group and strives for independence of Azawad (figure 2). The movement was founded in October 2011 and is mainly represented by Tuareg. Its formation is a direct result of the civil war in Libya. During this war, Ghadaffi had approached the Tuareg to form an alliance (figure 3). After the fall of Ghadaffi in August 2011, the Tuareg refused to hand in their weapons again and used them to strive for their independent state Azawad.¹⁸ The Tuareg rebels frequently clash with Ansar al-Dine, AQIM and other Islamic groups in the region. Their strength is about 9.000 – 10.000 people.¹⁹

Ansar al-Dine is the second largest rebel group in the country. Ansar al-Dine means "helpers of the (Islamic) religion" or "defenders of the faith" and is a group of Islamic militants.²⁰ Ansar al-Dine is formed by a group of local Tuareg, Arabs and other local ethnic groups who do not want a separate sovereign entity but rather want to implement the Sharia law everywhere in Mali and across the Muslim world. Ansar al-Dine is based in the three main cities of the North: Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. They work closely together with the former president in trying to stop the Tuareg rebellions and kidnappings from AQIM. Ansar al-Dine avoids fights with the MNLA. Although they deny having any links with al-Qaeda, in practice there are many similarities and Ansar al-Dine makes it very easy for them (both al-Qaeda and AQIM) to operate in Mali.²¹

AQIM is part of al-Qaeda. They have their roots in the Algerian civil war of the '90s and are based in several countries in North-Africa. They were founded in 2003 and their members come mostly from Algeria and Mauritania. Their aim is to spread the Islamic law, as well as to liberate Malians from French colonial legacy. AQIM is responsible for drug trafficking and the kidnapping of more than 50 Western people (amongst others the Dutchman Sjaak Rijke, who was released on April 6 – 2015), with estimated earnings of 100 million dollars. Rumours has it that these hostage ransoms has been given to Malian officials while AQIM was given free rein in Tuareg areas. AQIM has helped Ansar al-Dine and

¹⁸ Permanece firme (2012)

¹⁹ Missie Mali (2015a)

²⁰ Wikipedia (2013a)

²¹ Al Jazeera (2013)

MUJAO to conquer the key northern cities in 2012. It is estimated that AQIM has about 4000 members.²² Their opponents are the MNLA and their allies are Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and MUJAO.²³

MUJAO is another group that is linked to al-Qaeda; they split off from AQIM in 2011 but do still work together closely with them. Just like Ansar al-Dine, they want to spread the Sharia law everywhere in the world. MUJAO is a strong opponent of the MNLA; they are very aggressive in attacking MNLA elements, as well as other Arab groups who strive for independence of North-Mali.²⁴

A more schematic timeline of the most important historic events can be found in appendix A.

1.2.2. Establishment of the MINUSMA mission

Establishment of the mission

As was already written in paragraph 1.2.1. and 1.2.2., the history of Mali contains many crises, with both political, security, socio-economic, humanitarian and human rights consequences. Due to these crises, the long-standing structural institutions are weak and there are huge differences between people in the north and people in the south. Hereby, the environmental degradation, climate change and economic shocks also play a role. The situation worsened in early 2012: several cities in the north were captured by rebel groups and there was a coup d'état on March 22. Following this coup, Said Djinnit (the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for West Africa), offered the Malian authorities the support of the UN. The Malian interim government agreed, and they asked the UN for help in rebuilding the capacity of the transitional authorities. This support was mainly focused on the areas of political negotiation, elections, governance, security sector reform and humanitarian assistance.²⁵

On January 11, 2013 "Operation Serval" started, led by France to assist the Malian Defence and security forces. This mission was based on the Security Council 2085 and had the aim to reconquer the occupied cities in the north. The mission's goal was to provide coordinated and coherent support to the ongoing political process and the security process, including support to the planning, deployment and operations of AFISMA. AFISMA was set up with the aim to contribute to the rebuilding of the capacity of the Malian Defence and Security Forces, support the government in trying to get in control of the rebel groups in the north and assist the authorities by creating a secure environment for the civilians, IDP's and refugees.²⁶ This mission was the precursor of the MINUSMA mission and still exist next to the MINUSMA mission, both mission have different goals.

During the first three months of 2013, a road map for transition was adopted by the UNSC. This roadmap contained two main points for the Transitional Government: the restoration of territorial integrity and the organisation of free and fair elections. This roadmap builds on Operation Serval and AFISMA with the aim to set free occupied areas from rebel groups in the north and to rebuild the territorial integrity of Mali. After a stable period mid-2013, the Malian interim President Traoré ask the UN for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force that could follow up AFISMA and the French intervention force. In April 2013, the UNSC adopted the Resolution 2100, in which it was decided that MINUSMA would take over control from AFISMA by July 1, 2013.²⁷ MINUSMA operates under a 'robust mandate', which means that all possible actions and means are allowed to achieve the goals. The military is also allowed to use force if the situation requires.²⁸ The view of employees of MINUSMA and the view of other actors in the arena on the stabilisation mission and its mandate are explained in chapter four.

²² Wikipedia (2013b)

²³ Missie Mali (2015a)

²⁴ Al Jazeera (2013)

²⁵ MINUSMA (2014), background

²⁶ MINUSMA (2014), background

²⁷ MINUSMA (2014), background


²⁸ Nilsson, C., K. Zetterlund (2014), p. 36

Mandate and goal

The mission of the United Nations in Mali is called MINUSMA: Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali and was started by request of the government. The mission was established on April 25, 2013 by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to carry out security-related tasks and support political processes. This mandate is described in the Resolution 2100.²⁹ The goal of the mission is to support the transnational government in Mali by stabilizing the country and implement a transitional roadmap. Hereby, there is a focus on major population centres and lines of communication, protecting civilians, human rights monitoring, the creation of conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and the return of displaced persons, the extension of State authority and the preparation of free, inclusive and peaceful elections. From the first of July 2013, MINUSMA took over control from the ECOWAS mission AFISMA.³⁰

The MINUSMA mission is an integrated mission, which means that there is integration with the other UN agencies present in the country. MINUSMA contains of three different pillars: the force, police and civil. Several countries are involved in different parts of the mission.³¹ Each country has its own tasks and is located in a different region of the country. For example, the Dutch are responsible for the gathering of intelligence and are located in Gao. Figure 4 gives an overview of several involved countries and their deployment areas.³²

Figure 4: Deployment areas of several countries involved in the MINUSMA mission



Source: OCHA (2015)

²⁹ United Nations Security Council (2013)

³⁰ MINUSMA (2014), background

³¹ Missie Mali (2015b)

³² UN OCHA (2015c)

1.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1.3.1. Goal, research questions and structure of the research

The goal of this research project is to find out what the perceptions of the involved actors are about the coordination structure in the humanitarian arena in Mali and how these different discourses have arisen. Important hereby is to find out what the influence of the United Nations integrated mission is on the arena. As the context analysis showed, Mali has a long history of humanitarian and political crises. Since the '70's, many humanitarian and development actors have been interfering in the country. Suddenly, they have to deal with the involvement of the UN stabilisation mission. What are the perceptions of the other actors on the sudden involvement of the UN? Does this presence influence the coordination structure and the way other actors can implement their programs? This research provides an insight in the coordination structure in the country and the discourses and perceptions the different actors have on topics as the reconstruction phase, the humanitarian arena and coordination. What do actors need to work together and how do they feel about working together? The perceptions of the different actors involved in the humanitarian arena are key in this research. The following research question is answered in this thesis: **How do the different perceptions of actors in the humanitarian arena in Mali influence the coordination structure?**

The following sub questions form the qualitative part of this research and provide a basis to answer the research question:

1. How do the different humanitarian actors in Mali describe the main problems in the country and what is their perception on the reconstruction phase and the humanitarian arena?

This sub question is answered in chapter three and forms an introduction to the empirical part of the research. The different perceptions of the involved actors on the reconstruction phase are clarified. The different discourses of the actors are key in answering this question.

2. What are the perceptions of the different actors on their own role in the humanitarian arena and to what extent does this meet the mutual expectations?

Chapter four describes the role of the six most important actors in the arena. By means of this sub question, an overview is given of the different expectations the actors have from each other and themselves. Additionally, the different perceptions about the integrated mission are covered.

3. How do the different actors in the humanitarian arena in Mali describe and value the coordination structure?

By answering this sub question in chapter five, the different forms of coordination and the view of the involved actors on it, are explained. This chapter will also give an insight in to what extent the presence of the integrated mission influences the coordination structure.

4. What is the added value of the involvement of the International Private Sector in the Malian humanitarian arena and what could be their future role?

This question forms a kind of encore to this research and is covered in chapter six. The possible involvement of the International Private Sector in future missions and especially during the coming years of reconstruction in Mali are described. The added value of the International Private Sector is examined, next to the perception from other actors in the arena regarding the International Private Sector. This chapter focusses only on the International Private Sector, the involvement of the local private sector is explained in paragraph 4.4 about the National Civil Society.

The first part of the research consist of the context analysis, the theoretical framework and the research design. The second part forms the empirical part of the research. As was explained above, chapter 3 till 6 all cover one sub-research question. This research will end with a conclusion that looks

back on the research question and gives some recommendations for future missions and future research.

1.3.2. Scientific and social relevance

This mission to Mali is one of the most well-known current missions. The mission is frequently shown in the media and receives a lot of international attention. In the Netherlands the mission plays an important role in everyday politics and civil society as well, due to the Dutch involvement in the mission and the fact that Mali is one of the fifteen Dutch partner countries. One of the last missions the Netherlands contributed to, were the missions to Uruzgan and Kunduz. However, these missions had a very different set up from this mission to Mali. In the 'Artikel 100 brief', which described the exact Dutch deployment, some lessons learned from the past are treated as well.³³ This research investigates, amongst others, to what extent the lessons learned from Afghanistan are applied to this situation.

Mali has already been a 'donor darling' for decades, and this mission emphasizes this even more. In the wake of the mission, many NGOs have scaled up their programs in the country. The concept of an integrated mission however is still quite new and not well-known amongst NGOs and other development actors on side. Their influence has not yet been studied extensively and it is uncertain what the UN presence will induce in the field. Some NGOs are renowned for their dogmatic approach and their fear of change and their reluctance to innovations. Inside the NGO world, it is not sure yet how actors will react to the presence of this integrated mission.

Besides the special attention for this integrated mission, the concept of civil-military coordination (CIMIC) got some increased attention too, not only from scientists but also from politicians, NGOs and military actors. More and more missions have an integrated approach and are based on the idea of civil-military coordination and more and more voices emphasize the importance of this cooperation. Additionally, the UN mission to Mali is based on an integrated approach and the coordination between civil and military actors. However, this coordination is not always based on theoretical research: the involved parties say that there is a lack of theoretical background for this cooperation. Most of the parties have the same goal, but follow different paths to reach this goal and adhere to other principles and Codes of Conducts. There is no joint analysis made, nobody knows exactly how the different parties are about to solve the problem. It is difficult to set up a cooperation, if there is uncertainty about the methods of other actors. Therefore it is important to create a common ground and explore what the collaboration could be based on and how integration exactly works.

This knowledge gap in the civil society could be linked to an academic research gap; there is a lack of scientific information about the application of the integrated approach in fragile states. Besides, there is also a lack in the available information about the involvement of the private sector in the integrated approach. At this moment, it is not common to ask the International Private Sector to join in a reconstruction phase. However, there has been an increase in voices pleading for their involvement; they say a mission can't not start up without their contribution anymore. The academic research gap could also be enlarged to a knowledge gap about the current state of coordination in the humanitarian arena in Mali. It is not sure how lessons learned from previous missions are applied to the coordination structure in Mali.

This research will fill in both the scientific and social knowledge gap. By investigating how the different actors would like to cooperate, how they feel about cooperation and what they need in order to cooperate, this research could give some recommendations for this mission and could, at the same time, form an inspiration for the design of future missions. Although it is just a case study, this research can be used to learn more about the integrated approach in fragile states and the


³³ Rijksoverheid (2013), Artikel 100 brief Mali

involvement of the private sector in future humanitarian crises and peacekeeping missions.

1.3.3. Conceptual model

The following conceptual model (figure 5) shows the conceptual design of this research and explains how the different concepts (assumptions, theories, knowledge gap and objectives) are related together.

Figure 5: Conceptual model



1.4. METHODOLOGY

The previous paragraph was about the *why* question; it has explained the need for this research by clarifying the scientific and social knowledge gap. This paragraph is about *how* the research has been done. The methodology explains the investigation methods and the choices made. The study population is illustrated and the ethical dilemmas and problems & limitations are explained.

1.4.1. Study design

Type

This study is a qualitative research because it forms an exploration of an action, rather than quantifying it. A qualitative research fits this study best, because the main purpose of this method is to

obtain an understanding of a particular phenomenon; in this case the coordination between different actors in the humanitarian arena in Mali. Another reason why this study design fits well is because it is necessary to outline an accurate picture of the situation, to draft a context analysis.

Qualitative research is a suitable design to reach depth and accuracy of natural occurring phenomena. It takes the context of a situation into account, which is especially important for this study.³⁴

This study forms a case study in the larger study to coordination structures during emergency situations in general. Due to time and money constraints, it is not possible to investigate the whole field of civil-military coordination processes in integrated missions. However, that would also be quite impossible because each situation asks for another approach: during each mission and each crisis coordination takes place in another way. A case study seeks to understand the context and applies an in-depth study which can give answers to the specific research questions.³⁵ This case study will describe *if* and *how* coordination takes place in Mali, what the influence of the integrated mission is and how the private sector could be involved. This case study can help during the evaluation of the mission and can also be of an added value to gain insights and start discussions already during the mission.

This study is an exploratory and descriptive research. As the mission is still in the start-up phase during the time of the fieldwork, there is not much to evaluate yet. Therefore, this research will focus on the knowledge gap about the application of the integrated approach in fragile states and their influence on the already present actors. The current consultation structure and dialogue is brought into chart and the different needs of the involved actors are examined.

Nature of data

The data used in this study is mainly derived from primary sources: interviews with people who work in the humanitarian arena. Secondary sources form an important source for this research as well; scientific theories give the researcher insight in CIMIC processes and integrated missions in general. Media items like newspapers, documentaries, internet sources and radio items are of interesting use to capture the general opinion about the mission in Mali in the politics and the civil society and to understand the current crisis. Together, the primary and secondary sources form the basis to answer the research question.

Data processing

Before the fieldwork started, the theoretical framework was written and a topic list for the interviews was made. During the fieldwork, all interviews were taped in order to be able to listen to them again. Already during the time of fieldwork, all the recorded interviews had been transcribed: written on paper word-by-word. Transcribing all the interviews enables the researcher to quickly look some parts up, but it also makes it easier for the researcher to not only see *what* people said, but also *how* they said something. What was their intonation, were there many silences? Did the interviewee contradict himself later on? All the transcripts were uploaded in Maxqda, a software program to analyse qualitative data. After the fieldwork was done and all the interviews were transcribed, a coding system was created (see appendix B). The codes and sub-codes together cover all the topics of the research. The four main codes each reflect one sub-research question and are discussed in chapter three till six. During writing the analysis chapters, some changes in the groupings have been made. Some extra sub-codes have been added and the fourth code (UN mission) is integrated under chapter four and five, and one of the former sub-codes of chapter four (International Private Sector) got more weight and was given a chapter for its own.

³⁴ Darke e.a. (1998), p. 275

³⁵ Boeije (2009), pp. 258

The quotes from the respondents are represented literatim in this report. This, in order to display their statements as clearly as possible, without an interpretation of the researcher. Sometimes, this creates a fuzzy line or the feeling that a sentence is not correct, but according to the researcher, all quotes are still understandable. Besides, all quotes are displayed anonymously, to guarantee the privacy of the respondents. This is explained furthermore in paragraph 1.3.3 - Ethical issues. Finally, the quotes from Dutch interviewees are displayed in Dutch in this thesis, to give the reader more insight in the background of the respondents. The quotes are also translated into English and can be found in appendix C.

1.4.2. Methods of data collection

Different ways of collecting data help to increase the validity and reliability of a study. By using multiple methods at the same time, it helps to get a better and more accurate overview of the situation. The two main data collection methods for this research are: literature study and interviews.

Literature study

To frame the research and gain more insight in the context and the crisis, a literature study has been done. Besides a study to the specific context of Mali, general processes have also been studied; like theories about securitization and human versus state security, for example. These theories have been used to be able to understand the current situation in Mali and to be able to place the current happenings in a wider context. Reports from the UN, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and several NGOs gave an insight to current processes and policy making and integrated missions and coordination structures in other countries. Several news items from international sources clarified the Malian conflict and the context. These diverse secondary sources have helped to understand the conflict and make comparisons with other conflicts and other missions worldwide.

The desk study was used throughout the whole process of writing this thesis. Before the fieldwork in Mali started it was used to gain more knowledge about the context and later it was used to broaden and deepen the understanding of the collected data and events that took place during the fieldwork, as well as to verify findings.

Interviews


** Background of the interviewees*

In-depth interviewing is a useful method to study people's perceptions and meanings about a certain topic. Although it costs a lot of time and effort, it is an important and useful tool to gain more insight about the topic. As a preparation for the field research in Mali, several interviews were conducted in the Netherlands. These interviews

were used to gain more understanding of the context, frame the research question and understand the social relevance of the research. Twelve people, working for different institutions, were interviewed about the current situation in Mali, the underlying causes of the conflict and their view on the integrated mission. Figure 6 gives more insight in the institutes where those people work.


Figure 6: Professional background of the interviewees in the Netherlands

BACKGROUND INTERVIEWEES IN THE NETHERLANDS



38 interviews have been conducted during the fieldwork in Mali. It has been strived to ensure an equal distribution between the different actors present in the arena. However, in practice this was difficult to carry out. The share of international NGOs in the humanitarian arena is much bigger than the number of donors, for example. Although the number of interviews is not equally shared amongst the different types of involved actors, all groups (except for the government and the International Private Sector) are represented in the list of respondents. The International Private Sector was hardly present in the country, therefore they were not interviewed. Because of the limited timeframe, attempts to get in contact with a government official have not been successful. Figure 7 gives an overview of the organisations the interviewees in Mali work for. People working for a research institute or a lobby organisation are labelled as 'others'.

Figure 7: Professional background of the interviewees in Mali



Another interesting fact is the ethical background of the respondents, which is displayed in figure 8. Because the country of origin of the researcher is the Netherlands, it was easy to find Dutch respondents to interview. However, this was not the main reason to decide to interview a person or not. The most important reason to interview someone was the organisation the person works for and the position he/she has within this organisation.

Finally, an overview of the gender of the respondents is shown in figure 9. Once again, respondents were not chosen because of their gender, but because of their professional background. However, it is interesting that the male are more represented in the interesting positions in the humanitarian arena.

Figure 8: Ethical background of the interviewees





Figure 9: Gender of the interviewees



** Place and setting where and how interviews took place*

The first interviews were arranged through contacts in the Netherlands. People who were interviewed in the Netherlands gave the contact details of their counterparts in Mali. Most of the time, these counterparts brought the researcher in contact again with their colleagues in Mali. Sometimes it was difficult to get in contact with a certain person, but with some determination the researcher ultimately did speak to everyone she wanted to speak with.

The interviews had a semi-structured form. The researcher did make use of a topic list, but let the interviewee mainly talk about the topics he or she found interesting (within the broader topic of integrated missions and coordination), because this also gave the researcher insight in the preferences of the interviewee and the things he focuses on.

All the interviews were conducted in the office of the respondent. According to the researcher, this did not influence the reliability of the respondents or the degree of openness. All respondents answered openly to the questions and did not hesitate to react on the questions. The decision to conduct the interviews in the office of the respondent was made to respond to the ethical dilemma of time. When conducting the interview at the office of the respondent, it would not cost them more time than necessary, so that a maximum amount of time could be spent on discussing the questions.

Observation

Beforehand, the researcher had the intention to attend meetings of different organisations and clusters, to get a general idea of the people who are involved in the arena and the way they coordinate. By attending those meetings as an observer, it would be interesting to see how people work together and who is and who is not joining. However, once in the field it turned out that all those meetings were strictly only open for employees of certain NGOs, it was not possible to join. With the exception of the Friday-morning meetings at UNDP, the researcher did not succeed to attend a cluster meeting. Although that is unfortunate, this had no influence on the conduct of the research.

1.4.3. Ethical issues

For this research, a number of general ethical issues have been taken into consideration. One of the most important ones lies in the field of privacy. The fact that a study like this makes what is said and done in the private sphere public through the final report, may cause some problems for the interviewees. Some people might see this as unethical, or at least something which has to be taken into account. The researcher has to think about the impact of disclosure of sensitive information. For some people or organisations, the impact can be huge and disastrous. The interviews used for this research are displayed anonymously, on request of the interviewees. All the quotes got a number (from X1 – X38) and some small information about the background of the interviewee is given, in relation to the importance according to the quote. For some quotes, it is interesting to know the exact position of the interviewee (for example if the interview was done with a general employee or with the head of the office). For others this did not matter very much.

The second dilemma is related to the level of credibility; you never know if people tell you the truth or not. Because you interview or observe people in your role as researcher, people may act different, because they do not want to share private or secret information with you. This dilemma could be overcome because the same questions are asked to different respondents. If one of the interviewees gives a totally different answer, which does not fit in the overall perception, the researcher asked more in-depth questions to find out where this different opinion came from.

The third dilemma is the situation that in such a fragile country you do not know if people really are who they say they are. There are stories of Tuareg rebels who try to infiltrate in the humanitarian world, to gain insights and information. Therefore, it is important that when you interview someone, you have to think of which information you want to share with your participants and which information you only use as background information for your own use. This latter dilemma did not occur during this fieldwork, because the researcher only interviewed people who were recommended by other interviewees. The humanitarian arena in Mali is quite small and has a 'small-culture', almost all respondents know the other organisations in the arena.

1.4.4. Problems and limitations

This paragraph will form a reflection to the methodology and explains some problems and limitations the researcher had to deal with during the fieldwork.

Validity

Validity refers to whether or not the research is distorted by systematic errors; it is about influencing the research. The validity is the extent to which a test measures what it should measure: did the researcher ask the right questions? If the researcher measures what he intends to measure, there is validity. There is an incorrect interpretation of the empirical data. Methodical justification plays an important role here. By justifying the possible choices to the fullest extent, researchers try to avoid subjectivity. Furthermore, it is important to conduct the interviews with an open mind, without any biases. However, no researcher can completely look objective at the research; he will always be partly led judging by past experience and value.³⁶

In this research, the validity is guaranteed by conducting multiple interviews with different people working for different institutions. In total 38 interviews are conducted and several people have been interviewed twice. During subsequent interviews, also information from previous interviews (with other people) was discussed, to try to view a subject from different angles. The researcher has also discussed the outcomes of the interviews (anonymously) with friends afterwards. These friends were also working for NGOs, MINUSMA or UN agencies and because of the informal setting it was easier to discuss the findings of the interviews with them. The outcomes of the interviews were also discussed with the interpreter, because he joined the researcher with several interviews and could help her in this way with creating linkages and comparisons between different interviews.

Reliability

Reliability is the degree to which a measurement is independent of coincidence. Reliability in qualitative research is difficult to achieve. In a qualitative research the researcher is dependent from observation and interviews, whereby it is difficult to not be influenced by your own opinion. A qualitative study can become reliable through triangulation. By triangulation, you are viewing a point from different perspectives; you use different ways of collecting data.³⁷

In the analysis part of this research, mainly interviews are used, and, to a lesser extent, documents, reports and news items. Hereby, the researcher is fully dependent of the interviewees and their reliability. You are never 100% sure if people tell the truth, although you can test this by asking them the same questions in another way or on another day or situation. Besides this, the researcher will ask the respondents for feedback after the interview. The interviewee will always get the possibility to add something or indicate that something is missing in the elaboration of the interview.

Local circumstances

Finally, some problems occurred because of local circumstances. Working in a fragile country is not the same as working behind a desk in the Netherlands, but although there have been some struggles, this did not influence the research in a negative way, it just created a challenge to look for other solutions.

First problem was the local language. Although the researcher took several classes before and during the fieldwork, her level of French was not fluently. However, after arrival it turned out that almost all NGO employees and people working for the UN spoke fluently English as well, so most of the interviews were conducted in English. For interviews with people active in the National Civil Society, use was made of an interpreter. This guy already had a long experience of translating from French to English for other researchers in the country. This turned out to be a great advantage, because he

³⁶ Boeije (2009), pp. 273-276

³⁷ Wetenschap.infonu.nl (2012)

could help the researcher with filling in some knowledge gaps about the civil society the political system in the country.

A second obstacle was the unsafe situation in the country. Although the capital Bamako is quite safe, it was not possible for the researcher to travel to northern places, due to security reasons. This was also an ethical dilemma, because for the research it would have been very interesting to visit the northern areas, but there was just no safe transport to go there. This was a pity, because most of the programs from NGOs or the UN are implemented in the north and it would have been of an added value to see by own eyes how these programs are implemented there and how the coordination takes places in these areas. However, this problem was overcome by asking the interviewees how they experienced the coordination structure in the north - because they all go there every now and then.

There were also some things which were identified as a possible problem beforehand, but they turned out to be not a problem at all after arriving. The fieldwork was done in the period June – October 2015, which includes both summer holidays and the Ramadan. However, none of the institutes were closed and all the people whom the researcher wanted to speak to were available for an interview. Another possible ethical dilemma was the time an interview will take from an employee. Working in a fragile state could be very hectic, chaotic and stressful. It may cost some extra time and effort to meet a student, without getting back a direct result of the interview. However, everybody the researcher wanted to talk to, was able and willing to talk to her; most of the time even within a few days. This was a great advantage which was not expected before.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK



2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

*“Les dimanches à Bamako c'est les jours de mariage
C'est les jours de mariage
Les djembés et les dununs résonnent partout
Les baras et les tamas résonnent partout
La kora et le n'goni sont aussi au rendez-vous
Les dimanche à Bamako c'est les jours de mariage”*

First couplet of the song ‘Dimanche à Bamako’ from the Malian artists Amadou & Mariam³⁸

2.1. HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES AND CODE OF CONDUCT

Within the world of humanitarian aid, there are four humanitarian principles (figure 10): Impartiality, Neutrality, Independence and Humanity. These principles were proclaimed in 1965 by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) during a conference in Vienna. Almost all humanitarian organisations stick to these four principles and implement their programs in line with these principles. The principles provide the basis for humanitarian action. They form a guideline in bringing aid to vulnerable people during a natural disaster or a complex emergency. The principles are founded by *“the desire to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found... to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being”*.³⁹ The Humanitarian Principles form a guideline for NGOs to implement their work. Because of their important role in the humanitarian arena, the Humanitarian Principles are explained here. This research will investigate to what extent the different Humanitarian Principles influence the coordination structure in the field.

Figure 10: Four Humanitarian Principles

Humanity	Neutrality	Impartiality	Independence
Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. The purpose of humanitarian action is to protect life and health and ensure respect for human beings.	Humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.	Humanitarian action must be carried out on the basis of need alone, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress and making no distinctions on the basis of nationality, race, gender, religious belief, class or political opinions.	Humanitarian action must be autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.

Source: UN OCHA (2012), *Humanitarian Principles*

In the beginning of the ‘90s there has been some concern about the quality of humanitarian aid. After joint evaluations, concern arose about the political abuse of humanitarian aid. There was more attention for the long-term effects of aid and the idea of do-no-harm, based on the experience that some forms of development and humanitarian work can harm the local structures and sometimes even fuel the conflict.⁴⁰ Some organisations embrace this idea as a fifth principle; the principle of do-no-harm. Humanitarian organisations must strive to ‘do no harm’ or to minimize the negative effect they may have while providing assistance during an emergency situation. To minimize possible longer-term harm, humanitarian organisations should provide assistance in ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term development.⁴¹

³⁸ This quote represents the attitude of the Malian population towards the crisis. Whatever happens in their country, if there is a period of violence or fragile stability, culture traditions will always continue. As Amadou & Mariam explain in their famous song, Sunday is the perfect day for a wedding and everywhere in town are amorous couples and their families celebrating the love, even during a crisis.

³⁹ International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (1997)

⁴⁰ Leader (2002)

⁴¹ UNICEF (2003), UNICEF’s Humanitarian Principles

The Code of Conduct for the ICRC and NGOs in disaster relief (text box 1) was developed in 1994. The Code of Conduct consists of ten – voluntary – points which all humanitarian actors should adhere to in their disaster response. It describes how humanitarian agencies should interact with donor governments, host governments and the UN system. It is a tool to monitor the standards of relief delivery. The founders of the Code of Conduct hope that all humanitarian actors worldwide will commit themselves to the code by signing it and holding to the principles in their programs.⁴²

Text box 1: Conduct of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Response Programs

1. The humanitarian imperative comes first.
2. Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone.
3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint.
4. We shall endeavor not to act as instruments of government foreign policy.
5. We shall respect culture and custom.
6. We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities.
7. Ways shall be found to involve program beneficiaries in the management of relief aid.
8. Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs.
9. We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources.
10. In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognize disaster victims as dignified human beings, not hopeless objects.

2.2. RECONSTRUCTION

‘Reconstruction’ is the effort from the outside world to help a certain country or area overcome a crisis, (civil) war or disaster. Reconstruction used to be an ordinary human activity - based on charity, but has changed to an explicit policy since World-War II. Reconstruction is a directed effort with support from outside, based on the idea that recovery is impossible without outside assistance. Most of the time, reconstruction takes place in the phase after a crisis. However, in many situations it is very indistinct when a crisis is exactly over.⁴³

The reconstruction of a country goes through several phases on the timeline: relief > rehabilitation > reconstruction > recovery > peacebuilding > development and, finally, stabilisation. In the timeline, steps forward are alternated with a step back sometimes. Not every phase lasts as long as the others. Each phase has its own characteristics and features. However, the different steps are connected through the five domains of reconstruction: social (peace building, reconciliation and conflict resolution), physical (reconstruction of the infrastructure), security (DDR & SSR, police reform), political (state building and political reform) and economic (macro-economic measures and socio-economic development). According to Barakat & Zyck (2009) the aim of reconstruction is “*to reactivate economic and social development and create a peaceful environment that will prevent a relapse*”. They emphasize that reconstruction is defined by its purpose: the re-activation of social and economic developments, the creation of a peaceful environment and preventing relapse.⁴⁴

The goal of reconstruction is to make the internal structures of the country stronger, to make them more independent and resilient. The original culture and institutes will not be forgotten, but will be made stronger. Reconstruction is therefore based on the idea of ‘building back better’. Reconstruction reflects ideas, ideologies and visions of the past and the desirable future. There are ‘blueprints’ for this

⁴² IFRC (2015)

⁴³ Barakat & Zyck (2009)

⁴⁴ Barakat & Zyck (2009)

desirable future. However, these blueprints are not made by a certain person or organisation, but are based on existing dogma's as democracy and decentralization.⁴⁵

During reconstruction, several questions must be asked: priority (what needs to be done first, where should the focus be on?), timing and sequencing (how much time is needed, in which order does the reconstruction has to take place?), levels (where does the reconstruction take place?) and interactions (what are the relations between the several domains?).⁴⁶ Not each organisation involved in the reconstruction of the country will answer these questions in the same way. It is possible that there are different blueprints for a desirable feature of the country.

Hilhorst said about reconstruction that it is important to distinguish between 'saving societies' and 'saving lives'; where lies the focus of the organisation? According to her, reconstruction is more ambitious than just guaranteeing survival. Reconstruction is not palliative but transformative. Reconstruction does not have a 'wait and see approach' but is active and focuses on preventing the country from a relapse and making institutions stronger to develop the country from the inside. Reconstruction focusses not mainly on the individual lives but on the (re-)creation of structures of society for a sustainable and stable situation.⁴⁷

2.3. SECURITY

2.3.1. Different kind of conflicts

Since a few decades, the nature of conflicts has changed; there has been a fundamental shift from 'the era of wars' to 'complex political emergencies'. This shift can be described as a shift from wars between states to conflicts within states. These contemporary conflicts do not have a clear beginning nor ending; they are a process of social change. Conflicts become more trans-boundary and complex.⁴⁸ Goodhand (1999) described there are three different kinds of conflicts: armed conflicts (parties on both sides resort to the use of violence); violent conflicts (similar to armed conflicts but may include one-sided violence) and constructive / peaceful conflicts (use of non-violent means to pursue competing interests). He also mentions the change from old to new wars, which is more detailed described by Mary Kaldor.⁴⁹ Table 1 describes the most important differences between the current complex emergencies and the previous wars.

The conflict in Mali can be described as a 'complex emergency' and conforms to the characteristics of a new war. The framework of this conflict is different from conflicts in the same region years ago. In this specific case, a new trend can be described: the exposure of civilians to extreme violence by armed rebel groups. The conflict does not have a clear beginning and the violence takes place on a lower scale; it is more towards the people instead of towards the state. In this way, armed groups try to ensure local control, to implement justice and they engage in not well-balanced warfare. The conflict does not only have a political basis, but is also formed by criminal reasons and a Jihadist ideology. The country has to deal with more than only conventional definitions. The dynamic of the conflict, shaped by interests and motives, can be described as 'hybrid', which is also in line with the global security concerns.⁵⁰ Finally, this conflict could be described as 'complex' because different groups are involved. As was already explained in the context analysis (chapter one): the conflict in Mali is multidimensional and has different root causes. Different actors are involved in the conflict, not only state actors but also different rebel groups are fighting for their wishes.

⁴⁵ Haar, G. van der (2012), Reconstruction, Models and Debates, Lecture at Wageningen University, September 6, 2012

⁴⁶ Barakat & Zyck (2009)

⁴⁷ Hilhorst (2008)

⁴⁸ Goodhand (1999), p. 23

⁴⁹ Kaldor (2005)

⁵⁰ Briscoe (2013a), pp. 1 - 2

Table 1: Characteristics of old and new wars

Characteristic	Old war / interstate war	New war / intrastate war
Nature and aim	Clear and fixed	Dynamic and subject to change. Not clearly centralized. Blurred and mixed characteristics.
Context	- Functioning public structures - War economy	- Failed states and fractured societies - Economy of violence
Main actors	States	State and non-state actors
Conflict parties	States	More and other stakeholders: variegated parties and temporary alliances
Warring parties	Regular armies	Warlords, militias, guerrilla movements, gangs
Warfare	Conventional	Non-conventional
Weaponry	Arms race	- Small arms - Proliferation
Course of conflict	Clear beginning and ending	Continuous situation of latent conflict without clear benchmarks or end-points
People related factors	Clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants	90% of the victims is civilian
International rules	War Law, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), Geneva Conventions	IHL, rules and conventions are ignored

Source: Goodhand (1999)

Since September 11, 2001, the world knows another kind of war: the “War on Terror” (WoT). The War on Terror could be described as a global campaign which contains military, political, security, diplomatic, economic and legislative strategies. The United States are the leading nation in this war, but are closely followed by other countries. The terrorist enemy is usually described as al-Qaeda or as ‘Islamic extremism’ in general. According to Newman (2012) however, giving a more accurate definition of the War on Terror is problematic, because: *“we encounter a major difficulty in separating its true meaning from its ideological connotations and political manipulations.”* Some people argue that the War on Terror is an ideology, or at least a political discourse, due to their huge influence on the international politics of the first part of the 21st century.⁵¹

Besides the argument that the conflict in Mali could be described as a complex emergency, the UN intervention also fits within the worldwide War on Terror. After the coup d’état in March 2012 and the declaration of the Islamic state Azawad, the western world and especially France began to frame the Jihadists in north Mali as an international threat; not only for the security of the West-African region, but also to Europe and the rest of the world. The intervention that has been started by France and was followed by the UN has a direct purpose to combat the Islamic powers.⁵²

Gutelius (2006 & 2007) even argued that the War on Terror in Mali and the broader Sahel region was already started by the USA in the year 2002. Since that year, the USA has provided the Malian government with troops, material and funding to combat the threat: the terrorist groups linked to al-Qaeda. According to the author the War on Terror has even fuelled the problems in the country: *“the way the USA has chosen to carry out the War on Terror in Mali has heightened regional tensions and widened pre-existing political and economic disparities.”*⁵³ As is shown in the historical timeline (appendix A), the years after the start of this War on Terror in the Sahel are known as a period of rebellion with a lot of civil unrest.

⁵¹ Newman (2012)

⁵² E-International Relations Students (2014)

⁵³ Gutelius (2006), pp. 38 - 39

2.3.2. Concept of Securitization

According to Renner, security is linked to the safety of the state. He also describes security as a process, not a fixed thing.⁵⁴ The broader concept of security is securitization, a concept which is developed and promoted by the Copenhagen School (CS). The Copenhagen School is a research institute who have their origin in the book *'People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations'* from Barry Buzan (first published in 1983).⁵⁵ According to the CS, securitization is a socially constructed concept, while Emmers explained that theories of security focus on the role of states in obtaining security. The CS argues that the concept of security can be defined by using five sectors: military, environmental, economic, societal and political. All these categories can form a security threat to the society. The Copenhagen School developed a method (securization model, text box 2) which can be used to justify extraordinary measures (measures beyond normal action in the political domain), taken to protect the population against a threat in one of these categories. This 'securitization model' is a five step method to examine how a specific event becomes securitized. It is a spectrum along which issues can be plotted.⁵⁶

The Copenhagen School claims that security should be seen as a speech act, whereby the question is not if the threat is real or not, but where there is a discussion about how certain measures (troop movement, migration etc.) can be socially constructed as a threat.⁵⁷ Important question hereby is also how the securitizing actors are convincing their audience.

Text box 2: Securitization model

1. *Existential threat*: what exactly is the threat?
2. *Securitizing actor*: these actors securitize something or someone as a threat; they portray issues, persons or identities as existential threats. Most of the time these actors are politicians, the government or activists.
3. *Referent objects*: who or what are under threat? Who or what needs to be protected?
4. *Relevant audience*: the public needs to be convinced of the danger. Only then can extraordinary measures, outside the realm of the usual political sphere, be imposed.
5. *Speech act*: the tool of persuasion. Starting point of the process of securitization.
6. *Means*. What means are used to tackle down the threat?

The theory of securitization can help to understand the international intervention in Mali. By applying the current situation to the securitization model, one will get more insight in the period of indicating the threat till the actual start of the mission. The existential threats are the growing Islamic powers in the country. The French Minister of Defence Jean-Yves le Drian explained this as: *"that a terrorist state will be created near Europe and France...we had to react before it was too late"*. The problem is that there is not enough safety and stabilisation, which needs to be re-established. The securitization actor is in the first place the Malian government, who asked for international help in January 2013. The Malian government was the first to frame the problem in the country and indicate the threat. On the other hand, the securitizing actor is also the UN, who started their stabilisation mission to bring peace and stability back to the country. The referent object can be seen as the 'collective identity', because the democratic norms and values are being suppressed by the Islamic rebel groups. The civilians need to be protected from the rebel groups. On the other hand, when viewing the UN intervention within the broader War on Terror, the referent object could be described as the western world, who needs to be protected from the growing Jihadist threat in the Sahel. The relevant audience who needs to be convinced by the securitizing actors is the UN; they needed to be convinced of the threat and understand the need to start a mission. Only with their agreement and support, extraordinary measures to overcome the threat are accepted and applied. However, in a broader sense both the international world but not in the last place also the Malian civilians needed to be convinced of the danger of this threat. If there is no public support for the means, the securitizing actors would face much counterforce. The speech act forms a discursive view on a certain issue. In this case, the

⁵⁴ Renner (2005)

⁵⁵ Sussle (2015)

⁵⁶ Emmers (2007)

⁵⁷ Munster (2012)

speech act is the way the conflict is portrayed in the (international) media. By focusing on the possible threat of terrorist attacks in Europa, politicians try to find understanding and approval for this mission. The UN mission can be described as the means to overcome this threat. Due to the UN intervention the country is now on top of the international political agenda, the process of securitization is complete.⁵⁸

However, there are also some critics about this theory of securitization. Stritzel (2007) confirms that the idea of securitization has been one of the most controversial contributions to new security theories since the 1990s. In his article he argues: *"rather than providing a consolidated position, the discourse on securitization has only just begun to transform the new idea into a more comprehensive security theory."* Stritzel pleads for a re-conceptualization of the current use of the concept of securitization. According to him, the definition of a speech act itself is too limited to study 'real-world' securitizations. In his view, the explanation of the CS about securitization processes is too narrow, they only view a single security situation at a particular point in time, without taking the entire social process into account.⁵⁹ Balzacq has some comments about the way the CS applies the speech act in the theory of securitization as well: *"I argue, however, that a speech act view of security does not provide adequate grounding upon which to examine security practices in 'real situations'."* According to him, securitization must comply three conditions: (i) an effective securitization is audience-centered; (ii) securitization is context-dependent; (iii) an effective securitization is power-laden.⁶⁰ By investigating how the securitization process works in the humanitarian field in Mali, this research hopes to contribute to a more general knowledge about how the tool of persuasion (the speech act) can influence the means (the UN mission).

The link between security and development is described by Duffield in several of his articles. This development-security nexus describes the interconnectedness between security and development in a conflict state. The concept indicates that security and development are connected in a reconstruction phase, since they are dependent on each other and have to deal with the same challenges. Economic and social development can be a safety-enhancing factor while, conversely, an improvement of the security situation can increase opportunities for development. According to him, the development-security nexus has attracted the interest of academic researchers, donors and other involved actors in the humanitarian field. This nexus describes the link, the relation between bringing development to a region and the securitization of a certain area.⁶¹

The relationships between development of a country and counter-terrorism has been studied by Briscoe (2013). In the past decade, there has only been a limited cooperation between the counter-terrorism community and the development sector. There has been a lot of distrust and civil-military exercises have caused some serious problems for humanitarian aid workers. Concerning the recent War on Terror, Briscoe has argued that there is a complex but important connection between political violence and socio-economic development. However, at the height of the War on Terror, there was almost no common ground shared between those actors trying to protect the Western security and the actors trying to bring development to a country.⁶²

2.3.3. Radicalisation of Aid

In line with the development of complex emergencies and the War on Terror is the development within the giving of aid. Duffield calls this the 'radicalisation of aid': since the Cold War, aid and politics are inseparably linked. Development has become a tool of conflict resolution and social reconstruction. Duffield sees aid as part of global governance. It is embodied in public and private

⁵⁸ E-International Relations Students (2014)

⁵⁹ Stritzel (2007), pp. 358 & 377-378

⁶⁰ Balzacq (2005), p. 171

⁶¹ Duffield (2010), pp. 54-56

⁶² Briscoe (2013b), p. 1-2

networks and brings together governments, UN agencies NGOs and private companies.⁶³ In the last few years, aid workers have increasingly often become the target of violence, death, kidnapping or serious injuries. Over the last decade, the number of incidents has more than tripled. Despite the danger of some situations, the aid industry is expanding, even within challenging political environments and dangerous security situations. Duffield gives two examples of the protection of aid workers: proliferation of field-security training among aid agencies (such as the NGO INSO is doing) and the bunkerization of aid.⁶⁴ To protect the aid workers from local threats, the process of 'bunkerization' is emerging. While in some cases this approach is needed to carry out the work, the aid workers also become more remote from the societies they work in.⁶⁵

This concept of 'bunkerization' is also visible in Mali. In the beginning, the Dutch military had planned to stay in tents. However, the threats increased, so after a few rocket attacks, the decision was made to replace the tents with containers, which are more strong and safe.⁶⁶ The situation in general for aid workers in the country is decreasing and becoming less safe. Five employees of the ICRC were kidnapped in February 2014⁶⁷, several UN soldiers have been killed due to rebel attacks and a popular restaurant for expats in Bamako has been attacked.⁶⁸

The development-security nexus affects the possible coordination between civil and military partners. Possible partnerships are influenced by the radicalisation of aid. This research investigates how different actors in the arena cope with security issues and the relation between security and development. As Duffield said: *"The current bunkering of the aid industry and increasing risk aversion on the part of aid workers, however, are more indicative of a deepening development–security impasse rather than a new beginning. (...) Development and liberalism are different but interconnected."*⁶⁹

2.4. HUMAN SECURITY VS STATE SECURITY

2.4.1. Definition of concepts

As was argued above, Renner said that security is linked to the safety of the state. Duffield (2006) would describe this as 'state security': *"giving priority to securitizing the state"*. The opposite of state security is human security, described by Duffield as: *"the widening of security concerns beyond those of states to include the needs and well-being of people"*. Human security gives priority to the security of people (individuals); it interconnects ideas of sustainable development and security. From this perspective, human security is a moral technology through which effective states are able to protect and strategize power. Within human security, the focus is on the welfare and well-being of people instead of defence of the borders and building military capacity. Human security approaches have to deal with concepts as poverty, displacement, HIV/AIDS, environmental problems, social exclusion etc. The concept of human security has grown since the post-Cold War period and has been affected by the War on Terror.⁷⁰

Duffield argues that there is a shifting focus of international security from states (state security) to the people living within them (human security).⁷¹ He also states that one of the consequences of putting human security in the middle of the development nexus, is that a process of re-territorialisation emerges. This process is exacerbated by the War on Terror and has an important impact on the role of NGOs. Duffield argues that due to this re-territorialisation, NGOs are transforming into auxiliaries of the State.⁷²

⁶³ Duffield (2002), pp. 1049 - 1050

⁶⁴ Duffield (2010), pp. 54-55

⁶⁵ Duffield (2012), pp. 475 & 484-485

⁶⁶ NOS (2014a)

⁶⁷ NOS (2014b)

⁶⁸ BBC News (2015)

⁶⁹ Duffield (2010), p. 54

⁷⁰ Duffield (2006), p. 1

⁷¹ Duffield (2010), p. 55

⁷² Duffield (2005a), p. 2-3

According to Frerks and Klein Goldewijk (2007), the strengths of the human security approach are the comprehensive and integrated security view. The human security approach interlinks different components of the security issue, which is an added value in the reconstruction process. The human security discourse has shown a positive effect and valuable prospects in the past. According to them, the concept needs to be upheld against a remilitarisation of the debate.⁷³

David Chandler (2008) describes human and state security as two totally different paradigms in the world of international relations and policy making. State security is based on states, interests and problem solving while human security deals with individuals, values and emancipatory theories. He describes human security as “*the dog that did not bark*” because the integration of human security in mainstream policy making has only reinforced existing policy frameworks, instead of challenging them. Since 9/11, and even more since the post-Cold War era, human security approaches have been easily integrated into mainstream policy making, but on the other side, it has had so little impact on policy outcomes.⁷⁴

2.4.2. Case of Mali

According to Peter Knoop (Director of the International Centre for Counter Terrorism), security is needed to increase stability. He explains that there is a worldwide clash between human security and state security. When looking to security, the viewpoint of the state is used most often. States are responsible for creating stability and security, so we need to secure and strengthen state institutions if we want to create stability. When the state is corrupt, if there is no state at all or when state representatives only focus on their own interests, it becomes important to involve the state in the process of securitization; so the focus is on state security. Human security however, is a totally different concept. To strengthen human security, you need to understand what people need to secure themselves. People have always taken care of their own security and especially for the situation in Mali it is very important to find out how people secured themselves in the past few years, and use this information to secure the people in the coming few years.⁷⁵

Knoop also made a link between Mali and Groningen. He explains that the same mixing up between different kinds of security now happens in Groningen, due to the earthquakes as a result of gas extraction. The inhabitants of Groningen focus on the damage on their own houses while the government focuses more on the state income; both are consequences of gas extraction in the soil. The Dutch government thinks mostly about their own income (state security) while the local people are worried about their own properties and possible loss of value (human security).⁷⁶

The same is happening in Mali: both the local government and the local people have different interests. There is a mix of the focus of the involved actors on both human and state security. Local people are worried about their income and future and choose for short time solutions, while at the same time also governmental institutions need to be built up. This is reflected in the difference between human and state security. Most NGOs focus on the well-being of the local population (human security), while the UN embraces the concept of state security by strengthening Rule of Law and building up governmental institutions.

2.5. BROADENING OF THE HUMANITARIAN ARENA

2.5.1. Concept of humanitarian arena

In the humanitarian arena, the conditions and practices of aid are being negotiated. Aid gets shaped through the interaction between different actors, including the aid recipients. The arena is created by agencies, the media and other stakeholders. The humanitarian arena paradigm is that needs blend

⁷³ Frerks and Klein Goldewijk (2007)

⁷⁴ Chandler (2008), pp. 427 – 428 & 436

⁷⁵ Knoop (2014)

⁷⁶ Knoop (2014)

together; the idea is that problems are not always only caused by a crisis, but also by other 'normal' causes. In the humanitarian arena, humanitarian aid must be constantly improved and adapted to the local circumstances. The principles and politics play an important role, but are mostly negotiated in practice. Policy and practice are shaped during the process of implementation.⁷⁷

Principles acquire meaning through social interaction; here, the input of all actors is important. However, there is a difference between the different deliverers of services; not all actors have an equal share in shaping the humanitarian action. The different actors in the service delivery are: CIMIC, corporate reconstruction work, local humanitarian organisations, alternative funding, local people & institutions and non-governmental individuals. All actors are multi-faced and driven by different politics. Each actor has different interests and may have different sets of values and principles, which will influence their service delivery. The behaviour of the involved actors is different in each situation; it is not predictable. Driven by their motives, there are different interpretations of the situation, which leads to different decisions taken. The situation, the needs and the interaction with other actors shapes their behaviour. The way aid is framed depends on how the actors interpret the context and the needs. The idea of the humanitarian arena is based on an actor-oriented approach, with the assumption that all actors reflect on their own experiences and events in the direct vicinity. However, political motivations could influence the humanitarian action.⁷⁸

It is important to keep in mind that service delivery during crises is not only done by the traditional agencies, but is encompassed by many more actors. These include UN agencies, different kind of NGOs, both the international and the local private sector and the military. The cooperation between all different actors can be explained by investigating their everyday practices; the life worlds of the humanitarians need to be explored. The way all the different actors define and organize their work makes the difference. The mandates of their organisations, their willingness to cooperate, their needs-assessments, their context-analysis, their expectations, motivations, frustrations and the organisations culture determine the way they carry out their jobs.⁷⁹

2.5.2. New actors in the humanitarian field

Despite that it is argued that giving aid is becoming more dangerous in certain situations, the aid industry has continued to expand itself. The UN is seen as a leading agency, if they are setting up a new mission, many other aid givers follow: (i)NGOs, private companies and consultants.⁸⁰ The securitization of aid has created openings for new actors and opportunities for wider privatization.⁸¹ Because of the increasing attention for a certain region, which is stimulated because of the UN presence, additional funds are released which attracts again other international organisations.

In the past 25 years, many new forms of economic, social and political influence have emerged in relation to the creation of security. (Donor) governments, UN agencies (such as WHO, UNICEF, OCHA etc.), (i)NGOs and private companies have become involved in the process of stabilisation a country during or right after a crisis. Here, it is important that there is no question of 'territorial control' like in the colonial times, there is no technical efficiency of aid. The impact is more reflected in the new possibilities for thinking about security that aid as a will to govern makes possible. The influence is based in networks and is non-territorial.⁸² However in practice, the giving of aid may look like territorial power to some people. The presence of the UN and foreign militaries on sovereign ground could be described as imperious or dominant and will remind to colonial times, where Western

⁷⁷ Hilhorst & Jansen (2010)

⁷⁸ Hilhorst & Jansen (2010), p. 1120

⁷⁹ Hilhorst & Jansen (2010), pp. 1121-1122

⁸⁰ Duffield (2012), pp. 484-485

⁸¹ Duffield (2005a), p. 3

⁸² Duffield (2002), pp. 1062-1063

powers imposed their will and way of living. Due to the close relationships between the UN and several NGOs, this perception can also influence the expectations local people have from NGOs.

The expanding of networks in the development of aid becomes more important. In the '90's, due to the growing number of UN missions, also non-state and private associations started to feel responsible to fulfil humanitarian, governance and security responsibilities. Multinationals in the private sector have become part of public-private networks in the world of giving aid.⁸³

The change from 'old wars' to 'new complex emergencies' also asks for another way of intervention. Current conflicts have become more complex, with several root causes that ask for a more multidimensional solution. Another way of giving and receiving aid is necessary. The multidimensional conflict asks for a multidimensional range of aid givers. But also changes on the side of the aid recipients, create changes in the arena. Local actors and the National Civil Society play a more important role than they did in the past.

According to Renner (2005), the War on Terror leads to a militarization of the problem, it makes us focus on one thing and forget the rest. However, cross border problems (like the crisis in Mali) are not solvable by only military involvement.⁸⁴ The conflict in Mali has (as was explained in chapter one) several causes which ask for a multidimensional solution. It is argued that the interference of new actors is beneficiary to create a more sustainable and long-term situation of peace and development.

2.6. CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION

2.6.1. Context

According to Olsen there are three main events in history which form the basis for the rise of civil-military coordination (CIMIC). The first can be found in the protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan: policymakers were searching for ways how initial military victories could be translated into sustainable peace. They were looking for ways to win the hearts and minds of the population. The second basis for CIMIC arose in the '90's, in a time of several complex emergencies. Due to the safety situation, it was almost impossible for humanitarian organisations to deliver emergency assistance to the most needy. Examples are the situations in Bosnia or Somalia. These situations promoted a more intensive collaboration between civil organisations, NGOs, development agencies and military forces. The September 11 attacks forms the last event that lies on the basis of civil-military coordination: this attack has ensured that the international focus has shifted to weak and failing states which form a security threat to the Western world. This attention strengthened the growing understanding that security and development are closely linked. To protect the Western world from such attacks in the future, it is important to bring more development to weak and failing states.⁸⁵

This shift in attention to weak and failing states is related to the shift from 'old wars' to the War on Terror and could be connected to the difference between human and state security. The new conflicts are more temporary and intrastate, conflicts take place within a country (for example between different groups, or between the government and the civilians), instead of between different countries. This implies that there is also a shift in the causes of conflicts: they must be found more in the internal political area and the civil society. The current conflicts are more multidimensional, reasons for the problems are for example: misrule, exclusion of certain groups, violations of human rights, scarcity of natural resources and underdevelopment. Due to the nature of the current conflicts, the role of the military changes; there is a growing interest in historical, political, socio-economic and environmental factors and processes. The current approaches to conflict and conflict resolution now emphasize a much broader notion of 'human security' as a key to an understanding of the conflict and future processes of action. This new focus is reflected in attempts to integrate the different actors and to formulate multi-actor responses: the '3D-approach' includes Diplomacy, Defence and Development

⁸³ Duffield (2002), pp. 1062-1063

⁸⁴ Renner (2005)


⁸⁵ Olsen (2011), p. 335

simultaneously. The core of this 3D approach is that economic and development aid policies focus on peace and conflict issues and are mobilized to contribute to conflict resolution and peace building.⁸⁶

2.6.2. Explanation of definition

Within the international politics, there are several definitions of CIMIC in use. Two often used definitions are the ones from UN OCHA and the NATO. OCHA defines civil-military coordination as follows: *“The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and, when appropriate, pursue common goals”*.⁸⁷ To make this more clear, OCHA uses a figure from IASC to explain this (figure 11). This figure shows that coordination has two extremities: cooperation and co-existence. The different forms take place in different situations: during peacetime (for example a natural disaster) there is less risk of violence so cooperation between civil and military actors is easier to perform. During a conflict accompanied by violence, the risk when blurring the lines is higher. Civil actors take more distance from military actors. They both operate in the same geographical area, but do not coordinate: there is a form of co-existence.

Figure 11: The range of civil–military relations



Source: HPG (2012), p. 2

The other often used definition is the one from the Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence (CCOE), accredited by the NATO. Their definition of CIMIC is the following: *“The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.”*⁸⁸ This definition is more focused on an international peacekeeping mission, while the definition of OCHA was more focused on coordination between civil and military actors in general. The CCOE described their core functions in three ways: civil-military liaison, support to the force and support to civil actors and their environment (text box 3).

⁸⁶ Frerks (2009), pp. 213-215

⁸⁷ HPG, (2012), pp. 1-2

⁸⁸ CCOE (2012), p. 21

Text box 3: NATO interpretation of CIMIC

- *Civil-military liaison*

Establish and maintain liaison with civil actors at appropriate levels, facilitating cooperation, harmonization, information sharing, concerted or integrated planning and conduct of operations.

- *Support to the Force*

Commanders, depend on the circumstances, will require significant support from within their Joint Operations Area (JOA) as well as coordination of effort to minimize disruption to military operation. For that reason CIMIC plays a proactive role by contributing to operational planning and participating in operations.

- *Support to civil actors and their environment*

Within a comprehensive approach, military support to civil actors and their environment will generally only be conducted, if it is required to create conditions supportive for the accomplishment of the military mission within the context of the mandate and may include a wide spectrum of resources such as information, personnel, materiel, equipment, communications facilities, specialist expertise or training. Enabling this is a role of CIMIC and it may be executed by all elements of the military.

2.6.3. Various forms

At this moment, there are different forms with different degrees of intensity of interaction between military and civil actors. The most common (in order of intensity) are presented in table 2.⁸⁹ Not all forms occur in each disaster field, depending on the specific situation, another form of coordination is taking place.

Table 2: Different forms of coordination

Training & 'advocacy'	Learn about each other's views on the Humanitarian Principles and the Humanitarian Law. This form of interaction is not contested, because it only takes place outside the conflict zone.
Information exchange	This can contain exchanging information about security situation (briefings), humanitarian locations and activities, population movements, military relief activities and mine-action activities.
Coordination	Coordination between activities of both parties, to avoid overlap on each other's programs. This form requires a more intensive cooperation, because it is important to have the same outputs and outcomes.
Protection & armed escort	Military can provide civil actors with armed guidance or road patrols so that civil actors are able to implement their programs.
Logistical cooperation	This takes place in the form of transport, communications, infrastructural engineering and evacuation services.
Sub-contracting	The military asks the civil society or NGOs to carry out particular tasks or projects.
Intensive cooperation or integration	For example DDR programs; where the military is responsible for the disarmament and the NGOs for the reintegration component.

Source: Frerks (2009)

2.6.4. Limitations and advantages

Although the coordination between civil and military actors is now used quite often, there are still many debates about the implementation and consequences. Moreover, there is a huge difference in the method of working between NGOs and the military and there are many prejudices on both sides. Some NGOs and civil organisations do not want to cooperate with the army, because they are afraid to lose their 'neutral' position. Especially NGOs adhere to the Humanitarian Principles (humanity, independence, impartiality and neutrality) and the Code of Conduct; in contrast to the military, who have their own guidelines. Working together with military actors undermines the principle of neutrality for civil actors; there is a risk of becoming confused with military actors. Within the rules of Humanitarian Law, it is important to distinguish between civilians and combatants and civil and military objects. Within these rules, it is forbidden to attack civilians and humanitarian agencies. However, in the current complex conflicts, it is extremely difficult to make this distinction and many

⁸⁹ Frerks (2009), pp. 216-219

humanitarians fear that, when working under CIMIC conditions, the border between civil and humanitarian organisations and the military becomes even more blurred. NGOs are afraid that especially local people will associate them with the military, and that they will be prevented or hindered from doing their job. Many organisations are afraid that their (local) staff members will not be safe anymore when working together with the military.⁹⁰ The risk of blurring of lines is high in complex emergencies and examples of the past have justified this fear. Alone in the year 2014 several aid workers have been killed, in i.a. Syria, Afghanistan and the Central African Republic.

The space for humanitarian action in war zones seems to become more narrow. Working in the same area without interaction between military and civilian actors becomes difficult, and undermines at the same time the principles of neutrality and impartiality. These principles were set up to ensure that aid agencies can work in complex emergency areas without being attacked or influenced by other actors. The reality however, is often far from this 'ideal situation'. The space for the humanitarian community is especially tight in situations where also an international peacekeeping operation takes place, like what is happening in Mali.⁹¹ In situations where civil and military actors are working in the same areas, it is almost impossible to not interact. However, there is a fear that CIMIC will cause a militarization of aid. Frerks wrote about this: *"Aid will then be provided on the basis of military needs and priorities instead of on humanitarian needs or human rights only"*.⁹² This undermines the humanitarian principles again and will increase the risk of blurring the lines. This research investigates how the different actors in the arena think about civil-military coordination and what the exact problems and limitations are.

There are also some important advantages of coordination between the military and civil actors: exchange of safety & security information, access to areas of high risk, joint programs in which both sorts of expertise are necessary and joint training. Coordination can make individual actors stronger and make certain areas more accessible for civil actors. Another important advantage of CIMIC are the 'Hearts and Minds' projects. Via these projects (mainly provision of services), the military try to boost their popularity; they try to get the acceptance for military interventions from the local population.⁹³

2.7. INTEGRATED MISSIONS

The MINUSMA mission in Mali is an integrated mission. Integration could be seen as one step further than civil-military coordination, because integration in a peacekeeping mission means integration between *all* UN agencies, both civil and military actors, both working for the mission itself and working for separate UN agencies (like WHO or UNICEF).

According to four researchers (2005) who studied the concept of Integrated UN Missions, an integrated mission is *"an instrument with which the UN seeks to help countries in the transition from war to lasting peace, or to address a similarly complex situation that requires a system-wide UN response, through subsuming actors and approaches within an overall political-strategic crisis management framework."*⁹⁴ The goal of an integrated mission is to ensure integration at all levels of mission planning. The objective of an integrated mission is *"to bring the UN's resources and activities closer together and ensure that they are applied in a coherent way across the political, military, developmental and humanitarian sectors"*.⁹⁵ In the post-Cold war era the nature of conflict has changed. From more one-sided conflicts, the world moved to more complex and multidimensional crises. This also asked for another type of interventions. In the beginning of the '90's, the UN needed to do interventions on the side of political, military, humanitarian and development areas in the same time, in the same region, for example in Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Haiti and

⁹⁰ Frerks (2009), pp. 211 & 219-220

⁹¹ Brechenmacher (2015)

⁹² Frerks (2009), p. 220

⁹³ Frerks (2009), p. 209

⁹⁴ Barth Eide e.a. (2005), p.3

⁹⁵ Barth Eide e.a. (2005), p.5

Somalia. The concept of integrated missions was developed in Kosovo in 1999, to create a better allocation of tasks between all involved actors who were operating in the arena. This first integrated mission was mainly dealing with ‘technical’ issues related to coordination and policy obstacles. The later missions in i.a. East-Timor, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Liberia have revised and refined the concept.⁹⁶ The book ‘Making War and Building Peace’ from Doyle e.a. (2006)⁹⁷ describes the UN mission in East-Timor as a success and the missions in Rwanda and Cyprus as a failure. The four researchers working for the UN Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs agreed on this and added the mission in Bosnia as another failure.⁹⁸

Integration means that the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) is responsible for all elements of the mission, including political, humanitarian and military responses. This frequently means that the responses of the Resident Coordination (RC) and the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) are done by the same person.⁹⁹ In Mali this position is fulfilled by David Gressly.¹⁰⁰ According to Weir (2006, p.5): *“integration is designed to streamline UN efforts and ensure that the objectives of all UN forces and agencies are channelled towards an overarching goal.”* She also agreed on the objectives of the humanitarian community, who have serious reservations about the fact that UN humanitarian agencies now become under the same control structure as political and military forces of the mission. This will hinder their coordination with other non-UN humanitarian agencies. Another objective of integrated missions she mentioned, is that a peacekeeping mission can be morally right, but can never be ‘neutral’ or ‘partial’ and can therefore never be ‘humanitarian’, due to the different forms of action and priorities and they have because of the integrated structure.¹⁰¹ Besides the objectives, Weir also explains the added value of an integrated mission to the field. The threat of blurring the lines between politics and humanitarianism is real, but at the same time the reality is that peacebuilding and humanitarian action are no longer separate concepts. In order to reach the beneficiaries, humanitarian actors have to make compromises every day. To facilitate this overlap a new kind of structure is necessary: *“and in that sense, the integrated mission may be the best step forward.”*¹⁰²

Harmer (2008) has investigated the relation between integrated missions and human security. She argues: *“in integrated missions, minimalist approaches to integration are more likely to improve coordination on humanitarian action than maximalist approaches that may preclude the participation of non-UN humanitarian actors.”* She agrees with Weir that the principles of independence and neutrality are undermined by creating the perception that actions from the humanitarian community are of secondary importance to the political and security goals of the UN integrated mission. However, she also argues that the actual evidence of the impact of integrated missions on actions from the humanitarian community are weak. According to her, there are not many examples of real threats for the humanitarian community and the security of aid workers. She refers to a study from 2006, which has found that violence against aid workers did not occur more or less when a UN integrated mission is present.¹⁰³ At the end, Harmer (2008) gives advice for future missions. She explains that the principles and neutrality and independence are no end-goals by themselves. It is important to adapt those principles to local situations. They must be operational tools to ensure access and provide assistance to the beneficiaries: *“The more carefully and consistently this is demonstrated to military and political actors on all sides of the conflict, including those within integrated missions, the more likely it is that safe and secure access to the local population will be achieved.”*¹⁰⁴

⁹⁶ Barth Eide e.a. (2005)

⁹⁷ Doyle, e.a.(2006)

⁹⁸ Barth Eide e.a. (2005)

⁹⁹ Weir (2006), p. 5

¹⁰⁰ UNDG (2015)

¹⁰¹ Weir (2006), p. 5

¹⁰² Weir (2006), p. 45

¹⁰³ Harmer (2008), p. 528

¹⁰⁴ Harmer (2008), pp.537-538

2.8. CONCLUSION

This theoretical chapter forms the basis for this research. It provides the reader insights in certain general processes and will help to understand the empirical data.

The direct phase after a crisis is described as the reconstruction phase. However, in many situations it is not clear when exactly a crisis is over. This research investigates how the actors in Mali describe the reconstruction phase in the country and what their perception is about this reconstruction. By examining the possible desirable futures and ideas about the blueprints, more insight will be acquired in the various discourses on reconstruction.

Each geographical area where a disaster or a crisis has happened, will transform into a humanitarian arena. The arena is framed by the negotiations of the involved actors about the conditions and practices of aid. Aid is shaped through the interaction between different actors, including the aid recipients. The humanitarian principles of neutrality, independence, impartiality and humanitarian and the Code of Conduct form a guideline for the humanitarian community to perform their work, but can also form an obstacle in certain partnerships. The empirical part of the research explains how the humanitarian arena in Mali is framed and how it is valued by the involved actors. To what extent do the different perceptions about the arena correspond and how does this influence the coordination structure? This research also investigates to what extent new, non-traditional actors, are becoming more involved in the humanitarian arena in Mali. Does the presence of the UN mission attracts other international agencies and to what extent do renewal and innovation in the arena take place?

The conflict in Mali could be described as a complex emergency and the following UN intervention fits within the worldwide War on Terror. Conflicts have become more dynamic and consist of several warring parties. The western world was afraid of the growing Islamic powers and therefore decided to start an integrated mission, to stabilize the country again and combat the rebel groups in the north. This integrated mission focusses both on human and state security. Due to the peace negotiations in Algeria on the one hand, but smaller projects focusing on the well-being of the population on the other hand, the two different paradigms are connected. This research examines to what extent the differences between human and state security influence the humanitarian arena and the coordination structure and how the humanitarian community values these two concepts.

Within the War on Terror, it is becoming increasingly common that civil and military actors are working in the same field. There is a growing understanding of the importance of the development - security nexus: to stabilize a country, both development and safety are necessary. However, coordination between military and civil actors brings also some limitations and risks. Due to the increasing number of violent incidents against aid workers, their fear of a blurring of lines has grown. On the other hand, coordination between civil and military actors also brings some advantage to the humanitarian field. Certain areas become more accessible and due to the exchange of information and joint trainings, actors become more strong. By researching the coordination structure in the Malian arena, more insights will be collected in how the different involved actors value the various forms of coordination.

A more extensive form of coordination takes place within an integrated mission. Integrated missions are the response from the UN to the changing conflicts. Due to the integration between UN agencies, political and military actors, the integrated missions are focusing on both political, humanitarian and military goals at the same time. In the past few years, the humanitarian community has expressed its fears, because of the increasing risk of blurring the lines and a changing perception of the humanitarian principles. This research investigates to what extent the humanitarian community still fears the presence of an integrated mission and to what extent this MINUSMA mission influences the coordination structure in the arena.

3. RECONSTRUCTION PHASE AND HUMANITARIAN ARENA



3. RECONSTRUCTION PHASE & HUMANITARIAN ARENA

The biggest mud mosque worldwide is located in Djenné (picture previous page) and is reconstructed each year. Together with the inhabitants and people from neighbouring villages, the mosque is prepared for the coming rain season. The last few years this event was cancelled due to the violence but in 2014 the 'Crepissage de la Grande Mosquée' was going on again. Just like the mosque is getting reconstructed each year again, the reconstruction of the country has also started.

This chapter forms an introduction to the empirical part of the research. The social understanding of the reconstruction phase and the humanitarian arena in Mali are described. As above quote makes clear, there is a wide range of perceptions about the reconstruction phase and the humanitarian arena in Mali. This chapter elucidates the different perceptions of these two concepts, whereby the different backgrounds of the actors are taken into account. How does the image of reconstruction grows in the arena? How do the different actors describe the arena itself? This chapter forms an overview of the different discourses that prevail about reconstruction and the humanitarian arena. The chapter will start with a description of Mali's main problems according to the actors. The research question which is answered in this chapter is: **How do the different humanitarian actors in Mali describe the main problems in the country and what is their perception on the reconstruction phase and the humanitarian arena?**

3.1. DISCOURSE

Mali has a long history of different crises and underdevelopment but the direct reason for the start of Operation Serval and the MINUSMA mission were the events in 2012 (when the state lost control over the north and rebel groups committed a coup in Bamako) and the following period of civil unrest. However, there are different opinions about the main underlying problems in Mali. Each actor had a different focus on the problems and different perceptions about what is necessary to create stability, or even what the concept of stability means. The circumstance that there are so many discourses about the description of the country and these two concepts, makes that there is no consensus.

3.1.1. Problems & stability

The insecure situation in the north is the most obvious problem in the country. The different actors however have different discourses about what are the underlying causes and consequences of the insecurity in the country. Common heard opinion is that the lack of possibilities and the dissatisfaction of the population are the main reason for radicalisation in the north. A military advisor working for the Dutch embassy (X5) argues that the lack of legal ways of earning income, the lack of access to services and the unfair distribution of finances promote the corruption and cross border illicit trafficking. To create stability in the northern areas it is important to give those people an alternative way of earning an income. According to him, the lack of legal perspectives and the illegal activities are the main reason for the conflicts. Without bringing those people an alternative way of earning a livelihood, they will always be attracted by rebel groups and illegal activities. Due to the unsafe situation in the north and the presence of different rebel groups linked to al-Qaeda, a comparison to the War on Terror (WoT) could be made. After the coup d'état in March 2012 there were increasing concerns of growing linkages between rebel groups in the north and al-Qaeda. The West and especially France began to frame the Jihadists in northern Mali not only as a threat to Mali itself, but also as a threat to Western Europe.¹⁰⁵ The West fears a Jihadist springboard towards Europe.¹⁰⁶ This stabilisation mission in Mali fits within the picture of the worldwide trend of the War on Terror, which began after 9/11 in New York.¹⁰⁷ As was already explained in the theoretical framework, the problems in Mali could be seen more and more as problems related to securitization issues. Due to the extreme encroaching (Jihadist) violence in the north, the issue has become a security issue and fits within the trend of War on Terror.

¹⁰⁵ E-International Relations Student (2014)

¹⁰⁶ Correspondent (2013)

¹⁰⁷ Roberto e.a. (2013), p. 88

The lack of legal ways of earning an income is also related to the natural circumstances in the northern areas: increasing drought and a lack of infrastructure. A woman working for a UN agency related to food assistance (X34) explained that the drought and diminishing possibilities for agriculture cause problems for the people living in the north. The northern areas have a long history of pastoralism and livestock farming. From the past on, farmers are not hindered by borders on a map and wander through the different countries in the Sahel. Besides the fact that these nomads are hindered by the changing weather conditions, they also feel more connected to other nomad groups in the Sahel as with Malian people living in the south of the country; there is a feeling of disconnection to the rest of the country. The changing weather conditions provoke a lack of income and a dependency of food assistance. WFP is assisting 900.000 vulnerable people in the north with food assistance activities.¹⁰⁸

Another problem in the north is the lack of infrastructure. Without paved roads or working airstrips, it becomes very difficult for NGOs and the private sector to implement programs or start a business in this region. It takes days to drive from the capital to Gao for example and going to the remote north is even impossible by using a 4x4 car; a camel is necessary. Except this long distance, there is also a problem with IED's (Improvised Explosive Device) on the road and the risk of being kidnapped by rebel groups. For example, in spring 2014 a car of the NGO NRC exploded due to IED bombs. These bombs are not always placed on the road to harm NGOs, but there is a high risk a NGO car will pass the road before the original (military) target passes. This lack of (safe) infrastructure makes it more difficult for humanitarian actors to implement programs in the north and reach the vulnerable people¹⁰⁹ or for entrepreneurs to start a business in this region. Also the small number of airports in the north does not meet the needs, and sometimes the few runways get destroyed by rebel groups, for example in Kidal last year. A man working as an advisor for the SRSG Koenders (X26) said there has to come more attention to the development of infrastructure in Mali. Without infrastructure, it becomes very difficult to bring safety to the northern regions: *"Buiten alle inhoudelijke dingen is eigenlijk het allerbelangrijkste in dit land logistiek."*¹¹⁰ He also made a comparison with South-Sudan. South-Sudan has a long history of humanitarian aid and although the country faces many problems, there is an extended infrastructure network and good airports which NGOs can use to transport their relief goods and aid workers. This network makes it easier for the humanitarian community to do their work.

Building infrastructure in an unsafe area is however like a vicious cycle; where do you start? To convince an infrastructure company to build roads in the north, a safe and secure area is needed. However, without roads and airstrips it is almost impossible to secure an area and the involved construction company. Police cannot run enough patrols and in case of an emergency it will take days before help can reach the victims. What is the gain for infrastructure companies to start working in the north? The risk of losing properties, or even worse: losing people, is too high. All actors agree on the need to improve the infrastructure network, but until this moment, no one has taken the responsibility. The same advisor of the SRSG (X26) stated that it is not the responsibility of MINUSMA to improve the infrastructure network. They have some small projects (QIP's, which are explained in five) to construct wells or generators, but they are not involved in constructing roads or runways.

Building infrastructure is maybe not part of the mandate of MINUSMA, but what is stated in their mandate, is 'support for humanitarian assistance'. Supporting infrastructure companies, by doing road patrols and creating funds for construction companies, would improve the situation a lot. By creating a situation in where other institutes can improve the infrastructure, the humanitarian institutes are supported. Almost all international NGOs and actors in the National Civil Society argue that they can implement their programs much better if there would be a better infrastructure network in the north. Developing the infrastructure could really help to bring the stability back in the north.

The absence of well-functioning governmental institutions for years already is seen as an important

¹⁰⁸ WFP (2015)

¹⁰⁹ Briceño-Garmendia e.a. (2011)

¹¹⁰ For English translation, see appendix C, number 1.

cause of the periods of civil unrest in the past. But also the current instability in the north is still dedicated to the lack of institutions in that region. The chairmen of a local platform for national NGOs (X20) stated that a return of institutions in the north is needed; without a state presence it is impossible to develop the region in a legal and safe way. He argues that the governmental institutes in Bamako are too far away from the northern areas; the policies which are designed in Bamako or even in the Western world are too far away from what is happening in the field. An advisor of the SRS (X26) adds to this statement that, although he disagrees with the vision of the Jihadist rebel groups, they were able to provide basic services for the population in the north: *“Die Jihadisten in Noord-Mali, daar kan je van vinden wat je wil, maar die zijn wel in staat geweest om een aantal dingen voor de lokale bevolking te doen. Die hadden een politie die functioneerde, die hadden een redelijke mate van orde, die financierden allerlei jongeren groepen in de wijken in die steden om de stad schoon te houden. Die kochten ze om. Die hebben allerlei kleine pensioenregelingen voor mensen die een kind hebben verloren. Die maken voor de bevolking een verschil! Alleen ze zijn te ver gegaan met het handen afhakken, dat vinden de noord Malinezen niet zo fijn.”*¹¹¹ The presence of authorities has a positive influence on the stability in the region.

Since the crisis in 2012, there have been elections again in the country: for example the presidential elections in July 2013 and the parliamentary elections in November 2013. At this moment Mali has a formal government, with Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta as the president. However, a Malian woman working for an international NGO (X2) stated that although there have been presidential elections and there are formal institutions nowadays, this is still not enough to exercise control over the country. The government does not have the same understanding, the same vision as the international actors or the inhabitants of the country: *“For me personally, this country is not securitized, the level of institutions is very low, we now have an institution in place, we assemble we have the president and we will have local elections. But I think they do not have the same understanding, the same vision. It is still very fragile for me.”* Although there are some examples of a functioning government nowadays, there is still a lack of governmental responsibility and a need for more governmental institutions, especially in the north. A Ghanaian man working for a Dutch NGO (X7) confirmed the return of institutions in some parts of the country, but added to this: *“I believe it is now beyond the capacity of the Malian government to solve the problems in the country.”* In order to help them to stabilize the country and bring back peace again, the Malian government asked the UN to support them.

The goal of the UN mission is to bring stability in the country. However, the description of the concept stability brings up different perceptions and explanations. A civil advisor working for MINUSMA (X12) made the following statement: *“Ik vind het zelf eigenlijk nogal een behoorlijk vage omschrijving. Wat is stabilisatie nu eigenlijk precies? Ik heb het in het verleden vaker dan eens bestudeerd, en dat ik dacht, oh is dat het? En dan was het eigenlijk zo vaag...”*¹¹² There is no consensus about the explanation of the concept nor which factors are necessary to bring back the stability in the north. When linking the main problems in the country to factors necessary to create stability, most Western expats were focussing on insecurity and the lack of infrastructure. On the other hand, African interviewees answered that problems with the government and the lack of institutions in the north are an important cause of the instable situation. To create safety and stability, the vicious cycle of conflicts must be broken. It is useful to have the same perception about the main problems and there has to be an overarching view on the underlying causes. It is important to focus on different problems at the same time, whereby all actors have to be involved. The question however is: who are the essential actors? All respondents agreed that only military involvement is not enough to stabilize the country, but who are the other actors who need to become involved? Paragraph 3.3. will introduce the most important actors in the humanitarian arena.

¹¹¹ For English translation, see appendix C, number 2.

¹¹² For English translation, see appendix C, number 3.

An overview of the humanitarian needs according to the UN could be found in the Strategic Response Plan (SRP) of Mali¹¹³, the SRP of the Sahel¹¹⁴ or the humanitarian bulletins from OCHA.¹¹⁵

3.1.2. Differences between north and south

Mali is a huge country with different tribes and different regions. Most important difference between the north and the south is the security situation. Most places situated in Azawad or above Mopti are considered as unsafe, impossible to reach without armed escort. Keeping this line in mind, more as half of the country is regarded as unsafe. Another important difference between the north and the south is population density. The northern parts are very sparsely populated, mainly with nomads who travel through the Sahel region. According to Gutelius (2007), the Malian government themselves is responsible for the differences between the north and the south: *“As American and other Western authorities have imagined and portrayed northern Mali as a hotbed of potential terrorists, northern leaders, sometimes drawing directly on these media statements, have imagined and portrayed US forces and the Malian military as arrayed against the community.”*¹¹⁶ According to this statement the attitude of the USA and the Malian governments themselves have fuelled the separation between the north and the south of the country.

The differences between the north and the south are reflected in the division between ‘policy and implementation’. Overall, policies are designed in the south while they are implemented in the north. The coordination structure in the north is more low threshold as in the south, because all institutions are living and working in the same small area. Actors working in Bamako have a lot of meetings every day to coordinate with each other and design the policies. Meanwhile, offices in the north are directly implementing the programs. This same difference between ‘policy and implementation’ is visible between offices in Bamako and the Hague. In Western head offices policies are designed, which will be implemented in Mali. However, when going to a lower level, this division between ‘policy and implementation’ is also happening in Mali itself. Both actors working in Mali and the Hague agree with this difference in policy and implementation and confirm that the reality at the Western offices and in the field are far away from each other. This separation between policy & implementation and the unsafe situation in the north, ensures that most humanitarian organisations have their headquarters in Bamako, while they implement their programs in the north. Many NGOs would like to open more field offices in the north and send more staff in order to start more programs in these regions, but state it is not safe to work or implement projects in the north. This lack of NGO presence in the north and dominant preponderance in the south is criticized by some actors. An African man working for an international NGO (X13) argued that there are too many people working in the south, while the real problems are happening in the north: *“Let all of us concentrate more on what is happening in the field, instead of doing a lot of meetings here in Bamako.”* An advisor of the SRSG (X26) stated that without the presence of humanitarian agencies, there will never become a stable and safe situation in the north: *“De internationale gemeenschap kan niet teveel wachten. Je bent in een post-conflict land om het verschil te maken. Als je dat niet durft dan moet je naar huis gaan. Dan moet je niet hier in Bamako zitten met mooie workshops en mooie verhalen. Je moet ook durven! Je moet er naar toe gaan.”*¹¹⁷ All actors are complaining about the number of meetings in the capital and the lack of agencies and representation in the north. However, this is also linked again to the insecure situation. Once again, this is an interesting discussion point. Is security created by the implementation of humanitarian programs or can humanitarian programs only being implemented while there is a safe situation?

¹¹³ Humanitarian Response Info (2015a)

¹¹⁴ UN OCHA (2014a)

¹¹⁵ UN OCHA (2015b)

¹¹⁶ Gutelius (2007), p. 59

¹¹⁷ For English translation, see appendix C, number 4.

3.2. PHASE OF RECONSTRUCTION

After the coup d'état in March 2012 and the expelling of the rebel groups in the North, the Western world is talking about reconstruction of the country. Objective is to implement political and economic reforms to prevent Mali from falling back into anarchy again. During the donor conference in May 2013, Mali got three billion euro which was intended for the reconstruction of the country.¹¹⁸ However, amongst actors living and working in Mali, there are different perceptions about the current phase Mali is in nowadays and not everybody agrees with the use of the word 'reconstruction'.

According to Barakat & Zyckm, the reconstruction phase is the phase between a crisis and normality; it is a transition phase between the other two (figure 12). Reconstruction is the creation of a safe and stable environment; to prevent a relapse and to re-activate economic and social development. Reconstruction is an effort to stimulate recovery after a crisis, mainly focussing on five domains: physical, safety, politics, social and economic (figure 13).¹¹⁹




Figure 12: Reconstruction is a transition phase, according to Barakat & Zyckm

A Malian man working for a consultancy office for the government (X18), agrees that Mali is currently in a transition phase, but he describes this as a phase between conflict and reconstruction. The differences between the regions are too big to be able to use the word reconstruction phase. Besides, there are also too many different perceptions about the conflict. In this transition phase, the most important activities are the strengthening of governmental institutes and reducing the diversity amongst the population. He also argues that the government needs to take a leading role in clarifying Mali's current phase; they are responsible for creating consensus amongst the actors. The government has to legitimate its action and stimulate the division of tasks between the different actors and donors. According to him, it is very important that all actors have the same opinion about Mali's current phase. From there on coordination and cooperation can start. Without consensus about the description of the phase and the related problems, actors are never able to work together and solve the problems: "For example, when you are sick and each doctor gives you different medicines, at the end you only become more sick. Because of the variety of solutions, the situation only gets worse."




Figure 13: Five domains of reconstruction according to Barakat & Zyckm

Although there are blueprints for a desirable future, the perceptions about these blueprints and the interpretation of the reconstruction differ widely. A blueprint is an ideal situation for the future, a design for the phase after the crisis. It is not made by a certain person or organisation, but arises from existing (western) dogma's such as democracy and decentralisation. The actors involved in the peacebuilding and stabilisation process have different discourses about the description of Mali's current phase and the application of the five domains of reconstruction (figure 13). Creating consensus is difficult because all actors have a different focus and different explanations about what is happening in the country and what are the underlying causes of the conflict (paragraph 1.2.). The

¹¹⁸ Volkskrant (2013)

¹¹⁹ Barakat & Zyck (2009)

country and the involved actors do not have a blank slate; the country was not so badly destroyed that nothing was left. Some institutes remained and many international actors had already experience in the country. South-Sudan is used as an example again. Originally, this geographical area belonged to Sudan, but since 2011 a new state was established. Although there was already an infrastructure network and some institutes, the country had to form a new government, a new constitution and develop an independent economic market: the country had to construct itself completely from the basis. The situation in Mali is different because this country already has a long tradition of (more or less) active local authorities, available services, legislation and international actors. These available services, perceptions and memories are influencing the blueprints for reconstruction.

The chairman of a platform for local NGOs (X20 & X35) said Mali is now in the 'processus de sortir de crisis'. Mali is in the post-conflict phase, because there have been some examples of the return of democracy (elections for example). On the other side, the reconstruction phase is still out of the question because the peace negotiations did not start yet and there are still too many unsafe area's in the north. The violence is not over in all regions and the institutions did not yet return to the north. According to him, it is too early to talk about reconstruction because there are no features yet of re-building the country again. For example, the schools in the north were still closed during the time of conducting the interview.

An European man who works already for years in Mali for an international organisation (X15) is strongly against the view of a reconstruction phase. He said that although there are some opportunities for development in Mali, the humanitarian needs still remain. While these needs are not yet complied, it is too early to talk about reconstruction because the risk of falling back into a crisis again is too high: *"We have a frozen conflict; a ceasefire. We have an absence of state control of the area. We have a multitude of actors controlling the area. In a very fragile equilibrium. Which can be blown away every time. We are really in a phase in which we have a frozen conflict; political progress has not taken place so far."*

Reconstruction is about transition and transformation and is an ongoing process, always in between conflicts and normality. Reconstruction is a normal human activity; a policy, designed to "build back better". However, some respondents had a very clear opinion why they are against the use of the word reconstruction: *"If you want to make a re-construction, it means that there was something build or constructed before, then it collapsed, was destroyed, and now we have to rebuild it again. So my question is: are you sure there was something build before?"* (X13 – man working for an international NGO).

A middle-aged European man working for a civil department within MINUSMA (X16), explained why it is so difficult to describe the whole country in one word. The situation is really volatile and can change each moment, so it is not easy to frame it. He used the word post-conflict phase to describe the current situation, but immediately explained he was not happy to use this definition. To his opinion, it is impossible to speak about reconstruction, because the situation staggers often between conflict and post-conflict: violence erupts in some areas while other areas are getting more safer, but the situation changes from day to day and from city to city: *"If you look for example in Gao or Timbouctou, it is a different situation. You can start in some cases to think about reconstruction, while in some other cases we are still in conflict management. So I do not think there is just one definition."* A French women working for an international NGO (X6) agrees with these arguments and adds that although Mali is not yet in a reconstruction phase, at the same time, they should have been! However, the situation is still very unstable and although there is no open-conflict anymore, there is also no peace yet. Mali is in an in-between situation.

A man working as an advisor for the SRSG (X26), argues there have been made some improvements on certain areas. There has been a constitutional crisis, but since then Mali has had elections and

there is a formal government. Also on the area of security some improvements have been made: before the whole northern part was occupied by rebel groups, but nowadays not anymore. Because of these arguments, he states Mali is in a post-conflict phase.

Overarching opinion is that the reconstruction phase in Mali did not really start yet. The humanitarian needs in the north are still very high and a lot of IDP's do not dare to go back to their home towns because of the presence of rebel groups. The violence is not yet over in all regions and the differences between the north and the south are too big to describe the country in one word. According to the actors, the violence has to be completely banned before a country can become in a reconstruction phase. According to Barakat & Zyckm however, the reconstruction phase is a continuous process; it does not have a clear beginning or end. Reconstruction does not have an end-state, it is an ongoing process. Theoretically, reconstruction is starting in the phase directly after the conflict, but in most situations, like in Mali, there is no strict end of the violence so the reconstruction phase is a continuous phase, with ups-and-downs and periods of safety and periods of violence. The reconstruction phase can already start in the conflict phase, move to the phase of normality and fall back again to the crisis phase: it is an ongoing process.

By adding a 'post-conflict phase box' to the scheme (figure 14), it becomes easier to describe this ongoing process: the different phases are less far removed from each other and merge into another




Figure 14: Place of the post-conflict phase

easier. The post-conflict phase box represent the instable situation of Mali and the fluctuations between periods of conflicts and periods where actors start thinking about development again. Objection of many respondents was the strict separation between the conflict phase and the reconstruction phase. Although reconstruction does not have an end-state and is an ongoing process, the respondents did not want to use this word, because the situation is still too volatile. The risk of a resurgence of violence is too high; the conflict is lurking and the danger of drifting downward is too large. By adding this box, running through the various phases goes more smoothly.

Although most of the respondents stated they do not want to describe the current phase in Mali as a reconstruction phase, some of the domains Barakat & Zyckm describe are in the process of being achieved. All five domains within the reconstruction phase are necessary to reconstruct Mali. All actors also agree on the importance of these five domains, although each actor has a different focus within the reconstruction phase. The five domains are linked to each other, one cannot be achieved without making improvements on the other domains.

3.3. HUMANITARIAN ARENA

The humanitarian arena could be described as the interplay between different actors and institutions operating in a humanitarian field. The humanitarian arena is driven by every day practices and analyses processes rather than projects.¹²⁰ It is a system consisting of complementary parts of donors, UN and NGOs. This paragraph will describe how the arena is formed in practice and how the different actors negotiate about the formation and composition of the arena.

3.3.1. Formation of the humanitarian arena

The humanitarian arena was already being shaped before the arrival of the MINUSMA mission. Two important factors lie on the basis of the formation of the humanitarian arena. Before MINUSMA started their mission, France started operation Serval in January 2013. This operation was the first Western intervention in the country since years. Serval re-captured some strategic cities in the north and brought back the faith and believe in a stable and safe country. An European man working for a donor organisation (X37) explained that Operation Serval had an important influence on the formation of the humanitarian arena: *"The humanitarian arena has changed since the arrival of MINUSMA, although I have to say that the French intervention has had a much bigger influence on the arena."* Due to this operation, the north became more safe and stable so that NGOs could start thinking about re-starting programs again. A Ghanaian man working for a Dutch NGO (X7) added that also the events of 2012 had an important influence on the formation of the arena: *"I would not only attribute changes in the humanitarian arena to Serval and MINUSMA. I would think, since 2012, when there was this rebellion and occupation, things have changed."* The events of 2012 created a shift in the needs. Until that moment there were mainly development programs operating in the country, but since the outbreak of violence in 2012, the needs changed whereby the international humanitarian actors responded, which has again influences the formation of the arena.

The conflict in 2012 and the start of Operation Serval have made sure the UN established the stabilisation mission, on request of the government. In all countries with civil or political unrest or struggles, the UN sends an United Nations Country Team (UNCT), to investigate the situation in the country. If this team decides the situation needs a peacekeeping or stabilisation mission, they will think about the possible goals and design of the mission. This is called the 'concept of operations'. Since mid-2013, the MINUSMA mission started with their stabilisation mission and took over control in the northern areas. France had already drawn back their troops a few months after the start of Operation Serval.

The presence of the UN stabilisation mission has attracted other institutes to establish offices in Mali. Before the UN started their stabilisation mission in Mali, some UN agencies were already present in the country, for example OCHA and WFP. Since the start of the MINUSMA mission some additional UN agencies started programs. However, the mission has not only attracted UN agencies but also international NGOs. The number of international NGOs in the country has grown enormously since the crisis in 2012 and the related arrival of MINUSMA. Before the crisis there were about 40 or 50 international NGOs present, mainly focussing on development. Since the crisis there are 78 international NGOs active, both focussing on development and humanitarian needs. This increase of number is partly due to the increasing humanitarian needs, but main factor is that the presence of the UN has brought in new funding possibilities for humanitarian programs. These funds are partially from the UN, but their decision to start a mission has also released humanitarian funds from other donors like the EU.

An African researcher (X38) who was also investigating the humanitarian arena in Mali, explained that NGOs are moving faster as the UN. The decision of the UN to start a mission in a country has ensured that also other organisations will start programs in this same country, although most of the time these NGOs are starting their programs much faster: *"Since MINUSMA came, also many other*

¹²⁰ Hilhorst & Serrano (2010), pp. 183 – 185 & p. 199

actors came to Mali. However, NGOs move faster. So when the UN decides to start a mission, it takes a long time before they actually start this mission. In the meantime many NGOs could also decide to start programs in the same area and they are moving much faster. The arrival of MINUSMA thus creates an increase of actors.”

The humanitarian arena could be described as a play ball of politics. The arena is influenced by decisions made on global headquarter-level and follows the interest of international donors: “the money goes where the donors want to.”¹²¹ A Dutch women working for a lobby organisation for international NGOs (X11) explained the influence international donors and funds have on the arena. Since the start of the crisis there has been a stop of donor money for development programs. Donors did not want to spend any funds on development anymore, because of the increasing humanitarian needs. Funds have shifted from development purposes to humanitarian purposes. This has attracted new humanitarian NGOs like NRC and IRC and persuaded already present NGOs to change or add programs into humanitarian programs, like World Vision and Handicap International did. The humanitarian and the development cash flows are two really different flows which ask for different implementation mechanisms and different principles. Different actors working with different mechanisms and principles are operation in the same arena and therefore kind of forced to interact together. But this also shows the influence donors have on the composition and shaping of the arena. Chapter five explains this interaction more detailed.

3.3.2. Composition of the arena

In the humanitarian arena, multiple actors operate and negotiate the conditions and practices of aid. Aid gets shaped by interaction between the recipients, the providers and the donors. The humanitarian arena refers to the space in where humanitarian actors implement their tasks and where they negotiate about their responsibilities, according to their principles. Each actor adheres to its own principles and fears to be confused with other actors in the arena. The arena is under constantly construction; there is an continuous image formation.^{122 -123} The arena in Mali is still quite new; the mission just started and the different actors are still scanning each other. The composition of the arena is a continuous process, without a clear beginning nor a clear end-state. The European man working for a donor organisation (X37) explained the humanitarian arena in Mali in the following way: *“I would describe the arena as a bit coherent, uncoordinated. An arena under construction”*. There is a continuous process of a broadening of the arena.

All actors stated that a multi-sector and a multi-actor approach is very important. A Ghanaian man working for an international NGO (X7) argued that involving different actors is the only way to create sustainability: *“We think that the multi-sector approach is very important in sustaining development. We work with the government, the public sector, the private sector and academies or research institutions and civil society. So that is the kind of way we try to do it for sustainability. So we promote it: multi-sector approach.”* Also other actors argue that it is important to involve all actors in the interaction process in the arena, whereby – although not all actors are as much welcomed – it is not possible to ignore someone. This is confirmed by Hilhorst & Serrano (2010) who argued that the history of service delivery in Angola has showed that: *“during different conflict and post-conflict phases, a range of actors and service types that fall outside of those labelled as humanitarian were essential in addressing local needs.”*¹²⁴ In the process of providing aid and negotiating the everyday practices, it is important to involve all actors in the arena, in order to reach all the beneficiaries.

The Malian government is seen as one of the most important actors in reconstruction of the country. A Dutch civil-military advisor working for MINUSMA (X30) explained that the government is the final

¹²¹ Hilhorst & Jansen (2010)

¹²² Hilhorst & Jansen (2010), pp. 1117

¹²³ DeChaine, D.R. (2002)

¹²⁴ Hilhorst & Serrano (2010), p. 183

responsible for everything happening in the country. All other actors in the country are there to support the government. *“Wij zijn hier om de regering van Mali te helpen en de bevolking te beschermen.”*¹²⁵ In order to bring peace to the country, the government asked the UN to start a stabilisation mission. As a woman working for an international NGO (X9) explained: *“The government should be intermediary, but at the moment they are not strong enough to play that role.”* The Malian government asked the UN for help, on which the UN send their Country Team (UNCT) to frame the mission. However, because the government is still the final responsible and the one who has to take the lead again after the termination of the mission, they are an important actor in the humanitarian arena. The government has had an important influence in the composition of the arena. The lack of governmental institutions in the north is regretted by different actors.

On request of the government, the UN started their stabilisation mission. This is an important difference with the *raison d'être* of other international actors. The MINUSMA mission is here mainly to support the government, while other institutes are driven by humanitarian needs: *“MINUSMA is here in support of the government. They are invited by the government, to help them, to set in place, or to restore, rehabilitate whether it is territorial integrity, political stability, stabilisation and all that.”* (X19 – African women working for international NGO). The arrival of the MINUSMA mission was not well received by everyone. The European man working for a donor organisation (X37) explained that the influence of MINUSMA in the field is too big. When establishing the mission, they did not interfere with already present actors: *“MINUSMA came unprepared, unwilling to hear or listen or take into consideration whatever is already existing. Just acting like an elephant in a porcelain shop. They do not hear us. We are too small and tiny. They stamp on everything, creating a mess, completely.”* To his opinion, the UN just started this mission, without interfering or consulting the already present actors. On the other hand, other actors are really happy with the presence of the UN mission. Due to the stabilisation mission and Operation Serval the rebel groups in the north are pushed back so that other actors are able again to implement programs in certain areas in the north. An African woman working for an international NGO (X3) said she was really grateful when the UN started this mission, because due to their work, her organisation was able to carry out their work again more safely: *“MINUSMA has brought stability. Before their arrival the north and the south were completely separated. Now people are thinking about the future again. MINUSMA created safety and from there people go back again, start to develop themselves again. They start projects again. MINUSMA creates safety and good roads; this creates an opportunity for NGOs to go back again.”* However, not all actors agree with the statement that MINUSMA has brought safety: *“Ik denk dat je niet statistisch kan onderbouwen dat het in Mali veiliger is geworden door MINUSMA.”*¹²⁶ said the military advisor working for the Dutch embassy (X5). Overall opinion is that MINUSMA is such a big actor in the arena, that it is impossible to ignore them. Whether actors are happy or not with their presence, it is impossible to implement their work without noticing them: *“I think it is incredible irresponsible to not engage with an actor that has this big impact. Once again, you can agree or disagree with what they are doing whether you hate that they are here or not. That is not the point, they are here and they are engaged to the sections we are also working in. So you need to talk to them.”* (X27 – expat working for international NGO). The MINUSMA mission has an important influence on the humanitarian arena, because due to their presence the reconstruction of the country got a new boost and other international actors were attracted to the region. MINUSMA influences the humanitarian area, because of their dominance, the number of employees they have and the activities they do. This makes them one of the most important actors in the arena.

But not only the arrival of the MINUSMA mission was not welcomed by other actors, also the arrival of humanitarian based organisations was not well received by some other actors: *“Development actors, people who have a longer term presence, are not always super excited to see the humanitarian actors*

¹²⁵ For English translation, see appendix C, number 5.

¹²⁶ For English translation, see appendix C, number 6.

and the UN arriving. Because they realize people are in their territory.” (X27— expat working for international NGO). Mali does not have a long history of humanitarian programs; in the past donors were more focussing on development based actors and -projects, mainly aimed at farmers and agriculture in the southern areas. An European man working for a donor organisation (X37) explained that Mali has no humanitarian culture and that there are no humanitarian actors active who have a long history in the country: *“The problem is that Mali has no humanitarian culture. There are no real humanitarian actors, apart from ICRC and MSF.”* The involvement of humanitarian based actors has changed the arena. Their presence in the country is quite new and already active actors have to learn to take the new actors into account. The traditional development NGOs were used to work with their own standards and did not have any experience with military interventions or working together with the UN. Because of this new mix of traditional NGOs and new humanitarian actors, the mutual relationships became different. Each actor brings in new ideas and other mandates, which influence the arena. The arena is not only driven by the needs, but also by the actors involved.

A missing actor in the arena is the International Private Sector. The International Private Sector is much welcomed to join the arena by the other actors, but until this moment they are hardly involved, although they could have a lot of influence on the economic pillar in the reconstruction phase. Paragraph one already explained the lack of economic development in the country. Economic development will bring stability and sustainability. An African women working for an international NGO (X3) explained the importance of the involvement of the private sector: *“It brings stability in a certain way. Nobody wants to destroy what they have created. You do not want to destroy what you have taken years to do.”* However, she also emphasized the importance of a safe and stable environment for the international private sector. Without a stable environment, it is not worth it for international companies to invest in the country. Until so far the only international company involved in the arena is Orange, a telephone company. One of the pillars of reconstruction is the economic pillar: *“Economic stabilisation is necessary to rebuild the country”* as a Malian woman working for an international NGO clarified. Without the influence of the International Private Sector, there will not be economic growth. Without economic chances and prospects, young people will join rebel groups again, is the opinion of many expats working in the country. However, the government is not able to stimulate economic growth and it is not in the mandates of MINUSMA or other international actors to bring economic development, so the interference of the private sector is much welcomed. Chapter six will go into more depth about how their absence influences the arena and which role they could possibly play in the future.

Finally, the perception of the National Civil Society on the humanitarian arena is an interesting discussion point. The National Civil Society in Mali could be divided in three actors: local NGOs, local private sector and religious leaders. The chairman of a platform for local NGOs (X20 & X35) explained his perception on the arena. Because of the crisis, they accepted and understood the formation of a humanitarian arena, although they are disappointed by their own lack of involvement in the arena. According to him, each actor in the arena has an added value, and their added value lies in the field of local knowledge. Local actors have an enormous knowledge about the country, the situation and the conflict, which could be of good use for just entering international actors. Autesserre (2014) argued in her book that interveners value thematic expertise over local knowledge. The adherence to their own experience and their lack of local embeddedness prevents them from building trust and personal networks that are necessary for professional networks.¹²⁷ By establishing more partnerships with national organisations, the humanitarian community would be more able to adapt their programs to the local needs.

The role of the National Civil Society in the arena is small, they are mainly an implementing partner. Working together in the arena is important: *“Each actor has its own rules and vision and mandate, so if you want to work together, you have to adapt to each other”*. According to the National

¹²⁷ Autesserre (2014), pp. 249 - 250

Civil Society, the most important actors in the arena are the government, the international private sector and themselves. The National Civil Society also advocates for more involvement of the local population in the arena. By involving the local population in decision making, awareness and confidence is created. Citizens need to accept the institutions and in order for citizens to accept that, it is important to strengthen the contact, the trust and the availability of social and public services. It is important to strengthen individual capacities, so that people can take care of their own rights and needs and become more resilient. Only in this way a sustainable arena can be created. An imam (X28) explained that there is lack of trust in the arena. *"Many international institutes do not trust Islamic Organisations, this is caused by a wrong or inadequate image formation in the media."* Without having trust in each other, coordination between the different involved actors becomes very difficult.

3.4. CONCLUSION


This chapter answers the following research question: **How do the different humanitarian actors in Mali describe the main problems in the country and what is their perception on the reconstruction phase and the humanitarian arena?**

The country faces various problems that are explained in different ways by the involved actors in the arena. The differences between the northern and the southern part of the country are huge and strengthen the separation between policy and implementation. The actors involved in the peacebuilding and stabilisation process have different discourses about the description of Mali's current phase and the application of the five domains of reconstruction. Most actors working in the field argue that the reconstruction phase has not start yet. There is still too much violence in the country and the peace negotiations have not start yet. Interviewees referred to a 'post-conflict phase', a fragile phase between crisis and reconstruction, with fluctuations between periods of stability and periods of violence. Actors in the country are focusing on five different domains of reconstruction (physical, safety, politics, social and economic) whereby each domain is considered equally important.

The humanitarian arena in Mali is a community that is under constant construction. The formation has just started and is still continuing; it does not have a fixed start nor will it have a precisely end date, as we have learned from other UN missions worldwide. The arena is influenced by different actors and institutes with different backgrounds who negotiate together about the interpretation of the giving of aid. Especially the presence of the UN integrated mission has influenced the formation and composition of the arena, because they brought in new funds and several NGOs decided to launch new programs in their wake. However, each actor influences the arena in its own way, and all these influences together shape the humanitarian arena. The arena is constantly changing and expanding itself, based on the interactions between the involved actors and the way they negotiate about the humanitarian principles. Additionally, the needs influence the composition. The focus of the donors has shifted from development programs to humanitarian programs; this has also changed another composition of present actors in the arena.

Taking above statements into account, the humanitarian arena in Mali consists of six different pillars (figure 15): the UN (which can be divided in the MINUSMA mission and the UN agencies, merged in the UN Country Team), the government, international NGOs, donors, the National Civil Society (subdivided in local NGOs, religious leaders and local entrepreneurs) and the International Private Sector. All those actors operate in the same field and negotiate together about the composition of the humanitarian arena. All actors desire a sustainable arena and accept that it is necessary to involve different actors with different backgrounds on different levels. Each actor has its own added value and its own focus and can contribute to the stabilisation and peacebuilding in the country in his own way. These six actors form the key players of the empirical chapters and are the most influencing actors in the coordination structure.

Figure 15: Involved actors in the Humanitarian Arena in Mali



The argument of the interviewees that the arena is still being shaped and that the reconstruction phase did not really start yet, fosters the various discourses that exist in the arena. The next chapters explain how these different perceptions on the arena and the reconstruction phase influence the mutual expectations and the coordination structure.

4. ACTORS AND EXPECTATIONS



4. ACTORS AND EXPECTATIONS

'Avec Maggi, chaque femme est une étoile', is a very well-known wall painting on a roundabout close to Hippodrome in Bamako. The expectation is that each woman is able to cook a delicious meal for her family with the help of Maggi. However, this statement does not make clear if women like to cook or even if they like to use Maggi; the assumption is that with the help of Maggi, every woman becomes a master chef.

This chapter explains the different perceptions of the involved actors on their own role in the arena and the expectations the actors have from each other. Just like the expression above, there might be some discrepancy in expectations about each other. The six different actors introduced in chapter three are central again (figure 15). Each actor explains his own role in the arena and his expectations from the other actors. Besides, the concept of the UN integrated mission and the opinions in the arena about this presence are clarified. The consequences of the differences in the mandates and the management of expectations are explained with help of the theories about broadening of the humanitarian arena, securitization and radicalisation of aid. The research question which is covered in this chapter is: **What are the perceptions of the different actors on their own role in the humanitarian arena and to what extent does this meet the mutual expectations?**

4.1. UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations are present in two ways in Mali: by the MINUSMA stabilisation mission and via the different UN agencies, merged in the UN Country Team (figure 16). Because the mission is an integrated mission, this means that there is an 'one UN approach': the stabilisation mission and the UN agencies are working together.¹²⁸ In this paragraph, the mandates and modus operandi of both parts are explained, next to the interpretation and consequences of the integrated mission itself.

4.1.1. United Nations Country Team

The United Nations Country Team (UNCT) was already present in Mali before the arrival of the UN stabilisation mission and contains of two parts: a group of development based UN agencies¹²⁹ and the humanitarian based UN agencies,

which are represented in the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT)¹³⁰ (figure 17). An advisor working for MINUSMA (X21) clarified that it is very important that MINUSMA and the UNCT work closely together, because the mission will leave one day while the UNCT will stay for many decennia longer. To guarantee stability and a continuation of the projects undertaken, the UN agencies need to become involved in the stabilisation and peacekeeping process. The goal of the UNCT is to formulate a common position amongst UN agencies on certain topics, to ensure cohesion in action and advocacy. The UNCT forms the link between all UN agencies and MINUSMA and is led by the Resident Coordinator (RC), David Gressly.¹³¹ The UNCT forms the counterpart of the HCT, which is also led by Gressly, in his role of Humanitarian Coordinator (HC). David Gressly has four positions at the same time. Besides his functions as RC and HC, he is also head of UNDP (an UN agency) and Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) within the civil pillar of MINUSMA. This four-hatted position of David Gressly is one of the expressions of the integration of different UN agencies and is explained in paragraph 4.1.3. about the integrated mission.




Figure 16: United Nations structure


¹²⁸ This 'One UN approach' is based on the a report from Kofi Annan, issued in 2006: UN (2006) - Delivering as One

¹²⁹ Development based UN agencies present in Mali: UNWOMEN, UNESCO, OHCHR, UNAIDS, UNMAS, UNOPS, IFAD, ILO

¹³⁰ Humanitarian based UN agencies active in the HCT in 2014: OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, IOM, UNFPA, WHO, FAO, WFP, UNDP

¹³¹ UNDG (2015)

The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT)



The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) is a platform which is part of the UN and linked to MINUSMA in different ways. The HCT is an independent body used for strategic and operational decision-making and brings together the key humanitarian actors in order to coordinate better and have a stronger and clearer voice in the arena. One of the members of the HCT (X19) explained that this platform forms a very strategic body within the humanitarian world. For example, the HCT has written a Strategic Response Plan, to be able to response coordinated in a more strategic way and fill in the humanitarian needs without overlap. The HCT is accountable for making agreements on strategic issues which are related to humanitarian action.¹³² In the year 2014 the HCT was

represented by seven international NGOs¹³³, nine humanitarian UN agencies¹³⁴, the ICRC (only as an observer) and the two biggest donors: ECHO and US AID (figure 17). All actors present in the HCT have a humanitarian mandate. The NGOs involved in the HCT work on a rotating basis; they represent the other humanitarian based NGOs turn by turn.

An advisor working for the DSRSG in MINUSMA (X21) explained that the HCT is a way to make meetings more easy. When only representatives of the international organisations are invited, more people and institutes will be reached, but at the same time it becomes possible to gather with less people and make meetings more effective. Also other NGOs appreciate this structure of gathering together. It reduces the number of meetings, but there is no risk of not getting involved or losing information.

UN agencies

Mid-2014, there were 17 different UN agencies present in the humanitarian arena in Mali. Some of them were already active in the country before the arrival of MINUSMA, while others started their projects in the wake of MINUSMA. A women working as an advisor for the HCT (X19) explained that some UN agencies show many similarities with NGOs, referring to their mandate and way of working. Just like NGOs, also UN agencies can be divided in humanitarian based and development based but most of them have mixed mandates: *"All the UN agencies have a humanitarian mandate as well as development mandate. With the exception of OCHA and UNDP. These two are clearly distinct. UNDP is development and OCHA is humanitarian."* Also the advisor of DSRSG (X21) agreed with this division: *"Within all UN agencies you have some humanitarian and some development, but most of them are half development and half humanitarian."*

UN agencies are organisations part of the UN structure, but each organisation has its own mandate and their own programs. Although both MINUSMA and the UN agencies are part of the same UN and the mission is an 'integrated mission', there are important differences between UN agencies and the MINUSMA mission. A women working for a UN agency (X34) explained that UN agencies are more focussing on the needs, while MINUSMA is more active in the political atmosphere: *"We are rights based, they [MINUSMA] are policy based. They have a political mandate, we are here because of people are suffering and people need help."*

UN agencies argued that they are more focussing on the population or the humanitarian and development needs as the MINUSMA mission is doing. This difference could be compared to the

¹³² Humanitarian Response Info (2015b)

¹³³ NGOs active in the HCT in 2014: NRC, ACTED, World Vision, IRC, DRC, Solidarité.

¹³⁴ Humanitarian based UN agencies active in the HCT in 2014: OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, IOM, UNFPA, WHO, FAO, WFP, UNDP

difference between human and state security. The MINUSMA mission is (as is explained in the next paragraph), in general, mainly focussing on state building and state security. On the other hand, the UN agencies feel more connected to the concept of human security: they focus on the direct well-being of the population. This difference in focus causes a difference in feelings of relatedness. The woman working for a UN agency (X34) also explained that UN agencies feel more connected to international NGOs as to the MINUSMA mission. The way of working and the principles they adhere show many similarities. This could also be linked to the theory that international NGOs also focus more on human security instead of state security. UN agencies and international NGOs understand each other's mandates and have most of the time the same mission. A CIMIC advisor working for MINUSMA (X1) added to this: *"In de praktijk blijkt dat een organisatie als World Food Program zich sterker identificeert met de NGO wereld en de hulporganisaties dan bijvoorbeeld met de militairen van MINUSMA. Terwijl ze allebei onderdeel van de VN zijn, maar zo zien ze dat gewoon zelf niet. Hun hele leven en hun hele ervaring is gebaseerd op dat zij onderdeel van de humanitarian community zijn en dus vanuit het idee van de humanitarian space een gebied benaderen."*¹³⁵

On the other hand there are also important differences between UN agencies and international NGOs. A woman working for a lobby organisation for international NGOs (X11) clarified that the UN can have multiple roles, which distinct them from NGOs: *"VN organisaties zijn anders, de VN is echt een klasse apart. De VN is echt een multilateraal kanaal wat dus wel bepaalde rollen heeft, maar weer hele andere rollen als NGOs hebben. Totaal onvergelijkbaar. De VN is soms een donor, soms een advocate, soms een policy body, ligt helemaal aan wie je waar hebt."*¹³⁶ Another important difference between UN agencies and NGOs is explained by a man working for an international NGO (X7) who said that each agency is working on a different scale level. According to him, UN agencies are working on a higher level as international NGOs and these international NGOs work again on a higher level as civil society actors: *"NGO decisions are made locally, they do not have a hierarchy. So the mode of operations is different, they can response very quickly to situations locally. Of course they do not mobilize a lot of resources either. Like the UN does. They cannot be present all at one time. (...) There is a need for complementarity between them. Because each of them have their advantages and disadvantages"* Later on he also explained the differences in reaction time between NGOs and UN agencies: *"For example, if I take the UN, they may take a very long time to respond to a need, because of the bureaucracy and how big they are. But they have a lot of resources to respond. The NGOs can take action very quickly, because they are locally based and decisions can be made locally, so they can respond very quickly. But they also do not have a lot of resources to be able to make impact in very big projects. They cannot make big impact. That is why they try to come together. Because they are small they can respond to certain kind of needs, where the UN cannot respond to. For example, the UN has to go with many vehicles, marked on certain times. But the NGOs can decide to go with donkey's and camels."* UN agencies work on a higher scale level as NGOs and need a longer response time to be able to react on a crisis situation, there are not as flexible as most NGOs are. UN agencies hardly implement their own programs. Most of the time their work as a donor and they hire local or international NGOs as implementing partners. An African man working for an international NGO (X13) explained that there is no hierarchical difference between UN agencies and NGOs, for involved actors it feels like they are working on the same level: *"UN agencies work like a donor to us. So we write a proposal, they approve the proposal, we both sign the agreement and we are implementing."*

The arrival of the mission has changed the way of working for UN agencies, according to some actors in the arena. A man working for one of the biggest donor organisations (X37) explained: *"For the UN agencies, it is completely different. Because their way of working has completely changed. They cannot do anything without the green light. The green light from UNDSS."* Because UN agencies are part of the 'one UN approach', their work has to fit within the mandate of the MINUSMA mission. Also a woman working for an international lobby platform (X11) explained that all actors linked to the UN,

¹³⁵ For English translation, see appendix C, number 7.

¹³⁶ For English translation, see appendix C, number 8.

got a military twist since the arrival of the UN. They cannot act neutral or independent anymore. On the other side, someone working for a UN agency (X31) argued that according to him, the distinction between UN agencies and the MINUSMA mission is very clear: *"At least the one I am talking to, they know very well the difference between the integrated UN mission MINUSMA and the UN agencies individually. They know and understand our mandates."* He also said his daily work did not change since the arrival of the MINUSMA mission. He compared this situation in Mali to the situation in South-Africa, where he has also worked for a UN agency. This difference is caused by a different history in conflicts. Mali knows a long history in different conflicts and various UN interference; in contrast to South-Africa, where there has only been one crisis: the Apartheid. He argued that the local population and other NGOs in Mali are used to work with UN agencies, the country already has a long experience of working with them.

Weir (2006) explained in her article that it is sometimes difficult for UN agencies that they now belong to the 'one-UN family' while they felt more related to the humanitarian community before. The mandates of the UN agencies are broad, with elements of both humanitarian and development aims, but focus in general on human security. Although the UN agencies were originally established to operate independently from the core-UN, the current complex emergencies hinder this. Due to the more insecure situations, the most recent missions all have an integrated approach, of where all UN entities fall under the same hat. This 'one UN approach' creates a situation in where it becomes more difficult for UN agencies to stay neutral and independent. Due to the – on paper – overarching goal, the UN agencies are now connected to the (partly military) mandate of the integrated mission. It becomes more difficult for them to stick to the principles of independency and neutrality.¹³⁷ UN agencies in Mali have to frame their position in the arena again, but until now there haven't been complaints about confusion of their position in the arena.

OCHA

Within the group of UN agencies, UN OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) has a special role. Traditionally, OCHA has the task to improve coordination between different actors in the humanitarian arena. OCHA is the UN coordination body for the humanitarian agencies. They work closely together with the lead agencies of the different clusters in order to develop policies, coordinate inter-cluster issues, support operational guidance and organize field support. The cluster system falls under the wings of OCHA and is explained more detailed in chapter five. Besides, OCHA provides guidance and support to the HC and HCT.¹³⁸ A woman working for OCHA (X8 & X24) explained her mandate as: *"We are here to ensure that humanitarian actors can still work in the field, even if you have ongoing military operations. So it is really to maintain and to be sure that we have a humanitarian space and the people can still work in accordance to their principles of neutrality and partiality."* She also explained that OCHA is coordinating with everybody who is willing to talk with them: *"We are in charge of humanitarian coordination, so we are not only coordinating with NGOs but also with all humanitarian UN agencies, like UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF."* OCHA is the mediator between all different actors in the arena. They represent the humanitarian community within the UN and form the link between MINUSMA and humanitarian agencies. OCHA wants to ensure there is an ongoing dialogue between the humanitarian community and the military forces (both the national military, MINUSMA military and armed rebel groups). They try to see how MINUSMA can support the humanitarian actors and the humanitarian arena, without exceeding lines or principles. To preserve the humanitarian principles, sometimes it is difficult for NGOs to have direct contact with MINUSMA. In this case, OCHA can play the mediator role and speak on behalf of all international NGOs with MINUSMA. When NGOs have a request for MINUSMA, they ask this via OCHA. This also applies vice versa. Requests are mainly focussing on two theme's: military affairs (for example road patrols or escort) or civil affairs (for example information exchange or cargo questions).

¹³⁷ Weir (2006), pp. 5-6 & 29-30

¹³⁸ UN OCHA (2015a)

Coordination between humanitarian actors is also important, because otherwise there is the risk of overlap of programs or requests. Another advantage of coordinating via OCHA, is that OCHA can summarize the requests, so that not all NGOs are asking the same questions to MINUSMA. Finally, military and civilians have another way of working, another language and another mind-set. Sometimes it is difficult for these groups to understand each other, because of these differences. OCHA can again be the mediator in this case and support mutual understanding between these two groups of actors.

The MINUSMA mission is an integrated mission, what means that, in theory, all UN agencies are involved in the stabilisation mission and fit under the same umbrella. Also OCHA is considered as part of this 'one UN structure', so indirectly linked to the military part within MINUSMA. A civil advisor working for MINUSMA (X12) explained that this can bring OCHA in a difficult situation, whereby there could be a problem with sticking to the principle of neutrality. Some actors are afraid that OCHA is too closely involved with the military part of MINUSMA so that they can't be the representative of the humanitarian community anymore. Humanitarian actors could fear that OCHA will channel information to the military. A women working for the civil-military department within OCHA (X8 & X24) argued that before the mission came in, it was really clear for the international relief agencies that OCHA was representing the humanitarian community and that they were promoting the humanitarian principles. With the arrival of MINUSMA it changed a bit: *"They were scared that we will be influenced by MINUSMA and that we will be part of MINUSMA and being influenced by their agenda."* For NGOs it becomes more difficult to make the distinction between MINUSMA and the UN agencies, like OCHA. But as OCHA says: *"We have a link with the mission, but we are not part of the mission."* However, although some NGOs expressed their fear OCHA will become too much involved with MINUSMA, there have been no concrete examples of problems of coordination with MINUSMA. The overwhelming part of the humanitarian actors are thankful for the work OCHA is doing.

Worldwide, OCHA is the UN organisation for coordination in the humanitarian field. In the case of Mali this role is clear: they are the contact point in discussions between MINUSMA and other actors in the humanitarian field. Their role is solid and not undermined by the other actors in the humanitarian arena. However, this is not the case in all crises worldwide. In the current Ebola crisis, it looks like the WHO (World Health Organisation, also a UN agency) is taking over the lead, since they were the first agency involved in this crisis. Later on, the UN have started their first health mission ever: UNMEER (UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response), with headquarters in New York and Accra. In the fight against Ebola, many different actors are involved: donors (Western governments and the EU), international NGOs, National Civil Society organisations and other UN agencies. It looks like not OCHA is taking lead in coordinating all those actors, but the WHO and UNMEER are taking over this role. At this moment it is too early to draw conclusions about the long term effect of this process, but the differences in responsibility between these two crises is important to notice.

4.1.2. MINUSMA

The MINUSMA mission is an integrated mission and contains of three different pillars. This paragraph explains how both people working within MINUSMA and other actors in the arena think about the structure and mandate of the mission.

Own vision on structure

The MINUSMA mission consists of three pillars: force, police and civil (figure 18¹³⁹) and is headed by the SRSG; until the end of 2014 that was Bert Koenders. He was at the same time head of the

¹³⁹ Figure 18 is a simplified representation of the organogram of MINUSMA. Only the pillars that matter for this research are displayed. The departments that are only important for internal business within MINUSMA (or the supporting departments) are not discussed in this research.

MINUSMA mission and head of the UN agencies active in the country; this is one of the examples of the integration of this mission.

The three pillars in the mission do not have an equal size; there are important differences between them. The police pillar has the most obvious role: they are responsible for the training of local actors to maintain the safety after MINUSMA will leave.




Figure 18: Structure of the MINUSMA mission and the most important departments

The civil pillar has a mainly political and development role and contains of different departments with subjects related to gender, child protection, rule of law and civil rights. The civil pillar forms the bridge between the humanitarian actors in the country and MINUSMA itself. A civil-military advisor (X1) described the civil pillar as several separate islands. The office of the DSRSG forms the strongest link with the UNCT and the UN agencies. To create a stronger link between the different civilian sections within MINUSMA and the Humanitarian Country Team, the office of Stabilization and Recovery was created (figure 18). This office tries to start the dialogue between

different sections, build bridges and share information. This mission is the first mission where this office exist. An employee of this office (X16) said: *“This section does not exist in any other peacekeeping mission.”* A woman working for the office of Stabilization and Recovery (X17) added that this section is still framing itself and tries to seek how they can support the humanitarian community in the country. It is an often heard complaint that even people working within MINUSMA can’t find each other or are not able to share information: *“Informatie delen binnen verschillende takken van MINUSMA is nog niet zo makkelijk. Dat is nog een brug die geslagen moet worden.”*¹⁴⁰ (X12, civil advisor working for the force pillar).

An important difference between the civil pillar and the military pillar is described by a civil-military advisor deployed at the force pillar (X1): *“Op de civiele afdeling werken mensen die al 20 jaar voor de VN allerlei verschillende functies en missies hebben gedaan. Voor militairen is dit vaak hun eerste VN missie en dan is het maar zes maanden. Dat wringt soms.”*¹⁴¹ This is an important difference in experience, which influences the way the different pillars implement their programs. Another CIMIC advisor (X30) explained that, because this mission is a UN mission, functions are carried out by people without a suitable background: *“De Force is niet verantwoordelijk voor de deelnemende naties en de deelnemende individuen. Ik word persoonlijk als hoofd van een sectie geconfronteerd met mensen die opeens aan mijn bureau staan, daar moet ik het gewoon mee doen. En die blijken dan helemaal geen passende achtergrond te hebben. Dat is een VN probleem volgens mij. Mensen in New York bepalen wie er in de missie op welke stoel komt te zitten. In NAVO operaties zitten in principe mensen op een stoel die dat al jaren doen en weten wat ze aan het doen zijn. De CIMIC mensen in deze missie hebben meestal geen training en ervaring.”*¹⁴² Due to their inexperience, they will deal in another way with certain issues as people with a suitable background. He also added that his biggest point for improvement would be more experienced staff: *“Voor mij persoonlijk zou het idealer zijn als ik personeel zou hebben dat precies weet wat het moet doen en wat het niet moet doen. Bijv. de discussie wat is CIMIC wel en wat is CIMIC niet.”*¹⁴³

¹⁴⁰ For English translation, see appendix C, number 9.

¹⁴¹ For English translation, see appendix C, number 10.

¹⁴² For English translation, see appendix C, number 11.

¹⁴³ For English translation, see appendix C, number 12.

Different men working in or closely related to the force pillar (X5 & X32) argued that this pillar is subordinate to the other two pillars. One of them (X32) explained that the mission got two main commands by their establishment: protection of the civilians and ensuring the government of Mali gets back in control over the whole territory of the country. He argued that the mandate of MINUSMA could be summarized in these two tasks. In principle, the military pillar is not needed to fulfil these tasks. However, military can make it easier for the other two pillars to perform these tasks. The force pillar can shape an arena in where it is possible for the police and civilians to perform their jobs. According to him, that is the role of the force pillar and therefore this pillar is subordinate to the other two. Another man working for the force pillar (X30 & X33) added to this that it is the job of the force pillar to enable others to do their work. According to him, the mission of MINUSMA is a civilian-led mission, where the military force has barely any responsibilities. The force pillar is included in the mission to enable the civil parties, both within and outside MINUSMA, to carry out their work. Only as a last resort, the force pillar can take over tasks if other actors are not able to fulfil these anymore. However, the borderline of being or not being able to fulfil a task is very thin. He argued explicitly that the force pillar, and MINUSMA as a whole, did not come to the country to do humanitarian work.

Amongst MINUSMA employees, there is division about the three-pillar structure. Each pillar has its own goals, but there is not always consensus about these individual goals and coherence. A civil-military advisor working in the force pillar (X1) said: *“MINUSMA heeft drie poten: een civiele, een militaire en een politie. En die werken alle drie op hun manier mee binnen de missie, maar binnen hun eigen organisatie. En het is al heel moeilijk om die drie op elkaar af te stemmen. Daar hebben heel veel mensen al een volledige dagtaak aan.”*¹⁴⁴ Atonement and agreement between the different pillars is difficult, because the people working in the different pillars have a very different background and different ways of working. Another man working in the force pillar as a civil advisor (X12) is critical about the integrated mission and added to the previous statement: *“Het is natuurlijk onwijs moeilijk om echt te integreren met een starre, hiërarchische jongensclub-cultuur als de militaire cultuur is. De mate waarin je echt kunt integreren is misschien ook..., daar zitten beperkingen op. Daar geloof ik heilig in.”*¹⁴⁵ According to him, the difference between the different pillars are so big that integration becomes more difficult. A civil-military advisor working for the force pillar (X30 & X33) clarified this: *“Mijn persoonlijke waarneming tot nu toe: het ontbreekt aan een duidelijke visie in mijn optiek. En als je die niet hebt, kan je hem ook niet delen. Dat is punt één. Punt twee is dat militairen en civiele mensen op een verschillende manier werken en ook op een verschillende manier tijdslijnen hebben. Een concreet en bekend voorbeeld is dat militairen begin 2014 volledig ontplooid moesten zijn, dat betekent: ze moeten allemaal ergens wonen, allemaal voldoende te eten hebben, ze moeten munitie hebben etc. Alleen de logistiek wordt uitgevoerd door civiele mensen, en die moeten pas begin 2015 op volledige sterkte zijn. Dat is een spanning. We hebben nu 100% van de spullen nodig en zij zijn er pas klaar voor begin 2015 om 100% van de spullen te leveren. Dat betekent voor ons dat er mensen honger hebben of geen bescherming of geen onderdak hebben of geen vluchten hebben. Dat is een tweede punt van niet goed geïntegreerd zijn. Het begint met een gezamenlijk plan wat gezamenlijk gedeeld wordt, dat is er niet of onvoldoende. En dan heb je de opbouw en de uitvoering van wat nodig is om dat plan tot stand te brengen en te realiseren. Dat loopt ook in een verschillend tempo. Dan heb je daarnaast ook nog de mind-set, de cultuur. Militairen hebben een heel andere werkcultuur dan burgers. Dat zie je aan verloven, werktijden. Die (burgers) hebben een andere sense of urgency.”*¹⁴⁶ According to him, fully integration is not possible at this moment, due to the difference in deployment between the different departments. Some departments are dependent of other departments, who are fully operational in a later timeframe. However, after the first set-up phase of the mission, this problem should be solved. A CIMIC advisor working for MINUSMA (X1) said about the statement that MINUSMA is not fully operational yet: *“We zitten nog in de aanloop fase. Heel veel VN missies gaan na*

¹⁴⁴ For English translation, see appendix C, number 13.

¹⁴⁵ For English translation, see appendix C, number 14.

¹⁴⁶ For English translation, see appendix C, number 15.

*drie tot vijf jaar beter functioneren. De eerste drie jaar ben je nog ontzettend bezig met het opzetten van de minimale organisatie.”*¹⁴⁷ He also thinks that the coordination between the different pillars should improve after the first startup phase.

Own vision on mandate

The MINUSMA mission was established after consultation with the Malian government and is mainly aimed to support the government in bringing back the peace and stability in the country. The mandates of MINUSMA (text box 4 and 5) contain elements with a focus on both state security (clearing the north from the rebel groups, bringing peace to the country and re-construct governmental structures) and human security (protection of human rights, support for humanitarian assistance). The mandate is reformed each year. The first mandate¹⁴⁸, resolution 2100, was valid from July 2013 till July 2014. In June 2014, resolution 2164¹⁴⁹ was adopted, which is valid for another year again. In this way, the mission is always adapting to the most recent needs. The policies which are applied, are adapted to the local

Text box 4: mandate of MINUSMA / resolution 2100

- a) Stabilization of key population centres and support for the re-establishment of State authority throughout the country.
- b) Support for the implementation of the transitional roadmap, including the national political dialogue and the electoral process.
- c) Protection of civilians and United Nations personnel.
- d) Promotion and protection of human rights.
- e) Support for humanitarian assistance.
- f) Support for cultural preservation.
- g) Support for national and international justice.

Text box 5: mandate of MINUSMA / resolution 2164

- a) Security, stabilization and protection of civilians.
- b) Support to national political dialogue and reconciliation.
- c) Support to the re-establishment of State authority throughout the country, the rebuilding of the Malian security sector, the promotion and protection of human rights and the support for humanitarian assistance.
- d) Protection of United Nations personnel.
- e) Support for cultural preservation.

circumstances. Policy and practice are shaped in the process of implementation.¹⁵⁰ Because the resolution is changed each year, it is always adapted to the recent situation and context. Due to extreme fightings in Kidal in May 2014 for example, the new resolution has a stronger focus on presence of peacekeeping forces in the northern areas and protection of civilians. Besides, the new mandate emphasizes on peace talks and there is a call upon the Malian government to take more responsibility and ownership.¹⁵¹

An advisor of the SRS (X26) said about the first mandate: *“Wat we in het begin hebben gedaan, als je het mandaat van MINUSMA leest, dat is een beetje absurd. Alsof we hier het hele land gaan opbouwen en verbeteren. Op elk terrein moeten we wel iets doen volgens die veiligheidsresolutie. Super breed! Toen heeft Koenders gezegd: ik wil vier topprioriteiten hebben en op die vier topprioriteiten zijn vier werkgroepen gecreëerd. Die worden voorgezeten door iemand van MINUSMA en iemand van een agency.”*¹⁵² This is again an example of the integration between the peacekeeping mission and the UN agencies.

Besides the overarching mandate, each pillar has its own goals and its own mission. These underlying goals however are not clear to all actors working for MINUSMA. Especially the mandates of the civil and the force pillar are not clear according to both actors within and outside the UN. A civil advisor working for the force pillar (X12) stated: *“Nou dat [civil affairs] vind ik ook een vage club moet ik zeggen. Ook omdat die naar mijn idee nogal snel op het terrein zitten van andere organisaties buiten MINUSMA.”*¹⁵³ But also other actors have different views on the explanations of the MINUSMA

¹⁴⁷ For English translation, see appendix C, number 16.

¹⁴⁸ United Nations Security Council (2013), Resolution 2100

¹⁴⁹ United Nations Security Council (2014), Resolution 2164

¹⁵⁰ Hilhorst & Jansen (2010)

¹⁵¹ Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2014)

¹⁵² For English translation, see appendix C, number 17.

¹⁵³ For English translation, see appendix C, number 18.

mandate. Two civil-military advisors (X1 and X30 & X33), both working for the U9 office (figure 18) have different perceptions on the line 'support for humanitarian assistance'. They both had different views on the role of the force pillar and when something fits within the work of this pillar and when something lies more in the field of humanitarian agencies. These differences are the consequence of a discourse in expectation management. One of them (X30 & X33) explained this difference in the following way: *"Je hebt twee stromingen in de CIMIC wereld. Je hebt de mensen die een beetje de groene NGO in hun achterhoofd hebben: 'we willen goede dingen doen voor de mensen'. Dat wil ik op zich ook, maar wij zijn een militaire instrument met een militaire doelstelling. En onze doelstelling is om anderen hun werk te kunnen laten doen, zodat wij onze handen vrij hebben voor andere dingen waar we wel voor zijn. En wij zijn er voor de veiligheid. En alles wat ons daarbij in de weg staat komt ons niet van pas en daarom willen we anderen 'enablen' om dat voor ons uit handen te nemen."*¹⁵⁴ These different perceptions between people working on the same position is difficult for other people in the humanitarian arena, it causes indistinctness. The CIMIC-advisors change twice a year, so there is a chance that every six months someone else with a different background and different experience will give advice on civil-military issues. This turnover of staff and differences in education, background and experience make it difficult for other actors in the arena to create a sustainable relationship with MINUSMA, based on civil-military issues.

A woman working for the office of Stabilization and Recovery (X17) explained that she is aware there have been other actors in the country who deal with humanitarian assistance already for a long time, even before the arrival of the mission. She explained that the task of MINUSMA is not to do humanitarian work themselves, but to support these humanitarian actors with implementing their work: *"We understand that there are principles and the main issue here is to get to the communities, to make sure that we reach those who are in need, the most vulnerable people. We rely a lot on assessments done by humanitarians. We also facilitate in terms of transporting. Help the humanitarians transporting during a crisis. We are trying to make a standard of operating procedures. To make it a standard in case of emergency or evacuation or in case of specific needs. To make sure what each actor can do. How can MINUSMA support? Because we have quite a number of means. We have planes that go everywhere. So we can provide support to those who are in need. We are now in the process of putting some standard procedures and working with systemization."* She explained that due to the large number of means and funds MINUSMA has, they are able to help other actors to carry out their work. An advisor of the SRS (X26) added that he understands the feeling of NGOs about the arrival of MINUSMA: *"Ik heb de analyse van een Franse onderzoeker gelezen, die heeft veel interviews gedaan met MINUSMA mensen en traditionele donoren, dus de ambassades; die vinden het soms wel irritant dat MINUSMA het land zo ineens binnenkomt en alles gaat voorzitten, terwijl zij al jarenlang ervaring hebben."*¹⁵⁵ People working for MINUSMA themselves understand the feelings of dissatisfaction from the humanitarian community about their 'sudden' presence in the field.

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (X32) said he thinks it is logical that there is internal division about the mandate of the mission: *"In zo'n grote missie is dat toch logisch [dat het mandaat door verschillende mensen binnen MINUSMA op een andere manier wordt uitgelegd]. Ik snap dat wel. Het is een missie met 14.000 mensen, iemand die heel dicht betrokken is bij het onderwerp die heeft een mening die wellicht wat meer gefocaliseerd is op zijn missie alleen en mensen die meer generalistisch kijken die plaatsen dat in perspectief en kijken daar wellicht iets anders tegenaan."*¹⁵⁶ This is again an example of the idea that the implementation of the mission is human work, it is all dependent of the people involved in the mission.

¹⁵⁴ For English translation, see appendix C, number 19.

¹⁵⁵ For English translation, see appendix C, number 20.

¹⁵⁶ For English translation, see appendix C, number 21.

All employees agree that MINUSMA came to Mali 'to support the government'. However, this role could be explained in different ways. All respondents working for MINUSMA itself argued that MINUSMA does not do humanitarian work itself, but only supports the government and the humanitarian community, to make it possible these actors can implement their programs. One of the CIMIC advisors (X30 & X33) clarified that in the first place, the Malian government is responsible for humanitarian assistance to the international actors. In order to help the government, the MINUSMA mission was framed. Difficulty hereby is the four-hatted position of David Gressly¹⁵⁷. Due to his involvement in both the mission and the Humanitarian Country Team, he embodies the integration of the mission. Someone working for the QIPs unit (X16) explained that the office of the DSRSG of David Gressly is called the 'integrated office': *"It is the task of this office to coordinate, to make sure there is coordination of the work of the mission with the humanitarian and development actors."* The office of the DSRSG is an important actor in coordination between the different UN offices in the integrated mission. However, due to this four-hatted position, it becomes more difficult to say if MINUSMA is doing humanitarian work or not. At least MINUSMA is very closely involved to humanitarian work and according to some other respondents in the humanitarian arena, this four-hatted created fussiness and indistinctness about the exact mandate of MINUSMA. Weir (2006) explains that, due to the double role of the HC / RC it is difficult for him to stay neutral and independent: the political context will always be intervened in his humanitarian tasks. Also in Liberia this double role of the HC / RC has caused some tensions between the ostensibly neutral humanitarian community and the political actors.¹⁵⁸ The integration between the different UN –entities and people's opinions about the multi-hatted position are explained more in paragraph 4.1.3. about the integrated mission.

Expectations other actors have from MINUSMA's mandate and the work they do.

The expectations other actors have from MINUSMA could be categorised according to three main themes: ignorance about the mandate, lack of communication and interference with humanitarian work.

First of all, many actors in the arena do not fully understand the MINUSMA mandate and why exactly they came to Mali. A woman working for an international NGO (X27) said: *"Their mandate is extremely messy."* Almost all actors argued that, according to their opinion, the main task of MINUSMA is to create safety: *"So I think the first and the most important role of MINUSMA is to bring peace."* (X36 – international NGO). Not everybody knows the mandate of MINUSMA is larger as only creating a safe area in the north. Another woman working for an international NGO (X6) added to this: *"I think their mission is to ensure the security of the Malian entity. We can expect from them to improve the security situation, so that we can do our work more properly and safely. Besides, no, we do not have any expectations from them."* A fourth respondent (X11) said: *"MINUSMA moet wat mij betreft gewoon de veiligheid garanderen. Dus die moeten ervoor zorgen dat je als NGOs de humanitarian space hebt om te opereren."*¹⁵⁹ This variety in expectations could be caused by MINUSMA's predecessor: Operation Serval. The mission of Serval was all about curbing the rebel groups and liberate the occupied cities in the north. However, MINUSMA and Serval have a totally different mandate. Many people do not exactly understand the difference between the two and therefore they expect other things from MINUSMA as MINUSMA is currently doing. There is a mismatch in expectations.

Not everybody understood that MINUSMA is more as just a military organisation. A French man working for a healthcare organisation (X36) did not know MINUSMA has also other departments apart from the force pillar: *"I am not sure. MINUSMA is a special task force, it is a military organisation. It is not the same. They are here just to preserve the security. (...) When I speak with MINUSMA, I think about the military part."* And although some people know there are three different pillars, not

¹⁵⁷ David Gressly has four positions at the same time. He is the Humanitarian Coordinator (head of the HCT), he is also the Residence Coordinator (head of the UNCT). Besides these functions, he is also head of UNDP (UN agency) and Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) within MINUSMA.

¹⁵⁸ Weir (2006), pp. 5 & 45-47

¹⁵⁹ For English translation, see appendix C, number 22.

everybody understands the difference between them. A man working for an international NGO (X13) said: *"I do not see any differences between the civil part and the military part of MINUSMA."* The nescience about the mandate of MINUSMA influences the perception actors have about the work MINUSMA does. There may occur irritation and confusion, because there is uncertainty about the precise mandate and goals of the mission.

International actors in the arena expect from MINUSMA that they will create safety and take care of the state security, but there are more expectations. Someone working for a French NGO (X29) argued that the added value of MINUSMA mainly lies in the field of psychological support for their employees: *"To implement our projects, there is no added value. But for some of our staff, it is like psychological security to have MINUSMA around. I think it is a psychological guarantee. For the last resort there is the possibility of armed escort."* Although NGOs signed a position paper that they will not use armed escort unless as a last resort (explained in chapter five), the thought that armed escort could be possible if necessary, has a positive influence on some international actors. On the other hand, there are also international actors who do not expect anything from MINUSMA. A woman working for an international lobby organisation (X11) explained that she does not expect much from MINUSMA: *"Ik denk dat ze een beetje een doorn in het oog zijn voor veel dingen. Op dit moment is juist de associatie met alles wat MINUSMA is, best wel negatief. En geassocieerd worden met MINUSMA werkt niet in ons voordeel. Dus het enige wat MINUSMA voor ons zou moeten doen, is zorgen dat het veilig is. Voor de rest verwacht ik niks bijzonders."*¹⁶⁰ And some people do not even expect anything at all: *"I do not know exactly what is the role of the UN mission in Mali. Because I see a lot of cars of the UN, but we did not see any impact."*, said by a Malian woman working for an international NGO (X2). But although sometimes there seems to be some dissatisfaction about MINUSMA, there are also still some people who say the country can't deal with the crisis without the UN presence: *"People who say that there is no need for MINUSMA are not good informed."* (X14 – national woman working as lead of the Thematic Group Security of FONGIM).

The second misperception about MINUSMA is caused by the lack of communication. A woman working for OCHA (X8 & X24) explained that communication with MINUSMA is difficult. MINUSMA is an enormous machine which came in without introducing themselves to other actors. The UN mission has an enormous power and influence in the arena; from their start on they are one of the biggest players in the arena. However, for other actors it is not always clear what is the entry point of MINUSMA, on which gate do they have to knock on? She argued: *"At this moment we are kind of facing a wall. You cannot move forward. So I think there is a real world to coordinate together, but we are misunderstanding, we are not using the same languages, we do not have the same mandate or the same objectives. Misunderstanding and confusion. We do not understand their rules, because they have so many administrative rules, that's crazy. For humanitarian actors, they do not exactly know who is who in MINUSMA, they do not know who to contact, if they have some questions or like that."* Due to the lack of communication, actors in the humanitarian field do not really understand how MINUSMA works and what their mandate is. There is a lot of misunderstanding and ignorance about the mandate and exact goal of MINUSMA. She fears this lack of communication: *"Our major concern is about communication. Not only on the humanitarian side, but many people in the country do not understand what MINUSMA exactly does."* Also other actors argued that communication with MINUSMA is difficult. A woman working for the Dutch embassy as a link between the embassy and the Dutch deployment (X23) also argued that the communication with MINUSMA needs to be improved: *"Het is inderdaad veelal ook onwetendheid. Die communicatie van MINUSMA kan ook wel iets verbeterd worden."*¹⁶¹ Due to ignorance, people feel ignored & excluded and images & perceptions are leading its own life. On the other side, people working for MINUSMA know and understand that there is a lot of ignorance in the arena about their mandate and goals. Therefore, since spring 2014,

¹⁶⁰ For English translation, see appendix C, number 23.

¹⁶¹ For English translation, see appendix C, number 24.

different departments within MINUSMA started to give presentations about their work and seek rapprochement to other organisations.

This is not the first mission in where the humanitarian community complains that the UN interfering in humanitarian activities too much and that there is a lack of communication between civil and military actors. Rietjens (2009) has done a research about the civil-military cooperation in Afghanistan, where he concluded that there was a lack of structured information databases, an absence of identification of information needs and an over-classification of documents by the military. This feeling of a lack of communication is perfectly represented by a quote he used: *"ISAF is like a black box. You throw something in, you do not know what happens to it, but you know for sure that nothing comes out of it."*¹⁶² Interviewees in Mali sometimes expressed the same feeling. Because MINUSMA is such a big organisation, they did not understand on which door they had to knock or what exactly happened with their information they gave to MINUSMA.

The last reason for the discourse in perceptions about MINUSMA, is explained by the different opinions of people about the interference of MINUSMA with humanitarian work. Some actors argued MINUSMA is interfering in the humanitarian field too much; they are exceeding the lines of the humanitarian world. NGOs fear the interference of MINUSMA with humanitarian programs because of the risk of blurring the lines. The number of attacks on MINUSMA targets have raised in 2014 and although until so far there have been hardly attacks on NGO targets, the risk of getting confused is always there. Especially a man working for a donor organisation (X37) has a really outspoken opinion about the role of MINUSMA: *"I only comment on what they [MINUSMA] are overlapping what they shouldn't, their core business. I speak about MINUSMA in the humanitarian field, where they shouldn't be. Yes. But because of that I am against it..., in this context they are just..., they are blind, they are deaf, they cannot speak. (...) MINUSMA is not only there for peace, they are also here for humanitarian assistance. They do it on purpose. Because it gives them a good image. Yes it is. They assume this role."* Later on he also added: *"It should be to maintain and preserve according to their mandate. The humanitarian space, because their mandate is assuring for delivery of assistance. By doing so they are actually doing the opposite."* He explained that, because MINUSMA is preserving the humanitarian space, on the same time they are impairing this space, due to their presence. Also the woman working for the lobby organisation (X11) explained that there has been a moment, just after the arrival of MINUSMA, that there were many problems with the projects MINUSMA wanted to implemented. However, due to joint lobby activities and position papers, she thinks there is now more understanding within MINUSMA about the opinion of NGOs. She also pleads that MINUSMA does not get involved in humanitarian or development things, but will focus more on activities with a quick impact on the society, like electricity and roads. This creates a better understanding for all involved parties in the task division.

But there are more actors concerned about the risk of blurring the lines. An African man working for an international NGO (X7) said: *"We are concerned that military and humanitarian do not go hand in hand. Because there can be confusion. If you mix military and humanitarian there could be confusion because we as NGOs do not use arms, do not use guns and if military is also doing humanitarian work, then there could be a confusion in terms of rebels, they can mistake who is doing what. They might be seen as an aggressor and there might be confusion. We are concerned about that, when military is doing humanitarian work."* Also another woman working for a NGO (X19) appointed these concerns: *"They [MINUSMA] are here to help the government, they have been invited by the government. They have been mandated by the UN security Council. In essence they are there and they represent the government. So for rebels, MINUSMA is equal to the government."* According to her, local rebel groups see MINUSMA as an extension of the government. It is dangerous for the humanitarian community to become associated with MINUSMA, because then at the same time they are associated with the government.

¹⁶² Rietjens (2009), pp. 412-413 & p. 432

Also other actors argued that MINUSMA is too much active in doing humanitarian work themselves. OCHA (X8 & X24) and a woman working for the Dutch embassy (X23) argued that the military are extending their mandate, they have an increasing 'can do-mentality'. X23: *"Op de korte termijn kunnen ze [militairen] ook heel veel dingen voor elkaar krijgen. (...) Maar ik vind niet dat het de verantwoordelijkheid van de militairen is om duurzame ontwikkeling te geven. Zij zijn meer instrumenteel om daar een environment voor te creëren, maar ze moeten het niet zelf gaan doen. Het valt wel mee hoor, maar dat zie ik wel als een negatieve les van onze samenwerking in Afghanistan waar het een soort gemeentegoed is geworden. Waardoor alle militairen nu gaan denken: oh NGOs, al die projecten, dat kan ik ook zelf wel doen! Dan denk ik: nee, doe het niet!"*¹⁶³ In Afghanistan, there were almost no NGOs present in the country, so the military became also responsible for doing small humanitarian projects, because there were just no other actors available for this task. In Mali, the rule is that the MINUSMA will only implement humanitarian work when there are no actors available who can do this job. However, this is a difficult question, because when is the need for humanitarian action so high that MINUSMA can take over? Military are more and more used – with the experience of Afghanistan in mind – to do small humanitarian projects themselves. Examples of these projects are the Quick-Impact-Projects (QIPs). Another example, to overcome the drive of military actors to do humanitarian work, is the 'hearts&minds fund', created by among others the Embassies, whereby the military contingent can ask for money to do small projects to help the communities they visit; like painting a school and reconstructing a play garden. These projects are not the same as the QIPs, because they are especially meant for the military contingent, while the QIPs are there for the whole MINUSMA mission. The QIPs and the small hearts&minds funds are examples of activities where MINUSMA is doing humanitarian work, in cases where this is not necessary according to NGOs. Some agreements about the QIPs have already been made¹⁶⁴, but there is still a lot to improve. Paragraph six in chapter four and paragraph two in chapter five explains more about the Quick-Impact-Projects and the influence they have on the coordination in the humanitarian arena.

Finally, there is also comprehension amongst actors for the situation MINUSMA has to deal with. A man working for an international NGO (X13) explained that there is understanding in the humanitarian arena for the fact that MINUSMA has 'just' established their mission and that therefore they are not yet fully operational: *"Ban Ki-Moon has to give them [the MINUSMA mission] all the requisites that they need to be able to work. At this moment, they do not have the full working capacity. Today, it is normal that they are targeted and they cannot do more patrols."* He is willing to help MINUSMA building up their mission, because he argued that all actors in the arena are dependent from each other: *"They have to do their jobs, but we have to help them doing their jobs. Because they do not have enough. From there, we can easily do our jobs also. We need them! We are all together."* He argued that it is necessary to involve each other in the arena and that international NGOs therefore need to help MINUSMA with building up their mission. Actors in the arena understand that the UN is an enormous, bureaucratic and sometimes sluggish machine, who needs time to become fully capable. Also ICRC (X15) agreed that there is much internal division amongst MINUSMA employees about their structure and mandate: *"Not many people in MINUSMA do fully understand their function. It is a huge complex. (...) We have had cases where we had to inform one MINUSMA service about another MINUSMA service. Because internally they were not informed. But it is understandable. It is such a huge and complex organisation. It is slowly improving. But in the beginning it was very amazing."* Although he was surprised by the lack of knowledge MINUSMA employees had about their own mission, he also understands it and is willing to help and maintain patience. The fact that MINUSMA is still busy with developing itself, could also be seen as an opportunity, according to a woman working for OCHA (X8 & X24): *"We can influence them. We can say: this is a priority, because we already have a demand, and there is a lack of procedures. So this is what we can suggest to look forward."* Because

¹⁶³ For English translation, see appendix C, number 25.

¹⁶⁴ MINUSMA or the military contingent makes a project proposal which will be assessed by OCHA, who speaks on behalf of the international community in the country.

the mission is still in the start-up phase, it is possible to guide or influence them in the direction which is more positive or effective for the humanitarian community. Harmer (2008) wrote about this: *“Some UN agencies and aid organizations have recognized that integration can provide an opportunity to influence the course of political and military strategies so that they take account of humanitarian principles and are not detrimental to humanitarian outcomes.”*¹⁶⁵ The integration is a two way process, not only can the mission influence the UN agencies, but the UN agencies can also influence the mission.

To conclude with, many interviewees argued that they think the MINUSMA mission is set up too big. Most actors agreed that there have been some problems in the country, but the way the UN started with this stabilisation process is just too big. The means the UN is taking to overcoming the threat are not meeting the actual threat. When referring back to the securitization model in chapter two, it turns out that means of the securitization model are not accepted or understood by the relevant audience, the other international community working in the humanitarian arena. The existential threat is clear for all actors, but estimated on another scale. It could be that the tool of persuasion did not work out well for all actors. Not all actors are convinced of the need for this mission, and therefore argue that they think the set-up of the mission is too big for this actual threat

Another interesting observation is that none of the actors mentioned the War on Terror in relation to MINUSMA. When talking about the *raison d'être* of the UN mission, actors told about the instability in the north and the security threat. This could all be related to the War on Terror (the growing Islamic powers in the north) but the War on Terror was never directly mentioned by name by the interviewees.

4.1.3. Integrated mission¹⁶⁶⁻¹⁶⁷

This paragraph explains the concept of integrated missions and clarifies which factors are involved and how the interviewees view the integrated mission. Only the integration between the mission and the UN agencies is clarified here, because the integration between the three different pillars of MINUSMA is already explained in paragraph 4.1.2. Besides a clarification of the concept of integrated missions, also the opinions of different actors (both working for the UN and working for organisations in the arena) are given. Some comparisons with other integrated missions (in Bosnia and East-Timor) are made.

Explanation of the concept

According to four researchers who studied the concept of Integrated UN Missions¹⁶⁸, an Integrated Mission is *“an instrument with which the UN seeks to help countries in the transition from war to lasting peace, or to address a similarly complex situation that requires a system-wide UN response, through subsuming actors and approaches within an overall political-strategic crisis management framework.”* (Barth Eide e.a., 2005, p. 3). The goal of an integrated mission is to ensure integration at all levels of mission planning. The objective of integrated missions is *“to bring the UN’s resources and activities closer together and ensure that they are applied in a coherent way across the political, military, developmental and humanitarian sectors”* (Barth Eide e.a., 2005, p. 5). Weir (2006) added to this that it is difficult to give a clear definition on an integrated mission. She refers to OCHA, who has said that only senior mission staff understand clearly the mission, goal and practical shape of integration.¹⁶⁹

A military advisor working for the Dutch embassy (X5) explained the integrated approach in the following way: *“Geïntegreerde benadering: een plan waarin de te bereiken doelen op de gebieden*

¹⁶⁵ Harmer (2008), p. 537

¹⁶⁶ UNLB (2014)

¹⁶⁷ Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (2008)

¹⁶⁸ Barth Eide e.a. (2005)

¹⁶⁹ Weir (2006), p. 13

*veiligheid en stabiliteit, ontwikkeling en politieke processen duidelijk gedefinieerd zijn, waarin hun onderlinge samenhang duidelijk in kaart is gebracht en waarin deze doelen - in de tijd - duidelijk zijn vertaald naar concrete actie. MINUSMA faciliteert in de planning, maar het wordt duidelijk samen met de regering (en andere partners) opgelopen en uitgevoerd en er liggen duidelijke besluiten aan ten grondslag, zodat sprake is van ownership en commitment aan de zijde van de regering.”*¹⁷⁰ Important to notice is that ‘integration’ is only based on integration between different UN entities, not with other actors in the field. A man working for a NGO (X13) said: *“It is an integrated mission between MINUSMA and the blue UN, like UNICEF. Not with the NGOs. Here we [the humanitarian community] are independent. Integrated mission means we have ‘one UN’. Which is different from NGOs. This mandate is not for us. It does not mean that we, NGOs, have to integrate with MINUSMA.”*

The integrated mission is also called the ‘one UN approach’ because it takes all UN entities together in one plan. An integrated mission has a dual focus, on both human and state security. While the mission itself is more focussing on peacebuilding activities and peace negotiations (state security) the different civil UN entities are giving priority to the security of the population (human security). Besides integration between the different UN agencies, there is also integration between the different Dutch deployments (the military involvement, the work of the embassy and the involved NGOs): the 3D approach. This integration between the different Dutch involvements is clarified in textbox 6. This research will not further elaborate the 3D approach, because this research involves all actors in the humanitarian arena, not only the Dutch ones.

Text box 6: 3D approach

The 3D approach refers to Defense, Diplomacy and Development. It is an often used termination in the Netherlands and refers to the coordination between military, civil and government organisations in a conflict situation and was used in the Dutch deployment in for example Afghanistan. Also in Mali, the Dutch involvement is described according to the 3D approach. As was said in the letter to the Dutch Second Chamber about the Dutch deployment: *“De complexe problematiek in Mali vraagt om een geïntegreerde (‘3D’-) benadering.”*¹⁷¹⁻¹⁷² Also on different weblogs Dutch experts on military interventions and humanitarian aid are using the 3D approach in explaining the Dutch contribution to MINUSMA.¹⁷³ The former military advisor working for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained the 3D approach is the Dutch interpretation of the doctrine that has made a strong international march in the past decade.¹⁷⁴ However, in Mali none of the international experts of other people working for MINUSMA knew about the Dutch 3D approach.

An often heard complaint is that the overarching goal between the different UN entities is missing. Next to the missing goal between the different pillars within MINUSMA (explained in paragraph 4.1.2), also a common plan between the different UN agencies is lacking, according to some actors in the arena. Weir (2006) explained in her research that one of the goals of the integrated mission is to design a common overarching goal: *“Integration is designed to streamline UN efforts and ensure that the objectives of all UN forces and agencies are channelled towards an overarching goal.”*¹⁷⁵ The military advisor working for the Dutch embassy (X5) clarified this lack of an overarching goal further: *“Waar ik juist om vraag is: waar is nu dat overkoepelende plan? Wie zegt nou hoe we van A naar B komen? Ik zou zo graag morgen een mailtje van je krijgen met: ‘Ik heb hem gevonden hoor. Ik heb met Koenders gepraat en die zegt: die (X5) zit te lullen. Maar die is er gewoon hoor, hier is het: van A naar B.’ Maar het mandaat is het niet, dat is niet wat ik bedoel. Dat is niet het abstractieniveau wat ik bedoel. Daar staan geen concrete doelen in, wat je op elke lines of operations wil bereiken.”*¹⁷⁶ On the other hand, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (X32) explained why, according to him, there is an overarching goal: *“Nou dat overkoepelende doel is er dus wel, want het mandaat is het overkoepelende*

¹⁷⁰ For English translation, see appendix C, number 26.

¹⁷¹ Rijksoverheid (2013)

¹⁷² For English translation, see appendix C, number 27

¹⁷³ Berg (2013)

¹⁷⁴ Matthijssen (2014)

¹⁷⁵ Weir (2006), p. 5

¹⁷⁶ For English translation, see appendix C, number 28.

doel van de missie. En er is ook een missie concept, dat is opgesteld door de UNCT, zij hebben opdracht gekregen om na te gaan denken over hoe zo'n missie eruit moet komen te zien en wat de doelen moeten zijn die aan de missie gesteld moeten worden. Daarnaast is er toen de mission concept eenmaal gemaakt was vanuit New York een team hierheen gestuurd om samen met de UNHCT een aantal plannen te maken, om een afgeleide daarvan te maken. Zodat het voor de verschillende poten in de missie: de civiele, de militaire en de politie poot, meer duidelijk zou moeten worden wat nu precies de gestelde doelen moeten worden. Dat hebben ze een 'concept of operations' genoemd. Dat bestaat voor de militairen, dat bestaat voor de politie en voor de civielen. Drie verschillende dingen die wel op elkaar zijn afgestemd. Terwijl ze dat gedaan hebben, hebben ze daarna gezegd: 'we moeten hier ook een club plaatsen die ervoor gaan zorgen dat het geïntegreerd wordt. Dat er een Integrated Strategic Framework komt, IFS'. Daar zijn mensen nog steeds druk mee aan het schrijven, dus dat is er nog niet helemaal. Maar dat wil niet zeggen dat er nu helemaal niets is, dat is iets te overdreven. Maar ik ben het wel met (X5) en (X30 & X33) eens dat het heel prima zou zijn voor de missie om zo'n soort plan te hebben, dat zou wel fijn zijn. Maar om nu te zeggen dat er helemaal niets is, dat gaat me te ver." ¹⁷⁷ Those two Dutch men are both working in a position related to the force pillar, but both have a completely different opinion about the integration between the UN and the different pillars.

The four researchers¹⁷⁸ raised three dilemmas about integrated missions: the humanitarian dilemma (the tension between political transition and protection of humanitarian space); the human rights dilemma (arises when the UN feels compelled to promote peace by working with those who may have unsatisfactory human rights records, while still retaining the role of an "outside critic" of the same process) and the dilemma of local ownership (refers to the tension to involve local structures, which form at the same time the basis of the conflict) (Barth Eide e.a., 2005, pp. 5-7). Except for internal division about the existence of an overarching mandate, there is also discord about the level of satisfaction about the integrated mission itself. The way other actors in the arena think about the integrated mission and these three dilemma's, is explained in the next paragraph.

Expectations and opinions about integrated missions

Several civil and / or military advisors working for the MINUSMA mission are quite sceptical about the integrated mission. A civil advisor working in the force pillar (X12) described the integration mission in the following words: "Het moet nog groeien." ¹⁷⁹ Later on he said: "Maar wat zou je precies verwachten van een geïntegreerde missie? Ik zou bijvoorbeeld verwachten dat als er een intelligence unit wordt neergezet die van dienst moet zijn aan de civiele kant van de zaak, dat die dus ook onder civiel toezicht staat. Niet alleen toezicht, maar ook command, de hiërarchisch structuur. En dat er ook veel meer civielen in zitten bijvoorbeeld. Dit zijn alleen maar militairen. Ik vind dat helemaal niet geïntegreerd in die zin. Nee ik heb niet de indruk dat..., het ondersteunen van stabiliseringsprojecten bijvoorbeeld, waar ik het net over had, dat gebeurt in de praktijk ook heel weinig." ¹⁸⁰ According to him, there is indistinctness about the civil and military roles. This not only influences the coordination between the different pillars within the mission, but also influences the coordination with other UN agencies. Following this, there could be indistinctness about the role UN agencies play in the arena. The problems for UN OCHA for example are already explained in paragraph 4.1.1. Due to the 'one UN approach' UN agencies could get confused with the military mandate of MINUSMA, while most of them feel more related to the humanitarian principles and the work of NGOs.

A woman working for the Dutch embassy (X23) said she is happy with the presence of an integrated mission in the country, however: "Dat wil echter niet zeggen dat je taken moet overnemen. Het gaat om gezamenlijk optrekken, samen acties ondernemen. Gezamenlijk nadenken over hoe de QIPs moeten werken. Hoe zorg je ervoor dat je impact krijgt? Wat heb je daarvoor nodig? Welke visie heb je daarbij?"

¹⁷⁷ For English translation, see appendix C, number 29.

¹⁷⁸ Barth Eide e.a. (2005)

¹⁷⁹ For English translation, see appendix C, number 30.

¹⁸⁰ For English translation, see appendix C, number 31.

*Welke acties ga je gezamenlijk ondernemen en wie doet wat? Het is coördinatie maar je moet wel een gezamenlijk doel hebben, een gezamenlijke visie. En dan daarna gezamenlijk bepalen hoe het moet.*¹⁸¹

She explained her contentment about the integrated mission but also referred to some areas for improvement. An important disadvantages of an integrated mission is that the division of labour is less effective. An integrated mission creates a situation where actors with a very specific background (for example, military trained) are interfering with humanitarian tasks and responsibilities. According to her, each actor needs to focus on his own qualities and form an added value on this theme. She is in favour of a situation where each actor has its own responsibilities without exceeding the line of someone else's tasks.

A man working for the ICRC (X15) shared his opinion about the integrated mission: *"It definitely causes some problems. There can definitely be some advantages, they have a common approach. But the risk is of blurring the lines is absolutely here. If you have a military mandate, a political mandate and a sort of rehabilitation mandate.... The perception can be different, can be problematic. That is also why we try not to be associated to it."* This man is afraid the integrated mission will cause a blurring of lines in the arena. So not only the presence of the peacekeeping mission creates a threat for the humanitarian community, but also the presence of an integrated mission increases the fear for a blurring of lines. Harmen (2008) has also explained this fair of confusion between humanitarians and military. Because military and political objectives are so closely related, humanitarians argue that the integrated mission undermines the concepts of neutrality and independence by *"creating the perception that humanitarian efforts are being subordinated to the political and security goals of UN missions."* (Harmen, 2008, p. 528). Humanitarians fear for the safety of their own staff and for their access to the population in need.

An advisor of the SRS (X26) explained the extent of integration in Bamako and in the northern regions: *"Ten eerste is er een groot verschil tussen hier in Bamako, het HQ, waar nog verschillende pilaren zijn, daar kunnen we het zo nog over hebben; en in Gao, on the ground. Ik denk dat het on the ground veel beter gaat dan hier in Bamako. Omdat mensen daar bij elkaar wonen, er is een veel kleinere schaal. Er is een tekort aan mensen en iedereen zit heel dicht bij elkaar."*¹⁸² The extent of integration is higher in the northern areas, because there are less people involvement, which makes coordination easier. Later on he also clarified why integration in Bamako is sometimes still difficult: *"In Bamako is het niet makkelijk om echt geïntegreerd te werken. Ten eerste, wat mij opviel, een militaire structuur is een hiërarchische structuur. Als jij in een militaire structuur zit dan rapporteer je omhoog, naar je baas. Je krijgt orders van je baas. Terwijl geïntegreerd werken (op de werkvloer) meer horizontaal is. In de top is er wel veel integratie. Koenders spreekt bijna dagelijks met de Force Commander en de politie commandant en ze hebben ook echt wel een gedeeld idee over waar het heen moet. Maar om dat op de werkvloer ook te organiseren, dat is nog niet zo makkelijk. Dan zit je met een soldaat die informatie moet delen met iemand die hier bij een politieke of civiele sectie zit, die zegt: nee ik rapporteer gewoon omhoog! (...) Zeker in veel Afrikaanse legers is de hiërarchie nogal sterk. Dan begrijp ik zo'n soldaat ook wel dat hij niet het risico wil lopen dat hij op zijn donder krijgt van zijn baas. Dat moet je dus als top heel goed organiseren."*¹⁸³ The way of working in military organisations and in civil organisations, is really different. There is another culture and another atmosphere on the floor, which influences the way people interact with each other.

Some humanitarian actors are not in favour of the integrated mission. A man working for a French NGO (X29) said: *"I think I prefer it to be not integrated. But when you discuss it with a UN agency they would say: it is better to have one person in charge instead of three persons. And that is true. But the problem is that humanitarian principles are not the one which are more important. When there is a balance between politic, military and humanitarians, there are the humanitarian principles, this is a*

¹⁸¹ For English translation, see appendix C, number 32.

¹⁸² For English translation, see appendix C, number 33.

¹⁸³ For English translation, see appendix C, number 34.

problem. So I think I prefer a non-integrated mission. But it is tough, you have different levels of integration. But I prefer it is a Humanitarian Coordinator only humanitarian.” He appointed both the positive and negative aspects of an integrated mission: less coordination problems because one person is in charge of the three different pillars, but on the other side there is also the problem of the humanitarian principles which could be forgotten or overruled. This was also mentioned by Weir (2006), who mentioned that a peacekeeping mission can be morally right, but can never be ‘neutral’ or ‘impartial’ and can therefore never be ‘humanitarian’. Weir later on explained the disadvantages of the fact that the HC and RC position are fulfilled by the same person: *“the practice of integrated missions of combining in one individual roles, of both the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and the Resident Coordinator (RC) creates a tension between the ostensibly neutral HC and the explicitly political RC.”*¹⁸⁴ This is confirmed by a man working for an European donor organisation (X37). He mentioned the disadvantage of the triple hatted person: *“To my opinion, the mission is not really integrated now. The big problem is to have one person who is at the same time the Humanitarian Coordinator and the Residence Coordinator. Just impossible for him to remain independent in position of Humanitarian Coordinator, he is from the beginning on mainly the head of the humanitarian community here. So it is really the basis of the problem.”* He said it is impossible to act neutral or independent as a representative for the humanitarian community when you are working for an integrated mission.

This concept of a multi-hatted position in the integrated mission is not new. A research from 2001 has proved that this model has made sense during the integrated missions in for example Somalia and Afghanistan, situations which were characterized by a chronic political conflict and the lack of a clear distinction between humanitarian, rehabilitation and development action. This research assigns this multi-hatted position to reduce the gap between relief and development.¹⁸⁵ But although the added value of a double role for the HC / RC is proved in several researches and this concept exist in already many integrated missions, the humanitarian community in Mali is still not yet convinced about its benefit. The fear for confusion and a lack of neutrality in the humanitarian arena remain more substantial.

A woman working in the HCT (X19) declared that the model of integrated missions is still quite new for many people and is not fully operational yet. Weir (2006) added to this that it is difficult to give a clear definition on an integrated mission, for many actors in the arena it is not really clear what integration exactly means. She referred also to OCHA, who has said that only senior mission staff understand clearly the mission, goal and practical shape of integration.¹⁸⁶ The woman working in the HCT (X19) additionally explained: *“Whenever there is a UN integrated mission, it means a lot. It is an integrated mission, a political mission, they are here in support of the government. They are always invited by the government, to help them, to set in place, or to restore, rehabilitate whether it is territorial integrity, political stability, stabilisation and all that. They are very much political. However, and that is the whole discussion or debate, now more and more the model is..., these integrated missions have..., they are not just political a.i. military; because they are here as peacekeepers. They also have many civilian sections. They are integrated. The reason being, if you are integrated you can think better, not just think about peacekeeping, or being political. But we can also think about cross the borders, cross cutting missions. That is why more and more people, and the DPKO, has adopted these models, to have an integrated mission.”* She also gave the example of the UN mission in the Central African Republic. By the establishment of the mission in December 2013, it was an African-led support mission (MISCA - African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic¹⁸⁷). However, in September 2014 the mission was transformed in an Integrated Stabilization mission: MINUSCA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic).¹⁸⁸ Given the scale

¹⁸⁴ Weir (2006), pp. 46 & 47

¹⁸⁵ Reindorp and Wiles (2001), pp. 19-20

¹⁸⁶ Weir (2006), p. 13

¹⁸⁷ French acronym for ‘Mission Internationale de Soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite Africaine’

¹⁸⁸ UN MINUSCA (2015b)

and geographic breadth of the crisis, the security situation was asking for an extension of the capabilities and an increasing number of deployed troops. Despite the UN presence, there was still ongoing violence and human rights abuses throughout the country. The underlying causes of the conflict were not tackled by the former design of the mission; the civilian components lacked to protect the civilian employees for example. An integrated response to deal with the complex security, humanitarian, human rights and political crisis in the car was necessary.¹⁸⁹ As this crisis in the Central African Republic shows, in certain situations only a military intervention is not enough anymore. The different types of conflicts ask for a different style of interventions. Crises needs to be addressed in a multidimensional way. More permanent crises ask for a new style of interventions. Conflicts nowadays do not have a clear beginning or end anymore, but are a process of social change.¹⁹⁰ New interventions need to be adapted to these changing environments. The context of a crisis is also important for the design of the mission, a more permanent crisis like in West-Africa due to Ebola or the current problems in Mali are asking for another solution as a temporary natural disaster as the typhoon in the Philippines. The extent to which national authorities are still functioning is important for the design of the UN intervention.

A man working for a UN agency (X31) said he did not want to decide if he is in favour or against the UN integrated mission. Because his agency is part of the UN, he just has to deal with the presence of the integrated mission: *"For me, we are all one UN, so I am not the one to decide that there will be a UN mission in a particular country. I am not against or in favour. Other people can say that."* However, not all people working for UN agencies have such an avoiding opinion. A woman working for another UN agency (X34) thinks integrated missions are the future: *"The existence of the integrated presence, for all intensive purposes, and I am not Ban Ki Moon but I think I can quote him: it is not going away. Despite there are many arguments, many issues about civil military cooperation, humanitarian space, human rights, the mixed agenda of what it means for peace keepers. So the integrated presence by default, have to have humanitarians married to a UN political mission."* According to her, humanitarian actors have to get used to work next to or together with UN integrated missions; this is the future within UN missions.

But the 'one UN approach' does not only influence UN agencies, but also people who work together with UN agencies. A woman working for a lobby organisation (X11) experienced the presence of the integrated mission as a disadvantage because due to this integration, it becomes more difficult for her to work together with UN agencies: *"Alles wat nu in de geïntegreerde missie zit is VN. En is dus automatisch ook..., heeft een tintje militair. (...) Daar waar je normaal wel makkelijker met OCHA en alle blauwen VN samenwerkt; op het moment dat je naar het noorden gaat... kan dat nu niet meer. Dat zou sowieso al delicaat zijn, maar niet zo delicaat als dat het nu is. Het risico om verward te worden met het leger is te groot."*¹⁹¹

A woman working for an international NGO (X27) shared her opinion about the integrated mission in the following way: *"There are two questions, the question of whether or not integration works well and whether or not MINUSMA works well. I know there is a lot of resistance to the concept of integration. I tend to think that the most resistance to integration is actually resistance to civil-military coordination. (...) Integration in general, when you look at it in different contexts, it rises or falls based on different personalities who are involved. A weak structure can be made well by strong leaders or managers and a well-designed system can fall in different pieces when core people are in charge. I think MINUSMA has really struggled with leadership. They have got excellent people, people with a lot of experience. And at the senior level and director level, you would rather have people who are appointed, and they have been quite weak. So the mission, the purpose of integration, is to work together behind a strict clear strategic objective and I am not sure if MINUSMA has ever had a clear*

¹⁸⁹ UN MINUSCA (2015a)

¹⁹⁰ Goodhand (1999), p. 23

¹⁹¹ For English translation, see appendix C, number 35.

strategic objective. Their mandate is extremely messy. Within the mission again, I think the HC/RC - the triple hatted mister Gressly - is always in competition. He is probably one of the stronger managers in the mission. He has a clear idea about what he wants to get done, even if not everybody agrees with that. But I think MINUSMA is not been effective, that is not because of the integration but about the people." According to her, the individual people can make a difference in the success or failure of the mission. Their attitude, experience and background have a large influence on the perception other actors have on their work and the way they implement their programs. This could also be linked again to the argument that military employees regularly have less experience with field work and this specific mission as civil employees of MINUSMA and people working for NGOs.

Autesserre (2014) argued in her book that the personal background of peace builders influences the intervention. They often use their own interpretations or meanings to interpret foreign situations. During an emergency, they follow the routine or mode of action that they have acquired through previous deployments or experiences. However, these often good intentions are not adapted to this specific situation and context; which has pernicious consequences according to the author.¹⁹² This same process is happening in Mali. The interpretations certain people have of a situation or problem are based on the experience they have from other deployments and are not always adapted to the local context.

Someone working for the QIPs unit (X16) said: *"Integration is maybe a strong word, maybe you should speak about coordination. Because if you read the literature, it is really difficult to coordinate. That is one of the ideals we have."* Chapter five gives more information about the differences between cooperation and coordination within the humanitarian arena.

Not only the mandate of MINUSMA is unclear to the involved actors in the arena, also the purpose and implementation is not well-known. Actors are not always sure what the presence of an integrated mission means for their own work and presence in the arena. This ignorance and uncertainty is not new but has occurred during many other integrated missions. A study about the integrated mission and the humanitarian imperative in Liberia (2006) has shown that the humanitarian community was very uncertain about how they had to get in contact with the mission. There was confusion about the exact mandate of the UN and the relationships between the mission and non-mission actors such as NGOs. The humanitarian community feared for a possible blurring of lines and a loss of the humanitarian principles.¹⁹³ Since that time, the uncertainty about influence of an integrated mission and ignorance about their mandate has not reduced. Also in the Malian arena, actors are dealing with the same uncertainty, problems and fears regarding the presence of the UN stabilisation mission.

4.2. INTERNATIONAL NGOS

Since the crisis there are 79 international NGOs present in the humanitarian arena in Mali. Within this world of international NGOs it is possible to make some distinctions. For example, the time presence of a NGO in the country or the themes they focus on. A woman who already works in the country for years (X19) explained that another possible distinction is the division between humanitarian based and development based organisations: *"Within the NGO world, you have development NGOs and humanitarian NGOs."* A difference between these two indicates the focus the organisation has. However, not all actors agree with this division; one man who already has many years of working experience within the NGO world (X13) explained that he does not like to use these two terms: *"I hope that the conclusion of your thesis will not be on the distinction between these two, on the separation between them. (...) What is the purpose of them? It is to help the population. What is the difference? This is my point of view, I do not care how they call it. Resilience, development, it is only the name."* Later on, he explained that he is worried humanitarian NGOs will lose the long term prospects out of sight. For this reason, he is not in favour of humanitarian programs, because these programs only

¹⁹² Autesserre (2014), p. 248

¹⁹³ Weir (2006), pp. 39-40

focus on the short term needs and do not bring sustainable development; no lasting result is being forged there, according to him. However, all other respondents were willing to distinct their programs one the one hand as development, or as humanitarian based on the other hand.

"I would definitely not describe our programs as development. We are in between emergency and rehabilitation. We are here since long time, since the '90's. We never had such a big program since the last year. But we have been engaged since the beginning of the '90's, with ups and downs, in different sectors." (X15 - ICRC)

"I would describe our programs as humanitarian. [X] is a humanitarian organisation. Some programs are about early recovery as we are a protection and human rights based organisation. So wherever we can use humanitarian response and emergency response to address the longer term needs, address vulnerabilities, we do that. So there is a fuzzy edge, in terms of humanitarian aid focus." (X27 – international NGO)

"Would you describe [X] more as a development organisation or a humanitarian emergency?"
"Both. Because we are doing emergency humanitarian response in the north.
In the south we are doing development programs." (X10 – international NGO)

A distinction between the two is based on the goal of the programs, however both are related to human security; due to their focus on the needs of the population. While development aid is focussing on the underlying causes of poverty and crises, humanitarian aid is meant to save lives during acute emergency situations. In Mali both cases occur: in the south there is a long tradition of development work like pastoralism programs, while in the north agencies are starting projects due to the recent crisis and related to IDP's, food aid and medical healthcare. As was already explained in chapter three, some development based NGOs have changed their programs into humanitarian based since the crisis of 2012. Besides, new NGOs have entered the arena. Examples of these new international NGOs are: SPARK, ACTED, NRC, IRC and DRC. Both development based programs and humanitarian programs are focussing on human security. As Duffield (2006) said: *"Human security is commonly understood as prioritizing the security of people, especially their welfare, safety and well-being, rather than that of states."*¹⁹⁴ Most international NGOs in the country are involved in meeting the needs of the population, instead of working on state building issues. The idea of human security is symbolic for the changed relations and governmental technologies that have shaped the international humanitarian arena since the Cold War era. In the more universalistic notion of human security, development and security are regarded as 'different but equal', the War on Terror has deepened the interconnection between development and security.¹⁹⁵

Some actors also explained that the way NGOs operate in the arena, is completely dependent from individuals, from the separate employees. Hilhorst (2003) explained in her book that the background of NGO employees is very important for the direction a NGO takes. One particular relevant aspect is that NGOs operate in a number of different domains, each with their own (partially overlapping) languages, rules, routines and demands. The result is a situation in where many 'forces' pull and push NGOs in different directions, creating incompatible commitments, confusions and contradictions. These discontinuities and segmentations are exacerbated by differences amongst staff members in the NGO with regard to their policies, origin, kinship, sexuality and livelihood.¹⁹⁶ All those different backgrounds together form the uniqueness of each NGO and influence the way NGOs can distinct themselves from each other. The five domains of reconstruction (figure 13) described in chapter two are all covered by different NGOs in the Malian arena.

The increasing insecurity in the country caused also the establishment of new NGOs like INSO (International NGO Safety Organisation) and CSD (Centre for Safety and Development). These NGOs provide trainings for NGO employees to prepare them to work in unsafe areas, they give regular

¹⁹⁴ Duffield (2006)

¹⁹⁵ Duffield (2005b)

¹⁹⁶ Hilhorst (2003), p. 217

reports and updates about the security situation and analyse the security plans of NGOs. International NGOs adhere to the principles of humanity and the Code of Conduct and in the growing trend of radicalisation of aid, the conditions under which employees are working, are becoming more dangerous. To be able to stick to the principles of neutrality and independence, NGOs together have raised INSO, to be able to stay independent from armed escort or other military involvement. The creation of new NGOs corresponds to the idea of Hilhorst (2003) who explains that everyday practices are key in the process of meaning making and the framing of the arena. She explains that NGOs are formed due to idealistic and practical reasons. There are numerous small and big, proactive and responsive decisions and actions that altogether frame the organisation. She argues that without studying everyday practices, it is impossible to understand, manage or support NGOs.¹⁹⁷ Later on Hilhorst & Serrano (2010) explained that it is almost impossible for NGOs to stay neutral during service delivery. Their research in Angola has shown that in many cases, agencies had to give up some of their principles in order to gain access to certain areas. Due to the violent conflicts and accusations of partiality by the conflicting parties, in the last few decades it becomes more and more difficult for the humanitarian community to stay neutral in a conflict.¹⁹⁸

NGOs see their own role in the arena as bringers of aid, development and humanitarian assistance. Of course each NGO has its own vision and implementing methods, but overall there is consensus about their position in the arena. Weir (2006) disagreed with this. She argued in her article that the humanitarian community consists of a variable of different objectives and abilities. She argues that those internal differences in the humanitarian community hinder coordination.¹⁹⁹ In Mali however, there is a long history of mutual relations and joined position papers and Memorandum of Understandings. A woman working for an international NGO and part of the HCT (X19) explained this in the following way: *"If I look at other country situations, we have a good coordination here with other NGOs in terms of having joint positions and how to address certain issues and what are common priorities, what are common ways of working? That is also really important for communities. You should have similar principles in ways of working. If one says 'we do not work with MINUSMA', the others should also say this for the same reasons."* For NGOs, it is important to frame one body to the outside world, therefore FONGIM was created. FONGIM is a lobby organisation for international NGOs, already active in the country since 2002. This platform has several Groupe Thematics and is intended for the transmission of common positions in the arena. The activities of FONGIM are explained more detailed in the paragraph one in chapter five about the different coordination structures.

But there are also comments on the way NGOs behave in the arena. A man working at the civil-military department for MINUSMA (X30) said that NGO employees live in their own world, with their own expectations and ideas: *"Sommige NGOs zijn heel erg opgevoed of geïndoctrineerd met het idee dat er een duidelijke scheidslijn moet zijn. Zij doen humanitaire dingen en het leger doet zeg maar 'nare dingen'. Dat is een perceptie probleem."*²⁰⁰ He argued that NGOs have sometimes a tunnel vision, and only stick to their principles because they are used to, not because these principles are suitable in this arena. NGOs are sentenced due to their dogmatic approach. They rely on their own routines and stability to function, without being able to adapt on the local situation.²⁰¹

The perceptions NGOs have from the other actors in the arena, influence the possible coordination. Also an advisor of the SRSG (X26) criticizes the way NGOs act in the arena. He argued that NGOs are not innovative, they are already implementing their projects for years in the same way, without making adaptations to the local circumstances. Another thing he would like to change, is the NGO presence in the north: *"En als NGO moet je ook een beetje ballen hebben, anders moet je hier*

¹⁹⁷ Hilhorst (2003), p. 213

¹⁹⁸ Hilhorst & Serrano (2010), pp. 196-197

¹⁹⁹ Weir (2006) p. 5

²⁰⁰ For English translation, see appendix C, number 36.

²⁰¹ Autesserre (2014), p. 251

niet zitten. Dan moet je maar lekker naar Nieuw-Zeeland gaan. Dat is part of the deal hier!"²⁰² He agreed that the situation in the north is not completely safe yet, but according to him, without the NGO presence MINUSMA cannot completely fulfil their goal and the situation can never become safer. The two actors are together responsible for bringing back the safety in the north.

But NGOs are not only criticized by military, but also by employees of other NGOs. The head of an international NGO (X13) explained that he does not understand why some NGOs are already for 13 years in the country, but they still have made any progress: *"I was very shocked when I heard some NGOs are already here for 13 years, and I go in the north and I do not see anything. So what are they doing?"*

Although there are some critics about the way NGOs implement their programs and the progress they have made in the country during the years; their role in the arena meets the expectations of the other actors and their presence is not disputed. There is internal consensus about their presence and responsibilities. To understand the way NGOs are operating in the arena, it is important to study their everyday practices and involve the background of their employees. Without understanding of the local context, one is never able to understand the perception of NGOs. The everyday practices NGOs have to deal with influence their view on the arena and the view other actors have on the NGOs. The mandate of NGOs is related to human security; NGOs have a focus on lower scale needs and capacity building of individuals, instead of the state apparatus.

4.3. GOVERNMENT

The government is one of the most important actors in the reconstruction phase in a country. Without a strong government, a country will never be able to be self-sustainable and independent. One of the main points in the reconstruction phase, is reframing governance and governmental institutions.²⁰³ Without a functioning government, a country will never be able to operate independent and self-sufficient. The MINUSMA mission came to Mali to support the government and all actors agree that the local government is the end responsible for the stabilisation of the country.

In Mali, the government is already not well-functioning for a long time. As was explained in the context analysis, a coup d'état and periods of rebellion have caused an unstable and not-well functioning government. Also Gutelius (2007) has argued that the Malian government is already less stable since the War on Terror in the Sahel region started in 2002.²⁰⁴

Although the Malian government is nowadays unstable and not well function in all regions, both MINUSMA, UN agencies and international NGOs focus on the involvement of the local authorities in their programs for a continuation of the programs. A woman working for the civil department of MINUSMA (X17) explained: *"One thing we are really keen on is the involvement from day one of the government. This is a matter of ownership. This is something that we keep discussing with the government. We want them to make sure that they take the lead after we leave. From day one it is a joined responsibility. So we try to involve the central regional government as much as possible. So we are in that kind of thinking. Because it is not only MINUSMA, MINUSMA is not here only by itself."* MINUSMA knows they will leave one day, and it is very important to start from day one thinking about who has to take the responsibility after they leave and how they will complete this task. They are not only talking with the formal government in Bamako, but also with local authorities in smaller areas: *"In principe moet de lokale overheid betrokken worden en als die er niet zijn andere gezagsdragers. Dat is de instructie. En ik zie ook wel dat het regelmatig gebeurt. Ik zie gespreksverslagen met bijv. een imam, dat moet de intentie zijn. Wij zijn hier om de regering van Mali te helpen en de bevolking te beschermen. Samengevat. Bij die eerste taak heb je de overheid nodig. Wij zijn er om hen te helpen hun eigen volk te leiden en te helpen. Er moet als wij weggaan ook iemand achterblijven om het werk uit te*

²⁰² For English translation, see appendix C, number 37.

²⁰³ UN DESA (2007)

²⁰⁴ Gutelius (2007), p. 59

voeren. *Wij blijven hier maar tijdelijk.*" ²⁰⁵ (X30 – CIMIC department). Also international NGOs are willing to cooperate with the Malian government, for the same reasons as MINUSMA. An African man working for an international NGO (X13) said: *"We really have to focus in helping the government, to build the policy. Because If you do not have a clear policy, the country cannot work. So help to government to organize, to capacity, contract the policy, make an agenda and blablabla."* But also UN agencies involve the government in their programs: *"There is not one single day where I am not working with the government. It is mandatory for us. Because we are in Mali, we are not in a planet called UN, we are in Mali, we need to work with them."* (X31 – UN agency). In order to create a sustainable situation, all actors agree it is very important to involve the government in all the work they do. Someone working for a NGO (X7) explained: *"The NGOs feel that they cannot replace the government. For reason of continuity."* Another NGO employee (X13) added to this: *"We cannot take over the government. The government has to do that. We are here and after they take over."* Someone working for the CIMIC department in MINUSMA (X33) even goes a step further. He explains that they try to put MINUSMA in a positive light in front of their own people, because they are the one who need to take over after MINUSMA leaves. He explained that he also sees it as the task of MINUSMA, to create trust of the population in the government again.

4.4. NATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY

For a more sustainable and lasting result of stabilisation and peacebuilding, it is important to involve local actors in the reconstruction process.²⁰⁶ According to the respondents, the National Civil Society in the Malian humanitarian arena contains of three important actors: religious leaders, local entrepreneurs and local NGOs (figure 19). Civil society organisations can play an important role because they are strongly linked to local communities and have a huge knowledge about underlying causes of the conflict. The National Civil Society can also play a key role in implementing programs and activities in the field of peacebuilding or stabilisation.²⁰⁷




Figure 19: National Civil Society

The role of the National Civil Society is widely accepted and appreciated by the other actors in the humanitarian arena. Someone working for the CIMIC department in MINUSMA (X30) explained: *"Wij proberen altijd lokale structuren erbij te betrekken omdat wij altijd werken met de end-state in ons achterhoofd. (...) En in die hoedanigheid moeten wij altijd zorgen dat er iemand is die, als wij weggaan, klaar staat om de touwtjes in handen te nemen."* ²⁰⁸ By involving the National Civil Society, a more sustainable arena is created because there is goodwill amongst the population for the ongoing process. The international humanitarian agencies do not have the intention to stay forever in the country; so it is important to start transferring tasks to local actors in an early phase. A woman working for an international NGO (X6) added to this: *"We have a sustainable strategy and a localization strategy; reinforcing the capacities of local NGOs to transfer them our methodology approaches, competences and skills, to make them able to do what we are doing now, but for the future. So it is part of our advisory services. We have advisory services for direct implementers. But we are also working together with local NGOs to transfer methodology and approaches."*

But although the role of the National Civil Society is widely accepted, they are not widely concerned or involved by international organisations. Interveners value thematic expertise over local knowledge and partnerships with local networks are quite scarce. This is not only the case in Mali, but also in other

²⁰⁵ For English translation, see appendix C, number 38.

²⁰⁶ WANEP and Human Security Collective (2014)

²⁰⁷ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2014)

²⁰⁸ For English translation, see appendix C, number 39.

disaster areas. International peace builders prefer a top down approach, where they can apply their own western ideologies to the local circumstances. Autesserre (2014) however pleads for a greater inclusion of local people in the design of international programs, to make these programs more valuable and effective.²⁰⁹ This paragraph explains if and how several local actors are involved in the coordination structure and in the integrated mission.

4.4.1. Religious leaders

In the absence of a functioning government, in many villages religious leaders have a strong influence in the local administration. A man working for the CIMIC department within MINUSMA (X30) explained that in an ideal situation, the UN works together with a democratic chosen government, but in many fragile or failed states, they are absent: *“Dan kijk je naar welk gezagsstructuren er wel zijn. In veel maatschappijen heb je dan bijv. een dorpsoudste of een imam die veel macht heeft. En dan kan je wel zeggen: ‘volgens onze hoogstaande democratische principes is dat niet goed genoeg’, maar als we daar geen zaken mee doen, met wie dan wel? We moeten met iemand zaken doen. En als die persoon gedragen wordt door zijn gemeenschap, nou ja, het is hun leven, hun gemeenschap.”*²¹⁰ Due to this absence of governmental structures, the role of religious leaders becomes more important in the arena and is accepted by all international actors. However, although their role and involvement is accepted by most actors in the arena, religious leaders themselves state that they are restrained by the international actors in the process of reconstruction and peacebuilding: *“Many NGOs do not trust Islamic Organisations. This is partly caused by a wrong or deficient imaging of us in the media.”* (X28 – religious leader). There is an important problem of lack of trust in religious leaders. The work they do and the role they play is accepted, but they are not actively involved or invited in the humanitarian community.

A religious leader and President of the organisation Association Malienne pour la Paix et le Salut (AMPS) (X28) explained that these leaders can be used as mediators between different organisations. Rebel groups often do not want to talk with NGOs or the government but they do want to speak with the local imam. In these cases imams can build bridges and stimulate the stabilisation process. Hereby, it is important that religious leaders are able to stay neutral and independent. As soon as they choose side in the conflict, they will lose their credibility: *“If religious leaders would be neutral, they can do a lot of important work. But since they are involved in politics also, this becomes more difficult. Religious leaders should be a sort of referee between the different parties, instead of supporting one party and choosing a side in the conflict. Whenever he chooses one side, there is no neutrality anymore.”* (X28 – imam). The added value of religious leaders lies in the occurrence that they can operate neutral in the political field. As soon as they become involved in politics, the civilians will not accept them anymore. Religious leaders, chiefs or elderly of communities, are able to build trust and confidence by the local population in the programs of international organisations. Without their blessings, a program can fail because of the lack of interest of the local communities.

A civil-military advisor working for MINUSMA (X1) explained that he regretted the absence of religious leaders in the arena: *“Er schijnen hier ook een aantal islamitische organisaties actief te zijn, die hebben zich niet aangesloten bij het OCHA systeem. Althans, niet allemaal. Ik kom ze nooit tegen, ik weet dat ze actief zijn, maar ze zijn helemaal zelfstandig. Ze gebruiken eigen netwerken en eigen kanalen. Dat is jammer, maar aan de andere kant zullen ze zich nooit conformeren aan internationale gedragsregels of codes.”*²¹¹ On the one side, he would like them to become more involved, but he already recognized that they would not confirm themselves to the guiding rules in the arena. He also does not see active engagement with religious leaders, he does not actively try to involve them.

²⁰⁹ Autesserre (2014), pp. 250 - 252

²¹⁰ For English translation, see appendix C, number 40.

²¹¹ For English translation, see appendix C, number 41.

Religious leaders in the humanitarian arena try to strengthen human security. They are standing close to the local people and are therefore able to focus on the needs and well-being of the population, an activity which is key in human security.²¹²

4.4.2. Local entrepreneurs

The local private sector could also be seen as a victim of the crisis. They lost income and investment opportunities. At this moment, there is a lack of funding and financial services, necessary for entrepreneurs to start new businesses. Local entrepreneurs do not play an important role on policy making in the arena; they are mainly hired by international NGOs and UN agencies as implementing partners. For example, when a NGO decides to build a school or a hospital, they will hire a local construction company. A Malian man working as an entrepreneur (X25), explained that it is a great opportunity for local companies to work with international organisations, because most of the time the payments from international organisations are quite high according to local standards: *"I am an entrepreneur, always looking for new opportunities to development my company. Each assigner is fine with us, as long as they pay!"* He also explained that local entrepreneurs are not always acting because of ideological considerations, but just because they want to earn some money.


Most important local industrial sector in Mali is the agriculture, from cotton to cattle to rice. Local companies are often involved in the arena as suppliers. They deliver goods for the army in the north or grow crops which are distributed by international agencies. An advisor working for the DSRSG in MINUSMA (X21) argued that other examples of involvement of local companies can be found in the field of logistics. An advantage of hiring local companies is that they understand the context and the dynamics: *"I am pretty sure our friends from FAO or WFP are working directly with the local private sector, in terms of food assistance for example. If you decide to deliver food in Kidal, WFP works with local transport companies for instance. Because in that area they are able to understand the whole dynamics in terms of security and basically, where to go and how to appoint some of the problems we have."*

In contrast to the religious leaders, the local private sector is highly appreciated and involved in the reconstruction process, although their role is really different from the ones who are more involved in policy making and peacebuilding. A women working for an international NGO (X6) explained that, by involving local actors, you create sustainability of the development process in the country: *"I think it is important to involve the local private sector, to involve them in recovery and rehabilitation activities."* Interesting situation is that a lot of local private companies in Mali are owned by Libyan families. Almost all supermarkets, clubs, bars and many restaurants are owned by Libyan people who moved to Mali already decades ago. These small business companies are seen as local entrepreneurs by the international organisations, although the Malian population considers them as 'expats'. Malian local entrepreneurs still feel disadvantaged in the arena.

²¹² Duffield (2005a)

The difference between the local private sector and local NGOs, is that NGOs create jobs as a key element of stabilisation and peacebuilding strategy while companies create jobs because they need the people. This creates a more sustainable solution.²¹³ Private Sector Development (PSD) is a trending topic in the humanitarian community and is more and more seen as key factor in the peacebuilding process and during conflict management.²¹⁴ Figure 20 shows the influence PSD can have on the peacebuilding process. Chapter six explains in more detail the involvement of the International Private Sector on the reconstruction process and the humanitarian arena.

Figure 20: Impact of Private Sector Development (PSD) on peacebuilding process



Source: Davis (2014)

4.4.3. Local NGOs

Local NGOs show much similarities with local entrepreneurs: they are also hired by international organisations as implementing partners and they are also dependent of the availability of funds. Local NGOs are gathered in two platforms: Forum OSC and Conseille National. These platforms are umbrella organisations for local associations helping to organize themselves and put themselves more central in the arena. The chairman of Conseille National (X20 & X35) explained that the difference with local entrepreneurs is that local NGOs also adhere to the humanitarian principles & the Code of Conduct and local NGOs are also involved in policy making and advising international organisations about ways of designing and implementing programs. He described the national NGOs as prostitutes, because they are working with everyone, as long as they get paid: *“National NGOs are like prostitutes.”*

There are also differences between local NGOs and international NGOs, mostly on the area of responsibilities and professionalism. Local NGOs are hired by international organisations as implementing partners, subcontractors. Local NGOs are dependent of the money, resources and funds of international agencies. Amongst others due to this dependency, local NGOs have much respect for international NGOs. On the other side, they would like to receive some respect back: *“Local NGOs are implementing the programs, they know the country and the situation. For that, they want to have more recognition and appreciation!”* (X20) The most important difference between local NGOs and international NGOs, is that local NGOs know the field and international NGOs have knowledge about management.

International NGOs confirm that, when working with local NGOs, a sustainable arena is created. By coordinating together with local NGOs, men is doing capacity building at the same time. Local NGOs learn to continue doing the work after international organisations have left. A man working for a UN agency (X31) explained this: *“Local NGOs know the context and when you work with local NGOs, you also build the capacity of the country to cope with the consequences of the conflict. International NGOs might leave - such as MDM in Kidal - while national NGOs will remain.”*

²¹³ Hoffman (2014)

²¹⁴ Davis (2014)

4.5 DONORS

The two main donors in the humanitarian arena in Mali are the European Commission (ECHO – European Commission for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection) and the American Government (US AID). In the year 2014 the USA have donated 106,442,779 USD, which is 28.7 % of the total contribution to the crisis. The European commission have contributed 74,881,630 USD, what corresponds with 20.2% of the grand total.²¹⁵ But also the foreign embassies and the UN have a donor role in the arena, amongst others due to their Hearts & Minds programs and the Quick-Impact-Projects. Donors play a coordinating function in the humanitarian arena. Besides their presence will attract other humanitarian agencies, they also lead the approval or refusal of project proposals. An European man working for a donor organisation (X37) explained that his organisation has a coordinating function in the arena: *“We are the main donor for humanitarian assistance. We are the leading donor also, in terms of national coordination. We are strongly involved in the coordination of the humanitarian response.”*

A Dutch women working for a lobby organisation for international NGOs (X11) explained that there are different types of donors, whereby the private donors and institutional donors are the main ones. Private donors are not involved in the arena and do not coordinate together, therefore she is less happy with these initiatives. Another women working for an international NGO (X9) added to this statement that donors can influence the decisions governments make. She advocated for a stronger involvement of donors in the arena, although they already have a quite influencing role.

Aid gets shaped by interaction between the recipients, the providers and the donors.²¹⁶ The amount of available funds is important, because it leads the institutions in their policy making. As was already explained in chapter three, most international organisations are geographically led by the needs, but also by the available funds. The stop of donor money for development programs in 2012 has influenced the composition of the arena enormously. A man working for an international NGO (X13) explained that due to the amount of extra funds available for humanitarian programs, the number of organisations with humanitarian programs in Mali has increased. He also argued that international NGOs are too much focussing on the money, and less on the needs: *“I am sorry to tell you this, but NGOs only focus on the donors, while the purpose of all this business is to help the people.”*

Two important programs, made available by donor money, are the Quick-Impact-Projects (QIPs) of MINUSMA and the Hearts & Minds projects each military contingent has. A man working in the QIP department of MINUSMA (X16) explained that the QIPs are a program of the United Nations, based on the idea that a peacekeeping mission should be structured. Every stabilisation-keeping mission gets some funding to start projects to help the mission and the troops to be accepted by the local population. The QIPs are micro-projects, which do not cost more as 50.000 dollar per project and projects do not last for more as six months. These projects can be implemented in different sectors but the three most often used themes are: infrastructure, creating livelihood & employment and training & capacity building. Important hereby is that the MINUSMA mission is only the donor in this case, other organisations implement these projects. Implementing partners could be NGOs (both international and national), UN agencies or other public institutes like local municipalities. Beside these Quick-Impact-Projects, most military contingents have their own small Hearts & Minds projects, used to win trust and confidence of the local population for their own contingent. These are also short-term projects, used to create acceptance for the military; to show they are able and willing to do more as just collecting information. The influence of these projects on other actors in the humanitarian arena is discussed in chapter five.

Although there have been many discussion about the interpretation and application of the QIPs, the

²¹⁵ Financial Tracking Service (2015b)

²¹⁶ Hilhorst & Jansen (2010)

mutual expectations about the role of donors in the arena are clear. Donors are not directly involved in the implementation of humanitarian programs, but have a guiding and controlling role via their funds. It is not possible to classify the donors as focussing on human or state security, but indirectly they are involved with both due to the sponsoring of programs.

4.6 DIFFERENCES IN MANDATES

The mandates and goals of all actors in the humanitarian arena differ. The question however is, if these differences have a positive, neutral or negative effect on the mutual expectations and perceptions.

An employee of a French NGO (X29) explained his vision on the consequences of the differences in the mandates. He argued that it is very important to communicate with the other actors and explain what their mandate exactly means, in order to create a mutual understanding. Due to the humanitarian principles, it is easier for NGOs to have contact with OCHA instead of having direct contact with MINUSMA, although this is not always possible: *“In the field, we try to do the same, but sometimes there are less actors so sometimes there is more contact with MINUSMA in the field as we have in Bamako.”* The differences in the humanitarian arena between Bamako and the northern areas are already explained in chapter three. Due to the smaller number of actors, sometimes it is impossible to not have direct contact with MINUSMA. But this also creates a risk of blurring the lines, related to the humanitarian principles.

A woman working for the Dutch embassy (X23) explained that different mandates do not have to hinder cooperation, it is more about the perception the different actors have from each other. A woman working for a lobby organisation (X11) added to this that the mandates of different organisations are equal, there is no hierarchical structure in the arena. According to her, it is important to keep in mind that one mandate is not better or more powerful as another mandate. However, other missions have demonstrated that there is always a certain kind of hierarchy in the humanitarian arena. Some organisations have more policy influence and more access to funds as others.²¹⁷ This is also visible in Mali, where certain actors have complained about their lack of involvement in the decision making process.

She (X11) also added that it is very important for each actor to stick to its mandate, because other actors have certain expectations according to its mandate and actors will be judged on this mandate. She explained that she does not want to make concessions on neutrality and independence. In the humanitarian arena, it is very important that each actor understands and respects each other's mandate, so that actors do not have to give up their humanitarian space and principles. A woman working as a civil advisor for MINUSMA (X17) explained that it is sometimes difficult to work together with actors with a totally different mandate. All actors stick to their own principles and no one wants to give up some space. It is necessary to find a common ground, a reason to work together.

Due to the risk of blurring the lines, it is important that all actors in the arena plus the local population understand the difference in the mandates. A woman working in the HCT (X19) made a comparison with the humanitarian arenas in Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia. The situation for humanitarian workers in these places is much more unsafe as the situation is in Mali. In Mali MINUSMA is getting targeted, but not on the same level as in the other mentioned countries. She explained that rebels in Mali do not see the difference between the civil part and the military part of MINUSMA, and therefore everybody working within MINUSMA and actors working with MINUSMA are at risk: *“MINUSMA is targeted, constantly. Just the last week of August [2014], I think they were attacked 8 or 9 times. Within a week or 10 days!”* Until so far, there have only been one example of a NGO who got attacked

²¹⁷ Harmer (2008), p. 29

(a car of the NGO NRC)²¹⁸. In Syria and Somalia the situation is nowadays so untenable, that there are almost no aid workers left.²¹⁹

A man working for a donor organisation (X37) argued he thinks the different mandates impede coordination in the arena: *"We do not speak the same language, we do not have the same goals, we do not have the same objectives, we do not have the same way of working. (...) The having of different principles and mandates is a very complex subject."* According to him, the different mandates and principles which are used in the arena hinder an easy coordination. On the other hand, there are many actors who argued that the different mandates in the arena just complement each other. A CIMIC-advisor working for MINUSMA (X1) sees the different mandates as a positive thing: *"Iedereen heeft zijn eigen verantwoordelijkheden. En als je elkaar kan helpen of nodig hebt zoek je toch contact."*²²⁰ He argued that each mandate can form an added value to another mandate and all together the different mandates can support the reconstruction phase. The occurrence that the mandates are far apart from each other is not per se a negative thing. Also an employee of a medical NGO (X36) explained that the different mandates can complement each other, as long as they all have a humanitarian mandate.

A woman working for an international NGO (X27) explained that she does not think there is a need for a clear task division: *"We all define our roles and our confidences in one way or another and we frame different things on the table. The UN humanitarian agencies blur with the UN development agencies and MINUSMA and any big multidimensional missions crosses over lines as well. We all bring different qualities to the table, so I do not think there is a need to drop clear lines here."* Also other international actors argued that a difference in mandates does not have a negative influence per se on the coordination in the arena: *"Yes you can work together by just respecting your engagement."* (X10 – international NGO employee). Finally the military advisor working for the Dutch Embassy (X5) explained that an overarching goal is not necessary in the coordination structure: *"Moet dat einddoel 100% op elkaar liggen? Nee dat hoeft helemaal niet. (...) Natuurlijk zijn het verschillende mandaten, en zeker van NGOs, dat hebben we absoluut niet in de hand. Een NGO heeft een bepaalde organisatie achter zich staan, een bepaalde ideologie. En die ideologie hoeft niet altijd te corresponderen met de actie die militairen uitvoeren."*²²¹

4.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter answers the following research question: **What are the perceptions of the different actors on their own role in the humanitarian arena and to what extent does this meet the mutual expectations?**

The perceptions the involved actors have about their own role in the arena do not always meet the expectations other actors have. In general, all actors accept the presence of the other actors in the humanitarian arena; the involved organisations understand that the different organisations can complement each other. However, the small misperceptions do impede the uncertainty and ignorance in the arena. Not all actors are satisfied with their own role; actors belonging to the National Civil Society, for example, would like to become more involved in the process of decision and policy making. But especially in the case of the MINUSMA mission, there are a lot of discourses between the expectations and the actual mandate. The expectations the humanitarian community has from MINUSMA lie mainly on the field of creating safety, while they also think MINUSMA is doing to many programs which go beyond the desire to bring back safety in the north. Actors complain about the lack of communication with MINUSMA and the ignorance about their mandate. This is not the first integrated mission where the humanitarian community is complaining about this, but until now no

²¹⁸ Explanation in chapter three, paragraph 3.1.1., p. 37

²¹⁹ Parool (2013)

²²⁰ For English translation, see appendix C, number 42.

²²¹ For English translation, see appendix C, number 43.

progress has been made in stimulating the communication between the mission and the non-UN humanitarian actors. The fact that UN agencies are now linked to the peacekeeping mission and therefore get a military touch, creates confusion in the arena and a fear of a loss of the humanitarian principles of neutrality and independence. However, on the one side, the humanitarian community is also happy with the presence of an integrated mission in the country because this makes it easier for them to put humanitarian issues on the agenda and reach certain areas in the north, but on the other side, their presence reinforces the feeling that the UN mission is too much involved in humanitarian programs. The risk of blurring the lines in the arena is high and the growing number of attacks on MINUSMA targets increases this feeling.

A difference in mandates does not have to hinder the coordination in the arena. Involved actors argued that these differences can complement each other, as long as actors respect each other's principles. Actors in the arena understand that there are different mandates in the arena and different perceptions on the implementation of these mandates. The various discourses have a neutral effect on the mutual expectations. Besides, the differences in focus between the various domains of reconstruction do not influence the mutual expectations as well. For all actors, it is clear which actor is dealing with which domain and all actors understand that it is impossible to embrace all domains of reconstruction; it is preferable to select one or a few domains to focus on in the programs.

The most important difference between the MINUSMA mission on the one hand and the other actors on the other hand, is that the mandate of MINUSMA is much broader: the integrated mission is both focused on human and state security. While the stabilisation mission has a focus on the securitisation of the state (clearing the north from the rebel groups, bringing peace to the country and re-construct governmental structures), the programs of UN agencies and the civil side of the mission are more connected to human security (protection of human rights, support for humanitarian assistance). The integrated mission has therefore a dual focus. The UN stabilisation mission has a legal mandate and its goal is to implement the resolution. The mission is started because of international concerns, in order to support the national government. It is not the intention of the mission to stay for a long time; due to involvement of local actors the mission gets a sustainable process which can be taken over by national authorities after the UN will leave. The limits of response are fixed, only the tasks which fall under the resolution are implemented.

On the other hand there are the humanitarian actors in the arena. Although the humanitarian community consists of a variable of different objectives and abilities and you can't lump them together, the outcomes of the various interviews hold with people working for a humanitarian agency argue that these actors all work needs driven. They are in the country to assist those in need and they have a flexible limit of response: the mandate can be extended or changed any moment. Humanitarian organisations say they work according to the humanitarian principles and the International Laws and Conventions; they focus on human security.

Other crisis situations worldwide have shown that humanitarian operations (fulfilled by the humanitarian community and by the civil part of the UN mission) and military missions (performed by the military part of the integrated UN mission) often operate in the same geographical field and need each other to reach the beneficiaries. Their differences in mandates are reflected in the differences between human and state security. State security and human security together lead to a safer country; both processes are necessary in a reconstruction and stabilisation process. Mandates can form an added value to other mandates and actors can complement each other, just by fulfilling their own tasks. All actors agreed that the existence of different mandates does not obstruct the coordination in the arena. As long as the principles are adhered to and there is mutual respect, a variation of mandates in the arena is just an added value instead of an obstruction.

5. COORDINATION STRUCTURE



5. COORDINATION STRUCTURE

Saturday night, all expats in Bamako are preparing for another party night. Together with some drinks, good food and live music all the stress from the previous week could be shaken off. Everybody gathers in the Bla Bla Bar or La Terrasse; no matter if you have worn a military uniform, were busy with distributing medicines, have flown helicopters or were setting up education programs; when Habib Koité starts playing his kora, everybody is equal and all tensions and struggles from the week before are forgotten. Today is today and the meetings of next week are still far away....²²²

This chapter explains the coordination structure in the humanitarian arena in Mali. Different forms of having contact are explained: interaction, coordination and cooperation. A distinction is made between coordination between solely civil actors and coordination between civil and military actors. Besides, attention is given to competition in the arena and the advantages and disadvantages of different forms of coordination. This chapter is not only a description of the coordination structure but describes also the different opinions of the involved actors. The research question which is answered in this chapter is: **How do the different actors in the humanitarian arena in Mali describe and value the coordination structure?**

5.1. CIVIL-CIVIL COORDINATION

The humanitarian arena does not only contain military actors, but has also many different civilian actors. Figure 16 (chapter three) described the six most important actors in the arena; only two of them have a military powers (MINUSMA and the government). The coordination between the different civil actors is an interesting study object. Some actors were already present in the country for decennia, others came in together with the arrival of the UN. This paragraph describes the different tools which help civil actors to coordinate (UN clusters and Groupe Thématique) and describes the current state of coordination and the perception of the involved actors in the coordination. Also the degree of competition is explained. The importance of coordination could be best expressed by a quote from a woman working for OCHA (X8 & X24): *"I think there are a lot of good initiatives and ideas, but without coordination it would be a total failure for everybody: for the beneficiaries, for the image of the military also and also for the humanitarian actors."* Also Weir (2006) confirms the importance of coordination: *"In a world where civilians are strategic assets and a poorly planned aid response can result in the diverse of aid to the benefit of belligerents, coordination has become more important than ever."*²²³ She later on refers to the aid experiences in the 1990's and the manipulation of aid in the Goma refugee camps. These situations have demonstrated that a poorly coordinate humanitarian arena can do more worse as good.²²⁴ This chapter describes the perception of the different actors on coordination and explains to what extent coordination takes place actually.

5.1.1. Coordination structures

UN clusters

In most developing countries, the government is leading the different sectors of development. The Ministry of Education for example is coordinating with all NGOs and UN agencies about education programs and the Ministry of Health is end responsible for programs on the area of healthcare. When a crisis emerges and the government becomes part of the conflict, this way of coordination does not work anymore. If the government does not function smoothly, it is impossible for them to stay neutral and lead the different development and humanitarian organisations. This situation took place in Mali; at this moment there is no state structure in the country anymore. Under the guidance of OCHA, the UN started the cluster system (figure 21). There are several clusters active in the country, the exact presence can change from time to time. At the end of 2014 there were seven cluster active (figure 21


²²² During the process of writing this thesis an attack has been committed in La Terrasse. At this moment it is not clear how this attack will influence the leisure time of expats and the way they get together. Source: BBC News (2015).

²²³ Weir (2006), p. 5

²²⁴ Weir (2006), p. 33

& 22), the logistic cluster has just been closed. Both UN agencies, MINUSMA and NGOs (national and international) can join the clusters, as long as they have programs on the specific theme the cluster deals with. Each cluster also has a cluster lead (which can be a UN agency or a NGO) who is responsible for the coordination between all involved actors in the cluster. The clusters are only meant for humanitarian actors; they deal with humanitarian issues and are only active during a humanitarian crisis. Clusters are both active on the capital level and in the northern cities.

Figure 21: National Humanitarian Coordination Structure



Source: UN OCHA (2014b)

A man working for a UN agency (X31) explained how big a cluster approximately is: *“We are the lead agency of the shelter cluster and the protection cluster. There are more or less 70 members of the protection cluster. It makes some 200 people. So it is a lot of people. So it is not easy to have a coordination between all these people. You have humanitarian actors, NGOs, members of the government and since the arrival of the MINUSMA mission, we have MINUSMA also as a member.”*

Different opinions prevail about the functioning of the clusters in Mali. A man working for an international NGO (X13) explained that according to him the clusters do not work: *“The coordination based on the clusters does not work. (...) The people are only involving the coordination if there are funds. If there are no funds they are not interested.”* He argues people only join the meetings because they are interested in the funds available. NGOs are leaded by the availability of money and are impressionable by the possibility to get extra funds. This statement is confirmed by a woman working for an international NGO (X27): *“The added value for us to be part of a coordination structure, is because that is where the money comes from. Funding is coordinated through that.”* She confirmed the prejudice of (X13), through saying that the most important added value of joining the clusters lies in the field of competing for funds, instead of the intended purpose of better coordination. This strengthens the information in chapter three, where was already said that the humanitarian arena is based and shaped on the possibility of getting funds. Weir (2006) also described the importance of funds in her article. She said that the majority of organisations is dependent on the whip of the donors and that these donors have an important influence on the design of the humanitarian programs. By receiving funding from certain organisations, NGOs can also lose their independency and neutrality.

She also gave the example of MSF, who refuses to receive donor money from governments who take part in the conflict, because they want to stay neutral in the conflict.²²⁵

Also Duffield referred to the principle of neutrality in one of his articles. According to him, since the post-Cold War liberal interventionism, it is not possible for aid givers anymore to stay neutral. Aid recipients see international assistance more and more as an extension of Western foreign policies.²²⁶

An independent researcher from Burkina Faso (X38) explained the position of OCHA and the clusters in the humanitarian arena. According to him, the formal government had more legal power as OCHA has, and therefore they were a more powerful cluster lead. OCHA does not have complete legitimacy, no authorisation over the NGOs. NGOs can refuse an invitation from OCHA for example, but they can't refuse one from the government. Only the NGOs who are dependent from funds will join the meetings from OCHA because they want to show their good will. An organisation as MSF will not join those OCHA coordination meetings. According to him, the position of OCHA in the arena is less powerful and therefore the clusters are not so well functioning as they were under the guidance of the government.

Another argument for the malfunctioning of the clusters is their lack of presence in the northern areas, which is also argued by the man working for an international NGO (X13): *"The problem is, the clusters are very strong at the capital level, but at the field level they are not strong. They have to start at the field level with coordination between all the actors and step by step build the capital level. Maybe that will work. The only thing I can tell you is: for the moment this way does not work."* However, as is visible in figure 21 from OCHA, there is a cluster representation in several cities in the north, but it is to a lesser extent as in Bamako.

An actor who is normally very negative about other aspects in the humanitarian arena (X37) is surprising positive about the functioning of the clusters: *"I am absolutely not convinced that we need a super coordination. We have the existing one: the clusters, who are working well."* He also explained that the functioning of such a system is depending on the functioning of the involved people; people can make the clusters to fail or to succeed, just by their own commitment and dedication. The argument that the work which is done in the arena is very dependent on the involved people, is shared by more experienced NGO employee and is mentioned and explained in more paragraphs in this chapter.

Groupe Thématique

Before the clusters were created, there was FONGIM (Forum des ONG Internationales au Mali), a platform for international NGOs. FONGIM was raised in 2002 as a coordination platform for lobby activities. It is not meant for coordination on program level, but to transfer joint positions and setting up a joint agenda. FONGIM works with different thematic working groups: Groupes Thématique (figure 22), comparable with the UN clusters. Before the crisis there were eight Thematic Groups, but at the end of 2012 it was decided that there was a need for two new working groups, because some themes were not covered and NGOs were dealing with new issues which were not falling under one of the other eight groups. Therefore two new groups for security and humanitarian assistance (Groupe Thématique Sécurité and Groupe Thématique Assistance Humanitaire) were created. Each




Figure 22: Clusters and Thematic Groups in Mali

²²⁵ Weir (2006), pp. 32-33

²²⁶ Duffield (2010), p. 54

thematic group is headed by another NGO: ‘chef de ville’. There are important differences between FONGIM and OCHA, although they both form a platform for international actors in the arena. The chairwoman of FONGIM (X11) explained this difference as: *“OCHA is VN. Alles wat nu in de geïntegreerde missie zit is VN. En is dus automatisch ook..., heeft een tintje militair. Wij zijn echt een onafhankelijk internationale organisatie.”*²²⁷ Besides this, FONGIM is more focusing on lobby activities while OCHA is dealing with coordination issues. However, NGOs can both join the Groupe Thématique of FONGIM and join the UN clusters.

Where FONGIM is here to support the government and focusses more on development issues, the GTAH (Groupe Thématique Assistance Humanitaire) only deals with humanitarian issues. The chairwoman of the GTAH (X19) explained this difference: *“Normally you always have a network of NGOs in the country that have been there for years. And that is FONGIM! And you have NGOs that have never been in the country. They only came for a specific reason. Generally there is a clash. And that is the beauty of the GTAH, because it was created to sort of say, we are part of the FONGIM, but the working group, the group we are working in, is specific to humanitarian issues and responsive to questions that are very pertinent or relevant to what has just happened in this country.”* She also explained that the GTAH has two roles. The first role is to become the link between the HCT and humanitarian NGOs: being recognized by the HCT and the whole system of humanitarian response. The other role is to coordinate better and form a more unified and stronger humanitarian NGO body to respond to what is happening on the ground and in the field. This second role is about advocacy. The GTAH was created to have a stronger body against MINUSMA: *“So GTAH is important for us to have these body and to make that link between the HCT, that is a very strategic body within the humanitarian world. Major decisions are taken. We think about what are some of the action plans that we want to set and establish. That was keen, that was one thing. And the other thing was to have a stronger body. A NGO body. Because often, and that is another challenge, it is UN versus NGO. Often because the NGO apparatus is so strong and well-funded and big, you can have the tendency of having the UN voice, higher and louder than the NGOs.”* (X19). All international NGOs with humanitarian programs can be part of the GTAH. Every several months, another NGO gets the chairmanship so that the burdens are shared.

Since the arrival of the UN clusters, some NGOs have left from FONGIM to OCHA. A woman working for a development NGO (X6) gave her opinion about this process: *“What was disappointing to some extent, is that there were some dynamics and dialogues within FONGIM for years and as soon as OCHA came, people moved from FONGIM to OCHA, because people were expecting to have better access to funds that came under the CAP [Consolidated Appeal], so the dynamic was broken.”* While the chairwoman of FONGIM said these two platforms can exist next to each other, the woman of the NGO (X6) thought this does not work; NGOs do not want to be part of two platforms at the same time, although both have a different focus, because this cost too much time and energy. Also a man working for a donor company (X37) did not see the added value of FONGIM and the thematic working groups: *“The Thematic Groups from FONGIM are only for international organisations, for NGOs. The form was created before the clusters are implemented. I do not understand the value of their meetings. I haven’t seen any outcome which where useful from my point of view.”* He also added: *“The FONGIM groups are just a group of discussion but I won’t consider them as a coordination structure. They do not have the mandate, they do not have the capacity and they are not inclusive enough. It is a form of discussion.”* However, the thematic groups of FONGIM still exist and function in the humanitarian arena.

5.1.2. Coordination between different civil actors

The current state of coordination is described in different ways by the involved actors. Overall conception is that the current state can be best described as ‘coordination’ instead of ‘cooperation’.

²²⁷ For English translation, see appendix C, number 44.

Coordination in the humanitarian arena takes place by means of the above described structures: the UN clusters and the Groupes Thématique. This paragraph explains how the current coordination structure amongst civil actors in the arena looks like. It explains the advantages and disadvantages according to the involved stakeholders and exemplifies which factors impede or facilitate the coordination structure.

Current state of coordination

First of all, none of the actors wanted to use the word 'cooperation' to describe the linkages between the different actors in the arena. Actors are fierce to explain there is only coordination in the arena and almost no cooperation: *"We coordinate but we do not work together."* (X13 – international NGO). (X13) explained the differences between coordination and cooperation in the following way: *"Cooperate is you work together. But coordinate is you can work in the same area and say: 'me I am doing that, but I do not do the health, so can you please come and do the health'. 'I have a problem with malnutrition, you, you are doing something with malnutrition, can you please send someone?' So we coordinate."* A woman working for OCHA (X8 & X24) added to this: *"I think there is no cooperation so far. It is really coordination, just to ensure that everybody can work in the same operational environment. We have to know each other, we have to acknowledge the role of each other."* She also explained the difference between coordination, coexistence and cooperation: *"Coordination is always ongoing. Actually, we have cooperation on one side of the spectrum and on the other side coexistence. So cooperation is you walk hand in hand, for example by the typhoon in the Philippines. Oke the military actors and the humanitarian actors are calling each other: 'oke I am doing water purification here and me I am doing water purification there'. And coexistence is: we do a legacy here, we do a project also here, and we have different mandates and to get access to the population it is better for us to be far from the military actors, we just try to have someone who does the liaisons between the others and this person is OCHA. But either with coordination or coexistence, you have to coordinate. The coordination with authorities, so as OCHA, we say we do coordination on three aspects: it is information sharing, so either you are in coexistence or in cooperation, you have to do information sharing. So maybe the level of sharing information is different. But we try to have information sharing. And then planning. So we try to plan together, so for example, we as a humanitarian community, we inform about our planning. (...) So it is a kind of task division. So according to ensuring cooperation and coexistence, task division and cooperation it would be like, 'I am doing this here and you are doing this there'. Could be the same activity. Here it would be more like, you do this kind of activity and I am doing another kind of activity. So it really depends on the context."* She explained that coordination mainly consists of sharing information and sharing planning. She compared coordination with task division; according to her, coordination is sharing information about who is doing which activities in which region and make sure there is no duplication amongst the actors in the arena. It is the task of OCHA to guide this coordination in the arena.

Also other actors describe coordination as the sharing of information and sharing of working areas. A man working for an international NGO (X15) explained that international agencies working in Mali divide the working areas in different geographical zones. An African man working for an international NGO (X7) confirmed this: *"We come together to exchange on some themes. And sometimes geographical areas."* The same has happened in Afghanistan, although to another extent. In Afghanistan the participating countries in the UN mission have divided the regions and each country got the responsibility for a certain area. In Mali the participating countries get the responsibility for a certain task, one element of the integrated mission of the UN. For example, the Dutch contingent got the responsibility for the gathering of intelligence, while other contingents in the same area get other responsibilities. In Uruzgan, the Netherlands were the leading nation and were end responsible for everything.²²⁸

²²⁸ Matthijssen (2014)

Later on the woman working for OCHA (X8 & X24) explained that there are different tools for coordination: *“OCHA is in charge of coordination humanitarian agencies. So we have different ways of coordination. We have different tools, that we are developing all around the world. We have the strategy consistent plan, were we all plan together about the response, approaching the tools, lots of maps to coordinate to make sure there are no gaps between humanitarian assistance. We are doing interagency missions and things like that. OCHA is in charge of coordinating with everybody. Two major actors are not coordinating through OCHA. Since the beginning of the development coordination structure: ICRC of course and Doctors without Borders. But generally they are also with us. Whenever we have a meeting, they are there.”* She clarified that all major actors (except for two, who only join as observers) are involved in the coordination structure. In general, the actors in the arena are willing to work together with all other actors involved in the arena; both local and national parties and with all different backgrounds; as long as they adhere and respect the humanitarian principles. However, there are some organisations who work to a lesser extent together with national actors. A woman working for an international humanitarian based NGO (X27) explained: *“Our organisation does not work together with local NGOs. There are a lot of organisations who do that pretty well, we have some informal linkages with local organisations but we do not have partnerships. Yes, that is the short answer: we do not do it. It is not a matter of policy per se, we also do not have a very good development policy how to deal with local actors. Right now, it is just not how we work. There are a lot of organisations that have policies, that have practices and staff who are doing it. We just do not. We do some coordination work to the extent that local organisations are involved in the coordination structure and advocacy structures, things like that. It is not that we are unaware of what they are doing. We do involve them in training and things like that, we bring in the trainers for the government for instance. But we do not have any formal linkages with local organisations.”*

A woman working for an international development agency (X6) explained coordination as the forging of partnerships: *“We hire some consultants with other NGOs to implement projects. We have partnerships with private sector organisations like Orange. We have partnerships with authorities also because we are supporting and trying to strengthening the local capacities of authorities. At national level. So we have a lot of different partnerships.”* Also a man working for a UN agency mentioned the partnerships: *“We are coordinating, working with national and international NGOs. Some of them just because we are targeting the same people. So it is a partnership of coordination within the cluster: sharing of information and sharing of results. And then we have others who are direct partners. So we have a certain agreement with them and they are implementing our programs. This is another way of cooperation with international NGOs.”*

Hilhorst (2003, pp. 204 - 212) describes the difficulty of having different perceptions on partnerships in her book. The different perceptions the various NGOs have on the mutual relations and the interpretation of the term ‘partnerships’ hinders the coordination between them. This is also the case in the humanitarian arena in Mali. When actors have different expectations from each other, this impedes the coordination because the mismatch hinders smooth mutual relations. Later on Hilhorst (2003, p. 219) explained the relation between NGOs and stakeholders. Relationships with stakeholders are multiplex and dimensional. At first sight, the relationship between NGOs and stakeholders seems to be purely contractual. Stakeholders act as authorities wherefore NGOs need to fulfil certain tasks and obligations. However, in practice the relationship is open for negotiations and not as clear-cut as it used to be before. The hierarchical structure is changing, which is clearly visible in Mali. NGOs become more empowered and due to the several platforms and clusters, they arrange a stronger body against the former authorities.

Coordination structures between Bamako and the north are different. A man working for an international NGO (X15) explained: *“The coordination here in Bamako is a huge machine. For me it is too big. But that is classic. Additionally, Bamako is extremely far away of the field. Not for the activities in the south, but for everybody engaged in the north. The gap between the capital and outside is big. You now stay in Bamako, you cannot feel something is going on up there. You are completely dissociated. That is also the case for Malians. I think here we have a huge machine for coordination,*

clusters, you often confront you have people around the table discussing something, who are not present in the field. I have one example from a meeting about Kidal. There were about 25 people around the table, speaking about Kidal, and there were only three people who could say: I have colleagues on the spot, so I have first-hand information.” According to him, people in Bamako have sometimes not enough direct contact with the northern areas, they do not have colleagues or direct lines with the north. Another woman working for an international NGO (X27) explained that coordination itself in the north is easier, because there are less people you have to deal with: *“In the field you have less people and less actors. Not necessarily to say that this is better for the coordination, but it is easier. I think the challenge at the national level is the number of actors and the desire..., not everybody is willing to put in the work that acquires action. Unfortunately, the coordination tool is kind of set at the capital level.”* The cluster structure is set at the capital level, with smaller clusters in the northern areas. Due to the reduced amount of actors present in the north, it is easier for the actors to coordinate. There are less meetings and less actors who are influencing the arena (less actors which need to be taken into account).

Differences UN agencies and NGOs

There is a difference in the way the various civil actors in the arena coordinate with each other. As was already explained in chapter four, UN agencies are bigger as international NGOs and need a longer response time. UN agencies are more bureaucratic and while NGOs are more focussing on specific programs, UN agencies can have a wider range of activities. An employee of the ICRC (X15) said the following about the differences between UN agencies and NGOs: *“Yes, it is clear that UN agencies are much bigger, more bureaucratic as a small NGO or even a big NGO, which is more focused on their specific programs. It is a really big difference. But there is also a big difference between the different UN agencies. You cannot..., it depends on the context. How close your activities are. Some are easier to work with.”* He explained that there are not only differences between the various groups of civil actors, but also between the group of UN agencies themselves. According to him, this all has to do with the different mandates, principles and modus operandi. On the other hand, a woman working for another international NGO (X10) added to this that although various actors are working on different scale levels, this does not influence the coordination: *“There is no different way for us of working together with UN agencies or NGOs. It is just the same. Just depend on what is the agreement between you.”* Also a man working in the office of Stabilization and Recovery in MINUSMA (X16) said there is no big difference for him in working together with UN agencies or NGOs: *“In fact, there is not a big difference [in coordination with UN agencies and coordination with NGOs]. In terms that international NGOs, sometimes they work with the funding from the UN agency.”* This refers to a hierarchical structure. Although some actors have argued there is no hierarchical structure in the arena²²⁹, the way funds are divided does indicate a layered structure. The biggest difference according to him is that UN entities can only involve other UN entities (and no NGOs) in the process of structuring of their programs: *“There is no difference in the sense that for us, both actors that have competences and mandates with which we have to coordinate at the end. And projects in the field that we have to coordinate with. So in this case there is not a big difference. The difference is that in the process throughout, we can only involve UN entities. We cannot involve entities that are not UN. And I even think it is not a good idea, otherwise we enlarge too much. In fact, UN funds should be decided by the UN.”* (X16). According to him, UN entities work more easily together with other UN agencies, because they have the same origin. A man working for a UN agency (34) added to this that each actor is treated in the same way in the arena, there is no different hierarchy in mutual coordination structures: *“We are working with the same professionalism from national and international NGOs. Maybe we will try to have more national NGOs working with us, but because we are also looking at results, professionalism, principles, in the sub-agreement we have the Code of Conduct, it is not just doing the work, it is also doing the work by the principles of the United Nations. We are looking at that when we are starting a partnership with NGOs. But we do not make any difference between national and international NGOs.”*

²²⁹ Quote from (X11) used on p. 75 of paragraph 4.6

Necessary factors for coordination and obstacles & support which influence the coordination structure
Which factors impede the coordination structure and which factors ensure a more increased coordination amongst the actors in the arena? Which factors are necessary for a smooth coordination structure? Almost all actors in the arena, both those actors who are positive about the current state of coordination and those who have a more negative attitude, do have an opinion about how the coordination structure could be improved. Answers of the respondents could be summarized in different categories.

First necessary factor for a smooth coordination is a more regular exchange of ideas. A Malian man working for a consultancy office (X18) would like to have more exchange of ideas between the different actors: *"There should be more consultation between all different actors. A lot of people work together in the same field, but there is zero coordination between them."* A local entrepreneur (X25) agreed on this and added that communication is extremely important, if not essential, in the coordination with NGOs: *"If there is no open communication, there is no ideal work situation."*

However, on the other hand, often heard complaint in the arena is the high number of meetings. A man working for a donor organisation (X37) said: *"It is a nightmare to participate to all those meetings, very difficult and costly also."* He also added that not all NGOs are actively involving the discussions during meetings: *"In some cases NGOs come to the meetings, they occupy the room, just to see whether there would be some funding opportunities. This is so common. They do not say anything, just take a seat front row."* There is a common feeling that the arena is largely influenced and shaped by the availability of funds and that the number of meetings are too high. The CIMIC advisor working for OCHA (X8 & X24) added that she indeed often heard there are too many reunions: *'The problem is that most of the time the meetings turn into information sharing, which is a bit useless. Because at the end of the meetings there are no decisions taken. You have like no follow up, no monitoring, it is just oke we do this and you do that and so on. So we need to have more technical meetings with the right persons and taken decisions. Because this is also the problem. Sometimes when you organize a meeting, people are coming but then it is not the head of mission. So you can't take decisions. (...) So the problem is also leadership. If you're head of mission, you can't go to all the meetings, you delicate and decide which meetings have the priority. Otherwise nothing is progressing. The number of meetings, the frequency of meetings, is sometimes too much and too often, but the problem is, people are also asking for that.'* She clarified this problem in two ways: the meetings are not efficient because there is only a sharing of information and no real appointments are taken, but this is caused by her second comment, that the meetings are only attended by people who do not have the power to make decisions. For a more structured coordination system, she advises to decrease the number of meetings and only invited people from a higher status who are able to make decisions. However, this is sometimes difficult to accept for other employees of international organisations, because they put much value on attending these meetings and they are afraid to miss important (safety) information.

The **second** factor could be linked to the previous factor and is about the number of people involved in the coordination structure. Not only the number of meetings is too high, but also the number of involved employees makes coordination more difficult. According to a woman working for an international NGO (X27) the fewer number of people working in the northern areas are the cause of the more smoother coordination structure in this area: *"In the field you have less people, less actors; not necessarily to say that this is better for the coordination, but it is easier. I think the challenge at the national level is the number of actors."* She also explained that personal characters have an important influence on the coordination structure: *"Not everybody is willing to put in the work that acquires action."* This is confirmed by a woman working for an international NGO (X6), who explained that the most important tool for coordination is willingness. Without commitment or engagement of the involved actors, no one will make the first move and no one will try to seek rapprochement to another.

Third factor which supports a smooth coordination, is a mandate based on the same principles. Hilhorst explained that humanitarian agencies could be subdivided in four different sectors: principle-centred, pragmatist, solidarity and faith-based.²³⁰ A Dutch based NGO (X7) agreed with this, for them it is very important to have the same creed during a partnership. The mandate needs to be based on the same religious principles. He explained his NGO is part of a bigger network of international NGOs with the same religious beliefs. Besides he added something about necessary factors for coordination: *“Well, which factors are necessary... well I think we are guided by our effectiveness on the field. We are a development organisation and we know that we cannot achieve everything by ourselves. We need cooperation with others. That’s what pushes us to have a platform to exchange and to see how we can be more efficient with the resources we have and those of others.”* The understanding that one NGO cannot do everything by itself, encourages him to seek coordination and partnerships with other NGOs, preferably with the same background. A woman working for another NGO (X10) added to this that besides respect, a share in vision and activities is necessary in the coordination structure: *“If you do not have the same activities or you do not have the same understanding of what we are doing; it will be difficult to do a partnership. Just sit and exchange about what you want to do exactly in this partnership. What is your vision, purpose? Can we have a counter strategy plan?”* Also a common agreement on expectations is important. A man working for ICRC (X15) summarized what he expected from interaction with other actors: *“We want coordination, pragmatic operation, oriented coordination. On concrete issues where we and the other organisation really intervene.”*

Fourth factor which is necessary for a well-functioning coordination structure, is the involvement of all actors in the arena. A man working for a French NGO (X29) explained that each actor has its own added value and by coordinating together, all these added values could be used. Actors can complement to each other’s expertise’s: *“Every actor has some capacity and we try to do our best to mix these capacities.”* By making common assessments on the needs, the work load could be shared amongst the involved actors. A woman working for OCHA (X8 & X24) added to this: *“There are a lot of things to improve. First of all, I would say that in terms of coordination: we need first of all to be sure that we have all the actors. Because we cannot coordinate with only half or just a few NGOs.”*

Finally, the difference in length of a mission influences the coordination structure, according to a Belgium security advisor (X4): *“Veelal kiezen NGOs voor een ‘acceptance’ model, waarin ze de sympathie en respect kunnen verwerven van de bevolking, mede door het respect en sympathie die zij opbrengen voor hun leef- en werkomgeving. Dat is ook broodnodig voor het contact met de bevolking en de beneficiaries. Je kan namelijk niet met gewapende escorte aankomen en hopen dat je de kinderen onder 5 jaar gaat kunnen vaccineren. De UN en zeker de blauwhelmen opteren eerder voor een ‘protection’ model en ook deterrence (de modus operandi van elk leger).”*²³¹ According to him, these two different models influence the coordination between the UN and NGOs in a negative way.

Advantages and disadvantages

Coordination between various civil actors in the arena has some advantages and disadvantages for the involved actors. Some people talk about competition within the humanitarian community. There is only a limited amount of funds available and many different actors have to vie with each other to acquire projects. However, all involved actors argue that a certain extent in the arena is healthy and makes individuals sharper. A woman working for as an expert on local economic development (X3) said competition creates a higher working force and gives NGOs the opportunity to improve themselves. Everybody wants to reach good results and are therefore more striving to achieve their goals. Everybody wants to be the best, in order to get more funds. Another woman working for a NGO (X6) added that competition is something normal in a humanitarian arena: *“As usual that is not something very..., it is part of our job. When our donor is launching a call for a proposal, sometimes we*

²³⁰ Hilhorst (2012), International Aid Actors and Organisations, Lecture at Wageningen University, September 5, 2012

²³¹ For English translation, see appendix C, number 45.

are in a competition, sometimes we are working together, because we are doing some consortium, it is just the way how this kind of industries work. There is not something special between us and other NGOs. In general, it is the way how it works.” Later on she explained that there are enough problems in the country to generate work for the present NGOs: “I think there is so much work to do in Mali that there is no place for competition. But sometimes, oke, some organisations have the same expertise and maybe we can be in a very strong competition for a specific call, but it is not so usual. I think we are trying more and more to collaborate and exchange information. And as I said, there is so much work to do in Mali.” According to her, there is no competition in Mali because there is enough work to do. A man working for a safety NGO (X4) mentioned the concept of ‘concullega’s’, a merging of the Dutch words for competitor and colleague: “De concurrentie tussen verschillende NGOs is niet anders in Mali dan elders. Het zijn concullega’s. In veiligheid gaan ze waarschijnlijk allemaal zeer solidair zijn, in netwerking ook. Maar soms spelen de donors ook spelletjes: ‘Hallo wie wil er naar Gao gaan? Ha, jij niet, dan kan ik het aan de andere vragen.’ Als er maar één budget is en er zijn vijf NGOs, dan wordt er inderdaad soms een beetje..., niet geconcurrerd, maar wel..., iedereen kijkt naar elkaar. Zijn er andere mensen die ook een project voorstel maken? En wie zijn die mensen? Maar het is niet dat ze belangrijke informatie over veiligheid achterhouden.”²³² According to him, the competition does not lead to unsafe situations and the keeping back of important (security) information, but only ensures NGOs are trying to convince donors about their own added value in the arena.

According to a woman working for a lobby organisation (X11) there are only advantages of coordination: “Ik kan eigenlijk alleen maar voordelen noemen. Ja. Het helpt in alles zeg maar. We zouden het veel meer moeten doen. Maar zodra er geld in het spel komt is het veel moeilijker om te coördineren.”²³³ According to her, due to coordination NGOs also get a stronger body in the arena, against UN entities. This is confirmed by a man working for a French NGO (X29); he added that another added value of coordination is the creation of a common position on certain topics: “We have a big coordination with other NGOs there to be sure we have the same position regarding the MNLA. We have a strong communication to make sure we say the same thing. This kind of situation is very important. To show the humanitarian community we have the same idea.” Without this joint standpoint about certain issues, it is easy for rebel groups to influence individual organisations. Also a man working for a medical NGO (X36) said he thinks coordination with other actors has only advantages. Besides, he made a comparison to the situation in Haiti: “We are suffering from coordination, it is not good when people do not speak with each other. You need coordination. I have been in the logistic coordination in Haiti, after the cholera. It was a very very big gap, the coordination.” According to him, the coordination structure in Haiti was much less developed as it is in Mali. After the earthquake in Haiti, an overall aid coordination framework which was able to integrate all different kind of humanitarian assistance was not present. There were limited connections between coordination mechanisms and there was some overlap between different programs. Another conclusion of the disaster in Haiti is that there has been a lack of coordination due to a lack of (recognised) leadership.²³⁴⁻²³⁵ It is too early to conclude what Mali exactly learned from the situation in Haiti, but it is clear that the rate of communication has improved and that involved actors value the coordination structure in a more positive way.

5.1.3. Coordination with civil pillar of MINUSMA

Chapter four already explained how the civil pillar of MINUSMA looks like and what actors expect from this pillar. This paragraph continues on this topic by explaining how other actors in the arena are coordinating with the civil pillar. There is made a distinction in coordination with the civil pillar and the military pillar (is discussed in paragraph 5.2), because these two pillars both take in a very different role in the arena.

²³² For English translation, see appendix C, number 46.

²³³ For English translation, see appendix C, number 47.

²³⁴ IASC (2012), p. 36

²³⁵ IASC (2010)

Explanation and examples of coordination with civil pillar of MINUSMA²³⁶

First of all, not all actors in the arena coordinate directly with the civil pillar of MINUSMA. Due to the risk of blurring the lines, some actors prefer to use OCHA as a mediator between them and MINUSMA, even if they are only coordinating with the civil pillar. Actors are afraid that, because the three pillars fall under the same mandate, information will be shared between the different pillars - especially with the military one. If an organisation is talking or coordinating with the civil pillar, they are afraid that after a while the information will end up in the military pillar. Therefore several NGOs are quite strict in that they do not work directly with MINUSMA but only via OCHA, so that their organisation could not be directly linked to a military organisation. A man working for a French NGO (X29) said: *"In fact, in Bamako we have not a lot of direct contact with MINUSMA, we prefer to have direct contact with OCHA."* A woman working for another NGO (X9) said: *"We definitely do not cooperate with MINUSMA."* On the other hand, there are also international organisations who do not have problems with having direct contact with MINUSMA. A woman working for an international humanitarian agency (X27) explained: *"I communicate directly with them. But I know some organisations do not like to."* Later on she added: *"I engage as closely as I can. Because I need to understand what they are doing and they see what we are doing."* A man working for a medical NGO (X36) responded to the question how he communicates with MINUSMA: *"Straight. Directly."* For UN agencies the situation is different, because they are all part of the 'one UN approach'. A man working for a UN agency (X31) clarified this: *"My entry point to MINUSMA is directly. I do not need OCHA to talk with MINUSMA."* For UN agencies it is not necessary to approach MINUSMA via OCHA, because they all fall under the same UN structure.

Coordination takes places in different forms and is twofold. None on the interviewed actors said they are implementing programs together, it is mostly about sharing information. A woman working for an international NGO (X27) explained: *"It is not at all about which programs were are implementing. Because we do not support their programs and they do not support ours. For me it is about information, they have different information than we have, in different areas from where we have it. In terms of protection of civilians in particular, they are an advocacy target."* MINUSMA is present in areas which are not or only poorly accessible for some NGOs. The information MINUSMA collects in these places is valuable for NGOs. Also information about recent security updates and places where MINUSMA will run patrols is important for NGOs, they can use this information to implement their own programs in the north. A man working for an international NGO (X7) clarified: *"We interact with them to know about the security situation of the places we want to visit and where our project partners like to visit. For security reason we work together with them in that aspect. By finding out, first, we are doing that with the French troops, Serval, and now we are doing it with MINUSMA. In terms of security."* A woman working as head of the Groupe Thématique Sécurité (X14) added that besides information about the safety situation in the north, MINUSMA can also give information about how NGOs can better protect themselves, for example: how to protect your employees from getting robbed or hijacked? Also INSO (X22), the national NGO for safety, shares information with MINUSMA about the latest security situation: *"MINUSMA gives us up-to-date information about the security situation in different areas, but we do not participate in their meetings."*

But the other way around is also happening. Both actors are either recipient and donor of information. A woman working for an international NGO said (X6) she also shared information with MINUSMA: *"We have some relations with MINUSMA, for example, we inform them that we are in the process to restart our activities in Gao. As soon as we will launch our projects, we will inform them."* NGOs share information about their programs with the civil pillar, so that MINUSMA has a complete overview of humanitarian activities in the northern areas.

Next to the sharing of information, coordination is also based on the mutual exchange of expertise and knowledge. The National Civil Society and some NGOs who are already present for a longer time,

²³⁶ Figure 18 in chapter four provides more information about the structure of the civil pillar of MINUSMA.

have a lot of knowledge about the local situation which they like to share with MINUSMA. The chairman of a platform for national NGOs (X20 & X35) said they helped MINUSMA by reforming the second resolution (textbox 5), because in the first resolution where some inaccuracies about the situation in Kidal. This platform has helped MINUSMA to improve the new resolution: there has been an exchange of knowledge.

On the other hand, a man working for the office of the DSRSG (X21) said the civil pillar of MINUSMA has disposal about employees with a lot of expertise, which NGOs could use while implementing their programs: *"It takes time before people really understand that it is an added value. Because some guy in the justice section is actually an expert in corrections, which you do not have. Another person is an expert on corruption, which you do not have. Rather than see it as..., oke you can go on and look for an anti-corruption expert somewhere else. But you can get this person in MINUSMA, in hotel l'Amitie. Why should you travel 2000 km to find this person if he is working for MINUSMA now?"* According to him, MINUSMA disposes some expertise which NGOs do not have. He is willing to share this expertise with other actors in the arena. However, some NGO employees already have decades of experience in other crisis situations in other countries; therefore it is debatable if MINUSMA really disposes more expertise as NGOs employees have.

ICRC (X15) gave another example of the exchange of knowledge: *"We exchange a lot here. We exchange because we have to promote International Humanitarian Law. So we discuss with them trainings, briefings, which we carry out with them. Then there are issues, that, I mean they are also up to certain..., obliged to follow international humanitarian laws. Their behaviour, if they arrest people, how they deal with it. So far it is not really the case, but we discuss this kind of issues with them."* This is a concrete example of training and advocacy, one of the examples of civil-military coordination mentioned by Frerks (chapter two, theoretical framework). In (cluster) meetings, ICRC only participates as an observer, but they are always keen to share their knowledge with other actors. He said he wants to teach MINUSMA, to learn them more about the International Humanitarian Laws. There has taken place an exchange of knowledge about international relations and affairs, which could indirectly improve the mutual coordination in the arena.

The civil pillar of MINUSMA is willing to work together with all kind of actors in the arena. The advisor of the DSRSG (X21) said: *"Particular to the UN is that we are seen as an actor that works with everyone. If you look at for instance, when it gets to things such as aid effectiveness and coordination but also the thematic groups that we have. In Mali we have almost 19 UN agencies. Each one of them is working in a different area: food, health, education, agriculture, industrial development, so you can imagine each one of them make 8 partnerships with so many different partners or government institutions."* About the coordination with NGOs he said: *"When it gets to international NGOs, there are many types of collaboration. We have this partnership with international NGOs more of..., service delivery."* This means that MINUSMA (or UN agencies in general) is using NGOs as implementing partners. A man working for the QIP department (X16) added to this that 40% of the partners of his department are national NGOs. However, in general, MINUSMA does not have much international NGOs as implementing partners; the civil pillar of MINUSMA works mainly together with UN agencies. A woman working in the office of Stabilization and Recovery (X17) declared however that this is also caused due to the fact that this office in MINUSMA is still quite new: *"Yes it is very new. It is like, maybe a couple of months ago. So we are really getting much more closer to the clusters and to the NGOs. Reaching out to them. We need to first of all, make that dialogue."* Because this office is still establishing itself a little bit, they were not yet ready to seek partnerships with actors outside the UN. Later on this woman (X16) also explained the coordination between UN agencies and MINUSMA: *"We have our financial payment and procedures, which are different from UN agencies. We have different stages for accountability and transparency."*

Since the start of the mission, the coordination amongst actors in the arena and the civil pillar of MINUSMA has improved. Employees working in the civil pillar are more and more seeking rapprochement to other actors in the arena by joining information meetings and providing

information about the work they do and the kind of coordination they would like to start. A woman working for an international NGO (X27) said about this rapprochement: *"Sure, there are problems, there can be problems. But again, they are consulting all of us, we all have the opportunity to mention problems. If they weren't doing that, then it would be different."* Also ICRC (X15) explained that the type of coordination is more and more expanding. When the mission just started, the only coordination which took place was about the sharing of information about safety and security: *"The entry point in the field, in the beginning was the discussion about the situation and security. Just to exchange, to learn. And more and more as they get operational, we discuss basically issues."* He mentioned the factor that MINUSMA becomes more deployed and operational as the reason the coordination in the arena with the civil pillar is expanding. Also a woman working for the civil pillar in MINUSMA (X17) mentioned the improvement in the coordination with actor actors: *"As far as I understand, the situation is improving."* According to her, the civil pillar is more evolving itself lately and therefore seeks more linkages with other actors in the arena.

However, there are still some feelings of let-down about the coordination with MINUSMA. Especially the chairman of the platform for national NGOs (X20 & X35) was very disappointed about the coordination with MINUSMA. He argued that national NGOs have a lot of knowledge about the country, the inhabitants and the conflict and he felt ignored in the extent of involvement from MINUSMA towards local institutes. According to him, MINUSMA and international institutes do not have as much knowledge about the country as the National Civil Society has. Besides, the limited coordination which does take place, is quite compelling. National NGOs are not involved in decision making, but just get orders which they have to perform, according to the instructions from above. Both MINUSMA and international NGOs only share their decisions, without involving the above platform in the process of decision making. Also a woman working for an international NGO (X6) expressed her disappointment about MINUSMA. She invited them for a meeting but none of the invited MINUSMA employees came, even without sending a cancellation. Although there are some disappointments about the coordination with MINUSMA, there are also several advantages worth to mention. Striking however is that MINUSMA mentions a lot of advantages for NGOs of working together with them, while other actors in the arena take the presence of MINUSMA for granted, but do not mention many advantages of coordinating with them; they seem a bit more sceptical.

Some of the actors already provided solutions for the inadequate coordination with MINUSMA. Most important ones are an improvement of communication and the feeling of involvement & importance. The chairman of a platform for national NGOs (X20 & X35) said he wants to become more involved in the decision making process, but also in the implementation of the programs and in the evaluation afterwards. By becoming more involved in all phases of the reconstruction phase, he can guarantee the continuity and sustainability when MINUSMA will leave. A man working for an international NGO (X29) said: *"We have to find a better way to make sure coordination is done but sometimes it is like we only need staff to go to all those meetings. The objective is to make projects, so it is very time consuming and I think we can try to improve this."* "How would you like to improve this?" *"Oh well, that is a good question. It is difficult to say. One of the problems is that it is difficult to have all the actors present. Even in the cluster, sometimes it is more easy to have bilateral contact with the service of the state than in the cluster."* The number of meetings and the frequency of having contact is an important point of discussion. On the one hand people argue the number of meetings is too frequent and not effective. But on the other hand, NGOs are very afraid to miss information and they are always eager to show their presence and show their possible interest in funds available.

But also people working for the civil pillar of MINUSMA gave some recommendations for a smoother contact with other civil partners in the arena. A man with years of experience of working for the UN (X16) denounced the dogmatic approach some NGOs in the arena still have: *"If you want to be dogmatic, be dogmatic, but sometimes it will create damage."* According to him (and confirmed by other people working for MINUSMA), many NGOs still stick to their principles which were set up decades ago. These principles and the Code of Conduct are not adapted to local circumstances. When NGOs have a certain idea about something (for example about coordination with the UN) it is almost

impossible to change these thoughts, according to (X16). He gave the following recommendations for coordination: *“Mutual knowledge first of all. Especially for humanitarian actors, they need to know what is the structural peacekeeping mission. So if they know that they could discuss for example. I would say again put aside dogmatic approach. Which is never useful in this case. Understanding of the differences in the mandate. Respect the humanitarian principles. Basically all these things.”* According to him (X16), this dogmatic approach some NGOs still have, hinders the mutual coordination and stimulates prejudices. Later on, he gave also another advice for a better coordination with other actors in the arena: *“The mission could be more involved in the cluster mechanism. So if we participate more as a mission, if the NGOs participate more, there will be more easy understanding of the programs and even they will get a more clear idea how the mission works in fact.”* He agreed that more mutual understanding about each other’s mandates is necessary in order to be able to work together.

A man working in the civil pillar of MINUSMA (X21) gave a concrete example of coordination: *“At a certain moment the local NGO said: ‘I cannot do this project anymore.’ Basically because they were under the pressure of the international NGO which is our partner. ‘That does not want us to work with you, because they say that we are invading the humanitarian space.’ So to be honest with you, I think that was a bit unfair. Not only for us, but also for the local NGOs, because at the beginning the local NGOs said yes this is true: they try to push us to work with you, we want to do the project. But then they were convinced to do not work with us.”* With this example, he explained that national NGOs are much impressionable by big international agencies. National NGOs are mainly used as implementing partners and are therefore very dependent on funds and projects from international agencies.

Advantages and disadvantages

Some advantages of coordinating with MINUSMA are been mentioned in above paragraph, but this paragraph will highlight some of the benefits and explains the disadvantages.

A man working for the civil pillar of MINUSMA (X16) explained that working together with NGOs makes him sharper. On the question what the consequences for MINUSMA are due to their coordination with NGOs he responded: *“We do better our job.”* Other advantages for MINUSMA are that due to coordination with other actors in the arena, the work they do becomes more sustainable and long-lasting, because other actors can take over when MINUSMA leaves the country.

Advantages for NGOs of coordinating together with the civil pillar of MINUSMA lie mainly in the field of getting access to the latest news and possibilities of funds. A man working for a NGO (X29) added to previous statements that the added value of coordination between NGOs and UN agencies is that these two can complement each other. A woman working in the civil pillar (X17) described coordination as finding complementarities: *“MINUSMA is not only military but we also have civilians. We have a huge number of civilian sections and they can do an amazing work. And it can complement each other! This is exactly the word. To find complementarities and synergies. (...) So we are trying to find complementarities. It is not always easy, because it depends on the level of familiarity.”* Later on she said: *“What is really important and what we always try to do is to ensure that we are not taking space of anybody. We need to complement each other. That is really what is needed.”* The man working for the NGO (X29) also referred to the means and capacity the UN has. The added value of coordination for him is that NGOs can make use of these capacities: *“UN agencies have a lot of capacity. (...) I think for big capacity, UN agencies are very important. (...) Every actor has some capacity and we try to do our best to mix these capacities.”* However, mid-2014 MINUSMA was not fully operational yet, they did not have all the capacity which was necessary to implement their own programs. A CIMIC advisor working for MINUSMA (X1) said about this: *“Wij bieden niet actief onze hulp aan, want voor onze eigen taken hebben we al schrikbarend weinig middelen en mankracht.”*²³⁷ Also other actors have noticed that MINUSMA is not fully operational yet, which could cause problems

²³⁷ For English translation, see appendix C, number 48.

in the things they want to do and the programs they want to implement.

Last advantages of the integrated mission for NGOs is the influence they can exert on the political and military strategies of the UN. Due to the integration with civil actors, NGOs can insist by the UN on sticking to the humanitarian principles.²³⁸

5.2. CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION

Civil-military coordination (CIMIC), is a very sensitive topic in the humanitarian arena. However, amongst others due to the radicalisation of aid, coordination between civil and military actors becomes more important. In certain situations, military support is necessary for civil actors to reach the beneficiaries. This paragraph explains to what extent there is interaction between the humanitarian community and military actors, what different kinds of CIMIC there are in the humanitarian arena in Mali and what the perception of the involved actors is about CIMIC. The integration between the civil and military pillar within the UN is not explained here but in the paragraphs about the integrated mission (4.1.3 and 5.3.). When talking about military actors, only the MINUSMA militants are meant because these have the most important influence in the arena.

5.2.1. Different perceptions on explanation of civil-military coordination

Civil-military coordination is a broad topic, which could consist of different forms. This paragraph deals with civil-military coordination in general and expresses the different perceptions that prevail about CIMIC in the Malian humanitarian arena.

Perceptions and explanations from employees directly involved in civil-military coordination

Interesting thing is that many actors who work on a daily basis with civil-military issues, have a different explanation on this concept. A working paper from the Humanitarian Policy Group and Overseas Development Institute²³⁹, referred to various definitions about civil-military coordination, ranging from the NATO, the EU and the UN and therefore confirms the existence of various explanations of usage patterns of the concept. In the theoretical framework was already written that the interaction between civil and military actors has different degrees of intensity. Figure 11 explained that there are different forms, existing from co-existence till cooperation. As was already explained in chapter four (paragraph 4.1.2), two Dutch civil-military advisors (X1 and X30 & X33), both working as head of the U9 office, have different perceptions on the line 'support for humanitarian assistance' in in the MINUSMA mandate and the explanation of civil-military coordination. One of them (X30 & X33) used the NATO explanation to clarify civil-military coordination. According to him, CIMIC is based on three principles: *"Onze focus ligt op liaison, ten tweede op 'support aan de force', en ten derde doen wij iets voor de bevolking, maar dan wel als een last resort."* He also explained why the concept of CIMIC was founded: *"CIMIC werk is ontstaan uit een noodzaak. Omdat een militaire macht in een bepaald gebied vaak de enige macht was, werd zij met allerlei problemen van de bevolking geconfronteerd. Die ze er dan maar op hun bordje bij kregen, omdat er verder niemand (meer) was. Vanuit die noodzaak is CIMIC geboren en CIMIC heeft vooral tot doel om alle niet-militaire taken die bij het leger terecht komen, daar vandaan te houden of ze zo goed mogelijk uit te voeren. Dat betekent: kijken of er anderen zijn in het gebied, civiele overheden of andere instanties, die de niet-militaire taken in plaats van het leger kunnen uitvoeren. En zo de noden van de bevolking te ledigen. Want een leger is er om zo nodig te vechten en wil daar zijn aandacht op kunnen richten. Maar hoe gaat het in het echt? Als er ergens iemand is die de verantwoordelijkheid op zich neemt, dan gaat iedereen daarnaar toe. En zo krijg je als leger dan ook ineens de verantwoordelijkheid over riolering, water, elektriciteit, ziekenhuizen etc. Daar heeft het leger geen tijd voor en ook niet de capaciteit en het geld. De bedoeling van CIMIC is om dat soort zaken bij het leger weg te houden en om anderen dat te laten doen. Anderen*

²³⁸ Harmer (2008), pp. 537-538

²³⁹ HPG (2012)

die er eigenlijk verantwoordelijk voor zijn.”²⁴⁰ According to him, the force pillar of MINUSMA is not responsible for humanitarian affairs. In Mali there are many civil actors present who are able to take responsibility for the humanitarian tasks, therefore he is mainly working on liaison activities and enabling others to do their own (humanitarian) work. He explained CIMIC as ‘enabling others to do humanitarian activities and taking over these responsibilities in a (not frequently occurring) situation where civil actors are not able to fulfil humanitarian tasks’.

His predecessor (X1) gave another interpretation of civil-military coordination and had especially another vision on the line ‘support for humanitarian activities’. He described a feeling of competition between civil actors and military actors. He gave an example of a project of a temporary health clinic in Bamako: *“Kijk we hebben eenheden en als die in een gebied komen, dan leggen ze contacten met de plaatselijke bevolking. En dan geven ze aan, we hebben een medisch team bij ons, we hebben een genie team bij ons, dus als we iets voor jullie kunnen doen... We kunnen dus bijvoorbeeld een huisartsenpost neerzetten en gratis medische consulten bieden aan de bevolking. Dat is geen development, maar een soort noodhulp. Het gaat niet op basis van een humanitarian assesment, het is puur: wij zijn nu in dit gebied, er is vast wel ergens hier een wijk waar mensen zo arm zijn dat ze niet naar en huisarts gaan en geen medicijnen kunnen betalen, terwijl er natuurlijk ongetwijfeld ook zieke mensen rondlopen. Vorige week is hier in Bamako zo’n activiteit geweest. Dan denk je, nou in Bamako, is dat wel nodig? Dat heeft toch genoeg artsen, ziekenhuizen en klinieken? Ja. Maar er zijn hier heel veel wijken waar mensen zo arm zijn dat ze in principe niet naar een dokter gaan en geen medicijnen kunnen betalen.”*²⁴¹ However, according to civil actors in the arena this is a perfect example of a blurring of lines. In this situation, there would have possibly been other health NGOs who could have done this project. His (X1) reply against this argument is: *“Wat humanitarians doen is prachtig, maar die kunnen niet overal zijn. En die zijn zeker niet hier in Bamako met dat soort dingen.”*²⁴² He described the feeling displeasure, when a certain military unit is doing all the preparation work for a project²⁴³ and a NGO takes over later on: *“Het gevolg is dus dat die militaire eenheid nooit meer een voorstel heeft gedaan. Terwijl er heel veel werk ligt. Maar die denken ‘wij al het werk doen, en dan gaat de NGO ermee vandoor’. Daar moeten we nog een oplossing voor bedenken, dat zij... want we hebben heel veel waterprojecten behoeftes geïdentificeerd waar hulp nodig is. Maar het moet dus niet zo zijn dat wij al het voorwerk doen en dat dan de humanitarian agency zegt ‘nou bedankt, wij gaan het werk wel oppikken’.”*²⁴⁴ This quote exactly identifies the difference in vision about CIMIC between (X1) and (X30 & X33), because the latter said about this situation: *“Misschien hadden zij dit heel graag willen doen en hadden ze er veel tijd en energie in gestoken, maar hadden zij niet het vertrekpunt dat wij dingen als last resort doen. Je zou in hun plaats ook kunnen denken: ‘fijn, wij hebben iets nuttigs aangeleverd, iemand anders gaat het doen, dus wij kunnen weer iets anders met onze energie gaan doen.’ En intussen wordt het probleem wel opgelost! (...) Ik probeerde uit te leggen dat CIMIC er is om te coördineren en bewerkstelligen dat anderen het werk doen dat nodig is. Als het is zoals jij beschrijft, dat anderen hebben bedacht: ‘dit is nuttig en dit is nodig, wij gaan dit doen’... Dat is juist perfect! Dat scheelt ons tijd, energie en geld.”*²⁴⁵ According to him (X30 & X33), there is no rivalry between the force pillar of MINUSMA and civil actors in the arena, because these two can complement and help each other in the preparation or elaboration of certain projects. He also said that projects in Bamako carried out by military actors are not necessary, because in Bamako there are enough civil actors present who can take responsibility for this area and these activities. He agrees that if the force pillar is doing humanitarian activities in Bamako, this increases a risk of blurring the lines in the capital. These two civil-military advisors have the same position within MINUSMA but both use different interpretations of civil-military coordination. This could cause confusion for other actors working in the arena and the local population.

²⁴⁰ For English translation, see appendix C, number 49.

²⁴¹ For English translation, see appendix C, number 50.

²⁴² For English translation, see appendix C, number 51.

²⁴³ These projects are explained more detailed in paragraph 5.2.4.

²⁴⁴ For English translation, see appendix C, number 52.

²⁴⁵ For English translation, see appendix C, number 53.

A third person with a lot of knowledge and experience about civil-military questions is a woman working as a CIMIC expert for OCHA (X8 & X24). She described civil-military coordination as military support for civilian activities in the humanitarian arena: *"So how can we work together but at the same time humanitarian actors do not want to see military guys next to them."* There is a crossroad between 'do not want to be seen together' and the need to talk together because both actors are operating in the same arena. OCHA stands as a mediator on this crossroads and tries to represent the interests of all actors in the arena. She explained civil-military coordination mostly as the sharing of information about for example road patrols, cargo distribution, planning of new programs and security updates: *"It can be security, if you need to have extra patrol, or actually it can also be in terms of contingency planning."* According to her, civil-military coordination could exist of both the exchange of information and a kind of armed escort or area patrol.

A military attaché working for the Dutch embassy (X5) said about civil-military coordination in general: *"Civiel militaire coöperatie, dat is eigenlijk als militairen civiel getinte dingen doen. Soms met NGOs, soms met eigen geld en eigen uitvoering; om de missie die ze uit voeren te ondersteunen. Belangrijk bij CIMIC is dat onze missie daarin centraal staat. Dus het draagvlak bij de bevolking voor de missie staat centraal."*²⁴⁶ This is again another vision about CIMIC as above actors have. There is a difference in the goal with which actors perform civil-military activities. Is the goal to win the hearts & minds of the population, or is the goal to support the civil actors in the arena? A civil advisor working for MINUSMA (X12) mentioned the motive to do humanitarian work and argued he is in favour of a strict line between humanitarian and civil actors: *"Nou ik ben wel voor een goede scheiding tussen het humanitaire en de ontwikkeling en de militairen. (...) Je moet die dingen niet uit een militaire motivatie doen. Dat vind ik niet zuiver."*²⁴⁷ He argued to keep the humanitarian principles in mind.

Also another employee working for the Dutch embassy (X23) argued she thinks there is too much focus on civil-military coordination: *"Ik vind dat er teveel belang wordt gehecht aan de civiel-militair samenwerking."*²⁴⁸ The consequence of this is, according to her, that the division of labour works less effective: *"Het is gewoon goed is dat verschillende partijen verschillende verantwoordelijkheden hebben. Ik vind niet dat het de verantwoordelijkheid van de militairen is om duurzame ontwikkeling te geven. Zij zijn meer instrumenteel om daar een environment voor te creëren, maar ze moeten het niet zelf gaan doen. Het valt wel mee hoor, maar dat zie ik wel als een negatieve les van onze samenwerking in Afghanistan waar het een soort gemeentegoed is geworden."*²⁴⁹ This woman mainly talks about the involvement of military in humanitarian activities, instead of military supporting the humanitarian arena. She also explained the background of the urge of military to do humanitarian activities: *"De militairen die hier zitten die zeggen: 'we kunnen nergens gebruik van maken. Er is geen geld, terwijl we allerlei behoeftes zien'. Toen zei ik: 'maar het is niet aan jullie om dat te doen, die behoeften moeten door andere organisaties worden ingevuld.'"*²⁵⁰ Due to the military desire to do small humanitarian programs, the Hearts & Minds fund is created, which is explained more detailed in paragraph 5.2.4.

Perceptions and explanations from civil actors on CIMIC

Above paragraph gave the perceptions and explanations of people working for MINUSMA, OCHA or the embassies on the topic of civil-military coordination. However, also various other people in the humanitarian arena have to deal (sometimes on a daily basis) with civil-military coordination. A Malian man working for a consultancy office (X18) expressed there is no cooperation at all between civil and military actors in the arena: *"Officially, there is no cooperation between the civil and the military."*

²⁴⁶ For English translation, see appendix C, number 54

²⁴⁷ For English translation, see appendix C, number 55

²⁴⁸ For English translation, see appendix C, number 56

²⁴⁹ For English translation, see appendix C, number 57

²⁵⁰ For English translation, see appendix C, number 58

CIMIC is a sensitive topic in the arena and none of the other respondents disproved this statement. All actors are to a more or lesser extent worried about civil-military coordination, but they all agree it exist in one or more different forms. A Malian woman working for an international NGO (X2) explained that for her, civil-military coordination mainly consists of the sharing of (security) information. She used this tool for the protection of her programs and employees. She also added that according to her, there are no disadvantages of coordinating together with the military: *"I think it is good for me. It is complementary. Everybody has to respect. It is like the separation of the power and democracy. We have military, but we have also the public of the power. Civil has to play its role and military do not have to influence this."* She clearly mentioned the separation between different tasks and mandates, but also referred to the possible added value of CIMIC. A man working for a UN agency (X31) mentioned another added value of CIMIC: *"So the only thing we have to do, and this is about coordination, is to make sure that we are not duplicating all."* By a regular exchange of information, a duplication of programs is prevented. This not only counts for coordination with military actors of course, but for a regular interaction with all actors in the arena. Not all actors agree there are no disadvantages of coordination with military actors; the risk of blurring the lines and a ignorance of the humanitarian principles are already often mentioned.

A woman working for an international NGO (X9) explained the difference in civil-military coordination in Bamako and in the field. The number of actors in the field is smaller which makes it more difficult to stay aloof from military actors: *"We do not get into MINUSMA vehicles, we won't go to places where MINUSMA is seen regularly, like in Gao. But it becomes a little bit more difficult here in Bamako. But here are definitely efforts to keep the perception of the humanitarian actors separate, in being too closely with military. (...) I think we are probably more strict now to make sure the type of activities we implement are not to be confused with being MINUSMA activities, but it is very hard to make sure this."*

A man working for an international safety NGO (X4) explained the difference between civil-military coordination in situations with a civil conflict and in situations with a natural disaster. Military employees have a huge knowledge and capacities about themes related to logistics and physical reconstruction. They are very well able to transport people and goods from A to B in a short time frame; which is very useful during a natural disaster. Also the working document from the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG)²⁵¹ mentions the difference in civil-military coordination during a natural disaster and a civil conflict by arguing that joint operations are more accepted by all involved actors during a natural disaster. This has also to do to that a natural disaster does not always happen in a crisis situation. In a situation of peace it is easier to start such coordination structures (2012, p.2).

The same man (X4) also mentioned the danger of the hidden agenda of the military. In some situations military contingents were for example implementing health projects but only gave a treatment in exchange for information: *"Maar ze deden die geneeskunde ook om informatie te krijgen, intelligence. Of, en daar zijn bewijzen van: 'Jij krijgt een tuberculose behandeling maar eerst ga je zeggen wat je weet. Anders krijg je die behandeling niet!' Dat zijn dingen die gebeurd zijn. En ongetwijfeld wat je gezien hebt twee maanden geleden: Obama heeft verklaard dat het Amerikaanse leger moet stoppen met humanitaire hulp onder voorwaarden. Dus als Obama dat beslist, twee maanden geleden, dan wil dat zeggen dat ze dat daardoor wel deden."*²⁵² According to him, in some situations military actors do not implement their Hearts & Minds projects regarding the humanitarian principles, which is inconsistent with the Humanitarian Law. He is not predominantly against civil-military coordination, but explained it is very difficult in certain situations: *"Het wordt een ingewikkeld kluwen als militaire samenwerking zich ook gaat bezig houden met zaken waar ook NGOs zich mee*

²⁵¹ HPG (2012), p. 2

²⁵² For English translation, see appendix C, number 59.

*bezig houden. Militairen trekken zich terug. NGOs doen dat niet. (...) Dus, ik zelf persoonlijk, vind dat iedereen op zijn terrein moet blijven.”*²⁵³

A woman working for an international NGO (X27) expressed her feeling of amazement about the restrained attitude from humanitarian actors against military involvement: *“Humanitarian actors have a lot of resistance in talking or engaging with military actors. This is contradictory because humanitarian actors always work in areas where there are also military. But I find development actors are often more willing to engage with military actors.”* Although humanitarian actors have more experience with partnerships with military actors, they have a more reluctant attitude. Later on she added: *“There is always difficulty in establishing constructive lines of communication between military and humanitarian actors (there is often mistrust and scepticism on both sides) but in my experience military are relatively more open to engaging with humanitarian actors (often because they want to know what the humanitarians are doing that might be considered beneficial to their own goals) and the humanitarian actors are more resistant to establishing communication/engagement.”*

Above statements clarified the perceptions from involved actors on civil-military coordination in the Malian arena. All together, the quotes made clear that there are various discourses about civil-military coordination and that different perceptions about the best way of adaptation of implementation is not yet clear. Civil-military coordination raises some discussions in the arena and fuels the fear for a blurring of lines and a neglect or ignorance of the humanitarian principles. As Briscoe (2013) wrote: *“Both in Afghanistan and in other conflict zones, the deployment of military-led relief operations, or the use of other forms of civil-military governance cooperation, has caused grave problems for humanitarian workers seeking to maintain their profile as apolitical and neutral, leading to the killing of a number of relief staff, as well as prompting accusations of wasteful or inefficient spending.”*²⁵⁴ Civil-military coordination is not only a sensitive topic in Mali, but also in other missions and other conflicts worldwide. On the other hand, coordination between civil and military actors also brings some advantages. Through the coordination between civil and military actors, the development-security nexus gets more attention. Security and development are linked with each other in the phase of stabilisation and reconstruction a country. Sometimes coordination between civil and military actors is necessary to bring both safety and development to an area. The development-security nexus describes the link, the relation between bringing development to a region and the securitization of a certain area.²⁵⁵ The next sub-paragraphs explain the different forms of civil-military coordination which occur in the Malian arena.

5.2.2. Information exchange and coordination

The first and least intense form of civil-military coordination is the exchange of information and mutual coordination. This is also the most common form of coordination between civil and military actors in the humanitarian arena in Mali.

The exchange of information exists in different forms. A civil-military advisor working for MINUSMA (X30 & X33) explained the difference between liaison and coordination: *“Liasison komt gewoon neer op verbindingen en contacten onderhouden. Liaison is contact hebben en coördineren gaat iets verder. Dat gaat uit van partijen die met elkaar samen dingen willen doen, maar sommige partijen willen dat helemaal niet. Sommige mensen willen zich niet laten coördineren. Het begint dus met liaison en met sommige partijen kan dat leiden tot coördinatie, of iets anders, coöperatie bijvoorbeeld. Er zijn stappen van elkaar gedogen tot aan innig met elkaar samenwerken. Dat heeft allemaal een ander woord: co-existentie, coördinatie, coöperatie. Allemaal woorden tussen: elkaar gedogen, van elkaars aanwezigheid op de hoogte zijn tot innig verstrengeld samen iets doen.”*²⁵⁶ The theoretical framework

²⁵³ For English translation, see appendix C, number 60.

²⁵⁴ Briscoe (2013b), p. 1-2

²⁵⁵ Duffield (2010), pp. 54-56

²⁵⁶ For English translation, see appendix C, number 61.

showed a picture from HPG (figure 1), which does not make this distinction between coordination and liaison, but does agree there are different levels of coordination.

Another CIMIC advisor working for MINUSMA (X1) is more precisely about how liaison exactly looks like: *"Ik ga elke week naar OCHA en daar overleggen we dus. En daarnaast hebben we elke week ook nog drie of vier keer contact met OCHA, over allerlei lopende problemen en kleine aangelegenheden die spelen. Dan proberen we dus aan de NGO wereld, of aan de humanitarians duidelijk te maken wat dus vanuit MINUSMA, dus vanuit de militaire kant, gebeurt, en waarom het gebeurt en dát het gebeurd. Maar aan de andere kant willen wij ook van de humanitarians weten waarom zij bepaalde dingen doen en hoe zij omgaan met bepaalde situaties. We informeren elkaar over, vooral het transport van konvooien, voertuigen en personen. Dat moet allemaal worden gecoördineerd en afgestemd."*²⁵⁷ He explains liaison as the exchange of information and coordination about small things.

A woman working for OCHA (X8 & X24) explained that while exchanging information, she tries to strengthen all actors as much as possible. Although actors do not want to be seen together, they can complement each other: *"So the idea would be for humanitarian actors to influence the patrol planning of MINUSMA. Saying, 'oke, our priority as humanitarian actors is this area and this area and this area'. So at the moment, we are producing maps, based on information from UNHCR and IOM about returning of population movement. And priority areas according to the actors based in the field. We are suggesting this map and showing to MINUSMA: 'so according to us - humanitarian actors - are priorities would be this one and this and this. So if you can consider this priority areas, in your monster planning, that would be helpful for us. If there is more MINUSMA patrolling in the area, at least we will have the feeling of safety.' The problem with MINUSMA is that most of the time they say: 'oke if you feel unsafe, we provide you with armed escort', but that is not what NGOs want."* She explained that OCHA tries to draft focus areas and focus themes, so that MINUSMA knows what NGOs are doing exactly. She also explained that NGOs would like to get area security but that is very costly for MINUSMA: *"MINUSMA can't effort that. So what we try to do in terms of coordination, we try to establish a kind of mapping tools or priority tools. Where are the priorities of the humanitarian community? So we say that we will try to establish the planning for humanitarian actors: so oke, next month the priority would be this and this and that. Can you take this into account into your patrols? For some very sensitive mission can you maybe do like additional patrols, being in the same village in the same day? That kind of things. So they said: 'oke, on principle we say yes: because it is in our mandate. If you provide us with enough details and information.' Because you cannot say you need to secure Timbouctou, because Timbouctou is as big as the Netherlands, or even bigger. MINUSMA can't do that. So they [the NGOs] say: 'you need to secure this road on this day from this area to this area'."* This kind of information exchange is very helpful for NGOs and still falls under the mandate of MINUSMA (support for humanitarian assistance). However, a small footnote has to be made, because MINUSMA is still not fully operational yet and according to their mandate (box five) their prior task is to secure UN personnel. Therefore they are not always able to fulfil those requests: *"They also need to secure their own troops. So they say: 'oke we can coordinate, we can take into account your demand, we can have this kind of shared planning, but we have no guarantee. The only thing we can say is within means and capabilities.' So anything we do in coordination with MINUSMA, there is this small footnote within means and capabilities."* This creates sometimes a disappointed attitude from NGOs towards MINUSMA.

Finally, an advisor of the DSRSG within MINUSMA (X21) added that he would really like to know what kind of programs NGOs are doing and in which regions. He is in favour of the exchange of information: *"If you do not tell me you are active in a certain zone, that is why we have this civil-military coordination, then oke, I just bomb and you did not tell me you were around. This happens. And this is also on the side of military: oke fine you do not need to tell me everything but at least tell me on which*

²⁵⁷ For English translation, see appendix C, number 62

spot you have programs or you are going to move from A to B so that I know that when I see a movement I know that it is Handicap International for example.” He argued that civil-military coordination is a two-fold process and it is also in favour of civil actors to inform MINUSMA about their programs and activities.

The exchange of information between civil and military actors in other missions is an often researched topic. Rietjens (2009) gave two main reasons for the difficult relationships between civil and military actors in Afghanistan. First of all, the context of the civil and military operations is chaotic, unstable and conflictive. Besides, the temporary nature of the coalitions involved obstructs fuels the different objectives and different ways of achieving these goals.²⁵⁸ The same two arguments are applicable to the case of Mali. The situation in the country is still unstable and violence emerges from time to time. Besides, the (ignorance about) different mandates obstruct a smooth coordination between the actors. Rietjens used a logical framework to analyse the problems which occurred in the communication between the military contingent ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) and the humanitarian community. He defined six areas of improvement: (i) defining, planning and organising the civil–military task; (ii) selecting and training staff; (iii) adjusting the rotations to the liaison tasks; (iv) improving and focusing the internal information management; (v) organising and planning the communication possibilities (vi) implementing constructive evaluation, transparency and feedback.²⁵⁹ Each of these six recommendations are also applicable to Mali and are further explained in chapter 7 paragraph two about the recommendations.

5.2.3. Armed escort

The most sensitive form of civil-military coordination is the use of armed escort. This subparagraph highlights the perceptions from the humanitarian community about armed escort and the current state of armed escort in the humanitarian arena in Mali.

Perceptions on armed escort

A man working for a UN agency (X31) explained that there are different forms of armed escort and different ways in which such an escort could be used: *“Of course there are different ways of using an escort. I can use an escort like: three cars with armed people around me and the company car in the middle, this is one way. This is what we are not doing usually. But we can also tell MINUSMA in advance that we are going to a certain region and we would like this specific area to be secured. MINUSMA goes there, they are securing the area and then we go.”* This later form of armed escort (which was already mentioned in above paragraph²⁶⁰) is what most NGOs mainly expect and wish from MINUSMA: doing road patrols, securing the area and leave the zone when the NGO comes in. However, he (X31) continued his story by explaining that even this way of armed escort is not always accepted by NGOs. Some NGOs have a really dogmatic approach regarding certain issues and refuse being in the same area with military at all. Overall, NGOs do not use the military assets of MINUSMA directly. A man working for a French NGO (X29) said: *“We do not have activities with MINUSMA. We do not use escort because we do not need that to come and do our activities. Of course we meet them in the field. Sometimes there is a ceremony or something, we can be at the same place. But we try to do not use the assets of MINUSMA.”* He explained that it is inevitable to meet each other in the field, but that they try to work without military engagement. But also being present in the same village on the same time, could already be dangerous for NGOs. A woman working for OCHA (X8 & X24) gave the example of a French NGO working in Kidal: *“This NGO used to work in Kidal area even in 2012 when it was occupied by armed groups. Without any problems, because of the work they did and because they were respecting the principles of the village. So one day they were called by the local leader: ‘oke, we have water issues in our village, we do not have any more water points. The well is broken’. So they*

²⁵⁸ Rietjens (2009), pp. 413-414

²⁵⁹ Rietjens (2009), pp. 429-430

²⁶⁰ OCHA has explained that NGOs would like to get area security but that is very costly for MINUSMA.

went there to do an assessment. And on the way back, they just crossed a Serval patrol. So they used to do that. They used to cross Serval patrol, because Serval is in the north, in Kidal. But what they did not know, was that this patrol stopped in exactly the same village. They proceed to do some active search, in the houses, they were looking for people, for weapons and so on. They arrested even some people. So the NGO was already on his way back to Kidal when they received like threat messages, saying that they do not want them to go back there. They do not care that they will never receive any assistance from this NGO, saying you are a traitor. So it was a very serious concern. And the NGO was like 'why?'. It was a very friendly meeting with the local leaders. What happened? What happened was that Serval just stopped in the same village, just a few hours later. So the local leaders thought 'aah, this NGO is doing intelligence for Serval'. Because the NGO is French, Serval is French and they just arrived three hours later. But it was just by coincidence! So they had to speak a lot to explain. But it was quite challenging." This example shows that the presence of military contingents is very sensitive in villages in the north and that NGOs really have to be careful with being active in the same village as military groups, otherwise they could be cured from losing their partiality and neutrality. This example also shows it is important to inform MINUSMA about the activities NGOs are doing, to prevent such situations again (just as the DSRSG advisor (X21) said in above paragraph).

The reason why actors in the arena do not want to use armed escort is simply explained by a woman working for a lobby organisation (X11): *"Wij accepteren in principe geen escort, zeker ook geen militaire escort. Omdat je dan veel meer een target zou kunnen zijn, dan als je dat niet doet."*²⁶¹ The risk while working in the north is already high, but according to her, the risk of getting confused with MINUSMA (who is frequently a target of terrorist attacks) is even higher.

A Malian man working for a platform for national NGOs (X20 & X35) explained they only use armed escort when they travel together with foreign people. For Malian people, the risk of getting kidnapped is less, so armed escort is not necessary. In very dangerous situations they also travel with donkeys and camels sometimes; that is in some situations much safer as using a big luxury car. This is again an advantage of the National Civil Society, who are able to travel in this more basic way. Bigger international organisations usually have to meet enormous security protocols, which makes travelling on such a low scale impossible. A man working for a UN agency (X31) disputes that national staff members do not need to make use of armed escort: *"I want to avoid to the maximum extent any of my staff to be in danger. Both national and international! I cannot just say: 'oke, me, as an international staff, I am not going there, but the national people can go there'. If something is not good for me, it is also not good for the national staff. If we need to use armed escort, national or international, we are going to use it. If there is no need, we are not going to use it. Because we only use armed escort as a last resort."*

A man working for a health NGO (X36) explained that, in the first place, he avoids partnerships with military organisations: *"But when MINUSMA is saying: 'How can we help you?' We do not refuse that."* However, later on he contradicted himself by saying: *"We consider them, but we do not show we consider them. Please understand that armed escort is a very political way and we have to take care of this. We can't say too loud that we get help from MINUSMA."* It looks like he gets support from MINUSMA, but he does not want to show this.

A Malian woman working for an international NGO (X2) explained her low expectations about the military pillar of MINUSMA: *"When the military is in an area, for protection, they should know how to work or to protect people in humanitarian or human rights approach. I feel the military does not know. They do not know much about this."* Her main point of improvement is the exchange of information on security issues.

²⁶¹ For English translation, see appendix C, number 63

Current state

As above paragraphs already explained, NGOs do not want to make use of armed escort but prefer area control in certain situations. The civil-military advisor working for MINUSMA (X30 & X33) said about this: *“Afhankelijk van de capaciteit die we hebben wordt dat verzoek gehonoreerd. Hier in Mali is de capaciteit schaars, dus daarom is het system gekomen dat wij escorte konvooien organiseren, wij delen mensen mee wanneer die zijn en dan kunnen ze daar in aanhaken. Zij moeten een week van te voren aan geven dat ze naar een bepaald gebied willen, dan kijken wij of er al een escorte naartoe gaat of dat er een escorte te organiseren is. En is het antwoord op een van die vragen ‘ja’, dan kan dat. Maar als er geen escorte is en er geen troepen beschikbaar zijn om die mensen te begeleiden en er wordt ook geen order gegeven ‘verschuif je prioriteiten als legermacht, want dit is heel belangrijk’, dan kan het niet doorgaan.”*²⁶² Again, the argument that MINUSMA is not fully operational yet hampers the extent to which MINUSMA can fulfil request from NGOs for area security. In practice, none of the NGOs joins such an procession, because the risk to be seen together with military vehicles is too big.

A woman working for OCHA (X8 & X24) said about the current state of armed escort: *“There is always a kind of confusion because the military actors say: ‘oke we can provide you security; we put one vehicle here, one vehicle here, and we put you in the middle.’ But the humanitarian actors do not want that. So we are trying to advocate for area security, advanced patrol, roads patrol or things like that. But it is quite challenging, because military actors say, ‘when it comes to security, we are accountable. I cannot be accountable for security, if I cannot see you. I cannot be like 50 km away and saying I’m ensuring your security. As a military I have procedures, if I am doing an escort, I need to see you. So I can’t have all this flexibility about moved escort, if I am doing an escort, I need to see you. I am 500 m maximum away from you.’ So it is quite complicated, because for UN humanitarian actors, UNHCR, UNICEF and so on, we’re depending on the same security system as MINUSMA. If you want to go there, they will say: either you take an escort, either you do not go.”* The difficult thing about providing security and armed escort, is that military and civil actors have different perceptions about what is the best way to fulfil this task.

This woman (X8 & X24) also referred to the humanitarian principles of neutrality and independence during a real emergency situation; because if the need is really high and when lives are in seriously danger, people do not think about the joint statements anymore, they just want to save their lives in each possible way: *“In a certain situation the national staff of a program were seeing fights ongoing, and they did not even call to Bamako, to say: ‘oke what shall we do now?’ Just go! And I mean, what can we say? People who want to save their lives, you won’t say: ‘no no it is not good regarding the principles!’ But then it gets complicated. Because they were in the MINUSMA camp, and they are all like, ‘no we do not want to be relocated with MINUSMA, in terms of independence blablabla’. It was a lot of political issues that were playing by the relocation of the staff. And this is were also, we see there was coordination; like MINUSMA took care of the people, they relocated them. They were looking for resorts for them to be safe, everything was oke. When staff members are in real danger, it is not doable or even human to stick to the humanitarian principles, because you just want to use each possible way to get safe; even if that is with the help of a military vehicle.*

Struggles and obstacles

To form a common body and to have a joint position in the UNCT, the NGOs together signed a joint position paper on the use of armed escort. The chairwoman of the HCT (X19) introduced this paper: *“To ensure that there is a NGO representative within the HCT, and information sharing, to adopt NGO positions when there is either a special visit or a question that is very important; such as armed escort. We needed a position paper.”* This paper explains that NGOs will not use armed escort, unless as a last resort. However, this raises certain points of discussion.

²⁶² For English translation, see appendix C, number 64

The **first problem** is related to partnerships. A man working for a French NGO (X29) explained this: *“If you have an assessment with the UN, and UN agencies are using escort but the NGO is not using armed escort, what can they do? This is the issue. There is a position, that if the UN is using escort, the NGOs do not go with the UN.”* He does not say that all UN agencies are using escort, but at least some of them do. This influences the partnerships and understanding between UN agencies and international NGOs. Because NGOs are funded by UN agencies, it is not possible to stop a program due to the issue of armed escort. However, he argued that UN agencies do not impose NGOs to use escort from MINUSMA. A CIMIC advisor working for MINUSMA (X30 & X33) added to this: *“Alle civiele onderdelen van MINUSMA zijn in bepaalde gebieden verplicht te reizen met gewapende escorte. Ik denk dat dit ook voor VN organisaties geldt. VN organisaties maken gebruik van een bepaald veiligheidssysteem. Voor elk gebied geldt een bepaalde veiligheidscode en voor elke code zijn bepaalde minimum eisen. Bijv. draag een helm of een schermvest, of u kunt zich alleen verplaatsen in een gepantserd voertuig of alleen via de lucht. Of u kunt zich alleen verplaatsen met een gewapende escort. Dat is voor organisaties van de VN dan gewoon verplicht, anders krijgen ze geen toestemming om daar heen te gaan.”*²⁶³ A woman working for OCHA (X8 & X24) added to this: *“The problem is that UN humanitarian agencies are all working with NGOs, who will never use escort. So then it creates a kind of clash between implementing partners, because UN agencies are not implementing the projects. We have NGOs who are implementing partners for us. So then it creates a kind of distinction, between implementing partners and UN agencies.”* Also ECHO (X37) confirmed that some UN agencies do use armed escort, which can cause big problems in the arena. However, he also argued that some UN agencies do not want to use armed escort but are forced by the UNCT, because they are part of the UN and fall under the security guidelines of the UN: *“They are forced and they cannot contradict. This is the mean thing. Authority how it is. The UN Country Team, they cannot contradict to that.”* The chairwoman of the HCT disputes this by describing ECHO as a purist: *“ECHO is a purist. They are very entitled, for example on armed escorts. They are for keeping strict distinction between MINUSMA and humanitarians. They will always help NGOs to come together, coordinate better, all in the interest of getting better assistance to in fact the properties.”*

A man working for a medical NGO (X36) said that the use of armed escort of some NGOs does not influence his partnerships: *“If MdM works together with another local or international NGO, you have a partnership, and the other NGO does use armed escort, is that a problem for you?”* *“For me? No that is not a problem, I do not care about it.”* Several UN agencies themselves say they do not use armed escort unless as a last resort. A man working for a UN agency (X31) said: *“We can use their escort but this is only in the last resort, if there is no other way to do it.”* He also said that the fact that he is part of the UN, does not influence his partnerships with international NGOs. According to him, actors in the arena can sometimes have another opinion, without having a negative influence on the coordination: *“We have a different views as NGOs have. They do not want to use any escort. But this does not influence our partnership. Sometimes I have a very different opinion with my wife, but it does not prevent us to come together. The same thing in a partnership.”* A woman working for another UN agency (X34) agreed on this: *“For the relationship with the NGOs, many NGOs who are in the nutrition field, like MsF, they have a more stricter rule with regard to humanitarian space, use of armed escort, blurring of the lines between political mission and the UN humanitarian activities. So with them, we would never require them to do escort. We do not do escort either for their activities. I do not think our relationship has been damaged with our NGO partners.”* But she confirmed that she uses armed escort sometimes: *“I do make use of armed escort sometimes. Of course we prefer not to use armed escort. We very rarely use it. But sometimes we have to.”*

The **second problem** is related to the feeling of respect and appreciation towards the military. Sometimes they feel ignored in the arena, because some NGOs have a quite dogmatic approach²⁶⁴ and in general, refuse to talk with military actors. NGOs do not want to consult with military or sit around

²⁶³ For English translation, see appendix C, number 65

²⁶⁴ Quote from (X16) in paragraph 5.1.3 on page 91-92 and also explained by (X30) in paragraph 4.2 on page 69.

the same table to discuss something, but in case of emergency, when they need to be evacuated, they are the first to call MINUSMA in order to ask for armed escort or evaluation possibilities. MINUSMA is not yet fully operational and one of their goals is to protect UN employees in the first place. Sometimes they just do not have the capacity to direct evacuate NGO employees, but this generates indignation from the NGO side.

The different definitions used of 'last resort' are the **third problem** surrounding the joint position paper. All NGOs are clear that they need to call MINUSMA in an emergency situation, but they all indicated that the definition is not unanimous. When is a situation a direct emergency and when is there still some more time to solve the problem without the help of MINUSMA? *"Then you have the last resort, the definition is ongoing. If we are in this kind of situation, of course we will use MINUSMA services."* (X29 – NGO employee). Someone else said: *"We do not use armed escort, unless for the last resort. The last resort needs to be clarified."* (X13- NGO employee). In theory, the use of armed escort is agreed with the HCT. An employee of a UN agency (X31) explained this: *"The different opinions about what is the last resort needs to be clarified. We are doing this together, we are clarifying this within the Humanitarian Country Team. And we put in place the procedures, so that the last resort has the same meaning for everybody. Because we notice that different people have different interpretations, so we are trying to start to work with a kind of matrix, where you can ask questions."*

A working paper from the Humanitarian Policy Group and Overseas Development Institute²⁶⁵ explained 'last resort' as: 'the requirement that military and civilian defence assets are used in support of humanitarian operations only in accordance with four key criteria: unique capability (no appropriate alternative civilian resources exist); timeliness (the urgency of the task at hand demands immediate action); clear humanitarian direction (civilian control over the use of military assets) and time-limited (the use of military assets to support humanitarian activities is clearly limited in time and scale).' (2009, p. 9). According to this definition, it should be possible to define a situation as 'emergency' and 'last resort'. However, in practice and in a very short timeframe it is difficult to enforce consensus about such a sensitive topic.

5.2.4. Projects

There are several programs running in the context of civil-military interacting. This subparagraph explains the different programs and the perceptions of the involved actors on these. MINUSMA has, in the context of their stabilisation mission, several programs focussing on human security: programs in the field of Human Rights, Rule of Law etc. Besides, they have short-term programs which are already shortly explained in paragraph 4.6: the Quick-Impact-Projects (QIPs) and the Hearts & Minds programs. Especially these latter two are a major concern for NGOs in the arena. These programs are not directly resulting from civil-military coordination, but because the demarcation between humanitarian based programs and programs in line with the mission is not clear for the involved actors and the local population, these programs are explained here in the paragraph about civil-military coordination.

Quick-Impact-Projects (QIPs)

Every stabilisation-keeping mission (like MINUSMA is) gets some funding to start projects to help the mission and the troops to be accepted by the local population.²⁶⁶ The QIPs are micro-projects, which can be implemented in different sectors but the three most often used themes are: infrastructure, creating livelihood & employment and training & capacity building. Important hereby is that the MINUSMA mission is only the donor, other organisations implement these projects. Implementing partners could be NGOs (both international and national), UN agencies or other public institutes like local municipalities. According to the head of the QIPs department (X16) the goal of Quick-Impact-Projects should help the mission *"to build a relationship between the mission and the population."*

²⁶⁵ HPG (2012)

²⁶⁶ Baker (2007), pp. 1-2

When I say 'mission', I do not necessary mean the military, could also be the civilian actors. In fact, most of the projects are not proposed by the military component." When MINUSMA people in the field visit a certain village and see some needs, or when the National Civil Society hands in a project proposal or a demand for funds to MINUSMA, they can decide to make a Quick-Impact-Project from this need or demand.

According to a CIMIC advisor working for MINUSMA (X30 & X33) QIPs are not only used to win the hearts and minds of the population: *"Dat is een bij-effect. Dat is niet alleen waar we het om doen. Projecten en andere activiteiten moeten onze missie ondersteunen. Dat kan op allerlei manieren zijn en om allerlei redenen. Natuurlijk proberen wij daarmee ons imago te versterken omdat dat goed is voor de missie die we hier doen. Dat is goed voor onze veiligheid en voor onze bewegingsvrijheid. En voor het draagvlak voor de regering hier, want dat is ook onze missie hier: de bevolking beschermen en de regering ondersteunen."*²⁶⁷ Another CIMIC advisor (X1) from MINUSMA added to this: *"Alle afdelingen van MINUSMA, niet alleen de militaire, want dat is maar een deel van MINUSMA, maar ook alle civiele afdelingen, die kunnen voorstellen doen, projectvoorstellen, om financiering te krijgen voor een project. Dat zijn de zogenaamde Quick-Impact-Projects."*²⁶⁸ Also the vision of woman working for the Dutch embassy (X23) is in line with the above explanations: *"Volgens mij zijn de QIPs niet bedoeld om Heart & Minds te winnen maar meer om vredesdividend te creëren. Dus als je ergens binnen komt, bijv. in Afghanistan, dat je dan de impact gaat vergroten en dat je dan vrij snel op het moment dat je iets stabiliseert, dat je dan met die projecten daar achteraan komt om te zorgen dat er veiligheid en ontwikkeling komt. Het is een soort kip en ei verhaal. Leidt meer veiligheid tot meer ontwikkeling of heb je eerst meer ontwikkeling nodig om te zorgen dat er meer veiligheid komt?"*²⁶⁹

This definition of the Quick-Impact-Projects seems quite clear. However, since the start of the mission there have been an ongoing discussion about the goal of the QIPs and how they needed to be implemented. A man working for an international NGO (X15) said that even within MINUSMA, there was no consensus about what the QIPs exactly are: *"I think, even within the MINUSMA itself, there is not the same idea what QIPs are. What QIPs exactly are and what they should do."* The QIPs therefore used to be a very sensitive topic in the Malian arena. A woman working for OCHA (X8 & X24) explained: *"If you say the word 'QIPs' to a humanitarian actor, they are really scared."* After a long period of debates, the humanitarian community agreed to establish a kind of committee, who will review all projects proposals of MINUSMA. To prevent a blurring of lines or a duplication of projects, OCHA will (as spokesperson of this committee) evaluate all incoming project proposals and check with involved NGOs if someone of them wants to respond to the needs by implementing a program, or that it is oke that MINUSMA will do this program, in the form of a QIP.

Due to this committee, the fear for a blurring of lines is reduced. Actors in the Malian arena used to have a strong resistance against the QIPs. They were very afraid of the humanitarian principles were not enforced and said MINUSMA was taking over tasks of the humanitarian community in the arena. After this first critical phase and the setup of the committee, many actors have nowadays a more flexible attitude against the QIPs. A woman working for an international NGO (X27) said that due to this special committee, she does not fear the risk of blurring the lines regarding the QIPs anymore: *"Now all the projects that the military are doing, are send out to NGOs for comments and criticism and for debates. If we have some fundamental issues, we can raise them and as far as I am aware these issues are taken seriously. So of course it can cause problems. But in this case, I think it isn't. I am not considered of blurring the lines."* A man working for the ICRC (X15) said: *"QIPs are such oke. Why not? I think what is definitely..., I think they need something. MINUSMA is a huge machine. But except the military forces which has very limited means to do something, so it is obvious that they want to have some sort of intervention, to do something good."* NGOs understand that MINUSMA and especially the military forces want or even need some low scale programs to have direct contact with the

²⁶⁷ For English translation, see appendix C, number 66

²⁶⁸ For English translation, see appendix C, number 67

²⁶⁹ For English translation, see appendix C, number 68

population, to do something back for them. Also a woman working for an international NGO (X27) expressed her more positive attitude against the QIPs nowadays: *“I do not have any fundamental problems with QIPs in general. There is a ton of needs and whoever can engage and meet some of those needs: the more the better! I think there have been cases, before I arrived, where the mission wasn’t coordinating with NGOs to found out what was already being done or how their work might impact on humanitarian projects. So that’s where we had a problem. What they are doing now, there is a lot of engagement with the humanitarians, the fact that they were able to give input on every single project they propose. And you can’t ask for better than that. They are now doing the work that we wouldn’t be doing otherwise.”* She explained the improved coordination amongst MINUSMA and other actors in the arena and appreciated the situation that MINUSMA is asking for input to perform the QIPs as good as possible. Finally, she also gave the argument that there is enough work to do in the arena, as was already said before in this chapter.

However, the goal and exact interpretation of the QIPs are still not very clear for all actors; opinions differ amongst some of the involved actors. A man working for a French NGO (X29) expressed his preference: *“We wanted that the QIPs only work on infrastructure activities and not food distribution or even water. We did not win the discussion on this point, but we made a compromise, which is quite oke. And what is this compromise? If the cluster validate the QIP to ensure that there is no duplication with other actors.”* Also an ICRC employee (X15) gave his preference that the QIPs become more related to infrastructure: *“For example, rehabilitation work that is not too close to humanitarian work. It has as much an impact on the population. There are a lot of opportunities and things which need to be done. Rehabilitation work.”* As was already explained in chapter three, the poor condition of the infrastructure causes much problems for NGOs and other civil actors. According to them, if MINUSMA is able to meet those needs, they both support the humanitarian arena (according to their mandate) and win the hearts and minds of the population, because they will also profit from the better road conditions.

Another problem of the QIPs are again the partnerships. MINUSMA only pays from the QIPs, but they are implemented by local partners. A man working for an international NGO (X29) explained: *“One big issue is also that the QIPs were implemented by national NGOs who are also working with international NGOs. This can be a problem.”* Also a woman for OCHA (X8 & X24) mentioned again this problem with partnerships: *“It depends how it is implemented. Some of the QIPs are implemented via local partners, which are also local partners working with NGOs. After that the people on the ground would say: oke so do you work for MINUSMA or NGOs? Maybe that is the same. So this was a problem.”* It becomes confusing if local actors are both working for MINUSMA and for NGOs. To whose principles and mandates to they stick?

A woman working for OCHA (X8 & X24) made a comparison to the PRT-QIPs in Afghanistan, where humanitarian action was misused for other purposes. When military contingents are collecting intelligence for the UN mission and at the same time collecting information to implement a humanitarian program, there is a blurring of lines. It is important to keep in mind the overarching goal: *“What are you trying to do? Are you trying to help people or do you want to gain intelligence?”*²⁷⁰ Another woman working for an NGO (X9) added to this example of Afghanistan: *“That is what I remember from Afghanistan and other places. Because often times, we really ran in into problems with military forces, when they engaged with those kind of activities.”* Baker (2007) said that the disadvantage of the PRT-QIPs in Afghanistan is that organisations are not challenged to focus on the long-term effect of their programs.²⁷¹ The same is happening in Mali, the QIPs in this context are also only focussing on the short time, which hinders a sustainable development of the country. In doing

²⁷⁰ US AID (2013)

²⁷¹ Baker (2007), p. 15

humanitarian work, it is important to keep the 'do no harm' principle in mind. Aid, delivered without sufficient understanding of potential unintended consequences, can actually do more harm than good.²⁷²

But not only the way the QIPs are implemented in the country are discussed, also their actual profit is contested. Recent studies in Afghanistan have shown that when money is spent too quickly, not only the effect is unsure, but it also undermines security and development objectives.²⁷³ In this specific case in Mali it is still too early to evaluate the impact of the QIPs, but the fears of the humanitarian community about a blurring of lines have already proved that the QIPs could undermine security and development objectives.

Although there have been many debates about the goal and interpretation of the QIPs, the real implementation of the projects is still pending. Until mid-2014 only a few projects had been implemented and the total available budget was less than one million dollars (with a maximum of 50,000 dollars per project). An amount which is smaller than some programs from UN agencies, who spend more money on one single program. According to the head of the QIP unit (X16) in the first year of the mission (from July 2013 till July 2014) only 23 projects have been implemented. However, the woman working for OCHA (X8 & X24) even said that in the same period of time, only three programs have been implemented. Although the risk of the QIPs has to be taken into account, the real threat is still far away. The available budget for the year mid 2014 – mid 2015 is increased to an amount of three million dollars in total.

Hearts & Minds

Beside these Quick-Impact-Projects, most military contingents have their own small Hearts & Minds projects, used to win trust and confidence of the local population for their own contingent. These are also short-term projects, used to create acceptance for the military; to show they are able and willing to do more than just collecting information. Hearts & Minds programs are not the same as QIPs: they have different donors and different implementing partners. A woman working for a lobby platform (X11) explained this: *"Maar QIPs zijn niet Hearts & Minds. Officieel moet je daar een verschil in maken. Nee ze zijn wel bedoeld uiteindelijk voor Hearts & Minds. Maar je hebt ook echt projecten die echt bedoeld zijn voor Hearts & Minds."*²⁷⁴ While the QIPs are programs from MINUSMA in general, the separate military contingents each have their own funds to win the hearts and minds of the population for their mission. MINUSMA, and therefore also the special review commission headed by OCHA, is not able to control these small funds. This increases for example the risk of duplication and programs which are not adapted to the humanitarian principles. A woman working for OCHA (X8 & X24) gave an example of where separate military contingents were interfering in the humanitarian arena: *"The Dutch troops wanted to distribute additional food rations that they have. But you already have lots of people receiving food in this area. So if you distribute, what will happen is that the food will be sold on the market. And then you have MINUSMA Dutch troops everywhere in the market and in terms of image, it would be worse for them. Because there is no guarantee that the people will eat what is given them because it is not part of their daily diet. I think there are a lot of good initiatives and ideas about that, but without coordination it would be a total failure for everybody: for the beneficiaries, for the image of the military also and also for the humanitarian actors."* This idea of food distribution was not only bad for the inhabitants of this area (overload of food), but also for the involved NGOs (disorder in the supply chain) and for the military contingent themselves, they got a bad reputation of doing a humanitarian program which was not really necessary. Most of the time, military contingents do not have the expertise about doing development or humanitarian work; they are not used to provide food distribution for example.

²⁷² Weir (2006), p. 42

²⁷³ Fishstein, P., A Mulder (2012), p. 68

²⁷⁴ For English translation, see appendix C, number 69.

A woman working for the Dutch embassy (X25) was busy with developing this Hearts & Minds fund, based on her experiences in Afghanistan: *“Als militair wil je effectief zijn in zo’n omgeving, dan is het soms ook fijn om niet alleen maar informatie te vragen maar ook iets terug te kunnen geven. Dus ik ben bezig met een soort Hearts & Minds fonds. Daar hebben we veel discussie over: wat is Hearts & Minds precies en wanneer gaan zij dingen doen die ze eigenlijk niet moeten doen? (...) Ik zie ook wel dat het goed is als zij een keertje komen en ze zien een speeltuin die een likje verf nodig heeft, dat zij dan kunnen zeggen: hier heb je een paar potten verf. Dan doe je iets terug voor de community zonder dat je meteen...”*²⁷⁵ She also explained she has contact with MINUSMA about this funds, to explain it is not the same as the QIPs are. It is difficult to explain the exact difference: *“Hoe formuleer je de criteria zo dat het gewoon duidelijk is dat het doel hearts & minds is? Het doel is niet ontwikkeling. Natuurlijk moet het wel iets bijdragen aan het verbeteren van de leefomstandigheden..., maar het is echt een korte termijn project. Om te accepteren dat de militairen er zijn. En dat ze niet worden gezien als een soort vrijbuiters die alleen informatie ophalen.”*²⁷⁶ She also explained that each country with a military contingent has such a Hearts & Minds fund. For example, Togolese military go to villages with their doctors to help the people. She explained she understands it is not the job of the military to perform humanitarian tasks, but these projects do not need to become overestimated, all together the budget is 100.000 euro (for the Dutch contingent).

5.3. COORDINATION IN THE INTEGRATED MISSION

Chapter four already explained the perceptions other actors have about the integrated mission. This paragraph explains the coordination between the different UN entities and to what extent there is integration between them. This chapter also explains the need for another kind of intervention related to the changing nature of conflicts. An integrated mission is much bigger as only stabilisation of the area or bringing peace: it is about managing security in the humanitarian arena. As was shown in the chapters before, the integrated mission has a quite dominant role in the arena and influences the coordination structure to large extent. Finally, this paragraph gives some recommendations for future integrated missions.

5.3.1. Coordination between different UN entities

The ‘one UN approach’ refers to an integration between the peacekeeping mission and the UN agencies present in a country. A woman working for the Dutch embassy (X23) explained that a common ground is necessary in the coordination structure: *“Nu begrijpen we elkaar steeds beter. Je moet in elkaar investeren om te begrijpen waar het vandaan komt.”*²⁷⁷ Without a mutual understanding and respect, integration and coordination between the different UN entities will not work. One of the civil-military advisors working for MINUSMA (X30 & X33) clarified the concept of integrated missions a bit more: *“In een geïntegreerde missie is een groot deel van die coördinatie toebedeeld aan civiele organisaties, civiele spelers, in dit geval civiele spelers binnen MINUSMA.”*²⁷⁸

For the UN agencies who were already present in the country before the arrival of MINUSMA, the integrated stabilization mission changed their position in the arena. There was already coordination between NGOs and UN agencies for a long time. When the mission came in, suddenly everything changed because the UN agencies now became part of the ‘one UN structure’ and were linked to the mission. It took some time before NGOs and other actors in the arena learned how to cope with these changes. A man working in the office of the DSRSG of MINUSMA (X21) explained: *“It took a lot of time. I am very honest about that. You have to put this in the context where, for the last 20 years, more agencies used to work in their very own peaceful and stable environment. Suddenly there is a mission coming in. In the beginning it was very difficult to understand. People ask you: ‘you are FAO, but are*

²⁷⁵ For English translation, see appendix C, number 70

²⁷⁶ For English translation, see appendix C, number 71

²⁷⁷ For English translation, see appendix C, number 72

²⁷⁸ For English translation, see appendix C, number 73

you the also MINUSMA?’ And then you say: ‘not really, but we have this big UN hat and we are all part of the same UN. We have the same SG.’ At the end of the day, when they realized that on certain topics the SRSR will say: ‘I want to know what we will do the next 6 months.’ And when he talks, he does not talk about FAO or WFP, but he talks about everybody: ‘I want to know what the UN is doing the next six months.’” Both UN agencies and other actors in the arena had to get used to the idea that UN agencies were not independent anymore, but became part of the integrated mission. However, there are still changes visible between UN agencies and the mission. A woman working for a UN agency (X34) explained that there consist important differences between their mandates and vision: “We are rights based they are policy based. They have a political mandate, we are here because people are suffering and people need help. That is totally different, it is cats and dogs.” Although she said this difference does not have to hinder the mutual coordination, in practice it does sometimes. There is a difference in mandates which influences the coordination structure. She also added: “We will engage, but we will never give up our humanitarian space”. This line expresses the feeling that UN agencies feel more related to international (humanitarian) NGOs as to the UN mission. For outsiders it looks like there is ‘one UN approach’ while UN agencies themselves feel this approach is imposed to them by the headquarters in New York.

A civil advisor working for the force pillar of MINUSMA (X12) gave some critical comments against the integrated mission: “Je kunt je afvragen, hoezo hebben we eigenlijk CIMIC nodig? In de VN missie hebben we gewoon civiele afdelingen, die doen field visits, die gaan naar dorp X. Als het heel gevaarlijk is, dan doen ze dat met protectie van het leger, van de force. Als ze dat doen, waarom zou je dan CIMIC nodig hebben? Dat is eigenlijk hetzelfde, het verschil is alleen dat het leger het helemaal zelf doet. Het militaire gedeelte doet het helemaal zelf.” “Maar je kan de aanwezige NGOs die er al zijn compleet negeren?” “Nee ik bedoel het tegenovergestelde, je moet ze helemaal niet negeren, je moet zelf niks doen. Als je namelijk als militairen in de CIMIC hoek gaat zitten, in feit ga je dan een concurrentie aan met wat er al is, en dat moet je dus eigenlijk ook niet willen.”²⁷⁹ According to him, there is competition between MINUSMA and international NGOs in the arena. MINUSMA is taking over jobs and responsibilities from civil actors. However, some areas (especially in the north) are just not accessible for normal civil actors, who also refuse to use armed escort. Some other actors would see this as ‘taking over responsibilities because other actors are not able to perform this task’. A woman working for a UN agency (X8 & X24) explained that this is exactly the added value of an integrated mission; that there is the possibility that civil UN actors go to inaccessible areas: “So that we can collect information in some areas where you do not have humanitarian actors. And if you have humanitarian actors there, it is also good, because we can cross check information.” According to her, the added value of an integrated mission is that certain places become accessible for civil actors, who can share this information with humanitarian actors again. A man working for another UN agency (X31) agreed on this: “Comparative advantage of MINUSMA is that they have both a military and a civilian component. It means that when they go to some places in Timbouctou, which are quite insecure outside the city, you have the military component going but you have also the civilian component. We are joining them. We can reach our presence of concern more easy within MINUSMA. We can also strengthen the monitoring, because if we cannot go because we have no staff, the human right officer can go and he shares with us the report. We can also work with them on strategies, for instance with regard to the protection of civilian etc.” According to the UN agencies, the added value of the integrated mission for them is expansion of their working area: some places which were inaccessible before are now possible to reach and otherwise, the UN mission will share their reports with them. The added value of an internal UN coordination structure, is that information is more easily shared with other UN actors, who can share this information again with other civil actors or international NGOs in the arena.

The advisor of the DSRSG (X21) explained how integration works in daily life: “But I think the secret is planning together and measuring together and if you’re able to sit together and say: what is important

²⁷⁹ For English translation, see appendix C, number 74

for Mali as UN? As one UN, what is important for us is to do? So yes that is what makes integration work. We have a bit of experience with other missions. In some missions you would have people working in the country team, having their own strategy. So it is more of, we are UN but we all have our own strategy on the side, that makes things very difficult. But here, in the mission in a way, I think what happens is the fact that we start working on the SG directive, which was very clear in terms of priorities and how we should go. And then it is the fact that we decided we need to have, what we call 'joint action plan' and 'task forces'. Which are mixed because we have people from the mission and people from the country team. And you are almost forcing them to talk and to say: you have to work together and working together is not something..., in theory it is very easy, but people are used to do their own things. They would say: 'why should I share my email or my work with him, why should I share the numbers of my budget?' It took a lot of time to cooperate." He explained the importance of a joint action plan, which improves the mutual coordination. He also gave attention to the background of the individual employees. Coordination is done by individuals, if these people do not have a cooperative attitude, or one the other side, have a very pro-active approach this influence the coordination structure in a positive or negative way.

An advisor of the SRSg (X26) explained²⁸⁰ that four working groups were created to be able to better implement the mandate of MINUSMA. Each working groups is headed by someone from MINUSMA and someone working for a UN agency: *"De UN agencies doen op hun terrein hun eigen ding, MINUSMA doet op zijn terrein hun eigen ding, maar in het midden is er overlap. Daar zijn ook de vier topprioriteiten voor opgesteld. Voor dit gebied hebben ze een gezamenlijke strategie ontwikkeld. Dat is een flink proces geweest, om te proberen om de mensen te laten samenwerken."*²⁸¹ The coordination between the MINUSMA mission and the UN agencies is done by the office of the DSRG. He later on said: *"Kijk, dus we doen niet alles samen. UNICEF bijv. heeft ook gewoon zijn eigen dingen, maar op de onderwerpen waarop we wel raakvlakken hebben, daar is dus dit gezamenlijk plan voor."*²⁸² The four working groups are the perfect example of integration between the mission and the UN agencies.

On the other hand, there are also people who say there is no coordination between the UN agencies and the mission. A military attaché working for the Dutch embassy (X5) said there is no common plan for all involved UN entities: *"Waar is nu dat overkoepelende plan? Wie zegt nou hoe we van A naar B komen?"*²⁸³ Also some other researchers²⁸⁴ have argued that an overarching strategic vision is necessary in a coordination structure. It is important to define the desired "end state" of the trans boundary process; what are the main steps necessary to achieve the goal and what should be the role of the international community and the national government? They also explain each mission has its own "centre of gravity", which refers to *"the decisive parameters that must be influenced to achieve the strategic goal that makes all the other efforts possible, and without which the mission is likely to fail."* (Barth Eide e.a., 2005, p.6).

5.3.2. Recommendations for future integrated missions

Finally, the involved actors in the humanitarian arena would like express their expectations for the progress and continuation of the mission and make some recommendations for future integrated missions.

A woman working for the Dutch embassy (X23) was quite sceptical about possible improvements: *"Ik verwacht niet dat er grote veranderingen zullen optreden. De les die hier geleerd wordt kan gebruikt worden voor andere missies in de toekomst hoop ik. Maar ik denk dat het heel moeilijk is om het schip te kantelen. Behalve als er echt ander management komt, dat iemand een nieuwe start kan maken. (...) Of als er iets positiefs uit de onderhandelingen komt, maar daar geloof ik ook niet zo in. Ik denk dat het*

²⁸⁰ Quote is used in paragraph 4.1.2 on page 56

²⁸¹ For English translation, see appendix C, number 75

²⁸² For English translation, see appendix C, number 76

²⁸³ For English translation, see appendix C, number 77

²⁸⁴ Barth Eide e.a. (2005), p.6

*heel erg overschat is wat daar allemaal gebeurd. Ik denk dat dat uiteindelijk niet echt gaat leiden tot een enorme veranderingen van het land. Ik geloof gewoon wat minder in de maakbaarheid van de samenleving. Ik geloof dat je niet zo heel veel kan veranderen. Je kan het wel iets stabielier krijgen en dat zou mooi zijn al.”*²⁸⁵ She argued it is not possible to change a whole society during the timeframe of one mission. Of course there are more people who share her opinion, but they did not express their low expectations this clearly. As a practical recommendation she would like to make small steps; people are always striving for more and a bigger impact but first of all it is important to find each other, to create linkages and share thoughts: *“Wij als Nederland pushen vaak dat MINUSMA een overkoepelend plan moet hebben. Daarmee impliciet zeggend dat als je een plan hebt, dat dan de (geïntegreerde) uitwerking daarvan wel goed zal komen. Dat is volgens mij teveel ‘maakbaarheid van de samenleving’.”*²⁸⁶ She wants a lesser focus on the overarching goal. According to her, having an overarching goal is no panacea for a stable integrated mission.

The report from Barth Eide e.a. (2005) explains that the mission planning and the budget should be adapted to the local needs and have a focus on operational objectives: *“Supply-driven planning and budgeting should be avoided through a clear focus on the operational objectives”* (2005, p. 39). They also say that the Security Council and the Secretary-General must ensure a coherent link between mandates and resources. Until this moment, the UN is still not fully operational yet, while according to their planning, they need to implement certain projects wherefore they needed to have full capacities.

The advisor of the DSRSG (X21) responded to the lack of coordination between the different UN entities, by giving some recommendations: *“For a smooth coordination within MINUSMA, it is important to plan together. Someone said something very interesting the other day: when you agree that you have to meet and work together on a plan; for example, if you and I decide we are gonna build a house, if we do it together, it is easier when you see some defaults and say: at least we did it together and you can see the house as your house. The very big risk is that people say: I am in the mission, I do my section budgets and I am in charge of let’s say women protection and I know how many people I want to reach. My budget is for three or four people, I just do my thing and then whatever happens there, I do not care. Then you risk a problem in terms of integration. Because at the end, you might be doing things that another agency is also doing, the fact that you have not decided to meet and agree on a certain points, means you just completely go off radar. But I think the secret is planning together and measuring together and if you’re able to sit together and say: what is important for Mali as UN? Maybe gender or women or child protection, it is not rocket science, we know that in Mali problem number one is this, problem number two is that. As UN, what is important for us is to do?”* According to him, planning together is essential for a successful mission.

Barth Eide e.a. (2005)²⁸⁷ also made some recommendations related to planning in their report about integrated missions: *“Operational planning for integrated missions must be based on clearly defined strategic policies that should act as a framework for guiding the UN’s long-term support for peacebuilding. These objectives should reflect benchmarked transitional targets in order to ensure a smooth hand-over from the peacekeeping to the reconstruction and development phases of the UN’s in-country activities. Where relevant, regional dimensions of a specific conflict as well as appropriate means for realizing regional goals should be incorporated into such planning exercises.”* (2005, p. 38) However, this report is already nine years old and some progress has been made in the meantime. The report also gave some recommendations related to engaging the UNCT²⁸⁸, but in the current integrated mission, this is already done. There are regular meetings with the UNCT and although some actors argue the overarching goal is sometimes missing, there has already been made some progress on this point.

²⁸⁵ For English translation, see appendix C, number 78.

²⁸⁶ For English translation, see appendix C, number 79.

²⁸⁷ Barth Eide e.a. (2005), pp. 38 – 43

²⁸⁸ Barth Eide e.a. (2005), p. 39: *“At the field level, mission planning must engage the UN Country Team and relevant local partners from the beginning of the planning process.”*

5.4. CONCLUSION

This chapter gave an overview of the current coordination structure in the humanitarian arena in Mali. The research question that is covered in this chapter is: **How do the different actors in the humanitarian arena in Mali describe and value the coordination structure?** To prevent duplication and to strive for a sustainable continuation of the programs, it is important to coordinate together. An open and active attitude in the arena is important and studies about coordination during crisis situations in other countries has proved that it works better to coordinate and learn from each other instead of putting up fences on each own's programs. It is important to identify the various forms of having contact, whereby coordination and cooperation are the most well-known ones. According to the interviewees however, in the Malian arena there is hardly any cooperation amongst the actors, most organisations speak of coordination. The humanitarian arena in Mali consists of various actors who all have a different background, different mandates and different ways of implementing programs.

Coordination in the arena has some advantages and disadvantages. Coordination takes place to prevent duplication of programs and to improve a sharing of experiences and knowledge. Mutual coordination makes the involved actors sharper and gives them a stronger body against other actors in the arena (for example international NGOs against UN entities). Coordination can ensure that organisations compete each other. Coordination is not necessarily the same as competition, because the humanitarian needs in the arena are high enough to create work for all present actors. Another added value of coordination is that certain places suddenly become less inaccessible for civil actors; for example the northern regions where civil UN actors can collect information and share this with other civil actors in the arena. On the other side coordination brings some risk to the involved actors. An important disadvantage is the possible blurring of lines, whereby humanitarian actors become confused with military contingents. MINUSMA becomes more and more a target of terrorist attacks and therefore NGOs hold on more strongly to a strict division of lines, tasks and responsibilities. The humanitarian principles are a tool for NGOs to perform their programs but these are not always implemented in the same extent by other (military) actors. There have been accusations that military contingents are performing humanitarian tasks for other purposes.

Important tool for a good coordination, is a common ground and a mutual understanding. Without adhering to the same humanitarian principles, coordination becomes more difficult and actors will not be willing to give up some of their humanitarian space to meet the mandates of the other actors. There are different tools to run the coordination structure in Mali: the UN clusters and the Groupes Thématiques from FONGIM. Coordination mainly takes place via the intermediary OCHA. By fulfilling this position, OCHA can help NGOs to stay neutral and independent. The goal of these mechanisms is clear for the actors and forms an added value in the coordination structure. Only downside is that there is an overrepresentation of actors in the capital, the number of meetings is too high and is not effective anymore. There is a smaller cluster representation in the northern areas and because of the smaller number of actors, coordination is more effective in these regions.

Coordination in the arena takes place between civil actors, between civil and military actors and between the different UN entities (the MINUSMA mission and the UN agencies). Especially the coordination between civil and military actors in the arena is a sensitive topic, although some organisations have more problems with it as others. Some interviewees had a very dogmatic, adverse opinion concerning CIMIC, while others were more willing to think about ways how CIMIC could be used in the arena. Civil-military coordination in the Malian humanitarian arena consists of different forms, ranging from the exchange of information to coordination to armed escort. NGOs have signed a position paper that they do not use armed escort unless as a last resort, but this raises some questions and debates. UN entities use armed escort more often, which influence the partnerships with (national) NGOs or other international organisations. The humanitarian community in general prefers a situation in which MINUSMA provides area control, instead of using armed escort.

There are some factors that influence the coordination in the arena. Firstly, there are the personalities of the involved employees. By means of personal commitment, experience, background or individual ideas, partnerships and coordination are largely influenced. The differences in experience and education between people working for the civil and the force pillar within MINUSMA are large and influence their perceptions and the discourse about certain topics. Secondly, there are the differences in mandates and especially the differences between organisations with a focus on human and state security. Also the lack of mutual knowledge about each other and an inadequate communication has an important influence on the coordination structure.

Some recommendations for a more smooth coordination are: create a setting in which there is a more regular exchange of ideas and information. By updating each other more about each other's programs and mandates, coordination will become more effective. However, the downside here is however, that it is important to keep the number of involved people low. To make meetings more effective, it is important to invite less people and at the same time only people with a higher position within the organisation (people with a certain power to take decisions). The final recommendation is to involve all actors in the humanitarian arena. Excluding some actors (like the National Civil Society) however, may expose a knowledge gap and some parts of the reconstruction process will not be covered.

The argument that the UN stabilisation mission does not have the goal to stay for a long time, while NGOs are often for a longer time present in the country, does not involve the coordination structure much. Indirectly some NGOs have more local knowledge and a more comprehensive network, but this difference in time presence does not directly influence the way these actors coordinate. These variations are clearly visible in the integrated mission, whereby UN agencies and the stabilisation mission all fall under the 'one UN approach'. For outsiders, it looked like UN agencies were absorbed by the mission. However, the UN agencies themselves faced some difficulties because they felt more related to the humanitarian community as to the UN mission. They had to frame partnerships again and explain they are not the same as MINUSMA. Due to involvement of the UNCT in the framing and planning of the mission, a smooth coordination between all different UN entities was created. The very positive point of integrated missions is that certain areas which were inaccessible for civil or humanitarian actors before, become now accessible, due to the more easy way of sharing information between different UN entities. Of course the mission needed some time to start up, but most actors accepted this and were willing to give the mission some time and space – as long as the mission is willing to respect the humanitarian principles.

6. INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE SECTOR



6. INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE SECTOR

Orange and Malitel prepaid credit cards are available everywhere on the street. No matter if it is six in the morning, after midnight, Ramadan or just a normal weekday; the biggest international company is never far away. This, in contrast to other international companies. Except for a wide range of various French cheeses and some whiskeys, there are almost no Western brands available in the country.

The involvement of the International Private Sector in the humanitarian arena in Mali is an often discussed topic. At this moment they do not have an important role in the humanitarian arena, but their involvement is much welcomed and appreciated by the other actors. This chapter forms a kind of appendix, an encore to this rest of the chapters, about the possible involvement of the International Private Sector in future missions and especially during the coming years of reconstruction in Mali. This chapter both examines how the International Private Sector can stimulate economic development in the country, but also how they can join in the process of giving aid after a crisis. The research question which is answered in this chapter is: **What is the added value of the involvement of the International Private Sector in the Malian humanitarian arena and what could be their future role?**

6.1. CURRENT INVOLVEMENT IN THE HUMANITARIAN ARENA

The International Private Sector could join the humanitarian arena in several ways. First of all, by doing investments in the country and stimulating the economic growth. Secondly, by giving direct support to the humanitarian community. In Mali, mainly the first form of private sector involvement occurs. This form is much appreciated by the actors in the humanitarian arena in Mali and is an often discussed topic. To a certain extent, the International Private Sector is already for a long time present in the country, but they are only involved in the southern areas. The five biggest areas where international companies are involved in are: agriculture, financial sector, mining and gold companies, construction companies and telephone companies. Although most of these companies are not directly involved in humanitarian work, they can indirectly contribute to the reconstruction phase and the work of other actors in the humanitarian arena, for example by building infrastructure, providing financial services or constructing a telephone network.

The second form however, does not occur frequently in Mali. A direct support to humanitarian agencies mostly occurs during a natural crisis, whereby the company provides for example foods, cars or shelter for the agencies. A third form of involvement is the exchange of information and expertise. The International Private Sector aims to make profit and has an innovative character. By exchanging this knowledge about for example innovations of rural development or the production of food, the international companies help the humanitarian community to be better able to adapt to the needs.²⁸⁹

A concrete example of involvement of an international company is in the field of telecommunication. Orange is one of the most well-known companies active in the humanitarian arena. Different international organisations are working together with Orange Mali to develop programs based to bring people in northern areas in contact with each other and provide easy and fast systems of sharing information. This could be used to exchange prices on the market, but also to inform others about the security situation.

Worldwide there have been a lot of examples of where a telephone company helps to improve the communication during an emergency situation. During a crisis, especially a natural disaster, making contact with family and friends is extremely important for the victims. But also for aid agencies, it is important to be able to communicate together and with the beneficiaries. After the typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (November 2013) a small team of employees from Vodafone reconstructed the telephone network again and made sure that the victims and the aid workers could make use of the network again.²⁹⁰

²⁸⁹ Correspondent (2014a)

²⁹⁰ Correspondent (2014a)

6.2. ADVANTAGES

Involvement of the International Private Sector has advantages for both the receiving country and the international company itself.

The advantage of involvement of the private sector for the host country is based on the assumption that the private sector will bring in economic opportunities and funding possibilities, which will lead again to the creation of stability and sustainability. For a sustainable long term revival of the country, it is important to emphasize the involvement of the International Private Sector. To reconstruct the ailing economy, private sector engagement through investments and public-private partnerships is necessary.²⁹¹ Due to a cooperation or coordination between the International Private Sector and humanitarian agencies, a continuation of the programs is ensured.


The International Private Sector is much welcome to enter the humanitarian arena, partly due to the absence of a functioning government. In a stable situation with a functioning government, authorities are able to make some investments in the country and stimulate economic growth. In their absence there is another actor needed who can create economic welfare. A woman working for MINUSMA (X17) explained the important role of the International Private Sector in the arena: *"I believe that the private sector could play a role in creating youth employment and bringing in economic opportunities. Because we cannot always count on the state, on the government."*

A man working for a French NGO (X29) explained that neither NGOs nor MINUSMA can stay forever in the country; one day there is another crisis somewhere else and NGOs will leave the region again or funds become depleted and there is no possibility of implementing programs anymore: *"We are just here to support the more vulnerable people. We can't do that for 20 years, like we did in Congo. That is failure to my opinion. The only way for us to leave is to be sure that there is some activities for them. There we need the private sector."* According to this man, it is too costly for the UN to stay in a country for more as 20 years. The involvement of the International Private Sector in the arena can stimulate the sustainability of the work the humanitarian actors have done during the crisis.

An expert working on local economic development for an international NGO (X3) explained that the private sector can create an economic incentive, which will stimulate social economic recovery. By creating jobs and employment, people get a legal way of earning their own income. This lack of possibilities was mentioned in chapter three as one of the biggest causes of the instability of the country. When people make investments and own properties, there is a lesser risk of an outbreak of violence. The risk of losing the investments is too high: *"If you get the private sector going on and making some money... it brings the stability in a certain way. Nobody wants to destroy what they have created. You do not want to destroy what you have taken years to do."* (X3)

Last advantage of the involvement of the International Private Sector is the amount of money and funds they bring in. There is a worldwide growing trend of unmet appeals for humanitarian needs. Also in Mali, in the year 2014 only 50% of the UN appeal was covered (figure 23).²⁹² The International Private Sector could partly fill in this gap with their involvement in the arena, due to the work they do and the funds they bring in. According to a woman working for an international NGO (X9) this role needs to be controlled and investments have to support poor women and men to move out of

Figure 23: Humanitarian pledges and appeal for Mali



Source: Financial Tracking Service (2014)

²⁹¹ DEVEX IMPACT (2014)

²⁹² Financial Tracking Service (2014)

poverty.²⁹³ Finally, a man working for a big international NGO (X15) clarified that the International Private Sector is much appreciated because of the new possibilities they offer, mainly on the area of starting new programs with the help of their funds and networks: *"We have a corporate pool group, trying to get funds from them."*

There are also several advantages for international companies of supporting of the humanitarian community. The more prosperous the world is gonna be, the bigger the sales market will be. The more money people are able to spend, the sooner they will be able to buy more luxurious products. An employee of Land Rover (who has a partnership with the IFRC) said about this: *"The more we make the world more prosperous, the more likely is the chance that we reach our commercial objectives."* Besides more economic profit, also the sales market will be extended. People in a disaster area are introduced to new brands, which they will maybe also buy in the phase after the crisis. And finally, giving humanitarian aid and having partnerships with humanitarian agencies is good for the image of a company. Corporate Social Responsibility becomes more and more a common tool in entrepreneurship.²⁹⁴

6.3. REASONS FOR THE LACK OF INVOLVEMENT

There are different reasons why there is a lack of involvement of the International Private Sector in the humanitarian arena in Mali. Most important reasons are the lack of possibilities, linked to the very small sales market and the unsafe situation (these problems are explained in paragraph 3.1.1).

The northern part of Mali is an extensive area without infrastructure and with just a few inhabitants: there is almost no sales market. While the southern areas have possibilities for agriculture, mining and gold industries, in the north there is only desert and livestock farming. A woman working for an international development agency (X6) made the following statement: *"I cannot imagine what would be the interest of these kind of internationals to invest there. There is not a big market."* Due to the lack of sales markets and few inhabitants, there is almost no opportunity for the private sector to make some profit.

Another reason for the lack of involvement of the International Private Sector is the unstable and unsafe situation. An employee working for the civil department of MINUSMA (X17) explained that the private sector needs some sort of trust in the situation: *"Investors do not just come, if you want to invest in this country you have to make sure your investment is worth it for a while. You need a minimum of security and a sense of security. Over a certain period of time. You need stability."* When investors have the possibility to start a new investment somewhere and they are able to choose between different countries (in West-Africa for example), it seems more profitable to start a business in a stable and safe country instead of a place which is just recovering from a crisis. *"Als je kan kiezen tussen Senegal en Mali dan weet je het wel. Dan is de keus snel gemaakt. De slaag- en winst kansen liggen beduidend hoger in Senegal dan in Mali."*²⁹⁵ (X4 – man working for an NGO). The risk of doing investments and losing your properties again is just too high in Mali nowadays. The country has to be really safe and stable before an international company is able to start making investments. The risk is just too high that there will be another outbreak of conflicts again so that employees have to flee and leave properties behind. A woman working for a UN agency (X8) added that the private sectors needs to earn money: *"They won't do it just for philanthropy. Working in northern Mali is really complicated. Most of the companies working in northern Mali receive subsidies from the government. For example, Total, who used to work in northern Mali, received subsidies from the government, to have some petrol stations in Timbouctou. So it is really challenging, if you are a big company, and you want to work up there; there is no road!"*

²⁹³ DEVEY IMPACT (2014)

²⁹⁴ Correspondent (2014a)

²⁹⁵ For English translation, see appendix C, number 80.

However, safety does not only refer to areas without violence and conflicts, but also to a safe financial market. Financial safety is key for the private sector to start businesses in the country and forms the third reason for the lack of involvement. Access to financial services is necessary to be able to start up new companies. Besides, criminality on the market areas itself becomes more and more a problem. Some big traders fear going to the market to make important transactions because of the risk of getting robbed by criminals or rebel groups. Access to financial services and safety, both in the villages, roads and markets is needed before the private sector can start making investments. A man working for an international NGO (X13) summarized this argument: *“If you do not have peace, how can the private sector develop their projects if the places are controlled by the rebels? If you are the private sector, are you able to do investments in a region where you will lose 90% of all your equipment and funds? No!”*

To become more involved in the arena, the goals of the private sector and the humanitarian actors do not have to be the same. The private sector has to make profit otherwise they will not survive; this is generally accepted by the humanitarian actors. When going to a country and starting a new business, the company has to do this for their own personal goals. These are the reasons a company will stay in the country and contribute something to the arena. It is their own interest and your own social responsibility. Work of the private sector does not have to get the label of ‘humanitarian work’, just by fulfilling their own tasks, they will indirectly contribute to the humanitarian goals: *“The private sector does not have to be linked to development in name to do development. They can do infrastructure for a personal gain. But that does not mean it is not used by our people.”* (X27 – NGO employee).

The entire global structure in a country needs to be stable for the private sector to feel welcome. At this moment, the lack of a sales market, the unsafe situation and the lack of financial services are the most important reasons for the absence of the International Private Sector in the arena. The environment where they can operate needs to have clear rules, be transparent, and have accountability mechanisms. To develop the international industry in the country, it is important that the national government implements certain rules and regulations. At this moment, the business and investment climate in the country is not convenient enough for new entrepreneurs to start a company; it is not suitable for the local context. To improve the situation, it is essential to strengthen legal certainty for companies and create an easier access to loans through the reform of the microfinance sector.²⁹⁶

6.4. FUTURE ROLE

The International Private Sector is much welcomed to join the humanitarian arena in Mali by the other actors; their involvement becomes more accepted and appreciated. Not especially by doing humanitarian work, but while producing their own products the side-effects will have a positive influence on the humanitarian actors. During international meetings and conferences in for example Brussels or the Hague, representatives of the International Private Sector are more often invited. Not only donors, local authorities and NGOs get a chair around the table, but also companies like Orange are able to share their opinion about the humanitarian needs and the process of reconstruction. This paragraph gives some recommendations for the future role of the International Private Sector during stabilisation missions or peacekeeping operations.

Some voices are raised to involve the International Private Sector already more from the very first phase of a mission on. From establishing the mandate of a UN mission, the role of the private sector has to become more clear. A man working for a UN agency (X31) explained: *“We will have to touch base with the private sector much more in the face of shaping the resolution, to make sure that for example the reintegration of the IDP’s in the north is sustainable.”* At this moment, economic development is not included in the mandate of MINUSMA and the private sector was not invited in

²⁹⁶ DEVEX IMPACT (2014)

discussions about the framing of the mandate. Although there are some small initiatives for Private Sector development, there is no large scale involvement in the Malian arena.

In some countries the private sector already gets a very important role during the reconstruction phase. In Myanmar for example, the government invited the private sector to take the lead in the humanitarian aid after the cyclone in 2008: *“Doing so will enable governments to maintain control over the crisis response, rather than permitting traditional aid actors to establish parallel systems that, intentionally or unintentionally, often act independently of host state institutions”* (2014, p. 25).²⁹⁷ The assumption here is that traditional aid actors will form a parallel system next to the government, while the private sector will act independently and leave the traditional government in their role. Important hereby however is the form of a crisis (short-term natural disaster or long term civil conflict) and if there still is a functioning government or not. In Myanmar there was an abrupt natural disaster, which was not caused by a malfunctioning of the government. In Mali the situation is totally different; the insecure situation in the north is caused by the lack of government institutions. The role the private sector has played during the natural crisis in Myanmar is different as the role the private sector could play in the giving of aid to Mali. However, a lesson learned from the situation in Myanmar is the parallel structure the private sector has next to the government and next to NGOs.

Innovations in the world of humanitarian aid are key in many recent debates and discussion meetings. The role of the International Private Sector is also debated in these discussions. A good example is the ‘cash & vouchers’ program of WFP, whereby victims of a crisis do not receive food but cash vouchers, wherewith they can buy food and other necessary products themselves, which enables them to hold on to dignity and independence.^{298–299} In Mali there are no examples yet of innovative ways of involving the International Private Sector. However, programs with mobile banking or cash & vouchers are much welcomed by the northern inhabitants and the private sector.

An opportunity for international companies is the development of (solar) energy sources. A large percentage of the population does not have access to reliable energy sources, so there is a lot to win in this sector for international companies. The use of solar energy is clean and there is a great availability of this source. Hereby it is important that the national government changes and reforms the business climate, so that it becomes more attractive and easy for companies to get loans and start a business.³⁰⁰

In November 2013 there has been a trade mission to Mali, organized by the Netherlands African Business Council (NABC). The focus of the mission was on agriculture and was joined by a delegation of eleven companies. One of the organizers of this mission confirms the important role of international companies during the reconstruction phase in a country, but also understands their lack of interest and possibilities.³⁰¹ Such trading missions could help to introduce international companies to the country and present the possible advantages of investing in the country.

6.5. CONCLUSION

This encore answers the following research question: **What is the added value of the involvement of the International Private Sector in the Malian humanitarian arena and what could be their future role?** The War on Terror and more complex emergency situations ask for another type of intervention. Complex emergencies, like the crisis in Mali, are more long-lasting, without a clear beginning or end. These complex emergencies ask for another type of intervention; interventions with a more sustainable goal and long-term vision. At the same time, donors become more critical and in a long-

²⁹⁷ Zyck, S.A. and R. Kent (2014)

²⁹⁸ Correspondent (2015)

²⁹⁹ Correspondent (2014a)

³⁰⁰ DEVEX IMPACY (2014)

³⁰¹ NABC (2015)

term crisis funds are drying up. The International Private Sector would be a valuable player in these new kind of interventions.

Due to the content of the crisis, which is more political and security related and not a natural disaster, the involvement of the International Private Sector is mainly based on stimulating economic development, instead of supporting the humanitarian community. The current interference of the International Private Sector in the Malian arena is slight, due to the unsafe situation in the country and the very small sales market. There are just a few international companies active, mainly in the field of agriculture, mining, financial services, construction and telecommunication. All those companies are only active in the southern areas. Although they are absent now, their involvement in the arena is much welcomed and appreciated by the other actors. The private sector brings stability and a continuation of the work of humanitarian actors. Although the International Private Sector is not directly involved in doing humanitarian work, the work they do (for example, constructing roads) will benefit the humanitarian arena and create a stable situation, due to the economic growth and creation of employment possibilities. One of the economic sectors with a high potential for development is the (solar) energy sector. This source is available in abundance and since a major part of the population is lacking reliable energy sources, there is a great possible economic gain.

Recommendations for more involvement of the International Private Sector lie mainly in the field of governmental reforms and an easier access to funds and loans. Besides, during a UN mission, it would be advisable to involve international companies already from the very first phase on. To create a sustainable situation and a continuation of the humanitarian work, the private sector should be involved in the designing in the mission, to explain their involvement and the work they could do.

The involvement of the International Private Sector and processes of Private Sector development lie on the crossroad between human and state security. These activities have a dual effect. Security in the country will be improved on different scale levels. By stimulating economic growth, the country will become more independent and less needy from international aid organisations. When there is economic growth in a country - which could be created with investments from international companies - the national government will be stimulated which will lead to state security. The national government will be stimulated by the economic growth to secure the country itself; due to the increasing income they will also be able to make financial investments on state security. Economic growth will drive innovation and bring stability in the country. International companies can take over some roles of the national government in the reconstruction process. The government is not able to bring peace to the country all by themselves, so the International Private Sector can support this process by their involvement in the arena.

On the other hand, private sector development will also strengthen the human security in the country. Employment is created, which will directly lead to personal gain for the population. Economic independence will boost confidence of the population, which will lead again to human security again. As the military advisor working for the Dutch embassy (X5) said in chapter three, to secure the country it is important to bring people an alternative (legal) way of earning their own livelihood. A lack of income possibilities will lead to conflicts, illegal activities and insecure areas. By bringing people a legal way of earning their own income, human security is promoted.

Human and state security both take place on another scale level and the added value of private sector involvement is that all scale levels will profit from their investments. Private sector development forms an added value for all actors in the reconstruction phase and, more importantly, will directly bring prosperity to the local population and the company itself. However, future research on the consequences of Private Sector involvement and public-private partnerships in the humanitarian arena is necessary. Private sector development could be divided in many different forms and activities and not all types will bring prosperity to both the government and the population.

7. CONCLUSION



7. CONCLUSION

This research contains a study to the perceptions of the humanitarian community about the coordination structure and the integrated UN mission in the humanitarian arena in Mali. First of all the main actors are introduced, their view on their own mandate is illustrated and the expectations they have of the other actors are exemplified. Later on, the perceptions the main actors have concerning coordination are explained. What does coordination in the arena look like and what are the consequences of it? To what extent do the different perceptions and mandates of the actors influence the coordination? Finally, the influence of the presence of the UN integrated mission MINUSMA in the arena is described. The following research question has been answered in this thesis: **How do the different perceptions of actors in the humanitarian arena in Mali influence the coordination structure?**

7.1. MAIN FINDINGS

Reconstruction

A change in the nature of conflicts also asks for another way of intervening. The conflict in Mali has a complex and hybrid background. Several actors and different rebel groups play an important role in the conflict and it is difficult to indicate a precise start point of the conflict. The conflict is long lasting and a future of peace and stability still seems far away in the northern areas. Besides the description as a complex emergency, the intervention fits also within the worldwide War on Terror. After the coup d'état in March 2012 and the declaration of the Islamic state Azawad, the western world and especially France and the United Nations framed the Jihadists in north Mali as an international threat; not only to the security and stability in the West-African region, but also to Europe and the rest of the world.

The current phase of reconstruction is difficult to describe according to the interviewees; it is a continuous cycle where periods of progress and relapse alternate with each other. Although there are blueprints for a desirable future, the perceptions of the involved actors about how to reach this future differ. The actors involved in the peacebuilding and stabilisation process have different discourses about the description of Mali's current phase and the application of the five domains of reconstruction: physical, political, security, social and economic. However, the differences in focus between the various domains of reconstruction do not influence the mutual expectations. All actors agree that it is impossible to embrace all domains of reconstruction; it is preferable to select one or a few domains to focus on in the programs.

The humanitarian arena in Mali is dynamic, a community that is constantly changing and expanding itself based on the interactions between the involved actors and the local context. The formation has just started and is still continuing, something in which the presence of the UN integrated mission plays an important role because in its wake many NGOs have scaled up their programs and donors have released more funds. Each actor influences the arena in its own way and all these negotiations together shape the humanitarian arena. The humanitarian arena is currently dominated by six different actors: the UN (both the MINUSMA mission and the UN agencies), international NGOs, the National Civil Society, the Government, Donors and the International Private Sector. The roles these actors fulfil in the arena differ; some institutes are mainly hired as implementing partners while others have more access to money and are more involved in policy making.

The humanitarian community says they work according to the Code of Conduct and with the Humanitarian Principles of neutrality, independence, impartiality and humanity. However, within the humanitarian community there are also some differences and variations in objectives and abilities. Although humanitarian actors claim to adhere to the same principles, some actors are more willing to give up some space in order to reach the beneficiaries as others. Besides, it is almost impossible for humanitarian agencies to stay 100% neutral or independent. Due to funds they receive and

partnerships they establish, they are always politically influenced. There is a risk that if the humanitarian principles are released too much, aid is not unconditional anymore, but could get a hidden agenda. Some actors even argue that many international NGOs are already an extension of Western politics. The same goes for the UN integrated mission. A stabilisation mission tries to improve the international structures of a country, but can never be 'neutral' or 'impartial' and can therefore never be 'humanitarian'. Due to the multi-hatted position of the HC / RC and the overarching mandate of the mission, it is difficult for the civilians in the mission to stay neutral and independent: the political context will always influence the humanitarian tasks. This has influenced other integrated missions in the past (in for example Liberia) and still influences the coordination and partnerships between UN actors and non-UN actors in the humanitarian arena in Mali.

Expectations

The expectations the humanitarian actors have from each other do not always meet the perceptions they have about their own roles; there is sometimes a mismatch or displeasure about the work other humanitarian actors in the arena do. Some smaller NGOs and local organisations have expressed their disappointment about the degree to which they are involved in the decision making process. However, although there are still some variations in the humanitarian community itself, there is mutual respect and understanding for the work the actors in the humanitarian arena are doing. One exception to this is the role MINUSMA has in the arena. MINUSMA entered the field as a very big and bureaucratic organisation with some setup problems; it took some time before they were fully operational. Although they had some start-up problems, they immediately took on a huge role in the arena and for that reason some NGOs and National Civil Society organisations felt ignored or overruled. Besides, many organisations in the humanitarian arena do not fully understand what the mandate of MINUSMA is and therefore they have some resistance against the work MINUSMA does. For many employees in the humanitarian arena it is the first time they have to deal with an integrated mission and they still have to get used to it. But this is not the first UN mission where there is ignorance from the humanitarian community about the mandate and purpose of an integrated missions. Studies in amongst others Liberia and Afghanistan have proved that also in these situations there has been confusion and nescience about the exact goal of the integrated mission. Some institutes did not know MINUSMA is more than just a military organisation; they were quite indignant because MINUSMA also has some civil programs. They had the feeling MINUSMA is stepping over some lines and is not working according the humanitarian principles. In the mandate of MINUSMA is written that they 'support for humanitarian assistance', but this could be interpreted in different ways. Certain NGOs fear that MINUSMA is interfering with humanitarian work too much. The humanitarian community expects from MINUSMA that they will take care of creating safety and security in the country and stay far away from humanitarian programs. Regarding the fear of blurring the lines, NGOs are afraid that local people could not see the difference between NGOs and MINUSMA anymore. Because the expectations NGOs have from MINUSMA do not really correspond with their actual mandate, NGOs are sometimes disappointed in the behaviour of MINUSMA.

The most important difference between MINUSMA on the one hand and the other actors on the other hand, is that MINUSMA has a dual focus: an integrated mission is about the managing of both human and state security. The UN stabilisation mission has a military touch due to the force pillar, but implements also programs with a focus on re-constructing governmental structures and protection of human rights for example. On the other hand there are the humanitarian actors in the arena who work focus on the basic needs with a focus on human security. They are in the country to assist those in need and have a flexible limit of response: the mandate can be extended or changed any moment.

There is a growing understanding of the importance of the development - security nexus: to stabilize a country, both development and safety are necessary. The differences between humanitarian operations and military operations are reflected in the differences between human and state security. State security and human security together lead to a safer country; both processes are necessary in a reconstruction and stabilisation process. Mandates can form an added value to other

mandates and actors can complement each other, just by fulfilling their own tasks. According to the interviewed actors, a difference in mandates or a different focus on human or state security does not obstruct the coordination structure in the arena, as long as there is mutual respect, understanding and openness.

Coordination

There are a lot of prejudices about the extent of coordination and cooperation in the humanitarian arena and interviewees were not unanimous in their opinion. During most interviews, respondents expressed their disappointment concerning how different organisations interact in the arena, but this has different consequences for different actors. And although there is a willingness to coordinate, a will to exchange information and the drive to push back own boundaries is great, there is no cooperation - no projects are implemented together.

Coordination in the humanitarian arena depends to a large extent on personalities and experiences of those involved. Coordination between organisations is done by individuals. The mission could be so well thought out, but if people on the work floor do not understand the mandate, are not so concerned or do not feel like cooperating, then it just does not work out. Here the experience of the persons involved plays an important role. For military employees, this MINUSMA mission is often their first mission and they only stay for a period of six months. Civil employees (within the UN and people working for NGOs and other institutes) often stay in the country for a much longer period and have sometimes done some more missions in other countries; their professional background will help them to be able to adapt to this arena more easily. For civil employees it is sometimes difficult that the rotation speed amongst military actors is quite high.

Although there is ignorance about the mandate of MINUSMA and sometimes indignation about certain programs MINUSMA executes, the coordination between MINUSMA and other actors in the arena has improved since the start of the mission. There is more clarity about the goal of the mission and the UN's mandate. For a lot of people working in the arena, this is the first time they have to deal with the presence of an integrated mission. Slowly but surely it becomes more clear what their presence means for the humanitarian community, and for the UN itself, it becomes more clear what other actors expect from MINUSMA and how the UN can become an added value in the arena.

Although coordination is sometimes difficult due to different principles, mandates and ignorance, it also brings advantages to the humanitarian arena. By exchanging information, individual organisations are becoming stronger and better able to run their programs. Coordination will also prevent duplication; it makes sure there are not several organisations executing the same programs in the same regions. Finally, an added value of coordination is that it becomes easier for civil actors to work in the northern regions. Civil UN employees are now better able to fulfil humanitarian needs in the north but also for non-UN humanitarian actors, coordination will help them to prepare themselves against the threat in the north. By getting updates about the security situation from the military, they are better able to implement their programs.

Forms of coordination

The two most commonly tools for coordination are the UN clusters and the Groupe Thematics from FONGIM. Both tools work quite well and their purpose is clear to all actors. The clusters are meant to assemble different organisations that work together on the same theme's to share information and discuss the programs. Coordination takes place between different type of actors: between solely civil actors, between civil and military actors and between different UN entities (in the integrated mission).

Coordination between solely civil actors takes place already for years in Mali and does not cause much discussion. Although there are some differences within the humanitarian community, civil actors among themselves generally adhere to the same humanitarian principles, understand each other's

mandate and have respect for each other's programs and methods of working. There is sometimes competition for funds, but this only makes them stronger and more sharp.

Civil-military coordination on the other hand does cause some debates. Many humanitarian actors are very afraid to be seen together with military actors or to become confused with them and have therefore a very strong, negative position against CIMIC. Nevertheless, the reality of humanitarian action means that interaction with the UN mission (both civil and military elements) is necessary in order to deliver aid to the beneficiaries. Many humanitarian actors do not have the capacity to operate in insecure areas and are therefore dependent on peacekeeping forces. Some of the interviewees accepted this and they were looking for ways how CIMIC could take place in the arena. The three most common forms of CIMIC are coordination & the exchange of information, armed escort and the implementation of projects. Humanitarian actors signed a position paper that they will not use armed escort, unless it is a last resort. However, this raises some questions: what is the exact definition of a last resort? What should the armed escort during a last resort look like? There is no consensus about these questions. Military actors also somehow feel ignored, because NGOs generally do not want to talk to them, but when they have a problem, they are the first to call and ask for help. The use of armed escort also causes a problem related to partnerships, because some national NGOs used armed escort when working for a UN agency and therefore became less attractive to work for an international NGO during another project. Another related problem is that MINUSMA does not have the capacity to fulfil the escorts immediately. Sometimes it can take a few hours or even days before a vehicle is available to perform the evacuation. Through this, MINUSMA can count on incomprehension and indignation from NGOs, which expect help immediately when they ask for. But above all, coordination between military actors and humanitarian agencies in the arena does not work well, because the humanitarians are too afraid of blurred lines and a loss of work. There is indignation in the arena that MINUSMA is interfering with humanitarian work too much. The Quick-Impact-Projects and the Hearts & Minds funds are perfect examples of where NGOs think MINUSMA is interfering with the humanitarian work too much.

The third form of coordination in the arena is coordination between different UN entities, who are all part of the 'one UN approach'. The advantage of such an approach is that areas that were inaccessible for civil actors before (due to security reasons and the wish to not make use of armed escort) now become accessible for civil actors working within the UN. These civil UN actors can make sure that the beneficiaries are reached and that the needs are met. However, a difficulty within this integrated approach is that, according to the involved actors, there is no overarching mandate between the UN agencies and the mission. Another difficulty is that the UN agencies suddenly became involved in this integrated mission, while before they felt more related to NGOs than to other UN entities. Since the start of this integrated mission they fall under the 'one UN hat', without being able to explain to others that they are still independent from the military actors working for MINUSMA.

New style of interventions

The UN introduced the concept of integrated mission as the new form of interventions for future complex crises. According to them, this will be the solution for failures related to civil-military coordination in the past. It is strange however, that all interviewees indicated that this mission in practice not so integrated as it looks on paper and that it only involves UN entities; the integration does not include all actors in the humanitarian arena. Although it would be quite impossible to involve all actors in the arena in the integrated approach (due to the different mandates, principles, donors and goals), the respondents argued they would like to have more influence on the extent of integration. It is also strange that there is internal division within the UN about the extent of integration and there is no overarching goal for the MINUSMA mission and the UN agencies.

An added value of integrated missions is that the sustainability of the mission is ensured. Due to the intense coordination between the stabilisation mission and the UN agencies, information is shared with institutes who will stay for a longer period in the country. The MINUSMA mission does not have

the intention to stay for a long period in the country and by involving actors that already have a long presence and will stay for a longer period, they ensure the continuity of the UN programs more.

UN OCHA used to be the mediator between the UN agencies, the stabilisation mission, NGOs and other actors in the arena. They take on the lead role in the coordination amongst all involved actors in the arena. However, due to the enormous influence of the UN and their large capacities, the integrated mission also takes over a bit of the coordination in the arena. Although OCHA has years of experience in the country and with coordination during crisis situations, MINUSMA has such a huge influence on the arena that they can also influence the coordination structure, while they are at the same time still busy setting up their mission, gaining experience in the region and implementing their own tasks and mandate.

Another new type of intervention is the involvement of the International Private Sector. At this moment their involvement in the Malian humanitarian arena is just slight, due to the unsafe situation and the very small sales market. But although they are absent now, their involvement in the arena is much welcomed and appreciated by the other actors.

The involvement of the International Private Sector and processes of Private Sector development lie on the crossroad between human and state security. Their activities have a dual effect: the security in the country will be improved at a sustainable way on different scale levels. By stimulating economic growth, the country will become more independent and less needy from international aid organisations. Individual needs will be met, due to the creation of jobs and employment, so that become more self-reliant again and less dependent of (small) criminal activities. But also the state security will be stimulated by the International Private Sector, due to the investments in the country and the economic drive.

Conclusions

To conclude, the prejudices, the different perceptions and the knowledge gap about the mandates influence the way actors in the arena coordinate. Different discourses have arisen due to the different backgrounds and education of the employees working in the arena. Due to ignorance and a mismatch in expectations, actors sometimes do not understand each other and end up disappointed or confused. Since the UN Integrated Mission arrived in Mali, the humanitarian arena has changed enormously. Due to their power, funds and massive presence it is impossible to ignore them or coordinate without them. The concept of the 'one UN approach' has changed partnerships and made UN civil actors less neutral and independent. Although the coordination between the UN and humanitarian agencies has already improved since the start of the mission, some further improvements are necessary for a better continuation of the reconstruction phase and the work which is done in the humanitarian arena.

7.2. RECOMMENDATIONS

To conclude this research, some recommendations for the future are given. These recommendations focus on this specific MINUSMA mission and conflict, but could also be applied for integrated missions in the future.

To improve the coordination structure in the country, it is necessary to create more transparency and openness in the arena. Still some meetings are not open for all interested parties and there is a lot of ignorance about each other's mandates. Although the number of meetings in the capital is already quite high, it is recommended to give more presentations about each other's exact goals, mandates and methods of working. By accepting the fear of NGOs for a blurring of lines, some concession and respect is already ensured. Many NGOs do not fully understand the mandate of MINUSMA and can only think about their fear of a blurring of lines and can therefore not always see the added value of working with this mission. By being completely open about the mandate, from the very beginning on, the UN can create more acceptance and respect for their stabilisation mission.

The second recommendation is related to the rotation speed of the UN personnel. There is an important difference in the length of employment between civil and military actors working for the UN. The high rotation speed amongst military actors creates sometimes confusion and irritation amongst civil actors, both working for the UN and for other civil organisations. Each time the new military employees have to adjust to the new situation, the circumstances and this specific mission. For civil employees this is often not their first mission and they also stay for a longer time period. It is recommended if military actors in the capital (where the living conditions for expats are quite high) would stay for a longer time as just six months and can do more missions in a row. This will reduce the time they need for integration in the mission and will improve their productivity and the coordination with other actors in the arena.

Another recommendation is about the involvement of the humanitarian community in an integrated mission. The interviewed humanitarian actors would like to be more influential to the extent of integration between the different UN entities. The strong partnerships between NGOs and UN agencies in the past have changed due to the current 'one UN approach'. Humanitarian principles become endangered due to the interweaving between political and humanitarian objectives. By giving humanitarian agencies more influence in the extent of integration, they will be more likely to continue the coordination with separate UN agencies and therefore guarantee a continuation of the humanitarian work after the stabilisation mission leaves. However, herewith the work of the humanitarian NGOs will become more politicized, which will influence again the humanitarian principles.

Finally, to create more sustainability of the work the actors are performing, it is recommendable to involve the International Private Sector more. The involvement of the International Private Sector lies on the crossroad between human and state security and could therefore form a link between the UN and humanitarian agencies in the arena. Especially in the field of (solar) energy and infrastructure, there is a huge terrain to win and much profit to be made. By involving the International Private Sector more from already the set-up from the mission on, they are more capable of shaping the arena in a way which is profitable from them. The involvement of local actors will also enhance a local appreciation for the mission and stimulate a continuation of the programs after the UN will leave.

During this research, some more questions arose. To gain more insight in the humanitarian arena and the influence of integrated missions, it is recommended to study the perceptions of the national people about the work the UN is doing in their country. By gathering more knowledge about the reception of the mission in a country, it would be possible to adapt the mission more to the needs. To gain more knowledge about the sustainability of the work a mission is doing, it is recommended to study the interests of the International Private Sector and public-private partnerships more. This will also give more insight in how the International Private Sector can support the humanitarian community in the process of giving aid during a crisis or disaster.

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9. APPENDIXES



9. APPENDIXES

A. HISTORICAL TIMELINE

Independence

1960	Mali gains independence from France. Keïta becomes president.
1968	President Keïta ousted in coup d'état by Moussa Traoré.
1968 – 1974	Period of extreme drought.
1991	Moussa Traoré is deposed by a military coup and replaced by a transitional committee. Amadou Touré becomes the interim president.
1992	First democratic elections. Alpha Konaré becomes Mali's first democratically-elected president.

Democracy

1995	Signing peace agreements with Tuareg rebels. This leads to the return of thousands of refugees.
2002	Konaré retires, Amadou Toumani Touré becomes president.

Rebellion

2006 – 2009	Period of unrest and rebellion. Many attacks (mainly in the northern part) and the involvement of Algeria in the conflict.
April 2007	President Touré wins a second five-year term in elections.
April 2010	Mali, Algeria, Mauritania and Niger set up a joint command to tackle down the threat of terrorism.

Terror challenge

March 22, 2012	Coup d'état; Touré is deposed.
March 2012	* ECOWAS and the AU suspend Mali. * Tuareg rebel groups capture large towns in northern Mali (Tinzawaten, Kidal, Gao & Timbuktu).
April 6, 2012	Tuareg rebels (MNLA) seize control of northern Mali & declare an independent state: Azawad.
April 2012	* ECOWAS imposes economic sanctions on Mali. * Military hand over to a civilian interim government, led by President Dioncounda Traoré.
Sept 2012	Interim President Traoré agrees to host an ECOWAS deployment of 3000 soldiers in Bamako. ECOWAS continues to wait for a UN mandate for military action.
Oct 2012	UNSC approves a resolution which request ECOWAS and the AU to present a plan for military intervention within 45 days.
Dec 2012	* Ceasefire is signed between Malian Officials, Ansar al-Dine and the MNLA. * UNSC authorized the deployment of AFISMA for the initial period of one year.


French intervention

Jan 11, 2013	* Start of Operation Serval. * UNSC announces its support for the France intervention and calls for support by a West African force as soon as possible.
Feb 2013	EU launches EUTM (European Union Training Mission in Mali).
April 2013	* France begins with withdrawal of their troops.

April 25, 2013	UNSC adopted Resolution 2100, in which was decided that MINUSMA would take over the duties of AFISMA, from July 1, 2013 onwards.
May 15, 2013	Donor conference in Brussels about Mali, four million dollar is pledged.
June 2013	* Government signs a peace deal with Tuareg rebels. * Presidential elections: Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta wins.
<u>MINUSMA mission</u>	
July 1, 2013	MINUSMA officially takes over from France and AFISMA.
Sept 2013	First fighting between the army and Tuareg rebels since the peace deal of June 2013.
Dec 12, 2013	Dutch Second Chamber agreed on joining the mission to Mali. The details of the Dutch deployment could be read in the 'Artikel 100 brief'. ³⁰²
Dec 2013	Parliamentary elections.
May 2014	Fragile ceasefire with MNLA breaks down in north. Terrorists seize control of Kidal city and four others towns in the north.
June 25, 2014	UNSC adopted Resolution 2164.
July 2014	Start of peace negotiations between the Malian government and Tuareg rebels in Algeria.
July 15, 2014	End of Operation Serval. Replaced by Operation Barkhane on August 1, 2014, to combat Islamic fighters in the entire Sahel region.
October 2014	Bert Koenders stopped in his function as SRSG. He is succeeded by Mongi Hamdi since December 2014.
<u>Increased violence</u>	
October 3, 2014	Nine UN peacekeepers killed in the north-east. Deadliest attack so far since the start of the mission.
October 23, 2014	First Ebola dead in the country.
January - March 2015	Several attacks from rebel groups to UN targets.
January 8, 2015	Prime Minister Moussa Mara resigned and in his wake the rest of the Cabinet followed. President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta appointed Modibo Keïta as the new Prime Minister. The reason for Mara's resign is not clear.
January 19, 2015	Mali is officially free of Ebola. In total there have been eight cases and six deaths.
January 21, 2015	MNLA immediately stopped the cooperation with MINUSMA, due to an attack to a MNLA vehicle a few days before.
February 20, 2015	Malian government and Tuareg rebels reach cease-fire.
March 6, 2015	Rebel attack on La Terrasse, expat restaurant in Bamako, five people died.
March 30, 2015	International Red Cross has temporary stopped all activities in the country, due to an attack to one of their trucks in the north.

³⁰² Rijksoverheid (2013), Artikel 100 brief Mali

B. CODING SYSTEM



C. TRANSLATED QUOTES

Number footnote	Dutch quote	English translation
1.	“Buiten alle inhoudelijke dingen is eigenlijk het allerbelangrijkste in dit land logistiek.”	“Except for all substantive things, actually the most important thing is logistics.”
2.	“Die Jihadisten in Noord-Mali, daar kan je van vinden wat je wil, maar die zijn wel in staat geweest om een aantal dingen voor de lokale bevolking te doen. Die hadden een politie die functioneerde, die hadden een redelijke mate van orde, die financierden allerlei jongeren groepen in de wijken in die steden om de stad schoon te houden. Die kochten ze om. Die hebben allerlei kleine pensioenregelingen voor mensen die een kind hebben verloren. Die maken voor de bevolking een verschil! Alleen ze zijn te ver gegaan met het handen afhakken, dat vinden de noord Malinezen niet zo fijn.”	“The Jihadist in north-Mali, you can think about them whatever you like, but they were able to do certain things for the local population. They had a functioning police with a certain degree of order, they financed youth groups in certain neighbourhoods to keep the city clean. They bribed them. They had a kind of small pension plan for people who lost a child. They made the difference for the population! They have only gone too far with cutting the hands off, the north Malians did not like that so much.”
3.	“Ik vind het zelf eigenlijk nogal een behoorlijk vage omschrijving. Wat is stabilisatie nu eigenlijk precies? Ik heb het in het verleden vaker dan eens bestudeerd, en dan dacht ik, oh is dat het? En dan was het eigenlijk zo vaag...”	“I think it is actually a quite vague description. What exactly is stabilisation? I have studied it more than once in the past, and I thought, oh is that it? And then it was actually so vague...”
4.	“De internationale gemeenschap kan niet teveel wachten. Je bent in een post-conflict land om het verschil te maken. Als je dat niet durft dan moet je naar huis gaan. Dan moet je niet hier in Bamako zitten met mooie workshops en mooie verhalen. Je moet ook durven! Je moet er naar toe gaan.”	“The international community cannot wait for too long. You are in a post-conflict country to make the difference. If you do not dare to do that, you have to go home. Then you shouldn't stay in Bamako with nice workshops and fancy stories. You have to dare! You have to go there.”
5.	“Wij zijn hier om de regering van Mali te helpen en de bevolking te beschermen.”	“We are here to support the government of Mali and to protect the population.”
6.	“Ik denk dat je niet statistisch kan onderbouwen dat het in Mali veiliger is geworden door MINUSMA.”	“I do not think you can statistically substantiate that it is safer in Mali due to the arrival of MINUSMA.”
7.	“In de praktijk blijkt dat een organisatie als World Food Program zich sterker identificeert met de NGO wereld en de hulporganisaties dan bijvoorbeeld met de militairen van MINUSMA. Terwijl ze allebei onderdeel van de VN zijn, maar zo zien ze dat gewoon zelf niet. Hun hele leven en hun hele ervaring is gebaseerd op dat zij onderdeel van de humanitarian community zijn en dus vanuit het idee van de humanitarian space een gebied benaderen.”	“In practice, it turns out that an organisation as World Food Program identifies themselves more strongly with the NGO-world and relief agencies as with the military from MINUSMA for example. Although they are both part of the UN, but they do not see it in this way. Their whole life and experience is based on that they are part of the humanitarian community and they approach a certain area based on the idea of the humanitarian space.”
8.	“VN organisaties zijn anders, de VN is echt een klasse apart. De VN is echt een multilateraal kanaal wat dus wel bepaalde rollen heeft, maar weer hele andere rollen als NGOs hebben. Totaal onvergelijkbaar. De VN is soms een donor, soms een advocate, soms een policy body, ligt helemaal aan wie je waar hebt.”	“UN organisations are different, the UN is truly a group apart. The UN is really a multilateral channel, they have certain roles, but very different roles as NGOs have. Totally incomparable. The UN is sometimes a donor, sometimes a lawyer, sometimes a policy body; it is entirely up to who you have in front of you.”

9.	"Informatie delen binnen verschillende takken van MINUSMA is nog niet zo makkelijk. Dat is nog een brug die geslagen moet worden."	"Sharing information between the different pillars of MINUSMA is not so easy. That is a bridge which still needs to be build."
10.	"Op de civiele afdeling werken mensen die al 20 jaar voor de VN allerlei verschillende functies en missies hebben gedaan. Voor militairen is dit vaak hun eerste VN missie en dan is het maar zes maanden. Dat wringt soms."	"At the civil pillar there are people working with sometimes already 20 years of UN experience in different functions and missions. For military people, this is often their first UN mission and it is only for six months. That causes frictions sometimes."
11.	"De Force is niet verantwoordelijk voor de deelnemende naties en de deelnemende individuen. Ik word persoonlijk als hoofd van een sectie geconfronteerd met mensen die opeens aan mijn bureau staan, daar moet ik het gewoon mee doen. En die blijken dan helemaal geen passende achtergrond te hebben. Dat is een VN probleem volgens mij. Mensen in New York bepalen wie er in de missie op welke stoel komt te zitten. In NAVO operaties zitten in principe mensen op een stoel die dat al jaren doen en weten wat ze aan het doen zijn. De CIMIC mensen in deze missie hebben meestal geen training en ervaring."	"The force pillar is not responsible for the participating nations and the participating individuals. As head of this section, I am personally confronted with people who are suddenly standing before my desk and I just have to deal with those people. And sometimes these people do not have a matching background. I think that is a UN problem. People in New York decide who gets which chair in the mission. In NAVO operations, basically only people with years of experience and knowledge are sitting on these chairs. The CIMIC people in this mission do not have any experience or training most of the time."
12.	"Voor mij persoonlijk zou het idealer zijn als ik personeel zou hebben dat precies weet wat het moet doen en wat het niet moet doen. Bijv. de discussie wat is CIMIC wel en wat is CIMIC niet."	"For me personally, it would have been better when I would have employees who exactly know what to do and what not to do. For example, the discussion about what is CIMIC and what is not CIMIC."
13.	"MINUSMA heeft drie poten: een civiele, een militaire en een politie. En die werken alle drie op hun manier mee binnen de missie, maar binnen hun eigen organisatie. En het is al heel moeilijk om die drie op elkaar af te stemmen. Daar hebben heel veel mensen al een volledige dagtaak aan."	"MINUSMA has three pillars: a civil, a military and a police. All three work within the mission in their own way, but within their own organisation. It is already quite difficult to adjust these three pillars together. A lot of people have a fulltime job in doing this."
14.	"Het is natuurlijk onwijs moeilijk om echt te integreren met een starre, hiërarchische jongensclub-cultuur als de militaire cultuur is. De mate waarin je echt kunt integreren is misschien ook..., daar zitten beperkingen op. Daar geloof ik heilig in."	"Of course it is very difficult to integrate with a rigid, hierarchical boys-club-culture as the military culture is. The extent to which you can really integrate is maybe also... there are restrictions on. I have a strong believe in that."
15.	"Mijn persoonlijke waarneming tot nu toe: het ontbreekt aan een duidelijke visie in mijn optiek. En als je die niet hebt, kan je hem ook niet delen. Dat is punt één. Punt twee is dat militairen en civiele mensen op een verschillende manier werken en ook op een verschillende manier tijdslijnen hebben. Een concreet en bekend voorbeeld is dat militairen begin 2014 volledig ontplooid moesten zijn, dat betekent: ze moeten allemaal ergens wonen, allemaal voldoende te eten hebben, ze moeten munitie hebben etc. Alleen de logistiek wordt uitgevoerd door civiele mensen, en die moeten pas begin 2015 op volledige sterkte zijn. Dat is een spanning. We hebben nu 100% van de	"My personal view until now: a clear vision is lacking. And if you do not have that, you can't share it. That is point one. Point two is that military and civil people work in different ways and also have different time schedules. A concrete and well-known example is that the military pillar had to be fully operational in the beginning of 2014, that means: they all had to live somewhere, have enough food, they needed to have ammunition etc. However, the logistics are conducted by civil people and these people had to be fully operational at the beginning of 2015. That causes friction. We need 100% of the stuff and they are only ready to deliver 100% of this stuff at the

	<p>spullen nodig en zij zijn er pas klaar voor begin 2015 om 100% van de spullen te leveren. Dat betekent voor ons dat er mensen honger hebben of geen bescherming of geen onderdak hebben of geen vluchten hebben. Dat is een tweede punt van niet goed geïntegreerd zijn. Het begint met een gezamenlijk plan wat gezamenlijk gedeeld wordt, dat is er niet of onvoldoende. En dan heb je de opbouw en de uitvoering van wat nodig is om dat plan tot stand te brengen en te realiseren. Dat loopt ook in een verschillend tempo. Dan heb je daarnaast ook nog de mind-set, de cultuur. Militairen hebben een heel andere werkcultuur dan burgers. Dat zie je aan verloven, werktijden. Die (burgers) hebben een andere sense of urgency.”</p>	<p>beginning of 2015. That means for us that some people will be hungry, do not have shelter or protection or no flights. That is a second point of not being integrated. It starts with a common plan which is shared jointly, which is however not yet there or insufficiently. And then you have the construction and implementation of what is needed to achieve and realize this plan. That also runs is a different speed. Besides, you also have the mind-set, the culture. Military have a very different work culture as citizens. You can see this in the permissions, the working hours. They (the citizens) have another sense of urgency.”</p>
16.	<p>“We zitten nog in de aanloop fase. Heel veel VN missies gaan na drie tot vijf jaar beter functioneren. De eerste drie jaar ben je nog ontzettend bezig met het opzetten van de minimale organisatie.”</p>	<p>“We are still in the start-up phase. A lot of UN missions are functioning better after three till five years. The first three years you are still very busy with setting up the minimal organisation.”</p>
17.	<p>“Wat we in het begin hebben gedaan, als je het mandaat van MINUSMA leest, dat is een beetje absurd. Alsof we hier het hele land gaan opbouwen en verbeteren. Op elk terrein moeten we wel iets doen volgens die veiligheidsresolutie. Super breed! Toen heeft Koenders gezegd: ‘ik wil vier topprioriteiten hebben’. En op die vier topprioriteiten zijn vier werkgroepen gecreëerd. Die worden voorgezeten door iemand van MINUSMA en iemand van een agency.”</p>	<p>“What we did in the beginning, if you read the mandate of MINUSMA, is a bit absurd. As if we are going to construct and improve the whole country. According to this security resolution, we have to do something in each field. So broad! Then Koenders said: ‘I want to have four key priorities’. And from these four key priorities four working groups are created. Those groups are headed by someone from MINUSMA and someone from an agency.”</p>
18.	<p>“Nou dat [civil affairs] vind ik ook een vage club moet ik zeggen. Ook omdat die naar mijn idee nogal snel op het terrein zitten van andere organisaties buiten MINUSMA.”</p>	<p>“I think the civil pillar is a little bit vague. Because to my opinion, they are quite quick working in the field of other organisations outside MINUSMA.”</p>
19.	<p>“Je hebt twee stromingen in de CIMIC wereld. Je hebt de mensen die een beetje de groene NGO in hun achterhoofd hebben: ‘we willen goede dingen doen voor de mensen’. Dat wil ik op zich ook, maar wij zijn een militaire instrument met een militaire doelstelling. En onze doelstelling is om anderen hun werk te kunnen laten doen, zodat wij onze handen vrij hebben voor andere dingen waar we wel voor zijn. En wij zijn er voor de veiligheid. En alles wat ons daarbij in de weg staat komt ons niet van pas en daarom willen we anderen ‘enablen’ om dat voor ons uit handen te nemen.”</p>	<p>“Within the CIMIC world, there are two schools. You have the people who have the ‘green NGO’ in mind: ‘we want to do good things for the people’. I also want that, but we are a military instrument with a military objective. Our objective is to enable other people to do their work, so that we have our hands free for others things where we came for. And we are here for safety. And everything that stands in our way is not useful and therefore we want to enable others to take this work out of our hands.”</p>
20.	<p>“Ik heb de analyse van een Franse onderzoeker gelezen, die heeft veel interviews gedaan met MINUSMA mensen en traditionele donoren, dus de ambassades; die vinden het soms wel irritant dat MINUSMA het land zo ineens binnenkomt en alles gaat voorzitten, terwijl zij al jarenlange ervaring hebben.”</p>	<p>“I have read the analysis of a French researcher who did a lot of interviews with MINUSMA people and traditional donors like the embassies; they think it is sometimes annoying that MINUSMA suddenly enters the country and takes the lead, while they have already years of experience.”</p>

21.	<p>"In zo'n grote missie is dat toch logisch [dat het mandaat door verschillende mensen binnen MINUSMA op een andere manier wordt uitgelegd]. Ik snap dat wel. Het is een missie met 14.000 mensen, iemand die heel dicht betrokken is bij het onderwerp die heeft een mening die wellicht wat meer gefocaliseerd is op zijn missie alleen en mensen die meer generalistisch kijken die plaatsen dat in perspectief en kijken daar wellicht iets anders tegenaan."</p>	<p>"In such a big mission it is logical [that the mandate is explained in different ways by different people]. I do understand that. It is a mission with 14.000 people, someone who is very closely involved in the subject has maybe an opinion which is more focalized on the mission only and people who have a more generalistic view are able to place this in perspective and have another view."</p>
22.	<p>"MINUSMA moet wat mij betreft gewoon de veiligheid garanderen. Dus die moeten ervoor zorgen dat je als NGOs de humanitarian space hebt om te opereren."</p>	<p>"According to my opinion, it is the task of MINUSMA to guarantee the safety. They have to make sure NGOs get the humanitarian space to operate."</p>
23.	<p>"Ik denk dat ze [MINUSMA] een beetje een doorn in het oog zijn voor veel dingen. Op dit moment is juist de associatie met alles wat MINUSMA is, is best wel negatief. En geassocieerd worden met MINUSMA werkt niet in ons voordeel. Dus het enige wat MINUSMA voor ons zou moeten doen, is zorgen dat het veilig is. Voor de rest verwacht ik niks bijzonders."</p>	<p>"I think she [MINUSMA] is a bit of a thorn in the eye for many things. At this moment, the association of everything what MINUSMA stands for is quite negative. And being associated with MINUSMA is not in our favour. So the only thing MINUSMA should do for us, is guarantee the safety. For the rest I do not expect anything special."</p>
24.	<p>"Het is inderdaad veelal ook onwetendheid. Die communicatie van MINUSMA kan ook wel iets verbeterd worden."</p>	<p>"There is indeed a lot of ignorance. The communication with MINUSMA could be improved a little bit."</p>
25.	<p>"Op de korte termijn kunnen ze [militairen] ook heel veel dingen voor elkaar krijgen. (...) Maar ik vind niet dat het de verantwoordelijkheid van de militairen is om duurzame ontwikkeling te geven. Zij zijn meer instrumenteel om daar een environment voor te creëren, maar ze moeten het niet zelf gaan doen. Het valt wel mee hoor, maar dat zie ik wel als een negatieve les van onze samenwerking in Afghanistan waar het een soort gemeentegoed is geworden. Waardoor alle militairen nu gaan denken: 'oh NGOs, al die projecten, dat kan ik ook zelf wel doen!' Dan denk ik: 'nee, doe het niet!' "</p>	<p>"On the short term, they [military] can get many things done. But I do not think it is the responsibility of the military to ensure sustainable development. They have a more instrumental role to create this environment, but they shouldn't do it themselves. It is not that bad though, but I see this as a negative lesson from our coordination in Afghanistan, where it became a kind of common property. So military start now thinking: 'oh NGOs, all those projects, I can do this myself!' And then I think: 'no, do not do this!' "</p>
26.	<p>"Geïntegreerde benadering: een plan waarin de te bereiken doelen op de gebieden veiligheid en stabiliteit, ontwikkeling en politieke processen duidelijk gedefinieerd zijn, waarin hun onderlinge samenhang duidelijk in kaart is gebracht en waarin deze doelen - in de tijd - duidelijk zijn vertaald naar concrete actie. MINUSMA faciliteert in de planning, maar het wordt duidelijk samen met de regering (en andere partners) opgelopen en uitgevoerd en er liggen duidelijke besluiten aan ten grondslag, zodat sprake is van ownership en comittment aan de zijde van de regering."</p>	<p>"Integrated approach: a plan in where the goals to achieve in the areas of security and stability, development and political processes, are defined clearly, in where their international relations are brought into chart clearly and in where the goals, in the current timeframe, are translated clearly into action. MINUSMA is facilitating the planning, but it is clearly linked and implemented with the government (and other partners) and clear decisions are lying at the basis, so that there is ownership and commitment on the side of the government."</p>
27.	<p>"De complexe problematiek in Mali vraagt om een geïntegreerde ('3D'-) benadering."</p>	<p>"The complex problems in Mali ask for an integrated ('3D'-) approach"</p>

28.	<p>"Waar ik juist om vraag is: waar is nu dat overkoepelende plan? Wie zegt nou hoe we van A naar B komen? Ik zou zo graag morgen een mailtje van je krijgen met: 'Ik heb hem gevonden hoor. Ik heb met Koenders gepraat en die zegt: die (X5) zit te lullen. Maar die is er gewoon hoor, hier is het: van A naar B.' Maar het mandaat is het niet, dat is niet wat ik bedoel. Dat is niet het abstractieniveau wat ik bedoel. Daar staan geen concrete doelen in, wat je op elke line of operations wil bereiken."</p>	<p>"Where I am asking for: where is the overarching plan? Who says how we can get from A to B? I would love to receive an email from you tomorrow which says: 'I found it! I talked to Koenders and he says: he (X5) is talking nonsense. But here it is: the plan from A to B.' But I do not mean the mandate. That is not the level of abstraction I mean. That does not contain concrete goals, what you will achieve on each line of operations."</p>
29.	<p>"Nou dat overkoepelende doel is er dus wel, want het mandaat is het overkoepelende doel van de missie. En er is ook een missie concept, dat is opgesteld door de UNCT, zij hebben opdracht gekregen om na te gaan denken over hoe zo'n missie eruit moet komen te zien en wat de doelen moeten zijn die aan de missie gesteld moeten worden. Daarnaast is er toen de mission concept eenmaal gemaakt was vanuit New York een team hierheen gestuurd om samen met de UNHCT een aantal plannen te maken, om een afgeleide daarvan te maken. Zodat het voor de verschillende poten in de missie: de civiele, de militaire en de politie poot, meer duidelijk zou moeten worden wat nu precies de gestelde doelen moeten worden. Dat hebben ze een 'concept of operations' genoemd. Dat bestaat voor de militairen, dat bestaat voor de politie en voor de civielen. Drie verschillende dingen die wel op elkaar zijn afgestemd. Terwijl ze dat gedaan hebben, hebben ze daarna gezegd: 'we moeten hier ook een club plaatsen die ervoor gaan zorgen dat het geïntegreerd wordt. Dat er een Integrated Strategic Framework komt, IFS'. Daar zijn mensen nog steeds druk mee aan het schijven, dus dat is er nog niet helemaal. Maar dat wil niet zeggen dat er nu helemaal niets is, dat is iets te overdreven. Maar ik ben het wel met (X5) en (X30 & X33) eens dat het heel prima zou zijn voor de missie om zo'n soort plan te hebben, dat zou wel fijn zijn. Maar om nu te zeggen dat er helemaal niets is, dat gaat me te ver."</p>	<p>"Well, the overarching campaign plan does exist, because the mandate is the overarching goal of the mission. There is also a mission concept, which is drafted by the UNCT, they got the instruction to think about how such a mission should be framed and which goals should be set. When the mission concept was framed, a team was sent from New York to here to develop some plans together with the UNHCT. So that it would become more clear for the individual pillars: civil, police and military, what the exact set goals have to do. They have called this a 'concept of operations'. Such a thing consists for military, for the police and for the civilians. Those three things are aligned. When they have done this, they also said: 'we need to have a certain club who can take care of the extent of integration. To make sure there becomes an Integrated Strategic Framework, IFS.' Till now, people are still busy on writing this, so it is not yet there. But that does not say there is nothing at all now, that's something too exaggerated. But I agree with (X5) and (X30 & X33) that it would be great for the mission to have such a plan. But to say that there is nothing now, that's not fair."</p>
30.	<p>"Het moet nog groeien."</p>	<p>"It needs to grow."</p>
31.	<p>"Maar wat zou je precies verwachten van een geïntegreerde missie? Ik zou bijvoorbeeld verwachten dat als er een intelligence unit wordt neergezet die van dienst moet zijn aan de civiele kant van de zaak, dat die dus ook onder civiel toezicht staat. Niet alleen toezicht, maar ook command, de hiërarchisch structuur. En dat er ook veel meer civielen inzitten bijvoorbeeld. Dit zijn alleen maar militairen. Ik vind dat helemaal niet geïntegreerd in die zin. Nee ik heb niet de indruk dat..., het ondersteunen van stabiliseringsprojecten bijvoorbeeld, waar ik het</p>	<p>"But what do you exactly expect from an integrated mission? I would expect for example that if there is an intelligence unit who needs to serve the civil pillar, that that unit will fall under civil guidance. Not only guidance, but also command and hierarchical structure. And that there would be more civil employees involved. In this sense, I do not think it is very integrated. No, I do not get the impression that..., supporting stabilisation programs for example, where I talked about before, that occurs very little in practice."</p>

	net over had, dat gebeurd in de praktijk ook heel weinig.”	
32.	<p>“Dat wil echter niet zeggen dat je taken moet overnemen. Het gaat om gezamenlijk optrekken, samen acties ondernemen. Gezamenlijk nadenken over hoe de QIPs moeten werken. Hoe zorg je ervoor dat je impact krijgt? Wat heb je daarvoor nodig? Welke visie heb je daarbij? Welke acties ga je gezamenlijk ondernemen en wie doet wat? Het is coördinatie maar je moet wel een gezamenlijk doel hebben, een gezamenlijke visie. En dan daarna gezamenlijk bepalen hoe het moet.”</p>	<p>“That does not mean you need to take over tasks. It is all about joint effort, taking steps together. Joint reflection on how QIPs should work. How do you ensure you get impact? What do you need? Which vision do you have? Which action can you take jointly and who does what? It is coordination but you need to have a common goal, a joint vision. And later on decide together how to implement.”</p>
33.	<p>“Ten eerste is er een groot verschil tussen hier in Bamako, het HQ, waar nog verschillende pilaren zijn, daar kunnen we het zo nog over hebben; en in Gao, on the ground. Ik denk dat het on the ground veel beter gaat dan hier in Bamako. Omdat mensen daar bij elkaar wonen, er is een veel kleinere schaal. Er is een tekort aan mensen en iedereen zit heel dicht bij elkaar.”</p>	<p>“First of all, there is an important difference between here in Bamako, the HQ, where there are various pillars, we can talk about that later; and in Gao, on the ground. I think it is going better on the ground as here in Bamako. Because there the people live more close together, there is a smaller scale. There is a shortage of people and everyone is very close.”</p>
34.	<p>“In Bamako is het niet makkelijk om echt geïntegreerd te werken. Ten eerste, wat mij opviel, een militaire structuur is een hiërarchische structuur. Als jij in een militaire structuur zit dan rapporteer je omhoog, naar je baas. Je krijgt orders van je baas. Terwijl geïntegreerd werken (op de werkvloer) meer horizontaal is. In de top is er wel veel integratie. Koenders spreekt bijna dagelijks met de Force Commander en de politie commandant en ze hebben ook echt wel een gedeeld idee over waar het heen moet. Maar om dat op de werkvloer ook te organiseren, dat is nog niet zo makkelijk. Dan zit je met een soldaat die informatie moet delen met iemand die hier bij een politieke of civiele sectie zit, die zegt: ‘nee ik rapporteer gewoon omhoog!’ (...) Zeker in veel Afrikaanse legers is de hiërarchie nogal sterk. Dan begrijp ik zo’n soldaat ook wel dat hij niet het risico wil lopen dat hij op zijn donder krijgt van zijn baas. Dat moet je dus als top heel goed organiseren.”</p>	<p>“In Bamako it is not easy to work integrated. First, what struck me was that a military structure is a very hierarchical structure. If you are in a military structure then you will report directly upwards to your boss. You get orders from your boss. While working integrated (on the work floor) is more horizontal. In the top of the mission there is a lot of integration. Koenders speaks almost daily with the Force Commander and the police commandant and they also have a joint idea of where they want to go to. But to organise this on the work floor is not so easy. There are soldiers who should share information with someone working in the police or civil pillar, and they say: ‘no I will report directly upwards!’ (...) Especially in many African armies the hierarchy is very strong. Then I do understand such a soldier who does not want to take the risk to get punished by his boss. So you have to organise this quite well.”</p>
35.	<p>“Alles wat nu in de geïntegreerde missie zit is VN. En is dus automatisch ook..., heeft een tintje militair. (...) Daar waar je normaal wel makkelijker met OCHA en alle blauwen VN samenwerkt; op het moment dat je naar het noorden gaat... kan dat nu niet meer. Dat zou sowieso al delicaat zijn, maar niet zo delicaat als dat het nu is. Het risico om verward te worden met het leger is te groot.”</p>	<p>“Everything what is part of the integrated mission is part of the UN. And therefore gets automatically..., a military touch. (...) Where you used to work together with OCHA and the blue UN; at the moment you go to the north..., that is not possible anymore. That would have been sensitive anyway, but not as sensitive as it is now. The risk of being confused with the army is too big.”</p>
36.	<p>“Sommige NGOs zijn heel erg opgevoed of geïndoctrineerd met het idee dat er een duidelijke scheidslijn moet zijn. Zij doen</p>	<p>“Some NGOs are educated or indoctrinated with the idea that there has to be a clear border. They are doing humanitarian things</p>

	humanitaire dingen en het leger doet zeg maar 'nare dingen'. Dat is een perceptie probleem."	and the army is doing 'bad things'. That is a perception problem."
37.	"En als NGO moet je ook een beetje ballen hebben, anders moet je hier niet zitten. Dan moet je maar lekker naar Nieuw-Zeeland gaan. Dat is part of the deal hier!"	"If you are an NGO you need to have some courage, otherwise you shouldn't be here. Then you can better go to New-Zealand. That is part of the deal here!"
38.	"In principe moet de lokale overheid betrokken worden en als die er niet zijn andere gezagsdragers. Dat is de instructie. En ik zie ook wel dat het regelmatig gebeurt. Ik zie gespreksverslagen met bijv. een imam, dat moet de intentie zijn. Wij zijn hier om de regering van Mali te helpen en de bevolking te beschermen. Samengevat. Bij die eerste taak heb je de overheid nodig. Wij zijn er om hen te helpen hun eigen volk te leiden en te helpen. Er moet als wij weggaan ook iemand achterblijven om het werk uit te voeren. Wij blijven hier maar tijdelijk."	"In principle, the local government should be involved, or in their absence other officials. That is the instruction. And I can see this happens regularly. I read reports from meetings with for example an imam, that has to be the intention. We are here to help the government of Mali and to protect the population. For the first task, you need the government. We are here to help them to lead and help their own people. There always has to stay someone to implement the work when we are gone. We only stay here temporarily."
39.	"Wij proberen altijd lokale structuren erbij te betrekken omdat wij altijd werken met de end-state in ons achterhoofd. (...) En in die hoedanigheid moeten wij altijd zorgen dat er iemand is die, als wij weggaan, klaar staat om de touwtjes in handen te nemen."	"We always try to involve the local structures because we always keep the end-state in mind. (...) And in this way we have to ensure that there is someone to take over when we leave."
40.	"Dan kijk je naar welk gezagsstructuren er wel zijn. In veel maatschappijen heb je dan bijv. een dorpsoudste of een imam die veel macht heeft. En dan kan je wel zeggen: 'volgens onze hoogstaande democratische principes is dat niet goed genoeg', maar als we daar geen zaken mee doen, met wie dan wel? We moeten met iemand zaken doen. En als die persoon gedragen wordt door zijn gemeenschap, nou ja, het is hun leven, hun gemeenschap."	"Then you check which authority structures there are. In many societies there is for example a village chief or imam with a lot of power. And then you can say: 'according to our high democratic principles that is not good enough', but if we do not negotiate with them, with who else? We have to negotiate with someone. And if that person is accepted by the community, well, it is their live, their community."
41.	"Er schijnen hier ook een aantal islamitische organisaties actief te zijn, die hebben zich niet aangesloten bij het OCHA systeem. Althans, niet allemaal. Ik kom ze nooit tegen, ik weet dat ze actief zijn, maar ze zijn helemaal zelfstandig. Ze gebruiken eigen netwerken en eigen kanalen. Dat is jammer, maar aan de andere kant zullen ze zich nooit conformeren aan internationale gedragsregels of codes."	"There seems to be a number of active Islamic organisations here, who have not joined the OCHA system. Although, not all of them. I never meet them, I know they are active but they are totally independent. They use their own networks and channels. That is a pity, but on the other hand, they will never conform to international rules or codes."
42.	"Iedereen heeft zijn eigen verantwoordelijkheden. En als je elkaar kan helpen of nodig hebt zoek je toch contact."	"Everybody has its own responsibilities. And when you are able to help each other or need something, you can get in contact."
43.	"Moet dat einddoel 100% op elkaar liggen? Nee dat hoeft helemaal niet. (...) Natuurlijk zijn het verschillende mandaten, en zeker van NGOs, dat hebben we absoluut niet in de hand. Een NGO heeft een bepaalde organisatie achter zich staan, een bepaalde ideologie. En die ideologie hoeft niet altijd te corresponderen met de actie die militairen uitvoeren."	"Does the end goal have to correspond for 100%? No that is not necessary. (...) Of course there are different mandates, and especially NGOs, we do not have control over them. An NGO has a particular organisation behind him, with a certain ideology. And that ideology does not always have to correspond with the actions of the military."

44.	<p>"OCHA is VN. Alles wat nu in de geïntegreerde missie zit is VN. En is dus automatisch ook..., heeft een tintje militair. Wij zijn echt een onafhankelijk internationale organisatie."</p>	<p>"OCHA is the UN. Everything what is part of the integrated mission is part of the UN. And therefore gets automatically..., a military touch. We are really an independent international organisation."</p>
45.	<p>"Veelal kiezen NGOs voor een 'acceptance model', waarin ze de sympathie en respect kunnen verwerven van de bevolking, mede door het respect en sympathie die zij opbrengen voor hun leef -en werkomgeving. Dat is ook broodnodig voor het contact met de bevolking en de beneficiaries. Je kan namelijk niet met gewapende escorte aankomen en hopen dat je de kinderen onder 5 jaar gaat kunnen vaccineren. De UN en zeker de blauwhelmen opteren eerder voor een 'protection' model en ook deterrence (de modus operandi van elk leger)."</p>	<p>"NGOs choose mainly for an 'acceptance model', in where they can acquire the sympathy and respect of the population, partly by the respect and sympathy they fetch for their living- and working environment. That is also highly necessary for the contact with the population and the beneficiaries. You cannot arrive with armed escort and hope you can vaccinate children under 5 years old. The UN and especially the blue helmets definitely prefer a 'protection model' and deterrence (modus operandi of each military contingent)."</p>
46.	<p>"De concurrentie tussen verschillende NGOs is niet anders in Mali dan elders. Het zijn concullega's. In veiligheid gaan ze waarschijnlijk allemaal zeer solidair zijn, in netwerking ook. Maar soms spelen de donors ook spelletjes: 'Hallo wie wil er naar Gao gaan? Ha, jij niet, dan kan ik het aan de andere vragen.' Als er maar één budget is en er zijn vijf NGOs, dan wordt er inderdaad soms een beetje..., niet geconcurrereerd, maar wel..., iedereen kijkt naar elkaar. Zijn er andere mensen die ook een project voorstel maken? En wie zijn die mensen? Maar het is niet dat ze belangrijke informatie over veiligheid achterhouden."</p>	<p>"The competition between the several NGOs is in Mali not different from somewhere else. They are 'concullega's. They will all be solidary when talking about safety and networking. But the donors are also playing games sometimes: 'Hello, who wants to go to Gao? You do not? Oke then I can ask someone else.' If there is only one budget and there are five NGOs, then there is sometime a little bit..., not competition but..., everybody is looking to each other. Are there also people who are writing another project proposal? And who are these people? But they do not keep the important information about security behind."</p>
47.	<p>"Ik kan eigenlijk alleen maar voordelen noemen. Ja. Het helpt in alles zeg maar. We zouden het veel meer moeten doen. Maar zodra er geld in het spel komt is het veel moeilijker om te coördineren."</p>	<p>"I think I can only mention advantages. Yes. It helps in everything. We should do it a lot more. But as soon as there is money involved in the game it becomes much more difficult to coordinate."</p>
48.	<p>"Wij bieden niet actief onze hulp aan, want voor onze eigen taken hebben we al schrikbarend weinig middelen en mankracht."</p>	<p>"We do not offer our help in an active way, because already for our own tasks we have shockingly few resources and manpower."</p>
49.	<p>"CIMIC werk is ontstaan uit een noodzaak. Omdat een militaire macht in een bepaald gebied vaak de enige macht was, werd zij met allerlei problemen van de bevolking geconfronteerd. Die ze er dan maar op hun bordje bij kregen, omdat er verder niemand (meer) was. Vanuit die noodzaak is CIMIC geboren en CIMIC heeft vooral tot doel om alle niet-militaire taken die bij het leger terecht komen, daar vandaan te houden of ze zo goed mogelijk uit te voeren. Dat betekent: kijken of er anderen zijn in het gebied, civiele overheden of andere instanties, die de niet-militaire taken in plaats van het leger kunnen uitvoeren. En zo de noden van de bevolking te ledigen. Want een leger is er om zo nodig te vechten en wil daar</p>	<p>"CIMIC work arose from a need. Because military power was in certain areas often the only power, and became therefore confronted with various problems of the population. They just had to deal with these problems, because there was no one else left (anymore). From this need CIMIC was born and CIMIC mainly has the aim to keep all the non-military tasks away from the army or to perform them as good as possible. That means: looking at whether there are others in a certain area, civil authorities or other institutes, who can conduct these non-military tasks instead of the army. And so to meet the needs of the population. Because an army is there to fight if necessary and they want to be able to focus</p>

	<p>zijn aandacht op kunnen richten. Maar hoe gaat het in het echt? Als er ergens iemand is die de verantwoordelijkheid op zich neemt, dan gaat iedereen daarnaar toe. En zo krijg je als leger dan ook ineens de verantwoordelijkheid over riolering, water, elektriciteit, ziekenhuizen etc. Daar heeft het leger geen tijd voor en ook niet de capaciteit en het geld. De bedoeling van CIMIC is om dat soort zaken bij het leger weg te houden en om anderen dat te laten doen. Anderen die er eigenlijk verantwoordelijk voor zijn.”</p>	<p>on this. But how does it work in real life? If there is someone who takes the responsibility in a certain area, then everybody will go to this person. And in this way the army can suddenly get the responsibility for sewerage, water, electricity, hospitals etc. But the army does not have time for this, nor the money or the capacity. The purpose of CIMIC is to keep those tasks away from the army and to enable others to do it. Others who are actually responsible for it.”</p>
50.	<p>“Kijk we hebben eenheden en als die in een gebied komen, dan leggen ze contacten met de plaatselijke bevolking. En dan geven ze aan, we hebben een medisch team bij ons, we hebben een genie team bij ons, dus als we iets voor jullie kunnen doen... We kunnen dus bijvoorbeeld een huisartsenpost neerzetten en gratis medische consulten bieden aan de bevolking. Dat is geen development, maar een soort noodhulp. Het gaat niet op basis van een humanitarian assesment, het is puur: wij zijn nu in dit gebied, er is vast wel ergens hier een wijk waar mensen zo arm zijn dat ze niet naar en huisarts gaan en geen medicijnen kunnen betalen, terwijl er natuurlijk ongetwijfeld ook zieke mensen rondlopen. Vorige week is hier in Bamako zo’n activiteit geweest. Dan denk je, nou in Bamako, is dat wel nodig? Dat heeft toch genoeg artsen, ziekenhuizen en klinieken? Ja. Maar er zijn hier heel veel wijken waar mensen zo arm zijn dat ze in principe niet naar een dokter gaan en geen medicijnen kunnen betalen.”</p>	<p>“Look, we have units and when they enter an area, they make contact with the local population. And then they indicate, we have medical team with us, we have an engineer team with us, so if we can do something for you... We can for example set up a GP station and provide free medical consultations for the population. That is no development, but a kind of emergency aid. It is not based on a humanitarian assessment, but more: we are now in this area, there is probably a neighbourhood where people are so poor that they can't go to a doctor and can't pay medicines, while there are undoubtedly sick people around. Last week there has been such an activity in Bamako. Then you think, well, is that necessary in Bamako? That city must have enough doctors, hospitals and clinics. Yes. But there are so many neighbourhoods here where people are so poor that they can't go to a doctor and can't effort medicines.”</p>
51.	<p>“Wat humanitarians doen is prachtig, maar die kunnen niet overal zijn. En die zijn zeker niet hier in Bamako met dat soort dingen.”</p>	<p>“What humanitarians are doing is great, but they can't be present everywhere. And they are certainly not here in Bamako with things like that.”</p>
52.	<p>“Het gevolg is dus dat die militaire eenheid nooit meer een voorstel heeft gedaan. Terwijl er heel veel werk ligt. Maar die denken: ‘wij al het werk doen, en dan gaat de NGO ermee vandoor’. Daar moeten we nog een oplossing voor bedenken, dat zij... want we hebben heel veel waterprojecten behoeftes geïdentificeerd waar hulp nodig is. Maar het moet dus niet zo zijn dat wij al het voorwerk doen en dat dan de humanitarian agency zegt: ‘nou bedankt, wij gaan het werk wel oppikken’.”</p>	<p>“The consequence is that this military unit never made a proposal anymore. While there is still a lot of work to do. But they think: ‘we did all the work, and the NGOs takes it all’. We still need to devise a solution for that, that they... because we have identified a lot of needs for water projects. But it cannot be like that we do all the preparation work and that the humanitarian agency then says: ‘well thanks, we will implement this project further’.”</p>
53.	<p>“Misschien hadden zij dit heel graag willen doen en hadden ze er veel tijd en energie in gestoken, maar hadden zij niet het vertrekpunt dat wij dingen als last resort doen. Je zou in hun plaats ook kunnen denken: ‘fijn, wij hebben iets nuttigs aangeleverd, iemand anders gaat het doen, dus wij kunnen weer iets anders met onze</p>	<p>“Maybe they wanted to do this job very much and they had invested a lot of time and energy in it, but they did not have the idea that we do things as a last resort. In their place you could also think: ‘fine, we have provided something useful, someone else is going to implement it, so we can do something else again with our</p>

	energie gaan doen.' En intussen wordt het probleem wel opgelost! (...) Ik probeerde uit te leggen dat CIMIC er is om te coördineren en bewerkstelligen dat anderen het werk doen dat nodig is. Als het is zoals jij beschrijft, dat anderen hebben bedacht: 'dit is nuttig en dit is nodig, wij gaan dit doen'... Dat is juist perfect! Dat scheelt ons tijd, energie en geld."	energy.' And in the meantime the problem is solved! (...) I tried to explain that CIMIC is there to coordinate and to ensure that others do the required work. If the situation is like you just described, and that others have thought: 'this is useful and necessary, we are going to do this'... that is perfect! That saves us time, energy and money."
54.	"Civiel militaire coöperatie, dat is eigenlijk als militairen civiel getinte dingen doen. Soms met NGOs, soms met eigen geld en eigen uitvoering; om de missie die ze uit voeren te ondersteunen. Belangrijk bij CIMIC is dat onze missie daarin centraal staat. Dus het draagvlak bij de bevolking voor de missie staat centraal."	"Civil military cooperation, that is when military are doing civil things. Sometimes with the help of NGOs, sometimes with their own money and implementing efforts; to support the mission. Important for CIMIC is that our mission is key. So the support base from the population for the mission comes first."
55.	"Nou ik ben wel voor een goede scheiding tussen het humanitaire en de ontwikkeling en de militairen. (...) Je moet die dingen niet uit een militaire motivatie doen. Dat vind ik niet zuiver."	"Well, I am in favor for a clear separation between the humanitarian and the development of the military. (...) One cannot do things from a military motivation. I think that is not fair."
56.	"Ik vind dat er teveel belang wordt gehecht aan de civiel-militair samenwerking."	"I think too much importance is given to civil-military coordination."
57.	"Het is gewoon goed is dat verschillende partijen verschillende verantwoordelijkheden hebben. Ik vind niet dat het de verantwoordelijkheid van de militairen is om duurzame ontwikkeling te geven. Zij zijn meer instrumenteel om daar een environment voor te creëren, maar ze moeten het niet zelf gaan doen. Het valt wel mee hoor, maar dat zie ik wel als een negatieve les van onze samenwerking in Afghanistan waar het een soort gemeentegoed is geworden."	"It is just good that different actors have different responsibilities. I think it is not the responsibility of the military to create a sustainable development. They have a more instrumental role to create this environment, but they shouldn't do it themselves. It is not that bad though, but I see this as a negative lesson from our coordination in Afghanistan, where it became a kind of common property."
58.	"De militairen die hier zitten die zeggen: 'we kunnen nergens gebruik van maken. Er is geen geld, terwijl we allerlei behoeftes zien'. Toen zei ik: 'maar het is niet aan jullie om dat te doen, die behoeften moeten door andere organisaties worden ingevuld.' "	"The military who are present here say: 'we cannot make use of anything. There is no money, while we see a lot of needs.' Then I said: 'but it is not your task to do that, those needs have to be fulfilled by other organisations.' "
59.	"Maar ze deden die geneeskunde ook om informatie te krijgen, intelligence. Of, en daar zijn bewijzen van: 'Jij krijgt een tuberculose behandeling maar eerst ga je zeggen wat je weet. Anders krijg je die behandeling niet!' Dat zijn dingen die gebeurd zijn. En ongetwijfeld wat je gezien hebt twee maanden geleden: Obama heeft verklaard dat het Amerikaanse leger moet stoppen met humanitaire hulp onder voorwaarden. Dus als Obama dat beslist, twee maanden geleden, dan wil dat zeggen dat ze dat daardoor wel deden."	"But they provided that healthcare also to obtain information, intelligence or, and there is evidence of: 'you will get a tuberculosis treatment but first you are going to say what you know! Otherwise you do not get this treatment!' These things have happened. And maybe you have heard this two months ago: Obama has declared that the US military should stop with giving humanitarian aid under certain conditions. So if Obama has decided that two months ago, then that means that they did do this before."
60.	"Het wordt een ingewikkeld kluwen als militaire samenwerking zich ook gaat bezig houden met zaken waar ook NGOs zich mee bezig houden. Militairen trekken zich terug. NGOs doen dat	"It becomes a complicated tangle when military cooperation will also become involved in cases where NGOs are also involved in. Military troops withdraw. NGOs do not do

	niet. (...) Dus, ik zelf persoonlijk, vind dat iedereen op zijn terrein moet blijven.”	that. (...) So, I personally think that everybody has to stay in his own field.”
61.	“Liaison komt gewoon neer op verbindingen en contacten onderhouden. Liaison is contact hebben en coördineren gaat iets verder. Dat gaat uit van partijen die met elkaar samen dingen willen doen, maar sommige partijen willen dat helemaal niet. Sommige mensen willen zich niet laten coördineren. Het begint dus met liaison en met sommige partijen kan dat leiden tot coördinatie, of iets anders, coöperatie bijvoorbeeld. Er zijn stappen van elkaar gedogen tot aan innig met elkaar samenwerken. Dat heeft allemaal een ander woord: co-existentie, coördinatie, coöperatie. Allemaal woorden tussen elkaar gedogen, van elkaars aanwezigheid op de hoogte zijn tot innig verstrengeld samen iets doen.”	“Liaison refers to the maintenance of linkages and contacts. Liaison is having contact while coordination goes a step further. That assumes that some actors want to do things together; but some actors do not want to do that at all. Some people do not want to be coordinated. It starts with liaison and for some actors that can lead to coordination, or something like cooperation. There are steps from tolerating each other till intimate interaction. That all has another word: co-existence, coordination, cooperation. All words between tolerating each other till being aware of each other’s presence till doing together something in very close contact.”
62.	“Ik ga elke week naar OCHA en daar overleggen we dus. En daarnaast hebben we elke week ook nog drie of vier keer contact met OCHA, over allerlei lopende problemen en kleine aangelegenheden die spelen. Dan proberen we dus aan de NGO wereld, of aan de humanitarians duidelijk te maken wat dus vanuit MINUSMA, dus vanuit de militaire kant, gebeurt, en waarom het gebeurt en <u>dat</u> het gebeurt. Maar aan de andere kant willen wij ook van de humanitarians weten waarom zij bepaalde dingen doen en hoe zij omgaan met bepaalde situaties. We informeren elkaar over, vooral het transport van konvooien, voertuigen en personen. Dat moet allemaal worden gecoördineerd en afgestemd.”	“I go to OCHA every week and there we discuss. And besides, every week we have about three or four times contact with OCHA, about all kind of ongoing problems and small affairs. We try to clarify to the NGO world or to the humanitarians, what is happening within MINUSMA, the military pillar and why that is happening and <u>that</u> it is happening. But on the other side, we also want to know from humanitarians why they do certain things and how they deal with certain situations. We inform each other about issues, mainly relating to the transport of convoys, goods and persons. And that all has to be coordinated and matched.”
63.	“Wij accepteren in principe geen escort, zeker ook geen militaire escort. Omdat je dan veel meer een target zou kunnen zijn, dan als je dat niet doet.”	“In principle we do not accept escort, and especially no military escort. Because than you become even more a target as when you do not do it.”
64.	“Afhankelijk van de capaciteit die we hebben wordt dat verzoek gehonoreerd. Hier in Mali is de capaciteit schaars, dus daarom is het system gekomen dat wij escorte konvooien organiseren; wij delen mensen mee wanneer die zijn en dan kunnen ze daar in aanhaken. Zij moeten een week van te voren aan geven dat ze naar een bepaald gebied willen, dan kijken wij of er al een escorte naartoe gaat of dat er een escorte te organiseren is. En is het antwoord op een van die vragen ‘ja’, dan kan dat. Maar als er geen escorte is en er geen troepen beschikbaar zijn om die mensen te begeleiden en er wordt ook geen order gegeven ‘verschuif je prioriteiten als legermacht, want dit is heel belangrijk’, dan kan het niet doorgaan.”	“Depending on the capacity we have, we accept the request. Here in Mali the capacity is scarce, so that’s why we introduced the system of organising escorted convoys; we tell people when these convoys are taking place, and then they can join. They have to inform us a week before that they want to go to a certain area, and then we check if there is already a convoy going to that place or if we can organise a convoy. And if they answer to one of those questions is ‘yes’, then it is possible. But if there is no escort already planned and there are no troops available to guide those people and we do not get the command ‘change you priorities as a military force because this is really important’, then it is not gonna happen.”
65.	“Alle civiele onderdelen van MINUSMA zijn in bepaalde gebieden verplicht te reizen met	“All civil parts from MINUSMA are obliged to travel with military escort in certain areas. I

	gewapende escorte. Ik denk dat dit ook voor VN organisaties geldt. VN organisaties maken gebruik van een bepaald veiligheidssysteem. Voor elk gebied geldt een bepaalde veiligheidscodes en voor elke code zijn bepaalde minimum eisen. Bijv. draag een helm of een schermvest, of u kunt zich alleen verplaatsen in een gepantserd voertuig of alleen via de lucht. Of u kunt zich alleen verplaatsen met een gewapende escort. Dat is voor organisaties van de VN dan gewoon verplicht, anders krijgen ze geen toestemming om daar heen te gaan."	think this also applies for UN agencies. UN agencies make use of a certain security system. For each geographical area there are certain security codes and for each code there are certain minimal requirements. For example, wear a helmet or a vest, or you can only travel in an armed vehicle or just through the air. Or you can only move with armed escort. That is for organisations within the UN obligatory, otherwise they do not get the permission to go to those places."
66.	"Dat is een bij-effect. Dat is niet alleen waar we het om doen. Projecten en andere activiteiten moeten onze missie ondersteunen. Dat kan op allerlei manieren zijn en om allerlei redenen. Natuurlijk proberen wij daarmee ons imago te versterken omdat dat goed is voor de missie die we hier doen. Dat is goed voor onze veiligheid en voor onze bewegingsvrijheid. En voor het draagvlak voor de regering hier, want dat is ook onze missie hier: de bevolking beschermen en de regering ondersteunen."	"That is a side effect. That is not the reason why we do it. Projects and other activities need to support our mission. That can be for several reasons and in several ways. Of course we try to strengthen our image with it, because that is good for the mission we implement here. That is good for our safety and our freedom of movement. But also for the acceptance for the government here, because that is also our mission here: to protect the population and support the government."
67.	"Alle afdelingen van MINUSMA, niet alleen de militaire, want dat is maar een deel van MINUSMA, maar ook alle civiele afdelingen, die kunnen voorstellen doen, projectvoorstellen, om financiering te krijgen voor een project. Dat zijn de zogenaamde Quick-Impact-Projects."	"All departments of MINUSMA, not only the military, because that is just one part of MINUSMA, but also the civil departments of MINUSMA can hand in proposals, project proposals, to get finance for a projects. That are the so called Quick-Impact-Projects."
68.	"Volgens mij zijn de QIPs niet bedoeld om Heart & Minds te winnen maar meer om vredesdividend te creëren. Dus als je ergens binnen komt, bijv. in Afghanistan, dat je dan de impact gaat vergroten en dat je dan vrij snel op het moment dat je iets stabiliseert, dat je dan met die projecten daar achteraan komt om te zorgen dat er veiligheid en ontwikkeling komt. Het is een soort kip en ei verhaal. Leidt meer veiligheid tot meer ontwikkeling of heb je eerst meer ontwikkeling nodig om te zorgen dat er meer veiligheid komt?"	"I think the QIPs are not meant to win the Hearts & Minds of the population, but to create peace dividend. So when you arrive at a certain place, for example in Afghanistan, you try to enhance the impact and at the moment you stabilise something, you start with those projects to make sure that there will be safety and development. It is a kind of chicken and egg situation. Does more safety lead to more development or do you need development first to make sure there will be safety?"
69.	"Maar QIPs zijn niet Hearts & Minds. Officieel moet je daar een verschil in maken. Nee ze zijn wel bedoeld uiteindelijk voor Hearts & Minds. Maar je hebt ook echt projecten die echt bedoeld zijn voor Hearts & Minds."	"But QIPs are not the same as Hearts & Minds. Officially you need to make a distinction between them. No, at the end they are intended for the Hearts & Minds. But you also have projects who are actually meant for Hearts & Minds."
70.	"Als militair wil je effectief zijn in zo'n omgeving, dan is het soms ook fijn om niet alleen maar informatie te vragen maar ook iets terug te kunnen geven. Dus ik ben bezig met een soort Hearts & Minds fonds. Daar hebben we veel discussie over: wat is Hearts & Minds precies en wanneer gaan zij dingen doen die ze eigenlijk niet moeten doen? (...) Ik zie ook wel dat het goed is als zij een keertje komen en ze zien een	"As a military, you want to be effective in such a situation, so sometimes it is nice to not only ask for information but to be able to do something back. So I am now developing a kind of Hearts & Minds fund. We have a lot of discussions about it: what are Hearts & Minds exactly and when are they gonna do things which they shouldn't do? (...) I can see it is good that they sometimes notice that the

	speeltuin die een likje verf nodig heeft, dat zij dan kunnen zeggen: hier heb je een paar potten verf. Dan doe je iets terug voor de community zonder dat je meteen..."	playground need a coat of paint and that they then can say: here you have some pots of paint. Then you do something back for the community without immediately..."
71.	"Hoe formuleer je de criteria zo dat het gewoon duidelijk is dat het doel hearts & minds is? Het doel is niet ontwikkeling. Natuurlijk moet het wel iets bijdragen aan het verbeteren van de leefomstandigheden..., maar het is echt een korte termijn project. Om te accepteren dat de militairen er zijn. En dat ze niet worden gezien als een soort vrijbuiters die alleen informatie ophalen."	"How do you formulate the criteria as such that it is immediately clear what the goal of hearts and minds is? The goal is not development. Of course you need to contribute something to the living conditions..., but it is really a short-term project. To accept that the military are here. And that they are not seen as a kind of freebooters who are only here to collect information."
72.	"Nu begrijpen we elkaar steeds beter. Je moet in elkaar investeren om te begrijpen waar het vandaan komt."	"Now we understand each other better and better. You need to invest in each other to understand where it comes from."
73.	"In een geïntegreerde missie is een groot deel van die coördinatie toebedeeld aan civiele organisaties, civiele spelers, in dit geval civiele spelers binnen MINUSMA."	"In an integrated mission a large part of the coordination is assigned to civil organisations, civil players, in this situation civil players within MINUSMA."
74.	"Je kunt je afvragen, hoezo hebben we eigenlijk CIMIC nodig? In de VN missie hebben we gewoon civiele afdelingen, die doen field visits, die gaan naar dorp X. Als het heel gevaarlijk is, dan doen ze dat met protectie van het leger, van de force. Als ze dat doen, waarom zou je dan CIMIC nodig hebben? Dat is eigenlijk hetzelfde, het verschil is alleen dat het leger het helemaal zelf doet. Het militaire gedeelte doet het helemaal zelf." "Maar je kan de aanwezige NGOs die er al zijn compleet negeren?" "Nee ik bedoel het tegenovergestelde, je moet ze helemaal niet negeren, je moet zelf niks doen. Als je namelijk als militairen in de CIMIC hoek gaat zitten, in feit ga je dan een concurrentie aan met wat er al is, en dat moet je dus eigenlijk ook niet willen."	"You can ask yourself, why do we need CIMIC? In the UN mission we just have civil departments who do field visits, they go to village X. When it is really dangerous, then they do those visits with the protection of the army, of the force. If they do that, why would they need CIMIC? That is actually the same, the only difference is that the army is doing it all by themselves. The military part is doing it all by their self." "But can you ignore the already present NGOs totally?" "No, I mean the opposite, you do not have to ignore them, but you should not do anything yourself. When there are military working in the CIMIC corner, actually you start a competition with something which is already there, so you should do this."
75.	"De UN agencies doen op hun terrein hun eigen ding, MINUSMA doet op zijn terrein hun eigen ding, maar in het midden is er overlap. Daar zijn ook de vier topprioriteiten voor opgesteld. Voor dit gebied hebben ze een gezamenlijke strategie ontwikkeld. Dat is een flink proces geweest, om te proberen om de mensen te laten samenwerken."	"The UN agencies are doing their own thing on their own field, MINUSMA is doing their own thing on their own field, but in the middle there is some overlap. Therefore, four top priorities are established. For this area they designed a common strategy. That was quite a process, to try to get the people together."
76.	"Kijk, dus we doen niet alles samen. UNICEF bijv. heeft ook gewoon zijn eigen dingen, maar op de onderwerpen waarop we wel raakvlakken hebben, daar is dus dit gezamenlijk plan voor."	"Well, we do not do everything together. UNICEF for example does their own things, but on the themes where there is overlap, we design a common plan."
77.	"Waar is nu dat overkoepelende plan? Wie zegt nou hoe we van A naar B komen?"	"Where is that overarching plan? Who explains how we have to go from A to B?"
78.	"Ik verwacht niet dat er grote veranderingen zullen optreden. De les die hier geleerd wordt kan gebruikt worden voor andere missies in de toekomst hoop ik. Maar ik denk dat het heel	"I do not expect that major changes will occur. The lesson we learned here can be used for other missions in the future, I hope. But I think it is very difficult to change the

	<p>moeilijk is om het schip te kantelen. Behalve als er echt ander management komt, dat iemand een nieuwe start kan maken. (...) Of als er iets positiefs uit de onderhandelingen komt, maar daar geloof ik ook niet zo in. Ik denk dat het heel erg overschat is wat daar allemaal gebeurt. Ik denk dat dat uiteindelijk niet echt gaat leiden tot een enorme veranderingen van het land. Ik geloof gewoon wat minder in de maakbaarheid van de samenleving. Ik geloof dat je niet zo heel veel kan veranderen. Je kan het wel iets stabiel krijgen en dat zou mooi zijn al."</p>	<p>current direction. Unless there will be a real change in management, if somebody will make a new start (...) Or when some positive things will result from the negotiations, but I do not really believe in that. I think it is really overrated what is happening there. I do not think that will lead to enormous changes in the country. I do not not really believe in the malleability of the society. I believe you cannot really change much. You can create some more stability and that would already be very nice."</p>
79.	<p>"Wij als Nederland pushen vaak dat MINUSMA een overkoepelend plan moet hebben. Daarmee impliciet zeggend dat als je een plan hebt, dat dan de (geïntegreerde) uitwerking daarvan wel goed zal komen. Dat is volgens mij teveel 'maakbaarheid van de samenleving'."</p>	<p>"We as the Netherlands often push that MINUSMA needs a more overarching plan. Implicitly, we thus say that if there is a plan, the (integrated) implementation thereof will be fine. I think that is too much a malleability of the society."</p>
80.	<p>"Als je kan kiezen tussen Senegal en Mali dan weet je het wel. Dan is de keus snel gemaakt. De slaag- en winst kansen liggen beduidend hoger in Senegal dan in Mali."</p>	<p>"When you can choose between Senegal and Mali the choice can be made easily. The success and profit opportunities are significantly higher in Senegal than in Mali."</p>