MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PROCESSES, SERVICE DELIVERY AND STATE INSTITUTIONS

Service Provision and the Legitimacy of State Institutions in Situations of Conflict and Fragility

*Experiences from Burundi, DR Congo, Nepal and the Palestinian Territories*

SYNTHESIS REPORT

Nora Stel, Diederik de Boer and Dorothea Hilhorst

With Gemma van der Haar, Irna van der Molen, Nynke Douma and Riti Herman Mostert

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Children fetching water at a rehabilitated water point in Buhinyuza – Burundi (picture taken by Nora Stel)

Working group: MSPs, service delivery and state institutions

Sustainable Development Center, Maastricht School of Management

Diederik de Boer; Nora Stel; Huub Mudde; Mina Noor

Disaster Studies, Wageningen University

Dorothea Hilhorst; Gemma van der Haar; Nynke Douma; Riti Herman Mostert

Centre for Conflict Studies, Utrecht University

Irna van der Molen

Oxfam Novib

Jogien Bakker; Liesbeth van der Hoogte

Conflict Research Unit, Clingendael Institute

Christine van Empel; Floor Janssen

Peace Building and Stabilisation Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ronald Wormgoor; Monique van Asperen

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACORD	Association for Cooperative Operations Research and Development
ACPP	*Asamblea de Cooperacion por la Paz*
ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADB	African Development Bank
ANERA	American Near East Review Aid
ASBL	*Association Sans But Lucratif*
AVEDEC	Association of Villager and Community Development
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CBO	Community Based Organization
CDC	*Comité Développement Communal*
CEC	Chai Electrification Committee
CEPEA	Provincial Committee of the Action for Water and Sanitation
CICR	International Committee of the Red Cross
CMWU	Coastal Municipal Water Utility
CTB	Belgian Development Agency
GVC	Civil Volunteers Group
DCC	District Development Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
DGHER	General Direction for Rural Hydrology and Energy
DoLIDAR-PCC	Department of Local Infrastructure and Development of Agricultural Roads – Program Coordination Cell
DoR	Department of Roads
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DRCC	District Road Coordination Committee
DRSP	District Road Support Program
DRSP-DST	District Road Support Program – District Support Team
DRSP-PSU	District Road Support Program – Program Support Unit
DTO	District Technical Office
DWSS	Department of Drinking Water Supply and Sewerage
ECHO	European Collaboration for Health Optimization
EQA	Environmental Quality Authority
EWASH	Emergency Water, Sanitation and Hygiene in the occupied Palestinian Territories
GEDCo	Gaza Electrical distribution Company
ICCO	*Interkerkelijke Organisatie voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking* – Inter Church Organization for Development Cooperation
(I)NGO	(International) Non-Governmental Organization
KIRDARC	Karnali Integrated Rural Development And Research Centre
LRCC	Local Road User Committee
LRUC	Local Road Coordination Committee
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MoEA	Ministry of Environmental Affairs
MoLD-JSC	Ministry of Local Development – Joint Steering Committee
MoLG	Ministry of Local Government

MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoH	Ministry of Health
MPPW	Ministry of Physical Planning and Works
MSP	Multi-Stakeholder Process
OCHA-oPT	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the occupied Palestinian Territories
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OGP	*Observatoire Gouvernance et Paix*
PA	Palestinian Authority
PARC	Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committee
PEA	*Programme Eau et Assainissement*
PECDAR	Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction
PHG	Palestinian Hydrology Group
PICC	Programme Implementation Coordination Committee
PLC	Palestinian Legislative Council
PNA	Palestinian National Authority
PPRD	People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy
PR	Public Relations
PSDN	Peace, Security and Development Network
PWA	Palestinian Water Authority
RCE	*Régie Communale de l'Eau*
RCG	Road Construction Group
REGIDESO	*Régie de Distribution d'Eau*
RRF	Rural Road Forum
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SINELAC	*Commauté de Pays de Grands Lacs* (regional energy project in Ruzizi river)
SNEL	*Société Nationale de l'Electricité*
SNHR	National Rural Hydrological Service
SNV	*Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers* - Netherlands Development Organisation
SUV	Sport Utility Vehicle
SWM	Solid Waste Management
TDF	Town Development Fund
UCPN	Unified Communist Party Nepal
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
VDC	Village Development Committee
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WATSAN	Water and Sanitation
WB	World Bank
WDR	World Development Report
WSSCC	Water Supply and Sanitation Coordination Committee
WWTP	Waste Water Treatment Plant

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the outcomes of an applied research project conducted in four countries under the auspices of the 'Multi-Stakeholder Processes, Service Delivery and State Institutions' working group of the Peace, Security and Development Network (PSDN). The study explored arrangements between multiple state and non-state actors for the governance and implementation of basic services in fragile situations. This report focuses on the insights gained about how such service delivery arrangements can contribute to the legitimacy of state institutions.

Background of the research

The international donor community, including the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, increasingly recognizes that development strongly depends on a country's political and institutional organization. Effective state-building, in turn, depends on balanced interaction between state institutions and society. An important insight is that state-building in fragile situations depends as much on state *legitimacy* as it does on state *capacity*. Perceptions of legitimacy are shaped through the relationships between various sectors of society: the public sector, private actors, civil society and beneficiary communities. The legitimacy component of state-building, however, has long been underestimated and has scarcely been researched – less so its relation with basic utility services.

The provision of utility services, such as drinking water, electricity, waste management and infrastructures, is a crucial aspect of development. The extent to which the state can provide such services – or enable and support other actors to do so – moreover influences people's appreciation of their government. Hence, utility service provision initiatives can serve a powerful role in strengthening state-society relations and state resilience in post-conflict and fragile situations. In such situations, however, where the state lacks the willingness, capacity or opportunity to deliver services, it is common practice for non-state actors to develop alternative and hybrid service provision arrangements. These actors (NGOs, international agencies, community based associations, or insurgency groups) may do so with or without government cooperation. We defined such multi-stakeholder processes (MSPs) as initiatives aimed at bringing together different stakeholders (state, civil society, private sector, beneficiary communities and international organizations) to engage them in a process of dialogue and collective action for service delivery.

Our study is one of the first to research in-depth the impact that MSPs for service delivery can have on the capacity and the legitimacy of the state.

We conducted twelve case studies of MSPs in four countries: Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nepal and the Palestinian Territories. They included initiatives as varied as the rehabilitation of the local hydrological infrastructure in Burundi; connecting a poor neighbourhood to the electricity grid in the DR Congo; the installation of a solid waste management site in the Palestinian Territories; and the construction of a rural road in Nepal. In all these cases we studied to what extent joint service delivery arrangements can bridge existing gaps between, on the one hand, state and non-state service providers and, on the other hand, service providers and service consumers. We explored whether or not, and why, the MSPs contributed to better services and to increased state legitimacy. In-depth interviews and focus groups were conducted with 520 respondents among MSP actors, MSP beneficiaries, MSP donors, state representatives and external experts.

Findings and conclusions

In our analysis, MSPs consist of three stages. First, the input phase, which centres on the MSP design and initiation. Second, the throughput phase, during which the process of interaction and implementation is core. And third, the output phase, which revolves around results and follow-up. Our findings cover elements of each of these phases.

MSPs for service delivery in fragile and conflict-affected contexts

We assessed the *input* of MSPs according to five indicators: actors included; initiation mode; objectives set; funding; and scope.

- The MSPs studied were dominated by civil society and state institutions. Most of them also included beneficiary communities. Private actors were not involved as decision-making partners, but they did play an important implementing role within the MSPs.

- The manner of MSP initiation, top-down or bottom-up, did not significantly affect the governance of the MSPs.

- The majority of the MSPs incorporated governance (coordination, management, awareness-raising, etc.) issues as part of their objectives.

- The majority of the MSPs primarily depended on donor funding; in only 4 out of 12 MSPs did state institutions act as co-funders.

We analyzed MSP *throughput* or governance by means of six indicators: inclusiveness; division of roles; decision-making; accountability, communication; and formalization.

- The MSPs studied were overall inclusive in their selection of stakeholders. Yet, subsequent decision-making was often hierarchical.

- The MSP actors that provide, receive or manage funding are the ones taking decisions about service implementation. The other stakeholders therefore consider them the main MSP authority.

- Most MSPs had internal accountability structures in place. Nevertheless, they were vulnerable to politicization in the form of elite-capture and corruption.

- Most MSPs had a formal meeting schedule. However, the additional ad hoc meetings that were convened were considered crucial for MSP governance because these meetings tended to be more needs-based.

- On paper, the majority of the MSPs studied were formal structures. In the implementation practice, however, many relations were informal and not recognized as part of the MSPs.

The composition of the MSPs studied often changed over time, involving different stakeholders in different phases of the work and with different levels of commitment. The actual network of stakeholders that in practice constitutes the MSP does not necessarily coincide with the 'paper version' the MSP. Norms and agreements on service delivery are renegotiated during the implementation phase rather than being pre-defined 'rules of the game'. While MSPs eventually bring about new cooperation relations, they also depend on existing partnerships and reflect existing power relations. MSPs are influenced by politics and election cycles as well as by government policy priorities. The existence of local management structures that can serve as a focal point for organisation is important for an effective running of the MSP.

The effects of MSPs on service delivery

We studied MSP *output* by means of four indicators: achievement of objectives; contributions to capacity; influence on policy; and sustainability. Most of the MSPs studied achieved their objectives and thus helped improve the quality, quantity, reliability, accessibility and affordability of service implementation and governance in their specific context.

- Of the 12 MSPs studied, 6 MSPs reached their objectives; 5 MSPs reached part of their objectives; and only 1 MSP hardly reached any of its objectives.

- Some of the MSPs studied influenced service delivery by contributing to the capacity development of individual stakeholders. 3 MSPs extensively contributed to capacity building; 4 MSPs contributed modestly to capacity; and 4 MSPs contributed minimally to capacity development.

- The MSPs had, however, only a small impact on policy-making. 3 MSPs extensively contributed to policy-making; 1 MSP affected policy-making, but only modestly; and 6 MSPs had minimal to no effect on policy.

- Finally, the MSPs made only a limited contribution to service sustainability. Of the studied MSPs, 4 were sustainable; 3 MSPs were partially sustainable; and 4 MSPs were unsustainable.

This lack of sustainability was particularly unfortunate given that sustainability of services was a major concern of most stakeholders and moreover a recognized asset of MSPs. It can be explained by the failure to identify and capacitate specific stakeholders for follow-up; the absence of successful cost-contribution of services; and the insufficient institutional embedding of the MSP initiatives.

The outputs of the MSPs were strongly determined by their throughput: high levels of internal accountability, communication and information-sharing, especially, corresponded with high levels of achievement of objectives; capacity development and sustainability. Finally, even in situations of fragility where state capacity is generally low, the active involvement of state institutions had a positive effect on MSP output.

The effects of MSPs on state legitimacy

We define legitimacy as "the normative belief of a political community that a rule or institution should be obeyed" (Papagianni 2008:50). We found modest indications that the MSP contributed to state legitimacy in only 4 of the 12 MSPs studied. In other cases, improvements in the implementation and governance of services, or in the relations between stakeholders, were not attributed to state institutions. Often this was due to insufficient visibility of state institutions within the MSP and insufficient communication towards their beneficiaries about their role.

Stakeholder involvement in MSPs can result in them granting greater legitimacy to the state, but this always relates to specific state institutions and representatives and not to 'the state' as a whole. State legitimacy is shaped by existing perceptions and determined by a legitimacy threshold: stakeholders need to have enough faith in the state to take the trouble to voice their demands and expectations because only then state legitimacy can develop. Considerations for granting legitimacy vary per stakeholder category. Beneficiary communities attribute legitimacy depending on the visibility and accountability of the state institution in question and the degree to which it involves beneficiaries, represents them vis-à-vis other stakeholders and is responsive to their direct needs. NGOs value the increased cooperation in MSPs, but uncertainty about the division of roles and unequal decision-making power between state and non-state service providers can also result in continued competition. MSPs do not necessarily decrease the state's dependency on donors; moreover, donor funding of

MSPs can lead to a situation where state accountability is directed to the donors rather than to citizen beneficiaries.

The MSPs that had a positive impact on state legitimacy had more often achieved their objectives and had contributed more to the capacity of stakeholders than the MSPs that did not contribute to state legitimacy. Nevertheless, the impact of MSPs on state legitimacy is determined more by their throughput (the multi-stakeholder process) than by their output (improvement of service delivery). The MSPs that were successful in contributing to state legitimacy all had high levels of mutual accountability and strong communication and information sharing. MSPs often help state institutions to improve their relations with other stakeholders. In some cases, non-state actors then become *de facto* brokers of state legitimacy. In terms of the triangular relation between MSPs, basic utility services and state legitimacy, the impact of MSPs on the legitimacy of state institutions mostly manifests itself directly through the *throughput* of MSPs. MSPs can also contribute to the legitimacy of state institutions indirectly, through *output*, or the changes in service delivery that they achieve, but this effect seems conditional, rather than causal.

Policy challenges

MSPs, in some cases, can help bridge the gap between short-term service delivery and longer-term governance improvement. We identified five challenges for MSPs that aim at providing better services and enhancing state legitimacy.

1) **The inclusion of specific state institutions based on a contextual analysis**

An important factor for the success of MSPs is their 'initiation mode': is the MSP set up as a contribution or a challenge to state service delivery, and does the MSP include or exclude state institutions? MSPs that attribute an important role to state institutions tend to be more sustainable and will more significantly enhance state legitimacy. Which state institutions to include in MSPs can be decided by an assessment of histories of cooperation, local political dynamics and existing institutions that the MSP could link up to. This entails:

- Identifying the opportunities and the right actors to achieve the goals of the MSP, and assessing which other actors can play a facilitating role.

- Building awareness of how local politics are likely to impact MSP governance and output.

- Anticipating how ongoing or re-emerging violent conflict may hamper the operation of the MSP and taking precautions to minimize this.

2) **The role of state institutions in MSPs**

One key priority is the visibility of state institutions. Stakeholders will only change their perceptions of the state if they are aware that the institution involved in the MSP is, in fact, a state institution. Often people lack this awareness. Secondly, stakeholders need to know the role the state institution plays in order to appreciate why it deserves partial credit for the achievements of the MSP: does it fund the initiative, is it responsible for mobilizing partners, does it provide material or advice? In many of the MSPs studied, state institutions played a passive and/or unrecognizable role. State visibility in MSPs also requires the right distancing, support and positioning of the other stakeholders involved (especially NGOs). At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that MSPs can easily overpower their weaker stakeholders and that in fragile contexts, state institutions often fall into this category. To address these concerns, one could:

- Ensure sufficient ownership of the process by each stakeholder, particularly by the state.

- Set objectives for increasing the legitimacy of state institutions. This should minimally include a stipulation to 'do-no-harm' in terms of sidelining or undermining state institutions. Ideally, an MSP formulates targets on for its contributions to state capacity and legitimacy.

- Assess how MSPs can bridge the gap between local and national state institutions.

3) The accommodation of beneficiary and stakeholder interests, perceptions and expectations

Our study has shown that citizens and other stakeholders do not award the state legitimacy based on objective outputs, but on how they *perceive* these outputs and the manner in which they were achieved. Legitimacy that is based on the needs of local stakeholders is more durable than legitimacy based on foreign 'good governance' standards. Therefore it is crucial for stakeholders to exchange their expectations and then to explicitly address these in the strategy, goals and division of tasks of the MSP. In our research, local stakeholders identified a lack of accountability, transparency, communication, proximity and responsiveness as the main weaknesses. One should thus:

- Explore the needs of the stakeholders.

- Establish which organisations and institutions related to the intended service are seen to represent the state.

- Explore perceptions towards the state institutions (to be) involved in the MSP and assess the risks and opportunities of involvement for their legitimacy.

4) An optimal organization of the governance of stakeholder interaction

State institutions are important participants of MSPs but not the sole responsible actors for service delivery. MSPs are an opportunity for developing joint engagement and shared responsibilities. The management of relations between various stakeholders within MSPs has a profound impact on state legitimacy. Good performance on throughput indicators, such as accountability and information sharing, was a notable characteristic of the MSPs that contributed to state legitimacy. However, the competition between state and non-state service agencies vying for constituencies outside MSPs is often replicated within MSPs. The gap between state and non-state capacity, particularly on the local level, is significant. To ensure optimal stakeholder composition and interaction, MSP actors should:

- Explicate and define stakes and interests before setting objectives and dividing roles and responsibilities. Give ample attention to internal accountability and information-sharing.

- Avoid competition between state and non-state actors over beneficiary appreciation and donor funding.

5) The follow-up of MSPs and the sustainability of service delivery

Our research has shown that MSPs often fail to achieve sustainability. This not only undermines service delivery, but also state legitimacy, because respondents consider the follow-up of development projects a state responsibility. MSPs must therefore draw up, at the start, a long-term vision that extends beyond the lifecycle of the MSP and contributes to continuity of services at large. Increasing the willingness of end-users to pay and enhancing the cost-recovery of services are important follow-up mechanisms as they help relieve the burden on the state that is held responsible for affordable services (also after donors withdraw). The extent to which an MSP is embedded within institutional

structures and succeeds to link up with policy-makers partly determines the sustainability of its services. Three components are of importance here:

- Include a cost-contribution strategy as part of the MSP objectives and work towards consumer-based accountability in the service sector.

- Decide who is responsible for follow-up at the start of the initiative and use the MSP to develop the needed capacity of the selected actors. MSP capacity building needs to be based on a clear division of roles and a solid sustainability plan.

- Plan donor withdrawal and make sure that MSPs are embedded in sector-wide programs and institutional structures.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION RESEARCH

This report offers the outcomes of an applied research project about arrangements between multiple state and non-state actors for the governance and implementation of basic services in fragile situations. Specifically, the report presents insights in how these arrangements may contribute to the legitimacy of the state institutions involved in such cooperation processes.

With this report, we seek to share lessons learned with two main groups. First, those organisations and people involved in organising or providing services 'on the ground:' NGOs, companies, technical state services and beneficiary/user communities. Second, those institutions and individuals concerned with understanding and improving service delivery and/or state-society relations 'from afar:' national policy-makers, international donors and knowledge institutes and INGOs.

1.1. Origins and background of the research

Improving basic services is high on the development agenda in post-conflict societies. In fragile situations, basic social (like health, education) and utility (like water, electricity, transportation and communication) service provision is often problematic, either because services are lacking or because they are of poor quality, expensive or discriminatory. This can have many adverse consequences for people's health, income-earning capacities and other crucial aspects of development. Service provision is also considered important because it is assumed that people's appreciation of their government largely depends on the extent to which the state can provide reliable services – and enable and support other actors to do so. Hence, while security and political governance concerns might impact perceptions on state legitimacy more directly (OECD 2010:12), there is an increasingly widely-held assumption that states can enhance their legitimacy through better service provision (Plummer and Slaymaker 2007).

The notion that state legitimacy can be enhanced through service provision, however, glosses over the fact that in most societies, including so-called fragile states, the state is not the sole provider of services. International NGOs, private initiatives, community based associations, insurgency groups and religious organizations can all be involved in service delivery. Often, we see arrangements emerging where services are provided by a multitude of actors. This can be done in collaboration, in competition, or simply as parallel initiatives. An important question guiding this report is how these arrangements affect service delivery and how they affect state legitimacy.

This report is based on the study of 12 multi-stakeholder service provision arrangements in the domains of water-provision, road building, waste management and electricity, in 4 different countries: Burundi, DR Congo, Nepal and the Palestinian Territories, all countries that are listed as fragile states in international policies. We label these hybrid arrangements as Multi-Stakeholder Processes (MSPs). MSPs cover a wide range of structures and levels of engagement. They can be highly engineered and formed in the context of a planned project, or evolve from partly planned and partly spontaneous, informal arrangements and formalization processes. They can be initiated by local or international actors and can be very diverse in their shape and purpose.

Our study of these MSPs reverberates with the question what the role of the state in service provision is, can be, or should be. The Weberian model in which the welfare state takes responsibility for the provision of services has in most societies been weakened or abandoned. Alternatives, such as "New

Public Management" approaches suggest that the state takes on a norm-setting and monitoring role, while steering the relations between public agencies, private providers and end users.

Fragile states in terms of institutions and resources display some features that interestingly resonate to these discussions regarding the role of the state. Contrary to the widely held belief that fragile states are characterised by a lack of institutions, current insight reveals that the poor development of state-monopolized institutions leads to situations where multiple normative systems prevail and hybrid institutions evolve (Boege et al 2010). Where state services fail, local people develop their own initiatives to compensate for the lacking services or fall back on traditional institutions. This is not to say that people will always be assured of services. The hybrid and multiple institutions that evolve are patchy and do not add up to a full coverage of services, may be politicized and conflictuous, or lack resources, quality, or accountability. Nonetheless, this multiplicity may also open up space for cultivating new, hybrid forms of service delivery. At the same time, we see the internationalization of governance, where INGOs take up service delivery in parallel to the state. Donor support for non-state delivery mechanisms risks the creation of a dual public sector, run parallel to and/or often in competition with state structures. MSPs are often seen as a potential alternative for this and help prevent the emergence of "centres of resource allocation, focal points of lobbying and sources of patronage outside of the state, which can have a significant impact on […] the sources of legitimacy of the state" (OECD 2010:15).

The 'Multi-Stakeholder Processes, Service Delivery and State Institutions' consortium has studied to what extent joint service delivery arrangements can bridge the gap between state and non-state service providers and between service providers and service consumers in fragile situations and thereby contribute to better services and increased state legitimacy. The consortium is one of the five working groups constituting the Peace, Security and Development Network (PSDN) that was initiated by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the context of the September 2008 Schokland Accords (www.psdnetwork.nl). This synthesis report is the culmination of various other outputs of the working group, including a Theoretical Framework, a Research Protocol and separate case-study and country reports. The research has also generated a Policy Implication Note for each of the countries. The research will further yield several academic papers and articles as well as a comprehensive Policy Brief. All outputs can be found on www.psdnetwork.nl and can be acquired through stel@msm.nl.

1.2. Core concepts

A comprehensive theoretical background to the research is offered in our Theoretical Framework. Here, we limit ourselves to providing our core concepts and working definitions.

1.2.1. The state

We approach the state as the assortment of public institutions representing a multitude of roles, positions and interests in the domains of security, welfare and political representation (Van der Molen and Stel 2010). We have operationalized this conceptualization of the state by breaking down 'the state' into 'state institutions'[1] and by distinguishing between levels and forms of such state institutions, resulting in four core categories of state institutions, as illustrated in figure 1.1 below.

	General	Specialised

[1] With institutions we mean concrete organizations or sets or organizations, rather than the more abstract systems of rule and authority sometimes indicated with the term 'institution.' In this research, then, the instrumental rather than the normative aspect of the state is put center stage.

	(broad administrative, representative structures)	(specific service delivery related structures)
Local	Example: municipality; village council	Example: technical branches
National	Example: government, president	Example: ministries

Figure 1.1: The state operationalized

Our distinction between local and national and general and specialised state institutions sheds light on the difference between state legitimacy and government legitimacy. While they influence each other, the government is only one of several state institutions and while it might be the most visible and representative, there can be significant differences between expectations towards and appreciations of a country's government and, for example, specific ministries or local service institutions.

1.2.2.   *Legitimacy*

Another core concept in our theoretical framework is that of legitimacy. We define legitimacy "as the normative belief of a political community that a rule or institution should be obeyed;" "the acceptance of a governing regime as correct and appropriate" (Papagianni 2008:50; Brinkerhoff 2005:5). State legitimacy, specifically in post-conflict and fragile situations, manifests itself in "the willingness by domestic political elites and the public to support state institutions and to pursue their interests through these institutions" (Papagianni 2008:50). State legitimacy depends on both perception and behaviour. We have thus analyzed, on the one hand, the way people think about certain institutions – their opinions – and, on the other hand, the way they act in response to these institutions – their conduct.[2]

We have operationalized the concept of legitimacy by following the OECD (2008:17) in distinguishing five forms of legitimacy.

General legitimacy	General legitimacy is characterised by knowledge of the existence, objectives and activities of state institutions; willingness to participate in activities and projects organized by state institutions; willingness to pay for the services delivered by state institutions; and the degree to which the provision of services is seen as the responsibility of the state.
Embedded legitimacy	Embedded legitimacy is closely linked to general legitimacy and relates to the recognition that state institutions are established as proper representatives of the state and in a strong and independent manner; to the overall confidence of the population in local governance; and to functioning complaint procedures.
Process legitimacy	Process legitimacy of the state, when it comes to service delivery, refers to *how* service delivery is organised and managed (rather than *what* it yields). Process legitimacy entails the quality and quantity of the state's cooperation with non-state actors and beneficiaries-consumers; the coherence among state institutions; and the governance of service delivery.
Performance legitimacy	Performance legitimacy refers to legitimacy based on the results of service delivery, rather than the way in which these are generated. This is strongly related to state capacity. Here, matters such as quantity, affordability and accessibility are indicative.

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[2] This approach is related to conceptions of value-based and behavioral-based legitimacy as proposed by, among others Brinkerhoff (2011). We have approached legitimacy by studying broad indicators (embedding; process; performance; international relations) literature suggests impact state legitimacy, rather than setting normative benchmarks (trust, reliability, transparency, credibility, etc.) for each of these indicators that state institutions should meet to acquire legitimacy – such benchmarks, we found, differ per constituency and context.

International legitimacy	The international legitimacy of the state relates to the position of MSP donors; the adherence to international standards; and use of and reference to international resources.

Figure 1.2: State legitimacy operationalized

Legitimacy is relational and co-determined by people as they evoke different elements and functions of the state. It is contingent upon historical state-society relations, the presence and strategies of other non-state providers, the performance of services, and relationships of accountability between actors (Douma and Van der Haar 2010). Legitimacy is thus socially negotiated and expectations people have regarding the state and service delivery is a large factor in their valuation of the state's legitimacy.

1.2.3. *Service delivery and state institutions*

In this study, we consider state legitimacy in the context of service delivery. Service delivery here pertains to basic utilities such as drinking water, electricity, waste management and roads. We assess services by looking at their implementation (quality, quantity, accessibility and affordability) and their governance (their organisation, formalization, reliability and equality).

In 'fragile states,' basic service provision intertwines with processes of social and political exclusion and with vertical and horizontal forms of inequality (Berry et al 2004:21). Even more so as basic service delivery structures are either physically destroyed, or are controlled to serve only particular groups of people, leading to a politicization of services (Vaux and Visman 2005; Van der Haar 2005). Thus, on the one hand, problems of state capacity and political will are drivers of poor basic services, while, on the other hand, poor services contribute to perpetuating state fragility (Douma and Van der Haar 2011:22).

In post- social welfare perspectives, service delivery is not just a relation between states and their citizens, but includes a triangular relation which also involves non-state providers. *Allocation* of services is generally seen as the central task of policy makers, whereas the *production* of services is in the hands of these service providers. The governance of basic service provision thus involves the organization of accountability relations between the state, providers and the users of services. The legitimacy of the state as a function of service delivery is then subject to a so-called compact, concerned as much with governance as with implementation (OECD 2008:16).

The expectations people have of the state concerning both governance and implementation are often expressed through the metaphor of the social contract. The 'social contract' is an abstraction capturing the willingness of citizens to accept the control of the state in return for the maintenance of order and provision of security (Fritz and Menocal 2007:27). The metaphor has been extended to the provision of basic services. The social contract concept draws attention to how perceptions of a fragmented, discontinuous or contested state are linked to people's experiences with basic services and their notions of who is responsible and accountable for these services.

1.2.4. *Multi-Stakeholder Processes*

Multi-Stakeholder Processes (MSPs) have emerged as mechanisms that can link state and non-state service providers and thereby possibly shape the legitimacy of the state. We define MSPs as initiatives with the notion of bringing together different actors, who have an interest in a problem and engaging them in a process of dialogue and collective action to address this problem (Vermeulen et al, 2008:97 and Hemmati 2002:2). The concept of MSPs thus refers to large sets of phenomena, but their common denominator is the involvement of multiple actors from different societal domains (the state, civil society and the private sector). The term MSP displays attention beyond the contractual arrangement per se and denotes an interest in the quality of the *process* in terms of values around inclusiveness, division of roles, decision-making, communication, accountability and formalization (Noor 2010). In this report we investigate a diversity of arrangements for multi-stakeholder service delivery with

different objectives and backgrounds, whose empirical properties we analyze with the MSP framework in mind.

We have analyzed the MSPs studied through the following analytical model that divides MSPs in three stages and assesses several indicators per stage to analyze their functioning and performance. These indicators are derived from, among other authors: Dore (2007), Hemmati (2002), Van Tulder (2009) and Warner (2007). A detailed motivation of the model can be found in the Theoretical Framework (definitions and variables for each indicator are provided in figures 3.1, 3.3 and 4.1).

Figure 1.3: MSPs operationalized

1.3. Research approach

1.3.1. Research questions

The research examined in-depth if and how MSPs for service provision influence service delivery and the legitimacy of state institutions involved in them. The main question is:

How do multi-stakeholder processes (MSPs) for the improvement of service delivery affect services and how do they affect the legitimacy of state institutions?

This main question is underpinned by six sub-questions:

- Which actors and trends can be identified in service delivery in the studied context?

- What are the characteristics of the MSP organised for service delivery?

- How is the MSP governed?

- What are the MSPs outputs in terms of service delivery?

- How does participation in the MSP affect the legitimacy of relevant state-institutions?

- What are key factors in the (socio-political and institutional) context influencing MSPs, service delivery, and their relation with the legitimacy of state institutions?

1.3.2. Conceptual scheme and propositions

The above questions concern the relationship between i) MSPs; ii) basic services; and iii) state legitimacy. This relationship can manifest itself in two ways as displayed in figure 1.4 below: the MSP, as a process/initiative, could influence the legitimacy of participating state institutions directly, through MSP throughput (1) or indirectly through the changes it generates in service delivery, MSP output (2-3).

This scheme lead to the following propositions:

- Through MSPs the legitimacy of relevant state-institutions in service delivery can be increased;
  - The configuration of the MSP (input) has an influence on the legitimacy of state institutions;
  - The governance of the MSP (throughput) has an influence on the legitimacy of state institutions;
- MSPs organised around services have a positive effect on services;
- Improvements in the access, coverage, quality, quantity, affordability and/or equity of basic services contribute to the legitimacy of relevant state-institutions

Figure 1.4: Conceptual scheme research

1.3.3. Country selection

Field research for our study has been conducted in Burundi, DR Congo, Nepal and the Palestinian Territories, vastly different countries selected with the explicit aim to grasp the diversity of conditions in countries affected by conflict or political instability. The choice for four countries was perceived to be the optimum given the available research capacities, finances, and time frame. The following criteria were taken into account for the selection of countries:

- Listed by the OECD/DAC overview of fragile states (www.oecd.org/dac/fragilestates);

- Relevance to Dutch policy strategy. As the research project is part of the PSDN aiming at concrete policy recommendations, the focus countries of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs are taken into account. Therefore attention is paid to the listed countries in the "Security and Development" strategy paper[3] and other countries with a focus on the MDGs;

- Inclusion in the Oxfam Novib list of 'partner countries.' The project aimed to build the capacity of local partners of Oxfam Novib and connect to these partners, who could benefit from research results and facilitate the research process;

- Resonance with the expertise and experience among the research partners.

1.3.4. Case-study selection

Our research of MSPs involves the examination of all interactions between the various actors involved in the process; of the results achieved; and ultimately of its impacts on state-society relationships. To capture such dynamic and context-dependent phenomena, in-depth information that uncovers detailed characteristics is needed. Our selection of cases has been guided by the following criteria:

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[3] Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007), http://www.minbuza.nl/dsresource?objectid=buzabeheer:36761&type=pdf

- the MSP is organized around utilities or basic services, such as water, electricity, waste management and infrastructure;

- the MSP involves at least a public sector representative and a civil society representative and preferably a private actor;

- the MSP operates with measurable output and functions for a substantial period of time at the time of research;

- the MSP operates on the local and/or meso level

We have selected a total of 12 MSPs as case-studies – 2 in Burundi; 2 in DR Congo; 4 in Nepal; and 4 in the Palestinian Territories. The MSPs are presented in more detail in chapter 2 and Annex I.

1.3.5. *Data sources and collection*

Considering the context-dependent nature of our research – the measurement of legitimacy centres around perceptions, ideas and appreciations –, we adopted a predominantly qualitative research methodology in gathering and analyzing data. The analyses presented in this report are based on primary and secondary data. Secondary data encompass documentation – such as letters, memoranda, agendas, minutes of meetings, written reports and administrative documents (such as proposals, progress reports) – and archival records – like service records, organizational records and survey data. Primary data were collected through fieldwork by means of: interviews; focus groups; and (participatory) observation.

Primary data were gathered through interviews and focus groups with five main target groups:

- citizens/beneficiaries/users of the services provided;

- organisations participating in the MSP involved in service provision (public, private and civil institutions);

- donors funding the MSP;

- external experts not involved in the MSP, but aware of its activities;

- and national policy-makers

Respondents for interviews were selected through our target group definition and a snow-ball sampling process. Interviews were in-depth and semi-structured, taking on average 1,5 hours and conducted, when possible, in English and, when needed, in local languages (sometimes through a translator). Such interviews were carried out by means of interview guides that were tailored versions of the questionnaire provided in Annex III. Focus groups refer to an interactive method in which a group of people discuss and exchange on different opinions and perceptions they have regarding a specific question related to a concept, topic or issue. We have done focus groups primarily with the beneficiary target group. In total, 520 respondents were consulted during the research. In figure 1.5 below, an overview is provided of their distribution across countries and target groups.

	Beneficiaries		MSP actors	Donors	Non-MSP experts	Policy-makers	*Total no. of respondents*
	Interviews	Focus groups	Interviews	Interviews	Interviews	Interviews	
Burundi		6 (52 participants)	33	3	8	5	101
DR Congo	103		31		23	12	169

Nepal	82		48	5	12	5	152
The Palestinian Territories	32	3 (28 participants)	14	8	8	8	98
Total no. of respondents	217	9 (80 participants)	126	16	51	30	**520**

Figure 1.5: Respondents

The data collected in the manner described here were analysed in draft case-study and country reports. These draft reports have been validated in a workshop in each of the research countries with consulted respondents and general experts.[4]

1.4. Methodological challenges

Several aspects of our conceptual and methodological approach merit further reflection. First, we have chosen to explore the relation between multi-stakeholder service delivery and state legitimacy through case studies. The case studies have been selected from a pool of possible cases according to the pre-defined properties explained above. To allow an inquiry into the significance of various circumstances for processes and outcomes of legitimacy relations, we have selected cases from this pool on the basis of their diversity, more than their comparability (Flyvbjerg 2006:230).

Second, it proved difficult to find MSPs formally including private actors. This prevented us from studying interactions between the private and public sector within MSPs for service delivery. Yet, the fact that private actors are involved in MSP implementation activities rather than in MSP initiation and decision-making constitutes a significant finding in itself.

Third, we have mainly opted for an qualitative methodology allowing us to assess perceptions, without aiming to contrast these perceptions with objective measures of change. This follows from our premises that legitimacy is not attributed based on reality, but on how people perceive this reality.

1.5. Set-up of the report

In the remainder of this report, we, in chapter 2, introduce our case-studies and the context in which they are set – addressing our first sub-question (Which actors and trends can be identified in service delivery in the studied context?). In chapter 3, subsequently, we analyze the functioning of MSPs for service delivery – answering the second, third and last sub-questions of our research (What are the characteristics of the MSP organised for service delivery?; How is the MSP governed?; and What are key factors in the socio-political and institutional context influencing MSPs, service delivery, and their relation with the legitimacy of state institutions?). In chapter 4, then, we explore the impact of the MSPs on services – tackling our fourth sub-question (What are the MSPs' outputs in terms of service delivery?). Then, in chapter 5, we discuss the effects of MSPs for service delivery on the legitimacy of state institutions – going into our fifth sub-question (How does participation in the MSP affect the legitimacy of relevant state-institutions?). In the concluding chapter 6, we will come back to our main research question and propositions. In chapter 7, finally, policy implications are shared.

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[4] Reports of these validation sessions are available upon request through stel@msm.nl.

CHAPTER 2

CASE-STUDIES AND CONTEXTS

This chapter of the report is dedicated to the countries and cases selected for research and addresses one of our six sub research questions:

- Which actors and trends can be identified in service delivery in the studied context?

2.1. The case-studies

Our research focuses on what we call basic services. We have divided these services into two categories: social services – such as education and health care – and utility services. In our research, we focused on the latter category. Within this category of utility services we have looked at four separate sectors: drinking water; waste management; roads construction and electricity. The majority of our cases (8) concerns drinking water projects. In addition, we have studied 1 electricity MSP; 1 waste management MSP; and 2 road construction MSPs. Our case-studies are presented schematically in figure 2.1 below. Succinct descriptions of each case are provided in Annex I of this report. Elaborate descriptions of each MSP can be found in the respective case-study and country reports.

	Where	Whom	What	When
MSP 1	Burundi Ngozi province; Mwumba commune	CARE NL; CARE Burundi; AVEDEC; local water committee; communal administration; provincial water coordinator	WASH: Improve access of marginalized groups to water and sanitation	2008-2010 Finished
MSP 2	Burundi Muyinga province; Buhinyuza commune	UNICEF; state water and sanitation program; local water committee; communal administration; provincial water coordinator	WASH: Rehabilitation of local water infrastructure	2009-2010 Finished
MSP 3	DR Congo South-Kivu province	(among other INGOs:) UNICEF; ICCO; CICR; CTB; Oxfam; REGIDESO (national water provider); SNHR, rural water board	WASH: Harmonize donor interventions in the water sector	2006- Ongoing
MSP 4	DR Congo South-Kivu province; Bukavu town; Chai area	User and interest committees for electricity (CEC), LICOSKI (consumer rights league); SNEL (national electricity provider), parish; PPRD (political party)	ELECTRICITY: Realize electricity connections for the neighbourhood	1993- Ongoing
MSP 5	The Palestinian Territories Northern West-Bank; Qalqilya and Tulkarm municipalities	Local farmer association; Qalqilya and Tulkarm municipalities; PWA; EQA; MoA; MoLG; PLC; MoH; PHG; ECHO; OCHA-oPT	WASH: Rehabilitation of irrigation groundwater wells	2003-2010
MSP 6	The Palestinian Territories Northern West-Bank;	ECHO; WB; MoLG; MoEA; MoF; Jenin Service Council; PECDAR; Israeli authorities	SWM: Creation of a solid waste landfill	1998-2009

	Zahrat al-Finjan municipality			
MSP 7	The Palestinian Territories Southern West-Bank; Kharas municipality	USAID; Save the Children; landowners; farmers; Hatta council; Kharas municipality; PWA; EQA; MoA; MoLG; MoH; PARC	WASH: Development of a waste water treatment plant	2003-2010
MSP 8	The Palestinian Territories Gaza Strip; Bureij municipality	ECHO; Terre des Hommes; GVC; PWA; Coastal Municipal Water Authority; Bureij municipality; Gaza electrical distribution company	WASH: Realization of a desalination plant	2006-2009
MSP 9	Nepal Karnali region; Jumla district; Ghodasin, Seridhuska, Thapagaun and Odi villages	SNV; UNICEF; KIRDAC; DCC; water supply and sanitation divisional office; district technical office; district women office; district education office; district health office	WASH: Improving and integrating governance of local water and sanitation sector	2006-Ongoing
MSP 10	Nepal Inner Teraj and Gandaki region; Udjaypur and Kaski districts; Trijuga and Lekhnath villages	ADB; MPPW department of drinking water supply and sewerage; NGO social workers group; TDF; total sanitation women's volunteer group; user committees	WASH: Improve drinking water supply and public sanitation	2001-Ongoing
MSP 11	Nepal Central development region; Ramechhap district	SDC; DoLIDAR; DCC; DRSP-PSU; user committees	ROADS: District Road Support Program (DRSP) Manthali-Kurkot road	1999-2005
MSP 12	Nepal Mid-Western development region; Rolpa district	UCPN-Maoist Movement and local people (NGO involvement; international volunteers and journalists)	ROADS: 'Sahid Marga' ('martyr's') road	2003-2006

Figure 2.1: Overview of MSP case-studies

Since we are interested primarily on the impact MSP participation has on the state institutions involved in the MSPs, we have listed the state institutions involved in the MSPs we have studied in figure 2.2 below. Following our operationalization of the state in chapter 1, we have discriminated between local institutions – with local we refer to all sub-national institutions, from village to provincial level – and national institutions. We have also distinguished between those state institutions that are specifically related to utility service delivery and those institutions involved in general administration, representation and governance. Nevertheless, the institutions listed below vary widely in form, function and authority. Some institutions de facto consist of one person, while other institutions concern entire ministries; some are semi-privatized, others extremely politicized.

	Burundi	**DR Congo**	**Nepal**	**The Palestinian Territories**
Local administrative	Communal administration		VDC – Village Development	Village councils and municipalities

(general)			Committee DCC – District Development Committee	
Local specialized (service delivery related)	CPRCE – Provincial Coordinator of the Communal Water Committees		DTO – District Technical Office WSSDO – Water Supply and Sanitation Divisional Office	
National administrative (general)			National Planning Commission of the government	PA – Palestinian Authority PLC – Palestinian Legislative Council
National specialized (service delivery related)	PEA – Water and Sanitation Program DGHER – General Direction for Rural Hydrology and Energy	REGIDESO – *Régie de Distribution d'Eau* SNEL – *Société Nationale de l'Electricité* SNHR – National Rural Hydrological Service The Division – Energy Division of the Ministry of Mines, Energy and Hydrocarbons	DWSS - Department of Water Supply and Sewages MPPW – Ministry of Physical Planning and Works , DoLIDAR – Department of Local Infrastructure Development and Agricultural Roads MLD – Ministry of Local Development	MOA – Ministry of Agriculture MEA – Ministry of Environmental Affairs MoF – Ministry of Finance MoLG – Ministry of Local Governance PWA – Palestinian Water Authority

Figure 2.2: State institutions participating in the MSPs studied

2.2. Utility service sector contexts

Access to basic services is not a given for a substantial part of the world's population, in particular those living in marginal regions in poor or conflict-ridden states. According to the 2004 World Development Report, in 2000, 20% of the world population had no access to safe water, 50% went without adequate sanitation and over 25% had no access to electricity (75% for Africa) (WB 2004). With regard to the value per person available in terms of basic services infrastructure, high income countries present almost twelve times more access than low income countries (Schwartz et al 2004:2). The problems with basic services relate to coverage, access and quality, as well as to the governance of service provision. Violent conflict halts the development of capacity and breeds a need for foreign assistance to provide services, which often complicates already brittle governance structures. Service delivery structures as studied in Burundi, DR Congo, Nepal and the Palestinian Territories are characterized by a lack of coordination and limited administrative capacity. Services tend to be concentrated in urban areas, with uneven coverage of rural communities, leading to pockets of service exclusion. And where the physical infrastructure for drinking water or electricity is in place, services

may be provided very infrequently and irregularly – generally favouring rich neighbourhoods over poorer areas and higher castes and classes over lower ones. Thus, basic service provision intertwines with processes of social and political exclusion and with vertical and horizontal forms of inequality and tends to reinforce gaps between the rich and poor, men and women and between different groups in society (Berry et al 2004:12, 21).

Annex II provides brief sketches of the relevant service sectors in the countries of study.

2.3.   Political contexts

This paragraph highlights some core themes in the socio-economic and political-institutional contexts of the various countries and how these affect service delivery. These contexts are importantly characterized by 'fragility'.

The fragile state concept has major shortcomings in the sense that it is extremely broad; fails to distinguish between causes, effects and characteristics; and has by now become all too closely associated with normative policy frameworks (Duffield 2007; Chandler 2006).[5] It has been challenged, moreover, by more analytically rooted concepts aiming (such as Boege et al's (2009) 'hybrid political order,' Menkhaus' (2006) 'mediated state' and Lund's (2006) 'twilight institutions' (Overbeek et al 2009:24). The concept of fragility can nevertheless help assess the role of the state in wanting socio-economic development. According to OECD/DAC's definition, "states are fragile when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations" (OECD 2008:15-19).[6]

Here, we briefly discuss how the core aspects of state fragility as distinguished by Naudé et al (2011) – violent conflict; capacity deficits; politicization; and vulnerability to external shocks – affect services in the countries studied. As will be discussed in the concluding chapters of this report, these elements all affect service delivery and the legitimacy of the state, but differ substantially per country.

2.2.1.   *Conflict*

Basic service delivery in societies emerging out of violent conflict is often problematic in terms of their availability, quality and coverage and services are often politicized. Services are either physically destroyed, or are controlled to serve only particular groups of people. The warring parties, including the state, often use such services to stimulate support or exclusion (Vaux and Visman 2005; Van der Haar 2005). These problems with services often originate from before the conflict, yet are intensified or exacerbated during the conflict.

- A post-independence history characterized by civil war has left much of Burundi's service delivery infrastructure destroyed – not in the least because such structures were sometimes targeted as symbols of government power by insurgents.[7]

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[5] See also: Overbeek et al (2009) that groups the main academic criticisms on state fragility under etatism and euro-centrism; one-dimensionality; technological and linear notions of state development; overly abstract conceptualization; and policy driven (Overbeek et al 2009:18-20)

[6] As such, it is also more accurate to describe states as experiencing fragility, rather than as being fragile because states are susceptible to situations of fragility (OECD 2008:19)

[7] For references for the provided information per country, we refer to the respective case-study and country reports.

- The South-Kivu area we have studied in DR Congo is currently still heavily impacted by regional conflicts involving rebel groups supported by Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda that undermine institutional stability, development and service delivery.

- In Nepal, the 1996-2006 conflict has stagnated the development of the country and increased polarization between those areas reached by government services and those areas devoid of them. The conflict has also aggravated inequalities between rural and urban areas.

- In the Palestinian Territories, the Israeli occupation severely undermines the Palestinian Authorities' ability to provide services by the elaborate zoning system in the West Bank that leaves less than half of the occupied territories under the actual mandate of the Palestinian Authority and makes development hostage to a bureaucratic permit system; the spread of illegal Israeli settlements that usurp natural resources; and the building of the wall and various other barriers that prevent an integrated infrastructure for service delivery. The Palestinian Authority is, furthermore, dependent on the Israeli government for (return of) tax revenues, through the customs agreement.

2.2.2. *Politicization of services*

In many contexts, utility services have historically been important in state formation and state dominance and as such have significant political importance. As DFID (2011:44), for instance, notes, "water is used both as a political weapon […] or as a useful 'peace-building' entry point post conflict." As a result, services have often become associated with ruling parties or regimes and their politics, rather than with a more neutral state bureaucracy. In such instances, services are used, and perceived, as political favours, rather than universal rights.

- In Burundi, both pre- and post-independence states have been a focal point for the acquiring and redistribution of wealth, resources and services. Burundi has a legacy of a strong and predatory state, the control of which has been a major source of violent conflict. Service delivery, as a result, is patrimonial and politicized.

- In DR Congo, service delivery has also officially been the monopolized domain of the state. This formal position of the state, however, has not been lived up to by the Congolese state and under former president Mobutu a system evolved where state personnel derived their income from payment for their services and direct taxations. In practice, delivery of services was often relegated to churches. There is little political will to provide services indiscriminately and state service delivery is often regarded primarily as a source of income for state officials, rather than an obligation towards citizens.

- In Nepal, service delivery has also historically played a key role both in the functioning of the state and in the perception of this functioning. The 1996-2006 Maoist insurgency is often seen to have been built on a widespread sense of deprivation stemming from, amongst other things, a stagnation or decrease in the development of local service provision in rural and peripheral areas. The will of the state to provide services in Nepal is seen as limited and discriminatory.

- The Palestinian state, not having all powers of a state, has no long-term track-record in providing services. These have been provided in the past (before the Oslo Agreements) by Israeli civil and military authorities, and to some extent by Mekorot, the Israeli largest national water supplier. Service delivery can therefore not be seen in isolation from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, since Palestinian service sectors are dependent on their Israeli counterpart. Recently, especially in Gaza, service delivery has become a more important

aspect of state governance as a result of the rivalry between Fatah and Hamas administrations and the ensuing duplication of institutions.

2.2.3. *Limited state capacity and institutional multiplicity*

Fragile state literature emphasizes the lack of state capacity. Rather than producing an institutional void, however, this leads to situations of institutional multiplicity, where other societal institutions are involved in service provision. Service delivery in these situations is importantly affected by how state institutions engage with these non-state service providers.

- Burundi is characterised by an underdeveloped private sector and a traditional authority network (in the form of the *Bashingantahe*, wise men) that is losing influence. Civil society in general is considered weak and is regarded hostile by the government. The Catholic Church, more active in social than in utility services, provides the main societal alternative to state service provision. In general, however, the state – which can in Burundi increasingly be equated with the ruling party – dominates the economy as well as the service sector.

- In DR Congo, people largely depend on their own entrepreneurism and – scarce – community initiatives. The Catholic Church plays a crucial role in service delivery, but this concerns health care and education more than utilities. More often than not, the Congolese government sees non-state service providers as undermining its authority.

- In Nepal, too, societal alternatives for service delivery are mostly international (see below) and individual or community based. Elaborate decentralization programs and MSP initiatives are currently enshrined in national policy. This has opened up the domain of service delivery for non-state professionals in Nepal's post-conflict era. NGOs are relative newcomers in Nepal, but are currently crucial in the service sector.

- In the Palestinian Territories, alternatives to state service delivery, in particular of water supply, are occasionally provided by NGOs and MSPs (through projects), and – more structurally – by actors in the private sector, but at much higher costs. The WASH and solid waste sectors in the Palestinian Territories are heavily dependent on donor support and international pressure on Israel to grant permits.

Figure 2.3: Nepal – rural roads (pictures taken by Riti Herman Mostert)

2.2.4. *Vulnerability to external shocks and donor dependency*

A fourth component of state fragility that influences service delivery is the vulnerability stemming from the dependence on donor support. Alternatives to state service delivery do not only come in the form of national institutions, but also as international pressures and assistance. MSPs are often influenced by policies and prioritizations of the international donor community. All four countries studied rely heavily on donor funding (see figure 2.4) to function in general and to provide services specifically.

- Burundi is landlocked and resource poor and has little alternative resources to provide services to its population beyond donor funds.

- In DR Congo, despite its wealth in natural resources, service delivery is still rather humanitarian in outlook and dependent on donor funding.

- Due to its geographical location, geology and climate that have made development and service coverage fragmented and tedious, Nepal – isolated until the 1950s – strongly relies on donor funding to develop service delivery.

- Partly due to the occupation and the related loss of revenue collection opportunities, the Palestinian Authority also heavily depends on the international community to provide services.

The figure below summarizes some of the indicators of conflict as well as some general indicators that exemplify differences in socio-economic development and institutional context of the four countries.

	Burundi	**DR Congo**	**Nepal**	**West Bank**
History				
Years of war – last violent conflict	1991-2000 (ongoing unrest)	1996-Ongoing	1996-2006	1948-Ongoing
Colonialism / occupation	Independent from Belgium since 1962	Independent from Belgium since 1960	-	Occupied
Level of development				
GDP (PPP per capita)	US$300,-	US$300,-	US$1200,-	US$2900,-
Main means of existence	Agriculture (93.6%)	Agriculture	Agriculture (32.8%)	Services (82.6%)
Population below poverty line	68%	71%	25%	46%
Natural resources	Average	Many	Average	Scarce
Population density	367/km	31/km	200/km	438/km
Life expectancy	58.78 years	55.33 years	66.16 years	75.10 years

Literacy rate	59.3%	67.2%	48.6%	92.4%
Donor funding (2009)	US$548.83 million	US$2.354 billion	US$864.64 million	US$3.026 billion

Figure 2.4: Development indicators (sources: CIA The World Factbook and World Development Indicators)

2.4. Conclusions on fragile contexts

Key characteristics of fragility – the legacy of (and the risk of rekindled) violent conflict; the politicization (in terms of elite capture and clientelism) of services; limited state capacity and institutional multiplicity; and vulnerability to external shocks and donor dependency – all profoundly affect multi-stakeholder service delivery. In addition, we have found three key factors in the (socio-political and institutional) context influencing MSPs, service delivery, and their relation with the legitimacy of state institutions in the cases studied. First, state institutions are associated with utility service delivery in different ways in different contexts. Services are patronage instruments for some fragile states (Burundi) and historically ignored by others (DR Congo), while they featured as core theme's of violent disputes in yet other situations (Nepal and the Palestinian Territories). In all cases, however, the (lack of) the state's political will and capacity to provide services is cause for concern for both beneficiaries and expert respondents. Second, in the fragile contexts we have studied, people mostly seem to depend on themselves, on non-governmental service institutions (such as churches) and on international intervening agencies for service provision. By and large, again with Nepal as the exception, state institutions tend to regard civil society service providers with some antagonism. Third, significant parts of both state and non-state service delivery depend on donor funding.

The main trend or characteristic that can be identified in the service delivery related contexts explored above in relation to the role state institutions play in service delivery is instability. In general, instability tends to result in a lack of long-term vision and investment on all levels that leaves deep traces in post-conflict settings. Except for the Palestinian Territories, in all utility service contexts studied, performance of services was weak in terms of quality, quantity and governance of services. There is a lack of coordination, the synchronization of objectives and strategies, between the various civil, public and private actors involved in all sectors. Privatization and decentralization are commencing in most contexts, but have not (yet) resulted in an integrated approach to service delivery. As will be further elaborated on in the remainder of this report, fee-based services are complicated by socio-economic hardships and often lack tradition, with DR Congo as a notable exception, which further complicates long-term planning and sustainability of services.

CHAPTER 3

THE FUNCTIONING OF MSPs FOR SERVICE DELIVERY IN FRAGILE SITUATIONS

In order to answer the two aspects of our main research question – how do MSPs for service delivery affect services and how do they affect the legitimacy of state institutions – it is pertinent to understand how such multi-stakeholder initiatives to improve basic utility service delivery in fragile situations emerge and function. In this chapter we will address three of our six sub-questions.

- What are the characteristics of the MSP organised for service delivery?

- How is the MSP governed?

- What are key factors in the (socio-political and institutional) context influencing MSPs, service delivery, and their relation with the legitimacy of state institutions?

In order to explore the characteristics and governance of the MSP case-studies, we have adopted a framework that views MSPs as arenas in which actors socially negotiate the policy and practices of service delivery (Hilhorst and Serrano 2010; Hilhorst and Jansen 2010). The realities and outcomes of services depend on how actors —aid recipients, donors, field staff, government representatives, international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and others—interpret the context, the needs, their own roles and each other (WUR 2011:2). The idea of an arena has its roots in an actor orientation based on the premise that social actors have agency (Long 1992; Long 2001). MSPs, in this perspective, are the outcome of the interaction of social actors struggling and negotiating to further their ideas and interests, shaping the conditions of service delivery along the way.

This view of MSPs as arenas emphasizes the social dynamics of service delivery and provides a fresh look at the characteristics of the MSPs studied. First, MSPs may constitute more than contractual or otherwise functional relations. Stakeholders have networks that precede the MSP and have wider meaning than service delivery alone. Second, MSP compositions change over time, involving different stakeholders in different phases and in to a different degree of intensity. The actual network of stakeholders constituting the MSP in practice need not coincide with the working of the MSP on paper. The ways in which stakeholders act in service delivery and respond to each other is informed by their own understanding of the situation, their interests and the history of their relationship. Norms and agreements on service delivery, then, are renegotiated in the practice of implementation and become emergent properties of the MSP, rather than the pre-defined 'rules of the game'. Third, context matters for MSPs, as stakeholders also respond to local as well as international power dynamics (patronage and donor dependence) and political developments (elections) and institutional structures in place at the national (policy) and local (user committee) level.

3.1. MSPs for service delivery

The MSPs studied often (all except MSPs 3, 4, 9 and 12) involved a time-bound project component concerned with the implementation or governance of utility services. The multi-stakeholder aspect of such initiatives, however, concerned much more than the mere setting and executing of service related project objectives. The MSPs concerned interaction – both competition and coordination – regarding a much wider range of issues than service delivery alone. These were partly incorporated in the MSP objectives, but also emerged from the pre-existing relations and contexts in which the MSPs were formed.

For end-users, often unaware of the dynamics between stakeholders in the MSP arena, tangible achievements in the services they rely on are the main benchmark of evaluating MSPs. However, MSP members also evaluate the MSP for its contribution to coordination with other stakeholders involved in service delivery. The process of bringing together various actors and the streamlining of goals and objectives, is often (except in MSPs 3 and 9) not a specific objective of the initiative but a means towards reaching objectives. Nonetheless, this interaction acquires great value for stakeholders.

3.1.1. The characteristics of MSPs for service delivery: MSP input

	Actors	Initiation	Objectives	Funding	Scope
MSP 1	State: M	T-D	G	NGO	L
	Priv sec: N				
	Civ soc: H				
	Comm'ty: H				
MSP 2	State: H	B-U	D	B/M	L
	Priv sec: N				
	Civ soc: M				
	Comm'ty: M				
MSP 3	State: M	T-D	G	B/M	M
	Priv sec: N				
	Civ soc: H				
	Comm'ty: N				
MSP 4	State: N	B-U	I	N	L
	Priv sec: N				
	Civ soc: M				
	Comm'ty: H				
MSP 5	State: H	B-U	I	B/M	M
	Priv sec: N				
	Civ soc: M				
	Comm'ty: H				
MSP 6	State: H	T-D	D	B/M Partial: S	M
	Priv sec: N				
	Civ soc: L				
	Comm'ty: L				
MSP 7	State: M	B-U	I	NGO Partial: S	L
	Priv sec: N				
	Civ soc: H				
	Comm'ty: M				
MSP 8	State: H	T-D	D	B/M	L

	Priv sec: N				
	Civ soc: H				
	Comm'ty: M				
MSP 9	State: M	T-D	G	NGO	M
	Priv sec: N				
	Civ soc: H				
	Comm'ty: H				
MSP 10	State: H	T-D	D	B/M Partial: S	M
	Priv sec: N				
	Civ soc: M				
	Comm'ty: H				
MSP 11	State: H	T-D	D	B/M Partial: S	M
	Priv sec: N				
	Civ soc: L				
	Comm'ty: H				
MSP 12	State: N	T-D	D	???	M
	Priv sec: N				
	Civ soc: L				
	Comm'ty: H				

Actors	The degree of representation of the state; private sectors (priv sec); civil society (civ soc) and communities (comm'ty) in the MSP based on comparative numbers of organisations within the MSP N = no representation L = low representation M = medium representation H = high representation
Initiation	The manner in which the MSP was instigated – either by local actors (bottom-up) or by national or international (top-down) actors B-U = bottom-up initiation T-D = top-down initiation
Objectives	The sort of goals set by the MSP – either regarding the governance of services (such as coordination; dialogue; monitoring and evaluation; advocacy) or the implementation of services (construction; rehabilitation; quality and quantity improvements) or a mixture of both G = governance oriented objectives I = implementation oriented objectives D = dual governance and implementation oriented objectives
Funding	The main source of funding and/or material support of the MSP (if any) N = no external funding B/M = bilateral or multilateral funding NGO = NGO funding S = state funding

Scope	Range of the MSP – either local (municipal or below) or meso (provincial)
	L = local level
	M = meso level

MSPs are scored based on the respective case-study and country reports and validated by the research team-leaders. Data are based on project documentation and interviews and reflect the opinions of the majority of the participating stakeholders and the research team leader's evaluation.

Figure 3.1: The case-study MSPs scored on MSP input indicators

Actors and state involvement   All but 2 (MSPs 4 and 12) of the MSPs studied included several state institutions. All MSPs involved civil society organisations (mostly NGOs and service committees). All but one MSP (3) included beneficiary communities. Remarkably, none of the MSPs included private actors as partners (only as contractors). It thus seems that the various (public; private; civil) societal sectors tend to be represented unequally in MSPs for service delivery and that MSPs predominantly constitute partnerships between state and civil society. Demarcations between the public, private and civil society sectors, however, can be deluding. In Burundi, for example, the distinction between an *association sans but lucrative* (ASBL) – an NGO – and a private company puzzled respondents from all target groups. With state institutions, too, the difference between companies and public institutions is increasingly vague. Where state providers are subject to privatization developments, as in DR Congo, public, semi-public and private institutions overlap. Moreover, consortia of MSP actors are not static. Often, some actors form a core group and others join only when relevant for them.

Of the MSPs including state institutions, all included 'specialized state institutions:' state institutions specifically involved in service delivery (such as ministries and technical services). 6 MSPs (MSPs 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 10) also comprised 'general state institutions' of a more representative and administrative nature (such as village councils and municipalities). General and specialized state institutions are included for different reasons. Where general institutions are hoped to bring representativeness to the MSP as well as a means of mobilizing beneficiaries, specialized institutions are sought for their expertise and capacity (either for the MSP to draw upon it or to increase it). In addition, MSPs that include state institutions often do so because they feel they have to or because they are legally obliged to do so (MSPs 5 and 6 are exceptions). The degree of state involvement in MSPs may also correlate with the nature of the donor supporting the MSP. In general, MSPs supported by (I)NGOs had less extensive state inclusion than MSPs supported by bilateral or multilateral organizations.

Initiation   Of our sample, 8 MSPs (MSPs 1, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12) were initiated in a top-down manner and 4 MSPs (MSPs, 2, 4, 5 and 7) were initiated bottom-up. MSPs that were initiated bottom-up, tended to be pragmatic in terms of inclusion (i.e. guided by the question 'whom do we need to make this MSP work?'). Top-down initiated MSPs, on the other hand, had a more principled rationale of inclusion (i.e. guided by the question 'who needs this MSP to work?'). This probably originates in the fact that most local actors starting an MSPs have little resources and need to obtain these through the partners they include, while national – and especially international – actors usually supply the resources for MSPs and do not necessarily need further partners to provide these. Warner's (2007:22) observation that "where MSPs are introduced by the state or a donor [i.e. top-down], co-opting the grassroots proves a difficult task; conversely, where MSP initiatives are bottom-up, it may be difficult to co-opt the public and private sectors" seems oversimplified. While MSPs might be initiated top-down, this need not mean their governance is also organised in a top-down manner, as each phase of the MSP can be organised and structured differently. Conversely, seemingly bottom-up initiatives may be incorporated in top-down dynamics (Hilhorst, Christoplos and van der Haar 2011).

Objectives   6 of the 12 MSPs studied (MSPs 2, 6, 8, 10, 11 and 12) had objectives that mixed service implementation (construction; rehabilitation; enhancing quantity) with service governance (management; facilitation; capacity building; awareness raising; monitoring and evaluation). 3 MSPs (MSPs 4, 5 and 7) focused solely on service implementation and 3 MSPs (MSPs 1, 3 and 9) were concerned exclusively with service governance. Three quarters of our MSP case-studies, then, included service governance issues in their objectives and it might be this (partial) focus on the governance of services that is characteristic of service delivery initiatives that include stakeholders from state, civil society and beneficiary communities.

BOX 1: Fighting the Wall. Merging strategic and practical objectives in Qalqilya – the Palestinian Territories (MSP 5)

While the MSPs studied in our research are concerned essentially with service delivery, the context in which they are situated sometimes encourages them to go beyond the technical and even governmental aspects of service provision and venture into the realm of politics.

A Palestinian MSP involved in a rehabilitation project for ground water wells managed to kill two birds with one stone. On the one hand, the MSP improved service delivery by rehabilitating the wells and thereby allowing Palestinian farmers to develop irrigation opportunities and raise their crop revenue. On the other hand, because the ground water wells in question were located in the contested strip of land between the Green Line (the official border between Israeli and Palestinian territory) and the Wall (built by Israel on Palestinian land), their rehabilitation had political repercussions as well. Due to a law stating that Palestinian farming land not cultivated for several seasons will automatically fall to the Israeli state and the restrictions for Palestinian farmers to work on their land west of the Wall (but east of the Green Line), the Palestinian lands in question risked being confiscated by Israel. However, partly due to the rehabilitation of the wells and the subsequent surge in cultivation, the lands were preserved for the Palestinian communities.

Figure 3.2: DRC – cable network and self-made device to raise the voltage (pictures taken by Nynke Douma)

Funding   The funding or resource support of the MSPs studied more often than not came from bilateral or multilateral donors. 7 of the 12 MSPs studied (MSPs 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10 and 11) received bilateral or multilateral funding. 3 MSPs (MSPs 1, 7 and 9) got financial support from (I)NGOs. 1 MSP (MSP 4) had no source of funding and of 1 MSP (MSP 12) we could not obtain information on funding. None of the MSPs were exclusively financed by state institutions, but 4 MSPs (MSPs 6, 7, 10 and 11) received partial financial support from state institutions or channelled donor money through state institutions. For our cases, MSPs funding thus tends to be dependent on the strategic outlook of bilateral and multilateral donors. The dependency on donor funding pins MSPs down on shorter timeframes than ideally envisioned by stakeholders. Within the MSPs studied, moreover, there were

distinctions between actors that were financially supported for their MSP contribution and those that were not. In Burundi (MSPs 1 and 2), for example, only implementing partners of the donor (NGOs and ministerial departments) were funded, not the local actors involved (local administrations and water committees) who thereby became beneficiaries rather than partners. These differentiated funding methods may complicate the relations between the funded and non-funded contributors.

Scope   5 of the 12 MSPs (MSPs 1, 2, 4, 7 and 8) functioned on a local level and 7 MSPs (MSPs 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11 and 12) operated on a meso-level. The latter have a coordinating structure at the meso-level, but also an implementing component on the local level.

3.1.2.   *The governance of MSPs for service delivery: MSP throughput*

The input of MSPs has generally received more attention from the initiators of the MSPs studied than the throughput of the MSPs – their inclusiveness; division of roles and responsibilities; their decision-making procedures; their accountability; their communication structures; and their degree of formalization. This is in line with the conventional outlook of MSPs as implementation modalities, but does not entirely reflect the significance of the process of stakeholder interaction both for the stakeholders themselves and for the eventual impact of the MSP on service delivery and on state legitimacy as described in chapters 4 and 5 respectively.

	Inclusiveness	Division of roles	Decision-making	Accountability	Communication	Formalization
MSP 1	H	H	U	H	H	M
		State: F				
MSP 2	L	H	U	M	H	M
		State: L				
MSP 3	L	H	U	H	M	H
		State: P				
MSP 4	H	L	U	L	L	M
		State: -				
MSP 5	H	H	J	H	H	H
		State: F				
MSP 6	M	H	J	H	H	H
		State: L				
MSP 7	H	M	U	L	L	M
		State: P				
MSP 8	???	???	???	???	L	???
		State: ???				
MSP 9	M	H	J	L	L	H
		State: F				
MSP 10	H	H	J	M	M	H
		State: P				
MSP 11	M	H	U	H	H	H

		State: L				
MSP 12	L	H	U	L	H	L
		State: -				

Inclusiveness	The degree to which stakeholder selection is broad, transparent, flexible and jointly determined (rather than narrow, static and pre-established) L = low inclusiveness M = medium inclusiveness H = high inclusiveness
Division of roles	The degree to which the division of roles and responsibilities between the participating stakeholders are clear and undisputed L = low clarity regarding role division M = medium clarity regarding role division H = high clarity regarding role division And the role of state institutions in the MSP F = facilitative role state L = leading role state P = passive role state
Decision-making	Whether decisions are made by all participating stakeholders together (or a body representing all of them) or by a leading actor or coalition U = unilateral decision-making J = joint decision-making
Accountability	The degree to which decision-making and organisation is transparent and controlled by internal complaint and report procedures; rules and regulations; and codes of conduct L = low accountability M = medium accountability H = high accountability
Communication	The relative frequency of MSP meetings and the degree to which information is shared equitably and transparently L = low frequency of meeting and information-sharing M = medium frequency of meeting and information-sharing H = high frequency of meeting and information-sharing
Formalization	The degree of formal structuring of the MSP (through a secretariat, governing bodies and executive committees, coordinating groups and/or constitutions) L = low formalization M = medium formalization H = high formalization
MSPs are scored based on the respective case-study and country reports and validated by the research team-leaders. Data are based on project documentation and interviews and reflect the opinions of the majority of the participating stakeholders and the research team leader's evaluation.	

Figure 3.3: The case-study MSPs scored on MSP throughput indicators

Inclusiveness   Of the 12 MSPs studied, 5 MSPs (MSPs 1, 4, 5, 7 and 10) had a high level of inclusiveness; 3 MSPs had a medium level of inclusiveness (MSPs 6, 9 and 11); and 3 MSPs (2, 3 and

12) had a low level of inclusiveness.[8] The MSPs studied, then, overall were rather open and inclusive in selecting stakeholders. As will be further explicated under decision-making below, however, such inclusiveness should not be mistaken for equality. More often than not (in all cases except MSPs 5, 6, 9 and 10) an inclusive selection of stakeholders was accompanied by rather hierarchical decision-making based on benefactor-beneficiary rather than partnership relations.

Division of roles   In the MSPs studied, two MSPs (4 and 7) had an unclear division of roles. All other MSPs studied had a clear division of roles. This division of roles was not always formalized (in the form of, for example, Memorandum of Understanding or a Terms of Reference). Rather, the tasks of each actor were broadly defined, but transformed under influence of changes in the capacity or strategy of each actor and the waxing and waning cooperation between them. The management of MSPs for service delivery tends to be dominated by NGOs, with occasional support and steering by (national) state institutions. The implementation phase of MSPs appears to be the most truly 'multi-stakeholder' (also including local state and beneficiary representatives). Thus, in most cases, the division of roles was explicit, and often mutually recognized, but not static.

Decision-making   In 7 of the 12 MSPs (MSPs 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 11 and 12), decision-making was unilateral (i.e. decisions were made by one actor or a limited number of leading actors); in 4 MSPs (MSPs 5, 6, 9 and 10) decision-making was joint (through all partners or by a representative body). The idea of MSPs as neutral spaces for negotiation based on equality (Moreyra and Wegerich 2006) was thus not reflected in our case-studies. The MSP actors that provide, receive or manage funding take decisions on the implementing level and are thereby seen as key determinants by the other stakeholders. These decision-makers are coalitions of MSP actors rather than single actors (donors with standard implementing partners that had gathered an MSP around them, for example). Local actors seem to have less decision-making clout in MSPs, partly because funds are mostly provided by (inter)national actors. There thus seems to be a discrepancy between what various MSP actors bring to the MSP and their influence on MSP governance. While support by state institutions and community involvement is promoted by MSP decision-makers as crucially important for the success of MSPs, this does not translate in more official decision-making power for these actors. If we follow Verhallen et al (2007:261) that "critical conditions for MSPs to make a difference are recognition of interdependencies and the willingness of involved actors to take joint responsibility," we note that while interdependencies were widely recognized by MSP actors in our study, MSP decision-making showed less readiness to carry joint responsibility.

Accountability   The extent to which the MSPs studied have internal accountability structures or rules varies significantly for the MSPs studied. 5 of the 12 MSPs (1, 3, 5, 6 and 11) had a high level of internal accountability; 2 MSPs (2 and 10) had a medium accountability level; and 4 MSPs (4, 7, 9 and 12) had a low accountability level.[9] Note, however, that our scoring of MSPs on accountability was based on the availability of internal complaint and report procedures; rules and regulations; and codes of conduct, which might say little about accountability in practice.

Communication   Of the MSP studied, 4 MSPs (4, 7, 8 and 9) had infrequent meetings and/or a low level of information-sharing. 2 MSPs had a medium level of meeting and information-sharing (MSPs 3 and 10). The other 6 MSPs all had frequent meetings and/or a high level of information-sharing. The importance of informal meetings for MSP functioning that was found among all MSPs, suggests the significance of consultation among all categories of stakeholders included in the MSP. The MSPs we studied were guided more by pragmatism than by protocol and most MSPs had phases

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[8] Of MSP 8 we could not establish the level of inclusiveness. MSP 8 is the MSP in Gaza, the Palestinian Territories, where we could not do extensive fieldwork and hence had to base our analysis on secondary data. This means that especially throughput indicators were hard to score.
[9] Of MSP 8 we could not establish the level of accountability.

of intense meeting intermitted by periods of lack of coordination activity. While generally (in all cases, except MSPs 4 and 12) a schedule of meetings existed, more ad hoc, needs-based meetings also occurred. Such unprompted meetings were often initiated by grassroots actors and were described by respondents as important for the functioning of MSPs. These meetings did not always fall neatly within the official MSP sphere as MSP related matters were also addressed in meetings for non-MSP purposes – underlining the arena character of MSPs.

Formalization   6 of the studied MSPs (3, 5, 6, 9, 10 and 11) were extensively formalized; 4 MSPs (1, 2, 4 and 7) were partially formalized (with, for instance, formal relations between some partners and informal connections between others); and 1 MSP (12) had only a very low level of formalization.[10] Most MSPs studied were thus formalized to some extent. Yet such formalization only concerned part of the MSP dynamics. On paper and on the coordinating level, MSPs (except MSP 12) were formalized and regulated, but on the implementing level, many MSPs (except perhaps MSP 5) were not recognized as a homogenous initiative by beneficiary communities.

BOX 2: The bewildering jargon of MSPs. From PICC to LRUC in Ramechhap – Nepal (MSP 11)

MSPs, just like other development initiatives, can be extremely challenging to understand and dissect, not in the least due to their inaccessible terminology and complex structures. This was noted by researchers, MSP partners and beneficiary communities alike.

One, very successful, MSP on road construction in Nepal might present a case in point. The District Road Support Program (DRSP) consists of two levels. On the central level, there are no less than three different coordination structures: the Ministry of Local Development's Joint Steering Committee (MoLD-JSC), the Programme Implementation Coordination Committee (PICC) and the Department of Local Infrastructure and Development of Agricultural Roads' Program Coordination Cell (DoLIDAR-PCC). These structures are replenished by five MSP entities – distinct from MSP actors – on the operational level: the District Road Coordination Committee (DRCC), the Local Road Coordination Committee (LRCC), the Local Road User Committee (LRUC), the Road Construction Group (RCG) and the DRSP District Support Team (DRSP-DST). The activities of each of these entities and their communication and coordination are recorded to some extent, but the entirety of the endeavour seems to be hard to comprehend even by the core DRSP functionaries.

3.2. Key context factors that shape MSPs: histories, politics and institutions

Besides the general context factors influencing service delivery in fragile contexts explored in chapter 2 (conflict; politicization; limited capacity; and vulnerability to external shocks), three context factors in particular influenced the input and throughput of the MSPs studied: previous cooperation experiences; local and international politics; and the available local institutional support.

3.2.1. Histories of cooperation

All MSPs featured affiliations between organisations that paved the way for the MSP – be they between donors and their bilateral implementation partners; NGOs and their local counterparts; or local communities and technical services. Such existing networks allow for more informal and extensive communication and information-sharing, on which MSP functioning, according to respondents, greatly depends. Histories of previous cooperation affect the inclusion dynamics of MSPs. The actors included in the MSPs studied were mostly (MSPs 1 and 6 are exceptions) not selected on extensive mapping or stakeholder-identification procedures, but were based on existing networks and previous relations. Swyngedouw et al (2002) note that coalitions often emerge between

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[10] Of MSP 8 we could not establish the level of formalization.

various MSP actors. Our cases, however, show that such coalitions do not only emerge during the MSP, but exist before MSPs are initiated.

3.2.2. Politics

Politics affect MSPs for service delivery in fragile contexts through personification of services and election dynamics. MSPs risk being co-opted by political parties. This was especially evident in Burundi (MSP 2), where we heard accounts of opposition members refusing to participate in compulsory communitarian work meetings. The MSP used these meetings to mobilize beneficiaries, but they were perceived by the opposition as de facto propaganda meetings for the ruling party. In Nepal (MSPs 9, 10 and 11), district development committees responsible for service delivery implementation were seen as patronage networks in the absence of an elected body to monitor them. Such developments are most evident during elections. One of the Congolese MSPs (MSP 4) received funding from a parliamentary candidate during the 2006 election campaign. After the elections, support was withdrawn again and the MSP was left to fence for itself, having to deal with a parallel, politically affiliated shadow committee within the MSP. Burundian local authorities (in MSP 2) withdrew support for fee collection by local water committees to win votes for reelection, resulting in a dislocation of state/non-state cooperation as well as a decrease in community confidence in the MSP. The Palestinian cases, finally, show the effect of periods of violent conflict (and occupation) on MSPs. The Palestinian MSPs studied were affected by popular uprising during the Second Intifada (MSPs 5, 6 and 7); dual political administrations as an effect of the Hamas-Fatah strife (MSP 8); and administrative and logistical obstruction due to Israeli occupation (MSPs 5, 6, 7 and 8).[11]

International donor politics also affect MSPs. International prioritization and initiatives can impact the relative prioritization of various basic service sectors (DFID 2011:33). They can thereby either broaden or narrow the space of opportunity for MSPs. Burundian and Nepalese national water policies, for example, closely follow internationally established preferences and concerns (such as the Paris Declaration, the MDGs, UN WASH and climate criteria and multilateral African agreements). To illustrate: the focus of one of the Burundian MSPs (MSP 1) closely resembled the priority issues of this national water policy and thereby international policy. In Nepal (in MSPs 9, 10 and 11), attempts to reach MDG coverage standards have, according to WASH experts, resulted in a focus on realizing full coverage, which requires new construction, rather than sustainable coverage, which demands funds and dedication for maintenance and management. In DR Congo, MSP 3 was, according to local respondents, hampered by the residual humanitarian mode of the leading INGOs that resulted in limited timeframes and a focus on working with other NGOs.

BOX 3: Getting hold of the keys. MSP responses to politicization in Bukavu – DR Congo (MSP 4)

When a Congolese MSP aiming to connect Bukavu's Chai neighbourhood to the electricity grid, after various years of lack of funding, finally managed to raise enough money to purchase the much needed generator, the MSPs steering committee was co-opted by a political party aiming to use the initiative (and the money acquired by it) for election purposes. This resulted in the degeneration and malfunctioning of the MSP. After two lost years, however, the population – that was supposed to benefit from the MSP and raised the money for the MSP – took the keys of the generator cabin away from the politicized committee and handed them to the state's electricity enterprise. In a meeting between the neighbourhood leaders, later on, a transitional committee was chosen. While few improvements have been made, the event shows remarkable empowerment on behalf of civil and communal MSP actors.

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[11] These effects, however, were mixed. The MSP in Gaza (MSP 8) exemplified how politicization – in this case the conflict between the parallel Fatah and Hamas administrations – obstructed an MSP service delivery initiative. The MSPs in the Northern West Bank (MSPs 5 and 6), on the other hand, illustrate the detrimental effect of political conflict on MSPs, but also the resilience MSPs can develop in the face of this.

3.2.3. Institutional environment

The institutional environment at the local level also affected the functioning of the MSPs studied. The existence of local management structures that can serve as a focal point for organisation and implementation activities can be important. In Burundi, *Régies Communales de l'Eau* (communal water committees) functioned as the de facto core of both MSPs studied (MSPs 1 and 2). These committees provided an entrance point to both local communities and local hydrological infrastructures. In Nepal (MSPs 9, 10, 11 and 12), local committees abound, but are mostly put in place at the occasion of an intervention, rather than being pre-existing entities, and therefore have more problems with playing a vanguard role for MSPs. In the Palestinian Territories, the focal point for the MSPs studied (MSPs 5, 6 and 8) appears to be national, the Palestinian Water Authority, rather than local (user or sector committees).

CHAPTER 4

THE IMPACT OF MSPS FOR SERVICE DELIVERY ON SERVICE DELIVERY

This chapter concerns the first part of our main research question: how do MSPs for service delivery affect services? and one of our six sub-questions:

- What are the MSPs' outputs in terms of service delivery?

Assessing the outputs of the MSPs studied, has yielded three main conclusions. First, the effect of MSPs on service delivery is widely divergent but by and large modestly positive in terms of achieving MPS objectives, contributing to the service delivery capacity of MSP actors, affecting state policy and enhancing sustainability. Second, the extent to which MSPs achieved objectives and contributed capacity, policy and sustainability was influenced by the MSPs' throughput. Third, the sustainability (in terms of capacity, finances and institutionalization) of service delivery is in many cases not enhanced significantly by MSPs, despite this being a major concern of most stakeholders. This is related to missed opportunities of MSPs in terms of identifying and capacitating the actors responsible for follow-up; dealing with cost-recovery of services; and institutionally embedding service initiatives.

4.1. MSP outputs: achieving objectives, developing capacity, influencing policy and striving for sustainability

	Achievement objectives	Capacity development	Effect on policy	Sustainability
MSP 1	H	H	L	H
MSP 2	M	L	L	L
MSP 3	M	L	M	L
MSP 4	L	L	L	L
MSP 5	H	M	L	M
MSP 6	H	H	H	H
MSP 7	H	M	???	L
MSP 8	M	???	???	???
MSP 9	M	M	L	H
MSP 10	M	M	H	M
MSP 11	H	H	H	H
MSP 12	H	L	L	M

Achievement objectives	The degree to which the MSP has reached the objectives it set for itself L = low level of achieving objectives M = medium level of achieving objectives H = high level of achieving objectives
Development of capacity	The degree to which the MSP has contributed to the skills, knowledge and resources of individual participating stakeholders L = low level of capacity development

	M = medium level of capacity development H = high level of capacity development
Effect on policy	The degree to which the MSP has affected official policy and decision-making structures and documents L = low level of policy influence M = medium level of policy influence H = high level of policy influence
Sustainability	The degree to which stakeholder interaction within the MSP and the outputs it has yielded have been able to continue to function at the same level of quality and quantity without external support. This regards capacities, finances and institutional support L = low level of sustainability M = medium level of sustainability H = high level of sustainability

MSPs are scored based on the respective case-study and country reports and validated by the research team-leaders. Data are based on project documentation and interviews and reflect the opinions of the majority of the participating stakeholders and the research team leader's evaluation.

Figure 4.1: The case-study MSPs scored on MSP output indicators

Achievement of objectives   MSPs have affected service delivery predominantly positively by reaching the majority of their objectives and thereby improving the quality, quantity, reliability, accessibility and affordability of service implementation and governance (depending on the specific objectives of each MSP). Of the 12 MSPs studied, 6 MSPs reached their objectives (MSPs 1, 5, 6, 7, 11 and 12); 5 MSPs reached part of their objectives (MSPs 2, 3, 8, 9 and 10); and only 1 MSP (4) did not reach its objectives.

Opinions on the extent to which MSP objectives were achieved, however, vary distinctively across target groups. Stakeholders often do not agree on the successfulness of the MSP. MSP members are more enthusiastic about the degree to which MSP objectives were met than end-users and external experts. This is related to a difference in implementation related objectives and governance oriented objectives. Beneficiaries look, first and foremost, at the implementation of service delivery. As soon as performance drops (due to maintenance or capacity problems), their appreciation decreases as well. MSP members, on the other hand, look more at each others' performance in the process of governing service delivery (project planning, decision making, implementation, and cooperation).

Capacity development   MSPs have also, in some cases, affected basic utility service delivery by contributing to the capacity development of individual stakeholders. 3 MSPs (1, 6 and 11) extensively contributed to capacity-building of participating actors; 4 MSPs (5, 7, 9 and 10) contributed modestly to capacity; and 4 MSPs (2, 3, 4 and 12) contributed minimally to capacity.[12]

Effect on policy   MSPs have, furthermore, in a limited number of cases, influenced policy-making. 3 MSPs (6, 10 and 11) have extensively contributed to policy-making; 1 MSP (MSP 3) affected policy-making, but only modestly; 6 MSPs (1, 2, 4, 5, 9 and 12) had minimal to no effect on policy-making.[13]

Sustainability   Finally, some MSPs have affected service delivery by contributing to service sustainability in terms of capacity, finances and institutionalization. Of the studied MSPs, 4 (MSPs 1, 6,

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[12] Of MSP 8 we could not establish the impact on capacity of participating actors.
[13] Of MSPs 8 and 9 we could not establish the impact on policy.

9 and 11) were sustainable; 3 MSPs (5, 10 and 12) were partially sustainable; and 4 MSPs (2, 3, 4 and 7) were unsustainable.[14]

4.1.1. *Correlations between MSP input and throughput and MSP output*

The outputs of the MSPs studied are influenced by input and throughput factors as presented in chapter 3 above. The throughput of MSPs especially seems to correlate with MSP outputs: high levels of internal accountability and communication especially correspond with high levels of achievement of objectives; capacity development and sustainability.

- The differences between the MSPs with high levels of achieving their objectives (MSPs 1, 5, 6, 7, 11 and 12) and the MSPs that had only partially or not at all reached their objectives, manifested themselves mostly concerning MSP throughput – inclusiveness, accountability and communication.

    o The 6 MSPs that reached their objectives on average had higher levels of inclusion than the 6 MSPs that reached only part of their objectives or none at all.[15]

    o The 6 MSPs that reached their objectives on average had higher levels of internal accountability than the 6 MSPs that reached only part of their objectives or none at all. Nevertheless, two MSPs (7 and 12) had low levels of internal accountability, but did achieve their objectives.

    o The 6 MSPs that reached their objectives all (except MSP 7) had frequent communication and information-sharing. The 6 MSPs that reached only part of their objectives or none at all had varying levels of communication and information-sharing (from low to medium to high).

- The differences between the MSPs with high levels of capacity development (MSPs 1, 6 and 7) and the MSPs that had a modest to limited effect on capacity development, manifested themselves mostly concerning MSP throughput – accountability and communication.

    o The 3 MSPs with high levels of capacity development all had high levels of internal accountability, while the other 9 MSPs had varying levels of accountability.

    o The 3 MSPs with high levels of capacity development all had frequent communication and information-sharing, while the other 9 MSPs had varying levels of communication.

- The differences between the MSPs with an extensive effect on policy making (MSPs 6, 10 and 11) and the MSPs that had only a modest to limited effect on policy-making, manifested themselves mostly concerning MSP input[16] – state involvement; initiation; objectives; funding; and scope – but also regarding throughput – formalization.

    o All 3 MSPs with an extensive effect on policy-making had high levels of state involvement, while the others 9 MSPs had varying levels of state involvement (ranging from none to medium to high).

    o All 3 MSPs with an extensive effect on policy-making were initiated in a top-down manner.

    o All 3 MSPs with an extensive effect on policy-making had dual (implementation and governance) objectives.

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[14] Of MSP 8 we could not establish the sustainability.
[15] Please refer to figure 3.3. for the respective MSP throughput scores.
[16] Please refer to figure 3.1. for the respective MSP input scores.

- o All 3 MSPs with an extensive effect on policy-making received partial state funding.

- o All 3 MSPs with an extensive effect on policy-making operated on the meso-level.

- o The 3 MSPs that extensively contributed to state policy-making all had high levels of formalization, while the others 9 MSPs had varying levels of formalization.

- The differences between the 4 sustainable MSPs (1, 6, 9 and 11) and the MSPs that were only partially, or not at all, sustainable, manifested themselves mostly concerning MSP throughput – division of roles; accountability; communication; and formalization.

  - o The 4 sustainable MSPs all had a facilitating or leading role for state institutions, while the others 8 MSPs had varying roles for states institutions (ranging from passive to facilitating to leading).

  - o The 4 sustainable MSPs on average had higher levels of internal accountability than the 8 MSPs that were partially or minimally sustainable.

  - o The 4 sustainable MSPs on average had more frequent communication and information-sharing.

  - o The 4 sustainable MSPs on average had higher levels of formalization.

4.1.2. The relevance of state institutions for MSP output

The specific role state institutions play in MSPs can affect MSP output. Where state institutions played a central (leading or facilitating) role in the MSP, this has been identified by stakeholders as an important ingredient for realizing MSP output. Where state institutions have played a passive role in the MSPs studied, in turn, this has repeatedly been mentioned as a missed opportunity. In only 3 MSPs (2, 6 and 11) did state institutions have a leading role in planning, decision-making and implementation. In 2 of these cases (MSPs 6 and 11), this corresponded with high scores for all 4 output indicators. In 3 other MSPs (1, 5 and 9), state institutions played a facilitating role. In Burundi (MSP 1), for instance, the local state institutions provided the main communication and mobilization structures for the MSP. In the Palestinian Territories (MSP 5), state institutions facilitated communication between local communities and donors and national state institutions provided legal and institutional support for the MSP as well as monitoring structures. These MSPs had relatively positive outputs. In 3 MSPs (3, 7 and 10), finally, state institutions were represented, but had a passive role. In 2 of these cases (MSPs 3 and 7) this correlated with relatively lower output scores.

The degree to which state involvement in, and government approaches to, MSPs are enshrined in policy influences state institutions' position in MSPs. In Nepal, the MSP modality is embraced in national policy as the guiding principle for development coordination. In the Palestinian Territories, too, policy focuses on coordination among stakeholders, predominantly Palestinian and Israeli authorities and the international community. In DR Congo, on the other hand, (outdated) laws present the state as having the exclusive mandate to provide services. In Burundi, policy on development coordination is more bilateral than multi-stakeholder oriented. These differences have shaped the opportunity for MSPs to engage with state institutions and to link up to existing state structures and policies. This has particularly shaped MSP sustainability as further discussed in chapter 4.2.3 below. Where national policies embraced MSP like modalities, as in Nepal and the Palestinian Territories, MSPs have more often been able to link up with national institutions (MSPs 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10). Where this was less the case, as in Burundi, MSPs more often engaged with local state institutions (MSP 1) or hardly engaged with the state at all, as in DR Congo (MSPs 3 and 4). Differences in institutional context have also influenced the position state institutions can take vis-à-vis MSP initiatives. State representatives in Nepal and Palestine were more supportive of the MSPs studied than Congolese

state institutions. In Burundi, there was a difference between local state institutions, that pragmatically embraced MSPs and national state representatives, who tended to see MSPs as a threat.

Figure 4.2: The Palestinian Territories – irrigation canals and water tanks (pictures taken by Nora Stel)

4.2. Sustainable services: a missed MSP opportunity

Besides the achievement of MSP objectives, MSP sustainability was, for our respondents, a more pressing concern than other MSP outputs (capacity development and effect on policy). Therefore we will devote additional attention to this here.

The MSPs studied have made positive contributions to the sustainability of services by identifying the needs and capacities of relevant stakeholders (de facto strength and weakness assessments) and by connecting these capacities. Nevertheless, the sustainability of service delivery is not enhanced optimally by MSPs. Only 4 out of the 12 studied MSPs were sustainable. This is especially regrettable considering that respondents agreed that sustainability is one of the most pressing issues MSPs need to face. Moreover, it is seen as troubling for MSPs because the MSP modality is often presented as specifically suitable to address sustainability problems (Multipart 2008).

Sustainability – the ability to continue activities and guarantee outcomes on the same quality level and in the long run without external support – depends on three core components: capacity; finances; and institutional embedding. Our research has laid bare problems that MSPs have trouble addressing in all three areas.

4.2.1. Division of roles and developing of capacity

For the majority of the MSPs studied, it seems that the MSP actors with the most direct stake in the MSPs' output – beneficiaries and the local state – are expected to take the principal role in follow-up. Yet, these actors frequently fail to ensure continuation or preservation of the MSP or the service improvements the MSP has generated.

Local state institutions especially seem to be seen (except in DR Congo, MSPs 3 and 4) as the natural guardians of MSP achievements and the MSPs we studied that were sustainable, all had a relevant (facilitating or leading, rather than passive) role for the state. However, state institutions in most cases (with the exception of MSPs 5 and 6) had the least capacity of the gathered stakeholders. This capacity, also, is not developed according to envisioned follow-up responsibilities – tackling, for example, the sustainable use of resources and management and maintenance skills.

Many development initiatives – and the MSPs studied are no exception – present end-user communities as a key actor in maintaining services after interventions. The MSPs studied involve communities in two ways. First, end-users were organized in committees or associations and as such have a chance to influence the course and prioritization of the MSP (as in MSPs 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and 10). This form was especially prevalent in Nepal, where citizen participation is broadly practiced in development initiatives. Second, beneficiaries were included as a work force (as in MSP 2, 6, 11 and 12). Such employment opportunities, and in some cases related social packages, can be effective means to get local communities aboard MSPs. While there are widespread critiques on the current emphasis on participation and many authors claim that it is an overvalued concept (Robinson 2007:7; Burde 2004:73), respondents in our research are convinced of the importance of mobilizing and sensitizing beneficiaries to make services more sustainable. But while the MSPs handling community involvement most creatively and leaving most space for community initiatives (such as MSPs 1 and 5) have yielded durable community involvement this does not translate directly to sustainability and our case-studies have not indicated that MSPs with more community involvement are necessarily more sustainable. Community involvement, then, will need to be coupled with targeted capacity-building for it to contribute to sustainability of MSPs and services (Brinkerhoff 2010:70).

4.2.2. *Financial stability and cost-contribution*

The lack of sustainability of MSPs is also related to their dependence on donor funding. Donor aid for service delivery is generally temporary and can be volatile, making it difficult for governments to effectively plan for longer-term public investments in the service sector. It is also often earmarked and mostly not spent on recurrent expenditures, leaving many services in place but only partly operational. MSP 2 had great difficulty in including social mobilization in its activities as a result of tight funding frames. In MSP 5, donors were willing but unable to continue monitoring the MSP after implementation due to rigid planning outlines. Local member organizations of MSP 3 felt that the pooled fund created by the MSP favored international organizations with the experience and capacity to file extensive applications.

However, the lack of sustainability of services, is, according to a majority of stakeholders, even more the result of limited cost-recovery or cost-contribution and a failure to increase or utilize willingness to pay for basic services. Shifting financial contributions from benefactors to users can also generate a consumer-based agency that could lead to service users more actively holding service providers accountable. 4 MSPs have helped increase willingness to pay for services, contributing to sustainability of service delivery and tackling free rider problems. Sometimes directly, by developing innovative cost-contribution mechanisms (MSPs 1 and 10), and sometimes indirectly, by improving services (MSPs 5 and 6). By and large, however, willingness to pay for services in the studied contexts was low due to several reasons. First, service delivery is often of bad quality and characterized by a vicious cycle: people do not pay because services are not up to standard and services are not up to standard because people do not pay – a sequence apparent especially in Burundi and Nepal. Second, people have little faith in the proper use of the money they would pay. Respondents from all countries stressed the interrelatedness between their willingness to pay and the financial accountability and management of (state) institutions. Misuse of funds and corruption cause a decreasing willingness to pay for services. This is illustrated by the fact that the MSPs that were sustainable all had high levels

of internal accountability. Third, people are not always accustomed or able to pay for services – although this diverged per country and per service sector.[17]

BOX 4: A Crash course in undermining state legitimacy – the importance of financial management

Funding matters because it plays an important role in people's perceptions: where the money comes from and how it is managed significantly impacts respondents appreciation of the MSP process and their interpretation of MSP outcomes.

State institutions, however, are not always aware of this – or do not seem to care about it. We found cases of local administrators in Burundi that have huge water payment debts with the local water committee and simultaneously demand people to pay for their services; of Congolese politicians who sabotage user committees to embezzle funds for services for their election campaigns and subsequently plead the importance of dealing with non-payment and illegal service delivery. In DR Congo, moreover, electricity prices in the Eastern part of the country are five times higher than elsewhere. When a consumer initiative went to court to remedy this; rather than lowering the prices in the East, the prices in the rest of the country were raised. Due to a separation between state enterprises providing services and ministries supposedly controlling these enterprises, the management of these enterprises is guided more by corporate needs to generate funds than by an obligation to provide good services. Such episodes not only directly harm state legitimacy, it also impairs people's willingness to pay for services and thereby the cost-recovery and sustainability of services at large.

4.2.3. *Formalization and institutional embedding*

A third major reason for limited sustainability of MSPs can be found in their sometimes rather isolated nature. The 4 sustainable MSPs from our sample had higher levels of communication and information-sharing and formalization than the less sustainable MSPs. They also shared institutional embedding in state structures. In the Palestinian Territories, the two most sustainable MSP initiatives (MSPs 5 and 6) were those with extensive national state involvement. Sustainability of the projects was ensured through integration of the project objectives in policy strategies; providing continual support with bureaucratic procedures and acquiring permits related to maintenance works. In Nepal, too, MSP 11 – the MSP with most extensive and formalized relations with ministerial plans and programs – had a positive and sustainable output. In Burundi, MSP 1 was integrated with the drafting of development plans for the communal administration. In many other cases, however, (MSPs 2, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 12) best practices proved hard to replicate or translate to different areas or administrative levels. Overall, the MSPs studied created various opportunities for establishing connections with broader service delivery structures and national programs and strategies. For most of the MSPs studied, however, these opportunities are then not structurally utilized.

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[17] While services in DR Congo are, for instance, vastly more expensive than in Burundi, willingness to pay is higher in DR Congo than in Burundi as there are less free-rider opportunities for Congolese consumers. In the Palestinian Territories, people are more accustomed to pay for water and electricity, both in the form of taxes and in the form of billing. Regarding waste collection, payment is less organised, but exists and largely goes through municipalities. In Nepal, people pay service delivery taxes to local authorities, but not unconditionally or exclusively. In some instances, people also pay monthly fees to user committees. Here, important differences between service sectors manifest themselves. In the Palestinian Territories, for example, the willingness to pay for solid waste services in MSP 6 has been much higher than expected. On the other hand, water is, by part of the population, seen as 'God given'.

CHAPTER 5

THE INFLUENCE OF MSPS FOR SERVICE DELIVERY ON STATE LEGITIMACY

Chapter 5 concerns the second part of our main research question: how do MSPs for service delivery affect the legitimacy of state institutions? and one of our six sub-questions:

- How does participation in the MSP affect the legitimacy of relevant state-institutions?

In the first part of this chapter we describe the MSPs' contributions to state legitimacy and identify the characteristics of those MSPs that had a legitimizing effect on the state. We attribute increases in state legitimacy mainly to better performance in the throughput of the MSPs as the major effects were found regarding process legitimacy. Overall, however, we observe that the legitimacy effects of MSPs are modest, mostly due to factors that relate to the characteristics of fragility discussed in chapter 2. In the second part of the chapter, we identify several factors that help MSPs to make a positive difference for state legitimacy. Importantly, we suggest that the increased collaboration among service delivery institutions may lead to better acceptance of the state by non-state actors that may eventually become brokers of state legitimacy.

5.1. MSP impacts on the legitimacy of state institutions

We identified a positive effect on state legitimacy for 4 of the 12 MSPs studied (MSPs 1, 2, 5 and 6).[18] For 7 MSPs (3, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 12), the overall legitimacy of the participating state institutions was not affected.[19] 1 MSP (MSP 4) actually undermined the legitimacy of state institutions.

The scope of the increases in legitimacy we found for these 4 cases – whether legitimacy was enhanced for MSP partners only, or for beneficiaries and external experts as well – was more or less similar for MSPs 1, 2 and 5. Regarding these MSPs, legitimacy was enhanced mainly in the eyes of MSP partners, but beneficiaries and experts also recognized increases in the legitimacy of the state institutions that had participated in the MSPs. For MSP 6, increases in state legitimacy especially pertained to MSP partners and experts as well as to community leaders. Beneficiaries and end-users themselves, in this case, appreciated the MSP, but did not specifically credit the state for it.

The increased legitimacy for these 4 cases we have deduced from references to, for instance, an augmented appreciation of the state's ability to mobilize, in the form of (I)NGOs and donors, the resources and expertise needed to improve services. Legitimacy was also connected to referrals to increased mutual trust and appreciation as a result of more coherent approaches to service provision among state institutions and increases in the coordination between state and non-state institutions (for instance through joint implementation and evaluation). Specific indicators for increased state legitimacy flowing from MSP 1 included the increased support of local state institutions for the communal water committee and improvements in the approachability and responsiveness of local state representatives when it came to water related problems. Beneficiaries said that, whereas "before you could not go in the morning to see the *chef de colline* about a water problem because he kept sleeping, now you can go during night and he is ready to help." Indications for improvements in state legitimacy particular for MSP 2 were, to name but two, a widely shared recognition of the value of the

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[18] Of MSP 8, we could not establish if there were changes in legitimacy attributed to participating state institutions.

[19] This does not mean there were no changes in state legitimacy. Legitimacy may have increased for some target groups, while it decreased for others. Overall, however, the net state legitimacy stayed constant.

involvement of a national state water department on the grassroots level and appreciation of the way in which the state institutions in the MSP guaranteed income earning opportunities for local workers. For MSP 5, in the Palestinian Territories, a remarkable example of an indication for growing state legitimacy was the widespread approval of the explicit strategic and political objective of the MSP to use rehabilitated wells to prevent land-capture by Israel. Concerning MSP 6, state legitimacy was, for instance, deduced from referrals to increased trust in state institutions as a result from their considerate approach to informal waste-pickers threatened to lose their 'job' as a result of the new solid waste management site.

When looking at the 4 MSPs studied that contributed to state legitimacy in relation to the different sources of state legitimacy identified in chapter 1 – general-embedded, performance, process and international legitimacy (OECD 2008:17) – we note that these MSPs have had the most profound impact on the process legitimacy of state institutions.[20]

- General-embedded legitimacy (in terms of extent to which service delivery is seen as a state responsibility and willingness to work through and with state institutions) shapes the context of MSPs and determines to what extent MSPs can hope to contribute to state legitimacy in the first place. In terms of knowledge of state institutions and willingness to pay, general-embedded legitimacy is also influenced by some of the MSPs studied.

- Performance legitimacy (the state's stake in improvements in service delivery in terms of coverage, affordability and accessibility and perceived state capacity) is related to the output of MSPs. A positive MSP output does not automatically lead to enhanced state legitimacy, as this requires that the positive changes are attributed to the state, which is not always the case. While MSP output needs to be positive for state legitimacy to emerge, this need not directly be linked to the participating state institutions, but can also be the merit of other stakeholders. In several cases (MSP 6 especially), however, positive MSP output was attributed to state institutions and resulted in performance legitimacy.

- State process legitimacy is linked with the process of stakeholder interaction, MSP throughput, and is most profoundly impacted by the MSPs studied. This regards the quality of the state's cooperation with non-state actors and beneficiaries-consumers (the shaping of relations and meeting of expectations) explored in more detail below; the coherence among state institutions; and the governance of service delivery.

- International legitimacy – the extent to which the state can utilize international actors and resources to improve services – showed itself as part of the category of process legitimacy and was impacted by the MSPs studied (for instance when state institutions were credited for 'bringing in' donors).

MSP output and state legitimacy   All MSPs studied that contributed to state legitimacy had relatively positive outputs, but not all MSPs with relatively good outputs contributed to state legitimacy (especially apparent for MSPs 9, 10, 11 and 12). The 4 MSPs that contributed to state legitimacy more often and more comprehensively achieved their objectives than the MSPs that did not contribute to state legitimacy. They also contributed more to capacity development. The MSPs that boosted state legitimacy did not influence policy more and were hardly any more sustainable than the

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[20] Increases in the perceived legitimacy of state institutions associated with MSP 1 predominantly regarded process and international legitimacy and to a lesser extent general-embedded legitimacy. Increased legitimacy for state institutions involved in MSP 2 first and foremost concerned international legitimacy and to a more modest degree process and performance legitimacy as well. Considering MSP 5, increased state legitimacy pertained to mainly to process legitimacy, but the MSP also had a mild positive effect on general-embedded and performance legitimacy. Increases in state legitimacy resulting from MSP 6 mainly concerned general-embedded and performance legitimacy and to a mode modest extent process legitimacy as well.

MSPs that did not contribute to state legitimacy. Overall, a positive effect on services seems a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for MSPs to contribute to state legitimacy.

MSP throughput and state legitimacy   State institutions also gain legitimacy directly through the process of stakeholder interaction (the throughput of the MSP). The 4 MSPs that contributed to state legitimacy had relatively high internal accountability standards and intensive communication. Most importantly, in the MSPs that contributed to state legitimacy state institutions played an important leading or facilitating role, whereas in the MSPs that did not contribute to state legitimacy, state institutions more often played a passive role (albeit not in MSPs 9 and 11). Thus, it seems it is predominantly the role of the state institutions themselves within the process – their interaction with other stakeholders and their perceived contribution to the MSPs success – that affects state legitimacy.

It is noteworthy that the attributions of state legitimacy we found were not necessarily based on convictions that state conduct in the contexts of these MSPs is good, or even good enough, in an on itself. Rather, state legitimacy is construed in an inherently comparative manner and state conduct in the MSPs discussed above is seen as better than in other, non-MSP, experiences with the same institutions. Besides being rooted in specific accomplishments, state legitimacy is thus derived from dynamics – developments in the right direction.

MSP input and state legitimacy   The 4 MSPs that contributed to state legitimacy on average had more elaborate state and community involvement than the MSPs that did not contribute to state legitimacy.

The effect of MSPs for service delivery on state legitimacy is thus shaped in both a direct way – through MSP throughput, the process of stakeholder interaction – and in a more indirect manner – through the effect of the MSP on services, the MSP output (see figure 5.2). Considering, as elaborated on in chapter 4 above, that MSP output also depends largely on MSP throughput, MSP throughput seems the single most important focal point for MSPs.


Figure 5.1: Relations between MSP context, throughput and output and state legitimacy

5.2. State legitimacy as a function of state-society interaction in MSPs

In this section, we will elaborate how effects on process legitimacy have manifested themselves for our main categories of stakeholders: beneficiary communities; non-state MSP partners; donors; and state institutions themselves.

BOX 5: The quest for legitimacy. Parallel service delivery in Rolpa – Nepal (MSP 12)

A road building project in Nepal's Rolpa district instigated in 2003 by the Maoist insurgency group was the one case-study where an MSP for service delivery was not merely parallel to the state, but constituted an actual and intended challenge to the state. All respondents for the case recognized the MSP as an ideologically guided attempt not only to serve the people, but show them the Maoists are better able to provide services than the state.

Considering the positively evaluated outcomes of the project, such a threatening parallel initiative was expected to have a negative impact on state capacity. However, due to the forced contributions in labour and material demanded by the Maoists, this was not wholly the case. While beneficiaries recognized the superior performance of the Maoist road-building project, they loathed the involuntary implementation process which made them re-appreciate state service delivery. Thus, while the parallel service delivery contributed to the performance legitimacy of the Maoists, it simultaneously – and quite surprisingly – boosted the process legitimacy of the state. What is more, after the Maoist rebellion ended and the Maoist party became part of the government, the state took over the road construction project and build on earlier achievements, thereby potentially reaping the fruits of their previous adversaries' efforts.

5.2.1. End-users: the impact of MSPs on state-citizen interaction – community involvement and accountability

Community involvement   Beneficiaries value being involved in service delivery initiatives and involving beneficiaries as a stakeholder in MSPs can thus possibly contribute to state legitimacy. Apart from DR Congo, and contrary to some popular ideas on fragile states, the majority of people we spoke to sought improvement of relations with state services, rather than "exit" from such relations (Batley 2004:48). Community involvement in service delivery was widespread in the MSPs studied. Often, however, community involvement in MSPs was not seen by citizens as encouraged by the state and thus did not contribute to state legitimacy. Where community involvement was shaped through the mediation of local authorities, as in MSPs in Burundi and the Palestinian Territories (MSPs 1 and 5), this had a positive impact on state legitimacy – especially where state authorities were seen as protecting citizens' interests vis-à-vis donors.

Accountability   State institutions participating in MSPs have also used MSPs to increase their accountability to citizens. In general, however, in the fragile contexts we have studied, the state's accountability to citizen-consumers is poor. MSPs have, in some instances, acted on this by providing good governance trainings for local authorities aiming to improve the accountability of the local state to the population (MSPs 1 and 10). Decentralization seems an important prerequisite here: accountability only works when it has a certain degree of proximity. Most of the MSPs studied have contributed to realizing approachability.

5.2.2. Non-state MSP partners: the impact of MSPs on state-NGO interaction – division of roles and decision-making

Division of roles   In the contexts studied, state institutions tended to insufficiently coordinate with non-state service actors, a weakness some of the MSPs partly remedied (MSPs 1, 2, 5, 6, 9 and 11), while other MSPs merely repeatedly laid bare this problem (MSPs 3, 4, 7 and 12).

Decision-making   In a number of cases, joint operation and decision-making bodies (such as steering committees and implementation units) have been established (MSPs 5, 6, 9 and 10). The

experience of close cooperation has created mutual understanding and nascent forms of reciprocal accountability. A member of the Burundian water committee featuring in one Burundian MSP (MSP 2), for example, accounted that the provincial water coordinator now more frequently calls him to exchange information. Nevertheless, existing tensions and irritations between state institutions and NGOs have in many cases been exacerbated by close cooperation and mutual dependency fostered by MSPs. Different modes of operation and logics of organisation have clashed in a number of the MSPs (2, 3, 7 and 10).

5.2.3. *Donors: the impact of MSPs on state-donor interaction – funding and accountability*

Funding   International funding is seen as crucial for providing basic services by most informants. This widespread conviction of the importance of donors also affects the role of the state when it comes to utility service delivery. This role tends to shift towards attracting donors to fill the service gap, often instead of aiming to fill this gap itself.

Accountability   We also found some sentiments that donors force state institutions to be accountable to them, to the detriment of state accountability to the population and civil society. This is linked to the dependence of state institutions on donor money, rather than taxes and fees, to provide services. In general, the more pro-active state institutions operate within MSPs, the more donors involved in MSPs appreciate their cooperation and award state legitimacy (as evidenced by MSPs 5, 6 and 11).

BOX 6: SINELAC's rubbing it in. Cross-border electricity undermining state legitimacy in DR Congo

In DR Congo's South-Kivu region, the concept of international legitimacy of state institutions acquires a specifically tangible edge. The SINELAC initiative in question concerns a project generating electricity through use of the Rusizi river that involves DR Congo, Burundi and Rwanda. Citizens of Congolese border town Bukavu are confronted every night with the proof that power cuts or denominations are relatively scarce across the border in Burundi and Rwanda, while they abound on the Congolese side of the border. Considering that all three countries draw on the same river and the same generating facilities, it is reasoned by users, the lesser output in DR Congo must be related to a lesser management and maintenance in DR Congo. This conclusion is casting a definite negative glow on DR Congo's state-led electricity enterprises.

5.3.4. *State institutions: the impact of MSPs on internal state interaction – communication*

Communication   Except from state institutions' abilities to coordinate with non-state counterparts, their organizational success – and legitimacy – also depends on their aptitude to coordinate with other state institutions, departments and representatives. The coherence of the state in its policy and practice of organizing service delivery was in many cases influenced by the MSPs studied as the concrete service delivery projects laid bare the weaknesses in internal state coordination. A lack of communication between state actors in the local water sector is, for instance, seen as leading to a lack of utilization of water resources in Burundi and to impunity for corruption in DR Congo.

BOX 7: The other side of the story – the perspective of the state

In this report, we principally talk *about* the state. This does not mean, however, that during the research we have not also extensively talked *with* the state, i.e. various local state representatives and national policy makes and implementers. Their story differed widely per country.

Among Burundian state representatives consulted, there was growing sense of urgency regarding the state's lack of capacity. Legitimacy seemed to be a lesser concern and responsibility for dissatisfaction among citizens was denied. Local authorities blamed national policy-makers for decentralizing tasks, but not making the necessary means available. National representatives accused local functionaries of corruption and lack of adherence to policy.

In DR Congo, the state representatives interviewed and involved in the validation workshop by and large refused to acknowledge the massive problems they (should) face in terms of service provision and state legitimacy and clung to abstract legal mandate in justifying their approach.

In Nepal, (local) state representatives are well aware of, and seem sincerely concerned about, the legitimacy problems the government has in especially the remote areas and the preference the local population there has for service delivery by NGOs. In the context of the four cases studied in this research, various attempts, mostly following a logic of community inclusion, are being made to deal with these issues.

In the Palestinian Territories, government authorities acknowledge the many problems in various utility service sectors and stress the need for reform – and their own role in it. They also structurally link these problems to the Israeli occupation, sometimes to the extent that their own responsibility is downgraded considerably.

Figure 5.3: Burundi – rehabilitated water points (pictures taken by Nora Stel)

5.3. MSPs are no magic legitimation bullets

The relation between service provision and legitimation is deemed relevant for two reasons. Firstly, it is considered that appreciation of services will translate in higher legitimacy of the state. Secondly, it is assumed that people will be able to call upon their legitimate government to account for better services. They can do this either through elections (the long route to accountability) or through directly demanding improved services (the short route to accountability) (Pavanello and Darcy 2008).

Although we have found some positive relations between multi-stakeholder service delivery and state legitimacy, the overwhelming observation from our study is that MSPs are no magic legitimation bullets and expectations regarding their effect on state legitimacy should be modest. There are several reasons why the legitimacy effects of MSP are limited.

5.3.1.   *The legitimacy threshold*

In all our case-studies we found that people have a general idea of what the state should look like and that the state has a responsibility towards service provision. There is a widespread ideal and meta-expectation that the state should be the ultimate guarantor or protector of service provision.

Interestingly, we also found in several cases that people nonetheless had very low expectations towards the likelihood that the state would actually fulfil this obligation. In DRC, for example, respondents – both state representatives and citizens - have a sense of state-society relationships where the state carries the responsibility or mandate for service delivery. At the same time, they do not expect this to happen in practice. We concur with Boege et al (2009:6) that in many societies, "people are relatively disconnected from the state, neither expecting much from state institutions nor willing to fulfil obligations towards the state (and often with little knowledge about what they can rightfully expect from state bodies, and what the state can rightfully expect from them)."

If there is a cognitive discrepancy that people roughly know what stateness is about, but consider it improbable to be realized in practice, it means that teaching people about the responsibilities of the state does not by itself have a mobilizing effect to demand better services. As a result, we observe a wicked pattern that as long as expectations are very low, bad services are not likely to generate demands to evoke the 'social contract'. Only when state performance towards services improves, people develop expectations and act accordingly. In this way, we identify what we call a legitimacy threshold below which citizens and state representatives are locked into a situation where it is unlikely that people develop demands to the state and therefore state representatives have no incentive to improve services, reproducing the low expectations people already have. In such cases, the relation between state institutions on the one hand and citizens and societal organisations on the other may be more accurately captured in the notion of a 'leave-me-alone-contract' – where the absence of negative intrusion on their lives is the most important request people have towards the state.[21]

However, the idea of a legitimacy threshold is developed for generalized expectations to the state and mainly applies, regarding our case-studies, in DR Congo. In Burundi, Nepal and the Palestinian Territories, respondents did voice expectations towards the state even if they thought such expectations unlikely to be met and felt they had few means to demand their fulfillment. Within specific MSPs, moreover, stakeholders develop expectations of the participating state actors, for example the mobilization of beneficiaries (MSPs 1, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10), institutional facilitation (MSPs 5, 6, 10 and 11) and attracting of donor resources (MSPs 1, 2 and 11). Some MSPs focused on helping state institutions meet stakeholder service needs. These include the construction of roads (MSP 11); maintenance of infrastructures (MSP 2); and waste collection (MSP 6).

5.3.2. *Personalized state services*

One of the characteristics of 'fragile states' with institutional multiplicity is that the personification of institutions is relatively high. State representatives acting in MSPs may or may not identify with the state. The district officer in Nepal who deliberatively adjusted water policies to enhance state legitimacy (MSP 10) in remote areas of his district is more an exception than a rule. In many cases, state representatives may not seek legitimacy for the state in general, but a have more pragmatic approach in gaining legitimacy for their specific project.

At the same time, people may not perceive of government officials as representatives of the state. In Burundi, people spoke of the state in terms of individuals rather than institutions: 'the ministers', rather than 'the government'; 'the communal administrator' instead of 'the communal administration'. In the Nepalese MSPs, community members were generally not aware of institutions and officials were generally described by first names or physical appearances rather than functions or association

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[21] The concept of the 'leave-me-alone-contract' was proposed by Stephen Ndegwa, advisor on fragile and conflict-affected situations at the World Bank, during a panel discussion at the *Service Provision and the Legitimacy of State Institutions in Situations of Conflict and Fragility* conference (the Hague, 7 December 2011) held to discuss a draft version of this report.

with the state. As a result, appreciation for services provided through an MSP may result in local and personal process-legitimacy without translating in wider state legitimacy.

5.3.3. Attribution problems

In a number of cases, people did not attribute improvements in service delivery to the government even though the government had been instrumental in delivering the services (see MSPs 2 and 11 especially). To some extent this was due to a lack of visibility when the government facilitated rather than implemented services. State institutions are more often involved in the coordination level of MSPs, and this paradoxically leads to them being less active on the visible implementation level and as such undermines the credits state institutions receive for MSPs participation (OECD 2010:112).

Attribution problems are also related to the fact that people are often not aware of the identity of institutions as belonging or being outside of the state. Sometimes, non-state institutions are seen as belonging to the state. In Burundi, for instance, the communal water committees were often thought of as part of the communal administration. Therefore, when the MSPs studied (MSPs 1 and 2) helped increase the capacity of these water committees, this reflected well on the local state. At the same time, (especially technical) state institutions are often not recognized as such and are seen as NGOs (MSPs 2, 9 and 11). In DR Congo, it is for many people unclear which technicians belong to state enterprises and which do not as many unaffiliated technicians present themselves as state officials. Such, in Lund's (2007:13) terminology, 'twilight institutions' illustrate the difficulty of distinguishing between state and non-state in people's understanding.

On the other hand, it was also obvious in some cases that people's perception of the state colors their appreciation of the services. Where they have no confidence in the government, they are likely to attribute services to NGOs or the MSP as a whole. The legitimacy of the state at large is shaped by grander concerns than MSPs can affect. In Palestine, to take the most obvious example, state legitimacy at large is almost exclusively dependent on the defiance the Palestinian Authority can muster vis-à-vis Israel. Isolated service delivery initiatives like the MSPs studied here, thus, can affect the legitimacy of specific state institutions involved in these MSP in the eyes of other stakeholders related to the MSP, but do not shape the legitimacy of 'the' state.

5.4. How MSPs nonetheless make a difference for state legitimacy

Even though the above reasons should temper expectations on what MSPs can mean for state legitimacy, we have also identified factors that enhance the likelihood that MSPs have a positive impact on state legitimacy.

5.4.1. Addressing problems

MSPs, as we saw above bring state actors closer to stakeholders. This may result in a de-legitimization of the state when weaknesses become visible and competition between multiple institutions becomes apparent. However, in those cases where the MSP actually addressed uncovered weaknesses, and resolved problems (MSPs 1, 6, 9 and 11), state institutions gained legitimacy. Where MSPs merely exposed problems (MSPs 3, 4 and 7), state institutions lost legitimacy.

An important component of addressing state weaknesses that came to light in MSPs for service delivery regards communication and information. Citizens and non-state organizations are acutely aware of the minimal means and resources of state institutions due to which the state cannot address all service delivery needs of all citizens at the same time. Respondents, moreover, indicated that when they are properly informed about the timing, planning and quality of service delivery initiatives beforehand – and about state institutions' reasons for setting specific priorities – they would have

considerable understanding for such limitations. The uncertainty of 'no news,' then, might undermine state legitimacy as much as the disappointment of 'bad news.' This suggests that MSPs can help enhance state legitimacy in the realm of service delivery through increasing the predictability and reliability of services and lessening citizens' uncertainty.

5.4.2. *Visibility*

If stakeholders are not aware of the role state institutions play within an MSP, state legitimacy cannot be improved through either improved cooperation or the meeting of expectations. Strong local physical state presence that is visibly involved in service delivery and is known to have attracted the non-state actors in question may therefore be important for achieving state legitimacy (see MSPs 1 and 5 especially). In this respect, we want to highlight the difference in representation of local states and international actors. Logo's and billboards enhance the visibility of INGOs and background the state. Some of the MSPs studied (MSPs 2 and 11 especially), however, attempt to deal with this problem by restricting PR signals; grouping state and non-state organisations under project names; and locating NGO staff in ministry or local authority offices.

5.4.3. *Brokering state legitimacy*

State legitimacy is primarily associated with citizen appreciation and analyzed in the framework of a social contract between citizen and state (Chabal and Daloz 1999; Mamdani 1996). State legitimacy, however, is also significantly shaped by the state's non-governmental counterparts and by relations with donors.

In chapters 3 and 4 we have analyzed how the throughput of the MSP– their inclusiveness; division of roles and responsibilities; decision-making procedures; accountability; communication structures; and degree of institutionalization - is crucial to their success. One of the outcomes of MSPs may then be the improved relations between stakeholders. The effect of this in terms of non-state actors changing discourses on state actors and capacities appears to have an effect on state-legitimacy indirectly. Many stakeholders are aware of these effects of stakeholder interaction on their reputation and MSPs are more often than not seen as chances to acquire legitimacy (see BOX 8). The value of MSPs may thus ultimately be found in providing platforms where state-society relations are negotiated and where brokerage of state legitimacy can be fostered.

BOX 8: The abyss between state capacity and legitimacy. Road construction in Ramechhap – Nepal (MSP 11)

The MSP most explicitly dedicated towards working with and increasing the capacity of state service delivery institutions was the District Road Support Program (DRSP) in Ramechhap, Nepal. The MSP was de facto and de jure integrated in the institutional structure of state infrastructural institutions. The MSP was governed by a tripartite agreement between the ministerial department, the local executing state agency and the NGO-driven program support unit. Financial management was in the hands of state representatives. In short, the state – in many forms and ways – played a crucial part in the MSP.

Nevertheless, the MSP did not seem to have significantly increased the legitimacy people directed towards the state institutions in question. The effort and investments of the ministerial institution were not recognized by the public, as it was a higher-echelon role hardly visible for them. And the achievements of the MSP were not attributed to the local state institutions either, because the project was so strongly associated with the international donor involved in it that this NGO was awarded all credits (even though it has deliberately aimed to refrain from profiling itself). The DRSP MSP underlines the complexity of the subjects discussed in this report. Even where an MSP has a leading role in a successful MSP embedded in state structures and significantly increases state capacity, this does not lead to enhanced state legitimacy as long as its visibility of these feats is trumped by NGO visibility.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

Our research conducted for the Peace, Security and Development Network brought together two in practice often separated worlds: that of service delivery – or, development – and that of political state-society interaction – or, peace and security. We posed the question whether service delivery can help strengthen state legitimacy and state-society relations. The research findings show that this is indeed the case, even though security and political governance issues may have a more direct and profound influence on state legitimacy. We found that service delivery MSPs, which predominantly operate from a development perspective, nevertheless have an impact on state legitimacy. This impact is primarily achieved through the process of interaction between the different MSP stakeholders. An MSP that consciously invests in this process of interaction is more likely to experience a pay off in terms of its internal functioning, the sustainability of the services it delivers, and the legitimacy of the participating state institutions.

Coming back to our main research question:

How do multi-stakeholder processes (MSPs) for the improvement of service delivery affect those services and how do they affect the legitimacy of state institutions?

we can conclude that, on the whole, MSPs have a positive impact on service delivery, partly because they improve the capacity of their participating stakeholders. A considerable number of MSPs moreover contributed to policy-making and enhanced the sustainability of their services. One third of the MSPs studied furthermore contributed to the legitimacy of state institutions, mostly by bringing about positive changes in the interaction between these institutions and non-state partners. We will elaborate on these general conclusions below.

The triangular relationship between MSPs, basic utility services and state legitimacy was central to our research. Our findings show that the impact of MSPs on the legitimacy of state institutions mostly manifests itself directly through the *throughput* of MSPs (their inclusiveness, division of roles, decision-making, communication, accountability and formalization). MSPs can also contribute to the legitimacy of state institutions indirectly, that is, through the changes in service delivery that they achieve (*output*). This indirect effect, however, appears to be conditional rather than causal: MSPs need to have a positively evaluated output to be able to contribute to state legitimacy, but it is not usually this output as such that is the actual source of increased state legitimacy (see figure 6.1).


Figure 6.1: Relation between MSP, Services and State legitimacy

Our research findings confirm the two propositions stated in chapter 1 that:

- MSPs organised around services have a positive effect on service delivery

- Through MSPs the legitimacy of relevant state-institutions in service delivery can be increased or decreased (based on the configuration of the MSP (input) and the governance of the MSP (throughput))

Our research findings are more ambiguous regarding the third proposition that:

- Improvements in the access, coverage, quality or governance of basic services contribute to the legitimacy of relevant state-institutions

Improvements in basic services are a prerequisite for beneficiaries to appreciate the MSP and grant its actors legitimacy. However, such improvements do not seem to influence the legitimacy of state institutions as much as improvements in the mentioned process of stakeholder interaction. Our explanation is that state institutions are not usually associated with the actual implementation of basic services (but rather with their governance or management).

The effect of MSPs on service delivery The exact impact that the MSPs studied had on service delivery was very case-specific and hard to translate across contexts. However, in all twelve cases the effect was moderately positive, as the MSPs reached their objectives and contributed to the capacity of their stakeholders. Whether or not the MSPs reached their objectives strongly depended on their throughput in terms of the division of roles, the degree of internal accountability and the strength of communication and information sharing within the MSP. Even if the MSPs reached their objectives, most respondents commented that their impact on service delivery was not sufficiently sustainable. This is particularly unfortunate given that sustainability of services was a major concern of most stakeholders and moreover a recognized asset of MSPs. This lack of sustainability can be explained by the failure to identify and capacitate specific stakeholders for follow-up; the absence of successful cost-contribution of services; and the insufficient institutional embedding of the MSP initiatives. Finally, our research showed that even in situations of fragility where state capacity is generally low, the active involvement of state institutions in MSPs has a positive effect on their throughput and output.

The effect of MSPs on state legitimacy Only 4 out of the 12 MSPs studied contributed to state legitimacy. These 4 MSPs had done better in achieving their objectives and had contributed more to the capacities of their different stakeholders than the other 8 MSPs. However, this does not fully explain their success, because, as mentioned above, the impact of MSPs on state legitimacy is determined more by their throughput (the multi-stakeholder process) than by their output (improvement of service delivery). The MSPs that were successful in contributing to state legitimacy all had high levels of mutual accountability and strong communication and information sharing. There were also cases where the positive output and throughput achievements did not translate into increased state legitimacy. This can be explained by a limited visibility of state institutions in the MSPs; low expectations towards the state (a low legitimacy threshold); and the personalization of state institutions.

MSPs facilitate the interaction between state and non-state stakeholders and they often help state institutions to improve their relations with other stakeholders. In some cases, non-state actors then become *de facto* brokers of state legitimacy. *Beneficiary communities* attribute legitimacy depending on the visibility and accountability of the state institution in question and the degree to which it involves beneficiaries, represents them vis-à-vis other stakeholders and is responsive to their direct needs. *NGOs* value the increased cooperation in MSPs, but uncertainty about the division of roles and unequal decision-making power between state and non-state service providers can also result in continued competition. *Donor engagement* with state institutions in MSPs deepens state dependency on donors. *Intra-state interaction* in MSPs reveals, and sometimes remedies, the weak coherence among

state institutions involved in service delivery and highlights the importance of communication and predictability.

6.1. Lessons learned about MSPs for service delivery in fragile situations

Development and people's welfare require effective service delivery, and service delivery, in turn, is greatly helped by capable and trustworthy state institutions. Under certain conditions, service delivery initiatives that bring together various stakeholders can contribute to both service delivery and state legitimacy. MSPs can be an effective method for tackling service delivery in situations where services are fragmented, state-society interaction is fragile, and where individual stakeholders, including the state, lack the unilateral capacity for service provision. MSPs moreover provide a chance for state institutions to improve their relations with societal stakeholders and can help bridge existing gaps between state institutions and NGOs in the service sector. These positive effects of joint service delivery initiatives are, however, not a given. They were found only in a minority of the 12 cases studied. We conclude therefore that MSPs provide *opportunities* rather than *guarantees* for improved services, increased coordination or enhanced state legitimacy.

In order to maximize these opportunities, future MSPs may well benefit from five lessons learned through our research:

1) Include specific state institutions based on a contextual analysis

2) Accommodate beneficiary and stakeholder interests, perceptions and expectations

3) Devote specific attention to the role of state institutions in MSPs

4) Focus attention on the *process* of stakeholder interaction and try to work towards a complementary division of roles between state and non-state stakeholders

5) Focus on the follow-up of MSPs and the sustainability of service delivery

6.1.1. *Include specific state institutions based on a contextual analysis*

Effective interaction between state and non-state stakeholders is important to realize MSP output and strengthen state legitimacy. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, where state institutions were not involved in the MSPs studied, these MSPs had limited effects on service provision and did not change respondents' perceptions of state legitimacy (instead, they confirmed the lack hereof). In fragile situations such as in DR Congo many factors influence the desirability and feasibility of working with state institutions, including: legacies of violent conflict; the politicization of service delivery and state-society interaction (elite capture and clientelism); institutional multiplicity; and vulnerability to external shocks due to donor dependency. Donors who do not understand such contexts can harm state legitimacy (OECD 2010:11).

An important factor for the success of MSPs is their 'initiation mode': is the MSP set up as a contribution or a challenge to state service delivery, and does the MSP include or exclude state institutions? We found that even in fragile contexts where the legitimacy of the state is generally low, MSPs that attribute an important role to state institutions tend to be more sustainable and will more significantly enhance state legitimacy. Furthermore, MSPs that aim to help the state manage its service delivery (through coordination and capacity-building) have more impact on state legitimacy than purely palliative or humanitarian MSPs that manage service delivery because the state fails to do so. Which state institutions to include in MSPs can be decided by an assessment of histories of cooperation, local political dynamics and existing institutions that the MSP could link up to.

6.1.2. Accommodate beneficiary and stakeholder interests, perceptions and expectations

MSPs, and especially donors involved in MSPs, can influence the expectations that citizens have of the state and its institutions. They can raise these expectations beyond what the state can reasonably do, or they can encourage citizens to put positive social pressure on the state to improve its responsiveness and accountability. Alternatively, MSPs can alter citizens' normative views of what the state should or should not do, thus influencing political processes (OECD 2010:12-13). We found that MSPs are more likely to function effectively and overcome contextual obstacles, as well as positively change state legitimacy, when they help meet people's existing expectations of the state. These expectations, then, can inform the roles that state institutions take on in the MSP and determine what capacities should consequently be strengthened. In our case studies, different stakeholders had different expectations of the state, but all focused on the governance of services: coordination, facilitation, monitoring and follow-up. Knowing which state institutions to 'target' requires a study of which institutions, or people, are most strongly associated with the state.

6.1.3. Devote specific attention to the role of state institutions in MSPs

Specific attention thus needs to be devoted to the role of state institutions in MSPs. One key priority is the visibility of state institutions. Stakeholders will only change their perceptions of the state if they are aware that the institution involved in the MSP is, in fact, a state institution. Often people lack this awareness. Secondly, stakeholders need to know the role the state institution plays in order to appreciate why it deserves partial credit for the achievements of the MSP: does it fund the initiative, is it responsible for mobilizing partners, does it provide material or advice? In many of the MSPs studied, state institutions played a passive and/or unrecognizable role, especially for less involved stakeholders.

The visibility of state institutions within MSPs also depends on the extent of ownership that state institutions perceive towards the MSP. Capacity building of state institutions that are involved in the MSP can be an effective instrument to increase state legitimacy, but this should not result in state institutions becoming beneficiaries rather than partners of the MSP. Moreover, capacity building should depart from existing capacities and not assume a total vacuum of ability (Brinkerhoff 2010:70). On the other hand, it is important to keep in mind that MSPs can easily overpower their weaker stakeholders (Edwards and Wollenberg 2001) and that in fragile contexts, state institutions that lack resources and capacities often fall into this category.

6.1.4. Put specific emphasis on the process of stakeholder interaction (MSP throughput)

State institutions do not operate in isolation and state legitimacy stems from state interaction with non-state actors. MSPs are per definition inclusive, but this does not automatically generate either effective services or state legitimacy. It is important to explicate the interests of various stakeholders before determining the division of roles within the MSP. As said earlier, our research showed that both the output of MSPs (service delivery) and their potential contribution to state legitimacy are strongly influenced by throughput factors such as inclusiveness, mutual accountability, communication and information sharing. These factors therefore should receive ample attention.

A vital issue for further research is the desirability and feasibility of getting private actors on board of MSPs for service delivery. The MSPs in our study were not set up to structurally develop the relations between private providers and public allocators of services. Another important issue is community participation. MSPs that seek to contribute to the positive appreciation of state institutions must ensure effective communication between public authorities and their beneficiaries. Many state institutions want to join MSPs exactly because of this chance to engage with communities. This motivation points at the importance of proper decision-making structures and division of roles between state and non-state service institutions. After all, the competition between state and non-state

service agencies vying for constituencies outside MSPs is often replicated within MSPs. This could be partially solved if providers and allocators of services developed clearly different relations with receivers of their services: while people are *consumers* in the eyes of service providers (and *beneficiaries* in the logic of donors), they should be approached as *citizens* by state institutions. Our research found a significant gap between state and non-state capacity, particularly on the local level, which meant that decision-making power between state institutions and NGOs and donors was not equal.

6.1.5. *Focus on the follow-up of MSPs and the sustainability of service delivery*

Structural attention to the follow-up of implemented activities is essential for stable and long-term service delivery. It moreover contributes to state legitimacy, as durability of services is closely associated with state responsibility. Increasing the willingness of end-users to pay and enhancing the cost-recovery of services are important follow-up mechanisms as they help relieve the burden on the state that is held responsible for affordable services (also after donors withdraw). The extent to which an MSP is embedded within institutional structures and succeeds to link up with policy-makers partly determines the sustainability of its services. Thus, a conscious strategy for donor withdrawal and for capacity-building of the actors entrusted with follow-up tasks, coupled with investment in cost-contribution of services can together contribute to both the functioning of MSPs, the improvement of services and the strengthening of state legitimacy. Any sustainability strategy should prioritize the sustainability of services over the sustainability of the MSP providing the services.

CHAPTER 7

POLICY CHALLENGES AND IMPLICATIONS

7.1. State legitimacy in international development thinking

The international donor community, including the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, increasingly recognizes that development strongly depends on a country's political and institutional organization (Waddell 2006 in Overbeek et al 2009:10). Such state-building in fragile situations, it is ever more realized, depends as much on state *legitimacy* as it does on state *capacity*. State institutions need not only be capable to fulfil their service delivery tasks, but also need to be *perceived* as fulfilling these tasks and fulfilling them satisfactorily. Such perceptions and appreciations are shaped through the interaction between various sectors of society: public, private, civil society and beneficiary communities. Effective and durable interaction between the state and society can thus contribute to state-building processes.

The legitimacy component of state-building has long been underestimated and has scarcely been researched (less so its relation with basic utility service delivery). The 2011 World Development Report (WDR), however, demonstrates a nascent shift in thinking because it stresses the importance of confidence-building by the state for increasing its legitimacy. While confidence should first and foremost be build with citizens, states also need to invest in gaining the trust of non-state development partners (both national and international). The WDR recognizes this and argues that states cannot restore confidence alone, but need 'inclusive-enough' societal coalitions to achieve this.

The provision of utility services, such as drinking water, electricity, waste management, and transportation and communication infrastructures, is a crucial aspect of development. The extent to which the state can provide such services – or enable and support other actors to do so – moreover influences people's appreciation of their government (OECD 2010:20-21). One implication hereof, as noted by the OECD (2010:111) is that "[d]onors risk doing harm to state legitimacy unless more attention is devoted to associating the support they provide for service delivery with the state." In fragile and post-conflict situations, however, where the state lacks the willingness, capacity or opportunity to deliver services, it is common practice for non-state actors to develop alternative and hybrid service provision arrangements in the form of MSPs. These actors (NGOs, international agencies, community based associations, or insurgency groups) may do so with or without government cooperation. Their MSPs may nevertheless provide the inclusive enough societal coalitions to boost services as well as state legitimacy.

In fragile countries, perceptions of state legitimacy are probably primarily influenced by people's security concerns or their views on fair and unfair political representation. The role that service delivery can play in constructions of state legitimacy nevertheless is an important area that merits further exploration. Involvement in service provision, after all, is a way for states to tangibly contribute, and be seen to contribute, to the welfare of their population. Further study is especially pertinent in situations where the state is not the only or leading actor involved in service provision and where services are characterized by hybridity – and sometimes competition.

7.2. The emergence and relevance of MSPs in fragile contexts

During the 1990s, development aid to fragile countries was often channeled through NGOs. This increasingly created parallel service structures and raised the question to what extent these efforts

really contributed to sustainable development, or whether they instead undermined development by crowding out state structures (De Boer and Pfisterer 2009; OECD 2010:15). Subsequent shifts from project to sector support, and from sector to budget and balance of payment support, did not bring solace to this problem of fragmented service delivery. Moreover, these shifts were often accompanied by a democracy discourse that left state-building to political reforms and societal development to international intervention. This 'democracy first and socio-economic development will follow' mantra, however, has proven flawed. In this context, MSPs can serve to link the effectiveness of working through NGOs with the long-term requirement of state-building. MSPs are also supported as a way to give tangible form to democracy on a local level by improving the accountability of state institutions.

That development cooperation should be a joint effort of different societal actors was internationally approved with the adoption of Agenda 21 at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. This global plan of action for sustainable development introduced partnerships and MSPs as new forms of governance (Multipart 2008). Ten years later, the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg was convened to identify concrete steps for the implementation of Agenda 21. The concept of 'Type II' partnerships was introduced: voluntary agreements between actors from various sectors who address a common challenge and carry out the tasks they do best. It challenged the more state-centred 'Type I' partnerships (Warner 2006:15).

Donor discourse moved away from neoliberal service provision and started to reflect the decentralization discourse that had come en vogue since the 1990s. It suggested that services best be organized through the dual processes of decentralization and public private partnerships (PPPs). The further aim was to improve pro-poor and localized implementation. Many authoritative guidelines for dealing with development in 'fragile states' as well as recommendations on how to improve service delivery in the least developed countries have emerged in this fashion. Our research was especially informed by the OECD and DFID approaches to development in fragile settings. The OECD's nine principles for good engagement in fragile situations (endorsed at the Development Assistance Committee's High Level Forum in 2007) set an important precedent by focusing on context, coordination and inclusion. They urge international actors to:

- Take context as the starting point; align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts; do no harm; focus on state-building as the central objective; prioritize prevention; promote non-discrimination; avoid pockets of exclusion; recognize the links between political, security and development objectives; agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors; and act fast, but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance.

This is largely congruent with the vision of DFID (2001:8), which stresses four key elements in its approach to state-building and peace-building:

- Addressing the causes and effects of conflict and fragility; supporting inclusive political settlements; developing core state functions; and responding to public expectations.

Regarding service delivery, DFID (2011:17) highlights three donor dilemmas:

- Between addressing immediate needs (for service delivery) and building long-term capacity; between engaging with the public sector and with non-state service providers; and between supporting central and local government.

It is evident from these sets of recommendations that a) state legitimacy is a core concern in building resilient state-society interaction; b) this can be tackled by means of inclusive and coordinated development interventions; and c) service delivery is an important domain through which such inclusive-enough societal coalitions can try to enhance state legitimacy. However, few donors address quick and accessible service delivery in an integrated manner with long-term reform and rebuilding of

public institutions (Commins 2005:2; Brinkerhoff 2010:69-70). Our research shows that MSPs, in certain cases, can help to bridge the gap between instant service delivery and longer-term governance improvement.

7.3. Policy challenges

In chapter 6 we presented five core lessons learned from our research. Each of these lessons at the same time poses challenges for the actors involved in MSPs for service delivery. These challenges concern the contributions of MSP to services as well as to state legitimacy. This chapter will close, in figure 7.1, with a listing of practical implications of the five policy challenges for different MSP stakeholders.

We have tried to highlight opportunities for different groups of stakeholders to contribute to sustainable services and state capacity/legitimacy in a way that corresponds with their interests and mandates. We focus on the leading actors within MSPs, which can either be single organizations or joint committees or boards representing several organizations active within the MSP.

In our analysis, MSPs consist of three stages. First, the input phase, which centres on the MSP design, initiation and the connecting function it serves. Second, the throughput phase, during which the process of interaction and implementation is core. And, third, the output phase, which revolves around results and follow-up. The five policy challenges that emerged from our case studies pertain to the input phase of MSPs (challenges 1 and 2); the throughput phase (challenges 3 and 4); and the output phase (challenge 5).

7.3.1 Challenge 1: Analyzing context and identifying opportunities

MSP are contested arenas: participating organizations are embedded in local dynamics and histories with different interests at stake. MSPs moreover are changeable, particularly in conflict and post-conflict settings. The OECD recommends that this particular context must be taken as the starting point of any engagement in fragile countries, and DFID adds to this the importance of addressing the causes and effects of conflict. Therefore, the establishment of an MSP should be preceded by a thorough context and power analysis to identify the relevant stakeholders and formulate specific goals. The analysis can focus on mapping the impacts of different characteristics of fragility (violent conflict, politicization; limited state capacity/institutional multiplicity; and vulnerability to external shocks/donor dependency) on service delivery mechanisms. In particular it should map histories of cooperation, assess the local political dynamics and identifying the existing institutions that the MSP can link up with. In other words, the local situation is the starting point for developing sustainable service delivery structures and for defining the desirable roles that civil society, state and private sector will play in this. The analysis thus entails:

- Identifying the opportunities and the right actors to achieve the goals of the MSP, and assessing which other actors or factors can play a facilitating role.

- Building awareness of how factions and local politics are likely to impact MSP governance and output. In particular, assess how the causes and effects of violent conflict may influence the chosen service sector as well as the actors participating in the MSP.

- Anticipating how ongoing or re-emerging violent conflict may hamper the operation of the MSP and taking precautions to prevent or minimize this.

7.3.2.   *Challenge 2: Accommodating the expectations and perceptions of stakeholders*

Our study has shown that citizens and other stakeholders do not award the state legitimacy based on objective outputs, but on how they *perceive* these outputs and the manner in which they were achieved. Legitimacy that is based on the needs of local stakeholders is thus more durable than that based on foreign 'good governance' standards. Therefore it is crucial for stakeholders to exchange their expectations and then to explicitly address these in the strategy, goals and division of tasks of the MSP. An appraisal of expectations can be conducted by means of a traditional strengths and weaknesses assessment. However, this assessment should not only take into account the objective capacity of institutions, but also their perceived strengths and weaknesses in the eyes of stakeholders (and especially beneficiary communities). In our research, local stakeholders identified a lack of accountability, transparency, communication, proximity and responsiveness as the main weaknesses. One should thus:

- Establish which organisations and institutions related to the intended service are seen to represent the state.

- Explore the needs of the stakeholders and make these the vantage point of MSP objective setting. Use the MSP to avoid donor/supply driven service delivery programs.

- Explore perceptions towards the state institutions (to be) involved in the MSP and assess the risks and opportunities of involvement for their legitimacy.

- Encourage communities to put positive social pressure on the state to improve responsiveness and accountability, but be careful not to raise unrealistic expectations.

7.3.3.   *Challenge 3: Devoting specific attention to the role of state institutions in MSPs for service delivery*

Our study established that a lack of visibility and communication hampers the strengthening of state legitimacy through MSPs for service delivery. Many stakeholders are not aware of the roles that state institutions play within MSPs and thus do not grant them legitimacy, even if they do a good job. To change this, firstly, state institutions should be visible and responsive to citizens. They should welcome discussions about citizens' problems and the possible solutions in order to create a basis for accountability.

Secondly, state institutions could consciously shape their role within the MSP, focusing on coordination and governance responsibilities rather than on implementation. As long as parallel service structures, such as those provided by MSPs, do not lead to new centres of (political) authority they need not pose a challenge to state legitimacy (Di John and Putzel 2009; OECD 2010). In other words, parallelism in service implementation is less problematic than parallelism in service coordination and policy-making.

Thirdly, state institutions need to communicate their role in the MSP more clearly. They need to be visible, and other stakeholders, especially NGOs, need to support them while observing the right distance. MSPs are all too often equated with their most visible representative. The sometimes super visibility of (I)NGOs and donors - through logos, billboards and SUVs – can therefore be problematic. This is aggravated by the fact that MSP funding still depends largely on donors, while money allocation is a crucial factor in the perceptions and appreciations of beneficiaries. The legitimacy of state institutions is often based on their capacity to attract donors. This can, however, be a shaky source of legitimacy as it may increase the state's dependency on the donor and consequently decrease

its ownership of the MSPs. This will do no good for the development of lasting and stable service provision structures. To address these concerns, one should aim to:

- Ensure sufficient ownership of each stakeholder, particularly of the state.

- Set objectives for increasing the responsiveness, and hence legitimacy, of state institutions. This should minimally include a stipulation to 'do no harm' in terms of sidelining or undermining state institutions (when these are unable to participate in the MSP). MSP should ideally formulate targets for its contributions to state capacity and legitimacy.[22]

- Assess how MSPs can bridge the gap between local and national state institutions.[23]

7.3.4. Challenge 4: Giving special attention to the process of stakeholder interaction

State institutions are important participants of MSPs but not the sole responsible actors for service delivery. In fact, their role should be part of a broader development and political agenda. This agenda, ideally, is determined through the interaction between citizen organizations and governments. This interaction moreover is a basis for mutual accountability. MSPs can serve an important purpose in facilitating this interaction. They are more than a coordination mechanism for service delivery; they provide an opportunity for exchanging objectives and sharing responsibilities. The management of relations between various stakeholders within MSPs has a profound impact on state legitimacy. Good performance on throughput indicators, such as accountability and information sharing, was a characteristic of the MSPs studied that contributed to state legitimacy. It is thus important to:

- Invest in community involvement within the MSP, where possible through state institutions.

- Explicate and define stakes and interests before setting objectives and dividing roles and responsibilities. Give ample attention to internal accountability and information sharing.

- Contribute to complementarity, especially between state and non-state stakeholders, and avoid competition over beneficiary appreciation and donor funding.

- Explore whether and how MSPs as arenas for societal interaction provide opportunities to synchronize public and private approaches to service delivery and address equality and accountability issues in private service provision (Welle 2008).

7.3.5. Challenge 5: Improving the sustainability of services and follow-up of MSPs

Our research has shown that MSPs often fail to achieve sustainability. This not only undermines service delivery, but also state legitimacy, because respondents consider the follow-up of development projects a state responsibility. MSPs must therefore draw up, at the start, a long-term vision and plan that extends beyond the lifecycle of the MSP and contributes to continuity of services at large. Embedding the MSP in existing institutions is a sine qua non for sustainability. Four elements are of special importance:

- Include a cost-contribution strategy as part of the MSP objectives and work towards consumer-based accountability within the service sector.

[22] According to the OECD (2010:12), donors especially need to invest much more in understanding the sources of legitimacy and how they are changing over time within the states where they are working.

- Decide who is responsible for follow-up at the start of the initiative and use the MSP to develop the needed capacity of the selected actors. MSP capacity building needs to happen based on a clear division of roles and a solid sustainability plan.

- Plan donor withdrawal.[24]

- Embed MSPs in institutional structures and sector-wide programs.

The five challenges discussed above have practical implications, which will vary per service sector, per context and case, as well as per actor. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify certain key implications. The table below lists the core concerns, roles and activities per actor within MSPs for service delivery. This list is not exhaustive, but may serve as a first guideline for those wishing to establish an MSP for service delivery.

Practical implications for MSP stakeholders	
Donors	Adopt a development approach and step away from purely humanitarian goals.
	Opt for a facilitating role and explore what can be done from the outside to support the MSP in terms of resources and formalization.
	Include state institutions as partners, not as liabilities or beneficiaries or solely out of (legal) obligation.
	Reflect on funding modalities and reserve a budget for monitoring and evaluation. Consider making NGO funding contingent on their cooperation with, and training of, state institutions.
National state	Aim to serve and be accountable to beneficiaries rather than donors (reconsider what the prime source of state legitimacy is). Sequence state capacity-building according to citizen priorities.
	Allow independent control of state institutions involved in service delivery to improve accountability.
	Decentralize and delegate and avoid politically inspired posting of civil servants. Invest in local service management structures and user committee structures that can function as a focal point for MSP organization.
	Approach MSPs as an opportunity rather than a threat. Coordinate among sectors and with non-state programs and structures.
	Build on good examples. Identify lessons learned and translate these across sectors.
Local state	Aim to serve and be accountable to beneficiaries rather than donors or national state institutions. Increase responsiveness, approachability and transparency vis-à-vis citizens. Develop exchange and information structures between consumers and providers. Align with user committees.
	Communicate planning of services to citizens transparently to enhance the predictability of services. Do not merely communicate goods news, but also explain setbacks in realizing services.
	Work in an integrated way with national policies, strategies and jurisdiction and incorporate national counterparts.
	Build linkages with NGO's.
NGOs	Assess who represent the local community best in a certain situation and support service user committees.

	Engage in state capacity building: contribute to the knowledge of local state actors about institutional and policy frameworks. Approach mobilization of users together with local state institutions.
	Tone down public relation efforts. Be aware of state/non-state competition for skilled and motivated personnel and do not recruit among state staff.
CBOs	Approach MSPs as structures to demand and develop accountability of local government institutions.
	Be vocal on politicization of services and communicate related problems to MSP actors.
	Organize in local user committees or consumer organizations to represent end-users.
	Ensure capacity development among user communities and communicate the temporary nature of donor/NGO service provision.
Private actors	Approach MSPs as networking and business opportunities, possibly through a chamber of commerce.
	Invest in capacity to take over functioning service systems after MSP initiation – develop communication with state and civil counterparts on maintenance contracts.
All	Devote specific attention to state legitimacy risks and opportunities. Include state institutions in MSPs and give them a relevant role that reflects stakeholder expectations. Include state capacity development in MSP objectives. Invest in stakeholder assessments about needs and expectations towards state institutions.
	Make sure all relevant stakeholders are included or involved in the MSP. Balance the importance of existing partnerships with the need for representative stakeholder inclusion.
	Include process issues in objectives. Consider using a facilitator. Ensure a clear division of roles. Improve coherence among MSP coordination and implementation levels. Organize joint operation bodies, such as steering committees and implementation units.
	Develop a joint structure for donor withdrawal and (I)NGO phasing out. Adopt a long-term financial vision – use maintenance money for maintenance and invest in cost-contribution systems to enhance sustainability.
	Distinguish between various domains of capacity building (resources; skills and knowledge; organization; politics and power; and incentives) and determine sequencing modes with all stakeholders.

Figure 7.1: Practical implications for MSP stakeholders drawn from the above key policy challenges

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ANNEX I

CASE-STUDY DESCRIPTIONS

Where	Whom	What	How	When
Burundi Ngozi province Mwumba commune	CARE, AVEDEC, communal water committee, communal administration, provincial water coordinator	WASH: diminishing discrimination, building management capacity and increasing revenue collection	Capacity building and social mobilization around water kiosks	2008-2010

MSP 1   Burundi – Ngozi --- Fighting marginalization in the water sector

The first MSP studied in Burundi combined two structures in Ngozi province, Mwumba commune. First, the *Ntunkumire* program. *Ntunkumire*, "don't exclude me," is a program designed and funded by CARE Nederland and implemented by CARE Burundi. The two-year program started in 2008 and ended in December 2010 and consisted of a peace-building and a livelihood pillar. Both pillars were implemented by Burundian partners of CARE Burundi that worked with local grassroots organizations. The livelihood pillar of *Ntunkumire* was managed by the NGO AVEDEC and included a WASH program that featured so-called water kiosks. To execute its WASH program, second, AVEDEC linked up with the water management structure in Mwumba commune that was already in place before *Ntunkumire* started. This structure centered around the communal water committee (*Régie Communale de l'Eau*) that represents all water point committees in the commune and is supported by the communal administration and the provincial water coordinator functioning under the national department for rural water and electricity provision.

The initiative for the MSP came from CARE and Ngozi was selected as implementation locality because *Ntunkumire* built on a previous CARE program on service provision. The main objective of the MSP followed from this and concerned strengthening the institutions needed for more sustainable service delivery, resulting in a focus on governance. The MSP sought to improve the access of marginalized communities to WASH services; build local capacity to govern the water sector and increase revenue collection. The main instruments adopted by the MSP to reach these objectives were capacity-building and social mobilization. Already existing water kiosks were used as a vehicle to, on the one hand, provide marginalized community members with free water and give anti-discrimination training to community leaders, good governance education to local authorities and technical workshops to communal water committee members. On the other hand, the kiosks were used to monitor and control water consumption and introduce a payment system. These objectives were by and large reached and most stakeholders were positive about the MSP. Marginalization decreased, management of the local water sector improved and willingness to pay for water grew. There was nevertheless mild disappointment regarding the lack of newly constructed water points.

The MSP consisted of two formalized structures – *Ntunkumire* and the local water management system –, but the interaction between these two structures was less formalized. Interaction was needs based and dependent on the initiative of *Ntunkumire* field coordinators and communal water committee members. Practical and technical decisions were mostly made by AVEDEC in coordination with the communal water committee. Strategic decisions were made by CARE, after consultation with their

grassroots partners. The role of the local state authorities, the communal administration, in the MSP resembled local expectations. Their main responsibility was to mobilize and inform the population (to contribute to the maintenance of water points, provide local materials, vote for their water point committee and pay their fees). In combination with an improved conduct and increased responsiveness to citizens as a result of trainings, people's appreciation of the role of the local state in WASH grew. MSP partners also saw the coordination process taking place in the arena provided by the MSP as having contributed to a better division of roles and a more integrated approach to WASH. Local authorities were more visible in the sector and more aware of – and more motivated to address – the needs identified together with other stakeholders. This has made the MSP more sustainable as it connected the MSP to the communal development plan and because local authorities, proud of the outcomes of the MSP, committed themselves to maintain the achievements of the MSP and spread the water kiosk approach to other communes.

Where	Whom	What	How	When
Burundi Muyinga province Buhinyuza commune	UNICEF, state water and sanitation program, communal water committee; communal administration; provincial water coordinator	WASH: Rehabilitation of local water infrastructure	Reconstruction and training	2009-2010

MSP 2   Burundi – Muyinga --- Rehabilitating infrastructures in the water sector

The second MSP studied in Burundi was located in Muyinga province, Buhinyuza commune. Communities in Buhinyuza complained to the local authorities about their limited access to water due to a non-functioning water system. The communal administration then turned to the provincial water coordinator who addressed UNICEF with a request to rehabilitate the water system. Together with their implementing partner, the PEA (the *Programme Eau et Assainissement* – a department under the Ministry of Planning and Communal Development), UNICEF developed a rehabilitation plan. From July 2008 to October 2010, the PEA has led the rehabilitation activities in coordination with the communal water committee of Buhinyuza commune (supported by the communal administration and the provincial water coordinator) and assisted by a local labor force.

The objective of the MSP, then, was the rehabilitation of the communal water infrastructure. The practical rehabilitation consisted of the replacement of damaged pipes, reservoirs and taps and the introduction of more advanced water transportation systems. To make this rehabilitation sustainable, an additional objective of the MSP was the provision of maintenance training to water point committees and the sensitization of user communities. Technical reparations were conducted by an engineer of the PEA and technicians of the communal water committee. Training of water point committees and sensitizing users was done by the PEA, sometimes with assistance of the local authorities. The rehabilitation works were done satisfactorily according to a majority of the stakeholders and beneficiaries. Due to a regional drought and insufficient maintenance, however, the rehabilitation failed to result in better access to water. The mobilization and training of water point committees met with skepticism from water point committees who say they did not receive any training or information. The national MSP partners maintain that mobilization has taken place. The sustainability of the MSP and its achievements proved a problem, as the initiative has not addressed resource management and has failed to anchor maintenance and management improvements.

The MSP was a temporary merging of two formalized structures – the local water management system and the UNICEF-PEA initiative –, but the cooperation between these two structures was informal. Interaction was fragmented, as the PEA and UNICEF were only represented in the field by a lone engineer and occasional field teams. The MSP was therefore an affair of individuals, rather than institutions. Technical decisions were made locally, by the PEA engineer after consultation of the communal water committee, whereas strategic decisions were made nationally, by UNICEF. Vagueness remained about the division of roles in the local WASH sector. Nationally, the cooperation between UNICEF and the PEA has become strained as a result of different 'operational logics.'

The PEA was the hub of the MSP and played the key role in both rehabilitation and mobilization. However, it was not recognized as a state actor by many of the beneficiaries. Although its work was generally appreciated and the engagement of the PEA with local stakeholders was praised, this did not affect state legitimacy in the eyes of beneficiaries. MSP partners, however, did attribute legitimacy to the PEA based on the MSP experience. The communal administration had the task to inform communities about the project; manage the recruitment of workers; and support the communal water committee. Yet, cooperation between the communal water committee and the communal administration was not optimal and MSP partners found that the communal administration did not play its role vis-à-vis beneficiaries proactive enough, suggesting that the MSP did little to boost the legitimacy of the local state.

Where	Whom	What	How	When
DR Congo South Kivu province	(among other INGOs:) UNICEF, ICCO, CICR, CTB, Oxfam, REGIDESO (national water provider), SNHR, rural water board	WASH: Harmonize donor interventions in the water sector	Information exchange	2006-ongoing

MSP 3   DR Congo – South-Kivu --- Harmonization in water and sanitation

The Water and Sanitation (WATSAN) Cluster is the MSP structure generally considered the most important, active and influential in the Congolese water sector. It constitutes a platform for the distribution of water in rural areas on the basis of information exchange between member NGOs (local and international) that have projects to increase access to water for the Congolese population.

WATSAN was established in 2006, and is one of the various thematic Clusters (security, protection, etc.) set up on the initiative of the UN agencies working in DR Congo. Headed by UNICEF, the Cluster meets once a month. Its main objective is to share information on the projects implemented by its members in order to harmonize the distribution of water services and avoid overlap. The Cluster was created with a purely humanitarian mandate and was to play an intermediary role in the transition from humanitarian crisis to development (filling the gap left by the state). The members represent UN agencies, international NGOs, national NGOs and also state institutions, even though the latter hardly ever participate in the Cluster meetings. All members execute their own projects, and while these differ in approach they all have an equal say in the meetings. Participation of the same representatives, however, is not assured because of organization turnover and a possible neglect of the Cluster's importance. Recently, the Ministry of Planning has taken over some of the Cluster's lead tasks. It remains, however, unclear whether this gesture has been a decision based on a real

motivation to strengthen state capacities or if it is merely a measure to become somewhat in line with new policy guidelines voted in by the Congolese Parliament.

According to rural water consumers, service performance is perceived positively and has improved over recent years. This is attributed to the numerous projects that have been implemented by NGOs that are members of the WATSAN Cluster. In some areas water wells have been created (hand pumps), in others old and decayed water conveyance systems are in the process of being rehabilitated. The quality of the drinking water has also improved because of the distribution and use of water testing kits offered by some of these NGOs. It is unclear, however, to what extent these results are achieved by the Cluster as a whole, as an MSP, rather than by its individual members.

Where	Whom	What	How	When
DR Congo South Kivu province Bukavu town Chai neighbourhood	User and interest committees for electricity (CEC), LICOSKI (consumer rights league), SNEL (national electricity provider), parish, political party PPRD	ELECTRICITY: Realize electricity connections for the neighbourhood	Revenue collection, community organisation, lobbying	1993-ongoing

MSP 4   DR Congo – Bukavu --- Connecting the Chai neighbourhood to the electricity network

The Electricity Committee of the Chai neighbourhood in Bukavu (CEC) is an informal MSP that gathers a number of non-state actors who claim consumer rights and contribute to the actual delivery of the service. In comparison with similar committees that exist in other neighbourhoods, the Chai committee is labelled as relatively active. The CEC has a legalized status and is mainly characterized by the involvement of various (elected) community members, mostly people identified as local leaders (e.g. church leaders, teachers, and youth leaders). State institutions have acted largely in opposition to CEC, while supporting contesting committees.

CEC is thus an entirely indigenous, bottom-up MSP, initiated out of the need to improve service delivery and living conditions of the Chai citizens by connecting the area to the National Electricity Society (SNEL) electricity network. Attention was focused on consumer-right awareness raising, lobbying towards SNEL and, later on, raising money through household contributions in order to purchase the necessary materials and equipment for connection.

An amount of US$ 3,800 was raised, which was topped up with money from the Parish and later, during the election period, US$ 5,000 was added by the People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD). The transformer was bought, but political interference caused the creation of a new PPRD-affiliated committee whereby old members of CEC were ousted. The PPRD committee managed the funds very badly. Later, PPRD added US$ 20,000 directly to SNEL and the cabin that houses the transformer was finally linked to the electricity network. Currently, a transitional committee is being put in place and management of the cabin has been handed over to SNEL. Even though the cabin is installed, however, still very few households have electricity in Chai. But community awareness that basic service access is a fundamental right has improved. This meagre result, however, cannot really be attributed to the work of CEC as an MSP as the accomplishments are mostly the result of personal investments (Parish and the PPRD).

Where	Whom	What	How	When
The Palestinian Territories Qalqiliya and Tulkarem	Farmers and ground water well owners, village councils and municipalities within Qalqilyia and Tulkarem areas; various ministries; PWA and MoA; PHG; e-WASH; ECHO; OCHA-oPT	Rehabilitation of ground water wells for irrigation	Needs assessment, composition of domestic and agricultural water access profiles, selection and rehabilitation of pumps and wells; training of farmers, well owners, municipalities, monitoring, reporting; visibility program	2003-2010

MSP 5   The Palestinian Territories – Qalqiliya and Tulkarm --- Reutilizing irrigation groundwater wells

This project entails the rehabilitation of irrigation groundwater wells in two cities: Qalqilyia and Tulkarm. Both cities are located in north-western part of the West Bank, close to the Green line. The stakeholders in this project aimed to rehabilitate irrigation groundwater wells in these two areas, especially those behind the separation wall (located in area C). As such, the project activities serve not only a practical interest (irrigation of land), but also a more strategic interest: preventing the land between the green line and the wall from falling to the state of Israel.

The principal objective as formulated by the MSP was: "to improve access of vulnerable population to agricultural and domestic water by improving the water infrastructure and the key water managers' abilities" (ECDG for Humanitarian Aid – ECHO, 2007:24). This would then contribute to diminishing the dependence of families on tankered water and increase cultivation of lands that were sensitive to confiscation in case of abandonment. Through this project, the MSP was successful in increasing access to water supply for agricultural purposes to 6 communities and agricultural cooperatives. The project resulted also in increased water use efficiency and reduction of unaccounted water losses, through maintenance of the pipes and construction of new water nets. However, sustainability proved difficult to achieve. The transfer of responsibilities to stakeholders who were said 'to lack the equipment, means and capacity to do something' seriously impacted the sustainability of the project and the ability of the well owners to continue to deliver affordable and good quality water.

The MSP projects in Qalqilyia and Tulkarem did not have the same composition over time. There were progressive changes in the MSP membership and level of participation, due to the participatory approach used as a tool for projects success and sustainability. In this project, multiple stakeholders already started working together in the early nineties, with only a few farmers and well owners. The rehabilitation of wells gained importance on the political agenda, and the top-down administrative commitment from the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) followed from a strong motivation of local partners. To facilitate the initial decision-making and supervisory process, a Steering Committee was established. At national level, several meetings were conducted with PWA and MoA to seek their support, to discuss the interventions, and to discuss progress in terms of the procedures for requesting permits.

Trust in the functioning of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Palestinian Water Authority slowly improved when farmers' access to water increased. 'legitimacy' in this situation was related to performance.

Where	Whom	What	How	When

The Palestinian Territories Jenin Governorate Zahret Al-Finjan	World Bank; EU ECHO; MoLG; MEnA; MoF; PECDAR; Joint Service Council (JSC); Project Implementation Unit (PIU); Jenin Governor; Israeli Authorities; contractors	Establishment of regional landfill and capacity building for improved SWM services	(a) the design and construction of a controlled landfill in Jenin District; the rehabilitation / closure of uncontrolled dumps; (b) the improvement in SWM services (collection, haulage and disposal of solid wastes); (c) the building of institutional capacity for regional SWM services	2000-2009

MSP 6   The Palestinian Territories – Jenin --- Waste collection and management through the Zahret Al-Finjan landfill

The project is located in Zahret Al-Finjan region approximately 17 km southwest of Jenin city. The capacity of the landfill was estimated to be 2.25 million tons (total in 15 years) to serve the northern West-Bank for 15 years as a first phase. After the landfill construction was completed in June 2007, other municipalities from the Nablus and Tulkarm governorates were accepted to deliver their wastes to the landfill, which increased the beneficiaries to about 800,000 inhabitants.

This initiative is strongly supported by donor organizations. It is remarkable in three ways: (a) almost immediately after the start of the implementation, the Second Intifada started; (b) the Civilian Administration from Israel granted approval to construct this facility; and (c) as a result, it is one of the few regulated and formal landfills in the Palestinian Territories.

Zahrat Al Finjan is considered as one of the most successful multi-stakeholder projects in West Bank. The problems of solid waste in the governorate encouraged all actors to join in a process of dialogue and concerted action towards effective solutions for solid waste collection and disposing services. The MSP involves different types of actors involved in solid waste management and international, national, and local representatives acted together at the different phases of the project. Despite the fact that the project is a Palestinian driven project, the Israeli authorities were involved in the process (partly to take critical stands for groundwater aquifers consequences).

One of the key factors that initially affected the start of the project was the beginning of the Second Intifada. Despite this, the MSP has been quite successful in terms of process and cooperation between MSP members. While part of the success can be attributed to the leadership, another important factor was the decision-making structure, standardizing a secret voting procedure with a majority rule. The continuous dialogue between the donor organization (World Bank) and the Israeli military and environmental authorities, and the unexpected decision from the JSC to hire an Israeli consultant for the redesign of the landfill, also contributed to the acceptance of the construction and operation of the landfill. Finally, the support from the relevant Ministries greatly facilitated the work of the MSP.

Where	**Whom**	**What**	**How**	**When**
The Palestinian Territories Hebron governorate	MOA; PWA; MOLG; MOH; EQA; Village Council; PHG; inhabitants of Kharas village; land owners of the treatment facility site; farmers of Kharas	Connection houses to waste water treatment plant to avoid ground water	Establishment of a sewer system and waste water treatment plant for Kharas; capacity building for municipal staff; and public	2003-2004

Kharas village	village; inhabitants/landowners of downstream villages; USAID, Save the Children Fund, ANERA	pollution	Awareness activities. These activities were part of the larger Village Service Program.	

MSP 7 The Palestinian Territories – Kharas --- Waste water treatment

The Waste Water Treatment Plant in question is located in Southern part of the West Bank in Kharas village, approximately 8 kilometers west of Hebron. Before 2002, most people in Kharas village relied on cesspits for waste water disposal. These cesspits were not sealed, resulting in infiltration of sewage through the soil in the groundwater. Additionally, the problem of overflowing cesspits created public health risks to their immediate environment, the water network and water storage facilities. The waste water treatment plant project was as a response from the Palestinian NGO PHG to local community needs: many citizens were worried that their drinking wells might be affected by the cesspits.

The objectives of the treatment facilities in Kharas village were to: (a) "improve the hygienic conditions; (b) protect water quality; (c) reduce pollution loads and (d) demonstrate a village with sound collection and treatment of waste water that could enhance surrounding villages to carry out such projects in their areas" (Awadallah, Abu-Sharkh and Al-Rabi, 2007:4).

During the first 7 years of operation, the treatment facility proved to be efficient and offered a good sanitary solution. However, during the decision-making and implementation of the project, it was clear that the implementing organizations faced major challenges in terms of (a) available management capacity and skills at the level of the municipal council, (b) communication with and within governmental organizations; and (c) in terms of revenue collection at local level. At the time of our visit in 2010, the treatment plant was not in use. Several proposals have been formulated for rehabilitation of the waste water treatment plant and for extension of the sewage network since 2007.

Where	Whom	What	How	When
The Palestinian Territories Gaza Strip Al Bureij Camp	Local Water Committee; PWA; Municipality of Bureij; Coastal Municipal Water Utility (CMWU); Gaza Electrical distribution Company (GEDCo); EU ECHO; GVC; Terra des Hommes - Italy; PHG as a local partner	Investigating sources of contamination of drinking water and improve drinking water quality of Al Bureij Camp	Formulation and implementation of a *water quality monitoring campaign* of the water provided by the municipal network, as well as the drinking water provided by private vendors in Al Bureij and Al Nusseirat refugee camps; establishment of a small desalination plant	First effort 2006 (but suspended due to change political context); renewed in 2008-2009

MSP 8 The Palestinian Territories – Gaza --- The Desalination Plant and Water Campaign in Al Bureij camp

In December 2006, the NGO GVC began implementing this project in partnership with the Palestinian NGO PHG. The original project was, however, suspended after the Hamas take-over of power in the Gaza Strip and the Israeli blockade on import of goods and construction materials in 2007. GVC was able to complete the water carrier line, but the plans for the desalination plant had to be suspended

(Liveleak, May 2009). In 2008, the project was re-funded by the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Agency (ECHO). The two main activities were: a water quality campaign and construction of a desalination plant.

The campaign regarded the water provided by the municipal network, as well as the drinking water provided by private vendors in Al Bureij and Al Nusseirat Refugee camp. It involved water samples taken in the Al Bureij and Nusseirat refugee camps, from various sources: (a) water wells, (b) network distribution nodes, (c) taps and (d) roof storage tanks. (GVC and PHG, 2009:3). The campaign also included awareness raising activities (follow-up) through visits at household level, in particularly for those families whose storage tanks had high levels of contamination.

The system of water treatment in the desalination plant is reported to be operational. Information from SKYPE meetings with the PHG in Gaza, however, indicated that the blending of treated water with water from two other wells results in a water quality that has somewhat improved compared to the pre-treatment phase, but is not perceived to be of sufficient drinking water quality by the beneficiaries, who therefore tend to use the water solely for domestic purposes (washing, sanitation, cooking, cleaning).

Since the establishment of Hamas government in Gaza, a transfer took place from the 'old office' under the PA administration and the 'new office' under Hamas administration. The Al-Bureij municipality council was replaced on 18 July 2007. Similarly, the community-based local water committee that was first established in 2006, was very fragile due to the internal conflict in June 2007. Therefore, a new local committee was established in 2007. These changes resulted in lack of communication, and tension, between the old and new institutions and severely hampered the functioning of the MSP.

Where	Whom	What	How	When
Nepal Jumla district Odi, Ghodasin, Thapagaun, Sheriduska communities	SNV, KIRDARC, RRRSDP, Household water and sanitation program, Local Water User Groups; District Development Committeee (DDC).	WASH: Rehabilitation and implementation of local water infrastructure	Reconstruction, implementation, capacity development and training	SNV is active in Jumla since 1986, water schemes were implemented in 2006-2010

MSP 9   Nepal – Jumla --- Governance of household water schemes in remote areas

Jumla is a remote and mountainous district in Nepal, signified by drought and cold winters. Although inhabited by high caste communities, people are poor. There is a strong sense of distrust of the government and a perception that the government is not interested in their remote communities (except for election time). NGOs have been active in the region since the early eighties. Their project implementation and visibility has left the communities with a positive image of development organisations. NGOs have worked independently of each other and of the government in Jumla, which has resulted in legitimacy for NGOs instead of the government. The legitimacy of state institutions was perceived to be different by those communities nearby the head quarters and those afar from the head quarters.

Various government and non-government organisations have implemented water and sanitation schemes in Jumla and the WASH sector is fragmented. Hence, there was a need for coordination of the various active stakeholders in the area. For this purpose, a sector coordination committee has been established. This MSP, called the Water Supply and Sanitation Coordination Committee (WSSCC), serves the coordination and collaboration of organisations within the WASH sector on district level. The Dutch NGO SNV has initiated the MSP. Ownership of this MSP lies with the District Development Committee. In this committee, which gathers several times per year, the participating organisations (Government, INGOs, NGOs and user groups) network, exchange knowledge and decide on coordination of development work.

The WSSCC was not known by people on community level. This district coordination platform has therefore not increased or decreased state legitimacy. On implementatio level it was experienced that the projects from the MSP members involving an NGO or the Government and a Water Users Group were more worthwhile. The process of capacity building and governance was thought to be more positive if an NGO initiated and capacitated the MSP. If the government initiated the MSP it was perceived to be qualitatively less good. Even in those cases where the government was proximate to the communities and had established successful water schemes, then, people did not attribute more state institutions. The past experiences with the state, the perceived distance of the state towards the people and their perceived sub-optimal institutional performance could not be overcome by good service delivery. Key to this perception is state proximity to citizens and communication about state activities.

Where	Whom	What	How	When
Nepal Kaski and Udhaypur Districts	Town Development Fund (TDF), Ministry of Physical Planning and Works (MPPW), Department of Drinking Water Supply and Sewerage (DWSS)UNICEF, Asian Development Bank, Local user groups and NGOs.	WASH: Increasing water supply and adequate sanitation facilities	Construction of water schemes based on public private partnership for cost sharing of the system and by capacity development of users.	2001-2008 (Phase I)

MSP 10   Nepal – Kaski and Udhaypur --- Privatization of water supply in small towns

The Small Town Drinking Water Supply Project has been initiated to address the fact that drinking water supplies are inadequate and sanitation facilities get challenged in terms of coverage, quantity and quality in emerging urban areas due to increasing rural urban migration to emerging towns. The Ministry of Physical Planning and Works (MPPW) is the executing agency of the MSP and the Department of Drinking Water Supply and Sewerage (DWSS) is the implementing agency. The MSP was designed based on the 15 years plan of the government for small town water supply and sanitation development. The first phase of the project was implemented in 29 towns of 12 districts with a loan from the Asian Development Bank from 2001-2008, though it was planned to be completed by 2006. Currently, the second phase of the project is implemented.

The project aim was to provide water supply and drainage and sanitation facilities following demand driven and interactive procedures to ensure participation of consumers and non-government

organizations (NGOs) in project design, preparation, implementation and maintenance. The project focuses on developing the institutional capacity of users' committees to make cash or in kind contributions to cover project costs and promote community water quality monitoring (ADB 2010).

The project implementation, then, was guided by the hypothesis that an emerging town provides economic opportunities for beneficiaries. Thus, investment by users was stated at fifty percent. This was the first Nepalese project implemented in the water sector with half of the investments made by users. The investment by the users was divided into three components: 15 percent contribution, 5 percent upfront cash contribution and 30 percent from Town Development Fund Loan (12-15 years) with 8 percent interest. This cost recovery plan of the project, however, was too ambitious. In one case the payment scheme has been successful (Lekhnat), whereas in another scheme (Trijuga) people are in debt (as they took loans for the scheme) and water supply is underperforming.

The state has been legitimized on national and international level as it was welcomed that the state would be able to cover service costs. Nonetheless, on local level people do not legitimize state institutions as they do not experience good performance (there is an absence of water) or a good process (there is exclusion and high costs for poor people). In the case where the project was successful, it was mainly due to the investment and input of powerful individuals in the community. Thus, whereas the aim was to involve all people in the community and have egalitarian measures to operate the system (equal financial input and user participation) the success was based on elitism and individual excellence. A second aspect of non-legitimisation is the historical background of the locations. In Trijuga, there are historically larger disparities between class, ethnicity and caste (resulting in a more conflict), whereas in Kaski, the social relations are less conflicting and the state institutions enjoyed more embedded legitimacy.

Where	Whom	What	How	When
Nepal Ramechhap district Final road is 14 kilometer from Manthali to Kurkot	District Road Support Programme, Swiss Development Cooperation, Government of Nepal, local rural road construction committees, District Development Committee, Local Development Office.	Rural Road construction: Increasing accessibility, mobility and economic growth using LEP: Labour based, Environmental friendly and Participatory methodology. DRSP aimed to develop communities and government institutions.	Implementing road construction project. Extensive monitoring and institutional capacity development of local organisations and government organisations.	1999-2006 (Phase I and II)

MSP 11 Nepal – Ramechhap --- The District Road Support Programme

The District Road Support Programme (DRSP) is a formal MSP, initiated by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), an international donor-organization, which particularly aims at improving the capacity of the government of Nepal. The MSP was arranged to work within the administrative structure of the government system and it involved local communities, societal actors and local bodies extensively.

In Ramechhap, fourteen kilometer of road was constructed to connect South (Terai) Nepal with Northern (Hill and Mountainous) tourist and trade routes. The road was manually constructed by local disadvantaged groups, to gain income and to learn skills. The construction was perceived to be

lengthy though beneficial to the communities. One such labor based, environmentally friendly and participatory road project takes 4 years. This is in contrast with the mainstream 'heavy machinery' projects that are completed within approximately one year, but without participatory methods and institutional capacity building.

The MSP realized its main objectives to a large extent (increasing access to resources and opportunities for the remote rural population). On the other hand, increasing the capacity of local state institutions still leaves room for improvement. The local government bodies that are not elected and the fluctuation of district government staff resulted in high staff turnover and therefore less stability. It is perceived that the openness of the process in terms of participation increased the capacity of various actors and their contributions to the project. However, the involvement of users and local committee members gave room for political interference and struggles over leadership which hampered the implementation. Political interference was experienced at the inception of the programme, when the user committees were formed.

DRSP is based on collaboration of the government and SDC. The entire MSP was organized within the government structure. The DDC, the main district state authority, was the main implementer and decision maker complemented with extensive involvement of civil society representatives and the beneficiaries. But even though the program focused extensively on government institutions, it was often referred to as SDC, or "the Swiss" project by the local people in the district. The case study shows that in the perception of people the DRSP MSP was mostly conceived as an international program, provided by "the Swiss". The capacity development of state institutions and the extensive work through government organizations, then, does not necessarily result in strong state legitimacy. People appreciated the MSP approach, process and the outcomes in terms of service delivery. However, the MSP (DRSP) did not represent the state to people.

Where	Whom	What	How	When
Nepal Rolpa district Final road is 108 km through three districts: Dang, Rukum, Rolpa	Unified Communist Party-Nepal (UCPN), Maoist. Involvement of citizens, civil society actors, NGO and media	Finalisation and new construction of strategic rural road. Creating legitimacy for the Maoist and development for people.	Mandatory recruitment for large movement of people (workers) for the road.	2002-2006

MSP 12   Nepal – Rolpa --- Constructing the 'Martyr road'

The "Sahid Marga", or the "Martyrs' road", was initiated by the Maoist party in 2003, during the conflict period in Nepal (1996-2006). This informal MSP represents an example of parallel service provision set up by a rebel groupsas a part of its rivalry with the state.

Rolpa is one of the poorest districts in Nepal. Road construction had already started in this area, but was unfinished and roads were not in condition for motorized vehicles. The Maoists, in their attempt to build the country through a revolutionary peoples' movement, started road construction in their stronghold in the Western region. A large number of people (it was mentioned that 8000 people worked each day) participated through mandatory labor provision and in kind. The Maoists wanted to create a 'pro-development' image and gain legitimacy for their movement. Only during the conflict period did the Maoist engage in building infrastructure like roads and bridges. During a relatively

short time-span, the Maoists were able to organize large numbers of people and gained many kilometers (90-100 km). The Maoist gave the name 'Sahid Marga', to the road which means: 'Martyr's road'. This was meant to honor those who died in the revolutionary war.

The road was built with mandatory 15-day contributions of labor and cash from each household in Rolpa and neighboring districts. The Maoists worked together with (and persuaded) institutions such as INGO's, local entrepreneurs and people from the media. The MSP was informal, but not without planning. The Maoists had a strong organization and effective methods to engage communities and to promote themselves. Even though not all collaboration was voluntarily and the labor was mandatory, this was not perceived negatively by all people. The accomplishment of the length of the road and the increase of confidence were perceived as positive.

Nevertheless, the process (mandatory labor, no direct benefits from the road and fear of the Maoists) led to distrust and a negative perception of the Maoist (MSP) governance. Thus, while parallel service provision by a rebel group is assumed to challenge legitimacy of the state, the accounts given by the people involved in this MSP indicate that this is not necessarily the case. This case-study shows that the degree of legitimacy for state institutions depends heavily upon the implementation approach chosen by the respective institution. People experienced previous road construction by the government before, which strengthened the idea that the state institutions work through better (voluntary) processes and that they are the main responsible institution for service provision. Thus, the Maoist parallel service delivery led to more legitimacy for the state, despite the room for improvement in state governance.

ANNEX II

CONTEXT PER UTILITY SERVICE SECTOR

Drinking water (and sanitation)

Drinking water and sanitation, or WASH, provision differs widely per country (as illustrated by figure II.1 below). Nevertheless, several issues specifically relevant for this sector manifested themselves for the majority of the countries studied. These concern, for example, the quality and quantity of the water provided. Water access is often irregular and unreliable; of bad quality; and with limited coverage as a result of old and insufficient hydrological infrastructures. Most other contexts are not as disheartening as the Congolese, but the following passage from the DR Congo country report illuminates several widespread WASH predicaments:

> Supply does not match demand as it is irregular, of bad quality and invoiced against high and discriminatory prices. Furthermore, installation investments to increase production are largely absent; management and accountability systems are too centralised; staff nomination is based on nepotism; legislation is non-contextualized and non-applied; corruption (and impunity) is widespread; and good working relationships between service institutions, state authorities and consumers are absent. Consequently, consumers apply all kinds of (often illegitimate) practices to access water or electricity, varying from theft of materials to tapping-off, sub-subscriptions and corruption-based arrangements made with service managers.

In many cases, moreover, also in situations of nascent privatization, (local) WASH sectors are monopolized and consumers can demand little from their providers due to a lack of alternatives. In the Palestinian Territories, however, privatization does seem to lead towards more complementation between government services (that usually provide cheaper water) and private sector providers (whose water and service tend to be more reliable) and thus more consumer agency. In most other cases, however, the idea of paying for water – a 'God-given' natural resource – is hardly embraced, which undermines both the functioning of services and the negotiating position of 'customers,' or, rather, beneficiaries.

DFID (2011:34) mentions that states have an overall responsibility for the provision of water and sanitation as an essential component of public health and as a human right. However, in practice, water and sanitation services are delivered by small-scale and sometimes large non-state service providers (mostly NGOs) and are self-supplied by the household. While ambitious national policies and ministerial departments are mostly in place, these find little compliance on the ground and local implementation structures are much more rare.

At the same time, the WASH sector has been a consistent donor priority, especially since the launch of the MDGs, also because of its potential to reduce mortality.[25] Water and sanitation have received one of the largest pieces of the development aid pie since 2001 and this has resulted in genuine improvements (OECD 2010).

	Burundi	**DR Congo**	**Nepal**	**The Palestinian Territories**
Access to improved water source	Total: 72% Rural: 71%	Total: 46% Rural: 28%	Total: 88% Rural: 87%	Total: 91% Rural: 91%

	Urban: 83%	Urban: 80%	Urban: 93%	Urban: 91%
Access to improved sanitation facilities	Total: 46% Rural: 46% Urban: 49%	Total: 23% Rural: 23% Urban: 23%	Total: 31% Rural: 27% Urban: 51%	Total: 89% Rural: 84% Urban: 91%
State institutions	National: Local: Communal Water Committees	National: REGIDESO (*Régie de Distribution d'Eau*); National Rural Hydrological Service (SNHR) Local: CEPEA, the Provincial Committee of the Action for Water and Sanitation	National: Department of Water Supply and Sewerages Local: Water User Committees	National: Joint Water Committee; Palestinian Water Authority (PWA), Ministry of Environmental Affairs (MEnA); (MoLG), Ministry of Health (MoH) Local: Municipal/Village Councils
Policies	National Water Policy	Under construction (and constitution)	National Policy on Rural Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation 2004 National Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Policy 2009	National Sector Strategy
Privatization	Hardly	Started in 2010	Increasing in urban contexts	Significant
Donor aid	Over the period 2003-08 aid to water and sanitation primarily targeted regions most in need of improved access to water and sanitation: Sub-Saharan Africa received 29% of total aid to the sector, and South and Central Asia 18%. Poorest countries classified as "low income" received 43% of total aid to the sector, two-thirds of which was in the form of grants. (OECD 2010)			

Figure II.1: Water and sanitation sector indicators (source: World Development Indicators)

Electricity

Electricity provision in South-Kivu is characterised by irregular delivery; instable voltage; unrepresentative billing and price discrepancies between regions; and materials that need to be acquired and paid by customers. Given these problems, consumers have very little confidence in the semi-state provision enterprise and many turn to alternatives, such as: theft of equipment; *dahulage*, the branching of small cables to the high voltage cables of paid subscribers; and alternative sources of energy. What is more, rural areas are not served with electricity at all, as there is no infrastructural outreach outside Bukavu.[26]

	DR Congo

Access to electricity	Total: 5% Rural: 0%
Electric power consumption	95 kWH per capita
State institutions	Regional: *Commauté de Pays de Grands Lacs* (SINELAC) National: SNEL (*Société Nationale de l'Electricité*), Division of Energy Local: None
Policies	None
Privatization	Started in 2010, but not followed up yet

Figure II.2: Electricity sector indicators for DR Congo (source World Bank)

Solid waste management

The importance of good solid waste management (SWM) has gained significant attention by the Palestinian government in recent years and a number of objectives have been achieved, such as the establishment of a number of regional sanitary landfills. Other achievements are the closure of uncontrolled and illegal dumps; the passage of a number of relevant laws; and improvement of solid waste infrastructure. At the same time, the SWM sector faced a range of obstacles.

One of the key problems in the sector is the collection of fees. A study on solid waste management in Nablus District revealed that 40-70% of the residents do not pay their annual SWM fees (Al Khatib et al 2010:1135) due to the economic situation. The National Strategy for Solid Waste Management in the Palestinian Territories for the 2010-2014 period outlines other major problems the sector is dealing with, including: ambiguity of legislation; incomplete implementation and inadequate enforcement mechanisms; a lack of standards for the design and operation of landfills and transfer stations; vagueness in terms of roles and responsibilities in the coordination stakeholders; lack of human, financial and organizational capacity at national and institutional levels, and to a lesser extent at the level of Joint Service Councils; the absence of a comprehensive system for authentication and analysis of data; insufficiency of monitoring and evaluation systems; limited participation of the (registered) private sector in SWM; and insufficient public awareness and weakness of participation mechanisms. (Summarized from: PNA 2010, National Strategy for Solid Waste management in the Palestinian Territory 2010-2014).

	The Palestinian Territories
Waste production	The solid waste produced is currently estimated at 78,644 tons per month. This encompasses three types of waste: - residential waste from households (70,597 tons/month); - waste from health care centres (1,202 tons/month); - and waste from industrial establishments (7,807 tons/month)
State institutions	National: Ministry of Local Government (MoLG); and Ministry of Environment Affairs (MoEA); Environmental Quality Authority (EQA) Local: regional solid waste councils and municipalities, joint service councils
Policies	Solid Waste Management Strategy (and Law No. 1, 1997 regarding Local Government; Environmental Law No. 7, 1999; Public Health Law 2004)
Privatization	Confined to waste transport processes, recycling operations and maintenance

Figure II.3: SWM sector indicators for the Palestinian Territories (source: World Development Indicators)

Road construction

The government of Nepal has been giving high priority to the development of roads since the beginning of planned development programmes in 1956. Road development further increased after the advent of democracy in the country in 1990s. The largest expansion was in the district and rural roads most of which were built with initiatives of local bodies (ADB 2007). In 2000, Nepal introduced construction of rural roads through community based organizations (CBOs). Since the 1950s, a steady increase in state investment in the roads sector has been observed.[27] Though there have been improvements in road infrastructures, accessibility remains a major constraint in rural areas and the road density in Nepal is still the lowest of the whole South Asia Region (MoF and ADB 2010). It is estimated that only 10% of the potential rural roads have been constructed. Nepal's road network is haphazard and the majority of roads is not appropriately engineered and inaccessible for vehicles.

	Nepal
Roads	Total: 17,282 km Paved: 10,142 km Unpaved: 7,140 km
State institutions	National: Department of Roads (DoR); Department of Local Infrastructure Development and Agricultural Roads (DoLIDAR) Local: District Development Committee
Policies	National Strategy for Rural Infrastructure Development (1997); Nepal Transport Policy (2002); Local Infrastructure Development Policy (2004); Agricultural and Local Level Roads Implementation Guidelines (2007); and Approach for the Development of Agricultural and Rural Roads (2007)
Privatization	Being developed

Figure II.4: Road construction sector indicators for Nepal (source: the CIA Factbook)

ANNEX III

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

Questions	Informant
A) ACCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF BASIC SERVICES: What is the quality and quantity of services consumed, and by whom? Are services delivered in an effective manner, responsive of needs and expectations? **FOCUS ON THE SERVICE STUDIED (e.g. WATER, ELECTRICITY, ROADS)** **Assure that the majority of your informants answer the questions for the service as arranged through the MSP studied (those informants must therefore be beneficiaries of the service delivered through the MSP). A small part of the informants will focus their answer on the service they get delivered regardless of the provider (more general).**	
1. (Quantity) How much of service x do you get? Does this match your needs?	- Citizen/service consumer
2. (Regularity) What is the frequency of your access to service x? If irregular, what are factors contributing to this?	
3. (Price) How much do you pay for service x on a monthly basis? Do you feel this amount is appropriate?	
4. (Policy) Are you aware of government policies on service x? Which ones? How were you informed?	
5. (State institutions) What is your impression regarding state institutions involved in delivering service x? Are they more or less capable in shaping the practices surrounding the delivery of service x then other actors (NGOs; CSOs; entrepreneurs; criminals; rebels) involved?	
6. (Arrangements) What are the main (contractual) mechanisms through which people acquire or arrange access to service X? Have you heard of alternative arrangements regulating people's access to service x?	
7. (Access) Do all groups of people have equal access? If not, who not and why? Do all households or villages in the respective region have equal access? If not, who not and why?	
8. (Responsibility) Who *is* end-responsible for good service delivery? Why? Who *should be* end-responsible?	- Citizen/service consumer
9. (Quality) In your opinion, what are the characteristics of a high quality service? Does this apply to service x delivered?	- Donor organisation - Service provider/MSP
10. (Problems) What sort of problems do you identify with the service? Who is, mainly, to blame for these problems?	- Policy maker
11. (Changes) Have you observed any recent changes in the delivery of service X? (in terms of quantity, quality, coverage or governance)	- Citizen/service consumer

	- Service provider/MSP - Policy maker
12. (Recommendations) What are some recommendations for improvement you would like to make regarding the effectiveness of service delivery? What can state institutions, specifically, do to further these improvements?	- Citizen/service consumer - Service provider/MSP - Policy maker

B) INTERACTION BETWEEN SERVICE AND CONTEXT: How does the socio-economical, political and security context impact services?
FOCUS ON THE GENERAL CONTEXT IN WHICH THE SERVICE THAT IS STUDIED FUNCTIONS

Questions	Informant
1. (Political and security context) How is the availability of service X influenced by the political context? And what about the security context?	- Citizen/service consumer - Donor organisation - MSP member - Policy maker **(all questions)**
2. (Local governance) Do local state institutions and representatives do a proper job? Do you trust them? Do you feel represented?	
3. (Recent changes) Have recent changes in the political and or socio-economic situation affected the access to and the quality of service X?	
4. (Impact of context) What political and/or socio-economic factor has had the most significant negative impact on the delivery of service X? And the most positive?	
5. (Main service provider) What institution(s)/organization(s)/individual(s) assure that service x is delivered? Is this done in an (in)formal collaboration with others? Whom? How do you describe the capacities of the actor(s) responsible for the delivery of service X?	
6. (Ideal service provider) What institution(s)/organization(s)/individual(s) should ideally assure that service x is delivered? How do you describe the capacities of the actor(s) you would like to take responsibility for the delivery of service X?	

C) ARRANGEMENTS AROUND SERVICES: What are the legal, political and quality arrangements between the service provider and the consumer?
FOCUS ON THE SERVICE STUDIED.
Once more, assure that the majority of your informants answer the questions for the service as arranged through the MSP studied (those informants must therefore be beneficiaries of the service delivered through the MSP). A small part of the informants will focus their answer on the service they get delivered regardless of the provider (more general).

Questions	- Informant
1. (Political cohesiveness services) Do state institutions act consistent regarding service delivery? Have you heard of differences in policy and practice concerning service x across regions or across governance levels (national; provincial; local)? If so, how do you perceive this?	- Donor organisation - Service provider/MSP - Policy maker
2. (Legal mechanism) What legal mechanisms are put in place to assure a good quality of service delivery and protect consumers?	

3. (Compliance) Do service providers comply with such legislation? Why (not)?	- Citizen/service consumer - Donor - Policy maker
4. (Claims) Have you heard of legal cases over poor service delivery? If so, who was accused by whom?	- Citizen/service consumer - Donor organisation - Service provider/MSP - Policy maker
5. (Repare) What happens when a breakdown or malfunctioning is observed? Who repairs it? Are these reparations done in a satisfactory manner? Why (not)?	- Citizen/service consumer - Donor organisation - Service provider/MSP
6. (Responsibility) Who takes responsibility for malfunctioning of services? How?	
7. (Funding) How is the service being paid for? What financial and fiscal arrangements are put in place to raise funds that can be used for service delivery? Do you pay for such arrangements (taxes/fees)? Why (not)? Is all money raised invested in service delivery? Why (not)?	- Donor organisation - Service provider/MSP - Policy maker
8. (Capacity building) Has any sort of capacity building in the service delivery sector take place? What, by whom? With which results?	
9. (Public actions) What type of (public) actions have led to (public/state) policy changes? By whom, how many?	- Citizen/service consumer - Donor organisation - Service provider/MSP - Policy maker
10. (Communication) What tools and mechanisms exist to communicate and coordinate with users of service x and with providers?	
11. (Impact policy changes) Have the policy changes led to changes in the actual functioning of services? Which, how many?	
12. (Impact on state institutions) Has the MSP influenced the investments, planning and priorities of the state institution(s) involved? If so, how? For example: In terms of financial, material and human resources devoted to the specific service delivery?	

D) MSP ON SERVICE DELIVERY: Who and how are people/institutes that are involved in service delivery via the MSP? What are the key objectives or driving factors? **FOCUS ON THE MSP STUDIED**

Questions	Informant
1. (Initiation) How was the MSP process initiated? When? And by whom?	- MSP members **(all questions)**
2. (Goals) With what goal was the MSP initiated? What is the current main objective of the MSP? If the objectives have changed, how and why has this happened?	

3.	(Decision making) Who (what individual, organization or institution) determines the direction (goals, agenda, strategies) of the MSP? How? Why? Has this changed over the years? If so, how and why? How do you perceive the role of the state institutions involved in the MSP regarding decision making and agenda setting?	
4.	(Consensus) Will a decision be based on consensus? Why (not)? Does this mean unanimity?	
5.	(Scope) At what geographical/administrative level does the process operate? Why was the choice for this level made?	
6.	(Functioning) How many times do the MSP participants approximately meet (per week/month/year)? What have been the most important concrete achievements of the MSP since its initiation?	
7.	(Conflict management) Are there any agreements on how to deal with potential conflict that may arise between the MSP members?	
8.	(Leadership) Who facilitates the MSP? What is the exact role of a facilitating body? Is this a formalized function?	
9.	(Motivation) Why do you/does your organisation participate in the MSP? What do you hope to achieve through participating? Have your motivations changed since the initiation of the MSP? If so, how and why?	
10.	(Role) What is your role and what are your responsibilities within the MSP? How and by whom has this been assigned to you? Has this role changed over the years? If so, how and why?	
11.	(Input) What is according to you the most important resource or capacity you bring in to this process? Why this/these?	
12.	(Inclusion) Is the group open in case the need arises for other stakeholders to be involved? Has such expansion of the MSP occurred? Are there any relevant stakeholders left out?	
13.	(Obstacles) Are there any factors limiting you to get fully engaged in the process or the activities of the MSP?	
14.	(State participation) Which relevant state institutes take part in or are associated with the MSP? How? Why do you think they participate? How do you appreciate the role they play? Does their involvement mean that the MSP is part of or connected to decision-making processes of state-institutions? If so, which processes or institutions?	
15.	(Openness) What type of information about the process is documented (e.g. budgets, objectives, plans, strategies)? Is it accessible to all actors? Is it externally accessible?	
16.	(Capacity building) How does the MSP contribute to capacity building of its members? How are these capacities of use for service delivery? Is the capacity of state institutions involved increased?	
17.	(Funding) How are the activities of this MSP funded? And by whom; for which activities; and to what extent?	
18.	(Donor involvement) How do you appreciate donor involvement in the MSP? What impact does donor involvement have on service delivery external to the MSP that is arranged for by the state? What preconditions must be taken into account by external donors when	

funding service delivery? Why?	
19. (Achievement objectives) Which specific activities of the MSP have contributed most to the achievement of its overall objectives? What other (unexpected) results are achieved by the MSP?	

E) LEGITIMACY OF STATE INSTITUTIONS: How do the outcomes of MSP service delivery have an influence on legitimacy of state institutions?
FOCUS ON THE MSP STUDIED LINKED TO THE SERVICE THEY DELIVER

Questions	Informant
1. (Service improvement) Do you think that the access to and the quantity and quality of the service has improved because of the work of the organisations active in the MSP? What elements of delivery have improved (e.g. quantity, quality, coverage, access, governance)?	- Citizen/service consumer - Donor organisation - MSP member - Policy maker **(all questions)**
2. (Main benefactors) What actors internal or external to the MSP do you feel have done most to create these improvements in service provision?	
3. (Role state institutions) Do you see any changes in the role government institutions have played with regard to service delivery? If so, what changes? Why do you think these changes have occurred? Can you specify this for state institutions that are internal and external to the MSP?	
4. (Perception state institutions) *A)* Have the changes in the role government institutions played with regard to the access to and the quantity and quality of services given you a more positive or a more negative image of these government institutions? *B)* If state institutions were participating in the MSP, has their participation within the MSP given you a more positive or a more negative image of these government institutions?	
5. (Effective state service delivery) Do you feel the involved state institutions have been able to improve their capacity to effectively organize services of a satisfactory level? If so, in what way? If not, what would be priority areas for capacity improvement?	
6. (Standards) Do you feel service delivery has become more in line with international standards? Why? In what respect?	
7. (International factors) Do you feel that state institutions involved in the delivery of service x make good use of international resources, channels and networks to improve service delivery? How do you perceive the international organisations these state institutions cooperate with and the international networks they take part in?	

DONOR FUNDING OF SERVICES: What are the influences and impact of the funding policy and mandate of the donors involved in the MSP?

Questions
1. Motivation: Why do you fund this MSP? Explanation: Based on what criteria have you selected this MSP for funding?
2. Approval: From which local institutions does your organisation needs authorization to fund projects?
3. Development mission: What is you organisation's development mission in this country? For example: Is your funding policy based on development or humanitarian considerations?
4. Project mandate: What is your organisation's mandate for the MSP? For example: Do you facilitate the MSP and the project or do you merely fund it? Do you consider yourself a donor or a more comprehensive stakeholder?
5. Sustainability: What are your organisation's considerations regarding the sustainability of the MSP? For example: What do you do to protect the MSP project in terms of ensuring maintainability? How does your organisation contribute to or aim to overcome donor dependency dynamics? How is this reflected in your spending record?