Would that the one-liner “It is not possible to dip into the same sauce twice” had come from Heraclitus, or that Nietzsche had titled his famous book *Thus Ate Zarathustra*. And what if we could turn to Kant’s *Critique of Culinary Reason*? Or Heidegger’s “The Food feeds”? Alas, Western philosophers and food are not at all congruent. Heraclitus said, “It is not possible to step into the same river twice”; Nietzsche’s book is, of course, titled *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*; Kant wrote *Critique of Pure Reason*; and Heidegger stated in *What Is Metaphysics*? that “The Nothing nothings.” It would seem that philosophers do not eat food and think about it only in a Rodin-statue-sort-of-way—melancholically. In fact, according to Galen’s theory of the four humors, philosophers are said to be dominated by black bile and are therefore cold and dry (indeed, *melancholerus*). However, as living beings they are torn between being creatures who need and might perhaps even enjoy food and being philosophers who officially deny food’s significance.

Several times in the history of Western philosophy this lack of comprehension might have been redressed, but again and again the disdain for food that had accompanied Western thought from the outset won out. My aim here is to make good on all that, to discuss some of the instances in which food surfaces in philosophical discourse, and to predict a brighter future for philosophy and food.

Food was alienated from philosophy almost right at the beginning of the discipline. As Plato documented in his famous dialogue, *Symposium*, Socrates participated in many symposia (literally, communal gatherings for drinking). One of Socrates’s seminal arguments on Eros or love in the *Symposium* begins with this promising sentence: “Socrates took his place on the couch, and supped with the rest; and then libations were offered, and after a hymn had been sung to the god, and there had been the usual ceremonies, they were about to commence drinking…” However, as the men talk further, their discussion explores instead the necessity of emancipating the soul from the body, of disconnecting it. Here, the philosopher’s failure to comprehend food appears for the first time: while drinking, Socrates denies that drinking (and eating) have any relevance. He proposes a view of life focused on “absolute beauty,” one that would move beyond “gold and garments, and fair boys and youths”:

and you and many a one would be content to live seeing them only and conversing with them without meat or drink, if that were possible—you only want to look at them and to be with them. But what if man had eyes to see the true beauty—the divine beauty, I mean, pure and dear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality and all the colours and vanities of human life—thither looking, and holding converse with the true beauty simple and divine?³

In the *Phaedo* Plato records a striking conversation:

Socrates: Do you think that the philosopher ought to care about the pleasures—if they are to be called pleasures—of eating and drinking?

Certainly not, answered Simmias.

And what do you say of the pleasures of love—should he care about them?

By no means.

And will he think much of the other ways of indulging the body—for example, the acquisition of costly raiment, or sandals, or other adornments of the body? […] What do you say?

I should say the true philosopher would despise them.

Would you not say that he is entirely concerned with the soul and not with the body?

He would like, as far as he can, to be quit of the body and turn to the soul….⁴

Many people regard Socrates and Plato as marking the birth of philosophy. But it seems as if this birth could take place only by denying food its due in making life enjoyable for both body and mind.
Had the Judaic tradition been followed, the history of Western philosophy might have turned out differently. In this second source of what later came to be called “Western civilization,” broad-minded reflections on food and its anthropological meaning are abundant. The Bible admonishes readers that some things are not to be eaten: “These are the creatures you may eat, of all the larger land animals you may eat any hoofed animal which has cloven hoofs and also chews the cud; those which only have cloven hoofs or only chew the cud you must not eat” (Lev. 11:1–4). Or, in another passage: “You must not eat any abominable thing...You may eat any hoofed animal that has cloven hoofs and also chews the cud; those that only chew the cud or only have cloven hoofs you must not eat” (Deut. 14:3–7). Apparently, within the Judaic tradition there was no sharp split between the material and the spiritual.

As for Christian theology, the relation between food and philosophy could have been developed differently from Platonic dualism. Compared to the rather austere Socratic and Platonic picture of eating and cooking, Christ’s message at the Last Supper seems almost cheerful: “Take and eat, this is my body” (Matt. 26:26; also Luke 22:19–20, Mark 14:22–24, and Cor. 11:23–27). Moreover, Christ stresses that there are no food taboos: “No one is defiled by what goes...
into his mouth; only by what comes out of it... Do you not see that whatever goes in by the mouth passes into the stomach and so is discharged at a certain place? But what comes out of the mouth has its origins in the heart; and that is what defines a person” (Matt. 15:11–17). Unfortunately, the interpretation of these texts and the concept of supper as an event of the utmost importance for human beings grew ever more neglected, and the Platonic heritage in the subsequent history of Christian theology and philosophy took dominance from the early Middle Ages on.

When more than a thousand years later Erasmus’s balanced and tolerant voice was heard, the course of Western philosophy of food might again have taken a different turn. In his famous *Praise of Folly (Stultitiae laus*, 1520) Erasmus proposes “the mad table.” In contrast to Plato’s diatribes against the body and sobriety in the *Symposium*, Erasmus argues that feasts can be enjoyed only when accompanied by much merriment. What is the point of a meal if the ear and eye, the whole mind and body, do not enjoy laughter and jokes? It may be that philosophers are wise men, but, exhausted by their sedentary life and burdened by their cold, thin blood, they show that theirs are not fun-loving and vital minds. According to Erasmus, philosophers spoil the joys of feasting and living. In his words one can recognize the longevity of Galen’s theory of the four humors, each of which was linked to a specific type of person and what he or she should eat.

However, during the seventeenth century the history of the philosophy of food took another course, as philosophers decided they were not welcome to participate at the mad table of life. Instead, they found other, apparently more important, things to do.

The Philosopher’s Conundrum: Is Taste Subjective or Moral?

In modern times, from approximately 1600 on, the exclusive orientation on the mind, its liberation from the body, and the consequent denigration of the body and of physical enjoyment lost their primacy. However, food and agriculture were still not seen as philosophically relevant issues, although a new emphasis on knowing about and conquering nature became important. It was at this point that society began to focus on discovering, investigating, and conquering nature and producing durable things like houses, machines, and bridges. By contrast, philosophers remained, as they always are, interested in nature’s intrinsic condition apart from human intervention. They further contemplated how from one state of things other things can be made, and how to make something from another thing—not, in other words, how to turn something into nothing, or how from something nothing can be made, as apparently happens in eating. The (mere) maintenance of plants, animals, and human beings does not engender something new but only perpetuates existing conditions. Agriculture and food production result in foodstuffs that disappear after dinner and are therefore seen as less interesting realms of investigation. Moreover, even Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s respected countermovement to Western seventeenth-century rationalism proved not to be especially helpful. The respect for untamed nature for its own sake, without seeking to conquer or dominate it, meant that domesticated nature and activities such as farming were once again neglected.

From the seventeenth century on, the rationalist stressed the primary senses of vision and hearing, a view that relegates the senses of smell, taste, and touch to secondary status. By contrast, properties that can be expressed in mathematical terms—size, weight, speed—or be visualized are classified among the positive, primary characteristics of objects. Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) was one of the first to deny all credibility to the organs of taste, the nose and the mouth. In *De motu* he claims:

As soon as I form a conception of a material or corporeal substance, I simultaneously feel the necessity of conceiving that it has boundaries or some shape or other; that relative to others it is great or small; that it is in this or that place, in this or that time; that it is in motion or rest; that it touches, or does not touch, another body; that it is unique, rare, or common; nor can I by any act of imagination disjoin it from these qualities. But I do not find myself absolutely compelled to apprehend it as necessarily accompanied by such conditions as that it must be white or red, bitter or sweet, sonorous or silent, smelling sweetly or disagreeably; and if the sense had not pointed out these qualities, language and imagination alone would never have arrived at them. Therefore I think that these tastes, smell, colours, etc. with regard to these objects in which they appear to reside are nothing more than mere names. They exist only in the sensitive body... I do not believe that there exists anything in external bodies for exciting tastes, smells, and sounds etc. except size, shape, quantity, and motion. 

While he may have considered taste, smell, and color as mere words, the fact is that Galileo, the ordinary human being, enjoyed good food. He sent his daughters all kinds of delicacies, in particular small birds, a dainty that despite the protests of bird lovers is still appreciated by Italians today. His daughter Maria Celeste wrote to him from her convent in Siena, telling the following charming story of the four...
stolen thrushes, which shows the care that Galileo and his family members devoted to food and meals:

Inside (the basket) were twelve thrushes: the additional four, which would have completed the number you state in your letter, Sire, must have been liberated by some charming little kitten who thought of tasting them ahead of us, because they were not there, and the cloth cover had a large hole in it. How fortunate that the gray partridges and woodcocks were at the bottom, one of which and two thrushes I gave to the sick girl, to her great joy, and she thanks you, Sire. I sent another gift, also in the form of two thrushes, to Signor Rondinelli, and the remainder we enjoyed with our friends.³

Galileo’s behavior shows again the philosophers’ typical lack of comprehension: theoretically, taste is of no consequence to him, but in daily life it is of the utmost importance. Its right to existence might be called into doubt when thinking in a reflective way, but for the quality of life, taste demands a rightful place among the senses.

Indeed, as the exception that proves the rule, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) in La Nouvelle Héloïse shows, in detail, how individual European nations—France, Italy, and Germany—came into being on the basis of culturally determined eating habits. He pursues this idea in the Confessions by speculating about the possibility of improving the character of people in a moral sense through the use of specially selected foods. Because of his miserable youth and his obsession with the mother figure and women’s breasts (throughout his entire life, Rousseau looked for an older woman who would cherish and admire him and be a mother to him), Rousseau claimed that eating milk and dairy products would provide the nutrients necessary to produce a high moral character. However, in the end, even for him, the ideal is untamed nature, not the nature of farmers and domesticated plants and animals, which means that food production is held in low esteem.⁹

As to the rest of nature, philosophy is not interested: a great silence descends on agriculture and food. In other cultural fields, such as painting and poetry, much attention was given at this time to the countryside and its products.¹⁰ Well-known seventeenth-century painters such as Jacob van Ruisdael, Joachim Beuckelaer, Jan Davidsz. de Heem, and Carla Peeters produced beautiful paintings in the Virgilian tradition of glorifying peasant life, the countryside, and its products. Yet in philosophy we find this theme only in the United States, far from Europe. In 1781 Thomas Jefferson wrote: “Those who labour in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever he had a chosen people, whose breasts he has made his peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue. It is the focus in which he keeps alive that sacred fire, which otherwise might escape from the face of the earth.” His conclusion is surprising, if one thinks of the modern American dream: “Cultivators of the earth are the most virtuous and independent citizens.”¹¹

With Karl Marx (1818–1883) in the nineteenth century, a philosophical current gained momentum that took an even more ambivalent position toward agriculture and food products. Marx turns against agriculture in every possible way: he contrasts its narrow-mindedness, slave labor, and low productivity with industrial production. He regards farmers as a “bag of potatoes” that is nearly impossible to motivate politically. If farmers are politically active at all, they support the conservative forces, thanks to their attachment to a small plot of land. Labor, the collective transformation of nature, and the “metabolism between people and nature” are such central ideas to Marx that he portrays the intensive, caring process of tilting the land—a primary characteristic of agriculture—as a primitive and transitory phase of man’s development.

Like Rousseau, Marx was capable of writing very idyllic passages, especially in his early works, about the simple pre-agrarian joys of “fishing in the morning, hunting in the afternoon, and being a critic at night.”¹¹ Even though these visions of enjoying nature largely disappeared in his later work, they nonetheless contributed to the general neglect—contempt even—of the processing of nature that is characteristic of agriculture and food production.

In the nineteenth century, it was Friedrich Nietzsche who elaborated on the moral effect of food intake. Nietzsche focused especially on the possible weakening or strengthening effect of food on the strong individual who acts independently. For that reason, he was critical of vegetarianism, which he considered “nonsense” and claimed led to addiction:

But vegetarianism also has subtler effects that include ways of thinking and feelings that have narcotic effects. This agrees with the fact that those who promote narcotic ways of thinking and feeling, like some Indian gurus, praise a diet that is entirely vegetarian and would like to impose that as a law upon the masses. In this way they want to create and increase the need that they are in a position to satisfy.¹⁴

According to Nietzsche, a diet consisting only of fruits and vegetables weakens an individual’s independence. The same dangerous effect results from rice, which leads to opium addiction, and potatoes, which lead to alcohol addiction.

As with Marx, we encounter in Nietzsche the idea of an undefiled nature that offers us of its own accord the tasty
food that humans need. In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche describes domesticated, agricultural nature in the negative light of alienation and subjugation:

Under the magic of the Dionysian, not only does the bond between man and man lock itself in place once more, but also nature itself, no matter how alienated, hostile, or subjugated, rejoices again in her festival of reconciliation with her prodigal son, man. The earth freely offers up her gifts, and the beasts of prey from the rocks and the desert approach in peace. The wagon of Dionysus is covered with flowers and wreaths. Under his yoke stride panthers and tigers…. Just as the animals speak and the earth gives milk and honey, so now something supernatural echoes out of him. He feels himself a god. He now moves in a lofty ecstasy, as he saw the gods move in his dream. The man is no longer an artist. He has become a work of art. The artistic power of all of nature, the rhapsodic satisfaction of the primordial unity, reveals itself here in the intoxicated performance.\(^1\)

In the opposite camp, John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), the founder of utilitarianism, viewed opinions about taste as personal, with relevance in the private domain but devoid of any social meaning. Mill argues in On Liberty that only when the public order suffers from bad habits of eating or drinking (as in the case of a drunken police officer) does the government need to take action;\(^16\) for the rest, eating habits must be left to personal choice. The implication is that food has no inherent quality that challenges philosophical reflection; food belongs to the necessities of life and functions as a kind of survival mechanism. Food is fuel for the body and nothing more.

In the twentieth century the tradition of viewing food merely as one of the necessities for human survival continued. In a famous chapter on intrinsic needs in Political Argument (1965), Brian Barry uses food as an example to argue that these needs are always elliptical because they are for some aim. “Men need food,” which, according to Barry, can be formalized in “AxY,” which means “A needs x in order to do Y.”\(^17\) In the subsequent philosophical discussion of this statement he says a great deal about functional needs, but nowhere is there a statement that food is necessary for anything more than the maintenance of life—that it might, in fact, stand for quality of life.

Kantian Ambivalence: Food between Nature and Reason

As this brief review has shown, the most important philosophical reflections of modern times ignore the aesthetic, cultural, and social aspects of eating. Although few philosophers contradict the famous saying about the senses used in eating (“taste” with a lowercase t): De gustibus non est disputandum (“taste cannot be disputed”), they ignore the food itself. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), however, represents an ambivalent position, from which it is possible to rehabilitate philosophy’s attitude toward food. On the one hand, Kant’s theory of taste preferences with regard to food arises from the purely subjective: “Preferences and distaste of food are not comprised by our capacities to know the object and cannot be attributed to external objects.” While, according to Kant, opinions about beauty can be universalized and have general validity in regard to others (“taste” with a capital T), this is not the case with food. In his Critique of Judgement he writes:

As regards the agreeable, every one concedes that his judgement, which he bases on a private feeling, and in which he declares that an object pleases him, is restricted merely to himself personally. Thus he does not take it amiss if, when he says that Canary-wine is agreeable, another corrects the expression and reminds him that he ought to say: “It is agreeable to me.”…To quarrel over such points with the idea of condemning another’s judgement as incorrect when it differs from our own, as if the opposition between the two judgements were logical, would be folly. With the agreeable, therefore, the axiom holds good: Every one has his own taste (that of sense). The beautiful stands on quite a different footing.\(^18\)

However, there is another Kant, one who casts eating and drinking in a different light and therefore avoids the philosopher’s failure to comprehend food. This Kant strongly advocates for an undeniable sovereignty in food choice and makes it clear that this choice is intrinsically connected with individual autonomy. As one should think for oneself in theoretical matters, and in moral issues not make oneself dependent on preachers, so it is with eating: one should not obey physicians who prescribe diets. Autonomy for Kant does not mean, as it did for Plato and Socrates, that the mind should be liberated from the body. Rather, reason makes the body human and thus able to exercise its own choices about food. Kant writes:

Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why such a large part of humanity, even long after nature has liberated it from foreign control (naturaliter maiorennes), is still happy to remain infantile during its entire life, making it so easy for others to act as its keeper. It is so easy to be infantile. If I have a book that is wisdom for me, a therapist or preacher who serves as my conscience, a doctor who prescribes my diet, then I do not need to worry about these myself. I do not need to think, as long as I am willing to pay.\(^19\)
Because consumption choices fall under the aegis of individual autonomy, consumers should determine their own food (diet). Simply paying for your food, without exercising your own autonomy, is a sign of infantilism, or, as is said in German, “having no say over your mouth.” Autonomy is taking responsibility not only for what comes out of your mouth but also of what goes into it.

Kant’s most suggestive comments on food are found in his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1790). In general, he places humans between Nature and Reason. Man’s capacities derive neither from Nature nor Reason alone but from the two together, where Nature stands for the passions and sensual experience, and Reason stands for transcending Nature by using the faculty of reasoning to know, will, and appreciate (judge). For instance, to enjoy art and food socially means to transcend Nature—to judge something that is given and structured according to the standards of judgment that are shared among rational beings.

The main thrust of Kant’s text is to emphasize what human beings can make of their nature; it is not about what Nature has made them. Human beings must embrace the drive toward maturity, must stand on their own two feet, even if they hesitate and stumble in the process. Taste plays a special role here. It has, according to Kant, the extraordinary ability to stimulate solidarity through enjoyment.

Feuerbach’s Supper

With Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872) we finally arrive at a genuine appreciation of food. Feuerbach’s insights were, unfortunately, distorted and overshadowed by Marx in his rather cavalierly written *Theses on Feuerbach* (1848). Contrary to Nietzsche, Feuerbach reassesses the corporal aspect and the enjoyment of the common meal in his discussion—or, better put, his critical evaluation—of Christianity and other religions. Feuerbach shows greater appreciation for culture, nutrition, and agriculture than did Marx, who appropriated his thought. Although he criticized the way in which religions project human imperfections on
the divine, Feuerbach identifies eating as fundamental to religions, especially Christianity:

Eating and drinking are the mystery of the Last Supper. Eating and drinking as such are indeed a religious act, or should be such at any rate… But enjoyment of life also includes the enjoyment of food and drink. If life is indeed sacred, then eating and drinking must also be sacred. Is this the confession of an irreligious person? This irreligion, however, is the analyzed, explicated, honestly expressed secret of religion itself. All secrets of religion culminate in the secret of eternal salvation. But eternal salvation is only the salvation that is stripped of the real boundaries.20

Feuerbach’s and Kant’s positions remain the exception, however. Most philosophical reflections neglect the social enjoyment of eating.

Further Implications

Some would ask, what about Michel Foucault (1926–1984)? Didn’t he focus on biopolitics in his later work? Indeed, by biopolitics Foucault meant the fact that issues concerning the body and human life are more and more often objects of political intervention. In particular, he posits in The Will to Knowledge that issues of procreation, health, age, and life expectancy should be regulated. “For ages, the human being remained the being he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the capacity to live a political existence; the modern human being is an animal of which politics takes its living existence.”21 Once the human body becomes an object of political power, it should be trained and adapted to large organizations; human life is no longer a precondition for political life but is itself politicized. However, food plays no role in Foucault’s often-cynical commentary on Western society. Even though it is food that maintains the human body and in one way or another determines that body’s health and quality, Foucault pays no attention to the politics of food, the most basic biopolitics for humankind.

Let me offer one last example of the difficulties philosophers encounter in thinking in a reasonable way about food. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), by no means a philosopher who despised practice, never took food seriously. His biographer relates how Wittgenstein survived his last years: “While at Rosro [Ireland] he lived almost entirely on tinned food ordered from a grocer’s shop in Galway. Tommy [his housekeeper] was concerned about this diet. ‘Tinned food will be the death of you’, he once said. ‘People live too long anyway’, came the grim reply.”22

So, in the end, we are left without a bellyful of books on the philosophy of food. This is a strange state of affairs, because even as the hottest ethical debates now concern the plate, we have never been so far from maturity with respect to what we put into our mouths. (Conversely, based on Kant’s What Is Enlightenment?, our maturity with respect to what comes out of our mouths—our freedom of speech—has never been so great.) The philosophers’ failure to comprehend food has contributed mightily to this immaturity, which finds its purest expression in the saying “Food is fuel.” Westerners are largely satisfied to be connected with food either through their wallets or their bathroom scales. Most Europeans and Americans consume processed foods. We measure our money and our time and value cheapness and convenience over quality. We will eat anything if its plant and animal origins are disguised, if it is colorful and uniform in shape, or is in the form of pills;23 we despise vegetables with delinquent shapes. The result is that the majority of people in the West are both overfed and badly fed. The idea of food solely as fuel in affluent societies produces soaring rates of obesity and cardiovascular disease. It is a metaphor that gives the illusion of knowing what we put into our mouths, but in fact we have no idea. Herein lies the gap between consumers and producers, and somewhere, in the furthest depths of this gap, live philosophers.

As this brief overview has shown, from the birth of their discipline philosophers have tried to discredit food, to neglect it. Nevertheless, food repeatedly pops up, because even philosophers must eat.

Over the last ten years some interesting publications on the philosophy and ethics of eating have appeared, which finally, after 2,500 years of argument and analysis, tackle the big issues: food and everything that happens before it appears on the plate. I am thinking of books like Elizabeth Tefler’s Food for Thought: Philosophy and Food (1996), Carolyn Korsmeyer’s Making Sense of Taste: Food and philosophy (2002), my Before Dinner: Philosophy and Ethics of Food (2004), Peter Singer and Jim Mason’s The Way We Eat: Why Our Food Choices Matter (2006), and, in particular, Michael Pollan’s The Omnivore’s Dilemma: A Natural History of Four Meals (2006).

It could be that this new attention to the ethics of food, concerned as it is with all that happens before dinner—the treatment of animals, environmental damage, unfair trade, the destruction of landscapes—will change the philosophers’ historical neglect. Only then will we witness the birth of a mature philosophy emerging from the attention to good food and, as a result, overcome our immaturity about what we put into our mouths.
NOTES


4. Plato, “Phaedon,” in ibid., 64d.

5. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for Gastronomica and to Professor Athalya Brenner of the University of Amsterdam for their help in enlightening me on the profound meaning of food in Jewish religion and culture. See also John Cooper, Eat and Be Satisfied: A Social History of Jewish Food (Northvale, N.J.: Jason Aronson, 1993).


21. Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978), 139.
